Frontier Governance In Imperial China: Strategies and Measures [1 ed.] 1433179741, 9781433179747

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FRONTIER GOVERNANCE IN IMPERIAL CHINA Strategies and Measures

Fang Tie Translated by Qian Chuijun

The southwestern borderland in imperial China covers the area encompassing present-day Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou, southwestern Sichuan, and the northern part of the Indochina Peninsula, once under the Central Plains dynasty’s rule. For more than two millennia, China exercised varying degrees of political and military control over this region. The book traces the history of the dynamic and delicate relationship between the imperial court and the southwestern borderland throughout the Han, Jin, Southern, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, and examines how the Nanyue, ShuHan, Nanzhao, and Dali regimes governed the region. The author’s close analysis of both the governance strategy and its implementation sheds critical lights on how this important relationship was sustained for such a long period of time.

Fang Tie, Professor and Doctoral Student Supervisor at the Center for Ethnic Groups of the Southwest Borderlands at Yunnan University, specializes in borderlands history, ethnic history, and historical geography. He is Former Director of the Center for Ethnic Groups of the Southwest Borderlands, a Ministry of Education-designated Humanities and Social Sciences Key Research Base. Fang currently serves on the expert panel of the Academic Planning Evaluation Group at the National Social Science Fund; as Vice President of the Chinese Society for Historians of China’s Foreign Relations; Vice President of the Society of Yunnan Nationalities; Council Member of the Chinese Association for Ethnic History, the Chinese Society for Mongolian History, and the Chinese Society for Yuan History; and as Executive Director of the Chinese Society for Southwestern Ethnic Groups. Fang has published more than 140 journal articles, many of which have been reprinted by Xinhua Digest and China University Academic Abstracts. His books include A General History of Southwest China, History of Borderland Development in Southwest China, Exploration of Borderland Ethnic History, and New Explorations in Borderland Ethnic History. Fang is the recipient of a number of outstanding achievement awards from the Ministry of Education and the Yunnan Provincial Government.

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Frontier Governance in Imperial China

Fang Tie

Frontier Governance in Imperial China Strategies and Measures Translated by Qian Chuijun

PETER LANG Lausanne • Berlin • Brussels • Chennai • New York • Oxford

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Fang, Tie, author. Title: Frontier Governance in Imperial China: Strategies and Measures Other titles:Strategies and Measures Description: New York : Peter Lang, [2023] | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2023017975 (print) | LCCN 2023017976 (ebook) | ISBN 9781433179747 (hardback) | ISBN 9781433179730 (ebook) | ISBN 9781433179754 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: China, Southwest–Politics and government | China, Southwest–Boundaries–History. Classification: LCC DS793.S6445 F37 2023 (print) | LCC DS793.S6445 (ebook) | DDC 951/.3–dc23/eng/20230511 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023017975 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023017976 DOI 10.3726/b16797

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Cover design by Peter Lang Group AG ISBN 9781433179747 (hardback) ISBN 9781433179730 (ebook) ISBN 9781433179754 (epub) DOI 10.3726/b16797 This edition is an authorized translation from the Chinese language edition Published by arrangement with Social Sciences Academic Press (China) All rights reserved Supported by a Grant from the Yunnan University Double First-Class Initiative © 2023 Peter Lang Group AG, Lausanne Published by Peter Lang Publishing Inc., New York, USA [email protected] - www.peterl​ang.com All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilization outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed.

Contents

Chapter One Review and Outlook 1 1. Studies of China’s Southwest Borderland: A Historical Overview������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 2. Research Methodology and Definition of Concepts���������������� 17 3. Carrying Out Research on Borderland Governance History�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 37 4. Emphasis on the Theoretical Reflection on Borderland History��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������50 5. Deepening the Research on the Tusi System���������������������������� 59 6. Carrying Out Research on China’s Borderland Studies���������� 78 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������90 Chapter Two Borderland Governance Theories and Practices of the Central Plains Dynasty 93 1. The Borderland Governance Theories of China’s Imperial History�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 93 2. Practice of Border Management in China’s Imperial History������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 118

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3. The Evolution of Border Governance Theories and Practice in China’s Imperial History���������������������������������������� 151 4. The Main Content of Border Governance Theories in China’s Imperial History������������������������������������������������������������ 171 5. The Cultural Soft Power of the China’s Imperial History in Governing the Borderland���������������������������������������������������� 193 6. The Main Experience of Border Governance in the China’s Imperial History������������������������������������������������������������ 226 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 252 Chapter Three Strategies of the Central Plains Dynasty for Managing the Southwestern Borderland 261 1. Development of the Southwestern Borderland in the Qin and Han Dynasties �������������������������������������������������������������������� 261 2. Management of Ningzhou in the Jin Dynasty and Southern Dynasty ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 280 3. The Strategy of the Sui and Tang Dynasties for Managing the Southwest Borderland���������������������������������������������������������� 295 4. The Strategy of “Prioritizing Internal Risks over Borderland Affairs” in the Song Dynasty ������������������������������ 312 5. Strategies of the Yuan Dynasty for Governing the Southwestern Borderland���������������������������������������������������������� 327 6. Strategy of the Ming Dynasty for Governing the Southwestern Borderland Regions ������������������������������������������ 341 7. The Strategy of the Qing Dynasty for Managing the Southwestern Borderland���������������������������������������������������������� 358 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 373 Chapter Four The Administration of the Southwestern Borderland by the Central Plains Dynasty 379 1. Ethnic Relations in the Southwestern Borderland and Its Administration in Imperial China ������������������������������������������ 380 2. The Evolution of the Han Chinese in the Southwestern Borderland and the Administration of Imperial China��������405 3. The Two Southward Adventures of Northern Nomads and the Administration of Imperial China ����������������������������430



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4. Border Governance in the Qin, Han, Shu and Jin Dynasties and Transportation Upgrade in Yunnan�������������� 450 5. Border Governance of the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties and the Development of Transportation in Yunnan������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 468 6. The Native Official System of the Yuan Dynasty and Its Underlying Reasons��������������������������������������������������������������������509 7. The Evolution of the Jimi Rule into the Chieftain System���� 529 8. Replacement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule by the Qing Court in the Qing Dynasty and Its Influence�������� 560 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 598 Chapter Five Geopolitics of the Borderland and Administration of the Central Plains Dynasty 611 1. The Geopolitical View of the Central Plains Dynasty ���������� 612 2. The Tendency of the Central Plains Dynasty to Value the North over the South and Its Influence������������������������������������ 621 3. The Geopolitics of Present-day Yunnan-Guizhou Region and the Administration of Qin, Han, Jin, Tang and Song Dynasties��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������642 4. The Geopolitics of Yunnan-Guizhou Region and the Administration of Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties ������������ 667 5. Border Management and Communication from the Hinterland to the Borderland and Beyond in the Tang and Song Dynasties�������������������������������������������������������������������� 692 6. Changes in the Relationship between Yunnan and the Surrounding Areas �������������������������������������������������������������������� 722 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 743 Chapter Six Borderland Strategies of Borderland Regimes and Their Borderland Governance 757 1. The Borderland Strategy and Administration of Nanyue Kingdom�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 757 2. The Strategy of Shu Han for Governing Nanzhong and Its Implementation���������������������������������������������������������������������� 780

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3. The Borderland Governance Strategy of Nanzhao and Its Implementation �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 798 4. Nanzhao’s Strategies for Handling the Relationship with the Tang Dynasty and the Tubo Kingdom�������������������� 816 5. The Strategy of Dali for Borderland Border Governance and Its Implementation��������������������������������������������������������������842 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 861

Chapter One

Review and Outlook

1.  Studies of China’s Southwest Borderland: A Historical Overview Notable achievements have been made over the past more than 60 years in the historical studies of China’s southwest Borderland. Based on the development trajectory of this area of research, and existing survey studies (Fang, 1990, 2002, 2005, 2009), this author has, in the interest of expository clarity, divided the history since 1949 into three periods: the first forty years, the following ten years, and the recent ten years or so.

1.1  The four decades from 1949 to 1989 saw the emergence of historical studies of China’s southwest Borderland, and the production of the earliest research output. Although there had been previous studies on the topic, they were small in number and had little connection to one another. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, national reconstruction started from scratch. Thanks in part to large-scale

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surveys of ethnic minorities, the history of the southwest Borderland became a relatively freestanding research field, and has received growing attention. A major achievement in this period was the comprehensive inquiry into the history and condition of ethnic minorities on the southwest Borderland. The central government sent several delegations to visit ethnic minorities at the Borderland from 1950 to 1952 and conducted a large-scale survey of ethnic groups nationwide starting in 1953, especially those in provinces and autonomous regions at the Borderland. The results are mainly reflected in five book series compiled by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, namely Languages of Ethnic Minorities, A Brief History of Ethnic Minorities, Social History Survey Data of Ethnic Minorities, A Brief Introduction to Autonomous Regions and the comprehensive monograph Ethnic Minorities in China. Focusing on the history of ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland, more in-depth studies have been conducted during this period, and many important results have been achieved, especially on the genesis, population and important activities of ethnic minorities in southwest China. In general, the following issues are covered. The first is the origins of ethnic minorities in southwest China. Such ethnic groups as Tibetan, Yi, Bai, Miao, Yao, Zhuang, Dai and Buyei are the focus of the study for their great historical influence and complexity as well as comparatively rich records. Relevant studies typically cover different theories about the origin of these groups, including native origin, external origin, mixed origin and other theories. Since researchers assume that the ancestors of the existing ethnic minorities can be traced back to different historical periods and their development process be discovered, they extend their exploration to earlier periods. The second is the study of important historical people like Qiang, Baiyue and Southwestern-barbarian. Emphasis is laid on their composition, distribution, continuity and related activities. Meanwhile, their complex internal relationships, like those between Di and Qiang, Baiyue and Baipu, Luoyue and Ouyue, and western barbarians and southern barbarians, have also received considerable attention from scholars. The third is the study of ancient states and regional authorities, including Ba, Shu, Yelang, Dian, Nanyue, Tubo Kingdom, Nanzhao and Dali



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Kingdom. Their ethnicity, origin and development, social institutions, economic life, political system, relationship with the Zhongyuan (the Central Plains) dynasty, historical activities and decline are of interest to researchers. The relationship among different ethnic groups in ancient times has been a research focus since the early 1980s. Many of these studies have been on China’s policies throughout its imperial history towards ethnic minorities in the southwest Borderland. In their assessments of these policies, researchers are generally agreed on the following points: the Qin and Han dynasties handled these issues quite adequately, during the Three Kingdoms period, the Kingdom of Shu was the most successful and the Kingdom of Wu the least, policies in the Jin dynasty were regressive relative to those in Shu-Han, and while policies during early Tang were largely commendable, the same cannot be said of those in late Tang. There are mainly two views on the policies of the Song dynasty towards the Dali Kingdom. According to one, the Song court recognized the head of the Dali Kingdom as its ruler and allowed the kingdom to continue economic trade and cultural exchanges with the Yunnan region. On the other view, the Song court treated the Dali Kingdom as a vassal state, and this policy had a serious adverse impact on the relationship between them. Most researchers have a favorable opinion on the policies towards the southwest Borderland of the Yuan dynasty. The discussion focused on the Tuguan System or the Native Civilian Commanders System, the Tusi system or the Native Chieftain System, and the process of gaitu guiliu (replacing the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court). Earlier studies emphasized the contents, duration, causes, and historical status of the Tuguan System and the Tusi system, while later studies highlighted the implementation of the Tuguan System and the Tusi system in different provinces, autonomous regions, and ethnic groups, as well as causes, process and assessment of gaitu guiliu. There are generally two views on the rationale behind the Tuguan System and the Tusi system. One is that the Tusi system is based on the feudal economy because the imperial ruler wishes to use it to showcase the prosperity of their country; according to the other, the Tusi system is built on a different economic foundation than the rest

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of the country and is used by the imperial ruler to strengthen control over border areas. On the time of its establishment, one view holds that it first emerged in Yuan Dynasty and reached institutional maturity in late Ming and early Qing, while the other holds that its origin can be traced back much further, to the Jimi System that had long been in existence and of which it is essentially an extension. The most important achievement of the study of borderland history is the section of southwest Borderland in The Historical Atlas of China edited by Tan Qixiang in the 1970s. The Historical Atlas of China was completed through the joint efforts of many scholars under the direct leadership of the central government. The research on the southwest Borderland was undertaken by Fang Guoyu, You Zhong, Zhu Huirong, and other scholars from Yunnan University. The Historical Atlas of China shows not only the territory of China in China’s imperial history from Qin to Qing but also the jurisdiction of local governments like Nanzhao, Dali, and so on, covering comprehensive information of place names, ancient passages, important towns, and ethnic distribution.

1.2  The first decade after the first 40 years of this research was from 1990 to 1999. In this period, the studies on the history of southwest Borderland were freed from the influence of the “Left” opportunism from 1950s to the early 1970s and some new fields, such as borderland history and geography, were explored, showing relative prosperity. Much discussed topics are as follows. The changes of the southwest territory and government administration throughout the country’s history. You Zhong published Changes of Southwest Borderland of China and Local History of Yunnan. Based on the text on Yunnan during Qing dynasty in The Historical Atlas of China, the former elaborates on the changes of southwest Borderland in Qing dynasty; while the latter explores the government administration in Yunnan from Han dynasty to Qing dynasty. On the Study of Southwest China by Xu Jianxin and History, Culture and Geography of Yunnan by Li Shou et al., are also about the territory and government administration of Yunnan. The General History of Zhuang People edited



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by Zhang Shengzhen, The History of Guangxi by Qin Yanhuan, and The General History of Guangxi by Zhong Wendian narrate the changes of territory and government administration of Guangxi in history. The History of Nanyue by Zhang Rongfang et al. discusses the territory and government administration of the ancient Chinese Kingdom Nanyue. Researchers focused mainly on the government administration and the evolution of territories. Such topics as the management and development of the Borderland, the political, economic, and cultural relations between the inland area and the Borderland, within the Borderland areas, and between the Borderland areas and bordering countries are less discussed. Governance of southwest Borderland throughout Chinese history. Ma Dazheng discusses the border policies and governance of the central government in different historical periods and analyzes the evolution of traditional border governance ideas and border management institutions in Research on Borderland Policy in Ancient China. Ma Ruheng et al. completed Borderland Policy in Qing Dynasty. Zheng Shan edited Borderland Defense History of China to study borderland defense and management in China’s imperial history. Cross-sectional research in this period included Borderland Policy and Official in Eastern and Western Han Dynasties by Li Dalong and Study of Jimi Fuzhou in Tang Dynasty by Liu Tong. Governance of southwest Borderland in imperial China is discussed in these works of different lengths. In this period, more attention is paid to Borderland governance and policies towards ethnic minorities in ancient dynasties while the Borderland governance theories and policies of longer term as well as border development and social governance thoughts are less discussed. As a major achievement in this period, the relationship between southwest Borderland and neighboring regions is thoroughly discussed, showing that Chinese researchers had overcome the taboo against discussing historical disputes between China and neighboring countries. It is the consensus of Chinese scholars that Nanzhao is not established by the Tai people, yet foreign researchers still hold different opinions. In Research on the Origin of the Tai People, Chen Lüfan expounds the views of Chinese scholars. Huang Huikun, He Shengda, and other scholars also wrote articles on the topic. In History of Myanmar and A

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Cultural of Southeast Asia by He Shengda, History of Laos by Shen Xu, and History of Southeast Asia by Wang Mintong, they explore the historical relationship between China, especially Yunnan region, with the countries on the Indo-China Peninsula. Great progress was made in the study of modern history of southwest border. Such scholars as Niu Zhongxun, Zhang Zhenluan, Lu Yiran, Yu Shengwu, Zhang Zhirong, Xie Benshu, Qin Heping, and so on, wrote articles on the historical evolution of the border between China and Myanmar, border conflicts between the two countries and related negotiations, and other issues. In Local History of Yunnan, You Zhong describes the border conflicts between China and Vietnam and changes of the border in Qing Dynasty. The border issues between China and Vietnam are closely related to the Sino-French War. Liu Qing, Huang Zhennan, Luo Suzhen and others wrote papers to elaborate on the countermeasures of the Qing government during the Sino-French war, the influence of the Sino-French War on the border between China and Vietnam, and so on. You Zhong and Li Guoqiang looked into the formation of the border between China and Laos. The period also witnessed remarkable progress in the study of the development history of southwest Borderland. If the changes of territory are to a greater extent related to the political, institutional and administrative division history and demonstrate mainly political relations, the development of Borderland is more closely related to resources, economy and population, reflecting the relationship between man and nature. The topic, which was rarely discussed before the 1980s, has gradually attracted the attention of researchers, and that interest has continued to grow. Major issues discussed in the period include governance of southwest Borderland by China’s imperial history, measures for management of the Borderland, development of economic sectors like agriculture, mining and metallurgy, transportation, and animal husbandry, and contributions of different ethnic groups to the development of Borderland. Related works cover Modern Economic History of Yunnan by Li Gui, Economic Development History of Ethnic Groups in Yunnan by Yang Yucai, Southern Silk Road and Economic Development and Ecological Changes of Southwest China in History by Lan Yong, Development History of Southwest Borderland in China by Fang Tie



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et al., External Transportation History of Yunnan by Lu Ren, Science and Technology History of Yunnan by Xia Guangfu et al., History of Nanyue by Zhang Rongfang et al., Research on Modern Market Towns in Guangxi by Zhong Wendian, Agricultural Geography of Guangdong and Guangxi in Qing Dynasty by Zhou Hongwei, Research on Borderland Development in Qing Dynasty by Ma Ruheng, and so on. The following topics should be further studied: recognition and development of natural resources in southwest Borderland, diversity of resources for development and relevant local knowledge, characteristics and laws of economic development in southwest Borderland, role of mining and metallurgy as well as transportation in overall economic development, relationship between economic development and the formation and consolidation of southwest territory, relationship between different types of economy and cultural diversity, and so on. Frequently discussed topics also include the following. Ethnic policies at the Borderland in imperial China. Tuguan System, Tusi system, and the process of gaitu guiliu still drew much attention, yet researchers went beyond general discussions on their content, significance, and impact. In addition to comparatively thorough overall study, the tendency to discuss their implementation in different regions in combination with specific problems appeared. There were also papers on the process of gaitu guiliu in Yunnan in modern times. The ethnic policy of Du Wenxiu’s reign is discussed in History of Hui People in Yunnan by Yang Zhaojun and Duwenxiu Uprising by Jing Dexin. As a part of the Borderland governance policy, the discussion over governance of ethnic minorities should be placed in a larger historical background with more influencing factors. However, it had not been noticed in the period. Moreover, the profound influence and cultural form of Tuguan System and Tusi system should be further studied. Relations among ethnic groups in southwest Borderland. Relations among ethnic groups in southwest China in ancient times, especially between the Han people and ethnic minorities, are elaborated on in A History of Ethnic Groups in Yunnan and Ancient Ethnic Groups in Southwest China (Sequel) by You Zhong and Cultural Influence of the Migration of Ethnic Groups in Yunnan by Cang Ming. The population in different regions of ancient China, including the southwest Borderland, is studied

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from the perspective of the historical demography in A Simple History of Chinese Migration by Ge Jianxiong et al., and Administrative Division and Demography in the Prime Tang Dynasty by Weng Junxiong. The relations among ethnic groups and patriarch clan system in the history of Guangxi are explored in The Patriarch Clan System of Ethnic Groups in Guangxi by Qian Zongfan et al. The origins of ethnic groups in southwest Borderland are further discussed in Classification of Ethnic Groups in Ancient China by Wang Wenguang. Significant progress was made in the period. In particular, the study of cross-border ethnic groups in the southwest Borderland continued to deepen. Nevertheless, such topics as the development of relations between immigrants and ethnic minorities in southwest China, the factors influencing the pattern of relations among ethnic groups in the region, and relations among ethnic groups of the modern era received relatively little attention. The research in the period was characterized by the study of cross-border ethnic groups of the southwest in the context of the whole country. Meanwhile, attention was paid to situation of cross-border ethnic groups and the impacts on the reality and new points on the definition of cross-border ethnic groups were also proposed. Influential works include On Tusi system in Qing Dynasty by Li Shiyu, Cross-border Ethnic Groups in China by Jin Chunzi et al., and Cross-border Ethnic Groups in Yunnan by Zhao Tingguang. The relation between Dai people and relevant ethnic groups abroad is explored in On the History of Dai People by Zhu Depu. Since the Jimi System implemented by the Zhongyuan dynasty covered a larger region in and out of the border, it seems that all ethnic groups in the region could be mentioned as “ethnic groups at the Borderland in China’s imperial history.” Cross-border ethnic groups are a modern concept. Therefore, ethnic groups at the Borderland in imperial China, covering the cross-border ethnic groups referred to today, should also be studied in a comprehensive and thorough way. An important condition for the progress of research was the review and summary of the academic history of the study of southwest Borderland. Many works published in the period, such as Borderland Research of China in the 20th Century and Borderland Policies in China’s Imperial History of China by Ma Dazheng et al., The History of Ethnology in



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China (Part II) by Wang Jianmin, and related articles, are related to the academic history of the study of southwest Borderland. Nevertheless, studies in this respect should be further expanded in general.

1.3  The years from 2000 to 2013 was the latest period of the research on the history of the southwest Borderland. Notable progress was achieved in both the scope and depth of research and the application of new methods and perspectives. Great achievement was made in the study of the general history of southwest Borderland. The series A Complete History of China Borders, with Ma Dazheng as the editor in chief, cover several complete histories of different borderland regions of China. Among them, A History of China Administration of Borderland by Ma Dazheng looks into the theory and practice of borderland administration from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Qing dynasty and a certain part of it is about the southwest borderland. A Complete History of China Southwest Borderland, a tome of over one million Chinese characters and edited by Fang Tie, expounds on the evolution of southwest borderland from ancient times to 1840. It covers politics, social economy, ethnic relations|, cultural exchanges, and daily life of the local population in different times. The ideas and policies for administration of southwest borderland in China’s imperial history and other major issues are introduced in eight chapters. The publication of the two works changed the relatively fragmented study and absence of overall discussion in previous research and promoted the examination of borderland history from a national and long-term perspective. It seems that the two works haven’t given full expression to the field, leaving considerable space for further exploration. A Complete History of Yunnan edited by He Yaohua includes the achievements of over ten Yunnan scholars in decades, covering diverse areas of the history of Yunnan at great length. Introduction to Chinese Borderland Studies by Zheng Shan is the first work on the topic. Remarkable progress was made in the study of cross-border ethnic groups. Sino-Vietnam and Sino-Laos cross-border ethnic groups are thoroughly discussed in Ethnic Groups Relevant to Southeast Asia in South

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China by Fan Honggui, Sino-Vietnam and Sino-Laos Cross-border Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Relations by Zhou Jianxin and Ethnic Groups in Laos by Huang Xingqiu. Major issues in the history of the Miao people in southwest Borderland and neighboring countries are explored in A Transnational Study of the Miao by Shi Maoming. Different from previous studies, these discussions not only describe cross-border ethnic groups in neighboring countries but also expound on the policies of Vietnam and Laos towards cross-border ethnic groups and even make in-depth investigation into cross-border ethnic groups. A Preliminary Study of the Culture of Cross-border Ethnic Groups in Yunnan by He Shaoying et al. is the first monograph on the systematic study of the culture of cross-border ethnic groups in Yunnan. In From Yunnan to Assam, Origin and Evolution of Ethnic Groups on Indo-China Peninsula, and Ethnohistory of Southeast Asia, He Pin provides new interpretation on the origin of ancient ethnic groups in Yunnan, the Indo-China Peninsula, and Assam region of India and their evolution after systematic study of historical materials at home and abroad. History of Sino-Myanmar Relations by Yu Dingbang is the first work on this topic. The study of the relationship between the prehistoric civilizations of the southwest Borderland of China and the Indo-China Peninsula is deepened in recently published works including Study of Ancient Bronze Culture and Ethnic Groups in Yunnan and Guangxi Regions and Northern Vietnam by Xie Chongan and Bronze Culture in Yunnan and Vietnam by Li Kunsheng et al. Breakthroughs were made in the study of the history and development of southwest Borderland in the Qing dynasty and modern times. Influential works include Sino-Vietnam Suzerain-Vassal Relationship in Qing Dynasty by Sun Hongnian, Research on the Issue of Sino-Burmese Boundary by Zhu Zhaohua, British Empire and Southwest Borderland of China by Lü Zhaoyi, Drug Problem in Southwest Ethnic Minority Areas and Countermeasures by Qin Heping, The Monsoon Climate and Weather Disasters in Yunnan in Qing Dynasty by Yang Yuda, Land Utilization and Ecological Changes in the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau by Yang Weibing, Studies of Miasma and Ecological Change of Yunnan in Qing Dynasty and Famine and Social Changes in Southwest China by Zhou Qiong, Industrial History of Yunnan by Chen Zhengping, On Du Wenxiu Uprising by Lin Quan and A Brief History of Yunnan by Liu Shusheng et al. Border Policy



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of the Nanjing National Government by Duan Jinsheng is the first work on the topic and a considerable part of the book is related to the southwest Borderland. Important achievements were also made in the study of the development of southwest Borderland. Development History of Transportation in Guilin by Huang Jiacheng et al. and History of Commodity Economy in Guangxi during the Ming and Qing Dynasties by Wu Xiaofeng make up for the weak links in the study of the development history of Guangxi. The Political Economy of a Borderland: Southwest China by James Lee focuses on the Ming and Qing dynasties, providing detailed information and novel points. The Unbalance of Guangxi Regional Development in Ming and Qing Period by Teng Lanhua is completed on the basis of her doctoral dissertation, putting forward the point that Guangxi regional development in Ming and Qing dynasties is unbalanced. Development of Southwest China and Control of Social Conflicts in History by Li Xiaolong et al. links the development of southwest Borderland and control of social conflicts, providing a new research perspective. New progress was made in historical demography and the study of migration in southwest Borderland. Historical demography in southwest Borderland is elaborated on in A General History of Chinese Population by Lu Yu et al. and History of Population in China by Ge Jianxiong. Works on migration in China’s imperial history include Migration of the Han People to Yunnan in the Ming Dynasty by Lu Ren and History of Migration on the Borderland of Yunnan by Cang Ming. In the period, Zhang Zhongkui published Replacing the Chieftain System with Direct Rule by the Qing Court and Rebuilding the Miao Borderlands and Lan Wu published From Establishing Tusi system to Turning into Regular Administration: On the Tusi system in Guangxi during the Yuan and Ming Dynasties, making thorough and detailed discussion on the Tusi system or “replacing the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court.” Influential works on ethnohistory of the Borderland include History and Geography of the Yi Ethnic Minority Region by Guo Shengbo, The Qiang People: A Ethnic Group between the Han People and the Tibetan by Wang Mingke, History, Geography, and Ethnic Groups in Southwest China: A Study Focusing on the Song Dynasty by Liu Fusheng, and Ethnic Development in Yunnan of the Ming Dynasty by Duan Hongyun.

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Many other important works were published in the decade. Overview of China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies edited by Li Sheng et al. provides systematic discussion on the study of China’s borderland history and geography from 1989 to 1998 and the length of the part on southwest Borderlands is over 60,000 Chinese characters. History of Ethnic Minority Areas in Southwest China (1st Half) by You Zhong explores the changes of administration areas in the southwest Borderlands from the Pre-Qin Period to the Han and Jin Dynasties. The Legal History of Yunnan by Fang Hui expounds on the legal system and management of Yunnan in China’s imperial history. History of Chinese Ethnic Policy by Gong Yin puts ancient China into four periods and describes the ethnic policy of the central government of each period respectively, covering a large part on southwest Borderlands. History of Sino-French War by Miao Zongling and Looking into Sino-French War by Huang Zhennan are important works for the study of Sino-French War. Ethnosociology of Yunnan in the First Half of the 20th Century by Bai Xingfa is a new work on academic history. Development of Education in Ethnic Areas of Wujiang River Valley by Li Liangping et al. provides detailed information on the study of a previously less discussed topic. The period witnessed the gradually increasing exchange between Chinese scholars and western scholars. Some works relevant to the history of southwest Borderland were translated into Chinese, like A History of Southeast Asia by British scholar D.G.E.Hall, The Cambridge History of China and The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia with the US scholar John King Fairbank as the editor -in-chief, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia by French scholar George Cœdès, and Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680 by the Austrialian scholar Anthony Reid. Meanwhile, works on the study and introduction of the research of western scholars were also published, such as World Politics—Views From China: China’s Foreign Affairs by Niu Jun et al., History of Southwest Borderlands of China in the Eyes of Western Scholars in Modern Times by Lu Ren et al., Study of Western Borderland Theories in the Context of Globalization by Yu Pei et al., and New Historiography of the Contemporary West by Li Xiaobing.



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1.4  Evidently great achievements have been made in the study of the history of southwest Borderland over the 60 years since 1949, which are generally reflected in the following aspects: Consensus has been reached in the following points: the inland area and the borders have become linked with and dependent on one another to constitute a unified multi-ethnic country in the long course of history; ethnic groups in both the inland area and the borders have made indelible contributions to the formation and development of the Chinese civilization and the Chinese nation; the development and evolution of the borders have both similarities and differences to the overall history of China and that of the inland area of China. Meanwhile, due to the special natural environment and the diversity of ethnic groups at the Borderland and corresponding culture, the southwest Borderland boasts rich history and great complexity for research, providing large space for the study of researcher. Many scholars have persisted in the exploration of the history of southwest Borderland and looked into various fields. For historical reasons, the research in the fourth years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China was focused on ethnic minorities at the southwest Borderland, with special attention paid to the investigation of social conditions, their origins, historical activities, social forms, and ethnic governance policies, as well as the relations among ethnic groups in ancient times, and so on. A highlight of the research in the period is the compilation of the part of the southwest Borderland for The Historical Atlas of China. The research in the following decade continued to focus on the relations among ethnic groups, cross-border ethnic groups, and so on. Meanwhile, emphasis was laid on the changes of territory, administrative division, governance, borders, and development of the region in China’s imperial history. There are two distinctive features of the research in the period, namely the gradual emancipation of researchers’ minds and the obvious expansion of research fields. On the basis of previous studies, greater progress has been made in the studies over the past decade which are characterized by the adoption of new

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perspectives and methods, the emphasis on the integrity of the history of the southwest Borderland and influential and in-depth issues, as well as exchange and cooperation. Because of the substantial progress of the studies and increasingly evident significance of relevant achievements, the society and government have provided active support for the studies on the history of southwest Borderland. Among the projects with national and provincial financial support in the past two to three decades, those on the history of southwest Borderland account for a considerable part. Yunnan Province and Guangxi Autonomous Region have attached great importance to the study of the history of southwest Borderland and provided support through development of academic disciplines, training of talents, funding for projects, and other ways. In 2008, the comprehensive project on the history and status quo of southwest Borderland of China was launched. With a master plan and the step-by-step implementation, it has provided a strong impetus to relevant study in Yunnan and Guangxi and integrated many related subjects into the study of the history of southwest Borderland. Far-reaching impact of the project will be further manifested in the next few years. Numerous achievements have been made and most of them are of significant academic value. For example, the history of over thirty ethnic groups in southwest Borderland has been studied to varying degrees and such ethnic groups with comparatively larger population as Zhuang, Bai, Yi, and Dai have been more frequently discussed. These discussions are relatively concentrated on Tuguan System and Tusi system, replacing the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court, policies towards the Borderland in China’s imperial history, crossborder ethnic groups, and so on. Meanwhile, fruitful achievements have been made in the study of the history and geography of the Borderland, especially the changes of territory, administrative division, borders, transportation, development, and foreign exchanges. The achievements in recent years are unprecedented. Not only are many controversial issues solved, but also some new areas are looked into, laying a solid academic foundation for future research. Nevertheless, there are also some problems and deficiencies in the studies. For example, more attention was paid to the ethnic minorities



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in the southwest Borderland in most of the more than 60 years, yet the history and geography of the Borderland were less discussed. For another example, minor issues from microscopic perspectives were repeatedly studied, while the discussion over major and deep-rooted problems as well as the theories on the formation and development of Borderland was to be strengthened. Besides, the academic perspectives and methods of many scholars were old-fashioned, resulting in relatively narrow field, stereotyped method, and slow improvement of the research in general. This author believes that more attention should be paid to the following aspects in future research. The first is to expand the width and depth of the research. The history of ethnic groups, administrative division, governance, and development related to the southwest Borderland is frequently discussed. Nevertheless, there is still great space for expansion of these studies. For example, the history of society, population, culture and tradition, ethnic concepts, and ethnic evolution in southwest Borderland could be studied as a part of the ethnohistory of the Borderland. For the evolution of administrative division, the changes of territory, place names, administrative regions, towns, and geopolitics as well as the digitization of historical geographic information could be explored. For the history of the governance over southwest Borderland, the history of border governance thoughts, policies towards the Borderland, practice of border governance, and system of border governance, and experience in border governance could be probed into. For the history of the development of southwest Borderland, the history of the economic types, the history of the changes of economic structure, the history of crossborder joint development, the history of the changes of economic pattern, the history of resource utilization and environmental changes, and the history of individual development cases could be studied. Moreover, the studies on previously discussed topics could be deepened. The second is to adopt new research perspectives and methods. Compared with the studies on the history of the whole country and most of the dynastic history, the topics in the research of the history of southwest Borderland and relevant historical materials are limited. New perspectives and methods in this field can expand the scope of

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topic selection and solve the problem of insufficient historical materials in some aspects. More importantly, new perspectives and methods will help us broaden our horizon and clarify our understanding, so that we can look into these topics from multi-dimensional angles and make more accurate analysis on the complex relationship among different elements to “see light at the end of a tunnel”. Scholars of the history of a particular subject should pay more attention to the systematic exploration and in-depth analysis of a certain aspect, look into the complex relationship between the research object and other factors, and make panoramic consideration of historical periods. Scholars of historical geography should stress the relationship between human social activities and natural environment and resources utilization and adopt the methods of natural sciences like geography. The perspectives and methods for research of both history and geography could be used. The third is to highlight the study of major issues, complex topics, and the general history of the southwest Borderland. Most of the previous research topics on the history of southwest Borderland were focused on comparatively small regions, short periods, and minor issues. Considering the accumulation of previous studies and the urgent need for achievements in the exploration of complex and deeprooted issues, it is necessary to strengthen research on major and complex issues and exploration of the general history of the development of southwest Borderland. Relevant topics include the theory and practice of governance over southwest Borderland in China’s imperial history, the theory on historical territory development taking southwest Borderland as the research object, the geopolitics and its evolution in the history of southwest Borderland, the controversial and sensitive issues in the history of southwest Borderland, the history of the governance and development of southwest Borderland, the history of the relationship between the central and local governments in governance of the border region, the history of the general development of southwest Borderland, the history of the change of the concepts of residents of southwest Borderland, the history of the research on the governance of southwest Borderland, the history of the evolution and negotiation of the southwest borders, the history of the relationship between southwest Borderland and neighboring countries, and so on.



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The fourth is to learn from the achievements and methods of related disciplines and promote multi-disciplinary cooperation. In recent years, scholars of anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, law, ecology, and other subjects have actively paid attention to the history and status quo of southwest Borderland and made gratifying achievements. The multi-disciplinary cooperation has entered a new stage, injecting fresh blood into the traditional research on the history of southwest Borderland. Several scholars have already practiced according to some of the above-mentioned suggestions and made gratifying achievements. At present, the research environment in China is in the best period after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. It is believed that more and better research achievements will be made and the study of the history of southwest Borderland will be more prosperous with the joint efforts of researchers.

2.  Research Methodology and Definition of Concepts Chinese Borderland has undergone a long-term process of formation and development which has continued without interruption for thousands of years. A long tradition has formed based on the accumulation of knowledge of Borderland governance, including strategies and implementation of Borderland governance in imperial China. On the other hand, China has accumulated profound research on Borderland history, and has experienced a process of gradual improvement and maturity. In terms of generalizing the research methods of Borderland history, the inheritance of traditional research methods and the study and application of new methods should be combined to push forward the study of Borderland history.

2.1. Continue and Develop the Historical Research Methodology Chinese Borderland history research originated from Borderland geography, Borderland defense and study of Borderland history and

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geography in modern times. One of the characteristics of Borderland history research is its commitment to staying relevant to present reality, which is related to China’s long history and profound traditions. The traditional historical research method is still one of the main methods for exploring Borderland history. Basically, historical research emphasizes the collection and organization of historical materials, and pay attention to the historical development process and the complex connections between related factors; the original appearance of history can be restored as accurately as possible through methods of analysis, deduction, and induction on the basis of comprehensive collection and correct interpretation of historical materials, and then the characteristics and principles of historical evolution can be summarized. Seen from a historical point of view, the systematic collation of files and data related to Borderland issues is still in a state of underdevelopment. In terms of ancient Borderland history, a lot of valuable information can be found in the local chronicles, relative collections and manuscripts of the Borderland areas over dynasties in addition to the common official histories and specialized historical books. However, these materials are in large numbers with scattered distribution so it is very difficult to organize them. Taking Yunnan province as the example. Since the Ming Dynasty, there are ten types of Yunnan Provincial Chronicles, and nearly one thousand types of local prefecture and county chronicles, of which only dozens have been sorted, marked and published. According to preliminary statistics, there are hundreds of anthologies related to the history of Yunnan Borderland, especially in the Ming and Qing dynasties. The content involves edicts, political and military affairs, Borderland affairs, finance and economy, social life, religious customs, and ethnic relations. The local chronicles, anthologies, and manuscripts of Yunnan over the dynasties also record the memorials, reports, and discussions of many the high officers of the Borderland, which are of high historical value for studying the Borderland governance of local governments over dynasties. In terms of modern Borderland history, a large number of archives concerning Yunnan Province are preserved in Beijing, Yunnan and other places, involving the economic development, social conditions, ethnic relations, and relations with Britain and France in Borderland areas. In



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the 19th century, some Western expeditions and missionaries entered Yunnan and Guangxi from Vietnam, Myanmar and other countries to conduct expeditions, surveys and investigations. They wrote a lot of investigation reports and records, which are also of important reference value for understanding the situation at that time. These materials are collected separately in libraries in China and some Western countries, and some of them are manuscripts. So far few have been translated and published. In early 20th century, the Central Government of Republic of China had organized investigations and studies in Yunnan and other Borderland provinces, and formed some investigation reports and governance development plans. At present, the comprehensive compilation of this batch of information has not yet begun. According to different research objects, there are differences in the methods of various fields of history. In view of the characteristics of Borderland history, special attention should be paid to summarize the research methods of Borderland history of a particular subject and historical geography. Ethnohistory of the Borderland, history of Borderland development, and history of Borderland governance are three sub-fields in Borderland history that have drawn particular attention. At the same time, studies of the Borderland theory and theory of Borderland governance, Borderland social history, history of Borderland institutions and management, culture and tradition history in the Borderland, relations history of Borderland with the inland and foreign regions, cross-border ethnohistory of the Borderland, and history of resource development and environmental changes in the Borderland, and so forth should also be carried out. Compared with Chinese general history, dynastic history, and the history of a particular subject focusing on inland, Borderland history of a particular subject pays attention to the absorption of the research results and methods of anthropology, sociology, geography and other disciplines, to the horizontal connection and vertical development of history, to the dynamic changes of the historical process and its development trajectory, as well as to the complex connection between the Borderland area and the inland and neighboring countries regarding to research methods. In terms of research perspective and

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knowledge preparation, Borderland history of a particular subject is also quite different from other fields of history. In China, there are two basic views about the subject matter of historical geography: issues related to history in the study of geography, and issues related to geography in the study of history. Scholars of the former school believe that historical geography is a discipline that studies the changes and development of the geographical environment in historical periods (Zou, 2005, 1); while the latter group of scholars believe that historical geography is a discipline that studies the relationship between human activities and the geographical environment in history, or that historical geography is a marginal discipline between history and geography (Zhang, 1995, 2). As a result of these views about the nature of the subject, historical geography is bound to adopt both the research perspectives and methodology of history and geography. Some issues studied by historical geography circles, such as the formation and changes of historical territory, administration and its changes in the Borderland, the distribution and migration of the population in the Borderland, economic development and regional differences in the Borderland, the historical changes of Borderland cities and transportation lines, historical and cultural landscape and its changes in the Borderland, and relationship between human activities, natural resources and the environment and its changes in the Borderland, are multi-disciplinary or interdisciplinary and are also of interest to those who study Borderland history. This suggests that the research perspectives and methods of historical geography have profoundly affected Chinese Borderland history. There is another common point between the studies on historical geography and Borderland history, that is, a holistic, developmental, dynamic and comparative perspective on investigating history. In addition to traditional empirical test, and analytical and synthetic methods of reasoning, we should also introduce relatively new research methods such as systems analysis, historical time scale, and comparative research. The main features of the systems analysis method are that the research object is a complex system composed of many elements. The structure, interrelationship and movement of these elements have



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profoundly affected the nature of the research object and its development process. The system is strictly composed according to a certain hierarchical structure. There are different levels of subsystems under the overall system, and the subsystems influence and restrict each other. The overall function of the system is greater than the sum of the functions of each part. The system is in constant motion and change, and often has a relationship with the surrounding environment. The systems analysis method was born out of natural science, but also applicable to social science. This method focuses on analyzing the interrelationship of various factors within the research object, and regards the development of the research object as a dynamic process of change, which has similarities with historical materialism. The systems analysis method allows us to examine the research object from a multi-dimensional perspective, and further clarify the main contradictions and main aspects of the research object to accurately analyze the complex connections between multiple elements. These connections not only come from different cross-sections such as politics, economy, culture, ethnicity, and human-land relations, but also exist in the primary and secondary relations, mutual influence, causal connection, and position change of multiple elements. From the perspective of systems analysis method, the research object is in the process of development and change, and the change of the relationship between multiple elements causes the change and development of it; and the change of the research object leads to changes in the relationship between related elements. This is the case in the objective world. The adoption of the above perspective and analysis method may lead us closer to the real history. Historical time scale is an important method proposed by the Annales School in France. The representative of the School Braudel believed that historical time can be divided as three scales consisting of very long time scale (the longue durée) which mainly studies certain factors that have been in effect for hundreds, even thousands of years, and is the most important in historical research; the medium time scale pays attention to historical phenomena such as trends, dynamics and cycles over multiple decades; and the short time scale focuses on events, phenomena and activities that take place within a short time frame. The Annales School’s division of different time scales and research content

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in the historical development process has important lessons for us. Due to the influence of the periodization of research objects, the research weaknesses such as fragmentation, micro perspective over macro perspective, and historical facts over historical roots have existed in the research on Chinese history for a long time. The rational application of the historical time method can broaden the horizons of researchers so as to make in-depth research, as well as play a positive role in changing the above-mentioned weaknesses in Chinese historical research. The proposal of historical time scale theory is an outstanding contribution to historical research methodology. This theory divides the history into different time scales, highlights the research questions for each time scale, focuses on discovering the hidden structural factors in the medium-long time scale, and greatly expands the researcher’s vision in terms of time and space. At the same time, it should be pointed out that Braudel’s arrangement of the importance of the three time scales is not without problems. Research on issues such as events, phenomena, and characters within the short time scale is, after all, the cornerstone and premise of historical research; the research in medium and long time must be based on the restoration of basic historical facts and related analysis. Wallerstein also believes that the order of structure, situation and event is “a severe mistake of this book (note: this book refers to The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II)”, “If Braudel considers the event first, then the structure, and finally summarizes the situation, the persuasive power of the book will be greatly increased” (Wallerstein, 2008, 244). There are some other defects in “the longue durée”, such as ignoring political and cultural studies in Braudel’s theory; when narrating the relationship between people and the environment, Braudel overemphasizes the latter’s “decision” role, and ignore the “creative” function of people. Chinese scholars are familiar with comparative research method. The key to the successful application of the comparison method is to pay attention to the comparability between the selected objects, follow the relevant procedures to compare the objects after selecting the suitable comparison type, and finally summarize the similarities and differences of the compared objects and their causes. In terms of the application of comparative research method in the research of Borderland



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history, the current problems in China mainly are that there are few high-level, large-perspective studies, and the depth of research should continue to be broadened. The systems analysis, the medium-long historical time scale and the comparative research can be used alone or in combination when studying a certain issue. Here’s an example. The author believes that in terms of the effectiveness of rule, the management of Yunnan-Guizhou area by successive dynasties can be roughly divided into the time scale from Qin-Han to Song, and the time scale of Yuan, Ming and Qing. The Yuan Dynasty is the turning point for the latter time scale. In the former, the China’s imperial history of the Central Plains established and initially consolidated its rule over the Yunnan-Guizhou area, which was mainly manifested in the establishment of counties and the implementation of some governance measures. But the effectiveness of governance is still relatively limited not only because of the traditional Borderland governance emphasizing on north China rather than south China, but also due to the relatively backward development in Yunnan-Guizhou area and the lack of resource advantages. Therefore, the China’s imperial history placed Yunnan-Guizhou area under the jurisdiction of Sichuan administrative region, and taxes were basically not collected in Yunnan-Guizhou area, and the way of governance was roughly the Jimi System that was implemented in Borderland across the country since the Han Dynasty. During this time scale, large-scale governance and development of the Yunnan-Guizhou area was out of the question. there is no talk of. Due to the relatively loose rule of the Zhongyuan dynasty and other reasons, Nanzhao and Dali had carried out local separatist rule for about five hundred years in Yunnan. Yunnan Province was established in the Yuan Dynasty and the provincial seat was moved from west Yunnan to east Yunnan. Since then, Yunnan-Guizhou area was under active operation and taxes were collected largely there. With the opening of the post road from Kunming to the Hubei-Hunan area through Guiyang, the old road between Yunnan and Sichuan was gradually discarded. In order to protect this new official post road, which can be called the lifeline of Yunnan-Guizhou area, and it has become a fixed trend of Yunnan-Guizhou area’s separation from the administrative jurisdiction of Sichuan, Guizhou Province was

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established in the Ming Dynasty, thus a pattern of division of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi was formed. The Yuan Dynasty promoted the Tuguan System suitable for local characteristics in the southwest Borderland, which is different from the Wanhu System promoted in the northern grasslands. It not only started the period when the Zhongyuan dynasty ruled the Borderland area and formulated policies according to local conditions, but also made feudal rule to penetrate into the present Yunnan-Guizhou area, effectively promoting the operation and development of this area. The Ming and Qing Dynasties followed and developed the Yuan system, and the effective rule of the YunnanGuizhou area was greatly enhanced. At the end of the Ming and Qing Dynasties, there was no local separatism in the Yunnan-Guizhou area. The study of the evolution of the effectiveness of the Yunnan-Guizhou area in the China’s imperial history involves a large number of issues including the Borderland governance ideology and the governance of ethnic minorities in the imperial China, the social and economic development of the Yunnan-Guizhou area, the geopolitical relations in the southwest area, as well as the roles of transportation, core regions, and so forth in southwest Borderland. In view of the characteristics of the research objects of Borderland history, the research methods adopted should be diversified. The author believes that the following methods have their advantages. One is the combination of micro research and macro research. The focus is to summarize historical traditions, development and evolution principles, and historical lessons from a macro perspective, however the macro research must be based on micro research. The second is the combination of horizontal analysis and vertical combing. It is necessary to clarify the complicated relationship between political and economic factors in various periods and stages and Borderland governance strategies and governance practice. It should also analyze the evolution of Borderland governance strategies and governance practice in different periods and stages, and the development trajectory and characteristics formed thereby, based on which the formation and development principles of the strategy and governance practice of Borderland governance can be explored. The third is to strengthen the research on the dominant Borderland governance strategy and governance practice, and combine



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it with non-mainstream (such as dissident politicians and folk thinkers) Borderland governance ideas and governance practice recommendations. The fourth is to advocate the study of the combination of the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland regime. Although the focus of the study is on the former, the analysis of the latter also has its value.

2.2. Learn from the Research Methods of Related Disciplines Many disciplines are related to the study of Borderland history. In addition to history, Borderland history also involves geography, cultural anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, international relations, demography, religion, archeology, linguistics, law, military science, diplomacy, environmental science, ecology and many other disciplines. It is just empty talk to build a higher level of Borderland history research if researchers are unfamiliar with the research results and methods of these disciplines. There are roughly two effective ways to learn from the research results and methods of related disciplines. One is to attract researchers from related disciplines to participate in the research of Borderland history through project cooperation and intensive discussion of a certain issue. The advantage is that researchers in related disciplines are familiar with their own professional field, and the research results provided are also highly professional. However, the weaknesses are also obvious. The main reason is that the dialogue and cooperation between researchers of different disciplines must go through a difficult process of running-in. It is also difficult to attract researchers from related disciplines to participate in the research. The other way is to encourage the Borderland history circle to actively learn the methods of related subjects. The advantage is that the research results of related scholars are easier to achieve the initial combination of traditional methods and the methods they have learned. The weakness is that it is difficult to truly master the new research methods in the short term, and the initial results will inevitably be ridiculed. In fact, the above two approaches can be carried out at the same time without conflict. We can promote the exchanges and mutual learning between different disciplines by organizing interdisciplinary seminars and project cooperation, and

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holding multi-disciplinary researchers to participate in thematic written speeches. It is very difficult to learn from the research methods of related disciplines, and it will not be accomplished overnight. Here are some preliminary suggestions on the combination of related disciplines and Borderland history research, as well as the problems of learning from the research methods of these disciplines. Geography is an integrated science that spans natural sciences and humanities. It takes the earth’s surface space as the research object, and the core of the research is the region of man-land relationship (Pan, 2001, 1). Human geography and physiography are the two branches of geographic science. Human geography aims to study the man-land relationship, focusing on the relationship between human social, economic, and cultural activities and the geographical environment. The object of human geography research is closer to historical geography, but the difference is that the research of human geography is mainly about practical problems. The man-land relationship stressed by human geography, the relationship between economic activities, population, settlements, cultural activities, political activities, and so forth and the geographical environment, the use and protection of natural resources, regional development and coordination and other issues, are all closely related to the Borderland history research. Its research method is characterized by specificity, experience, accuracy and testability of science in the general sense, which should be learned by the Borderland history researchers. Anthropology is a discipline that comprehensively studies people and their culture (Zhuang, 2004, 1, 12). In Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, anthropology includes two parts: cultural anthropology and physical anthropology. Cultural anthropology is also called social anthropology, which is what is called ethnology in China. Depending on the specific subject matter, cultural anthropology can be divided into different branches, such as historical anthropology, political anthropology, economic anthropology, ecological anthropology, religious anthropology, population anthropology, visual anthropology, applied anthropology, psychological anthropology, and so forth. Anthropology mainly studies people and their



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culture in real life, which distinguishes it from history. The author believes that anthropology’s research methodology has the following characteristics: The first emphasizes the holistic view and the view of adaptive change of the research object based on universalism, holistic theory, integration theory, adaptation theory, and cultural relativity theory, and believes that the value of cultures is relative and equal, which is unique and worthy of respect and research. The second is to attach importance to direct observations, comprehensively and systematically grasp the situation of all aspects of the research object through in-depth observation and interview. The third is to pay attention to exploring the cultural connotations of the many representations of the research object, exploring the deep hidden cultural elements and the process of change, as well as related operating mechanisms and internal laws. The combination of anthropology and history can be said to complement and benefit each other in research methods. In comparison, most historians are mainly engaged in the work of restoring historical facts based on historical data, and pay less attention to the internal changes and mechanisms hidden in them. If we introduce the method of anthropology to explore history from the outside to the inside, and delve into the internal causes and connections of historical development, which will be more profound than the previous focusing on the appearance of history. The holistic view and the view of adaptive change emphasized by cultural anthropology are similar to the above-mentioned systems analysis method and medium-long historical time method. It can be said that the research method used by historical anthropology is a beneficial practice combining historical method and anthropology method. In view of the important reference value of discussing and summarizing the Borderland governance in the historical periods in the realization of stable and coordinated development in the Borderland region today, it is particularly important to study the mechanism and principles of Borderland governance in history. Therefore, attentively learning from anthropology’s methods are indispensable for Borderland history research. Sociology is a comprehensive and specific social science that studies the conditions and mechanisms for the sound operation and

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coordinated development of society (Zheng, 2003, 3, 457, 471, 503). Sociology takes the conditions and mechanisms of the operation of the real society as the research object, so it is different from disciplines such as history and anthropology. Sociology pays attention to microanalysis, macroanalysis and countermeasure analysis, and mainly adopts the method of sociological survey to conduct research. The main methods of research in this discipline are to use scientific methods to collect and analyze social facts, pay attention to selecting topics with typical significance, emphasize on the division of quantitative and qualitative research, scientifically and rationally design questionnaires, stress the reliability and validity of the collected information and data, and conduct scientific sampling and processing of the collected information and data. The humanistic care of Chinese sociology for the major social issues including the Borderland, the methods of stressing the collection and analysis of social facts, and the characteristics of the discipline of putting forward countermeasures and suggestions to solve problems, all have important reference value for our research on the real and historical issues related to the Borderland. Furthermore, understanding people’s observation and management of Borderland issues in real life provides us with reference numbers for studying historical issues. Among them, there are many positive enlightenments that help researchers broaden their horizons. Political science studies the activities, forms and relationships of social public power and the law of its development (Scientific Research Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2000, 256). The core issue of political science research is the national issue. The hotspots discussed in the Chinese political science community in the past ten years are mainly issues of national theory, political development, political culture, political participation, and political stability. Obviously, these issues are also concerns of Borderland history. Research on Chinese political system, including the history of political system, has been in the ascendant in recent years. The discussion on the history of Chinese political system generally has two different perspectives—political and historical, which indicates that this is a marginal field of the discipline. The feudal centralized system in the history of Chinese political system, the central and local administrative systems and their operating



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mechanisms, including national management systems such as law, supervision, military, finance, education, and official systems, and traditional Chinese political philosophy, are all of important reference value for exploring the historical territory of China and the formation and management of a unified multi-ethnic state. The subdisciplines of political sociology, political anthropology, political geography, ethnic politics, comparative politics, policy analysis, and so forth, which have emerged in recent years, also show the characteristics of interdisciplinary research. Some research methods of political science, such as attaching importance to the discussion in conjunction with national theory，a global vision equipped with historical contrast and comparative research，active capture and track of the major theoretical and practical issues, and good at choosing appropriate research methods according to the differences of research objects, are worth Borderland historians’ learning and reference. The Study of international relations is a discipline that involves and investigates international relations (Cai et al., 2005, 1, 3). The International relations in question refers to the relations between countries and transnational entities in political, economic, military, cultural and other aspects. The research focus of International relations is the conflict and cooperation between countries, as well as various diplomatic activities around bilateral and multilateral relations. Some scholars believe that International relations is a branch of Political science, mainly concerned with the relations between countries, especially foreign policy. Disciplines similar to International relations mainly include diplomacy, international law, international economics, international communication, and so forth, which reflects the correlation between International relations and disciplines of Political science and Law, and the similarities in their research methods. Some important issues in the scope of International relations, such as sovereign states, foreign relations strategies and policies of countries, ways and means of foreign relations, international cooperation, the constraints of international relations, coordination and integration of international relations, international security and international order, are all related to issues discussed in Borderland history, therefore they deserve academic attention.

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It should be pointed out particularly that although International relations mainly studies realistic international relations, the principles and methods it follows and uses are of great significance to the discussion of ancient diplomatic relations and the internal and external relations in the Borderland area. The reason is that the basic principles of law, diplomacy, and politics on which modern international relations are handled are not fully applicable to ancient times, after all, they have provided a valuable reference for exploring such issues in ancient times. The author believes that the Zhongyuan dynasty had implemented the principle of “accepting those who come, letting go those who leave” for the ethnic minorities in the Borderland and neighboring regions, and heavily rewarded the tributers to realize the effect of the Jimi System. As a result, the nominal subjects of the Zhongyuan dynasty had spread all over the border and even outside the territory. The ancient Borderland therefore became an area with ambiguous definition and unclear geographical scope, or the so-called “flexible Borderland”. Under such circumstances, the diplomatic relations of ancient China and the vassal relationship in the Borderland often caused confusion, because of the often-changing situation as well as the interconversion of the above-mentioned relations. Generally speaking, feudal rulers defined clearly about the differences between diplomatic relations and vassal relations in the Borderland, and usually named them in different terms. But there is no centralized record of the relevant principles and standards that distinguish these two types of relationships in the classics of the China’s imperial history. Of course, the ancient people’s understanding of diplomatic relations and vassal relations in the Borderland may be different from today. Comparing the principles and practices of dealing with such issues in real international relations is obviously of important reference value for the discussion of ancient diplomatic relations and vassal relations in the Borderland. In the cross-disciplinary fields of Borderland history and economics, demography, religion, law and other disciplines, there are also many topics to be chosen for study. Those with aspirations will be enlightened and rewarded a lot if they go deep into it.



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2.3. Definition of Concepts It is necessary to define some of the concepts used in this book. The first reason is that the situation in ancient China was very complicated, and the meaning of some terms was different in different periods. Second, the meaning of some terms used by the ancient people is somewhat different from how we understand them today, and may even refers to totally different things. The third is the definitions made by researchers of today from the perspective of self-understanding to give these terms a precise academic meaning. That is to say, researchers strictly define the content of related terms in order to analyze and compare in the research to reveal the nature of historical phenomena and the process of development and change. In order to avoid readers’ misunderstanding caused by the ambiguity in understanding, and to explain the changes of some terms in different periods, the definitions of the terms used in this book are now briefly described as follows. Southwest Borderland：it refers to the southwest Borderland area in ancient times, which covers the areas that includes today’s Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou, southwest Sichuan, and the northern part of the Indo-China Peninsula that had at times in the past been part of China. In the mid-Ming Dynasty, the northern part of the Indo-China Peninsula was no longer China’s territory, and the scope of the inland area under the Qing Dynasty expanded in all directions. The area that includes today’s Guangxi and the eastern part of Guizhou was no longer regarded as the Borderland area. Borderland，neighboring regions，border area，Siyi (barbarians): The concept of Borderland in ancient times is different from what it is today. Since the ancients regarded people of civilizations outside of China as Yidi or Manyi, the area where Yidi lived and bordering the territory of China was usually regarded as the Borderland. In other words, the outer part of the core area within the sphere of influence of the Zhongyuan dynasty or the Borderland regime, and the part near the boundary between the sphere of influence of other countries or regimes, are regarded as the Borderland areas. The ancient Borderland usually refers to a larger geographical area, which is still unstable due to constant changes and adjustments. In short, the “Borderland” mentioned in

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this book mainly refers to the periphery of the dynasty’s central region and sometimes also includes the buffer zone at the border with other countries. There was no such word as Borderland in ancient times. For narrative convenience, researchers now borrow the term Borderland. In ancient times, terms similar to Borderland were mainly neighboring regions, border area and barbarian area. The characteristic shared by these three terms is that Borderland is the buffer zone between the Zhongyuan dynasty or Borderland regime and foreign forces. There’s a relatively clear boundary between the central region of the Zhongyuan dynasty or the Borderland regime to the Borderland areas, and a relatively vague extension of Borderland outward. As for Siyi (barbarians), it is much obvious that the Zhongyuan dynasty regard the residents of the Borderland as Yidi, so there are such sayings as “to live in peace with the surrounding barbarian groups to protect China” or “to handle the affairs with barbarian groups cautiously and skillfully”.1 Strategy, governance practice, management: The strategy mentioned in this book refers to the basic strategy or overall strategy formed by the Zhongyuan dynasty or Borderland regime under the guidance of its Borderland governance ideology, which has nothing to do with the strategy of the Borderland warfare in the Qing Dynasty. The governance practice in this book refers to practice of ruling or governance by the Zhongyuan dynasty or the Borderland regime. The management in this book includes the political and military domination of the Borderland by successive dynasties in a broad sense. In the narrow sense, it mainly refers to the administrative management and regional development of the Borderland through the dynasties. And it has nothing to do with engaging in economic activities in the modern sense. The Zhongyuan dynasty, imperial dynasties, feudal dynasties, Borderland regime, local regime: There were many types of regimes in ancient China with complicated related situations. The nature of various regimes also changed frequently. The basic characteristics of the Zhongyuan dynasty in this book include traditional agriculture as the main economic form, Confucianism as the dominant ideology, and the  middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River or the middle and 1 See Section 1 of Chapter Two.



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lower reaches of the Yangtze River as the central region of management. The dynasties were usually established by the Han nationality. The term the Zhongyuan dynasty includes not only most of the national unified dynasties, but also the Song Dynasty, Eastern Jin Dynasty and other local ruling dynasties that have the above basic characteristics, although they are not national unified dynasties. The successive dynasties are usually another name for the Zhongyuan dynasty. The feudal dynasties referred to in this book has a larger scope than the Zhongyuan dynasty, and roughly includes the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland dynasties. The Liao, Xia, Jin, and Tubo belong to the Borderland dynasties or Borderland regimes. Their common features include that the implementation of a feudal autocracy, rulers have a clear self-awareness of the dynasty, the state machines such as the royal court, the army, and the legal system are relatively complete, and there are clear administrative jurisdictions. But where the feudal dynasty is mentioned in the book, it usually refers to the Zhongyuan dynasty. The scope of the local regime is larger than that of the Borderland regime, also including some vassal states enfeoffed by dynasties and the inland separatist regimes during the period of a national division. But the “local regime” mentioned in the book usually refers to the Borderland regime.。 Yidi, Manyi, Yi: In the Spring and Autumn Period, the notion of “Yidi and Manyi” already existed, which was first used to refer to other ethnic groups neighboring China, usually specifically used to describe the tribes in different regions as Eastern Yi, Northern Di, Sounthern Man and Estern Yi. Yidi was used to name the Borderland ethnic groups in the west and north and Manyi was used to name the Borderland ethnic groups in the south. The people of the Chinese civilization draw a line based on the nature of the civilizations they see. They believed that the non-Chinese civilization is far behind the Chinese civilization, so they call it as Yidi or Manyi which then became the general term for non-Chinese civilization by the people of Chinese civilization, or collectively known as Yi; while people of Chinese civilization named themselves as Huaxia or Xia. The view of Yi-Xia with difference existing between Yi and Xia and respected Xia and humble Yi as its core has long been the cornerstone of the values and morality of the rulers

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of the Zhongyuan dynasty. In the eye of most dynasties of the Central Plains, China is the center of the world, and the surrounding Yidi civilizations should admire, obey, protect and live in peace with it. When dealing with the relations with Manyi in border area, the prevailing tribute, vassal, marriage, education and other communication methods in the Zhongyuan dynasty all originated from the Yi-Xia view. It should be pointed out that the Yidi referred to by the Chinese civilization not only encompasses all the tribes in the Borderland region, but also includes foreign countries with diplomatic relations with the Zhongyuan dynasty. The advocates of the Westernization Movement in the late Qing dynasty proposed Shi Yi Chang Ji Yi Zhi Yi (to control the foreigners by learning from the skills of them), and the Yi referred to the Western powers. Cultural soft power: It is part of the comprehensive strength of the Zhongyuan dynasty, and is opposed to the hard power which includes the gross social product, infrastructure and other hardware ownership of the Zhongyuan dynasty. Soft power refers to cultural and ­institutional influence, including cultural influence, ideological influence, and institutional arrangements. Soft power is not only embodied in institutional power and cultural power, but also includes international recognition, public discourse power, good image shaping capabilities, soft power transmission routes, and the ability to promote the orderly development of the country. There was no such term as cultural soft power in ancient times, but a concept similar to it. The rulers of the Zhongyuan dynasty were highly confident in their own culture, strength and system, and spread it to the ethnic groups around China through cultural infiltration and other methods based on the Tributary system. Most of the Zhongyuan dynasty regarded the demonstration of their own culture, strength and system as an effective weapon for border extension and Borderland governance. During the Tang and Song Dynasties, the pattern of the world changed, the way of the Zhongyuan dynasty to demonstrate their culture, strength and system, as well as the communication methods and focus of propaganda also changed accordingly. Tributary system: it’s a system in which foreigners on all sides of China paid tribute to the Zhongyuan dynasty, and the Zhongyuan



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dynasty conferred titles onto the foreigners who came to tribute. The major basis of Tributary system is the view of Fushi, and the nature of Tributary system is the Zhongyuan dynasty’s establishment of a covenant and a master-slave relationship with the foreigners who paid tribute through the two basic forms of tribute and conferment, and the further formation of a norm that can function in the world. Tributary system is the machanism by which the Zhongyuan dynasty spread the cultural soft power of Borderland governance. Through this system, the Zhongyuan dynasty left the influence of the Chinese culture and system on other ethnic groups.2 After the Tang and Song Dynasties, the substance and form of the Tributary system gradually changed. Vassal or Borderland patriarchal-vassal relationship: Generally, the vassal relationship or Borderland patriarchal-vassal relationship related to Borderland governance refers to the establishment of a sovereign and subordinate relationship between the Borderland ethnic groups and the Zhongyuan dynasty, in which the Zhongyuan dynasty are in the position of the sovereign, and the Borderland ethnic groups is subordinate. But the vassal relationship before and after the Yuan Dynasty is different. The vassal relationship before the Yuan Dynasty is widely applicable to the Borderland ethnic groups and other ethnic groups that received conferment from the Zhongyuan dynasty; The vassal relationship in the Ming and Qing Dynasties was limited to the vassal states that established a new type of vassal relationship with the Zhongyuan dynasty, such as Annan and Korea, while Borderland ethnic groups had become subjects under the direct jurisdiction of the dynasty and their vassal relationship with the Zhongyuan dynasty had ended.3 Ethnic groups in southwest Borderland: The situation of ancient peoples in southwest Borderland was very complicated. National fusion, changes in connotation, and time-to-time integration and separation were common in the national development process, and the economic culture can also be divided into different types. Explanation of the concepts used in this book is as follows: Han nationality in southwest Borderland: refers to the local Han nationality of southwest 2 See Section 5 of Chapter Two for more discussion. 3 See Section 5 of Chapter Two for more discussion.

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Borderland, which is related to but not overlapping with immigrants. Immigrants: refers to the immigrants who entered the southwest Borderland throughout the dynasties, in which Han nationality formed the most part, and the Mongolia, Semu, Manchu and other ethnic groups were also included. The foreign immigrants or immigrants mentioned in this book mainly refer to Han nationality immigrants. Ethnic minorities: a concept relative to Han nationality used in modern times, and the ethnic minorities mentioned in this book refer to ethnic minorities other than Han nationality. “Aboriginal ethnic groups”: refers to the indigenous peoples living in the southwest Borderland since the Neolithic Age. Local ethnic groups: It includes not only the indigenous ethnic groups, but also others that moved to and settled in the southwest Borderland at different times. It also refers to the new groups such as the Baiman formed by the integration of foreign immigrants and the aboriginal ethnic groups. Ethnic groups in mountainous area: it is a category coming from the division from the perspective of the relative dual structure of plains—Mountainous area, which is opposite to the ethnic groups in the plains; The ethnic groups in the plains mainly engage in rice cultivation, but also have a considerable degree of commercial and processing industries. The main part is the peoples are Han nationality and the local ethnic groups who have a close relation to Han nationality; Ethnic groups in mountainous area live in the vast mountainous areas outside the plains, where animal husbandry is developed, hunting and gathering are popular, and they also operate mountainous agriculture based on dry land cropping. The economic development level is usually lower than that of the people in the plains.4 Mountain civilization: a civilization in ancient China that is opposed to agricultural civilization and nomadic civilization. Its basic features are the mountainous area—based distribution and the corresponding development and utilization of natural environment and resources, as well as a clear and complex diversity in the categories of the residents, cultural types, and historical development. Mountain civilization is mainly discovered in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces, as 4 See Section 2 of Chapter Four.



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well as the mountainous regions of Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi, Liaoning, and Jilin. There is a complex relationship of coexistence and complementarity between mountain civilization, agricultural civilization, and nomadic civilization. Geopolitics: refers to politics and political issues closely related to the geographical environment. Geopolitics had long been known in ancient China, and some related thoughts and strategies were formed. the Zhongyuan dynasty had their own geopolitical views and used them to deal with Borderland governance issues. The understanding of Borderland geopolitics in ancient China includes the relationship between China and neighboring countries, the relationship between the mainland and the Borderland, the relationship between Borderland regions, and the commonality and differences in governance strategies in the Borderland regions of different geographical locations. The geopolitical views of the Zhongyuan dynasty paid attention to the boundary division between agricultural civilization and other civilizations, and used the agricultural civilization circle as the foundation to prudently expand to the outside or seek stability. Many dynasties have adhered to the Borderland governance tradition of “to live in peace with the surrounding barbarian groups to protect China”, and were accustomed to “befriending the distant enemy while attacking the enemy near home” and “coping with changing situation by sticking to a fundamental principle”. The academic circles still have much to learn about ancient Chinese Geopolitics and its theories, further in-depth exploration is needed in the future.5

3.  Carrying Out Research on Borderland Governance History Borderland governance history is a new research field that has attracted much attention of researchers. Among its rich research contents, the ancient Borderland theory, ancient Borderland governance theories and policies, the development history of the Borderland, and the Borderland 5 See Section 1 of Chapter Five.

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system research based on the Tusi system or the Native Chieftain System and the process of gaitu guiliu are the most discussed issues in the academic circle. The current research on Southwest Borderland governance history can be said to be in the ascendant.

3.1  Ancient Chinese Borderland theory includes two c­omponents: the Borderland theory adopted by the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland theory adopted by the Borderland regimes. The former one should be the focus of the study because of its greater influence and more complicated historical conditions. The Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty mainly includes the ruler’s views on Borderland and Borderland governance, theory on governance in the Borderland area, theory on the governance of Borderland barbarians, theory on the development of Borderland resources, geopolitics in the Borderland area, tendency and evolution of the traditional Borderland governance emphasizing on north China rather than south China, formation of evolution of the territory, diplomatic relations and national defense, and so forth. The philosophy of Borderland governance covers theories of what a Borderland is, how it should be governed, and understandings and beliefs about how to handle Borderland-related affairs; the Borderland governance is a governance policy in the Borderland area, that is, the strategy, policy and measures for the practice of Borderland governance guided and unified by the Borderland governance thoughts. The understanding of Borderland-related issues by the rulers of each dynasty and the formation of the Chinese historical territory has experienced a tortuous development over thousands of years; in terms of Borderland governance theories and policies, China has formed a long tradition, which has had a non-negligible impact on contemporary China. On the other hand, due to the complex influence of factors such as historical conditions, economic and cultural foundations, and governance practices, the Borderland governance theories and policies throughout China’s imperial history have been diverse and a rich source of historical lessons.



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Chinese territory is so vast that it took a long but uninterrupted process for the formation of its historical territory. Studying the Borderland governance theories and policies in the Chinese history can strengthen the knowledge of the formation of Chinese historical territory and promote the understanding of the rising process of China as a unified multi-ethnic country. Due to the frequent changes in the scope of jurisdiction of dynasties, the ancient Borderland concept often involves border area and neighboring regions. Successive dynasties applied the Tributary system to the Borderland tribes and certain neighboring states in order to gain control over them to maintain the peace of the border and demonstrate the power of the dynasty. Therefore, discussing the Borderland governance theories and policies in Chinese history not only has positive significance for in-depth exploration of the relationship between the ancient inland areas and Borderland areas, the relationship between the inland nationalities and the Borderland ethnic groups, but also helps to understand the ancient Chinese foreign policy and diplomatic relations. The Borderland governance theories and policies of the successive dynasties is closely related to the reign of the Zhongyuan dynasty in the Borderland area. The ancient Borderland governance thoughts were generally formed in the Qin and Han dynasties, and developed into the Republic of China, whose dynamic changing connotations have undergone a process from superficial to mature. On the other hand, Borderland governance thoughts in various periods have their own characteristics. The Borderland governance thoughts of the rulers of the China’s imperial history have a complex and multi-faceted influence on the Borderland area; Many historical phenomena in the Borderland area can be found in the Borderland governance thoughts of the imperial China. The ancient Borderland governance theories and policies have had an important impact on the formation of Chinese historical territory, as well as the formation and development of a unified multi-ethnic country and the Chinese nation. During the period of the Republic of China and even after 1949, it is not difficult to see the traces of the influence of ancient Borderland governance ideas on the parties concerned in when dealing with Borderland issues. In addition, when studying

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Chinese history, people in the past mainly paid more attention to historical phenomena and historical events rather than the reasons and related considerations of the historical parties; If the two aspects are well combined, the related speculation and description may be closer to the real history. Borderland governance theories and policies cover a wide range of topics. In this author’s opinion, the following issues deserve close attention: The definition of the view of Borderland and Borderland of interests throughout the dynasties; important ideas and how they came to be, the relationship between Borderland management, Borderland governance and national stability and development; conservatism and explorations in Borderland governance and the formation of related traditions; effectiveness and institutionalization of important Borderland governance policies and measures, important thinking and creation in Borderland governance; the Borderland governance thoughts of important leaders and their influence, governance theories and policies for the Northwest China, Xizang, Southwest China, Northeast China, and Chinese border areas; the handling of the relationship between the central government and the Borderland area during the period of national unification, management and development of Borderland theories and policies, theories and policies for handling Borderland ethnic issues, among others and so forth. Other important issues include: The relationship between the central and local governments in Borderland governance, Borderland governance theories and policies and the overall development of southwest Borderland, the effectiveness and impact of Borderland governance policies in the Southwestern China, the Borderland governance theories and policies of the Borderland officials in the southwest Borderland of the Ming and Qing dynasties, the thoughts, practice and related writings of governing southwest Borderland in the Republic of China, Borderland governance theories and policies in the local governments of Yunnan and Guangxi in the Republic of China, the governance practice of the southwest Borderland regime and its historical influence, the Borderland regime’s management of the Indo-China Peninsula, the politicians’ Borderland governance thoughts and related writings of



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the southwest during the Ming, Qing and the Republic of China, and so forth. In recent years, some researchers have pointed out that the Borderland governance policies have experienced a process of development from a single model to a diversified one. The topics derived from this include: the development and evolution of the Borderland system and governance policies, the change of the Borderland system and governance policies of Borderland regimes, the management system within the Borderland ethnic groups, the compatibility between government system and the internal system within the Borderland ethnic groups, and so forth.

3.2  The development of southwest Borderland should be emphasized. The ancient southwest Borderland including present-day Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces and regions and some areas to the south of these regions that have been included into China’s territory throughout its imperial history, is a Borderland area with an earlier development, an important position and obvious characteristics in China. The southwest Borderland has been managed to varying degrees throughout China’s imperial history, which makes it an important gateway and an important supplier of resources in China. The southwest Borderland is mostly mountainous with some plain geomorphological features. The major tropical and subtropical climate there is characterized by a diversified and three-dimensional distribution. These two profoundly affected the management and development of the southwest Borderland. For example, as for the resident distribution in the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, although the population is mainly concentrated in the flat and arable plains, human activities can be found in areas at different latitude from early times. These residents are mainly engaged in gathering, hunting, and fishing, and are significantly dependent on abundant wild animal and plant resources, resulting in the characteristics of small-scale settlement, large-scale dispersion, and frequent diffused migration. In the Qing Dynasty, large and medium-sized plains were overcrowded. Meanwhile, with the

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introduction of corn, potato and other crops suitable for extensive management, a wave of migration to the mountainous area ensued. Geographical similarities can be found among some areas in the southwest Borderland. A number of economic geographic units that are approximately concentrically distributed are formed. These units mainly center on plain where rice is grown, and the mountainous or semi-mountainous areas with slopes and meadows are the edges. Plain economy plays a leading and central role in these economic geographic units. On the other hand, there are differences in the degree of development and influence of these units. Although it can be subdivided into different types such as high plain economy, low plain economy, plainhilly economy, plain-wetland economy, there are obvious similarities in many plain economic forms. Most of the administrative offices in the counties in the southwest Borderland were located in plains, as a result, and these plains gradually developed into the centers of local administration, economic exchange and cultural communication, among which, Kunming plain and Dali plain successively developed into the ruling center of the Yunnan Plateau, and Guiyang plain became the seat of Guizhou provincial governance. The southwest Borderland has an extremely rich variety of animal and plant, which provides the local ethnic groups with a source of food, raw materials for keeping warm and working livestock. Animal and plant products, including medicinal materials and rare products, have always been important tributes paid by various ethnic groups to the Zhongyuan dynasty, who also effortlessly sought for rare animal and plant products, fine livestock species and precious woods. In general, the Zhongyuan dynasty focused on collecting rare raw materials and products of animals and plants in the early times, and then shifted to acquiring good horses and precious woods from the southwest Borderland as rulers in the middle and late periods. The planting industry was developed in an earlier time and reached a larger scale during the Nanzhao period, the planting industry in mountainous and remote areas got greater development in the Qing Dynasty. The primary compound economy, including agriculture, animal husbandry, breeding, gathering and hunting, was the dominant economic form in the southwest Borderland in ancient times. Although



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the agricultural economy in large-medium sized plains of southwest Borderland was relatively developed, the development level was still significantly behind the Central Plains; Although there is a gap between the agriculture of large-medium sized plains and the planting industry of the surrounding mountainous areas, they still belonged to the same economic type as a whole. Metal mining has an extremely important position in the southwest Borderland. Due to the difference in technology level and social demand in different periods, the degree of mining and processing of various metals in the southwest Borderland is also different. Generally, copper, iron, and gold were mined in the earlier period, while silver, copper, and tin were developed largely in the later period. Since different dynasties had different focuses on types of mining metals, it’s understandable that the key operation areas and related channels were changing over the dynasties. For the above reasons, the economic development of the southwest Borderland has different characteristics from the inland area and other Borderland areas. The difference is not only significantly manifested in the metal mining and animal-plant resource development, but also reflected in the degree of development of various economic sectors, which have obvious differences in different periods. Generally speaking, the traffic line of the southwest Borderland and the planting industry in the counties were the key points of management from the Han Dynasty to the Jin Dynasty. The management focuses of Yuan Dynasty can be arranged in the order of transportation, agriculture, mining and metallurgy, and commerce. The Ming and Qing dynasties expanded the scale of non-ferrous metal mining in the southwest Borderland and cut down a large number of high-quality logs. The difference in the practices of the two dynasties was that the Ming Dynasty mainly expropriated the mining of gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, mercury, and cinnabar, while the Qing Dynasty exploited a large amount of copper and silver in Yunnan as the raw materials for coining in the capital and several provinces in the south of the Yangtze River. The following issues should be studied in the future: The understanding and development of the natural resources of southwest Borderland, the diversity of resource development types and the related

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knowledge in the local areas, the characteristics and laws of southwest Borderland economic development, the role of mining and metallurgy, transportation and other sectors in the overall economic development, the relationship between economic development and the formation and consolidation of the southwestern territory, the link between multiple types of economy and cultural diversity, the historical joint governance and cooperative development of the border land between the southwest Borderland and neighboring countries, the ancient Borderland regime’s management and development of the northern part of the Indo-China Peninsula, the infiltration and influence of countries such as Britain and France in modern times towards the southwest Borderland, the opium economy and its influence in the southwest Borderland during the Republic of China, the experience and lessons of politicians’ development of southwest Borderland in the Ming and Qing Dynasties and the Republic of China, the formation and development of cities and towns in the southwest Borderland in history, the formation and evolution of the southwest Borderland traffic line and its role in China’s international relations, the similarities and differences in economic culture between southwest Borderland and the indigenous peoples’ in neighboring countries, the economic development and ecological environment changes of southwest Borderland in history, the development and utilization of animal and plant resources in southwest Borderland in history, the development and utilization of non-ferrous metals in southwest Borderland in history, and so forth. The study of the development of southwest Borderland can also involve different types of economy, the evolution of economic structures, cross-border joint development, the change of economic forms, the change of resource utilization and environment, and the development cases in history. For issues that have been discussed, in-depth research is encouraged. Research on population migration in the southwest Borderland has achieved some results in the academic circle. The focus of future discussion can be on the comparison of migrants in different periods, the role and far-reaching influence of migrants, the relationship between immigrants and local ethnic groups, and the joint forces of immigrants and local ethnic groups for development.



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3.3  Since the Reform and Opening-up, the Tusi system and the process of gaitu guiliu have always attracted strong scholarly interest. According to preliminary statistics, from 2011 to 2012, more than one-third of Chinese research papers on the history of southwest Borderland and history of nationality had discussed the issues concerning the Tusi system and the replacement of the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court, which fully shows that the researchers have a strong interest in this issue which still has much room for exploration. There are now agreements among scholars on some issues related to the Tusi system and the policy of replacing the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court. Such as the nature and basic characteristics of the Tusi system, it is generally believed that the Tusi system is an important invention in ancient China. Its significance lies in that the feudal dynasties set up a unified political body with Borderland ethnic groups through its relatively loose and flexible ruling and fixed the historical territory through the strengthening connections between them. The success of the Tusi system has provided an example of solving the Borderland issue in the way of one country with multiple systems. Regarding the beginning time and ending time of the Tusi system, most researchers believe that the Tusi system was formed in the Yuan Dynasty and was perfected in the Ming and Qing dynasties. However, the Qing Dynasty reformed and adjusted the Tusi system through the policy of replacing the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court, the Tusi system gradually declined after then. Research in recent years have shown that the governance policy of Jimi System of the previous generations was developed into the Tuguan System or the Native Civilian Commanders System in the Yuan Dynasty, and a more effective Tusi system was formed in the Ming and Qing dynasties and was promoted in the southwestern ethnic regions. The major differences between the Tusi system and the Jimi System are at the aspects of management thoughts of the ruler and the Borderland governance strategy and its practice effect, among others and so forth. The Tusi system realized the effective integration of social relations in the administration areas, deepened the rule of the Zhongyuan dynasty,

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and initially solved the problem of high cost and low profit in the management of the dynasties of Central Plains over the Borderland management. The Tusi system cultivated the loyalty of the chieftain and the people under his jurisdiction, promoted the integration of Borderland and inland culture, and formed a rich Tusi culture in the southern Borderland area. Although the reasons for replacing the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court in the Ming and Qing Dynasties were complex and diverse, the reasons for the large-scale adoption in the Yongzheng period of the Qing Dynasty was relatively clear, i.e. to solve the problem that some chieftain or the chiefs of Miao ethnic group violated the law impudently, competed with the Imperial Court for natural resources, obstructed the opening of post roads and immigration entry, and so forth, and is largely irrelevant to whether there was a landlord economy in the reform area. Replacement of the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court was carried out as a necessary reform of the Tusi system, not to completely abolish it. The Zhongyuan dynasty actively promoted various school education in areas where the Tusi system or replacement of the chieftain system with direct rule by the Qing court was implemented. In the Yuan Dynasty, Tiju official of Confucianism was appointed to Kunming and Dali in Yunnan. Numerous schools were set up in border area in Ming Dynasty, and sixty-three schools of Confucianism were found in Yunnan Province alone. The education in the southwest Borderland in the Qing Dynasty developed even faster. In the middle of the Qing Dynasty, 101 schools of province, state, county and department levels were founded in Yunnan Province, and academies were also set up in some important cities. Through the development of school education and changes in customs, the culture of the southern Borderland and the inland culture gradually became similar. The Tusi culture is rich in content, continuous for a long period, and far-reaching in impact. Although there is a bad lot as feudalism in the Tusi culture, it is still a part in the traditional Borderland culture. The history, literature and genealogy related to the Tusi system, as well as the related traditional customs, are worthy of research. There are apparent limits in the Tusi system. One is that the chieftains are protected by the imperial court, but sometimes their actions



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are beyond the control of the court; as a result, the chieftains would become stronger and even try to separate from the Imperial court depending on the local army. The other is that the Tusi system protects the backward society in an objective way and makes it difficult for the native people under the jurisdiction to obtain the protection of the national legal system. With the development of the Borderland area, the conservative and backward side of the Tusi system has gradually become apparent, and there has been an increase in the number of cases where chieftain competes with the Imperial court for resources such as land and mineral deposits. Even so, the Tusi system still has the raison d’edtre in Borderland area, especially in remote regions. After the outbreak of the first Opium War, the British and French powers invaded the Borderland of Yunnan, but the Qing court was unable to repel them. The Borderland chieftains there spontaneously organized army to fight the invaders and thus played an active role in maintaining the security of the territory. Regarding the Tusi system as an important system for Borderland governance in the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, rather than just a national government policy or strategy, will effectively expand the research space. Although the research in this area has made progress, it is still at the beginning of the academic work, and there is still a lot of work to be done. In addition, related research still needs more in-depth exploration. A lot of work is needed for the research of the Tusi system itself: the procedure of appointing a new chieftain, the procedure of chieftain hereditary, issuance and collection of seal and order, regulations on Huyin or the subordinate officials, implementation and effect of the Fenxi System or enfeoffment system, promotion and features of liutu bingzhi or the Combination of Native Rule and Regular Administration, taxation in the chieftain ruling areas, placement and disposal of chieftain, and so forth. Further research on these topics is needed. Many issues involved in the promotion of the Tusi system throughout the dynasties also require comprehensive research and in-depth discussion, such as the relationship between chieftain and the central government, national identity issues in chieftain regions, relationship between chieftain and local government, relations among chieftains,

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relationship between chieftain and local people, regional distribution of chieftain regions, social structure in chieftain regions, and so forth. In particular, issues such as cultural education, imperial examinations, and customary laws in the chieftain regions are hardly touched. Besides, due to the limitation of the division of disciplines, there is still a lack of overall research on the Tusi system. The history circle usually make research on the Tusi system in generations or periods, while the ethnic history circle mostly focuses on a certain region or a certain ethnic group. Therefore, it is necessary to make out a general history of the Tusi system in China in its true sense. It is also possible that the discussion will be deepened by examining the issues that have been studied for many years from a new perspective or adopting new methods. Taking the historical study of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms as the example. The research conducted in the past mainly focused on the historical facts and historical data of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms. If the history of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms is examined in the context of the whole country, and is connected with the development of Yunnan over thousands of years, the horizon of research can be broadened. The author believes that a comprehensive study can be done on the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms and the influencing factors. This topic includes the following aspects: the first is the rise and prosperity of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, including the reasons of each kingdom, the economic and culture of each kingdom in its prosperity, and the internal and external transportation of each kingdom. The second is the decline and demise of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, including the reasons of each kingdom, the role and influence of wars with other countries of Nanzhao, the division and its influence of the late Dali kingdom, and the unification and its influence of Mongolia on Yunnan area. The third is the external environment of the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, including the relationship between Nanzhao, Tubo and the Tang Dynasty, the relationship between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty, the reason and influence of the Song Dynasty regarding Dali as its vassal state, the relationship between Dali and the Song Dynasty, the relationship between Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms and the Indo-China Peninsula, and so forth. The fourth is



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the governance strategy and practice of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, including the ethnic policies and implementation in Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the internal governance policies and implementation in Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, as well as the foreign defense policies and implementation in Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms. The fifth is the existence conditions and the far-reaching impact of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, including the comparison of the external existence conditions of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the comparison of the internal existence conditions of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the contribution of the development on the Borderland remote area of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the influence of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms on the national relations in Yunnan, the relationship between Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms and changes in geopolitical relations, and so forth. There are many related factors when reviewing the process of the prosperity and decline of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms. We should analyze the role of these factors and the relationship between them from the perspective of the overall structure, dialectical development and dynamic evolution, and make a comprehensive examination of this issue to give a reasonable explanation of the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, as well as sum up the experience and lessons from it. The internal and external factors affecting the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms are a focus of research, which include the governance policies of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the internal relations in Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms and the adjustment of them; the relationship between Nanzhao, Tubo and the Tang Dynasty, the nature of the relationship between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty, the nature of the relationship between Dali and the Song Dynasty, the relationship between Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms and the Indo-China Peninsula, and so forth. As for the contribution and historical status of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the issues of the contribution of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms towards the unification of Yunnan and the economic and cultural development in Yunnan, the exploration of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms towards the remote areas in the Borderland, the influence of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms towards the geopolitics in Yunnan, the important status of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms in the history of

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Yunnan and the Chinese civilization history, and so forth should be included. Through the above research, the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, the factors behind the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms, and the historical status and far-reaching impact of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms can be further discovered. Furthermore, the discussion of the rise and fall of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms can also inform the study of the rise and fall of the Borderland dynasties of the Huns, Turks, Liao, Jin, and Mongolia, as well as the role and contribution of these dynasties in building a unified multi-ethnic country.

4.  Emphasis on the Theoretical Reflection on Borderland History Historical research requires theoretical guidance, and Borderland history research is no exception. It can be said that in recent years, due to the lack of theoretical reflection, it has had an adverse effect on the research of Borderland history in Southwest China, which should be noted by researchers.

4.1  One issue is the Borderland governance and the internal and external relationship of the Borderland area. Compared with ethnohistory, local history and dynastic history, the research of Borderland history has its own characteristics and can provide some historical reference for the national Borderland governance. In order to carry out a deeper study of related issues, it’s far from enough to summarize the basic laws and lessons of Borderland governance throughout the dynasties with traditional textual research methods. Newer methods such as medium-long historical time, overall historical method, and comparative research must be adopted. In recent years, the academic circles have discussed a lot of issues, including the Borderland governance thoughts, the view of Borderland, the view of Borderland governance, Borderland policies, and some major events in the Borderland, which are necessary



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but not sufficient. We should pay attention to the issues that the government urgently needs to understand. Recently, this author considered “Borderland Governance Tactic of the Zhongyuan Dynasty” as a research topic. Ancient China was composed of the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland regimes, who had different practices and ideas on Borderland governance. It would be better to study them together if possible. Because the Zhongyuan dynasty have ruled for a long time on China’s central area, the tradition formed in these dynasties on Borderland governance has influenced up to the present day. Therefore, we are necessary to strengthen the research on Borderland governance tactic of the Zhongyuan dynasty. As a military term, tactic is usually used to refer to the plan and strategy that guide the war situation. The introduction of the research on Borderland governance can state the Borderland governance tactic as the basic strategy and tradition formed through long-term practice and summary in Borderland governance throughout the dynasties. Are there basic strategies and corresponding traditions in the Borderland governance throughout the dynasties? The answer is definitely yes. The reason is that under the influence of agricultural civilization, the central area in the territory of the Zhongyuan dynasty has formed an ultra-stable social structure. Although the dynasties were altered because of the corruption or invalid ruling of the Central court, the economic foundation and social structure remained unchanged. On the other hand, On the other hand, the surrounding environment of the Zhongyuan dynasty has not undergone fundamental changes since the unification of Qin Dynasty. Therefore, although the feudal dynasties are constantly changing with different features and explorations in the Borderland governance, the Borderland governance of the new dynasty still basically inherits traditional strategies and practices. The successive dynasties may not have systematically summarized the traditional Borderland governance tactics, but there are many related knowledge and records in historical records. In studying the Borderland governance tactic of the Zhongyuan dynasty, the following issues should be stressed: the view on ethnic minorities of the Zhongyuan dynasty and its impact on Borderland governance tactic, the view of Borderland of the Zhongyuan dynasty

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and its impact on Borderland governance tactic, the geopolitical view of the Zhongyuan dynasty and its strategic application, the gaming view of the Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty and its strategic application, the cultural soft power tactic of the Zhongyuan dynasty, the governance tactic of “following the tide and leading a new trend” adopted by the Zhongyuan dynasty Borderland, the institutional influencing factors of the Zhongyuan dynasty on the Borderland governance tactic, the evolution and development of the governance tactic of the Zhongyuan dynasty. Although there are a lot of issues concerning the governance tactic of the Zhongyuan dynasty Borderland, the above-mentioned are of the most importance. Figuring out these issues can lead to a further expansion of the research content and depth, such as the discussion on the relationship between the important system of the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland governance: the complicated connections between formation of ancient Chinese territory and the diplomatic relations of China and other countries, as well as the development and evolution of these connections, and so forth. The critical inheritance of traditional Borderland governance theory and the innovation and development of Borderland governance theory in China under the new situation should also be studied. As for the driving force behind Borderland development, some people believed that it is the people in the Borderland area because they misunderstood the judgment of “The masses of the people are the driving force to advance history”. It should be noted that there is a difference between “driving force of the development” and “subject of the development”. The former refers to the main driving force that promotes development, while the latter refers to the basic unit that implements development. It’s no doubt that the subject of the Borderland development is people, including local ethic groups, immigrants and soldiers of the Zhongyuan dynasty who had engaged in the development. However, the driving force of the Borderland development is the ruling bodies including the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland regimes. The reason is that the ruling bodies in the feudal era possessed enough strong authority and mobility to use various resources at will in order to achieve the set goals, even at the expense of massive consumption of financial and human resources. Of course, the effect of its actions



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was obvious. Although the management of the Borderland areas by the ruling bodies is mainly based on geopolitical considerations or some specific purposes, it objectively promotes the development of the Borderland or creates favorable conditions for Borderland development. On the other hand, the indigenous peoples and immigrants in the Borderland have lower consumption desires due to the lower level of social development. At the same time, the power of these people was scattered or even neutralized because of the diversity of ethnic groups and ethnic cultures, therefore, they have neither the powerful driving force of the Borderland development nor the prerequisite for the active large-scale development. Furthermore, ruling bodies are not only the major driving force of the Borderland development, but also the major operators of the Borderland administration and management. That is why the researchers nowadays always put the related ruling bodies (especially the Zhongyuan dynasty) at the focus when studying such issues.

4.2  As for the issue of relationship between the Borderland history and ethnohistory, there have been three stages of the research on the Borderland history and ethnohistory since 1949. The first thirty years has seen the ethnohistory-based research, which is related to the determination of the legal status of fifty-five ethnic minorities through ethnic identification and the emphasis on equality among all ethnic groups and the greater emphasis on ethnic minorities in aid. Therefore, most studies pay more attention to the historical activities of ethnic minorities, including their status in origin, politics, economy, and culture, and so forth, as well as the ethnic relations in various periods and so on from the perspectives and methods mainly based on ethnic minorities and ethnohistory. The research during this period showed that the Chinese government attached great importance to the ethnic equality. However, the Borderland issues at that time were not as prominent as they are today. After the reform and opening-up, the situation has undergone major changes, especially since the government initiated the China Western Development. The economic development

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and management practices of the Borderland area require historical research achievements for reference. During this period, the history of development and management of the Borderland area quickly became a hot spot in the academic circles, and the research focus also shifted to the issues of the Borderland area in the history such as transportation, agriculture, culture and education, and social changes. In recent years, new situations have emerged in the Borderland area. Affected by many factors, the Borderland area of China has formed a new interest pattern and the national self-awareness has also increased. These have caused some changes in national relations. On the other hand, China’s peaceful rise has caused uneasiness in some neighboring countries and has generated some conflicts of interest. At the same time, the return of the United States to Southeast Asia has also brought new problems. The issues of how China solves the emerging problems in the Borderland area, deals with its relations with neighboring countries, and handles the increasingly tense situation in East Asia are all before us. These issues also have affected the topic selection and research methods of the Borderland history. A relatively new research perspective is to combine together the Borderland formation and the diplomatic relations in the history, the Borderland governance and relations with the neighboring countries, which is also in line with the historical reality of the inseparability of China’s Borderland issues and diplomatic relations in the long period of ancient times. As for the economic development of the ancient Borderland, the previous research was mostly done from the perspectives of economic history and local history. Economic history mainly studies the interaction between Borderland area productivity and production relations, paying more attention to the development of productivity in various periods, as well as the level of agriculture, animal husbandry, mining, transportation, handicraft and commerce, and attaching importance to the statistics of the total amount of social products, yields, and land area, and so forth. The study of local history regards economic development as a content of local development, juxtaposing it with politics, culture, and ethnic composition. Most local history focuses on provinces and other administrative units as the research scope. Less attention is paid to the relationship between the provinces studied and



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their surrounding areas, and there are few comparisons of the similar regions. The research conducted from the perspective of Borderland history is different from the former two in many aspects. The author believes that the following issues are worthy of attention: As for the relationship between the economic development and the Borderland management, it’s obvious that the Zhongyuan dynasty and the local regimes that carried out the Borderland management have different in different dynasties or even the same dynasty, the ideas, strategies and focuses of the Borderland management will change under the reign of different rulers, and the development activities of the Borderland will therefore show a dynamic process of change. which is the key to the Borderland development. For example, before the Yuan Dynasty, the Borderland governance of the successive dynasties has the tendency of the traditional Borderland governance emphasis on north China rather than south China. The focus of Borderland governance is to prevent the nomadic people in the north from going south, and it is generally a passive response to the southern Borderland. Therefore, southern Borderland is far from a scaled development. The situation in the Yuan Dynasty changed significantly. The rulers of the Yuan Dynasty came from Mongolia grassland, the northern territory of the Yuan Dynasty extended to Siberia, and the northwestern territory was connected with the Four Great Khanates, resulting in a very narrow space for expansion to the north. The Yuan Dynasty implemented the policies of nomadic khanate and “ruling Han lands by Han’s law”. It was necessary to continuously acquire land and population to meet the needs of rewarding. Therefore, the Yuan Dynasty continued to expand outward, especially in the direction of south. The Yuan Dynasty actively managed Yunnan, Guangxi, and the adjacent Indo-China Peninsula, and Yunnan became a central province directly governed by the Central Court with a significantly accelerated speed of economic development. The Yuan Dynasty’s active development of Yunnan and Guangxi accelerated the integration of these regions with the inland area, on the contrary, the minerals and forest resources of the southern Borderland also benefited the Central Court. The Yuan Dynasty’s active management of southern Borderland was inherited by the Ming and Qing dynasties, thus these three dynasties have become the most

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powerful and effective period for developing southern Borderland by the Zhongyuan dynasty.

4.3  As for the relationship between the Borderland economic form and historical territory, it is important to study the productivity of Borderland area in different periods, and the development of transportation, agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, commerce and other production sectors, but other issues such as the profound impact of economic formation on the formation of historical territory should also be paid attention to as well. The natural environment and resource utilization in Chinese Borderland area are complex and diverse, which directly affects the differences in the formation and consolidation of various regions. Comparison of the southwest Borderland represented by Yunnan with the northern Borderland represented by Mongolia grassland could be carried out. The southwest Borderland is a mountainous area with few plains, a humid and warm climate, and abundant animal and plant resources. In the southwest Borderland represented by the Yunnan region, the main economic type of ethnic groups is a low-level compound economy. This kind of economy is based on primary agriculture, which mainly grows basic food crops in dry land and paddy fields. At the same time, animal husbandry, gathering and hunting still occupy a considerable proportion. The low-level compound economy is a primary selfsufficient economy, which can easily meet the living needs of local residents, but it has never reached the level of agricultural development in the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the Yangtze River. This kind of economy belongs to the same economic and cultural circle as the agricultural economy of the Central Plains, but its degree of development cannot be compared with the latter. As a result, all ethnic groups in the southwest Borderland always respect and learn from the Zhongyuan dynasty without any desire to compete and even conquer the Central Plains. On the other hand, a low-level compound economy can cover different resource types and production means, making it easy for the local ethnic groups living in the mountains and basins and



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the foreign immigrants to accommodate each other and realize the integration of mutual relations, so as to form a relatively harmonious ethnic relation in the southwest Borderland and become one of the driving forces for the border land to spiritually connect closer to the inland area. Affected by this, the tendency of the southwest Borderland to integrate with the inland has become more obvious in the Tang and Song Dynasties. Even when the Song Dynasty demarcated the Dadu River as the boundary with Dali Kingdom and adopted an attitude of alienation and repulsion towards Dali Kingdom, Dali Kingdom still regarded the Court of two Song dynasties as Zhengshuo or the Orthodox Ruler, and sent envoys to the two Song dynasties many times to establish a vassal relationship. At the end of the Song Dynasty, the Mongolian army conquered Dali Kingdom, after then, the Yunnan Province was established in Yuan Dynasty on the basis of the Yunnan region, and the integrating process of Yunnan and other Borderland areas with the inland was significantly accelerated. At the same time, the Ming and Qing Dynasties attached great importance to the development of Yunnan, especially the large-scale mining of silver, copper and other minerals for the benefit of the country. By the end of the Ming and the early Qing, Yunnan, Guangxi and other southwest Borderland areas had been regarded as inland areas. Mongolia grassland has a flat terrain and lush pastures, and has always been an important grazing land. The economy of the region is a typical animal husbandry one, which is based on animal husbandry with small proportions of planting, gathering, mining and metallurgy. Therefore, animal husbandry economic regions usually lack cultural accumulation and important products such as cloth and ironware which can only be obtained from agricultural regions through exchange or war. On the other hand, the animal husbandry economy is obviously affected by natural conditions such as climate. In the good weather, the number of livestock can increase exponentially; in the extremely cold weather, large numbers of livestock will die, and nomadic people are forced to go south for shelter from the cold. There is another situation, that is, if the agricultural area near the Great Wall expands too far to the north and occupy vast tracts of grasslands on which herders depend for their livelihoods, the nomadic people will be forced to go south to fight

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back. The areas based on the animal husbandry economy share certain similarities in the environment, resources, society and culture, which makes it easy for nomadic people to merge and reorganize. Nomadic society has been stagnant in the early and mid-stage of class society for a long time. Compared with the Zhongyuan dynasty, it’s less mature in the state form and ruling system. Therefore, the power of nomadic people rises very quickly, but it falls and even collapses quickly either. In short, the main contradiction in Mongolia grassland is extroverted. The nomadic people on the grassland are easy to be integrated and gathered which makes them a huge force to fight against the Central Plains. After a cruel struggle and painful process, some nomadic people who went south merged with the ethnic groups on the Central Plains, and then a new force of nomadic people formed on the Grassland and went south again, repeating the historical tragedies and comedies that appeared in previous generations. Due to the above reasons, nomadic people in Mongolia grassland often go south, seriously threatening the safety of the Zhongyuan dynasty. The large-scale southward movement of nomadic people has the characteristics of high frequency, abruptness and the proneness of severe damage and the powers of nomadic people that go south have less inheritance in different periods. These all increase the damage caused and the difficulty of the Zhongyuan dynasty to deal with these harassments. Under such circumstances, for a long period of time the Zhongyuan dynasty put the focus of the Borderland governance in the north, and at the same time had a high level of vigilance towards nomadic people. Compared to the southwest Borderland, the formation and consolidation of the northern Borderland of the Zhongyuan dynasty is quite late. Moreover, the integration of the northern Borderland and the inland finally is achieved not because the Zhongyuan dynasty vigorously developed its minerals and other resources to accelerate this process, but mainly because of the extensive marriages implemented by the Qing Dynasty with the upper Mongolian people, the promotion of Buddhism on the Mongolian grassland, and other measures. This suggests that the southwest Borderland and northern Borderland of the Zhongyuan dynasty are different in terms of the time, degree, and internal motivation of formation and consolidation. Furthermore, the



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formation and consolidation of historical territory in China is related to factors such as different types of economic forms in various parts of the border land. The complicated relationship among these factors is worthy of further research.

5.  Deepening the Research on the Tusi System The Tusi system was a political regime adopted by feudal Chinese emperors in Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties to govern ethnic minority regions in southwest Borderland and other regions of ethnic minorities in south China. Lasting for over six hundred years, it has had a significant and far-reaching impact on relevant regions. The studies on the Tusi system have gained growing popularity in China and many important achievements have been made since 1949. Current studies involve system for the ruling of the Borderlands and ethnic minorities by the Zhongyuan dynasty and its evolution, changes of the society under the Tusi system and the character of ethnic minorities in southern China, influence of the Tusi system over the culture of ethnic minorities, and so on. It is necessary to summarize the understanding of the Tusi system by researchers so far, point out the direction for expanding the research fields and propose ideas for deepening relevant studies.

5.1. Review of Relevant Studies The Tusi system was a political regime adopted by feudal Chinese emperors in Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties to govern ethnic minority regions in southwest Borderland and other regions of ethnic minorities in south China. A paragraph in Biography of Tusi, Volume 310 of the History of the Ming, provides description of the Tusi system, which is simple but roughly accurate. “The Tusi system was greatly expanded in Ming dynasty, covering all levels of administration. The chieftains can have their own share of taxes and commissions, yet they should follow the order of the central dynasties. It was in essence similar to the Jimi system. Major chieftains inherited their power for generations and were appointed by the central dynasties under certain titles with

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rank and emoluments for unified administration of the whole country. However, when they frequently received the orders from the central dynasties, they would count on their contributions and rebel against the unified control. Therefore, the key of the Tusi system is to temper justice with mercy so that the chieftains would serve for the country rather than becoming hidden troubles.” Originated from the Tuguan System in Yuan Dynasty, the Tusi system was further developed and perfected in Ming and Qing Dynasties.6 In the late Ming Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty, the policy of “gaitu guiliu” was implemented to abolish the rule of some local Tusi and replace them by a “mainstream” (Liu) direct administration. The rest was kept through the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China to 1950s and finally abolished through democratic reform. Lasting for over 600 years, the Tusi system had a significant and far-reaching impact on relevant regions and some of its influence even still exists today. Investigation and research into the Tusi system have surpassed a century since the publication of the Tusi in Yunnan by Yunsheng in 1908. The study of the Tusi system in the past century could be a dynamic process of development with distinctive feature of the times. It can be divided into four parts, namely the period before 1949, the period from 1949 to 1989, the period from 1989 to the end of the 20th century, and the end of the 20th century to the present. The study of the Tusi system before 1949 mainly focused on the investigation into and introduction of the native chieftain in the border areas and some researchers also discussed the pros and cons of the Tusi system and whether it should be abolished or not. Out of the sense of crisis, relevant studies were characterized by the care for politics and the search for solutions to the problems of border area. The formation, development and evolution of the Tusi system, as well as relevant historical issues were less discussed. The forty years from 1949 to 1989 was a period of warming up for the study of the Tusi system. It can be further divided into three stages, 6 The Tuguan system and the Tusi system are basically similar in the contents and char­ acteristics despite some differences in their degree of perfection and scope of application. The general term Tusi system is adopted in the following part for simplicity.



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namely before the Cultural Revolution, during the Cultural Revolution, and after the Cultural Revolution. Before the Cultural Revolution, the exploration into the Tusi system reflected the concern for ethnic equality and relevant issues as well as the enthusiasm for learning MarxismLeninism and application of them into historical research. Frequently discussed topics include the beginning and the end of the Tusi system, reasons for the feudal dynasties to implement the Tusi system, whether the Tusi system had an economic foundation or not, the influence of the Tusi system and gaitu guiliu, and so on. Researchers become gradually familiar with Marxism-Leninism and historical materialism, which helped them to make completely new achievements in terms of historical outlook, academic viewpoints and research methods. Some of the works were very insightful. However, some other works were inevitably left-leaning and dogmatic. Due to the special academic environment during the ten years of Cultural Revolution, few work on the study of the Tusi system was published. The discussion on the Tusi system gradually recovered after the Cultural Revolution. Researchers began to seriously reflect on previous studies. For example, the aura of some once-popular views, like the prerequisite for gaitu guiliu is the full development of landlord economy in regions under the Tusi system, gradually faded. The scope of research continued to expand. Such topics as Tusi system in different provinces and regions, evaluation of the Tusi system, connotation of local positions like Tuguan and Tusi, position of gaitu guiliu, and gaitu guiliu in different provinces and regions, were adopted as the objects of study. The period from 1989 to the end of the 20th century witnessed the gradual thriving of the research on the Tusi system. The characteristics of the research in the period are as follows: the first is growing numbers and quality of research findings, including some fresh ideas; the second is to highlight the perspectives of vertical evolution and horizontal analysis and significant progress was made in the study of the origin, formation and development of the Tusi system, major construction and feature of the Tusi system, positive role and disadvantages of the Tusi system, and similarities and differences of Gaitu Guili in Ming and Qing Dynasties; the third is the relatively concentrated choice of topic and more attention is paid to Tusi in border areas especially in the

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modern times, the Tusi system and gaitu guiliu of different provinces and regions, the family of Tusi and its inheritance and evolution, and so on; the fourth is that some scholars chose to study different types of Tusi system in different regions and zero in on specific issues because they were not satisfied with general discussions on the Tusi system. In conclusion, researchers had gradually abandoned dogma and solidified ways and entered a broader academic area. The expansion and deepening of related discussions also demonstrate the great vitality of research into the Tusi system. The study of the Tusi system has flourished since the end of the 20th century. The accumulation of previous studies brought great potential for the research in the period, so the number of new findings soared and the quality of research markedly improved. At present, it is still on the upswing. According to preliminary statistics, nearly one third of the articles on ethnohistory and Borderland history of southern part of China are on the Tusi system or gaitu guili, showing significant interest in the Tusi system among researchers. Research done in this period shows three features. Firstly, increasing number of new topics was chosen with deepening study. More essays adopting new perspectives and methods were completed. In addition to the discussion on the Tusi system in the border areas, great progress was made in the exploration into the Tusi system in inner regions like Huguang, Chongqing, and so on. Some scholars also looked into the Tusi system in Ganqing, Chuanbian, Muli, and other regions. In view of the booming of the study of the Tusi system, some scholar put forward the suggestion to construct an independent discipline and started to discuss relevant concept and discipline construction. Secondly, joint force has been achieved through intensive cooperation among researchers. National symposiums have been held for several consecutive years. In 2010, the Institute of History under CASS and other units held the symposium on the Tusi system and relevant culture in Guangxi. In 2011, China Borderland History and Geography Studies Center and Jishou University jointly organized the First Symposium on Chinese Tusi system and Ethnic Culture. In 2012, the Institute of History under CASS, Yunnan Normal University and the government of Jingdong county jointly hosted the Second International Symposium on the Tusi system



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and Border Society. In 2013, China Borderland History and Geography Studies Center, Yangtze Normal University and other organizations jointly organized the Third International Symposium on Chinese Tusi system, Tusi Culture, and Qing Liangyu Studies and it was determined during the symposium that the National Symposium on Tusi system for 2014 would be held in Guangxi. Thirdly, many new scholars joined the study of the Tusi system and most of them are energetic young people with Master’s or Doctoral’ degree. A number of influential works on the study of the Tusi system have been published in recent years and the majority of the authors are young scholars. It is very encouraging that there will be no lack of people to carry on the research on the Tusi system. Research on the Tusi system has also received strong support from the National Social Science Fund of China, in particular the comprehensive project on the history and status quo of southwest Borderland of China, and the humanities and social sciences projects of the Ministry of Education. Dozens of projects related to the Tusi system have been approved. Some universities have established academic institutions to focus on the study of the Tusi system or chosen the Tusi system as their major direction of research. There are also some weak links in the current research. For example, the research is limited to the southern borders and ethnic minority regions in southern part of China, so it could be further expanded to the perspective of the overall border system and comparative research. For another example, some details are repeatedly studied while the study of the theoretical framework of the Tusi system, the institutional arrangements and standards of the Tusi system, the field of Tusi system, and other major issues should be strengthened.

5.2. Research Direction of Understanding and Expansion of the Tusi System The achievements in the past one hundred years, especially in the past sixty years, have deepened people’s research on the Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty and barbaric rules, and also showed broad prospects for future discussions. The current research perspectives are developing in a diversified direction. While continuing to

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discuss the specific issues of the Tusi system, some scholars have shifted their research focus from ethnohistory to Borderland history, and from local Borderland history to national Borderland history; From the general Borderland history to the formation and governance of Borderland regions, the history of ancient diplomatic relations, and the history of international order, and so forth. In terms of research objects, the combination of the micro and macro methods is popular with the gradual focus on macro research. Some scholars have shifted their objects from small issues to overall history and historical development principles, which are all good signs. 5.2.1. With the Deepening of Research, People Have a New Understanding of the Tusi System, Which Is Mainly Manifested in the Following Aspects The formation and development of the Tusi system. The predecessor of the Tusi system was the Jimi System. The Jimi System prevailed from the Qin to Song dynasties. It was formulated based on the fact that the border of the Zhongyuan dynasty was still changing, the Borderland rule was difficult to push forward, and the border with neighboring states had not been clearly defined. The Jimi System is mainly characterized by its loose and arbitrary control, and is generally applied to the areas at the Borderland connecting with neighboring regions of other countries. The border shire system in the Han Dynasty, the prefecture of Jimi in the Tang Dynasty and the counties of Jimi in the Song Dynasty represent the main types of the Jimi System at different stages. The Yuan Dynasty developed the Jimi System to the Tuguan System, and the Ming and Qing Dynasties perfected and deepened the Tuguan System, forming a more effective and standardized Tusi system. The Jimi System is primarily applied in Borderland areas. The Tusi system in the early days was also designed as a Borderland ruling system. After being successful in practice, it was then extended to the barbaric areas in Hubei and Hunan provinces, Chongqing and other places, becoming an important system for the governance of the southern ethnic minorities. Institutional characteristics of the Tusi system. The main feature of the Tusi system is that the Zhongyuan dynasty formally incorporated



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the leaders of the ruled Borderland ethnic minorities into the national official system, and clearly stipulated the duties and obligations of the chieftains at all levels. The post of Tusi (chieftain) can be hereditary, but it must be reviewed and approved by the Court. The imperial court allowed higher-medium leveled chieftains to govern a certain number of troops. The troops were attached to the relevant chieftains but were incorporated into the national military system for management. In addition to maintaining public security in the governing areas, the troops might be dispatched by the Court for military missions. The above contents are obviously different from that of the Jimi System. The relationship between the implementation of the Tusi system and Borderland governance. As an important system for the Zhongyuan dynasty to govern Borderland and ethnic minorities, the Tusi system and its predecessors have undergone complex changes during the creation, prosperity to the decline. These changes also reflect the evolution of the thoughts, strategies, and measures of Borderland governance by the Zhongyuan dynasty, from which not only can we understand the characteristics of the rule of the China’s imperial history, but also can further understand the trajectory of the formation and development of China’s historical territory. If we study these issues from the perspective of Borderland governance and rule of the ethnic minorities, it will broaden the researchers’ horizons and help to explore the relationship between the political systems of the successive dynasties, the theories and policies of Borderland governance, and the formation of Chinese historical territory, and so forth. The social foundation for the implementation of the Tusi system. The Tusi system has a specific foundation, that is, the closely integrated relationship between the ethnic minorities and their leaders with the local land and other resources in the southern barbaric regions. The interdependent relationship of the three forms a special social structure that is passed down through generations. In the southern barbaric regions, the ethnic minorities take possession of land and other resources as their basic living conditions, and the leader must firmly control the people under his jurisdiction and the land and other resources on which they depend. For this reason, the imperial court stipulated that native officials can guard the land forever, govern their people forever, and

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allowed their posts to be inherited in a hereditary system. The imperial court appointed the leaders of the submissive ethnic minorities as orthodox officials, which equipped them in a favorable position in the battle with other ethnic minorities. Therefore, the Tusi system was welcomed by the leaders of the submissive ethnic minorities and was successfully implemented. The great changes in the Borderland governance policies of the Zhongyuan dynasty. The development and change from the Jimi System to the Tusi system has gone through a process from a simple and mixed early stage to a detailed and personalized development in the later stage. It can be said that the diversification of Borderland governance policies of the Zhongyuan dynasty, and the clear distinguish between the Borderland governance policies and the vassal state system are generated from the Tusi system. The Tuguan System of the Yuan Dynasty was founded in Yunnan Province. At the beginning of the occupation of Yunnan, the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty also implemented the traditional Wanhu System, but the effect was not good and the chaos continued. On the basis of the Mongol Empire’s practice of appointing the leaders of the submissive groups to keep their original posts, and absorption of the experience of setting up Tuguan and Zhuangding in Guangxi in the Southern Song Dynasty, Yuan Dynasty established the Tuguan System in Yunnan, and further promoted it after achieving significant success. The Tusi system was only implemented in the southern Borderland and other southern barbaric regions, however, in other Borderland areas such as the northern grasslands, the Zhongyuan dynasty still implemented the traditional Wanhu System. On the other hand, the areas where the Tusi system was implemented were limited to the Borderland or other barbaric regions that were effectively ruled by the Central dynasty. The neighboring countries such as Korea, Annam and Burma, and the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties implemented the system of vassal states. Therefore, the Tusi system and the Jimi System are obviously different in terms of the scope of application, the relationship between the imperial court and the Tusi, the specific governance methods, and the depth of dynasty’s rule over the barbaric regions. The Tusi system was highly valued by the rulers of the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, because it replaced the officials and troops



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originally dispatched by the court with the Tusi and his troops from the barbaric regions to a certain extent, which greatly reduced the court’s administration costs of the Borderland governance, and successfully realized the strategy of “using barbarous people to subjugate their own races” that was dreamed by previous rulers. The current research on the above issues is only at the initial stage, and the content involved is numerous and complicated. 5.2.2. From the above Perspective, We Can Expand the Following Research Directions The interaction between the Tusi system and other important systems in terms of development and evolution. Such as the specific content and features of the border shire system in the Han Dynasty, the prefecture of Jimi in the Tang Dynasty and the counties of Jimi in the Song Dynasty, as well as the similarities, differences, and interaction among these Borderland governance systems. And the similarities and differences between the Tuguan System in Yuan and Ming-Qing Dynasties, Tusi system’s development and perfection of Tuguan System, the reformation and limitation brought by the process of gaitu guiliu in Qing Dynasty towards the Tusi system. The status of the above systems in the history of the Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty and their interaction with the evolution and development of other systems. The influence of the important systems of the Zhongyuan dynasty, including the Tributary system, the administrative jurisdiction system, the official system, the military system, and the cultural and educational system, on the Borderland governance, and the interactive relationship between them. The changes in the social environment and the surrounding natural environment in the Borderland areas, and the response of the Zhongyuan dynasty. Such as the way of resource extraction and utilization in the Tusi regions, social relation and its structure, cultural traditions and humanistic environment, and the influence of the above factors on the Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty. Different ruling systems in different Tusi regions, and the individualized, phased development and characteristics of each system, as well as the comparison of their similarities and differences. The path, time and

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degree of maturity of the integrated development of the Borderland areas and the inland, and further analysis on the complexity and uneven development of the formation of China as a unified multiethnic state. The relationship between the Zhongyuan dynasty and its neighboring countries has gradually become clear, and it has experienced the evolution and division of the neighboring regions and border areas of the Zhongyuan dynasty, as well as the long-term evolution of the relationship between the Zhongyuan dynasty and neighboring states. From the perspective of the Tusi system as the basic demarcation, it is possible to explore the understanding of the relationship between the Borderland areas, foreign states and neighboring countries in the China’s imperial history, and the issues concerning its response principles, related systems and textual expressions. The rule and administration of the Tusi regions in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. The Tusi system was formed in the Yuan Dynasty, matured in the Ming Dynasty, and promoted in the Qing Dynasty. During this period, the central government’s rule of the Tusi regions further deepened, and the society in the Tusi regions also experienced significant changes. The specific manifestation is that the central government paid more attention to the rule of the southern barbaric regions, and its jurisdiction extends to various places and even the grassroots. The second manifestation is to actively develop the transportation, plantation, and mining industries in the Tusi regions, so as to obtain tax revenue, non-ferrous metals and timber and effectively promote the local social and economic development. The third one is to transform the Tusi regions through the development of education and the change of old customs, which promoted the process of integration of the Borderland areas and the inland. In recent years, the governance of Borderland areas and ethnic minorities in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties has become a hot spot in academic circle, and the Tusi system is an important entry point. Comparison of the similarities and differences of ruling Tusi regions in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. The Borderland governance of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties differed in goals, strategies, measures, and effectiveness, which had a lot to do with the view of the world, the view of Borderland, and insights of the rulers of the



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three dynasties and is shown in the governance of the southern ethnic minorities. Yuan Dynasty founded the Tuguan System in the southern barbaric regions and achieved great success. It is related to the ruler’s unique view of the world and Borderland, trust and bold use of local ethnic minorities leaders, and the principles of flexibility and simplicity. The Yuan Dynasty’s short ruling and its quick corruption in the middle and late stages failed to perfect the Tuguan System. The Ming Dynasty developed the Tuguan System into the Tusi system and actively promoted it. It made important contributions to the enrichment and standardization of the Tusi system, but it still had some limitations. In the late Ming Dynasty, the Tusi of Luchuan in Yunnan launched a rebellion and expanded outward. The imperial court dispatched hundreds of thousands of troops to suppress it three times. Although the rebellion was repressed finally, the hidden dangers remained unresolved. Later, the southern Borderland fell into the hands of other foreign invaders and the border of the country was shrunk. The present-day Miao and Yao peoples in Hunan and Guizhou had also launched large-scale uprisings. The Wei-so area in the southern Borderland was very prosperous, but the Tusi regions was obviously lagging behind. There are still many problems in the Tusi system in the Ming Dynasty, which are related to the relatively conservative rulers and the inherit of some negative parts of the Borderland governance tradition of the Tang and Song Dynasties. The Qing Dynasty was more conscious of the overall situation of the Borderland governance, deliberately managed, and attached great importance to the governance and development of the southern Borderland, especially the governance and development during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong periods in the Dynasty had reached an unprecedented scale, and the degree of in-depth and perfection had surpassed that of previous generations. During the Yongzheng period, the Chieftains in various parts of the south were turned into regular administration successively. The overall goal was to remove obstacles to the rule and regain resources such as occupied land. Some turning-measures were to consolidate border defense or eliminate hidden social threats. The Qing Court promoted Guiliu System in the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Guangxi. Based on

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careful investigations, it formulated different plans in response to local conditions, it also focuses on disintegrating to breaking down while attacking the target. Some researchers pointed out that the reform of the process of gaitu guiliu in the Qing Dynasty is not a complete denial to the Tusi system. Some Tusi system set up from the Qing Dynasty (especially in the border areas) continued to play a role, therefore the previous view that the process of gaitu guiliu in the Qing Dynasty was not thorough is open to question. Although there has been some research on the above-mentioned issues in the academic circle in recent years, there is still a lot of room for further discussion. The government control in Tusi regions during the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. After the implementation of the Tusi system, the situation that the Zhongyuan dynasty’ control of southern barbaric regions has long been confined to county-level administration had changed. The central government’s control of the barbaric regions at the grassroots level is also obviously deepened. The political, economic and cultural factors in the inland have profoundly affected these regions. We can introduce the concepts and methods of political science to study from a new perspective on the relationship between the central and local governments under the Tusi system, the government’s management and control of all levels of regimes, including the grassroots, the administrative management and its efficiency of the barbaric regions, and issues concerning the cultivation, use and supervision of officials. The development and changes of the ruling system in the Borderland areas during the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. The Tuguan System of the Yuan Dynasty was mainly implemented in the southern region, pioneering the Zhongyuan dynasty to govern all parts of the Borderland and formulate a ruling system based on local conditions. Later, in order to adapt to the differences in social structure, Borderland culture, and ethnic relations formed by the natural environment, resource types, and resource development and utilization methods in different regions, the Ming and Qing dynasties implemented different governance systems in the northern, southern and western Borderlands and developed the respective systems in these areas vertically. Such as the Tuguan System in southern barbaric regions had evolved into the Tusi system, the Wanhu System had evolved into Mongolian Banner System



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on the Mongolia grassland, Burke System in Xinjiang, and Golden Vase System in Xizang. Why was the Tusi system not widely implemented in the grasslands and other northern borders? What is the social and cultural basis and effectiveness of the implementation of the abovementioned Wanhu System, Mongolian Banner System, Burke System and Golden Vase System implemented in the Borderland areas? Studying these issues will help us improve our understanding of the diversity and complexity of China’s historical development. The influence of the Tusi system on the social development of Tusi regions. The large-scope and in-depth rule of the Tusi system and its wide-spread and profound influence are all far surpassed other previous ruling systems. As the Tusi system is applicable to the southern barbaric regions, the Zhongyuan dynasty’ rule in these regions can be deepened, and the central government’s control over the abovementioned regions has been greatly strengthened. In order to improve the quality of chieftains at all levels and train their successors, the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties actively established various schools in Tusi regions, which not only effectively improved the cultural level of Tusi regions, cultivated ethnic minorities’ sense of identity of the country, but also vigorously promoted the cultural exchange and integration between the Borderland areas and the inland. During the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, the society of Tusi regions has undergone great changes. It is not only reflected in the continuous entry of immigrants into Tusi regions and fusion with local ethnic groups, but also reflected in the significant changes in the political, economic, cultural and ethnic relations in the society of Tusi regions. All these topics are of considerable academic value. The social history in Tusi regions. In recent years, academic circles at home and abroad have paid more attention to the research on the lower class. In terms of the degree of maturity of social cultivation and the sorting and research of history and culture, there may be differences between southern ethnic minorities and the inland, but the history of southern ethnic minorities is rich, complex and diverse in content with some unique parts quite different from the inland. Due to the limited data and the influence of traditional prejudice, academic research on the society of southern ethnic minorities was very weak

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in the past. With the key of the Tusi system, we can open the door to the study of southern ethnic social history. After the implementation of the Tusi system, the distribution pattern of interests and resources in ethnic minority areas, the social structure and social relations, the relations between and within ethnic groups, and the production and lifestyles of related ethnic groups have all changed. With rich materials of local chronicles, genealogy, contracts, and survey records, we can conduct specific and in-depth research. We can also explore the history of social evolution and cultural heritage in Tusi regions. In terms of ethnic relations, national identity, and national character, there is a clear difference between the regions where the Tusi system was implemented and the regions where was not. What are the reasons? The historical influence of the governing systems of the Zhongyuan dynasty, especially the Tusi system, in ethnic minority areas and the role in the formation of ethnic minority traditional culture are all worthy of in-depth study. The group character and related culture of the ethnic groups in the Tusi regions. During the six centuries in which the Tusi system was implemented, the feelings of ethnic minorities towards the inland and their national identity increased significantly. The Tusi system also affects the group character and behavior of ethnic minorities. Under the Tusi system, some people were foolishly loyal to the court, feared the government and Han officials, followed the rules and lacked initiative, and some people were accustomed to cheating and deceiving the government or superiors. Some parts of the Tusi system are even integrated into the traditional culture of ethnic minorities, and inherited and evolved to the present day. After the implementation of Reform and Opening-up, the exploration and research on the traditional culture of ethnic minorities has become a hot spot. At present, the focus of research has gradually shifted from the food, clothing, housing, and transportation of ethnic minorities to deeper levels of thoughts, concepts, character, and cultural heritage. Under the influence of the Tusi system, what changes have taken place in the thoughts, concepts, and character of the southern minorities, and what important cultural heritages are left, are worthy of further exploration and discussion.



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5.3. Some Ideas for Further Research My vision is to focus on the following so as to further deepen the research on the Tusi system: 5.3.1. In-depth exploration, sorting and research of historical materials related to the Tusi system An advantageous condition for studying the Tusi system is that its time limit is focused on the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, extending forward to the Han and Tang Dynasties, and extending back to the Republic of China and even the 1950s and 1960s. In this long historical period, extremely rich documents and archaeological materials have been retained by the governments and the common people, but there is still a lot of room for going forward since there have not been enough excavations and sorting so far. The systematic and comprehensive collection and organization of historical materials related to the Tusi system will not only provide strong support for the research on many topics mentioned above, but will also give birth to new research fields and directions. New materials will inevitably produce new disciplines, which has been confirmed by numerous examples. The parts that have been carefully excavated and sorted out of the Tusi system historical materials so far are mainly official histories, special histories and some local chronicles. In recent years, the focus of excavation and sorting has gradually shifted to related archives from central and local governments, official records, anthologies and various local chronicles of the successive dynasties, as well as inscriptions, genealogy, modern oral historical materials and newly discovered archaeological materials. “The Collection, Sorting and Research of Historical Materials of the Tusi system in China”, which was approved in 2012, is the only major national project in China to study the Tusi system.7 Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Central Historical

7 Projects of the National Social Science Foundation of China, “The Collection, Sorting and Research of Historical Materials of the Tusi system in China”, hosted by Researcher Li Shiyu from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Project No.: 12&ZD135.

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Archives, Yunnan University and other units are organized to systematically collect, arrange, and research historical materials of the Tusi system during the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties throughout China. The final result of the project is a compilation of historical materials of no less than five million words and research works. The compilation of historical materials does not mean a complete collection, but plans to make breakthroughs in gathering important historical materials and forming a scientific compilation system for historical materials. The research works should include major theoretical issues of the Tusi system and the latest achievements in the discussion of the historical data compilation system. A highlight of the project will be the collection of rare historical materials collected by the Central Historical Archives and the archives of the Qing Dynasty collected by the National Palace Museum in Taiwan, as well as newly discovered local chronicles, inscriptions, genealogy and archaeological materials in recent years. The approval and implementation of this project will play an important role in promoting research in the field of the Tusi system in China. 5.3.2. Advocation of the diversification of research perspectives and methods to fully reflect the advantages of adopting different ­perspectives and methods Given that the Tusi system covers a wide range of fields and complex and diverse research types, whether the perspectives and methods adopted in the research are appropriate has a significant impact on the quality of research results. The traditional method of focusing on analysis, summary and deduction is still the basic method for exploring the Tusi system. According to the difference of research objects, different perspectives such as macro and micro can be adopted. The former mainly studies the relatively macro issues including the development and evolution of the Tusi system, the relationship between the Tusi system and Borderland governance thoughts, and the status of the Tusi system in the development history of ancient countries. The latter may study specific provinces, nationalities or types, or discuss the rise and fall of a certain Tusi and a certain problem in Tusi regions. In terms of research ideas, vertical or horizontal perspectives can be used. The former is mainly to explore the trajectory of the Tusi system-related



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issues in a longer period of time, such as the Tusi system’s changes from creation, prosperity to decline, as well as the content, characteristics and practical effects of the Tusi system in different periods of Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. The horizontal perspective mainly studies the factors related to the research object and the relationship between them in a short period of time, such as the relationship between the Tuguan System of the Yuan Dynasty with the provincial system and the national view of the Mongolian aristocrats. If the vertical and horizontal methods are combined for research, readers can not only understand the development and changes of the research object, but also understand the internal relationship of related factors. In addition to traditional historical methods, some relatively new research methods such as systems analysis, historical time, and comparative research can also be adopted. Historical time, which was promoted by the Annales School in France divides historical time into as three tiers consisting of very long time (the longue durée), the medium time, and the short time with corresponding status and functions on the history. This theory highlights the research content of each time period, focuses on discovering the hidden factors and developing principles in the medium-long historical period, and greatly expands the researcher’s vision in terms of time and space. The following issues can be discussed from the perspective of the division of Historical Time: the relationship between the Tusi system and the previous Jimi System, the similarities and differences of the Tusi system in the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, the relations of the Tusi system and the formation of territory of the Zhongyuan dynasty, The influence of the ideas, thoughts and ruling styles of the rulers on the ruling of the Borderland and ethnic minorities, and so forth. System analysis, also called “the overall history research method”, regards the research object as a system composed of many elements. The total system can be subdivided into subsystems and sub-subsystems, among which there are complex associations with a state of continuous movement. This method pays attention to the connections among interior factors, and treats objects from a dynamically changing perspective, which is similar to historical materialism. Based on the systems analysis method, we can deeply explore the relationship between the Tusi system and the social, economic, and

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cultural aspects of the Tusi regions during the development and evolution of the Tusi system, as well as the essence, dross and historical heritage contained in the Tusi system. problem. Comparative research method also has advantages when being applied in the research of the Tusi system, such as the comparison of the Tusi system with Mongolian Banner System, Burke System, and Golden Vase System, and so forth as well as the comparison of the Tusi system in southern provinces. 5.3.3. New breakthroughs in the Tusi system, the Tusi society and the Tusi culture. In recent years, some new research topics in the history of the Tusi system roughly include the core content and institutional characteristics of the Tusi system, the strategies and methods of the Tusi governance, the formation, system, training and enlistment of the Tusi Army, the changes in the Tusi system during the Republic of China, the remnants of the Tusi after 1949 and the process of their demise, and so forth. We also pay attention to the following issues: The institutionalization and evolution of the Tusi system; Tributes, inheritance, assessment and other regulations related to the Tusi system; Academic history related to the Tusi system; The individual differences of the Tusi system in different regions; The system comparison of the barbaric regions ruled by the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties; The short-term and farreaching effects of the process of gaitu guiliu; The changes in social contradictions and the rulers’ response before and after the process of gaitu guiliu; Deep connection of the Tusi system and the process of gaitu guiliu with the social development in the Borderland and the integration of the Borderland and the inland, and so forth. Recent research on the social history of Tusi system mainly include administration and social control of Tusi regions, social reconstruction of local society after the process of gaitu guiliu, changes in the administrative affiliation of Tusi regions after the process of gaitu guiliu, the Confucianization of some Tusi Clan, immigrants and ethnic relations in Tusi regions, and so forthand so forth. Topics that can be further explored include the society and its operation in Tusi regions, the tension and compatibility between the customary laws of Tusi regions and national laws, the similarities and differences of the process of gaitu



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guiliu between the Ming and Qing dynasties and their main periods as well as the comparison of their correspondent effectiveness, changes and adjustments in local social relations after the process of gaitu guiliu. Some scholars have noticed the relationship between the Tusi system and the internal and external relations of the Borderland, focusing on the Ming and Qing dynasty’s establishment and reliance on Borderland chieftains, the phenomenon of “tributing to the central court as well as the external powers” of the Borderland chieftains in the southwest border, and the activities and functions of chieftains outside the border, and so forth. It is recommended to further explore the following issues: the influence of the Borderland chieftains on cross-border ethnic relations, the inheritance and mutual relations of the Borderland chieftain families within and outside the territory, the relationship between the Tusi system and the formation of southern border of China, and so forth. The Tusi Culture is an area of great concern. Someone proposed and demonstrated the concept of the Tusi Culture. The issues with more discussion include Tusi literature and works, writers in the Tusi families, Confucian education in Tusi regions and its influence, the relationship between the migration of Tusi regions and national identity, the Tusi Culture heritage and its protection and development, Tusi Architectural art, the cuisine, singing-dancing and costumes of the Tusi families, the remains of the Tusi and the declaration of world cultural heritage, and so forth. Other issues that can be studied further: The definition of the Tusi Culture and its systematic research, the formation and influence of the Tusi ideology and group character, the relationship between the Tusi system and the culture of ethnic minorities, the excavation and organization of the Tusi Culture heritage and the declaration of cultural heritage, and so forth.8 Outstanding Tusi figures is another hot spot that has attracted much attention. There are more studies on well-known Tusi and 8 In recent years, the ancient buildings of the Tusi’s Governance Office in Bozhou (Zunyi) of Guizhou, Yongshun of Hunan, and Tangya of Hubei have been included in the list of China’s declaration of world cultural heritage in 2015, which aroused great interest and promoted the formation of an upsurge in excavating and sorting out the remains of the Tusi system.

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Tuguan, the inheritance of chieftains and the evolution of family lineage; Outstanding Tusi figures, such as Shexiang, the eleventh head of Dali in Yunnan Province in the Yuan Dynasty and a female Tuguan of Shuixi, Guizhou who built “Nine Posts in Longchang”, and Qin Liangyu, a female Tusi of Bayu who led the army to resist Japanese pirates in the Ming Dynasty. Future research can be extended to the following areas: the relationship between the Tusi figures and major historical events, the collection, sorting and research of the Tusi genealogy system, the collection, sorting and research of the Tusi’s works, the descendants of the Tusi and their participation in political and economic activities, and so forth. It should also be pointed out that the cooperation and exchanges between Chinese mainland scholars and overseas counterparts urgently need to be strengthened. Overseas scholars paid little attention to the Tusi system in the past. Japanese scholars had cooperated with mainland scholars to sort out and study the genealogy of Chieftains of Zhuang nationality. In recent years, scholars from Hong Kong, Taiwan and foreign countries have published many works on the Tusi system, and those results applying anthropological methods are more eye-catching. We should actively cooperate and communicate with overseas counterparts through academic exchanges, conferring in writing and project cooperation, and raise the level of research on the Tusi system to a new level.

6.  Carrying Out Research on China’s Borderland Studies The Italian historian Croce once said: “Every true history is contemporary history”. People’s interests in the reality calls for the true history. The Annales School Historian Bloch also said:‘’To understand the present through history, and to understand history through the present. After entering the 21st century, China faces unprecedented challenges in terms of Borderland stability and Borderland governance. The future is bright while the road ahead is long. People are eager to understand the historical Borderland governance theories and policies, including



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long-standing traditions and indelible marks, as well as successful experiences and profound lessons; We hope to learn from history and carry forward our cause and forge ahead into the future. Since the Reform and Opening-up, China has made great progress in the research of Borderland issues, especially the realization of two breakthroughs. One is the extension of the boundary issue in modern times to the discussion on the history of ancient territories, and the research history of Borderland in modern times; other is the development from traditional study of the borderland history and geography to focusing on the new situation and new issues of contemporary Chinese Borderland, and to better realize the organic combination of basic research and applied research (Ma, 2003).

6.1  China’s Borderland Studies is a discipline that studies the history and current situation of Chinese Borderland. China’s Borderland Studies has the following characteristics: it involves a lot of content with a wide coverage; the combination of basic research with applied research; the combination of history combined with other humanities and social sciences; the combination of humanities and social sciences with natural sciences; the extensive attention to the research results. In terms of research fields, China’s Borderland Studies includes: research status and related theories of Borderland issues at home and abroad; the theory of the formation and consolidation of China’s Borderland (including land and sea); formation and development history of China’s territory and Borderland research history; ethnic history, immigration history and population history of Chinese Borderland; the history and reality of the relationship between human activities in the Borderland and natural environment changes; The history and reality of the relationship between China’s Borderland and neighboring countries; Borderland thoughts and Borderland governance policies that have had an important impact in history and real life; the economic and social development history and realistic issues in the Borderland regions. Borderland history, which belongs to the discipline of Chinese history, and Borderland historical geography, which belongs to the

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discipline of Chinese historical geography, have the closest relationship with China’s Borderland Studies. Borderland regional history and ethnohistory of the Borderland, ancient Chinese territory and modern Chinese border issues are valued earlier by scholars who study Borderland issues. Borderland historical geography is mainly derived from ancient geography and modern study of Borderland defense. These two disciplines laid the foundation for China’s Borderland Studies. The issues that China’s Borderland Studies are concerned about are closely related to history, not to mention the Borderland history itself is an aspect of China’s Borderland Studies. Determined by the object and nature of China’s Borderland Studies, Borderland history, historical geography, and disciplines such as law, anthropology, and international relations are the main academic support points of China’s Borderland Studies. The regional history, national history, foreign relations history, intellectual history, economic history, cultural history, and so forth in Discipline of Borderland History, are closely related to China’s Borderland Studies. Historical geography involves a lot of China’s Borderland Studies, especially the changes in historical territory, historical administrative divisions, population growth, distribution and migration, Borderland development and geographical differences, the distribution and rise and fall of industry and mining, urban distribution and changes in transportation lines, as well as historical and cultural landscapes, has the closest relationship with China’s Borderland Studies. Boundary, border, and diplomacy are issues studied by China’s Borderland Studies, and are closely related to law, especially international law. Western countries attach importance to the interpretation of boundary, border and diplomacy issues from the perspective of international law. Strengthening the study of law, especially international law, will help us to open up research fields. It is also a prerequisite for communicating with foreign counterparts and sharing common discourse. The historical and practical issues of China’s Borderland are very complex. Not only do we need to conduct detailed field investigations, but we also need to analyze from the perspectives of the internal evolution mechanism and the internal connections of cultural events. Therefore,



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it is necessary to pay attention to the results of anthropological research and master the methods of anthropology. International Relations takes modern international relations as the main research object. It not only comprehensively explores the international relations between major powers and regional areas from a global perspective, but also proposes important guidelines for handling international relations. And the academic value of China’s Borderland Studies is obvious. In addition, geopolitics is one of the theoretical foundations of international relations. Applying the theory of geopolitics can make new interpretations of the formation and change of ancient Chinese historical territory, as well as the status and challenges of modern China’s Borderland. The relationship between related disciplines is an important issue in the construction of China’s Borderland Studies. Borderland Studies should actively introduce knowledge and methods of related disciplines, and find the integration point of multi-disciplinary cooperation, thus forming a new research field. In terms of Borderland history, the following areas that can be explored: The history of ethnic activities and the formation of the Borderland region, Borderland governance thoughts, Borderland governance concept and its history of practice, regional history of multinational bordering areas, regional history of inter-provincial areas, a new history of international relations with the clues of international channels, international trade, population migration between countries, and joint development of the bordering areas of various countries, the history of regional differences and changes in historical cultural landscapes, the influence of the natural environment on the social and historical development in the Borderland, and the history of the development and utilization of animal and plant resources and mineral resources in the Borderland area in the China’s imperial history. The history and social development of China’s Borderland area shows obvious complexity and diversity, as well as distinct levels and great regional differences. Therefore, the research on the historical and practical issues in the Borderland area should pay equal attention to the macro and micro perspectives, holistic research and case studies, and theoretical research and applied research. To make research in China’s Borderland Studies, we should look at it from a higher basic

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point, vigorously expand the original vision, and fully reflect the characteristics of macro-level research such as grasping the overall situation, focusing on generalization, and analyzing profoundly. First of all, we should pay attention to the relationship between the social development of the Borderland area and its historical background, such as the historical status of the successive dynasties and the characteristics of Borderland management, and the corresponding situation of the territory management. Secondly, we should pay attention to the relationship between the part and the whole, such as the position and role of the Borderland area in Chinese historical development. Besides, the relationship between the Borderland area and the whole country, the relationship between the Borderland and the inland, and the relationship among regions within Borderland area should also be studied. Attention should also be paid to the comparison of the historical development of Borderland areas in the southwest with the northeast, northwest, and coastal Borderland areas, the comparison in the former and latter stages of the development of the Borderland area, as well as the comparison of the development differences within the regions in Borderland area. If the development of Chinese Borderland history is regarded as a system, the subsystems included and the content covered can be roughly summarized as follows: The first is the subsystem of political relations, including the concepts, ideas, strategies and policies related to Borderland governance, the establishment of Borderland political districts and the Borderland governance system, the relationship between the Zhongyuan dynasty and the local government, the relationship between the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland regime and neighboring states, the formation and evolution of the state and territory, and so forth. The second is the subsystem of social economy, including the production and lifestyles of the Borderland ethnic groups, the development and management of the Borderland by the Zhongyuan dynasty, the development and utilization of natural resources in the Borderland area, the socio-economic structure and various economic sectors of the Borderland area, the development and status of the economy in the Borderland area, the interaction between human activities and the natural environment, and so forth. The third is the subsystem of culture,



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including the cultural exchanges between the Borderland area and the inland, the world outlook and values of Borderland ethnic groups, the group psychology and social psychology of Borderland ethnic groups, the religious beliefs, education and other cultures of Borderland ethnic groups, and so forth. The fourth is the subsystem of society, including the social structure of the Borderland area, the relationship among Borderland ethic groups, the patriarchal system and other social systems, social customs and social consciousness, and so forth. The fifth is the subsystem of population and nationality, including the number and change of the Borderland population, the composition of the gender and occupation of the residents, the migration and distribution of the residents, the origin and evolution of the ethnic groups, the relationship among the ethnic groups, the health level of the residents and the disease status of the residents, and so forth. By that analogy, the historical development of the Borderland, on a larger scale, forms a new system with the overall historical development of China and Asia. Intricate relationships also can be found within the new system. From the perspective of China’s Borderland Studies, some traditional topics can show new research prospects. Take modern Chinese ethnohistory as an example. The formation of modern nationalities in the Borderland was deeply influenced by the Borderland governance policies of the China’s imperial history and the formation of a multi-ethnic unified country. The activities of modern nationalities in the Borderland are also an important factor influencing the formation of Chinese historical territory. The formation of nationalities in the Borderland is an extension of the development of ancient nationalities. The integrated investigation asks for the further exploration of the whole process of the historical development of Chinese nationalities. The latter half of the Qing Dynasty was the period when the Chinese boundary was finally formed. The evolution and activities of the nationalities in the Borderland were also related to the final formation of the Chinese boundary. Analyzing the formation and evolution of nationalities in the Borderland will help to understand the Borderland and ethnic governance policies of the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China, and then understand the status and changes of China’s Borderland in modern times. In addition, in view of the fact

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that there are many historical records and research reports that record nationalities in the Borderland, we can also use anthropological methods to study the nationalities in the Borderland of China. The development of China’s Borderland Studies should be based on the expansion of the field of research and the development of the in-depth research. At present, Borderland Studies has a wide range of topics, but the development of research is very uneven, and certain fields are quite weak and need to be strengthened. Even in the part with more research, there are still many problems that have not been clarified and need to be further discussed. Comprehensive research and large-angle research should also be promoted. The objects of Borderland Studies have the characteristics of long-time span, large geographical scope, rich connotation and complex situation, and the content involves many disciplines and research fields. Conducting multi-disciplinary and comprehensive research can enlarge the field of vision, expand the scope of materials, and understand the essential laws of the research object from different angles and levels. Compared with specialized research, large-angle research is more important. Comprehensive research emphasizes the horizontal connection between various disciplines, while large-angle research refers to the investigation of the research objects in a broader context by expanding the vision in research. Due to the natural environment and social development, the historical process of the social and national evolution of the Borderland area is extremely complicated. If the research is carried out in a static and isolated way, it is difficult to avoid the limitation of just seeing the part while ignoring the whole picture.

6.2  The author believes that some of the following contents need to be studied. The construction and improvement of new theories. Such as the discipline construction of China’s Borderland Studies, the research methods of Borderland Studies, the new perspectives and fields of Borderland Studies, and the problems existing in the development of Borderland Studies, and so forth. Moreover, the dialogue between China’s



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Borderland Studies and relevant international research and the realization of discourse integration and other theoretical issues; the history and reality of China’s peaceful rise, and its impact on the development of China and its neighbors; the theoretical issues of achieving common prosperity at home and abroad and successful cooperation; sharing in the history between China and its neighboring countries inside and outside the Borderland, or jointly studying and facing historical issues together; Chinese traditional ideas of Borderland (including the view of Borderland, Borderland governance thoughts, Borderland governance strategies and Borderland governance measures, and so forth) and the implementation of these ideas, as well as the rational inheritance and creative application of traditional Borderland governance ideas in the new situation; theories on the formation, improvement, operation and management of the Chinese historical territory; the theoretical issues concerning the interaction of the Borderland’s history and reality; the development and changes of China’s Borderland area and nationalities in the Borderland in recent years, as well as the theoretical issues of prediction of the future development trend. In terms of the governance theory and practice of Chinese traditional Borderland governance. The knowledge and theories formed in the Borderland governance of ancient China are a valuable ideological and cultural heritage, but little attention has been paid to them in the past. The research on the Borderland theory and practice of ancient Borderland governance roughly covers the following aspects: The first is the Borderland governance theory of the Zhongyuan dynasty, including the theory of the governance of the Borderland and nationalities in the Borderland, Borderland geopolitical theories, the theory of the formation and evolution of territory, the theory of ancient diplomatic relations and national defense, and the theory of Borderland development and management. The second is the Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty, including the interaction between Borderland governance theory and practice, the formulation and adjustment of Borderland governance policies, the impact and evaluation of Borderland governance practice, Borderland governance officers and their management, the relationship between the Central government and local governments, and non-institutional factors that affect

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Borderland governance practice. The third is the Borderland governance theory and practice of the Borderland regimes, including the theories and ideas of Borderland governance, the Borderland governance strategy and practice of the Borderland regimes, the comparison of the Borderland governance of the Zhongyuan dynasty and the Borderland regimes, and so forth. The research contents of the formation and consolidation of the Chinese historical territory and the stability and development of the Borderland area include: The formation and consolidation of the Chinese historical territory, the establishment and management of the boundary in modern China, the Borderland area and ethnic groups in the Borderland, the realization of coordinated development of Borderland area and ethnic groups in the Borderland with the eastern and central regions in China, the management of cross-border ethnic groups in the bordering area between China and neighboring countries, as well as the sharing of history and culture of cross-border ethnic groups and the common prosperity in their distributed areas. To engage in research in China’s Borderland Studies, we should look at it from a higher basic point, vigorously expand the original vision, and fully reflect the characteristics of macro-level research such as grasping the overall situation, focusing on generalization, and in-depth analysis. First of all, we should pay attention to the relationship between the social development of the Borderland area and its historical background, such as the historical status of the successive dynasties and the characteristics of Borderland management, and the corresponding situation of the territory management. Secondly, we should pay attention to the relationship between the part and the whole, such as the position and role of the Borderland area in Chinese historical development. Besides, the relationship between the Borderland area and the whole country, the relationship between the Borderland and the inland, and the relationship among regions within Borderland area should also be studied. Attention should also be paid to the comparison of the historical development of Borderland areas in the southwest with the northeast, northwest, and coastal Borderland areas, the comparison in the former and latter stages of the development of the Borderland area,



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as well as the comparison of the development differences within the regions in Borderland area. In addition to paying attention to the common and universal issues of Borderland area in China, Borderland provinces should also select some more targeted issues for research based on their own characteristics. The provinces of Southwest Borderland should pay attention to the following issues: Cross-border ethnic issues. Research on cross-border ethnic groups in Southwest China started earlier and has achieved many results. In recent years, some important research results have been released. At the same time, it should be pointed out that in recent years, driven by the wave of regional economic cooperation and the strengthening of ethnic consciousness, there have been some notable changes in the consciousness and behavior of economic exchanges, cultural penetration, and ethnic cohesion of the cross-border ethnic groups in Yunnan, Guangxi and the areas connecting with neighboring countries. For example, with the expansion of foreign economic and cultural exchanges among cross-border ethnic groups, transnational economic activities, transnational marriage and family ties, transnational religious activities, and so forth rapidly heat up. In some Borderland areas, regional and narrow ethnic cultural identities have gradually prevailed. We should study these changing trends and the related historical, cultural and social reasons. Issues of historical relations between China and its neighboring countries in the southwest. Generally speaking, China’s relations with neighboring countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos are relatively good, but it does not mean that there are no historical issues that need to be studied. For example, Vietnamese scholars have different views from Chinese scholars on the influence of the Hùng Vương period, the Thời Bắc thuộc period, the Sino-Vietnamese icy period and the so-called DongSon culture. In the past, Chinese scholars studied the friendship between China and Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s. There is a lack of in-depth research on the complete picture of the ancient Sino-Vietnamese relationship, as well as the official relationship between Yunnan and Vietnam during the Republic of China, China’s aid to Vietnam against France and the United States in the last century,

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and the Sino-Vietnamese relations since the implementation of Reform and Opening-up. Similar issues in the historical relations between China, Myanmar and Laos also need to be explored. The study of sensitive issues in Borderland history, controversial issues in history, and sensitive issues in modern times should be encouraged. A comparative study of typical cases can also be conducted. When conducting research in Borderland provinces, attention should also be paid to identifying the local characteristics formed in the natural environment and historical traditions. Take the Yunnan region as an example. Yunnan has a unique geography and climate, characterized by the dominance of mountainous areas. Mountains account for about 94% of the total area. The topography and geomorphology are complex, and most areas are blocked for a long time. Yunnan has a diverse and complex climate. Due to the low latitude of Yunnan, the topographical height difference within a short distance is very large, so the vertical climate change is significant with the change of topographical height. Almost every region can delineate several different vertical climate distribution zones from the foot of the mountain to the top, and this climate feature can be called as the “three-dimensional climate”. Affected by the special natural environment, the historical development and traditional culture of the various ethnic groups in Yunnan have formed multiple, diverse and very complex characteristics. The abovementioned characteristics of Yunnan’s geographical environment have also had an impact that cannot be ignored on the management and governance of Yunnan throughout the dynasties. Yunnan borders the Indo-China Peninsula and Indo-Pakistani region. For thousands of years, it has been China’s link and gateway to these regions. In the long-term development process, the geographical scope of Yunnan has not only intersected or re-divided with the surrounding areas, but also established close political ties with some areas in the northern part of the Indo-China Peninsula in certain historical periods. Therefore, to explore the history of Yunnan, it is necessary not only to study the relationship between this area and neighboring regions, but also to explore the historical relationship with neighboring  countries. In some periods, even the areas connected to



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the neighboring countries in Yunnan should be examined as a whole, such as the period of Nanzhao rule in the Tang Dynasty. In addition, the economic development of Yunnan and nearby areas in history has formed a unique development type and path. There are many ethnic groups in Yunnan, and ethnic minorities account for about 1/3 of the total population. There are more than a dozen cross-border ethnic groups in Yunnan in the strict sense, and there are some related ethnic groups who share the same origin, but whether they are of the same ethnic group is still disputed. Numerous cross-border ethnic groups and related ethnic groups connect Yunnan with the adjoining northern Indo-China Peninsula and the northeastern part of the Indo-Pakistani region. The common regional characteristics of their historical development are more obvious. The ancient economy of Yunnan included plantation, animal husbandry, gathering, hunting and fishing, mining and metallurgy, cottage craft, transportation, commerce, and many other sectors. The status and role of these production sectors changed significantly in the early and late stages in ancient times. The primary compound economy consisting of agriculture, animal husbandry, breeding, gathering and hunting has long been the dominant economic form in most parts of Yunnan. Under this kind of economic situation, it is easier for people to get by, but it is difficult to reach a level of development comparable to that of the inland; if society is destroyed due to wars and other reasons, it can be restored to life in a relatively short time. Residents living in different altitudes, adapt to the unique climate and ecological environment, and accumulate experience and skills in obtaining living materials in a specific environment, and exchange products with residents in other altitude areas through many ways. The various ethnic groups in Yunnan are mostly used to a settled life, or are generally limited to slow diffused and penetrated migration in the same altitude area; the harmony between the various ethnic groups is more than predatory disputes, and mutual dependence is stronger than opposing oppression are all rooted here. Certain factors affecting historical development have shown special importance in Yunnan. For example: Transportation played an extremely important role in the historical development of Yunnan. The

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rise and fall of transportation lines may affect the formation and transfer of political and economic centers in various regions, the development and rise and fall of economic culture in various regions, and even the Borderland governance strategies and practice of the rulers. On the other hand, the rise and fall of transportation lines are also affected by many factors, and there is a close interaction between the two. For example, in the Yuan Dynasty, Yunnan Province established its provincial capital in present-day Kunming, and then opened a channel from present-day Kunming through Guizhou to Hunan, which led to the change of Yunnan’s connection with the inland from the former mainly through Sichuan to Guizhou and Hunan. The establishment of Guizhou Province in the Ming Dynasty was an important reason to protect the above passages. After the opening of this channel, a large number of immigrants from the middle reaches of the Yangtze River entered Yunnan, which suddenly changed the situation where the immigrants from Yunnan were mainly Sichuanese. They are located along and on both sides of the road in present-day Guiyang, Qujing, Kunming, Chuxiong, Zhaotong, Yuxi, and so forth where have also become areas with faster economic development during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Guangxi, Guizhou, and southwest Sichuan are different from Yunnan in terms of geographic environment, however, they share similarities in the geographic environment affected the development of local society in ancient times and the management of the successive dynasties in the southwest Borderland area. The current discussion on such issues is still lacking in depth.

References Cai, Tuo et al. 2005. International Relations. Tianjin: Nankai University Press. Fang, Tie. 1990. “Overview of Research on the Ethnic History in Southwest China over the Past 40 Years (1st Half, 2nd Half).” Dynamics of Ethnic Studies (3) and (4). Fang, Tie. 2002. “Overview of Borderland History and Geography Studies on China’s Southwest Borderlands (1989–1998).” In Overview of China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies, edited by Li Sheng et al. Heilongjiang: Heilongjiang Education Press



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Fang, Tie. 2005. “Borderland History and Geography Studies on China’s Southwest Borderlands.” In Report on Academic Research Borderland and Development of Philosophy and Social Science in Yunnan from 2004 to 2005, edited by Zheng Xiaoyun. Kunming: Yunnan University Press. Fang, Tie. 2009. “The Retrospect and Prospect of Southwest China’s Borderland History Studies in the Past 60 Years.” In China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies Vol.19 (3), pp. 39–49. Ma, Dazheng. 2003. “China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies.” Study on the Ancient Governance and Development of Borderland Issues Should Be Emphasized (Vol. 3), pp. 10-13. Pan, Yujun. 2001. Basics of Geography. Beijing: Science Press. Scientific Research Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 2000. Social Sciences in the Fifty Years Since the Founding of New China. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2008. “Braudel: Historian: ‘People in Situation’.” In On History, edited by Fernand Braudel and translated by Liu Beicheng et al. Beijing: Peking University Press. Zhang, Quanming et al. 1995. Outline of Chinese History and Geography. Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press. Zheng, Hangsheng, ed. 2003. An Introduction to Sociology (3rd ed.). Beijing: Renmin University of China Press. Zhuang, Kongshao, ed. 2004. A General Theory of Anthropology. Taiyuan: Shanxi Education Press. Zou, Yilin. 2005. Brief Introduction to Chinese History and Geography (Rev. ed.). Shanghai: Shanghai Education Press.

Chapter Two

Borderland Governance Theories and Practices of the Central Plains Dynasty

1.  The Borderland Governance Theories of China’s Imperial History The Borderland governance theories of ancient China underwent a complex process of evolution in the past 2,000 years, initially germinating in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, taking shape in the Qin and Han dynasties, and surviving the replacement of the Qing dynasty by the Republic of China. The related ideas and theories have had a significant and profound impact on the formation of China’s historical territory, and the formation and development of China as a unified multi-ethnic country, as well as the Chinese nation. Specifically, they fall into two categories, namely, the thinking and theory on Borderland governance. The former encapsulates richer content on a more extensive scale, while the latter constitutes its generalization and promotion. For the sake of simplicity, the two are collectively referred to as “Borderland governance theory” below.

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1.1  The Connotations of Ancient Borderland Governance Theories and Related Research The term “ancient Borderland governance theories” includes the series of thoughts and concepts on the formation and management of borders and historical territories in ancient China, as well as attitudes, strategies, and measures gradually adopted to handle border, territory and related issues. The territory of China since modern times has undergone complex changes, featuring the expansion and reduction of the area inhabited by the Chinese nation and its ancestors, the partial and overall management, the division and merger of the territories, and unified and divided rule. The editors of the Historical Atlas of China have been true to fact in recognizing the territory of the Qing Dynasty at around the Opium War as the basic territory of ancient China and in depicting its expansion and reduction in various periods. Therefore, the Borderland governance theories of ancient China should basically consist of the thoughts and theories of the previous unified dynasties on Borderland governance and related issues, and those of past regional governments on governance of territories beyond their hinterland, as well as related issues. However, since the concept of “Borderland” had different meanings in the past from what it does today, many academic fields and issues related were included in the field of ancient Borderland governance to varying degrees. In the eyes of ancient statesmen, “Borderland” should refer to the peripheral areas beyond the core sphere of influence of political entities (dynasties in the Central Plains or border regimes), as well as areas near the boundary with the sphere of influence of other countries or regimes. The most obvious difference is that the former usually refers to a larger geographical area, which is also unstable due to constant changes and adjustments, while the latter involves a relatively stable demarcation (or national border) clearly defining each other’s territories, with the adjoining part called the Borderland. In ancient times, the Borderland was an ambiguous concept involving an unclear geographical scope, mainly due to four reasons. First, before the middle of the Qing Dynasty, the historical map of China in the sense of territory was not established and was prone to changes



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constantly. Second, the ancients mostly used the distribution of “Chinese and barbarian” cultures and regional economic strength for differentiating the core area from the Borderland. The Borderland mainly included the remote areas inhabited by ethnic groups, with economic development clearly lagging behind the core region. It was usually considered to be the borderland or even areas beyond the Great Wall. For example, Guizhou, Yunnan and even Guangdong and Guangxi were considered Borderlands or “land of the barbarians” for a long time in ancient times. Third, the territories of ancient Chinese political entities (dynasties in the Central Plains or border regimes) were subjected to expansion and reduction in different periods. In addition, there were interlocks on their borders with neighboring countries or other political forces, as well as buffer zones created due to the see-saw strife or prolonged confrontation. Those adjoining areas and buffer zones with frequently changing control were usually regarded as Borderland. Fourth, during the reign of unified dynasties, the ruler embraced the policy of “welcoming allegiance but not punishing defection” for ethnic groups living on the Borderland or even beyond it, and generously rewarded those paying tribute to the imperial court for the purpose of winning them over. As a result, their nominal subjects were all over the border and extended beyond their territory, obscuring the far end of the Borderland for even the ruler. Study of the Borderland governance theories in ancient China should cover the following topics: historical figures who played key roles in border governance (including the supreme ruler, high-ranking government officials and Borderland officials, ancient thinkers), and their views on the ancient “Borderland” and definitions of its scope for various political entities; their thoughts and theories for governing and handling border affairs (including the study of issues such as borders and border characteristics); the border-related thoughts and theories on the relationship between ancient countries and political entities; on “Chinese-Barbarian” relationship and the policies for governance of the “barbarians”; on economic development, resource acquisition, channel construction, information dissemination, trade exchanges, population migration and other issues; on feudal culture communication; on the relationship between the central government and the border and that

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between the central governing agency and the Borderland grassroots; on the selection and supervision of border officials, and the dispatch and management of Borderland troops; on the establishment and management of central and border-related institutions. In a nutshell, the Borderland governance theories of ancient China generally include three main parts: ancient border views, ancient Borderland governance theories, and understanding of other border-related issues and their theoretical generalization. The study of ancient Borderland governance theories can be very complicated and consequently difficult, since it involves the thought history, concepts, institutional history, border history, ethnic history, diplomatic history, military history, education history, economic development history, transportation history, business history, population history, environmental history, ecological history, historical geography and other disciplines of ancient times, as well as a wide range of issues, such as contemporary diplomatic relations, national boundary issues, ethnic relations, cross-border ethnic groups, multinational economic cooperation, border economic development, border population, border resources and environment, and sensitive border issues. It is necessary to briefly review the study in recent years on ancient Borderland governance theories, which were the basis for ancient ideas on Borderland governance to take shape, and the main basis for China’s imperial history to formulate Borderland governance strategies and specific measures. From this perspective, the ancient Borderland governance theories should belong to the history of thought. However, no specific chapters have been dedicated to them in the various books published in China so far, including History of Chinese Thoughts and History of Chinese Political Thoughts. Only the Borderland governance concept of individual dynasties has been mentioned in a few books, indicating that the study of ancient Borderland governance theories has been inadequate among the circle of history of thought for a prolonged period of time. The inadequacy may be attributable to the focus placed on philosophical issues in studying the history of ancient thought in China. Ethnic historians have made considerable efforts to study the ancient thought of “barbarian governance”, such as the thought of loose-rein governance and peace-keeping marriage in China’s imperial history,



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and have been fruitful in their scholarly pursuits. In recent years, some scholars have been actively thinking about extending the research interest from “barbarian governance” thought in the past to the thought of Borderland governance (Peng, 2004). However, it should also be pointed out that the past research did not unequivocally differentiate the two in most cases. There was even confusion of “barbarian governance” with Borderland governance, and consequently confusion between the underlying thoughts, indicating insufficient understanding. Scholars that have noteworthy experience in ancient Borderland governance theories are mainly those engaged in Borderland history and geography. Take Ma Dazheng for an example. In his book Research on Border Policies of Ancient China (China Social Science Publishing House, 1990), Borderland governance has been explored in most of the articles on Borderland policies in the past. Among them, “A Preliminary Study of Borderland Governance Thought in Ancient China” specifically explores ancient thinking on Borderland governance. In another book Chinese History of Borderland Management (Zhongzhou Ancient Books Publishing House, 2000), there are chapters entitled “Conciliation Thought and Borderland Governance in the Sui and Tang Dynasties”, “Borderland Governance Thoughts of the Ming Dynasty with Comments”, and “Borderland Governance Theories of Ancient China.” Take Fang Tie for another example. In his book General History of the Southwest (Zhongzhou Ancient Books Publishing House, 2003), Fang Tie expounded the theories and policies for governing the southwestern Borderland with five “comprehensive theses”, covering as many periods, namely, the Qin, Han and Sui dynasties; Tang and Song dynasties; Yuan dynasty; Ming dynasty and Qing dynasty. Other related works published in recent years also deal with Borderland governance theories of the China’s imperial history to varying degrees (Li Zhi’an, 1996; Li Dalong, 1996; Cui, 2005; Xie, 2005; Wang, 2005). On the whole, the academic research on ancient Borderland governance theories is relatively young and the achievements made are not satisfactory. However, it is not only of great academic significance, but also instrumental for solving major practical problems in border areas with its research findings. In recent years, elaboration of certain issues involving historical boundaries in some monographs is found to be flimsy

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and the reason is partially attributable to the lack of relevant theoretical research. Enhancing the study of the ideas and theories of Borderland governance is also of important methodological value. In the past, when we studied history, the emphasis was placed on outlining and restoring historical events, determining their causes and consequences, and identifying the objective laws of historical development, which are absolutely necessary. However, our efforts to explore the motivations or original intentions of important figures in historical development were inadequate, and sometimes we even forgot about this important factor altogether. Enhancing the research on the motivations or guiding ideologies of important figures in historical development will help us to not only grasp history with greater accuracy and to a greater depth, but also see the dialectical and unified relationship between motivation and effect in historical development, and more accurately evaluate the Borderland governance of the China’s imperial history and its effectiveness and influence. It can also bring the figures behind the historical development to the forefront, thus making our narration of history more vividly, recapturing the complexity of historical development and the possibilities and selectivity of the process, and further uncovering the multitudinous elements affecting the historical trend, as well as their complex connections. An important reason for the academic charm of Historical Records is that its author Sima Qian offered a vivid account of history by seamlessly integrating the historical background, ideological activities and social practices of the historical figures. This excellent tradition should be inherited. In-depth study of ancient Borderland governance thoughts and theories can also broaden the horizons of researchers and open up new research fields such as “the history of ideas” and “historical psychology.”

1.2. Types and Characteristics of Ancient Borderland Governance Theories No complete record of Borderland governance theories can be found in historical archives of the China’s imperial history. However, by combing through the relevant accounts and discussions of the ancients on



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Borderland governance, we can still get a glimpse of their knowledge, concepts and thoughts on Borderland governance, as well as some theories in the formation. Delve into the thoughts and theories of ancient China on Borderland governance, and we can see that dynasties based in the Central Plains and the border regimes established by the Borderland ethnic groups have connections and shared features, but their differences can also be apparent. The Borderland governance theory of dynasties based in the Central Plains roughly includes the ruler’s view of borders and governance, theories on Borderland governance, the theory on governance of border barbarians, theories on development of border resources, theories on border geopolitical relations, the tendency to prioritize the north over the south in border governance and its evolution, theories on territorial formation and evolution, theories on diplomatic relations and national defense, and theories of civilian thinkers on Borderland governance. The Borderland view and Borderland governance view can be inclusive, encompassing the views of rulers or important figures of the Central Plains dynasties (as well as eminent officials and Borderland officials, and civilian thinkers) on the ancient “Borderland” and their delineation of its scope; their understanding and thinking on handling Borderland affairs (including the study of Borderlands and Borderland characteristics); their understanding of and thinking on the relationship between ancient countries and political entities related to Borderlands; understanding and thinking of “Chinese-Barbarian” relationship and the “barbarian” governance policies. Other important parts of the Borderland governance theories of dynasties in the Central Plains include understanding of and thoughts on, economic development, resource acquisition, passageway construction, information dissemination, business exchanges, population migration and resettlement and other issues related to the border areas; the spread of inland culture related to border areas; the relationship between the central government and Borderland governments; the selection and supervision of Borderland officials and the dispatch and management of Borderland garrisons; the establishment and management of relevant central institutions related to border areas.

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The Borderland governance ideas and theories of dynasties in the central plains are centered on “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence”, upholding a clear division between the “central regions” and the “land of the four barbarians.” The ideal realm pursued by most dynasties is the stability and prosperity of the heart regions, and the realization of “peace with the barbarians in the Borderlands” in the border areas. Proceeding from those ideas and theories, dynasties in the Central Plains also developed the following Borderland governing thoughts: the relation between the central regions and border areas are like that between the trunk and the branches. “Never trouble the Middle Kingdom with affairs of the barbarians,” “once national stability is achieved in the Middle Kingdom, the barbarians will naturally come over and pledge allegiance” (Sima, 1956, 6067), “to deal with foreign states, we must first address domestic affairs,” guarding the ancestral cause with care and maintaining national unity; drawing on the submissive barbarian tribes as the line of fence on the Borderland, “handling affairs related to the barbarians in the Borderlands with care” and “exercising caution in waging war in the border areas.” In the academic circles, there has been a lot of study on the specific policies, regulations, and measures of Borderland governance in the China’s imperial history. However, efforts to study the Borderland governance strategies and macro-level governance policies of dynasties in the Central Plains, or other content closely related to the ideas and theories of Borderland governance have been inadequate. China has a vast territory and undergone a complex historical development process. The Borderland governance theories, strategies, and related measures of different dynasties, early and late ancient times, and different regions can be markedly different, and the difference warrants in-depth study. Another example is the theories of the Central Plains dynasties on diplomatic relations and national defense. As mentioned earlier, the boundaries of ancient times were often unclear. Meanwhile, there were vassal forces and neighbor states, which might be interchangeable. On the other hand, presenting tributes from afar was regarded by the Central Plains dynasties as a token of submission. In fact, it was inevitably misused by neighboring states to send envoys



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and business travelers from distant countries. Therefore, many of the practices adopted by the Central Plains dynasties in response of submissive gestures from distant people, rebellion of Borderland barbarians, and tributes from remote countries actually served to address diplomatic relations, though they were intended for the Borderland barbarians. The Borderland governance theories of the Borderland regimes. Some of the barbarians and tyranny in the border regions were very active, with their own dynasties or regimes; other Borderland political forces were mainly active as tribes or ethnic groups. The former included the Xiongnu, Xianbei and Nanyue State in the Han dynasty; the Turks, Huihe, Tubo, Nanzhao and Bohai in the Tang Dynasty; and Liao, Xixia, Jin and Dali State in the Song dynasty. The latter included Niaohuan, Jiehu, Di, Qiang, the Cuan Clan, Baiyue and Baipu of the Han dynasty, as well as Liliao, Baiman, Niaoman and Moyao of the Tang dynasty. During the period when the whole China was falling apart, there were some local governments and political forces in various regions. Most of those Borderland regimes and political forces set great store by expanding and consolidating their spheres of influence, and dealing with the relationship with the Central Plains dynasties and other regimes. In this regard, local regimes and political forces, especially some border regimes with more a mature institution, had an understanding of Borderland governance and corresponding policies at varying degrees, and even formed some theories on Borderland governance. Despite the similarities in their ideas and theories on Borderland governance to dynasties in the Central Plains, the differences were also very obvious. Generally speaking, dynasties in the Central Plains based their Borderland governance concepts on ideological understanding of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland,” “governing the Borderland barbarians with a loose rein” and “extending imperial benevolence to the barbarians”, often regarding the Borderland regimes as a foreign land or barbarians representing a foreign culture, and regarding themselves as the Chinese orthodoxy, partially due to influences of Confucian political thought. Some of their concepts of Borderland governance might be rare in border regimes. For example, from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming

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and Qing dynasties, they had a tendency to prioritize the North over the South, but no similar situation was obvious in the border regimes. Some concepts and practices of the border regimes in administering the Borderlands might be quite different from those of the Central Plains dynasties. For example, they deemed themselves on a par with the latter, and harbored the wish to contend for orthodoxy, status or superiority. If a subordinate relationship was involved, then there might be intentions and measures for contending for dominance as suzerainty, extrication from control and even fierce confrontation. Borderland regimes in the pre-feudal stage of development would usually conquer other regimes or tribes by force to seize their land and population, and try their best to expand their territories. However, they seldom adopt “placating and suppressing the barbarians in the Borderlands,” “extending imperial benevolence to the barbarians” or other thoughts or practices closely related to the feudal system. The characteristics of the ancient Borderland governance theories. In the course of historical development, the ancient thoughts and theories of Borderland governance gradually took on some characteristics, mainly in the following aspects. They had a profound impact on the Borderland governance in the China’s imperial history. Judging from the relevant records, rulers of successive dynasties and border regimes mostly attached great importance to the study of Borderland governance, and some even put forward insights. Meanwhile, the summary and suggestions of courtiers and Borderland officials on the experience and lessons of the current and previous generations in Borderland governance were frequently seen in official history and related memorials. The policies and corresponding measures for Borderland governance in the imperial China were gradually formulated and implemented under the guidance of the Borderland governance ideas and theories established by the ruling group. The importance of Borderland governance theories for the administration of border areas in the China’s imperial history is self-evident. The Borderland governance theories have profoundly affected Borderland governance in history, roughly in three manners. First, certain concepts of Borderland governance officially recognized and announced by the supreme ruler influenced and even dominated the



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Borderland governance of the entire reign. Take the Northern Song dynasty for example. After its establishment, Song dynasty summarized the lesson of the Tang Dynasty’s demise, believing that “The Tang dynasty was overthrown by Huang Chao, but the disaster had been rooted in Guilin” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6295). That is, it believed that although the Tang Dynasty collapsed because of the Huang Chao uprising, but the cause had been the mutiny of the Guilin garrison for guarding against Nanzhao. In the third year of Qiande (965), Emperor Taizu Zhao Kuangyin rejected Wang Quanbin’s suggestion of “continuing the vigorous effort to capturing Yunnan.” Keenly aware that “The disaster of Tianbao years in Tang Dynasty originated in Nanzhao, he gesticulated with a jade axe at areas to the west of the Dadu River and said that ‘regions beyond that is not to be mine’ ” (Bi, 1992, 43). In the 6th year of Shaoxing (1136), Zhu Zhen the Imperial Academician clearly pointed out that “Emperor Taizu was most clairvoyant in guarding against the barbarians by giving up Yuexi and other prefectures and adopting the Dadu River as the boundary, making it possible for the Dali State to invade or submit itself.” (Zhu, 1937) Zhao Kuangyin’s notion of separate governance from the Dali State with the Dadu River as the demarcation deeply influenced the subsequent emperors of the Northern and Southern Song dynasties and was strictly followed. In the 26th year of Shaoxing (1156), Emperor Gaozong said to his ministers that “The barbarians have been cunning and ferocious since ancient times, repeatedly invading into Sichuan before the Tang Dynasty. After Emperor Taizu unified the country with his army, he separated them from the Middle Kingdom, and made it impossible for them to invade. However, in no way shall we begrudge with manpower for border control” (Xu, 1957). Therefore, Dali State was basically regarded as a foreign state in the Song dynasty, on a par with Cochin, Champa, Chenla, and Pu’er (Tuotuo, 1977, 13981).1

1 “Alien States: State of Xia (1)”: “Vassal states along the coast, including Cochin, Champa, Chenla, Pu’er and Dali have successively come to pay tributes, after Liu Chang and Chen Hongjin pledge allegiance … receive their pledge of allegiance, refrain from chasing them if they defect, launch punitive expeditions if they invade, release them when they surrender and exercise discretion with use of force.”

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Second, the Borderland governance ideas proposed by the founding monarch was earnestly implemented at first, but was adjusted or drastically changed by the successors in view of greatly changed circumstances. Take the Tang Dynasty for example. In the early Tang Dynasty, Bianzhou Commander and six protectorates were set up in the Borderland of Guangying, for administering more than 800 jimi prefectures and protectorates were under its jurisdiction. Emperor Taizong of Tang took a relatively open-minded attitude towards border politics and put forth progressive concepts such as “people within the four seas are like one family” and “the barbarians are also human beings.” He once said that “The king regards the whole country as one family, so all those living on the imperial territory are my subjects” (Sima, 1957, 6022). In the 18th year of Zhenguan (644), when Emperor Taizong promised to relocate the tribe of the Turkic Silibi Khan to Henan, his courtiers thought that it might forebode trouble. Emperor Taizong explained that “The barbarians are also human beings, with sentiments much the same as the people of the Middle Kingdom. A ruler should worry about the failure of his grace to disseminate and refrain from suspecting those from different ethnic groups, since widespread imperial grace turns the barbarians of the Borderlands into family, while suspicion turns blood kin into enemies” (Sima, 1957, 6216). After the death of Emperor Taizong, Emperor Gaozong, Wu Zetian and Xuanzong inherited the policies he had formulated and implemented for governing the Borderland. Following the outbreak of the “An-Shi Rebellion”, the hidden contradictions in the Tang Dynasty were fully exposed, and internal and external troubles followed. Under such circumstances, the practice of establishing jimi prefectures and protectorates for administering the Borderland areas regardless of cost in the early Tang Dynasty became unsustainable. The succeeding emperor changed the concept and implemented more pragmatic border policies, abandoning some uncontrollable jimi prefectures and protectorates and dealing with Borderland affairs on a matter-of-fact basis. In the seventeenth year of Zhenyuan (801), Du You wrote Tong Dian (Comprehensive Statutes), insinuating that Emperor Taizong’s concepts and practices might be open to discussion. He said that “The practice of establishing kingdoms for popular governance has been long-standing and the



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institution of dividing territories for separate rule began with the five legendary sage emperors. When kingly virtue and ways are spread far and wide, the barbarians in the Borderland naturally come and pledge allegiance. So governance should be exercised free of personal whims, and jimi should be practiced regardless of the land conferred … The heaven has nurtured commoners and instated monarch to rule them, but the intention is to achieve governance with one person not to render the people submissive to him. So the peril consists in confined virtue, not narrow territory” (Du, 1988, 4450). Third, the emperor, his courtiers, and Borderland officials had full knowledge of the complexity of the border issues and “barbarian governance” and tried their best, but they were at wits end to formulate suitable concepts and effective countermeasures, because of the complicated and volatile Borderland circumstances. As a result, they had no choice but to implement not entirely unsuitable countermeasures, or sway or drift between vague opinions and different governance strategies. This is especially so in the northern Borderland. During the early days of the Western Han dynasty, Wang Mang had wanted to pursue the Xiongnu to the bitter end. His general Yan You remonstrated that “I heard that the Xiongnu have been a trouble for the Middle Kingdom for a long time … In the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties, punitive expeditions were launched against them, but none was truly successful. Roughly, the Zhou and Han dynasty had acted according to the second best and an ill-advised strategy respectively, while the Qin had had no strategy at all. During the Zhou dynasty, when the Xianyun came to Jingyang in an invasion, the generals of King Xuan drove them across the border and stopped at that. To the Zhou dynasty, barbarian invasion was dismissed as mosquito sting, to be banished with a waving of hands. In contrast, the Ming was praised for its second best strategy. In the Han dynasty, Emperor Wu selected generals to train troops, who went deep into the land of the Xiongnu with little ration. He succeeded in his strategy, but his success was met with prompt counteroffensive, plunging China into the scourge of strife lasting three decades. The prolonged war exhausted China of its resources, though it also struck fear into the heart of the Xiongnu. Emperor Wu was lauded, but for the ill-advised strategy. Emperor Qin Shihuang, refusing to put up with

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the minor shame and taking lightly private resources, embarked on the project of the Great Wall stretching for thousands of miles. With transportation routes beginning from the remotest barbarian land, the ambitious undertaking exhausted domestic resources and eventually led to the demise of his dynasty. So this is a case of action without strategy” (Ban, 1962, 3824). Yan You’s remarks represented the Han people’s view that the efforts of Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties to quell the Xiongnu were ultimately futile. Therefore, Lu Zhi, a courtier of his time, said in commenting the governance of the Borderlands and Borderland ethic groups by the Central Plains dynasties that “No rule is steadfast; nor is any victory guaranteed. However, the difference in success and failure is significant. Isn’t that a fact” (Liu et al., 1975, 3806)? The thoughts and theories of Borderland governance in the China’s imperial history are dependent on national strength. When we look back into the history, it is not difficult to see a basic law of their evolution: they may change due to the changing strength of the Middle Kingdom. Prosperity of the Middle Kingdom usually enhanced the ambition of the ruler, who was thus mostly active and open-minded in Borderland administration thoughts, with enhanced efforts to manage the Borderland. In the case of declining strength or in the early days of a newly established dynasty with various undertakings to be started from scratch, the ruler often emphasized “tightening internal security and loosening border control” or “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence”, according to the basic Borderland governance policy of conserving territory and stabilizing the border. Even the same emperor may undergo obvious changes in his thoughts on Borderland governance in the different stages. Despite factors such as changing personal understanding, the declining state strength and dwindling prosperity were also important reasons. A typical case in point is Han Wudi. When he succeeded to the throne, the national strength of the Han dynasty had significantly increased, after 60 to 70 years of recuperation since its founding. The rebellion of the seven prince kingdoms had been suppressed, and the power of the vassal states had been also greatly curtailed. The favorable circumstances fired the ambitions of Emperor Wu, who actively stepped up military actions



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in the Borderland, defeated the Xiongnu and completely eradicated its threat to the Han dynasty. He also pacified Minyue, Dongyue and Nanyue, opened up the Xinanyi area, and expanded the Borderland of the Western Han dynasty. Incessant war drained the Western Han dynasty of its financial and material resources. In his later years, social conflicts were sharp, and his national strength plummeted. Emperor Wu regretted his early conquests. He denied Sang Hongyang’s suggestion to increase garrison in the Western Regions to set up farms, issued an edict of introspection, and conferred the title of People-Enriching Duke on his Prime Minister Che Qianqiu, “to allow the country to recuperate and build up strength and to enrich the people” (Ban, 1962, 3912). Lu Zhi clearly proposed adjusting Borderland governance concepts and strategies according to changed circumstances, saying that “The prosperity of the Middle Kingdom, the strength of the barbarians, the pros and cons of events and opportunities, and the effectiveness of measures change from time to time. Knowing what to do but not how to judge the situation will lead to failure; adapting to the times and acting in view of the specific situation will lead to success. If the situation is ever-changing, how can the countermeasures be constant” (Liu et al., 1975, 3805)? The formation of the ancient concept of Borderland governance has been a process of evolution. The ideas and theories of Borderland governance in ancient China have common content and basic characteristics in general. In history, the Borderland governance concepts in different dynasties and even in different period of the same dynasty underwent obvious differences. Chronologically, they initially emerged during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, basically took shape in the Qin and Han dynasties, and further developed and evolved during the Ming and Qing dynasties, experiencing ups and in the process. Take the management of the southwest Borderland for example. The pioneering establishment of governance seat by the Qin and Han dynasties in the southwest Borderland constitutes a great contribution to Chinese civilization. The governance of the southwest Borderland might have been exercised out of specific motives, but the Qin and Han rulers could not have fully realized the great significance of opening

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up the Borderlands. In the Tang Dynasty, rule in the southwestern Borderland was significantly deeper than that in China’s imperial history. However, in the early days it mainly started from the view of barbarian-Chinese equality, as in “all under heaven is one family” and the view of governance by virtue, as in “extending imperial benevolence to the barbarians.” It had not fully realized the difficulties in opening up the southwestern Borderland and the important value of developing Borderland resources. In the early Tang Dynasty, governance of the southwestern Borderland was launched regardless of the cost, with multiple undertakings started from scratch. In addition, there were many problems in the practice. As a result, few of its governance measures followed through. In the Yuan dynasty, active measures were implemented to manage the southwest Borderland, in order to obtain taxes and mineral products, and to achieve the goal of external expansion. Its thought of border governance took a big stride forward from that of its predecessor, but it also lacked understanding of comprehensive developing and fully using border resources. The Ming and Qing dynasties strengthened the management of the southwest Borderland. In particular, the comprehensive management and development of the southwest border in the Qing dynasty achieved remarkable results. The above is only a preliminary outline from the perspective of economic development. The development and evolution of the ideas and theories of the feudal dynasties for governance of Borderlands in the southwestern region and even the entire country is very complicated, with many aspects awaiting discussion in depth.

1.3. Chinese-Barbarian Differentiation Is the Core of Borderland Governance Theory for the Central Plains Dynasty Regarding the dominant ethnic group and the non-dominating ethnic groups, as well as the relationship between the two and the corresponding governance policies, the policymakers of the Central Plain dynasties and those of the non-Central Plain dynasties have different views, that is, each have their own view of Chinese-Barbarian differentiation. There have been many studies on Chinese-Barbarian differentiation of the Central Plains dynasties at home and abroad. Those expounding



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the Chinese-Barbarian Differentiation of the Central Plains dynasty have profoundly influenced the policies for governing the barbarians; those upholding the Chinese-Barbarian relations equivalent to relations between states have been trying to establish the theoretical basis for “Chinese-Barbarian Order” and “Tributary System.” However, the view of Chinese-Barbarian differentiation as the core of the Central Plains dynasty’s theory of Borderland governance still needs further deliberation. The Chinese-Barbarian differentiation of the Central Plains dynasties was a product of agricultural civilization. For thousands of years, the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the Yangtze River have been the main areas of the agricultural economy in the East Asian continent. Their material civilization and spiritual civilization were more advanced than those of the grassland nomadic civilization and the subsequent mountain civilization for a long time. Drawing on the highly developed agricultural civilization, the Central Plains Dynasties were established, and developed. Therefore, their view of ChineseBarbarian differentiation is representative of a relatively advanced ideology. Essentially, it was the lines drawn by the owner of the Chinese civilization based on the nature of other civilizations seen. Deemed as being far behind the Chinese civilization, those civilizations were called barbarian civilizations. A prominent feature of the Central Plains dynasty’s view of Chinese-Barbarian differentiation is that its ruler was highly confident in its strength and advancement. The regarded non-China civilization as ignorant and barbaric, thus developing the China Central View. In their eyes, the land of the Middle Kingdom was the center of the world, and other civilizations should respect it, submit to it, surround it and protect it, or live in peace with it. From the imperial capital, the center of the Middle Kingdom, the rule of the dynasty is extended to all corners. The Central Plains dynasty’s management of the surrounding areas and the obligations of the surrounding areas to it differed according to the distance in between, generally diminishing or fading with distance. The absorption of the content and manifestation of the feudal political system and the feudal patriarchal system is another characteristic of the Chinese-Barbarian differentiation view of the Central Plains

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dynasties. First of all, in the Chinese-Barbarian relationship, the Han ethnic group was a monarch or family leader, occupying the position of supreme ruler or a feudal parent, while barbarians were regarded as subjects or children that had to bow down in recognition of its supreme authority and status. When handling the relations with the Borderland barbarians, neighboring regimes and even distant countries, the Central Plains dynasty common adopted such methods of tribute, vassal titles, kinship through marriage, and education, and used forms of address between monarch and subject, brothers, maternal uncle and nephew, father and son to represent the mutual relationship. All those have derived from the feudal political system or the feudal patriarchal system. Another characteristic of the Chinese-Barbarian differentiation view of the Central Plains dynasty is that it embodies the deep-seated consciousness of an agrarian society, including reluctance to relocate, emphasis on self-protection, and advocate for courteous exchanges and education with ethics and morality. The Borderland governance view of the Central Plains dynasties upheld the basic principle of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland,” emphasized the demarcation between China and the barbarians, and cherished prevention and resistance of foreign intrusion in handling border issues. In Borderland management, their overall attitude was conservative and cautious, and subsequently the strategic thinking of “strong stems and weak branches” took shape. In handling internal and external relations, they mostly made consolidating and developing the central regions as the top priority, while considered border issues as of minor importance or less urgency. The Chinese-Barbarian differentiation view mentioned above has undergone a long and tortuous process of evolution. Since the Tang dynasty, the nomadic civilization and mountain civilization gained momentum in development, posing a challenge to the agricultural civilization of the Central Plains dynasty. For hundreds of years, the Mongolian and Manchus, representing nomadic civilization and mountain civilization respectively, stepped onto the historical stage and established the Yuan and Qing dynasties respectively, after defeating the Song and Ming dynasties established by the Han Chinese.



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The supersession manifests the gradually diminishing advantage and leading position of agricultural civilization in the competition with nomadic civilization and mountain civilization. The result of historical development is the gradual confluence of the three major civilizations, and consequently formation of a unified multi-ethnic nation in China. It should be noted that the Chinese-Barbarian differentiation view, which germinated from the Central Plains dynasty in the pre-Qin period, has gradually matured and exerted a profound influence after more than 1,000 years of development from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Tang and Song dynasties. It became an important weapon of the Central Plains dynasties for state governance and Borderland administration. After the Opium War, it was bound to be eliminated in historical development since it had proven unable to catch up with the world trend, and the fact gradually became the consensus of the Chinese people. In thinking about and dealing with the problems of Borderland governance under its guidance, the rulers of the Central Plains dynasty formed their Borderland governance thought, which roughly includes the Han-Chinese centrism, the subordination view and the moralization view. In the same way the European-centered view of modern times regarding areas beyond Europe as the land of barbarians, the HanChinese-centered view deemed areas beyond the Middle Kingdom as backward and barbaric. However, the two are markedly different in content and practice. In the Han-Chinese-centered view, all the tributaries (including many visitors for factual diplomatic exchanges) that had expressed a willingness to become subject to or establish friendly relations with the Central Plains dynasty must be treated favorably in accordance with the principle of “giving more but taking less.” Intrusion by surrounding barbarians, the governance policy of “enhancing defensive and deliberating offensive” was implemented. Establishment of kinship with the border barbarians increased their sense of intimacy with the Central Plain dynasty. Trade markets were organized by governmental agencies in the border areas or passes, and fair and standardized management was exercised in the transaction with the barbarians, not only restraining and controlling the barbarians, but also

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consolidating the favorable image of a big country. The Central Plains dynasty also set great store by restraining and educating the barbarians. The border management was mainly funded by the treasury of the feudal dynasty (especially before the Song dynasty), rather than by taxes and levies imposed on the barbarians. Those are in contrast to the military conquests and extensive taxation of the subject countries habitually adopted by Western colonists. Based on the vassal governance policies of the China’s imperial history, the Qing dynasty formally established suzerain-vassal relations with Vietnam and Korea. The suzerain-vassal relationship in this period was the development of the previous vassal relationship, but there were different characteristics. In the Qing dynasty, there was a clear agreement on the responsibilities and obligations of the suzerain state and the vassal state. In handling vassal relations and suzerain-vassal relations, the Central Plains dynasty drew on the feudal patriarchal system, for example, using conferment and regular tribute to emphasize the supreme status of the suzerain state. However, the internal management of the vassal state, including laws and taxes, allowed greater flexibility. Therefore, this suggests that China’s vassal relationship and vassal-vassal relationship featured integration of leniency and severity, emphasizing loose-rein control and tolerance, and less interference in the internal affairs of the vassal states. This is especially so in the vassal relationship of the Qing dynasty with Vietnam and Korea. The situation is different from the protectorate system formed in the modern West to control the sovereignty of the other party. In the ancient classics, there is no specific and complete record of the relationship between the suzerain and vassal. The terms “vassal of the royal clan” and “dependent vassal” appeared sequentially, but they were often mixed in ancient times. Meanwhile, Borderland governance measures such as voluntary hostage, tribute, audience with the monarch, alliances, and kinship through marriage were often used to handle diplomatic relations and vassal relations, bespeaking the complexity of such issues. They ancients couldn’t see eye to eye on them either. During powerful, prosperous and unified dynasties such as Han and Tang, diplomatic or tributary relations, or suzerainty were referred to as those between maternal uncle and nephew, fraternal relationship,



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father-son relationship, and monarch-minister relationship, and it was important that these not be confused with one another. Generally speaking, diplomatic or tributary relations were referred to as those between maternal uncle and nephew and fraternal relationship, and suzerainty was referred to as father-son and monarch-minister relationships. For example, Shilong, King of Nanzhao, repeatedly launched wars to harass the areas under the jurisdiction of the Tang dynasty. After Shilong died, his son Long Shun succeeded to the throne. In the fifth year of Qianfu (878), Long Shun sent an envoy to the Tang court proposing a matrimonial alliance, “There is no memorial. Instead, he sent a letter via its envoy, which was also a Dushuang, and requested to be considered a younger brother instead of a minister.” In the sixth year, when the Magistrate of Yongzhou sent Xu Yunqian as an envoy to Nanzhao, a Minister of Nanzhao went to the posthouse and said to Xu Yunqian that “Your esteemed ruler wanted to make our king a minister, and offer our local products as tributes. And our king had sent an envoy to your land through Xichuan, to propose a fraternal relationship, or maternal uncle-nephew relationship if appropriate. In brotherly relationship and maternal uncle-nephew relationship, a letter and gifts shall suffice, why is a memorial with tributes required?” Xu Yunqian refuted his observation strongly on just grounds (Sima, 1956, 8212). Nanzhao wanted to change its relationship with the Tang dynasty from the original suzerain-vassal relationship to that of tributary or diplomatic relations, by changing related titles like “monarch and minister”, “brotherly kin” or “maternal uncle and nephew.” Its proposal was rejected. On the whole, in handling diplomatic relations and tributary issues, the Han and Tang dynasties had clearer principles and terms, indicating a clear distinction from them. However, some dynasties, especially some local regimes, sometimes mixed terms such as “monarch and minister”, “brotherly kin” or “maternal uncle and nephew” while referring to diplomatic relations, tributaries, and subordinating relations, indicating considerable chaos and even confusion in those relations. Seen from the above-mentioned China-centered view, the Central Plains dynasty also developed the tradition of prioritizing the north over the south in terms of Borderland governance thought and theory.

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In the Qin and Han dynasties, the tendency of valuing the north over the south had roughly taken shape, and it later developed into a Borderland governance tradition handed down across the dynasties, exerting profound influences over thousands of years. It is primary manifested in that the rulers of various dynasties had focused on nomadic peoples along the northern borders and had relatively neglected the southern borders in managing the Borderlands. For example, the focus of military garrison and farming was in the north, and in some cases they even went on the offensive to actively eliminate the threat posed by nomads to the Central Plains. For the southern Borderland, the focus was on defense and the goal was maintenance of territory and peace, so cases of active offensive were few and far between. Among the unified dynasties, the Yuan and Qing dynasties were less apparent in emphasizing the north over the south. The main reason is that the Yuan dynasty had been established by the northern nomads based in the northern meadows, while the Qing dynasty had effectively alleviated the pressure from the northern grasslands by establishing close ties with the Mongolians through marriage. The subordination concept contained in the traditional Borderland governance theory of the Central Plains dynasty roughly took shape in the pre-Qin period, mainly explaining the relationship of the feudal dynasty to the surrounding barbarians. Regarding the theory of “five-tiered subordinations”2 proposed in “Tributes of Yu” in Book of History and that of “nine-tiered subordinations” in Rites of Zhou with 2 Tributes of Yu in the Book of History: Areas within the first five hundred li around the imperial capital were called Dianfu: the closest, second closet, third closet, fourth closest and fifth closest one hundred li shall send grain ears on stalks, grain ears, bristleless grain ears, millet and shelled millet for tribute to the Emperor respectively. Areas five hundred li outside Dianfu were called Houfu: the closest one hundred li were conferred onnobilities and ministers, the second closet on barons, and the rest on powerful vassals. Areas five hundred miles outside Houfu were called Suifu: in the closet three hundred li, education should be offered to the people according to the circumstances; in the remaining two hundred li, military training should be implemented to enhance the defense power. Areas five hundred li apart from Suifu were called Yaofu: the closest three hundred li were inhabited by the barbarians, and the remaining two hundred li were intended as a penal colony. Areas five hundred li beyond Yaofu were called Huangfu: the closest three hundred li were the barren zone, and the remaining two hundred li were also a penal colony.



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slight changes, ancient politicians had different interpretations, but their understanding was basically the same. Specifically, the imperial capital was considered the center of the Central Plains dynasty, which extended the scope of its governance or control from the capital to the rest of the country. As the distance increased, the responsibilities of the Central Plains dynasty for the surrounding barbarians differed, so did their obligations to the Central Plains dynasty. In the Han dynasty, there was a lot of elaboration on the theory of “five-tiered subordinations” or “nine-tiered subordinations”, but few references were made to them in historical records after the Han dynasty, indicating that it was difficult to explain the complicated situation of Borderland governance and its evolution with the subjective and idealized model. However, the “five-tiered subordination” theory and the outlook on subordination derived from it still had a profound impact on the Borderland governance of dynasties in the Central Plains. Based on the understanding of the subordination concept and summarization of the related governance, the Central Plains dynasties developed the tradition of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland,” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence”, which became the cornerstone for formulating various Borderland governance policies. The gist is that the ruler shall take the Central Plains region as the center of the dynasty, to emphasize that the border can be governed only when the central regions are kept; and that there is a clear division between the land of “central region” and the land of “border barbarians.” The ideal scenario pursued by most of the Central Plains dynasties in border governance was the stability and prosperity of the innermost region and realization of “barbarians as the guarding fence” in the border areas, and consequently realization of “Han-Chinese as the center and barbarians as the peripheral” and “non-interference with China by barbarians.” This understanding gave rise to such concepts as guarding the ancestral undertaking, exercising caution in waging war in the border areas, and actively safeguarding national unity. In handling confrontations or wars with Borderland barbarians, the Central Plains dynasty often implemented the strategy of “when they attack, repel them, and when they flee, guard the Borderland fortresses.”

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That is to say, the focus should be defense, with preparedness and organized measures as the key. was Later summarized by Jiang Tong, a scholar-official in the Jin dynasty, as “regular preparedness” (Fang et al., 1974, 1530), the strategy constituted not only the concretization in practice of the Borderland governance tradition of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland,” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence”, but also advisable choice in accordance with the fact extremely high political and economic costs but fairly limited actual benefits of Borderland warfare. Therefore, the Central Plains dynasty chose the defense strategy of building fortresses, establishing beacons, and even repairing the Great Wall accordingly in the northern Borderland where military affairs were frequent. Generally speaking, those undertakings incurred fewer expenses and caused less turmoil and destruction than sending inland troops over long distances to the battlefield. Moralization is also an important part of the Borderland governance theory. The ruler of the Central Plains dynasty believed that the Chinese civilization was much more advanced than other civilizations, and thus it was responsible for the management and enlightenment of the surrounding barbarians. With full recognition of the important influence of enlightenment on non-Chinese civilizations and for the purpose of manifesting themselves and prosperity, the Central Plains dynasty generally solicited tributes from surrounding barbarians with generous rewards and imposed lighter tax burdens in border areas. Meanwhile, it emphasized the influence of inland culture, developed Confucian education and changed old customs, to spread Chinese civilization to the border areas and gradually change the make the concept and habits of border barbarians. The positive effect of education on the formation and consolidation of a multi-ethnic unified country is obvious. Regarding the significance of developing Confucian education, Zhu Yuanzhang, Emperor Taizu of the Ming dynasty made a cogent observation. In the second year of Hongwu (1369), Zhu Yuanzhang issued an instruction to the Central Secretariat: In state governance, education is the first priority, and schools are the cornerstone of education. All counties and counties shall establish schools, and hire teachers and



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Confucian scholars, to offer courses to students and apprentices, “so as to gradually educate the people and restore the ways of ancient kings.” In the 28th year (1395), he issued an edict to the Ministry of Rites: All the native officials of the Borderland know little about rites, since they are now holding their offices through inheritance. “If education is not offered in advance, how can they be assimilated?” Therefore, the native officials in Yunnan and Sichuan were ordered to set up Confucian schools, for education of their children, “acquainting them with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and preventing them from violating the rites and participating in struggles are also the way to achieve peace in the Borderland.”3 Throughout history, dynasties in the Central Plains, especially the Ming and Qing dynasties, had attached great importance to running schools in the border areas and provided preferential conditions to the barbarian students, thus promoting the spread of Han-Chinese culture in those quarters. They also emphasized changing the old customs in the Borderland. For example, the Emperor Taizu of the Song dynasty issued an edict in the fourth year of Kaibao (971), prohibiting the trading of slaves and maids on Guangnan Xilu Road for profit; in the second year of Yongxi (985), he prohibited from killing people as a sacrifice to ghosts in the Yongguan (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 32, 76). Some political commentators also analyzed the dialectical relationship between moralization and military conquest. Gao Lü of the Northern Wei dynasty said that “If the people from afar refuse to submit, improve our culture and virtue to attract them; if they are ruthless and cunning, launch military action to conquer them.” Lu Zhi of the Tang dynasty also proposed the views of “remote states can be assimilated with virtue alone” “virtue will be futile if prestige is not established.” In the Song dynasty, there was also the view that “If might cannot subdue the enemy, then nor can virtue” (Gao, 1997, 478; Liu et al., 1975, 3804; Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10836). Those thoughts have enriched the moralization view of dynasties in the Central Plains.

3 History of Ming, Vol. 69, “Election (1)”, 1680.; Veritable Records of Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty. Vol. 239.

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2.  Practice of Border Management in China’s Imperial History Implementation was an important part of Borderland governance in the China’s imperial history. The practice and theories of Borderland governance in ancient times constituted the governance activities of the feudal dynasties and local governments in the border areas. From the perspective of the relationship between social practice and theoretical generalization, their practices in Borderland governance were founded on the epistemological basis of rich social practice, with welladministered Borderland as the ultimate goal. In contrast, the Borderland governance theory is a summary and generalization of those practices, with important guiding or correcting roles.

2.1. Understanding of Borderland Governance Practice In studying the theory and practice of Borderland governance in ancient times, attention should be paid to the interactive relationship in between, specifically including mainly the guiding role of the former for the latter, the implementation, feedback, revision and adjustment of governance policies, the ruler’s evaluation of their effectiveness, and their profound impact on the formulation and development of the former. The Borderland governance in ancient China was extremely complicated, teeming with both successful stories and painful lessons. Some of the subsequent views on the ideas and theories of Borderland governance are correct and profound, while others are controversial. In terms of the types of problems, the Borderland governance theory mainly refers to the ancient people’s knowledge, concepts and thoughts on the border and Borderland governance, and related theories formed subsequently. The implementation of Borderland governance includes related institutional arrangements, follow-through of policy implementers, and the short- and long-term effects. In addition, the relationship of administration of Borderland officials and the corresponding institution to Borderland governance, the influence of the relationship between the central government and Borderland local



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governments on Borderland governance, the non-institutional factors affecting Borderland governance, and the interaction between the practice and theory of Borderland governance are also worthy of in-depth research. The focus should be on the role and influences of the following factors: the relationship between the central and local governments in the formulating the Borderland governance theory and in implementing it, the coordination of related subordinate and subordinate relationships, the formation and feedback and effects of relevant information in implementing Borderland governance, the participation of Borderland local officials in formulating, implementing, and revising governance policies. Besides, attention should also be paid to the influence of official governance and the corresponding institution on governance policies in border areas, and the role of non-institutional factors in the governance theory and practice of the central dynasty or the dynasty in the Central Plains. Take the practice of the Central Plains dynasties in governing the southwestern border for example. The basic content of our research is, first of all, their governance policies and measures, including looserein governance, native officials and fiefs, bureaucratization of native officers, peace-keeping marriage for peace, sworn coalition, voluntary hostage, education, and trade, as well as their scope, depth and effects. The second is the arrangement and adjustment of relevant institution, including the deliberation and formulation of relevant systems and measures, their implementation, feedback and corresponding adjustments, as well as immediate effects and long-term impact. The third is the ruler’s random contingencies and revision of periodic policies in handling border issues. The former mainly refers to the unique or creative handling of border problems in the China’s imperial history, and the latter refers to the path of changes to the governance of the southwestern Borderland in imperial China, as well as changes of governance policies in the same dynasty and due to the change of the supreme ruler. In the southwest Borderland region, especially in the second half of the Qing dynasty, the Borderland governor had greater decision-making power in border governance, and played an important and even key role.

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The influence of official management and the corresponding institution on governance policies for border areas was very obvious. The rule of the Borderland regions in the China’s imperial history, the effectiveness of governance policies in the early and late stages, and the actual control of the territory often changed significantly. The quality of the officials involved, their ultra vires action, unauthorized action, and the way they handled problems were often important factors leading to changes. Border officials were not a special group of officials, but were part of the national official system and subject to move and change. In many cases, their positions were changeable with those of officials in the capital and other areas of the dynasty. In the imperial China, improperly selected officials and political corruption led to unauthorized action and misconduct of Borderland officials, and consequently crises in border affairs. Sima Guang even believed that the outbreak of the An-Shi Rebellion was directly attributable to Emperor Xuanzong changing the principle of appointing Borderland commanders. He said that “Since the establishment of the Tang dynasty, Borderland commanders have been selected from loyal and well-known ministers, who personally served their tenure exclusively. Those with outstanding achievements often became prime minister. However, the generals from the barbarian tribes in the Borderlands were not entrusted with the duties of generals exclusively, though they might be as capable and resourceful as Ashina She’er and Qibi Heli; instead, ministers were sent as envoys by the central government to rein them in.” During the Kaiyuan Years, Emperor Xuanzong was fired with the ambition to annex the barbarian land, and entrusted An Lushan with important official duties. “So and so, the post of circuit (provincial) military governor was held by people of barbarian origin, and elite troops were deployed in the north side, upsetting the pattern of strength in the dynasty and eventually leading to the An-Shi Rebellion which overthrew the regime” (Sima, 1956, 6888). It is also worth noting that officials appointed by the Central Plains dynasty to guard the Borderland tended to collude with the local despots over time, and form a dominant local clique. More often seen in the south than in the north, the situation was attributable to the inability of feudal rule to reach and consequently control the Borderland, and



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delayed transfer of the local officials appointed by the Central Plains dynasty. However, the root cause was that the Central Plains dynasty usually exercised tight control of the troops and generals guarding the northwestern Borderland, and reduced the likelihood of important affairs requiring discretion. Meanwhile, the garrison generals were transferred frequently, reducing the possibility of their collaboration with local forces. The situation in the early and late stages of a dynasty for Borderland governance could change greatly. The reasons were multi-faceted, including decline of the Central Plains dynasty in prosperity, the passing of events, changed policy due to the succession of the ruler, the change of the ruler’s concept for border governance, and corrupt governance of officials, as well as deeper-seated reasons such as rule by men invariably overriding rule of law under the feudal institution, and failure of some enlightened governance policies and practices to fall through. Take the Tang Dynasty as an example. Before the An-Shi Rebellion, the imperial court attached great importance to the selection of the Borderland commanders, and stipulated that they serve fixed tenures personally and exclusively. Those with outstanding achievements were often made prime minister. The border areas were also relatively stable during this period. When Emperor Xuanzong changed the rules, there were cases of Borderland commanders holding office for more than a decade. After he began to appoint An Lushan to important posts, the Borderland bureaucracy collapsed. Meanwhile, the imperial court’s decision-making became random and rash in most cases, leading to the rebellion of Borderland barbarians and political turmoil and division. After the An-Shi Rebellion broke out, the Tang Dynasty switched from active to passive in managing the border areas. In fact, it abandoned the practice of actively promoting the jimi prefecture system in the border areas since Emperor Taizong and adopted matter-of-fact approaches to border issues, merely addressing urgent needs in some cases. The “non-institutional factors” that affect the theory and practice of Borderland governance roughly include the interference of relatives on the empress’s or empress dowager’s side, abuse of power by eunuchs and the abnormal power changes within the ruling group, the interference caused by corruption, abuse of power, and chaos of the

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Borderland local government, as well as natural disasters, plagues, turmoil, and wars. Strictly speaking, their emergence is inherently related to the feudal system, but they are nonetheless put under the category of “non-institutional factors” because they tend to be accidental. The short- and long-term effects of Borderland governance are also issues to be studied. There are often deviations between the specific goals of historical figures and the objective effects of their actions; the immediate effects of Borderland governance policies sometimes deviate considerably from the far-reaching effects decades or even centuries later. Engels said that “The purpose of the action is anticipatory, but its actual result of the action is unexpected. Or, it may seem to be consistent with the expected purpose at first, but in the end is absolutely not the expected result” (Engels, 1972, 243). For example, most dynasties set great store by developing transportation in border areas. However, it should be pointed out that the ruler’s original intention was not to develop the Borderland (especially in the early days of ancient times), but to develop ties with other countries or neighbors. The endeavor stemmed from not only strategic considerations based on geopolitical interests, such as “befriending the distant enemy while attacking the enemy near home”, but also acquisition of treasures from other countries. In addition, it served to facilitate transport of troops to the Borderland areas and to meet the needs of the Borderland barbarians and neighboring countries to pay tribute. However, objectively the development of transportation in border areas effectively promoted the integration of border and the hinterland, furnishing an important condition for forming the historical territory of China. Compared with the Central Plains dynasty, the border regime’s administration of the Borderland differed not only in comprehensiveness, but also in content and focus. Take Nanzhao as an example. Nanzhao was deeply influenced by the economy and culture of the Tang dynasty. Practicing the slave system, it had to not only learn the production technology and culture of the Tang dynasty, but also constantly supplement labor. During the period of friendly relations with the Tang dynasty, it drew on the technological and cultural inflow of the Tang dynasty through frequent exchanges and rewards. During the period of antagonism with the Tang dynasty, it staged wars and



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captured prisoners of war and looted the Han residents, with possessions, experienced old officials and technicians as the focus of plundering. After the death of Yi Mouxun, the King of Nanzhao, in the third year of Yuanhe (808), its relations with the Tang Dynasty broke down again and its army repeatedly invaded Xichuan. “The area of 800 li between Chengdu in the south and Yuexun in the north was ransacked” (Sun, 1983, 8334). In the third year of Taihe (829), the Nanzhao Army seized Chengdu, and “it took several dozen thousand children and craftspeople, as well as precious goods with it.” “From then on, its artifact was on a par with that of Shuzhong in ingenuity” (Sima, 1989, 7868). It focused so much on abducting scholars, craftsmen and weaver girls in Chengdu that its invasion was described as “emptying the city of all musicians and craftsmen by taking away more than 50,000 professionals” (Li, 1983, 7220). Obviously, during the antagonism, Nanzhao made plundering wars an important policy for acquiring the population, property and production technology of the Tang Dynasty. After its founding, Nanzhao launched large-scale immigration in its territory, through the following measures. First, it annexed various places by force, and relocated the defeated tribes from their homelands to other places for resettlement, partly as a preventive measure. Implementing the practice in annexing other Zhao tribes in Erhai, it relocated more than 200,000 households of the Cuan tribes from eastern Yunnan to western Yunnan in a largest relocation undertaking, in order to eradicate the foundation of its competitor in eastern Yunnan. After Yimuxun reconciled with the Tang dynasty, he relocated the Shiman and Shunman tribes in the northwestern Yunnan that had once pledged allegiance to Tubo. Second, it relocated some tribes from the border areas to economically developed areas in the hinterland of Yunnan, or as supplementary labor to areas awaiting development. Third, it attacked its southern neighbors and abducted their populations. Nanzhao once invaded the countries of the IndoChina Peninsula, plundering property, and abducting people as slaves, who were settled in Tuodong and other cities, or sent to Lishui (now vicinities of the Jinsha River) to pan for gold. Fourth, it relocated some Wuman and Baiman nobles to guard the important passes or towns in its territory, which was actually tantamount to immigration. Therefore,

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this suggests that Nanzhao’s immigration practices were quite distinctive, and its governance policy quite different from that of the central dynasty. In handling the mutual relations, Nanzhao was pragmatic and flexible, while the Tang dynasty had a rigid institution that even caused command failure, and a wide policy fluctuation range and insufficient forward-looking. Judging from the ups and downs in the development the relationship, Nanzhao had upheld the principle of seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages, which led to appropriate measures. It also cleverly leveraged the corrupt official governance of the Tang Dynasty and its contradictions with other political forces. Faced with the antagonism of the Tubo, officials of the Tang Dynasty officials also made a detailed analysis of the superiority of the Tubo’s internal system and its timely and efficient response to the attack from the Tang troops. This suggests that comparing the border policies of the feudal dynasty and local regimes furnishes a relatively new perspective. In addition, the Borderland regimes of different regions in the north and the south were different in Borderland governance, reflecting the rich diversity of governance practice in ancient China. For example, compared with the northern nomads, the southern barbarians were less likely to collude and form powerful Borderland regimes, or harbor the aspirations to rule the Central Plains or contend with the dynasty in the Central Plains. After breaking with the Tang dynasty, Nanzhao defeated three conquests of the Tang army, and invaded into the territory of Tang many times. In the first year of Guangming (880), the court of the Tang dynasty discussed securing peace with Nanzhao through peace-keeping marriage. Prime Ministers Lu Xie and Dou Lu Zhuo said that “Since the Xiantong Years (860–874), barbarians have captured Annan and Yongguan twice, entered Central Guizhou once, and invaded into Xichuan four times, plaguing our people for fifteen years. More than half the taxes have been unable to reach the capital, and the financial resources of the three departments and imperial treasury have been exhaused. Our soldiers are dying of malaria; our people are rendered destitute and forced into robbery, the Central Plains lay waste—all because of the barbarians” (Sima, 1989, 8227). Since the first year of Xiantong, Nanzhao conquered Jiaozhou and Yongzhou



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twice, attacked Guizhou once, and reached Chengdu in one of its four invasions into Xichuan, but its troops returned after plundering, and showed no intention of contending for control of the Central Plains. In contrast, when the northern nomads entered the Central Plains, they mostly claimed to be the successor of the Central Plains dynasty, and strove for control of the Central Plains and contending for the throne with the Central Plains dynasty. Wang Fuzhi once said that “By nature, the people are born different in temperament, and by nurture, they are different in custom. Therefore, the people of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Western Guangdong are able to defend the barbarians and the Miao, eradicating the risk of their venturing beyond the mountains or converting the hinterland. It is not necessarily that they are weaker than the northern barbarians. Instead, they are fearful that the belligerent aboriginals might take it off guard and capture their bases” (Wang, 1975, 37). Wang Fuzhi was not correct in explaining why the southern barbarians did not dare to invade the Central Plains. The fact is that both their unwillingness to invade the Central Plains, and the eagerness of the northern barbarians to aspire for control of the Central Plains, have complicated and profound social, historical and cultural traditional reasons. It should also be pointed out that the strategies, policies, regulations, and measures formulated and implemented for Borderland governance in the China’s imperial history constitute not only the embodiment of the ideas and theories of Borderland governance, but also participation in governance, or rather, experimentation or examination of those ideas and theories in social practice. Seen from this perspective, the strategies, policies, regulations, and measures related to Borderland governance should also belong to the realm of governing practice. The strategies and policies of Borderland governance in imperial China mainly include the guidelines, principles and strategies for border management, as well as specific policies, stipulations and measures, based on the guidance of the ruler’s ideas and theories on border management, and rich practical experience. Specifically, they include emphasis on the rule of morality, like “cultivating virtue to solicit them [the barbarians] and spread the prestige of the Emperor and education to assimilate them” (Liu et al., 1975, 5364); skillful use of the contradictions

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between the Borderland barbarians, “setting the barbarians against one another is the supreme strategy for the Middle Kingdom” (Liu et al., 1975, 5717). Borderland governance in China’s imperial history often prioritized the north over the south, just as Wang Xiangzhi of the Song dynasty said that “The imperial court gave priority to the northwest and slighted the southeast.”4 They also include advocacy for flexible understanding of the way for ruling the barbarians, “there are also fast laws, and contingencies shall be formulated, with reference to their custom” (Fan, 1965, 2895). The border governance must be adapted to the circumstances, “there is no inevitable rule, or infallible approach” (Liu et al., 1975, 3805). For the Borderland barbarians “staging a rebellion, punitive expedition shall be sent; those surrendering themselves shall be placated”; “when they attack, repel them, and when they flee, guard the Borderland fortresses” (Liu et al., 1975, 5171). In dealing with the Borderland barbarians, “preparedness and defense shall be primary, and conquest secondary”(Gui, 1962). In Borderland governance, selection of the officials should come first: “Choosing the general is the most difficult part in governing the barbarians”(Sun, 1994, 38). In the Qin, Han and Tang dynasties, such policies as “rule by their own customs without imposing taxes” (Sima, 1959, 1440) were pursued in border areas inhabited by the barbarians. The more specific regulations and related measures mainly include relocating populace to the border areas, establishing government seats, deploying garrison, and opening up wasteland by troops and civilians; taking oath of peace with the barbarians and exercising peace-keeping marriage for peace in the border areas; integrating loose-rein governance and military presence in the border areas; requiring the Borderland barbarians to send hostages and pay regular tributes, using trade and other economic means to deter and control the Borderland barbarians; managing and developing the Borderland areas, and making use of their resources and products.

4 Wang Xiangzhi. “Guangnan Xilumen.” In Complete Geographic Records.



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2.2. Important Strategies and Policies for Borderland Governance in China’s Imperial History For the reasons mentioned above, the strategy, policies, regulations, and measures of Central Plains dynasties on border governance can also be regarded as a component of border governance, and the main ones are summarized below. First, peacemaking marriage, that is, political alliances formed via marriage between different ethnic groups, or different regimes of the same ethnic group, out of expediency. In the pre-Qin period, there had been peacemaking. However, back then it was mainly political marriage between the princes for solving territorial disputes, establishing military alliances, or ending confrontation. The peacemaking marriage for border governance began in the Western Han dynasty. Seen from historical records, the peacemaking marriage in the ancient times roughly includes the following six categories (Cui, 2005, 5): that between the Central Plains dynasty and the barbaric regime, which is the dominant category; that between the separatist regime and the barbaric regime; that between the separatist regimes; that between barbaric regimes; that between dynasties in the south and dynasties in the north; that with foreign countries in the present point of view. According to function and nature, it can be divided into the following seven types: that out of good faith for Borderland law and order; that for establishing military alliances; that for dividing and disintegrating the barbaric regime; that for borrowing troops or returning a favor; that for developing mutual relations, that for consolidate the alliance and that for political alliance. From the Western Han dynasty to the Qing dynasty, the peacemaking marriages in each period showed different characteristics (Cui, 2005, 8, 17). For example, those in the Western Han dynasty were mainly intended for demarcating borders or establishing trade, those in the Wei, Jin, Southern and Northern dynasties were mainly intended for establishing alliances, and mostly carried out between barbarian regimes. Those in the Sui and Tang dynasties more often highlighted princesses, with more extensive areas and objects of marriage, and obviously diverse purposes. Those in the Liao, Xia, Jin and Yuan

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dynasties featured higher status of marrying princesses, complex and diverse types and natures, and proposals for both marriage and assistance. In the Qing dynasty, peacemaking marriage between Manchu and Mongolian ethnic group was made a basic national policy. During this period, the marriage between the rulers of the Qing dynasty and the Mongolian aristocracy was mainly intended to enhance the kin-like relationship, and princesses were sent in between for marriage. It also had the characteristics of being long-lasting and encompassing rich social strata. The peacemaking marriage between the Central Plains dynasty and the Borderland regimes underwent three peaks in the Han, Sui and Tang, and Qing dynasties. From the three peaks, one can roughly see its role in Borderland governance in China’s imperial history. In its early days, the Western Han dynasty was still no match for the Xiongnu. Its founding emperor Liu Bang was besieged at Baishan Mountain with 400,000 cavalrymen led by Modu during an ill-fated punitive expedition to the Xiongnu. He managed to break out of the encirclement with his resourcefulness. However, many Han generals defected to the Xiongnu and consequently Modu was able to invade into the land of Han dynasty frequently. Worried yet aware that the strong enemy was not to be vanquished soon, he sent Liu Jing to propose a peace-keeping marriage for peace. Liu Jing sent to the Xiongnu cloth, rice, wine and food of fixed quantities as a tribute annually, and agreed to arrange a peacemaking marriage. “As a result, Modu reduced his invasion.” When the empress of Liu Bang took power his death, Modu grew disrespectful in his tone in his letter. The empress wanted to send a punitive expedition to the Xiongnu but was dissuaded by the generals, “so another peacemaking general was arranged with the Xiongnu.” Emperor Wen decided to resume the matter of peacemaking marriage after he first acceded to the throne. However, King Youxian of the Xiongnu that had settled in Henan invaded into Shangjun. When the government of the Han dynasty deliberated the choices of attacking the Xiongnu or making peace, all the officials said that Chanyu was unbeatable since he had just defeted the Dayuezhi. Therefore, the Han dynasty decided to make peace. In the 14th year BC (166 BC), the Xiongnu sent 140,000 cavalry troops to invade the north, and the areas in



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Yunzhong and Liaodong were the most afflicted. The Han dynasty sent a letter to remonstrate, “once again mentioning a peacemaking marriage.” After Emperor Wen died, Emperor Jing acceded to the throne and the Han dynasty achieved some military victories. Emperor Jing proceeded with the peacekeeping marriage with the Xiongnu, “opening the border market, conferring presents on the Xiongnu, and sent the princess for marriage, just as previously agreed upon.” Emperor Wu succeeded to the throne, “he specifically clarified loose-rein control of the Xiongnu through peacekeeping marriage, treated the Xiongnu favorably, opened border markets and met, and graciously rewarded the Xiongnu.” Eventually, the Xiongnu became close to the Han dynasty from Shanyu downward (Sima, 1959, 2904). Therefore, this suggests that the peacekeeping marriage with the Xiongnu in the early Western Han dynasty was carried out because it was obviously no match for the Xiongnu in strength. The peacemaking marriage in that period was mainly intended to ease the tension with the Xiongnu and avoid their invasion. Aside from marrying the princess to the Xiongnu, the Han dynasty also offered a certain amount of cloth, wine, rice, and food as gifts to them, and traded with them. Although the Han dynasty served the Xiongnu with all humbleness, the effect was still limited. Later, when the Tang court discussed about peacekeeping marriage, Lu Fu, an advisory, said in commenting on the practice of the Han dynasty that Emperor Gao of Han “married a daughter of his clan to Modu and gave the Xiongnu a huge amount of money, only to fire the arrogance of Modu who molested the Borderland ceaselessly” (Liu et al., 1975, 5170). What he said was basically truthful. After Emperor Wu succeeded to the throne, the Han dynasty won several major victories in the war against the Xiongnu, and significantly changed the balance of military forces between the two sides. Shanyu therefore sent envoys to the Han many times, “asking for peacemaking marriage with good faith and in a soft tone.” The Han envoy Yang Xin proposed that the Shanyu send his crown prince as hostage to the Han dynasty as a token of sincerity for peacemaking marriage. Upon that, Shanyu said that “This is against our previous agreement, according to which the Han dynasty would marry its princesses to us and gave us cloth, silk, food and other items for peace, while we would refrain

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from invading into your borders. Now, the Han dynasty is requesting my prince as hostage. It seems that the old ways will not be restored.” When the Dihou Shanyu took over, he repatriated the Han envoys who stayed but refused to surrender. “Afraid of being attacked by the Han,” he claimed that himself to be son of the Han dynasty, saying that “How dare I harbor aggressive designs against the emperor of the Han dynasty!” He added that “The emperor of the Han dynasty is my father-in-law” (Sima, 1959, 2917). This suggests that the Central Plains dynasty had formally imitated the feudal patriarchal system of the Central Plains in conducting peacemaking marriage with the border tribes, hoping to establish kinship similar that of father-in-law and son-in-law in order to maintain and restrict their political behavior. The Borderland clans were also clearly aware of that intention. In addition, when Emperor Wu succeeded to the throne, the balance of power changed between the Han and the Xiongnu, and consequently the nature of peacemaking marriage followed suit. The Han dynasty was no longer actively seeking peace while the Xiongnu were on its knees begging for peace. This indicates that the peacemaking marriage between the Central Plains dynasty and the Borderland clans inevitably carried political connotations, with the leading party determined via contention in political and military strength. It also shows that peacemaking marriage was an important means for adjusting the relationship between the two parties, so it was valued by both parties, especially the one party seeking the favor of the other. In the Sui and Tang dynasties, peacemaking marriage with the Borderland clans became even more complicated. During the Sui dynasty, there were many peacemaking marriages with the Turks, involving Princess Dayi, Princess Yicheng, Princess Gwanghwa, Princess Zongyi, and Princess Anyi successively. Those marriages alleviated sharp ethnic contradictions, sped up the national unification, and promoted its economic and cultural exchanges with the northwestern tribes. In the Tang Dynasty, peacemaking marriage with the Borderland ethnic groups was quite different in different periods. In the beginning, the Turks and other barbaric forces in the north were powerful,



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and they were in a dominant position, even threatening the Tang dynasty by refusing or breaking the marriage. After Li Shimin came to the throne, he defeated the Turks in the third year of Zhenguan (629), and later captured Jieli Khan, overthrowing the Eastern Turkic Khanate. Later, the Western Turkic Khanate rose, but was troubled by incessant civil strife. Under such circumstances, the Tang dynasty gradually commanded the initiative of peacemaking marriage, turning it into a powerful weapon to restrain and control the surrounding ethnic groups. During the Kaiyuan and Tianbao years, its ten peacemaking marriages with the Borderland ethnic groups took place when the latter had submitted (temporarily submitted) to the Tang dynasty. The Tang dynasty marked the heyday of peacemaking marriage of the Central Plains dynasty with the surrounding barbarians, most clearly manifesting its important role for border governance. After Emperor Ruizong of the Tang dynasty succeeded to the throne, Moduo the Turkic leader sent an envoy to propose for peace-keeping marriage for peace. Emperor Ruizong promised to marry the daughter of Prince Song, to be conferred the title of Princess Jinshan, to him. So Yangwo Zhitele, son of Moduo, was sent his son to the Tang dynasty as a hostage, and was conferred the title of Left Brave Guard General by the Tang dynasty. The event indicates that peacekeeping marriage could concur with voluntary submission of hostage by the border tribes. In the Wude years, the Northern Turkic Khanate became a nuisance, and it secretly collaborated with Tongyehu Khanate. So when Tongyehu sent an envoy for peacekeeping marriage, Feng Deyi suggested to Emperor Gaozu that “Currently it is urgent that we befriend the distant enemy while attacking the enemy near home. It might be advisable that we grant his wish to deter other barbarians in the north. We may devise a more beneficial strategy when the Middle Kingdom gains further strength after a few years.” Emperor Gaozu granted the wish of Tongyehu, who became very pleased. In the thirteenth year of Kaiyuan (725), Emperor Xuanzong sent Yuan Zhen, the Minister of Ceremony, as an envoy to Turk. At the banquet hosted in his honor, Xiaosha the Turkic leader asked him that “The Tang dynasty had granted peacemaking marriage to Tubo, Xi and Khitan, but why had it repeatedly refused the proposal of the Turks alone?” He added that “I was told

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that the princesses married by the Tang dynasty to the barbaric rulers were not real princesses. I am not requesting a real princess; instead, all I want is to have my wish granted, because repeatedly denied proposals have put me to shame among all barbaric tribes” (Liu et al., 1975, 5175). Yuan Zhen promised to pass on his request to the emperor. From this incident, this suggests that peacekeeping marriage had been used by the Tang dynasty as a means for dividing the Borderland ethnic groups, and cherished as an honor by those in the northwest. In strengthening the economic and cultural exchanges between the inland and border areas, the peacekeeping marriage has played a positive role. In the Tang dynasty, the marriage of Princess Wencheng to Songtsen Gampo the Tubo ruler and that of Princess Jincheng to another ruler of Tubo were typical examples. In the fifteenth year of Zhenguan (641), Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty approved the marriage of Princess Wencheng to Songtsan Gampo, ordering Daozong, the Minister of Rites to preside over the ceremony, and send the princess to Tubo as his envoy. The Han convoy was greeted at Heyuan personally by Songtsan Gambo, who “acted respectfully with all the courtesy of a son-in-law, admired the gorgeous costumes and etiquette of the great country, and almost couldn’t hide his shame and dismay.” Soon he built a new city, with a specific mansion for princess Wencheng. Sensing that the princess disliked the custom of Tubo painting their face reddish brown, Songtsen Gambo issued an order to have it prohibited. He also changed his felt clothing for silk and brocade apparel, and “gradually adored the customs of the Central Plains.” In addition, he sent the children of the chieftains to the Central Plains to study Book of Songs and Book of History. In the fourth year of Jinglong (710), Emperor Zhongzong conferred the title of Princess Jincheng on the daughter of Prince Shouli, and betrothed her to another Tubo ruler. When the princess reached Tubo, he specifically built a city for her residence. In the seventeenth year of Kaiyuan (729), he sent an important minister to the Tang dynasty, together with a memorial intended for the throne, saying that “I am a nephew of the late Emperor, now I am betrothed Jincheng Princess. We are even close as a family, and all the people are happy about it.” In the eighteenth year, the demarcation monuments were erected in Chiling, “under the agreement of no invasion ever since.”



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From this, this suggests that the peacekeeping marriage played an important and active role in promoting the close relationship between the Tang dynasty and Tubo (Liu et al., 1975, 5231). In handling the Borderland tribes, the Central Plains dynasty mostly emphasized the offer of reward and the threat of punishment, coupling threats with promises. In the chapter Tubo (Vol. 2), the Book of the Old Tang, the historian said that “Confucian officials talked more about peace via peace-keeping marriage, and military commanders only expected victory through war. That is the general situation.” In the view of feudal rulers, peacemaking marriage and military conquest were two ways for handling the Borderland barbarians, to be flexibly employed in view of the specific circumstances. In the Qing dynasty, there were nearly 600 person-times of ManchuMongolian marriage over 300 years, with multiple-pronged positive influences, as well as greater significance than those in the previous era. The Manchu-Mongolian marriages have the following characteristics: First, the intention and results were both establishing and consolidating the political alliance between the Manchu nobles and the Mongolian princes. Second, they were continuous and mutual, covering a large scale and multiple levels, and were not princesses marrying beneath them. A total of 431 Manchu princesses were married to Mongolians in the Qing dynasty, indicating an imbalance. Before the Qing dynasty entered the Shanhai Pass, the upper-class Manchu took more Mongolian women to wife but married fewer daughters of their clans to Mongolians. In the reign of Emperor Shunzhi, the numbers were even. After Kangxi, the number of Mongolian women taken to wife decreased rapidly, and most of them were not mandatory political marriages (Du, 2003, 583, 593). On the whole, the intermarriages between Manchus and Mongolia in the Qing dynasty were different from the peacemaking marriages of China’s imperial history, but they were based on the political alliance between the Manchu nobles and the Mongolian princes. They enhanced the connection between the Manchus and the Mongolians, but inevitably carried some important features of their ancient counterparts. The adoption of peacemaking marriage showed that the Central Plains dynasty had drawn on the feudal patriarchal system in handling the relations with the Borderland

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barbarians. It allowed the Central Plains dynasty and the border barbarians to establish a kin relationship, and effectively enhanced the intimacy between the two sides. In most cases, peacemaking marriage helped to strengthen the political alliance between the two parties and enhance mutual affection. At the same time, it also played a positive role in promoting the economic and cultural exchanges. Second, taking oaths. Mutual restraint with words or rituals was a common form of alliance or agreement with the Borderland clans or ethnic groups in the pre-Qin and subsequent dynasties. There might have been differences between alliance and oath. The chapter Quli in Book of Rites says that “Agreements reached by word of mouth is called oath, while those reached via offering is called alliance.” In comparison, “alliance” is more formal, usually involving killing of a sacrificial animal for sacredness and solemnness, and promulgation of a covenant or inscription of a stele. In some cases, a ceremony of drinking the blood of the sacrifice was held, for involving the gods as a witness. Another practice of similar significance is called zu, whose meaning can be extended to “curse”, meaning heavenly punishment for those violating the alliance. Because of the similarity in meaning, “oath and alliance” can also be used synonymously with “alliance and curse.” In the pre-Qin period, vassal states often took oaths for political alliances or division of interests, and oaths of that period had generally had the basic characteristics of oaths for alliance in feudal society. The Borderland tribes also had a tradition of taking oaths for alliance. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom written in the Jin dynasty, the southern barbarians “had the custom of invoking ghosts, and taking oaths for alliance, so the government often made (agreement) with them by taking oaths.” When Zhuge Liang pacified what is known as the present Yunnan and Guizhou, he complied an illustrative book in accordance with local customs, first painting the heaven and earth, the sun and the moon, the monarch and the city government; then the image of the dragon and the dragon giving birth to the barbarians, as well as oxen, horses and sheep; then the local chief official patrolling under a canopy on horseback the land to pacifying it. He also painted barbarians leading an ox, and carrying wine and precious goods to pay tribute to the local chief official. “The book was presented to the



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barbarians, and much cherished by them.” Zhuge Liang also distributed auspicious brocade and iron pledges to barbarians, to be the governor or military officers coming for inspection presented (Chang, 1984, 264). The paintings of Zhuge Liang on the origin of Borderland tribes and their submission to governance by the authority, and the brocade and iron pledges symbolizing obedience to the government were actually a form of agreement with the Borderland tribes. The local governments of the Han and Jin dynasties also took oaths with the Borderland clans for various reasons. According to the chapter Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, “there was originally a salt well in Wanshou Mountain in Wanshou County, Zangke Prefecture in the Han dynasty, but the barbarians took an oath not to exploit it at the end of the Han dynasty.” In Wei County, Jianning Prefecture, there was a Mingyue Community “where the barbarians refused to submit to the rule of Jin dynasty, so the officials took an oath with it.” Taking oaths is an important method for the Central Plains dynasty to restrain and control the Borderland clans. In the Northern Song dynasty, Fu Bi wrote “Thirteen Strategies for Defending Hebei”, and listed important strategies adopted by China’s imperial history for handling the Borderland tribes, such as requesting their sons for hostage, offering them gold and silk to suppress their desires, and establishing marital relationship to bring them closer. He mentioned the approach of “taking oaths in front of god”, saying that since ancient times, courtiers had “contended for supremacy at the imperial court for those several issues in devising strategies and coordinating resources” (Fu, 1999, 1501). Therefore, this suggests that the ruler had attached great importance to the oath for alliance. In the Han and Tang dynasties, the practice of oath for alliance was also implemented, together with the prevailing hostage system back then. In the 21st year of Jianwu (45), all 18 kingdoms including Cheshi Qianwang, Shanshan, and Yanqi sent their sons as hostage and offered their treasures as tribute. During their interview with Emperor Guangwu of Han, they all tearfully begged with drooped heads for dispatch of an administrative commanding officer. However, considering the Eastern Han dynasty was newly established and had yet to conquer the north, Emperor Guangwu “rejected their sons as hostage”,

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generously rewarded them and ordered them to return. Back then, kingdoms in the Western Regions were troubled by the aggravating offensive from Shache which was bent on taking control of the Western Regions. When they learnt that protection from Han dynasty woud not be forthcoming, and all the hostages were rejected, they grew worried and panicstricken. So they wrote an urgent letter to the Han Governor of Dunhuang, requesting him to take in the returned hostages as deterrence to Shache, “since their retention may make Shache think the Han commanding officer is forthcoming and stop the war” (Fan, 1965, 2924). The governor of Dunhuang submitted a memorial on the issue to Emperor Guangwu, and obtained his approval. In the incident, the kingdoms of the Western Regions grew worried when their hostages were repatriated by the Han court, because the repatriation was construed as a gesture of refusal for alliance and consequently a prelude to their annexation by Shache. From this, this suggests that acceptance of the hostage sons of the Western Regions by the Han Dynasty was regarded as an important indicator of willingness to form an alliance. There are similar records of Borderland tribes sending hostages while establishing alliances via oaths in the Tang dynasty. The Tang dynasty marked the apogee of oath for alliance. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Wei Gao the Military Governor of Jiannan, sent the magistrate Cui Zuoshi to take oath for alliance with Yimuxun the King of Nanzhao in the Diancang Mountain. The gist of the oath was to invite the gods of the Xi’er River and the Diancangshan to witness the alliance and request the Tang dynasty to accept the pledge of Nanzhao for allegiance. It was agreed that after the oath, if Nanzhao were to be half-hearted, or contact Tubo privately, or invade into the territory of the Tang dynasty, it would be inflicted with disasters and punishment by heaven and earth; if the Tang dynasty were to harbor vicious intentions, covet the land of Nanzhao, and refuse to offer relief to Nanzhao in the event of trouble, it would also be punished by the gods. The text of the oath came in quadruplicate, with the first one submitted to the Tang dynasty, the second one placed in the shrine under the Diancang Mountain, the third one kept in the Ancestral Temple of Nanzhao, and the last one placed in the treasury



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of Nanzhao (Fan, 1985, 331). The oath between Nanzhao and Tang dynasty is detailed and typical. Oaths were also popular within Tubo. The ruler and his ministers took a minor oath each year, and sheep, dogs, and macaques were sacrificed to the gods of heaven, earth, mountains, rivers, sun, moon, and stars, with a diviner making the prayer. Those guilty of disloyalty or treachery shall be “subject to the full wrath of the gods, and killed like sheep and dogs sacrificed.” Every three years, the ruler of Tubo and the tribes would hold a major oath-taking ceremony for alliance. At night, delicacies were served at the altar and dogs, horses, cows and donkeys were sacrificed, with an incantation saying “You must work together to protect our homestead and let god bear witness to your aspirations. If you betray this alliance, your body will be carved apart, like the sacrifices.” During Songtsen Gambo’s reign, the Zampo took a separate alliance with each clan. Later, they Zampo did not personally participate in the oath-taking ceremony. Instead, the Prime Minister or the Central Minister was sent to various places to preside over the ceremony, which grew to twice a year, known as winter oath and summer oath respectively. The oaths of this period were no longer intended for maintaining the relationship between monarchs and ministers as they had been in the early stage, but were intended for interaction and mutual restraint between the central and local governments (Liu et al., 1975, 5220; Lin, 2006, 91). In order to agree on peace and delimit each other’s jurisdiction, the Tang dynasty and Tubo took an oath many times to promote the development of friendly mutual relations. However, the oath-taking for alliance did not involve a sacrifice at the ancestral temple, with the exception of the oath-taking between Emperor Dezong and Tubo at Yanpingmen. “To enhance the good faith,” Emperor Dezong specifically ordered a sacrifice to the ancestral temple (Dong et al., 1983, 10024). In the first year of Changqing (821), the Tang dynasty and Tubo held a grand meeting to form alliance in Chang’an. Attended by the prime minister, Left and Right Puye, the six ministers, and other important officials of the Tang dynasty, the meeting led to an agreement emphasizing that each side keep their respective boundaries and refrain from violating each other. The two parties agreed that “now the two states have reached

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this commendable agreement for peace out of one mind, while the original maternal uncle-nephew goodwill must be communicated through post horses, in according to the tradition.” “The maternal uncle-nephew intimacy shall keep the clouds of contention down, and eliminate robbery and theft in the Borderland, thus eradicating fear and panic for war. The garrison shall be withdrawn and peace achieved, enabling the people to live in happiness for countless generations and consequently spreading the commendation of this great agreement to all land under heaven.” After the ceremony, Liu Yuanding and other officials from the Tang dynasty went to Tubo and met Tubo officials again in Lhasa. The Tubo prime minister and his fellow officials all wrote their names on the book of the instrument of alliance. The stone tablet carved there was the famous monument of the Tang-Tubo Meeting for Alliance. Generally speaking, oath for alliance is a common approach to political agreement between the Central Plains dynasty and the Borderland tribes, as well as that among the Borderland tribes. In most cases, it played a positive role for both parties to clarify their positions on disputed issues and to restrict their actions. However, its role was still limited. For example, Tubo forced alliance on the Tang dynasty under the pretext of oath for alliance, indicating the inherent unreliability of the practice. Third, edification. Also known as “wende” (cultural education), edification means that the ruler changes the grass-root concepts and customs of society, especially the Borderland tribes, by spreading inland culture and promoting changes in their customs, to gradually assimilate them to the inland, and consequently to strengthen governance there. It’s essentially implementation of relevant measures with the administrative power of a country to enable the subtle influence of inland culture, change the original lifestyles and concepts of the Borderland ethnic groups, and consequently serve feudal rule. The rulers of the China’s imperial history attached great importance to the edification of the Borderland tribes, and regarded it as an indispensable part of governance integrating both hard and soft tactics. Chu Suiliang the Tang courtier said that when the ancient wise kings governed the border, “they invariably prioritize the Han Chinese over the barbarians, and highlight moralization.” He also believed that it was the duty of the feudal dynasty to placate the Borderland barbarians with virtue, and once it



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performed that duty, “any blame will be on the barbarians, not the Han Chinese, and the barbarians will be guilty of dishonesty.” Likewise, Gui Yanliang of the Ming dynasty said that “The ideal border-guarding policy is to make barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom, placate them with virtue and subjugate them with prestige, so that each of the Borderland courtiers can guard their land.” In the Tang dynasty, Emperor Taizong further put forward the view of “spread imperial to benefit the barbarians”, believing that “imperial grace” was applied to the Borderland barbarians, their contradiction with the Central Plains dynasty would be alleviated, “since widespread imperial grace turns the barbarians of the Borderlands into family” (Gui, 1962; Liu et al., 1975, 2736; Sima, 1956, 6216). Lu Zhi, a minister of the Tang dynasty, analyzed the interdependence of moralization and military conquest in governing the Borderland. He said that the barbarians have been harassment since ancient times, and the key to their deterrence is whether the approach is appropriate. The ancients said that “barbarians cannot be assimilated unless with moralization”, indicating that dissemination of virtue would be difficult without deterrence by force. On the other hand, “military conquest won’t be reliable without moralization.” In the Song dynasty, the people also held the view that “where military coercion fails, grace won’t placate.” In the Northern Wei dynasty, Gao Lü proposed that the first two ways of national governance were cultural education and military conquest. “If the distant people refuse to submit, enhance cultural education to attract them; if the barbarians reject orders, exercise military conquest to strike terror into them.” He believed that cultural education served to tame the barbarians, while military conquest served to quench the barbarians’ resistance, and that both were indispensable (Liu et al., 1975, 3804; Gao, 1997, 478). In edification of the Borderland tribes, promoting Confucian education was the most effective. Zhu Yuanzhang made a very cogent argument on this. When the national academy was founded in the second year of Hongwu (1369), at the beginning of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang issued an edict to the central secretariat, saying that in state governance, education is the first priority, and schools are the cornerstone of education. All counties and counties shall establish schools, and hire teachers and Confucian scholars, to offer courses to students and apprentices, “so as to gradually educate the people and restore the

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ways of ancient kings.” In the twenty-eighth year (1395), he issued an edict to the Ministry of Rites: All the native officials of the Borderland know little about rites, since they are now holding their offices through inheritance. “Education is not offered in advance, how can them be assimilated?” Therefore, the native officials in Yunnan and Sichuan were ordered to set up Confucian schools, for education of their children, “acquainting them with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and preventing them from violating the rites and participating in brawls are also the way to achieve peace in the Borderland.”5 Therefore, some Central Plains dynasties set great store by promoting education in the border areas. There are records of Borderland officials zealously running schools in the Han dynasty. According to the Biography of Southwestern Barbarians in the Book of Later Han, when Wang Fu, a native of Shu County, took office as magistrate of Yizhou Prefecture in the Yuanhe years of the Eastern Han dynasty, “he began a conscientious effort to establish schools and gradually changed the local customs.” Officials in other border counties followed suit one after another. According to Records of Nanzhong in Records of Huayang Kingdom, Huo Yi the army supervisor in Nanzhong (now Yunnan and Guizhou) “placated the foreign customs, made laws and implemented education, all properly; hence the barbarians and the Jin dynasty were in peace.” In the fourth year of Qingli (1044), Emperor Renzong of Song ordered the military superintendent of all circuits to open schools, saying that schools with more than 200 scholars could be elevated to county school, “from then on each prefecture had its own school.” In today’s Guangxi and other places, learning Confucianism and attending the imperial examination became the fashion of the day. Volume 4 of Notes to the Answers from beyond the Mountains says that “in areas beyond the mountains, imperial examination is cherished more than the Middle Kingdom.” At least five to six hundred candidates took the imperial examination each year, following one another in close succession. In the Song dynasty, there were 41 municipal, prefecture and county schools in Guangxi today, including 12 built in the Sui and Tang dynasties and restored in the Song dynasty, 20 were founded in the 5 History of Ming, Vol. 69, “Election (1)”, 1686. Veritable Records of Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty, Vol. 239



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Song dynasty and 9 founded in unknown years. In the Song Dynasty, many erudite scholars were exiled to Guangxi because of setback in official career or offence, including Li Shizhong, Huang Tingjian and Qin Guan in the Northern Song dynasty, and Fan Chengda, Zhou Qufei and Zhang Qian in the Southern Song dynasty. Most of them actively advocated education in Guangxi, and enthusiastically eliminated bad customs, promoting local enlightenment. In the Tang and Song dynasties, officials serving in Hainan also highlighted promoting inland etiquette and customs. In the Tang dynasty, when Wang Yifang took office as Ji’an Cheng of Danzhou, he recruited students to give lectures on Confucian classics and held sacrifice to Confucian forefathers when he saw that the local “barbarians were living in the wild, unenlightened. The local chieftain was overjoyed to see all this” (Liu et al., 1975, 4874). In the 11th year of Zhiyuan (1274), the Yuan Dynasty established a province in Yunnan. The provincial governor Sai Dianchi appointed Confucianism promoters in Zhongqing (now Kunming) and Dali, and later built a Confucian temple in Zhongqing. “Even Cuan and Bo ethnic groups sent their children to school.” In the 19th year, the imperial court instructed all circuits in Yunnan to build schools. In the 29th year, it reiterated the establishment of schools in all circuits in Yunnan, with “instructors to be the selected from scholars in Shu.” In the first year of Dade (1305), when Hu Xin, the son of Sai Dianchi, was appointed as the Right Minister of Yunnan Province, “he ordered schools to be built in all prefectures and counties.” Areas recorded to have established schools include Yongchang, Lijiang, Heqing, Yao’an, Weichu and other remote circuits. In the first year of Yanyou, the Yuan dynasty established the Yunnan Confucianism Promotion Department. Some of the schools built in the Yuan dynasty were later destroyed in war, and 11 were rebuilt in the Ming dynasty.6 Similar situations are not uncom­ mon in border areas across the country.

6 Song Lian et al.., History of Yuan, Vol. 125, “Biography of Sayyid Shams Din ‘Umar’ ”, 3069. [Yuan Dynasty] Li Yuandao, “Records of Lectures at Jianzhong Qinglu”, in (Zhengde) Records of Yunnan, Vol. 29, “Theses”. History of Yuan, Vol. 17, “Emperor Shizu (14)”, 362. [Yuan Dynasty] Deng Lin: “The Epitaph of Wang Zhi’ang, Deputy Placting Envoy of Yuan”, in (Republic of China) Newly Compiled General Records of Yunnan, Vol. 94, “Stele and Bronze Inscription Study”, Book 5, 283.

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In the Ming and Qing dynasties, school operation in the border areas reached a larger scale and had a far-reaching influence. Take the southern border areas as an example. According to statistics in Records of Yunnan, there were 63 Confucianism schools in Yunnan in the Tianqi Years, including 16 provincial schools, 23 prefecture schools, 22 county schools, and 2 garrison schools. In addition, there were 163 community schools, 48 academies and 4 Confucian temples. In the last years of Chongzhen, there were 73 Confucian institutions and 65 academies (Fang, 2003, 753). The Qing dynasty also attached importance to the development of education in Yunnan. In the 18th year of Shunzhi (1661), Yuan Maogong, governor of Yunnan, submitted an imperial memorial, and suggested offering courses to the children of native officials in schools in various places to “acquaint them with etiquette and justice.” His suggestion was approved. In the 33rd year of Kangxi, the Qing court set up schools in Qujing, Chengjiang, Guangxi, Yuanjiang, Kaihua, Shunning, Wuding, and Jingdong, and set up tutoring institutes in 17 prefectures and counties, including Xundian and Jianshui. Later, it increased many Confucian schools, academies, philanthropic schools and private schools. Philanthropic schools were mostly located in border areas. From the Kangxi years to the Guangxu years, prefectures and counties in Yunnan built 866 philanthropic schools, some of which were located in remote areas, for example, 60 in Tengyue Prefecture and 35 in Menghua Prefecture. In Lijiang, which had no record of schools established in the Ming dynasty, 27 philanthropic schools were built in the Qing dynasty.7 The Qing court emphasized running schools in the regions inhabited by the Miao ethnic group. In the 16th year of Shunzhi (1659), the Hunan government ordered the official schools in Chenzhou Prefecture to admit Miao students and stipulated the quota of admission. In the 44th year of Kangxi (1705), the governor of Guizhou Province set up official schools in the prefectures and counties in the Miao districts upon approval of the emperor, and admitted Miao children. After the 7 Veritable Records of Emperor Shengzu of Qing dynasty, Vol. 2. Veritable Records of Emperor Shengzu of Qing dynasty, Vol. 164; (Republic of China) Newly Compiled General Records of Yunnan, Vol. 134–136, “Study of Academic Institutions.”



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bureaucratization of native officers, the pace of establishing schools in the Miao districts accelerated. From the 7th to 10th year of Yongzheng, the Hunan government established Sangzhi County School, Yongshun County School, Yongshun County School, Baojing County School, Longshan County School, and Guixiang Academy in Yongshun Prefecture. From the first year to the 46th year of Qianlong, government schools were established in Shinan Prefecture, Hefeng Prefecture, Xuan’en Prefecture, Laifeng County, Lichuan County, Xianfeng County and Changle County, and academies were established in Baojing County and Sangzhi County. In the 8th year of Yongzheng, Eertai and others submitted an imperial memorial for establishing a philanthropic school in Guzhou and other places. In the 9th year of Qianlong (1744), Jiang Pu, the governor of Hunan, set up free schools in the Chengbu and Suining upon approval of the emperor. After the Miao uprising between the Qianlong and Jiajing years, the rulers keenly felt the importance of education, and highlighted the restoration or establishment of new schools in pacified areas. For example, in the first year of Jiaqing, the government of Fenghuang Prefecture confiscated the weapons of the Miao Villages and set up academies and philanthropic schools there. The Qing dynasty promoted the “land-harnessing policy” in the Miao district of Xiangxi, and various schools increased rapidly. In the 12th year of Jiaqing (1807), Fenghuang Prefecture, Qianzhou Prefecture and Yongsui Prefecture and Luxi County, Mayang County, Baojing County, each built one academy, and built 50 new philanthropic schools for land-harnessing households and as many 50 philanthropic schools for the Miao ethnic group. In the 14th year, the government established another 20 philanthropic schools for the Miao ethnic group in remote areas.8 The establishment of schools raised the literacy in the border areas. Since the middle of the Qing dynasty, most of the Miao people in Liping Prefecture spent their time farming and recitation, and many outstanding ones went to take imperial examination. The Miao people in 8 [Qing Dynasty] General Records of Hunan, Vol. 84; (Qing Dynasty) Xu Ke, Manuscript of Qing Anecdotes, Vol. 1 “War·Fu Nai Placating Miao”; [Qing Dynasty] Veritable Records of Frontier Garrisons in the Miao Colonies, Vol. 29.

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Huangping and Qingping had taken such an interest in schooling and taking the exams that they were frequently not recognized as Miaos. The Miao people in the Taigong Prefecture “were mostly literate and sensible.” Under such circumstance, some Miao scholars were trained. An outstanding example is Yang Youkai, who was born to a Miao family in Chengdu in the Yongzheng period. He would “read book that he could acquire” and “was praised in all towns.” Yang Minhua, a student of the Miao ethnic published his collection of poems and essays in the reign of Emperor Qianlong, “and was considered unrivaled in the art of writing.”9 Actively spreading the lifestyles and customs of the hinterland to gradually edify and assimilate the Borderland tribes was also a Borderland governance method valued by the rulers of the China’s imperial history. In the second year of Hongwu (1369), the Central Secretariat of the Ming dynasty suggested relocating the aboriginals of colonies in Guangxi to the hinterland, “so as to eradicate border disasters.” Emperor Taizu Yuanzhang answered that “Those colonies are inhabited by barbarians of different ethnic groups, who are ignorant of courtesy and justice. If you let them have it their way, they submit themselves; if you go against their wish, they rise in rebellion. So, relocation might be inadvisable. Garrisons should be stationed at strategic points, and then we wait for their acculturation. In a few years, they will be law-abiding. Why bother to relocate them?”10 The answer shows that Zhu Yuanzhang was keenly aware of the important of role of acculturation and changed social customs in consolidating the feudal rule in the Borderland. In the early Jianwu years of the Eastern Han dynasty, Ren Yan was the appointed Prefect of Jiuzhen Prefecture, which habitually suffered from food shortage due to the reliance on hunting for livelihood and ignorance of farming. Ren Yan taught the locals to make farm tools and 9 [Qing Dynasty] Ai Bida, Knowledge and Stratagem on Southern Guizhou, Vol. 20; [Qing Dynasty] Li Zongfang: Records of Guizhou, Vol. 3; [Qing Dynasty] Ding Shanggu, Essential Documents of Taigong; (Guangxu) General Records of Hunan, Vol. 190, Personages of the Kingdom. 10 [Qing Dynasty] Records of Yunnan from the Daoguang Years, Vol. 7, “Native Officials (1)”, 8204.



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farming methods. The fields were opened up, and the people became enriched. The local people of Luoyue had never known marrying etiquette, and they became couples because of sexual relationship. “Never did they know anything about father-son or husband-wife etiquette.” Ren Yan issued an order to counties under his jurisdiction, requesting that all men from 20 to 50 and all women from 15 to 40 “be made couples according to age.” For those too poor to afford to betrothal presents, county magistrates and officials below them shall provide assistance. “More than two thousand people got married at the same time.” That year, the weather was favorable and there was a bumper harvest. Those who got married and had children began to have the notion of filiation. The common people said that “now I am a parent, thanks to Mr. Ren,” and named their children “Ren.” Gradually, ethnic tribes came from beyond the Borderland to pledge allegiance (Fan, 1965, 2462). The production methods and living customs of the hinterland promoted by Ren Yan greatly changed the social tendency of Jiuzhen Prefecture, and earned him recognition among the locals, indicating the far-reaching influence of changing customs. The Song dynasty was outstanding in actively reforming the old customs in the border areas. In the 4th year of Kaiyuan (971), Emperor Taizu of the Song dynasty issued a decree, saying that “in Guangnan, men and women were sold as slaves and servants (now Guangxi Guilin); those people should be set free. Other policies harmful to the people should be reported and consequently abolished upon approval.” As a result, human trafficking in Guangxi and the vicinity areas was significantly reduced. In the 2nd year of Yongxi (985), the imperial court “banned human sacrifice and forbade monks to marry or have children in Yongguan (now Guangxi).” Later, it stipulated that “township officials shall be punished together with the offenders, and all ghost statues and temples shall be demolished, to eradicate their harm once and for all”.11 With the strict prohibition by the imperial court, undesirable

11 [Yuan Dynasty] Tuotuo et al. 1977, History of Song, Vol. 2, “Emperor Taizhu (2)”, 32; Vol. 5, “Emperor Taizong (2)”, 76; Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, citing Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali State”.

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customs as offering human sacrifices to ghosts and extensively building temples in Guangxi and other places was greatly reduced. The Qing people had described the great changes that took place in border areas in Yunnan after the Ming and Qing dynasties promoted Confucian education and reformed old customs: from the Han dynasty to the Yuan dynasty, prefectures and counties in Yunnan were generally sparsely governed, with Han Chinese living together with barbarians. The Song dynasty and Dali State ruled their land separately, with the Dadu River as the demarcation. People in the Song dynasty rarely knew about the Dali State, and had to rely on translation for exchanges. The language, diet and dress code of Dali were also quite different from those of the Central Plains. After superseding the Yuan dynasty, “the Ming dynasty leveled the terrain, cut the forest and built walled cities; replaced the hair coils and jade earrings with hats and clothing; set up schools, and carefully selected Confucian officials.” Children of chieftains in Yunnan took admission to schools as an honor. In particular, the chieftain of Mu Clan in Lijiang and that of the Gao Clan in Yaozhou loved to get acquainted with migrant scholars, and they both had poems handed down. After the establishment of the Qing dynasty, native officials and aboriginals all admired its literary rituals and music, clothing and diet, and tried to imitate them. After decades of acculturation, “the chieftain’s children civil examinations and became successful candidates of imperial examination one after another. Some erudite scholars rose, and were equally matched to master Confucian scholars of the hinterland in knowledge on classics and scholarly achievements.”12 The above-mentioned situation can be said to be representative in the Borderland regions of the entire country. The China’s imperial history had attached importance to the subtle influence of inland culture, and spread the Chinese civilization to the border areas by developing Confucian education and reforming old customs, gradually integrating the Borderland barbarians into the hinterland in concept and custom. The positive effects of education for the formation and consolidation of a multi-ethnic unified country are self-explanatory. 12 [Qing Dynasty] Records of Yunnan from the Daoguang Years, Vol. 7, “Native Officials (1)”.



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Fourth, interchange trade. Interchange trade was commercial activities in which porcelain, tea and other commodities from the hinterland were sent to border areas specified by the government for exchange for rare local produces and horses of barbarians in in a prescribed manner under the management of relevant institutions. The participating barbarians included not only tribes from the Borderland regions, but also traveling businessmen from distant countries. In order to regulate trade with traveling businessmen from distant countries, the Song dynasty formulated the Interchange trade Law, like other dynasties. After the inauguration of interchange trade with the Nanyue Kingdom in the early Western Han dynasty, the institution on interchange trade gradually took shape. In the Eastern Han dynasty, the scale of interchange trade was further expanded, to include Wuhuan, Northern Xiongnu and Xianbei. While the Northern Wei dynasty established interchange trade in the southern border, the Sui and Tang dynasties mainly traded with the barbarians in the northwestern border. In the Kaiyuan years of the Tang dynasty, regulations were drafted and trade catalogues formulated, and Late Tang followed suit. Meanwhile, Goryeo, Uyghur, and Heishui each traded with the Central Plains dynasty with their native products. In the Song dynasty, interchange trade witnessed marked development; in particular, interchange trade with business travelers of other countries reached a considerable scale. In the 4th year of Kaibao (971), the Song dynasty set up a Bureau for Foreign Shipping in Guangzhou, and later in Hangzhou and Mingzhou, and opened trade with the Dayi, Dupo, Champa, and Brunei, exchanging gold, silver, stringed coins, lead tin, variegated silk and porcelain for their spices, rhinoceros horns and ivory, coral, amber, wrought iron, agate, tridacna and crystal. In the 9th year of Xining (1076), the interchange trade revenue of the three cities of Hangzhou, Mingzhou, and Guangzhou exceeded 540,000 strings of money. The Song dynasty also developed interchange trade with the border tribes. In the second year of the Taiping Xingguo (977), it ordered Zhen, Yi, Xiong, Ba, Cang and other prefectures to establish market bureaus for trading with Khitan in spices, rhinoceros horns and ivory, and tea. Throughout the reigns of Emperor Renzong and

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Emperor Yingzong, the Song dynasty and the Khitan maintained an alliance, “and the border market” The Song dynasty also established interchange trade with Xixia, through both official and private markets. In Chu, Shu and Southern Guangdong, where the territory of the Song dynasty adjoined that of barbarians, and the area inhabited by the Qiang ethnic group along the border of Xizhou Prefecture, border residents were allowed to trade with the local tribes. In the third year of Xining (1070), the Song dynasty set up multiple markets in Lanzhou, Hubei Circuit, Lizhou Prefecture, and Yazhou Prefecture, to facilitate the exchange of border residents with border tribes. It also established a city trade department for management. After Song imperial court moved to the south, the market for horse trade with Dali State was changed from Lizhou to Guangxi, with a specific department established for its management (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4558). The nomadic ethnic groups relish in cheese, beef and mutton, while tea can serve to relieve the greasiness. “Without tea, they tend to feel sick.” Since the Tang and Song dynasties, the trade of tea for horses had been practiced, “as a means to restrain the Qiang and Rong ethnic groups, especially in the Ming dynasty.” The tea-for-horse market between the Ming dynasty and the northern nomads generally involved official tea and commercial tea, both of which reached a considerable scale. Large quantities of tea produced in the hinterland provinces were shipped to warehouses in border areas for horse trading. In official tea trade, taxes were mainly levied on the trading parties; for commercial tea, “taxes were levied according to regulations similar to those for salt.” In the Yongle years, the horse market was established in three places: the first was in the southern pass of Kaiyuan, intended for border tribes of Haixi; the second was five li’s east of Kaiyuan City and the third in Heguangning, both intended for Doyan Sanwei. In the reign of Jiajing, a horse market was established in Datong, and then in Xuanzhen on the border of Shaanxi.13

13 History of Ming, Vol. 80, “Food and Money (4)”, 1947; Vol. 81, “Food and Money (5)”, 1982.



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In addition to the horse market, the Ming dynasty also set up a tea market for Tibetans in Sichuan, Shanxi and other places. Since their establishment was obviously intended as a loose-rein control, the imperial court exercised a very strict control the tea market. Each western barbarian coming to trade their horses for tea was given a gold pass, “to prevent fraud.” Every three years, the Ming dynasty would send court officials to convene all the barbarians to conduct the tea transaction after verifying the pass. According to regulations, first grade horses were exchanged for 120 kilograms of tea each, second grade for 70 catties and third grade for 50 catties. Trafficking tea out of the country was punishable by death, and “even the high and mighty were not to be spared.” In the early Ming dynasty, the Bureau for Foreign Shipping was established to manage the interchange trade with overseas barbarian tribes. The sites of interchange trade were Taicang Huangdu, Ningbo, Quanzhou and Guangzhou successively. Ningbo was mainly intended for with Japan, Quanzhou for Ryukyu, and Guangzhou for Champa, Siam and Western countries. The Ryukyu and Champa were all punctual, but Japan “was rebellious and unpredictable.” Therefore, it was stipulated that trade with Japan shall be conducted every ten years, the number of people and boats going to the trade each time should be 200 and two respectively. Meanwhile, the gold leaf was used as for verification, “to prevent fraud and encroachment.” Later the Ming dynasty canceled the Bureau for Foreign Trading and prohibited the military and civilians in the coastal areas from communicate with overseas countries.14 The tea-horse exchange market for Tibetans in the Qing Dynasty was further expanded on the basis of the Ming Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty followed the Ming Dynasty system, and tea circulation was roughly divided into three types: official tea, commercial tea and tribute tea. Among them, official tea is the official tea-horse exchange market, and the purpose is to “store the side and easy horses”; the purpose of business tea is to “give the introduction lesson”. A considerable part 14 History of Ming, Vol. 80, “Food and Money (4)”, 1947; Vol. 81, “Food and Money (5)”, 1980.

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of the tea also enters the market for the Tibetans, and only the tribute tea is transported. Beijing is for the rulers to enjoy. This suggests that a large amount of tea produced in the Qing Dynasty is still used for mutual market with Tibetans. The Qing Dynasty strengthened the management of the tea market. In Shaanxi alone, five places were set up to inspect the tea horse history. Among them, the Xining Division was based in Xining, the Taozhou Division was based in Minzhou, the Hezhou Division was based in Hezhou, the Zhuanglang Division was based in Pingfan, and the Ganzhou Division was based in Lanzhou. A salt tea ceremony was set up in Sichuan, and a tea ambassador under Jiangning Prefecture was set up in Jiangxi to strengthen management (Zhao et al., 1977, 3651). Most of the interchange trade markets organized for the Borderland tribes and the overseas tribes in China’s imperial history had clear political purposes, that is, to restrain and control the latter through economic and trade activities. The History of Ming therefore said in the section Food and Goods (IV) that “(The emperor) carefully prepared for border defense, and used tea to trade for horses, thus stabilizing the barbarians mentally and strengthening the Middle Kingdom.” During the Yongle period, the Ming dynasty increased the quantities of tea transactions, in order to “placate the people from afar.” The interchange trade market had helped to control and restrain the border tribes and the overseas tribes. Organization by the government ensured fair transaction and standardized management to a certain extent, and therefore interchange trade was generally welcomed by the border barbarians. Besides, the interchange trade increased the treasury income of the Central Plains dynasty, expanded its economic exchanges with the border and even overseas countries, and promoted the economic development and the construction of communication lines in the border areas, most notably in the Ming and Qing dynasties. In the 18th year of Shunzhi (1661), the Qing court entertained the request of Dalai Lama and Gendu Taiji and agreed to open tea-horse trade in Beisheng Prefecture, Yunnan (to the east of present-day Lijiang). In the 4th year



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of Kangxi, the tea-horse trade market was officially opened in Beisheng Prefecture (Zhao et al., 1977, 3655). The original path from Central Yunnan to the Tibetan region through Dali and Lijiang was restored. In the late Ming dynasty and early Qing dynasty, the tea production in Sichuan was severely damaged by the war. The opening of the teahorse market in Beisheng Prefecture promoted the production of tea in southern Yunnan, Xishuangbanna, Simao and other places, and Pu’er tea replaced Sichuan tea to become an important commodity in the tea-horse trade in the southwestern border. With the rapid development of Pu’er tea, the six major tea plantations gradually took shape in Xishuangbanna and Simao. Covering an area of nearly 800 li’s in radius, they became a source of livelihood for most local people and immigrants (Hu, 2008). During the tea picking season, hundreds of thousands of people swarmed in for tea-related work (Tan, 1990, 269). Even today, Xishuangbanna and Simao are better developed than other regions. In addition to the measures listed above, the central dynasty or the Central Plains dynasty also adopted strategies and policies in terms of tribute, request of hostages, establishment of governance seat, expansion of roads, land reclamation, immigration, jimi governance and the chieftain system in border governance.

3.  The Evolution of Border Governance Theories and Practice in China’s Imperial History The ideas and theories of the Central Plains dynasty on border governance have undergone dynamic development and changes, with slightly different content in different periods. However, the development of their cognition can still be seen and their general characteristics can be summarized from the basic historical facts and related expositions of the ancients. In view of the rich records on thoughts and theories of border governance in the unified dynasties, the Han, Tang, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties are selected for their analysis and exploration.

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3.1. The Central Plains Dynasty’s Understanding of Border Governance and Its Characteristics There have always been different opinions regarding the opening up of the Borderland in the Qin dynasty and the Western Han dynasty. One of the earliest records on Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s opening up of the Borderlands was Huainanzi; before the Song dynasty, Sima Qian and Sima Guang were the main historians to discuss the Borderland development by Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty. According to Huainanzi, Emperor Qin Shi Huang had ordered an army to attack areas to the south of the Five Ridges in order to “seize the rhino horns, ivories, emeralds, and pearls of Yue.” When Historical Records was written, Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty was still alive and Sima Qian couldn’t vent his thoughts directly, but his implications can still be inferred from the text. He said in Biographies of Dayuan that when Zhang Qian returned from Tochari, he suggested opening up the road to India via the land of the Southwest barbarians. “The emperor was told that Dayuan, Tochari, and Arsacid are all large countries, rich in exotic things and inhabited by aboriginals. Engaged in much the same trade as the Middle Kingdom, they are weak in military strength and avaricious for the wealth of the Han; to their north there are Tokhara, Kangju and other kingdoms that are powerful and may be roped in with gifts. If they can be won over with righteousness, the land of the Middle Kingdom will be greatly expanded, the barbarians subdued and different customs integrated. Consequently, the mighty virtue of the Middle Kingdom will be extended to all corners of the world.” So Emperor Wu started a war against the southwest barbarians once more. Sima Guang had this to say in commenting on Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty: “[Emperor Wu] had led an extremely corrupt way of life, exercised stringent punishment and imposed heavy taxes, built extravagant palaces domestically, waited on the four barbarians, believed gods and spirits, and toured his territory indefinitely, exhausting the resources of the people and forcing them into robbery. He is not much different Emperor Qin Shi Huang” (Sima, 1956, 747). In summary, regarding the military administration of areas beyond the Five Ridges and southwest barbarians by Emperor Qing Shi Huang and



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the Emperor Wu of Han, commentators are roughly divided into three views: first, territorial expansion can help to “spread the mighty virtues of the feudal dynasty to all quarters”, and to lure Tokhara and Kangju into submission with benefits; second, it can help collect distant strange objects, such as rhino horns, ivories, emeralds and pearls of areas to the south of the Five Ridges, Ferghana horses of Dayuan; third, since the barbarian land of the southwest has not been a source of tribute, tax or manpower, its operation is not cost-effective. Greed for foreign and eagerness to expand our territory will inevitably disturb the people, exhaust financial resources and shake the foundation of the country. “That is beneficial for courtiers but not a strategy in the long-lasting interest of the country.” In its heyday, the Tang dynasty had a smaller directly governed territory than the Han dynasty, but a far bigger area in jimi provinces and prefectures. The remarkable achievement was attributable to the thoughts of Emperor Taizong on border governance. Seen from related historical records such as the Book of Tang and Book of Late Tang, the thoughts can be summarized as follows. “All under the heaven are one family,” “barbarians in the north and south are family,” all ethnic groups on the land of Tang dynasty are its people; opposed to the theory of the four barbarians being “trifles”, if the vassal lords of the Borderland areas abuse their superiors and subjects, “and make the people crying for help”, the imperial court will not sit back and do nothing; “barbarians of the south and north are all human beings, with human sentiments just like our people”, if governed with virtue, “they will be like family,” and “barbarians in northernmost barren land will become our subjects”; too many suspicions will “turn blood kin into enemies”; the previous emperors had pacified remote peoples to “earn the fame of bringing remote land under submission” “which serves no real benefits but burdens the people” and “I will refrain from such practices.” The core of the above thoughts is “all under heaven are one family”, “the barbarians are also human beings” and the rule of barbarians with virtue. Those understandings were quite progressive, and affirmed by many researchers. However, they still had their limitations. First of all, Emperor Taizong of Tang had proceeded from the perspective of

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moralization such as “all under heaven are one family” and “rule of barbarians with virtue” and had not yet fully realized the great significance of opening up and consolidating the border. Nor had he fully understood the practical value of the border areas after development. Instead, he believed that canvassing the barbarians of remote areas “would carry no benefits but exhaust the resources of the people”, and thus should be renounced by wise emperors. This shows that he still followed the set pattern of his predecessors. Based on this understanding, the Tang court spent a lot of manpower and material resources in operating the border areas, but the limited tax revenues made it unsustainable. This defect was keenly felt in the Tang Dynasty. In the first year of Shen Gong (697), the Zhang Jianzhi, the Governor of Shuzhou submitted an imperial memorial requesting cancellation of Yaozhou Prefecture. He said that “Now (Yaozhou) doesn’t pay salt or cloth tax, offer rarities for tribute, uses its arms for military purposes, or send its treasures and goods to the Middle Kingdom. Meanwhile, the national treasury is exhausted, to lead the common people to serve the barbarians. I am taking the liberty of personally feeling sorry for the Middle Kingdom” (Liu et al., 1975, 2940). Du You, an important minister of the Tang dynasty, served successively Imperial Envoy for Management of Rongguan, Lingnan Military Governor, and Manager of Government Affairs in the reigns of Emperor Dezong, Shunzong and Xianzong. In the 17th year of Zhenyuan (801), he presented to the imperial court the Comprehensive Institutions which had taken him more than 20 years to complete. In expounding the strategies for governing borders, it said that “in state governance one should worry the spread of virtue, not the size of territory; in governing the barbarians”, jimi policy shall suffice, regardless of the land; the Qin dynasty and its subsequent dynasties “pursued territorial expansion as the top achievement and tributes from afar as a token of widespread virtue”, which led to countless killings, undermined national stability, and notoriety for the policy makers. It advocated the approach of “when they attack, repel them, and when they flee, stay prepared” in governing the barbarians; armed expedition to the barbarians would only repeat the futile efforts of China’s imperial history; rulers should remember that “those bent on expanding



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territory fail to govern it while those bent on spreading virtues become strengthened.” In the Kaiyuan and Tianbao years, the country was originally peaceful, but was thrown into chaos by a war started by “Borderland generals currying imperial favor” with the border ethnic groups. The war on a foreign land took the life hundreds of thousands of troops, sending the Tang dynasty to the verge of comprehensive collapse. Du You’s views were quite representative among the ruling clique of the Tang dynasty. It can also be regarded as a prevailing view among feudal scholar-bureaucrats on the issue of opening up territories in the first half of feudal society. The Mongolian rulers originated from the grasslands, and cherished conquest, hunting and feasting the most. The Mongolian aristocracy, headed by Genghis Khan, also believed that foreign expansion was approved and protected by the gods, considering countries beyond the Borderland part of the Mongolian empire. They were deeply interested in launching conquests, communicating with other countries, and acquiring rarities from afar through exchange and tribute. The Yuan dynasty launched wars on many occasions, and attached great importance to developing communication lines to foreign countries, because it maintained the tendency of external expansion and hoped to establish wider contacts with the outside world. In the view of its ruler, the border areas were not much different from the hinterland areas. They were not only a source of taxation and materials, but also a base for attacking neighboring countries and a portal for foreign exchanges. Therefore, it made conscious efforts to manage them. Under the control of this ruling ideology, not only did they deliberately managed the provinces in the border areas, but governed them with methods applied to the hinterland, such as extensively establishing government department for in-depth governance in various places, indiscriminately imposing taxes and various mining taxes, actively developing transportation and opening schools, and recruit native forces for expedition wars. Just as mentioned in the section Geography I in the History of Yuan, “The border areas to the north of the Five Ridges, Liaoyang, and those in Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Hunan and Guangdong, were formally jimi prefectures in the Tan dynasty. Now taxes and labor duties are imposed on them, just like the hinterland.”

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Zhu Yuanzhang the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty inherited the Borderland governance concept of the Han and Tang dynasty “making the barbarians the guard of the Middle Kingdom”, but opposed external expansion. In the 4th year of Hongwu (1371), Zhu Yuanzhang said to his minister that “punitive expedition must be launched for barbarian states posing a threat to the Middle Kingdom; otherwise, discretion should be exercised in waging war against them.” Later, he warned his descendants that “All the barbarians are located in remotest corners separated by mountains and seas. Even if acquire, their land won’t provide much supply, nor will their people of much use.”15 He listed Annan, Siam, Champa and Kmir as countries free from punitive expeditions, always maintaining friendly relations with them and returning most of their tributes with generous rewards, in order to achieve the goal of “all barbarians in submission.” In the 14th year of Hongwu (1281), he sent troops to conquer Yunnan. In the 16th year (1383), he said in his edict that “Now that the Middle Kingdom is safe and secure, the Borderland barbarians shall be made the fence for guarding it. Previously, they had refused the imperial prestige and edification and insisted on their unbridled ways. So the South-Pacification General was dispatched with 300,000 troops to punish them.”16 In the Qing dynasty, “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” were the core of the rulers’ thinking on border management. In the first half of the dynasty, the view that the Middle Kingdom “occupying the center of the world” was still quite common among the ministers, who believed that “The middle land occupies the center of the earth, surrounded by sea. Those living on the edge are called remote dwellers and states beyond the sea are called remote countries” (Zhejiang Ancient Books Publishing House, 2000). In the 3rd year of Yongzheng (1725), Gao Qizhuo the Governor of Yungui proposed to ask Annan to return the 240 li’s of land seized by it and Emperor Yongzheng specifically issued an edict to him. 15 Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu Vol. 68, “Ancestral Injunctions: Remonstrations.” 16 Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 153.



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“I think that among the approaches for pacifying remote people, border contention is inferior to friendly neighbors; fear for power is inferior to moralization … Since the establishing of our dynasty, Annan has been submissive for generations. Its loyalty should be commended and rewarded. What is the point of contending for the small tract of land that had been lost in the late Ming dynasty? Even if the land promises benefits, how can our heavenly dynasty take it from a small state? If there is no benefit, why bother to fight for it? I sincerely hope that you can be upright and righteous and regard all people as our subjects. Moreover, the Borderland involves two countries and is the most prone to provocations. It should be properly handled, to placate not only their people, but also our people. Making the brook the demarcation may sound mediocre, but what harm is there? Undertakings aimed at profits or merits should not be made the rule.”17 On learning about Gao Qizhuo’s memorial, King Li Weitao of Annan submitted a memorial in his defense, and Emperor Yongzheng ordered E’ertai to handle the matter. Eertai offered a new plan of demarcation by falling back another 80 li’s from the original borderline. Li Weitao submitted a memorial to express his gratitude, and Emperor Yongzheng gave Annan another 40 li’s of land “in recognition of his decorum” (Zhao et al., 1977, 10232). The rulers of the China’s imperial history emphasized the spread of Confucian culture in the border areas. And Zhu Yuanzhang was the most clairvoyant about the intention. According to Record of Elections (I) in History of Ming, in the Second Year of Hongwu (1369), the Ming dynasty first established the national academy, and Zhu Yuanzhang issued a decree to the Central Secretariat, saying that “The Yuan dynasty heinously laid waste to school education … In state governance, education is the first priority, and it is founded on schools. All counties and counties shall establish schools, and hire teachers and Confucian scholars, to offer courses to students and apprentices, so as to gradually educate the people and restore the ways of ancient kings.” In the twenty-eighth year (1395), he issued an edict to the Ministry of Rites, saying that “All the native officials of the Borderland know little about 17 Veritable Records of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 31.

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rites, since they are now holding their offices through inheritance. If education is not offered in advance, how can they be assimilated? Therefore, the native officials in Yunnan and Sichuan shall set up Confucian schools, for education of their children, since acquainting them with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and preventing them from violating the rites and participating in struggles are also the way to achieve peace in the Borderland.”18 It can be seen from the above records that the rulers of the Han, Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties had the following two basic characteristics in their thinking on border governance: first, under normal circumstances, the rulers were relatively conservative towards territorial expansion, and even considered it the emperor’s personal reckless behavior to flaunt national prestige and pursue foreign objects; second, the farther back the times were, the more common the similar views were. Most of the rulers believed that the ideal Borderland governance was to achieve the goal of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland”, that is, to effectively maintain the stability of the border areas, rather than acquiring land from outside. However, the Yuan dynasty is an exception. The basic tendency of its rulers’ thought of border governance to expand outwards. After the founding of the Ming Dynasty, its practice was abandoned and the Han and Tang tradition of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” was restored. It should also be pointed out that the resistance and even counterattack of the Central Plains dynasties against the northern nomads invading the south was another exception. The reason is that such resistance was intended to prevent the invasion and destruction of the Central Plains civilization by foreign forces, and to maintain its own stability and sustainable development, usually with unanimous support from the government and the people alike. In the latter half of ancient times, many rulers realized the importance of consolidating borders, but they generally followed the principle of waging wars to preserve the existing territory and not expanding it, just as Emperor Qianlong had said “bellicose tactics for expanding are below

18 Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 239.



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me; however, in guarding the land of my ancestors, I dare not lose one single inch.”19 The rulers of the China’s imperial history believed that the Middle Kingdom (or the economically developed Yellow River and Yangtze River basins) was the center of eastern civilization. So they took the stance of a representative of the Han Chinese civilization in governing the backward “barbaric” border areas, and developed the view of “differentiation between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” for border governance. Based on this understanding, the Central Plains dynasty exercised relatively lose control over the Borderlands and areas beyond, using generous rewards to solicit tributes from their peoples or forces, and alleviating their tax burden; when they rose in rebellion, some rulers advocated that “when they attack, repel them, and when they flee, stay prepared.” Meanwhile, they generally cherished the subtle enlightenment with Confucianism, and focused on spreading the Central Plains civilization to the Borderlands and remote areas by developing Confucianism education and changing Borderland customs. It should be noted that due to the limitations of feudal society, and the superiority of rule of man over rule of law in ancient times, there were often deviation in the ruler’s relatively objective understanding of the Borderland governance and the actual implementation effects. As a result, there are many records of ethnic groups being massacred and exploited in the border areas. In the latter half of ancient times, the rulers gradually realized the importance of the resources from border areas, and therefore strengthened the development and extraction of the border areas. All those had caused the complexity and diversity of the historical development.

3.2. The Evolutionary Track of the Theory and Practice of Border Governance in China’s Imperial History In talking about the management of the border areas by the Central Plains dynasty, some researchers were more often accustomed to enumerating the rulers that opened up the Borderlands to expand the 19 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 377.

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territory and established extensive governance in the border areas, imposed a jimi system (loose-rein governance) on the Borderland ethnic groups, relocated population to the border areas, opened up wasteland for farms in the border areas, and spread the culture of the hinterland areas. Generally speaking, there is nothing wrong with those statements. However, upon scrutiny of the historical records, one can see that the feudal rulers’ understanding of governing borders and corresponding methods were obviously different in different dynasties. From the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties, the rulers of successive dynasties had experienced a long process of evolution in recognizing the value of developing and utilizing the Borderland areas, and the significance of Borderland management to national unification and development, as well as the corresponding measures. The continuously deepening thought and recognition of border governance was closely related to the development of both the Middle Kingdom and border areas, as well as the increasing importance of political and economic ties in between. Meanwhile, the rulers were subject to restriction from the times and their class. Therefore, we should refrain from rigidly comprehending the border governance ideology and policies of the China’s imperial history, and attributing the border management by the rulers of imperial China to a certain fixed pattern. Take the management of the southwestern Borderland by the unified dynasties for example. The pioneering establishment of governance by the Qin and Han dynasties in the southwestern Borderland is a great contribution to Chinese civilization, with continually increasing significance as time passes. However, the rulers might have been based on certain specific motives. To a certain extent, they hadn’t and could not have fully realized the great significance of opening up the southwestern Borderland. One reason for the implementation of “jimi rule” there in the Qin and Han dynasty was that prefectures and counties were newly established while the feudal rule generally centered on their radiation to and influence on the surrounding areas were gradually attenuating. The rulers in the early Tang Dynasty represented by Emperor Taizong attached great importance to the management of the southwestern Borderland, reached greater depth than previous generations, and achieved greater social and economic development.



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However, in the early Tang dynasty, the governance of the southwest Borderland area was basically based on the “all under heaven are one family” view upholding equality between the Han Chinese and the barbarians and the “moralization to the benefits of barbarians” view championing benevolent governance. There couldn’t have been an in-depth understanding of the profound significance for opening up the southwestern Borderland or developing the Borderland for its practical value. Therefore, in the early Tang dynasty, governance of the southwestern Borderland was launched regardless of the cost, with multiple undertakings started from scratch. In addition, there were many problems in the practice. As a result, few of its governance measures followed through. After the “An-Shi Rebellion”, the Tang government was overwhelmed by internal and external troubles following one another in quick succession, as well as corrupt official management and decision-making mistakes. During this period, its governance of the southwestern Borderland consisted mostly of contingencies, which lacked long-term and overall considerations. To say the least, even without the “An-Shi Rebellion”, the sustainability of its rule according to established policies is open to question. Although it lasted only one century, the Yuan dynasty marked an important turning point in the history of developing the southwest Borderland. Since the Mongolian aristocrats were ethnic groups from the border areas, they conceptually had little bias of “difference between Han Chinese and barbarians” and “Han Chinese in the hinterland and barbarians beyond”, as well as less discrimination and prevention against the border ethnic groups. In order to acquire taxes and mineral products, and to achieve the goal of external expansion through the border areas, the Mongolian rulers implemented an active management policy in the southwestern Borderland. They also adopted the governance method of the hinterland in many aspects, like extensively establishing governance and tightening control in various places, generally imposing duties and mining taxes, actively developing transportation and establishing schools, and launching large-scale farming. The extensive promotion of the native official system was also reflective of the rulers’ active concept for governing the border. Although the Yuan dynasty marked a big step forward in Borderland governance

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concept, it still lacked understanding of the comprehensive development and usage of resources in the border areas. The lack has distinguished its active management from the general development in the Ming and Qing dynasties. In addition, the Yuan dynasty lasted only a short period of time and quickly collapsed, exerting an adverse effect on its management of the border areas. The Ming dynasty inherited the policy of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” practiced in the Han and Tang dynasties. Its basic goal for governing the southwestern Borderland was to strive for “zero worries for the southwestern border” through the deployment of troops and the implementation of the chieftain system, so as to ensure that the imperial court concentrated could pool resources to address the threats of the northern Mongolian tribes. On the other hand, due to the centralization of power and the implementation of the garrison station system, and full knowledge of the difficulty to manage the bellicose southwestern tribes, the Ming rulers stationed numerous troops in the southwestern Borderland, turning the soldiers and their families into compulsory migrants. The largescale land reclamation for farming and the accompanying compulsory immigration movement greatly promoted the economic development of the southwestern Borderland region. The Qing dynasty carried out a comprehensive management and development of the southwestern Borderland, with the traditional view of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” at the core of its Borderland governance thought. It also inherited the tradition of actively managing the Borderland exercised in the Yuan and Ming dynasty. The Qing aristocracy seldom discriminated against the border ethnic groups, similar to their counterparts in the Yuan dynasty. Its great importance attached to the management of the southwest Borderland was also manifested in the active development of transportation and cultural undertakings. Its active development of the border areas, including the southwestern Borderland, was partly out of consideration for the expanding inland population and urgently needed metal raw materials in the border areas. However, it should also be pointed out that although the economic development of the southwest Borderland accelerated significantly in



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the Qing dynasty, the imposition and oppression of the people from all ethnic groups by the rulers was also very serious. Another characteristic of the Qing dynasty in managing the southwestern border was the marked difference in policy between the first half of its rule and the second half, as well as the effect of implementation. It should also be pointed out that in each period, the ruler’s ideas on border governance usually included overall considerations, forming the overall characteristics of the border governance idea. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the rulers of the same period had different emphasis and policies for governing different Borderland areas, and it is ill-advised to treat them as one and the same. An obvious fact is that in most of the ancient times, the focus of the feudal dynasty’s management and defense was on the northern Borderland, while the southern Borderland carried relatively less weight. For example, in its early days, the Western Han dynasty had no time to take care of the southwestern Borderland for more than a decade, because it was either healing from the trauma of war or busy fighting against the Xiongnu. According to Biographies of Southwestern Barbarians in Historical Records, “For more than one decade between the demise of Qin and rise of Han, the land (of the Southwestern barbarians) was ignored, and the former fortress of Shu was established.” The focus of the Ming dynasty in addressing border affairs was in the north. The Dada and Wala tribes were very active in the Ming dynasty, and constantly harassed it. Later, Zhu Yuanzhang implemented the fief system after establishing the Ming dynasty, and sent his son to guard the north. Muying, his adopted son, was made garrison commander of Yunnan and Guangxi was entrusted to an important minister for managing the southwestern Borderland. A large number of garrisons were established in various places to tighten control. However, his principle was still to guard the border and maintain peace, and reduce wars as much as possible, to achieve the goal of “no worries from the southwest.” After the Qing army entered the Shanhai Pass, the focus of its operations was the Yellow River Basin and the Yangtze River Basin. When entering the southwestern Borderland, the surrendered Han Chinese army was assigned as the vanguard. As the overall situation gradually became stabilized, the rulers designated Southwest, Guangdong, and

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Fujian as defense zones for Wu Sangui and other surrendered generals of the Ming dynasty. After unifying the whole country, the Qing dynasty still focused its management strategy on the northern Borderland. In the 29th year of Kangxi (1690), the Qing army defeated the invading Mongolian Junggar tribe that had colluded with the Russian army. In the 35th year of Kangxi, Emperor Kangxi personally led an army to quell the rebellion of Galdan, the leader of the Junggar tribe. In the 20th year of Qianlong (1755), the Qing dynasty unified the Tianshan Beilu on the basis of suppressing the Dzungars. In the 24th year, it unified the southern Xijiang after pacifying the Revolt of the Altishahr Khojas in the Uygur colony. In the Northeast, in the 15th year of Shunzhi (1658), the Qing army wiped out the invading Russian Cossacks in the Battle of the Songhua River. After Emperor Kangxi took the throne, he strengthened the countermeasures against Russian encroachment on the northeast, and the Qing army captured the city of Jaxa in the 24th year of Kangxi. In the 28th year, the Qing dynasty and Russia signed the “Nerchinsk Treaty”, which demarcated the eastern boundary between China and Russia. During the reign of Emperor Yongzheng, a large-scale “bureaucratization of native officers” was launched in the southwestern Borderland. And the purpose was to eliminate local destabilizing forces, not to resist foreign aggression. After the Opium War, major changes began to take place in the thinking of Qing rulers on border governance. Specifically, in order to address the evergrowing coercion of the Western powers, the focus of border governance was shifted from the north to the southeastern coast, and then a serious separatist crisis occurred in the entire border region.

3.3. The Influence of Border Governance Theories in China’s Imperial History First of all, the border governance thoughts and theories of the rulers of the Central Plains dynasty had had an extremely important influence on their rule in the border areas. For example, the border governance thoughts directly affected the policy for governing the border ethnic groups. Previous researchers mostly focused on the policy of the Central Plains dynasty for ethnic



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governance in the border areas and ignored that for border governance. In some cases, the two were even confused. In fact, despite the close interrelationship, they are not the same, though they were the embodiment and derivation of the ruler’s view on Borderland governance in a certain period. The “jimi governance” generally implemented by the Qin and Han dynasties in the border areas was partly due to the fact that the prefectures and counties there were newly established and incomplete. Its flexibility and adaptability to local circumstances made it ideal, because they had to maintain the rule in the border areas, but could not exercise deep and secure rule. Establishment of jimi prefectures in the Borderland during the Tang dynasty was an important development of the “jimi governance” in the Qin and Han dynasties. The jimi prefectures have the following characteristics: They were mainly established to control the border ethnic groups and stabilize the Borderland, not to expropriate tributes or conscript healthy strong men for military subordination. To control the ethnic groups, usually prefectures and counties were established in their colonies, with their tribe leader appointed hereditary governor or military governor of the jimi institute. Those official posts were different from the post of chieftain that had been conferred since the Qin and Han dynasties and that had not been part of the official system like princes, vassals, and village directors. The tributes and register of those areas could not make the records of the Ministry of Revenue and Population, and the light tax and forced labor were imposed on them. Generally adapted to the local social and economic development, the institution of jimi prefectures implemented by the Tang dynasty in the border areas played an important role in consolidating its rule in the border areas. After Mongolia captured the land of the Han Chinese, Kublai implemented the law of the Han Chinese, by following the suggestion of the Confucian scholars to “reforming the barbarians with the culture of the Han Chinese.” However, he was not thorough in his undertaking, and the conflict between Han Chinese and Mongolian culture persisted in the entire Yuan dynasty. The Mongolian rulers had not fully absorbed Confucian feudal thoughts and their governance strategies, and consequently harbored little of the traditional prejudice as

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reflected in “barbarians as being different from Han Chinese” and “Han Chinese being the center and barbarians being the peripheral.” As a result, the Yuan dynasty seldom regarded the peripheral areas of its empire as border areas, and generally did not regard the border ethnic groups as “barbarians.” The institutional and cultural “dualism” of the Yuan dynasty was also clearly manifested in the handling of ethnic relations. On the one hand, it implemented the “four-class system” among its subjects throughout the country and implemented a policy of ethnic oppression mainly targeted at the Han Chinese. On the other hand, its rulers harbored little prejudice or bias against Borderland ethnic groups like that in the abovementioned feudal concepts, since they were also an ethnic group. The Yuan dynasty usually promptly granted official posts to leaders of Borderland ethnic groups, incorporated them into the system of state officials and assigned them to posts with trust, as long as they pledged allegiance. On this basis, a system of native officials different from the previous “jimi system” gradually took shape. The most obvious feature of this native official system is that the Yuan dynasty was relatively random and trustful in appointing native officials, who were tolerated or even protected for their faults. Therefore, this system was widely promoted in southern ethnic areas. Those characteristics are all attribute to less adoption of the view of “Han Chinese being the center and barbarians being the peripheral”, the use of border areas as a springboard for external expansion, and the urgent need for support from border ethnic groups for conquering wars and border stability. The biggest difference of the tusi (chieftain) system implemented in the Ming dynasty from the native official system of the Yuan dynasty was strengthened, standardized and institutionalized management of native officials and tusi. This major change was consistent with the Ming ruler’s idea for achieving stability in the southern Borderland through “using barbarous people to subjugate their own races.” The Qing Dynasty promoted large-scale “bureaucratization of native officers,” mainly for the purpose of removing obstacles to the development and stability of the Borderland areas and the collection of taxes there. In the 4th year of Yongzheng (1726), Eertai the governor of Yunnan was very clear about this in his memorial on “bureaucratization of



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native officers.” He said that “The biggest trouble for Yungui is nothing other than the Miao ethnic group. To maintain peace for the people, we must first control the barbarians, and for that purpose, we must launch bureaucratization of native officers”. At present, no one dares to enter their lands, in Ruongchuan four hundred li’s of fertile land was not reclaimed for farming; in the four provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and Guangxi, local chieftain forces are unbridled and violent. When problems arise, they would often play the blame game, making it difficult to deepen governance; all the barbarian tribes in the vicinity of the Lancang River in southern Yunnan “have been an immediate problem in times of peace and may collude with foreign countries in times of trouble.” In fact, they have been “a border devil” from the Yuan dynasty to the Ming dynasty. Eertai believed that once appropriately launched, the bureaucratization of native officers “will be effective and be beneficial for the Borderland defense of Yunnan and Guizhou in the long run” (Wei, 1984, 284). Previous researchers believed that the reason for the large-scale “bureaucratization of native officers” in the Qing dynasty was that the chieftains were rampant and lawless and the local people were suffering in a quagmire. It is worth noting that the local officials had been lawless for a long time, and there were partial “bureaucratization of native officers” before the Ming dynasty. The reason for its expansion in the Qing dynasty must have other deep-seated reasons. Secondly, the concepts and theories of the Central Plains dynasty on border governance have profoundly affected the economic development of the border areas. In managing the border areas, the Han dynasty virtually had no plans to reap the rewards via economic development. For example, in the 6th year of Jianyuan (135 BC), Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty began to manage the Southwestern Borderland, backed by the national strength of the Middle Kingdom, and with the original intention to open a road from Bodao to Panyu via Zangkejiang. The effort to build the road in the Southwestern Yi met with resistance, so Emperor Wu canceled most of the local counties in the third year of Yuanshuo (126 BC). In the first year of Yuanshou (122 BC), he resumed the management of Southwestern Yi, to open up the road from Southwestern Yi to Tochari. This suggests that Emperor Wu had managed Southwestern

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Yi with specific utilitarian purposes and been arbitrary in decisionmaking to a certain degree. Lingnan was originally managed for more than one century by the Qin Dynasty and the Nanyue Kingdom, so Emperor Wu showed greater interest in forcing the Nanyue Kingdom to change from a tributary into a vassal state. In the early Tang dynasty, the management of the Borderlands generally emphasized rule and investment and neglected development and return. For example, it generally exempt or reduce the taxes of the border areas; the mineral deposits there were mined generally by the private sector, and gold and silver products were admitted to the hinterland in the form of tribute. In the Yuan dynasty, the border governance concept was more active. Its management of border areas included economic measures such as taxation and reclamation of land for farming, but those measures were preliminary and incomprehensive, in contrast to the general development of border areas in the Ming and Qing dynasties (especially the Qing dynasty). The immigration activities launched by Zhu Yuanzhang in the early years of Hongwu were basically characterized by huge scales and obvious coerciveness. The destinations were mainly the Yangtze River Basin and North China, with approximately 7 million moved to the former and 4.9 million moved to the latter. Some people, about 1.5 million in number, were moved to the northwestern, northeastern, and southwestern Borderlands (Ge et al., 1993, 391). This suggests that the Borderland was not a key destination for immigration. The main purpose of the Ming dynasty’s rule of the southern border was to maintain its stability. Due to the characteristics of the garrison system, the large number of troops stationed in the southern border actually became military emigrants, and led to a large-scale military land reclamation movement. The Ming government also imposed agricultural taxes in the border areas, and the income was mainly for expenditures of the local government. It also expanded the mining of gold, silver, iron, copper, lead, zinc and gemstones in Yunnan and other places, and used the raw copper to cast coins on the spot. Those measures show that the extent of development and utilization of Borderland mineral deposits was significantly improved in the Ming dynasty. However, the expropriation of important metals, especially gold and silver, was



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mainly intended to satisfy the personal desires of the supreme ruler, as opposed to that in the Qing dynasty. An important change in the Qing ruler’s thinking on border management consists in a real understanding of the importance of border resources and production of border areas as an important source of national taxes and metal products. Driven by actual interests, the Qing dynasty increased its manpower and material investment in developing the Borderland. At the same time, the Borderland areas were more involved in the economic life of the country. An important fact was that the Qing government allowed refugees to move into the border areas, and led to a large-scale land reclamation movement by civilian immigrants. In the early Qing dynasty, the rulers mostly banned development of the mineral deposits in the hinterland, but actively supported that in Yunnan and other places. The reason was that their rich mineral resources were needed as materials for minting. During the Qianlong years, large quantities of copper were transported from Yunnan to the capital every year, and the copper was thus called “Capital Copper.” Ministers were appointed to specifically manage transportation of the metal, which was subject to intercept by Hunan, Hubei, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and other provinces along the route. Back then, the copper produced in Yunnan was supplied to Beijing and several provinces to the south of the Yangtze River, so there was the saying “the copper of Yunnan is unrivaled throughout the country.” Thirdly, the thoughts and theories of the Central Plains dynasties on border governance are very important historical and cultural heritage. The Central Plains dynasty’s thought on border governance is an important part of the conceptual history of China. Integrating the ancient ideological and understanding achievements in politics, economy, culture, ethnic relations, population, resources and environment, it is worthy of in-depth study and summarization. The content and composition of ancient border governance thought, its evolution, its relationship with the formation of historical territory, and border governance policy, its complex association with the concept of “governance of barbarians” and territory thought, and its far-reaching influence are all very important issues

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worthy of systematic and comprehensive research for exploring its rational core, critically discard its negative parts. Many of the ancient thoughts and theories on border governance seem to have positive value for reference today. For example, the enlightened ancient politicians tend to be cautious about opening up the Borderlands and expanding the territory. They believed that the ideal situation of Borderland governance was “the virtuous son of heaven making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” (Fang et al., 1974, 1530) instead of wantonly waging wars on the border or against foreign countries. Recognizing the particularities of the Borderlands and the Borderland clans, they proposed that there was no invariable law of governance, and that “measures should be adopted to the circumstances with consideration for the customs.”20 This proposal is the conceptual basis for the formation of jimi governance policy in ancient times. The correct way proposed by ancients to govern the Borderland was “cultivating virtue to solicit them [the barbarians], spread imperial prestige to subjugate them, selecting trustworthy courtiers to placate them, enhancing border defense to guard against them, so that remote tribes and overseas barbarians would come to pay tribute—that is almost the Way” (Liu et al., 1975, 5364). They also believed that the relationship of the hinterland people with the Borderland tribes and that of the hinterland with the Borderland were like that of the trunk with the branches. If the trunk is damaged, how can the branches and leaves expect to flourish (Liu et al., 1975, 2388). They proposed that the dialectical relationship between the inland and the Borderland be properly handled. If the hinterland is stable and strong, “(the Borderland) barbarians will naturally submit”— this was regarded the best policy for governing the Borderland.21 They

20 Fan Ye, Book of Later Han, Vol. 87, “Biography of Xiqiang”, Commanding General Liang Shang said to Lai Ji and his company that “southern and eastern barbaric areas serve the emperor by accepting his constraints, while northern and western barbaric areas serve the emperor by paying tribute irregularly, indicating that the barbarians can be volatile and inconstant. So there is no constant approach to govern them; contingencies should be formulated in view of their customs,” 2895. 21 Sima Guang, History as a Mirror, Vol. 193, “Records of Tang (9)”: When the envoy of Mohe arrived to pay tribute to the Tang dynasty, Emperor Taizong said that “The



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upheld that the traditionally correct way to handle the ethnic groups in the Borderland area should be “If they surrender, placate them; if the defect, suppress them.” In other words, they advocated exercising rationality and restraint, and opposed resorting to force and relying solely on military suppression.22 Needless to say, the above views had been proposed by ancient politicians from the perspective of maintaining feudal rule, and thus inevitably carried prejudices of the exploiting class and tinges of Han chauvinism. However, we should also see that many of those thoughts and theories that still shine with the brilliance of ancient political wisdom are after all important summaries of historical experience, and a correct reflection of objective reality. Therefore, they must be justifiable at varying degrees. Those positive understandings and concepts obviously belong to the precious historical and cultural heritage of China.

4.  The Main Content of Border Governance Theories in China’s Imperial History The border governance theories of ancient China, especially those of the Central Plains dynasty, are very complicated. The reason is not only the lack of centralized records in historical records, and consequently little research in academic circles, but also the extremely complex and volatile situations for governing the Borderland were often confusing for rulers of the China’s imperial history, even prompting them to lament that “there was simply no best strategy.”23 However, some traditional Mohe had come from afar to pay tribute because the Turks have surrendered themselves. Previously it was said that there had been no ideal strategy for governing the barbarians. Now I have secured the allegiance of the frontier barbarians by achieving governance in the Middle Kingdom. Isn’t it an ideal strategy? ”6067. 22 Sima Guang, History as a Mirror, Vol. 206, “Records of Tang (22)”: provincial gover­ nor Di Renjie submitted an imperial memorial, saying that “barbarians should be suppressed if they rebel and placated if they surrender, so as to demonstrate the benevolence of the imperial court in overthrowing states embracing doomed practices and consolidating those embracing thriving practices This practice is in line with both the decrees of the present dynasty and the tradition of China’s imperial history on placating the frontier,” 6525. 23 Ban GU, Book of Han, Vol. 94 (2), Biography of the Xiongnu, 3912. During the Jianguo Reign in the Western Han dynasty, Wang Mang proposed to chase the Xiongnu and

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concepts and theories on border governance gradually taking shape were carried forward, and had a profound impact on the strategies and measures of border governance in imperial China. Based on the relevant records, they are summarized as follows.

4.1. “Keeping the Central Regions and Administering the Borderland” and “Making Barbarians in the Borderlands as the Guarding Fence” After long-term practice and exploration, the Central Plains dynasties formed a relatively mature tradition on border governance. It can be said that “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” were the core of the border governance theories of most Central Plains dynasties, and their theoretical basis to formulate various border policies. The main content of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” includes: the ruler took the Central Plains, usually the his ruling base, as the center of his dynasty, and emphasized that the  border could be governed only when the Middle Kingdom was; there was a clear division of the central regions and the barbaric land; the ideal state pursued by most of the Central Plains dynasties was stability and prosperity of the hinterland, barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence, “Han Chinese in the hinterland and barbarians in the peripheral” and “barbarian not inferring with the Han Chinese.” In the pre-Qin period, the statesmen of the vassals put forward the theory of “five-subordination” or “nine-subordination” theory. The chapter Tributes of Yu in the Book of History says that “Areas within the first five hundred li around the imperial capital were called Dianfu: the  closest, second closet, third closet, fourth closest his general Yan You suggested that “I heard that the Xiongnu have been a trouble for the Middle Kingdom for a long time … In the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties, punitive expeditions were launched against them, but none was truly successful. Roughly, the Zhou and Han dynasty had acted according to the second best and an ill-advised stratagy respectively, while the Qin had had no strategy at all.”



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and fifth closest one hundred li shall send grain ears on stalks, grain ears, grain ears without bristles, millet and shelled millet for tribute to the Emperor respectively. Areas five hundred li outside Dianfu were called Houfu: the closest one hundred li were conferred on nobilities and ministers, the second closet on barons, and the rest on powerful vassals. Areas five hundred miles outside Houfu were called Suifu: in the closet three hundred li, education should be offered to the people according to the circumstances; in the remaining two hundred li, military training should be implemented to enhance the defense power. Areas five hundred li apart from Suifu were called Yaofu: the closest three hundred li were inhabited by the barbarians, and the remaining two hundred li were intended as a penal colony. Areas five hundred li beyond Yaofu were called Huangfu: the closest three hundred li were the barren zone, and the remaining two hundred li were also a penal colony.” In addition to the “five-subordination” theory put forward in the Book of History, the “nine-subordination” theory was also proposed, in the Book of Rites. Although politicians have different interpretations of the “five-subordination” theory and the “nine-subordination” theory, they had roughly the same understanding of the basic meanings: both of them proposed to regard the imperial capital as the center of the country, and believed that ruling was extended from the capital to the surrounding area and further to all corners of the country, and that different regions had different means of management and different obligations in view of the distance, with the obligations gradually diminishing as distance increased. The “five-subordination” theory and the “nine-subordination” theory put forward in the pre-Qin period indicates an initial awareness of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” back then (Ban, 1962, 3830). In the Spring and Autumn Period, Shen Yinshu clearly put forward the concept of “the emperor of the ancient times made barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence.” The “five-subordination” theory and the “nine-subordination” theory had a profound influence on later generations, and both were elucidated in the Han dynasty. However, in the middle and late periods of the feudal era,

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there were rare references to them in relevant historical records, indicating that their idealist pattern was unable to explain the complicated situation of border governance and its evolution in the China’s imperial history. However, the “five-subordination” theory and the subsequent outlook on subordination still had an important and far-reaching influence on the border governance of Central Plains dynasties. During the Han dynasty, the rulers further enriched the ideas and theories of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” on the basis of summing up their rich experience in border governance. The observation of Ban Gu was quite representative. He said that “Therefore, sage kings of ancient times planned and measured land of the country and set up the capital of the kingdom in the Central Plains. The entire country was divided into nine administrative regions, and the “five-subordination system” was proposed to manage the areas around the capital, each with their own tributes and systems based on their distance to the capital. In some places, the criminal punishment is still exercise, while in others, culture is enhanced for governance, because of the geographical distance and different circumstances. Therefore, the Spring and Autumn Annals says that the various ethnic groups in the Central Plains should be treated as part of the internal relations, and barbarians as foreign races. The barbarian tribes are greedy and profiteering; they habitually wear their hair loose, have a left lapel and hide a barbaric heart beneath a human face. They are different from the tribes of the Central Plains in dress code, customs, food, and speech, living in the remote northern borders, exposed to the cold and dew of the wilderness, grazing with water and grass, migrating with livestock, and supplemented their livelihood with hunting. Separated by valleys and blocked by deserts, they are separated from the hinterland by a divine arrangement. Therefore, the sage king treated them like beasts, refused to make an alliance with them, and refrained from waging war against them. Alliance with them has proven costly and illusive; attacking them will exhaust the army, and invite their subsequent invasion. Their land cannot be cultivated for grains, and their people cannot be supported as subjects. Instead, they must be rejected and not accepted, alienated and not intimated. Political edification



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should not be extended to their people, and the calendar should not be applied for them. When they attack, kill and resist them, and when they flee, guard against them and hold the Borderland fortresses. When they come to submit tribute to the Emperor, receive them with ceremony to win over them. However, do not take the initiative to sever relations with them, so that the blame will be on their side. That is probably the constant approach of sage monarchs for controlling the Xiongnu and other barbarians” (Ban, 1962, 3833). According to Ban Gu, the Han dynasty believed that the sage kings had established the capital in the Central Plains, divided the country into nine administrative regions and listed the five subordinations because “circumstances differ according to distance.” The land inhabited by the Han Chinese was separated from the barbaric settlements with valleys and deserts, by some kind of divine arrangement. Therefore, the order should not be disturbed at will. The barbaric tribes were “greedy and profiteering” and “with a human face but beastly heart”; their uniforms, customs, diet, and languages were different from those of Han Chinese, and their civilization was far behind; their land was not suitable for farming and their people incorrigible. Therefore, they were regarded as “beasts”, and the costs for managing their land far outweighed the gains. The advisable policy should be “treating the relationship with other Han Chinese as internal relations, and that with barbarian tribes as foreign relations.” In other words, according to the difference in culture and in civilization, the hinterland ruled by the Han Chinese should be clearly distinguished from the remote Borderland inhabited by the barbarians. By no means should they be confused. Ban Gu went on to propose that for the border area inhabited by the barbarians, the policy should be “they must be rejected and not accepted, alienated and not intimated; political edification should not be extended to their people, and the calendar should not be applied for them.” In fact, he emphasized that they should be properly governed, and that a policy of conservative rule should be adopted, on the basis of maintaining the necessary distance. In terms of the principle for communication, the principle “when they attack, kill and resist them, and when they flee, guard against them and hold the Borderland fortresses” should be upheld. That is their invasion must be resolutely resisted, and

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when they retreat, the watchtowers should be enhanced and preparations made. If they come to pay tribute to the emperor, they should be received with courtesy. When disputes rise, it must be ensured that they are to blame, so as to reflect the benevolence and justice of a civilized power. This way, the barbarians will be restrained, and ultimately the goal of strengthening the border and the Middle Kingdom achieved. The thoughts and theory of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” can be regarded as a reflection of the ruler’s consciousness of cultural self-confidence. For thousands of years, the Central Plains area has been a concentrated settlement of the Han Chinese, the main distribution area of the agricultural economy in the East Asian continent, and the core area for the development of handicrafts and commercial trade in East Asia. The metropolises established therefore were also the center of science, technology, culture and art in ancient East Asia. In the eyes of feudal rulers, “Middle Kingdom” (in most cases mainly referring to the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the Yangtze River) was the center of world civilization, and regions outside it were uncivilized land of barbarians, that is, at the peripheral or even beyond of the Chinese civilization. The special geographical environment of China, namely the numerous mountains, deserts, and oceans in its border areas, had hindered its communication with other ancient civilizations in the world. As a result, most of the rulers of its feudal dynasties lacked a deep understanding of other important ancient civilizations, contributing to the concept of “supremacy of Chinese civilization” and ethnic groups outside China as barbarians. Since its official establishment in the Han dynasty, the Borderland governance theory of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” lasted for more than 2,000 years, considerably influencing the rulers of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Zhu Yuanzhang also observed that “discretion should be exercised in waging wars against barbarian countries overseas, unless they became a scourge.” The Qing Emperor Yongzheng said that before the Qing dynasties, the difference in the nature of the culture and the degree of civilization was used to divide Han Chinese from barbarians and the hinterland from the border areas. If the barbaric culture assimilates into the Han Chinese culture, it will change the geographical scope of the barbaric land. He



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boasted that the Qing dynasty had not divided the Han Chinese from foreigners, so it managed to expand its territory farther, including all the tribes on the extreme borders of Mongolia (China City Press, 1999, 5).This suggests that by the Ming and early Qing dynasties, the feudal rulers still regarded the border and areas beyond it as the land of the barbarians, and failed to clearly distinguish the border barbarians from the neighboring countries. In the middle of the 19th century, as foreign powers peeped into China’s borders, the problems of land and borders became increasingly prominent. The Qing Dynasty began to change its traditional concept and the idea of sharing borders with foreign countries became gradually accepted. After the Han dynasty, politicians further elucidated the concepts and theories of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence.” For example, Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty compared the relationship between the hinterland and the border barbarians to that between the trunk and branches, saying that “how can the tree expect to flourish if the root and trunk are cut to nourish the branches and leaves” (Sima, 1956, 6149)! Upholding that understanding, some politicians put forward the principle of “not troubling the Middle Kingdom with issues of the barbarians.” For example, Li Daliang, a courtier of the Tang dynasty compared the relationship between the hinterland and the border areas to that between roots and branches, suggesting that close neighbors must be stabilized before placating distant countries, because “efforts must be made to avoid disturbing the roots to enrich the branches and leaves” (Li, 2003, 503). In the third year of Yuanshuo, the Han dynasty failed to open up the roads to the Southwestern Yi, and Emperor Wu sent Grand Censor Gongsun Hong there for investigation. Gongsun Hong returned and suggested that “it might be advisable to stop (expanding the roads to southern barbarians), since it futilely exhausts the resources of the Middle Kingdom.” His advice was adopted by Emperor Wu (Sima, 1959, 2950). In the first year of Chuyuan, Jia Juanzhi submitted a memorial saying that Zhuya Prefecture was remote and that “there is no regret to relinquish it or no harm to the imperial court to cease wars against it,” in view of repeated

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rises from the local barbaric people. His suggestion of abandoning Zhuya Prefecture was followed by Emperor Yuandi (Ban, 1962, 2834). Based on the above-mentioned concept, in ancient times, the idea of “discretion in handling the Borderland barbarians” and refraining from military action in the Borderland took shape in ancient times. Regarding the relationship between Borderland governance and hinterland governance, Emperor Taizong of the Song dynasty further proposed that “the hinterland must be managed first before ruling the Borderland; once the hinterland is governed, peace will naturally rule the border areas” (Li, 1980). This proposal became an important source for the ruling strategy of “tightening internal security and loosening border control.” Based on “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence”, ancient dynasties also gradually developed the national defense concept of guarding the ancestral undertaking and maintaining national unification. In the 3rd year of Jingde, Shao Ye, a courtier of the Song dynasty, presented a map of water and land transportation from Yongzhou to Jiaozhou. The map was showed by Empeor Zhenzong it to his ministers and he said that “Jiaozhou is afflicted with miasma, while Yizhou is extremely dangerous. Seizing them via military action incurs heavy casualties. Moreover, cautiously guarding the territory opened up by our ancestors shall suffice. What is the point of mobilizing all those people and resources to capture a piece of useless land? If the rebellions are detected, efforts must be made to eliminate the scourge for the people” (Xu, 1957). Emperor Qianlong also said that “developing the Borderland with brutal force is below, but for the land handed down by my ancestors, I dare not lose one single inch.”24 Keeping the ances­ tral undertaking and maintaining national unification has become a far-reaching historical tradition in China, and its positive significance is worthy of recognition. Highly treasured by most rulers of the ancient dynasties, “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” contributed to a 24 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 377.



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far-reaching tradition of border management, but the social practices and historical activities were very complicated. Therefore, the understanding and implementation of the two theories in the China’s imperial history should be specifically analyzed, and generalizations should be avoided. Among the dynasties of the Central Plains, the Yuan dynasty was outstanding in expanding its border through military conquest. Due to the emphasis of Mongolian aristocracy on conquering and plundering, and the incomplete integration between Han and Mongolian cultures, border governance traditions such as “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” had little influence on the rulers of the Yuan dynasty. In its early days, the Yuan dynasty fundamentally adopted a militaristic tendency in territorial expansion and conquered Japan, An Nam, Champa, Burma, and Java successively. However, it should be pointed out that shortly after Kublai’s death, its foreign conquests also gradually ceased. In addition, although “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” was affirmed by some dynasties in border governance, there were also inconsistencies in handling barbarian and border issues, indicating the complexity of historical development.

4.2. “When they attack, repel them; when they flee, stay prepared.” From the perspective of governing the country and stabilizing the border, the Central Plains dynasties most adopted the strategy of “when they attack, repel them; when they flee, stay prepared” in handling confrontation or dispute with the Borderland tribes, emphasizing that defense should be highlighted, with adequate preparations and effective countermeasures, in addressing issues related to them. That is what Jiang Tong had said in the Jin dynasty, “be prepared to defend and repel” (Fang et al., 1974, 1530). Meanwhile, the principles of justification, benefits and restraint should be upheld, especially in implementing the strategy of “punishing defectors and forgive surrenders” (Sima, 1956, 773). Afterwards, important concepts and theories on

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border governance were established. The reason is that some rulers had drawn on the thinking of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland” and “making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence,” while judging the situation and analyzing the characteristics of the border areas, especially the northern ethnic groups, and summarizing the governance experience and lessons of the China’s imperial history. In the first year of Yonghe in the Eastern Han dynasty, the governor of Wuling submitted a memorial to the imperial court, suggesting increasing the rent and levies of the barbarians on the grounds that they had been assimilated and comparable to the Han Chinese. The suggestion was considerable feasible by ministers deliberating the issue, but Yu Xu, Director of the Imperial Secretariat alone saw otherwise. He said in his memorial that “ ‘ancient sage kings did not treat those with exotic customs as subjects’, because they were ‘greedy, beastly and couldn’t be received with ceremony.’ The appropriate countermeasure should be loose-rein control plus placation- ‘receive them with grace if they come to pledge allegiance and leave them alone if they flee in defection.’ A sudden increase in taxes and levies is bound to incur their resentment and rebellion. ‘There is bound to be regret as the gains will not be sufficient to compensate for the costs’ ” (Fan, 1965, 2833). What Yu Xu had said mainly stemmed from the difference of barbarians from Han Chinese, emphasizing that the tradition of border governance from the previous generation should be followed. However, his opposition to tax increase was generally in line with the circumstances in the border areas back then. On the other hand, in the first half of ancient times, waging wars on the border inevitably consumed a lot of manpower and material resources. The border areas were generally underdeveloped economically, making it impossible for the Central Plains dynasty to further develop their resources for a benefit. Therefore, the rulers would inevitably pay extremely high political and economic costs to wage wars in the border areas, while the actual benefits were very limited. And the imbalance was bound to incur criticism that the gains could not justify the cost. Sun He of the Northern Song dynasty made a clear point on the issue. He said that there was the Xianyun in the Zhou dynasty,



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the Xiongnu in the Han dynasty, the five barbarians in the Jin dynasty, the Rouran in the Northern Zhou dynasty, Turks in the Sui Dynasty, and the Tubo in the Tang dynasty—each of the dynasties in the Central Plains had their share of barbarian scourge on the Borderland, killing and plundering their officials and subjects, and disrupting the border areas. Their rulers sent their generals on punitive expeditions. However, the Borderland barbarians were driven by profits alone, neither following the orders in the instructions nor considering it a shame to flee. Their land was unfit for farming, nor were their captives eligible as subjects. “As a result, the expeditions were a waste of manpower and financial resources, incurring damages instead of profits.” In the Zhou dynasty, King Xuan wrote a poem, which said that “during the expedition, the Xianyun were driven to the great wilderness.” In his verse, the barbarians were compared to vexing mosquitos, to be driven away, since “(The court) will never contend with beasts, or ants.” Emperor Qin Shi Huang and Emperor Wu of Han managed to chase the Xiongnu across thousands of miles, but by the time their military action stopped the Central Plains had been severely undermined. Yan You therefore said that “When it comes to dealing with the Borderland barbarians, roughly the Zhou and Han dynasty had acted according to the second best and an ill-advised strategy respectively, while the Qin had had no strategy at all” (Sun, 1999, 1431). In Biography of Northern Barbarians in the Old Book of Tang, a historian also said that “The land of barbarians is like a rocky field. It’s totally useless even if gained, so what will be the harm if it’s lost?” He believed that rulers opting for war on the Borderland were mostly seeking name and wasting their efforts. The correct way to govern the Borderland was “cultivating virtue to solicit them [the barbarians], spread imperial prestige to subjugate them, selecting trustworthy courtiers to placate them, enhancing border defense to guard against them.” With those achieved, remote tribes and overseas barbarians would certainly come to pay tribute (Liu et al., 1975, 5364). Some politicians pointed out that compared with border scourge, internal problems were more important and more devastating to the country. They even held that if the ruler prioritized the former in handling the relationship between the hinterland and the Borderlands, he was bound to incur disruption domestically. In the Western Han

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dynasty, a minister Chao Cuo once said that “When Emperor Qin Shi Huang built fortresses along the northern bank of the Yellow River to attack the Xiongnu in the north and deployed garrisons to attack the Yue barbarians in the south, he had no intention to defend the Borderland and save the people from their plight. Instead, he was intent on expanding his territory to satisfy his personal greed and bellicosity. As a result, his country was plunged into chaos before he achieved the goal.” Chao Cuo went on to praise Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty for relocating people to the border areas, and avoided dispatching garrisons to those remote quarters. Therefore, he could be called brilliant, far better than Emperor Qin Shi Huang (Ban, 1962, 2286). In the Eastern Han dynasty, Xianbei rose after the Xiongnu and seized their former establishment, claiming to have one hundred thousand soldiers. Back then, it mastered the craft for producing fine gold and quality iron; with advice of defecting Han Chinese, its military strength surpassed the Xiongnu. Facing the serious situation in the northern Borderland, Councilor Cai Yong said in a court deliberation that waging war would incur untold transportation and consequently exhaust the resources of the Central Plains, therefore we must beware that “troubles in the border areas are nothing but an irritation, while those in the Middle Kingdom can be deadly.” He added that “currently the prefectures and counties are unable to eradicate robbery, how can we expect to subjugate the beastly barbarians easily” (Fan, 1965, 2990)? Di Renjie, a minister in the Tang dynasty, further proposed that the Central Plains dynasty had to implement the principle of quenching rebellions and placating surrenders in handling border issues. This way, it would honor the righteousness of overthrowing states embracing doomed practices and consolidating those embracing thriving practices, while relieving the burdens on the people, in line with both the decrees of the present dynasty and the tradition of China’s imperial history on placating the Borderland. He also believed that for the emperor, “a peaceful border is invariably accompanied with internal troubles,” because that scenario meant insufficient efforts in ruling (Liu et al., 1975, 2891). Upholding the view that “exhausting internal resources to satisfy the greed for external leads to rebellion”, ancient political commentators mostly believed that the priority should be given to guarding the



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territory for stability, and discretion should be exercised on managing borders and expanding the territory. They believed that an important reason for Wuding and King Cheng to achieve their much lauded feats in the Yin and Zhou dynasties respectively was that their territory adjoined the Changjiang River and the Yellow River in the east, the land of the Di and Qiang ethnic groups in the west, Jingzhou in the south and Shuofang in the North (Sima, 1956, 903). However, the Qin dynasty mobilized a massive army to attack enemies far away, and eventually collapsed. In the 11th year of Chenghua, Li Zhen, the Garrison Commander of Huguang, reported a defeat of the government forces by the barbarians and suggested sending troops to encircle and annihilate them, following the precedent of Wang Ji leading a punitive expedition to Luchuan. Emperor Xianzong issued an edict, saying that “The barbarians have existed along with the Han Chinese since ancient times. The crux to their management consists in effective restraint by the border general, and the purpose is to prevent them from venturing across the border. Never were measures taken to annihilate them.”25 Because the prosperity and decline of the Borderland barbarians were impermanent, their political activities and strength unpredictable, some political theorists had also proposed that prosperity and decline were the inevitable law governing their influence, so the strategic thinking of “meeting the changeable with the constant” (Li, 1980). Wang Fuzhi of the Qing dynasty believed that after the Zhenguan reign of the Tang dynasty, the Turks gradually subsided, and Tubo Khitan began to rise successively, indicating that the nomads of the steppe invariably rose and fell. Failure to see the dialectical relationship may cause arrogance or ignorance, and consequently incessant troubles (Wang, 1975, 596). Due to the above reasons, many political commentators upheld “when they attack, repel them; when they flee, stay prepared” as an unshakable standard, and used it as a criterion for judging the ruler’s border policy, for example, “tightening internal security and loosening border control” of the Song Dynasty. In the early Northern Song dynasty, Dali State, the local regime of Yunnan, sent envoys to Shu to 25 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Chenghua in the Reign of Emperor Xianzong, Vol. 142.

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submit instruments several times, to establish friendly relations with Song dynasty. However, the ruler of the Northern Song dynasty was wary of it for being the successor to Nanzhao, which “under the leadership of Huang Chao overthrew the Tang dynasty, but the disaster was rooted in Guilin” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6295). In the third year of Qiande (965), the Song court discussed the possibility to take advantage of the momentum to conquer Yunnan. Emperor Zhao Kuangyin indicated with a jade axe the west of the Dadu River and said, “Areas beyond it will not be mine” (Bi, 1992, 43). The strategy of demarcating the Dadu River with Dali State was thus determined, and followed by subsequent emperors. Faced with the mighty barbaric troops in the north, the Song dynasty chose the less of two evils by alienating the Dali State with the Dadu River. However, abandoning the management of Yunnan and beyond incurred adverse effects on its relationship with them. The Song Dynasty also listed Dali State an alien state, together with Cochin, Champa, Kmir, and Bagan, and ordered them to pay tribute from far away. The author of the Book of Song had this to say in commenting the practice: The Song dynasty implemented the policy of receiving their pledge of allegiance, refraining from chasing them if they defect, launching punitive expeditions if they invade, releasing them when they surrender and exercised discretion with use of force, “even the restraining policy of ancient sage kings couldn’t have been more advisable” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 13982). In the Ming dynasty, Gui Yanliang, described his ideal strategy of border governance as follows: Regarding the management of barbarians, defense should be the first, and conquest be the second. Random provocation of border disputes to satisfy the greed for gains is the most ill-advised policy. Therefore, it is said that the virtuous emperor shall make barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence, placate them with virtue and subjugate them with prestige, so that “each of the Borderland courtiers can guard their land—that is the ideal scenario.” Emperor Wu of Han adopted a militarist approach, and exhausted the resources of the Central Plains without any gain; Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty launched an expedition against Goryeo, and incurred successive rebellions in the Central Plains. Wise as Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty was, he regretted the mistake of attacking Goryeo in his later



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years. Such actions can all be regarded as historical lessons, “for deviating from the principle of making barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence” (Gui, 1962). It was not easy for the Central Plains dynasty to achieve the scenario of “when they attack, repel them; when they flee, stay prepared” in handling the Borderland tribes. The reasons were multi-pronged. Just as many political commentators had pointed out, official management was an important factor in determining the success of border governance. Zhuge Liang said that guarding the Borderland was very difficult and should be a last resort. There are many essential points to observe in guarding the border, including training an army for combat, reclaiming land for food, setting up watchtowers, waiting for opportunities, and conquering the enemy on its decline. Among them, “picking capable generals” was first and foremost (Zhuge, 2008, 330). During the Xianheng Years in the Tang dynasty, Emperor Gaozong ordered officials from both hinterland and Borderland officials to submit strategies for defeating the Turkic regime. Lu Fu said in his memorial that “The safety of border areas and victory of wars there hinges on one virtuous official, despite the vast land.” “The governor of the border prefectures must be chosen carefully, and only the capable should hold that office” (Liu et al., 1975, 5171). The vast meadows in the north are dominated by grasslands, hills and deserts in terrain. Most local nomads are engaged in animal husbandry. Herds are not only their main wealth and means of living, but also an important means of production. Nomads generally regarded “settlements” as the basic unit of society, and usually one settlement consisted of one family or several closely related families. Therefore, their strength can be easily gathered, but equally easily dispersed or disintegrated, or even replaced by other emerging nomadic forces. Accustomed to traveling long distances and good at guerrilla warfare, they could usually regroup and quickly regain their combat effectiveness after a defeat. The unpredictable migration and rapid movement of nomads gave their southward venture into the Central Plains suddenness and periodicity. Gao Lü of the Northern Wei dynasty said that “The barbarians were scattered in river basins, following water and grass. They went

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to war with all their property and fled with the livestock in the event of a defeat. They were well provided for, without having to carrying rations. Therefore, in attacking north the ancients were mainly trying to thwart their invasion and looting. Dynasties were known to be troubled by Borderland problems because of their unpredictability”(Gao, 1997, 478). On the other hand, the northern grasslands were close to the Central Plains, making it within easy reach of their cavalry, and posing a great threat to the rule of the Central Plains dynasty. In a battle with the northern nomads, the Central Plains dynasty might be faced with suddenly changed situation for even the slightest mistake or slack. Therefore, sticking to the strategy of “when they attack, repel them; when they flee, stay prepared”, the Central Plains dynasty gradually developed the tradition of building fortresses and setting up beacons in the northern Borderland. In the 8th year of Daye (612) in the Sui dynasty, Duan Wenzhen, the Minister of War, submitted a memorial, saying that the imperial court had treated the Turks too kindly and that they should be ordered to go beyond the fortresses. He added that the beacons should be extensively deployed, garrisons stationed along the border, military affairs cherished and the orders unified, because “this is an enduring policy” (Sima, 1956, 5661). In the Tang dynasty, Emperor Taizong summed up the historical experience of the Zhou dynasty on the governance of the river, as well as that of the Han dynasty in strengthening the capital defense and setting up strategic border fortresses, before concluding that “defense should be planned for the long term, with fortress construction as the priority” in the face of “ruthless and perennial” Turks (Song, 2008, 552). In handling the northern nomads, land reclamation for farming to enhance defense had been an effective approach. In the Western Han dynasty, Zhao Chongguo believed that the there were twelve benefits to land reclamation by the garrisons in the border areas, such as producing grains, outlasting the Qiang barbarians, making the people engaged, save transportation costs, hoarding supplies, planting trees for post houses, waiting at ease for the fatigued enemy, reducing the casualty from chasing the enemy, reducing opportunities for barbarians to attack, reducing harassment to the hinterland, benefiting road and bridge maintenance, and reducing of military expenditures. He



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added that wantonly sending troops beyond the fortresses would cost all twelve benefits (Ban, 1962, 2987). In the Qing dynasty, Wang Fuzhi pointed out that there were six advantages to land reclamation and farming in border areas in his book On Reading “A Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government”. To curb the mobility of the cavalry of the northern tribes and their raid on the Central Plains, some Central Plains dynasties resort to construction of walls as an important defense. The Biography of the Xiongnu in the Book of Han says that after Qin overthrew the Six Kingdoms, Emperor Qin Shi Huang dispatched hundreds of thousands of troops to the north, commanded by his general Meng Tian, who eventually defeated the Xiongnu and recovered the land to the south of the Yellow River. Then, taking advantage of the precipitous border mountains, Meng Tian built the Great Wall by leveling valleys with earth. The Qin Great Wall stretches for more than 10,000 li’s, from Lintao in the west to Liaodong in the east. In the Northern Wei dynasty, Gao Lü said that there were five advantages in building the Great Wall, namely, avoiding the painful mobile defense, eradicating the risk of being plundered while grazing, watching the enemy and waiting for it with ease, avoiding the trouble of border defense and incessant preparation, and ensuring the daily storage and transportation (Gao, 1997). However, there were latent dangers in building the Great Wall. Some researchers pointed out that the rulers had originally intended to protect the interests of resource-sharing groups in Han China. However, the construction, improvement and maintenance of the Great Wall objectively forced the people to its north into a nomadic lifestyle, and strengthened their power to compete with the Chinese civilization for resources (Wang, 2008, 148). That disadvantage was probably not expected.

4.3. Cultivate Virtue to Solicit Them, Spread Imperial Prestige to Subjugate Them In the ancient Middle Kingdom based on the Han Chinese civilization, the rulers attached great importance to the differentiation between the Han Chinese and the barbarians, and used it as the basic criterion to distinguish agricultural civilization from other civilizations, and to

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rule the hinterland and border areas. Back then, the term “Huayi” (Han Chinese and barbarians) had very complicated meanings, indicating the difference between the Han Chinese and the surrounding ethnic groups, aside from having other connotations. For example, it was often used by the ancient in describing the relationship between the central regions and the outlying areas, as the dividing line between regions of the Han Chinese and other areas. Areas mainly inhabited by ethnic groups and far away from the ruling center were usually regarded as border areas or even alien land. Rulers of the China’s imperial history not only adopted “differentiation between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” to emphasized the difference in governance between the hinterland and the Borderland, but also put forward the concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the peripheral,” gradually forming the following concept of “Barbarians are not our kin, so they won’t share our empathy, and will definitely harbor different aspirations and concepts” (Fang et al., 1974, 1530). This concept reflects the deep-seated contempt and discrimination of rulers of the Central Plains dynasty against other ethnic groups, especially those in the border areas. Back in the Spring and Autumn Period, Guan Zhong told Duke of Qi that “the barbarians are like jackals and thus insatiable; while the Han Chinese kingdoms are blood kin and thus shouldn’t be renounced.”26 In the Jin dynasty, court historians even said that “the barbarians are all beasts under a human façade, easily tempted into defecting from their ruler and relatives by material gains and deviating from righteousness and benevolence by wealth. Banish them to the remote corners and they become invading aliens; keep them around the imperial capital, and they harbor sinister desire against the Central Plains” (Fang et al., 1974, 2703). Some enlightened monarchs like Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty harbored progressive understandings of “all under the heaven is family” and “barbarians are also human beings”, but from time to time they couldn’t suppress the consciousness of “barbarians are beasts under a human façade and are bound to bite with the slightest grievance” (Sima, 1956, 6201). This suggests that the influences of the concept “Barbarians are 26 Master Zuo’s Spring and Autumn Annals, the first year of Duke Min.



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not our kin, so they won’t share our empathy” have been far-reaching. After the Opium War, some enlightened politicians put forward the slogan of “learning from the barbarians to control barbarians”, but they were still trapped in the old concept of “difference between the Han Chinese and the barbarians.” The virtuous king should “superioritize the Han Chinese over the barbarians” and “refrain from administering the remote areas.” In other words, affairs of the Han Chinese should be considered first, and the border affairs second; for the remote land of the barbarians, the rulers should adopt a passive attitude. After conquering Gaochang, Emperor Taizong of Tang dynasty had to dispatch more than a thousand soldiers to guard its land every year. Chu Suiliang submitted a memorial, saying that The wise kings of the ancient times are known to prioritize the Han Chinese over the barbarians, “and to expand moralization while refraining from administering the barbarians” (Liu et al., 1975, 2736). The words of Chu Suiliang were quite representative of the prevailing views of scholar-officials. Regarding the land of barbarians as remote deserted land, and believing that the virtuous king should “prioritize the Han Chinese over the barbarians”, the rulers of the dynasties in the Central Plains regarded the expansion and colonization of the border areas as a fearful undertaking, and believed that their expansion and colonization were sub-marginal, and even an important cause of troubles and social chaos. On the other hand, in order to guard the legacy of their ancestors and prevent barbaric invasion, the feudal rulers sometimes had to cherish Borderland management, and to face the contradiction. In A Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, Sima Guang condemned Duan Ying, a border officer of the Eastern Han dynasty for indiscriminately killing Xiqiang ethnic groups on the border, and said that wise kings should “punish the defecting barbarians, placate the subjugated barbarians, and relocate them to the border areas, to prevent them from wreak havoc with the state of rites and righteousness” (Sima, 1956, 1817). Open-minded as it was, the view was based on “barbarians being different in kind” and “the virtuous king refraining from administering the deserted remote areas.”

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Due to the concept of “the Han Chinese and the barbarians being different”, the rulers of the China’s imperial history generally showed an unmistaken sense of cultural superiority and even cultural arrogance towards the ethnic groups in the border areas. Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty said that “Since ancient times, the Han Chinese has been cherished. But for me, I love the barbarians in the same way, so all of them depend on me as if I were a parent” (Sima, 1956, 6247). Those words embodied the cultural self-confidence in and the consciousness of cultural superiority of the emperor. As for some feudal monarchs who spent huge sums of money to boast about the abundance and power of the Central Plains dynasty to the Borderland clans, they showed a strong sense of cultural arrogance. Emperor Chengzu of the Ming dynasty is a case in point. According to records, Emperor Chengzu sent envoys to the Western Regions every year, to subjugate distant countries. The foreign countries coveted the wealth and presents rewarded by China, and their business people came to pay tribute in an endless stream, in order to profit from the trade with the Ming dynasty. Merchants also brought horses, camels and jade into the land of the Han Chinese under pretext of paying tribute to the emperor. After entering the pass, all their transport and supplies were provided by the Tang government. As a result, the post system was overwhelmed, and the military and civilians were busy about the transfer. “Grievances rose in the government and private sector,”27 since the area stretching for thousands of miles from east to west was implicated. Some emperors even forbade barbarians to change their clothing and follow the Han customs in order to maintain the “difference between the Han Chinese and the barbarians.” In the 3rd year of Daye reign, Qimin Khan and Princess Yicheng were granted an interview with Emperor Yang of Sui dynasty. And Qimin Khan submitted a memorial, “begging for approval to wear the clothes and follow the customs of the Han Chinese.” His request was rejected by the emperor, on the ground that the customs and clothing were meant to be different. The emperor also said that the difference in clothes was meant to differentiate the Han Chinese and the barbarians, in accordance with “the way of nature” 27 History of Ming, Vol. 332, “Western Regions (4)”, 8614.



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(Wei et al., 1973, 1874). In essence, Emperor Yang had wielded the superiority of his own culture, to forcibly maintain the difference in clothing for border tribes and the Han Chinese. Out of high cultural self-confidence, some politicians put forward the view of “extending imperial benevolence to the barbarians”, which was accepted by most rulers. In the fourth year of Zhenguan (630), the court discussed the disposal of more than 100,000 Turks that had surrendered to the Tang dynasty after a defeat. Wen Yanbo, the Secretariat Director, suggested that they should be handed benevolently and settled to the south of the Yellow River. The suggestion was endorsed by Emperor Taizong, who placed the surrendering Turkic population between Youzhou and Lingzhou, with thousands of Turkic households relocated to Chang’an (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6038). Emperor Taizong also said that “The barbarians are also human beings, with sentiments much the same as the people of the middle kingdom.” “Widespread imperial grace turns the barbarians of the Borderlands into family, while suspicion turns blood kin into enemies” (Sima, 1956, 6216). Chu Suiliang further proposed that the ancients had proposed prioritizing internal management over Borderland governance and “placating the Borderland tribes with benevolence” (Liu et al., 1975, 2733). Those opinions were all progressive in certain aspects. In addition, there were also political commentators who had held that benevolence could influence the rise and fall of the country, saying that “those bent on disseminating virtue flourish, and those bent on expanding their land perish” (Wei et al., 1973, 1829). All those indicate that great importance had been attached to the exercise of benevolent rule in governing the border. Some political commentators in the Central Plains dynasty also analyzed the interdependence of moralization and military conquest in border governance. For example, in the Northern Wei dynasty, Gao Lü said that “If the distant people refuse to submit, enhance cultural education to attract them; if the barbarians reject orders, exercise military conquest to subjugate them”(Gao, 1997, 478). Here “cultural education” was made the first of the five main principles for governing the country. In the Tang dynasty, Lu Zhi put forward the opinion that “remote states can be assimilated with virtue alone” “virtue will be futile if prestige is not

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established” (Liu et al., 1975, 3804). In the Song dynasty, there was the view “If might cannot subdue the enemy, then nor can virtue” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10836). Edifying the Borderland tribes with the Confucianism culture of the hinterland to gradually assimilate them was a much cherished approach to Borderland governance in China’s imperial history. For example, in the second year of Hongwu (1369), the Central Secretariat of the Ming dynasty suggested relocating the aboriginals of colonies in Guangxi to the hinterland, so as to eradicate border disasters. Emperor Taizu Yuanzhang answered that “Those colonies are inhabited by barbarians of different ethnic groups, who are ignorant of courtesy and justice. Garrisons should be stationed at strategic points, and then we wait for their acculturation. In a few years, they will be law-abiding. Why bother to relocate them?”28 In the book Records of Yunnan from the Daoguang Years, the edifying effect of the inland culture on the barbaric people in Yunnan during the Ming and Qing dynasties: after its establishment, the Ming dynasty leveled the terrain, cut the forest and built walled cities; replaced the hair coils and jade earrings with hats and clothing; set up schools, and carefully selected Confucian officials. Children of chieftains in Yunnan took admission to schools as an honor. “The originally deserted barbaric area of past was turned into a land of civilization.” The Qing dynasty continued to develop Confucian education. After decades of acculturation, “the chieftain’s children emulated one another in taking civil examinations and many became successful candidates of imperial examination. Some erudite scholars rose, and were equally matched to master Confucian scholars of the hinterland in knowledge on classics and scholarly achievements.”29 In assimilating the Borderland barbarians, promoting Confucianism education is most effective. For this, Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang made a clear point. In the 28th year of Hongwu (1395), he issued a decree to the Ministry of Ritual, saying that “All the native officials of the Borderland know little about rites, since they are now holding their offices through inheritance. If education is not offered in advance, how can they be 2 8 History of Ming, Vol. 317, “Chieftains of Guangxi (1)”, 8204 (PDF, 111). 29 [Qing Dynasty] Records of Yunnan from the Daoguang Years, Vol. 7, “Native Officials (1)”.



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assimilated? Therefore, the native officials in Yunnan and Sichuan shall set up Confucian schools, for education of their children, since acquainting them with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and preventing them from violating the rites and participating in struggles are also the way to achieve peace in the Borderland.”30 The rulers of the China’s imperial history cherished extending benevolence to the Borderland tribes, and spread the culture and customs of the hinterland by developing Confucian education and promoting changes in customs. Although each had their own motives, they objectively strengthened the influence of Han Chinese culture and benefited the integration of the hinterland and the border areas. With the passage of time, the enlightenment effect of disseminating virtue and spreading Confucianism on the border areas became more and more pronounced. Accordingly, the rulers gave greater weight to the two measures. For example, the Ming and Qing dynasties made the development of Confucianism education in the border areas an important indicator for assessing the performance of local officials. Meanwhile, acceptance of the inland culture spread by the Central Plains dynasty gradually changed the ideology and cultural customs of the Borderland ethnic tribes, intimating them to the hinterland, and objectively benefiting the formation and development of a unified multi-ethnic country.

5.  The Cultural Soft Power of the China’s Imperial History in Governing the Borderland The cultural soft power used to govern the border is part of the comprehensive strength of the Central Plains dynasty.31 Its foundation is the view of barbarians being different from the Han Chinese and that of changing the barbarians with the customs of the Han Chinese, while its main content is to demonstrate the culture, strength and system of the Central Plains dynasty, so as to make possible “keeping the central

3 0 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 239. 31 Hereafter “cultural soft power for border governance.”

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regions and administering the Borderland.” With the Tributary system as the carried, it relies on cultural dissemination as the dissemination mechanism. After the Song dynasty, its content and communication carrier changed, together with the situation of the world.

5.1. The Cultural Soft Power of the Central Plains Dynasty The comprehensive strength of a country includes hard power and soft power. The former refers to the extent of its gross social product, infrastructure and other hardware possessions, while the latter refers to cultural and institutional influence, including cultural influence, ideological influence, and institutional arrangements. Soft power features elusive connotations, relatively vague extension, and hardly quantifiable content. Extended further, it includes not only institutional and cultural power, but also international recognition, public discourse power, good image building capabilities, soft power transmission channels, and the ability to promote the orderly development of the country. The above situation has held true since ancient times. The cultural soft power of the Central Plains Dynasty is different from that of other dynasties. With the relatively advanced agricultural civilization as the basis of rule and the long period of rule, it was more complicated, with much greater impact. Therefore, it is made the object of research in this chapter. One characteristic that makes the Central Plains dynasty different from other dynasties is the unique set of governance system, political traditions and political ideas founded on the political, economic and social forms of the aforementioned core regions. The ideology of the Central Plains dynasty was deeply influenced by the typical agrarian society and the derived political centralization system and feudal patriarchal system. As far as the target is concerned, its cultural soft power roughly includes the influence and appeal of various political forces and social strata under its rule, as well as their influence and appeal when applied to the Borderlands and other areas outside the country. In other words, its unique ruling system, cultural traditions and political ideas were sublimated into Chinese culture based on Confucianism



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and applied to border governance, to form the soft power of its border culture. It is impossible for the ancients to make a scientific summary of cultural soft power in the modern sense. However, it is a fact that the ancient dynasties had a deep understanding of the important values of Chinese culture and its significant impacts, and adopted corresponding policies to maximize those influences. Under certain historical conditions, the ruler of the Central Plains dynasty keenly felt the important role of cultural soft power, and had full confidence in their own cultural soft power, using it as a weapon to consolidate the rule of his dynasty and expand its power. There were roughly two different political environments in which the Central Plains dynasty governed the Borderland, namely, overall unification and partial unification. During the period of overall reunification, the established goal of central plains dynasty in border governance was to effectively address the challenges of the Borderland destabilizing forces, and stabilize and develop the border areas, with typical agricultural areas at the core. Meanwhile, it had to actively resist or counterattack the invasion and interference of alien forces to form a favorable situation of good-neighborliness, so as to consolidate and develop national unity. In the period of partial unification, the main task of the Central Plains dynasty in governing the Borderland was to declare to the outside world its inheritance of the orthodox unified position of the previous dynasty, weaken and even defeat other regimes that challenge itself, and strive to achieve national unification, with the typical agricultural area at the core. For certain unified dynasties with serious border problems, their goal of border governance resembles that of some partially unified dynasties. Whether in overall unification or partial unification, the Central Plains dynasties mostly insisted on adhering to the Han Chinese culture and pursuing the political ideal of national reunification. They firmly believed in the superiority of the Han Chinese culture and its invincibility in the face of the enemy, and insisted on edifying the stabilizing side with the Han Chinese culture. From this point of view, the completely and partially unified dynasties in the Central Plains were roughly the same in content and characteristics of the cultural soft power for border governance. Together they

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have formed a tradition over thousands of years. With the change of the times and the deepening of the understanding of the parties, the content, application method, and utility of cultural soft power for border governance have also changed.

5.2. The Foundation of Cultural Soft Power for Border Governance The basis of the cultural soft power for border governance are two ideas: Han Chinese are different from the barbarians, and the need to change the barbarians according to the Han norms. The Central Plains dynasty believed that there were significant differences between the barbarians and the Han Chinese. The heart of the Central Plains dynasty was the Yellow River Basin and the Yangtze River Basin, which had been a typically agricultural area. Based on prosperous agricultural production, the area had formed a relatively advanced agricultural civilization, which was ideologically manifested as Han Chinese culture. During its long period of development, the agricultural civilization had been at a leading position in China and surrounding areas. The Central Plains dynasty thus had a strong sense of superiority, and regarded other civilizations as being inferior, as manifested in the concept of Han Chinese being superior to barbarians. Accordingly, it called itself “Huaxia” or “Xia”, and other civilizations “Yi Di” or “Yi.” The term “Yi Di” did not refer to any specific type of ethnic group or ethnic groups within a certain geographical range, but included the indigenous peoples on its borders and aliens with diplomatic relations with the Central Plains dynasty. When the advocates of the Westernization Movement in the late Qing dynasty proposed “curbing the barbarians by learning their advanced skills,” they were referring to the Western powers. The view of barbarians being different from the Han Chinese was formed during the Warring States Period, and later supplemented and developed. Ban Gu, a historian of the Han dynasty, made a relatively comprehensive summary of the concept. He said that the Han Chinese live in the center of the world, while barbarians live beyond it. To distinguish the distance in between, the ancient kings divided the country into nine regions and delineated the system of five subordinations. The



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barbarians are greedy and profiteering, with “a beastly heart behind a human façade” “customs and costumes different from those of the Han Chinese.” Therefore, the ancient kings treated them like beasts and livestock, “keeping them away and refusing to intimate them,” and adopted the governance policy of “if they attack, repel them; if they flee, enhance preparations.” If they came to offer tribute in an effort to follow righteousness, the court treated them with ceremony, so as to restrain them. If they fell out with the Central Plains dynasty, they should “be the party to blame.” That is “the constant way of the sage kings for controlling the barbarians.”32 The view of barbarians being different from the Han Chinese embodied the views of the Central Plains dynasty on the world, civilization, and internal and external relations. It became the theoretical basis for the cultural soft power for border governance, and had a profound impact for thousands of years.

32 Ban GU, Book of Han, Vol. 94(2), “Biography of the Xiongnu: Commendation”, 3833. “Therefore, sage kings of ancient times planned and measured land of the country and set up the capital of the kingdom in the Central Plains. The entire country was divided into nine administrative regions, and the “five-service system” was proposed to manage the areas around the capital, each with their own tributes and systems based on their distance to the capital. The Spring and Autumn Annals says that the various ethnic groups in the Central Plains should be treated as part of the internal relations, and barbarians as foreign races. The barbarian tribes are greedy and profiteering; they habitually wear their hair loose, have a left lapel and hide a barbaric heart beneath a human face. They are different from the tribes of the Central Plains in dress code, customs, food, and speech, living in the remote northern borders, exposed to the cold and dew of the wilderness, grazing with water and grass, migrating with livestock, and supplemented their livelihood with hunting. Separated by valleys and blocked by deserts, they are separated from the hinterland by a divine arrangement. Therefore, the sage king treated them like beasts, refused to make an alliance with them, and refrained from waging war against them. Alliance with them has proven costly and illusive; attacking them will exhaust the army, and invite their subsequent invasion. Their land cannot be cultivated for food, and their people cannot be supported as subjects. Instead, they must be rejected and not accepted, alienated and not intimated. Political edification should not be extended to their people, and the calendar should not be applied for them. When they attack, kill and resist them, and when they flee, guard against them and hold the frontier fortresses. When they come to submit tribute to the Emperor, receive them with ceremony to win over them. However, do not take the initiative to sever relations with them, so that the blame will be on their side. That is probably the constant approach of sage monarchs for govern the barbarians.”

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The notion that barbarians are different from the Han Chinese generally includes the following ideas: The first is the Huaxia-centrism. Affected by the geographical environment, eastern Asia is a relatively independent and closed region. There, the Chinese civilization got rid of ignorance earlier and became outstanding. Other civilizations in Asia have long been in a position of subordination, learning from the Chinese civilization. The awe-inspiring status contributed to a cultural psychology of aloofness and arrogance in the Central Plains dynasty. The concept of the Han Chinese group as the suzerain and the center of civilization had been recognized by other civilizations for a long time and brought about a prevailing world order in East Asia. The view of barbarians being different from the Han Chinese adopted civilization types as the standard for differentiating the Han Chinese from the barbarians. The term “Yi Di” includes civilizations other than the Han Chinese civilization. In geographical distribution, the part centered on the Han Chinese was clearer, while areas adjacent to the land of “Yi Di” were fuzzy. Meanwhile, the scope of Yi Di could be extended to the outside at will. In terms of the Borderland and the external relations of the Central Plains Dynasty, the scope of the Borderland area had been ambiguous and frequently changing. Sometimes, it can be difficult to determine whether the “Yi Di” having dealings with the Central Plains dynasty was a Borderland ethnic group under its jurisdiction, a vassal state under its control, or even an alien country that communicated with it through tributes. Among them, the most difficult to identify are border ethnic groups, border regimes, and neighboring vassal states. In the formation of China’s historical territory, the nature of Borderland ethnic groups, Borderland regimes, and vassal states were not easily distinguishable. In addition, it was often subject to changes. The geographical distribution of Borderland ethnic groups, Borderland regimes, and vassal states would usually result in a vast intermediate zone with elusive boundaries. The notion that barbarians are fundamentally different from the Han Chinese was not only the basis of the Central Plains dynasty’s views of the world, civilization and race, but also the basic premise for formulating border governance policies and the principles of dealing with diplomatic relations. The ambiguity of the concept of “Yi Di”



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provided a loose and variable range for the Central Plains dynasty in applying governance policies. The Tributary system formulated by the Central Plains dynasty was therefore generally applicable to different types of “Yi Di”. Due to this feature of the Tributary system, even if the court slightly deviated in responding to the Yi Di, it would not cause too much trouble, especially before the Yuan dynasty. The Tributary system of the Central Plains dynasty was widely applied to all kinds of Yi Di, and the cultural soft power of border governance carried by the Tributary system was also spread far and wide. The second is the thought of cherishing the Han Chinese and demoting barbarians. The view of the barbarians being different from the Han Chinese held the former in contempt and the latter in high esteem, even believing that backwardness and inferiority of the former and the advanced nobility of the latter were inherent and difficult to change. Teeming with contempt against the barbarians, it proposed strict separation of the barbarians from the Han Chinese. According to Kingly Institutions in the Book of Rites, “The barbarians of the Middle Kingdom, like the people of all the five directions, each has their property that cannot be changed.” It is said in the chapter Biography of Koryo in History of the Northern Dynasties that “the Han Chinese were born righteous and benevolent to the land of safety, while barbarians were born ruthless and bellicose to the deserted quarters”(Li, 1974, 3109). Just as the people of the pre-Qin dynasty had said, “since they are not my kin, they can’t be of one mind with us.” (“The First Year of Duke Cheng”, Master Zuo’s Spring and Autumn Annals) It was even believed that the farther away from the Middle Kingdom the regions were, the more barren and backward and barbaric they became. Under such a thought, in border governance, China’s imperial history developed such concepts as “Han Chinese first, and barbarians second” “prioritizing the stem over the branches and leaves” “intimating the Han Chinese while alienating the barbarians.” The third is the concept of keeping a necessary distance between the barbarians and Han Chinese. This is a principle abided by the Central Plains dynasty, as well as an embodiment of the strategy of prioritizing the stem over the branches and leaves. Mainly shown as “refraining from taking those with different customs as subjects”, it

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means that soliciting barbarians from afar should not be the goal and that certain rules should be observed in handling barbarians. The reason was not that the barbarians had been beyond the reach of the virtue or military might of the dynasty in the Central Plains, but that “the barbarians were beastly and greedy, and cannot be ruled with rites.” So, an appropriate distance should be kept, to achieve the ultimate goal of “barbarian not inferring with the Han Chinese” (Wei, 1974, 1286). In ruling the border areas, the Central Plains dynasty followed the principle of accepting the surrendering barbarians and leaving alone the rebelling ones (Fan, 1965, 2833). In the second year of Wude (619), an edict of the Tang dynasty clearly stated that “in governance, the former emperors placated the distant people, for the purpose of restraining them and not taking them subjects” (Song, 2008, 689). “Refraining from taking those with different customs as subjects” as proposed by Central Plains dynasty was out of the consideration for cherishing agriculture and suppressing commercial activities, and for reducing the cost of border governance. In other words, the land of the barbarians “was unfit for agricultural cultivation” and “their people unfit for subjects” (Ban, 1962, 3834). Managing their land would incur losses. Based on the above concepts, the Central Plains dynasty formed the idea of “keeping the central regions and administering the Borderland.” Changing the barbarians with the customs of the Han Chinese is another basis for the cultural soft power of border governance. The view mainly originated from the Confucian view of virtue. Confucianism cherished harmony, the beauty of loyalty, and used its moral concepts to explain the relationship between barbarians and the Han Chinese. For example, it proposed that credibility should be a national treasure, and renouncing credibility would mean no help in times of need. Righteousness and credibility, together with harmony and benevolence, were all qualities of supremacy. Deeds against righteousness are doomed to destruction. A small country chose to serve a big country as a token of honoring credibility, while a big country protects a small country for the sake of benevolence. Benevolence and kindness to neighboring countries are a treasure of the country, while harmony with barbarians is its blessing. Violation of covenants is ominous and deception of the great powers is against righteousness. Confucianism analyzed



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the relationship between virtue and prestige, and believed that the imperial court should adopt the policy of quenching the rebellious and forgiving subjugated, to show the ruler’s virtue and prestige in handling the barbarians, both virtue and prestige were indispensable; the treatment should be lenient, while preparations should be enhanced to guard against them. “How can prestige be shown if rebellions were not punished? How can acculturation be extended if the subjugated were not placated? Without prestige and acculturation, how can virtue be manifested?” However, the benevolent must not impose on others, and war must not be self-initiated.33 The moralization concept advocated by Confucianism reflects the thoughts of peace, harmony, and honesty in the agrarian society, and reflects the demeanor befitting a great power in the Central Plains. From the perspective of acculturation with morality, the Central Plains dynasty believed that moralization among the barbarians would

33 “In appropriacy, harmony is cherished and credibility lauded.” Book of Rites: Confucian Code of Conduct; “Credibility is the treasure of a state and the haven of commoners.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 25th Year of Duke Xi; “if one renounces credibility and one’s neighbors, who shall empathize him?” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 14th Year of Duke Xi; Righteousness and credibility, together with harmony and benevolence, are the approaches to kingly ways. Book of Rites: Classics Annotated; evil deeds lead to demise. Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 1st Year of Duke Yin; “smaller countries serves bigger ones out of credibility, and bigger countries protect smaller ones out of benevolence.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 1st Year of Duke Cheng; “Upholding benevolence and befriending the neighbors are treasures of a state.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 6th Year of Duke Yin; “Harmonious relationship with barbarians is a blessing for the country.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 11th Year of Duke Xiang; “Betraying an alliance is ominous and deceiving a big country is indecorous.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 1st Year of Duke Cheng; “In launching punitive expeditions to the rebelling and forgiving the surrendering, virtuous ruling coupled with punishment is formed.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 12nd Year of Duke Xuan; “Treat them with benevolence and guard against them with enhanced preparations.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 9th Year of Duke Cheng; “If rebellions are not quenched, how can coercion be demonstrated? If submission is not received cordially, how can placation be conducted? Without coercion and placation, how can virtue be shown?” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 7th Year of Duke Wen; “Imposing on others will be of no avail.” Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: 4th Year of Duke Zhao; “No war should be started on my account.” Book of Rites: Kingly Institutions.

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help to “extend imperial benevolence to the barbarians” and “avoid administering the barbarians.” Before the Qin dynasty, the role of moralization was much cherished. Mozi proposed that those known for righteousness could secure the allegiance of the entire China effortlessly if they were to seek the support of vassals with morality. King Zhuang of Chu said that how can we be sincerely admired by the people if we contend against the vassals by sheer force? Sima Cuo suggested that those who want to be king should enhance their virtues, and listed cultivated virtue, vast land, and enriched people as the three necessary conditions for kingship.34 After the pre-Qin period, thinkers of the China’s imperial history also developed the content of “extending imperial benevolence to the barbarians.” A minister of the Han dynasty proposed that geographical advantage was inferior to harmonious people, and military strength inferior to acculturation, saying that “the Borderland fortresses of the Central Plains dynasty had been guarded for generations with moralization, not their impassibility” (Du, 1988, 5321). In the Ming dynasty, Gui Yanliang held that moralization had been exercised to placating the barbarians so that “they may guard their respective land” and “become the fences of the Middle Kingdom” (Gui, 1962). He added that placation with morality and subjugation with prestige was the best strategy for Borderland governance. Sima Guang made a cogent point when he said that rebellious barbarians should be punished while subjugating barbarians placated, and that they should be relocated to the remote border areas, so that they wouldn’t “wreak havoc with the state of rites and righteousness.” That was the ideal governance of ancient sage kings (Sima, 1956, 1817). This suggests that the acculturation policy of the Central Plains dynasty for “changing the barbarians with the customs of the Han Chinese” was intended to win the recognition of barbarians peacefully with morality and a favorable image, so as to stabilize the Borderland and restrain the Borderland barbarians, and achieve victory without taking up arms. 34 The Mozi: Condemning Offensive Warfare II. Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals, “13th Year of Duke Xuan”. Sima Cuo: “Those who want to enrich the country will expand the land; those who want to strengthen the army will enrich their people; those who want to be king will cultivate their virtues. With the three goals achieved, kingly ways naturally follow.” Stratagems of theWarring States: Stratagems of Qin (1).



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5.3. The Content and Goals of Cultural Soft Power in Border Governance The content of cultural soft power in border governance mainly consists in demonstrating the culture, strength and institution of the Central Plains dynasty. Highlighting culture is one of the important contents. The economic foundation of the Central Plains dynasty was agricultural civilization, which emerged very early in China. Compared with the relatively simple structure of nomadic civilization and the underdeveloped mountain civilization, it boasts distinct advantages, higher production efficiency and stability among others. In the early days, when the per capita cultivated land area was very large and the natural ecological environment was not damaged, a year of cultivation could provide grains for several years. As a result, part of the population became detached from direct productive activities and able to engage in creation or service in other aspects. For a long time, the developed agricultural civilization was far ahead of other civilizations. The Han Chinese culture is a wonderful flower that originated from agricultural civilization, deeply imprinted by the farming society. For example, concepts such as attachment to the native land and reluctance to move, peace and harmony, orderly respect and tolerance, tolerance and inclusiveness have all come from the farming society. Due to the closed geographical environment and long-term excellence, agricultural civilization and the derived Chinese culture were rarely challenged. Hence, the Central Plains dynasty had been highly confident in its own culture and regarded it as an important part of the cultural soft power in border governance. The cultural promotion of the king of the Central Plains dynasty mainly focused on publicizing the broadness and profoundness of its culture, spreading the values of peace, harmony, and distinction between barbarians and Han Chinese, and showing the moral values of respect and order, service to one’s superior and master, credibility, and tolerance. In handling the relationship with neighboring barbarians, the Central Plains dynasty advocated maintaining harmony and seeking common ground while reserving differences. The Han and Tang dynasties were the heydays of the first half of the Central Plains

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dynasty. Both the Han and Tang dynasties paid attention to highlighting and exerting cultural influence, and their common feature was the extensive moralization of barbarians. Moralization in the Han dynasty was mainly exercised through the institution of hostage taking and that of peace-keeping marriage. Through the former, Borderland barbarians sent a large number of nobility children as hostages to the Han dynasty. In the third year of Ganlu (51 BC), the Hun ruler Huhanxie went to Chang’an to pay tribute to the emperor. He was welcomed with exceptional cordiality by Emperor Xuan, who met him under the Weiqiao, together with thousands of barbarian chiefs and dukes (Ban, 1962, 3798). Except for some chieftains that had gone to the capital for personal interview with the emperor or that had settled down there, most were hostages sent to the capital. During the Yongchu period, the chief of the 120 tribes of Xianbei sent hundreds of hostages to the Eastern Han dynasty at a time. When Ban Chao was stationed in the Western Regions, all 50-odd states there voluntarily sent hostages to Chang’an (Fan, 1965, 1582; 2986), where they were recruited to the imperial guards with generous treatment. Those allowed to guard important Borderland towns were treated with honor by the imperial court, who even built hotels or schools for them. To accommodate the hostages sent by the chiefs of the 10 Xianbei tribes, the Eastern Han Dynasty built a “hostage hall” consisting of the northern and the southern towers. It also actively arranged peace-keeping marriages with the Borderland barbarians, for spreading its culture to the vast border areas. The Tang dynasty was almost on a par with the Han dynasty in hostage taking and peacekeeping marriage. In some cases, it went even further in both content and scale. In addition, it also promoted the spread of Chinese culture to the outside world by rewarding barbarians with books and admitting their children to the imperial schools. During the Zhenguan period, Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty made several visits to the Imperial College, attending the lectures of famous scholars who served as academic officials. He also built another 1,200 classrooms, and the number of students to 2,260. Scholars from all over the country gathered in the capital. “The chiefs of Goryeo, Baekje,



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Silla, Gaochang, and Tubo also sent their children to the national academy, with over eight thousand lecturers” (Sima, 1956, 6153). According to Xinluo Biography in the Book of Old Tang, Emperor Taizong conferred his calligraphy “Wentang Stele Style”, “Jin Temple Stele Style” and the newly completed Book of Jin to Xinluo. In the second year of Chuigong (686), Xinluo submitted a memorial, requesting the Rites of Tang and other books. His wish was granted by Wu Zetian, who ordered him to transcribe Jixiong Yao Lu (Essentials of Good and Bad Omens), and gave him 50 volumes on “admonitions” selected from Wen Guan Ci Lin (Library of Essays and Poems). Japan dispatched Tang ships to the Tang dynasty many times, and sent a continuous stream of envoys to Chang’an to learn Tang culture. The surrounding areas set off a climax of learning Tang culture, and those activities laid the foundation for the formation of the Han Chinese cultural circle in East Asia. Since the purpose of spreading morality was to stabilize the barbarians, not to conquer them, barbarians, the Central Plains dynasty had a preset bottom line in implementing moralization. Some rulers did not want the barbarians to imitate the Han Chinese and completely change their old customs. In the third year of Daye (607), the Qimin Khan submitted an imperial memorial, asking for permission to adopt the Sui dynasty’s clothing and legal system, to be more like the Han Chinese. Emperor Yang issued an edict, saying that “When our founding father established the dynasty, the barbarians had customs different from the Han Chinese. In ruling, the gentleman shall not seek to change the customs,” since the clothes of the barbarians are different from those of the Han Chinese, we can distinguish the difference between waste and the world (Wei et al., 1973, 5321). In the 17th year of Hongzhi in the Ming dynasty (1504), Liu Hong the Chief Investigating Censor submitted an imperial memorial after inspecting Guizhou, saying that “The aborigines and Miao ethnic group have flourished and lived together, and it might be advisable to give them Chinese surnames.” The emperor replied that “The Han Chinese has established names; those should not be used for the aborigines, who may be called by terms according to local customs.”35 35 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongzhi in the Reign of Emperor Xiaozong, Vol. 207.

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The Han, Jin, Tang, and Song dynasty didn’t see eye to eye on whether the barbarians should be allowed to acquire the essence of the Han Chinese culture. Yu Xiulie, a minister of the Tang dynasty submitted “The Memorial to Protest Presenting Books to Tubo”, saying that there had been a permanent system prohibiting the practice, and citing the precedent of a Han dynasty emperor rejecting the request of King of Dongping for Historical Records and other books. He added that giving books to Tubo would be tantamount to giving soldiers and supplies to them and that at least the Spring and Autumn Annals should not be given (Yu, 1983, 377). There was also criticism among court officials on acceptance of barbarian hostages. In the second year of Tiance Wansui (696), Xue Qianguan submitted an imperial memorial, saying that “the secret weapon of the country should not be shown to others,” and that Emperor Wu of Jin had erred incorrigibly in allowing barbarians to study Historical Records and other classics to seek the name of being open-minded. The hostages sent by Turks, Tubo Khitan, and other ethnic groups were allowed access to the capital, to learn Chinese customs and dynasty institutions, thus becoming acquainted with the essential knowledge for governance. “After their return, they almost invariably instigated wars against the dynasty in the Central Plains. In the final analysis, this is the root cause of border problems.” Xue went on to suggest canceling the hostage-acceptance system and retaining hostages already sent to the Middle Kingdom, so as to avoid leakage of secrets(Du, 1988, 5496). The Song dynasty was too weak to rival the Liao, Jin and Mongolia in the north, and was even forced to pay tribute. Its consciousness of “differentiation between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” was obvious. Unlike other dynasties of the past, it had no record of peace-keeping marriage with surrounding barbarian tribes. It prohibited the export of books on calendar, divination, art of war, imperial decrees, current affairs, border secrets, and geography, to a rare degree of strictness. In the third year of Jingde (1006), the emperor of the Northern Song dynasty issued an edict, banning border residents from taking books to the border market, with the exception of the Nine Classics and books irrelevant to imperial examination. In the fifth year of Tiansheng (1027), the Northern Song Dynasty reiterated the prohibition on exporting



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books with restricted content, when it found that collected works of officials were brought to Liao via the border markets. In the first year of Yuanfeng (1078), the imperial court issued a stricter ban, stipulating that those who sold books privately to aliens should be exiled for three years, or banished to places thousands of miles away for aggravation of circumstances (Li, 1980, 1425, 2436, 7068). In the late Tang and Song dynasty, the situation in East Asia gradually changed, and the cultural dissemination of the Central Plains dynasty encountered resistance. Accordingly, the content and focus of cultural dissemination changed. Another aspect of the cultural soft power for border governance was to demonstrate strength. The strength of the Central Plains dynasty roughly includes economic strength, human resources and military strength. With a fertile hinterland guaranteeing stable harvests and consequently high total grain production, it was completely selfsufficient, without the need for external plunder and large-scale trade. This advantage not only created the conditions for it to strengthen national power, but also constituted an important reason for it to focus on internal stability and development, and care little about external expansion. Under the governance system characterized by autocracy and centralization, the imperial court had the power to fully control the society and its subjects, and mobilize all kinds of resources including human resources any time. With rich social, economic and human resources, the Central Plains dynasty was able to build a strong military. However, in some periods, its economic strength was not proportional to its military strength, which might be significantly underdeveloped. This imbalance was partially due to the unreasonable military institution (for example in the Song dynasty), and the inability for the army of an agrarian society to contend with the nomads that had been good at mobile warfare. The Central Plains dynasty was very confident in its own strength. The ruler believed that its stockpile of resources was abundant and easily replenished, and in some cases devoted a lot of resources to border governance. In addition to waging wars for border governance, it also implemented a policy of “generous rewards to meager tributes”, which ate into its inventory. In order to bluff and show national prestige,

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some rulers also spent a lot of money for embellishment. Take the Han dynasty for example. Its envoys scaled the Pamir in the west and reached Parthian Empire in the north, bringing along the envoys of all the countries along the route to Chang’an to meet the emperor. The Han court also “generously rewarded the envoys of alien states, and held sumptuous banquets for them, to impress them with the prosperity of the Middle Kingdom. “In addition, it gathered them together and arranged exotic shows and exhibition of curios. The generous gifts and conferment were complemented with flaunt of wealth, mesmerizing and shocking the alien envoys” (Sima, 1956, 696). After a defeat by the Tang Dynasty, the Turks “swarmed into the Middle Kingdom to pay tribute.” For each newly surrendered, the Tang court gave five rolls of cloth and one brocade robe. All chiefs were given high official posts, “and the high and respected position incurred considerable waste” (Wu, 2003, 504). In the Northern Song dynasty, “equal-value reimbursement” for tributes from barbarians, and rewarded the envoys with precious items. For example, it gave tens of thousands of rolls of silk alone to the King of Goryeo. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the world situation changed drastically, while the national power of the imperial court was limited. The Ming dynasty hoped to restore the grand ceremony of the Han and Tang dynasties, and it still gave rewards annually, exhausting the treasury resources. However, rare treasures, birds and beasts offered by barbarians all over the country increased with each passing day, overwhelming the Ming court and exhausting its resources. The Ming people ridiculed the tributes from the barbarians as worthless; “while the silk, boots and hats returned by the court as gifts were unbearably shoddy, and couldn’t stand the slightest strain” (Xie, 2009, 81). Since an imperial interview entailed rewards of the Central Plains dynasty, some foreign businessmen also received generous rewards by pretending to be the envoy of distant barbarians. During the Yongle period, Emperor Chengzu of Ming devoted to solicitation of all distant countries for hopes of their subjugation. As a result, envoys of the Western Regions kept coming every year. Some businessmen pretended to be envoys, and claimed that the horses, camels and jade brought were tributes. After entering the border of the Ming dynasty,



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“all the travel expenses were covered by relevant authorities of the Ming dynasty.” After an interview with the emperor, they were given generous rewards, against the outcry of both officials and the people.36 In the era of dynasty rule, rulers could effectively mobilize social resources to cover the cost of border governance. Excessive border governance not only ate into the national treasury, but also extensively posed a great threat to the sustainable production of agrarian society, since it required mobilization of social resources, especially that of male and strong labor on a massive scale. The high cost and the unreasonable use of resources in blind border expansion put to severe tests the national strength of the Central Plains dynasty and even the maintenance of its rule. The courtiers of the China’s imperial history raised their border governance to the point of undermining national strength and even the foundation of rule. Du You, a minister of the Tang dynasty, said that “Relying on the wealth accumulated by the two preceding emperors, Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty mobilized a massive army for expanding the border areas. Eventually he was forced to issue an edict of introspection because the undertaking reduced the national household registration by hal. Chu Suiliang claimed that after the war waged by the Tang dynasty against Gaochang, the vast majority of houses in the Hexi area became empty and the loss was not restored until five years later. In addition, the imperial court dispatched male labors to the front garrisons each year, with all expenses and preparations borne by their families. Plunging the people into unspeakable suffering, it also caused innumerable deaths en route.” Zhang Jianzhi said that the unplanned governance of border areas by the imperial court “had brought no profit to the country, but untold sufferings to the people” (Liu et al., 1975, 2940, 3979; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6222). Institution is also an integral part of the cultural soft power for border governance. Here, institution mainly refers to the state institution and tribute institution of the Central Plains dynasty. In view of the diversified alien forces and the complex Borderland political situation, rulers were also aware of the successive weakening of the controllable range with distance. Therefore, they often chose a more flexible form of 36 History of Ming, Vol. 332, “Western Regions”, 8614.

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state structure for border governance, called one country with multiple institutions. In the late Tang and Song dynasties, the state structure of border governance also changed greatly. As for the Tributary system, which had been closely related to border governance, was considered by the ruler as a symbol of political unification and allegiance of the conferred, and was often persisted. For example, even when the world pattern had changed significantly, the Qing court had many disputes with Britain and other countries on the etiquette of foreign envoys entering the imperial court. The goal of cultural soft power in border governance is to achieve “barbarians as the fences of the Middle Kingdom,” which could be justified as the core of border governance thought for most of the dynasties in the Central Plains. In the Ming dynasty, Gui Yanliang said that “Regarding the management of barbarians, defense should be the first, and conquest be the second. Random provocation of border disputes to satisfy the greed for gains is the most ill-advised policy. Therefore, the virtuous emperor makes the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” He added that placating the barbarians with virtue and subjugating them with prestige so that they might defend their own land should be the best policy. The bellicosity of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, and the expedition to Goryeo by Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty and Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty were deviations from the way (Gui,1962). The core of “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” is to prioritize defense in handling the barbarians, and to adopt a conservative and cautious stance in managing and expanding border areas. The nature and characteristics of the agrarian society determined that the Central Plains dynasty had to “make barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” Some ministers believed that the seas, quick sands, deserts, and five ridges surrounding the Central Plains were gifts from heaven. “They were intended to curb the barbarians and separate the Middle Kingdom from the alien states”, and the heaven’s will could not be violated (Di, 1983, 1725). The key to “make barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” is to properly handle the relationship between keeping the central regions and governing the border areas. The goal pursued by the Central Plains dynasty was the stability and prosperity



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of the land of the Han Chinese, so the Borderland management and expansion were given secondary importance. In the Tang dynasty, Chu Suiliang said that “The wise kings of the ancient times are known to prioritize the Han Chinese over the barbarians” (Liu et al., 1975, 2736). Li Daliang wrote in his imperial that “The Han Chinese are the foundation of state, while the four barbarians are like branches and leaves. How can you expect long-term stability if you disturb the roots to benefit branches” (Wu, 2003, 503)? Dynasties in the Central Plains forward the idea of prioritization and emphasizing agriculture in border governance. That can be said to be a summary of the experience of governing borders in the China’s imperial history. The Song dynasty developed the concept of “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” into the border-governing principle of “internal order should be achieved before pursuing external peace.” In the second year of Duangong (989), minister Tian Xi stated in his memorial that “internal order should be achieved before pursuing external peace; once internal order is achieved, external peace naturally follow.” In the 2nd year of Chunhua (991), Emperor Taizong of the Song dynasty said to his courtiers that “without external troubles, a country is bound to be inflicted with internal worries. However, external troubles were border issues and could be forestalled. However, when misconducts turn into internal troubles they the country, they become a true fear” (Li, 1980, 678, 719). In order to “make the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom,” Song courtiers also believed that keeping the Dali state out with the Dadu River as a boundary to “rule out the possibility of their encroachment and submission” was the top policy of imperial defense against barbarians.37 During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Borderland of the Middle Kingdom was basically formed. So Emperor Qianlong of the Qing dynasty turned “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” into the tactics of “bellicose tactics for expanding are below me; however, in

37 Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali State”, in Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, the Ninth Month, Sixth Year of Shaoxing

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guarding the land of my ancestors, I dare not lose one single inch.”38 Upholding the principle of “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom”, the Central Plains dynasty formulated the following strategy for border governance: “Never trouble the Middle Kingdom with affairs of the barbarians; never let the useless get in the way of the useful.” It believed that consuming a lot of national resources to rule the barbarians was just like turning the cart before the horse, making no sense while affecting the stability of the Han Chinese. A similar saying was “it would be ill-advised to bother the people while serving the barbarians.” The Central Plains dynasty believed that the ideal state of border governance should be peaceful coexistence of the Han Chinese and the barbarians, each guarding their own land without interfering with the other. The policy of Central Plains dynasty for dealing with the Borderland barbarians was to be courteous and keep them reined in (Wei et al., 1973, 1859; Wei, 1974, 1286; Fu, 1999, 1501). Therefore, this suggests that the concept of “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” upheld the basic principle of guarding the Borderland for self-security, held a conservative attitude in managing and expanding border areas, and even pursued the tenor of segregation and noncommunication. Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty and others held that “when stability and governance is achieved in the Middle Kingdom, the Borderland barbarians will naturally submit themselves,” and regarded it as the best policy to govern the border. They believed that the key was to handle domestic affairs properly and that the surrounding barbarians would naturally surrender with domestic stability and prosperity (Sima, 1956, 6067). Based on “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom”, the Central Plains dynasty developed the traditions of guarding the ancestral undertaking and cherishing the maintenance of national unity. “Handling Borderland barbarian issues with care” has multiple meanings. The first one is to treat the provocations of the surrounding barbarians cautiously. The necessity and feasibility of armed response should be carefully considered, and haste avoided. The second is the

38 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 377.



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art of response, which should not only set the bottom line, but also reflect the demeanor of a civilized power. In other words, it should be justifiable, disciplined, and moderate. Regarding the bottom line for contact with barbarians, Yu Xu, an official of the Eastern Han dynasty proposed “readily accepting their initiative to pledge allegiance and refraining from chasing them when they defect.” Ban Gu said that barbarians should be “segregated and not harmonized, estranged and not intimated.” “If they attack, repel them; if they flee, enhance preparations.” If the barbarians grow assimilated by righteousness and come to the court to pay tribute, the imperial court must receive them with ceremony. “The relations should be maintained, and the blame shall rest with the barbarians for discord.” In the Tang dynasty, Di Renjie pointed out that “barbarians should be suppressed if they rebel and placated if they surrender,” so as to demonstrate the benevolence of the imperial court in “overthrowing states embracing doomed practices and consolidating those embracing thriving practices”, while exempting the hardship of guarding distant fortresses. This way, the dual effects of demonstrating the Chinese civilization and avoiding the consumption of financial resources and disturbance to the people can be achieved. Sima Guang believed that “punishing the rebelling and forgiving the subjugated” should be the basic principle for the king to handle barbarians. “Isn’t it a shame for a dynasty as powerful as the Han dynasty to scheme against barbarians like thieves” (Ban, 1962, 3834; Fan, 1965, 2833; Di, 1983, 1725; Sima, 1956, 773)? Based on the above strategy, the Central Plains dynasty formed a strategic view of border governance that featured “befriending the distant enemy while attacking the enemy near home” and that focused on the overall situation and long-term development. The author has found through research that the Western Han dynasty had managed the southwestern Borderlands mainly to open a military road from Shu to Panyu along the Zangkejiang River, and a traffic line from Shu to Tochari through the southwestern Borderland and India. In the Eastern Han and Tang dynasties the basic driving force for managing the present-day Yunnan region, was still to maintain the above-mentioned foreign passages. Since the Yuan dynasty, the focus for governing Yunnan gradually shifted to the Borderland economic development

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and other aspects. Similar circumstances were also common in other Borderland regions, and they were reflective of the strategy of “befriending the distant enemy while attacking the enemy near home”. In Borderland governance, the strategic focus on the overall situation and long-term development was mainly manifested in the tradition of prioritizing the north over the south, the long-term goal of “eliminating barbarian interference with the Han Chinese”, as well as emphasis on the application of cultural soft power, active promotion of moralization, and the development of Confucianism education in the border areas. “Making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” has its rational core. In the era when the Chinese civilization dominated the East Asia, the border governance strategy derived from “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” could be deemed proactive and effective. However, as the world situation changes, its conservative elements gradually surfaced, to become one of the reasons for the Central Plains dynasty to cut itself off from the outside world. Japanese scholar Shino Seizaburo believed that the East Asian international order, or the Huayi order, featured centripetal and unequal vertical relations, while the modern European state system featured centrifugal and equal horizontal relations. The latter type of international relations meant challenges to the Chinese culture from the other rising cultures, and the inevitably emergence of a new direction for the development of relations in East Asia. In this process, the concept of “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” gradually became outdated, and the effectiveness and influence of the cultural soft power for its realization declined accordingly. Consequently, the cultural soft power for border governance underwent adaptive changes.

5.4. The Vehicle and Mechanism for Disseminating the Border Governance Cultural Soft Power The vehicle for propagating the cultural soft power of border governance was the Tributary system, which was mainly founded on the concept of subordination. In the pre-Qin period, some vassals put forward the theory of “five subordinations” or “nine subordinations.” The “five-subordination” theory put forward in Tributes of Yu in the Book



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of History39 held that the ruler occupied the center of the country, with influences extending from the center outward, to Dianfu, Houfu, Suifu, Yaofu and Huangfu successively, each being 500 li apart and consisting of multiple levels. As the distance increased, obligations born by the residents gradually diminished. The “nine-subordination” theory in Rites of Zhou was different from the “five-subordination” theory mainly in finer segmentation. The chapter Justifiable Argument in Xunzi gives a specific explanation on the “five-subordination” theory.40 Its main idea was that all states in the Central Plains should serve the emperor according to the same institution, but the Borderland barbarians should do so according to a different institution. Specifically, those in the range of “Dianfu”, “Houfu”, “Binfu” and “Yaofu” should present tribute to the emperor 39 The chapter Tributes of Yu in the Book of History says that “Areas within the first five hundred li around the imperial capital were called Dianfu: the closest, second closet, third closet, fourth closest and fifth closest one hundred li shall send grain ears on stalks, grain ears, bristleless grain ears, millet and shelled millet for tribute to the Emperor respectively. Areas five hundred li outside Dianfu were called Houfu: the closest one hundred li were conferred on nobilities and ministers, the second closet on barons, and the rest on powerful vassals. Areas five hundred miles outside Houfu were called Suifu: in the closet three hundred li, education should be offered to the people according to the circumstances; in the remaining two hundred li, military training should be implemented to enhance the defense power. Areas five hundred li apart from Suifu were called Yaofu: the closest three hundred li were inhabited by the barbarians, and the remaining two hundred li were intended as a penal colony. Areas five hundred li beyond Yaofu were called Huangfu: the closest three hundred li were the barren zone, and the remaining two hundred li were also a penal colony.” 40 Xun Zi: On Righteousness: Therefore, all kingdoms in the Central Plains serve the emperor with the same etiquette and standards. Barbarians in the south, east, west and north also serve the emperor, according to different customs. People in the land under the jurisdiction of the emperor pay tribute to him by handing in grains; those beyond the scope serve him by attending to his needs; those still further off serve him by pay tribute regularly as a guest. Ethnic minorities in the south and east serve him by following his constraints, while those in the west and north serve him by paying irregular tributes. For the first four categories, they should furnish sacrifices for the emperor’s father and grandfather, his great grandfather, his ancestor and the heavenly gods respectively, according to distance. The last category must follow the rule of the emperor. Sacrifices were offered once a day to the grandfather and father, once a month to the great grandfather, once a quarter to distant ancestors, and once a year to the gods. As each emperor passes away, they must meet the new emperor to recognize his dominant position. This is the echelon of tribute determined by distance. This is the kingly institution.

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every day, every month, every season and every year respectively. However, those in the range of “Huangfu” should only recognize the supremacy of the emperor and do not have to pay tribute regularly. The size and frequency of the tributes from the Borderland barbarians to the emperor should decrease according to distance. That is the justifiable system of kingly rule. After reforming the pre-Qin concept of subordination, the Central Plains Dynasty developed a Tributary system featuring Borderland barbarians paying tribute to the Central Plains dynasty and getting its canonization. The essence of the Tributary system was that the Central Plains dynasty established a covenant and master-subordinate relationship with the Borderland barbarians that had come to pay tribute through the two basic forms of tribute and canonization, and consequently developing a prevailing norm. The Tributary system is the embodiment of the feudal clan system. Founded on the agrarian society, the feudal clan system had the primary feature of the kinsmen gathered in the same clan “and became bonded by blood ties.” (Baihu Tongyi, lit. Virtuous Discussions of the White Tiger Hall) The clans are divided into complex hierarchies according to intimacy and parental hierarchy. Then, the top-down control relationship is clarified through the level-by-level conferment, with all members required to unconditionally obey the highest parent suzerain. The clan system is materialized in many forms, so as to ensure a common suzerain and seniority. In the agrarian society, the country was regarded as a family, with the emperor in charge. The clan system was applied by the Central Plains dynasty in border governance, and gave rise to the Tributary system with far-reaching influences. The Tributary system generally has the following characteristics: First, the relationship was based on the barbarians’ recognition of their vassal status to the Central Plains dynasty, and reflected in paying tributes, accepting canonization, and fulfilling the obligations stipulated by it. In turn, the Central Plains dynasty gave the barbarinans a generous economic return by taking little and giving much. By canonization, it also awarded the tributary barbarians with various titles or official positions, and included them in the spectrum of monitoring with jimi prefectures. The Tributary system features a peaceful and



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gradual progress without war. The Doctrine of the Mean in The Book of Rites says that “granting audiences timely and returning tributes with generous gifts are the ways to appease the vassals.” Li Daliang, a courtier of the Tang dynasty made a clear point, saying that “[barbarians] coming to pledge allegiance as vassals or tributaries shall be accepted by the imperial court, and relocated to the Borderland areas, ‘to reap real blessings with false benefits’ ” (Wu, 2003, 504). Second, the principle of voluntariness shall be followed for tributary and canonization, without imposition. The relations established upon canonization could be abolished at any time as the barbarians wished. The strategy was summed up by some courtiers as “receiving them with grace if they come to pledge allegiance and leaving them alone if they flee in defection” (Fan, 1965, 2833). The Central Plains dynasty also used specific forms such as hostage acceptance, oath for alliance, peace-keeping marriages, and border trade to consolidate the covenant relationship established with the barbarians. Third, the scope of the Tributary system was very wide. Its target was “barbarians”, a term used by the Central Plains dynasty to refer to civilizations other than the Han Chinese. Therefore, the border barbarians and countries in diplomatic relations with the Central Plains dynasty could all be included in the scope of the Tributary system. On the other hand, for a long period of time, the territory of the Central Plains dynasty was not stable and frequently changing. So it was always confusing whether the barbarians that had accepted the imperial canonization belonged to the Borderland barbarians or alien forces, and even the identified nature would change. The wide application scope of the Tributary system was generally in line with the situation at the time. As other civilizations were far less developed than the Han Chinese civilization, and the Central Plains dynasty mainly adopted friendly relations and moralization in handling relations with neighboring barbarians, the Tributary system achieved great success. The Central Plains Dynasty not only constructed a world order centered on itself, but also often acted as the arbitrator of conflicts among various forces and even the balancer of the world situation. It seldom sent troops beyond its national border and in some cases it intended to mediate conflicts. Under the influence of the Chinese culture of

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ritual rule, general peace ruled East Asia for thousands of years. The Tributary system also played a positive role in promoting the progress of civilization in East Asia. Through it, the cultural soft power of the Central Plains dynasty was effectively displayed, and the barbarians were deeply influenced by the Chinese civilization. Gradually an East Asian circle of Han Chinese culture with the Middle Kingdom in the center took shape. The far-reaching influences of the cultural soft power for border governance were particularly obvious in the Han and Tang dynasties. The Tributary system also had obvious weaknesses. The first was that the extensive scope easily caused confusion between the policies for Borderland governance and those for neighboring countries. This was one of the reasons for the frequent vacillations in border governance in some Central Plains dynasties. Some courtiers had lamented the ineffectiveness of the Borderland governance policy. In the Western Han dynasty, Wang Mang’s general Yan You said that the Huns have been a pest for a long time, despite the punitive expeditions of the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties, “since none was truly successful. Roughly, the Zhou and Han dynasty had acted according to the second best and an ill-advised strategy respectively, while the Qin had had no strategy at all” (Ban, 1962, 3824). In addition, both the Han dynasty and the barbarians were subject to ups and downs in strength. Therefore, there is no inevitable rule, or guaranteed victory (Liu et al.., 1975, 3805). The deep-seated reason for the difficulty in governing borders should be explored from the limitations of the Tributary system itself. Second, the connotations of the Tributary system were superficial and monotonous, lacking specific pertinence and necessary flexibility in application. In addition to the excessively wide application range and other reasons, there was also the tendency to prioritize the north over the south in border governance in most dynasties. The Tributary system was mainly derived from the experience of handling the northern nomads and could not fully reflect the situation of the surrounding barbarians or effectively handle related matters. Third, the Han and Tang dynasties adopted the Tributary system as an unchangeable policy. From the Qin and Han to the Song dynasties,



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there was basically no obvious change to it. There are many reasons for this. Fourth, the Tributary system was based on the principle of “generous rewards and scanty demands.” The imperial court valued political gains without considering economic benefits and put a lot of pressure on the national treasury. Before the Tusi (native official) system and other specific governance policies in the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, the Borderland garrison and Borderland officials were all dispatched by the imperial court, incurring huge expenditures. This was the main reason for some monarchs and ministers to complain about the high cost of border governance and the loss of benefits. Di Renjie, the minister of the Tang Dynasty, made a quite representative observation. He said that the imperial court had “exhausted the state treasury, to fight for the rocky barren land, whereas its subjects were unlikely to increase tax revenue and its land unfit for cultivation” in managing the Borderland, and that it was bound to lose the support of the people (Di, 1983, 1725). Under such circumstances, the Central Plains dynasty, which adopted the Tributary system as its basic national policy, pursued a natural and passive internationalism. Once the world situation changed, its approach would inevitably encounter challenges and even obstacles everywhere. The spreading mechanism of cultural soft power for border governance is cultural communication, which has dual meanings. One is to spread the cultural soft power of border governance to the surrounding area through cultural influence and infiltration; the other is that the main content is culture. The core of culture is values and ethics, and cultural communication focuses on embodying the breadth, depth and inclusive of the Chinese culture. In spreading culture, the Central Plains dynasty mainly adopted the two methods of popularizing moralization and promoting Confucianism education. The Central Plains dynasty had a full understanding of the importance of culture. In the pre-Qin period, special emphasis was placed on the role of values and virtue, believing that virtue was powerful enough to conquer the world, and even what military forces could not conquer. Culture can rally popular support, which determines the success of border governance. “Those who win the hearts of the people

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win the world, and those who lose the hearts of the people lose the world.” Yu Liaozi proposed that “military conquest is the auxiliary means and culture the fundamental tool for governance. The military conquest is the superficial, and culture is the essential.” (On War (1), Wei Liaozi) He believed that that culture was the soul and core of military power. Culture was known to have a strong appeal. For example, in the Song dynasty, it was believed that Han Chinese culture was sufficient to subjugate barbarians close to the border and solicit those further away (Liu et al., 1975, 5317). Cultural dissemination is a slow process of infiltration, described in the Tang dynasty described it as “nourishing like the timely rain, warming like the spring sun, placating like the purest virtue and trusting like credibility.” It was believed that under the influence of Chinese culture, barbarians would naturally become upright and grateful, and would approximate “benevolence” (Song, 2008, 689). The Ming and Qing dynasties attached great importance to promoting Confucianism education in border areas. The Qing people said that after the launch of Confucianism education, the children of the chieftains took pride in being enrolled and rushed to imitate the dressing code of the Middle Kingdom, with many participating in state examination and some even becoming jinshi.41 The cultural dissemination of the Central Plains dynasty had managed to play a huge role because of the situation in East Asia. As mentioned above, the agricultural civilization enjoyed by the Central Plains dynasty had long been at the leading level in China and surrounding areas, and the rulers formed the concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the periphery.” The influence of the Central Plains dynasty radiated outward with the emperor in the center, whose control and influence decreased successively. On the other hand, between the Han Chinese region and its neighboring states, there was usually a broad and constantly changing intermediate zone. In the era when contention and competition had not yet become the main theme of development in East Asia, the ritual and righteous diplomatic relations and the maintenance of the land for peace advocated by the Central Plains

41 [Qing Dynasty] Records of Yunnan from the Daoguang Years, Vol. 7, “Native Officials (1)”.



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dynasty had had a profound impact on the surrounding barbarians. Through the “generous rewards and scanty demands” and the extensive application of moralization, the Central Plains dynasty obtained a relatively stable surrounding environment, thus achieving the purpose of “making Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” The ancient Middle Kingdom had invariably managed to become reunified in a varying period of time, and grow from low-level unification to high-level unification, every time it disintegrated. The reasons were multi-faceted. The key was that the Central Plains dynasty properly handled the relationship between the center and the periphery, that is, it had subtly and effectively transformed the surrounding barbarians by making full use of the radiation effect of the Han Chinese culture. Facts have proven that “The Chinese nation is known to the world with its great assimilation power” (Lü, 2008, 28). The effect of cultural dissemination could be maximized only under the situation of “Borderland barbarians as the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” If cultural dissemination was against the spirit of Chinese culture, its effectiveness would be greatly reduced, and even punishment by objective laws could be expected. The China’s imperial history summed up the past experience and realized that the “degree” must be grasped in Borderland expansion. Too fast expansion, and hopes to turn the emperor of the Han Chinese into the common ruler of the world were against the spirit of the Han Chinese culture, and the resource reserve would also be quickly exhausted. In the fourth year of Zhenguan (630), the chiefs of the Borderland barbarians went to the capital and requested Emperor Taizong of Tang to be the Khan of Heaven. Emperor Taizong said that “I am now the emperor of Tang, and am I expected to exercise the duties of the Khan?” Both the ministers and the barbarian chiefs hailed approval for his majesty. From then on, Emperor Taizong styled himself “Khan of Heaven” in imperial decrees issued to the northwestern rulers. “That ushered in the rule of Emperor Taizong among Borderland barbarians” (Sima, 1956, 6073; Du, 1988, 5496). Some ministers disagreed with Emperor Taizong on blindly expanding the Borderlands. In the 14th year of Zhenguan, when Emperor Taizong wanted to set a prefecture in Gaochang, Wei Zhengjian remonstrated that “if a prefecture was established in

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Gaochang, more than a thousand soldiers will be required for its garrison, which should be changed every few years. Within a decade, the resources of Longyou will be exhausted. Your Majesty will eventually reap nothing from Gaochang to benefit China. That is called wasting useful resources for the useless.” However, Taizong would not listen. And his practice was inherited by subsequent emperors. In the first year of Shengong (697), Chancellery Minister Di Renjie submitted an imperial memorial, saying that in recent years, the frequent wars have drastically increased expenses and would shake the foundation of the country. Empress Wu Zetian ignored him. In the following year, Zhang Jian, the governor of Shuzhou Prefecture submitted an imperial memorial, saying that “Yaozhou is located in a barren land and establishing a prefecture there would eat into national treasury without gains in taxes or arms. So it was recommended that the Yaozhou be deprived its status of prefecture and placed under the jurisdiction of Guizhou Prefecture. Again, Wu Zetian did not follow the advice” (Sima, 1956, 6155, 6524, 6537). The An-Shi Rebellion triggered a hidden crisis in the Tang dynasty. The jimi prefectures set up in the border areas in the early Tang dynasty were mostly abandoned. After the Tang dynasty was overthrown, the entire country was even split up. That has much to do with the border governance against the principle of “Borderland barbarian as the fence of the Middle Kingdom” in the early Tang dynasty.

5.5. Changes in the Cultural Soft Power for Border Governance after the Song Dynasty In the late Tang and the Song dynasty, the world situation and the cultural soft power for border governance changed, and formed an unstoppable trend in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. The situation of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties was very complicated, and further analysis will be left to the future research. In the following section, the general trend of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties will be outlined. The late Tang and Song dynasties were the era of drastic changes in the Middle Kingdom. Lü Simian proposed that after the Sui and Tang dynasties, the Chinese history entered a new chapter (Lü, 2008, 85). Fu Haibo and Cui Ruide believed that “before China was reunified in the



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Yuan dynasty, the political structure of the East Asia can be described as that in the era of the covenant.” The Five-Service Theory might have had some rationality in the distant past, when China’s surrounding areas were inhabited by ethnic groups with backward cultural development, and loose and incomplete political organization. In the Tang dynasty, this situation changed. “In the late 8th century and the early 9th century, a new and stable international situation gradually formed.” “And China was no longer the center of international relations” (Franke and Twitchett, 1998, 4, 5, 16). In other words, the world after the 9th century was very different from the world before. The world in the vision of the Central Plains dynasty after the 9th century roughly included the hinterland and the Borderland regions of the Middle Kingdom, and distant alien countries. The Borderland regions were the middle zone between the hinterland and distant alien countries. The changes that took place in the world during the late Tang and Song dynasties just proved the considerable role played by the cultural soft power of the Central Plains dynasty in border governance, as well as its important and far-reaching impact on the surrounding barbarians. The confrontation of Song against Liao and Jin dynasties was not a confrontation between two civilizations. “Instead, it should be deemed a special kind of civil war, in which the Song was on one side and Liao, Xixia, Jin or Mongolia on the other” (Franke and Twitchett, 1998, 13). The wars fought by the Song against Liao, Xixia, Jin, and Mongolia were not only contention for the control of the Middle Kingdom, but also the clash and competition between different cultures. They eventually gave birth to a new pattern on the Chinese land. Furthermore, due to the active management of the Central Plains dynasty and the infiltration of the cultural soft power for border governance, most of the areas surrounding the land of the Han Chinese had become an inseparable part of the Chinese territory during the late Tang and Song dynasties, and China’s diplomatic relations with distant alien countries had also gradually become clear. The part between the hinterland and distant alien countries was divided among the Borderland regimes of Liao, Jin, and Xia, which belonged to the Middle Kingdom, together with the Central Plains dynasty.

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The world situation changed drastically in the late Tang and Song dynasties, and the following Yuan dynasty further clarified a brandnew world pattern from the height of national unification. The Ming and Qing dynasties followed the development trend since the Song and Yuan dynasties, contributing to new and continuous changes in the connotations of the Central Plains dynasty and in its relationship with the barbarians. The above changes generally strengthened the border areas, which become a strong fence for defending the Middle Kingdom; meanwhile, the neighboring countries mostly became vassal states in a new type of vassal relationship with it. Although in the process of evolving to peer-to-peer relations, the diplomatic relations of the Middle Kingdom with distant alien countries had been slow and faltering in development, due to the influence of historical inertia and the indulgence of the ruler in the old fancy of “all directions coming to pledge allegiance.” At the end of the Qing dynasty, Western powers blasted through the gates of the empire with artillery, suddenly awakening the rulers who hurriedly planned changes to address the urgency. In this period, the cultural soft power for border governance was changed in main content, transmission carrier, and application methods. Although the surrounding nations that rose during the late Tang and Song dynasties had the consciousness of contending with the Central Plains dynasty for orthodox, they were different from it in world view, values and race views, posing challenges to the Chinese central view. The complex circumstances faced by the Central Plains dynasty required a more reasonable combination of hard power and soft power; unpredictable changes in the circumstances also called for more timely and flexible responses; the supremacy of competition and the survival of the fittest were gradually becoming the universal law of the international community. All those questioned the passive internationalism pursued by the Central Plains dynasty. The strength comparison of rivaling parties also changed, and the surrounding ethnic groups gained the upper hand in the Song dynasty. After the Song dynasty, two unified dynasties with Borderland ethnic groups as the ruling class, namely, the Yuan and Qing dynasties. Although their ruling groups absorbed the Han Chinese element, the Borderland ethnic



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groups still occupied the dominant position, declaring the end of the era with the Han Chinese as the orthodoxy and the supreme center. The Han Chinese culture integrated the cultures of Mongolia, Houjin and other border ethnic groups, formed a deeper, richer and more vital Chinese culture, and ultimately promoted the formation of a pluralistic unity of the Chinese nation. The original Tributary system could not adapt to the changes of the times and gradually withdrew from the stage of history. After its establishment, the Ming dynasty had hoped to restore the system of “all nations coming to the pledge allegiance” in the previous dynasty. During the Hongwu Reign, the “Taiqing Song” authorized by Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang said that “All nations come to pledge allegiance and pay tribute to the sage lord of Ming, and thus the Han Chinese and the barbarians are unified.” Zheng He’s seven voyages to the western ocean in the Ming dynasty constituted not only the swan song of the Tributary system, but also the announcement of the advent of obscurity. The Ming dynasty spent a lot of resources, but gained very little. After the seven voyages, similar actions abruptly ceased. The underlying reason was that with changing times the Central Plains dynasty was no longer unique and unrivaled in East Asia. Later, the ruler imposed maritime blockade, banning even “sampan from going out to the sea.” Although there were many reasons for the rulers of Ming and Qing dynasties to enter into self-imposed enclosure, the unsustainability of the debilitating Tributary system featuring “generous rewards and scanty demands” was an important one.42 Although the Central Plains dynasty’s spread of moralization toward foreign countries gradually declined, the development of education in the border areas flourished. There had been inland-style education in the border areas before the Yuan dynasty, but the organizers were mainly scholars or officials who were demoted there. The government-run border education had not yet become a general national policy. In the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the Borderland 42 The tributary system of the Ming and Qing dynasties is different from the conferment-Tributary system of the Han and Tang dynasties in the objects, connotations and expected goals. It will be deliberated elsewhere in the future.

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areas became an inseparable part of the national territory. The imperial government implemented specific governance policies such as the chieftain system; actively spreading Confucian culture became an objective need to improve the quality of native officials and strengthen the national cohesion. The Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, especially the Ming and Qing dynasties, spared no effort in the developing education in the border areas, and achieved great results. The development of education in border areas had become an important aspect of the cultural soft power of border governance. The cultural soft power for border governance sprouted in the preQin period and flourished in the Han and Tang dynasties. It underwent transformations and changes after the Song Dynasty, but remained a powerful weapon for the border governance in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. This issue involves a lot of content and complicated situations and is bound to be a topic of everlasting interest.

6.  The Main Experience of Border Governance in the China’s Imperial History In the long historical development, the Central Plains dynasty regarded border governance as an important content of its rule. There are many profound understandings and important creations, and the historical experience is an important part of China’s cultural heritage. They are all worthy of careful study and summary. Based on relevant historical facts and records, the experience of the Central Plains dynasty in governing borders is summarized as follows.

6.1. Properly Handle the Relationship between the Center and the Edge The rulers of the China’s imperial history generally regarded the hinterland as the center and the Borderland as the edge of the empire. “Border governance” can be deemed as the understanding and corresponding practice in handling border issues from the perspective of the relationship between the center and the periphery.



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The rulers of the China’s imperial history believed that the Central Plains dynasty ruled the world, and other civilizations around it should respect it, obey it or live in peace with it. The state capital was regarded as the national center, from which the rule or influence of the Central Plains dynasty on the world gradually spread to all directions. The “five-subordination” or “nine subordination” put forward by preQin politicians43 is a vivid expression of such an understanding. By the early Qing dynasty, it still had a wide range of influence in the imperial court and among the people. It was generally believed that “the Middle Kingdom occupies the center of the land, surrounded by four rings of sea. Those living on the edge of the sea were called Yi (remote people), so were overseas ethnic groups” (Zhejiang Ancient Books Publishing House, 2000, 7413). The interpretation of the Borderland by Ban Gu, a historian of the Han dynasty, is generally representative of the views of China’s imperial history. He believed that the valleys or deserts separating the barbarians from the Han Chinese had been “a divine plan.” The Central Plains dynasty established fiefs in the surrounding areas and divided the country into nine administrative regions, listed the tributes of five subordinations, and curbed penal government or promulgated assimilating virtues. The situation was different due to the distance. He pointed out that barbarians were different from the Han Chinese in customs, so the Spring and Autumn Annals determined that the Han Chinese should be in the center, while barbarians should be in the 43 The chapter Tributes of Yu in the Book of History says that “Areas within the first five hundred li around the imperial capital were called Dianfu: the closest, second closet, third closet, fourth closest and fifth closest one hundred li shall send grain ears on stalks, grain ears, bristleless grain ears, millet and shelled millet for tribute to the Emperor respectively. Areas five hundred li outside Dianfu were called Houfu: the closest one hundred li were conferred on nobilities and ministers, the second closet on barons, and the rest on powerful vassals. Areas five hundred miles outside Houfu were called Suifu: in the closet three hundred li, education should be offered to the people according to the circumstances; in the remaining two hundred li, military training should be implemented to enhance the defense power. Areas five hundred li apart from Suifu were called Yaofu: the closest three hundred li were inhabited by the barbarians, and the remaining two hundred li were intended as a penal colony. Areas five hundred li beyond Yaofu were called Huangfu: the closest three hundred li were the barren zone, and the remaining two hundred li were also a penal colony.”

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Borderland. The interaction between the Central Plains dynasty and barbarians should also reflect the tolerance. If barbarians come to pay tribute to following righteousness, the imperial court should treat them with courtesy. In dealing with barbarians, the restraint should be maintained, and efforts should be made to avoid wrong doing in the event of violation against courtesy. This is the “constant way to control the barbarians.”44 The Borderland view expressed by Ban Gu not only reflected the high confidence of the dynasty rulers in the Han Chinese civilization, but also showed that the standard of the Central Plains dynasty for distinguishing the interior and the Borderland was whether the civilization belonged to the Han Chinese or barbarians. Ban Gu proposed that managing the border areas was not cost-effective, “the land cannot be cultivated for food, and the people cannot be assimilated for 44 Ban GU, Book of Han, Vol. 94(2), “Biography of the Xiongnu: Commendation”, 3833. “Therefore, sage kings of ancient times planned and measured land of the country and set up the capital of the kingdom in the Central Plains. The entire country was divided into nine administrative regions, and the “five-service system” was proposed to manage the areas around the capital, each with their own tributes and systems based on their distance to the capital. In some places, the criminal punishment is still exercise, while in others, culture is enhanced for governance, because of the geographical distance and different circumstances. Therefore, the Spring and Autumn Annals says that the various ethnic groups in the Central Plains should be treated as part of the internal relations, and barbarians as foreign races. The barbarian tribes are greedy and profiteering; they habitually wear their hair loose, have a left lapel and hide a barbaric heart beneath a human face. They are different from the tribes of the Central Plains in dress code, customs, food, and speech, living in the remote northern borders, exposed to the cold and dew of the wilderness, grazing with water and grass, migration with livestock, and supplemented their livelihood with hunting. Separated by valleys and blocked by deserts, they are separated from the hinterland by a divine arrangement. Therefore, the sage king treated them like beasts, refused to make an alliance with them, and refrained from waging war against them. Alliance with them has proven costly and illusive; attacking them will exhaust the army, and invite their subsequent invasion. Their land cannot be cultivated for grains, and their people cannot be supported as subjects. Instead, they must be rejected and not accepted, alienated and not intimated. Political edification should not be extended to their people, and the calendar should not be applied for them. When they attack, kill and resist them, and when they flee, guard against them and hold the frontier fortresses. When they come to submit tribute to the Emperor, receive them with ceremony to win over them. However, do not take the initiative to sever relations with them, so that the blame will be on their side. That is probably the constant approach of sage monarchs for controlling the huns and other barbarians.”



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subjects.” So he held a conservative attitude towards opening up the Borderlands. His view of repelling barbarian attack and staying prepared in the wake of their retreat after defeat was also regarded as the paramount standard by most of the Central Plains dynasties. The politicians of the China’s imperial history after Ban Gu further summarized the above-mentioned border governance view “making barbarians the fence for the Middle Kingdom”, and proposed “the capable emperor makes barbarians the fence in ruling” (Fang et al., 1974, 1529). Gui Yanliang, a minister of the Ming dynasty said that “the virtuous emperor shall make barbarians in the Borderlands as the guarding fence, placate them with virtue and subjugate them with prestige, so that each of the Borderland courtiers can guard their land—that is the ideal scenario” (Gui, 1962). Hence, “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” was elevated to the status of supreme strategy for border governance of the Central Plains dynasty. Based on the Borderland view of “guarding the Middle Kingdom before governing the border” and “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom”, the rulers of the China’s imperial history emphasized that the border could be governed only when the Middle Kingdom was secure, and the ideal goal of border governance was “barbarians being the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” They went further to believe that the central area to be guarded should be clearly separated from the land of the border barbarians and that border governance should be exercised to guarantee the stability and prosperity of the hinterland. In the border areas, the barbarians and the Han Chinese should be able to live together in peace, “without interference of the barbarians with affairs of the Han Chinese.” In the long historical development, the outer edge of the Central Plains dynasty’s Borderlands was difficult to determine. There was usually a constantly-changing buffer zone between the periphery of its hinterland and the Borderland of other countries, so its border governance assumed varying degrees of openness to the outside world. Therefore, related governance policies had more room for adaptation. The main approach was to generally regard areas outside of Han Chinese as barbarian land, and implement a tributary system that encouraged barbarians to visit the imperial court and seek imperial audience, and a

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canonization system for leaders of barbarians coming to pay tributes or respect. The above-mentioned institution was not only aimed at barbarians on the outer periphery of the hinterland, but also generally applicable to alien states coming to pledge allegiance from afar. The essence of the Tributary system was to give generous rewards and courteous treatment, in exchange for at least the formal submission of the tributaries, and their recognition of the supreme status of the Central Plains dynasty. The canonization system was modeled on China’s feudal patriarchal system. Through it, the ruler of the dynasty could grant relevant barbaric chiefs the title of a vassal state or the identity of being a relative of the emperor. Moreover, he could also control, restrain or influence the canonized according to the seniority scale of the patriarchal system. In order to realize “Borderland barbarians as the fence of the Middle Kingdom,” the rulers of the China’s imperial history set different priorities for border governance and hinterland management, out of the belief that the center and the periphery were different, with the latter subordinate to the former. During the reign of Emperor of Ling when courtiers discussed the invasion of the Xianbei Tribes from the northern border, Cai Yong compared it to hand and foot scabies, holding that troubles in the hinterland was life-threatening chest and back sores (Fan, 1965, 2992). Li Daliang, a courtier of the Tang dynasty, compared the hinterland to the roots and the Borderland barbarians to branches and leaves; Emperor Taizong further pointed out that “if the root and stem are curtailed to nourish the branches and leaves, how can the tree expected to thrive” (Sima, 1956, 6149)! He also regarded the stability of the interior as the primary condition for stabilizing the Borderland, quoting the remarks of his courtier Wei Zheng “distant barbarians are naturally subjugated when peace reigns the Middle Kingdom” (Liu et al., 1975, 2558). In the Song dynasty, Emperor Taizong put forward the Borderland governance idea of “internal order should be achieved before pursuing external peace,” saying that “internal order should be achieved before pursuing external peace; once internal order is achieved, external peace naturally follow” (Li, 1980, 678). Ancient politicians mostly took a cautious attitude towards Borderland expansion, abiding by the tenet of “handling the Borderland barbarians with care”, and emphasizing the role of the Borderland



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regions in defending the hinterland. Throughout history, China’s imperial history had actively recruited and canonized the Borderland barbarians. An important purpose was to make them a barrier for enhancing the security of the Central Plains dynasty. The Borderland barbarians knew this only too well. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794 years), Nanzhao expressed the willingness to restore rapprochement with the Tang dynasty, and its king Yimou Xun stated that “I would like to pledge allegiance to the Tang dynasty, and take the oath to be the southwestern fence forever.” When the Tang envoy Yuan Zi went to Yunnan for the canonization, he emphasized that Nanzhao should “be true to its words and serve as the southwestern fence”, and Yimou Xun promised tearfully (Fan, 1985, 334, 342). The strategies adopted by the Central Plains dynasty to handle the invasion of Borderland barbarians mainly included focusing on prevention, waiting at ease for the fatigued enemy, and launching well-devised countermeasures. Regarding the imperial court’s policy to address the invasion of Borderland barbarians, Jiang Tong of the Jin dynasty summed it up as “always being prepared to repel them whenever they attack,” while Sima Guang of the Song dynasty said that “rebelling [barbarians] shall be punished and subjugated ones forgiven” (Fang et al., 1974, 773, 1530; Sima, 1956). The Northern nomads often went south, posing a serious threat to the Central Plains dynasty. In the Tang dynasty, Emperor Taizong summed up the experience of consolidating the capital and setting up Borderland fortresses in the China’s imperial history, and proposed the long-term defense, believing it to be “beneficial for border governance” and effective for resisting the Turks (Song, 2008, 552). In summary, historical dynasties compared the relationship between the inland and the Borderland to that between the center and the edge, and formulated and implemented corresponding governance policies. The concepts and practices can be summarized as “guarding the Middle Kingdom and governing the border” and “making barbarians the fence for the Middle Kingdom.” This understanding was put forward when the ancient China had no borders with other powerful countries in the world, and the Chinese civilization was ahead of the East Asian countries. The border governance formed on this basis

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emphasized giving different priorities to the center and the periphery, and giving play to the role of the Borderland in defending the interior, generally adopting a defensive position in border expansion. The Central Plains dynasty also established exchanges with the Borderland barbarians through such practices as tribute, canonization, and trade development; in handling the mutual relations, it strived to achieve harmony while preserving difference and develop good-neighborly peace. Before the middle of the Qing dynasty, the above-mentioned governance policies were generally successful. When the western powers invaded China in the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty failed to adapt to the major changes of the times, and held fast to the old system, leading to its defeat in wars with Western powers.

6.2. Greater Flexibility in Forms of State Structure The form of state structure is a concept of modern politics, mainly referring to the relationship between the central and local governments. Commonly, there are two forms of state structures, namely the unitary and federal system. Due to the conditions of the times and other reasons, the state structure of the Central Plains dynasty was roughly somewhere between the unitary system and federal system. Meanwhile, it emphasized practicality, tolerated pluralism, and changed with time. The unitary factor mainly referred to the high degree of centralization of the central government, and the effective control of the entire country, including most of the periphery; while the federal factors allowed the legitimacy of the existence of certain Borderland local regimes under the premise of recognizing the authority of the central government. In fact, those regimes could also retain their own ruling systems, including laws. Most of the rulers of the China’s imperial history were keenly aware of the diverse political situation in the border areas and the complexity of the border politics. It gradually became the consensus of most rulers that the border policy could neither be the same as that of the interior, nor could it be rigid or monotonous. In the Western Han dynasty, when Wang Mang wanted to track down the Huns, his general Yan You said that the Huns had been a pest for a long time, and none of the preceding dynasties had effective countermeasures. The Zhou, Qin, and Han



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dynasties had all launched punitive measures. Although their countermeasures were different, none could be called ideal. “Roughly, the Zhou and Han dynasty had acted according to the second best and an ill-advised strategy respectively, while the Qin had had no strategy at all” (Ban, 1962, 3824). So he suggested against chasing the Huns. “Practical strategies being ideal, and feasible ones being applicable” became the common view of the China’s imperial history. The formation of this concept not only reflected the process of arduous exploration in governing borders in the China’s imperial history, but also showed that the rulers had realized to varying degrees that although “there is no inevitable rule, there is no guaranteed victory” (Liu et al., 1975, 3805). Instead, the basic principle of “contingencies adapted to conditions and with reference to the customs” should be embraced.45 On the other hand, the rulers of the Central Plains dynasty also realized that concepts and governance policies unable to timely keep up with the situation must be adjusted, to adapt to the changing circumstance. Correctly handling the relationship between the central and local governments is the core of border governance. Regarding the form of state structure, the China’s imperial history mostly allowed relatively greater flexibility, with the emphasis on practicability effectiveness. Therefore, the state structure of the Central Plains Dynasty showed diversification and formed several mature types at the same time. Take the Han and Tang dynasties, which are more successful in governing the country, for example. The state structure of the Han dynasty mainly included counties or states established according to a standardized system in the hinterland, and counties or states in the border areas specifically called “border counties” or “dependent states.” With barbarians as the subjects of rule, border counties and dependent states emphasized the strengthening of military control. The Han dynasty appointed a Defender of 45 Fan Ye, Book of Later Han, Vol. 87, “Biography of Xiqiang”, Commanding General Liang Shang said to Lai Ji and his company that “southern and eastern barbaric areas serve the emperor by accepting his constraints, while northern and western barbaric areas serve the emperor by paying tribute irregularly, indicating that the barbarians can be volatile and inconstant. So there is no constant approach to govern them; contingencies should be formulated in view of their customs”, 2895.

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the Dependent State for “managing the surrendered barbarians.” In some areas, a Commandant of Cavalry or Commandant who patrolled all over the place was appointed (Fan, 1965, 3621). Meanwhile, the border counties and dependent states were often exempted of taxes or required to pay fewer taxes in accordance with their old customs. In the Western Han dynasty, border counties established from the west of Panyu to the Shunan “were exempted of taxes by the old custom” (Sima, 1959, 1440). The border counties and the dependent states were actually quasi-county areas with looser restrictions and relatively more flexible governance policies. The third type of state structure can be exemplified with Nanyue State, which was established at the end of the Qin dynasty by Zhao Tuo, the garrison officer. In 196 BC, the Han emperor Liu Bang sent an envoy to instate Zhao Tuo as the King of Nanyue, and awarded him with the seal of the king, as a token of recognizing its status as a local regime, but under the condition of submitting to the Han dynasty and obeying it covenant with the Han dynasty. Liu Bang also issued an edict to Zhao Tuo, requesting him “to harmonize with local barbarian tribes, so as to prevent them from invading the south” (Sima, 1959, 2697, 2967). Nanyue was authorized to appoint officials, establish subordinate counties, and make laws. In the fourth year of Yuanding (113 years ago), Zhao Xing the young king of Nanyue submitted an imperial memorial, requesting to “surrender his entire state to the Han dynasty” and expressing the hope of switching to the laws of the Han Dynasty and changing the old customs. His request was strongly opposed by Prime Minister Lü Jia, on the ground that it was contrary to the agreement between Zhao Tuo and Emperor Gaozu of Han. Lü Jia sent troops and killed Zhao Xing and his envoys to the Han dynasty, plunging Nanyue into chaos (Ban, 1962, 2821; Sima, 1956, 664). The Huns and the Han dynasty were originally enemies. In the first year of Wufeng (57 BC), the Huns were divided into two factions, and the eastern faction was recognized as a local regime after submitting to the Han dynasty, under the leadership of the Khan Huhaanyeke. Later, the eastern section became the fence of the Han dynasty in the northern Borderland (Ban, 1962, 3798, 3808). The Tang dynasty witnessed a mostly similar scenario. It set up prefectures and counties in the hinterland for standardized



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management, and implemented the jimi prefecture system in the border areas inhabited by barbarians. Its characteristic was that the prefectures and counties were established according to the distribution of the barbaric tribes in the Tang dynasty. Those with larger areas were made Area Commands, under the charge of a Commander in Chief or governor, and all official positions were hereditary. Normally, the local tributes, taxes and household registrar of jimi prefectures were not sent to the Ministry of Revenue (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1119). Since the central government generally did not impose taxes on them (Liu et al., 1975, 2939), the huge expenditures for managing those areas were borne by the national treasury, except for a small sum provided by land reclamation in the northern Borderlands. This suggests that the state structure was roughly the same as that of the Han dynasty. Nanzhao, a local regime based in Yunnan in the Tang dynasty, was similar to the Nanyue State of the Han dynasty in some periods. In its early days, Nanzhao was a local power under the rule of the Tang dynasty. Many of its leaders served as the governor of a jimi prefecture, and helped the imperial court to unify the Erhai area and resist the invasion of Tubo forces to the south. During the Tianbao Reign, it broke with the Tang Dynasty. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), it restored friendly relations with the Tang dynasty, and its leader Yi Mouxun was canonized as the King of Nanzhao, marking the official recognition of its status as a local regime. At the canonization ceremony, Yi Mouxun said that he wished his descendants “could be courtiers for the Tang dynasty forever”, pledging to serve as the “southwestern fence” of the Tang Dynasty. His promise was exactly the same as the agreement between the Han dynasty and the Nanyue State. Even after the canonization, Nanzhao still had the de facto control over Yunnan. The canonization and public recognition transformed from a local force into a local regime, indicating that the Tang dynasty had considerable flexibility in border policy in terms of the state structure. The relations between Tubo and the Tang dynasty changed time and again. During the reign of Songtsen Gambo, Tubo established an maternal uncle-nephew relationship with the Tang dynasty and became a recognized Borderland regime, like the Eastern Huns did in the Han dynasty.

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In other Central Plains dynasties, the state structure also featured pluralism and changes with time. Generally speaking, their state structure in the Borderland was complex and diverse. In some cases, it was not even seen in the China’s imperial history, while random disposal and flexible management were also common. On the other hand, if the state structure proved ill-adapted to the changing reality, the feudal dynasty would change it in time so as to seek effective governance and border stability. For example, in some border areas where the conditions permitted or where leadership was rendered ineffectual by recalcitrant subordinates, the Ming and Qing dynasties, especially the Qing dynasty, successively abandoned many chieftains and replaced them with nonlocal officials under the direct jurisdiction of the imperial court. The Qing dynasty summarized the experience of previous generations, and promoted the maturity of the state structure for border governance in adapting to local conditions. For example, it implemented the chieftain system and replaced local officials with non-local ones in the south, promoting the allied banner system on the basis of the Wanhu system (the brigade system) in the north and implemented the system of resident ministers in Xizang and Gaxag system on the Qinghai- Xizang Plateau.

6.3. Set Up Borderland Administrative Areas to Facilitate Management With in-depth understanding of the particularities of the Borderland and the Borderland barbarians, the rulers of the Central Plains dynasty made painstaking efforts to study the establishment and management of the Borderland administrative areas, and gradually deepened their understanding. China has a vast territory and complex geographical and climatic environment. The rulers of the China’s imperial history were aware of the connection between geographical factors and political activities, and mostly good at detecting and handling the problems of geopolitical relations; in the border areas, this characteristic was first manifested in the establishment and management of administrative areas, which were divided by successive dynasties for the governance. The form and the division of administrative areas not only reflected the complex



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relationship between the central and local governments and that between various regions, but also contained the potential intentions of rulers for governing the border areas and handling barbarians. Their division in the China’s imperial history emphasized their relationship with natural areas and economic zones, which were also an important basis due to their dependence on the socio-economic development and the needs of economic and cultural exchanges. Generally speaking, the division of administrative regions in the China’s imperial history overlapped with the boundaries of natural and economic regions in the Qin and Han dynasties, diverged after the Wei and Jin dynasties, partially overlapped in the Sui and Tang dynasties, diverged against in the Song and Yuan dynasties, and tended to conform again in the Ming and Qing dynasties (Zou, 2006, 97). Furthermore, in setting up and dividing administrative areas in border areas, the China’s imperial history not only considered the relationship of administrative areas to natural regions and economic regions. It also reflected their insights and intentions in governing the Borderland and handling the barbarians. Take the southwest region as an example. In managing the southwestern Borderland, the Han dynasty regarded the area beyond the southwest of Shu County as alien land and collectively called the two provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou and the southwestern Sichuan “Southwest Yi.” Emperor Wu set up seven Borderland County there, all under the jurisdiction of the Yizhou Provincial Bureau (today Chengdu) established later on (Fan, 1965, 3516). Trusting the land of the southwestern barbarians with the hinterland province of Sichuan remained unchanged since the Han dynasty. In the 21st year of Kaiyuan (733 years), the Tang dynasty divided the entire country into 15 Roads, and most of the counties and counties in the two provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou and southwestern Sichuan were placed under the jurisdiction of Jiannan Road (government seat in present-day Chengdu) (Liu et al., 1975, 1385, 1663). The Yuan dynasty regarded Yunnan as the forefront for managing the Indo-China Peninsula, and the Yunnan Province was established, with Zhongqing (Kunming today) as the government seat, and the status of Yunnan suddenly became important. The Yuan dynasty also opened up the post road from Kunming to the capital through Guiyang and Yuanling, obviously strengthening

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the connection between Yunnan and the Central Plains. From then on, Yunnan was separated from the administrative jurisdiction of Sichuan and became directly managed by the central government. In order to protect the traffic line from Kunming to the Central Plains through Guiyang and give full play to the important role of Yunnan Province, the Ming dynasty established Guizhou Province in underdeveloped areas along the route, and established a new pattern of administrative region in the southwestern region. In the Han dynasty, prefectures and counties in the border areas were basically established according to the distribution of the surrendered barbarians, with most of the administrative offices located at the area of their core forces. Zangke Prefecture was established by the Western Han dynasty in Southwestern Yi, with a scope roughly covering the area of surrendered Yelang Barbarians and the administrative seat at Guqielan, where its king was based. Yongchang County was established in the Eastern Han dynasty, and its area was roughly the same as the sphere of influence belonging to Ailao Barbarians, and Buwei the administrative seat was also a key area for their activities. On the other hand, when the Han dynasties set up prefectures and counties in the Southwestern Yi, they also considered using the surrendered barbarians to control other local forces. In the second year of Yuanfeng (109 years ago), the King of Yunnan, who had been based in the vicinities of the Dianchi Lake, surrendered to the Western Han dynasty. Yizhou Prefecture was established under his jurisdiction in the Western Han dynasty. The two counties of Zangke and Yuexuan were divided into counties (Fan, 1965, 2846). The King of Yunnan had treated the Han envoys well before surrendering to the Han Dynasty, so he won the favored of Emperor Wu, who gave him a golden seal and restored his rule of his people. At the onset of its establishment, Yizhou County governed the Dianchi Basin and parts of the areas to its east and north controlled by the King of Yunnan, much the same as the case with other Borderland counties in the Southwestern Yi. However, according to Chapter 8 (Part 1) in the section Geography Records in the Book of Han, Yizhou Prefecture covered almost half of the present Yunnan Province and consisted of 24 counties in total, with about half of them located in the vast area to the south and west of the Dianchi Lake Basin (Ban, 1962,



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1601). A more reasonable explanation is that after establishing Yizhou Prefecture in the Yuanfeng period, the Western Han dynasty continued to dispatch troops to suppress Xi and Kunming tribes that had repeatedly intercepted Han envoys. After the final pacification, the area of their activities was placed under the jurisdiction of Yizhou Prefecture, rapidly expanding its scope.46 The record in the Book of Han reflects the situation after the Western Han dynasty pacified Xi and Kunming and re-adjusted the administrative regions. Segmentation for better control of the Borderland barbarians was also an important motivation for some Central Plains dynasties to plan administrative regions in the border areas. Generally speaking, the strategy was not apparent in the deployment and division of the administrative regions established in the border areas before the Yuan and Ming dynasties. The main reason was that those China’s imperial history had abided by the ancient motto of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the periphery”, and lacked enthusiasm in managing the border areas. As a result, governance activities were not yet in-depth. The Yuan dynasty divided its people into four classes, including Mongolians, the Semu people, the Han people (in the north), and Southerners, with the last two classes as the focus of oppression. As for the barbarians in the border areas, they were regarded by the rulers as an effective force to assist in the rule; the native official system implemented in the southern border therefore reflected the trust in and bold appointment of native officials. For example, after overthrowing the Dali State the Mongolian army set up 19 army division sub-prefectures in its old place. The Lufu Prefecture, under the jurisdiction of the Yunnan Province, was basically transformed from the 19 sub-prefectures. The Province of Yunnan had a wide area of jurisdiction, including such powerful barbarians as Luoluo (present-day Yi ethnic group) and Miao (present-day Miao ethnic group). For the above reasons, the Mongolian rulers attached great importance to the management of the Yunnan, and seemingly never

46 Fan Ye, Book of Later Han, Vol. 86, “Biography of Southwestern Barbarians”, 2846: in the 2nd year of Yuanfeng, the Western Han dynasty established Yizhou Prefecture in the former land of Yudian State, “a few years later, the land of Kunming was annexed to the prefecture.”

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considered splitting the barbarians for control by the imperial court. After the Yuan dynasty, the Luoluo and Miao people in the border areas gradually became active, and launched many rebellions against feudal rule. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the areas of the powerful barbarians were mostly divided into different administrative regions. For example, the land of Luoluo were split among the four provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi, while that of the Miao were split among the provinces of Yunnan, Hunan, Guizhou, Guangxi and Hubei. Important barbarian colonies were further subdivided among different prefectures and counties in their respective provinces. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, there were many reasons for the changes in the border administrative regions, but splitting the barbarian land up for better governance was undoubtedly one of the original intentions of the rulers. Actually, it was also an important feature of their adjustment during this period. There are sufficient records in relevant historical archives. For example, in the fifth year of the Yongzheng reign (1727) in the Qing dynasty, the Ministry of Appointments relayed the memorials of Yue Zhongqi, governor of Sichuan and Shaanxi, to the emperor. Yue stated in his memorial that Zhenxiong connected the two provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou, but its prefect Longqinghou, a native official, was ignorant and incompetent. So he recommended that the opinions of Eertai, Governor of Yungui, be consulted, to decide upon its jurisdiction and replacement of native officials with non-local ones. Emperor Yongzheng issued an edict, ordering the replacement of native officials with non-local ones in Zhenxiong and put it under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Province.47 Today, Liangshan, the vicin­ ities of Liangshan in Sichuan is the area with the most concentrated Luoluo population, with ramifications distributed in an area hundreds of miles around. The Luoluo uprisings and rebellions are often seen in records of the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Ming dynasty established Guizhou Province, and put the section of Luoluo to the east of Liangshan under its jurisdiction. In the sixth year of Yongzheng (1728), the Qing Dynasty changed Jianchangwei under Yunnan Province to Ningyuan Prefecture (government seat in now Xichang, Sichuan), and put it 47 Veritable Records of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 55.



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under the jurisdiction of Sichuan Province and added Huili Prefecture to its jurisdiction. In the first year of Xuantong (1909), Yanbian subprefecture was established under Ningyuan Prefecture. The presentday Liangshan and the vicinity areas with Ningyuan Prefecture as the center were placed under the jurisdiction of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou (Zhao et al., 1977, 2221).

6.4. Implementing a Governance Policy That Is Different from that for the Hinterland Formulating governance strategies and methods adapted to the Borderland circumstances was an important feature of the Central Plains dynasty in ruling the border areas. The governance policy for Borderland barbarians in the China’s imperial history can be generally referred to as “jimi governance.” The term “jimi” meant that the imperial court could control the barbarians effectively while granting them certain freedom, just like one would do the horses and cattle by controlling the “ji” (halter) and the “mi” (nose rope) respectively.48 The jimi governance underwent several develop­ ment stages, including the jimi governance policy, the system of native officials, the system of chieftains, and the replacement of native officials with non-local ones. Its main forms in the early period were the jimi method in the pre-Qin period, the system of border prefectures in the Han dynasty, and the jimi prefecture and sub-prefectures in the Tang dynasty; in the middle stage, it was represented by jimi prefectures and counties in the Song dynasty and the native official system in the Yuan dynasty; in the Ming and Qing dynasties, it featured the Tusi system and the replacement of native officials with non-local ones in the south. Before the Song and Yuan dynasties, it was characterized by the lack of restraint on border barbarians, arbitrary management and imperfect institutional regulations, and a generalized governance framework and content throughout the country. The Yuan dynasty implemented the native official system in the southern border, and the military division system in the northern Borderland, ushering in border governance in 48 Wei Hong, Official Decorum of the Han Dynasty.

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accordance with local conditions. In the Ming dynasty, the Tusi system realized standardization of border governance, clarifying the duties of the Tusi while strengthening the restraint. The Qing dynasty continued to implement the Tusi system in some areas and expanded the scope of direct rule through the reform of “replacing native officials with non-local ones.” The jimi rule was an important creation of the feudal dynasty in border governance. The feudal dynasty established a politically unified relationship with the border barbarians through a looser and flexible form of governance, and continuously strengthened mutual relationship through contact and communication, benefiting the consolidation and development of a unified multi-ethnic country. In terms of specific strategies, the Central Plains dynasty also summed up a lot of experience. The rulers of Qin and Han dynasties proposed that strategies should be emphasized in border governance. In the Eastern Han dynasty, Yu Xu, Chief of the Secretariat believed that the response to barbarians must be rational and restrained, “receiving them with grace if they come to pledge allegiance and leaving them alone if they flee in defection.” Di Renjie, a courtier of the Tang dynasty, said that “punishing barbarians when they rebel, and placating them when they surrender” had been the tradition of ruling the border area and was the praiseworthy law now. In the Northern Wei dynasty, Gao Lü said that moralization and military conquest were indispensable in state governance, believing that “If the people from afar refuse to submit, improve our culture and virtue to attract them; if they are ruthless and cunning, launch military action to conquer them.” The Song people analyzed the dialectical relationship between grace and coercion, proposing that “where military coercion fails, grace won’t placate.” In the Yuan dynasty, courtier Chen Tianxiang further pointed out that only by “combining grace with coercion” could border governance be successful, adding that “grace should be extended to the submitting, and military coercion to those resisting”(Fan, 1965, 2833; Di, 1983, 1725; Gao, 1997, 478; Song et al., 1976, 3950; Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10836). In the Ming dynasty, Emperor Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang had a unique insight into the relationship between mercy and rigor. Shortly after the Ming army set off to Yunnan in the 15th year of Hongwu (1382), he issued an edict, saying that “I found that the barbarians of Yunnan have been



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fickle since ancient times, rebelling and pledging allegiance now and then. The reason is that their land is dangerous and remote, and their people rich and ruthless. So the way to rule them must strike a balance between leniency and rigor.” He recalled the cases of barbaric rebellion in Yunnan in the China’s imperial history, and proposed the current strategy, so as to “prevent the barbarians from revolting, not just suppressing their rebellion.”49 Rulers of the China’s imperial history generally praised the strategy of “using barbarians to subdue barbarians.” In the Tang dynasty, Lu Fu, an advisory said that “letting the barbarians fight it out among themselves should be a long-term strategy for the Middle Kingdom.” Before the Yuan dynasty, the strategy was exercised mainly by provoking the struggle among the barbarians. However, the side with its support might turn against it, with the decline of its opponents. So the strategy was more often ineffective. The Yuan dynasty practiced the native official system, and duke and other nominal titles conferred by the previous generations on the barbarians were formally upgraded to official titles at all levels, enabling native officials to occupy a favorable position in the internal struggle. In addition, the imperial court promised to let native officials have their land and rule their people forever, in order to induce barbarians to serve the Central Plains dynasty with loyalty, further achieve mutual restraint among the barbarians and facilitate the rule of the Central Plains dynasty. The China’s imperial history attached great importance to the management of officials in the border areas. Lu Fu of the Tang dynasty proposed that “governance of a vast land hinges on one virtuous official, so full discretion must be exercised in choosing border governors” (Liu et al., 1975, 5171). Prior to the An-Shi Rebellion, the Tang dynasty attached great importance to selection of Borderland officers, who personally served their tenure exclusively. Those with outstanding achievements often became prime minister. This system brought about peace and stability to the border areas. When Emperor Xuanzong changed the appointment rules, many Borderland commanders held

49 Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 142.

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their posts for more than one decade (Sima, 1956, 6888). After he appointed An Lushan to important posts, the management of officials in the Borderland quickly collapsed, and barbarian forces rose in rebellion one after another, plunging the Borderlands into turmoil and splitting the country. Due to the restriction of multiple factors, it was often difficult to choose a suitable official to govern the Borderlands. The difficulty was such that Sun He, a courtier of the Song dynasty, lamented that “selecting the ideal general is the most difficult in governing the barbarians” (Sun, 1999, 1431). Political measures ceased with the ousting of officials and improper appointment had been partially to blame for the failure of some dynasties in border governance. Giving full play to the influence of Chinese civilization was also a strategy that generally emphasized by the China’s imperial history in border governance. The key for the Borderlands of ancient China to be relatively stable and gradually consolidated is that the dynasties had properly handled the relationship between the center and the periphery, and fully used the radiation effect of the Chinese civilization to gradually form a Han Chinese cultural circle in the surrounding areas, while gradually making possible qualitative changes in control over the border areas by building on the influences. The ancients might not have summarized the experience systematically, but formed a longstanding tradition because of the effectiveness of the strategy The tributary system and the canonization system promoted by the Central Plains dynasty, the practice of generous reward for fewer demands, and reciprocation in courtesy are all conducive to the spread of Chinese civilization to the Borderlands and alien states. The China’s imperial history also attached great importance to the education of Borderland barbarians, regarding it as an indispensable part of the strategy for border governance. Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty proposed “extending imperial benevolence to the barbarians,” believing that it could bridge the cultural gap between the Borderland and the hinterland through subtle edification. “This way, the Borderland barbarians will be like a family” (Sima, 1956, 6216). In promoting edification in border areas, development of Confucianism education had been most remarkable in achievements. Zhu Yuanzhang proposed that Confucianism should be extensively established in the border areas, and the children



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of native officials enrolled, so that they could be acquainted with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and prevented from participating in struggles against the rites. “That is the way to achieve peace in the Borderland.”50 The development of Confucian education and pro­ motion of changes in customs gradually brought the Borderland and hinterland cultures closer and prompted their integration, which was beneficial to the formation and development of a unified multi-ethnic country. Some Central Plains dynasties also organized a business activity called “interchange trade” in the border areas. Interchange trade in border areas mainly came into two forms: one was non-governmental trade launched in multi-ethnic areas with the permission of the government, and the other was transactions organized by the government and between the government and the border residents in designated places. Participants in the large-scale interchange trade include the barbarians and Han Chinese from the Borderlands, as well as traveling businessmen from neighboring countries and merchants from the hinterland. The interchange trade established with Nanyue Kingdom in the early Western Han dynasty gradually developed into a system. The scale of interchange trade continued to expand in the Eastern Han dynasty, and the trade partners included Wuhuan, Northern Xiongnu, and Xianbei. The Sui and Tang dynasties mainly traded with the barbarians in the northwest. In the Kaiyuan Reign, the Tang dynasty drafted regulations for interchange trade, making it possible for Goryeo, Uighurs, and Heishui to trade their native products with the Middle Kingdom (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4558). In the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties, the tea-horse trade with the Borderland barbarians all reached a relatively large scale. The interchange trade was mainly intended for the Borderland barbarians, for the purpose of restraining and controlling them through commerce and trade. The chapter “Food and Trade (4)” in History of Ming said that “(The emperor) made arrangements for border defense, through trade of horses with tea, to stabilize the hearts of the barbarians, and strengthen the Middle Kingdom.” On the other hand, the interchange trade served as an economic leverage, 50 Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 377.

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increasing the revenue of the Central Plains dynasty, expanding economic exchanges between the hinterland and the border areas, and promoting the economic development of the border areas. In addition to the above measures, the Central Plains dynasty had also adopted hostage-taking, peace-keeping marriage, oath for alliance, and other strategies to handle Borderland barbarians. Hostage-taking means that the feudal dynasty requested hostages from the vassal states or Borderland barbarians that had established suzerain-vassal relations with it. Peace-keeping marriages of the Central Plains dynasty were political marriages for the purpose of fettering the Borderland barbarians or forming an alliance with them. Oath for alliance was commonly used when the Central Plains dynasty formed an alliance or agreement with the Borderland barbarians. The common feature of the above strategies was complying with the customs of the barbarians as appropriate, and striving for methods acceptable to them, in order to achieve the purpose of restraining or intimating the barbarians.

6.5. Emphasize the Borderland Development and the Acquisition of Borderland Resources Similar to the gradual formation of historical territory and the continuous increase in government efforts, the China’s imperial history had also experienced a gradual process in developing the Borderlands and acquiring Borderland resources. Affected by the situation of the Borderlands in different periods and priority for border governance, the China’s imperial history also had distinct characteristics in prioritized area for governance, development of various economic sectors and resources acquired in different periods, but all with a detectable path of development and evolution. Their development of border areas and the acquisition of Borderland resources can be roughly divided into two stages, with the Yuan dynasty as the demarcation line. In the previous period, the territory of the Central Plains dynasty was still frequently changing and initially taking shape. Its control over the border areas needed enhancement, and there was not the tradition of utilizing border resources for state benefits. Meanwhile, it was exposed the considerable pressure of northern nomads invading south,



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which showed a tendency to prioritize the north over the south. The border management during this period was dominated by the concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the periphery” and the notion of the cost unworthy. In the Borderland areas, the emphasis was on defense, and there was little interest in development. The climax of comprehensive management of the Borderland and emphasis on exploring border resources had not yet arrived. The operation of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties for more than 500 years has promoted and developed national unification. The territory of the Central Plains dynasty was officially took shape during this period and remained basically stable. In managing the Borderlands, the rulers of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties had little concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the periphery.” Instead, they showed a strong sense of responsibility for the unifying the country and developing of the Borderland. Emperor Yongzheng disapproved of the previous denunciation of those who had not been assimilated as barbarians, believing that since the Qing dynasty had unified the Middle Kingdom, “Why are barbarians differentiated from the Han Chinese, and the Middle Kingdom from alien countries”(China City Press, 1999, 5)? Emperor Qianlong also said that “resorting to arms to open up the Borderland is below me; however, I dare not lose even one inch of all the ancestral territories.”51 In the Yuan dynasty, border governance was different from the previous generations in both concept and practice. The Mongol rulers had quite a strong ambition to dominate the world, establishing the Yuan dynasty and the Four Great Khans while launching many expeditions to Central Asia and Europe. In their view, the Borderlands of the previous generations were just the Borderlands for them to deploy military forces. Therefore, measures such as extensive establishment of official offices, military and civilian land-reclamation for farming, addition of post roads, population surveys, taxation, and development of mineral deposits were implemented in the border areas, effectively promoting their development. For example, the chapter Geography I in the History of Yuan says that “The border areas to the north of the Five 51 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 377.

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Ridges, Liaoyang, and those in Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Hunan and Guangdong, were formally jimi prefectures in the Tan dynasty. Now taxes and labor duties are imposed on them, just like the hinterland.” On the other hand, the Yuan dynasty established its capital in Xanadu, its origin in the northern grasslands (now Zhenglan Banner, Inner Mongolia), and in Dayidu (now Beijing). Kublai Khan, the ancestor of the Yuan dynasty, once led his army to pacify Dali State, so he had a better understanding of the importance of Yunnan and other southern Borderlands. Therefore, the Yuan dynasty changed the tradition of valuing the North over the South, and extended the native official system and other successful experience of Yunnan Province in governing the border to Huguang and other provinces, further deepening its rule over the border areas, especially the southwestern Borderland. The Ming dynasty was under heavy pressure from the Wala Mongol tribes in the north, but it implemented the guard station system and stationed a large number of troops in the border areas, giving rise to a large-scale military emigration to the border areas. It also inherited the Yuan dynasty’s practice of collecting taxes and exploiting mineral deposits in the border areas, enabling the rapid development of their agriculture, mining and metallurgy. In the early Qing dynasty, the environment of the times and the measures for border governance were similar to those of the Yuan dynasty, except that the Qing dynasty had to bear the pressure of rapid population expansion. In the 15th year of Daoguang (1835), the population of the Qing dynasty exceeded 400 million, making the living space over crowded in the interior, and a large number of refugees moved to the border areas and other areas with less population. Although the Qing government repeatedly issued orders to ban migration, it actually tacitly allowed the people to go to the Borderlands to reclaim the land for farming, “so as to feed themselves temporarily.”52 The government of Yunnan and other border provinces formulated measures to encourage immigrants to reclaim wasteland for farming, attracting migrant populations to those remote areas and mountainous areas53. The Ming and Qing dynasties also 5 2 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 1441. 53 [Guangxu Reign] General Annals of Yunnan, Vol. 39, “Land Tax: Examples”, cited in the imperial memorial of Gao Qizhuo in the 10th year of Yongzheng; Zhao



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attached importance to developing education and changing customs in the border areas, and promoted the change of local social trends. This suggests that the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties were the climax of active Borderland development by the Central Plains dynasty, occupying an important position in the history of border development. In managing the border areas, the Central Plains dynasty had different characteristics in the early and late stages in the focus of development and the types of resources exploited. From the Qin and Han dynasties to the Tang dynasty, the Middle Kingdom emphasized the development of transportation in the border areas, and actively tried to acquire border produces, such as ivory, rhino horn, tortoiseshell, coral, gems, pearls, fragrant medicine, medicinal materials and tropical fruits. During this period, the development Borderland transportation was mainly for the purpose of communicating neighboring countries, using the geographical advantages of the border land, and collecting foreign information and distant rarities. Therefore, the focus was the international passage to the neighboring countries. The rules had actively tried to acquire border and foreign treasures, because those treasures not only symbolized the spread of their dynasty’s power and virtue, but also satisfied their needs for an extravagant lifestyle. Ban Gu of the Western Han dynasty said that Since the Western Han dynasty opened up the Borderlands, pearls, tortoiseshells, rhinoceros, emerald feathers and other rarities filled the imperial harem, and Pushao, Longwen, Yumu, Hanma and other fine horses teemed in the palace city. “Exotic rarities are sent to the imperial court from all corners” (Ban, 1962, 3928). When Emperor Xuan learned that there were golden horses and green chickens in Qinglao County (now Dayao, Yunnan), he sent a special envoy to search for them, but his hopes were dashed as the envoy died of illness on the way (Li, 1984, 1149). In the Sui dynasty, the local production of the prefectures and counties were also levied (Wei et al., 1973, 674). In the middle and late Tang dynasty, jimi prefectures were ordered to pay the annual tributes of medicinal materials, native products, rare animals, and exotic plants Erxun et al, Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 292, “Biography of Gao Qizhuo”, 10302.

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(Wang, 1955, 1796). The Tang court also allowed hinterland merchants to go to regions beyond the five ridges to buy medicinal materials and pearls and transport them back for sale.54 In order to meet the needs of Borderland economic development, the rulers had emphasized the construction of local transportation in the border areas since the Yuan dynasty. In the Yuan dynasty, the traffic was very developed in all border areas; in particular, post stations were extensively established on important roads, which greatly facilitated the communication for the officials and the people. The Ming and Qing dynasties emphasized the development of transportation in border areas. With greater social and economic progress, the Yuan dynasty imposed substantial taxes on the Borderlands, for example, autumn taxes and summer taxes in Yunnan Province, and allowed tax payment with grain or gold and silver. Though an extra economic burden, the collection of taxes objectively stimulated the economic development of the border areas and prompted the consciousness of Borderland barbarians for commodity economy. In addition to the transportation industry, the border areas also witnessed marked development in agriculture, mining and metallurgy during the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. Those quickly grew into developed economic sectors in the Borderland. During the Hongwu years of the Ming dynasty, the military and civilian land reclamation exceeded one million mu in Yunnan,55 contributing to a huge sum of agricultural taxes to the imperial court. In the Qing dynasty, the agricultural production in the southwestern Borderland provinces gradually narrowed its gap from Sichuan and other traditional agricultural provinces. In the 13th year of Qianlong (1748), the Qing government determined the annual grain storage in stabilization warehouses in various provinces, with 1 million, 700,000, 500,000 and 200,000 dan for Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi respectively. In the 31st year, when the provinces reported the quantity of grains in storage, the number for Sichuan and Guangxi increased to 1.85 million and 1.83 million dan 54 Liu Xu et al., Old Book of Tang. Vol. 19, “Record of Emperor Yizong”, 654; [Tang Dynasty] Liu Xun, Exotics of Lingnan Recorded. 55 History of Ming, Vol. 126, “Biography of Mu Ying”, 3759.



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respectively, while that for Yunnan and Guizhou also increased (Zhao et al., 1977, 3558). In the Ming and Qing dynasties, Yunnan exploited a large amount of non-ferrous metals such as copper, silver and gold. Due to the excessive demands of the rulers, in the 34th year of Wanli in the Ming dynasty (1606), Chen Yongbin the Governor of Yunnan said that the heaviest levy throughout the country “was none other than the gold from Yunnan.”56 During the Qing dynasty, Yunnan mined such a large quantity of copper, silver, iron, and lead deposits that the people back then said that “copper and salt are of the utmost importance in governing Yunnan.” During the Qianlong period, its annual output of copper ranged from 6 to 7 million or to 8 and 9 million catties, with a maximum of 12 to 13 million catties. All the raw copper needed for casting coins by the Baoquan Bureau and Baoyuan Bureau of the imperial court and the nine provinces including Jiangnan was shipped from Yunnan (Tan, 1990, 41; Zhao et al., 1977, 3666). At that time, there was the saying of “Yunnan is unrivaled in copper in all China.” Gold, copper, iron, lead, mercury and other mineral deposits in Guangxi and Guizhou had also been exploited in large quantities. The Ming and Qing dynasties also harvested precious logs from the southwestern Borderland. In the Ming dynasty alone, the southwestern Borderland was intensively harvested for more than 90 years. The economic development and resource utilization of the southwestern Borderland in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties could be justifiably deemed a microcosm of the situation in the Borderlands of the Middle Kingdom. On the whole, the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties strengthened their management of the border areas and obtained considerable economic benefits, not only consolidating and stabilizing the border areas and supporting the economic construction of the hinterland areas, but also gradually integrating the border areas with the inland areas. In addressing the cost-effectiveness of Borderland management, they basically solved the long-standing contradiction of imbalance between operating costs and the benefits, and sometimes that of the costs far 56 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Wanli in the Reign of Emperor Shenzong, Vol. 424.

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exceeding the benefits. The success strengthened the feudal rulers’ confidence in managing the Borderland and greatly improved their enthusiasm to construct the border areas. The border governance of the Central Plains dynasty has very rich content, and the accumulated experience should be more than the above-mentioned. There are also many issues to be discussed in depth. For example, which issues had raised the deepest concern of the Central Plains dynasty and proven tricky to them? How were they handled? Which of the feudal rulers’ border governance concepts and practice were prejudiced or restricted by the exploitative system, and which ones reflected the internal laws of things and had universal significance? Studying the experience of the Central Plains dynasty in governing borders not only constitutes a valuable academic issue, but also has important practical significances.

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Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Du You.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Li Daliang.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Lu Zhi.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Northern Barbarians.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Wei Zheng.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Western Barbarians.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Zhang Jianzhi.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Geography (1).” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Geography (4).” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Loyalty and Righteousness: Biography of Wang Yifang.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Record of Emperor Yizong.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “The Tubo (1).” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated edition). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “The Turkut Peoples (1).” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Lü, Simian. 2008. Lü Simian on Chinese Politics. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. Marx, K., et al. 1972. Selected Works of Marx and Engels. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Official Compilation of the Qianlong Reign. 2000. “Study of the Four Remote Lands (1)” In Encyclopedia of Qing-Dynasty Literature (downsized version). Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Publishing House. Ouyang, Xiu et al. 1975. “Geography” (7: 2).” In New Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ouyang, Xiu et al. 1975. “Nanzhao, Southern Barbarians.” In New Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ouyang, Xiu et al. 1975. “Southern Barbarians: Nanzhao (commendation).” In New Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ouyang, Xiu et al. 1975. “Turks.” In New Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ouyang, Xiu et al. 1975. “Western Regions (1).” In New Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Peng, Jianying. 2004. The Evolution of Restraint Policies in Ancient China. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.

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Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Han (12).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Han (13).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Han (14).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Han (15).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Han (20).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Han (48).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Sui (5).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (8).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (9).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (11).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (13).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (14).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (22).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (32).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (60).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated edition). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Guang. 1956. “Records of Tang (69).” In History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima Qian. 1959. “Biography of Gongsun Hong.” In Records of the Grand Historian (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Qian. 1959. “Biography of Nanyue.” In Records of the Grand Historian (punctuated and collated edition). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Qian. 1959. “Biography of the Turkut Peoples.” In Records of the Grand Historian (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Qian. 1959. “Biography of the Xiongnu.” In Records of the Grand Historian (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sima, Qian. 1959. “Treatise on Price Regulation.” In Records of the Grand Historian (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.



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Sun, Qiao. 1983. “On the Borderland Management of General Tian.” In Complete Essays of Tang, edited by Dong Hao et al. (punctuated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Lian et al. 1976. “Biography of Chen Tianxiang.” In History of Yuan (punctuated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Lian et al. 1976. “Biography of Sayyid Shams Din ‘Umar’.” In History of Yuan (punctuated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Lian et al. 1976. “Emperor Shizu (14).” In History of Yuan (punctuated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Minqiu. 2008. “Edict on Building Borderland Fortresses.” In Collected Imperial Edicts of the Tang Dynasty (typesetting ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Minqiu. 2008. “Edict on Releasing Hostages to Their Native States.” In Collected Imperial Edicts of the Tang Dynasty (typesetting ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Minqiu. 2008. “Edict on Showing the Rites to Protectorate Envoys at the Imperial Academy.” In Collected Imperial Edicts of the Tang Dynasty (typesetting ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Song, Minqiu. 2008. “Decree on Suppressing and Soliciting Barbarians.” In Collected Imperial Edicts of the Tang Dynasty (typesetting ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Sun, He. 1994. “On the Benefits and Shortcomings of Military Actions.” In Encyclopedia of Imperial Memorials in China’s imperial history in China. Haerbin: Haerbin Education Publishing House. Sun, He. 1999. “Emperor Zhenzong on the Benefits and Shortcomings of Military Actions.” In Imperial Memorials of Courtiers in the Song Dynasty, edited by Zhao Ruyu (punctuated and collated ed.). Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House. Tan, Cui.1990. Annals of Yunnan (collated and annotated ed.). Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House. Tuotuo et al. 1977. “Emperor Taizhu (2).” In History of Song (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Tuotuo et al. 1977. “Emperor Taizong (2).” In History of Song (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Tuotuo et al. 1977. “Food and Money (2: 8).” In History of Song (punctuated and collated edition). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Tuotuo et al. 1977. “Alien States: State of Xia (1).” In History of Song (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Tuotuo et al. 1977. “Biography of Suzhe.” In History of Song (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Ermin. 2005. History of Political Thought in the Late Qing Dynasty. Guangxi: Guangxi Normal University Press. Wang, Fuzhi. 1975. “Emperor Wen.” In On Reading “History as a Mirror” (punctuated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

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Wang, Fuzhi. 1975. “Emperor Taizong.” In On Reading “History as a Mirror” (punctuated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Mingke. 2008. The Nomads’ Choice. Guangxi: Guangxi Normal University Press. Wang, Pu. 1955. “Miscellanies.” In Selected Regulations of the Tang Dynasty (typesetting ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wei, Shuo. 1974. “Biography of Yang Bo.” In Book of Wei (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wei, Yuan. 1984. “Bureaucratic Reform of Emperor Yongzheng in the Southwestern Barbarian Land.” In Record of the Great Emperors (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wei, Zheng et al. 1973. “Biography of the Eastern Barbarians.” In Book of Sui (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wei, Zheng et al. 1973. “Biography of the Northern Barbarians.” In Book of Sui (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wei, Zheng et al. 1973. “Biography of the Western Region.” In Book of Sui (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wei, Zheng et al. 1973. “Records on Food and Money.” In Book of Sui (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wu, Jing. 2003. “On Border Stabilization (36).” In Essentials of Governance in the Zhenguan Reign (annotated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Xie, Tiequn. 2005. Strategies of Past Central Government for Governing Tibet. Beijing: China Tibetology Press. Xie, Zhaozhe. 2009. “Geography (2)” In Miscellaneous Records in Five Categories (typesetting ed.). Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House. Xu, Ke. 1984.“War·Fu Nai Placating Miao.” In Manuscript of Qing Anecdotes. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Xu, Song. 1957. “Local (20–21): Fortresses.” In Selected Regulations of the Song Dynasty (abridged ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yu, Xiulie. 1983. “The Memorial to Protest Presenting Books to Tubo.” In Complete Essays of Tang (punctuated ed.), edited by Dong Hao et al. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al 1977. “Biography of Gaoqizhuo.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Biography of Erertai.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Food and Money (2).” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Food and Money (5).” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Food and Money (5): Tea Law.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Geography (16): Sichuan.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.



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Zhu, Zhen. 1937. “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom.” In Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, edited by Li Xinchuan. Beijing: Commercial Press. Zhuge, Liang. 2008. “Generals: Northern Barbarians.” In Complte Works of Zhuge Liang (collated and annotated ed.). Tianjin: TianjinAncient Books Publishing House. Zhuge, Liang. 2008. “Generals: Northern Barbarians.” In Complete Works of Zhuge Liang (collated and annotated ed.) Tianjin: Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House. Zou, Yilin, ed. 2006. Chinese History, Culture and Geography. Beijing: Science Press.

Chapter Three

Strategies of the Central Plains Dynasty for Managing the Southwestern Borderland

1.  Development of the Southwestern Borderland in the Qin and Han Dynasties Understanding of the importance of the southwest Borderland and development of the strategy for its management in China’s imperial history took a long period of time. Based on the ruler’s level of knowledge and focus of management, this process can be roughly divided into three stages, namely, from the Qin and Han dynasties to Sui Dynasty, the Tang and the Song dynasties, and the Yuan Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty. Among them, the Qin and Han dynasties and the subsequent Kingdom of Shu Han and Kingdom of Sun Wu had a very important position and profound influences in managing the southwestern Borderland in successive dynasties.

1.1  After reunifying the Middle Kingdom, Emperor Qin Shi Huang implemented a system of prefectures and counties throughout the country.

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Except for the area around the capital, which was directly managed by Chamberlain for the Capital, the rest of the country was divided into 36 prefectures, which grew to about 50 at the end of Qin Dynasty. For prefecture-level administrative regions, a Commandery Governor, a Commandery Defender and a Commandery Director were instated to take charge of civil affairs, military affairs, and supervision respectively. For counties under the prefectures, magistrates or chiefs were instated, complete with assistants and lieutenants. In the border areas, the Qin Dynasty set up the administrative region of “dao”, which had the same level as counties, as well as similar functions. In the imperial court, a Supervisor of Dependent Countries was appointed, to “handle the barbarians that have surrendered.” This suggests that the system of prefectures and counties in the Qin Dynasty was relatively complete, and adapted to the characteristics of the border areas. The Qin institution was inherited in the early Western Han Dynasty. However, in the 5th year of Yuanfeng (106 BC), 13 departments were added as supervisory agencies, each taking charge of several prefectures or vassal states. Meanwhile, a system of conferment was implemented for dependent states, which were powerful in the beginning, but gradually weakened later on. After Emperor Wu, dependent states were on a par with prefectures, without substantial difference. The 60-odd prefectures of the early Western Han Dynasty grew to 103 prefectures and dependencies at the end of the dynasty. There were several types of county-level administrative districts, including county, town, circuit, and fief state. In the early Eastern Han Dynasty, the system of the Western Han Dynasty was followed. At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, regions were added above the prefecture and vassal states, and the administrative division was changed from two levels to three. According to the Sequel to Book of Han: Records of Prefectures and Vassal States, there were 1180 counties, fief states, towns or circuits under the jurisdiction of 105 prefectures or states in 13 regions. The addition of regions was out of consideration for addressing the border situation. Back then, as the Xiongnu invaded southward and captured some areas in the northern Borderland, the imperial court merged Shuofang Province into Bingzhou Region. In order to strengthen the control of the southern Borderland, Jiaozhi was also changed to Jiaozhou Region.



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With the newly established Metropolitan Commandant, there were 13 tier-one administrative areas in the Eastern Han Dynasty, commonly known as “Thirteen Regions.” Another change in the administrative system of the Eastern Han Dynasty was to separate some border areas from the jurisdiction of the prefectures, and turn them into dependent states governed a newly established Chief Commandant, who took charge of both military and civil affairs. In the Western Han Dynasty, Chief Commandants were also appointed for dependent states in the border areas, but only as one of many special commandants, and mainly charged with governance of the Borderland barbarians. In the Eastern Han Dynasty, dependent states were elevated to the same administrative level as the prefecture, and accordingly Chief Commandants were on a par with the prefects in importance. There were six dependent states inthe Eastern Han Dynasty, including Qianwei, Guanghan, Shujun, Liaodong, Zhangye, and Zhangye Juyan. The Han Dynasty attached great importance to the management of Borderland regions with a considerable part of the prefectures established. According to historical records, the Western Han Dynasty established many border counties in the northeast, northern grassland, northwest, southwest and areas to the south of the five ridges. The Eastern Han Dynasty inherited the Borderland prefectures of the Western Han Dynasty, without changing its number much. The Borderland prefectures were managed in a very much different approach, as compared to their hinterland counterparts. Before the establishment of Yongchang Prefecture in Ailao, the Eastern Han Dynasty and the King of Ailao had developed an “annual tribute” relationship more than one decade. The border prefectures established in the Han Dynasty emphasized taking barbarians as the object of governance, and the rule obviously featured military dominance. According to the “Official Ranks (5)” in Book of Later Han: In the Western Han Dynasty, a Chief Commandant and a Defender were instated in the border prefectures, with the former responsible for managing “the barbarians that have surrendered” and the latter responsible for taking charge of military power. In the early Eastern Han Dynasty, the post of defender was removed and its duties was entrusted with the prefect, but for the border prefectures the posts of defender and

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chief commandant were kept. In Borderland areas with complex conditions, a Commandant of Cavalry or a Commandant was re-instated, to “defend and govern the prefecture, handle grievances, launch field investigations and learn about the problems.” According to “Biography of Xiqiang” in Book of Later Han, a barbarian Commandant of Calvary was instated in the western of Yizhou. In the present-day Songpan, Sichuan, a former colony of the Di and Qiang tribes, a Commandant of Calvary was established in the Western Han Dynasty. Aside from prefectures and counties, institutions specifically for managing the barbarians were established in the Borderland areas in the Han Dynasty, which also inherited the tradition of the Qin Dynasty to establish the prefecture-level “dependencies” and county-level “circuits” in the barbaric regions. According to the “Official Ranks (5)” in Book of Later Han, the Han Dynasty also established a Commandant of Fortifications in Borderland prefectures, “to guard against barbaric invasion.” Both the dependencies and circuits were mainly established to strengthen the management of the barbarians. The officials below the Commandant of the Dependent State were instated on the basis of tribal distribution, not the size of land, reflecting the characteristics of “governance according to the aboriginal customs.” The highest officer of the dependencies was the Commandant, assisted by a Zuoqi and Hou as military chiefs and other subordinate officials responsible for encouraging agriculture and managing water conservancy. In addition, the dependencies were given the privilege of not paying taxes. All those indicate that they were governed much in the same way as indicated by the jimirule (loose-rein rule). The Han Dynasty also instated officials in the imperial court specifically entrusted with barbaric affairs. According to the “List of Official Ranks” in Book of Han, “Chamberlain of Dependency, an official post instated in the Qin Dynasty, was charged with managing surrendering barbarians, with assistants.” During the reign of Emperor Wu, the official post was changed to Minister Herald. In addition, Dian Shuguo was also established “to manage the surrendering barbarians.” During the reign of Emperor Chengdi, it was integrated into the Ministry of Ceremony. In establishing Borderland prefectures, the Han Dynasty usually followed the principle of adapting measures to time and local conditions.



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There was no requirement for their size or jurisdiction; the established ruling institutions or prevailing laws and regulations can also be changed according to changes in circumstances, so as to effectively maintain the loose control over the Borderland tribes. According to the “Biography of Barbarians in Southwestern Borderland Regions” in Book of Later Han, Shenli Prefecture was merged into Shujun Prevecture in the fourth year of the Tianhan (BC 97), and a Commandant was instated in Maoniu and Qingyi respectively, to facilitate the management of its barbarians and Han Chinese. In the third year of Dijie (BC 67), the barbarians of Wenshan Prefecture complained to a Han envoy about high taxes after its establishment. Emperor Xuan issued an edict, ordering to have the prefecture integrated into Shujun Prefecture. The Borderland prefectures and counties established in the Han Dynasty emphasized the development of the local economy. According to “Official Ranks” in Book of Later Han, the Han Dynasty instated a Farming Commandant in border prefectures “to take charge of land reclamation and grain cultivation.” It can be seen from the relevant records that the focus of land reclamation in the Han Dynasty farmland was in the north, but the southern border prefectures were also responsible for organizing agriculture production. According to the Book of Later Han, when Wen Qi, a native of Guanghan, took office as the Prefect of Yizhou in the late Western Han Dynasty, he excavated ponds for irrigation and reclaimed more than 2,000 hectares of land, “drilled his troops, built fortresses, gathered the surrendered barbarians and achieved harmony with them.” In the Yuanhe years of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Wang Fu, the Prefect of Yizhou, “achieved outstanding governance”, and “gradually changed the local barbaric customs by establishing schools.” Later, he was transferred to the Prefect of Yongchang, and imposed light taxes and conscript labor, “bringing about peace among the barbarians.” Regarding the policies implemented by the Han Dynasty in the border prefectures, the Treatise on Price Regulation in Historical Records says that “after destroying Qiang and Nanyue with three years of war, the Han Dynasty established 17 prefectures from the west of Panyu to southern Sichuan, and exempted their taxes in exercising rule according to their customs.” The essence of the so-called “rule according to

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their own customs” is to recognize the particularity of the Borderland regions and exercise a looser rule without forcibly changing the social structure, production and lifestyle of local barbarians. The approach is to ensure the subordination of local barbarians to the feudal dynasty, to retain the status of the local barbarian chief and to rule with their assistance. Usually, dual leadership by the prefect and the chieftain was implemented in Borderland prefectures, known as “jimi rule” in literature. The Han Dynasty relied on the chieftains of the Borderland barbarians to govern the border prefectures, roughly by conferring them king, vassal, fief protector and other titles according to their strength, granting them the right to “lead their people” and allowing them the right to rule together with the prefectures and counties. The kings, vassals, and fief protectors were not official posts of the state, as in stark contrast against the native officials of the Yuan and Ming dynasties. The “jimi rule” gradually became an institution since the Western Han Dynasty, and exerted a profound influence on the subsequent feudal dynasties. The Han Dynasty also appointed ministers and other officials to help the conferred kings and princes in ruling, which were stipulated to be on a par with border prefectures or counties in importance. According to “Official Ranks” in Book of Later Han, “the Borderland barbarian kings shall each lead their own dukes, fief protectors, and shall be of the same rank as prefects or magistrates.” Those titles and the accompanying rights were hereditary. In the Han Dynasty, their management was relatively loose, without unified management rules. Therefore, the management was arbitrary in some cases, indicating further room for improvement in “jimi rule.” Another meaning of “ruling by the original customs” is to emphasize the different characteristics of Borderland barbarians as compared to the people in the hinterland, flexibility in governance according to local custom, and avoidance of unduly restraint. Some members of the ruling group have a deeper understanding of this point. In the 4th year of Yonghe in the Eastern Han Dynasty (139 AD), Lai Ji the new governor of Bingzhou wanted to “make a clear distinction between right and wrong, as he had habitually loathed wickedness.” The Commanding General Liang Shang said that “southern and



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eastern barbaric areas serve the emperor by accepting his restraints, while the northern and western barbaric areas serve the emperor by paying tribute irregularly, indicating that the barbarians can be volatile and inconstant. So, there is no constant approach to govern them; contingencies should be formulated with reference to their customs.” He added that the correct way to govern the Borderland barbarians was to “prevent their felonies and endure their minor mistakes”(Fan, 1965, 2895). However, officials at all levels had a clearer understanding of the characteristics of barbarians, and few could “slightly follow their customs.” The harsh torture and tyrannical lawlessness of officials were often important reasons for the Borderland barbarians to rebel. The Han Dynasty exempted or reduced taxation in the southwestern Borderland, because of the generally low level of productivity and consequently little room for taxation in this region. Meanwhile, the barbarians were “volatile and inconstant, submitting and rebelling now and then” and “might instigate trouble when hard pressed.”1 However, with the gradual consolidation of the border prefectures, the feudal rulers began to increase taxation. In addition, there was the abuse by corrupt officials in the counties and prefectures. The dual economic pressure finally became an unbearable burden for the clans in the counties and prefectures. This situation first appeared in the middle of the Western Han Dynasty, but became exacerbated in the Eastern Han Dynasty. In order to consolidate the counties and prefectures in the Borderland areas, light taxation and little conscript labor should be imposed, but the feudal system determined that the ruler could not implement this policy for a long time.

1.2  The southwestern Borderland was one of the first regions to be included in the territory of a unified country. Soon after the Qin reunified the Middle Kingdom, Emperor Qin Shi Huang dispatched 500,000 troops to conquer Lingnan, and placed it under his rule by setting up Nanhai Prefecture, Guilin Prefecture and Xiangjun Prefecture. According to 1 History of Ming, Vol. 310, “Biography of Chieftans”, 7981.

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“Biography of the Southwestern Ethnic Groups” in Historical Records, Qin once established government agencies in northeast Yunnan and southwest Sichuan. In fact, records on the earliest knowledge of the Qin and Han dynasties about the present-day Yunnan and Guizhou can be found in it. In the fifth year of Yuanding (112 BC), the Western Han Dynasty sent troops on a punitive expedition against Nanyue Kingdom located in Guangdong by way of Zangkejiang (now the Beipanjiang). After pacifying Nanyue Kingdom, the returning victorious Han army attacked the Yelang Tribe, which had refused to assist in its endeavor, and established several prefectures in present-day Xichang, and northwest of Sichuan. In the following year, Sima Qian went as an envoy to the present-day Xichang, and later recorded what he saw in Historical Records. Sima Qian called the multitude of tribes in the present-day Yunnan, and southwestern Sichuan “Xinan Yi” (southwestern ethnic groups), which was used in the writings of the Han Dynasty to refer to the above-mentioned area. From the 6th year of Jianyuan (135 BC) to the 2nd year of Yuanfeng (109 BC), the Western Han Dynasty established Qianwei Prefecture, Zangke Prefecture, Yueshou Prefecture and Yizhou Prefecture successively, and put most of the region under its jurisdiction. In the 12th year of Yongping (69), the Eastern Han Dynasty added Yongchang Prefecture, thus including the entire “Xinan Yi” (the southwestern ethnic region) into the territory of the central dynasty. A considerable number of rulers in the Qin and Han Dynasty and later did not truly realize the profound significance of opening up the territory. The rulers of the China’s imperial history also gradually deepened their understanding of the important position of the southwest Borderland for the development of multi-ethnic countries. The intensity of the southwestern Borderland has gradually increased with the development of understanding. Of course, this deepening of understanding is closely related to the development of feudal countries and the southwest Borderland, and the increasing importance of political and economic ties between the inland and the Borderland. Therefore, the starting point of the ruler’s management of the southwestern Borderland has a certain gap with the evaluation of some researchers’. In other words, the original motivation of the ruler’s management of the southwestern Borderland is not consistent with objective effects. We



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cannot and should not demand the level of knowledge that the ruler could only achieve due to the limitations of the times. However, due to the lack of research on this issue in the past, there have been situations in which the description of historical features is not accurate enough. For example, when the Emperor Qin Shi Huang and Emperor Wu of Han first realized the great significance of unifying the Borderlands in administering Lingnan and southwestern ethnic regions, they immediately launched a comprehensive development after the establishment of governance, including large-scale farming. Some thought that the various measures of the Ming and Qing dynasties to rule the southwest Borderland and their ideas on border governance had been practiced in the Qin and Han dynasties, and that there were almost no differences. This type of view obviously lacks historical basis. The unification and establishment of governance in the southwestern Borderland of the Qin and Han dynasties made an indelible contribution to the establishment and consolidation of the Middle Kingdom as a unified multi-ethnic state. However, according to historical records, rulers in the early period of feudal society had managed the southwestern Borderland mostly out of certain specific motives. Take the Western Han Dynasty, which has a clear record, for example. At the beginning of its founding, the Western Han Dynasty had no time to handle the southwestern Borderland because it was either healing from the trauma of war or busy fighting against the Xiongnu. According to “Biography of the Southwestern Ethnic Groups” in Historical Records, “For more than one decade between the demise of Qin and rise of Han, the land (of the Southwestern barbarians) was ignored, and the former fortress of Shu was established.” In the 6th year of Jianyuan (135 BC), Emperor Wu began to manage the southwestern Borderland, backed by the national strength of the Middle Kingdom, and with the original intention to open a road from Bodao to Panyu via Zangkejiang. The effort to build the road in the southwestern ethnic regions met with resistance, so he canceled most of the local counties and prefectures in the third year of Yuanshuo (126 BC). In the first year of Yuanshou (122 BC), he had resumed the management of the southwestern ethnic regions, to open up the road from the southwestern ethnic regions to Tochari (now Northern Afghanistan). This suggests that Emperor

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Wu had managed the area with specific utilitarian purposes and been arbitrary in decision-making to a certain degree. In contrast, Lingnan (areas to the south of the Five Ridges) had greater utility values since it had been managed for more than a century by the Qin Dynasty and Nanyue Kingdom. Therefore, Emperor Wu showed greater interest and determination in forcing the Nanyue Kingdom to change from a protectorate state into a vassal state. After the unification of southwestern ethnic regions and Lingnan, there were voices in the imperial court singing praise. However, there were also many public dissents before and after it. For example, when Empeor planned to send troops to punish Minyue for invading into the border city of Nanyu, in response to the appeal of its King, Liu An, King of Huainan wrote an imperial memorial to dissuade him, saying that “Although the kingdoms of the Yue people have been tributary states in name, their tribute has never reached the court, nor have they sent one single conscript labor. Now your majesty is trying to help by sending troops as they turned on each other. Isn’t it utilizing the resources of the Middle Kingdom to benefit the barbarians?” “(In the punitive expedition against Lingnan, Emperor Qin Shi Huang had) caused a commotion domestically and externally, and exhausted the means of the people, who fled their homesteads for good and banded together for banditry. Gradually, disaster began to foment to the east of the Huashan Mountain” (Ban, 1962, 2778). In the first year of Yuan Shuo (128 BC), Yan An, a courtier of the Han Dynasty wrote in his imperial memorial that “(in expanding the border, Emperor Qin Shi Huang) had stationed soldiers on useless land, who had nowhere to advance or retreat. In a decade, all the young were conscripted, males to active service and females to the logistics. The people were devoid of all means to support themselves, and many hanged themselves in sidewalk trees. And the decease of Emperor Qin Shi Huang, the entire country rose in rebellion.” “Today, we have conquered the southern ethnic region, secured the alliance of Yelang, subjugated Qiangbo, seized Huizhou Prefecture, and built cities. We have also gone deep into the lands of the Xiongnu, burnt down Longcheng, and its holy site. Those have been commended by some as remarkable feats, but they shouldn’t be long-term strategy for governing the



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country, though they count as meritorious services for courtiers” (Ban, 1962, 2811). In the 3rd year of Yuanshuo, Emperor Wu sent Gongsun Hong the Imperial Censor to investigate the futile efforts to build the road to the southwestern ethnic regions. After returning to the court, Gongsun Hong remonstrated with Emperor Wu repeatedly “for canceling the endeavor since it only exhausted the resources of the Middle Kingdom for the sake of useless land.” Upon then, Emperor Wu then ordered the abolishment of the western ethnic region, and retained only one commandant with the two counties in Nan Yi (Sima, 1959, 2950; 2995). After the death of Emperor Wu, there were still controversies among the ruling clique about his border governance practice. In the 2nd year of Chuyuan (47 BC), when the Zhuya Prefecture rebelled time and again despite all pacification efforts, the Expectant Official Jia Juanzhi said that: “Wuding and King Cheng had achieved much lauded feats in the Yin and Zhou dynasties respectively, on a limited territory, adjoining the Yangtze River and the Yellow River in the east, the land of the Di and Qiang ethnic groups in the west, Jingzhou in the south and Shuofang in the North.” “In the Qin Dynasty, the ruler sent troops to attack distant enemies, exhausting internal resources to satisfy the greed for external gains, bent on territorial expansion without considering the harms. However, the entire country had risen in rebellion when its land reached only Minyue in the south, and Taiyuan in the north.” “(In managing the Borderland barbarians, Emperor Wu of Han) divided Nanhai into eight prefectures. Tens of thousands of cases were heard; levies were increased, and salt, iron and wine taxes were imposed to cover the expenses, but those were still not enough. Consequently, the banditry and thievery rose incessantly, leading to repeated military actions. As the father fell, the son followed. The fortresses were guarded by women; the orphans were left crying along the road, and elderly mothers and widows left weeping in backward alleys.” He added, “It is not like Zhuya alone has rhinoceros horns or tortoise shells. Discarding it will not be a pity and refraining from attack it will not damage the imperial prestige,” recommending to abandon Zhuya County. His recommendation was followed by Emperor Yuan (Ban, 1962, 2831; Sima, 1956, 904).

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The views of ancient historians on the use of military forces and establishment of governance in Lingnan and southwestern ethnic regions are also worth noting. The history of Qin army pacifying Lingnan is mainly found in Historical Records and Huainanzi. As for the management of those regions by Emperor Wu of Han, the record in Historical Records is the most credible. History as a Mirror has been regarded by rulers as a political textbook for restoring order and promoting state prosperity, and its discussion is also worthy of attention. In “Biography of Emperor Qin Shi Huang” in Historical Records, Sima Qian did not comment on Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s use of military force in Lingnan or establishment of three prefectures there. Instead, he ended it with Jia Yi’s treatise “Faults of Qin”, which mainly discussed the reason for the collapse of Qin Dynasty during the rule of the second emperor after taking over the six kingdoms with strenuous efforts. However, it didn’t mention its management of Lingnan. Huainanzi said that Emperor Qin Shi Huang had attacked Lingnan “out of greed for its rhino horns, ivories, emeralds, and pearls”, adding that he had sent able-bodied youths to guard it after capturing it. By and by, “the men were unable to till the land and the women unable to tend to their weaving”, “so Chen Sheng rose in rebellion in Daze.” Therefore, it was quietly commonly held that the Qin and Han dynasties had mannaged the southwestern Borderland regions mainly to satisfy the emperor’s personal desire to spread his prestige and virtues to the entire Middle Kingdom and to collect exotic objects from afar, but they had been met with widespread rebellion for the ill-advised undertaking. In fact, this was also the general level of understanding attainable by rulers and most scholar-officials on the issue of opening up territories. Seen from certain signs, Emperor Qin Shi Huang and Emepror Wu of Han actually were not far from that speculation in intentions. According to “Biography of Emperor Qin Shi Huang” in Historical Records, Emperor Qin Shi Huang claimed the Langya Mountain in the 28th year of his reign (219 BC), and inscribed a stele to “sing praise to the virtue and victory of Qin.” The inscription reads: “All under the heaven is the land of the emperor, extending to the desert in the west, Lingnan in the south, the sea in the east and areas beyond Tochari in



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the north. All the people are his subjects. His feat is greater than the five ancient sage emperors and his benevolence is extended everything that breathes. All are basking in his virtue, and living in peace.” The pomposity and self-satisfaction of Emperor Qin Shi Huang in being greater than the five sage emperors is vividly expressed here. According to other records, in the first year of Yuanshuo (128 BC), Yan An compared the management of southwestern ethnic regions by Emperor Wu to his attack of the Xiongnu and conquest of Lingnan, which were “intended to spread his prestige abroad”, but which drove the people to dire straits. He said that Emperor Wu had actually “been striving to satisfy his infinite desires, and acting whimsically, and thus aggravated the grudges against the Xiongnu, instead of pacifying the Borderland areas.” Emperor Wu eventually granted an interview to Yan An and made him an official. The incident reflected that Emperor Wu was open-minded to admonition on the one hand, and indicated that such discussion was no longer news to him. In addition, Emperor Wu also deeply regretted his early conquests in his last years. He rejected Sang Hongyang’s suggestion to increase garrison in the Western Regions to reclaim land for farming, and issued an introspective edit, “to allow the country to recuperate and to enrich the people” (Ban, 1962, 3914). This indicates that Emperor Wu had advanced his understanding of the huge financial and popular cost of border expansion. It should also be pointed out that Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty had managed the southwestern ethnic regions several times for specific reasons, that is, to open up the traffic line through it. The main reason for its management in the Western Han Dynasty was to open the road open a road from Bodao to Panyu via Zangkejiang (now Beipanjiang) for military transport and the international channel to Tochari through India and the southwestern ethnic regions. In order to completely open the passage from Shu of Han to Tochari via the southwestern ethnic regions and Tochari, Emperor Wu tried his best before eventually achieving the goal. Historical Records said that envoys sent by the Western Han Dynasty to explore a road to India and Tochari had been repeatedly intercepted in Xi and Kunming, “and they never reached Tochari.” In the 2nd year of Yuanfeng (109 BC), the Western Han Dynasty sent tens of thousands

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of troops under the leadership of General Guo Chang to attack Xi and Kunming. “After that, it sent envoys, but later Kunming rebelled” (Sima, 1959, 3171). In the following year Emperor Wu built Kunming Reservoir in Chang’an for naval drills, to prepare for war against Xi and Kunming. In the 6th year of Yuanfeng (109 BC), the Han Dynasty dispatched several troops under the leadership of Guo Chang to attack Xi and Kunming, but later had to strip his seal because his efforts came to no avail (Ban, 1962, 198). According to “Biography of Dawan” in Historical Records, “Envoys were sent later, but Kunming returned to banditry, and access to Tochari was eventually blocked.” Sima Qian’s statement of the Western Han Dynasty failing to open the road to Tochari was wrong. According to the research of the present author (Fang, 2004), after Guo Chang conquered Kunming in the 6th year of Yuanfeng (105 BC), Emperor Wu continued his war by joining forces with the King of Yunnan, and finally defeated Xi and Kunming, and placed them under the jurisdiction of Yizhou County. The Han army also defeated the Ailao aborigines in western Yunnan, opened the road to Tochari across the the Lancang River and through India, and established the two counties of Buwei and Xitang on opposite banks of the Lancang River.

1.3  On the whole, the territorial expansion and establishment of prefectures and counties in the southwestern Borderland during the Qin and Han dynasties was of far-reaching significance. Objectively those efforts strengthened the ties among various ethnic groups, and expanded the territory of the Central Plains dynasty, creating the conditions for a unified multi-ethnic country to take shape. For the southwestern tribes, jurisdiction under the feudal dynasty was conducive to the development of their land. Under the positive influence of the inland economy and culture, they quickly embarked on the road of feudalization. Another move of the Han Dynasty in managing the southwestern Borderland was to relocate some Han Chinese from the Shu area to the southwestern Borderland for land reclamation and farming. Those Han Chinese lived together in prefectures near counties with military



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garrison and mixed with indigenous peoples, gradually forming powerful local clans. In today’s Yunnan, the Cuan clan was the most influential. The vicinity of Wuchi Road and Lingguan Road in the present-day northeastern and central Yunnan, as well as the adjacent Zunyi also became densely populated and economically prosperous areas. The Han Dynasty established a firm rule in those areas, and also prepared the necessary foundation for the subsequent Jin, Sui and Tang dynasties to manage the present Yunnan and Guizhou. Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty also conquered the Nanyue Kingdom, a separatist in the Lingnan region, and the victory was also of positive significance. Meanwhile, it should be pointed out that due to the limitations of the times, a considerable part of the ruling group did not fully realize the positive significance of managing the southwestern Borderland. There was a considerable gap between the knowledge of the operators and the scale of business activities and the gap was detrimental to the development of the southwest Borderland. After the Han Dynasty established governance agencies in the western part of Lingnan and the southwestern ethnic regions, the central task was to consolidate the prefectures and counties established. Officials and troops were dispatched, and a certain number of people were relocated from the interior to the Borderlands, toward that end. Areas heavily influenced by the hinterland and developing rapidly were also mainly located in and near the government seat of the prefectures and counties. Due to the constraints of the times and the level of understanding, the Han Dynasty was unable to launch large-scale development in the southwestern Borderland, unable to relocate a large number of inland people to all parts of the area, to comprehensively develop local economic sectors such as agriculture, mining and metallurgy, or obtain considerable revenue, let alone to turn the area into a strong support to national finances. The implementation of the “jimi rule” by the Qin and Han dynasties in the southwestern Borderland was also because the prefectures and counties established in those areas were new and unstable. The rule back then was roughly centered on the counties and prefectures and radiated to the surrounding areas. “jimi rule” was loose, flexible and adapted to local circumstances, in line with the fact that with

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the domination of the southwest Borderland must be maintained, but could not be deepened or solidified. At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, the world was in turmoil, and the ruling group became nominal only. After the formation of the three kingdoms, the southwestern ethnic regions came under the jurisdiction of Shu, and the western Lingnan ruled by the Kingdom of Wu under Sun Quan. In the 16th year of Jian’an (211), Liu Zhang allowed the entry of Liu Bei to Shu in order to resist Cao Cao. In the 19th year, Liu Bei drove Liu Zhang away and seized Yizhou Prefecture. When Liu Bei stationed his army in Xinye to visit Zhuge Liang, Zhuge Liang had proposed the strategic vision of waiting for the right opportunity to rule the Central Plains by seizing Jingzhou Prefecture and Yizhou Prefecture, “protecting the rocky fortresses, making peace with the barbarians in the west and placating those in the south, developing a good relationship with Sun Quan, and enhance government domestically.” After taking Yizhou Prefecture, the Kingdom of Shu committed itself to consolidating rule in the southwestern ethnic regions. Its king Liu Bei appointed Deng Fang protector of Qianwei, and later appointed the Laixiang Governor-General for administering the entire Nanzhong (present-day Yunnan and Guizhou), with the government seat in Nanchang County (in Zhenxiong County, Yunnan). Back then, the area controlled by Shu in the south included northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou to the south of present-day Yibin, Sichuan. In the 2nd year of Zhang Wu (222), the government seat of Laixiang Governor-General was changed to Pingyi County (now Bijie, Sichuan), and government offices were restored in the former Yueshang County, Zangke County, and Yongchang County, but the control of Shu over those areas was still weak. In the 3rd year of Zhang Wu (223), Liu Bei led an ill-fated attempt to topple the Kingdom of Wu and subsequently died of illness in Baidi City. Yong Kai, who was from an influential clan in Nanzhong and who had been secretly colluding with the Kingdom of Wu, rallied other influential clans and barbarian chieftains and rose against the Kingdom of Shu. Except for Yongchang Prefecture, which was located in the Borderland, all counties in Nanzhong changed sides. The odds were against the Kingdom of Shu, just as Zhuge Liang stated in “Memorial on Northern



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Expedition” that after Liu Bei’s death, “Yizhou Prefecture is exhausted and tottering on the verge of collapse.” In order to solve political instability in Nanzhong once and for all, in the 3rd year of Jianxing (225), Zhuge Liang personally led an expedition against it. In fact, the undertaking was part of his master plan to seize the Central Plains, as can be seen from a passage in “Memorial on Northern Expedition”, which says that “Therefore, we have crossed the Lujiang River and ventured deep into the deserted land. Now the south is pacified and our military preparations sufficient, we should lead our troops on a northern expedition to pacify the Central Plains.” After the victory of the southern expedition, Zhuge Liang attached great importance to the governance of Nanzhong. He changed the four prefectures to seven, and added some new counties, tightening the rule and expanding the area controlled by the counties. For example, the newly established three counties of Yongxiang, Yongshou, and Nanfu were located in present-day Lancang and Xishuangbanna, which had no governance institutes in the Han Dynasty. He established a ruling order in Nanzhong, and sent generals to guard it, resolutely suppressing the rebels. According to the Book of Shu in Records of the Three Kingdoms and Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, the generals dispatched to Nanzhong after the southern expedition included Ma Zhong, Zhang Biao, Yan Yu, Zhang Yi, Zhang Yi, Li Hui, Lü Kai and Huo Yi, and many of them were famous generals of Shu. Therefore, Nanzhong Records said that “After the Southern Expedition, the post of Laixiang Governor-General was mostly held by important officials.” Zhang Yi, Zhang Yi, Li Hui and Lü Kai had all led their troops to suppress the resistance of the Nanzhong tribes, and Lü Kai was “murdered by the rebelling barbarians.” Zhuge Liang treated the various factions in Nanzhong differently, based on their attitude to Shu. In fact, it had been a consistent strategic thinking of Zhuge Liang to make specific analysis of the opposition and allies, and take corresponding countermeasures according to different situations. Back when Liu Bei visited his thatched cottage to enlist his service, Zhuge Liang had analyzed the characteristics of the warlords of Yuan Shao, Cao Cao, Sun Quan, and Liu Zhang to Liu Bei, and proposed corresponding strategies. After the

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pacification of Nanzhong, he formulated different governance policies based on a detailed analysis of the various factions there. The Kingdom of Shu successively instated Laixiang GovernorGeneral in present-day Bijie, Guizhou, and Qujing, Yunnan, as the military and political center for ruling the regions. In order to quell the rebellion of influential clans and barbarian chieftains in Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang peresonally led an expedition to Nanzhong. After the victory, the Kingdom of Shu adjusted the prefectures and counties in the Yunnan-Guizhou region, and established Yunnan Prefecture with the government seat in Yao’an, strengthening the connection between Dianchi and Erhai. It also established new counties in present-day Gengma and Jinghong, opened the road from Jinghong to the Laos and northern Thailand. In addition, it established Xinggu County with Yanshan as the county seat to strengthen its control over the roads leading to Jiaozhou. In governing Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang focused on placation to win the locals over. He became very successful in governance by appointing those from influential families and barbarian leaders as officials, emphasizing legislative administration and suppression with placation, and capitalizing on the customs of ethnic groups. Zhuge Liang therefore became a household name in Nanzhong, and the monuments related to him appeared in the Sui Dynasty. Shi Wansui, the Sui general that led troops to conquer the rebels in Yunnan, reported to have seen memorial monuments for him in today’s Yao’an and Dali. He said that there was a Zhuge Wuhou City in Baoshan, with a temple teeming with worshippers. According to the provincial chronicles of the Ming Dynasty, there were 21 prefectures in Yunnan Province, of which 13 had a Wuhou Temple built in his honor. Zhugeying Villages, Zhuge Steles, and Zhuge Wells can also be seen everywhere (Liu, 1991, 139; 543). This suggests that Zhuge Liang’s governance policy in Nanzhong is in the present Yunnan-Guizhou region. It had a profound impact. Zhuge Liang’s policy of governing Nanzhong was indeed superior to its predecessors in certain aspects, but it should by no means by overestimated, since it was intended to serve the Northern Expedition from the very beginning, and couldn’t entail effective governance and development of Nanzhong out of long-term considerations. The levy of



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manpower and material resources in Nanzhong was also quite heavy, as witnessed by the saying “the repeated expeditions of Zhuge Liang to the north had left the country destitute, and the western land suffered from levies and conscript labor” (Chen, 1959, 935). The saying should be a fact. In addition, resistance of the Nanzhong tribes is constantly seen in historical records. The substantive rule of Shu over Nanzhong was not long, lasting only 42 years from the re-establishment of the government offices to the destruction of Shu by the Wei. The Sun Clan ruled the Kingdom of Wu for 59 years, with 31 years under the reign of Sun Quan as the most important period in its history. In terms of strength, Wu was far inferior to Wei under the reign of the Cao Clan, and it could not draw on the slogan of “Restoring the Han Dynasty” as Liu Bei did. Therefore, “carefully judging the pattern of strength” and “keeping Jiangdong” became its basic national policy, which was followed by Sun Quan after he took power. However, realization of that policy was dependent on the control of various places and establishment of governance there. In the Eastern Han Dynasty, the seven counties of Nanhai, Hepu, Cangwu, Yulin, Jiaozhi, Jiuzhen, and Rinan were set up in Lingnan, all under the jurisdiction of Jiaozhou. At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Jiaozhou was controlled by Shi Xie the prefect, with the help of several younger brothers. According to “Biography of Shi Xie” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, Shi Xie served as the Prefect of Jiaozhi, and his younger brothers served as the Prefect of Hepu, Jiuzhen, and Nanhai respectively. In the 15th year of Jian’an (210), when Sun Quan appointed Bu Zhi the Governor of Jiaozhou, Shi Xie and his brothers pledged obedience, but his family remained in actual control. In the 5th year of Huangwu (226) in the Kingdom of Wu, Shi Xie died of illness and Sun Quan divided the area of Lingnan with Hepu as the demarcation, establishing Guangzhou to the north, with Lü Dai as the governor, and Jiaozhou to the south, with Dai Liang as the governor. He also appointed Chen Shi as Prefect of Jiaozhi. Shi Hui, son of Shi Xie, rose in arms, but was killed by Lü Dai, who then took control of Jiaozhou and Guangzhou. After the incident, the Kingdom of Wu abolished Guangzhou and restored Jiaozhou for governing Lingnan. After pacifying Lingnan, Lü Dai served as Governor of Jiaozhou for 12 years,

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followed by Lu Yin. From the time when Sun Quan divided Lingnan into Jiaozhou and Guangzhou to the demise of Wu in the 4th year of Tianji (280), the Kingdom of Wu directly ruled Lingnan for 55 years. Judging from “Biography of Xue Zong” and “Biography of Lu Yin” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, the Kingdom of Wu still exercised “loose-rein governance” of the Yue people in Lingnan. The Yue people were powerful, and were constantly rebelling against the government; often their households were not included in the official household registration. Under such circumstances, the tribute collected from the local tribes was still mainly various kinds of native products, and officials were known to plunder, embezzle and bend the law. Lingnan was remote and weak in economic foundation, and the Kingdom of Wu lacked enthusiasm in its development because its direct rule of the region had been late. As a result, little attention was paid to its development, and extensive land reclamation for farming and development of handicraft production practiced in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River was not implemented there. Except for the production of native products and the cultivation of economic crops such as sugarcane, agriculture, mining and other economic sectors in Lingnan witnessed little development during the reign of Wu, which even plundered the Shanyue in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, to seize their property and population. The practice was also applied in the Lingnan area. According to “Biography of Lu Yin” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, “Lu Yin suppressed the resistance of the barbarians in Cangwu County and arrested more than 8,000 barbarians for conscript labor.” The “Biography of Cao Huan” in Records of the Three Kingdoms says that Sun Xiu the King of Wu issued an edict to Jiaozhi Governor, ordering him “to lock up locals and train them as soldiers.”

2.  Management of Ningzhou in the Jin Dynasty and Southern Dynasty During the Jin Dynasty, Ningzhou (now Yunnan and Guizhou) underwent severe social unrest. The main reason is that the Jin Dynasty changed the effective governance policy since the Han Dynasty and



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switched to a tough repressive policy instead. Later, the political situation in Ningzhou was plunged into turmoil, announcing the failure of its management. In addition to policy mistakes, the failure could also be attributed to inappropriately handled relationship with local influential clans. In the subsequent Southern dynasties, rule over Ningzhou was for most of the time ineffective and nominal, due to their own weakness and long-term turmoil in the Ningzhou area. Fact has proven that the direct cause of the failure of the Jin dynasties to rule the Ningzhou was the wrong judgment of the social conditions, social contradictions and ethnic contradictions in Ningzhou. On the other hand, the political corruption of the Jin Dynasty with bureaucratic cliques as the core was the main cause of misjudgment of social conditions, social contradictions, and ethnic contradictions of Ningzhou.

2.1  The Jin and Southern and Northern dynasties were a period of political turbulence and social turmoil in Chinese history. Soon after it completed national reunification, the Western Jin Dynasty was plunged into the quagmire of the Eight-Prince Rebellion. In the first year of Yongxing (304), Li Xiong proclaimed himself king in Chengdu, and Liu Zhou followed suit at Lishi in Shanxi. By then, it had been only 24 years after the reunification. The short-lived reunification of the Western Jin Dynasty was closely related to the complex and acute social and ethnic contradictions back then and the improper handling of major problems by the rulers. The prevailing tendency in the Western Jin Dynasty was “none of the nobilities will become lower-rank officials, however incompetent they may be, nor will commoners advance into nobility however hard they may try.” Members of the ruling clique mainly came from the influential clans and families trenched in the officialdom. Those people rigidly followed the set routine, lacked the resourcefulness for ruling the country, and searched high and low for wealth to satisfy personal pleasure and profligacy. The prevailing social trend back then featured political corruption followed by empty talk among the upper class, and sharp social contradictions that were improperly handled. After the

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establishment of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, the nature of the regime and the social contradictions were much the same, so were the thinking and methods for solving those problems. In the Jin Dynasty, the focus for border management was the north. Since the Eastern Han Dynasty, the Borderland population, especially the northern nomadic tribes, had migrated to the inland in large numbers, and became mixed with the Han Chinese in the hinterland. The scale of migration further expanded during the Western Jin Dynasty, leading to the serious situation of the foreign barbarians contending with the inland residents for natural resources such as land, water, and grazing land. In addition, northern nomadic tribes were markedly different from the hinterland residents in culture, production and lifestyle. As a result, social contradictions and ethnic conflicts were intensified, and there were even signs of social unrest. The cultural differences and conflicts of practical interests caused serious social crises in the region of the Han Chinese, overwhelming the Jin Dynasty. There was a serious prejudice of “differentiation between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” in the ruling clique of the Jin Dynasty. The scholar-bureaucrat Jiang Tong said in “On Relocation of Barbarians” that “Barbarians are not our kin, so they won’t share our empathy, and will definitely harbor different aspirations and concepts.” In much the same vein, Kong Xun said to Emperor Wu of Jin that “Barbarians are not our kin, so they won’t share our empathy.” According to “Records of Liu Yuanhai” in Book of Jin, Liu Xuan, the Left Sage King of the Xiongnu, gathered his men to discuss rising in arms, saying that “In the past, my ancestors were brothers to the Han Chinese, and they lived through thick and thin. After the fall of the Han Dynasty, the Wei and Jin dynasties succeeded. The title of Chanyu became nominal, without an inch of land. Accordingly, the princes and vassals were demoted to registered households.” The situation reflected in the statement was common in the Jin Dynasty. The rulers saw the seriousness of the problem, but the imperial court was divided regarding how to deal with the immigrants from the northern Borderland. Jiang Tong and other scholar-bureaucrats proposed to forcibly relocate the barbarians back to the Borderland, and his “On Relocation of Barbarians” was representative of the view, which was obviously



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empty talk under the social conditions back then. The policy actually implemented was to place the Borderland barbarians in the hinterland under the jurisdiction of local prefectures and counties, while adding Commandant of Calvary and other military ruling institutions to strengthen management and coercion, so as to stabilize the situation and prevent social unrest. According to “Record on Official Ranks” in Book of Jin, “the post Commandant of Calvary was established by Emperor Wu in Xiangyang, Chang’an, and Ningzhou” (Fang et al., 1974, 747). This suggests that the policy was extensively implemented in the border areas, without regional difference between the north and the south. Another approach in the border areas was random increase in the number of prefectures and counties. According to the “Geographic Records” in Book of Jin, there were 1,723 prefectures and 1,232 counties in the Western Jin Dynasty, including a considerable proportion located in the border areas. The random addition increased the difficulty of the imperial administration, thus leading to the vicious circle of increasing prefectures and counties and strengthening the suppression. Affected by the prejudice of “differention between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” and other factors, the rulers of the Jin Dynasty could not “rule barbarians according to their customs,” or adopt more relaxed and flexible methods. Therefore, their rule in the southwestern Borderland seemed rigid, short-sighted, and driven by brutal force most of the time, and it constantly ran into obstacles in implementation. The rule of the Western Jin Dynasty over the Ningzhou tribes unfolded against this historical background.

2.2  In the first year of Taishi (265), Sima Yan replaced the Wei Dynasty with the Jin Dynasty. In the first year of Taikang (280), the Western Jin Dynasty achieved national unification. After the founding of the Western Jin Dynasty, Huo Yi, the Laixiang Governor-General instated by the Kingdom of Shu, was allowed to continue governing Nanzhong. He was also appointed Governor of Jiaozhou, authorized to “choose subordinate officials as he sees fit” (Chang, 1984, 361). After his death, his son Huo Zai was allowed to take over as the Laixiang Governor-General,

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and to “command his troops and harmonize with local tribes”, generally implementing the established governance policy established by the Shu Kingdom after its southern expedition. Soon, the Western Jin Dynasty changed its governance policy in Ningzhou, whose political and social situation took an apparent turn for the worse. The failure of the Jin Dynasty in governing Ningzhou was attributable to its failure to handle the relationship with local influential clans. During the Han and Jin dynasties, influential clans appeared in some areas of Nanzhong or Ningzhou, mostly from the upper echelons of Han immigrants. According to “Biography of the Southwestern Ethnic Region” in Book of Later Han, “during the rule, Gongsun Shushi, large and influential clans surnamed Long, Fu, Yin, and Dong of the Zangke Prefecture, helped Xie Xian the Administrative Clerk in keeping the prefecture under the rule of Han, and sent envoys through the Panyu River to pay tribute” (Fan, 1965, 2845). Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom says that “of large and influential families, there was the Wang clan in Biexian County, Zangke Prefecture; the Cuan family in Tongle County, Jianning Prefecture; the Zhu, Lu, Lei, Xing, Qiu, Di, Gao Li and Li clans in Zhuti Prefecture, each with their respective troops; the Chen, Zhao, Xie, and Yang clans in Yongchang Prefecture. A larger proportion of them were powerful Han-Chinese immigrants” (Chang, 1984, 388, 405, 414, 435). According to “Biography of Lü Kai” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, Yong Kai, the leader of influential clans “with credibility and trust in the entire southwestern region” during the rule of Shu Kingdom was a descendant of Yong Chi, a general under Liu Bang the founding emperor of Han. After Liu Bang unified the country, he was conferred the title Duke of Zhifang (now Shifang, Sichuan). In the 5th year of Yuanding (112 BC), his descendants were deprived of the title by the court and relocated to the southwestern ethnic regions. In the 3rd year of Zhang Wu (223), some large clans in Nanzhong instigated a rebellion after Liu Bei died of illness. Lü Kai, who nonetheless insisted on upholding Shu Kingdom as the legitimate ruler, was a descendant of Lü Buwei’s clan who had moved from Sichuan to Buwei County (now Baoshan, Yunnan). During the Eastern Han Dynasty, Lü Kai was quite influential in Yongchang Prefecture,



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and was historically described as “prominent in prestige and benevolence, with allegiance of the entire prefecture” (Chen, 1959, 1047). There are also some influential big families that evolved from the officials or generals stationed Nanzhong. For example, in the last years of the Shu, Huo Yi, who served as Prefect of Yongchang and Jianning, was a native of Zhijiang in Nanjun. After surrendering to the Wei Dynasty, he continued to hold this office and appointed Governor of Nanzhong. His grandson Huo Biao served as Prefect of Yuexi (Chen, 1959, 1008). Stationed in Nanzhong for generations, the Huo family became an influential clan locally. A tomb of the Huo family was discovered in Houhaizi, Zhaotong, Yunnan in 1963 and the owner Huo Chengsi was a descendant of Huo Yi (Cultural Relics Press, 1984). Famous influential families of the Eastern Han Dynasty seen in the records include the Li’s, which descended from Li Hui, a native of Yuyuan in Jianning County. Li Hui was the Educational Inspector of Jianning County under the rule of Liu Zhang, and later surrendered to Liu Bei and gained his trust. His maternal uncle Cuan Xi, who served as Prefect of Jianling, also came from an influential large clan in Nanzhong. Zhu Bao, who came from the influential Zhu clan in Zhuti, served the Magistrate of Jangke County during the reign of Shu. After Liu Bei died, he assumed the post of Prefect of Jangke County and participated in the resistance to Shu. Other influential big families included Meng Yan from Zhuti and Meng Huo from Jianning (Chang, 1984, 353). The prestigious families of Nanzhong were mainly immigrants, as confirmed by archaeological materials. There are many ancient tombs in Bazi in northeastern, central and western Yunnan, as well as western Guizhou. Called “Liangdui” because of their large mounds above ground, they are the tombs of prestigious families in Nanzhong in the Eastern Han Dynasty.2 “Liangdui” are distinctively related to the Han Chinese culture. The relocation of population to the southwestern ethnic regions in the Han Dynasty was mainly intended to consolidate and enrich the border counties, so most of the relocated population lived in the government seat. According to records, the prestigious families in 2 Sun Taichu, Study of Liangdui Mausoleums in Yunnan, Collected Papers for Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of Yunnan Provincial Museum, 1981.

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Nanzhong during the Han and Jin dynasties were mainly distributed in the government seat of Jianning, Jinning, Zhuti, Zangke, and Yongchang. Their rise to influence was mostly based on the familial power brought about by their control of Han and barbarian troops and association with the government. The ancestors of Yong Kai and Lü Kai moved into the southwestern ethnic regions, bringing with them many tribesmen, family members, and servants, already with the signs of prestigious families. The Huo family had from the Shu Kingdom been stationed in Nanzhong and the troops and barbarians under its control gradually evolved into its subordinates, who mainly guarded the homestead and participated in farming and other production activities, and who developed a strong personal bond with it. Since the Central Plains dynasty exercised “jimi rule” in Nanzhong County, and the prestigious clans of Nanzhong were inextricably linked with the local government, the rulers mainly adopted the policy of placation and loose governance in Nanzhong. In most cases, leniency was given to members of those clans, in order to keep them in restraint and win them over. One of the reasons was that the prefectures and counties set up by the Central Plains dynasty in Nanzhong were only relatively isolated ruling strongholds in the border areas, like islands surrounded by surrounding lakes. For the county government, the Han immigrants living in the government seat, especially the prestigious clans, were obviously an indispensable force that must be relied on. During the Jin Dynasty, the prestigious clans were very active on the political stage of Ningzhou, holding such positions as protector general, prefect, governor, chief lieutenant, administrative clerk, county magistrate, and garrison commander. It can be said that they held all the most official posts of Ningzhou, in particular, the prefect. In many cases, those posts were hereditary. In the opinion of the rulers of the Jin Dynasty, those clans were still Han immigrants, and a force from the interior to be capitalized for ruling the southwestern Borderland. The extensive reliance on prestigious clans of Ningzhou in the Jin Dynasty was significantly different from the extensive appointment of local barbarian leaders as native officials or chieftains in the southwestern Borderlands in the Yuan and Ming dynasties. On the other hand, those prestigious clans were regarded Han immigrants to the border areas by



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the ruler, and consequently inferior to their counterparts in the interior. Therefore, there were often the tendency of discrimination and even unreasonable oppression against Ningzhou officials of their origin. The conflicting and even discriminatory and oppressive attitudes were also one of the reasons for the dynasty to lose control of the political situation in Ningzhou. According to Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, in the early Western Jin Dynasty, the surrendered governor Huo Yi was allowed to resume his office as the Laixiang Governor-General. After his death, his son took over, and “commanded his troops and harmonized with the locals.” Nanzhong was relatively stable during this period. Later, the Western Jin Dynasty appointed Wu Jing, Prefect of Baxi, as the Laixiang Governor-General, and its stability was gradually undermined. In the Western Jin Dynasty, four prefectures were separated from Nanzhong and turned into Ningzhou Prefecture, which was again changed to Nanyi Prefecture in the fifth year of Taikang. Power rule dominated by military suppression was implemented in the former Nanzhong, and economic burdens on the Nanzhong clans enhanced. After the restructuring, Li Yi, Commandant of Calvary, “was dispatched to guard Nanzhong with troops, and appointed Director-inChief for the fifty-eight barbarian tribes. The oxen, gold, felt and horses collected from those tribes amounted to tens of thousands” (Chang, 1984, 868). In the 1st year of Tai’an (302), Mao Xian and Li Meng, from prestigious clans in Jianning and Zhuti, rose in rebellion against the tyranny. The rebellion was suppressed by Li Yi and the two leaders were killed. Later, Li Yi killed the barbarian leader of Wucha in Lingcheng, eventually incurring resistance of the people of Ningzhou Prefecture. Li Yi and his men “held the stranded city”, eating grass roots and rat for food. The turmoil lasted for seven years. Later, in the Western Jin Dynasty, Guanghan Prefect Wang Xun was appointed Nanyi Protectorate and Ningzhou Governor. His tyrannical rule was even worse than Li Yi. Administrative Clerk Zhou Yue, who acted as Prefect of Jianning County, which had had no prefect for a long time, was killed by Wang Xun over a trivial discord. Subsequently, Wang Xun killed his younger brother Zhou Bing, administer of Qinzang and Zhao Tao, an imperial censor, together with dozens of influential

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families in Ningzhou “for violation of law”. Thousands of civilians were slaughtered or captured during the turmoil, and tens of thousands of cattle and horses were seized, “striking terror into the hearts of the Han Chinese and barbarians alike.” Due to the disorderly management and long-term wars, Weixian County (now Qujing, Yunnan) and the vicinity of present-day Yunnan “had no grain in the warehouse or a complete brigade in the army; the civilian and governmental resources were exhausted and laws and discipline were laid waste.” Faced with the severe chaos, Wang Xun did not try to restore stability and gave the people a break; instead, he randomly used troops for suppress and massacre. According to “Biography of Wang Xun” in the Book of Jin, when Wang Xun took office, he “resorted to punishment in rule and exercised particularly harsh rule,” exacerbating the tense social and ethnic contradictions. Once Wang Xun had regarded the Wucha barbarian tribe as the greatest of all troubles, and wanted to send troops to quell it. However, he couldn’t find an excuse, until the tribe secretively excavated the tomb of the Zhuang of the Yelang tribe. With the pretext, Wang Xun sent troops and “then exterminated it.” He and his troops also conquered “several thousand colonies of evil officials and incorrigible barbarians”, creating a sensation in the entire Ningzhou. His suppressive rule was the Eastern Jin Dynasty, who granted many rewards to him. Wang Xun was later promoted to the General of Pacifying the West and South, concurrently serving as the Governor of Yizhou. Because of his “overly stringent rule, and wanton killing” in Ningzhou, Pingyi Prefect Lei Yi, who was from an influential family in Zhuti, Yingong, a refugee leader and Pingle Prefect Dong Ba, led a rebellion and seized Zangke, Pingyi, and Nanguang, before surrendering to Li Xiong, the leader of the Chenghan regime who declared himself emperor in Chengdu. Cuan Liang, from a prestigious clan in Jianning, joined forces with Li Dang, the Prefect of Yizhou County, and Dong Xi, the Prefect of Liangshui County, and took Xinggu Prefecture (today Xianshan, Yunnan). Li Xiong dispatched his paternal uncle Li Xiang to attack Yuesui County and then attack Ningzhou. Wang Xun sent Yao Yue, a protector general from a prestigious clan in Yunnan to intercept Li Xiang in Tanglang County. He was enraged when he learnt that Yao Yue won the battle but failed to chase Li Xiang, and



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died of illness. By then, he had ruled Ningzhou for 14 years (Fang et al., 1974, 2189). In the first year of Yongchang (322), Yin Feng, Prefect of Lingling, was appointed Ningzhou Governor and Nanyi Protectorate by the Eastern Jin Dynasty, but the situation of Nanzhong was already beyond salvation (Chang, 1984, 377). After sworn in, Yin Feng “slackened criminal punishment and neglected governance.” During the Eastern Jin Dynasty, the northwestern part of present-day Sichuan was controlled by the regimes of Qiuchi and Tuyuhun. In the 2nd year of Tai’an (303), the refugee leader Li Te occupied Chengdu, and established a separatist regime centered on Chengdu. In the 8th year of Xianhe (333), Li Xiong sent his younger brother Li Shou to attack Ningzhou, and Yin Feng surrendered, thus Ningzhou was taken over by the Cheng-Han regime. During its rule of 15-some years in Ningzhou, the Cheng-Han regime managed to restrain its subordinates in the early years, “thanks to stringent bans”, but “began predating on the people” after a period. Mao Yan and Luotun, residents of Jianning County, led a rebellion and killed the Prefect Shao Pan. In the 9th year of Xianhe (334), Cheng-Han split Ningzhou up and established Jiaozhou, appointing Huo Biao as the Governor of Ningzhou, Cuan Shen as the Governor of Jiaozhou, and Li Shou as the King of Jianning (Chang, 1984, 675). In the 3rd year of Yonghe (347), Huan Wen, a general of the Eastern Jin Dynasty captured Chengdu, and Li Shi, the leader of the ChengHan regime, surrendered. Once again, Yizhou and Ningzhou were placed under the rule of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, and were controlled by Huan Wen’s generals Zhou Fu, Zhou Chu and their families for 41 years. During the period, “Liang and Yi were rife with banditry.” When Zhou Zhongsun served as the Governor of Ningzhou, “his greed and despotism plunged the people in despair” (Fang et al., 1974, 1586). Judging from record like this, the Zhou family’s rule of Ningzhou was not much different from that of the Western Jin Dynasty. In the first year of Ningkang (373), when the Former Qin army mounted an offensive against Chengdu, Zhou Zhongsun retreated to Ningzhou, and “Qiongze, Yelang and other places in the southwestern ethnic regions surrendered to the Former Qin.” Later, Yao Chang was appointed Governor of Ningzhou, establishing the rule of Former Qin there. In

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the 8th year of Taiyuan (383), as its sphere of influence of Former Qin diminished following its defeat in the Battle of Feishui, the Eastern Jin Dynasty regained its rule, which was officially ended after the establishment of Liu’s Song Dynasty in the 2nd year of Yuanxi (420). The policy shortsightedness of the Jin Dynasty in ruling Ningzhou is also seen in the volatile imperial decree to establish governance. In the 6th year of the Taishi (270), the Western Jin Dynasty separated Jianning, Xinggu, Yunnan, and Yongchang out of the seven Nanzhong counties under the jurisdiction of Yizhou, and established Ningzhou at the same level as it. In the 5th year of Taikang (284), Ningzhou was abandoned, and the four counties were merged into Yizhou. Then, the Nanyi Prefecture was set up to rule the original Nanzhong area. In the first year of Tai’an (302), Ningzhou was restored and Yizhou Prefecture established. By then, Ningzhou had a total of eight prefectures under its jurisdiction. In the first year of Jianwu (317), the Eastern Jin Dynasty wantonly split up the counties and prefectures in Ningzhou, which eventually included more than 14 prefectures and 68 counties (Chang, 1984, 462). The frequent changes in the establishment of prefectures and counties in Ningzhou reflected the lack of consistency in Jin Dynasty’s thought on governing this region. Its actions were counterproductive and aggravated the chaos there. The above-mentioned governance practice of the rulers of the Jin Dynasty not only caused political turbulence in Ningzhou and intensified the contradictions of the prestigious clans with the barbarians in Ningzhou and the imperial court, but also fomented mutual suspicion and struggle among the large and influential clans, finally leading to decades of fierce fighting and annexation among the large clans in Ning Zhou. By the time Wang Xun took office as the Governor of Ningzhou, the large clans of Ningzhou had already been divided into two factions. Among them, Yao Yue, Pang Yi, Cuan Shen, Dong Bing and Huo Biao were loyal to him, while Lei Xun, Cuan Liang, Li Kui, Dong Ba, and Dong Jin were against him. After Li Xiong captured Ningzhou, some of the large clans surrendered to Cheng-Han, while others opposed its reign. For example, after seizing Ningzhou, the Cheng-Han regime initially “exercised effective stringent bans”, but “began predating on the people in a while.” Mao Yan and Luo Tun from the large clans rose in



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rebellion and killed the prefect Shao Pan. Xie Shu, from another large clan in Zhangke Prefecture, also opposed Cheng-Han regime (Chang, 1984, 674). During the Eastern Jin Dynasty, the competition among the large clans in Ningzhou became intense. After fierce annexation, only the Cuan, Meng, and Huo clans were left, by the time Emperor Chengdi acceded to the throne. Yet their contention never ceased, under the leadership of Cuan Shen, Meng Yan, and Huo Biao respectively. During the reign of the Cheng-Han, Huo Biao became the Governor of Ningzhou with the support of Cheng Han, and Cuan Shen became the Governor of Jiaozhou. Meng Yan stood in opposition, on the side of the Eastern Jin Dynasty who was bent on recapturing Ningzhou from Cheng Han. In the 5th year of Xiankang (339), Deng Yue, the Governor of Guangzhou, led an army on a punitive expedition against Shu, “and Meng Yan captured Huo Biao and surrendered” (Ni, 1992, 74). However, Cheng-Han did not give up, and dispatched troops to hunt down Meng Yan, with Li Shou as the commander. Eventually, the Meng and Huo clans were both eliminated. From then on, the Cuan clan was the only important large clan left in Ningzhou. During the Eastern Jin and Southern dynasties, Ningzhou was actually beyond the control of the Central Plains dynasty. Formally, the Cuan clan still regarded the hinterland dynasty as the justified ruler, but exercised actual control over Ningzhou. According to the inscriptions in “Stele of Cuan Longyan” carved in the second year of the Liu-Song Dynasty (458) (Wang, 1980): The ancestors and fathers of Cuan Longyan, from an influential clan of Ningzhou, both served as Prefect of Jinning County (today Jinning, Yunnan) and Jianning County (successively governing Qujing and northeastern Luliang, Yunnan) and Governor of Ningzhou; though those official titles might have been self-appointed, they indicate that the Cuan clan had been based in Dianchi and Qujing as the center of rule. The inscription also said that in the Year of Renjia, “the East and West of Ningzhou were subjected to the scourge of violence, and Mian Rong in particular was rife with conflicts”, and Cuan Longyan led a group of five thousand elite troops to suppress the violence, “killing thousands of rebels and rid the Borderlands of turmoil.” Here “Mian Rong” may be Minpu in the south of Yongchang County, indicating that the entire Ningzhou was basically under the control of the Cuan family.

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2.3  In the second year of Yuanxi (420), Liu Yu established Liu-Song Dynasty and put an end to the Eastern Jin Dynasty. In the subsequent years before the Sui Dynasty reunified China again, the South experienced the four dynasties of Song, Qi, Liang, and Chen. Liu-Song retained Ningzhou from the Eastern Jin Dynasty (ruling present-day Qujing, Yunnan), and placed 15 prefectures and 81 counties under its jurisdiction (Shen, 1074, 1182). In the 15th year of Yuanjia (438), Liu-Song named Xu Xun as the governor of Ningzhou. In the 18th year, Jinning prefect Cuan Songzi rebelled, and Xu Xun quelled the rebellion with troops (Shen, 1074, 85, 88). Therefore, it can be seen, that some of the governors of Ningzhou appointed by Liu-Song did take office. However, according to the “Stele of Cuan Longyan”, the official title of Cuan Longyan was “Formerly Long Xiang General, Protector, Governor of Ningzhou, and Qiongdu Vasal of Song.” According to Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, in the first year of Tai’an (302), when the Jin Dynasty restored Ningzhou, it appointed Li Yi the governor of Ningzhou, and “conferred on him the title of Longxiang General, and the Vassal of Chengxian.” It seems that the governors of Ningzhou appointed by Liu Song were conferred those titles in accordance with the original institution. “Stele of Cuan Longyan” said that Cuan Longyan had been promoted to Ningzhou Governor, Longxiang General and the Vassal of Qiongdu County for leading five thousand elites to suppress the resistance of the barbarians in western Yunnan. So his official post might have been granted by Liu-Song. This suggests that some appointed Ningzhou governors did not take office, and Liu-Song had no choice but to give the post to the Cuan clan to rule the region on behalf of the imperial court. In the third year of Shengming (479), Xiao Daocheng overthrew Liu-Song Dynasty and established Qi Dynasty in its stead. After the establishment of the Southern Qi Dynasty, the Emperor Gaodi sent envoys to inspect the entire country to promulgate an edict, “but excluded Jiaozhou and Ningzhou for their remoteness” (Xiao, 1972, 34). Therefore, this suggests that the Southern Qi had only nominal rule of Ningzhou in its early years. According to “Biography” in Book of the



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Southern Qi, nine governors were appointed successively for Yizhou and Ningzhou. Presumably, most of them were based in Yizhou and never personally took office in Ningzhou. According to Book of Southern Qi, “Ningzhou, with the government seat in Jianning County, previously part of Nanzhong, described by Zhuge Liang as a barren land. Road to the distant land inhabited by a multitude of barbarian tribes was rugged; the Han Chinese was few and sparse. The local Cuan clan and influential barbaric tribes had habitually refused orders of the Middle Kingdom, against which its rebellion had been a concern” (Xiao, 1972, 303). This suggests that for most of the time, the Southern Qi failed to exercise effective governance of Ningzhou as a whole. According to “Biography of Liu Quan” in the Book of Southern Qi, in the 8th year of Yongming (490), Liu Quan, the Governor of the Yizhou who concurrently took charge of Yizhou and Ningzhou, reported to Emperor Shizu that “the ancient copper smelting site in Mengcheng, Nanguang County (present-day Zhaotong, Yunnan) should be put into operation. And the imperial court sanctioned his proposal” (Xiao, 1972, 653). According to the “Prefectures and Counties (2)” in the same literature, the Southern Qi also reorganized the prefectures in present-day northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou. It is speculated that through the Wuchidao, Southern Qi still managed to keep control of present-day northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou in its later years. In the first year of Tianjian (502), Xiao Yan established Xiao-Liang and inherited the rule of the Southern Qi over Ningzhou. In the third year of Datong (537), Liang appointed Xiao Ji, King of Wuling, as Governor of Yizhou. Xiao Ji ruled Shu for 17 years, “built roads to Ningzhou and Yuexi in the south and to Ziling and Tuyuhun in the west. Domestically, he developed farming, sericulture and salt and iron development. It also promoted trade to reap benefits from the distant places. Therefore, it managed to build up considerable financial resources and weaponry.” Xiao Ji emphasized management of Ningzhou when he was stationed in Yizhou, and collected a large amount of native products, which were sold to merchants for profit, and sent to the imperial court as tribute. Historians said that after he developed traffic to Jianning and Yuexuan, “imperial contributions rose to ten times of his predecessors.” He was thus awarded the title of Commander Unequalled in Honor by the

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court (Li, 1975, 1328). In the last years of Datong, Xiao Liang made Xu Wensheng, a native of Pengcheng, the governor of Ningzhou. Back then, Ningzhou was “remote and populated with ignorant barbarian tribes; the greedy and corrupt locals were impossible for previous governors.” After Xu Wensheng took office, he “empathized with local barbarians, and edified them with virtue. The barbarians were touched, and the customs were thus changed.” Xu Wensheng did not hold the post long. In the 2nd year of Daiqing (548), when the Houjing Rebellion broke out in the hinterland, he recruited tens of thousands of troops from Ningzhou to crush it, but he never returned (Yao, 1973, 640). There have been no records of officials coming to Ningzhou to take office after that, and Ningzhou was completely controlled by the Cuan clan. Xiao-Liang dynasty and the later Chen dynasty appointed the chief of the Cuan family as the governor of Ningzhou. By the Northern Zhou dynasty, Cuan Zhen, the last Ningzhou governor of the Cuan family had developed an abnormal relationship with the Central Plains dynasty, “retaining the levies and taxes locally collected and sending several dozen horses to the imperial court as tribute” (Wei et al., 1973, 1126). It seems that Cuan Zhen still regarded the Central Plains dynasty as the just ruler, and followed the practice of previous generations by presenting a small number of horses every year. Since the middle period of the Northern and Southern dynasties, Ningzhou was basically ruled by the Cuan family, forming a situation where the Central Plains dynasty had a short and shallow control over it. However, its effective control by the Cuan family also spared it of the greater scourge of war in the hinterland. During the Northern Zhou Dynasty, Liang Rui, the Governor of Yizhou, wrote a letter to Yang Jian, the Prime Minister, and suggested that the imperial court manage Ningzhou, saying that “Ningzhou has a large and thriving population, and rich treasure, like the horses and pearls of Erhe, and the rhino horns and salt wells in Yi and Ning.” “Mostly inhabited by Han Chinese, the fertile land is rich in treasures and known to produce famous horses.” If Ningzhou was seized, “presumably the naturalized barbarians shall furnish sufficient manpower for defence” (Wei et al., 1973, 1126). From the situation described by Liang Rui, this suggests that during the rule



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of the Cuan clan the previously severely afflicted society and economy of Ningzhou in war and chaos had not only recovered to some degree, but also witnessed considerable progress in some aspects. The area with a large and thriving population and rich treasures described by Liang Rui mainly refers to the present-day central Yunnan, where the economic foundation was solid and control of the Cuan family strict. The western and southern Ningzhou remained much the same as it had been in the Han Dynasty, due to lack of active management during the Jin and Southern and Northern dynasties.

3.  The Strategy of the Sui and Tang Dynasties for Managing the Southwest Borderland Although Emperor Wen put forward some positive thoughts on border governance and achieved some results in administration, the Sui Dynasty did not have much influence due to its short-lived rule. The Tang Dynasty marked the heyday of China in the middle ancient times. At its heyday, the Tang Dynasty established an area command for Borderland prefectures and six protectors, which took charge of more than 800 jimi prefectures. Although the territory directly under its jurisdiction was smaller than that of the Han Dynasty, it was much larger in scope of jimi prefectures. On the whole, the Tang Dynasty has made great achievements in managing the Borderlands, but there were also some problems that cannot be ignored. Its border governance is distinctly characteristic, especially for the southwestern Borderland.

3.1  In the 2nd year of Taiping (557) in the Liang Dynasty, Yu Wenjue established the Northern Zhou Dynasty, which split Naning Prefecture for establishing Gongzhou Prefecture (in present-day Zhaotong and Huize, Yunnan) in the second year of Baoding (562). In the 5th year of Tianhe (570), Northern Zhou Dynasty pacified the Yuexie Region and established Xining Prefecture. Later, the southwest of Sichuan was called “Xining Prefecture”, and the former Ningzhou called “Nanning Prefecture.” At the time when the governance of the Northern Zhou

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Dynasty was initially established, and Cuan Zhen the barbarian chief of Nanning Prefecture “being refractory and disrespectful”, Liang Rui, the Administrative Clerk of Yizhou (in present-day Chengdu), wrote to a memorial to Yang Jian, the Great Prime Minister of the Northern Zhou Dynasty (later Emperor Wen of Sui) and suggested using force to reunify Nanning Prefecture. Liang Rui said that Nanning Prefecture was populous and prosperous, and that its pacification would “serve not only to deter the barbarians but also to benefit the country.” He also explained the reasons for expanding the territory, saying that “in my humble opinion, placating and restraining the distant land is the just aspiration of kingly rulers, and changing the customs and tendencies should be the constant mission of a country.” “It is said that the locals were suffering from harsh governance, and hankering for a virtuous king. Your Excellency has made unrivaled contributions to the dynasty, and the time is ripe for you to bring the distant people under its rule.” In the second memorial, Liang Rui said that “In my humble opinion, placating the distant helps to secure the allegiance of the near and following the track of our ancestor in territorial expansion is the just undertaking of kings.” “After capturing it, we may retain the prefectures, firstly to extend your prestige and secondly to benefit our country.” Yang Jian couldn’t agree more with Liang Rui, “but rejected his proposal because the country was newly stabilized and such a move would disturb the people” (Wei et al., 1973, 1126). Liang Rui’s reasons for proposing to seize Nanning Prefecture include tapping material resources to “benefit the country” and “spreading the imperial prestige.” In addition, he also proposed that territorial expansion should be “the kingly undertaking”, for the purpose of rectifying customs in the border areas, and emancipating locals from tyranny. His outstanding insights and broad view show that he was one step ahead of his predecessor in understanding. It is worth noting that his views were well received by Yang Jian, though they were not implemented due to the constraints of the time. After the establishment of the Sui Dynasty, Emperor Wen unified Nanning prefecture “with his stratagem.” In the 9th year of Kaihuang (589), the Sui Dynasty destroyed Chen and ended the division between the North and the South. While



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keeping the original Xining and Nanning, it set up Kunzhou in present-day Kunming, Yunnan, and then Nanning Prefecture General Administration Office (government seat in today’s Qujing), with a garrison led by Wei Chong as the General Administrator. Cuan Zhen, the chief of the Cuan clan, personally paid a visit to the official mansion for an interview with Wei. The Sui Dynasty also appointed Liang Pi as the governor of Xining Prefecture. Soon the soldiers of Nanning Prefecture indulged in violence, “much to the disappointment of Borderland residents.” Cuan Wan, the leader of Nanning Prefecture, instigated a rebellion with his men but was quelled by Yang Wutong, a Sui general. Soon after, Cuan Wan revolted again, the Sui troops led by Shi Wansui swept across over 1000 li and defeated over 30 barbarian tribes, who sent envoys to surrender. Cuan Wan was released after bribing Shi Wansui with gold and treasures. The next year, Cuan Wan revolted once again. This time, the Sui troops killed him, and brought his sons back to the hinterland as official slaves. After that, the Sui Dynasty gave up the Ningzhou area (Sima, 1956; Wei et al., 1973, 1270; Li, 1974, 2524). The Sui Dynasty once sent troops to contend for the YunnanGuizhou area, but it soon gave up. The reason was not only that its political situation was unstable but also that its thoughts and strategies for governing the Borderland regions, especially the southwest Borderland, were still unclear. Compare with the subsequent Tang Dynasty, and one can get a clear picture. After the founding of the Tang Dynasty, the rule of the Han and Jin dynasties in present-day YunnanGuizhou region, especially in present-day northeastern and central Yunnan, was quickly restored. And the focus was set on managing the roads leading to India and Annan, acquiring the continued drive for managing the Yunnan-Guizhou area. However, the Sui Dynasty did not seem to have formed such governance thinking, so it quickly gave up after encountering resistance. The unification of Lingnan was relatively smooth. The reason was the active support of Madam Xian of Gaoliang. According to the “Biography of Madam Xian” in Book of Sui, in the end of the Chen dynasty, Lingnan had no suzerain, and several counties rallied around Madam Xian, upholding as the “Sacred Mother.” When Emperor Gaozu of Sui dispatched his general Wei Guang to attack Lingnan,

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Wei Guang faltered. So Madam Xian sent her grandson to his way to Guangzhou, and later ordered her grandson to lead troops to attack the rebelling barbarians. She also mounted a horse in full armor and accompanied the Sui envoy Pei Ju to placate the prefectures. With her help, Lingnan was stabilized. Emperor Gaozu canonized Madam Xian as Mrs. Qiaoguo, made her two grandsons governor of Gaozhou and Luozhou respectively and set up the Office of Madam Qiaoguo. The barbarian chiefs who had surrendered were also appointed as governors or county magistrates. According to “Biography of Pei Ju” in Book of Sui, Pei Ju took orders to placate them, “secured the allegiance of more than 20 prefectures, and appointed their chiefs as governor or county magistrate according to regulation. When he returned with news of his success, the emperor was very satisfied.” In unifying Lingnan, the Sui Dynasty had basically adopted the practice of “placation with grace”, but had resorted to brutal force when necessary. In the first year of Renshou (605), officials of five prefectures including Chaozhou, and Chengzhou rebelled. Emperor ordered Feng Ang, the governor of Gaozhou, to launch a punitive expedition, and Feng Ang was thus promoted to Prefect of Hanyang (Sima, 1956, 5589). The Sui Dynasty set up over 20 counties in Lingnan, with greater density compared to the previous generations, indicating that its rule had deepened. However, it set up few counties in Yulin Prefecture and Si’an Prefecture (Present-day Zuoyoujiang in Guangxi), indicating that they were still beyond its reach. In terms of taxation, Emperor Wen ordered the abolition of “the institution collecting local products for the benefit of the country” exercised in Lingnan since the Eastern Jin Dynasty, and prohibited local officials from levying excessive collections on barbarians in the Borderland areas. In ruling the southwestern Borderland, the Sui Dynasty inherited approach of “jimi rule” and “graciousness plus coercion” exercised in the Qin and Han dynasties, with developments in some aspects. For example, more barbarians were appointed as prefecture and county officials to improve the governance institution, while the ruling reached greater depth. In addition to positive thoughts on the territorial expansion and border development, Emperor Wen also had the concepts of “unification of the monarch and ministers” and “prestige for obedience



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and virtue for placation”, which were applied in handling the relationship between the imperial court and local forces. In the 17th year of Emperor Kaihuang (597), Emperor Wen said in an edict to King Tang of Goryeo that “although you annually send envoys to pay tribute and claimed submission as a vassal, your loyalty is still reserved. If you are truly a courtier, you should harbor the same virtue as me.” “You shall perform the vassal duties, follow the just codes of the imperial court, assimilate your aliens and refrain from confrontation against other countries. This way, you shall be bathed in prosperity and prestige, as I have hoped for. Although you have a small area and a small population, all under heaven shall be my subjects” (Wei et al., 1973, 1815). The observation reflects his idea of “like mindedness between the monarch and ministers.”

3.2  On the whole, in terms of the scale and achievement, the Tang Dynasty is unrivalled in Borderland management by any of the preceding dynasties. The remarkable achievement should be attributed to its emphasis on and active management of the Borderland areas. Among the emperors of the Tang Dynasty, Emperor Taizong was the keenest about the Borderland and barbarian issues. Contemplating danger in peacetime, he mustered all his energy to improve governance, ushering in the “Golden Years of Zhenguan”, a noted period of peace and prosperity in the Chinese history. Emperor Taizong elaborated his thoughts on Borderland and barbarian issues on many occasions. In the 9th year of Wude (626), when courtiers admonished him for allowing armed guards into his bed chamber, he replied that “A king regards the world as his family and all within his territory his subjects. I am utterly candid with them, why should I exclude the armed guards” (Sima, 1956, 6022)? In the 5th year of Zhenguan (631), when he learnt that the Kingdom Kang had requested to become a vassal, he said that “Preceding emperors were habitually eager to seek the name of being competent in acquiring the allegiance of distant land, but their endeavor served no practical purpose while exhausting the resources of the people. Today, if the Kingdom Kang has come to pledge allegiance

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because of an emergency, we have the duty to extend a helping hand. However, that means our troops will have to cover tens of thousands of miles. Wouldn’t it be exhausting? If I have to put my people to such trouble for some false name, I won’t do it.” So, he rejected the request of the Kingdom of Kang. In the 7th year, at a banquet held by the Tang court in the former Weiyang Palace of the Han Dynasty, Emperor Gaozu ordered the Turkic Illig Qaghan to dance, and the Lingnan chief Feng Zhidai to recite poems to go with it, saying smilingly “The Hu and Yue have never been in such harmony like one family since ancient times” (Sima, 1956, 6091; 6104)! In the 18th year of Zhenguan, Emperor Taizong wanted to personally lead a punitive expedition against Goryeo, and Chu Suiliang wrote a letter to dissuade him. Taizong replied that “time makes a man. As Su Wen plunged his people into dire straits, and they were hankering for salvation, it is high time that Goryeo collapsed. The plethora of dissidents has failed to see this point.” In the same year, Taizong promised to relocate the Turkic Khan tribe to Henan, and his courtiers thought the relocation might foment trouble. Emperor Taizong explained that “The barbarians are also human beings, with sentiments much the same as the people of the Middle Kingdom. A ruler should worry about the failure of his grace to disseminate and refrain from suspecting those from different ethnic groups, since widespread imperial grace turns the barbarians of the Borderland into family, while suspicion turns blood kin into enemies” (Sima, 1956, 6216). In the 21st year, Taizong said that he had five reasons for the barbarians to be subdued, and one of them was “since ancient times, the Han Chinese has been cherished and barbarians belittled. I am the only one to treat them alike, so the barbarian tribes shall come to me as if I am a parent” (Sima, 1956, 6247). Therefore, this suggests that Emperor Taizong harbored the thoughts of “all under heaven are family” “the Hu and Yue people are family.” Believing that all the people within his country were compatriot subjects of Tang, he opposed the view that the Borderland barbarians were “detached aliens.” The core of his border governance thought was “all under the heaven are family”, “the barbarians are also humanity” and the rule of barbarians by virtue. Those understandings were quite advanced at his time, indicating that emperors of the Tang



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Dynasty represented by Emperor Taizong were better enlightened about the importance of integrating the Borderland with the hinterland, and equal treatment for the barbarians. The Tang Dynasty was so open-minded on border governance partly because it learnt the lessons of the peasant uprising at the end of the Sui Dynasty and inherited Emperor Wen’s strategy of governing the border, and partly because it had barbarian lineage, the tradition of marriage with barbarians among the imperial clan and consequently weaker consciousness of “troubles resting with the barbarians.” Emperor Gaozu’s mother Dugu, Empress Dou, and Emperor Taizong’s Empress Zhangsun, were all Xianbei people. In the early Tang Dynasty, Dou Dan, Doulu Huairang, and Ashina Sheer, who married Tang princesses, were all of barbarian origin. In the Tang Dynasty, the active development and management of border areas was launched under the guidance of the above-mentioned philosophy. Emperor Taizong has repeatedly rejected all opposition and insisted on his idea of border governance. In the 15th year of Zhenguan (640), the Tang Dynasty conquered Gaochang, “and wanted to establish a prefecture and county there for governance.” Wei Zheng opposed on the grounds that a garrison would be too costly and “unlikely to produce any material benefit to the Middle Kingdom.” Chu Suiliang then suggested repatriating the leader to Gaochang to make it a vassal of the Tang Dynasty. His suggestion was also rejected by Emperor Taizong, who set up Xizhou in Gaochang, and made Xizhou the Anxi Protectorate, “dispatching over thousand troops to defend and guard the land” (Wu, 2003, 506). Emperor Taizong’s governance of Borderland barbarians with graciousness was also fruitful. As a result, the impact of Tang Dynasty penetrated into the border areas, and even spread far beyond them. According to “Records of the Tang Dynasty (9)” in History as a Mirror, in the 4th year of Zhenguan (635), when the visiting chiefs of the Borderland barbarians submitted a memorial requesting Emperor Taizong to assume the title of Heavenly Khan, Emperor Taizong accepted the request. From then on, Emperor Taizong affixed the signature of “Heavenly Khan” in all letters to barbarian leaders in the northwest. In the first year of Shengong (697), Assistant Minister Di Renjie wrote in a memorial that “the Borderland barbarians have

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been beyond the territory of preceding emperors. The seas in the east, quicksands in the west, deserts in the north, and five ridges in the south have been a godsend to separate them from the Middle Kingdom. Seen from historical records, they have been impenetrable by education of the Middle Kingdom over three generations, but now our country has taken them all” (Sima, 1956, 6524). What Di Renjie said is not complete flattery. However, it should be pointed out that Emperor Taizong was not immune from limitations in border management thought and strategy. First of all, his thoughts on border governance and placation of Borderland barbarians mainly started from the moral values of “all under heaven being one family” and “extending graciousness to the barbarians.” He did not fully realize the profound significance of developing and consolidating the border, nor had he sufficient understanding of its use after development. Instead, he thought that managing the Borderland would be “futile and detrimental to the common people”, and that as an advisable ruler he would refrain from it. Therefore, the Tang court gained little, although it invested a lot of manpower and material resources to manage the border, and consequently border management became unsustainable. This situation was already pointed out in the Tang Dynasty. In the first year of Shengong (697), Shuzhou Governor Zhang Jianzhi submitted an imperial memorial requesting to cancel Yaozhou, saying that “now the salt tax and cloth tax (of Yaozhou) are no longer sent to the imperial court, nor are the rare tributes. Its weapons are not sent to the army, nor are its treasures sent to the Middle Kingdom. However, we are still exhausting our resources and dispatch our people for the sake of the barbarians. I privately feel sorry for my country.” He added that Yaozhou should be canceled and “made to pay annual visits to Tang like a vassal does.” His proposal was rejected by Wu Zetian (Liu et al., 1975, 2939). The circumstances of “salt and cloth taxes retained by” or exempted for jimi prefectures as described by Zhang Jianzhi are also seen in historical records. Zheng Hui, a prime minister of Nanzhao, once said to Yimou Xun, King of Nanzhao, that “previously when Nanzhao submitted to China, China had handsomely rewarded it but took nothing, out of courtesy and righteousness. Now, abandoning the vassaldom to submit to the



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Tang wouldn’t incur conscript labor for distant garrison or heavy taxes, but the benefits would be untold.” Yimou Xun agreed. In the 3rd year of Xiantong (862), Emperor Yizong issued an imperial decree to have Lingnan divided into the East and West Circuit, under the jurisdiction of a military governor each. He said that “the eight prefectures were remote and were never used to sericulture or farming. Lately, it has been plagued by robbery and rendered even more forlorn. Walls will have to be built and counties established” (Liu et al., 1975, 682). The decision to establish counties in the south was not aimed at economic development or taxation, since it never knew sericulture or agriculture. Instead, the primary purpose was to enhance defense. According to “Records on Food and Money” in Book of Old Tang, regulations were initially formulated in the 7th year of Wude, stipulating that “Rice shall be collected instead of taxes for prefectures in Lingnan, specifically, one dan two dou, eight dou and six dou for class-A, class-B and class-C households respectively. The quota shall be halved for barbarian households.” The rice taxes imposed on registered households were already light, while adjustment tax and conscript service were exempted altogether. However, the taxes of Borderland barbarians were imposed only half of the tax burden, which can be said to be very light. Secondly, although Emperor Taizong harbored enlightened thoughts such as “all under the heaven being one family” “barbarians are also humanity”, he also demonstrated a negative consciousness such as “barbarians are beasts at heart despite a human façade, and they inevitable to turn on you for the slightest grievance” (Sima, 1956, 6201). When his established policy for border governance was met with resistance in implementation, he might also become volatile and suspect that his policy of “extending graciousness to barbarians” had been wrong. In the 13th year of Zhenguan (639), Emperor Taizong said to his courtiers that “The Middle Kingdom is the root and the stem, while barbarians are branches and leaves. How can the tree be expected to flourish if we cut the root and stem to serve the branches and leaves. I almost plunged myself into dilemma when if ignored Wei Zheng’s remonstrance.” Here, “Wei Zheng’s remonstrance” refers to the observation of Wei Zheng in the 4th year of Zhenguan. Back then, the Tang court discussed strategies for handling the 100,000-odd Turkic captives following the defeat

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of Turkic army. Wei Zheng said that “The (Turkic) are wild like birds and beasts, and are not our kin. They lie low when they are weak and rebel when they are strong. Volatility is in their nature.” He suggested that they be set free and repatriated to their homeland, not retained on Tang land. However, his suggestion was not adopted by Emperor Taizong. Wen Yanbo, Head of the Secretariat, suggested that the Turks should be placed to the south of the Yellow River. His opinion was consistent with Taizong’s idea of “all under heaven being one family”, and was thus approved by Taizong. So the Turkic population was settled in the vicinity of Youzhou and Lingzhou, and Dingxiang Area Command and Yunzhong Area Command were set up in the former land of Jieli. And Tuli Khan was appointed Area Commander to lead the garrison. Thousands of Turkic households moved to Chang’an. In the 13th year of Zhenguan, Jieshe, the brother of Tuli Khan organized a rebellion, and Taizong regretted not following Wei Zheng’s advice (Sima, 1956, 6076, 6147). Third, Emperor Taizong often deviated from his previous practices in his later years. In launching ruling strategies, the Sui and Tang emperors commonly failed to see them through. And the same was true for Emperor Taizong. Emperor Wen of the Sui Dynasty, Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty and other emperors all emphasized the legal institution and the rule of law. However, it was the relatively complete legal theory proposed in the Sui and Tang that revealed the flaws and limitations of the ancient legal theory and legal system, and proved that the rule of man had always been above the rule of law. Some of the more enlightened governance policies and their implementation seldom saw out, mainly because that they tended to be extremely unstable under the rule of man politics. After the death of Emperor Taizong, his successors such as Gaozong, Wu Zetian, and Xuanzong still generally inherited his strategy of governing the border. In the first half of Xuanzong’s rule, there was a prosperous situation called “Golden Days of Kaiyuan.” However, during the “Golden Days of Kaiyuan”, social contradictions and the corruption of the ruling group were already intensifying, foreboding a profound crisis under the façade of prosperity. The An-Shi Rebellion that broke out in the 14th year of Tianbao (755) marked that the transition of the



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Tang Dynasty from centralization and unification to separatism, and its management of the border areas also changed from active to passive. The An-Shi Rebellion became a watershed in border management in the Tang Dynasty, separating the blind expansion in the early period to the gradual retreat in the later period. The shift was also attributable to Xuanzong’s arrogance and indulgence, and neglect of political affairs in his later years. Following the An-Shi Rebellion, the various hidden contradictions in the Tang Dynasty were fully exposed, and the constantly emerging internal and external troubles overwhelmed the Tang court, and eliminated the vigor and enterprise of the early Tang Dynasty. Under such circumstances, the Tang court strove to be pragmatic in Borderland management, and to handle Borderland affairs mostly on a matter-of-fact basis. However, the officials were corrupt, with frequent decision-making errors and lack of long-term and overall considerations. Even without the “An-Shi Rebellion”, it remains doubtful whether the established strategy of the Tang Dynasty for border governance would last.

3.3  In border areas, the Tang Dynasty extensively implemented the jimi pefecture system, which was not only a policy for rule of barbarians, but also a policy for Borderland governance. In practice, it inherited the “jimi ruling” of the Qin and Han dynasties, and set the precedent of the chieftain system for the Yuan and Ming dynasties, exerting a profound impact in the Tang Dynasty and beyond. Seen from the records, its jimi prefecture system generally had the following characteristics: jimi prefectures were mainly set up to control the Borderland barbarians, not to expropriate tribute or levy conscript labor. To control the Borderland barbarians, jimi prefectures were usually established on the basis of tribes, with their tribes made the governor or area commander of the jimi institution organization; those posts were hereditary, in contrast to kings, marquises, and county magistrates that were excluded from the state official system in the Qin and Han dynasties. Most of the tribute record and household registration were not sent to Ministry of Revenue and light taxes and corvee were exercised. The jimi prefecture system

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of the Tang Dynasty in the border areas was adapted to the lower level of social and economic development and played an important role in consolidating its rule in the border areas. border areas were obviously intended for military rule, and charged with placating, conquering and controlling the jimi prefectures and barbarians under their jurisdiction. Although jimi prefectures sometimes paid a symbolic amount of tribute to the Tang Dynasty, there was no clear stipulation on the amount, and the relevant management system was not sound. Those became loopholes utilized by Borderland officials to levy hefty taxes. There were admittedly profound social reasons for the “An-Shi Rebellion” to break out shortly after the “Golden Years Kaiyuan,” but improper appointment by the Tang court and consequently inappropriate treatment of some major issues were a factor that aggravated the crisis and promoted the outbreak of contradictions. In the 22nd year of Kaiyuan (734), Emperor Xuanzong appointed Li Linfu, who was known for “his sweet talking and devious scheming” and for abusing power for personal gains, as his prime minister. During his tenure of 19 years, Li Linfu caused political chaos in the Tang Dynasty. He was succeeded by Yang Guozhong, originally a township rogue, who was  arrogant and domineering but ignorant about state governance. He was responsible for the three ill-fated wars launched by the Tang Dynasty against Nanzhao. The quality and origin of border officials and the mechanism for their appointment were important factors that affected the results of border governance. The inconvenient communication between the Borderlands and the hinterland normally requested the generals guarding the Borderlands to handle government affairs independently, and their loyalty and competence was the key to the success in border governance. Carefully selecting the appropriate border officials and generals was an important experience summed up in border rule in all dynasties. The crisis in border governance in the middle and late Tang Dynasty had a lot to do with the serious problems in the management of its officials. The Borderland officials were often changed, usually via swapping positions with their counterparts in the capital or the hinterland. In the early Tang Dynasty, there were strict regulations on the appointment of Borderland general, including the



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selection of loyal and well-known officials, avoidance of prolonged tenure, service in person and avoidance of concurrent tenures. From the beginning of the Kaiyuan period, due to the ruler’s misunderstanding and problematic appointment of officials, the Tang court changed the original regulations. Sima Guang believed that the outbreak of the An-Shi Rebellion had been directly attributable to Emperor Xuanzong changing the principle for appointing the Borderland commanders. He said that “Since its founding, the Tang Dynasty has assigned loyal and well-known commanders to border areas as the governing officials. With a fixed tenure, personal service and nonconcurrent service, they often became prime ministers, as their merits increased. Ministers were dispatched to the generals of Borderland barbarian origin, though they might be talented and resourceful like Ashina Sheer, and Qifu Heli, because they were deemed unable to perform the duty alone.” In Kaiyuan years, Emperor Xuanzong harbored the aspiration to bring under control the Borderland barbarians, and began to appoint An Lushan to important posts. “By and by, the military governor of all circuits was of barbaric origin and the elite troops were sent to guard the northern Borderland. Finally, the equilibrium of power was upset and An Lushan laid waste to the world” (Sima, 1956, 6888). Since Xuanzong changed the rules of appointment, some Borderland generals served for more than one decade. In particular, after his promotion of An Lushan, the Borderland bureaucracy was further corrupted, and decision-making of the imperial court were ill-considered. After Tianbao years, the generals of the Borderlands selected by the Tang Dynasty were of varying eligibility. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan, the Tang Dynasty managed to form an alliance with Nanzhao again largely because of the resourcefulness and wisdom of Wei Gao, the military governor of Xichuan. However, outstanding garrison generals like Wei Gao were after all few and sparse. It should not be said that the Tang Dynasty managed the Yunnan region with few achievements. In particular, before it fell out with Nanzhao, the Tang Dynasty managed Yunnan for more than 130 years. During this period, its rule there was gradually advanced from the northeast and east that had been occupied by the previous dynasties to the west, before controlling the Erhai Basin and the area to its west. In

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the first year of Linde (664), the Tang Dynasty set up the Yaozhou Area Command (now Yao’an, Yunnan), and placed 57 jimi prefectures under its jurisdiction. That feat of the Tang Dynasty surpassed previous generations. It also built a number of roads in Yunnan, connecting it to Xichuan and Annan. The impact of the management in the early Tang Dynasty was far-reaching. Faced with the intricate relationship with Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom, the Tang Dynasty exercised a sober judgment and adopted corresponding countermeasures. In the 2nd year of Baoying (763), the Tubo Kingdom captured Chang’an and repeatedly invaded into Yan, Xia and other prefectures. In the 3rd year of Zhenyuan (787), the courtier Li Mi proposed a strategy to Emperor Dezong, saying that “Your majesty may find it advisable to befriend the Uyghur Khaganate in the north, Yunnan in the south, and Tay and Tintu in the west, to lay siege to the Tubo Kingdom. This way, horses will be easier to acquire.” His proposal was approved by the emperor. Li Mi added that “to win over Yunnan is like to cut off the right arm of the Tubo Kingdom” (Sima, 1956, 7505). Out of the above consideration, the Tang Dynasty actively contacted Nanzhao, and quickly restored friendly relations with it. In the struggle with Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom, it took the initiative to change and created a new situation that was beneficial to it. However, in handling the relationship with Nanzhao, the rulers of the Tang Dynasty made many mistakes, including many painful lessons. As Nanzhao rose in influence, the Tang Dynasty saw that it might threaten its own interests, and gradually changed its countermeasures from support to restriction and crackdown whenever the opportunity presented itself. Zhang Qiantuo, then serving as the governor of Yaozhou, faithfully safeguarded the interests of the Tang Dynasty. In response to the changes in the situation in Yunnan, he formulated a thorough plan and used various methods to sow discord in and consequently weaken Nanzhao. He also contacted the Tubo Kingdom and even made military preparations against Nanzhao. When Nanzhao saw the change of Zhang Qiantuo from harmony to suppression, it concluded that Zhang Qiantuo had been personally accountable. Nanzhao couldn’t and didn’t dare to believe its ears that the Tang Dynasty, that had been originally supportive, could change so drastically almost



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overnight. So it submitted an imperial memorial, and voiced its grievances. The Tang Dynasty received the memorial of Nanzhao “complaining repeated injustices” and sent Jia Qijun, an envoy, to inquire. However, Jia Qijun supported Zhang Qiantuo after learning the truth. Ge Luofeng was still convinced that he had been framed by Zhang Qiantuo, and sent his general Yang Luodian to the capital for explanation. However, nothing came of Yang’s request for justice. As a result, Nanzhao attacked the Yaozhou Area Command and killed Zhang Qiantuo, eventually disrupting its friendship with the Tang Dynasty. However, New Book of Tang, Old Book of Tang, History as a Mirror, Prime Tortoise of the Record Bureau, Essential Records of the Tang Dynasty, and other historical records attributed the disruption between Nanzhao and Tang Dynasty to Zhang Qiantuo’s unreasonable bullying of Nanzhao and “abusing them without regard to courtesy” (Wang, 1955, 1763; Sima, 1956, 6901; Liu et al., 1975, 5280). Later, Nanzhao carved the “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao”, which detailed the events of Yaozhou. Although Nanzhao had different interpretations of the record, it can be seen from the inscription that the stringent and harsh attitude of Zhang Qiantuo towards Nanzhao actually reflected the changed policy of the Tang Dynasty towards Nanzhao, and that his approach had also been approved by the imperial court. Zhang Qiantuo became the scapegoat for the rupture between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty (Fang, 2007). The author believes that the reasons are two folds. First, Yang Guozhong and others, that were holding sway in the imperial court, shifted the blame to the rupture between the Tang Dynasty and Nanzhao onto Zhang Qiantuo, since they had habitually deceived the imperial court more than once about the relationship with Nanzhao. Second, the prolonged chaos following the An-Shi Rebellion might have caused the loss of relevant files, and consequently concealed the historical fact of Nanzhao’s rebellion against Tang. However, even when the content of the “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao” were known very early and the historical facts were easily clarified, the Old Book of Tang, New Book of Tang, History as a Mirror and other classics still insisted on the argument that the despotic bully of Zhang Qiantuo had been the cause for the Nanzhao rebellion, fully reflects the corrupt feudal politics and

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bureaucratic dictatorship, as well as the ignorance of related people. After the Yaozhou incident, Nanzhao knew that it had committed a felony, so it pleaded with the Tang Dynasty to give it a chance to amend. Faced with a good opportunity to subdue Nanzhao, Yang Guozhong rejected Nanzhao’s plead and arbitrarily launched three military expeditions, but was defeated by the coalition of Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom. Subsequently, Nanzhao grew into a powerful local regime. After the An-Shi Rebellion, Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom jointly invaded into the territory of Tang many times and became a lingering nightmare for its rulers. The Tang Dynasty’s painstaking management of the Yunnan region for over one century came to no avail. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Yimou Xun returned to the Tang Dynasty. The friendly relationship between the Tang Dynasty and Nanzhao was restored, and the power of the Tubo Kingdom was obviously diminished. However, the Tang Dynasty ignored the historical experience of “administration ceasing with the death of the ruler” and failed to adopt the necessary measures to guard against Nanzhao. After the two sides restored friendly relations in the Zhenyuan years, Yimou Xun asked to send hostages to the Tang court according to tradition, but was refused by Wei Gao, the military governor of Xichuan. Yimou Xun insisted. Eventually, Wei Gao set up an official school in Chengdu for admitting Nanzhao children, and taught them arithmetic and history. “When they graduate, a new batch is admitted.” The school lasted several decades (Sima, 1956, 8078). It facilitated cultural exchanges between the two sides, but also enabled Nanzhao to fully understand the reality of Chengdu (Sun, 1983, 8335). In the 3rd year of Taihe (829), Nanzhao attacked Shu with a massive army and alarms were sent from the border prefectures. However, Du Yuanying didn’t believe it. When the Nanzhao army arrived, “none of the border cities was unprepared” (Sima, 1956, 7867). Nanzhao’s repeated success in attacking Shu was related to the lack of defense on the part of the Tang Dynasty over the previous decades. After taking over as military governor of Xichuan, Li Deyu said that “Wei Gao did not repair the fortresses during his tenure in Xichuan, and canceled the border patrol altogether. He would remonstrate against the addition of even



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one single soldier to the garrison, so as to please Nanzhao. Therefore, Du Yuanying should not be solely held accountable for the defeat of the Tang Dynasty” (Li, 1983, 7220). In short, in handling the relationship with the Tang Dynasty, Nanzhao was more pragmatic and flexible in strategy. However, the Tang court was obviously rigid and ineffective in command. Meanwhile, its policy tended to fluctuate considerably, and its handling of related matters was short-sighted. The principle of Nanzhao was to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages, and its relevant measures were also appropriate. Nanzhao also took full advantage of the corrupt official management of the Tang Dynasty and the contradictions between the Tang Dynasty and the Borderland barbarians to serve its interests. In the 3rd year of Taihe (829), when Nanzhao attacked Xichuan, the then military governor Du Yuanying reduced the clothing and food of soldiers, since he had been ignorant of military affairs. Therefore, Nanzhao “gave clothing and food to them, and consequently knew all movements in Shu.” Later, when Nanzhao attacked Xichuan, “Shu soldiers served as the local guide” (Sima, 1956, 7867). According to “Biography of Nanzhao” in the New Book of Tang, in the Dazhong years when Li Zhuo served as the military commissioner of Annan, he “bent the law to line his own pockets, and traded one bucket of salt for an ox, making the livelihood of the barbarians unbearable.” The barbarian tribes then joined force with the Nanzhao Army and captured the Annan Area Command. Yu Shizhen, the governor of Xizhou, was greedy and violent, and often plundered the Lianglin Tribe for gold. In the 6th year of Xiantong (865), when Nanzhao attacked the city, “the Lianglin Tribe opened the gate to welcome them” (Sima, 1956, 8111). The eastern barbarian tribes of Junashi, Wudeng, and Mengchong originally served the Tang Dynasty meritoriously by assisting Wei Gao in subduing the the Tubo Kingdom. Later, when they were excessively exploited by the Tang officials, they turned to Nanzhao. “Every time they accompany the Nanzhao in an invasion, they would fight with all their strength and torture and kill any Tang captives” (Sima, 1956, 8156). This suggests that the corrupt officials in the Tang Dynasty had been devastating.

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4.  The Strategy of “Prioritizing Internal Risks over Borderland Affairs” in the Song Dynasty The Song Dynasty raised the level of material and spiritual civilization to a new height during the 320 years of rule. It strengthened authoritarian centralization, thereby establishing a huge army and bureaucratic institutions, and incurring the formation of “excessive troops”, “excessive officials” and “excessive expenses.” Embracing the tendency of emphasizing internal affairs over external affairs in administration, it adopted the strategy of “prioritizing internal risks over Borderland issues.” The strategy helped maintain the long-term stability of its rule, but also weakened its military capabilities and enhanced conservative tendency in foreign exchanges, reducing it to a disadvantageous position in the competition with the northern barbarians. In the beginning of the 10th century, the Khitan, Dangxiang, and Jurchen tribes in the north witnessed rapid development, while the originally advanced Han Chinese became weakened politically and militarily in comparison. For about three centuries, the Han Chinese lost the dominance in the competition among various ethnic groups. Therefore, the repeated failures of Song in the wars with Liao, Xixia, and Jin were not solely due to faulty strategies or tactics. Faced with the strong pressure from the northern barbarians, its strategy of “prioritizing internal risks over border affairs” was gradually enhanced. For the southwest Borderland left by their predecessor, the Song Dynasty adopted different governance policies in Dali and Guangxi.

4.1  Dali Kingdom was a Borderland regime established in the 2nd year of Tianfu in the later Jin Dynasty (937). Before its annihilation by the Mongol army in the first year of Zhibaoyou (1253), it ruled for 317 years and witnessed 22 monarchs. In its early days, its territory included present-day Yunnan Province and southwestern Sichuan, as well as present-day northeastern Burma and northern Laos, roughly the same as that of the previous Nanzhao. During its rule, the agricultural areas of Yunnan entered the early feudal society, and the frequent plundering



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of Nanzhao was no longer seen. Meanwhile, Yunnan had been the destination of a large number of immigrants from other places since the Han and Tang dynasties, and its economy and culture was profoundly affected by the hinterland. Therefore, it had a strong sense of belonging to the Central Plains dynasty and hoped to establish a long-term vassal relationship with it. In the third year of Qiande (965), the Song Dynasty dispatched its general Wang Quanbin with an army to attack Chengdu, and Meng Chang, the ruler of the Later Shu, surrendered. Thus the land of Shu was unified by the Northern Song Dynasty. Upon hearing the news, the Dali Kingdom dispatched its garrison official of Jianchang City (now Xichang, Sichuan) to congratulate the Song Dynasty via Qingxiguan Road in Chengdu. In the 7th year of the Taiping Xingguo (982), Emperor Taizong ordered garrison generals of Lizhou Prefeture to build big ships on the Dadu River, “to ferry southwestern barbarians paying tribute to the Song court” (Li, 1980, 43). After Hou Shu was pacified, Wang Quanbin submitted relevant maps of Yunnan to Emperor Taizu Zhao Kuangyin, who was keenly aware that “the disaster of Tianbao in the Tang Dynasty had originated in Nanzhao”, indicated with a jade axe areas to the west of the Dadu River, saying that “this will not be mine” (Bi, 1992). This instruction was thoroughly implemented in the Northern Song Dynasty as an established policy. In the last years of Zhenghe, a memorial was submitted, requesting the establishment of cities outside the Dadu River to facilitate border trade. Emperor Huizong asked Yuwen Chang, the Prefect of Lizhou, about this matter. Yuwen Chang replied that “since Emperor Taizu designated the Dadu River as a border, our dynasty had been free from the threats of barbarians in the southwest for 150 years. Establishment of cities beyond the river will incur ambivalence of the barbarians and incur discord, which were not a blessing for the Middle Kingdom” (Tuotuo et al., 1977). The alienation of the Northern Song Dynasty from Dali Kingdom was also attributed to a one-sided summary of the lessons of the Tang Dynasty’s demise. It firmly believed that “Tang had been overthrown by Huangchao, and the root cause consisted in Guilin” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6295). In other words, it believed that although the Tang Dynasty was destroyed by the Huangchao uprising, the reason was the mutiny of the garrison stationed in Guilin

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to guard against Nanzhao. The mutiny caused the aggravation of political situation to beyond salvation. Of course, the estrangement of Dali Kingdom was mainly due to the need to concentrate on dealing with barbarians in the north. Just as Guo Songnian had said in the early Yuan Dynasty, “at its founding, the Song Dynasty was forced to guard against a great enemy in the north, and had no energy to manage distant land” (Guo, 1986, 20). The Song Dynasty has always held a conservative attitude on managing the Borderlands for expanding territories. In the 3rd year of Jingde (1006), Shao Ye submitted a map of water and surface transportation from Yongzhou to Jiaozhou. And Zhenzong showed it to his trusted ministers, saying that “Jiaozhou teems with epidemic miasma, and Yizhou is extremely dangerous and impassable. If we attack them with an army, there will be heavy casualties. Moreover, since our ancestors had seized such a vast territory, if there is a sudden rebellion, we must eliminate the harm for the people” (Xu, 1957). The remark of Empror Zhenzong represented a general view of rulers in the Song Dynasty on border governance. Emperor Huizong said to his ministers that “The imperial court must not fall out with the Borderlands. Once discord is formed, disasters will certainly ensue and cannot be easily settled. How can a monarch be so callous with the life of his troops and his people?” According to record, in the third year of Duanping (1234), Emperor Huizong “repented development of the border areas after soul searching” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 810; 11094). Those were a reflection of the conservative mentality of the Song Dynasty in governing the Borderland regions. In the eyes of the rulers, the territory left by the ancestors should be guarded carefully, and expanding the territory or operating the Borderlands was “a greed for useless land”, and would lead to exhausted resources in vain. Therefore, the Northern Song Dynasty was always scrupulous about handling the relationship with Dali Kingdom and strove to restrain it within a narrow range. The courtiers of the Song Dynasty even thought that using the Dadu River as the demarcation with Dali Kingdom was a clever move by the court to rule the border. In the 6th year of Shaoxing (1136), Hanlin Academician Zhu Zhen said that Dali Kingdom was originally called Nanzhao in the Tang Dynasty, and it repeatedly attacked the Tang



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Dynasty, causing turmoil all over the country. Emperor Taizu learnt the lesson of Tang and adopted the Dadu River as the border, making it impossible for Nanzhao to commit crimes or pledge allegiance. “That is the best policy is to ward off the barbarians.”3 In the 26th year, Emperor Gaozong said to his ministers that “The barbarians have been violent and cunning since ancient times, repeatedly invading into Sichuan before the Tang Dynasty. In our dynasty, Emperor Taizhu established the Dadu River as the boundary, and kept them in restraint. However, isn’t it still necessary to deploy troops along the border to keep watch” (Xu, 1957)? Dali Kingdom repeatedly sent envoys to pay tribute and requested canonization from the Song Dynasty. In the 7th year of Zhenghe (1117), it sent horses, musk, bezoar, fine felt, and marble mountain sculpture inlaid with gold as tribute to the Song court, which conferred a series of titles on its King Duan Heyu, including Military Governor of Yunnan and King of Dali. However, soon the situation changed. In the second year of Xuanhe (1120), the Song court called for the Jin Dynasty to attack Liao together, and the war in the north suddenly became intensified. Huang Lin, Guangzhou Observation Envoy, was set up and convicted for introducing Dali Kingdom to the Middle Kingdom. Later, the relationship between the Song Dynasty and Dali diminished, “and Daili cut off all its contact with the Middle, Kingdom, except for the occasional border trade in Lizhou” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14073). On the other hand, during the war with northern barbarians, the Northern Song Dynasty had to purchase horses from the Dali Kingdom and the Southwestern barbarian tribes, because they were in short supply. In the Northern Song Dynasty, it set up trading fairs in Lizhou, Yazhou (now Ya’an, Sichuan) and other places. The horse trade between the merchants of Dali and the local government of Lizhou once reached a considerable scale. The five tribes including Shanqian and Shanhou in Qiongbuchuan (now Yuexi County, Sichuan) even “relied on horse trade for food and clothing.” In the 4th year of Qingli (1044), because the horses purchased in Lizhou were uneven in quality, Emperor Renzong 3 Zhu Zhen, Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom, in Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105.

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issued an edict “to have those inappropriate for war returned.” Yizhou official Yuan Kang submitted a memorial, remonstrating that “The move may ‘disappoint the people, encroach on their rights’ and consequently cause turmoil.” As a result, “the original practice was maintained” (Li, 1980). After being forced there, the Song court stayed to the south of the Yangtze River. The failure of the war with the northern barbarians and consequent humiliation further deepened its prejudice against the Borderland ethnic groups. The originally meager courage of its ancestors to open up Borderlands was virtually exhausted by the reign of Emperor Gaozong. Under such circumstances, its monarchs and ministers grew increasingly more wary of Dali and insisted on the Dadu River as the demarcation line, believing that the area to its south (including Dali Kingdom) belonged to the foreign land and should be on a par with other neighboring countries such as Jiaozhi. According to “Rites (22)” in History of Song, “when countries came to pay tribute, Jiaozhou, Yizhou, and Lizhou were rejected, but they were treated with respect.” According to the “Biography of Xia” in History of Song, “coastal tribues, including Jiaozhi, Champa, Kmir, Pu’er, and Dali, had habitually paid tribute after Liu Chang and Chen Hongjin came and pledged allegiance … They were not rejected when they came to submit themselves or chased when they defected. Since their land adjoined with that of the Middle Kingdom, they sometimes invaded it. As this occurred, they were punished, and forgiven when they surrendered. Brutal force was never the choice” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 2813, 13981). All reflect the above-mentioned views of the Southern Song Dynasty. After its founding, the Southern Song Dynasty continued to buy horses from Dali Kingdom, Luo Dian, Ziqi and other barbarian regimes. In the 4th year of Shaoxing (1134), the Southern Song Dynasty moved its horse-purchase department to Yongzhou (now Nanning, Guangxi), and set up a trade fair in Hengshanzhai (now Tiandong, Guangxi). The horse trade in Guangxi was once prosperous, reaching 1,500 horses in Hengshanzhai each year, and the cost paid by the Southern Song Dynasty included 50 yi of gold, 300 catties for platinum, 4,000 rolls for cotton cloth, and 2 million catties for Lianzhou salt (Bi, 1992, 756). However, due to the many restrictions on Dali merchants selling horses,



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as well as the long distance with multiple obstructions, records about them selling horses in Guangxi gradually became sparse. The Ziqi and Luodian tribes in western Guizhou “originally had no horses for sale.” So they bought horses from Dali and became the intermediaries to sell horses to the Southern Song Dynasty. For horses and elephants sent as tribute by Dali to the Southern Song Dynasty, Emperor Gaozong issued an edict saying that the value of the horses should be reimbursed, but the elephants should be rejected since they were a symbol of vassal relationship (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4565). The edict indicates that the Southern Song Dynasty did not want to continue the vassal-suzerain relationship established in the Northern Song Dynasty. In order to refuse entry of the tribute horses from Dali Kingdom to the Middle Kingdom, the horse-purchasing department of Guangnan Xilu Route actually resorted to the pretext of “the budget for buying horses this spring has been used up, and there is no money left to buy horses.” Emperor Gaozong ordered that the tribute horses could be purchased, but added that the tribute envoys of Dali Kingdom should be closely watched after they entered the territory of the Southern Song Dynasty, “and a low-profile approach be adopted to avoid troubles” (Xu, 1957). Zhu Zhen said in “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom” that “now fighting is still going on, and war horses are badly needed. The horse purchase in Guilin should be enhanced. However, the savages are familiar with risks and trades, and merchants are treacherous. They would balance the interests and learn about our real situation. How shall we guard against incidents of Dazhong and Xiantong? It might be advisable to secretly order Guangxi officials to choose reliable and trustworthy people for horse-trading venues, and avoid the arrogant and troublesome, so as to keep them in restraint. After a while, the road to the northwest would be available, and the use of Guangxi horses will be gradually reduced, thus dispersing trouble before it happens.”4 From this this suggests that the monarchs and ministers of the Southern Song Dynasty had been outwardly strong but inwardly weak. Their unwarranted suspicion of Dali Kingdom and their uneasiness in 4 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105.

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the mutual relationship was also seen from the high alert and rigorous preparations made by Song officials in Hengshanzhai for upcoming Dali Kingdom caravans, as if they were facing an arch enemy. Zhou Qufei described such a scene: “the Song Dynasty established villages and fortresses in Hengshanzhai, and pooled soldiers from the vicinity areas to suppress any possible trouble. The horse-purchasing official would arrive at the trading scene with armored troops and then trade with them” (Zhou, 1999, 190). The monarch and courtiers of the Song Dynasty backtracked and deceived wantonly in communication with Dali Kingdom. In the 7th year of Xining (1074), the Northwestern tribes reached an agreement of not trading with the Song Dynasty, “and stopped selling horses to it.” The Song court commissioned Chengdu Circuit to recruit people to go to Dali and buy horses from it “through hoaxing and coaxing.” Yang Zuo, a successful imperial examination candidate from Emei, answered to the recruit and led a team there, “nominally as an envoy of state visit, for the purpose of horse purchase.” The King of Dali was “overjoyed.” The following year, a caravan of horses from Dali reached Tongshan Village (now Emei, Sichuan), claiming that it “was answering to the call of Yang Zuo.” However, by that time the Northwestern tribes had resumed their trade as before, and the shortage of horses began to ease. As a result, the Song Dynasty government denied that “the circuit had never heard about a Yang Zuo,” and eventually rejected the horses. The envoys of Dali “knew that they had been rejected with a pretext and left with resentment” (Yang, 1980, 6539). As the Southern Song Dynasty gradually became lackadaisical, records of its exchanges with Dali were rare. In the middle years of Xianchun, when Ma Ji became Prefect of Zhizhou, he resolutely implemented the Southern Song Dynasty’s intention to alienate Dali. “Consequently, Dali did not dare to venture beyond Shanchan (in Kunming today), and Annan did not dare to enter Yongping” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 1327). In the first year of Baoyou (1253), when the Mongolian army bypassed the northwest to attack Dali, the Yongzhou government of the Song Dynasty proposed to infiltrate Dali to spy on the military situation, but most of the military investigations stopped at Temo (now Guangnan, Yunnan). “Those that reached Dali were few and sparse,



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because the barbarians along the route had blocked all passages, making it difficult to get through.”5 Therefore, this suggests that the contacts between the Southern Song Dynasty and Dali were basically cut off in the later period. The alienation of Dali Kingdom by the Song Dynasty with the Dadu River as the demarcation had multi-faceted influences. This policy avoided being sandwiched by the enemy, and allowed it to concentrate all its efforts on addressing the challenges of the barbarian regime in the north. Since the Southern Song Dynasty was far inferior to the Northern Song Dynasty in strength, understandably it adopted a more passive and conservative policy towards Dali. However, as far as the management of the southwest Borderland is concerned, the negative impact was also very obvious. Regarded as a foreign country by the Song Dynasty, Yunnan was isolated from most parts of the motherland, and inevitably marginalized in the political life of the Middle Kingdom. When Dali Kingdom was overthrown in the Yuan Dynasty, a Confucian Temple was set up in present-day Kunming, but the locals did not know the statue of Confucius enshrined, and called it “Han Buddha.” The Song Dynasty also recognized the independent status of Annan, allowing the separation of the present-day northern Vietnam from the territory of the Central Plains dynasty. As the tribute road via Annan was blocked, the communication between the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula and the Chinese hinterland was also significantly reduced. In order to meet the urgent need for war horses, the Song Dynasty set up trading fairs in present-day Sichuan and Guangxi for buying horses from Dali merchants, thus providing some opportunities for economic and cultural exchanges. However, its relationship with Yunnan was lackadaisical after all, exerting considerable negative impacts on its strategy to handle Dali. The fact the political relationship between Dali and the Song Dynasty (especially the Southern Song Dynasty) was indifferent or lukewarm does not mean that the Yunnan region lost contact with the motherland. In the historical arena where the Song, Khitan, Dangxiang, 5 Li Zengbo, Sequal Manuscripts of Kezhai Studio (2), Vol. 9, Memorial in Reply to the Imperial Decree.

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Jurchen, and Dali regimes competed, the Song Dynasty did not have a dominant political, military, or geographical position. Although it was irrefutably the direct successor of the Han and Tang state systems and the Chinese culture, it should by all means be improperly positioned as the orthodox among the Liao, Song, Xia, and Jin dynasties. Nor was its relationship with the Borderland regimes tantamount to that between the Borderland ethnic minorities and the Chinese mainland. Furthermore, the Chinese nation has developed in the mutual competition and integration of various ethnic groups. The inequality, contention and even wars among the ethnic groups were nothing out of the ordinary in ancient times. The fierce war between Liao, Song, Xia and Jin did not prevent the Yuan Dynasty from achieving a higher level of national unification on a new basis. Therefore, denying the Song Dynasty’s discrimination and alienation of Dali and its prolonged negative and loose connection with Daili was neither necessary nor in line with the facts.

4.2  Management of Lingnan in China’s imperial history was mainly centered on Panyu and Jiaozhou. In the 3rd year of Xiantong (862), the Tang Dynasty divided the Lingnan area into the eastern and western circuit, in order to mobilize forces to regain Jiaozhou, which had been captured by Nanzhao (Liu et al., 1975, 653). Lingnan Eastern Circuit and Eastern Circuit were headquartered in Guangzhou and Yongzhou (now Naning, Guangxi), concurrently governing Gui, Rong and Annan, while ushering in the separate government of Guangdong and Guangxi in history. The Song Dynasty regarded Guangxi as an important source of tax revenue for the treasury, and exercised active management, ushering in a period of rapid economic development in Guangxi. In order to facilitate the horse trade with Dali, it enhanced the operation and management of southern Guangxi. Meanwhile, the roads from Guilin to Nanning gradually increased, establishing the basic pattern of balanced economic development in Guangxi later on. The Northern and Southern Song dynasties adopted two completely different governance strategies for Dali and Guangxi. For the



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Dali Kingdom that had inherited the Nanzhao territory, the basic attitude was to keep Nanzhao as far away as possible with the Dadu River as the demarcation; for the Guangxi region belonging to the Song Dynasty, it actively strengthened operation in order to obtain more taxation and benefit the country and to make up for silver required for placating the neighboring Liao and Jin. Although the scale of the development of Guangxi in the Song Dynasty was not as large as that of the Yuan and Ming dynasties, it achieved quite obvious results. In fact, the Song Dynasty marked the period of fastest growth in Guangxi before the Yuan and Ming dynasties. In addition to the formal establishment of prefectures and counties in Guangxi, the Song Dynasty also implemented the system of jimi prefectures and counties, which were entrusted to the jurisdiction of an official department. According to “Geographical Records” in History of Song, Yongzhou Area Command controlled 44 jimi prefectures, 5 jimi counties and 11 jimi dong’s, mostly along the Zuojiang River and Youjiang River. In the present-day Guizhou area, some jimi prefectures and counties were also set up, but the degree of control was looser. All jimi prefectures and counties were established on the basis of local barbarian chiefs serving as officials, according the size and scope of their influence. Meanwhile, land was granted to them in view of their population. The Song Dynasty established the feudal lord’s jurisdiction over serfs in the form of law, and emphasized the establishment of county, dong and other jimi institutions, indicating that its control of jimi areas was deeper than that of the Tang Dynasty. Its control over Guangxi was enhanced, and its rule deeper than that of previous generations. On the one hand, it promoted the development of Guangxi; on the other hand, it also intensified the contradiction between the ruler and the barbarians in the south. The uprising and repeated rebellion of the Zhuang ethnic group in Guangyuan Prefecture and Yizhou and Fushui Prefecture were also attributable to the Song Dynasty’s strict control and excessive burdening of the tribes. In the 3rd year of the Zhidao (997), the Northern Song Dynasty divided its land into 15 Routes, establishing Guangnan Donglu Route (government seat in Guangzhou) and Guangnan Xilu Route (government seat in Guilin) in Lingnan. In the Yuanfeng reign, the 15 Routes

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were reorganized into 23 Routes. In the first year of Daguan (1107), the Song Dynasty split Jiuzhou from northwest Guangxi and established Qiannan Route, which was integrated into Guangnan Xilu Route in the 3rd year of Daguan. Guangnan Xilu Route governed 25 prefectures, three military prefectures, and 65 counties. After the Song court was forced to move south, it still had 15 routes, including Guangnan Donglu Route and Guangnan Xilu Route. Guangnan Xilu Route governed Jingjiang, Qingyuan and some other prefectures and military prefectures. In the Northern Song Dynasty, it included 25 prefectures, the three military prefectures of Hechanghua, Wan’an, and Zhuya, and 65 counties, roughly covering Guangxi region, the area connecting southern Guizhou and southeastern Yunnan to Guangxi, and Hainan Island. In the Southern Song Dynasty, it governed 20 prefectures and the three military prefectures of Nanning, Wan’an, and Jiyang. Compared with the Northern Song Dynasty, there was no obvious change in its jurisdiction in the Southern Song Dynasty. After the Song court moved south, the Horse-Purchase Department was established in Hengshanzhai (now Tiandong, Guangxi) in the third year of Shaoxing (1133), and the operating envoy and placating envoy of Guangnan Xilu Route was entrusted with management of Yongzhou. In the 22nd year of Shaoxing, Guangnan Xilu Route had 488,655 households and 1,341,572 people (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 2094; 2239). The rapid development of agriculture in Guangxi during the Song Dynasty was attributable to the emphasis by the rulers. For example, Emperor Taizu ordered the prefects and magistrates to issue a notice to the people that “only the original taxes shall be levied on” those who could extensively plant mulberry and jujubes on reclaimed barren fields. He also said that “awards shall be deliberated for” the county magistrates and clerks if they could succeed in attracting people to settle down, thus increasing the registered permanent residence and eliminating uncultivated land. Emperor Taizong, Zhenzong and other emperors also actively advocated farming and sericulture. All over the country, large tracts of wasteland were cultivated, and emphasis on agriculture and sericulture became a prevailing tendency. The Song Dynasty also implemented some measures to develop agricultural production in



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Guangxi. At the beginning of Duangong, Emperor Taizong ordered the officials of Lingnan and other places to encourage the people to plant various grains, and “to fetch millet, wheat and bean from prefectures and counties to the north of the Huaihe River” to be given to those lacking seeds. In the early Xianping reign, Emperor Zhenzong ordered to encourage mulberry and jujube cultivation in Guangnan Xilu Route, advocated increasing ramie production, and allowed the people to use ramie folds instead of mulberry or dates or woven cloth at a discount for trade in official markets (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4155; 4232). During the Song Dynasty, a large amount of wasteland in various parts of Guangxi was reclaimed. In the 6th year of Baoyou (1258), Guangxi official Li Zengbo said in his imperial memorial that “There were many barren fields in Guangxi, and the people were reluctant to till them for fear of increased tax”, recommending that farmers be exempted the rent for the first year and levied half the quota in the next two years and that “local officials succeeding in persuading reclamation be awarded.” His suggestions were approved. Since then, the area of newly reclaimed land increased significantly. By the beginning of the Southern Song Dynasty, the land reclaimed in Guizhou alone reached 10,042 qings (1 qing=6.67 hectares). The Song Dynasty also actively launched land reclamation by garrisions in Guangxi. According to “Biography of Emperor Lizong” in History of Song, the emperor issued the edict for establishing Hengchan Garrison Reclamation in the 6th year of Baoyou. In the 3rd year of Jingding (1262), when Jingjiang government “achieved initial success in official land reclamation”, the Song court ordered the garrisons of Yong, Qin, Yi, Rong, Liu, Xiang, and Xun prefectures to set up farms, and required them to report the progress in implementation. As the land continued to be reclaimed, the agricultural population also increased accordingly. In the late Jiading period, the population of Guangnan Xilu Route reached 520,000 households, more than double that during the Yuanfeng period of the Northern Song Dynasty. The 320 years of rule in the Song Dynasty witnessed relatively comprehensive development in Guangxi’s mining and metallurgical industries. There, the Song Dynasty carried out large-scale mining of some metal deposits, whose development was actually among the highest

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in the country. According to records in the first year of Xining (1068), the important mines in Guangxi include Baoxi Mine in Tengzhou and Baofu Mine in Yizhou for silver mines, Gudai Pit in Rongzhou for iron mines, and Tanglin Mine in Tengzhou for lead mines, and Gaozhou Farm for salt (Xu, 1957). According to the edict in the 6th year of Xuanhe (1124), “The benefits of smelting and mining are the most rewarding in Guangdong and Guangxi.” In the 32nd year of Shaoxing (1162), there were a total of metallurgical mines across the country, with Guangxi as one of the important origins of silver, copper and iron (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4531). According to another record, “There were silver pits in Guangxi during the Song Dynasty, and silver was mined and silver taxes levied; there were also copper pits, iron pits, lead pits, and tin pits.”6 Silver was generally produced throughout Guangxi. In the Song Dynasty, aside from silver plants managed by the government, various jimi prefectures and counties also built furnaces to smelt silver, which was a major product of annual tribute for various places. Guangxi also focused on the development of salt industry. According to the record, “(Song) used sea water for producing salt, mainly in Jingdong, Hebei, Liangzhe, Huainan, Fujian, and Guangnan.” “Salt revenues in the southeast were unrivaled” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4426, 4438). Zhou Qufei also said that “now the canal revenue rests in salt trade.” The western salt dealers transported salt by from Lianzhou to Yulin Prefecture and then ship it in boats, generating revenue of 655,600 strings of money for the canal department. This suggests that Song court set up salt farms along the coast of Guangxi to obtain huge taxes from them. After Song court went south, the salt industry in Guangxi was further developed, and the salt produced could meet local needs. The transportation industry in Guangxi was also significantly developed. The road from Yongzhou to the north is the most important transportation line for Guangxi to reach other places. The Southern Song Dynasty established a horse-purchase department in Hengshanzhai (today’s Tiandong, Guangxi) and other places for purchase of horses from Dali, Ziqi and Luodian. Most of the horses were transported 6 [Qing Dynasty] Wang Sen, Literary Records of Western Guangdong, Vol. 16, citing Collected Allusions.



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to the inland via Yongzhou, as were the tribute of Dali Kingdom. In addition, Yongzhou was still the main passage between Jiaozhi and the Song Dynasty, just as mentioned in the saying “Hengshanzhai Village in Yongzhou is the inevitable juncture for the passage from the Middle Kingdom to the southern barbarians.” The northward path from Yongzhou led to Guizhou and Jingzhou before reaching the hinterland. The Song Dynasty set up thousands of water posthouses along the route, but those were unable to meet the needs of transportation. Because the workers of those water posthouses were “overwhelmed with postal services”, Zhang Qixian, Controller-general of Hengzhou, cut their conscript labor by half, with approval from the emperor. The road from Guizhou to Yongzhou had to go through Liuzhou, Xiangzhou, and Binzhou. There were many post stations between Yongzhou and Guizhou, “amounting to 18” as mentioned in the record (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 9150, 12173, 10680). The Song Dynasty also opened up some new roads in Guangxi. At the beginning of Yuanyou, it opened the road from Rongzhou (now Rongshui, Guangxi) to Chengzhou, and established Xunjiang and other forts along the way. In addition, it also carved out an overland passage to Qianzhou (now Ganzhou, Jiangxi), and the passage made it possible to transport gold and silver, famous incense, rhinoceros, elephants and local products sent as tribute from Guangxi to Qianzhou by land for shipment to the capital by water (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14181). During the Song Dynasty, Guangxi made remarkable progress in agriculture, animal husbandry and handicrafts, especially rice planting, large livestock husbandry, mineral deposits development, sea salt production, cloth weaving, and ceramics. The transportation industry and commerce also developed greatly, as mainly manifested in the formation of a transportation network with Yongzhou-Guizhou Road as the trunk and the emergence of important commodity hubs such as Hengshanzhai, Qinzhou, Guizhou and Wuzhou. Although there was no officially organized immigration to Guangxi in the Song Dynasty, many people moved from the hinterland to Guangxi through various channels, which enlarged the influence of economic and cultural factors in the hinterland. Among them, the development of education, the change of social trend, the promotion of medicine, and the development

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and utilization of medicinal materials were most important. However, the progress of Guangxi should not be overestimated. The main reason was that its economic foundation was weak and the starting point too low. Despite the fast development, it could not keep up with other areas. The land under the jurisdiction of the Song Dynasty can be roughly divided into three types: economically developed areas, average areas and economically backward areas. Guangxi was classified as an economically backward area back then, and the excessive tax burden also exacerbated class and social contradictions there. The Song Dynasty also recognized the independent status of Annan, which managed to become a state. Jiaozhou had been made part of its territory after the reunification of the Middle Kingdom in the Qin Dynasty. In the 5th year of Yuanfeng (110 BC), the Western Han Dynasty established 13 military governors throughout the country, including one for Jiaozhou. In the Tang Dynasty, Jiaozhi was made the governance seat of Jiaozhou, which was later changed to Annan Protectorate. Annan was the bridgehead for the management of Yunnan, Guangxi, and the China-Indochina Peninsula by successive dynasties, and also a transit point for overseas transactions to Panyu. In the Five dynasties, Qu Chengmei a dignitary of Jiaozhou established a separatist regime there. In the 6th year of Qiande in the Song Dynasty (968), Ding Buling subdued the 12-Lords Rebellion in Jiaozhou and built the Great Quyue Kingdom. In the first year of Chunxi (1174), Great Quyue Kingdom came to the Song court to pay tribute, and Emperor Xiaozong conferred it the name “Annan” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14071). The conferment was out of consideration for pooling strength to deal with the northern barbarians, such as Liao and Xia, but it constituted recognition of the independent status of the Great Quyue Kingdom. Thereby, the Song Dynasty lost the bridgeheads and transportation hub for managing present-day Yunnan, Guangxi and the Indo-China Peninsula, as well as the favorable situation in the China-Indochina Peninsula. In addition, the Song Dynasty was forced to strengthen border defenses in Guangxi to resist Annan’s intrusion. So the practice was not costeffective by all means.



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5.  Strategies of the Yuan Dynasty for Governing the Southwestern Borderland The Yuan Dynasty managed the southwestern Borderland for only a little more than one century, but it marked a critical period for the development of the region. Regarding the southwestern Borderland as a source of taxation, as well as a base for attacking neighboring countries and a gateway for communication with the outside world, it adopted active measures for management. Its management strategy was completely different from that of the previous dynasties. In many aspects, strategies for governing the hinterland were adopted. For example, it extensively established governance agencies for in-depth rule, actively reclaimed land and stationed garrison, collected taxes and mining levies, vigorously developed transportation and opened schools, thus ushering in the fastest growth for the region. The Yuan court promoted the native official system, creating a precedent for the chieftain system, and established a watershed for the imperial court to implement separate governance policy in the border areas. Its active management laid the foundation for the comprehensive rule and development of the southwestern Borderland in the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties.

5.1  In the last years of the Southern Song Dynasty, in order to launch the “Wofu Stratagem” against the Southern Song Dynasty, Kublai Khan was ordered by his elder brother Mongke Khan to lead his army the northwest to attack Dali Kingdom. After pacifying it, Kublai Khan returned to the north, leaving Uriyangqatai to “subdue the remaining barbarians.” In the 9th year of Xianzong (1259), Uriyangqatai responded to the invitation of Emperor Xianzong. He led 3,000 cavalry and 10,000 Yunnan native troops to attack Hengshanzhai in Guangxi, and captured Guizhou, Xiangzhou, Jingjiang, Chenzhou and Yuanzhou along the way, before finally reaching the gate of Tanzhou (now Changsha, Hunan). After the army led by Kublai reached Ezhou (now Wuchang, Hubei), he joined forces with it, roughly realizing the strategic vision

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of “Outflanking Stratagem” (Song et al., 1976, 2981). Yunnan left a deep impression on Kublai and it became known that he attached great importance to the Yunnan region, since he dispatched princes or important officials to exercise government. In order to facilitate war in the Indochina Peninsula, Kublai Khan actively operated the Yunnan region. After Hugechi the Yunnan King was murdered by a subordinate, Kublai Khan ordered his minister Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar to establish a province in Yunnan. After taking office, Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar made conscious efforts to alleviate the tension in Yunnan and established Yunnan Province in the 11th year of Zhiyuan (1274). The subsequent 20 to 30 years was a relatively stable and prosperous period in Yunnan. In the 16th year of Zhiyuan, Sayyid Shams Din Umar died in office. His governance measures aimed at long-term peace and stability won the approval of Kublai Khan, who urged the officials of Yunnan Province to follow them and “to refrain from changing any of them unless with approval.” The Yuan court once took the provincial seal and left the seal of General for the Pacification Commission, until the following year when the Yunnan province was restored, with Nasr al-Din, the eldest son of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, as the minister in charge of political affairs (Song et al., 1976, 3067). According to “Geographical Records” in the History of Yuan, Yunnan Province had jurisdiction over 37 routes, 2 prefectures, 3 subordinate prefectures, 54 counties, and 47 subordinate counties. It also housed the Pacification Commission for Qujing, Wusa Wumeng, Luoluosi, Dali, Jinchi, Lin’an, Guangxi, Yuanjiang, Babai, Yinsha, Luodian, Mengqing, Bangya, Weichu, and Kainan, aside from that for Lijiang Route and Guangnan Xilu Route. The area under its jurisdiction “extends for over 3900 li from Hengshan of Pu’an Route in the east, to Jiangtou City in Burma in the west, and for nearly 4000 li from the Lucang River of Lin’an Route in the south to the Dadu River of Luoluosi in the north” (Song et al., 1976, 1457). This suggests that the scope of the province’s rule included the entire province of Yunnan, western Guizhou, southwestern Sichuan, northern Burma, Laos, and northern Thailand, exceeding that in China’s imperial history. The governance seat was today’s Kunming, which was the center of local, military and political power.



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In Yunnan, the Yuan Dynasty also stationed some Mongolian princes named “King of Yunnan” or “King of Liang.” The kings of Yunnan seen in records include Hugeci, Esen Timur, Laodi, Wang Chan, Timur Buqa, Alu, and Bolod. The King of Liang was higher in status than King of Yunnan, and was actually in control of the provincial affairs later on. The kings of Liang seen in the record include Gammala, Songshan, Bolod, and Basalawarmi. The Yuan Dynasty’s rule over Yunnan far exceeded that of previous generations in both breadth and depth. According to “Geography (4)” in History of Yuan, multiple official offices were established by Yunnan Province in the western and southern borders. The Placation Commission was established in the second year of Zhongtong (1261), and renamed to the Pacification Commission in the 15th year of Zhiyuan (1278), with the addition of the General Command for Six Routes; in the 23rd year, it was merged into the Pacification Commission of Jinchi in Dali. In the 13th year of Zhiyuan, Rouyuan, Mangshi, Zhenkang, Zhenxi, Pingmian and Luchuan Routes were established, all under the jurisdiction of the Pacification Commission of Jinchi; in the middle of Dade Reign, the Cheli General Command (government seat in today’s Jinghong). In the present Lincang area and northeastern Burmar, the Yuan Dynasty successively established Yinsha Luodian Pacification Commission (government seat to north of Lancang, Yunnan), Bangya Pacification Commission (government seat in to southwest of Mandalay, Burma), Babai Pacification Commission (government seat in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand), Mengqing Pacification Commission (government seat in Chiang Seam in northern Thailand), Laogao General Administration Office (government seat in Luang Prabang in northern Laos), and the routes of Yunyuan, Mengjian, and Menglai, Taigong, Mulian, Mengguang, Mubang, Mengding, Mounian, Menglong, Muduo, and Mengwu, aside from some military prefectures. In the Yuan Dynasty, the Yunnan region was separated from Sichuan and made a province directly managed by the imperial court, thus creating favorable conditions for its rapid development. The policy was followed in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Yunnan Province opened the post road from Kunming to Beijing through Guizhou and Hunan, establishing close ties with the middle reaches of the Yangtze

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River and the Central Plains. The newly opened post road was flat and short, with convenient supply of post horses. By and by, it replaced the old road to Sichuan and became the main passage to the hinterland. The Ming people said that “Guizhou is the gateway to Yunnan, and there would be no passage if Guizhou shuts its gate” (Min, 1991, 768). The opening of the post road to Huguang also enhanced the importance of the current Guizhou area, as Yunnan, Huguang, Sichuan and other provinces contended for its management, creating the conditions for establishing Guizhou Province in the Ming Dynasty. In the Yuan Dynasty, the transportation from Yunnan to various places was well-developed. Not only were post stations established along the original roads to Sichuan and Guangxi, and the newly opened Huguang Road, there were also post roads leading to places like Burma, Vietnam, and Thailand. There were several important post roads leading to Guizhou and Guangxi, and those from Zhongqing to Huangping via Puanda, to Luzhou via Usada, and to Yongzhou were the most important. There were two roads leading to present-day Burma. One was from present-day Dali to Burma and ultimately India via Baoshan and Tengchong; the other was from Yongchang to Jiangtoucheng (now Dehong area of Yunnan) via Jinchi (present-day Katha, Burma). The southward journey by water and land along the Irrawaddy River leads to the Bay of Bengal. The Yuan Dynasty also stationed troops on the main sections of the above roads for protection, even to the south of Pyay on the Irrawaddy River (Harvey, 1957, 96). Post stations were established in the Yuan Dynasty to “publicizing government orders and inform urgent military affairs” (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959); however, the post roads were used by officials and civilians, as well as barbarians paying tribute. According to “Emperor Shizu (11)” in History of Yuan, in the 23rd year of Zhiyuan (1286), several issues mentioned in the imperial memorial of Nasral-Din the governor of Yunnan Province were granted imperial approval. One of them was “to lift the ban on roads to facilitation communication for the people.” In the Yuan Dynasty, the Yunnan region maintained close contact with the imperial court, ending the frequent local separatism of preceding dynasties. The Yuan Dynasty allowed the chiefs of the Borderland tribes to use the post stations on their trip to the capital. Due to the



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rewards and official ranks ensuing the tribute and the convenient post roads, the chiefs of the local tribes swarmed to the capital, and incurred considerable burden for the court. Their visits to the capital for imperial interview and payment of tribute were actually an important part of the political ties and economic and cultural exchanges between the Borderland and the hinterland, strengthening the centripetal force of the Borderland tribes towards the motherland. Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, the first governor of Yunnan Province, presided over its establishment, appeased the rebelling barbarians everywhere, built water conservancy in the Dianchi Lake area, and launched military and civilian land reclamation throughout the province, thus promoting the gradual economic prosperity in Yunnan. According to “Geography IV” in History of Yuan, Dianchi Lake was in disrepair for years, “and would invariably inundate cities in raining seasons in summer.” Sayyid Ajjal Shams organized soldiers and civilians to dig ditches to drain the excessive water, and obtained more than 10,000 qing’s of land, all of which were converted into fertile rice paddies. The Yuan Dynasty also launched extensive land reclamation in Yunnan Province. According to “War (3)” in History of Yuan, in the early days when it invaded south, the Mongolian army invariably pitched camps and reclaimed land for farming before attacking well-defended cities or tough enemies. After the national reunification, it launched land reclamation in various places to “feed the army.” Since Yunnan and Bafan were “barbarian heartland”, it specifically “stationed garrisons to exercise control.” The military and civilian farms under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Province (Song et al., 1976, 1457, 2575) were distributed in Weichu Supervisorate, Dali Jinchi Pacification Commission, Heqing Route, Wuding Route, Weichu Route, Zhongqing Route, Qujing Pacification Commission, Wusa Pacification Commission, Lin’an Pacification Commission, Liang Qianhu Flank, Luoluosi Pacification Commission, and Wumeng General Command, including a total of 19,149 households and 6000 people, and 71,667 pairs and 1,250 hectares of land (excluding Usa Pacification Commission and Luoluosi Pacification Commission for lack of record). If one Shuang equals five mu’s (1 mu=0.16 acre), the recorded farmland reclaimed exceeds 483,335 mu’s.

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The province also expanded the scale of mining. In Yunnan, there were gold mines and silver yards managed by the province; some routes also established handicraft manufacturing bureaus for mining and processing gold and silver, while Dali, Zhongqing and other routes also produced salt. According to The Travels of Marco Polo (Polo, 1999), Jiandu, Dali, Jinchi, Luoluosi, Tuluoman and other places were rich in gold, and merchants came from other provinces with silver to trade in gold, “obtaining huge profits.” Jinchi also produced silver, and the local ethnic groups were called “Yinchiman” (Silver-Tooth Barbarians) because they liked to decorate their teeth with silver flakes. The province also actively disseminated inland culture. Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar set up a Confucianism Supervisorate in Dali and Zhongqing after taking office in Yunnan. After his death, his son Husayn “establish Confucian schools” in various counties and towns, and staffed them with erudite scholars to serve as instructors (Song et al., 1976, 3068). Under the subtle influences of the inland culture, the culture of Yunnan was assimilated by the inland culture. The people back then described the situation as “as people from the north gathered there, the Cuan and Bo tribes became accustomed to rituals, and gradually peace reigned. Officials and the gentry inherited established institutions, rode post horses to the hinterland to seek the Confucian canon. Schools came to be established in even the poor Borderland inhabited by barbarians” (Wang, 2002, 385). The various ethnic groups of Yunnan also participated in the imperial examinations, and some even became successful candidates. The rapid development of Yunnan was due to the importance attached by the imperial court and the properly appointed officials. In addition, the Yuan Dynasty cherished the southwestern region, and it didn’t care much about “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the periphery.” It reunified Yunnan and established a province there, changing the unfavorable tendency of marginalizing it since the Northern Song Dynasty. Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi and other regions also witnessed significantly improved status in the country, benefiting the consolidation of the southwestern Borderland.



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5.2  Guangxi was under the jurisdiction of Huguang Province, and it also witnessed marked development in the Yuan Dynasty. The Mongolian ruler placed less emphasis on Guangxi, despite a positive attitude towards its governance. Although the effectiveness of governance was not as good as that in Yunnan, the approaches were similar. According to “Stele on the Virtuous Governance of Preminer Sayyid”, in the 11th year of the Yuan Dynasty (1274), Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar solicited the allegiance of various tribes in Guangxi while he established Yunnan Province: “that year, over 80 prefectures with more than 40,000 households surrendered.” In the 13th year, AriqQaya launched an expedition to Guangxi, and pacified most of the area; in the 23rd year of Zhizheng (1363), the Yuan Dynasty established Guangxi Province, and stationed troops to guard it. Yunnan was different in that there were many garrison princes at different levels such as King of Liang and King of Yunnan, while in Guangxi, there was no such record. The post roads set up in Guangxi during the Yuan Dynasty were centered on Jingjiang (now Guilin, Guangxi) to form a network of post transportation extending in all directions. They were bound for Yuezhou (now Yueyang, Hunan), Xiangtan (now Xiangtan, Hunan) and Xinzhou (now Xinxing, Guangdong), Beiliu (now Beiliu, Guangxi) via Wuzhou (now Wuzhou, Guangxi), and Yongzhou (now Nanning, Guangxi) in the southwest, connecting Yunnan to Annan; or crossed the sea at Binzhou (now Binyang, Guangxi) to Qiongzhou (now Qiongshan, Hainan). The most important transportation line in Guangxi was the one extending northward from Yongzhou to the inland via Guizhou and Jingzhou. The above post roads included both land and water routes, as well as connecting routes. Some were old roads opened in the previous dynasties and others new roads built in the Yuan Dynasty. An important contribution of the Yuan Dynasty was the construction of the post road from Yongzhou to Annan. According to “Biography of Annan” in the History of Yuan, in the 15th year of Zhiyuan (1278), Chai Chun, the Minister of Rites of the Yuan Dynasty, chose the road from Jiangling to Annan via Yongzhou when he was dispatched to Annan as

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an envoy. Later, the road from Yongzhou to Daluo (now Hanoi, Vietnam) became an important passage. In the 22nd year, the Yuan Dynasty set up post stations and stationed garrisons on this road, deploying one outpost every 30 li and one garrison every 60 li. Each outpost and post station was guarded with 300 troops through patrolling. The Yongzhou post road thus became the main passage between the Yuan Dynasty and Annan. Huguang Province actively developed agricultural production in Guangxi and invested heavily toward military-agricultural colonies (tuntian). In the first year, the 36 sluice gates of the Lingqu Canal were repaired by troops and civilians under the leadership of AriqQaya, “thus allowing the passage of post boats.” In the 15th year of Zhizheng (1355), the Deputy Surveillance Commissioner Yeerjini organized troops and civilians to repair the Lingqu Cannal destroyed by floods.7 According to “Geography (6)” and “Wars (3)” in History of Yuan, there were three military-agro colonies in Huuang Province, including the one in Hengzhou, under the administration of the Hunan Route Pacification Commission, and two more in Guangxi, one administered by the Pacification Commission of Haibei-Hainan Route and the other by the Pacification Commission in Liangjiang Route in Guangxi. In the 30th year of Zhengyuan (1293), the Yuan court recruited civilian households and dispatched newly incorporated regiments to Haibei, Hainan and other places to work on military-agro colonies. In the 3rd year of Dade (1299), the Military-agricultural Colony Administration was eliminated, and 8,428 households were ordered to continue to farm. In the 2nd year of Dade, the native official Huang Shengxu defected to Jiaozhi and abandoned 545 qing’s of paddy fields. The Yuan Dynasty recruited Yao and Tong people to cultivate the land in Shanglang and Zhongzhou; in the 10th year, the Tengzhou Farn was set up and more than 208 qing’s of land were opened. In the 28th year of Yuan Dynasty, the Guangxi Marshal Commission requested the recruitment of 5,000 households

7 Biography of the Prime Minister Duke Chuguo and Duke Wuding, [Yuan Dynasty] Su Tianjue, Records of Famous Ministers of the Yuan Dynasty, Vol. 2; [Ming Dynasty] Huang Shang, Records of Lingji Temple, [Jiajing Years] A General History of Guangxi, Vol. 33.



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from Nandan Prefecture to cultivate farmland. The Huguang Province ordered to have five encampments established, and to give cattle, seeds and farming tools to all the households (Song et al., 1976). The Yuan Dynasty collected taxes in Guangxi. According to “Food and Money (1)” in History of Yuan, in the 2nd year of Yuanzheng (1296), Yuan Dynasty began to set the summer tax system for south China, “but excluded Huguang as the only exception.” In the 2nd year of Dade (1298), Huguang was included in the summer tax system, following the request of Zhang Guoji, the Pacification Commissioner, in an imperial memorial. However, it was later excluded by an edict of Emperor Chengzong. In the following year, the household tax was changed to summer tax and levied in Huguang Province. According to “Tax and Rent Exemption” of “Virtuous Governance” in Compendium of Yuan Statutes, in the seventh year of Dade, “prefectures and counties in Jing, Hu, Chuan and Shu shall be exempted two thirds of summer taxes and autumn rents, since they are paying taxes intended for military purposes.” This suggests that the summer taxes and autumn rents were finally implemented in Huguang Province. Guangxi also mined some mineral deposits. According to “Food and Money (2)” in History of Yuan, the whole prefecture of Guangxi produced iron; in the annual taxes recorded for the first year of Tianli (1328), Huguang Province province collected 80 gold and 236 silver ingots, 282,595 catties of iron, and 1,798 catties of lead and tin. Among all mineral deposits, iron ore was mined in the largest volume. “Food and Money (2)” in History of Yuan says that among iron producers “levies from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang were the most.” In the first year of Tianli, the iron levy of Huguang Province exceeded 280,000 catties, ranking first among the provinces. As for the ways to mine mineral deposits, “Records of Emperor Shizu” in History of Yuan says that in the 19th year of Zhiyuan (1282), the Yuan court abolished the Supervisorate of Huguangxing Province for gold, silver and iron smelting, “and entrusted the duties with the general administration of various routes.” According to “Biography of Wugu Sunze” in History of Yuan, in the 29th year of Zhiyuan, Wugu Sunze, Deputy Commissioner of Liangjiang Route in Guangxi, found out that Haibei Marshal Xu Chigan

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had plundered a large number of gold and silver artifacts from the people in Leizhou. Therefore, it is safe to presume that the silver utensils were locally made. Table salt was a bulk product exclusively operated by the Guangxi government. In the 13th year of Zhiyuan (1276), the Yuan Dynasty restored Guangxi’s salt management agency Guanghai Salt Tax Supervisorate. The output of salt in that year reached 24,000 yin or 9.6 million catties, close to the level of about 10 million catties in the Southern Song Dynasty (Guo, 1997, 431). In the 30th year, the Guangxi Shikang Salt Tax Supervisorate was established. The salt production increased by 11,000 yin in the 10th year of Dade (1306), and further by 15,000 yin in the first year (1308) of Dade. By the end of Emperor Shizu’s reign, salt production in the South had exceeded that in the Southern Song Dynasty, and the increase was greater in Guangxi. In the Tianli years, the national salt production peaked. In the 2nd year of Yanyou (1315), salt production of Guangxi reached 50,165 yin.

5.3  From the Han Dynasty to the Tang and Song dynasties, the rule of Middle Kingdom over the present Guizhou area was relatively weak, and things began to change in the Yuan Dynasty. The Yuan Dynasty attached great importance to the present Guizhou region mainly because of the many traffic lines passing through it. In the 30th year of Zhiyuan (1293), it opened a post road from the Zhongqing to Luzhou (now Luzhou, Sichuan) via Wusa (now Weining, Guizhou). The road went from Kunming to Songming, Malong, Qujing and Xuanwei, before entering Guizhou. From there, it wound through Weining, Hezhang and Bijie to Weixin in Yunnan, to Luzhou via Xuyong and Luxi in Sichuan and further to Chengdu in the northwest or Chongqing in the northeast (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959; Liu, 1991, 162). According to “Post Stations (8)” in Yongle Encyclopedia, there were 49 post stations under the jurisdiction of Wusa Pacification Commission. Including 1,074 posthorses in 45 horse stations, and 24 boats in 4 water stations, the Commission ranked first in terms of post stations among all government offices in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Wusa Pacification Commission governed Dongchuan Route, Wusa Route, and Mangbu



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Route. Therefore, the line from Wusa to Luzhou should not be the only post road under its jurisdiction, but Wusa Station, Abdu Station and Bipan Station each had 30 horses and about 10 oxen. It can be known that the traffic from Zhongqing to Luzhou Route via Wusa had been very busy. After the opening of the above roads, Guizhou became a transportation hub connecting Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangxi and Hunan. “Geography (6)” in History of Yuan says that “connected to the land of eight barbarians, and a little more than two hundred miles away from Bozhou, Guizhou is the strategic juncture for passage to Huguang, Sichuan, and Yunnan.” The establishment of post stations reflected frequent passage of envoys and troops. In “Military (4)” in History of Yuan, there are records of additional vouchers issued by the imperial court to the above areas. The Yuan Dynasty attached great importance to the present Guizhou region, and its determination and proactive attitude were manifested in the repeated military expedition launched by the ruler to pacify the region, numerous troops stationed to guard it, and extensive establishment of governmental institutions there. According to “Geography (6)” in History of Yuan, governmental institutions established there for Yunnan Province included Wusa and Wumeng Pacification Commission, Pu’an Route, Puding Route, Wusa Route and Mangbu Route, while those established for Huguang Province included (1) Office for consolidating the allegiance of Bafan barbarian tribes to the Yuan Dynasty, govering 1,620 barbarian colonies in Bafan and Luo’s Ghost Country in the southwest; (2) General Administrator for Barbarian Population, who was in charge of 53 barbarian military and civilian chiefs, including Xiaocheng Barbarian Tribe; (3) Pacification Commission of Shunyuan and other routes, with jurisdiction over 24 divisions such as Jiuxi Shibadong Barbarians and Yongzhenguai Xige Aborigines; (4) Sizhou Publication and Pacification Commission, with jurisdiction over 67 divisions including Zhenyuan Prefecture; (5) Pacification Commission of Yanbian Xidong; (6) Bozhou Pacification Commission, governing 33 native prefectures including Huangping Prefecture; (7) The newly added pacification commission for Geman Aborigines, governing 131 native prefectures and villages areas including Nanwei Prefecture; (8) Dingyuan Prefecture, governingr 5 native prefectures, including

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Sangzhou Prefecture. The Yuan Dynasty generally implemented a native official system in the southwestern Borderland, and appointed native chiefs as officials. However, in the Guizhou area, Mongols and Semu were still appointed as local officials, some of which were made hereditary due to their prolonged service. The Yuan Dynasty extensively reclaimed land for farming in Guizhou and the adjacent areas. In the 27th year of Zhiyuan (1290), it established the Wusa Route Military Farm, and deployed 114 native soldier households there for farming. In the 7th year of Yanyou (1320), it opened the Pudinglu Farm, and dispatched 2000 troops from the farming troops in Wusa and Wumeng. Military Farms were also established in Bafan, Shunyuan and other places. “Emperor Chengzong” in History of Yuan History says that in the first year of Dade (1297), Bafan and Shunyuan were firstly placed under the jurisdiction of Huguang Province, and later changed to Yunnan Province. “The soldiers of Yunnan did not arrive, and the original troops stationed there defective in large numbers. So, Huguang Province was ordered to dispatch troops there instead.” According to “Biography of Liu Guojie” in History of Yuan History, in the fifth year of Dade, when the Shunyuan native official Song Longji rebelled with his subordinates, Liu Guojie, governor of Huguang Province, set up 38 garrisons in the area extending for 3000 miles from the north to the south in the west of the province. “As a result, a garrison-farm network extending to Jiaozhou and Guangzhou in the east, and central Guizhou in the west, and along the perimeter of Huguang was completed, ruling out future barbaric invasion” (Song et al., 1976, 3811). This suggests that the west of the garrison-farm network was extended to Guizhou in the west. The various practices of the Yuan Dynasty for actively exploring the Guizhou area were unprecedented and they had an important influence on its development. Based on the rule of the Yuan Dynasty, the Ming Dynasty managed to turn it into a separate province.

5.4  An important contribution of the Yuan Dynasty in border governance was the implementation of the native official system in the southern



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border. The native official system formally took shape in the Yuan Dynasty, because of the Mongolians’ ideology on governing borders. Since the Mongolian army entered the areas inhabited by the Han Chinese, especially after the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty, the Mongolian rulers adopted the original rule to a certain extent, while retaining the old Mongolian customs in many aspects, thus forming the political and cultural duality. The basic characteristics included the unification and opposition of adopting traditional Chinese methods and preserving old Mongolian customs; the eclectic and chaotic lack of integration of Yuan culture; the complexity and diversity of ideological sources in the design of political systems and policies; the limited inheritance of the traditional ruling ideas of the Han Chinese, as well as the arbitrariness, flexibility and practicality in policy making. The political and cultural duality gave the rule of the Yuan Dynasty a distinctive hallmark of the times. It not only had a profound impact on the historic contributions of Yuan Dynasty, but also determined that its rule would not last long. The duality of politics and culture also profoundly affected the policies of the Yuan Dynasty for governing the barbarians. The Yuan Dynasty implemented the “four-class system” based on national oppression throughout the country, but its rulers were less influenced by such orthodox concepts as “distinction between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” and “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery”, and consequently less discriminated against the Borderland barbarians. The core of the “four-class system” was to prevent and oppress the Han Chinese. However, the Mongolians trusted the foreign tribes and the Borderland barbarians, and even drew on their resources to strengthen the rule over the Han Chinese. It became a period of great migration and integration of the Chinese people, because the implementation of the above-mentioned barbarian policy to a large extent. Compared with the chieftain system of the Ming Dynasty, the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty was distinctly characteristic in that the appointment of native officials was more casual, and with full trust. The imperial court was more tolerant and even protective of erring native officials, and this system was popularized in the

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southwestern Borderland. Those characteristics were all related to the weakened notion of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery” among the rulers, the use of Borderland regions as a springboard for external expansion, and the urgent need for support from Borderland barbarians for conquering wars and stability in Borderland regions. Before the Yuan Dynasty, the dynasties implemented a jimi rule in the Borderland areas, and there was not much difference in the governance policies between the north and the south. The native official system of the Yuan Dynasty evolved from the system of jimi prefectures and counties implemented in Guangxi and other places in the Song Dynasty. It inherited the basic content, for example, assigning local chieftains to official posts which could be hereditary, clarifying the responsibilities and obligations of native officials, delimiting the governing boundaries of the native officials and strictly prohibiting mergers, and collecting taxes in areas with formal governmental institutions. Its cornerstone was the priority on land and various closely related resources occupied by barbarians in the south. The chief obligation was to ensure the above-mentioned resources for the survival of the people under their jurisdiction. The native official system of the Yuan Dynasty coincides with the above principles. Another reason for the Yuan Dynasty to implement the native official system was that the rulers wanted to use the complicated relationships among the numerous barbarian tribes in the south for the purpose of their mutual restraint. The subsequent Ming Dynasty grasped the key of the rule, and improved the native official system by turning it into the chieftain system, which was widely implemented in the southern border areas for hundreds of years across the Ming and Qing dynasties. The key to ruling barbarians in the north was to control its leader and population, and control land and related resources should be relegated to a secondary position. In addition, adopting the native official system in governing the northern barbarians to pursue “control of barbarians with barbarians” could repeat the same mistakes of creating powerful nomadic tribes. Therefore, in the northern Borderland areas, the Yuan Dynasty generally followed the rule of Centurion System, which was basically unchanged during the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Yuan



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Dynasty marked the dividing line in the policies for governing the barbarians in the north and south, and the separation was also an important invention of the Yuan Dynasty. Under the native official system, native officials had the important duty of leading the native army to participate in the expedition organized by the Yuan court. There are many records of such expeditions to Burma and Annan in History of Yuan. In the 19th year of the Yuan Dynasty (1282), the Yuan Dynasty signed the ethnic group of Yixi Buxue into the army. In the 21st year, Emperor Shizu issued an edict, order the troops of Si, Botian, and Yang’er to join the expedition against Burma. In the 20th year, “[he] dispatched the Li soldiers to conquer Japan.” In the 24th year, he issued an edict, dispatching the Mongolian, Han and Li troops of the three provinces of Jianghuai, Jiangxi and Huguang to join the expedition against Annan, together with the Li troops of the four overseas prefectures, but from separate routes; Chen Zhongda, the Pacification Commissioner of Qiongzhou Route also assisted the conquest with 120 ships carrying more than 1,700 soldiers. “Expedition” in Essential Records of Annan stated that a total of 100,000 people were dispatched for this conquest, including the Mongolian Army, the Han Army, the Guangxi “Dong Troops” and the Hainan “Li Troops.” In the 15th year of Zhizheng (1355), Marshal Aslan led 50,000 “Miao Troops” of Guangxi to defend Luzhou. In the Yuan Dynasty, native troops led by native officials were stationed as garrison and dispatched for expedition, effectively reducing the cost of ruling the border areas, while exerting far-reaching impacts.

6.  Strategy of the Ming Dynasty for Governing the Southwestern Borderland Regions After the establishment of the Ming Dynasty, the Yuan court still maintained considerable military strength, though forced to retreat into the desert. The Tartar and Oriat tribes repeatedly invaded into the border region, so the focus of the Ming Dynasty on governing the border was still in the north. However, the Ming Dynasty still set great store by the management of the southwestern Borderland. Firstly, the Yuan Dynasty

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had laid a solid foundation for its management, and secondly, the Ming Dynasty was keenly aware of the incorrigibility of the southwestern tribes. It dispatched a large number of troops to the southwest border. It implemented the Wei-Suo (guard post) military system, in which soldiers from various guard posts were stationed in designated garrisons or garrisoned farms together with their families and became hereditary military households. In fact, they were immigrants dispatched by the military. Due to the large number of garrisons stationed in the southwest Borderland, a large-scale wave of military immigration was formed. In terms of barbarian governance, the Ming Dynasty improved and comprehensively implemented the chieftain system based on the appointment of native officials in the Yuan Dynasty. The management of barbarians and the responsibilities and obligations of their leaders were standardized and specified. Meanwhile, it was stipulated that native officials at all levels should be appointed by the imperial court, with seals and salaries paid by the government, thus formally incorporating them into the system of state officials. The chieftain system of the Ming Dynasty deepened the imperial rule over the southwestern Borderland, and profoundly affected the society and local ethnic groups there.

6.1  The Ming Dynasty inherited a unified country from the Yuan Dynasty and ruled for 277 years. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founding emperor, was born to the lower class of society. After joining the Red Turban Army, he made a point of reading and studying, and accumulated rich political experience in war, gradually becoming a statesman who was familiar with ruling traditions, shrewd and pragmatic. In the first year of Hongwu (1368), he proclaimed himself emperor in Nanjing. His 31 years in power featured continuity and relative stability of policies for governance. After his death, most of the policies and strategies he formulated and implemented became canonized by the Ming Dynasty and had a great impact on the subsequent rulers. In the Ming Dynasty, the provinces of the Yuan Dynasty were changed to Provincial Administrative Commissions. The



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responsibilities were divided among the Administrative Commission, the Judicial Commission and Chief Military Commission, which were charged with civil affairs, criminal prosecution and military affairs respectively. The three commissions were intended to consult together for settling major issues in governance. In addition to the capital and Nanjing, which were respectively called “Bei Zhili” and “Nan Zhili”, there were 13 Administrative Commissions throughout the country, including Shandong, Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Huguang, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Collectively they were known as the “two zhili and 13 administrative commissions” and commonly called “the fifteen provinces in the Ming Dynasty.” The Administrative Commission was the highest administrative institution in the province, but its political importance declined after the middle period, when the imperial court subjected it to the restraint of the newly established governor or grand coordinator in various places. The Ming Dynasty also set up military-region organizations all over the country, that is, the Regional Military Commission or Acting Regional Military Commission. Placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War of the imperial court, they were in charge of military households of guard posts in various provinces. Usually, one was established for each province, and an acting institution or regency was added where the situations were complicated. In the Ming Dynasty, there were 16 Regional Military Commissions, 5 Acting Regional Military Commissions and two Regencies. Both Regional Military Commission and Acting Regional Military Commission could either have land or not. In the former case, the military households exceeded civilian households in number; in the latter case, the number of military households exceeded civilian households. Separate institutions for military and civilian administration were set up in each province, for the purpose of mutual complementation and restraint. This was a feature of the Ming Dynasty in border rule, indicating that military rule had an important position in all regions, especially border areas. The subordinate guard posts were quite distinctive. According to the records in History of Ming, all soldiers under the garrison system were hereditary, with father succeeded by son; stationed in the garrison

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and engaged in agricultural production for a long time, they were allowed to bring their families along with them. In fact, they were compulsory immigrants relocated by the government, but different in that they had to follow orders and assume active duty in the event of war, and return to the garrison afterwards. To meet the needs of military defense, guard posts were spread all over the country. With the collapse of the guard post system in the late Ming Dynasty, most of the soldiers became self-supporting farmers. The Ming Dynasty successively sent a large number of troops to guard the border areas, and extensively established various farms, mainly military-agro colonies, objectively realizing a large-scale economic development, and significantly promoting the social and economic development of the border areas. In terms of border governance, the founding emperor Zhu Yuanzhang inherited the Han and Tang ideologies of “Borderland barbarians as the fence of the Middle Kingdom”, advocating active management and consolidation of the border, while opposing outward expansion with the use of force. In the 4th year of Hongwu (1371), he said to the ministers that “the foreign barbarian states posing trouble for the Middle Kingdom must be punished; otherwise, discretion should be exercised in waging war against them.” Later, he warned his children and grandchildren that “The Borderland barbarians are all restricted to remote corners separated by mountains and seas. Their land won’t generate enough supply, even if seized; nor will their people be of much use, even if captured.”8 He also ordered that no expedition should be launched against Annan, Siam, Champa, and Chenla, and that friendly relations be maintained with them, adding that most of their tributes be generously rewarded, in order to “subdue the Borderland barbarians with placation.” Inheriting the border management strategy of “making barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” adopted in the unified dynasties of Han and Tang, he abandoned the active Borderland expansion of the Yuan Dynasty.

The focus of the Ming Dynasty in managing the border was the north, that is, on defence against the Tatar and Oirat tribes, the descendants of Mongolians that had retreated to Outer Mongolia. The Tatar and Oirat tribes were very active. According to records in History of Ming, “The land of Tatar, extends eastward to Uringhai, and westward to Oirat. In 8 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 68; Ancestral Exhortations of the Imperial Clan: Exhortations.



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the Yongle, Hongxi and Xuande years, the Middle Kingdom was in full prosperity, but was often blackmailed by the barbarians, which rebelled now and then. After the Zhengtong years, the Borderland defence was virtually abandoned and the prestige of the Middle Kingdom undermined. The barbarian chiefs often resorted to violence and rose against it one after another. Border disasters have since accompanied the Ming Dynasty until its collapse.”9 After the founding of Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang implemented a system of enfeoffment and assigned his 24 sons to the whole country to consolidate its rule. The Yuan Dynasty still maintained considerable strength after being forced to Outer Mongolia and were thus a thorn in the flesh for Zhu Yuanzhang and his successors. Thus Zhu Yuanzhang dispatched many of his sons to guard the north. The border troubles were the most serious in mid-Ming, when the empire was under tremendous pressure from “both the northern barbarians and the southern pirates.” In the last years of Xuande, Oirat and Tatar were unified, seriously threatening the security of its northern border. In the 10th year of Zhengtong (1445), the Oirat and Tatar coalition forces launched an offensive. In the 12th year, they defeated the Uringhai tribes that had submitted to the Ming Dynasty and invaded into its northeastern border. In the 14th year, Esen Taishi the leader of Oirat also led an army south, attacking Datong, Xuanhua, Liaodong and Shaanxi simultaneously. Emperor Yingzong led a personal expedition with an army of 500,000 and was surrounded at the Tumu Fort, to the east of Huailai City. The Ming army was crushed and Emperor Yingzong was captured. The Oirat army took advantage of the situation and marched to the city gates of Beijing. From there, it continued to advance southward. During the Jiajing period, Altan Khan extended an olive branch to the Ming Dynasty, but because Emperor Shizong was erratic in his border policies,in the 29th year of Jiajing (1550), the Mongolian army once again attacked the Ming capital. In the fifth year of Longqing (1571), Altan Khan agreed to entera tributary relationship with the Ming Dynasty, finally putting an end to the unrest in the northern Borderland. Before the threat 9 History of Ming, Vol. 327, “Foreign Countries (8): Tartars”, 8494.

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from Mongolia was undermined, “Japanese pirates” emerged on the southeastern coast. Composed of roving Japanese warriors, Chinese and Japanese pirates, and merchants, they robbed merchant ships of the Ming Dynasty and attacked coastal cities and towns. Thanks to the efforts of Qi Jiguang and other generals, the peril that had lasted for decades gradually diminished. The southwestern Borderland was not the focus of border governance in the Ming Dynasty, but it was also guarded with numerous troops. Zhu Yuanzhang appointed his favored adopted son Muying as the General Commander of Yunnan, and dispatched important ministers to rule Guangxi, to enhance control over the southwestern Borderland with guard posts in various places. His principle was generally to strengthen the defensive and refrain from wars as much as possible, to alleviate worries from the southwest. He repeatedly emphasized that the key to the stability of the southwest Borderland was to implement the strategy of “complementing leniency with rigor in governance” and “forestalling rebellion,” and that the priority in governance was to “rule through inaction”, that is, to reduce the harassment of the Borderland tribes. That is an important governance experience gained by the Ming Dynasty after summing up the lessons of imperial China. Most of his strategies and practices were accepted and followed by his successors. In the 5th year of Zhengtong (1440), Emperor Yingzong issued an edict to Mu Ang, who succeeded to the General Commander of Yunnan, saying that “Your father, King Jing of Qianning, had guarded Yunnan and effectively placated the barbarians, achieving border stability, and eliminating concerns of the imperial court for the southwest. Later, your elder brother took over and also rendered meritorious service. You are aware of their feat.” In the 11th year of Chenghua (1475), Li Zhenzuo the General Commander of Huguang submitted an imperial memorial on the failure of governmental troops to suppress the uprising of barbarians and recommended to invoke the precedent of Wang Jizheng sending troops to Luchuan. Emperor Xianzong specifically issued an edict, saying that “Barbarians and the Han Chinese have existed side by side since ancient times. The key consists in exercising loose-rein governance by the garrison general, to prevent their invasion.



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What is the point of annihilating them to satisfy our whims?”10 The edict indicates that the basic strategy implemented for the southwestern Borderlands was appropriate loose-rein governance, so as to spare the court of worries about turmoil in the southwest. In addition to organizing farms to promote agricultural production and developing mining and smelting, salt production and other handicraft production, the Ming Dynasty also implemented development and governance measures such as building roads, posts, and schools in the southwestern provinces, and achieved obvious results. Although it did not build many roads in the southwestern Borderland, its traffic management was relatively complete after establishing posts. Meanwhile, the utilization rate of trunk lines was maintained at a high level. It further improved the road opened in the Yuan Dynasty from Yunnan to Huguang via Guizhou, and turned it into the most important channel for connecting Yunnan to Guizhou, Hunan and the Central Plains. The significance was far-reaching. The Ming Dynasty carried out large-scale mining of important minerals such as gold, silver, iron, copper, tin, lead and mercury in Yunnan, in large quantities. The government also used the local raw copper to cast a large amount of money on the spot. The situation was unprecedented in previous generations, showing that the Ming Dynasty set greater store by mineral resources in the southwestern Borderland than previous dynasties, and significantly improved their development and utilization. However, the Ming rulers had seized large quantities of important metals in the southwestern Borderland, especially gold and silver, through mineral taxes. The main purpose was not to enrich the national treasury, but to satisfy personal desires. Their wanton avarice neglected the wellbeing of the people, and incurred a heavy economic burden on the mineral-producing provinces. To meet the need for palace construction, the Ming Dynasty cut down a large number of precious trees in Guizhou, southwest Sichuan, and Yunnan, over a period of more than 90 years. The sheer cost and 10 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Zhengtong in the Reign of Emperor Yingzong, Vol. 67; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Chenghua in the Reign of Emperor Xianzong, Vol. 142.

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disturbance on locals from timber collection were rare in the history of the Borderland, indicating that the Ming Dynasty had noticed the rich timber resources of the precious forest in the southwest border, and started large-scale logging. The plunder of forest resources by rulers of the Ming Dynasty was matched by its expropriation of mines and gems in severity.

6.2  Zhu Yuanzhang inherited the Borderland management ideas of the Han and Tang dynasties, and set the focus of Borderland management on the north. Out of the recognition that “the barbarian tribes of Yunnan have been rebellious and unpredictable because their land is dangerous and remote, and their people are rich and ruthless”, Zhu Yuanzhang adopted the strategy of dispatching his trusted ministers as the garrison commanders in ruling the southwestern Borderland, so as to “make Borderland barbarians the guarding fence of the Middle Kingdom”. His thought and strategy of governing the border were followed by his successor Emperor Taizong. In September of the first year of Yongle (1403), Gu Cheng, the supervisor of Zhenyuan, Guizhou Province, said in his imperial memorial that “I think that Yunnan, Guangdong and Guangxi are in the remote Borderland, and that there is nothing to worry about, because the occasional barbarian rebellion is just like bee sting. The southeast coastal circuits were plundered by Japanese pirates from time to time, but with enhanced coastal defense, there is nothing to worry about. However, the northern barbarians have been tough and cunning, always ready to encroach on the Middle Kingdom. They should be a deep concern in exercising national governance.” Gu Cheng’s words summed up the overall strategy of the Ming Dynasty for governing the border, and won him the appreciation of Emerpor Chengzu, as well as an imperial citation. In the same year, Emperor Taizong issued an edict to Mu Sheng, the Western Pacification Duke, saying that “Mu Ying secured the allegiance of distant barbarians and contentment of soldiers and civilians with virtuous rule and spared the worry of the imperial court over the southwest, after being dispatched



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to guard Yunnan. Likewise, you may observe the set rule so as to achieve law and order among the troops and the civilians and solicit the allegiance of distant barbarians.”11 The emperors after Chengzu also generally followed the practices of Emperor Taizu and Taizong. In the 7th year of Xuande (1432), Guizhou Chief Command Xiao Shou, requested placating the rebelling barbarians of Anlong in an imperial memorial. Emperor Xuanzong said that “The barbarians should be placated with leniency. Nothing other than their stability should be expected [in your placation], and it would be inadvisable to investigate the matter thoroughly.”12 During the Zhengtong years, as the chieftain of Luchuan expanded outward, Emperor issued an edict to its leader Si Renfa, saying that “the government office of Nandian had reported you encroaching on their land, plundering their people, seizing their elephants and horses, murdering their officials and ransacking official ships. The General Commander of Yunnan and others have repeatedly asked to dispatch government forces for suppression. However, I featured that an army might inevitably hurt the innocent. If you can mend your ways and obey the rules, release the captured people, and return the seized land, your wrongdoing shall be forgiven.” Later, Emperor Yingzong conferred the title of Dingyuan King on Musheng, and the Duke of Qianguo, posthumously, saying that Musheng had guarded Yunnan for more than 40 years, “and achieved law and order among locals and stability in the Borderland.” The Ming Dynasty launched two major wars on the southwestern Borderland. One was the War of Banzhou launched in the 27th year of Wanli (1599), listed among the “Three Three Expeditions of Wanli”, and the other was launched in the 6th year of Zheng (1441), known as the “Three Expeditions to Luchuan.” The Ming people said that the former “threw almost half of the country into chaos,” and that the Battle of Pingbo alone cost more than 4 million taels of silver. The “Three Expeditions against Luchuan” lasted eight years, and 450,000 expedition 1 1 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Yongle in the Reign of Emperor Taizong, Vol. 18. 12 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Yongle in the Reign of Emperor Taizong, Vol. 11, Vol. 22; Veritable Records of Xuande in the Reign of Emperor Xuanzong, Vol. 87.

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troops participated, advancing to the Great Jinsha River Basin (now the Irrawaddy River in Burma).13 The two large-scale military deployments had complicated historical backgrounds and reasons. However, the resolution of the Ming court to send troops was intended to suppress the rebelling local forces and stabilize the southwestern Borderland. In the 6th year of Zhengtong, the decision of the Ming Dynasty to launch an expedition against Luchuan incurred a debate within the Ming court about its justifiability. He Wenyuan, the Minister of Justice, said in his imperial memorial that “The sage emperors of Yao and Shun had solicited the allegiance of Youmiao with virtuous rule. Luchuan had a land only several hundred miles across, and a population of a dozen thousand. Therefore, its land and its people won’t be much use, even if it is conquered.” Wang Ji, the Ministry of War, who was entrusted with the military affairs for conquering Luchuan, replied that “What Wenyuan said was different from the current situation. The reigns of Emperor Yao and Shun were not far from ancient times, and the land controlled was just the nine prefectures. So the rule over remote Borderlands featured restraint. Now, we have unified the whole country, and subdued all Han Chinese and barbarian tribes. Si Renfa’s family has assumed the post of Pacification Commissioner of Luchuan for over six decades. Still, Luchuan gathered rebellion forces against the Ming army. If left unaddressed, the rebellion might give ideas to Mubang, Cheli, Baibai and Burma, not only constituting a sign of weakness for the dynasty, but also encouraging further troubles in the Borderland.”14 Therefore, this suggests that dispatching troops to Luchuan was the last resort intended to resolve border turmoils and to forestall troubles for future generations. At around the time the Ming army entered the southwest Borderland, Zhu Yuanzhang repeatedly warned Fu Youde and other generals against underestimating the enemy. Facts proved that his worries were justified. The Ming army defeated the Yuan army guarding Yunnan easily, but encountered fierce resistance from the Borderland barbarians. In the 13 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Tianqi in the Reign of Emperor Xizong, Vol. 26; History of Ming, Vol. 171, Biography of Wang Ji. 14 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Zhengtong in the Reign of Emperor Yingzong, Vol. 75.



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14th year of Hongwu, the 300,000 Ming troops invaded Yunnan from Guizhou and defeated the Yuan army. Basalawarmi, the Mongolian King of Liang, threw himself into water and drowned himself. When the Ming army advanced west to attack the present-day Kunming and Dali, the native officials of east Yunnan and west Guizhou joined hands in rebellion. Then the native officials of the Yuan Dynasty in Dali, Baoshan and Dehong rebelled one after another, together with those in Kunming and other places that had surrendered to the Ming. It took the Ming army more than one decade to finally pacify Yunnan and Guizhou. Therefore, Zhu Yuanzhang successively stationed a large number of troops in the southwestern Borderland. After Yunnan was pacified, most of the troops were withdrawn back to the interior except for those left behind as garrison. However, afterwards more troops were disptached to the southwestern provinces many times. In the Ming system, 5,600 soldiers were organized into one wei and 1,120 soldiers into one qianhusuo. During the Hongwu period, the garrison of Yunnan included 15 wei and two qianhusuo. In the 15th year of Hongwu, the Ming court established Guizhou Administration Commission and Yunnan Administration Commission; in the middle of Xuande, it added Sichuan Acting Administration Commission in Jianchang.15 The local guard posts were placed under the jurisdic­ tion of the local Administration Commission or Acting Administration Commission. According to Veritable Records of Ming, the Ming Dynasty sent ten troops to Yunnan ten times in the middle and late Hongwu years, involving a total of 250,000 soldiers. Together with the original garrison, there were about 200,000 to 300,000 troops stationed in Yunnan. The guard post system allowed soldiers to bring their family members along, and Yunnan was no exception. In the 24th year of Hongwu, Emperor Taizu issued an edict, saying that “for soldiers stationed in Yunnan, Dali and other Borderland posts, if their family members are living in the capital, each shall be given ten taels of gold and ten silver ingots, which shall be sent to the place of garrison with official ships.” If each military household consisted of three persons,

15 History of Ming, Vol. 76, “Official Posts”, 1873.

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the garrison soldiers and their families in Yunnan should reach about 700,000. After its army entered Guizhou in the 14th year of Hongwu, the Ming court set up 13 guard posts and one battalion in Guizhou, and dispatched a total of more than 74,000 troops there. According to records in the 6th year of Chenghua, a total of 20 guard posts were set up in Guizhou, and the number of troops exceeded 145,400. Together with the families of military households, the population stationed in Guizhou was about 430,000. In its early days, the Ming Dynasty established six guard posts and one battalion in Guangxi, and stationed 100,000 people, including soldiers and their family. And the number grew later. However, in general, the number of troops guarding Guangxi was much smaller than that guarding Yunnan and Guizhou. In addition to troops, a large number of criminals were banished to Yunnan and other places. Emperor Taizu issued an edict in the 22nd year of Hongwu, saying that “soldiers attending the contest in the state capital shall be transferred to Yunnan for failure to pick out the bull’s eye, with the official rank relegated.”16 The large number of troops stationed in the Borderlands presented a major logistical challenge. Zhu Yuanzhang was keenly aware of the severity of the food problem. In the 16th year of Hongwu, he said to Fu Youde and others that “there would be no trouble if food is readily available, even after the army was pulled out. If there is not enough grain, the garrison will flee after the army returns. If the garrison was absent for too long, the city will be vulnerable. When the barbarians learn about it, they will instigate trouble again and will get out of control.” It became the inevitable choice for the rulers of the Ming Dynasty to mobilize the garrison to reclaim land for farming to meet the needs of ration. Military farms in Yunnan were first opened in the 19th year of Hongwu (1386). In the same year, Muying the Duke of Xiping said in his imperial memorial that “Yunnan has a vast land, and most

16 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 210; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Chenghua in the Reign of Emperor Xianzong, Vol. 82; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 197.



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of it is uncultivated. It is advisable to set up farms and start farm to hoard grains.” Mu Ying’s suggestion was much appreciated by Zhu Yuanzhang, who said to the Minister of Households that “Military-agro colonies can alleviate the burden on the people and provide food to the soldiers. It is the supreme strategy for enhancing border defense.”17 The Ming garrison in Yunnan started farming on a large scale and achieved obvious results. In the 21st year of Hongwu, Yu Tongyuan, the Duke of Nan’an, reported the statistics of the “newly incorporated army”, including 64,000 troops, 3,545 horses, 12,994 oxen, 435,036 mu of land, and 336,007 dan of grain; the Administrative Commission had 63,740 households, and 76,562 dan of grain. Those were the numbers for the military-agro colonies manned by the “newly incorporated army”, from which we can extrapolate the scale of military-agro colonies in Yunnan can be inferred. Although military-agro colonies of Guangxi and Guizhou were not as extensive as Yunnan, they also reached a considerable scale. In the 6th year of Zhengtong (1441), according to Wang Ji’s report, the 20 guard posts of Guizhou reclaimed more than 950,000 mu of land, and “the harvest was enough to feed the army.” The military-agro colonies in Guangxi began in the 9th year of Hongwu (1376), which witnessed records of their establishment in Hezhou. In the 25th year, the Ming Dynasty established Military Farm Batallion in Qianjiang County, Guangxi.18 In the 29th year, the Administrative Commissioner of Guangxi said that to feed the three newly established posts and Fuchuan Batallion, more than 200,000 dan of military ration was needed, “and the levies of the competent department had been inadequate.” Emperor Taizu ordered to set up military-agro colonies and dispatched envoys to Guilin and other prefectures to buy cattle for the troops. This is a record of the Guangxi government setting up a large-scale militaryagricultural colony.19

1 7 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 179. 18 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Zhengtong in the Reign of Emperor Yingzong, Vol. 80; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 105, Vol. 221. 19 History of Ming, Vol. 317, “Chieftans of Guangxi (1)”, 8208.

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On the whole, military-agricultural colonies were successful and largely met the garrison’s food needs. In the 4th year of Zhengtong (1439), the Ming court found out at the end of December of the second year of Zhengtong that the Yunnan Administrative Commission had more than 540,000 dan of grains in the warehouse, while the used quantity was unknown. Despite the harvest of the following year remained unknown, it ordered to use the hoard on the Ming army on an expedition against Luchuan. In addition to the military-agro colonies, the Ming Dynasty also implemented “commercial farms” in the border areas. Specifically, merchants were allowed to operate the Borderland farm, and trade the harvested grain for salt quota with the local government, so as to obtain the license to sell the prescribed amount of salt. In the 15th year of Hongwu, commercial farms were extensively launched in Yunnan and Guizhou. During the Hongzhi period, commercial farms were still relatively active in those areas. In the 29th year of Hongwu, the Ming Dynasty also set up commercials in the three guards of Nandan, Fengyi, and Qingyuan in Guangxi.20 The commercial farms in the southwest Borderland were also a way to meet the needs of military rations, though their grain production was not as good as that of military-agro colonies. The Ming Dynasty also set up civilian farms in the southwest border. According to History of the Ming, in the middle of Hongwu Reign, “The imperial court further encouraged the establishment of military-agro colonies; by and by, all troops and civilians in all posts, batallions, prefectures and counties became engaged in farming.” The Ming court also stipulated that “population be relocated to sparsely populated counties; ordinary people shall be recruited and criminals dispatched to civilian farms, all under jurisdiction of their respective department.” According to Veritable Records of Ming, in the 10th year of Wanli, Guizhou Province had more than 320,000 mu of private land and more than 330,000 mu of farmland.21 The Ming 20 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 150, Vol. 187; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongzhi in the Reign of Emperor Xiaoong, Vol. 65, Vol. 184. 21 History of Ming, Vol. 77, “Food and Money (1)”, 1884; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Wanli in the Reign of Emperor Shenzong, Vol. 126.



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Dynasty developed civilian farms in the southwestern Borderland, and organized relocation of immigrants as the main labor force, in contrast to the practice of the Yuan Dynasty, which merely dispatched native troops for the purpose. The scale of the civilian farms in the southwest Borderland was much smaller than that of military-agro colonies, because the southwest Borderland was not a key area for “immigration to the sparsely populated area” according to the migration movement of the Ming Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty stationed a large number of troops and organized military-agro colonies in the southwestern border, caused a large wave of military emigration, and contributed to a climax of economic development on an unprecedented scale with agriculture as the mainstay. Its practice was obviously of great significance to the social development and economic and cultural progress of the southwest Borderland, while exerting profound influences at the same time. Although the original intention was to stabilize the region and “spare the imperial court of worries from the southwest”, but objectively it effectively promoted the development of the southwestern Borderland, turning the Ming Dynasty into a period of rapid development in the southwestern Borderland, especially in terms of agriculture. Another contribution of the Ming Dynasty in managing the southwest Borderland was the formal establishment of Guizhou Province and adjusting the administrative establishment of Guangxi. Previously, the area around Guizhou was under split among Sichuan, Huguang, and Yunnan, while the central part was a remote area with sparse population and underdeveloped economy. The Yuan Dynasty opened the post road from Kunming to Hunan via central Guizhou, significantly improving the economic and military importance of Guizhou. Since the founding of Annan in the Song Dynasty, the Central Plains dynasty lost a bastion for operating in the southwestern Borderland, and consequently for restraining the China-Indochina Peninsula drawing on the advantageous geographical location of Yunnan and Annan. In view of this, the Ming Dynasty attached great importance managing the present-day Guizhou area to ensure the control of Yunnan, before eventually establishing Guizhou Province. Guangxi was given the status of a relatively independent administrative region in the early years of

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Xiantong in the Tang Dynasty, which divided the Lingnan area into Lingnan East Circuit and Lingnan West Circuit. The Song and Yuan dynasties inherited the pattern of divided rule over Guangxi and Guangdong, but the administrative settings of Guangxi also changed now and then. In the 15th year of Hongwu (1382), the Ming Dynasty set up the Guizhou Chief Military Commission, but the civil affairs of Guizhou were still under split among the three provinces of Huguang, Sichuan and Yunnan. In the 11th year of Yongle (1413), the Administration Commission of Guizhou was established, and Guizhou was formally established as a province, ending the history of its surrounding areas under the jurisdiction of other provinces. The Administrative Commission had jurisdiction over eight prefectures, one subprefecture, and one county, as well as one Placation Commission and 39 Official Departments; later, its jurisdiction was expanded to 10 prefectures, 9 sub-prefectures, and 14 counties, as well as one Placation Commission and 76 Official Departments. The ten prefectures established by the Administration Commission of Guizhou included Guiyang, Anshun, Duyun, Pingyue, Liping, Sinan, Sizhou, Zhenyuan, Tongren, and Shiqian, roughly governing present-day Guizhou, excluding Zunyi and Weng’an. In the 2nd year of Hongwu, it inherited the old Guangxi Branch Secretariat in the Yuan Dynasty, and established Guangxi Administrative Commission in the ninth year. The Guangxi Administrative Commission had jurisdiction over 11 prefectures, 48 sub-prefectures, and 50 counties, and four official departments. The 11 sub-prefectures included Guilin, Pingle, Wuzhou, Xunzhou, Liuzhou, Qingyuan, Nanning, Si’en, Taiping, Siming, and Zhen’an, with an area similar to those of today’s Guangxi.22 Regarding the Borderland management system, the Ming Dynasty further developed the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty into a relatively complete chieftain system. According to History of Ming, “The Ming Dynasty followed the original institution of the Yuan Dynasty and further developed, extending it to sub-prefectures and counties, 22 History of Ming, Vol. 46, “Geography (7)”, 1197; History of Ming, Vol. 45, “Geography (6)”, 1148.



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imposing taxes and conscript labors to ensure their submission. Thus the laws and regulations became ready, but essentially the purpose consisted in restraint. Those influential clans had habitually abused power and enhanced prestige, but they had to rely on our conferment. Therefore, they could be easily controlled via conferment of titles. However, frequent conscription might force changes, especially when they drew on their past merits and stuck their erroneous ways. So the conscription in China’s imperial history has proven to generate benefits while incurring troubles, depending on whether the official appointed was competent. If graciousness is complemented with coercion, the full submission of the people can be rallied without the risk of troubles.”23 The above records give a brief description of the essence, content and characteristics of the chieftain system in the Ming Dynasty. Regarding the starting point for its implementation, the rulers of the Ming Dynasty were keenly aware that the barbarian chiefs of the southwest “might rebel if pressed hard” “conferment of titles was the surefire way to keep the influential big clans under control,” and that “appointment of competent officials and complementation of graciousness with coercion were the key to success in governance.” In fact, the theory was a further development of Zhu Yuanzhang’s strategy of “supplementing rigor with leniency as the inevitable way of subjugation” and the tradition of “ruling barbarians with barbarians”, and its goal was to “make the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” Compared to the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty, the chieftain system of the Ming Dynasty featured further improved relevant regulations and management, more extensive implementation, and deeper rule. In addition, under the chieftain system, the Ming Dynasty actively developed school education, which played a very important role in spreading the culture of the inland, improving the quality of the tusi at all levels and enhancing the identification of the Borderland ethnic groups with the motherland. However, there were also many problems with the chieftain system. The main one was that the Ming Dynasty lacked vigilance against the situation that some of the chieftains gradually grew more powerful and even into separatist regimes, 23 History of Ming, Vol. 310, “Biography of Chieftans”, 7981.

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it had no active and effective countermeasures. As the Ming Dynasty gradually became corrupt, its officials became lackadaisical in handling inheritance formalities for chieftains at all levels, enraging them and forcing them into rebellion in some cases, and consequently further aggravating the Borderland chaos. The rebellion of Tabinshwehti chieftain in the Borderland of Yunnan during the Longqing years was partially because of their inaction. Among the people there was the folklore of “The government begrudged a piece of paper (appointment letter of the chieftain) and lost a land extending for two thousand miles.”24 in satire of such phenomena.

7.  The Strategy of the Qing Dynasty for Managing the Southwestern Borderland The Qing Dynasty was the last feudal dynasty in China. Taking 1840 as the demarcation line, its rule can be roughly divided into the early and the later periods, which had markedly different border governance strategies. In the early stage, it made important contributions to opposing separatist forces and resisting foreign aggression, strengthening national unity and developing the border areas. In the later period, it was apparently subjected to limitations in border governance, and it kept running into obstacles in practice. This was partially because of its being the last leg of the feudal society and its failure in confronting the Western powers, and partially because of the imperial court inheriting the negative elements of the previous ideology for governing borders. After the Daoguang years, the negative impacts of the increasingly restrained foreign policy, and apparent tendency to close its doors to the outside world of the Qing Dynasty began to show. The emperors of the Qing Dynasty seldom had such views as “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the peripheral”, while their views to maintain the territory was also clear. The tradition of prioritizing the north over the south was not obvious in the Qing Dynasty, which in its early days emphasized the management of the southwestern Borderland, with 24 [Qing Dynasty] Feng Su, Yunnan Investigations, Vol. 2, Invasion of Tabinshwehti Tusi.



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significantly more effective measures than previous generations. The 133 years under the reign of Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong was the peak of the Qing Dynasty in managing the southwestern Borderland.

7.1  The concept and strategy of the Qing Dynasty for border governance were initially formed in the early years of Kangxi, and became complete during the reigns of Emperor Yongzheng and Emperor Qianlong, during which the Qing government devoted more energy to Borderland governance. In the northwestern region, during the Battle of Ulan Butong in the 29th year of Kangxi (1700), the Qing army defeated the invading Mongolian Junggar tribe that had colluded with the Russian army. In the 35th year, Emperor Kangxi personally led an army to conquer the rebellion of Galdan, the leader of the Junggar tribe. In the 20th year of Qianlong (1755), the Qing Dynasty unified the Tianshan Beilu Circuit after suppressing Junggar; in the 24th year, it suppressed the Revolt of the Altishahr Khojas and unified southern Xinjiang. In the Northeast, in the 15th year of Shunzhi (1658), the Qing army wiped out the invading Russian Cossacks in the Battle of the Songhua River. After Emperor Kangxi succeeded to the throne, he strengthened resistance to Russian encroachment on the northeast, and ordered the Qing army to attack the city of Kjaksa in the 24th year. In the 28th year, the Qing Dynasty signed the “Nerchinsk Treaty” with Russia and determined the eastern boundary between China and Russia. Emperor Yongzheng also carried out a large-scale gaitu guiliu in the southwestern Borderland, and began to instate a minister in Xizang. Emperor Qianlong continued the war in the northwest and southwest, smashing the rebellion of the local forces, and further consolidating “replacing native chieftains with state officials.” In view of the differences between the Borderlands and the interior, the Qing government also adopted different approaches to the administrative management of the Borderlands according to specific circumstances (Bai, 1991, 243–253). And its approaches were successful. In fact, its governance of the border areas can be said to be a consummation of the experience from China’s imperial history. With full consideration of

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local circumstances and adaptation of its measures, it attained a high level in the maturation, improvement and individualization of governance practice. The northeastern area beyond the Shanhai Pass, including the three administrative regions of Shengjing, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, were the cradle of the Qing Dynasty. In the area, it established of the Five Departments of Shengjing and Governor’s Mansion of Shuntian Prefecture, and instated Shengjing General to take charge of the entire Shengjing area, under which prefectures, sub-prefectures, and counties were established. To the north of Shengjing there were Jilin and Heilongjiang, each under the command of their respective generals. In Inner and Outer Mongolia and other Mongolian regions, the imperial court set up a foreign department court to handle relevant affairs. Meanwhile, it appointed generals, commanders, deputy commanders, ministers of counselors, clerks and other officials to comprehensively handle or supervise the affairs of the region. The Qing Dynasty also divided Mongolia into “Inner Mongolia” and “Outer Mongolia” for separate ruling. In Xinjiang, it appointed military chiefs to comprehensively manage military and civilian affairs, and established the Administrative Office of Yili General, the supreme official of Xinjiang. Under Yili General, there were commanders, counselors, clerks, and farm leaders. In addition to assisting management of the Yili area, most of them were stationed in various places for defense. For Xizang, a management system integrating administration and religion was implemented. The Qing court sent two ministers to Xizang to take charge of all affairs on its behalf. Meanwhile, it drew on the strength of the two supreme religious leaders, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni, were recognized. The former was stationed in the Front Xizang area, and the latter stationed in the Back Xizang area. In the Southern chieftain areas, the Qing Dynasty drew on the traditional society of the local barbarians, appointed its chieftains as court officials and made their posts hereditary, allowing them to guard their land and people forever. In order to prevent the chieftains from being domineering and seeking independence, it also adopted administration of local and non-local officials, and conferment, while prohibiting



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the chieftains from going beyond their spheres of influence and using force to replace native officials with non-native ones. Its general strategy of border governance generally had the following features: First, the fundamental powers were highly centralized power, while specific powers were highly decentralized. Second, it studied the characteristics of the Borderland barbarians, and took into consideration their customs while implementing administrative policies. Third, it offered generous rewards to the upper-class figures of the Borderland barbarians and implemented divided rule. Fourth, it vigorously advocated Lamaism in the Mongolian grasslands and the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau. Fifth, it implemented the Tributary system and the annual interview system for the border areas. Through the above strategies, the Qing Dynasty achieved effective governance of a unified multi-ethnic country, while effectively consolidating border defense. There was also a brutal and backward side to the Qing Dynasty’s strategy of border governance. In the northeast area beyond the Shanhai Pass, it implemented a policy of “embargo”, restricting the exchanges between the various ethnic groups, and objectively weakening the defense of the border areas. Later, Western powers coveted these areas and managed to continually plunder them, partially because of the enfeebled local tribes. During the period when the Qing Dynasty took a turn for decline from its heyday, the Qing court also changed its thought of governing borders, with the primary tendency of replacing the previous reforms and enterprising with conservatism and retrogression. After the advent of the 19th century when some western countries entered capitalism, the Qing court still regarded itself as “the heavenly dynasty” and “the heavenly kingdom” and continued its closed-door policy, while political corruption and social stagnation also gradually became common. In the 20th year of Daoguang Emperor (1840), the Western powers blasted open the gate of China with artillery. In the first year of Xianfeng (1851), the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement broke out. After 14 years of persistence, it failed under the combined suppression of Chinese and foreign forces. After the Opium War, the Qing court significantly changed its thinking on border governance, and continually compromised and

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retreated under the belligerent Western powers, losing influence and land in the border areas; the focus of its border governance also shifted from the north to the southeast coast, until the outbreak of a full-scale crisis in the border areas. The Qing Dynasty maintained friendly relations with the Mongolian forces in the northern grasslands through marriage and other means, effectively alleviating the pressure from that quarter. Although it emphasized operating the northern Borderland after unifying the country, its opponents were mainly Tsarist Russia and its dependent forces. After the Opium War, the Western powers encroached on all parts of China’s Borderlands. Although Zuo Zongtang believed that “I personally believed that urgent affairs to be addressed in a coordinated manner include coastal defense in the east, and Borderland defense in the west. The two should be simultaneously implemented.” However, the Tsarist Russia’s border violations made the situation in the northern Borderland tense. Zuo Zongtang went on to suggest that “in Borderland defense, the emphasis should be put on guarding against the cunning and scheming Russians and a full expedition should be launched to the west. Once the northwest is safe, the southeast will naturally be stabilized.”25 In other words, he believed that the northwestern Borderland should be prioritized. In the southwest, the Qing Dynasty made Vietnam and Burma protectorates and maintained the suzerainty. In the 17th year of Shunzhi (1660), Annan sent envoys to pay tribute and requested recognition of the Qing Dynasty. In the following year, the Qing court issued an imperial decree to the aristocrat Li Family of Annan and asked it to “serve as a screen and its duties.” In the 5th year of Kangxi (1666), it gave Annan a seal, reaffirming the suzerainty relationship with it. The suzerainvassal relationship between the Qing Dynasty and Annan was ended in 1884 when the French occupied Annan. Burma took the Southern Ming regime in exile under its wings in the early Qing Dynasty, but surrendered Zhu Youlang, its Yongli Emperor, to the Qing army, after 25 [Qing Dynasty] Zuo Zongtang, Imperial Memorial on the Necessisity for Launching an Expedition to the Northwest, Collected Works of Zuo Zongtang: Imperial Memorial, Vol. 46.



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a coup d’etat. In the 32nd year (1767) and 34th year of Qianlong, the Qing court sent troops to Burma twice, to address disputes between border residents. In the 53rd year, Burma submitted a letter to the Qing court, expressing its willingness to pledge allegiance. In the 55th year, the Qing Dynasty appointed its lord as the King of Burma, who agreed to pay tribute every ten years. Thus the suzerain-vassal relationship between the two parties was formally established (Wei,1984, 268, 275). In 1858, the British colonists occupied Burma, and the suzerainty relationship ceased to exist. The Qing Dynasty also established suzerain-vassal relations with Laos (Lan Xang) and Siam. In the several hundred years before the Qing Dynasty, the southwestern border of the Central Plains dynasty was roughly elastic, stretching and contracting now and then. The Central Plains dynasty “bestowed graciousness on” the barbarians beyond the southwestern border with the magnanimity of “a heavenly dynasty” and accepted their tribute. The British and French began to encroaching on China’s southwestern Borderland after occupying Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, and the border issues between China and the countries of the Indochina Peninsula became prominent. After surveys and negotiations, the Qing Dynasty delineated the border with Burma and Vietnam controlled by Britain and France, which continued to penetrate into China’s southwestern Borderland through them. Faced with the situation of being divided up by great powers, the Qing court placed its main forces in the southeast coast and around the capital. By and by, the crisis of secession in the southwestern Borderland went beyond its control.

7.2  In the 3rd year of Shunzhi (1646), the Qing army invaded Sichuan from Hanzhong, forcing the remnants of Zhang Xianzhong’s uprising army into Guizhou and Yunnan under the leadership of Sun Kewang and Li Dingguo. In the 13th year, Li Dingguo lost in the Northern Expedition, and ushered Zhu Youlang, Emperor Yongli of the Southern Ming Dynasty, into Yunnan. In the 15th year, the Qing army invaded Guizhou and Yunnan from Hunan, and Emperor Yongli fled into Burma. In the first year of Kangxi (1662), Wu Sangui, a general of the

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Qing army, captured and killed Zhu Youlang, and took over Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. In the 24th year of Guangxu (1898), Yunnan Province “had an area extended to Sicheng in Guangxi in the east, Jiaozhi in the south, Huili in Sichuan in the north, and Tianmaguan in the west, and bordered on Burma,” roughly the same as that of Yunnan Province today. In the 9th year of Shunzhi, the Qing troops led by Kong Youde occupied most of Guangxi and marched into Guizhou. Sun Kewang ordered his subordinate general Li Dingguo to lead an army to attack Hunan and conquer Guilin, and then regain the entire province of Guangxi. Hong Chengchou, a minister of the Qing court, was stationed in Changsha by the Qing court, and the Qing army reoccupied Hunan and Guangxi. In the 13th year of Shunzhi, the Yongli Regime and the Daxi Army retreated into Yunnan, and the Qing court established rule over Guangxi. In the 16th year of Shunzhi, various Qing troops met in Yunnan, after pacifying the areas including Guizhou. After the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories was put down, the Qing Dynasty appointed the Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi in Lingnan. In the 2nd year of Kangxi (1663), Guangxi and Guangxi were placed under the jurisdiction of separate governors, but were later merged and divided time and again. In the 6th year of Yongzheng (1728), Eertai implemented the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Yunnan-Guizhou region, and the imperial court placed Guangxi under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou, implementing the reform as well. In the 12th year of Yongzheng, the Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi was restored, with the government seat in Zhaoqing Prefecture and later in Guangzhou Prefecture. On the whole, Guangxi was not ruled by a separate governor for long. For most of the time, Guangxi and Guangdong were under the jurisdiction of one governor. In the Guizhou region, the Guizhou Administrative Commission was established in line with the practice of the Ming Dynasty. In the 16th year of Shunzhi (1659), the Circuit Inspector of Guizhou was instated, with the government seat in Guiyang, and the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou was established, with one government seat in each. In the first year of Kangxi (1662), the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou was changed to Governor of Guizhou, and back in the 4th



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year, with the government seat in Guizhou and later moved to Yunnan in the 21st year. The Qing court stationed many troops on the southwest border. The Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou, the Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi, the Governor of Guangxi and the Governor of Guizhou were all authorized to command troops. In the 16th year of Shunzhi (1659), the Qing government established the green-standard camp system for Yunnan and Guizhou, placing four battalions and two battalions under the command of the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou and the Governor of Yunnan respectively. In the 50th year of Qianlong (1785), Yunnan Province had 41,353 green-standard troops, topping the southwestern provinces. Guizhou also had a Circuit Inspector with the same battalion command as Yunnan. Guizhou also set up a commander in the four towns of Dading, Qianxi, Zhenyuan, and Weining, each with 2,000green-standard troops organized in three battalions. According to statistics, the number of green-standard troops in Guangxi was 20,000 and 23,588 in the 28th year of Kangxi (1689) and the 50th year of Qianlong respectively. Due to insufficient military supplies in Guizhou, some of the garrisons in were allowed to operate farms locally, “and Hunan and Guizhou were the only ones allowing military-agricultural colonies” (Zhao et al., 1977, 3898). In addition to the green-standard troops, the Qing government also stationed other armies in various places, including flood control troops, militia and native soldiers. Due to the vastness of border region in Yunnan, the Qing Dynasty increased 15,400 flood control troops in 30 battalions, dispatched to border regions of Tengyue and Mengzi, as well as Dali and Pu’er prefectures. The militia who assisted in the defense consisted mainly of barbarian soldiers, chieftain troops and native soldiers, who were sent to guard the “land of miasma” along the border of Mening and Tengyue. In the chieftain areas of Guangxi and Guizhou, a large number of native soldiers were stationed for defense. From the beginning of the Qing Dynasty to the Daoguang and Xianfeng years, the Qing government had not fully taken over the defense of the border passes. In Guangxi, it only guarded the strategic land and water passes in Pingxiang with garrisons and chieftains along the border. In the 11th year of Tongzhi (1872), the imperial court ordered Feng Zicai

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to pick elite soldiers from various battalions to guard various passes in the south, marking the beginning of its comprehensive guarding of the Guangxi border with garrisons. The Qing government believed that the Miao ethnic groups of Guizhou were fickle and cracking down on them with troops would be counter-productive. So it guarded them closely, building innumerable watch towers (Zhao et al., 1977, 4071, 4075). An important feature of its governance of the southwestern Borderland was to actively promote social reforms, emphasize standardized and sustainable management, and adopt effective governance measures suited to local conditions. The rulers devoted a lot of effort to the undertaking, especially in the early period of Qing Dynasty. As a result, the reign of Emperor Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong became a period of rapid development and significant changes for the southwestern Borderland. The achievement was contributive to the effective removal of shackles hindering social development through measures such as replacement of native chieftains with state officials. Many border areas in the early Qing Dynasty were still controlled by barbarians or lawless chieftains. After the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories was settled, the issue of replacing local officials with non-native ones was officially put on the agenda. Emperor Yongzheng appointed Eertai as the Governor of the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guizhou, and authorized him to preside over the implementation of the measure there. The measure thoroughly resolved resistance of local forces to management and obstruction of development. By the end of the Qing Dynasty, with the exception of the border areas to the south of the Lancang River and several remote areas, the chieftains of Yunnan were abolished, as were most of the chieftains in Guizhou and Guangxi. However, new contradictions rose. In the middle and late Qing Dynasty, the contention between immigrants and aboriginals over land, and the resistance of ethnic minorities to the exorbitant taxes after the reform gradually became the focus of social conflicts. In the Qing Dynasty, active management of the southwestern Borderland was also manifested in the deployment of troops, adjustment of social relations, rectification of social order, and standardization of official management. The imperial court implemented a garrison



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system in the southwestern Borderland, instated the Yunnan-Guizhou Governor and the Yunnan Governor entitled to command troops, stationed green-standard troops and native soldiers in various places, and emphasized the defense of various places, especially border fortresses, forming a strict defense pattern of garrison troops. After the replacement of native chieftains with state officials, migrants swarmed in. Some Han profiteers wandered through the villages and took advantage of the ethnic people in transactions; or lure them into debauchery or manipulated litigations, causing social unrest and even turmoil. The Qing court called those people “traitors” and adopted stringent prevention and punishment measures against them. It issued orders to ban Han Chinese from entering the barbarian villages and prohibit barbarians from trading with the Han Chinese, with severe punishments for the offenders. Although such prohibition had the negative effect of isolating the barbarians from the Han Chinese, it reduced the incidence of barbarians being deceived by “traitors.” In addition, the Qing court also extensively implemented the Bao-Jia System in various places, including those where the native officials had been replaced with nonnative ones, and allowed contingencies according to local conditions in order to establish standardized management at the grassroots level. The early Qing Dynasty attached great importance to the governance of Borderland officials. All newly elected officials must explain in their memorials about their experience and quality would make them competent to “stand the miasma”, and take office only after being qualified by the court and even the emperor himself.

7.3  While implementing social reforms and strengthening management, the Qing Dynasty increased its efforts to develop the southwestern Borderland and achieved remarkable results. One of the social problems faced by the mid-Qing Dynasty was the rapid growth of the national population and the migration of the inland refugees to sparsely populated areas. Explicit bans were imposed, but didn’t seem to work much. In fact, migration was tacitly approved. In the first year of Yongzheng (1723), Emperor Yongzheng issued an edict, saying that “after a long

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period of peace, our population has increased and agricultural products can barely feed the people … Afterwards, where there are, the people should be allowed to cultivate arable land lying fallow in each province. The local officials shall not blackmail them, nor should the subordinate officials obstruct it.”26 Emperor Qianlong said that “in the 100-odd years since the founding of the Qing Dynasty, the number of households nationwide has exceeded ten times that of the past. It’s hard for one farmer to feed a dozen people, so naturally they wouldn’t be as well off as they had been in the past.” “After I took over the throne, I have stepped the efforts to reclaim land and expand our territory. As a result, the common people had land to cultivate and earn a livelihood.”27 The government of Yunnan and other provinces reduced taxes, and loaned seedlings and oxen to encourage refugees to come and cultivate wasteland. The land cultivated by the immigrants might be recognized by the government as permanent properties, with taxes to be paid after the borrowed travel expenses, cattle and seeds were fully redeemed with harvests in the following years. The government also taught the immigrants to cultivate the mature paddy field first, and then to cultivate the new reclaimed paddy field, before proceeding to reclaim rainfed cropland in a convenient way.28 The population of Yunnan and other provinces grew rapidly in the middle and late Qing Dynasty, mainly due to the large inflow of immigrants. Recognizing that immigration to the southwest Borderland would help address population expansion in the interior, the provincial governments of the southwest Borderland welcomed refugees to cultivate wasteland, thereby linking immigration to the economic development of the southwest border, and incurring a wave of unprecedented scale in immigration to the southwest Borderland. In addition to immigration for cultivation, the Qing Dynasty also organized farms in Yunnan, though on a much smaller scale as 2 6 Veritable Records of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 6. 27 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 1441. 28 [Guangxu Reign] Manuscripts of General Records of Yunnan, Vol. 39, “Land Tax: Illustrations”, entry: 10th year of Yongzheng, citing the imperial memorial of Gao Qizhuo.



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compared to the Ming Dynasty. In some places, the farms were changed to private ownership. Farms originally managed by guard posts in the Ming Dynasty were mostly seized by the high and mighty in the early Qing Dynasty and capable farming hands fled in large numbers. For example, the Yongchang Guard Post originally had more than 1,143 hectares of farmland in the Ming Dynasty, but only 364 hectares in the middle years of Kangxi Reign in the Qing Dynasty, with the rest either seized occupied or abandoned.29 The Qing court originally tried to maintain the farms by reducing the rent. In the 28th year of Kangxi (1689), Yunnan governor Fan Chengxun ordered to “exempt” 200,000 taels of silver owed by the military-agro colonies from the 21st to 27th year, with the approval of the imperial court. However, the tax cuts did not seem to work. Yunnan Governor Shi Wensheng said in an imperial memorial that “although today the taxes are reduced, [the farms] suspect that they will be increased in the future.” In view of this, in the 29th year of Kangxi, the Qing court adopted the suggestion of Yunnan Governor Fan Chengxun and others. According to the proposal, civilians should be allowed to reclaim barren military-agricultural colonies, with land taxes payable according to standards of civilian land. Later, the imperial court allowed the farms to follow the example of Heyang County and pay taxes according to the standard of civilian land. After the abolition of the farming system in some areas, Yunnan began “to recover from the dilemma of farms lying at waste.” After this reform, a large number of military-agro colonies became private farms. In addition, according to Volume 11 of Chronicles of Yunnan, in the 24th year of Kangxi, Cai Rong, the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou, was allowed to turn the Mu’s Manor of Merit, previously given to Wu Sangui, into private land, after securing the approval of the imperial court. In fact, it indicated an abolition of the tenant system since the Ming Dynasty and was thus progressive. In Guangxi, and Guizhou, the Qing court extensively opened up military and civilian farms, while attracting immigrants to reclaim wasteland. According to local government reports, more than 300,000 mu of land was reclaimed in Guangxi. During the Yongzheng reign, 29 [Kangxi Reign] Annals of Yongchang Sub-prefecture, Vol. 9, “Ode to Land Relcamation”

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replacement of native chieftains with state officials in southeastern Guizhou led to stretches of deserted field and villages, due to war damages. Feng Guangyu, the Governor of Guizhou, started recruiting Han Chinese to the Miao villages to reclaim wasteland and set up guard posts after securing the approval of the imperial court, and helped promoting the recovery of the local economy (Zhao et al., 1977, 10583). During the Qing Dynasty, agriculture in the southwestern Borderland witnessed marked development. The area of cultivated land increased year by year, the proportion of mature land and the output of crops continually grew, and agricultural taxes became an important source of local finances. The Qing Dynasty made conscious efforts to develop agricultural production in the southwest Borderland, with the main purpose of collecting agricultural taxes, making it different from the previous dynasties. After Jiaqing reign, the agricultural economy of the southwestern Borderland peaked and took a turn for decline. After the Opium War, tobacco bans were widely lifted in Yunnan and other provinces, and large areas of arable land was converted for growing opium poppy, seriously affecting the development of agriculture. There was such a popular saying in Yunnan during the Qing Dynasty: “The poor would move to the land of barbarians while the destitute rush to the mine pits.” Most of the migrants had migrated because of poverty. They could not count on the government to organize and settle down, nor had the financial resources and skills to make a living. After entering Yunnan, they often went to remote areas to reclaim wasteland, make charcoal or dig coal, developing the Borderlands and mountainous areas, but damaging the ecological environment. On the other hand, after the replacement of native chieftains with state officials, a large number of refugees entered the Borderlands to reclaim wasteland, and became entangled in conflicts with the local ethnic groups for resources. In the 60th year of Qianlong (1795), a large-scale Miao uprising occurred in the area connecting Guizhou and Hunan. Yongsui Sub-county had been a Miao colony but was “entirely seized as private land in a matter of one decade.” So the Miao people shouted the slogan of “evicting the immigrants and restoring our original land” and rose in massive scale, “with hundreds of households from multiple



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villages entering the foray” (Wei, 1984, 314). The insurgence was suppressed by the Qing army. The Qing court also actively developed mineral deposits in the southwestern Borderland, with unprecedented coverage, scale and output. In the beginning, development of mineral deposits was banned, but Yunnan was an exception since it had been of the source of minting materials for all provinces. Since the 44th year of Kangxi (1705), governmental mining was allowed, and copper mining industry in Yunnan witnessed rapid development. In the early years of Yongzheng, its cooper production was 8.9 million catties annually, and soared to two to three million catties a few years later. In the 5th year of the Yongzheng (1727), its copper surplus from minting exceeded 2 million catties, and the court imperial ordered it to be transported to Huguang and Jiangxi for minting (Zhao et al., 1977). During the Qianlong period, its annual output of copper might have reached twelve million catties, since the two bureaus of the imperial court, and the eight eastern provinces and Shaanxi Province took over 9 million catties of copper each year from it.30 Back then, a large amount of copper was transported from Yunnan to Beijing, and was partially withheld by provinces along the route. Hence there was the saying “Yunnan is unrivaled in copper production.” In the middle of the Qing Dynasty, private mining was allowed, and “soon the bans on mining were mostly lifted.” Famous copper mines in Yunnan included Tangdan and Maolu in the east, Huilong and Debao in the west, and Chuxiong, Yongbei and Yunwu in the center. Gejiu was famous all over the country for its tin production. After the mid-Jiaqing period, silver mines developed rapidly. The two silver mines in Zhaotong, Ludian, Lema, Maolong and Mengding Sub-prefecture were the largest. The Bolong Silver Factory in Burma hired tens of thousands of miners from Jiangxi, Huguang, Yunnan and other places of the Middle Kingdom.31 The people of Qing Dynasty said that “In southern Yunnan, the copper and salt production is the most

30 [Republic of China] Yan Zhongping, On the Copper Policy of Yunnan in the Qing Dynasty, 81. 31 Zhao Erxun et al., Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 528, “Protectorates (3): Burma”, 14662; Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong in the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 269.

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important” (Tan, 1990, 41). Due to poor management in the late Qianlong period, Yunnan’s copper mining industry gradually declined, resulting in a large number of unemployed miners. The Qing Dynasty was incompetent in handling the situation, which became even commonplace in the later period. During the Xiantong and Jiaqing reigns, the anti-Qing uprising led by Du Wenxiu broke out in Yunnan, and a large number of unemployed miners participated. The Qing court suffered the full consequence of ignoring the unemployment problem of miners. In terms of cultural education, the Qing Dynasty actively established schools at all levels, and Confucian schools, academies, free schools, and private schools increased rapidly. Education in Yunnan also witnessed rapid development. In the 33rd year of Kangxi (1694), the Qing Dynasty established eight prefectural schools in Qujing, Chengjiang, Guangxi, Yuanjiang, Kaihua, Shunning, Wuding, and Jingdong, and set up magisteriums in 17 prefectures and counties including Xundian and Jianshui.32 This was one of the large-scale campaigns to estab­ lish school education in Yunnan during the Qing Dynasty. Later, the imperial court built a number of schools in the Borderlands, including Lijiang Sub-Prefectural School, Zhaotong Sub-Prefectural School, Zhongdian Sub-Prefectural School and Simao Sub-Prefectural School. According to the statistics contained in Newly Compiled General History of Yunnan: School System, a publication of the Republic of China, prior to the establishment of new schools in the late Qing Dynasty, Confucian schools in Yunnan increased to 101 from the 73 in the Ming Dynasty. The climax in establishing Confucianism schools in Guizhou was mainly during the Kangxi period. After the addition, the original 47 Confucian schools of the Ming Dynasty were increased to 66 in the Qing Dynasty. After the replacement of native chieftains with state officials, the number of Confucian schools in Guangxi increased from 69 in the Ming Dynasty to 84, with the fastest growth in the areas in West Guangxi where the reform was completed. The famous academies in Guizhou included the Guishan Academy, which was expanded on the basis of Yangming Academy, and the Zhengxi Academy and Zhengshu

32 Veritable Records of Emperor Shengzu in the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 2.



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Academy built in the provincial capital in the 5th year of Jiaqing (1800). They were collectively called “The Three Academies of Guiyang” back then. Originally, the academies of Guangxi were mostly in the eastern part, and later spread to the west. Among them, the famous ones included Huacheng Academy in Tianzhou Prefecture, Yunfeng Academy in Sicheng Sub-Prefecture, Anlong Academy in Xilongzhou Prefecture, Xiuyang Academy in Tianbao County, Yuxiu Academy in Xilin County, and Kangshan Academy in Yongkang Prefecture. Thanks to the active development of school education, the number of scholars taking imperial examinations in the southwestern Borderland provinces continued to increase, and the literacy of ethnic areas was also significantly improved. More importantly, the continuous efforts to promote education enhanced the quality of native officials and chieftains at all levels enhanced the exchange and integration of Borderland culture with the culture of the hinterland, and played a positive and far-reaching role in enhancing the bond with the Borderland tribes.

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Fang, Xuanling et al. 1974. “Biography of Wang Xun.” In Book of Jin (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Fang, Xuanling et al. 1974. “Biography of Zhou Fang.” In Book of Jin (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Fang, Tie. 2004. “Textual Criticism on Lost Record of the Several Historical Facts of Southwest Ethnic Minorities in the Historical Records and the Book of Han Dynasty.” Journal of the Central University for Nationalities (3). Fang, Tie. 2007. “The Border Governance and Officials of the Tang Dynasty Seen from Its Relationship with Nanzhao.” In French Sinology. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Guo, Songnian. 1986. Travels in Dali (collated and annotated ed.), edited by Wang Shuwu. Yunnan: Yunnan Nationality Publishing House. Guo, Zhengzhong, ed. 1997. History of Salt Production in China. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Harvey, G. E. 1957. History of Burma (translated and annotated ed.). Beijing: Commercial Press. Institute of Archaeology, and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 1984. Archaeological Excavation and Researches in New China. Beijing: Cultural Relics Press. Li, Deyu. 1983. “The Second Memorial in Response to the Edict.” In Complete Essays of Tang (punctuated ed.), edited by Dong Hao et al. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Li, Yanshou. 1974. “Biography of Wei Shikang.” In History of Northern Dynasties (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Li, Yanshou. 1975. “Sons of Emperor Wu of Liang.” In History of Southern Dynasties (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Wenzheng. 1991. [Tianqi] Records of Yunnan, collated and punctuated by Gu Yongji. Kunming: Yunnan Education Publishing House. Liu, Wenzheng. 1991. “The Original Road from Wusa to Sichuan.” In [Tianqi years] Records of Yunnan, collated and punctuated by Gu Yongji. Kunming: Yunnan Education Publishing House. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Nanzhao.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Biography of Zhang Jianzhi.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Liu, Xu et al. 1975. “Record of Emperor Yizong.” In Old Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Min, Hongxue. 1991. “Memorials on Opening the Road to Guangdong.” In [Tianqi] Records of Yunnan, edited by Liu Wenzheng (collated and annotated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Ni, Tui. 1992. Historical Biography of Yunnan (collated and annotated ed.). Kunming: Yunnan University Press. Ouyang, Xiu et al. 1975. “Southern Barbarians: Nanzhao (Commendation).” In New Book of Tang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.



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Chapter Four

The Administration of the Southwestern Borderland by the Central Plains Dynasty

Abstract: This chapter studies the practice of the managing. The Central Plains dynasty’s administration of the southwestern Borderland was part of its management of the national Borderlands, but with distinct characteristics. In particular, during the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the gradual concretization and diversification of its border governance policies led to distinct local characteristics and effectiveness in its governance of the southwestern Borderland. Keywords: Qin and Han dynasties, Sui Dynasty, Tang and Song dynasties, Yuan Dynasty, Qing Dynasty, Qin Shi Huang, ancient China, Southwestern Borderland The Central Plains dynasty’s administration of the southwestern Borderland was part of its management of the national Borderlands, but with distinct characteristics. In particular, during the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the gradual concretization and diversification of its border governance policies led to distinct local characteristics and effectiveness in its governance of the southwestern Borderland.

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1.  Ethnic Relations in the Southwestern Borderland and Its Administration in Imperial China In comparison, the ethnic relations in the southwestern Borderland had distinct characteristics, especially when compared with those in the northern grasslands. They were an important factor that profoundly influenced the governance policies of the southwestern Borderland, with continually deepened understanding across dynasties. To facilitate comparison, southern regions mentioned in this thesis included the southern borders of the present-day Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangdong, while the northern regions mainly referred to the Mongolian grasslands. Roughly, in the ethnic relations of the southwestern Borderland, the Han Chinese merged with the ethnic groups of the north and south, integrated with them gradually, and gradually formed an inseparable relationship. However, the ways and means of integration were not single. There were many reasons contributing to the difference between the ways and means of integration between ethnic groups of the north and those of the south. The characteristics of the relationship between the ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland were also considerably influenced by the administration of dynasties.

1.1  The integration of ethnic groups in the south with the Han Chinese who migrated there underwent a gradual process for thousands of years. In the first half of ancient society, the gradual integration of Han immigrants and indigenous peoples in the southern border area was first of all because they had lived together in a large area and influenced each other for a long time. Wang Fuzhi of the Qing Dynasty noticed that the aborigines and the Han Chinese in the southwestern Borderland had lived together extensively, and their cultures and customs had influenced each other. He said that “The water flows west to the west of Yumen and does not confluent with the water of the Middle Kingdom. The geographic difference bespeaks a divine design. Zhang Qian relied on his talents and forced his way to the western regions, and interfered with the divine order. Hexi Corridor had been



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the periphery of Yongzhou and Liangzhou, while the Mang people, Ran people, Qiongbo people, Yuexi people and Dian people had been in contact with the Borderland population of the Middle Kingdom for long. So they should not be regarded as inaccessible barbarians. In the beginning, Emperor Wu had set out to seek the fine horses thousands of miles away when he heard about them, and Zhang Qian catered to his private desires, without considering that Zangke could be included in the mainland” (Wang, 1975, 61). The Han Dynasty relocated Han Chinese to the southwestern ethnic regions (present-day Yunnan and Guizhou) mainly to consolidate the newly established border counties, and most of the immigrants lived in the county seats. In the Han and Jin dynasties, the influential clans of Nanzhong were mainly distributed in the administrative seats of Jianning, Jinning, Zhuti, Zangke, and Yongchang counties, and Li Hui, Zhu Bao, Cuan Xi, Meng Yan, and Meng Huo were representative descendants of those immigrants. This can also be confirmed in archaeological materials. There are many ancient tombs in the basins of northeastern, central and western Yunnan, as well as western Guizhou. Called “Liangdui” because of their large mounds, those ancient tombs belong to influential clans of Nanzhong since the Eastern Han Dynasty. The influential clans that appeared in the Nanzhong region (present-day Yunnan and Guizhou) between the Eastern Han Dynasty and the Jin Dynasty were mainly Han immigrants from Sichuan, and their early culture basically belonged to the Han culture. On the other hand, they established close ties with the native Bo people, and was also deeply influenced by them culturally. According to Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, “Among the aborigines there were ones good at persuading their people. Called Qilao, they tended to resort to analogy in expounding their views. Those analogies came to be known as native classics. Those marrying the aborigines were called Huangye (in-law) and marrying other ethnic groups were called Ziyouye. In times of commotion, those who violated the law tended to hide among them. In some cases, those punished by the government often had their grievances redressed by the barbarians. Those most intimate with barbarians were called “Baishi Huangye”, and treated like blood kin.

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Accordingly, the land became a haven for refugees of law. As a result, the southerners tend to revolt at a whim” (Chang, 1984, 364). According to “The Biography of Zhang Yi” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, Yong Kai feigned the instruction of ghosts before rebelling against Shu, saying that “Prefect Zhang is like a gourd bottle, slick externally but coarse internally. He is not worth killing, so tie him up and send him to Wu” (Chen, 1959, 1012). Yong Kai compared Zhang Yi, the prefect of Yizhou, to an outwardly smooth but inwardly coarse gourd and drew on the witchcraft to order the barbarians to send him to Wu. This suggests that Yong Kai was not only familiar with the customs of barbarians, but also given the authority of a Guizhu, that is, the leader of witchcraft cult among them. This incident shows that the influential clans tended to be “barbarized” because they lived in areas dominated by indigenous peoples. In its early days, the Western Jin Dynasty inherited the practice of Shu Han appointing members from influential clans as the county magistrates, but soon switched to a rigid repressive policy in Nanzhong. When the Eastern Jin and Southern dynasties were unable to control the chaotic situation of Nanzhong, the influential clans also began to compete and merge. Around the fifth year of Xiankang (339), the Cuan, Meng, and Huo clans represented by Cuan Chen, Meng Yan, and Huo Biao were the only influential clans left, but the competition and annexation did not stop. The Meng Clan and Huo Clan eventually met their doom together, and the remaining Cuan Clan still regarded the Central Plains dynasty as the orthodox nominally, while taking actual control of the Nanzhong area. During the Southern and Northern dynasties, as the political relations between the Yunnan-Guizhou region and the hinterland were relatively relaxed, the influential clans merged with the Bo people to form a new ethnic group, the Baiman, which virtually held the entire agricultural zone in the current Yunnan and Guizhou. Nowadays, most of the major clans in Guizhou also originated from Han immigrants. Judging from Records of the Huayang Kingdom, they are no different from the influential clans of Nanzhong surname in terms of origin. In the Song Dynasty, there were still some common surnames in northern Guizhou. Song tombs discovered in Guizhou in recent years are roughly divided into two types with the Wujiang



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River as the boundary. The tomb of Yang Can in Zunyi excavated in 1957 is a representative of Song tombs on the north bank (Cultural Relics Editorial Committee, 1979, 365). Song tombs with similar styles were also found in Tongzi, Zunyi, Suiyang, and Meitan, indicating that during the Sui, Tang and Song dynasties, the exchange and integration of the Han and indigenous peoples was relatively common in today’s Yunnan-Guizhou region. The gradual integration laid the foundation for the development of local peoples such as Baiman to a higher stage. Since the Qin and Han dynasties, the Bo Ethnic Group, who had mainly lived in the flat areas of Yunnan and Guizhou, continuously absorbed the Han Chinese population from outside and underwent rapid economic and cultural development to form the new ethnic group Baiman during the Southern and Northern dynasties. During the period, the actual ruler of Baiman in eastern Yunnan was the Cuan Clan, so the Baiman in this area was also called “Baiman of the Cuan Clan.” Far more advanced economically and culturally than the Bo people, they were a higher-level aboriginal ethnic group, with the most active and advanced elements derived from the descendants of Han immigrants. Their emergence did not mean the utter disappearance of influential clans or other Han immigrants. In fact, after their formation, the successor and influence of the influential clans continued to play a central role in today’s Yunnan-Guizhou through new forms. The situation in the Lingnan Area was similar. During the Southern dynasties, the descendants of Baiyue, such as Liliao and Wuhu in the Lingnan area, formed large tribes living together in villages or caves, assuming the nature of political and military alliances in some cases. Their leaders were called “qiuhao”, “dongzhu” or “haoshuai.” Wielding considerable power and influence, they were often given official titles and posts by the Central Plains dynasty. Some representatives evolved into influential clans. Judging from historical records, a considerable part of the influential clans in the Lingnan area were derived from the officials and generals sent to the border by the Central Plains dynasty, or their descendants. After being stationed in the border areas for a long time, they settled down, became localized, and merged with part of the indigenous peoples to become influential clans.

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During the Sui, Tang and Song dynasties, the integration of various ethnic groups in Lingnan was obvious. Among them, that of the Han population with the local indigenous peoples was most influential and most extensive. Since the late Southern and Northern dynasties, many inland people moved into the Lingnan region through various channels and mainly settled in areas along the transportation line and with relatively developed agriculture. Over time, they were gradually integrated with Li, Liao and other Borderland ethnic groups. In the Sui and Tang dynasties, some powerful clans appeared in Lingnan. They often claimed that their ancestors had come from the hinterland, or had been Han descendants, in many cases falsely for namedropping, but was not invariably unfounded. Take for example Madam Xian and her clan of the Southern dynasty to the Sui Dynasty. In the Jin Dynasty, the Xian Clan of Gaoliang County was “the leader of Nanyue for generations, administering more than 100,000 households.” A daughter of the Xian family, who was later named Madam Qiaoguo by the Sui court, was married in the Liang dynasty to Feng Bao, Prefect of Gaoliang County and son of Feng Rong, Governor of Luozhou. Feng Rong was “originally a descendant of the Miao of Northern Yan”, i.e., a Sinicized native of Northern Yan. After her marriage to Feng Bao, she was deeply influenced by the inland culture. When Lingnan was plunged into turmoil following Feng Bao’s death, “Madam Xian placated Baiyue, and restored order in the prefectures.” Her lofty ideals were inherited by her grandson Feng Ang. At the end of the Sui Dynasty, Feng Ang served as the prefect of Hanyang, governing 20 counties in Lingnan. When some tried to persuade him into claim the title of the King of Nanyue, he said that “My family has been stationed here for five generations, serving as the prefect or governor successively. Our wealth and prestige have been at the peak and I personally fear that I may fail them and dishonor my ancestors. How dare I follow the example of Zhao Tuo and make myself king!” Then he surrendered to Tang (Sima, 1956, 5953). When Madam Mrs. Xian took over the anvil, she was supported by the rulers of Liang, Chen and Sui dynasties. The Xian family took control of today’s Guangdong and Hainan, and some of the local leaders of Guangxi today pledged allegiance to her. When it cooperated with the Sui army to quell the rebellion of



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Wang Zhongxuan the barbarian commander of Panyu, the leaders of the Yue people of Cangwu, Lianghua, and Tengzhou “all came to pay tribute”, and Madam Xian ordered them to continue leading their respective tribes, “thus restoring order in Lingnan.” As the representative of the Xian family, the most influential clan of Lingnan, Madam Xian unswervingly upheld the Liang, Chen regimes of the Southern dynasties and the Sui Dynasty as the justified ruler, supported national unification, opposed secession, and advocated the harmonious coexistence of all ethnic groups. The Xian family is somewhat representative. It can be seen from relevant records that not all the rich and powerful clans in Lingnan were purely Yue ethnic groups. Some had combined with Han officials or the upper emigrants through marriage, and their descendants had Han ancestry, with profound influence from the Han culture. For example, the Xian family was originally a Li Clan in Lingnan, and later bonded with the Feng Family, Northern Yan nobility that had settled down in Lingnan for more than three generations and had thus been thoroughly Sinicized. Madam Xian’s consciousness of the feudal dynasty as orthodox, loyalty to the country and reward for filial piety bore obvious traces of the influence from feudal moral concepts. From the Southern and Northern dynasties to the Sui Dynasty, most of the influential clans recorded in Lingnan were Han families, as represented by Li Ben, the Li leader, Li Guangshi, Li leader of Guizhou and his brothers Li Guanglue and Li Guangdu, Li Datan, the Qu leader, Li Shigong, the Li leader of Lingnan, Li Fuzi, the Li leader of Jiaozhou, Wang Zhongxuan, the Li leader of Panyu, Li Shixian, a native of Guizhou, Chen Tan, the leader of Cangwu, Feng Cenweng of Gangzhou, Deng Matou of Lianghua, and Pang Jing of Luozhou. Admittedly, part of the reason for the prevalence of Han surnames could be that some Yue people changed to Han surnames out of admiration for the Han culture. Nonetheless, it shows that those influential clans had varying degrees of Han ancestry. In some cases, they had directly evolved from the Han immigrants or town officials stationed in Lingnan. During the Sui and Tang dynasties, a part of the southern Liao tribes was called the “Xiyuan Barbarians”, because of their primary settlement in Xiyuan Prefecture in the Tang Dynasty. Some were also

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called “Huangdong barbarians” because their leader was surnamed Huang. Xiyuan Barbarians were widely distributed in Guangzhou, south of Rongzhou, Yongzhou and west of Guizhou. According to “Biography of Xiyuan Barbarians” in New Book of Tang, chieftains emerged in the Ning Clan, Huang Clan, Wei Clan, Zhou Clan and Yi Clan of Xiyuan Barbarians. Among them, that of the Ning Clan was the most prominent. The Ning Clan was based in the present-day Qinzhou area, dominating the region with a massive army (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6329). Its representative Ning Kui served as the Governor of Anzhou during the reign of the Xiao’s Liang Dynasty, and his son Ning Mengli later pledged allegiance to the Sui Dynasty and became the Governor of Anzhou, which was succeeded by his grandson. Ning Daowu, the great-grandson of Ning Mengli, served as the Governor of Longzhou, Aizhou and Yulinzhou successively, indicating the long-running family tradition. In 1977 and 1981, archaeologists excavated the tombs of the Ning family in Qinzhou and initially revealed their main connotations (Cultural Relics Editorial Committee, 1990, 238). Dating back to the Sui and the early Tang Dynasty, they have roughly the same shape and burial objects as Han tombs excavated in various places in the same period.

1.2  Since the Qin and Han dynasties, the rise of powerful ethnic groups represented by Baiman in Southwest China and Li and Liao in Lingnan had very complicated reasons, including geographical environment, social development and historical legacy. In addition, the distance of Yunnan-Guizhou region and Lingnan from the hinterland made them elusive to the Central Plains dynasty, while the prioritization of the north over the south in border governance made it possible for ethnic minorities such as Baiman, Li and Liao to absorb Han immigrants for integrated development. Before the Yuan and Ming dynasties strengthened their control over the border areas, there was a common phenomenon in the southern border areas, that is, officials appointed by the Central Plains dynasty to guard the border areas were prone to collude with local



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despots over time, forming dominating local powers. This situation was in part because that the feudal rulers were unable to control the border areas, and that a considerable part of the appointed local officials were not transferred in time. However, the root cause was the discretion granted by the Central Plains dynasty to local officials in the southern Borderland areas, because the right of discretion constituted the basic content of the “jimi system” implemented from the Han to Song dynasties. The “jimi system” had been implemented as the last resort by the Central Plains dynasty, and had been objectively effective, but its negative impacts should by no means be underestimated. In today’s Yunnan-Guizhou region, the rise of influential clans in Nanzhong was mostly based on familial strength resultant from barbarian and Han troops, as well as association with the government. When the ancestors of Yong Kai and Lü Kai moved from Sichuan to the southwestern ethnic regions in the early Han Dynasty, they brought a large clan together with servants, and already had the makings of influential clans. The Huo Clan had been stationed in Nanzhong since the Shu Han regime, turning the troops and barbarians under its jurisdiction gradually into a private army. Those troops had the dual status of domestic slaves and serfs, and consequently a strong personal ties. Since the Central Plains dynasty implemented the “jimi rule” in the Borderland counties of Nanzhong, and because of the inextricable links between the influential clans of Nanzhong and the local government, the ruler generally adopted the policy of placation and loose governance towards the influential clans of Nanzhong. In most cases, their members were given a slap on the wrist for offenses in order to reap jimi effect. According to “The Biography of Li Hui” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, when Cuan Xi, the magistrate of Jianling, broke the law during the rule of Liu Zhang in Shu, his in-law Li Hui should be dismissed from office for implication. However, since Cuan Xi was from an influential clan, the Prefect Dong He “put the issue aside.” Another reason for rulers to frequently indulge the influential clans of Nanzhong was that the prefectures and counties set up in the southwestern ethnic regions by the Han court were roughly isolated ruling strongholds, like islands surrounded by water. For counties and prefectures, Han

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immigrants, especially those from influential clans, were naturally an important force to rely on.

1.3  During the Sui and Tang dynasties, an important change took place in the ethnic composition of the Yunnan-Guizhou region. The basic trend was that Baiman people absorbed a large number of Han population and achieved great progress, to become the dominant ethnic group. The five centuries of Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms established with the Erhai area as the center during the Tang and Song dynasties marked a period of unprecedented development and growth for Baiman. During the reign of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom, Baiman was widely distributed in the agricultural area of the southwestern border. There are a fairly large number of Baimans in western Yunnan today, such as the Xi’er Heman (Heman), which is active in the Erhai area and with most of their leaders surnamed Yang. The influential Yang, Zhao, Li and Dong clans that lived between Dali and Chuxiong were also Baiman. Many of the prestigious officials and generals inscribed in the back of “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao” were Baiman. Today, the Baiman in western Yunnan are of the same ethnic group as the Baiman of the Cuan Clan in eastern Yunnan, and there is no obvious difference in sense of belonging or living habits. In the early Yuan Dynasty, Li Jing wrote in A Brief Account of Yunnan: Customs of the Aborigines that “The Bai people have surnames. Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty opened the Bodao Road and the Nanyi Road, he passed what is now a county in Xuzhou. Therefore, all the Bo people living in Zhongqing, Weichu, Dali, and Yongchang have become the Bai people now” (Li, 1986, 86). Here, the “Bai people” refers to the Baiman since the Northern and Southern dynasties. Their distribution includes the Baiman Cuan Clan in the Tang and Song dynasties and the residential area of the Baiman in western Yunnan today, similar to that in the Qin and Han dynasties. In the Tang Dynasty, the Baiman extensively integrated with the Han Chinese, incorporating a large number of Han people that had moved into Yunnan and witnessing rapid development. Their political, economic and cultural strength was also unprecedentedly enhanced.



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During the Tianbao years, the Tang court launched three ill-fated expeditions against Nanzhao, and a large number of Tang troops either lost their lives or were forced to settle down in Yunnan. In the autumn of the 9th year of Tianbao (750), Ge Luofeng captured Yaozhou City, the seat of the Yaozhou Area Command. The following year, the Tang court ordered Xianyu Zhongtong, the Military Governor of Jiannan and Wang Zhi, the Protector-General of Annan to launch an expedition against Nanzhao. The former led an army of 80,000 Tang troops to attack Nanzhao along Qingxiguan Road, while the latter led an army into Yunnan from Annan via Butou Road. However, the former army was annihilated. According to “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao”, Emperor Xuanzong ordered Sikong Xili, the Prefect of Hanzhong County to restore Yaozhou Area Command and appointed General Jia Guan as the governor. Ge Luofeng then joined forces with the garrison of the Tubo Kingdom in Shenchuan, encircled Yaozhou City and eventually tore through its defense. Jia Guan was captured and the Tang army disbanded (Wang, 1980, 157). In the 13th year, the Tang court ordered Li Mi, the Attending Censor and He Lüguang, the Military Governor of Guangzhou to attack Nanzhao from two directions. Li Mi and his 70,000-strong troops went so far into the enemy land that they reached Taihe City, but was then forced to withdraw due to depleted rations for prolonged combat and the epidemic. They were tracked down by the Nanzhao army; Li Mi killed himself by plunging into a river and the Tang army “was annihilated.” The three expeditions of the Tang court were met with failure, incurring “the death of about 200,000 people.” If the conscript laborers drafted to transport heavy equipment and rations were added, the number could still be bigger. During the war, Tang soldiers were either killed, or taken captive and made slaves or serfs in Nanzhao. Guo Zhongxiang, Censor of Yaozhou, was a typical example (Ouyang et al., 1975, 5509). In the Reizong years, Guo Zhongxiang was defeated and captured in a battle against Nanzhao. He was given to a barbarian chief as a slave, “and favored by his master, who virtually ate on the same table with him.” A year later, he escaped but was arrested again and resold to Nandong. Later, he tried to escape and was recaptured and resold. Finally, he was redeemed by relatives and friends. Therefore, it seems that Guo Zhongxiang served as a serf when

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he was first captured, but was later turned into a slave because of his resistance. Most of the captured Tang troops must have undergone a roughly similar experience. Another source of the foreign population settling down in Yunnan in the Tang Dynasty was Tang population captured by Nanzhao via plundering wars. After the Tianbao War, Nanzhao joined forces with the Tubo Kingdom to attack Guizhou (now Xichang, Sichuan). After capturing it, Nanzhao seized a large number of people, livestock, and various materials, “with captives and treasure goods blocking the road and a rich horde of livestock and grain carriages.” In the 3rd year of Taihe, Nanzhao launched a massive attack against Tang, capturing Zhangzhou, Rongzhou and Qionghou one after another. After that, it launched an offensive from three directions, with its western army capturing Lixian County and Yazhou County, eastern troops breaking into the western gate of Zizhou, and the middle army led by Wang Cudia capturing the western section of Chengdu. In retreat, the Nanzhao troops “took away with them tens of thousands of children and workers, as well as precious goods.” In the first year of Xiantong (860), Nanzhao captured Annan for the first time and Yongzhou the following year. Due to the wanton raids of the Nanzhao army, “less than ten percent of” the residents of Yongzhou managed to survive. In the 4th year, Nanzhao captured Annan again, “killing and capturing 150,000 Tang people.” After the death of Yimou Xun, its King, Nanzhao invaded into Sichuan four times, and captured Chengdu once and Annan and Yongzhou twice, and invaded central Guizhou once, capturing at least a population of 100,000 (Fang, 2003, 443). During its invasion into the Tang land, Nanzhao mainly abducted artisans, in order to acquire the production technology of the Tang Dynasty and increase its own labor force. It also appointed the Han people to important posts to draw on their familiarity with the hinterland culture and the official governance of the Tang Dynasty. According to “Biography of Nanzhao Barbarians” in Old Book of Tang, Zheng Hui, a native of Xiangzhou serving as the magistrate of Xilu County, Guizhou, had started his career in the officialdom as a Confucian scholar in the Tianbao Year. When he was captured and brought back to Nanzhao, Ge Luofeng held him in high esteem after learning about his



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accomplishment in Confucianism and appointed him as a court teacher responsible for teaching Feng Jiayi, Yimuxun, and Xunmengcuo successively. Yimou Xun appointed him Qingping Official after acceding to the throne, “consulting with him for all matters on government.” Zheng Hui’s descendants were well treated in Nanzhao, and Zheng Maisi, the dignitary initiating the coup in the last years of Nanzhao, was one of them. According to The Record of Horse Purchase in Yunnan written in the Song Dynasty, when Yang Zuo and his entourage went to Dali to buy horses, they were warmly received by the ruler, who sent a Tounang’er to the guest house to keep them company. “The so-called Tounang’er was originally scholar officials of Tang unfortunately driven by the barbarians south across the Dadu River. Their descendants living today are given hereditary posts and salary. In most cases, they are clever and well versed in the Chinese language.” Nanzhao relied on war and captivity to obtain a large population from the Tang Dynasty. The practice was very different from that of relocation of immigrants by the Central Plains dynasty to the border areas. However, the impacts were similar, that is, the Han population brought with them factors of economic and cultural development in the hinterland. Besides, the Nanzhao regime also increased its labor force, which objectively promoted its economic development. Nanzhao marked another peak in influx to Yunnan and its surrounding areas of inland population and economic and cultural factors, after the Han and Jin dynasties. Under the rule of Nanzhao, hundreds of thousands of inland people settled down in Erhai, Dianchi and other places. In terms of the sheer number of Han people who moved in, and the wide and far-reaching influence, Nanzhao far surpassed the Han and Jin dynasties. By absorbing a large Han population and learning the inland culture, Baiman and other local peoples enhanced their strength. That is an important reason for the Nanzhao regime to prosper for more than 200 years. By absorbing a large number of Han population and learning inland culture, Baiman and other border ethnic groups witnessed significant improvement in quality, and their sense of identity with inland culture was significantly strengthened. During the lackadaisical relationship between the Song Dynasty and Dali for more than 200 years,

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residents in the hinterland of present-day Yunnan and Guizhou still practiced the inland customs. Guo Songnian said in Travels in Dali that, “Their palaces, buildings, language, calligraphy and mathematics, as well as rituals for passage into adulthood, marriage, funeral and sacrifice, and battle formation for war had traces of origination from Han Chinese, though they were not entirely the same. Seen from now, they bear traces of inheritance from the motherland.” During the Han and Jin dynasties, the prestigious clans in present-day Yunnan and Guizhou and their Han customs are frequently seen in records, reflecting the relatively concentrated distribution of Han immigrants who moved into the above-mentioned areas. Mostly independent of the Borderland ethnic groups, those Han immigrants were considerably inferior in terms of economic and cultural development. After the establishment of Nanzhao, Baiman and some advanced Wuman absorbed a large number of Han population and culture, and had their quality and strength unprecedentedly enhanced. For a period after the Tang Dynasty, there were no independent local Han powers in Yunnan and Guizhou, indicating that the ethnic integration of Nanzhao and Dali had led to considerable development for ethnic groups in the southwest, represented by Baiman and a part of Wuman and that they had already possessed strong capacity for tolerance and integration, making it impossible for local Han forces to exist independently. Since the Yuan and Ming dynasties, an important change in the border management strategy of the Central Plains dynasty was to strengthen control over the southern border areas, while the trend of political integration between the border and the inland became more obvious. During the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the number of migrants in the southern Borderland increased dramatically compared with previous generations, and their distribution also became more extensive. The natural integration among various ethnic groups in the Borderland regions reached a new stage. According to “Sichuan Chieftains (1)” in History of Ming, “Therefore, Jianchang Road was changed to Jianchang Posthouse, and the military and civilian commanders were instated. The An Clan had served as the hereditary commander for generations, without the official seal. Their mansion was situated about one li from the eastern wall of the city. The posthouse had 48 horse stations under



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control, and Datou, Borenzi, Baiyi, Moxie, Zuogelu, Baoluo, Tatar, and Huihe were scattered among the valleys. The area stretching for thousands of li from the Dadu River in the north to the Jinsha River in the south, and from Wumeng in the east to salt wells in the west was placed under the command of the governors of Changzhou, Puji, and Weilong. The local aborigines were placed in their charge, who reported to the Chief Military Commission of Sichuan. Among all the native officials of the southwest, the An Clan was the most important.”1 The above-mentioned “Tatar” and “Huihe” respectively refer to the Mongolian and Semu people that entered the southwestern Borderland in the Yuan Dynasty. They lived together and integrated with other local ethnic groups in a vast area of more than 1,000 li, extending to the Dadu River in the north, the Jinsha River in the south, Wumeng in the east, and Yanjing in the west. They were regarded as aboriginal until the Ming Dynasty; the situation reflected in the record should have been common back then.

1.4  Regarding the comparison between the north and the south, the continuous southward adventure of nomads imposed considerable pressure on the Central Plains dynasty. The relationship between the two parties basically featured the former’s southward invasion and the latter’s resistance and defense; the ethnic integration featured contradictions in development, as well as fierce struggle and oppression for most of the time. The southern ethnic groups seldom ventured beyond their place of residence to enter the Central Plains. Their cultural similarities with the Han Chinese in the Central Plains were mainly the result of edification by the Han Chinese culture of the Central Plains. Consequently, their integration was a process of gradual development. Wars in the northern Borderland often spread to the inland, while disputes in the southern Borderland seldom affected the hinterland. An important reason was that the northern ethnic groups continued to venture south and enter the Central Plains. Generally speaking, the 1 History of Ming, Vol. 311, 8018.

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integration of the ethnic groups in the south with the Han Chinese mainly featured the continuous (in most cases sporadic and gradual) entry of the Han Chinese population into ethnic group areas, and there were fewer fierce social turmoil and conflicts in the slow process. On the other hand, the economy of the southern border areas was generally a primary compound economy based on the primary agricultural economy, with a large proportion for animal husbandry, gathering, fishing and hunting, making it easier for the immigrants to adapt. Consequently, the cultural conflicts incurred by them were less intense than those by the northern nomads entering the Central Plains. Under such circumstances, the process of ethnic integration in the southern Borderland regions was relatively gentle, with less influence on the outside world. Meanwhile, the southern ethnic groups that had undergone gradual ethnic integration lacked the driving force to advance eastward into the Central Plains. That was an important reason for the ethnic regimes in the southern Borderland to rarely aspire for the Central Plains over thousands of years. For thousands of years, the trend of changes to China’s vegetation generally features continually expanding cultivated vegetation, and gradually shrinking of natural vegetation. Specifically, in the northern region, as the boundary for the integration of Han Chinese and ethnic groups and that for agriculture and animal husbandry moved northward, the cultivated vegetation centered on food production gradually expanded to the north. In the southern border areas, due to the gradual cooling of the climate and the intensification of human development activities, the natural vegetation gradually shrunk southward. As a result, the population flow in the northern and southern borders and the ethnic relations were changed. In the northern grassland areas, there were roughly two ways of ethnic integration: one was troops and civilians sent to guard the areas where agriculture and animal husbandry were mixed promoted the gradual northward move of contact and integration between agricultural and nomadic peoples, and the other was the relocation by the Central Plains dynasty of northern nomadic population into in the hinterland or within the border passes also caused the ethnic integration to continue to move northward.



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There were many reasons contributing to the characteristics of the integration of the northern nomads with the Han Chinese. On the whole, some of the southern ethnic groups entered class society early and formed a solid local power. They didn’t suffer major setbacks or failures in thousands of years of development, and were always the pioneers of southern ethnic groups. Among them, the upper class easily combined with the garrison generals and officials of the Central Plains dynasty, to form strong local forces. However, those local forces often established regional regimes, and had never unified the southwest or southern border regions. From the Qin and Han dynasties to the Northern and Southern dynasties, there are records of prestigious clans in various parts of the southern Borderland. Similar records are rarely seen in the northern grassland. In the northwest Borderland, local officials and towns rarely colluded with local forces. The reasons were fourfold. Firstly, the nomadic peoples in the northwest tended to gather and disperse very quickly, and the active nomads changed frequently. Secondly, no relatively stable political or economic center appeared in the northwest meadow for a long period of time, while the formation of a stable political and economic center was preconditioned by one or several agricultural areas that had stable economic and cultural development and that had been chosen by Central Plains dynasties as the ruling institutions. Without a stable political and economic center, it was impossible for ethnic groups with rich historical legacy and long-term stable development to emerge. Thirdly, the Northwest nomads had stood off against the Central Plains dynasty for a prolonged period of time. The local officials and garrison generals had been in a state of opposition or on alert against the ethnic groups, and mutual trust was rare, not to mention integration. Fourthly, most of the imperial China followed the tradition of prioritizing the north over the south, and exercised strict control over the troops and generals guarding the northwestern Borderland. There were very few cases where they were allowed discretion on important affairs. Meanwhile, the imperial court frequently transferred the garrison generals, reducing the likelihood of their separatism and collusion with local forces.

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From the perspective of ethnic relations, Han officials and garrison generals in the northwest Borderland were less likely to be integrated into ethnic groups. In contrast to the northwestern nomadic regions, several important ethnic regimes emerged in the southern Borderland back in the Qin and Han dynasties, including the Dian Kingdom in the Dianchi Basin, and the Nanyue Kingdom centered on Guangzhou and covering parts of Yunnan and Guizhou. Later, Nanzhao emerged in the Tang Dynasty, with Yunnan as the center, and Dali Kingdom appeared in the Song Dynasty. Their political centers were often also the regional economic and cultural center, as well as the regional transportation hub. Economically and culturally well-developed, those central areas were mostly spared the scourge of war in history and became the colony of more advanced ethnic groups in the local area, including the Baiman in the Yunnan-Guizhou area and the Liliao in the Lingnan area. They also became an important national melting pot for absorbing and integrating the foreign population. The above situation in the southern Borderland was in sharp contrast with the nomadic regions in the northwest. Some of the economic and cultural centers of the southern Borderland had a history of thousands of years and were mostly located in basins among high mountains. Back in the early Qin and Han dynasties, there was a huge gap between the basins in the southern Borderland and the mountainous regions in economic development. In today’s Yunnan and Guizhou where basins cover only 6% of the total area, the population was relatively concentrated in the limited number of large and medium-sized basins. There hoe farming or plow farming was developed very early; before the middle of ancient times, the mountains in the southern Borderland were still sparsely populated. According to the “Biographies of southwestern ethnic regions” in Records of the Grand Historian, the Dianchi Basin in the early Han Dynasty “was three hundred square miles, adjoining a flat fertile land stretching for thousands of miles.” In the mountainous area and semi-mountainous area in western Yunnan “between eastern Tongshi in the west and Yeyu in the north there lived the Gui and the Kunming people, all wearing a queue, and they migrated with the livestock. They had no permanent residence or a ruler, living on a land of thousands of miles” (Sima, 1959,



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2991). “Biography of southwestern ethnic regions” in the Book of Later Han also said that “(The Dianchi area) have flat sediment land, and produces parrots and peacocks. It is rich in salt and fish resources, as well as gold, silver and livestock. The people habitually lead an extravagant life. Local officials are known to amass enough wealth to benefit their descendants.” However, in the mountainous areas of western Guizhou, “the land is mostly water-logged in the rainy season, and the people habitually uphold witchcraft. In addition, there is little livestock and no sericulture. So the county is the poorest” (Fan, 1965, 2846). The above records are fairly representative of the situations in the southwestern Borderland. Before the Ming and Qing dynasties, the integration of the migrant population and the ethnic groups in the southwest was very different from that in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. The Han population who migrated there were scattered in the Borderland ethnic areas as small settlements. During the Han and Jin dynasties, many immigrants entered the southwestern Borderland area, and their small settlements were mainly distributed in the vicinity of county and prefecture government and along the traffic lines with developed agriculture. From the Northern and Southern dynasties to the Ming Dynasty, the Han population from Yunnan was still scattered in the border areas in small settlements. Different from their predecessors in China’s imperial history, they had a closer relationship with local ethnic groups. After the great national fusion of the Jin Dynasty, and the Southern and Northern dynasties, the Han population that had moved to the southwestern Borderland during the Han and Jin Dynasty gradually integrated with the ancestors of the Baiman and Zhuang ethnic groups. After the Ming Dynasty, the migrant Han Chinese of Yunnan and Guizhou lived together with ethnic groups on a larger scale. The basic feature was a wider distribution, and in some areas spread to the border areas. Meanwhile, their settlements gradually expanded. Before the Ming and Qing dynasties, when the southwestern Borderland was relatively isolated from the inland, immigrants from the hinterland were gradually integrated with large ethnic groups, in the process of which these inland immigrants underwent “barbarian transformation.” The ethnic groups living in the agricultural areas of

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Yunnan were mainly tributaries of Baiman and Wuman. The absorption of population and economic and cultural factors from the inland, and consequently the significant improvement in group quality and economic and cultural development furnished the necessary preparations for the establishment of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom, the two strong local regimes, during the Tang and Song dynasties. Guizhou and Lingnan experienced a process of ethnic integration similar to that in Yunnan. The difference was the main ethnic group to absorb the Han population from outside. In Guizhou, it included tributaries of the Baiman and Wuman, as well as Buyi people that had been mainly engaged in agricultural production. In Lingnan, it was mainly the Liliao, which was the ancestor of the Zhuang people. During the late Ming and early Qing Dynasty, the unprecedented increase in the population of Han people who moved into Yunnan and surrounding areas, and the development during the rule of Nanzhao and the subsequent several centuries, the Baiman and some advanced Wuman significantly narrowed their economic gap from the Han Chinese. As a result, an important change took place in the trend of integration for native and foreign ethnic groups in Yunnan. Specifically, the gradual integration of the Han population who had originally migrated into Yunnan and surrounding areas with the local ethnic groups gave rise to a new locally dominant Han Chinese, with Han immigrants as the main body, and integrating Baiman, part of Wuman and other relatively advanced local ethnic groups. The process continued into modern times. The situation of ethnic integration in Guizhou and Guangxi was roughly the same as that in Yunnan.

1.5  In the northern grassland, the integration of ethnic groups with Han Chinese was mainly manifested as large numbers of northern nomads venturing south to areas inhabited by them. They arrived quickly in large numbers, inevitably leading to intense conflicts between agricultural culture and nomadic culture. In many dynasties, there were records of large-scale rebellion against feudal rule by ethnic groups that had migrated to the north. For example, in the Jin Dynasty, a large



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number of northern ethnic groups migrated to the Central Plains, and “almost half the one million population of Guanzhong was barbarians”, who rose in rebellion to end the suppression on them. The rulers of the dynasty noticed that the inland migration of the northern nomads was an important inducement for the intensification of social contradictions. The Jin Dynasty had a dispute over whether to banish the barbarians beyond the national border. The scholar-official Jiang Tong once wrote “On Relocation of the Barbarians”, but his suggestion was unlikely to be implemented. The Jin Dynasty had no choice but to wait for the accumulation and explosion of social contradictions, and the fusion if the Han society with foreign cultures. A more serious situation was that the nomadic tribes who migrated to the hinterland were integrated by the agricultural civilization of the Central Plains, while other nomads following them to the original grassland settlements might continue to go south, being attracted by the developed agricultural civilization in the Central Plains. A new wave of migration of nomadic peoples would ensue, and consequently a new round of fierce struggle between agricultural culture and nomadic culture would occur. In the past, it was manifested as the continuous wars and fierce conflicts between the northern nomads and the Han Chinese in the Central Plains, and the Han society in the Central Plains continued to accept and digest the integration process of the northern nomadic population. When the northern nomads went south, they always moved from the grassland to the deserted land left by the previous nomads after they went south, and then continued to go south from the empty land. Therefore, their contact with the Han Chinese in the Central Plains was obviously sudden and intermittent, intensifying the pain of ethnic integration. The ethnic regimes in the north were usually developed from many small and medium-sized tribes. The ethnic origins of Mongolian and other northern ethnic groups were not single; instead, their internal components were very complex. In different periods, the dominant factor of the northern ethnic regime often tended to change. The regimes established by the three ethnic groups of the Xiongnu, Xianbei, and Donghu were based on a dispersed and mobile nomadic economy. It was impossible for them to have a complete and consolidated

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superstructure, let alone a centralized power system like the Central Plains dynasty. Therefore, the regimes of those nomads were relatively fragile and loose. Once the leader died or became incompetent to control the overall situation, the regime easily collapsed. As a result, it was very difficult for cultural accumulation in the grassland area, and even the latter civilization was not as good as its predecessor in some cases. For example, the Xianbei Civilization following the decline of the Xiongnu was in fact less developed than the Xiongnu Civilization. On the whole, the rise of the powerful northern nomads was fairly rapid, but their decline or even disappearance was equally fast. In different historical periods, the dominant ethnic groups in the northern grasslands changed many times, that is, in different eras, there were generally different nomads dominating the stage. Due to the dependence of the nomadic economy on the farming economy, and its obvious gap from the agricultural civilization of the Central Plains, it was historically inevitable for the northern nomads to move south and their populations to continue to move to the agricultural areas of the Central Plains. Wang Fuzhi said that “barbarians tend to rebel when they gather and become docile when they disperse, according to the inevitable law” (Wang, 1975, 792). This situation was particularly prominent in the northwestern grassland area. Its emergence is attributable to whether the Borderland ethnic minorities were prone to form political powers and political forces on a larger scale. The formation of ethnic minority regimes or political forces on a larger scale was relatively rapid in the north, while that in the southern border regions was not easy. This is also one of the reasons for the northwestern ethnic groups to venture south and provoke border troubles for the Central Plains dynasty, while a similar scenario was rarely seen in the southern border areas. In the northwestern grassland area, due to the lack of long-term stable historical and cultural accumulation, cities as regional political, economic and cultural centers were late to appear, leading to the frequently changed ethnic or political forces on the historical stage. There are quite a few related records in historical records of the imperial China. Wang Fuzhi became aware of this law of history. He said that “In the 7th year of Emperor Huidi, Suotou Yiyi attacked more than 30 countries in the



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west, and laid the foundation for the Tuoba Clan to seize the dominant position in the Middle Kingdom. Living within the border passes, the barbarians took advantage of the Middle Kingdom at its weakest and tried to steal the throne. The loosely guarded remote land was more prone to attack by barbarians. The barbarians had managed to prevail over the Middle Kingdom because they were tough from living in the remote barren desert, braving hunger and harsh elements, scraping a living out of animal husbandry and hunting, and fighting for life with beasts, while the Han Chinese were weakened from a pampered life. However, once they entered China, they began indulging themselves with the pampered lifestyle and those taking over their original homestead in return overthrew them” (Wang, 1975, 314). “The strength of barbarians tended to flourish and decline, according to the inevitable law of nature. Gloating over its decline makes one forget about preparations against its future rise. As a result, disasters invariably ensue. All the territory must be inhabited and those inhabitants will seek the protection of the emperor. When the protection is sufficient, they shall prosper. In history, there has been no precedent of thousands of miles of land leaving unprotected for centuries. The debilitated tribe will become nothing to reckon with, and those rising in their wake will seize their land for rule. The ethnic groups and tribes may be different, but the encroachment on and threat to our border remain the same. By the time of Illig Qaghan, the Turks was already on the decline, after being divided into the east and west factions. Unable to be united for mutual protection, they gradually declined and eventually became extinct during the Five dynasties. Although the tribes became weak and even perished, their land persisted. It is impossible to ban the land from nourishing the people of other tribes, or the earth from growing aquatic plants and other flora, or late-comers from restraining their ambition. How can the Middle Kingdom disregard this situation, and gloat over the decline of one tribe? If the tribe is weak and there is no leader in its land, other tribes and ethnic groups who inevitably take advantage of the void and gradually enhance their own power in the grasslands and bushes” (Wang, 1975, 596). In the above two paragraphs, Wang Fuzhi pointed out insightfully that the supersession of the nomadic peoples in the northern grasslands

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was an important law. Its characteristic was that the nomads occupying the fertile grasslands first were invariably replaced by new nomads after they went south to contend for the throne in the Central Plains or declined. The replaced former nomads could reinvigorate their power in very few cases. He also cited a number of examples in the northern grassland region since the Zhenguan years in the Tang Dynasty to prove the point. Since the Qin and Han dynasties, Baiman has been the dominant ethnic group in Yunnan and Guizhou, while the Lingnan area has been dominated by the ancestors of the Zhuang people. In terms of ethnic relations, the dominant ethnic groups of the south managed to integrate the foreign population and gradually grow. The major ethnic areas in the south are better developed than those in the north; in fact, their economic and cultural gap with the Han in the Central Plains was not large, and their progress and development were more stable. The dominant ethnic group in the north was constantly changing. Meanwhile, due to the large economic and cultural gap from the Han Chinese in the Central Plains, it was more easily attracted by the Central Plains civilization. That is one of the reasons for the northern minorities to continue to move south and migrate. For thousands of years, the Central Plains region has always been a concentrated settlement of the Han Chinese, as well as the center of the agricultural economy, handicraft and trade in the East Asian continent. Cities established on this economic basis have subsequently become centers of science, technology, culture and art, turning the civilization of the Central Plains into a model for imitation for the surrounding ethnic groups. For the Northwest nomads that had entered the Central Plains, due to insufficient cultural legacy of their own, they were often faced with a strong contrast between their nomadic civilization and agricultural civilization due to the disparity in cultural characteristics. As a result, they had a strong sense of belonging to the Chinese civilization, claiming to be the successor of the Central Plains dynasty. In fact, such phenomena were quite common. In contrast, the ethnic groups in the southwest had generally richer cultural legacy and continued to contact with and absorbed the Han culture in the interior for a long time. Therefore, when cultural collision occurred, they were less likely to lose their own culture.



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Wang Fuzhi noticed this, and he said that “Areas with different climatic conditions nourish life with different biological textures and characteristics; areas with different geological conditions nurture residents with different habits and customs. Therefore, the residents of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xiyue are strong enough to defend the Barbarian and Miao ethnic groups, but are unable to cross the Wuling Mountains to intervene in the affairs of the hinterland. This is not because the southern barbarians and the Miao people are really weak while the northern barbarians are strong, but because the indigenous people are always ready to seize them by the throat. When they go deep south into the hinterland, they are afraid that the border people will take advantage of them and seize their lair” (Wang, 1975, 37). He added that “the southern barbarians are not as tough as their northern counterparts, who were proficient in riding and arrow-shooting, but they are fierce and not afraid of death. They will have no scruple. They had quietly launched surprise attacks, but in the end failed to expand their power beyond the territory” (Wang, 1975, 55). Wang Fuzhi’s theory in the reason for the southwest ethnic groups refraining from contending for the imperial throne in the Central Plains might be open to controversy, but his claim that the southern barbarians eventually never left their colonies even after the war with the hinterland was obviously a fact. On the whole, the general trend of ethnic integration in ancient China was the growth of the Han Chinese by absorbing the elements of ethnic groups to gradually form a pattern of mutual interdependence. Meanwhile, the integration of ethnic groups with Han Chinese experienced a process of mutual integration. Specifically, there were obvious differences in the ways and means through which the ethnic minorities of the north and south integrated with the Han Chinese, reflecting the diversity and complexity of the historical development of ethnic relations in China, and consequently the vastness and profoundness of a unified multi-ethnic family. The Ming and Qing dynasties marked the watershed of ethnic integration in the north and south. Previously, ethnic groups mainly absorbed the Han Chinese in the southern Borderland. So the ethnic integration featured gradual “barbarization” of Han immigrants, while the ethnic groups themselves were enriched and strengthened. During

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the Ming and Qing dynasties, a large number of Han Chinese entered the southwestern Borderland, significantly narrowing the economic and cultural gap of Baiman and other ethnic groups from the Han Chinese. Thus, the tendency of ethnic integration was reversed. A considerable part of Baiman and other ethnic groups were integrated by the Han immigrants, to form a local Han Chinese group, which gradually became dominant in the southwestern Borderland. The situation in Guizhou and Guangxi was roughly the same as that in Yunnan. In the northern grassland area, the general trend before the Ming and Qing dynasties was that nomads continued to move south and merge with the Han Chinese of the Central Plains; as a result, the boundary between agricultural civilization and animal husbandry civilization gradually shifted to the north. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, a large number of Han people from the interior entered the northern grassland areas, expanding the influence of Han economic and culture there, and accelerating the integration of Han Chinese with the northern nomads. In other words, in the northern grassland areas, before and during the Ming and Qing dynasties, the basic tendency of the Borderland ethnic fusion with the Han Chinese was the integration of ethnic population of the south with the Han Chinese. Meanwhile, the geographical boundary between the central plains and the ethnic groups of the northern Borderland gradually took on signs of northward movement. For thousands of years, the integration of the northern ethnic groups with the Han Chinese roughly underwent a continuous “Sinicization” process. In short, the differences between the north and south in the ways and means of ethnic integration in ancient times were mainly manifested before the Ming and Qing dynasties. The ethnic regions in the south generally experienced the gradual “barbarization” of Han immigrants, while the ethnic groups themselves were also enriched. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, due to the influx of a large number of Han Chinese, the integration tendency changed to continued Sinicization of some ethnic groups, and consequently the formation of a local Han group. Around the Ming and Qing dynasties, the basic trend in the northern ethnic areas was the continued southward movement of nomads and their integration into the Han Chinese, giving rise



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to the pattern of “Sinicization.” The above-mentioned differences were attributable to the formation and characteristics of the ethnic forces in the north and south, the differences in their own cultures, and the governance policies implemented by the feudal dynasties.

2.  The Evolution of the Han Chinese in the Southwestern Borderland and the Administration of Imperial China During the Qin and Han dynasties, Han Chinese from the interior moved to the southwestern Borderland, and later experienced a process of integration with the aboriginal ethnic groups. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Han Chinese became the largest and most influential ethnic group in the southwestern Borderland, playing an important role in promoting local social development. Their relationship with the aboriginal ethnic group underwent continuous evolution over the past 2000 years. Accordingly, they took on some characteristics that were different from the Han Chinese of the hinterland.2 It also took succes­ sive dynasties a long time to understand the formation and characteristics of the Han Chinese in the southwestern Borderland, and their views on some issues also changed in different periods. The information was used this as an important basis for formulating governance policies in various dynasties. In fact, the formation and function of the Han Chinese in the southwestern Borderland had an important influence on their administration of the southwestern Borderland.

2.1  The integration of the original ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland with the immigrant Han population underwent an evolution spanning thousands of years. The gradual integration was mainly the result of the long-term coexistence and mutual influence of the two in a large area.

2 Cf. Section 3, Chapter One for related concepts.

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The worship of Han Chinese as ancestors among ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland reflects the gradual acceptance of the Han people of the interior after their migration to the southwest border and integration with the original ethnic groups. After the Sui Dynasty reunified the whole country, Liang Rui, the General Administrator of Yizhou, proposed to manage Ningzhou (now Qujing, Yunnan), saying that Ningzhou had a large population and rich resources, and that Dianchi and Erhai produced fine horses and pearls, while Yinzhou and Ningzhou boasted salt wells and rhino horns. He added that “mostly inhabited by Han Chinese, the land was fertile, producing treasures and fine horses.” “Mostly inhabited by Han Chinese” means that the plains of Yunnan and Guizhou was mostly occupied by Han descendants who had turned them into a land of abundance (Wei et al., 1973, 1126). The New Book of Tang said that the area from the west of Qujing to Lufeng in present-day Yunnan was inhabited by local ethnic group of “Xicuan Baiman”, who claimed to have been natives of Anyi in Xiaxian County, Shanxi. Their seventh ancestor, who served as the prefect of Nanning Prefecture (government seat in Luliang, Yunnan) in the Jin Dynasty, had proclaimed himself “king of the barbaric land” during the turmoil in the hinterland. During the rule of Emperor Yuan in the Liang Dynasty, Cuan Zan, from one of its prestigious clans, established a separatist regime in today’s Yunnan-Guizhou area (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6315). When Sichuan merchant Wang Zuo and his entourage went to Dali to see about horse purchase on the order of the Northern Song Dynasty, they were kept company by “Tounang’er” sent by its court to the post house. The “Tounang’er” were descendants of the Han people abducted by Nanzhao from today’s Sichuan. At the time of Dali, some of those descendants still held important posts and enjoyed hereditary benefits, and “were mostly clever and proficient in Chinese” (Yang, 1980). Wang Shixing said that “Zhuge descendants”, who had moved from Sichuan to Baoshan, Yunnan, had prospered in the Ming Dynasty. Despite the remoteness of their land, they still retained the features of “rouge face and fair skin.” Their speech and food were the same as the people of Chengdu, and their “craftsmanship was ingenious, and unrivaled in the Middle Kingdom” (Wang, 1981, 124).



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The ancients also noticed that in the southwestern Borderland regions, local aborigines and foreign Han Chinese lived together extensively, influencing each other in culture and customs. In the Wei Dynasty, Xing Luan said that although the people in southeastern Sichuan mostly live in the mountains, they also have “haoyou”, whose “literary writings are often impressive, since there are many talented scholars” (Wei, 1974, 1442). The “haoyou” here refers to the prestigious clans of the Han Chinese that had moved to the Borderland area. Wang Song from the Qing Dynasty had this to say in describing the ethnic integration in the southwestern Borderland: in Yunnan, the ethnic groups prospered, with the larger ones gathering to form cities, and the smaller ones clustering to form tribes. By and by, people from the neighboring areas moved into the Borderlands, “and became mixed with them. Thus the aborigines and Han Chinese began emulating each other after living together for long periods of time.”3 Seen from the relevant records, the Han people in the southwestern Borderland generally had the following characteristics. First, their relocation from the inland to the southwestern Borderland took a long time. Although there were peaks and rock bottoms, the process never paused, and witnessed gradually strengthened influence in the southwestern Borderland. Second, among the alien immigrants in imperial China, the Han Chinese ranked first with the largest number and the greatest influence. Their relationship with the aboriginal ethnic groups basically dominated the ethnic relations in the southwest border. Third, their integration with the aboriginal ethnic groups could be roughly divided into two periods with the Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation. From the Han to Song Dynasty, they were mainly integrated by the aboriginal ethnic groups, in an evolutionary pattern dominated by “barbarization”. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, their number increased dramatically, forming local Han groups in important gathering places, while integrating the original ethnic population. Some of them also spread to the main colonies of the original ethnic groups. Fourth, a pattern can be detected in the ways and methods of their 3 [Qing Dynasty] Wang Song, Records of Yunnan from the Daoguang Years, Vol. 7, “Feudal Records (1)”.

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relocation, as well as their distribution, as obviously different from those of the original ethnic group. Fifth, in the long-term development, Han immigrants developed a relationship of peaceful coexistence with the original ethnic groups, with ethnic relations featuring harmonious coexistence above contradictions and disputes. Sixth, the Han Chinese in the southwestern Borderland has always been valued by the Central Plains dynasty and played an important role in the administration of the southwestern Borderland. The source of Han immigrants was complicated, roughly consisting of immigrants organized by the government and voluntary immigrants. Among the first category, the troops stationed in the southwestern Borderland regions took up a large proportion. Due to the long garrison time, many soldiers settled down in the local area and could be regarded as military immigrants. Usually, troops were dispatched by the Central Plains dynasty for defense, once the counties and prefectures were established. For example, the Tang Dynasty established the Yaozhou Military Command, and “dispatched 500 troops to Yaozhou every year to defend it” (Zhang, 1983, 1784). The Ming Dynasty implemented a guard post system, and stipulated that 30% of the garrison should be deployed for defense while the rest 70% should be engaged in farming. Military households under the jurisdiction of the guard post usually brought their family along with them. According to research, there were at least 600,000 to 700,000 troops and soldier’s dependents in Yunnan, while the number for Guizhou and Guangxi was also large. The seat of the post house was very attractive to Han immigrants, and usually became an important place for their gathering and activities. “Southwestern Provinces” in Expansion and Annotation of Records says that at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, there were only guard posts in the southwestern Borderland. They were gradually changed to prefectures after the replacement of native chieftains with state officials, but the government office was built in the original guard post, usually with guard posts as the mainstay, and the prefecture as the supplement. The local gentry invariably chose the guard post for worshipping. In governmental administration, there is roughly the pattern of the guard post managing the army and the prefectures managing the people. In the guard post seat, what one saw were invariably Han



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Chinese. In addition, some immigrants were civilians organized by the government to farm in the border areas. According to Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, Yizhou County was established in the Western Han Dynasty (government seat in present-day Jinning, Yunnan), “and populated it with death convicts and despots.” The second category included the people who spontaneously migrated to the southwestern Borderland to earn a living or avoid misfortune, as seen in all dynasties. According to “Bandun Barbarians” in Comprehensive Statutes, the poor were forced to flee into the barbaric land by the rigorous taxation during the Liu’s Song Dynasty. To escape from conscript labor and official taxes, they fled to the barbarians in groups of several hundred or even one thousand. If the prefecture and county government was weak, the fugitives would gather for robbery. The second category consisted of various types and their household registration was not known. The Tang Dynasty official Zhang Jianzhi said in his imperial memorial that the Yaozhou Area Command was likely to foment crises, one of which was the 2,000-oddseholds of fugitives from Jiannan and the outlaws from the Central Plains. Scattered in Yaozhou, they “had no undertaking other than plundering.” As for the 57 jimi prefectures under the jurisdiction of the Area Command of Yaozhou, “the cunning and loitering were innumerable” (Zhang, 1983, 1785). In terms of number, the inland population who spontaneously migrated to the southwestern Borderland was mostly refugees who migrated in the Qing Dynasty in search of livelihood. The third category was the troops who participated in the expedition wars, in which the defeated and captured also settled down in the southwestern Borderland. Nanzhao defeated the Tang Dynasty army three times, and at least 100,000 captured Tang troops later settled down in Yunnan. Fourth, they entered the southwestern Borderland due to business, official duties and other reasons, and some people will later settle down in the local area. “Southwestern Provinces” in Expansion and Annotation of Records said that “In the Qing Dynasty, Yunnan and other provinces were sparsely populated”, and “without the migrant merchants from areas to the west of the Changjiang River, it would have been deserted.” The statement reflected the situation of inland merchants doing business and settling in the southwestern Borderland.

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2.2  Regarding the relationship between Han immigration and border governance, a key focus of historical attention was “treacherous tyrants” and garrison generals and officials. Among the immigrants who moved to the southwestern Borderland during the Han and Jin dynasties, many of the “treacherous tyrants” had prestigious origins. According to Family Origins of Shu, “previously, the Qin banished the family and relatives of Lü Buwei to Shu. Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty opened the southwestern ethnic regions, set up a prefecture there, and relocated the Lü Clan to populate it. Hence, it was called Buwei County” (Chen, 1959, 1047). During the time of the Three Kingdoms, Yong Kai, who was from a prestigious clan in Nanzhong and who led a rebellion against the Shu Han in Yizhou County, was the descendant of Yong Chi, the Duke of Zhifang (now Shifang County, Sichuan) conferred by Emperor Gaozu of the Han Dynasty. The descendant of Yong Chi was stripped of the dukedom in the fifth year of Yuanding (112 BC) for submitting sub-standard sacrificial gold, and banished to Yizhou County (to the east of Jinning, Yunnan) (Ban, 1962, 555; Chen, 1959, 1047). There were many similar situations. Prestigious clans represented by Li Hui, Zhu Bao, Cuan Xi, Meng Yan, and Meng Huo were all descendants of immigrants from the hinterland, as attested in archaeological materials. There are many tombs in Bazi in northeastern Yunnan, central Yunnan, western Yunnan, and western Guizhou. Called “Liangdui” because of their large mounds above ground, those ancient tombs belong to those clans since the Han Dynasty.4 The “treacherous tyrants” banished by the imperial court to the southwestern Borderland brought with them a large number of tribesmen, house servants and tenants. Generally called “underlings”, those people had dual identities, both as domestic servants and serfs. Normally, they guarded the homestead of their master and participate in farming and other production activities. In the event of a struggle, they would rush to the front. As a result,

4 Sun Taichu, Study of Liang Mounds in Yunnan, Collected Papers in Commemoration of the Founding of Yunnan Provincial Museum.



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“treacherous tyrants” soon became the locally dominant ruler, and consequently “prestigious clans.” Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom says that the Dianchi Lake Basin is a vast stretch of land, with many rice paddies, “and rich gaming and agricultural resources, as well as gold, silver and livestock products.” Therefore, “the people are accustomed to an extravagant life, and difficult to placate. Wen Qi, Wang Fu, Jing Yi, Li Yong and Dong He of Nanjun Prefecture were an exception, and were later favorably treated.” “Accustomed to an extravagant life, and difficult to placate” means that the relocated “treacherous tyrants” and prestigious clans were too powerful to be placated by the government. Later, they began to collude with local officials, and the mutual relationship became peaceful. The local officials also became prosperous with their support and good at accumulating power and wealth. The “Biography of southwestern ethnic regions” in Book of Later Han therefore said that the Dianchi area was “dominated by extravagant tendencies, and all  the officials became rich and prosperous.” After Zhuge Liang quelled the rebellion of the barbarians and Han in Nanzhong, he supported the prestigious clans by assigning the young and strong aborigines to them, while “persuading” them into using gold and silk to hire the “incorrigible ones” as their subjects. Those outstanding in this respect were rewarded with hereditary official positions by the government. As a result, “the aborigines gradually pledged allegiance to Shu Han, and became its subjects,” and the double effect of strengthening the power of the prestigious clans and weakening the mountaindwelling ethnic groups was achieved. This policy proved quite effective in consolidating the rule of Shu Han in Nanzhong, but its recognition of the political and economic privileges of the prestigious clans promoted the expansion of their influence. The “treacherous tyrants” or prestigious clans that had moved to the southwestern Borderland were regarded by the local government as an important force for restricting the aboriginal ethnic groups. Out of fear for their power, it often adopted an accommodating or even indulging attitude, and let them go with a slap on the wrist for infringement with law. According to “Biography of Li Hui” in Records of the Three Kingdoms, when Li Hui, an in-law of Cuan Xi, the Magistrate of

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Jianling, was due to be removed from office for implication in his violation of the law during the administration of Liu Zhang in Sichuan, the Prefect Dong He “simply put the matter off permanently”, considering that Cuan Xi was from a “prestigious clan.” Furthermore, the garrison generals and officials stationed in the southwestern Borderland developed a symbiotic relationship with the “treacherous tyrants” or prestigious clans. Before the Central Plains dynasty the rule over the southwestern Borderland in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, it was common for them to collude with local tycoons after prolonged tenures, and to form deep-rooted local forces. This situation was partly because the Central Plains dynasty had been unable to control the southwestern Borderland, and the garrison generals and officials had not been transferred timely. It was also attributable to the discretion granted by the imperial court to them, authorizing them to adopt countermeasures as they saw fit. During the Six dynasties, the generals or officials garrisoned in Lingnan often rebelled. The main reason was the overt imperial authorization, which invariably consolidated their influence after prolonged tenures. The imperial court became worried, and inevitably grew suspicious about those officials or generals. If handled improperly, it might force them into rebellion. During the Chen Dynasty, Guangzhou Governor Ma Jing became very popular among the people in Lingnan. Moreover, “he boasted well-trained troops and fine armors and consequently achieved military merit on multiple occasions since he went deep into the barbarian settlements each year.” As a result, the government and the opposition alike “became quite suspicious.” Emperor Gaozong then sent Xiao Yin as an envoy to Guangzhou to “examine his deeds and remonstrate with him to send hostages.” After arriving in Panyu, Xiao Yin announced the imperial decree, and Ma Jing sent his children to the imperial court as the hostage (Yao, 1972, 290). During the Guangda years in the Chen Dynasty, Emperor Gaozong grew suspicious of Guangzhou Governor Ouyang He, who had been stationed in Lingnan for more than 10 years. In the first year of Taijian (569), he issued a decree, appointing Ouyang He as General Zuowei. Ouyang He didn’t want to go because of fear, and his subordinates persuaded him to rise in rebel. Ouyang He sent troops to attack Qian Daoji, the governor of Hengzhou, and Chen Dynasty sent



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troops in response. He was repeatedly defeated in battle, taken prisoner, sent to the capital and be beheaded, while his family was made official slaves (Yao, 1972, 159). The Shixie Family and the Ouyang Wei brothers couldn’t have dominated Lingnan for such a long time, without the support of local power. Because the southwestern Borderland was beyond control, while the appointed officials were reluctant to take office in the remote region, the Tang Dynasty implemented a system of selecting and appointing officials locally, lowering the selection criteria for local officials and prioritizing natives. In the Song Dynasty, records about the collusion of the “treacherous tyrants” and prestigious clans with garrison generals and officials gradually became few and sparse in Guangxi and other places, and was virtually unseen in historical records after the Yuan Dynasty. The main reason was strengthened management of the southwestern Borderland in imperial China. The social soil conducive to such collusion was gradually lost, forcing it off the historical stage. Due to the suppression and crackdown by the government, the “treacherous tyrants” or prestigious clans also tended to decline, and ceased to be a threat for the rule of the dynasty. In the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the people that had settled down for long and the migrant merchants and civilians became the main body of the Han Chinese in the southwestern Borderland. “Southwestern Provinces” in Expansion and Annotation of Records of the Ming Dynasty said that: “Although Yunnan is a place where all the aborigines have been mixed, only the post houses are populated with Han Chinese.” During the Kangxi period, Yunnan-Guizhou Governor Cai Yurong said that Yunnan was the most difficult place to rule and that its administration must be preceded by rule of the natives, because “once the natives are at peace, law and order shall prevail in the entire province.”5 In the 23rd year of Qianlong (1758), Ai Bida the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou said in proposing a Baojia System (Neighborhood Administrative System) for Yunnan in an imperial memorial that Yunnan has always had a small native population, but a large migrant population, “including many Han Chinese from Jiangxi, Huguang, 5 [Qing Dynasty] Cai Yurong, “Ten Memorials on Managing Yunnan”, [Kangxi Reign] A General History of Yunnan, Vol. 29. “Art and Literature (3)”.

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Shaanxi, Sichuan and other provinces scattered in all counties.” Those in possession of property, with family or without family but engaged in trade locally should be incorporated into Baojia System by default; as for the rest of the merchants and migrant workers who were highly mobile, they should be inspected from time to time by a Kezhang (Director of Migrant Affairs). Aibida only mentioned those who had settled down and lived in various places.6 The situation in Yunnan was roughly typi­ cal of the southwestern Borderland provinces in the Qing Dynasty.

2.3  Most of the Han immigrants that had moved in before the Yuan Dynasty lived in the prefecture or county government seat, which were mostly located in areas with well-developed agriculture, serving as a transportation hub and a distribution center for common commodities, as well as the headquarters of local power bases and cultural center. Those areas were large and medium-sized Bazi (plains). If the original ethnic distribution in the Han and Jin dynasties was described as a vast lake, the distribution of Han immigrants could be described as islands in it. Those islands were also the government seat of prefectures and counties established in China’s imperial history. With the gradual increase in number, immigrants began spreading to the surrounding areas, especially those with traffic lines. Comprehensive Statutes says that from the west of the Dianchi Lake to the Erhai Lake, there were a hundred and several dozen tribes called “Songwai Zhuman” (Aborigines of Songwai), among which Yang, Li, Zhao, and Dong were the major prestigious surnames. Claiming to be descendants of Han Chinese, they boasted castles, villages, bows and spears. “Their language was generally the same as that of the Han Chinese, despite minor deviations. They had their own writing system and know yin yang and the calendar well.” Their crops included rice, wheat, millet and beans, “which were planted and harvested in the same way as the Han Chinese

6 “Memorial of Yunnan-Guizhou Viceroy Ai Bida and Yunnan Governor Liu Zao on Reporting the Implementing of Imperial Decree” (28th of the fifth month, 23rd year of Qianlong), Archive 0219-021; microsfilm 01-032-0608.



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had done.” Their vegetables included green onions, leeks, garlic, and turnips, while their fruits included peaches, plums, and scallions. “They had sericulture and hemp weaving”, kept cattle, horses, pigs, sheep, chickens, dogs and other livestock (Du, 1988, 5067). Judging from their economic and cultural characteristics, they should have been descended from Han immigrants. Although they were affected by the aboriginal ethnic group because they had settled down earlier on, they managed to maintain traces of the basic characteristics of Han immigrants. It is worth noting that their colonies were located between the two plains of the Dianchi Lake and the Erhai Lake, on a relatively flat terrain interspersed with mountains. This means that the distribution of Han immigrants in the Tang Dynasty had spread from the large and medium-sized plains of the Dianchi Lake and the Erhai Lake to the surrounding area. Important roads that connected the Dianchi Lake and the Erhai Lake passing through it was a reason for descendants of Han Chinese to live in those colonies. Today’s Yunnan and southwestern Sichuan were the areas managed by the Central Plains dynasty earlier. As for present-day Guizhou and western Guangxi, the original ethnic groups were extensively distributed in the Ming and Qing dynasties, and the distribution of Han immigrants had some characteristics different from Yunnan. History of Ming said that Guangxi was dominated by Yao and Tong ethnic groups, who lived in the mountains circled by the three rivers, with the 63 mountains as the center. It added that those scattered in the counties of Guilin, Liuzhou, Qingyuan, and Pingle, “and spread extensively, with those in Tianzhou and Sicheng particularly tough.”7 Guizhou was founded in the Ming Dynasty, whose rule gradually expanded southward from Zunyi, the focus of management in China’s imperial history. Therefore, the Han immigrants were concentrated in the prefecture seat and post houses, while the distribution pattern of “aboriginal Miao ethnic groups in the south, Han Chinese in the north, and Sinicized Miao in the middle” (Zhao et al., 1977, 10267). In the 33rd year of Wanli (1605), Guo Zizhang, the Governor of Guizhou, said in his imperial memorial that there were many Miao people living in Guizhou. Although 14 post 7 History of Ming, Vol 317, “Chieftains of Guangxi”, 8201.

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stations, such as Guizhou, Xintian, Pingyue, and Weiqing, were set up in the early Ming Dynasty to guard the post road to Yunnan, “areas beyond the lines were inhabited by the Miao people”, adjoining Sichuan in the north and Hunan and Guangzhou in the east, and Guangxi in the south.8 Guizhou was generally inhabited by original ethnic groups such as Miao, as seen in records of the Qing Dynasty. Fang Xian, an official of Guizhou said that there were many Miao people in Guizhou, from Liping Prefecture in the west to Duyun Prefecture in the east and Zhenyuan Prefecture in the south to Qingyuan Prefecture in the north, and “that all were aboriginal Miao people.”9 The origin of the Han immigrants that had moved from the inland to the Yunnan-Guizhou area differed, with the Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation line. Before the Yuan Dynasty, the present YunnanGuizhou region was connected to the hinterland mainly through two official roads that had been frequently used since the Han Dynasty, namely the Wuchi Road from Chengdu to Qujing via Yibin, and the Lingguan Road from Chengdu to central Yunnan via Xichang. Through these two roads, the current Yunnan-Guizhou region became closely connected to the Sichuan Basin, forming the tradition of the YunnanGuizhou region being governed by the present-day Sichuan. Therefore, the dispatch of troops and officials to the present Yunnan-Guizhou region and the expatriation of immigrants all took the present Sichuan Basin as the starting point. During this period, immigrants lived in clusters in the prefecture and county seat, or scattered along Wuchi Road, Lingguan Road, and the road from the Dianchi Lake to the Erhai Lake. The sites of Han-dynasty tombs discovered so far are mainly distributed in Zhaotong, Qujing, Dali, Kunming, Baoshan and Songming in Yunnan, Weining, Hezhang, Bijie, Qingzhen, Anshun, Xingyi, in Guizhou, and Xichang in southwestern Sichuan. Those places were mostly the government seat of prefectures or counties set up in the Han and Jin dynasties, and some were located along Wuchi Road or Lingguan Road. 8 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Emperor Wanli, Vol. 414, Jiayin of the 10th lunar month in the 33rd year of Wanli. 9 [Qing Dynasty] Fang Xian, A Brief Account of Pacification of the Miao Region.



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The Yuan Dynasty established the Yunnan Province, made the present-day Kunming the government seat, and opened post roads such as the Huguang Road from Kunming to Hunan via Guizhou. For protecting the post road from Yunnan to Hunan and other reasons, Guizhou Province was established in the mid-Ming Dynasty. Those measures changed the geopolitical pattern of the southwestern Borderland. The present-day Yunnan-Guizhou region began to be closely linked to the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and the Central Plains, making possible the influx of a large number of immigrants from the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, and radically changing the domination of Sichuanese among local immigrants. The inhabitation of the migrant population also expanded from the prefecture and county seat to the medium-sized and small plains and their surrounding areas. Areas along the Tonghuguang Road, including Guiyang, Qujing, Kunming, Zhaotong and Yuxi, grew into densely populated and economically prosperous areas. In the 23rd year of Qianlong (1758), Aibida, the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou, mentioned the origin of immigrants in an imperial memorial, saying that, “a large number of Han Chinese immigrants from Jiangxi, Huguang, Shaanxi and Sichuan have been scattered in various counties and prefectures.”10 In Aibida’s account, Jiangxi and Huguang preceded Shaanxi and Sichuan, indicating that Yunnan Province had a lot of immigrants from Jiangxi and Huguang, reflecting the changes in the origin of immigrants. In terms of the number of Han immigrants to the southwest border in imperial China, the Ming and Qing dynasties topped the list, but the types and influences of immigrants in the Ming and Qing dynasties were different. Although the immigrants who entered the southwest border in the Ming Dynasty were classified into military households, civilians, and merchants, military households accounted for more than 70% to 80% of the total. The imperial court set up post houses in various places, mainly in agricultural areas and strategic areas. So, most of the

10 “Memorial of Yunnan-Guizhou Viceroy Ai Bida and Yunnan Governor Liu Zao on Reporting the Implementing of Imperial Decree” (28th of the fifth month, 23rd year of Qianlong), Archive 0219-021; microsfilm 01-032-0608.

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post houses were located in cities and towns, agricultural areas and along transportation lines. The social changes in the southwestern Borderland in the Ming Dynasty were mainly because the hinterland of Yunnan and other provinces became increasingly close to the central plains, widening its gap with the border and remote areas in development. Therefore, Wang Shixing from the Ming Dynasty said that the five prefectures of Yunnan (government seat in today’s Kunming), Lin’an (government seat in today’s Jianshui), Dali, Heqing, and Chuxiong were quite prosperous, while the rest of Yunnan was barren land (Wang, 1981, 127). In Guizhou Province, the military households were surrounded by ethnic settlements for a long time due to the “supremacy of barbarians over the Han Chinese in number”, and the relatively isolated “village fortresses” gradually took shape. There were many “village fortresses” in Pingba, Anshun, Zhenning, Puding, Changshun and other places, involving a total population of 300,000 (Weng, 2001). Generally, the Qing Dynasty didn’t organize immigration officially, so the inland population that entered the southwestern Borderland was mainly refugees who migrated there spontaneously for a better livelihood. The imperial government issued orders prohibiting emigration for fear of social unrest, but in fact connived. Yunnan and other provincial governments offered preferential conditions such as startup money, farming cattle, and private ownership for newly cultivated land to attract refugees from other places to reclaim its wasteland.11 The ref­ ugees in the Qing Dynasty were at the bottom of the society, with neither organization nor the means of earning a living. Their choice of settlement place and means of livelihood were restricted. In Yunnan, there was the proverb saying “the destitute go to the barbarian region or work in the mines,” meaning that migrants entering Yunnan had to either work as miners or go to the Borderlands and remote areas to cultivate the land, in order to earn a living. Refugees were ready to take any job, be it land cultivation, charcoal production or coal mining, so long as it kept their belly full. By and by, they settled down 11 [Guangxu Reign] General Annals of Yunnan, Vol. 39, “Land Tax: Examples”, cited in the imperial memorial of Gao Qizhuo in the 10th year of Yongzheng.



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where the worked. Since the flat areas were densely populated and difficult to wedge their way in, a large number of migrant refugees went into mountainous areas and remote areas to reclaim wasteland. The introduction of corn, potato, sweet potato and other crops tolerant of barren soil in the mid-Ming Dynasty provided favorable conditions for them to feed themselves. Therefore, in the Qing Dynasty, a large-scale development was achieved in the mountains and remote areas of the southwestern Borderland, forming the basic pattern of population distribution that continues to this day.

2.4  Understanding the difference between plains and the mountainous land in natural environment and development process is of great significance for in-depth understanding of the characteristics and changes of the Han people in the southwestern Borderland. The Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, consisting of the Yunnan Plateau and the Guizhou Plateau, and the extensions in southwestern Sichuan and northwestern Guangxi, is a geographic unit with roughly the same geological structure and geomorphic features. Its main part is the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau with an altitude of 1100–2000 meters, and a terrain high in the northwest and low in the southeast. Due to the impact and cutting of the Jinsha River, the Yuanjiang River, the Nanpan River, the Beipan River, the Wujiang River, the Yuanjiang River and the Liujiang River, the topography of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau is relatively fragmented, featuring a large proportion of mountainous areas and plateaus, as well as hilly land. The mountains and plateaus account for 94% of the total area of Yunnan Province, while the rest 6% consists of plains (basins) of various sizes. In Guizhou Province, mountains and plateaus account for 87% of the area, while plains account for only 3%, and the rest are hills. In Guangxi, the hilly land accounts for 60.24% of the total area, and a large part of the northwest. In Yunnan, there are more than 30 lakes, among which the Dianchi Lake, Erhai Lake and Fuxian Lake are the larger ones. In Guizhou and southwestern Sichuan, there are only the Weining Caohai Lake and the Qionghai Lake near Xichang respectively. In northwestern Guangxi, there is no large lake. Areas around

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the larger lakes were inhabited by humans long ago, and then gradually developed into agricultural areas. Generally, the mountainous areas in the southwestern Borderland feature large height differences, steep slopes and thin soil layers, and consequently poor suitability and cultivability. Meanwhile, the land ecosystem is fragile, and improper development can easily lead to soil erosion and resource destruction. With a subtropical and tropical climate of the south, they are rich in biological resources. The plethora of meadows in the mountains, especially in parts of northeastern Yunnan and Guizhou, are suitable for developing animal husbandry. In contrast to the mountains, the plains interspersed in the mountains are suitable for agricultural development. The larger plains are flat, with many rivers or lakes, and thick and fertile soil. The well-known ones in Yunnan are located in Kunming, Luliang, Zhaolu, Qujing, Xiangyun and Mengzi, while those in Guizhou are mainly distributed in Guiyang, Anshun, Zunyi and Duyun. Qionghai is the largest plain in southwest Sichuan. Most of those larger plains are areas developed early and valued by successive dynasties. Rice farming in large and medium-sized plains started earlier and developed rapidly. Those plains also became distribution centers for bulk commodities because transportation lines passing through them, as well as a stronghold of local power and a center of cultural accumulation and inheritance. Most of the prefecture and county seats in the past were located in such a plain. Kunming Plain, Dali Plain and Guiyang Plain are the larger ones of their kind, with the first two on the Yunnan Plateau and the third one on the Guizhou Plateau, each in its respective heart. The first two plains later grew into political centers of Yunnan, and the third one became the seat of the provincial capital of Guizhou. Although the mountains are rich in flora and fauna resources, the forests are dense, inaccessible, and infested with beasts and snakes. The mountainous climate is volatile and prone to make people vulnerable to various diseases. Aside from the complex and changeable natural environment, which is not suitable for living, there is very little arable land. In addition, the inconvenient transportation has made those



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areas underdeveloped and closed, slowing the social development of mountain-dwelling ethnic groups. Therefore, the mountainous area is sparsely populated, and considerably behind the plains in social development. Nanzhong Records in Records of the Huayang Kingdom says stated that the Dianchi Plain in the Han and Jin dynasties was flat and vast, with carefully tended rice paddies, pines, parrots and peacocks everywhere, and that it was rich in salt, fish, gold, silver and livestock resources. In the same period, western Guizhou was called “ox bending head” or “horse-cheek slapping” for the steep mountains. “It has no rice paddy or sericulture, but many snakes, tigers and wolves. Witchcraft was followed; taboos and temples were in multitude” (Chang, 1984, 421). Book of Later Han also said that the present-day western Guizhou “boasts soggy land, witchcraft and taboos, but little livestock and no sericulture, so the counties are the poorest” (Fan, 1965, 2846). For a long period after the Han and Jin dynasties, there are still many records about the disparity between the plains and the mountainous areas in development. In the early Yuan Dynasty, Li Jing said that the plains of Yunnan boast many rice paddies, “with beautiful landscape almost on a par with the south of the Yangtze River, and hemp, wheat, fruit and vegetable varieties similar to those in the Middle Kingdom” (Li, 1986, 88). In the Song Dynasty, Zhou Qufei claimed that the Yao people of Guangxi made a living by tilling the mountainous land, and feed on millets, beans and taros. They had few rice paddies, which could provide for them in years of abundance, but “forced them into plundering elsewhere in years of famine” (Zhou, 1999, 119). Despite the large gap between the plains and the mountainous areas in natural conditions and development, there is a connection between them, especially as seen in the symbiosis and complementarity. During the Han and Jin dynasties, the upper-class “senior members” of prestigious clans in Nanzhong colluded with chiefs of “Kun” “Sou” and other aboriginal ethnic groups living in the mountainous area to form “Huangye.” When they broke the law, they usually hid away among the aborigines. In return, they sought revenge for aborigines held accountable by the government. The particularly solid friendship between those senior members and the aborigines was called

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“eternal Huangye”, almost on a par with “flesh and blood ties.”12 The relationship of “Huangye” was not restricted to the prestigious clans and the upper class of the aborigines. The people of the plains also liked to pair up with the mountain-dwelling aborigines, as seen in all dynasties. Essentially, the “Huangye” relationship or friendship was a symbiotic and complementary relationship established economically, before developing into a mutual-aid social relationship and even a political alliance. The important role of plains in the development of the southwestern Borderland was most prominent in the early stage of ancient society. During the Song and Yuan dynasties and the subsequent period, the mountain peoples rose and developed rapidly. The exchanges between the plain residents and mountain dwellers increased, continually strengthening the interdependence and complementarity in between. As a large number of inland refugees migrated to the mountains, the relationship between the plains and the mountains became closer in the Qing Dynasty, and the integrity of the southwestern Borderland became obvious, changing the relationship between the Han Chinese and the mountain peoples. This suggests that there is a duality structure between plains and mountainous areas in the southwestern Borderland. Despite the marked differences in natural conditions, development, and cultural features, they are also connected and complementary. This duality structure has contributed to obvious differences between the Han immigrants and mountain peoples. The earlier the time was, the more obvious the differences were. With historical development and social progress, the symbiotic and complementary relationship in the duality structure has gradually strengthened, as specifically manifested in the strengthened relationship and mutual influence between Han immigrants and mountain peoples.

12 Chang Qu, Records of the Huayang Kingdom, Vol. 4, “Records of Nanzhong”, 364. In the Han and Jin Dynasties, “Kun” and “Sou (Xi)” mainly lived in the mountainous areas around the plains. Cf. Fang Tie, Textual Criticism on Lost Record of the Several Historical Facts of Southwest Ethnic Minorities in “the Historical Records” and “the Book of Han Dynasty”, Journal of the Central University for Nationalities, 2004 (3).



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Before the Yuan Dynasty, the Han immigrants who moved to the southwestern Borderland experienced a process of “barbarization.” Affected by the complex relationship between the plains and the mountainous areas, they had many exchanges with the aboriginal ethnic groups in plains (such as the Bo people in Yunnan, the Liao or Liliao people in Guizhou and Guangxi), and we deeply affected by them culturally. During the Shu Han reign, Yong Kai led his people in a rebel against Shu. Before rebelling, Yong Kai feigned the instruction of ghosts, saying that “Prefect Zhang is like a gourd flask, slick externally but coarse internally. And he should be tied up and sent to Wu” (Chang, 1984, 351). Yong Kai compared Zhang Yi to an outwardly smooth but inwardly coarse gourd and drew on the witchcraft to order the barbarians to have him sent to Wu. This suggests that Yong Kai was not only familiar with the customs of barbarians, but also given the authority of a Guizhu the leader of witchcraft cult among them. On the other hand, the Han immigrants living in the plains did not contact much with the mountain peoples, and were even on guard against them. In the third year of Zhang Wu (223), when Liu Bei died of illness in Baidi City after an ill-fated expedition against Wu, the prestigious clans and aboriginal chiefs turned against Shu. And Yong Kai from a prestigious clan of Yizhou County and Gao Dingyuan, the chieftain of Sou people in Yuexi County, decided to join forces in rebellion. In the third year of Jianxing (225), Zhuge Liang sent troops on a punitive expedition, and led western branch of his army to attack Gao Dingyuan in the present-day Xichang. Yong Kai rushed to Gao’s aid in the juncture, but was killed by his subjects in internal strife (Chang, 1984, 353). Details of Yong Kai’s death were unknown due to the lack of records, but the incident also showed that the prestigious clans of Nanzhong and the chieftain of Sou people were on guard against each other, and were even ready to turn against each other. This suggests that in terms of development and cultural background, the Han immigrants were markedly different from the mountain ethnic groups. Zhuge Liang adopted different governance policies for the prestigious clans and the mountain peoples after pacifying Nanzhong, partially because of the above-mentioned reasons.

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During the Northern and Southern dynasties, the Han immigrants in Yunnan merged with the Bo people to form the local ethnic group Baiman, which became the main ethnic group of Nanzhao and Dali. Nanzhao handled its relationship with the mountain peoples mainly for military conquest and for requisition for the war against the Tang. The Dali Kingdom handled its relationship with the 37 tribes of the mountain-dwelling ethnic forces in eastern Yunnan with official alliances. The main reason was that their marked development in the Song Dynasty made it impossible for the Dali Kingdom to conquer them. This shows that the strength of the mountain peoples in the Song Dynasty was significantly increased, enabling them to challenge the authority of the ethnic groups in the plains.

2.5  The Yuan Dynasty implemented the native official system in the southwestern Borderland, promoting the development of mountainous areas and the ethnic groups there. As mentioned above, after the Song Dynasty, the collusion of “treacherous” prestigious clans with garrison generals and officials gradually decreased, and the people that had settled down or lived in various places rose, to become the main body of the Han Chinese in the southwestern Borderland in the Ming and Qing dynasties. As far as the Han Chinese are concerned, the changes in ethnic relations during this period were twofold. Firstly, new local Han groups gradually took shape and their strength continued to increase, until they became dominant in the southwestern Borderland; secondly, the powerful forces in the plains gradually weakened or even disappeared. In the Central Plains dynasty, especially the Qing Dynasty, the focus of civilian management under the prefecture-county structure, shifted from the despotic forces to the “scum among the Han” among the ethnic groups. The “scum among the Han” mainly included certain populations who had recently moved to the southwestern Borderland. The changes in ethnic groups were twofold: 1) the gradual Sinicization under the influence of Han immigrants and inland culture, and their more extensive and profound integration with the Han Chinese; 2) the generally slow social development of ethnic groups, prevalent arbitrary



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looting, fighting with weapons or plundering for slaves under the backward system, and rampant illegal behaviors of some chieftains in obstructing the government’s management and development of areas under its control led to sharp contradiction with the government administration strategies and with the general trend of the Qing Dynasty for strengthening ties between the plains and the mountainous areas, as well as the need for overall development of the southwestern border. Therefore, the imperial court carried out large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in ethnic areas for implementing the Baojia system, encouraged immigrants to the Borderlands and remote areas to cultivate the land, while stepping up efforts to combat “scum among the Han.” After prefectures and counties were established in the Qin and Han dynasties, Han Chinese had entered the southwestern Borderland throughout the ages to avoid punishment or seek profit. Historically, imperial China generally had a low opinion of those Han Chinese, believing that they undermined the relationship between the imperial court and the barbarians and disrupted the security of the border areas. In the Tang Dynasty, the official Zhang Jianzhi submitted the imperial memorial to close the Yaozhou military-agro colony, saying that the escaped criminals of Jiannan and the outlaws of the Central Plains “were bent on plundering” and that there were innumerable “cunning tyrants” sneaking into the territory of Yaozhou from the hinterland. Before the Ming and Qing dynasties, the management of the southwestern Borderland was not deep, and the management of “cunning tyrants” was not exercised. Such problems were prominent in the Ming Dynasty. In the 12th year of Hongzhi (1499), Xie Chaoxuan, Governor of Yunnan, said in an imperial memorial that the land of Manmo was a water and land transportation hub where the utensils needed by Burma were exported. Many of the fugitives from Jiangxi and Dali went there, and “betrayed information of the Middle Kingdom” together with law-bending officials.13 In the 33rd year of Wanli (1605), Guo Zizhang, the Governor of Guizhou, stated in his memorial that

13 History of Ming, Vol. 315, Chieftains of Yunnan (3), 8153.

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since the expedition against the Miao people, there has been a shortage of rations, and the officers and soldiers has been subjected to considerable hardships. Troops unable to return to their homestead “crept into the villages for illegal dealings.” Previously, they haunted the villagers only occasionally, but now they are a daily bane. In previous years, they came in groups of several dozen, robbing only merchants and officials, and now they came in hundreds at every turn, victimizing the vicinity of the provincial capital. “The area of several hundred miles across in Guizhou suddenly becomes the den of robbers.”14 The situation men­ tioned was ready very serious, but it was beyond the reach of the Ming Dynasty because of its declining national strength. In the Qing Dynasty, there were many Han people who entered the ethnic areas. Inevitably, there was a mixture of good people and bad ones. There were often situations in which Han people undermining Han-Barbarian relations and even inciting Yiluo aborigines into rebellion. In the early years of the Yongzheng reign, the Miao people of the Qingshui River rebelled. The reason was the instigation of Jiugu Miao by Zeng Wendeng, who claimed that after the replacement of native chieftains with state officials, the government would double the tax and impose corvee according to the actual land area, and that their settlement would be inaccessible for government forces since it was protected by the deep river and dangerous cliffs. Consequently, the Miao people rose in rebellion. The troops of Zhang Guangsi invaded the Qingshui River valley, and the Miao people tied Zeng Wendeng up and surrendered him to the government forces.15 In the 22nd year of Qianlong (1757), the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou Chen Hengwen said in a memorial that The Miao people are human beings though they are stubborn. “They were known to cause troubles previously because they had been instigated by traitors or harassed and coerced by local soldiers.”16 14 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Emperor Wanli, Vol. 414, Jiayin of the 10th lunar month in the 33rd year of Wanli. 15 Zhao Erxun et al., Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 515, “Chieftains (4): Guizhou”, 14272. A Brief Account of Pacification of the Miao Region. 16 “Memorial of Yunnan Governor Heng Wen” (23th of the third month, 22nd year of Qianlong), Archive 23-0026-001; microfilm 23-002-0849.



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The Qing court also believed that Han Chinese profiteers wandering around the villages took advantage of Yiluo aborigines in transactions and incited their discontent or goaded them into lawsuits, thus causing social unrest and even chaos. In the 20th year of Qianlong (1755), Guo Yiyu the Governor of Yunnan reported on the situation in an imperial memorial, saying that Yiluo aborigines were stupid and straightforward. “When they were taken advantage by some cunning Han Chinese, they accepted the injustice submissively and dared not argue for their rights and interests.” He added that some Han rascals that had dabbled with civil and military affairs, but that had excelled in defrauding despite rudimentary knowledge “often took the Yiluo aborigines as coward and weak, and would wantonly deceive them in the villages.”17 In the 22nd year, Liu Zao, the Governor of Yunnan, stated in an imperial memorial that the Yiluo aborigines have been mostly respectful of the law and officials, and extremely docile; however, from time to time local rascals or Jiangxi and Guangzhou migrants would come to their village and lend money to them to take advantage of and even blackmail them. “Although measures have been taken, the evil practice has not been eradicated.”18 In the 47th year, Fu Gang, the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou said in an imperial memorial that the Yiluo aborigines, who were formerly under the jurisdiction of the chieftains, have now mostly placed in the charge of non-native officials. They have become most law-abiding, but are sometimes plunged into ceaseless litigations because of manipulation by Han traitors. In the 60th year, the main cause of the Miao uprising led by Shi Liudeng in Songtao, Guizhou was insufferable bullying by profiteers. The Han profiteers of Songtao traveled around the Miao village and traded the silk of the Miao people with plain cloth. Initially, they sought an exorbitant interest; gradually, they became to take the land or houses of locals. The Miao people rebelled for fear of losing their subsistence.19 17 “Memorial of Yunnan Governor Guo Yiyu on Reporting the Local Circumstances” (3rd of the 10th month, 20th year of Qianlong). 18 “Memorial of Yunnan Governor Liu Zao on Reporting Official Management and other Local Circumstances” (11th of the 12th month, 22nd year of Qianlong), Archive 13-0025-021; microfilm 13-01-1899. 19 [Qing Dynasty] Aibida, Records of Southern Guizhou, Vol. 19.

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Since the above situation was common, the Qing court adopted strict preventive and severe punitive measures against the “Han traitors” who infiltrated into the land of the Yiluo aborigines, and imposed a ban on prohibiting Han Chinese from entering their villages and from trading with them, under pain of severe punishment. In the 5th year of the Yongzheng reign (1727), Eertai, the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou, ordered that “Han traitors” be strictly prohibited after securing imperial approval, and issued the order to all Han Chinese and aborigines that in Miao colonies “the aborigines should not offer accommodation to Han Chinese, who should not force their way in.” Rewards or citations were offered for capturing the “Han traitors” that had broken the law (Eertai, 1930). In the 57th year of Qianlong (1792), the Guilin and Liuzhou prefectures in Guangxi issued an order prohibiting Han Chinese from buying the homes and the properties of the Yao people. Once reported, those offending the regulation were ordered to return the property without their money back, aside from other punishment. The land of the Yao people should be lent to their fellow people, but never to the Han people (Huang, 1993). In the 7th year of Daoguang (1827), the government inspected the Miao villages again and specifically banned Han merchants from entering the Miao villages.20 There were also disputes between the Han and Miao over land. Some mainland Han people went to Yunnan-Guizhou region to rent the land of the Miao people or trade with them. For Miao people that could not make ends meet, they would lend silver, often at hefty interests and with their land as guarantee. By and by, the land of the Miao was all seized the Hans. In the event of a dispute between the chieftains, the Han people would encourage litigation. All lent silver taels were guaranteed with land. In the 18th year of Daoguang, the Qing court issued a decree and banned the practice. Judging from the relevant records, the “Han traitors” should refer to Han Chinese involved in certain affairs for Yiluo aborigines, including businessmen, refugees, gangsters, and shysters. Some of them instigated relations between aborigines and Han Chinese, deceived and blackmailed the aborigines and even manipulated lawsuits, while 20 Aibida, Records of Southern Guizhou, Vol. 19.



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others deliberately became mixed with Yiluo aborigines to make a living. The strict preventive measures of the Qing government reduced the incidence of Yiluo aborigines by “Han traitors”, but also cut off their exchanges with the Han Chinese and weakened their ability to withstand hardship and distinguish right from wrong. In addition, prohibiting the Han people from interacting with Yiluo aborigines was not a viable strategy after all; so the Qing court revised the regulations in some respects. For example, in the 26th year of Qianlong (1761), the Qing court officially abolished a law and allowed previously prohibited intermarriage between the Han and Miao (Xu, 1984, 1989). In short, the formation of the Han Chinese as an ethnic group in the southwestern Borderland underwent a complicated process. Since the establishment of prefectures and counties in the Qin and Han dynasties, Han immigrants had continuously moved into this area. Although there were peaks and nadirs in migration to the southwestern Borderland in imperial China, and the identity and source of the migrants were also different, the migration was continuous, coherent and gradually enhanced. The migration in imperial China to the southwestern Borderland increased the strength for developing the Borderland, strengthened the connection of the inland with the southwestern Borderland, and consolidated the development of the Borderland region. It was also cherished by the court in governing the border, playing an important role. The integration of immigrants and the original ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland could be roughly divided into two periods with the Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation line. In the first period, the economic and cultural differences between immigrants and the original ethnic group were obvious. Over time, the two gradually merged, forming new local ethnic groups such as Baiman. During this period, most of the imperial China viewed immigrants as a force to rely on, trusted them and implemented supportive policies. On the other hand, immigrants, especially the rich and powerful, were prone to integrate with garrison generals and officials, preparing the soil for the rise and even secession of local powers. After the Yuan Dynasty, the number and influence of immigrants to the southwestern Borderland increased significantly, and the tendency

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of ethnic integration changed to immigrants merging certain aboriginal ethnic groups to form the Han ethnic group of the southwestern Borderland in the settlements in large and medium-sized plains and along the traffic lines. The influx of immigrants and the formation of the Han ethnic group in the southwestern Borderland created favorable conditions for its rapid development and stability. The governance policies of the dynasties during this period were mainly to actively expand the number and distribution of the people (mainly Han people in the southwestern Borderland), to form a reliable basis for Borderland management. The Qing Dynasty also followed the trend of strengthening connection between the plains and the mountains and the need for overall development of the border areas, and adopted a series of administrative measures, such as replacing native officials with non-native ones, strengthening their management and development, and encouraging relocation to the border and remote areas. Its focus of governing the Han people in the southwestern Borderland also shifted from the local tyranny in the previous period to the “Han traitors” bullying Yiluo aborigines and instigating trouble.

3.  The Two Southward Adventures of Northern Nomads and the Administration of Imperial China From the Warring States Period to the early Han Dynasty, some nomadic tribes in the northwest moved south from the Hehuang Valley, and entered the southwestern Borderland through the West Sichuan, which is now known as the “Corridor of Xizang-Burman Ethnic Groups.” Later, they spread to Yunnan, Southwestern Sichuan and Guizhou, and mostly settled down in the mountainous areas. After blending with the indigenous peoples, they became the ancestors of the Yi, Hani, Naxi, Lisu, Lahu, Jinuo and other ethnic groups belonging to the Yi branch of the Xizang-Burman group of the Sino-Tibetan language family. In the late Southern Song Dynasty, Mongke, the Mongolian Great Khan, ordered his brother Kublai Khan to lead an expedition against Dali with a cavalry of 100,000. After the pacification of Dali, Yunnan and Huguang provinces were established in the southwestern Borderland,



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and some Mongols and Semu people were relocated there successively. The Yuan Dynasty sent many Yunnan kings and Liangwang kings to guard Yunnan, together with many Mongolian soldiers. The Mongols and Semu people who entered the southwestern Borderland were mainly soldiers, officials and merchants, and they were roughly distributed in the hinterland, towns and transportation lines. The two large-scale migrations of the northern nomads to the southwestern Borderland have had an important and far-reaching impact. Due to different historical conditions and related factors, they were similar in several aspects, but obviously different in the development process, result and influence. The differences are directly attributable to the administration of the Central Plain dynasties.

3.1. The Historical Background for the Southward Migrations of Northern Nomads During the Western Zhou Dynasty, the State of Qin repeatedly launched wars against nomadic tribes in the northwest. For example, Duke Xian of Qin led expeditions against the aboriginal tribes inhabiting in the origin of the Weishui River. Under the strong military pressure of the Qin, some Qiang aborigines of the Xirong tribe were forced south. The descendants of Yuan Jian, the chieftain of one faction, gradually moved south with the tribe, getting further away from the rest of the Qiang people. The faction was further divided into three branches in the southwest. Among them, the “Maoniu Branch” was distributed in the present-day Hanyuan and Xichang of Sichuan. In the Western Han Dynasty, the Yuexi County was established in its colony; so it also became known as “Yuexi Qiang” in historical records. The “Baima Branch” lived in the area from north of Mianyang in Sichuan to south of Wudu in Gansu. The Western Han Dynasty established Guanghan County in this area, so this branch was called “Guanghan Qiang.” The “Canlang Branch” moved to the Wudu in Gansu, where Wudu County was established in the Western Han Dynasty, so it came to be known as “Wudu Qiang.” It is generally believed that the “Xi” and “Kunming” in Records of the Grand Historian refer to the Maoniu Branch and Baima Branch of the Qiang people that moved to the south during the pre-Qin period.

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After Nan and Kunming entered the southwestern Borderland, they continued to maintain the custom of nomadic animal husbandry and spread to the surrounding areas. According to the “Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of southwestern ethnic regions”, the main areas of activity in Nuan and Kunming in the early Western Han Dynasty were from Tongshi (now Baoshan in Yunnan) to Luyu (now Dali, Yunnan), “extending for thousands of miles.” This part of Qiang people were still in the primitive nomadic stage without a monarch or permanent dwelling. According to the records of the Eastern Han Dynasty and later periods, the Xi and Kunming tribes distributed in the above-mentioned areas spread eastward and southward from the western Sichuan and northwestern Yunnan in which they first arrived. The tribe active in the western Sichuan ventured into the present Xichang region in the middle of the Western Han Dynasty and grew into a strong local power during the Shu Han period. A part of the Xi and Kunming tribes migrated to the territory of the Dian Kingdom in the present-day eastern Yunnan, and fought fierce wars with the Dian people. In the later period, they were defeated by the Western Han Dynasty and the Dian Kingdom in the reign of Emperor Wu and were forced to accept the jurisdiction of Yizhou Prefecture. The rest population of Xi and Kunming tribes fled from their land and moved into the mountainous areas of present-day Eastern Yunnan and Western Guizhou through a tortuous journey. During the Song Dynasty, they developed into a loose tribal alliance called “Thirty-seven Wuman Tribes.” In the war of Dian Kingdom against the Xi and Kunming tribes, the Western Han Dynasty sided with the Dian Kingdom. The reason was that the envoys of the Western Han Dynasty from the present Sichuan Basin (in present-day Yunnan-Guizhou region) to Tochari (in presentday northern Afghanistan) via southwestern ethnic regions were repeatedly blocked by the Xi and Kunming and robbed of their belongings. In the 2nd year of Yuan Feng (109 BC), the Western Han Dynasty sent General Guo Chang and other troops to attack Xi and Kunming with several dozen thousand troops. However, after the Han army withdrew, they made a comeback, and the envoys of the Western Han Dynasty were once again robbed (Sima, 1959, 3171). In the following



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year, Emperor Wu ordered the construction of Kunming Pool in the capital city Chang’an to drill the navy for a decisive battle with them. In fact, the Xi and Kunming were nomadic tribes from the northwest and were not good at water warfare. Perhaps Emperor Wu had heard of the large pond in Yeyu and took it for granted that they lived by the water. In the 6th year of Yuanfeng (105 BC), Emperor Wu once again sent Guo Chang to lead an army to attack Xi and Kunming tribes, but the result was not satisfactory. Guo Chang was punished by having his seal taken away.21 After Yuanfeng years, the Han Dynasty continually waged war on Xi and Kunming, and eventually defeated the faction of them that had ventured into the territory of the Dian Kingdom. According to the “Biography of Southwestern Aborigines” in Book of Later Han, in the second year of Yuanfeng, the Western Han Dynasty established Yizhou Prefecture in the former territory of the Dian Kingdom. In the following years, it captured the land inhabited by the Kunming tribe “and placed them in the charge of Yizhou Prefecture.” Therefore, this suggests that the war of the Dian Kingdom and the Western Han Dynasty against Xi and Kunming tribes ultimately ended with the victory of the former. The Western Han Dynasty placed the land of the defeated under the jurisdiction of Yizhou Prefecture, which was jointly managed by the King of Dian and the Prefect of the Han Dynasty.22 After the war, a part of the Xi and Kunming tribes bypassed the Dian State and went into the vast mountainous areas of eastern Yunnan and western Guizhou, at the time after the completion of Records of the Grand Historian. Therefore, related information missing in Records of the Grand Historian is found in the historical records after the Western Han Dynasty. According to “Annotations on Wenshui” in the Water Classics, Wenshui flows through Weixian County (now Qujing, Yunnan), flanked by high mountains. Between the mountains and rivers, “there 21 Ban Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 6, “Records of Emperor Wudi”. Guo Chang led his troops to attack Nan and Kunming for the second time in the sixth year of Yuanfeng, 198. 22 According to Records of the Grand Historian, Vol. 116, “Biography of Southwestern Ethnic Groups”: When the King of Dian surrendered to the Han Dynasty, “all the officials instated were sent to the imperial court, which established the Yizhou County, gave the King of Dian the seal, and ordered him to rule his original people.” This shows that the King of Dian enjoyed the same status as the prefects in governing Yizhou County, 2997.

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lives the Muer Aborigines, who speak a different language and have different temperament. The purported mountainous area has a flat terrain devoid of miasma” (Li, 1984, 1125). The “Muer Aborigines” mentioned here should refer to the Xi and Kunming tribes among whom the dress code of “pinned-down hair and wooden earring” was popular.23 Among the Yi and Hani ethnic groups, which are descendants of the Xi and Kunming tribes, men in modern times still follow the custom of wearing large wooden earrings and using iron and copper headbands to tie their hair. According to Geographical Records of the Taiping Reign of the Song Dynasty, when a “Muer” aborigine in Xizhou (now Xichang, Sichuan) died, his relatives would burn his corpse on a faggot stack. If the smoke rose steadily, they would butcher cattle and sheep for an orgy; if the wind scattered in the wind, they would think it ominous and cry together (Yue, 2007). Cremation is a common custom for all tribes of the Qiang ethnic group. Back in the Han Dynasty, there was a record of Qiang soldiers not fearing death in battle but failure of cremation after death. The Muer aborigines who lived in the mountains near Qujing, Yunnan, as mentioned in “Annotations on Wenshui” in the Water Classics and those insisting on cremation after death in Xichang, Sichuan, as mentioned in Geographical Records of the Taiping Reign were descendants of Xi and Kunming tribes that had moved to those regions during the Han Dynasty. The second southward journey of the northern nomads took place during the Song and Yuan dynasties. Genghis Khan asked his adviser Guo Baoyu about the strategy to seize the Central Plains. Guo Baoyu replied that the Southern Song Dynasty was still strong, and couldn’t be overthrown in one fell swoop. He added that the southwestern tribes were tough and could serve the purpose for attacking it (Song et al., 1976, 3521). Later, due to changes in the situation, the policy was abandoned. When Ogedei came into power, he launched a massive attack against the Song Dynasty and became entangled with his opponents. In the 2nd year of Emperor Xianzong (1252), Mongke Khan 23 Chang Qu, Records of the Huayang Kingdom, Vol. 4, “Records of Nanzhong”, “among the aborigines, the larger tribes are called Kun and the smaller ones called Sou, both with curly hair and”, 364.



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decided to attack Dali Kingdom first, to capture its troops for the “outflanking stratagem” against the Southern Song Dynasty. His brother Kublai Khan and General Uriyangqatai were ordered to join forces and led a 100,000-strong cavalry to maneuver northwest for an expedition against Dali. When Yunnan was initially pacified, Kublai Khan left part of his troops for further conquest, and personally led the rest to return north. According to Jami’ al-Tarikh by Rashid al-Din, due to attrition in combat, epidemics in the army, and troops left behind, no more than 20,000 of 100,000 Mongolian troops led by Kublai Khan on the expedition to the Dali Kingdom managed to return north. After acceding to the Khanate, Kublai made his son Hugeci the King of Yunnan in the fourth year of Zhiyuan (1267). Before Hugeci left for Yunnan, Kublai told him to his face that “Dali Kingdom was pacified by me personally, and I love its customs and folklore. I have made a point of handling all affairs related to it by myself, but now I am placing it under your rule. When you reach there, do make conscious efforts to placate the officials and the people” (Tu, 1989, 510). This suggests that Kublai Khan had a profound attachment for Yunnan. More importantly, Yunnan was a base for the Yuan Dynasty to attack neighboring countries and expand foreign exchanges. Therefore, he set great store by its governance. After Hugeci was murdered by his subordinates, Kublai thought over and over again and decided to send Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, one of his most important ministers, to Yunnan to establish Yunnan Province. The establishment of Yunnan Province marked that Yunnan had officially become a province directly managed by the imperial court, creating favorable conditions for the immigration of non-locals to populate Yunnan, and enhanced exchanges and integration among ethnic groups. According to “Garrison” in Records of Great Statutes of Statecraft, after unifying the entire Middle Kingdom, the Yuan Dynasty implemented the system of “stationing princes with troops to guard strategic points in the Borderland.” Due to its strategic location, Yunnan was highly valued by the imperial court, and many Mongolian princes were sent to guard it. Named King of Yunnan or King of Liang, those princes exercised administration together with the provincial government. Of the ten provinces established in the Yuan Dynasty throughout the

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country, only few were guarded by Mongol princes. Those made King of Yunnan as recorded in History of Yuan include Hugeci, Yexan Temur, Laode, Wangchan, Timur Buhua, Alu, and Polo; while those made King of Liang include Gammala, Jungsai, Bolad, and Basalawarmi. Usually, the King of Yunnan was headquartered in Dali, on one end of the hinterland of Yunnan, opposing the provincial seat in Zhongqing (today’s Kunming) on the other. The two formed a pincer pattern in control over the entire province. The King of Liang had a higher status than the King of Yunnan, and often took charge of affairs of the province in the late Yuan Dynasty. The two kings commanded numerous guards, which became an important source of Mongolian immigrants in Yunnan. Of political districts established in the southwestern Borderland during the Yuan Dynasty, the earliest one and the one with the widest jurisdiction was none other than Yunnan Province. Its area included present-day Yunnan Province, Western Guizhou Province, Southwestern Sichuan Province, and northern China-Indochina Peninsula, larger than any other administrative district established in the southwestern Borderland by imperial China. Yunnan Province had numerous and strictly hierarchical institutions. According to “Geography (4)” in History of Yuan History, Yunnan Province had a total of 37 routes, 2 prefectures, 3 subordinate prefectures, 54 subordinate states and 47 subordinate counties, with numerous military personnel and civilians distributed in countless villages. Under the province, there were also a number of military ruling agencies including the Placation Division and the Pacification Division. The routes, prefectures and counties under the jurisdiction of the province were complemented with the Placation Division and the Pacification Division to forming a complete and strict governance system. Yunnan Province also had a variety of administrative institutions with clear functions. The institutions recorded in History of Yuan and other historical records include supervisory institutions at all levels, institution for management of farming institutions, supervisorate of Confucian Schools for educational management and schools at all levels, regulatory agency in charge of metal production and its taxation, tax officials in charge of salt taxation, general administration office



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for promotion and management of religions, state-run horse farms, public-welfare pharmacies responsible for collecting, and processing medicinal materials and medical care. First, supervisory institutions. In the 20th year of Zhiyuan (1283), the Yuan Dynasty established the Surveillance Commission of Yunnan, and Censorate in the 27th year, but changed it to Judicial Commission in the second year of Dade (1298). In the 4th year of Taiding (1327), the Yunnan Provincial Tea and Salt Inspector was inaugurated. Second, institution for management of farming institutions. In the 22nd year of Zhiyuan, the provincial government ordered specific officials to take charge of farms in the entire province; in the 4th year of Taiding, the emperor issued an edict and appointed Ma Sihu as the administrator of Yunnan Province, responsible for farming management in the Wumeng area. Yunnan Province also established General Administration Office for Farming in Wumeng and Jianchang Circuit. Third, supervisorate of Confucian Schools for educational management and schools at all levels. According to “Stele on the Virtuous Governance of Preminer Sayyid” written by Zhao Ziyuan, In the 10th year of the Zhiyuan, Governor Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar first established Confucianism promotion in Zhongqing and Dali; in the 28th year, schools were established in all circuits in Yunnan, with instructors chosen from scholars of Sichuan; in the first year of Yanyou (1314), Yunnan Province formally established a special administrative institution for the promotion of Confucianism. Fourth, regulatory agency in charge of metal production and its taxation. In the 12th year of Zhiyuan, there is a record of the establishment of such a regulatory agency in all circuits of Yunnan. Fifth, tax officials in charge of salt taxation. In the third year of Zhizhi (1323), the Yuan Dynasty instated a tax official for Baiyan City in Dali Circuit, and one for Zhongqing circuit. Sixth, general administration office for promotion and management of religions. In the second year of Zhishun (1329), the Yuan Dynasty established 16 such offices across the country, including ones for each of the circuit. Seventh, state-run horse farms. The Yuan Dynasty set up 14 large-scale national horse farms across the country. There is also record of state horse farms established in Yunnan and Yixibuxi (in present-day Guizhou). Eighth, public-welfare pharmacies responsible for collecting, and processing medicinal materials and

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medical care. According to records, public-welfare pharmacies were established in Huguang, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Present-day Guangxi and eastern Guizhou were under the jurisdiction of Huguang Province, which established many ruling institutions there. According to the records of “Geography (6)” in History of Yuan, the Yuan Dynasty set up the following offices in the present Guangxi: In the first year of Dade (1297), Nandan Prefecture and Qingyuan Circuit were merged and the Military and Civilian Placation Commission was established. In the first year of Yuanzhen (1295), it merged the Liangjiang Pacification Commission to become the Pacification Commission Guangxi and Liangjiang Circuit. In addition, the Circuit of Jingjiang, Nanning, Wuzhou, Xunzhou, Liuzhou, Qinzhou, Lianzhou, Siming, Taiping, Tianzhou, Lai’an, Zhen’an, Rongzhou, Xiangzhou, Binzhou, Hengzhou, Rongzhou, and Quanzhou were established, as well as the Prefecture of Pingle, Yulin, Tengzhou, Hezhou and Guizhou. The Huguang Province also established the Lingnan-Guangxi Circuit Judicial Commission. In the 30th year of Zhiyuan (1293), HainanHaibei Circuit Judicial Commission was established. Pacification commissions established in Guangxi in the Yuan Dynasty mainly included the Pacification Commission of Guangxi-Liangjiang Circuit and that of Haibei-Hainan Circuit. The official institutions set up by Huguang Province in the present-day Guizhou include: Yuan Conqueror of the Aborigines of the Eight Directions, which has 53 aboriginal military and civilian chiefs under its jurisdiction, such as Xiaocheng Fan; military and civilian pacification commission of Shunyuan and other circuits, which has 24 grassroots organizations under its jurisdiction, such as military and civilian commissioners of aborigines from the nine creeks and eighteen caves, as well as those of Yongzhengua Xige Aborigines; the Placation Commission of Sizhou has jurisdiction over 67 grassroots organizations such as Zhenyuan Prefecture; Bozhou Pacification Commission, which has 33 prefectures in the charge of native officials, including Huangping Sub-prefecture；Xintiange Aboriginal Pacification Commission, which has 131 native prefectures and villages under its jurisdiction, including Nanweizhou, and Dingyuan Prefecture, which has five native prefectures under its jurisdiction, including Sangzhou.



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Due to their extensive jurisdiction, Yunnan Province and Huguang Province had complete and strictly organized management institutions, and a large number of officials at all levels stationed by the imperial court. The Yuan Dynasty mainly relied on the Mongols and Semu people for ruling, and most of the officials stationed there were Mongols and Semu people. According to recent statistics on the History of Yuan, the number of recorded generals dispatched to garrison Yunnan reached 100, including 31 of Mongolian origin, 32 of Semu, and 37 of Han Chinese and other ethnic groups (Xia, 1935). The generals and officials in History of Yuan are mostly prominent officials, which were dominated by Mongolians and Semu people. The Mongols and Semu people serving as officials in the southwestern Borderland often became registered locally after a long tenure. The native official system of the Yuan Dynasty is still in a stage to be improved. Some grassroots officials under the native official system were also held by Mongols or Semu people, and even allowed to be hereditary. For example, the Mongol Bieer Qiebuhua who belong to the Eljigidey clan are not timid, whose family had assumed the hereditary post of pacification commissioner for the eight aboriginal groups, was made daruqai (supreme inspector) of the pacification commission by Emperor Yingzong. After he take office, the local native people were very happy; even those who have been dissatisfied for years also claimed that “how dare I disobey the orders of the descendant of sage officials for generations” (Song et al., 1976, 3365). Soldiers stationed in the southwestern Borderland were roughly assigned for two purposes, namely guarding designated locations and holding cities, towns and strategic passes. According to “Military (3)” in History of Yuan, in the early days of its southward advancement, the Mongolian army would lay siege to solid cities and tough enemies. After reunifying the whole country, the Yuan Dynasty set up military and civilian farms in various places to feed its army. Yunnan, Bafan, Hainan, and Haibei were in the hinterland of aborigines and the need for garrisons to exercise control was especially urgent. In the third year of Yanyou (1316), the Yuan Dynasty set up a military garrison in Wumeng (now Zhaotong, Yunnan). The reason was an imperial memorial from the Yunnan Province, saying that Wumeng was a strategic

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pass for Yunnan, but there was no garrison to guard it. Its land was vast and fertile, with traces of previous farming. Therefore, it is suggested that the Uihur Army and the newly attached Han Army be dispatched to Wumeng military-agro colonies. The imperial court followed the advice. Among the military-agro colonies established in Yunnan Province, those of Wumeng, Zhongqing, Dali, Weichu, Qujing, and Lin’an were largest in size. So were the numbers of soldiers stationed. The militaryagro colonies under the General Administrative office for Farms of Wumeng alone covered 125,000 mu, exceeding one-third of the total size of all military-agro colonies in the province; Zhongqing, Dali, Weichu, Lin’an and other places had all been traditional agricultural areas. However, the Yuan Dynasty also established a large number of military-agro colonies in remote places such as Wumeng, Wusa, and Luoluosi, and a General Administrative Office for Farms on Jianchang Circuit (today Xichang, Sichuan), which lasted until the 25th year of Zhiyuan (Song et al., 1976, 316). There were reasons for that. The Yuan Dynasty set up military-agro colonies in remote area to protect the important roads passing through the area. There were also many military-agro colonies in present-day Guizhou and Guangxi. In these military-agro colonies, troops made up the largest farming force, including Mongolian and Semu troops. For example, in the third year of Yanyou, the Wumeng military-agricultural colony established in the 3rd year of Zhiyuan, was based on the 1,250 hectares of land cultivated by the 5,000 households of Uihur Army and the newly attached Han Army. Guarding key places such as towns was also an important task of the Mongolian and the Semu troops. The relevant records include: In the 22nd year of Zhiyuan (1285), the Yuan Dynasty set up post stations along the road from Annan Daluo City (present-day Hanoi, Vietnam) to Yongzhou (present-day Nanning, Guangxi). For every 30 li and every 60 li, one village and one post station were established respectively, with 300 troops assigned each for guarding and patrolling (Song et al., 1976, 4644). The post road network in Yunnan and Huguang provinces was well developed. According to the research of the present author (Fang, 2009), the important post roads opened successively in Yunnan include the one from Dali to Chengdu Circuit via Chahanzhang (now Lijiang,



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Yunnan), the one from Zhongqing (now Kunming) to Xuzhou (Now Yibin, Sichuan) via Wumeng (now Zhaotong), the one from Zhongqing to Yongzhou Circuit (now Guangxi Nanning), the one from Zhongqing to Chengdu Circuit via Jiandu (now Xichang, Sichuan), the one from Zhongqing to Huangping Circuit via Pu’an (in present-day Guizhou), the one from Zhongqing to Luzhou Circuit via Wusa (now Weining, Guizhou), the one from Dali or Zhongqing to Cheli Circuit (now Jinghong, Yunnan), the one from Zhongqing to Daluocheng Circuit via Mengzi, and the one from Zhongqing to Burma Kingdom (now Burma). Among those, the one from Zhongqing to Huangping Circuit via Pu’an was the most important. Reaching Huangping in the east, it was the “busy station route” connecting areas to the east of Chenzhou (now Yuanling, Hunan). In the Yuan Dynasty, several water stations were set up in the section of the Yuanjiang River from Zhenyuan to Yuezhou (now Yueyang, Hunan). This road thus became the main transportation connecting Yunnan and Huguang to the hinterland. The important post roads in northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou include the passage from Zhongqing to Xuzhou via Wumeng, and the road from Zhongqing to Luzhou via Wusa. Those areas became heavily area after the establishment of post stations by the imperial court. “Geography (6)” in History of Yuan says that “Guizhou (government seat in now Guizhou Guiyang) was connected to the eight aboriginal groups, and more than two hundred miles away from Bozhou (now Zunyi, Guizhou). It is the strategic pass for Huguang, Sichuan, and Yunnan.” An important feature of the Mongolian and the Semu troops dispatched to the southwestern Borderland by the Yuan Dynasty is that they were mainly deployed in cities and towns and areas along transportation routes. The present-day northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou were the intersections of important post roads and guarded by many Mongolian troops. In recent years, residents living in the adjacent area of Yunnan and Guizhou with the surname Yu24, told the local government that they were descendants of the Mongolian ethnic group. It is said that 24 According to the author’s investigation, these residents claim to be descendants of Temüjin, and have adopted the current surname Yu after the Yuan Dynasty to avoid harm.

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there are about 100,000 residents carrying the surname Yu in the area, indicating an internal connection to the passage of important lines of communication.

3.2. The Strategies of Han, Yuan and Other Dynasties for Managing the Southwestern Borderland and Their Influences The situation of the northern nomads after their southward venture to the southwestern Borderland had a lot to do with the strategy of the Central Plains dynasty for managing the southwestern Borderland. The management of the southwestern ethnic regions (the name given to the Yunnan-Guizhou and Western Sichuan in the Han Dynasty) by Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty were related to the expansion of communication lines in this area. Specifically, the Western Han Dynasty operated the southwestern ethnic regions mainly for opening the military route from the Bodao to Panyu (present-day Guangzhou) along the Zangke River (now Beipanjiang), and international communication line from Shu to Torchari (northern Afghanistan) through the southwestern ethnic regions and India. The Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty had endeavored to open the above-mentioned roads, in view of the important strategic position of Shu. In the 5th year of King Shen of Zhou (316 BC), the Qin army overthrew the two countries of Shu and Ba, and merged them (Chang, 1984, 32). After 115 years of active management by Qin, the Sichuan Basin became a land of abundance known for its “vast fertile fields.” Qin once managed the area south of Shu, built Wuchi Road from Bodao (now Yibin, Sichuan) to the present-day northeastern Yunnan, and instated officials in the areas where the road passed (Sima, 1959, 2993). It also opened up the road from Chengdu to Xichang, and instated official agencies to guards it (Sima, 1959, 3046). From then on, those two roads became the northern section of the transportation line connecting the Chengdu Plain to the South Asian Subcontinent. In operating the southwestern ethnic regions, the Eastern Han Dynasty established Yongchang County (now Baoshan in Yunnan) on the basis of the previous generations, securing the international communication line leading to Torchari through India, while establishing



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the border of the Central Plains dynasty in the southwest. Otherwise, its strategies and measures for managing the southwestern Borderland were not significantly different from those of the Western Han Dynasty. From this point of view, the main purpose of the Han Dynasty for managing the southwestern ethnic regions was to open up and maintain the international passage to India and Torchari. During the Han Dynasty, the geopolitical pattern of drawing on the Sichuan Basin to operate the southwestern ethnic regions also had a profound impact on later dynasties. However, the in-depth rule and active development of the southwestern Borderland was obviously not included in the plan. The relatively conservative business strategy was also partially because of the huge pressure from the frequent southern invasions of the Xiongnu in the north. After Xi and Kunming were defeated by the Western Han and Dian Kingdom, part of their population was ruled by Yizhou County, while most of the rest moved to the mountainous area nearby, gradually fading out of the vision of the rulers of the Han Dynasty. For a long time, they were mountain peoples that no one cared about. During the Han, Jin, and Tang dynasties, the main purpose of the Central Plains dynasty for managing the southwestern Borderland was to maintain the accessibility of international passages to India and Tochari. It did not have much interest in the ruling mountainous areas of Xi and Kunming. The Han immigrants from the Sichuan Basin in the prefectures and counties were far superior in cultural outlook and development, and the superiority also increased the sense of distance for Xi and Kunming among the court and the civilians, which even regarded them as unreasonable and incorrigible “weird and rebellious barbarians.” The estranged relationship was recorded in many historical records. In pursuing the long-term goal of grabbing the anvil in the Central Plains, the Shu Han prioritized maintaining the stability of Nanzhong Region. Zhuge Liang was very successful in running Nanzhong, and his governance policies were both enlightened and practical. However, enlightened as a politician, Zhuge Liang did not think favorably of the mountain peoples in Nanzhong. He believed that the southern aborigines “would attack each other, gather or disperse, living in a cave and a

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mountain” (Zhuge, 2008, 102), and were difficult to control. Therefore, Zhuge Liang adopted a policy of preventing Sou and Kunming by setting them against each other. According to “Biography of Zhang Yi” in Book of Shu, Zhang Yi pacified the Zhuoma Tribe in Yueshang County with force, and submitted an imperial memorial, requesting the title of Yihou to his commander Wei Lang. Under the military pressure of Shu Han, Langlu, the leader of Maoniu Aborigines in Hanjia surrendered; consequently, the Lingguan Circuit was restored, and Zhang Yi conferred the title of Maoniugou Biwang on Langlu after securing imperial approval. In addition, Zhuge Liang also recruited competent youths of the Sou Tribe into the army, and “persuaded” the prestigious clans to hire “evil aborigines” as subjects, in order to disperse and weaken the armed forces controlled by the aboriginal chiefs and commanders. Soon after its establishment, the Tang Dynasty began managing the southwestern Borderland. It took the present northeastern and central Yunnan as the breakthrough point in managing the present Yunnan region, before gradually advancing to present western Yunnan and other places. Later, the focus of management was on the present western and northern Yunnan along the road leading to the Sichuan Basin. This suggests that the Tang Dynasty remained in the rut of the Han Dynasty in managing the Yunnan region, that is, prioritizing the safety of the traffic line from Jiannan Circuit (now Chengdu) to the area west of Yunnan. During the Tianbao period, the Tang Dynasty broke with the supported local power Nanzhao, and the Yunnan area fell into its control. During the 100-odd years when the Tang Dynasty exercised effective control of Yunnan, the Tang Dynasty launched only several wars against the various ethnic groups in Yunnan. Except for the expeditions of Emperor Ruizong who sent troops to drive out the Tibetan forces that had entered the Erhai Basin from the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau, there are only sparse records of its wars, for example, to stamp out the rebellion of the Songwai Aborigines, which interfered with the passage from Xi’erhe to Tianzhu Circuit (the previous way to India and Tochari) to the generation in the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648). Even if it sent troops to cope with the forces of the Tubo Kingdom in the Erhai area venturing south, the main purpose was to protect the Erhai area, an



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important hub on the Xi’er River to Tianzhu Road, from being invaded by the Tubo Kingdom. During this period, the Tang Dynasty had little contact with Wuman, the descendants of Sou and Kunming. “Biography of Southern Aborigines” in New Book of Tang, which furnishes a concentrated record of the Yunnan aborigines, does not mention much the Wuman living in present-day Xichang and northeastern Yunnan. Instead, it mainly focused on the vacillation and hedge of Wuman in the struggle of the Tang Dynasty against Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom. An important change of Wuman living in the mountainous area in the Tang Dynasty was that Nanzhao was ordered by the Tang Dynasty in the fifth year of Tianbao (746) to quell the rebellion of Baiman from the Cuan Family in eastern Yunnan. Subsequently, the Nanzhao King Geluofeng sent its general Yang Mouli to threaten the Cuan Family Baiman with war and moved more than 200,000 households to Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan). Wuman was not forced to emigrate because of the language barrier and mostly became scattered in the forest and valleys. After this great migration, the vast area east of Kunming was “deserted because of war.” A part of Wuman in the mountainous area of present-day northeastern Yunnan moved out of the mountains and settled down in the former land of Xicuan (Fan, 1985, 129), roughly forming the present-day distribution pattern of the Yi and Hani peoples in eastern Yunna. At that time, most of Yunnan was controlled by Nanzhao, and the Tang Dynasty was neither interested nor able to intervene in this great migration of Wuman. The Song Dynasty was very indifferent to developing the relationship with Dali. The policy formulated by Emperor Taizu Zhao Kuangyin on taking the Dadu River as the demarcation with Dali was followed by the emperors of the Song Dynasty. Since the Song Dynasty regarded Dali as a foreign country, it couldn’t have had any real interest in Wuman living in present-day Xichang and northeastern Yunnan. Out of considerations for containing Dali, it treated Wuman tribes in Xichang and northeastern Yunnan lackadaisically, although it accepted its tribute from time to time. It even mistook Nuoqu, the leader of the Chuanman in Qiongbu, who lived in present-day Meigu, Sichuan as the King of Dali. In the Song Dynasty, Emperor Taizong issued an edict

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in the second year of Chunhua (991), and conferred the title of Grand Guardian of the Record Office and Guide General on Nuoqi, and named him “Lord of Yunnan Dali” (Li, 1980). The Mongols and Semu people that went south to the southwestern Borderland in the late Southern Song Dynasty were significantly different from the Qiang nomadic tribes that went south in the Warring States Period and the early Han Dynasty in terms of status, circumstances and evolution. After occupying the southwestern Borderland, the Yuan Dynasty successively established the Yunnan Province and the Huguang Province to exercise full control over the southwestern Borderland. The successful implementation of the native official system was an important factor that allowed its rule to penetrate into the vast southwestern Borderland. The main reason for the native official system to succeed in the southwestern Borderland was that it fitted the characteristics of the local society. The geographical and climatic environment of the southwest border and the derived animal and plant resources are complex and diverse. As a result, the production and lifestyles of the aborigines in the southwest border are also complex and diverse. The ethnic groups living in a specific natural environment for a long time will become closely dependent on the local animal and plant resources. On the other hand, absorption of foreign population, economic and cultural factors in different periods made their culture similar to that of the inland, and developed an affinity to the Central Plains dynasty. Therefore, the main contradiction of the barbarians in the southwestern Borderland was the struggle within and among the tribes for resources and grievances, as well as the entangled interests. The basic content of the native official system was the appointment by the imperial court of Borderland aboriginal chiefs as state officials with the promise of allowing them to keep their land and govern their people, thereby awarding legitimacy to their resources and power, and advantages in contention with other aborigines. On the other hand, the imperial court wielded the power to recover their resources and power, forcing them to serve the imperial court with loyalty. The native official system was an instant success after implementation, pushing Mongolian rule of the southwestern Borderland into the mountainous and remote areas beyond the reach of previous generations.



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The system of native officials also showed full trust in and leniency with the aborigines in the southwest. This was determined by the characteristics of the Yuan court. According to estimates in the late Ming Dynasty, the number of Mongols was only 400,000 when they first took over the Central Plains (Han, 1986, 5). It was very difficult for the conquerors to rely on such few Mongols to rule the large areas inhabited by the Han Chinese. Therefore, the Mongolian rulers implemented the four-class system throughout the country, relying on the Mongols and Semu people to guard against the numerous Han and southerners. The Yuan Dynasty also had another purpose in implementing the native official system in the southwestern Borderland, namely, to address the serious shortage in its own strength and Borderland officials. In addition, the Mongolian rulers were seldom influenced by the traditional concept of “differentiation between Han Chinese and the aborigines” since they came from the depths of the grassland. Therefore, it was easy for them to live in harmony with the aborigines in the southwestern Borderland. For the above reasons, in implementing the native official system, the Mongolian rulers regarded the southwestern aborigines as their right-hand assistant, appointing a large number of their chiefs as native officials at all levels with full trust. When their chiefs came to surrender, the imperial court granted different official positions depending on their power; if they rebelled later, they could be re-instated after being suppressed. There were even records of multiple rebellions and reinstatements. The Borderland aborigines were also grateful for the sincerity of the imperial court and returned its kindness with loyalty and active service. Drawing on the native official system, the Mongolian rulers extended their administration of the southwestern Borderland to the grassroots. As the native official system was mainly applied to mountainous and remote areas, the mountain peoples such as Wuman, who had been neglected in China’s imperial history, became the biggest beneficiaries. As mentioned earlier, due to the many important post roads passing through them, northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou became areas with the most concentrated distribution of native officials. The present-day northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou were

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important settlements for Wuman, who felt the full trust and courtesy of the Mongolian rulers. Roughly prefectures and counties were established by the Yuan Dynasty in the southwestern Borderland after military conquest or voluntary surrender of the aborigines. The latter was more common in the border and mountainous areas, indicating that the Borderland governance policy of Yuan appealed considerably to Wuman and other mountain-dwelling peoples. The Yuan court granted them the authority to assist their ruling, while giving them higher treatment and full trust. It also cooperated with them extensively. For example, it allowed them to organize native troops and assist it in attacking the Southern Song and Indochina Peninsula countries, thus obtaining the sincere allegiance of Wuman and other mountain peoples. Regarding the profound influence of the native official system among the aborigines in Southwest China, here is a cogent example. In the 14th year of Hongwu (1381), Zhu Yuanzhang ordered his General Fu Youde to attack Yunnan with 300,000 troops. Although he exhorted that the enemy should not be underestimated, he estimated that with the right strategy, “the enemy will certainly be crushed.”25 The Ming army invaded Yunnan via Guizhou and quickly defeated the main force of the Yuan army guarding Qujing. Then it went on to conquer central Yunnan and Dali. Unexpectedly, the native officials of Yuan Dynasty in the pacified areas rebelled one after another, and elected the defeated generals of the Yuan army as their leaders, throwing the whole province of Yunnan into turmoil. The Ming troops returned to suppress them, but it took them more than ten years to finally pacify Yunnan and Guizhou. From this incident we can see the unswerving loyalty of native officials at all levels to the Yuan Dynasty. On the other hand, the Mongolian rulers of Yuan trusted Wuman and other mountain peoples and unreservedly enlisted their service, showing that there was no discrimination against them. Instead, those peoples were regarded as active collaborators, subverting and changing the previous stereotype of them being “weird, rebellious barbarians.” As a result, the relationship between the imperial court and the 25 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 139, 1st day of the 9th lunar month in the 14th year of Hongwu.



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mountain peoples changed significantly. During the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the southwest border aborigines were no longer divided into “meek barbarians” and “rebellious barbarians” as in China’s imperial history, but into “cultured aborigines” and “uncultured aborigines.” Previously, the standards for division of “meek barbarians” and “rebellious barbarians” mainly included whether their characters and behaviors were grotesque and whether they were friendly and docile toward the imperial court. In the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the categorization was based on the status of social development and acceptance of the effective governmental jurisdiction and mutual cooperation, with the scope extended to the mountain peoples neglected in the previous generations. In the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the distinction between the “cultured aborigines” and “uncultured aborigines” among the Borderland ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland indicates the positive attitude of rulers on approaching the Borderland ethnic groups and wishing to transform them into registered households. Such an understanding was an ideological source of their in-depth rule and development of the southwestern Borderland, so it was significantly progressive. For the ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland, including the mountainous ethnic groups, the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties adopted the enlightened policy of actively striving for their allegiance and promoting their progress. The policy was also conducive to breaking the barriers and promoting exchanges and integration among ethnic groups. After the Ming Dynasty unified the southwestern Borderland, the Mongols who had settled down there gradually hid among the local ethnic groups in order to avoid possible persecution by the new dynasty against the ruling ethnic groups of the old dynasty. By the time of the Republic of China, the number of Mongolians who maintained their original ethnic identity in the southwestern Borderland was only a few thousand in Tonghai, Yunnan. The tens of thousands of Mongolians who had settled down in the southwestern Borderland in the Yuan Dynasty merged into other ethnic groups during the Ming and Qing dynasties, indicating their willing acceptance. Although the Mongols were close to the local ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland

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as mentioned above, their acceptance also reflected the changes after the time had changed. The Semu people who went to the southwestern Borderland gradually merged with other local ethnic groups to form the Hui people in the southwestern Borderland during the Yuan and Ming dynasties. On the whole, the southward adventure of northwestern Qiang nomadic tribes during the Warring States Period and at the beginning of the Han Dynasty injected new blood to ethnic groups in the southwestern border, promoted their diversification, and benefited the early development of the vast mountainous areas. During the Yuan Dynasty, Mongols and Semu people migrated to the southwestern Borderland in large numbers as soldiers, officials, and businessmen, and expanded the distribution of the population directly under the government. They not only constituted new ethnic groups and border builders, but also developed the flesh and blood connection between the southwestern border and inland areas. Thanks to the open-minded policies of the rulers in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the Mongols and Semu people who moved into the southwestern Borderland had a more harmonious relationship with the local ethnic groups, and played a positive role in the integration of the  southwestern Borderland and the hinterland. In its development across thousands of years, the southwestern Borderland witnessed the change from the relative unfamiliarity between the Qiang people and the local ethnic group in the early days, to the harmonious and smooth ethnic integration between the Mongolians and the Semu people in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. The change was not only an affirmation of the governance policies of Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties for the southwest border, but also a commendable historical progress.

4.  Border Governance in the Qin, Han, Shu and Jin Dynasties and Transportation Upgrade in Yunnan The 800 years from the Qin to the Jin Dynasty was an important period in the early historical development of Yunnan. During this period, the Central Plains dynasty established comprehensive rule over Yunnan,



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consolidated the political structure for the purpose, and opened several important communication lines there. The border governance strategies of the Qin, Han, Shu, and Jin dynasties exerted an important influence on the development of transportation in Yunnan. The relationship between the border governance strategies of the Qin, Han, Shu, and Jin dynasties and the development of transportation in Yunnan is an issue worthy of study, because it constitutes one of the important governance measures of the Central Plains dynasty in the southwestern border.

4.1. The Qin and Han Dynasties In 221 BC, Emperor Qin took over the Central Plains, proclaimed himself the First Emperor and began to unify the southeast and southwest regions. Emperor Qin Shi Huang had the ambition to open up and expand the territory. In the 28th year of his rule (219 BC), he climbed the Langya Terrace and erected a stone tablet “to sing praise to the virtue of Qin and vent his pride.” The inscription on the stele reads “the people of all quarters are my subjects; my achievement exceeds that of the five sage emperors, benefiting even the cattle and horses”, vividly portraying his pride after extending his prestige all over the country (Sima, 1959, 245). Soon after reunifying the Middle Kingdom, Emperor Qin Shi Huang mounted an attack on the Yue people of Lingnan. After several years of brutal war, he conquered the land of the Yue people, establishing Nanhai County, Guilin County, and Xiangjun County. Among then, Xiangjun County governed eastern Guizhou and southwestern Guangxi, but not Yunnan. The government seat of Xiangjun County was in Linchen (now Chongzuo, Guangxi) (Ban, 1962, 54). Another move taken by the Kingdom of Qin to manage the southwest region was to conquer and actively develop the Sichuan Basin. During the Spring and Autumn Period, the Kingdom of Shu and the Kingdom of Ba occupied the western and eastern sections of the Sichuan Basin respectively. There was a long feud between the two kingdoms. When the King of Shu launched an expedition against Juhou Duke, who was an ally of Ba, Ba asked Qin to intervene (Chang, 1984, 191). In the fifth

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year of King Shen of Zhou (316 BC), the Qin army launched an expedition against the Kingdom of Shu, and conquered it. Then, it overthrew Ba, merging the land of two kingdoms (Chang, 1984, 32). In the former land of Shu, the Qin Dynasty instated a premier and a protector there, named the descendants of the King of Shu as the Prince of Shu, and promoted the governance system combining counties and chieftains. In the 30th year of King Nan of Zhou (285 BC), Wan, the Prince of Shu was killed for “plotting a rebellion” and the post was never instated again. Instead, the system of prefectures and counties was comprehensively implemented. Li Bing, the protector of Shu, dredged the two rivers of Chengdu and irrigated more than ten thousand hectares of fields, “rendering meritorious services to Emperor Qin Shi Huang in annexing the rest of the world.”26 After more than 110 years of operation by the Kingdom of Qin and Qin Dynasty, the Sichuan Basin already became a land of abundance with fertile fields and the economic center for the Central Plains dynasty to operate the southwestern region by the Western Han Dynasty in the Western Han Dynasty. As for the present Yunnan area, which bordered Xiangjun County and Shujun County to the west to the south respectively, Qin Shihuang seems to have interest in it, and roughly regarded it as an area under the jurisdiction of Shujun Prefecture, if not a foreign country. When the Kingdom of Qin ruled the Sichuan Basin, the official Chang E opened the Wuchi Road (Five-foot Road), “and a lot of local officials were instated for the area (from Yibin to northeastern Yunnan)” (Sima, 1959, 2993). Named after its width of five feet according to the Qin system, the “Wuchi Road” extended from Bodao (government seat in present-day Yibin, Sichuan) to Langzhou Prefecture (government seat in present-day Qujing, Yunnan) through northeastern Yunnan (Sima, 1959, 2993). According to “The Biography of Sima Xiangru” in Records of the Grand Historian, Sima Xiangru said to Emperor Wu of Han: “Qiongzuo and Ranmang were close to Sichuan. They were made counties in the Qin dynasty, but abolished after the rise of the Han Dynasty.” This suggests that Qin once set up government agencies in 26 [Tang Dynasty] Yu Shinan: Beitang Shuchao, Vol. 74, citing General Recods of Folk Customs.



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northeastern Yunnan, and opened roads and established counties in Xichang, Sichuan, but the details are no longer known. “Geographical Records (8)” in Book of Han also said that “the Qin Dynasty owned Zangke, Yuexi, and Yizhou in the southwest.” It seems that through the Wuchi Road and Xichang Road, the Qin Dynasty might have extended its influence to southwestern Sichuan and central Yunnan. Qin generally took most of Yunnan to the south of Shu County as foreign land, as evidenced in the following records. After saying “When the Kingdom of Qin ruled the Sichuan Basin, the official Chang E opened the Wuchi Road, and a lot of local officials were instated for the area”, “Biography of southwestern ethnic regions” in Records of the Grand Historian added that “After a decade, the Qin Dynasty perished and Han rose. The land was abandoned in favor of the land of ancient Shu.” According to “Records of Shu” in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, “Although (Emperor Gaozu of Han) had Shu under his jurisdiction, Nanzhong (present-day Yunnan-Guizhou and southwest Sichuan) refused to pledge allegiance.” According to “Biography of Dayuan” in Records of the Grand Historian, In the first year of Yuanshou (122 BC), when Zhang Qian went to Tochari as an envoy, he personally saw Shu cloth and Qiong bamboo rods on sale there and speculated that there must be a private commercial road between Shu and Tochari. Therefore, Emperor Wu sent envoys from Qianwei (government seat in present-day Yibin, Sichuan) along four routes to find a path to India. The envoys set off from Mang and Ran (Ran Mang, now Maowen, Sichuan), Xi (now Tianquan, Sichuan), Qiong (Now in Xichang, Sichuan), and Bo (now Yibin, Sichuan), but were subsequently blocked by tribes such as Xi and Kunming (Sima, 1959, 3166). This suggests that Mang and Ran, Xi, Qiong, and Bo were the border areas under the actual control of the County of Shu in the west and southwest. The areas beyond were regarded as barren and unknown foreign land according to the people of Qin. Although Qin was lackadaisical about the management of the present Yunnan region, it expanded the Wuchi Road linking present-day Sichuan to present-day northeastern Yunnan, and established a government agency along the line from Chengdu to present-day Xichang for the construction of roads, exerting a profound impact. Its strategy of operating

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Yunnan with Shu as the basis was followed by subsequent dynasties for a long time. The first six decades of the Western Han Dynasty after its establishment in 202 BC was a period of reconstruction virtually from scratch. Meanwhile, it had to ward off the Xiongnu. So the rulers “focused on developing the former land of Shu” and temporarily abandoned the southwestern ethnic regions (present Yunnan-Guizhou and Western Sichuan). When Liu Che succeeded to the throne in 141 BC as Emperor Wu, the national strength of the Middle Kingdom was greatly enhanced after the meritorious reign of Emperor Wen and Emperor Jing. And Emperor Wu began to plan about managing the south. It is quite interesting that the West Han Dynasty had managed the southwestern ethnic regions several times for the communication lines there. In other words, the main reason for its management of southwestern ethnic regions was Emperor Wu’s desire to open a military passage from Bodao along the Yanke River (now the Beipanjiang River) to Panyu, as well as an international passage from Shu to Tochari and India via southwestern ethnic regions. The counties of Qianwei, Yuexi, Shenli, and Yizhou set up in the southwestern ethnic regions in the Western Han Dynasty were located in the route of important passages. The collected commentaries of “Biography of Dayuan” in Records of the Grand Historian even stated that Emperor Wu set up the counties of Yizhou, Yuexi, Zangke, Shenli, and Wenshan, “so that his territory could be connected to Tochari” (Sima, 1959, 3171). In other words, he had established those counties to open up the road to Tochari. Another important strategy adopted in the Western Han Dynasty to manage the southwestern ethnic regions was to give full play to the important roles of Shu in governing the present Yunnan area. The Western Han Dynasty set up 13 governorship departments throughout the country. The military governor of Yizhou governed all counties in Shu, as well as Qianwei, Yuexi, Yizhou, and Zangke County in Yunnan and the surrounding areas.27 In order to consolidate the con­ nection between Shu and the southwestern ethnic regions, the Western Han Dynasty made conscious efforts to develop the transportation 27 Ban Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 28, “Geography (8)”, 1599. Shenli County was abolished in the fourth year of Tianhan (97 BC), and Wenshan County was merged into Shu County in the third year of Dijie (67 BC). Wudu County is located in the present-day Gansu.



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between the two areas. It drew on the old roads of the previous generations, extending the Wuchi Road from present-day Qujing, Yunnan to the Dianchi area. In the fifth year of Yuanguang (130 BC), it opened the Nanyi Road, which extended from Bodao to Pingyi (present-day Bijie County, Guizhou Province) to Nanguang (present-day Southwestern Junlian, Sichuan), and established post houses in the following year (Ban, 1962, 164; Chang, 1984, 417; Sima, 1959, 2995). The active operation of Nanyi Road in the Western Han Dynasty might have been intended to consolidate the southbound road to Panyu via Wuchi Road and then down the Zangke River. At round the time, Sima Xiangru was ordered to lead the masses to build a bridge on the Sunshui River and open the Lingguan Road (named after Lingguan along the route) extending southward from Chengdu to Qiongdu (now Xichang, Sichuan). In order to expand those roads, the imperial court requisitioned a large quantity of rent from the prefectures of Shu, and recruited tens of thousands of migrant workers from the four counties of Hanzhong, Guanghan, Ba, and Shu. The road builders and migrant workers toiled for several years, and many laid down their lives in the process. The southwestern aborigines repeatedly rebelled and the Han Dynasty made futile efforts to crack down on them. At the same time, the construction of the Shuofang City in the north incurred considerable financial stress. As a result, Emperor Wu issued an edict to stop managing southwestern ethnic regions in the third year of Yuanshuo (126 BC) (Sima, 1959, 2995). The Eastern Han Dynasty roughly inherited the basic strategy of the Western Han Dynasty for governing Yunnan, namely, following the administrative submission of Shu to Yunnan, ensuring the accessibility of the Wuchi Road and the Lingguan Road, and prioritizing the operation of the road from Shu to India. In construction of international passages, it made greater achievements than the Western Han Dynasty. In the Borderland counties, it instated many captains to “administer the people of each county,” upgrading the subordinate states established in the border areas during the Western Han Dynasty to county-level administrative institutions. Emperor An set up six subordinate defenders in the Borderland area. The Yizhou Military Governorship governed Guanghan, Shujun, and Qianwei. Among them, Qianwei (government seat in today’s Zhaotong in Yunnan) had jurisdiction over the

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subordinate states of Zhuti (government seat in today’s Zhaotong) and Hanyang (government seat to the east of today’s Weining in Guizhou). Tanglang County of the Western Han Dynasty (government seat in today’s Qiaojia County in Yunnan) merged into Zhuti County, and Cunwu County (government seat in today’s Yibin in Sichuan) merged into Hanyang County (Fan, 1965, 3513). Qianwei County established in the Western Han Dynasty was kept and expanded into a protectorate. Those measures were quite conducive to the safety and smooth flow of Wuchi Road. The area under the jurisdiction of Qianwei subordinate state extended southward to Dongchuan, in the present-day Kunming. It is contiguous with the land of Yizhou, making it possible for the government to offer effective protection to envoys and business travelers going south from Bodao to Yizhou on their entire journey. During the Han Dynasty, a large number of immigrants from the Shu area were officially organized to enter today’s Yunnan, especially northeastern and central Yunnan. They brought advanced economic and cultural factors, and promoted the development of Yunnan. Wuchi Road and Lingguan Road became the main channels for Yunnan to connect with other places, and promoted its economic and cultural exchanges with Shu. Meanwhile, the Eastern Han Dynasty also strengthened the management and operation of the road from Shu to India. In the 23rd year of Jianwu (47 AD), the Ailao tribe inhabiting in Baoshan and Yongping, Yunnan, grew fearful of an imminent doom after repeated failure in battles with the Lufu Tribe attached to the Han Dynasty, and approached Yuexi County to pledge allegiance and submission. The Eastern Han Dynasty named its chieftain King and named its commanders princes. In the 10th year of Yongping (67 AD), the Eastern Han Dynasty added a Western Captain for Yizhou, with the government seat in Xitang (to the northwest of today’s Yongping in Yunnan). In the 12th year, Ailao King Liu Mao submitted to the Han Dynasty with all his tribesmen, including 550,000 people ruled by 77 princes. The Eastern Han Dynasty established the two counties of Ailao and Bonan in its land and divided six counties under the command of the Western Captain of Yizhou and merged them into Yongchang Prefecture, with the government seat in Buwei (now Baoshan, Yunnan) (Fan, 1965, 2848; Chang, 1984, 427). Yongchang Prefecture was a famous



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large county in the Eastern Han Dynasty, governing the western and southwestern Yunnan Province west of today’s Xiangyun, and the neighboring northeastern Burma. Its establishment basically determined the boundaries of southwestern China in ancient times. After entering the present-day Burma, the road from Shu to India split in two directions. One led to northern Burma, and Assam in India, before reaching the Mediterranean area. The other led to Kaung-ton in Burma, and then southward along the Irrawaddy River to the estuary. Yongchang Prefecture had eight counties under its jurisdiction, namely Xitang, Bisu (government seat in present-day Yunlong in Yunnan), Yuyu (government seat to the north of present-day Dali), Xielong (government seat in present-day Weishan in Yunnan), Yunnan (government seat to the southeast of present-day Xiangyun in Yunnan), and Ailao (government seat in the southwest of Baoshan), Bonan (government seat in present-day Yongping in Yunnan), Buwei (government seat in present-day Baoshan) (Fan, 1965, 3513). It is worth noting that most of the eight counties were located along the Yunnan section of the road to India. This suggests that the establishment of Yongchang Prefecture in the Eastern Han Dynasty had been out of considerations for ensuring the accessibility of the road. In fact, its establishment also brought the northeastern part of Burma, which was along the road, into the jurisdiction of the Central Plains Dynasty. It can be said that the Eastern Han Dynasty had established Yongchang for managing the Shu-India passage and the Yongchang Prefecture took on its protection and management as an important responsibility after its establishment. The opening of the land and water passage from central Yunnan to Cochin (Hanoi, Vietnam) was another major contribution of the Eastern Han Dynasty. In the 19th year of Jianwu (43 AD), Wave-taming General Ma Yuan was ordered to suppress the Uprising of the Trung Sisters. He and his troops left Jinsang (government seat in the border of Jinping County, Yunnan) along the Mileng Waterway and reached Cochin via Bengu (government seat to the southeast of Mengzi in Yunnan) and Xisui (government seat in Jinping County in Yunnan), and used the route for transporting military rations. It was also known as “the Jinsangguan Pass road” because it passed Jisangguan (Li, 1984, 1154). Spreading from present-day central Yunnan to Mengzi, along the Honghe River

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and through the border of Jinping to present Hanoi, the path wound its way through “dangerous towering mountains and three thousand miles of water.” In addition, according to “Geographical Records (8)” in Book of Han, the Western Han Dynasty established Jinsangguan on a bank of the Honghe River in Jinsang County. The record indicates that there had been private water and land transportation activities in Honghe back then, and the Western Han Dynasty therefore established the pass for their management. Ma Yuan then formally opened this channel for governmental use. However, the Honghe River was known for its torrential flow, and drastically changed water level from summer to autumn, making it difficult to sail against the current. The Jiaozhou path usually began with southward downstream travel from Central Yunnan before a switch to land travel northward from Cochin. According to relevant records, before the Five dynasties when Cochin broke free of the control of the Central Plains Dynasty, it had been connected to the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom mainly through the sea, and the people that traveled through the Jiaozhou path were mainly civilian business travelers and the troops of the imperial court. During the Eastern Han Dynasty, there were frequent contacts with Southeast Asia, South Asia and regions to its west. According to “Biography of Southwestern Ethnic Regions” in Book of Later Han, Yongchang Prefecture was rich in copper, iron, lead, tin, gold, silver, pearl, amber, crystal, colored glaze, worms, mussels, pearls and other treasures, some of which come from areas outside Yongchang. For example, mussel pearls were mainly produced from the Myeik Coast of present-day Burma. Through the Shu-India Path and Jiaozhou Road, the Kingdom of Shan and Kingdom of Piao from the Indo-China Peninsula, and Daqin from the east coast of the Mediterranean, sent envoys to the Middle Kingdom many times. According to “Biographies” in Book of Later Han, in the 9th year of Yongyuan, the first year of Yongning and the 6th year of Yongjian, the Kingdom of Shan dispatched envoys to the Middle Kingdom three times. The one in the first year of Yongning was recorded in “Biography of Southwestern Ethnic Regions” in Book of Later Han, as follows: “Yongyodiao, the King of Shan dispatched envoys to the imperial court to pay tribute, presenting music and magicians. The magicians performed transformation, fire spitting,



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self-dismemberment, and head switching for cattle and horses. They were extremely skilled at juggling, capable of keeping the game going for several thousand rounds. They claimed themselves native of Haixi, which was another name for Daqin, connected to the Kingdom of Shan in the southwest.” Yuan Hong also said that during the reign of Emperor An, the Kingdom of Shan sent magicians to Han for tribute, adding that “the Kingdom of Shan is connected to the Borderland aborigines via Jiaozhou. There is another path in Yizhou” (Yuan, 1987). This suggests that the kingdoms of the Indo-China Peninsula could travel to northern China along the path via Burma or northern Vietnam.

4.2. The Shuhan Period In the 5th year of Zhongping (188 AD), the Eastern Han Dynasty named Liu Yan as the Governor of Yizhou. Liu Yan blocked the Xiegu Road and ruled Yizhou with his son Liu Zhang for more than 20 years. During this period, the part of Nanzhong (now Yunnan-Guizhou region) under his effective control mainly included Qianwei Protectorate and Yizhou County. From around the reign of Emperor Shun to the early years of Yanxiin the Shu Han Dynasty, the Maoniu Aborigines from present-day Hanyuan in Sichuan cut off the Lingguan Road leading to Qiongzhou via Chengdu. Travelers from Chengdu to Nanzhong had to switch to Anshang path (now Pingshan, Sichuan), which “is dangerous and far” (Chen, 1959, 1053). Before Liu Bei seized Yizhou, Zhuge Liang proposed the stratagem of occupying Jingzhou and Yizhou and biding his time to take over the throne in the Central Plains. “Befriending the aborigines to the west and placate the aborigines in the south” was one of the major move. In the 16th year of Jian’an, Liu Zhang welcomed Liu Bei into Shu to guard against the offensive of Cao Cao. In the 19th year, Liu Bei expelled Liu Zhang and seized Yizhou. With suppressing the rebellion of influential clans in Nanzhong as the boundary, the rule of the Shu Han over Nanzhong can be divided into two periods. Due to limited control in the early stage, it adopted the basic strategy of appeasing the local forces by appointing members of the influential clans and aboriginal chieftains as officials, and handled them leniently in the event of their rebellion,

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seldom waging wars. After pacifying Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang exercised a comprehensive and in-depth rule over it. The main measures included prioritizing rallying popular support, establishing prestige, and integrating suppression with placation. He upheld the tactics of retaining a powerful army, definitely in contrast to the claims of “leaving no general or soldier or transporting any military rations” in later generations. Instead, he actively developed production in Nanzhong, collected a large amount of taxes, and drew capable youth from the tribes, to serve the northern expeditions. After seizing Yizhou, Liu Bei appointed Deng Fang as the Defender of Qianwei Protectorate in the 19th year of Jian’an (214), but soon changed it to Zhuti Prefecture. Laixiang Governor-Generalship was also instated as the supreme governing body of Nanzhong, with the government seat in Nanchang County (now Zhenxiong County, Yunnan). In the 2nd year of Zhang Wu (222 AD), following the death of Laixiang GovernorGeneral Deng Fang, Liu Bei assigned the post to Li Hui and relocated the government seat to Pingyi County (now Bijie County of Guizhou) (Chen, 1959, 1081; Chang, 1984, 350). Later, the Shu Han Dynasty successively restored Yuexi Prefecture, Yizhou Prefecture, Zangke Prefecture, and Yongchang Prefecture of the Eastern Han Dynasty, but its control of those prefectures was very limited. The area effectively under its control remained the present-day northeastern Yunnan. In the 3rd year of Zhangwu (223 AD), Liu Bei succumbed to disease in Baidi City after an ill-fated expedition against the Kingdom of Wu. Gao Dingyuan, a chieftain of the Sou People from Yuexi Prefecture seized the prefecture and claimed himself king. Zhu Bao, from a prestigious clan of Zangke Prefecture, and Yongkai, from a prestigious clan of Yizhou Prefecture, followed suit when they heard of the news. The three prefectures of Yuexi, Yizhou, and Zangke successively separated from Shu Han. Yongchang Prefecture came under the control of Lü Kai who closed prefecture border and held fast to his ground. Zhuti County alone was still controlled by the Shu Han. In the spring of the 3rd year of Jianxing (225 AD), Zhuge Liang led the army on a southward expedition, planning to subdue the rebel forces of Yuexi and Zangke as a breakthrough. Zhuge Liang personally led the main force to attack Yuexi, and ordered Ma Zhong to attack Zhu Bao from



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the east road, and Laixiang Governor-General Li Hui to attack (now Qujing, Yunnan) via Pingyi. Thanks to full preparations and correct strategies, Zhuge Liang pacified Nanzhong within 11 months after launching the expedition. The Shu Han relocated the Laixiang Governor-Generalship from Pingyi to Weixian (now Qujing, Yunnan), stationed a massive army in Weixian and started military-agricultural colonies there. According to “Records of Nanzhong” in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, “Jianning Prefecture (established by the Shu Han Dynasty, with the government seat to the west of Qujing), was headquartered in the former militaryagricultural colony of Laixiang Governor-Generalship, and was called by southerners ‘Tunxia’.” The Shu Han divided the land of Yuexi and Jianning and established Yunnan Prefecture, with the government seat to the north of present-day Yao’an, Yunnan. It had accelerated the development of the area west of present-day central Yunnan, seemingly for the protection of the Shu-India passage. Laixiang Governor-General Li Hui relocated thousands of colonies of the Pu People from Yongchang Prefecture to Yunnan Prefecture and Jianning Prefecture, “to populate it.” This was the largest population relocation of the Shu Han in Nanzhong, and it effectively promoted the development of areas under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Prefecture and Jianning Prefecture. Several hundred years thereafter, the vicinity of present-day Qujing became the administrative center of Yunnan. The Shu Han restored the Lingguan Passage with force. After pacification by Zhuge Liang, Yuexi Prefecture “was plagued by repeated aboriginal rebellions”, and the prefect did not dare to be stationed in Qiongdu (now Xichang, Sichuan). Instead, he moved to Anshang County, which was more than 800 li away. The Shu Han appointed Zhang Yi a meritorious valiant general as the prefect of Yuexi. Zhang Yi launched an expedition against the powerful Zhuoma Tribe in the northern border, captured its chieftain Wei Lang, and made him a prince after securing approval from the court. “And the rest tribes gradually surrendered one after another after hearing the news.” Zhang Yi also killed the recidivist rebel Dongfeng and his younger brother Kuiqu, and seized Dingzuo, which was rich in salt, iron and lacquer. Lang Lu, the chieftain of Maoniu Aborigine in Hanjia, responded to the solicitation

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and surrendered. Eventually, the Lingguan Passage, which had been closed for more than a hundred years, was restored (Chen, 1959, 1052). Before Zhuge Liang’s southern expedition, the section east of Yongchang of the Shu-India path had been inaccessible for more than a decade. The three prefectures of Yuexang, Yizhou, and Zangke all rebelled, while Lü Kai, a member of the prestigious clan in Yongchang Prefecture, and Wang Kang, the Deputy Governor, closed the prefecture with the help of the people and the garrison to avoid the scourge of war (Chen, 1959, 1047). After the Southern Expedition, the Shu Han Dynasty strengthened its rule over Yongchang Prefecture and successively appointed Wang Kang and Huo Yi as the prefect. It also built a bamboo suspension bridge at the Lancang River ferry along the ShuIndia Path, and the rock with cable lasted to the Tang Dynasty (Fan, 1985, 83). Afterwards, the areas within the effective control of Shu Han and Jin Dynasty also extended south to the present-day central Yunnan to the east of the Erhai Lake by virtue of the Wuchi Road, Lingguan Road, and the eastern section of the Shu-India Road. The Shu Han also added some new counties in Yongchang Prefecture. Among them, the three counties of Xisui (government seat in today’s Jinping), Yongshou (government seat in today’s Gengma), and Nanfu (government seat in today’s Jinghong) were in Lincang and Xishuangbanna. Presumably, the road from Jinghong to the present-day Laos and northern Thailand had been opened. Another measure taken by the Shu Han to rule Yunnan was to keep the Jiaozhou Road unblocked in order to compete with Sun Wu for Cochin. In the 15th year of Jian’an (210 AD), Sun Quan used Bu Zhi as the governor of Jiaozhou, and Shi Xie, the prefect of Cochin instated by the Han Dynasty surrendered to the Kingdom of Wu, which then took over Lingnan. In the 20th year, Liu Bei and Sun Quan divided Jingzhou equally between themselves, with the Xiangshui River as the boundary: Changsha, Jiangxia, and the area to the east of Guiyang were put under the administration of Wu, and Nanjun, Lingling, and the area to the west of Wuling were put under the administration of Shu (Chen, 1959, 1119). After taking over Lingnan and present-day Hunan, Wu bordered Nanzhong and became covetous of it. Shi Xie secretly contacted Yong Kai, a member for a prestigious clan of Yizhou, and asked him



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to rise in rebellion when the opportunity ripened (Chen, 1959, 1192). After pacifying Nanzhong, the Shu Han took land from Jianning and Zangke, and established Xinggu Prefecture (now to the north of Yanshan) to strengthen the control and management of Jiaozhou Road, whiling containing Cochin. In the 4th year of Jingyuan (263 AD), Liu Chan, the King of Shu, surrendered to the Wei Dynasty. Lü Xing, an official of Cochin Prefecture, killed the prefect Sun Xu and surrendered to the Kingdom of Wei. Huo Yi, the former Laixiang Governor-General, was allowed to renew his post, and concurrently assigned to the post of Jiaozhou Governor. Lü Xing was appointed Annan General, and entrusted with the military affairs of Jiaozhou with official appointment. Wu put on a fierce fight against Wei, in a bid to recover Jiaozhou. Huo Yi maded Cuan Gu from the local prestigious clan the prefect of Jiaozhi and led general Dong Yuan and others to Cochin via Jiaozhou Road. After the death of Cuan Gu, Ma Rong and Yang Ji became prefects of Jiaozhi successively. In the four to seven years of Taishi, the Coachin Jin Army fought a fierce tugof-war with more than one hundred thousand Wu troops from Jingzhou Road and Jian’an maritime route, relying on ration supply from Jiaozhou Road. In the end, Jiaozhi City ran out of food and was captured by the army of Wu. Accordingly, Jiuzhen Prefecture and Nichinan Prefecture “both fell to Wu” (Chang, 1984, 465; Sima,1956, 2508, 2517). In the first year of Taikang (280 AD), the Jin army seized Jianye, the capital of Wu, and the King of Wu surrendered. Tao Huang, the governor of Jiaozhou, also surrendered. This way, Jiaozhi was captured by the Western Jin Dynasty (Fang et al., 1974, 1560).

4.3. The Jin Dynasty In the year 265, Sima Yan replaced the Wei Dyasty with the Jin Dynasty. The base for the Western Jin Dynasty to rule the present Yunnan was still Jinning Prefecture (government seat in present-day Jinning, Yunnan) and Jianning Prefecture (government seat in present-day Qujing and northeastern Luliang, Yunnan). After its founding, the Western Jin Dynasty allowed Huo Yi, the Laixiang Governor-General instated by Shu Han to resume office, and appointed him as Governor of Jiaozhou,

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with “full discretion on choosing officials.” After Huo Yi’s death, his son Huo Zai succeeded to the post of Laixiang Governor-General. The Huo family “commanded his soldiers and placated the prestigious clans” in Nanzhong, and generally implemented the governance policy if the Shu Han Dynasty. In the Western Jin Dynasty, Wu Jing was appointed as the Laixiang Governor-General, but who had to be recalled in a few years and replaced with Xian Yuying, for “failure to achieve harmonious rule.” In the 6th year of Taishi (270 AD), the Western Jin Dynasty separated Jianning Prefecture, Xinggu Prefecture, Yunnan Prefecture and Yongchang Prefecture from Nanzhong, and established Yizhou, an administrative region of the same level as Ningzhou, with Xian Yuying as the Governor. In the 5th year of Taikang (284 AD), Ningzhou was abolished, and its four subordinate prefectures were incorporated into Yizhou. Meanwhile, the Nanyi Sub-prefecture, a military ruling institution was established in the former Ningzhou area, with Li Yi as the Nanyi Defender. Nanyi Sub-prefecture imposed heavy taxes on the aborigines, ordering “each of their tribes to present tribute, which consisted cattle, gold, felt, and horses in large quantities.” “A similar levy was imposed on prefectures and counties” (Chang, 1984, 363). Later, the Western Jin Dynasty appointed Wang Xun, the prefect of Guanghan as the Nanyi Sub-prefecture and Governor of Ningzhou. Wang Xunzhi resorted to a more tyrannical and suppressive measure than Li Yi, incurring fierce fighting among the prestigious clans of Ningzhou for decades. As a result, the present-day central and northeastern Yunnan were been destroyed (Fang et al., 1974, 2109). After its establishment, the Eastern Jin Dynasty appointed in the first year of Yongchang (322 AD) Yin Feng, the prefect of Lingling, as Governor of Ningzhou and Defender of Nanyi, but the political situation in Nanzhong was beyond salvation. In the 8th year of Xianhe (333 AD), Li Xiong, the leader of the Chenghan regime, captured Ningzhou and Yin Feng surrendered. Soon, Xie Shu, the prefect of Zhangke County, still upheld the Jin Dynasty as the orthodox. In the 2nd year of Yuanxi (420 AD), the Eastern Jin Dynasty perished. Where the conditions were not yet ripe, the Western Jin Dynasty rashly changed the tradition of placing Yunnan under the jurisdiction of Shu, and established Ningzhou, which was on the same level as



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Yizhou. However, it failed. The Western Jin Dynasty also abandoned the Shu Han’s practice of relying on the prestigious clans and prioritizing ethnic relations and implemented a brutal and rigid ruling approach in Nanzhong, led to overall social unrest in Ningzhou. The establishment of the Eastern Jin Dynasty didn’t see any improvement in the rule of Ningzhou. The Southern dynasties inherited the rule of the Eastern Jin Dynasty over Ningzhou, but the actual control was significantly weakened. Liu’s Song Dynasty kept Ningzhou (seated in present-day Qujing), which governed 15 prefectures and 81 counties, roughly encompassing the two provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou today. In the present-day Southwestern Sichuan, it set up Yuexi Prefecture (government seat in present-day Xichang) and placed it under the jurisdiction of Yizhou (government seat in present-day Chengdu). Most of the governors of Ningzhou appointed by Liu’s Song Dynasty didn’t go to Ningzhou to take up their posts. So most of the time, governorship was performed by prestigious clans of Nanzhong. In the Southern Qi Dynasty, the control of Ningzhou consisted in the present-day northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou only. In the Xiao’s Liang Dynasty, Xiao Ji was appointed as the Governor of Yizhou, and Xiao Ji ruled Shu for 17 years. In the 2nd year of the Taiqing (548 AD), the Hou Jing Rebellion broke out in the hinterland, and Xu Wensheng, the Governor of Ningzhou appointed by the Liang Dynasty, recruited an army of several dozen thousand to suppress the rebellion. However, he never returned (Yao, 1973, 640). In the Chen Dynasty, the governorship of Ningzhou was awarded to the Cuan clan, which virtually became the land of the Cuan clan after Xu Wensheng left. During the Jin and Southern dynasties, although there were no new achievements in the construction of passages in Ningzhou, most of the old roads of the previous generations were still passable, including the Lingguan Road and the Wuchi Road. Zuo Si of the Jin Dynasty wrote in “Rhapsody of the Capital of Shu”, “speeding away along Jiuzheban,” a section of Lingguan Road to the south of Yandao County. According to “Records of Shu” in Records of the Huayang Kingdom, Sanjian County was connected to Ningzhou Prefecture, “facing Qingling County across the Lu River.” Sanfeng County was located to the south of present-day

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Huili, Sichuan, while Qingling County was in the vicinity of Dayao and Yao’an, Yunnan. Therefore, Lingguan Road was still passable in the Jin Dynasty. It was still possible to reach the capital of Shu via Wuchi Road from central Yunnan. After reaching Zhuti (now Zhaotong) Wei County (now Qujing) along passing the Wuchi Road, one can take the water and land route to Badao Circuit (now Yibin) “Records of Nanzhong” in Records of the Huayang Kingdom says that there are two waterways including Heishui River (now the Nanguang River) and Yangguan River (now Hengjiang River), both are “very dangerous and difficult to navigate.” The land route had to pass Niukowtou Hill and Mabojia Hill, “which are also fraught with danger.” Thus, the passing merchants were known to sing a song, which says “merchants of Laixiang had to carry their burden on the left shoulder for seven li”, indicating that the path was difficult and dangerous and that they had to walk seven li before shifting the weight to the right shoulder. Liang Rui, the General Administrator of Yizhou at the beginning of the Sui Dynasty, also said that “The northernmost part of Zhuti borders Ningzhou” (Wei et al., 1973, 1126). When Xiao Ji served as the governor of Yizhou in the Liang Dynasty, “he developed Ningzhou and Yuechang in the south and built a path to Ziling and Tuyuhun in the west, developing agricultural production, sericulture, salt production and iron smelting domestically, while fostering trade with distant foreign land. As a result, he managed to amass a large quantity of wealth and build a large arsenal for Yizhou.” After Xiao Ji opened the path to Jianning and Yue Shou, “native contributions reached ten times that of preceding dynasties” (Li, 1975, 1328). From this it can be seem that during the rule of Xiao Ji in Yizhou, the utilization of Wuchi Road and Lingguan Road was significantly improved, and the native products of Nanzhong were also transported to the Shu area. The road from Cochin to Shu along the Wuchi Road in present-day central Yunnan is recorded in many historical records. For example, “Biography of Tao Huang” in Book of Jin says that “Southern Yunnan and Cochin are connected by land and water routes, which are mutually complementary.” Zuo Si says in “Rhapsody of the Capital of Shu” that “the journey from Cochin to Zangke and Qianwei (a protectorate of the Eastern Han Dynasty, headquartered in the present-day



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Zhaotong), extends for more than five thousand li.” There are also records of Daqin (Ancient Rome) businessmen landing on the shores of Cochin after sailing across the sea, before going north through Yunnan. During the Jin Dynasty, some influential clans of Ningzhou also took the passage from present-day central Yunnan to Cochin, to lead an expedition against Jiaozhou, or to take up posts there. However, according to the relevant records, the main route for Cochin to communicate with the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom was still by sea before the Song Dynasty. During this period, Shu-India Passage was still passable. According to “Stele of Cuan Longyan” erected in the 2nd year of Daming in the Liu’s Song Dynasty (458 AD), when Cuan Longyan took up the hereditary post of Qiongdu County Magistrate, “the East and West of Ningzhou were subjected to the scourge of violence and Mianrong in particular was rife with conflicts.” Cuan Longyan led five thousand elite troops to suppress the violence, “personally went to the front killing thousands of rebels and ridding the Borderlands of turmoil” (Wang, 1980, 114). “Miangong” was the ethnic group in the south of present-day Yongchang Prefecture. The military action of Cuanlongyan seemed to be out of consideration for protecting the western section of the passage to India. On the whole, the Central Plains dynasties had emphasized the construction of transportation lines in Yunnan region and those communicating it with neighboring countries turned Yunnan into one of the Borderland areas with better developed transportation. Although some of the many transportation lines in Yunnan area were gradually developed with the early commercial activities of the private sector, the active management of the imperial China, especially the Central Plains dynasty, had an important impact on the formation of these transportation lines, especially the important official roads. The management of transportation in Yunnan by the Central Plains dynasties can be roughly divided into the early and later stages with the Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation. In the early period, Yunnan was ruled by the Qin, Han, Shu Han, Jin and other dynasties. Due to the profound influence of the tradition prioritizing the north over the south, and the inappropriate timing for further developing various

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resources in Yunnan, while the Central Plains dynasty had not yet formed a tradition of developing and absorbing various resources of the Borderland for the benefit of the country, management of the transportation in Yunnan was mainly intended to communicate with neighboring countries, seize geographical advantages of the border, collect information on the border and foreign countries, and search for “exotic things” of distant lands. It was especially so in the Western Han Dynasty. Although there were some changes in the Tang Dynasty, transportation management of Yunnan remained much the same as that in the Han Dynasty. Therefore, those dynasties had focused on the international channel from Yunnan to neighboring countries and the road from Shu to Yunnan. During the Qin, Han, Shu Han, and Jin dynasties, Sichuan Basin was used as the base for managing Yunnan and the Lingguan Road and Wuchi Road from the Sichuan Basin to Yunnan became the lifeline of transportation linking Sichuan and Yunnan. The Lingguan Road and Wuchi Road extended further to the west and south respectively after reaching the present-day central Yunnan, forming the international passages leading to the South Asian Subcontinent and the southern part of China-Indochina Peninsula.

5.  Border Governance of the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties and the Development of Transportation in Yunnan Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing are a very important period in the history of Yunnan. During the period, the transportation lines in Yunnan underwent remarkable development and played an important role in the political and economic life. Meanwhile, it assumed some characteristics different from the Qin, Han, Shu, Jin and Southern dynasties. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the border management strategies of the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties and the traffic conditions of Yunnan in each of those dynasties, as well as the complex relationship between their border management strategies and the changing transportation in Yunnan.



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5.1. The Sui and Tang Dynasties Soon after reunifying the entire country, the Sui Dynasty began operating the Yunnan region. Emperor Wen successively established the General Administration Office for Nanning Prefecture (in present-day Qujing, Yunnan), Xining Prefecture (government seat in present-day Xichang, Sichuan), Gongzhou (government seat in presentday Yunnan Zhaotong), Xiezhou (government seat in present-day Yiliang, Yunnan), Kunzhou (government seat in present-day Kunming), naming Wei Chong as the General Administrator of Nanning Prefecture, Liang Pi as the Governor of Xining Prefecture, and some local chieftains as the prefectural officials (Wei et al., 1973, 1270, 1479). In the 17th year of Kaihuang (597), Cuan Wan, a local chieftain and Governor of Kunzhou, rebelled, subjecting eastern Yunnan, central Yunnan and Erhai Lake region to the scourges of war. The Sui court ordered Shi Wansui to launch an expedition with troops. The aborigines pleaded for mercy with a tribute of pearls, so Shi Wansui released Cuan Wan and returned. In the following year, Cuan Wan rebelled again, and Emperor Wen sent General Liu Kuai to suppress it. The frightened Cuan Wan came to the imperial court and was killed at the order of Emperor Wendi, who soon abandoned his land (Wei et al., 1973, 1355; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6315). The Sui Dynasty operated the southwestern Borderland for more than a decade, but its government offices were limited to the presentday southwestern Sichuan, northeastern Yunnan, and eastern Yunnan through which the Lingguan Road and Wuchi Road passed. In attacking Cuan Wan, Shi Wansui reached Nongdong (now Yao’an, Yunnan), Xiaobonong, and Dabolong (in the vicinity of Xiangyun to Midu in present Yunnan) to Xi’erhe (now Erhai, Yunnan) to the south of Lingguan Road. This suggests that the Sui Dynasty inherited the traditional strategy of the previous generations in managing Yunnan, that is, using the land of Shu area as the base, and the Lingguan Road and Wuchi Road beginning there as the main passage to Yunnan. The Jin Dynasty once set up Ningzhou in the present YunnanGuizhou region, as a large administrative region directly under the imperial court. But the pattern was changed in the Tang Dynasty. In

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the first year of Zhenguan (627), the Tang Dynasty divided the country into ten circuits, and placed the southwestern region under the jurisdiction of Jiannan Circuit and Lingnan Circuit. In the 21st year of Kaiyuan (733), it divided the country into 15 circuits, including Jiannan, Qianzhong and Lingnan Circuit in the southwest. The Tang Dynasty appointed Military Governors and Administrative Commissioners for the border circuits, for example, Jiannan Military Governor governed the Li Prefecture and Yao Prefecture. All in all, the Tang Dynasty ruled Yunnan region via the Jiannan Circuit based in Chengdu, abandoning the hasty approach of the Jin Dynasty and restoring the governance policy of governing the present Yunnan region with Shu, as practiced in the Qin and Han dynasties. With the An-Shi Rebellion as the demarcation, the management of Yunnan in the Tang Dynasty can be roughly divided into the early and late stages. The thoughts and strategies of Emperor Taizong on governing the border profoundly affected the management of Yunnan in the early Tang Dynasty. His thought of border governance had the following major characteristics. Firstly, he “deemed the entire country a family and all the people therein his kin” (Sima, 1956, 6022). In order to realize the goal of “all under heaven like a family”, he had to “manage ethnic affairs of the Borderland properly.” For example, Assistant Minister Di Renjie wrote in an imperial memorial that “the Borderland barbarians have been beyond the territory of preceding emperors. The seas in the east, quick sands in the west, deserts in the north, and five ridges in the south have been a godsend to separate them from the Middle Kingdom. Seen from historical records, they have been impenetrable by education of the Middle Kingdom over three generations, but now our country has taken them all” (Sima, 1956, 6524). The blind pursuit for territorial expansion without acquisition of border resources for supplement was inevitably followed by the unsustainability in border development. Some claimed that the quick retrogress in the border governance of the Tang Dynasty after the An-Shi Rebellion had been rooted in the reign of Emperor Taizong, whose practice was also disproved by later generations. For example, in the Song Dynasty Zeng Gong said that “(The Tang Dynasty) subdued all the aboriginal kingdoms in the borderland and the entire country lauded the feat, which was not the due mission



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of previous sage emperors.”28 Secondly, he held that “the aborigines were also human beings, with emotions much the same as the Han Chinese”, and they would be like blood kin if treated with grace (Sima, 1956, 6215). The belief in Borderland aborigines and Han Chinese can be a family embodied Emperor Taizong’s precious thought of equality between Borderland aborigines and Han Chinese. However, the belief can lead governance astray. For example, to extend imperial grace to all and to achieve the goal of “all under heaven like a family,” the imperial court shouldered the vast cost of Borderland management, lavishing the financial resources without considering the benefits. For example, Zheng Hui, the pacification and placation commissioner of Nanzhao, said that “The Middle Kingdom uphold courtesy and righteousness, and the benefits for the aborigines, without taking anything from them” (Liu et al., 1975, 5281). As a result, relevant policies were unsustainable. Guided by the above-mentioned border governance ideas, the Tang Dynasty actively managed the Yunnan region in its early days. The effectively controlled area spread from the present-day southwestern Sichuan, northeastern Yunnan, and eastern Yunnan in imperial China to the present-day western, southern and northwestern Yunnan, and northwestern Gruizhou. In order to rule those areas, the Tang Dynasty set up a military command or protectorate in Rongzhou, Xizhou, Yaozhou, and Qianzhou, for governing the several hundred jimi counties. In order to strengthen the control of present-day western and northwestern Yunnan, the Tang Dynasty repeatedly dispatched troops to fight the barbarians in the present-western Yunnan area. In the first year of Linde (664), it established Yaozhou Military Commission (government seat in present-day Yao’an, Yunnan) for managing 57 jimi prefectures. However, border management was costly while the Borderland area was exempt from taxation in the Tang Dynasty, making it increasingly difficult for managing the border areas. In the first year of Shengong (697), the Shuzhou Governor Zhang Jianzhi submitted an imperial memorial, and requested dissolution of Yaozhou, on the ground that “(Yaozhou) doesn’t pay salt or cloth tax or tribute of rarities or serve the Middle Kingdom in war. Nor are its precious goods sent to the Middle 28 Zeng Gong, “On the Tang Dynasty”, in Appraisal of Song Essays, Vol. 87.

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Kingdom, while its management as exhausting our financial resources. In addition, we have placed ourselves in servitude to the aborigines” (Liu et al., 1975, 2939). The statement reflects the situation in this respect. In the 9th year of Tianbao (750), Nanzhao raided Yaozhou from western Yunnan and captured it, shattering its relationship with the Tang Dynasty. The three ill-fated expeditions against Nanzhao were followed by the An-Shi Rebellion, and the Tang Dynasty was hand-tied with its own problems. As a result, the Yunnan region was seized by Nanzhao. From the establishment of the Dameng Regime in Xinuluo, Nanzhao lasted 254 years, before collapsing in about the same time as the Tang Dynasty did. When Nanzhao was in its heyday, its territory roughly included parts of present-day Yunnan Province, western Guizhou Province, southwestern Sichuan Province, and northern China-Indochina Peninsula. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Nanzhao submitted to the Tang Dynasty because oppression under the Tubo Kingdom had become unbearable, and was awarded by Emperor Dezong the seal bearing the inscription “Conferment Seal to Nanzhao in the Zhenyuan Reign.” However, after it submitted to the Tang Dynasty, Nanzhao was no longer a local power under the rule of the Tang Dynasty, but a local regime in a suzerain of the Tang Dynasty. The title “King of Yunnan” bestowed on Nanzhao before the Tianbao War was a native official in the Erhai Basin under the jurisdiction of the Tang Dynasty, but the title “Nanzhao (king)” awarded to Yi Mouxun in the 10th year of Zhenyuan indicated the recognition of the sphere of governance of Nanzhao by the Tang Dynasty. Therefore, the direct rule and management of Yunnan by the Tang Dynasty was limited to the 100-odd years before the Tianbao War. For more than a century after its founding, the Tang court followed Emperor Taizong’s strategy of border governance and actively developed the transportation in Yunnan. In the Tang Dynasty, the lifeline connecting the land of Shu to Yunnan included the Lingguan Road and Wuchi Road opened in the Qin and Han dynasties. Lingguan Road was renamed to Qingxi Pass in the Tang Dynasty, spreading from Chengdu to Dali through present-day Hanyuan, Xichang, and Yao’an. According  to “Roads in Yunnan” in Book of the Aborigines, the road from Chengdu to Yangjumie City of Nanzhao (in present-day Dali,



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Yunnan) extended for 2720 li, including 30 post stations from Chengdu to Ezhunling in Xizhou (in present-day Xichang, Sichuan) under the jurisdiction of Xichuan Military Governor. The section from the south of Ezhunling to Yangjumie City was under the jurisdiction of Nanzhao, including the post station of Jingkou, Nongdong, Yunnan, and Longwei. The record in Book of the Aborigines was about the pattern after the rehabilitation between Yi Mouxun and Tang. From the early Tang Dynasty to the Tianbao War when the peaceful relationship between Nanzhao and Tang was torn asunder, Qingxiguan Road was the main line of communication between the hinterland and Yunnan. Therefore, Gao Shi of the Tang Dynasty said that “Although Jiannan was divided into the Eastern and the Western Sichuan, it actually belonged to the same circuit, separated from the southern aborigines in Qiongguan, Li and Ya” (Liu et al., 1975, 3329). In the Tianbao Years, Xianyu Zhongtong and Li Mi led two expeditions against Nanzhao, and Qingxiguan Road was the route of the first choice. Nanzhao defeated the Tang army, and then captured Yuexi and forced Huitong to surrender. Later, the Tang army and Nanzhao stood off against each other on the banks of the Dadu River, and Qingxiguan Road was obstructed for decades. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan, when Nanzhao and Tang restored the formerly friendly relationship, Wei Gao, the Military Governor of Xichuan reopened the Qingxiguan Road. Subsequently, thousands of children from Nanzhao went to Chengdu to study via the Qingxiguan Road in about 50 years. Soon after Yi Mouxun’s death, Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty once again became antagonized, and Nanzhao attacked Xichuan several times through the Qingxi Pass. Wuchi Road was called “Shimenguan Road” in Tang Dynasty, so named because it went through Shimen Pass along the route from Rongzhou (now Yibin, Sichuan) to Tuodong City (now Kunming) via eastern Yunnan. Nanzhao called Qingxiguan Road the southern thoroughfare for entering Xichuan, and Shimenguan Road the northern thoroughfare, indicating the importance of Shimenguan Road. In Shimen to the south of Rongzhou, there are still cliffs carved in the fifth year of Emperor Kaihuang of the Sui Dynasty recording the completion of the passage. The Tang people said that the Anliang stone holes there were drilled in the Sui Dynasty, indicating a large-scale renovation of

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the Shimen Pass back then (Fan, 1985, 33). In the 10th year of Tianbao, when Xianyu Zhongtong led an offensive against Nanzhao, he divided his troops into three routes, including two through the Qingxi Pass and Jiaozhou Road, and one through Shimen Pass. In the 9th year of Zhenyuan, Yimou Xun sought to submit to the Tang Dynasty, and sent envoys via Rongzhou, Qianzhou, and Jiaozhou to the Tang court. His envoys via Rongzhou and Qianzhou both reached Chengdu. In the 10th year, when the Tang court planned to send envoys to announce conferment on Yimou Xun, it was rumored that the Tubo Kingdom would block Qingxiguan Road. So Wei Gao, the Military Governor of Xichuan renovated the Shimenguan Road and set up some post houses along the way (Sima, 1956, 7547; Fan, 1985). Later, when Yuan Zi was sent by the Tang Dynasty to Nanzhao for canonization, he took the path through Shimen Pass. According to “Roads in Yunnan” in Book of the Aborigines, the ninth section down south from Rongzhou to Zhichangguan in Malong County, buildings, and government offices for welcoming guests began to emerge, giving it the appearances of a Han Chinese region. Along the westward journey from Anning to Yangjumie City, there were many post houses, including Longhe, Shaziguan, Quguan, Shaque, Qiuzeng, Boda, Baiya, and Longwei. There were also about 50 post houses on Qingxiguan Road. However, so far, there is no record of Nanzhao setting up post stations in areas under its jurisdiction. Except for the post houses added by Wei Gao in the 10th year of Zhenyuan Dynasty on Shimenguan Road, most of the above-mentioned post houses should have been built in the early Tang Dynasty, which had habitually followed the system of the previous generation. Usually, one post station was set up every thirty li, with discretion in view of the terrain or availability of water and fodder for accommodation. The distance between the post houses of various roads in Yunnan is mostly 30 miles, as specified in the Tang system.29 29 Cf. Book of Barbarians, Vol. 1, “Roads within the Boundary of Yunnan”: The trip from Jiaozhou to Jiayongbu in southern Yunnan was firstly by water and then by land. The path from Jiayongbu to Jumie City consisted of 21 post stations in total, each for one day’s travel. The early mountainous roads in Yunnan were difficult, and each 15 kilometers took an entire day on horseback.



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In addition to Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road, the Tang Dynasty also attached great importance to the construction of the road from Xi’erhe (now Erhai, Yunnan) to Tianzhu and that from Jiaozhou to the Anning Gucheng (now Anning, Yunnan). In the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648), the Tang Dynasty dispatched Liang Jianfang to lead troops to quell the Songwai ethnic people in order to restore the road from Xi’erhe to Tianzhu. In the 2nd year of Yonghui (651), Baishui aborigines of Langzhou (now the vicinity of Kunming to Dali) rebelled, and Tang sent the Left-Commanding General Zhao Xiaozu to quell it. The following year, General Zhao achieved a major victory and “the southwestern aborigines were pacified.” After Nanzhao established separatist rule, it stationed 1/3 of its elite troops in Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan), a city along the road from Xi’erhe to India (Fan, 1985, 237). Therefore, the road was very important back then, and its active management in the early Tang Dynasty had been beneficial. Since the northern tip of the Jiaozhou-Anning Gucheng Road was connected to the road from Xi’erher to India, the whole road came to be known as “Annan-India Road.” Jia Dan, the prime minister of Zhenyuan reign in the Tang Dynasty, considered the Annan-India Road as one of the seven most important roads leading to aboriginal land. He described its direction as follows: from Jiaozhou North to Guyongbu (now Hekou County, Yunnan), and to Tuodong City via Lusuozhou (now Pingbian County, Yunnan), Tangchidun (now Mengzi County, Yunnan), Nanting (now Jianshui, Yunnan), Tonghai and Jinning, before winding west through Anning Ancient City to Yangjumie City, and then via Yongchang to Zhuge Liang City (now southeast of Tengchong, Yunnan). There it forked in two directions, one leading to Kamarupa (now western Assam, India) through Lecheng and Kingdom of Piao and the other to Nolu (west of present-day Assam, India) via Lishui city (south of present-day Myitkyina, Burma), Anxi city (present-day Mogaung, Burma), and the Kingdom of Daqin Brahman (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1151). The details of the road from Annan to India mentioned by Jia Dan were the situation after the reconciliation of Tang with Nanzhao in the 10th year

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of Zhenyuan.30 The description of the road in Book of the Aborigines was in greater detail, including even the daily camping locations in Yunnan, indicating that traffic on the road was heavy. When the Tang Dynasty managed Yunnan in its early days, it created a pattern of double-pronged deployment with the military commands of Rongzhou, Shizhou, and Yaozhou on one side and the Annan Protectorate on the other. Since the Han Dynasty, Jiaozhou had been an important port for international trade, “through which all tributes to the imperial court are shipped” (Liu et al., 1975, 1750). Jiaozhou was also responsible for restraining the land and the aborigines in southern Yunnan. In the first year of Tiaolu (679), the Tang Dynasty reshuffled the government agency of Jiaozhou and established the Annan Protectorate, for governing present-day northern and central Vietnam, as well as southeastern Yunnan. Tang troops traveling north along the JiaozhouAnning Gucheng Road would easily encircle Yunnan with their fellow troops through Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road. When the Tang court launched three offensives against Nanzhao following the outbreak of Yaozhou incident in the 9th year of Tianbao, its army had entered Yunnan via Jiaozhou. In the 10th year, the Tang court ordered Jiannan Military Governor Xianyu Zhongtong to lead an expedition against Nanzhao, together with Annan Protectorate Wang Zhijin, but the offensive ended in defeat. In the 12th year, Emperor Xuanzong ordered General He Luguang to launch an expedition against Nanzhao with the troops of five sub-prefectures in Lingnan (Sima, 1956, 6918). In the following year, it ordered Li Mi to lead 70,000 soldiers to attack Nanzhao, together with Guangzhou Governor He Lüguang, who was to attack Nanzhao from another direction (Sima, 1956, 6926). Jiaozhou boasted great importance for its strategic location, and it could not be

30 Jia Dan said that Tuodong City was located 40 kilometers from the Jinning Post Station, and the old city of Anning 40 kilometers further. Tuodong City was built by the separatist regime of Nanzhao. Previously, Jia Dan detailed on the entire path from Annan to Sindhu before mentioning Tuodong City. So what he described must be the scenario in the 10th year of Zhenyuan after the opening of the road. The old city of Anning must have been different from the new city of Anning built in the 4th year of Tianbao.



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guarded on the sea alone. Therefore, the Tang court had long planned to build the surface transportation line from Jiaozhou to Xichuan. In the 13th year of Zhenguan (639), Hou Hongren, a native of Yuzhou, under the escort of Tang troops, opened a road from Zangke to Yongzhou via Xizhao, together with his company. “Thus the road to Jiaozhou and Guangxi was opened, and over 28,000 households of aborigines surrendered.”31 The road wound southward from Chongqing to the north of Vietnam via Huangping, Wangmo, Tianlin and Nanning. It was a difficult and dangerous road, and eventually did not become an official road. In the 4th year of Tianbao, the Tang Dynasty planned to open the Butou Road winding northward from Annan Protectorate to Rongzhou Military Command via Butou (now Jianshui, Yunnan) and Anning. Zhangchou Jianqiong, the Military Governor of Jiannan, dispatched Zhu Lingqian, the Military Commander of Yuexi to build a city in Anning first. This arrangement aroused suspicion from the Baiman Cuan clan in eastern Yunnan, and Cuan Guiwang killed Zhu Lingqian and destroyed Anning City with his tribesmen.32 Emperor Xuanzong issued a decree to Nanzhao, ordering it to launch a punitive expedition against the Cuan Clan. However, Nanzhao subsequently occupied eastern Yunnan, and the political situation in Yunnan became more complicated. As a result, the initiative of building Butou Road came to no avail. After the An-Shi Rebellion, internal and external troubles followed in close succession, overwhelming the Tang court. One of the characteristics of border governance in the late Tang Dynasty was that the 31 Sima Guang, History as a Mirror, Vol. 195, “Records of Tang” (11), the 6th month 13rd year of Zhenguan, 6148. “Yuzhou” is present-day Chongqing; “Zangke” Zangzhou Prefect (to present-day Southwest Huangping, Guizhou); “Xizhao” is in Mingzhou (to present-day Northeast Wangmo, Guizhou). 32 According to the “Stele on Acculturation of Nanzhao with Virtue”: King Cuangui, the governor of Nanning Prefecture (government seat in now Qujing), killed Zhu Lingqian, together with Kunzhou (government seat in now Kunming) Governor Cuan Rijin, Lizhou (government seat in now Huaning) Cuanqi, Qiuzhou (government seat in now Yuxi) Prefector Cuan Shouyi, the Great Ghost Chief of Nanning Prefecture Cuan Chongdao. They were native officials of Jimi prefectures in the south and northeast of Yunnan. This suggests that the above areas were inevitable for the Butou Road to lead north, agitating the local Cuan clans. Cf. Wang Ningsheng, “Yunnan Archaeology”, 154 for the above stele inscriptions.

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effective governance establishments in the border areas were lost one after another and contingencies to address practical problems became prevalent. On the other hand, after the Tianbao War, the Yunnan area fell into the hands of Nanzhao, making it impossible for the Tang court to launch transportation construction in Yunnan. Although Wei Gao, the Military Governor of Xichuan, managed to renovate the Shimenguan Road and set up some post houses in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, his endeavor was limited to the area occupied by the Tang army. It was impossible for him to get into the area controlled by Nanzhao. Nanzhao formed an alliance with the Tubo Kingdom, after breaking with the Tang Dynasty. It then seized the important towns of Yuexi and Huitong on the Qingxiguan Road and extended its sphere of influence to the southern bank of the Dadu River, with an army standing off against the Tang army across the river. In order to prevent Nanzhao from attacking Xichuan, the Tang Dynasty also blocked the northward passage from Yunnan. Despite the reconciliation and reopening of Qingxiguan Road in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, while it was another 150 years after the Yaozhou incident before the Tang Dynasty came to an end, the number of years during which Yimou Xun was a subject of the Tang Dynasty only accounted for one third of that.

5.2. The Song Dynasty The Song Dynasty ruled for 320 years, divided into the Northern Song Dynasty and the Southern Song Dynasty with the invasion of the capital Kaifeng by Jin troops as the demarcation. During the Song Dynasty, the Yunnan area was ruled by Dali Kingdom, which lasted for 317 years, roughly the same length as the Song Dynasty. The Dali Kingdom generally inherited the territory of Nanzhao, including the present-day Yunnan Province, southwestern Sichuan, northeastern Burma, and northern Laos. The Borderland management strategies of the Northern and Southern Song dynasties featured commonality and continuity, but there were also obvious differences in management strategies for the Yunnan Passage. After establishing the Northern Song Dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin sent his general Wang Quanbin to attack Chengdu in the



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third year of Qiande (965), and overthrew the Later Shu. The Dali Kingdoms sent envoys several times to Shu via Qingxiguan Road to submit instruments for establishing friendly relationship with Song (Li, 1980). However, the Northern Song Dynasty believed that “the Tang Dynasty was overthrown by the rebellion of Huang Chao, but the disaster fomented in Guilin much earlier” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6295), and grew wary of Dali, the successor of Nanzhao. In the 3rd year of Qiande, Wang Quanbin submitted relevant maps to the imperial court, “and described a plan to take advantage of the situation and seize Yunnan.” However, Zhao Kuangyin feared the disaster of Tianbao in the Tang Dynasty might recur, and indicated with a jade axe the area to the west of the Dadu River on the map, saying that “areas beyond this are not mine to have” (Bi, 1992, 43). Thus the strategy of using the Dadu River as the demarcation with Dali Kingdom was determined. This decision was implemented by future emperors. In the 6th year of Shaoxing in the Southern Song Dynasty (1136), Imperial Academician Zhu Zhen said that “Dali Kingdom was originally known as Nanzhao in Tang Dynasty. It invaded Chengdu in the Dazhong and Xiantong reigns, and threatened Yongzhou, causing national turmoil.” Emperor Taizu drew lessons from the disaster of the Tang Dynasty, abandoned the counties of Yuexi, and took the Dadu River as the boundary, making it impossible for the Dali Kingdom “to invade or surrender via the most effective strategy for keeping the barbarians away.”33 In the 26th year, Emperor Gaozong said to his ministers that “The barbarians have always been cunning since ancient times, repeatedly invading into Sichuan in the Tang Dynasty. In the present dynasty, they were pacified by Emperor Taizu, who adopted the Dadu River as the boundary and made it impossible for them to run riot” (Xu, 1957). Under the situation of a powerful barbarian army threatening the northern border and complicated domestic affairs, adopting the Dadu River as the boundary for keeping the Dali Kingdom away was the lesser evil, because the practice forestalled all likelihood of getting implicated in disputes in the southwest. However, the relinquishment of the operation of Yunnan 33 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, citing Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali State”.

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and beyond caused profound changes in the geopolitics of this region, in particular seriously affecting the relationship between Yunnan and the hinterland. In order to address the shortage of war horses, after the 6th year of Xining (1073), the Northern Song Dynasty set up horse trade fairs in Lizhou (now north of Hanyuan, Sichuan) and Yazhou (now Ya’an, Sichuan) for purchase of horses from the southwestern aborigines. The horse trade between Dali Kingdom and Lizhou once reached a considerable scale, and the five tribes of Qiongbuchuan (now Yuexi County, Sichuan) even “relied on horse trade for food and clothing.” In the 4th year of Qingli (1044), as some of the horses purchased by Lizhou were of uneven quality, Emperor Renzong ordered “to have the disqualified horses returned.” Soon, Sichuan officials submitted an imperial memorial, saying that the policy would rob common people of their jobs and thus cause turmoil. As a result, “the new imperial decree failed and the original system kept” (Li, 1980). At the repeated request of the Dali Kingdom, in the seventh year of Zhenghe (1117), the Northern Song Dynasty conferred the title of Military Governor of Yunnan, King of Dali and other official ranks, thus establishing a suzerain relationship. In the 2nd year of Xuanhe (1120), the Song Dynasty reached an agreement with Jin to attack Liao, and the war in the north became fierce. Huang Lin, the Guangzhou Observation Commissioner was framed for introducing Dali Kingdom to pay tribute to the Middle Kingdom. From then on, the Northern Song court deliberately downplayed its relationship with Dali. “And the communication of the Song court with Dali was severed, with only occasional barter trade in Lizhou” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14073). After it went south, the Song Court followed the policy of alienating Dali Kingdom as practiced in the previous dynasty. It was even unwilling to continue the suzerainty established between the Northern Song Dynasty and Dali. In the 3rd year of Shaoxing (1133), the Guangxi government submitted an imperial memorial, saying that Dali Kingdom requested to pay tribute to the imperial court. Emperor Gaozong “instructed his ministers that they should buy horses from Dali Kingdom only but refuse its request to pay tribute” (Tuotuo et al., 1977). He specifically ordered that the white elephants sent as tribute



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by the Dali Kingdom to symbolize the vassal relationship be returned. The Southern Song Dynasty also closed the Qingxiguan Road that went through Lizhou. In “Biography of Emperor Xiaozong” in History of Song, from the third year of Chunxi (1176) to the 12th year, the “Song History Xiaozong Benji” has there are about ten entries about Lizhou, including “Lizhou barbarians invaded the border”, “Lizhou barbarians to surrender” and content on strengthening border defenses in Lizhou. According to “Rites (22)” in History of Song, The Southern Song Dynasty stipulated that the various countries paying tribute be treated ceremoniously. Yizhou and Lizhou were on a par with Cochin, indicating that they were regarded as foreign land in the Southern Song Dynasty. In the 4th year of Shaoding (1231), Dali Kingdom requested the Southern Song Dynasty to reopen the Qingxiguan Road so that it could pay tribute. Meng Gong, the official of the Southern Song Dynasty refused on the grounds that “Dali Kingdom already had roads to Yongguang, and there is no need to take the road via Sichuan” (Tuotuo et al., 1977). Due to the shortage of war horses, the Southern Song Dynasty still purchased horses from the southwestern aborigines, but changed the trading fair from Lizhou and other places to the present-day northeastern Guangxi today, while setting up a horse-purchasing division in Yongzhou (now Nanning, Guangxi). The Southern Song Dynasty took rigorous precautions against the coming Dali caravans. For example, Emperor Gaozong ordered Guangxi Military Commissioner to keep track of the horse trade, enhance preparations secretly, and “keep a low profile and stay out of trouble” (Xu, 1957). The unwarranted suspicion of Dali Kingdom was apparent. Due to the many restrictions on horse purchase, and the long and difficult travel, the record of Dali caravans bringing horses to Yongzhou for sale become increasingly fewer and sparser. The Ziqi and Luodian tribes in the western Guizhou “were all engaged in purchasing horses from Dali for sale” and consequently became the main merchants trading with the Southern Song Dynasty. Their contact with Yunnan in the late Southern Song Dynasty gradually decreased. During the Xianchun Reign, Ma Ji was appointed the prefect of Yongzhou. During his tenure, “Dali did not dare to venture into Shanchan (now Kunming), and Annan did not dare to enter Yongping” (Tuotuo et al., 1977). At the end of the Song Dynasty, the Mongolian

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army maneuvered to the northwest to attack Dali. The scouts sent by the Yongzhou government to spy on the military situation had to return when they reached the Temo area (now Guangnan and Yunnan). “On few occasions could they reach Dali, because the road was blocked by local aborigines.”34 The Southern Song Dynasty set up a trade fair in Hengshanzhai, Guangxi (in Tiandong, Guangxi), and bought horses from Dali Kingdom and the southwestern aborigines. Therefore, the road from Shanchan Ziqi to Yongzhou via Ziqi or Luodian prospered. Known as “Yongzhou Road”, it led to Shanchan Sub-prefecture in three directions after reaching Hengshan Village from Yongzhou. One led to Shanchan Sub-prefecture via Lezhou (now north of Baise, Guangxi), Suidian Prefecture (now southeast of Tianlin, Guangxi), Sicheng Prefecture (now Lingyun, Guangxi), Moju (now southwest of Anlong, Guizhou), and Ziqi Prefecture (center in today’s Xingyi, Guizhou) successively. The second led to Qiyuanzhou Branch, and then passed through Male County, Shuntang Prefecture and Luodianguo (in the west of Guizhou) to reach Shanchan. The third led to Ande Prefecture (southeast of Napo in present-day Guangxi), Temo Circuit (now Guangnan, Yunnan), and Zuining Sub-prefecture (now Kaiyuan, Yunnan) before arriving in Shanchan (Zhou, 1999, 122). The tribute of Dali Kingdom to the Southern Song Dynasty was sent from Shanchan to Hengshanzhai via Ziqi, Luodian and Temo Circuit, and then to Yongzhou, before being sent eastward from Guizhou (now Guilin, Guangxi) to Lin’an (now Hangzhou), the capital of the Southern Song Dynasty. The horse trade via Yongzhou Road once attained a considerable scale for a period of time. For example, in the 21st year of Shaoxing, 1,500 horses were traded in Hengshanzhai, and prices paid by the Southern Song Dynasty included 50 yi of gold, 300 catties of white gold, 4,000 rolls of cotton cloth, and 2 million catties of Lianzhou salt (Bi, 1992, 756). “The horses usually came, together with many other goods.” There were also many merchants who accompanied the southwestern horse teams to the Hengshanzhai with large quantities of goods for 34 Li Zengbo, Sequal Manuscripts of Kezhai Studio (2), Vol. 9, “Memorial in Reply to the Imperial Decree”.



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trading. The situation of “private trade by Borderland generals and business travelers” could also be seen everywhere.35 Zhou Qufei of the Song Dynasty said that “in the south, the imperial court exercised horse administration exclusively in Yong, where most of the Borderland rarities and exotic goods gathered” (Zhou, 1999, 47). Caravans and business travelers passing by sometimes followed in such rapid succession that the people back then claimed that “the Middle Kingdom had to communicate with the southern barbarians via Hengshanzhai in Yongzhou.” In order to facilitate the northward transportation of horses and the exchange of materials and personnel, the Southern Song Dynasty set up 18 post houses on the road from Yongzhou to Guizhou (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10680). In addition, thousands of water post houses were set up on the roads from Guizhou to Jingzhou. Due to the overwhelming traffic, Zhang Qixian, the judge of Hengzhou, acquired the approval of the court for cutting by half the conscript labor of families engaged in water post house services (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 9150). After Song court moved south, the place for purchasing horses from Dali was changed to Guangxi. As a result, the Qingxiguan Road leading to Shu through Lizhou was gradually abandoned and Yongzhou Road became the main channel for Yunnan to communicate with the mainland. The change weakened the traditional connection between Yunnan and Shu, and laid the groundwork for establishment of Yunnan as a province of independent of Sichuan in the Yuan Dynasty. In terms of communication with the South China Sea kingdoms, the Song Dynasty alienated Dali with the Dadu River, making it extremely difficult for the foreign kingdoms beyond Yunnan to pay tribute to the Central Plains through it. Since the Han Dynasty, their traditional connection with the Central Plains was significantly weakened. According to “Biography of Foreign Kingdoms” in History of Song, in the Song Dynasty, the communication of Cochin, Champa, Zhenla, and Pagan of the China-Indochina Peninsula with the Song Dynasty was significantly reduced, and most of them chose to pay tribute to the Central Plains by sea through Guangzhou or Cochin. None chose the surface 35 Li Zengbo, Sequal Manuscripts of Kezhai Studio (2), Vol. 9, “Memorial in Reply to the Imperial Decree”.

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transportation via Yunnan. Pagan and other kingdoms had close contacts with the Central Plains dynasty in their proceeding dynasties, but were briefly recorded in “Biography of Foreign Kingdoms” in History of Song, which devoted 90 characters to Pagan. There is only one instance of Pagan paying tribute to the Middle Kingdom, in the fifth year of Chongning (1106), through a path unknown. In the 3rd year of Tianfu in the later Jin Dynasty (938), Cochin dignitary Wu Quan defeated the invading troops of the Southern Han Dynasty and established a kingdom of his own (Sima, 1956, 9192). In the 6th year of Qiande (968) in the Song Dynasty, Ding Buling of Cochin established the Daquyue Kingdom, which was regarded as a “protectorate” in the Northern Song Dynasty. In the first year of Chunxi in the Southern Song Dynasty (1174), Daquyue presented a tribute, and Emperor Xiaozong conferred on it the name “Annan” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14058), thereby officially recognizing its independent status. Now that Cochin was lost, the feudal dynasty of the Middle Kingdom lost the base for managing the southwestern Borderland and areas beyond, and the loss had far-reaching influence. Annan had a lukewarm relationship with Dali Kingdom. In the 7th year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1014), a war broke out between the two countries, and Annan finally won (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 156). Since the Five dynasties, the road from Cochin to Yunnan had been obstructed and impassable; in the Song Dynasty, there was no record of businessmen traveling through Cochin to central Yunnan.

5.3. The Yuan Dynasty From establishment to withdrawal from the capital, the Yuan Dynasty lasted 97 years. From pacification of the Dali Kingdom by Kublai Khan to the invasion of the Ming army into Yunnan, the Mongolian Yuan ruled Yunnan for 128 years. Due to the importance attached to Yunnan and the long period of rule, its influence in this area was extensive and profound. Yunnan was personally pacified by Kublai Khan, who was impressed by its strategically important location and simple folk customs. In the 4th year of Zhiyuan, when Hugeci was about to set off for



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Yunnan and take up the post of the Prince of Liang, Emperor Shizu exhorted him in person that “Dali was personally pacified by me and I have been fascinated with its local customs, and have personally handled relevant affairs. Now I am handing it over to you. When you get there, do placate the local officials and the people” (Tu, 1989, 510). Yunnan was also a base for attacking foreign kingdoms. The Mongol Yuan conquered Burma, Annan, Champa and the Kingdom of Lan Na (now Chiangmai), all with Yunnan as the base. As the Yuan continued to launch conquests against foreign countries, the unique strategic position of Yunnan became increasingly important. The basic policy of the Yuan Dynasty for governing Yunnan was “appoint a prince as king and entrust its affairs with the important ministers.”36 Hugeci was poisoned during internal dissension four years after he took office as prince of Yunnan. In the 11th year of Zhiyuan, Kublai decided to send his important minister Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar to Yunnan for establishing a province. After arriving in Yunnan, Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar changed fiefs with 10,000 and 1,000 households into prefectures and counties, replaced the multi-purpose military rule with civil administration, adjusted the chaotic rule and subordination relationship, and eased the tension of ethnic contradictions, quickly stabilizing the Yunnan area, and achieving initial results in building the province. In the 6th year of Zhidian, Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar died in office, and Kublai Khan ordered that his established rules be followed by officials of Yunnan Province, to be changed with imperial approval only (Song et al., 1976, 3066). The imperial court of Yuan once detained the provincial seal of Yunnan, retaining only the seal of the High Command of the Placation Division. In the following year when the situation was stabilized, the Yunnan province was restored. Kublai’s eldest son, Nasr al-Din, soon succeeded to the office of prime minister of Yunnan Province, and continued to implement the governance policies of Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar. The several Yunnan commanders after Nasr al-Din were 36 [Yuan Dynasty] Yu Ji, Ancient Records of Daoyuan Learning, Vol. 5, “On the Eve of Sending Wen Zifang to Yunnan”.

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mostly clean and capable, and made the decades after the establishment of the province a period of rapid development in the Yuan Dynasty. The provincial system was created by the Jin Dynasty and was promoted all over the country after reformation by the Yuan Dynasty. The province consolidated the local military and administrative power, entrusted to handle all affairs of significance, including “collection of taxes and land rent, training of soldiers and production of weaponry, land reclamation for farming and water transportation.” By establishing the Yunnan province, the Yuan Dynasty successfully put together for the first time all parts of Yunnan into a large administrative region under the imperial court, based on the 500-year rule of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom. The province of Yunnan had a wide jurisdiction, including present-day Yunnan Province, western Guizhou, southwestern Sichuan, as well as present-day northeastern Burma, northern Laos and Thailand, and northwestern Vietnam. The subordinate institutions under the provinces were also complete and well organized, including 37 circuits, 5 sub-prefectures, 54 prefectures, and 47 subordinate counties, “excluding villages, and military and civilian prefectures” (Song et al., 1976, 1457). In addition, the Yuan Dynasty also established many placation divisions, which were “charged with the military and civilian affairs of prefectures and counties for the circuits.” The establishment of Yunnan Province marked the official separation of Yunnan from the jurisdiction of the Sichuan hinterland, and elimination of the profound political, economic, social, and cultural influence of Sichuan for a long time. The important decision of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty was related to not only historical evolution and the actual circumstances of Mongol Yuan’s rule, but also the apparent decline of the Sichuan Basin since the end of the Song Dynasty. Bashu was the stage of the decisive battle between the Mongolian army and the Southern Song Dynasty. The decades of war in the late Song Dynasty severely damaged the economy of Shu, and antagonized the Yuan army against the officials and people of Bashu. After being pacified, the land of Shu was first placed under the jurisdiction of ShaanxiSichuan Province. In the 8th year of Zhiyuan (1271), it was separated from into Sichuan Province, but was merged and separated repeatedly



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later on. The provincial government also moved between Chengdu and Chongqing. In the first year Tianli (1328), of the annual taxes collected, Yunnan Province topped the entire country in gold, silver, copper, and iron ore taxes, while Sichuan Province paid only a little more than seven liang of gold in tax (Song et al., 1976, 2383). Following the establishment of Yunnan Province, the ruling center shifted from western Yunnan in the preceding dynasty to Zhongqing (now Kunming). Accordingly, the post road was opened from central Yunnan to Huguang via present-day Guizhou was opened immediately, and the area closely connected with Yunnan was changed from Sichuan to Huguang. This way, Yunnan established closer ties with the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and the Central Plains. The Mongolian Yuan Dynasty treated Yunnan as the base for managing the southwestern Borderland and the foreign regions beyond. Meanwhile, it was less influenced by the traditional consciousness of “Han Chinese in the center and aborigines on the periphery.” Therefore, it promoted a different method of governance in Yunnan, for example, extensively establishing governance institution and comprehensively implementing the native official system, and actively launched census, opened up farms, excavated mines and collected taxes. Just as mentioned in “Geography (1)” in History of Yuan, “taxes were imposed on all regions along the borderland of Lingbei, Liaoyang, Gansu, Sichuan and Huguang, called jimi prefectures in the Tang Dynasty, almost on a par with the hinterland.” The determination and proactive attitude of the Yuan Dynasty in actively managing Yunnan were unprecedented. Meanwhile, its rulers made indefatigable efforts to launch punitive expeditions and placate locals, dispatched princes to guard it with large garrisons, established government offices, and opened post roads and made conscious efforts to develop the economy. Upholding the above-mentioned border governance strategy, the Yuan Dynasty spared no effort in developing transportation in Yunnan Province, opening nine major post roads opened successively. The first one was Dali-Shu Road via Chahanzhang. In the 11th year of Zhiyuan (1270), the Placation Commission of Dali Jinchi set up a horse station in Chahanzhang (now Lijiang, Yunnan) and Xifan Xiaodangdang. The road was built on the basis of the Daxue Mountain Road to the north

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of Dali Kingdom, spreading from present-day Dali and Lijiang to Shu via northwestern Yunnan, and then northwestward or via Kangding, Tianquan, and Ya’an to Chengdu. When the Mongolian army attacked Yunnan, it traveled north to the southern section of Daxueshan Road. Before the Sichuan region was pacified, its road was the main channel for the Mongolian Army to travel north. After the middle Yuan Dynasty, many post roads were built in Yunnan Province, but the road from Dali to Shu through Chahanzhang was still passable. In the Ming Dynasty, it was said that “begin from south of Lintao, pass Lijiang Shimenguan south to Dali and one reaches Yunnan” (Zhang, 1991, 867). The second one was the road from Zhongqing to Xuzhou through Wumeng. The road was roughly based the former Shimenguan Road, with several branch roads opened and post stations established in Yuan Dynasty. It was opened after the 13th year of Zhiyuan, with water and land post houses established (Song et al., 1976, 3012). There were two routes from Zhongqing to Wumeng (now Zhaotong, Yunnan). One route extended from Kunming to Zhaotong, with 11 stations including Yanglin, Malong, and Zhanyi; the other one went from Kunming to Zhaotong via 7 stations including Yanglin and Huize. After converging in Zhaotong, they led to Xuzhou (now Yibin, Sichuan) via the stations of Yanjin and Qingfu in Gaoxian County. In the 28th year, a new road with five stations from Yeshao Town to Qingfu was opened. There were also the two waterways of the Jinsha River and the Hengjiang River for travel from Wumeng to Xuzhou (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959; Song et al., 1976, 344; Xiong, 1983, 130). Later, the road from Pu’an to Huangping was opened, but supplies from Yunnan could still be transported to Sichuan via Wumeng Waterway. The third one was the road from Zhongqing to Yongzhou, built after the 13th year of Zhiyuan on the basis of the road between Dali Kingdom and Yongzhou for horse trade, with post houses added (Zhao, 1991, 816). This road had two branches. One was the branch from Zhongqing to Yongzhou via Luliang as recorded in Ferries Explained. It spread from present-day Kunming to Nanning via Jingning, Chengjiang, Luliang, Shizong, Guangnan, Funing and Tianyang. The other was the branch from Zhongqing to Yongzhou via Jianshui, as recorded in Records of Roads in Western Guangdong. It traveled through Jinning, Jiangchuan,



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Tonghai, Kaiyuan, Guangnan, Funing, Jingxi, Debao and Daxin (Liu, 1991, 169). The fourth one was the road from Zhongqing to Chengdu through Jiandu. In the 19th year of Zhiyuan, the original Qingxiguan Road was reopened, and 24 post stations established along it. Thus, Jiandu (now Xichang, Sichuan) became a hub for connecting Yunnan and Sichuan. Luoluosi Placation Commission, which governed the area on the inevitable path of the road, boasted 1,271 horses in 29 post stations. Among the local government offices in Sichuan and Yunnan, Wusa Placation Commission had the largest number of post stations and horses, followed by the Luoluosi Placation Commission. However, the road boasted a complicated and dangerous terrain. After the opening of the road from Pu’an to Huangping, the Yuan court reduced the number of horses by more than 500 horses and post workers by more than 15,000 (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959). Hence the road ceased to be the main passage from Yunnan to the hinterland. The fifth one was the road from Zhongqing to Huangping via Pu’an, opened in the 28th year of Zhiyuan, with post stations established (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959). It spread from Kunming to Zhenyuan via Qujing, Pu’an, Anshun, Guiyang, Huangping, and linked to the “frequent station road” east of Yuanling, Hunan. After its opening, the traffic was busy. The Yuan court set up 24 water post stations on the Yuanjiang waterway from Zhenyuan to Yueyang today. Later, except for emergency envoys who still took the land route, the aborigines who went to Beijing to pay tribute and the officials who went to the hinterland to take up offices mostly went north by boat from Zhenyuan, “because water transportation proved truly convenient.” Compared with Wumeng Road, Pu’an Road to the hinterland was “more than two thousand li shorter faster”, and the areas enroute was flat, with a lot of steeds (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959; Xiong, 1983, 130). After reaching Zhenyuan, travelers were diverted by water and land transportation. After its opening, the road quickly became the main channel connect Yunnan to the hinterland. The 20,000 Yuan troops launching an expedition to Chiangmai in the 5th year of Dade, and the hundreds of thousands of troops entering Yunnan to quell the “garrison mutiny” in the Shunjian reign had all taken this road. In previous generation,

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there was no record of the road. The Yuan Dynasty first opened it and set up post stations, and the impact was extremely far-reaching. In the future, it became the first choice for communication between Yunnan and the hinterland. The Ming people said that “Guizhou is the portal of Yunnan. If it is blocked, there would be no road leading to Yunnan” (Min, 1991, 768). Gu Zuyu of the Qing Dynasty called the southbound road from Luzhou via Wusa (now Weining, Guizhou) the west road to Yunnan, and the Pu’an Road the east road to Yunnan (Gu, 2005, 5040). The sixth one was the road from Zhongqing to Luzhou via Wusa. Opened in the 30th year of Zhiyuan, it spread from present-day Kunming to Guizhou via Songming, Malong, Qujing, and Xuanwei, and then to Luzhou via Weining and Bijie, Weixin in Yunnan and Xuyong and Naxi in Sichuan. It could be extended to Chengdu or Chongqing. This road was “nearly more than a thousand li shorter, winding through flat terrain devoid of miasma.” After opening, it became busy with traffic (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959; Liu, 1991, 165). According to “Post Stations (8)” in Yongle Encyclopedia, there were as many as 49 post stations under the jurisdiction of Wusha Placation Commission, indicating that this road was also an important passage between Sichuan and Yunnan. The seventh one was the road from Dali or Zhongqing to Cheli. There were two roads from central Yunnan to Cheli (now Jinghong, Yunnan). One was from the present-day Dali or Chuxiong to Jinghong via Jingdong, Zhenyuan, Pu’er, and Simao. The second was from Kunming to Jinghong via Jianshui, Yuanjiang, Xiaoganlanba in Simao County. The former was an old road connected to Nanzhao, and latter was expanded in the Yuan Dynasty. According to records, Yuancheli Circuit Chief Han Sai sent his nephew Dao Wen to pay tribute to the Yuan court, but was framed by the judge Zong Xian in Yuanjiang. The provincial governor dispatched Sulujie the commanding general to have him rehabilitated. Han Sai was deeply touched, and “established post houses there, just as he had done for other circuits” (Liu, 1991, 393). According to “Records of Emperor Shundi” in History of Yuan, in the first year of Zhengyuan (1341), “The Han Sai, Dao and their people rebelled in Yunnan Cheli, the Yuan court ordered Toqto’ the prime minster of Yunnan province to pacify it.” The same event was said. In the



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21st year of Zhiyuan (1284), the Yuan general Bulu Heda led his army on a punitive expedition against Luobidian (now Yuanjiang, Yunnan), before conquering the kingdom of Chiangmai and venturing into Cheli. In recent years, the cliff stone carvings of the Yuan army’s conquest of the Chiangmai Kingdom were discovered at the Lancang River ferry at Xiaoganlanba in Simao County. The signature inscribed was December of the 19th year of the Yuan Dynasty.37 This suggests that the Yuan army had passed through Jianshui, Yuanjiang, Pu’er, Xiaoganlanba to reach Cheli in the late 19th year and the early 20th year. In the early years of Zhizheng, Han Sai built post houses along this road. The eighth one was from Zhongqing to Annan Circuit via Mengzi. It extended from Kunming to Badian, Mengzi County via Jinning, Jiangchuan, Tonghai and Jianshui, and south to Daluo City (now Hanoi, Vietnam), Annan, roughly along the southern section of the Tang road from Annan to Tintu. In the 12th year of Zhiyuan, the Yuan court ordered Annan to “start administration, organize an army, establish a station, transfer tax, and pay annual tribute”, and consequently set up post stations along the road. The following year, it set up Annan Circuit Battalion Command in Shezi (to the east of present-day Mengzi) (Song et al., 1976, 160, 1476). The road forked in Mengzi, passing through the lianhua Beach and Heyang Pass of Mengzi respectively, spreading along the banks of the Honghe River after entering Annan and converging in Sanqi River in Baihe before crossing the Fuliang River to reach Daluo City. The area on the right bank of the Honghe River was often the preferred choice for its flat terrain (Deng, n.d.). In the 22nd year, the Yuan court set up post stations along the road from Yongpeng Village (southeast of Langshan, Vietnam) to Daluo City and guarded them with troops (Song et al., 1976, 4642). Thus Yongzhou Road became the first choice for travel between the Middle Kingdom and Annan. However, by the late Yuan Dynasty and early Ming Dynasty, travels from Yunnan to Annan Road were not severed.

37 Song Lian et al., History of Yuan, Vol. 132, “Biography of Bulu Heda”, 3208. See Xishuangbanna CPPCC ed., Selected Works of Banna Literature and History, Vol. 2, printed in 1988.

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The ninth one was the road from Zhongqing to Bruma via Dali. It had two routes: one extended north to India from present-day Dali via Baoshan, Tengchong and Bruma; the other led to Jiangtou City (now Katha, Bruma) from Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan) through Jinchi (now Dehong, Yunnan), before extending out to sea along the Irrawaddy River by water or land. The second one was the “southward road to the sea” recorded in the Yilihou Stele in Yunnan in Dali State (Yang, 1980). In the 7th year of Zhiyuan (1270), the Placation Commission of Dali Jinchi and other offices set up post houses along the road from present-day Dali to Tengchong (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959). According to “Biography of Bruma” in History of Yuan, when Nasr al-Din led an expedition to conquer Burma in the 14th year, he had followed the latter to Jiangtou City. According to “Emperor Shizu (7)” in History of Yuan, in the 16th year, Nasr al-Din once again entered Burma along this road, urged villages along the way so surrender and established post stations. According to “Biography of Bruma” in History of Yuan, in the 20th year, the Yuan army seized Jiangtou City, and proceeded to attack the city of Taigong City (now Raingong, Burma) along the land and water. In the 26th year, Taigong Road was established in Taigong City. According to records, in the 3rd year of Dade (1299), Xidou, Administrator of Taigong City, “moved to Jiangtou Station” (Su, 1993). This suggests that post stations may have been established on the road from Jiangtou City to Taigong City. In the 24th year of Zhiyuan, the Yuan army captured Bagan, the capital of Burma (Song et al., 1976, 4659). Later, troops were stationed in Bagan and the Irrawaddy River section below, and there was garrison even in Toludo to the south of Pyay (Harvey, 1957, 96). Thus the Yuan Dynasty achieved effective control of the entire southward road to the sea. The route of this road was as follows: it spread from present-day Dali to Lianghe via Baoshan, to Bagan via Katha, Rajungong, Xingu, and Mandalay after entering Burma, and then southward along the Irrawaddy River to Bago, before eventually reaching the Bay of Bengal in the southwest. The above nine post roads were the main channels from Yunnan to adjacent areas. The most important road within the province was none other than the one from Zhongqing to Jinchi via Dali. In the 7th year of Zhiyuan, the Yuan Dynasty set up 19 post stations along



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the way, including Anning, Lupin, Lufeng, Shezi, Ludian, Weichu, Luge, Shaqiao, Purun, Pupen, Xiaoyunnan, Baishanshi, Heweiguan, Yangbei, Daniuping, Yongping, Shamohe, Yongchang and Tengchong (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959; Xiong, 1983, 130), and greatly facilitated travel along the route. By the second half of the 19th century, those post stations remained the main stops for businessmen traveling along the road. The comprehensive and effective management of post roads was a major feature of the transportation in Yunnan Province. According to “Post Stations (8)” in Yongle Encyclopedia, there were 78 post stations in Yunnan Province, including 74 horse stations and 4 water stations, with 2,345 post horses, 24 oxen and boats (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959). Judging from the relevant records, the actual numbers of stations and facilities were larger. Yunnan also set up express delivery stations for “exchange of instruments with other areas.” In the 20th year of Zhiyuan, the Yuan court set up an express delivery station in the section from Luoluosi (now Xichang, Sichuan) to Chengdu. In the 23rd year, the Yuan court approved the request of Nasr al-Din, administrator of Yunnan Province, and allowed him to “set up an express delivery station to reduce post horses” (Song et al., 1976, 288, 2596). Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar set up towns wherever the post road passed, and appointed a chief and a centurion for each, “for punishing robbers and thieves” (Song et al., 1976, 3065). Each province also had a post officer in charge of related affairs. The Yuan Dynasty set up Yunnan Province and extensively built post roads, effectively strengthening the connection between Yunnan and the hinterland, while extending its rule to the grassroots and borders. Since the Yuan Dynasty, there had been no separatist local regime in Yunnan. The road from Zhongqing to Huangping via Pu’an and that to Luzhou via Wusada passed present-day Eastern Yunnan and Guizhou, and effectively promoted their development. According to “Geography (6)” in History of Yuan, Guizhou (government seat in today’s Guiyang) was connected to Bafan (now western Guizhou). “Located more than two hundred li from Bozhou (now Zunyi, Guizhou), it was a strategic pass for Huguang, Sichuan, and Yunnan.” In the Ming Dynasty, Guizhou was established as a separate province based on

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the administration of the Yuan Dynasty. The primary purpose of the Yuan Dynasty setting up post stations was “to communicate information on the borders and to issue orders.” However, once the post roads were opened, they were used for travels of officials and civilians and tribute-paying aborigines. By the 23rd year of Zhiyuan, one of the several issues approved by the imperial court in response to the request of Nasr al-Din the administrator of Yunnan Province was “to ease the control on roads and facilitate the travel of the people” (Song et al., 1976, 288). It was quite common for the Yunnan tribes to travel to take the post roads to the capital to pay tribute, and even “overwhelmed the post stations”, forcing the rulers to order restrictions. For example, in the 29th year of Zhiyuan, Emperor Shizu issued an edict, saying that “foreign envoys paying tribute via Yunnan will not be provided with rations if they refuse to follow the instructions, unless they had submitted recently” (Song et al., 1976, 362). The post roads built in the Yuan Dynasty were inherited by the Ming and Qing dynasties, and therefore had a far-reaching impact.

5.4. The Ming Dynasty The Ming Dynasty lasted for 277 years. In the 14th year of Hongwu (1381), the Ming army entered Yunnan and the Administrative Commission of Yunnan was established the following year, with the government seat in Yunnan (now Kunming). It governed 58 subprefectures, 75 prefectures, and 55 counties, including Dali, Yongchang, Yao’an, and Chuxiong, as well as a number of placation commissions.38 In the middle of Hongwu reign, the scope of Yunnan Administrative Commission was similar to that of Yunnan Province in the Yuan Dynasty. Later, the Ming Court made some adjustment, placing some areas in the east and northeast of Yunnan under the two administrative commissions of Guizhou and Sichuan.39 In the late Ming Dynasty, the northern part of the Indo-China Peninsula was separated from the jurisdiction of the Yunnan administrative commission, roughly 3 8 History of Ming, Vol. 46, “Geography (7)”, 1171. 39 History of Ming, Vol. 43, “Geography (4)”, 1021.



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forming the southern boundary of Yunnan that lasted to the end of the Qing Dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang and the subsequent Ming emperors abandoned the Yuan Dynasty’s practice of territorial expansion via the borderland and inherited the policy of “making the Borderland the fence of the Middle Kingdom” since the Han and Tang dynasties. In the 4th year of Hongwu, Zhu Yuanzhang said to his ministers that “For overseas barbarian countries that pose a threat to the Middle Kingdom, punitive expeditions must be launched; otherwise, wars should not be waged against them wantonly.”40 When he sent troops to conquer Yunnan, he issued an edict in the 16th year, saying that “now that the Middle Kingdom is secure, the Borderland aborigines should be made the fence for it. Previously, the barbarians refused to follow the teachings of the Middle Kingdom and acted arbitrarily. Therefore, I have sent the General of Southern Conquest to lead a punitive expedition against the southwest with 300,000 troops.”41 In the 22nd year of Jiajing (1543), Emperor Shizong also said that “I heard that a kingly rule should make the Borderland aborigines the fence of the Middle Kingdom. Today, I desire long-term peace and stability, and there is no better strategy than taking the defensive stance.”42 The Ming Dynasty also listed Annan, Siam, Champa, and Kmir as countries not to be conqueror and repaid their tribute with generous gifts, to maintain friendly relations with them, so as to achieve the purpose of “placating the Borderland barbarians.” The Tatar and Oira tribes of Mongolian Yuan descendants to the north of the Gobi Desert were very active, often victimizing the Borderlands of the Ming Dynasty. According to History of Ming, “during the Hongwu, Yongle and Xuande reign, the Middle Kingdom peaked in prosperity, but was constantly harassed by the belligerent Tatar, which surrendered and rebelled time and again. After the Zhengtong reign, the national strength waned and the barbaric tribes drew on their military might and repeatedly rebelled against the Middle 4 0 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 68. 41 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 153. 42 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 284.

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Kingdom. The disasters on the border accompanied the Ming Dynasty till its demise.”43 The Ming people said that “In the time of national unification, the various aboriginal tribes might rose but they were not a concern. The northern aborigines ventured into the Borderlands of the Middle Kingdom time and again, and posed the greatest trouble” (Wang, 1962). Adding: “Of the Borderland barbarians, the northern nomads poses the greatest trouble” (Yang, 1962). Most of the entrusted sons of Zhu Yuanzhang were stationed in the north. As a result, the Borderland governance policy of prioritizing the north over the south formed in the previous generations was inherited by the rulers of the Ming Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty still stationed massive troops in Yunnan to “eradicate worries from the Southwest.” The reason was that Zhu Yuanzhang believed that a military deterrence must be exercised for the tough aboriginal tribes of Yunnan. He said that “The barbarians and aborigines lived together in their colonies and cared nothing about etiquette and righteousness. They are obedient if they can have it their way; otherwise, they tend to rebel. Therefore, troops should be stationed in strategic points to ensure their obedience. By and by, they will be turned into law-abiding citizens after gradual edification.”44 In February of the 15th year of Hongwu, he exhorted Fu Youde, the Southern Conquest General entrusted with leading the punitive expedition against Yunnan, that “I found that they aboriginal tribes of Yunnan had habitually rebelled time and again since ancient times, because their land was dangerous and remote, and their people rich and ruthless. The approach to rule them must be one of balance between leniency and rigor.”45 Although the Ming army defeated the remnants of the Yuan army in Yunnan effortlessly, it encountered fierce resistance from the local tribes. The native officials appointed by the Yuan Dynasty in Dali and today’s Baoshan, Dehong and other places, rose in rebellion, together with some of those who had already surrendered. It eventually took more than a decade to finally pacify Yunnan. Zhu Yuanzhang’s views were confirmed, and stationing a massive 4 3 History of Ming, Vol. 327, “Foreign Countries (8): Tartar”, 8494. 44 History of Ming, Vol 317, “Chieftains of Guangxi (1)”, 8204. 45 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 142.



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army to guard Yunnan thus become established practice. In the 13th year of Chenghua (1477), Yu Zijun, the Minister of War, said that “I think the foundation of the way to rule the barbarians should be garrison with a defensive stance, as noted down by the founding emperor of this dynasty. It should be followed as the eternal law.”.46 According to records, during the Hongwu period, the Ming court had more than 86,000 garrison troops in Yunnan, distributed in 2,000 post houses in 15 guard posts. According to Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty, the Ming court dispatched ten batches of troops to Yunnan in the middle and late stages of Hongwu, totaling about 250,000. Together with the original garrison, the number of troops guarding Yunnan was about 300,000. The garrison soldiers were allowed to bring their family members along, and were stationed in various places all year round. If a military household had three members on average, the total number of people guarding Yunnan amounted to about seven to eight hundred thousand. Those guard posts were distributed throughout the province, forming a large-scale military immigration. The large number of troops entailed considerable pressure on the supply of rations. In the 18th year of Hongwu, the scholar Song Ne proposed that militaryagricultural colonies should be established to enhance border governance. “The troops shall be ordered to engage the enemy in the event of its invasion and began agricultural production after its defeat. That is the long-term strategy for guarding the Borderlands.” The proposal was adopted by Zhu Yuanzhang (Yan, 1993, 506), who stipulated 30% of the garrison should defend the city while the rest 70% should tend to the farms. Therefore, the Yunnan garrison carried out a large-scale military-agricultural colonies, and Mu Ying cultivated more than one million acres of land when he was stationed in Yunnan. His son Mu Chun took over his post after his death, and reclaimed over 300,000 mu of land47. The Mu father and son played a significant role in promoting agricultural development in Yunnan. In order to ensure a large number of troops stationed in Yunnan and achieve their effective mobilization, the importance of transportation 4 6 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Emperor Xianzong, Vol. 195. 47 History of Ming, Vol. 126, “Biography of Muying”, 3759.

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between Yunnan and the hinterland became prominent. The passages included the old road from Pu’an to Guizhou, the former road from Wusha to Shu, Jianchang (modern Xichang, Sichuan) Road and Yuexi Road, as they were called in the Ming Dynasty (Liu, 1991, 162). Travelers from Yunnan to the hinterland mainly took the first two routes; in particular, the old road from Pu’an to Guizhou was often the first choice. Jianchang Road and Yuexi Road that passed through the western Guangxi were abandoned before the middle of the Ming Dynasty. In the late Ming Dynasty, due to social turmoil and poor public security,  the first two roads were sometimes blocked, forcing the officials and the civilians to take Jianchang Road and Yuexi Road. In the 4th year of Tianqi (1624), Yunnan governor Zhu Taizhen and his entourage were stranded in Chengdu for several months on their return to Yunnan from the hinterland, because of the blocked road. Officials and businessmen trapped likewise amounted to several dozen thousand. At last, they had to resort to Jianchang Road, and suffer the plethora of hardships and difficulties (Zhu, 1991, 776). Xuexi Road was also rife with robbery, “making the travel to Guangnan a fearful trip” (Liu, 1991, 162). The former road from Pu’an to Guizhou was the road from Zhongqing to Huangping via Pu’an, while the old road from Wusa to Shu was the one from Zhongqing to Luzhou via Wusa, both built in the Yuan Dynasty. Those two roads had to pass through present-day Guizhou, which was called the “strategic pass for the four provinces.” In the Qing Dynasty, Gu Zuyu said that although the terrain of Guizhou is narrow, but the 1,600 li of land through which the post road passed from Pingxi and Qinglang to the northwest was like the chest and abdomen of a person, connecting the prefectures in the east and the west like the two arms. As far as the geographical situation is concerned, if Pianqiao and Tonggu were secured, Ruan and Jing would be discouraged. If Pu’an and Wumeng were under control, Yunnan and Guangdong would not dare to instigate trouble. If Pingyue and Yongning were held, the troops of Sichuan and Shu would not dare to contend. “That’s what we call defense makes one invincible.”48 As 48 Essentials of Geography in Historical Records, Vol. 120, “Preface to Geographical Records of Guizhou”.



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Guizhou was strategically positioned and held the strategic pass of Yunnan to the hinterland, the rulers during the Ming Dynasty attached great importance to it. In the 15th year of Hongwu (1382), the Ming court set up the Guizhou Chief Military Commission in Guiyang, and placed 18 command posts and settled 2,000 households there. In the 11th year of Yongle (1413), it divided Guizhou into eight prefectures and four sub-prefectures and established the Administrative Commission of Guizhou. In the 15th year, it established the Judicial Commission.49 This marked the beginning of Guizhou as a separate province. The Ming Dynasty attached great importance to the maintenance and protection of the road from Pu’an to Guizhou and that from Wusa to Shu. In February of the 15th year of Hongwu, Emperor Taizu told the aboriginal chiefs of Shuixi, Wusa, Wumeng, Dongchuan, Mangbu, and Zhanyi that “I’m dispatching personnel to build a post road to Yunnan. It is recommended that you build a road to your boundary. The road should be ten zhang wide, with a post station established every 60 li.”50 The Ming court also actively expanded the branch roads. For example, in the 17th year of Hongwu, Shexiang, a native official of Shuixi, opened Pianqiao and Shuidong Post Roads and built Longchangjiu Post Station, for reaching Wumeng, Wusa, Rongshan and Caotang.51 In September of the 27th year, there were 96 water and land post stations in Yunnan, including 83 land post stations and 15 water post stations.52 Some of the important post stations were located along those two roads. In the Ming Dynasty, the way from Wusa to Shu was valued, because the imperial court actively developed mineral deposits, and shipped silver taxes to the hinterland together with copper coins and copper ingots. There were 23 silver mines in Yunnan, and the government collected about 20,000 strings of copper coins in tax annually through an on-site taxation official. In addition, there were 19 copper mines.53 49 [Ming Dynasty] History of Ming, Vol. 316, “Biography of Chieftains in Guizhou”, 8167; Vol. 46, “Geography (7)”, 1197. 50 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 142. 51 [Ming Dynasty] History of Ming, Vol. 316, “Biography of Chieftains in Guizhou”, Vol. 8169. 52 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 234. 53 [Ming Dynasty] Xie Zhaozhe, Management of Yunnan, Vol. 9, “Management of Production”.

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Yunnan topped the entire country in silver production. Song Yingxing said that after Jiajing and Wanli reigns, there are nine silver-producing provinces across the country, but the output of Yunnan more than doubled that of the rest eight provinces combined. Therefore, silver mining can be conducted forever in Yunnan (Song, 1997, 355). Therefore, the silver taxes were considerable. The scale of some mines was also very large, for example, the Mubushan of Lunan produces a million catties of copper annually.54 During the Jiajing, Wanli, and Tianqi years, Yunnan was ordered to start casting coins, and the finished products were transported to the hinterland, together with some copper ingots through the Road from Pu’an to Guizhou and that from Wusa to Shu. In the Ming Dynasty, Wang Shixing said that “Copper and tin produced in Yunnan are only worth 30 liters per catty, but the price can be doubled or tripled in other provinces. There are more than 20 stations on the post road from central Yunnan to Zhenyuan and caravans transporting Yunnan copper and tin are often seen passing by, either carried by footmen or by horses and mules.” Xu Xiake mentioned that horses carrying copper from Dongchuan were seen on the post road from eastern Yunnan to Zhanyi. (Wang, 1981, 128; Xu, 1985). At that time, there was a saying of “Yunnan copper facilitating trade nationwide.” In a bout of palace construction, the Ming Dynasty felled a large number of precious giant trees in the Yunnan-Guizhou region, with a peak period reaching 90 years. In order to harvest and transport the timber, the Ming court repeatedly exempted officials from the tree-cutting areas from paying tribute to the court. The vastness of the project and the huge expenditures were “beyond the capacity of one single province.” For example, in the 37th year of Jiajing (1558), Gao Chong, the Placation Official of Guizhou, said that the province needs more than 1.38 million taels of silver for timbering, and hereby requests Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangnan, Yunnan, and Shaanxi to “provide financial assistance.” In the 36th year of Wanli (1608), Guizhou Governor Guo Zizhang reported in an imperial memorial that “Guizhou felled 12,298 large Nanmu and fir

54 [Daoguang Reign] General Annals of Yunnan, Vol. 75, “Food and Money (8:3): Mineral Resources (3)”.



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trees, worth more than 1.07 million taels of silver.”55 The large number of huge trees was transported to the hinterland mainly through the road from Pu’an to Guizhou. As the road from Kunming to Burma via Dali, and the road from Kunming to Annan via Mengzi remained busy, the imperial court added some post stations en route. For example, in the 5th year of Yongle (1407), four post stations were set up, including Tengchong, Longchuanjiang, Nandian, and Luobu Sizhuang. In the following year, Lujiang Post Station and the Diantou Post Station were set up, under the jurisdiction of Jinchi Lujiang and Qianya Chieftain’s Office respectively. In the 11th year, the Director of Jinchi Mengha Post Station was instated, for managing “post roads leading to Mengyang, and Major and Minor Gour.”56 As commodity economy thrived, business travel through post roads increased significantly, and those two post roads became wellknown international business roads. Traveling from west Yunnan to the south or west, one can reach the Kingdom of Buddha (now Pattani in Thailand), Ashoka (in present-day India), Galu (in present-day central India), and Daqin (in present-day east coast of the Mediterranean Sea), which all had trade relations with Yunnan. For example, Yunan merchants went to Galu, “for trading with the aborigines, they selling river dolphins, fine cotton cloth, glass, and Poppies.”57 There is the Great Ming Street, a large-scale market in Jiangtou City, Bruma. There, “tens of thousands of merchants from Fujian, Guangxi, Jiangxi, and Shu gathered for trade.” There were 12 gates in the city. Traders were requested to exit the market from their entrance; otherwise, punishment would be imposed. After another 30 li, one reaches Baigu Dengwen market, where the businessmen normally traded in the middle of the day. “There were more than 3,000 corridors around the market to provide shelter from rain.”58 Traders included businessmen going by ship northward from

55 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Jiajing in the Reign of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 456; [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Wanli in the Reign of Emperor Shenzong, Vol. 443. 56 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Yongle in the Reign of Emperor Taizong, Vol. 48, 56, 89. 57 Xie Zhaozhe, Management of Yunnan, Vol. 9, “Management of Barbarians”. 58 [Ming Dynasty] Zhu Mengzhen, Folk Customs of Southwest Yi.

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Fujian and Guanghai along the Irrawaddy River, as well as Yunnan and Sichuan merchants from present-day central Yunnan and south. Due to the Luchuan rebellion in the Zhengtong years, the Great Ming Street was destroyed by war.

5.5. The Qing Dynasty The Qing Dynasty lasted for 268 years. At its beginning, a governor was instated in Yunnan and the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou was appointed. Later, the governor of Yunnan and the governor of Guizhou were replaced by the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou. During the Guangxu period, Yunnan Province had jurisdiction over 14 prefectures, 6 directly managed departments, 3 directly managed prefectures, 12 departments, 26 states, and 41 counties. Later, the Qing court assigned Dongchuan, Zhaotong, Zhenxiong and other places from Sichuan to Yunnan. In the late Guangxu period, Yunnan Province had jurisdiction over 14 prefectures, 6 directly managed departments, 3 directly managed prefectures, 12 departments, 26 states, and 41 counties, which were roughly the same in scope as present-day Yunnan Province. The Qing emperors before the Opium War still followed the traditional border-governance ideas of “guarding the hinterland while governing the borderland” and “making the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” Since they came from the Borderland regions, the rulers seldom had the traditional consciousness of “Han Chinese in the hinterland and barbarians in the Borderland areas.” Emperor Yongzheng disapproved of the previous denunciation of those refusing acculturation as barbarians He believed that since the Qing Dynasty unified China, with its vast territories, “there is no point in making the differentiation between Han Chinese and the barbarians” (China City Press, 1999, 5). The gradually stabilized territories of China were also attributable to the prominent boundary problem in the early stage and consequently the importance attached by the Qing court. The Qing emperors had shown a strong sense of historical responsibility for guarding the territories. For example, Emperor Qianlong said: “resorting to arms for territorial expansion would be below me, but I dare



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not lose one inch of land inherited from my ancestors.”59 Because the relationship with the northern nomads was handled properly, the tendency of prioritizing the north over the south was not obvious in the Qing Dynasty. Consequently, Yunnan ushered in another climax of economic development following the Yuan Dynasty. An important social problem faced in the mid-Qing Dynasty was the rapid growth of the national population and the migration of large numbers of refugees to sparsely populated areas. The population of Yunnan grew rapidly in the middle and late Qing Dynasty, mainly due to the large numbers of immigrants. In the 18th year of Shunzhi (1661), the population of Yunnan was about 2 million. According to the General History of Qing and other records, the population of Yunnan reached 12.5 million at the end of the Qing Dynasty, and the Dianchi Lake and Erhai Lake basins were the most densely populated. The densely populated area of Guizhou was the region extending from Pu’an to Zhenyuan in the east (Lu et al., 2000, 755, 824, 928), on the route of the post road from Guizhou to Huguang. With economic development and the rapid population increase, Yunnan witnessed increasingly active business and trade. In some places, the zodiac signs were used for fairs of different times, for example, the Horse Fair, Ox Fair, Ram Fair, Dog Fair, Chicken Fair, Mouse Fair, and Long Fair. People in the vicinity went to the market according to their zodiac signs. The prospering traffic promoted the construction of cities and towns. For example, Tengchong as an important transit point for traveling from Yunnan to Burma had highly developed commerce. Merchants went to Burma in an endless stream from the hinterland of China through the eight passes of Tengchong.60 In the Jiaqing and Xianfeng reigns, large firms such as “Sanyuan” and “Yuhe” emerged in Dali. At the beginning of Guangxu reign, the three caravans of Sichuan, Lin’an, and Yixi took shape, furnishing transportation to Burma and other neighboring countries.

5 9 Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 377. 60 [Republic of China] Long Yun, A Newly Compiled General Record of Yunnan, Vol. 143, “Commercial Studies (1)”, Book 7, 90; [Qing Dynasty] Liu Kun, Miscellaneous Records of Nanzhong.

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The Qing court regarded immigrants as an important human resource, and believed that wasteland reclamation should be combined with the resettlement of refugees to encourage a large number of immigrants to enter Yunnan. The immigrants moved into Yunnan roughly along the communication lines and spread to the surrounding areas. During the Qing Dynasty, the highland plains of Yunnan were mostly overcrowded, and immigrants went to the Borderlands and mountainous areas, gradually creating an upsurge of immigration to the border and mountainous areas. Different from their predecessors, which mainly came from the Shu area and settled down in northeastern and central Yunnan near Shu, immigrants from the Yuan to Qing dynasties mostly traveled along the roads from Guizhou to Yunnan along Huguang, and settled down in the vast areas along the main lines and branch roads. As a result, transporting mineral products, and facilitating business activities and emigration became the main functions of communication lines in Yunnan during the Qing Dynasty, instead of military maneuver and the tribute envoys of neighboring states and aborigines in China’s imperial history. In the Qing Dynasty, the traffic development of Yunnan also showed a significant increase in passenger flow through arterial roads, the emergence of towns along the roads, and the gradual prosperity of the passages connecting the Borderlands and mountainous areas. The situation was mostly attributable to economic development. For example, the road from Dongchuan Prefecture to Luzhou, Sichuan and that from Luxi to Nanning, Guangxi were valued for their large quantities of copper, silver, and lead shipped to the hinterland. The Qing government also opened the Jinsha River water transport to facilitate the transport of copper from Yunnan and lead from Guizhou to Beijing (Zhao et al., 1977, 10557). The road from Huguang to Yunnan via Guizhou was even busier than in the previous dynasty, and the towns along the way stood to benefit. According to Records of Liping Prefecture, “(Liping) extends to Yunnan, Huguang, Guangyue and Chuanshu in the south, north, east, and west respectively, and is the transportation hub for the four provinces.” In the 2nd year of Xuantong (1910), Yunnan-Vietnam Railway from Kunming to Vietnam via southern Yunnan was completed, objectively facilitating



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the connection between Yunnan and other places, and cities emerged one after another along the line. The important post roads from Yunnan to other places included the following. First, the one from Central Yunnan to the Huguang through Guizhou. Following the direction of the old road from Pu’an to Guizhou of the previous dynasty, it was a strategic passage connecting Yunnan and Guizhou to the hinterland, and the Qing government attached great importance to its maintenance and protection. In the 38th year of Kangxi (1699), the imperial court changed Yuanzhou Town to Zhengan Town, and guarded with 2100 troops led by a military commander. In the 9th year of Yongzheng (1731), it dispatched an additional army of 2,000. Eretai the governor of Yungui also set up the Qingjiang Garrison, which commanded Danjiang, Taigong, Tongren and Zhenyuan Batallion; the general army command of Guzhou Town governed Duyun, Liping, Shangjiang and Xiajiang paramilitary batallions for protecting this road (Zhao et al., 1977, 4087). In the 4th year of Yongzheng (1726), Eertai submitted “Imperial Memorial on Requesting Placement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule”, proposing that the native prefectures of Dongchuan (Sichuan), Nanning (Guangxi), the aboriginal tribes near the Lancang River of Yunnan, and the Miao colonies of Guizhou were in urgent need of such a reform. He believes that the Miao colony with Guzhou as the center was held by the “incorrigible Miao”, and that it blocked the communication among three provinces, saying that “a thorough military conquest must be launched in order to open the water traffic to Guizhou and Guangdong.” Under the support of Emperor Yongzheng, Errtai carried out the reform in the above areas, and set up six halls including Bazhai and Guzhou, calling them “the New Colony of Miao.” The Qing army dredged beaches along the Shangjiang and Xiajiang River, set up fortresses, and opened up water transportation for rations, “bringing law and order to Guzhou” (Wei, 1984, 283). After the reform, it became easier to take the road from central Yunnan to Huguang via Guizhou, and business travel became incessant. Second, the post road from Dongchuan Prefecture to Luzhou, Sichuan, which was built on the basis of the old road from Wusa to Shu. At the beginning of Qianlong reign, Yunnan copper was ordered to transfer Beijing in large quantities. The main transportation

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route extended on land from Dongchuan Prefecture (now Huize, Yunnan) and to Yongning (now Yanjin, Yunnan), and then by water to Chongqing, Hankou and Beijing along the Yangtze River via Luzhou. The copper shipped from Dongchuan Prefecture was not just locally produced; it also included copper of western Yunnan transported via Chuxiong, Kunming, and Xundian. The specific route extended from Dongchuan to Ludian, Zhaotong Prefecture, and then to Yongning via Zhenxiong. Meanwhile, the copper from Ludian was transported to Luzhou via Daguan and Yongshan by water and land, while that produced in Zhenxiong was transported by water and landvia Luoxingdu to Luzhou. The copper from Xundian was transported to Weining, Guizhou, and by water to Luzhou via Yongning. In order to facilitate the transportation of Yunnan copper to Beijing, the Qing government also opened the Jinsha River water transportation extending for more than 1,300 miles during the Qianlong reign.61 Third, the road from Luxi to Nanning, Guangxi, which roughly followed the route of Luliang-Yongzhou Road as mentioned in the Records of Ferries in the Yuan Dynasty. It extended from the mint of Guangxi Prefecture (now Luxi, Yunnan) by land to Guangnan Prefecture (now Guangnan, Yunnan), where it switched to water transport to the capital.62 Yunnan copper transported by this road was much smaller in quantity than that shipped along Luzhou Road via Dongchuan Prefecture. Fourth, the road from Yunnan to Burma. According to Qing records, it took 38 days to travel from Tengchong, Yunnan to Taigongcheng (now Layungong, Bruma) and Miancheng (now Ava, Burma), along the old road via Jinlianghe and Ruili. There were several ways leading from Yunnan to Bruma. The first one was to cross the Nujiang River to the northeastern part of Bruma; the second one was to travel from Tengchong for seven days to Ruili, and the third was to travel from present-day Midu, Yunnan to Jingdong and Wandian Damang City for another ten days. The fourth is from the upper reaches of the Nujiang

61 [Daoguang Reign] Manuscripts of General Records of Yunnan: Treatise on Literature: The Copper of Yunnan, Vol. 4, “Land Transport”. 62 [Daoguang Reign] Manuscripts of General Records of Yunnan: Treatise on Literature: The Copper of Yunnan, Vol. 3, “Transportation to the Capital”.



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River to reach Jingdong. If you travel by boat along the Irrawaddy from Burma, a trip of five days leads to today Bago in southern Bruma. The northern section of the Yunnan-Bruma Passage diverges into multiple branch roads, indicating that caravans everywhere were looking for access roads to Bruma.63 Fifth, the road from southeastern Yunnan to Sichuan and Xizang via northwestern Yunnan, roughly along the route from Dali to Shu via Chahanzhang built in the Yuan Dynasty. In the Qing Dynasty, Cheli (now Xishuangbanna) was known for tea production. Its tea bricks were sent through this road to Lijiang for trading the mules and horses of Xizang areas. The road was thus called the “Tea-Horse Road.” Merchants mostly bought tea in Cheli and transported it to Xiaguan, Dali for processing compacted tea, which was then carried it Lijiang with horse caravans for trade with Xizang people carrying horses to the south. Travelers could also go northward, cross the Jinsha River, and pass Mupiwan, Zhongdian, and Benzilan to reach Batang, Sichuan, and then depart to Lhasa in Xizang or Ya’an in present-day Sichuan.64 Since the opening of Yongzhou-Annan Road in the Yuan Dynasty, the envoys between the Central Plains dynasty and Annan generally switched from the previous Central Yunnan-Annan Road to YongzhouAnnan Road. The former became used mainly for business travel. The government set up customs to the south of Mengzi to collect tariffs from passing business travelers.

5.6. Summary In summary, there is a close relationship between the border governance strategies of the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties and the changes in transportation in Yunnan. Imperial China include border management theories and policies, border management priorities, and border management strategies related to border geopolitics and major realities, which have profoundly affected the rise and fall of transportation in Yunnan. On the contrary, the opening and operation 6 3 [Qing Dynasty] Ni Tui, A Minor Record of Yunnan: Road to Burma. 64 A Minor Record of Yunnan: Road to Xizang.

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of the transportation lines in Yunnan is an important factor that has influenced and even influenced the governance of Yunnan in China’s imperial history. The border governance strategies of the above dynasties and the changes in the passage of Yunnan have gone through a complicated process of evolution, but there are also basic laws to be found. Generally speaking, the Tang and Song dynasties and the imperial China can be regarded as a stage, which is characterized by the Sichuan Basin as a basis for operating the Yunnan area, and the Lingguan Road and Wuchi Road from the Sichuan Basin to the Yunnan area are the lifeblood transportation links between the two places. The establishment of a province in Yunnan during the Yuan Dynasty marked Yunnan’s official status as a large administrative region directly under the Central Government; the post road from central Yunnan to Huguang from Guizhou and the post road from northeast Yunnan to east Sichuan more closely linked Yunnan and the Central Plains. This change in the business structure in the Yuan Dynasty was inherited by the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Yuan Dynasty unified the whole country, attached importance to the Yunnan region and established the Yunnan Province, which separated Yunnan from the jurisdiction of Sichuan. Since the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty, the political and cultural center of Yunnan has moved from west Yunnan back to east Yunnan. An important factor closely related to this change is the opening of the post road from Kunming to Huguang via Guiyang in the early years of the Yuan Dynasty. This road was immediately followed. It became a thoroughfare between Yunnan and the mainland, accompanied by the gradual decline of the old road from Yunnan to Sichuan. The traffic pattern formed in the Yuan Dynasty remained unchanged during the Ming and Qing dynasties. One of the reasons why Guizhou Province was established in the Ming Dynasty was to protect the safety of the post road from Kunming to Huguang via Guiyang. Economic activity is also an important driving force for the expansion of channels. The Southern Song Dynasty bought horses from the Dali Kingdom and the southwestern countries, which contributed to the prosperity of the road from central Yunnan to western Guangxi. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Central Yunnan Road to



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Sichuan through the northeast of Yunnan received attention, mainly driven by the export of Yunnan copper. As the commodity economy becomes more active, the social economy’s influence on transportation lines becomes more and more obvious. The main function of the Yunnan Passage in the Qing Dynasty was to transport mineral products, facilitate commerce and migration and migration, which was different from the former mainly for the movement of the army, neighboring countries and barbarians. Successive generations have actively managed the road from Yunnan to neighboring countries such as Burma and Vietnam. From the Qin and Han dynasties to the Tang Dynasty, the construction and protection of these passages were emphasized, and it even became an extremely important driving force for the rulers to manage the southwestern Borderland. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the role of the passage between Yunnan and its neighboring countries changed and showed some new characteristics.

6.  The Native Official System of the Yuan Dynasty and Its Underlying Reasons The native official system of the Yuan Dynasty evolved from the jimi rule policy from the pre-Qin period to the Tang Dynasty. The basic content of jimi rule was that the feudal dynasty relied on the Borderland ethnic leaders in ruling, by conferring the titles of king, prince, duchess and duke according to strength. In practice, the dual-track system of governance featuring native chieftains and prefects was implemented. The imperial court assigned officials to assist in the management of the enfeoffed kings, princes and dukes, and stipulated that the enfeoffed kings, princes and dukes were on a par with Borderland prefects or magistrates. The enfeoffed posts were hereditary, but were not in the system of governmental officials. The imperial court implemented a loose management for them, usually without unified management rules. As a result, related issues were handled with obvious arbitrariness. In addition, the feudal dynasty did not expect economic returns from operations of the barbarian lands, and imposed very light taxes and tributes on such areas (Fang, 2003, 138–140).

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The Ming and Qing dynasties had a deeper understanding of the connotations and function of the chieftain system developed from the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty. According to “Biography of chieftain” in History of Ming, “the Ming Dynasty followed the practice of the Yuan Dynasty and popularized it, establishing prefectures and counties, imposing taxes and duties, and securing their obedience. Thus the rules and regulations became established. However, the secret consists in jimi rule. Those prestigious clans took the law into their own hands and accumulated prestige over generations, but had to rely on the conferment and titles of the imperial court. Therefore, they could be controlled and ordered about. However, the increasingly frequent conscription and imposition tended to cause them to change, making them prone to draw on their merits and foment trouble. So the levies and duties imposed in imperial China had led to mixed results. The key lied in proper placation and combination of grace with deterrence. This way, their allegiance can be secured without the risk of forcing them into rebellion.”65 Therefore, the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty was markedly different from the jimi rule of pre-Qin to Tang Dynasty.

6.1. The Content of the Native Official System The native official system of the Yuan Dynasty roughly included the following content: native officials were governmental officials not to be casually abolished, but were hereditary. The Yuan Dynasty extensively appointed Borderland barbarians as native officials at all levels, with unprecedented level of trust, number of appointments and the weight of authorization. The Yuan Dynasty closely integrated the appointment of native officials with the establishment of ruling institutions. The ruling institutions in which native officials served were still intended for jimi rule to some extent, but they were included in the national administrative system and managed in the same way as the ruling institutions in the hinterland. The native officials had formal ranks and were no different from their hinterland counterparts in terms of treatment, 65 History of Ming, Vol. 316, “Biography of Chieftains”, 7981.



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rights and responsibilities (Song et al., 1976, 2318; Fang, 2003, 648). There are many records of transfers of native officials and non-native officials in History of Yuan. However, the kings, princes, duchesses, and dukes conferred in the preceding dynasties were actually nominal titles, to be canceled or exterminated by the feudal dynasty as it saw fit. The establishment of the Placation Commission that concurrently served as the military command and the extensive appointment of native officials as its officials was an important creation of the Yuan Dynasty, later followed by the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Yuan government stipulated that the Placation Commission “shall be in charge of the military and civilian affairs, subject to the jurisdiction of circuits but entrusted with the management of prefectures and counties. It is responsible for disseminating the government orders of provinces and submitting the requests of prefectures and counties to the province. It shall take up the duties of the general military command or the military command where Borderland military affairs are involved. In remote regions, expedition, placation and publicity commissioners were instated, in different numbers and at different ranks” (Song et al., 1976, 2318). However, the ethnic regions in southwestern China topped the entire country both in number and influence. In fact, the extensive establishment of commissioners can be regarded as one of the important contents of the native official system. Officials of the Placation Commission guarded various places with troops and actually wielded considerable power. So the extensive assignment of native officials to the Placation Commission in the Yuan Dynasty fully demonstrated the trust and reliance on the aboriginal native officials. The rule of the imperial court over the areas under the jurisdiction of native officials was clearly deepened, as particularly reflected in the extensive establishment of governance offices, enforcement of laws, implementation of census, and collection of taxes. According to records, Yunnan Province had jurisdiction over 37 circuits, two sub prefectures, three subordinate prefectures, 54 subordinate states, and 47 subordinate counties, “not including the numerous villages or military and civilian sub prefectures” (Song et al., 1976, 1457). In addition, a placation commission was established in ten places including Qujing, each with several subordinate commissions. The number of governance

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institutions and the depth of rule both exceeded the China’s imperial history. The situation in Huguang Province was similar to that in Yunnan Province. Before the Yuan Dynasty, there was no record of the Central Plains dynasty conducting a census in the southwestern Borderland. The Yuan Dynasty adopted a governance method similar to that adopted for the hinterland and conducted several censuses in Yunnan Province. For example, in the 19th year of Zhiyuan, there was a record of registering newly attached households in Yunnan, saying that when Uriyangkhadai was dispatched to guard Yunnan “there were eight types of civilian household registration and four types of civilian land registration, creating considerable inconvenience.” So the Yuan court ordered those that had already been registered not to move home, so that the those who had submitted recently can be registered (Song et al., 1976, 246). By then, there were more than 1.28 million households in Yunnan and the surrounding areas. Before the Song and Yuan dynasties, the dynasties only symbolically collected native products from the southwest borderland, and the official taxation began in the Song and Yuan dynasties. The Yuan Dynasty mainly collected autumn taxes and summer taxes in Yunnan Province.66 In remote areas, taxation was more flexible. For example, gold and silver were collected on the basis of family size or housing in Jinya and other places; Autumn and summer taxes were also collected in Huguang Province (Song et al., 1976, 2359). Just as mentioned in “Geography (1)” in History of Yuan, “taxes and levies were imposed on Lingbei, Liaoyang and the border areas of Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Huguang, and other areas known as jimi states in the Tang Dynasty, on a level similar to the hinterland.” The organization of the native army is defined as a system. Composed of barbarians in the south, it is under the jurisdiction of the native officials, but it can be mobilized by the court. According to records in History of Yuan, the native army in Yunnan province includes Cuan Su, Luo Luo, and Ni ethnic groups in Yunnan. A similar situation exists in Huguang province. The native official institution was allowed to command the 66 History of Yuan: Emperor Taiding (1): in the 3rd year of Zhizhi, “exempted the taxes payable by villages of Bafan, Si, Bo and Guangdong and Guangxi, cut the autumn levy of Gansu by 30 percent”, 642.



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native army. Leading the native army to participate in the expedition organized by the imperial court was an important duty of native officials. In History of Yuan, there are also records of the native troops sent to expedition against Burma, Annan and even Japan. Before the Song Dynasty, native soldiers were recruited, mainly as attachments to the official army or as mercenary. There was no record of the formation of a separate native army. The emergence of the native military organization system under the native official system was of great significance, in that it enhanced the strength of the native officials with soldiers, and benefited the implementation of the native official system, while ushering in the transition from a military democratic system to a feudal subordination system for the society in the area ruled by native officials. The full implementation of the native official system in the aboriginal areas in the south also ushered in a period when the feudal dynasty implemented separate policies for governing aborigines in the north and the south. The policy for aboriginal ruling in imperial China could be generally referred to as “jimi system.” The term jimi originally meant that once the imperial court mastered the knack it could effectively control the aborigines with ease, just like controlling the horse by holding the ji (halter) and the ox by holding the mi (nose rope).67 In development, the jimi system underwent several major development stages, including the jimi governance policy, the native official system, the chieftain system, and the replacement of native chieftains with state officials. In those stages, the essence of jimi was upheld all along the way, but the content, focus and method of its implementation were obviously different. So were the effectiveness and impact. The period from Pre-Qin to Tang was the first stage of the jimi system, and the main forms were the jimi method of pre-Qin and jimi prefectures of the Tang Dynasty. The second stage was the native official system of the Song and Yuan dynasties, with the jimi counties in the Song Dynasty and the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty as the basic forms. The native official system of the Yuan Dynasty was the most thoroughly implemented. The third stage was the Ming and Qing dynasties, which marked a period of 67 Wei Hong, Official Decorum of the Han Dynasty.

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improvement and gradual change in the jimi system. The main forms were the chieftain system and the replacement of native chieftains with state officials. The basic characteristics of the jimi system from the pre-Qin to the Tang Dynasty included emphasis on loose-rein control and insufficient restraint, casual administration with little institutional arrangement, and generally uniform governance policies throughout the country without regional difference between the north and the south. From the pre-Qin to the Tang dynasties, a generally uniform governance policy was implemented throughout the country. An important reason was that during this period, the north was prioritized over the south in border governance, and the policies were mainly intended to handle the northern nomads, without considering the characteristics of the aborigines in the south and their governance. Prior to the Yuan Dynasty, the administration of the ethnic minorities in the northern Borderland was not comprehensive or in-depth. Therefore, it was impossible to formulate a governance policy reflecting the regional differences between the aborigines in the north and their counterpart in the south. Among the unified dynasties, only the Yuan and Qing dynasties had a less obvious tendency to prioritize the north over the south in border governance. The Yuan Dynasty was founded by northern nomads, with the northern grassland as its birthplace and base. The influence from the tradition of the Central Plains dynasty for border governance was limited, and the Yuan Dynasty emphasized the management of Yunnan and other southern borders. In strengthening its rule over the aborigines in the southwestern Borderland, the Yuan Dynasty found that the jimi county system implemented in Guangxi by the Song Dynasty was applicable and developed a native official system on its basis for general promotion in the aboriginal areas in the south. As for the north, especially the grassland areas, the traditional rule of Centurion, Battalion, and Chief Brigade was used. As a result, it caused major differences in aboriginal administration between the north and the south. This practice of the Yuan Dynasty was inherited by the Ming and Qing dynasties, and popularized in various border areas. By the Qing Dynasty, separate governance policies were developed for the southwestern Borderland, the northern grasslands, the



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Xinjiang region, and the Xizang region, each with their distinctive features and perfection.

6.2. The Reasons for and Process of Implementing the Native Official System As an effective way to rule the barbarians in the south and a watershed in the policy of separate administration of aborigines in the north and south, the native official system was established and widely promoted in the Yuan Dynasty for many reasons. The main ones were: First, the Mongolian Yuan rulers had implemented the native official system partly because of their unique views on race, Borderlands, and governance. According to estimates in the late Ming Dynasty, the number of Mongols first entering the Central Plains was about 400,000 (Han, 1986, 5). According to studies, by the seventh year of Zhiyuan (1270), China had 1,939,449 households (Wu, 2000, 253), the vast majority of which were Han Chinese. It would be extremely difficult for the small number of Mongols to rule the large population conquered. Therefore, the Mongolian rulers divided the population into four categories, namely, Mongolians, Semu, Han Chinese, and Southerners.68 The imperial court trusted and relied on the Mongols and Semu, and placed the focus of prevention and oppression on the Han Chinese and Southerners. As for the Borderland aborigines, their social statuses seemed to vary. For example, the Qincha people were classified as the Semu people, while the rest tribes were regarded as the Han people. Judging from the Mongolian rulers’ trust and extensive appointment of southern native officials, the southern aborigines appointed as native officials at all levels were actually regarded as helpers to rule the Han Chinese and southerners. This was obviously different from the discrimination against the Borderland barbarians under the concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery” practiced in China’s imperial history. 68 Although there is no explicit record of the four-class system of the Yuan Dynasty, there were indeed great differences in the political and social treatment, and legal judgments among the Mongols, Semu people, Han and Southerners in the Yuan Dynasty. The existence of the four-class system is generally credible.

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The Yuan Dynasty not only implemented the four-class system, but also retained the original Mongolian customs in many aspects, manifesting the duality of progress and backwardness in institution and culture. On the one hand, it implemented a four-class system that emphasized ethnic oppression throughout the country. On the other hand, the rulers themselves belonged to the category of Borderland aborigines, and were seldom influenced by the feudal orthodoxy of “distinction between Han Chinese and the aborigines” or “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery.” Therefore, they were not so watchful against other Borderland aborigines. Upholding the above-mentioned ethnic outlook, the Yuan rulers respected different religious beliefs and culture and had a more tolerant attitude towards exchanges and integration among various ethnic groups. Seen from records, the Yuan Dynasty appointed native officials more casually and had full trust in them. The imperial court was generally tolerant or even protective of native officials when they made mistakes. On the other hand, another reason for the Yuan rulers to prioritize and appoint southern aborigines was that they had to use the southwestern Borderland as a springboard for external expansion and that they urgently needed the support of the Borderland tribes in conquering wars and maintenance of Borderland stability. In terms of Borderland concept and border governance, the emperors of the Yuan Dynasty, especially the early ones, were relatively indifferent to the traditional concepts of “guarding the middle and governing the border” and “making the Borderland aborigines the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” They habitually resort to arms for Borderland expansion. After the death of Kublai Khan, the frequent foreign conquests of the Yuan Dynasty gradually ceased. Meanwhile, the Yuan Dynasty originated in the northern grasslands, and there was no threat of invasion from the northern nomadic tribes. Therefore, the traditional tendency to “prioritize the north over the south” in border management was not obvious. As a result, the Yuan Dynasty spared no effort in operating Yunnan, Huguang and other aboriginal areas, and even applied some of the hinterland governance policies there, as different from preceding generations.



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Second, the Yuan rulers advocated simplicity in their actions, and were accustomed to borrowing and transplanting foreign systems. This was another important reason for it to implement the native official system. The Mongolian nation originated in the Mongolian plateau. There they led a nomadic life from generation to generation, allowing their nobles to develop personalities and habits different from those of farming nations. In terms of behavior, they cherished the practicality of governance policies and mostly followed the old system of the previous dynasty. In terms of management, they advocated simple and practical principles, tended to neglect the summarization of existing systems and rarely had the consciousness to improve them. Examples in this regard are in the multitude. For example, its provincial system was borrowed from the Jin Dynasty. When the rulers believed it effective and feasible, it was promoted throughout the country. The unified dynasties before and after it, including the Qin, Han, Tang, Ming and Qing dynasties, all formulated relatively complete written codes, but the Yuan Dynasty did not have a complete written code. Some researchers thought that it did not have a complete and mature code, and was faced with scenarios of “having precedence to follow but no law to abide by” (Zeng, 2000, 168). The Yuan Dynasty managed to extensively implement the native official system in the southern aboriginal areas and achieve remarkable results in a short time was partially because that there was no cumbersome and inefficient bureaucratic apparatus fraught with ills like the preceding dynasties, the administrative structure had fewer levels and the lower-level agencies were resolute and thorough in implementing the orders of their superiors. In 1252, Möngke Khan decided to wage war against Yunnan, and conquered it in the following year. Then, he instated 19 brigadier commands in Yunnan, but still couldn’t stamp out the political turmoil there. In the 11th year of Zhiyuan (1274), Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar followed the order of the imperial court and established a province in Yunnan. After a serious investigation, he decided to change the political system there. He abolished the Wanhu System (the brigadier system) and tried the system of appointing local aborigines as native officials. The new system was a great success, so the Yuan Dynasty quickly promoted it in the southern aboriginal areas.

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If we were aware of the behavioral habits of the Yuan rulers, we could easily understand how the native official system was fully and thoroughly implemented. Thirdly, the jimi county and prefecture rule implemented in Guangxi during the Song Dynasty provided a necessary reference for the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty. In the Song Dynasty, especially the Southern Song Dynasty, the tendency of “separate rule of the north and the south” was very obvious in borders governance. For the northern nomads, the Song court adopted the strategy of emphasizing defense and warfare; for the Dali Kingdom, which established a separatist regime in Yunnan, it took the Dadu River as the boundary and strictly guarded against it, regarding it as a foreign country. In Guangxi and other aboriginal areas, it enhanced control and development, to exploit its financial and material resources for national use. After the Nong Zhigao Uprising was suppressed in the Qingli years during the reign of Emperor Renzong, the Song rulers noticed the influence of Jiaozhi on his forces, and formed a Dongding native army composed of aborigines mainly for border defense in Guangxi. So far, the jimi prefecture and county system implemented in Guangxi and other places had roughly assumed the basic characteristics of the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty. For example, on the condition of recognizing and protecting the sphere of influence of the chieftains (including their land and people), it secured their obedience, appointing them as state official officials and stipulating the duties and obligations. It also permitted them to establish a native army mainly charged with border defense and uprising pacification, and included in the national system of armed forces ready for mobilization of the imperial court. The taxation of the Borderland aborigines was used as an official source of state finances, and the collection and management of them was strengthened. However, the system of jimi prefectures and counties in the Song Dynasty was still in the initial stages. It was no match for the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty, known for comprehensive and specific content, thorough and profound implementation and the far-reaching influence, as well as the degree of trust in and free appointment of the native officials by the court. The Song Dynasty achieved remarkable results in the jimi prefecture and county system in Guangxi, and accordingly became one of the



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fastest growing periods for Guangxi. The success was mainly attributable to its consistency with the situation in the southern aborigines. In the southern border regions, the topographical conditions are complex, and the climate types diverse. Mountains take up most of the land area. Areas at different altitudes often have different ecological environments and different animal and plant resources. Accordingly, the residents would gradually develop a dependence on specific ecological environments and their animal and plant resources. The villages of varying sizes from a common ethnic origin grew into greater interdependent forces linked by geographical and kinship relationships. There were many ethnic groups in the southern Borderland area, with a complex internal structure. They lived together and were interdependent, but were known to compete for land, water, mountains, forests, mineral deposits and other resources. They were often locked in prolonged hostility and conflicts because of complex historical entanglements. When encountered with external pressure, they might put aside enmity and form alliances for resistance. The jimi county system of the Song Dynasty and its improved version the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty stemmed an in-depth understanding of the key issues about the southern aborigines. The aborigines generally relied on ownership of land and natural resources as the foundation for survival, and the foremost duty of their chieftain was to keep the land and natural resources on which they depend and to preserve the population and lineages under his jurisdiction. The imperial court stipulated that native officials would guard their land and govern their people. The duties of native officials could be hereditary, and would not be abolished with good reason, addressing the greatest worry for the chieftain. On the other hand, the Yuan Dynasty appointed the surrendered chieftains to official posts, instead of granting them nominal titles like prince, duke, and duchess, giving them statutory powers, a special capacity with governmental protection to manipulate their fellow aborigines and consequently advantages in the struggle with other forces. Therefore, the official posts held considerable appeal to the aborigines in the south. The role of the native official and native chief system in social integration consisted in granting certain legitimacy to use of resources by

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their owner, while entitling the government to recover their resources, thereby reducing the scenario of groups monopolizing resources or continuously contending for resources. This way, the goal of relatively reasonable distribution of natural resources in the aboriginal land was achieved, providing an institutionalized guarantee, though limited guarantee, for the social stability of areas where the native official system was implemented. local official and chieftain system areas. Of course, it is unlikely that the Mongolian Yuan rulers had been keenly aware of the above reasons. However, the native official system coincided with the internal mechanism of the southern Borderland, and its implementation was also effective. Therefore, it was deemed a feasible system for general implementation in the areas of southern aborigines. Seen from the relevant records, the native official system should have been pioneered by Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar. It was proven effective in trial implementation Yunnan province, and was actively promoted in Huguang province and other places. The Mongolians pacified Yunnan more than 20 years before the founding of the Yuan Dynasty. Genghis Khan once asked Guo Baoyu about the strategy for conquering the Central Plains and Guo replied that “The Central Plains is still too powerful to be conquered. The southwestern aboriginal tribes are tough and may be of service. So the southwestern Borderland areas should be taken first. With its help, we will certainly achieve our aspiration” (Song et al., 1976, 3521). After Möngke took over the anvil, he ordered his younger brother to join forces with General Uriyangkhadai to lead an expedition against Dali with 100,000 cavalry troops. Dali was eventually pacified. Kublai attached great importance to Yunnan. In the 4th year of Zhiyuan, when Hugeci was about to assume the post of Yunnan Prince, Kublai said to him that “Dali was personally pacified by me. And I love its customs. I have made a point of handling its issues personally, and now I’m giving it to you. Do remember to placate the officials and people there properly” (Tu, 1989, 510). However, the situation in Yunnan remained turbulent for a long time. In the 10th year of the Yuan Dynasty, Emperor Shizu ordered Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar to go to Yunnan to establish a province there. Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Oma was a meritorious general and administrator who



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met Emperor Taizu in his early years. In the 40 years before he went to Yunnan, he had presided over the local military administration and served in the imperial court. He had managed rural areas and Yanjing successively, and had been an experienced statesman. After arriving in Yunnan, he submitted an imperial memorial, requesting that “the brigadier commanders and battalion commanders in charge of the land of Yunnan evenly distributed among prefectures and counties be changed to magistrates and prefects.” His request was approved, and the brigadiers, battalions and centurions were changed to circuits, prefectures and counties respectively. Duan Shi, the former nobleman of Dali Kingdom, was appointed as the Administrator of Dali. In the 18th year of Zhiyuan, he was also appointed the Placation Commissioner and Military Commander of Dali, Weichu, and Jinchi, as well as the Political Superintendent of Yunnan Province. Following the precedent during the rule of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, the Duan family served as the general administrator of Dali for generations, and held the post for eleven generations until the early Ming Dynasty. There were also many appointments to the upper class of other aborigines in Yunnan. Those appointments ushered in the native official system and gradually eased the sharp social contradictions. The approach of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar had a significant impact in Yunnan and other ethnic areas. All the ethnic tribes in Zuojiang and Youjiang Caves of Guangxi surrendered to Yunnan Province. In the 13th year of Zhiyuan, more than 2,000 aborigines led by Nong Shigui, chieftain of Temodao, Li Weiping, chieftain of Zuojiang aborigines and Cen Congwei, chieftain of Youjiang aborigines came to Yunnan Province with native produces and money, as a token of allegiance. “In the year, more than 80 prefectures with a total of 400,000 households from Guangzhong surrendered, including Jingjiang in the east and Guangdao in the south. They were all pacified without firing a single shot” (Zhao, 1991, 816). Bafan and Luoshi also came to surrender, with101,168 households in 1,626 villages (Song et al., 1976, 214). Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar succeeded in governing Yunnan and won the support of Kublai Khan. After his death, the emperor ordered that his rules be followed by all officials in Yunnan Province and “not to be changed.” Worrisome that his successor would change his practices,

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the Yuan court once seized the provincial seal of Yunnan, leaving the commander office of the placation commission only. In the following year, Yunnan Province was re-instated (Tu, 1989, 362). The Mongolian army pacified the present-day Guizhou and Huguang areas much later. In the 13th year of Zhiyuan, the chieftain Yang Bangxian surrendered Bozhou, Zhenzhou, and Nanping to the Yuan Dynasty. In the 16th year, the Yuan court changed Wuzhou, Liuzhou, Xiangzhou, Yongzhou, Qingyuan, Binzhou, Hengzhou, Rongzhou and Xunzhou from prefectures into circuits. In 18th year, it changed Jinghu Province to Huguang Province, and placed Guangxi under its jurisdiction. Later, the system of extensively appointing native aboriginal leaders was promoted in the above-mentioned areas. Therefore, the claim that the native official system was pioneered by Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, successfully implemented in Yunnan Province and extensively popularized in Huguang Province was well-founded.

6.3. The Significance and Impact of the Native Official System The full implementation of the native official system in the Yuan Dynasty was of great significance and had extensive and far-reaching influences. First, as we study the connotations of the native official system and the process of its practice, we should have a new understanding of the ruling style and the border aboriginal administration of the Yuan Dynasty. Judging from the establishment and promotion of the native official system, the Mongolian Yuan rulers were quite characteristic in actions and decision-making. For example, they cherished the practicality and simplicity of the system, and seldom increased the complexity of problems. It held no prejudice against the systems of previous generations and other regimes. If preceding strategies were feasible after trial implementation, they were implemented with minor reforms and then popularized. The implementation of established governance policies or systems was thorough in order to achieve maximum results. On the other hand, the lack of summary and improvement of the implemented governance policies made it difficult to improve or standardize



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the systems and policies. Understanding this feature will benefit our exploration of the governance and systems of the Yuan Dynasty. The widespread implementation of the native official system showed that the Yuan rulers trusted the southern aborigines. When they came to surrender themselves, the Yuan court conferred different official positions on their leaders, depending on their force. If they rebelled later on, they were mostly restored to their posts after pacification. There are even records of repeated rebellions and reinstatements. Huang Shengxu, a chieftain of Tongren Tribe in Zuojiang was a case in point. In the Zhiyuan reign, Huang Shengxu surrendered to the Yuan Dynasty, was appointed prefect of Shangsizhou Prefecture, and was given a gold insignia. Later he colluded with Annan, gathered a mob and seized 92 villages. In the 29th year, Liu Guojie led an expedition against him with 20,000 troops and defeated him and his Annan reinforcements. Huang fled to Annan, started an in-law relationship with the Xingdao Prince of Annan, and refused the Yuan Dynasty’s solicitation for surrender. In the second year of Yuanzhen, Huang Shengxu attacked Guangxi and was defeated by Huguang Province. In the first year of Dade, he sent his son Zhibao to the Placation Commission of Guangxi Liangjiang Circuit to surrender, but soon rebelled again. In the third year of Zhida, the Huguang Province solicited the surrender of Huang Shengxu. In the first year of Yanyou, he captured Chungju. In the third year of Zhizhi, his son-in-law attacked the counties of Yongzhou Prefecture. In the first year of Taiding, he and the rebellious native official Cen Shixing requested permission to dispatch their sons to send tribute to the imperial court. The imperial court approved their request and Cen Shixing sent his younger brother instead. The Yuan court made Cen Shixing General of Huaiyuan, and ordered him to serve as the Administrator of Lai’an Circuit concurrently. Huang Shengxu was made General of Huaiyuan, and his son Zhishu allowed to succeed to the post of Shangsi Prefect.69 69 “Gravestone of H.E. Liu, Prime Minister of Huguang Province”, [Yuan Dynasty] Huang Pu, Collected Essays of Huang Jinhua, Vol. 25; Song Lian et al., History of Yuan, Vol. 162, “Biography of Liu Guojie”, 3810; Vol. 21, “Emperor Chengzong (4)”, 466; Vol. 23, “Emperor Wzong (2)”, 521; Vol. 28, “Emperor Yingzong (2)”, 632; Vol. 29, “Emperor Taiding”, 652. Records of Solicitation and Arrest: Huang Shengxu, in [Yuan Dynasty] Su Tianjue, Essays of the Yuan Dynasty.

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Most southern aborigines lived up to their expectations and showed rare loyalty to the Yuan court. In the 14th year of Hongwu (1381), Fu Youde, a general of Ming, led 300,000 troops from Guizhou to Yunnan and defeated the main force of the Yuan army. When the Ming army marched west to attack central Yunnan and Dali, the native officials in eastern Yunnan and western Guizhou jointly rebelled; the native officials of the Yuan Dynasty in Dali, Baoshan, Dehong and other places, as well as the native officials in Kunming and other places that had already surrendered to the Ming Dynasty, followed suit. They elected a defeated Yuan general as their leader. It eventually took more than a decade for the Ming army to finally pacify Yunnan and Guizhou. Therefore, this suggests that the aborigines in the southwestern Borderland had profound feelings for the Yuan Dynasty. In the past, researchers criticized the ethnic policies of the Yuan Dynasty mainly from the perspective of discrimination against and suppressing of the Han Chinese by the rulers via the four-class system. However, considering the Yuan court’s full tolerance of the different cultures and religions, as well as its trust in and little prejudice against the Borderland tribes, the ethnic policy of the Yuan Dynasty should not deemed totally unworthy. Instead, it was complex and diverse. Meanwhile, it should be pointed out that the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty had room for improvement. The imperial court regulated that the post of native officials were hereditary, but under the condition of sending hostages to it. Due to the inconvenient transportation of Yunnan Province, it made a number of self-contradictory regulations. The imperial court appointed not only a large number of Borderland aborigines as native officials, but also Mongols and Semu people as officials in government offices below the provincial level. For example, the Mongol Bieer Qiebuhua from the Eljigidey Clan that “had served as the Placation Commissioner of Bafan for generations” was made Darughachi of Bafan Placation Commission by Emperor Yingzong. When he took office, the cave-dwelling aborigines were happy. Even those who had refused to surrender said that “He is the descendant of our former virtuous leader; how dare I disobey his orders” (Song et al., 1976, 3365). In other cases, some native officials were so competent as to warrant constant transfer, until they in fact became non-local officials.



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For example, Wang Hui from the Boren Tribe of Zhongqing Circuit, Yunnan Province, first served as farming ambassador of Weichu. After the 25th year of Zhiyuan, he was reappointed as the county magistrate or judge of Dingyuan County, Luquan Prefecture, Zhanyi Prefecture, Malong Prefecture and other states and counties. In the 4th year of Dade, he served as the magistrate of Kunming County, Zhongqing Circuit, before taking up important positions in Lunan Prefecture, Yongchang Prefecture, Shiping Prefecture, Yiliang County, and Weimei County.70 Such situations show the obvious confusion in the management of the native official system. Second, the implementation of the native official system enabled the feudal rulers to finally find an effective way for ruling the southern aborigines. One of the prerequisites for its implementation was that the complex relationships among the various tributaries of the aboriginal tribes could be used to restrain them, that is, to promote the policy of “using barbarians to rule barbarians,” as discussed in “Biography of chieftain” in History of Ming History. “Using barbarians to rule barbarians” was an important strategy for imperial China to handle Borderland aborigines, but rarely succeeded before the Yuan Dynasty. The reason is that previously the policy was implemented among the nomadic peoples in the north, with the feudal dynasty trying to use the contradictions from political struggles between the nomadic tribes to turn them against each other for the purpose of profiting from it. However, the situation in the grassland area was complex and changeable, making it difficult for onlookers to manipulate the changes. On the other hand, the northern nomads tended to rise very quickly, and decline equally quickly. The dominant force on the grassland rose and fell frequently. Under such circumstances, a nomadic nation or tribe supported by the feudal dynasty were known to quickly become a new opponent after the decline of the originally hostile party. For example, the Southern Song Dynasty teamed up with Jin and Mongolia to deal with its old enemies, but created new powerful opponents. 70 [Yuan Dynasty] Li Yuandao, “Epitah for Wang Jun, Prefect of Meixian County”, [Republic of China] A Newly Compiled General Record of Yunnan, Vol. 93, “Epigraphic Studies (1)”, 265.

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“Ruling barbarians with barbarians” under the native official system was different. In the Yuan Dynasty, as well as the Ming and Qing dynasties that implemented the chieftain system, the policy was mainly intended to use the contradictions among the southern aborigines to contain and compete with each other. In their internal struggle for inheritance rights, resource possession, or retribution, the feudal dynasty usually stood by, to reap benefits. Its support for them also changed from the originally open support for certain political forces to use of native official positions and legal inheritance as a bait to manipulate them. Therefore, the successful implementation of the native official system finally realized the dream of “ruling barbarians with barbarians” for all dynasties. That is, the intricate relationship among barbarians was used to achieve the purpose of restraining them and facilitating their control by the imperial court, without backfiring. On the other hand, the widespread implementation of the native official system among the southern aborigines also led to overly powerful and uncontrollable native officials. That is the other side of the “double-edged sword.” In implementing the chieftain system, the feudal rulers were much troubled by such officials. The headache promoted the Ming and Qing dynasties to gradually form the chieftain system by replacing native chieftains with state officials. Third, the implementation of the native official system effectively consolidated the rule of the Central Plains dynasty over the southern border and promoted the economic development there. The popularization of the native official system and the later chieftain system in the southern aboriginal area had the following two important effects. First, it significantly strengthened the rule of the Central Plains dynasty over the southern aborigines, and extended it to the outskirts beyond the reach of the preceding dynasties. Second, it effectively cultivated the loyalty of the southern aborigines to the Middle Kingdom, thus benefiting the formation of a unified multi-ethnic country. The imperial China had attached great importance to the defense against the northern nomads. The focus of garrison and farming was in the north, while the operation of the southern border areas was relatively overlooked. Beginning in the Yuan Dynasty, the rulers of the Middle Kingdom began to regard the southern borderland



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as an important source of mineral deposits, timber, jade and treasures, and began to manage it in depth and develop it actively. The three dynasties of Yuan, Ming and Qing marked a period of active management and the fastest social and economic development in the southwestern Borderland region. The rapid development of the southwestern Borderland during this period was preconditioned by the effective control of the local aborigines through the implementation of the native official and chieftain system. The system effectively cultivated the loyalty of the southern aborigines to the Middle Kingdom, mainly through two ways. Firstly, acquisition and preservation of native official posts and realization of their hereditary status was preconditioned by absolute loyalty to the imperial court. Second, the imperial court stipulated that it was the duty of native officials to set up school education, through which the aborigines were subtly enlightened. After the implementation of the native official system, more foreign populations and influences entered the aboriginal land, promoting ethnic integration and changing the social tendencies. Fourth, the native official system had a profound impact on subsequent dynasties. The Ming Dynasty developed the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty and implemented a more complete chieftain system. The biggest difference was that the Ming Dynasty further standardized and improved the native official system, in particular making stricter regulations on the duties, inheritance, and assessment of the chieftain. Meanwhile, the shortcomings of the Tusi system itself were fully exposed. As stated in the “Biography of chieftain” in History of Ming, if the court became more demanding of chieftain, they were prone to rebel. In some cases, the chieftain became incorrigible because of meritorious service, and turned into troubles. Therefore, the Ming and Qing dynasties successively abolished some chieftain that became disobedient as they gathered influence and instated non-native officials in their stead. In some cases, they had to resort to arms and caused considerable collateral damage in the process later known as “replacement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule of the Court.” However, the original intention, key points and scope of implementation were different in the Ming and Qing dynasties.

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The reason for extensive implementation of the chieftain system in the Ming and Qing dynasties was that they boasted a relatively sound legal system and ruled for a longer time. Since it was proven effective in practice, the chieftain system became the basic national policy in the two dynasties. The large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the southwestern Borderland in the early Qing Dynasty was not because the chieftain system had come to an end, but mainly because the Qing government had to remove the obstacles in developing the border and resettling the migrant population. Some of the chieftain in Yunnan and other places remained in power in the Republic of China. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the chieftains distributed in the border areas of Yunnan actively organized resistance against the invading Japanese troops and were commended by the KMT Government. In the 1950s, through the democratic reforms organized by the people’s government, the history of the chieftain system finally came to an end. The establishment and implementation of the native official system also marked the beginning of changing directions in the policy of the feudal dynasty for aboriginal rule. In the northern grasslands, the situation was different from that in the southern aboriginal areas. There the ecological environment and resources were relatively simple, and the means of production and the livelihood of the nomads were roughly the same. This natural environment, resources and residents’ production and lifestyle had obvious identity and generality, and the nomadic people taking “luo” (single family) as the basic cell of society and watergrass nomadism as the main way of life could be easily scattered or reorganized. The control of the population was more important than the control of the land. Therefore, the traditional brigadier system, with battalion units and centurion units successively on the lower echelon for production and warfare based on the size of population obviously suited the northern grasslands better. The Qing Dynasty developed the brigadier system of the previous dynasty and implemented the LeagueBanner system in the northern grasslands. Although the League-Banner system also attached importance to the possession and distribution of land, it still focused on the control of the population under its jurisdiction. In addition, there were fewer hereditary positions. As a result,



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though there were still traces of the previous brigadier system, many regulations were different from the native official system. All in all, the system of jimi rule, and the ensuing native officialchieftain system were an institutional creation of the Central Plains dynasty. Their significance consisted in the fact that they made it possible for the Central Plains dynasty to establish a politically unified relationship with the Borderland barbarians via a looser and more flexible form of rule, and to finally establish a consolidated historical territory through the gradual strengthening of mutual contact. Furthermore, the success of jimi rule, native official-chieftain system furnishes an example and experience of solving border problems in the form of one country with multiple systems. The native official system initiated in the Yuan Dynasty is obviously different from the previous governance policy in terms of content, effect and influence, indicating a big step forward.

7.  The Evolution of the Jimi Rule into the Chieftain System The Jimi Rule was an important strategy of the Central Plains dynasty before the Yuan Dynasty to handle issues about the Borderlands and areas beyond. Its basic feature was that the Central Plains dynasty recognized the difference of the Borderlands and regions beyond from the hinterland, chose to handle the former in a relatively loose and flexible way without demanding uniformity in form and strategy to ensure or maintain effective control over them. The Yuan Dynasty turned the Jimi Rule of the imperial China into the native official system, which was improved in the Ming and Qing dynasties and transformed into the more effective and institutionalized chieftain system, and promoted in the southwestern and other Borderland areas. Although the three systems are different, they are similar in core idea and all intended to achieve “loose-rein governance,” which continued for thousands of years in ancient China, and which had extensive and far-reaching influence. The differences of the native official system and chieftain system from Jimi Rule are mainly

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manifested in management thought, basic strategy, scope and effectiveness. The formation and improvement of the native official system and the chieftain system is not only a product of the changing times, but also attributable to the governance perspectives and behaviors of the rulers of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. Therefore, in exploring the evolution of the system, we must make a comprehensive investigation with reference to background of the times, the historical development process, and the historical choice.

7.1. The Content, Characteristics and Significance of the Governance Policy The term jimi originally meant that once the imperial court mastered the knack it could effectively control the aborigines with ease, just like controlling the horse by holding the ji (halter) and the ox by holding the mi (nose rope).71 The Jimi Rule originated in the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period, and gradually became the policy of the Central Plains dynasty to govern the borders and regions beyond after the Qin Dynasty. The basic content of Jimi Rule was that the feudal dynasty relied on the Borderland ethnic leaders in ruling, by conferring the titles of king, prince, duchess and duke according to strength. In practice, the dualtrack system of governance featuring native chieftains and prefects was implemented. The imperial court assigned officials to assist in the management of the enfeoffed kings, princes and dukes, and stipulated that the enfeoffed kings, princes and dukes were on a par with Borderland prefects or magistrates. The enfeoffed posts were hereditary, but were not in the system of governmental officials. The imperial court implemented a loose management for them, usually without unified management rules. As a result, related issues were handled with obvious arbitrariness. In addition, the feudal dynasty did not expect economic returns from managing the ethnic regions, and imposed minimal taxes and tributes on them.

71 Wei Hong, Official Decorum of the Han Dynasty.



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Its main feature is the extensive implementation scope, covering aborigines in the Borderland and neighboring countries that have relations with the Central Plains dynasty. In other words, the targets included “barbarians” as related to Han Chinese, that is, other civilizations outside of the Middle Kingdom, including the Borderland barbarians and neighbors having dealings with the Central Plains dynasty. The people of the Jin Dynasty said that “they are not of my race, and they must have a different mentality. Their aspirations and behaviors are different from those of the Han Chinese” (Fang et al., 1974, 1531). The observation clearly showed that the Central Plains dynasty had distinguished barbarians from the Han Chinese roughly on the basis of civilization. Those having a civilization different from were all regarded barbarians by the Central Plains dynasty. The advocates of the Westernization Movement in the late Qing Dynasty proposed “Learning from Barbarians to Competing with Barbarians.” The use of “barbarians” to refer to Western powers demonstrates influences from the feudal era. The main reason is that China’s territory had been changing from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Tang and Song dynasties, and there was no accurate concept of Borderlands or borders. Therefore, the land of the Borderland regions and that of neighboring countries were sometimes mixed and difficult to distinguish in understanding. The service concept, which was formed in the pre-Qin period and which exerted a profound influence on later generations, vividly expressed the ancients’ understanding of the relationship between the Central Plains dynasty and the Borderland ethnic groups. The service concept contained in the traditional Borderland governance theory of the Central Plains dynasty roughly took shape in the pre-Qin period, mainly explaining the relationship of the feudal dynasty to the surrounding barbarians. “Tributes of Yu” in Book of History proposed the theory of “five-tiered services”72 and the Rites of Zhou changed it to “nine-tiered services.” However, the content remained much the same. Specifically, the imperial capital was considered the center of the Central Plains dynasty, which extended the scope of its governance or control from the capital to the rest of the country. 72 “Tributes of Yu” in Book of Documents: Areas within the first five hundred li around the imperial capital were called Dianfu: the closest, second closet, third closet, fourth

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The responsibilities of the Central Plains dynasty for the surrounding barbarians differed, so did their obligations to the Central Plains dynasty. The responsibilities and obligations differed according to the distance from the barbarians to the capital, decreasing steadily with it. The concept of service has two characteristics. Firstly, the Central Plains dynasty was deemed the mainstay and the surrounding barbarians as secondary and subordinate; secondly, the degree of intimacy between the Central Plains dynasty and the surrounding barbarians changes with distance. The proponent of related theories did not have the consciousness of dividing different levels among the surrounding barbarians. In the early days of ancient society, successive dynasties insisted on “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery” and upheld the border governance principles of “guarding the Middle Kingdom to achieve border governance” and “making the Borderland barbarians the guarding fence of the Middle Kingdom,” regarding the Borderland regions and areas beyond as deserted barbaric land. They believed that the land of the Han Chinese was separated from that of the barbarians by deep valleys or vast deserts because “the heavenly design had intended it to be so,” proposing that it would be inadvisable for the Central Plains dynasty to operate the border areas, because the barbarian land could not be cultivated for food and the barbaric people could not be turned into qualified subjects. The correct approach should be “rejecting and not accepting them, alienating and not intimating them. Political edification should not be extended to them, and the calendar should not be applied for them” (Ban, 1962, 3834). Due to insufficient closest and fifth closest one hundred li shall send grain ears on stalks, grain ears, bristleless grain ears, millet and shelled millet for tribute to the Emperor respectively. Areas five hundred li outside Dianfu were called Houfu: the closest one hundred li were conferred on nobilities and ministersis, the second closet on barons, and the rest on powerful vassals. Areas five hundred miles outside Houfu were called Suifu: in the closet three hundred li, education should be offered to the people according to the circumstances; in the remaining two hundred li, military training should be implemented to enhance the defense power. Areas five hundred li apart from Suifu were called Yaofu: the closest three hundred li were inhabited by the barbarians, and the remaining two hundred li were intended as a penal colony. Areas five hundred li beyond Yaofu were called Huangfu: the closes three hundred li were the barren zone, and the remaining two hundred li were also a penal colony.



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enthusiasm for border expansion, the Central Plains dynasty did not bother to develop complete border governance policy, and regarded all the Borderland and foreign forces as barbarians. Even if they pledged allegiance, only irregular tributes were required of them, since they were deemed as a barrier of the Central Plains dynasty.73 Jimi Rule was mainly applied to barbarians in the border areas under the jurisdiction of the Central Plains dynasty, but also to countries that had established vassal or diplomatic relations with it through tribute and other means. The question that followed was whether the ruler could distinguish the nature of the two categories and adopt separate measures to handle them? There is no distinct description in historical records. But judging from the relevant records, the answer should be confirmative. The Han and Tang dynasties had handled their relations with the Borderland barbarians separately, according to their specific terms, such as subjects, vassals, and diplomatic counterparts. It should also be pointed out that in ancient times, especially in the early stage, the boundary between the Borderland barbarian forces and the neighboring countries was sometimes quite ambiguous. There were even mutual conversions, which further complicated this issue. Jimi Rule was an important creation of the Central Plains dynasty in Borderland governance. In the early days of ancient society, China’s territory was not yet stable, and the boundaries with its neighbors were sometimes unclear. The Central Plains dynasty adopted a relaxed and flexible management style applicable to the Borderland areas and areas beyond, relatively effectively controlled or preserved the abovementioned areas, and created conditions for enhancing mutual understanding. This was conducive not only to the formation of a unified multi-ethnic state in China, but also to the radiation of the influences of the Central Plains dynasty to the outside world. Jimi Rule is the embodiment of the Central Plains dynasty’s ideas of “guarding the Middle Kingdom to achieve border governance” and 73 For example, when Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty defeated the Turks, he ordered the Turks and other ethnic groups that had settled down in the prefectures to cross the river, and repatriated them to their old tribes, “so that they can serve as a fence for protecting the frontiers”. Sima Guang, History as a Mirror, Vol. 195, “Records of Tang (11)”, the 6th month of the 13th year of Zhenguan, 6148.

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“making the Borderland barbarians the guarding fence of the Middle Kingdom” in governing the Borderland regions. In the eyes of the ruler, the Central Plains dynasty could survive only if the hinterland was secure. There was a clear distinction between the land of “the Middle Kingdom” and that of the “Borderland aborigines.” And the border could be governed only when the hinterland was safe. The ideal goal of border governance was to achieve stability and prosperity in the hinterland, to realize the “Borderland aborigines serving as guarding fence”, to achieve “Han Chinese in the center and aborigines on the periphery” and to ensure “barbarians not seeking equality with or interfering with affairs of the Han Chinese” (Wei, 1974, 1286). The rulers believed that after implementing Jimi Rule, the normal status of the relationship between their dynasty and the border areas should “feature modesty and propriety in dealings and loose reign control,” (Fu, 1999, 1501) and the bottom line should be “welcoming those coming to pledge allegiance with open arms but refraining from punishing those defecting” (Fan, 1965, 2833). Attack from the subjects of Jimi Rule was responded with the strategy of “ensuring preparedness against their offensive and enhancing defense during their retreat.” The Jin Dynasty scholar Jiang Tong summed it up as “normalized preparations and effective counterattacks” (Fang et al., 1974, 1530). Jimi Rule was conducive to the realization of “freeing the Middle Kingdom from troubles caused by barbarians.” Therefore, its implementation helped to protect the safety of agricultural areas such as the Central Plains. In the early days of ancient society, China had witnessed a prosperity that peaked in the Han and Tang dynasties partly because of the effectively defended borders. Jimi Rule also contains some important thoughts and strategies, which have always been teeming with the brilliance of truth. For example, it recognized that border governance and internal affairs should be given different degrees of priority. During the reign of Emperor Ling in the Han Dynasty when courtiers discussed the invasion of the Xianbei Tribes from the northern border, Cai Yong compared it to hand and foot scabies, holding that troubles in the hinterland was lifethreatening chest and back sores (Fan, 1965, 2990). Li Daliang, a courtier of the Tang Dynasty, compared the hinterland to the roots and the



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Borderland barbarians to branches and leaves; Emperor Taizong further pointed out that “if the root and stem are curtailed to nourish the branches and leaves, how can the tree expected to thrive” (Sima, 1956, 6149)! Facing the complicated and volatile situation of the border areas, the ruler of most dynasties had a deep understanding and realized that the strategy for governing the border areas should neither be the same as that for governing the hinterland, nor should it be fixed or stereotyped. Instead, necessary flexibility and adaptability should be maintained. After the Yuan Dynasty, the relationship between the central and local governments evolved into several types and all became successful. Thus China gradually ushered in a period of rationalization in state structure. In fact, this state structure featuring one country with multiple systems and reflecting the characteristics of Chinese history actually originated from the Jimi Rule in the early stage of the ancient society.

7.2. Problems with the Jimi Rule Jimi Rule was a product of historical development, and was thus rational in the early stage of ancient society. However, there had been many problems with it since its formation. Some of those problems plagued the rulers of the imperial China for a long time, making them agitated. The more prominent problem included: overly broad scope of implementation led to confusion of the policies for dealing with neighboring countries and the policies for Borderland governance. In the early days of the ancient society, it is not uncommon for dynasties such as Han and Tang dynasties to appoint monarchs of neighboring kingdoms as kings, princes, generals, and governors. Although there were certain differences, their institutional characteristics were not much different. It was sometimes difficult to distinguish Borderland barbarian forces from neighboring countries during this period, despite important differences in their nature. The Central Plains dynasty’s confusing policies had a negative impact on the formation of China’s historical territory and got in the way of its efforts to deepen border rule.

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Jimi Rule was an unchangeable policy since the ancient times. From the Qin and Han dynasties to the Tang Dynasty, there is basically no record of the corresponding adjustments to it across the dynasties based on the differences between the northern and southern borders and the changes in different periods. Before the Yuan Dynasty, Jimi Rule largely remained in the stage of initial creation awaiting improvement. Meanwhile, the randomness and irregularity of implementation were obvious, lacking a corresponding mechanism to ensure its stable operation. Take the Han and Tang dynasties for example. Both cherished Borderland governance and expansion and accumulated rich experience. The Borderland prefecture system of the Han Dynasty and the Jimi prefecture system of the Tang Dynasty were applied to the border regions, but there were no regulations on adaptation and specification according to local conditions. Both dynasties emphasized defense and neglected development. This suggests that there was no obvious difference between them in terms of subjects at which their border governance policy aimed. The Song Dynasty had to face the pressure of the ethnic regimes in the north, and to increase taxes from Guangxi and other places. The focus of managing the northern and southern borders changed, and the governance policies were also different. Jimi prefectures and counties located in Guangxi and other places later gave rise to the native official system in later generations. Jimi Rule was mainly derived from the experience of operating the northern border. dynasties in the Central Plains, in particular the Yuan Dynasty, generally attached great importance to defending the northern Borderland, placing the focus of garrison and farming in the north, while the southern Borderland was relatively ignored. As a result, the tradition of “prioritizing the north over the south” was formed, profoundly influencing their border governance policies. Many of the thoughts and strategies of the governance policy were based on the experience of dealing with the northern aborigines. The nomads living in the northern grasslands were fierce, highly mobile, and known to quickly gather to form a powerful force. Their continuous southward movement posed a considerable threat to the agrarian society of eastern China. Such thoughts as “barbarians not seeking equality with or interfering with affairs of the Han Chinese” and “the barbarian land could not be cultivated for food



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and the barbaric people could not be turned into qualified subjects”, and such strategies as “ensuring preparedness against their offensive and enhancing defense during their retreat” were proposed for dealing with the northern nomads. They were not adaptable to the overall situation of Borderland management. Their emphasis on rigid defense, caution in dealing with the Borderland aborigines may not be suitable for the complex and diverse social forms of the southern Borderland and the longterm integration of Han Chinese and the aborigines. Mainly formulated to cope with the barbarians in the north, they caused the Central Plains dynasties to embrace external defense and border defense in management of the border areas, while ignoring the in-depth rule and economic management there. It was difficult to solve the problem of high cost and low profit in Borderland management. In ancient times, launching wars had to overcome huge difficulties in transportation, the supply of rations and equipment, and military conscript. In the 2nd year of Yonghe (137), Li Gu, a general of the Eastern Han Dynasty, was repeatedly defeated by the barbarians of Nichinan and Xianglin. He listed the seven difficulties in expedition, believing that the cost of sending the soldiers of the four prefectures over thousands of miles was too high, and that consequently an expedition was tantamount to cutting the heart to make up for the limbs (Fan, 1965, 2838). The source and management of officials in border areas was also quite difficult. Before the Yuan Dynasty, there was no tradition of drawing border resources to benefit the country. Those factors made the phenomenon of high cost and low profit in Borderland governance very prominent, and became a reason for some ministers to oppose it. In the first year of Tang Shengong (697), Chancellery Di Renjie submitted an imperial memorial in opposition to dispatch troops to the four towns of Shule, saying that it was like the reckless Emperor Qin Shi Huang and Emperor Wu of Han to exhaust national treasury on expedition against deserted remote corners, which were not likely to increase tax revenue or agricultural produce (Liu et al., 1975, 2889). His words are quite representative. Statesmen with outstanding track record in border governance, for example, Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty and Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty, also agreed that they had erred in border

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expansion. Emperor Wu regretted his early conquests in his later years, and banned increasing garrison in the Western Regions to set up farms, while issuing an introspective edict for his early conquests (Ban, 1962, 3912). Emperor Taizong of Tang said that the former emperors had solicited the allegiance of remote areas only to impose unduly heavy burden on the people, adding that the practice of “troubling the people for false names” would be below him (Sima, 1956, 6091). In the early days of ancient society, it was a popular belief that Borderland management was counter-productive, since greed for external exploits was bound to disturb the people and even shake the foundation of the country. The Jimi Rule implemented in this context obviously showed an introvert and conservative tendency. Its implementation before the Yuan Dynasty not only constituted responses to the public opinion of the ruling class and ordinary people, but also avoided the extremely disequilibrium of cost and benefit in border management. As a result, the counterproductive problem was not solved for a prolonged period of time. The problem of the administration of officials in the border areas was outstanding. In fact, governance of Borderland officials had always been a problem that plagued the rulers. In ancient times, due to the imperfect legal system, the quality and role of officials were extremely important in governance. Border officials had too much power and too little supervision, so corruption was virtually rampant. In addition, the source and selection of Borderland officials had not been addressed for a long time. In implementing Jimi Rule, the Borderland officials with real power were mostly dispatched from the interior. The Central Plains dynasty mostly granted nominal titles to the Borderland barbarian chiefs, such as kings, princes, princesses or generals, and governors. In the early Tang Dynasty, the Borderland officials were cautiously selected. The Borderland commanders were all loyal and well-known officials, and they were required to serve on their posts personally and exclusively. The meritorious ones often became the Prime Minister later on (Sima, 1956, 6888). However, it was difficult for the strict regulations to last. After Kaiyuan reign, the garrison generals gradually grew disobedient and the Borderland areas were in turmoil, partially because of the chaotic official administration and the rampant corruption. Another problem faced by the



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imperial court was that many officials of the hinterland were reluctant to serve in the Borderland regions. The Tang Dynasty allowed the governor and the imperial censor to select officials from local gentry in Qianzhong, Lingnan and other places. At that time, the policy was called “Nanxuan” (lit. southern selection), but many were still “randomly chosen and incompetent” (Sima, 1956, 6362, 6380). Moreover, the officials locally selected in the Borderland were not put under the management of the Ministry of Appointments. In fact, the policy was beset with problems, and Wang Fuzhi of the Qing Dynasty called it “manifest of abuses accumulated over a thousand years” (Wang, 1975, 622). Generally speaking, the officials who served in the Borderland mainly came from the hinterland. Some dynasties also selected a small number of Borderland gentry for supplement, but were still unable to address the shortage of competent Borderland officials. There is no effective strategy for conquering and dividing the Borderland aborigines. The crux was the failure to properly address the issue of “ruling barbarians with barbarians.” The Central Plains dynasty before the Yuan Dynasty had such strategies as “enhancing preparations against their invasion and keeping up with the defense when they flee” and “soliciting the allegiance of barbarians by promoting education and enhancing self-cultivation” for handling the Borderland ethnic groups, but they lacked effective approaches to conquer or divide them. The rulers had realized the importance of “ruling barbarians with barbarians” long ago. In the Tang Dynasty, Lu Li said that “setting the barbarians against one another is in the interest of the Middle Kingdom in the long run.” However, the strategy rarely succeeded before the Yuan Dynasty. The main reason was that the focus of border governance was in the north. Although the contradictions between the nomadic forces were manipulated to divide them, but their rise and demise were equally rapid, and the changes in the complex situation of the grasslands were unpredictable. The nomadic forces close to the Central Plains dynasty might turn into its enemy in a fairly short time. The Southern Song Dynasty teamed up with the Jin and Mongolian regimes to deal with their old enemies, but later suffered heavy losses from those original allies. In the southern border

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such as Rinan County, the Han Dynasty also hoped to use gold and silk to divide the barbarians and “set them against one another”, but the results were virtually negligible (Fan, 1965, 2838). In imperial China, Borderland aborigines were recruited into the army, either as regular armed forces or as mercenaries, but the exorbitant cost often rendered the practice unsustainable. At the same time, there is no record of establishing a Borderland native army or an important system for that purpose, in contrast to the ruler’s hope of “ruling barbarians with barbarians.” There was a lack of sufficient understanding of the importance of school education, and a lack of effective measures in practice. It had always been advocated by rulers to influence or instruct border areas and the aborigines with the Han Chinese civilization. However, in the early period of ancient times, the influence was exerted via prioritizing “grace” or “grace from civilization” over “military conquest”, that is, to show magnanimity and benevolence to the aborigines. For example, Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty put forward that “the Borderland can be like a family with sufficient magnanimity and benefits” (Sima, 1956, 6216). The people of Song believed that “for barbarians not succumbing to military conquest, magnanimity won’t enough to placate them” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10836). In the Northern Wei Dynasty, Gao Lü believed that “If people from afar refuse to pledge allegiance, enhance our virtue and civilization to solicit them; for the desperado barbarians, a military conquest should be launched” (Gao, 1997, 478). Magnanimity was extended to the Borderland barbarians mainly through handsome rewards for minimal tributes and extensive magnanimity under the Tributary system. During this period, due to the superficial knowledge of the rulers and scarce inspection of regions, most dynasties failed to take effective measures to develop school education in the border areas, thus hampering the spread of Chinese civilization there.

7.3. The Content, Characteristics and Limitations of the Native Official-Chieftain System Although there are differences between the native official system of the Yuan Dynasty and the chieftain system of the Ming and Qing dynasties



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in terms of completeness and specific refinement, their connotations, governance ideas, and scope of application are roughly the same. For the convenience of narrative, this article refers to it as “the native official-chieftain system.” The main content of the native official-chieftain system is: in the Borderland areas, especially southwestern areas including Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, the Central Plains dynasty appointed local barbarians as native officials or chieftains at different levels, in view of aborigines under their jurisdiction, and according to the basic principle of each governing their own native people. The native officials and chieftains belonged to the ranks of state officials, with positions not to be abolished and to be hereditary after approval. If they perform their duties improperly or merge with each other, the court could remove, them, or punish them. In some areas, after their removal, the court assigned non-native officials as the governor, and the practice was later known as “replacing native officials with non-native ones” in history. The imperial court adapted the appointment of native officials and chieftains to the establishment of local ruling institutions. In the yamen (magistracy) where native officials and chieftains served, non-local officials of the same level were instated by the imperial court, while grass-roots affairs were trusted with low-level local officials. Although they were Jimi institutions in nature, those establishments in which the native officials and chieftains served were included in the national administrative system. Native officials and chieftains had formal ranks, and were roughly on a par with officials of the hinterland in terms of treatment, rights and obligations. Their responsibilities included checking household registration, collecting taxes, commanding the native army, adjudicating disputes, maintaining public order and regular tribute, and etc (Song et al., 1976, 3318; Fang, 2003, 648). They were allowed to command the native army that belonged to the national army.74 The native army was composed of native youths and

74 Only native officials were established in the Yuan Dynasty, and native officials were allowed to command the native army. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, whether it was the native officials, or chieftains or both were allowed to command the native army is still controversial.

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mainly used to maintain local security, but it was also subject to orders of the imperial court and dispatched to expeditions under the leadership of native officials. Compared with the Jimi policy of China’s imperial history, the native official-chieftain system has the following characteristics. First, the scope of implementation was clear. It was only implemented in border areas and no longer used as a policy to deal with neighboring states. The Yuan Dynasty appointed a large number of native officials in Yunnan and Huguang provinces, but there is no record of it instating native officials in Annan, Burma, or Champa. For those neighbors that expressed the willingness of submission, it dispatched a Darughachi, ordered their kings to pay tribute and taxes, to send children as hostage and to organize their people to serve in the army, as particularly manifest in the administration in Annan (Song et al., 1976, 4633, 4655, 4660). This suggests that the Mongolian Yuan rulers believed that the native officials were only applicable to the border areas, and that they had other measures to deal with the neighboring states. The situation in the Ming and Qing dynasties was roughly the same as that in the Yuan Dynasty. Second, it is only implemented in the southwest border and other barbarian areas in similar situations. Yunnan Province was the earliest province established in the southwestern Borderland of the Yuan Dynasty. Mongolia simultaneously attacked the Southern Song Dynasty from the north and the south, and maneuvered troops to pacify Yunnan through the northwest. It initially implemented the 10,000-household system which had been common in the northern grasslands in Yunnan, but the situation was still volatile. In the 11th year of the Zhiyuan (1274), the minister Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar was appointed to implement the provincial system in Yunnan. Brigadier and battalion commands were turned into circuits, prefectures and counties, and aborigines were appointed native officials, following the practice of the Southern Song Dynasty in governing Guangxi. All of the undertakings were successful. After Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar passed away a few years later, Kublai Khan issued a decree, ordering officials of Yunnan Province to abide by the rules established by him (Song et al., 1976, 3066). The rule of using barbarians as native officials



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was promoted in Huguang Province and other places and became an important system. In other barbarians with similar conditions in the southwestern Borderland, similar policies were also implemented in the Ming and Qing dynasties. The key to the success of the native official system in the southwestern Borderland lies in its consistence with the characteristics of the local barbarian society. Affected by the complex diversity of geographical and climatic environment and animal and plant resources, the production activities and lifestyles of the ethnic groups in the southwestern Borderland were complex and diverse. The tribes have lived in a specific natural environment for a long time, and have accumulated special experience in adapting to local life, developing a close bond with the land and natural resources. On the other hand, immigrants from other places kept moving in for thousands of years and gradually merged with the indigenous peoples of the southwest, making the southwestern Borderland culture similar to that of the hinterland. Although the economic development in this area was backward, it was economically self-sufficient and close to the hinterland culturally. Therefore, the main contradiction of the tribes in the southwestern Borderland was internal, that is, they had been fighting over resource and grievances for a long time, and had developed a complex relationship of interests. In fact, their struggle in the southwest was mainly local. As for the Central Plains dynasty in the hinterland, it was held in high regard by the fractions of the southwestern tribes. The northern nomads were easily grouped and gathered. When they ventured south, their focus was mainly on obtaining food and other materials from the Han region by force to make up for the deficiencies caused by the structural defects of the nomadic society. The main fronts of the struggle between them in the north and the south were therefore markedly different. The Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties made the leaders of the barbarians in the south as state officials, and promised to allow them to continue holding their sphere of influence and governing their people. This way, the native officials and chieftains obtained the legitimacy for possession of resources and power for a long time. At the same time, the government had the power to recover their resources and power, forcing them into obedience and allegiance. The institutionalized management under the

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native official-chieftain system also guaranteed the long-term rights and interests of native officials and chieftains, as well as the relative stability of the pattern of relations with aborigines. Therefore, the system witnessed rapid results after implementation, helping the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties to penetrating their rule into areas previously beyond their reach, cultivating the loyalty of the barbarians in the south, and reducing the struggle between barbarians due to competition for resources or retribution. Third, it initially solved the problem of high cost and low profit in the Borderland management of the Central Plains dynasty and helped its much-sought strategy of “ruling the barbarian with barbarians” to succeed. The native official-chieftain system basically solved the shortage of intermediate and low-ranking officials in areas with government agencies. Appointing barbarians as officials to govern the native people generally had the characteristics of greater prestige, familiarity with the situation, and convenience. In the Southern Song Dynasty, Zhao Yanli, the Prefect of Tanzhou, proposed “appointing natives known for wisdom and courage among their people as officials” to help with government. He believed that “since their customs and desires are the same, they can be a great help in governing the Yao people” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14194). Using the native army instead of the official army to guard the Borderlands also drastically reduced the expenditures of the treasury. Zhou Shuoxun, the Prefect of Lianzhou, made a cogent argument. He said that the wolf soldiers and Yao soldiers does not cost any public money. Just divide the arable land among them, ask them to till their land and mobilize them for war when necessary. “The practice saves the national expenditure while enhancing border defense.”75 This way, the shortage of Borderland officials was initially resolved, and the use of Borderland native troops to replace the garrison reduced the running cost of managing the Borderland. In addition, the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties collected a large amount of taxes and non-ferrous metals from the southwestern Borderland regions, and initially solved

75 [Qing Dynasty] Zhou Shuoxun, “Proposal on Establishing Wei and Yao Native Troops”, in [Daoguang Reign] Chronicles of Lianzhou Prefecture, Vol. 23.



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the long-term problem of high cost but low profit that had plagued the rulers in operating the Borderland. The implementation of the native official-chieftain system also made it possible to manipulate the contradictions among the barbarians in the south to restrain each other, while the imperial court acted as the legal arbiter of their disputes and managed to stay behind the scene. Therefore, Cai Yurong, the governor of Yunnan-Guizhou in the Qing Dynasty, said that The court used the barbarians to rule the barbarians, and generously granted official posts and power to deter their tribesmen while benefiting their children. However, the official posts granted were not higher than placation commissioner or prefect, which was subordinate to non-native officials, whom they never dared to challenge. Therefore, they became contented about staying in peace and refrained from causing big troubles.76 The native troops established in various parts of the south belonged to the national army and could also be mobilized to crush the rebellion of the barbarians. Anyway, they served to help the imperial court achieve the goal of “ruling barbarians with barbarians.” In the northern grasslands and other border areas, the Yuan court continued to implement the brigadier and battalion system, instating thousands of brigadier commanders and centurions for hierarchical management according to the size of the population under their jurisdiction. The focus was placed on controlling their population rather than their land, making the system adaptable to the barbarians’ preparedness for fast action and withdrawal. The Qing Dynasty turned the Wanhu System (brigadier commander system) into a complete Mongolian Banner System, which attached importance to the possession and distribution of land by league and banner, but which still focused on controlling the barbarian population. Meanwhile, in rare cases were the official posts hereditary. All those bore the traces of the brigadier commander system. Therefore, the Yuan Dynasty created a period of different governance policies on the Borderland ethnic groups 76 [Qing Dynasty] Cai Yurong, “Ten Memorials on Managing Yunnan: Memorial 2: Management of Native Peoples”, [Kangxi Reign] A General History of Yunnan, Vol. 29. “Art and Literature (3)”.

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by promoting the native official system in the southwestern Borderland; the Ming Dynasty inherited and developed the practice, while the Qing Dynasty ruled the border areas with mature and diverse means. Fourth, it embodied the characteristics of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties to strengthen border rule and cherish Borderland resource development. Therefore, it was an aggressive policy, focusing on practical results. The Yuan Dynasty once again unified the entire country, and significantly alleviated the pressure from the northern nomads. The tradition of “emphasizing the north over the south” of the China’s imperial history was rendered obscure. Meanwhile, the strategic position and resource advantages of the southwestern Borderland gradually became apparent. The native official system implemented in the southwest and other border areas of the Yuan Dynasty also became better targeted. And the feature was inherited in the native chieftain system of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Although the problems faced by the Ming and Qing dynasties in the border areas were different, emphasis on and active management of the border areas such as the southwestern Borderland was a common feature of the Yuan, Ming and Qing rule. An important duty of native officials and chieftains was to collect taxes from the native people. During the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, with the deepening of the Borderland governance, immigrants from other places flowed in, and a large number of mineral deposits, in particular, non-ferrous metals were mined. Agriculture, handicrafts, and commerce witnessed rapid development. Various resources in the border were developed, and taxes increased, enriching the national treasury and strengthening the rulers’ confidence in managing the Borderland. Fifthly, the institutionalized management of border policies was basically realized, mainly manifested in the integration of native officials and chieftains into the national administrative management system, for standardized and continuously improved management. An obvious drawback of the Jimi policy was the lack of institutionalized management. The generals guarding the Borderland wielded great power but lacked corresponding supervision, and often rode roughshod over the local people, becoming the culprit for the repeated uprisings of the Borderland barbarians. In order to draw materials to use



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the Central Plains, the Shu Han paid great attention to the operation of Nanzhong (now Yunnan-Guizhou area), and levied a large amount of gold and silver, oxen and war horses from the Nanzhong tribes. The taxation was exorbitant. However, it strived to “be strict in taxation and education, and trustworthy in doling out rewards and punishments” (Chen, 1959, 930). There were generally laws to be followed and the legislation was appropriate, while the administration of officials was relatively effective. Therefore, the stability of Nanzhong was generally maintained. The native official-chieftain system always sought institutionalized management, and was superior to the short-lived policy of the Shu Han for governing Nanzhong. Sixth, the policy emphasized adaptation to real-time conditions and timely adjustment. The native official-chieftain system implemented in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties each had their own specificities, or rather, their intention for addressing specific problems. The purpose for implementing the native official system in the Yuan Dynasty was to establish a comprehensive rule in the southwestern Borderland and to address the serious shortage of officials and troops there. Therefore, the focus was to establish governance and draw on the Borderland human resources. In its early years, the Ming Dynasty mainly followed the governance policies of the imperial China. At the beginning of Hongwu Reign, the barbarians from the southwest surrendered, and submitted the placation commissioner seal granted by the Yuan Dynasty. And the Ming court re-instated them to their original posts.77 During the subsequent 200 years of rule, the Ming Dynasty continued to modify and improve the native official system, mainly to stipulate and strictly enforce the duties, inheritance, rewards and punishments of native officials. Through the complete chieftain system, the Ming Dynasty established an institutionalized and relatively stable rule in the barbarian land like the southwestern Borderland. In the Qing Dynasty, the first problem encountered in the southwestern Borderland was to break the closed state of backward areas in order to establish a new feudal rule and further develop its resources. The Qing court used a chieftain system and the replacement of native chieftains with state officials as a 77 History of Ming, Vol. 310, “Biography of Chieftains”, 7982.

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weapon to clear obstacles for immigrants to enter the border areas and deepen the absorption of border resources. Seventh, the policy advocated actively developing Confucianism education in the southern Borderland. This important measure was based on the general implementation of the native officialchieftain system. For example, the Yuan Dynasty instated the supervisor of Confucian education in Kunming and Dali in Yunnan (Wang and Fang, 2000, 12), built Confucian Temples in Kunming, and established Confucian schools in all counties and prefectures, with selected scribes as the instructors (Song et al., 1976, 3069). The Ming Dynasty set up schools in various parts of the Borderland regions. In Yunnan Province alone there were 63 Confucianism schools. In the Qing Dynasty, the Borderland education witnessed even faster development. In the middle of the Qing Dynasty, Yunnan Province had 101 schools of various types, including prefectural, county and departmental schools. In some important cities academies were also set up (Fang, 2003, 755). In the Borderland areas, especially the southern Borderland, active efforts were made to abolish the old customs after the Song Dynasty, especially in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Through the development of feudal education and promotion of changes in customs, the culture between the southern Borderland and the inland gradually drew near and even merged. Although the native official-chieftain system marked a big step forward on the basis of Jimi governance, it still had obvious limitations, some of which were apparent in the beginning, and even grew into serious scourges in the future. One of those primary limitations was that native officials and chieftains were recognized and protected by the imperial court, and sometimes were beyond the control of the imperial court. The other one was that native officials and chieftains gradually mastered the methods of dealing with the imperial court, and usually lined their own pockets via excessive taxation. When conditions permitted, they gradually became more influential and established separatist regimes with the native army under their command. According to “Biography of Chieftains” in History of Ming, the chieftain system matured in the Ming Dynasty, but the purpose still consisted in Jimi rule. Powerful chieftains grew steadily gathered influence and



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power over generations. They were known to rebel when hard pressed or “became increasingly aggressive” because of their merits. The Yuan Dynasty ruled for a short period of time, and there were few cases of native officials becoming rebellious. In the Ming Dynasty, their scourge was severe. For example, the rebellion of the chieftain surnamed Si in Luchuan, Yunnan in the middle Ming Dynasty, and that of the chieftains She Chongming and An Bangyan in Sichuan and Guizhou afterwards were all sensational incidents. The imperial court allowed native officials and chieftains to follow the traditional management method, objectively protecting the backward society and its old customs, while making it difficult for the native people under its jurisdiction to obtain the protection of the national legal system. With the progress of the Borderland regions, the conservative and backward side of the native official-chieftain system gradually became apparent. Some chieftains competed with the imperial court for land, mineral deposits and other resources, while others interfered with the opening of post roads and the entry of immigrants. That was main reason for Qing court to launch the replacement of native chieftains with state officials. However, there was no reason for the chieftain system to exist in the border areas, especially in remote places. After the large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in Yunnan, the Qing court realized that “areas beyond the river (Lancang River) is suitable for implementing the native official system, and those behind it was suitable for implementing direct rule” (Zhao et al., 1977, 14205). The small and medium chieftains in southern Yunnan were retained. After the outbreak of the Opium War, the United Kingdom, France and other western powers attempted to encroach on the border of Yunnan, but the Qing court was unable to put up a resistance. The Borderland chieftains spontaneously organized a resistance and played an active role in safeguarding the territory.

7.4. The Main Reasons for Implementing the Native Official-­ Chieftain System There were many profound reasons for the formation and promotion of the native official system in the Yuan Dynasty and its transformation

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into the chieftain system in the Ming and Qing dynasties. The main ones included the changes in the situation of the Borderland regions and the ruler’s ideas on border governance. In fact, the administration of the border areas was deeply influenced by the thoughts of the important emperors of this dynasty. The reasons are detailed separately below. First, the situation of the border areas and the management thinking of the rulers had changed. The Yuan Dynasty was a relatively special period. The northern minorities unified China for the first time, and the Mongolians who came from the depths of the grasslands did not know much about traditional Chinese politics, although its cavalry virtually swept across the world. It relied on promoting the thinking of “making Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” and used the borderland as the strategic Borderland for expansion. In military actions throughout the country, the Mongolian rulers traditionally did not bring military rations along but acquired supplies wherever they went. In the heavily guarded border areas, they actively engaged in military and civilian farming, taxation, and mineral development. For example, “Geography (1)” in History of Yuan says that, “the so-called Jimi prefectures of the Tang Dynasty are often located in the Borderland regions of Lingbei, Liaoyang, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Huguang. Today, taxes and levels are imposed on a level similar to the hinterland.” On the other hand, the former tradition of “prioritizing the north over the south” was not apparent in the Yuan Dynasty. The main reason is that the Yuan Dynasty was established by the northern nomads, which originated in the northern grassland. The areas beyond the northern border were ruled by the Four Khanates. Therefore, the focus of Borderland expansion was border areas elsewhere, especially the southwest. According to estimates in the late Ming Dynasty, the number of Mongols initially entering the Central Plains was about 400,000 (Han, 1986, 5). It was extremely difficult for so few conquerors to rule such populous areas of Han Chinese. Therefore, the Mongolian Yuan rulers regarded the Han Chinese as their biggest opponent, and implemented the “four-class system” throughout the country, relying on the Mongols and the Semu people for guarding against the Han and southerners. After the implementation of the native official system, the upper class



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of the barbarians in the south was regarded as the necessary assistant. That was the deep reason for the Yuan Dynasty to appoint a large number of their leaders as native officials and gave them full trust. The Borderland barbarians also felt the kindness and worked actively to live up to the trust. For example, in the Zhiyuan years, the native officials from the southwest rushed to the capital to pay tribute, causing the post road to be overcrowded, and Emperor Shizu Kublai had no choice but to issue the edict “except for those who had recently submitted, envoys coming from Yunnan border to the capital will have to bear the fodder expenses on their own, if they refuse to follow the arrangement of the imperial court” (Song et al., 1976, 362). Due to the above reasons, the Mongolian Yuan rulers had the following characteristics in border management: they changed the conservative management of the imperial China to active expansion; shifted the focus from the north to the southwest border; abandoned the traditional concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery”, trusting the southwest barbarians and appointing many of them as officials. The focus was to establish rule as soon as possible and to exploit the human resources of the Borderland for external expansion and internal and external wars. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty, said that “for the Middle Kingdom is safe and secure, the Borderland barbarians shall be made the fence,”78 indicating that the Yuan Dynasty’s policy of actively expanding outwards was abandoned and the border governance tradition of “making the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” since the Han and Tang dynasties was restored. The governance policy was inherited by subsequent emperors. In the 22nd year of Jiajing (1543), Emperor Shizong of the Ming Dynasty issued an edict, saying that “The ideal government of an emperor should make the Borderland barbarians the fence. Now, I want long-term peace and stability, and there is no better option than staying on the defensive.”79 The Tartars and the Oirats, which were descendants 78 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 153, Xinmao day of the 4th lunar month in the 16th year of Hongwu. 79 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Jiajing in the Reign of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 284.

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of the Mongolians in the northern desert, had been active and harming the Borderland regions. To prevent the Tartars and Oirats from going south, the Ming Dynasty stationed a lot of troops on the northern border, placing the focus of prevention in the north. On the other hand, as a practical and experienced politician, Zhu Yuanzhang had a good understanding of the tendencies and habits of the southwestern barbarians. He pointed out that the barbarian tribes of Yunnan had not always been volatile since ancient times because their land was remote and inaccessible and their people rich and belligerent. “To tame them, leniency and rigidity must be combined.”80 Although the Ming army captured Yunnan, it met fierce resistance from the local barbarians, and did not pacify the region until one decade later. Zhu Yuanzhang defended Yunnan with a large garrison, and later made it a law. According to Veritable Records of Ming, the Ming troops stationed in Yunnan often amounted to several dozen thousand, or even half a million along with their family members. The officers and soldiers under the post house system had to reclaim land for farming, thus leading to a wave of military immigration and reclamation. The focus was in cities and towns, as well as strategic places. Therefore, the areas where the population and cultivated land increase rapidly were mainly the hinterland, along the transportation line, and the county seats. On the other hand, the territory of the Ming Dynasty was relatively stable, and the rulers also had a strong sense of national territory. The deployment of large troops in areas close to the border became one of the characteristics of military arrangement in the Ming Dynasty. The situation of Guangxi and Guizhou was similar to that in Yunnan. In order to protect the post road from the Central Plains to Yunnan through Huguang, the Ming Dynasty established a province in Guizhou area along the way. The surrounding areas of Guizhou are relatively flat and the central part is abrupt and mountainous. The surrounding areas, especially the vicinity of Zunyi, developed earlier, while the central part developed rapidly in the Ming Dynasty. 80 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 142, Bingyin day of the 2nd lunar month in the 15th year of Hongwu.



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The situation in western Guangxi and Guixi was similar to that in the adjacent southeastern Yunnan and southwestern Guizhou. Although eastern Guangxi was relatively developed, the natural and social environment was still similar to that of the Yunnan-Guizhou region. The Ming Dynasty also extended the chieftain system to remote areas in Hunan and other provinces, and the chieftain system was gradually popularized there. Affected by the background of the times, the Ming Dynasty’s thinking on border management has the following characteristics: Although it inherited the Borderland management tradition of “emphasizing the north over the south” since the Han and Tang dynasties, it stationed a massive army in the southwest border and actively managed it. The garrison exercised large-scale land reclamation and developed the economy to secure the source of supplies, thus the border governance was still different from that of the Han and Tang dynasties. The Ming Dynasty attached great importance to the security of its territories. In order to maintain Borderland stability, it launched major battles such as the “Three Expeditions to Luchuan.” At the same time, it attached great importance to the development of resources in the southwestern Borderland, and made conscious efforts to exploit its taxes and metal deposits. Although the Qing Dynasty was established by a Borderland ethnic group, its rulers had the concept of the unification of the Han Chinese and barbarians. Emperor Yongzheng said that “since the Qing Dynasty has unified the entire country, what is the point of differentiating the Han Chinese from the barbarians” (China City Press, 1999, 5)! After the development of Yuan and Ming dynasties, border areas became an important part of political and economic activities in the country. At the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, development of mineral deposits was banned. Yunnan became an exception for its rich reserves of copper and silver. Therefore, Yunnan became an important source of raw materials for mintage in the hinterland. During the Qianlong reign, it produced 6–7 million catties, or even 89 million catties of raw copper per year. Most of the raw copper needed to make money in the Board of Works, Board of Revenue, Jiangnan Province and another eight provinces was collected from Yunnan (Zhao et al., 1977, 3666).

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The Qing people said that “copper and salt is the most important for governance of Southern Yunnan” (Tan, 1990, 41). At that time, there was the saying of “the copper of Yunnan is unrivaled in the country.” During the Qianlong period, the population of the whole country increased rapidly, and there was a phenomenon of large numbers of refugees migrating to the Borderlands. Although the Qing court tried to ban the migration, it achieved little success. Yunnan and other border provinces, offered preferential conditions such as reducing taxes and lending seed and cattle for farming, to attract refugees to the Borderlands for land reclamation and farming. The tendency of a large population moving to the borders was in contradiction with some barbarians who had habitually been closed or even resisted government management. Meanwhile, the Qing court also hoped to collect more taxes from the Borderland regions. Yunnan governor Eertai said in the beginning of his “Memorial on Requesting Replacement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule” that the purpose was to remove the barbarian officials and register land, so as to increase the taxes and achieve grassroots peace, adding that “it will benefit national treasury in no small way.” Emperor Yongzheng commented that “By no means small” (Eertai, 1930). The large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the southwestern Borderland during the Yongzheng period was launched under this background. Second, it was deeply influenced by important emperors of the dynasty. The Yuan Dynasty ruled for 98 years since Kublai determined the name of Yuan. The 31 years under Kublai Khan’s reign was a period witnessing its founding and prosperity. The emperors after Shizu adhered to the original system. Mongolia was founded on military strength and valued strength comparison and outflanks in war. Back in the time of Genghis Khan, counselor Guo Baoyu suggested to the emperor that “The Central Plains was so powerful that it cannot be taken lightly. The southwestern tribes are brave and can be of service, so it is best that we subdue them first. With their help, we will definitely defeat the Jin Dynasty” (Song et al., 1976, 3521). In the 2nd year of Xianzong (1252), Möngke Khan ordered his younger brother Kublai Khan to join forces with the general Uriyangkhadai, and detour to the northwest for expedition to Dali with 100,000 troops, planning



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a “outflanking strategy” against the Southern Song Dynasty with the forces of the southwestern aboriginal tribes. After capturing Dali, Uriyangkhadai led several thousand cavalry soldiers from four kings and 10,000 native troops of Yunnan, and swept across Guangxi all the way to the city of Tanzhou (now Changsha, Hunan) (Song et al., 1976, 2981). Thus, the original strategic vision was generally realized. The southwestern tribes were brave and helpful, while Yunnan was rich in resources and could be used to restrain Annan and Burma. All those left a deep impression on the Mongolian court. Kublai, who personally led the army to conquer Yunnan, also developed a Yunnan complex. In the 4th year of Zhiyuan, Yunnan Prince, Kublai said to his son Hugeci before dispatching him to Yunnan that “Dali was personally pacified by me. And I love its customs. I could have gone there to govern it personally, but I have to manage affairs of the entire after ascending the throne. Now I’m giving it to you. Do remember to placate the officials and people there properly.” A few years later, Hugeci was killed in an internal strife (Tu, 1989, 510). Kublai thought over and over again, and sent Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, an important minister there to establish a province. Kublai Khan also sent many Mongolian princes, known as “Prince of Yunnan” and “Prince of Liang”, to guard Yunnan, together with the provincial officials. The Yuan Dynasty set up more than ten provinces, but only sent high-ranking princes to guard them on few occasions. The Yuan people therefore said that Kublai Khan “sent princes to guard Yunnan while appointing important officials to take charge of its governance.”81 The importance attached by Kublai Khan to Yunnan was also seen in his strenuous efforts to improve its status. In the 11th year of Zhiyuan (1274), Yunnan Province was established, and it was one of the earliest provinces established in the Yuan Dynasty. Yunnan Province had a vast territory, including parts of present-day Yunnan Province, western Guizhou, southwest Sichuan, and northern Indochina Peninsula. Its establishment ended the long history of Yunnan and Guizhou being under the administrative jurisdiction of Sichuan. It became a province, 81 [Yuan Dynasty] Yu Ji, Ancient Records of Daoyuan Learning, Vol. 5, “On the Eev of Sending Wen Zifang to Yunnan”.

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with close contact with the imperial court through the newly built post road from Zhongqing (now Kunming) the provincial governmental seat to Dadu (now Beijing) the state capital via Huguang. The great importance attached to Yunnan also led to its important radiation effect on the surrounding areas. The Mongolian army seized the Dali Kingdom, more than 20 years before the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty. The Mongolian army actively solicited surrender in Yunnan and its surrounding areas, and appointed some surrenders as officials according to the original system. So many barbarians surrendered and pledged allegiance. When Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar arrived in Yunnan, he renounced the original indiscriminate use of force and exercised rule by virtue and force, significantly expanding the influence of the imperial court. In the 13th year of Zhiyuan (1276), Li Weiping and Cen Congwei, leaders of the barbarians from Zuojiang and Guangxi submitted to Yunnan Province authorities, together with the officials and hundreds of thousands of people from more than 80 Jimi prefectures established in the Song Dynasty.82 Thus Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar became knowledge about the Song policy for governing barbarians in Guangxi, and created the native official system. The Jimi prefecture system established in Guangxi during the Song Dynasty already had some of the features of the native official system. For example, the imperial court recognized and protected native officials’ ownership of the land and native people under their jurisdiction in exchange for their obedience and allegiance, allowed the establishment a native army mainly for maintaining law and order locally but subject to mobilization of the imperial court and collected taxes from the barbarians to enrich the national treasury. In the Song Dynasty, the Jimi governance policy was quite effective in Guangxi. According to Zhang Shi, the prefect of Jingjiang, the Zuojiang and Youjiang regions were strategically important, but fewer than 1,000 troops were stationed in Yongzhou to guard them, because there were more than 100,000 native troops stationed in over 80 garrisons “under the command of a 82 [Yuan Dynasty] Zhao Ziyuan, “Stele on the Virtuous Governance of Governor Sayyid”, [Republic of China] A Newly Compiled General Record of Yunnan, Vol. 92, “Epigraphic Studies”, Vol. 5, 224.



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hereditary leader to serve as a fence” (Bi, 1992, 1006). The Jimi prefecture system of Guangxi was still in its early stages, and was markedly inferior to the chieftain system of the Yuan Dynasty in appointment of the ruling agency, implementation scale, trust in native officials, and effectiveness. The native official system managed to achieve great results in a short period of time partly because of the characteristics of the Mongolian Yuan in governance. The provincial system was a creation of the Yuan Dynasty. The provinces were directly managed by the imperial court, each with a clear scope of jurisdiction and considerable power. All the issues related to finance, grain, soldiers and armament, cultivation and military-agricultural colonies, and water transportation were all under provincial control. In remote areas, the Placation Commission was established under the provinces to govern the prefectures and counties, acting as a bridge between the provincial government and the prefecture or county government. Where Borderland military issues were involved, it took up the duties of the general military command. In the grassroots level, the commission of conquest, placation and publicity was established (Song et al., 1976, 2308). The provinces and the placation commission featured general control over military and civilian affairs, multiple official positions with clear-cut obligations, emphasis on leading troops and in-depth governance. Therefore, under the native official system, there were many native posts at all levels, and most native officials led the army to participate in wars. The management channels were simple and the work efficiency was high. It can also be seen that the main goal of the native official system was to assist the military rule over the border and wars inside and outside the border. The Mongolian Yuan rulers followed simple and realistic principles in governance; they were good at learning but neglected improvement. Although the provincial system and native official system were quite new, there were still many areas to be improved. The 53 years of the reign of Emperor Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang and Emperor Chengzu Zhu Di was a period of standardized management and social prosperity in the Ming Dynasty, as well as one of development and improvement of the chieftain system and its promotion in a larger area. In the middle and late Ming Dynasty, social turmoil and

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corruption in official administration frequently appeared, and the chieftain areas were also affected and exploited by the government. Chen Yongbin, the governor of Yunnan during the Wanli reign, said that the heaviest levy in the entire country was “none other than the gold tax of Yunnan”83 Certain disadvantages that accompanied the chieftain sys­ tem, such as the tendency of the chieftains to grow disobedient or even separatist, and oppressive towards the local people, were also apparent. The main change of the chieftain system in the Ming Dynasty included improvement of initial shortcomings in the early stage, formation of a systematic and standardized management, and extension to Guizhou and other newly developed areas, as well as Huguang and other remote areas. The Ming Dynasty also made conscious efforts to suppress the rebellious chieftains, and tried to implement the replacement of native chieftains with state officials. Emperor Taizu cherished the development of Confucian education in the chieftain areas, and the practice later became an established policy of the Ming Dynasty. In the 2nd year of Hongwu (1369), Zhu Yuanzhang issued an edict to the Central Secretariat, saying that “In state governance, education is the first priority, and schools are the cornerstone of education. All counties and counties shall establish schools, and hire teachers and Confucian scholars, to offer courses to students and apprentices, so as to gradually educate the people and restore the ways of ancient kings.” In the twenty-eighth year (1395), he issued an edict to the Ministry of Rites: All the native officials of the borderland know little about rites, since they are now holding their offices through inheritance. “If education is not offered in advance, how can they be edified?” Therefore, the native officials in Yunnan and Sichuan were ordered to set up Confucian schools, for education of their children, “acquainting them with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and preventing them from violating the rites and participating in struggles are also the way to achieve peace in the borderland.”84 He also

83 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Wanli in the Reign of Emperor Shenzong, Vol. 424, Wuxu day of the 8th lunar month in the 34th year of Hongwu. 84 History of Ming, Vol. 69, “Election (1)”, 1680. Veritable Records of Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty, Vol. 239.1st day of the 6th lunar month in the 28th year of Hongwu.



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proposed that garrisons should be stationed at strategic points, and efforts be made to develop education and change the old customs, so as to change the situation of the barbarians being ignorant of etiquette and volatile in obedience. After years of osmosis, they would become law-abiding citizens.85 Due to the emphasis on spreading inland cul­ ture, the social trend of the southwestern Borderland changed drastically, and later generations called the Ming Dynasty the period for the hinterland of the southwestern Borderland to take on the features of the Middle Kingdom. In the Qing Dynasty, the cultural education there witnessed greater development, and became basically aligned with the inland culture. The golden years of Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, which last more than 100 years in the early Qing Dynasty, were attributable to the enlightenment approaches and diligence of Emperor Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong. The three emperors all supported the refugees’ entry into the border areas and replacement of native chieftains with state officials. In the first year of Yongzheng (1723), Emperor Yongzheng issued an edict, saying that as the population of the country grows, the land can barely support it; from now on, wherever there is arable land in each province, the people shall be allowed to cultivate it to support themselves and the government shall not interfere. Emperor Qianlong said that “In the 100-odd years since the early Qing Dynasty, the number of households all over the country has increased by more than ten times. I have instated on developing the Borderland regions and made it possible for the people to cultivate the land there.”86 After reading the memorial submitted by Eertai on Requesting the Replacement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule, Emperor Yongzheng expressed his approval and decided that Eertai was “certainly going to stamp out the thieves.” So he appointed Eertai as the Governor of Yunan, Guizhou and Guangxi, entrusting him with replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the three provinces. Eertai lived up to his expectations.

85 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 43, Dingwei day of the 6th month in the 2nd year of Hongwu. 86 [Qing Dynasty] Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 1441, Wuwu of the 11th month of the 58th year of Qianlong.

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In the 10th year of Emperor Qianlong, Eertai died, and the Qing court enshrined him for sacrifices in the ancestral temple of the imperial clan (Wei, 1984, 283; Zhao et al., 1977, 10236, 14205). From Emperor Kangxi to the Opium War, the policy of the Qing Dynasty for governing the southwestern Borderland was basically stable. The main change of the chieftain system in the Qing Dynasty was the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in some areas, and that was a major adjustment and reform. This suggests that the local official-chieftain system implemented by the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties not only had important changes in content and effectiveness, but also featured adapted measures to local conditions and changed times. This change not only reflected the general trend of historical development in China, but also constituted the result of coordinating many factors. Among them, the role of emperors such as Kublai, Zhu Yuanzhang, Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong should not be underestimated. They made important decisions based on the realistic circumstances and supported the reform of the native official-chieftain system. The correctness of their historical choice was confirmed by the future development of the border areas.

8.  Replacement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule by the Qing Court in the Qing Dynasty and Its Influence The replacement of native chieftains with state officials means replacement of native officers and chieftains with non-hereditary officials appointed by the imperial court for ruling. Shortly after the establishment of native officials in the Yuan Dynasty, there were records of replacement of native chieftains with state officials in a few areas. After the mid-Ming Dynasty, the process reached a certain scale. During the Yongzheng period, the Qing Dynasty implemented it comprehensively on a large scale in the southwestern Borderland. After the reign of Emperor Yongzheng, it was roughly the aftermath. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the replacement of native chieftains with state officials during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng. In recent years,



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with the collation and release of a batch of Qing palace archives, especially imperial memorials submitted by Borderland officials, researchers have gained a new understanding of the governance of border areas in the Qing Dynasty. Since the Yunnan-Guizhou region was the focus of replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Yongzheng reign, its content was also obviously representative in the three southwestern provinces. Focusing on the Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, this chapter will discuss some issues about it, while expounding its profound impact on the southwestern Borderland.

8.1  To explore the reasons for the large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the southwest Borderland during the Yongzheng reign, we must clarify the nature and characteristics of the chieftain system. The chieftain system, which evolved from the Jimi rule of the Han and Tang dynasties, was a major advancement in the Borderland governance policy of the Central Plains dynasty. Its implementation in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties strengthened the rule of the imperial court over the barbarians in the south. The depth of its rule and the far-reaching influence were unmatched by the governance policies of preceding dynasties. The key to its success consisted in the fact that the Central Plains Dynasty generally achieved effective control of the natural resources in the areas under its control. The imperial court granted some legitimacy to the chieftain on the use of natural resources while wielding the right to reclaim the qualification, thereby reducing the situation of barbarians monopolizing resources or fighting for resources, and providing institutionalized guarantee for the social stability of the area under his jurisdiction. In the Qing Dynasty, the Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou, Eertai, pointed out that the basic method for ruling the barbarians included Sinicization and governance of barbarians with barbarians (Eertai, 1930). In fact, his observation constituted the key to the success of the chieftain system. However, the chieftain system also had problems not to be taken lightly. The main reason was that the chieftains were protected by the imperial court, while their deeds were beyond the control of the imperial

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court. Thus, the chieftains gradually mastered the knack for dealing with the court and usually resorted to excessive taxation to line their own pocket. Where the conditions permitted, their gradually became disobedient, and even relied on the native army to establish separatist regimes. The approval of the imperial court for them to follow the traditional management objectively protected the backward society and its old customs, making it difficult for the barbarian people under their jurisdiction to obtain the protection of the national legal system. With the development of the Borderland regions, the conservative and backward side of the chieftain system became more and more apparent. The chieftains competed with the imperial court for land, mineral deposits and other natural resources, and even obstructed the opening of post roads and immigration, leading to very serious problems. After the Qing army suppressed Yunnan, Wu Sangui seized the land for over a decade. During this period, there was no comprehensive governance of the southwestern Borderland. Wu Sangui lavished the conferment of chieftains in Yunnan and instigated some of them into rebellion, making it more difficult to control the chieftains since the end of the Ming Dynasty. After the Qing court quelled Wu Sangui’s rebellion, Cai Yurong, the Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou Province, submitted an imperial memorial in the 21st year of Kangxi (1682) and proposed the measures for restoring peace to Yunnan after the incident from ten aspects.87 Rich in content on the shortcomings of the current times, it was distributed by Emperor Kangxi to his ministers and courtiers for discussing the feasibility of the proposals (Wang, 1987, 439). Three of the measures proposed by Cai Yurong were related to the chieftain system. One was about the governance of native people. He pointed out that Wu Sangui had indiscriminately recruited native soldiers and arbitrarily appointed puppet generals or deputy generals among the native people virtually among all the barbarians. After his rebellion had been suppressed, the chieftains of various regions had surrendered one after another, but they were “still not submissive since they had been indulged to have it their way for such a long time.” The second was to 87 [Qing Dynasty] Cai Yurong, “Ten Memorials on Managing Yunnan”, [Kangxi Reign] A General History of Yunnan, Vol. 29. “Art and Literature (3)”.



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confiscate the weapons. Wu Sangui had enlisted native soldiers and issued a lot of weapons and firearms, which were brought home by the defeated native soldiers, instead of being surrendered to the imperial court. The third was the rampant banditry. Cai Yurong pointed out that rebellion and looting were a constant threat in Yunnan. In particular, the chieftain of Lukui Mountain in southern Yunnan was the most harmful. Those formulating plans for governing Yunnan mostly opted for suppression but not placation, on the ground that placation could only achieve brief peace, while suppression could solve the problem once and for all. However, Cai Yurong believed that suppression was not suitable for the time being due to the limitations of the circumstances, and that countermeasures should be taken according to the situation a few years later. From this we can see that chieftains of Yunnan were dominantly illegal. After more than 40 years of careful management in the Kangxi reign, the Yunnan-Guizhou area underwent a facelift at the beginning of the Yongzheng period. The originally devastated and decrepit sight had changed significantly. Social stability and sustained economic development in the Yunnan-Guizhou area became the goal pursued by Emperor Yongzheng. At this time, the serious problems of chieftains had become increasingly prominent over the years and the time to address those problems was ripe. Emperor Yongzheng appointed Eertai as the Viceroy of the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi, and entrusted him to preside over the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the three provinces. After reading the relevant memorabilia carefully, I found that there are several issues the purpose of replacement of native chieftains with state officials, the means for its realization, the different types, and the social conditions after it, are worthy of our attention. Regarding the purpose of replacement of native chieftains with state officials. In the past, some researchers thought that the large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Yongzheng reign was due to the fact that the landlord economy had become the main economic form in the related areas, and the superstructure including the chieftain system must be changed accordingly. Judging from the known records, the above view is open to question. Eertai analyzed the

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reasons for the implementation of the chieftain system in China’s imperial history. He said that the chieftain areas were border areas, where the dynasty had not ruled for long. In addition, they were areas full of smoky mists and inaccessible mountains, with local customs and habits not easily adjusted. Therefore, the imperial court ordered the native officials to manage them and to control them, “as the last resort.” The situation changed in the hundreds of years since the inception of the Ming Dynasty. Moreover, the chieftains took advantage of their official status to ride roughshod over the Miao people. “They sent only one to two percent of the exorbitant taxes to the imperial court.” In addition, they burned, killed, robbed, and habitually harassed the people. Therefore, replacement of native chieftains with state officials must be exercised, “so that the military and the civilians can exist alongside each other in peace” (Eertai, 2011, 303). In other words, the Chieftain system was unable to adapt to the social changes in the early Qing Dynasty. In a related memorial, Eertai detailed some crimes of the lawless chieftains. The first one was wantonly resorting to violence and breaking the law, endangering the people, and making the barbarians uncontrollable. The Yunnan-Guizhou chieftains had been tyrannical for years, and the Miao people under their jurisdiction suffered considerably. In cases where the native officials were cowardly, the viciousness and harm were doubled. The chieftains ignored not only the prefect, but also the governor. When their illegal conducts came to light, the higher-level government mostly chose to turn a blind eye because they were beyond its capacity. The Guizhou chieftains were weak and incompetent, “therefore, the Miao people were even a greater trouble.” Sometimes, a few culprits were executed, without addressing the fundamental problem (Eertai, 2011, 303). In some areas, the cruelty of the Miao people “was the result of inaction by chieftains”, who bent the laws and plunged the Han Chinese into dire straits. “This major disaster for the Borderland areas must be eradicated” (Eertai, 2011, 302). He concluded that “in Yunnan and Guizhou, no problem is more serious than that of Miao people, who had been a scourge because of the chieftains in fact” (Eertai, 1930). The second one was seizing land, mines and resources by denying the access of the government, merchants, and the people, and making it



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difficult for the state tax to grow. In March of the 4th year of Yongzheng (1726), the Viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou Eertai said that the chieftain of Wumeng, Sichuan, was unlawful and undisciplined. If he was let go without punishment, he would be more unruly in the future. Replacement of the chieftain system with direct rule of the Qing court “will be of great benefits locally.” He added that Dongchuan of Sichuan borders Xundian, Luquan, and Zhanyi of Yunnan, “and its land is vast and fertile.” However, the people of Sichuan refused to travel a long distance to cultivate the land there, while the people Yunnan in the vicinity dared not to, “because the local people have been fierce and specialized in looting.” He suggested that Dongchuan should be reassigned to Yunnan and the nearby garrisons should be moved to its place to consolidate the results of the replacement of native chieftains with state officials implemented in the 31st year of Kangxi (1692), so that “the grassland will be turned into fertile farms, increasing benefits for the people and tax revenues for the country” (Eertai, 1930). In November, Eertai further pointed out in his memorial that there were large tracts of wasteland in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, but they were mostly left unclaimed for their vicinity to “the colony of the Miao people” and consequently for fear that they might steal the harvest. However, if the chieftains obeyed the law, and the barbarians were held in fear, “many will come to surrender without solicitation.” Therefore, “managing the Miao people is a priority, with training soldiers as the prerequisite” (Eertai, 1930). The following year, Eertai reported that the Wumeng chieftain did cherish agriculture, saying that only the people in Daguantun were known to cultivate the land under the jurisdiction of the Wumeng chieftain, while “those around the native officers never adopted farming but were exclusively engaged in looting.” He added that the salt and rice needed were all coming from Zhenxiong, Daguantun and other places (Eertai, 1930). Eertai also asserted that “unless with replacement of native chieftains with state officials, so as to capture the rich, despotic and violent and replace the cowardly and mediocre, all efforts in managing land taxes and military system would come to no avail.” Therefore, in managing Yunnan and Guizhou “replacement of native chieftains with state officials must be made the first priority” (Eertai, 2011, 302). He also tried exploiting the mineral

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reserve of Tangdan Mine in Dongchuan, believing that “the outcropping promises a large reserve, and seen from the presently available standard, the taxes will reach ten thousand in gold.” In addition to the Tangdan Factory, there were more than ten other mines in Dongchuan, for example, Geshu. If they are actively mined after the replacement of native chieftains with state officials, “the output will be large, despite varying sizes of the reserve” (Eertai, 1930). In the twelve Bannas, Simao, and the six tea mountains in southern Yunnan, there were also chieftains or profiteers intervening in or monopolizing the tea trade, causing “armed rebellion of barbarians.” Therefore, Eertai suggested that Simao, the six tea mountains and the six bannas of Ganlanba should be placed under the jurisdiction of centrally-appointed non-hereditary officials, and that the remaining six bannas should still be under the jurisdiction of the Placation Commission; a location be selected for establishing a head office in tea-producing areas to preside over tea transactions, and the head office be managed by a justice, to prevent profiteers and other outsiders from entry, “so as to end provocations once and for all.” The six tea mountains produced about six to seven thousand packs of tea each year, and a tax of three silver coins levied on each pack from the merchants constituted a considerable income for the imperial court.88 As for the chieftains in Weiyuan, Xinping, and Ailao in southern Yunnan, “they were all stubborn and tough, despite the difference in origin.” In particular, the six tea mountains had been rebellious for years, and were seldom at peace. “Though they were not particularly harmful at present, they would be, if left unaddressed.” Therefore, Eertai suggested implementing replacement of native chieftains with state officials as soon as possible. Emperor Yongzheng also instructed that “the issue should be expedited as soon as possible; it will solve the problem once and for all, so you should put your mind on it.”89 In the 4th year of Yongzheng (1726), the chieftain of Zheledian, Zhenyuan, Yunnan incurred the “grievances of the local people and barbarians”

88 [Qing Dynasty] Eertai, “Memorial on Adding the System of Centrally Appointed Officials for Pu’er Prefecture”. 89 [Qing Dynasty] Eertai, “Memorial on Deploying Countermeasures for the Frontiers”, 10th of the 2nd month, 6th year of Yongzheng.



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and presented his seal to the Qing court, “as a token of surrender.” (Eertai, 2011, 303). In the sixth year, Eertai submitted another imperial memorial, saying that the chieftains of Cheli, Chashan, Mengyang, Laos, and Burma alongside the Lancang River in Yunnan, “had been vying for superiority and bullying the weak” and “had spread their unruly behavior to the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom” because of the connivance of the local government. He suggested that replacement of native chieftains with state officials be implemented and separate battalions be stationed to the south of the river “so as to solve the problem once and for all” (Eertai, 1930). This suggests that the large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials implemented in the Yongzheng reign in Yunnan, Guizhou and other provinces had been mainly intended to address the problem of some chieftains or Miao chieftains taking the law into their own hands and endangering the society, competing with the imperial court for resources such as land and minerals, and obstructing the opening of post roads. Borderland chieftains “currently harmless but might be so in the future” were also subjected to the reform as soon as possible, to avoid future troubles. In fact, the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Yongzheng reign was largely irrelevant to the development of the landlord economy in the chieftain area.

8.2  Regarding the strategy for implementing the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Yongzheng reign, past researchers believed that it had been carried out hastily without sufficient preparations, that it had been based on wanton killing of the barbarians, and that it had lacked mature and effective strategies. Seen from the currently available historical data, the above views are biased. First, Emperor Yongzheng and Eertai the Viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou who was entrusted to preside over the reform reached a consensus that its implementation must be meticulous and well prepared, so as to achieve success. Eertai recalled the lesson that the Ming Dynasty had failed to pacify the Luchuan Chieftain Siren’s rebellion after three expeditions, and pointed out that its plan was faulty and

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costly, but the perpetrator rebelled soon after surrendering, “after all, the problem was not solved.” He admired Zhuge Liang’s strategy of “unexpected scheming for war, meticulous considerations and secrecy for planning, humbleness for leadership and dedication in mind,” believing that the key to victorious wars in times of peace was to seize the opportunity, “and there is no need to have too many troops.” It is especially important to think about prevention at the peak of full prosperity, “this way, twice the result can be achieved with half the efforts.” Emperor Yongzheng appreciated his proposal so much90, that he specif­ ically instructed Eertai to “all the important issues should be handled carefully with comprehensive considerations, so as to avoid problems” (Eertai, 1930). The Qing court treated the replacement of the chieftain system with direct rule cautiously, which was also manifested in “appointing the proper officials.” Emperor Yongzheng emphasized the importance of appointing capable officials, saying that “proper employment is the most important thing, and most difficult issue” (Eertai, 2011, 154). In the fourth year of Yongzheng (1726), Eertai the newly appointed Viceroy of Yunnan proposed replacement of native chieftains with state officials in his imperial memorial, with detailed and feasible measures. Emperor Yongzheng read the memorial and decided that Eertai “was the one to rule the barbarians.” So he decided on the reform, and instructed that the three prefectures of Dongchuan, Wumeng, and Zhenxiong be switched from the jurisdiction of Sichuan to Yunnan. In the 6th year, he ordered that the seal for the Viceroy of the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi be cast and presented to Eertai, ordering him to govern Guangxi (Wei, 1984, 285). In the 12th year, when the Miao people of Taigong rebelled, Eertai submitted a self-introspective memorial to the imperial court for the faults in his plan. Emperor Yongzheng traced the origins of replacement of native chieftains with state officials, saying that Eertai’s proposal in capacity as Viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou had been sincere and that “I personally appreciated his candor and vision, and I knew that he would be meticulous in plan 90 [Qing Dynasty] Eertai, “Memorial on Deploying Countermeasures for the Frontiers”, 10th of the 2nd month, 6th year of Yongzheng.



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and would certainly succeed. So I approved his request and ordered to handle the issue carefully” (Wang, 1987, 1023). He also said that “I really cannot blame you, since you have handled all issues properly, as is known by the rest ministers. We’re glad that the heaven has been generous to bestow you to the country. I consider myself exceedingly lucky for being able to have your counsel, diligence and service” (Eertai, 1930). Emperor Yongzheng also exhorted Eertai in the instructions that “You mentioned investigating the six tea mountains thoroughly for establishing garrisons, and addressing the problem once and for all. However, the key to the endeavor consists in appropriately appointed officials and officers; without proper appointment, the reform may as well be postponed, to avoid counterproductive results. I reckon that you will be able to select the ideal candidates.”91 The “proper appointment” mentioned by Emperor Yongzheng explicitly instructed careful selection of investigative personnel and implicitly requested expedition. Eetai was entrusted by the emperor to handle the major undertaking under his constant reminders, and would certainly go all out for it. Therefore, this suggests that the replacement of native chieftains with state officials during the Yongzheng period generally featured meticulous planning, adequate preparation, flexible strategies and a clear target for success. Secondly, both Emperor Yongzheng and Eertai both believed that “to achieve peace locally, the Miao people must be placated first; to placate the Miao people, the chieftains must be properly governed; to govern the chieftains, efforts must be made to take their wealth and advantages away.” In other words, addressing the unruly chieftains was the key to govern the barbarian areas and the Yunnan-Guizhou area (Eertai, 1930). In punishing illegal chieftains, we must also adopt strategies accordingly. Emperor Yongzheng proposed that the Wumeng chieftains who were unruly and illegal should be exhorted first, so that they would not abuse the natives or disturb the neighbors, rectify their wrongdoings and abide by the law. If they refuse to mend their ways, meticulous planning should be exercised for their replacement with 91 [Qing Dynasty] Eertai, “Memorial on Deploying Countermeasures for the Frontiers”, 10th of the 2nd month, 6th year of Yongzheng.

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centrally appointed officials (Eertai, 1930). Eertai also believed that although the Wumeng chieftains had always been fierce and seemingly incorrigible, the still deserved grace first. After their placement under the jurisdiction of Yunnan, we should teach them the national laws, gradually take away their staunch supporters and gangsters, and wait for the opportunity to solicit their allegiance. If the solicitation came to no avail, “military conquest should be launched to solve the problem in one fell swoop” (Eertai, 1930). Furthermore, he proposed the strategy of “capturing the chieftains with carefully planned stratagem as the best policy, and suppression as the last resort; willing surrender as the best policy, and forced surrender as the last resort.” In replacing the chieftain system with the direct rule of the Qing court (Eertai, 2011, 302). The Emperor Yongzheng also reminded him in the instruction that replacement of native chieftains with state officials is a great undertaking but must be executed by the appropriate people. In its implementation, we should avoid the thinking of choosing one evil to flee from another among the barbarian peoples, so as to achieve long-term peace and stability. Deterrence with military conquest and belittlement of the barbarians like beasts to be arbitrarily tortured and abused will inevitably push them back to their former master. The relevance must be remembered (Eertai, 1930). Generally, the Qing court paid more attention to distinguishing the docile and kind from the incorrigible and fierce in the reform. To the docile and kind Miao people and Ganuoluo people of the various villages in Dongchuan, it believed that “those people should not be disturbed”; as for the Heiluo people, they were different from the primary culprit, although they were fierce. Eertai proposed that tribal leaders and chiefs should be captured by all means and exterminated or expatriated from their native places, while their followers should be properly treated if they came to surrender. However, the chiefs and chieftains that chose to rebel after the bureaucratization, like the Wumeng chieftain, should be “justifiably killed”, because “connivance would mean endless harm.” The cruel suppression meant not only the killing of the chieftains’ entire clans but also their gangsters. No mercy will be shown to even those coerced into rebellion. The punishment included expatriation of their family to the northern barren land or cutting off the left foot with



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the tendon if they chose to stay in their former residence (Eertai, 1930). From this, we can get a glimpse at the cruelty of feudal rule. Thirdly, emphasis was put on the aftermath treatment after the reform, that is, just as Eertai had said, “There is nothing difficult about the replacement of native chieftains with state officials but the subsequent redress must be careful designed” (Eertai, 1989). As for the replaced chieftains in the bureaucratization, those regarded “traitors” or violators of law were punished according to law, with their clans relocated to the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom, to avoid subsequent troubles. The second measure was to deploy green camp troops in areas where the native chieftains were replaced with state officials to suppress them. Emperor Yongzheng said in his comment that “Don’t hesitate about this expenditure. Efforts should be conscientious to ensure solution once and for all. Reductions and withdrawals ‘may as well be discussed’ after their full naturalization” (Eertai, 1930). Due to the proximity to Burma in Cheli, Pu’er and other places in southern Yunnan, was subject to particularly strict control after the bureaucratization. The Qing government turned Pu’er into a prefecture, and renamed the Puwei Battalion to Puzhen Garrison and relocated it to Pu’er, in the same city as the prefect. The troops were divided to guard the various checkpoints. “With close cooperation, they can handle important affairs with ease.” Simao had a dense population and a vast area. It was the strategic pass to the Jiulong River, Ganlanba and the six tea mountains. Therefore, the Qing court relocated the judicial department from Pu’er to Simao, “so as to enhance its role.” Ganlanba as the gateway to the whole county “was the most important area” (Eertai, 1930). So the imperial court established a prefect office there, and instated prefect Command in the same city. Due to changes in deployment, the Qing court reduced the Yuanjiang Garrison and reassigned the troops to the nearest Linyuan Garrision. After the military additions and adjustments, the Qing significantly strengthened it control over Cheli, Pu’er and other places. Emperor Yongzheng commented in his instructions that “The above deployment is ‘truly apt’ ” Before implementing the reform, Eertai attached great importance to the prior investigation to thoroughly learn about the basic situation in the areas involved. After submitting an imperial memorial on his

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plan to handle the chieftains of Dongchuan Prefecture, he secretly sent scouts to the Dongchuan area to conduct detailed investigation on local boundaries, strategic passes, mountains and rivers, cities, government offices, soldiers and household registration, grain taxes and levies, barbarians customs and folklore, and mine operations. “He learned about the general situation of all the items.” After obtaining the imperial approval, he went on fact-finding trips for detailed surveys, before discussing with his subordinates the specific steps. The reason for his caution was the belief “one tends to simplify planning in the beginning but the slightest overlook can result in a major disadvantage. So we should always be careful” (Eertai, 1930). Before deploying the green camp troops in Cheli and other places, Eertai worried that it would be difficult to deploy troops due to the miasma. Later, he learned that there were only minor miasma in Simao, the six tea mountains, Ganlanba, and Jiulong River, and that “the traveling merchants did not consider it an obstacle to trade.” Eventually, he set up officers and stationed troops there (Eertai, 1930). In the 12th year of Yongzheng (1734), Taigong Miao of Guizhou rebelled after the replacement of the chieftain system with the direct rule of the court, and Eertai submitted an introspective memorial for his fault in the previous plans. Emperor Yongzheng said in another edict that, “in fact the mistake was because their lacked a consensus and coordination” (Wang, 1987, 1023). This suggests that the Qing court’s strategy was flexible and tolerant of changes in implementation. The replacement of native chieftains with state officials in Yunnan and Guizhou was implemented according to the principle of adapting measures to local conditions, and roughly divided into the following types of Dongchuan, Wumeng, and Zhenxiong. Eertai believed that the chieftains of Wumeng and Zhenxiong “have been a resident evil for many generations with considerable harms to the Borderlands.” Originally, he opted for tactful measures without doling out severe punishment, but had to resort to “justified extermination” because the incorrigible chieftains rebelled after surrendering and had to be subdued with brutal force (Eertai, 1930). Therefore, he launched attacks in various prongs, ordering his troops to “go deep into the dens of the rebel to annihilate them, however inaccessible they may be.” Yuan Sheng and Cheng Zhen



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led their troops to attack Wumeng from Weining, capturing more than 80 villages and defeating tens of thousands of rebel forces. The military supervisor Zhang Yaozu demanded the troops “to seek the rebels circuit by circuit and massacre all of them, and to disembowel them and hang their intestines among the cliffs and forest, striking terror into the hearts of the Miao people.” Later, Emperor Yongzheng rewarded Eertai and the generals for their meritorious service, giving Yuan Sheng and Cheng Zhen citation of the first class, and rewarding their troops with money from state treasury (Zhaoet al., 1977, 10234). This suggests that the Qing army’s brutal suppression of the ethnic rebels in Wumeng and Zhenxiong was approved by the imperial court. Eertai’s shift of strategy for handling the chieftains there from the previous “grace preceding military conquest” to mass killings was partially because of the repeated rebellion of the related chieftains, and partially out of consideration for deliberately creating terror to force the chieftains of Wumeng and Zhenxiong to flee. After defeating the chieftain Lu Wanzhong of Wumeng, Eertai said in the memorial that “I think the two chieftains are at the end of their tether and have no choice but to flee into Sichuan. And I have secretly sent handwritten messages to officials of Sichuan about their conditions, asking them to be lenient. This way, we will succeed in relocating the chieftains” (Eertai, 1989). This suggests that the harsh suppression of rebellious chieftains in Yunnan was intended to force them to flee into Sichuan. The strategy was premeditated. Just as he had expected, the rebel chieftains of Wumeng and Zhenxiong fled to the southern part of Daliang Mountain to north of the Jinsha River and the high barren mountains of Wumeng and Zhenxiong, leaving behind large tracts of plains and hilly areas with fertile land, creating conditions for future immigrants to reclaim the wasteland for cultivation. The types of the Newly Developed Miao Territory. The Guzhou area of Guizhou was one of the focal points for the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Yongzheng reign. From the 6th year of Yongzheng (1728) to the 11th year, after many operations, the Qing Dynasty established the six prefectures of Bazhai, Danjiang, Qingjiang, Guzhou, Dujiang and Taigong in the Qingshui River basin with Guzhou as the center, and called them “the Newly Developed Miao Territory.”

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Back in the 4th year of Yongzheng, when he submitted the “Memorial on Replacement of the Chieftain System with Direct Rule by the Court”, Eertai pointed out that chieftains of Guizhou were different from their counterparts in Yunnan. Most of the cruelty and stubborn actions were wrought by the grassroots village masters. Therefore, “the replacement of native chieftains with state officials there should be based on local conditions, with specific scheduling” (Eertai, 2011, 303). Eertai asked Fang Xian, the prefect of Zhenyuan, Guizhou, about the method for developing the Miao territory. Fang Xian said that the Borderland Miao people were not under the jurisdiction of the local government or the chieftain. Their land held the inevitable pass for the hinterland to reach Yunnan, Hunan, and Guangxi. However, they had seized the pass and rebelled. So the officials and civilians passing their region had to detour. In addition, they sometimes ventured beyond their territory for plundering, “causing considerable problems to business travelers of the hinterland.” Their land had sweet springs, fertile land, and a rich reservoir of tung oil, white wax, cotton, bamboo and wood. If the reform there could ensure the smooth water traffic and promote the communication between the Miao people and the Han Chinese, both parties would stand to benefit, from the circulation of goods. “And that will benefit Guizhou enormously.” Therefore, Fang Xian said that the replacement of native chieftains with state officials should be carried out, and pacification should be combined with conquest. Fang Xian’s suggestions won the approval of Eertai.92 Since the target of the reform was mainly the village owners and the local chieftains, and the purpose was to punish the local Miao tyrants and recover the land and other resources seized by the Borderland Miao people, in the sixth year of Yongzheng (1728), Eertai proposed to implement the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the land of Miao people by capturing and punishing the most stubborn and powerful, and expressly appeasing the weaker and kind, so as to “dampen their disobedience and win their allegiance.” Emperor 92 Zhao Erxun et al., Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 308, “Biography of Fang Xian”, 10579; [Qing Dynasty] Fang Xian, A Brief Record of the Pacificatio of the Miao Region.



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Yongzheng reminded that “If military conquest is launched, cautious measures should be implemented to wrap it up.” He added that the emphasis should not be put on “profits” in the newly pacified places, and that expenditure must not be begrudged, to avoid “big mistakes because of smaller ones” (Eertai. 1930, 52–58). In the ninth year, the emperor also instructed that governance the Miao area “hinged on proper placation by the officials and officers, thus bullying should be avoided.” Efforts must be made to conscientiously educate the Miao people and promote their peaceful coexistence with the Han Chinese, so that “results may be achieved after a few years” (Zhang, 1930, 74–77). For this reason, Eertai believed that the bureaucratization of Miao areas should be adjusted according to the specific situation, and priorities should be determined. The basic principle was “to take into full consideration of the times and circumstances, as well as popular sentiments.” He emphasized that all chieftains shall be subject to the reform, with or without criminal records; otherwise, it would be difficult to make the reform accepted and to deal with the aftermath. He said by way of exemplification that “to pacify Liping, we must choose Duyun as the forerunner; to pacify Zhenyuan, we must make Liping the forerunner.” “This way, we can proceed with the undertaking with ease” (Eertai, 2011, 304). Thanks to the strategy of “combining suppression with placation”, annihilating the chieftains one by one, and “adapting to the circumstances”, the replacement of native chieftains with state officials went smoothly in the Miao areas, with relatively little social shock and damage. The newly opened Miao territory occupied an area of two to three thousand miles, “almost half the area of Guizhou Province.” The Qing court increased garrisons all over the region to strengthen control. In addition, it established bureaucratization battalions in the vicinity of the Qingshui River and the Danjiang River, and hired more than 100 Miao boats to go to Hunan to buy salt, cloth, grain and other goods. Thanks to the trips to and fro based on water transport, “the territory was swarmed with merchants, much to the delight of the immigrants and aborigines.” The government also opened the channel linking the Qingshui River to the Qignshui River, making it possible for merchant ships of Hubei and Guangzhou to reach the outer city of Zhenyuan,

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“thus fully pacifying Guzhou” (Wei, 1984, 290). Eertai also paid attention to the restoration and development of production there. In the 7th year of the Yongzheng (1729), he obtained the imperial approval for exploiting the copper mines in Weining, Guizhou, and ordered the organizers to persuade the local Miao people to participate in the mining. “There is no need to recruit excessive workers, firstly to benefit the workers and improve their livelihood and secondly to keep them engaged so that they could gradually be edified.”93 The attentiveness was nothing short of kindness. Emperor Yongzheng also affirmed the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the Miao territory. Ten years later, Eertai was transferred to capital to serve as Grand Scholar of the Hall of Preservation. The emperor issued a decree in his commendation, saying that The Borderland Miao people in Guzhou and other places have not been under the jurisdiction of the Middle Kingdom since ancient times. Eertai has secured their allegiance via ingenious coordination, combining suppression with placation, and has “expanded the Borderlands and restored peace there” (Wang, 1987, 1021). The types represented by Mengmian and Zheledian. The Mengmian Command under the Shunning Prefecture of Yunnan Province was under the control of the chieftain to the north of the Lancang River. It was verified that the chieftain had paid bribes for making his post hereditary, and had harassed the barbarians. Hundreds of barbarians from fifty villages went to the government of Yixi Circuit, requesting bureaucratization in Mengmian in order to “save the lives of the barbarians from imminent danger.” The Qing court conducted a secret investigation and found that all the people there “were expecting replacement of native chieftains with state officials to escape from the scourge earlier.” In order to save the aborigines from further abuse by the chieftains and discourage other chieftains from following the example of bending laws, the Qing government agreed to start replacement

93 “Memorial of Yunnan Yunnan-Guizhou-Guangxi Governor Eertai on Benefiting Popular Livelihood in Guizhou by Allowing Iron Smelting” (19th of the 9th month, 7th year of Yongzheng).



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of native chieftains with state officials in Mengmian.94 The native offi­ cer’s command of Zheledian under the jurisdiction of Zhenyuan “was surrounded by precipitous mountains and dangerous rivers.” And its chieftain Daoliandou was ignorant and surly, incurring widespread resentment. When Eertai led some troops to Zheledian to investigate into the matter, Daliandou knew that he was doomed, so he surrendered his seal and scepter, “and asked for requesting while pledging to accept the bureaucratization reform.” Eertai granted him his wish, and seized his properties and subjects while keeping his official post and rationing (Eertai, 2011, 303). The main characteristic of this type was that the Qing court complied with the request of the barbarians and launched bureaucratization peacefully, giving proper treatment to the chieftains who voluntarily proposed the reform, “to show encouragement.” However, this type of bureaucratization was few and sparse, and the rank of the chieftains involved was lower. The type of the Lancang River area. In the first lunar month of the sixth year of the Yongzheng period (1728), Eertai, the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou, submitted an imperial memorial, claimng that Dongchuan, Wumeng and Zhenxiong in eastern Yunnan, and Zhenyuan, Weiyuan, Enle, Cheli, Chashan and Mengyang in western Yunnan “were seized by fierce barbarians that have long been a harm to the people,” adding that they must be pacified before planning the management of the border of the province. The eastern part was gradually pacified since the dispatch of troops there for the bureaucratization reform. However, the western part, especially Cheli, Chashan and Mengyang bordered Cochin, Laos and Burma, and were rife with rebels active along the Lancang River, not only robbing people and burning villages at will, but also often killing officers and soldiers. “Yet they left no trace in the wake of the rampant cruelty.” He added that chieftains had been established along the Lancang River; in addition to Placation Commission of Cheli (in Jinghong, Yunnan), there were also chieftains in Chashan, Mengyang, Laos, and Burma. The chieftains had competed for superiority and habitually abused the weak, 94 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy and Governor Zhang Yunsui on Requesting Imperial Authorization” (28th of the 6th month, 10th year of Qianlong).

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annexing Chashan and Mengyang, and even “spread their violence to the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom.” Dao Zhengyan, the chieftain of Cheli, was particularly incorrigible and fierce and would be a major problem unless eliminated timely. Therefore, he suggested that Dao Zhengyan and his gangsters be taken captive and the thousand miles of land of the six tea mountains be thoroughly investigated, “so as to solve the problem once and for all” (Eertai, 1930). Later, Zhu Gang, the governor of Yunnan, submitted an imperial memorial, saying that the aboriginal people of the tea mountains often “caused troubles” and the solution should be “placation combined with suppression”, with garrisons and prefectures established in the tea mountains, “so as to discourage those surrendered from thoughts about their former master and to attract others into surrender” (Zhu, 1930). In March of the sixth year of Yongzheng (1728), Eertai once again submitted an imperial memorial. He pointed out the six tea mountains in southern Yunnan, including Yibang, Youle, Mengyang, Jiulongjiang and Ganlanba, were all strategic points with more than a thousand miles of land, including many fertile areas. “In addition to tea, there are salt wells and mines to be exploited.” After pacification, cities and barracks could be built there, so as to “enhance border defense while turning the remote corners into a paradise” (Eertai, 1930). The bureaucratization of the imperial court in Cheli was launched against the above background. In May of the sixth year of the Yongzheng reign (1728), Eertai ordered native soldiers under his command in Cheli to block the road beyond the Lancang River, while the regular army carved a path with axes, burning fences, filling ditches, and capturing strategic passes along the way, before reaching Mengyang. In Youle Mountain, the largest among all six tea mountains, more than 40 villages rebelled. The Qing army could not catch all of them after prolonged search; in many cases, the rebels had fled when it arrived. So the Qing army went deep into the mountains under guidance of surrendered aborigines and “turned all the mountains inside out.” After the pacification, the Qing court adopted the principle of “native officers for areas beyond the river and centrally appointed officials for areas on the near side.” Except for the chieftain of Cheli, all the chieftains within



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the Lancang River were replaced with centrally appointed officials. As a result, the era of chieftains for areas in the vicinity of the Lancang River was ended, “together with their threat and scourge from the Yuan Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty” (Wei, 1984, 283). After the reform, the Qing court gradually established government offices in Cheli and other places, and exercised careful management. The twelve bannas including Cheli and the tea mountains, covered an area of more than 2,000 miles originally under the jurisdiction of the Placation Commission of Cheli, but “the barbarians were unruly” because of the incompetence of Dao Jinbao the chieftain. Eertai obtained the approval of the imperial court, and placed Simao, Puteng, Zhengdong, Mengwu, and the six major tea mountains, as well as the six bannas of Ganlanba under the jurisdiction of Liuguan, leaving the rest six bannas under the jurisdiction of the Placation Commission of Cheli. Pu’er was also elevated to the prefecture, and the deputy general of Yuanjiang was transferred there for its defense. Since simao borders the tea mountain, and held the strategic pass to Cheli, the Qing court moved the original judicial department of Pu’er to Simao, and instated an inspector and brigadier commander there to crack down on robbery and manage the affairs of Simao and the six tea mountains. (Eertai, 1930).Ganlanba as the gateway to the region was “of the greatest importance.” So the imperial court turned it into the government seat of the prefecture and instated a prefect, aside from a brigadier commander in Jiulongjiang and garrisons in Zhenyuan and Weiyuan. After the establishment of governance agency in Ganlanb, the imperial court thus canceled the Yuanjiang Garrison, because its defense area was reduced by half. This way, and the importance of Cheli suddenly became prominent, causing a sensation among the neighboring countries, and Laos and Jingmai presented elephants to the Qing court as tribute (Eertai, 1930; Wei, 1984). In the eighth year of Yongzheng (1730), Zhang Yunsui, the governor of Yunnan, started construction of walls Pu’er City, Youle City and Simao City after obtaining imperial approval. Yin Jishan, his successor, later transformed the wall of Pu’er City into a rock wall, repaired and strengthened the earth wall of Simao, and added fortresses on all sides, while repairing or rebuilding the city walls in Zhenyuan and

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other places, with approval of the imperial court.95 The establishment of a prefecture in Pu’er and the transfer of the judicial bureau to Simao significantly strengthened the governmental control over the local area. The author of “Historical Biography of Yunnan” said emotionally, “(Puer and Simao) are virtually the same as big cities in the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom” (Ni, 1992, 602). The outstanding feature of the Lancang River area was the replacement of native chieftains with state officials to consolidate the Borderland and defense. The Qing army traveled thousands of miles to search in the Borderland area, and then established camps in various places, generally realizing the Eertai’s vision of “having the entire Liucha Mountain investigated for establishing camps and defenses”, “having all camp sites carefully selected to address the issue once and for all.”96 The Qing court kept some chieftains in its bureaucratic reform, which was thoroughly implemented to the north of the Lancang River, but partially to its south.

8.3  The utility and influence of the replacement of native chieftains with state officials during the Yongzheng reign were of far-reaching significance. After that, the situation where the chieftain areas with rampant violation of law and endangerment of the society was changed significantly, and the local social order was also stabilized. Eertai found via irregular investigations in the eight months after the reform of Zhenyuan chieftain prefecture in Yunnan that the local “aborigines accepted the fact without objection” (Eertai, 1930). The chieftain of the Wumeng area was originally quite fierce. Eertai found after irregular investigations three years after the replacement and establishment of the town that “the aborigines lived peacefully with the Han Chinese” (Eertai, 1989). In the 10th year of the Yongzheng (1732), Zhang Yunsui, the governor of Yunnan, said in the memorial that after the bureaucratization reform 95 (Daoguang) General Annals of Yunnan; [Qing Dynasty] Ni Tui, Chronicles of Yunnan, Vol. 12, 606. 96 [Qing Dynasty] Eertai, “Memorial on Deploying Countermeasures for the Frontiers”, 10th of the 2nd month, 6th year of Yongzheng.



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presided over by Eertai in the three provinces, “parts of the land that had habitually denied the acculturation of the Middle Kingdom surrendered to it” and the situation of “burning, killing, robbery, and looting for livelihood” was changed drastically. Thanks to the effective guidance of the local officials, the barbarians gradually became honest and kind, “restoring peace to the place.”97 In the 12th year, according to a report by Yin Jishan, an official of Yunnan, Pumao, Si’er, Yuanjiang, and Lin’an of Yunnan Province had since the bureaucratic reform “become peaceful, with all the people happily engaged in farming. All the surrendered aborigines were making a living as they had done previously. Now the entire area is covered in crops while the people are living in happiness, as completely different from the past.”98 The bureaucratic reform lifted the shackles restricting social and economic development. With the active solicitation of the government, a large number of immigrants from various places entered the areas for land reclamation, especially the Wumeng area. In the 9th year of the Yongzheng (1731), Zhang Yunsui, the governor of Yunnan, was approved by the imperial court to keep Zhenxiong and Yongshan for soliciting and placating locals for resumption of production, and to actively attract the people to the Wumeng area, to “reclaim the vast tracts of wasteland.” It was stipulated that those who were native to the province and were willing to reclaim land and make homes in Wumeng, would be entitled to the land reclaimed forever, with government loans to be “repaid in annual instalments.” Zhang Yunsui also suggested that the court instruct the local governments of Sichuan to offer travel expenses to immigrant families from other provinces to “settle down in Wumeng for land reclamation.” The government should allocate land according to the size of the population, “and loan the startup capital to be repaid through taxes.”

97 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy and Governor Zhang Yunsui on Requesting Imperial Authorization” (12th of the 3rd month, 10th year of Yongzheng), Collected Imperial Memorials with Imperial Instructions in Han Chinese, Vol. 22. 98 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy and Governor Zhang Yunsui on Reporting Growth of Rice Seedlings and Rainfall” (12th of the 3rd month, 10th year of Yongzheng), Collected Imperial Memorials with Imperial Instructions in Han Chinese, Vol. 26.

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He expected that within a couple of years Wumeng area “will be inhabited by obedient people, who would prosper and reclaim more land” and the eternally barren land could be “turned into a land of abundance rarely seen in history.” Emperor Yongzheng instructed that “relocation from Sichuan to Yunnan should be allowed, and Zhang Yunsui’s suggestion should be adopted, to promote its realization.”99 In the 12th year, Zhaotong prefecture allocated more than 54,800 ounces of silver with imperial approval to build water conservancy projects on the three rivers of Zini, Liji, and Lacha. Those water projects made it possible to not only irrigate the reclaimed land in En’an and Ludian, but also increase 10,000 mu of paddy fields in the vicinity.100 The fol­ lowing year, Zhang Yunsui submitted a memorial, saying that after the bureaucratic reform “the indigenous people had lived and worked in peace and contentment, attracting an increasing number of reclaiming households each year.” “The autumn harvest in Zhaotong last year was double that of the preceding year, and the price of buckwheat in En’an, Ludian and Daguan was very low.” “For fear that the local didn’t cherish buckwheat because of the excessively low price of buckwheat”, he suggested the government purchase the grain at market price to increase its hoard.101 With time, the far-reaching impact of the replacement of native chieftains with state officials gradually began to show. In the 13th year of Qianlong (1748), Yunnan-Guizhou Governor Zhang Yunsui submitted an imperial memorial, saying that the rebellion of Miao and Luo people in the past was mostly adventures of aborigines bullied by soldiers

99 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy Zhang Yunsui on Capturing and Settling Dong and Wu Rebels for Land Reclamation” (3rd of the 4th month, 9th year of Yongzheng), Collected Imperial Memorials with Imperial Instructions in Han Chinese, Vol. 20. 100 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy Zhang Yunsui on Reporting the Completion of Zhaojun Road and Requesting Irrigation Construction to Benefiting Commerce, Farming, the Army and Popular Livelihood” (27th of the 5th month, 12th year of Yongzheng), Imperial Memorials of Zhang Yunsui (1), Collected Imperial Memorials with Imperial Instructions in Han Chinese, Vol. 26. 101 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy Zhang Yunsui on Preparing Xinjiang Warehouses for Ensuring Food Supply for the People” (16th of the second 4th month, 13th year of Yongzheng), Imperial Memorials of Zhang Yunsui (1), Collected Imperial Memorials with Imperial Instructions in Han Chinese, Vol. 28.



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and goaded by “traitors.” After the implementation of the bureaucratic reform and strengthening of management, punishment of “traitors” and the prohibition of soldiers harassing the Miao villages, “now the Miao and aborigines are living in peace.” In areas without replacement of native chieftains with state officials, “illegal conducts and killing are rampant.” Peace and order were all restored via military conquest, and now the aftermath was being addressed.102 In the 22nd year, Liu Zao, the Grand Coordinator of Yunnan, submitted an imperial memorial on the public security in Yunnan Province, saying that the situation there was roughly the same as that in the Borderlands, that is, the tribes “had grown respectful towards law and officials, and exceedingly submissive after being bathed in the imperial grace for years.” In recent years, there had been conflicts and internal strife among foreigner aborigines, but native forces were increased for strategic points to enhance defense. As a result, “the Borderland people were safe and order was restored in the Middle Kingdom and borderland.”103 In the 47th year, Fu Gang, the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou and Liu Bingtian, the Grand Coordinator of Yunnan said in the imperial memorial that The natives and barbarians of Yunnan Province had lived together and influenced each other for hundreds of years. Most of those formerly under the jurisdiction of the chieftains were placed under the jurisdiction of centrally appointed non-hereditary officials. As a result, now the aborigines “are most law-abiding.” The border areas such as Yongchang, Shunning, and Pu’er were controlled by hereditary chieftains, and connected to foreign barbarians. In the past, there were occasionally disputes over inheritance and division of property to be addressed by the government. However, after investigation, “I found that (now) there is no grievance or unsolved case involving chieftains in Yunnan Province.”104 Although the account may have been white­ washed, but it should be a fact that the society of Yunnan was basically 102 “Memorial of Yunnan-Guizhou Governor Zhang Yunsui on Following Imperial Instructions” (30th of the second 7th month, 13th year of Qianlong). 103 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy Liu Zao on Respectfully Reporting the Local Circumstances of” (11th of the 12th month, 22nd year of Qianlong). 104 “Memorial of Yunnan-Guizhou Governor Fu Gang and Yunnan Viceroy Liu Bingtian on Following Imperial Instructions” (27th of the 1st month, 47th year of Qianlong).

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stable and the people of all ethnic groups were law-abiding. The situation in Guizhou was largely the same. In the 51st year, the emperor issued a decree, saying that “the Miao people in Guzhou, Guizhou, was pacified by Eertain in the Yongzheng reign; now the Borderland is quiet after all those years of peace.” The following year, Fu Gang, the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou said in his report that “The vast land of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces are inhabited by either Miao or the Luo people. Simao in Pu’er, Yunnan, and Guzhou in Guizhou, have been particularly important places in the Borderland.” After the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the 7th year of the Yongzheng reign (1729), “there may have been occasional lack of constraints that led to incitement to rebellions.” Now, after more than 50 years of acculturation, many of the aborigines were wearing hair and clothing and going to school like the Han Chinese did, “their language, clothing and diet are no different from the people of the hinterland.” In addition, their custom of hunting for a living was changed and all the men were engaged in farming.105 The situation mentioned above was common in the southwestern provinces after the bureaucratic reform. This suggests that although the reasons for bureaucratic reform in the Ming and Qing dynasties in the Southwestern Barbarian Regions were complex and diverse, but the reasons its large-scale implementation in the Yongzheng reign were relatively clear, that is, mainly to solve the problems of some chieftains or Miao chiefs indulging in lawlessness, endangering society, competing with the court for land, mineral deposits and other resources, and obstructing the opening of post roads and the entry of immigrants. On the other hand, the Qing court noticed the painful situation of the aborigines and Han Chinese in areas controlled by chieftains or the Miao people, indicating the Qing rulers’ concern for the livelihoods of the people in the border areas and its dream to include those people in the standardized management and

105 “Memorial of Yunnan-Guizhou Governor Fu Gang on Pledge to Follow Imperial Instructions and Report of Their Implementation” (6th of the 1st month, 52nd year of Qianlong).



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legal protection of the country. Those undertakings were of progressive significance. In order to complete the bureaucratic reform at a relatively low cost, the imperial court and ministers of the Yongzheng reign cherished investigation and research, formulated the basic strategy for its implementation, and adopted corresponding countermeasures according to the specific conditions of different regions. In implementing the reform, they paid great attention to methods, and thus led to several different types of reform, reflecting the diligent administration of the court officials and the effective governance of officials. In fact, the replacement of native chieftains with state officials during the Yongzheng reign was essentially a necessary reform of the chieftain system, to adapt it to the needs of social development, rather than abolishing it completely. The reform basically achieved the expected results, promoting social stability and economic development in the areas involved, while helping adjusting social and ethnic relations. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the replacement of the chieftain system with direct rule back then was, after all, a government-led behavior under the feudal system, and therefore had the limitations of the times and classes. Despite the emphasis on “combining suppression with placation”, ruthless killing was occasionally seen in some areas, leaving a painful historical memory for some ethnic minorities. On the other hand, in the newly opened Miao land, new contradictions rose. The Qing Dynasty stipulated that the officers of the hinterland should not interfere in civil affairs, but the stipulation did not apply for the land of the Miao people. Civil officials did not dare to enter the Miao villages, so all cases involving robbery and killing were referred to military officers, who then used the referral as an excuse to line their own pockets, even confiscating the personal properties of Miao families and insulting their women. The Miao people resisted with indignation but were suppressed by the government. However, the subsequent officials seemed never to amend their ways (Zhao et al., 1977, 10488). After nearly ten years of bureaucratic reform from the fourth year of Yongzheng reign, the goals of the Qing court were basically reached, and the chieftains, especially the disobedient ones, were replaced. The

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chieftains kept in the southwestern provinces included one publicity and placation commissioner (Cheli), five placation commissioners (in Gengma and other places), two deputy placation commissioners (in Zhefang and other places), three placation commissioners (in Mangshi), and three deputy placation commissioners (in Nalou and other places), four aboriginal prefectures (including Menghua) and four aboriginal sub-prefectures (including Zhenkang). Most of them were located in the border areas of present-day southern and southwestern Yunnan. In Guizhou Province, there were a deputy chief’s offices in 62 places, including Zhongcao and Xibao. In Guangxi Province, there are 26 native prefectures, including Zhongzhou, four native counties, including Luoyang, and three native commands, including of Qianlongdong (Zhao et al., 1977, 14206). In general, the remaining chieftains in the southwestern Borderland after the bureaucratic reform in the Yongzheng reign were mostly distributed in the Borderlands and remote areas with little influence on the rule of the dynasty, and most of them were low-level chieftains. After the 9th year of Yongzheng, the reform of the Qing Dynasty in the southwestern Borderland was no longer at climax. Meanwhile, the scope shifted to Huguang, Sichuan, and Guangxi, with the focus on the first two provinces.

8.4  The replacement of native chieftains with state officials in the southwestern Borderland had far-reaching effects. Previously, the chieftain system made it possible for the imperial court to deepen its rule in the relevant areas, effectively consolidating the Central Plains dynasty’s rule over the southern border, and benefiting the social and economic development of those areas. The chieftain system was widely implemented in the barbarian areas in the south, with obvious effects. First, it strengthened the rule of the Central Plains dynasty over the barbarian areas in the south and extended its rule to the remote areas previously beyond the reach of the Middle Kingdom before the Yuan Dynasty. However, the chieftain system had obvious restrictions and its shortcomings peaked during the Ming and Qing dynasties. During



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the Yongzheng period, the Qing Dynasty intensively launched the bureaucratic reform in the chieftain areas. Thanks to the reform and adjustment, the tense social relations in these areas were eased, making it possible for the Borderland society to continue developing. In the early years of the Yongzheng period, Gao Qizhuo, the Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou, exercised bureaucratic reform in native prefectures of Lijiang, and transferred the prefect Yang Bi to guard them. After a year of governance, the unjust levies imposed on the barbarians and the exorbitant taxes and outdated rules imposed by the native commands and the chieftains were canceled, cutting local tax by more than 20,000 tales of silver. Yang Bi also set up school education to inculcate the aborigines with etiquette and righteousness, and supported the replaced native officials to ensure their subsistence. Gao Qizhuo said in the memorial that “now the natives of the entire prefecture are rejoicing in the bureaucratic reform and even neighboring people ruled by chieftains are convinced” (Gao, 1930). Within one year after the reform, the Lijiang area underwent such great changes. In the 10th year of the Yongzheng (1732), Zhang Yunsui the Provincial Governor of Yunnan said in a memorial that Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi are important Borderland provinces, but have been seized by the Miao and Yao barbarians, who wantonly engaged in burning, killing and robbing, and made a living out of abduction. Emperor Yongzheng ordered Eertai to take control of the three provinces and implement the bureaucratic reform of the local government. After six years of governance, “parts of the land that had habitually denied the acculturation of the Middle Kingdom surrendered to it.” With effective guidance of the local officials, the barbarians would gradually become honest and kind, “restoring peace to the place.”106 In the 12th year, according to a report by Yin Jishan, an official of Yunnan, Pumao, Si’er, Yuanjiang, and Lin’an of Yunnan Province had since the bureaucratic reform “become peaceful, with all the people happily engaged in farming. All the surrendered aborigines were making a living as they had done previously. Now the entire area is covered in crops while the people are living in 106 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy Zhang Yunsui on Secret Issues” (12th of the 3rd month, 10th year of Yongzheng), Imperial Memorials of Zhang Yunsui.

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happiness, as completely different from the past.”107 Seen from other related records, the above is not an exaggeration. Instead, it roughly reflects the positive effects of the bureaucratic reform, and the trend of social stabilization in areas originally governed by the chieftains. Another important contribution of the chieftain system was that the replacement of the native army under the jurisdiction of the chieftains with the official army to guard the Borderlands, thus greatly reducing the expenditure of the national treasury. In the 9th year of Hongzhi in the Ming Dynasty (1496), Viceroy Deng Tingzhan said that “There were many Yao people in Guangxi, but few natives, with the vast majority of garrisons killed, the native army became the last resort in the event of need.”108 In the Qing Dynasty, Zhou Shuoxun, the prefect of Lianzhou, also made a clear point here. He said that “The mobilization of Lang soldiers and Yao soldiers did not require the slightest amount of public funds. The existing fields can be distributed among them, so that they can have land to till in times of peace and serve active duty in times of war. This way, the state government can save the money for supporting soldiers, and the local government can enhance defense.”109 The native army also played an important role in border defense. In the third year of Qianlong (1738), Zhang Yunsui, the Governor-General and Viceroy of Yunnan said in the memorial that although Menglian Chieftain belongs to foreign barbarians, he has been paying his taxes and respect over the years. Located between the Han Chinese and the foreign barbarians, he is in fact the barrier for the three prefectures of Yongchang, Pu’er and Zhenyuan, and has played an active role in consolidating border defense.110 The Qing government also stationed special soldiers in border areas to guard the important passes, and provided them with rice and money, believing that “dedicating pacified aborigine to border 107 “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy and Governor Zhang Yunsui on Reporting Growth of Rice Seedlings and Rainfall” (12th of the 3rd month, 10th year of Yongzheng), Collected Imperial Memorials with Imperial Instructions in Han Chinese, Vol. 26. 108 [Ming Dynasty] Tian Rucheng, Records of the Scorching South, Vol. 3. 109 [Qing Dynasty] Zhou Shuoxun, “Proposals on Planning Wei and Yao Native Troops”, in [Daoguang Reign] Chronicles of Lianzhou, Vol. 23. 110 [Qing Dynasty] “Memorial of Yunnan Viceroy Zhang Yunsui on Reporting His Observations” (12th of the 2nd month, 3rd year of Qianlong), Imperial Memorials of Zhang Yunsui.



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defense are truly indispensable.” In the 54th year of Qianlong (1789), Fu Gang, Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou obtained imperial approval from the Qing court and ordered the chieftains in the border areas of Yunnan to choose the competent to serve as the guards of the passes, and report the relevant situation to Zhenzhou Prefecture every year. Those who did well were rewarded by the government as an encouragement. As a result, the relevant local chiefs were given enough governmental recognition and honor to control the locals, while the duties for choosing garrisons were entrusted to the chieftains, “expediting responses, and further enhancing patrol and defense” (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1982). The implementation of the chieftain system also made it possible to effectively manipulate the contradictions among the southern barbarians for mutual restraint, while the imperial court acted as the legal arbiter of their disputes, without getting entangled. Therefore, Cai Yurong, the viceroy of Yungui in the Qing Dynasty, said that the court used the barbarians to rule the barbarians, and generously granted official posts and power to deter their tribesmen while benefiting their children. However, the official posts granted were not higher than placation commissioner or prefect, which was subordinate to non-native officials, whom they never dared to challenge. Therefore, they became contented about staying in peace and refrained from causing big troubles.111 The native troops established in various parts of the South belonged to the national army and could also be mobilized to crush the rebellion of the barbarians. Anyway, they served to help the imperial court achieve the goal of “ruling barbarians with barbarians.” Through the examination and approval system for the inheritance of the chieftains, and the development of formal school education in the areas where the chieftain system was implemented, the feudal dynasty effectively cultivated the loyalty of the southern barbarians (including the leaders and people). The Confucian education actively advocated by the imperial court was gradually popularized in areas controlled

111 [Qing Dynasty] Cai Yurong, “Ten Memorials on Managing Yunnan”, [Kangxi Reign] A General History of Yunnan, Vol. 29. “Art and Literature (3)”.

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by the chieftains. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, various government-run or private schools developed rapidly in those areas, nurturing their identity with the feudal country, and also promoting cultural exchanges and integration between the border and inland areas. Those achievements are very beneficial to the formation and consolidation of a unified multi-ethnic country. In terms of consolidating cultural soft power and using it to affect the border areas, the chieftain system was obviously more effective and powerful than the previous Jimi rule. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, was keenly aware of the positive roles of edification in transforming barbarians. In the second year of Hongwu (1369), the Central Secretariat suggested relocating the aboriginals of colonies in Guangxi to the hinterland, so as to eradicate border disasters. Emperor Taizu Yuanzhang answered that “Those colonies are inhabited by barbarians of different ethnic groups, who are ignorant of courtesy and justice. Garrisons should be stationed at strategic points, and then we wait for their acculturation. In a few years, they will be law-abiding. Why bother to relocate them?”112 Establishing regular schools and giving full play to their role in edifying the Borderland barbarians have always been an important policy of the Ming Dynasty. In the 18th year of Shunzhi (1661), Yuan Maogong, the Viceroy of Yunnan in the Qing Dynasty, summed up the experience of the Ming Dynasty in governing Yunnan. He said that in the early Ming Dynasty, when Muying conquered Yunnan, he would send troops to suppress all rebellions, virtually annihilating the barbarians but failing to win their loyalty. After the situation was basically stabilized, he carried out systematic management, ordering even the native officials’ children to go to school and learn etiquette and righteousness. On the New Year’s Day or other festivals, he would order teachers and students gather together, and throw a banquet, serving lamb to them, with the chieftain’s subordinate officials sitting on one side. In winter and summer, he would bestow them with clothing of the season. This way, he succeeded in restraining the children of the chieftains and securing the loyalty of the chieftains. Hundreds of years later, the Yunnan chieftains and native commands still burned incense to honor 112 History of Ming, Vol. 317, “Chieftains of Guangxi (1)”, 8204.



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Mu Ying for his favor, and vowed to protect the land under their jurisdiction, for the reasons mentioned above (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1998). The Qing Dynasty inherited the Ming Dynasty’s tradition of actively developing Confucian education in the areas controlled by the chieftains. In the 21st year of Kangxi (1682), Cai Yurong, who was transferred from the Viceroy of Huguang to Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou, believed that since the hereditary posts of native officials were inherited according to lineage, the wise ancestors or fathers might have proud offspring who knew nothing about etiquette or righteousness. As a result, abuse would be inevitable. He suggested that regulations be enacted. In the future, for successors to hereditary posts of native officials, they must go to a Confucian school to study and practice rituals when they reached 13. Later, they could only inherit their father’s position with recommendations from the Confucian school. Children of their clan should be allowed to go to the county to take the imperial examination if they wished to, and should be given the opportunity to tour the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom.113 Later, the Qing court adopted the sugges­ tion and made specific regulations in this regard. The Complete Book on Provincial Education Commissioner promulgated by the Qing court has the following stipulation: “The future chieftains should accept education as stipulated by the Provincial Education Commissioner to learn etiquette and righteousness, and succeed to their post as their father or brother steps down.” In the 29th year of Qianlong (1764), the Qing government added a stipulation: In the future, in the chieftain area of the Borderland provinces, those who succeed to the post of chieftain qualified only in imperial examination at the county level should submit a report for resign if they had too many tasks or did not feel up it. Those who wish to should take the test as scheduled, and should not avoid the test with any excuses. In breach of this regulation, the Provincial Education Commissioner would be dismissed (Zhonghua Book Company, 1991).

113 [Qing Dynasty] Cai Yurong, “Ten Memorials on Managing Yunnan”, [Kangxi Reign] A General History of Yunnan, Vol. 29. “Art and Literature (3)”.

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The Qing Dynasty actively developed Confucianism education in areas controlled by chieftains, and achieved obvious results after unremitting efforts. In the 52nd year of Qianlong (1787), Fu Gang, the Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou, said in a memorial that Simao in Pu’er, Yunnan and Guzhou in Guizhou are both extremely important areas. In the 7th year of the Yongzheng (1729), a bureaucratic reform was conducted. At that time, the local barbarians were still “wild and undisciplined” and sometimes rebelled. After educational promotion in the Qing Dynasty for more than 50 years, the barbarians took it a fashion to wear the clothing of the Han Chinese and go to school for education. Their language and diet were “the same as those of the people in the Middle Kingdom.” All were specialized in farming, not in hunting as they had done before (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1982). The situation mentioned above was common in the Qing Dynasty. Under the chieftain system, the imperial court used loyalty or even blind loyalty to assess the chieftains at all levels, adopting various methods and gradually made them obedient to rules and regulations and fearful of the court, officials and Han officials in performing official duties. The chieftains admired and enthusiastically embraced the customs of the hinterland, but they actively changed customs in the areas under their jurisdiction, incurring contempt for their own traditions and culture, regarding them as backward, ignorant and unsightly. Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, some chieftains and ethnic minority intellectuals tried to fabricate a genealogy featuring Han ancestors, in a bid to deny their relationship with ethnic minorities. This phenomenon gives a glimpse of how the upper strata of ethnic minorities in the areas ruled by chieftains had hankered for Han customs. The rulers of the Qing Dynasty believed that the Miao people were the fiercest among all Borderland peoples, and that they relied on the “traitors”, “as known by the officials and officers of the two provinces.” Eertai, the Viceroy of Yunnan-Guizhou, proposed that the Miao villages without a battalion garrison should be reserved for Miao people only and Han Chinese should be forbidden to live there. The reason was that he thought the Han people would on many occasions use trade as the pretext for collusion and therefore should be strictly prohibited from



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living in Miao areas. He also formulated a regulation for promulgation among the Han Chinese and aborigines, “prohibiting the aborigines from accommodating Han Chinese,” and the entry of the Han Chinese to Miao villages. In areas where the Baojia system was implemented, those in charge of the Baojia institution should be responsible for local inspections, and the neighbors were required to report if they know it, otherwise they would be implicated and held liable (Eertai, 1930). In the late Qianlong period, the local governments were still highly vigilant against “traitors”, believing that in Yunnan and other provinces where Yi and Han lived together, most of those formerly under the jurisdiction of the chieftains had been placed under the management of centrally appointed non-hereditary officials. After more than a hundred years of education and management, the aborigines had mostly become law-abiding and kind, although they were straightforward by nature. However, they would “fight ceaselessly” when tempted by “traitors” (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1982). Therefore, stipulations were repeatedly made on strictly guarding against “traitors” and those intervening in the affairs of barbarians were usually severely punished. Seen from the relevant records, the so-called “traitors” were mostly Han Chinese involved in barbarous affairs, including merchants, shysters, and refugees. Some instigated relations between the barbarians and Han, deceived or blackmailed the barbarians or even intervened in litigations. However, there were also some who roamed the barbarian land to make a living. The Qing government strictly guarded against “traitors”, and protected the barbarians from being deceived in some cases. However, the practice also cut off their exchanges with the Han Chinese, weakening their ability to distinguish right from wrong, and making it difficult for them to shirk off the “foolishness by disposition.” Due to the above reasons, after the implementation of the chieftain system, most of the chieftains gradually developed the mentality of being obedient and even loyal, fearing superiors, especially Han officials, just as what the Qing court had hoped. The mentality was frequently recorded in the middle of the Qing Dynasty. In the 7th year of Qianlong (1742), Zhang Yunhe, the Governor of Yunnan said in a memorial that “aborigines of Dongchuan and Zhaotong in Yunnan, have after the bureaucratic reform launched

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by the imperial court in the ninth year of Yongzheng (1731) become respectful toward the imperial dynasty and mended their rough ways.” He added that during his tour, “the chiefs of the villages all came out of the village and stood by the side of the road to welcome him,” and then he rewarded them in view of the circumstances, and told them the pros of submission and cons of rebellion. “And the native chiefs were all moved and happy.”114 In the 17th year of Qianlong (1752), Shuo Se, the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou, was ordered to inspect various local garrisons, especially those where the Luo people lived together. According to his memorial, the aborigines in Lin’an, Chengjiang and other prefectures in Yunnan “have gradually become the same as registered people after being basked in the imperial grace for a long time.” As for the Luo people in other places, although they still wore MalletShaped bun and short clothes and practiced the same customs, they were “all respectful of the officials and their chief.” All along the way, Shuo Se was “welcomed by the head of the aboriginal villages with his people hold incense.” Shuo Se told them the emperor’s grace and awarded them. “Hence the chieftains and the aborigines were all happy, grateful to the emperor and very much obedient.” As for the area along the Kaihua Prefecture, the people were happy and content in work, and the border was peaceful. Emperor Qianlong wrote in red that “I am pleased to learn about it” (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1982). Some daring chieftains manipulated the power granted by the imperial court and often deceived the government, even forming backward separatist forces. In the early years of the Yongzheng reign, Eertai gave a detailed description of this phenomenon. He said that some chieftains of Yunnan have been powerful despots for many years, ordering the Miao people under his jurisdiction about. Others were brutal, reckless and capable of all wrongdoing. For cowardly native officials, the native leaders under them were especially harmful, neglecting not only the prefect, but also the provincial superintendent. When the matter became serious and the higher-level government wanted to report 114 [Qing Dynasty] “Memorial of Yunnan Governor Zhang Yunsui on Inspecting the Frontier Regions and Garrisoned Passes” (2nd of the 10th month, 7th year of Qianlong), Imperial Memorials of Zhang Yunsui.



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them, they would secretly bribe their superior and fabricate the facts in order to close the case. They were usually let go, because the superior wanted to maintain the peace, albeit superficially. For lawless chieftains that disdained the government, the officials had no choice but to put up with them. In Guizhou, the chieftains were too weak to control their underling; “therefore, the Miao people were greater trouble.”115 The century-long chieftain system had a profound impact on the social character and behavior of ethnic minorities in the areas governed by the chieftains. Under it, loyalty to the imperial court and higher-level government, and the subconscious feeling of being a local emperor became the basic characteristics of the mentality for chieftains at all levels. Affected by this ideology, the native chiefs in the southern ethnic regions feared officials and superiors, following their orders indiscriminately. However, they were good at deceiving the court or the government, while taking advantage of their power to line their own pockets. They regarded the property and population under their jurisdiction as private property to be disposed as they saw fit, and treated the rights and interests, or even the lives of the people under their jurisdiction lightly. The above situation was already obvious in the Ming Dynasty. Especially in the areas on the provincial border, due to the unreasonable submission relationship, the provincial governments resorted to the blame game. As a result, the chieftain forces in this area steadily grew, until beyond the control of the imperial court in some cases, not to mention the local government. According to “Biography of Chieftains” in History of Ming, in most cases, the territory of the chieftains in Sichuan were nearer to Yunnan and Guizhou than Chengdu. For example, Wumeng and Dongchuan were nearer to Yunnan, while Wusa, Zhenxiong, and Bozhou were closer to Guizhou. In the Ming Dynasty, when Emperor Taizu pacified the southwest, he conquered Sichuan first and established Sichuan Provincial Administrative Commission, placing under its jurisdiction all the barbarians that had surrendered. Therefore, the native officials of Wumeng, Wusa, Dongchuan, and 115 [Qing Dynasty] Eertai, Memorial on Measures for Administration Yunnan and Guizhou, in [Yongzheng Reign] A General History of Yunnan.

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Mangbu came under the jurisdiction of the provincial administrative commissioner of Sichuan; the imperial court requested nothing more than an annual tribute to indicate the existence of Jimi rule. However, the barbarians are fierce and blood-thirsty, competing among themselves and wantonly burning and plundering. The provincial administrative commissioner of Sichuan was far away from them and could not effectively restrain them. As a result, the border residents nearby suffered a lot. Therefore, throughout the Ming Dynasty, the imperial court often sent troops for expedition, but achieved little results. Only after the establishment of guard posts in Jianchang, Song, Mao and other prefectures, and the bureaucratic reform in Zunyi and Pingyue prefecture was the chieftains slightly stabilized.116 In the early Qing Dynasty, Wu Sangui indiscriminately conferred titles of chieftains as a preparation for rebellion, making the chieftains in Yunnan-Guizhou region increasingly imperious and disobedient. There are many records of similar cases. During the Kangxi period, Cai Yurong, the Viceroy of Yunnan Guizhou, said that each of the chieftains has their own land and people, as well as different personalities. They often vie over supremacy, killing or annexing each other, and instigating rebellions. Disasters in Shadingzhou and Pumingsheng should be a lesson from the past. Therefore, he suggested issuing a decree to stipulate that the chieftains “should guard their own land as usual without attacking each other.” If any of them should start hostility, the government troops would exterminate the leading culprit and annihilate his followers so as to maintain righteousness and nipping chieftain rebellion in the bud.117 In the second year of Yongzheng (1724), the emperor issued a decree to the governors and township chiefs of Sichuan, Huguang, Yunnan and Guizhou, saying that “I learnt that the chieftains rarely knew anything about laws and regulations and habitually collected more than twice the amount of taxes payable by the native people. In some cases, they even rob the livestock and abduct the children of the native people, wielding the right to their life and death. 1 16 History of Ming, Vol. 311, “Chieftains of Sichuan (1)”, 8013. 117 [Qing Dynasty] Cai Yurong, “Ten Memorials on Managing Yunnan”, [Kangxi Reign] A General History of Yunnan, Vol. 29. “Art and Literature (3)”.



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The native people were angry but dared not to stand up against them.” He added that the chieftains were so unruly because of the “traitors.” Back then, “traitors” were those seeking haven for breaking the law and in some cases they gather together and became powerful. Emperor Yongzheng believed that they were “particularly abhorrent” on the ground that they were literate but chose to goad the chieftains or help them in their evil undertakings (Zhonghua Book Company, 1991). Generally speaking, the management method of the chieftain system was outdated and backward, and most of the chieftains were accustomed to the obsolete routine and narrow-minded self-defense. They were generally timid and obedient, but were rarely enterprising and creative. However, the few self-reliant and shrewd chieftains often deceived the government and rode roughshod over the common people. In the 22nd year of Qianlong (1757), Yunnan inspector Liu Zao described the character and mentality of Yunnan chieftains and their barbarian subjects in a memorial, believing that the barbarians were scattered and engaged in farming or animal husbandry. Divided into various tribes, they “were seemingly cunning and tough but actually stupid and cowardly.” In addition, they had been subject to the rule of the Qing Dynasty for many years, “and had become lawabiding and most obedient.” However, occasionally the inferior race, local rascals and foreign Han vagrants were engaged in money lending in their villages and blackmailing the resident. Although the government had adopted strict measures for rectification, this trend was not completely curbed. Liu Zao himself often emphasized the matter when he instructed his subordinate officials, “so that the Han Chinese would not dare to bully whimsically, and the aboriginal could be content in their means of livelihood.” As for the prefectures of Kaihua, Pu’er and Yongchang bordering Vietnam, Laos or Burma, Liu Zao believed that there must be strict orders for the civil and military personnel, and native troops should be stationed along the border to enhance defense (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1982). In the 48th year of Qianlong (1783), Yunnan Viceroy Liu Bingtian submitted a memorial, saying that some chieftains in Yunnan and Guizhou were treacherous while others were loyal. “The cowardly still knew to keep to their posts and dared not contend with the centrally

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appointed officials, but the strong ones were prone to foment trouble.” Therefore, he suggested that for Guizhou chieftains holding hereditary civilian posts without actually managing a village be demoted. For example, the native judges and native magistrates could be changed to tier-six and tier-eight native officials respectively, while chief clerks and inspectors could be given different posts according to their level. As for the hereditary military posts, for example, the chief administrator should be changed to tier-six native officer, and his deputy to tiereight native officer (National Palace Museum in Taipei, 1982). What Liu Bingtian said reflected the fact that some of the chieftains in Guizhou had been significantly weakened in the power and ability to govern, even to the point of “tribal chiefs who are entrusted with prompting tax payment and noticing governmental affairs.” The Qing government also reduced their power accordingly, and it was only a matter of time that a complete bureaucratization reform would be conducted in those places.

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Yan, Congjian. 1993. “Tartar.” In Records of Consultations on Remote Regions (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yang, Yiqing. 1962. “General Management Strategies.” In Selected Classic Works of the Ming Dynasty (photocopy ed.), edited by Chen Zilong et al. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yang, Zuo. 1980. “Record of Horse Purchase in Yunnan.” In Manuscripts of Sequel to History as a Mirror (punctuated and collated ed.), edited by Li Tao. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yao, Silian. 1972. “Biography of Ouyang Wei” with “Biography of Ouyang He.” In Book of Chen (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yao, Silian. 1972. “Biography of Xiao Yun” with “Biography of Xiao Yin.” In Book of Chen (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yao, Silian. 1973. “Biography of Xu Wensheng.” In Book of Liang (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Yuan, Hong. 1987. Records of the Later Han Dynasty, punctuated and annotated by Zhou Tianyou. Tianjin: Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House. Yue, Shi. 2007. “Xizhou Prefecture.” In Universal Geography of the Taiping Era (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zeng, Xianyi, ed. 2000. The Legal History of China. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press. Zhang, Guangsi. 1930. “Memorial of Zhang Fujun on instructions of the Miao boder.” In Decrees with Imperial Instructions: Memorials of Zhang Guangsi, edited by the Palace Museum. Beijing: Palace Museum Printing Office. Zhang, Ji. 1991. “Proposal on Smoothing Water and Land Transport to Facilitate Imperial Tribute.” In [Tianqi Reign] Records of Yunnan edited by Liu Wenzheng and collated and punctuated by Gu Yongji. Kunming: Yunnan Education Publishing House. Zhang, Jianzhi. 1983. “Memorial on Request Cancellation of Yaozhou Garrison.” In Complete Essays of Tang (punctuated ed.), edited by Dong Hao et al. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Biography of Eertai.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Biography of Fang Xian.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Biography of Sun Jiagan.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Biography of Yang Mingshi.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Biography of Zhang Yunsui.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Chieftains (1).” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.



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Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Chieftains (1): Huguang.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Erxun et al. 1977. “Food and Money (5).” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao Erxun et al. 1977. “War (8): Border Defense.” In Historical Manuscripts of the Qing Dynasty (punctuated and collated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhao, Ziyuan. 1991. “Stele on the Virtuous Governance of Governor Sayyid.” In [Tianqi] Records of Yunnan, edited by Liu Wenzheng and collated and punctuated by Gu Yongji. Yunnan Education Publishing House. Zhonghua Book Company. 1959. “22: Post Stations (2).” In Yongle Encyclopedia (photocopy ed.). Zhonghua Book Company. 1959. “22: Post Stations (3).” In Yongle Encyclopedia (photocopy ed.). Zhonghua Book Company. 1959. “22: Post Stations (4).” In Yongle Encyclopedia (photocopy ed.). Zhonghua Book Company. 1959. “22: Post Stations (8).” In Yongle Encyclopedia (photocopy ed.). Zhonghua Book Company. 1991. “Official Management (129): Inheritance of Native Official Posts.” In Imperial Code of Qing on Administration (photocopy ed.). Zhonghua Book Company. 1991. “Official Management (130): Punishment.” In Imperial Code of Qing on Administration (photocopy ed.). Zhou, Qufei. 1999. “Channels to Overseas Barbarians.” Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains (collated and annotated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhou, Qufei. 1999. “Placation Supervisor of Yongzhou and Guangxi Circuit.” In Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains (collated and annotated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhou, Qufei. 1999. “Yao People.” In Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains (collated and annotated ed.). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhu, Gang. 1930. “Yun Viceroy Zhu Gang on Investigating the Rebellious Barbarians of the Tea Mountains.” In Decrees with Imperial Instructions, edited by the Palace Museum. Beijing: Palace Museum Printing Office. Zhu, Taizhen. 1991. “Memorial on Requesting the Opening of Jianchang Road and Arrest of Robbers.” In [Tianqi] Records of Yunnan, edited by Liu Wenzheng and collated and punctuated by Gu Yongji. Kunming: Yunnan Education Publishing House. Zhu, Zhen. “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali State.” In Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, edited by Li Xinchuan, the basics of traditional Chinese studies. Zhuge, Liang. 2008. “Southern Barbarians.” In Complete Works of Zhuge Liang (collated and annotated ed.). Tianjin: Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House.

Chapter Five

Geopolitics of the Borderland and Administration of the Central Plains Dynasty

Abstract: Geopolitics refers to politics and related issues closely related to geographical factors. The Central Plains dynasty had its own geopolitical view and applied it to the governance of the Borderland regions. Keywords: Geopolitical View, Central Plains, border areas, border governance, Qin and Han dynasties, Sui Dynasty, Tang and Song dynasties, Yuan Dynasty, Qing Dynasty, economy

Geopolitics refers to politics and related issues closely related to geographical factors. It is an objective existence, and the people’s understanding and theories of it are a summary of the objective reality and the countermeasures. Western geopolitical theories were put forward by military strategists from a strategic point of view since the First World War. The ancient China had long before understood it, and developed thoughts and strategies. From the relevant records, it is not difficult to see that certain principles of geopolitics were applied consciously or unconsciously by imperial China in handling political

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issues involving geographical factors. Furthermore, the Central Plains dynasty had its own geopolitical view and applied it to the governance of the Borderland regions.

1.  The Geopolitical View of the Central Plains Dynasty 1.1  Geopolitical relations are an objective existence. Theories about geopolitical relations are the cognition and summary of this objective reality and the countermeasures. The concept of geopolitics of ancient China is very different from its modern counterpart of the West, leading to the mistaken belief that ancient China had no clear understanding of geopolitics. On the whole, although a complete geopolitical view was formed in ancient China, it was not a formal science after all. One of the important reasons was that the unified dynasty tended to regard its discussion as treason, making scholars unwilling to explore it and consequently hampering its development. The Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, the Three Kingdoms and the Qing Dynasty were periods when research results in China’s geopolitics were abundant. In the Spring and Autumn Period, Warring States Period, and the Three Kingdoms period, the competition and mergers among kingdoms made the research and application of geopolitics very popular. Scholars keen to explore the knowledge in the Qing Dynasty mainly included Wang Fuzhi, Gu Yanwu, and Gu Zuyu. Their elaboration on geopolitics of previous generations carried the implicit intention of resisting the Qing Dynasty to restore the Ming Dynasty, so their works could only be circulated among the people. China’s ancient understanding of border geopolitics included the relationship of China with neighboring countries, that between its hinterland and border areas, that between important Borderland regions, that between its borders and neighboring states, and the commonalities and differences in governance strategies for Borderland areas in different geographical locations, as well as the complex associations between



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administrative centers within and outside the state boundary. In addition, the geopolitics in ancient China belonged to the historical category, making it different from the issues studied by modern military strategists of the West. Back in the pre-Qin period, the ancients had a deep understanding of geopolitical relations, and proposed strategies such as “enemy camp and ally camp” and “befriend the distant enemy while attacking the enemy near home” for application in warfare. Since the Qin and Han dynasties, in dealing with the relationship between the core area and the Borderlands, the ancients put forward such important strategies and ideas as “relying on the vassals as a fence” and “ruling barbarians with barbarians.” In its long-term development, the ancient Chinese geopolitical theory and its application was continuously enriched and developed. Compared to their counterparts formed in the West since the First World War, the geopolitical theories in ancient China had distinct characteristics, featuring distinct terminology, content, and practical applications. For example, in Borderland geopolitical relations, ancient China placed greater emphasis on the role of human factors and cultural traditions, than on geographic factors such as the ocean. In considering issues, it obviously carried traces of emphasis on the relationship between nature and human beings, and that on social hierarchy, as well as traditional ways of thinking such as cultural distinction. The ancients believed that China was the center of world civilization. The relationship between the core area of the dynasty and other regions was gradually estranged as distance increased; the ancients cherished the restraint and education of the “barbarians” in the Borderlands and beyond, to a greater extent than the West cherished common conquest by force and taxation. When ancient politicians considered the issue of Borderland governance, they paid more attention to the accessibility and security of international passages, and the association between the regional plates of the borderland and the center of governance. Those all showed that they were attentive to and familiar with the geopolitical relations of the Borderland regions. It is of great academic significance to sort out and summarize the ancients’ understanding of the geopolitical relations in border areas and related theories.

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Compared to the geopolitics of the modern West, the geopolitical studies of ancient China focused on dividing the boundary between agricultural civilization and other civilizations, using the circle of agricultural civilization as the foundation of the dynasty, while cautiously exploring outward or seeking to maintain stability. Many dynasties have adhered to the Borderland management traditions of “safeguarding the middle and governing the border” and “making the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” The relationship between the inland and the Borderland was seen as one between the center and the periphery. In addition, all dynasties highlighted the role of international communication lines passing through the border and border administrative agencies, as well as establishment of government agencies, the stationing of garrisons, and immigration. When handling Borderland issues, they often regarded areas outside the hinterland as alternative areas that were very different from it, and cherished the relationship among border areas of different locations as mutually coordinating or restraining. In particular, it should be pointed out that there had been long-term differences in the geopolitical relationship between the north and south. As the nomads in the northern grasslands often ventured south and seriously threatened the security of the Central Plains dynasty, the focus of border governance in the China’s imperial history was mainly in the north rather than in the south, adversely affecting the management and development of the southern border. The Borderland governance thoughts and theory of the Central Plains dynasty also included certain geopolitical ideas. For example: they believed that the Middle Kingdom was the center of world civilization. There are varying degrees of relationship between the core area of the dynasty and other regions, mainly based on the geographic distance. Therefore, feudal rulers emphasized “difference between the Han Chinese and the barbarians” to support the different governance for the hinterland and the border areas, and put forward the concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the peripheral”, which led to the strategic thinking of “safeguarding the center to govern the border”, “making Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” and “pacification afar is preconditioned by security nearby”. The Central Plains dynasty proposed that there had been a



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clear demarcation between the land of the Han Chinese and the territories of the surrounding barbarians, with a buffer zone of varying sizes in between. For this buffer zone and the areas beyond, governance policies with a certain degree of flexibility should be implemented. Meanwhile, the Central Plains dynasty should adjust the corresponding governance policies in time according to changes in the situation, so as to achieve effective control or restraint of remote areas. Ancient Chinese politicians had long recognized that the complex entanglement in natural environment, resources, products and population, important cities, passages and gates and that between important regional plates under the rule of the Central Plains dynasty, including border areas, had profoundly affected geopolitics. Therefore, they proposed that in handling the relationship between regional plates, the strategies of befriending distant enemies while attacking enemies nearby, and establishing ally camps to fight enemy camps and emphasized that although the borderland was closely related to the hinterland like the leaves to the branches, it should still be distinguished from the hinterland in terms of priority and importance. Active research and careful handling of the relationship between the hinterland and the border areas can be said to be a universal feature in the border governance theory of the Central Plains dynasty.

1.2  In specific governance and management of border areas, implementing geopolitical views and the corresponding governance policies was a major feature of ancient Chinese geopolitical thought and its application. Throughout history, the Central Plains dynasty had cherished setting up prefectures and counties and opening up roads in territories within its jurisdiction, and promoted the measure to controllable border areas. However, the management of prefectures and counties in the border areas was less stringent but more flexible than that of the hinterland, and the role of the opened channels were different from those of the hinterland. For example, the Han Dynasty, the Tang Dynasty and the Song Dynasty established Borderland counties, jimi prefectures

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and jimi counties in the border areas respectively. A common feature of those governing institutions is the obvious intention for restraint and the moderate flexibility. Besides, in the early and late periods of feudal society, the motivation and utility of the Central Plains dynasty in setting up counties and opening roads in the border areas were also apparently different. Take the Yunnan region for example. In the first half of feudal society, the traffic in Yunnan was operated mainly for the benefit of contacting neighbors, developing the geographical relationship in the border area, collecting information on the border and outside, and searching for distant “exotics”. In the latter half, in particular in the Yuan and Qing dynasties, as Yunnan became an integral part of the dynasty’s territory, and management of Yunnan was implemented to greater depth, the transportation within Yunnan and that between Yunnan and the hinterland was cherished. Meanwhile, the importance of economic development for transportation grew steadily obvious. The situation in other Borderland regions should not have been much different. The border governance of the Central Plains dynasty and the evolution of geopolitical relations in the southwestern Borderland were complementary and interactive. From a temporal perspective, the management and governance of the southwestern Borderland in imperial China gradually led to the formation of some basic principles and traditions, which exerted an important influence on later generations. On the other hand, changes in the background of the times and the conditions of the southwestern Borderland regions might have also lead to major changes in the relevant thinking and countermeasures for handling geopolitical relations in this region, and might have had an important impact on related geopolitical elements. On the contrary, the changes in the status and roles of these relevant elements continued to affect the geopolitical relations of the southwestern Borderland. The relationship between the Borderland governance and the geopolitics of the southwestern Borderland did not undergo a process of simultaneous evolution. From time to time, the intervention of accidental or unforeseen factors affected or even changed the geopolitical relationship there. For example, the Mongols pacified Dali Kingdom, established the Yunnan Province as the strategic Borderland for war in the China-Indochina



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Peninsula, which caused drastic changes to the geopolitical relationship between Yunnan and surrounding areas. Of course, the change still relied on the administration of China’s imperial history, especially the foundation laid during the Nanzhao and Dali periods. Judging from relevant historical facts and records, the changes in the ancient geopolitical relations of the southwestern Borderland regions were roughly affected by three factors. The first one was the background of the times and the Borderland management ideas of the dynasties, including the general domestic situation in different periods, the conditions of the southwestern Borderland regions, and the management thoughts and governance policies of the imperial China for the border areas. The second was the changes in the situation in the border areas and the response of the rulers, including changes in the southwestern Borderland regions and even the national border situation, the status of the southwestern Borderland regions in the southwest and even the country in China’s imperial history, as well as the strategy, response and administration of the southwestern Borderland regions. The third was related factors, mainly including transportation lines, such as those leading to foreign nations and the neighboring administrative regions. The core areas were the focus of management in imperial China, with a guiding role in the southwestern Borderland regions. They were usually centered on the location of the main administrative institutions. Important cities were not only seats of important administrative institutions, but also hubs on major transportation lines, as well as major settlements for immigrants and areas leading economic and cultural development. The status of economic development in the southwestern Borderland includes the highlighted areas for development in China’s imperial history, key economic sectors, and the overall level of economic development. The relationship between the southwestern Borderland regions and the surrounding areas involved foreign countries and neighboring administrative regions.

1.3  Historical development inevitably follows a tortuous road. In different periods, the geopolitical outlook of the Central Plains Dynasty changed.

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Among them, the Mongolian Yuan witnessed the greatest change and impact. The Mongolian rulers came from the Mongolian grasslands, and their behaviors were typical of the nomadic people. In addition, their goal for launching battles in various places was to continue land acquisition to meet needs of rewarding soldiers. Compared with other Central Plains dynasties, Mongolian Yuan had a distinctly characteristic geopolitical outlook. The formation and evolution of the Yuan geopolitical views can be roughly divided into two stages, namely the Mongolian State and the Yuan Dynasty. The Mongolia State regarded the world as an extension of Mongolian grassland, had no consciousness of the Chinese central view, and formed a view of the world different from the Central Plains dynasty. When the Mongolian army first entered the Central Plains, the Mongolians said that the flat and vast Central Plains would be an excellent place for grazing if the Han Chinese were driven away. In the late Yuan Dynasty, there were constant rebellions, and the Mongolian aristocracy attributed them to an exceedingly large Han Chinese population, saying that peace would be restored if the leading surnames were eliminated. The advantage of Mongolian world view was a broad horizon and emphasis on the connection between the occupied areas and other places. In its early days, the Yuan Dynasty was inevitably influenced by the Mongolian concept. After the death of Kublai Khan, its external expansion gradually stopped, and its geopolitical view featured the combination of the Mongolian view of the world with the traditional geopolitical view of the Central Plains dynasty. The geopolitical view of the Yuan Dynasty included gradually shifting the focus of administration from the north to the south, and changing the Central Plains dynasty’s tradition of valuing the north over the south in ruling the border. Before the Yuan Dynasty, there was the tendency to prioritize the north over the south in the management of Borderlands, with the emphasis on preventing the southward venture of the northern nomads, while the strategy of passive response was implemented in the southern Borderland. The situation changed significantly in the Yuan Dynasty. The rulers of the Yuan Dynasty came from the Mongolian grasslands, while the northern



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territory of the Yuan Dynasty extended to Siberia and linked to the Four Khanates. As a result, there was little space for expansion to the north. The Yuan Dynasty implemented a policy of nomadic khanate together with Han Chinese ruling of Han Chinese land, and had to continuously acquire land and population for rewarding its troops. Therefore, in its early period, the Yuan Dynasty continued to expand outward and chose the south as the direction of expansion. The Yuan Dynasty actively managed Yunnan, Guangxi and the adjacent ChinaIndochina Peninsula, making Yunnan a province directly managed by the imperial court. Its active development of Yunnan and Guangxi accelerated the process of their integration with the hinterland. The active measure was inherited by the Ming and Qing dynasties, making the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties the period of greatest efforts and results of the Central Plains dynasty in developing the southern Borderland regions. In a long period of time, the Mongolian Yuan actively expanded to the outside world and fought wars frequently, quite against the traditions of “safeguarding the middle for ruling the border” and “making the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” Most of the Central Plains dynasties followed the tradition of upholding agriculture as the foundation, emphasizing internal development and cherishing the native land. They believed that there was a clear distinction between the “mainland” to be guarded and the “Borderland barbarian” as the fence. They mostly pursued the stability and prosperity of the heartland and the realization of “barbarians as the guarding fence” in the border areas. In dealing with confrontations or wars with the Borderland barbarians, the Central Plains dynasty often adopted the conservative strategy of “ensuring preparedness against their offensive and enhancing defense during their retreat.” For the Yuan Dynasty, the familiar management method was nomadic grazing and plundering, without any consciousness of “safeguarding the middle to rule the border” or “making Borderland barbarians the guarding fence.” That was the main reason for its frequent wars. Meanwhile, it also expanded and consolidated the border areas, laying the foundation for the final formation of traditional Chinese territories. It also strengthened the

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exchanges with neighbors, and promoted the establishment of new types of state relations, especially with neighboring kingdoms such as Annan, Champa, and Burma, aside from vassal state relations different from those in the Han and Tang dynasties. Since the mid-Yuan Dynasty, the tradition of “making Borderland barbarians the guarding fence” prevailed in the court, and the Yuan court gradually ceased its foreign expansion and wars. Due to its wars in various places and the emphasis on foreign exchanges, the Yuan Dynasty had a broader global perspective and established trade or envoy relations with many parts of the world. It valued international trade and cultural exchanges and actively developed them. Its world view also had an impact on the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties. The seven voyages led by Zheng He to the West in the Ming Dynasty were partially attributable to inheritance of the open world view. Affected by the production methods of grassland hunting and long-distance nomadism, the Mongolian Yuan rulers were often peculiar in deploying wars, which indicated their unique understanding of geopolitics. In the time of Mongolian State, Guo Baoyu suggested to Genghis Khan that troops be maneuvered to the rear of the Southern Song Dynasty to attack Dali, so as to seize its material and manpower for attacking the Southern Song Dynasty. Mongke Khan carried out the bold plot. In the second year of Emperor Xianzong’s reign, Kublai Khan took orders to detour to the northwest to attack Dali with 10,000 soldiers. When Dali was pacified, General Uriyangkhadai and his cavalry joined forces with the Yunnan native army, and swept across Guangxi and reached Tanzhou City (now Changsha, Hunan), roughly realizing the original plan. Mongke Khan’s outflank strategy against the Southern Song Dynasty acquainted the Yuan rulers with the importance of Yunnan in terms of resources and gateways, and laid the foundation for the subsequent establishment of Yunnan Province. It should also be pointed out that so far, our understanding and study of the geopolitics of the ancient southwestern Borderland regions and even the geopolitical view and applications is still wanting in depth. This issue will be one of the focuses of our efforts in the future.



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2.  The Tendency of the Central Plains Dynasty to Value the North over the South and Its Influence In ancient Chinese society, successive dynasties accumulated rich experience in managing the Borderland areas and formed a long-standing tradition. However, their governance of the border areas also featured diverse types and uneven development. And one of the manifestations was that the Central Plains dynasty mostly tended to value the north over the south. Furthermore, the tendency as an important part of its Borderland governance strategy was basically formed in the Qin and Han dynasties, and lasted for thousands of years, exerting extensive and complex influences. For the convenience of description and comparison, “the north” mentioned below mainly refers to the ancient Monan and Mobei regions, that is, the Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia today. The south mainly refers to Yunnan, Guizhou and southwestern Sichuan, as well as Lingnan and Hunan.

2.1  For thousands of years, some important ethnic ethnic groups and border regimes appeared in the northern border, including the Xiongnu and Xianbei in the Western Han Dynasty, Xianbei and Qianghu in the Three Kingdoms Period and Western Jin Dynasty, and Gaoche and Rouran in the Eastern Jin Dynasty, the Turks in the Sui and Tang dynasties, Liao, Jin, Xixia and Mongolia in the Song Dynasty, and Oirats and Tatars in the Ming Dynasty. In the southern border regions, there were Xinanyi, Baiyue and Pu in the Han Dynasty; Yi, Daxing and Shanyue in the Three Kingdoms and the Jin Dynasty; Nanzhao, Wuman and Baiman in the Sui and Tang dynasties, and Dali in the Song Dynasty. The Central Plains dynasty valued the north and over the south in handling the relationship with the Borderland ethnic groups or regimes, and thus formed a far-reaching political tradition. In imperial China, border troubles were mostly in the north, as pointed out by many ancient politicians. For example, the Qin Dynasty to the Eastern Han Dynasty tended to emphasize the north over the

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south because the Xiongnu “had victimized the border for a long time.” Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Wuwan, Xianbei and Dongyi clearly pointed out that “The Xiongnu had victimized the Borderland for long time. Emperor Xiaowu placated the Borderland barbarians, pacified Nanyue, Dongyue and Korea, conquered Ershi and Dayuan, and opened to road to Qiongqi and Yelang, but those were all distant lands without much influence on the Middle Kingdom. The Xiongnu was the great harm, and its cavalry venturing south meant enemies on three sides” (Chen, 1959, 831). After the Qin and Han dynasties, the tendency of valuing the north over the south was still very obvious. In Book of Sui: Biography of Northern Nomads, historians said that “Borderland barbarians have been plaguing the Middle Kingdom for a long time. Northern nomads were in particular victimizing; with multiple tribes and colonies, they had risen to influence one after another in the Borderland since ancient times” (Wei et al., 1973, 1883). In the Tang Dynasty, Fang Xuanling said that “historically, the most serious victimization came from none other than the Turks” (Wu, 2003, 486). In the Tang Dynasty, Cui Rong summed up the situation in which the northern nomads became a serious border trouble for the Central Plains dynasty from the pre-Qin to the Tang Dynasty, and various countermeasures formulated. He said that “the northern nomads had been a victimizer of the Middle Kingdom for a long time, notably the Xunyu before Yao and Shun, Xianyun in the Yin and Zhou dynasties, Xiongnu led by Modu in the Han Dynasty, Wuwan and Xianbei in the Three Kingdoms Period and Jin Dynasty, Ruru in the Northern Wei Dynasty, and Turks in the Northern Zhou Dynasty. Despite the difference in names and the changes in their fate, the northern nomads had defied even the five sage emperors and the three sage kings. They had continuously instigated wars across the dynasties, which had planned countermeasures against them. Known by the general name Beidi, they had a land connected to Yan and Zhao in the south, the desert in the north, jiuyi in the east and liurong in the west. Proud by nature, they were quick to detect weak links and exploit them; like birds and beasts, they switched their grazing land in accordance with the availability of grass and water. They claimed to have been born to nature and raised by the sun and the moon. Sandwiched between the powerful Han in



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the south and Hu in the north, they had been unable to attain peace for years” (Cui, 1983). Many politicians in imperial China further pointed out that the focus of border governance for the Central Plains dynasty was in the north. Chen Zhongyan, a minister of the Eastern Han Dynasty said “I heard that of the eight barbarian tribes none was more victimizing than the Xiongnu in the north. After the rise of the Han Dynasty, Emperor Gaozu was subject to the insult of siege at Pingcheng, and Emperor Taizong was subject to the shame of being ordered about by the Xiongnu. So Emperor Xiaowu suppressed his anger for careful deliberation before sending mighty generals to cross the Yellow River and go deep into the desert to hunt down the enemy until they reached its royal court. In the battle, many people were killed to the north of Langwang Mountain, with the wealth of the people wasted for nothing. The state treasury was exhausted, and production ceased. Taxes were levied for boats and carriages and on domesticated animals, but were still insufficient. Didn’t Emperor Wu take the scenario into consideration? Yes, he had long-term considerations. He finally opened up the four counties in Hexi, separated his country from the Qiang people in the south, and conquered 36 kingdoms, severing the right arm of the Xiongnu. As a result, Shan Yu was isolated, and forced into exile in the remotest corner. By the reign of Emperor Xuan and Emperor Yuan, the Western Regions finally became a vassal state, and there was no need to close the border, or send emergency military documents” (Fan, 1965, 2911). Wang Fuzhi of the Qing Dynasty summed up the situation of Borderland governance in the Tang Dynasty and said: “In the first year of Tianbao, ten military governors were instated, with nine in the northwestern Borderland. Only the military governor of Hedong (headquartered in Taiyuan) was closer to the hinterland. In addition, a military commissioner was instated for Lingnan, and a security commissioner was instated for Changle, Donglai and Dongmou. Although those four places were located in the Borderland region, they were given less weight (Wang, 1975, 667)”. In the Southern Song Dynasty, Huang Qianshan wanted to have the imperial court relocated south, but Li Gang firmly opposed the proposal, saying that “since ancient

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times, the aspiring monarchs revitalizing the country were known to rise in the northwest, from where they could seize the Central Plains and then the southeast. If they had risen in the southeast, it would be impossible for them to recover the Central Plains, not to mention the northwest. The reason was that all elite soldiers and horses were in the northwest” (Bi, 1992, 304). Wang Xiangzhi also said: “in managing the border, the imperial court valued the northwest over the southeast”1 In the first year of Yongle (1403) in the Ming Dynasty, Gu Cheng, the garrison commander of Zhenyuan Town, Guizhou Province, compared the characteristics of the ethnic groups in the south and the north and unequivocally remarked that the focus of the imperial defense should be in the north. He said that “I personally believe that occasional robbery in Yunnan, Guangdong and Guangxi shouldn’t be a concern because of their remote location, just like the poison of insects that were not lethal. For the southeastern sea route, although the Japanese pirates appeared time and again, they only plundered once in a while, so enhanced preparations for the coastal guards shall be sufficient. The remnants of the Northern Wei were tough, and cunning, always ready to strike a blow on our Borderlands. In the long run, they should be an issue of serious concern.” Emperor Cheng Zu issued an imperial decree to him as a token of citation.2 The ruler’s attention in border management was mainly in the north, while the south was relatively neglected. For example, the focus of military garrison and farming was in the north. The Central Plains dynasty even took the initiative to attack in order to address the nightmare. Regarding the ethnic groups in the south, it mostly followed the principle of “making the Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom.” In military affairs, it focused on the offensive, with keeping the territory and maintaining peace as its pursuit. In order to prevent the northern nomads from going south, some dynasties also spent a lot of financial and civilian resources to build the Great Wall. The imperial China (especially the unified ones) stationed a large number of troops 1 Wang Xiangzhi, The Record of Scenic Spots Across the Country, Vol. 1, “Guangnan Xilu Circuit”. 2 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Yongle Reign, Vol. 18.



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in the northern Borderland, but considerably fewer troops in the south. For example, the Kingdom of Wu and Jin Dynasty stationed only a few thousand troops in the Lingnan area, and the actually controlled area was very limited. Lingnan defender Tao Huang said: “I have under my command only 7,000 soldiers. Due to casualties from the high humidity, unhealthy air and conquests, only 2,420 remain. In the southern bank of Guangzhou, there is a land of more than 6,000 li, and more than 50,000 households are not my subjects. In Guilin, there are another 10,000 households refusing my rule. There are only a little more than 5,000 households rendering official service. Rule has been possible in those two prefectures with the help of military might” (Fang et al., 1974, 1560). The rulers of the Sui Dynasty and other Central Plains dynasties used various methods to demonstrate their strength to the ethnic groups in the north, but not to the ethnic groups in the south. Their confrontation and competition with the northern ethnic groups required so, and it also reflected their bluffing mentality. For example, in the third year of Daye (607), Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty inspected the Yanzhi Mountain during a westward tour, and the King Gaochang and Yiwushe arranged various aborigine tribes to welcome him by the road and “asked the masses to dress themselves in costumes and applaud him, and the throng extended for several dozen miles. The emperor was delighted by the sign of prosperity.” When Emperor Yang went to Dongdu, Pei Ju obtained his approval for the plethora of barbarians paying tribute to perform dramas, “soliciting those capable of exotic skills and variety show, asking them to stage their shows in the Duanmen Street, which had been gorgeously decked out. Pei Ju also ordered officials and the people to sit under pavilions and enjoy the show. Both the performers and audiences were all dressed in beautiful clothes for the grand event, which lasted an entire month. The restaurants set up tents, which were laden with wine and food. Barbarian chiefs led their people to trade with the people, and they were invited to drink and eat to their fill wherever they went. As a result, all the barbarians were impressed with the unimaginable prosperity of the Middle Kingdom” (Wei et al., 1973, 1581). Regarding the Borderland ruling strategies and policies, it can be seen from the official history and related memorandums of the Han

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Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty that the rulers of successive dynasties discussed more about the governance policies for the northern Borderland, but relatively less about those for the southern Borderland. On the other hand, many of their basic principles for governing the Borderlands and border ethnic groups had stemmed from the thinking and strategies for handling the northern ethnic groups. For example, in the Eastern Han Dynasty, Ban Gu said: “throughout all the years since its founding, the Han Dynasty has been implicated in wars with barbarians, in particular, the Xiongnu. In fact, there have been various strategies for handling the barbarians, for example, enhancing cultural osmosis, launching expedition for conquest, showing magnanimity, or soliciting their allegiance via conferring titles. Although the strategy changed from time to time, it was never relinquished. The imperial court never gave up its attempt to contact with the barbarians” (Fan, 1965, 1374). Regarding the relationship between the hinterland and Borderland areas, the rulers of the imperial China compared it to the primarysecondary relationship between the trunk and the branches. They believed that only with a strong trunk could branches and leaves flourish, and that it should not be disturbed for their sake. This view was first summed up from the experience of handling the relationship with the northern ethnic groups. In the reign of Emperor Ling in the Han Dynasty, when Xianbei invaded the border, the court summoned the officials to discuss countermeasures. Counselor Cai Yong said: “The trouble of the border is but a minor irritation of the hands and feet, while the dilemma of the Middle Kingdom is a grave condition. Now we cannot even eradicate robbery in the counties and prefectures of the hinterland, how can we spare efforts to handle the barbarians? Previously, Emperor Gaozu was subject to the shame of siege at Pingcheng City, and Empress Lü to the effrontery of the Xiongnu in an arrogantly worded letter. How is today’s situation in comparison? The heaven arranged mountains and rivers, the Qin court built the Great Wall and Han Dynasty built passes—all for the purpose of warding off the barbarians with their exotic customs” (Fan, 1965, 2992). Cai Yong compared the disturbance in the hinterland to a disease in the chest and back, and that in the Borderland to a minor irritation, in describing the primary and secondary relationship



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between the inland and the Borderland. Li Daliang, the Governor of Liangzhou in the Tang Dynasty, further described it as one between the root and branches, based on the Tang Dynasty’s governance policy on Turks, believing that valuing the branches and leaves over the root was not advisable. He said that “I heard that pacifying a distant land is preconditioned by restoring peace to the land nearby. The Chinese people are the root of governance, while the Borderland barbarians are the branches and leaves. Taking the interests of the root to benefit the branches for the sake of long-standing peace has never been known to succeed (Wu, 2003, 503)”. Another example of Borderland governance policy evolving from the practice of guarding against the northern nomads: the deployment of military-agro colonies and garrisons to establish governance in the Borderland areas. In order to guard against the Xiongnu, the Qin Dynasty took to large-scale land reclamation and farming and stationed a vast army in the north. In the Western Han Dynasty, the garrison and land reclamation for farming in the north reached a larger scale, eating into its national treasury. Sang Hongyang said in “Treatise on Punitive Expedition” against the Xiongnu that “The Xiongnu betrayed and refused to perform its duties as subordinate of the imperial court. It had invaded the Borderland regions frequently. Preparations against their invasion mean excessive costs for the Middle Kingdom, while ignoring them means incessant invasion. Our founding emperor emphasized the sufferings of the Borderland people, who were sometimes taken captive. So he built passes, barriers and watchtowers, and stationed troops in the Borderland. When the expenditure could not be covered by taxes, he instated salt and iron production, introduced wine taxes, instated trade officials and initiated trade with the barbarians, so as to cover Borderland management expenses.”3 From Qin and Han dynas­ ties to the Song Dynasty, the Central Plains dynasties had garrisons and farms in the barbarian land in the south, but their scale and management were incomparable with their counterparts in the north.

3 [Western Han Dynasty] Sang Hongyang, Discourses on Salt and Iron: Basis Argument.

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For another example, the rulers emphasized the strategy of “accepting them if they come in good faith and leaving them alone if they flee” in handling Borderland barbarians and the principles of “with justifiability, to our advantage and with restraint.” In the Tang Dynasty, the courtier Di Renjie said that “in the recent Zhenguan reign, the Middle Kingdom have subjugated the nine clans, conferred Khanate on Li Simo and ordered him to lead his tribes in line with the principle of launching punitive expedition against rebelling barbarians and placating the surrendering ones. This way, we have honored the righteousness of overthrowing kingdoms embracing doomed practices and consolidating those embracing thriving practices, while relieving the burdens on the people, in line with both the decrees of the present dynasty and the tradition of China’s imperial history on placating the Borderlands” (Di, 1983). The Borderland governance principles stemming from the experience of preventing northern nomads also include: territorial expansion should be properly handled, since most dynasties upheld “making Borderland barbarians the fence of the Middle Kingdom” as the criterion; the court should carefully select Borderland officials and guards in order to ensure peace; the strategy of “ruling the barbarians with barbarians” can be used to contain the Borderland ethnic groups; restraint on the Borderland ethnic groups should be imposed via rule of virtue. In Borderland management and development, imperial China highlighted the defense in the north, and placed the focus of garrisoning and farming in the north. The management of the southern Borderland was given less weight by the feudal dynasty. Before the Yuan and Ming dynasties, the rulers did not pay much attention to the development and utilization of various resources in the southern borderland. From the Yuan Dynasty to the Ming and Qing dynasties, the rulers took the southern Borderland regions as an important source of minerals, timber, and grain, and began its in-depth management and comprehensive development. The tendency of the Central Plains dynasty to value the north over the south was initially formed in the Qin and Han dynasties. Its development and evolution underwent a complicated process. Take the main dynasties for example.



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The Qin Dynasty paid little attention to the southwestern Borderland regions. In its early days, the Western Han Dynasty was busy recovering from the wounds of war and fighting against the Xiongnu and virtually neglected the southwestern Borderland for more than a decade. In the sixth year of Jianyuan (135 BC), Emperor Wu of Han began to manage the southwestern Borderland regions. The drive was underpinned by national strength but intended to open the road from Bodao to Panyu via Zangkejiang. When the effort to build the road met with resistance, Emperor Wu of Han abolished most of the local counties and prefectures. In the first year of Yuanshou (122 BC), he resumed the management of southwestern Borderland regions, to open up the road from ­southwestern Borderland regions to Tochari. This suggests that he had managed southwestern Borderland regions with specific utilitarian purposes and been arbitrary in decision-making in certain aspects. The Borderland ethnic groups that caused troubles for the Tang Dynasty were mainly Turks, the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao, especially the former two. Their expansion put considerable pressure on its rule in the northwest. The Tang court spent a lot of energy to address the problem, and even moved the northwest ethnic population and their leaders that had surrendered to the hinterland many times. On the whole, its tendency to value the north over the south was more obvious. Sima Guang stated that during the Tianbao period of the Tang Dynasty, “peace has prevailed for long and many are discussing the cancelation of the army in the Middle Kingdom. By and by, private ownership of arms dwindled and the brothers and fathers of officers felt ashamed. All the capable generals and elite troops were clustered in the northwest, leaving the hinterland virtually undefended” (Sima, 1956, 6895). The Song Dynasty’s tendency to emphasize the north and over the south was even more apparent. In the early Yuan Dynasty, Guo Songnian said: “at its inception, the Song Dynasty had to focus on the powerful enemy in the north, and was unable to manage the Borderland areas” (Guo,1986, 20). The reasons for the Song Dynasty to cherish the north in border governance included the pressure from the powerful northern ethnic regime, and the rulers’ belief that the Tang Dynasty had been overthrown by the rebellion of Huang Chao because of the

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mutiny of the garrison stationed in Guilin against Nanzhao. In the sixth year of Shaoxing (1136), the Imperial Academician Zhu Zhen said: “Dali Kingdom was originally Nanzhao in the Tang Dynasty. In the Dazhong and Xiantong years, it had invaded Chengdu and Yongguan, and led to warfare in the east and turmoil all over the country. Emperor Taizu was most clairvoyant in guarding against the barbarians by giving up Yuexi and other prefectures and adopting the Dadu River as the boundary, making it possible for the Dali Kingdom to invade or surrender.”4 The Song Dynasty’s alienation of Dali with the Dadu River as the boundary weakened the connection between the Central Plains dynasty and the southwestern tribes, but objectively avoided the possibility of being outflanked by the enemy. In the Song Dynasty, Lizhou official Tang Ju said: “After Emperor Taizu came to the throne, he determined the national boundary on the map, abandoned the barren land of Yue and Xi, with the Dadu River as the boundary. As a result, the Borderland people were spared the scourge of war for almost two hundred years.” The Tatar and Oirat tribes descend’ng f’om the Yuan Dynasty posed a serious border threat in the Ming Dynasty. The rulers paid much more attention to them than other Borderland ethnic group. Lin Xiyuan said in great detail: “Barbarians have been a trouble for China! Since ancient times, the virtuous monarchs, ingenious ministers and daring generals have all tried to conquer them. However, none of them have managed to devise the impeccable strategy, as the undertaking is truly difficult. For example, in the Han Dynasty, troops were stationed in Yanmen and Yunzhong, Longxi counties, Ba and Shu, Liaodong counties, and Kuaiji counties as a preparation against the northern nomads, the Qiang, the southwestern barbarians, Korea, and Nanyue respectively, indicating the breath of border troubles. In the Tang Dynasty, the imperial court had to guard against the Turks and the Tubo Kingdom in the north and the northwest respectively. In the Song Dynasty, the imperial court had to guard against the Khitan and Ningxia in the north and west, where border troubles were most serious. Luckily, the southeastern border had much fewer troubles. In the present dynasty, we are faced 4 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, citing Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom”



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with the Tatar and Huihu barbarians in the north and west, as well as the Yao and Zhuang in Guangdong and Guangxi. So the court tried to demarcate the borders in the three areas, establish passes and guard them with large troops, so as to ensure long-term stability within the country.”5 History of Ming also recalled that “The Tatar had a land extending to Uliangha in the east and Oirat to the west. During the Hongwu, Yongle, and Renxuan reigns, the Middle Kingdom was at its peak in prosperity, and able to keep them under restraint. However, they still rebelled time and again. After the Zhengtong Reign, border defense gradually slackened and the prestige of the Middle Kingdom dwindled. The tribal leader often assumed heroic postures, and resorted to brutal strength, in fighting against the Middle Kingdom one after another. Hence border problems plagued the Ming Dynasty for life.”6 After establishing the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang dispatched his 24 sons to various places as princes, mostly to the northern Borderland. In the southern Borderland, his strategy was to send his cronies to guard them. The general principle was to guard the border and refrain from warfare, so as to spare the court the worry for Borderland wars. Among all the unified dynasties, only the Yuan and Qing dynasties showed little tendency to favor the north over the south in border rule the border. The tendency of valuing the north over the south in border management was not obvious in the Yuan Dynasty. The reason was that the Yuan Dynasty was established by the northern nomads, which had originated and been based in the northern grassland and that the Yuan Dynasty followed few of the Central Plains dynasty’s border governance traditions. As for the intimacy between the Mongolian grassland tribes and the rulers of the Yuan Dynasty, Wei Yuan of the Qing Dynasty said: “The two tribes of Monan and Mobei mostly originated from Genghis Khan, the Emperor Taizu of Yuan and maintained marital relationship with the royal family. Qinghai was a branch of the Yuan, and the Western Regions was its servant. Now they are only paying 5 [Ming Dynasty] Lin Xiyuan, “Memorial on Report of the Border Situation According to the Imperial Decree”, Collected Works of Lin Xiyuan, Vol. 2. 6 History of Ming, Vol. 327, “Foreign Countries: Tartar”, 8494.

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tributes, and they have special families claiming to be blood relatives. Therefore, the difference is made to keep the barbarians informed” (Wei, 1984, 93). After the founding of the Qing Dynasty, the Qing court maintained close contact with the Mongolian forces in the northern grasslands through marriage, effectively alleviating the pressure from the northern nomads. Its efforts to operate the northern Borderland after unifying China were mainly Tsarist Russia and its dependent forces. After the Opium War, the Western powers encroached on China’s Borderlands. Zuo Zongtang believed that “the current affairs need to be addressed include coastal defense in the east, and fortressed defense in the west, both being equally important.” However, since the situation in the northern Borderland was tense because of border violations by Tsarist Russia, he suggested: “in Borderland defense, efforts should be focused on a full-strength expedition to the west since the Russians were cunning and covetous; once the northwest is safe, the southeast will naturally be secure.”7 In other words, he believed that the northern Borderland should be the first priority.

2.2  There were many reasons for the ancient tendency of valuing the north over the south in Borderland governance. First of all, the characteristics of the ethnic groups in the north and south were an important factor. There were many narratives about the characteristics of the northern nomads in the past. According to Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Xiongnu, in the Western Han Dynasty, the Xiongnu had more than 300,000 archers; “From the Left Wise King and Right Wise King down to the Danghu, the higher-ranking officials command a dozen thousand mounted troops each and lower-ranking ones command several thousand each. There are a total of 24 chief officers officials, and they are named “Wanqi”. All the ministers are hereditary … The 24 chief officers each appointed their own subordinates, including Qianlong, Baizhang, 7 [Qing Dynasty] Zuo Zongtang, “Memorial on the Necessity for Waging War in the Northwest”, Complete Works of Zuo Zongtang: Manuscript of Imperial Memorials, Vol. 46.



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Shichang, Bixiaowang, Xiangfeng, Fengduwei, Danghu, and Qiequ. In battle, whoever killed or captured the first enemy soldier would be rewarded with a pot of wine, together with the spoils, and the hostage would be given to them as slaves. Therefore, the Xiongnu soliders were known to fight for their own interests and surprise the army by ambushing. So when they saw the enemy troops, they would attack like a flock of birds; when they suffer a defeat, they would disperse like mist” (Sima, 1959, 2890). The vast grassland in the north is dominated by plateaus, mountains, hills, grasslands and deserts, which feature smaller differences in the ecological environment and animal and plant resources, in comparison with the southern Borderlands. The common feature of the local nomads is the overwhelming importance of livestock industry in the social economy. The herd is not only their main wealth and means of living, but also their main means of production. In addition, hunting, agriculture and handicrafts also were also fairly important in their economic life. Their society was generally based on “luo”, each of which was normally tantamount to a family, as the basic cell. The grassland ethnic groups with family as the basic cell of society and mainly engaged in nomadic activities were easily gathered to form alliances, but were also easily dispersed and disintegrated, or replaced by other emerging nomadic forces. They were accustomed to traveling long distances and were good at guerrilla warfare. After suffering a defeat, they could usually regroup and quickly regain their combat effectiveness. On the other hand, the decentralized and highly mobile nomadic economy made it easy for them to lose but difficult to amass the means of production or wealth. They could not form a consolidated and mature superstructure, or develop a complete centralized system like the Central Plains dynasty. Therefore, their regimes were relatively fragile and loose. The death of the leader of his incompetence to control the overall situation could easily lead to the division or disintegration of the regime. The assembly and rise of the nomadic cliques were quite rapid, but their decline and even disappear were just as fast. In different periods in history, the dominant ethnic group forces in the northern grassland have risen and fallen in fairly quick succession.

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The southern Borderland presented a different picture. It has complex topography and diverse climate types, with mountains taking up most of the land area. Areas with different altitudes often have different ecological environments and consequently different animal and plant resources. Residents living in areas with different altitudes gradually developed a dependence on specific ecological environments and their animal and plant resources. Reluctance to relocate, isolated life, and dispersal migration were extremely common among the southern Borderland ethnic groups. Villages derived from the same ethnic origin were the basic unit of the ethnic society. Closely related villages of varying sizes were linked by geographical and blood relationships to form greater forces for sustenance together. The various Borderland ethnic groups depending on different ecological environments usually had their own specific livelihoods and cultural types. The local economies were obviously different due to differences in products, and thus were complementary. The ethnic groups living in different ecological environments exchanged or redistributed agricultural products, animal products, game and metal products through market trade or plundering wars. The Borderland ethnic groups of the south had many branches and complex internal structures. They lived together and depended on each other, but often developed enmity due to complex historical entanglements in competing for land, water, mountains, forests, mineral deposits and other resources. When faced with external pressure, they might resolve their hostility and form alliances for joint resistance. The social economy of the southern Borderlands was not as developed as that of the Central Plains, but the economy and culture were usually deeply influenced by it. Through gradual accumulation, the southern Borderlands formed a tradition of attachment to the native land, easy satisfaction, and identification with and admiration for inland culture. Due to the above reasons, it was difficult for the various ethnic groups in the southern Borderland to become united and form a larger Borderland regime, or develop the political ambition to replace the Central Plains dynasty or attain the same status as it. Therefore, they were very unlikely to adopt an offensive stance or pose a threat to the Central Plains dynasty.



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Due to the obvious developmental gap between the farming civilization of the Central Plains and the nomadic civilization of the north, and the large demand of nomads for food, cloth and ironware of the agricultural areas, the northern nomads often tended to venture south after their rise, and their population continued to move to the agricultural areas of the Central Plains. That is historically inevitable to some extent. The northern nomads often became a serious border trouble for the Central Plains dynasty, while such situations rarely occurred in the southern border areas. The formation of the tradition of valuing the north over the south in ancient times was also attributable to the difference in the ethnic integration in the north and south. Due to the obvious economic and cultural differences between the nomads relocated to the hinterland and the Han native to it, and the oppression of the relocated ethnic groups in the hinterland by the rulers, the nomads in the south led a very painful life, and sharp class and ethnic contradictions ensued. This serious social problem was fully exposed in the Jin Dynasty, whose rulers discussed it on many occasions, but failed to form effective countermeasures in the end. In fact, in the Jin Dynasty, there was a debate on relocation of barbarians beyond the national border. The scholar-bureaucrat Jiang Tong said in “On Relocation of Barbarians” that “Barbarians are not our kin, so they won’t share our empathy, and will definitely harbor different aspirations. When they were weak, the preceding dynasties forced them to move to the area within 1,000 miles of the capital. The court officials and civilians despised them and bullied them, embittering them. As their population and strength grew, they would inevitably harbor a rebellious intention. Their greed and fierce nature, coupled with the accumulated anger, would grow out of control once erupted. Since they are now in the heart of the country, without the barriers of checkpoints and fortresses, attacking unsuspecting people, they may loot food from warehouses and the fields, and cause widespread disasters and unpredictable atrocities. History shows that it is an inevitable consequence” (Fang et al., 1974, 1531). The suggestion of Jiang Tong for relocating the barbarians beyond the fortress was highly unfeasible. So the rulers had no choice but to wait for the accumulation and eruption of social and ethnic contradictions, and consequently “The Upheaval

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of the Five Barbarians” in the Central Plains region. The continuous southward venture of the northern nomads led to sharp ethnic conflicts, and became an important reason for the social turmoil and even frequent wars in the Central Plains. That is one of the important reasons for past rulers to regard the northern nomads as scourges and go all out to prevent them from going south. As the northern nomads moved south and settled down in the agricultural areas, they were integrated by the agricultural civilization of the Central Plains, and new northern nomads moved from the depths of the grasslands to the vacancy left behind by them. Attracted by the developed agricultural civilization in the Central Plains, they continued to move southward, forming a new wave of population migration, and repeating the tragicomedy of intense conflict between agricultural culture and nomadic culture. This was manifested in incessant fierce conflicts and even wars of northern nomads with the Han Chinese in the Central Plains, and their acceptance by the Han society in the Central Plains and integration with them. Meanwhile, due to the unsteady migration and rapid movement of nomads, their southward journeys to the Central Plains were sudden and cyclical to some point. Therefore, Gao Lü of the Northern Wei Dynasty said: “The barbarians lived in the marshes and migrated where there was water and grass. They went to war with all their family property, and fled with their livestock, capable of supporting themselves without carrying rations. Therefore, the ancients launched expedition to the north, only thwarting their invasion and looting. The barbarians have been a Borderland scourge mainly because of their high mobility and volatility” (Gao, n.d.). The economic and cultural exchanges and ethnic integration between the southern ethnic groups and the Han Chinese in the hinterland took a gradual and cumulative process. The ethnic integration featured the entry of the Han population into ethnic areas. The contact and integration of local ethnic groups with foreign ethnic groups was a gradual and slow process, with few intense conflicts and social unrest. On the other hand, the southern Borderlands featured a primary compound economy dominated by a low-level agricultural economy and complemented with animal husbandry, gathering, fishing and hunting, making it easier for the immigrating agricultural population to adapt.



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The conflict between civilizations was relatively mild compared to the northern nomadic areas. Under such circumstances, there were fewer violent conflicts or serious threats to the Central Plains dynasty from the southern ethnic groups. So, naturally the Central Plains dynasty would shift the focus of its border governance to the north. Another reason for rulers of dynasties to emphasize the defense against the northern nomads was the geographic proximity of the northern grasslands. The distance to be covered by the cavalry of the nomads in a fairly short time entailed a great threat to the rule of the Central Plains dynasty. In the Jin Dynasty, the imperial censor Guo Qin said that “The barbarians had been tough and a scourge since ancient times. In the Wei Dynasty, the population was small, and all the counties in the northwest were inhabited by barbarians. They were submissive now, but in the event of hostility later, the cavalry of the barbarians can sweep from Pingyang and Shangdang to Mengjin in three days, and capture Beidi, Xihe, Taiyuan, Fengyi, Anding, and Shangjun” (Fang et al., 1974, 2549). In the war with the northern nomads, the slightest mistake or slack on the part of the Central Plains dynasty might lead to sudden changes in the situation. History as a Mirror believes that the transfer by the Tang court of a large number of northern garrison troops to the south after the outbreak of the An-Shi Rebellion was an important reason for the loss of northern territories. It said that “since the Wude Reign, the Tang Dynasty had extended its Borderlands to the western region and established governors, prefectures and counties. In Kaiyuan Reign, it set up Shuofang, Longyou, Hexi, Anxi and Beiting, placing them under the jurisdiction of the Military Governor. Each year, it recruited capable young men from Shandong and dispatched them there for garrison, along with silk and brocade for military expenses. It thus opened up farms to ensure food supply, instated animal husbandry superintendent to raise horses and cattle, and stationed troops for protection and patrol over a land of thousands of miles. By the time of An Lushan Rebellion, the elite Borderland troops were all conscripted and organized into field headquarters, to the assistance of the imperial court. The troops left behind were insufficient and incompetent. As a result, the barbarians gradually encroached on the Borderland of the Middle Kingdom.

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Within years, dozens of prefectures in the northwest were lost one after another. The area from the west of Fengxiang and the north of Yuzhou all fell into barbarian hands” (Sima, 1956, 7146). In order to prevent surprise raids by the northern nomads, from the pre-Qin to the Qin and Han dynasties onwards, the Central Plains dynasty began a large-scale wall construction in the north, hoping to block the northern peoples from going south. According to Book of Han, “after Qin took over the six kingdoms, Emperor Qin Shi Huang dispatched his general Meng Tian to the north with several hundred thousand troops to attack the northern nomads, and recovered all the land to the south of the Yellow River. Then, he used the river as the barrier, established forty-four counties alongside it and relocated those banished to guard the Borderlands to populate them. He also built a thoroughfare from Jiuyuan to Yunyang, and built a great wall of more than 5,000 kilometers from Lintao to Liaodong, taking advantage of the dangerous mountainous terrain and the valleys and repairing the original wall wherever possible. Later, the Qin army crossed the Yellow River and captured the northern part of Yangshan” (Ban, 1962, 3748). In ancient wars, the army of the agrarian society was often defeated that of the nomadic society. Faced with the southern invasion of the northern nomads, the Central Plains dynasty suffered multiple defeats, but never formulated feasible countermeasures. Effectively preventing the northern nomads became a headache for the ruler of the Central Plains dynasty. Wang Mang’s general Yan You said: “I heard that the Xiongnu have been a trouble for the Middle Kingdom for a long time … In ancient times, no ruler of the Middle Kingdom had launched expeditions. In the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties, punitive expeditions were launched against them, but none was truly successful. Roughly, the Zhou and Han Dynasty had acted according to the second best and an ill-advised strategy respectively, while the Qin had had no strategy at all. In the reign of King Xuan during the Zhou Dynasty, when the Xianyun came to Jingyang in an invasion, the generals of King Xuan drove them across the border and stopped at that. To the Zhou court, barbarian invasion was dismissed as a mosquito sting, to be banished with a waving of hands. In contrast, the Ming was praised for its second best strategy. In the Han Dynasty, Emperor Wu selected generals to train



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troops, who went deep into the land of the Xiongnu with little ration. He succeeded in his strategy, but his success was met with prompt counteroffensive, plunging the Middle Kingdom into the scourge of strife lasting three decades. The prolonged war exhausted the Middle Kingdom of its resources, though it also struck fear into the heart of the Xiongnu. Emperor Wu was lauded, but for the ill-advised strategy. Emperor Qin Shi Huang, refusing to put up with the minor shame and taking lightly private resources, embarked on the project of the Great Wall stretching for thousands of miles. With transportation routes beginning from the remotest barbarian land, the ambitious undertaking exhausted domestic resources and eventually led to the demise of his dynasty. So this is a case of action without strategy” (Ban, 1962, 3824). Yan You’s observation is generally correct. The repeated failure of the Central Plains dynasty in the war against the northern nomads also exposed many insurmountable shortcomings in contrast. The military failure also strengthened its tendency to emphasize the north over the south in border policy. In the Tang Dynasty, Lu Zhi had an insightful analysis of border defense affairs, in an imperial memorial. He said: “The Han Chinese dynasty has been subject to the cycle of prosperity and decline, while the barbarians are also known to rise and fall. As the situation and consequently the countermeasures are always changing, there shouldn’t be cut-and-dried regularity or sure-fire methods. Instead, countermeasures should be adapted to the real-time circumstances … The customs differ from area to area, each with its advantages and shortcomings. The advantages should not be ignored while the shortcomings should not be followed. Wielding one’s shortcomings against the advantages of others will lead to failure, while directing one’s advantages against their shortcomings will bring about success. For the Xiongnu, their strength consisted in their roaming lifestyle of hunting and coarse diet, and consequently their cavalry capable of raids. They took life lightly and were bent on winning. Those advantages cannot be rivaled for the Middle Kingdom. Therefore, the strategy of increasing troops to confront them on the vast plains with brutal strength is fallible. It will incur hefty costs but all in vain. Even if a victory is attained once in a while, it will be followed by great setbacks. Isn’t it against the heavenly will and

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popular belief, as well as the circumstances and regularities” (Liu et al., 1975, 3805)? In ancient times, the north was always the focus of military contention and the arena dominating the political situation of the Middle Kingdom. Far-sighted politicians never dared to take the northern Borderland lightly. In the Southern Song Dynasty, Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan wanted to have the Emperor of Song relocated south. Li Gang vehemently opposed the suggestion, saying that “since ancient times, the monarchs revitalizing the country were known to rise in the northwest, from where they could seize the Central Plains and then the southeast. If they had risen in the southeast, it would be impossible for them to recover the Central Plains, not to mention the northwest. The reason was that all elite soldiers and horses were in the northwest. If we forfeit the north, not only will the Jin people try to seize the Borderland passes, but also robbers will appear in large numbers, victimizing prefectures and towns. When that happens, His Excellency won’t be able to return, not to mention training soldiers for defeating the enemy and welcoming the Emperor Gaozong and Empress Wu Zetian back” (Bi, 1992, 304). In the mid-1970s, the researchers who compiled the Atlas of Chinese History once asked Mr. Guo Moruo how he thought of the ethnic relations in ancient China in general. Guo pointed out that in general the ethnic relations featured “defense in the north and infiltration in the south”, adding that the “infiltration” was mainly cultural (Di, 2002, 466). The author believes that the “defense in the north” here mainly refers to the southward invasion of the ancient nomads continuously venturing southward and defense of the Central Plains dynasty subject to the pressure. The ethnic integration was relatively intense and full of contradictions. The so-called “infiltration in the south” means that the ethnic groups of the south rarely ventured beyond their living areas into the Central Plains, and had more in common with the Han Chinese of the Central Plains culturally; the ethnic integration featured a gradual process and mutual influence. Mr. Guo’s observation revealed that in most cases the Central Plains dynasties had handled its relations with the barbarians in the north and south according to the



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principle and thus inevitably adopted the border policy of valuing the north over the south. In ancient times, the competition between the Han Chinese and ethnic groups was an important aspect of ethnic relations. The various ethnic groups strove for their own survival and further development through different forms of competition. In most cases, the Han Chinese had the upper hand, especially when the competition involved the southern ethnic groups. Therefore, most of the Central Plains dynasties did not suffer much from the southern ethnic groups in border troubles. In some periods (for example, in the rule of Sun’s Wu in the Three Kingdoms period and in the Southern dynasties), the rulers even looted the southern peoples and compounded their property to enrich the national treasury. For example, in the Chen Dynasty, Guangzhou Governor Ouyang Wei, his younger brothers Ouyang Sheng and Ouyang Xie, who were governor of Jiaozhou and Hengzhou respectively, “were from an illustrious family with renown all over the south, and rendered a meritorious service to the Middle Kingdom by sending bronze drums, livestock and exotic produces” (Yao, 1972, 159). The Book of Southern Qi: Prefectures and Counties (1) said: In the Southern Qi Dynasty, Xijiang and Nanjiang “each appointed a superintendent exclusively for conquests, and thus became exceedingly rich” (Xiao, 1972, 262). On the other hand, in the competition with the northern peoples, it is not uncommon for the Central Plains dynasty to lose the upper hand. For example, in the Han Dynasty, the imperial court was forced to make peace with the Xiongnu at first, and the Song Dynasty was humiliated by the Liao, Xia, and Jin dynasties in sending gold and silk for peace. Under such circumstances, strict precautions against the northern nomads became the inevitable choice of the Central Plains dynasty. To sum up, in the ancient times, many Central Plains dynasties had a tendency to emphasize the north over the south, or formed a tradition of north supremacy. The tendency, or rather tradition, profoundly affected the ancient ethnic relations and the border ideology and policies of the Central Plains dynasty, and even the formation and development of a unified multi-ethnic country. Thus affected, many of the principles for governing the Borderlands and Borderland ethnic groups in imperial

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China were developed from measures for handling the ethnic groups in the north. Since its focus of garrisoning, farming and management was in the north for a long time, the Central Plains dynasty made little effort to develop the southern Borderland before the Yuan Dynasty. In the Yuan and Qing dynasties, the tendency of emphasizing the north over the south was not obvious, mainly because these two dynasties had little pressure from the northern Borderland. The formation of the tendency of valuing the north over the south in border governance was attributable to the difference between the north and south in characteristics of ethnic groups, ethnic integration, the north as the focus of military operations in China’s imperial history, and the threat from the northern nomads to the Central Plains dynasty.

3.  The Geopolitics of Present-day Yunnan-Guizhou Region and the Administration of Qin, Han, Jin, Tang and Song Dynasties The Borderland governance of the Central Plains dynasty was closely related to the geopolitics of the Yunnan-Guizhou region. Its administrative thoughts and practice for Yunnan-Guizhou region, as well as the transportation lines, core areas, important cities and regional administrative centers, migration and distribution of immigrants, social and economic development status, and the focus of management in the region are all influential factors for the geopolitics of this region. In studying this issue, it is necessary to analyze not only the relevant elements in each period and their relationships, but also the trajectory of historical development and the characteristics of different periods. The Yuan Dynasty was a turning point in the management of the present Yunnan-Guizhou region and the changes in its local geopolitics. In the following narration, the history of the region from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Opium War is divided into two periods, with the late Song Dynasty and the early Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation. Each period is further divided into several stages in the order of historical development, for elaborating the roles of related factors, as well as their interaction with geopolitical factors.



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3.1  The first half of the management of the present-day Yunnan-Guizhou region in imperial China can be subdivided into three stages: Qin and Han to Southern and Northern dynasties, the Sui and Tang dynasties, and the Song Dynasty. In the first stage, the Central Plains dynasty initially established its rule over the region, while the Qin and Han dynasties, the Jin Dynasty and the Southern and Northern dynasties each had their own characteristics in its administration. The present Yunnan-Guizhou region in the pre-Qin period was the zone connecting the present Shu and Guangxi to the China-Indochina Peninsula, with varying degrees of ties with the surrounding areas. During the reign of Emperor Wu, the Western Han Dynasty still regarded southwestern Borderland regions (today’s Yunnan-Guizhou region) as a remote and unfathomable borderland. In the first year of Yuanshou (122 BC), Zhang Qian returned from Tochari as an envoy, and suggested that Emperor Wu send envoys to find a way from Shu to Tochari (now north Afghanistan). So Emperor Wu dispatched separate delegations from Ranmang (now Sichuan Maowen), Yu (now Sichuan Tianquan), Qiong (now Sichuan Xichang), and Bo (now Sichuan Yibin), but the exploration came to no avail as the envoys were all obstructed by indigenous tribes (Sima, 1959, 3166).This suggests that the above four places were the southwestern extremes under the jurisdiction of Shu County, and the areas beyond were unknown places. In the 5th year of King Shen of Zhou (316 BC), the Qin army launched an expedition against Shu and seized Ba, and included the land of Shu and Ba into its territory (Chang, 1984, 32). After 115 years of operation by the Qin Kingdom and the Qin Dynasty, the Sichuan Basin became a land of abundance with a vast stretch of fertile fields. Chang E, an official of the Qin Dynasty opened up the Wuchi Road from Bodao County (today Sichuan Yibin) to present-day northeastern Yunnan, and “extensively instated officials” along the route (Sima, 1959, 2993). The Qin Dynasty also extended the road from Chengdu to Xichang and set up a government institution in Xichang (Sima, 1959, 3046). Those two roads were the northern section of the passage from the Chengdu Plain to the India-Pakistan subcontinent. The Western Han Dynasty

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operated the southwestern Borderland regions, and began to incorporate present-day Yunnan into the territory of the Central Plains dynasty. Emperor Wu had tried to manage the southwestern Borderland regions several times for expanding the communication lines there. In other words, the main purpose was to open a military passage from Bodao County along the Zangke River (now the Beipanjiang River) to Panyu, as well as an international passage from Shu to Tochari and India via thesouthwestern Borderland regions. In its early days, the Han Dynasty was busy resisting the Xiongnu and had no time to manage the southwestern Borderland regions. After a decisive victory against the Xiongnu, Emperor Wu shifted his attention to the south. In the sixth year of Jianyuan (135 BC), Minyue and Nanyue attacked each other, and Tang Meng was dispatched to send an order to Nanyue. Tang Meng saw the Chinese wolfberry sauce from the Shu area in Panyu and learnt that it had been transported there via the Zangke River of Yelang. When he returned, he suggested that the court open a road to Yelang to prepare for an offensive against Nanyue. Emperor Wu Xu adopted his suggestion. Tang Meng lured the Duke of Yelang into establishing the Qianwei Prefecture (now Sichuan Yibin) with handsome gifts, and opened a road from Bodao to Zangkejiang. Emperor Wu also sent Sima Xiangru to set up one protectorate and more than a dozen counties in Qiongze and Ranmang, and reopened the old road of the Qin Dynasty from Chengdu Qiongdu (now Sichuan Xichang). In the third year of Yuanshuo (126 BC), due to the huge cost incurred in building the city of Shuofang against the Xiongnu, Emperor Wu temporarily abolished the governance institutions in the southwestern Borderland regions, retaining only Qianwei Prefecture and two counties and one protectorate in Yelang-Duwei (Sima, 1959, 2994). In the first year of Yuanshou (122 BC), Zhang Qian returned from Tochari and reported that he saw that Shu cloth and Qiong bamboo sticks there had been purchased from India by the Tochari people, speculating that there was a road from the Shu area through the southwestern Borderland regions and India to Tochari. He added that it was very dangerous to go to Tochari from Qiangzhong, and that the road from Shu to India was shorter and free of robbers. In addition, Dayuan, Tochari, Parthian Empire and other countries along the route



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had many exotic things. Emperor Wu resumed operation of the southwestern Borderland regions and sent envoys to explore a way from Shu to India, but all envoys were obstructed by the indigenous tribes (Sima, 1959, 2995, 3171). In the fifth year of Yuanding (112 BC), the Western Han Dynasty began operating the southwestern Borderland regions for the third time, sending troops to suppress the rebelling Nanyue from five routes. One route set off from Shu along the Zangke River to Panyu via Qianwei, and Yelang. After pacifying Nanyue, the Han army returned along the original road, destroyed Qielan, the tribe of Yelang opposing its conscription, and set up Zangke County (based to the southwest of Huangping, Guizhou) in its land. Later, it established Yuexi County in Qiongdu (based in now Sichuan Xichang), and Shenli County in Zedu (based in the northeast of today’s Hanyuan, Sichuan), Wenshan County in Ranmang, and Wudu County in Guanghan. In the second year of Yuan Feng (109 BC), the Bashu troops sent by Emperor Wu suddenly came to the Kingdom of Yunnan, and forced it into surrender. Then, the Han court established Yizhou County in its land (based to the east of today’s Jinning, Yunnan) (Sima, 1959, 2996, 2975). Emperor Wu was bent on opening the road from Shu to India. Since Xi and Kunming had abducted Han envoys sent to explore a path to India on many occasions, Emperor Wu ordered General Guo Chang to attack them in the 2nd (109 BC) and the 6th year of Yuanfeng. He also built Kunming Lake in Chang’an for naval training, preparing for a decisive battle with Xi and Kunming (Sima, 1959, 3171; Ban, 1962, 198). Later, Xi and Kunming were defeated, and the Western Han Dynasty merged their land into Yizhou County. The Han army also defeated the Ailao aborigines in present-day West Yunnan, opened the way to Tochari cross the Lancang River via India, and set up the two counties of Buwei and Xitang on the banks of the Lancang River (Fang, 2004). The Eastern Han Dynasty continued the war against the Ailao ethnic gorup. In the 23rd year of Jianwu (47), the chief of Ailao ethnic gorup went to Yuexi County to pledge allegiance. In the 12th year of Yongping (69), Liumao the Ailao King surrendered, with 77 subordinate kings and their tribes. The Eastern Han Dynasty established Yongchang County, which had a wide jurisdiction, and which had Buwei (now Yunnan Baoshan) as the seat of government (Fan, 1965, 2848; Chang,

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1984, 424; 430). So far, the obstacles to the opening of the road from had been largely cleared. The Eastern Han Dynasty also opened water and land communication lines from central Yunnan to Cochin (now Hanoi, Vietnam). In the 19th year of Jianwu (43), Fubo General Ma Yuan was ordered to suppress the Uprising of the Trung sisters. For transporting military rations and equipment, the Han troops opened the road from central Yunnan to Mengzi, and further to Hanoi via the Honghe River and present-day Pingbian. Since the road passed Jinsangguan, it was also known as “the Jinsangguan Road” (Li, 1984, 1154). The Red River is turbulent, with a markedly different water level in summer and autumn. The communication between the Yunnan-Guizhou area and Cochin was usually from central Yunnan down south the Red River. From Cochin there was a land route leading to the north. According to relevant records, before Cochin broke away from the control of the Central Plains dynasty during the Five dynasties, most of the connections between the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom and Cochin were by sea. Jinsangguan Road was mainly used for business travel and temporary military dispatch. The Han Dynasty established some prefectures and counties in the southwestern Borderland regions, not only to consolidate its rule of the land, but also to protect the Shu-India Road and Jinsangguan Road. Qianwei, Yuexi Shenli, and Yizhou prefectures set up in the Western Han Dynasty were all necessary for roads crossing the border. It is sad in collected annotations to Historical Records: Biography of Dayuan that Emperor Wu set up Yizhou, Yuexi, Zangke, Shenli, and Wenshan, “to extend the territory to Tochari” (Sima, 1959, 3171). Most of the county seats and their subordinate counties were also in the areas along the Shu-India Road and Jinsangguan Road, with some even serving as transportation hubs. For example, six of the eight counties under the jurisdiction of Yongchang County, including Xitang, Yeyu, Yunnan, Ailao, Bonan, and Buwei were all located on the route of the Shu-India Road, while the prefecture seat Yongchang had always been an important commodity hub for the Road. The Eastern Han Dynasty added Qianwe Protectorate on the basis of Qianwei County (Fan, 1965, 3515), and placed the area extending south to Dongchuan, Yunnan, under its



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jurisdiction. Therefore, southbound travelers from Bodao to today’s Yunnan were be protected by the local government along the way. In the late Eastern Han Dynasty, the southwestern Borderland regions were ruled by the Shu Han. When Liu Bei paid the third visit to the thatched cottage of Zhugeliang to enlist his service, Zhuge Liang proposed the strategic plan of seizing Jingzhou and Yizhou, “to rely its natural conditions for defense, befriend the barbarian forces in the west, and the Yue people in the south, establish a good relationship with Sun Quan, and enhance domestic governance”, so as to wait for chances to win the Central Plains (Chen, 1959, 913). After the Shu Han took control of Yizhou, Nanzhong (now Yunnan-Guizhou area) was regarded as a strategic rear area and a supply base for important materials. After Zhuge Liang’s southern conquest, he strengthened control over the present-day Yunnan-Guizhou area as a base for troops and supplies. The Shu Han attached great importance to the Shu-India Road and the Jinsangguan Road. In the third year of Jianxing (225), Zhuge Liang led an expedition to Yunnan, putting down the rebellion of local prestigious clans and barbarian chiefs, and reopening the Lingguan Road between Chengdu and present-day Xichang (Chen, 1959, 1053). Later, he built a suspension bridge at the Lancang River Ferry on the Shu-India Path, and the rock with cable lasted to the Tang Dynasty (Fan, 1985, 83). The Shu Han also established Yunnan Prefecture, with land taken from the two prefectures of Yuexi and Jianning, with the based in Nongdong (to the north of today’s Yao’an), for protecting the Shu-India Road, aside from adding several new counties in Yongchang Prefectures. Among them, Xisui (based in today’s Jinping), Yongshou (based in today’s Gengma), and Nanfu (based in today’s Jinghong) (Chang, 1984, 445, 439). The three counties were located in today’s Lincang area and Xishuangbanna in Yunnan, so presumably the road from Jinghong to Laos and northern Thailand was initially completed back then. In order to compete with the Kingdom of Wu, Shu Han attached great importance to Jinsangguan Road. In the 15th year of Jian’an (210), Sun Quan used Bu Zhi as the governor of Jiaozhou, and Xie Shi, after the prefect of Jiaozhou appointed by Shu Han surrendered to Wu. Later, Liu Bei reached a peace deal with Wu and divided Jingzhou equally with the Xiangshui River as the boundary, with Changsha, Jiangxia, and areas

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to the east of Guiyang for Wu and Nanjun, Lingling, and areas to the west of Wuling for Shu Han (Chen, 1959, 1119). Shi Xie secretly colluded with Yong Kai, a tribal leader of Yizhou, and the situation became unfavorable for Shu Han (Chen, 1959, 1192). After the Southern Expedition of Zhuge Liang, the Shu Han established the Xinggu Prefecture on the land taken from the two prefectures of Jianning and Zangke, with the based in Wanwen (to the north of Yanshan Mountain in present-day Yunnan) (Chang, 1984, 455), in order to strengthen control of Jinsangguan Road. During the Jin and Southern dynasties, the control of the Central Plains dynasty over today’s Yunnan-Guizhou area was weakened, but the Shu-Indiau Road and Jinsangguan Road were still passable. In the Liu’s Song Dynasty, the tribal leader Cuan Longyan, who ruled Yunnan with a separatist regime, led five thousand troops to quell the Mianrong Rebellion in southern Yongchang Prefecture, in order to protect the western section of Shu-India Road (Wang, 1980, 115). There are also many records mentioning Jinsangguan Road. In the Jin Dynasty, Tao Huang said that Xinggu (now Yanshan, Yunnan) and Cochin “were connected by land and water routes, which were mutually complementary.” Zuo Si said in “Rhapsody of the Capital of Shu” that the road from Cochin to Zangke and Qianwei “extended for more than five thousand li” (Fang et al., 1974, 1560; Xiao, 1998, 28). During the Jin Dynasty, when tribal leaders of Yunnan were dispatched on expedition to Jiaozhou or sent there to take up official posts, they also took the Jinsangguan Road (Chang, 1984, 462–68). The Western Han Dynasty established 13 regional governors throughout the country, and placed Qianwei, Yuexi, Yizhou, and Zangke under the jurisdiction of the governor of Yizhou (based in today’s Chengdu) (Ban, 1962, 1543). When the Eastern Han Dynasty was first established, it followed the tradition of placing Yunnan-Guizhou region under the jurisdiction of Yizhou Region. In fact, the tradition remained unchanged before the Yuan Dynasty. Now that the Yunnan-Guizhou area was placed under the jurisdiction of Yizhou, the northeastern Yunnan and the economically developed Dianchi watershed along the Wuchi Road became the focus of management throughout dynasties, and grew into a densely populated and economically prosperous area. Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong called the three



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prefectures of Shu, Guanghan, and Qianwei the “Three Shu’s”, saying that their land was fertile, and the people were talented. The subordinate counties of Zhuti, Tanglang, and Cunwu of Qianweijun were all located in today’s northeastern Yunnan (Ban, 1962, 1599). Yizhou County, due to its extensive jurisdiction and relatively better developed economy and culture, took the lead among the Yunnan prefectures set up in the Han Dynasty. Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong said that the Dianchi area was “rich in salt farms, rice paddies and fishery resources, as well as gold, sivler and livestock”, but “was accustomed to extravagant practices and difficult to placate.” It also said that the Jin Dynasty turned Qianwei Protectorate into Zhuti Prefecture (based in today’s Zhaotong, Yunnan), and that there were the prestigious clans of Zhu, Lu and Lei, “Their people are eager to learn, making them the crown of Ningzhou” (Chang, 1984, 394, 414). A change in the geopolitical relationship of Yunnan-Guizhou during the Shu Han Dynasty was the promotion of Weixian County’s status. In the late Eastern Han Dynasty, Yizhou was ruled by Liu Yan and his son Liu Zhang. However, the areas effectively controlled by them were restricted to the present-day northeastern Yunnan and Dianchi. Liu Bei seized Yizhou and instated the Laixiang GovernorGeneral to rule Nanzhong, with the seat of government in Nanchang County (in present-day Zhenxiong, Yunnan) and Pingyi County (in present-day Bijie County, Guizhou) successively. Zhuge Liang relocated the Laixiang Governor-General to Weixian County after his southern conquest, stationed troops and launched land reclamation there, enabling its marked development (Chen, 1959, 1081; Chang, 1984, 402). The Shu Han appointed its audacious general Zhang Yi as the Prefect of Yuexi County (based in today’s Xichang), and made Yuexi a strategic point on the Shu-India Road. The key areas of management by the Western Jin Dynasty in the Yunnan-Guizhou region were still Jianning Prefecture (based in today’s Qujing and northeastern Luliang successively) and Jinning Prefecture (based in today’s Jinning). During this period, the tradition of placing Yunnan-Guizhou area under the jurisdiction of Sichuan was changed and Ningzhou was established on a par with Yizhou (based in today’s Jinning). However, the reform failed because the conditions were

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not met. More than one decade later, the Yunnan-Guizhou area was returned to the jurisdiction of Sichuan (Chang, 1984, 369; Fang et al., 1974, 439, 441). During the Southern dynasties, the area effectively controlled by the Central Plains dynasty in the present Yunnan-Guizhou region gradually shrunk to the east and northeast of Yunnan. In the Liu’s Song Dynasty, Ningzhou was established in present-day Qujing for governing Yunnan-Guizhou, and Yuexi Prefecture was placed under the jurisdiction of Yizhou (based in present-day Chengdu) (Shen, 1074, 1182). In the subsequent Qi, Liang, and Chen dynasties, the situation of governance in the Yunnan-Guizhou area remained much the same.

3.2  After its establishment, the Sui Dynasty resumed management of the present Yunnan-Guizhou region on the basis of northeastern Yunnan, establishing the Nanning Prefecture General Administration Command (in Qujing, Yunnan) and Xining Prefecture (based in the present-day Xichang) successively, aside from Gongzhou, Xiezhou and Kunzhou in present-day Zhaotong, Liliang and Kunming respectively (Wei et al., 1973, 1270, 1479). In the 17th year of Kaihuang (597), Cuan Wan, a tribal leader of Kunzhou Commandery, rebelled, and he was joined by eastern Yunnan, central Yunnan, and Erhai. The Sui court ordered Shi Wansui to suppress the uprising with troops from Sichuan. The barbarian tribes presented a pearl and requested submission, so Shi Wansui released Cuan Wan and returned. In the following year, Cuan Wan rebelled again, and Emperor Wen ordered Liu Kuai to lead a punitive expedition. Cuan Wan was sent to the imperial court and killed (Wei et al., 1973, 1355; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6315). The two wars weakened the local forces in the Yunnan-Guizhou region, and led to the decline of the Cuan Clan. Taking Nanzhao’s separation after the An-Shi Rebellion as the demarcation, the Tang Dynasty’s management of the present YunnanGuizhou area can be divided into the former and the later stages. In the early stage of about 130 years, the Tang Dynasty made great achievements in the undertaking, and extended the effectively ruled area from present-day northeastern and central Yunnan to western Yunnan. After



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the Tianbao War, the geopolitical structure of the Yunnan-Guizhou region was changed. Although there were 35 years of restored rapport between Nanzhao and Tang since the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Nanzhao was no longer part of Erhai managed by a native official, but a separatist Borderland regime occupying the Yunnan region. Generally speaking, in the 150-odd years following the An-Shi Rebellion, the Tang Dynasty had no actual control over the present Yunnan-Guizhou region. Emperor Taizong of Tang was passionate about managing the Borderlands, and his theories and policies influenced several generations of monarchs in the Tang Dynasty. He believed that there were people with in the territory of Tang were his subjects, and the aboriginal people on the Borderlands were anxiously awaiting the salvation of the imperial court, so virtuous administration could turn the country into one family and “turn those in the remotest corner into common households.” To achieve this goal, he spared no effort to manage the Borderlands, even “exhausting the treasury” (Liu et al., 1975, 2940). Due to the active border management drive, the Borderland barbarians came to pledge allegiance to the Tang court from Zhenguan years to Kaiyuan years. The Tang court set up numerous jimi prefectures on the Borderland. In the heyday, it mainly had 856 jimi prefectures and counties under six protectorates in the border area, including Anbei, Dayu, Anxi, Beiting, Andong, and Annan (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1119). The jurisdiction was very wide. The active Borderland management in the early Tang Dynasty was of great significance to the formation of China’s borders. It also reflected that some emperors of the Tang Dynasty represented by Taizong had an enlightened consciousness of cherishing the Borderland areas and treating barbarians kindly. However, it was difficult for the overly generous practice of exhausting government treasury to manage the Borderland area. The shortcomings were revealed in the very beginning. In the first year of Shengong (697), Zhang Jianzhi, the Governor of Shuzhou, submitted a memorial to the imperial court, requesting the abolishment of Yaozhou (based in today’s Yao’an, Yunnan), on the ground that it was ill advised for the imperial court to exhaust its financial resources and burden the people and soldiers for serving the barbarians of Yaozhou,

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which paid no salt or cloth tax or any exotic tribute to the court. He suggested that it was high time the situation be changed (Liu et al., 1975, 2940). The situation described by Zhang Jianzhi was widespread in border areas. In Borderland management, the Tang Dynasty lacked understanding of the complexity of the Borderland barbarians and the preparations needed to handle the volatile Borderland situation. After the An-Shi Rebellion, the Borderland situation changed drastically. Some border areas even separated from the imperial court, and caused its full retrogress in Borderland management, partially because of the reasons mentioned above. In its early days, the early Tang Dynasty followed the previous tradition of valuing border passages. It attached great importance to the Qingxiguan Road (the original Lingguan Road), the Shimenguan Road (the original Wuchi Road), and the road from Xi’er River to Tintu (the section from Erhai Lake to the west of the original Shu-India Road) and Anning-Jiaozhou Road (the original Jinsangguan Road). Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road were not only part of the Shu-India Road, but also the main channel connecting the Tang Dynasty to the present Yunnan-Guizhou area. In the Tang Dynasty, Gao Shi said: “Although Jiannan consists of Dongchuan and Xichuan, it is actually one road, extending from Qiongguan, Li, and Ya, to the barbarian land of the south” (Liu et al., 1975, 3329). In the Tianbao years, Xianyu Zhongtong and Li Mi both took Qingxiguan Road as the first choice for entering the Yunnan-Guizhou region. During the Eastern Jin Dynasty, northeastern Yunnan was destroyed by the war of large tribes and Shimenguan Road took on the tendency for decline. In the Tang Dynasty, the strategic importance of Jiaozhou (based in present-day Hanoi, Vietnam) steadily increased, and the imperial court also attached great importance to the road leading from it to the north. Since the Han Dynasty, Jiaozhou had become an important international trading port, “and all imperial tributes must go through its road” (Liu et al., 1975, 1750). As the Tang Dynasty strengthened the management of the present Yunnan-Guizhou region and the China-Indochina Peninsula, the water route between the hinterland and Jiaozhou could not meet the needs alone, and the court began actively expanding the land route from Jiaozhou to the north. In the 13th year of Zhenguan



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(639), Hou Hongren, a native of Yuzhou, found a southward path from east Sichuan to Jiaozhou in the west of Lingnan, under protection of the Tang troops (Sima, 1956, 6148). The route was not made an official road in the end probably because of the difficult and dangerous passage. In the fourth year of Tianbao (745), the Tang Dynasty planned to open the Butou Road by extending the Anning-Jiaozhou Road to Sichuan.8 Zhu Lingqian, the Military Governor of Yuexi took orders to build a city in Anning. However, the undertaking aroused suspicion from the Cuan Clan in eastern Yunnan, and the Cuan Clan killed Zhu Lingqian and destroyed Anning City.9 When Emperor Xuanzong ordered Nanzhao to launch an expedition against the Cuan’s, Nanzhao took the opportunity and occupied eastern Yunnan. Later, its conflicts with the Tang Dynasty intensified, and the plan to build Butou Road was thus shelved. Even so, the Tang Dynasty still connected the Xi’erhe-Tintu Road to Anning-Jiaozhou Road. This road, called “Annan-Tintu Road” at the time, became one the seven main roads for accessing the Borderland barbarians in the Tang Dynasty. Jia Dan, the Prime Minister of Zhenyuan Reign, described the direction of his path: from Jiaozhou to Kunming via present-day Hekou, Pingbian, Mengzi, Jianshui, Tonghai and Jinning, to the Ancient City of Anning and to Zhuge Liang City in today’s southeast of Tengchong via Baoshan. There it forked in two directions. One led to Kamarupa in now western Assam, India, through the Kingdom of Piao and the other to the same destination via Lishui City to the south of present-day Myitkyina, Burma, and the Kingdom of Daqin Brahman. The Tang court also established some post stations along the way (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1151). After Nanzhao established a separatist regime in Yunnan, about 30% of the elite troops 8 The road was so named because it passed Butou (now Jianshui, Yunnan) 9 According to the “Stele on Acculturation of Nanzhao with Virtue”: Cuan Guiwang, the governor of Nanning Prefecture (government seat in now Qujing), killed Zhu Lingqian, together with Kunzhou (government seat in now Kunming) Governor Cuan Rijin, Lizhou (government seat in now Huaning) Governor Cuan Qi, Qiuzhou (government seat in now Yuxi) Prefect Cuan Shouyi, the Great Ghost Chief of Nanning Prefecture Cuan Chongdao. They were native officials of Jimi prefectures in the south and northeast of Yunnan. This suggests that the above areas were inevitable for the Butou Road to lead north, agitating the local Cuan clans.Cf. Wang Ningsheng, “Yunnan Archaeology”, 154 for the above stele inscription.

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were stationed in Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan), which was on the route of Xi’erhe-Tintu Road (Fan, 1985, 237), indicating the importance of the road and reflecting the emphasis placed on it in the early Tang Dynasty. Another geopolitics-related move made by the Tang Dynasty to manage the present Yunnan-Guizhou region was to abide by the tradition of placing it under the jurisdiction of Sichuan, and to control it via Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road. In the first year of Wude (618), Nanning Prefecture was established, and was successively changed to Nanning General Administration Command and Nanning Protectorate (based in today’s Qujing) later. The Qianwei Prefecture established in the Sui Dynasty was changed to Rongzhou Prefecture, and Rongzhou Protectorate was later established (based in today’s Yibin, Sichuan) (Liu et al., 1975, 1692). In the first year of Zhenguan (627), the Tang court divided the whole country into ten circuits. Most of the Yunnan-Guizhou area was placed under the jurisdiction of Jiannan Circuit (based in today’s Chengdu), while the southeastern part was placed under the jurisdiction of Lingnan Circuit (based in today’s Guangzhou). In the 21st year of Kaiyuan (733), it divided the world into fifteen circuits, including the Jiannan and Lingnan circuits. The jurisdiction of the present-day Yungui region was roughly the same as that of the Zhenguan period (Liu et al., 1975, 1384). Relying on the Nanning Protectorate and Rongzhou Protectorate, the Tang court gradually extended its rule in Yunnan-Guizhou region from northeastern and eastern Yunnan to western Yunnan. In the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648), the Tang court ordered its general Liang Jianfang to quell the Songwai Rebellion with the Ba and Shu soldiers, killing and capturing more than 100,000 people, and reopening the Shu-India Road. In the second year of Yonghui (651), Emperor Xiaozu of Zhao led troops to suppress the Baishui Barbarians of Langzhou (in the vicinity of present-day Kunming to Dali) (Sima, 1956, 6255, 6275; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6315). Those two wars cleared the obstacles to the management of western Yunnan. In the first year of Linde (664), the Tang court established the Yaozhou Protectorate (based in today’s Yao’an, Yunnan) (Liu et al., 1975, 85), and placed jimi prefectures under its jurisdiction (Liu et al., 1975, 2941), covering the present-day western Yunnan and northeastern



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Burma; those under the jurisdiction of Yaozhou Prefecture extended to present-day Tengchong in the west.10 After the rise of Nanzhao, Yaozhou Protectorate was regarded as a thorn in the flesh. When it broke with Tang, it first captured Yaozhou City, its governing seat, and seized the 32 jimi prefectures under its jurisdiction (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6271). Therefore, it can be seen how strategically important Yaozhou Protectorate was. In its early period, the Tang Dynasty extended the area under its rule from northeast Yunnan to west Yunnan, and influenced the geopolitical relations of Yunnan-Guizhou region. Another factor that led to the change of the geopolitical relations in the Yunnan-Guizhou region was the establishment and important roles of Annan Protectorate. In the fifth year of Wude (622), the Tang Dynasty changed Cochin to Jiaozhou General Administration Command, and later to Annan Protectorate (based in present-day Hanoi, Vietnam) (Liu et al., 1975, 1749). Annan Protectorate and Yaozhou Protectorate were located at the north and south ends of the Annan-Tintu Road, and were important towns for supervising and restraining the present YunnanGuizhou region. In the 9th year (750) and 13th year of Tianbao, the Tang troops in Annan went northward along Anning-Jiaozhou Road twice, to outflank Nanzhao with the Tang troops in Sichuan. In the early Xiantong Reign, Nanzhao captured Annan, and Emperor Yizong issued a decree to divide Lingnan into the east and west circuit, ushering in the separate governance of Guangxi and Guangdong. In the fourth year of Xiantong (863), Nanzhao seized Annan again. The Tang Dynasty set up Xingjiaozhou in Hepu, Guangxi, and later restored Annan Protectorate. Annan was recovered in the seventh year, and the 10 Liu Xu et al.., Old Book of Tang, Vol. 91, “Biography of Zhang Jianzhi”, 2941. In the early years of Shengong, Shuzhou Military Governor Zhang Jianzhi submitted an imperial memorial and requested the abolishment of Yaozhou Prefecture, mentioning that the Yaozhou Protectorate governed 57 jimi prefectures and counties but not specifying their names or location. According to New Book of Tang, Vol 43 (2), “Geography (7:2)”, 1142, the 13 jimi prefectures were roughly in the vicinity of present-day Chuxiong to Dali in Yunnan. According to History of Yuan, Vol. 61, “Geography (4)”, 1480, Tengchong sub-prefecture is “a jimi prefecture established in Tang Dynasty.” Therefore, Tengchong was one of the jimi prefectures under the jurisdiction of Yaozhou Protecture. The record also mentioned that there were no jimi prefectures to its west. Therefore, it can be inferred that Tengchong was the westernmost point of the jurisdiction for Yaozhou Protectorate.

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Tang Dynasty added Jinghai Military Governor to strengthen garrison (Liu et al., 1975, 652; Sima, 1956, 8098–8117).This suggests that great importance was attached to the Annan Protectorate. In the middle of the 7th century, the Tubo Kingdom rose on the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau and threatened the rule of the Tang Dynasty after it moved south to the Erhai area. The initial countermeasure of the Tang court was to send troops to drive them away. In the first year of Jinglong (707), it sent Tang Jiuzheng to conquer the forces of the Tubo Kingdom that entered western Yunnan, and demolished the cable bridge and castle (Liu et al., 1975, 144; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6081). After the Tang army withdrew, the Tubo Kingdom made a comeback. After the first year of Jingyun (710), it once controlled the section of Qingxiguan Road south of Zhangzhou, causing it to be blocked for years.11 The Tang court changed the strategy and began to support Mengshezhao that had a closer relationship with Tang. Nanzhao (Mengshezhao) lived up to its expectations, unified the tribes of Erhai and drove the forces of the Tubo Kingdom out of this area. Later, Nanzhao steadily gained influence, and the Tang court lacked a comprehensive response to this. Zhang Qiantuo, the governor of Yaozhou Prefecture, prepared the arsenal, enhanced drilling, and doubled the taxes to weaken Nanzhao. Nanzhao remonstrated to the Tang court about this exorbitance but was dismissed, so it launched a preemptive attack and seized Yaozhou. Nanzhao knew that it had made a grave mistake, and wrote to the court requesting to amend its ways. Yang Guozhong, who held sway in the imperial court, made a hasty decision to send troops to suppress Nanzhao, thus losing the opportunity to conquer Nanzhao with coercion and placation. The Tang army failed in all three campaigns (Wang, 1980, 154; Fang, 2007). The outbreak of the An-Shi Rebellion in the following year made it impossible for the Tang court to handle affairs of the west. So Nanzhao seized Yunnan and formed an alliance with the Tubo Kingdom. 11 Sima Guang, History as a Mirror, Vol. 210, “Records of Tang” (26), the 12th month of the 1st year of Jingyun, 6661; According to New Book of Tang, Vol. 216, “Tubo (1)”, 6081, Tang Jiuzheng had led troops to suppress the rebelling barbarians of Yaozhou after Li Zhigu’s expedition there. It shouldn’t be accurate. So, the record of History as a Mirror is followed in the book.



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Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom joined forces and seized Xizhou Protectorate (based in today’s Xichang), and extended their influence to the south bank of the Dadu River. Nanzhao also conquered Xunchuan (now Dehong, Yunnan and northwestern Burma), and chose the place to establish a city (Wang, 1980, 154). The area under the jurisdiction of Nanzhao in its heyday included present-day Yunnan Province, present-day Xichang area south of Dadu River, present-day western Guizhou and northern China-Indochina Peninsula. Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom jointly attacked the Tang repeatedly, killing and looting wherever they went. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Nanzhao once again submitted to the Tang Dynasty. After the death of its king Yimou Xun, Nanzhao resumed its former ways and enhanced plundering of the Tang land. In the first year of Guangming (880), the Tang court discussed peace-keeping marriage with Nanzhao. Prime Minister Lu Xie and Dou Luzhuo recalled that “Since Xiantong Reign, Nanzhao had captured Annan and Yongzhou (based in today’s Nanning, Guangxi), once reached central Guizhou (based in today’s Pengshui, Chongqing), and attacked Xichuan (in Sichuan) four times. During its invasion, most of the rents and taxes of those areas were not paid to the imperial court, and the imperial court’s treasury was thus exhausted” (Sima, 1956, 8227). With the collusion of Nanzhao, the Tubo Kingdom succeeded in all its attacks against the Tang Dynasty, changing the geopolitical structure of its western territory. People at that time regarded Nanzhao, the Tubo Kingdom and Uyghur as the three major scourges. In the 3rd year of Zhenyuan (787), the courtier Li Mi suggested to Emperor Dezong that “soliciting the allegiance of Yunnan is to cut off the right arm of the Tubo Kingdom” (Sima, 1956, 7505). Back then, Nanzhao was also suffering tremendously from the Tubo Kingdom oppression, and the Tang Dynasty responded to Nanzhao’s request for peace. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Nanzhao King Yimou Xun accepted the golden seal given by the Tang envoy (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6274), and the friendly relationship between the two parties was restored. Later, Nanzhao joined the Tang army to fight back against the Tubo Kingdom and chased its army to the north of the Dadu River. “The Tubo Kingdom was outflanked by Tang and Nanzhao, but dared not to covet Nanzhao.” The Tubo Kingdom hated Nanzhao for cooperating with the Tang Dynasty

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for self enhancement, and called it “the vacillating barbarian” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6277). The cooperation between Nanzhao and Tang presented a gratifying picture, but the Tang court and relevant officials failed to learn their lesson and never considered the possibility that the cooperation might break down again. Thus, they lacked the necessary vigilance. Therefore, another failure ensued.

3.3  In the 36 years after the fall of Nanzhao, the Yunnan-Guizhou region experienced the three brief regimes of Changhe, Tianxing, and Yining. In the second year of Tianfu in the later Jin Dynasty (937), Duan Siping, the Military Governor of Tonghai established the Dali Kingdom, and gradually stabilized the political situation in Yunnan-Guizhou region. Dali ruled for 317 years, and its jurisdiction was roughly the same as Nanzhao in the early period. However, later the area under its effective control was restricted to the vicinity from Erhai Lake to Dianchi Lake, and most of the rest areas were divided by other forces. It existed in roughly the same time as the Song Dynasty. The Song Dynasty had to confront the Liao, Xixia, Jin and Mongolia in the north. In the fierce competition with the northern tribes, it was a dynasty with no political, military and geographical advantages, and was repeatedly defeated in wars and forced to seek peace with ransom. The severe situation and the humiliating mentality faced in border defense had an impact that could not be ignored on its management of the southern Borderland. The geopolitical structure of the southwestern Borderland regions also changed, mainly because Jiaozhou officially broke away from the rule of the Central Plains dynasty in the Song Dynasty following the  separatist regime built by Qu Chengmei in the Five Dynasties. In the sixth year of Qiande (968), the Ding Buling annexed the major regimes of Jiaozhou and established the Major Quyue Kingdom. In the sixth year of Kaibao (973), he sent his envoys to pay tribute to the Song Dynasty, and his son Ding Lian was named by Emperor Taizu of Song as the protector of Annan and King of Cochin (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14058). In the 5th year of Taiping Xingguo (980), Ding Lian and his father died



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one after another. Hou Renbao, the Prefect of Yongzhou, suggested attacking their kingdom with an army, and Emperor Taizong agreed. The following year, the Song army was defeated,12 and the Northern Song Dynasty took Annan as a feudal vassal in accordance with its previous practice. The Southern Song Dynasty inherited this situation. In the first year of Chunxi (1174), Daquyue Kingdom came to the imperial court to pay tribute, and was given the name “Annan” by Emperor Xiaozong (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14071). After Annan became independent, the southern part of Guangxi became the front line along the border. In order to guard against Annan and increase taxes, the Song Dynasty attached great importance to Guangxi. After the suppression of the Nong Zhigao Uprising, the Northern Song court instated an Administrative and Placation Commissioner in Guizhou (based in today’s Guilin, Guangxi), and make Guizhou a “powerful prefecture in the West” (Zhou, 1999, 42). Yongzhou (based in today’s Nanning, Guangxi) was close to Annan and Dali and was also valued in the Southern Song Dynasty. The road from Guizhou to Yongzhou became an important passage in Guangxi, and the Southern Song Dynasty set up 18 post stations along the way (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10680). The Song Dynasty had to cope with powerful enemies in the north, and for a long time was overwhelmed. In governing the borders, it also deliberated the pros and cons, and was influenced by the strategy of “focusing on defense of the center and ignoring the Borderlands.” Meanwhile, it believed that “the Tang Dynasty was overthrown by the rebellion of Huang Chao, but the disaster fomented in Guilin much earlier” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6295), that is, Although the Tang Dynasty was destroyed by the Huangchao Uprising, the cause was a mutiny launched by Guilin guards to defend Nanzhao. Therefore, it made the Dadu River a demarcation for Dali. The Song Dynasty’s policy towards Dali began with Emperor Taizu Zhao Kuangyin. In the third year of Qiande (965), the Song general Wang Quanbin presented relevant maps for taking Yunnan after pacifying Later Shu. Wary that “in the Tang Dynasty, Tianbao Disaster originated in Nanzhao, Taizu indicated with 12 [Ming Dynasty] Chen Bangzhan, Ins and Outs of History of Song, Vol. 15, “Revolution in Jiaozhou”.

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a jade axe area to the west of the Dadu River and said ‘areas beyond this are not mine to have’ ” (Bi, 1992, 43). The Southern Song Dynasty inherited this established policy. In the 6th year of Shaoxing (1136), Imperial Academician Zhu Zhen said that “Dali Kingdom was originally known as Nanzhao in Tang Dynasty. It invaded, attacked the Tang territory many times and caused national turmoil. Emperor Taizu drew lessons from the disaster of the Tang Dynasty, and took the Dadu River as the boundary, making it impossible for the Dali Kingdom “to invade or surrender”, a most effective strategy for keeping the barbarians away.”13 In the 26th year, Emperor Gaozong said to his ministers that Nanzhao had repeatedly invaded Sichuan in the Tang Dynasty, “so (Emperor Taizu of Song) made the Dadu River as the demarcation, and curbed its tendency for rampant violence” (Xu, 1957). Dali Kingdom actively paid tribute to the Song court, hoping to establish friendly relationship with the Song Dynasty. After the Shu surrendered to the Song Dynasty, it sent an envoy to Chengdu to offer congratulations. In the first year of Kaibao (968), it sent an envoy to Lizhou (now Hanyuan, Sichuan) to deliver the instruments, expressing the hope to pay tribute to Song (Li, 1980, 228). In the seventh year of Taiping Xingguo (982), Emperor Taizu issued a decree to the garrison chief of Lizhou to build a big ship on the Dadu River to facilitate the tribute of Dali (Li, 1980, 515). Later, the number of tributes from Dali Kingdom gradually increased. The Northern Song Dynasty also set up trade fairs in Lizhou and Yazhou (now Ya’an, Sichuan) to buy horses from Dali merchants; the horse trade once reached such scale that residents of Qiongbuchuan (today’s Yuexi County, Sichuan) “relied on it for subsistence” (Li, 1980, 3736). In the 7th year of Zhenghe (1117), the Dali Kingdom came to the Song court to pay tribute again, and the Song court named Duanhe the Military Governor of Yunnan Province and the King of Dali (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14073). However, the Northern Song Dynasty restricted its relationship with Dali Kingdom to buying horses. In the last years of the Zhenghe period, a memorial was

13 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, citing Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom”.



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submitted, requesting the establishment of cities beyond the Dadu River to facilitate trade. When Emperor Huizong sought the counsel of Yuwen Chang, who said that since Emperor Taizu designated the Dadu River as the boundary, the Middle China was spared of border scourge for 150 years and that a new city beyond the Dadu River would not be a blessing for the Song Dynasty. The proposal for building a city was thus shelved (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 11149). In the 2nd year of Xuanhe (1120), the Song Dynasty made an appointment with Jin to attack Liao together, and the situation in the north was tensed. Huang Lin, the Surveillance Commissioner of Guangzhou, was convicted for introducing Dali into the court to pay tribute. The relationship between Dali and the Northern Song Dynasty was obviously estranged, and people occasionally went to Lizhou for trade (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14073). After being forced to the south, the Song court grew even more wary of Dali, and even regarded it as a foreign state, on a par with Cochin, Champa, Kmir and Puli. It is said that Dali and the above-mentioned countries had habitually paid tribute one after another. The response of the Southern Song Dynasty were “no rejection when they came to submit themselves and no chasing after them when they defected. Since their land adjoined with that of the Middle Kingdom, they sometimes invade the latter. As this occurred, they were punished, and forgiven when they surrendered. Brutal force was never the choice” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 2813, 13981). On the other hand, due to the scarcity of war horses, the Southern Song Dynasty set up a horse-purchasing division in Yongzhou (now Nanning, Guangxi), for purchase of horses from barbarian tribes in Dali, Luodian and Ziqi Zhuman. In the third year of Shaoxing (1133), the Guangxi government reported that Dali Kingdom requested to pay tribute. Emperor Gaozong “instructed his ministers to permit them to sell horses and not to pay tribute” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4565), and ordered that all dealings with Dali Kingdom should be restricted to horse purchase. In the Xianchun Reign, Yongzhou Prefect Ma Ji tried his best to distance himself from Dali, and prevented its merchants from Shanchan (in today’s Kunming city), let alone Guangxi (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 13270). By this time, the communication between Dali Kingdom and the Southern Song Dynasty had virtually been cut off.

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In the Song Dynasty, Dali was regarded as the foreign domain, so Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road were abandoned. Since Nanzhao, the Shimenguan Road gradually declined and connection between the Yunnan-Guizhou area and Sichuan was mainly through the Qingxiguan Road. In the 6th year of Xining (1073), Sichuan businessman Yang Zuo responded to the ad of the Chengdu government and went to Dali to discuss horse purchase. Yang Zuo and his entourage made full preparations and took the Tongshanzhai Road of Qingxiguan Road, finding their way by the bean clusters from seeds leaked out of the sacks of preceding travelers. There was no one to be seen all along the way and a single valley usually took an entire day until the right path was found. About 150 miles to the city of Yangjumie, they began to see mountain-dwelling farmers who claimed to have come in the reign of Huangyou because of hunger. “Now our hair has become hoary and we never expected to see a fellow countryman” (Yang, 1980, 6539). The Qingxiguan Road was deserted to such extent. In the 4th year of Shaoding (1231), Dali Kingdom requested the Southern Song Dynasty to reopen Qingxiguan Road in order to facilitate its payment of tribute. The long-term decline of Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road gradually distanced the current Yunnan-Guizhou region from Sichuan and laid the groundwork for the Yuan Dynasty to establish the Yunnan Province as an independent province of Sichuan. Southern Song court established the Horse Purchase Division in Yongzhou and a horse trade fair in Hengshan Village (in today’s Tiandong, Guangxi). Merchants from Dali, Ziqi, Luodian and other tribes came one after another, and gradually led to the formation of the line of communication called “Yongzhou Road.” The road extended from Shanchan (in present-day Kunming) to Yongzhou via Ziqi (center in present-day Xingyi, Guizhou) or Luo Dian (in present-day western Guizhou) (Zhou, 1999, 122). The purchased horses were screened and graded in Yongzhou, and then transported to various parts of the Southern Song Dynasty via Guizhou (now Guilin, Guangxi). The horse trade between Dali Kingdom and the Southern Song Dynasty was once prosperous, and Yongzhou became a lively commodity distribution center. Zhou Qufei of the Song Dynasty said that “for the imperial court, the horse trade was exclusively conducted in Yongzhou;



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by and by, the exotics and rarities of the Borderlands were gathered there” (Zhou, 1999, 47). In the mid and late Southern Song Dynasty, the Guangxi government imposed a lot of restrictions on the horse merchants of Dali, and gradually travelers on Yongzhou Road decreased. Sometimes, “Dali (merchants) dared not to go beyond Shanchan” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 13270). Compared to the Tang Dynasty, the situation in the YunnanGuizhou region also changed. Before the Tianbao War, Songwai barbarians, living in the area from Erhai Lake to Dianchi Lake, planted rice, wheat, millet, beans and other food crops, as well as green onions, leeks, garlic, leek flowers and other vegetables, “according to the same seasonal arrangement as the Middle Kingdom” (Du, 1988, 5067). It was said that from the south of Quzhou (based in present-day Zhaotong, Yunnan Province) to the west of Dianchi Lake, “the locals were exclusive engaged in planting paddy fields”, indicating agricultural production were contiguous in the area. The livestock industry of Quzhou to Xuancheng (now southeastern Yunnan) was also well developed, “with multiple villages, whose cattle and horses are scattered all over the area.” After the rise of Nanzhao, the Erhai area witnessed rapid development, and there was a stretch of 30 li of high-yield farmland. “Irrigated with spring, the farmland was free from the impacts of floods and droughts” (Fan, 1985, 256–257). After annexing Eastern Yunnan, Nanzhao coerced the Baiman of the Cuan Clan with force, and relocated more than 200,000 households from Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan) to Longhe (now south of Lufeng, Yunnan), promoting the development of Longhe; however, the present-day northeast Yunnan became “empty as if ravaged by war” due to the large migration of population (Fan, 1985, 129). Thanks to the active operation of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom, western Yunnan with Erhai as the center witnessed rapid economic growth, and the social and economic center of the Yunnan-Guizhou region gradually shifted from the east to the west. The economy of Nanzhao was dominated by slavery, and required a large supply of labors. Nanzhao invaded into the Tang territory many times, and an important purpose was to acquire population. Nanzhao attacked and occupied Xizhou (based in today’s Xichang), and looted children and precious goods extending for “100 li”. Due to repeated

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looting and destruction by Nanzhao, the area from south of Chengdu to north of Yuexu had “800 li of deserted land, devoid of people and livestock” (Sun, 1983, 8334). After the establishment of Dali Kingdom, the economically better developed areas gradually entered the feudal society featuring feudal lords, gradually ceasing the foreign plundering wars and ushering in a period of relatively peaceful development. Dali Kingdom attached great importance to the exchanges with countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula and the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent. In the Northern Song Dynasty, Yang Zuo and others went to Dali to discuss horse purchases. There was a milestone stele in front of the Yunnan Post Station (now Xiangyun County, Yunnan). Engraved on there is the road to Rongzhou in the east, India in the west, Cochin in the southeast, Chengdu in the northeast, the Daxue Mountain in the north, the sea in the south, all in great detail (Yang, 1980, 6539). The road to India in the west, Cochin in the southeast, and the sea in the south all led to the China-Indochina Peninsula. Among them, first one was the Xi’erhe-Tintu Road in the Tang Dynasty; the second one was the Anning-Jiaozhou Road; the third one was water and land route from the present-day Burma to the Andaman Sea along the Irrawaddy River. Through the above-mentioned roads, Dali Kingdom had frequent exchanges with the China-Indochina Peninsula and the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. In the second year of Chongning (1103) in the Song Dynasty, the “Burmese, Persian, and Kunlun people” paid a tribute of white elephants and incense to Dali Kingdom. Among them, the Burmese lived in northern Burma, Persian refers to present-day Pathein, Burma; Kunlun is now Nasirin, Burma (Ni, 1990, 269). A trip of five days from Dali Kingdom led to Bagan (in present-day northern Burma), or westward to West Tintu. Wangshe City (in present-day Bihar State, India), Tintu Kingdom, and Central India were well-known Western countries, and the journey from Dali Kingdom to Wangshe City took only 40 days (Zhou, 1999, 108). Because Dali Kingdom had many connections with the countries of the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinents, Guo Songnian from the early Yuan Dynasty believed that Dali Kingdom advocated Buddhism so much that each household had a Buddhist temple, because “(Dali) people were close to Tintu” (Guo, 1986, 22).



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Despite non-governmental trade relations, Dali Kingdom and Annan had little official contact. In the 7th year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1014), the two were suddenly entangled in a dispute. Dali Kingdom dispatched 200,000 troops to attack Annan and was defeated by Annan, whose king, Li Gongyun, sent envoys to the Song court to “report the victory.”14 Afterwards, the two parties resumed their original relationship. The Song Dynasty took Annan and Dali as foreign feudal vassals. It was on peaceful terms with them, but its relationship with them was rather aloof. The roads from China-Indochina Peninsula and overseas countries via Annan and Dali were impassable, adversely affecting the normal communication of those areas with the Song Dynasty. According to History of Song: Biography of Foreign Countries, the connection of Champa, Kmir and Bagan with the Song court significantly reduced, and in most cases tributes were paid to Song court by sea, without going through Yunnan. Previously, the Burmese region had frequent exchanges with the Central Plains dynasty. In the record of History of Song: Biography of Foreign Countries, the part involving Bagan, which is now northern Burma, had fewer than 100 words. And only one instance of its tributes to the Song court—in the 5th year of Chonging was recorded, without mentioning the specific route (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14087). The alienation of the relations also had an impact on the geopolitical relations in the Yunnan-Guizhou region. To sum up, it can be said that the geopolitical relations of in the Borderlands of ancient China have some characteristics that are different from their modern Western counterparts. The governance and management of the Borderlands in the China’s imperial history, including the thoughts and practices, is an important influencing factor. In addition, attention should also be paid to the status and evolution of the following elements in the border areas in various periods: internal and external communication lines, core areas, important cities and regional administrative centers, migration and distribution of immigrants,

14 Tuotuo et al., History of Song, Vol. 8, “Emperor Zhenzong”, 156. [Ruan Dynasty of Vietnam] Pan Qingjian, et al., Texts and Explanations of the Complete Mirror of the History of Vietnam, Vol. 3, for related textual research, cf. Fang Tie, A General History of the Southwest, 386.

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socio-economic development and historical management priorities, borders and relations with the surrounding areas, major Borderland events and the response of the rulers. Examination of the changes in the geopolitical relations of the Yunnan-Guizhou region from the perspective of border governance in imperial China can be roughly divided into two periods, with the late Song Dynasty and early Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation. In the first period, the present Yunnan-Guizhou area was roughly under the Sichuan administrative region. The communication lines connecting it to the hinterland areas, the political, economic and cultural influences on it, and the sources of immigrants were all closely related to Sichuan. After the Yuan Dynasty pacified Dali Kingdom and established Yunnan Province, Yunnan Province became a separate province, independent of the Sichuan administrative region. It also established direct connections with the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and beyond through the post roads passing through eastern and northeastern Yunnan, whose economic and cultural factors, and population entered the Yunnan-Guizhou region in large numbers, exerting a profound impact for centuries. The present Yunnan-Guizhou region had been dependent on the Sichuan region for a long time, and the parts of it that were developed earlier and effectively rules by the Han and Jin dynasties were mainly present-day northeastern Yunnan and Dianchi area. Since the early Tang Dynasty, the focus of management gradually shifted to western Yunnan. After the rule of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom for more than 500 years, the Yunnan-Guizhou region roughly completed partial unification, and the central regions became connected to each other due to relatively better development and similar conditions. The late Song Dynasty and early Yuan Dynasty was also the demarcation point in the economic development of Yunnan-Guizhou region in different periods. In imperial China, the Central Plains monarch focused on the north, while relatively neglecting the southwestern Borderland including the present Yunnan-Guizhou area, adversely affecting its development. The changes in the situation in the northern part of the ChinaIndochina Peninsula also affected the geopolitical relations in the present-day Yunnan-Guizhou region today. Before the Five Dynasties,



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Jiaozhou was a strategically important town there. The establishment of Annan as a kingdom had a great influence on the geopolitical relations in the Yunnan-Guizhou region. The changes in the geopolitical situation in the Yunnan-Guizhou region also affected the relations between China and countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula.

4.  The Geopolitics of Yunnan-Guizhou Region and the Administration of Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties The Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties marked the second half of the management of the Yunnan-Guizhou Region. The Yuan Dynasty lasted 97 years. From Kublai Khan’s pacification of Dali to the establishment of the Ming rule, Yunnan-Guizhou Region was under its management for 128 years. In the Yuan Dynasty, the geopolitics of the region underwent major changes. The ensuing Ming and Qing dynasties generally inherited the new pattern formed in the Yuan Dynasty, with certain changes in some aspects.

4.1  Back in the time of the Mongolia Kingdom, Guo Baoyu suggested that Genghis Khan make a detour of the Southern Song Dynasty to attack Dali, to seize its material and manpower for outflanking the Southern Song Dynasty (Song et al., 1976, 3521). Möngke carried out this bold scheme. In the second year of Emperor Xianzong (1252), Kublai Khan was ordered to lead ten thousand soldiers to maneuver to the northwest to attack Dali. After the capture of Dali, General Uriyangkhadai swept across Guangxi with his cavalry and the Yunnan native army and reached Tanzhou (now Changsha, Hunan) (Song et al., 1976, 2981). Thus the original strategic vision was generally realized. The southwestern tribes were brave and tough and made ideal soldiers, while Yunnan was rich in natural resources, and close to Annan and Burma. Those left a deep impression on the Mongolian court. The Mongolian army pacified the Dali Kingdom and curbed the gradual marginalization of the Yunnan-Guizhou Region since the Song Dynasty, playing a significant role in consolidating China’s southwestern territory.

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The Mongolian Yuan had the ambition to unify the entire China, and its monarchs were bent on external expansion. While Kublai Khan managed the Han land, the four khanates successively occupied the areas beyond the northern border. Kublai then focused his outward expansion on other border areas, especially the southwest. The tendency of the Central Plains dynasty to emphasize the north over the south was not obvious in the Yuan Dynasty.15 The Mongolian Yuan also rarely had the concept of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians in the periphery.” Therefore, the Yuan rulers regarded as a base for outward expansion. The Yuan court not only focused on operating the present Yunnan-Guizhou Region, but also implemented governance policies similar to those in the hinterland. According to History of Yuan: Geography (1), jimi prefectures (of Yunnan and other places) established in the Tang Dynasty were mostly located there; now taxes and levies are imposed, on a par with the hinterland (Song et al., 1976, 1346). The emphasis on and active management of the current Yun-Gui Region were never seen in preceding generations. Kublai also developed a Yunnan complex. In the fourth year of Zhiyuan (1267), Kublai Khan named his fifth son, Hugeci, as the King of Yunnan, and dispatched him there to guard it. Before Hugeci left for Yunnan, Kublai told him that “Dali Kingdom was pacified by me personally, and I love its customs and folklore. But now, I have to concentrate on the Khanate, so I trusting it to you. When you reach there, do make conscious efforts to placate the officials and the people.” In the 18th year, Yunnan tribes rose in rebellion, and his ministers suspected that it was otherwise. Kublai said, “I once managed Yunnan and its affairs are not to be taken lightly.” So he instructed the minister to be dispatched there in person (Tu, 1989; Song et al., 1976, 2958). It is known to the Yuan people that Kublai Khan placed great importance

15 Wang Shixing of the Ming Dynasty said: In the early Ming Dynasty, the court had a full treasury. 7 million taels of silver were allocated to Zheng He for exploring West Oceans. When he returned ten years later, he still had a million taels left. “The reason was that the Ming Dynasty had inherited the hoards of the Yuan Dynasty, which never made preparations for border defense. Hence the large sums of surplus.” [Ming Dynasty] Wang Shixing, Expansion and Annotation of Records, Vol. 1, “Geographic Records”, 5.



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on Yunnan. Yu Ji said: Emperor Taizu had risen from the remote corner and personally handled affairs in Yunnan. He had established prefectures and counties there, “and trusted it to princes aided by his most trustworthy ministers.”16 The practice of sending princes to govern Yunnan was followed by subsequent emperors. According to the statistics in History of Yuan, about 19 Mongolian princes were dispatched to guard Yunnan with the title of “King of Yunnan” and “King of Liang” (Fang, 2003, 498). The number was unmatched in other provinces. Hugeci ruled the Yunnan for several years before being poisoned during an internal strife. Kublai decided to set up a province in Yunnan, and trusted the task to Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, a most trusted minister, after careful deliberation. Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar took office and changed the 19 brigades there to routes, prefectures and counties, with Duan Shi, a member of Dali aristocracy as the General Administrator of Dali. He also replaced military repression with a policy of placation and coercion, easing the sharp social contradictions in Yunnan. In the 11th year of Zhiyuan (1274), Yunnan Province was established, with Zhongqing (in today’s Kunming) as the seat of government. When Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar died a few years later, Kublai Khan ordered the officials of Yunnan Province to abide by his rules (Song et al., 1976, 3066). Yunnan Province was one of the earlier provinces established in the Yuan Dynasty, and its jurisdiction included present-day Yunnan Province, western Guizhou, southwest Sichuan, and northern China-Indochina Peninsula. Its establishment ended the long history of Yunnan-Guizhou Region being under the jurisdiction of Sichuan. In the form of an independent administrative region, it affirmed the partial unification of the Yunnan-Guizhou Region since Nanzhao and Dali. The provinces wielded all the local military and political power, and took charge of everything, including taxation, military affairs, farming, and transportation. It had 37 routes, 5 prefectures, 54 sub-prefectures, and 47 subordinate counties under its jurisdiction, not including the plethora of villages, military and civilian prefectures (Song et al., 1976, 1457). In addition, there were also several 16 [Yuan Dynasty] Yu Ji, Ancient Records of Daoyuan Learning, Vol. 5, “On the Eve of Sending Wen Zifang to Yunnan”.

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Publicity Commissions and Placation Commissions, who were charged with “military and civilian affairs, led by their respective circuits and trusted with county affairs” (Song et al., 1976, 2308). Routes, prefectures, sub-prefectures and counties were joined by Publicity Commissions and Placation Commissions to form a strict management system under the leadership of the province, each with clear-cut duties. There were historical and practical reasons for the Yunnan to break away from the jurisdiction of Sichuan and become a province, and establish direct contact with Dayidu (now Beijing). After more than 500 years of operation under the rule of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom, Yunnan region achieved partial unification and remarkable development. Since the middle and late periods of Nanzhao, its connection with Sichuan was weakened. Judging from the situation in the Yuan Dynasty, Sichuan was the theater for the decisive battle between Mongolia and the Southern Song Dynasty. Decades of wars severely damaged its economy and made the Mongolian Yuan wary of its military and civilians. After being captured, Sichuan was first made part of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Province, but was made a separate province in the 8th year of Zhiyuan (1271). Later, it was merged with Shaanxi Province and separated from it again, while the provincial capital was also switched between Chengdu and Chongqing (Song et al., 1976, 2307, 1423, 139). In terms of annual taxes collected nationwide in the first year of Tianli (1328), Yunnan was leading the country in gold, silver, copper, and iron ore taxes, while the gold tax of Sichuan Province was only a little more than seven taels (Song et al., 1976, 2383–2384). From this we can see that the Yuan court had been wary of Sichuan and Sichuan had declined. With the establishment of Yunnan Province, the administrative center shifted from Erhai Lake to Dianchi Lake. Later, the post road from Zhongqing to Huguang and Dayidu Metropolis was opened, enhancing the connection of Yunnan with the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and the Central Plains. The establishment of Yunnan Province had a significant impact in the province and surrounding areas. In the 13th year of Zhiyuan (1276), Li Weiping and Cen Congwei, barbarian leaders of Zuojiang and Youjiang in Guangxi surrendered and submitted themselves with Yunnan Province, together with more than 80 native officials of jimi



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prefectures established in the Song Dynasty,17 as well as a population of several dozen thousand. Bafan, Luoshi and other kingdoms in today’s Guizhou also surrendered, with 1,626 caves and 101,168 households (Song et al., 1976, 214). In the 15th year of Zhiyuan, Yunnan province solicited the surrender of a dozen thousand barbarians from more than 100 villages in Tonghai, Chuxiong and other places. In the 16th year, the Mongol army arrived in Dehong and the area to the west, and solicited the surrender of more than 110,000 people from 300 villages including Mangmu. In the 29th year, Alu, the son of Huruma, the native official of Jinchi, went to the court for an imperial interview, saying that there were about 200,000 people ready to surrender in the southeastern Borderland and requesting an edict for soliciting their surrender. His wish was granted the governing institutions were established along the border at the request of the local barbarians, including Tongxi Military and Civilian Prefecture, the Command of Mengqing Placation Commission and Jingdong Military and Civilian Prefecture (Song et al., 1976, 200, 1485, 369, 778). The eastward shift of the provincial governing center, and the opening of the post roads from Zhongqing to Huangping via Pu’an (in today’s Guizhou), to Xuzhou (in today’s Yibin) via Wumeng (in today’s Zhaotong), and to Luzhou (now Chongqing) via Wusa (in today’s Weining, Guizhou) brought northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou, which had been damaged by war since the Eastern Jin Dynasty, to the attention from the Yuan court and enabled their development. The Yuan court regarded the above-mentioned areas as “barbarians heartland,” and stationed troops and built farms to control them. It also believed that Wumeng and other places were of strategic importance to Yunnan, and their vast land and farming relics made them the focus of garrison farming (Song et al., 1976, 2558, 2578). In the third year of Yanyou (1316), the Yuan Dynasty sent 6,000 sergeants to farming in Wumeng and other places, and set up the only general administration subprefecture for farming in Yunnan (Song et al., 1976, 574). In the fourth 17 [Yuan Dynasty] Zhao Ziyuan, “Stele on the Virtuous Governance of Premier Sayyid”, [Republic of China] A Newly Compiled General Record of Yunnan, Vol. 92, “Epigraphic Studies”, Vol. 5, 223.

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year of Taiding (1327), the Yuan court appointed Ma Sihu as the prime minister of Yunnan Province and promoted land-reclamation of farming in Wumeng (Song et al., 1976, 677). In Qujing, Wusa, Puding, Bafan Shunyuan (in today’s Guiyang today), the Yuan Dynasty also organized military and civilian farming. Guizhou (based in Guiyang) was strategically important for Yunnan, Sichuan, and Huguang (Song et al., 1976, 1536), so the three provinces competed for jurisdiction over it. As a result, Guizhou sometimes belonged to Yunnan, and sometimes to Huguang or Sichuan. The official offices set up there were dense (Fang, 2003, 522, 530). Compared with the previous dynasty, the southwestern part of the province also featured intensive administration. The Placation Commission set up in this area in the Yuan Dynasty mainly included the Placation Commission of Dali Jinchi (based in today’s Baoshan), which governed Rouyuan Route, Mangshi Route, Zhenkang Route, Zhenxi Route, Pingmian Route and Luchuan Route; the Placation Commission of Yinsha Luodian (based to the north of present-day Lancang, Yunnan), the Placation Commission of Bangya (based to the southwest of Presentday Mandalay, Burma), and the Placation Commission of Lan Na (based in now Chiang Mai, Thailand), the Placation Commission of Mengqing (based in Thailand today). The routes and prefectures established included: Yunyuan Route, Menglian Route, Menglai Route, Taigong Route, Mulian Route, Mengguang Route, Mubang Route, Mengding Route, Mounian Route, Menglong Route, Muduo Route, Mengwu Route Cheli Tribal Command, and Laogao Tribal Command (Song et al., 1976, 1479–1485). The establishment of many government offices in the above areas shows that the Yuan Dynasty intensified its rule over the land and the intensified government was conducive to their development. The Yuan Dynasty attached great importance to the transportation industry in the Yunnan-Guizhou Region, and formed a transportation network with Zhongqing as the center and leading to other provinces or even beyond. The equal emphasis on international channels and provincial channels was a characteristic of the transportation development in today’s Yunnan-Guizhou Region. In the Yuan Dynasty, troops were dispatched to Burma several times, and they successively conquered Jiangtou City (now Jesha), Taigong City (now Rajungong) and



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its capital, Bagan, and set up post stations along the way (Su, 1993, 521; Song et al., 1976, 4657). The Mongolian Yuan also stationed troops in the lower reaches of the Irrawaddy River below Bagan, reaching the south of Pyay in the southernmost tip (Harvey, 1957, 126), and effectively controlled the entire southward road to the sea. In the west, it also set up post stations along the Dali-Tengchong section of the international road to India (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959). In the 12th year of Zhiyuan (1275), the Yuan court set up post stations along the southward road to Cochin, and set up the Annan Circuit Brigadier Command in Shezi (to the east of present-day Mengzi, Yunnan) the following year (Song et al., 1976, 160, 1476). It also opened a new post road to Jinghong, via Kunming, Jingjianshui, Yuanjiang and Simao (Liu, 1991, 393), reaching central China-Indochina Peninsula in the south. As for the important post roads in the province, in addition to those in eastern and northeastern Yunnan mentioned above, there were also the road from Dali to Sichuan via Chahanzhang (now Lijiang, Yunnan), the road from Zhongqing to Yongzhou, the road from Zhongqing to Chengdu via Jiandu (the original Qingxiguan Road). The most important transport artery in the province was the road from Zhongqing to Jinchi via Dali. In the seventh year of Zhiyuan (1270), the Yuan court set up 19 post stations along it (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959; Xiong, 1983, 130). The second characteristic of the transportation in the present-day Yunnan-Guizhou was the establishment of post stations and emphasis on management. In the Yuan Dynasty, stations were set up for all important roads, and regulations formulated on the supplements of station households and horses. According to records, there were 78 post stations in Yunnan (Zhonghua Book Company, 1959), but actually there were more. There were urgent delivery services for documents. Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar set up towns along the post roads and appointed one native official and one centurion for each; those officials were held accountable in the case of travelers being robbed. The use of the post station was preconditioned by possession of a permit, additional copies of which were issued by the imperial court to Yunnan Province many times. After establishment of post stations, the transportation of Yunnan was greatly improved. The imperial court sent troops to Yunnan many times to suppress the uprisings or mutinies,

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with the number of troops reaching hundreds of thousands. The provincial government also allowed people to walk on the post roads. In the 23rd year of Zhiyuan, Nasr al-Din, the prime minister of Yunnan Province, obtained imperial permission for several issues, and one of them was lift the ban on use of roads to facilitate the travels of the people (Song et al., 1976, 288). The society and economy of Yunnan-Guizhou Region also made great progress. Under the leadership of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, the troops and civilians of Yunnan built a water conservancy project in the Dianchi Lake area, reducing the water level of the Dianchi Lake and acquiring more than 10,000 hectares of arable land (Song et al., 1976, 1458). The province also organized the troops and civilians to reclaim wasteland for farming, attaining considerable scales in Wumeng, Zhongqing, Dali, Weichu, Qujing and Lin’an. According to the statistics in History of Yuan, there were 19,149 military and civilian households and 6,000 people that participated in land reclamation for farming, and the area totaled 483,335 mu at least (Song et al., 1976, 2575–2578, 1458–1480; Fang, 2003, 504). The government set up gold or silver fields in some areas. There were 15 gold producing locations in Yunnan, including Weichu, Lijiang and Dali, making it one of the provinces known for gold production locations nationwide. In addition, Weichu, Dali, and Jinchi produced silver; Dali and Chengjiang produced copper; Zhongqing, Dali, Jinchi and Lin’an produced iron. In the fifth year of Taiding (1328), in the amount of mineral taxes Yunnan Province topped the country with 184 ingots for gold tax and 735 ingots for silver tax (Song et al., 1976, 2383–2384). General taxes were also collected in the province, as well as the annual rent taxes (Song et al., 1976, 3069; Fang, 2003, 507). The above situation shows that the Yunnan-Guizhou Region entered a period of relatively rapid development. The Mongolian Yuan Dynasty had considerable trust in the ethnic groups in the Yunnan-Guizhou Region, and formed the native official system on the basis. Native officials were given the right to own land and other resources within a certain range, the protection from the government, and hereditary posts and powers. This way, the imperial court secured the loyalty and service of native officials at all levels, and deepened its rule in areas governed by the native officials. The significance



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of the native official system in terms of geopolitics also lied in ushering in a period in which the central dynasty implemented different governance policies on the barbarians in the northern and southern borders. In the northern grasslands, the Yuan Dynasty inherited the brigadier system featuring control of barbarian households, and adaptation to the nomadic lifestyle of mounting horses for fighting and dismounting horses for animal husbandry. The Yunnan-Guizhou Region had very close ties with other countries beyond the national border. Through the Yunnan-Guizhou Region, the Mongolian Yuan repeatedly launched expedition against Burma, Annan, and Champa (now central Vietnam), and had frequent contacts with the countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula. According to the statistics in History of Yuan and New History of Yuan, the Yuan court sent envoys to Burma 10 times, while Burma sent envoys with tribute to the Yuan court 30 times; Yuan court sent envoys to Annan 44 times, and Annan sent envoys and paid tribute to the Yuan court 63 times. The Yuan Dynasty sent envoys to Champa seven times, and Champa sent envoys with tribute 21 times. The Yuan Dynasty also had more connections with the Kingdom of Lan Na (now Chiang Mai of Thailand) and the Kingdom of Siam (now northern Thailand) (Fang, 2003, 560–563). This suggests that the Yuan Dynasty has basically realized the vision of operating the China-Indochina Peninsula based on the present Yunnan-Guizhou Region, which also had trade exchanges with the present-day India. Marco Polo, who had been to Yunnan in the Zhiyuan Reign, said that “Dali produces fine horses with a powerful and elegant torso and are sold to India” (Polo, 1999, 434). One year of travel from India further led to Tiantang (that is, Mecca in present-day western Saudi Arabia) (Wang Dayuan, 1981, 352). The relationship between the Yunnan-Guizhou Region and Annan changed. When Yunnan was first pacified in the Yuan Dynasty, its communication with Annan was made through the southward road to Cochin. Via the road, Yunnan government or the King of Yunnan managed to negotiate with Annan on behalf of the imperial court. In the 12th year of Zhiyuan (1275), the King of Annan wrote to the Yuan court, requesting to send the regular tributes in the future, one to Shanchan (that is, Zhongqing), and the other to the Central Plains (Song et al., 1976, 4634, 4637;

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Fang, 2003, 558). In the 15th year, Chai Chun, the Minister of Rites, went to Annan, via the road from Jiangling (now Jiangling, Hubei) to Yongzhou on the order of Emperor Shizu. The King of Annan requested sending envoys together with Chai Chun to Shanchan along the original road to pay tribute, but Chai Chun refused im. In the 22nd year, the Yuan court built post stations and deployed garrisons along the road taken by Chai Chun from Yongzhou to Yongping Village (to the southeast of Langshan, Vietnam) to Daluo City (now Hanoi, Vietnam) (Song et al., 1976, 4638). Thus the road became the main post road between Yuan Dynasty and Annan. The relationship between Guangxi and Annan gradually became close, and finally surpassed that between present-day Yunnan-Guizhou Region and Annan.

4.2  The Ming Dynasty ruled for 277 years, during which the geopolitical relations in Yunnan-Guizhou Region also changed. The founder Zhu Yuanzhang and his subsequent emperors abandoned the policy of expanding outward from the previous generations and returned to the tradition of “making the Borderland barbarians the guarding the borders of the four barbarians” practiced by the Central Plains dynasty since the Han Dynasty. In the 16th year of Hongwu (1383), Zhu Yuanzhang sent troops to Yunnan and issued an edict saying that “now that the Middle Kingdom is safe, the Borderland barbarians should be made the guarding fence.”18 In the 22nd year of Jiajing (1543), Emperor Shizong said in an edict that “I also heard that: the virtuous rule is to make the Borderland barbarians the guarding fence. Now, I want longterm peace and stability, and there is no better strategy than that.”19 The Dada and Oirat tribes, who were the Mongolian descendants, frequently attacked by the border, and the people said that “of all the Borderland barbarians, the northern nomads were in urgent need.”20 In

1 8 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 153. 19 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Jiajing in the Reign of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 284. 20 [Ming Dynasty] Yang Yiqing, “General Management Strategies”, Selected Essays on Administration, Vol. 250.



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the Ming Dynasty, the focus of border defense was put on the north, featuring a tendency to value the north over the south. As a statesman with rich political experience, Zhu Yuanzhang also had a deep understanding of the characteristics of the tribes in the Yunnan-Guizhou Region. He said that the barbarians of Yunnan were fickle, frequently rebelling and surrendering, because their land was dangerous and far away, and their people rich and ruthless. “To tame them, leniency must be combined with rigor.”21 In the beginning, the Ming army made smooth progress in its offensive, but later all the tribes get together in rebellion. The pacification took more than ten years, strengthening Zhu Yuanzhang’s view that the Yunnan-Guizhou Region was easy to attack and difficult to defend. As for the countermeasures, Zhu Yuanzhang said that “(The Borderland tribes) did not know etiquette or righteousness. If you satisfy their wish, they shall surrender; otherwise, they rise in rebellion. Therefore, they should not be taken lightly. Just station troops in strategic passes as coercion, and educate them. They shall be qualified citizens a few years later.”22 He also cherished developing Confucian education in the border areas. In the twenty-eighth year (1395), he issued an edict to the Ministry of Rites: All the native officials of the borderland know little about rites, since they are now holding their offices through inheritance. Therefore, the native officials in Yunnan and Sichuan should set up Confucian schools, for educating their children, acquainting them with the emperor-minister and father-son etiquette, and preventing them from violating the rites and participating in struggles.23 Zhu Yuanzhang appointed his adopted son Muying as the General Commander for guarding the Yunnan-Guizhou Region with a large army. According to records in History of Ming, the soldiers under the guard post system of the Ming Dynasty were given hereditary military status, and allowed to bring family members. Because of their sheer number, and self-sufficiency over a long term, they brought about largescale waves of immigration and border reclamation under military 2 1 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 142. 22 History of Ming, Vol. 317, “Chieftains of Guangxi (1)”, 8204. 23 Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Taizu, Vol. 239.

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deployment. The guard posts were mainly stationed in cities and towns, densely populated places and areas along traffic lines. Therefore, the areas featuring rapidly increasing population and cultivated land in Yunnan were mainly the hinterland of the province, areas along the traffic lines, and the county seats. According to Veritable Records of Ming, the Ming court dispatched a total of about 250,000 troops to Yunnan in about ten batches in the middle and late years of Hongwu. Together with the original garrison, there were about 200,000 to 300,000 troops stationed in Yunnan throughout the year. The total population could reach 700,000 to 800,000 when the family members were included. In addition to the troops, some civilians were relocated to Yunnan by the government to operate civilian or commercial farms. According to research (Lu et al., 2006, 1072), in the early Ming Dynasty, the total population of Yunnan was approximately 4 million, and foreign military and civilians accounted for a large proportion24, and exerted influences not to be underestimated. In remote areas inhabited by barbarians, the Ming Dynasty promoted the Chieftain System derived from the Native Official System. In the early Hongwu, when the Yunnan barbarians surrendered, together with the seal and insignia issued by the Yuan Dynasty, they were mostly restored their official posts by the Ming court.25 Later, governance gradually improved, and the responsibilities, inheritance, rewards and punishments of the chieftains were clarified and strictly implemented. This way, the Ming Dynasty established institutionalized management and in-depth rule in the chieftain areas. The hinterland of Yunnan gradually took on appearances of the hinterland. The Ming people said that the five prefectures of Yunnan (based in present-day Kunming), Lin’an (based in present-day Jianshui), Dali, Heqing, and Chuxiong were the hinterland of Yunnan, and their land was quite fertile, while the rest were barren areas constantly troubled with invasion alarms (Wang Shixing, 1981, 127). The residents of 24 [Ming Dynasty] Wang Shixing, Expansion and Annotation of Records, Vol. 5, “Southwestern Provinces”, 127: Sixty to seventy percent of Yunnan Province was inhabited by barbarians, 129: only garrison troops are Han Chinese. The fact of Wang Shixing being an official in Yunnan gave credibility to his words, which can be corroborated with the situation of immigrant troops and civilians mentioned above. 25 History of Ming, Vol. 310, “Biography of Chieftains”, 7982.



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those five prefectures were mainly Han Chinese from outside and the local ethnic groups deeply affected by them. Their economic development and cultural outlook were like the hinterland areas, and some large-scale cities gradually formed. The Ming Dynasty sent centrally appointed officials to manage them. In Wuding, Lijiang, Menghua (now Weishan) and other areas where there were many barbarians and some immigrants, governance was jointly implemented by native officials and centrally appointed ones or mainly by native officials. In border areas where barbarians lived, and where the economic and cultural development lagged behind, because of relatively closed environment, the imperial court appointed chieftains to administer them. For those areas, the influence of the court was still weak; in some cases, they were beyond its reach. This shows that the Ming Dynasty’s management of Yunnan mainly focused on the hinterland, which occupied a dominant position in the social life, and that an apparent gap developed between the hinterland and the borders and remote areas in social development and cultural outlooks. In the 15th year of Hongwu (1382), the Ming Dynasty set up the Administrative Commission of Yunnan (based in present-day Kunming), and placed under its jurisdiction 58 prefectures, 75 sub-prefectures and 55 counties such as Dali, Yongchang, Yao’an, and Chuxiong. In addition, it also established a number of Placation Commissions and Pacification Commissions.26 During the Hongwu years, the Administrative Commission had roughly the same jurisdiction as that of the preceding Yunnan Province. The geopolitical pattern of Yunnan in the middle of the Ming Dynasty changed, including firstly the establishment of Guizhou as a province and annexation of northeastern Yunnan into Sichuan.27 The Ming Dynasty established Guizhou Province with the original intention of ensuring the safety of the transportation lines, especially the old road from Pu’an to Guizhou. According to the Chronicles of Yunnan Province written in the Tianqi Reign, the important lines of communication between Yunnan and the hinterland included the 2 6 History of Ming, Vol. 46, “Geography (7)”, 1171. 27 History of Ming, Vol. 43, “Geography (4)”, 1039.

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old Pu’an-Guizhou Road, the old Wusa-Sichuan Road, the Jianchang (based in present-day Xichang) Road, and the western Guangdong Road (Liu, 1991, 162–174). The old Pu’an-Guizhou Road was the Zhongqing-Huangping Road via Pu’an in the Yuan Dynasty. After renovation and rectification, it became the first choice for Yunnan to connect with the hinterland. The old Wusa-Sichuan Road was the former Zhongqing-Luzhou Road via Wusa. It was one of the earliest roads restored in Yunnan according to the edict of Zhu Yuanzhang issued in the fifteenth year of Hongwu.28 Jianchang Road was the one from Zhongqing to Chengdu via Jiandu in the Yuan Dynasty. Yuexi Road was the Zhongqing-Yongzhou Road built in the previous dynasty. The last two roads were deserted and sparsely populated before the middle of the Ming Dynasty. Although there were travelers passing by, it did not become a thoroughfare in the end. In the fourth year of Tianqi (1624), Yunnan Viceroy Zhu Taizhen and others were stranded in Chengdu for several months due to road obstruction in their return to Yunnan from the hinterland, “together with tens of thousands of officials and merchants.” Later, they changed to Jianchang Road, and suffered a difficult and dangerous journey (Zhu, 1991, 776). However, the Yuexi Road was rife with robbery, “making travel to Guangnan a dreadful trip” (Liu, 1991, 173). The old Pu’an-Guizhou Road and the old Wusa-Sichuan Road were the main channels for transporting copper, silver and giant trees from Yunnan. Yunnan produced a huge amount of silver and copper and was ordered to establish a mineral bureau and cast coins, with the finished products and some ingots transported to the hinterland through the above two roads. The post roads from central Yunnan to Zhenyuan, Guizhou were often taken by merchants transporting copper and tin, carried on human shoulders or horseback. Xu Xiake said that on the post road from eastern Yunnan to Zhany was often taken by, packhorses transporting copper from Dongchuan (Xu, 1985, 689). In a bout of palace construction, the Ming Dynasty felled a large number of precious giant trees in the Yunnan-Guizhou region, with a peak 28 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Hongwu in the Reign of Emperor Hongwu, Vol. 142, Guichou of the 2nd month of the 15th year of Hongwu.



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period reaching 90 years. In the 37th year of Jiajing (1558), the Viceroy of Guizhou reported a shortage of timbering funds, and requested Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangnan, Yunnan, and Shaanxi to “provide financial assistance.” In the 36th year of Wanli (1608), Guizhou felled 12,298 large Nanmu and fir trees, worth more than 1.07 million taels of silver.29 Those giant trees were transported to the hinterland mainly through the road from Pu’an to Guizhou. The terrain of Guizhou is narrow, but the many important post roads passing through it made it a strategically important, so much so that Gu Zuyu called it the strategic pass for the four provinces (Gu, 2005, 5231). After more than 150 years of operation in the Yuan Dynasties and the early Ming Dynasty, the Guizhou General Command established in the Hongwu years was divided in the 11th year of Yongle (1413) into eight prefectures and four sub-prefectures, and the Administrative Commission was established in the same year. In the 15th year, the Justice Commission of Guizhou was established.30 Hence, Guizhou was officially established as a province, changing the pattern of geopolitical relations in this region. The current Dali-Burma Road and Kunming-Annan Road, which lead to neighboring countries, were still busy, and the imperial court added some post stations along the way. A new change to these two roads was the significantly increasing number of business travelers passing by, and the formation of new commodity hubs along the way. In particular, the Daming Street near Jiangtou City in Burma was worth mentioning. Next to the Irrawaddy River that harbored a large number of sea-going ships from Fujian and Guangdong, the Daming Street had tens of thousands of sellers and entertainers from Fujian, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Sichuan, as well as tens of thousands of people affiliated with chieftains of western Yunnan. A trip of 30-li down the Irrawaddy River led to the cities of Baigu and Dengwen, as well as a large-scale

29 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Shizong in the Reign of Emperor Jiajing, Vol. 456; Veritable Records of Shenzong in the Reign of Emperor Wanli, Vol. 443. 30 History of Ming, Vol. 316, “Biography of Chieftains in Guizhou”, 8167; Vol. 46, “Geography (7)”, 1197.

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noon-time fair. The Daming Street was later destroyed by the wars in Luchuan (Zhu, 1998, 492). After more than 100 years of recuperation, Sichuan witnessed significantly enhanced strength in the early Ming Dynasty, and became valued by the Ming court. The Ming people said that “Of all treasuries nationwide, none is richer than Sichuan.” Sichuan didn’t have to ship its grain to the imperial court, because it had to support campaigns in the southwest (Wang Shixing, 1981, 5). This suggests that although Sichuan no longer governed the Yunnan-Guizhou Region in the Ming Dynasty, the tradition of the Han and Tang dynasties using it as a base for operating the barbarian region to its south were restored. In addition, the Yi ethnic group in the Daliangshan Area centered on present-day Xichang were very active, and the neighboring northeastern Yunnan was an important source of non-ferrous metals. In order to strengthen the control of this area and exploit its mineral resources, the Ming Dynasty assigned the area of present-day Xichang and part of northeastern Yunnan to Sichuan. The government offices of the area included Sichuan Xingdusi (based in present-day Xichang) and Zhenxiong Prefecture (based in present-day Zhenxiong, Yunnan), Wumeng Prefecture (based in present-day Zhaotong), Wusa Prefecture (based in present-day Weining), and Dongchuan Prefecture (based in present-day Huize, Yunnan).31 The northeast of the territory under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Province receded to the south of Dongchuan. The Ming Dynasty also listed Annan, Siam, Champa, and Kmir as countries not to be conquered and repaid their tribute with generous gifts, to maintain friendly relations with them. From the 6th year of Zhengtong (1441) to the 13th year, the Ming Dynasty sent hundreds of thousands of troops to suppress the rebelling Luchuan chieftain, creating the sensational “Three Expeditions to Luchuan.” The Luchuan Burmese-Pacification Commission was centered on Ruili, Yunnan, with a jurisdiction covering Dehong, Lincang and northern Xishuangbanna in present-day Yunnan, and northern Burma. Since the early Ming Dynasty, the Luchuan Chieftain from the Si Family expanded to the surrounding area, and seriously threatened the security of the southwestern 31 History of Ming, Vol. 43, “Geography (4)”, 1049; 1038–1040.



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Borderland of the Ming Dynasty. The imperial court had a dispute over an expedition against it. Wang Ji, the Minister of War, pointed out that ignorance of the wanton expansion of the Si Clan might constitute a wrong message to Mubang, Cheli, Chiangmai, and Burma chieftains along the border of Yunnan “It would not only be a sign of weakness for foreign states, but also be conducive to border troubles.”32 Therefore, he vehemently supported an expedition. The campaigns successfully contained the expansion of Luchuan Chieftain. After the collapse of the Luchuan Chieftain, the Yunnan border remained turbulent. The Tongyu Dynasty (center in present-day central Burma) established by the descendant of the Burmese Chieftain Mangrui, gradually annexed his counterparts on the Yunnan border, and became unstoppable by the Ming Dynasty. In the 22nd year of Wanli (1594), Chen Yongbin the Viceroy of Yunnan set up eight passes to the west and south of present-day Tengchong and tenaciously defended the area, while the areas beyond them were reduced to foreign territory due to lack of care.

4.3  In the early Qing period before the Opium War, Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong ruled for 133 years. The golden days under their rule, as well as their ideas and strategies for border governance, had an important influence on the geopolitical relations of Yunnan. In the early Qing Dynasty, the emperors still had the traditional consciousness of “guarding the middle and governing the border” and “making the Borderland barbarians the guarding fence of the Middle Kingdom” but rarely had such views as “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery.” Emperor Yongzheng clearly stated that since the Qing Dynasty ruled the country, “what is the point of differentiating Han Chinese from barbarians.”33 The concept of conservative territory in the Qing Dynasty was also clear. Emperor Qianlong said that “it was beyond me to launch conquest wars for border expansion,

32 [Ming Dynasty] Veritable Records of Zhengtong in the Reign of Emperor Yingzong, Vol. 75. 33 [Qing Dynasty] Record of Englightenment to Supreme Righteousness, 5.

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but I dared not to lose one inch of the land inherited from my ancestors.”34 Since it handled its relationship with the northern nomads appropriately, the traditional tendency of valuing the north over the south was not obvious border governance in the Qing Dynasty. Due to the above reasons, it cherished the management of Yunnan and other border areas in the south, with significantly greater depth, comprehensiveness and practical effectiveness better than the China’s imperial history. In governing Yunnan and Guizhou in its early days, the Qing Dynasty paid more attention to their relationship with the surrounding areas, and adopted a national perspective on many issues. After reunifying the country, the Qing court deployed its elites in the central provinces, and designated the southern provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian as defense zones for the surrendered generals of the Ming Dynasty. In the 16th year of Shunzhi (1659), the Qing court called on the counselors and princes to discuss the dispatch of garrison troops to Yunnan. After deliberation, the courtiers said that Hanzhong was already in the hinterland and separated by Sichuan, so no vassal garrison would be necessary; one prince should be selected from Pingxi, Pingnan, and Jingnan to guard Yunnan, and the rest two stationed in eastern Guangdong and Sichuan. Eventually, Emperor Shunzhi ordered the Prince of Pingxi, the Prince of Pingnan and the Prince of Jingnan to guard in Yunnan Guangdong, and Sichuan respectively.35 From the above measures, this suggests that when the Qing court cherished the relations among Hanzhong, Sichuan, Yunnan and the Guangdong and Guangxi regions in establishing local government institutions, so as to achieve their mutual restraint. After the Wu Sangui Rebellion was put down, the Qing court set great store by the stability and development of Yunnan, hoping that Yunnan would play an important role in the country. Emperor Yongzheng carried out largescale replacement of native chieftains with state officials in Yunnan, mainly to solve the problems of local barbarians resisting management and obstructing development. Admittedly, there were also strategic 3 4 [Qing Dynasty] Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong, Vol. 377. 35 Veritable Records of Emperor Shizu in the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 124.



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layout considerations. Meanwhile, as part of the counterattack against the Junggar tribe, Yongzheng decisively promoted the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in Yunnan to eliminate the latent danger of the Junggar tribe instigating the rebellion of the southwest chieftains (Ma, 2010). The national perspective adopted by the Qing Dynasty in administering Yunnan was also reflected in choosing it as the resettlement place for the surplus hinterland population and the production of raw materials for minting in multiple provinces. During the golden days under the reign of Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong and the subsequent period, the population of the whole country increased to 400 million in Daoguang Reign. In order to seek space for survival, a large number of refugees moved to sparsely populated areas, such as border areas. The Qing court officially prohibited population migration was, but in fact allowed it in acquiescence. The Yunnan government provided funds, farming cattle, and allowed private ownership for newly reclaimed land, to attract the hinterland migrants to reclaim the wasteland.36 Due to the large number of immigrants, the population of Yunnan grew rapidly, reaching 12.5 million in the late Qing Dynasty (Lu et al., 2000, 755, 824, 928). The successful resettlement of a large number of refugees in Yunnan played a positive role in alleviating the pressure of overpopulation in the hinterland. In the early Qing Dynasty, development of the inland mineral deposits was mostly banned, but mining of silver and copper was allowed in Yunnan. The reason was that Yunnan’s silver and copper deposits were extremely rich and of high grade, making the province the source of minting materials for many provinces. From the 5th year of Qianlong (1740) to the 16th year of Jiaqing (1811), the annual copper production of Yunnan was basically more than 10 million catties. From the 31st to the 34th year of Qianlong, its annual output of copper was more than 14 million catties.37 In the 24th and 28th years of Daoguang, the emperor issued two edicts to expand mining in Yunnan and other provinces (Zhao et al., 1977, 3666).The Yunnan copper that 36 [Guangxu Reign] General Annals of Yunnan, Vol. 39, Land Taxes: Examples, entry of the 10th year of Yongzheng citing the imperial memorial of Gao Qizhuo. 37 Yan Zhongping, Copper Management of Yunnan during the Qing Dynasty, 81.

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was destined to Beijing was called “Beijing Copper”, which Hunan, Hubei, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guandgong all tried to intercept and keep a share. In the early Qing Dynasty, many Borderlands and remote areas in Yunnan were still controlled by barbarians or chieftains, and it was difficult for non-local refugees to enter. In order to relieve the shackles on the resettlement of the migrant population and consequently the development of border and the remote resources,38 Emperor Yongzheng appointed Eertai as the Governor of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, and order him to preside over the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in those areas. The reform took the adjacent area of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi as the breakthrough point. The reason is that “The court has the stance but not the power to bring Yunnan and Guizhou under control, and has the power but not the stance to bring Sichuan under control; the soil barbarians do not cultivate, but takes to robbery and killing for a living, victimizing the Borderland people for generations.” After gaining experience, replacement of native chieftains with state officials was fully implemented in the southwestern Borderland regions. By the end of the Qing Dynasty, with the exception of the border areas south of the Lancang River and a few remote areas, the chieftains in the three provinces were abolished and replaced by centrally appointed non-hereditary officials (Wei, 1984, 284–291). After the replacement of native chieftains with state officials in Dongchuan, Wumeng, Zhenxiong and other native prefectures, the affected chieftains took most of their population and fled to the Liangshan Area north of the Jinsha River. The incessant influx of migrants to reclaim wasteland for farming, to exploit mines or to make charcoal gradually formed a population pattern of more Han Chinese than barbarians. Since it was no longer necessary to be on the guard against the barbarians there, and to facilitate the overall management of 38 Eertai, “Imperial Memorial Requesting Bureaucratization of Native Officers”: The biggest trouble with Yunnan and Guizhou is none other than the Miao; to placate the people, the barbarians must be subdued first; to subdue the barbarians, the replacement of native chieftains with state officials must be launched. Cf. Wei Yuan, Record of the Great Emperors, Vol. 7, “Bureaucratic Reform of the Yongzheng Reign in Southwestern Yi” (1), 284.



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the refugees in Yunnan Province, the Qing court assigned Dongchuan, Zhaotong, and Zhenxiong from Sichuan to Yunnan. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, Yunnan Province had jurisdiction over 14 prefectures, 6 directly managed departments, 3 directly managed sub-prefectures, 12 departments, 26 sub-prefectures, and 41 counties, with a scope roughly the same as that of present-day Yunnan Province (Zhao et al., 1977, 2322). The plateaus and hilly areas with better natural conditions in Yunnan gradually became overcrowded after the early Qing Dynasty. By replacing native chieftains with state officials, the barriers to entering the borders and remote areas were lifted, and barren-tolerant crops such as corn, potato and sweet potato introduced to China since the Ming Dynasty were planted in Yunnan, effectively alleviating the food shortage for refugees. As a result, places such as southeastern Yunnan, southern Yunnan, and northwestern Yunnan, which were sparsely populated in the past due to harsh natural conditions, as well as the remote mountainous areas of the province, became key destinations for immigrants. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, the population of Yunnan was about 12.5 million, and the densely populated areas were the Dianchi Lake area and the Erhai Lake Basin (Lu et al., 2000, 928).According to Revised General Geographic Records completed in the Jiaqing Reign, the sub-prefectures and departments of Yunnan could be ordered this way in terms of population size in the late Kangxi years: Dali, Yunnan (based in present-day Kunming), Lin’an, Yongchang, Qujing, Chuxiong, Shunning (based in present-day Fengqing), Menghua (based in present-day Weishan), Chengjiang, Lijiang, Yongbei (based in presentday Yongsheng), Wuding, Jingdong, Guangnan, Pu’er, Kaihua (based in present-day Wenshan), Yuanjiang, Zhenyuan and Tengchong. In the first half of the 19th century, the population ranking changed significantly, and the order became Yunnan, Dali, Qujing, Chuxiong, Lijiang, Chengjiang, Kaihua, Tengyue, Yongchang, Menghua, Shunning, Guangxi (based in present-day Luxi), Wuding, Yongbei, Jingdong, Guangnan, Pu’er, Zhaotong, Dongchuan, Yuanjiang, and Zhenyuan (Ma et al, 1990, 479). The above changes have two characteristics. One was that the population of the border and remote areas increased rapidly after the middle of the Qing Dynasty, and most of the increased population was immigrants. The second was the rise of many new towns,

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which was obviously related to the increase in local population and economic development. The large influx of refugees to the Borderlands or remote areas created new economic growth points such as tea planting, logging and charcoal burning, thus promoting the social development of the areas where they settled, for example, Pu’er tea named after the city of Pu’er, which was a tea distribution and management center. According to research (Fang, 2010), before the Qing Dynasty, Yunnan produced very little tea, and there was no such a variety as Pu’er tea. According to Records of Pu’er Prefecture compiled in the Daoguang Reign, many immigrants moved in after the replacement of native chieftains with state officials during the Yongzheng Reign, and by the time of Daoguang, it “took on the looks of the hinterland in both customs and habits.” Since Xishuangbanna and Pu’er produced largeleaf teas that can be picked all year long, and their planting and processing were relatively extensive, many immigrants became engaged in planting and management of the tea. Six tea hills with a radius of nearly 800 li gradually formed in the above-mentioned areas. In the peak season for tea picking, hundreds of thousands of people swarmed in and the people of Pu’er “relied on the tea hills for food and clothing” (Hu, 2008, 314). In order to strengthen the man even agement of the tea district, the Qing Dynasty established Pu’er Prefecture, Simao Justice and Ning’er Prefecture successively, and built Pu’er Prefecture City, Youle City and Simao City (Ni, 1992, 601–602, 606–607). Another factor that promoted the development of Borderlands and remote areas was the large-scale mining. In the Qing Dynasty, many metal deposits with large reserves were discovered in the Borderlands and remote areas, including very high-grade rich deposits. In addition, the mining volume of lead and zinc deposits also increased significantly and attracted people to gather in new mining areas, thereby forming new towns and densely populated areas. In the 11th year of Qianlong (1746), Zhang Yunsui, an important official of Yunnan, said in an imperial memorial that it had been difficult to make a profit from the sparse land of the mountainous Yunnan, “luckily its land is rich in mineral resources, so many locals have made a living via mining. The people of Jiangxi, Huguang, Chuanxian and Guizhou also came to exploit the rich mineral resources of the province. In fact, copper resources were



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found even in the barbarian areas” (Fang, 1998, 683). The most famous copper mines in Yunnan included Tangdan and Lulu. The larger ones could have 60,000 or 70,000 workers, and the smaller ones had more than 10,000.39 The largest silver mines included the Bolong and Maolong silver mines located in the part of Mengding Prefecture inhabited by the Wa Ethnic Group (Zhao et al., 1977, 14662). According to Records of Tengyue Prefecture compiled in the Qianlong Reign, the Maolong Silver Mine hired several dozen thousand workers in its heyday. The Munai Silver Mine located in the northern part of Lancang County had more than 100,000 miners at its peak and remained in business for many years. The rapid development of Borderlands and remote towns also gradually contributed to a more balanced and reasonable pattern in the distribution of various cities in Yunnan Province. The development of social economy, especially the transportation of large amounts of mineral products and salt, became an important reason for the rise of transportation lines in Yunnan. The most important transportation lines in Yunnan during the Qing Dynasty included the old Pu’an-Guizhou Road and the old Wusa-Sichuan Road since the Ming Dynasty. The latter was also called “Dongchuan-Luzhou Road.” The prosperity of the two roads was attributable to the massive transportation of silver, copper and other mineral products. In the early Qianlong Reign, a large amount of copper was shipped to Beijing at imperial orders. The goods were shipped from Dongchuan Prefecture (based in present-day Huize) to Yongning (based in present-day Yanjin), switched to water transportation, and shipped along the Yangtze River through Luzhou to the Central Plains. In order to facilitate the transportation of Yunnan copper to the capital Beijing, the Qing court opened the Jinsha River water route during Qianlong Reign.40 The post road from Luxi to Nanning, Guangxi was also pros­ perous, and valued by the government for the transporting Yunnan copper to Beijing. Table salt was also a major transport item of Yunnan.

3 9 Copper Management of Yunnan during the Qing Dynasty, 31. 40 [Daoguang Reign] Manuscripts of General Records of Yunnan: Treatise on Literature: The Copper of Yunnan, Vol. 4, “Land Transportation”.

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Tan Cui of the Qing Dynasty said that “The most important issues of government in Yunnan was none other than copper and salt.” Yunnan set up three promotional departments to manage the well salt produced. Those beyond the scope were in charge of the subprefectures and counties, and the salt produced was transported to various places (Tan, 1990, 65). In order to transport Pu’er tea into Sichuan or Xizang, the road from Pu’er and Xishuangbanna to the north via Dali also became active. As for the passages from Yunnan to foreign countries cherished by the past, such as the Yunnan-Burma Road and the Yunnan-Vietnam Road, their original functions had changed, mainly because the Qing court had established suzerainty relations with neighboring countries such as Burma and Vietnam and seldom fought wars with China-Indochina Peninsula countries. In addition, the ChinaIndochina Peninsula and its regions also seldom sent tributes to the Qing court via Yunnan. The travelers of the passages from Yunnan to foreign countries were mainly pedestrians and caravans engaged in long- and short-distance transportation. In summary, seen from the perspective of Borderland governance in imperial China, the changes in the geopolitical relations of the present-day Yunnan-Guizhou Region could be roughly divided into two periods, with the later Song Dynasty and the early Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation. When the Mongolian Yuan pacified Dali Kingdom and established Yunnan Province, Yunnan became independent of the Sichuan administrative region as a single province, and established direct connections with the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and beyond via the post roads passing through its east and northeast. The economic and cultural factors, and large population influx had a profound impact for hundreds of years. Regarding the relationship between Yunnan-Guizhou Region and Sichuan, when the Yuan Dynasty established Yunnan Province, the east, southeast, south, and northwest were given development opportunities. In the Ming Dynasty, the hinterland of Yunnan became a densely populated and economically leading area in the province, and the gap between it and the Borderlands and remote areas widened. The Qing Dynasty basically solved the problem of the migration of the foreign population to the mountainous areas and border areas, as well



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as the jurisdiction division and management of adjacent areas among Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou. The development of the borders and remote areas accelerated significantly, and a more reasonable pattern of city and population distribution took shape in Yunnan and Guizhou. The late Song Dynasty and early Yuan Dynasty was also the demarcation point of the obvious differences in economic development for Yunnan-Guizhou Region in different periods. In the first period, the Central Plains dynasty focused on the north, while relatively neglecting the southwestern Borderland including the present Yunnan-Guizhou Region, adversely affecting its development. The Yuan Dynasty regarded the present Yunnan-Guizhou Region as the Borderland for managing the China-Indochina Peninsula, and adopted proactive measures to manage and develop it. Some important measures, such as the establishment of Yunnan Province, the shift of Yunnan’s political center from the west to the east, the expansion of communication lines connecting Yunnan to the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, and strengthening of the control on neighboring regions all achieved obvious results, profoundly affecting the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties. The establishment of Guizhou Province in the Ming Dynasty was attributable to the shift of the focus from the west to the east for managing Yunnan since the Yuan Dynasty. The thoughts and strategies of the imperial China for governing the Yunnan-Guizhou Region were mostly closely related to the geopolitical situation in the Yunnan-Guizhou Region, and their implementation also had a profound impact on it in return. On the whole, the perspective of managing the Yunnan-Guizhou Region was limited to the southwestern border in the early stage; later, the relevant border areas were taken into account and then even the overall plan was considered. Historically, the basic point of planning and implementation in the current Yunnan-Guizhou Region also evolved from its interaction with the imperial court and areas beyond, to gradual consolidation of imperial rule over and extraction of large amounts of various resources. The changes all profoundly affected the geopolitical relations in the Yunnan-Guizhou Region. In the development of more than 2,000 years, the role and status of the various elements affecting the geopolitical relationship of the present

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Yunnan-Guizhou Region also underwent a dynamic change. Take the internal and external communication lines there as an example. In the first half of ancient times, expansion of the communication lines from the hinterland to foreign countries through the present Yunnan-Guizhou Region and maintenance of their smooth traffic were an important driving force for the management of the present-day Yunnan-Guizhou Region. With the gradual formation of the southwestern Borderland regions, the economic development of the current Yunnan-Guizhou Region and the development of minerals, timber and other resources, the communication lines connecting the current Yunnan-Guizhou Region to neighboring provinces gradually became more important than those leading to foreign kingdoms. The functions of the internal and external communication lines also changed from being mainly used for sending envoys, tribute, and troops, to meeting the needs of material transshipment and business activities. The status of the transportation industry in the historical process of the Yunnan-Guizhou Region also changed accordingly. In the Qing Dynasty, the mining and metallurgical industry became the most important economic sector there.

5.  Border Management and Communication from the Hinterland to the Borderland and Beyond in the Tang and Song Dynasties During the Tang and Song Dynasties, the hinterland of China had frequent exchanges with the southwestern Borderlands and areas beyond (mainly the China-Indochina Peninsula), but the use of communication lines was different in each period. The land and sea routes also underwent ups and downs, which had a complex and profound impact on the geopolitical relationship between the Central Plains dynasty and the China-Indochina Peninsula.

5.1. The Management of the Southwestern Borderland and Its Communication Lines in the Tang Dynasty The Tang Dynasty ruled for 290 years. Its management of Yunnan can be roughly divided into the first stage of 130 years featuring effective



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control and the second stage of 150 years beginning with the capture of Yunnan by Nanzhao, with the separation of Nanzhao from its control in the wake of the An-Shi Rebellion as the demarcation line. In the first stage, the areas effectively controlled were extended from the eastern and central parts of Yunnan in the previous dynasty to the Lancang River Basin in the west. Measures such as establishing governance institution, garrisoning, and rectifying communication lines were also effective. After the An-Shi Rebellion, Yunnan was seized by Nanzhao. Although Nanzhao restored the friendly relationship with Tang during the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), and maintained it for 35 years, Nanzhao was no longer ruled by a native officer under the command of the Erhai area, but a vassal regime in control of Yunnan. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan, the Tang Dynasty sent envoys to enshrine Yimou Xun as the King of Nanzhao, and recognized the existing scope of Nanzhao. Therefore, after the An-Shi Rebellion, the Tang Dynasty has lost actual control over Yunnan. After the establishment of the Tang Dynasty, Emperor Taizong actively operated the border areas. He believed that all within the national boundary were the subjects of the Tang Dynasty, that the aboriginal people in the Borderlands “were avidly awaiting the salvation” and that with proper administration, “all under the heaven will be like a family” and “the remote areas will be turned into the land of regular households.” Therefore, he tried his best to manage the Borderlands regardless of the cost, even “draining the treasury” (Liu et al., 1975, 2939). The effect of the Tang Dynasty’s Borderland expansion was significant. From Zhenguan Reign to Kaiyuan Reign, the Borderland barbarians submitted to the Middle Kingdom one after another and their colonies were turned into jimi prefectures or subprefectures. In its heyday, the Tang Dynasty mainly had six protectorates in the border areas, including Anbei, Chanyu, Anxi, Beiting, Andong, and Annan, which governed more than 856 jimi prefectures and jimi sub-prefectures (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1119). Although the territory of its hinterland was incomparable to that of the Han Dynasty, the scope of its jimi prefectures and jimi sub-prefectures was far larger. In the first year of Shengong, Di Renjie said that “Seen from historical records, they have been impenetrable by education of the Middle

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Kingdom over three generations, but now our dynasty has taken them all” (Sima, 1956, 6524). In the Song Dynasty, Ouyang Min also said that “in the Tang Dynasty, the land from the north to the south was as large as that in the Han Dynasty, but narrower in the east and wider in the west” (Ouyang, 2003, 47). Those observations indicate that the Tang Dynasty effectively extended its territory in the west. The Tang Dynasty operated the Yunnan region like the Han and Jin dynasties did, expanding to the south and west based on the southwestern Sichuan and northeastern Yunnan that were adjacent to the Shu area. In the first year of Wude (618), Nanning Sub-prefecture was established, followed by the General Administration Command. In the 7th year, it was changed to Nanning Protectorate (based in present-day west of Qujing, Yunnan). In the first year of Wude, Qianwei County of the Sui Dynasty was changed to Rongzhou, before the establishment of the Protectorate of Rongzhou (based in present-day Yibin, Sichuan) (Liu et al., 1975, 1664). Later, the Tang Dynasty focused its operations on Erhai Lake and the area to the west, as well as the area south of central Yunnan. In the first year of Linde (664), it set up the Yaozhou Protectorate in Nongdongchuan (based in present-day Yao’an, Yunnan) (Liu et al., 1975, 85). In the first year of Tiaolu (679), it set up the Annan Protectorate (based in present-day Hanoi, Vietnam), which governed northern and central Vietnam and the jimi prefectures and jimi sub-prefectures in southeastern Yunnan. The Tang Dynasty’s active management of the Yunnan area sprang from its hope to restore the transportation lines built in preceding dynasties to reach the neighboring states. In the reign of Emperor Wu of the Western Han Dynasty, the two access roads from Chengdu to the neighboring states via Yunnan were expanded into official roads. One of them led from Chengdu to Burma via Hanyuan, Xichang, Yao’an and Dali successively, with a section called “Lingguan Road”; the other was the passage from Chengdu to Kunming via Yibin and Qujing, leading further southward to Jiaozhi. The section from Chengdu to Kunming was called “Wuchi Road.” Lingguan Road was called “Qingxiguan Road” in the Tang Dynasty, and Wuchi Road was called “Shimenguan Road.” Those two roads intersected in the central part of Yunnan, forming the Annan-Tintu Road, one of the seven important transportation



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lines into Borderland barbarian land in the Tang Dynasty. Jia Dan, prime minister of Zhenyuan Reign, described its direction as follows: from Jiaozhou to Kunming via Hekou, Pingbian, Mengzi, Jianshui, Tonghai and Jinning in present-day Yunnan, and further to Dali via the west of the Ancient City of Anning, and then to Zhuge Liang City to the southeast of present Tengchong via Baoshan. There it forked into two roads, one leading through Piao Kingdom to the west of Assam, India, and the other to Menggong via Lishui City to the south of Myitkyina, Burma, and it goes to West Assam, India through Daqin Brahman Kingdom (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1151). In the Tang Dynasty, the western section of Annan-Tintu Road was called “Xi’erhe-Tintu Road”, and the eastern section was called “Anning-Jiaozhou Road” or “Butou Road.” Due to the separatist local forces, the roads through Yunnan were difficult passages before the establishment of the Tang Dynasty. In the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648) and the 2nd year of Yonghui (651), the Tang Dynasty launched two campaigns in western Yunnan and quelled the rebellions of Songwai barbarians and Langzhou Baishui barbarians along the route (Sima, 1956, 6255). After the establishment of the Yaozhou Command and Annan Protectorate, the Annan-Tintu Road was brought under the protection of the Tang army and made readily passable. Relying on the Qingxiguan Road, Shimenguan Road and the lines of communication extending into present-day Burma and northern Vietnam, the Tang Dynasty achieved a stable rule in Yunnan and established close contacts with the countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula. Yaozhou Defenders Prefecture and Annan Protectorate also became bridgeheads for the management of the southwestern Borderland regions, forming a clear restraint on western and southern of Yunnan, as well as regions beyond. The Yaozhou Command had jurisdiction over 57 jimi prefectures and jimi sub-prefectures (Liu et al., 1975, 2941), in present-day western Yunnan and northeastern Burma. The Tang Dynasty had more governmental institutions in the area than the Han Dynasty. In the 9th year of Tianbao (750 AD), Nanzhao, a local power centered on the present Erhai Lake, broke with the Tang Dynasty, attacking and capturing Yaozhou Command first, demolishing Yaozhou City, and seizing 32 jimi sub-prefectures. When the Tang court sent troops to punish it, it

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begged for permission to rehabilitate Yaozhou City. However, the Tang court still sent troops for conquest three times, indicating the strategic importance of Yaozhou Command. Nanzhao also attached importance to the Xi’erhe-Tintu Road after its independence, stationing about 30% of its standing army in Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan), the strategic town along the route (Fan, 1985, 237). Annan Protectorate evolved from Jiaozhou established in the Han Dynasty and was always the bridgehead for the various dynasties to manage the present Yunnan, Guangxi and Chia-Indochina Peninsular. In the 5th year of Yuanfeng (110 BC), the Western Han Dynasty instated Jiaozhou Military Governor, as one of the thirteen governors throughout the country. Sun’s Wu Kingdom divided Lingnan into two prefectures, separating four counties of Haidong to the north of Beihai for establishing the Guangzhou Sub-prefecture and three counties of Hainan to the south of Cochin to form Jiaozhou. The Sui Dynasty also set up Cochin County. In the fifth year of Wude (622), the Tang Dynasty changed Cochin to Jiaozhou General Administration, and later to Annan Protectorate (Yue, 2007, 3249). Because of Annan’s strategic location, the Tang Dynasty planned to extend the eastern section of Annan-Tintu Road northward to Shimenguan Road. In the 4th year of Tianbao (745), Zhu Lingqian, the Governor of Yuexi began an ill-fated attempt to build a city in Anning for the construction of Butou Road. The local forces in eastern Yunnan killed home and destroyed Anning City. Emperor Xuanzong ordered Nanzhao to launch a war of conquest against them. Nanzhao occupied eastern Yunnan, and then its contradictions with the Tang Dynasty intensified. As a result, the plan to build a new road was shelved. After Nanzhao rose in rebellion, the Tang Dynasty used Annan as a base to attack it. In the 9th year of Tianbao, the Defender of Annan, Wang Zhijin, led an army from Annan to Yunnan, and encircled Nanzhao with the Tang army from Sichuan. In the 13th year, the Tang court also ordered Guangzhou Governor He Lüguang to lead Lingnan troops to Yunnan, and support the offensive led by Imperial Attendant Li Mi against Nanzhao. In the early Xiantong years, Nanzhao captured Annan and severely threatened the Tang rule of the southwestern Borderland regions. Emperor Yizong issued an edict to divide



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Lingnan into the Eastern and Western circuits, with the based in Guangzhou, and Yongzhou respectively. In the 4th year of Xiantong (863), Nanzhao captured Annan for the second time. The Tang Dynasty set up Xingjiaozhou in Hepu, Guangxi, and later re-established Annan Protectorate there. In the 7th year, Annan Defender Gao Pian recovered Annan, and Tang Court set up Jinghai Military Governor in Annan to strengthen the defense (Sima, 1956, 8098–8116; Liu et al., 1975, 659). Therefore, this suggests that the Tang Dynasty attached great importance to Annan. The Tang Dynasty not only turned the Qingxiguan Road, Shimenguan Road, Xi’erhe-Tintu Road, and Anning-Jiaozhou Road into official roads, but also set up post stations for some sections. So far, there is no complete record of the Tang Dynasty operating the Yunnan Channel, but there are many scattered records offering a glimpse of its original look. According to records, along the Qingxiguan Road from Chengdu Prefecture to Yangjumei City (in present-day Dali, Yunnan), the boundary between Nanzhao and Tang Dynasty was Ezhunling Ridge in Xizhou (south of present-day Dechang, Sichuan); there were 30 post stations on the section from Chengdu to Ezhunling Ridge and 19 on the section from Ezhunling Ridge to Yngjumei City (Fan, 1985, 13). In Zhenyuan Reign, Yimoxun sought to return to the Tang Dynasty, and the Tang court planned to send the envoy Yuan Zi to enshrine Yimuxun. However, it was rumored that the Tubo Kingdom would block Qingxiguan Road, so Wei Gao, the Military Governor of Xichuan renovated the original Shimenguan Road and established some post houses along the way. Yuan Zi and his entourage headed south from Rongzhou with few people on the way. On the ninth day, they arrived at the Zhichangguan Post House in Malong County, “and were duly greeted and supported there.” Along the way from present-day Malong to Yanjumie City via Anning, there were such post houses as Tuodong, Anning, Longhe, Shaziguan, Music Hall, Shaque, Wow, Boda, Baiya and Longwei (Fan, 1985, 36). So far, there is no known record of Nanzhao establishing post houses. So the post buildings mentioned above should have been built in the early Tang Dynasty. The accommodation sites detailed in Jia Dan’s observation and in the Book on Barbarians in the Yunnan section of the Annan-Tintu Road should also be the legacy

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of the post houses built in the early Tang Dynasty. The post houses of Tang Dynasty had followed the old system of the previous generation, mostly with an interval of 30 apart. The above-mentioned post houses are mostly 30 miles away from each other, in line with the Tang system.41 In the Tang Dynasty, Qingxiguan Road was called the South Road from Yunnan to Shu, and Shimenguan Road the North Road to Shu. Since the hostility developed in the Tianbao Reign between Nanzhao and the Tang court, the relationship between the two had improved and worsened time and again, and the road from Yunnan to Shu was also affected. Generally speaking, there are many records of travel through Qingxiguan Road, while Shimenguan Road was gradually abandoned. In the Tianbao Reign, Xianyu Zhongtong launched an expedition against Nanzhao via Shimenguan Road, “which was closed afterwards.” After that, records of travel along the road included the trip of Yuan Zi to Nanzhao for canonization in the 10th year of Zhenyuan. On this trip, he saw that there were few people passing by, and some of the mountains were overgrown with forests that shielded the sun, “making it impossible to tell day from night.” Occasionally, he saw barbarians kneeling down in front of him without courtesy. Only after a translation relay was them understood. On the ninth day, when he reached Zhichangguan, he found a post station (Fan, 1985, 34). This suggests that Shimenguan Road had been deserted for a long time. The Tang Dynasty also cherished the operation of the communication lines from Guangxi to kingdoms of the China-Indochina Peninsula. Before the establishment of Lingnan Dongdao Circuit and Lingnan Xidao Circuit in the third year of Xiantong in the Tang Dynasty, the political centers of Lingnan were mainly Guangzhou and Cochin. Since the Qin and Han dynasties established a government institution in Cochin, there were two ways to reach Cochin throughout the dynasties, but the sea route was mostly the first choice. After Nanzhao regained Annan in the Xiantong years, the southwestern part of Guangxi received attention from the court, 41 According to Book of Barbarians, the trip from Jiaozhou to Jiayongbu in southern Yunnan was firstly by water and then by land. The path from Jiayongbu to Yangjumie City involved 21 post stations. The early mountainous roads in Yunnan were difficult, and each 15 kilometers took an entire day on horseback.



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and increasinly more travelers took the road to Guizhou (based in Guilin, Guangxi) via Yongzhou (based in Nanning, Guangxi). However, in the Tang Dynasty, the southwestern Guangxi was not fully developed, while the land route from Annan to Guizhou via Yongzhou was long and difficult. Therefore, most travelers still chose the sea route from Annan to the hinterland.

5.2. The Communication Lines of the Tang Dynasty to the China-­ Indochina Peninsula and Their Utilization The development of the western border of Yunnan in the Tang Dynasty can be seen from the distribution of the prefectures and counties under the jurisdiction of Yaozhou Command, which governed many jimi sub-prefectures, and Tengchong was the westernmost one known so far.42 This suggests that the effective jurisdiction of the Tang Dynasty over the Xi’erhe-Tintu Road was generally limited to the area east of present-day Tengchong; travelers entering the area to its west could only take the private road. In Tianbao Reign, the Nanzhao separatist regime repeatedly launched wars in the area west of present-day Tengchong. The “Stele of Rule of Virtue in Nanzhao” stated that Ge Luofeng “befriended Lingchuan in the west, and colluded with the Piao Kingdom in the south.” During the reign of Emperor Wenzong of Tang, Nanzhao sent

42 According to Old Book of Tang: The Biography of Zhang Jianzhi: In the early Shengong Reign, Zhang Jianzhi, the Governor of Shuzhou, submitted an imperial memorial requesting the abolishment of Yaozhou, saying that it governed 57 jimi subprefectures, but did not specify the names or locations. New Book of Tang: Geography (7:2) says that the 13 jimi sub-prefectures under the jurisdiction of Yaozhou Prefecture were roughly located in present-day Chuxiong and Dali. According to History of Yuan (Vol. 61) “Geography (4)”, the entry of the “Military and Civilian Command of Dali Route”, the Tang court had established the Yaozhou Command in Nongdongchuan, “for administration of Erhe Barbarians of Yeyu.” The focus of jurisdiction mentioned was in line with the distribution of jimi prefectures and jimi sub-prefectures in New Book of Tang: Geography (7:2). Song Lian et al., History of Yuan: Geography (4) also said: Tengchong Prefecture “was originally a jimi county established in the Tang Dynasty.” This suggests that Tengchong was one of the jimi prefectures under the jurisdiction of Yaozhou Command. Therefore, it can be seen that Tengchong was the westernmost boundary of the jurisdiction of Yaozhou Command known so far.

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troops to Piao Kingdom (present-day central Burma) to attack Mino and Michen at the upper reaches of the Irrawaddy River. Then, it tried to attack Kunlun at the mouth of the Salween River and Tonle Sap Lake in the south of the China-Indochina Peninsula, but had to order a retreat because the Lake could not be crossed by boat (Fan, 1985, 326). In the conquered areas, it built Guangdang, Lishui, Anxi, Cangwang and other towns and garrisoned them. It also opened the “Qingmu Xiangshan Road” from Lincang, Yunnan to the middle reaches of the Irrawaddy River (Fan, 1985, 223), and the road from Jingdong, Yunnan to the central and southern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula. Its wars in the area west of Yunnan had an expansive nature, but they also made passable the western section of the Xi’erhe-Tintu Road, which objectively facilitated the land travel between the China-Indochina Peninsula and China. The Old Book of Tang: Biography of the Southwest Barbarian Piao Kingdom says that the Piao Kingdom adjoined Nanzhao’s Lecheng Boundary (in present-day Luxi, Yunnan) in the north, and was 1,800 miles from Yangjumei City in the northeast (in present-day Dali, Yunnan). It seems that that the Piao Kingdom had contacted Nanzhao through the road from Lecheng to Yangjumei City. The Tang Dynasty had frequent contacts with the kingdoms of the China-Indochina Peninsula. After the reconciliation with Nanzhao in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, its exchanges with the China-Indochina Peninsula reached a climax, and the land route via Yunnan played an important role. The Piao Kingdom was a large kingdom in the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula, and it had jurisdiction over 18 subordinate countries including Michen. Before the Tang Dynasty, it “had no exchange with the Middle Kingdom.” In the 18th year of Zhenyuan (802), when its King learnt that Yimou Xun, the King of Nanzhao, had submitted to the Tang Dynasty, he sent his brother Xiliyi to pay tribute to the Tang court together with the envoys of Nanzhao, offering ten songs of national music and many musicians. Before setting off for the Tang court, Wei Gao composed and recorded the music in Chengdu, and drew the dancing arrangement and the musical instruments as tribute (Wang et al., 1960; Liu et al., 1975, 5286). According to “Ode to the Music of Piao” written in the Tang Dynasty, the Prince of Piao presented musical instruments and musicians to the Middle



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Kingdom, “reaching Shu after a journey of ten thousand miles,” “before being escorted by envoys of Wei Gao to the imperial court.”43 This sug­ gests that the envoys of the Piao Kingdom had taken the road from Yunnan to Chengdu in sending tribute to the Tang Dynasty. In the 20th year of Zhenyuan and the first year of Yuanhe, it sent envoys to pay tribute for the second and third time respectively (Wang et al., 1960). Other ancient countries in the China-Indochina Peninsula sent envoys to the Tang court, mostly via the road through Yunnan or Jiaozhou. In the 8th year of Wude (625), Wendan (in present-day Laos) sent envoys to pay tribute. In the 12th year of Tianbao (753), the Prince of Wendan led an entourage to the Tang court to pay tribute, and the Tang court gave him the title of Captain Guoyi. Prince Wendan happened to pass Jiaozhou on his way back and was ordered by Emperor Xuanzong to help He Lüguang conquering Nanzhao. He was allowed to return to his fief afterwards. In the 6th year of the Dali (771), Wang Pomi, the deputy King of Wendan came to the Tang court, to pay respect to the emperor. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), after Nanzhao surrendered to the Tang Dynasty, Wendan once again made a tribute (Wang et al., 1960). In the 21st year, Le Daowu, the heir of the Michen Kingdom, came to pay tribute to the emperor, and the Tang Dynasty made him the King of Michen (Wang, 1955, 1795). The Tang Dynasty wrote an essay in praise of the event, saying that “Piao Kingdom and Michen Kingdom had come to pay respect, taking the same route”. This suggests that the messengers of Michen and Piao kingdoms had come to pay respect one after another or at the same time, both traveling through Yunnan (Fu, 1983). According to Book of Barbarians: Towns of Yunnan, it took 10 days to travel by land to Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan) from Kainan City (in present-day Jingdong, Yunnan), and 30 days to travel to Michen KingdomKingdom by water, “which adjoins the Nanhai in the south, and takes a journey of three months to Kunlun State.” It shows that the travel from Yongchang along the Irrawaddy River led to the Michen Kingdom, and to the Kingdom of Kunlun (at the mouth of the Salween River in present-day Burma) in the south, as corroborated by the preceding descriptions. 43 Ode to Piao Kingdom, Vol. 100, “Treatise on Fu”, Weiwan Shantang Studio.

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Since the Qin and Han dynasties, Jiaozhou had been ruled by the Central Plains dynasty, and has always been an important transit point for its communication with the central and southern ChinaIndochina Peninsula and beyond. From Jiaozhou to the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom, there were land and sea routes to choose from. In the Western Han Dynasty, Rinan County was set up, and became the inevitable path for overseas countries to pay tribute to the imperial court; for example, in the reign of Emperor Huan of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Daqin and Tintu paid tribute through this road (Yue, 2007, 3354). The importance of Jiaozhou in the Tang Dynasty was further improved. Its status as a maritime hub was consolidated due to the fact that the connection of the hinterland with Jiaozhou was mainly by sea, and the Tang Dynasty had frequent exchanges with overseas countries. According to the Old Book of Tang, “Jiaozhou Command was established to rule the barbarians.” Hainan kingdoms were mostly located to its south and southwest in Zhongzhou in the middle of the sea, “and had to take the road of Cochin to pay tribute since the reign of Emperor Wu in the Han Dynasty” (Liu et al., 1975). Records of Roads and Counties written by Ibn Khurdadhbah no later than the early years of Xiantong also said that Al-Wakin (Long Biên, in present-day Hanoi) “is the first port of the Middle Kingdom.”44 Recent Japanese scholars also believed that “Jiaozhou was still the southernmost prosperous trading port in China in the Tang Dynasty” (Kuwabala, 1935, 69). Regarding the roads from Jiaozhou to the central and southern China-Indochina Peninsula and beyond, the records of the Tang Dynasty are roughly as follows: One route went eastward from Huanzhou to Anyuan County, Tanglin Sub-prefecture, and further to the capital of Champa (in present-day south-central Vietnam) via the Guluo River, Tandong River, Zhuya, and Danbu Town. The road from the southwest of Huanzhou led to Suantai County of Wendan Kingdom via Wuwenling, Riluo County of Tangzhou Sub-prefecture, Luolun

44 Cen Zhongmian: Textual Research on Chinese and Foreign History and Geography, Vol. 1, 376. Previously, scholars believed that Al-Wakin was Longbian or Bijing (that is, Jingzhou in the Tang Dynasty, located in Hengshan, Nghệ Tinh Province, Vietnam). The author upholds this view.



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River, Shimishan, and Wenyang County, then to outer city and inner city of Wendan to Kmir (in present-day Laos), further south to Xiaohai and Luoyue Kingdom (currently the southern Malay Peninsula), and then further south to the sea (present-day Pacific Gulf of Thailand). The southward land route from Tonghai City led to Kunlun Kingdom via Jiayongbu, Zhenzhou, Dengzhou, and Linxiyuan (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1151). The New Book of Tang Book: Biography of Southern Barbarians (2) says that the land route from Kmir to the Tang Dynasty passed through Huanzhou and Daoming in Annan, and that if you travel further by sea, you can reach Tintu and Daqin via Jiaozhou. “(Tintu) West adjoins Daqin and Anxi in the sea, and occasionally traders came to Funan and Cochin” (Du, 1988, 5261). Konghai Road in western Yanzhou in Annan was the inevitable path from Guangzhou and other ports to Linyi (now central and southern Vietnam) and Funan (Li, 1983, 963). Dunxun Kingdom in the present-day Tanasarin area of Burma extended to Jiaozhou in the east; from Brunei to the southeast of Linyi, a maritime trip led to Guangzhou via Dandan Kingdom, Chitu and Jiaozhou. If you go to Chitu from the Central Plains, you will first arrive at Jiaozhou by boat from Guangzhou, and then pass Linyi. Travel north to the Panpan Kingdom across the small sea from Linyi took just one day by boat (Yue, 2007, 3364, 3365). Annan was not only an important transit point for overseas countries to trade in Guangzhou, but also a famous international trade market. According to records, Central Tintu used sea shells as currency and traded with Jiaozhi, Daqin, Funan and other countries with precious objects such as diamond, Indian sandalwood, and Curcuma Aromatica (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6237). In the 8th year of Zhenyuan (792), overseas merchant ships originally planned to go to Guangzhou all went to Annan for trading. The courtier Lu Zhi said that it was because the officials of Guangzhou had been “excessively demanding” (Sima, 1956). Overseas countries often went to Annan to trade by sea. Because of the greed and imposition of Jiaozhou Military Governor and Rinan Prefect, they had to surrender 20% to 30% of their profits, “and thus became indignant” (Yue, 2007). The “southwestern Borderland regions” in southern Yunnan and northern Burma also traveled south down the Irrawaddy River and went to Guangzhou to trade by sea. The “Stele of

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Rule of Virtue in Nanzhao” says that “Xunchuan (now northern Burma) adjoins Bohai in the south, and Daqin in the west.” There were only four five merchant ships setting off from “the southwestern Borderland regions” to Guangzhou for trade each year. Because Li Mian, the Military Commissioner of Lingnan, advocated fair trade, the number of merchant ships increased to a dozen (Ouyang et al., 1975, 4507).

5.3. Yunnan, Guangxi, Annan and Their Transportation Routes in Song Dynasty After its founding, the Northern Song Dynasty ruled the lower reaches of the Yellow River south of Datong, the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River east of Chengdu, and Lingnan. In the Southern Song Dynasty, the northern boundary shrank, but the southern boundary remained the same as the Northern Song Dynasty. However, there were strong enemies in the north, as throughout the Song Dynasty. On the historical stage for contention against the Khitan, Dangxiang, Jurchen, and Mongolia regimes, the Song Dynasty had no advantage politically, militarily, or geographically. The severe situation had a profound impact on its management of the southern border. In the southwest of the area under its jurisdiction, the Song Dynasty was faced with the problem of handling its relations with Dali and Annan. The rule of the Song Dynasty tended to emphasize internal affairs over external affairs. In the second year of Duangong (989), Emperor Taizong declared that “to handle external affairs, we must address internal affairs first. When we are stable internally, external troubles will naturally be solved.” In the second year of Chunhua (991), he said to his closest ministers that without external worries, the country will be plagued by internal troubles. While external worries were none other than border affairs, which can be prevented, latent traitors and evils should be deeply feared, since they tend to evolve into internal troubles (Li, 1980). Affected by this thought, the Song Dynasty pursued the policy of “enhancing internal control and slackening external affairs” in administering the borderland. On the other hand, the Song court had to “stay prepared against a powerful enemy in the north, and cannot find the opportunity to manage remote areas” (Guo,1986, 20).



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The heavy pressure from the northern border also made it difficult to govern the surrounding borders. The steady advance of the northern tribes made the Song court afraid and hateful, but unable to get out of the predicament. Out of the hatred of barbarians in the Borderlands, it regarded Dali and the northern barbarians as the same kind, and tried its best to avoid them. As the situation in northern Borderland became increasingly more intense, the Song Dynasty, especially the Southern Song Dynasty, became more and more wary against Dali. In the 3rd year of Qiande (965), the Song General Wang Quanbin submitted a map of Sichuan, suggesting take advantage of the situation to seize Yunnan. Emperor Taizu Zhao Kuangyin pointing with a jade axe to the Dadu River on map on the grounds that the disaster of the Tang Dynasty in the Tianbao Reign had originated in Nanzhao, and saying: “areas beyond that are not mine to have.” Thus, the principle of delimiting the Dadu River as the boundary for the Dali Kingdom based in Yunnan was determined. Zhu Zhen, a scholar of the Imperial Academy of the Southern Song Dynasty, said that: “Dali Kingdom was originally known as Nanzhao in Tang Dynasty. It had invaded into Chengdu and threatened Yongguan many times in the Dazhong and Xiantong regins, causing nationwide turmoil. Thus Emperor Taizu renounced the counties of Yuexi and took the Dadu River as the boundary, making it impossible for the Dali Kingdom to invade or surrender. That is the best policy for guarding against the barbarians.”45 At the end of Zhenghe Reign, some people suggested that cities be built on the far bank of the Dadu River to facilitate trade, and Emperor Huizong consulted with Yuwen Chang, the prefect of Lizhou (based in present-day northwest of Hanyuan, Sichuan). Yuwen Chang said that since Emperor Taizu designated the Dadu River as the border, the Middle Kingdom had been spared of barbarian invasions for 150 years. Building a city beyond the river would inevitably foment border disputes. Therefore, the proposal of building a city was shelved (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 11149). This suggests that not only the emperors of the Song Dynasty followed

45 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, citing Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom”.

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the established strategy of Emperor Taizu, but also the monarchs and officials regarded it as the supreme policy. In the early Northern Song Dynasty, Dali Kingdom made several tributes. In the 9th year of Xining (1076), it dispatched envoys to present gilded marble artefacts, felt and blanket as tribute; in the 7th year (1117), it presented horses and musk as tribute, and the Northern Song court conferred the title King of Dali on its king Duan He. Later, Huang Lin, the Guangzhou Superintendent, who submitted the imperial memorial on the upcoming tribute of Dali Kingdom, was reported to have committed fraud and convicted. From then on, Dali Kingdom stopped all contact with the Song Dynasty, “except for occasional trade in Lizhou” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14073). In the second year of Xuanhe, the Song court reached an agreement with Jin on attacking Liao, intensifying the confrontation on the northern border. The Northern Song Dynasty had stopped improving relations with Dali Kingdom possibly for this reason. The Southern Song Dynasty was even more conservative towards Dali Kingdom, and explicitly ordered that only sale of horses should be allowed but no tribute. Meng Gong the Southern Song Dynasty official also refused to reopen Qingxiguan Road (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 12378). In History of Song: Records of Emperor Xiaozong, there are 10 entries about “Lizhou barbarians invading the border”, “Lizhou barbarians surrendering” and strengthening border defense at Lizhou from the 3rd year of Chunxi (1176) to the 12th year (1185). This indicates that the Southern Song Dynasty strictly abided by the legacy of the ancestors and still regarded the south of the Dadu River in Lizhou as foreign land. In records of tributes presented by the foreign vassals in History of Song, Dali Kingdom is given the same status as Japan, Pagan, and Chenla (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 2813). On the other hand, because the northern regimes stopped trading horses with the Central Plains, the Song Dynasty suffered a severe shortage of supply in war horses, and was forced to buy horses from the Dali Kingdom and the southwestern Borderland regions. In the 7th year of Xining (1074), due to the war in Xihe, the supply of horses was hampered. The Song court ordered Cai Yanqing, the prefect of Chengdu, to take charge of the purchase of horses for Rongzhou and Lizhou. From then on, the purchase of horses from Rongzhou and Lizhou rose and



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fell many times. In the Northern Song Dynasty, the horses purchased from Rongzhou and Lizhou were called “jimi horses”, which were short, inferior in quality, and scanty in number (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4955). After the relocation of the Song court to the south, the scale of horse purchase from Dali and the southwestern barbarians expanded, and the trading location was shifted from southern Sichuan to Guangxi. In the 3rd year of Shaoxing (1133), the Southern Song court established the Horse Purchase Division in Yongzhou, set up a horse trade fair in Hengshan Village (now Tiandong, Guangxi) and entrusted the Administrative Commissioner of Guangnanxilu Route to preside over horse purchase for Yongzhou (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 2340). Relying on the Yongzhou-Shanchan Road, the horse trade between the Southern Song Dynasty and Dali once attained a considerable scale. The annual quota of horses traded in Hengshan Village in the Shaoxing Reign was 1500.46 “When the horses came, they came together with other goods.” Hengshan Village and Yongzhou (based in now Nanning, Guangxi) became the distribution centers for commodity trade between the hinterland and Yunnan. Zhou Qufei said: “The horse trade of the imperial court in the south was exclusively conducted in Yongzhou, where the Borderland rarities also gathered consequently (Zhou, 1999, 47).” The road from Shanchan via Hengshan Village to Yongzhou and further north also become an important channel for Yunnan to connect with the hinterland.47 According to Volume 3 of Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains, “The Middle Kingdom (in the Southern Song Dynasty) had to take the route via Hengshan Village in Yongzhou in contacting the southern barbarians.” In the Southern Song Dynasty, the horses purchased from Dali Kingdom and 46 There was no fixed quota for horses to be purchased every year. Usually several hundred were purchased each year, but there were years when 20-odd horses were bought. Cf. Huang Zhen: Daily Records of Huang’s, Vol. 67, quoted from Fan Chengda: Folk Customs of Guangxi: Appendix 5, 88. 47 Fan Chuo, the author of Book of Barbarians, said that “I am not familiar with the trip from Yongzhou Road to Yangjumei City.” This suggests that there was a road from Yangjumei City to Yongzhou in the Tang Dynasty. However, Fan Chuoyan did not know about its details, indicating that the road was not busy in the Tang Dynasty, hence lack of knowledge about its details. Cf. Fan Chuo, Book of Barbarians, Vol. 1, “Roads within the Boundary of Yunnan”, 28.

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barbarians were diverted from Hengshan Village zhan to Yongzhou, and then sent to the hinterland via Guizhou (Guilin, Guangxi). The trip from Hengshan Village to Yongzhou took 7 days, and that to Guizhou took 18 days. The route led to Hunan via Yongzhou, Binzhou, Xiangzhou and Guizhou, and eventually to Lin’an via Quanzhou.48 According to Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains: Annan Kingdom, Annan envoys could also cross the sea to enter the Middle Kingdom via Qinzhou, Guangxi, and then go north to Guizhou. From Hengshan Village to Shanchan (in today’s Kunming), to the east of Dali Kingdom, there were three routes. The first one was through Lezhou (now Baise north, Guangxi), Suidianzhou (now southeast of Tianlin, Guangxi), Sichengzhou (now Lingyun, Guangxi), Moju (now southwest of Anlong, Guizhou), and Ziqi Kingdom (center in present-day Xingyi, Guizhou); the second was via Qiyuanzhou, Male County, Shuntang Prefecture and Luodian Kingdom (in the west of present-day Guizhou); the third was from Andezhou (to the southeast of Napo in present-day Guangxi), Temodao, and Zuining Prefecture (in present-day Kaiyuan, Yunnan) (Zhou, 1999, 122). The Southern Song Dynasty was cautions about the horse trade in Hengshan Village, and tended to close it where there was the slightest hint of trouble upcoming. Meanwhile, the caravan journey was difficult. Therefore, t records of Dali Kingdom going to Yongzhou to sell horses became increasingly fewer. Ziqi and Luodian, located in the area adjacent to Guizhou and Guangxi, “both bought horses from Dali for sale to the Southern Song Dynasty.” The road from Shanchan to Hengshan Village was blocked in Ziqi in the north and Luodian in the south, making it impossible for the caravan of the Dali Kingdom to arrive, “even after prolonged periods of waiting” (Liu, 2003, 719). The road to Yongzhou via Shanchan was also gradually blocked, and there was no record of Dali caravan passing through Shanchan by the Xianchun Reign (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 13270). When the Mongolian army attacked Dali in the first year of Baoyou (1253), the scouts sent by the

48 Daily Records of Huang’s, Vol. 67.



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Yongzhou government to learn about the status of war could only reach Temo (now Guangnan, Yunnan).49 The situation of Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road in the early Northern Song Dynasty was roughly the same as in the late Tang Dynasty. When it learnt the establishment of the Northern Song Dynasty, the Dali Kingdom sent envoys twice to congratulate it, both via the Qingxiguan Road (Li, 1980). In the 7th year of Taiping Xingguo Reign (982), Emperor Taizong ordered the Commander of Lizhou Garrison to build big ships on the Dadu River, “to ferry the southwestern barbarians coming to pay tribute.” Later, the Dali Kingdom made several tributes via Qingxiguan Road (Li, 1955). However, due to the lukewarm attitude of the Northern Song court, in the Taiping Xingguo Reign or shortly thereafter, officials and citizens of Dali Kingdom entering Sichuan via Qingxiguanguan Road became rare. In the 6th year of Xining (1073), Sichuan businessman Yang Zuocheng answered to the want ad of the Chengdu government and went to Dali to discuss the purchase of horses. Yang and his entourage prepared the gears and rations and set off along the Tongshanzhai section of the Qingxiguan Road, looking for their way through clumps of bean stemming from seeds leaked by preceding travelers. There was not a soul to be seen along the way and sometimes it took an entire day to cross a mere valley when they lost the way. Finally, about 150 li before Yangjumei City, they first saw mountain-dwelling farmers claiming to be originally farmers relocated there in the Huangyou Reign in the Han Dynasty because of year-on-year hunger. “Now our hair has grown hoary, and we never expect to see a fellow national before our death” (Yang, 1980, 6539). This suggests that the Qingxiguan Road had been blocked and virtually deserted. In the 4th year of Shaoding (1231), Dali Kingdom asked the Southern Song Dynasty to reopen the Qingxiguan Road for presenting tribute. However, its request was rejected by Meng Gong, the garrison official, on the grounds that “there are roads from Dali to Yongzhou and Guangzhou, and the detour via Sichuan and Shu is inadvisable.” 49 Li Zengbo, Sequal Manuscripts of Kezhai Studio (2), Vol. 9, “Memorial in Reply to the Imperial Decree”.

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During the Five Dynasties, in the Zhenming Reign of the Liang Dynasty, the powerful nobility Qu Chengmei established a separatist regime in Jiaozhou. In the 6th year of Qiande (968) in the Song Dynasty, Ding Buling conquered the twelve county magistrates of Jiaozhou to build Daquyue Kingdom. In the 6th year of Kaibao (973), Ding Buling dispatched an envoy to pay tribute, and Emperor Taizu of Song named his son Ding Lian as the Protector of Annan and the King of Jiaozhi (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14058). Ding Lian and his father died in the fifth year of Taiping Xingguo (980). Yongzhou Prefect Hou Renbao suggested that the civil turmoil of Jiaozhou should be exploited and an army be sent to conquer it. Emperor Taizong then appointed him as Transport Commissioner of Jiaozhou, and ordered him to launch the offensive. In the following year, Hou Renbao fell into a trap of Jiaozhou and was killed, and the Song army was defeated.50 After the ill-fated attempt to recover Jiaozhou, the Northern Song court treated Annan as a feudal vassal according to tradition, and refrained from any further thought of recovering it by force. In the 3rd year of Jingde (1006), Emperor Zhenzong showed the water and land transportation map from Yongzhou to Jiaozhou to his closest ministers and said: “Jiaozhou is a land of malaria, and Yizhou is extremely dangerous. Sending an army to conquer them will mean many deaths and injuries. Moreover, our ancestors have secured such a large territory for us, we should guard it carefully. What’s the point to labor the people for taking the useless land” (Xu, 1957). This policy was also inherited by the Southern Song Dynasty. In the first year of Chunxi (1174), Daquyue Kingdom made a tribute, and Emperor Xiaozong issued an edict for conferring the title “Annan” on it, and appointing Li Tianzuo the King of Annan (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14058). Annan harassed Guangxi many times. In the spring of the first year of Zhidao (995), it dispatched more than 100 warships from Jiaozhou and invaded Ruhong Town of Qinzhou, plundering residents and grains, before attacking Lüzhou under Yongzhou in the summer (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14062). In the 8th year of Xining (1075), Annan even captured 50 [Ming Dynasty] Chen Bangzhan, Ins and Outs of Records in History of Song, Vol. 15, “The Revolution of Jiaozhou”



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Yongzhou, Qinzhou and Lianzhou (Shen, 2007, 165). The uprising of Nong Zhigao came as an even greater shock for the Song court. In the 4th year of Huangyou (1052), Nong Zhigao, the leader of Guangyuan Jimi Sub-prefecture under the jurisdiction of Yongzhou rose in rebellion. His army broke through Yongzhou, captured Heng, Gui, Gong, Xun, Teng, Wu, Feng, Kang, and Duan Sub-prefecture, and besieged the city of Guangzhou, before being defeated by the general Di Qing and his troops. Nong Zhigao fled to Dali Kingdom alone. Afterwards, the Song court believed that Nong Zhigao’s rebellion was related to Annan, and that Dali Kingdom was also a scourge. So it ordered Di Qing to divide Guangzhou, Yongzhou, Yizhou, and Rongzhou Subprefecture into three routes, appointed their defenders as the military supervisors, and instated a management and placation commissioner in Guizhou. It also instated the Jianwu Military Governor in Yongzhou for ruling Zuojiang and Youjiang, which were responsible for guarding against Annan and barbarians of Dali Kingdom respectively. It also established more than 60 ethnic jimi clusters and guarded them with 5,000 troops. All wars along the border with Annan and Dali Kingdom were the responsibility of Yongzhou; the management and placation commissioner also had to rely on “Yongzhou” solely in handling border affairs (Zhou, 1999, 47). According to “Biography of Dali Kingdom” in History of Song, in the Chunxi Reign, there were more than 100,000 native troops guarding Zuojiang and Youjiang area. The heavy defense was “intended to check Dali Kingdom.” Yongzhou thus became an important town of border defense in Guangxi and an important market for foreign trade. In order to guard against Annan and to collect taxes, the Song Dynasty made conscious efforts to manage Guangxi, and ushered in the fastest growing period for the area before the Ming Dynasty. One of the signs of its emphasis on Guangxi was to raise the status of Guizhou (Guangxi Guilin) by placing under its jurisdiction the Guangnan Xilu Route. In the Han Dynasty, the based for Lingnan was in Jiaozhou, and the Tang Dynasty was in Guangzhou. When Nong Zhigao rebelled in the Huangyou Zhongping years, the Song court instated the management and placation commissioner in Guizhou, with its prefect cooperating in placation affairs, turning Guizhou into “the most important

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sub-prefecture of Guangnan Xilu Route” (Zhou, 1999, 42). Yongzhou was also valued as the gateway to Annan and Dali Kingdom and the road from Guizhou to Yongzhou became an important transportation line in Guangxi. In the Southern Song Dynasty, 18 post houses were set up along the way (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 10680). In addition, thousands of delivery agencies were set up on the waterway northward from Guizhou along the Xiangshui River, but the transportation was still busy. Therefore, Hengzhou Justice Zhang Qixian secured the approval of the court and reduced the conscript labor on the water delivery services by half (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 9150). The establishment of Annan as a kingdom changed its geopolitical relationship with Guangxi. Although the road from Yongzhou to Annan remained passable, the Song court took strict precautions against it for border defense. Although there was a trade fair in Yongping Village right next to Annan, the traders were all the native people of Annan (Zhou, 1999, 195). Qinzhou was opposite to Annan across the sea, far away from the Yongzhou-Annan Road, and become an active market for the official-civilian trade between the Southern Song Dynasty and Annan. Zhou Qufei said: “The means of livelihood in Cochin all hinged on Qinzhou; the ferrying boats are in an endless stream.” Wealthy merchants bought brocade from Sichuan to Qinzhou for sale once a year, with a transaction volume reaching thousands of strings of coppers. Those who went to the trader also included wealthy businessmen in Yongan Sub-prefecture of Annan and special envoys from Daluo City (in present-day Hanoi, Vietnam), with transactions known as “Xiaogang” and “Dagang” respectively (Zhou, 1999, 196). The Guangxi government also obtained imperial approval for establishing posthouses in Qinzhou, “allowing the people of Cochin to trade there” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4564). Overseas merchant ships also moored in Qinzhou, not only for supply of fresh water but also for trading. By and by, Qinzhou became an important international commercial port. The Song court also strengthened the management of Hainan Island and set up the Jinghai Naval Command in Qiongzhou (currently Haikou City, Hainan Province). Therefore, Qiongzhou become an important commercial port (Zhou, 1999, 45). According to the memorial



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of Qiongzhou government in the third year of Yuanfeng (1080), merchants from Quanzhou, Fuzhou, Liangzhe, and Huguang mostly brought gold, silver and silk to Qiongzhou for trading, “and the trade amount can exceed a dozen strings of copper sometimes” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4544).

5.4. The Communication Lines from the Middle Kingdom to the China-Indochina Peninsula in the Song Dynasty and Their Utilization The Dali Kingdom had a lackadaisical relationship with the Song Dynasty, but maintained close contacts with the kingdoms of the ChinaIndochina Peninsula. According to Anecdotal History of Nanzhao, in the second year of Chongning (1103) in the Song Dynasty, Burmese, Persia, and Kunlun sent white elephants and incense to Dali Kingdom as tribute. Among them, the Burmese lived in northern Burma today, while Persia and Kunlun refer to present day Pathein and Nasirin in Burma respectively. Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains also said that Pagan Kingdom was five days’ journey away from Dali Kingdom, not far from West Tintu, “and could possibly be accessed.” “I was told that the trip from Dali Kingdom to Wanshe City was no more than 40 days’ journey.” Wanshe City is located in present-day Bihar, India (Zhou, 1999, 122, 108). Yang Zuo and his entourage went to Dayunnan Posthouse (in present-day Xiangyun County, Yunnan), and saw Lihou Stele in front of it. The inscription showed the direction of the road from Yunnan eastward to Rongzhou, westward to India, southeast to Jiaozhi and northeast to Chengdu, north to Daxueshan and south to the sea, “with complete details of the lengths.” This shows that the land roads from Yunnan to Sichuan, the ChinaIndochina Peninsula and even Tintu opened by the previous generations still existed in the Dali Kingdom; through these roads, Dali Kingdom continued to communicate with the China-Indochina Peninsula countries and even India. As seen in the previous description, it was very difficult to enter Sichuan from Yunnan. The Shimenguan Road in the Song Dynasty was basically abandoned, while the Qingxiguan road was difficult to pass most of the time.

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Pagan was located in the north of present-day Burma, only five days away from Dali Kingdom (Zhou, 1999, 84). Before the Song Dynasty, the Dan Kingdom and Piao Kingdom in the present-day north-central part of Burma, had close contacts with the Chinese hinterland via the road through Yunnan. However, it sent only two batches of envoys to the Song court, because of the poor road through Yunnan. According to records, in the 5th year of Chongning (1106), “The Kingdom of Pagan paid a tribute to the Song court.” Song court deemed Pagan as a great kingdom and gave its envoys a higher standard of reception than their counterparts of Dayi and Cochin (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14087). In the sixth year of Shaoxing (1136), when “Dali Kingdom and Pagan Kingdom came to pay tribute,” Emperor Gaozong ordered the Guangxi Management Commissioner to escort them to Lin’an (Xu, 1957). This suggests that the envoys from Pagan and Dali had traveled together to Yongzhou through the road via Yunnan. As for the tribute of Pagan in the fifth year of Chongning, the journey it took was unclear due to loss of records.51 In the Song Dynasty, other kingdoms of the China-­ Indochina Peninsula also sent envoys to the Song court, but there seems to be no record of their passing through Yunnan. Before the Song Dynasty, there were mainly two roads connecting the hinterland to Cochin, one through Yunnan and the other via Guangxi. There are more records of travels along the previous road. The Song Dynasty distanced itself from Dali, and made the Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road from Yunnan to Shu impassable. The northward road to the Central Plains through Yongzhou and Guizhou became the more important land route connecting Annan to the Song Dynasty. The envoys sent by Annan to the Song court mostly took the route via Yongzhou as the first choice. The Song Dynasty took great care to guard against Annan. If Annan wished to send envoys to the Song Dynasty via Yongzhou or Qinzhou, it must send an envoy for 51 According to the “Pagan Kingdom” in Vol. 1 of Records of Barbarian Countries, in the first year of Jingde (1004), Pagan sent envoys together with Srivijaya and Dayi Kingdom to the Song court to pay tribute. Their envoys were allowed to attend the lantern show of the Lantern Festival. However, Pagan Kingdom should be Butuan, which is believed to be on the north coast of Mindanao, Philippines. Cf. Chen Jiarong, A History of Communication Between China and Foreign Countries, 278.



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negotiation with the Song court and the agreement should be submitted to the court for approval by the Guizhou Administrative Commissioner; only when an imperial decree allowed it can envoys be sent. Otherwise, it shouldn’t do so (Zhou, 1999, 58). When the countries of the ChinaIndochina Peninsula paid tribute to the Song Dynasty, they might take the road via Yongzhou. In the 8th year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1015), Champa sent envoys to escort trained elephants from Jiaozhou to Que (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14083). In the 9th year of Qiandao (1173), Annan gave ten elephants to the Southern Song Dynasty and followed its original itinerary taken in the 26th year of Shaoxin, crossing the sea to Qinzhou before heading north along the land route.52 The Kingdom of Chenla also traveled by land from Annan to Guangxi while sending tribute elephants to the Ming court (Fang, 2005). Because of the long distance, the tamed elephants might die from failure to acclimatization, so land route was always the optimal choice. Envoys or merchants from various countries to the Middle Kingdom mainly considered safety and speed, so they might not choose to go by land. As there were disputes between Annan and Song Dynasty from time to time, the road from Annan to Yongzhou was closed sometimes. Under normal circumstances, the countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula mostly chose sea routes to the Song Dynasty, and seldom took the northward land routes via Annan and Yongzhou. Even the Song envoys favored the sea route to Annan. In the first year of Chunhua (990), the Song court sent Song Gao as an envoy to Annan, “and Song Gao had a dangerous trip navigating among the waves” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14061). Since the 22nd year of Yuan Dynasty (1285), the Yuan Dynasty set up post stations along the road from Yongzhou to Annan and strengthened its management, turning it into the primary channel

52 Fan Chengda, “Memorial on an Upcoming Tribute of Elephants”, Selected Regulations of the Song Dynasty, Vol. 199, citing Fan Chengda, Folk Customs of Guangxi: Appendix 4, 86; Another theory says that the journey of the tribute elephant in the 9th year of Qiandao was from Yongping Village to Jingjiang via Yongzhou. Cf. Zhou Qufei, Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains, Vol. 2, “Foreign Countries (1): Annan Kingdom”, 58. The truthfulness of the account needs further study.

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for Annan to contact the Central Plains.53 In the Yuan Dynasty, Li Ze also said that “The imperial court overthrew the Song Dynasty, and the Guizhou post became the place via which Annan sent elephants as tribute because it was near” (Li, 1995, 368). The Yongzhou-Annan Road wound past the due south of Taiping Village in Zuojiang and crossed the Fuliang River and the Baiteng River at Guanglang Huabu. The entire trip took four days. A trip from the southeast of Taiping Village to Liangzhou after crossing the Dantluo Xiaojiang River took six days; the trip from Wenrun Village in Youjiang was the farthest (Fan, 1984, 50). Zhou Qufei described roughly the same scenario, saying that one day’s boat trip from the southwest of Qinzhou to Yong’an Prefecture in Annan took one day, and that after another five days’ travel from Dapan Village in Yushan led to the capital of Annan after passing Yongtai and Wanchun. If you travel south from Yongping Village in Zuojiang, Yongzhou (near Youyiguan in present-day Guangxi), enter Jilang County (Guanang County, near Gaoping in present-day Vietnam), and cross the two small rivers of Wupi and Taohua (that is, tributaries of the Ruyue River), you can reach the capital of Annan after four days. Or you may travel southeast from Taiping Village, and cross the Dantluo River (the upper reaches of the present-day Ping’er River) into Langzhou, you can reach the capital of Annan after six days (Zhou, 1999, 55). It can be seen from relevant records of the Song Dynasty that overseas countries had come to the Song Dynasty for tribute or trade basically by sea. According to Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains, the Wali kingdoms near the Middle Kingdom had taken Champa and Chenla as the metropolis of transportation; Chenla was farther than Champa, and its neighboring countries of Wali, Xipeng, Sanbo and Malan, Dengliumei, and Dilata all 53 Song Lian et al., History of Yuan, Vol. 209, “Biography of Annan”. According to the book, in the 19th year of Zhiyuan, Emperor Shizu ordered Chai Chun to begin his trip from Jiangling to Cochin via Yongzhou. When Chai Chun and his company reached Yongping Village in Yongzhou, Chen Rixuan, King of Annan, sent them a letter, saying that “We learnt that you have condescended to our humble land, and disconcerting the border people. We have no idea who you are or why you are here. Could you possibly return where you came?” This suggests that before the establishment of the post station in the 22nd year of Zhiyuan, the roads from Yongzhou to Annan were not readily passable, nor were they regarded as “obsolete roads”.



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relied on it as a metropolis. The travelers from those countries often reached Champa in the north via sea routes. Zhunian Kingdom was Southern India in the west, “and could be reached by boat from Gulin Kingdom” (Zhou, 1999, 74). The famous western kingdoms include Rajgir, Tintu and Central India, which had routes connecting the Song Dynasty. According to Routes to the Borderland Barbarians by Jia Dan, “those routes led to Tintu via Annan” (Zhou, 1999, 108). In terms of wealth among overseas countries, no one was richer than Dayi, Dupo and Srivijaya. Travelers of Srivijaya must sail due north, pass Upper Tintu, Lower Tintu and the sea ships would pass through Shangzhu and Jiaoyang to reach the Song territory. Those from Dayi would take small boats and travel south; switch to larger ships at Guling Kingdom and travel east to Srivijaya, where it took the maritime route to the Song territory (Zhou, 1999, 126). For a trip to Dupo, travelers had to depart from Guangzhou in November, “hoping to reach their destination in January” (Zhou, 1999, 88). The overseas transportation and trade in the Song Dynasty, especially the Southern Song Dynasty, was highly prosperous. The situation was attributable to the remarkable socio-economic development of the Song Dynasty, the retirement of the Southern Song Dynasty to the southeast, and the obstruction of land routes to the surrounding areas. In the Song Dynasty, the biggest change in maritime traffic in the southeast was the significant decline of Jiaozhou’s status as a hub, and continuous rise of Champa’s status. Annan was a neighboring or enemy country in the Song Dynasty, and often detained or robbed ships sailing from other countries to the Middle Kingdom. Therefore, most sea-going ships from other countries were reluctant to call at Jiaozhou; instead, they turned to Champa, which had closely relationship with the Song Dynasty. Champa had frequent exchanges with the Song Dynasty. According to records in History of Song, Selected Regulations of the Song Dynasty and Imperial Encyclopedia: Statutes on Borderland Peoples, Champa sent 60 batches of envoys to the Song court to pay tribute (Chen, 1987, 273). The great importance attached by the Song Dynasty to Champa (in Quy Nhon, Vietnam) can be seen in the following record: “Champa was to the southwest of the Middle Kingdom, adjoining the sea in the east, Yunnan in the west, Chenla Kingdom in the south, and Huanzhou

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in the north. It is three days’ journey to Srivijaya in the south by sea, and one month’s journey to Bintulu by land—Bintulu was under its jurisdiction. It’s two days’ journey to Mayi Kingdom in the east, and seven days’ journey to Putuan Kingdom. Travel to Guangzhou in the north takes half a month downwind and to Liangzhe in the northeast takes one month. It is two days’ journey to Jiaozhou in the northwest and half a month’s trip by land” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14077). “Champa is connected to Guangzhou in the east by sea, to Yunnan in the west, Chenla in the south, Cochin and Yongzhou in the north; it leads to the Middle Kingdom via Quanzhou, after sailing down the wind for twenty days” (Zhao, 1996, 8). Before the Yuan Dynasty, most of the seafaring ships from various countries to the southeastern coast of China still stopped in Champa, highlighting its role as a hub in shipping. Zhou Daguan accompanied the envoys to Chenla and said that he sailed from the port of Wenzhou and arrived in Champa after more than 20 days. According to Folk Customs of Chenla, he set off from Wenzhou, passed the ports of Fujian and Guangxi, crossed the Qizhou Ocean and the Cochin Ocean to reach Champa; from Champa, one can reach Zhenpu after half a month’s trip down the wind, “and that is the land of Chenla” (Zhou Daguan, 2000, 15). Zhou Zhizhong said that “(Champa) adjoins Chenla in the south, Annan in the north; it can be reached by ship from Guangzhou can after eight days down the wind” (Zhou Zhizhong, 2000, 27). History of Yuan said that “Java belongs to the overseas and is farther than Champa. Those setting off from Quannan by boat reach Champa before it” (Song et al., 1976, 4664). Li Ze stated more clearly: “Champa is founded on the coastlines. Chinese merchants who go to foreign countries gather here for supply of fresh water. It is the first wharf in the south” (Li, 1995, 43). Another change in maritime transportation from the Middle Kingdom to the China-Indochina Peninsula in the Song Dynasty was that Qinzhou and Qiongzhou became important ports for ships of all countries to call halfway, and the well-known seaports of Xuwen (now southwest of Xuwen, Guangdong) and Hepu (now southwest of Pubei, Guangxi) since the Qin and Han Dynasties gradually diminished in influence day by day.



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According to Book of Han: Geographic Records (8:2), Rinan Zhangsai, Xuwen, and Hepu were important ports for berthing ships of the Middle Kingdom and kingdoms of the South China Sea, until the Song Dynasty. In addition, although many seagoing ships have called on Hainan Island, Hainan was not yet a stable port. In the Tang Dynasty, Jia Dan described the roads to the Borderland barbarian lands, mentioning the road from Guangzhou to the overseas barbarians, and saying that sea ships stopped at Jiuzhoushi (now Qizhou Archipelago to the northeast of Hainan Island) and Xiangshi (now Duzhu Mountain in the southeast of Hainan Island) (Ouyang et al., 1975). After the early Song Dynasty, the above situation changed. Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains said that “Now [ships] from all the coastal prefectures and counties from northeast to southwest all stop at Qinzhou.” The Song court set up the inspection commission in Qinzhou to “welcome ships coming from afar and send them off” (Zhou, 1999, 126, 53). Folk Customs of Guangxi also said that starting from Annan, “the east sea road leads to Qin and Lian” (Fan, 1984, 50). This suggests that Qinzhou had become the main port for the seafaring ships of the Middle Kingdom and other countries to call in Guangxi, followed by Lianzhou (in the site of the former Hepu).54 The lively Xuwen Port of the previous generation seemed to have disappeared from the records of the Song Dynasty. Zhou Qufei pointed out that Lianzhou was inferior to Qinzhou in importance, and added that “previously ships from Annan mostly called in Lianzhou, but some were sunken; so they switched to Qinzhou.” “Qinzhou was close to Yonganzhou and can be reached in the afternoon if one set off in the morning” (Zhou, 1999, 53). In other words, the sea of Lianzhou was dangerous and prone to cause capsizing, while the water of Qinzhou was safe and close to Annan. As a result, all the ships including Annan were willing to berth in Qinzhou. However, according to Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains, “Cochin relies on Qinzhou for everything needed for subsistence, hence the endless stream of boats shuttling between them.” 54 In the 8th year of Zhenguan (634), the Tang Dynasty set up Lianzhou in the former site of Hepu. Song Dynasty followed the setting.

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Qinzhou was a prosperous international market, and there were post roads connected to it. That is also an important reason for Qinzhou to be welcomed by sea ships of all countries. Sea ships passing Hainan Island tended to stop at Qiongzhou, because the Song Dynasty established the Jinghai Naval Commission there and turned Qiongzhou into a well-known market. In the Yuan Dynasty, Qiongzhou was still an important transit point for Chinese and foreign sea-going ships. History of Yuan stated that “Champa is near Qiongzhou, and can be reached by boat down within one day” (Song et al., 1976, 4660).

5.5. Conclusion The transportation links between the hinterland and the southwestern Borderland began very early. Between the hinterland of China and the China-Indochina Peninsula, there had been two types of transportation lines, land and sea. During the 610 years of its reign in the Tang and Song dynasties, the Middle Kingdom witnessed important changes in communication lines with China-Indochina Peninsula. The governance policies and administration of the southwestern Borderland regions, as well as the changes in the conditions of the southwestern Borderland regions and the China-Indochina Peninsula were important reasons for the changes in those lines of communication and their utilization. The changes in the communication routes between the Middle Kingdom and the China-Indochina Peninsula in the Tang and Song dynasties also profoundly affected the pattern of geopolitical relations between the southwestern Borderland and the China-Indochina Peninsula. The Tang Dynasty actively expanded its borders and focused on the management of the Yunnan region and the western part of Lingnan. The Yaozhou Command set up in western Yunnan and the Annan Protectorate established on the basis of Jiaozhou were located at the two ends of the Anan-Tintu Road, serving as the bridgeheads for stabilizing the southwestern Borderland. The land and sea transportation between the Middle Kingdom and the China-Indochina Peninsula was prosperous; through these roads, the kingdoms of the China-Indochina Peninsula maintained close contacts with the Tang Dynasty. Envoys sent by countries in the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula



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to the Tang Dynasty mostly traveled along the Yunnan-Chengdu Road. The Anan-Tintu Road leading from Yunnan to the China-Indochina Peninsula and India, the Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road from Yunnan to Chengdu, and the shipping routes from Jiaozhou to Guangzhou and other places were among the busy traffic lines in the Tang Dynasty. In addition, the Tang Dynasty also set up some post houses on the above land routes, while Jiaozhou became the most prosperous trading port in southern Asia. Since the development of the hostility between the Tang Dynasty and Nanzhao, Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road were affected, and the effect on the latter was especially significant. The Song Dynasty had to a powerful enemy in the north, and mostly had a difficult time defending itself. Its emphasis on weighing the pros and cons in border management was also influenced by the strategy of “enhancing internal control and slackening external affairs.” Thus, it made the Dadu River the demarcation with Dali Kingdom, and distanced itself from the latter. By and by, the Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road were abandoned. In order to secure the supply of war horses, it purchased horses from Dali and other southwestern kingdoms. During the Southern Song Dynasty, the horse trade through Guangxi was prosperous. The eastward road from Yunnan to Nanning was once an important transportation line; however, it was blocked and difficult to pass in the late Southern Song Dynasty. The Song court recognized Annan as a nation. In order to prevent Annan and increase taxes, it focused on operating Guangxi, and highlighted present-day Guilin and Nanning. The road between the two places gradually became busy, and was taken by envoys sent by Dali and Annan to Song. However, it was blocked from time to time. Affected by the above changes, the China-Indochina Peninsula and overseas countries communicating with the Song Dynasty mostly chose the sea route to the southeast coast. The changes to this sea route were mainly due to the fact that most of the seagoing ships stopped midway in Champa, Qinzhou and Qiongzhou. So the transit ports of Annan, Xuwen, and Hepu, which were prosperous in previous generations, tended to decline. In addition to changes in geopolitical relations, Qinzhou became a prosperous trading market in the Song Dynasty,

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furnishing an important reason for attracting past sea ships to call. As for the Pagan and other countries close to Yunnan, they had very little contact with the Song Dynasty due to the obstruction of the land route to the north. The changes in the communication lines between the Song Dynasty and the China-Indochina Peninsula also led to changes in the geopolitical structure of Yunnan and the China-Indochina Peninsula. Since the Song Dynasty, the situation where Yunnan and Jiaozhi were used as the positions to operate the China-Indochina Peninsula in both directions ceased to exist. The rise of the Luchuan power centered on present-day Ruili in Yunnan in the Ming Dynasty posed a threat to the stability of the southwestern Borderland. The Ming Dynasty sent 400,000 to 50,000 troops and spent nearly ten years to put it down, but the troubles remained. Eventually, the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula finally broke away from its control. The emergence of this major event was attributed to the passive border policy of the Song Dynasty for the southwestern Borderland and the change of its communication line to the ChinaIndochina Peninsula.

6.  Changes in the Relationship between Yunnan and the Surrounding Areas The relationship between Yunnan and its surrounding areas in ancient times contained the formation of the administrative districts of Yunnan Province, and its relationship with neighboring provinces, and neighboring kingdoms. Yunnan and its surrounding areas constitute a relatively complete physical geographic unit, but the formation of its political administration, the evolution and determination of its relationship with surrounding areas, as well as the basic stereotypes were mainly the result of interaction among many factors, including politics, economy, and society. Among those factors, the one most worthy of attention is the strategy and policy for border governance in the China’s imperial history, the geopolitical relations in Yunnan, and the internal and external communication lines of Yunnan.



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6.1  The relationship between Yunnan and surrounding areas was based on a certain degree of similarity in natural environment. They belong to a relatively complete geographic unit, with the common features of similar geomorphic and climatic characteristics in roughly the same latitude, as well as similar animal and plant resources and mineral resources derived. In the long process of development, Yunnan and its surrounding areas underwent a complex process of differentiation and combination. It finally formed the current political jurisdiction, as well as a stable political relationship with the surrounding areas. As a relatively independent geographic unit, the geographic environment of Yunnan has the following characteristics: high in the northwest and low in the southeast, with the large rivers such as the Jinsha River and the Lancang River rushing from the northwest to the southeast, creating a fragmented terrain. In Yunnan, there are many mountainous plateaus, and plains occupy only 6% of the total land area. In terms of climate, it features “a different weathers every ten miles”, and obviously different climates for parts of different altitudes in the same area. Affected by those factors, the ancient Yunnan was thick with forests and grasslands and rich in animal and plant resources, but there were marked differences at different latitudes. As a result, Yunnan was divided into several regional plates, including Central Yunnan, Northeast Yunnan, West Yunnan, Southwest Yunnan, Southeast Yunnan, North Yunnan, and Northwest Yunnan. Those regional plates were similar in varying degrees to the surrounding areas in natural environment, and again those similarity they are used as a basis to form several geographic units. Based on the naturally formed geographical unit, Yunnan gradually developed a relatively stable political relationship with its surrounding areas. It was deeply influenced mainly in political, economic, social and historical development, by the following factors: the thought and focus of managing Yunnan in imperial China, the rise and fall of the transportation lines inside and outside Yunnan and their influence, the status of Yunnan in the southwestern Borderland regions and the

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formation of its administrative region, the role of geopolitical relations (political relations closely related to geographical factors), the status of economic development and social governance, and the effectiveness of the imperial jurisdiction. The relationship of Yunnan with surrounding areas was composed of that with other parts of the motherland and that with the neighboring countries. The former includes that with the hinterland and that with neighboring provinces. Its relationship with the hinterland can be subdivided into that between the Borderland and the hinterland, that between the central and local governments, and that between indirect subordination and direct jurisdiction. The relationship of Yunnan with neighboring provinces includes that with Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and Xizang. Its relationship with neighboring countries can be divided into that with Vietnam, Burma, Laos and Thailand. Changes in its relationship with the surrounding areas were also attributable to socio-economic development and changes in the pattern. From the Qin and Han dynasties to the end of the Qing Dynasty, the relationship can be roughly divided into two stages with the early Yuan Dynasty as the demarcation: the early stage and the late stage. The former includes the Qin, Han, Wei, Jin and Southern dynasties, Sui, Tang, and Song dynasties, Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms; the latter stage includes the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. In the first stage, the Central Plains dynasty established and initially consolidated its rule over Yunnan and the surrounding areas, as mainly manifested in the establishment of prefectures and counties and the implementation of administrative measures. However, the effectiveness of the rule was still relatively limited. Affected by such factors as the traditional prioritization of the north over the south, the relatively backward development of Yunnan and surrounding areas and the obscure resource advantages, the dynasties had placed Yunnan under the jurisdiction of the Sichuan administrative region, and basically didn’t collect taxes locally, in accordance with a governance roughly the same as the jimi policy implemented in the Borderlands since the Han Dynasty. During this period, there was no large-scale governance or development of Yunnan and the surrounding areas. Due to the relatively loose rule of the Central Plains dynasty, Nanzhao and



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Dali kingdoms became separatist regimes in Yunnan and lasted more than 500 years during the Tang and Song dynasties. Under their rule, Yunnan witnessed markedly progress in socio-economic development. In the latter stage, the Yuan Dynasty established the Yunnan Province, shifted the ruling center from western Yunnan to eastern Yunnan, actively operated the Yunnan region and extensively collected taxes, and opened the post road from Kunming to Huguang via Guiyang. In the Ming Dynasty, in order to protect this lifeline official road, and because Yunnan was separated from Sichuan’s administrative jurisdiction, Guizhou Province was established, laying the foundation for the administrative structure of the four provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. The Yuan Dynasty promoted the native official system suitable for local characteristics in the southwestern Borderland regions, and extended its rule deep into the Borderland and the grassroots. The Ming and Qing dynasties inherited and further developed the Yuan system and greatly enhanced the effective rule over Yunnan. In the latter stage, the social economy of Yunnan witnessed comprehensive and in-depth development, and active management of mountainous and border areas under strengthened construction of the hinterland. In the three dynasties of Yuan, Ming and Qing, the pattern of economic development in Yunnan was established, and the pattern extended to modern times. In the process of social and economic development, Yunnan took on different characteristics from other surrounding areas, and gradually evolved into a relatively independent administrative jurisdiction with a clear extension.

6.2  The scope of Yunnan’s administrative region and the relationship between Yunnan and surrounding areas underwent thousands of years of development and evolution. The earliest knowledge of the Yunnan region for the hinterland can be found in the records of southwestern Borderland regions in Records of the Grand Historian. In the 5th year of Yuanding (111 BC), the Western Han Dynasty sent troops to conquer the Nanyue Kingdom, which is in present-day Guangdong, via Zangkejiang (now Beipanjiang). After a victorious battle, the returning

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Han army attacked the Yelang tribe (in present-day eastern Guizhou) who were unwilling to send troops to assist its military action against Nanyue and set up several counties in present-day Xichang, Sichuan and northwestern Sichuan. By the second year of Yuanfeng (109 BC), the Western Han Dynasty had established a total of seven counties in southwestern Borderland regions, namely Qianweijun (based in present-day Yibin, Sichuan), Yankejun (based in present-day southwest of Huangping, Guizhou), Yuexi County (based in present-day Xichang, Sichuan), Shenli County (based in present-day northeast of Hanyuan,  Sichuan), Wenshan County (based in present-day north of Maowen, Sichuan), Wudu County (based in present-day south of Xihe, Gansu), Yizhou County (based in present-day Jinning, Yunnan) (Ban, 1962, 1599–1602, 1609; Fan, 1965, 3509–3514). Among them, Yizhou County, when first established, had under its jurisdiction roughly the area of the ancient kingdom of Dian, the largest ancient country in the entire southwestern Borderland regions. The based Jinning is now the site of the tombs of the Dian royal family, and is presumed to be the administration center of Dian. A few years after the establishment of Yizhou County, the Western Han Dynasty defeated the nomadic Xi and Kunming tribes in present-day Yunnan, and placed most of their land under the jurisdiction of Yizhou County (Fan, 1965, 2846). Therefore, the vast area extending to Nongdong in the north (now to the north of Yao’an, Yunnan), (present-day Lai Châu province of Vietnam in the south), Buwei (based in present-day Baoshan, Yunnan) in the west, and Zangke in the east (now western Guizhou) in the east came under its jurisdiction, making it the most extensive and most powerful county in the entire southwestern Borderland regions. Later, Sima Qian went to Xichang as an envoy in the capacity of a Lieutenant General. After returning, he wrote down what he saw and heard in Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of southwestern Borderland regions. Sima Qian referred to the numerous tribes in Yunnan, Guizhou, and southwestern Sichuan as “Xinan Yi”, and writings during the Han Dynasty also referred to those areas by the same name. Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty had managed the southwestern Borderland regions mainly for opening the military route along the Zangkejiang (now Beipanjiang) to Panyu (based in present-day



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Guangzhou), then capital of Nanyue Kingdom, and international communication line from Shu (now Sichuan Basin) to India through the southwestern Borderland regions and India. The road was later called the “Sichuan-Yunnan-Burma-India Road.” As for the southwestern Borderland regions in the Han Dynasty, it also included remote areas such as western and northwest Sichuan, probably because the Xi and Kunming had ventured south from present-day Gansu and Qinghai, while the migration activities in the early Han Dynasty were still active. The region is now called Western Sichuan-Xizang-Burma Ethnic Corridor. Before the official operation of southwestern Borderland regions, the envoys of the Western Han Dynasty from Shu to India were repeatedly blocked by the Xi and Kunming tribes. So Emperor Wu built the Kunming Pool for drilling naval forces, vowing to defeat and control them (Sima, 1959, 1428). The Eastern Han Dynasty inherited the rule of the Western Han Dynasty and established Yongchang County in Baoshan, Yunnan, placing under its jurisdiction southwestern and southern Yunnan to the west and south of present-day Dali, and the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula, and roughly establishing the southwestern Borderland regions of the later Central Plains dynasty. The establishment of Yongchang County was mainly because of the repeated wars, which forced the submission of Ailao Yi, located in the southern section of the Shu-India Road (Fan, 1965, 2849). Collectively known as “southwestern Borderland regions”, Yunnan, Guizhou, southwest Sichuan, and northern Indochina Peninsula were governed by the Yizhou Governor (based in present-day Chengdu, Sichuan), thus forming the tradition of Yunnan and surrounding areas under the jurisdiction of Shu. During the Han Dynasty, travelers from the southwestern Borderland regions to the hinterland had to enter the Sichuan Basin first, and then take the Shiniu Road and Baoxie Road to the present-day Shaanxi. The road from the Sichuan Basin to the north was very difficult and dangerous, as seen in the saying “the path to Shu is more difficult than climbing up into the heaven.” At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, the pattern of three kingdoms standing off against each other was formed, and the southwestern Borderland regions were ruled by the Shu Han. The southwestern

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Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou regions were called “Nanzhong.” Back then, the migration activities of Xi and Kunming tribes in the “SichuanXizang Burma Ethnic Corridor” gradually came to a halt. The Shenli County (based to the present-day northeast of Hanyuan) and Wenshan County (based to the present-day north of Maowen) established in the Western Han Dynasty in the area were abolished. Now that the Western Sichuan region gradually faded out of the ruler’s vision, it was no longer included in the Nanzhong established by the Shu Han. After stamping out the rebellion of the local forces in Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang set up a total of seven counties in Nanzhong. While maintaining the original Yuexi County (based in present-day Xichang), Zangke County (based in present-day southwestern Huangping), Yongchang County (based in present-day Baoshan), and Zhuti County (based in present-day Zhaotong, Yunnan), he changed Yizhou Prefecture to Jianning Prefecture and moved the government seat to Zhiwei County (now Qujing) Meanwhile, land was taken from the two counties of Jianning and Yuexi for establishing Yunnan Prefecture, with the government seat in Nongdong (to the north of present-day Yao’an); the two counties of Jianning and Zangke were reorganized into Xinggu County, with the government seat in Wanwen (to the north of present-day Yanshan Mountain in Yunnan) (Chang, 1984, 357). The Shu Han also added several counties in today’s Lincang and Xishuangbanna. The establishment of Yunnan Prefecture helped Shu Han to strengthen its control over the area between north of Dianchi Lake and Erhai Lake, and initially connected the populated areas there. The addition of Xinggu Prefecture reflected its intention of controlling the area north of Cochin (currently Hanoi, Vietnam) in order to contend against Sun Wu for Cochin. The addition of several counties in Lincang and Xishuangbanna was presumably the result of newly built roads there. The details are uncertain due to the lack of records. Judging from the existing records, the Shu Han cherished maintaining the accessibility of the road from Shu to India and Cochin (the road from the present central Yunnan to the present Hanoi, Vietnam) in ruling Nanzhong. The Shu Han set up the Laixiang Governor-General Command as the military and administrative center for ruling Nanzhong. It took present-day northeastern Yunnan as the base for managing Nanzhong,



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mainly according to the Han Chinese tradition of placing the southwestern Borderland regions under the jurisdiction of Shu, relying on the Wuchi Road extending from present-day Yibin of Sichuan to northeast and central Yunnan, as well as the Lingguan Road extending from Chengdu to Yunnan via Xichang, for exchanges between the southwestern Borderland regions and the hinterland. In the Jin Dynasty, Zhuti Prefecture (based in today’s Zhaotong), changed from Qianwei Protectorate, had Zhu, Lu, Lei and other influential tribes, which nurtured a large number of outstanding figures, earning it the title “crown of Ningzhou” (Chang, 1984, 394). Back then, the northward road to Shu from central Yunnan through Zangke and Qianwei was still the main channel connecting Nanzhong to the outside world. Zuo Si said in “Rhapsody on Capital of Shu” that the road from Cochin to Chengdu via Zangke and Qianwei “extended for more than five thousand li” (Fang et al., 1974, 1560). Establishment of the Laixiang Governor-General and launch of land reclamation in the present-day Qujing in the Shu Han (Chang, 1984, 402) changed the practice of the Han Dynasty operating the southwestern Borderland regions with present-day Central Yunnan as the basis (the center was in the present-day Jinning, the government seat of Yizhou Prefecture) and formed the basic pattern of ruling in the present-day southwestern Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou region with the present northeastern Yunnan as the center before the Tang Dynasty. The Jin Dynasty followed the tradition of Shu Han in governance. Although the Western Jin Dynasty once set up Ningzhou at the same level as the Yizhou Governor (based in Chengdu) in Nanzhong, it abolished Ningzhou soon after, because the conditions for establishing a province in Yunnan were not yet mature. The southwestern Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou regions were still divided into several prefectures under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Yizhou (Chang, 1984, 362, 369; Fang et al., 1974, 440–441). The Southern Dynasty set up Ningzhou under the jurisdiction of Yizhou Governor in the southwest of Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou region, with Qujing or Jinning as the center of rule. However, due to the long distance, its rule over Ningzhou was largely nominal, and Ningzhou was controlled by the Cuan Clan, a local power. In modern times, the “Stele of Cuan Baozi” of the Eastern Jin Dynasty discovered in Qujing, and the “Stele of Cuan Longyan”

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erected in the Southern Song Dynasty discovered in today’s Luliang, Yunnan, recorded the general situation of the current Yunnan-Guizhou region (mainly in eastern Yunnan) under control of the Cuan Clan. In the Tang Dynasty, management of southwestern Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou region can be divided into two periods, namely the early and the late period. For more than 130 years in the early period, it was based on the present Sichuan Basin. Taking western Sichuan and northeastern Yunnan as the breakthrough points, the Tang Dynasty gradually advanced its influence to central and western Yunnan. Back then, the border management had a pattern similar to that of the Han Dynasty, that is, the emphasis was put on preventing the northern nomads from venturing south. The main purpose of operating the southwestern Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou regions was to protect the safety of the roads to India and Cochin. The Tang Dynasty also connected the road to India and that to Cochin, and renamed it to “AnnanTintu Road”, which became one of the ten major transportation lines to neighboring countries (Ouyang et al., 1975, 1146, 1151). It dreaded southward venture of the Tubo Kingdom to the Erhai area, mainly because that would threaten the security of the Shu-India Road. Before the breakdown of its relationship with Nanzhao, the Tang Dynasty set up a number of commands in southwestern Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou region. Among them, the Rongzhou Command, the Yaozhou Command, the Annan Protectorate, the Qianzhou Command and the Xizhou Command were headquartered in present-day Yibin, Sichuan; Yao’an, Yunnan; Hanoi, Vietnam; Pengshui, Chongqing, and Xichang respectively. The southwestern Sichuan and Yunnan-Guizhou regions were under the jurisdiction of Jiannan Military Governor based in Chengdu (Liu et al., 1975, 1692, 1697, 1698, 1749). Among the above-mentioned Commands, the Yaozhou Command was established the latest, but it had a very important strategic position, because it was in charge of the newly developed Erhai Lake and the surrounding areas, which were on the route of the Shu-India Road. Later, Nanzhao rose and was given the title “King of Yunnan” by the Tang court for its meritorious service in resisting the forces of the Tubo Kingdom venturing south from the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau. The wording Yunnan was derived from Yunnan Prefecture established by the Han court in the



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vicinity of Xiangyun. Accordingly, the term “Yunnan” in the historical records of this period only referred to the present-day Erhai Lake basin and Xiangyun area in Yunnan. The later period was actually the period when Yunnan was controlled by Nanzhao after its relationship with the Tang Dynasty worsened. In the 4th year of Tianbao (745), in order to open up the road from Annan (now northern Vietnam) to Rongzhou (now Yibin, Sichuan) via Butou (now Jianshui, Yunnan) and Anning, the Tang court sent general Zhu Lingqian to build a city in Anning with his troops. The Cuan Clan in northeastern Yunnan became agitated, gathered some mobs, destroyed Anning City and killed Zhu Lingqian. The Tang Dynasty ordered Nanzhao to advance to the east to quell the rebellion. However, Nanzhao seized eastern Yunnan after pacifying the uprising and forcibly moved more than 200,000 households of the Cuan Clan to the west of Yunnan (Fan, 1985, 129). The trend of unifying Yunnan with the Erhai Basin as the center was initially formed. Later, western Yunnan surpassed eastern Yunnan in development, and Qingxiguan Road (the Lingguan Road of the previous dynasty) also replaced Shimenguan Road (the Wuchi Road of the previous dynasty) to become the main channel connecting Yunnan with Shu. Gao Shi from the Tang Dynasty said that although Jiannan Command reputedly had Dongchuan and Xichuan under its control, the main road to the south was Qingxiguan Road (Liu et al., 1975, 3329). After Nanzhao gradually grew more powerful and seized present-day eastern Yunnan, it obviously threatened the interests of the Tang Dynasty, who switched its policy on Nanzhao from active support to attack whenever there was a pretext. In the 9th year of Tianbao (750), Nanzhao captured the Yaozhou Command, which was deemed a major threat, killed its commander Zhang Qiantuo, and defeated three campaigns against it by the Tang army (Wang, 1980; Sima, 1956, 6929). It so happened that the Tang court was weighed down by the An-Shi Rebellion, allowing Nanzhao to grow into a powerful local regime. Nanzhao actively expanded outward. First, it joined hands with the Tubo Kingdom and captured the present Xichang area, before invading into and plundering the southwestern Sichuan many times. The southwestern Sichuan was literally ravaged and became devoid

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of people and livestock. The Qingxiguan Road through the area also became inaccessible, since Nanzhao controlled its southern section in a standoff against the Tang army guarding the north bank of the Dadu River. Ge Luofeng, the King of Nanzhao, embarked on a personal campaign against Xuchuan (now Dehong of Yunnan and northern Burma), and “handpicked a spot for building the city.” In addition, he built the Tuodong City in the present-day Kunming, and took control of Eastern and Southeastern Yunnan, extending to Zhaotong in the northeast and Jianshui in the south. When Yimuxun took over as the King, Nanzhao reconciled with the Tang Dynasty, and Yimuxun captured the present-day Lijiang area of Yunnan and relieved the pressure from the Tubo Kingdom. He also launched wars in present-day Xishuangbanna and Lincang in Yunnan, expanding his sphere of influence to present-day southern Shan Kingdom in Burma. In the early years of Xiantong, the Nanzhao army captured Annan, shocking the Tang court. Emperor Yizong issued a decree for dividing the Lingnan area into the east and the west circuit, and ordered them to take active measures to organize an army and recover Annan, ushering in the tradition of separate governance for Guangxi and Guangdong. In its heyday, Nanzhao controlled present-day Yunnan Province, western Guizhou Province, southwestern Sichuan Province, and northern China-Indochina Peninsula. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), the Tang Dynasty canonized Yimou Xun as the “King of Nanzhao”, recognizing the scope of Nanzhao rule (Sima, 1956, 7561). After the Tianbao War, the Tang army no longer had the opportunity to enter the land of Nanzhao. In the late Tang Dynasty, “Nanzhao” and “Yunnan” became the terms for the scope of Nanzhao’s rule. Nanzhao set up many management institutions in areas under its control, including 10 dans, 8 governors and two protectors. The 10 dans were instated in the Erhai Lake Area, and the rest two types of officials were located in other areas. The 8 governors were instated in Nongdong (based in today’s Yao’an), Yunnan (based in today’s Yunnan Station in Xiangyun County), Tuodong (based in today’s Kunming), Kainan (based in today’s Jingdong), Yinsheng (based in today’s Jinghong), Jianchuan (based in today’s Jianchuan), Yongchang (based in today’s Baoshan), Lishui (based in today’s south of Myitkyina, Burma). The two protectorates were Tonghai Protectorate (based in



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today’s Tonghai, Yunnan) and Huichuan Protectorate (based in today’s Huili, Sichuan). Through those institutions, Nanzhao established effective rule over the land under its jurisdiction. It also built some strongholds in southern Yunnan and northern China-Indochina Peninsula to maintain loose-rein control. The territory of Nanzhao was inherited by its successor Dali Kingdom, which was called “Yunnan” in the writings of the Song Dynasty. Dali Kingdom had eight prefectures, four counties and the 37th Tribe under its jurisdiction. The 37th Tribe was a loose alliance formed by the Wuman tribes in the vast area of eastern Yunnan. It was an ally of Dali Kingdom based on oath, indicating that Dali Kingdom had fairly loose control over the present-day East Yunnan. Areas outside the 37th Tribe were divided by the Dali Kingdom into eight prefectures and four counties for governance. The most important change in Yunnan during the period was the gradual entry of agricultural areas into the feudal lord society, which led to obvious changes in Dali’s domestic and foreign policies. The Song Dynasty delineated the Dadu River as the boundary with Dali, and regarded Dali as a foreign state.55 The “Song wielding a jade axe to delineate the demarcation” mentioned in the long couplet of Daguanlou written by Sun Ranweng in the Qing Dynasty roughly reflects this historical fact. The Dali Kingdom had two capitals, with Dali City (now the Dali Ancient City) as the main capital and Shanchan City (in Kunming) as the secondary capital, but the focus of its operations was still western Yunnan. The present-day northeastern Yunnan north of Weixian (based in present-day Qujing) mostly returned to a state of isolation due to severe damage from the war and the long-term decline of Shimenguan Road. In the late period of Dali Kingdom, the tribes of surrounding mountains and the southern Borderlands, such as the Wuman and Jinfang Baiyi peoples, rose. The Wuman in today’s eastern and southeastern Yunnan formed a tribal alliance known as “the 37th Tribe of Eastern Yunnan.” The Jinchi Baiyi people established Jinglong Jindian Kingdom, 55 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 105, citing Zhu Zhen, “Memorial on Strategies for Purchasing Horses from Dali Kingdom”.

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with Jinghong as the center, and its jurisdiction extended south to present northern Thailand. The alliance between Dali Kingdom and the above-mentioned two regimes was actually recognition of their actual control, under the premise of partial unification of Dali Kingdom. The hinterland of Yunnan was also divided by the Baiman feudal lord in the later period of Dali Kingdom, and the Dianchi Lake area was seized by the Gao Clan lord. The area under the effective control of the Dali Kingdom was limited to the present-day western Yunnan centered on Erhai Lake. The Dali Kingdom maintained normal business exchanges with kingdoms of the China-Indochina Peninsula and basically had a peaceful relationship with them, except for war with Annan once. Although the Song Dynasty regarded Dali Kingdom as a foreign country, it had to contact the latter to purchase horses, due to the extreme shortage incurred by the war in the north. During the Southern Song Dynasty, merchants from Dali went to Hengshan Village (now Tiandong, Guangxi) to sell horses many times. Due to the restrictions imposed by the Southern Song Dynasty on the sale of Dali horses, merchants of Dali sold their horses to Luodian and Ziqi tribes in western Guizhou and northwestern Guangxi, for their resale to the government of Yongzhou (based in today’s Nanning, Guangxi) under the Southern Song Dynasty. By and by, Western Guizhou and northwestern Guangxi became the buffer zone between the Dali Kingdom and the Southern Song Dynasty (Liu, 2003, 719). Generally speaking, in the later period of the Dali Kingdom, the communication of Yunnan with the outside was obstructed at varying degrees, except for that with countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula. The connection with Shu, Guangxi and Huguang was therefore slack. In the Northern Song Dynasty, Sichuan businessman Yang Zuo was entrusted by the imperial court to buy horses from Dali Kingdom. In today’s Xiangyun County, Yunnan, he saw the stele of the post station and found that it “had records of the roads to Rongzhou in the east, India in the west, Cochin in the southeast, Chengdu in the northeast, the big snow mountain in the north and the sea in the south, complete with the days of travel required. He checked the post stations and found that many were in good condition” (Yang, 1980).



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Of the six traffic lines from Dali Kingdom to other places mentioned in the inscription, three led to the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula. The inscriptions reflected the situation in the Northern Song Dynasty and couldn’t prove that those roads were still passable. In addition, they failed to mention the way taken by Dali merchants to Yongzhou to sell horses.

6.3  In the later stage of the Southern Song Dynasty, the war between the Mongolians and Song Dynasty fell into a stalemate. The Mongolian king Kublai Khan was ordered to lead 100,000 cavalry troops to make a detour from the northwest to Dali, for outflanking the Southern Song Dynasty. After pacifying Dali, the Yuan court ordered its minister Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar to establish Yunan Province with Kunming as the provincial seat (Song et al., 1976, 3064), ushering the period of Yunnan as an independent province. The scope of Yunnan Province covered the eight prefectures, four counties, and the 37th Tribe of the early Dali, roughly the same as that of Nanzhao at its height. In other words, it controlled the present-day Yunnan Province, Western Guizhou, Southwestern Sichuan and northern China-Indochina Peninsula. The difference from Nanzhao was that Yunnan Province ruled the southern border to a greater depth. A considerable part of the 37 routes, 54 subordinate sub-prefectures, 47 subordinate counties and other governing institutions were located in Southern Yunnan Province and the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula. The Mongolian Yuan also established some military ruling institutions such as the Placation Commission and the Chief Command there, and dispatched many princes called “Prince of Liang” and “Prince of Yunnan” to guard various places, together with the government institutions of the province. In Yunnan, the Yuan Dynasty actively promoted the native official system, which essentially meant appointing the chief of Borderland ethnic groups as imperial officials. The Yuan court promised to allow them guard their land and govern their people, while granting the legitimacy of their resources and power. On the other hand, the imperial court

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had the power to recover their resources and power, forcing them to be loyal to the imperial court. The prerequisite for the implementation of the native official system was full trust in and extensive appointment of native officials at all levels. The system achieved remarkable results, and enabled the Yuan court to extend its rule deeper into the mountains and border areas of Yunnan than preceding dynasties. The rigor of the institutional establishment in Yunnan and the depth of its rule obviously exceeded China’s imperial history. The internal and external traffic in Yunnan Province was very prosperous. According to the author’s research, there were more than a dozen roads in Yunnan Province with post stations (Fang, 1988). The most important ones were the newly opened road to Huguang (YunnanGuizhou-Hunan Road) and Wusa-Luzhou Road. The former extended from present-day Kunming to Dayidu (now Beijing), the capital of the Yuan Dynasty, via Guizhou, and Hunan, with many post stations along the way. After its opening, the imperial court greatly reduced the post stations and staff for the Qingxiguan Road and Shimenguan Road that led to Sichuan. The Wusa-Luzhou Road extended from Kunming to Luzhou in Sichuan via Qujing and Zhaotong, and Bijie of Guizhou. Travelers could go downstream the Yangtze River to reach the hinterland. In the Yuan Dynasty, travelers between Yunnan and the hinterland mostly took the newly opened roads as the first choice, changing the situation that Yunnan travelers to the hinterland mainly taking the road to Sichuan. In order to protect the Yunnan-Huguang Road and Wusa-Luzhou Road, the Yuan Dynasty opened military and civilian agricultural colonies in northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou, and set up many government offices to operate them, curbing their decline and gradually restoring their prosperity. There were many post roads in northeastern Yunnan and western Guizhou, as well as extensive relics of previous cultivation. Therefore, the two regions were much sought after by Yunnan, Huguang, and Sichuan provinces. Their active development in the Yuan Dynasty laid the foundation for the establishment of Guizhou Province in the Ming Dynasty. The roads leading to present-day Sichuan, Guangxi and Xizang from the China’s imperial history were also restored to varying degrees in the Yuan Dynasty, and



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post stations were extensively established. The ties between Yunnan and neighboring provinces were closer than those in any preceding dynasty. In terms of foreign operations, Yunnan Province roughly inherited the territory of southern Nanzhao. The Yuan Dynasty started wars on Annan and Burma (present-day northern Burma) many times. Although defeated by Annan in the end, it conquered the Pagan Dynasty of Burma and controlled most of its territory. The Ming and Qing dynasties inherited the tradition of the Yuan Dynasty in establishing a province in Yunnan with Kunming as the provincial capital. The Ming Dynasty established in Yunnan the Administrative Commission, the Judicial Commission and the General Command Commission. Directly responsible to the imperial court, the three departments were ordered to handle major affairs via consultation. Before the middle of the Ming Dynasty, the scope of Yunnan Province was roughly the same as that in the Yuan Dynasty. In the 15th year of Hongwu (1382), the Yunnan Administrative Commission had jurisdiction over 58 prefectures, 75 sub-prefectures and 55 counties. Later, adjustment was made, and its jurisdiction was changed to 21 prefectures, 43 sub-prefectures and 30 counties, as well as the 8 placation commissions, 4 publicity commissions and 35 tribal commands.56 A change in the areas bordering Yunnan in the Ming Dynasty was the reassignment of northeast Yunnan and southwestern Sichuan to Sichuan Province, and that of Pu’an and Puding to the newly established Guizhou Province. During the Zhengtong years, in order to curb the expansion of the Luchuan chieftains in the vicinity of Dehong in Yunnan Province, the Ming Dynasty mobilized a conquest army three provinces in nine years, and extended its military conquest as far as the Irrawaddy River basin in present-day northern Burma. The “Three Conquests to Luchuan” maintained the integrity of its southwestern border, but also exposed the limitations of its rule, but it caused severe damage in the war-affected areas, and set the scene for the long-term disputes between the relevant chieftains.57 After the pacification of Luchuan, 5 6 History of Ming, Vol. 46, “Geography (7)”, 1171. 57 History of Ming, Vol. 162, “Biography of Liu Qiu: Imperial Memorials”, 4405.

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the southwestern Borderland of Yunnan was plunged into prolonged turmoil. Back then, the national power of the Middle Kingdom was weak and the Ming Dynasty was unable to launch another war on the Borderlands. Chen Yongbin the Viceroy of Yunnan set up eight passes at the junction of Dehong and Burma, and carefully guarded them in order to protect himself. The northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula to the south was annexed by the Toungoo Dynasty of Burma. In the Ming Dynasty, the gap between the developed areas and the backward areas of Yunnan was quite large, and in some places the gap assumed a trend of gradual expansion. Wang Shixing back then said that the places under the jurisdiction of the Yunnan Administrative Commission only included the five prefectures of Yunnan (based in today’s Kunming), Lin’an (based in today’s Jianshui), Dali (based in today’s Ancient City of Dali), Heqing (based in today’s Heqing), and Chuxiong (based in today’s Chuxiong), which occupied the fertile central hinterland, while “the rest of the province are barren and turbulent districts.” The five prefectures mentioned above were basically places with concentration of the post houses and farms. Heqing was a commodity hub on the road from Dali to Xizang via Lijiang for trade of horses from Xizang during the Ming Dynasty. The remaining four prefectures were located near the west extension of the road to Huguang and were all economically prosperous areas where immigrants gathered. Wang Shixing also said that the barbarians accounted for 60% to 70% of the population of Yunnan, while the rest were Han Chinese “distributed in the garrisons” (Wang Shixing, 1981, 127, 129). This suggests that the Ming Dynasty generally implemented the post house system in Yunnan gradually formed a wave of large-scale forced immigration to Yunnan. The development of key areas under the system accelerated, while that of the rest areas, in particular, the remote mountainous areas, apparently lagged behind. In areas with multiple post houses, the local powerful tribes gradually formed, mainly consisting of military officers at all levels, and the gentry emerged. Due to their source and composition, the Yunnan gentry showed rare loyalty to the court. At the end of the Ming Dynasty when the Nanming Regime, who had fled to Yunnan in exile, was about to flee to Burma, there were hundreds of thousands of tearful people



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accompanying the rulers. As a result, the burdened officials, troops and gentry could travel only 30 li each day (Fang, 1998, 732). In the late Ming Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty, a large number of refugees moved into Yunnan. Centering on the gentry from the Ming Dynasty, they formed a local Han Chinese group, giving Yunnan a different social structure and ethnic relations from neighboring provinces. So far, Yunnan had all the necessary internal and external conditions for a provincial-level administrative region. In the Ming Dynasty, the separatist Luchuan local forces appeared in Yunnan, partially because of the widening gap between hinterland and the Borderlands in development, and the serious problems of the chieftain system that had evolved from the native official system in the Yuan Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty stationed a large number of troops in Yunnan, hoping to maintain stability. Under the post house system, military service was a hereditary profession. The sergeant lived a self-sufficient life with his family and children in the garrison, serving in the army when there was war, and worked as a farmhand otherwise. The large number of post houses stationed in Yunnan had an important impact on the economy and society of Yunnan, and accelerated the development of the areas where the post houses were concentrated, at a rate clearly faster than the borders and remote areas. The structural contradiction of the dual opposition between the plains and the mountains in Yunnan was even more serious and outstanding. On the other hand, the hidden dangers of native officials and chieftains taking advantage of the situation gradually emerged, and evolved into serious social problems when improperly handled by the Imperial court. The separatist activities of local forces in Luchuan and the subsequent separation of the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula from the Ming Dynasty both had profound internal reasons. The Qing Dynasty instated the Viceroy of Yunnan and the Governor of Yunnan-Guizhou to manage Yunnan. During the reign of Emperor Kangxi, Yunnan Province had jurisdiction over 20 prefectures and one directly managed sub-prefecture but there had been changes since then. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, it had jurisdiction over 14 prefectures, 6 directly managed departments, 3 directly managed sub-prefectures, 12 departments, 26 sub-prefectures, and 41 counties (Zhao et al., 1977,

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2322). Its boundary extended to Sicheng in Guangxi (now Lingyun, Guangxi) in the east, Xingyi Prefecture in Guizhou in the northeast (now Anlong, Guizhou), Zhen’an Prefecture in Guangxi (now Debao, Guangxi) in the southeast, Annan in the south, Huili of Sichuan in the north, the Tubo Kingdom in the northwest, Shenhuguan Pass in the west (in present-day Yingjiang County, Yunnan), and Tianmaguan Pass in the southwest (outside of Ruili County, Yunnan) (Zhonghua Book Company, 1986). Many of the historical records in the Qing Dynasty about the administrative system of Yunnan were about the multiple adjustments of the level and affiliation of the government in the newly developed regions of the northeast, northwest, and southeast. The purpose was to clarify the submission of those areas and achieve their effective control. The population explosion in the early Qing Dynasty made it increasingly difficult for the people to make a living and a large number of refugees ventured to the border areas for livelihood with their families. The Qing government took a tacit attitude towards this, and the Yunnan government used tax exemptions and provided seeds and rations to attract the inland refugees to farm there. In order to address the inaccessibility of the road sections of Guizhou and Eastern Yunnan to Huguang because of obstruction by unlawfully chieftains and foreign barbarians, Emperor Yongzheng ordered Eertai, the Governor of Yungui, to launch a large-scale replacement of native chieftains with state officials by the Qing court focusing on those areas. He also kept some of the chieftains to the south of the Lancang River, according to the principle “when rule by chieftains is more advisable than rule by centrally appointed non-hereditary officials.” After solving the problems of the chieftain’s arbitrary violation of the law and disobedience, and allowing a large number of refugees to the above-mentioned areas, the Qing court reassigned the current Huize, Dongchuan, Zhaotong, and Zhenxiong from Sichuan to Yunnan (Zhao et al., 1977, 2321, 2338, 2340), turning them into key areas for land reclamation and development. Aside from northeastern Yunnan, a large number of foreign refugees also entered other remote mountainous areas of Yunnan Province, promoting their development and creating favorable conditions for the delimitation of the boundary between Yunnan and neighboring



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provinces. The Ming and Qing dynasties also highlighted the development of non-ferrous metal deposits in Yunnan, and transported large amounts copper, silver and other raw materials to the hinterland through the post roads passing through Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi, bringing Yunnan closer to the hinterland. In the late Qing Dynasty, British and French colonial forces controlled most of the China-Indochina Peninsula and forced the Qing Dynasty to assign part of its territory to British Burma or French Vietnam. The savage mountainous areas in the northern part of Burma and the Namwan Triangle outside Ruili, Yunnan, were then assigned to British Burma. In the 23rd year of Guangxu (1897), the Qing government signed an agreement with France and completed the determination of the Yunnan section of the Sino-Vietnamese border. After the above process, the border of southern Yunnan was basically formed for the modern times.

6.4  Examining the changes in the administrative area of Yunnan Province and its relationship with surrounding areas, we can roughly discern the following clues. Its scope was initially mixed with other places and its extensions were relatively ambiguous. Later, it attained considerable scale in the reign of Nanzhao and Yuan Dynasty, and basically became stabilized and clarified during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, after a complex evolution process. The land of Yunnan is centered on the western part of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, and the widely distributed plateaus and mountains constitute the basic characteristics of its geographical environment. The flora and fauna resources and mineral resources of the plateau and mountainous regions, the complex and diverse ethnicities and cultures derived therefrom, as well as the characteristic composition of the society and the residents, have roughly differentiated Yunnan from the surrounding areas. The gradually clarified geographical scope of Yunnan was also attributable to factors such as its location among the four geographical units of Shu, Huguang, Lingnan, and China-Indochina Peninsula, as well as its role as a Borderland gateway between the hinterland and neighboring countries.

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The formation of the administrative area of Yunnan was the result of the division or segmentation of the geographic plates of Yunnan and Sichuan, Huguang, Lingnan, and China-Indochina Peninsula. Its scope was obviously affected by the political situation in those geographic plates in China’s imperial history. In its formation, geopolitical relations were manifested through political and geographic games, and the strategies and policies for managing the southwestern Borderland in imperial China. Its evolution and determination can be justifiably regarded as a typical case in the formation of China’s historical territory. In the evolution of the administrative area of Yunnan, the role of communication lines cannot be underestimated. The Han Dynasty expanded the road from Chengdu through present-day Yunnan to Burma, India and even the Mediterranean coast, and the road to Annan from Chengdu through present-day Yunnan to northern Vietnam, roughly connecting the Sichuan Basin with the China-Indochina Peninsula, India and Pakistan. In the Yuan Dynasty, the construction of the road to Huguang and the Wusa-Luzhou Road from Kunming to the central plains through Guizhou not only marked the establishment of direct connection of Yunnan with the middle reaches of the Yangtze River and the Central Plains, but also facilitated the traffic from the hinterland of the Middle Kingdom to the China-Indochina Peninsula, India and Pakistan. Therefore, those new roads highlighted the important position of Yunnan in southwestern Asia. In order to ensure their accessibility, the Ming court established Guizhou Province in areas connecting Yunnan, Sichuan and Huguang. The jurisdiction of the border areas of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou was determined because the imperial court had exercised active development and achieved effective control. Communication lines were an important factor affecting the relationship between Yunnan and surrounding areas. It can be said that the roads to Sichuan, Huguang, India, and Cochin were the basic framework supporting the division of administrative regions in Yunnan. The rise and fall of important transportation lines profoundly affected its relationship with surrounding areas, while the changes in the relationship also caused the rise and fall of relevant communication lines. Before the Yuan Dynasty, the Yunnan area was under the jurisdiction of Sichuan,



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with Wuchi Road and Lingguan Road serving as the medium of communication; Yunnan was established and consolidated in the Yuan Dynasty, mainly due to the opening of the road to Huguang and the Wusa-Luzhou Road. Later, Wuchi Road and Lingguan Road assumed a declining trend. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, immigrants swarmed into Yunnan along the road to Huguang and Wusa-Luzhou Road, turning Qujing, Kunming, Chuxiong, Jianshui and Zhaotong near the roads into densely populated and economically prosperous areas, as well as the core area affecting the management pattern of the entire province. Changes in the pattern of geopolitical relations profoundly affected Yunnan’s relationship with surrounding areas. Prior to the Yuan Dynasty, Yunnan was valued as a gateway for communication between the hinterland and neighboring countries, as mainly manifested in the emphasis on the two international communication lines leading to India and Cochin. Since the Yuan Dynasty, the central dynasty cherished its strategic position and the development and utilization of its resources, highlighting its important role in consolidating the national border and participating in the national economic activities. Furthermore, the focus of its management before the Yuan Dynasty was mainly the government seat of prefectures and counties and the transportation lines extending overseas. The Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties placed greater emphasis on its strategic position, its communication lines with neighboring provinces, and the division of jurisdiction for adjacent areas with neighboring provinces. Its flesh-and-blood ties with other regions of the motherland were therefore consolidated and strengthened.

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Chapter Six

Borderland Strategies of Borderland Regimes and Their Borderland Governance

Abstract: Taking the Nan Yue Kingdom as an example, this chapter further explains the relationship between the Central Plains and the border regions. The Nanyue Kingdom was a Borderland regime established in Lingnan by Zhao Tuo. The relationship with the Western Han Dynasty was the key for the Nanyue Kingdom to maintain its rule and it underwent several stages of development. Keywords: the Nanyue Kingdom, Western Han Dynasty, Song Dynasty, Borderland Strategy, Administration, Central Plains, border governance strategy, Dali Kingdom

1.  The Borderland Strategy and Administration of Nanyue Kingdom The Nanyue Kingdom was a Borderland regime established in Lingnan by Zhao Tuo, an official of the Qin Dynasty, lasting 93 years and witnessing five rulers. According to Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue, when a peasant uprising broke out in the Central Plains at the end of the Qin Dynasty, Ren Xiao, the Brigadier of Nanhai instated

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by the Qin Dynasty, became seriously ill and was about to die. He summoned Zhao Tuo, the magistrate of Longchuan to his deathbed and said “amid the disturbance in the Central Plains, the remote Lingnan is secure. Besides, there is the support of quite a few Han Chinese. So it might be advisable to establish a kingdom there.” Zhao Tuo killed the original official appointed by Qin and installed his cronies, before proclaiming himself “King Wu of Nanyue” (Sima, 1959, 2967). The jurisdiction of the Nanyue Kingdom included Nanhai County (based in present-day Guangzhou), Guilin County (based in an area to the southwest of present-day Guiping, Guangxi), and Xiangjun County (based in present-day Chongzuo, Guangxi) of the Qin Dynasty. With its center of governance in Panyu (now Guangzhou), it had a territory extending to Minyue in the east. In the fifth year of Yuanding (112 BC), Minyue sent troops to help the Han Dynasty attack Nanyue, but stopped on the sea beyond Jieyang (in present-day Jieyang, Guangdong) to see the development of the situation. After the Han troops overthrew Nanyue, the Magistrate of Jieyang (appointed by Nanyue) surrendered (Sima, 1959, 2982, 2977). Therefore, this suggests that that the boundary of Nanyue and Minyue was to the east of Jieyang. In the north of Nanyue Kingdom, there were the three passes of Hengpu, Yangshan and Huangxi, that is, the area of Yangshan and Nanxiong in present-day northern Guangdong was its northern border. The Nanyue Kingdom adjoined Yelang Kingdom in the west. During the Yuanding Period, the Han Dynasty conquered Yelang Kingdom, set up the Zangke Prefecture in its south. The easternmost counties in Zangke Prefecture included Wulian (based in present-day Dushan, Guizhou), Juting (based in present-day Guangnan, Yunnan), Dumeng (in present-day Wenshan, Yunnan) and Jinsang (in present-day Pingbian County, Yunnan) (Ban, 1962). The east of these four counties was the western border of Yelang Kingdom. The southwestern border of Nanyue Kingdom was originally the western border of Xiangjun Prefecture, to the west of present-day Pingxiang, Guangxi. When Zhao Tuo attacked the Anyang Kingdom, to the north of present-day Vietnam, he extended the border to the central and northern part of Vietnam. According to Book of Han: Biography of Nanyue, after conquering Nanyue Kingdom, the Han court established the nine prefectures of Dan’er, Zhuya, Nanhai, Cangwu, Yulin,



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Hepu, Jiaozhi, Jiuzhen and Rinan in its place. Those nine counties were roughly equivalent to the jurisdiction of Nanyue Kingdom.

1.1  The relationship with the Western Han Dynasty was the key for the Nanyue Kingdom to maintain its rule and it underwent several stages of development. In the 5th year of Emperor Gaozu of the Han Dynasty (202 BC), Liu Bang proclaimed himself emperor. Back then, the resources of the Central Plains were exhausted, and the Lingnan region under the rule of Zhao Tuo “was in good order.” So the Han court left Zhao Tuo alone. In the 11th year, Liu Bang sent Lu Jia to name Zhao Tuo the King of Nanyue, and “ordered him to honor the Han covenant.” Then Han court established bilateral ties and trade relations with the Nanyue Kingdom, and entered into suzerain-vassal relationship with it. Emperor Gaozu ordered Zhao Tuo to keep peace with Changsha Kingdom ruled by a prince of the Han Dynasty, and to “refrain from instigating trouble in the south” (Sima, 1959, 2967, 2697). During the decade from establishment of suzerain-vassal relationship in the Han Dynasty to the rule of Empress Gaozu, the relationship between Nanyue Kingdom and the Western Han Dynasty was relatively peaceful. Emperor Hui continued Emperor Gaozu’s policies when he succeeded to the throne, and the two sides sent envoys to each other continuously. In the third year of Emperor Hui (192 BC), the Nanyue Kingdom sent an envoy to pay tribute to the Han court (Ban, 1962, 89). When Empress Gaozu took over the anvil, she imposed a strict control on materials exported into the Nanyue Kingdom, banning gold, iron and farm implements, as well as cows, mares and ewes. Zhao Tuo grew dissatisfied, thinking that he had been “discriminated” by Empress Gaozu. The restrictions of the Western Han Dynasty on trade also seriously affected the social production of Nanyue. Zhao Tuo sent envoys to the Han court to remonstrate, but to no avail. Since his ancestral cemetery and relatives and brothers were all in Zhengding in the Central Plains, when it was rumored that the Han court had destroyed his ancestral cemetery and executed his relatives, Zhao Tuo suspected that the Han Dynasty intended to make Changsha attack and destroy

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Nanyue and annex its territory. In the fifth year of Empress Gaozu’s reign (183 BC), Zhao Tuo proclaimed himself Emperor Wu of Nanyue and seized several counties in the border towns of Changsha with troops. Empress Gaozu grew enraged and cut off communication with Nanyue, severing the bilateral relationship (Ban, 1962, 3848). In the seventh year of Empress Gaozu, the Han Dynasty sent Zhou Zao, a General with the title Duke Longju, to lead an army to attack Nanyue. It happened to be a humid summer, and plague broke out in the Han army, which was forced to stop short of the Yangshan Mountains (now Yangshan County, Guangdong). After the death of Empress Gaozu, the Han Dynasty stopped the campaign. Zhao Tuo took the opportunity to expand his strength, united Minyue in the east and Ouluo in the west, and created a sphere of influence exceeding 10,000 miles, to confront the Han Dynasty (Sima, 1959, 2969; Ban, 1962, 100). In the early years of Emperor Wen, the Nanyue Kingdom continued to attack the Changsha Kingdom. The scale of war disturbed Nanjun Prefecture to the northwest of Changsha. In the second year of Emperor Wen (178 BC), the Nanyue Kingdom attacked the present Jiangxi area under the jurisdiction of the Han Dynasty and was defeated by Liu Chang, the Prince of Huainan. Emperor Wen sent Lu Jia to the Nanyue Kingdom to announce the decree, agreeing to Zhao Tuo’s previous request, to set up a guard for his ancestral tombs, to make seasonal sacrifices to them. He also appointed Zhao Tuo’s cousins to official posts and sacked the Duke of Boyang leading the attack against Nanyue. After that, he restored the title of King of Nanyue, allowing Zhao Tuo autonomy in the land south of Wuling and resuming the trade with Nanyue. Zhao Tuo agreed to renounce the title of emperor and presented white jade discs, kingfishers and rhino horns to Emperor Wen. After Emperor Wen gave up the practice of discriminating against the Nanyue Kingdom and took the initiative to restore mutual relationship, the Nanyue Kingdom restored friendly relations with the Western Han court and sent envoys to pay tribute. The suzerain-vassal relationship between them lasted for more than 60 years.1 1 Ban Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 27, “Records of the Five Elements”: “in the second year of Emperor Wen, the Nanyue rebelled and attacked the border of Huainan, but was repelled by the King of Huainan”; Vol. 95, “Biography of Nanyue”, 3852



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In the fourth year of Jianyuan (137 BC), Zhao Tuo died of illness, and his grandson Zhao Hu succeeded him as the King of Nanyue. Shortly afterwards, Minyue sent troops to attack the border towns of Nanyue. Zhao Hu wrote a letter to the Han court, saying that the vassals of the Han Dynasty should not attack each other, and requested intervention. Emperor Wu believed that the Nanyue Kingdom had abided by the contract of duty, and sent Generals Wang Hui and Han Anguo to attack Minyue. Before the soldiers crossed the ridge, Yu Shan, the younger brother of the King of Minyue, killed the king and surrendered, and Han aborted the campaign. Zhao Hu was very grateful to the Han court for its timely assistance, and sent the crown prince Ying Qi to the court as a resident guard, and promised he would travel to the Han court with the Han envoys so he could personally pay respect. However, Zhao Hu became concerned that he might be retained by the Han court, and finally decided against going, citing illness as a pretext (Sima, 1959, 2971; Ban, 1962, 2788). According to Biography of Nanyue in Records of the Grand Historian, when Zhao Hu died more than ten years later, his son Ying Qi succeeded and continued the friendly relationship with the Han Dynasty. Ying Qi decided to make his wife, a member of the Jiu Family from Handan, whom he married back in Chang’an, as the queen, and Zhao Xing, their son, as the crown prince. His requests were approved by the Han court. Ying Qi also sent his son, the second prince, to the court as resident guard. After Ying Qi died, crown prince Zhao Xing succeeded him. In the fourth year of Yuanding (113 BC), Emperor Wu sent An Guo Shaoji and others to enjoin Zhao Xing, King of Nanyue and its Empress Dowager Yu to pay a tribute to the imperial court, wishing to give it “the same status as the rest of the vassal states.” He also ordered Lu Bode, a brigadier commander, to station his troops in Guiyang (based in today’s Lianxian County, Guangdong), to flaunt the military strength of the Han Dynasty, under the pretense of welcoming the envoys from Nanyue. When Emperor Wu requested changing the original suzerain relationship and turning Nanyue Kingdom into a vassal state of the Han Dynasty, opinions within the Nanyue Kingdom were divided, and eventually led to its disintegration. Zhao Xing, the King of Nanyue, and the Empress Dowager Jiu advocated accepting Han’s proposal.

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Zhao Xing was still young had and ascended the throne very recently, and was effectively being controlled by the Empress Dowager. Empress Dowager Jiu was the daughter of a Han Chinese in the Central Plains, and she had an affair with Anguo Shaoji back in Chang’an. When Anguo Shaoji was dispatched to Nanyue Kingdom as an envoy of Han, the affair resumed, which everybody in Nanyue knew about this. The Empress Dowager feared that chaos would ensue because of the affair, and wanted to rely on the power of Han to settle it. So she tried several times to plead with the king and his ministers into accepting Han’s proposal. But before the court of the Nanyue Kingdom had reached a consensus, the Empress Dowager sent a letter to the Han court through a messenger without authorization, requesting submission as a vassal state. Emperor Wu agreed, and ordered the Han envoy to stay to placate the Nanyue Kingdom. Zhao Xing and the Empress Dowager made preparations to travel to the Han court. However, Lü Jia, the prime minister, and the rest ministers had no intention of being a vassal, tried to dissuade her several times, all to no avail. So Lü Jia feigned illness and refused to see the envoy of the Han Dynasty. Zhao Xing and the Empress Dowager feared an uprising by Lü Jia and his company, and decided to take preemptive measures. The Empress Dowager held a banquet and asked Lü Jia why he had no intention of submitting to the Han Dynasty, in an attempt to anger the Han envoy. However, Lü Jia only stood up and left the palace. After the divergence became public, Lü Jia and his ministers secretly plotted to rise in arms, but waited for several months. In much the same vein, the Empress Dowager wanted to kill Lü Jia and his clique, but hadn’t the power to do so. Emperor Wu believed that the king and the empress dowager of Nanyue had been forced into submission because of the uprising by Lü Jia. So he ordered Han Qianqiu, a Brigadier Commander and Jiu Le, the younger brother of the Empress Dowager of Nanyue who had surrendered to the Han earlier, to lead 2,000 soldiers to Nanyue to kill Lü Jia. When Lü Jia and others heard the news, they rebelled and killed Zhao Xing, the King of Nanyue, the empress dowager and the Han envoy. After that, they sent messengers to inform the King of Cangwu and the prefects and magistrates of Nanyue and installed Jiande, another son of Ying Qi, as the King of Nanyue. They also killed Han Qianqiu,



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Jiu Le and their Han troops, and stationed troops in strategic points. Emperor Wu learnt about the rebellion in Nanyue Kingdom, and dispatched 100,000 Han troops to suppress it. In the autumn of the 5th year of Yuanding (112 BC), the Han troops marched toward Nanyue from five directions. Bo De, the Fubo General, set off from Guiyang (based in today’s Lianxian County, Guangdong), Yang Pu, the Louchuan General set off from Yuzhang (today’s Nanchang, Jiangxi), Gechuan General and Xiali General set off from Lingling (based in today’s Quanzhou, Guangxi), the Chiyi Duke went southward along the Zangke River via Yelang. The troops planned to join forces at Panyu. In the winter of the 6th year, Fubo General and Louchuan General broke through the defense of Nanyue and reached Panyu. Under the strong attack and lure of the Han army, Panyu City fell, and Lü Jia, Jiande and others were captured. The commanders of Nanyue troops all surrendered. Before the arrival of the rest Han troops, news came of the conquest of Nanyue (Sima, 1959, 2975; Ban, 1962, 3857). Regarding the relationship between the Nanyue Kingdom and the Western Han Dynasty, there are two issues worth noting. One is the nature of the Nanyue Kingdom. Historians are divided on the issue, some holding that it was a feudal state of the Han Dynasty, and others believing that it was a separatist regime. After examining relevant records, the author believes that the Nanyue Kingdom should have been a local separatist regime established by the Yue and Han peoples in Lingnan. Before Zhao Tuo was crowned King of Nanyue, and during the period from Empress Gaozu to the first year of Emperor Wen’s reign, the Nanyue Kingdom was obviously a relatively independent local regime in a stand-off against the Han Dynasty, as evidenced by relevant records. For example, after Zhao Tuo established the Nanyue Kingdom, he proclaimed himself as King Wu of Nanyue. When Emperor Gaozu sent Lü Jia on an envoy to Nanyue, Lü Jia tried to persuade Zhao Tuo “to pledge allegiance to the emperor.” Zhao Tuo considered himself on a par with Emperor Gaozu and asked Lü Jia, “between I and the emperor, who is wiser?” He went on to add that “I proclaimed myself king here because I rose to prominence here. If I had lived in the Middle Kingdom, I could not have been his inferior.” Those remarks show that

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he considered himself the legitimate emperor of Lingnan. In the reign of Empress Gaozu, the Nanyue Kingdom and Han Dynasty fought a war, and Zhao Tuo called himself Emperor Wudi of Nanyue, preparing all the systems and palaces suited for an emperor. Emperor Wen wanted to reconcile with Nanyue after succeeding to the throne, and allowed to resume the exchange of envoys and trade with Nanyue, but under the condition of Zhao Tuo renouncing the emperor title and refraining from “the situation of two emperors standing in confrontation” (Ban, 1962, 3849). When the Nanyue Kingdom pledged allegiance, it had a suzerainvassal relationship with the Han Dynasty. According to the author’s research (Fang, 1991), such a relationship in ancient times had the following features: First, the central dynasty recognized the vassal state as a local government by conferring the title of the king, allowing it to keep its land and hereditary duties, and promising to protect it when it got into trouble. In turn, the vassal states regarded the Central Dynasty as the legitimate superior, paid tribute to it, and secured their borders. Second, the vassal states had certain autonomy, and the central dynasty usually did not interfere with their internal affairs. Third, the relationship between the suzerain and the vassal was looser and unstable in comparison to the relationship of subordination, so the Central Dynasty required the vassal states to send princes or children of the vassal kings and ministers to its court as a guarantee to maintain the relationship. On the other hand, there is no record of the vassal states sending hostages in the Han Dynasty, indicating that they were not required to do so. Judging from the records, when the Nanyue Kingdom declared submission to the Han, it had a suzerainty-vassal relationship with the latter. Firstly, the vassal relationship between the Nanyue Kingdom and the Han Dynasty was confirmed by both parties on many occasions, with each performing their respective duties faithfully. According to Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue and Book of Han: Biography of Nanyue, Emperor Gaozu canonized Zhao Tuo as the King of Nanyue, “making him a courtier requested to pay tribute regularly.” Emperor Wen restored Zhao Tuo’s title as King of Nanyue, and resumed communication via envoys with Nanyue Kingdom. Zhao Tuo said that “I am



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willing to serve as a vassal and pay my tribute.” When Minyue attacked Nanyue, Zhao Hu, the King of Nanyue, submitted an imperial memorial, saying that “Both of Nanyue and Minyue are vassals, and one should not attack the other.” Thus, Emperor Wu believed that Nanyue Kingdom “had abided by the covenant” and sent troops to intervene. In addition, the Nanyue Kingdom sent envoys to the Han court many times to pay tribute. Secondly, after establishing a suzerain-vassal relationship with the Han Dynasty, the Nanyue Kingdom retained its official system and legal system. In the reign of Emperor Wu, the Empress Dowager of Nanyue Kingdom sent a letter to request the status of a subordinate, “hoping for the same treatment as feudal lords.” Emperor Wu granted her the wish, and according to the institution of feudal lords, he gave Nanyue Prime Minister Lü Jia a silver seal, together with the official seals for the official historian, lieutenant, and court academician, and allowed Nanyue to instate the other officials as it saw fit and to replace its previous punishments of tattooing and cutting off the nose with penalties according to Han law.2 Those situations show that before Emperor Wu granted the request of the Empress Dowager, the official system and the legal system of the Nanyue Kingdom were independent of the Han Dynasty, and thus the Nanyue Kingdom was not its vassal. Thirdly, the Nanyue Kingdom repeatedly sent princes as hostages to the Han Dynasty. According to records, when Zhao Hu served as the King of Nanyue, he sent the prince Yingqi to Han court as a resident guard. After his death, Yingqi returned to Nanyue to inherit the throne, and sent his son Cigong to the Han court as a resident guard. The 2 Ban Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 64, “Biography of Zhong Jun”, 2821: “When (Zhao Xing) requested surrender with his entire kingdom, the emperor became very pleased. He gave official insignia and seals to the ministers of Nanyue, and allowed it to practice the laws of the Han Dynasty to change its old customs. Sima Guang, History as a Mirror: Records of Han (22), annotation of Hu Sanxing to the entry “4th year of Yuanding”: according to Han rules, the officials with a salary of above 2,000 bushels for vassal states should all be appointed by the imperial court, while the rest officials could be instated as they see fit. On this occasion, the Emperor has conferred the seal for the prime minister, chamberlain, commandant and erudite of the chamberlain for ceremonials to Nanyue, elevating it to a status on a par with the feudal lords. Since Emperor Wen of the Han Dynasty abolished mutilations, such as facial branding and cutting off the nose, he also ordered Nanyue to abolish them.”

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practice was consistent with the dispatch of hostages by the Xiongnu, Xianbei, and Western Regions countries that had vassal relations with the Western Han Dynasty. Fourth, the Han system stipulated that the king of the feudal state must go to the imperial court to pay tribute every three years. According to Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue, the Empress Dowager of Nanyue dispatched an envoy to submit an imperial memorial, for requesting vassal status, and pledging to pay tribute every three years and guard the Borderland passes. However, Nanyue Kingdom was different. Despite repeated urges by the emperor of the Han Dynasty throughout the 93 years of its rule, its king never went to the imperial court to pay tribute, for fear of “being retained” or “being coerced into submission” like the other vassals. The second issue worth noting is the nature of Lü Jia’s uprising. There are generally two views about it among researchers: one believing that the uprising was a rebellion against the will of the Nanyue people, and the other believing that it was a just action against national oppression. To evaluate the nature of Lü Jia’s uprising, one should first clarify the reasons. The civil strife in Nanyue was caused by the empress dowager petitioning for submission to the Han Dynasty without authorization. Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue says that before the rebellion, Lü Jia issued an order to the people of Nanyue, saying that “The king is young, while the Empress Dowager is a Chinese who messed with the Han envoys. She is bent on submitting to the Han, sending the ceremonial wares of the late King to the Han emperor to curry favor with him. She sold her entourage into slavery when she reached Chang’an, to line her own pockets at the cost of the Zhao clan. Never did she think about its future.” In Lü Jia view, the empress dowager’s insistence would ruin the rule of the Zhao Clan with her treacherous conduct, while he was duty-bound to protect the Nanyue Kingdom and its prolonged subsistence. It was from this starting point that Lü Jia rebelled against Han and installed Jiande, a descendant of the Zhao clan, as the King of Nanyue, when the Han troops approached. Therefore, he had been trying to defend the status of Nanyue as a vassal state, and forced into revolt, which should not count as mutiny. Moreover, the Emperor Dowage’s intention to submit to the Han Dynasty did



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not receive the support of the government or the people of the Nanyue Kingdom. Therefore, the uprising shouldn’t be deemed as against the will of the Nanyue people. The constant pressure exerted by the Han Dynasty was the fuse for Lü Jia’s uprising. In the fourth year of Yuanding (113 BC), Emperor Wu sent Anguo Shaoji to issue an edict to the King of Nanyue and the Empress Dowager personally, to request their tribute to the court, so that Nanyue Kingdom could be on a par with “other vassal states of Han”. In making preparations, Emperor Wu dispatched Zhong Jun, a sophist, to read the edict, under the company of Wei Chen, the warrior, and Lu Bode the Brigadier Commander to station his troops on the border. Before leaving, Zhong Jun stated that “please kindly give me a long rope, so that I can tie up the King of Nanyue and send him to the imperial court.” The Han court tried all civil and military means to coerce the Nanyue Kingdom into submission. While the Nanyue court was undecided about submission to the Han, Emperor Wu arbitrarily believed that the Nanyue King and the Empress Dowager had pledged to become a subordinate of Han but were deterred by Lü Jia. Therefore, he dispatched troops led by Han Qianqiu to execute Lü Jia, forcing him into rebellion and aggravating the situation. Therefore, Lü Jia’s uprising constituted resisting the Han Chinese centrism and national oppression. However, the situation of the Middle Kingdom was significantly different from the time when Zhao Tuo rose against Han. After decades of development, the Western Han Dynasty entered its heyday. After winning the war against the Xiongnu, it shifted its focus of border governance from the northwest to the southwest. Under such circumstances, it can be said that the general trend would be for all parts of the southwest to be included in the direct rule of the Han Dynasty. In addition, after about 100 years of management in the Qin Dynasty and the Nanyue Kingdom, the Yue ethnic group of Lingnan gradually became closer in economy and culture, as did its connection with the hinterland. The obstacles to reunifying Lingnan were much fewer than the time of Emperor Qin Shi Huang. That is one of the reasons for the speedy victory of the Han troops to win. However, Lü Jia tragically failed to realize the point, which meant that his uprising would be

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doomed. Sima Qian commented on the demise of the Nanyue kingdom, saying that “Later, the Nanyue Kingdom met its end, because of a war attributable to the Empress Dowager Jiu and foolish loyalty of Lü Jia. Hence, the bloodline of Zhao Tuo was annihilated” (Sima, 1959, 2977). He believed that the Empress Dowager had been the root cause for the extermination of the Zhao clan, while Lü Jia could only be regarded as an “inadvisably loyal”, since his foolhardy conduct cost the entire Zhao clan. He actually had a cogent point there. In its early days, the Western Han Dynasty couldn’t spare any energy to manage Lingnan. During this period, the Nanyue Kingdom was a decisive force in Lingnan and held considerable sway in the stability of Lingnan. The ruler of the Western Han Dynasty was clearly aware of this. In the 11th year (196 BC), Emperor Gaozu of Han sent Lu Jia to Panyu to canonize Zhao Tuo as the King of Nanyue, and ordered Zhao Tuo to “develop a peaceful relation with the Yue tribes and prevent them from causing trouble in the southern border, since it adjoins Changsha Kingdom.” The decree in fact recognized hegemony of Nanyue among the Lingnan tribes. In the first year of Emperor Wen (179 BC), when the Han court wanted to reconcile with Nanyue Kingdom, Emperor Wen affirmed its role in “reconciling various Yue tribes” in Lingnan in the edict issued to Zhao Tuo, reiterated that “he had full jurisdiction over areas in Lingnan” (Ban, 1962, 3850).

1.2  Correctly handling relations with various forces in Lingnan is an indispensable condition for the survival of Nanyue Kingdom, which attached great importance to them, and formulated and implemented various policies accordingly. The local forces adjacent to the Nanyue Kingdom mainly included Minyue, Changsha, Yelang and Ouluo. Minyue was a branch of Baiyue, located to the east of Nanyue Kingdom. After Qin reunified China, it abolished Wuzhu the King of Mingyue, and established Minzhong Prefecture in its old land. At the end of the Qin Dynasty, Wuzhu led the Yue people to destroy Qin with the feudal lords, and then attacked Xiang Yu with Liu Bang. After the establishment of the Western Han Dynasty, Liu Bang, Emperor Gaozu



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of Han, re-instated Wuzhu as the King of Minyue, and ordered him to govern the former land of central Fujian, with the government seat in Dongye (now Fuzhou City, Fujian). Thus the Western Han Dynasty established a suzerain-vassal relationship with Minyue (Sima, 1959, 2979). During the reign of Emperor Wu, Minyue was powerful and often rode roughshod over neighboring kingdoms (Ban, 1962, 2776). In the 4th year of Jianyuan (137 BC), Zhao Tuo died and his grandson Zhao Hu acceded to the throne. Ying, the King of Minyue took advantage of the situation and mounted an attack against the border towns of Nanyue. Zhao Hu, the King of Nanyue, wrote a memorial to the Han court, requesting its intervention on the ground that Nanyue and Minyue were both vassals of the Han Dynasty and should not be allowed to attack each other without justification. Emperor Wu of Han then sent two generals to lead a punitive expedition against Minyue. The younger brother of Ying saw that the Han army was invincible, so he killed him and surrendered. The upcoming conflict between the Nanyue and Minyue was thus resolved, thanks to the ingenious manipulation of the contradiction between the Han court and Minyue. In the 5th year of Yuanding (112 BC), Lü Jia, the prime minister of Nanyue, led a rebellion. The Han Dynasty sent Lu Bode and other generals to attack Nanyue from various routes, with the plan to join forces in Panyu. Yu Shan, the King of Dongyue, submitted an imperial memorial, saying that he would send troops to attack Lü Jia with Louchuan General. The military ships of Mingyue sailed to the sea of Jieyang, stopped there under the pretext of the wind and waves, to observe the development and secretly tipped off the news to Nanyue. After the Han army had captured Panyu, the Nanyue soldiers were still stranded at sea. This move was unmistakably an act of betrayal. So Louchuan General submitted an imperial memorial, requesting to attack Minyue. Emperor Wu issued an edict to stop the military action on ground that the troops had seen enough action. This suggests that despite occasional disputes between Nanyue and Minyue, Minyue pledged to follow the Han army’s crusade but actually acted as scout for Minyue, indicating a fear for its own fate, as well as a desire to do maintain friendship with it (Sima, 1959, 2975, 2982).

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Changsha Kingdom was the northern neighbor of Nanyue Kingdom. At the end of Qin, Fanyang Magistrate Wu Rui to lead the Yue people to overthrow Qin. After the establishment of the Western Han Dynasty, he was made King of Changsha by Emperor Gaozu. Changsha thus became one of the eight protectorates ruled by a king from a clan other than Liu (Ban, 1962, 1894). It was a subordinate of the Han Dynasty, different from the Nanyue and Minyue, which were its tributaries. It extended southward to about the junction of present-day Hunan and Guangdong, and separated from Nanyue through Hengpu Pass, Yangshan Pass and Huangxi Pass. As a vassal state of the Western Han Dynasty, Changsha had roughly the same attitude towards Nanyue as did the Han court. Its relationship with Nanyue changed roughly according to the relationship between the Han court and Nanyue. Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue says that, in the early Western Han Dynasty, Emperor Gaozu sent Lu Jia to make Zhao Tuo the King of Nanyue, and ordered him to “refrain from harming the south, since it borders Changsha.” During this period, the Han court maintained a friendly relationship with Nanyue and Changsha and Nanyue were in peace. According to the imperial edict issued by Emperor Gaozu of Han in the fifth year of Emperor Gaozu (202 BC), Wu Rui, the King of Hengshan, had rendered a meritorious service in helping the feudal lords overthrowing Qin, “and was made King of Changsha, governing Changsha, Yuzhang, Xiangjun, Guilin, and Nanhai” (Ban, 1962, 53). This suggests that when Emperor Gaozu made Wu Rui the King of Changsha, he gave him jurisdiction over Qinxiang County, Guilin County and Nanhai County, which were then controlled by the Nanyue Kingdom. Zhao Tuo was wary of Changsha. During the reign of Empress Gao, the Western Han court restricted the export of gold, iron farming implements and large female livestock to Nanyue. Zhao Tuo believed that the restriction sprang from the conspiracy of the King of Changsha to “destroy Nanyue and took its land” with the support of the court. Meanwhile, Nanyue had already had plans to seize the southern part of Changsha. So he sent troops to attack the border towns of Changsha. Upon hearing the news, Empress Gao sent troops for a punitive expedition, but had to cancel the campaign because the army was unable



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to pass the Yangshan Mountains. A little more than one year after, Empress Gao died of illness, and the Han court disbanded the mobilized troops. During this period, the Nanyue Kingdom once occupied several counties in the southern part of the Changsha Kingdom. After Emperor Wen succeeded to the throne, Nanyue continued to attack Changsha, with a vehemence unnerving the Nanjun Prefecture to the northwest of Changsha Kingdom. Emperor Wen sent an edict to Zhao Tuo, promising to dismiss the General of Changsha and the Boyang Duke, and to restore the trade with Nanyue, on the ground that Nanyue Kingdom restoring peaceful relations with its neighbors. Thanks to the friendly gesture of the Han court, Nanyue Kingdom restored its relationship with the Han court, and stopped its hostility against the Changsha Kingdom (Sima, 1959, 2969; Ban, 1962, 3852). As Empress Gao took over the anvil, the Nanyue Kingdom resisted the suppression of the Han court by force, maintaining its relative independence as a vassal state, and taking the opportunity to expand its territory. When the Han Dynasty showed good faith for peace, it presently restored its good-neighborly relations with the Han court and Changsha. Yelang was a large tribal alliance distributed in the western part of Guizhou and nearby areas, and had properties that would preliminarily qualify it as a local regime. It was based in Yelang County established in the Han Dynasty, in present-day Guanling, Guizhou Province. Nanyue Kingdom established an alliance with Yelang. Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Southwestern Borderland Regions says that, in the 6th year of Jianyuan (135 BC), Tang Meng, an envoy dispatched by the Han Dynasty to Nanyue reported that “Nanyue Kingdom used wealth and property to secure the alliance with Yelang, extending its influence to Tongshi in the west, but could not make it a subordinate.” This suggests that back in the early years of the Han Dynasty, Nanyue Kingdom had established an alliance with Yelang by donating wealth and goods, and it was in an advantageous position in the relationship. Through Yelang, Nanyue extended its influence to Tongshi (now Baoshan, Yunnan). In Book of Han: Biography of Nanyue, there is the record that in the early years of Emperor Wen, “Zhao Tuo bribed or coerced Mingyue, Xiou and Luo, and turned Xiou and Luo into subordinates.” Zhao Tuo also said in his letter to Emperor Wen that “in the

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low-lying and humid land of the southern Borderland, the barbarians of the west, represented by Xiou, have accepted my rule as king; so have Minyue with thousands of tribesmen in the east, and Changsha with half its population barbarians in the northwest.” None of the above records mentioned Yelang, which seems to have submitted to Nanyue. Yelang was far from the center of Nanyue, and was not involved in the entangled relationship between the Han court and Nanyue. Therefore, it was not mentioned in historical records. The relationship between Yelang and the Nanyue Kingdom was relatively stable. There had been no recorded disputes, partly because of the long distance between the centers of the two regimes, and the Nanyue Kingdom’s strategy of “befriending those far away and attacking those nearby.” There were relatively close trade ties between Nanyue Kingdom and Yelang. Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Southwestern Borderland Regions says: when Tang Meng ate the citrus sauce shipped from Shu in Panyu, he learned after inquiries that there had been a waterway from Zangke to Panyu. After his return to the Han court, Tangmeng suggested to Emperor Wu that it would be much easier and faster to attack Nanyue along the Pengke River than the Yuzhang Waterway of Changsha, which was “mostly difficult to navigate.” When Lü Jia, the prime minister of Nanyue, rebelled in the Yuanding years, the Han court sent an army to attack Nanyue along the Zangke waterway, and ordered the conscripts of Yelang to assist. However, Julan, the region under the rule of Yelang, rose in rebellion. After the Nanyue Kingdom was destroyed, Yelang Duke, who “previously depended on Nanyue”, lost his support. “He had no choice but to send envoys to the Han court to pay tribute, and Emperor (Han of Wu) made him King of Yelang.” This suggests that the alliance between Yelang and Nanyue Kingdom lasted until the demise of the Nanyue Kingdom. Xiou and Luoyue were two branches of the ancient Baiyue ethnic group and were mainly distributed in present-day Guangxi and the central and northern Vietnam. The east and north of present-day Guangxi was mainly inhabited by Xiou, while the west and southwest of Guangxi and the central and northern parts of Vietnam were mainly



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inhabited by Luoyue (Fang, 1993). Since Zhao Tuo seized Xiangjun County and Guilin County in the Qin Dynasty, the Ou and Luo people in present-day Guangxi had been ruled by Nanyue Kingdom. The Luoyue people lived in today’s northern and central Vietnam, which as a result was considered a neighbor of Nanyue Kingdom even in the early years of Emperor Wen. In a letter he wrote to Zhao Tuo, Emperor Wen said that “Your excellency might find it advisable to entertain yourself with music and show concern for your neighboring kingdom.” Nanyue Kingdom had submitted to the Ou and Luo people in the region by offering gifts. When Zhao Tuo sent troops to attack Anyang Kingdom to the north of present-day Vietnam, with Fengxi (present-day Huyện Đông Anh, Vinh Phu Province, Vietnam) at the center, he was unable to prevail at first and stationed his troops in Wuning County (in present-day Ha Bac Province, Vietnam). Later, he sent spies to destroy the giant crossbow of Anyang King, who was then forced to flee out to the sea. Thus, the Nanyue Kingdom took control of the area that is present-day northern and central Vietnam (Fan, 1965; Li, 1984, 1156). There were roughly three ways in which the Nanyue Kingdom governed its land. The first one was to set up counties. Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue mentioned “by order of Jieyang Magistrate.” Lacquer wares bearing the Chinese inscription for “fanyu” and “Bushan” were unearthed from tombs of early Han Dynasty in Guangzhou. Therefore, this suggests that Nanyue Kingdom had Jieyang County, Panyu County and Bushan County under its jurisdiction. Second, “Zhao Guang, King of Cangwu” and “Superintendent of Guilin” seen in historical records indicate that the Nanyue Kingdom had instated Cangwu King and Guilin Superintendent to rule the eastern and western parts of the former Qin Guilin County respectively. Thirdly, envoys were sent to supervise the leaders of the conquered ethnic groups in areas where direct rule was not easy, for relatively loose rule. Zhao Tuo captured Anyang and adopted the third method locally, dispatching two envoys to supervise the local rule by the Luo generals who had surrendered. The rule was strongly reminiscent of Jimi Rule (Sima, 1959, 2977).

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1.3  Yue and Han were the two largest ethnic groups in Nanyue. Handling the relationship with them became a cornerstone to maintaining domestic stability. The residents of Lingnan were mainly Yue people. In the Han Dynasty, Liu Xin said that “Colonel Tuo of Nanyue seized Baiyue and proclaimed to be the emperor.” The Han Dynasty “destroyed Baiyue and established seven counties on its land” (Ban, 1962, 3126). Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Xue Zong also said that “Zhao Tuo rose to eminence from Panyu and subdued the king of Baiyue.” Seen from the records, the Yue people in Lingnan roughly belonged to the three major branches of Nanyue, Xiou and Luoyue, with Nanyue was mainly distributed in the eastern part of Lingnan. According to records in Huainanzi, Emperor Qin Shi Huang sent 500,000 troops to attack the land of the Yue people in Lingnan from five routes, “and one of them attacked from the capital of Panyu” (Gao, 1986). According to Records of the Grand Historian: Chronicles of Qin Shi Huang, Qin captured the land of Luliang and established the three counties of Guilin, Nanhai and Xiang in the 33rd year of Shihuang (214 BC). In the following year, “it banished the corrupt officials to the Borderlands to build the Great Wall, or to Nanyue.” Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue also says that Zhao Tuo established the Nanyue Kingdom and styled himself the King of Nanyue, and he lived in Panyu. Judging from these records, Nanyue as an important part of the Lingnan Yue people mainly lived in today’s Guangdong. Because of its large population, the kingdom founded by Zhao Tuo was based in the area where the Nanyue people lived. Hence, his kingdom was named “Nanyue.” Xiou and Luoyue are located to the west of Nanyue. Sima Qian said that “Ou and Luo attacked each other, throwing Nanyue into turmoil” (Sima, 1959, 2977), indicating that Xiou and Luoyue each had a vast land and a population. Their stability determined that of Nanyue Kingdom. Before the founding of Nanyue, the Yue people in Nanhai, Guilin and Xiangjun were still scattered and difficult to control. Zhao Tuo claimed himself king and gradually reunified the Baiyue tribes. In the early years of the Western Han Dynasty, the reunification was not completed, so the Han envoy Lu Jia once jokingly said of Zhao Tuo: “Isn’t it



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ill-advised to draw attention to oneself like that, since he had just found the Nanyue Kingdom without securing the allegiance of the people” (Sima, 1959, 2697)? After basically controlling the Baiyue tribe in South China Sea, Guilin and Xiangjun County, Zhao Tuo expanded his jurisdiction to the northern and central parts of today’s Vietnam. At its peak, Nanyue Kingdom even controlled the northern part of present-day Hainan Island.3 Zhao Tuo was proud of his achievement of reunifying the Baiyue tribes in Lingnan. According to Book of Han: Biography of Nanyue, Zhao Tuo said proudly in a letter addressed to Emperor Wen: “I have personally pacified the land of a hundred towns, extending for tens of millions of miles from east to west, and north to south. And I have under my command more than one million troops. Still, I have served the Han court loyally. Why so? Because I don’t dare to go against the will of my ancestors!” In addition to the Yue people, there were many Han Chinese in Nanyue Kingdom. After the Qin Dynasty set up counties Lingnan, it dispatched many officials there from other places, and left a considerable amount of troops for garrison. In addition, it also dispatched some population from the hinterland to Lingnan. Its large-scale relocation of population to Lingnan is also seen in records. For example, Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue says that The Qin pacified the land of Yangyue, set up Nanhai County, Guilin County and Xiang County, and “banished many people there, forcing them to stay with the Yue people for 13 years.” The Han population who stayed in Lingnan was the foundation for the counties established by the Qin Dynasty to survive in Lingnan. In analyzing the situation at the end of the Qin Dynasty for Zhao Tuo, Renxiao, the magistrate of Nanhai, also regarded “availability of many Han Chinese” as an advantage for establishing a separatist regime in Lingnan. When Zhao Tuo established a separatist regime in Lingnan, he first executed the chief officials appointed by the Qin Dynasty and replaced them with his cronies. After he proclaimed himself king, he appointed some Han officials to hold important positions, for example, Cangwu 3 Ban Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 7, “Records of Emperor Zhao”, annotations of Yan Shigu: “Daner (County) originally belonged to Nanyue”, 223.

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King Zhao Guang, whose purportedly had the same surname as the Yue King, should also be a Han Chinese. The immigrants relocated from the hinterland in the Qin Dynasty were mostly settled in the villages in the land of the Yue people, so that they could be mixed with the Yue people in a large range. In the 11th year of Emperor Gaozu (196 BC), Emperor Gaozu of the Han Dynasty said in his edict that “previously, Qin relocated some people from the hinterland to the three counties in the south, mixing them with the Yue people.” The annotation quoted Li Qi as saying “so that they won’t attack each other” (Ban, 1962, 73). Most of the immigrants who moved from the hinterland to Lingnan lived in the county seats, along the traffic lines and in areas with relatively flat terrain. On the other hand, due to the large number of immigrants in the Qin Dynasty, and the management of Lingnan for nearly a hundred years by the Han Chinese-Yue ruling group of the Nanyue Kingdom with the Zhao family as the core, some Han Chinese and their descendants mixed with the Yue people over a large area. The integration of Han immigrants and Yue people in Lingnan varied in different regions. In areas with a small number of Han immigrants, the foreign population was generally integrated by the local residents, though it also affected by them. Commentary on the Waterways Classic: The Yushui River contains the following citation from Records on Gardens and Towns: the Han Chinese relocated there gradually took on the features of the barbarians and lost their original customs completely. The citation is a reflection of this situation in ethnic integration. Where there were a large number of immigrants in relatively concentrated residence, the Han population had an advantage in ethnic integration and managed to keep the original characteristics of the Han culture for a long time. Because the Han people held an important position in Lingnan society, especially in the court of the Nanyue Kingdom, the institutions and culture of the Nanyue Kingdom assumed apparent features of the Han culture in the hinterland. The official posts of the Nanyue Kingdom included prefects, generals, county magistrates, attendants, left generals, and supervisors. Some were the same as official posts of the Han Dynasty, indicating that they might have been borrowed from the institution of the Han Dynasty. Wooden slips, seals and bronzes of Nanyue



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Kingdom unearthed in recent years bear inscriptions in Chinese, indicating Chinese was the common language of Nanyue Kingdom. Although the Han population who relocated to Lingnan was relied upon by the Zhao’s ruling group, its size and strength was no match for the local Yue people. Therefore, the ruling group implemented the policy of harmony and integration for the Han Chinese and Yue ethnic groups. After claiming the title of king, Zhao Tuo took the lead in following the Yue customs and consciously downplayed his Han blood. He wore his hair in a mallet bun, which was common among the barbarians in the south, and he also imitated the barbarian custom of sitting comfortably on the ground with both legs naturally spread out in meeting guests.4 In meeting Lu Jia, the envoy of the Han court, he called the Nanyue Kingdom a “barbarian kingdom” and himself “barbarian chief.” He rarely talked about the Han Chinese in the court.5 The Zhao ruling clique also advocated marriage between Han immigrants and the local Yue people. According to Records of the Grand Historian: Biography of Nanyue: Lü Jia, the leader of the Yue people 4 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian, Vol. 97, “Biography of Lu Jia”: “When Lu arrived, Zhao Tuo welcomed him, sitting with his legs spread and wearing a mallet-bun hairstyle.” Textual study: “Wearing one’s hair down and folding one’s clothes to the left were originally the dress code of barbarians; so Zhao Tuo’s appearance indicated that he had followed the barbarian customs.” Wang Chong’s Balanced Enquires, Vol. 2 “The Forming of Characters”: “Zhao Tuo, the king of Nanyue, was also a wise man of the Han Dynasty. He took the practices of the southern barbarians and betrayed the kingly institution, wearing mallet-bun hair and sitting with spread legs.” According to Book of Chen, Vol. 35 “Biography of Chen Baoying”: The Chen court rebuked the “bandit of Fujian” Chen Baoying in a public declaration, saying that “Born of a roving rogue, he instigated barbarian tribes, wore a mallet-bun hair, sat with legs spread out, and styled himself a barbarian chief.” This suggests that “mallet bun” and “sitting with spread-out legs” were regarded as a barbarian custom by the Han people in the Central Plains. 5 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian, Vol. 113, “Biography of Nanyue”, 2970; Vol. 97, Biography of Lu Jia, 2697. Regarding the pause of Zhao Tuo’s wording in claiming to be “the chief of the barbarians”, researchers have different opinions. Some believed that it should be “Tuo, the Courtier and Grand Chief of barbarians,” while others held that it should be “Tuo, the Grand Courtier and Chief of barbarians.” According to [Han Dynasty] Huan Kuan: Treatise on Salt and Iron, Vol. 11, “On Merit”: “Zhao Tuo, the Captain of Nanyue rose up in the Middle Kingdom and established himself as a king. However he was devoid of virtue and failed to see the grand picture of the entire country. Instead, he based himself in a prefecture, and grew proud, calling himself ‘the senior fellow’.” The second pause should be correct.

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that raised troops to resist the oppression of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, served as the prime minister of Zhao Tuo, Zhao Hu and Yingqi successively. In the Lü Clan, “the men married daughters of princes and women were married to the prince’s families.” Lü Jia and Cangwu King Zhao Guang were in-laws, while Jiande, the last King of Nanyue, was born to Yingqi wife from the Yue ethnic group. Therefore, this suggests that in the ruling group of Nanyue Kingdom, the Han-Yue intermarriage was common. Many Han soldiers and commoners who immigrated to Lingnan also married local Yue women. After the Qin Dynasty pacified Lingnan, the garrison chief sent a letter to Emperor Qin Shi Huang, requesting that 30,000 unmarried women be recruited from the hinterland “to be betrothed to the soldiers.” Emperor Qin Shi Huang approved 15,000 (Sima, 1959, 3086). Where the quota fell short, the soldiers presumably married local Yue women in Lingnan. The Zhao ruling clique also cherished uniting the upper classes of the Yue people, not only appointing them as officials, but also entrusting some with important responsibilities. Lü Jia was a veteran statesman who had served three kings of Nanyue in a row, and he held a status second only to the King of Nanyue. Sima Qian said that “He was very much cherished in the kingdom and the Yue people trusted him so much that he was even more popular than the king.” Lü Jia had a younger brother that wielded the military power of the kingdom and over 70 members of his clan served as the chief officials of the kingdom. Prominent officials of the Nanyue Kingdom seen in historical records, such as Lang Duji, Jieyang Magistrate Shi Ding, Guilin Supervisor Weng, General Bi Qu and Ouluo Left General Huang Tong, were all from the Yue people of Lingnan.6 Zhao Tuo implemented the policy of “Harmonizing the Yue People” and friendly relationship between Yue people and Han Chinese in Lingnan, and achieved positive results. According to Book of Han: Records of Emperor Gaodi: in the 11th year of Emperor

6 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian, Vol. 113, “Biography of Nanyue”, 2977; Ban Gu, Book of Han, Vol. 17, “List of Meritorious Courtiers in the Reigns of Emperor Jing, Wu, Zhao, Xuan, Yuan and Cheng”, [Ming Dynasty] Ou Daren, “Records of Wise Men of Baiyue”, Vol. 1.



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Gaozu (196 BC), Liu Bang, Emperor Gaozu of the Han Dynasty, said in his edict to Zhao Tuo that “The Yue people had been belligerent and prone to attack each other. Previously, the Qin Dynasty relocated the people of the hinterland to the three counties in the south, to settle down among the Baiyue people. Later, when the world joined forces and overthrew the Qin Dynasty, Zhao Tuo, the Capitan of Nanhai became entrenched in the south and ruled it effectively. The population of the Han Chinese there managed to sustain, while the Yue people stooped attacking each other, thanks to his effective government. It is hereby decided that Zhao Tuo shall serve as King of Nanyue.” Lu Jia, the Han envoy who read the edict, also relayed Emperor Gaozu’s expectations for Zhao Tuo: “harmonize the Yue ethnic groups and refrain from harming the southern Borderlands of Han.” This suggests that Emperor Gaozu of Han did not think that Zhao Tuo had established a separatist regime. Instead, he believed that the latter had been fully justified to keep Lingnan out of the scourges of war when the entire Lingnan was plunged into chaos, as the entire country “rebelled against the Qin court.” Emperor Gaozu also said that Zhao Tuo’s governance of Lingnan had been “meticulous”, praised him for the booming population of Lingnan and the change of bad habits of the Yue people, and allowed him to continue to rule Lingnan on the condition of maintaining its stability and refraining from disturbing the Borderlands of the Han Dynasty. The comment from Emperor Gaozu was not easy to come by. It showed that the rulers of the Han Dynasty fully affirmed Zhao Tuo’s governance in Lingnan. Thanks to the careful governance of Zhao Tuo and his successors, the Yue tribes in Lingnan were reunified gradually, their mutual attacks decreased, and the economic and cultural ties obviously strengthened, benefiting the development of the Yue people. The existence of the Nanyue Kingdom protected Lingnan from the wars started in the interior of the late Qin Dynasty; its social production and population did not suffer any loss, but witnessed development to some extent. During the reign of the Nanyue Kingdom, the Yue and Han peoples in Lingnan also increased mutual understanding, and became closer. When the Qin army conquered Lingnan, they encountered

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stiff resistance from the local Yue people, who even “ventured into the thicket, to live together with animals, to avoid being taken captive.” The Qin troops were thus forced to be on the alert and always prepared for action on short notice. As the Western Han Dynasty pacified the Nanyue Kingdom, Ju Weng, the Guilin Supervisor of the Nanyue Kingdom “persuaded over 400,000 people of the Ouluo Ethnic Group to surrender when he learnt about the fall of Panyu”, thus preventing further losses caused by the war. Had it not been for the friendly relationship between the Han Chinese and Yue people over decades, the several hundred thousand Ouluo people in Lingnan could not have surrendered without a fight.

2.  The Strategy of Shu Han for Governing Nanzhong and Its Implementation The rule of Nanzhong (now the Yunnan-Guizhou area) by Shu Han consisted of two stages, with the third year of Jianxing (225) when the rebellion of the local forces in Nanzhong was quelled as the demarcation. In the early stage, due to the limited control over Nanzhong, Shu Han basically adopted the strategy of appeasement to win over local forces. Influential clans and barbarians were generally treated with leniency for their rebellion; seldom was punitive wars launched. In the third year of Jianxing, Zhuge Liang led the army on a southern conquest, and quelled the rebellion of influential clans and barbarians in Nanzhong. After pacifying Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang changed his approach and exercised comprehensive and in-depth rule over it. The most distinctive feature of was the principle of classified governance. The present author thinks that conscious classified rule of the Borderland barbarians officially began in the Song and Yuan dynasties. The strategy of Zhuge Liang in governance of Nanzhong already had the features of classified governance, and achieved good results. The governance strategy of Shu Han for the various ethnic groups in Nanzhong was very clever, and was the main reason for the ethnic groups of the south to hold Zhuge Liang on such high esteem over hundreds of years.



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2.1  In the decade between Liu Bei’s occupation of Yizhou and his expedition to the south, Shu Han instated Laixiang Governor-General for managing Nanzhong, with the administrative office successively set up in Nanchang County (in present-day Zhenxiong County, Yunnan) and Pingyi County in Zangke County (in present-day Bijie County, Guizhou). However, the only areas under its effective control were only the three counties of Zhuti, Yizhou, and Zangke, while Yuexi County was controlled by a local barbarian chief. Shortly after the instatement of officials in Yongchang County, the road to Shu became blocked. In the 15th year of Jian’an (210), the Kingdom of Wu occupied Jiaozhou, and intervened in the politics of Nanzhong, further weakening the control of Shu Han over Nanzhong. During this period, the basic strategy of Shu Han for ruling Nanzhong was to appease and win over local forces. Shu Han successively appointed members of some influential clans and barbarian chiefs as officials of various counties. Those seen in Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong include Cuan Xi, Magistrate of Jianling, Zhu Bao, Magistrate of Zangke County, Lü Kai, clerk of Yongchang County, and Li Chengzhi, barbarian chief of Yueqi County (Chang, 1984, 351). When influential clans and barbarian chiefs rebelled, the Shu Han would generally deal with them leniently, and even accommodate their wrongdoing, refraining from launching punitive wars. For example, when Zhu Bao from an influential clan in Zhuti County attacked and killed Chang Fang, an inspector in Yizhou, Zhuge Liang executed the sons of Chang Fang, and relocated his four younger brothers to Yueqiang, in an effort to “placate his family” (Chen, 1959). Such practice of Shu Han was a contingency, as well as a last resort, when the rule of Nanzhong had not yet been consolidated. In the 24th year of Jian’an (219), the Kingdom of Wu captured Jingzhou, and killed Guan Yu, the general of Shu Han. In the 3rd year of Zhangwu (223), Liu Bei died of illness in Baidi City following an illfated punitive expedition against Wu. Upon this, the influential clans and barbarian chiefs of Nanzhong turned their backs upon hearing the news. Gao Dingyuan, the Sou chieftain of Yuexi County, killed the

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county general Jiao Huang, seized the county and proclaimed himself king. Lilang, the Sou chief of Yuexi County, Qingqiang people of Yuexi and central Yunnan, and the Cong people in today’s eastern Sichuan also rebelled one after another (Chen, 1959). Within a year, the three counties of Yuexi, Yizhou, and Zangke had successively separated from the Shu Han. Zhuti County alone remained under its control, while Yongchang County closed its borders and tighten defense under leadership of Lü Kai and Wang Kang the prefect counselor. In the spring of the 3rd year of Jianxing (225), Zhuge Liang led his army on the southern expedition. In March, the army set off from Chengdu; in May it crossed the Jinsha River, and in autumn it pacified the Nanzhong counties. Due to adequate preparation and correct military and political policies, Zhuge Liang achieved the victory of pacifying Nanzhong in just 11 months. After pacifying Nanzhong, the Shu Han focused on establishing a comprehensive rule over Nanzhong. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong: after the Southern Expedition, Shu Han changed Yizhou Prefecture to Jianning Prefecture, with Li Hui as the prefect, and moved the government seat to Weixian County (now Qujing, Yunnan); it separated land from Jianning and Yuexi and established Yunnan Prefecture, with Lü Kai as the prefect, and Nongdong (in the north of present-day Yao’an County) as the government seat. In addition, it established Xinggu Prefecture on the land divided from Jianning and Zangke prefectures, with Ma Zhong as the prefect, and Wanwen as the prefecture seat (to the north of present-day Yanshan, Yunnan). Together with the original Yuexi Prefecture, Zangke Prefecture, Yongchang Prefecture and Zhuti Prefecture, the Shu Han had seven counties in Nanzhong. In Jianning Prefecture, Xinggu Prefecture and Yongchang Prefecture, it also added some counties (Chang, 1984, 357). After the adjustment, its governance structure in Nanzhong became improved, and its rule over southern Yunnan was deeper. After the southern expedition, Shu Han moved the Laixiang Governor-General from from present-day Bijie, Guizhou to Weixian County (now Qujing, Yunnan), and the practice played an important role in helping it to control Nanzhong. It stationed a large garrison in



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Weixian County, and reclaimed fields for farming locally to supply food to the soldiers. Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong says that “Jianning Prefecture consisted of farming villages managed by Laixiang Governor-General; hence it was called ‘Tunxia’ by people in the south.”7 In other areas, Shu Han also organized civilian land reclama­ tion for farming. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong: Shu Han divided the land of Yuexi and Jianning prefectures for establishing Yunnan Prefecture, and Laixiang Governor-General Li Hui relocated several thousand Pu ethnic tribes to Yunnan and Jianning to populate them. It was the largest population migration of Shu Han in Nanzhong. The relocation of several dozen (or more than 100,000 ethnic groups) by Shu Han from Yongchang Prefecture to Yunnan Prefecture and Jianning Prefecture was a land-reclamation move organized by the local government. Thanks to the active management of Shu Han, Nanzhong witnessed marked social and economic development, and Shu Han extensively collected taxes to supply military needs. Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Li Hui says: After the Southern Expedition, Shu Han “levied oxen, war horses, gold and silver, and rhinoceros leather from the Sou and Pu ethnic groups, to supply military needs, since there was no shortage of expenses at that time.” According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong: The tribes in Nanzhong contributed gold and silver, red lacquer, cattle, and war horses, “serving the needs of war.” Dingze County (now Yanyuan, Sichuan) produced salt, but the salt pounds were owned by the Mosha Ethnic Group. Zhang Yi captured the salt ponds and instated an official to manage it, “thus securing the supply of salt and iron” (Chen, 1959). Seen from records, materials collected by Shu Han in Nanzhong, mainly fell into the three categories of gold and silver, salt and cloth, and red lacquer. Those were imposed on not only the influential clans, but also the local barbarians such as Pu, Sou and Kunming. The purpose of taxation was no longer the small amount of tribute levied by the feudal dynasty to the Borderland barbarians; instead, it was an official move intended to enrich the treasury of the Shu Han. The people of that time said 7 Ren Naiqiang, Illustrated Annotations of Records of the Huayang Kingdom, 273.

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that “The remote barbarian areas of the south normally paid no tribute but rebelled time and again. When Zhuge Liang, the prime minister, launched the Southern Expedition, there were forced into surrender by the troops. Later, they were forced to pay government taxes to furnish the needs of war, but soon grew resentful of it” (Chen, 1959, 1030). Therefore, this suggests that the official duties imposed by the Shu Han in Nanzhong were quite heavy. Shu Han also recruited a large number of able-bodied youths from various ethnic groups in Nanzhong for the war against the Kingdom of Wei. After the southern expedition, Zhuge Liang moved more than 10,000 households of “elite Qingqiang troops” from Nanzhong to Shu and organized the elite Wubu Army (Five-Tribe Army). According to other records, Meng Yan, member of an influential clan in Nanzhong, led his tribesmen to follow Zhuge Liang on the northern expedition, and was later promoted to Supervisor of the Hubu Army (Li, 1984, 585). The taxes and man power levied by Shu Han in Nanzhong helped strengthening its strength considerably. According to Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Zhuge Liang: Zhuge Liang launched the southern expedition with a massive army, and won the campaign in autumn. “As the military expenses were furnished by Nanzhong, the Shu Han thus became richer.” On the other hand, the government tax imposed on the tribes of Nanzhong, in particular, the mountain peoples. Shu Han recruited a large number of able-bodied youths to join the army, reducing the local labor force and exerting a negative impact on the social production of Nanzhong. All in all, through the Southern Expedition, Shu Han consolidated its rule in Nanzhong. Meanwhile, the heavy official duties imposed by Shu Han on Nanzhong tribes and the recruit of youths for soldiers also caused tension between Nanzhong tribes and Shuhan. Resistance of various ethnic groups in Nanzhong was frequently seen in records.

2.2  The success of the Southern Expedition laid the foundation for Shu Han to establish a stable rule in Nanzhong. After it, Zhuge Liang formulated a more thorough policy for ruling Nanzhong. It basically consisted of



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five aspects. Firstly, to realize the long-term stability of Nanzhong, efforts should be enhanced to rally popular support and establish credibility among the people. Thus, suppression and placation should be combined in governance. Zhuge Liang was a sober and pragmatic statesman who associated the long-term goals of pacifying Nanzhong with the Northern Expedition to the Central Plains. The basic starting point of his strategy for governing Nanzhong was to restore law and order, so as to stabilize the rear, and to draw materials and troops from Nanzhong for the Northern Expedition. In order to achieve long-term stability in Nanzhong, the rebels must be made to concede defeat from the bottom of their heart, and to truly recognize e the authority of Shu Han; otherwise, just as Ma Su had said “Even if they are vanquished, they would rebel later.” Therefore, Zhuge Liang adopted Ma Su’s suggestion that “psychological battle is more important than elite troops; may Your Excellency cherish measures to secure their concession to defeat” (Chen, 1959, 983). In the punitive expedition, he captured Meng Huo, the rebel leader, seven times and released him as many times, eventually winning him over. After pacification of Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang implemented a series of measures focusing on placation and legislation for governance. Most of the officials appointed to ruled Nanzhong after the Southern Expedition could understand his intentions and abide by his policies. According to Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Zhuge Liang: Ma Zhong, the Laixiang Governor-General was compassionate and lenient in ruling, and established considerable credibility among the barbarians. Meanwhile he was magnanimous, “clairvoyant and held in awe and respect by the barbarians.” Zhang Yi, the prefect of Yuexi Prefecture, “ruled with kindness and good faith, and secured the obedience of barbarians, who surrendered one after another.” When he was about to leave his office at the expiry of his tenure and return to Shu, the barbarians clung to his carriage tearfully, refusing to let him go. The superintendent Huo Yi “harmonized exotic customs, taught them law and promoted education with appropriate measures, fully placating the barbarians” (Chen, 1959, 1049, 1052). Deviation from Zhuge Liang’s established policy and blindly suppression of the tribes

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in Nanzhong inevitably led to political turmoil, just like what Zhang Yi, the Laixiang Governor-General did. In the 9th year of Jianxing (231), Zhang Yi was appointed to the post by the imperial court. He “rigidly upheld the law and lost favor with those embracing different customs.” In the 11th year, Liu Zhou the barbarian commander led a rebellion and defeated the army sent by Shu Han to suppress it. Zhang Yi was also dismissed and succeeded by Ma Zhong, who suppressed Liu Zhou’s uprising (Chang, 1984, 360; Chen, 1959). The practice of Shu Han combining pacification with suppression according to law for the various ethnic groups in Nanzhong was an important reason for Nanzhong to remain politically stable during the 38 years of its effective ruled by Shu Han after the Southern Expedition. Zhuge Liang proceeded from the long-term goal, maintained a certain degree of respect for the various ethnic groups in Nanzhong. He did not give up force, and managed the ethnic groups in Nanzhong with reason and law, making conscious efforts to maintain the continuity of his policy. Second, the pacification and effective governance of Nanzhong by Shu Han was still backed by military strength. The theory of later generations that Shu Han never shipped any supplies to Nanzhong after the pacification since it withdrew all its generals and troops, placing full trust in the local ethnic groups. Thanks to the lenient jimi policy, it “achieved law and order among the Han people and barbarians with only skeletal regulations.”8 During the Southern Expedition, Zhuge Liang first attacked the enemy with military strikes, and only “released Meng Huo all seven times after capturing him” with full knowledge of his unmistakable

8 Chen Shou, Records of the Three Kingdoms, Vol. 35 “Book of Shu: Biography of Zhuge Liang” annotation citing History of the Han and Jin Dynasties: “after pacifying Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang restored the surrendered generals. When he was admonished against the practice, Zhuge Liang said: ‘If outsiders are appointed, we have to station troops, but there is no way to feed them. That is the first problem. In addition, the barbarians are newly defeated, and many have lost their blood kin. If outsiders are appointed without the support of troops, disasters are bound to ensue. That is the second problem. The barbarians are aware of their history of abusing and killing and won’t trust their fate with outsiders. That is the third problem. Now, I don’t want to station troops here or sent rations here. I just want the barbarians and Han Chinese to stay in peace with rudimentary regulations’ ”. 921.



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victory. After the victory of the Southern Expedition, the officials and generals guarding Nanzhong usually resorted to force to rebelling tribes, and then decided whether or not to solicit their surrender in view of the circumstances. In other words, suppression and placation were combined, and alternated as required by the situation. For example, after the return of the Shu army following the Southern Expedition, some southern barbarians rebelled, and Li Hui led an army “to suppress it, killing all the incorrigible rebels.” In the 11th year of Jianxing (233), Liu Zhou, a barbarian chief of Nanyi, rebelled, and Ma Zhong “decapitated him and pacified the southern land.” Zhuoma Tribe on the northern border of Yuexi Prefecture grew disobedient of the prefect, and Zhang Yi led an army on a punitive expedition, capturing its chief Wei Lang, who was later ordered to solicit the surrender of his former subordinates. When Zhang Yi captured Dingze (now Yanyuan, Sichuan), Langcen and Panmu Wangjiu, two barbarian chiefs, didn’t come to pay respect in person. Zhang Yi later sent troops to their land, and captured and killed them. After that, he lured all the barbarians to surrender. The barbarians in Yongchang County took advantage of their strategic position and grew disobedient. Huo Yi, the prefect launched a punitive expedition, killing its leader and destroying its villages, before finally suppressing them. After the Southern Expedition, Zhuge Liang not only dispatched capable generals to Nanzhong and stationed numerous troops there, but also carefully selected the officials and generals, to ensure that they would live up to their duties. Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Zhuge Liang says that “the post of Laixiang Governor-General was often taken by important officials.” After the Southern Expedition, those serving on the post included Li Hui, Zhang Yi, Ma Zhong, Zhang Biao and Yan Yu, most of whom were famous generals of Shu Han. The prefects of the seven prefectures in Nanzhong were basically famous generals. For example, Li Hui, prefect of Jianning, Lü Kai, prefect of Yunnan, Wang Kang, prefect of Yongchang, Ma Zhong, prefect of Zangke, Zhang Yi, prefect of Yuexi, and Huo Yi, who successively served as the prefect of Yongchang and Jianning, had all been valiant generals. Shu Han also established an elite force in Nanzhong by combining the garrison army with the native army. Records of the Three

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Kingdoms: Biography of Li Hui says that after the return of the Shu army, the southern barbarians rebelled and killed the “garrison general.” In addition, according to Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Zhang Yi: in the 11th year of Jianxing (233), Liu Zhou, the barbarian commander of Nanzhong, rebelled, and Laixiang Governor-General was ordered to suppress his rebellion. “Before defeating Liu Zhou, Zhang Yi was ordered to return because of an accusation and his subordinate thought it advisable to return to the court as soon as possible.” However, Zhang Yi refused the advice. The “garrison general” and “subordinates” in the above records should refer to the officers and soldiers dispatched by Shu Han to guard Nanzhong. Some of the garrison troops in Nanzhong were native soldiers recruited from the local barbarians. The Shu Han recruited able-bodied as soldiers from the seven barbarian tribes of Qiongdu, and organized them into seven battalions by origin, known as the “seven-battalion army.” In Qiongdu area, there was also the “four-tribe army” composed of soldiers from the Sou Ethnic Group. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Shu, since Zhang Yi, the prefect of Yuexi, was transferred back to Chengdu, “there were the four-tribe army and seven-battalion army serving as the garrison troops, but they were not enough to hold on.” Therefore, Shu Han set up “the Red-Armor, north army and two commands” to strengthen the defense. This suggests that the provision of reliable ruling agents and powerful troops were the basis for the Shu Han to achieve stable rule in Nanzhong. As for the so-called claims of “Zhuge Liang leaving no troops, sending no rations and solely restoring surrendered local generals” lacks historical basis. Third, the Shu Han actively developed production in Nanzhong, levied a large quantity of taxes, and recruited able-bodied youths from various tribes to furnish manpower for the Northern Expedition, as described above. The economic exploitation of the various ethnic groups was excessive, and caused the resistance of local tribes in an endless stream. Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Lü Kai says: After the southern expedition, Lü Kai was appointed as the prefect of Yunnan, but was soon killed by rebelling barbarians. After Li Hui’s death, the Shu Han made Zhang Yi the Laixiang Governor-General, but Zhang Yi



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was too strict in upholding the law, “failing to harmonize exotic customs.” In the 11th year of Jianxing, Liu Zhou, a chief of southern barbarians, rebelled and “plunging local prefectures into chaos.” Zhang Yan of the Wu Kingdom thus commented that “(Zhuge Liang) had launched punitive campaigns in vain and failed to extend one inch of land, not to mention laying the foundation for a dynasty. Instead, he exhausted the domestic resources and incurred the grievances of the west with incessant levies and conscription” (Chen, 1959, 935). Emperor Ming of Wei also stated in a public notice that “(Zhuge) Liang also abused the land and the people of Lilang, Dangqu, Gaoding and Qingqiang, disintegrating them and turning them into arch enemies” (Chen, 1959, 94). Without strong military deterrence and occasional repression, it would have been unimaginable to maintain general stability, with “all those exorbitant taxes and levies.” Fourth, the strategy of Shu Han for managing Nanzhong was strongly pragmatic. It not only adopted the customs of the ethnic groups of Nanzhong in ruling, but also exercised different governance for different objects, timely adjusting the countermeasures according to the changing circumstances. Shu Han cherished the use of barbarian traditions. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong: the Nanzhong tribes embraced the tradition of “witchcraft to inquire the advice of ghosts, and oaths to establish alliances.” After the conquest of Nanzhong, officials of Shu Han often “resorted to oaths for covenant” with the barbarian tribes for important issues. Zhuge Liang awarded to the Nanzhong barbarians a “pictorial classic” with schematic diagrams, vividly telling them that the government should be respected and obeyed, just like the heaven, the earth, the sun and the moon, and the ruler. When prefect or county officials inspected the barbarian land, the barbarians had the obligation of welcoming them with ox and wine, as well as gold treasures. To the barbarians who had surrendered, Zhuge Liang also issued “Ruijin Tiequan” (auspicious iron plaque), to be presented when the governor or captain of Shu Han visited their land, to show that they were decent and good people. The barbarians in Nanzhong cherished the “pictorial classic” and “Ruijin iron plaque” bestowed by the Shu Han, and even handed them down to future generations as heirlooms.

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Fifth, Zhuge Liang adhered to the rule of law in Nanzhong, with clear rewards and punishments, which to a certain extent reduced the abolishment of governance or law with the decease of the advocate in ancient law enforcement, in contrast to rulers of other dynasties. Zhuge Liang said when talking about managing bullies in Sichuan that “now I deter them with law, so that they may know gratitude, and restrain them with peerage, so that they may know honor. When gratitude is combined with honor, the order and rank is determined. That is the secret to governance, as particularly cogent here” (Chen, 1959, 917). “Deterrence with law” was also an important principle of Zhuge Liang in ruling Nanzhong. After the southern expedition, Shu Han’s governance policy in Nanzhong was formulated for the sake of long-term stability, and was by no means a contingency. Therefore, Zhuge Liang asked the garrison officials and generals of Nanzhong to strictly follow the established policy. Zhang Yi, the Laixiang Governor-General, was transferred from Nanzhong because he was too strict in enforcing the law and violated the principle of combining leniency with strictness. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong: when Liu Shan took over the anvil of Shu, Huo Yi replaced Yan Yu as the supervisor of the Nanzhong garrison and “taught them law and promoted education with appropriate measures.” All those were examples of Shu Han cherishing the legal system in Nanzhong. Shu Han insisted on having laws to follow and legislating properly in Nanzhong, and basically achieved “strict and unequivocal laws, credible rewards and punishments, appropriate penalties for all evils, and highlighted kindness” (Chen, 1959, 930). Those were beneficial to maintain the stability of Nanzhong. At that time, the people said that Zhuge Liang “strictly enforced laws but was followed with alacrity, and imposed heaviest possible levies but no of the subjects complained” in ruling Shu (Chen, 1959, 934). Nanzhong was in a similar situation after the Southern Expedition. Thanks to the emphasis on the legal system and strict rewards and punishments, the official administration of the Shu Han in Nanzhong was well ordered, and the policies formulated by Zhuge Liang were implemented for a long time. After his death, the measures to develop production implemented by the garrison officials in Nanzhong were



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also misunderstood by the locals as his plan. In the 12th year of Jianxing (234), Zhuge Liang died of illness, and his governance policy was followed by his successors. Ma Zhong governed Nanzhong by combining kindness and coercion, “and was thus feared and loved by the barbarians” (Chen, 1959, 1049; Chang, 1984, 1049). After the Shu Han crusaded against Gao Dingyuan in Yuexi Prefecture, the local Sou barbarian tribes still rebelled several times. In the third year of Yanxi (240), the Shu Han appointed Zhang Yi as the prefect of Yuexi. Zhang Yi adopted the methods of coercion and placation to conquer them one by one and successively subdued Beijiao Zhuoma and Suqi barbarians, solicited the surrender of Maoniu barbarians of Hanjia, and restored the Linguan Road that had been blocked for almost a century. During the 15 years of his rule, the situation in Yuexi Prefecture was relatively stable. When Zhang Yi left office, the local barbarians were so reluctant to let him go that they accompanied him to the court to pay tribute (Chen, 1959, 1052). After Ma Zhong, the officials who presided over the government affairs of Nanzhong included Zhang Biao, Yan Yu and Huo Yi. In particular, Huo Yi held the post the longest, previously serving as the prefect of Yongchang and Jianning, and taking over the anvil from Yan Yu as the supervisor and general of Annan. During his rule, the political situation in Nanzhong was also relatively stable, “and all the barbarians and the Han Chinese lived in peace” (Chen, 1959, 1008; Chang, 1984, 362). To sum up, after the southern expedition, the control of the Shu Han over Nanzhong increased significantly, and there were no more large-scale uprisings by influential clans. Though the mountaindwelling barbarian tribes rebelled time and again, they were put down soon. Therefore, this suggests that the strategy of Shu Han for governing Nanzhong (especially during and after the Southern Expedition) was relatively effective. That was also an important reason for the ethnic groups of Yunnan to hold Zhuge Liang on high esteem. On the other hand, after the Southern Expedition, the economic exploitation of Nanzhong ethnic groups by the Shu Han and the suppression of their resistance were also prominent. There were such concepts of “ruling the barbarians with Han Chinese” and “ruling barbarians with barbarians” in it, indicating that Nanzhong failed to break through the rut of dynastic rule.

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2.3  The primary content of Zhuge Liang’s classification for rule was to actively support and to rely on the influential clans. In the Eastern Han Dynasty, a local power of influential clans appeared in Nanzhong. In governing the southern border counties, the Han Dynasty made the local barbarians the main subjects and followed roughly the policy of “governing according to the original customs and refraining from imposing taxes” (Sima, 1959, 1440). In other words, it recognized the original status and power of the barbarian leaders, and implemented the system of combined rule by the prefecture and the local chief. In order to achieve “governing according to the original customs”, the imperial court allowed the officials of the Borderland county a certain range of deliberation in enforcing the law, thus expanding their power. The implementation of “governing according to the original customs” proved effective for restraining the barbarians, but had obvious negative effects. In areas where the barbarians were powerful, the influence of their leaders constantly expanded, and relegated the government agencies to secondary importance on some occasions. In areas under the rule of the prefecture, county officials and generals colluded with local immigrant despots and ethnic leaders to become local overlords. Some of influential clans of Nanzhong originated from immigrant bullies. For example, Yong Kai, was from an influential clan of Yizhou Prefecture. His ancestor Yong Chi was a general of Liu Bang, later conferred the Marquis of Zhifang (now Shifang, Sichuan) after the establishment of the Han Dynasty. In the fifth year of Yuanding (112 BC), his descendant was stripped of the title and relocated to the Southwestern Ethnic Regions. During the Eastern Han Dynasty, Yong Kai turned his clan into a prominent influential clan of Nanzhong (Chen, 1959, 1047). Lü Kai, from an influential clan “with prestige spread far and wide” in Yongchang Prefecture, was a descendant of Lü Buwei’s clan moved from Shu to Buwei County (now Baoshan, Yunnan). Some influential clans evolved from the officials and generals garrisoned in Nanzhong. For example, Huo Yi, a native of Zhijiang in Nanjun Prefecture who successively served as the prefect of Yongchang and Jianning in the last years of Shu Han, was re-instated and made prefect of Nanzhong after



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surrendering to the Kingdom of Wei. His grandson Huo Biao was also appointed prefect of Yuexi. The Huo Family became an influential clan after being stationed in Nanzhong for generations, and had under its command barbarian and Han Chinese subordinates. In the Han and Jin dynasties, the influential clans of Nanzhong were mainly distributed in the administrative offices of Jianning, Jinning, Zhuti, Zangke and Yongchang. The rise of the influential clans in Nanzhong was mostly attributable to the power stemming from association of family power based on the barbarian and Han Chinese subordinates with the government. When the ancestors of Yong Kai and Lü Kai moved to the Southwestern Ethnic Regions, they brought with them a large number of clansmen and family members, and already had the makings of local overlords. Since the Huo Family had been garrisoned in Nanzhong during the reign of Shu Han, the soldiers under its jurisdiction and the barbarians under its control gradually evolved into its subordinates, who normally kept watch over family properties and took to farming and other productive activities, and thus developed a strong personal bond with it. Due to the inextricable links between the influential clans and the government, the dynastic rulers since the Eastern Han Dynasty generally adopted a policy of placation and loose governance. Even if they were convicted, leniency was exercised in their punishment so as to keep them in restraint. Another reason for the dynastic rulers to condone the influential clans of Nanzhong was that they were an important force for the Borderland counties to rely on. The prefectures and counties established by the Han Dynasty in the southwestern Borderland were only relatively isolated local strongholds, just like islands surrounded by water. For the county and prefecture government, Han immigrants living in the prefecture seat, especially those from the influential clans were the basic forces to be relied on. Zhuge Liang was keenly aware of the situation. Before pacifying Nanzhong, he accommodated the influential clans in all undertakings. In the conquest of Nanzhong, he “released Meng Huo seven times after capturing him as many times” to subdue him entirely. After pacifying Nanzhong, he was supportive of them, and allotted barbarians to them as subordinates, in a bid to enhance

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their economic strength. In addition, he appointed many of them as prefects and magistrates to take advantage of their social influence. However, the policy enhanced their political and economic privileges, and served to promote their development into local separatist forces in the future. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong, after the pacification of Nanzhong, Zhuge Liang assigned the ablebodied youths of the barbarian tribes to the influential clans as subordinates, and “asked” them by hoax and coax to hire “evil barbarians” as subjects, “awarding hereditary official posts to some of the top achievers.” “By and by, the barbarians gradually became subordinate to the Han because of their greed for treasures.” The influential clans were strengthened, while the Sou and Kunming barbarian tribes were weakened. Zhuge Liang enhanced the economic strength of influential clans by persuading or ordering them to recruit the barbarians as subordinates, and the empowerment was in line with his vision of relying on them to rule Nanzhong. When the barbarians were turned into subordinates of the influential clans, the mode of production was changed from slavery to feudal lordship, and the change was also of great significance to the economic and social development of counties and prefectures. Zhuge Liang succeeded in his policy on ruling the influential clans. During the 38 years from the end of the Southern Expedition to the merging of Shu into Wei, the influential clans of Nanzhong did not launch a major uprising. Zhuge Liang also did not trust all the influential clans of Nanzhong indiscriminately. For those supportive of the Shu Han, he adopted the basic policy is to active support, strengthening their economic strength, improving their social status, and even including them in the ruling group. For example, Zhuge Liang trusted Li Hui and Lü Kai, who were staunch supporters of Shu, and appointed Li Hui as the Laixiang Governor-General, serving as the Governor of Jiaozhou concurrently. After the Southern Expedition, Li Hui was made Xingting Duke and Anhan General for his meritorious service. In the 7th year of Jianxing (228), he was dismissed from the post of governor since Jiaozhou was seized by Wu, and appointed as the prefect of Jianning. After the pacification of Nanzhong, Lü Kai was appointed by Zhuge Liang as the



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Prefect of Yunnan and Yangqianting Duke. Their titles were made hereditary (Chen, 1959, 1046, 1048). As for Cuan Xi, Meng Yan and Meng Huo that surrendered after rebelling, they were also made officials, but transferred from Nanzhong to Chengdu. Compared with Li Hui and Lü Kai, they were much less trusted. Eventually, Cuan Xi became Commandant; Meng Yan became the Fuhan General and Meng Huo became Imperial Censor (Chang, 1984, 951). As for the Sou and Kunming tribes living in the mountainous areas, Zhuge Liang believed that they “tended to attack if denied their way, lived in the mountainous caves and scattered or gathered unpredictably” (Zhuge, 2008, 328)and were difficult to restrain. So he adopted a policy focused on prevention and sowing of discord among them. For the barbarian chiefs or leaders who surrendered, the Shu Han followed the Jimi policy since the Qin and Han dynasties and appointed them as kings, dukes, fief heads or fief dukes. Zhuge Liang’s practice also carried the implication for distinguishing between Han and barbarian households, and using the power of the Han Chinese to suppress the barbarians. In addition, Zhuge Liang recruited able-bodied youths of the Sou people to join the army, “persuaded” the influential clans to hire “evil barbarians” as subordinates, and tried to disperse and weaken the armed forces commanded by the barbarian kings and Sou chiefs. As for the rebelling mountain barbarians such as the Sou and Kunming tribes, the Shu Han adopted resolute suppression, and sometimes relocated the rebel leader to other places for resettlement. After Zhuge Liang’s Southern Expedition, the southern barbarians rose in rebellion again. When their rebellion was pacified by Li Hui, “their chiefs were moved to Chengdu” (Chen, 1959, 1046). Of course, while actively resorting to force, the Shu Han also cherished combination of coercion and placation and separate conquest. The barbarian forces in Yuexi Prefecture were very strong, and the government policies of Shu Han for the area were typical. According to Records of the Three Kingdoms: Biography of Zhang Yi: after being pacified by Zhuge Liang, the Sou barbarians of Yuexi Prefecture rebelled time and again, forcing the prefect away from Qiongdu the prefecture seat (now Xichang, Sichuan) to Anshang, which was more than 800 miles away. Later, Zhang Yi, a valiant

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general, was appointed by Shu Han as the prefect of Yuex. He “solicited the barbarians with prestige and credibility and many of the barbarians surrendered.” Then, he led a punitive campaign against the powerful but disobedient Beijiao Zhuoma Tribe, captured its commander Wei Lang and appointed him as a fief duke after securing the approval of the King of Shu. “Gradually, the barbarian tribes came to surrender one after another after hearing the news.” For the fief head Suqi and his younger brother Weiqu, who had surrendered but rebelled, Zhang Yi devised a stratagem and killed them. He also caught and killed Li Qiucheng, the leader of Sidu who had murdered Gong Lu, the prefect of Yuexi. In addition, Zhang Yi also seized Dingze from the barbarians, which was rich in salt, iron and lacquer, and instated an official to manage it. When Zhang Yi arrived at Dingze, the chief lords Langcen and Panmu Wangjiu, two barbarian chiefs “much trusted by the barbarians”, didn’t come to pay respect in person. So he later sent troops to their land, and captured and killed them, and announced “the crimes of Langceng.” Lang Lu, the leader of the Maoniu barbarians of Hanjia, accepted his solicitation and surrendered, and restored the blocked Lingguan Road. Since the Shu Han implemented a policy of focusing on prevention and disintegration for the mountain barbarians such as the Sou and Kunming people, its contradictions with them became tense and difficult to resolve. Revolts following the Southern Expedition mainly occurred in Borderland areas inhabited by ethnic groups, in particular the mountainous and Borderland ethnic groups. According to Records of the Huayang Kingdom: Records of Nanzhong: after Zhuge Liang returned with his army after the Southern Expedition, “the southern barbarians revolted and killed the garrison general. Li Hui personally led a campaign to suppress it, eradicating the rebels and relocating their leaders to Chengdu.” Lü Kai, the prefect of Yunnan Prefecture, died in the war to suppress the rebelling barbarians. When his grandson served as the prefect of Yongchang, “the southern rebelled together with the Minpu people, so he moved them southward to Yongshou (now Gengma, Yunnan) 1,000 miles from their original location, thus isolating them completely.”



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For the obedient influential clans of Nanzhong, Shu Han often appointed them as court officials, including governors on many occasions; for incorrigible mountain barbarians such as Sou and Kunming, it conferred nominal titles such as kings, dukes, fief dukes or fief chiefs, according to the Jimi policy practiced since the Qin and Han dynasties. This also shows that, in Zhuge Liang’s view, there was a clear difference between the extensive appointment of Borderland ethnic leaders as court officials, and the conferring of false titles such as kings, dukes, fief dukes or fief chiefs. The idea of classified rule witnessed further development in the Yuan and Ming dynasties to become one of the important differences between the native official -chieftain system and the previous Jimi rule. Zhuge Liang was a statesman of the feudal era, and unavoidably had historical limitations. On the other hand, his strategy for governing Nanzhong was indeed brilliant in many aspects. To a certain extent, he got rid of the prejudice of “Han Chinese in the center and barbarians on the periphery” as embraced by the dynastic rulers, managed to treat the Borderland ethnic groups with a relatively fair attitude, and showed a certain degree of respect for them, including using the customs of Yunnan ethnic groups to consolidate the feudal ruling order, and minimizing killing and bloodshed during rule. Zhuge Liang did not suppress wantonly during his southern expedition, but adopted the strategy of “psychological warfare first”, even convincing Meng Huo by “capturing and releasing him seven times.” That was indeed rare in feudal society. After pacifying Nanzhong, he took into consideration the circumstances of various factions in Nanzhong, and formulated different countermeasures. He adapted his measures for specific targets, occasions and issues, consciously tried to win the majority and focus on disintegration and separate conquest. Alternating between suppression and placation, he refrained from blind suppression. In Nanzhong, he insisted on governing according to the law, with clear stipulations for rewards and penalties, “combining gratitude with honor, and determining the order and rank”, reducing the randomness of governance by local officials, preventing official corruption to a certain extent, and maintaining the stability of the ruling order of Nanzhong. Zhuge Liang noticed the importance of establishing

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the rule of law and reducing the “rule of man” in the Borderland areas, demonstrating a vision rarely seen in the feudal society. The governance policy formulated by Zhuge Liang for Nanzhong and implemented there for decades had a far-reaching influence on later generations. In the Jin Dynasty, the rulers ignored the characteristics of the Borderland ethnic areas in ruling Nanzhong, implemented a governance method roughly the same as that in the hinterland, and brutally suppressed the Borderland tribes, leading to incessant turmoil and lost lives in Nanzhong. This further highlighted the wisdom and progressive nature of Zhuge Liang’s governance policy for Nanzhong.

3.  The Borderland Governance Strategy of Nanzhao and Its Implementation From the 23rd year of Zhenguan (649), when Xinuluo established the Dameng Kingdom, to the 2nd year of Tianfu (902) when Nanzhao fell, Nanzhao witnessed 13 kings over its history of 254 years. Nanzhao was originally a tribe in Weishan, Yunnan. In order to resist the forces of the Tubo Kingdom from the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau, the Tang court supported Nanzhao to unify the Erhai area. Later, as Nanzhao gradually grew in strength, it became disobedient and conflicted with the Tang Dynasty. It captured Yaozhou City (in present-day Yao’an), the seat of the Yaozhou Area Command, and openly broke with the Tang Dynasty. The Tang Dynasty launched three punitive campaigns against it, but was defeated by the joint forces of Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom. The outbreak of the An-Shi Rebellion the following year made it impossible for the Tang court to attend issues of the west and Nanzhao grew into a separatist Borderland regime. At its peak, Nanzhao had a territory consisting of the present-day Yunnan Province, western Guizhou Province, southwestern Sichuan Province, and northern ChinaIndochina Peninsula. As the most influential Borderland regime in the southwest region from the 7th to the 9th century, it held a very important position in the development history of southwest China and even the southeastern Asia.



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3.1  In order to study Nanzhao’s strategy for governing borders and its implementation, we must first clarify the nature of its relationship with the Tang Dynasty. After Nanzhao unified the Erhai area, in the 26th year of Kaiyuan (738), Emperor Xuanzong of Tang named his leader Piluoge the King of Yunnan. The name “Yunnan” originated from Yunnan Prefecture, established by Shu Han in today’s Xiangyun. The jurisdiction of the King of Yunnan was restricted to Yunnan Prefecture, so this suggests that the area of Nanzhao was limited to the western part of Yunnan back then. After merging the rest zhao tribes and reunifying the Erhai area, the Nanzhao steadily grew in strength. In the 4th year of Tianbao (745), it quelled the rebellion of the Cuan Clan Baiman in the east in accordance with the order of the Tang court, and then annexed the eastern part of Yunnan. Its king Geluofeng also forced about 200,000 Baiman households of Cuan Clan to migrate to Yongchang and other distant places in western Yunnan, thus seriously diminishing the strength of the Cuan Clan while establishing rule in eastern Yunnan (Fan, 1985, 129; Wang, 1980). As Nanzhao grew stronger, its relationship with the Tang Dynasty changed. The Tang Dynasty then regarded the original subordinate as a rival in the Borderlands, and the contradictions between the two sides gradually went public. Zhang Qiantuo, a Yaozhou official entrusted to monitor Nanzhao, tried to weaken it in various ways, and even contacted the Tibetan Emprie for jointly attacking it Nanzhao. In the 9th year of Tianbao, its conflict with the Tang court intensified, and Geluofeng’s troops captured Yaozhou City, killed Zhang Qiantuo, and seized 32 Jimi prefectures. The following year, the Tang Dynasty sent troops on a punitive expedition against it but was defeated. In the 12th year, it dispatched troops to restore the Yaozhou Area Command, and Nanzhao besieged and broke Yaozhou City. In the 13th year, Li Mi the imperial attendant was defeated in an offensive against Nanzhao. The An-Shi Rebellion broke out the following year, and Nanzhao formed an alliance with the Tubo Kingdom and grew into a powerful Borderland regime.

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During the Zhenyuan period, Nanzhao found the oppression of the Tubo Kingdom unbearable and sought to restore its submission to the Tang Dynasty. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), the Tang court gave its leader Yimou Xun the golden seal “King of Nanzhao” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6274), and the two sides restored friendly relations. After entering into the alliance, the Tang Dynasty recognized Nanzhao’s separatist rule over the Yunnan area, and the Tang army did not enter Yunnan. The friendly relations lasted for 35 years. Shortly after the death of Yimou Xun, the powerful general Wang Cuodian launched a massive offensive against the land of Shu, conquered many cities in the present-day southwestern Sichuan in quick succession, and once seized Chengdu. Later, the relationship between Tang and Nanzhao alternated between friendly and hostile. Nan Zhao repeatedly invaded into the territory of Tang for plundering and havoc, seriously afflicting the Tang Dynasty (Sima, 1956, 8066–8228). In general, Nanzhao was a Borderland regime in the southwest region when it stood off against the Tang Dynasty in combat. Some historical records claim that the relationship between the two broke down in Tianbao years because Zhang Qiantuo, the Borderland official, had oppressed Nanzhao unreasonably, and that Geluofeng had been forced to resist. The claim is inconsistent with historical facts. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Nanzhao and Tang restored friendly relationship, but the nature of the relationship was different from that before the Tianbao War. Nanzhao was no longer a local power under the rule of the Tang Dynasty, but a Borderland regime that regarded the Tang Dynasty as the legitimate imperial power. Although the Tang Dynasty restored the title of “king” to Nanzhao, its connotations had changed significantly. Before the Tianbao War, the “King of Yunnan” conferred by the Tang Dynasty was a native official governing the Erhai area and under the Tang Dynasty’s rule; “Nanzhao” conferred on Yimou Xun by the Tang Dynasty constituted recognition of Nanzhao’s existing jurisdiction and its vassal status. The relationship between the two parties changed from time to time, but in the 254 years of its life, Nanzhao was mostly friendly with the Tang Dynasty. Therefore, Nanzhao was not an independent country on a par with the Tang Dynasty.



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After capturing Yaozhou and killing Zhang Qiantuo, Geluofeng sent an envoy to apologize to the Tang court, and pledged to return the captives and rebuild the destroyed Yunnan City. After Nanzhao defeated the Tang army to conquer it, Geluofeng erected a monument at the gate of Taihe City, indicating that he had been forced to rebel against Tang. He said that “for generations I have served the Tang court and accepted its conferment. If we are allowed to restore the subject-dominion relationship later on, my successor should show the stele to the envoys of Tang, and tell them that originally I had no intention to rebel.” This suggests that Nanzhao was still unwilling to change its subordinate position in relation to the Tang court, and firmly believed that the rupture of the friendly relationship with it was temporary. Most of the rulers of Nanzhao regarded the emperor of Tang as the emperor, and never showed the idea of contending for dominance in the Central Plains or replacing the Tang court. In contrast, it was full of admiration for the civilization of the Central Plains and the economy and culture of Tang, bent on learning (or seizing it through plundering) for its own use. Influenced by its relationship with the Tang Dynasty, Nanzhao’s several expansions into the surrounding areas mostly occurred when it fell out with the Tang Dynasty. Meanwhile, it also adopted a policy of active acceptance and settlement for generals and soldiers stranded there in the wake of the defeat, as well as other Han Chinese that reached Yunnan.

3.2  Nanzhao implemented a policy of territorial expansions. Its policy could be divided into several types. One was to actively seize strategically important places located in areas adjacent to the land under the jurisdiction of the Tang Dynasty after falling out with it. After the Tianbao War, Nanzhao broke with the Tang Dynasty and formed an alliance with the Tubo Kingdom. Then, it attacked Yuexi and Huitong, two strategically important towns on the Qingxiguan Road. According to “Stele on Moralization in Nanzhao”, the Tubo Kingdom

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and Nanzhao jointly mounted an attack against Yuexi and Huitong “to eradicate evil”, because “they had harbored evil design against me.” The Tang troops of Yuexi were defeated after putting up a resistance, and their counterparts of Huitong surrendered in fear of the powerful enemy. Nanzhao seized a large number of people, livestock and various materials from the two towns, and took them back, “blocking the road of 100 li with captives, treasures, livestock and grain carts.” In the following year, the Tang army recovered Yuexi, and appointed Yang Tingjin as its commander-in-chief and concurrently placed under his jurisdiction Taideng (now Hugu, Sichuan). The coalition forces of Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom then captured Yuexi and Taideng, and then Qiongbu (northeast of present-day Yuexi, Sichuan). Later, Nanzhao extended its sphere of influence to the south bank of the Dadu River. After Nanzhao formed an alliance with the Tubo Kingdom, the barbarians in Lijiang and to the north in Yunnan turned to the Tubo Kingdom, and assisted it in the subsequent oppression of Nanzhao, thus incurring deep-seated hatred by Nanzhao. After Nanzhao returned to Tang in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, Yimou Xun carried out a comprehensive clean-up of those barbarians. Nanzhao seized the c­ ities of Tieqiao (in present-day Tacheng, Lijiang) and Kunming (in presentday Yanyuan, Sichuan), “taking captive ten thousand households and assigning them to two banks of Kunchuan and the original land of Xicuan.” Nanzhao also attacked the cities of Shiman, “and captured its king Xunluo and his clan, imprisoning them in Mengshe City, and keeping them in good care.” It also moved the Shunman chieftain to the Baiya next to the Miqian Clan. In addition, it also pacified Moxie Man, “relocated them to the original land of Xicuan in Shanxi, conquered the Mangman barbarians, and looted the Nongdong and Hanshang barbarians to enrich the northeast of Yunnan” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6275; Fan, 1985, 154). Later, Nanzhao expanded its northern sphere of influence to the north of present-day Lijiang. The second type of Nanzhao’s external expansion was to abduct population through foreign wars to replenish slaves, and to plunder wealth. Under the rule of Nanzhao, the agricultural areas of Yunnan were in a slavery society. Launching frequent foreign wars for plundering was a common practice of Nanzhao. Aside frequently attacks on



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the territories under the jurisdiction of the Tang Dynasty, Nanzhao also sent troops to southern Yunnan and the China-Indochina Peninsula to abduct their population and plunder their properties. After the Tianbao War, Geluofeng, the King of Nanzhao, took as his basis Zhenan City (to the northeast of today’s Yongde, Yunnan) established by his ancestor Shengluopi to “develop Lingchuan in the west and establish ties with the Piao Kingdom”, expanding its territory to the southwest of Yunnan and the northern part of present-day Burma. “After Geluofeng, Nanzhao gradually become less aggressive.” After reconciliation with the Tang Dynasty in the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Yimou Xun, the King of Nanzhao again sent troops to present-day Lincang and Xishuangbanna, and established Xicheng City in Manmao, to the west of present-day Yingjiang County in Yunnan, and instated Zhenxi Governor in Zhenxi and Yinsheng Governor in Xishuangbanna to govern the local areas. Nanzhao also sent 20,000 troops to conquer Hariphunchai (in present-day Laos), failing to establish rule there, but pushing the border to the area bordering it. During the reign of Emperor Wenzong of the Tang Dynasty, Nanzhao once again launched a campaign to conquer Piao Kingdom (in present-day central Burma), and returned with more than 3,000 captives. It also attacked the Mino Kingdom and the Michen Kingdom (at the mouth of the Irrawaddy River in present-day Burma), looted their gold and silver, and abducted thousands of people to the Jinsha River for gold panning. Nanzhao launched an offensive against Kunlun Kingdom (in the mouth of present-day Salween River in Burma), but was defeated after meeting with stubborn resistance. Nanzhao also went on an expedition to Land Chenla and Water Chenla (in present-day Cambodia and areas to its north), but the army could not cross the sea by boat. As a result, “it withdrew the troops and returned dejectedly” (Fan, 1985, 312, 326). For the barbarians in the conquered areas, Nanzhao instated officials for relatively loose rule, or to keep them in restraint. However, in the event of military action, it enlisted them as death squads, betraying very obvious discrimination against and oppression of them. According to Book of Barbarians: Towns in Yunnan, Nanzhao built Moling City on Mount Moling (south of present-day Myitkyina in northern Burma), “instated trusted subordinate to handle the affairs of Xunchuan,

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Changbang, Moling, Jinbao and Micheng,” so as to manage more than a dozen local tribes including Jinchi, Qichi and Xiujiao. In addition, according to Book of Barbarians: Category, barbarians living in present-day southern Yunnan and northern China-Indochina Peninsula, such as Puzi barbarians, Xunchuan barbarians, Luoxing barbarians, Wangjuzi barbarians, Heichi barbarians, Jinchi barbarians, Chuanbi barbarians, and Mangman barbarians, “were under the jurisdiction of Nanzhao and called on for battles.” “In action, Zhengman barbarians were ordered to wielded sharp knives behind to warn those refusing to charge ahead.” Nanzhao invaded the southern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula many times, but failed to establish effective rule there. Its southern border was roughly in present-day Burma, Laos, Thailand and northern Vietnam. In the expanded area, Nanzhao established ruling strongholds and dispatched officials to rule. The most famous towns in northern Burma today include Xunchuan Dachuan City (in present-day Jiangxinpo), Guangdang City (in present-day Kandi), Zhenxi City (in present-day Manmao), and Lishui City (to the south of present-day Myitkyina), Jinbao City (in present-day Myitkyina), Anxi City (in present-day Meng Gong), Cangwang City (in presentday Bamo), Xiangbai City (in present-day Moning) and so on. In the Tang Dynasty, there was no kingdom or major power in the northern part of the China-Indochina Peninsula. So Nanzhao’s management of the area was to some extent preliminary development of remote areas. Nanzhao also actively managed eastern Yunnan. In Anning, the “strategic stronghold for the Cuan clans” with rich salt resources, Nanzhao instated a city supervisor for management. After the Tianbao War, Geluofeng inspected the eastern part of today’s Yunnan and believed that “the mountains and rivers here make an ideal fence, and the flat terrain makes ideal farmland.” Therefore, in the first year of Yongtai (765), it established Tuodong City in today’s Kunming, roughly as a secondary capital. After establishing the city, it “deterred Butou, and solicited the allegiance of Qu and Jing, securing the obedience where its decrees went” (Wang, 1980). The area extending northeast to



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Zhaotong, Yunnan, and south to Jianshui in eastern and southeastern Yunnan were also brought under its control. During the reign of Nanzhao, some Tibetan population moved from the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau to the northwest of Yunnan. Records of Yunnan written in the Tianqi Reign says in Volume 30 that “Guzong (aka the Tubo Kingdom barbarians) was a separate tribe of Xifan; since the Tubo Kingdom bordered Yunnan in the northwest, and flows into the territory, they occasionally ventured into the Middle Kingdom, in particular, Lijiang and Heqing once in a while.” The southward migration of the Tubo Kingdom population began in the early Tang Dynasty. After the Tianbao War, Nanzhao formed an alliance with the Tubo Kingdom, incurring the climax in the southward influx of the Tubo Kingdom population to Yunnan. Nanzhao acquiesced. The Esoteric Buddhism of the Tubo Kingdom was introduced into Yunnan in the Tang Dynasty, and later Acarya took shape with the Erhai area as the center, under the influence of the Esoteric Buddhism. In addition, the Tibetan Esoteric sect centered on Diqing, Lijiang and other places also indicated that the Baiman and other ethnic groups in the Erhai area also accepted the culture of Tibetan religion. The expansion and management implemented by Nanzhao basically completed the reunification of the Yunnan region. The Dali Kingdom inherited its rule over the above-mentioned areas, which created conditions for the reunification of the Yunnan area after the Yuan Dynasty. In the 13th century, the Mongolian army occupied Yunnan and southwestern Sichuan, and established Yunnan Province on the basis of land ruled by Nanzhao and Dali. The rapid consolidation of Mongolian rule of the province was attributable to the management and administration of Nanzhao and Dali over a long period of time.

3.3  Nanzhao generally adopted a policy of active acceptance and resettlement for the Han Chinese population from abroad. The main source of the Han Chinese population absorbed by Nanzhao was prisoners of war and the population of Han land abducted in plundering. During the Tianbao years, there were three large-scale

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wars between the Tang Dynasty and Nanzhao. The Tang court “mobilized a total of 200,000 troops and left them to their own devices in the quagmire, plunging them into action via alternation but withdrawing none” (Liu et al., 1975, 3243). Together with able-bodied young conscripts to transport equipment and ration, the number of troops lost in Yunnan far exceeded 200,000 people. Except for those killed in battle, the rest became captives of Nanzhao. Later, Nanzhao captured Xizhou, and took captive a lot of Han people. The “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao” says that the children and treasures plundered by Nanzhao “were so numerous as to block the road.” After the death of Yimou Xun the King of Nanzhao, Nanzhao attacked Xichuan many times. Due to its plundering and devastation, “the 800 li of land from Chengdu in the south and Yuexi in the north became a ghost area, devoid of people and livestock” (Sun, 1983, 8334). In the third year of Dahe (829), Nanzhao army broke into Chengdu, “and took away numerous children, artisans and precious goods with them.” “From then on, the articraft of Nanzhao was virtually on a par with the hinterland of Shu” (Sima, 1956, 7868). In Chengdu, Nanzhao focused so much on abducting scholars, craftsmen and weavers that rumor came to the capital of the Nanzhao Army “abducting more than 50,000 scholars, artisans and weavers after capturing Chengdu, and exhausting the city of musicians and craftsmen”(Li, 1983, 7220). Later, Nanzhao invaded into the land of the Tang Dynasty many times, and scholars and craftsmen were still the focus of plundering. After the first year of Xiantong, the Nanzhao army captured Annan and Yongzhou twice, entered central Guizhou once and attacked Xichuan four times. It abducted a large number of Han Chinese people through war, “capturing and killing 150,000 of them when they seized Annan twice.” Nanzhao regarded the Han people that moved into its land and scholars, craftsmen and weaver girls abducted there as human resources, giving them treatment generally better than slaves. As for the captured Tang troops, mostly were made slaves. The experience of Guo Zhongxiang, an official of Tang was an example. In the first year of Kaiyuan (713), when Nanzhao attacked Yaozhou, Li Meng led an army to repel it but was defeated, and clerk Guo Zhongxiang was captured and made a slave. Nanzhao promised to allow his family to



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redeem him with silk. More than ten years later, Guo Zhongxiang fellow villager Wu Baoan gathered enough silk to redeem him, and learnt that during the decade he had been resold by his owners many times for trying to escape (Ouyang et al., 1975, 5509; Li, 1961). There were still some Han people in Nanzhao who had resettled there for several generations. The rulers of Nanzhao were wary of them and forced them to move elsewhere. For example, when Nanzhao captured Nongdong City during the rule of Geluofeng, “the Yaozhou people captured were relocated far away.” The “Shangren” who lived north of Tieqiao, “were originally Han people” “relocated there long long ago.” In the 10th year of Zhenyuan, Nanzhao broke the Tieqiao Jiedu City of the Tubo Kingdom, and moved the several thousand households of “shangren” taken captive to the flat areas in the northeastern part of Yunnan (Fan, 1985, 143). Nanzhao was inextricably linked with the Tang Dynasty, and deeply influenced by it in terms of institution and culture. Therefore, it cherished absorbing Han people with previous governance experience into the upper ruling class. Its appointment of Zheng Hui to important posts was a typical example. Zheng Hui, a native of Xiangzhou, was serving as the magistrate of Xilu County after starting his career in the officialdom as a Confucian scholar in the Tianbao Year. He was captured when Xizhou fell. Geluofeng held him high esteem after learning about his accomplishment in Confucianism and ordered him to teach his on Fengjiayi, as well as the other two of his sons Yimou Xun, and Xunmengcuo. When Yimou Xun acceded to the throne, he appointed Zhenghui the First Qingping Officiale, “consulting with him for all matters on government” (Liu et al., 1975, 5281). In the 2nd year of Tianfu (902), Zheng Maisi, a Qingpng Official, launched a mutiny and established Dachanghe Kingdom in stead of Nanzhao. Zhengmaisi was the seventh-generation grandson of Zheng Hui, whose descendants were Qingping officials.9 Zheng Hui was not the only Han people appointed to important posts by Nanzhao. In the 7th year of Xining (1074) in the 9 Ni Lu, Unofficial History of Nanzhao: Ins and Outs of Usurption by Zheng Maisi, 187; [Qing Dynasty] Feng Sheng, Records of Yunnan: Usurpation by Zheng Maisi, Zhao Shanzheng and Yang Ganzhen.

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Song Dynasty, when Yang Zuo, a Jinshi (a successful candidate in the highest imperial examinations) of Emei County, and his entourage went to Dali Kingdom to buy horses at the request of the Song court, Dali Kingdom sent a Tounang’er to the guest house to keep them company (Yang, 1980). The so-called Tounang’er were descendants of scholar officials of Tang abducted by Nanzhao from Xichuan. By the reign of Dali Kingdom, they still spoke Chinese. In the several hundred years after Nanzhao, they were appointed to official posts and cherished by the Dali Kingdom. The acquisition of a large population from the Tang land by Nanzhao was very different from the immigration of other dynasties to Yunnan, but the influence was similar. In other words, Nanzhao also obtained a large number of laborers, which objectively promoted the development of its society. Nanzhao marked another climax following the Han and Jin dynasties, when Yunnan and its surrounding areas absorbed a large number of population and economic and cultural factors from the hinterland. Under its rule, several hundred thousand people from the hinterland settled in Erhai, Dianchi and other places successively. In terms of the number and extensive and far-reaching influence, Nanzhao far surpassed the Han and Jin dynasties. By absorbing Han population and learning the culture of the hinterland, Baiman and other local ethnic groups greatly enhanced their quality and strength. That was one reason for Nanzhao to last for more than 200 years.

3.4  For the Wuman and Baiman under its jurisdiction, Nanzhao generally adopted a policy of rallying their support and promoting their integration. The tribe known as “Wuman” in historical records in the early Tang Dynasty included not only the ancestors of today’s Yi people, but also the Lisu and Naxi people. The royal family of Nanzhao was also of Wuman origin.10 The Wuman people had quite an extensive 10 At present, there are still controversies over the ethnic property of the royal clan of Nanzhao, namely between the Wuman and Baiman people. The present author upholds that it belonged to the Wuman people, but won’t elaborate here.



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distribution. In addition to the vast mountainous area, they also lived together with Baiman in some plains. The stage of their development varied according to specific tribes. Those living in the plains had to pay the taxes to Nanzhao and get enlisted in the army to fight, while those living in the mountains stayed in a relatively closed state. The Wuman in the Yunnan region of the Tang Dynasty initially formed three larger groups in the west, east and north respectively. The western Wuman was dominated by the “six zhao” tribes11 in the Erhai area; in the late Nanzhao period, the eastern Wuman evolved into many tribes, and formed a tribal alliance called “the 37th tribe.” The northern Wuman in today’s northern Yunnan and southwestern Sichuan maintained a marriage relationship with the “37th Tribe” and Nanzhao. Nanzhao was closely related to the Wuman tribes with a higher degree of development, and have maintained long-term marriage relations with some of them; while the rest Wuman tribes accepted the rule of Nanzhao, together with other local barbarians. The former was represented by Shibang, the Wuman leader of the Erhai region. His mother was a daughter of Piluoge, while his daughter was married to Geluofeng. Mieluopi, the ruler of Tengdan Zhao, was a nephew of Piluoge. Previously, he attacked Heman barbarians and occupied the Dali City by joining hands with Piluoge, but was later annexed by Nanzhao. The intermarriage of Nanzhao with the Wuman tribes was frequently found in records after it reunified Yunnan and the surrounding areas. The Dujin barbarian tribe, who lived to the south of Qinzang (now Lufeng, Yunnan), was “the descendant of Wuman barbarians”; the mother of Yimou Xun, the King of Nanzhao was born to the Dujin barbarian tribe, and his paternal aunt was married to the leader of the Dujin barbarians. Yimou Xun married a woman of Dujin barbarian tribe and gave birth to a son named Li Fulan. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan, Fu Lan became a general and served as the envoy of Bolongchuan. Moxie Man also had “marital relationship with Nanzhao.” Nanzhao also maintained close ties with Wuman in eastern Yunnan. In Tianbao years, the upper class of Baiman from the Cuan 11 The six major tribes of Mengxizhao, Yuexizhao, Langqiongzhao, Tengdanzhao, Shilangzhao and Mengshezhao.

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Clan in eastern Yunnan had an internal strife. Cuan Chongdao killed Cuan Guiwang, whose wife Acha, originally from a Wuman tribe, led an army to stand off against him, while turning to Nanzhao for help. Piluoge tried to mediate, and married a daughter to her son Cuan Shouyu, and another daughter to Cuan Fuchao, son of Cuan Chongdao. However, Cuan Shouyu and Cuan Chongdao constantly attacked each other later. Nanzhao defeated Cuan Chongdao, killed Cuan Fuchao, took back the daughter of Piluoge and supported Acha to become the head of the local Wuman tribe. Later, Acha was stationed in eastern Yunnan together with generals of Nanzhao to jointly rule the land (Fan, 1985, 128). The seven Wuman tribes of Ayulu, Ameng, Kuishan, Baoman, Luluman, Momilian, and Wudeng in northern Yunnan and southwestern Sichuan also maintained a marriage relationship with Nanzhao for generations (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6317). The Baiman was a local ethnic group in the agricultural area of Yunnan, consisting of the Bo people that mainly lived in the plains after integrating the Han immigrants. Nanzhao implemented a policy of supporting and relying on Baiman. The most economically developed areas of Nanzhao were mainly inhabited by Baiman, and the residents around Erhai were mostly Baiman. The plains in the east and southeast of Yunnan were also important colonies of Baiman. After Nanzhao reunified Yunnan, Baiman became the main bearer of taxes due to their prowess at agricultural production. In fact, the ethnic group was also the main source of Nanzhao’s standing army and conscripts, and was thus valued and favorably treated. When Nanzhao first invaded into eastern Yunnan, it adopted a strategy of appeasing and pacifying the Baiman of the Cuan Clan. After defeating them, it then forcibly relocated most of them to western Yunnan, and the relocated population was later integrated with the local Baiman. Nanzhao was a multi-ethnic regime with Wuman and Baiman as the main body. The residents of the Erhai area were mainly Baiman, which was the ethnic group with the highest economic and cultural development in Yunnan. Therefore, the Baiman held considerable sway in Nanzhao, as can be seen from the origins of senior officials in Nanzhao. In the list of officials inscribed in the back of “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao” as a token to commemorate their contributions in erecting



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the stele, 64 had surnames or names (Sun, 1992, 150). Among them, 37 or more than half of the total belonged to Baiman, under the surnames of Duan, Yang, Zhao, Wang, and Zhang. Again, more than half of the 37 officials once held such important positions as Qingping Official, Army General, and Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs, including Duan Zhongguo, Wangcong Luoduo, Yin Cuoqian and Yang Longdong. Cuan Shoukou and Meng Chuowang were presumably from Baiman of the Cuan Clan. Liwai Chengju, Lixie Fengxun and others with the wording “zhaoqin” (royal relative) in their titles were from Dujin barbarians that had intermarriages with the royal family of Nanzhao. After 200-odd years of management by Nanzhao, the western Yunnan witnessed greatly increased Baiman population, as well as rapid economic and cultural development, becoming the most developed area of Yunnan. The Nanzhao royal family got along with Qing Ping officials and army generals who were mostly Baiman by origin, and was deeply influenced by the language and customs of the Baiman. As a result, the Wuman royal family took on the tendency of becoming more and more like “Baiman.” Book of Barbarians: Barbarian Customs says, “Linguistically, the Baiman had the standard pronunciation, followed by the Mengshe Zhao, and then the rest tribes.” The observation indicated that Mengshe Zhao and Baiman were close in language. The situation that the Erhai region was ahead of other parts of Yunnan in development continued until the 13th century, when the Yuan Dynasty established the Yunnan Province with Zhongqing (in present-day Kunming) as the center. During the Han and Jin dynasties, the influential clans of Yunnan and the surrounding areas were more seen in records, indicating that the Han immigrants to the above-mentioned areas were relatively concentrated in distribution and separated from the local barbarians, and that they were economically and culturally much more advanced than the latter. After the establishment of Nanzhao, Baiman and some advanced Wuman absorbed a large Han population with its culture, and their quality and strength were unprecedentedly enhanced. From the Tang to the Yuan Dynasty and for the ensuing period, no independent local Han forces appeared in Yunnan or the surrounding

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areas. This shows that after the great ethnic integration in the Nanzhao period, the barbarians of Yunnan represented by Baiman and some Wuman had witnessed great development and acquired considerable tolerance and affinity, making it impossible for Han local forces to develop independently. On the whole, Nanzhao’s policies for governing barbarians were practical, complex and flexible. Practical means that practicality was the basis for handling barbarian relations, with flexible adaptation according to specific circumstances; complexity refers to the fact that under the rule of Nanzhao, the coexistence of ethnic oppression and exploitation and ethnic cooperation was relatively common, and the related situations were complex. Flexibility means that Nanzhao had different policies for the Wuman, Baiman, and Han people, as well as other barbarians in the mountainous and Borderland areas under its jurisdiction. Depending on the changes of specific conditions and circumstances, those policies were also adjusted or even changed correspondingly.

3.5  After its establishment, Nanzhao successively took some measures to consolidate its rule, and the most influential one was the immigrant administration. Its resettlement generally consisted of the following situations. The first one was to annex various places by force, and move the defeated tribes from their homeland to other places for resettlement. The measure was implemented when Nanzhao merged with the rest five zhao tribes in Erhai. For example, the tribal leader Shibang originally living in Tengchuan Prefecture (in present-day Eryuan County, Yunnan Province) moved to Baiya City after incurring the suspicion of Geluofeng by taking several thousand households from Shanglang Zhao. In the Kaiyuan period, Nanzhao, with the help of the garrion general of Tang, killed Bochong, the leader of Yuexi Zhao, “and relocated his tribes and merged his land into its territory” (Fan, 1985, 99). The largest immigration occurred when Geluofengbao moved more than 200,000 Cuan households of eastern Yunnan to the west (Fan, 1985, 129; Song et al., 1976, 1467). The scale of this population migration was so large that afterwards, the plains in northeastern Yunnan and



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central Yunnan, where the Baiman of the Cuan Clan lived, were virtually “deserted.” The Wuman in eastern Yunnan originally living in the mountainous area moved to the plains, after the relocation of the Baiman of the Cuan Clan, leading to the mixed living of Bai and Yi in Kunming, Qujing and other places in modern times. After Yimou Xun restored friendly relations with the Tang Dynasty, he seized Tieqiao and other places north of Erhai from the Tubo Kingdom, and then relocated the local residents to other places. This was the second large-scale immigration in Nanzhao. According to Book of Barbarians: Category: Shiman and Shunman barbarians originally lived in the northwest of Tieqiao in the area of Dashidan, and were crowned kings by the Tubo Kingdom. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Nanzhao invaded into the land, captured the Shiman leader Xunluo and his clan, and “relocated them to Mengshe City (now Weishan), and kept them there.” It also captured Bangmiqian, the chief of the Shunman, together with his clan, “relocating them to Baiya, Yunnan, and kept them there; the people of his tribe were scattered in the northeast plains.” There were also the Shangren people living in the north of Tieqiao. In the 10th year of Zhenyuan, when Nanzhao seized Tieqiao City, it captured several thousand households of them, “who were presently moved to the northeastern plains in Yunnan (now Xiangyun County).” “Now, Tieqiao was occupied by the southern barbarians.” As Nanzhao seized cities of the Tubo Kingdom, it also captured Nongdongman, who were relocated to Yongchang. Later, Yimou Xun attacked the tribes of Erhai area that had not surrendered, and defeated the Sanlang Zhao, and moved them to Yongchang and other places. Nanzhao also seized Jianchuan, captured Yiluojun, the chief of Langqiong Zhao, and moved his family to Yongchang. Later, Nanzhao entered Yegongchuan, captured Dianzhituo, the chief of Tengdan Zhao, and moved him also to Yongchang. The Changkun barbarians who lived in the Jianchuan area were moved to the east of Tacheng by Nanzhao to live together with the remaining Shiman and Shunman tribes. Nanzhao also moved Heman to Tuodong (now Kunming) (Fan, 1985, 144). Nanzhao resettled the captured tribes mainly in Yongchang, and the surrounding areas of Dianchi Lake and Erhai Lake; the latter

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two areas were the most economically developed areas in Nanzhao, and Yongchang was the inevitable juncture on the road from Yunnan to Piao Kingdom and Tintu. The number of troops stationed in Yongchang accounted for one third of Nanzhao’s total troops. Thus this suggests that Nanzhao had relocated a large number of defeated tribes to make it difficult for them to resist by separating from their bases, and to enrich the economically developed areas or key military areas. The practice of Nanzhao was different from that of the mainland dynasties, which banished convicts to remote Borderlands for the purpose of punishment. The second situation of large-scale relocation by Nanzhao was to relocate some barbarian tribes from the Borderland regions to areas with better developed economy in the hinterland of Yunnan, for repairing roads, and maintaining law and order, or resettling them in areas to be developed as supplementary labor. For example, after Nanzhao took over Tieqiao cities previously occupied by the Tubo Kingdom, it relocated tens of thousands of local Shiman and Shunman households to Tuodong City “to populate it.” Moxieman originally lived in the vicinity of Tieqiao and Kunming (in today’s Lijiang). Nanzhao attacked cities in Tieqiao and Kunming, and captured about 1,000 Moxieman households, “relocating them all to Kunchuan and the original land of Xicuan.” Nanzhao also relocated more than 1,000 households from Wangjuzi and Wangman Waiyu tribes in Yongchang area to Tuodongcheng, “resettling them in different cities to restore law and order” (Fan, 1985, 155, 213). This type of immigration was coercive, but it did objectively promote the development of the backward ethnic groups in the region. The second situation of large-scale relocation by Nanzhao was to send troops to conquer areas outside Nanzhao and abduct its population and bring it back. When Nanzhao attacked countries of the China-Indochina Peninsula, in addition to plundering property, it also abducted people as slaves, or sent them to populate Tuodong and other cities, or to Lishui River (the Jinsha River) to pan for gold. According to Book of Barbarians: Names of Foreign Kingdoms Bordering the Southern Barbarians: in the sixth year of Taihe (832), when Nanzhao invaded the Piao Kingdom, it abducted more than 3,000 of its people and sent them to populate Tuodong and leave them to their own devices. After



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conquering the Minuo Kingdom and the Michen Kingdom in the 5th year, “it robbed gold and silver, captured 3,000 or 2,000 people of their clan, and sent them to Lishui to pan for gold.” When it captured the towns in their territory once controlled by the Tang Dynasty, it also relocated the local Han people to other places for resettlement. Such migrations were intended to disintegrate and guard against the conquered. Yaozhou was the government office of the Area Command of Yaozhou in Tang Dynasty. After Nanzhao captured it, the people were “all relocated to remote places.” The newly built Nongdong City “had several barbarian tribes but on Han Chinese” (Fan, 1985, 211). There was also a special situation, that is, the ruler sent some Wuman and Baiman nobles to guard the strategic passes or towns along the borders. Over time, these Wuman and Baiman nobles and their subordinates also became immigrants to where they settled down. According to the records of the Yuan Dynasty (Song et al., 1976, 1459, 1462), Anning Prefecture, “was inhabited by Wuman and Baiman relocated there by Geluofeng after he fell out witht Tang.” “Hequ Prefecture” was stolen by Baiman during the reign of Nanzhao. Chengjiang Route, was originally inhabited by Moxieman in the early Tang Dynasty, “but was later stolen by Bo (Bai) barbarians.” Heyang was inhabited by Baiman when the Meng rebelled against Tang. Jianchang Route was “turned by Mengzhao into Jianchang Prefecture and populated with Wuman and Baiman.” When Nanzhao decided to restrain its tribes, Hugu “was placed under the rule of a chief of the Wuman people, who thrived and called themselves the Luolan Tribe.” Similar records are seen for Longzhou, Lixizhou, Huichuan, Hexi, Jianshui, Buridan and Tengchong, indicating that this form of immigration was common in Nanzhao. From this point of view, Nanzhao had launched relocation in various forms, to serve the political purpose of consolidating its rule and facilitating its control. In addition, increasing the labor force or enriching the human resources the areas to be developed was also a starting point. In the Tang Dynasty, the productivity of the hinterland of Yunnan was enhanced significantly, and the Borderland and remote areas were also developed to varying degrees, to a considerable extent thanks to the immigration policy implemented by Nanzhao. On the other hand,

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the large-scale immigration of Nanzhao changed the distribution pattern of various ethnic groups in Yunnan to a certain extent, objectively strengthened their inter-connection, and promoted their exchanges and mutual integration. Therefore, it had positive significance.

4.  Nanzhao’s Strategies for Handling the Relationship with the Tang Dynasty and the Tubo Kingdom The relationship among Nanzhao, the Tubo Kingdom and the Tang Dynasty was one of the most influential and complicated political relationships in ancient China. Here, this section takes the rise, development and decline of Nanzhao as the thread and divides the evolution of that relationship into five stages, to expound on the alternation of hostility and alliance between Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom, as well as the intricate restraint and influences. Meanwhile, it analyzes the reasons for the evolution of the relationship among Nanzhao, the Tubo Kingdom and Tang Dynasty. From this, we can get a general picture of the strategies adopted by Nanzhao for hanlding the relationship with Tang Dynasty and the Tubo Kingdom.

4.1  Soon after its establishment, the Tang Dynasty began to manage Yunnan and the surrounding areas. According to Old Book of Tang: Geography (4), in the first year of Wude (618), the Tang Dynasty set up Nanning Prefecture, and in the fourth year it set up the General Administrative Command of Nanning Prefecture (based to the west of Qujing, Yunnan), changing it to the Area Command. In the first year of Wude, the Tang court changed Qianwe County established in the Sui Dynasty to Rongzhou Prefecture (based in today’s Yibin, Sichuan), before establishing the Area Command of Rongzhou Prefecture (Liu et al., 1975, 1663). After consolidating its control of present-day northeastern and central Yunnan, the Tang Dynasty focused its management on present-day western and northern Yunnan. In the fourth year of Wude,



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it set up Yaozhou in Yunnan to govern the jimi prefectures nearby. In the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648), the Tang court ordered General Liang Jianfang to lead the soldiers of the thirteen prefectures of Bashu to suppress the Songwai Barbarians that had rebelled after surrendering (Sima, 1956, 6255). In the second year of Yonghui (651), the Baishui barbarians of Langzhou (now the vicinity of Kunming to Dali) rebelled. Tang sent the Left General Zhao Xiaozu to suppress the revolt with his troops. “Zhao Xiaozu defeated them, restoring peace among the southwestern Borderland ethnic groups.” In the first year of Linde (664), the Tang Dynasty set up Yaozhou Area Command (based in present-day Yao’an, Yunnan), and placed under its jurisdiction present-day western Yunnan (Sima, 1956, 6275; Liu et al., 1975, 70). So far, the Tang Dynasty established its rule over most of Yunnan. In the early 7th century, Songtsan Gampo reunified the Qiang tribes on the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau and established the Tubo Kingdom slave regime, which expanded to the surrounding area, pointing to the northern part of Yunnan. The Jiannan Military Governor of Tang recruited troops to build Anrong City (southeast of present-day Malkang County, Sichuan) to the southwest of Maozhou to block the Tubo Kingdom from venturing south to Yunnan. In the first year of Yonglong (680), the Tubo Kingdom, captured the city of Anrong with uncivilized Qiang people as its guide, and guarded it with troops. Now that the natural barrier had fallen, the Tubo Kingdom forces began to enter the Erhai area of Yunnan, “and all the barbarian tribes in the West Erhai surrendered to it.” In its heyday, the Tubo Kingdom “was the overlord of all Qiang people in Yangtong and Dangxiang.” “Its land extended for more than 10,000 li, adjoining Song, Mao and Xi in the east, the Brahmins in the south, Sizhen in the west, and the Turks in the north. It had an influence unrivaled by all barbarian groups in the Han and Wei dynasties” (Sima, 1956, 6396; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6077). The strategy of the Tang Dynasty was to send troops to contain the Tubo Kingdom’s southward movement, while actively seeking the support of the barbarian tribes of Yunnan. Langqiong Zhao, one of the six zhao barbarians of Erhai, had originally submitted to the Tubo Kingdom. In the first year of Yongchang (689), its leader led 25 tribes to

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surrender to the Tang Dynasty. The Tang court appointed Bangshixi as the Military Governor of Langqiong Prefecture and ordered him to command those tribes (Sima, 1956, 6457). The Tubo Kingdom went south to present-day western Yunnan mainly through the road to Yaozhou via Xizhou (now Xichang, Sichuan). In the third year of Shenlong (707), the Tang court dispatched Tang Jiuzheng, the Pacification Commissioner of Yaoxi Route to attack the barbarian rebels. Tang Jiuzheng demolished the iron bridge and castles built by the Tubo Kingdom along the Yangshui and Bishui rivers, took more than 3,000 captives, and cast an iron pillars to commemorate the victory (Liu et al., 1975, 144; Ouyang et al.,1975, 6081). However, when the Tang expedition army withdrew, the Tubo Kingdom forces made a comeback. In the first year of Jingyun (710), Li Zhigu, the censor of the inspectorate, proposed dispatching the Tang army from Jiannan to pacify the Yaozhou tribes who had surrendered to the Tubo Kingdom, before building the Yaozhou City and establishing subordinate prefectures and counties. Li Zhigu wanted to kill the barbarian leaders of Yaozhou and took their children as slaves, incurring the hatred of the barbarian tribes. Banming, a barbarian leader, colluded with the Tubo Kingdom troops to attack Li Zhigu, killing him. As a result, the roads in Yaozhou fell into the hands of the Tubo Kingdom, and “became blocked for years.”12 After the occupation of Anrong City by the Tubo Kingdom, the Tang army repeatedly tried to recover it without success. In the 26th year of Kaiyuan (738), Jiannan Military Governor Wang Yu built two cities beside Anrong City, transported grain and stationed troops there as preparations for attacking Anrong City. The Tubo Kingdom sent troops to rescue Anrong City, and the Tang army was defeated, losing several thousand troops (Sima, 1956). Regarding the area where the Tubo Kingdom and the Tang Dynasty stood off against each other, the Old Book of Tang: Biography of the Tubo Kingdom says that “Jiannan Xishan was adjacent to Tufo, Di, and Qiang.

12 Sima Guang, History as a Mirror, Vol. 210, “Records of Tang (26)”, 12th month of the 1st year of Jingyun. In New Book of Tang, Vol. 216 (1), “Biography of the Tibetan Empire (1)”, there is the record of Tang Jiuzheng attacking the rebelling barbarians of Yaozhou after Li Zhigu’s expedition against them. That is incorrect.



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In the Wude years, prefectures and counties were established, and garrisons stationed there. In the Han Dynasty, it was known as Zelu Route (that is, Yaozhou Road); after Qianyuan years, it also fell into the hand of the Tubo Kingdom.” After the Tubo Kingdom captured Anrong City, “its land is connected to Song, Mao, and Xi in the east.” Book of Barbarians: The Oath between Yimou Xun and the Tang Dynasty says that in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, when Yimou Xun the king of Nanzhao swore an oath with the envoys of the Tang Dynasty, he promised to “take Tieqiao as the boundary and return the seized territory to the Middle Kingdom” after submitting to Tang (Fan, 1985, 331). According to History as a Mirror (Vol. 214), “prior to submitting to the Middle Kingdom, Nanzhao was originally known as Ailaoyi, living to the west of Yaozhou, with Cochin in the southeast, and the Tubo Kingdom to the northwest.” The original place of settlement for Nanzhao was Mengshe (present-day Weishan, Yunnan). In the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648), Xinuluo, the leader of Mengshezhao, attacked and destroyed the Baizi Kingdom centered on Baiya (now Hongya, Midu County, Yunnan), and reached the southernmost tip of the Erhai area. According to the “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao”: when Nanzhao started a war with the Tang troops in Tianbao years, its king Geluofeng dispatched General Yang Li and others to Langqiong (now Eryuan, Yunnan) to asked the Tubo Kingdom censor Lun Ruozan to send reinforcements. “The censor studied the situation and sent an army to its rescue.” As a result, the Tubo Kingdom had effective control over Sizhou in the northeast and confronted the Tang army in the Yaozhou area. In the north, it took Tieqiao (now Tacheng, Lijiang, Yunan) and Langqiong were their strongholds. The Tubo Kingdom instated the Shenchuan Commander and Imperial Historian in Tieqiao and Langqiong respectively, to keep watch over them. At its height, the Tubo Kingdom expanded its territory southward and occupied the Erhai area. Faced with the aggressive offensive of the Tubo Kingdom, the Tang court was forced to change its strategy and support the local forces in western Yunnan to resist it. In the early Tang Dynasty, there were six or eight larger tribes in the Erhai area, called Liuzhao or Bazhao, but most had submitted to the Tubo Kingdom. So the Tang court chose Mengshezhao (Nanzhao) as its agent, out of two considerations. First,

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among the various tribes in the Erhai area, Nanzhao had a relatively prosperous social economy and had the strength to reunify the Erhai area and command the rest of the tribes. Book of Barbarians says in Volume 5 in commenting on Menshechuan that “The land is shrouded in miasma, but is fertile and suitable for growing rice. There is also a large pond, which is dozens of li in area and teems with fish and aquatic plants.” “The villages are densely populated and rich in vegetables and fruits. Mengshe is especially richly-endowed.” Mengshechuan also had well-developed animal husbandry. A Brief History of Nanzhao says that in the early Tang Dynasty, Mengshechuan area “had large livestock flocks and a prosperous population.” Before the Tubo Kingdom forces entered the Erhai area, Nanzhao had been extending to the surrounding areas. In the 22nd year of Zhenguan (648), Xinuluo, the leader of Mengshezhao, attacked and destroyed Baizi Kingdom, whose king Zhang Lejin begged to surrender. In the following year, Nanzhao established the Dameng regime. Second, Nanzhao had a close relationship with the Tang Dynasty, as well as its full trust. From Xinuluo onwards, several generations of its king of nobility, such as Luoshengyan, Shengluopi, and Piluoge had all been granted personal interviews by the emperor of Tang in the imperial court, or appointed to official positions of Tang. After the Tubo Kingdom went south to the Erhai area, Nanzhao took the initiative to attack the barbarians that surrendered to fan, winning the favor of the Tang court (Zhang, 1983, 2090, 2911). In the 22nd year of Kaiyuan (734), Emperor Xuanzong of Tang ordered Wang Yu, the military governor of Jiannan, to support Piluoge, the leader of the Nanzhao, in attacking the tribes that had surrendered to the Tubo Kingdom, and gave Piluoge the name “Meng Guiyi.” Nanzhao “subdued the barbarian tribes with the threat of troops, and annihilated those refusing to obey, thus defeating the Tubo Kingdom.” Among the various tribes in the Erhai region, the focus of Nanzhao in the offensive was on the Shilangzhao and other zhao tribes that had surrendered to the Tubo Kingdom. Two barbarian chiefs, namely Shibang, who moved to Baiya City, and Yiluoshi, who occupied Jianchuan, secretly contacted the Governor of Shenchuan appointed by the Tubo Kingdom, “requesting the status of independent zhao tribes.” The plot came to light and Shibang was killed. However, Yiluoshi



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got away and was sent by the Governor of Shenchuan to Luoxie City (now Lhasa, Xizang). Shi Wangqian, the chief of Shilang Zhao and Mieluopi, the chief of Tengdan Zhao, joined hands to attack Nanzhao but were defeated. Shi Wangqiao and his clan fled to Yongchang (now Baoshan, Yunnan), while his younger brother Shi Wangqian took refuge in the Tubo Kingdom, and was made a Zhao leader and relocated to Jianchuan, with several dozen thousand tribesmen. After Shi Wangqian died, his son Qianpang Luodian succeeded him (Fan, 1985, 109; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6294). Regarding the merit of Nanzhao in resisting the Tubo Kingdom forces, Emperor Yuanzong said in an edict that “occasionally there were traitors secretly colluding with Quanrong and wantonly resorting to violence. Meng Guiyi personally armed himself with armor, ventured deep into their land with his valiant troops, and exterminated all evils” (Dong et al., 1983, 277). In the 26th year of Kaiyuan, Emperor Xuanzong sent an envoy to canonize Piluoge as the King of Yunnan. The term “Yunnan” had originated from the Yunnan County established by the Shu Han in the present-day Xiangyun and the jurisdiction of the King of Yunnan generally did not exceed it, that is, the present-day western Yunnan centered on the Erhai area. Thanks to the efforts of Nanzhao, the Tang court recovered the area surrounding Erhai Lake, and the northern sphere of influence of the Tubo Kingdom shrank to the vicinity of Langqiong (now Eryuan, Yunnan).

4.2  After Nanzhao merged the rest zhao tribes and unified the Erhai area, Piluoge moved to Taihe City. Nanzhao steadily grew in influence, and won the favor of the Tang Dynasty. The Old Book of Tang: Biography of Nanzhao Barbarians says in describing the relevant situation that “Guyi (Piluoge) annexed the five zhao tribes, subdued the barbarians, defeated the massive the Tubo Kingdom army, and grew increasingly proud. Every time he went to the court for an audience with the emperor, he was treated with exceeding cordiality.” In the fourth year of Tianbao (745), the Tang court opened the Butou Road winding northward from Annan Protectorate to Rongzhou Area Command (based in presentday Yibin, Sichuan) via Butou (now Jianshui, Yunnan) and Anning.

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Jiannan Military Commissioner dispatched Zhu Lingqian, the governor of Yuexi, to Anning to build a city. Cuan Guiwang, the Baiman leader of the Cuan clan in eastern Yunnan, colluded with the rest Cuan clans, killed Zhu Lingqian and destroyed the city of Anning. Nanzhao was ordered by the Tang court to send troops to quell the rebels, but it occupied the present-day eastern Yunnan. By then, the trend of Nanzhao to grow into a contender became obvious and the Tang court regarded the original subordinate as an opponent in the southwest. The contradiction between the two sides gradually stood out. New Book of Tang: Biography of Nanzhao says that “Xianyu Zhongtong served as the Military Commissioner of Jiannan, but he was hot tempered and rigid. Previously, Geluofeng, the chief of Nanzhao and his family passed through Yunnan on the way to visit the Area Commander. Zhang Qiantuo humiliated and scolded him on several occasions and secretly framed him, incurring his wrath and consequently rebellion.” Thus this suggests that the tension between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty had stemmed from the excessive oppression of Nanzhao by an official of the Tang Dynasty. However, upon closer examination of the records, it was not the case. According to Old Book of Tang: Records of Emperor Gaozong: in the first year of Linde (664), Tang established the Area Command of Yaozhou in Nongdongchuan. New Book of Tang: Geography (6): The Area Command of Xizhou “was originally based Yuexi, but was seized by the Tubo Kingdom in the second year of Zhide, until being recovered in the 13th year of Zhenyuan.” After the establishment of Yaozhou Area Command, Erhai region was placed under its jurisdiction. During the Shengong reign by Wu Zetian, there were 57 Jizhou Prefectures under its jurisdiction. Xizhou Area Command (based in present-day Xichang, Sichuan) was charged with supervising the relationship with the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao, due to its geographic proximity to them. As the relationship between the Tang Dynasty and Nanzhao deteriorated, the area commands of Yaozhou and Xizhou were regarded by the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao as a thorn in the flesh. According to the “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao”, “Zhang Qiantuo, the Governor of Yuexi, used to be the Governor of Yunnan. Considering his knowledge about local customs and governance measures, the imperial court made him Governor of Yuexi” (Wang, 1980,



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156). Book of Barbarians: Appendix: Memorials Submitted by Yimou Xun: in the 9th year of Tianbao, [Nanzhao] was alienated from tribes by Zhang Qiantuo, the Governor of Yaozhou, and was separated from the Han. This suggests that Zhang Qiantuo was originally the Governor of Yuexi, and later transferred to the Governor of Yaozhou. When the Tang court clashed with Nanzhao, Zhang Qiantuo would surely bear the brunt. The “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao” also says: “Zhang Qiantuo, the Governor of Yuexi, was previously the Governor of Yunnan. Transferred to the post for his knowledge of local customs, he tried to deceive the emperor and instigate trouble on multiple occasions. Firstly, he colluded with the Tubo Kingdom, a perennial enemy of Han to eliminate me. Secondly, Chengjie, the younger half-brother of the king, banished to Changsha for being unfaithful and unfilial, was called back to sow distrust. Thirdly, Cuan Chongdao colluded with his allies for revolt and should be punished, but Zhang Qiantuo offered him food and lodging, in an effort to incur his enmity against me. Fourthly, those on bad terms with me were promoted and given official honors by Zhang Qiantuo, while those on good terms with me were suppressed and humiliated, in a scheme to isolate me. Fifthly, he built the city walls, took hostages, prepared armors and drilled soldiers in a secret plot against me. Sixthly, he imposed heavy levies, doubled the taxes for military supplies and levied conscripts excessively, in a bid to overpower me. The memorial submitted is intended to tell the wrongs against me, for the discretion of Your Excellency. Jia Qijun, his gang in the imperial court, had intercepted my memorial time and again. He is indeed a most unworthy courtier, and has to be bribed into honor his duties. He has colluded with Zhang Qiantuo to hide the truth from Your Excellency and maliciously rumored that I am going to revolt.” In order to safeguard the interests of the Tang Dynasty in Yunnan, Zhang Qiantuo, followed the changes in the situation in Yunnan, made careful planning, and used various methods to alienate and weaken the increasingly powerful Nanzhao. Nanzhao therefore complained to the Tang court, but Zhang Qiantuo was nonetheless supported by the special envoy of the Tang court; the latter reported to the Tang court that Nanzhao “was on the verge of revolting.” Seen from the inscriptions in “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao”, it is worth noting that Nanzhao

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took “collusion with the Tubo Kingdom the arch enemy of Han Chinese to destroy it” as the primary crime of Zhang Qiantuo. This suggests that Nanzhao still regarded the Tubo Kingdom as an enemy and that local officials of Tang prepared to contact the Tubo Kingdom to conspire against Nanzhao. In the autumn of the 9th year of Tianbao (750), Geluofeng besieged the Area Command of Yaozhou with troops, and captured Yaozhou in the winter, killing Zhang Qiantuo, and seizing 32 jimi prefectures under its jurisdiction. The relationship between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty suddenly became tense, but there was still room for recovery. After capturing Yaozhou, Geluofeng sent envoys to apologize and proposed to return the captives and rebuild Yaozhou City. He also said: “now, the Tubo Kingdom army is threatening my borders. If my proposals are not entertained, I’ll be forced to surrender to the Tubo Kingdom. In that case, Tang will lose Yunnan.” It happened that Yang Guozhong held considerable sway in the court, and he ordered Xianyu Zhongtong, the Military Commissioner of Jiannan, to attack Nanzhao. In April of the 10th year of Tianbao, the Tang army reached the border of the Xi’erhe. Nanzhao sent envoys to Langqiong to ask for help from Lunruozan, the imperial censor of the Tubo Kingdom, “who studied the situation and sent troops to its rescue.” The Tang army suffered a major defeat, and lost 60,000 soldiers. Xianyu Zhongtong escaped alone. In June of the following year, Yang Guozhong concealed his defeat and falsely claimed that the Tubo Kingdom dispatched 600,000 troops to save Nanzhao, and that the Tang troops of Jiannan defeated the Tubo Kingdom forces in Yunnan, and took three cities including Xizhou from the enemy hand, and 6,300 captives (Sima, 1956, 6906, 6912). History as a Mirror says that the claim of the Tubo Kingdom sending 600,000 troops to save Nanzhao might not be true, but it reflected that the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao had joined hands. After Nanzhao defeated the Tang army, the Tubo Kingdom ordered its prime minister, Yixiang Yele, to congratulate Nanzhao with golden crowns, brocade robes, golden belts and horses, and made an agreement for “country of brothers.” In the first lunar month of the 11th year of Tianbao (752s), the Tubo Kingdom canonized in Dengchuan Nanzhao as “Zanpu Zhong Nanguo Dazhao” (Prestigious Country of the South



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Ruled by Btsan Po Gcung), and granted Geluofeng the title “zanpu zhong”, meaning Zanpu’s younger brother, and “the East Emperor”, complete with the golden seal. It also granted the title of Great Military General on Fengjiayi, son of Geluofeng, and varying rewards to officials of different levels. Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom also swore an oath of alliance, “to uphold the brotherhood forever.” Nanzhao changed this year to the first year of Zanpu Zhong. The following year, the Tang court ordered Sikong Xili, the prefect of Hanzhong to restore Yaozhou City, and appointed General Jia Guan as the governor of Yaozhou. Geluofeng dispatched troops led by General Wang Bing to cut off the food supply of Yaozhou, and sent the Great General Hong Guangcheng and Lunqi Lixu, the Shenchuan military envoy of the Tubo Kingdom to besiege Yaozhou City with troops. Eventually, the troops seized Yaozhou City, captured Jia Guan, and the Tang army crumbled. In the 13th year, the Tang court ordered Li Mi, the imperial attendant, and He Lüguang, the governor of Guangzhou, to attack Nanzhao in two directions. When Li Mi’s army pressed on Dengchuan (now Dengchuan, Yunnan), “Lunqi Lixu came to the rescue of Nanzhao”(Wang, 1980), and defeated the Tang army. Li Mi threw himself into the river and killed himself. The three Wars of the Tianbao reign marked the showdown between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty, and the alliance between Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom. In the 14th year of Tianbao, An Lushan, the Military Commissioner of Fanyang and two other circuits, rebelled, and then captured Luoyang the eastern capital. The Tang court couldn’t find the time to manage the southern Borderland and Nanzhao grew into a powerful local regime. After the war of Tianbao, Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom joined forces to attack the Area Command of Yuexi. “Stele of Moralization in Nanzhao” says that, Zanlang Luoyuyang, the Zanpu imperial censor of the Tubo Kingdom, sent the decree of the Tubo Kingdom to Nanzhao, saying that “virtues should be cultivated and promoted, while evils should be eradicated. If we can join hands to attack Yuexi, we can prove our resourcefulness in cooperation, and achieve a memorable feat.” Nanzhao “accepted the kind proposal with alacrity,” and sent General Hong Guangcheng and Counselor Zhao Quandeng to join hands with Yixiang Yele, the prime minister of the Tubo Kingdom and

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Shangjianzan, its military commissioner, to attack Yuexi (now Xichang, Sichuan) and Huitong (now Huili, Sichuan). Yuexi was defeated, while the Tang army of Huitong surrendered. Nanzhao seized a large number of people, livestock and various materials, and took them back, “blocking the road of 100 li with captives, treasures, livestock and grain carts.” The following year, the Tang Dynasty recovered Yuexi, with Yang Tingjin as the governor, concurrently managing Taideng (now Lugu, Sichuan). Zanpu, the leader of the Tubo Kingdom, then sent an envoy to Nanzhao, saying that “The Han Dynasty has now recovered Yuexi to support Kunming. If Yuexi is not crushed, it may foment future trouble.” The Nanzhao-the Tubo Kingdom coalition forces seized Yuexi and Taideng, captured Yang Tingjin and took Qiongbu (northeast of present-day Yuexi, Sichuan). The influence of Nanzhao reached the south bank of the Dadu River. Thanks to the alliance with Nanzhao, the Tubo Kingdom consolidated its land “bordering Moxieman to the west of Jiannan and the Dadu River to the southwest” (Liu et al., 1975, 5247). After forming the alliance with Nanzhao, the Tubo Kingdom considerably expanded its power in the northeast and east. In July of the first year of Guangde (763), it captured the Dazhen Pass (in present-day western Longxian, Shaanxi) controlled by the Tang Dynasty, and successively captured Lan, Kuo, He, Shan, Tao, Min, Qin, Cheng ad Wei prefectures, seizing all the land in Hexi and Longyou. Within a few years, dozens of prefectures in the northwest region fell one after another, and the vast area west of Fengxiang and north of Binzhou was occupied by it. In October, its army arrived in Xianyang. Consisting of more than 200,000 troops from Dangxiang, Diqiang and other tribes, it “extended for dozens of li.” Then it entered Chang’an, looting and burning. Emperor Daizong was forced to flee to Shanzhou with his subordinates and the masses took refuge among the mountain valleys. In December, the Tubo Kingdom captured Songzhou (based in present-day Songpan, Sichuan), Weizhou (based northeast of present-day Lixian, Sichuan), Baozhou (based north of present-day Lixian, Sichuan), and built two new cities in Yunshan. Gao Shi, the Tang Military Governor of Xichuan, could do nothing to stop it. Hence, the prefectures of Xishan in Jiannan all fell into the hands of the Tubo Kingdom (Sima, 1956, 7146, 7150, 7159). During the Guangde and Jianzhong years, the Tubo Kingdom



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once again took control of the Minjiang River. In attacking, it often ordered the Nanzhao troops to take the lead. Nanzhao troops wielded long halberds, advancing as they fought, and “the Shu soldiers could not kill one single of them, however hard they try amongst the blades and arrows.” Since the Nanzhao army plundered and slaughtered as soon as it seized a place, the people of Shu were terrified, saying that “the cruelty of the western barbarians was bearable, in comparison to the scourge of the southern barbarians.” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6027). The Tubo Kingdom had managed to win battles against Tang one after another largely because Nanzhao fell out with Tang and became its ally. After establishing the alliance, Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom maintained close contact. During this period, the road from Luoxie City (now Lhasa) to Taihe City, the capital of Nanzhao, via present-day Deqin, Zhongdian, Judian, Lijiang and Eryuan of Yunnan was smooth. Book of Barbarians: Mountains and River Origins says that the Daxueshan (the snow-capped mountains between present-day Lijiang and Judian), “has a peak that almost touches the sky. Merchants from the Tubo Kingdom often come to Tengdan for barter trade, saying that there is a path leading through the mountain and that it is near the camp of Zanpu.” the Tubo Kingdom instated the Shenchuan Military Commissioner (based in Tieqiao City) in Tacheng north of present-day Judian to guard the road and monitor Nanzhao. History of Yuan: Geography (4) says that Jujin Prefecture (based in present-day Judian, Yunnan) “adjoins Sanchuan and Tieqiao in the north and the Tubo Kingdom in the west.” “It is named after the role of Tieqiao as a major ferry between Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom since ancient times” (Song et al., 1976, 1466). In the Song Dynasty, the road was called “the Road to Daxueshan in the North.” Along this road, many Tibetan people moved to the northwestern part of present-day Yunnan. There were also frequent economic and cultural exchanges between the Tubo Kingdom and Erhai. Book of Barbarians: Produces of Land under the Jurisdictio of Yunnan says that “big sheep are mostly sent from Xiqiang and Tieqiao along the border with the Tubo Kingdom for trade here, usually in two or three thousand.” The esoteric Buddhism was introduced to Yunnan through “the Road to Daxueshan in the North”, and later grew two major sects in Yunnan. One is the Acarya sect of the Bai people centered in the Erhai area,

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and the other is the Tibetan Buddhism tantric sect centered in Diqing, Lijiang and other places.

4.3  In September of the 14th year of the Dali (779), the Nanzhao King Geluofeng died. His son Fengjiayi had died before him, so his grandson Yimou Xun became his successor. Yimou Xun “was well educated, resourceful and good at appeasing its people.” In October, the joint army of Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom with more than 200,000 troops set off from Maozhou, Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Lizhou and Yazhou to attack the Tang land under the jurisdiction of Jiannan Circuit. The Tubo Kingdom gave the order of “taking Shu as my eastern prefecture, sending all the artisans to Luosuo City and imposing a levy of one roll of cloth each year.” Cui Ning, the military commissioner of Xichuan, was in the capital, and the generals left behind couldn’t put much resistance. The allied forces of Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom seized several prefectures and counties in quick succession. The governors abandoned their cities and fled, while the people took haven in the valleys. Emperor Daizong dispatched Li Sheng, the Right Shence Army Commander, to lead the royal guards and join the Tang army of Shannan to attack the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao. The Tang army won the battle, and beheaded 6,000 enemies. Anyi Quhuan, the Great General of Capital Guards, pursued the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao forces with the Tang troops from Bin, Long and Fanyang, and caught up with and defeated them at Qipan, thus conquering the Wei and Mao prefectures. The Tang troops led by Li Sheng chased to the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao forces to the south of the Dadu River and defeated them again. The defeated allied forces of the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao were starved in the cold, and about 80–90 thousand troops fell off the cliff to their death. “The Tubo Kingdom regretted its decision and killed the envoy that had persuaded it on the ill-fated campaign.” Yimou Xun was frightened and moved the capital from Taihe City to Yangjumie City (in present-day Dali, Yunnan). the Tubo Kingdom changed the title of Yimou Xun to “King of Ridong”, and relegated the status of Nanzhao from a brotherly state to a vassal state (Sima, 1956, 7270; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6272; Liu et al., 1975, 5281).



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In the alliance between the Tubo Kingdom and Nanzhao, when an offensive was launched against the Tang territory, the Nanzhao troops were often ordered to take the lead. In addition, the Tubo Kingdom imposed heavy taxes on Nanzhao, took its strategically fortresses and cities, and repeatedly requested supply of troops to help with defense. The exorbitant requirements made Yimou Xun very painful. Zheng Hui, the Qingping official of Nanzhao and formerly magistrate of Xilu County in Tang Dynasty, suggested to Yimou Xun that “The Middle Kingdom is known to uphold righteousness and ceremony and never shift the blame. However, the Tubo Kingdom has been outrageous and greedy. Abandoning the Tubo Kingdom and instead submitting to the Tang Dynasty is the most advisable move under the circumstance.” Yimou Xun agreed and sought to return to the Tang Dynasty for many years, but he never dared to speak out for fear of revenge from the Tubo Kingdom (Sima, 1956, 7270, 7479; Liu et al., 1975, 5281). In the first year of Zhenyuan (785), the Tang court replaced Zhang Yanshang with Wei Gao as the military commissioner of Jiannan Xichuan. Wei Gao solicited the barbarian tribes in the southwest of Jiannan in many ways, and Yimou Xun sent envoys the tribes rallying them to submit to Tang. Wei Gao then submitted an imperial memorial, saying that “the Qiang people of Yunnan and the rest eight are ready for submission; if we accept them, we will be able to detach them from the Tubo Kingdom and thus weaken the Tubo Kingdom.” Emperor Dezong ordered Wei Gao to issue a notice in the name of the Borderland general, to see the developments. In the third year, when Emperor Dezong had the intention of soliciting the allegiance of Nanzhao, Li Mi said that “if the Uyghurs are at peace with us, the Tubo Kingdom will be deterred from invading into our Borderland regions. Soliciting the surrender of Yunnan is just like cutting off its right arm. Since the Han Dynasty, Yunnan has been a subordinate of the Middle Kingdom, but Yang Guozhong forced it into alliance with Tubo Kingdom via unreasonably harassing it. However, the heavy taxes and levies of the Tubo Kingdom were unbearable, and it has been hankering to restore its former status” (Sima, 1956, 7502). In the 4th year, Yimou Xun sent Piaopang the ghost chief of eastern barbarians to the court, and the Tang court threw a banquet for him in Linde Hall, “generously awarded him, granting him the

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seal of a king and sending him back.” Later, Tubo Kingdom launched an offensive against Xichuan with 100,000 troops and ordered Nanzhao to assist it. Nanzhao secretly communicated with Tang, but it did not dare to betray the Tubo Kingdom, and dispatched several dozen troops to Lubei. Knowing that Nanzhao was hesitant, Wei Gao addressed a letter to its king, “thanking him for his sincerity in turning away from Tubo Kingdom towards Tang” but sent it via the eastern barbarian tribe to the Tubo Kingdom. Wei Gao’s plan to sow discord worked. “The Tibetan grew suspicious of Yunnan, and dispatched 20,000 troops to Huichuan,” to defend the road from Yaozhou to Chengdu. Nanzhao was so enraged that it withdrew his troops and returned south. Later, Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom became mutually suspicious, and Nanzhao became resolute to submit to Tang. “The Tubo Kingdom lost the help of Yunnan, and its military strength took a trend for the decline.” It launched campaigns in Xichuan, attacking Piaopang, the chief of Lianglin tribe in Dongman with 40,000 troops, Dongman with 30,000 troops, Qingxi Pass (south of present-day Hanyuan, Sichuan) with 7,000 troops and, and Tongshan with 5,000 troops. Wei Gao dispatched Wei Jin, the prefect of Lizhou, to join forces with Dongman. The Tang-Dongman allied army crushed the army of the Tubo Kingdom outside Qingxi Pass. Then, the Tubo Kingdom sent 20,000 soldiers to attack Qingxi Pass and another 10,000 to attack Dongman, but was defeated by the Tang army once again (Sima, 1956, 7515). In the second month of the fifth year of Zhenyuan (789), Wei Gao sent a letter to Yimou Xun, saying that “The Uyghurs have repeatedly asked to help the emperor to destroy Tubo Kingdom. It is advisable for your highness to make up your mind, before the suggestion of the Uyghurs is taken, since that scenario would lay your reputation and merits to waste. In addition, Yunnan has been humiliated by the Tubo Kingdom for too long. It’s high time that Yunan drew on the strength of a big country to revenge the grievances and humiliation. I was afraid that your highness might regret this chance later on.” In October, Wei Gao sent General Wang Youdao to join forces with Dongman and Lianglinman to wage a war against the Tibetan military commands of



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Qinghai and Lacheng in the Taidenggu, Xizhou. The army of the Tubo Kingdom was defeated, and its General Commander Qicang Zhezhe was killed. The Tang troops followed up the victory with a series of offensives, recovering the entire Xizhou Prefecture within several years. Wei Gao again sent a letter to Nanzhao to solicit its allegiance. Although Yimou Xun did not write back, “he steadily reduced the number of soldiers sent at the request of the Tubo Kingdom.” In May the 7th year, Wei Gao dispatched Duan Zhongyi, the envoy of Geluofeng that had stayed in Chengdu, back to Yunnan with a letter addressed to Yinmouxun. When the Tubo Kingdom learnt about the episode, it sent an envoy to find out. Yimuxun explained that Duan Zhongyi had been an envoy of Nanzhao and there shouldn’t be any question about his return to his homeland. After that, he sent Duan Zhongyi to the Tubo Kingdom, which however, grew even more suspicious, “and demanded the ministers of Nanzhao to send their sons as hostage to it, exacerbating the resentment of Yunnan.” Jumengchong, the leader of Wudeng tribe in Dongman, who had secretly colluded with the Tubo Kingdom, intercepted the envoys between Tang and Yunnan; Wei Gao and his troops captured Jumengchong, beheaded him, and restored the Yaozhou Road. Later, the Tubo Kingdom took strict precautions against Nanzhao. When the Nanzhao army reached the border, it also made an excuse and sent troops there as a precaution (Sima, 1956, 7517, 7519, 7524, 7525, 7537). In the 9th year of Zhenyuan (793), Yimou Xun sent three batches of messengers, each carrying a memorial, raw gold and cinnabar, to Chengdu via Rongzhou, Qianzhou, and Annan to visit Weigao. The messengers offered gold to show the resolution of Nanzhao to return to Tang, and cinnabar to show its loyalty. Wei Gao sent a messenger to Chang’an, and Emperor Dezong issued Yimou Xun an edict, and ordered Wei Gao to send a messenger to placate him (Sima, 1956, 7547). It can be seen from the memorial of the Yimou Xun that (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6272) following the death of Geluofeng, the Tubo Kingdom had ridden roughshod over Nanzhao in many aspects, of which four were tolerated and four were intolerable. The four tolerable abuses included: firstly, Lunashe, the Shenchuan Governor of the Tubo Kingdom supported by offering handsome rewards to the Wuman

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leader Liluoshi in his harassment of Nanzhao with troops, panicking all the tribes of Nanzhao; Liluoshi scolded the envoy of Nanzhao and threatened: “I am the general to destroy your country—who else could you expect? All your wealth will be mine.” After being crowned king by the Tubo Kingdom, the Shenchuan Governor Lunnashe intercepted and shelved all memorials submitted by Nanzhao to cut it off from the Zanpu. He also “stationed troops around the Borderland cities of Nanzhao” and made the tension almost unbearable. The four incidents that Nanzhao found intolerable included: Liluoshi harassed and provoked Nanzhao for 12 years, but the Tubo Kingdom didn’t intervene, and gave him 60 guards instead, indicating a sinister intention. The Tubo Kingdom secretly harbored the design to annex Nanzhao, which was simply unbearable. Its treatment of loyal courtiers was most disheartening: the King of Tuihun was assassinated by it, and his offspring were left to the mercy of bullies; the Queen of Xishan was stripped of her throne, and the leader of Tuoba tribe was killed. Although aware of the infinite kindness of Tang, Nanzhao had no way to vent its grievances, because of its status as a subordinate of the Tubo Kingdom. Yimou Xun further showed the intention of returning to Tang, and suggested that the Tang Dynasty contacted the Uyghur kingdoms to disperse the power of the Tubo Kingdom, so that Nanzhao could find an opportunity to attack it. In the first lunar month of the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), Wei Gao sent the inspector Cui Zuoshi with an imperial edict to the City of Yangjumie, the capital of Nanzhao. It so happened that several hundred envoys of the Tubo Kingdom were in the city, and Yimou Xun did not want them to know about the Tang envoy. So he asked Cui Zuoshi to change his clothes. Cui Zuoshi refused, saying that “I am the envoy of the great Tang Dynasty, how can I wear the clothes of the barbarian land!” Yimou Xun had no choice but to greet him at night. When Cui Zuoshi read the edict in a sonorous voice, Yimou Xun was terrified, but he bowed down and accepted the edict. Cui Zuoshi persuaded him to kill all the envoys from the Tubo Kingdom, renounce the title conferred by it, return its gold seal and restore the former name of NAnzhao. “His suggestions were all followed by Yimou Xun.” Then Yimou Xun and



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his son Xunmengcou made an oath with Cui Zuishi in the Temple of Diancangshan, officially reaching the agreement for Nanzhao to return to the Tang Dynasty (Sima, 1956, 7552). Back then, the Tubo Kingdom was contending for Beiting with Uyghur, and suffered heavy casualties, so it asked for 10,000 troops from Nanzhao. Yimou Xun gave only 5,000, on the pretext of his country being small. Yimou Xun ordered them to march in the front and led several dozen thousand troops behind them. Traveling day and night, the troops sneaked up to and attacked the Shenchuan Governor’s Mansion and destroyed it, seized 16 cities including Tieqiao, captured five kings, together with more than 100,000 of their subjects. In August, Yimou Xun sent 27 envoys, including his younger brother Cou Luodong, and Qingping Official Yin Qiukuan to offer its map, local produces and the eight seals granted by the Tubo Kingdom to the Tang Dynasty, and request restoration of the title “Nanzhao”. Emperor Dezong conferred the title Gaoxi Commandery Prince on Yin Qiukuan, and the rest of the envoys were also granted official titles of varying levels. In the Tang Dynasty, Yuan Zi, the Minister of the Ancestral Hall, was entrusted with the canonization of Nanzhao. Yuan Zi passed Shimenguan Road to the city of Yangjumie, and Yimou Xun knelt down to receive the seal. The golden seal bore the inscription of “Seal for Canonizing Nanzhao in the Zhenyuan Years” (Sima, 1956, 7552, 7561; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6274; Liu et al., 1975, 5283). The alliance formed between Nanzhao and Tang in the tenth year of Zhenyuan featured a relationship different from that before the Tianbao War. This time, Nanzhao was no longer a local power under the rule of the Tang court, but a vassal regime that regards the Tang Dynasty as the suzerain. Although the Tang Dynasty restored the title of “king” to Nanzhao, its connotations had changed significantly. Before the Tianbao War, the “King of Yunnan” granted by the Tang Dynasty was a native official who governed the Erhai area under the jurisdiction of the Tang Dynasty. The “Nanzhao” canonized to Yimou Xun constituted recognition by the Tang court of the scope ruled by Nanzhao, and consequently that of the vassal status of Nanzhao.

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4.4  In the Tang Dynasty, the area from present-day southwest Sichuan to northwest Yunnan was inhabited by Dongman, Sanwangman, the eight kingdoms of Xishan, Shiman, Shunman, and Moxieman and other mountain-dwelling barbarians. In the alliance and conflict among the Tang Dynasty, the Tubo Kingdom, and Nanzhao, they were also involved, playing a role not to be underestimated. After Nanzhao re-submitted to Tang in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, Yimou Xun first cleaned up the barbarians between Nanzhao and Tang Jiannan Governor. The situation of barbarians to the west and south Jiannan Military Commision was very complicated. Generally speaking, the barbarians in the above-mentioned areas were prone to change in attitude according to the balance of power among the Tang Dynasty and the Tubo Kingdom. For example, the Songzhou Qiang people of Xishan were called “Double-dealing Qiang”. Wudeng, Fengpa, and Lianglin people that were called “Eastern Barbarians” for living east of the Yalong River were granted titles by The Tang during the Tianbao years. After the Tianbao War, Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom captured Zhangzhou by joining forces, and the Eastern Barbarians “fell into the hands of the Tubo Kingdom.” To the west of the two prefectures of Lizhou and Qiongzhou, there were the Sanwangman, whose northern boundary reached Feiyueling in the northwest of present-day Hanyuan County, and whose southern boundary reached the Dadu River. Before the 10th year of Zhenyuan, Jiannan Governor gave them 3,000 rolls of silk and ordered him to monitor Nanzhao. However, “Nanzhao also bribed them in secret so that they could spy on Chengdu” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6317). To the north of present-day Hanyuan, Sichuan, there were the eight tribes of Xishan, including Geling, Duoba, Ruoshui, Baigou, Fuzu, Nanshui, Qingyuan and Xidong; Xishan, which was under the jurisdiction of Jianna, adjoined the Tubo Kingdom and Diqiang. In the Wude Reign, the Tang court established prefectures and counties in its land and stationed troops there. However, it also fell into the hands of the Tubo Kingdom after Qianyuan years. Xishan was located right in the southward path of the Tubo Kingdom, governing the towns of



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Shimen and Liuqiang of the Tang Dynasty. The Tang court stationed troops to guard them, and instated a soliciting and expedition commissioner to lead the five tribes including Miqiang. “In addition, there were the Dongqin and Moxie tribes.” Those tribes “received rewards from Xizhou in spring and autumn, but were proud by colluding with the Tubo Kingdom” (Liu et al., 1975, 5224). In the 9th year of Zhenyuan, after Wei Gao won the battle against the Tubo Kingdom, the chiefs of the eight tribes tore themselves away from the Tubo Kingdom and paid a visit to Xichuan Governor, requesting to be ruled by the Tang Dynasty. Wei Gao relocated their people to Wei, Ba, Bao and other prefectures. In the same year, more than 20,000 households of the Qiang people in Songzhou, Xishan became subjects of the Tang court. In the 9th month of the 11th year, emperor Dezong issued an edict and appointed Wei Gao to concurrently performing the duties of the Placation Commissioner of Qiang people and the eight tribes of Xishan (Liu et al., 1975, 5279, 3823). In the early years of Zhenyuan, many of the tribes in the south of Jiannan became dependent on the Tubo Kingdom, a constant source of agitation for Nanzhao. In the 7th year of Zhenyuan (791), Wei Gao dispatched an envoy to Nanzhao carrying a decree with him. The envoy passed through the land inhabited by the Moxie Man, whose chief tipped him off to the Tubo Kingdom. And the Tubo Kingdom questioned Yimou Xun about the incident, sewing the seed for enmity between Nanzhao and Moxie Man. For another example, Jumengchong, the leader of the Wudeng tribe that had submitted to the Tubo, blocked the Yaozhou Road connecting Nanzhao to the Tang Dynasty. Wei Gao summoned Jumengchong to Pipachuan with troops, listed his crimes and beheaded him. Yimou Xun never trusted the barbarians south of Jiannan, even after they surrendered to the Tang Dynasty. In the 15th year of Zhenyuan, the Tubo Kingdom conspired to attack Nanzhao and planned to encircle Xizhou. “Yimou Xun was afraid that the unpredictable eastern barbarians and Moxie Man might serve as its guide and proposed to attack them first.” Wei Gao said that Xizhou was heavily guarded, “and that the eastern barbarians won’t dare to become disloyal.” “Yimou Xun then issued a notice and requested all eastern barbarians and Moxie Man to send their grains to the city; those refusing to abide had their grains burnt” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6277).

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Since the barbarians to the south of Jiannan switched their loyalty between the Tubo Kingdom and the Tang Dynasty, in the 10th year of Zhenyuan, Yimou Xun attacked and seized Tieqiao City (now Tacheng City, Lijiang), the headquarters of Shenchuan Governor instated by the Tubo Kingdom, and left a general to administer it; then he moved the local tribes to other areas for resettlement. Previously, Major Shiman and Lesser Shiman to the northwest of the city, Shiman of Jianxundan, and Shunman to the north and south of the city, “had been granted the title of king by the Tubo Kingdom.” Yinmouxun moved Shiman to Mengshe City, and Shunman to Baiya. The Moxie Man had been living around Tieqiao, Dapo, Xiaopo, Santanlan (in the northwest of Ninglang, Yunnan today), and Kunchi (now Lugu Lake). When Nanzhao captured Tieqiao and Kunming (in present-day Yanyuan, Sichuan), it took captive some 10,000 households of Moxie Man, and moved them all to their former colony in the east and west of Yunnan. In addition, it also moved Nongdong barbarians to Yongchang and several thousand households of Shangren people to the northeastern part of Yunnan (Fan, 1985, 151, 153; Sima, 1956, 7570). After Tang Dynasty and Nanzhao formed an alliance, a series of victories were achieved in the war against the Tubo Kingdom, leading to the disintegration of the barbarian alliance. And tribes broke away from the Tubo Kingdom and surrendered to the Tang Dynasty. In the 16th year of Zhenyuan, Wei Gao joined hands with Nanzhao troops and defeated more than 20,000 Tubo Kingdom troops in Lizhou and Xizhou. In the following years, more than 1,000 households under the jurisdiction of Kunming surrendered to the Tang court. In commenting on Wei Gao’s achievements in dividing the eastern barbarian tribes, the New Book of Tang: Biography of Wei Gao says that “In the beginning, the eastern barbarians had a land of 2,000 li, and a powerful army of several dozen thousand soldiers. Colluding with Geluofeng in the south and the Tubo Kingdom in the west, they instigated troubles in view of the balance of power. Wei Gao solicited their allegiance and was thus able to achieve merit in battle against the Tubo Kingdom.” After Tang and Nanzhao formed an alliance, Nanzhao shook off the oppression of the Tubo Kingdom, and received strong support from the Tang Dynasty. “The Tubo Kingdom had to face the Tang Dynasty



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and Nanzhao, and dared not to plot against Nanzhao.” After losing Xizhou, it fell into a stance of passive defense strategically, thus it deeply resented Nanzhao “for relying on the Tang Dynasty to elevate its own status,” calling it “the Janus-faced barbarian.” After the 10th year of Zhenyuan (794), the Tang Dynasty allied with Nanzhao and launched many wars against the Tubo Kingdom. In April of the 15th year, Yimou Xun asked Wei Gao, the Governor of Jiannan, to attack the Tubo Kingdom together to ensure the safety of Xizhou, Kunming, and Nongdong. Wei Gao refused and proposed the following year, on the grounds that he hadn’t had mobilized enough troops and rations. In December, 50,000 soldiers of the Tubo Kingdom attacked Nanzhao and Xizhou separately from various directions. Yimou Xun and Wei Gao each sent their troops to defend. “The Tubo Kingdom returned without success.” The Tubo Kingdom was defeated by Tang and Nanzhao several times, and its army of 20,000 soliders was defeated in Lizhou and Xizhou by Wei Gao time and again. It was enraged, and in the 16th year, it actively recruited troops, and built fortifications and boats, “as preparations for plundering.” However, its plots were all defeated by Wei Gao. Nanggong, a general and army supervisor of the Tubo Kingdom surrendered to the Tang court with his men, together with 87 others, including Duying, the Governor of Lacheng, Madingde, the Longguan Official and his generals. When the Tubo Kingdom heard that 30,000 troops of the Tang Dynasty had entered Nanzhao, it grew panic, and stationed all its troops in the five cities of Nachuan, Guhong, Nuoji, La, and Yuji, “planning to attack from Xishan and Jianshan, and capture Xizhou, so as to isolate Nanzhao.” Yimou Xun said to Wei Gao that “The enemy is clamouring about attacking Xizhou, but its evil designs are on Yunnan. Let’s station an army in Yangjumie City for preparations.” Under the attack of the Tang-Nanzhao coalition, the Tubo Kingdom was defeated, but still adhered to hold the front line of Kunming and Nachuan. The Tang-Nanzhao joined forces defeated the Tibetan army in Yazhou in Yazhou, and surrounded Weizhou and Kunming. In the several battles, the combined forces of Tang and Nanzhao captured 7 cities and five military towns of the Tubo Kingdom, burned 150 fortresses, beheaded 10,000 of its troops, and captured another 6,000. In the Tang Dynasty, Wei Gao was promoted to Prosecutor and Minister

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of the Central Secretariat, and granted the title of Commandery Prince of Nantang. In the battles, Nanzhao mounted multiple attacks against the heartland of the Tubo Kingdom and taken the most captives, so Emperor Dezong sent a court envoy to commend it. In the 18th year of Zhenyuan, Lunmangre, a prime minister of the Tubo Kingdom, led 100,000 troops to relieve the siege of Weizhou, but was defeated by the Tang army. More than half his troops were killed or wounded while he himself was captured by Wei Gao and sent to Chang’an. During the period from the tenth year of Zhenyuan to the third year of Yuanhe, Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty joined forces to fight against the Tubo Kingdom and achieved unprecedented victories. The coalition pursued the army of the Tubo Kingdom to the north of the Dadu River. In today’s northwestern Yunnan, the Tubo Kingdom “stationed a large army in Kunming, Shenchuan and Nachuan to defend itself.” During this period, Nanzhao had very close exchanges with the Tang Dynasty. Every year, it sent envoys with tribute of local produces to the Tang court and “was treated with etiquette by the emperor” (Sima, 1956, 7570–7656; Ouyang et al., 1975, 6277; Liu et al., 1975, 3823).

4.5  In the third year of Yuanhe (808), Yimou Xun died, and his son Xungequan succeeded to the title. In the same year, Xungequan also died and his son Quanlongsheng took over. In the 11th year, Nongdong Jiedu Wang Cuodian killed Quanlongsheng and instated his younger brother Quanli, taking into his own hands the actual power (Sima, 1956, 7867). Wang Cuodian changed Yimou Xun’s friendly policy towards Tang, and prepared to attack and plunder the lands under its jurisdiction. In December of the 15th year, 20,000 Nanzhao troops entered the jurisdiction of Xichuan, and its governor Du Yuanying falsely reported that Nanzhao “was requesting assistance to attack the Tubo Kingdom.” In November of the third year of Taihe (829), the Nanzhao army raided Xizhou and Rongzhou occupied by the Tang Dynasty and “caught all the Borderland cities off guard.” Xizhou and Rongzhou were thus seized by Nanzhao. Du Yuanying sent troops to fight with the Nanzhao army in the south of Qiongzhou, but the Tang army was defeated and



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Qiongzhou fell. In December, Wang Cuodian led his troops north from Qiongzhou, and then captured Xiguo in Chengdu. In retreating, he plundered numerous children, craftsmen and precious goods. In October of the fourth year, the Tang Dynasty appointed Li Deyu the Governor of Yicheng as the Governor of Xichuan. Li Deyu was allowed by the imperial court to build a fortress on the north bank of the Dadu River, south of Lizhou (now Hanyuan, Sichuan), to prevent Nanzhao troops from entering Xichuan along Qingxiguan Road (Yaozhou Road). “Thus law and order was restored to the land of Shu” (Sima, 1956, 7867, 7872). Wang Cuodian invaded Xichuan, but did not dare to tear up the suzerain-vassal agreement with the Tang Dynasty. After withdrawing his troops, he said that “previously we have honored our duties and paid tributes faithfully. Never have we harbored the design to invade your borders. However, Du Yuanying has never shown any care for his troops, who have come to me and begged me to kill the tyrannical chief, so as to address their grievances. I have failed to honor my promise to comfort the Shu people. I sincerely hope that your Majesty can execute him.” Later, Nanzhao resumed paying tribute to the Tang Dynasty (Sima, 1956, 7868). In the 13th year of Dazhong (859), Shilong succeeded to the King of Nanzhao, and later mounted a massive attack against the Tang Dynasty. In December of the first year of Xiantong (860), Nanzhao first captured Jiaozhou (in present-day Hanoi, Vietnam) where the Area Command of the Tang Dynasty was located; after that, it attacked Guangxi and Xichuan many times. In the first year of Guangming (880), when the Tang court discussed Nanzhao’s request for peace-keeping marriage, the prime ministers Lu Xie and Dou Luzhuo said that “Since Xiantong years, the barbarians have captured Annan and Yongguan twice, invaded into Guizhu once and attacked Xichuan four times, leaving the entire country struggling in chaos for more than fifteen years. More than half of the taxes were not sent to the capital, and thus the resources of the treasury and the three commissions were exhausted. Our soldiers died of miasma; our people were reduced to robbery and the Central Plains was deserted, all because of the barbarians” (Sima, 1956, 8092, 8227).

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Since the first year of Xiantong, Nanzhao captured Jiaozhou and Yongzhou (now Nanning, Guangxi) twice, and attacked Guizhou once and Xichuan four times. However, there is no record of its collusion with the Tubo Kingdom. The main reason was that the Tubo Kingdom had declined at that time. According to records, in the third year of Kaicheng (838), Yitai, the Zanpu (King) of the Tubo Kingdom died, and his younger brother Damo took over stood. Yitai had been in ill health and entrusted the government to his ministers. The Tubo Kingdom under his rule could only defend itself, “and didn’t trouble the Borderland regions for a long time.” Damo was stupid, lecherous and cruel, and was unable to rally the support of the government or the opposition. As a result, “disasters occurred in quick succession, and the Tubo Kingdom became increasingly diminished in strength” (Sima, 1956, 7938). In the third year of Huichang (843), the Tubo Kingdom split up into two regimes, which were never reunified. In the following year, the Tang Dynasty “discussed restoring the four towns and eighteen prefectures of Hehuang, taking advantage of the decline of the Uighurs and the civil strife of the Tubo Kingdom.” Subsequently, the garrisons of Tang mounted attacks against the Tibetan successively (Sima, 1956, 7999). Under such circumstances, the Tubo Kingdom was no longer able to join forces with Nanzhao to attack Tang. However, seen from the relevant records, Nanzhao and the Tubo Kingdom still restored their vassal relations during this period. In the 14th year of Xiantong (873), Nanzhao attacked Shu, and sent a messenger to Niu Cong, the Governor of Jiannan, saying that it would need to detour through the land of Tang. Niu Cong scolded him in the reply, saying that “considering that your forefathers had served the Tibetans like a slave, the Tibetans should be an arch enemy. Why are you treating them like a master? Have you forgotten the grievances” (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6290)? After the death of Shilong, the king of Nanzhao, his son Longshun succeeded him and sent envoys to Yongzhou to make peace with the garrison general. The tension between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty became to ease, and conflicts gradually ceased. The relatively lukewarm and calm relationship continued until the end of the Tang Dynasty.



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During the 39 years from the 13th year of Dazhong (859) to the fourth year of Qianning (897) when Nanzhao collapsed, the relationship between Tang and Nanzhao alternated between war and peace. When Shilong was in power, Nanzhao aggressively attacked Tang, for the purpose of plundering property, production technology and labor. After his death, his son succeeded him, and the tension between Nanzhao and the Tang Dynasty eased. Accordingly, Nanzhao gradually ceased its war against the Tang Dynasty. In the fifth year of Qianfu (878), Nanzhao sent envoys to request peace-keeping marriage, but didn’t go through the due formality. Instead, it had only a letter written by Shuangdie, its prime minister, requesting brotherly relationship, not a subordinate one. In the sixth year, Xin Dang, when Xu Yunqian was dispatched by the garrison general of Yongzhou as an envoy to Nanzhao, a minister of Nanzhao went to the post house and said: “Your government wants Piaoxin to call himself a subordinate in the letter, while sending local produces as tribute. Piaoxin has sent messengers to Tang via Xichuan and made arrangements to enter into a brotherly or maternal uncle-nephew relationship, which required a letter and tributes. What is the point of the request for a memorial?” Xu Yunqian refuted him on just grounds. Piaoxin treated him very well, “but refused to submit a memorial” (Sima, 1956, 8204, 8211). During this period, Shilong the King of Nanzhao and Longshun proclaimed Nanzhao “Dali Kingdom” (kingdom of great rituals), and tried to transfer its relationship with the Tang Dynasty to a brotherly or maternal uncle-nephew one. Its request was rejected sternly, and its hope towards the end fell through. Although the relationship of Nanzhao with the Tubo Kingdom was not as complicated as that with the Tang Dynasty, it also experienced several ups and downs. There were not only contradictions and fierce contentions, but also two-way economic and cultural exchanges. Nanzhao’s strategy for dealing with the Tubo Kingdom was roughly one of flexible adaptation based on the situation. In the games among the three major political forces of Nanzhao, Tang Dynasty and the Tubo Kingdom, Nanzhao was the most flexible and clever. It was in the ingenious dealings with the Tang Dynasty and the Tubo Kingdom that Nanzhao basically maintained stability, and achieved great development in economy and culture.

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5.  The Strategy of Dali for Borderland Border Governance and Its Implementation Dali Kingdom was a Borderland regime established by Duan Siping, the Baiman leader of Yunnan after Nanzhao, in the second year of Tianfu (937) of the Later Jin Dynasty. It ruled for 317 years and witnessed 22 kings, before it was overthrown by the Mongolian expeditionary army in the first year of Baoyou (1253). Regarding its territory, the History of Yuan says that the Dali Kingdom conquered by Kublai Khan and his troops “extended for more than 3900 li from Hengshan of Pu’an Route in the east to Jiangtou City of Burma in the west, and a little fewer than 4,000 li from the Lucang River on Lin’an Route in the south to the Dadu River of Luoluosi in the north” (Song et al., 1976, 1457). “Hengshan” is in the vicinity of present-day Zhenning, Guizhou; “Jiangtou City” is in present-day Katha, Burma; “the Lucang River” refers to the Heihe River in the northern part of Lai Châu Province, Vietnam, and “the Dadu River” is the section of the Dadu River in present-day Hanyuan, Sichuan. The area ruled by the Dali Kingdom included present-day Yunnan Province and southwestern Sichuan, as well as northeastern Burma, northern Laos, and northwestern Vietnam, roughly the same as that under Nanzhao.

5.1  The strategy of Dali Kingdom for Borderland governance and its administration were based on the legacy of Nanzhao, but there were significant differences, mainly because of social development and ethnic integration. They had the following characteristics: adopting a feudal enfeoffment system, and relying on Baiman lords at all levels to rule the various ethnic groups in the hinterland by granting titles to them; abandoning Nanzhao’s military conquest of remote barbarians, in favor of an approach via oaths and conferment, similar to the Jimi system of the hinterland; weakening the political alliance with the Wuman and the Jinchi barbarians, and adopting a low-profile joint ruling regime; inheriting Nanzhao’s emphasis on absorption of the Han population and the economic and cultural elements of the hinterland, featuring



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positive and profound identification with the hinterland. In terms of foreign policy, Dali Kingdom always maintained a positive attitude towards developing relations with the Song Dynasty; with neighboring countries such as Annan and Burma, it generally maintained contact and kept the borders at peace. The Baiman nobles were the rulers of the Dali Kingdom, and under their rule there were the Baiman, Wuman, Han and Jinchi barbarians. The Dali Kingdom always maintained close contact with barbarians of remote quarters and the Borderland regions, including the 37th Tribe, Ziqi, Luodian, Temodao, and Qiongbu barbarians. It implemented characteristic restraint policies on those barbarians. The Dali Kingdom also proactively handled its relations with the Song Dynasty, the Daquyue Kingdom (Annam), and the Burmese Kingdom, so as to promote economic and cultural exchanges with them. Seen from the records, rulers of Dali Kingdom mainly adopted the feudal system of enfeoffment in governance. Relying on Baiman feudal lords at all levels to maintain their rule over the hinterland, they specifically conferred titles on the feudal lords of the Duan, Gao, Yang, and Dong clans, and made their enfeoffment and power hereditary. Duan Siping named the nobility Gao Fang as the Marquis of Yue, placing under his jurisdiction Chengji and Juqiao (now Kunyang and the vicnity), and named Cuan as the Marquis of Badian. In the 8th year of Jiayou (1063) in the Song Dynasty, Gao Zhisheng, a descendant of Gao Fang, suppressed the rebellion of Yang Yunxian, a nobleman in the Erhai area, and Duan Silian, the King of Dali, “granted him the land of Baiya Rudian, and promoted him to Marquis Shanchan, and made his titles and enfeoffment hereditary” (Duan Silian, 1990, 243). In the third year of Yuanfeng (1280), the King of Dali Duan Shouhui, made Gao Zhisheng the Prime Minister of Dali, and his son Gao Shengtai the Marquis of Shanchan. In addition, Duan Zhengchun, the King of Dali, built Chuxiong City to confer a title on Gao Mingliang, nephew Gao Taiming. In addition, the ruler of Dali Kingdom also conferred the title of Duke of Chu on Gao Mingliang. The ruler of the Dali Kingdom also named Gao Mingliang the Duke of Chu, and “placed Jiushe and Shaque under his jurisdiction” (Duan Zhengchun, 1990, 269). Duan, Gao, Yang, Dong and other big feudal lords further conferred titles on their

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subordinates and relatives to form a pyramid pattern of feudal relationships. For example, Gao Zhisheng enfeoffed his two sons Gao Shengtai and Gao Shengxiang in Dali and Shanchan respectively. Gao Shengtai and his descendants controlled Weichu, Yaoan, Heqing, Yongsheng, Tengchong and Yongchang, as well as Xichang in present-day southwest Sichuan. The Gao Shengxiang family occupied Shanchan, Jinning, Songming, Yimen, Lufeng, and Luoci (Ni, 1990, 266). Although the scope of the other feudal lords was not as wide as that of the Gao clan, the same practice of subordinate enfeoffment and subordinate rule was adopted. The enfeoffed lords of various levels were obliged to contribute local products to the king and provide manpower for labor. When Duan Zhengchun was in power, Li Guanyinde, the lord of Shanchan, came to pay tribute to him, “and submitted 80 gold horses and 32,000 households of people.” The subordinate enfeoffment system was in fact a feudal practice to control and rule the various tribes, but different from the Nanzhao period, when the Wuman nobles actively wooed the upper classes of the Wuman and Baiman from all over the country, which was different from the practice of Wuman nobility actively currying favor with the upper class of Wuman and Baiman for joint rule. As for the feudal lords of Baiman, the Duan clan rulers also kept in close contact with them through conferment and marriages. Such situations were more common in historical records such as Unofficial History of Nanzhao. According to the “Inscribed Tombstone of the Former Concubine Gao of Dali”, “The concubine was from the Gao clan, originally known by the name Jinxian. She was a daughter of Gao Hu, the Counselor-in-Chief, and Duan Yichangshun, the daughter of Emperor Jiande. Her husband was Li Darixian, principal of the imperial academy.” This suggests that Gao Jinxian was the granddaughter of Duan Zhengxing, the King of Dali (Wang and Fang, 2000), indicating that the Duan family of Dali had established a marital relationship with the noble Gao clan. The Baiman feudal lords as the mainstay of Dali Kingdom can also be seen from the fact that they were extensively dispatched to guard various places. Inheriting the practice of Nanzhao, Dali Kingdom actively built cities and towns in various places, and those cities and towns played a great role in foreign operations and regional development. More than



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100 cities and towns were established in the middle and late period of Nanzhao, and Dali Kingdom added some more. For important ones, the ruler of Dali Kingdom sent Baiman feudal lords to guard them with their troops. The prominent Baiman noble Gao Zhisheng conferred on his descendants Heqing, Beisheng, Tengchong, Yongchang, Yaozhou, Weichu, Jianchang, Shanchan, Jinning, Songming, Lufeng, Yimen and Luoci. Those enfeoffed rulers made conscious efforts to manage their counties, and successively turned some of them into cities, for example Weichu City. Before the Tang Dynasty, there was no prefecture or and town in Chuxiong, Yunnan. During the rule of Geluofeng, prefectures and counties were established. Duan Zhengchun, the King of Dali, built the City of Chuxiong and gave it to Gao Mingliang, the nephew of the nobility Gao Taiming. After Gao Shengtai took over the anvil, he enfeoffed his nephew Gao Mingliang with Weichu, and “built an outer city known by the name ‘Dejiang City’.” After construction of the inner and outer cities, Weichu witnessed a steadily increasing population and prospering economy. When the Mongolian army pacified Yunnan, it established a Wanhu Command on the basis of Weichu City (Song et al., 1976, 1460; Duan Zhengchun, 1990, 269). The Baiman, who were mainly distributed in agricultural areas, were the social foundation of Dali in ruling. They were the main bearer of taxation and labor, as well as an important source of its standing army. Dali Kingdom attached great importance to winning their support. When Duan Siping founded the Dali Kingdom, he put forward the slogan of reducing taxes and grain levies by half and exempting three years of corvée for free people. The Baiman in various places were under the rule and jurisdiction of the feudal lords, with a social status similar to that of dependents in the hinterland during the Han and Jin Dynasties. When Duan Zhengchun ruled Dali as the king, Li Guanyinde, the lord of Shanchan, came to pay tribute to him, “and submitted 80 gold horses and 32,000 households of people.” This indicates that Baiman had a strong personal dependence on the feudal lords and must accept their domination. The standing army and township soldiers, mainly composed of Baiman, were the mainstay of the armed forces. Normally, the troops also served as farmers and were mainly responsible for maintaining local law and order. In times of war, they

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were dispatched into action. According to Unofficial History of Nanzhao, the 37th Tribe in eastern Yunnan had rebelled several times, and was all pacified by the Dali Kingdom, indicating a strong combat effectiveness of its army. In the southeast, southwest, northwest and south of the hinterland, the Dali Kingdom set up the four towns of Zuining, Zhenxi, Chengji, and Mengshe respectively, and guarded them with numerous troops. This suggests that the Dali Kingdom had a powerful standing army. The Dali Kingdom also followed the practice of Nanzhao in immigrating to enrich the areas to be developed. According to History of Yuan: Geography IV, when the Gao clan held the sway in politics, it moved some 200 Motuman households from present-day Xiangyun to Huangpengjing in Weichu (now Chuxiong), and some Han people to Hequzhou (based in the south of present-day Wuding County). In the early Yuan Dynasty, there were many Han tombs in this area, “indicating the inhabitance of Han people.” The Dali Kingdom established Wudan in Guhuichuan, which belonged to the Huichuan Prefecture (now Huili, Sichuan), and relocated Baiman of the 12 surnames of Zhang, Wang, Li, Zhao, Yang, Zhou, Gao, Duan, He, Su, Gong and Yin there, “appointing the Zhao as the lord.” The relocation of Baiman to the Wudan in Guhuichuan, and the Han people to Hequzhou was mainly to strengthen its ruling in those areas; the relocation of some Motu barbarians to Weichu was similar to the relocation among various places during the Nanzhao period. Seen from the records, the number and scale of immigration in Dali Kingdom was uncomparable to that during the rule of Nanzhao. Dali State inherited Nanzhao’s policy of actively absorbing the Han population and learning the culture of the hinterland. In the Song Dynasty, there was no officially organized immigration into Yunnan and southwestern Sichuan, and the Dali Kingdom did not send troops to abduct the Han population. However, due to the relatively stable society of Dali and the stable development of the feudal economy under the lordship system, people from surrounding areas afflicted with war or famine continued to move into Dali Kingdom. However, in terms of scale, the number of people that moved into its land was not as big as that of the Nanzhao period.



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In the 7th year of Xining (1074) Song, Emei Jinshi Yang Zuo was entrusted by Chengdu Route of the Song Dynasty to contact Dali to buy horses. Yang Zuo and his entourage crossed the border into Dali, and asked for direction from “the group of barbarians” ploughing and hoeing the mountain fields in the barbarian language. An old man among them wept and said, “I was originally a farmer of Hanjia (in present-day Mingshan County, Sichuan). During the Huangyou years, I had fled here for a living because of the famine. After all those years, my hair has grown hoary and I’ve lost many a tooth. Never have I dreamed to see my fellow countryman again” (Yang, 1980)! In addition, in the inscription of “Stele on the Guarding Saint of Dali” unearthed in Chuxiong, the author claims to be “originally a martial Jinshi of Jianwu in the Great Song Dynasty.” He said that “after being defeated twice in battle”, he found himself an exile in Dali, and that he had been well taken care of by Gao Liangcheng, the guarding saint of Dali, as if he were “kin” (Wang, 1980, 168). He couldn’t have been alone. The ruler of Dali Kingdom also held in high esteem the descendants of the Han people who moved in during the Nanzhao period, and in some cases appointed them to important posts. According to Records on Horse Purchase in Yunnan, Yang Zuo and his party were warmly received by the ruler of Dali when they reached the Erhai area. In fact, Dali Kingdom sent a Tounang’er to the guest house to keep them company. “The so-called Tounang’er was originally a scholar officials of Tang unfortunately driven by the barbarians south across the Dadu River. Their descendants living today are given hereditary posts and salary. In most cases, they are clever and well versed in the Chinese language.” In other words, the descendants of “literati-bureaucrats” that immigrated to Yunnan in the Tang Dynasty were treated favorably in Dali Kingdom. They had basically integrated into the Baiman, and spoke their language, but “they often did speak Chinese.” Dali Kingdom cherished learning the culture of the hinterland, as mainly reflected in imitating the hinterland to develop education. It actively studied the culture of the Central Plains by holding imperial examinations, for selecting talents. When Duan Suying was in power, he “issued an order to teach Records on Spread of the Doctrines, hold examination to select officials, and formulate systems to allow

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Confucian and Buddhist scholars to take the examination” (Ni, 1992, 165). It also made conscious efforts to purchase classics and scriptures from the hinterland. According to Unofficial History of Nanzhao, in the second year of Chongning (1103), the Dali Kingdom dispatched an envoy Gao Taiyun to the Song Dynasty “to ask for classics and scriptures, and acquired classics of 69 schools together with 62 medical books.” In the first year of Jiatai (1201) in the Southern Song Dynasty, it sent envoys to the Song Dynasty to ask for the Tripitaka, which was taken back and later placed in the Wuhua Building of Dali City. Due to the ruler’s efforts “to recommend and cultivate talents”, the reign of Duan Zhixiang featured “peaceful times and bumper harvests, and thus meritorious governance.” Consequently, the upper class of the Dali Kingdom developed the trend to read Chinese books and write Chinese poems, and many people in the ruling group became highly literate in Chinese culture. Guo Songnian, who went to Yunnan at the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty, said that “in its early days, the Song Dynasty had to cope with a powerful enemy in the north and had no energy to manage remote areas. However, Daili Kingdom dispatched envoys to Song and established contact with the Middle Kingdom. Therefore, its palaces, buildings, language and nine disciplines in the six arts, as well as the ceremony of crowning, weddings and funerals, and the method of fighting and battle array formation, bore traces of origination from the Han people in scale, costumes, movements, and behaviors, although they were not exactly the same. Seen now, they all carried the legacy of the Middle Kingdom” (Guo, 1986, 20).

5.2  In remote areas and mountainous areas that were still in the preslavery stage in development, the Dali Kingdom mainly relied on local barbarian leaders to rule. The vicinity of Wuding, Yunnan was inhabited by the Lulu Tribe of Wuman barbarians. After the rise of the Duan clan, it ordered the Wuman chief Ali to build the two fortresses of Gonglong City and Yilong City in Gongdian. “After two generations, Ali’s descendants thrived and named his tribe after his remote ancestor Luowu.” The Dali Kingdom also supported Ali’s annexation of more than 30



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nearby barbarian settlements, “and placed them under the control of his brothers, sons and nephews, all of whom belonged to the Luowu tribe.” Luomeng, the leader of the Heicuan barbarians in Lunan, Yunnan built Salü City under the support of Dali Kingdom. “Later, his descendants lived there, and named the tribe after him” (Song et al., 1976, 1460). Dali Kingdom fought few foreign wars, and on much smaller scales when compared with Nanzhao. Its armed forces consisted of three parts: the standing army, the militia and the barbarian army. The militia, mainly composed of peasants, was the mainstay. Its members were engaged in farming in peacetime and mainly responsible for maintaining local law and order, though they also participated in foreign wars. Among the inscriptions in “The Stele on the Alliance of the 37 Tribes in the Dali Kingdom”, there were such official titles and names as “Duan Zibiao, General Commander of the Armed Forces, Imperial maternal uncle and Prime Minister” “Yang Lianyong and Yang Qiuyan, respectively Changyu and Changlan” (Wang, 1980, 167). Here, “the armed forces” shall refer to the standing army, militia and barbarian army of Dali Kingdom. The Prime Minister Duan Zibiao was its general commander and was responsible for commanding the standing army; Changyu and Changlan were the deputy generals of the central government in the early stage of Dali Kingdom, and held by Yang Lianyong and Yang Qiuyan who were commanders of the militia. In the revolt of Duan Siping and some subsequent wars, troops of the 37th Tribe were mobilized. This suggests that the barbarian army of the Dali Kingdom were mainly armed forces seconded from the mountainous barbarians, as different from the direct recruitment of the Borderland barbarians by Nanzhao. The practice also reflected that Dali Kingdom abandoned Nanzhao’s practice of subduing Borderland barbarians with force and adopted feudal enfeoffment for establishing a jimi relationship. In the later stage of Nanzhao, powerful barbarian tribes appeared in some remote areas and the Borderland regions. The policy of the Dali Kingdom for governing the remote areas and Borderland tribes in its jurisdiction was roughly “enfeoffing those who have come from afar to pledge allegiance, and launching punitive expedition against those who refuse to be naturalized” “thus achieving governance in all quarters” (Wang, 1980, 168). The approach adopted by the Dali regime

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achieved effects similar to the jimi system adopted by the Central Plains dynasty for governing the Borderland peoples. This situation indicates that the feudal lordship system had dominated the Dali Kingdom, and there was no need to conquer the mountain-dwelling barbarians as tribal slaves. On the one hand, the policy of “ruling barbarians with barbarians”, featuring ruling by barbarian chiefs, effectively achieved restraint on the barbarians, and benefited the social development of remote areas and Borderland regions. Therefore, the governance policy of Dali Kingdom for ethnic groups in remote areas marked a further step forward on the basis of Nanzhao. The Dali Kingdom granted a certain degree of autonomy to ethnic groups of remote areas and Borderland regions in its jurisdiction through oaths or enfeoffment. Such practices were not seen in records of the Nanzhao period. Common to feudal societies, they indicated a major change in the barbarian governance policy of Dali Kingdom. A typical example of it using the above methods to restrain the barbarians in the mountains was to allow a certain degree of autonomy to the Wuman barbarians of the 37th Tribe in eastern Yunnan, exempting their taxes and levies, making oaths with them and pledging to “maintain the long-standing” suzerain-vassal relationship (Wang, 1980, 167). When the 37th Tribe revolted, the Dali Kingdom sent troops to suppress it. The Dali Kingdom also adopted the same strategy for the Jinglong Jindian Kingdom. In the 7th year of Chunxi (1180) in the Song Dynasty, Pazhen, the leader of the Jinchi barbarians, founded the Jinglong Jindian Kingdom in Jinglong (now Jinghong, Xishuangbanna). Controlling Jinchi barbarian tribes in Lanna (in present-day northern Thailand), Mengjiao (in present-day northeastern Burma), and Menglao (in present-day northern Laos), Jinglong Jindian Kingdom was a local regime with a vast territory. The king of Dali recognized Pazhen as the “lord of his land” and gave him the “Tiger-head Gold Seal” to establish a suzerain-vassal relationship with it (Fang, 1998, 564). Other barbarians that accepted the rule of the Dali Kingdom included the barbarian tribes from Ziqi, Luodian, Temodao and Qiongbuchuan. Ziqi was first recorded in the late Northern Song Dynasty, and was the most active in the Southern Song Dynasty. Centered in Xingyi, Guizhou, it was located midway of the horse trade route between



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Dali and Yongzhou. Luodian Kingdom arose in the late Tang and Five Dynasties. Historical records on the second year of Tiancheng (927) says that “a total of 153 people, including the King of Luodian and the great leader of Kunming, and the surrounding nine tribes went to the Later Tang Dynasty to pay tribute, along with Song Chaohua, Governor of eight prefectures in Zangke and Qingzhou.”13 After the establish­ ment of the Southern Song Dynasty, business activities of Luodian Kingdom selling horses to the Song Dynasty became often in historical records. The center of Luodian Kingdom was in the vicinity of Anshun, Guizhou. Judging from Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains and other records, Dali Kingdom had a very close relationship with Ziqi and Luodian, which participated in its commercial exchanges with the Southern Song Dynasty, mainly selling horses. After the horse-sale activities of Dali Kingdom gradually decreased, they became the main source of horse sales to the Southern Song Dynasty. According to History of Song: War (12), Ziqi and Luodian originally had no horses for sale. It had to purchase horses from Nanzhao, which is known as Dali Kingdom (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4956). This suggests that the horses of Ziqi and Luodian were actually purchased from the Dali Kingdom and that they were in fact the intermediary. It can also be seen that they were under the relatively loose control of Dali Kingdom. Temodao was originally a jimi prefecture of the Song Dynasty, and it was centered in Guangnan, Yunnan, covering the present-day eastern Wenshan Prefecture in Yunnan, and Napo and Jingxi in Guangxi. Its Liao tribes maintained close ties with the Dali Kingdom, and their leaders were given official positions by it. During the Five Dynasties period, Duan Siping, the military governor of Tonghai, revolted after joining hands with the 37 Wuman tribes and some nearby tribes, including Temodao. After establishing the Dali Kingdom, Duan Siping named Nongminfu, the leader of the Liao people in Temodao, Guangyuan Prefecture (now Guangyuan, Quang Binh Province, Vietnam) as “Tanchuo” (top leader), and later named Nong Xiacheng, another leader of Temodao “Buxie” (prime minister). The Northern Song Dynasty tried 13 Old History of the Five Dynasties, Vol. 38, “Records of Emperor Mingzong”, 526.

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to win over Temo Dao. In the second year of Taiping Xingguo (977), it appointed “Tanchuo” Nongminfu as the minister of public works and grand counselor (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 55). The Liao people of Temodao also had connections with the Nong Zhigao forces in Guangxi. In the first year of the Qingli reign, when Nong Zhigao revolted again, he gave Nong Xiacheng, the prime minister, gold, silk and population, while establishing an in-law relationship with him. This way, Nong Xiacheng then lent troops to Nong Zhigao. Later, in Temodao “the sixty barbarian tribes of Xishan became allied with Nong Zhigao”. The Song Dynasty took advantage of this discord, and “all tribes were turned against Nong Zhigao.” Later, Nong Zhigao was defeated and fled to Dali Kingdom. Nong Xiacheng’s younger brother, Nongxiaqing, rallied more than 3,000 remnant troops and stationed them in Temodao, for attacking the Song Dynasty. In the seventh year of Jiayou (1062), Nongxiaqing left Temodao and surrendered to the Song Dynasty (Sima, 1989). Temodao also participated in the horse trade between Dali Kingdom and the Southern Song Dynasty. According to Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains, “to go to Temodao, one has to travel for 11 days from Hengshan via Shang’an County and Fuzhou (now Funing, Yunnan).” Another two days of travel takes one to the border of Dali, which was one day’s travel to Zuiningfu (now Kaiyuan, Yunnan) (Zhou, 1999, 123). In addition, Temodao was also one of the intermediaries between Dali Kingdom and the Song Dynasty. Those all show that although Temodao swayed among the Song Dynasty, Dali Kingdom and Nong Zhigao regime of Guangxi, it was most closely related to Dali Kingdom, and was actually a local force under its rule. The barbarians of Qiongbuchuan were also known as “Wudeng” or “Daluman.” Living between present-day Meigu and Yuexi counties in Sichuan, they had a chief who called himself “Baimandu Guizhu” (“Specter Chief of 100 Barbarian Tribes”). They began to pay tribute to Song Dynasty via Lizhou (now Hanyuan, Sichuan) in the second year of Kaibao (969). In the first year of Chunhua (990), Nuoqu, the Baimandu Guizhu of Qiongbu, sent 250 horses to Lizhou in the Song land for trade and the Song Emperor issued an edict for paying him. Afterwards, the barbarians from Qiongbuchuan established the tradition of going to



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Lizhou to sell horses and pay tribute. Barbarians paying tribute to the Song Dynasty in Lizhou also included Shanhou Lianglin Barbarians. Living in the southwest of Meigu County, they paid tribute to the Song Dynasty many times (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14233). During the Qiande years, the Northern Song Dynasty unified Sichuan, and the Dali Kingdom dispatched the barbarians of Qiongbuchuan and the Shanhou Lianglin to the Song Dynasty many times to pay tribute. Those two tribes also participated in the horse trade between the Dali Kingdom and the Song Dynasty in Lizhou, giving the Song court the wrong impression that they were “tribes of Yunnan”, and that Nuoqu was the King of Dali. Song Taizong issued an edict in the second year of Chunhua, saying that “it is hereby decided that the Nuoqu, the lord of Dali, Yunnan, who rule over the 36 chiefs of barbarian tribes in Yaozhou and Xizhou to the south of the Dadu River, be conferred the title of Huaihua General and Zhongshun King, concurrently serve as the Grand Guardian and General Guide” (Li, 1980). Those scenarios show that the barbarians of Qiongbuchuan and Shanhou Lianglin had accepted the jimi rule of the Dali Kingdom. After the imperial court of Song was forced south, the place for horse trading was changed to Guangxi, and the Qingxiguan Road passing through Lizhou was gradually abandoned. Barbarians of Qiongbuchuan thus came under the jurisdiction of Dali Kingdom. According to History of Song: Barbarians (4): Barbarians of Qiongbuchuan, in the ninth year of Jiading (1216), “Qiongbuchuan was forced into subordination by Yunnan. Its tribes had always been obedient, defending the Borderland regions effectively. Its surrender to Yunnan constituted the loss of the southwestern barrier for the Middle Kingdom.” The Nong Zhigao force of Guangxi was also a distant object of restraint for the Dali Kingdom. During the Huangyou years the Song Dynasty, Nong Zhigao, the leader of the Zhuang people in Guangyuan Prefecture, captured Ande Prefecture (now northwest of Jingxi, Guangxi) and established the Nantian Kingdom. After being defeated, he defected to Dali Kingdom. With the support of Dali Kingdom, he also prepared to attack Guangxi and Lizhou and Yazhou of Sichuan; it was even rumored that he married the royal family of Dali, “rallied barbarian supporters, made weapons, and drilled soldiers for combat” (Xu, 1957). Nong Zhigao’s ending was thought to be unknown in

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the past. In the inscription of the Yuan stele “Preface to Master Bai’s Gravestone Epitaph” unearthed in Dali in recent years, there are such wording as “surrendered to Dali in Renchen month, the 4th year of Huangyou (1052)” “his head was sent in a box to Xiao XX, prefect of Yongzhou.” According to research (Fang, 1986), the above text said that the Dali Kingdom had yielded to the pressure of the Song Dynasty, killed Nong Zhigao and sent his head to the Song Dynasty. History of Song: Biography of Xiao Zhu says that Xiao Zhu, prefect of Yongzhou, recruited desperados to enter Dali to kill Nong Zhigao, but they arrived only find that Nong Zhigao had already been killed and had his head sent to the Song Dynasty by Dali Kingdom. The unearthed “Preface to Master Bai’s Gravestone Epitaph” proved that the records in History of Song were generally credible. The Dali Kingdom attached great importance to developing good-neighborly and friendly relations with the Song Dynasty and other neighboring regimes, for promoting mutual economic and cultural exchanges. The basic characteristics of its policy towards the Song Dynasty and other neighboring regimes were upholding friendly relations, satisfying needs via exchanges, and ensuring border security. Under normal circumstances, it did not easily resort to force against neighboring regimes. In fact, restraint from foreign wars was also a feature making it different from Nanzhao, which wantonly resorted to foreign wars.

5.3  Dali Kingdom always maintained a positive attitude towards developing its relationship with the Song Dynasty. In order to address the serious shortage of war horses, in the sixth year of Xining (1073), the Northern Song Dynasty established a trade fair in Lizhou and Yazhou, for purchasing horses from the southwestern barbarians. While trading horses, Dali Kingdom sent envoys to the Song court to request canonization many times. According to History of Song: Biography of Dali Kingdom, the Dali Kingdom paid a tribute in the 7th year of Zhenghe (1117) to the Song court, which named its king Duan He Governor of Yunnan and King of Dali, formally establishing the suzerain-vassal



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relationship. In the second year of Xuanhe (1120), the Song Dynasty asked the Jin Kingdom to jointly attack the Liao Kingdom, and the fight in the north became fierce. It happened that Huang Lin, the Surveillance Commissioner of Guangzhou, was framed for introducing Dali to the imperial court. So the Northern Song Dynasty deliberately turned a cold shoulder to Dali. “From then on, Dali cut off all its ties with the Middle Kingdom and came to Lizhou to trade occasionally.” After the establishment of the Southern Song Dynasty, the Horse-Purchase Division was relocated to Guangxi. In the third year of Shaoxing (1133), the Guangxi government submitted an imperial memorial on the request of the Dali Kingdom for permission to pay tribute to the Song court. However, Emperor Gaozong “issued an edict to the official in charge that only horse purchase will be approved, while tribute should be rejected” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 4565). Since the Southern Song Dynasty imposed many restrictions on selling horses in the Dali Kingdom, while the road was long and obstructed. Records about the Dali Kingdom going to Yongzhou and Guangxi to sell horses became scarce. Ziqi and Luodian then replaced the Dali Kingdom to become the main seller of horses to the Southern Song Dynasty. Under such circumstances, the Dali Kingdom repeatedly requested for permission to pay tribute, and showed a strong desire to submit to its rule. It is worth noting that even when its political relations with the Song Dynasty were sometimes almost severed, there was never a war between Dali Kingdom and the Song Dynasty. In the sixth year of Qiande (968) in the Song Dynasty, Ding Buling, a general of Annan overthrew the twelve overlords and established the Daquyue Kingdom. In the sixth year of Kaibao (973), he sent envoys to pay tribute. Emperor Taizu of Song granted his son Ding Lian be the protector of Annan and the lord of Cochin (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14058), and officially recognized the status of Annan as an independent kingdom. After Annan broke away from the rule of the Central Plains Dynasty, it still maintained close relations with the Middle Kingdom. Dali Kingdom as a local regime in China also had frequent contacts and exchanges with Annan. In the seventh year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1014), Li Gongyun, prefect of Jiaozhou, defeated Hetuo barbarians and reported his victory to the

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court (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 156). The History of Yue: An Outline for Reference also says that in the spring of the 7th year of Dazhong Xiangfu in the Song Dynasty, “Yang Changhui and Duan Jingzhi from the Hetuo barbarians launched an attack with 200,000 troopss, stationing their army in Jinhuabu, and establishing a camp called Wuhuazhai.”14 “Hetuo” was the name given to Nanzhao by the Tang Court (Ouyang et al., 1975, 6267). The name was also used by the Song Dynasty to call Dali Kingdom. Seen from the above records, the Dali Kingdom dispatched 200,000 troops to attack Annan, but was defeated by the Annan soldiers under the command of Li Gongyun, who later sent the victorious news to the Song Dynasty. It was nothing short of a remarkable feat, but due to the lack of historical records, the cause, process and impact of the war were still unknown at present. According to another records, in the ninth year of Shaoxing (1139), the Managing and Placation Commission reported to the imperial court that “we found that Li Qiande had a concubine, who gave birth to a son, and sent him to Dali to be raised under the surname of Zhao. Known by the name Zhizhi, he called himself King Ping. When Dali Kingdom learnt that Yanhuan had died and Tianzuo took over as the Commandery Prince, it sent him back. Now he was stationed in Tuohe, Longling Prefecture, Annan, and demanded that Tianzuo hand over the throne. Tianzuo was defeated. We also found that Zhao Zhizhi had sent envoys with fifty gold ingots and an elephant as tribute to our court.” Emperor Gaozong issued an edict, demand that active measures be taken to dissuade the envoys, “and that the envoys should be rejected by all means, to avoid further trouble” (Xu, 1957). Essential Annual Records since Jianyan says that when Zhao Zhizhi learnt about the death of his elder brother Yanghuan, he tried to contend the throne against Tianzuo, “and Dali Kingdom sent 3,000 soldiers to help him.”15 A similar record is also found in History of Song: Biography of Cochin. The above records refer to this incident: in the second year of Shaoxing (1132), Li Qiande, King of Annan died, and his son Li Yanghuan succeeded him. In the 8th year, Li Yanghuan died, and his 1 4 [Nhà Nguyện] Phan Thanh Giản, History of Yue: An Outline for Reference, Vol. 3. 15 Li Xinchuan, Essential Annual Records since Jianyan, Vol. 129.



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son Li Tianzuo took over the anvil, and was named King of Cochin by the Southern Song Dynasty according to precedent. Li Qiande originally had a concubine. She gave birth to a son who was sent to foster care in the Dali Kingdom. His surname was changed to Zhao and his name was Zhizhi. Knowing that Li Tianzuo succeeded to the throne of Annan, the Dali Kingdom sent Zhao Zhizhi back, “to compete with Tianzuo for the throne.” Li Tianzuo and his troops fought against the 3,000 Dali soldiers sent to assist Zhao Zhizhi, who also sent envoys to Song to pay tribute, hoping to get its support, but was rejected by the Song court. In the 17th year, the Song Dynasty gave a saddle to Li Tianzuo, and later granted him the title King of Nanping, as a token of his recognition. Therefore, in the 7th year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1014), after the war between them ended, Dali Kingdom and Annan resumed friendly relations, and the former also accepted and raised Zhao Zhizhi, the son born to a concubine of King Li Qiande of Annan. However, the contradictions between the two sides were not resolved. In the 8th year of Shaoxing, Li Yanghuan, the Annan King died, and the Dali Kingdom escorted Zhao Zhizhi back to Annan with troops to contend with Li Tianzuo for the throne. The attitude of the Song Dynasty was to support Annan. The battle for the throne of Annan ended in the defeat of Zhao Zhizhi. Apart from the above two wars, there are no other records of war between Dali and Annan. This suggests that maintaining peace and friendly exchanges were still the mainstream of the relationship between the two regimes. According to Horse Purchase in Yunnan, in the seventh year of Xining (1074) in the Song Dynasty, Yang Zuo, a native of Chengdu, went to Dali to discuss horse purchase. At the Great Yunnan Station (in present-day Xiangyun County, Yunnan), he saw a stele, with the inscription indicating “The inscription showed the direction of the road from Yunnan eastward to Rongzhou, westward to India, southeast to Jiaozhi and northeast to Chengdu, north to Daxueshan and south to the sea, with complete details of the lengths. He checked the stele and found it generally in perfect condition.” The roads recorded on the stele were the most important channels for Dali to reach out. The “northward road to Daxueshan” is the present-day road from Lijiang to Sichuan and Xizang through northwestern Yunnan. After passing through Lijiang

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and reaching Jinzhongdian, it spread all the way through Kangding and Ya’an to Chengdu. In another direction, it extended to Lhasa via the eastern part of Xizang, and then westward to India. “The westward road to India” refers to the road from Dali to India through northern Burma. Unofficial History of Nanzhao says that in the second year of Chongning (1103) in the Song Dynasty, “the three kingdoms of Mianren, Bosi and Kunlun present a tribute of white elephants and incense.” The Mianren was in present-day northern Burma; Bosi refers to Pathein in present-day Burma, and Kunlun was Tanahsari in present-day Burma. Mianren paid tribute via “the westward road to India”, while Bosi and Kunlun followed the “southward road to the sea,” which extended southward along the Irrawaddy River to reach the Andaman Sea after entering Burma. Through the “westward road to India” and the “southward road to the sea”, the Dali Kingdom maintained regular business exchanges with today’s Burma and India. According to Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains, “There are hundreds of kingdoms in the western, and the most famous ones are Rajgir, Tintu Kingdom, and Central India.” “It is said that the travel from Dali Kingdom to Rajgir takes forty days at most” (Zhou, 1999, 108). Raja is the present-day Rajgir to the southwest of Bihar, India. Notes in Lieu of Answers to Questions about Areas beyond the Mountains: Communication with Barbarians also says that “after traveling from Dali to Pagan (in present-day Bagan, northern Burma), the West Tintu is not far.” The “Anan-Cochin Road” mentioned in the inscription of station stele was the first section of the “Annan-Tintu Road” of the Tang Dynasty; travel southward along this road, one can reach the city of Champa in central Vietnam. From Dali to Champaign, one can also take the road via present-day Laos, “Champaign Kingdom is to the southwest of China, extending east to the sea, west to Yunnan, south to Chenla, and north to the border of Huanzhou” (Tuotuo et al., 1977, 14077). Through the above roads, Dali Kingdom maintained close economic and cultural exchanges with present-day South Asia and Southeast Asia. Guo Songnian said in Travels in Dali that: “The people of the (Dali) Kingdom mostly follow Buddhism, because of the geographic proximity to Tintu in the west. Every household has a Buddhist



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shrine, whether rich or poor. Both the elderly and the young all hold a string of Buddhist beads, and fast for virtually half the year.” He pointed out that the popularity of Buddhism among Yunnan residents in the late Song Dynasty and early Yuan Dynasty was attributable to its frequent exchanges with India in the Song Dynasty. According to Chronicles of Menghua Prefecture, in the 10th year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1017), “Sengfengyou built Wuhua Building in his country to entertain the barbarian chiefs of the 16 kingdoms in the southwest.” In The Painting Scrolls of Zhang Shengwen, picture 131 to 134 carried the images of 16 kings who came to Dali to worship. Among them, there are ones with deep eyes, a high nose or thick beards, and one even carries a pet dog, similar to the image of the Indians found the Shibaoshan Grottoes in Jianchuan (Li, 1995, 226). Seen from the paintings in The Painting Scrolls of Zhang Shengwen, the “lords of the barbarians of the 16 kingdoms in the Southwest” mentioned in Chronicles of Menghua Prefecture may include envoys from present-day South Asia and Southeast Asia.

5.4  This suggests that the main content of the border governance strategy of Dali Kingdom was to use the Baiman feudal lords as the basic force to effectively rule the Baiman, Wuman, Han people, Jinchi, Baiyi, and Liao people. In administration, it generally showed the following characteristics: First, it adopted a feudal enfeoffment, enfeoffing feudal lords at different levels and relying on them for ruling the ethnic groups of the hinterland. Second, it renounced Nanzhao’s practice of subjugating outlying barbarians by force with taking oaths for alliance or enfeoffing, and adopted a form of governance similar to that practiced by the Middle Kingdom. Third, its political coalition with Wuman and Jinchi barbarians was weakened, and the coalition regimes no longer bore distinct features. Fourth, it inherited the tradition of Nanzhao emphasizing on absorbing the Han population and the economic and cultural factors of the hinterland, and developed a more positive and profound identification with the hinterland. In terms of foreign policy, Dali Kingdom always maintained a positive attitude towards developing relations with the Song Dynasty. While

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conducting economic and cultural exchanges with the Song Dynasty, it strongly hoped to obtain the recognition of the Song Dynasty and maintain the suzerain-vassal relationship. For Annan and Burma, it actively developed economic and cultural exchanges with them, and implemented the policy of friendly coexistence, exchange for mutual benefits and maintenance of the borders for peace. Its foreign wars were few and sparse, as different from Nanzhao. After the establishment of the Dali Kingdom, the agricultural area generally shifted from the slave economy to the feudal lord economy. The major changes in the dominant economic form exerted a direct impact on its political system. For example, the rulers enfeoffed feudal lords, and developed the basic form of relying on them for ruling the hinterland; for the barbarians in remote areas, jimi rule proved a more practical and effective approach than conquest by force; due to the sharp decline of the slave economy, Dali Kingdom no longer needed to launch wars to plunder slaves. Meanwhile, the development of the feudal agricultural economy required a stable social environment. Therefore, the rational choice for Dali Kingdom was to minimize wars and social unrest, and to actively develop exchanges with the outside world. Through the great ethnic integration since Nanzhao, Baiman witnessed remarkably enhanced economic strength and political role, affecting the pattern of ethnic relations in Dali Kingdom. During the 254 years of rule under Nanzhao, hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese from the hinterland settled in Erhai and other places as prisoners of war. By absorbing a large Han population and the economic and cultural factors of the hinterland, the Baiman enhanced it economic and political power, to become the dominant ethnic group in Yunnan. On the other hand, since the rulers were no longer Wuman nobles, the political alliance between Dali Kingdom and Wuman weakened. The Dali Kingdom had a stronger sense of identity with the Central Plains Dynasty, partially because Baiman absorbed a large Han population and was deeply influenced by it. After several hundred years of development since Nanzhao, barbarians such as Wuman and Jinchi Baiyi entered the class society one after another. Among them, powerful tribal alliances or local forces emerged, such as the 37th Wuman Tribe and Jinglong Jindian Kingdom.



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Therefore, it was undoubtedly a wise move for the Dali Kingdom to abandon the tough military conquest and practiced jimi rule by means of alliances and other means. Affected by the social turmoil and overall decline towards the end of Nanzhao and due to the radical changes from slavery to early feudalism, the Dali Kingdom was no match for Nanzhao in economic strength and political influence. Therefore, it was impossible for the Dali Kingdom to continue its policy of subjugating the surrounding ethnic groups by force and actively expanding the outside world. Only by understanding this can we correctly explain the disempowerment of kingship and the separation of princes that appeared in the later period of Dali Kingdom. It should also be pointed out that the decline of kingship and the separation of princes were also common in early feudal societies at home and abroad.

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