Illicit Flows And Criminal Things: States, Borders, And the Other Side of Globalization (Tracking Globalization) 025321811X, 9780253218117, 9780253111579, 9780253346698, 025334669X

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illicit flows and criminal things



tracking globalization

robert j. foster, editor Editorial advisory board: Mohammed Bamyeh Lsa Cartwrght Randall Halle

illicit flows and criminal things States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization

Edited by

Wllem van Schendel and

Itty Abraham

Indiana University Press bloomington and indianapolis

Publshed wth the generous support of the Socal Scence Research Councl Ths book s a publcaton of Indana Unversty Press 601 North Morton Street Bloomngton, IN 47404-3797 USA http://upress.ndana.edu Telephone orders 800-842-6796 Fax orders 812-855-7931 Orders by e-mail uporder@ndana.edu © 2005 by Indana Unversty Press All rghts reserved No part of ths book may be reproduced or utlzed n any form or by any means, electronc or mechancal, ncludng photocopyng and recordng, or by any nformaton storage and retreval system, wthout permsson n wrtng from the publsher. The Assocaton of Amercan Unversty Presses’ Resoluton on Permssons consttutes the only excepton to ths prohbton. The paper used n ths publcaton meets the mnmum requrements of Amercan Natonal Standard for Informaton Scences--Permanence of Paper for Prnted Lbrary Materals, ANSI Z39.48-1984. Manufactured n the Unted States of Amerca Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Illct lows and crmnal thngs : states, borders, and the other sde of globalzaton / edted by Wllem van Schendel and Itty Abraham. p. cm. — (Trackng globalzaton) Includes bblographcal references and ndex. ISBN 0-253-34669-X (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-253-21811-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Transnatonal crme. 2. State, The. I. Schendel, Wllem van. II. Abraham, Itty, date III. Seres. HV6252.I448 2006 364.1'35—dc22 2005010917 1 2 3 4 5 10 09 08 07 06 05

Contents Acknowledgments

v

Introducton: The Makng of Illctness

1

Itty Abraham and Willem van Schendel

1. Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illct Flows, and Terrtoral States Interlock 38 Willem van Schendel

2. The Rumor of Trafickng: Border Controls, Illegal Mgraton, and the Soveregnty of the Naton-State

69

Diana Wong

3. Talkng Lke a State: Drugs, Borders, and the Language of Control 101 Paul Gootenberg

4. “Here, Even Legslators Chew Them”: Coca Leaves and Identty Poltcs n Northern Argentna 128 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui

5. Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant: Why So Many Non-crmnals Break Immgraton Laws 153 David Kyle and Christina A. Siracusa

6. Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade: A Methodologcal Case Study 177 Ian Smillie

7. Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands: The Ilem Trangle 201 Kenneth I. Simala and Maurice Amutabi

Consoldated Bblography Contrbutors Index

257

255

227

Chapter Ttle

Acknowledgments Country boats loatng down the rver Ganges wth cargoes of contraband cattle, motorcycle parts, people, and heron. Border guards n cvlan clothes recevng the smugglers to count ther goods and collect pocket money. A border that was ofically closed but at the same tme clearly an mportant ste of trade and mgraton, facltated by collaboratng state personnel and smugglers. . . . Ths s how, many years ago, the subject of ths volume irst took shape for one of the edtors. The roots of our fascnaton wth “llct” lows across nternatonal borders and wth processes of globalzaton “from below” come from ntersectng questons drawn from nternatonal relatons, anthropology, geography, hstory, securty studes, and cultural studes, and each of us has attempted to make sense of these n dfferent geographcal and hstorcal contexts. However, the ntellectual trajectory that led to ths volume was, from the outset, a collectve one, shared among scholars from a varety of countres and dscplnes, aded by the support of a number of nsttutons. In the irst nstance, ths volume developed out of conversatons among scholars nvolved n the last Jont Commttee on South Asa at the Socal Scence Research Councl (SSRC), New York, whch led n turn to the formaton of an SSRC collaboratve research network “Illct Flows and Crmnalty,” and inally to the project’s last home, the program on Global Securty and Cooperaton. Ths project has receved inancal support from grants from the Ford Foundaton, New York; the MacArthur Foundaton, Chcago; and the Hewlett Foundaton; for whch we are very grateful. Followng ntal dscussons, false starts, and other hccups n New York, workshops and plannng meetngs took place n Amsterdam (1999), Pars (2000), and Vancouver (2002) wth dfferent themes and partcpants, not all of whom are represented n ths volume. In partcular, we would lke to thank the followng colleagues who both advsed and contrbuted substantally to earler stages of ths project: Bernhard Bayerlen, Mamadou Douf, Mchael Kearney, Al McCoy, Carolyn Nordstrom, Douglas Sanders, Chrs Smth, Henz Stenert, and Nel Smth. Others who attended and/or wrote and presented papers at one of these workshops nclude Belnda Bozzol, Marc Epprecht, Peter Vale, Sun Lachen, Davd Atwll, Davd Fengold, Guy Lamb, Laurent Lanel, Robert Karnol, Erc Taglacozzo, Jonathan Goodhand, Kath Austn, and James Scott. Our sncere thanks to them all, and to Thomas Trautmann, who was supportve of our desre to v

Acknowledgments publsh a selecton of papers n Comparative Studies in Society and History. We were also fortunate to have, at the Pars meetng, the assstance of the faculty and staff at the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internatonales (CERI). Especally gven ther mmnent move to new quarters, we are partcularly grateful to Janet Rotman, Chrstophe Jaffrelot, Roland Marchal, and Davd Camroux for takng tme off from ther weekend to partcpate n our workshop. Insttutonal support was also receved from the Internatonal Insttute of Socal Hstory, Amsterdam, and the Unversty of Brtsh Columba, Vancouver. As always, enormous amounts of sem-nvsble, though hopefully not llct, labor made the many teratons of ths project far easer to manage and inally complete. We were fortunate to have a seres of dedcated, smart, and hard-workng project assstants who ncluded, over the years, Mathew Kng, Chrstna Harrs, Munmeeth Son, and Magge Schuppert. Veronca Raffo, program coordnator at the SSRC, was ndspensable n keepng ths project on track and for not losng sght of all the thousands of detals that go nto gettng a manuscrpt to press. Indana Unversty Press, represented by Rebecca Tolen, and Robert Foster, who heads up the Trackng Globalzaton seres, were very supportve of our ntal queres and have made the process of publcaton relatvely panless. Our thanks to them all, and to all those who may be readng ths.

v

illicit flows and criminal things

Introduction The Making of Illicitness Itty Abraham and Wllem van Schendel

Around the world, the mass meda have turned talk of transnatonal crme nto a major cottage ndustry. You only have to take a cursory look at the World Wde Web to ind news stores of transnatonal crme n many forms. Endangered anmals and exotc brds are smuggled to collectors overseas from the Pramuka pet market n Jakarta and Moscow’s Brd Market. Banned ozone-depletng chemcals are transshpped between Inda, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Snakeheads n Chna are accused of smugglng thousands of mgrants nto the Unted States for fees of up to US$20,000 per person. The fall of the Talban regme s lnked to a startlng ncrease n the low of opum and heron from Afghanstan to Russa and around the world. The meat of humpback whales, a speces that has been protected snce 1966, s reported to be freely avalable n a Hroshma ish market. A nuclear black market connects countres as dverse as Pakstan, North Korea, Iran, and Lbya. And perhaps most alarmng of all, nnumerable stores of sexual trafickng and slavery: Moldavan women to Germany, Ngeran chldren to England, Nepals to Inda, Latn Amercans to North Amerca, Burmese to Thaland, Thas to Germany, and Flpnas to Japan.1 The horror s multpled when some of these llegal practces merge, as 

it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el when llegally trapped anmal pelts are illed wth cocane, or when llegal mgrants are “mned” for ther organs.2 Addng to the newsworthness of these stores s the apparently enormous inancal scale of transnatonal llct actvtes. The Unted Natons Conference on Global Organzed Crme (1994) estmated the value of the world’s trade n llegal drugs alone at US$500 bllon annually. Manuel Castells feels that number should be doubled.3 The annual llct trade n small arms has been estmated to be worth US$2–3 bllon, or roughly 20 percent of the total world trade n small arms.4 In the closng years of the twenteth century, estmates of the world’s “gross crmnal product” often passed the US$1 trllon mark.5 These numbers, for drugs n partcular, are the subject of consderable contestaton. As R. T. Naylor, an economst who s the author of a number of books about the inancal underworld, puts t, the only way that the drug “busness” could be that valuable s f t ncluded “the value of every donkey owned by every campesino n the Andes but prced . . . as f they cost as much as pckup trucks.” He wrtes that a senor ofical of the Unted Natons admtted to hm that these numbers are less than accurate but “were great for catchng publc attenton.”6 Naylor does not offer an alternatve igure, but hs evdence strongly suggests that the scale of the llct underworld, apart from beng obvously dficult to estmate, s delberately exaggerated to serve parochal nsttutonal nterests. The subtext of these stores, taken together, s that there s a specter hauntng globalzaton—the specter of nternatonal organzed crme networks, cotermnous wth underworld maias, snakeheads, coyotes, trafickers, and other transnatonal jetsam. Groups and ndvduals trafickng n llct objects and substances—agan, to borrow from Marx, “the dangerous class, the socal scum, that passvely rottng mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old socety”7—have, we are told, taken advantage of the unprecedented ease of communcaton and movement offered by the new socal and techncal nfrastructures that grd the world today to create an alternatve, only partly vsble, global system that exsts n parallel to legtmate nternatonal transactons of corporatons, ndvduals, and states. The dangers of ths parallel system nclude threats to the moral, socal, and natural economes of the world. The best efforts of polce and border guards, domestc laws, and nternatonal conventons notwthstandng, the scale of ths trafic grows daly as the sophstcaton of these trafickers ncreases apace. As Mosés Naím puts t n a recent ssue of Foreign Policy, In one form or another, governments have been ightng [the llegal trade n drugs, arms, ntellectual property, money, and people] for centures. And losng. Indeed, thanks to the changes spurred by globalzaton over the last



Introducton decade, ther losng streak has become even more pronounced. To be sure, naton-states have beneited from the nformaton revoluton, stronger poltcal and economc lnkages, and the shrnkng mportance of geographc dstance. Unfortunately, crmnal networks have beneited even more. Never fettered by the ncetes of soveregnty, they are now ncreasngly free of geographc constrants. Moreover, globalzaton has not only expanded llegal markets and boosted the sze and the resources of crmnal networks, t has also mposed more burdens on governments: Tghter publc budgets, decentralzaton, prvatzaton, deregulaton, and a more open envronment for nternatonal trade and nvestment all make the task of ightng global crmnals more dficult. Governments are made up of cumbersome bureaucraces that generally cooperate wth dficulty, but drug trafickers, arms dealers, alen smugglers, counterfeters, and money launderers have reined networkng to a hgh scence, enterng nto complex and mprobable strategc allances that span cultures and contnents.8

Takng ths further, Manuel Castells argues for the symmetry of the crmnal network and the strategc busness model: [I]nternatonalzaton of crmnal actvtes nduces organzed crme from dfferent countres to establsh strategc allances to cooperate, rather than ight, on each other’s turf, through subcontractng arrangements, and jont ventures, whose busness practce closely follows the organzatonal logc of what I dentied as “the network enterprse,” characterstc of the Informaton Age. . . . Furthermore, the bulk of the proceedngs of these actvtes are by deinton globalzed through ther launderng va global inancal markets.9

Other startlng mages may also be used to ndcate the vrulence of the problem. In an artcle that denties a “greenhouse effect” n weak and transtonal states that allow crmnal networks to grow unhndered, Phl Wllams proposes that “organzed crme-corrupton networks can be understood as the HIV vrus of the modern state, crcumventng and breakng down the natural defenses of the modern state.”10 In the present context, ths knd of analyss sldes easly nto a descrpton of nternatonal terrorsm, a latent threat always present under the surface, equally able to moblze the latest n technology, hghly sophstcated n counterng state survellance, and, due to ts very nature, mpossble to stamp out or completely elmnate. And when IRA bomb-makers were dscovered n cocane-rch Colomba, the feared ntersecton of poltcal terrorsm and nternatonal crme ndeed appeared to have come to pass.11 The ntersecton of the power of globalzaton wth the threat of nternatonal crme appears to conirm the darkest fears of polcy makers, law enforcement oficals, and average ctzens of ndustralzed countres. When



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el globalzaton s taken to mean the dsmantlng of barrers of protecton around natons and states, when t promotes, or at least fals to prevent, the free low of dsease and other threats to human securty, when t appears to be the cause for the vsble publc presence of strangers of dfferent races, a natonalst backlash s common and nevtable. The “End of the Cold War” becomes the temporal rallyng cry markng the begnnng of a new, ntensied, and more dangerous phase of global transactons. To many polcy makers, such deadly understandngs of the contemporary world leave only one opton: to develop more ntrusve, authortaran, and muscular forms of law enforcement whch at ther lmt become forms of pre-emptve nternatonal volence. Thankfully, the alarmst nterpretaton s lawed.12 By contrast, the poston taken n ths volume s that we need a radcally dfferent way of conceptualzng “llegal” transnatonal lnkages, especally f we are to understand the persstence of these lows over tme and space. The domnant magery of naton-states ightng valantly aganst global crmnal networks s far too smplstc and even msleadng. We propose a more subtle approach to ssues of legalty and llegalty whch does not take the state as ts pont of departure. Instead, we buld upon a dstncton between what states consder to be legtmate (“legal”) and what people nvolved n transnatonal networks consder to be legtmate (“lct”). Many transnatonal movements of people, commodtes, and deas are llegal because they defy the norms and rules of formal poltcal authorty, but they are qute acceptable, “lct,” n the eyes of partcpants n these transactons and lows. We argue there s a qualtatve dfference of scale and ntent between the actvtes of nternatonally organzed crmnal gangs or networks and the scores of mcro-practces that, whle often llegal n a formal sense, are not drven by a structural logc of organzaton and unied purpose. Whle we do not seek to establsh that scalar threshold, the analyss n ths volume makes clear that the “armpt smugglers” or “ant traders” who cross borders all over the world wth small quanttes of goods may together account for huge quanttes of contraband, but they do not represent global syndcates of organzed crme.13 For analytc, methodologcal, and polcy reasons, t s necessary to rethnk the core concepts currently used n analyzng transnatonal lnkages, especally those lnkages of whch states do not approve. In the absence of a global soveregn authorty, t s mpossble to dstngush, n an objectve and tmeless way, between the llegal and the legal for “crmnal” lows that cross nternatonal borders. What passes for “nternatonal crme” s so closely ntertwned wth the domestc-legal that for analytc purposes the “crmnal” and “not-crmnal” systems form



Introducton a coherent whole, at tmes legal, at tmes llegal. We have a vvd recent example of ths ntertwned legal/llegal world n the story of Dr. A. Q. Khan, the Pakstan metallurgst who was responsble for masterng the technology to enrch uranum and who then sold ths technology and a bomb desgn to Lbya. What s worth notng here s that irst, Pakstan has not sgned the Nuclear Non-Prolferaton Treaty (NPT), whch forbds the sale of nternatonal nuclear materals wthout safeguards and other techncal precautons. Ths made the sale at least quas-legal from the Pakstan pont of vew (Lbya has sgned the NPT). Second, when Khan descrbed hs actvtes, he noted that “the Western world never talked about ther own hectc and persstent efforts to sell everythng to us . . . they lterally begged us to buy ther equpment.”14 Determnng thresholds of dstncton—boundares—between the legal and llegal wll always come, n other words, by appeal ether to powerful state nterests or nternatonal socal mores rather than by an ablty to “know” n some objectve fashon where the dvdng lne between the two les.15 The contemporary socal scences are ll equpped to make sense of transnatonal lows due to ther symbotc hstory wth the modern state and ts nterests. Most socal scence s expressly and unconscously bound by state boundares, categores that are reproduced wthn nsttutonally sanctoned academc specalzatons, e.g., Brazlan poltcal scence or the socology of France. Hence, t s no surprse that the ield of knowledge that seeks to understand the world beyond the state, nternatonal relatons, nonetheless takes the state as ts foundatonal unt of analyss. By hghlghtng the mportance of movement across state boundares n understandng transnatonal lows, we are alerted to the gap between our relance on analytc categores that presuppose socal ixty and the moble practces and phenomena we are observng. For example, wth new attenton beng pad to well-establshed and socally trusted forms of transnatonal inancal exchange, the mpresson s sometmes gven that these state-bypassng modes of exchange (known as hawala n South Asa) emerged solely n order to serve the nterests of terrorsts “wth a global reach.” Ths s far from beng the case. The patterns of movement, trade, and exchange that characterze llct trafic are often long-standng, bult on ethnc and kn networks that have been n exstence for centures. For example, the dhows that ply the coasts between the Persan Gulf and Gujarat n Inda are descrbed n Portuguese chroncles of the ifteenth century. The goods they carry may have changed, but often not by much. Traders, scholars, and relgous igures from the Hadramut regon of Yemen—the orgn of Osama bn Laden’s famly—have been travelng to Southeast Asa for centures, pre-



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el datng consderably the recent spread of Wahhab deology to Indonesa.16 The contrbutons to ths volume, n dfferent ways, alert us to the lmts of “seeng lke a state”; adoptng analytc perspectves that prvlege the partcpants n nternatonal llct actvtes leads us to very dfferent accounts and understandngs of the causes, meanngs, and processes nvolved n the crmnal lfe of thngs. Puttng ths all together leads to several analytc mperatves. Frst s the need to rescale our vsons of so-called “nternatonal crme,” both spatally and temporally. Sometmes we need to scale down from the level of the naton-state (as Kyle and Sracusa do n ther chapter n ths volume), sometmes we need to scale up (see Smlle’s chapter), and sometmes we need to scale across (see the chapters by Rvera, Wong, and Smala and Amutab). In terms of temporalty, we need to see the present as a temporary saddle pont n multple hstores of efforts at regulaton and authortatve control (see the chapters by van Schendel, Gootenberg, and Rvera). Wthout these shfts n scale we are unable to comprehend ether the motvatons of those partcpatng n “llegal” actvtes or the systemc frame wthn whch “nternatonal crme” takes place. The net result of dfferences n scale and ntent, the ntertwned legal and llegal, and the dficulty of studyng the moble s to propose that many of the phenomena that fall under the label of “nternatonal crmnal actvtes” are produced by mmanent contradctons of natonal legal, economc, socal, and poltcal forces workng across nternatonal borders. In ths volume, we do not try to establsh the threshold between organzed crme and unorganzed crme, but rather argue that “nternatonal crme” has become a resdual category to mark all the practces that forces of authorty do not know how to fully comprehend, dentfy, or stop, regardless of whether or not they are really “crmnal.” We argue that “nternatonal crme” appears so rampant and dangerous because of the ways n whch authortatve speech and certan mages and analoges are deployed to create a dscourse wthn whch the ubquty and prevalence of nternatonal crme and crmnals are taken for granted. Ths s notwthstandng the many contradctons of process, scale, culture, hstory, language, and order that contrbutons to ths volume pont to. We begn by clarfyng our methodologcal assumptons and elaboratng our core concepts. A consderaton of deintonal problems assocated wth nternatonal crme shows how mportant t s to relatvze the state as “just” another form of modern poltcal authorty so as to avod usng the state’s own domnant categores for our analyss. We then turn to the problems of understandng movement n the socal scences and the mbrcaton of state



Introducton practces and nterests wth socal mmoblty. Fnally, we outlne a smple model to explore the dfferent spatal mplcatons that emerge when we overlay the bnares lct/llct and legal/llegal, partcularly as they allow us to dstngush between the redolently crmnal stes of the “borderland” and the “underworld.” Beyond Oficial Discourses

Students of llct practces need to begn by dscardng the assumpton that there s a clear lne between llctness and the laws of states. Of course, ofical rules, structures, and dscourse do post a sharp dstncton between law and crme, but t s essental to understand that ths clam s only one element n the nexus of practces brdgng the lct/llct dvde. As Josah Heyman and Alan Smart wrte n the ntroducton to an nluental book on states and llegal practces: “Open-mnded, emprcal studes of statellegalty relatons enable us to transcend the stultfyng assumpton that states always uphold the law.”17 Both law and crme emerge from hstorcal and ongong struggles over legtmacy, n the course of whch powerful groups succeed n delegtmzng and crmnalzng certan practces.18 But ther success always falls short of ether wnnng full popular consent or fully suppressng crmnalzed practces. As a result, lct and llct practces coexst n socal lfe and are together mbrcated n state processes.19 Students of llctness must start from the assumptons that states cannot smply be equated wth law and order, and that llct practces are necessarly part of any state. Ths s true of both predatory behavor and commercal actvtes. The state’s clam to a monopoly of regulated predaton and redstrbuton of proceeds (.e., taxaton and state expendture) s based on the delegtmzaton of other forms of predaton that are constructed as robbery, pracy, fraud, warlordsm, or racketeerng. But hstorcally the boundary of llctness has shfted back and forth as bandts helped make states and states made bandts: Mltary entrepreneurs operatng on both sdes of the law sgnicantly contrbuted to the formaton of states n the modern world. . . . In stuatons where a central government, mperal or otherwse, was unable to mpose a monopoly of volence over the means of coercon, there was a propensty for a class of men at arms whom I have called mltary entrepreneurs to develop. The same absence of mechansms of control that was conducve to ther appearance compelled states and socal eltes to employ mltary entrepreneurs as the legtmate securty forces. Ths created a stuaton where



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el essentally the same groups of men were both the bandts and the polce, or, n the case of prates both the buccaneers and the navy. In-law or outlaw status was determned by the nature of the relatonshp of a group to the state at any specic pont n tme.20

Contemporary examples of ths mechansm abound. Take an ant-outlaw campagn n Bangladesh whch was drected aganst armed men whom the state branded as “terrorsts” and who were protected by regonal power holders opposed to the rulng party: “Where the presence of the rulng party s thn . . . outlaws who ndcated wllngness to jon and work for the party were allowed to surrender [and were gven jobs n the state paramltary forces]. . . . The government . . . may be workng on the strategy for next electons, where these terrorsts wll have a role to play.”21 For these men, legtmacy was easy to acqure, after whch they contnued ther predatory actvtes by legal means and wth state protecton. There are, of course, many forms of state predaton—or coercve appropraton of wealth by state personnel—that do not follow legal bureaucratc procedures. Such forms are known as brbery, embezzlement, extorton, and so on, and they are often bracketed under the master term “corrupton.” Ths term s problematc because t assumes a unversally shared deinton of lctness from whch corrupt behavor devates. But on the one hand, notons of lctness are contested wthn states and, on the other hand, normatve codes of conduct that outsders may consder llct may be shared by ndvduals nsde and outsde a state system. In such stuatons there s very lttle serous censure of corrupton as long as ts fruts are deemed to have been sutably and vgorously redstrbuted accordng to the logc of patronage. Condemnaton s reserved for those ndvduals or groups (lke some mltary clques) who are seen to approprate “publc” resources purely out of greed and wth lttle regard for those who would count on beneitng from such graft.22

What goes for predatory behavor also apples to commercal actvtes n whch states are nvolved. Clearly, the two are often connected. It s not only that hstorcally “llegal networks of armed predators played a crucal role n the spread and global trumph of captalsm,” but that these networks were, and contnue to be, connected to states and markets n a varety of ways.23 As a result, state deintons of what s llct are stuatonal. States themselves often ind t hard to pnpont the exact cutoff pont between lct and llct state trade. They may agree that a transfer of goods s llct f t breaks ether natonal or nternatonal laws. But what about transfers that do not volate nternatonal embargoes but do volate nternatonal human-



Introducton taran or human rghts laws? What about trade that s authorzed by the recevng country but not by the sendng country, or vce versa? The 2001 Unted Natons Small Arms Conference was unable to resolve these questons and faled to deine llct small-arms trade unambguously. Analysts of nternatonal small-arms lows now use the dstncton between legal transfers, llct “gray-market” transfers, and llegal “black-market” transfers. Clearly, many states routnely engage n llct trade: n 2001, at least iftyfour states were lnked to shpments of small arms that were llct because they volated nternatonal small arms embargoes. One well-publczed case was when Presdent Carlos Menem of Argentna authorzed the state arms factory, Fabrcacones Mltares, to sell arms to the tune of US$100 mllon to Panama and Venezuela from 1991 through 1995. In realty, these arms went to Croata (then under a UN arms embargo) and Ecuador (then ightng a border war wth Peru n whch Argentna was a guarantor of the peace process).24 It s for these reasons that studes of the producton of llctness must look beyond dscourses that equate state organzatons wth law, order, and bureaucratc probty. Such dscourses are easly recognzed by ther vewpont that global order and development are advanced prmarly by states and by nternatonal assocatons approved by states. Outsde ths crcle, they suggest, there s only narrow self-nterest whch s destructve of wder socal nterests, and states are enttled to outlaw such actvtes. The result s good guys/bad guys magery and the language of law enforcement. Many key words are reserved for the bad guys and ther organzatons—syndcates, cartels, gangs, trads, secret socetes, maias, guerrlla outits, terrorst networks—and they all denote ther specal and separate status of beng unauthorzed, clandestne, underground. Such language constructs conceptual barrers between llct bad-guy actvtes (trafickng, smugglng) and state-authorzed good-guy actvtes (trade, mgraton) that obscure how these are often part of a sngle spectrum. We need to approach lows of goods and people as vsble manfestatons of power coniguratons that weave n and out of legalty, n and out of states, and n and out of ndvduals’ lves, as socally embedded, sometmes long-term processes of producton, exchange, consumpton, and representaton. State Effects: Borders and Social Movement

By any standard of reckonng, we can agree that these actvtes need to be better understood, jontly and severally. Understandng of the nature, pattern, scale, forms, and meanngs of llegal transnatonal actvtes re-



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el mans far from adequate. There are a varety of reasons for ths, not the least of whch s the dficulty of conductng research on ndvduals and groups who pay a premum, n cash and volence, to keep ther affars from comng to publc attenton.25 There s also the problem of compartmentalzaton, as specalsts n small arms and drugs rarely communcate, and scholars of smugglng, trafickng, and money launderng have no common forum to share ther nsghts, all preventng a comprehensve landscape of the scale of llegal actvtes from beng vsualzed.26 The assocaton of llegal actvtes wth natonal securty concerns n some cases makes a crtcal publc dscusson dficult because t touches on another shadowy world of (l)legalty and ofical secrecy: that of the world’s ntellgence communtes. In such cases, evdence may be kept classied because of the means by whch ths evdence was collected. Furthermore, some of the data produced by states, ncludng that used n legal cases, may have been obtaned by force and coercon, rasng ethcal questons for socal scence researchers. But there s a far more fundamental reason why scholarly understandng of llct transnatonal actvtes remans nadequate. Ths s a problem endemc to the socal scences, .e., the dficulty of thnkng outsde the conceptual and materal grasp of the modern state. One reason for these blnders s the hstorcally close assocaton of the socal scences wth the needs and dscourses of states. As s well known, for example, the ield of statstcs developed wth the need of modern states to enumerate, categorze, and tabulate ts resources, ncludng the peoples who lved wthn the terrtores t clamed. As Alan Desrosères puts t, “the need to know a naton n order to govern t led to the organzaton of ofical bureaus of statstcs, developed from the very dfferent languages of Englsh political arithmetic and German Statistik.”27 The map and the census, whle not hstorcally novel technques of data collecton and representaton, acqured ther current forms only when drawn nto allance wth the modern state and for ts partcular needs, especally n the colony.28 The same goes for whole ields of knowledge producton. Two ields that touch drectly on the questons we have posed here, nternatonal relatons and strategc studes, drectly acknowledge the modern state as ther raison d’être. Furthermore, nether structural realst studes of nternatonal relatons (wth ther ahstorcal and uncontextualzed approaches to nterstate relatons) nor strategc studes (preoccuped wth buldng the ntellectual edice for theores of nterstate conlct) can escape the mark of havng beng developed n the most domnant country of ther tme.29 The weght of the state on socal scence takes many forms, ncludng

0

Introducton the hstorcal, nsttutonal, and deintonal. What we are partcularly concerned wth here s the queston of movement across state borders and how movement s consdered n the socal scences. Ths as we shall see s n turn lnked to the relaton of states to terrtory, borders, and fronters,30 further complcatng ths pcture. As Davd Ludden puts t, “Modernty consgned human moblty to the dusty dark corners of archves that document the hegemonc space of natonal terrtoralsm. As a result, we magne that moblty s border crossng, as though borders came irst and moblty second.”31 In general, we would argue, movement s dficult for the socal scences to fully understand, for reasons of both evdence and concepton. The evdence queston has to do wth the comparatve weghts of the archves of the sedentary and the archves of movement.32 Where human socetes have settled and lved over long perods of tme, they create ndelble materal traces of ther presence, from buldngs and ecologcal transformatons to wrtten texts and vsual mages. These traces form the bass of hstorcal and socal scence evdence n later years. From the days of Ibn Khaldu¯n, socal scentsts have commented on the state’s urge to sedentarze moble populatons n order to tax, dscplne, and count them.33 “Combnng creatve powers and reconclng conlcts at ntersectons of moblty and terrtoralsm preoccupy eltes who produce most hstorcal records. . . . After 1000 c.e. the force of moblty steadly ncreased, along wth terrtoral conlct that provoked more moblty and made the ixng of boundares ncreasngly mperatve, pervasve and mpossble.”34 Because of ther moblty, nomadc and pastoral communtes tend to leave behnd lttle more than lght traces of ther passng. Ths relatve lack of famlar and detaled evdence of presence complcates the task of socal scentsts and hstorans. But our understandng of the contemporary relaton of ixty to moblty mght also be qute mstaken, especally for the pre-colonal perod. In Afrca, as Achlle Mbembe ponts out, “poltcal enttes were not delmted by boundares n the classcal sense of the term, but rather by an mbrcaton of multple spaces constantly joned, dsjoned, and recombned through wars, conquests, and the moblty of goods and persons. . . . It mght be sad that operatng by thrusts, detachments and scssons, precolonal terrtoralty was an tnerant terrtoralty.”35 As far as concepton s concerned, movng people are typcally categorzed n relaton to ixed socal formatons. The fact that moble people are less vsble to socal scentsts guarantees that they often appear n socal theory as obscure, leetng igures, as perpheral socal actors wth a lowly status n the world order, and as faceless outsders who it mperfectly nto neat representatons of socal realty.36 In general, moble groups are of



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el nterest prmarly as they move between the unts that count. As such, they are often taken to be devant, dangerous, and out of control. The classc example of the stgmatzed movng group well nto the present s of course the Roma, or gypses. The pont about the pressures of stayng put can be made both drectly and ndrectly. The great fascnaton n pre-modern Europe37 wth tales of ntrepd travelers and explorers who face great odds and tell of bzarre encounters renforces the pont that to travel s to mark oneself off from domnant socal mores and the relable and respectable lmts of place. By the very strangeness of ther tales, we are remnded of how rare and dangerous journeys are. To travel was, n other words, to open oneself up to great challenges and trbulatons. Only a rare few would survve them. Narratvely, dangerous journeys are made safe by ther structure; they are always bracketed by ther domestc recepton, nvokng a statc populaton watng eagerly for stores of places and people beyond the pale.38 It can further be argued that travel and exploraton narratves of the “unknown” mark the temporal moment between the securty and comfort of home and the makng of modern European empres. Ths s evdent when we consder retrospectve accounts of the archetypcal journeys of “heroes” lke Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Pzarro, Clve, Duplex, Rafles, Lvngstone, or Lews and Clark, journeys that for the most part are preigured by precsely the tall tales that renforce the symbolc and lteral dstance of the traveler from the pont of departure.39 In a more drect ven, scholars of nternatonal mgraton have long struggled wth tryng to understand why people move.40 Mgraton theorsts begn by postng two knds of movement, forced and voluntary, a dstncton that centers on the ndvdual and her degree of choce and helps us understand the prevalence of economc ratonales underlyng theores of mgraton. Under the varetes of forced mgraton, the irst dstncton made s between forced mgraton across natonal boundares, the movement of refugees, and forced mgraton wthn the terrtory of states, the movement of nternally dsplaced peoples. The dfference between the two categores reles on the assumpton of a ixed nternatonal border. Crossng nternatonal borders s materally consequental: under current nternatonal dspensaton, once deined as refugees, ndvduals and groups may acqure access to enttlements from the nternatonal communty va the ofices of the UN Hgh Commssoner For Refugees. Ths nsttuton, t mght be noted, s one of the few sgnicant carryovers from the League of Natons to the present nternatonal system, a thread that tes together the anxetes of state soveregnty over two dstnct perods.41



Introducton In notng the lack of attenton pad to the state and ts polces n mgraton theores, Arstde Zolberg crtczes socal scentsts for “focusng on the ncomng streams [of people]” and payng “lttle or no attenton to the fact that the streams were lowng through gates, and that these openngs were surrounded by hgh walls.” Zolberg goes on to add, “international mgraton s an nherently political process, whch arses from the organzaton of the world nto a congeres of mutually exclusve soveregn states, commonly referred to as the ‘Westphalan system.’”42 Zolberg’s nsght renforces the taken-for-granted qualty of the state n socal scence thnkng, even where the presence or absence of the state s the fundamental condton producng dstnct categores of movng people. By not consderng the state and ts polces drectly, mgraton scholars can ind themselves dong the work of the state, leadng to an unexamned presumpton that unregulated nternatonal mgraton s a threat to natonal securty. Snce most research on nternatonal mgraton focuses on south-to-north mgraton, t s sometmes assumed that ths s the most sgnicant form of nternatonal movement. In fact, there s greater movement of people between the countres of the South;43 for example, the number of Bangladeshs and Nepals enterng Inda annually s larger than the number of Mexcans enterng the Unted States, and the number of Yemens enterng Saud Araba s greater than the number of North Afrcans mgratng to France. Dvdng the world up nto two knds of people, those who move and those who do not, s a presumpton that seems hardly obvous. More effectve, n our vew, s to begn from the assumpton that movement s an nherent qualty of socal bodes. Movement by tself, n other words, should not be seen as a prmary marker of socal dstncton but needs to be relocated wthn an ensemble of socal practces whch are moblzed at dfferent tmes for dfferent reasons. The analytc demands of the study of motlty thus change substantally, movng away from questons of “why move” to how movement takes place and what meanng s attrbuted to movement, especally by those who are movng. Movement s never abstract. It always takes place somewhere; n the present world, t takes place on terrtory clamed by a state. Terrtoral control s ntrnscally lnked to the other normatve characterstcs of the modern state—ts clam to a monopoly of legtmate volence and ts soveregn ablty to establsh the law. The scope of the law and the boundares of legtmate volence are “contaned” by the terrtory the state lays clam to. Wthout terrtory there s no modern state; a clam to statehood must begn from the poltcal control of land. Ths foundatonal (for the state) character of terrtory makes t dficult to dstngush as a separate and hstorcally con-



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el tngent aspect of poltcal authorty. As John Agnew and Stuart Corbrdge pont out, however, there are forms of poltcal authorty that do not rely on terrtoral clams, and the present-day denticaton of the state wth a sngular pece of terrtory s of relatvely recent orgn.44 The centralty of terrtory to the dentty and stateness of a state s most vsble when there s a real or perceved loss of control over land, a factor whch explans the persstence of terrtoral dsputes even among those states that have largely eschewed volence n nterstate affars, lke Japan, and even for strategcally and economcally worthless land lke the 20,000-foot-hgh Saltoro Range/Sachen Glacer lyng on the contested border between Inda and Pakstan.45 Short of actual loss of land, the perceved loss of control over land s equally a matter of grave concern for state managers and s a percepton that usually results n strong counteracton f state capacty allows t. Loss of terrtory to another agent, however, may be relatvely unusual n the lfe of the modern state, especally n the short run. Everyday state control over terrtory s most often expressed n the form of control over the people and goods that occupy, use, and cross over that space. Specalzed and hghly mltarzed gateways—border crossngs—are created at sanctoned ponts of entry and ext from state terrtores n order to control movement. The prmary actvty of specalzed state agences of customs and mmgraton s dstngushng between the movement of permtted and dsallowed goods and dentfyng legtmate and llegtmate, temporary and permanent resdents of state terrtory. Hence, ndvduals and socal groups that systematcally contest or bypass state controls do not smply lout the letter of the law; wth repeated transgressons over tme, they brng nto queston the legtmacy of the state tself by questonng the state’s ablty to control ts own terrtory. Of course, t s practcally mpossble for states to have that degree of control over people or terrtory even n hghly regmented and technologcally sophstcated cty-states lke Sngapore. More typcal states lke Mexco or Bangladesh, from where large numbers of undocumented workers cross over nto the Unted States and Inda respectvely, are caught n a double bnd. Unable to prevent ths movement for reasons of sheer logstcs and scale, they cannot acknowledge ths condton for wth every such admsson comes a loss of stateness. Such a stuaton makes t mpossble to dsprove the allegaton that llegal mgraton from Mexco/Bangladesh to the U.S./Inda s a matter of Mexcan/Bangladesh state policy. The degree of anxety that s expressed over the undocumented and llegal movement of people and goods across state boundares s, n other



Introducton words, also an expresson of the partcular poltcal logc of modern states. Wth every advance of modern communcaton and nformaton technologes, t becomes clearer that the modern state s ll equpped to ill the role that poltcal theory has thrust upon t. These anxetes can only ncrease wth tme. In the meantme, conventonal socal scence, whch has nternalzed the mores and norms of the modern state, and the state tself look upon movng people and commodtes wth consderable dstrust and suspcon, addng to the dficulty of dstngushng between laws that have been volated n the course of socal movement and the systematc replacement of one form of poltcal authorty wth another. Commodity Chains and Regulatory Spaces

At ther most general, “transnatonal crmnal actvtes” are forms of social practice that ntersect two or more regulatory spaces and volate at least one normatve or legal rule. Rules are deined drectly n relaton to partcular practces, usually some combnaton of the consumpton, producton, exchange, or dstrbuton of commodtes. Commodtes have lfe cycles and are subject to varous socal, economc, and technologcal condtons under captalsm. The lfe cycle of the commodty may be deined through a set of lnked actvtes captured by the mage of the commodty chan.46 The tradtonal commodty chan approach does not, however, consder consumpton, a vtal omsson n the case of the transnatonal llct. Whle n general the movement of any captalst commodty contnues untl the moment of exhauston, n the case of llct goods, movement/consumpton mght also mean crossng over a key regulatory threshold. The vector of consumpton, the passage of commodtes from one agent to another, s also often an act of transformation as well as an act of exchange. Illct-lct transformatons mght nclude legalzaton, as n the converson of llegal drugs nto cash through money launderng, as well as settng nto moton new chans of llegalty, as n the use of proceeds from one llegal substance, e.g., stolen damonds, to purchase another, small arms, whch mght be used n conlct zones bypassng nternatonal embargoes. In other words, consumpton cannot be separated from exchange and transformaton, and movement s an nherent qualty of commodty chans. Each transformaton brngs wth t new meanngs, whch mght convert the llegal good nto somethng qute legal, or vce versa, dependng on the regulatory space t occupes or passes through. Producton, movement, and consumpton are bounded by or take place wthn regulatory spaces. Regulatory spaces or regmes, zones wthn whch



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el partcular sets of norms or rules are domnant, may be ether generated by states or otherwse socally produced. Regulatory regmes organze routnes, make and enforce rules, enable or constran access to resources, set and mantan borders, dentfy and exclude actors. Regulaton affects short-term movement through the mposton of taxes, quotas, lcenses, qualty controls, and labor rules. Long-term movement s hndered by blockades and other restrctve condtons and s aded by the provson of nfrastructure and subsdes. Regulatory spaces are always contested and are bounded by varable thresholds of trust and volence. For the last two centures at least, the most domnant form of regulaton has been the modern state.47 The routne practces of producton, exchange, consumpton and dstrbuton of objects across regulatory spaces are well demonstrated by a bref example of the lfe cycle of an “llegal” commodty. In partcular, we seek to hghlght how llegalty s a form of meanng that s produced as an outcome of the effect of a crmnalzed object movng between poltcal, cultural, socal, and economc spaces. Illegalty becomes a feature of ths movement and hence a product of unstable and contngent poltcal, moral, bomedcal, or other prohbtory regmes. In other words, the irst casualty of approachng the crmnal object from the ground up s the ixty and sngularty of “crme” tself. Qat (kat) s a plant from northeast Afrca whose leaves are consumed for ther qualtes of keepng users awake and actve, as medcne, n relgous ceremones, and for relaxaton and mental stmulaton.48 Lee Cassnell shows how qat les at the ntersecton of a complex nterplay of socal, medcnal, cultural, hstorc, transnatonal, and prohbtory economes, creatng a commodty that far exceeds any smple classicaton as llegal or legal, that crosses natonal boundares at wll, and s constantly the focus of moral and prohbtory regmes. Users cross socal boundares and nclude workers, farmers, relgous students and judges, long-dstance truck drvers, anmal hunters, nght watchmen, clan elders, courers, and women. “In 1978, t was estmated that $300 mllon worth of qat was consumed annually wthn Yemen.” Followng the movement of qat takes us across natonal and transnatonal crcuts of exchange and n and out of legal and llegal economes. Qat s trucked, lown, shpped, and carred from hghland Kenya and Ethopa usng regularly scheduled lghts of natonal arlnes, ferres, and land rovers to Somala and Yemen where t s traded for cash, watches, tape recorders, transstors, and women’s clothes. Startng n the 1920s, efforts were made to prohbt the use of the plant because of ts apparent assocaton wth poltcally subversve actvtes, especally ts use by ant-colonal Islamc teachers and consumpton durng publc



Introducton gatherngs where Somal poetry was rected. The Brtsh colonal regme tred to reduce consumpton by rasng prces and reducng supply. Yet by the 1940s, chewng qat “had come to symbolze refusal to accept colonal authorty” and the Brtsh were stll tryng to prevent ts use, now targetng mltary personnel n Kenya. Forty years later, Somala also banned the cultvaton, trade, and consumpton of qat, but now for radcally dfferent reasons. Now qat chewng was seen as an ndvdualzed hobby and form of entertanment, and t led to gvng “prorty to personal nterest rather than the general publc nterest.” Ths post-colonal ban, for practcally the opposte reasons nvoked by the Brtsh, also passed wthout much success. Cassnell concludes, “Qat has always hovered on that ndstnct boundary between legalty and llegalty, and ts ofical status at any one moment s the product more of poltcal and economc consderatons than of strctly medcnal and publc health consderatons.”49 As ths example suggests, what passes under the name of crmnal actvty s always both more and less than “mere” crme. What determnes legalty and llegalty at dfferent ponts of the commodty chan s the partcular regulatory scale the object inds tself n. Another way of sayng ths s to recognze the mportance of dentfyng the origin of regulatory authority. Based on ths crteron, we ind t useful to dstngush between poltcal (legal and llegal) and socal (lct and llct) orgns of regulatory authorty. Illegal and Illicit

In the absence of a legtmate and soveregn legal authorty at the global level, the law almost always refers to the natonal, domestc sphere. Indeed, as R. B. J. Walker ponts out, ths can be turned around such that the presence of the law becomes one way of dstngushng the domestc from the “not-domestc” or outsde.50 Internatonal law does exst, of course, but ts scope s lmted to a narrow set of ssue areas, and t s especally weak n relaton to nterstate behavor. Most often the lack of enforcement power prevents nternatonal law from havng much effect. Ths stuaton s begnnng to change wth the comng nto force of the Internatonal Crmnal Court, the revval, after ifty years, of nternatonally sanctoned trbunals for crmes aganst humanty and war crmes, and the growng number of nternatonal conventons aganst trafickng narcotc drugs, the use of land mnes, and so on. The applcablty of these nternatonal treates to domestc law and behavor depends, however, on the procedure of adherence to nternatonal norms n each country. Some countres (Germany and the



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el Netherlands, for example) adhere to the doctrne of ncorporaton, accordng to whch nternatonal law s automatcally part of domestc law wthout the need for consttutonal or legal raticaton. Other countres (notably the Unted States and the Unted Kngdom) follow the doctrne of transformaton. Ths requres that nternatonal law must be expressly and specically transformed nto muncpal law by use of the approprate consttutonal machnery before t can have any effect n domestc jursprudence.51 In the last nstance, however, powerful countres can decde not to respond to adverse judgments of nternatonal law wth lttle fear of sancton, as n the case of the 1986 Internatonal Court of Justce (ICJ) judgment aganst the mnng of Ncaraguan harbors by the Unted States or the studed nternatonal slence to the landmark 1996 ICJ rulng on the condtons applyng to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the global scale, n other words, because of nconsstent deintons of crme across dfferent jursdctons and the absence of a soveregn nternatonal authorty, t may not always be possble to attrbute a sngle category of “legal” or “llegal” to practces and lows that cross natonal boundares. When we shft our nomenclature to the dstncton between “lct” and “llct,” we refer less to the letter of the law than to socal perceptons of actvtes deined as crmnal. To take the example of drugs agan, there s a growng agreement that the moderate consumpton of some narcotc drugs, marjuana n partcular, s no more dangerous than the moderate consumpton of lquor and cgarettes, whch are legal; moreover, the prvate consumpton of marjuana s extremely wdespread around the world. States have responded to ths common-sense percepton by gnorng the consumpton and sale of small quanttes of marjuana, by decrmnalzng possesson, and n a few rare cases—notably the Netherlands—by makng marjuana practcally a legal commodty, even taxng t. Here s a practce that, though llegal n a formal sense, s not consdered llct by the populaton or ndeed by the law enforcement communty. Decrmnalzng such practces nvolves lngustc nnovaton. For example, n Dutch the specal nomenclature for llegal substances s gradually and conscously beng abandoned. Terms equvalent to “narcotcs,” “hallucnogens,” “drugs,” or “stmulants” are replaced by the blanket term genotmiddelen (pleasure goods), whch refers to any pleasure-nducng substance—tea, beer, tobacco, qat, heron, glue, crack, ya-ba, coffee, or ecstasy—wthout specfyng whether ts consumpton s (l)lct or (l)legal.52 The socal value of llegal anmal products for ther cultural or medcnal qualtes (e.g., rhnoceros horn as materal for knfe handles used n comng-of-age ceremones n Yemen or the use of rhno horn, blood, pens,



Introducton and skn n East Asan medcne) offer other examples of the practcal dstncton between the llegal and the llct. The demand for these products, although they are banned under the Conventon on Internatonal Trade n Endangered Speces of Wld Fauna and Flora (CITES) snce 1977, has led to the wdespread poachng and destructon of rhno herds n Asa and Afrca that contnues to ths day. Here the dstncton between the llegal and the llct revolves around opposed cultural meanngs attrbuted to the tem n queston. Whle kllng the dwndlng number of wld rhnos for ther horn, skn, and organs mght seem reprehensble to Afrcan mores, clearly a dfferent standard of value s appled n Yemen and East Asa. Wthout a unversally held norm of socal value, no equvalence or translaton can be found between these two conceptons of approprate practce. For these reasons, rather than hew to the mpossble dstncton between the nternatonal legal and llegal, we prefer to use (l)lct parenthetcally, notng the dficulty of attrbutng unversally accepted meanng to crmes across borders. Clearly, the mere presence of the law does not by tself produce ts effect. The law, lke any ntersocal category, s relatonal, culturally nlected, and acts asymmetrcally along the contours of power and socal mores. Legal restrctons often come up aganst socally sanctoned practces, and whle ths may have the effect of drvng these practces nto the sphere of formal crmnalty, t does not elmnate them nor does t necessarly force them nto hdng. Lkewse, the absence of the law does not mply that all s permssble. Prevalng socal mores can work n the opposte drecton as well, to sancton practces that are not legally prevented and ndeed to cause the law to be adjusted n order to relect domnant socal values. We are nterested n dentfyng the poltcal spaces emergent from the nteracton of formal poltcal authorty and non-formal socal authorty. For heurstc convenence these may be dsplayed on a 2x2 matrx, leadng to the followng categores (see Table I.1). The table can be read as follows. When the lct/legal cell (A) s contrasted aganst the llegal/llct cell (D), we see two dealzed forms of socal ds/order n opposton to each other. The irst (A) s characterzed by perfect symmetry between socal rules, norms, and mores and by the publc legal expresson of these belefs and values. Its counterpont s (D), a space where nothng s legal or lct, a zone of complete anarchy and self-rule. One could perhaps see these as the dametrcally opposed poltcal spaces descrbed n the work of socal contract theorsts. Hobbes and others would argue that human socetes seek to move from cell D to cell A through popular support gven to a state. Yet no matter how much we may all want to lve n cell A and stay away from cell



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el Table I.1. Spaces of Competing Authorities Legal

Illegal

Licit

(A) Ideal State

(B) Underworld/Borderland

Illicit

(C) Crony Captalsm/ Faled State

(D) Anarchy

D, these two cells represent the least nterestng analytc categores due to ther wholly abstract and unrealstc character. The more nterestng and complex categores emerge from the cells descrbng the meetng of the lct and the llegal (B) and the llct and the legal (C). Both of these cells descrbe the (l)lct wrt large as we have descrbed t above; however, the effects and meanng of llct vares consderably, as we wll see. The spatal product of the nteracton of these categores s drawn out when one of the forces s clearly domnant over the other n each cell. Illicit and Legal Spaces: Crony Capitalism and Failed States

When the power of publc law s used to create spaces where llct actvtes are welcomed (C), we descrbe the money launderng havens of the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Jersey (n the Channel Islands), and other smlar stes. The same characterstc descrbes the prncple of the “lag of convenence,” where Lbera and Panama n partcular generate consderable revenues by allowng owners of seagong vessels to legally regster ther shps under ther marne lag wth a guarantee of mnmal regulaton. When the sland of Nauru n the Pacic s used to house Afghan refugees, or when the U.S. base n Guantanamo, Cuba, s used to jal “enemy combatants,” the letter of the law may not be volated, but these are examples of a stuaton deeply repugnant to socal mores. Ths space can also descrbe the stuaton characterstc of U.S. captalsm n the late twenteth and early twenty-irst centures. Ths development n the U.S. s n turn the latest manfestaton of what was called “crony captalsm” durng Southeast Asa’s short-lved mracle years. What made the recent Worldcom, Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Martha Stewart/ ImClone scandals more newsworthy than everyday behavor on Wall Street and Captol Hll was undoubtedly that laws had been broken, publcs had

0

Introducton been defrauded, and regulators bamboozled. However, when we consder the frequency of examples of corporate behavor only margnally less shady but legal, t may not be napproprate to speak, as Vjay Prashad does, of the emergence of the “Enron Stage of Captalsm.”53 To make the pont of how normalzed s the relatonshp between the state and captal, Prashad quotes Frederck Palmer of Peabody Energy, a member of U.S. vce presdent Cheney’s energy task force, argung that no laws were broken n the development of an energy polcy that favors energy producers: “We’re all on the supply sde—the electrc utltes, the coal companes—and the energy plan s bascally a supply sde plan . . . but that’s not the result of backroom deals or lobbyng . . . people runnng the Unted States government now are from the energy ndustry, and they understand t, and beleve n ncreasng the energy supply . . . contrbuton money has nothng to do wth t.”54 Whle money may not have “nothng to do wth t,” the larger pont s that no laws have been broken n ths close allance between one sector of the economy and the government, ensurng the proits of the former. Publc outrage at ths capture of the state by sectors of captal best expresses the dfference between the socally llct and the formally legal. Ths process of prvatzng the beneits of socal assets s descrbed by economsts as rent-seekng and s bracketed wth corrupton when performed on a small scale. However, when the llct domnates the legal thoroughly, and the power of the law and enforcement agences s nadequate to prevent or contan llct actvtes, we get a stuaton (n cell C) that s descrbed by Vadm Volkov. “Under the condtons n Russa n the md-1990s, where the boundares between publc and prvate volence became blurred, when the de facto capacty to enforce and thereby deine justce ganed prorty over wrtten laws, where protecton and taxaton were ncreasngly prvatzed, the very exstence of the ‘state’ as a unied entty and of the publc doman tself was called nto queston.”55 The dea of the faled state s a subject of ongong publc polcy concern these days, wth Serra Leone usually standng n as a prme example of the phenomenon. As ths dea developed from a purely abstract category representng the aberrant and rare nablty of a state to meet ts securty and welfare goals nto a descrptve category of the present, the use of ths term became closely related to arguments for the wthdrawal of the recognton of natonal soveregnty by the nternatonal communty. In other words, the declaraton of a “faled state” has become a pre-condton for nterventon by the nternatonal communty or by states that are most affected by the breakdown of securty.56



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el Licit and Illegal Spaces: Underworlds and Borderlands

Of partcular nterest for us are the tensons emergent from the nterplay of the llegal and the lct (cell B). Identfyng the product of the llegal and the lct n spatal terms gves us two llct spaces that occupy dstnct f unstable denttes: the underground and the borderland. Poltcally vbrant examples of when the state’s deinton of llegal domnates a communty’s dea of the socally lct nclude the ongong and multple contestatons over the use of relgous symbols n publc schools n France, e.g., yarmulkes, headscarves, and large crosses, the producton and consumpton of pornography, and, n earler tmes, the crculaton of samizdat lterature n Sovet Russa.57 Under these condtons, we suggest that a “thrd space”58 becomes the ste for actvtes that can only be called (l)lct: legally banned but socally sanctoned and protected. These thrd spaces mght certanly nclude the home but also nhabt a varety of sem-prvate settngs lke socal clubs, vdeo parlors, coffee houses, bath houses, brothels, gamblng dens, and, n the present, vrtual spaces such as Internet chat rooms and emal lsts. Igor Kopytoff suggests that these are stes where commodtzaton precedes captalsm, places “n whch the consumer, n order to purchase goods and servces, must irst purchase access to the transacton.”59 One may see these spaces but not know how to enter them. Hence, prvleged nformaton becomes a prmary dstrbutonal resource to access ths space, nformaton that mght be coded n ethnc, poltcal, relgous, or class terms, producng what s often termed the “underground,” sometmes but not necessarly domnated by “crmnal” elements.60 Where the socally lct domnates the formally llegal, as for nstance n the wdespread avalablty of Indan-made ilm DVDs, vdeo, and musc tapes n Pakstan shops, the publc spheres of commerce and meda themselves become the ste for a vsble loutng of the letter of the law. But the everyday vsblty of places wth names lke Chor (theves) or Kala (black) Bazaar must be dstngushed from overt poltcal statements such as the dsplay of a Basque lag n Span or nformal forms of dssent such as poltcal grafit. Partcpaton n these llegal spheres s low-rsk and wdespread but nvolves a necessary act of volton. Whle the very vsblty and routne character of llegal actvtes lends an ar of normalcy to partcpaton n them, they are never completely free of state presence and acton. As a result, durng moments of heghtened publc and cvc msson, polce drves mght lead to llegal shops and busnesses beng closed down or whole areas closed to llegal traders and actvtes. Wthn a few days, or sometmes hours, and wth the payment of a sutable ofical or unofical ine, the black markets are back n busness and lfe goes on as before. 

Introducton For the state, everyday publc volaton of the boundares of legalty becomes partcularly acute when we approach the poltcal lmts of the law or the geographc lmts of the state.61 If soveregnty must always mply space and control over t, as Henr Lefebvre argues, these lmts are especally fraught for the modern state.62 The absence of state order does not mean a state of dsorder, as statst dscourse would have us beleve. The poltcal and geographc lmts of soveregnty mply the presence of competng authortes, whether other states or non-state deologcal afilatons, and thereby consttute foundatonal crses of authorty. When geography and poltcs concde as descrbed n Erc Hobsbawm’s work on socal bandtry63 or n the varety of poltcal movements located on the borders between Inda, Bangladesh, Chna, and Myanmar, a full-ledged crss mght be sad to exst. Such spaces formed by the ntersecton of multple competng authortes are categorzed as the “borderland.” For the state, the meanngs of routne practces n the borderland are dficult to comprehend. Overtly poltcal actvtes that threaten or queston foundatonal precepts of the state need vsblty to take publc meanng, whle practces that seek to use physcal dstance as a means of escapng state control (see Smlle’s analyss of the Serra Leone damond busness, ths volume), need nvsblty to succeed. Ths ndetermnacy of vson makes the borderland only partly legble at best, producng great anxety among state eltes.64 What cannot be seen must be magned, and what can be seen mght only be the tp of the ceberg. The state’s astgmatc vew of the borderland produces a paranod ield of vew, renforcng the ongong process of securtzaton.65 The geophyscal boundares of the state brng other constrants. Neghborng states often hold dfferent vews on both the law and lctness. As a result, what s consdered lct on one sde of the border may be consdered llegal on the other sde, and ths leads to much strategc moblty of goods and people. For example, cross-border shoppng and cross-border gamblng66 are ncreasngly common as are sweatshops and brothels set up across borders to avod labor regulatons or the vce polce.67 Ths results n what Peter Andreas has called “border games,” strategc nteractons between border enforcers and unauthorzed border crossers.68 It s n such border games that contradctory deintons of (l)lctness come nto sharp focus. Deintons of what s llct are also contradctory wthn each state. Ths can be seen clearly today as many states pursue the neo-lberal dream of a borderless economy and at the same tme barrcade ther borders to keep out the specter of nternatonal organzed crme networks, terrorst organzatons, and ndvduals trafickng n llegal objects, substances, human 

it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el bengs, and deas. The contradctons between state deology and border praxs, between the border as a categorcal dvde and the border as an nteractve process, can be startlng.69 Here the state crmnalzes certan forms of moblty but clashes wth other state practces condonng or encouragng such border crossngs. An example s the Unted States’s spectacular survellance of the Mexco border, ostensbly to throttle the supply of “llegal alens,” but wthout takng effectve measures to dampen domestc demand for these mmgrants (e.g., by penalzng employers of cheap “unauthorzed” labor).70 There are contnual struggles, wthn and around the state, between poltcal nterests keen to nfuse the economy wth cheap labor and others concerned wth showng the border to be a zone of nterdcton and control. These lead to a compromse: border polcng takes on features of a “rtualzed spectator sport,”71 demonstratng to a natonal audence the effectveness of supply-sde controls that are actually neffectual. Never n hstory has there been a black market defeated from the supply sde. From Prohbton to prosttuton, from gamblng to recreatonal drugs, the story s the same. Supply-sde controls act, much lke prce supports n agrculture, to encourage producton and ncrease proits. At best a few ntermedares get knocked out of busness. But as long as demand perssts, the market s served more or less as before. In the meantme, falure to “wn the war” becomes a pretext for ncreasng polce budgets, expandng law enforcement powers, and pourng more money nto the voracous maw of the prson-ndustral complex.72

Not surprsngly, concepts of llctness are lud, also throwng up contradctons over tme. In borderland studes, ths s sometmes analyzed n terms of a successon of regulatory practces, employed to ntate and control moblty and nterconnectons, n whch states are mportant actors but non-state actors are also actve partcpants and beneicares. Andrew Walker’s exploraton of successve regulatory regmes n the Thaland-Laos borderland snce the early nneteenth century shows that the state has never been able to monopolze regulatory practce and that the lctness of socal and commodty movement s contnually beng renegotated. Such hstorcal awareness s very mportant n order to counter some contemporary clams. For example, n the case of Laos, a short perod of restrcted border trade (leadng to ncreased “crmnalty”) n the 1970s and 1980s has become to many “a powerful and tmeless motf of longstandng Lao solaton.” By contrast, Walker descrbes ths bref perod of crmnalzaton of cross-border movement as “somethng of an anomaly n Lao hstory.” In fact, he argues, the decrmnalzaton of cross-border connectons that followed the adopton of the Upper-Mekong Economc Quadrangle n the



Introducton 1990s was less a break wth the past than a re-establshment of older practces of lct cross-border moblty.73 Persons nvolved n movng objects, people, and practces across state borders may or may not share the state’s categorzaton of ther actvtes as crmnal. If they consder ther actvtes lct, they present us wth yet another contradcton n deinng (l)lctness. Borderland studes have shown how mportant t s to juxtapose state and non-state notons of (l)lctness f we are to understand how cross-border lnkages are mantaned, manpulated, and developed. Those who appear n ofical parlance as smugglers, crmnals, trafickers, maios, or llegal alens may hold radcally dfferent vews of themselves. Ths was the case wth Buddhst monks from southern Bangladesh who, on ther way back from a vst to dscples n Burma, were arrested by Bangladesh border guards. The guards coniscated the bronze Buddha statues and Burmese money the monks were carryng. The monks protested that these were donatons from ther followers n Burma, but the local magstrate rejected ther clam to lctness and jaled them for smugglng.74 In other words, border games are predcated not merely on strategc nteractons between border enforcers and border crossers but also on genunely dfferent understandngs of lctness. What state oficals vew as llegal and therefore crmnal behavor may be consdered well wthn the bounds of the acceptable by those who dsplay ths behavor and by the communtes to whch they belong. We have tred to suggest that the borderland s a ste of extreme anxety for the modern state. The state’s partally obscured vew of borderland actvtes, the gap between people’s understandngs of what they are dong versus the state’s, nconsstent notons of llegalty, and the presence of other legaltes across the border, all make, for the state, the borderland an area where by deinton crmnalty s rfe and soveregnty under constant threat. Overview of the Volume

By pontng to the close relaton between the nterests of the modern state and the concepts used to understand socal condtons, we seek to hghlght the gaps and errors n our understandng of what s called “global crme” or “nternatonal crmnal networks.” In partcular, ths ntroducton has argued for (a) the need to rescale the frames wthn whch we stuate the events and processes we are studyng, and (b) a heghtened awareness of the lmts of the concepts, language, and dscourse used to “explan” transnatonal llegal lows. The mportance of droppng below the level of the naton-state s partc-



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el ularly evdent n Davd Kyle and Chrstna Sracusa’s analyss of Ecuadoran mgrants to Span. Kyle and Sracusa approach (l)lctness from the perspectve of people commttng a textbook case of a “vctmless crme”: labor mgraton. They ask why hundreds of thousands of otherwse non-crmnals each year wllngly choose to break mmgraton laws by contractng ntermedares—and whether they vew ther actons as crmnal. Focusng on mddle-class Ecuadorans seekng work n Span, they show that these nternatonal mgrants are well aware they break the law but that they reject the dea that ths makes ther venture llegal or llct. Ther argument s twofold. Frst, they have been let down by the Ecuadoran state elte, whch they descrbe as a powerful maia runnng a predatory state and squanderng the enttlements of ordnary Ecuadorans. They feel abandoned by ther country. They also pont to the hstorcal responsblty of Span as the colonzer of Latn Amerca. Centures of explotaton enttle Latn Amercans to forms of compensaton, and gettng work n Span can be one such form. The Spansh state’s refusal to countenance labor mmgraton s seen as hypocrsy: “when Columbus arrved n Amerca no one asked hm for papers”; moreover, “they conquered and raped us and nothng happened; today we conquer them and they get mad.” Ths dscourse of natonal and post-colonal ctzenshp s strengthened by a smultaneous dscourse of justce stressng economc rghts and sacrice. Unauthorzed mgrants from Ecuador argue that, as world ctzens, they have a rght to subsstence, and f they cannot ind t at home, they must go abroad. Far from beng crmnals, they are makng mportant sacrices. By emgratng, they place themselves n a vulnerable poston and lve “borrowed lves,” but they are able to send money back home to help ther relatves get by. Ther remttances also are a sacrice to Ecuador, because that state s deeply dependent on ths source of ncome, and to Span, because t s dependent on ther labor. Fnally, mgrants sacrice ther own happness to the mproved lfe chances of ther chldren. The mportance of Kyle and Sracusa’s contrbuton s that they reveal a crucal slence n legal and poltcal scholars’ debates about what s at stake when states attempt to control human moblty. State dscourses of lctness are challenged by multple coherent dscourses of justce wthn sendng and destnaton countres. Understandng these competng ways of moral reasonng s essental. As the example of Ecuadoran mgraton shows, “llegal” labor mgrants have powerful legtmzng dscourses that reject state deintons of crmnal and llct behavor. Scalng “up” s vtal to apprecate the systemc drvers and forces that are entaled n some llegal actvtes. Ian Smlle’s artcle s methodologcally as well as analytcally mportant for ts descrpton and qualicaton of the multple lows that go nto an llegal transnatonal actvty. By carefully 

Introducton analyzng the export and mport igures of dfferent Afrcan countres and Belgum, the world’s largest market for uncut damonds, Smlle s able to show irst that the igures for damonds leavng the Afrcan contnent are qute dfferent from the igures that Belgum shows enterng, a dscrepancy that ponts to the exstence of a sgnicant llegal trade n damonds. Further, he ponts out that countres wthout damond mnes show substantal exports of damonds, exports that temporally concde wth changng condtons n neghborng damond-producng countres, strongly suggestng that damonds are smuggled across porous borders to convenent havens when poltcal condtons change. The absence of a relable system of provenance allows legtmate damond busnesses to purchase llegally mned and smuggled damonds wthout beng lable for partcpaton n an llegal actvty. Or, n other words, the world damond ndustry s made up of both llegal and legal elements, whch coexst and are qute compatble wth each other. A moment of sudden change comes when two Northern NGOs produce detaled reports showng how ths opaque system works, gve the llegal damonds the meda-frendly name “blood damonds,” and demonstrate that damonds mned llegally n Serra Leone are smuggled nto Lbera (whch doesn’t have damond mnes), whch openly exports them to Brussels, from whch they travel across the globe. These are “blood” damonds because the proceeds of the llegally mned damonds are used to purchase weapons and other homcdal equpment to kll cvlans. The outcry at these reports was also lnked to the grsly practces of rebels n Serra Leone, often young men and boys, who would horrbly mutlate ther vctms. Smlle’s terse analyss goes from the mcro-practces of smugglng and purchase of sngle damonds to the global scale of the South Afrcan company De Beers, whch sought to combne a global monopsony of purchase wth a monopoly on sales of uncut damonds. The efforts of NGOs and frendly governments led to the Kmberley Process, an ongong selfregulaton of varous actors n the world damond ndustry, seekng to establsh the authentc provenance of uncut damonds, thereby creatng separate categores of “conlct” and non-conlct damonds. “Blood damonds” mark the pont where llegalty and llctness meet, where nternatonal outcres and pressures overcome the reluctance of an ndustry that has been bult upon a regular trafic between the llct and the llegal. Borderlands le across the naton-state scale, and n the followng chapters we understand how dfferent are these spaces and the lmts of tryng to understand them from the symbolc and materal centers of power and terrtory. Slva Rvera Cuscanqu explores the shftng deintons of lctness n the case of the trade and consumpton of coca leaves. In the Andes regon, coca consumpton s an old cultural practce. Despte worldwde 

it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el prohbton, ths regonal practce has been recognzed as legal n varous natonal laws and nternatonal conventons. But ths has nvolved a msleadng constructon of coca as lnked to subsstence, recprocty, rtual, and tradton. Rvera shows how coca leaf has long been an mportant mercantle commodty whose producton and crculaton has contrbuted to the refashonng of socal herarches, labor relatons, and cultural connectons n the Andean world. These transformatons worked out dfferently over tme and space, leadng to remarkable varatons n how coca was and s used and perceved. By lookng at coca and ts changng (l)lctness, a complex hstory of subaltern agency and recolonzaton can be reconstructed. Rvera brngs these complextes to lfe n a rch “road ethnography.” Crossng the nternatonal border between Bolva and Argentna, she encounters contrastng natonal systems of dealng wth coca, perceved lnks between coca, race and class, cross-border contnutes, and negotatons over what consttutes (l)lct trade and who deines t. One remarkable indng s the emergence of coca leaf consumpton n new socal contexts. In Northern Argentna a modern, ndvdualstc, and hghly vsble style of coca consumpton had emerged among the professonal mddle class. Kenneth Smala and Maurce Amutab further develop the ways n whch the lct and the legal crosscut n an Afrcan borderland, the Ilem Trangle, lyng across Kenya, Ethopa, Uganda, and Sudan. They show how, n ths ecologcally fragle regon, local systems of regulaton based on pastoralsm broke down under the mpact of mperal border makng, msdrected state development polces, and the emergence of mltary entrepreneurs. As large numbers of sophstcated small arms began to crculate n the regon, cattle radng, once a lct practce of socally controlled volence, became totally transformed. In the hands of cross-border groups of young combatants rangng from guerrlla ighters to poachers, these arms have upset the age-determned systems of regulaton n whch elders had domnated. Wth state forces almost completely neffectual, the people of the Ilem Trangle now reject state clams to ther allegance. Confronted wth anomc volence, economc hardshp, and dsplacement, they clng to cross-border cultural tes. The breakdown of the naton-state’s legal authorty s far advanced n ths borderland where a bus passenger can offer a smuggled bullet as an acceptable fare. Wllem van Schendel’s essay can be read as a substantal extenson of the ntroducton, wth specal attenton to developng the dscusson of the borderland as a unque socal space. In a wde-rangng comment on the current stuaton of border/state studes and ts ntersecton wth llegal lows, he argues that the present concern wth the presumed deterrtoralzaton



Introducton of the state fals to fully comprehend the ntersectons and codependency of border practces wth the state’s poltcal economy and natonal securty. He begns wth a crtque of the fetsh of arrows—a vsual devce that obscures more than t reveals—the threatenng arrow gves the mpresson of grave dangers facng the heartland and helps produce the dscourse of threat-from-abroad that has become a part of current understandngs of globalzaton. By drawng attenton to the metaphor of the low, he shows how nvsble lud sgns become crucal to the renforcement of symbolc and materal bulwarks aganst the outsde, n partcular the ixed and vsble border. Ths dscusson leads nto analyss of the borderland, a space that s nether heartland nor perphery, a zone where llegal lows are naturalzed and ntersect wth the lct, where the mechansm of movement s most vsble. By focusng on the denzens of borderlands, van Schendel argues, t s possble to understand how borders produce new “poltcs of scale.” He argues that three knds of scales are most relevant: “scales we almost lost” or pre-border webs of relatons, the state scale, whch s most often beng renegotated or contested, and inally, border-nduced scales, “cross-border webs of nluence that sprng up because of the border’s exstence.” Borderland studes, he concludes, offer a way of understandng the complementary and mutual consttuton of transnatonal lows, terrtoral states, and transborder arrangements; borderlands are, he argues, a vtal and under-apprecated “pvot” between states and lows. The mportance of language and dscourse n makng “crme” s further developed n the chapters that follow. Dana Wong presents case studes of female cross-border mgrants to Malaysa n order to delate the rhetorc of human trafickng and ts current deployment n the poltcs of mgraton control. She asserts that “the rhetorcal producton of the boundares of the naton-state as stes of transgresson—through the deployment of the trafickng dscourse—rests . . . on an emprcal icton, and bears only partal resemblance to the actual contours of the economy of llctness n contemporary mass mgratons.” Wong concentrates on a range of nternatonal mgratory practces that are largely beyond the formal gaze of the state. Such practces are not only undocumented by states but also crmnalzed by them as morally and legally unacceptable. Ths s eptomzed by a dscourse of human trafickng that ganed remarkable nsttutonal support nternatonally after the fall of the Berln Wall n 1989 and famlarzed us wth mages of nnocent vctmhood and evl, shadowy trafickers. But ths “master metaphor” for prosttuton, llegal mmgraton, asylum seekng, and organzed crme s a dstorton because t gnores the agency of the mgrant. Wong shows that the vast majorty of nternatonal mgrants n the



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el undocumented, llegal economy of Malaysa are n actve control of ther own mgraton projects. Only where the nature of the work tself s llct (e.g., sex work) s the agency of the mgrant lkely to be restrcted. Reservng the term “trafickng” only for ths much smaller group, Wong shows that t was employers rather than transnatonal organzed crme groups that acted as trafickers, and that even traficked women entered Malaysa legally and only acqured ther llegal status n the country tself. These indngs qualfy easy assumptons about llegal mgraton as an mported crme of subversve border trespass by nnocent vctms coerced by organzed crme. They also underlne that what the state “does not see” belongs to the realm of the undocumented or llegal, but t s msleadng to dentfy the llegal wth the crmnal. Paul Gootenberg’s contrbuton focuses on the ntellectual dangers of uncrtcally adoptng bureaucratc dscourses on (l)lctness. He warns researchers aganst “talkng lke a state” because ths envelops us n a fog of controllng words and faulty bnary categores. Instead we need a language of analyss that goes “beyond the borders, and blnders, of authorty.” Takng drugs as hs example, he shows the mportance of constructng ths language on the bass of a hstorcal understandng of drugs as commodtes that played a vanguard role n the creaton of the modern world. In ths process, the late nneteenth century stands out as a crucal moment. It was at that tme that a new phase of deinng llctness commenced: certan tradable drugs became categorzed as legtmate commodtes and others were downgraded as llegal, dangerous parah substances. States began to devse polces and deologes that would culmnate n a global crusade aganst (certan) drugs. Gootenberg takes us on a roller-coaster tour of the consequences n terms of nterdcton of drugs across borders and the ways n whch drugs, rather than undermnng states, actually add to ther capactes. He also presents a number of nterpretatons of the U.S. War on Drugs (“now enterng ts tenth decade”)—from moral pancs through unntended consequences to conspracy and nsttutonalzed colluson—and crtczes most for acceptng the moral categorzaton of state talk. It s by revstng how these categores of (l)lctness came about, and permutated, that we can begn to free ourselves from them. Ths volume hghlghts the need for a reconsderaton of a range of actvtes and processes that are now lumped together n the amorphous and poltcally charged term “global crme.” By hstorczng the rse of varous forms of poltcal order and seeng the modern state as a sngular outcome of that process, and by dentfyng the socal scences and related knowledge

0

Introducton conceptons as an element of the state-makng project, we dentfy some of the lmtatons of conventonal thnkng on the subject of transnatonal crmnal actvty. The ntroducton and the chapters that follow pont, n a varety of ways, to the mbrcaton of legal and llegal actvtes n many everyday cross-border phenomena, showng that assumed and naturalzed dstnctons between the llegal and legal are often not sustanable n practce. Rather than seekng to mpose new crtera for dstngushng these categores, one set of chapters and the ntroducton focus nstead on unpackng “assumed and naturalzed” dstnctons, showng the extent to whch such deas uncrtcally rely upon state-derved conceptons of llegal and legal. By ntroducng the concept of socal legtmacy or lctness and settng t aganst poltcal legtmacy or legalty, we seek to remnd our readers of the poltcally derved nature of ths dstncton and ts moral-nsttutonal foundatons, helpng to denaturalze Law as the common-sense condton of domestc natonal space. We demonstrate how the spatal mplcatons of the bnary terms legal/llct and llegal/lct produce multple knds of “crmnal space,” and we draw attenton to those spaces where legal actvtes that volate socal norms loursh and where llegal but lct actvtes are commonplace. The latter arena gves us the borderland and the underground, whch are conceptualzed wthout recourse to poltcally loaded and analytcally weak crcular assumptons about the locaton of crmnals and the meanng of crme. The value of ths conceptual shft s hghlghted n the chapters that tell the story of global crme from the pont of vew of ts alleged perpetrators, showng how emprcally unstable s the dea of the global crmnal. Ths sad, t s mportant to recognze that ths project does not seek to establsh an abstract moral or other equvalence of the lawmaker and the lawbreaker nor to suggest that global crmnal actvtes do not exst or are not consequental. What we are sayng s that there s a qualtatve threshold between the actvtes of global organzed crmnal groups and the scores of everyday forms of lawbreakng that are morally, poltcally, and economcally of a wholly dfferent order, as a number of chapters show n detal. Our concern s that analysts and polcy makers are not tryng hard enough—f they recognze the dstncton at all—to apprecate the dfferences between the two levels of “crme,” and as a result, thousands of “law-abdng crmnals” are consgned to ncarceraton and worse across the globe. The relevance of these dfferences cannot be emphaszed enough durng the current phase of the “global war aganst terror,” as t s termed n the Unted States, and ts expresson n new constrants on cvl lbertes that have passed nto law n many countres durng the past few years. In



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el our vew, the urgent need to control nternatonal terror networks assocated wth Osama bn Laden has led to an unwarranted expanson of the concept of the crmnal, especally one who crosses nternatonal borders. In a number of countres, the sweepng provsons of ant-terrorsm legslaton have been used to control nsurgences, poltcal rvals, and other non-crmnal opponents who legtmately contest poltcal power. In other countres, the wde-rangng provsons of these new laws are used to bypass reasonable due process and evdentary condtons for establshng crmnal gult. State agents who try to control both nternatonal terrorsm and global crme see these phenomena as closely related and startlngly smlar n ther processes and methods. But congruence of behavor does not mply dentty of purpose. Understandng ths dstncton s essental n rethnkng some of the characterstc features of the modern system of terrtoral poltcal soveregnty, ncludng the cartographc dvson of culturally lnked communtes, the crmnalzaton of certan forms of socal movement, and the emergence of non-state-dependent forms of cross-border dentty. Ths volume seeks to make a contrbuton toward better understandng the socal, cultural, and economc processes that follow from, and nteract wth, the hstorcally partcular development of the modern state system. It explores the makng of llctness—how states, borders, and language produce transnatonal llegal and crmnal thngs, and how these n turn shape the modern state system. NOTES The authors would lke to thank the other contrbutors to the volume, an anonymous revewer, and especally John Agnew for ther comments on earler drafts of ths chapter. Veronca Raffo read t over many tmes, always mprovng t n the process. Rebecca Tolen’s comments were always nsghtful and helped make ths chapter far more legble than t was. 1. For a valuable correctve on the nature of trafickng and ts conlaton wth human smugglng, see Dana Wong, chapter 2, ths volume, and Supang Chantavanch, “Recent Research on Human Trafickng n Manland Southeast Asa,” (revew essay) Kyoto Review, Center for Southeast Asan Studes, Kyoto Unversty (October 2003). http://kyotorevew.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ssue/ssue3/artcle_282.html. 2. For a recent ilmc representaton, see Stephen Frears (dr.), Dirty Pretty Things, 2002. 3. Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 3: End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 169. 4. Jeffrey Boutwell and Mchael Klare, “A Scourge of Small Arms,” Scientiic American (June 2000): 48–53. For lower estmates around US$1 bllon, see Small Arms Survey 2001: Proiling the Problem (Geneva: Graduate Insttute of Internatonal Studes/Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 2001), 166–168; and Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost (Geneva: Graduate Insttute of Internatonal Studes/ Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 2002), 109.



Introducton 5. Such estmates typcally lack any methodologcal substantaton. Accordng to Chrstan de Bre, “The annual proits from drug trafickng (cannabs, cocane, heron) are estmated at $300–500 bllon (not to menton the rapdly mushroomng synthetc drugs), that s 8% to 10% of world trade. Computer pracy has a turnover n excess of $200 bllon, counterfet goods $100 bllon, European Communty budget fraud $10–15 bllon, anmal smugglng $20 bllon, etc. In all, and countng only actvtes wth a transnatonal dmenson, ncludng the whte slave trade, the world’s gross crmnal product totals far above $1,000 bllon a year, nearly 20% of world trade.” Chrstan de Bre, “Thck as Theves: Crme, the World’s Bggest Free Enterprse,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Aprl 2000). http://mondedplo.com/2000/04/05debre. 6. R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Unversty Press, 2002), x. 7. Karl Marx and Frederck Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Verso, [1848] 1998), 48. 8. “The Fve Wars of Globalzaton,” Foreign Policy, January–February 2003. 9. Castells, End of Millennium, 172. 10. Phl Wllams, “Transnatonal Organzed Crme and the State,” n The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. R. B. Hall and T. J. Berstecker (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 2003), 170, 165. 11. “Suspected IRA Tro Held n Colomba,” The Guardian, August 14, 2001. 12. For an excellent parallel crtque of the alleged dangers of globalzaton, focusng partcularly on the work of securty agences, see Dder Bgo, “The Mobus Rbbon of Securty(es),” n Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, ed. Mathas Albert, Davd Jacobsen, and Yosef Lapd (Mnneapols: Unversty of Mnnesota Press, 2001). 13. The term “armpt smugglers” s used on the Ghana-Togo border. Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands since 1914 (Athens: Oho Unversty Press/Oxford: James Currey/Legon, Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publshers, 2002), 257. Rvera (ths volume) refers to “ant” contraband on the Bolva-Argentna border. Cf. Small Arms Survey (2002), 135. 14. Quoted n Peter Eddn, “Dr. Khan Got What He Wanted, and He Explans How,” New York Times (Week n Revew), Feb. 15, 2004, 7. Quotes n the artcle are taken from Dr. A Q Khan Research Laboratories, 1976–2001: 25 Years of Excellence and National Service (n.p., 2001). 15. We note a close correspondence between the arguments lad out n ths volume and the research program of the group of scholars of nternatonal relatons known as the “Las Cruces” group, wth ther emphass on process tracng, relatonal analyss, and “verbng.” The trad of “borders, orders and denttes” s a remarkably productve schema through whch to thnk many of the ssues rased n ths volume. Unfortunately, we were alerted to ths mportant work too late to be able to engage drectly wth the arguments put forward by ths group, though we are conident that our approach renforces, and hopefully takes further, ther theoretcal and methodologcal crtque of nternatonal relatons. See Albert, Jacobsen, and Lapd, Identities, Borders, Orders, for a fuller statement of ther vews. 16. See Ulrke Fretag and Wllam G. Clarence-Smth, eds., Hadrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1760s–1960s (Leden: Brll, 1997). The larger pont s that we do not have a systematc and relable way of dstngushng the “medum from the message.” 17. Josah McC. Heyman and Alan Smart, “States and Illegal Practces: An Over-



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el vew,” n States and Illegal Practices, ed. Josah McC. Heyman (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999), 1–24, at 1. 18. Charles Tlly, “War Makng and State Makng as Organzed Crme,” n Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Detrch Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1985), 169–191. 19. Alan Smart, “Predatory Rule and Illegal Economc Practces,” n States and Illegal Practices, ed. Heyman, 99–128. 20. Thomas W. Gallant, “Brgandage, Pracy, Captalsm, and State-Formaton: Transnatonal Crme from a Hstorcal World-Systems Perspectve,” n States and Illegal Practices, ed. Heyman, 25–61, at 40. 21. “464 Former Outlaws to Be Recruted to Ansar Forces Today: 250 More Extremsts to Surrender at Kushta July 23,” The Independent, July 18, 1999; cf. “‘Terrorsts’ Now Have Legal Weapons and Legal Protecton,” The New Nation, July 19, 1999. 22. Patrck Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, ed., Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Curry/Bloomngton: Indana Unversty Press, 1999), 100. 23. Gallant, “Brgandage,” 25. The ways n whch prvateerng and ilibusterismo cannot be separated from the overseas hstores of Great Brtan and the Unted States respectvely drves ths pont home. 24. Small Arms Survey (2002): 110–111, 131–135, 148, 167. See also Unted Natons, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Volatons of Securty Councl Sanctons aganst UNITA, S/2000/203, March 10, 2000. 25. The problems of dong such research should not, however, be exaggerated. Although we do not have a well-developed methodology for studyng the nterfaces between the legal/llegal and the lct/llct, there are mportant new ntatves, notably the work of Carolyn Nordstrom. In a recent ethnography of war zones, Nordstrom convncngly poneers a number of ield approaches to what she deines as shadows (cross-state economc and poltcal lnkages that move outsde formally recognzed state-based channels). Carolyn Nordstrom, Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Proiteering in the Twenty-First Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Unversty of Calforna Press, 2004). 26. The journal Global Crime (formerly Transnational Organized Crime) s one of the few exceptons. 27. Emphases n orgnal. Alan Desrosères, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning, trans. Camlle Nash (Cambrdge, Mass.: Harvard Unversty Press, 1998), 16. 28. Bernard S. Cohn, “The Census, Socal Structure and Objecticaton n South Asa,” n An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (New York: Oxford Unversty Press, 1987), 224–254; Benedct Anderson, “Census, Map, Museum,” n Imagined Communities, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991). 29. Rchard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neo-realsm,” n Realism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columba Unversty Press, 1986); Bradley Klen, Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1994); Steve Smth, “The Unted States and the Dscplne of Internatonal Relatons: Hegemonc Country, Hegemonc Dscplne?” International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 2 (2002): 67–86. 30. For a dscusson of the hstorcal orgns of the dstncton between borders and fronters, see Jean Gottmann, The Signiicance of Territory (Charlottesvlle: Unversty Press of Vrgna, 1973). Thanks to John Agnew for alertng us to ths reference.



Introducton 31. Davd Ludden, “Presdental Address: Maps n the Mnd and the Moblty of Asa,” Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 4 (November 2003): 1062. 32. Davd Ludden, “Hstory Outsde Cvlzaton and the Moblty of South Asa,” South Asia 17, no. 1 (June 1994): 1–23. 33. Ibn Khaldu¯n, The Muqaddmah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). Cf. Mchael Adas, “From Avodance to Confrontaton: Peasant Protest n Precolonal and Colonal Southeast Asa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (1981): 217–247; Cohn, “Census, Socal Structure and Objecticaton,” 224–254; Leo Lucassen, Wm Wllems, and Annemare Cottaar, Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups: A Socio-historical Approach (Houndmlls: Macmllan/New York: St. Martn’s Press, 1998). 34. Davd Ludden, “Presdental Address,” 1063. 35. Achlle Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World: Boundares, Terrtoralty, and Soveregnty n Afrca,” Public Culture 12, no. 1 (2000): 259–284. 36. Ranabr Samaddar, The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal (New Delh: Sage Publcatons, 1999). 37. Perhaps a smlar role s played by the apocalyptc narratves of Robert Kaplan today. 38. It s worth notng that these are usually stores of males and ndvduals, rarely of groups and women. Lnda McDowell, Gender, Identity and Place: Understanding Feminist Geographies (Mnneapols: Unversty of Mnnesota Press, 1999); Patrca R. Poser, “The Role of Gender, Households and Socal Networks n the Mgraton Process: A Revew and an Apprasal,” n The Handbook of International Migration, ed. Charles Hrschman, Phlp Kasntz, and Josh deWnd (New York: Russell Sage Foundaton, 1999), 53–70. 39. See also Mary Louse Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Acculturation (London: Routledge, 1992), and Alson Blunt and Gllan Rose, Writing Women and Space: Colonial and Postcolonial Geographies (London: Gulford, 1994). 40. Douglas S. Massey, “Why Does Immgraton Occur? A Theoretcal Synthess,” n Handbook of International Migration, ed. Hrschman, Kazntz, and deWnd, 34–52. 41. Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Mnneapols: Unversty of Mnnesota Press, 1999). 42. Arstde R. Zolberg, “Matters of State: Theorzng Immgraton Polcy,” n Handbook of International Migration, ed. Hrschman, Kazntz, and deWnd, 71–93, from 73 and 81. 43. Stephen Castles, “Mgraton and Communty Formaton under Condtons of Globalzaton,” International Migration Review 36, no. 4 (Wnter 2002): 1147. 44. John Agnew and Stuart Corbrdge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 86. See also Ludden, “Presdental Address.” 45. V. R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conlict without End (New Delh: Vkng/Pengun, 2002). 46. See Gary Gerefi and M. Korenewcz, ed., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), especally the artcle by Terence Hopkns and Immanuel Wallersten, “Commodty Chans: Construct and Research.” For a useful comparson of commodty chans wth a smlar concept adopted n France called the ilière approach, see Phlp Rakes, Mchael Frs Jensen, and Stefano Ponte, “Global Commodty Chan Analyss and the French Flère Approach:



it t y abrah am an d w il l em van sc h en d el Comparson and Crtque,” CDR Workng Paper 00.3, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, 2000. For an anthropologcal perspectve on “follow(ng) the commodty,” see Angelque Haugerud, M. Prsclla Stone, and Peter D. Lttle, eds., Commodities and Globalization: Anthropological Perspectives (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Lttleield, 2000). 47. See Mchel Agletta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: New Left Books, 1979). For the development of regulatory spaces, see also Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the State in Its Place (Unversty Park: Pennsylvana State Unversty Press Press, 1991), Mchael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), and Anthony Gddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1987) 48. Based on the dscusson n Lee V. Cassnell, “Qat: Changes n the Producton and Consumpton of a Quas-Legal Commodty n Northeast Afrca,” n The Social Life of Things, ed. Arjun Appadura (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1986), 236–257. 49. Cassnell, “Qat,” 243, 253, 254. 50. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1993). 51. The Internatonal Court of Justce argues the “fundamental prncple” that nternatonal law prevals over domestc law and notes that the nablty to act under domestc law s no defense aganst non-complance wth nternatonal oblgatons (Artcle 27 of the Venna Conventon on the Law of Treates, 1969). In effect, however, ths ndexes a poltcal, not a legal struggle, as the ICJ has no ablty to enforce these prncples. Most countres follow the doctrne of ncorporaton for customary nternatonal law and the doctrne of transformaton for treaty-based nternatonal law. Some states hold to the dstncton between “self-executng” treates, whch operate automatcally wthn the domestc sphere, and “non-self-executng” treates, whch do not. Our thanks to Veronca Raffo for claricaton. 52. Anne Hubert comments on the presence of a related term n German (but not n French) and speaks of “plants of pleasure and socablty.” See “Introducton,” n Opiums: Les plantes du plaisir et de la convivialité en Asie, ed. Anne Hubert and Phlppe Le Faller (Pars: L’Harmattan, 2000), 7–12. See also Wolfgang Schvelbusch, Tastes of Paradise: A Social History of Spices, Stimulants and Intoxicants (New York: Vntage Books/Random House, 1992) 53. Vjay Prashad, Fat Cats and Running Dogs: The Enron Stage of Capitalism (Monroe, Mane: Common Courage Press, 2003) 54. Prashad, Fat Cats, 6. 55. Vadm Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Unversty Press, 2002), x. 56. Earler dscussons of the breakdown of state functons led to the term “quas” states. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press 1990). For the lnk between faled states and nterventon see Internatonal Commsson on Interventon and State Soveregnty, “The Responsblty to Protect,” Report of the Internatonal Commsson on Interventon and State Soveregnty (Ottawa: Canadan Foregn Mnstry, 2002). 57. Mgrant-exportng schemes, descrbed by Kyle and Sracusa n ths volume, begn wth the state’s loss of popular legtmacy, as they offer a complex and multfac-



Introducton eted answer to the queston of why so many Ecuadoran mgrants are wllng to gnore government laws and become “crmnals.” 58. Hom Bhabha, “The Commtment to Theory,” n Questions of Third Cinema, ed. Jm Pnes and Paul Wllemen (London: Brtsh Flm Insttute, 1989). 59. Igor Kopytoff, “The Cultural Bography of Thngs,” n Social Life of Things, ed. Appadura, 73. 60. Before the 1989 “Velvet” revoluton n Czechoslovaka, for example, the “underground” referred to an ntellectual, artstc, and poltcal space that was the ste of multple contestatons wth the state. Thanks to Petra Tcha for pontng ths out. Obvously ths perspectve also unsettles the normalty of the term “crmnal.” 61. Davd Newman, “Boundares, Borders and Barrers: Changng Geographc Perspectves on Terrtoral Lnes,” n Identities, Borders, Orders, ed. Albert, Jacobsen, and Lapd, 137–151. 62. “Soveregnty mples “space,” and what s more t mples a space aganst whch volence whether latent or overt s drected—a space establshed and consttuted by volence.” Henr Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Ncholson-Smth (Oxford: Blackwell, [1974] 1991), 280. 63. Erc J. Hobsbawm, Bandits, 2nd ed. (New York: New Press, 2000). 64. James Scott, Seeing Like the State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Unversty Press, 1998). 65. Mchael Dllon, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (New York: Routledge, 1996). 66. Crossng borders need not always mply movng to other countres. A number of Natve Amercan communtes n the Unted States have used the partal soveregnty of ther reservatons to set up large and lucratve gamblng enterprses. 67. Hastngs Donnan and Thomas M. Wlson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999). 68. Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Unversty Press, 2000), x. 69. Henk Dressen, “The ‘New Immgraton’ and the Transformaton of the European-Afrcan Fronter,” n Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, ed. Thomas M. Wlson and Hastngs Donnan (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1998), 96–116, at 111. 70. Joseph Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2002). 71. Andreas, Border Games, x. 72. Naylor, Wages of Crime, 11. 73. Andrew Walker, The Legend of the Golden Boat: Regulation, Trade and Traders in the Borderlands of Laos, Thailand, China and Burma (Honolulu: Unversty of Hawa‘ Press, 1999). 74. The New Nation (Dhaka), 27 January 1999.



w i l l em va n s ch en del

one Spaces of Engagement How Borderlands, Illegal Flows, and Territorial States Interlock Wllem van Schendel

A generaton ago, Erc Wolf warned hs fellow socal scentsts aganst studyng the world as f t were made up of “sococultural bllard balls, coursng on a global bllard table.”1 Today, many more scholars agree that ths s a crucal problem of how we study socetes, cultures, and economes. The hstorcal background s well known. The socal scences came nto beng as modern terrtoral states were rsng to unprecedented promnence n the world. No wonder socal scentsts stood n awe of the state: before ther eyes t brought almost all of humanty and all the earth’s surface under ts sway. A hstorcally unque system of states based on terrtoralzed power and soveregnty provded socal scentsts wth a framework wthn whch to conceptualze socetes, cultures, natons, hstores, and economes. Indeed, the terrtoral structure of the modern nterstate system came to be wdely accepted as a general model of socospatal organzaton, and most socal scentsts analyzed socal lfe as f t were beng played out n self-enclosed geographcal unts. In ther work, they took the state terrtory as a natural startng pont. In ths way we have all come to thnk n terms of French culture, the Malaysan economy, Bolvan hstory, or Canadan poltcs.



Spaces of Engagement Ths tendency toward “methodologcal terrtoralsm” s now beng challenged as never before.2 Increasngly we realze that we have allowed our socal magnaton to be stled by an “embedded statsm” and that we have fallen nto a “terrtoral trap.”3 As new forms of nternatonal connectvty present themselves and states are no longer perceved as the only protagonsts on the world scene, we realze more and more that terrtoral states do not “contan” socetes—that the noton that socetes, cultures, and economes can be studed as f they were self-enclosed unts that concde spatally wth the state’s terrtory has become untenable. Some predct the demse of states as a result of an ongong process of “globalzaton” that entals the deterrtoralzaton of economc, poltcal, and cultural relatons. Others deny ths wll happen but agree that a perod n whch poltcal and economc power was medated prmarly by the terrtoral state s comng to an end; the world s beng reterrtoralzed and reregulated, and the exceptonal concentraton of power that states have enjoyed for so long s beng “unbundled.” Whatever the outcome, we need to reconsder many of the core concepts and approaches n the socal scences: How can we overcome tendences toward methodologcal terrtoralsm? How do we study socal processes n the twenty-irst century? The sweepng magery of “globalzaton” wth ts predctons of the “end of geography” and a borderless, connected, homogeneous world does not seem to provde a ready soluton. Instead, we have to ind more modest and more dscernng ways of analyzng “processes that cross borders but are not unversal, that consttute long-dstance networks and socal ields but not on a planetary scale.”4 Illegal Flows and Borders It s aganst ths background that the study of “llegal lows”—lows of commodtes, persons, and deas that have been outlawed by one or more states—takes on partcular sgnicance. These commodtes, persons, and deas cross the borders of terrtoral states, and ther movement s dficult to study adequately by means of a terrtoralst methodology or state-centered concepts. It s often asserted that we know lttle about llegal lows because those who are nvolved n them keep them secret. Ths s no doubt true, but our gnorance also results from our lack of tools to study these lows, an absence of concepts and approaches to descrbe and analyze them. What tools do we have? A common way of dealng wth the movement of objects and people that cannot be pnned down geographcally s to use the mage of ludty: streams of mgrants, a trckle of nvestments, goods



w i l l em va n s ch en del loodng a market, a supply of labor that has dred up. The mage s partcularly appealng when dscussng the cross-border movement of objects and people prohbted by states. Here ludty becomes assocated wth danger: just as loodwater can undermne a buldng, causng t to collapse, so the uncontrolled nlow of unwanted goods or persons may subvert a state. The term “llct lows” (actually a msnomer, as we have explaned n the ntroducton5) has become very common, partcularly n relaton to the trade n small arms and drugs, as well as n relaton to the unauthorzed mgraton of labor. The metaphor of llegal/llct lows s not nnocent. It calls forth the metaphor of a barrer to hold back lows, a dam thrown up aganst the advancng water, a fence to keep the undesrables out. Ths barrer s nevtably equated wth the state’s nternatonal border, whch s seen as the prme lne of defense aganst an assault from outsde. In the dscourse on llegal lows, the border s the antonym. If lows stand for the lud, the spatally elusve, the ntrusve, the underworld, then the border symbolzes the sold, the terrtoral, the ordered, the rule of law. The border becomes pvotal n a defensve, protectonst rhetorc that demands that states “close the loodgates aganst uncontrolled waves breakng n from the outsde,” a rhetorc that s drected “just as much at arms merchants and drug trafickers who threaten nternal securty as t s aganst the ncomng loods of nformaton, foregn captal, or labor mmgraton, or the waves of refugees who supposedly destroy natve culture and standards of lvng.”6 The border stands precarously between the legtmate soveregnty of the state and a shadowy outer world of more or less organzed crme. Hence the border s always vulnerable and needs to be protected and strengthened, not only aganst mltary nvaders but ncreasngly aganst law evaders.7 In a globalzng, reterrtoralzng world that abounds wth mages of transnatonal lows, borders are far from dsappearng; they are a crucal measure of contnued state control. Contrasting Flows and Borders The dscourse on llegal lows s based on constructng multple contrasts between lows and borders. One s the contrast between visibility and invisibility. Illegal lows thrve on beng nvsble for those who are not drectly nvolved n them. The more outsders are aware of the movement of outlawed goods and persons, the greater the rsk of nterference and punshment. In the case of borders, on the other hand, vsblty s at a premum. At borders, states take great trouble to hghlght ther terrtoral

0

Spaces of Engagement soveregnty. Demarcaton by means of hghly vsble symbols such as pllars, lags, fences, and sgnboards s commonplace. A border that s not vsble for all s a border that has faled ts purpose. Another contrast s that between ixity and motion. Borders are presented as spatally rooted, sold, and durable enttes, undenable lnes nscrbed n the landscape, only to be moved very occasonally and n exceptonal crcumstances such as war or state dsntegraton. Illegal lows, on the other hand, are presented as hghly moble, caprcous, and unpredctable, mprovsng new routes as they move across space. The contrast between ixty and moton s vsualzed n the standard map of llegal lows. It shows the earth’s surface cut up nto well-known state terrtores marked by boldly drawn borders; crosscuttng these borders s an array of arrows representng objects or persons n moton. It s these arrows, rather than the borders, that are ntended to convey new nformaton.8 A thrd contrast s that between stimulus and reaction. In the dscourse on llegal lows, agency rests wth the lows. They are descrbed as permeatng borders, subvertng border controls, penetratng state terrtores, seekng markets, and indng customers. Borders, on the other hand, are presented as passve, vulnerable, and reactve. Whatever changes occur at state borders are n response to proactve, ndeed aggressve, attempts by proponents of llegal lows to volate them. These changes are defensve, geared toward restorng a level of natonal securty that s n danger of beng lost. A inal contrast s that between staging post and target. When llegal lows cross borders, t s suggested, ther am s not the border tself but the heartland beyond. The border s just an unavodable stagng post n an endeavor that ams to lnk products or laborers that have nothng to do wth the border wth consumers or employers who are equally unconnected wth the border. The dscourse on llegal lows focuses on the (ll) effects of the lows at ther ponts of destnaton but has lttle tme for possble effects at the varous stagng posts, ncludng borders; t s the head of the arrow rather than ts body that we are nvted to concentrate on. A Surfeit of Arrows The cartography of llegal lows depends heavly on the persuasve value of the arrow. The arrow s a godsend for those wshng to represent llegal lows n a threatenng manner because t s a dscursve tool that conveys the noton of moton, stmulus, and target as perhaps no other graphc code could. The arrow purports to make vsble what s essentally nvsble. It perfectly suggests the velocty of objects or persons lowng llegally, ther



w i l l em va n s ch en del

AFGHANISTAN

C H I N A PAKISTAN

BANGLADESH

THAILAND CAMBODIA

SRI LANKA MALAYSIA Initial transfers

SINGAPORE

Tranfers to insurgent groups

Fig. .. Vsualzng llct small arms lowng through the terrtory of Bangladesh. Based on Small Arms Survey 2001: Proiling the Problem (Geneva and Oxford: Graduate Insttute of Internatonal Studes/Oxford Unversty Press, 2001), p. 182. Used by permsson.

aggressve penetraton of soveregn terrtores, ther dsregard for borders, and ther reach deep nsde the natonal heartland. Maps depctng llegal cross-border lows are often attempts to persuade rather than to present nformaton accurately and even-handedly. The vsual seducton of such persuasve cartography works well: the more alarmng and threatenng the arrow, the more effectve t s—t makes polcy makers st up and pay attenton. Maps illed wth conspcuous arrows clamng to be scaled representatons of llegal lows have been used to great effect to propagate partcular ways of understandng spatal movements that lack state authorzaton.9 As tools of socal analyss, however, such maps are often equvocal. When t comes to understandng llegal lows, ther bold arrows hde more than they reveal. Usually they are quck stopgaps, hdng our lack of detaled knowledge, dramatzng and smplfyng processes that we understand at best n outlne, and forcefully pushng nterpretatons that need more careful consderaton. They tend to close the conversaton before t has begun, they suggest rather than demonstrate nsghts, and sometmes they actually pont n the wrong drecton. Clearly, arrows are hghly relevant as tools to nvestgate cartographc dscourses on the geopoltcal threat of llegal 

Spaces of Engagement

CANADA 8,000

Vancouver Seattle

4,000 Ottawa

2,000

Toronto Chicago New York

San Francisco

UNITED STATES

Washington, D.C.

Los Angeles

1,000

4,000 Phoenix

from Guam

El Paso

A TL A NTIC O C EA N

Ciudad Juarez

Miami

MEXICO

PA C IF IC O C EA N

THE BAHAMAS

2 ,0 0

0

CUBA

12,000

HAITI

Via air Via land Via sea

12,000 Approximate number of illegal migrants Arrows on the map add up to 33,000. An interagency assessment estimates that the flow in 1999 was 30,000 to 40,000

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

BELIZE GUATEMALA HONDURAS NICARAGUA COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

Fig. .. Vsualzng unauthorzed mgraton of Chnese ctzens to the Unted States. Based on The Terrorsm Research Center, Inc., http://www.terrorsm.com/ documents/pub45270/752335.gf. Used by permsson.

lows. For those nterested n explorng the actual movements of people and objects, however, maps representng llegal lows tend to suffer from a surfet of arrows, or “arrow dsease.” Arrows are especally unhelpful n the case of borders. A recourse to arrows feeds on a msconcepton: that llegal lows cross borders wthout affectng them or beng affected by them. As long as we see borders prmarly from the perspectve of the terrtoral state, as ts outer skn that needs to be protected from penetraton by unwanted alens and outlawed substances, we wll tend to fall prey to arrow dsease and the underlyng dea that borders and lows are antonyms. Borderland Societies For a long tme, the study of borders and borderlands was deeply marked by the methodologcal terrtoralsm of the socal scences. Borderlands were treated not as enttes n ther own rght, but as the margns of states, socetes, natons, economes, and cultures. The state terrtory was the m

w i l l em va n s ch en del

North America Japan FSU 100,000

Western Europe

Eastern Europe 75,000

Middle East

Latin America 100,000

South Asia 75,000

Southeast Asia 225,000

Africa 50,000

Australia

Fig. .. Arrow Dsease: a) Global trafickng n women and chldren. Based on U.S. State Department, 2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/pcw/trafickng/ mages/map.jpg. Used by permsson.

plct center of gravty, the pont of reference, and borderlands were seen n ther relatonshp to that terrtory. For ths reason, we know much more about how states dealt wth borderlands than how borderlands dealt wth states.10 Increasngly, however, border studes have emancpated themselves from ths state-centrsm, partly by elaboratng the concept of “borderland.” We may descrbe a borderland as a zone or regon wthn whch les an nternatonal border, and a borderland society as a socal and cultural system straddlng that border. The reconigured study of borderlands that s emergng takes both sdes of an nternatonal border as ts unt of analyss and thereby undermnes “lazy assumptons” that state and socety, state and naton, or state and governance are synonymous or terrtorally cotermnous.11 Borders not only jon what s dfferent but also dvde what s smlar.12



Spaces of Engagement

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Hashish Heroin Ingredients for Amphetamines

RO M AN IA

Fig. .. Arrow Dsease: b) Illct drug lows n Poland. Based on The Warsaw Voice, http://www.warsawvoce.p1/v1433/crme.html. Used by permsson.

As a result, border studes have redscovered the hstorcty of socal space. Borders are often seen as spatal ixtures, lnes n the landscape, separators of socetes—the passve and pre-gven ground on whch events take place.13 But f we thnk of spatalty as an aspect of socal relatons that s contnually beng reconigured, borders become much more sgnicant. It s here that the strategy of state terrtoralty s dramatzed and state soveregnty s paraded. It s also here that many countervalng strateges contestng state terrtoralty are clustered. The struggle between these



w i l l em va n s ch en del strateges contnually reproduces, reconstructs, or undermnes borders. In other words, there s nothng passve about borders; n borderlands, the spatalty of socal relatons s forever takng on new shapes. Ths s partcularly sgnicant now that socal scentsts see the world as undergong a major process of reterrtoralzaton. Internatonal borders are becomng crucal localtes for studyng how global restructurng affects terrtoralty. When people, goods, captal, and deas low across borders, what happens to them and to those borders? The contrbuton of borderland actors (ncludng states) to the present round of global restructurng, and the resultant reconiguratons of socal relatons n borderlands, are stll lttle understood. The rhetorc of “globalzaton” suggests prme movers beng located n centers of producton and consumpton, wth lows movng between them. But these lows do not move n thn ar and they are not dsemboded; we need to ncorporate the socal relatons of transport and dstrbuton, and ther spatalty, n analyses of global rescalng. And although borders may be localtes of mportance when t comes to producton and consumpton, they are always localtes of mportance when t comes to transport and dstrbuton—another reason to take them serously n studes of global restructurng. In short, borders must be understood as dynamc stes of transnatonal reconiguraton. It s no surprse, then, that socal scentsts nterested n terrtoralty and global restructurng are now studyng borders.14 The spatal strategy of terrtoralty—the attempt by states to clam complete authorty and control over socal lfe n a gven terrtory—produces borders and makes them crucal markers of the success and lmtatons of that strategy.15 Borders need to be constantly mantaned and socally reproduced through partcular practces and dscourses that emphasze the “other.” The very extent of nternatonal borders n today’s world s a testmony to the efforts devoted to ths by ndvdual states: a recent survey calculated that there are 226,000 klometers of land border worldwde.16 But borders are also socally reproduced by transnatonal actors. As students of globalzaton turn ther attenton from the “vrtual” world of global inancal lows to the “real” world of cross-border lnkages and nterterrtoral economes, borders emerge as core objects of globalzaton research.17 If we accept that borders and borderland socetes are contnually beng reproduced by an array of actors, ncludng transnatonal ones, t s clear that negotatons and struggles over borderng lead to dversicaton—between borderlands, between segments of borderlands, between groups of actors n borderlands, and over tme. And ths leads to a number of questons regardng llegal lows. What condtons draw certan objects and



Spaces of Engagement persons to certan (segments of) borderlands? How and to what extent do llegal lows shape and reproduce borderlands? And how do changng borderlands condton and reproduce llegal lows? Studying Flows in Borderlands Wth few exceptons, the lterature on llegal lows s not nterested n these questons, and nether s, on the whole, the lterature on borderlands. My contenton s that they should be. It has always been dficult for outsders to understand llegal lows because t s rare for nsders to make these lows vsble to outsders, to dvulge the detals of trade lows that are, after all, crmnalzed and punshed by states. The crcumstances under whch such rare confessons are made (e.g., n prson or as part of self-glorfyng memors) usually make the relablty of ths nformaton problematc.18 Socal scentsts who have been able to get access to nsders who were wllng to talk have focused largely on ether upper-level trader-strategsts or retalers, so we know much more about these players n “unauthorzed commodty chans” than about others.19 Borderlands provde a ste of research nto llegal lows that promses a range of nformaton and a number of perspectves that are often overlooked. As far as nformaton s concerned, unauthorzed lows may be much more vsble n borderlands than n other classc stes of observaton. In fact, n some borderlands t s almost mpossble not to be looded wth nformaton about unauthorzed border crossngs.20 But t s more than vsblty that borderlands have to offer; they also provde a number of perspectves that could enhance our analyss of llegal lows. To begn wth, studyng lows n borderlands allows us to explore the perspectve of the transporters of unauthorzed goods n greater detal. The exstng lterature focuses on entrepreneurs, producers, retalers, and consumers, but transporters usually reman n the shadows. Borderlands provde smultaneous access to transporters at all levels, from chldren occasonally engaged on a daly wage, to professonal truckers and supervsng personnel who vst ther border operatons on a regular bass. Ths makes borderlands good stes for explorng the mechansms and networks that actually make t possble for objects and persons to low. In the case of human smugglng, transporters or cross-border gudes go under a host of local names: Afrcan mgrants on the Moroccan-Spansh border know them as wolves, Chnese llegal mgrants speak of snakeheads, and on the U.S.-Mexcan border they are wdely known as coyotes.21 Borderland research could reveal who are the people who ill these roles, how they are connected to wder organza-



w i l l em va n s ch en del tons, and to what extent ther roles are comparable along an entre border, or between borders. For example, accordng to popular mages, snakeheads are tghtly ncorporated nto long-dstance networks, whereas coyotes are farly ndependent entrepreneurs offerng specalzed cross-border travel servces to all comers.22 Would comparatve research bear ths out? Second, borderlands provde an excellent ste to study the intermingling and overlapping of various legal and illegal lows. Most studes of lows are object-orented: they deal wth one partcular commodty (damonds, arms, marjuana) or one partcular category of persons (traficked Ghanaan women, Chnese labor mgrants). Although menton s often made of the fact that such lows may overlap and feed off each other, such connectons have proved very hard to study. Of course, overlap may occur at any pont, e.g., the pont of consumpton—when a Dutch drug dealer armed wth a Brazlan handgun buys Lberan damonds, or when traficked sex workers from Nepal and Bangladesh meet n a brothel n Kolkata (Inda). The overlaps that occur n borderlands, however, may be unquely complex as a result of the mx of commodtes, both legal and llegal, that gravtate toward partcular border locatons, to be stored there for shorter or longer perods, and then to go across the border. The complexty of the overlap that occurs at borders s also a functon of the fact that here transnatonal lows of very dfferent sze and extent meet. Thus a woman crossng the border between Angola and Congo wth a cartload of tomatoes hdng an Israel assault rle partcpates not only n both legal and llegal trade but also n a short-dstance trade low and a long-dstance one.23 A thrd perspectve that studyng unauthorzed lows n borderlands opens up s the networking around the border that s nevtable when lows meet borders. The partculartes of ndvdual borderlands allow locatonspecic ways of combnng (llegal) goods, labor, and captal for proit, beneitng from the advantages of two terrtoral systems of regulaton and avodng ther dsadvantages. The casnos and heron reineres on the ThaBurmese border, ambulant prosttuton on the Czech-German border, the small-arms factores of the Pakstan-Afghanstan border, the maquiladora producton unts of the Mexco-U.S. border, and the electronc-goods assembly plants of the Bangladesh-Inda border are all examples of economc actvtes that can occur only n border regons, and only because some of ther nputs (captal, labor, raw materals) and some of ther markets have been deined as llegal by one of the states concerned. Fourth, borderlands provde good stes to study participant perspectives on llegal lows. What motvates borderland smugglers, and how do other borderlanders perceve them? Who becomes nvolved and who does not?



Spaces of Engagement How mportant s llegal tradng n the lves of ndvduals, n terms of the tme they nvest n t, the ncome they derve from t, the denttes they buld around t, and the meanngs they attach to t? Do they see themselves as heroes of free trade, as vctms of crcumstance, as trators to ther naton, as rebels aganst the spatal truncaton of ther world? When do they consder outlawed trade to be lct behavor, and why? The range of partcpant perceptons s lkely to be wde. An arcrew consstng of varous European natonals makng an llegal arms delvery n eastern Inda consdered themselves to be adventurous professonals whose assgnment was purely a busness deal.24 Buyers at an llegal arms market at the tr-state pont where Burma, Inda, and Bangladesh meet thought of themselves as freedom ighters, armng ther cross-border ethnc group for a struggle of terrtoral ndependence. And nhabtants of the Belgan-Dutch borderland celebrated ther hstorcal nvolvement n llegal lows by erectng a “memory ste” (lieu de mémoire) to smugglers.25 Fnally, studyng llegal lows n borderlands provdes specal nsghts nto how territoriality and transnationality are negotated n everyday practces and how people “scale” the world they lve n.27 Borderlanders, unlke “heartlanders” (and most socal theorsts), usually do not thnk of the state scale as ntermedate between the local and the global (or transnatonal). For borderlanders, the state scale s not overarchng and does not encompass the more “local” scales of communty, famly, the household, or the body. On the contrary, to them t s the state that, n many ways, represents the local and the coninng, seekng to restrct the spatalty of borderlanders’ everyday relatons. Scales that most heartlanders experence as neatly nested wthn the state scale—face-to-face relatons of producton, marketng networks, or communty denttes—are experenced very dfferently by borderlanders. In ther case, these scales are often less “local” than the state; they breach the conines of that scale, spll over ts lmts, escape ts medatng pretensons, and thereby set the scene for a specic borderland poltcs of scale.28 Inevtably, borderland practces are suspended between toeng the borderlne and transgressng t, contnually explorng and challengng the terrtoral pretensons of two states. The result s a varety of forms of everyday transnatonalty that states treat as suspect f not downrght llegal practces.29 No wonder llegal lows easly nsert themselves n a border mleu: they dovetal wth many of the daly routnes of borderlanders. For all these reasons, t makes sense to study llegal lows n borderlands. Around the world, borderland socetes are deeply nvolved n the processng of unauthorzed lows, and these nteractons are so ntense that t s far to say that borders are as much a part of lows as they are of any terrtoral state.



Fig. .. Celebratng a borderland socety’s llegal lows. Photograph by G. Norbart, collecton of Ed Ragas. Used by permsson. It s rare to see smugglers turned nto heroes for all to admre. Here we wtness such a moment. Two former smugglers and a retred border guard are jontly unvelng a monument named “The Smuggler” on the border between Belgum and the Netherlands. Before the 1960s, many nhabtants of Baarle, a small town straddlng the border, had been dependent on the llegal cross-border trade n cgarettes, butter, gasolne, salt, cattle, currency, and perfume. Some of them worked for ther own account, others were employees of organzatons operatng from European ctes or, n the case of cgarette smugglng, the Unted States. Methods of smugglng vared from carryng sacks (as depcted on the monument) to drvng armored cars through roadblocks. In Baarle, and elsewhere n the Belgan-Dutch borderland, there was a deeply rooted sense of the moral correctness of cross-border trade and outsmartng the state. Smugglers and local border guards shared a code of conduct amed at allowng a certan amount of llegal trade whle reducng the use of volence. In the 1960s, European ntegraton mnmzed prce dfferences and removed most trade restrctons between the two countres. Illegal crossborder trade was no longer proitable and ex-smugglers had to ind other means of ncome. In 1996, as the last generaton of smugglers was reachng old age, shopkeepers n Baarle decded to commsson a local sculptor to make a monument commemoratng the communty’s hstory of smugglng. They donated ths monument to the lctness of llegal lows and cross-border soldarty to “the people of Baarle.”26

Spaces of Engagement How Borderland Flows Are Organized There s a vast lterature on how people organze to make objects and persons move across space despte ths movement’s beng prohbted by other groups (.e., state personnel). Much of ths lterature hghlghts large and durable crmnal organzatons for whch dfferent terms have orgnated n dfferent parts of the world: maia, cartel, syndcate, tong, brotherhood, trad, secret socety, and so on. Some wrtngs even conjure up the phantasm of a Pax Maiosa, global control by crme syndcates.30 But there s much evdence to suggest that llegal lows are much less completely controlled by such corporatons than the lterature on “organzed transnatonal crme” would have us beleve. Recent studes focusng on small, lexble, and less durable allances, as well as on ndvduals, argue that durable crmnal corporatons are actually rare and that we need a less nsttutonal approach to understandng how llegal transnatonal lows cross borders.31 Wrtngs on how llegal lows are organzed focus mostly on ther leadershp and ther ponts of producton, wholesale packagng, dspatch, and retalng. Organzatonal studes of llegal lows rarely provde detals of how people cooperate to get goods or persons to the borderland, across the border, and on to consumers (or very often yet another borderland). And yet, the organzaton of llegal lows s known to take on partcular forms n borderlands and to adapt to local and forever changng condtons there. Models of Organization It may be useful to make a prelmnary dstncton between two models of organzaton at borders. The irst s what Adler calls the double-funnel pattern, characterzed by an abundance of people nvolved at the ponts of orgn (growng/mnng/manufacturng and packng) and dsbursement (retalng and consumpton) but by relatvely few at the delcate and dangerous pont of mportaton.32 In the borderland, such an organzaton s at ts narrowest, wth only a few operatves who pass the border quckly and furtvely. It has been suggested that ths double-funnel or hourglass pattern may be assocated n partcular wth large crmnal syndcates and wth expensve, non-bulky goods such as damonds and upmarket drugs travelng over long dstances. The arrest of Gokul Barman may be a case n pont. In August 2001, Indan border authortes were astonshed to dscover that Gokul, who lved n a small vllage near the Bangladesh border, had n hs possesson a pouch contanng 225 grams of hgh-grade uranum. The uranum, made n the Sovet Unon n 1984, had apparently been smuggled



w i l l em va n s ch en del nto Inda from Bangladesh and was thought to be on ts way to secessonst groups n Kashmr.33 The second model can be called the capillary pattern, nvolvng many people at the ponts of orgn and dsbursement as well as at the border where the organzaton may actually spread out to nclude numerous borderlanders. It s often thought that ths pattern s assocated wth a more fragmented trade organzaton, and wth cheaper, more bulky goods such as agrcultural produce or salt. For example, when the Tha mltary junta enforced an economc blockade of neghborng Laos and trade across the border rver, the Mekong, was outlawed n 1976, local traders contnued tradng, “paddlng loads of Asprn, ish sauce and sugar across the Mekong at nght to be enthusastcally and proitably receved by Lao traders or oficals . . . but ther taste for adventure was soured when several were shot dead by Tha border polce who patrolled the hgh rver-banks.”34 Border Diversiication How llegal lows navgate a borderland s not only determned by the type of organzaton or the type of object beng traded. In many cases t s the characterstcs of the borderland tself that exert a greater nluence. For example, the hardness, or mpermeablty, of a border can dffer along ts length as a result of physcal features (when a secton of the border runs through water, a desert, a mountanous area, or a cty), more or less ntensve polcng of a partcular secton (as n Operaton Gatekeeper35), local cross-border agreements (e.g., between border dstrcts or sem-autonomous border regons n neghborng countres), varyng degrees of physcal or lngustc dfference between borderlanders on ether sde, or a combnaton of these. Unauthorzed lows crossng the border at dfferent ponts must adapt ther organzatonal form to these local characterstcs, even to the pont of choosng to avod certan sectons.36 Apart from these local varatons along a border’s length, borders are also more or less of an obstacle to dfferent groups of people. Ctzens from one sde may ind t easer to cross the border than ther counterparts from the other sde. People wth partcular cultural, economc, or poltcal characterstcs may experence the border as a more formdable barrer than others. Age and gender may also play a role.37 In order to be successful, operators of llegal lows need to explot these dfferences, and ths means adaptng ther organzaton.38 In addton to these relatvely stable characterstcs, the permeablty of borders s forever changng. The power of neghborng states waxes and



Spaces of Engagement wanes, and the relatonshp between them s always n lux. At the border, changng nterstate relatons combne wth the varyng demands of crossborder labor and commodty markets, as well as wth trade and mgraton polces, to produce complex patterns to whch those nvolved n llegal lows need to be attuned. State Attempts at Regulation Ths s partcularly clear when a state decdes to escalate border survellance to dsrupt an llegal low. A well-studed example s the Unted States’s massve attempt to stop the nlux of Colomban cocane through southern Florda n the 1980s. Ths campagn, whch nvolved recrutng the U.S. mltary nto drug nterdcton and classfyng drugs as a “natonal securty threat,” had unexpected results. The Magnot Lne-style strategy n south Florda dd not sgnicantly deter drug mportatons, but t dd powerfully nluence the locaton, methods, and organzaton of drug smugglng. Its most mportant mpact was to push much of the trafic to the Southwest, makng Colomban trafickers ncreasngly relant on Mexcan smugglng networks.39

Untl then, Colomban cocane exporters and ther U.S. counterparts had favored lght arcraft to get ther product across the U.S. border. Now, the buldng of an “ar nterdcton” nfrastructure forced them out of the ar. As a drect result, Mexcan road transporters became an ntegral component of the cocane trade, and the Mexco-U.S. borderland became the huntng ground of a new type of nternatonally connected drug smuggler.40 Smlarly, the escalaton of border controls at the Mexco-U.S. border to block unauthorzed mmgraton nto the Unted States dsrupted tradtonal routes and methods of clandestne entry that had nvolved “ether self-smugglng or lmted use of a local ‘coyote’ [human smugglng entrepreneur],” makng room for the emergence of professonal smugglng agences that elbowed out smaller operators.41 Such state regulaton turns borderland socetes nto landscapes of control and fear wthout necessarly achevng ts goal of blockng llegal entry. If measures are draconan enough, they can stop cross-border lows, at least for a whle, but few states have been able or wllng to go to such lengths. Although the Mexco-U.S. border s routnely descrbed as beng under the most ntense and hgh-tech survellance n the world, t s nstructve to compare t wth, for example, the German Democratc Republc’s achevement n ths respect. After a perod of consderable permeablty



w i l l em va n s ch en del (1945–1952), t closed ts border wth the Federal Republc of Germany by means of an accumulaton of measures that were unusually effectve: Thousands of border resdents were deported and the border was protected by a ive-klometer-deep excluson zone, a ive-hundred-meter protecton strp, and a ten-meter sand-covered control strp that was constantly beng patrolled and n whch you could see every footprnt. Barbed-wre fences, towers, guard dogs, trp wres, land mnes, curfews, and checkponts completed the pcture.42 Where the state does not develop nto a true “gatekeeper state” that can enforce complete closure, llegal lows adapt to hgher levels of survellance by strengthenng ther own organzatonal and technologcal prowess n order to retan the border porosty that s beng threatened by the new state polcy.43 Often, ths means not only the emergence of more complex, better armed, and more volent organzatons—as well as ther deeper entrenchment n borderland socety on ether sde of the border—but also much more mmcry: goods and persons whose entry s not authorzed are hdden among shpments of “legal” goods for whch the border s more porous.44 Thus state attempts at regulatng llegal cross-border lows may have the effect of replacng the capllary pattern of organzaton by the double-funnel one, wth related organzatonal adaptatons well beyond the borderland. How Borderlanders Domesticate Illegal Flows Inhabtants of borderlands share wth people nvolved n llegal lows an uneasness about domnant conceptons of spatal realty. Ther lved experence makes t mpossble for them to accept as gven, and unproblematc, the contemporary organzaton of the world as deined by state eltes.45 For them, the world of states s problematc, and so s the dea that the nterests of a “natonal communty of ctzens” should take precedence over all others. They cannot restrct ther magnaton to the terrtory of a sngle state, and they see those who do so as mprsoned n a deluson. In short, they have always been acutely aware of the dstortons of what socal scentsts have begun to refer to as “embedded statsm” and the “terrtoral trap.” In ther endeavors to rethnk state-centrsm, socal scentsts could therefore do worse than take a leaf out of the borderlanders’ book. Around the globe, nhabtants of border regons have devsed practces and worldvews that take account of the state but never as an undsputed, overarchng entty. In borderlands, two projects of natonal scalar structuraton meet, complementng and strengthenng each other. The materal consequences, medated through a host of bureaucratc, mltary, logstc, and symbolc



Spaces of Engagement practces, establsh the border as an undenable physcal and poltcal realty. But the hegemony of the natonal scale s never complete because states fal as “gatekeeper states” and cannot elmnate unauthorzed cross-border practces. As a result, state eltes’ attempts to use the border as a tool of statecraft to mantan poltcal and economc nequaltes based on terrtoralty are constantly beng challenged. A vbrant borderland socety, a socal and cultural system straddlng the border, becomes the engne for qute dfferent projects of scalar structuraton. Unauthorzed cross-border trade, llegal mgraton, cross-border manufacturng systems, and regonal autonomy movements—all these can be seen as practces ntended to counter the nequaltes across space that result from state terrtoralty. How these pan out n certan localtes and at certan tmes determnes the changng geographes of a borderland. The outcome s always hghly complex, and all along the borderland competng forms of terrtoralty exst smultaneously n dvergng socal practces.46 Clearly, then, llegal lows are not external forces that, arrow-lke, ly past supne borderland socetes. On the contrary, they are actvely domestcated and ncorporated nto borderland projects of scalar structuraton. One way of understandng how llegal lows can become mbrcated n borderland socetes s by lookng at the ways borderlanders and those who are nvolved n llegal lows map ther envronment. If we want to understand how they “scale” the world, we must start from ther cogntve maps—ther organzed representatons of ther spatal envronment and ther own place n t.47 Snce these maps are rarely stored externally (n the form of a physcal map), an essental part of studyng the changng geographes of borderlands s to access cogntve “maps n mnds.”48 Everyday Transnationality Although borderlanders’ scalng practces have rarely been studed n a systematc way, there s consderable evdence to show that many borderlanders comfortably accommodate multple cogntve maps. Let me gve a few examples from the Inda-Bangladesh borderland. When an arms smuggler uses the pronoun “we” to refer not only to a group of ctzens (Indans) but also to a cross-border trade organzaton (arms smugglers) and a regonal relgous category (Muslms n West Bengal [Inda] and Bangladesh), he demonstrates a capacty to poston hmself smultaneously n a varety of scales, only one of whch s natonal. When a dozen nsurgent groups n northeast Inda n a jont statement call for a boycott



w i l l em va n s ch en del of Inda’s Independence Day, argung that “the northeast was never a part of Inda and so the queston of celebratng Independence Day does not arse,” they reject the natonal scale altogether.49 When people from both sdes of the border come together to enjoy an open-ar opera (jatragan), to pray together, or to sell ther produce n a border market, they defy the restrctons mposed by the natonal scale and nsst on a cogntve map that ncludes the world beyond the state border.50 When an old revolutonary from the Inda-Bangladesh borderland remnsces about how Zhou Enla, the Chnese mnster of foregn affars, used to fête hm n Bejng n 1970, he nvokes a transnatonal brotherhood of revolutonary socalsts.51 And when an Indan man takes three months’ leave from hs government job to accompany hs pregnant wfe to her parents’ house n Bangladesh for the brth of ther irst chld, they may lout the ctzenshp laws and vsa regulatons of both states, but they afirm the scale of borderland knshp that lnks ndvduals and famly groups across the border. In the parttoned geography of a borderland, cogntve maps wll never overlap completely because ndvduals must frame ther conceptons of spatal realty n nonconsonant ways, some acceptng the border, others not.52 Inevtably, the poltcs of scale n borderlands wll focus on the ssue of borderng. Often, state practces are gnored by borderlanders who contnue to scale ther world n ways that do not concde wth state borders. Ther scales spll over the spatal lmts set by the state’s terrtory even at perods of extreme tenson between states. Despte a long hstory of state formaton n borderlands, the state scale has rarely won the cogntve war. It certanly has establshed tself as a most mportant scale among borderlanders, but t has seldom attaned hegemony. Overt deiance s vsble n ptched battles between smugglers and border guards (a regular feature n Bangladesh), n borderland nsurrectons (e.g., n Kashmr) and n the unauthorzed cross-border movement of populatons (e.g., n the Sahel). And covert deiance s expressed n smugglng, assstance gven to llegal mmgrants, and unauthorzed transborder producton and marketng systems. The poltcs of borderland scalng certanly use the state scale—when borderlanders hde behnd the border, when ctzenshp clams are made, when natonal holdays are celebrated, when attempts are made to pull border guards nto local conlcts and so elevate these to the status of nternatonal border ncdents—but the lmts of ths scale are frequently dssonant wth borderlanders’ other, and sometmes more powerful, conceptons of spatal realty. Three types of scale appear to be especally relevant for people n borderlands. The irst type s formed by scales-we-almost-lost, pre-border webs of relatons that have weakened under the onslaught of state formaton but



Spaces of Engagement have not qute vanshed. The second s the state scale, the web of relatons that comes wth the border and s conined to the natonal terrtory. And the thrd s made up of border-induced scales, cross-border webs of relatons that sprng up because of the border’s exstence. These three types of scale orgnate at dfferent tmes and can therefore be dstngushed as pre- and post-border phenomena. Although borderlanders can readly make such dstnctons, they are rarely nterested n the hstorcty of these scales. Rather t s the varous nterlnkages between these scales that nform borderlanders’ representatons of ther spatal envronment and ther own place n t. In an ntensve practce of scalng and rescalng, they have long snce reworked these three types of webs of relatons, and the outcomes are dverse. As we have seen, borderlanders do not experence the state scale as encompassng more “local” scales or as ntermedate between the local and the global (or transnatonal); rather, t s the state that represents the local and coninng, seekng to restrct the spatalty of borderlanders’ everyday relatons. It s the persstence of hghly meanngful pre-border scales that provdes nhabtants of many borderlands wth a sense of stablty. They are actvely nvolved n mantanng cross-border famly networks, relgous communtes, marketng regons, trade routes, poltcal connectons, and webs of socablty.53 Not only are such scales not oblterated by the state, they actually form the foundaton on whch new border-nduced scales emerge. These new scales may be tolerated by the state and hence be “legal,” as n the case of authorzed cross-border commutng, schoolng, or shoppng.54 But they may also be frowned upon by the state and hence be “llegal.” Knowledge of old trade routes may le at the bass of smugglng, a border-nduced actvty par excellence. Some borderlanders may be nvolved n llegal trade networks as smugglers, llegal mgrants, trafickers of humans, or recevers of mgrants’ remttances. Other borderlanders may not be drectly nvolved n smugglng, but they are well aware of how t rescales the borderland, and ther cogntve maps also nclude the topographes of everyday transnatonalty. At any border, the poltcs of scale revolve around competng forms of terrtoralty, expressed n dvergng socal practces. In a borderland, scale redeintons and scale “jumpng” frequently alter the geometry of socal power by strengthenng some people whle dsempowerng others.55 For ths reason, the poltcal geography of a borderland s never statc. These struggles become especally vsble when the state attempts to mpose ts verson of terrtoralty and ren n more expansve transnatonal scales. Much of the deiance and volence that makes borderlands so suspect and



w i l l em va n s ch en del vulnerable n the eyes of state eltes can be read as clashes between state agents’ localzng poltcs of scale and borderlanders’ attempts to organze ther lves accordng to less terrtorally coninng scales. The outcome of these clashes s unpredctable because state agents are often drawn nto cross-border poltcs of scale, and borderlanders’ poltcs of scale can ental niltratng a porous state structure.56 For ths reason, a heavly guarded segment of the border can easly be a segment where border guards are heavly nvolved n prvate gan from cross-border trade.57 Ther unforms and other vsble trappngs of terrtoral dscplne do not necessarly match the spatalty of ther everyday relatons or how they scale ther envronment and ther place n t. If the evdence s to be beleved, the very sentnels of the state are often hghly susceptble to the lure of the borderland and become actve agents n forms of scalar structuraton that weaken state terrtoralty and strengthen llegal lows. Beyond State-Centrism We have seen that the socal scences are strugglng to free themselves from the domnance of the naton-state as an overarchng scale. “Postmodern cracks n the Great Westphalan Dam” have opened up, and we are ncreasngly aware of the lmtatons of the “terrtoralst epstemology” that has so long held sway n the socal scences.58 The nherted model of statedeined socetes, economes, and cultures looks ncreasngly contrved, and so do studes that treat states as the conceptual startng pont for ther nvestgatons. As the socal scences are movng beyond ths paradgm, whch s based on how state eltes deine the organzaton of the world, the queston s what to put n ts place. The deterrtoralzaton thess (whch propheses a borderless world of lows and an end to geography, terrtory, and dstance) s hardly convncng. It takes nsuficent account of the fact that global lows must always be premsed upon varous forms of spatal ixty and localzaton.59 It also pays too lttle heed to the poltcal backlash of global scalar restructurng and the cogntve dssonance t produces; those who feel that dsorder and nsecurty are growng around them demand that ther state grow stronger to protect them from threatenng transnatonal lows by creatng a safe terrtory behnd mpermeable borders. The relatonshps between localtes and lows are clearly changng, and forms of enforcement that nvolve the actve use of geographc space to control people are changng wth them. As state strateges of terrtoralty and governance are becomng less central and transstate enttes and regulatory



Spaces of Engagement systems are pushng ahead, we are faced wth the fact that our conventonal poltcal map of the world s frayng and becomng undone.60 The state’s concern wth controllng the movement of objects and human bengs across space s a recent development n human hstory. It s characterstc of modern states to clam the exclusve rght to authorze and regulate movement—to monopolze the legtmate means of movement61—but t s only n recent tmes that many states actually have acqured the technologcal and bureaucratc capacty to effectuate that clam. Movement across borders, now conceved of as sharply deined lnes n the landscape ndcatng the precse lmts of state soveregnty, became an mportant yardstck of a state’s soveregn power, and borders came to exert extraordnary power over how we vew the world and how we dvde human bengs nto dstnct groups. In order to prepare ourselves for a new world of post-Westphalan terrtoraltes, we need to queston our broad acceptance of the often volent border practces of states and the attendant deintons of what (and who) s legal or llegal, ncluded or excluded. The study of transborder lows, the movement of objects and people across nternatonal borders, may help us break out of our state-centered chrysals. How do varous forms of trade and mgraton negotate space? How do they relate to competng forms of terrtoralty n borderlands? How do they beat, crcumvent, and shape regulatory systems, enttes, and allances? I have argued that extra-terrtoral lows of goods and people do not stand n smple opposton to terrtoral organzatons but n a relatonshp of mutual consttuton. For example, states that challenge lows by deinng them as “llegal” create more barrcaded and volent borders as well as more sophstcated, albet outlawed, organzatons to keep lows gong. In ths way, polces of state nterventon (“nterdcton”) and survellance produce new transborder arrangements that may turn out to be a bgger challenge to state terrtoralty. The mage of states as smply reactve, respondng to the growth of clandestne transnatonal lows, s msleadng because t understates the degree to whch states actually structure, condton, produce, and enable clandestne border crossngs.62 However, the study of transborder lows tself s often state-centrc. Dscourses on unauthorzed transborder lows are usually one-sded n the followng ways. Frst, they focus attenton on what enters the state terrtory but not on what leaves t. The Bangladesh dscourse on nternatonal mgraton exemplies ths. It s vocal about unauthorzed entry (e.g., Rohngya refugees from Burma) but slent about the much larger low of Bangladesh mgrants to Inda, whose departure from the terrtory of Bangladesh s unauthorzed and about whom complants from Inda are very audble.63



w i l l em va n s ch en del Smlarly, U.S. dscourses on unauthorzed lows hghlght the lows nto U.S. terrtory (manly of drugs and mgrants) but gnore the fact that the Unted States s probably the world’s sngle largest exporter of smuggled goods as well.64 Second, these dscourses tend to gnore the fact that t s consumer demand wthn the state terrtory that fuels unauthorzed transborder lows. Thus goods and servces the local economy cannot provde, and that the state deems undesrable (or admssble only f heavly taxed), become contraband as a result of state acton. There s often a strkng gap between state pronouncements about the need to stamp out unauthorzed transborder trade and state polces to stop t. For example, n both Inda and the Unted States, vbrant dscourses on unauthorzed mmgraton project mages of borders as beng subverted by niltratng and unwanted alens, and nspre state polces of border nterdcton, fencng, and expulson. In nether country, however, does the state effectvely target or penalze domestc employers of “llegal alens,” thereby ensurng that the demand for the mmgrants’ cheap labor, and thus ncentves for further unauthorzed mmgraton, contnue to exst.65 Thrd, state-centrc dscourses on unauthorzed transborder lows are usually one-sded n that they gnore how states facltate these lows and beneit from them. To stck to the example of labor emgraton, states may come to rely on t as a safety valve for ther problems of unemployment. Emgraton allows them to mplement economc polces that am at growth and structural adjustment rather than at creatng jobs, and so encourage workers to look for employment abroad.66 Such states take no steps to curb unauthorzed emgraton, but they are keen to tax the remttances that mgrants send back home. To ths end they try to make sure that these remttances low through ofical bankng channels. Bangladesh s a good example of a labor-exportng country that s contnually and unsuccessfully strugglng to stamp out prvatzed forms of remttng money (here known as hundi or hawala). States beneit from unauthorzed transborder lows n other ways as well. For example, f natonal ndustres can get ther products to foregn consumers cheaply by evadng mport dutes n the countres of destnaton, the home state may beneit by taxng these ndustres. Many Indan companes access the Bangladesh market n ths way,67 and ths s also how products from countless ndustralzed countres around the world clandestnely ind ther way to mllons of consumers n Inda.68 The lnk between the state and unauthorzed transborder lows s even closer when the state s nvolved n the producton and trade of goods (e.g., drugs, arms) that are banned

0

Spaces of Engagement n the markets of destnaton. Power holders n Burma, Afghanstan, and Colomba have been accused of runnng “narco-states”—states that are dependent on ncome from the trade n outlawed drugs—but many governments denouncng ths practce are themselves nvolved n “gray-market” transfers of arms. In analyzng unauthorzed and poorly documented extra-terrtoral lows of goods and people, then, t makes lttle sense to construct a sharp opposton between these lows and terrtoral organzatons such as states. States may strve for terrtoral control, a monopoly of the legtmate means of movement, or secure borders—but n realty borders are sem-porous and state acton devsed to nterdct clandestne border crossngs actually rescales and sometmes enables these crossngs. Conversely, unauthorzed lows can rescale states. The challenge s to look at terrtoral states, transborder terrtoral arrangements, and transnatonal lows as complementary elements n processes of global reterrtoralzaton. The current drft of these processes appears to be toward makng nsttutons at the natonal level less central and toward strengthenng drect lnks between localzed arenas (e.g., borderland networks) and supranatonal ones. In ths game of unequal power and unpredctable outcomes, state eltes hold some mportant cards: access to state nsttutons wth ther rch pckngs from tax, ther legtmzng authorty, ther access to other states and supranatonal organzatons, and ther superor mltary clout. But “unauthorzed” entrepreneurs hold other mportant cards: the power to operate proitably whle remanng largely llegble to states,69 a hgh degree of organzatonal and regulatory lexblty, the capacty to be spatally moble, and the skll to redrect state nsttutons, undermne state terrtoralty, and rescale states. Transnatonal entrepreneurs and state eltes can form allances that smultaneously prop up state structures and allow these to serve the nterests of “unauthorzed” transnatonal lows. In ths process, whch s sometmes descrbed as the crmnalzaton of the state, those who routnely undermne the state’s terrtoralty emerge as ts kngmakers and ofice bearers.70 But borderlanders also hold mportant cards. Ther power s based on a detaled knowledge of topography, socal ields, and overlappng scales that allows objects and persons to navgate the border safely. Borderlanders ncorporate llegal lows nto ther transborder projects of scalar structuraton, and these are not easly manpulated by ether states or transnatonal entrepreneurs. The three-cornered ambvalence s expressed n a mxture of trust, rewards, threats, volence, avodance, and subterfuge. When states



w i l l em va n s ch en del attempt to nterdct clandestne border crossngs and unauthorzed access to markets beyond the border, they hghlght that they are wagng war aganst transnatonal crme lords. But what s often forgotten s that they are also jonng battle wth borderland socetes, ther projects of scalar structuraton, and ther sense of socal justce. In other words, global reterrtoralzaton s best approached by lookng smultaneously at states, transborder arrangements, and transnatonal lows because these are overlappng, nterlockng arenas of power and proit—or spaces of engagement71—and they are far more dficult to separate than “bllard ball” theorsts have assumed. It s often only states and lows that igure n analyses of reterrtoralzaton. Transborder arrangements are usually overlooked—or consdered to be dervatve, margnal, or nsgnicant. In ths chapter, I suggest that ths s a serous msjudgment. In reterrtoralzaton (or globalzaton) studes, borderland socetes form a “mssng lnk” because they act as pvots between terrtoral states and transnatonal lows (as well as between separate lows), and the transborder arrangements worked out n the world’s myrad borderlands have a drect mpact on the shape, legtmacy, and organzaton of both states and lows. NOTES 1. Erc R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1982), 17. Wolf crtczed an approach to socety and culture that has strong lnks wth the conventonal model of nternatonal relatons and nternatonal law, for nstance, “the world . . . conssts of naton-states regarded as ndependent actors wthn an anarchc envronment, who make more or less ratonal decsons n pursut of the preservaton and expanson of ther own power.” Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambrdge: Polty Press, 2001), 69. 2. Nel Brenner, “Beyond State-Centrsm? Space, Terrtoralty, and Geographcal Scale n Globalzaton Studes,” Theory and Society 28 (1999): 45–46, 48. 3. Peter Taylor, “Embedded Statsm and the Socal Scences: Openng Up to New Spaces,” Environment and Planning A 28, no. 11 (1996): 1917–1928; John Agnew, “The Terrtoral Trap: The Geographcal Assumptons of Internatonal Relatons Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80. 4. Frederck Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalzaton Good For? An Afrcan Hstoran’s Perspectve,” African Affairs 100, no. 399 (2001): 189. 5. The conceptual dstncton between “llct” and “llegal,” whch we hghlght n the ntroducton to ths book, s rarely encountered n the dscourse on cross-border lows. Many cross-border lows are llegal because they defy formal poltcal authorty, but they are only llct f they defy nformal socal authorty as well. 6. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, 81. 7. Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Unversty Press, 2000), 140. 8. Ths does not always work as ntended. The lack of ixty of many contemporary borders may lead to strange cartographc effects that draw attenton away from



Spaces of Engagement the arrows. For example, some observers may ind t hard to put a name to the small state wedged n between Pakstan and Chna n igure 1. In fact, ths s no state at all but a part of Kashmr that both Chna and Inda clam and whose borders have never been settled. 9. Jeremy Black warns that although subjectvty s of course central to the producton of all maps, we should not jump too easly to the concluson that maps are “conspratoral devces of the powerful. Some maps may ndeed serve such ends but maps are a medum, not a message.” Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (Chcago: Unversty of Chcago Press, 1997), 168. For a general treatment of propaganda maps, see John Pckles, “Texts, Hermeneutcs and Propaganda Maps,” n Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape, ed. Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 193–230. The term “persuasve cartography,” coned by J. A. Tyner, s cted on p. 197. The theme s developed wth partcular regard to hstorcal maps and geopoltcs n Claude Raffestn, Daro Lopreno, and Yvan Pasteur, Géopolitique et histoire (Lausanne: Édtons Payot, 1995). For an Englsh translaton of the most relevant chapter, see Claude Raffestn, “From Text to Image,” n From Geopolitics to Global Politics: A French Connection, ed. Jacques Lévy (London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001), 7–34. On the hstorcal ntersecton of European mapmakng, European colonalsm, and the cartographc ratonalzaton of space, see Rcardo Padrón, “Mappng Plus Ultra: Cartography, Space and Hspanc Modernty,” Representations 79 (2002): 28–60. 10. For a fuller treatment, see Mchel Baud and Wllem van Schendel, “Toward a Comparatve Hstory of Borderlands,” Journal of World History 8, no. 2 (1997): 211–242; and Wllem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia (London: Anthem Press, 2005). 11. James Anderson and Lam O’Dowd, “Borders, Border Regons and Terrtoralty: Contradctory Meanngs, Changng Sgnicance,” Regional Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 602–603. 12. Tobas Wendl and Mchael Rösler, “Introducton: Fronters and Borderlands: The Rse and Relevance of an Anthropologcal Research Genre,” n Frontiers and Borderlands: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Mchael Rösler and Tobas Wendl (Frankfurt am Man: Peter Lang, 1999), 2. 13. Nel Smth, “Contours of a Spatalzed Poltcs: Homeless Vehcles and the Producton of Geographcal Scale,” Social Text 33 (1992): 66. 14. In ther excellent overvew of border studes, Donnan and Wlson speak of a “burgeonng lterature on borders.” Hastngs Donnan and Thomas M. Wlson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999), x. Cf. Rösler and Wendl, eds., Frontiers and Borderlands. 15. In hs survey of the world’s nternatonal borders, Foucher speaks of the cuttng up of the world as a result of a process of “planetary geodesy.” Mchel Foucher, Fronts et frontières: Un tour du monde géopolitique (Fronts and Borders: A Tour of the Geopoltcal World) (Pars: Fayard, 1991). 16. If ths igure, calculated by Foucher, s correct, and f we take the depth of the borderland to be an arbtrary 10 km on ether sde, the world’s borderlands cover an area of 4,500,000 square km. Foucher, Fronts et frontières, 15. 17. Anderson and O’Dowd, “Borders, Border Regons,” 600. Ths provdes a healthy counterbalance to much recent wrtng on globalzaton that focuses on connectons between urban, even metropoltan, centers and has abandoned the mage of the Global



w i l l em va n s ch en del Vllage for that of the Global Cty, resusctatng modernst mages of socal change emanatng from cty to countrysde that appear partcularly at odds wth assertons of unversal connectedness and an end to geography. 18. E.g., Chaktow: het verhaal van een drugsdealer (Chaktow: A Drug Dealer’s Story) (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1995); Chrstopher Seymour, Yakuza Diary: Doing Time in the Japanese Underworld (New York: Atlantc Monthly Press, 1996); Bart Mddelburg, De Godmother: De criminele carrière van Thea Moear, medeoprichter van de Bruinsmagroep (The Godmother: The Crmnal Career of Thea Moear, Co-Founder of the Brunsma Group) (Amsterdam/Antwerpen: L.J. Veen, 2000). 19. E.g., Patrca A. Adler, Wheeling and Dealing: An Ethnography of an Upper-Level Drug Dealing and Smuggling Community (New York: Columba Unversty Press, 1985); Frank Bovenkerk, La Bella Bettien (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1995); Edwn van der Torre, Drugstoeristen en kooplieden: onderzoek naar Franse drugstoeristen, Marokkaanse drugsrunners en het beheer van dealpanden in Rotterdam (Drug Toursts and Traders: A Study of French Drug Toursts, Moroccan Drug Runners and the Management of Safe Houses n Rotterdam) (Deventer: Kluwer, 1996); Damán Zatch, “Traquetos: Colombans Involved n the Cocane Busness n the Netherlands” (Ph.D. dss., Unversty of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Socal Scence Research, 2001). 20. As I found out when dong research on another topc, the hstory of a rural ndustry that happened to be located n the Inda-Bangladesh borderland. Vllagers and smugglers n two small vllages facng each other across the Ganges were eager to dscuss and show the mportance of llegal trade. Wllem van Schendel, “Easy Come, Easy Go: Smugglers on the Ganges,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 23, no. 2 (1993): 189–213. 21. The term “snakehead” s more encompassng and also refers to entrepreneurs n unauthorzed mgraton. On the use of anmal categores for human smugglers and llegal mgrants, see Henk Dressen, “The ‘New Immgraton’ and the Transformaton of the European-Afrcan Fronter,” n Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, ed. Thomas M. Wlson and Hastngs Donnan (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1998), 96; Donnan and Wlson, Borders, 134–136. 22. Za Lang and Wenzhen Ye, “From Fujan to New York: Understandng the New Chnese Immgraton,” n Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Davd Kyle and Rey Koslowsk (Baltmore and London: Johns Hopkns Unversty Press, 2001), 203–204. 23. I owe ths mage to examples gven by Carolyn Nordstrom. 24. One of the arms-tradng companes nvolved n ths case (whch became known as the Purula Arms Drop case) was aptly named Border Technology and Innovatons Ltd. Some of the nternatonal lavor of ths case s brought out n the followng quotaton: “An athletc-lookng Dane, wth blond har, blue eyes and an arrest warrant for armed robbery, hres a Brtsh arms dealer wth a colorful resume. In Latva, they buy a Russan cargo plane and have t lown to Bulgara where t s loaded wth 77 cases of weapons, ncludng 300 assault rles, ammunton, pstols, hand grenades and rocket launchers. The plane then heads east to Inda. When t gets over the vllage of Purula, near Calcutta, the weapons are shoved out, drftng down under parachute rggng purchased n South Afrca. The deal s inanced out of Hong Kong. The ntended recpent s a volent relgous sect.” Raymond Bonner, “Murky Lfe of an Internatonal Gun Dealer,” The New York Times, July 14, 1998. Cf. Suhrd Sankar Chattopadhyay, “Watng to Go Home,” Frontline 18, no. 10 (May 12–25, 2001): 10.



Spaces of Engagement 25. Perre Nora and hs collaborators stress the need to gve prorty to the study of “stes of memory,” .e., monuments, museums, archves, events, texts, deas, and so on, that support the noton of the naton. These are remnders of the naton; studyng them may help us n understandng the relatonshp between ndvdual memores and publc memory, and between both of these and power. But memory stes may be remnders of other scales as well, as n ths case whch proudly supports the noton of a borderland dentty that s nseparable from llegal cross-border lows. Such celebratons are not uncommon n borderland cultures, but usually they are frowned upon or suppressed by states—e.g., the narcocorridos, songs lonzng drug smugglers n the northwestern Mexco-U.S. borderland that became popular n the wake of U.S. drug nterdcton campagns. Cf. Perre Nora, ed., Les lieux de mémoire (Stes of Memory), 3 vols. (Pars: Édtons Gallmard, 1997); Eljah Wald, Narcocorrido: A Journey into the Music of Drugs, Guns, and Guerrillas (New York: Rayo/Harper Collns, 2001). 26. Ed Ragas, Baarle op de grens van twee eeuwen: Enclavedorpen in beeld (Baarle on the Brnk of Two Centures: Images of Enclave Vllages) (Baarle: Bruna, 1999), 54. The photograph shows a Belgan border guard and two ex-smugglers, one Belgan and one Dutch. 27. Scales are spatal representatons, ways n whch we frame conceptons of spatal realty. People wth dfferent conceptons of spatal realty may engage n struggles over these (“poltcs of scale”), and these struggles result n webs of relatons and other materal outcomes. For ntroductons to ths concept, see Smth, “Contours”; Erk Swyngedouw, “Excludng the Other: The Producton of Scale and Scaled Poltcs,” n Geographies of Economies, ed. Roger Lee and Jane Wlls (London: Arnold, 1997), 169; Rchard Howtt, “Scale as Relaton: Muscal Metaphors of Geographcal Space,” Area 30, no. 1 (1998): 49–58; Katherne T. Jones, “Scale as Epstemology,” Political Geography 17, no. 1 (1998): 25–28; Brenner, “Beyond State-Centrsm?”; Salle A. Marston, “The Socal Constructon of Scale,” Progress in Human Geography 24, no. 2 (2000): 219–242. 28. On the poltcs of scale, see Smth, “Contours” and Swyngedouw, “Excludng the Other.” In a more recent contrbuton, Brenner suggests two other terms: the “poltcs of scalng” and the “poltcs of scalar structuraton.” Nel Brenner, “The Lmts to Scale? Methodologcal Relectons on Scalar Structuraton,” Progress in Human Geography 25, no. 4 (2001): 591–614. 29. For an extreme case of such everyday transnatonalty, see Wllem van Schendel, “Stateless n South Asa: The Makng of the Inda-Bangladesh Enclaves,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 61, no. 1 (2002): 115–147. 30. E.g., Clare Sterlng, Crime without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Organised Crime and the Pax Maiosa (London: Lttle, Brown and Co, 1994). 31. E.g., Frank Bovenkerk, Misdaadproielen (Proiles of Crme) (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 2001). The lterature emphaszes the more durable forms of transnatonal crmnal organzaton but does not provde an assessment of the relatve mportance of these forms vs-à-vs ad hoc allances, small famly operatons, one-person operatons (e.g., a Belgan woman smugglng her Kurdsh lover nto Italy n her sutcase), or people sneakng across a border on ther own, n an act of “self-smugglng.” “Kurdsh lover sent packng,” Kurdistan Observer, 13 July 2002, http://home.cogeco.ca/~kurdstanobserver/ 14–7-02-reu-kurdsh-lover-packed.html. 32. Adler, Wheeling and Dealing, 33. 33. “Uranum Sezed from Vllager n W. Bengal,” The Times of India, August 27,



w i l l em va n s ch en del 2001; and “Inda to Seek Bangla Help n Uranum Case.” The Times of India, August 27, 2001. 34. Andrew Walker, The Legend of the Golden Boat: Regulation, Trade and Traders in the Borderlands of Laos, Thailand, China and Burma (Honolulu: Unversty of Hawa‘ Press, 1999), 58. 35. Ths mmgraton nterdcton campagn was restrcted to the Calforna secton of the Mexco-U.S. border. Joseph Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge Press, 2002). 36. Such spatal dversicaton s analyzed for unauthorzed mgraton across the Mexco-U.S. border n Audrey Snger and Douglas S. Massey, “The Socal Process of Undocumented Border Crossng among Mexcan Mgrants,” International Migration Review 32, no. 3 (1998): 581. 37. See, e.g., A. P. Cheater, “Transcendng the State? Gender and Borderlne Constructons of Ctzenshp n Zmbabwe,” n Border Identities, ed. Wlson and Donnan (1998), 191–214; Elzabeth Jeln, “Epílogo II: Fronteras, nacones, género: Un comentaro” (Eplogue II: Borders, Natons and Gender: A Comment), n Fronteras, naciones e identidades, ed. Alejandro Grmson (Buenos Ares: Edcones Cccus, 2000), 333–342. 38. An example of the adaptve sklls of borderlanders s gven by a woman from Fuzhou n Chna who was smuggled nto the Unted States va Mexco. “Several Mexcans worked as gudes. They were very nce to women. They gave us plenty of food. They nstructed us to ‘be quet’ n Mandarn, and to ‘le low’ and ‘kneel down’ n the Fuzhou dalect.” Quoted n Ko-ln Chn, Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States (Phladelpha: Temple Unversty Press, 1999), 79. 39. Andreas, Border Games, 44. 40. Andreas, Border Games, 52–53. 41. Andreas, Border Games, 95. Cf. Snger and Massey, “The Socal Process”; Peter Andreas, “The Transformaton of Mgrant Smugglng across the U.S.-Mexcan Border,” n Global Human Smuggling, ed. Kyle and Koslowsk (2001), 107–125; Davd Kyle and John Dale, “Smugglng the State Back In: Agents of Human Smugglng Reconsdered,” n Global Human Smuggling, ed. Kyle and Koslowsk (2001), 29–57. 42. “De Todesgrenze der Deutschen” (The Germans’ Border of Death), Der Spiegel, 24 June 1991, 58–83; 1 July 1991, 52–71; 8 July 1991, 102–116; and Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended: Re-uniication and Identity in the German Borderland (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1999). 43. Here I use the term “gatekeeper state” n the sense of a state that can open or close the border at wll. Ths s a more restrctve use than the one proposed by Nevns, from whom I derve the term. Accordng to Nevns, the gatekeeper state s a state “the task of whch s to provde extraterrtoral opportuntes for natonal terrtory-based captal (thus ntensfyng the process of globalzaton) whle, somewhat paradoxcally, provdng securty aganst the perceved socal costs unleashed by globalzaton—especally mmgraton.” Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper, 178. 44. On the Mexco-U.S. border, ths became a growng dlemma wth the creaton of the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that made that border much more permeable for many goods from Mexco, allowng llegal trade to pggy-back on them. Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper, 134–138, 178.



Spaces of Engagement 45. Cf. Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper, 186. 46. Cf. Ans Paas, “Boundares as Socal Processes: Terrtoralty n the World of Flows,” Geopolitics 3, no. 1 (1999): 669–680. 47. Cf. Roger M. Downs and Davd Stea, Maps in Minds: Relections on Cognitive Mapping (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 6. On scale and cogntve maps, see also Peter Orleans, “Dfferental Cognton of Urban Resdents: Effects of Socal Scale on Mappng,” n Image and Environment: Cognitive Mapping and Spatial Behavior, ed. Roger M. Downs and Davd Stea (Chcago: Aldne Publshng Company, 1973), 115–130. 48. For the nteractve nature of these representatons and ther content, selectvty, and organzaton, see Downs and Stea, Maps in Minds, esp. 99–145. 49. “Rebel Groups Call for Independence Day Boycott,” The Times of India, July 31, 2001; cf. “Mxed Response to ‘Black Day,’” The Telegraph, October 17, 2002. 50. “BSF Free 13 Bangladeshs,” The Daily Star, December 13, 2000; Probr Pramank. “Tragedy on Border over Prayer,” The Telegraph, December 29, 2000. 51. Sourn Bose was a leader of the Maost uprsng n Naxalbar n 1967 and an emssary of the Communst Party of Inda (Marxst-Lennst)—also known as the Naxaltes—to Chna n 1970. Sourn Bose, ntervew by Shahrar Kabr and Wllem van Schendel, vdeo recordng, Slgur, West Bengal, Inda, 1999 (avalable at the Internatonal Insttute of Socal Hstory, Amsterdam). 52. Cf. Alejandro Grmson, “Introduccón ¿Fronteras polítcas versus fronteras culturales?” (Introducton: Poltcal Borders vs. Cultural Borders?) n Fronteras, naciones e identidades ed. Grmson, 9–40. 53. On the persstence of such networks n the Chna-Thaland-Burma borderland, see Chranan Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade in the Nineteenth Century: Southwest China’s Cross-Boundaries Functional System (Bangkok: Insttute of Asan Studes, Chulalongkorn Unversty, 1989). 54. On “shoppng the border” n Ireland, see Donnan and Wlson, Borders, 117–122. 55. Swyngedouw, “Excludng the Other,” 169. Accordng to Smth’s orgnal formulaton, “jumpng scale” means to organze the producton and reproducton of daly lfe and to resst oppresson and explotaton at a hgher scale. Ths has been nuanced by Cox, who showed that such resstance can also be expressed at a more local scale. As we have seen, however, n a borderland stuaton the archtectural magery of hgher and lower scales (or more local and more global ones) breaks down, and the drecton of scale jumpng s n the eye of the beholder. See Smth, “Contours,” 60; Kevn Cox, “Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Poltcs of Scale, Or: Lookng for Local Poltcs,” Political Geography 17, no. 1 (1998): 1–23. 56. Van Schendel, “Easy Come, Easy Go,” 204–205. 57. For a dscusson of the “dsjuncture between ofical threats and the realty n whch state oficals were actually adng and abettng smugglng” on the Ghana-Togo border, see Paul Nugent, “Power Versus Knowledge: Smugglers and the State along Ghana’s Eastern Fronter, 1920–1992,” n Frontiers and Borderlands, ed. Rösler and Wendl, 94. 58. Scott Relyea, “Trans-State Enttes: Postmodern Cracks n the Great Westphalan Dam,” Geopolitics 3, no. 2 (1998): 30–61. Accordng to Nel Brenner, the terrtoralst epstemology entaled a “transposton of the hstorcally unque terrtoral



w i l l em va n s ch en del structure of the modern nterstate system nto a generalzed model of socospatal organzaton, whether wth reference to poltcal, socetal, economc, or cultural processes.” Brenner, “Beyond State-Centrsm?” 48. 59. Brenner, “Beyond State-Centrsm?” 62. 60. Tmothy W. Luke and Gearód Ó Tuathal, “The Frayng Modern Map: Faled States and Contraband Captalsm,” Geopolitics 3, no. 3 (1999): 14–33. 61. John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 2000), 6–10. 62. Andreas, Border Games, 7; Ncholas P. De Genova, “Mgrant ‘Illegalty’ and Deportaton n Everyday Lfe,” Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (2002): 419–447. 63. In terms of numbers, the nlow of unauthorzed Rohngya refugees from Burma runs nto several hundreds of thousands, whereas the number of unauthorzed Bangladeshs n Inda s estmated at between 12 and 20 mllon, wth 5 mllon lvng n the Indan state of West Bengal. If these igures are correct, the number of unauthorzed Bangladesh mmgrants n West Bengal alone equals that of all unauthorzed mmgrants n the entre Unted States of Amerca. Accordng to calculatons by the U.S. Immgraton and Naturalzaton Servce (INS), 5 mllon llegal mmgrants were resdng n the U.S. n 1997, of whom 2.7 mllon were from Mexco. Andreas, Border Games, 4n. 64. Andreas, Border Games, 16–17. 65. On Inda, see Ranabr Samaddar, The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal (New Delh: Sage Publcatons, 1999), 120–121. On the Unted States, see Andreas, Border Games, 32–39; Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper. 66. On Mexco, see Andreas, Border Games, 37–38. 67. E.g., Indan companes producng phensdyl, a cough syrup that s extremely popular n Bangladesh, although t s banned there as a narcotc because of ts hgh codene content. Other well-known Indan products are woolen shawls from Kashmr, slk saris from South Inda, table fans, cosmetcs, razor blades, medcnes, and components of trucks and buses. 68. A bewlderng varety of commodtes enter Bangladesh largely to be traded llegally across the border to Inda, e.g., Japanese, Korean, and Tawanese electroncs; Dansh, Dutch, and Australan mlk powder; Russan, Chnese, and Israel assault rles; Amercan cgarettes and cosmetcs; French perfumes; Tha concrete and fertlzers; and Swss watches. 69. On (l)legblty, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale Unversty Press, 1998). 70. Jean-Franços Bayart, Stephen Ells, and Béatrce Hbou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford/Bloomngton: Currey/Indana Unversty Press, 1999). 71. Cf. Cox, “Spaces of Dependence.”



The Rumor of Trafickng

two The Rumor of Trafficking Border Controls, Illegal Migration, and the Sovereignty of the Nation-State Dana Wong It s n a sense about the way objects move, but t s more decsvely about the way n whch movng objects and people are dentied, assmlated, margnalzed or rejected. —Jonathan Fredmann, Cultural Identity and Global Process

Furtve lows of human cargo slpped through the border controls of otherwse soveregn naton-states—ths dramatc mage has emerged n the last decade as the vsble embodment of a menacng “dark sde of globalzaton.”1 Illct movements of other lows—of drugs, weapons, and money—bloatng that underbelly of globalzaton whch “threatens to damage our socetes and our economes,”2 do not lend themselves as easly to arrestng meda mages as do multtudes of huddled masses left stranded at lonely border outposts. Spectacular scenes of rckety boats illed to the brm wth swarmng men, women, and chldren hoverng off the shores of Europe, the Unted States, and Australa have mprnted themselves on the publc magnaton. No less spectacular has been the publc polcy response. From a poorly funded, NGO women’s ssue n the early 1980s, “human trafickng” has entered the global agenda of hgh poltcs, elctng n recent years sgnicant legslatve and other acton from the U.S. Congress, the European Unon, and the Unted Natons. Ths chapter s about the power of the trafickng dscourse and ts deployment n the poltcs of mgraton control n the Western ndustralzed states of the post–Berln Wall era. In hs magsteral study of the condtons of possblty for the establshment of the free market n the naton-states of 

di a n a wong nneteenth-century Europe, Karl Polany famously referred to the necessary nterventon of the state: “The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous ncrease n contnuous, centrally organzed and controlled nterventonsm. To make Adam Smth’s ‘smple and natural lberty’ compatble wth the needs of human socety was a most complcated affar.”3 I shall argue that a century later, wth the creaton of a global free market at stake, the corollary s just as true: an enormous amount of transnatonal state nterventonsm has been necessary to hnder the emergence of the free moblty of labor, that “smple and natural lberty” compatble f not wth the needs then wth the dynamcs of a global economc order predcated on the free moblty of captal and goods. I should note at the outset that the use of the term “rumor” n the ttle of ths chapter s not n the least ntended to suggest the absence of trafickng as a crmnal practce. Rumor here s meant to refer to ts use n a poltcal ield of meanng as “a rhetorc, a project, or a contested topos.” The project, as suggested above, s one of poltcal and socal boundary-mantenance; the language of trafickng derves ts power to moralze and crmnalze from ts semantc proxmty to terms such as prosttuton, smugglng, and slavery, and ts present currency s remnscent of an earler nstance of “moral panc,” .e., the “whte slave trade,” n the irst decades of the twenteth century (see below). The realty whch the rhetorc purports to descrbe s more dficult to ascertan. Emprcal evdence from Malaysa, where undocumented mgraton has been an ssue snce the early 1970s, wll be adduced to ndcate the relatvely mnor role of trafickng by transnatonal organzed crme n the actual cross-border movement of mgrants, as aganst the smugglng and overstayng measures undertaken by the mgrants themselves. In makng ths pont, I shall be ntroducng a dstncton between trafickng and smugglng whch departs from the deintons establshed by the Unted Natons Venna Conventon, and I shall be argung for a necessary dstncton between socologcal (analytcal) conceptualzatons of emprcal processes on the one hand and admnstratve and jurdcal categores on the other. In mgraton research, there s the unfortunate tendency to unthnkngly adopt the latter as conceptual and categorcal gvens.4 Based on the Malaysan data, t would appear that the deployment of the trafickng dscourse—n the rhetorcal producton of the boundares of the naton-state as stes of transgresson—rests on an emprcal icton and bears only partal resemblance to the actual contours of the economy of llctness n contemporary mass mgratons. The trope deployed theren of llegal crossngs subvertng endangered boundares and erodng state

0

The Rumor of Trafickng soveregnty rests, I would argue, on a questonable conceptual dentty between natonal boundares, terrtoralty, and soveregnty.5 Undocumented, “llct” border crossngs of people have actually been much more common n the hstory of the naton-state than has been generally assumed. Borders have been mportant to the modern naton-state n real terms as much for the establshment of nternal soveregnty and for the control of movement of goods as for the control of people movements. The current obsesson wth mmgraton and border control as the bass of a state’s soveregnty and as ntrnsc to ts logc of beng—for whch the dscourse on trafickng s a chiffre—s specic, I suggest, to a hstorcal era whch acqured a conscousness of tself wth the fall of the Berln Wall n 1989. One inal ssue wll be rased n ths essay, namely, the conceptualzaton of llctness tself. The trafickng dscourse works n a double regster of the moral and the legal, crmnalzng, n both senses of the word, practces of cross-border rregulartes. These practces, as research on contemporary mgratons ndcate, are extremely far-lung and wdespread, as well as deeply embedded n varous formal state and market structures. Indeed, ndvdual mgrant lves constantly weave ther way n and out of ntersectng spheres of legalty and llegalty.6 The crmnalzaton of these practces through the moral power and legal force of the trafickng dscourse occludes ther quotdan and “normal” occurrence. Illctness, I suggest, should be used to draw attenton to the broad range of practces located n that space whch s beyond the formal data-collectng gaze of the state. Ths space of the undocumented or the llct s not so much llegal as extra-legal. It s n and from ths space of the undocumented, and hence llct, that the “new forms of terrtoralty and unexpected forms of localty”7 whch are reconigurng the nneteenth-century landscape of bounded and contguous naton-states are arsng. Castng ths space nto the shadow of the crmnal dark forces of globalzaton keeps the fecundty of ts everyday practces from vew. The chapter falls nto three parts. The irst centers on an account of the elaborate dscursve and nsttutonal machnery at the nternatonal level whch has been developed around the queston of trafickng and smugglng. It attempts to hstorcze the power of ths contemporary trafickng dscourse by lookng at earler antecedents (the whte slavery campagn), as well as by locatng ts emergence n the hstorcal conjuncture marked by the 1989 fall of the Berln Wall. Underlyng the account s the conceptual premse that n ths dscursve economy, trafickng works as a master metaphor for the llct as the crmnal, assgnng prosttuton, asylum, and mgraton n equal measure to the undesrable undersde of globalzaton.



di a n a wong The next secton looks at the emprcal contours of the economy of trafickng and smugglng n Malaysa, a country whch has experenced extraordnarly hgh levels of llegal mgraton snce the md-1970s.8 Exemplied by two case studes, but based on a larger study of llegal mgrants n Malaysa conducted n 2000, ths account of the economy of llct mgraton deploys a conceptual dstncton between trafickng and smugglng whch departs from the deintons, now wdely accepted n the lterature, establshed by the UN Conventon Aganst Transnatonal Organzed Crme. The dstncton ntroduced here s based on the agency (whch s, t should be noted, never absolute) of the mgrant and the condtons under whch the mgraton project s undertaken. The indngs on the Malaysan experence presented here qualfy easy assumptons (“rumors”) about llct mgraton as an mported crme of subversve border trespass by nnocent vctms coerced by transnatonal organzed crme. In the inal part of the chapter, the conceptual homology between soveregnty, terrtoralty, and border polcng, consttutng the poltcal logc whch underpns the rhetorcal power of the trafickng dscourse, wll be questoned. Notwthstandng a state dscourse n whch all three are seen to be ontologcally merged, the poltcs of soveregnty n postcolonal states has generally been agnostc wth respect to the border and neglgent wth practces of border control. At the borderlands of these states, a socetal logc, rather than a border logc, of ethnc afinty or hstorcal consocatonalty governs the trafic of goods and people, a low to whch the noton of border trespass s mmateral. The trafickng dscourse, wth ts metaphor of the materalty of the border and the crmnalty of border trespass, msrepresents not merely the realty of such borderlands but the nature of such post-colonal naton-states as well. The Power of the Traficking Discourse The New Migration and the “White Slavery” Scare, 1910–1913 The trafickng dscourse s not new. It has an emnent precursor n the “whte slavery scare” whch raged n Brtan and the Unted States at the turn of the last century, peakng between 1910 and 1913 and vanshng by 1917.9 The whte slavery dscourse centered around prosttuton and came to mean “the procurement, by force, decet, or drugs, of a whte woman or grl aganst her wll, for prosttuton.”10 As aganst earler pre-Vctoran depctons of the prosttute as a “fallen woman,” the whte slavery narratves constructed the prosttute as a youthful, nnocent vctm, trapped nto the



The Rumor of Trafickng trade through force or decet, and unable to escape from the subsequent depths of moral depravty on account of debt peonage. The youth of the vctm was often stressed, and the whte slavery ssue became closely lnked to that of chld prosttuton. The counterfol to the igure of the vctm was that of the vllan-traficker. In the Unted States n partcular, as Kere’s study ponts out, “urban reformers ntertwned the story of the sexually coerced maden wth a heated condemnaton of the busness of vce.”11 Indeed, n the course of the campagn, as the aboltonsts ganed the upper hand over the regulatonsts, t was the whte slave trafic whch came to hold center stage over the whte slave vctm, both on the legslatve agenda as well as n the meda representatons. Slent move ttles such as Trafic in Souls,12 The Inside of The White Slave Trafic,13 and Smashing the Vice Trust,14 testfy to the focus on the crmnal and commercal crtque. The success of the campagn was extraordnary. The theme of nnocent vctm/evl traficker was played out n numerous novels, plays, and slent moves of the perod, besdes recevng extensve coverage n the world’s press. Wth publc opnon galvanzed and several organzatons devoted to ts cause, the campagn culmnated n the passage of new natonal laws (the Crmnal Law Amendment Bll of 1921 n Great Brtan and the Mann Act of 1910 n the Unted States) as well as a seres of nternatonal agreements. Notwthstandng all that sound and fury, contemporary hstorcal research has snce debunked the materal bass of that campagn. The hstorcal evdence s that “the actual number of cases of whte slavery, as deined above, are very few.”15 Of note s that the “scare” arose at the tme of the “new” transatlantc mgratons, whch drew nto ts vortex mgrants from “non-tradtonal” eastern and southern European countres of orgn, as well as larger numbers of women mgrants, and that t faded away as ths wave of mgraton came to an end wth the outbreak of the Frst World War. Toward the end of the century, some sx decades later, a new trafickng dscourse made tself heard, ths tme nvolvng the trafickng of thrdworld women and chldren to the Western ndustralzed world. In her analyss of ths dscourse, Doezema16 draws the parallel to ts predecessor as another nstance of “moral panc.” Both dscourses were centered around the ssue of prosttuton and female mgraton. Both shared the motf of nnocent vctmhood, as well as a smlar absence of materal bass to the enraged clams of the vrulence and scale of the phenomena.17 The new dscourse had orgnated n the early 1980s from the socal



di a n a wong actvsm of progressve femnsts on behalf of traficked and stranded thrdworld women n the West, who had contnued to respect ther rght to work whle champonng ther rght to protecton. Doezema argues that ths dscourse was then taken over by a conservatve aboltonst agenda whch magnied and dramatzed the “sex slavery” ssue, an agenda whch met wth ncreasng success as growng female mgraton n the 1980s generated male anxetes and “boundary crses.” By the end of the 1990s, t was clear to the “progressve” femnsts that the trafickng dscourse was one capable of rasng publc attenton and fundng (now gong mostly to the “other” camp),18 but also “the spectre of regressve approaches to sexualty, race and gender.”19 Illegal Immigration and European Asylum Policy, 1989–1993 Doezema’s account of ths re-emergent trafickng s of one ntated by, and conined to, women NGO crcles. In contrast to ts predecessor, relatvely lttle attenton appears to have been gven to the traficker. The vllan of the pece was to be found n Western development polces and Western sex toursm, or n thrd-world vllagers who sold ther daughters to “trafickers.”20 In the followng, I shall suggest that the career—and power—of the trafickng dscourse took another remarkable turn n the late 1990s when t was hjacked and reframed from ts ntal context of mported thrd-world prosttuton nto the larger one of llegal mmgraton and European asylum polcy. Indeed, t s strkng how central the ssue of llegal mgraton has become to mgraton research n Europe and the Unted States.21 Accordng to Morrson and Crosland,22 the conjuncton of trafickng and llegal mmgraton materalzed nto the poltcal conscousness of Europe at the 11th Internatonal Organzaton for Mgraton (IOM) Semnar, devoted to the theme of “Global Human Trafickng” n 1994. In an nluental paper presented to that conference by a leadng European scholar on nternatonal mgraton, the emergent model of the new unholy trnty threatenng the borders of Europe—trafickng, llegal mmgraton, and organzed crme—was ntroduced and authortatvely quantied. Trafickng brngs annual ncomes to gangster syndcates n the magntude of at least US$5 to US$7 bllon a year. Other ofical data on llegal mmgraton to varous countres s by deinton not avalable. However, varous estmates can be made. Thus, the number of alens who n 1993 managed to llegally trespass the borders of Western European states, for the sake of llegal employment or resdence, could be estmated to have been n the magntude of 250,000 to 350,000. Ths estmate s establshed on the bass of extrapolatons on how many llegals inally reached ther ntended goal,



The Rumor of Trafickng as a relecton of the known number of mgrants who were apprehended when seekng to transt through the green [.e., land] borders of ntermedate countres on ther way to the stated inal goal.23

The poltcal conscousness of Europe n the early 1990s was haunted by the new mgraton fronter on ts eastern lank created by the fall of the Berln Wall n 1989. Followng the 1974 recesson, European countres such as Germany and the Netherlands had scrapped ther “guest worker” polcy of recrutment of foregn workers nto ther post-war, labor-scarce economes. All subsequent legal entry nto these countres had to fall under restrctve condtons for resdence and employment (such as student vsas and temporary employment passes) or famly reunon provsons for foregners already granted rghts of resdence. Vrtually the only other channel for acqurng a legal status (asde from that of marrage to a ctzen or permanent resdent) was through the procedures establshed for the asylum regme. It s not concdental that followng the halt of the labor mportaton program n 1974, a steady ncrease n the number of asylum applcatons from Turkey, an mportant source country for earler labor mgrants to Germany, was observed. Ths steady trckle, ntated n the md-1970s and augmented n the 1980s by thrd-world mgrants leeng from a varety of conlcts fueled by the closng convulsons of the Cold War, such as the wars n Afghanstan, Iran, and the horn of Afrca, grew nto a tde wth the end of the Cold War and the gnomnous collapse of the Sovet Unon. Mltary conlcts and the lghts of populaton they are wont to generate, prevously contaned n dstant perpheres, now lared up n drect proxmty to Europe’s own fronter. The brutal breakup of Yugoslava was partcularly damagng. For the European Unon as a whole, ths resulted n a tenfold jump n the number of asylum applcatons: from 66,900 n 1983 to 675,460 n 1992, wth Germany alone recevng 438,190 applcatons.24 Ths was the stuaton n whch the IOM Semnar referred to above, at whch the trafickng dscourse was ntroduced to the “European poltcal conscousness,” was held. 1992 was the year asylum applcatons peaked (the statstcs of course are only released n the followng year). By 1994, the number of asylum clams iled had halved to 309,710. It fell further to 233,460—ts lowest n the decade—n 1996. Thereafter, a slower but steady ncrease was agan regstered untl 2000, when ts rse was capped at 391,460. In 2001, the igure fell agan to 384,530. A smlar curve, though delayed n tme, can be observed for asylum clams n the Unted States. There, the igures rose from 150,740 n 1992 to peak at 216,150 n 1996 before fallng to a low of 46,020 n 1999. In 2001, the igure had agan rsen, to 86,170.25



di a n a wong These statstcs lend themselves to a smple nterpretaton: actons undertaken by the European Unon, and somewhat later by the Unted States, have been successful, although not entrely so, n reducng the number of asylum seekers n ther terrtores. Indeed, the decade of the 1990s can be seen as one marked by the massve rse and subsequent contanment of the phenomenon of “asylum mgraton” n the West. The contanment polcy has been largely based on technques developed to “export” mgraton and border controls,26 underpnned by legslatve and admnstratve amendments.27 It s prmarly wthn the context of the asylum system that the ssue of llegal mmgraton has ganed ts crtcal edge. A foregner who has managed to ile a clam to asylum dscards the status of an llegal mmgrant and acqures that of an asylum applcant. However, gven the formdable obstacles to legal entry for foregners seekng protecton or employment n the European Unon n place snce 1993, access to the asylum system s often mpossble wthout the assstance of “trafickers and smugglers.” Asylum seekers generally have to enter the country llegally. Hence t s that asylum, llegal mmgraton, and trafickng has assumed ts functonal and rhetorcal unty. Wth ths new asylum and mmgraton context came a reconiguraton of the motfs famlar from the earler dscourse. Unveried statstcs, such as the igure of US$5 bllon to US$7 bllon a year n commercal proit, have remaned a standard feature. There s however a notable shft n focus from the vctm to the traficker, and more specically to the nvolvement of crmnal “gangster syndcates.” Smlarly hghlghted s the physcal transgresson of the border or the metaphor of llegal trespass. And clearly “trafickng” has become a metaphor under whch the smugglng of llegal mgrants “for the sake of llegal employment or resdence” s subsumed and ndeed manly understood. The Great Traficking Consensus, Post-1994 Framed by ths “domnant paradgm,”28 whch to a lesser degree would also hold n the Unted States, the nternatonal career of the trafickng dscourse has been nothng short of phenomenal. Followng upon that nluental 11th IOM Semnar n 1994, the IOM, whch had been establshed n 1951 as the ICEM (Intergovernmental Commttee for European Mgraton) to handle resettlement problems posed by the wdespread presence of nternally dsplaced peoples n Europe, as aganst the refugee mandate of the Unted Natons Hgh Command for Refugees (UNHCR), found a new raison d’être. Renamed the IOM n 1989 as the mpendng end of the



The Rumor of Trafickng Indochnese refugee crss appeared to sgnal the end of the necessty for resettlement actvty n the nternatonal system (and the possblty of nsttutonal obsolescence), the IOM Councl endorsed n 1994 the adopton of a new IOM objectve: “to curtal mgrant trafic and to protect the rghts of mgrants caught up n ts practce.”29 Snce then, as the lead nternatonal agency on mgraton and trafickng, t has, through ts research fundng, publcatons, and countertrafickng programs, succeeded n puttng the ssue of mgrant trafickng at the center and forefront of today’s nternatonal mgraton research agenda. The IOM today s only one of more than thrty ntergovernmental fora, n Europe alone, addressng the ssue of trafickng.30 NGOs devoted to ths ssue also mushroomed and formed ant-trafickng coaltons at around the same tme, ncludng the Coalton of Trafickng Aganst Women (CATW) n 1993 and the Global Allance Aganst Trafic n Women (GAATW) n 1994. Ther growth has also been mpressve; from one secretarat n 1993, the CATW, for example, grew to sx n 1996. Varous UN agences are also devotng resources to ant-trafickng programs. They nclude the UNHCR, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNESCO, and the ILO. An ESCAP document recorded, as of March 2001, the exstence of sxty projects n the ESCAP regon devoted to the trafickng of women and chldren, nvolvng the followng UN agences: ESCAP, ILO, IOM, UNDCP, UNIAP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNIFEM and ther respectve NGO, natonal government, and unversty research partners.31 Major research programs on “human trafickng” are located n several unverstes and research nsttutes, such as UNICRI, Johns Hopkns, and the Unversty of Hawa‘. Meda attenton has also not been wantng, and t s n the meda reportng that the new rhetorcal igure of trafickng as a master metaphor for prosttuton, llegal mmgraton, and organzed crme s most clearly crystallzed: The way the trafic n human bengs s reported nearly always obscures the nternatonal aspects of the trade, evades crtcsm of European laws whch vctmze whole communtes and conlates “ethnc” gangs wth “ethnc” vctms. Such stereotypng nvarably serves a poltcal purpose. As 100,000 Albanans attempted to lee to Italy across the Adratc, on ishng boats and old ferres, the Italan press focused almost entrely on Albanan crmnalty, thereby justfyng the state of emergency brought n by the government and the refusal to take n any more refugees. As Portugal began preparatons to hand over Macau colony to Chna n 1999, the press reports focused on the Macaunese crmnal trads nvolved n human smugglng and the trade n fake dentty papers.32



di a n a wong Smlarly, n conjuncton wth the trafickng of women, “we contnue to see ‘trafickng’ used nterchangeably wth talk about the sex ndustry, prosttuton, and sex slavery n the meda.”33 Ths crmnalzng tendency has remaned the predomnant thrust n the meda coverage, notwthstandng the enrchment of the trafickng dscourse wth the ssues of human rghts and safe mgraton by other cvl socety and nternatonal organzatons, n partcular the OHCHR, from where the attempt to contest ts repressve power from the “nsde” has been undertaken.34 Indeed, much of the subsequent nsttutonalzaton of the trafickng dscourse through the passage of two key peces of legslaton n the year 2000 has occurred under the rubrc of transnatonal crme. In December 1998, the Unted Natons General Assembly establshed an ntergovernmental ad hoc commttee charged wth developng a new nternatonal legal regme to ight transnatonal organzed crme. The result s the UN Conventon Aganst Transnatonal Organzed Crme, supplemented by three addtonal treates (protocols) dealng respectvely wth Smugglng of Mgrants, Trafickng n Persons—Especally Women and Chldren, and Trafickng n Frearms, adopted by the General Assembly n November 2000. In her ncsve analyss of the background to ths conventon, Gallagher notes, The sgnicance of these developments should not be underestmated. The Venna process, as t has come to be known, represents the irst serous attempt by the nternatonal communty to nvoke the weapon of nternatonal law n ts battle aganst transnatonal organzed crme. Perhaps even more notable s the selecton of trafickng and mgrant smugglng as the subjects of addtonal agreements. Both ssues are now hgh on the nternatonal poltcal agenda. Whle human rghts concerns may have provded some mpetus (or cover) for collectve acton, t s the soveregnty/securty ssues surroundng trafickng and mgrant smugglng whch are the true drvng force behnd such efforts.35

In the same year, the Vctms of Trafickng and Volence Preventon Act of 2000 was sgned nto law n the Unted States. The act sets mnmum standards for the elmnaton of trafickng, whch are applcable to “the government of a country of orgn, transt or destnaton.”36 Non-complant states, begnnng n 2003, shall lose access to non-humantaran, non–trade-related U.S. assstance. In addton, such countres wll also face U.S. opposton to ther seekng and obtanng funds from multlateral inancal nsttutons ncludng the World Bank and the IMF. Ths extremely powerful act (ts only precedent s the Human Rghts legslaton passed under the Carter admnstraton) calls for the producton of annual reports by the State Department on all UN countres. It s clear from the irst two 

The Rumor of Trafickng reports snce presented that notwthstandng the rhetorc of moralty and the aboltonst thrust of the trafickng dscourse n the Unted States Congress, they have been “heavly based n favour of strong law enforcement responses”37 aganst transnatonal organzed crme and ts perceved threat to border controls. An elaborate trafickng dscourse, ndeed a moralzng and crmnalzng ant-trafickng consensus, of global reach and nsttutonal depth, encompassng states, nternatonal organzatons, and NGOs—and academc nsttutons—has been establshed n a relatvely short span of tme. In chartng ts breathtakng journey from a femnst-based thrd-world NGO ssue to the agenda of global hgh poltcs, I have referred to ts rhetorcal and metaphorcal functonalty. It s tme now to gve the dscourse ts due and to examne the clams t makes about the nature of llct cross-border lows of people n the contemporary world. Traficking and Smuggling in the Economy of Illegal Migration The Trafic in Figures Three emprcal clams are made by ths trafickng dscourse to justfy the need for publc funds and legslatve acton: clams related to the scale, the vctmzaton, and the crmnal organzaton of contemporary “trafickng n human bengs.” Central to these clams should be the legal dstncton between trafickng and smugglng establshed by the UN smugglng and trafickng protocols, under whch [s]mugglng of mgrants shall mean the procurement, n order to obtan, drectly or ndrectly, a inancal or other materal beneit, of the llegal entry of a person nto a State Party of whch the person s not a natonal or a permanent resdent. Trafickng n persons shall mean the recrutment, transportaton, transfer, harbourng or recept of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercon, of abducton, of fraud, of decepton, of the abuse of power or of a poston of vulnerablty or of the gvng or recevng of payments or beneits to acheve the consent of a person havng control over another person, for the purpose of explotaton. Explotaton shall nclude, at a mnmum, the explotaton of the prosttuton of others or other forms of sexual explotaton, forced labour or servces, slavery or practces smlar to slavery, servtude or the removal of organs.38

As igures are traficked, however, the dstnctons establshed above are gnored. Much of the trafic n numbers departs, as dd IOM tself earler, from “deintons tendered [whch] commonly nclude both a formulaton 

di a n a wong that provdes the bass for a crmnal offence as well as a more descrptve, often non-exhaustve account of the types of stuatons and actvtes commonly understood by the term.”39 As igures are traficked between research and meda reports, however, “trafickng” s generally taken to refer to more nclusve deintons, allowng for numbers to be magnied and nlated. The thcket of statstcal confuson whch prevals, even n serous research lterature, and wth the IOM as the source of reference, can be seen n the followng. In a recent journal artcle on trafickng n people, the scale of the phenomenon was suggested by two sets of igures: “estmated current global igures for people held n varous contemporary forms of slavery run as hgh as 200 mllon people” and “the IOM estmates the number of people traficked globally today at some four mllon.”40 The IOM deputy drector was quoted n a March 7, 2003, press release gvng a igure of “2 mllon women and chldren [who] were traficked across borders n 2001.”41 On ts ofical home page, however, IOM refers to the igure of “700,000 women and chldren traficked yearly” out of an estmated total of ifteen to thrty mllon rregular mgrants worldwde, a igure t appears to have adopted from the U.S. Department of Justce (see below).42 As recent research has been cautonng, all these wdely nvoked igures are hghly dubous. UNICRI tself notes that “relable data on smugglng n mgrants and trafickng n persons . . . are scarce,”43 and another recently completed Australan study notes that “n Australa, as n most countres of the world, lmted evdence s avalable about the ncdence and nature of human trafickng.”44 The most authortatve study done thus far, commssoned by the CIA, comes to the concluson that “an estmated 45,000 to 50,000 women and chldren are traficked annually to the Unted States.”45 It s lkely that the current U.S. Department of Justce igure of 700,000 worldwde rests on methodologcal assumptons used n ths study. Traficking versus Smuggling: The Economy of Illegal Migration in Malaysia Beyond the queston of the scale or magntude of trafickng and/or smugglng s the queston of ts nature and ts organzaton. As argued above, the trafickng dscourse and the conlatons and dstnctons t has spawned have arsen largely out of the European and North Amercan context of publc debate over llegal mmgraton and the vce ndustry. Wthn that context, the ssue of llegal mgraton has been reduced to one of mgrant trafickng and smugglng, treated as conceptually dentcal under the rubrc of “human smugglng,” and ths sngular entty n turn has been reduced to the nefarous busness of transnatonal crme. 0

The Rumor of Trafickng I turn now to another regonal context of extensve llegal mgraton to call these reductons nto queston. In Southeast Asan countres such as Malaysa and Thaland, the stock of llegal mmgrants s estmated to equal f not exceed the large numbers of legal labor mgrants crculatng wthn the regon.46 For the year 1997, the total stock of foregn mgrants, legal and llegal, n these two md-szed Southeast Asan natons, estmated at around three mllon, would have equaled f not exceeded the total number of llegal mmgrants then found n the European Unon.47 Malaysa, wth an estmated one and a half to two mllon foregn mgrants n 1997, has been experencng large-scale llegal mmgraton, n partcular from the neghborng slands of Indonesa, snce the md-1970s.48 Foregn labor presently consttutes almost 20 percent of the total labor force. Snce 1989, there have been more or less concerted attempts by the state to crack down on llegal mgraton and to replace llegal mgrant recrutment wth a regulated “guest worker” system of recrutment.49 Notable snce the md-1980s, and n tandem wth state campagns aganst llegal mmgraton, has been the emergence of a hostle ant-mmgrant publc dscourse, promnently featured n the mass meda, laced wth derogatory terms such as “llegals” and “alens.”50 Interestngly, ths dscourse s focused almost entrely on the mgrants themselves, wth scant though occasonal attenton pad to the trafickers or “syndcates” whch brng them n. Wth the excepton of NGOs workng aganst the trafickng of women nto the vce ndustry n the country, ths natonal ant-mmgrant dscourse has not lnked up wth nor utlzed the prevalng nternatonal trafickng dscourse.51 The metaphor of border trespass, central to the trafickng dscourse, s clearly not at ssue n the local, natonal poltcal context (as I shall argue below, border trespass s not necessarly synonymous wth the undermnng of state soveregnty), even where strong ant-mgrant sentments can be dscerned. The natonal magnary s troubled, t would appear, by the moral lmnalty of the mgrants themselves, not of the trafickers. Apart from the absence of poltcal valence n the Malaysan context, the lack of resonance of the nternatonal trafickng dscourse s also due, I would suggest, to the overwhelmng preponderance of smugglng versus trafickng n the economy of llegal mgraton n Malaysa. In makng ths argument, however, the dstncton between smugglng and trafickng, so often smudged through the careless use of statstcs as well as of termnology, s crtcal. A strct applcaton of the deintons of the two provded n the UN Conventon protocols (see above) would already pont to a clear preponderance of smugglng over trafickng n the practce of llegal mmgraton to Malaysa.52 However, drawng on the emprcal contours of 

di a n a wong Malaysa’s llegal mgrant economy as descrbed below, I would lke to ntroduce a dstncton between the two whch dffers from that of the UN Conventon, a dstncton whch departs from the perspectve of the mgrant rather than from that of the smuggler/traficker (as n the deinton contaned n the UN Conventon). The key crteron would be the degree of relatve autonomy and control over the mgrant project. From ths mgrant perspectve, the organzaton of the “local” llct mgrant economy as descrbed below may be ndeed more paradgmatc of “global human smugglng” than that suggested by the metaphor of trafickng. Ths account draws upon the indngs of two recent studes of the organzaton of llegal mmgraton nto Malaysa, one on the trafickng of Flpno women nto the sex ndustry n Sabah, East Malaysa,53 the other on llegal mgrants (n the constructon, plantaton, domestc, and petty tradng sectors of the economy) n West Malaysa.54 Two case studes wll be presented, followed by a further dscusson on the dstncton between trafickng and smugglng. Trafficking into the Vice Industry The story of Lanah (see Appendx 2.1) provdes clear evdence of the exstence of trafickng nto the vce ndustry n the fronter state of Sabah, whch shares a porous martme border wth the southern Phlppnes.55 At the center of ths economy of vce are entertanment centers (used as a generc term here to refer to pubs, dscotheques, and karaoke lounges), whch are servced by the traficked women. In the partcular case studed here, the company ran two entertanment centers, a pub whch opened from 2 p.m. to mdnght and a dscotheque whch closed at 5:30 a.m. At any one tme, the company has about thrty women n ts employ. The majorty of the women were traficked by the company tself. The company depended on agents n the source country, whch n the case of the Phlppnes are nvarably employment agences operatng n metropoltan Manla, as well as n provncal ctes such as Cebu, Davao, and Zamboanga. The women were channeled to the employment agences drectly, va meda advertsements, or through neghbors, former employees of the company, and other “recruters” who receve a commsson for sendng women to the agences. Potental recruts were accosted n places such as supermarkets, shops, restaurants, and entertanments premses. When an agency had collected a suficent number of women, the company was notied and the boss then lew to Manla to ntervew the women, not all of whom were selected. The women were told that they were beng ntervewed for jobs n



The Rumor of Trafickng Malaysa as housemads or as sales assstants. None of the women were nformed that they were destned for vce actvtes, although some may have had ther suspcons. No upfront payments were requred as the employer advanced the cost of travel and job brokerage. In addton, the company used ts contacts n the Phlppnes to arrange for the women to be provded wth Flpno nternatonal passports (wth false names) and Malaysan socal vst passes vald for one month. Ths was arranged wthn three days of the conirmaton of the contract. Ths mode of recrutment s hghly attractve to the recrut as no ntal outlays are requred for the mgraton enterprse. Later, however, the women dscovered that the company mposed a fee of RM 4,500 (US$1,184) to cover these expenses, a clearly nlated sum. The grls (n ths case, t was a group of eght) were then lown, n the accompanment of an employee of the employment agency, from Manla to Zamboanga, a town n the southern Phlppnes whch s a ferry rde away from the town of Sandakan, on the east coast of Sabah. In Zamboanga, they receved the ferry tcket from the agency and crossed the border from Zamboanga to Sandakan on ther own, enterng Sandakan as toursts. In Sandakan, they were met at the ferry termnal by an employee of the company, whose photograph had already been shown to them n Zamboanga. He provded them wth the RM 450 n cash necessary to secure ther entry as toursts at the mmgraton control counter. From Sandakan, the grls were lown to Kota Knabalu, the captal of Sabah, and from there to Labuan. It was n Labuan that they were turned nto llegal mgrant workers n the vce trade, forced nto the job n large part out of the necessty to pay off the debt of RM 4,500 ncurred n makng the legal entry nto Sabah. In Labuan, they were housed together n company quarters and brought to and from the quarters to the place of work by the company drver. In addton, there was a securty guard at the quarters and another at the center. There was a manager at each center who further oversaw the movements of the women. In prncple, however, the women were not subject to restrctons on ther movements outsde of ther workng hours. What n practce restrcted ther moblty was that ther passports were held by the company as ransom for the debt (RM 4,500) owed to the company for expenses ncurred for the passage to Sabah. Ths sum ncluded the cost of the passport as well as of transportaton. As long as the women were n debt to the company, they had to work to pay off the debt and redeem ther passports. And wthout ther passports, they could not move freely wthn Sabah for fear of polce detenton, nor could they return to the Phlppnes. The women were thus subject to three forms of control over ther moblty:



di a n a wong the physcal control of the male supervsors, the economc control of debt, and the polce control of unlawful presence. Gven the earnngs potental of the women, t should have been theoretcally possble to clear the debt n sx months. Once the debt was cleared, the contract could then be renewed on a voluntary bass. Ths, however, seldom happened. Most of the women remaned n debt to the company for more than a year. For example, eghteen women who were detaned and deported after eleven months n Labuan were found to owe RM 80,000 to the company. The reason for ths was not so much a low level of ncome as a hgh level of expenses, whch forced the women to contract new debts wth the company and thus reman n a contnuous state of debt bondage. Apart from regular expenses such as accommodaton, food, transportaton, and medcal expenses, as well as remttances to the famles (usually once every three months), there were some other heavy tems of expendture whch were pecular to the trade. One mportant tem was extortons by lower level polce personnel, allegedly to the tune of RM 1,000 every other month or so. The other was the heavy consumpton and hgh cost of drugs such as ecstasy plls, syabu (the local name for a popular drug), and amphetamnes, encouraged by the company. Furthermore, the women were made to pay the company RM 350 every month for the renewal of ther socal vst passes (whch the company never dd). The net result was a constant postponement of debt redempton. Notwthstandng all ths, wthn eleven months the company would lose the grls t had recruted. Some were caught by the authortes and deported as llegal mgrants, some left after ther debt was covered, and some ran away or were taken (bought) over by men who kept them as mstresses. Ths means there s a constant need for fresh recrutment, and the market demand for women n Labuan far exceeds the current supply. “Wthout the grls, no busness.” The key to the busness s the supply and control over women. It s noteworthy, however, that the bulk of the procurement s effected by the entertanment companes themselves. Apart from trafickng women for deployment n ts own entertanment center, the company also “sells” the women t recruts n ths fashon to other entertanment centers n Lmbang and Kota Knabalu. There are also small-tme “retaler” recruter-supplers who specalze n the recrutment and smugglng of women nto Sabah for supply to the vce busnesses. On the whole, however, drect recrutment by the vce ndustry tself appears to be the predomnant trafickng practce. Apart from small “retaler” recruters, there s no evdence of an ndependent trafickng ndustry n the bustlng vce trade n Sabah.



The Rumor of Trafickng Smuggling into the Market of Casual Labor Outsde of the vce sector, however, the recrutment of llegal mgrant labor s organzed along qute dfferent lnes. The story of Mamunah (see Appendx 2.2) exemplies mgrant smugglng nto the casual labor market n West Malaysa. For Mamunah, also a female llegal mgrant, the experence of llegal mmgraton could not be more dfferent than that of Lanah. She entered the country wth no dentty documents whatsoever, not even a forged passport from her country of orgn, Indonesa. Mamunah comes from Flores, an sland n the far east of Indonesa, 1300 klometers from Jakarta, the admnstratve captal. In those parts, documents of any knd, even forged ones, are prohbtvely rare. Her husband, hmself an llegal mgrant n Malaysa, had sent for her n a letter delvered by a fellow vllager back on a home vst. She was to follow ths vllager back to Malaysa. Mamunah, who had been tendng the small famly farm n her husband’s absence, rased the RM 1,000 necessary for the long journey n part from her own savngs, n part from her n-laws. Together wth her husband’s frend and fellow vllager, who organzed the entre journey, she irst traveled westwards by shp to Surabaya n Java and from there to Duma on the east coast of Sumatra. From Duma, they pad a boatman for navgatng the short, llegal entry across the Strats of Malacca onto the coast of Malaysa. Once dropped off by the boatman, they contnued ther journey by bus, reachng ther inal destnaton, a squatter settlement n Kuala Lumpur, n ive hours. Her husband found her a job mmedately as a street cleaner. She subsequently worked on a constructon ste for a whle before landng her present job as a helper n a small restaurant. In Malaysa, she dodges the authortes wth the assstance of forged Malaysan dentty papers. She lves wth her husband n rented accommodatons and plans to return to Flores n a year’s tme to vst her chldren, who are stll there. Mamunah’s entry nto the llegal mgrant economy n Malaysa s farly typcal, although t s only one mode of entry from a range of avalable optons. Of the 100 mgrants surveyed, 54 percent entered Malaysa wthout any documentaton whatsoever, not even a passport. Another 41 percent entered the country legally on a tourst vsa, 9 percent by ar, and 30 percent by ferry. The remanng 5 percent had entered the country va ts ofical labor market—as legally recruted foregn workers—and had subsequently “mgrated” from the legal to the llegal sector.



di a n a wong Whch mode of entry s chosen, legal or llegal, drectly nto the underground economy or va the ofical one, depends on a number of other factors, one of the most mportant beng the knds of ntermedares avalable for the organzaton of the mgraton enterprse. Here agan, the range of dscernble optons s strkng. In 16 percent of the cases, a taikong (broker) from the home vllage, who ether on hs own or n conjuncton wth larger syndcates, arranged the entre journey from the vllage of orgn to the workste n Malaysa for the mgrant. The payment made to the taikong n ths case ncluded the cost of job brokerage as well as the cost of safe passage. In 4 percent of the cases, the taikong dd not take mmedate payment from the mgrant, “sellng” the mgrant to an employer who would deduct the cost of the loan from the future wages of the mgrant.56 More often, however, the taikong was the boatman who was necessary only for the boat passage across the strats, wth the rest of the passage, and entry nto the labor market n Malaysa, actually beng organzed or facltated by the father (1 percent), husband (4 percent), frends (25 percent), and relatves (22 percent). The story of Mamunah, as narrated above, s typcal n ths regard. It s nterestng to note that n 11 percent of the cases, the mgraton venture was an entrely ndvdual enterprse, wth the mgrant hmself organzng hs journey across the strats and indng a job n Malaysa on hs own (3 percent) or through nformaton provded by fellow travelers met along the way (8 percent).57 It s n ths context of rregularty n Malaysa tself that another “mmgraton ndustry” has developed to serve the needs of the mgrants. “Imigresen Chow Kit” was the term used by Indonesans to refer to the trade n forged documents, run mostly by Indonesans n possesson of permanent resdence n the country, located n Chow Kt, a neghborhood n Kuala Lumpur assocated wth the presence of Indonesan foregn workers. Varous forged documents could be obtaned, both (supposedly) of Malaysan and Indonesan provenance. Apart from major documents such as work permts, dentty cards, etc., other documents specic to the needs of rregular mgrants were also ssued, such as forged Indonesan marrage certicates. The cost was relatvely low; forged work permts could be acqured for between RM 600 and RM 800, a forged red dentty card for RM 200–300, whle a forged passport or socal vst pass only cost between RM 40–80. Clearly, the assstance of the mmgraton ndustry (n ths case, an mmgraton ndustry whch servces llegal mgrants already n the country, as dstngushed from the one specalzed n provdng llegal entry nto the country) was ndspensable to the lves of llegal mgrants. Often, however,



The Rumor of Trafickng t was the employer whose help was sought, especally when there was trouble wth the polce or a need for a place to stay. Apart from professonal ntermedares and the employer, t was above all frends and relatves who contnued to play a key role n the provson of help and protecton. Of the mgrants, 58 percent had frends and relatves n Malaysa, of whom 13 were n possesson of work permts, .e., were n the country legally. Of even greater sgnicance s that another 16 percent of these frends and relatves were n possesson of permanent resdent status n Malaysa. Many of them had become entrepreneurs n the constructon ndustry as subcontractors and n petty tradng as owners of stalls and shops. Many had also establshed homes n squatter settlements throughout the cty. These ethnc busnesses and settlements were an mportant focal pont for fresh mgrants n search of work, resdence, and knowledge of survval sklls. The avalablty of these nformal networks wth a legal status n the country were as ndspensable to the lves of the llegal mgrants as was the mmgraton ndustry. The Victim, the Criminals, and the Border-Crossing in the Illicit Economy Not all llct trafic across Malaysan borders thus nvolves vctms. Lanah, who was traficked nto the vce ndustry, was clearly a vctm of decepton, and then was subject to the coercon of debt peonage for the cost of the passage whch had been organzed and pre-inanced by her future employer n Malaysa. Mamunah, on the other hand, came to jon her husband who was already n Malaysa. The cost of the journey, ncludng payment for the boatman who took her across the strats to Malaysa, was rased from her savngs and those of her n-laws. Once n Malaysa, she sought employment n dfferent sectors of the labor market. Her sense of vctmzaton derved from her vulnerablty to polce rads (“rush”) on llegal mgrants n the area where she lved. The key dstncton to be made here, I would suggest, s one based on the agency of the mgrant and the condtons under whch the mgraton project s undertaken, a dstncton, I suggest, whch could serve as a more salent socologcal dstncton between smugglng and trafickng than the one establshed n the UN Conventon. Ths s the dstncton between the servce of those ntermedares or taikong who prmarly execute the border crossng (e.g., as boatmen for that one leg of the journey whch nvolves evason of border patrols, both nto and out of the country) for mgrants who are n actve control of ther own mgraton project58 (ether alone or wth the help of frends and relatves), and those ntermedares who recrut the



di a n a wong mgrant, organze the transport, and “sell” hm to an employer n Malaysa, or are the employers themselves. The vast majorty of mgrants n the llct economy n Malaysa belong to the irst category. Ther tenuous subterranean exstence would not be possble wthout the exstence of an extensve “mmgraton ndustry.” In the man, however, ths mmgraton ndustry appears to be much lke that of any other servce provder—n ths case, t s prmarly a transport and document-delvery servce.59 Mgrants outsde the ofical legal recrutment system60 take advantage of and pay for these servces as and when the need arses. A number of mgrants fall nto the second category. Here, recrutment, ntal transacton cost, transport, and employment are all arranged by a sngle source. The level of self-control over the mgraton project s correspondngly low. The key factor here appears to be the nature of the labor market n whch the mgrant ends up workng. Where the nature of the work tself s llct, as n the vce sector, there appears to be a far greater lkelhood for the second pattern to preval. Whle the entre mmgraton ndustry works beyond the pale of the law, the role of snster “transnatonal organzed crme” groups n the organzaton of the above regonal cross-border movements s lkely to be exaggerated.61 The CIA study of the nternatonal trafickng of women to the Unted States found that trafickng was domnated by “mom and pop” type operatons: “perpetrators tended to be smaller crme groups, smugglng rngs, gangs, loosely lnked crmnal networks, and corrupt ndvduals who tend to vctmze ther own natonals. None of the trafickers’ names were found n the Internatonal Polce Organzaton’s database, ndcatng that these trafickers were not under nvestgaton for trafickng or other llct actvtes n other countres.”62 Smlarly, n the case of trafickng nto the vce ndustry n Sabah, the traficker nvolved was a lcensed dscotheque owner who acted as drect recruter of hs foregn staff. In the broader ield of llct servces provded to those smuggled but not traficked, as deined above, there appears to be a robust, decentralzed retaler market wth a far amount of competton. One inal emprcal note should be made at ths pont: All the women who were traficked nto the establshment n Sabah n the case study above crossed the border legally. Ther llegal status was acqured wthn the country when they overstayed ther vsas. Smlarly, 46 percent of the llegal mgrants n the sample had entered the country legally and overstayed. Legal entry precedng llegal status appears to be of sgnicance to the phenomenon of llegal mmgraton n the European Unon, the U.S., and Australa as well.63



The Rumor of Trafickng The llct, at least as t takes human form, s hence not merely a commodty to be kept wthout; t becomes so from wthn. Nether s the world of the llct one solely of vctms terrorzed by crmnals. Yet the rhetorcal producton of the trope of the naton’s borders as endangered by llegal mmgraton abetted by the machnatons of organzed crme has been hghly successful. In Europe, as Gallagher notes, llegal mgraton s now beng construed as an mported crme, so that commercal assstance for refugees s accordngly categorzed as “organzed crme.” In lne wth ths scenaro, rsks to nternal securty are to be met by addressng “crmnal geography” and by dentfyng socally adjusted “control ilters” . . . ultmately, an “overall European securty zone” wll be constructed based on the “organsed crme” scenaro and on the crmnalsaton of mgraton . . . usng a crmnologcal redeinton of offenders (smugglers and trafickers) and vctms (pennless refugees, women forced nto prosttuton), polce forces and publc authortes are tryng to use human rghts to justfy and legtmse ther actons.64

Border Controls and Nation-State Sovereignty The metaphor of the materalty of the border and of border trespass —and ts denticaton wth the terrtoral body and soveregnty of the naton-state—consttutes the unquestoned poltcal logc underlyng the power of the trafickng dscourse. Another reducton s at work here; naton-state soveregnty s equated wth border nvolablty, the border n turn s conceved as a fencng mechansm for the control of populaton movements or lows. The work of the border of a soveregn naton-state—so the assumpton goes—s that of keepng unwanted outsders out, ths functon havng been the mmutable prncple of ts beng snce the emergence of the modern naton-state. Ths assumpton s based on the standard narratve of the development of the nneteenth-century Westphalan state, as n the followng account: But what happened n the 19th Century was new, although t was the almost nevtable outcome of the Westphalan state. The broad acceptance of the doctrne of natonal soveregnty mpled a partcular knd of fronter and border control. After the appearance of the modern naton state n ts mature form, from the tme of the French Revoluton, the concdence of the mltary and securty border, wth the fronter of tax regmes, ecclesastcal boundares, lmts of provson of publc assstance, publc health servces, lcensed professons, educaton and economc regulatory regmes was completed. It became taken for granted that states had not only the rght but the legtmate authorty to control all actvtes on ther terrtory and to



di a n a wong do ths they needed, n prncple, absolute control of passage across ther borders.65

In ths standard narratve, “these deas of state soveregnty and terrtoralty were dffused from Europe to the rest of the world” n the late nneteenth and early twenteth centures and have snce been n practce wth the extenson of the Westphalan naton-state system to the entre globe.66 It should be borne n mnd, however, that although “these deas of state soveregnty and terrtoralty” found nsttutonal expresson n the European states n the nneteenth century, state practces of border control came to full maturty only n the followng century. The two world wars of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945 were crtcal n ths respect. Up untl the outbreak of World War I n 1914, possesson of an dentty-control document such as a passport was not necessary for the great transatlantc passage,67 nor, need t be sad, for the other vast populaton movements spawned by mperal expanson n Asa and Afrca n the nneteenth and early twenteth centures. World War II had, n ts turn, a further profound effect on border control regmes n Europe. “The changes n border controls across Europe snce the end of the Second World War are both radcal and wthout genune precedent,” Roger Don wrote, and contnued: “the war of 1939–45 conferred on poltcal fronters an eficacy, equalng or surpassng that of natural phenomena. A fronter as artical as the Franco-Belgan separates economc regmes so dfferent that we queston a traveler comng from Belgum wth as much curosty as ten years ago one comng from Australa; and the lne separatng a democratc country from a totaltaran one can be n 1940 more dficult to cross than a formdable mountan barrer. Whether or not correspondng wth natural fronters, the lnear fronters of Europe have become terrble realtes.”68 The novelty of poltcal borders was even more apparent for many of the new naton-states whch were establshed n the aftermath of World War II. And yet, artical as these borders were, the nherted colonal boundares, as Mbembe astutely observes, have remaned “essentally unaltered” and “the sacrosanct character of the boundares nherted from colonzaton” have not been challenged by state acton.69 In respectng the “sacrosanct” nature of state boundares, what appears to have been of prmary concern to states s the nternal soveregnty—to dscplne, command, and extract—delmted by ther terrtoral borders. It was the power of enforcement over the space enclosed wthn borders that occuped the energes of the new naton-states. “As soon as ndependence was won,” Mbembe notes, “Afrca began a vast enterprse of remodelng nternal terrtoral enttes even as t accepted the prncple of the nvolablty of boundares among states. Almost everywhere, the redeinton of nternal boundares was carred 0

The Rumor of Trafickng out under cover of creatng new admnstratve dstrcts, provnces, and muncpaltes.”70 Ths preoccupaton wth nternal reterrtoralzaton whch Mbembe observes for Afrca would also hold for state behavor n Southeast Asa. But to the degree that the exstng terrtoral boundares were accepted by the new naton-states, I would argue that these external boundares were also neglected. One could perhaps speak of state ndfference to these often extensve and remote borders. Fronter borderlands remaned largely perpheral to the nterest of naton-state eltes located n the center, whose naton- and state-buldng projects often took no account of those more than a day’s journey away. The socal and economc lfe of these borderlands, straddlng n many cases artical f not arbtrary borders, remaned robust, even f out of vew of the natonal governments, and n deiance of the overrdng and neluctable poltcal logc that governed the border n post–World War II Europe.71 In the post–World War II world of new post-colonal states, borders thus retaned ther porosty wthout states relnqushng ther soveregnty. Indeed, the large movements of populaton whch contnued to move across many of these terrtoral boundares s strkng. Ths became partcularly vsble n the course of the many refugee crses n Asa and Afrca n the decade of the eghtes.72 Such clear nstances of dramatc “dstress mgraton” spllng across borders may, however, obscure the more mundane exstence of substantal transgressve cross-border movements, often along pathways stretchng back to pre-colonal tmes, occurrng under condtons of covert state sancton. In Malaysa, Indonesans who entered the country llegally often managed to acqure permanent resdence status wthn a few months of ther arrval, a state practce that ended only n 1989. Control of ts extensve martme and land border wth Indonesa hardly exsted untl the outbreak of mltary hostlty between the two countres n 1963. Crossborder ethnc and cultural afintes thus contnued to mpact the evolvng border-control regmes of newly establshed pluralstc naton-states. For such states, the touchy queston of soveregnty was not necessarly, or not yet, dentcal to that of mmgraton control at the border. In Seeing Like a State, Scott documents the state’s drve to reorder socety through mproved technques of survellance and control such as the mappng of terrtory and the documentaton of personal dentty through the nsstence on surnames.73 Notwthstandng these “attempts at legblty and smplicaton,” the hgh modernst state’s socal engneerng projects ultmately faled, Scott argues, thanks n part to the hubrs of the planners and the authortaran state, but n no small measure thanks also to the very 

di a n a wong success of ths enterprse of admnstratve orderng and documentaton tself. The success of ths enterprse should not be overestmated. As the varous chapters n ths volume show, large commodty chans—of labor, drugs, weapons, damonds, and deas, among others—contnue to crculate trelessly—and undocumented—across the establshed and accepted borders of today’s naton-states. The economy of the llct, I would argue, s homologous wth the space of the undocumented, that whch contnues to reman hdden from the admnstratve order of the modernst state, that whch the state does not see. Much of ths space s topographcally located n the borderlands, at border ntersectons whch, contrary to state dscourse, have often been of lttle nterest to the soveregn power of the new post-colonal state. Whether the space occuped s merely of a resdual character, or whether more s at stake, such as “new forms of terrtoralty and unexpected forms of localty,” as n the formulaton by Mbembe, are questons beyond the scope of the chapter. I have tred to show, however, that n the contnung hstorcal contestatons over emergng forms of terrtoralty, the naton-state remans one of the most mportant actors. Its power derves n part from ts ablty to set the terms and condtons of the natonal and nternatonal research agenda. Hence the nsttutonalzaton, and the seductve power, of the trafickng dscourse. The state’s power to deine—and dstort—remans central to ts enterprse of admnstratve orderng and documentaton, wthn and at the border. It s for the conceptual polcng of the border that ts admnstratve and jurdcal categores have been developed. Ther unquestonng adopton as socologcal tools of the trade by the research communty les behnd much of the conceptual penury n the study of mgraton and of other borderlne ssues n the economy of the llct. The delaton of the trafickng dscourse attempted here s not a denal of the exstence of trafickng and the very real questons of human rghts and human securty whch are at ssue. Nether should a rejecton of the mputed nexus between mgrant smugglng and transnatonal organzed crme mply the neficacy or llegtmacy of state practces of border control. The recourse to the emprcal n ths chapter has been delberate. What the state does not see s also not avalable as processed data. Seeng lke the state n research practce on border ssues hence has often translated nto emprcal as well as conceptual penury. Even as we begn to pay attenton to the transformatve outcomes of llct lows across borders, t s the careful and crtcal attenton to detal wth whch research practce wll have to begn.



The Rumor of Trafickng APPENDIx 2.1. The Story of Laniah After a long slence, she resumes talkng, carefully, irmly. In Flpno Englsh: “I am from Santa Mesa, Metro Manla. It s a bg cty, many entertanment places there lke Harrson’s Club. But n Manla I am stll a good grl. My famly s also good . . . all my neghbors respect my famly.” She contnues, “I came here not for ths knd of job. I came here for a good job. Boss Tong cheated my frends and me. Durng the ntervew, he sad we would be workng here n a supermarket. “In Manla I had worked n three supermarkets. The irst and the second one not so long, about sx months each. At the last one, I worked for about two years. My salary n that supermarket was about 5,000 pesos per month. “I lved wth my parents . . . although I lved n Metro Manla, I was not free to go anywhere . . . because my mother ddn’t lke me to be nvolved n bad actvtes . . . f I went shoppng, my sster was always wth me. . . .” And she adds, “I know n Manla many many dscos and karaoke. Harrson Club n Mabn close to Makat Cty s one of the bgger entertanment place n Manla, there, there are many young grls from Bsaya . . . many of ther customers are Amercans, but I ddn’t lke ths knd of place. . . . ” That was her past. “I already had a good job n Manla. But ths company promsed me a good salary here and many facltes would be provded free such as housng, medcal expenses and transportaton.” Her lfe changed, she says, when “. . . I was approached by an old woman whle my frend and I were eatng durng happy hours. Ths woman asked me where I was workng. I sad, here at the supermarket. She ask me agan, how much s your salary? I sad 5,000 pesos. She sad, oh! If you work n Malaysa, your salary would be double. I sad, where n Malaysa? She repled, n Kuala Lumpur! I sad to her, yah t s good, but I have no money to go to Malaysa. In my mnd t must need much money, because when my frend went to Japan to work she needed 75,000 pesos. But ths old woman sad, no! If you really want to work n Malaysa, you need not have any money. I sad, how can? She explaned to me that I need not pay any money. All my expenses untl n Malaysa wll be advanced by the company. I only had to pay the credt through a monthly deducton from my salary, untl the credt s inshed. When your credt already inshed, then all your monthly salary belongs to you.” The old woman left after sayng to Lanah, “. . . ths s the best opportunty for you to go and work n Malaysa, wthout payng even one cent of money . . . f I were you, for sure I would not let t go. . . .” She told Lanah to “thnk about t. . . . If you decde to accept t, then please contact me. . . .” The old woman gave her contact address and telephone number to Lanah. After thnkng t over for about three weeks, Lanah contacted the old woman. They met at a Jollbee restaurant close to her place of work. The old woman sad she would arrange an ntervew wth the representatve of the company n Malaysa and would get back to Lanah as soon as possble to tell her the date and the place of the ntervew. Three days later, the ntervew was arranged. On that day, at about 2 p.m., Lanah took a tax wth the old woman from her place of work to the place where the ntervew was to be held. Whle watng for her ntervew, she was thnkng about the questons whch the ntervewer would rase. Hardly any



di a n a wong were rased. She was asked what her present work was and whether she really wanted to follow the company to work n Malaysa. That was all. But to Lanah’s bg surprse, the Chnese man asked her to take off her dress, down to her underwear. Lanah strongly objected to the request and asked for an explanaton. The man sad t was necessary because there was a lot of competton among the supermarkets n Malaysa and they had to attract customers wth attractve workers, whch s why he came to Manla to recrut sutable workers. Lanah stll refused, and inally the ntervewer agreed to drop hs demand and the sesson ended. Lanah was stll not satsied wth ths matter of undressng for the ntervew, and outsde the hotel, she contnuously questoned the old woman, who gave her a smlar reply. A week later, Lanah got the news that only eght grls out of the ifteen had been successful n the ntervew. She thought to herself that she was one of the unsuccessful ones, as she had refused to undress durng the ntervew. But she was not regretful, as her parents were aganst her workng n Malaysa. She had told her mother about her encounter wth the old woman n the restaurant, and her mother had expressed strong objectons to the dea. She had gone for the ntervew wthout the knowledge of her mother. But soon after, the old woman came to see her at her place of work and told her that she was among the fortunate few who were selected. The old woman encouraged her to grab the opportunty as, she sad, t was not easy for grls lke her to get good jobs n Malaysa wthout havng to pay even a sngle cent. The old woman left by sayng she hoped Lanah would accept the offer. It took Lanah three months to inally decde to accept the offer. Once agan she tred to get her mother’s blessngs to work n Malaysa. But her mother’s stand remaned unchangeable: “. . . I don’t want. . . . I don’t want. . . . I don’t want. . . .” Lanah inally decded to dsregard her mother’s objecton to her decson, and she notied the old woman of her decson. The next day Lanah met wth the man from the company. He told her that all the passport matters would be arranged by the company. Lanah only needed to provde the passport photos and duplcates of her brth certicate and dentty card. A week later, the passport was ready. She was then told that the journey to Malaysa would be va Zamboanga Cty. Eght grls had been collected, and she should prepare herself for departure very soon. Gven her mother’s objectons, Lanah had to run away from home and stay wth a frend for three nghts before meetng wth the group that was to leave for Malaysa. Transport had been arranged for them to be taken to Manla arport, and they were accompaned to Zamboanga by Madam Lh. They stayed n a hotel, four to a room, n Zamboanga Cty for ive days whle watng for the ferry to Sandakan, Sabah. That irst nght n the hotel room, Lanah thought of her mother and cred. She sad, “When I left my home that evenng, I felt very sad at separatng from my parents, my ssters and brothers. When I stepped out of the house, I prayed to God. . . . ‘Oh my God! Please don’t be angry wth me . . . please forgve me. . . . I dd not tell the truth to my mother.’” When her frends asked her why she cred, “I repled to them that I remember my mother. I come here to go to Malaysa wthout the knowledge of parents. My mother had not allowed me but I cheated her. I had run away from home.” On January 18, 2001, the grls boarded the ferry to Sandakan. Madam Lh. sent them



The Rumor of Trafickng to the ferry and explaned to the grls that a man would pck up them at the Sandakan ferry termnal. She gave the photo of the man to Lanah. The man, she told Lanah, had long har and a small body. “When you arrve, look up at the rght sde of the termnal, the man wll be there.” When they arrved, Lanah saw the man mmedately. “I looked at the photo agan and recognzed the man. He also guessed who we were. He gave a sgnal wth hs rght hand. I approached hm. He sad, ‘How many of you? Eght persons. Where are they? There! Call them here.’” The man gave each of them RM 500 to show to the mmgraton oficer. If asked how many were travelng together, they were to say only one. The man who met them n Sandakan was K, the manager of the dsco n Labuan where she was to work. He brought them from Sandakan to Labuan. There she agan met the man who had ntervewed her n Manla. He was the boss of the company, Boss LT. She was also ntroduced to Mam O, guest relatons oficer of the dsco and a senor worker n the company. Mam O was about ifty years old. She was a Flpna from Zamboanga. As a Mam, she controlled all the women workers of the dsco. She organzed the bookngs of all the grls. When Lanah was brefed by K and Mam O on the work she was to do, she felt her heart would explode and she would de. Her heart sad, “Please what I hear s just a dream, not the truth.” When she heard the truth, her mnd returned to her hometown. She remembered her mother, father, ssters, and brothers. She kept thnkng of escape. She kept thnkng of the future she had wanted wth a husband and chldren. Four days after arrvng n Labuan, she called her mother. “She was cryng . . . angry wth me. ‘Why are you so thck-headed?’ she sad. . . . I knew the job here; I am cryng . . . my mother sad, ‘you talk to your boss that you want to go back to Manla.’ But I sad to my mother, ‘no lah ma I got job here.’” Lanah sad, “Untl now my parents don’t know my job here. My mother asked me what my job s and I only say that my job s good.” For more than two weeks, Lanah locked herself n her quarters. Although the boss pressed her every day to start workng, she refused. Many women also approached Lanah to offer advce. Most told her to start work as soon as possble. Among the advce gven by the frends: “Keep n mnd that here nothng s free. Everythng must be pad for. Quarters rental has to pad each month. Credt due to the company must be pad. Passport’s cost must be pad to the company every month. The everyday necesstes lke food and cosmetcs must be bought wth your own money. So f you don’t work, how can you get the money to cover all the ixed expenses? And then how can you talk about gong back to Phlppnes?” But she was also told, “Why you come here f you have never done ths work! The people here knew well the work they had to do before follow the company here! . . . we had husband before and dvorced . . . we had chldren at home who are growng and need educaton . . . we are here because we want money! You have never had a relatonshp . . . ? No husband and not yet marred . . . stll no baby! So why you come here?” Lanah had brought 7,000 pesos from Manla, the savngs from three months of work n Manla. Every week she exchanged 1,500 pesos wth the moneychanger. After three weeks, when she ran out of pesos, Lanah agreed to commence work. (My thanks to Gusn Saat for permsson to use ths story.)



di a n a wong APPENDIx 2.2. THE STORy OF MAIMUNAH Mamunah s a marred woman of thrty-seven from a rural dstrct n Flores who lves n a rented house n a squatter settlement n Subang Jaya.74 She has completed elementary school and was engaged n farmng before comng to Malaysa a year and a half ago. In Subang, she lves wth her husband, who came to Malaysa several years ago and s now n possesson of a forged red dentty card.75 Ther eldest son s also n Malaysa, but he works n another state, whle ther three younger chldren, who are stll n school, are stll n Flores. She entered Malaysa together wth her husband’s frend, who s from the same vllage of orgn and who works n Malaysa as a lorry drver and also lves n the same resdental area as they do now n Malaysa. On a vst home to the vllage, ths frend had brought a letter from her husband askng her to jon hm n Malaysa. They entered wthout any travel documents, travelng from Ende n Flores to Surabaya by shp (a three-day, two-nght journey, wth three days transt stay n Surabaya), from Surabaya to Duma by bus (ive days and ive nghts wth two days of transt n Duma). From Duma on the Sumatran coast, they used the servces of a taikong (a boatman broker) to cross over to Tg. Sepat on the Malaysan coast by boat, an eght-hour crossng. From Tg. Sepat, they made ther way to ther destnaton n Kuala Lumpur by bus, a journey of another ive hours. The entre journey, ncludng indng the servces of the taikong for the Duma–Tg. Sepat crossng, was organzed by the husband’s frend. The cost of RM 1,000 came n part from her own savngs, n part from her n-laws. When she irst arrved, she found a job as a street cleaner wth a Chnese contractor and was pad RM 20 per day. After three months she left, as the pay was low and always slow n comng. Two weeks later, she found a job as a kongsikong (general laborer) for a Chnese contractor at a constructon ste for whch she was pad RM 30 a day, but she left after four months because the work was too tough. After a week, she found her present job, at whch she has been workng for eght months now, as a restaurant helper. She earns RM 700 monthly. Illegal status s troublesome. She s fearful of roadblocks, and n partcular of “rush” (polce rads) on the housng area. If there s news of an mpendng “rush,” the mgrants don’t sleep and prepare to run away f necessary. The other dsadvantage of not havng a permt s dficulty n gettng work, and the lower wages. She hopes to return to Flores n a year, as the chldren are stll there. She wll use the servces of a taikong to return, at a cost of RM 400.

NOTES 1. Invoked n the Communqué of the Mnsteral Conference of the G8 Countres on Combating Transnational Organized Crime, Moscow, October 19–20, 1999. The G8 countres comprse Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russa, the Unted Kngdom, and the Unted States. The European Unon also partcpates and s represented by the presdent of the European Councl and the presdent of the European Commsson. 2. Communqué of the Mnsteral Conference of the G8 Countres. 3. Karl Polany, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), 140.



The Rumor of Trafickng 4. Dana Wong, “The Semantcs of Mgraton,” Sojourn 4, no. 2 (1989): 275– 285. 5. See Achlle Mbembe’s crtque of ths “smplstc” noton of boundares consttutng terrtoralty and soveregnty n the hstory of the Afrcan state n “At the Edge of the World: Boundares, Terrtoralty and Soveregnty n Afrca,” Public Culture 12, no. 1 (2000): 259–284. 6. See Davd Kyle and Chrstna A. Sracusa, chapter 5, ths volume. 7. Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World.” 8. It has been estmated that n 1997, on the eve of the Asan inancal crss, the estmated number of foregn workers n Malaysa and Thaland alone, two md-szed countres n Southeast Asa, was close to the estmated number of all foregn workers n Europe, .e., between three and three and a half mllon. See Chrs Mannng and Pradp Bhatnagar, “The Movement of Natural Persons n Southeast Asa: How Natural?” http://rspas.anu.edu.au/economcs/publsh/papers/wp2004/wp-econ-2004-02.pdf. 9. See Jo Doezema, “Loose Women or Lost Women: The Re-emergence of the Myth of ‘Whte Slavery’ n Contemporary Dscourses of ‘Trafickng n Women,’” Gender Issues 18, no. 1 (Wnter 2000): 23–50; and Mara L. Kere, “The Vce Trust: A Renterpretaton of the Whte Slavery Scare n the Unted States, 1907–1917,” Journal of Social History 35, no. 1 (2001): 5–41, from whch the followng account s largely derved. 10. Doezema, “Loose Women or Lost Women,” 25. 11. Kere, “The Vce Trust,” 6. 12. Trafic in Souls, drected by George Loane Tucker, 1913. 13. The Inside of The White Slave Trafic, drected by Frank Beal, 1913. 14. Smashing the Vice Trust, drected by unknown, 1914. 15. Doezema, “Loose Women or Lost Women,” 26. 16. Doezema, “Loose Women or Lost Women.” 17. Drawng largely on the 1997 report by the Global Allance Aganst Trafickng n Women (GAATW), authored by M. Wejers and L. Lap-Chew, Doezema notes that much of the “evdence” was based on unrevealed or unveriable sources, that statstcs, where documented, tended to refer to the total number of llegal mgrants or domestc sex workers, and that n fact the evdence seemed to suggest a preponderance of sex workers rather than “coerced vctms” n ths “trafic.” See M. Wejers and L. Lap-Chew, “Trafickng n Women, Forced Labour and Slavery-Lke Practces,” n Marriage, Domestic Labour and Prostitution (Utrecht and Bangkok: The Foundaton Aganst Trafickng n Women [STV]/The Global Allance Aganst Trafickng n Women [GAATW], 1997). 18. See Gallagher for an account of the brusng debates between these two “camps” n the negotatons around the Venna Process. Anne Gallagher, “Human Rghts and the New UN Protocols on Trafickng and Mgrant Smugglng: A Prelmnary Analyss,” Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2001). 19. Fona Davd, “New Threats or Old Stereotypes? The Revval of ‘Trafickng’ as a Dscourse,” paper presented at the Hstory of Crme, Polcng and Punshment Conference, Canberra, December 9–10, 1999. Avalable at http://www.ac.gov.au/ conferences/hcpp/davd/pdf. 20. Doezema, “Loose Women or Lost Women,” 38. 21. Mchael Samers, “An emergng geopoltcs of ‘llegal’ mmgraton n the Euro-



di a n a wong pean Unon,” European Journal of Mgraton and Law, 6: 23–41; and Davd Kyle and Rey Koslowsk, eds., Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Baltmore: Johns Hopkns Unversty Press, 2001). 22. John Morrson and Beth Crosland, “The Trafickng and Smugglng of Refugees: The End Game n European Asylum Polcy?” New Issues in Refugee Research, Workng Paper no. 39, UNHCR, 2001. 23. Jonas Wdgren, “Multnatonal Co-operaton to Combat Trafickng n Mgrants and the Role of Internatonal Organsatons,” paper presented to the 11th IOM Semnar on Internatonal Responses to Trafickng n Mgrants and Safeguardng of Mgrant Rghts, Geneva. October 26–28, 1994. http://www.oefm.org/documents/ TrafickngUndok.pdf. 24. UNHCR, Statstcs, http://www.unhcr.org, accessed January 28, 2003. 25. All igures are from UNHCR 2003. 26. L. Morrs, “Globalzaton, Mgraton and the Naton-State,” British Journal of Sociology 48, no. 2 (1997): 192–209. 27. For an account of the measures undertaken, seen as sgnalng the “endgame” of the asylum system n Europe, see Morrson and Crosland, “Trafickng and Smugglng.” 28. Morrson and Crosland, “Trafickng and Smugglng.” 29. Internatonal Organsaton for Mgraton (IOM). http://www.om.nt/en/who/ man_polces_trafickng.shtml#chap0, accessed Aprl 4, 2003. 30. These nclude the Budapest Process, the Councl of Europe, the European Parlament and Commsson etc. Cf. Morrson and Crosland, “Trafickng and Smugglng.” 31. http://www.unescap.org/wd/04wdresources/03trafick/trafickng-drectoryupdated.pdf. 32. Lz Fekete and Frances Webber, “The Human Trade,” Race and Class 39, no. 1 (1997): 67–74. 33. Davd, “New Threats or Old Stereotypes.” 34. “I do not know f t s possble to use the dscourse of trafickng to the beneit of workers n the sex ndustry, mgrant or otherwse. But I do know that extensve negotatons are gong ahead on ths ssue n the UN at the moment and that t may be more productve to be on the nsde of these dscussons, rather than altogether on the outsde.” Davd, “New Threats or Old Stereotypes,” 7. 35. Gallagher, “Human Rghts and the New UN Protocols,” 975. 36. In bref, these standards requre governments to: (1) prohbt and approprately punsh severe forms of trafickng and (2) make serous and sustaned efforts to elmnate such trafickng. 37. Anne Gallagher and Susu Thatun, “The US Government Report—A Crtque,” Step by Step, newsletter of the UN Inter-Agency Project on Trafickng n Women And Chldren n the Mekong Sub-Regon, Thrd Quarter, 2001, 4. 38. “The consent of a vctm of trafickng n persons to the ntended explotaton shall be rrelevant where any of the means set forth (n the deinton) have been used. Furthermore, the recrutment, transportaton, transfer, harborng or recept of a chld for the purpose of explotaton shall be consdered ‘trafickng n persons’ even f ths does not nvolve any of the means set forth n the deinton.” Protocol aganst the Smugglng of Mgrants by Land, Sea and Ar, Supplementng the Unted Natons Conventon Aganst Transnatonal Organzed Crme, November 15, 2000, and Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punsh Trafickng n Persons, Especally Women



The Rumor of Trafickng and Chldren, November 15, 2000, avalable at http:www.unescobkk.org/culture/ trafickng/deintons.htm. 39. Patrck Twomey, “Europe’s Other Market: Trafickng n People,” European Journal of Migration and Law 2 (2000): 7. 40. Twomey, “Europe’s Other Market,” 8. 41. UNIFEM press release, March 7, 2003. http://www.unfem.org/newsroom/press/ pr_030307_IOM_MOU.html. 42. http://www.om.nt/en/who/man_servce_areas_counter.shtml#traffdef, accessed Aprl 4, 2003. 43. http://www.uncr.t/project_document.htm. 44. Adam Graycar, “Human Smugglng,” paper presented at the Centre for Crmnology, the Unversty of Hong Kong, February 19, 2000. Avalable at http// www.hku.hk/crme/humansmugglng.html. 45. Amy O’Nell Rchard, International Traficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime (Washngton, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intellgence, 1999), 13. Avalable at http://www.ca.gov/es/ monograph/women/trafickng.pdf. 46. Grazano Battstella and Maruja M. B. Ass, “Southeast Asa and the Specter of Unauthorzed Mgraton,” n Unauthorized Migration in Southeast Asia, ed. Grazano Batstella and Maruja M. B. Ass (Manla: Scalabrn Mgraton Center, 2003), 169–227. 47. Mannng and Bhatnagar, “Movement of Natural Persons,” 4. 48. Dana Wong and Teuku Afrzal Teuku Anwar, “Migran Gelap: Irregular Mgrants n Malaysa’s Shadow Economy,” n Unauthorized Migration in Southeast Asia, ed. Batstella and Ass, 169ff. 49. Dana Wong, “The Recrutment of Foregn Labour n Malaysa: From Mgraton System to Guest-worker Regme,” paper presented at the conference on Mgrant Labour n Southeast Asa: Needed Not Wanted, Armdale, December 1–3, 2003. 50. Wong and Afrzal, Migran Gelap, 170. 51. Notable among the few NGOs n the country workng on behalf of foregn mgrants n the country s Tenaganta. Tenaganta has drawn attenton to the ncreasng number of women traficked from countres such as Indonesa, the Phlppnes, Chna, Vetnam, as well as former states of the Sovet Unon, such as Uzbekstan. 52. See Arf Nasuton, “Alran Pekerja Indonesa Malaysa: Kes Tentang Pekerja Indonesa dalam Sektor Pembnaan d Kuala Lumpur, Malaysa” (Ph.D. dssertaton, Unverst Kebangsaan Malaysa, 1997); and Ernst Spaan, “Taikongs and Calos: The Roles of Mddlemen and Brokers n Javanese Internatonal Mgraton,” International Migration Review 28, no. 1 (1994): 93–113. 53. Dana Wong and Gusn Saat, “Trafickng of Persons from the Phlppnes nto Malaysa,” unpublshed report submtted to Unted Natons Interregonal Crme and Justce Research Insttute, 2002. 54. Wong and Afrzal, Migran Gelap, 169–227. 55. A fact often dened, even by mmgraton oficers n the state. Wong and Saat, “Trafickng of Persons from the Phlppnes nto Malaysa,” 30. As the story above ndcates, Lanah s a vctm of trafickng as deined by the Unted Natons Protocol on Trafickng n Persons by vrtue of the decepton whch her employer used to recrut her nto the economy of vce. 56. Ths would approxmate most closely the deinton of “trafickng” as ntroduced n ths essay.



di a n a wong 57. It may be pertnent here to note the tremendous mprovements n publc transportaton n Indonesa over the past decade, whch have smplied long-dstance travel by bus and ferry consderably. 58. Obvously, gven the constrants of llct entry nto the country as well as ts labor market, ths control can only be relatve n nature. 59. The ndustry also encompasses an extensve recrutment sector based n Indonesa. See Sdney Jones, Making Money Off Migrants: The Indonesian Exodus to Malaysia (Hong Kong: Asa 2002 Ltd., and Centre for Asa-Pacic Transformaton Studes, Unversty of Wollongong, 2000). 60. For an account of the parallel systems of foregn labor recrutment n Malaysa, see Wong, “The Recrutment of Foregn Labour n Malaysa.” 61. “Organzed crme s generally deined by US law enforcement agences as crmnal acts commtted by self-perpetuatng, structured, and dscplned assocatons of ndvduals or groups combned together n a herarchcal or coordnated manner. These actvtes are generally conspratoral and tend to nsulate ther leadershp from drect nvolvement. Ther prmary goal s economc gan from llegal actvtes.” Rchard, International Traficking, v. 62. Rchard, International Traficking, v. 63. Davd, “New Threats Or Old Stereotypes,” 6. 64. Gallagher, “Human Rghts and the New UN Protocols,” 59. 65. Malcolm Anderson, “The Transformaton of Border Controls. A European Precedent?” n The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe, ed. Peter Andreas and T. Snyder (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Lttleield, 2001), 15–29. 66. Anderson, “Transformaton of Border Controls,” 18. 67. John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 2000). 68. Anderson, “Transformaton of Border Controls,” 16. 69. Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World,” 271. 70. Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World,” 267. 71. See Wllem van Schendel, chapter 1, ths volume. 72. The asylum seekers from exotc thrd-world countres from the horn of Afrca such as Ethopa and Ertrea, or from central Asa such as Afghanstan, who made ther way nto the asylum regme of countres n the European Unon represented but the tp of the ceberg. Hundreds of thousands of Ertreans leeng the ightng n the horn led—and settled—n the Sudan, as dd smlar numbers of Afghan refugees n Pakstan and Iran. By 1984, accordng to the UNHCR, there were some 500,000 Ethopans, most of whom were Ertreans, n Sudan, and 2,500,000 Afghans n Pakstan. Although anmosty and ll feelng at the local level has not been absent, these large ntakes of populaton streamng across the border—and remanng wthn—dd not generate “boundary crses” and “moral pancs” of the sort whch emerged n the inal decade of the twenteth century n Western Europe and the Unted States. 73. James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale Unversty Press, 1998). 74. Ths s a mddle-class neghborhood n the captal cty of Malaysa. 75. A red dentty card s a personal dentty document ssued to foregners wth permanent resdent status n the country.

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Talkng Lke a State

three Talking Like a State Drugs, Borders, and the Language of Control Paul Gootenberg

Ths chapter explores the relatonshps between llct drug lows and state borders. The larger theme, for other objects-n-low, s how languages of “control” underle ther constructon and mantenance as illicit and crmnalzed lows. Researchers mght usefully make state dscourses about such lows an explct object of study. But n dong so they should also beware of the possble ntellectual and poltcal ptfalls of “talkng lke a state”—that s, of adoptng the categores or characterzatons of the llct deployed by polcng and regulatory agences—for thnkng productvely about lows. The chapter wnds ts way to these deas by addressng three topcs: irst, the relaton of drugs to “commodty studes” wrt large (how drugs were dfferentated from other goods durng the hstorcal rse of commercal and ndustral captalsm); second, the relaton of drugs to the buldng of borders and states; and thrd, the role of bureaucratc control language n markng and naturalzng the thn lne between “controlled substances” and freer commodtes. A crtcal deinton: “drugs”—whch are actually trcky to deine—are psychoactve substances and commodtes whch for a varety of reasons snce 1900 have been construed as health or socetal “dangers” by modern

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pau l g o o t en berg states, medcal authortes, and regulatory cultures, and whch are now globally prohbted n producton, use, and sale.1 In commonsense terms we know exactly what they are—heron, cocane, marjuana, ecstasy, quaaludes, methamphetamnes, LSD, etc.—but they are often dficult to dsentangle from other legal and popular mnd-alterng commodtes (such as coffee, tea, alcohol, tobacco, kola nut) or valorzed “tradtonal” ones (such as magc mushrooms, yage, kava, qat, coca leaf, peyote cactus) or legal and commercal scentic-medcnal drugs (ether, morphne, Demerol, sterods, Prozac, Vagra). There s no hard-and-fast alkalodal or natural dstncton between llct drugs and other drug-lke goods. Indeed, the “set and settng” of commodtes n general (for example, the assocatons generated by advertsng or by the power of money tself) may well nduce mnd-alterng effects or addctve attracton n ther consumers. Hence the need to secure legal and dscursve borders between llct drugs and analogous commodtes, pleasures, and medcnes, and the need for nowhuge nternatonal bureaucraces (from the DEA to INTERPOL) devoted to the day-to-day drty work of ightng drug lows. The global trade n llct drugs—worth about US$300–500 bllon n “street sales” annually—s among the world’s largest commodty trades, everywhere n tandem wth other lows and nsttutons, despte these massve efforts at control. Drugs Are/Are Not Like Other Global Commodities The economc forces drvng cocane’s producton and generatng hostlty towards t are no dfferent today from what they were three centures ago when the rsng commerce n tea, coffee, sugar and tobacco lnked Western Europe to ts tropcal colones and revolutonzed world consumpton.2 —Sdney W. Mntz, “The Forefathers of Crack” Heron s emergng as the deal product for a global [narcotcs] ndustry that s streamlnng for the post 9/11 age—slashng payrolls, lattenng herarches, marketng aggressvely and keepng a low proile.3 —Matthew Brzeznsk

A useful startng pont s to smply consder drugs as just lke “other commodtes,” susceptble to the same approaches customarly used n nterdscplnary commodty studes. Ths s a good start because economc or structural perspectves help to cool down some of the passonate rhetorc (or state talk) that dstorts much of the nner workngs of modern drug lows. Thus, to take some workng examples, the boomng world heron trade can be seen as comprsng shftng patterns of supply and demand, proitseekng and rsk-takng entrepreneurs, ratonalzed labor and schedules for

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Talkng Lke a State lexble producton, extensve networks of mddlemen and retalers, transport and outsourcng dlemmas, product testng and product substtuton, and a crunchng global competton. In ths, drugs are the consummate “free-market” actvty—attractng busnessmen as voracous or heroc as any multnatonal CEO, wth tens of thousands of employees and dynamc spn-off effects. Or the Andean-U.S. cocane low can be approached as a “poltcal economy” problem, where rval states and rent-seekng nterest groups (entrenched lobbes, syndcates, poltcal factons, bureaucraces) struggle over the proits and perls of the trade, frustratng along the way the domnant state strateges of control.4 Drugs are also essental lows n globalzaton theory; now clearly a “global habt,” llct drugs were among the irst global goods to supersede borders and regulatory states n the quest for proit by, for example, forgng new markets n Eastern European postcommunst regmes (wth ther decadent consumersm) or establshng lexble producton stes and transshpment routes across neo-lberal Latn Amerca and fourth-world sub-Saharan Afrca—ahead of statst nternatonal cops and drug represson. Globalzaton and ts nequaltes make a mockery of hard-lne deas of drug-war “vctory.” Drug trades are both the undersde and product of trade lberalzaton; pressures for enhanced commerce and for shrnkng states collde wth the dctates of tghter control over unwanted trades. Nowhere s ths tenson clearer than wth NAFTA and ntensied smugglng and mltarzaton along the U.S.-Mexco border durng the 1990s. Another example s that the locaton and typology of dstnctve layers of drug lows (street dealng, wholesale “kngpn” dstrbuton rngs) can be modeled by economc geographers. The “crack” dealers of East Harlem are rpe for class and ethnographc analyss—of how dsplaced Carbbean peasants and ex–factory workers ind occupatonal “respect,” much lke the coca-growng peasants of eastern Peru and Bolva, thousands of klometers away.5 Example: from trade theory, drug prohbton/nterdcton acts as protectve tarff walls. The early 1970s U.S. crackdown on mported Mexcan marjuana trafic n turn gave a huge boost to the domestc “home-grown” grass ndustry, whch, makng strkng productvty strdes, has emerged as rural Amerca’s number one “cash crop.” Or the World-Systems model of “commodty chans” s suggestve for takng us beyond the bfurcated dea of drugs as drven by supply and demand. Such socologcal deas foreground the lnkages between powerladen geographes of consumpton and producton. Ths approach mght help explan how lucratve world drug economes, where the value of drug commodtes multples hundreds of tmes from producers to consumers, nvolve such desperate actors (drt-poor poppy farmers n Myanmar; home-

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pau l g o o t en berg less Mexcan street gangs n L.A.) at ts extremes.6 All these are hghly useful and legtmate commodty approaches to drug lows. Seeng drugs as commodtes s also historically deeper; t helps queston how llct drugs were “made” durng the dual process of formng early modern world captalsm and modern natonal states. Hstorans of commodtes know that key stmulants—foregn spces, coffee, tobacco, chocolate—played deinng roles n consumpton and class styles n the constructon of European captalsm. The prolferatng eghteenth-century London coffeehouse, followng the rch nterpretaton of hstoran Wolfgang Schvelbusch, brought wth t a new mentalty, and nsttutons, for bourgeos poltcs and enterprse—ncludng the nsurance empre of Lloyds. Startng n the late sxteenth century, European colonalsm jumpstarted on the networks and revenue wndfalls made possble by new staples such as Amercan tobacco—arguably the irst modern “world commodty.” Habt-formng captve “drug-foods” developed taxable “cultures of dependence” lke those of tobacco, rum, and tea n Anglo North Amerca. Subsequent Brtsh mperalsm conquered much of Asa usng the weapons of tea plantatons and smokng-opum commerce, forcbly fosted upon Inda and Chna durng the nneteenth-century colonal “opum wars.” The rse of the world sugar ndustry, captured n the holstc anthropologcal optc of Sdney Mntz, connects the expulson and enslavement of mllons of Afrcans to Brazl and the Carbbean to the transformaton of sucrose from a Medterranean medcnal luxury nto the deinng artcle of the modern Englsh ndustral workng-class lfestyle.7 The sugar plantaton was a precursor to the factory ndustral revoluton, and as a quck non-nutrtonal ix, sugar even antcpates the post-ndustral Amercan urban crack boom of the 1980s. One promnent hstoran of drugs dubs these broad cultural shfts as captalsm’s “Psychoactve Revoluton.” Not all of these new substances ganed an easy acceptance n the West, though these early modern transformatons (often n the uses, forms, and cultures of stmulants) occurred before the post-1900 emergence of the global movement for drug prohbtons. The central queston rased by ths burgeonng hstorcal lterature, now explct n Davd Courtwrght’s recent Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World, s how and why certan tradable drugs become legtmate commodtes of European taste whle others become downgraded by the late nneteenth century nto undesred parah substances.8 The classcal dlemma of early states was how to tax the lush revenues afforded by drug-foods, tobacco, sugar, tea, alcohol, opum, whch contrbuted to a weghty early state and colonal nterest n ther iscal demarcaton and control. There were other commodty sets too: ndgenous drug substances 0

Talkng Lke a State and knowledge that was not readly or culturally exportable (n the natve Amercan drug cornucopa alone, Andean coca leaf, Amazonan yage, Mexcan peyote, Oaxacan mushrooms, Aztec mornng glores, Colomban daturas, Paraguayan mate). Only today can these be sampled as goods n the global vllage of Queens, N.Y., shaman gude servces ncluded. Another group of drug commodtes were powerful derved alkalods of late-nneteenth-century modern chemstry and medcne such as cocane, puried caffene, and heron, “heroc” new drug commodtes (hence the Bayer brand name “Heron”) that precptously rose and fell n medcal and socal prestge. In the md-twenteth century, certan synthetcs (famously, LSD n the 1960s) actually escaped from secret government labs (nvolvng CIA experments n “mnd control”) and became swftly and purposefully transformed nto mass-meda commodtes to fulill the mnd-expandng (hence “psychedelc”) crusades of ts proponents.9 In the 1990s, ths cycle of medcal promoton–recreatonal dsrepute assumed post-modern velocty, wth new corporate synthetc pankllers lke Oxycontn, n the unlkely settng of rural Appalacha. In sum, commodty perspectves can be used to produce a clearer and more relatonal portrat of the economc nterests and structures behnd global drug lows that s more objectve than the moblzng ant-drug mis-nformaton and forced nterpretatons of governments and of alled “drug control” professonals (such as medcal addcton specalsts). They are hstorcally rcher too: pror to the last century, drugs were not generally dvded nto llct and lct classes, and as border-crossng commodtes they actually played vanguard economc and cultural roles n the constructon of the modern world. For some economsts—odd bedfellows such as Mlton Fredman and Lester Thurow—ths artical dvde generates a radcal crtque of the perverse prce theory behnd drug prohbtons polcy. The ield of “commodty studes,” tself n renassance, s rch wth mplcatons for understandng drugs, nformed by the anthropologcal foundatons and global constructonsm of Arjun Appadura’s “socal lfe of thngs.”10 But where commodty and structural perspectves fall short s n decpherng the mysteres of how certan substances became classed as “good” and “bad” n the irst place (for our bodes, mnds, and socetes) and the often wldly rratonal rhetorc (racal or gender pancs) that accompaned the establshment and mantenance of ant-drug prohbtons. Why do mndor culture-alterng drugs str up such ntensely ambvalent passons, what poneer drug researcher Sgmund Freud, n the last of hs famous 1880s “cocane papers,” dubbed a “cravng for and dread” of drugs?11 Not to menton the gross rratonaltes that keep ths global dysfunctonal system gong after more than a century of falures. 0

pau l g o o t en berg Drugs on the Borders of the State What crosses the blood-bran barrer s now open to the same survellance as what crosses nternatonal borders. There s a customs n the cranum, a Checkpont Conscousness.12 —Davd Lenson

Before movng beyond borders, we need to look at the juncton of drugs wth the border and “the state.” Why do llct drugs exhbt such a known propensty for border crossngs and what are ther larger ntersectons wth statst regulatory spaces? How does “talkng lke a state” help stake out these ofical (or artical) lct and llct drug spaces? These are questons rfe wth paradox. A short answer to the queston of drugs-across-borders s that ecologcal condtons and local knowledge govern the dstance that drugs travel, and necessarly across many borders. Most alkalodal plants, the orgnal natural plant drugs lke tea, opates, kola, cannabs, and coca, were sem-tropcal ones, whereas most modern consumers of stmulant plants emerged n northern ndustral countres (hstorcally poor n drug resources or drug cultures, drowned out by centures of alcohol use).13 Thus, border crossng was ntally an economc queston of “natural” or comparatve advantage, especally gven the low producton cost of raw materals lke poppy n central Asa. Ths argument served well nto the late nneteenth century and was even adopted by colonal authortes (Brtsh, Dutch, German, French), who expermented n mperal botancal gardens wth new psychotropc plants and command labor as colonal staples. Oftentmes, gong back, local peasant communtes were the only ones who harbored the techncal agraran lore for these drug plants, as well as of ther medcnal or sprtual-sensory qualtes, just as today multnatonal pharmaceutcal irms seek controversal botanc patentng pacts wth ran forest trbes. An opum tral exsted, run by Greek, Jewsh, and Armenan merchants, across the mddle-eastern Golden Crescent. Regonal hashsh crcuts lowed before nneteenth-century colonalsm dvved up South Asa and North Afrca nto separate spheres, pqung the nterest of both concerned colonal oficals and ntrgued ant-establshment Parsan ntellectuals and bohemans. A three-century nterregonal Spansh colonal coca leaf tral traversed what s now Peru, Bolva, Chle, and northern Argentna, largely for mne workers and other hard laborers. It predated the creaton of a global taste and market for coca, whch only started wth the French luxury commodty drnk Vin Mariani n 1863, and later ndustralzed durng the German medcnal kocain boom of 1884–1887.14

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Talkng Lke a State Drug trades may also arse out of long-standng legal long-dstance or related contraband trades. Colomba’s 1970s “drug lords” began wth prme ntermedary locaton and the experence of smugglng cgarettes n the 1950s and marjuana n “the 60s”; they also exploted a new tral of undocumented Colomban émgré workers n Mam and New York. Amphetamne (“speed”) s obvous n followng truckng routes almost everywhere. Drugs are specally suted to long-dstance trade, for begnnng lfe as luxures, they are exemplary hgh value-to-weght tems that more than pay for freght costs. Only jewels such as damonds travel wth such unversal ease. From ths vew, the orgnal drug low s born autonomously, wth borders an obstacle later supermposed wth the rse of modern states and later evolvng nto an obstacle course as drugs became categorzed, outlawed, and tracked by expandng Western power durng the twenteth century. Durng the same post-1900 era, borders have generally become better deined and less permeable. Gven the notorously hgh prce “elastcty of demand” for habt-formng products, once llegal to sell, drugs easly take care of the extra “rsk premum” demanded by smugglng operatons. Moreover, hghly concentrated reined modern drugs (lke cocane or heron) are physcally smple to conceal, unlke, say, bulky cgarettes or slks. Artical llctness premums compensate the rsk that a porton of shpments (some 10 to 30 percent n ofical guesses) s bound to be sezed. Once ths llctness cycle accelerated durng chase-’em-down drug wars, irst wth post-war Mddle Eastern heron, then wth 1970s Andean cocane, the amount of these drugs produced skyrocketed and ther prces plummeted, makng them dramatcally avalable for the masses (as n the nfamous downward prce cycle of cocane—crack of the md-1980s). As a related rule, “harder” drugs become more proitable to market than softer drugs. Only the DEA acts oblvous to ths perverse prce cycle by premsng drug wars on the ppe dream that nterdcton drves up drug prces and dscourages ther use. The amounts sezed to actually do ths would need to be unrealstcally hgh (above 80 percent of drugs produced). And hstorcal data show the opposte; they show, after an ntal bump up wth the creaton of black markets, secularly fallng prces for llegal drugs. Of course, wth technologcal revolutons and gallopng global ntegraton, strct geographc factors no longer preval. Even earler, colonalsm swept ndgenous coca to East Asa (Dutch Java) for a spectacular commercal boomlet of the 1920s and 1930s; Paraguayan yerba-mate became a useful habt of tnerant Syran workers from Buenos Ares; arlfted Andean drugs now cross through Afrcan ctes wth lttle pror expertse n the

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pau l g o o t en berg global logstcs of drugs. In the md-1990s, pressurzed llterate Colomban peasants quckly learned the age-old secrets of qualty opates cultvaton and processng (reputedly tutored by mported Asan specalsts), becomng North Amerca’s hgh-end heron suppler n less than a decade.15 Fast-expandng synthetcs, “ATSs,” ecstasy (MDMA), and the ultmate yuppe “desgner” drugs (sometmes desgned to temporarly evade chemcally deined UN bans) can all be proitably produced “at home,” but stll drft across borders for safe haven. For example, global ecstasy now slps nto the Unted States from Holland by way of Israel know-how and the Internet. A strong possblty—more lkely after expanded 9/11 mltarzed border survellance—s genetc engneerng of hgh-alkalod hybrd plants, for example, an Iowa corn stalk that could actually produce perfectly good cocane. We have prevewed ths border substtuton wth marjuana snce the 1960s. Once mported and branded from Colomba, Panama, Jamaca, and Mexco (Colomban “Gold,” “Oaxaqueño”), marjuana s now bascally a domestc cottage ndustry n the Unted States, grown hydroponcally (an ndoor “sea of green”) and fuelng the blghted rural economes of Georga, Tennessee, and northern Calforna. Ths s manly thanks to Rchard Nxon’s early 1970s “Operaton Intercept” (bulky grass was easy to smell out and catch at borders), especally the toxc sprayng of Mexcan weed, and thanks to an army of homegrown genetcsts (some gong Dutch), who planted the seeds of ths new Amercan ndustry. Buyng Amercan has also meant that the old-fashoned “nckel bag” of wld mport weed or hash has been shunted asde by prcey hgh-THC dope, “Snsemlla” hybrds wth scary names lke “Whte Avalanche,” that many veterans of the 1960s can barely tolerate.16 Wth hgh-tech possbltes, the older comparatve advantage of drugs are no longer a gven. The second level of explanaton for drugs-across-borders s forced dsperson. Once certan drugs became restrcted or banned—startng wth a long lne of nternatonal opates conventons snce 1912—they fast escaped to scattered zones where producton could be safely concealed and pursued. Commerce became smugglng, and the newly deined crme of “narcotcs peddlng” became tanted n the West as an arch-evl crme. Yet untl the 1950s, wth the excepton of tghtly governed colones, most of the globe was not effectvely enveloped by ths paper prohbtons system, whch was not consoldated untl today’s stll-hegemonc 1961 UN Sngle Conventon on Narcotc Drugs. Ths treaty enshrned the Amercan deal, artculated snce 1912, of trackng drugs to ther “source” and progressvely eradcatng ther raw materals where they are grown abroad. So, after 1960, no legal cross-border safe havens for drugs remaned, though weak enforcement

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Talkng Lke a State capactes or ncentves (or a degree of cultural tolerance) remaned a factor n uneven drug regulatory spaces. Moreover, drug cops were hstorcally slow to cross borders and share nformaton and tactcs—the nternatonalzaton of drug agents (from the Unted States, UN, or INTERPOL) was a gradual affar, not acheved on any sgnicant scale untl the 1970s.17 Snce then, we have a famlar pattern: a greater polcng squeeze at borders or across them to chase down courers, reiners, or peasants leads to a wder dsperson of llct actvtes nto even more naccessble ntractable drug terrtores—deserts, jungles, mountans. Drug suppresson radcally elevates llct proits, but combnes wth geopoltcal factors n shapng where drugs end up lowng. Thus the typcal global hot zone of drug producton, whether remote from or close to inal markets, s a zone of refuge, wth a dsplaced, alenated, or ethncally segregated peasantry (for workng drug plantatons) and an especally weak state or ll-deined borders. A hstory of dsntegratng warfare helps, or so t seems. The “Golden Trangle,” “the Golden Crescent,” the uncharted danger-rdden Afghan-Pakstan mountan border, the Andean sub-tropcal Huallaga Valley or Chaparé Amazonan fronters, the northern Mexcan Serra Madre badlands of Snaloa and Chhuahua, devastated peasant Guatemala, Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, southern Colomba’s war-torn Putumayo and Caqueta forests—most of these areas host lourshng “borderlands” cultures, often antagonstc to natonal poltcal centers, where multple borders converge, weakly polced (n part because so easly broached by smugglers), and where drug producton inds not only securty but a commtted materal or even deologcal base among desttute, refugee, or colonzng peasants and regonal mddlemen. The armed “hll trbes” of the Golden Trangle are a classc example. (A smlar llct geography of drug entrepôt ctes—say, Rotterdam, Tjuana, Marselle, Shangha—would make a great book.) I am stressng these socal-spatal geographes over commonly held deas that essentalze the llct commodtes themselves, such as former World Banker Paul Coller’s well-known noton of “conlct”-nsprng or “grevance” “goods,” n whch drugs notably igure. And f global poltcal nsttutons push drug makng nto such forbddng zones, they have been exled to the proverbal “brar patch”—perfect areas for thrvng drug cultures. Another factor s the partcular nature of the state. Economst Francsco Thoum has rgorously surveyed competng theores of Colomba’s true advantage n the drugs trade, and he hghlghts ts “weak state,” one that was easly niltrated or bypassed by rapdly enrched drug lords of the 1970s and 1980s.18 Peru’s Huallaga Valley became an rresstble llct coca

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pau l g o o t en berg haven n the early 1970s when the strong-state leftst experment of the Velasco era collapsed, leavng thousands of colonzed farmers there bereft of publc servces and control. Attempts to artically “strengthen” llegtmate or low-nsttutonalzed drug-producng states, such as mltarzng Amercan ad to Peru and Bolva durng the 1990s, have usually led to ntensied volence and represson on the ground, and even f successful (snce many local authortes and generals work wth drug traders) has led to the “ext” of the ndustry to even wlder terrtores—such as the dramatc concentraton n the late 1990s of coca-cocane, vertcally ntegrated, n guerrlla-run, stateless borderlands of southern Colomba. “Narco” states, Banzer’s Bolva of the 1970s or Norega’s Panama of the 1980s, are typcally totterng or non-nsttutonal ones. Paradoxcally, “neo-lberalsm” has meant a prolferaton of such stes by brngng on thrd-world state collapse, a phenomenon that also worres ant-terrorst specalsts. Now, drug platforms quckly shft locales, jumpng across borders wth the greatest of ease, a behavor commonly dubbed the “balloonng effect” from the enforcement perspectve. In current memory, the sheer tonnage of llct drugs placed on world markets never “ratchets down,” but t does constantly shft provenance and product mx. There are some cardnal paradoxes of drugs-across-borders—beyond the central one that exportng and uppng drug represson usually spawns condtons and ncentves that worsen “the problem.”19 The other major related fallacy s seeng borders as statc gven “thngs”—nstead of lud spatal relatonshps under constant constructon and renovaton, manly from fuzzy or contested fronters, over most of the last century. The border controls that exst today (nformaton gatherng, physcal barrers, survellance, ntrcate iscal and legal operatons) were barely n place ifty years ago, and before that not even the ndvdual passport was unversal. One wonders what the drug trade tself (along wth stgmatzaton and control of undocumented mgrants) has meant for the hardenng of borders, say, on the southern U.S. rm. Across the globe n Chnese hstory, scholars now talk of “opum regmes,” a suggestve approach that drugs, rather than undermnng states, subtly and progressvely added to ther novel capactes and controls durng the nneteenth century.20 Borders are never sealed to drugs. It s post-9/11 publc knowledge that less than 2 percent of all freght nto North Amerca s physcally nspected n any fashon, hgh- or lowtech, no matter how motvated the state s. Borders wll reman permeable and now exst metaphyscally n every arport, pleasure boat, computer, and bankng termnal. A second related paradox s how the border trafic of drugs nto the Unted States and Europe s rarely seen as a two-way street. Certan tems 0

Talkng Lke a State n the exchange are lost from vew, lke most of the laundered cash proits (often va “legtmate busnesses” or respectable barter goods lke upscale cars), the small-arms low, or chemcal nputs nto drug terrtores. Borders, for poltcal reasons, also seem to mask the end of any “vsblty” of murky trafickng organzatons. We rarely wll see how the borderlander Arrellano-Félx or García-Abrego gangs operated on “the other sde” of the Mexcan-U.S. dvde, though proits are astronomcal n domestc dstrbuton, whereas the meda exaggerate the vgor and organzaton of “cartels” on the thrd-world sde. (Ths was one compellng aspect of the smulacra Hollywood blockbuster Trafic, orgnally made about the low of Asan opates to Brtan: t reveled n these border mbrcatons, f stll colorng ts Mexcan landscapes n omnous sepa tones.) The frequent complant of Latn Amercans about drug dscourse s just ths: North Amercan “demand”-drven, the drugs tral mysterously “stops” at the border, where the drugs are apparently dumped, wth no one of note ever mplcated n the domestc poltcal economy. Needless to say, the drug-ntensied border regon also becomes an area of heghtened rsk opportunty, servces, and nterchange, even for coveted nformaton about the lows. States erect the borders, crclng themselves protectvely, so t s worth ponderng the basc relatons of states and llct drugs—bearng n mnd the world of dfferng state styles (at ther stark smplest, Amercan, European, and thrd-world) and dscourses. The relaton looks more “symbotc” than the zero-sum oicilista dea that governments ban and ight bad drugs and that snster narcotcs dealers subvert states and rules. Much s wrtten on ths theme snce drug lteratures are characterstcally “state-centrc.” Much of ths analyss centers on the U.S. state—the lead polty, hstorcally, n settng world patterns and norms of drug control.21 To begn, the relaton s structurally “ambvalent”—analogous to the love-hate relatonshp of drugs (as remedy and scourge) that Dr. Davd Musto has dagnosed as “the Amercan Dsease,” a deep, almost Freudan tenson behnd the orgnal move to drug prohbtons from 1900 to 1920. Denal contnues to rule drug polces, startng wth poltcal denal that there s much endgame n zero-sum warrng on substances. The core dynamc functons under nsttutonal denal: that the harder we ban them, the harder we press aganst exstng drug trades, the more lucratve they become, resultng n ever more extended and socally njurous drugs. Ths equaton s sometmes crtcally analyzed as a varety of permanent unquestonable “drug-war poltcs,” analogous to the permanent “Natonal Securty” state and mltary-ndustral complex that domnated the Cold War.22 Ideologcal and symbolc obfuscaton, or a generalzed suspended publc belef, loom central to state-declared drug wars. 

pau l g o o t en berg So other nterpretatons arse, of hdden purposes behnd the stated objectves and speech of governmental and nternatonal ant-drug forces. Some are frankly conspratoral and unfortunately have ther grans of truth. For nstance, that ntellgence servces and ther alles proit from drug trades s well-documented. They sometmes have, snce the covert wars the CIA launched throughout the Cold War and now beyond were fought out n many of the same thrd-world refuge zones, whch offer underground contacts, organzaton, expertse, and nvsble fundng. (As busnessmen, some drug traders have been concerted ant-communsts, especally as Marxst states proved to be the only ones effectve at stampng out drugs). The ant-communst maia of southern Europe, protagonsts of the “French Connecton” of the 1950s and 1960s, were no strangers to Alled spes and covert-ops, some inanced by untraceable drug proits. Alfred McCoy long ago rchly exposed the roles assumed by drug-runnng CIA surrogate armes n Cold War Southeast Asa, even as U.S. troops and returnng vets became hooked on ther Asan heron. A smlar epsode and charge surfaced wth Reagan’s “Iran-Contra” prates of the 1980s (recently revved n controversal urban legends that ascrbe the spread of crack n Afrcan Amercan communtes to CIA plots) and wll no doubt rse agan n the current al-Qaeda wars, snce our frends and peasants n Afghanstan have begun quckly sowng the poppes strctly scorned by the Talban.23 A problem wth these popular theores from the left s that they share the relexve ant-drug moralsm of the rght: rather than evl cartels, evl CIA drugs are behnd Amercan moral decay. But such mperal poltcal allances and entanglements can, at best, only partally explan drug empres. Others propose, wth equal serousness, the dea that swellng drug bureaucraces serve ulteror purposes—concrete ones, as n Edward Jay Epsten’s classc Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America, whch portrayed the brth of the DEA n 1972 as the lnchpn of Rchard Nxon’s larger project of a repressve central state n the U.S., the one that stumbled nto Watergate. For sure, the DEA (and drug law enforcement generally) work to the detrment of cvl lbertes, especally of poor people of color, who snce the 1980s have made the Unted States (dsgracefully) the world’s leadng country n terms of ctzens ncarcerated. Poltcans routnely cultvate drug menaces as classc socologcal “moral pancs” to dvert attenton from root causes n urban socal dstress. The Reagan-Bush cocane drug war of the 1980s, wth ts racally encoded hystera about “crack babes,” was embedded n sharply worsenng socal nequalty n the Unted States and the bpartsan abandonment of the urban under-



Talkng Lke a State class. It hardly mattered that “crack babes” were another urban legend; the mage nsttutonalzed “blame the vctm” and lnked t to the threat of faraway dark-hued Bolvan peasants to boot.24 Stll, ofical motves of poltcal control and structural racsm also make partal accounts of state drug nterest. Other scholars present less frghtenng “bureaucratc” models. Government agences are not very good at ightng elusve non-state networks, learnng from the past, or at graspng wde-rangng Mertonan “unntended consequences of socal acton.” Or that n poltcal cycles, or wthn topheavy organzatons, the long run s dficult to conceve, allowng the poltcal domnance of contradctory short-term solutons lke greater drug represson. Interestngly, some agences, such as the CIA, appear less nvested than others n the drug war and thus contnue to produce (unheeded) ntellgence reports that warn of ts futle or dre consequences abroad.25 Some pont to materal vested nterests created by drug warrng—larger, skyrocketng “war” budgets n a war wthout end. Local U.S. polce forces, wth dmnshng federal ad, can lve off proceeds of coniscated “dealers” property, wth scant concern for consttutonal due process for the polcy’s vctms. In the bref 1990s nterlude between the Cold War and the global war on terrorsm, many analysts saw growng mltary nterest n drug wars as msson-enhancng budgetary poltcs. In polcng poltcs, the pyramdal cell structure of drug trades ensures that hgher-ups garner far more “protecton” and mmunty than exposed foot solders or users on the street, who nsttutonally swell prson facltes and state budgets. Medatng inancal nsttutons, such as Anglo banks n Mam or Houston, are relatvely mmune from prosecuton. All these deas suggest that drug traders and ant-drug warrors are actually n nsttutonalzed colluson. They need one another to prosper. “Narco-dplomacy,” Rchard Frman’s term for state-to-state drug relatons, has long ptted a focused monomanacal Amercan state nterest (exportng drug prohbtons, “wnnng” the drug battle abroad) aganst far more varegated overseas mnstres, agendas, or states.26 On the ground —say n the U.S.-sponsored UMOPAR ant-coca strke force and eradcaton program n Bolva’s Chaparé—these bureaucratc relatons fuel a number of permanently defeatst paradoxes that sustan rather than curtal llct producton. The low of ad depends on the low of drugs, as Peruvan generals also learned wth the spgot of the Huallaga Valley. Gven these dynamcs, some drug-makng states have spawned rent-seekng states-wthn-states, replete wth servces and mn-monopoles of protectve volence, local armes, or socal movements labeled wth the 1980s



pau l g o o t en berg Reagante msnomer of “narco-terrorsm.” Some leftst guerrlla groups too, such as Peru’s Sendero Luminoso and now the Colomban FARC, have n fact taken advantage of drug money and the unpopularty of drug polces among peasants to sustan themselves. Durng the 1950s and beyond, U.S. narcotcs oficals routnely equated drug peddlng wth “Communsm,” overrdng realty, n order to mpress budget-producng lawmakers. The Unted States vents frustraton at such complcated drug war “alles,” who ndeed must stll pass through the annual congressonal rtual of certfyng entre governments as “drty” or “clean.” “Corrupton” s the key word n these relatonshps—of drugs to states, and the Unted States to alles across borders. Corrupton can be a blndng phrase to the volence and graft opportunty that exported polces have wrought on neghborng states and peoples, for example, those of Colomba, who suffered the terrorsm spawned by the late-1980s U.S. campagn for the forced extradton of natonal drug igures.27 In a straght poltcal scence sense, systemc corrupton seems to undermne the very state nsttutons and legtmacy, such as the enhanced “rule of law,” needed to combat llct actvtes n the long run. But brbery and lke practces also serve as adaptve responses to bad laws or to the perceved gap between mperatves and realtes—as n the colonal Spansh-Amercan bureaucratc adage, apparently stll alve, of “we lsten but do not obey.” Corrupton may be the sole method avalable for states to surrepttously tax, as t were, the llct economes of drugs: to appease low-pad dsgruntled bureaucrats, loat a weak natonal currency, or even to pay off the IMF. Drug money n the thrd world sometmes (not always) has redstrbutve effects that are just—symbolcally at least takng from L.A. yuppes and gvng to the comunero slum dwellers of Medellín, where the poor nstnctvely apprecated the economc populsm and publc servces (lke lghted neghborhood soccer ields) of drug lords lke Escobar. The unavodable facts are that underpad cvl servants and oficers n most of the world have every ncentve to work wth local drug trades rather than fulill external agendas—or better yet, to work for both. The moblzng force of easy export dollars s legendary. For example, the Mexcan state, wth graft and secrecy oled by sx decades of PRI one-party rule, entered a inal stage of “kleptocracy” n the 1990s, fueled by the proxmty of the U.S. drugs market and the squeeze put on the Mam cocane corrdor of the 1980s. Mexcan transshpment grew swftly to ill the vod and blurred the thn lne separatng crmnal and state actvtes: the neo-lberal presdent’s entrepreneural brother looted the state n cahoots wth llct empres, as was a facton of hs ncreasngly fratrcdal poltcal party; the mnstry of



Talkng Lke a State transport and communcatons bult faster cocane routes to the north; the modernzng drug czar (General Guttérez Rebollo), a U.S. ntellgence partner, embarrassngly turned out to be on the payroll of northern maias (also dramatzed n the move Trafic); popular sngers heralded gun-totng drug runners as new folk desperados. Corrupton, fanned by Amercan drug and trade polces, became so nsttutonal as to preclude serous U.S. efforts to use the mplodng Mexcan state aganst drugs.28 Yet systemc graft can sometmes prove functonal too. The long regn of Fujmor-Montesnos n Peru (1990–2001), though a more “corrupt” regme than anyone magned (outsde ts CIA handlers and vdeotapers), was also a qute good one for dealng wth the U.S. foregn polcy objectve of haltng terrorst-nspred state dsntegraton and the Huallaga cocane trades, both of whch were reversed by a strong mx of Fujmor nsder deals and represson. So t s hard to say a priori whom “corrupton” serves: freer markets, a dysfunctonal state, drug lords, the people, the DEA. But overall, the lct states system and llct drug lows look far from mutually exclusve. Languages of Control The sgnicance of drugs s dstended wth veled socal meanngs; t s ther status as Other that permts ths overloadng.29 —Marek Kohn

By tranng and nclnaton, I am not one to slp nto the dscursve or lngustc “turn”—the wldly popular dea among 1990s academcs (under the nluence of cross-border lows of French theory) that socal realtes are “constructed” by the language, categores, or representatons used to depct them, and hence that everything s ntrnscally functonal to “socal control.”30 But the subject of drugs, or other llct lows, s partcularly temptng for dscourse analyss because of drugs’ socal nvsblty (whch allows much myth makng) and because of the cloud of passonate ofical rhetorc around them. Wth ther power on magnaton, drugs nvte a slew of gender and racal fascnatons, notons of the domestcated and the alen, of good/bad substances, and elaborate fantases about human loss of control—or nversely, fantases about the state’s possble “control” of the psychoactve realm. States have a specal purpose promotng such dscourses of control, whch we mght call (after James Scott) “thnkng lke a state” or at least talking lke one—though clearly mass anxetes about drugs (and meda sensatonalsm) enable ths knd of drug talk to succeed. States must mys-



pau l g o o t en berg tfy llct drugs n order to ight them. For, as seen, the border between lct commodty drugs (cgarettes, Valum) and llct ones (coke, grass) s a tenuous one, undermned daly by the borderlne nvolvements of most states n llct spheres. States are also often targetng a substantal part of ther own ctzenry who enjoy or make llct substances (for example, a quarter of European adults smoke cannabs), who must be convnced of ths drastc cure. The paradox s not that crusadng states talk a lot, but that they fall vctm to ther own speech acts and beleve n ther chmera of control. “Weberan” Western states may have begun wth ratonalzng regulatory dscourses about the llct, but n the course of carvng ther monopoly on the lct, they entered nto a byzantne cycle of poltcal and dscursve rratonalty. Dscourses of control are hard to categorze or catalogue. Some relate pecularly to drugs or to partcular drugs whle others are more general to modern governance of borders or the constructon of modern dscplned subjects (to adopt the non-statst, bodly concern of dscursve theorsts). Representatons of “drugs” (the bad knd) are rfe wth essentalsm, purtancal moralty, and ndvdualzed languages of self-control. Hstorcally, medcal debates long raged about drugs and ther effects on body, mnd, and socety, and even on attempts to ban or regulate some. But only n the late nneteenth century dd such dscourses emerge systematcally, representng the anxety-prone Vctoran moment of the modernzaton of everyday lfe. The professonalzaton of medcal and pharmacy trades contrbuted to these languages of control, as advancng scentic “allopathc” medcne establshed strcter boundares, n league wth the regulatory state, of legtmate cures and natonal publc health. In the urbanzng Unted States and Europe, relatvely harmless and famlar users or “habtués” of drugs lke opates or cocane became transformed, n ths process of medcalzaton, nto wld and volent drug “iends.” These men and women would end up transformed, by medcal representaton, nto pathetc vctms of an uncontrollable but well-deined pathology of “addcton.” By the 1920s, drug addcton was dagnosed as a dsease, socally nfectous, wth specic etology and vectors (restless young male populatons, parastc or nvasve trafickers). A good hstorcal lterature traces the evoluton of ths Western “addcton paradgm.” Long contested, addcton remans of doubtful objectvty or therapeutc value today, even wth “twelve-step” mantras or MRI scans of cocane brans routnely passed off as “addcton scence.”31 Of late, addcton talk (and ts weaker form, dependency and “co”dependency talk) has splled over promscuously from alcohol and drugs to everythng from sex to Krspy Kreme doughnuts, thus undermn-



Talkng Lke a State ng ts own scentic specicty. Ths addcton deology always held an uneasy yet renforcng allance wth polce-drven crmnalzng or “puntve” models of drug control. Addcton and the drug-control dscourses that go wth t have two chef sources. One s scentic reductonsm: the dea that “drugs” are the thng—bran-alterng alkalods to be exact—that work overpowerng effects on people. In ths trope, the drugs themselves take over and “control” mnds; users, lackng wll power, then crave them obsessvely, whch leads down the famlar path of abandoned self-control and ratonalty. Addcts are sckened vctms of external forces. “Ths s your bran on drugs” was only the latest televsed verson of ths twenteth-century noton. Ths boreductonsm helps draw the separaton between “drugs” and other freely avalable pleasure commodtes. Snce drug (ab)use amounts to personal enslavement, drugs no longer belong to the legtmate realm of free and desrable consumer choces. As dangerous drugs became thus deined and categorzed early n the century, they became undfferentated “narcotcs”—the word exudes deadenng menace—a label that msrepresents both the pleasurable sensatons and specic perls of the majorty of llct substances. Lke the related medcal addcton paradgm, ths “pharmaco-centrc fallacy” has drawn sharp rebuttals. It abstracts from the relatonal socal context and actual plastcty of drug effects, so-called drug “set and settng,” and dehumanzes the agency or choces of actual drug users.32 The second source of drug dscourses are obsessons wth “control” and the transgresson of behavoral or socal boundares. There are hstorcal roots to the corny personal boundary markng that sounded n Nancy Reagan’s late-1980s “Just say No!” ant-drug campagn. A person “on drugs” s assumed to be “out of control”—whch may or may not be true—a noton that taps nto deep-seated socal anxetes about self-control, whch were partcularly acute n the Vctoran socetes where these ant-drug deas irst blossomed n the 1890s. Lke the medcally dagnosed sexual “nymphomanac” (or the era’s self-destructve masturbator), the newfangled “narco-manac” or “dope iend” was a vsbly uncontrolled person who was swftly descendng nto the lower orders or already prvy to the urban underclass and ts crmnal culture. In an era of great socal lux and of potent new ndustralzed drugs lke morphne and cocane, these fantases rang true—as brllantly depcted n Marek Kohn’s Dope Girls for early-twenteth-century London. Drugs attracted spralng socal and cultural anxetes about proper gender, sexual, racal, and class boundares (as drug users and ther ncpent drug cultures seemed to promscuously cross borders of respectablty) and became sgniers of unstable denttes and threatenng



pau l g o o t en berg socal spaces. Lke coeval Amercan alcohol prohbton, drugs sparked a powerful “symbolc crusade,” one drawng upon the rch earler lberatonst vocabulary of ant-slavery (.e., addcton as enslavement). Such control and otherness dscourses swftly became part of the basc vocabulary of even the most respectable drug reformers. Prohbtonsts whpped up “moral pancs” wth racal overtones: blamng uppty “negroes” and prosttutes for spreadng cocane pleasures n the Jm Crow south; targetng Chnese mmgrants for “opum dens” that “enslaved” others (manly whte women) n Brtan, the Unted States, Australa, or across Latn Amerca; blamng Mexcans and black jazz muscans for the “kller weed” marjuana durng the Amercan Great Depresson. Uncouth and rootless Jews and greasy Italan mobsters became the deal snster archetypes for early drug dealers and controllng “combnatons” long before the fearsome Domncan “gangs,” Jamacan “posses,” or Chnese “trads” and Colomban “cartels” of our tmes. It s temptng to read these epsodes—whch surely helped consoldate drug-control regmes wth an nternatonal WASP cvlzng class of Col. Hobson, Hamlton Wrght, and Bshop Brent—as antecedents to the meda-orchestrated “crackhead”-“crackwhore” frenzes of the 1980s. Yet despte the exaggeraton of race (whte folks hstorcally consume drugs at socally representatve rates), there s also a realty to the margnal ethnc composton of nascent drug cultures and smugglng networks.33 Early depctons of narcotcs, for example n wdespread edtoral cartoonng of the 1910s and 1920s, reveled n the deathly magery of “foregn dope” nfestatons, plagues, or, as frequently, n stranglng orentalst predators such as vpers and snakes. Vulnerable youth—.e., cvlzaton’s future—were the vsually obvous vctms of ther Eastern venom. The thrust of racalzed drug archetypes was and s to locate the epcenter of drugs on the “outsde.” Drugs were/are an alen pollutant to the European body—a mortal danger to ts purty, to pose t n symbolc anthropologcal terms. Mnd-alterng drugs transgress symbolc boundares, such as race, along wth real borders, an understandable conlaton from ths the heght of European colonalsm. Certan states of conscousness became crmnalzed, declared outsde of the naton and ts whte body poltc. The partcularly Amercan deal of hermetcally sealng out these undesrable substances—closng them off at the borders, or crossng borders to hunt them down at ther threatenng thrd-world haunts, was actually a long-standng polcy and poltcal fantasy of early drug reformers and dplomats, who dd not have to deal wth many of these messy or proitable colones themselves. It orgnates n the 1910s wth the Shangha Conventon, though Amercan zeal n ths crusade only won nternatonal ap-



Talkng Lke a State proval a half-century later wth the UN Sngle Conventon of 1961. Along wth ths “alterty” of llct drugs, ther formal bureaucratc categorzaton (accordng to the fascnatng federal classicatory system, “Schedule I” drugs—lke marjuana—are the most dangerous because they possess no “legtmate” medcal usage), advancng externalst vocabulares, and nsttutons of global “drug control” came a systematc cultural denal about them. The Brtsh bured ther long-standng domestc cultures of opum usage and pretended as f someone else had ntroduced the drug to Chna. To nvoke a longer hstorcal example, n 1900, nothng seemed more “allAmercan” than mported Andean coca leaf—the actve ngredent n the rsng natonal beverage Coca-Cola and a hugely popular herbal cure for neurasthena or “Amercan nervousness.” Thrty years later, coca leaf was deemed a nasty base “addcton” of remote Peruvan Indans and no one remembered ts domestcated phase, and by the 1980s, coca leaf, made nto llct cocane, was depcted by the Reagan-Bush regmes as an aggressve organzed foregn securty threat to the Unted States, wth crack a knd of Afrcan prmtvst nvason of once cvlzed Amercan ctes.34 Intal “ratonalzng” FDA-type drug regulaton and medcalzed “drug control” thus escalated, at least n the U.S., nto demonzaton of users, of foregn substances and peoples, nto a grand-scale demonology whch by the md-twenteth century nfused the global crusade aganst drugs. Most European states, f passng through smlar dscursve stages, have managed somehow after World War II to keep the orgnal hygenc medcal model alve despte pressures to conform, avodng some of the extremes of puntve Amercan drug talk, and eventually allowng some of the de-escalaton experments of the Dutch, Brtsh, or Swss governments. These dfferng possbltes had to do wth the relatve weght of mmgrant or mnorty populatons (whch perhaps underle demonzaton of drugs), ther long tolerance of proitable colonal drug trades n Asa, as well as the more vgorous socal democratc regulatory regmes and relatve health of urban lfe n Europe. In the Unted States proper, generalzed drug fears were blatantly manpulated by Harry J. Anslnger, the famously dedcated “drug czar” of the long mddle era 1930–1962 (or nfamous for hs “reefer madness” campagn to bansh marjuana n the 1930s), who rased ant-drug dscourse to the shrll tone of Dr. Strangelove’s ant-communst phoba of “bodly luds.” Although ts genealogy has not been rgorously researched, the contemporary metaphorc dea of a “war on drugs” followed: a socally rooted hard-nosed Cold War deology (akn to “contanment”) nformed the U.S. verson of the 1950s through the 1970s, before the pure Reaganesque total vctory fantasy took off wth the “Star Wars” verson of the 1980s



pau l g o o t en berg and beyond. Whchever, the promse of drug polcy s always extermnatonst. Drug evls wll be “wped out” or at least radcally “controlled”; we must, we can, we wll acheve a “drug-free” Amerca, startng wth all those (allegedly) drug-free schoolyards. Amercan extremsm n recent years at least has spawned a small but purposeful peace camp, groups, and now a few countres rasng the whte lag of “harm reducton” or relegtmzed “medcal” usage (as n surprsngly successful state-level medcal marjuana campagns). I belabor ths obvous pont about the “essentalst” and “externalst” moorng of ant-drug dscourse because, by whatever means, these deas enjoy great hstorcal stayng power, a powerful “genealogy,” f perodcally nvgorated by novel drug scares and a refurbshed magery of fear. Ths vocabulary goes a long way to dscursvely explan the survval and legtmacy of ths hopeless U.S. War on Drugs, now enterng ts tenth decade. On a speculatve level, these resolute ant-drug passons, besdes poltcally drven, are the psychologcal nverson of popular cravngs for drugs—as exotc, lbdnal, enchantng, and ultmately forbdden frut. The more they are prohbted, the greater ther symbolc worth, to both users and the abhorred. In ths sense, llct drugs are clearly not banal everyday commodtes lke apples or mcrochps. Once etched nto state polcy and mass culture, control dscourses around drugs merge wth “governance-speak” that spans the whole range of crmnalzed modern commerce. Ths s to telescope a possbly much broader dscusson on the reicatons (to use a bg word) and slences (to use a hp word) that nform ofical cosmologes of the llct. There are plenty of ofical slences: on the connectons and complcty of manstream nsttutons and home markets to llct drug lows, on the chcken-and-egg problem of prohbton and reactons to t. There are curously centralzng demonologes: concentrated “cartels” and corruptve “narco-states” are easer shootng targets than nvsble mpersonal market sgnals or much looser networks nvolvng thousands of faceless peasants and dollar-lovng entrepreneurs. Apng the early-nneteenth-century ant-slavery movement that legtmzed emergng market ndvdualsm and free wages, ant-drug dscourse of the global age adopts a dramatcally atavstc vocabulary of “feudal” barbarsm. Drugs are cast as the antthess of borderless free-trade captalsm, as a warrng medeval black-and-whte spectacle of evl “drug lords,” “drug czars,” and “drug bazaars.” If today’s drug dscourse were actually a Hollywood move, t would run lke a blend of Mad Max and Lord of the Rings, rather than the cool realst footage of Trafic.35 In many producng areas, NGOs and nternatonal ad agences ntro-

0

Talkng Lke a State duce nstead a neutralst or techncal vocabulary of “alternatve development,” whch offers few uncoerced alternatves to commodty-hungry growers who are usually pursung the sole exstng developmental opton left after the ant-developmental neo-lberal 1980s. Paradoxcally, drugs often offer the best n grassroots alternatve development, somethng grasped by smart market lberals lke Hernando de Soto n Peru. NGO talk serves as the velvet-isted sde of extermnatonst drug “eradcaton” polces, wth all ts scorched-earth and dslocatng grassroots volence. To these modern-day mssonares, peasants can be relocated, converted, re-educated, or cvlzed n “good” market behavor. Generalzed smokescreens of “drug-related” volence obscure exactly what those “relatons” are: nsttutonal, economc, and judcal volence aganst mnorty populatons at home, and volence dsplaced across dstant borders. “Drug-related” (as n crme) systematcally obscures whether all ths dsorder and mayhem s prompted by drugs or drug laws themselves. Once all ths rhetorc gets off the ground, the queston of whch causes greater harm, laws or drugs, legal or llct drugs, becomes moot. What can researchers do about the pervasve dscourses of control around drugs and other llct lows? There s no pat formula to reconcle approaches that cut through fogs of controllng words—objectfyng or commodty lenses—and approaches that grapple head-on wth the rratonal representatons and dscourses that help consttute llct drugs. One must take both serously. There s also a staggerng practcal dlemma of based or faulty research sources: drug agency, polcng, and crmnal records are usually the only avalable “data” on llct trades, past and present, nfused wth the day-to-day suspcon-laden languages and categores of control. Polcng statstcs are notorously contamnated, pumped up, or even fabrcated to sut poltcal ends. The secrecy and nvsblty of the low leaves few alternatve documents and subjectvtes for neutral researchers to buld upon, hence the seemng safe ground of the ratonalst commodtes approach. Some scholars try to address these dlemmas of talkng lke a state. There s the ronc “deconstructonst” (res)stance to drug dscourses, as n recent lterary-crtcal works lke Avtal Ronell’s Crack Wars and Davd Lenson’s On Drugs. Others focus on the genealogy of drug representaton, over the story of the low tself, as cultural wrter Marek Kohn acheves wth Narcomania—a hstory of control-laden Brtsh fear and loathng of heron, a socal fear larger than the drug tself. Mexcan drug socologst Lus Astorga combnes the heroc and demonzng regonal “mythology” of northern Narcos wth nsder research on ther workng networks and te-ns wth the Mexcan state. Cocane hstoran Joseph Spllane compares



pau l g o o t en berg the “constructon” of the early Amercan “cocane iend” to the actual socal proile of the era’s drug users and follows how ths representatonal gap mpacts drug-control crusades.36 What many of these new scholars suggest, at the least, s that crtcal or semotc technques may go beyond “economstc” models (long assmlated to the realsts n drug agences) n demystfyng drug control. Academc drug-control rhetorc, whether the poltcal scence “wonkng” knd or by sncere drug polcy reformsts, accepts at ts perl the bnary categores and contours of the problem: foregn cartels, local addcts, llct and lct drugs, supply and demand strateges, dangerous and softer drugs that are all n fact conceptual weapons of ths unjust, futle, and harmful war. Crtcal approaches can begn by workng to free us from those demons of control. Guns and Money and Lawyers? Because of ther concentrated mnd power, drugs eptomze other stateless lowng objects, ncludng undocumented workers, subversve persons and refugees, hot laundered money, kdde porn, blood damonds, guns of every calber, hazmats and endangered speces (both “drug-related” n Amazona), and other junked, stolen, contraband, or coveted goods. Indeed drug lows, whch may well consttute 8 percent of all current nternatonal trade, elct and underwrte a number of alled spheres of nformal actvtes, ncludng underground wars and volence and all the mundane above-ground rce and beans to feed the llct low passng the other way. At the rsk of a terrble pun, llct drug lows are a “gateway drug” to other rsky busnesses.37 What lessons are there for other out-of-control objects, other ntersttal stes? The three-pronged analyss attempted here—lookng at hstorcal dfferentaton durng modern commodty-makng processes, ts relaton to state buldng and border makng, and the dscourses that accompany, naturalze, and blur these constructons—could presumably apply to other lows. The study of llct lows calls for a mx of “structural” and “dscursve” approaches, one that understands the cool hdden realtes of lows along wth ther overtly heated representatons. One can assume that other objects and ther dscourses of control wll vary accordng to cultural and natonal orgns, the nature and force of the non-state low, and the conjuncture of ts emergence, and that no ron law governs ther grammatcal code, vocabulary, or thematc core. But what may ultmately dstngush the new “beyond borders” approach to global lows, besdes ts wde-angled and moble optc, s the effort to develop a language of analyss that goes beyond exstng borders, and blnders, of authorty. That stops talkng lke a state. 

Talkng Lke a State NOTES Thanks to Laura for takng over Danyal n the dog days of wrtng and to all “BB” partcpants n beautful beyond-the-border Vancouver. 1. For some common (or poltcal) conundrums of deinng “drugs,” see, e.g., Introducton to Unted Natons Internatonal Drug Control Programme (UNIDCP), World Drug Report (Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 1997); Erch Goode, Drugs in American Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1984), 14–18; Andrew Wel and Wnfred Rosen, “What Is a Drug?” chapter 2 n From Chocolate to Morphine (Boston: Houghton Mfln, 1994). 2. Sdney W. Mntz, “The Forefathers of Crack,” NACLA Report on the Americas 22, no. 6 (March 1989). 3. Matthew Brzeznsk, “Re-engneerng the Drug Busness,” New York Times Magazine, June 24, 2002. 4. A recent journalstc example s Brzeznsk, “Re-engneerng the Drug Busness”; the thnk-tank genre of Patrck Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martn’s Press, 1996); or economst Francsco Thoum, Economía Política y Narcotráico (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Edtores, 1994); Maro De Franco and Rcardo Godoy, “The Economc Consequences of Cocane n Bolva: Hstorcal, Local and Macro-Economc Consequences,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24, no. 2 (1992): 375–406. The “commodty” perspectve s not alen to ant-drug organzatons; see “The llct drug ndustry: producton, trafickng and dstrbuton,” part 4 of the 1997 UNIDCP World Drug Report. 5. Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washngton, D.C.: Brookngs Insttuton, 1996); Jean-Claude Grmal, Drogue: L’autre mondialisation (Pars: Gallmard, 2000); Peter Andreas, “When Polces Collde: Market Reform, Market Prohbton, and the Narcotzaton of the Mexcan Economy,” chapter 5 n Illicit Global Economy and State Power, ed. H. Rchard Frman and Peter Andreas (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Lttleield, 1999); on “smlartes and dfferences” of drugs to “legal commodtes,” see George Rengert, The Geography of Illegal Drugs (Boulder, Colo.: Westvew Press, 1996); Phlppe Bourgos, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in “El Barrio” (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1995); Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru (Tucson: Unversty of Arzona Press, 1989). 6. Suzanne Wlson and Marta Zambrano, “Cocane, Commodty Chans, and Drug Poltcs: A Transnatonal Approach,” n Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, ed. Gary Gerefi and Mguel Korzenewtz (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); smlarly, Amy Bellone, “The Cocane Commodty Chan and Development Paths n Peru and Bolva, n Latin America in the World-Economy, ed. Roberto Patrco Korzenewcz and Wllam C. Smth (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996). See two of my works on cocane and commodty chans: Paul Gootenberg, “Cocane n Chans: The Rse and Demse of Global Commodty, 1860–1950,” n Latin America and The World Trade, ed. S. Topk, C. Marchal, and Z. Frank (Durham, N.C.: Duke Unversty Press, forthcomng) and Paul Gootenberg, ed., Cocaine: Global Histories (New York: Routledge, 1999), a comparatve volume organzed around cocane chans. 7. Wolfgang Schvelbusch, Tastes of Paradise: A Social History of Spices, Stimulants and Intoxicants (New York: Vntage Books/Random House, 1993); Jordan Goodman, Tobacco in History: The Cultures of Dependence (New York: Routledge, 1993), espe-



pau l g o o t en berg cally chapter 1; Sdney Mntz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Pengun Books, 1985); Jordan Goodman, “Exctanta: Or, How Enlghtenment Europe Took to Soft Drugs,” chapter 6 n Consuming Habits: Drugs in History and Anthropology, ed. Jordan Goodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sherratt (New York: Routledge, 1995); Rud Matthe, “Exotc Substances: The Introducton and Global Spread of Tobacco, Coffee, Cocoa, Tea, and Dstlled Lquor, 16th–18th Centures,” chapter 2 n Drugs and Narcotics in History, ed. Roy Porter and Mkulas Tech (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1995). 8. Davd T. Courtwrght, Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World (Cambrdge, Mass.: Harvard Unversty Press, 2001). One mght compare Courtwrght’s nterestng effort to “commodty” hstores that broadly nclude drugs, for example, Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topk, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400–The Present (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), chapter 3; and crtcal hstores of commodtes (such as Erc R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History [Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1982] and Sdney W. Mntz, “The Forefathers of Crack”). 9. LSD has a fascnatng “hstorography”: see Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven: LSD and the American Dream (New York: Atlantc Monthly Press, 1987); Martn A. Lee and Bruce Shlan, Acid Dreams: The CIA, LSD and the Sixties Rebellion (New York: Grove Press, 1985); or even (more conspratoral) Davd Black, ACID: A New Secret History of LSD (London: Vson Paperbacks, 1998). Ecstasy was dfferent, as adorng psychologsts tred frutlessly to keep ts secret powers (as therapy) under wrap; Bruce Esner, Ecstasy: The MDMA Story (Berkeley, Calf.: Ronn Publshng, 1994). 10. Arjun Appadura, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1986), optcs globally “post-modernzed” n hs Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Mnneapols: Unversty of Mnnesota Press, 1998). 11. Sgmund Freud, “Cravng for and Fear of Cocane” (July 1887), chapter 15 n Cocaine Papers, ed. Robert Byck (New York: Stonehll Press, 1974); Davd C. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control, expanded ed. (New York: Oxford Unversty Press, 1987), lnks such cultural ambvalence to the Amercan drve for drug “control.” 12. Davd Lenson, On Drugs (Mnneapols: Unversty of Mnnesota Press, 1995), 191. 13. Schvelbusch, Tastes of Paradise; Courtwrght, Forces of Habit; Rchard Rudgley, Essential Substances: A Cultural History of Intoxicants in Society (New York: Kodansha Internatonal, 1994), part of a rehabltaton of northern “drug cultures”; Pero Campores, Bread of Dreams: Food and Fantasy in Early Modern Europe (Chcago: Unversty of Chcago Press, 1989); Rchard Evans Schultes and Albert Hoffman, Plants of the Gods: Their Sacred, Healing and Hallucinogenic Powers (Rochester: Healng Arts Press, 1992) on wealth of the (non-commodied) Amercan drug complex. 14. Gootenberg, Cocaine: Global Histories; Slva Rvera Cuscanqu’s recent vdeo Las fronteras de la coca (ADEPCOCA, 2002) traces some stll-exstng networks n questonng the dualty of “tradtonal/modern” coca usage. 15. For llustraton of some of these phenomena, see Paul Gootenberg, “Between Coca and Cocane: A Century or More of U.S.-Peruvan Drug Paradoxes, 1860–1980,” Hispanic American Historical Review 83, no. 1 (February 2003): 123–53; Eva Bertram



Talkng Lke a State et al., Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1996), for comprehensve analyss. 16. Bran Preston, Pot Planet: Adventures in Global Marijuana Culture (New York: Grove Press, 2002); Mchael Pollan, The Botany of Desire (New York: Random House, 2001), chapter 3; on hgh-tech drugs trades, see Paula Kahla, “The Technologcal Secrets of Cocane Inc.” Business, July 20, 2002. 17. Wllam B. McAllster, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History (London: Routledge, 2000), especally chapter 7 on the Sngle Conventon; Ethan Nadelmann, Cops across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (Unversty Park: Pennsylvana State Unversty Press, 1993), chapters 4–5 on DEA. 18. Francsco E. Thoum, “Why the Illegal Psycho-Actve Drugs Industry Grew n Colomba,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 34 (Fall 1992): 37–63; Alfred E. McCoy, “Heron as a Global Commodty: A Hstory of Southeast Asa’s Opum Trade,” n War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, Colo.: Westvew Press, 1992), 237–255; Mchael L. Smth et al., Why People Grow Drugs: Narcotics and Development in the Third World (London: Panos Insttute, 1992). 19. Ethan Nadelmann, “U.S. Drug Polcy: A Bad Export,” Foreign Policy 70 (1988): 97–108, and “Global Prohbton Regmes: The Evoluton of Norms n Internatonal Socety,” International Organization 44, no. 4 (1990): 479–526; for paradoxes on ground (Bolva), see Jame Malamud-Got, Smoke and Mirrors: The Paradox of the Drug Wars (Boulder, Colo.: Westvew Press, 1992). 20. Tmothy Brook and Bob Tadash Wakabayash, “Introducton: Opum’s Hstory n Chna,” n Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952, ed. Tmothy Brook and Bob Tadash Wakabayash (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 2000). See also Lous R. Sadler, “The Hstorcal Dynamcs of Smugglng on the U.S.-Mexcan Border Regon, 1550–1998: Relectons on Markets, Cultures and Bureaucraces,” chapter 7 n Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands, ed. John Baly and Roy Godson (Pttsburgh: Unversty of Pttsburgh Press, 2000). 21. See H. Rchard Frman and Peter Andreas, ed., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Lttleield, 1999), whch focuses on a smlar set of ssues wth a more “statst” optc. 22. Musto, American Disease; there s no shortage of books analyzng/crtczng U.S. Drug War poltcs; e.g., Mke Gray, Drug Crazy (New York: Random House, 1998); Steven B. Duke and Albert C. Gross, America’s Longest War (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1993); Mchael Massng, The Fix (New York: Smon & Schuster, 1998), save for hs apologetcs to Nxon. 23. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, rev. ed. (Chcago: Lawrence Hll Books, 2003); Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1991); Kenneth C. Bucch, C.I.A.: Cocaine in America? A Veteran of the C.I.A. Drug Wars Tells All (New York: Sp Books, 1994), etc.—conspracy ssues frutlessly “debated” on the left n The Nation by Alexander Cockburn and JoAnn Kawell. 24. Edward Jay Epsten, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America,



pau l g o o t en berg rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1990); Ellott Curre, Reckoning: Drugs, the Cities, and the American Future (New York: Hll and Wang, 1993); Bourgos, In Search of Respect. 25. Jeremy Bgwood, “Plan Colomba’s Potental Impact on the Andean Cocane Trade: An Examnaton of Two Scenaros” (CIA Intellgence Report, DCI Crme and Narcotcs Center, September 19, 2000), avalable at http://jeremybgwood.net/FOIAs/ 2Scenaros-Colomba/CIA-2scenaros-Colomban_coca-2000.htm. Bureaucratc poltcs model s Bertram et al., Drug War Politics or hstorcally, Wllam Walker III, ed., Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Unversty Park: Pennsylvana State Unversty Press, 1992) or McAllster, Drug Diplomacy. 26. H. Rchard Frman, NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Unversty Press, 1996); Malamud-Got, Smoke and Mirrors (on Bolva); certicaton process n U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washngton, D.C., March 2000). 27. Alma Gullermopreto, The Heart That Bleeds (New York: Knopf, 1994), chapters 1, 5 on Bogotá and Medellín; on drugs corrupton, see essay by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, “On Corrupton and Organzed Crme,” n UNIDCP, World Drug Report, 150–53; Nadelmann, Cops across Borders, chapter 5; Baly and Godson, Organized Crime and Democratic Governability; or nnovatve hstorcal essays n Claudo Lomntz, ed., Vicios públicos, virtudes privadas: La corrupción en México (Mexco Cty: CIESAS, 2000), especally Lus Astorga, “Traicantes de drogas, polítcas y polcías en el sglo XX mexcano,” 167–93. 28. Mary Roldan, “Colomba: Cocane and the ‘Mracle’ of Modernty n Medellín,” chapter 8 n Gootenberg, Cocaine: Global Histories; Julo Cotler, Drogas y política en el Perú (Lma: IEP, 1999); for the latest on Mexco’s transborder culture of drugs, see Eljah Wald, Narcocorrido: A Journey into the Music of Drugs, Guns, and Guerrillas (New York: Rayo/HarperCollns, 2001). 29. Marek Kohn, Narcomania: On Heroin (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987), 167. 30. We call ths 1990s phenomena “grad-student Foucauldansm.” For a “po-mo” manfesto on drugs, see Desmond Manderson, “Metamorphoss: Clashng Symbols n the Socal Constructon of Drugs,” Journal of Drug Issues 23, no. 4 (1995): 799–816; or Davd Lenson, On Drugs; Erch Goode, Between Politics and Reason: The Drug Legalization Debate (New York: St. Martn’s Press, 1997), argues that the drug debate s nherently rratonally dscursve; lmts to “constructonsm” are explored by Ian Hackng, The Social Construction of What? (Cambrdge, Mass.: Harvard Unversty Press, 1999). 31. For addcton paradgm, see Marek Kohn, Narcomania, chapter 4; or Geoffrey Hardng, Opiate Addiction, Morality and Medicine: From Moral Illness to Pathological Disease (Houndmlls, Basngstoke, Hampshre: Macmllan, 1988); Herbert Fngarette, Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1989). 32. Norman Znberg, Drug, Set and Setting (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Unversty Press, 1984); Andrew Wel, The Natural Mind: An Investigation of Drugs and the Higher Consciousness (Boston: Houghton-Mfln, 1972); Dan Waldorf, Crag Renarman, and Shela Murphy, Cocaine Changes: The Experience of Using and Quitting (Phladelpha: Temple Unversty Press, 1991); John Morgan, M.D. (a crtcal pharmacologst), coned “Pharmaco-centrc fallacy” n John P. Morgan and Lynn Zmmer, “The Socal Pharmacology of Smokeable Cocane: Not All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” chapter 7 n Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice, ed. Crag Renarman and Harry G.



Talkng Lke a State Levne (Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1997). Ths lterature focuses on the plastcty of drug experence, relatng to ts socal settng (heron, the most “addctve drug,” addcted few U.S. solders n Vetnam, who used t stuatonally). 33. Marek Kohn, Dope Girls: The Birth of the British Drugs Underground (London: Lawrence & Wshart, 1992); Musto, American Disease, chapter 2, on use of race; Joseph R. Gusield, Contested Meanings: The Construction of Alcohol Problems (Madson: Unversty of Wsconsn Press, 1996); for typcal magery, see llustratons (e.g., 172) n Courtwrght, Forces of Habit; on recent drug “demonology,” see Renarman and Levne, eds., Crack in America, especally Introducton and edtors’ chapter 16, “The Cultural Contradctons of Puntve Prohbtons.” 34. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); on geness of U.S. concepts, see Arnold H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Trafic, 1900–1939 (Durham, N.C.: Duke Unversty Press, 1969); Vrgna Berrdge and Grfith Edwards, Opium and the People: Opiate Use in Nineteenth-Century England (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Unversty Press, 1987); Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country and Coca-Cola: The Unauthorized History of the Great American Soft-Drink and the Company That Makes It (New York: Scrbner’s, 1993), especally chapter 2 on coca culture; or Paul Gootenberg, “Secret Ingredents: The Poltcs of Coca n U.S.-Peruvan Relatons, 1915–65,” Journal of Latin American Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 233–265. 35. I am ndebted to coffee man Steve Topk for ths nsght about “feudal” dscourse; for analogy of slavery and markets, see Erc Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 1970) or Davd Bryan Davs, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Unversty Press, 1975). 36. Avtal Ronell, Crack Wars: Literature, Addiction, Mania (Lncoln: Unversty of Nebraska Press, 1992); Lenson, On Drugs; Kohn, Narcomania; Joseph F. Spllane, Cocaine: From Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States, 1884–1920 (Baltmore: Johns Hopkns Unversty Press, 2000), chapter 6; Lus A. Astorga, Mitología del “Narcotraicante” en México (Mexco Cty: Plaza y Valdés, 1995) and hs El siglo de las drogas: Usos, percepciones y personalidades (Mexco Cty: Espasa Hoy, 1996). For crtcal analyss of meda constructons, see Jmme L. Reeves and Rchard Campbell, Cracked Coverage: Television News, the Anti-Cocaine Crusade, and the Reagan Legacy (Durham, N.C.: Duke Unversty Press, 1994). On the other hand, there are dozens of books and proposals sportng ttular keywords “drug control” and “drug polcy,” e.g., Wllam Walker III, Drug Control in the Americas, rev. ed. (Albuquerque: Unversty of New Mexco Press New Mexco, 1989), though a thaw s comng even here; see Baly and Godson, Introducton to Organized Crime & Democratic Governability, for poltcal scentsts grapplng wth problems of “representaton” of the llct. 37. Alan Labrousse, La droga, el dinero y las armas (Sglo Ventuno, 1993; orgnally publshed n Pars, 1991); hs now-defunct “OGN—Observatore Geopoltque des Drogues” was devoted to factually uncoverng these worldly connectons. See UNIDCP, World Drug Report, 124, for 8 percent guess.



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i

four “Here, Even Legislators Chew Them” Coca Leaves and Identity Politics in Northern Argentina Slva Rvera Cuscanqu In La Quaca there aren’t any Argentne or Bolvan Indans. There are, smply, Indans. —Jame Molns, 1916

Chewng coca leaves s an ancent habt n the Andes that s currently spreadng among Westernzed urban consumers n northern Argentna. In ths chapter I take you on a journey through ths regon. You wll meet journalsts, doctors, members of parlament, mne workers, bllard players, and government oficals who chew coca leaves much as others around the world consume coffee or tea. They do so openly n the course of ther daly work or when socalzng at nght. To them, chewng coca s an enjoyable habt and an expresson of regonal dentty. There s somethng unusual about ths. Coca leaves do not grow locally but have to be mported from Bolva. Coca chewng came to northern Argentna wth Bolvan labor mgrants, a low-status group. Ther practce became ncorporated nto the cultural repertores of contemporary Argentnes who had no prevous nvolvement n Andean culture, turnng an “exotc” practce nto an emblem of local dentty. But there s more that s unusual about coca chewng n northern Argentna. It s a habt wth a checkered legal record. Up to the md-twenteth century t was perfectly legal to mport coca leaves from Bolva, but after



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” the publcaton of a Unted Natons report condemnng coca chewng n 1950, Argentna mposed ncreasngly strct quotas on coca leaf mports untl a total prohbton was enforced n 1977. Coca chewng was now strctly prohbted n Argentna. In 1989, however, the chewng of coca leaves was legalzed, but mportng the leaves from Bolva remaned llegal. As a result, the Argentne state consders the current boom n consumpton as legal but the large mports on whch t s based as llegal. The absurdty of ths stuaton of llctness s not lost on the traders who supply coca leaves to Argentna, nor on the consumers there who have to pay hgh prces. Ths absurdty s brought out partcularly clearly at the Bolva-Argentna border, and ths s where our journey through the regon wll start. We begn n the Bolvan border town of Vllazón, then we cross the rver to the Argentne border town of La Quaca, and then we travel to several ctes n northern Argentna. Throughout ths journey, the tensons between two types of authorty wll be nescapable. In northern Argentna, the formal authorty of the Buenos Ares–centered state s contnually beng questoned. Wthn the Argentne state tself, the legal status of coca chewng s part of poltco-legal struggles between the central and provncal levels. In addton, the state’s legal authorty s contnually beng challenged by large numbers of ctzens for whom coca chewng, and all t entals, s a hghly meanngful and respectable cultural practce. Ths dstncton between what s socally approved (lct) and what s legally allowed s essental n analyzng the consumpton of coca leaves n northern Argentna. From Tolerance to Prohibition, and Back Again In 1989, after a twelve-year perod of strct prohbton, Argentna legalzed coca leaf chewng (known locally as akhulliku, coqueo, or akusi). Ths was a remarkable occurrence because 1989 was also the year n whch all sgnatores to the Sngle Conventon on Narcotc Drugs (1961) were to eradcate the cultvaton and consumpton of coca. In Argentna, the act legalzng coca chewng was popularly known as the “Snopek Act” after a senator from Jujuy who promoted t and who s known to have been a habtual coca chewer hmself. The act allowed the consumpton and possesson of coca leaves but prohbted ther mport. Ths was strkng because the only way to obtan coca leaves s by mportng them from neghborng Bolva. Ths legal paradox led to sharply ncreased prces for coca leaves and hgh proits and rsks for llegal mporters. In practce, state personnel at the border undermned the law because they allowed ndvduals to cross the border wth up to half a klogram of coca leaves, generatng an llegal



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i but tolerated “ant trade” across the brdges lnkng Bolva wth Argentna at places lke Vllazón–La Quaca, the startng pont of our journey. The sze of the Argentne coca market s unknown. Rural labor mgrants from hghland Bolva, who have been mgratng seasonally to Argentna snce the nneteenth century, nvarably carred coca leaves. A traveler from Buenos Ares descrbed coca consumpton among ths work force employed n the agro-ndustry of northern Argentna as follows: Local trafic [through the border town of La Quaca] s restrcted to clothng, some tools and staple goods. Coca leaf s a transt tem. It goes to the sugar mlls n Jujuy, Salta and Tucumán, to be retaled to the workers (peonadas). It s usually acqured n Vllazón and t comes from the North [Bolva], from Cochabamba and La Paz.1

Accordng to Molns, annual mports were about 265 metrc tons. Coca leaves crossed the border wthout any restrcton and generated substantal tax ncomes for both governments. The demand for Bolvan coca leaves grew quckly, and n 1948 Argentna and Bolva sgned an agreement whereby Bolva would supply Argentna 500 tons annually.2 In addton to ths ofical trade, an unknown volume of coca leaves reached Argentna through tradtonal networks of recprocty and barter, and through “ant trade.” In 1950 the Unted Natons Commsson of Inqury on the Coca Leaf publshed a report that would have a devastatng effect on these commercal relatons. Suddenly, the Buenos Ares meda were full of medcal and psychatrc opnon condemnng coca chewng as backward, and n 1951 the Mnstry of Publc Health classied coca leaf as a narcotc or “stupefyng” drug.3 Ths was followed by the Argentne government’s decson to gradually decrease the mport quota and mpose a total ban n twenty-ive years’ tme (1977): whoever sold, possessed, or consumed coca leaves could be sentenced to up to ifteen years to jal.4 Despte ofical dscouragement, coca leaf consumpton n Argentna appears to have ncreased durng the 1960s and 1970s, reachng a peak of about 900 tons just before prohbton was mposed.5 It s mpossble to estmate the volume of coca leaf mported after 1977 because t s no longer mentoned n the ofical record. Crmnalzed, t surfaced occasonally only n polce records and press reports. Observers agree, however, that the demand ncreased rather than decreased and that coca chewng contnued more or less openly and deiantly. The prevalent atttude was one of pragmatc tolerance.6 Argentna’s decson to decrmnalze coca chewng n 1989 gave an

0

“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” mpetus to Bolva’s coca leaf crop, n partcular for “selected” leaves from the Yungas, near La Paz.7 In 2000, an ofical survey n the provnce of Jujuy concluded that the annual demand for dred coca leaves among male chewers aged between eghteen and ifty was 117 tons. Ths igure excluded women, adolescents, and the elderly (all consumers) and omtted eght out of ifteen departments of the provnce.8 Coca chewng was also spreadng n the provnces of Salta (wth almost twce the populaton of Jujuy), Tucumán, Catamarca, Córdoba, and Rosaro, as well as n the suburbs and nght spots n Buenos Ares. Raúl Noro, Jujuy correspondent of the natonal newspaper La Nación, estmated that the value of the trade n three provnces (Jujuy, Salta, and Tucumán) alone was about US$50 mllon.9 Accordng to another estmate, Bolva exported about 1,100 tons of coca leaves to Argentna.10 Coca Consumption and Modernity Consumers n Argentna chewed the leaves, but they also drank coca leaf tea, took coca as a medcne, or used t n rtuals. Accordng to Rcardo Abduca’s unpublshed research, modern forms of consumpton came up n the 1920s, a result of the urban elte’s romantc redscovery of the gaucho. Coca leaves began to be sold n drugstores around 1924, a tradton that was nterrupted durng prohbton (1977–1989).11 But durng ths tme, coca chewng dd not dsappear. On the contrary, t was popular a) among peasants of ndgenous background, b) among Andean wage-workers n bg enterprses, such as mnes or rural plantatons; and c) among the popular sectors of [the ctes of Jujuy and Salta]. . . . Snce n these provnces the members of the elte chew coca leaves, the habt does not functon as a marker of ethnc or class afilaton: n northwestern Argentna t has become a symbol of regonal belongng.12

In fact, durng prohbton, coca chewng became a form of cultural resstance to the hegemony of Buenos Ares, an act of self-denticaton and a challenge to the law. It mpled a rejecton of the Eurocentrc norms dctated by Buenos Ares that northerners consdered to be “absurd, not n force”13 and created a sense of prde among the provncal elte who would openly chew coca n clubs, peñas (restaurants where folk musc groups perform), and famly gatherngs. Even members of the provncal parlaments n Jujuy and Salta chewed coca n publc durng legslatve sessons n an act of cvl dsobedence.



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i Rabey’s study shows how the provncal elte’s socal etquette afirms a northern dentty lnked wth regonal customs and the landscape of northern Argentna.14 Syran-Lebanese settlers were nstrumental n spreadng coca chewng among the hgher strata. These so-called “Turks”—a msnomer for mgrants from Syra, Lebanon, and Palestne who settled n large numbers n northern Argentna and southern Bolva—adopted the habt irst, as a substtute for a smlar habt n ther countres of orgn. In 1927, Fausto Burgos, an author of costumbrista lterature, portrayed the SyranLebanese as merchants who obtaned coca leaves from muleteers who mported them from Bolva. In Burgos’s short stores, coca chewers are mostly peasants of Andean orgn, herdsmen, muleteers, weavers, and—occasonally—European travelers and Syran-Lebanese settlers. The habt may have spread out from Syran-Lebanese saloons n northern Argentna and southern Bolva, horzontally among petty merchants, gamblers, bohemans, and lberal professonals, and vertcally to reach the urban elte.15 Unlke n Bolva, where coca chewng remaned conined to the world of game houses and bars and was wdely condemned as backward, drty, and ntemperate, n northern Argentna t became popular n other socal contexts. Here students, muscans, and unon leaders all chewed, and t was a popular habt at soccer games, poltcal meetngs, and festve gatherngs. Accordng to Rabey, chewng coca leaves was “a symbol of maturty, and the acquston of rghts and socal recognton. It s for these reasons that adolescents and women (those ‘others’ of modern cvlzaton) have adopted the habt as a symbol of ther full rghts.”16 Argentnes dd not stgmatze Bolvan labor mgrants because of ther coca habt, whch was remarkable because Bolvans were perhaps the most dscrmnated-aganst group of mgrants n Argentna. The lnk between coca consumpton and northern dentty provded the only horzontal connecton between Argentnes and Bolvans n a context that was otherwse marked by racsm and volence aganst Bolvan mmgrants. The socal acceptance of coca chewng among the mddle classes of northern Argentna was drven home to me n 1998 when I traveled there and met a tall, blond young man wth a huge wad of coca leaves (jach’u or akusi) n hs cheek. He was a physcan from Salta on hs way to Tartagal Hosptal to work the nght shft. He was chewng coca leaves to stay awake durng the long workng nght when he would have to cope wth pregnant women, workers wth tuberculoss, and chagas dsease. Ths “pragmatc” consumpton of coca leaves s based on a recognton of ther stmulatng effect, ther capacty to enhance work performance and keep sleep and hunger at bay.17



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” Crossing the Border: People and Coca from Bolivia As soon as we came off the tran at Vllazón, a town on the BolvaArgentna border, my travel companon Félx Barra and I were accosted by a Qhchwa-speakng mestizo youth. He worked for an Argentne bus company, La Veloz del Norte, offered to help us wth our luggage, and tred to sell us tckets almost by force. We decded to follow hs advce, and we felt La Quaca deserved ts poor reputaton as a border post where Bolvan travelers are rpped off. There were other bus companes wth ofices n Vllazón, sellng tckets to destnatons n Argentna such as Buenos Ares, Escobar, Zárate, Vlla Madero, Lomas de Zamora, and other small towns that are well known n Bolva. The companes hoped to attract mgrants to those places by offerng specal servces to assst them n bypassng the obstacles put up by the Argentne border polce, the Gendarmería.18 Although Félx, who was the permanent secretary of ADEPCOCA (Departmental Assocaton of Coca Leaf Producers of La Paz), and I were hardly typcal mgrants tryng to get nto Argentna, we also experenced mstreatment by the Argentne gendarmes, perhaps n a mlder form than our compatrots, specally f they were llterate, uneducated, poor laborers. The bus company offered to sell us a one-way tcket and “lend” us the return tcket, whch we had to show at the border. They sad they dd not charge anythng for ths servce, but later we found out that they had actually charged an extra dollar per tcket for the La Quaca–Jujuy route, whch cost US$15. But worse was to come. It turned out that La Veloz del Norte, a bus company wth a good reputaton for comfortable, new, and fast two-stored buses, actually dd not operate from La Quaca but was merely a front for the Jama company.19 Jama’s leet of buses was old and uncomfortable. We were also offered a “loan” n cash because as toursts we had to show money at the border to prove our status. Afterwards we dscovered the cost of the “loan”: US$300 per US$1,000. We declned the deal because we thought we had enough money to rsk crossng on our own. But how much money would we need? At Vllazón, the owner of the Palace Hotel had told us we needed US$50–100 per day. We decded to cross the border for an exploratory vst to conirm the requrements. Anyone could enter La Quaca from Bolva just by presentng an dentty card and recevng a numbered badge, whch was gven wth no questons asked. We realzed, however, that a hdden vdeo camera was recordng our faces and movements from a wndow of the Gendarmería. After indng out about the requrements for toursts, we returned to the Bolvan sde to arrange for the necessary



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i

Sucre

BOLIVIA

Villazón La Quiaca

CHILE

Maimara Maymara

San Salvador de Jujuy 0

100

200 km

Salta

ARGENTINA

Fig. .. Bolva-Argentna border, South Amerca. Map by Bll Nelson.

paperwork by fax: a recent salary slp, a work certicate, a socal securty card. These were needed to enter Argentna, besdes a passport, round-trp tckets, and “enough money to pay for each day of the trp.” That amount we could only guess, snce varous people had suggested dfferent amounts of money requred per day n Argentna. By ten o’clock the next mornng we were lnng up n front of the Gendarmería, wth all the necessary papers and faxes, to get a tourst vsa. But the head oficer had gone to Vllazón, and he kept us watng for more than an hour. Fnally we entered hs ofice. The vdeo camera’s mages were dsplayed on a computer screen, and we could follow events on the border



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” brdge n full color. The oficer asked us all knds of questons, made rude remarks (“You can’t beleve anythng a Bolvan says”), and doubted the authentcty of our documents. When he asked us to show the money to “prove” our solvency as toursts, Félx showed hm US$500 and asked for a seven-day vsa, and I showed hm US$800 and asked for a ten-day vsa. He accepted wth some reluctance; we guessed he had establshed the adequacy of the amount by means of some “racal arthmetcs” between our skn color and our socal façade. Later, at Salta, a Ph.D. student workng on dentty formaton n the Argentna-Bolva borderland conirmed our mpresson that border crossers provde a lourshng llegal busness for many enterprses nvolved n smugglng, unequal exchange, and varous technques for leecng mgrants, especally those from Bolva and Peru. The moneylenders provde the mgrant wth about US$1,000 (ostensbly for a ten-day tourst vst at US$100 per day) to show to the cops. Once through and nsde the bus takng them to the nteror of Argentna, the moneylender’s agent collects the money from them, but nstead of US$1,000 they have to return US$1,300. In a lttle over an hour, the mgrants have ncurred nterest on ther loan of 30 percent! Rcardo Abduca has called ths system of border explotaton a “border rent,” a knd of colonal rent demanded from mgrants on account of the exstence of an nternatonal border as well as specic power-knowledge relatons based on racal and economc stereotypng. The peculartes of the border regme create economc opportuntes for actors wth access to formal power, such as gendarmes, to explot mgrants and traders nformally as well.20 As we crossed the border, we each showed that we were carryng half a klogram of fresh coca leaves. Ths was the amount we had calculated to be permssble based on nformaton gathered n Vllazón and La Quaca. The coca leaf merchants n Vllazón and Tupza had stated that the most one could carry through the border was a quarter of a klo. The owner of the Palace Hotel, however, had asserted that the lmt was half a klo, and the “Indo Kng,” a Bolvan mner resdent n La Quaca, told us that they let you cross wth one klogram. We averaged these suggestons and crossed wthout problems, each wth half a klogram of the best “selected” coca leaves we had been able to get at the Vlla Vctora market of ADEPCOCA. We had brought more but had to sell the rest n Vllazón for fear of ts beng coniscated. Durng a prevous trp I had thought La Quaca to be a lvely town, full of people and stores wth all knds of goods ready to be smuggled nto Bolva. Ths tme, t was lke a ghost town, wth empty buldngs and closed



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i stores, locked-up doors, and few passers-by. In contrast, Vllazón was full of people and boasted a lvely hgh street where many commodtes were beng sold: electrc applances, clothes, foodstuffs, coca leaves, alcohol, sodum bcarbonate, lejía, and cgarettes. Watng at the border, we had observed that the “ant trade” here was a lne of porters, men and women, gong n one drecton and carryng bg packs on ther backs. They were brngng nto Bolva the few artcles that were stll proitable. We saw soft drnks and lour, vegetables, and ctrus fruts. We also saw a truck crossng the border wth a load of peppers, tomatoes, and frut. A row of statonary trucks wth Argentne lcense plates were watng n lne wth who knows what products under ther covers. Nothng lke ths was happenng on the other sde of the border. There could not have been a greater contrast n the appearance of these two border town facng each other across the rver: somnolent La Quaca n Argentna and bustlng Vllazón n Bolva, the two connected by a very vsble one-way “ant trafic” across the border brdge. These “ants” were Bolvan men and women, Qhchwa-speakng peasants from local communtes, who carred ther goods across the border and through the Bolvan customs nto Vllazón. Ths nvsblty was partcularly strkng n the case of coca leaves. We had seen huge loads of coca bundles (takis) n the Vllazón bus termnal. But at the border no bundles were n sght; the cross-border coca leaf trade from Bolva to Argentna remaned nvsble to us. As we traveled from the border nto Argentna, however, descendng the hgh-alttude mountans and down the Quebrada de Humahuaca toward the provncal captals of Jujuy and Salta, coca leaves came nto vew agan. We saw them beng offered for sale and the llegal and secret trajectores that had brought them across the border faded aganst ths lluson of a free and open market. “Here Even Legislators Chew Coca Leaves” We arrved n Jujuy on the evenng of July 27 and found a modest hotel near the bus termnal. After a short rest, we went out to explore the lvely atmosphere n the town center. We stopped at a large well-lt bllard saloon full of people, mostly men. They were chewng coca openly as they were playng on a dozen bllard tables. The atmosphere drew us n because, to Félx’s total surprse and n sharp contrast wth the stuaton n Bolva, publc coca chewng dd not seem to carry any prejudce or socal censure here. The saloon was qute large, wth hgh celngs and bllard tables arranged n two adjacent neon-lt rooms. Playng n groups of two to ive, these jujeño nght owls concentrated ntensely on ther game, meanwhle 

“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” chewng coca leaves as f t were the most natural thng n the world. We noted that consumpton was strctly an ndvdual affar; nobody offered coca to anybody else. Every once n a whle they would take a lttle bica (sodum bcarbonate) from specal contaners and add t to ther wad to mprove the leaves’ lavor and effect. Nobody actually “chewed” the coca leaves; nstead, they kept ther wad (bolo or akusi) tucked away n ther cheek for hours on end, gently turnng t around and suckng t, addng a bt of llipta (quinoa ash, or ash of another plant) or bica now and then. Some bllard players were smokng cgarettes, as were most people seated at the surroundng tables; they were also drnkng local alcoholc beverages such as gn, beer, and wne, or mported ones such as whsky. The style of chewng, the concentraton on the game, and the ndvdualzed way of consumpton all ponted clearly to the modern nature of these consumers. They all belonged to a mestizo urban mddle class that, perhaps unconscously, shared some habts and cultural trats wth the Andean tradton. Around mdnght, Félx, who had been drnkng the local brew (ginebra), enthusastcally offered coca leaves to three mddle-aged men sttng at a nearby table. Ths was clearly an unusual gesture, but the men nvted us to jon them and we struck up a lvely conversaton, sharng ginebra and coca leaves. Soon the water joned us. Félx offered generous shares of “selected” leaves from Corpata and was delghted to share them wth these people who as consumers were so dstant, both socally and geographcally, from the producers. For them t was also a novelty to get to know a representatve of the producers of the leaf. One of our new frends happened to be a journalst wth El Pregón, the provnce’s most prestgous and wdely read newspaper. He told us that n hs crcle, taki leaves, small leaves from the Yungas regon of La Paz (Bolva), were the preferred varety. He and the other men were also acquanted wth the “selected” varety of coca leaf from the Yungas regon and regretted that ts prce was so hgh here that t was restrcted to elte crcles. “Here even legslators chew coca leaves,” they sad, an expresson that became a Leitmotiv for the entre trp. Félx Barra, pontng to a one-ounce bag of green plastc: “How much does ths bag of coca leaves cost?” Man: “Two pesos” [equvalent to US$2 at the tme]. Félx Barra: “And roughly how much do you consume per week?” Man: “Ouf . . . I chew two of these bags every day . . . ” Félx Barra: “That means you spend four pesos daly.” Man: “Every day. . . . So you better hurry brngng your coca leaves over here . . . !”21

The journalst nvted us for an ntervew at hs newspaper the next mornng and Félx was thrlled by the success of our irst nght’s venture. He 

si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i gave everybody a copy of the ADEPCOCA calendar wth ts motto “Coca Is Not Cocane” (la coca no es cocaína) and wth photographs of Chcaloma, hs hometown. He also gave a copy to the bartender so he could hang t on the wall as a souvenr of our vst. Gazng at the walls of the saloon covered n huge red-and-whte Coca-Cola posters, I saw the rony of puttng the calendar of an organzaton of coca leaf producers (cocaleros) on these same walls. Ther product s forbdden at the border, consdered llegal contraband, unlke the beverage patented by the gringos. It was past two n the mornng when we inally left. By then, the atmosphere had become even lveler. No doubt many customers would stay up tll sunrse. Our meetng wth the journalsts of El Pregón underlned that coca leaf chewng was common n northern Argentna. In the newspaper ofice, men and women were chewng coca leaves whle they were workng. A woman ntervewed us (the paper publshed the ntervew promnently the followng day).22 A photographer took the coca leaves that Félx offered hm by puttng hs hands together as a cup, as s often done n Bolva. “Do you usually receve coca leaves lke ths?” I asked. “Yes, of course. It s a matter of respect,” he repled. As Félx passed around leaves, the journalsts took out ther coca leaf bags and cases. One had an old alumnum tobacco box lned wth a plastc bag to keep hs leaves fresh. “These are really good. Are they from the Yungas?” he asked Félx. A few days later we were nvted to a party. The Assocaton of Bolvan Resdents of Jujuy (Asociación de Residentes Bolivianos en Jujuy) celebrated Bolva’s natonal holday, August 6. Durng ths all-nght occason, I saw people drnkng alcoholc beverages and Coca Cola. After a bg meal consstng of a natonal dsh, picante mixto (mxed cooked meats n hot sauces), people began to dance and drnk heavly, but very few ndeed were chewng coca leaves. It presented a strkng contrast. Jujuy’s mddle classes had adopted an ndgenous habt but Jujuy’s elte Bolvan mmgrants had not. These Bolvans had come from the country that was the source of the coca leaves and they were lvng n a center of modern coca chewng. And yet they rejected the habt, settng themselves apart. Later that nght these Jujuy Bolvans performed what they thought was the Saya dance (actually t was not a Saya but a stylzed verson of the Caporales dance). Ironcally, the Saya dance s the sgnature dance of Bolva’s afro-yungueño people who produce the coca leaves that are exported to Argentna. The publc nature of coca chewng n northern Argentna was llustrated by our experences n the next cty we vsted, Salta. Here we vsted a folklorstc restaurant (peña) where customers were chewng coca leaves n connosseur style. Nobody actually chewed the leaves; they sucked them.



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” You could see the bg wads of coca leaf pushng out people’s cheeks and beng moved around slowly and delberately. Occasonally, people would add alkalne substances and new leaves to promote the effects of the leaves’ fourteen alkalods. A blonde salteña woman was sttng at one table; she happened to be a hgh ofical of the Bureau for the Preventon of Addctons (Dirección de Prevención de Adicciones), chewng coca before havng a cup of wne wth a frend. She mentoned the law decrmnalzng coca chewng and ponted to the rony that physcans were currently usng coca leaves n the treatment of addctons, to wean addcts from cocane and other “hard drugs.” One mage symbolzed the new type of consumer market well. A very good-lookng woman n her thrtes had put her cell phone, the keys to her car, and her bag of coca leaves on the table. There was also a glass of wne and a dsh wth sodum bcarbonate. As she drank the wne and chewed the leaves, she seemed the perfect modern consumer, an ndependent professonal or upscale bureaucrat who was enjoyng herself alone and vsbly at ease durng ths nght of partyng and musc. The next day we were off to the “Concert of the Mountan” n an amphtheater naturally carved nto a huge red rock on the way to the town of Cafayate. The scenery was magnicent and the rock served as the acoustc shell for an extraordnary concert of both folk and classcal musc, performed by varous groups. All over the place, people were chewng coca. The audence seemed partcularly fond of Bolvan muscal genres such as the waynu, the kacharpaya, and carnval dances of Oruro. Ths “appropraton” of Bolvan musc by Argentnes would have bothered more than a few chauvnsts and pursts among the Bolvan elte. To me, a group from Buenos Ares playng Señora Chichera, La Diablada, or Ojos Azules, emblematc Bolvan peces, dd not appear as “cultural theft” but rather as evdence of Andean culture’s potental for expanson and hybrdzaton n a crss-rdden country whch nssted on ts Western metropoltan culture. Coca leaves were beng consumed as a matter of course by everybody n the audence, from hppe artsans to unversty professors. Among them were many survvors of the Argentne mltary dctatorshp that had caused so many dsappearances and deaths. In ths culturally and poltcally heterogeneous envronment, the chewng of quas-legal coca leaves had become a symbol. To share coca leaves wth our frends n the magnicent amphtheater of Cafayate was to be part of a cultural and commercal realty full of emotonal and poltcal paradoxes. It connected modern coca leaf markets wth old memores and practces. All these mpressons suggested that, n northern Argentna, coca leaf



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i consumpton s as general and normal as the coffee break n other urban and modern contexts. It s characterzed by ndvdual chewng, unlke the more “tradtonal” practce of sharng the leaves. People from all walks of lfe and dfferent age groups ndulge n t. We asked all tax drvers who took us around Jujuy and Salta whether they chewed coca leaves and they all conirmed that they dd. We observed our long-dstance bus drvers chewng coca durng every trp. When we asked varous users how and why they had irst taken up the habt, some mentoned a physcal or psychologcal alment such as gastrts or tobacco addcton. The neutral term “habt” seems to be well-suted to descrbe both the useful and the pleasurable aspects of coca chewng. What may have begun as a way of stayng awake durng a nght shft or a means to allevate the pan of, say, a peptc ulcer, ended up becomng a pleasure, not just n terms of consumng alkalod substances, but also as a symbol of a certan status, an expresson of personhood n the polymorphous modernty of neo-lberal captalsm. As such, the habt of coca chewng symbolzes practces and tastes that are produced locally but also are part of ever-wdenng crcuts of communcaton and meanng. The Licitness of Selling Coca It may be llegal to trade n coca leaves, but sellng and buyng them s clearly acceptable n the ctes of northern Argentna. In the center of Salta, we saw many sgns and posters advertsng coca. One read: “Don’t Tell a Soul! Export-Qualty Coca.” The sgn also advertsed candy, beverages, and cgarettes. Another store, Ke Koka, offered coca leaves at varous prces, n packages from one ounce to a quarter klo, twenty-four hours a day. In ts logo, the letters E, O, and A were coca leaves. Another sgn read: “Selected Coca Leaves. Bolvan Bca.” Down the road, the San Slvestre store (whch has branches n several other ctes) sported a neon sgn wth green coca leaves on a blue background. In all these stores the product was sold n sealed bags embellshed wth the store’s logo, and sometmes a lttle package of sodum bcarbonate or llipta came wth the bag. Ke Koka and Secus had stckers wth ther logos and a green coca leaf desgn. San Slvestre had plastc bags wth ts logo, a bg coca leaf n the upper corner, and the addresses of ts varous branches. Ths store acted as a wholesale outlet, supplyng other retalers. Wthout a doubt t had ts own arrangements for mportng leaves from across the border, only eght hours away. Customers of these varous stores would stop by n ther cars. There was a contnual bustle of men and women leavng the stores wth bags of coca.23 Many dd not even bother to ask for the leaves. They just put some cons

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“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” or blls on the counter and the store assstant would mmedately brng the requred amount of coca. Store assstants told us that ther clentele conssted of lawyers, judges, physcans, and all types of professonals and publc employees. They would stop by daly to get fresh coca leaves. It was as f the other merchandse beng dsplayed n the stores was of secondary mportance compared to the turnover n coca leaves. At a small store I saw a car come to a halt. A young lad, dressed n loose-ittng jeans and a cap worn backwards, asked for a one-ounce bag and pad two pesos for t. Showng hm my own bag of coca leaves, I asked hm, “You also chew coca leaves?” He repled, “Coca leaves are not chewed, lady. You take the leaves and gently suck them, you don’t chew them.” Then, takng me for a tourst, he showed me how t was done. Far from Salta’s town center we dscovered a less self-conident form of marketng coca leaves. Here Bolvan caseras (street vendors), sttng precarously on stools n a marketplace, dsplayed ther goods on wooden boxes. All goods were from Bolva: coca, alcohol, and a varety of lliptas. The coca leaves were pre-packaged n green plastc bags of varous szes. We notced only lower-class customers here, mgrant workers of both sexes who usually chose one-ounce bags. No doubt ths clentele was attracted by the low prces: the menuda or taki varetes sold at just one peso (US$1.00) per ounce. In the bg stores n the center of town, the taki varety sold for two and a half pesos and the selected varety for three pesos per ounce. Selected leaves, wth ther stalks removed (despalillada), reached as much as four pesos per ounce and usually ncluded llipta or sodum bcarbonate. At ths top prce, a klo of leaves cost 130 pesos, or US$130, that s to say, thrteen tmes as much as the best selected leaves sold at the Vlla Fátma market n La Paz. The lctness and acceptablty of these quas-legal leaves to the general publc also reverberated n the two lve rado ntervews Félx and I gave at Rado FM Notcas 88.1 and Rado Unversdad. In both cases we had a phone-n. Members of the audence generally supported our vewponts and contrbuted more nformaton and analyss. One person read Artcle 15 of Act 23.737 on drugs, argung that the trade n coca leaves actually was not prohbted but merely omtted from the act. He mentoned the lack of regulatory nstruments to complement the act. Ths same person calculated the number of coca leaf chewers n northern Argentna (Salta, Jujuy, Tucumán, and Catamarca) at half a mllon, .e., half the sze of the entre Bolvan market as calculated n the 1970s.24 Varous people phoned n to suggest that the ssue of coca leaves should be resolved by “whtenng” (legalzng) the “black economy” of coca leaf smugglng. To us Bolvans, the term



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i “whte” sounded contradctory because n Bolva t s assocated wth the “whte powder,” cocane. Pushng these color metaphors a bt further, we agreed that the border was a “gray area” of ambguty whch produced ofical behavor varyng from tolerance to represson, and that t was a fertle breedng ground for llegal trade, corrupton, and dscrmnaton. Legal Puzzles and a Dead Baby One journalst we met summarzed the tensons between the law and common practce n Argentna well: There s an artcle somewhere, I don’t know n what law, that allows coca leaf chewng, no problem. But what happens? In realty t s allowed only n Salta and Jujuy, not n the rest of the country. My brother-n-law travels a lot, he goes to Buenos Ares and elsewhere. He feels lke dyng when he leaves the provnce because f they catch hm wth half a klo of coca leaves elsewhere n Argentna he wll go to jal. He can go to jal for just carryng leaves—because down there they don’t know that there s ths lttle passage, ths artcle, n the law that allows coca leaf chewng.25

Ths gnorance explans why coca leaf prces skyrocket as one moves south. A kosk owner n a busy street n Jujuy sad that n Catamarca and Córdoba (ctes further south, halfway to Buenos Ares) coca leaves cost US$70 per klo and that n Buenos Ares they can reach as hgh as US$20 per ounce. Ths s many dozens of tmes the prce n Bolva, even for the most expensve leaves. Some tred to ight gnorance about the law. Journalst Raúl Noro gave us a postcard showng the text of Artcle 15 of Federal Act 23.737 of 1989 whch deals wth the status of coca leaves as a “drug”: Art. 15: The possesson and consumpton of coca leaves n natural form, as a habtual practce of coqueo or chewng, or as coca-leaf tea, wll not be regarded as possesson or consumpton of drugs.

The postcard also stated: Federal Act 23.737 was sanctoned on September 21, 1989, approved on October 10, 1989 accordng to Art. 70 of the Natonal Consttuton, and publshed n the Ofical Bulletn on October 11, 1989.

Ths postcard had been prnted by the Natonal Congress n August 1994 for use by consumers who wshed to travel outsde the provnces where coca chewng was a wdespread habt. These travelers could use t to sup-



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” port ther legal rghts as coca leaf consumers n case the polce would try to arrest them, as the El Pregón journalst’s brother-n-law feared. The legal paradox was bzarre. Possesson and consumpton of coca leaf was allowed because t was not consdered a drug. And yet t was llegal to mport coca leaf or trade n t. Consequently, supplyng the Argentne market was dangerous, and Bolvan wholesalers and retalers were crmnalzed. The press n northern Argentna carred many stores of traders beng abused. Many people told us that gendarmes statoned at the border receve brbes to let the leaves pass, and that they prvately sell the leaves they coniscate. Sometmes the meda also showed publc burnngs of coniscated coca leaves near the border at La Quaca, ofical demonstratons that the authortes were enforcng the law.26 Crossng the border wth coca leaves can be dangerous, however, n partcular for stgmatzed populatons. For example, Argentne gendarmes had stabbed a baby to death n her mother’s backpack because they thought the bundle was a stash of coca leaves.27 Ceremonial Consumption of Coca Leaves The lct nature of coca consumpton n northern Argentna was lnked to modern urban lfestyles. It was also lnked to rtual contexts that unted the two sdes of the borderland. On the nght of July 31 we were nvted to Manos Jujeñas n Jujuy, a restaurant whose owner, “Negra” Cabanas, was a mddle-aged woman from La Quaca whose mother was Bolvan. Manos Jujeñas s one of the best “typcal” restaurants n Jujuy. It serves hot stews such as picante de lengua (cow tongue n hot sauce) and sajita de pollo (chcken n hot sauce) whle well-known muscans from the regon perform folk musc. That nght was specal because t was the eve of the Pachamama (Earth Mother) festvtes, and a ceremony had to be performed. Such ceremones n honor of Pachamama are held throughout Jujuy and Salta durng the month of August. Ths ceremony conssted n buryng a dsh of t’iltincha (steamed meat), tubers, and grans n a huge earthen pot (berque) full of earth. After the meal the sponsors nvted all guests to form a long queue and offer coca leaves, cgarettes, and alcoholc beverages to the earth n the pot. It was a ceremonal lbaton that joned people from varous socal and cultural backgrounds. The place was full and most customers were women. At one table, three very attractve young women were chewng coca leaves, drnkng wne, and smokng cgarettes. When t was tme to dance to the nce deep voce of Tomás Lpán, the grls danced the chacareras and zambas together, wth a sensual cadence. In ther tght leather jeans, long blonde har, and slver jewelry, they were



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i a most conspcuous example of modern nghtlfe n northern Argentna, a mx of nvented tradtons, vague memores of a pre-captalst past, and a host of debts to rural Andean cultures on both sdes of the border. At 11 a.m. the next mornng a bgger rtual was held n the gardens behnd Jujuy’s old ralway staton. It was a ch’alla to Pachamama. Ths tme the offerngs conssted of lots of food and chicha (maze beer), lbatons of alcohol, and offerngs of coca leaves. Muscans such as Tomás Lpán stayed past noon, playng all knds of rhythms from the regon and from Bolva. That afternoon we went to Maymara, an hour toward La Quaca. Here I left Félx Barra at the bus termnal because he had to return to La Quaca and from there by tran to Oruro and La Paz. I headed for the house of Mercedes Costa, an anthropologst frend from Buenos Ares who had been lvng n the area for many years, researchng the mpact of toursm and Bolvan mgraton on the cultural paradoxes of northern Argentna. Mercedes has opened a restaurant, El Pato, n Tlcara, eght klometers north of Maymara. She told me many stores about Gendarmería abuses she had wtnessed n the borderland communty of Santa Vctora, one of her research stes. Ths communty’s terrtory les on both sdes of the border and ts people have been famous muleteers for centures. Of course, they are also well-respected small-scale smugglers. The next mornng on her pato, Mercedes made an offerng to Pachamama. I had brought her a misa dulce from Vllazón, qute a generous one by jujeño standards. We performed a hybrd ceremony, combnng the burnng of coca leaves and alcohol (as s done n La Paz) wth the bural of food and offerngs n a hole dug nto the earth (as s done n Jujuy). The fumes of our misa mngled wth the scent of ncense and q’uwa that wafted over the plaza as our offerng joned countless others that were beng performed n Tlcara that day. Sahumerio28 or mesa dulce29 seems to have been ncluded only recently n Pachamama ceremones n northern Argentna; the bural of food s probably lnked to local rtuals datng from early colonal tmes. At the Jujuy market t was qute mpressve to see how many small “tables” sold for one to ten pesos. It was as f the bg offerngs that one buys n La Paz or Vllazón were splt nto several small peces, each contanng the complete set of sweets and mysteres, pacha mixtura and q’uwa, untu and anmal igures, houses, cars, good-luck symbols (promnent among them the snake and the frog), and lots of colored wool and coca leaves. A lvely trade n sahumerios and other rtual tems always sprngs up n the days pror to tradtonal festvtes. Ths trade has been expandng as a result of the general revval of rtuals and cultural expressons n the towns and vllages of the regon. It s lnked to the revtalzaton of Bolvan mgrants’



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” rtuals, ncludng the celebraton of patron sant days and the Alasitas far. When I brely lved n Jujuy thrty years ago, I was not aware of Pachamama rtuals, even though I stayed from August to December, because then they were not as publc as they are today. Nevertheless, coca chewng was a general habt back then and I was able to earn some cash by buyng leaves wholesale and repackng them n one-ounce plastc bags that I sold, together wth sodum bcarbonate, cgarettes, and alcohol, before soccer matches at the local stadum. The Indio King It s qute possble that Bolvan mne workers, who mgrated n several waves from the 1950s and found work n mnes at Prquta, El Agular, and Santa Vctora n northern Argentna, were nstrumental n the expanson of Andean rtuals and Bolvan-style ch’alla ceremones. The same may be true for seasonal mgrants to sugar mlls and other agro-ndustres n Salta and Tucumán. Today these rtuals, practced by all strata, have become a shared “nvented tradton.”30 Ths connecton between cross-border culture, mgraton to dangerous ndustral surroundngs, and rtual nnovaton was demonstrated to me by the “Indo Kng.” On my way back to Bolva I stopped n La Quaca to look for Zacarías Gutérrez, founder-drector of a Devl’s Dance group, Los Mercenaros, that had provoked a publc scandal and even a dplomatc ncdent between the Argentne consul n Vllazón and hs Bolvan counterpart n La Quaca n the md-1990s. Anthropologst Gabrela Karask explored the conlct and the double rejecton that expressons of Bolvan folklore suffer at the border.31 Durng a carnval at La Quaca (the Argentne border town), dancers of Bolvan descent perform a partcularly fathful and grandose verson of the Devl’s Dance from Oruro. Natve Argentnes (ncludng earler mgrants) usually vew ths as a foregn cultural ntruson that dstorts the dentty of northern Argentna. Bolvans on the other sde of the border, however, vew t as a form of cultural robbery, llegal exportaton, and the expropraton of genunely Bolvan folklore. Paradoxcally, now that the carnval of Oruro has been recognzed nternatonally as “Cultural Patrmony of Humanty,” the Bolvan elte wll be strengthened n ts natonalst propretary atttude toward the cultural expressons of (domnated) ndgenous or cholo Bolvans. That the Devl’s Dance group s stgmatzed on both sdes of the border, but for dfferent reasons, shows that ethncty, class, and natonalty are entangled n a contradctory fashon. Zacarías Gutérrez testied to ths when



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i talkng wth Gabrela Karask. Curous to see how hs experences mght be connected wth other Andean customs and habts, such as coca chewng, I went to look for hm. Unfortunately he was away on a long-dstance trp, so I asked to speak wth hs father, also named Zacarías, the legendary “Indo Kng,” a well-known character n the local cultural scene. There are many stores about hs deeds n the mnes, and local folklorsts and wrters have even recorded some of these n wrtng. He was born n rural Toledo n the department of Oruro (Bolva) and hs mother was a Qhchwa-speakng Indan. As a youth workng n the mnes, he soon ganed the nckname of Indo Kng for hs sklls as an explorer who could ind mnerals n the deepest and most dficult mne shafts. He worked for twelve years n the mnes of Huanun, Sglo XX, and San José. Then, gun n hand, he took part n the Bolvan Revoluton of 1952. Afterwards, he could not ind work anywhere and, enraged by the ndfference shown by the revolutonary cadres to grassroots nsurgents such as hmself, he and other mners took the road south to the Argentne border n 1953. As a famous and nfallble ore-inder, the Indo Kng was wrapped n an atmosphere of myth and legend. He was sad to drnk much alcohol and to practce strange rtuals to the Devl. Perhaps that s why people thought of hm as ther last resort to save the Prquta mne, whch had been gven up because of low productvty. Prquta, a mnng town n northern Argentna, had been almost dsmantled, but the Bolvan mners, desperate to prevent ther source of lvelhood from gong bankrupt, pushed the mne managers to call upon the Indo Kng. He happened to be on a drnkng bnge at the tme. “Alcohol s powerful,” he told me when he showed me hs altar wth seven huge Devl’s masks, arranged among desccated anmals, dressed n dance costume. Two bg photographs of statues n the mnes stood n the mddle. They showed Ukako or Tío (uncle) of the Prquta mne and the Usqulla of the Santa Vctora mne. The Indo Kng gave a detaled account of hs irst entry nto the Prkta mne shaft. A Protestant mner who had converted durng the emergency took hm to the mne gallery, but the Indo Kng entered the chllng water of the looded shaft alone. Beforehand he had fortied hmself wth coca leaves and alcohol. To perform hs task he took along basc tools and, above all, he was carryng all knds of rtual elements: alcohol, coca leaves, and other offerngs. He went all the way to the end of the tunnel, secured wth huge logs. Here he performed hs task n a deep trance, chewng coca leaves and offerng alcohol lbatons. He prayed, nvokng the sprts of the mne, sometmes whsperng softly and at other tmes shoutng angrly. Then he became ntoxcated and was overcome by sleep. At last he began to tap the



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” mne walls and to taste and smell bts of ore, untl inally he found a huge depost of tn casterte, whch extended the mne’s lfe wth twenty-seven years of renewed productvty and employment. The Indo Kng s also a legendary trckster and cheater of women. He has forty-one chldren by sxteen dfferent women. Today he repents for all the sufferng he has nlcted on them: “So many rches have passed through my hands . . . and I have nothng now. . . . The Ukako s lke that, he gves, but he also takes away.” These remarks take us to the heart of Andean belefs about the transgresson of conjugal idelty as a precondton for a mne worker to have “luck.” A pagan verson of the “pact wth the Devl” emerges here, assocated wth the Ukako (Tío or uncle) and the chaotc fertlty of the underworld, the earth’s entrals that the mne worker penetrates. In ths endeavor he rsks hs blood (n a mne accdent), so he hopes to appease the detes of the mne shaft by anmal sacrices, rtual lbatons, and ch’allas that take the place of hs blood. Ths Andean deology of “luck” has ts bass n the powers of the coca leaf, whch the Indo Kng consumed n such an ntense, rtualzed manner. In ths he dffered from the ways of ndgenous shamans (yatiris), who consult or “read” the leaves. Coca leaves are key to the rtuals for enterng the mne, for searchng for ore, and for celebratng ts dscovery (the so-called “ch’alla of the new-found ore”). The owners and managers of the Prkta mne could not beleve the quantty of ore that the Indo Kng had found. The next day he made a mud model of the Ukako around a nucleus of tn and slver, and he naugurated a tradton of rtual coca chewng (akhulliku) and performng ch’allaku and wilancha ceremones to the Ukako that contnued to take place at ixed dates durng the rtual calendar untl the mne ceased to operate. The Indo Kng’s dscovery ushered n not only a long cycle of mnng productvty, but also the regular provson of coca leaves to the mne’s 700-odd workers. The company tself used to buy these leaves; ths was at a tme when mport restrctons began to be enforced. The Indo Kng and other heads of work teams would dstrbute the leaves to the mne workers as advance payment for ther work as well as for ther daly chewng and ther rtual consumpton. The collectve ceremones performed durng the rtual calendar (manly Carnval Frday and August 1) were followed by smaller rtuals performed ndvdually or n small groups, accordng to the habts and customs of the mgrant mne worker’s place of orgn—mostly Bolva or the Jujuy mountan range. Lbatons wth the blood of rtually klled anmals (wilancha) were performed n the man mne shaft every August 1. On one occason the Indo Kng asked for a lve calf to be brought from Salta, and the ch’alla reached ggantc proportons. He adorned the calf



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i wth tn and slver, wth Andean textles and slver cons, and threw t alve nto the depths of the mne shaft. Belefs regardng “good luck” n the mne, as well as nvocatons and prayers for Ukako’s protecton (done each Tuesday and Frday), reveal the old culture’s force n ths new captalst context. They demonstrate how coca chewng was an nseparable part of the labor process. It connected the performance of a dangerous, sklled job wth cosmc dspostons and ntutons. Mne workers perceved the mne as a lvng organsm wth moods, whms, and gestures of benevolence or anger. Therefore t was essental to seek ts cooperaton, or avod ts punshment, by means of proper rtual nvocatons and by generously sharng alcohol and coca leaves wth the other members of the work team, and wth the earth tself. The Indo Kng told me he had forced the presdent of the mnng company to share the rtual wth the mners. The presdent was a gringo who usually lved n Buenos Ares but who could not gnore the magcal explanaton gven by the Indo Kng to account for hs sudden rches. Avelno Bazán (a unon leader from El Agular and author of a book of testmonal folk stores of northern Argentna) portrayed the Indo Kng, n a short story enttled “El Ukako,” as a blend of a work-team chef and a moral authorty who would stmulate and organze cooperatve work teams by mprovng work dscplne, unleashng a collectve energy to produce, and makng t possble for mne workers to face the rsks and techncal challenges of mneshaft work.32 Ths nverson of the Protestant ethc hghlghts the peculartes of mne-shaft labor and ts sacred and cosmc mplcatons. Andean cosmology assocates the hdden forces of the underworld (manqhapacha) wth the doman of the Devl or Ukako (Tío or uncle).33 Snce t was early August when I vsted, the Indo Kng had served the Pachamama food on her altar n La Quaca. Ths food, n varous dshes and cups, had been lyng there snce the prevous Frday. He had to bury the food soon n order to close the rtual cycle of the “open mouth of the Earth” (lakapacha, as the month of August s known n Aymara). No doubt the rtual performed by the Indo Kng dffered from the rtuals we had observed n Salta and Jujuy. But no doubt there were mxed ngredents n hs rtual, too, as n all nvented tradtons. For example, the Tío was nvoked as “Momo God,” and among the mages on hs altar were two tny Buddha statuettes. The motley heterogenety of the Indo Kng’s altar s but one example of the type of cultural mélange that s produced at ths border where Andean labor mgrants artculate deep, long-standng belefs wth new ncorporatons and assmlatons. These new ncorporatons often act as cultural masks, protectng and coverng traces of older memores and



“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” symbols. What struck me most n all ths was that n the mddle of the altar there was a tny slver igurne of the Devl and that t had receved lavsh offerngs of confett, coca leaves, and lowers. “That one s growng,” sad the Indo Kng. “Each year he grows a lttle.” In the Indo Kng’s cosmology of the Devl, there s a lvng entty: the mneral that grows and changes wthn the earth and follows hdden paths, watng for the “lucky” mne worker but evadng a neglgent or non-belevng one. “The Devil Knows No Borders” The ntervew wth the Indo Kng, a Bolvan mne worker who had lved n Argentna for ive decades, provdes an approprate closure to my essay. It shows that the revtalzaton of the Pachamama cults and the August offerngs are lnked to rtuals for the mne-shaft dety. Ths s an old root, perhaps reachng back nto the colonal perod, whch has generated a seres of recent cultural transformatons n the whole border regon. One of the more recent developments n ths ield was the establshment of Los Mercenaros, the Devl’s Dance group. Durng the carnval the group performs the Relato, a play (auto sacramental) datng back to the eghteenth century and a specalty of the Devl’s Dance groups of Oruro (Bolva). Ths new development at the border was possble thanks to the efforts of Zacarías Gutérrez Jr., who got n touch wth Oruro and recognzed n the texts some aspects of hs father’s mnng stores. Speakng wth Gabrela Karask, Zacarías explaned why he felt t was legtmate to cross the border wth the costumes, musc, text, and choreography of the Devl’s Dance. “The Devl knows no borders,” he sad. In ths way he nadvertently syntheszed for us the socal representatons nvolved n the Devl’s Dance, as well as n other cultural and rtual practces. The same could be sad of coca leaves. They show the permeablty and lexblty of Andean cultural practces. They also demonstrate the hegemonc potental of these practces n modern scenaros of ndustral captalsm and globalzed urban cultures. The current coca leaf “boom” n northern Argentna s predcated on a dense texture of belefs and tradtons, halfway modern and halfway archac (or at least constructed as archac). These belefs and tradtons permeate labor relatons n mnng companes and agro-ndustral enterprses as much as urban nghtlfe and the daly habts of large numbers of Westernzed mddle- and upper-class Argentnes. In addton, the coca leaf “boom” n northern Argentna s also predcated on rtual renewal. Wherever rural and urban people mngle wth



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i gringo toursts and Bolvan labor mgrants, local actors of many socal and economc backgrounds are actvely nvolved n nventng ceremones and rtuals to Pachamama. Such “nvented tradtons” sustan a large crossborder trade n coca leaves whch s at once llegal and lct, outlawed and respected. Coca leaves n northern Argentna attest to the extraordnary vtalty of Andean dasporc culture n new socal contexts. They contrbute to new meanngs, new poetcs of dentty, and new dentty poltcs among a multethnc populaton. They are key to explanng the peculartes of ths borderland, not just as a space of commodty crculaton, but also as a space of cultural crculaton, wth repercussons at both the natonal and the nternatonal levels. NOTES 1. Jame W. Molns, Bolivia. Crónicas Americanas (Buenos Ares: Lbro Prmero, 1916), 17. 2. Ths contract was negotated between the Argentne Insttute for the Promoton of Exchange (Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio) and the Bolvan Corporaton of Coca-Leaf Producers (Corporación Boliviana de Productores de Coca). See Maro Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” n La coca . . . tradición, rito, identidad, Insttuto Indgensta Interamercano (Méxco: Insttuto Indgensta Interamercano, 1989), 58. 3. Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” 59–60. 4. Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” 65. 5. Carter and Maman have found documents concernng mports of Bolvan coca leaves between 1968 and 1976 (one year before total prohbton was enforced). The igures show an ncrease from 671 tons n 1968 to 938 tons n 1974, wth a slght decrease to 868 tons n 1976. See Wllam E. Carter and Maurco Maman, Multidisciplinary Study: Traditional Use of the Coca Leaf in Bolivia (La Paz: Museo Naconal de Etnograia y Folklore, 1978). 6. Rcardo Abduca, “De los yungas paceños al noroeste argentno: Nuevo enfoque sobre la produccón de coca para consumo tradconal” (unpublshed manuscrpt, ca. 1994), 23. The author thanks Rcardo Abduca for access to ths unpublshed manuscrpt; Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna.” 7. Abduca, “De los yungas paceños al noroeste argentno,” 37. 8. In Argentna, a “provnce” s equvalent to a “department” n Bolva, and vce versa. The survey was conducted on behalf of the secretary of health of the provncal government of Jujuy. See Secretaría de Salud del Goberno de la Provnca de Jujuy, Encuesta sobre el consumo de hoja de coca en la Provincia de Jujuy (San Salvador del Jujuy: Secretaría de Salud, 2000). 9. Raúl Noro, personal communcaton. 10. Abduca, “De los yungas paceños al noroeste argentno,” 35. 11. Drugstore sales contrbuted to a restrcton of consumpton to the elte and to the prolferaton of clandestne retal networks. Moreover, n the drugstores the usual reactve llipta or lejía (vegetable ashes) were substtuted by sodum bcarbonate, whch contnues to be the favorte reactve for coca chewng n urban northern Argentna. Cf. Abduca, “De los yungas paceños al noroeste argentno,” 26–35.

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“Here, Even Legslators Chew Them” 12. Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” 42, 50. 13. Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” 68. 14. Rabey denties three causes: “a) the regonal elte’s need to dfferentate tself from the Buenos Ares elte; b) the presence of an mportant contngent of ethnc Syran-Lebanese settlers, and c) the need to exhbt a socal conduct that s beyond the law.” Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” 50. 15. Abduca suggests that all these factors contrbuted to the formaton and consoldaton of a “quas-legal” market for coca leaves, smlar to the transnatonal market for qat leaves. Qat s another stmulant whch s chewed as fresh leaves. Its market has expanded from Yemen to neghborng countres such as Ethopa and Somala and to dasporc communtes from ths regon n the West. Abduca, “De los yungas paceños al noroeste argentno.” (Also see edtor’s ntroducton). 16. Rabey, “Legaldad e legaldad del coqueo en Argentna,” 55. 17. It s ronc that n 1949 doctors on the Unted Natons Commsson of Inqury on the Coca Leaf dsmssed as a superstton the “general belef that coca leaves suppress hunger, thrst and drowsness” and that now other doctors, equally whte and Western-mnded, bear wtness to the emptness of ther older colleagues’ clam by usng coca leaves themselves. 18. These small towns n the agrcultural belt surroundng Buenos Ares were wtnessng a most ntense process of land transfer and the leasng of land to Bolvan mmgrants and, at the same tme, terrble volence aganst these mmgrants, ncludng armed aggresson and murder, n a knd of low-ntensty “ethnc cleansng.” La Prensa, May 3 and 25, 2000, and June 9, 2000. 19. A suggestve name. In Aymara, jama means “sht.” 20. Abduca, “De los yungas paceños al noroeste argentno,” 9–10. 21. Intervew by author, vdeotape, Jujuy, July 27, 2001. See Las fronteras de la coca, drected by Slva Rvera Cuscanqu, 29 mn. vdeocassette, 2001. 22. “Cocaleros de Bolva mran con esperanza a Jujuy” (Coca producers from Bolva look hopefully to Jujuy), El Pregón, July 30, 2001. 23. Everywhere we notced that at least 30 percent of the customers were women. 24. Carter and Maman, Multidisciplinary Study; Wllam E. Carter and Maurco Maman, “Patrones del uso de la coca en Bolva,” América indígena 38, no. 4 (1978). 25. Group ntervew, El Pregón, Jujuy, July 30, 2001; see Rvera Cuscanqu, Las fronteras de la coca. 26. Zacarías Gutérrez, ntervew by author, La Quaca, August 7, 2001. 27. Mercedes Costa, ntervew by author, Maymara, August 2, 2001. 28. Sahumerio (from the Spansh verb sahumar) s an offerng that s to be burnt, as ts fumes carry the scents of herbs, sweets, untu or llama lard, and many symbolc tems to the heghts of the regonal mountan gods. Ths ethereal aspect s combned wth lbatons and the buryng of offerngs to the Earth Mother (Pachamama). The fact that the two motons—toward the earth (low, lat, and deep) and towards the mountans (hgh, steep, and elevated)—are complementary seems crucal n the percepton of “wholeness” nherent to the Andean worldvew. 29. Misa and mesa are nterchangeable n Aymara or Qhchwa, whch know only three vowels (a, , u). It means both a mass (misa), the man ceremony of the Catholc Church, and a table (mesa), the place where a rtual meal s to be eaten. 30. Erc Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1983). 31. Gabrela Karask, Formas de sociabilidad de un grupo de migrantes andinos en



si lv i a r i v er a c usic a nqu i el Gran Buenos Aires (Buenos Ares: Consejo de Investgacones Centicas y Tecncas (CONICET), 1987); Gabrela Karask, “Trabajadoras bolvanas en el conurbano bonaerense. Pequeño comerco y conlcto socal,” n Inmigración limítrofe: Los bolivianos en Buenos Aires, ed. Roberto Benenca and Gabrela Karask (Buenos Ares: Centro Edtor de Amérca Latna, 1995); Gabrela Karask, “Tras la genealogía del dablo. Dscusones sobre la nacón y el Estado en la frontera argentno-bolvana,” n Fronteras, naciones e identidades. La periferia como centro, ed. Alejandro Grmson, (Buenos Ares: La Cruja, 2000). 32. Avelno Bazán, Voces del socavón: Relatos, vivencias y sucesos en El Aguilar (Jujuy, 1986). 33. The meanng and cultural roots of the names of ths partcular Tío (uncle), Ukako, and of the female dety of Santa Vctora, Usqulla, are stll to be explored. The irst name could be a varant of iqaku or ekeko (a small dety who represents the mercantle prosperty that people seek to acheve durng the Alasitas far). The second name s the femnne form of usqullu, a small Andes jaguar.



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant

ive Seeing the State Like a Migrant Why So Many Non-criminals Break Immigration Laws Davd Kyle and Chrstna A. Sracusa

The Human Smuggling Problem through the Eyes of Destination States James Scott pondered the queston of why “the state” seems to be the enemy of people who move around, though ths queston led hm to wrte a much broader book regardng the falure of state plannng due to how states “see lke a state.”1 In short, states seek to radcally smplfy and reduce socal realty to it management schemes mposed from above. We turn the lens around to ask the opposte queston: How do mgrants see states? We argue that the answer to ths queston s crtcal for understandng why so many non-crmnals around the world are breakng states’ mmgraton and labor laws. When states began focusng ther vson n the 1900s on managng and controllng mgrants en masse, assgnng a varety of legal statuses wth or wthout the rght to work, they created “llegal alens.”2 Thus, llegal populatons ncrease when states retract the legal means of entry and work for foregners. The hallmark of such perods of retracton, typcally durng economc downturns, s the asserton that—at least for now—mgrants’ costs outwegh ther beneits to recevng states. Yet the lobbyng efforts 

dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a of employers of mmgrant labor, and above all the fact that mmgraton polcy s also a foregn polcy concern, mtgate “mmgraton reforms” durng even the peaks of ant-mmgrant perods. Thus, the resultng strategc complextes of the muddled and ever-changng laws and enforcement strateges related to mmgraton provde suficent proitable ambgutes for major employers of mmgrant labor and, consequently, endless hope for potental mgrant workers and asylum seekers.3 The domestc and foregn poltcal challenges and ethcal questons rased by these ever-changng mgrant management calculatons represent a topc of ntense debate among economc, legal, phlosophcal, and poltcal theorsts.4 Yet durng the past decade, a new actor shapng mgraton patterns has become the focus of mostly negatve attenton of those across the poltcal spectrum concerned wth mmgraton ssues—the mgrant smuggler, or traficker, who ads the unauthorzed mgrant or asylum seeker nto a foregn country for proit (wth prces rangng from US$50 to US$50,000).5 The mgrant smuggler, snce the md-1990s, has been the prmary target of novel border securty polces and legslaton for reducng llegal mmgraton, ncludng the recent “Vctms of Trafickng and Volence Protecton Act of 2000” n the Unted States. The successful smugglng operatons adng mgrants and asylum seekers n ther clandestne or falsely documented entry nto Western states has produced a growng number of government and multlateral programs around the world to combat smugglers and trafickers. These programs, for the most part, construct mgrants who contract smugglers as passve vctms of “organzed crme,” whch may be dstngushed, as James Fnkenauer has ponted out, from “crme that s organzed.”6 They are able to do so n part by focusng prmarly on the most egregous cases of smugglng abuses, ncludng enslavement. Smlarly, mgrant smugglng s now estmated to be the fastest growng type of “transnatonal crme,” wth analoges to other crmnal networks movng drugs, arms, and other llegal commodtes across borders.7 For example, a seres of artcles appearng n the Arizona Republic n late May 2001, reportng the deaths of fourteen mgrants, represent the starkly dvergent dscourses of who s to blame for mmgrant deaths and organzed mmgraton lawbreakng. The irst artcle blames the smuggler who led the mgrants to an area named “Devl’s Path” n whch they baked n the scorchng Arzona desert and were then allegedly left to de.8 It quotes Attorney General John Ashcroft: “They are to be condemned for puttng proits before people.” A second artcle, after realzng that one of the dead, found crouched under a cactus, was n fact a smuggler, leads,



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant “Suddenly the smuggler sn’t a very bad guy anymore.”9 A few months later, the newspaper, n an all too rare nvestgaton, examned a town n Mexco n whch nearly everyone s nvolved n the llegal mgraton busness as a normalzed actvty.10 Ths story took a much more socologcal perspectve on the llegal mgraton busness, ncludng the role of mutual trust between mgrant and smuggler. Far from beng an solated ncdent, these deaths and the debate surroundng them demonstrate the complex ethcal dmensons at play once we move beyond smplstc arguments ether blamng the crmnal smuggler, the mgrant, or the unntended consequences of state actons. Rather than enter nto a normatve debate regardng the foundatonal and evolvng rghts of states and mmgrants, for the sake of our argument we wll assume that states have legtmate nterests n controllng who enters ther terrtory, though ths has not always been a hgh prorty for states. Instead, the growng global busness of mgraton servces rases some emprcal socologcal questons that need to be examned along wth more deductve economc, poltcal, and crmnologcal theorzng. What has been lackng from most publc debates and news reportng on mgrant smugglng and human trafickng s the emprcal realty of how mgrants themselves vew ther actons and the often orderly, contractual nature by whch they enter nto a dverse range of “mgrant-exportng schemes” (see followng secton). By understandng the poltcal and moral reasonng of undocumented workers and those who ad them, we gan a better understandng of why so many non-crmnals are choosng to selectvely dsregard some states’ mmgraton laws prohbtng unauthorzed entry and work. Durng a perod n whch clandestne border crossngs are not nearly as smple as they used to be just ive years ago, we ask what may be posed as the “human smugglng queston”: Why do hundreds of thousands of otherwse non-crmnals each year wllngly choose to break mmgraton laws by contractng ntermedares? In other words, do mgrants and ther abettors (who are now subject to lengthy prson sentences n some destnaton countres—but n few sendng or transt countres) vew ther actons as “crmnal”? Whle smplicaton s necessary to all analytcal frameworks, the smplstc notons of “trade n human cargo” carred out by “human smugglers” s much too nadequate to the task. A more useful concept would attempt to overcome the complex relatonshps among varous apparent dchotomes such as mcro/macro; legal/llegal; state/non-state. To ths end we develop the concept of “mgrant-exportng schemes.”11



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a Migrant-Exporting Schemes: The Orderly Business of Disorderly Migration Mgrant smugglng s best understood as a strategc set of “mgrantexportng schemes” embedded n hstorcal socal relatonshps nvolvng both prvate and publc actors. The concept of a scheme mples both ts strategcally opportunstc (legal and llegal) and vsonary meanngs. Ths concept also provdes a better conceptual grasp of the organzaton and logc of “human smugglng,” whch narrowly lmts ts ield of vson to one small, albet mportant, part of a wder ield of socal acton. The label of “mgrant smugglng” fals to capture the mx of legal and llegal strateges (often blurrng the lnes) used by those who are attemptng to gan work abroad for a prce. The prmary goal of a mgrant-exportng scheme s to provde a lmted or “package” mgraton servce to a specic country, and often a specic locale or employer. Typcally, mgrants are drven to professonal smugglers by blocked socal moblty, pre-exstng corrupton, and uneven development—not absolute poverty. Many would be consdered mddle-class wthn ther home communtes. Ethnc persecuton and sexsm are also common reasons for perceved celngs n moblty. Most of the organzatonal actvty takes place on the sendng sde; the contract s termnated once the mgrant has arrved at the destnaton. In some cases, however, inancal loans for the smugglng fees also become an mportant source of ncome after arrval, but there s great varety n the terms of nterest and payment and the dvson of labor; the smuggler s not necessarly the loan shark. It s qute common for famly members already abroad to lend the smugglng fee for a reduced rate. Such mgrant-exportng schemes are often characterzed by hghly rregular, often short-lved crmnalty, much of t opportunstc and therefore shaped by one’s socal networks. And snce many “mgraton merchants” are part-tmers, haltng organzed llegal mgraton s not smply a matter of breakng up a stable crmnal organzaton. In many parts of the world, the busness of mgraton as a form of exportable commodied labor has been developed by economcally debltated and poltcally weak states, whch vew ther own ctzens as ther most valuable comparatve advantage. Formal government programs, as well as tact acceptance of llegal mgraton of ts ctzens, as n the case of the Phlppnes, form part of an export-led strategy that convenently resolves two of the most challengng problems for weakened state regmes that have



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant adopted export-led development and Internatonal Monetary Fund (IMF) “stablzaton and structural adjustment programs.” Frst, emgraton provdes a safety valve for some of the country’s most ambtous but frustrated ctzens who may cause poltcal nstablty.12 At the same tme, exportng labor provdes a source of hard currency, whch n many countres has now overtaken some of the tradtonal natural resource and commodty exports of mgrant-exportng countres. After all, developed states wth declnng brth rates have experenced shortages n specic occupatonal areas, rangng from unsklled agrcultural labor to relatvely hgh-sklled medcal occupatons. Several countres that have developed ths labor export strategy have erected government bureaucraces wth overseas outposts, thus nsttutonalzng the orderly export of ther ctzens abroad, champonng the rghts of llegal resdents, and offerng dual ctzenshp to those who are assmlatng poltcally. When mgrant-exportng schemes develop as a sort of grassroots development project wthout government authorzaton, whch typcally nvolves some level of corrupton of state oficals, sendng states generally ind lttle poltcal wll to dsrupt such schemes. Ths s due to both a lack of crmnal law for related “smugglng” actvtes n most sendng and transt states and, especally, due to the large sums of mgrant remttances outpacng earnngs from other major state exports. Lke state regmes that turn to export-led strateges for poltcal as well as economc reasons, would-be llegal mgrants have moral clams based on notons of socal, economc, and poltcal (n)justce whch help shape ther decson to overrde the varous legal routes to work abroad. Mgrants make partcularstc clams to certan mmgraton rghts to enter and work n states usng a hstorcal logc. Illegal mgrants often vew themselves as a type of economc ctzen of the poltcal economc empre Western states and transnatonal corporatons have created. Ths dea s relentlessly renforced n the popular dscourse of “globalzaton” as a naturalzed socal realty promoted n a myrad of nsttutons, and t has led to the real blurrng of state clams to soveregnty.13 The methods by whch mgrants break mmgraton laws, far from beng a completely underground crmnal actvty, s typcally done n an orderly, busnesslke manner usng legal contracts to borrow smugglng fees. In most sendng regons those publc oficals and prvate ctzens nvolved n mgraton servces are well known, and they qute often publcly, though dscreetly, advertse ther servces. The ntermedares who help mgrants cross borders, obtan false denttes, or ind work n the underground labor market—many of whom are return mgrants—also commonly beleve that ther actons are justied and, n many cases, humantaran. Whle ths



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a may be dsmssed by law enforcement as the common self-servng rhetorc of crmnals, we must consder that even legal scholars argue that mmgraton lawbreakng s the textbook case of a “vctmless crme.”14 Hence, llegal mgraton and work has become not only a means to an end but tself a proitable busness for entrepreneural non-mgrants and especally return mgrants wllng to rsk the ntal nvestment perod of a few years of ndebtedness (not unlke many college students). The purpose of ths descrpton of “mgrant-exportng schemes” as an deal type s not to gloss over ts very real dangers, ncludng the regular malfeasance of the ntermedares (mgraton merchants) and corrupt state oficals, as well as the bad luck of soarng temperatures or sudden storms at sea. Hundreds each year n varous parts of the world de en route due to the rsky condtons under whch they undertake ther journeys, sometmes smply due to unforeseen condtons as they cross oceans and deserts, and other tmes due to the neglgence and human error of the mgrant smugglers.15 These dangers grow exponentally when slave-importing operations take advantage of mmgrants’ precarous llegal status by opportunstcally enslavng a substantal mnorty of unsuspectng mgrants who thought they were smply part of a vctmless mgrant-exportng scheme. Mgrantexportng schemes provde the opportuntes for organzed crme to operate slave-mportng operatons, whch unlke a mgrant-exportng scheme, makes most of ts proits from unpad labor n the destnaton state.16 However, once agan, both the enslavement of llegal mgrants by opportunstc crmnal organzatons and the deaths of mgrants en route can only be understood aganst the backdrop of the ubqutous busnesslke mgrantexportng schemes and ther relaton to a wder set of local, natonal, and foregn nsttutons of power. Research Design and Methods Ths chapter s part of a larger study to llumnate the commodicaton of mgraton servces n many regons of the world, wth Ecuador as our most n-depth case study. How does one study llegal mgrants who have been part of a mgrant-exportng system? Obvously random-sample surveys are precluded for ntervewng actual smugglers or “mgraton merchants,” but they can be used n sendng communtes. In ths study we conduct most of our ntervews n destnaton countres. Ths chapter s based on prmary ntervews wth llegal alens, brokers, mmgrant poltcal organzers, and poltcal representatves, along wth secondary data collected from government and news sources and Internet stes dedcated to transnatonal



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant mmgrant communtes. In several cases, mmgrants wthout legal documents permttng them to work n Span allowed us not only to ntervew them but vdeotape them and ther places of recreaton. That we can easly and readly dscuss wth mgrants ther varous strateges, both n Ecuador and n the destnaton countres, tells us a lot about how mgrants vew ther own actons as justied. Unlke many accounts of human smugglng or other systematc transnatonal lawbreakng, “transnatonal crmnals” n the tradtonal sense do not igure n the mgrant-exportng schemes of Ecuadorans workng llegally n Span. Ths s also a tellng dfference between the smugglng, ncludng self-smugglng, of humans and other llct commodtes crsscrossng the planet—transnatonal crmnal organzatons may be present n some networks but are not a necessary condton. The rest of ths chapter s organzed nto three sectons: Frst, an overvew of the Ecuadoran mass mgraton; second, the poltcal and economc realtes faced by Ecuadorans at home and n Span and ther testmones characterzng Ecuador as a predatory state. The level of desttuton and generalzed loss of hope by Ecuadorans as a result of the predatory state leads to the ratonalzaton, “If we can’t beat ’em, jon ’em,” whch brngs us to testmones descrbng the decson to enter mgrant-exportng schemes. The inal secton dscusses mgrants’ clams that llegal work s not a real “crme.” We turn to a case that has many features of mgrant-exportng schemes as an deal type. Ecuadorans represent a new wave of long-dstance llegal emgraton, bult not smply on long-standng socal networks but on local economes emboldened by the ncreasng nvolvement of sendng and recevng states and employers seekng to proit from ther cheap labor. Mgrants’ remttances back to Ecuador are the second largest source of hard currency behnd ol exports. To understand why Ecuadoran mgrants have been leavng n large numbers n just the past three years, we must irst examne the magntude of the falure of the Ecuadoran state and, most mportantly, the general perceptons by Ecuadorans of ts causes. Ecuadorian Migration to the U.S. and Spain: An Overview Throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, nternatonal mgraton from Ecuador was hghly concentrated n the southern provnces of Azuay and Cañar, from whch most made ther way to New York Cty.17 They typcally entered and worked llegally, usng local mgrant-exportng schemes; most “coyotes” came from the same communtes as the mgrants and were often related by knshp. Mass emgraton from ths orgnal sendng regon s stll



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a contnung unabated; however, nternatonal emgraton s now wdespread throughout the country and at all socoeconomc levels. Whle any llegal populaton s dficult to estmate, the Ecuadoran daspora s calculated to nclude more than two mllon people, approxmately half of whom lve n the U.S.18 Between 1999 and 2000 alone, 400,000 Ecuadorans joned ther one mllon compatrots already n the Unted States. Departures to Span escalated from 5,000 people n all of 1994 to more than 7,000 per month n 2000.19 Before Aprl 2003, Ecuadorans entered Span legally as toursts wthout vsas, but generally almost mmedately sought employment rather than toursm, thus makng ther status llegal. Though ths s not “mgrant smugglng,” Ecuadorans do make use of mgrant-exportng schemes, wth the prce set at roughly half that of the U.S. destnaton (US$8,000 to US$10,000). The prce ncludes transportaton and the ntal funds needed to show the Spansh authortes upon entry (approxmately US$2,000) that they brng a “tourst” budget. Because Spansh authortes are now much more lkely to queston the ntentons of Ecuadorans, mgrant-exportng schemes also nclude a varety of routes and strateges for enterng a European Unon state as a belevable tourst. Once at work, the ncome earned can be astoundng to some: “Wth the salary of one or two days I cover the month’s expenses; the rest s savngs,”20 says Roco, an Ecuadoran emgrant workng n Murca. Tens of thousands have followed Roco. Ecuadorans have contrbuted mghtly to Span’s rapd transton from labor exporter to labor mporter, makng them the largest mmgrant communty n Span after Moroccans.21 So what prompted ths mass exodus of Ecuadorans from ther country? In the last decade, Ecuadorans have wtnessed one of the more dramatc economc and poltcal downturns n the country’s hstory. Begnnng wth the undeclared border war wth Peru n 1995 and the poltcal nstablty generated by the populst presdency of Abdala Bucaram (1996–1997), Ecuador then suffered the collapse of ts coastal agro-export sector due to the clmatologcal effects of El Nño, resultng n a loss of US$2.8 bllon, all of ths exacerbated by an nternatonal inancal crss rpplng through Latn Amerca. The deepenng economc crss reached a peak when small- and medum-scale savngs accounts were ndeintely frozen n 1998 (some for more than two years). In 1999, the GDP fell more than 7 percent, along wth the greater part of the country’s inancal system, when Presdent Jaml Mahuad elmnated the natonal currency, the sucre, to replace t wth the U.S. dollar, unleashng what could rghtly be called total chaos n the short term. Near-complete state collapse n the late 1990s has brought a dubous suc-

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Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant cess: t has caused the rapd development of mass mgraton to the Unted States and Europe of broad sectors of Ecuadoran socety, producng more than US$1 bllon per year to the Ecuadoran economy n remttances.22 Mgrants’ remttances exceed revenues from banana and shrmp exports and are second only to the country’s ol revenues. But the rse of llegal mgraton and human smugglng can also be lnked to the processes of democratzaton and economc lberalzaton n Latn Amerca n the 1980s as well as to faled development projects. When economes went sour and unfulilled expectatons were prmed by the successes of prevous small-scale mgratons, establshed socal networks were quckly revtalzed. In ths sense, mgrant-exportng schemes can be vewed as a “successful” large-scale strategy of ntegraton nto the global marketplace rather than a crmnal frnge actvty. Ecuadorans are ncreasngly blocked by both U.S. and Mexcan border authortes and naves as Mexco makes a bd to cut a deal for ts own llegal alens n exchange for blockng Central and South Amercans.23 The U.S. Coast Guard now regularly transfers hundreds of Ecuadoran mgrants off the Mexcan waters to detenton centers n Mexco.24 As a result, Span has become a refuge, partcularly for women and the mddle class. Even the wealthest and most productve regons of Ecuador are sendng thousands of workers abroad,25 who n Span work for as lttle as half the mnmum wage pad a Spanard. Many of them are professonals wth chldren who lost ther jobs, ther savngs, and generally ther qualty of lfe pror to the great monetary devaluaton of 2000. Ths rapd deprecaton of ther savngs—whle nlatng ther debts by about 400 percent26—precptated the collapse of banks, busnesses, and several government regmes. Even Ecuadoran salors attempted to transform a navy shp nto a smugglng vessel for ther own escape, creatng the mage of a stampede out of the country. “We can’t detan the wave of emgraton. . . . If thngs contnue lke ths, the country could lose half of ts nhabtants n the next decade,”27 sad Fernando Vega, a prest and drector of the non-governmental organzaton Movldad Humana (“Human Moblty”). If, however, such a truly mass mgraton from Ecuador comes to pass, emptyng the country of ts workng-age populaton, two common themes of current mgrants’ perceptons wll have to persst and even deepen. Frst, that Ecuador s an ncorrgble predatory state, and second, that breakng mmgraton and labor laws s not a real crme n destnaton countres wllng to hre them, a percepton that s exacerbated by the mxed messages and ever-changng mmgraton and labor laws governng ther tenuous legal status and economc survval.



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a Theme One: Ecuador as a Predatory State Ths secton weaves poltcal and economc realtes faced by Ecuadorans n Ecuador and Span wth ther vews on the Ecuadoran and Spansh states, regardless of the vews’ emprcal valdty. It s the result of ntervews carred out n Span n December 2001 and July/August 2002, and rch Internet testmones of mgraton through varous Ecuadoran webstes. An overwhelmng theme of these testmones s the vew of Ecuador as a predatory state n whch crmes of the elte have completely debltated the economy. The elte s deined as nterlockng publc and prvate oficals who use the state apparatus to plfer funds from the mddle class and wrte legslaton for the outrght pllagng of state funds and foregn ad or loans. In short, the mpresson that laws are wrtten for lawmakers s wdespread. There s a corollary theme: corrupton s possble only by the powerful. And nsofar as Span s the former mperal power n Ecuador, the Spansh state, or at least ts polces, s seen by many as an extenson of the predatory state—wllng to speak the language of globalzaton and transparency for ts economc and poltcal convenence but to the detrment of the mgrant laborer. In Robamba, Ecuador, as a schoolteacher for twelve years, Eduardo made US$50 a month and drove a tax to supplement hs salary. He has been n Span ive years and has several jobs ncludng hs own busness n Blbao runnng a locutorio, whch specalzes n long-dstance phone calls back home for a varety of mmgrants. He explans how as the head of a household wth two chldren, “I was always payng debts, at the end of every month, more debts. Do you know what a teacher s there? A teacher s he who most gves of hmself, because you always gve, and then you stll have debts. The end of the month would come and I would pay debts, every month, debts.” By leavng ther country, mgrants ncur debts, but they are debts wth a possble future for escapng debt, as Eduardo saw t. In Ecuador, he had lost all hope of beng able to support hs famly and provde them a prosperous future. In lght of ths, a professonal wth chldren who wants to gve the best to hs chldren, I realzed that there n my country they weren’t gvng me a chance. Fve years ago I resgned from my work. I’ve been here n Blbao four years. Every year n Ecuador got worse. Instead of mprovng, thngs got worse, gettng deeper nto debt. The state was n greater debt always. It was normal for the state to pay us wth two months delay. It was “normal”—the super famous burglares of the state treasury by a congressperson who would steal three bllon sucres and another who would steal ive bllon sucres.



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant The tme comes when you feel an mpotence to act. And everyone knows t. The news stores were that so and so had stolen $5 mllon and was now n the Unted States. And f——! There I am, kllng myself to make $50. And to see my chldren go hungry? The crss got worse and the moment came when I realzed there was nothng to be done. There was no hope for tomorrow. It was a termnal cancer—there was no hope. Here I have nothng to do. I’m leavng. I went to Bolva. I ddn’t lke t. I went to Caracas. There was more poverty, Latn Amercan nsecurty. At least n Ecuador there was peace. But n Caracas t was terrble. I’m better off n my country. A frend told me Span was good to work. Let’s go to Span! he sad. I bought my tcket and sold everythng I had to buy my tcket for Span. I gathered my money and traveled by myself. I ddn’t know anyone here but I couldn’t back out. I had resgned my job and gone nto debt to travel. My brother acted as guarantor. . . . I came November 4, 1998. I arrved n Madrd. I went to El Retro [Park] and by chance I ran nto a guy who had been my student years before. He told me that n Blbao there were few foregners and there was work there.

Eduardo opened up hs own locutorio wth a Spansh partner n Blbao’s Old Cty. He has already bought some land n Quto. Now he wants to buy a truck to transport vegetables from Robamba to Guayaqul and pck up banana refuse n Guayaqul to take to a pg farm he wants to start n Robamba. He wll leave a chauffeur n charge and return to Blbao. If the busness n Ecuador goes well, he wll stay n Ecuador. I want to stay a maxmum of two (more) years (n Span). I have my two boys there n Robamba. When I talk to them they call for me. They say ther frends ask them why ther father doesn’t go to the school meetngs, f they even have a father. One gets depressed here. Untl when? Ths s a borrowed lfe.28

Buttressng Eduardo’s clams and frustraton, Ecuador receved the ttle of the most corrupt country n Latn Amerca by Transparency Internatonal for the year 2000, only to become Transparency Internatonal’s second most corrupt country n 2001. Ths s not to lessen the hstorc structural lmtatons on the Ecuadoran economy that could be argued are reason enough for faled economc and poltcal “development.” But as many Ecuadoran observers assess the stuaton, responsblty for the Ecuadoran economc crss rests wth the neo-lberal economc polces of the successve governments of Jaml Mahuad and Gustavo Noboa, whch advocated polces n lockstep wth IMF and World Bank prescrptons29—polces whch, unwttngly or not, were geared to the specic nterests of a lessthan-“transparent” olgarchc bankng sector protected by the state and fattened by a captve natonal market.30



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a Ultmately, the dramatc socal costs of the dollarzaton of the economy led to a coup d’état by an odd and short-lved junta of mltary and ndgenous (“Indan”) leaders that cost Jaml Mahuad hs presdency on January 21, 2000. But the economc “adjustment” program was assured wth the successon to power of Gustavo Noboa, Mahuad’s former vce-presdent and Ecuador’s sxth presdent n ive years,31 n the return to a semblance of a democratcally elected regme. Despte the naugural US$2 bllon IMF credt and a welcome ncrease n ol exports, Presdent Noboa and the moblzed peasant–ndgenous masses confronted each other over IMF-prescrbed and government-mplemented prce hkes on gasolne and domestc gas consumpton, a necessary condton for contnued IMF credts despte pacts wth the moblzed popular sectors.32 IMF structural readjustment measures mposed n December 2000 led to a seres of mass moblzatons, partcularly among Ecuador’s ndgenous and rural populatons, more than 75 percent of whch lved n poverty and lacked basc housng, health, educaton, and employment.33 One hundred percent yearly nlaton, out-of-control budget deicts snce the 1980s, rampant government corrupton,34 and a complete lack of fath n Ecuador’s bankng system only served to undermne Ecuadorans’ fath n ther government, whch came to be seen as a shadow regme of the mltary. The armed forces consttutonally receve ten percent of all ol revenues, and ts own nvestments have made t the domnant economc and poltcal nsttuton n Ecuador.35 After the peaceful st-n of a unversty n Quto by 5,000 ndgenous Ecuadorans, the state decreed a natonal state of emergency and lfted basc consttutonal rghts36 n January 2001. As one emgrant sad, “corrupt poltcans have a safe-conduct to poltcal exle. . . . Corrupton has ts nurturng mother n the marrage of poltcs and economc power. Can we be hopeful of a dvorce? I beleve that ths marrage n Ecuador wll be more long lastng than the war aganst terrorsm.”37 In fact, the Ecuadoran state s sometmes referred to by Ecuadoran mmgrants and journalsts alke as an organzed and powerful maia. One Ecuadoran émgré, albet to New Jersey, wrote n to Vistazo, Ecuador’s premer news perodcal, pror to the 2002 presdental electon: “Despte where I may lve, today I am here, another day perhaps not; the only thng I can tell you s that I am a combatant of corrupton and opportunsm and I am n the know wth how Creole-Enrons [reference to the Enron scandal] operate; n Ecuador I wll never gve my vote to Ecuadoran poltcans.”38 Recognzng the mpendng mploson of the Ecuadoran state and economy, many Ecuadorans started to leave the country n what would develop nto a mass mgraton by the late 1990s. Ths mgraton erupted onto the poltcal agendas of both Span and Ecuador wth the tragc ac

Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant cdent of January 3, 2001, when twelve undocumented Ecuadoran workers were ht by a tran n Lorca, Murca, whle beng transported n a van at dusk to pck crops. Ths tragc ncdent symbolzed the sgnicant nformal labor market for llegal mmgrant labor; most mportantly, t launched a relatvely unknown mmgrant group onto center stage of Spansh mmgraton poltcs. In Span, the surroundng drama of nvestgatng the accdent, the hgh-level dplomatc cotere attendng the funerals, and the ensung dplomatc negotatons nvolved n compensatng the vctms’ famles and returnng the bodes to Ecuador proved to be, symbolcally and poltcally, semnal events. On January 23, 2001, just days after the accdent at Lorca, Span’s revsed mmgraton law, or Ley de Extranjería, came nto effect, albet wth several aspects beng challenged n Span’s consttutonal courts. The government’s foremost concern n redraftng the law, as dplomatcally stated by Spansh presdent and then presdent of the European Unon Jose Mara Aznar, was n nsttutng a rgorous “law and order” procedure and a clear dstncton between what s legal and what s llegal—a real challenge gven the way mgrant-exportng schemes operate and of serous concern to nsttutonally developed socal systems lke that of the European Unon.39 Presdent Aznar put mmgraton on the European Communty’s agenda, framng t n the language of global order beneical to European needs: “We wsh for legal mgraton, an mmgraton that we can ntegrate, that s beneical and that helps the country develop. Illegal mmgraton, wth the blurrng of legalty and llegalty, only allows for margnalzaton, for the creaton of an underclass, and can only lead to, unfortunately, phenomena of nsecurty.” It s wthn ths context that Ecuadoran mgrant labor began to see the Spansh state as egotstcal and hypocrtcal, partcularly gven the hstorc prsm of colonal explotaton: “They conquered and raped us and nothng happened; today we conquer them and they get mad.”40 What s even more aggravatng to many Ecuadoran mmgrants s that after complyng wth Spansh labor laws, wth work permts n hand, busnesses refuse to contract them because many busnesspeople are not wllng to pay workers’ socal securty quota as the law requres. “If the money for enrollment n the socal securty system comes from your pocket, the vacancy s yours. We have no optons. If we don’t pay t, we don’t get our vsas renewed.” Another mgrant laborer explans that work contracts are consummated n a matter of seconds. “No questons asked, no answers gven; wthout sgnng a contract n some occasons and wth doubts over payment at the end of the day’s work.”41 The “pistolero,” as the constructon mddleman who subcontracts foregners s called, “takes us n hs car and from there nobody knows where to. If we are lucky, he wll not get away wthout payng us.”42 

dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a The practces of “powerful” economc nterests and the Spansh state are not mmedately assocated wth each other for many. But for Ecuadorans, accustomed to the marrage of economc power and corrupt poltcal nluence, the seemng dssocaton between Spansh laws and practces s all too famlar. On the one hand, ths nurtures the proitable ambgutes that contnue to lure more mgrants to Span. But on the other, t could embolden mgrants to react aganst Span as they assocate the state’s polces wth that of the corrupt state they have led, and worse, as they consder Span a neglgent warden of ts former colonal chld. For other Ecuadoran mgrants, ther state’s corrupton splls over onto larger supranatonal organzatons such as the IMF. From Swtzerland one émgré wrtes: The natonal budget . . . s earmarked to pay off the debts of the unscrupulous state leaders and ther alles . . . (leaders) who n addton have channeled funds to also pay key sources to mantan themselves n power, lke the polce and the armed forces, who have become partcpants n ths true crme aganst the economy and the development of our country and people. . . . I mplore you that ths s our opportunty to turn around the development of the country . . . wthout bendng to the IMF, but rather puttng the cards on the table to wn ths battle aganst poverty and also aganst ths voracous and mercless neo-lberalsm that has done nothng more than make the mddle class poor and the poor wretched, and that cannot contnue to be.43

But to return to the connecton that some mgrants make between corrupton at home and corrupton/hypocrsy of the state n Span, we must look at the fallout of the Lorca accdent for labor mgrants n Span and the varous permutatons of Span’s oft-revsed Ley de Extranjería. Thousands of undocumented workers throughout Span found themselves unemployed and unemployable for months after the Lorca accdent, wth employers fearng government sanctons for hrng llegals. Mgrants’ inancal resources were partcularly depleted after the Lorca accdent, whch caused hundreds of undocumented Ecuadoran mmgrants to depend on food handouts, lve n cars, be taken n by frends after beng evcted, or be sheltered by churches and other non-governmental organzatons.44 Before Span’s revsons of the 2001 Ley de Extranjería, undocumented mgrants smply faced ines. As of 2001, they have no rght of assembly, no rght to protest, unonze, strke, or work. The percepton by both legal and llegal mgrants s that the underlyng cause of ther economc degradaton rests squarely wth those n control of the Ecuadoran state and ther collaborators. Whle ths s not surprsng,



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant the more mportant queston n lght of ths observaton s: Why would so many essentally choose to enter corrupt networks underlyng a myrad of mgrant-exportng schemes? That s, strongly dsagreeng wth the polces of a corrupt state doesn’t necessarly lead to rsky lawbreakng n foregn countres. Thus, the second domnant theme of llegal mgrants s of key mportance to answerng our man research queston. Theme Two: Illegal Labor Migration Is Not a Real Crime From the perspectve of Ecuadoran mgrants, the compounded crcumstances of a predatory state, the lure of Spansh laws and busnesses offerng work and hope for a future, and the commodicaton of mgraton through mgraton merchants at home and abroad congealed n 2001 wth enforcement of llegal labor hrng freezes, a result of the Lorca accdent. Ths polcy tghtened the noose around the necks of those who had rsked ther futures enterng nto mgrant-exportng schemes. Labor mgrants n Europe today are caught n the as yet unresolved tangle of evolvng mmgraton laws and state securty concerns. But Ecuadoran mgrants’ hstorcal nterpretatons and analyses of ther stuaton wthn the larger global economc pcture clearly shape ther poltcal actons and demands on the Spansh state. Rather than seeng themselves as crmnals, they vew themselves as vctms of hstorcal and present-day njustces. On the heels of the accdent and massve layoffs of llegal laborers, 1,000 mgrants set out on the seventy-klometer “March for Lfe” (Camnata por la Vda) to demand government work permts for mmgrant labor. Three hundred protestors completed the march to ask Span for “soldarty” and were met by some 1,500 mmgrants at the end, begnnng a dramatc nneteen-hour rally. The march began and ended wth the Ecuadoran anthem, recallng past centures of Spansh colonalsm: “Indgnant your chldren for the yoke the audacous Ibera mposed on you / Indgnant about the just and horrendous tragedy / that weghed heavly on you / holy voce to the heavens lfted / noble voce of unequaled promse / to avenge us of the bloody monster / to break that servle yoke.”45 Some of the sgns marchers carred read: “Because we don’t have papers, we work your ields”; “We don’t come to beg but to demand papers”; and “When Columbus arrved n Amerca no one asked hm for papers.” In addton, n Span, Ecuadorans dramatze ther hstorcal colonal tes by drawng blood from ther arms to demonstrate the common blood of Spansh ancestry and the hstorcal oblgatons that that mples.46 Echong Ecuadorans’ hstorcal argument, Jame Mayor, mnster of



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a nteror of the governng conservatve Popular Party, explans: “Span has hstorcal oblgatons wth those countres that form wth us a common culture. And n that sense a specal treatment can be gven to ctzens of those countres. It s not about gvng prorty to those who speak a partcular language or profess a partcular relgon, but that socety knows t must fulill partcular hstorcal oblgatons.”47 In coordnaton wth Spansh unons eager to elmnate clandestne labor hrng practces, the Spansh government brokered a deal wth Spansh busnesses n need of laborers by whch all llegal Ecuadoran mgrants n Span, havng prevously obtaned a pre-contract to work, were requred to return to Ecuador to process ther vsas. Although the agreement prvleged Ecuador wth the irst blateral agreement,48 upon the sgnng of the agreement, Ecuador’s estmated 150,000 labor mgrants already n Span were now threatened wth harsher penaltes and a reducton n cvl rghts unless they compled wth the repatraton agreement for obtanng a work vsa. Auter Solano, a twenty-eght-year-old Ecuadoran, was among the irst mmgrants to take the Spansh government up on ts offer to regularze hs status by returnng to Quto to obtan a work vsa wth a Spansh precontract n hand. Hs dary of the journey back home to Ecuador and to the ields of Murca agan reveals much about the normalzaton of mgrantexportng schemes: If they don’t gve me the papers, n any case, I wll return to Span. There s no doubt. I wll get there through Italy or Holland. If I entered undocumented to Newark [U.S.] at age 17, why not Murca? . . . the irst tme I emgrated from Ecuador was 1991. My father was the irst to go to the Unted States. Then, came hs chldren’s turn. When t was my turn, I was 17 years old and I was already marred. I remember the factory n whch I worked for ive and a half years. . . . My decson to go to Span was easy. I was advsed to go to Murca where the Ecuadorans were, and to look for a man who had an apartment. There was work. . . . Tomorrow I return to Span. I am an mmgrant. But I hope my chldren wll not be. I’ve sworn to myself to not stay more than three years. Then I wll return to Ecuador to never leave agan. . . . [In Span ths tme], I know I wll earn less than n other places because I have to work for the person who offered me the pre-contract at 600 pesetas an hour [about US$2.75/hour]. In constructon they pay 1,000 pesetas an hour. Let’s see f I can work three or four months for ths gentleman and then I’ll look for somethng better.49

The famles of “stranded” and unemployable Ecuadoran labor mgrants n Span angushed over acceptng Span’s work vsa repatraton requrements. Fearful of the lkelhood of actually returnng to Span once the vsa was obtaned and ncurrng even more debt, famly members n Ecuador



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant testied, “I don’t know what to do. The nterest of the debt my husband contracted now totals some 8,000 dollars and the land we mortgaged to a chulquero [loan shark] sn’t even ours.” She added that she preferred that her husband stay and work as an llegal so that he may send at least some money.50 Another woman sad, “I don’t want my husband to return. We are n debt for more than 3,500 dollars and we haven’t made two payments. If he returns, they wll put hm n prson.” Another woman sad, “In the name of mothers I want to ask that the Ecuadorans abroad not return. My son s undocumented over there and because he sn’t sendng money I know he doesn’t have work. The debt s asphyxatng us.” Another woman sad, “The chulqueros are pressurng us too much because we are behnd on our payments. The loan we took out s at 20 percent monthly nterest and f my son returns, where are we gong to get the money to pay them?” Amdst ths angush, Ecuadorans “lament” ther repudaton, as they see t, by the “madre patria” or “mother homeland” of Span: “The motherland asks us for papers,” but “the papers were pad for when Columbus dscovered Amerca—for ths lfe and the next!”51 Ironcally, at the same tme that Span s gettng tough on both legal and llegal mmgrants—drven prmarly by a fear of Afrcan mmgraton— Span needs laborers n both tradtonal sectors and to meet the growng demand for domestc labor. And lke the rest of the developed world, as the economy of Span has been transformed nto a more nformaton-based servce economy wth a relatvely hghly educated workforce, and as a crtcally low brth rate threatens Span’s armed forces52 and socal welfare system, the need for mmgrant labor to ill the lower strata of Span’s productve and servce sectors has rsen. Infurated at the mplcatons of hs government’s sgnng of the labor and repatraton agreement, one Ecuadoran academc pleaded wth Henz Moeller, Ecuador’s mnster of foregn affars and chef negotator of the agreement wth Span, not to sgn: “A quota system that ncludes some and excludes others s an extremely dangerous thess for the sendng country. . . . All of us who have the prvlege to carry the Ecuadoran passport abroad, and we who carry t wth honor and prde, wth love, and knowng or magnng, or wshng that t were so, that behnd that cordovan colored notebook s not only a people, a hstory, many cultures, a geography, a lag, but a Government that protects us. . . . Ours s a passport of work, of tenacty, of effort. We do not steal nor take anythng from anyone.”53 Speakng on behalf of those mgrants who mght not be able to obtan a pre-contract n tme and mght therefore face deportaton, Juan Carlos Manzanlla, spokesperson of the Hspano-Ecuadoran mgrant assocaton



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a Rumnahu, threatened, “If repatraton of Ecuadorans s carred out n accordance wth the Span-Ecuador blateral agreement, we wll ile sut aganst both states n nternatonal courts for approvng a law that goes aganst human rghts.”54 Foregn mnster Henz Moeller’s sgnng of the agreement was called a “betrayal” of Ecuadorans by mgrant assocaton leaders.55 In the end, the Span-Ecuador labor agreement remans an empty law gven the absence of labor contracts from Spansh companes who, as t turns out, prefer to hre labor from eastern Europe, namely Poland and Romana, where transportaton costs are sgnicantly lower and wage demands are compettve for Spansh busnesses—though llegal mgrant labor s lkely stll preferred when they can get t.56 Whle many mgrants’ testmones are focused on personal crcumstances, by contrast “Eduardo” clearly lnks hs stuaton as a mgrant vctm to larger state structures: the government sn’t nterested n knowng, quantfyng or qualfyng people. The only thng the government s nterested n s that there be good labor and that t be cheap. The state and busnesspeople lke t that way. It’s that t s so plan, t s so smple. The people know that the state needs people to work, and there s work, lots of work. The only thng s that the government puts obstacles. I’m talkng about here, n Span; I don’t know how t s n other parts but t must be the same. There s a demand for labor. There are countres that have workers but no demand for work. Here 70 percent of mmgrants work wthout papers. Why? Because the very government doesn’t want to ssue papers . . .but t s so smple. Wth just one law they could do t. It seems to be the government’s polcy. I’ve thought about ths and wth my companeros we’ve analyzed ths. But sht! It’s so smple! Issue workng papers and get to work legally! There’s work. . . . It’s so easy to insh wth the problem of mgraton but n ths case, I don’t know . . . they don’t want to see the problem and they don’t want to ix the problem because t would be so smple wth one law.57

Eduardo sees hs crme as smply a crme of legal status—somethng temporary, partcularly gven the ever-evolvng regularzaton laws of Span and the European Communty. Smlarly, along wth the attempts to formalze mgraton channels and enforce mmgraton controls, clandestne mmgraton nto Span and ant-mmgrant attacks are contnung unabated, further ncreasng the percepton and realty among Ecuadoran mmgrants of opportunty and vctmzaton by states.58 The unntended consequence of these hgh-proile government regularzaton/crmnalzaton strateges has been to effectvely advertse labor opportuntes n Span, further legtmzng mgrants’ actons wthn mgrant-exportng schemes. Not only do many mmgrants

0

Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant see ther mgraton as a necessary rsk, but they see t as morally justied n that ther remttances allow for the sustenance of ther mmedate famles. But the dscourse of many mgrants also relects ther moral justicaton for ther possble llegal mgrant status on the poltcal/patrotc bass of the “larger” famly or Fatherland. As one Ecuadoran mgrant put t: “I hope they hear ths strong cry for Ecuadorans from those of us who are n the north, beggng that our country remember us, snce we have every rght to make demands because we are the irst power n generatng ncome to mantan so many lazy and corrupt poltcans.”59 Another mmgrant wrote n to the mmgrant webste of Ecuador’s leadng newspaper: “I am Ecuadoran and I feel abandoned by my country and by everyone.”60 Another asserted: We have been vctms of everythng, from beng humlated, forced to work, many tmes we’ve been swndled or they pay us very lttle for what we do. We all have a story to tell, but I thnk they all have the same endng, and that s how much we mss our country and our famles. Wth all of ths that has happened to us, we begn to wonder f we return and see what condton our country s n, I feel lke workng even more and contnung wth ths snce t pans us to see what s happenng n our country.61

The proits, both legal and llegal, to be made from mgrant-exportng schemes are llustrated n the aggressve move by Spansh and U.S. companes as well as by ther governments to captalze on the proits of Ecuadoran mgraton. The Ecuadoran state s now offerng would-be mgrants inancng to buy out travel agency loans, whle the IMF s recommendng that Ecuador use remttances for “development.” The hypocrsy of nternatonal banks and development agences, however, whch, havng faled n ther prescrptons for Ecuador, now try to balance ther accounts wth mgrant remttances, shows the ease wth whch papers can be shufled, and t shows a poltcal callousness not lost on Ecuador’s mgrant populaton and strugglng mddle class.62 “If we were brds,” explans author Oscar Jara, “we would be protected; but we are a speces, not threatened wth extncton but wth expulson thanks to the Ley de Extranjería.”63 And n the case of Ecuadorans, expulson or condemnaton to eternal llegal status qute lterally could spell economc and socal extncton. Whle poltcal and legal scholars debate what s just for states and ther control over human moblty and work, what s lackng s an understandng of how multple voces wthn sendng and destnaton countres, foremost those of the mgrants themselves, have developed a farly coherent dscourse of justce. It s a dscourse most analogous to a type of “economc 

dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a ctzenshp” transcendng natonal ctzenshp. After all, some states have already been wllng to gve up parts of ther soveregnty by allowng mgrants to be ctzens of more than one country through dual ctzenshp (most frequently mgrant-orgn states). Mgrants are further motvated by ther percepton of the realty that t s they who are makng a sacrice not only for ther famles, but for both the sendng state dependent on remttances and for the destnaton state dependent on ther labor. Many observers have ponted out the unsustanable dscrepancy between the openng of our “economc borders” and poltcal soveregntes through common regonal and multlateral nsttutons and, n stark contrast, the ad hoc retracton of our poltcal borders (natonal labor markets) to economc labor mgrants, buttressed by physcal barrers, an enormous ncrease n border enforcement personnel, and varous technologes of control. However, more than a smple dscrepancy, the dlemma of facng chronc economc and poltcal crses at home on the one hand, and the attracton of employment opportuntes and socal moblty n developed countres on the other, has real negatve consequences for many caught n the cross-currents of these opposng global trends. People are choosng to break mmgraton laws and rsk death, rape, detenton, xenophobc attacks, and enslavement, whle developed states take measures to dffuse the poltcal and economc rsks of an actual reducton n mmgrant labor through blateral negotatons (e.g., wth Mexco) for the strategc legalzaton of “llegal alens” on whch some U.S. ndustres depend.64 Wth these mxed messages, more and more mgrants are turnng to a growng mgraton ndustry of legal and llegal servces to help them ether enter destnaton states llctly or “regularze” ther llegal mmgraton status. Though many state agents and meda place the blame for rsng levels of “human smugglng” at the feet of “organzed crme,” ths convenently gnores the other agents nvolved, namely the voluntary mgrants themselves who enter nto mgrant-exportng schemes and ther own moral and economc reasonng. Mgrant-exportng schemes wll reman resstant to even the harshest border controls, not due to the sophstcaton of ther strateges, but due to a much more fundamental realty—the convcton that they are justied n crossng borders llegally to obtan work or n helpng others to do so. Wlson Montenegro, twenty-one, who was caught by the U.S. and Mexcan naves n February 2002 n one of three ishng vessels attemptng a clandestne passage to the U.S., sums up the legtmzng dscourse of llegal mgrants who place ther actons n the context of ther personal and natonal relaton to the global poltcal economy. When asked why he pad thousands of dollars to board a rckety boat crammed wth 150



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant to 200 would-be llegal mgrants, he repled, “Shrmp s a major product of my country [ts thrd largest export] and I never get to eat t. . . . I want a job that pays me a man’s salary. I want my sons to have pencls and notebooks for school. I want them to eat shrmp.’’65 The mgrant-smugglng queston s a very real one faced by mllons each year who must ask whether they should trust the promses of local and natonal poltcans more than the promse of work abroad wth an llegal status that wll lkely be temporary. For many n countres lke Ecuador, n whch “export-led development” has been the cornerstone of IMF and World Bank polces, both stayng put and leavng carry grave rsks. NOTES 1. James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale Unversty Press, 1999). 2. For understandng the evoluton of state control over ts ctzens by regulatng who may enter ts terrtory, see John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 2000). 3. Several researchers have recently analyzed the nconsstences and unntended hypocrses of U.S. mmgraton law and ts uneven enforcement by the U.S. Immgraton and Naturalzaton Servce. See Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundaton, 2002); Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Unversty Press, 2000); Joseph Nevns, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Making of the U.S.–Mexico Boundary (New York and London: Routledge, 2002); Peter Andreas and Tmothy Snyder, The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (Oxford: Rowman & Lttleield, 2000); Wayne A. Cornelus, Phlp L. Martn, and James F. Hollield, eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford, Calf.: Stanford Unversty Press, 1994); and Tmothy J. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.–Mexico Border, 1978–1992: Low-Intensity Conlict Doctrine Comes Home (Austn: Center for Mexcan Amercan Studes, Unversty of Texas at Austn, 1996). 4. See, for example, the recent works of two emnent phlosophers: Mchael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), and Jacques Derrda, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001). 5. See Dana Wong, chapter 2, ths volume. 6. James Fnkenauer, “Russan Transnatonal Organzed Crme and Human Trafickng,” n Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Davd Kyle and Rey Koslowsk (Baltmore: Johns Hopkns Unversty Press, 2001), pp. 166–186. 7. Mosés Naím, “Fve Wars of Globalzaton,” Foreign Policy (January/February 2003): 28–36. 8. The Arizona Republic, May 25, 2001 (onlne verson). 9. The Arizona Republic, May 30, 2001 (onlne verson). 10. The Arizona Republic, October 14, 2001 (onlne verson).



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a 11. See Davd Kyle and John Dale, “Smugglng the State Back In: Agents of Human Smugglng Reconsdered,” n Global Human Smuggling, ed. Kyle and Koslowsk, pp. 29–57. 12. For a systematc analyss of the effects of IMF and World Bank polces n the promoton of free markets, ncludng a seres of “IMF food rots” n every regon of the world, see John Walton and Davd Seddon, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1994). 13. See Saska Sassen, Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columba Unversty Press, 1996). 14. Peter Schuck, for example, argues that typcally t s the vctm who irst learns of the crme; n ths area of mmgraton crmnalty, tellngly, t s the employer who irst becomes aware of “the crme.” See “Law and the Study of Mgraton,” n Carolne B. Brettell and James F. Hollield, eds., Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines (New York: Routledge, 2000), 187–204. 15. Karl Eschbach, Jacquelne Hagan, Néstor Rodríguez, Rubén Hernández, and Stanley Baley, “Death at the Border.” International Migration Review 33, no. 2 (1999). 16. See Kyle and Dale, “Smugglng the State Back In,” for a dscusson of the dstnctons between mgrant-exportng schemes and slave-mportng operatons. 17. Davd Kyle, Transnational Peasants: Migrations, Networks, and Ethnicity from Andean Ecuador (Baltmore: Johns Hopkns Unversty Press, 2000). 18. Sanjuana Martnez, “Pscoss por la Ley de Extranjería. Espana-Ecuador: La guerra mgratora,” Proceso, no. 1267 (February 11, 2001). 19. See Brad Joksch and Jason Prblsky, “The Panc to Leave: Economc Crss and the ‘New Emgraton’ from Ecuador,” International Migration 40, no. 4 (2002). 20. Marca Cevallos, “Ecuador, un país en estampda,” El País, January 7, 2001. 21. See Wayne A. Cornelus, “Span: The Uneasy Transton from Labor Exporter to Labor Importer,” n Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd ed., ed. Wayne A. Cornelus et al. (Stanford, Calf.: Stanford Unversty Press, 2004). 22. Sebastan Rotella, “As Crses Converge on Ecuador, an Exodus,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2000, p. A1. 23. Mary Jordan and Kevn Sullvan, “Mexco Plans a Tghter Grp on Its Border to the South,” The Washington Post, June 18, 2001, p. A01. 24. “Los 250 mgrantes presos estan en Puerto Madero,” El Comercio, May 20, 2002; “Mexco: nterceptan a ndocumentados, la mayora ecuatoranos,” El Comercio, May 17, 2002. 25. “Los Ros: nmgrantes al exteror aumentan,” El Comercio, May 17, 2002. 26. Marca Cevallos, “Ecuador, un país en estampda,” El País, January 7, 2001. 27. Marca Cevallos, “Ecuador, un país en estampda,” El País, January 7, 2001. 28. “Eduardo,” ntervew n Blbao, Span, August 9, 2002. 29. See Wlma Salgado, “La crss en el Ecuador en el contexto de las reformas inanceras,” Ecuador Debate 51 (2000): 7–22. 30. Vctor Breton Solo de Zaldvar, Cooperacion al desarrollo y demandas etnicas en los Andes ecuatorianos (Quto: FLACSO and Unverstat de Lleda, 2001). 31. “Postrado Ecuador,” El País, February 6, 2001. 32. “Postrado Ecuador,” El País, February 6, 2001. 33. “Sobre el Estado de Ecuador,” El País, February 13, 2001. 34. In June 2002, Ecuador’s inance mnster, Carlos Julo Emanuel, resgned after t emerged that he had run a mnstry-level scam takng brbes of up to 38 percent of



Seeng the State Lke a Mgrant unbudgeted funds handed over to local governments, wth congressmen and other mnstres also grabbng payoffs. Whle Noboa has dened any wrongdong, Noboa and Emanuel are not the irst senor oficals to be accused of corrupton n Ecuador. Presdent Abdala Bucaram was ousted by Congress after corrupton allegatons and led to Panama. Hs replacement, Faban Alarcon, was jaled n 1999 for fraud. And hs elected successor, Jaml Mahuad, who was ousted by a coup n January 2000, accepted campagn contrbutons from a corrupt banker. Corrupton, n the form of brbes, pervade the admnstratve, poltcal, and judcal systems of Ecuador, from polcemen to justces. See “Taken for a Rde,” The Economist, August 3, 2002, p. 31. 35. “De que huyen los ecuatoranos,” El País, January 23, 2001. In 1992, democratcally elected left-of-center statesman Rodrgo Borja ended hs ive-year term, handng the presdency over to Sxto Duran Ballen, a senor poltcan and neo-lberal proponent, and hs Harvard-traned neo-lberal vce-presdent Jaml Mahuad, later to be the deposed presdent of the dollarzaton plan. 36. Indgenous peasant moblzatons n Ecuador are carred out wth a repertore of road blockades, long marches, and peaceful occupatons of ofical buldngs and parks n Quto and Amazonan ol ields. 37. Jorge Vvanco Mendeta, “Carta del emgrante,” http://vstazo.com, October 25, 2001. 38. “Los que se van,” http://vstazo.com, November 14, 2002. 39. Jose Antono Alonso, “Europa frente a las maias,” http://elpas.es, Aprl 15, 2002. 40. “‘Esperanza’ n Testmonos de nmgrantes,” http://www.elcomerco.com, October 17, 2002. 41. Patrca Vllarruel, “Espana: la lucha es por un da de trabajo,” elcomerco.com, December 16, 2002. 42. Patrca Vllarruel, “Espana: la lucha es por un da de trabajo,” elcomerco.com, December 16, 2002. 43. Angel Son, “Saludo a m pueblo ecuatorano,” http://www.elcomerco.com, January 4, 2003. 44. “400 ecuatoranos en Murca necestan comda urgentemente,” El País, February 27, 2001. 45. Mara J. Lopez Daz, “300 nmgrantes camnan 70 klometros en Murca en demanda de permsos,” El País, January 11, 2001. 46. Javer Fresneda, vce presdent of the Ecuadoran mgrant assocaton Rumnahu, personal communcaton, Madrd, December 2001. 47. “Eleccones en el País Vasco. ‘Lo prortaro es la legaldad,’” El País, May 8, 2001. 48. Sgned on May 29, 2001, between the Spansh and Ecuadoran foregn mnsters, ths was Span’s irst blateral “Labor and Repatraton Agreement.” The agreement makes government-ssued work permts the only avenue for non–European Communty labor mgrants to enter Span. Accordng to the agreement, 40,000 Ecuadoran mgrants would be recruted in Ecuador and granted work permts n the constructon, domestc servce, and seasonal agrcultural labor sectors. 49. M. J. Lopez Daz and M. Cevallos, “El daro de un nmgrante de da y vuelta,” El País, March 12, 2001. 50. “Angusta por emgrantes,” El Universo. Aprl 22, 2001, http://www.elunverso.com /nformab.



dav i d k y l e a n d ch r is t i n a a . si r ac us a 51. T. Constenla and M. Cevallos, “El Ecuador pasa por Lorca,” El País, January 29, 2001. 52. “IU propone que se ncorporen nmgrantes a la polcía,” El País, May 23, 2002. Apart from proposals to ncorporate mmgrants nto the Spansh polce force, as of December 2002, Ibero-Amercan mmgrants are beng recruted nto the Spansh armed forces n order to ill the deict of canddates to the ranks. See “Defensa necesta 2,000 nmgrantes al ano para palar el deict de tropa,” El País, March 20, 2001; Patrca Vllarruel, “Ecuatoranos al Ejércto de Espana,” http://www.elcomerco.com, December 16, 2002; “625 ecuatoranos queren r al Ejércto espanol,” http://www.elcomerco.com, January 27, 2003. 53. Cesar Montúfar, “El pasaporte ecuatorano,” El Comercio, August 1, 2001. 54. “Mayor Oreja no escucho protestas,” El Universo, Aprl 22, 2001. 55. “Polítcos y académcos cuestonan en Ecuador el pacto de nmgracón irmado con Espana,” El País, February 26, 2001. 56. “Goberno y sndcatos culpan a los empresaros de no cubrr el cupo,” El País, June 11, 2002. 57. “Eduardo,” ntervew n Blbao, Span, August 9, 2002. 58. See Plar Marcos, “Aznar asegura que la nsegurdad dsmnuye y se concentra en los extranjeros,” http://www.elpas.es, Aprl 25, 2002. 59. Maro Rolando Paredes, “Desde New Jersey,” http://www.elcomerco.com, December 24, 2002. 60. “Saludos,” http://www.elcomerco.com, January 7, 2003. 61. In “Testmonos de nmgrantes,” see “Nos hace madurar,” elcomerco.com, January 7, 2003. 62. See “El BID acuerda se abarate el envío de dnero al exteror,” elcomerco.com, January 25, 2003. 63. Oscar Jara wrtes ths n Ecuador en Espana. La realidad de la migración, cted n “El iasco del paraíso,” http://elcorreodgtal.com, September 23, 2002. 64. For example, a U.S. Department of Labor Report found that approxmately 40 percent of Calforna’s agrcultural workers are undocumented (or falsely documented) mgrants, Migrant Farmworkers: Pursuing Security in an Unstable Labor Market, Research Report 5, May 1994. 65. Gnger Thompson, “Mgrants from Afar See Mexco as Steppngstone to U.S.,” New York Times (onlne verson), March 1, 2002.



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade

six Criminality and the Global Diamond Trade A Methodological Case Study Ian Smlle

Ths chapter was wrtten when the “blood damond” phenomenon t descrbes was at ts heght and when nternatonal efforts to control the trade n llct gem damonds were stll n ther nfancy. Snce then, a great deal has changed. The chapter, therefore, s a snapshot of a work n progress. It has been left unchanged to underscore the challenges that were faced n haltng llct damond lows. An eplogue updates the story to 2005.

Three Scenarios1 Damonds represent one of the most dficult of llct objects to study, both because of ther small sze and easy converson nto cash, and also because they are part of an extremely secretve and proitable ndustry that has taken enormous amounts of trouble over the past century to prevent unauthorzed outsders from gettng to know ts nner workngs. Damonds represent one of the best examples of the gray areas between “lct” and “llct,” and they demonstrate how “llct”—left to ts own devces—can become more clearly “llegal,” wth drect connectons to theft, murder, human rghts abuse, and terrorsm. Damonds also extend the dscusson



i a n sm i l l i e of “borderlands.” Illct and llegal behavor n the damond trade begns wth cross-border smugglng n Afrca—between Serra Leone and Lbera, between Angola and ts neghbors, between Knshasa on one sde of the Rver Congo and Brazzavlle on the other. But there are other borderlands n our brave new globalzed world. The conceptual (and actual) “border” between Serra Leone and Belgum can be found somewhere aboard the SN Brussels Arbus that takes sx hours to ly between Freetown and Brussels twce a week—possbly n the tolet where smugglers can easly repackage ther contraband before arrvng n Belgum. In what follows, we present a dscusson of the methodologcal dficultes of studyng ths ndustry and the effects of an nterventon by two nongovernmental organzatons whch has forced a new level of transparency on ths ndustry. The success of ths regulatory effort remans to be seen. But irst we ntroduce three scenaros to show that what transforms the trade n damonds from a legal, f unregulated, ndustry nto an llct process are the routes and paths the damonds take once extracted from a mne. Scenario 1: The “Licit” Diamond Trail Tamba Momoh s a seventeen-year-old hgh school dropout, lvng near the town of Jaama Sewafe n the Eastern Dstrct of Serra Leone. He dgs damonds wth ten other young men on a lease held by Danel Morla. Morla has been a damond mner for a dozen years, although he does none of the dggng hmself. He pays the dggers a small daly wage and gves them a share of the proceeds from the damonds they ind. He buys them ther equpment, some clothes, and rce, and he also pays ther medcal blls, as they often come down wth malara, blharza, or gastroenterts as a result of workng all day n swampy condtons. He pays hs annual lcense fee to the government and sells the damonds that Tamba and the others ind to Nawaz Mansour, a damond dealer n Kenema. Mansour, whose parents emgrated to Serra Leone from Lebanon n 1951, buys from many mners and consoldates hs purchases, takng them once a week to Freetown for sale to Mohammed Ibrahm, a damond exporter. Mansour has a buyng lcense; Ibrahm has an export lcense. Ibrahm takes the damonds to the Government Gold and Damond Ofice for valuaton, where he pays a 3 percent export tax. The damonds are then shpped to hs cousn, Al Ibrahm, who owns a company called Dagem n Antwerp. Dagem receves the damonds and sorts them nto two basc categores. The very small gems are sent to a cuttng irm n Surat, Inda. Once they are polshed, they are sold to Vales, a large retal jewelry chan n the U.S. Whle the



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade U.S. market consumes almost half of all polshed damonds every year, they tend to be lower-end goods. The better damonds go to Ramat Gan n Israel. Once they are cut and polshed, the best wll be sold to European and Amercan dealers for settngs that wll wnd up n the showrooms of Carter and Tffany. Scenario 2: The “Illicit” Diamond Trail Tamba Momoh s tred of beng sck and workng n the blazng sun all day for the pttance pad by hs boss, Danel Morla. He swallows the best damonds he inds and takes them every week to a Lebanese damond dealer n Kenema, Nawaz Mansour. Mansour gves hm a better prce than Morla. Mansour, n fact, pays the best prces n town. He gves Tamba leones and can afford to pay hgher than market prces because he makes huge proits on hs real busness, whch s rce mports. He prces the rce to cover the cost of the damonds he buys. Every month, Mansour drves to Freetown and then les to Banjul, the captal of Gamba, after brbng the customs oficers not to check hs carry-on luggage. There he sells the damonds to hs brother Mohamed, who gves hm the dollars he needs to buy rce on the world market. Mohamed or one of hs assocates make a damond run to Antwerp once a month. They never declare the damonds when they arrve n Brussels, and they have never been stopped or questoned. The damonds are bought by Al Ibrahm, who owns a company named Dagem. Ibrahm sorts and exports the damonds to Inda and Israel, but n colluson wth the buyers, he understates the value of the damonds on the nvoces. Ths wll help hm explan the volume-to-value rato of hs busness f anyone asks—whch s unlkely—and t helps hs customers, who pay less tax n Inda and Israel as a result of the colluson. Scenario 3: The “Conlict Diamond” Trail Tamba Momoh s seventeen. At the age of twelve he was kdnapped by the Revolutonary Unted Front (RUF) after beng forced to murder hs uncle n front of the entre famly. The RUF gves hm a mxture of gunpowder and heron whch he rubs nto a scrape on hs forehead. Ths “brown-brown” gves hm the energy he needs to dg for damonds all day. He and the others are always guarded by armed RUF “Black Guards” who have nsttuted what they call a two-ple system. Techncally Tamba s allowed to keep half of what he inds, but n realty the Black Guards take all the best damonds themselves. Brma Conteh, known as “Brgader Chop



i a n sm i l l i e Hands,” s the regonal RUF commander. He consoldates all the damond inds n hs area and takes them to RUF headquarters n Buedu once every two weeks. One of the more senor RUF commanders, General Rambo, takes a larger consoldaton of damonds across the border to Lbera. It takes hm two days to reach the ofice of Khall Khall, once a gas staton attendant n Lebanon and now known as the unofical inance mnster of Lbera. Khall weghs and sorts the damonds and tells General Rambo that he can rde back to Buedu on the Lberan government helcopter that wll transport the weapons he has exchanged for the damonds. Khall’s brother-n-law takes the damonds to Antwerp once a month. They are handed over to a company named Dagem, whch has nstructons to transfer all payments to an account n the Isle of Man. Funds arrvng n ths account are automatcally transferred to the Cayman Islands, to the account of Freedom Ar, regstered n the Central Afrcan Republc but based n Duba. Freedom Ar, owned by Vktor Crout (who has Russan and Israel passports), buys used weapons on the open market n Bulgara and Ukrane and les them to Monrova, va Sudan. He uses false lght plans and false Togolese or Ngeran end-user certicates to avod detecton by UN sanctons experts. Meanwhle, Dagem sends Khall’s damonds to Israel and Inda for cuttng and polshng, and wthn a few weeks they are n Vales wndows n Amercan shoppng malls or n the showrooms of Tffany and Carter n Pars, London, and New York. The Diamond Business The value of gem damonds s completely artical. Damonds, once rare, are now almost common. The world’s damond producton multpled ten tmes n the decade followng the South Afrcan dscoveres of the 1860s, and has multpled forty tmes agan snce then. Over 500 tons of damonds have been mned altogether, one thrd of them n the 1990s.2 The value of damonds, establshed when they were rare, has been sustaned by the nluence exercsed over the worldwde ndustry by one company, De Beers. De Beers establshed ts control n the nneteenth century and has never let go. Today, about 60 percent of global damond producton goes through De Beers ofices, from mnes owned or jontly owned by De Beers, or va drect arrangements wth other mnng irms. Half of the bggest and most lucratve damond operaton n the world—Debswana—s owned by De Beers, the other half by the government of Botswana (whch, as a result, had a hgher GNP growth rate than the Asan “tger economes” throughout the 1980s and 1990s). Tradtonally, De Beers has mopped up loose supples and wthheld damonds from the market whenever prces were set 0

Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade

Fig .. Illct damond dggers n Serra Leone washng gravel. Photograph courtesy Partnershp Afrca-Canada.

to fall. It mantans ts control and ts prces n other ways. It sells to fewer than 100 selected “sghtholders” on a preferental bass. These sghtholders are made offers that cannot be refused. De Beers also creates demand. It spends almost US$200 mllon a year on advertsng, and t expects ts sghtholders to advertse as well. And t cultvates new markets. Japan has n recent years provded a lucratve outlet for the growng supply. The damond trade s secretve, perhaps more secretve than any other. Multmllon-dollar deals are made on a handshake; tens of mllons of dollars worth of damonds are sent across borders and across contnents on approval, wth lttle or no paperwork. Some of ths s tradtonal—a way of dong busness n a trade that s heavly populated by small (and a few very large) famly-run busnesses, and by people who have known each other for generatons. Some of t has to do wth securty and the transportaton of hgh-value goods from one place to another. But there have been other reasons for secrets. In order to keep ts control over the market, De Beers bought all the damonds t could, no questons asked. And t had to deal n the 1950s and onward wth a wde array of strange and ncompatble bedfellows. Aparthed South Afrca, the home of De Beers, was an napproprate partner for newly ndependent damond-producng natons elsewhere n 

i a n sm i l l i e Afrca—Congo, Tanzana, Serra Leone, and Gunea. And t was an even more napproprate partner for the Sovet Unon after ts dscovery of damonds n the 1950s. In addton, havng dealt wth the Portuguese colonsts of Angola untl the md-1970s and the aparthed regme of Southwest Afrca untl the late 1980s, De Beers had some fancy and conidental footwork to do n makng frends wth the new management. Most of ths was done very successfully, largely because the company avoded the spotlght of publc attenton. By value, more than 60 percent of all gem damonds are mned n Afrca, and untl recent dscoveres n Canada, the percentage was much hgher. As some Afrcan damond-producng countres slpped nto corrupton and chaos durng the 1960s and 1970s, damond buyers remaned on the scene but began to conduct ther busness n new ways. Formal damond producton n Serra Leone, for example, fell from two mllon carats n 1970 to only 48,000 carats by 1988, courtesy of one of the most corrupt regmes on the contnent’s west coast. The same was true n the Democratc Republc of Congo (DRC), known from 1971 to 1997 as Zare. There was no drop, however, n the overall supply of damonds reachng the world’s tradng centers, of whch Antwerp had become the most mportant. All that was requred was a degree of secrecy, and few questons would be asked when the damonds were declared on arrval at Belgan customs. Between the 1950s and the md-1980s, the damond scene n Afrca changed. A sgnicant proporton of the producton of countres lke the Congo, Serra Leone, Angola, and others was beng hdden under a vel of secrecy, whch cloaked a vast network of corrupton, theft, and smugglng. Damonds were also beng used for money launderng—as a means of movng cash n cashless socetes, or n economes where currency no longer had value. Lebanese traders n Serra Leone, for example, have for decades smuggled damonds out of the country as a way of repatratng proits or of obtanng the hard currency needed to buy mports for other commercal actvtes: rce and other foodstuffs, vehcles, petroleum products. Most of ths was “llct” behavor, deemed “llegal,” as noted n the ntroductory chapter, n varous ways by varous governments, some of them ncreasngly predatory n ther own behavor. Most governments learned long ago that taxes on damonds—even very low taxes—lead nevtably to smugglng, because damonds can be so easly concealed and because the nature of the trade s so opaque. Export dutes are typcally set at about 3 percent n producng countres, and mport dutes are frequently zero n tradng, cuttng, and polshng countres. Other attempts at restrctng trade are strenuously and effectvely avoded as well.



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade A recent, dramatc example can be found n the Democratc Republc of Congo (DRC). An Israel irm, Internatonal Damond Industres (IDI), obtaned an eghteen-month monopoly on damond exports from the DRC n September 2000. The DRC mnster of mnes defended the monopoly at the tme, sayng, “Ths s the optmum way for the Congo damond producton to be marketed n a transparent manner that wll nspre trust and conidence n the country’s certicate of orgn, whch wll accompany each and every parcel to be exported by IDI.”3 It dd nothng of the knd, n part because t was lttle more than a thnly dsgused attempt by then Presdent Laurent Kabla to drect more of the ndustry’s proits hs way. He canceled the lcenses of all the other dealers—bought earler for US$100,000 each—and reportedly receved a multmllon-dollar payment from IDI for the favor.4 Exports from the DRC, however, mmedately fell, whle across the rver n Brazzavlle, the captal of a country wth no damonds at all, there was a sudden and dramatc change. Belgan damond mports from Brazzavlle—whch stood at zero n August of that year—jumped by October to US$37 mllon.5 Congo Brazzavlle has played ths role for years, n part because of the massve corrupton and predatory behavor of the DRC’s longtme dctator, Mobutu Sese Seko. Under hs leadershp, formal damond producton n the Congo apparently fell from 18 mllon carats n 1961 to 12 mllon n 1970 and to only 8 mllon n 1980, inally levelng off at about 6.5 mllon carats n the 1990s. Producton “apparently” fell to these levels, because these are the igures that were recorded. But Mobutu “nformalzed” much of the damond ndustry, brngng t and ts proits under hs own control and that of hs crones. Mners, mddlemen, and diamantaires devsed a smple way to avod hs rapacous appette and heavy system of nformal taxaton (otherwse known as “brbery”). They smply smuggled ther product across the rver to Brazzavlle. The ups and downs of Belgan damond mports from Brazzavlle are, n fact, a relatvely good barometer of war and corrupton n the DRC. In 1997, when the DRC was undergong the chaotc transfer of power from Mobutu to Kabla, Belgum mported US$454.6 mllon worth of damonds from Brazzavlle. By 1999, however, when thngs had settled down, and when t looked as though Kabla mght actually be a new wnd sweepng away the corrupton and cronysm of the past, Belgum mported only US$14.4 mllon worth of damonds from Brazzavlle, and there was growth n mports from the DRC. By 2000, however, the blush was off the Kabla rose, and the volume from Brazzavlle soared to US$116.6 mllon, almost doublng agan n 2001 to US$223.8 mllon.6



i a n sm i l l i e Scale of the Problem At least 20 percent of the world’s trade n rough damonds s marked by smugglng, tax evason, money launderng, sancton bustng, war, and state collapse. Ths represents approxmately US$1.56 bllon worth of llct behavor n a rough damond trade of about US$7.8 bllon annually. The extent of the problem started to become clear n the late 1990s, when two NGOs—Global Wtness n Brtan and Partnershp Afrca Canada—exposed the relatonshp between damonds and the wars n Angola and Serra Leone. Here the ssue was conlict damonds, a subset of the larger problem, but nintely worse n ts effect.7 In March 2000, the UN Securty Councl Sanctons Commttee expert panel on Angola conirmed what the NGOs had found, and for the irst tme n the hstory of the Unted Natons, sttng heads of state were named for ther complcty n launderng damonds and assstng n weapons sancton bustng. Snce then, there have been ntense dplomatc negotatons amed at creatng a certicaton system for rough damonds. More than ifty governments, along wth NGOs and the damond ndustry—n a seres of meetngs that became known as the Kmberley Process, descrbed below—reached an agreement that came nto effect on January 1, 2003, whch saw sweepng changes n the way damonds are protected, traded, counted, and tracked. Or so t seemed. The problem wth the agreement s that t contans weak provsons for ndependent montorng, and a year after startup t was stll strugglng to acheve basc, agreed mnmum standards among partcpatng countres. In an ndustry so nfected by llct behavor, ndependent montorng mght seem lke an essental element, a sine qua non to the casual observer. The problem, however, s that conlct damonds represent a very small porton of the overall trade. A system desgned to catch these damonds would ultmately expose the much bgger trafic n llct damonds, and too many vested nterests are at stake for ths to be gven up wthout a ight. Some Deinitions Conlct damonds, or “blood damonds,” are damonds used by rebel movements to buy weapons and fuel war. The deinton was made more restrctve by the Kmberley Process, whch ted conlct damonds to UN resolutons: Conlct Damonds means rough damonds used by rebel movements or ther alles to inance conlct amed at undermnng legtmate governments, as



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade descrbed n relevant Unted Natons Securty Councl (UNSC) resolutons nsofar as they reman n effect, or n other smlar UNSC resolutons whch may be adopted n the future, and as understood and recognzed n Unted Natons General Assembly (UNGA) Resoluton 55/56, or n other smlar UNGA resolutons whch may be adopted n future.8

Ths deinton elmnates Democratc Republc of Congo (DRC) damonds from the calculaton, because nether the Securty Councl nor the General Assembly have made any pronouncement on Congolese damonds. Ths techncalty notwthstandng, the connecton between damonds and conlct n the Congo has been well establshed by journalsts, NGOs, UN expert panels, and the damond ndustry tself. In a much-quoted estmate, Andrew Coxon, then drector of De Beers damond buyng, calculated n 2000 that conlct damonds n 1999 amounted to approxmately 3.7 percent of the world’s rough damond producton of US$6.8 bllon.9 The total was based on the estmates n Table 6.1. Ths 3.7 percent igure, rounded up to 4 percent, was wdely quoted for several years. It has also been dsputed. In earler years, the igure was certanly much hgher. In 1996 and 1997, the Angolan rebel movement (UNITA) alone exported as much as US$700 mllon annually—10 percent of world producton. An Aprl 2001 UN report on Angola estmated UNITA smugglng at US$300 mllon or more n 1999, double the igure n Table 6.1.10 Wth the end of hostltes n Angola and Serra Leone, however, the igure was probably less than 2 percent of world trade n 2004. Illicit damonds, however, have never been properly deined, n part because they are so rarely dscussed. A bref deinton s provded here for the sake of clarty. Illct damonds are damonds that have been stolen, smuggled, or used for purposes of tax evason and money launderng. Illct damonds nclude damonds referred to as “conlct damonds.”

In ts search for conlct damonds from Serra Leone, a UN expert panel noted the much greater volume of llct damonds. Part of the dficulty n understandng damond statstcs s that once rough damonds arrve n Europe, Israel, and elsewhere, they are sorted, traded across borders, resorted and retraded—possbly many tmes—before they actually get to a cuttng and polshng center. The report sad, Ths obscurng of orgns makes the damond ndustry vulnerable to a wde varety of llct behavour. It s no secret that damonds are stolen from vrtually every mnng area n the world. Damonds have long been used as an unofical hard currency for nternatonal transactons. As wth other pre-



i a n sm i l l i e Table 6.1. Estimate of Conlict Diamonds by Weight and Value, 1999 Angola

Serra Leone

Democratc Republc of Congo

Average Prce per Carat

US$300

US$200

US$180

Number of Carats

433,000

350,000

194,000

Total

US$150 mllon

US$70 mllon

US$35 mllon

cous commodtes, they lend themselves to money launderng operatons. Because they are small and easly concealed, they are readly moved from one country to another for the purpose of tax evason, money launderng or to crcumvent trade agreements. Vrtually all of these damonds eventually ind ther way nto the legtmate trade. And all of these llct transactons are made easer by the ndustry’s long hstory of secrecy. Secrecy n the damond ndustry s understandable for securty reasons, but secrecy also obscures llct behavour.11 When asked how conlct damonds enter the system, dealer after dealer told the Panel that t happens n the same way that llct damonds enter the system. Someone brngs them to a tradng centre—Israel or New York, for example—ether smugglng them past customs or makng a false declaraton. Ether way, they wll ind a buyer. Or, a dealer wll go to Afrca and buy them from rebels, or from a thrd or fourth party. He wll then take them to Europe, Israel, or New York, and smuggle them past customs or make a false declaraton.12

Damonds have always lent themselves to theft and smugglng, and they have served a wde varety of nterests as a ready alternatve to both soft and hard currency. They are small; they have a hgh value-to-weght rato; they keep ther value. And they are completely unregulated. Most governments gave up long ago tryng to tax damond exports and mports n any meanngful way because damonds have been vrtually mpossble to trace and to polce. Customs departments n most countres can call on techncal expertse to examne and assess damonds. Wth the excepton of Belgum and Israel, however, no non-mnng country has n-house damond expertse n ther customs departments, and n any case, there the man purpose s valuaton, not denticaton. Damonds have passed unhndered and mostly unchecked across U.S., Swss, Brtsh, and other EU borders, the



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade value and orgn recorded by customs departments as they are presented by the mporter. Lcensng and other regulatons have been strngent n some producng countres—South Afrca, Botswana, Namba, Russa—but elsewhere, especally n major consumng countres such as the U.S., there have been none. Anyone can buy and sell damonds; values are rarely checked; there s no reconclaton between what a dealer buys and sells. The Volume of Illicit Diamonds Before dealng wth the global volume of llct damonds, there s another termnologcal ssue that needs claricaton. Many of the statstcs n ths chapter relate to the damond trade between varous countres and Belgum. Ths s partly because, as noted, more than 80 percent of the world’s rough damonds pass through Antwerp n a year. But the man reason s that Belgum has untl recently kept and publshed very good statstcs on ts damond trade. Most other countres have not. Damonds statstcs are ether kept under lock and key—as n Russa where damonds are treated as a “strategc mneral”—or they are smply not publshed out of neglect or lack of nterest. Where statstcs are avalable, however, they may bear no relaton to recprocal statstcs n other countres. For example, Canadan damonds exported to Belgum under one customs code are recorded as arrvng n Belgum under another, makng t dficult and sometmes mpossble to reconcle the trade igures.13 On top of that, there s not much relable nformaton on what a partcular mnng country s capable of producng n a year, so anomales between actual producton and exports may be dficult to track. Ths was not so dficult n the case of Lbera, whch was stated as the orgn of an astonshng US$2.2 bllon n rough damonds arrvng n Antwerp between 1994 and 1999. Untl ths “anomaly” was ponted out by Partnershp Afrca Canada, however, nobody dd anythng about t. (The UN Securty Councl inally banned all “Lberan” damonds eghteen months later, n May 2001.) The Kmberley Process Certicaton Scheme (KPCS) for rough damonds deals specically wth the ssue of statstcs, requrng all partcpatng countres to post quarterly trade statstcs and sem-annual producton statstcs. A year after the KPCS began n January 2003, however, not a sngle statstc had yet been made publc. Ths statstcal fog s part of a further subterfuge n the damond trade, whch dstngushes between country of origin and country of provenance. “Country of orgn” means the country n whch a damond was mned. “Country of provenance” means the country from whch t was last shpped.



i a n sm i l l i e Customs departments are usually only nterested n the latter, whch means that orgn can be obscured smply by movng damonds through a thrd country, such as Swtzerland or Duba—or Lbera. The next sx tables calculate the dfference n value between the actual export of rough damonds from ive West Afrcan countres and the value of mports from these countres declared by Belgan mporters over a sxyear perod between 1994 and 1999.14 All igures are n mllons of U.S. dollars.

Table 6.2. Sierra Leone

Ofical Exports from Serra Leone Declared Belgan Imports from Serra Leone Dfference

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

30.2

22

27.6

10.5

1.8

1.2

106.6

15.3

93.4

114.9

65.8

30.4

76.4

-6.7

65.8

104.4

64

29.2

Table 6.3. Côte d’Ivoire 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

3.1

2.9

2.4

4

3.6

4.6

Declared Belgan Imports from Côte d’Ivore

93.6

54.2

204.2

119.9

45.3

52.6

Dfference

90.5

51.3

201.8

115.9

41.6

48.0

1997

1998

1999

0.8

0.9

Ofical Exports from Côte d’Ivore

Table 6.4. Liberia 1994 Ofical Exports from Lbera



1995

1996

No data avalable because of cvl war, although no ofical exports are lkely to have occurred.

Declared Belgan Imports from Lbera

283.9

392.4

616.2

329.2

269.9

298.8

Dfference

283.9

392.4

616.2

329.2

269.1

297.9

Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade Table 6.5. Guinea 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

28.6

34.7

35.5

46.9

40.7

40.2

Declared Belgan Imports from Gunea

165.7

26.2

83.6

108.1

116.1

127.1

Dfference

137.1

-8.5

48.1

61.2

75.4

86.9

Ofical Exports from Gunea

Table 6.6. Gambia 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

0

0

0

0

0

0

Declared Belgan Imports from Gamba

74.1

14.9

128.1

131.4

103.4

58.0

Dfference

74.1

14.9

128.1

131.4

103.4

58.0

Ofical Exports from Gamba

Table 6.7. Summary Excess of Belgian Diamond Imports over West African Exports (US $1,000,000)

Serra Leone Côte d’Ivore Lbera Gunea Gamba Total

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

76.4 90.5 283.9 137.1 74.1

-6.7 51.3 392.4 -8.5 14.9

65.8 201.8 616.2 48.1 128.1

104.4 115.9 329.2 61.2 131.4

64 41.6 269.1 75.4 103.4

29.2 48 297.9 86.9 58

662

443.4

1060

742.1

553.5

520

The dfference between ofical rough damond exports from these ive West Afrcan countres and mports nto Belgum durng the perod 1994– 1999 averaged about US$663 mllon per annum. None of the countres n queston s a damond-importing country; n other words, there s no ofically sanctoned mport of rough damonds, so the ssue of “provenance” versus “orgn” does not arse. There s, for example, no reason to declare Lbera or Gamba as a country of provenance except to dsguse the true



i a n sm i l l i e orgn of the goods. Whle some of the damonds declared as Gamban may well have passed through Gamba, t s unlkely that the US$2.2 bllon noted n Table 6.4 ever went anywhere near Lbera, one of the most unsettled and dangerous countres on earth durng the years n queston. It may be assumed, therefore, that all of these damonds were one of two thngs: damonds produced n the countres recorded by Belgan mport authortes and not recorded as exports (.e., smuggled out); or damonds produced elsewhere and mported nto Belgum under false declaratons. The former could be possble to a certan extent n the cases of Serra Leone and Gunea, although t s unlkely n the case of Côte d’Ivore, where known producton s sgnicantly less than what was sad to be mported nto Belgum. The second explanaton s the most lkely, and can be the only one n the cases of Gamba and Lbera. Lberan damond producton has never been sgnicant n ether volume or qualty, and Gamba has no damonds whatsoever. All the damonds mentoned n Table 6.7, therefore, are llct damonds, representng approxmately 10 percent of annual world producton. Addtonal estmates of llct goods can be added to these: • the CEO of the Angolan Sellng Corporaton (ASCorp) has sad that between US$350 and US$420 mllon n smuggled goods left Angola n 2000, representng about 5 percent of world supply;15 • most Belgan mports from Congo Brazzavlle, a country wthout damonds of ts own (US$2.2 bllon between 1994 and 1999, or US$377 mllon per annum on average; US$116 mllon n 2000 and US$224 mllon n 2001). The 1994–1999 average represents a further 5 percent of world supply; • US$200–$250 mllon worth of damonds of “questonable orgn” n 2001 from South Afrca: mne thefts along wth smuggled goods from Angola, the DRC, and elsewhere;16 • the drect mports of West Afrcan damonds nto Brtan, Israel, the U.S., Hong Kong, the UAE, Swtzerland, and elsewhere. Whle these are not sgnicant and may be backed by legtmate export documentaton, the numbers would have the effect of nlatng the Belgan igures; • theft from mnes and from places further along the tradng chan; estmates vary: 30 percent from Namba’s Namdeb n 1999; 2–3 percent of Botswana’s US$2 bllon annual producton;17 • launderng through, and/or theft from, other producng countres: Angola, DRC, South Afrca, Namba, Central Afrcan Republc, Brazl, Ghana;

0

Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade • launderng and/or theft n or through other sgnicant tradng, cuttng, and polshng countres: Israel, Inda, Swtzerland, Brtan, the U.S.; • launderng and/or theft through smaller condut countres such as Portugal and Germany. As noted above, exports of rough damonds from the UAE (Duba) to Belgum have ncreased exponentally n recent years: from US$2.5 mllon n 1997 to US$149.5 mllon n 2001. Large ncreases have been recorded n shpments from the UAE to Israel as well. Hong Kong rough damond exports to Belgum ncreased by 370 percent between 1997 and 2001. In addton, there s a phenomenon n Russa, known n the damond trade as “submarnng.” As much as one-thrd of Russa’s US$1.6 bllon worth of damonds are sold wthn Russa to Russan cutters and polshers. Many of these damonds cannot be processed economcally n Russa, and the surplus s “exported,” escapng ofical statstcs and agreements. Another term for ths phenomenon s “leakage.” Because these damonds are laundered under other labels, the leakage does not show up n mport igures elsewhere as damonds of Russan orgn.18 Another word that mght be used s “llct.” There s undoubtedly double countng n some of these igures, made nevtable by the secrecy surroundng damond statstcs. Some of the smuggled Angolan goods may be counted n the igures of Brazzavlle or countres n West Afrca, for example. But these igures, and the potental n countres for whch there are no igures, suggest that an estmate of 20 percent of world trade as llct s more than possble, and that t may actually be conservatve. Why s the level so hgh? The reasons are smple enough: the value, portablty, and accessblty of damonds; the nherent secrecy of the trade, lack of government controls, an absence of data for checkng even the most rudmentary movement of damonds wthn and between countres; lttle detecton; and few penaltes. These “reasons” represent the opportunity. The motivation n the past was predomnantly tax evason and money launderng, and ths contnues. As noted above, where money launderng s concerned, damonds offer an attractve alternatve to hard currency, often n short supply n Afrca. More recently, however, there have also been lnks to drug money and organzed crme.19 At the far end of the spectrum, conlct damonds are essentally llct damonds taken one step further—to pay for weapons n rebel wars. And there s growng evdence that they have been used to beneit a wder terrorst network. An al-Qaeda damond connecton was irst reported by the Washington Post n November 2001



i a n sm i l l i e (and subsequently much pooh-poohed by the ndustry).20 More recently, the UN montorng group establshed to deal wth the UN Securty Councl’s Counter-Terrorsm Resoluton (S1373) has also noted the damond connecton, sayng that all natons nvolved n the rough damond trade should jon the Kmberley Process.21 And the U.S. General Accountng Ofice has repeatedly warned about the use of damonds n terrorst inancng.22 Conlict Diamonds The stage was thus set for a new phenomenon, one that came to be known as “conlct damonds” or “blood damonds.” Damonds and war are not recent bedfellows. The Portuguese fueled ther ant-ndependence wars n Afrca wth the proceeds from Angolan damonds. The Amal facton n Lebanon’s cvl war was funded n part by subscrptons rased among Serra Leone’s damond-tradng Lebanese communty. But t was the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA, that developed the concept wth a vengeance, takng t to spectacular heghts n the 1980s and 1990s. Charles Taylor, the Lberan warlord, inanced the early stages of hs rampage to power by sellng tmber. The market for tropcal hardwood s lucratve, and once he secured the Port of Buchanan, he had both the supply and the means to export. But damonds would be even more lucratve. Taylor backed Serra Leone’s ledglng Revolutonary Unted Front (RUF), gvng them a base, weapons, and an outlet for whatever they could steal n Serra Leone. The RUF trademark was choppng the hands and feet off cvlans, often small chldren. As a terror technque, t was extremely effectve n clearng the alluval damond ields, provdng the RUF and Taylor wth a hghly rewardng money machne. In the Democratc Republc of Congo, another knd of conlct damond was beng nvented. There the conlct was slent at irst, fueled by greed, apathy, and corrupton at the top, and sustaned by the rapacous appette of foregn irms for anythng the Congo had to offer, ncludng damonds. When Mobutu’s regme collapsed under the weght of ts own depravty, t was succeeded by somethng that was lttle better. Laurent Kabla’s foregn alles, however, fell to squabblng over the spols, and by the late 1990s the DRC barely exsted as a country, and the armes of Zmbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda pcked over the spols and exported copper, cobalt, coltan, and damonds back to ther captals. Those sellng conlct damonds dd not need to nvent routes, buyers, or systems. These had long been establshed by the llct trade. Conlct damonds are smply llct damonds taken to ther logcal extreme. They are llct damonds that have gone septc. 

Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade The Kimberley Process: A Moment of Sudden Change Conlct damonds were irst brought to the world’s attenton late n 1998 by a small Brtsh NGO called Global Wtness. Global Wtness had been started only ive years earler by three dropouts from the envronmental movement who had seen that envronmental and human rghts problems were complex and nterrelated and that n order to solve them, the source of the problem needed to be addressed. They began to look at the role of resources n conlcts, whch at that tme very few people had examned. The irst ssue they tackled was tmber explotaton n Camboda, and n 1998 they turned ther attenton to the war n Angola and found that damonds were fuelng the UNITA war machne. UNITA, whch had long before lost any moral or poltcal justicaton for ts twenty-year war effort and whch had lost the Cold War ratonale needed for ts Amercan backng, was funded now almost exclusvely through the sale of damonds. In a December 1998 report enttled Rough Trade, Global Wtness reported that between 1992 and 1998, UNITA controlled between 60 and 70 percent of Angola’s damond producton, generatng US$3.7 bllon to pay for ts war effort. Half a mllon Angolans ded and many more were dsplaced, ther lves runed.23 A year later, n January 2000, a Canadan NGO, Partnershp Afrca Canada (PAC), released ts own report on damonds: The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security. That report told the story of Serra Leone’s Revolutonary Unted Front (RUF), a rebel movement devod of deology, wthout ethnc backng or clams to terrtory. Between them, Global Wtness and Partnershp Afrca Canada had put the damond ndustry on notce and had sngled out the gant De Beers conglomerate for specal attenton. In 1999, the Securty Councl Sanctons Commttee on Angola, chared by Canada’s UN ambassador Robert Fowler, ielded an expert panel to examne the connecton between damonds and weapons, irst exposed several months earler by Global Wtness. When they reported to the Securty Councl n March 2000, they also had the beneit of the PAC report. Unable to gnore what the NGOs had already shown, for the irst tme a UN report named sttng heads of government as accomplces n the breakng of UN sanctons. The presdents of Togo and Burkna Faso were named as both damond and weapons trafickers. Worred that growng NGO awareness and publcty mght spral out of control, the government of South Afrca called a meetng of nterested governments, NGOs, and the damond ndustry n May 2000. The meetng, held n the town of Kmberley, where South Afrcan damonds had been 

i a n sm i l l i e dscovered 135 years before, was ground-breakng, not least because of the eclectc mx of NGOs, government oficals, and leaders of the damond ndustry. Ths was the begnnng of what became known as the “Kmberley Process,” and through the rest of that year and the next, t grappled wth the ssue of how to ensure greater probty n an unregulated ndustry and how to end the phenomenon of conlct damonds. The wder damond ndustry joned the process and n July 2000 created a “World Damond Councl,” whch proposed a “chan of warrantes” for rough damonds as they moved from one dealer to another. De Beers and vrtually every damond bourse from Antwerp to Mumba threatened to cut off any of ts members caught dealng n conlct damonds. There were thrteen meetngs of the Kmberley Process between May 2000 and November 2002, when an agreement was inally reached. The meetngs were detaled, often tense, but always reasonably open. Industry representatves and NGOs partcpated on an equal footng wth government delegatons. In the end, the most contentous ssues related to statstcs and WTO compatblty. For some delegatons, damond statstcs had been rased to the level of a state secret, but t was understood that wthout good producton and trade data, no control mechansm could hope to succeed. It was inally agreed that quarterly trade statstcs would be produced by all partcpatng countres and sem-annual producton statstcs would be produced by all mnng countres, both sets of statstcs to be compled wthn two months of the end of the reference perod. The Kimberley Process Agreement on Monitoring: New Regulatory Space? Throughout the Kmberley Process meetngs, the debate on montorng was long and heated. Invarably, there were two sdes to the ssue. NGOs argued for regular, credble, ndependent montorng of all natonal control systems for rough damonds. Wthout ths as the ultmate test, all systems would be suspect. Most of the governments that spoke on the ssue, however, rejected the concept outrght. Many others remaned slent or sad that “the tme s not rght.” The text emergng from the inal November 2002 meetng at Interlaken left montorng to the dscreton of the entre membershp of the Kmberley Process at plenary meetngs, to be trggered only by extraordnary need: • “Partcpants at Plenary meetngs, upon recommendaton by the Char, can decde on addtonal vericaton measures”; • “These could nclude . . . revew mssons by other Partcpants or ther



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade representatves where there are credible indications of signiicant noncompliance wth the nternatonal certicaton scheme”; • Revew mssons are to be conducted n an analytcal, expert and mpartal manner wth the consent of the Partcpant concerned. The sze, composton, terms of reference and tme-frame of these msson should be based on the crcumstances and be establshed by the Char wth the consent of the Partcpant concerned and in consultation with all Participants.”24 As the assembled governments agreed on ths hestant wordng, there were already “credble ndcatons” that a wde varety of countres would be n “sgnicant non-complance” f permtted to jon. Membershp would be open to “all applcants wllng and able to fulill the requrements of the scheme”—n order to avod a WTO challenge—but there was no mechansm establshed—short of a full plenary debate—to determne whether an applcant actually is able “to fulill the requrements of the scheme.” Membershp crtera, however, tghtened up durng 2003, and several countres were removed from membershp untl they could demonstrate that they had approprate laws n place to relect agreed mnmum standards n the system. Montorng, too, advanced somewhat, wth an agreement at the end of 2003 that partcpatng countres mght “volunteer” for revew mssons. But ths fell consderably short of regular ndependent montorng for all partcpatng countres. Some natonal systems wll rely for much of ther natonal damond oversght on the proposed “chan of warrantes” to be devsed by the World Damond Councl, presumably n conjuncton wth nterested governments. The World Damond Councl proposal wll be underpnned by ndependent audtng and penaltes for non-complance, but—crtcally—t wll be voluntary. And the World Damond Councl by no means represents all companes nvolved n the damond trade. In creatng ther World Damond Councl and descrbng ther proposal for a certicaton system, the World Federaton of Damond Bourses and the Internatonal Damond Manufacturers Assocaton sad n July 2000 that the “[k]ey to the whole process s montorng.”25 The December 2001 Unted Natons General Assembly Resoluton on conlct damonds descrbed a system whch ncluded the “need for transparency.”26 On July 23, 2000, the G8 Heads of Government Meetng n Oknawa, Japan, ssued a communqué whch sad, inter alia, “we have agreed to . . . mplement measures to prevent conlct, ncludng by addressng the ssue of llct trade n damonds.” Two years later, the G8 meetng n June 2002 stated n ts G8 Africa Action Plan, “We are determned to make conlct preventon



i a n sm i l l i e and resoluton a top prorty, and therefore we commt to . . . workng wth Afrcan governments, cvl socety and others to address the lnkage between armed conlct and the explotaton of natural resources—ncludng by . . . supportng voluntary control efforts such as the Kmberley Process for damonds, and . . . working to ensure better accountability and greater transparency with respect to those involved in the import or export of Africa’s natural resources from areas of conlict.”27 The Kmberley Process arrangements mock all these resolutons on montorng and transparency. In fact the Kmberley Process wordng on transparency s as follows: “Partcpants and observers should make every effort to observe strct conidentalty regardng the ssue and the dscussons relatng to any complance matter.”28 The U.S. General Accountng Ofice, the nvestgatve arm of the Unted States Congress, revewed the Kmberley Process agreement n June 2002 and found t serously deicent n the area of montorng. “Even acknowledgng soveregnty and data senstvty constrants, the Kmberley Process scheme’s montorng mechansms stll lack rgor. . . . The scheme rsks the appearance of control whle stll allowng conlct damonds to enter the legtmate damond trade and, as a result, contnue to fuel conlct.”29 The Kmberley Process nternatonal damond certicaton scheme began ofically on January 1, 2003, wth more than ifty governments partcpatng. The ntal startup perod was bumpy, and the ssue of regular ndependent montorng remaned a matter of uninshed busness for the NGO partcpants. But a sgnicant nternatonal agreement had been acheved n relatvely short order. Why dd governments and ndustry move so far and so fast? It was n part because the mpact of the llct nature of the damond ndustry had become so catastrophc that somethng had to be done. The nordnate death and destructon, and the concomtant cost n relef programs and UN peacekeepng mssons, inally pushed the ssue to the top of the Securty Councl agenda. Wthout the NGO research, publcty, and campagnng, however, t s questonable whether anythng would have changed. It was the ndustry’s fear of an NGO swarmng, akn to the fur embargo of prevous years, that provded the real mpetus to move. By the end of 2001, the ssue of “blood damonds” had been ared by every televson newsmagazne from Tokyo to London, every major consumer magazne from Esquire to Vanity Fair and the National Geographic. The story was featured regularly n the New York Times, the Financial Times, Bloomberg News, and CNN. Why then have governments been so reluctant to move further on montorng? Three reasons have been gven, wth dfferent emphass placed 

Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade on them by dfferent partes. The irst s cost; the second s commercal conidentalty; the thrd s natonal soveregnty. The cost argument s dsngenuous. The damond ndustry already spends consderable sums to protect ts nterests. De Beers, for example, spends US$4 mllon a year on a Gem Defensve Program amed at keepng synthetc damonds out of the normal trade. If there were a levy on rough damond transfers of onetenth of 1 percent of a shpment’s value, t would yeld more than US$75 mllon a year—four tmes as much as the newly agreed Avaton Securty Plan of Acton and many tmes more than would be requred for a respectable damond montorng system. Such a levy would add one-seventh of 1 percent to the cost of a damond rng, or 75 cents to the cost of a US$500 luxury tem, no great burden.30 The ssue of commercal conidentalty arose frequently at Kmberley Process meetngs. However, some of the same governments that worred about the possblty of breakng WTO regulatons on free trade also defended monopolstc damond ndustry practces, secrecy, and sngle-company domnance of trade n one country or another. That asde, montorng s no more about publczng commercal conidentaltes than standard inancal audtng s. All commercal irms are ndependently audted, and commercally senstve nformaton s protected. If the same cannot be done where damonds are concerned, governments are essentally condonng the secrecy that has been used to hde and foster serous crmes aganst humanty. In any case, Kmberley Process montorng should be about the effectveness of systems, not the commercal conidentaltes of legtmate busness. One Kmberley Process delegaton leader sad that there s no compulsory nternatonal montorng mechansm n any agreement, so why now for damonds? Ths s ncorrect. The word “compulsory” does not exst anywhere n the Kmberley agreement. The entre agreement s voluntary, as are all ts provsons. There are, or should be, penaltes assocated wth falure to meet them. These may be costly, but any country s free to jon or not jon. If a country jons, t must observe the rules. If the rules nclude certicates, t must ssue certicates. Ths s not an nfrngement of natonal soveregnty. It s part of the cost of dong busness n the damond trade. It s agreed to voluntarly. Regular ndependent montorng can lkewse be voluntarly agreed to. In the end, of course, no force on earth can compel a country to accept a montorng msson f t refuses. But there would, and should, be consequences. There were two addtonal and largely unspoken reasons for the resstance. The irst was poltcal. Russa and Chna sad they would smply not accept ndependent montorng—for the reasons gven above. Other 

i a n sm i l l i e governments mght well have pushed for ndependent montorng but may have beleved that t made more sense to get a tepd agreement whch ncluded Russa and Chna than a strong agreement wthout them. Hence the suggeston from some that “the tme s not rght.” The other unspoken reason has to do wth the much larger ssue of llct damonds. Some governments partcpatng n the Kmberley Process have actvely colluded wth elements of the llct trade. Wth effectve montorng, ths would be exposed, and the beneits that low from t would have to stop. Other governments may be concerned that an effectve regulatory system would smply drve the busness and the jobs t creates away from ther bourses and cuttng factores to those n countres that are less regulated. Belgum complans of losng busness to Israel. Israel complans of losng busness to Inda. Chna, Thaland, and Hong Kong are growng. And so on. Whatever the reasons, a truly effectve Kmberley Process would have a major mpact on the llct damond trade. It would curb conlct damonds, but t would also make major nroads nto that part of the ndustry that has been used for money launderng, tax evason, and worse. When the global Kmberley Process system became effectve on January 1, 2003, t became apprecably more dficult to launder llct damonds. All rough damonds requred a government export or re-export certicate, guaranteeng the orgn and cleanlness of the goods. But many of the countres that were accepted nto the system wthout demur had been launderng llct and conlct damonds for years. The addton of some new paperwork nto the system was unlkely n the end to make a great deal of dfference. NGOs nvolved n the process vowed to contnue pressng on the ssue. The test n the months ahead wll be the resolve of the governments that have the most to gan from a clean ndustry—Belgum, South Afrca, Namba, Botswana, Israel, Inda, Russa, Canada. And t wll depend to a large extent upon the tradeoffs the damond ndustry tself s wllng to make—between what could be a dficult cleanup and a declne nto further crmnalty and dsrepute. Epilogue Many of the fears descrbed n ths chapter proved to be unfounded. The voluntary montorng arrangement grew teeth durng 2004. More than a dozen partcpatng countres nvted revews. Teams, usually comprsng representatves from three other governments, someone from the ndustry,



Crmnalty and the Global Damond Trade and someone representng NGOs, carred out detaled complance studes. The Republc of Congo (Brazzavlle) was expelled from the Kmberley Process followng a revew whch found that t could not account for the mnng or mportaton of the damonds t had been exportng. A dozen more revews were planned for 2005, and only a small number of countres remaned aloof from the process. Statstcs remaned a problem and the subject of much debate. Whle countres such as Russa overcame ther legal and commercal restrants, others refused or were unable to submt meanngful data. As of md-2005, ths remaned one of the thornest ssues n Kmberley Process complance. By then, however, the damond-fueled wars the Kmberley Process had sought to affect had ended. Serra Leone, whch had ofically exported only a handful of damonds n 1999, exported US$126 mllon worth n 2004, and the Democratc Republc of the Congo had ts best year ever for damond exports. Both governments acknowledged the Kmberley Process as a major contrbutor to the legalzaton of ther damond ndustres. The challenge for them now, and for the damond ndustry at large, wll be to ensure that the Kmberley Process can serve as preventon as well as cure and that damonds can become an engne of growth and development rather than a resource for predators. NOTES 1. These scenaros are completely authentc. The inal scenaro descrbes condtons prevalng untl the end of the war n Serra Leone n January 2002. Names have been changed. 2. Kevn Krajck, Barren Lands (New York: Tmes Books, 2001), 13. 3. Sharon Berger, “Congo Sgns $700m Agreement wth IDI Damonds,” Jerusalem Post, August 2, 2000. 4. Chrstan Detrch, “Have Afrcan-based Damond Monopoles Been Effectve?” Central Africa Minerals and Arms Research Bulletin 2 (June 2001), avalable at http://www.damondstudes.com/docs/onlne.html. 5. For a complete dscusson of damonds n Central Afrca, see Chrstan Detrch, Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Its Neighbours (Ottawa: Partnershp Afrca Canada, June 2002). 6. Fgures from the Damond Hgh Councl, Antwerp, and Diamond Intelligence Briefs, Tel Avv. 7. Global Wtness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conlict (London: Global Wtness, December 1998); Ian Smlle, L. Gbere, and R. Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Ottawa: Partnershp Afrca Canada, 2000). 8. Kmberley Process, “Essental Elements of an Internatonal Scheme of Certicaton for Rough Damonds,” Kmberley Process Workng Document no. 1/2002, March 20, 2002.



i a n sm i l l i e 9. A. M. Coxon, unttled paper (De Beers, March 2000). 10. UN Securty Councl, Report S/2001/363 (New York: Unted Natons, Aprl 18, 2001), para. 54. 11. Unted Natons, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19 in Relation to Sierra Leone (New York: Unted Natons, December 2000), 28. 12. Unted Natons, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306, 28. 13. For a dscusson of ths problem, see Ian Smlle, Fire in the Ice: Beneits, Protection and Regulation in the Canadian Diamond Industry (Ottawa: Partnershp Afrca Canada, 2002). 14. All igures have been produced by the governments of the countres n queston, although only those for Belgum are currently n the publc doman. 15. UN Securty Councl, S/2001/966 (New York: Unted Natons, October 12, 2001), para. 141. 16. “Damond Ppelne 2001,” Mazal U’Bracha 146 (June 2002). 17. Matthew Hart, Diamond: A Journey to the Heart of an Obsession (New York: Vkng, 2001), 159–181. 18. Detals of varous Russan damond frauds are contaned n Hart, Diamond: A Journey to the Heart of Obsession. 19. Ian Smlle, L. Gbere, and R. Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter, 44–47; Unted Natons, Report S/2000/1195 (New York: Unted Natons, 2000), 32–40. 20. Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Ted to Damond Trade,” Washington Post, November 2, 2001. 21. “Al-Qaeda terrorst operatves dversfyng inances, UN Expert Panel Warns,” UN News Center, New York, May 22, 2002. 22. U.S. General Accountng Ofice, International Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conlict Diamond Trade, GAO-02-678 (Washngton, D.C.: U.S. General Accountng Ofice, June 2002); U.S. General Accountng Ofice, Terrorist Financing: US Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms, GAO-04-163 (Washngton, D.C.: U.S. General Accountng Ofice, November 2003). 23. Global Wtness, A Rough Trade, 3. 24. Emphass added. 25. World Federaton of Damond Bourses and Internatonal Damond Manufacturers Assocaton, Jont Resoluton (Antwerp, July 19, 2000). 26. UN General Assembly, Resoluton A/RES/55/56 (New York: Unted Natons, December 1, 2000). 27. G8 Heads of Government, “G8 Acton Plan for Afrca” (statement presented at G8 heads of government meetng, Kananasks, Alberta, June 27, 2002). 28. Kmberley Process, “Essental Elements of an Internatonal Scheme of Certicaton For Rough Damonds,” Secton VI, para. 15. 29. U.S. General Accountng Ofice, International Trade: Critical Issues, 21. 30. US$7.9 bllon n rough damond producton n 2001 was converted nto US$54.1 bllon n damond jewelry. A 0.1 percent levy on US$7.9 bllon would represent, on average, a 0.15 percent levy on inshed goods. US$500 x 0.15 percent = US$0.75.

00

Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands

seven Small Arms, Cattle Raiding, and Borderlands The Ilemi Triangle Kenneth I. Smala and Maurce Amutab

In ths chapter we offer an analyss of how, n the border regon adjonng Kenya, Ethopa, Uganda, and Sudan, an area known as the “Ilem Trangle,” communal regulaton broke down n the face of an upsurge n volence. Our prmary focus s on the tensons between tradtonal authorty and state power and on the transformaton of cattle radng among pastoral communtes n ths regon, closely related to llegal cross-border trafic n small arms. We show how changes n ths seemngly remote area are drectly related to global events and how cattle radng, once a culturally deined recprocal actvty among pastoralsts, has been transformed nto an uncontrollable, technologcally sophstcated, and hghly volent practce. There are a varety of reasons why conlct among pastoralsts n the Ilem Trangle has recently taken on new and more volent dmensons. Incessant droughts have led to the death of lvestock and reduced the avalablty of pasture and water. More sophstcated weaponry has added to the problem. Moreover, the demand for lvestock has ncreased because of the exstence of rebel encampments n Sudan, Ethopa, and Uganda. Thus, a shrnkng resource base, new technologes of volence, and new demands for lvestock have provoked desperate struggles for survval among the pastoralsts lvng n ths borderland. 0

k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi Tradtonally, pastoralst customs, especally the requrement that young men have to provde dowry n the form of lvestock, accounted for the practce of mutual cattle rustlng. Former presdent Danel Arap Mo of Kenya, who comes from a pastoralst communty, has noted, “Tradtonally, cattle rustlng dd not nvolve kllng people.”1 In the past, rustled lvestock replenshed lost herds followng drought or major outbreaks of dsease. If elders from neghborng communtes dentied stolen herds, the matter was usually dscussed jontly and lvestock returned. Ths s no longer the case; recprocty has been replaced by mercless plunder orchestrated by hred goons. A sgnicant proporton of our ntervewees were unanmous that cattle rustlng dd not explode n ts present volent form untl the 1970s.2 Today the practce has evolved nto novel forms that are better descrbed as bandtry and commercal radng. Small arms (and lght weapons) have become so commonplace n eastern Afrca today that some vllages are better equpped wth the latest weaponry and mltary hardware than local state securty personnel. Further, these communtes’ nomadc lfestyles and relatve lack of ixed assets have resulted n weak attachments to natons and states. Not surprsngly, despte ncreased state survellance and polcng n the regon, trafickng n arms goes on unabated. As a result, the regon s full of permanent and potental war zones. On May 11, 2001, the Daily Nation carred a feature artcle on Barago, a pastoralst area close to the Kenya-Ethopa border. Because of bandtry, the area s one of the most dangerous n the country; the newspaper artcle descrbed t as “Kenya’s Kosovo.” Barago s just a few klometers from the Suguta Valley, an area that Kenya’s securty personnel and local people fear and dread because of ts treacherous terran and unbearable temperatures and humdty. The Suguta Valley s a nghtmare for Kenya’s securty personnel and a haven for lvestock theves and bandts from Ethopa, Kenya, and Sudan. “Even chldren know ths. They welcome vstors chantng: ‘Welcome to Kosovo! Barago s Kosovo!’”3 In 1996, bandts n ths regon blew to smthereens a helcopter carryng senor Kenyan government oficals together wth the dstrct commssoner of Samburu.4 The use of sophstcated weapons n cattle rustlng has become more frequent than ever before n eastern Afrca’s hstory, and cattle rustlng has turned nto nterethnc warfare. In the past decade, there have been constant clashes between varous peoples n the Ilem Trangle, especally the Nyangatom, Merlle, Pokot, Toposa, and Karmojong. These ncessant conlcts (e.g., between the Turkana and Pokot n Kenya, or the Sebe, Karmojong, and Iteso n Uganda) have resulted n numerous deaths and thefts of lvestock.5 The governments of the varous adjonng countres, 0

Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands except Sudan, have responded by launchng mltary operatons amed at contanng the volence, wthout much success. Commercal radng has been brought about by a greatly expanded demand for meat by varous rebel groups and combatants. Among them are warrng factons n Somala, the Oromo Lberaton Front (OLF) n southern Ethopa, Pokot lvestock raders n northern Kenya, the Sudan People’s Lberaton Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and rebels of the Lord’s Resstance Army (LRA) n northern Uganda. Havng depleted the area of ts edble wld anmals, rebel groups have turned to lvestock as the only readly avalable food source; as a result ther neghbors have been forced to buld up ther own mltary arsenal to survve. Warlords, professonal raders, rebel groups, bellgerent youths, and egocentrc vagabonds have appeared as volent protagonsts n the pastoralst envronment, causng many socal and economc upheavals n the Trangle. Volence n the Ilem Trangle has been descrbed varously as clan and ethnc skrmshes, radng, bandtry, cattle rustlng, and warfare. The avalablty of small arms has ntroduced a new twst to the conlcts: armed pastoralsts from the Trangle now terrorze non-pastoralsts outsde the pastoralst ranges. Non-pastoralsts feel compelled to protect themselves by acqurng arms, leadng to an escalaton of volence.6 Prelmnary research done n Samburu ndcates that the Samburu pastoralsts began to arm themselves after beng raded repeatedly by Turkana herdsmen. They clam that ther arms are obtaned from Pokot dstrct n Kenya, SPLM/A camps n Sudan, Karamoja n Uganda, and Somala.7 Arms n Pokot are lkely to be from Ugandan and Sudanese sources, but some arms also come from Isolo va Somala.8 The Ilem Trangle acts as the channel through whch arms move across the pastoralst corrdor that runs from Djbout through Somala, Ethopa, and Kenya to Sudan and Uganda. The scale of the arms trade, and the resultng volence, s constantly ncreasng. In the past ten years there has been a clear rse n the number of casualtes from armed rads and the amount of lvestock commandeered by armed raders. State securty forces have ncreasngly lost battles wth raders whenever the two sdes have confronted each other mltarly. Despte ncreased mltarzaton n the Ilem Trangle, nobody knows for sure the number of llegal arms n crculaton here. To complcate matters, the Trangle s both a transt pont and a market for small arms. At certan tmes of the year, and dependng on varous actvtes n other parts of the regon, the Trangle handles hundreds of arms a day. Ths s partcularly so durng perods of drought when many pastoralsts, seekng to replensh emacated stocks, ntensfy ther radng. Durng ethnc conlcts and n preparaton for cross-border lvestock rads, thousands of arms are collected. At other 0

k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi tmes, especally durng the rany season when movement becomes dficult due to mpassable roads, the crculaton of arms and people s mpeded. Conservatve estmates have put the number of small arms n the Trangle at about one mllon. Our estmate, based on our own calculatons, observatons, and ntervews, s hgher: between 1.4 to 2 mllon.9 Borders and Borderlands in Eastern Africa Lttle of the exstng scholarly lterature addresses borderland stuatons n Afrca n concrete ways.10 Ths s relected n the nadequacy of formulatons by Adeyoyn, who descrbes borderlands as “regons lyng along and across the boundary separatng one country from another,”11 and Hansen, who sees them as “sub-natonal areas whose economc and socal lfe are drectly and sgnicantly affected by proxmty to an nternatonal boundary.”12 It has been argued that Afrca no longer has tradtonal fronters (areas outsde natonal boundares and not fully occuped by states), although t may be more accurate to note that there are “new” fronters n eastern Afrca, where governments wth terrtoral clams over borderlands do not n fact have full control over them. Here government forces are permanently engaged n wars of attrton wth bands of “warlords” and “bandts” for the control of these areas. Lke most post-colonal areas, many Afrcan boundares are clearly artical and arbtrary. In the recent past, Afrcan eltes have retaned these colonal boundares to explot ther ctzens and to exercse poltcal, economc, and iscal polces over a gven terrtory.13 Those at the bottom of the explotatve herarchy, such as those n borderlands, know ths, hence ther ndfference to natonal ssues. In the Ilem Trangle, the varous ethnc groups share a sense of communty wth others across the border. These borderland ctzens have not been co-opted nto the natonal scheme of thngs. The natonal governments n Narob, Kampala, Adds Ababa, and Khartoum have reled excessvely on control through state agences and customs and mmgraton personnel, and they have allocated few resources to borderland development. Borderland ctzens ind ethnc and ancestral lnks far more meanngful than the poltcal soveregnty of states. In other words, cross-border ethnc groups that share certan cultural aspects and understand each other’s language feel greater closeness to ther kn across the border than to fellow ctzens wthn the artical conines of ofical state terrtory. Ths complcates border problems n eastern Afrca. We agree wth Momoh when he says that boundares n Afrca and elsewhere are not only artical but also arbtrary creatons.14

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Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands

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25

50 km

ETHIOPIA

SUDAN

LOTAGIPI SWAMP

MOGILA RANGE

ILEMI TRIANGLE (Disputed)

LO T AG IPI

Livan

GREA

Naitatitok

T RIF T VALLEY

Kibish Karotho Post

PLAIN Lokitaung

Tarach River

Lokichokio

KENYA

UGANDA

Fig .. The Ilem Trangle. Map by Bll Nelson.

Borders n Afrca are porous, poorly polced, hated as rrtatngly coninng by ordnary ctzens, and consdered almost rrelevant to daly lfe. Consequently, they serve not as boundares but as nterstate pathways, conduts for movng goods and movement of people, especally extra-legal ones. In eastern Afrca, the dentcal cultural envronment prevalng on ether sde of the colonal-mposed nternatonal borders provdes a general cover under whch clandestne actvtes take place. Beng strategcally located between Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Ethopa, the Ilem Trangle wtnesses these types of actvtes daly.

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k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi The Ilemi Triangle, Pastoralism, and State Policies The Ilem Trangle15 les at the ntersecton of the borders of Kenya, Uganda, Ethopa, and Sudan. The regon has permanent pasture as a result of rvers such as the Tarach that pour ther waters nto the Lotagp Swamp n the Trangle. For ths reason, colonal authortes, keen to mnmze conlct between the pastoralsts n the area, carved the Trangle out as a neutral buffer zone to reduce warrng and rustlng actvtes among cattlekeepng ethnc groups. Thus, the Toposa (Sudan), the Merle, Nyangatom, and Hamar (Ethopa), and the Turkana (Kenya) were enttled to graze and water ther lvestock n the Trangle durng tmes of extreme drought. Ths was under the supervson of the Brtsh authortes n Kenya. It s estmated that some 500 to 600 mllon people lve n the ard and sem-ard parts of the world and that some 30 to 40 mllon of them depend entrely on anmals. Of these 30 to 40 mllon people, 50 to 60 percent are found n Afrca. The Horn of Afrca “s home to the largest remanng aggregaton of tradtonal lvestock producers n the world.”16 It also has the hghest proporton of pastoralsts n the world; Sudan has the hghest percentage n the world, whle Ethopa ranks ifth. In Kenya, pastoralsts occupy three quarters of the natonal land space and Uganda has sgnicant numbers of pastoralsts, promnent among them the Karmojong and Je.17 In typcally pastoralst areas such as Karamoja n Uganda, Turkana n Kenya, Toposa n Sudan, and Merlle n Ethopa, as much as 80 percent of cash ncome s generated from lvestock.18 In Kenya, sem-ard and ard land consttutes 439,000 square klometers, coverng fourteen dstrcts,19 or 80 percent of Kenya’s total land area.20 Ths area supports 25 percent of Kenya’s populaton and half ts lvestock. The Ilem Trangle and ts surroundng areas are therefore home to one of the largest pastoralst economes n Afrca. The ncredbly rugged terran, punshng clmate, extreme temperatures, vegetaton wth needlesharp thorns, rattlesnakes, centpedes, scorpons, and other wld creatures and anmals typcal of ths entre regon makes nonsense of nternatonal border demarcatons. Ths makes polcng pastoralst regons extremely dficult; not surprsngly, pastoralst border areas are more porous than other border areas. Durng droughts, the Ilem Trangle often provdes sanctuary to pastoralsts. The resdent populaton then comes nto conlct wth transent populatons over grazng rghts, even though some of the transent populatons (such as the Je and Toposa) often only want to move across the Trangle to areas such as the Omo Valley n Ethopa. Despte ts natural endowments,

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Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands the Ilem Trangle s actually often the last resort for roamng pastoralsts leeng drought because t s so nsecure and lacks government control and arbtraton. The Trangle has a hgh concentraton of arms, whch makes radng easy. Raded cattle are dficult to retreve because they can easly be sneaked across nternatonal borders. Hence many pastoral groups avod the Trangle untl there s no other opton open to them.21 When such groups are raded and lose anmals n the Trangle, they often become desttute and rarely recover economcally. Ths s one factor that accounts for the large numbers of refugees and dsplaced and poor people from varous countres who now lve n the Trangle’s urban areas. In ntervewng a wde range of elderly nformants and examnng government archves, we found that the Ilem Trangle suffers from gross neglect and napproprate government development polces stretchng back nto the colonal past. Polces pursued by successve colonal and postcolonal governments n Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya, as well as msguded actons by mperal Ethopa, have tended not only to neglect the needs of pastoralsts but also often to harm pastoralst nterests and aspratons. The net effect of these polces, whch were based toward agrculturalsts and modern rangers, have added to the problems and nsecurtes of pastoralst communtes n the Trangle, partcularly regardng access to water and pasture. Colonal oficals rarely apprecated the dynamcs of land tenure and use n Afrca and set nto place polces that account for some of the problems encountered by pastoralsts today. Sr Charles Ellot, a colonal commssoner of the East Afrcan Protectorate (later Kenya), had no reservatons about dsplacng pastoralsts from ther tradtonal lands: “I cannot admt that wanderng trbes have a rght to keep other superor races out of large tracts of land merely because they have acqured the habt of strugglng over more land than they can utlze.”22 The same ofical atttude obtaned n Sudan and Uganda. It was the colonal polcy to conine pastoralsts n natve reserves whle colonal authortes approprated much of ther free-range space for other purposes. Throughout the colonal perod, governments ntervened n pastoral socetes and economes to try to remedy problems by settng up commssons to advse on better—.e., more eficent—ways of utlzng land. Before nterventon by colonal oficals, tradtonal practces allowed pastoralsts to hold back ther anmals from wetter areas so as to keep the grass n reserve for the dry season. Many ntervewees, such as Leklam Sote and Okuan Lupa, told us that the well-watered Ilem Trangle was hstorcally consdered the refuge of last resort.23 Post-colonal governments have followed a smlar approach. Polcy

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k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi planners and development actvsts assumed that part of the soluton to the problem of ard and sem-ard lands was to dg wells and develop boreholes. But ths exacerbated envronmental damage to such an extent that the water table and pastoralsts’ ecosystems were damaged forever. In an oral ntervew, Ewalam Lokolak, eghty-three years old, noted that he had wtnessed the dryng up of lterally hundreds of boreholes n the areas around Loktaung n hs lfetme, a fact conirmed by government oficals and extenson workers workng n the area.24 Some of the boreholes were sunk n fossl water, whch could not be replenshed, leadng to the dryng up of these wells forever. In other areas, the water table has been snkng, makng t necessary to snk deeper and deeper wells and boreholes. The lack of water would n turn drve mgraton to new areas where water was stll avalable. Other state polces also affected pastoralsts negatvely. Polces amed at anmal mprovement were accepted by pastoralsts but led to dramatc ncreases n the numbers of anmals, whch exacerbated the problem of overgrazng. Polces drected toward changng pastoralst behavor n favor of agrculture or seekng to turn roamng herdsmen nto town dwellers also faled. Ths was because ard and sem-ard areas were well suted to pastoralsm as an economc actvty and few other alternatves could succeed. Ths has led to a rse n numbers of nternal refugees, vctms not only of ll-conceved government polces n the past, but also prevented from re-enterng ther old way of lfe because of dsplacement and current state polces.25 Lttle wonder, then, that modern states, both colonal and post-colonal, are hardly popular wth pastoralsts n the Ilem Trangle. Musa Ekuro felt that the governments across the regon were not dong enough for pastoralsts. Lke many ntervewees we spoke wth, he beleved that governments were nterested only n collectng leves at markets and nsttutng taxes, but were otherwse absent most of the tme. When remnded about the system of chefs and assstant chefs (n Kenya), he retorted, “We have never seen the government here. Show me, where t s?”26 However, t s at the level of polcy that one comes face to face wth the greatest mstreatment of pastoralsts by governments n the regon. In Kenya, the most recent changes n polcy occurred n the 1990s and assumed that lnkng prvatzaton, land regstraton, and ttlng wth the provson of credt would lead to a “take-off” for pastoral development. The basc assumpton was that ndvdual control of land and resources would lead to more eficent producton.27 These polces were lawed from the very outset because they were derved from the belef that ndg-

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Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands enous tenure systems mpeded productvty and development. They took no cognzance of the natve populaton’s ndgenous knowledge systems, ther understandng of local condtons, or ther practcal solutons to herd management. Prvatzaton of land s not only ecologcally napproprate but also antthetcal to the pastoral nomadc way of lfe. Imposed ndvdualzaton has led to factonalsm and rvalres, leadng to an ncreased use of volence to gan access to water, pasture, and lvestock. Development polces undermned tradtonal systems of regulaton wthout provdng vable alternatves. The Decline of Traditional Authority Fred Ejore, a Turkana elder, speaks three of the major languages spoken on the frnges of the Ilem Trangle besdes hs own ndgenous Turkana: Karmojong, Toposa, and Nyangatom. He ponted out that t was the jostlng for the resources of the Trangle by the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethopa that had led the people n the Trangle not only to become antagonstc toward each other but also to feel solated and perpheralzed. He nssted that many of the problems faced by pastoralsts n the Trangle today should be understood as colonal and post-colonal legaces. We have been told that we lved as happy people before the colonal powers came and told us that we are dfferent. Many Toposa, Karmojong and some Atekur understand my language when I speak. I also understand when they speak. We have the same culture. We even ntermarry. But [now] we are told that we are Kenyan, Ugandan, Sudanese, and Ethopan, and ths just causes a lot of hatred. I beleve that we should all share the water, the grazng areas, and even land, but the problem s that the government solders from our countres thnk that we are always lookng for ways of ightng each other. I am not btter wth anybody for havng lost all my herds. Even f “Anyanya” [the Sudan People’s Lberaton Army (SPLA)] dd not take them, maybe drought would have klled them. What I want s that we should not kll each other because of lvestock. These people are even kllng women and chldren and old men lke me. The colonzer gave the bunduki [small arms] that they are usng, rght? He started all these problems. How many people can a spear kll? Even “Anyanya” would not kll many people f they used spears.28

Hstorcally, t was elders who were responsble for the governance of the communty n pastoralst socetes. Pastoralst communtes had structures for conlct resoluton through councls of elders, tradtonal courts, and peer- or age-group supervson, where each ndvdual or group had to meet certan socal and cultural expectatons. In Uganda among the Karmo-

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k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi jong, elders made mportant decsons through collectve dscussons and debates and solved communal conlcts.29 In Ethopa among the Oromo, and n Kenya among the Boran (the two are cousns and share smlar structures), the vllage councl and Aba-Olla (vllage head) had far-reachng poltcal, socal, and economc functons. The Aba-Olla was responsble, inter alia, for mantanng peace and order, for resolvng dsputes, for representng the vllage at meetngs, for grazng and water management, and for reportng back to vllage households.30 There were well-deined systems of utlzaton of the grazng areas through well-known mgraton routes and norms of access to pasture land and waterng ponts. When there was a breakdown n these norms, groups negotated peacefully. Declnng pastoralst authorty structures account for some of the problems confrontng pastoralsts n the Trangle today. Pre-colonal copng strateges were an ntegral component of the pastoralsts’ socoeconomc system and ncluded leavng land fallow, splttng famles to better manage famly herds, loanng and poolng resources, group herdng, collectve mgraton, and trade tes wth busnessmen.31 These strateges were based essentally on the premse that a varety of resources were needed to provde access to pasture and water at dfferent tmes of the year and partcularly durng perods of drought. Government polces, from the colonal to the post-colonal perod, have consstently sought to alter, rather than buld upon, pastoral producton and copng systems. The falure to apprecate the logc of pastoral lfe has meant that development objectves have been deined on the bass of presumptuous and erroneous assumptons. These polces have been mplemented wth lttle regard to pastoralsts’ needs and have dsrupted pastoral economes and tradtonal copng mechansms. As a result, these mechansms can no longer be reled upon to resolve conlcts n the regon. They have been replaced by other power structures. Elders have lost ther authorty to leaders of radng bands who have access to money and tools of volence such as sophstcated arms. As Tlam Lokwel, nnety, put t eloquently: When we were young, we respected our elders. Now we usually carry our own stools but ths was done for elders n the past. A young man would carry hs grandfather’s seat for hm. Nowadays thngs are dfferent. When I came, dd you see them gvng me a seat? No. Thngs have changed very much. These young people no longer respect age. That s why they wll contnue kllng each other. They even kll women and chldren. We never wanted to kll humans, leave alone women and chldren. Women and chldren were never klled n our days as youths do nowadays. Do women and chldren have spears, bows and arrows to defend themselves? No. Then why kll them? You see what I mean? We respected elders. We wated for elders to

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Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands gve us the nod to marry. All my sons have marred; all of them obeyed our choce of wfe and decson for them. The elders gave us the cattle to gve as dowry n marrage and we were obedent. Nowadays those who have arms are the ones who own many cattle. Sons steal and rob cattle from fathers. Brothers steal cattle from each other. The chldren of these days have no manners. They are kllers. Those days when we were stll warrors [young] we went far to rad for cattle. Elders knew where to get them. To be an elder was respectable. Elders were the wealthest and most vsble members of the famly. But ths s not the case any more. One of my grandsons has more cattle than I. Those days, f you dsobeyed an elder, the clan punshed you, and you agreed wth them. You could not escape the verdct of elders. The elders had so much power that we really enved them and always hoped one day to become elders ourselves. We are now elders only n name, wthout wealth and power.32

The Transformation of Livestock Raiding Tradtonally, radng among pastoralsts was a socal functon and a cultural enterprse carred out by youths under the drecton of elders. Radng was used only to replensh depleted herds after extended drought or n the aftermath of a major outbreaks of dsease. Followng these catastrophes, pastoralsts often negotated for seed stock (lve cattle loans) from ther neghbors whch they pad back after reachng herd stablty. Radng was a last resort when the loanng system33 had faled or when the whole populaton was equally short of lvestock.34 Ths understandng dffers remarkably from contemporary radng mssons that are prmarly undertaken for commercal reasons. Radng nvolved recprocty: groups came together to help each other n restockng through exchange or helpng n radng faraway areas.35 Where captves were taken, assmlaton, not annhlaton, was usually the rule.36 Radng was thus relatvely humane and carred out under the command of elders who ensured that ethcal and tradtonal rules of engagement were mantaned and adhered to. The loss of lfe was to be avoded at all costs. Women, chldren, and nvalds were never klled durng rads. Calves and other young anmals were never taken n rads as they would often succumb on the way due to the long dstances. Elders usually opposed young men’s aggressve tendences, whch mght lead to an unwelcome escalaton or expanson of conlct and would undercut ther authorty and pre-emnence. As Paul Baxter has remarked, “War was too serous a matter to be left to the young,” and the elders ensured that ths remaned the case.37 The generaton system therefore provded mportant ways elders could exert authorty over truculent junors and mpose strct lmtatons on warfare tself.



k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi Lvestock rustlng, a tradtonal actvty among all plans pastoralsts, s embedded n cultural tradtons, especally songs and dances that are carred from one generaton to another. Hstorcal accounts preserved n oral tradtons hghlght the exstence of cattle rustlng before Europeans came to eastern Afrca. Pastoral communtes engaged n a cattle-rustlng “culture,” radng weaker communtes and takng away ther anmals as a means of expandng grazng lands, restockng lvestock, and obtanng cattle for brde prce.38 When warrors returned from successful rads, ululaton and other songs of prase welcomed them. Among the sngers were the warrors’ potental brdes. Radng was thus celebrated and occurred at specic tmes and seasons. A lot of plannng went nto t. Consderable care was taken to avod human fataltes and casualtes, as Lukuem Emura, eghty-sx, recalled: Radng was not somethng to be entrusted wth juvenles and youths. Elders decded t after ntense consultatons. Elders would tell the warrors before departng for radng that the am of the rad was to get lvestock and not to kll fellow humans. If the owners of lvestock that you had gone to rad threatened you, you were advsed to nlct temporary and not permanent or fatal njury. The ones beng raded also knew that death was not ntended. But death dd occur at tmes and n such cases cleansng was admnstered on the warror who had occasoned the death. Calves were not taken. Women and chldren were never touched. Warrors raded far and wde beyond the ethnc area. If death occurred durng the rad, extra cattle from the kller’s famly were gven to compensate the vctm. A Moran (warror) who klled durng armed conlct could not enter hs ekai (homestead) and had to be cleansed at the nearest water pont wth blood from a slaughtered goat and ntestnal contents smeared all over the body. The Moran would then be cleansed wth water and had to stay alone n the bush overnght before beng declared clean to enter the ekai. Ths rgorous rtual cleansng prevented Morani from kllng durng cattle rads. Nowadays warrors do not respect human lfe or the authorty of elders; often, we see them corrupted by money and they even rad clansmen and fellow trbesmen. Money and these new arms have spolt everythng. Elders are not even consulted. When we were warrors, we were on full alert for the servce of the communty, protectng communty property and not ready for hre for money as youths are today.39

The Turkana of Kenya, lke ther Karmojong neghbors n Uganda, had a dstnctve clan-based customary system of governance derved from a progressve age-set system. Elders made decsons that guded radng and decded when, where, and how to rad. The decsons of elders were also absolutely bndng n arbtratng conlct. The elders played a major role n natural resource management and determned the modes of produc-



Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands ton, dstrbuton, or sharng of food and other essental common property resources such as water, salt-lcks, pasture, and lvestock. The status and functons of elders as resource managers have been eroded n recent years, partly because of the falure of governments to recognze the role of tradtonal nsttutons n management at the communty level and partly because of changng property rghts regmes n the legal systems of modern states. As a result of emergng ndvdualzaton and prvatzaton of land that was prevously governed by a common property regme, the ablty of tradtonal governance nsttutons to control conlct has weakened. Small arms have n turn fueled radng that has escalated nto bandtry as non-pastoralsts have joned the fray, for loot and as fortune seekers. “Eldershp” can now be attaned by wealth, and armed youth can attan wealth by radng. Ths has added a completely new dmenson to conlct whch communty elders have never had to deal wth on such a scale before. Despte all ths, tradtonal structures are stll mportant n tryng to understand conlct n ard and sem-ard areas of the Trangle. If state admnstratons had recognzed and respected ndgenous knowledge and cultural practces n the past, such structures could stll have been used to resolve conlcts today. Peter Lelak reported: I lost all my cattle to sporadc radng. Many of the people who raded me were Pokot and others who dd not speak the Pokot language but Kswahl. Our people [n the Trangle] do not speak a lot of Kswahl. Several nonTurkana were among the raders. We have been wonderng how and why people from so far away were found among the dead or njured n these lvestock rads. We have been seeng non-Turkana partcpate n lvestock auctons as sellers of anmals and yet they do not own lvestock n ths area. Where do these Kkuyu, Luya, Luo, and Kalenjn get ther lvestock from, and why do they come all the way to Kbsh to sell anmals? Nobody asks them ths queston but I beleve these are stolen anmals. These are our anmals. We have even seen many non-pastoralsts lvng n the Trangle but f you ask them what they do for a lvng, they cannot answer. Where do they get money to pay rent and buy food? They are raders and sellers of guns. Many of them are gone by nght. Begn here [pontng to neghbor’s house] and ask people who lve n that block [pontng . . . ] what they do for a lvng, and many wll just look at you and laugh. I beleve that even the polce know that what these ndvduals do for a lvng si halali [s not honest]. These people are the ones who spol our youth by hrng them as raders.40

Lamphear avers that n the past “most mltary actvty took the form of ntermttent radng rather than anythng lke large-scale campagns and typcally t stemmed from a desre to capture lvestock, to gan access to natural resources.”41 The recent escalaton of volence n the regon and ts



k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi ncreasng toll on human lfe s an ndcaton of a breakdown n tradtonal practces, ncludng recprocty, and s marked by a reduced regard for the sanctty of human lfe. Contemporary radng s sometmes carred out merely for mltary reputaton and prestge.42 A new herarchy based on the capacty to amass and use modern arms has replaced the authorty of the elders.43 The greater demand for lvestock and lvestock products has led to tradng cartels and the entry of very aggressve mddlemen. Because of a scarcty of lvestock n tradtonal areas due to radng, these cartels and mddlemen organze and sponsor ther own rads by hrng mercenares and bandts to execute ther schemes. Thus tradtonal radng, where chldren and women were spared and male casualtes lmted, has been replaced by mercless radng practces by prvate armes where a whole famly or clan can be completely wped out n a sngle rad. These mercenares engage n bandtry when not radng for lvestock, and reports of attacks carred out wth uncanny mltary precson are legon n the regon. Recent attempts to restore and revve tradtonal power structures have been mpeded by heavly armed ndvduals now resdng wthn pastoralst socetes. These “renegade youths” consttute rval centers of power. However, there has been some success at recuperatng tradtonal power structures. Ths s where local efforts at dsarmament have succeeded or where governments have alled ther mltary clout wth elders to counter the power of the renegade youths. Ths happened recently between the Karmojong and Turkana elders under the arbtraton of Kenyan and Ugandan government oficals. The Ubiquity of Small Arms, or, a Bullet for Bus Fare The Ilem Trangle has seen arms used n the course of colonal and mperal expanson and control, but small arms n the hands of pastoralsts ncreased substantally only n the 1930s, followng the Italan nvason of Ethopa. The Italo-Ethopan war, whch broke out n 1936, led Emperor Hale Selasse I to moblze people at Mychew to confront the Italans. In the ensung battle, the Ethopans lost the war and the solders retreated. After the emperor left the country n 1936, some solders joned the patrotc forces, whle others returned to ther homes wth ther guns. The Italans’ dvde-and-rule polcy was a crtcal factor n makng arms more easly avalable n the area. The Italans occuped Ethopa between 1936 and 1941 and they delberately fomented hostlty between the Amhara and Oromo. They favored the Oromo and armed them heavly n order



Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands to track down ant-colonal forces resstng Italan rule.44 These forces, n turn, however, receved smuggled arms from the French, who were hostle to the Italans. The Frst and Second World Wars had a spllover effect n the Horn of Afrca. Durng these mperal wars, Afrcans were recruted to ight n far-off places. Solders were conscrpted from many countres n the regon. On ther return from the wars solders carred home mementos other than mltary regala and nsgna; they also often smuggled n small arms. Whereas the former are proudly and promnently dsplayed by survvng combatants, the latter can hardly be found, let alone talked about. Intervews wth two such survvng World War veterans, Ezekel Odaro and Francs Ombacho, suggest that the smuggled World War arms were easly sold off to wllng buyers.45 Soon after the Second World War, the contnent of Afrca was engulfed n the agtaton for ndependence from colonal rule. Protest and resstance to colonal admnstraton took varous forms. In order to take on the European mperalsts, Afrcans, especally n Uganda and Kenya, came up wth the dea of makng ther own weapons. Thus homemade guns emerged as weapons for defense and offense for Afrcans. Although the technology used was crude, the guns were qute effectve and lethal. Over the years, the technology was mproved to make guns and explosves of a superor qualty and n large quanttes. It s not uncommon even today to stumble on both old and new homemade guns beng used n armed conlct. Thus the tradtonal pastoralst weapons used n cattle radng—spears and bows and arrows—were superseded by more technologcally advanced weaponry. Today the weapon of choce s the AK-47 or the M16.46 A casual walk through the Trangle ndcates the presence of small arms all over the place, at markets, n grazng ields, and n prvate homes. It s not at all uncommon to ind large arsenals of small arms n prvate hands. As a result of the prolferaton of these arms, pastoralsts lvng near the Kenya-Ethopa, Kenya-Uganda, Kenya-Somala, Kenya-Sudan, and Uganda-Sudan borders have found themselves vctms of cattle rustlng. Apr Ekuam traces the geness of small arms n the Trangle, and ther connecton to lvestock rustlng, to the Anyanya movement that emerged n southern Sudan n the 1950s. He suggests that the use of small arms ntensied n the 1980s when the Sudan People’s Lberaton Army (SPLA) was born. Anyanya [the predecessors of the SPLA] are the ones who brought many dangerous guns here. The guns that the Italans left [behnd n 1935] were too old. Anyanya were the irst to brng Russan guns [n the 1950s] and they



k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi started robbng us of our anmals n large numbers, untl we started to buy our own guns. And after the SPLA struggle started n Sudan, lvestock were stolen n the thousands. Many heads of cattle would dsappear wthout a trace, sometmes the lvestock of entre vllages. When the cattle populaton went down here, wezi wa ng’ombe [lvestock theves] . . . started hrng our youth and sendng them to Pokot, Samburu and Karmojong to steal anmals for them. The SPLA people have also been sendng the Nyangatom and Merlle, and Toposa to take our anmals. Bad stealng [radng], where everythng s taken away and people are klled, has come about because of the SPLA and these other people who want to take over governments n Uganda and Ethopa.47

Markaks conirms Ekuam’s report that the prolferaton of arms n the Ilem Trangle s ntmately and ntrcately ntertwned wth lvestock rustlng.48 Tornay makes a connecton between the avalablty of weapons across state borders and the rse of ant-state movements, when he reports that n 1991, “twenty ive young Nyangatom (Merle) had been traned n an EPRDF (Ethopa Peoples’ Republc Democratc Front) camp n Awasa and they had been sent back to ther country wth Kalashnkovs, as purely trbal mlta, commtted to mantan local order under the gudance of ther elders.”49 Tornay further reports that “the Sudanese Toposa have made an allance wth the Sudan People’s Lberaton Army (SPLA), from whch they acqured automatc weapons.”50 Meanwhle, arms are traded freely and openly n the Trangle. There are buyers who travel all the way from Kampala n Uganda, Narob n Kenya, and Adds Ababa n Ethopa lookng for llegal arms. Negotatons take place n hotels and lodgngs. There are mddlemen and mddlewomen who spot potental buyers and lnk them to sellers. In Kbsh, a gude led researchers to a house where they saw an array of arms on dsplay, n a neghborhood not far from the polce post and the Kenyan army outpost. They also met a young seller n one of the hotels by chance and he asked them f they wanted to buy arms. He proceeded to dsplay hs wares by lftng hs overcoat; he was carryng at least ive guns under that one overcoat. Almost every week, securty personnel unearth arms caches hdden n all knds of places. Weapons are often concealed n spare tres, fuel tanks, and even automoble engnes. In the Ilem Trangle, border crossngs are barely polced. Only Kbsh post s regstered as an ofical entry pont, but there are a dozen other entry ponts that are more actve n human and lvestock trafic. The crossng at Kbsh s scantly manned and the securty personnel there are ll equpped. On January 17, 2003, between 2 and 4 p.m., researchers statoned just behnd Kbsh polce post counted more than thrty people enterng Kenya



Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands from Ethopa wth loads of varous szes. Several rode bcycles loaded wth huge bags or sutcases. The researchers followed one of the cyclsts to hs resdence. To a casual observer the cyclst appeared to be carryng charcoal but embedded n the bag of charcoal was an assortment of electronc goods and applances. Also hdden n t were three AK-47 machne guns. If all thrty people were carryng arms, nearly 100 irearms entered Kenya n just two hours. What s more mportant s that none of the border crossers were stopped or nspected. It s easy to understand how small arms move between the states of eastern Afrca wthout the knowledge of ther respectve governments. The ubquty of small arms s llustrated n other ways as well. In the Trangle a bullet can be used as bus fare or to buy a glass of beer or a bottle of Coca-Cola. At Loell town we came across an open-ar market where small arms were openly dsplayed wth prce tags marked n the currences of Kenya, Uganda, and Ethopa, as well as n U.S. dollars. We saw an assortment of pstols and guns. The AK-47 was the most expensve, followed by the M16. We were surprsed that these llegal guns were dsplayed so openly and that they were so cheap. We were told that an AK-47 fetches ive head of cattle (about 10,000 Kenya shllngs, or 100 U.S. dollars) when offered for barter but costs almost half that prce when cash s pad. We also learned that some guns can also be rented. Gun renters n the Trangle at tmes also double up as sellers. The East African, a Kenyan-based weekly regonal newspaper, estmates that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 irearms n the Karamoja regon of Uganda alone, and about 50,000 n Turkana, and many of these must have passed through the Ilem Trangle. Whle the exact number of small arms n the hands of pastoral communtes n the regon s dficult to assess and actual igures mpossble to get, t s clear that the threat posed by them s enormous. Small arms have become a common medum of exchange n the pastoralst areas. In 2002, three to sx cows could buy a gun n the Trangle. In Turkana (Kenya) and Karamoja (Uganda), bullet calbers and the names and types of varous modern guns are common knowledge. The accuracy of local knowledge would put army recruts or unsophstcated securty personnel to shame. Arms have become part of ordnary currency transactons among pastoralsts n eastern Afrca, as spears and arrows once were. The demand for small arms s made more complex by two new dmensons: the arrval of warlords and the commercalzaton of cattle rustlng, whereby rch urban merchants fund rads n the pastoral communtes.51 Small arms usually arrve n the Ilem Trangle from dstant cvl wars or conlct zones, both legally and llegally. Sengle Fugcha, a Shanglla



k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi herdsman ntervewed at Sololo on the Kenya-Ethopa border, was bold enough to descrbe how arms are ferred across the border, reasonng that everyone knows how arms are moved across nternatonal borders: There are many ways through whch these arms are moved across borders. The irst one s the use of Shanglla herdsmen who cross the Kenya-Ethopa border every day wth ther herds to carry the arms across, often concealed n the moble homes atop camels. We do not have a permanent abode as we can move wth our homes, stocks, and property across ths border as many tmes as we want, and n many places wthout rasng eyebrows. However, snce commercal gun buyers and runners have ncreased ther use of herdsmen to move arms across, securty forces are begnnng to dscover our trcks. Also, the fact that many Turkana, Rendlle, and Boran are nowadays masqueradng as Shanglla n order to go unnotced, t s becomng dficult to operate. People betray each other more often than n the past, usually to elmnate competton, and ths has complcated matters and ntensied rvalry. Ths s because they are hred by gun-runners and want to make as many trps as possble even when there s grass and water here, whch are the excuses that we often use to justfy our free movement. The new people are makng crossng the border between Kenya and Ethopa suspect. We use unofical routes, usually unmanned border ponts and remote hlls and forested areas. The polce and army are only found where there are roads. Although ths often makes for long routes and lasts for days, one s always sure to cross the border safely. Fnally, we at tmes use our chldren and women to carry arms because securty forces rarely nspect ths category of ndvduals at the border.52

Rles and pstols are small, easy to take apart, and consequently smple to conceal and transport. Small arcraft can delver smuggled goods undetected to remote arields. Ths has happened n the past n the case of one unused arield n a ranch not far from Archer’s Post Townshp n Samburu dstrct. In March 2003, a lght arcraft from Somala made an unauthorzed landng at Masnga dam arstrp, and only nterventon by ordnary people made the securty forces arrest ts passengers and seze ts cargo, but by then the arcraft had made a safe escape back to Somala. Transportng by land, smugglers have to cope wth border guards, customs oficals, and/ or the polce. In the event that oficals actually carry out freght checks, however, small brbes are usually suficent to ensure safe passage for anythng, ncludng contraband goods. Ironcally, the rsk of beng attacked by bandts or rebels s consderably greater. In order to defend themselves n such emergences, smugglers must carry arms themselves.53 An NGO analyst’s account of how weapons are smuggled nto Afrca talles wth ths account of how small-arms prolferaton takes place n the Ilem Trangle:



Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands They [governments] often collected weapons from the former Sovet Unon and Eastern Europe, transshpped them through arports lke Ostende n Belgum or Burgas n Bulgara, iled false lght plans to Caro, Knshasa, or Lagos, and “secretly” delvered ther lethal cargoes to UNITA rebels and Hutu perpetrators of Rwandan genocde based n Eastern Congo. They carred wth them maps and dagrams of varous clandestne arields and depended on ther well-greased relatons wth rogue oficals to ensure the secure off-loadng of ther cargo as “farm machnery,” but they were rarely, f ever, subject to cargo nspectons. Crcutous ar routes, forged export lcenses and blls of ladng, and icttous end-user certicates to show to unsuspectng oficals are all standard. Even humantaran organzatons can be trapped, not always unwttngly, nto ferryng weapons nto conlctrdden zones. Planes under the supervson of the World Food Program, the UN Hgh Commsson for Refugees, and non-governmental relef organzatons such as OXFAM have been commandeered. Chnese arms ndustres’ weapons shpments—labeled “farm mplements”—are carred on the same Chnese shps that brng beans and tools to needy Great Lakes Refugees.54

Accordng to our ntervewees, Lokchoko Internatonal Arport n Kenya s used for clandestne actvtes, ncludng arms movement and lvestock rustlng from the Ilem Trangle. Lokchoko s an deal entry pont for arms as t has reportedly been used by SPLA oficals lyng nto southern Sudan (New Sudan). Arport securty s not tght—there are huge gaps n the permeter fence and a lack of personnel to man gates nsde the arport. Lokchoko can serve as an deal hdeout and ext port for stolen lvestock. Florence Etuko (a pseudonym) nformed us that she had wtnessed many suspcous actvtes at Lokchoko arport, especally at nght, ever snce she started workng there as an ar trafic controller ive years ago. Partcularly fascnatng were her accounts of cargo planes that delvered and pcked up cargo under tght securty and closed cover. Florence suspected that planes brought n arms and took away lvestock and other related products. It was notceable that tensons were usually hgh at Lokchoko whenever researchers arrved at the arport for overnght vgl and other research actvtes. Whle the growth of Lokchoko town and arport owes ts orgns to the Cold War (n the form of war between Ethopa and Somala), today Lokchoko town bears the marks of contemporary conlcts and ts status as the regon’s major refugee center. Cross-Border Raids, Forced Migration, and Poverty Long-dstance and cross-border nomadc movements of peoples wth ther herds are a convenent cover for transportng small arms. Stolen anmals are also brought together nto what mght look lke genune herds.



k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi Droughts occurrng frequently snce the 1970s and 1980s have made matters worse. Not only have pastoralsts n the Trangle had to compete for scarce resources, but the asset base of ther lvelhoods has also been serously eroded. An ntervew wth one person, Eljah Lekulan, on the Kenyan sde of the Trangle, dramatzed how the people n the Trangle felt. He jokngly asked researchers who the presdent of Kenya was, and whether Id Amn and Mengstu Hale Marram were stll presdents of Uganda and Ethopa respectvely, just to demonstrate how perpheralzed and dsnterested the pastoralsts n the Trangle have become vs-à-vs the states n the regon. Electons had been held four months prevously, and Mwa Kbak had just replaced Danel Mo as presdent of Kenya n 2002. Ths was news that domnated the regon, but Lekulan fegned gnorance concernng the poltcal dynamcs of the regon to make hs pont. Lekulan s a Turkana, a former herdsman now lvng at Kbsh as an urban refugee. He sad that he lost most of hs cattle to raders from Sudan and Ethopa. He was a sad man, poor and emacated, and he blamed the Kenyan government for not allowng the people on ther sde of the border to acqure and own arms to protect themselves from well-armed raders from neghborng countres. Because of the margnalty of ths area, goods n the Ilem Trangle often cost two or three tmes ther prces n other parts of the surroundng countres. A 380-mlllter bottle of Coca-Cola costs sxty shllngs n the Trangle but only twenty shllngs n other parts of Kenya. Bread costs ifty shllngs n the Trangle and twenty-ive shllngs n the rest of Kenya. Because of poor roads and a poor transport network, many NGO oficals prefer to use lght arcraft to move n ther essentals. The communcaton network s also poor, wth telephones found only n a few urban centers of the Trangle. Desttuton s wdespread. There are hundreds of famles that have lost ther lvestock to cross-border raders and are forced to eke out a lvng by provdng labor as hred herdsmen or other manual tasks. Others work as urban caregvers, domestc servants, shopkeepers, charcoal burners, and hawkers, and yet others rely on handouts from nternatonal NGOs such as OXFAM, CARE, World Vson, etc. Some famles go as many as three days wthout a decent meal. There s a rse n the number of homeless and street famles n towns n the Trangle, especally n Kbsh. In spte of the dficulty of travel, many desttute famles have moved out of the Trangle. For example, many destocked Turkana famles are lvng rght outsde the Unted Natons Hgh Commsson for Refugees (UNHCR) camp at Kakuma. These famles depend on handouts for survval; humantaran relef has become ther man source of sustenance. The Daily Nation of January 0

Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands 21, 2001, reported that more than 600 Burj, Gabra, and Boran famles had led ther Moyale homes followng nvasons from the Ethopan sde of the border. Many ended up n Walda refugee camp, whch houses refugees from Ethopa and Somala. Followng the escalaton of bandt attacks, the Member of Parlament from Moyale reported, “Sx vllages n my consttuency are now desolate as resdents have led ther homes and are campng at the Moyale dvsonal headquarters.”55 Volence, cross-border rads, and forced mgraton snce the 1990s have led to boomng slums n the Trangle. Slum dwellngs are manly made from paper, cardboard, stcks, and grass. Every urban center n the Trangle has ts share of these nformal settlements that are ncreasngly stes of crmnal actvtes. In some areas,56 nformal dwellngs far outnumber formal settlements, and they have congested the town’s socal and economc nfrastructure. There are no facltes for lesure such as playng ields, stadums, or socal centers. The only avalable playng ield at Kbsh Prmary School has been so overused that ts ground s barren. The Kbsh Dvson Dstrct Oficer uses ths ield durng publc holdays as a parade ground for march-pasts and mltary drlls. It s therefore dusty and uncomfortable to play on. The most vulnerable famles are known as “cattle-less pastoralsts,” an even poorer group wthn an already margnalzed communty. They are found n town slums n the Trangle and are forced to engage n all knds of actvtes, ncludng prosttuton, to eke out a lvng. Fed Bayeswa, orgnally from Kelem, Ethopa, s a busnesswoman n Kbsh and has seen grls turn nto prosttutes because ther famles could no longer fend for them. These dsplaced pastoralst grls are vctms of crcumstance. When they arrve here, they are very shy and often begn as house-helps and domestc servants. When they realze that they cannot make enough money, they begn to sell sex. The worst are those who work for polce oficers and solders n the barracks. Snce many solders do not have ther wves here, they often seek satsfacton from these grls and before you know t, the grls have become full-tme prosttutes. Others gve brth to bastards and add to the problems of women. There are Ethopan, Sudanese, Ugandan, Kenyan and even Somal women prosttutes here [n Kbsh]. These grls are able to take care of ther famles, usually fathers, mothers and ther sblngs. The bggest problem now aflctng these grls s AIDS.57

Conclusion Our analyss suggests the complexty of the dynamcs that make up an Afrcan borderland, the Ilem Trangle, located on the perphery of 

k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi four East Afrcan states and at the crossroads of llegal trade n small arms and lvestock. Although at irst glance the Ilem Trangle looks remote, ts physcal dstance from recognzed centers of power should not obscure the mpact of global events, from mperal expanson to World Wars and the Cold War. Ths borderland provdes an example of the ntersecton of multple hstorcal, geopoltcal, and ecologcal scales, whch n ths case have produced a massve prolferaton of small arms and a concomtant rse n volence, nsecurty, and envronmental degradaton. Tradtonal forms of authorty n pastoral communtes, whle not preventng volence, dd offer a relatvely ordered and accepted system of rules that kept peace wthn and between communtes that have now come to straddle one or more natonal boundares. These forms of lct tradtonal authorty have broken down under the pressures of new borders, alternatve conceptons of development, massve ecologcal change, proxmty to major conlcts, an ncreasng demand for meat and anmal products, and the arrval n bulk of technologcally superor weapons. New forms of authorty have now replaced the old regulatory system that enjoyed great legtmacy and acceptablty compared to the new arrangements. The populaton of the Ilem Trangle does not see the governance of modern post-colonal states as lct. Many pastoralsts hate the states’ development polces that have contnued to margnalze them; they abhor the mltary presence of these governments, detest nternatonal borders, loathe the polcng rather than embrace t. Ths loss of regulatory coheson s hghlghted by the example of cattle radng, once a culturally deined practce that was part of recprocal relatons between pastoral communtes. Radng has now been transformed nto commercal plunder and warlordsm. For the foreseeable future, there appears lttle chance for lct forms of authorty to re-establsh themselves n the Ilem Trangle. NOTES 1. R. Chesos, “(Presdent) Mo Offers One Month Arms Amnesty,” Daily Nation, Aprl 18, 2001. 2. Intervews conducted n Kaabong and Loyoro n Uganda, Lokchoko, Kbsh and Todentang, Lodwar, Maralal, Barago, Sololo n Kenya, Kelem, Mega, and Chelago n Ethopa, and Lutuke, Nagpotpot, Kapoeta, Loel, and Nagchot n Sudan. September 2 to November 30, 2002. 3. M. Agutu and J. Karuk, “Welcome to Kenya’s Kosovo,” Daily Nation, May 11, 2001. 4. M. N. Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng among Pastoralsts n Northern Kenya: The Geness and the Truth,” presented at the conference on Community Education, Isolo (August 25–28, 1999). 5. M. Namr-Fuller, “Conlct Management and Moblty among Pastoralsts n Karamoja, Uganda,” n Managing Mobility in African Rangelands (London: ITDG,



Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands 1999), 176. Also see D. Belshaw and M. Malnga, “The Kalashnkov Economes of the Eastern Sahel: Cumulatve or Cyclcal Dfferentaton between Nomadc Pastoralsts,” paper presented at the irst workshop of the Study Group on Conlct and Securty of the Development Studes Assocaton (South Bank Unversty, Unversty of East Angla, 1999). 6. M. N. Amutab, “Bandtry and Lvestock Rustlng n the Ilem Trangle of East Afrca,” presented at the 2nd Ednboro Unversty of Pennsylvana Conference on Afrcan Studes on “War, Refugees and Envronment n Afrca,” Ednboro Unversty of Pennsylvana, Ere, Pa., USA, (Aprl 3–5, 2003). 7. M. N. Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng and the Prolferaton of Small Arms: The Case of Barago, Samburu Dstrct n the Rft Valley Provnce of Kenya” (unpublshed research report, Mo Unversty, 2000). 8. Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng and the Prolferaton of Small Arms.” See also K. Mkutu and M. Maran, “The Role of Cvc Leaders n the Mtgaton of Cattle Rustlng and Small Arms: The Case of Lakpa and Samburu” (Narob: Afrcan Peace Forum, 2001). 9. These igures are based on estmates from ntervews, observaton, and ofical governments records. There are about ifty rural vllages n each gven local area of admnstraton, such as Kalokol Dvson of Turkana dstrct of Kenya or Lake Stephane dvson of Omo Valley regon n Ethopa. Based on the number of irearms n the hands of vllage vglante groups as revealed by opnon leaders, irearms n the hands of known and suspected raders based on conidental ntervews wth former raders, and irearms ofically gven to home guards n border areas by governments, we estmated that each vllage would have about 200 irearms. There are about ifty admnstratve areas near the Trangle, each wth about ifty rural vllages, whch when multpled by 200 yelds approxmately 500,000 small arms. There are about twenty concentrated (urban) settlements n each of the ifty admnstratve areas, each wth about 600 irearms n the hands of securty forces (polce and the mltary) usually based n these urban outposts, and others n llegal hands, plus those n the hands of the urban vglante groups, whch yelds 600,000. Addtonally, based on our vsts to underground arms markets at Kbsh, Loel, Sololo, etc., and together wth arms that pass through the Trangle n transt to rebel armes n Sudan, Uganda and Ethopa, we estmated that ths source would yeld 300,000, gvng us a grand total of 1.4 mllon. 10. For a revew of the borderlands lterature, see Wllem van Schendel, chapter 1, ths volume. 11. F. A. Adeyoyn, “Methodology of the Mult-dscplnary Problem,” n A. I. Aswaju and P. O. Ademy, eds., Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa (Lagos: Unversty of Lagos Press, 1989), 375. 12. N. Hansen, Border Economy: Regional Development in the Southwest (Austn: Unversty of Texas Press, 1981), 340. 13. O. Akntola-Bello, “The Poltcal Economy of Artical Boundares,” n Borderlands in Africa, ed. Aswaju and Ademy, 331. 14. C. S. Momoh, “A Crtque of Borderland Theores,” n Borderlands in Africa, ed. Aswaju and Ademy, 58. 15. The Ilem Trangle was named after Chef Ilem (Ilemb, Melle, Chambar) of the Anuak, whose vllage was located on the Sudan bank of the Akobo Rver near the juncture of the Rver Ajbur and the Akobo. 16. J. Markaks, Resource Conlict in the Horn of Africa (London and New Delh: Sage Publcatons, 1998), 41.



k en n et h i. si m a l a a n d m au r ice a m u ta bi 17. The sem-ard and ard areas n Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Ethopa make up 70 percent of ther total land area and provde 20 to 30 percent of the gross domestc product of these states, manly through lvestock and lvestock products. 18. Cted n ILRI/ASARECA, “Copng Mechansms and Ther Eficacy n DsasterProne Pastoral Systems of the Greater Horn of Afrca (GHA): Effects and Responses of Pastoralst and Lvestock durng the 1995–97 Drought and the 1997–1998 El Nno Rans” (Narob: ILRI/ASARECA, 1998). 19. The dstrcts nclude Isolo, Marsabt, Garssa, Mandera, Wajr, Barngo, Keyo, Kajado, Lakpa, Marakwet, Narok, Samburu, Turkana, and West Pokot. 20. Government of Kenya (GOK),”Recovery and sustanable development to the year 2000,” Sessonal paper no. 1 (Government of Kenya, Government Prnter: Narob, 1995), 59. 21. For example, Turkana herdsmen would go as far as Kanuk, Isolo, Maralal, and Barngo before they found themselves forced to enter the Trangle wth ther lvestock. Many Karmojong herdsmen also go as far as Sorot and Ktgum n Northern Uganda, but when drought perssts they also end up n the Trangle. 22. Quoted n the Report of the Kenya Land Commsson of 1933, Kenya Natonal Archves (1933–1934), Part II, Chapter 1, p. 185, paragraph 635 and 642. 23. Leklam Sote and Okuan Lupa, ntervew, Kbsh, Ethopa, October 19, 2002. 24. Intervew wth Ewalam Lokolak, ntervew, Loktaung, October 7, 2002. 25. Numbers of “destocked” pastoralsts are found n townshps such as Kaabong and Loyoro n Uganda, Lokchoko, Kbsh, and Todentang n Kenya, Kelem, Mega, and Chelago n Ethopa, and Lutuke, Nagpotpot, Kapoeta, Loel, and Nagchot n Sudan. 26. Musa Ekuro Kalemotha, ntervew, October 29, 2002. 27. I. Lvngston, “The Common Property Problem and Pastoralst Economc Behavour,” Journal of Development Studies 23, no. 1 (1986): 5–19. 28. Fred Ejore, ntervew, Kbsh, February 23, 2003. 29. M. D. Quam, “Creatng Peace n an Armed Socety: Karamoja, Uganda,” African Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1996): 15. 30. Namr-Fuller, “Conlct Management and Moblty among Pastoralsts n Karamoja.” 31. Casper Odeg Awuondo, Life in the Balance: Ecological Sociology of Turkana Nomads (Narob: ACTS, 1990). 32. Tlam Lokwel, ntervew, Loktaung, Turkana, Kenya, January 24, 2003. 33. Cattle-loanng s an ancent practce among pastoralsts where one clan provded seed anmals to a neghborng one for restockng. After herds recovered, an equal number of seed anmals were usually returned to the lender. Ths was carred out between frendly pastoralst groups. Radng was a last resort when such schemes had faled. 34. George Ekdor, ntervew, Kbsh, February 15, 2003. 35. H. Muller, Changing Generations: Dynamics of Generation and Age Sets in Southeastern Sudan (Toposa) and Northeastern Kenya (Turkana) (Searbrucken: Bretenbach Publshers, 1989). 36. Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng among Pastoralsts,” 12, and J. Lamphear, “The Evoluton of Ateker ‘New Model’ Armes: Je and Turkana,” n Ethnicity and Conlict in the Horn of Africa, ed. K. Fuku and J. Markaks (London and Athens, Oho: James Currey and Oho Unversty Press, 1994), 69. 37. U. Almogor, “Rader and Elders: A Confrontaton of Generatons among the



Small Arms, Cattle Radng, and Borderlands Dassanetch,” n Warfare among East African Herders, ed. K. Fuku and D. Turton (Osaka: Senr Ethnologcal Foundaton, Natonal Museum of Ethnology, 1979); Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng among Pastoralsts”; P. Baxter, “Boran Age Sets and Warfare,” n Warfare among East African Herders, ed. Fuku and Turton, 167–186; J. D. Galaty, “Form and Intenton n East Afrcan Strateges of Domnance,” n Dominance, Aggression and War, ed. Dane McGunness (New York: Paragon House, 1987). 38. See Mkutu and Maran, “Role of Cvc Leaders”; Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng and the Prolferaton of Small Arms”; B. Novell, “Aspects of Karmojong Ethno-socology,” Museum Comboninium, no. 44 (Combon Mssonares: Kampala, 1988). 39. Lukuem Emura, ntervew, Lodwar, Kenya, December 15, 2002. 40. Peter Lelak, ntervew, Kbsh, November 29, 2002. 41. Lamphear, “Evoluton of Ateker ‘New Model’ Armes,” 69. 42. O.-L. Dent, “Manhood, Warrorhood and Sex n Eastern Afrca,” n The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa, ed. Al A. Mazru (Leden: E. J. Brll, 1977); Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1988). 43. M. N. Amutab, “Challengng the Orthodoxes: The Role of Ethncty and Regonal Natonalsm n Leadershp and Democracy,” presented at the conference on “Ethncty, Natonalsm and Democracy n Afrca,” May 28–31 (Kercho, UNESCO, 1995); Amutab, “Cattle Rustng among Pastoralsts.” 44. Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng and the Prolferaton of Small Arms.” 45. Ezekel Odaro and Francs Ombacho, ntervew, Kakamega, September 27, 2002. 46. Amutab, “Cattle Rustlng and the Prolferaton of Small Arms”; Belshaw and Malnga, “The Kalashnkov Economes of the Eastern Sahel; K. Mkutu, “Bandtry, Cattle Rustlng, and the Prolferaton of Small Arms: The Case of Lakpa and Samburu,” Arusha report (Narob: Afrcan Peace Forum, 2000). See also S. Murur and W. Mugo, “Thrty Klled n Rads,” Daily Nation, February 9, 2001, 1. 47. Apr Ekuam, ntervew, Kokwo, November 23, 2002. 48. Markaks, Resource Conlict in the Horn of Africa. 49. S. A. Tornay, “More Chances on the Frnge of the State? The Growng Power of the Nyangatom, a Border People of the Lower Omo Valley, Ethopa (1970–1992),” n Conlicts in the Horn of Africa: Human and Ecological Consequences of Warfare, ed. T. Tvedt (Uppsala: Uppsala Unversty, Department of Socal and Economc Geography, 1993), 151. 50. Tornay, “More Chances,” 148. 51. Fred Ejore, ntervew, Kbsh, February 23, 2003. 52. Sengle Fugcha, ntervew, Sololo, Ethopa, December 18, 2002. 53. Amutab, “Lvestock War: Bandtry and Lvestock Rustlng n the Ilem Trangle of East Afrca,” 24. 54. Kath Austn, The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Bonn: Bonn Internatonal Center for Converson [BICC] and Monterey Insttute of Internatonal Studes, June 1996), 35. 55. Quoted n the Sunday Nation, January 12, 2001. The affected vllages were Kltpe, Uran, Lataka, Uran Dda, Badanota, and Kcha on the Kenyan sde of the border wth Ethopa. 56. Includng urban centers such as Nagpotpot, Kaemotha, Kokwo, Kbsh, Lomuru Itae, and Todentang. 57. Fed Bayeswa (Mss), ntervew, Kbsh, January 26, 2003.



Consoldated Bblography



Consoldated Bblography

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Consoldated Bblography Wdgren, Jonas. “Multnatonal Co-operaton to Combat Trafickng n Mgrants and the Role of Internatonal Organsatons.” Paper presented to the 11th IOM Semnar on Internatonal Responses to Trafickng n Mgrants and Safeguardng of Mgrant Rghts, Geneva. October 26–28, 1994. Wllams, Phl. “Transnatonal Organzed Crme and the State.” In The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, edted by R. B. Hall and T. J. Berstecker. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 2003. Wlson, Suzanne, and Marta Zambrano, “Cocane, Commodty Chans, and Drug Poltcs: A Transnatonal Approach.” In Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, edted by Gary Gerefi and Mguel Korzenewtz. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994. Wlson, Thomas M., and Hastngs Donnan, eds. Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1998. Wolf, Erc R. Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: Unversty of Calforna Press, 1982. Wong, Dana. “The Semantcs of Mgraton.” Sojourn 4, no. 2 (1989): 275–285. ———. “The Recrutment of Foregn Labour n Malaysa: From Mgraton System to Guest-worker Regme,” Paper presented at the Conference on Mgrant Workers n Southeast Asa. Needed, Not Wanted, Armdale. December 1–3, 2003. Wong, Dana, and Gusn Saat. “Trafickng of Persons from the Phlppnes nto Malaysa.” Unpublshed report submtted to Unted Natons Interregonal Crme and Justce Research Insttute, 2002. Wong, Dana, and Teuku Afrzal Teuku Anwar. “Migran Gelap: Irregular Mgrants n Malaysa’s Shadow Economy.” In Unauthorized Migration in Southeast Asia, edted by Grazano Battstella and Maruja M. B. Ass. Manla: Scalabrn Mgraton Center, 2003. World Federaton of Damond Bourses and Internatonal Damond Manufacturers Assocaton. Jont Resoluton. Antwerp, July 19, 2000. Zatch, Damán. “Traquetos: Colombans Involved n the Cocane Busness n the Netherlands.” Ph.D. dssertaton, Unversty of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Socal Scence Research, 2001. Znberg, Norman. Drug, Set and Setting. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Unversty Press, 1984. Zolberg, Arstde R. “Matters of State: Theorzng Immgraton Polcy.” In The Handbook of International Migration, edted by Charles Hrschman, Phlp Kasntz, and Josh deWnd, 71–93. New York: Russell Sage Foundaton, 1999. Zorn, Elayne. “Coca, Cash and Cloth n Hghland Bolva: The Chapare and Transformatons n a ‘Tradtonal’ Andean Textle Economy.” In Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality, edted by Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabra, 71–98. New York: State Unversty of New York Press, 1997.



Contrbutors

Contributors Itty Abraham, former program drector for the South Asa and Global Securty and Cooperaton programs at the Socal Scence Research Councl, s now a fellow at the East-West Center, Washngton, D.C. He s author of The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State. Maurice Amutabi s Lecturer at Mo Unversty, Kenya, where he has been teachng snce 1992. He s co-author of Nationalism and Democracy for People-Centred Development in Africa. Paul Gootenberg s Professor of Hstory and Drector of Latn Amercan and Carbbean Studes at Stony Brook Unversty. Hs books nclude Between Silver And Guano; Imagining Development; and the edted volume Cocaine: Global Histories. David Kyle s Assocate Professor of Socology at the Unversty of Calforna, Davs. He s author of Transnational Peasants: Migrations, Networks, and Ethnicity from Andean Ecuador and co-edtor of Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui s Professor at the Unversdad Mayor de San Andrés, Bolva. She s author of Oprimidos pero no vencidos (Oppressed but not Defeated) and Las fronteras de la coca (The fronters of coca) and producer of a vdeo of the same name. Kenneth I. Simala s Senor Lecturer n the Department of Kswahl, Maseno Unversty, Kenya. He has publshed artcles on natonalsm, ethncty, conlct, democracy, development, globalzaton, and poverty. Christina A. Siracusa s Lecturer n Poltcal Scence and Internatonal Relatons at the Unversty of Calforna, Davs. Ian Smillie s an Ottawa-based consultant and wrter. A leader n the campagn to end “conlct damonds,” he has served on a Unted Natons Securty Councl expert panel on ths topc and as Research Coordnator



Contrbutors for Partnershp Afrca Canada. He s a member of the ntergovernmental Kmberley Process, whch created and operates a global damond certicaton system. Among hs books s The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World (wth Larry Mnear). Willem van Schendel s Professor of Modern Asan Hstory at the Unversty of Amsterdam and head of the Asa Department of the Internatonal Insttute of Socal Hstory. Hs publcatons nclude The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia. Diana Wong s a senor fellow at the Insttute of Malaysan and Internatonal Studes (IKMAS) at Unverst Kebangsaan Malaysa n Bang. Her publcatons nclude Peasants in the Making: Malaysia’s Green Revolution; Vom Exil zur Diaspora: Asyl in einer deutschen Stadt; Memory Suppression and Memory Production: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore; and Migran Gelap: Irregular Migrants in Malaysia’s Shadow Economy.



Index

Index Addcton, 116–117, 139, 140 Adds Ababa (Ethopa), 204, 216 Afghanstan, 1, 61, 75, 100n72, 112; borders of, 48, 109 Afrca, 19, 90–91, 206–207; and borders, 204–205; and damonds, 27, 178, 182, 186, 189, 191–192, 196; and mgraton, 13, 75; North, 106; and small arms, 202, 215, 217– 218; sub-Saharan, 103; West, 188–189, 191. See also Ilem Trangle Agency, 28, 41, 117; mgrant, 29–30, 72 AIDS, 221 Alarcon, Faban (Ecuadoran Presdent), 175n34 Alens. See Mgrants al-Qaeda, 112, 191–192 Amharar (Ethopa), 214 Amphetamnes (speed), 107 Anarchy, 20 Andes, 27–28, 128; peasants of, 131–132 Angola, 178, 182, 184–186, 190–193; borders of, 48 Angolan Sellng Corporaton (ASCorp), 190 Anslnger, Harry J., 119 Ant trade, 4, 130, 136 Antwerp (Belgum), 178–180, 182, 187 Anxety, 12, 14–15, 23, 25; male, 74; mass, 115; socal, 117 Anyanya movement. See Sudan Peoples’ Lberaton Movement/Army Aparthed, 181–182 Argentna, 9, 106; borders of, 28, 129, 130, 133, 134–136, 146, 148–149; and coca leaf, 28, 128–132, 135–136, 138–146, 149, 150n8 Armpt smugglers, 4 Arms. See Small arms Arrows, 29, 41–43; and arrow dsease, 43–45 Ashcroft, John (Attorney General), 154 Asa, 19–20; and drugs, 5, 104, 106–107, 112, 119 Asylum, 29, 71, 74–76, 100n72, 154 Australa, 88, 90, 118 Authortes: border, 24, 51, 58, 133, 143–144, 154, 204; colonal, 17, 106 Authorty: colonal, 17, 207–206; competng,

20, 23; global, 4, 17–18; moral, 148; poltcal, 4, 6, 14–15, 19; socal, 19; state, 28, 89, 129; tradtonal, 201, 210–212, 222 Aznar, Jose Mara (Spansh Presdent), 165 Azuay (Ecuador), 159 Baarle (Belgan-Netherlands border cty), 50 Bandtry, 7, 202, 204, 213–214, 218 Bangladesh, 1, 8, 25, 49, 52, 56, 60; borders of, 23, 48, 51, 55; and mgraton, 13–14, 59 Barago (Kenya), 202 Barman, Gokul, 51 Belgum, 27, 90, 219; borders of, 49–50; and damonds, 178, 182–183, 186–191, 198 Berln Wall, 29, 71, 75 Bermuda, 20 bn Laden, Osama, 5, 32 Blood damonds, 27, 177, 184, 192, 196. See also Conlct damonds Bolva, 132, 138, 141, 145, 150n8, 163; borders of, 28, 129, 130, 133, 134–136, 148–149; and coca leaves, 128–129, 131, 142; and drugs, 103, 106, 110, 113 Bolvan Revoluton (1952), 146 Boran people (Ilem Trangle), 210, 218, 221 Border control, 40, 53–54, 69, 71–72, 79, 89–92, 110, 116, 118, 135, 155, 172 Border crossng, 11–12, 23–24, 41, 87, 117, 136; and coca leaf, 143; and culture, 149; experence of, 133–135; unauthorzed, 47, 59, 61–62, 71, 106, 155, 172, 218. See also Mgraton; Smugglng Border crossngs, 14, 52–53; nternatonal, 12, 28, 46; patrollng of, 216–217 Border games, 23, 25 Border studes, 43–45 Border trespass, 30, 72, 89 Borderland, 7, 20, 22, 27, 31, 43, 52, 72, 91, 109–111, 178, 201, 206, 221–222; ctzens of, 49, 54–55, 57, 61, 66n38, 204; deinton of, 23, 28, 204; geography of, 55–57; research value of, 47–49; socetes of, 24–25, 29, 44, 46–47, 49, 53–55, 62 Borders, 19, 23, 29, 89, 142–143; colonal, 205; contested, 14, 41, 63n8, 221; and drugs, 30, 102, 106–110; economc, 172;



Index ixty of, 41, 62n8; functons of, 44, 51–52, 205; nternatonal, 4, 6, 32, 40, 44, 135, 207, 218; meanng of, 24, 45–46, 52, 59, 61, 110, 178; as obstacles, 107; permeablty of, 52–53, 107, 110; poltcal, 90, 172; and scale, 56–57; state, 11, 55–56, 90–91, 101; tes across, 25, 28, 204; and vsblty, 40–41. See also Boundares Borja, Rodrgo (Ecuadoran Presdent), 175n35 Botswana, 180, 187, 190, 198 Boundares, 11, 91, 117; between legal and llegal, 5, 17, 18–19, 23; between publc and prvate, 21; colonal, 204; socal, 16; state/ natonal, 5, 12, 16, 18, 23, 29, 70, 90, 204, 222; symbolc, 118. See also Borders Brazl, 104, 190 Brazzavlle (Republc of Congo), 178, 183, 191 Brbery, 114, 175n34, 183, 218. See also Corrupton Brussels (Belgum), 27, 179 Bucaram, Abdala (Ecuadoran Presdent), 160, 175n34 Buenos Ares (Argentna), 129, 131, 133, 142, 148, 151n18 Bulgara, 180, 219 Burgos, Fausto (author), 132 Burkna Faso, 193 Burma, 25, 48–49, 59, 61 Caffene, 105 Camboda, 193 Campagns: ant-drug, 117–120; ant-mmgraton, 81; whte slavery, 71, 73 Canada, 182, 187, 198 Cañar (Ecuador), 159 Capllary pattern, 52, 54 Captalsm, 8, 15, 20–22, 101, 104; crony, 20; and drugs, 120; neo-lberal, 140 Caracas (Venezuela), 163 Cartels, 111. See also Drug trade Cartography. See Maps Cassnell, Lee, 16–17 Catamarca (Argentna), 131, 141, 142 Cattle. See Lvestock Cattle radng, 28, 201, 207, 213–216, 219– 222; commercalzaton of, 202–203, 217; tradtonal practce of, 202, 211–212, 214 Cayman Islands, 20 Central Afrcan Republc, 180, 190 Central Intellgence Agency (CIA) (Unted States), 88, 105, 112–113



Ceremones, 143–145, 147, 150 Chaparé (Amazonan fronter), 109 Chldren, 218; trafickng of, 73, 77, 80 Chle, 106 Chna, 1, 63n8; borders of, 23; and damonds, 197–198; and drugs, 104, 119 Ctzenshp, 26, 171–172 Cvl dsobedence, 131 Cvl lbertes, 31, 112 Class, 141; mddle, 28, 132, 137–138, 161– 162, 171 Coca leaf, 28, 106–107, 109–110, 113, 119, 131–132, 135–139; classicaton of, 130, 143; Departmental Assocaton of Producers of La Paz (ADEPCOCA), 133, 135, 138; legal status of, 128–130, 142–143; marketng of, 140–141; regulaton of, 141; and rtuals, 143–150; Unted Natons Commsson of Inqury on, 130, 151n17 Coca leaf chewng, 128, 132, 141, 145–146; legal status of, 129–131, 139, 142; publc, 136–140; and workers, 147–148 Coca leaf trade, 27, 130–131, 135–136, 140–141, 143, 150 Coca-Cola, 119, 138, 217, 220 Cocane, 2, 53, 102–103, 105, 107–108, 110, 112, 114–119, 139, 142 Cold War, 4, 75, 111–112, 193, 219; deology, 119 Colomba, 3, 61, 107–110, 114 Colonalsm, 106–107, 207, 209; European, 17, 104, 118, 167; resstance to, 215 Columbus, Chrstopher, 12, 26, 167, 169 Commodtes, 15, 28, 30, 48, 101, 117, 159; drugs as, 102–105, 109; lfe cycle of, 15–16; precous, 185–186 Commodty chan, 15, 17, 92 Commodty studes, 101–102, 105 Communsm, 114 Communty: borderland, 144, 204; mmgrant, 159–160; nternatonal, 12, 21; local, 106; margnalzed, 221; nomadc, 11; pastoralst, 207, 209–210, 212, 217, 222 Conlct damonds, 184–186, 191–196, 198 Conlct, 11, 193, 195–196, 202, 210, 213; armed, 75, 215; border, 56; ethnc, 203, 206 Conlct zones, 15, 217, 219 Consumers: coca leaf, 129, 131, 137, 139; drug, 106; legal rghts of, 142–143 Consumpton, 15, 48, 164; coca leaf, 27–28, 130–132, 137, 140, 143; drug, 18; ndvdualzed, 137, 139–140; qat, 16–17

Index Control, 24, 32, 51; border, see Border control; dscourse of, 101, 115–118, 120–122; drug, see Drug control; mmgraton, 170, 172; poltcal, 113; populaton, 89, 153; state, 13–14, 23, 40, 59, 191, 204; strateges of, 7, 91, 102. See also Self-control Córdoba (Argentna), 131, 142 Corrupton, 8, 21, 157, 162–163, 182–183, 192; and drugs, 114–115; state, 164, 166– 167, 175n34 Côte d’Ivore, 188, 190 Coyotes (human smugglers), 2, 47–48, 53, 159 Crack, 103–104, 107, 112, 119 Crack babes, 112–113 Crme, 7, 29, 108; and corporatons, 51; deintons of, 18–19; global, 25, 30–32; nternatonal, 3–4, 6; organzed, see Organzed crme; transnatonal, 1, 15, 80, 154; vctmless, 26, 158 Crmnal, 3, 6, 17–18, 30–31, 71. See also Illct; Illegal Crmnalty, 24–25, 156 Crmnalzaton, 71, 118, 170 Crses, 172; economc, 160, 163; refugee, 77, 91 Croata, 9 Cuba, 20 Culture, 148, 168, 209; Andean, 128, 139, 144–150, 151n28; borderland, 109, 145, 204; cattle-rustlng, 212; pastoralst, 202. See also Drug culture Currency: bullets as, 28, 217; and damonds, 186; hard, 157, 182, 185, 191. See also Money Customs, 14, 186, 188 De Beers, 27, 180–182, 185, 193–194, 197. See also Damond ndustry de Soto, Hernando, 121 Deaths, mgrant, 154–155, 158 Debswana (Botswanan damond company), 180 Debt, 83–84, 87, 158, 162, 168–169; state, 166 Demand, 84; coca leaf, 131; consumer, 60; damond, 181; drug, 111; mmgrant, 24; labor, 169–170 Democratc Republc of Congo (DRC), 219; borders of, 48; and damonds, 182–183, 185–186, 190, 192, 199 Demonology, 119–121 Deterrtoralzaton, 28, 39, 58

Development, 161, 163, 171; alternatve, 121; borderland, 204, 208; polces for, 28, 207, 209 Damond ndustry, 27, 180–181, 183–186, 192–193, 196–199; ndependent montorng of, 184, 194–199; regulaton of, 178, 194, 198 Damond trade, 178–182, 188–189, 197; llct, 27, 177, 184–186, 190–192, 195, 198; lcensng for, 178, 183; regulaton of, 182–184, 186–187, 194–196, 199; statstcs on, 187–189, 191, 194, 199 Damonds, 15, 27, 107, 184–186, 192–194; launderng of, 184, 190–191, 198; mnng of, 27, 178–179, 181–182; orgns of, 187; study of, 177; supply of, 182, 190; transport of, 186; value of, 180. See also Conlct damonds; De Beers; Damond ndustry; Damond trade; Producton, damond Dplomacy, 184; narco-, 113 Dscourse, 6, 9, 29, 46, 115; cartographc, 42; ctzenshp, 26; drug, 111, 117, 119–121; and lows, 40–41, 59; legtmzng, 26, 172–173; medcal, 116; mgrant, 154, 171; popular, 157; publc, 81; regulatory, 116; state, 23, 26, 30, 60, 72, 101; trafickng, see Trafickng dscourse; whte slavery, 72–73. See also Control, dscourse of Dsease, 4, 116, 178; lvestock, 202, 211 Documents: false, 77, 83, 85–86, 96, 141; dentty, 85, 90–91, 133–135, 159; legal, 167–170. See also Legal status; Passports Dollarzaton, 164, 175n35 Double-funnel pattern, 51, 54 Drought, 201, 203, 206–207, 209–211, 220 Drug control, 109–113, 117–120, 122 Drug culture, 109, 117–119 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (Unted States), 102, 107, 112 Drug lords, 107, 109. See also Escobar, Pablo Drug trade, 102–103, 107, 109–112, 114; colonal, 119; proits of, 2, 61 Drug use, 116–117, 119–120 Drugs, 15, 18, 30, 53, 101–104, 110, 115–118, 121–122; cost of, 84; and medcne, 105– 106, 116, 119; regulaton of, 108–109, 119; synthetc, 105, 108; Unted Natons Sngle Conventon on, 108, 119, 129; value of, 107, 112, 120. See also Drug control; Drug trade; Producton, drug; War, and drugs Duba (Unted Arab Emrates), 180, 188, 191 Duran Ballen, Sxto (Ecuadoran Presdent), 175n35



Index East Afrcan Protectorate. See Kenya East Harlem (Unted States), 103 Economy, 2, 16, 162; borderless, 23; coca leaf, 141; drug, 103, 114; Ecuadoran, 163–164; mgrant, 82, 85; pastoralst, 206, 210; poltcal, 29, 103, 111; Spansh, 169 Ecstasy, 102, 108 Ecuador, 9, 26, 158–165, 168–171, 173 Eltes, 137; Bolvan, 139, 145; and crme, 162; provncal, 131–132; state, 26, 23, 54–55, 58, 61 Embargoes, 9, 15. See also Sanctons Emgraton. See Mgraton Enforcement, 58, 108–110; law, 4, 9, 17–18, 79, 143, 158 Enslavement, 118, 154, 158. See also Slavery Entrepreneurs, 61, 102; mltary, 7, 28 Escobar, Pablo, 114 Ethopa, 28, 100n72, 151n15, 201–203, 205–207, 209–210, 216–217, 219–220; borders of, 202, 206, 215, 218; and Italans, 214–215; and qat, 16; and refugees, 221 Ethopa Peoples’ Republc Democratc Front (EPRDF), 216 Europe, 12, 167, 170; borders of, 74; conscousness of, 75; and damonds, 185; and drugs, 110, 112, 116, 119; Eastern, 103, 170, 219; and mgrants, 161 European Unon, 69, 75–76, 88, 100n72, 165, 186; and mgrants, 81 Explotaton, 26, 79; border, 135; colonal, 165 Exportng, 27, 196; damond, 186, 187–191, 199

Gem Defensve Program, 197 Genocde, 219 Geography, 3, 55–57, 107–109 German Democratc Republc (GDR), 53 Germany, 1, 17, 75, 191; borders of, 48, 53–54 Ghana, 190 Global Wtness (Brtsh non-governmental organzaton), 184, 193 Globalzaton, 2–4, 29, 39, 46, 62, 103, 157, 162; dark sde of, 69, 71 Golden Crescent, 109 Golden Trangle, 109 Government. See States Great Brtan, 1, 18, 72, 118–119; and damonds, 186, 190–191 Guatemala, 109 Guerrlla groups, 114 Gunea, 182, 189, 190 Guns. See Small arms Gutérrez, Zacarías, 145, 149

Femnsts, 74 Frearms. See Small arms Florda, 53 Flows, 26, 62, 69; and borders, 49, 51–55, 59– 61, 62n5, 79; crmnal, 4; drug, 101–109, 113, 115, 120–122; llegal/llct, 4, 28–29, 39–43, 48, 58, 60–61; metaphor of, 29; study of, 39, 46–49, 122; transnatonal, 5, 25, 48 France, 13, 22 Freetown (Serra Leone), 178–179 Freud, Sgmund, 105, 111 Fujmor-Montesnos, Alberto (Peruvan leader), 115

Identty, 22; borderland, 32, 65n25; conceptual, 71; natonal, 209; papers, see Documents, dentty; personal, 91; regonal, 128, 131–132, 145, 150; state, 14 Ilem Trangle (Afrca), 28, 201–208, 210, 213–222 Illegal, 4–6, 18–20, 22, 26, 30–31, 62n5, 177, 182. See also Illct Illegal alens. See Mgrants Illegalty, 4, 16, 17, 27; chans of, 15 Illct, 5, 15, 18–21, 26, 62n5, 92, 120, 191; deinton of, 8, 23, 101, 177. See also Illegal Illctness, 9, 25–28, 30, 71, 129; deinng, 7, 23–25, 30 Images, 4, 9, 29–40, 59, 120, 139; of borders, 60; commodty chan, 15; of crme, 6; of drugs, 113, 118; of llegal trade, 1–3;

G88 Heads of Government, 195 Gamba, 179, 189, 190 Gatekeeper state, 54, 55, 66n43

0

Hale Selasse I (Ethopan Emperor), 214 Hamar people (Ethopa), 206 Hashsh, 106 Heron, 1, 48, 102–103, 105, 107–108, 112, 121, 179 Holland, 108 Hong Kong, 190–191, 198 Hourglass pattern. See Double-funnel pattern Huallaga Valley, 109, 113, 115 Human smugglng. See Smugglng, human Human trafickng. See Trafickng, human

Index and meda, see Meda; of mgraton, 89; popular, 48 Immgrants. See Mgrants Immgraton, 14; Afrcan, 169; llegal, 29, 53, 59–60, 68n63, 74, 76–77, 80, 88, 165, 170; and legslaton, 154; Malaysan, 81–82. See also Law, mmgraton; Mgraton Immgraton ndustry, 86–88 Imperalsm, 104. See also Colonalsm Importng, 27, 51, 196; coca leaf, 128–130, 150n5; damond, 183, 186, 187–191 Inda, 1, 5, 22, 49, 52, 55–56, 60, 63n8, 104; borders of, 14, 23, 48, 55; and damonds, 178–180, 191, 198; and mgraton, 13–14, 59 Indo Kng, 135, 145–149 Indonesa, 6, 85 Interdcton, 24, 59–60, 62, drug, 30, 53, 65n25, 103, 107. See also Interventon Intergovernmental Commttee for European Mgraton. See Internatonal Organzaton for Mgraton Internatonal Court of Justce (ICJ), 18, 36n51 Internatonal Crmnal Court, 17 Internatonal Damond Industres (IDI), 183 Internatonal Damond Manufacturers Assocaton, 195 Internatonal Monetary Fund (IMF), 78, 114, 157, 163–164, 166, 171, 173 Internatonal Organzaton for Mgraton (IOM), 74–77, 79–80 Internatonal Polce Organzaton, 88 Internatonal relatons, 5, 10, 33n15 INTERPOL, 102, 109 Interventon, 21, 178, 218; colonal, 207; state, 59, 70 Iran, 1, 75 Isolo (Kenya), 203 Israel, 179–180, 185–186, 190–191, 198 Italy, 77, 214–215 Jakarta (Indonesa), 1 Jamaca, 108 Japan, 1, 14, 181 Jara, Oscar (Ecuadoran wrter), 171 Jersey (Channel Island), 20 Jujuy (Argentna), 130–131, 136, 138, 140–145 Justce, 171; socal, 62 Kabla, Laurent (DRC Presdent), 183, 192 Kampala (Uganda), 204, 216

Karamoja regon (Uganda), 203, 216, 217 Karask, Gabrela, 145–146, 149 Karmojong people (Uganda), 202, 206, 209–210, 212, 214, 216 Kashmr, 52, 56, 63n8 Kenya, 28, 201–203, 205–210, 212, 215–217, 219, 220; borders of, 202, 206, 215, 218; and qat, 16–17 Khald¯un, Ibn, 11 Khan, A. Q. (Pakstan metallurgst), 5 Khartoum (Sudan), 204 Kbak, Mwa (Kenyan presdent), 220 Kbsh (Kenya), 216, 220–221 Kmberley (South Afrca), 193 Kmberley Process, 27, 184, 192–199; Certicaton Scheme (KPCS), 187, 196 Knshasa (Democratc Republc of Congo), 178 Knowledge, 10, 106, 209, 213, 217 Kolkata (Inda), 48 Kuala Lumpur (Malaysa), 85–86, 96 Laa Paz (Bolva), 130, 131, 137, 141, 144 La Quaca (Argentna), 129–130, 133–136, 143–144, 145, 148 Labor, 24, 26, 149, 172, 167; cost of, 158–159; exportaton of, 156–157; mportaton of, 75, 160; moblty of, see Moblty, labor. See also Demand, labor; Mgrant labor; Mgrants, labor Labuan (Malaysa), 83–84, 95 Land, 13–14, 207–210, 213 Language, 18, 29, 32, 70, 121, 204, 209, 213; of analyss, 122; constructon of, 30; control over, 101; globalzaton, 162, 165; law enforcement, 9; statstcal, 10 Laos, 24, 52 Latn Amerca, 26, 103, 118, 160–161, 163 Law, 8, 13–14, 19, 21, 23, 28, 31, 73, 129, 170; crmnal, 157; mmgraton, 26, 154–155, 157, 161, 165–167; nternatonal, 17–18; publc, 20; state, 7. See also Enforcement, law Lawbreakng, 14–15, 21–22, 129, 153–154, 161, 167; forms of, 31; mmgraton, 157–159, 172 League of Natons, 12 Lebanon, 109, 132, 178 Lefebvre, Henr, 23 Legal, 4–6, 18–21, 31. See also Illegal Legal status, 8; mgrant, 30, 75, 85, 87–89, 91, 96, 153, 158, 160–161, 166–167,



Index 169–173, 176n64. See also Coca leaf, legal status of Legalty, 4, 9, 17, 31; boundares of, 23 Ley de Extranjería (Spansh mmgraton law), 165–166, 171 Lbera, 20, 27, 178–179, 187–190 Lbya, 1, 5 Lct, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29. See also Illct Lctness, 23, 31; deinng, 8, 25, 27 Lvestock, 202, 206, 209, 211–213, 220; demand for, 201, 203, 214; theft of, see Cattle radng London (Great Brtan), 117 Lorca accdent (Span), 165–167 Lord’s Resstance Army (LRA) (Uganda), 203 Los Mercenaros (Devl’s Dance group), 145, 149 LSD, 102, 105 Maia, 2, 115; and Pax Maiosa, 51; state as, 164 Mahuad, Jaml (Ecuadoran Presdent), 160, 163–164, 175n34, 175n35 Malaysa, 29–30, 70, 72, 81–83, 85–88, 91, 93–96 Manzanlla, Juan Carlos (Ecuadoran spokesman), 169–170 Maps: cogntve, 55–57; of llegal lows, 41–43; poltcal, 59 Marjuana, 18, 102–103, 107–108, 118–119; medcal, 120 Market, 1, 3, 136, 141, 163; black, 1, 22, 24, 107; border, 48, 56; coca leaf, 130, 139– 140, 143, 151n15; damond, 179–182; drug, 110, 114; global, 70, 161; labor, 85–88, 165; small arms, 49, 203–204, 217 Marx, Karl, 2 Mayor, Jame (Spansh Mnster of Interor), 167–168 Mbembe, Achlle, 11, 90–91 Meda, 1–2, 22, 69, 81; and coca leaf, 143, 130; and damonds, 196; and drugs, 118; and smugglng, 154–155; and trafickng, 77–78. See also Campagns; Images Memory stes, 49–50, 65n25 Menem, Carlos (Argentnean Presdent), 9 Mercenares, 214 Merlle regon (Ethopa), 206; people of, 202, 206, 216 Methamphetamnes, 102 Mexco, 155, 172; borders of, 24, 47–48, 53, 65n25, 66nn35,44, 103, 111; and drugs,



108–109, 114–115, 121; and mgrants, 13–14, 161 Mgrant labor, 85, 165, 170, 172. See also Mgrants, labor Mgrant-exportng schemes, 36n57, 155–161, 165, 167–168, 170–172 Mgrants, 70–71, 86, 133, 156–157, 159; agency of, 72, 87; control over, 153; dangers to, 158; experences of, 135, 163, 165–166; dscourse on, 81, 171–173; female, see Women, mgrant; llegal, 24, 74–75, 86–88, 96, 97n17, 157; labor, 26, 81, 83, 128, 130, 132, 141, 148, 154, 166–168, 172, 175n48 (see also Demand, labor); legal status of, see Legal status, mgrant; nternatonal, 26, 29, 81, 138, 151n18; 165–166, 169; perspectves of, 82, 155, 157, 161–162, 164–167, 169–173; rtuals of, 144–145; as vctms, see Vctms, mgrants as. See also Agency, mgrant; Smugglng, human Mgraton, 9, 71, 85–86, 157, 208, 210; commodicaton of, 167; control over, 29, 69; costs of, 160; crmnalzaton of, 89; dstress, 91; female, 73–74; forced, 12, 221; llegal, 14, 30, 72, 81, 89, 155–156, 161; nternatonal, 12–13, 73, 159–160, 171; labor, 26, 60; mass, 29, 70, 159, 161, 164; patterns of, 154; rsks of, 158, 171; safe, 78. See also Movement, populaton Mgraton ndustry, 172 Mgraton merchants, 158, 167. See also Coyotes; Snakeheads; Wolves Mgraton servces, 155–158, 172. See also Mgrant-exportng schemes Mgraton theory, 12–13 Mltarzaton, 203 Moblty, 11, 13, 23–25; control over, 26, 83–84, 171; labor, 70; socal, 156, 172 Mobuto Sese Seko (Congolese dctator), 183, 192 Moeller, Henz (Ecuadoran Mnster of Foregn Affars), 169–170 Mo, Danel Arap (Kenyan Presdent), 202, 220 Money, 210, 212; drug, 114, 191; launderng of, 3, 15, 20, 182, 184–186, 191, 198. See also Currency Monrova, 180 Moral panc, 100n72, 112, 118 Mores, socal, 5, 12, 15, 19–20 Morphne, 117 Movement, 11–13, 29, 42–43, 59; ant-state,

Index 216; cross-border, 24–25, 70, 219; poltcal, 23; populaton, 89, 91, 218; and regulaton, 14, 16; socal, 15, 32. See also Moblty Myanmar, 23 Mychew (Ethopa), 214 Mythology, 121, 146–147 Narob, 204, 216 Namba, 187, 190, 198 Narcotcs. See Drugs Naton. See States Nepal, 1, 13, 48 Netherlands, 18, 75; borders of, 49–50 Networks, 5, 8, 48, 103, 113, 182; communcaton, 220; corrupt, 167; crmnal, 3–4, 23, 25, 154; drug, 106, 120–121; nformal, 87; smugglng, 53, 118, 159; socal, 156, 159, 161; terror, 32, 191–192; trade, 130 New York Cty (Unted States), 159, 186 Nxon, Rchard, 108, 112 Noboa, Gustavo (Ecuadoran Presdent), 163–164, 175n34 Non-governmental organzatons (NGOs), 27, 77, 81, 120–121, 161, 219–220; and damonds, 178, 184, 193–194, 196, 198–199; women’s, 74, 69 North Amercan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 66n44, 103 Nuclear Non-Prolferaton Treaty (NPT), 5 Nyangatom people (Ethopa), 202, 206, 216 Omo Valley (Ethopa), 206 Operaton Gatekeeper, 52 Operaton Intercept, 108 Opum, 1, 106, 110, 116, 118–119 Organzaton, models of, 51–52; modes of, 38–39 Organzatons, 54; crmnal, 156, 159; humantaran, 219; terrorst, 23; trafickng, 110. See also Non-governmental organzatons Organzed crme, 2–4, 29–30, 40, 74, 77, 89, 100n61, 154, 158, 172, 191; transnatonal, 30, 72, 78–79, 88, 92; Unted Natons Conference on, 2; Unted Natons Venna Conventon aganst, 70, 72, 78 Orgns, country of, 187–189, 190–191 Oromo Lberaton Front (OLF) (Ethopa), 203 Oromo people (Ilem Trangle), 210, 214 Pachamama (Earth Mother), 143–145, 149–150

Pakstan, 1, 22, 100n72; borders of, 14, 48, 109 Panama, 9, 20, 108, 110 Partnershp Afrca Canada (Canadan NGO), 184, 187, 193 Passports, 83, 90, 110, 134, 169. See also Documents, dentty Pastoralsts, 28, 201–202, 206–210, 220–221 Peru, 9, 119, 135; and drugs, 103, 106, 109– 110, 113–115, 121; and war, 160 Phlppnes, 82–83, 93–95, 156 Pokot dstrct (Kenya), 203, 216; people of, 202–203, 213 Poland, 170 Polce. See Authortes, border Polces: colonal, 207; economc, 163; development, 74, 222; drug, 111, 114–115, 120–121; foregn, 154; guest worker, 75, 81; publc, 21, 69; state, 14, 162, 207–210 Polcng, 109, 206. See also Enforcement, law Poppes, 106, 112 Portugal, 77, 191–192 Power, 27, 57, 59, 92, 201, 214 Practces, 23–24; border, 29, 49, 55, 59; busness, 3; cultural, 27–28, 129, 149, 213; hrng, 168; llegal/llct, 1–2, 7; socal, 13, 15; state, 24, 56; tradtonal, 207, 214 Prces, 220; coca leaf, 129, 137, 141–142; damond, 180; drug, 107; market, 179; small arms, 217 Prvatzaton, 208–209, 213 Producton, 48, 208; damond, 180, 182–183, 185, 187, 190, 193; drug, 108–110, 113 Prohbton, 118; of coca chewng, 129–131; drug, 111 Prosttutes, 118; mages of, 72–73 Prosttuton, 29, 48, 70–74, 77, 221; chld, 73. See also Whte slavery Provenance. See Orgns, country of Publc health, 116 Publc opnon, 73 Qat (kat) leaf, 16–17, 151n15 Quaaludes, 102 Race, 112, 118, 135 Racsm, 113, 132 Reagan, Nancy, 117 Reagan-Bush regmes, 112, 119 Realty, 172; socal, 11, 153, 157; spatal, 54, 56, 65n27 Rebels, 27, 184, 201, 203, 218



Index Recrutment, 83–85, 88, 93–95 Refugee zones, 112, 109 Refugees, 12, 20, 77, 207–208, 219–221 Regulaton, 20, 24, 178; communal, 201; cost of, 197; regmes of, 16, 28, 119; state, 53–54, 56, 59, 112, 106. See also Coca leaf, regulaton of; Damond ndustry, regulaton of; Damond trade, regulaton of; Drugs, regulaton of; Enforcement; Interdcton; Interventon Remttances, mgrant, 26, 60, 84, 157, 159, 161, 171–172 Repatraton, 168–170 Represson, 110, 113. See also Interdcton; Regulaton Republc of Congo, 183, 190, 199 Resources, 201, 208–210, 213, 220 Reterrtoralzaton, 46, 61–62, 91 Revolutonary Unted Front (RUF) (Serra Leone), 179–180, 192–193 Rhetorc, 29, 102, 121, 158; and drugs, 105, 115, 122 Rghts: cvl, 168; consttutonal, 164; human, 9, 78, 89, 92, 170; mmgraton, 157; property, 213 Roma (gypses), 12 Romana, 170 Rosaro (Argentna), 131 Rumnahu (Ecuadoran mgrant assocaton), 170 Russa, 1, 21, 22; and damonds, 187, 191, 197–199 Rwanda, 192 Sabah (Malaysan state), 82–84, 88, 94–95 Salta (Argentna), 130–132, 135–136, 138– 143, 145 Samburu dstrct (Kenya), 202, 203, 216, 218 Sanctons, 184, 193. See also Embargoes Saud Araba, 13 Scalar structuraton, 54–55, 58, 61–62 Scale (spatal representaton), 6, 61; global, 27; jumpng, 57, 67n55; natonal, 55–56; poltcs of, 29, 49, 56, 57–58, 65n27; regulatory, 17; types of, 56–57 Scott, James, 91, 115, 153 Secrecy, 10, 181–182, 186, 191, 197 Securtzaton, 23 Securty: arport, 219; avaton, 197; human, 4, 92; natonal, 10, 13, 29, 41, 53; state, 167; threats to, 119 Securty forces, 7, 202–203. See also Authortes, border



Self-control, 116–117 Sex work, 30, 97n17. See also Vce ndustry Shangha Conventon, 118 Serra Leone: and damonds, 27, 178, 181– 182, 184–186, 188, 190, 192, 199, 199n1; as faled state, 21 Sngapore, 14 Slavery, 1, 70, 158; sex, 74. See also Enslavement; Whte slavery Small arms, 15, 28, 61, 201–202, 207, 209– 214, 220; as currency, 217; dealers of, 3; manufacture of, 48, 215; movement of, 49, 203, 216–219; prolferaton of, 215–218, 222; trade n, 2, 9, 203–204, 216; Unted Natons Conference on, 9. See also Cattle radng; Conlct; Smugglng, small arms Smth, Adam, 70 Smugglers, 3, 158; damond, 178; drug, 65n25; and meda, 154–155; memoral to, 49, 50; professonal, 156; small arms, 55, 218 Smugglng, 1, 9, 25, 57; coca leaf, 141; deinton of, 71–72, 79–80, 87; damond, 27, 178, 182–186, 190–191; drug, 53, 107–108; and fees, 156–157; human, 47, 70, 76, 78–82, 85, 92, 155–156, 159–161, 172–173; lvestock, 219; professonal, 53; small arms, 215, 217–219. See also Armpt smugglers; Coyotes; Snakeheads; Trafickng; Wolves Snakeheads (human smugglers), 1, 2, 47–48, 64n21 Socal scence, 5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 30, 38–39, 43, 58 Socal scentsts, 38, 46, 47, 54 Socal status, 128, 132 Somala, 151n15, 203, 218–219, 221; borders of, 215; and qat, 16–17 Soto, Hernando de, 121 South Afrca, 181, 187, 190, 193, 198 Soveregnty, 23, 25, 59; poltcal, 32, 172; poltcs of, 72; state, 12, 21, 40–41, 71, 89–91, 157, 172, 197, 204. See also Terrtoralty Sovet Unon, 75, 182, 219. See also Russa Space: crmnal, 31; poltcal, 19; regulatory, 15–16; socal, 45; thrd, 22 Span, 22, 26, 159, 160–166, 168–170; borders of, 47 Spatalty, 45–46, 57 States, 4, 6–11, 24, 27, 29–32, 40, 52–55, 57, 62, 71, 91–92, 111, 153; actons of, 60–61, 155; borders of, see Borders, state; corrupt, see Corrupton, state; damond-producng, 181; dscourse of, see Dscourse, state;

Index modern, 3, 5, 10, 13–16, 23, 25, 30, 32, 38–39, 59, 89; faled, 20–21, 39, 110, 159, 160–161, 164, 184; fath n, 164; nterests of, 2, 5, 113, 154–155, 170, 208; nature of, 109–110; oficals, 25; predatory, 7–8, 159, 161, 162, 167, 182–183; soveregnty of, see Soveregnty, state; structure of, 8, 58, 170; terrtoral, 38–39, 43, 49 (see also Terrtory, state); as unt of socal analyss, 5–6, 13–15, 38–39, 58–59, 92; Westphalan, 13, 58–59, 89–90. See also Boundares, state/ natonal; Control, state; Gatekeeper state; Strateges, state; Survellance, state Statstcs, 2, 10, 76, 80, 121 Stmulants, 106, 132, 104. See also Caffene; Coca leaf; Drugs Strateges: mmgraton, 154; mgrant, 159–161, 172 (see also Mgrant-exportng schemes); pastoralst, 210; state, 58, 156–157, 170; terrtoralty, 45–46. See also Control, strateges of Substances: controlled, 101; llegal/llct, 18, 105, 116–118. See also Drugs Sudan, 28, 100n72, 180, 201–203, 205, 207, 209, 216, 219, 220; borders of, 206, 215 Sudan Peoples’ Lberaton Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 203, 209, 215–216, 219 Suguta Valley (Kenya), 202 Survellance, 24, 54, 106; border, 53, 108; state, 3, 59, 202; technques of, 91 Swtzerland, 186, 188, 190–191 Symbols: borders as, 40–41; coca chewng as, 132, 139–140; and drugs, 118; relgous, 22. See also Images Taikong (mgraton broker), 86–87, 96 Talban, 1, 112 Tanzana, 182 Taxaton, 60, 130, 208; and damonds, 178– 179, 182–183, 186; and drugs, 104, 114; evason of, 184–186, 191, 198 Taylor, Charles (Lberan warlord), 192 Terrtoralsm: methodologcal, 39, 43, 58; natonal, 11 Terrtoralty, 11, 46, 49; forms of, 55, 57, 92; state, 45, 55, 57–59, 61 Terrtory, 13, 27; state, 14, 38–39, 43–44, 204 Terrorsm, 3, 32, 114 Terrorsts, 5, 8, 23, 191–192 Thaland, 1, 81, 97n8, 198; borders of, 24, 48, 52 Theft, 182, 186, 190–191 Tmber, 192–193

Tobacco, 104 Togo, 193 Toposa regon (Sudan), 206; people of, 202, 206, 209, 216 Toursm, 160; sex, 74 Trade, 24, 58, 150; llegal/llct, 2–3, 8–9, 28, 107, 192, 198; nternatonal, 122; lberalzaton of, 103; monopoles on, 197; organzaton of, 55. See also Ant trade; Coca leaf trade; Damond trade; Drug trade Tradtons: nvented, 145, 148, 150; cultural, 212; Andean, 137 Trafic (ilm), 111, 115, 120 Trafickers, 2–3, 23, 29, 30, 76, 154, 193. See also Smugglers Trafickng, 1–2, 74, 81; arms, 202 (see also Small arms); deinton of, 9, 30, 70, 72, 79–80, 87; human, 29, 69, 77, 88, 155 (see also Smugglng, human; Women, traficked); as metaphor, 71, 76–77, 82; Unted Natons Protocol on, 99n55; Unted States Vctms Protecton Act, 78, 154. See also Trafickng dscourse; Whte slavery Trafickng dscourse, 69–76, 78–81, 89, 92 Transgresson, 14, 29; border, 76; boundares as, 70 Transnatonalty, 49, 55 Transparency Internatonal, 163 Tucumán (Argentna), 130, 131, 141, 145 Turkana regon (Kenya), 217; people of, 202–203, 206, 212–214, 218, 220 Turkey, 75 Uganda, 28, 192, 201–203, 205, 207, 209, 212, 216, 220; borders of, 206, 215 Ukrane, 180 Underground, 22, 31 Underworld, 2, 7, 20 UNITA (Angolan rebel movement), 185, 192, 193, 219 Unted Arab Emrates (UAE), 190–191 Unted Natons (UN), 69, 79, 98n34, 109, 184; agences of, 77–78, 80 (see also Unted Natons Hgh Command for Refugees); conventons of, 17, 28, 70, 72, 78, 81–82, 87, 108, 119; General Assembly, 78, 185, 195 Unted Natons Hgh Command for Refugees (UNHCR), 12, 76, 77, 100n72, 219, 220 Unted Natons Securty Councl (UNSC), 185, 187, 193, 196; resolutons of, 185, 192; Sanctons Commttee of, 184, 193



Index Unted States (U.S.), 31, 60, 72–73, 78–79; and asylum, 75–76; borders of, 24, 47–48, 53, 65n25, 66nn35,44, 103, 110–111; Coast Guard, 161; Congress, 69; Department of Justce, 80; and damonds, 178, 186–187, 190–191, 196; and drugs, 108–116, 118–120; General Accountng Ofice, 192, 196; and law, 18; and mgraton, 1, 13–14, 160–161, 168; and trafickng, 88 Uranum, 51 Urban legends, 112–113 Venezuela, 9 Vce ndustry, 81, 82–84, 87, 93–95 Vctms, 27, 29–30, 76, 208, 215, 221; accdent, 165; drug, 117–118; mgrants as, 87, 89, 154, 167, 170–171; whte slavery, 72–73 Venna process. See Organzed crme, Unted Natons Venna Conventon Aganst Vllazón (Bolva), 129–130, 133–136, 144–145 Volence, 14, 16, 21, 28, 57, 132, 151n18, 201–202, 209–210, 221–222; and drugs, 121–122; escalaton of, 203, 213; nternatonal, 4; legtmate, 13 Wages, 86, 161, 165, 168, 170 War, 183, 191, 199, 211; of attrton, 204; cvl, 188, 192, 217; border, 160; and damonds, 184, 192–193; and drugs, 30, 107, 109, 111–114, 119–120, 122; nterethnc, 202; Italo-Ethopan, 214; lmtatons on, 211; opum, 104; and terror, 31. See also Cold War; Conlct zones War crmes, 17 War zone, 202



Warlords, 204, 217 Weapons, 27, 180, 184, 191, 201, 215; nuclear, 18. See also Small arms West Bengal (Inda), 55, 68n63 Whte slavery, 71–73 Wolf, Erc, 38 Wolves (human smugglers), 47 Women, 218; Coalton of Trafickng Aganst (CATW), 77; and coca chewng, 138–140, 143; Global Allance Aganst Trafic n (GAATW), 77; mgrant, 29, 73, 85, 96, 161; traficked, 30, 74, 77–78, 80–84, 93–95 Work permts, 168–169, 175n48. See also Documents, legal Workers, 106; foregn, 75, 86, 97n8; mne, 145–149; undocumented, 14, 155, 165– 166. See also Mgrants, labor; Polces, guest worker World Bank, 78, 163, 173 World Damond Councl, 194–195 World Food Program, 219 World Trade Organzaton (WTO), 194–195, 197 World Vson, 220 Yemen, 5, 13, 16, 18–19, 151n15 Yerba-mate, 107 Youth, 118, 214 Yugoslava, 75 Yungas regon (Bolva), 131, 137–138 Zare. are. See Democratc Republc of Congo Zmbabwe, 192 Zolberg, Arstde, 13

tracking globalization Illct Flows and Crmnal Thngs: States, Borders, and the Other Sde of Globalzaton Edited by Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham