History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms 9811525714, 9789811525711

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Yueqing Wang Qinggang Bao Guoxing Guan

History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms Translated by Shuchen Xiang

History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms

Yueqing Wang Qinggang Bao Guoxing Guan •

•

History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms

123

Yueqing Wang Nanjing, China

Qinggang Bao Nanjing, China

Guoxing Guan Nanjing, China Translated by Shuchen Xiang Peking University Beijing, China

ISBN 978-981-15-2571-1 ISBN 978-981-15-2572-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8

(eBook)

Jointly published with Nanjing University Press The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Nanjing University Press. © Nanjing University Press 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

The key terms of Chinese philosophy are central to the vast spiritual system of Chinese philosophy. In arranging the key terms of Chinese philosophy, one is, in effect, investigating the foundational concepts of Chinese philosophy. Philosophical concepts are both the distillations of theoretical thought as well as the foundational elements of philosophical thought and the history of philosophy. Understanding the key terms of Chinese philosophy is a useful aid in understanding the cultural, historical and unique natures of Chinese philosophy. It is a useful aid in understanding the unique modes of thought and vocabularies of traditional Chinese culture and so contributes to the dialogue between Chinese culture and global civilizations and helps realise the turn to modernity. In the long stream of its historical development, Chinese philosophy formed many concepts which constitute the nerve-centre of the Chinese philosophical system. The logical progress of Chinese philosophy is concentrated in and manifested by the appearance and development of a series of philosophical terms. In this process, the one-dimensional content of philosophical terms was gradually enriched so that philosophical thought evolved from their simple beginnings to a certain systematicity. On the one hand, philosophers relied on a series of specific philosophical terms to elucidate their thought and to construct their philosophical systems, so that understanding these terms is a prerequisite to understanding their thought and philosophical system. On the other hand, philosophical terms are dynamic and changing. In different periods, at the hands of different philosophers, the same philosophical terms are endowed with different or even antithetical meanings. The development of philosophical terms simultaneously makes clear the development of philosophy. As such, understanding and grasping the historical development of Chinese philosophical terms is a key means of understanding and grasping the development of Chinese philosophy. Carrying out an in-depth analysis of the important concepts and terms of Chinese philosophy is a key way of bringing to light the uniqueness of Chinese philosophy. It is also an essential path for bringing to light the internal developmental logic and objective pattern of Chinese philosophical thought.

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Foreword

Apart from possessing some universal characteristics that are common to all philosophical concepts, Chinese philosophical concepts possess their own unique characteristics. First, each Chinese philosophical concept has undergone a process of engendering, development and evolution. As such, it is necessary to understand the dynamic history of each concept’s engendering, development and evolution. Next, each Chinese philosophical concept has multidimensional meanings. At the hands of different philosophical schools and different philosophers, each term can have different and even antithetical meanings. As such, in order to understand and grasp the development and systematic pattern of its development, it is not only necessary to understand the content, origins and developmental process of key concepts, it is also necessary to bring to light the different definitions that different schools have endowed them with. It is only in this way that one can bring to light the unique natures of Chinese philosophical thought. Finally, Chinese philosophical concepts often have cosmogonic, root-body, epistemology, ethical, self-cultivation, methodological contents. As such, the investigation into Chinese philosophical concepts touch upon many domains, and so their contents must be brought to light from many different perspectives. Previous scholars have paid attention to and investigated Chinese philosophical concepts and provided many pioneering and invaluable inroads. The most important of these publications include, Study in the History of Chinese Philosophy (中国 哲学史研究), Explanation of the Ideas Behind Key Concepts in the History of Chinese Philosophy (中国哲学史主要范畴概念简释), the edited volume of the first national conference on Chinese philosophical concepts, Collection on Chinese Philosophical Concepts (中国哲学范畴集), Ge Rongjin’s (葛荣晋) History of Chinese Philosophical Concepts (中国哲学范畴史), Zhang Dainian’s (张岱年) Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy (中国古典哲学概念范畴要论). These works have all touched upon dozens of the main concepts in Chinese philosophy and have had a groundbreaking significance for the study of Chinese philosophical concepts. In recent years, key works in the field include Zhang Liwen’s (张立文), The Developmental History of Chinese Philosophical Concepts (中国哲学范畴发 展史) (This includes section on metaphysics (天道) and ethics (人道)), as well as his edited collection, Series on Chinese philosophical Concepts (中国哲学范畴精 粹丛书). The former combines history with philosophy to provide an overview of the majority of key concepts in the history of Chinese philosophy. The latter provides a more detailed and systematic discussion on concepts such as dao, li, qi, heart-mind and human nature in traditional Chinese philosophy. Apart from this, Ge Rongjin’s History of Chinese Philosophical Concepts is also a work of high scholarly value. This work studies in great detail 28 key concepts in Chinese philosophy and provides a substantial elaboration on their historical origins and development. The above-mentioned works provided a more detailed elaboration on Chinese philosophical concepts and so further deepened the study of Chinese philosophical concepts. In referencing and drawing lessons from the fruits of the works of the above-mentioned predecessors, the present work seeks to provide an even more comprehensive editing and study of the key concepts of Chinese philosophy. To

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this end, the present work has chosen 37 keywords from the history of Chinese philosophy as its subject matter. In content, it encompasses discourses on cosmology, root-body, human nature, self-cultivation, methodology, the state of one’s cultivation (境界论), historical outlook and political outlook. The work is both comprehensive in content as well as innovative in its perspective; in all, it embodies the key thematic content of Chinese philosophy and shows their essential characteristics. Methodologically, a genealogical account of these concepts is provided, so that a clear picture emerges of their historical lines of evolution. At the same time, to highlight the unique contents of these philosophies, thematic comparisons are provided. In combining the genealogical and comparative accounts, timely and insightful comparisons with Western philosophy are also employed so as to bring forth the original and multidimensional meanings of these terms. In this way, the richness and cultural specificity of Chinese philosophy is highlighted, Chinese philosophy is presented in its own natural habitat and, as such, the irreplaceable nature of the Chinese way of thought is made evident. In presenting each key term, the present work has attempted to be both scholarly, as well as readable for a broad audience. It hopes to aid the lay reader in understanding Chinese philosophical thought; at the same time, this work acts as a reference tool for professionals. This work was first initiated through Wang Yueqing’s (王月清) research project. Wang Yueqing, Bao Qinggang (暴庆刚) and Guan Guoqing (管国兴) were responsible for determining the specific entries. Bao Qinggang, Zhong Hailian (钟海连), Zhao Dinghua (赵锭华), Geng Jiajin (耿加进), Zhang Yisheng (张义生), Xue Jiangmou (薛江谋), Li Xinxin (李欣欣), Fan Wenli (范文丽) of the Department of Philosophy, Nanjing University have all participated in the writing of this book. Work on the initial draft was undertaken by Wang Yueqing, Bao Qinggang and Guan Guoxing. The authors of this work hope that the publication of this work will help advance the study of Chinese philosophical concepts. Finally, as the authors are cognisant of the limitations in their knowledge, they humbly hope that readers will provide enlightening criticisms in the cases of inaccuracies, insufficiencies or misunderstandings, which the present work will surely contains. Nanjing, China

Yueqing Wang

Contents

1

Way (Dao, 道) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

Charismatic Power (de, 德) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3

The Heavens (tian, 天) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

4

Mandate (ming, 命) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

5

Heart-Mind (xin, 心) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

6

Natural Tendencies (Xing, 性) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

7

Human Disposition (qing, 情) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

8

Sincerity (cheng, 诚) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

9

Trustworthiness (xin, 信) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

10 Humaneness (ren, 仁) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 11 Ritual Propriety (li, 礼) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 12 Filial Piety (xiao, 孝) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 13 Coherence (li, 理) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 14 Vital Energy (qi, 气) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 15 Being and Non-being (youwu, 有无) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 16 Yin and Yang (yinyang, 阴阳) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 17 The Five Phases (wuxing, 五行) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 18 The Great Ultimate (taiji, 太极) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 19 Self-so (ziran, 自然) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 20 Above Physical Form and Below Physical Form xingershang xingerxia, (形而上形而下) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

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Contents

21 One and Two (yiliang, 一两) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 22 Movement and Stillness (dongjing, 动静) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 23 Constancy and Change (changbian, 常变) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 24 Change and Transformation (bianhua, 变化) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 25 Root and Branch (benmo, 本末) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 26 Name and Corresponding Object (mingshi, 名实) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 27 Public and Private (gongsi, 公私) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 28 Righteousness and Profit (yili, 义利) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 29 Principle and Desire (liyu, 理欲) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 30 King and Hegemon (wangba, 王霸) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 31 Moral Knowing (liangzhi, 良知) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 32 Sage (shengren, 圣人) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 33 Exemplary Person (junzi, 君子) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 34 Equilibrium and Commonality (zhongyong, 中庸) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 35 Unfettered and Effortless (xiaoyao, 逍遥) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 36 Language and Meaning (yanyi, 言意) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 37 Harmony and Sameness (hetong, 和同) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 Translator’s Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

Key to Titles

Han Arguments Weighed 论衡 Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion 白虎通 Examination for Promoting the Worthy 贤良对策 The Decision: Hooking the Mandate 钩命决 Wei-Jin Disquisition on understanding Zhuangzi 达庄论 General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou 周易略例 Treatise on Human Character 人物志 Tang Expanded Collection of the Propagation and Clarification [of Buddhism] 广弘明集 Lotus Sutra 法华经 Returning to Human Nature 复性书 Sub-commentary to the Zhuangzi 庄子疏 The Rectified Interpretation of the Book of Changes 周易正义 Vimalakirti Sutra 维摩 Song-Ming An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate 太极图说 Annotations of the Book of Changes by the Cheng brothers 周易程氏传 Cautious Words 慎言 Cheng’s Furthered Interpretations of the Book of Changes 程氏易传 Commentary on An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate太极图说解 Correcting Youthful Ignorance 正蒙 Hengqu Discussions on the Book of Change 横渠易说 Inquiries on the Great Learning 大学问 Knowledge Painfully Acquired 困知记 xi

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Key to Titles

Refined Discussions 雅述 Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers 二程遗书 The Correct Meaning of Terms 北溪字义 The Surviving Works of the Chengs of Henan 河南程氏遗书 Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection 朱文公文集 Qing An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius 孟子字义疏 证 Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance 张子正蒙注 Inner Commentary on the Book of Changes 周易内传 Records of Thinking and Questioning 思问录 Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books 读四书大全 说 Records of Master Zhang 张子语录 Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes 周易外传 The Well-ordered Cave of the Science of the Classics (经学理窟)

Chapter 1

Way (Dao, 道)

“Dao” is an important concept in traditional Chinese philosophy. The three main branches of traditional Chinese philosophy—Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism—have all provided this term with rich exposition and developed their own unique and systematic discourses on it. Dao is not only an important element in the intellectual infrastructure of traditional Chinese thought, it also embodies its worldview and values. As a principal feature of the vocabulary of traditional Chinese philosophy, it has profoundly affected aspects of traditional cultural and intellectual life, such as religion, literature, art, as well as practical aspects of worldly affairs such as politics, self-cultivation, as well military affairs.

1.1 One Etymologically, “Dao” was understood as an unobstructed way or path without byways. By the end of the Western Zhou dynasty (1046–771 BCE) and the beginning of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE), however, the term had already departed from its original meaning, displaying more extensive ramifications, as it progressed towards an abstract philosophical concept. We can see this evolution in the Book of Odes. Although the “dao” used in this text seems superficially to reference a roadway, it is actually being used analogically. To take the further example of the Book of Documents, the use of “dao” here has the sense of governmental decree, norms and standards, and has been infused with tones of moral judgment such as “preferring or hating,” “uprightness” as well as “laws.” These uses of dao are all records of an important stage in dao’s evolution towards an abstract meaning. During the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 BCE), the “Sixth Year of Lord Huan” chapter of the Zuo Tradition records the saying that, I have heard that a small state can resist a big state because the small state has dao whereas the big state is debauched. The dao concerned is being loyal to the common people and trusting in the spirits. © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_1

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The “Fourth Year of Lord Zhuang” records that, the privileges and emoluments of the king is exhausted. If the privileges and emoluments are too abundant then there will be unrest. This is the way [dao] of the world.

The dao used in these examples has the sense of pattern and order, indicating its gradual development towards a more abstract meaning. Similarly, according to the records of “Eighteenth Year of Lord Zhao,” a politician named Zichan from the state of Zheng proposed that “the dao of the heavens is far, the dao of humans is close, as the two are unrelated, how can the dao of humans be known through the dao of the heavens?” Zichan analogized the order underlying the sun, moon and stars as the heavenly dao, and the order which applies to the human world as the human dao, thereby clearly separating the heavenly and human dao. This had a profound influence on philosophers of the Pre-Qin period. For example, as recorded in the “Discourse of Yue, part two” chapter of the Discourses of the States (国语), a statesman Fan Li from the state of Yue proposed that the way (dao) of combat should follow the dao of the heavens. The use of dao as “dao of the heavens” occurs on nine occasions in the Zuo Tradition and on seven occasion in the Discourse of the States. In the latter, furthermore, the “dao of the heavens” is juxtaposed with the “dao of humans” in order to emphasize that, for a propitious outcome, the human dao should be in accord with the heavenly dao. These historical sources indicate that by the Spring and Autumn period, “dao” was already extensively used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning had far exceeded the confines of “roadway,” having already evolved into an abstract philosophical concept.

1.2 Two 1. The Dao of Laozi and Zhuangzi The discourse on dao of the Daoist school as represented by Laozi is an intellectual high point in traditional Chinese philosophy. It had a profound effect on the development of the conceptual and intellectual systems of many Pre-Qin schools, for example Confucianism and Buddhism. The Laozi discourse on dao has the following dimensions. a. The Various Meanings of Dao (1) Dao as the original source of the myriad things. The Daodejing Chap. 25 says: There was something undefined and complete, coming into existence before the heavens and earth. How still it was and formless, standing alone, and undergoing no change, reaching everywhere and in no danger (of being exhausted)! It may be regarded as the Mother of all things. I do not know its name, and I give it the designation of dao. Forced to give it a name I call it great.1 1 Translator

note: Throughout the translation, I have relied on James Legge’s translation of the Daodejing (with modifications), unless otherwise stated.

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In Laozi’s opinion, the original source of all things has three characteristics. First, it is shapeless and formless, second, it is without beginning or end and third, it cannot be known through the senses. How then, does this shapeless, formless, timeless, space-less dao produce the concrete objects of space-time? Laozi says in Chap. 42, dao gives rise to one, one gives rise to two, two gives rise to three, and three gives rise to the myriad things. The myriad things carry yin on its back and hold yang in its arms, the vital energy blends these harmoniously together.

There has long been conflicting interpretations among the scholarly community with regard to this passage. Some think that Laozi is explaining the relationship between dao and the myriad things from the perspective of cosmogony, whilst others think that Laozi is positing that dao is the original source of all things from the perspective of root-body (benti, 本体). The relationship between “one” and “dao” has been particularly contentious throughout history. Regardless of how we interpret it, in Laozi’s philosophy, dao has risen from an average philosophical concept to the most elevated position in the universe, becoming the producer and decision-maker of all things. This is doubtlessly a paramount contribution on Laozi’s part to traditional Chinese philosophy. (2) Dao is the pattern inherent in the development of things and phenomena. As was previously mentioned, the use of “dao” in its evolved sense of pattern and order had already appeared before Laozi, and so it no invention or innovation or Laozi’s part. Laozi’s contribution lay instead in his doctrine that it is through a “return” or a “return to their roots” by which the myriad things in the universe (including social phenomena), operate. Laozi’s idea is that the myriad things in the cosmos all respect one order, and that although things increasingly depart from their original state as they develop, they will all ultimately return to this original state. Laozi uses the term “enduring” (chang, 常) to describe the order and regularity that is characteristic of the eternal, universal and unchanging nature of dao. He, furthermore, reminds the reader that dao is inescapable like “fate” (ming, 命); it is ever present, and the myriad things all exist because of it, and rely it in order to return to their original states. It is only through recognising, respecting and acting in accordance with dao that we truly understand the myriad things (including social phenomena), and thereby accrue benefit to ourselves; this is called “understanding what is enduring is called wisdom” (知常曰明). (3) Dao is the law of human society. The most striking characteristic of the Laozian discourse on dao is that it does not provide a precise definition of dao, but rather, in describing its uses and manifestations, sheds light on what it is from different experiential perspectives and contexts. For example, Laozi often explains dao from the perspective of governance, military affairs, self-cultivation and personal conduct in society, and thereby demonstrates how dao is the order which a well-functioning society should respect. With respect to the dao of governance, Laozi is opposed to the use of sophisticated policies and instead champions letting the common people be without knowledge and desires. With

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regard to military affairs, Laozi is of the opinion that military conflict is inauspicious; one only employs the military when left with no other choice. One must, furthermore, “advance calmly and without enthusiasm and not glorify victory.” With regard to the dao of self-cultivation, Laozi champions purifying the heartmind and having few desires and stopping when one knows one has reached capacity, as it is in this way that one can endure. As for the dao of personal conduct in society, Laozi puts particular emphasis on the term “yielding” (rou, 柔) and uses the analogy of water to describe it. In Chap. 78 he says: there is nothing in the world suppler than water, but there is nothing more powerful than in attacking the unyielding and the strong, as there is nothing that can change it.

The key here is that yieldingness and non-competitiveness is the nature of dao: “Water is good at benefitting the myriad things but does not vie for anything. It resides in places that the common lot disdain, thus, it is closest to dao.” Generally speaking, through mundane examples of how dao manifests itself in society and daily life, Laozi allows us to better understand what precisely dao is. Conversely, Laozi is explaining that the functioning of society necessarily follows dao. Dao is thus intimately bound up with the existence of every being, as well as the harmonious development of the whole of society; and as such Laozi’s discourse on dao is neither abstract nor abstruse. 2. The Intellectual Style of the Laozian Dao Discourse The intellectual style which the Laozian discourse on dao presents is a highly abstract, dialectical mode of thought. It transcends the primitive modes of thought of early humankind and tends in a more sophisticated direction. According to the French anthropologist and philosopher Lévy-Bruhl, the most characteristic feature of primitive thought is that it is mystical and prelogical. Under this worldview, no purely natural phenomena exist, instead everything has a mystical nature. Furthermore, it is prelogical, it shows a complete disregard for the most basic law of logic—the law of contradiction. Concerned only with the mystical relationship between phenomena and events, it can equate or connect two completely unrelated things, and then become swayed by the ambiguous relationship it sees. Thus, in primitive cultures, a person can be a person but can also be a bird, fish amongst other things. The Laozian discourse on dao displays a dialectical mode of thought which, whilst imbuing dao with a materiality and spirituality, does not literally consider dao to be a concrete object or spirit. In Zhu Xi’s terms, dao is the original source of the world that “does not have form but has coherence/order [li, 理].” From the opening chapter, Laozi makes clear that dao cannot be specifically pointed to with human language, thus he says the “dao which can be spoken, is not the real dao.” In Chap. 14, he further repeatedly stresses that dao is the a “shapeless shape and a formless form” but following that, in Chap. 21 says that, “within it objects are present,” “within it forms are present,” “within it forces are present.” In uniting the “formless” with “objects are present,” Laozi’s style of thinking eliminates the supernatural nature of dao, and so is a classic case of dialectical thinking.

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Here, Laozi’s discourse on dao also points out that opposites such as grand-small, being-nonbeing, difficulty-easiness, high-low complement and mutual transformation into each other. For example, Laozi considers “big” as characteristic of dao but also points out that “small” is also characteristic of dao. Laozi also says in Chap. 2 that “being and nonbeing grow out of each other, difficulty and easiness complete one another, high and low determine one another, sound and tone harmonise with one another, front and back follow one another.” From this we can see that the Laozian discourse on dao is full of dialectical thinking, but events and phenomena are still all ultimately united in dao. 3. The New Development of Zhuangzi’s Dao Discourse By employing dialectical reasoning, Laozi rarefied dao into the source of the myriad things, into the order that underlies the development of things and society, and thereby founded a highly sophisticated source for traditional Chinese philosophy. Zhuangzi both inherited and developed Laozi’s discourse. From the perspective of inheritance, Zhuangzi follows Laozi in considering dao as the original source (which is beyond perceptual experience) of the myriad things of the cosmos. In the chapter “The Great and Honoured Teacher” he said that, dao has a realness and reliability to it, but no activity or shape. It can be transmitted but not received, attained but not shown. It is its own root and its own foundation, even if the heavens and the earth were not there, it would exist firmly. It makes the spirits and the Lord-on-High divine, generates the heavens and the earth. It is above the ultimate peak without being high, it is below the six extremities without being deep. It precedes the heavens and earth without being enduring. It is older than pre-history without being old.2

In terms of development, if the Laozian dao contains the material nature of things, then Zhuangzi tends to emphasize its non-material nature, pointing out that whilst objects are limited, dao is limitless. Thus, this kind of transcending dao resists containment in specific objects and phenomena. We see this in the chapter “Knowing Rambling in the North,” which borrows the voice of “No-Beginning” to say that, “Dao cannot be heard, whatever heard is not it. Dao cannot be seen, what can be seen is no it. Dao cannot be spoken, what is spoken is not it.” It further borrows the voice of Confucius to say, “Was that which was produced before the heavens and earth a thing? That which made things was not itself a thing.” It is precisely because dao transcends all specific things and phenomena that Zhuangzi espouses an attitude of equanimity towards the myriad things, life and death. In the chapter “Equalizing Assessments of Things,” for example, he says, with reference to people, who are a part of dao, “the heavens and earth were born with me, the myriad things are one with me.” Similarly, in the chapter “Nourishing the Master of Life,” he says, “When it came to time to arrive, the master did just what the time required. When it was time to depart, he followed the flow.” For Zhuangzi, the myriad things as well as life and death are all equal and this is what distinguishes the Zhuangzian from the Laozian discourse on dao. 2 Translator

note: Throughout the translation, I have relied on James Legge’s translation of the Zhuangzi (with modifications), unless otherwise stated.

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4. The Dao of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism During the Wei-Jin period (220–420 BCE), philosophers including He Yan, Wang Bi, Pei Wei, Guo Xiang, with the aim synthesizing Confucianism and Daoism, made a series of commentaries on the Daodejing, Zhuangzi, Analects, Book of Changes, and thereby formed a new philosophical movement—Neo-Daoism. There are three main strands to the discourse of dao in Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism of the myriad things 1. Discourse on Valuing Non-Being: Explaining “Dao” with “Non-Being” Those who maintained this view were He Yan and Wang Bi. He Yan said Beings depend on non-being in coming into existence, in becoming what they are. Affairs on account of non-being come to fruition and become what they are. Now, one tries to speak about non-being, but no words could describe it; name it, but it has no name; look at it, but it does not have any form; listen to it, but it does not give any sound. Then, indeed, it is clear that dao is complete. (Discourse on Dao cited in “Heaven’s Gift” Zhang Zhan’s Commentary to the Liezi)

Wang Bi also says, Dao is an appellation for non-being. There is nothing which is not penetrated, and there is nothing for which it is not the basis [of its existence]. At the same time one [has to] say dao is calm in its insubstantiability and it is impossible to make an image of it. (“Shu Er”, Resolving Problems in Interpreting the Analects)

What Wang Bi is saying here is that all things and phenomena rely upon dao for their existence, but dao has no name, no form, no image or body, thus dao is “non-being.” Wang Bi thinks that this formless, nameless “non-being” transcends anything that has a form within the realm of “being.” It can encompass everything, and only it can become the master which unifies the myriad things: “that which is free from form and nameless is the progenitor of the myriad things.”3 (Chap. 14, Commentary on the Daodejing). This is because in names, there will be distinction, in forms, there will be limits. One may enlarge their size to the utmost, but there is sure to be something they do not encompass. One may make them as praiseworthy as possible, but there are sure to be those who cause calamity and distress. If success depends on making such conscious effort, how is that worth engaging in?4 (Chap. 38, Commentary on the Daodejing)

that this school championed non-being as the root and being as the branches and led to their discourse being called Discourse on Valuing Non-Being. 2. Discourse on Esteeming Being: Explaining “Dao” with “Being” The person who maintained this view was Pei Wei. Pei Wei believed that the ultimate origin of the myriad things was not “non-being” but “being” and that dao referred to the totality of the universe. Pei Wei points out that the Discourse on Valuing NonBeing had taken Laozi to mean that non-being is the master. For Pei Wei, however, 3 Lynn (1999: 73). Throughout this translation, I have used Richard John Lynn’s work on Wang Bi’s

commentaries on the Daodejing. (1999: 124), modified.

4 Lynn

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although Laozi used the vocabulary of non-being, his intention was actually in talking about the fullness of being. In proposing the tenet of the “tranquil oneness of nonpurposive action” (无为静一) Laozi’s intention was in allowing people to be at peace with themselves. It would thus be a misinterpretation to understand him as indicating that the ultimate order is mastered by non-being. As the myriad things are “being” and not “non-being,” then where and what is the origin of being? Pei Wei believes that it is borne from itself: As for absolute non-being, non-being cannot give rise to being, thus the beginning of things gave rise to itself. Giving arise to itself must necessarily have being as its body [体]. If there was anything incomplete in being then arising could not take place. Giving rise to things has being as its nature, and empty non-being is the so-called incompleteness in being. (Discourse on Esteeming Being)

Evidently, Pei Wei takes “being” as the original source of the myriad things, this is in direct opposition to Discourse on Valuing Non-Being, thus it has been called Discourse on Esteeming Being. 3. The Discourse of Self-transforming: Explaining “Dao” with “Self-so” and “Selftransforming” The person who maintained this view was Guo Xiang. In contrast to He Yan and Wang Bi who both used non-being to explain dao and Pei Wei who uses being to explain dao, Guo Xiang proposed the discourse of self-so and self-transformation. Guo Xiang believed that both non-being and being cannot give rise to being; the myriad things therefore gave rise to themselves and became so of itself, are the way they are due to their own self-soing, and so is also called self-transforming. In other words, the production of the myriad things does not rely on any external source, it produces itself, becomes a system on its own, is own cause without any external conditions or reasons. Accordingly, one can say that Guo Xiang’s discourse of selfsoing and self-transforming effaces the idea that dao is the original source of the myriad things. Guo Xiang says, for example, As for the creator, is he existent, or is he non-existent? If he is nonexistent, how can he create things? If he is existent, having a definite form himself, then he is not qualified to form all forms. Thus only after you understand that all forms form themselves can you understand what is meant by creation. Hence of all things involved in the realm of existence, even the penumbra, there has never been one that did not transform itself entirely on its own, constantly positioned in the realm where all agency vanishes. Thus creation is without lord or master, and each thing creates itself.5 (Commentary on Equalising Assessments of Things)

Guo Xiang believes that, precisely because non-being and being is not the original source behind the production of the myriad things, the so-called “ultimate dao” is the “ultimate non-being.” Analyzed more closely, “ultimate non-being,” in reality, is “self-so,” “not having something that makes it so.” He says,

5 Ziporyn

(2015: 402).

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What is that which precedes things? I take yin and yang to precede things, yet yin and yang is just what we call things. What precedes yin and yang? I take self-so as prior to it, yet self-so is just things being itself. I take the ultimate dao as prior to it, but ultimate dao is just ultimate non-being. If we take non-being, then what is prior to things? But as there are ceaselessly new things being created, we understand that things are just self-so, that there wasn’t anything making it so. (Commentary on Knowing Journeyed North)

From the relationship of “being” and “non-being” (that is, the relationship between the phenomenal and the world of root-body), Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism provided a new interpretation of “dao.” This new discourse broke new ground in Chinese philosophy, which heretofore was framed in cosmogonic terms. Compared with pre-Qin and Han cosmology, it is far more sophisticated philosophically and would come to have a profound impact on the innovations of Neo-Confucianism.

1.3 Three The philosophical structure of religious Daoism mainly revolves around commentaries on Laozi’s Daodejing and Zhuangzi’s Zhuangzi. For both religious Daoism and Daoist philosophy, therefore, dao is a central concept. The philosophy of religious Daoism finds its origins in the Pre-Qin Daoist school, and during its development absorbed influences from, amongst others, the Buddhist school of philosophy, the Confucian school of philosophy, and the Yinyang school, and displayed theoretical tendencies throughout history. 1. The Deification of the “Dao” in Xiang’er Commentary to the Laozi The “Dao of the Five Pecks of Rice” founded by Zhang Lingchuang is one of the two early schools of religious Daoism, which mainly flourished among the lower strata of society and transmitted the Xiang’er Commentary to the Laozi. The Xiang’er Commentary to the Laozi considered “dao” as an anthropomorphised deity—The Grand Supreme Elderly Lord (太上老君)—believing that “dao” has a human personality, intentions, and although without any perceptual traces, is however the omnipresent, all-encompassing and master of all things; there is nothing greater than it. The Xiang’er Commentaries also proposed the concepts of “the vital energy [qi] of dao” (道气) “the essence of dao” (道精)“the spirit of dao” (道神).When dao is dissolved from its form, this is “the vital energy [qi] of dao.” Since essence originates in vital (qi), this is called “the essence of dao.” As there is a great numinous spirit within dao, and this is the “spirit of dao.” Thus, “the vital energy [qi] of dao,” “the essence of dao” and “the spirit of dao” are but different manifestations of dao. They are the root of the myriad things (including humankind), and they are also the means by which humans become gods. As we can see, for the author of the Xiang’er Commentary to the Laozi, dao is an anthropomorphized god. By the period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties, following this line of thought, dao evolved into the revered three pure lords: the Celestial Venerable of the Primordial Beginning (元始天尊), the

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Grand Supreme Elderly Lord (太上老君), and the Lord of the Numinous Treasure (灵宝天). 2. The Classic of Great Peace: Using “Principle Vital Energy [qi]” to Explain “Dao,” the Philosophy of the “Principal Vital Energy [qi]” as the vehicle of Dao The Classic of Great Peace is an important text of the “Dao of Great Peace school” of Daoism (founded by Zhang Jiaochuang), which was one of the two main schools of early Daoism. For this school, principal vital energy (yuanqi, 元气) is the original source in the production of the myriad things, and dao is the order and regularity which controls the change and transformation of principal vital energy. Principal vital energy relies upon dao to give birth to the myriad things, and so it is dao that is the ultimate root and origin of all change and transformation. Without dao, principal vital energy would not be able to give birth to the myriad things. Of course, because the Classic of Great Peace was not authored by a single person, its explications of “dao” contains various meanings, for example the dao of order, the dao of different arts and techniques (方术), the dao of the mutual connectedness of the heavens, earth, and man (三合相通), the dao of self-cultivation, the dao of governance. 3. The Dao of the school of Double Mystery What is unique in the religious school of Double Mystery’s (of the Sui-Tang period) interpretation of the Laozi is that it interpreted dao as “formlessly connected with subtle order” (虚通妙理). This is an important characteristic of the school of Double Mystery of the Tang Dynasty. In saying that “utmost dao is formlessly connected” what is meant is that, on the one hand, dao is not confined to any specific name or concept or any specific space-time, and on the other hand, it is connected with all things without obstruction. This dao of “formless connection” is the root of all creation and transformation, the origin of the heavens and earth. As we have said, for this school, Dao is not only formlessly connected but is also a subtle order. In using “order” (li, 理) to explain dao, the scholars of the Double Mystery provided an innovative exposition of the essential meaning of dao. The person who gave fullest exposition to this topic is was Li Rong. On many occasions in his Laozi Commentaries he used the concept “order” (li, 理) to explain the Laozian dao. As Li Rong sees it, dao, as root-body, is the “order [li, 理] of the formless ultimate” (虚极之理) this “order” cannot be delimited or ascertained through concepts such as above and below, being and non-being. It is the most mysterious of the mysterious, the most formless of the formless, without shape or form, without shadow or trace, yet encompasses the myriad forms and gives birth to the myriad species. The school of Double Mystery interpreted dao as the order of the root-body of the universe, and thereby inspired Neo-Confucianism to take “order” (li, 理) as the key concept of its intellectual system.

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1.4 Four In the philosophical system of Confucianism, “dao” operates under a different rubric to, and has different implications from, those of religious and philosophical Daoism. If religious and philosophical Daoism explains and is formulated through cosmological paradigms (including cosmogony and ontology) and uses this vocabulary to explore the relationship between dao and the myriad things (including people), then the dao of Confucian discourse uses dao as an ethical paradigm to explore the relationship between dao and people. Analyzed more closely, we can see that the Confucian discourse on dao has three courses of development. First, that of Confucius, Mencius and the Doctrine of the Mean. Second, that of the Book of Changes and its attendant developments. Third, the creative synthesis of the above two in Neo-Confucianism. A brief summary of each will be provided below. 1. The Discourse on Dao from Confucius to Mencius a. Confucius’s Dao of humaneness Dao is an important element of Confucius’s thinking; as an indication of its importance, the word “dao” occurs around one hundred times throughout the Analects. In Analects 7.6 Confucius described his lifelong ideal as “Setting one’s heart upon the way [dao], relying upon virtue, leaning upon goodness, and wandering in the arts.” Confucius also said, “Having heard in the morning that the way [dao] is put into practice, I could die that evening without regret.” These examples serve to show the importance Confucius attached to the search for dao. Confucius expounded at length on “dao,” but as a philosophic paradigm, the content of Confucius’s dao is humaneness, as such, his dao is the dao of humaneness (rendao, 仁道). The concept of “humaneness” (ren, 仁) occurs extensively in the Analects. Although Confucius did not give “humanness” an explicit definition, he expounds at length upon the content of humaneness in different contexts and from different perspectives. In Analects 12.1, for example we see that, Yan Hui asked about humaneness and the Master replied, “Restraining yourself and returning to the rites constitutes humaneness. If you can subdue yourself for one day and return to the rites, in this way you could lead the entire world back to humaneness. The key to realizing humaneness lies within yourself, how could it come from others?”6

In another example, Analects 12.2, we read that, Zhong Gong asked about humaneness and the Master replied ‘When in public, comport yourself as if you were receiving an important guest, and in your management of the common people, behave as if you were responsible for a great sacrifice. What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose onto others. In this way, you will encounter no resentment in your public or private life.’

Similarly, In Analects 12.22 we read “Fan Chi asked about humaneness and the Master replied, ‘love people.” From all these examples it can be seen that the content 6 Translator

note: Throughout the translation, I have relied on James Legge’s translation of the Analects (with modifications), unless otherwise stated.

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of Confucius’s dao, as defined by humaneness, is disclosed through the reification of interpersonal ethical norms. It can be said, therefore, that humaneness is the inner direction of many different ethical norms. Conversely, it can be said that ethical norms such as righteousness, rites, wisdom, trustworthiness, bravery, loyalty and sympathetic understanding and other concrete manifestations of moral norms are the different materializations of humaneness. As compared with Laozi’s discourse on dao, Confucius rarely talks about cosmology, Confucius’s dao of humaneness is instead founded upon and developed through socio-ethical values. b. Mencius’s Dao of Humaneness Mencius inherited the idea of humanness as dao, we can see this in Mencius 7B16,7 “Humaneness is simply being human. The way [dao] is simply to harmonize with humaneness and put it into words.” As distinguished from Confucius’s seldom pronouncements on human nature and fate, Mencius did expound upon the logical relationship between humane (dao) and human nature, the heavens and fate (ming, 命). In so doing he happened upon the central issue of Neo-Confucianism: the relationship between human nature, the order or coherence of the world, and fate. In 7A1, for example, Mencius said, To fully fathom one’s heart-mind is to understand one’s nature. To understand one’s nature is to understand the heavens. To preserve one’s heart-mind and nourish one’s nature is the means to serve the heavens. To not become conflicted over the length of one’s life but to cultivate oneself whilst awaiting one’s fate is the way to take one’s stand on fate.8

From the Mencian point of view, fully fathoming one’s heart-mind, understanding one’s nature and understanding the heavens, belong in the same logical category. Thus, to fully fathom one’s heart-mind is to understand one’s nature; and to understand one’s nature is to understand the heavens. Mencius further explicitly states that the dao of humaneness is naturally endowed in everybody and one can obtain it as long as one desires it for oneself. Mencius 7A4 tells us: All things are there in us. There is no greater joy than, on self-examination, to discover sincerity. Nothing will get one closer to humaneness than forcing oneself to practice sympathetic understanding.

Mencius’s exposition on the relationship between the dao of humaneness, human nature, the heavens and fate, laid the foundations for the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers. This is what distinguishes Mencius from Confucius and is also what Mencius contributed to the development of the dao of humaneness. c. The Dao of the Doctrine of the Mean The discourse on dao as found in the Doctrine of the Mean has three aspects. First, human nature is the embodiment of dao. The opening chapter says as much, 7 Translator

note: I have followed Irene Bloom’s numbering system. note: Throughout the translation, I have relied on James Legge’s translation of the Mencius (with modifications), unless otherwise stated.

8 Translator

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What the heavens command is called human nature; drawing out human nature is called the way [dao]; improving upon this way [dao] is called education. With regard to this way [dao], we cannot abandon it for even an instant. Were it even possible to quit it, it would not be the way [dao].

What this is saying that dao is not all that abstract, that it is in fact inextricably bound with human beings; it is nothing else other the our naturally endowed natures. It is for this reason that Zhu Xi says that the nature of the heavens’ command is the embodiment of dao. Second, it perceives the “equilibrium and harmony” as the functioning of dao. The Doctrine of the Means says, The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure have not yet arisen is called equilibrium; once the emotions have arisen, but they are to their due degree this is called harmony. This equilibrium is the great root of all in the world. Harmony is the advancing of the proper way [dao]. When equilibrium and harmony are fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world.9

The Doctrine of the Mean uses the equilibrium of that which has not yet arisen and the harmony of that which has already arisen to distinguish between the fact that dao exists and the ways that dao manifests itself. Third, is the idea that it is through sincerity that one fully realizes dao. The Doctrine of the Mean proposes that it is through sincerity that one abides by dao in one’s daily life. Only those of utmost sincerity in the world are able to make the most of their human nature. Only if one is able to make the most of one’s own human nature is one able to make the most of the natures of other peoples. Only if one is able to make the most of the natures of other peoples is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of things. Only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of things can one assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of the heavens and earth; and only if one can assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of the heavens and earth can humans take their place as members of this triad.

2. The Dao of the Book of Changes The Book of Changes (Yijing) or Changes of the Zhou (Zhouyi) is comprised of the original divination manual as well the younger commentarial tradition known as the Yizhuan or “Ten Wings.” In the original divination manual, dao is still basically used in the sense of a roadway, but in the “Ten Wings” dao is elevated into a philosophical concept. In the “Ten Wings” we see the emergence of key ideas such as “what is above physical form pertains to dao, and where is below physical form pertains to concrete objects” and “one yin and one yang is called dao.” Here, dao is regarded as that which transcends specific, individual forms and is instead an abstract umbrella term which encompasses the orderly operations of the heavens and earth. Specific, material manifestations and social phenomena are but instances of dao and belong instead to the category of “concrete objects.” 9 Ames

and Hall (2001: 89). Throughout this translation, I have relied upon Ames and Hall’s translation of the Doctrine of the Mean and often based my own translation on theirs.

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The authors of the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” (one of the wings of the “Ten Wings”) do not, in fact, consider the dao of the original divination manual to be complicated; for it can be encompassed in one phrase: “One yin and one yang is called dao.” In contemporary philosophical terminology we could say this is the law of dialectical exchange or law of mutual transformation. The original divination manual illustrates this idea through the abstract image embodied in each hexagram as well as its associated line statements. Through divination, one receives a hexagram and after close analysis of the received hexagram and its attendant line statements, one can infer “the reasons underlying what is hidden and what is clear” (幽明之故), “the axiom of life and death” (生死之说),and “the nature of ghosts and spirits” (鬼 神之情状). Aside from this, the commentarial tradition proposed the discourse of the dao of the heavens, earth and humans: the dao which establishes the heavens is called yin and yang; the dao which establishes the earth is called soft and hard; the dao which establishes humankind is humaneness and righteousness. (Commentary on the Appended Phrases A)

The Yijing commentarial tradition’s elucidation and development of “dao” as well its paradigm of “above” and “below concrete form” had a profound influence on traditional Chinese philosophy. 3. The Dao of the Neo-Confucians During the Tang, Song and Ming dynasties, due to Han Yu and Li Ao’s proposal for a renaissance of the teachings of the Confucian lineage (daotong, 道统), a series of philosophers who had ambitions for transmitting and reviving Confucianism began to focus their discussions on the Confucian dao. This development spurred traditional Chinese philosophy onto a new level of theoretical sophistication. This wave of Confucianism has been variously called Neo-Confucianism or New Studies on the Dao (xindaoxue, 新道学). Due to their different interpretations of “dao,” there are three main strands to Neo-Confucians. First, is the school of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers which sought to understand dao from the “pattern/order/coherence/principle” (li, 理) which underlay the myriad things. Second, is the school of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming which sought to understand dao through the “heart-mind” (xin, 心). Third, is the school of Zhang Zai, Wang Tingxiang and Wang Fuzhi which proposed that all the myriad things are formed of “vital energy” (qi, 气). 1. Understanding Dao through pattern/order/coherence (li, 理) The two philosophers of li, the Cheng brothers of the Northern Song (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) sounded the first calls in the Tang-Song manner of using “li” to understand dao. Cheng Hao said, Probably, the doings of the heavens above have no sound or smell, its body is called change/simplicity [yi, 易], its li is called dao, its mandate in humans is called human nature, because its use is limitless it is called numinous, all this is but one. (Book 1, Surviving Works of the Chengs of Henan)

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Cheng Hao also said, “One yin and one yang is called dao, dao is not yin or yang, thus [the relationship between] one yin and one yang is dao.” “Yinyang is vital energy [qi]. Vital energy [qi] is below physical forms, and dao is above physical forms; what is above physical forms is thus the root.” (Book 15) The Cheng brothers thus used the language of the commentarial tradition to the Yijing (Yizhuan)—“yi” (change/simplicity), “li,” “one yin one yang,” “above physical form” and “below physical form”—to explain dao. Whilst it is true that there are tendencies towards the conflation of li and dao in the commentarial tradition to the Yijing, the Cheng brothers, in understanding dao as “li,” and thus taking “li” to be the highest philosophical concept (and making philosophical breakthrough on this basis), demonstrated their own theoretical innovations. The Cheng brothers themselves left many statements of self-appraisal with regard to this very innovation. Cheng Hao, for example said, “although I learned a great deal from others, the two words, heaven and principle, were a product of my own reflection.” (Book 12, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs from Henan) In the philosophy of the Cheng brothers, this “li” is not merely the order and law underlying the myriad things in the universe of the commentarial tradition to the Yijing, it is the creative spirit of the universe itself. It is something which transcends the limits of space-time and exists independently, it is the reason for the why the universe is as it is. As such, dao becomes the spirit which created the universe itself. Zhu Xi inherited the Cheng brother’s understanding of dao and developed their line of thought. He explained dao through philosophical concept such as li and vital energy, dao and concrete form (qi, 器), the juxtaposition of above and below physical form as well as form and function (tiyong, 体用), root and branch (benmo, 本末). He said, li is the dao of that which is above physical form, it is the root of the arising of things; vital energy is the concrete form of that which is below form, it is the apparatus [ju, 具] for the arising of things. (Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection)

The relationship between dao and concrete form is the relationship between form and function, origin and end. Dao here is form and origin whereas concrete form is function and end. Zhu Xi said, the utmost sincerity which does not cease is the form [ti,体] of dao, it is the reason why the myriad different things have one origin [ben, 本]; that which allows the myriad things to obtain their place is the function [yong, 用] of dao, it is the reason why there is one source [ben, 本] for the myriad different things. (Book 2, Collected Commentaries of the Analects)

In his elucidation of the relationship between dao and concrete form, however, Zhu Xi emphasizes that dao is inseparable from concrete form and that dao and concrete form are mutually implicated in each other. “One must know that concrete form is dao and that dao is concrete form, one cannot depart of dao and then speak of concrete form.” (Book 94, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) When speaking of dao, concrete form is already within it; when speaking of concrete form, dao is also already within it. As can be seen from the brief analysis above, the Cheng-Zhu understanding of dao utilized the philosophical concepts of form and function, origin and materialization

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to explain the relationship between dao and concrete form, li and vital energy. Their thinking harmoniously combined different elements whilst being tight and precise, and thus attained a new level of theoretical sophistication. 2. Understanding Dao through the Heart-Mind In the Southern Song (1127–1279) Lu Jiuyuan proposed the idea that dao is within the heart-mind and that dao and heart-mind have the same semantic content. The unity of dao and heart-mind which Lu Jiuyuan propounds, is built upon his basic philosophic thesis of “heart-mind is li” (心即理). Lu Jiuyuan believes that, Heart-mind is one heart-mind, and principle [理] is one principle. Oneness pertains to them throughout, and even in their most subtle meaning they contain no duality. This heart-mind and this principle do not admit of any dualism. (“To Li Zai II”, Book 11, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan)

As Lu Jiuyuan sees it, everyone is equipped with this heart-mind, whilst this heartmind is in turn equipped with the totality of li. This heart-mind and this li are thus not differentiated from dao; they are in fact the root-body of the myriad things of the universe. What is worth pointing out is that whilst Lu Jiuyuan agrees with the ChengZhu idea that dao is li, he opposes the Cheng-Zhu division of heart-mind and dao into two parts. He instead places the objective dao within the subjective (heart-mind), and in so doing, completely dissolved the subjective-objective division between the heart-mind and dao. The great scholar of the heart-mind Wang Yangming was also dissatisfied with Zhu Xi’s “division of heart-mind and principle into two” (析心里为二). In reference to Zhu Xi’s maxim of “investigating things in order to exhaust principle [li]” he said, What Zhu Xi meant by the investigation of things is “to investigate the principle [li] in things to the utmost as we come in contact with them.” To investigate the principles in things to the utmost as we come in contact with them means to look in each individual thing for its so-called definite principles. This means to apply one’s heart-mind to each individual thing and look for principle in it. This is to divide the heart-mind and principle into two.10 (Part II, 135, Instructions for Practical Living)

In order to resolve this antagonism, Wang Yangming proposed the discourse of “exhausting moral knowing” (zhi liangzhi, 至良知). He interpreted dao as moral knowledge (which is fully equipped in everyone) and moral knowledge, in turn, as the li of the world: “the moral knowing of my heart-mind, is what is called the li of the world.” From this it can be seen that, the school of li as well as the school of heart-mind both considered dao as li. The school of the heart-mind, however, went one step further in bringing dao into the human heart-mind, and thereby gave a particularly prominent place to the subjective. This is the main difference between the school of li and the school of the heart-mind. 10 Chan

(1963: 98)s, modified.

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3. Understanding Dao through Vital Energy (qi) The Northern Song (960–1127) philosopher Zhang Zai explained dao through vital energy. He was of the opinion that dao is the synthesis into one body of the two vital energies, yin and yang. Dao is thus also what one calls the process of “transformation of vital energy” (qihua, 气化):“when yin and yang are united in harmony they will be preserved and abide in dao,” (“Enlightenment Resulting from Sincerity”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance) “with transformation of vital energy we have dao.” (“Supreme Harmony” Correcting Youthful Ignorance) Sometimes, he calls dao the vital energy of “Supreme Harmony” (taihe, 太和) He writes, Supreme Harmony is called the dao. It embraces the natures which underlies all counter processes of floating and sinking, rising and falling, and motion and rest. It is the origin of the process of fusion and intermingling [of yin yang] [絪蕴], of overcoming and being overcome, and of expansion and contraction.11 (“Supreme Harmony” Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

There are scholars who point out that using “yinyang combined into one” to explain dao relies upon the dialectical nature of dao, whereas using “qi transformation” to explicate dao relies upon the processual nature of dao. This is an exceedingly precise insight. The Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Tingxiang explicitly proposed the idea that principal vital energy (yuanqi, 元气) is dao. He said, principal vital energy is the body [体] of dao, if there is formlessness [虚] then there is vital energy. If there is vital energy then there is dao. The change and transformations of vital energy is the change and transformations of dao. Vital energy is dao and dao is vital energy, one cannot talk about it in terms of separation and union. (Part I, Refined Discussions)

He specifies, furthermore, that dao is not a mysterious entity that is separable from vital energy and so self-subsistent, but that it belongs instead to the order or pattern which underlies the qi of physical forms or the qi of the formless. “If it has physical form it is also vital energy, if it is without physical form it is also vital energy. Dao resides within it.” (“The Form of Dao”, Cautious Words) As can be seen, Wang Tingxiang explains dao from the perspective of the inseparability of dao and vital energy or the impossibility of their mutual self-subsistence. As such, between dao and vital energy there is no question of the relationship between form and function, origin and materialization; without a doubt, this is a critique of the Cheng-Zhu school of li. The philosopher Wang Fuzhi (from the Ming-Qing period) synthesized the fruits of the previous discourse and provided a comprehensive summary of the traditional Chinese discourse on dao. Wang Fuzhi’s dao discourse involved the following elements. (1) Dao combines both the concrete nature of objects as well as the objective order and regularity which events and objects obey. Wang Fuzhi says 11 Chan

(1969: 500), modified.

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dao is what all objects manifest and abide by. The reason why objects manifest it is because only it has a concrete form which can be seen. The reason why objects abide by it is because only it has an eternal order which can be followed. (Book 5, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, Commentary on the Appended Phrases A)

(2) The dao that is above physical form and the concrete form that is below physical form combines in form. He says “that which is above physical form is called dao, that which is below physical form is called concrete form. Ultimately, however, they combine in one form.” (Book 5, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, Commentary on the Appended Phrases A). (3) Dao is hidden but concrete form is manifest, but dao and concrete form are inseparable from each other, both are inseparable from form. That which is above physical form is hidden, that which is below physical form is manifest. As soon as one says, “above physical form,” one has already left the trace of the word “form” by which one can trace the nature of this form. (Doctrine of the Mean, Book 2, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books)

(4) The concrete form as form and dao as function. The order and regularity of dao is merely the function of specific events and objects (concrete form). He uses examples such as vehicles, concrete forms, how can there be [the idea of] carrying without vehicles? How can there be [the idea of] storing without concrete vessels [器]? Thus, we say there is first form [体] then functioning [用]. Without storing there are no concrete vessels [器], without carrying there are no vehicles, thus we say function [用] manifests the value of form [体]. (Inner Commentary on the Book of Changes)

(5) Dao as origin and concrete form as manifestation. Dao is the inner nature of events and objects whereas concrete forms are the outward manifestations of events and objects. “Dao is the origin [本] of concrete forms and concrete forms are the outward manifestation of dao. This is the idea of the interconnection of origin and manifestation [末].” (“Zizhang”, Analects, Book 7, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books) (6) Dao changes according to concrete form. This is a criticism aimed at the postDong Zhongshu Confucianism which espoused the doctrine of “the heavens do not change and dao also does not change.” Wang Fuzhi believed that there is no dao of courtesy in floods and famines, [the sage kings] Yao and Shun do not have the dao of comforting and punishing [the common people], the Han and the Tang do not have today’s dao, but there are many things missing from today’s dao as compared to the dao of yester year. […] However, there has never been sons without there being the dao of the father, there has never been younger brothers without there being the dao of brothers, dao can be being but also non-being, but non-being is the majority. Thus, without its concrete form there can be no corresponding dao. All this is indeed true, but previously people have not realized this [the indivisible relationship between dao and qi]. (Book 5, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes)

Wang Fuzhi’s dao discourse is built upon the idea of vital energy (qi) as origin and combined the various modes of the preceding dao discourses. Philosophically it

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broke no new ground; one can say that Wang Fuzhi provided a historical summary of dao discourses, and thereby pushed it to new heights. The final thing that needs to be clarified is that the Daoist discourse on dao had a profound influence on Chinese Buddhism (this is mainly in reference to Buddhism with Chinese characteristics). Chan Buddhism in particular absorbed fertile ideas from the Daoist dao discourse, and in embracing this “dao” concept, proposed that dao is the universe (fajie, 法界) and that the ordinary heart-mind is dao. Its main point of focus, however, was religious practice as well as self-cultivation, enlightenment, becoming one with dao. In terms of its contribution to philosophical innovation, therefore, it did not exceed the discourses of Daoism and Neo-Confucianism and so will not be discussed.

References Ames, Roger T. and, David L. Hall. 2001. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Ziporyn, Brook. Zhuangzi. 2015. Guo Xiang: The Self-So and the Repudiation-cum-Reaffirmation of Deliberate Action and Knowledge. In Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy, ed. Liu Xiaogan, 397–424. Verlag: Springer.

Chapter 2

Charismatic Power (de, 德)

Charismatic power is an important concept in traditional Chinese philosophy. Today, it is hard to verify the origin and original meaning of de. From the explanation provided in Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters we can gather that its original meaning was rising or climbing to a height. By the Western Zhou, de already contained the idea of personal virtue and good character. Up until the Spring and Autumn period, de and dao were spoken of separately; the two did not become a compound noun. The concept of dao, furthermore, was a comparatively more elevated term than de; de was used from the perspective of practical realization of dao. The Guanzi, for example, said “the virtuous (de) person realises it,” the “Record of Music” of Book of Rites says “one who has apprehended both ceremonies and music may be pronounced to be a possessor of virtue (de). Virtue means realisation.”1 This is to say that dao is the principle and de is the praxis of dao. Confucius once said in Analects 7.6 that his ideal was “Setting one’s heart upon the way, relying upon virtue [de], leaning upon goodness, and wandering in the arts.” The Doctrine of the Mean also says, “Hence it is said, “without the perfect virtue (de) the perfect dao cannot be realized.” This means to say that only those of the highest personal virtue can put dao into practice. According to the philological work of Zhang Dainian (1909–2004), the compounding of dao and de began in the post-Warring States period. The Xunzi has it that “And so, learning comes to the rites and then stops, for this is called the ultimate point in pursuit of the way (dao) and virtue (de).” After the Han, daode became a common term.

1 Translator note: Throughout the translation, I have relied on James Legge’s translation of the Book

of Rites (with modifications), unless otherwise stated. © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_2

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2 Charismatic Power (de, 德)

2.1 One It was during the Zhou dynasty that the moral content of de and its employment as a philosophical term gained its first tentative footholds. After the Zhou replaced the Shang dynasty (c. 1600–c. 1046 BC), the rulers of the Zhou drawing lessons from their observations on why the Shang lost, and the Western Zhou ascended to power, concluded that “there is no constancy in the heavens’ commands” (天命糜常). It is only by cultivating personal virtues that one is able to fulfil heaven’s command and thereby enjoy the protection of higher powers. It is in following this line of thought that the idea of “honouring virtue [de] and nourishing the common people” arose during the Zhou. There are two dimensions to this idea. One, is the great reverence for the common peoples, elevating them to the position of the heavens and second, the idea that only the cultivation of virtue (de) is equal to, and capable of, carrying out the heavens’ command. In the literature of the Zhou dynasty, the idea that cultivating personal virtue in order to fulfill the heavens’ command occurs most profusely in the “Pronouncement of Shao” chapter of the “The Book of Zhou.” Here, it is said that both the Xia and Shang dynasties, “for the sole reason that they did not revere virtue [de], did they prematurely lose the command they received from the heavens.” The Zhou believed that the reason why the Xia and Shang dynasties died out was because they did not have virtue (de), and so the heavens’ command (tianming, 天 命) transferred to those with virtue: the Zhou. Clearly, “de” had a cardinal position in the ritual and music orientated culture of the Western Zhou. Although their “de” orientated value system, along with which includes the ideas of having virtue (de) in order to be adequate to the heavens, honouring de and nourishing the common people, still has shades of the religious, by relating de with heavens’ command (tianming, 天命), however, de was elevated into a bridge by which people could communicate with the heavens. This demonstrates the value that was accorded to the moral values of human beings, and undoubtedly came to have a profound impact on the form of Chinese philosophy and its subsequent developments.

2.2 Two The Spring and Autumn and Warring States period of Chinese history was a period of transition. Politically speaking this is to be seen in governmental power falling into the hands of the feudal lords and the ministers of state. With regard to culture, it is manifested in the transition from education being received in official bureaus to studying under personal tutors. Corresponding with these transitions is the “hundred schools of thought”—each of which represented the interests and political ideals of the different strata of society. Within these different schools, the Confucians took de as an important element in self-cultivation and stressed the importance of cultivating the self through de.

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Confucius is the founder of the Confucian school. In the Analects “de” appears in 27 chapters and appears on 36 occasions. Confucius’s discussions of de is, in the main, comprised of the following dimensions. First, de is the source of peoples’ moral (de) natures. Confucius seems to have held two different opinions about this in the Analects, either believing that our moral natures are congenitally conferred upon us, as for example when he himself says in Analects 7.23 “It is the heavens which has endowed me with virtue [de],” or that it is won through cultivation, as in 7.3, failing to cultivate virtue [de], to inquire more deeply into what has been learnt, not being able to move myself in the direction of the good I have heard, and being unable to reform what is not good, these are the things that worry me.

Second, de is the path towards improving one’s virtue (de). Although Confucius does not explicitly provide normative criteria for the content of virtue, he does describe the path of self-improvement. In instructing his disciples on how to improve their personal virtue, for example, Confucius adjusts his teachings according to the needs and character of each student. In answering Zizhang, for example, Confucius considered the person of virtue as “holding dutifulness and trustworthiness as guiding principles and moving in the direction of what is right.” In response to Fan Chi, however, Confucius thought that the person of virtue “puts service first and reward last,” and others before the self. Third, de is the highest attainment of virtue (de). Confucius proposed the idea of the de of “applying the mean” (zhongyong, 中庸), and took applying the mean to be the peak of the self-cultivation of virtue. Confucius also uses “balanced conduct” (zhongxing, 中行) synonymously with “applying the mean,” and takes “applying the mean” as a perfect moral virtue. This level of attainment is not, however, easily available to the average person, and so Confucius says in Analects 15.4, “rare are those who understand virtue [de].” The Analects, however, does not provide further elaboration on the content of “applying the mean.” It is in the Doctrine of the Mean (purportedly written by Confucius’s grandson) that we see a more systematic elaboration of this concept. In all, Confucius was the first thinker to provide a relatively systematic elaboration of the relationship between virtue (de) and personal cultivation. His discussion of de was inherited and developed by later Confucians. The Doctrine of the Mean focused its discussions on Confucius’s idea of “applying the mean,” and creatively extended this concept in two ways. First, it elevated the idea of “applying the mean” as a perfect moral virtue to a metaphysical concept. For the Doctrine of the Mean, it is only by being coherent with the principles of “applying the mean” that the myriad things can reside in their appropriate positions, proceed with due order, and so flourish. Second, the Doctrine of the Mean gave the idea of “applying the mean” a methodological content. In this respect it is elaborating on the idea found in Analects 11.16 that, “overshooting the mark and falling short are the same as each other” which examples Confucius’s general disapproval of going to extremes in one’s conduct. By borrowing Confucius’s words from the Analects, the Doctrine of the Mean proposed the methodological idea of “a timely maintaining of the mean” (shizhong, 时中) What then is maintaining the mean? In principle, the midpoint

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between any two opposing points is constantly changing in accordance with the changes in times and circumstances, thus to really achieve the mean, one must keep up with how things changes, and change according to the changing circumstances. The Doctrine of the Mean, furthermore, provides examples of what proper “strength” is, so that, methodologically, one can have a better grasp of what it involves in practice. In the words of the Doctrine of the Mean, “Showing tolerance and flexibility in the education of other and not taking revenge on those who have lost the proper way [dao]”2 is the strength of the southerners. “Sleeping on one’s armor and meeting one’s death without regret” is the strength of the northerners. Different geographical contexts, therefore, endow people with different apprehensions of what “strength” is. The Doctrine of the Mean believes that the exemplary person “stands in the middle and does not waver,” and that this is real strength; this is, in effect, an explanation of “maintaining the mean.”

2.3 Three Although the post-Qin (206 BCE) period till the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) witnessed a variety of different interpretations of the relationship between morality (de) and self-cultivation, there were no new breakthroughs. It was only in the Song period, with the philosopher Zhang Zai and his epistemological distinction between “virtuous-nature knowing” (dexing zhizhi, 德性之知) and “sensory knowing” ( jianwen zhizhi, 见闻之知) that one sees a creative innovation with regard to the Confucian discourse on morality. In their investigations on epistemology, the Song dynasty Confucians often used the twin concepts of “virtuous-nature knowing” and “sensory knowing.” The former refers to a priori, intuitive moral knowledge, and the latter refers to everyday experiential knowledge. Although the philosophers of the Northern Song (960–1127), Zhou Dunyi and Shao Yong had already made preliminary excursions into this domain, the first person to formally propose this concept was Zhang Zai. Zhang Zai separates knowledge into two main categories: “sensory knowing” (见闻之知) and “virtuousnature knowing” (德性之知). Sensory knowing comes from the interaction between objects and is attained through the contact between human sense organs and the external world. This is sensory, experiential knowledge and is thus limited. This knowledge, however, according to Zhang Zai, is also necessary: sensory experience is not enough to exhaust reality, but it is also necessary. If the ears and eyes do not receive [sensory data] then we are akin to wood and stone. The point of eyes and ears lies in uniting the internal and the external, if one did not hear or see then what evidence is there to speak of? (Part I, Records of Master Zhang)

Despite this, Zhang Zai regards “sensory knowledge” alone as insufficient, because for him, humans also need “virtuous-nature knowing.” What then is this “virtuousnature knowing?” In Zhang Zai’s words, this is a kind of “innate moral knowing” 2 Ames

and Hall (2001: 92).

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(tiande liangzhi, 天德良知), which is a kind of “understanding born from sincerity” (chengming suozhi, 诚明所知). “Sensory knowing” in contrast to “virtuousnature knowing” can only be considered “lesser knowing” (xiaozhi, 小知). Zhang Zai says, “understanding gained through enlightenment arising from sincerity is innate moral knowledge, whereas sensory knowledge is but lesser knowledge.” (“Enlightenment Resulting from Sincerity” Correcting Youthful Ignorance) The way to gain this “virtuous-nature knowing” is to “use one’s heart-mind to the utmost” ( jinxin, 尽心): If one takes the heart-mind to only be empirical knowing then this is to limit the heart-mind. Our world is brimming with things, but if we limited ourselves to sensory knowing then how many of these can we be in touch with? How could we then exhaustively know all that is in the world. This is why one wants to use one’s heart-mind to the utmost. (Part III, Records of Master Zhang) The sages exhausted their natures and did not shackle their heart-minds to the senses. When they regard all in the world as a part of themselves, this is what Mencius meant by using the heart-mind to the utmost in order to know human nature, to know nature itself. (Big Heart-mind chapter)

What Zhang Zai means by “using the heart-mind to the utmost” is the self’s realization of itself, that is, when the self comes to perceive the moral nature that was originally endowed in humans. As such, it can also be seen as an ideal state of moral cultivation. Zhang Zai’s views came to have a profound influence on Song Confucianism. Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, for example, followed this very line of thought. Zhu Xi, for example, said that virtue (de) is the practical realization of “dao” and also deemed virtue as the origin of ritual norms. The late Ming and early Qing dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhi interpreted “de” and “dao” as epistemological concepts and gave it further elucidation, thereby taking traditional Chinese philosophy to new heights. First, Wang Fuzhi re-defined “de,” he considered “de” as having a dual meaning. One of these meanings is derived from the discourse on root-body (benti, 本体), and can be called “utmost de” (dade, 达德). On the subject of “utmost de” Wang Fuzhi writes, from the perspective of root-body, and not from the practical perspective of its realistion, we call it utmost de, this utmost de is what people receive from heaven [tian]. (Doctrine of the Mean, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books)

The second meaning is from the perspective of epistemology. From this perspective de is when “one acts according to the dao and then de is internalized” (“Shu Er”, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books) —that is, it is understanding the nature of dao. Following this, Wang Fuzhi took “dao” to be the general order behind phenomena and “de” to be specific order of things: “de” is the foundation of the existence of “dao.” He believes that “de is the foundations of dao” (“Commentary on Explaining the Trigrams”, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes) and that if “dao” was separated from the specific patterns of things— de—then dao could not exist; dao exists within de. If one really wants to grasp the nature of dao then one must start with de; one must start from the particular in order

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to arrive at the universal. Wang Fuzhi’s elucidation on the relationship between dao and de is full of rich dialectical thinking and transcended the previous ethical confines of dao and de, and thereby opened up new horizons for Chinese philosophy and is therefore a key achievement in traditional Chinese moral philosophy.

2.4 Four As we saw from the preceding discussion, the earliest association of de with politics is to be found in the Western Zhou dynasty with concepts such as having virtue (de) in order to be adequate to the heavens, honouring de and nourishing the common people. Philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius, Laozi and Zhuangzi further enriched these ideas and broke new ground in philosophical terms. Confucius used his whole life to realise the political idea of “subduing the self in order to return to ritual propriety” (克己复礼). In proposing the idea that “it is by ritual propriety that a state is administered” he shows his inheritance of the tradition of the great Zhou dynasty statesmen. He further proposed the idea of “rule through virtue.” As Confucius sees it, it is only through the transformative effects of a moral education that the common people would naturally—in the same way that the myriad stars follow the pole star—wish to follow the ruler. For Confucius, whilst government control through mere coercive regulations and punishments will have short-term, superficial results, these means cannot change people from within and so are not long-term solutions. This is because the common people might follow the rule of law out of fear, but they will not have any sense of shame. The only way that the common people will have this intuitive moral sense is when morally transformative education is combined with edicts, and thereby awakening the moral sensibility which lies dormant within them, resulting in their having a sense of shame (i.e. right or wrong), and their spontaneously wishing to do what is right. The idea of “rule through virtue” requires that the ruler, first of all, strengthens his own moral character so that he can “placate the common people through his own self-cultivation.” Confucius believes that this is a very distant goal, something that even moral exemplars like Yao and Shun found hard to achieve, but it is the only way to realise the ideal political order. Analects 14.42, for example, records that, Zilu asked about the exemplary person. The Master said, ‘He cultivates himself in order to achieve respectfulness.’ ‘Is that all?’ ‘He cultivates himself in order to bring peace to the others.’ ‘Is that all?’ ‘He cultivates himself in order to bring peace to all people. Even Yao and Shun would have found the task of bringing peace to all people difficult.’

Confucius is very consistent with regard to this view. In Analects 13.13, for example, he says,

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If a minister makes himself correct, what difficulty will he have in government? If he cannot correct himself, what has he to do with correcting others?

In Analects 12.17 Ji Kangzi asked Confucius about government. Confucius answered, ‘Government (zheng, 政) is to be correct (zheng, 正). If you set an example in being correct yourself, who would dare be incorrect?’

Confucius was of the opinion that it is only when one is correct oneself that one can partake of government; that only when one is correct oneself that one can correct government itself. Analects 13.6, for example, says, The Master said, ‘When one’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without giving orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, his orders will not be followed even when they are given.’

This is but an explanation of “rule through virtue.” Mencius inherited Confucius’ idea of “rule through virtue” and proposed the policy of the “kingly way.” As Mencius sees it, the kingly way is, in practice, “realizing humaneness through virtue [de]” (以德行仁). It is putting “humane government” (仁政) into action. It is in direct contrast to the “way of the hegemon” (霸道) which superficially pretends to be humane but actually rules through the threat of force. From this we can see that the difference between Mencius’s kingly way and the way of the hegemon consists in the fact that there is a moral dimension to political rule, so that politics and morality are united into a seamless unity. Specifically, this entails that the kingly way expects the ruler to embody a relatively high level of personal moral attainment, as the moral character of the ruler is understood to influence the populace. We see this in Mencius 4A20: “If the junzi be benevolent, then all will be benevolent. If the junzi be righteous, then all will be righteous. If the junzi be correct, then all will be correct.” Following that, the kingly way requires that “esteems virtue and honours the noble” (Mencius 2A4): There is nothing better than esteeming the virtuous and respecting the noble. If the worthy are in office and the capable have authority, then the state is at ease. At this time, they should make clear to the people the government rules and punishments, and then even the large states will be in awe of him. (Mencius 2A4).

Apart from this, the kingly way requires that the common people are given a “constant means” so that they can have “constant heart” as these are the conditions to their being supportive of and obedient to the ruler. Laozi’s thought on the relationship between virtue (de) and politics operates under different paradigms to the Confucius-Mencius Confucian tradition and he is also of a different intellectual persuasion. First, Laozi starts from the position that the way of the heavens is naturally so (ziran, 自然) and without purposive action (wuwei, 无为). He therefore considers morality and the rules and regulations of morality to be a result or symptom of humans having forsaken the great dao; this phenomenon is a historical regression. Furthermore, due to the flaws inherent in the idea of moral education, Laozi believes that it will inevitably bring about phenomena such as social disorder

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and disingenuousness. There is a celebrated passage in the Daodejing, Chap. 18 which demonstrates this idea: Thus when the great dao is forsaken, then there is humaneness [ren, 仁] and rightouesness [yi, 义]. When knowledge and smartness emerge, then there is great disingenuousness. When the six family relations are not harmonious, then there is filial piety and compassion. When the state and families are in disorder, then there are loyal ministers.

Although Laozi did not completely reject the effects of moral education, he was of the view that “governing the state through making it knowledgeable” would render the people difficult to govern. As such, Laozi proposed that, The ancients who were adept in the practice of dao, did not enlighten the common people but rather keep them dull and ignorant. The reason why the common people are difficult to govern is because they are too knowing. Thus, governing the state through making it knowledgeable is to commit a crime on the state. To govern the state by not making it knowledgeable, is to bring beneficence to the state. (Chap. 65, Daodejing)

In practice this means: Not to promote the worthies will keep the people from contending with each other. Not esteeming rare goods will keep the people from stealing. Not displaying that which is desirable will keep the people’s hearts free from disorder. (Chap. 3, Daodejing)

In a word, this is the “rule of non-purposive action”: I do nothing [purposively], and the people transform themselves. I love stillness and the people correct themselves. I am without task, and the people prosper by themselves. I have no [purposive] desire, and the people turn to simplicity by themselves. (Chap. 57, Daodejing)

Following this, Laozi made a distinction between “higher virtue [de]” and “lower virtue [de]” and provided an analysis of humaneness, righteousness and ritual propriety as well as the negative effects that they may bring. Laozi is of the opinion that “higher virtue” does not require specific moral regulations, it is utterly spontaneous, without purposive action and one with dao; this is the real dao. “Lower virtue,” on the other hand, relies upon artificial moral regulations, is a kind of teleological, purposive action and so is, in actuality, a symptom of the loss of virtue. Moral norms such as humaneness, righteousness and ritual propriety not only put a distance between us and the dao, it actually becomes the source of social disorder. Laozi saw the simultaneous existence of moral and non-moral phenomena, as well as the disingenuous acts which resulted from the existence of moral criteria. It is for this reason that he championed “eschewing the ornate but taking the concrete.” Laozi’s thought and insights are profound indeed. What is worth mentioning is that in Laozian political discourse, Laozi raised the distinctive notion of “mysterious virtue” (xuande, 玄德). Laozi is saying that dao gives birth to the myriad things but that virtue [de] nourishes them. Even though it is virtue that allowed for the flourishing of all things, it is not jealous or possessive of them. This kind of virtue which is not motivated by utilitarian calculus or telos, and acts non-purposively, is called “mysterious virtue.” The cosmological undertones underlying Laozi’s concept of “mysterious virtue” means that it exceeds the usual

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confines of moral philosophy, and as such is more profound and more universal than the Confucian discourse. As we can see, Laozi’s thinking about virtue (de) never strays from the paradigm of dao, everything is measured against the yardstick of whether it is self-so and non-purposive. Laozi’s discourse on virtue (de) is therefore inseparable from dao.

2.5 Five Religious Daoism and Sinicized Chinese Buddhism has much to say about the relationship between de and its religious goal of liberation, thereby forming the philosophy of Chinese religion. Below, we will see some representative examples. The goal of the spiritual practices in religious Daoism is to become an immortal. Although, in practice there are many different forms of spiritual practices, they can generally all be grouped under two main sects: “external alchemy” (waidan, 外丹) and “internal alchemy” (neidan, 内丹). A famous thinker of religious Daosim, Ge Hong (葛洪) of the Jin Dynasty (265–420 CE) advocated ingesting (服食) external alchemy in order to become immortal. In his book, Master Who Embraces Simplicity: Inner Chapters (Baopuzi Neipian), Ge Hong expounds at length on the importance of cultivating one’s virtue (de) for attaining long life and immortality. Ge Hong was of the opinion that in order to achieve long life and immortality, one must pay special attention to cultivating virtue. Should one not cultivate virtue and only apply oneself to the mysterious arts (fangshu, 方术), then one could not gain a long life. In the chapter “Answering Questions about Popular Conceptions” (对俗) of the Master Who Embraces Simplicity: Inner Chapters Ge Hong writes that, Those who practise the dao consider as meritorious action rescuing people from danger so that they avoid catastrophe, protecting them from mortal illnesses and from dying in vain. Those wishing to seek for immortality should take loyalty, filial piety, harmony, obedience, humaneness and trustworthiness as the root. If one’s virtues are not cultivated but one applies oneself to the mysterious arts [方术], then one cannot realise long life.

In terms of the concrete content of good actions, Ge Hong says, Do unto others as you would do unto yourself. Extend humaneness to even the insects. Be happy for other people’s fortunes, feel commiseration for other people’s misfortunes, assist people when they are in need, provide relief in their destitution. Let your hands not harm living things, your mouth not lend themselves to inciting trouble. View other’s success as your own success, view other’s mistakes as your own mistakes. Do not be arrogant and self-praising. Do not be jealous when others have surpassed you. Do not flatter dangerous criminals. It is in this way that one can have virtue [de], enjoy propitiousness from the heavens. If all this is accomplished, then one can have hope of becoming an immortal. (“The Meaning of the Subtle”, Master Who Embraces Simplicity: Inner Chapters)

During the Tang and Song dynasties, due to influences from Buddhism and Confucianism, religious Daoism began to investigate the nature of dao. In trying to uncover the reason for how one becomes immortal and how one realizes the dao, they began

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to discuss the relationship between the nature of dao and human nature, and so assimilated the terms “dao” and “de” into the domain of human nature. A famous Daoist of the Tang dynasty, Wu Yun (吴筠) wrote The Mysterious Mainstays (玄纲论). In inheriting Laozi’s cosmological discourse, Wu Yun simultaneously assimilated the Confucian paradigms about human nature in order to discuss the relationship between dao, de, humans and the myriad things as well as the ways to self-cultivate. Wu Yun believes that dao is the productive cause of the heavens, earth, the myriad things and humans, de on the other hand is what everything depends on in order to grow. Everything, from the heavens, earth, people, immortals, ghosts and spirits, all depend on dao for their birth and rely upon de in order to grow to fruition, this is but a natural process. Evidently then for Wu Yun, de is an essential element in the growth and maturation of all things. Wu Yun says, What is dao? It is girdle to formlessness and non-being, the root of creation and transformation, the origins of spirit-like powers, the source of the heavens and earth. […] What is de? It is an endowment received from the heavens. It is endowed by yin and yang. It is warped by the five phases and wefted by the four seasons. For keeping things in order, it is sovereign, when one needs a model it is the instructor. All things with or without form all realise their natural dispositions. is nourishes continuously, but the living things do not know of its workings. It is limitlessly giving but the common people do not know that they rely upon its labours. This is what is called de. But if we call dao that which is connected and gives birth to things, then dao certainly has no name. If we call de that which rears and realizes it, then de has no designation. In attempting to discuss it we can say that, the heavens, peoples and all phenomena, spirits, immortals, ghosts and numina cannot arise without dao and cannot be realized without de. (“Dao and De Chap. 1”, The Mysterious Mainstays3 )

If humans, the heavens and earth as well as the myriad things are all born from dao and the nature of dao is endowed in human nature, then why are there three grades of people: the congenitally wise, the stubbornly hostile and the average? Wu Yun explains that although dao is the root of the production of all things, one still needs the medium of “principal vital energy” ( yuanqi, 元气) in order to accomplish the endowing of form to things. As there are differences of yin, yang, and distinctions of harmonious integration among the principal vital energy that people are endowed with, this results in the different grades of congenitally wise, stubbornly hostile and the average. Wu Yun further explains that although humans are born from dao, are endowed with numinous clarity, they easily tend towards desires and desires are counter to dao; this means that humans can become separated from dao. This is why the person of cultivation must: be without insatiable desires, destroy cleverness, look at that which is without the desirable appearances of physical objects [se, 色], listen to soundlessness. Tranquil and plain, bland and colourless, lucent in body and spirit, so formless and calm to the extent that one forgets one’s body, so that one can unit with perfect essence. This is what is called returning to my origins, being one again with dao. (Chap. 5, Human Nature and Dispositions)

With the key concepts of “dao,” “de,” “humans” “human nature” “disposition” (qing, 情), “return to origins” (fanzong, 反宗), “return to dao” (fudao, 复道), Wu Yun 3 玄纲论上篇

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was able to construct a philosophy whereby unity with the cosmos, morality and self-cultivation became a single coherent religion of liberation. In the discourse of liberation or deliverance in Sinicized Chinese Buddhism, de is manifested, in the main, through a stress on filial piety. A renowned Chan monk from the Song dynasty, Great Teacher Mingjiao, Qi Song (契嵩), authored Discourse on Filial Piety (孝论), and forcefully expounded on the idea that filial piety and the virtue (de) of filial piety is foremost among the complete commandments of H¯ınay¯ana and Mahayana (dajie, 大戒) and a supreme truth for becoming Buddha. Qin Song said, filial piety is foremost among the complete commandments [dajie, 大戒]. The commandments are the means by which all good arise. If one acts on the good but is slight on the commandments, then on what basis would goodness arise? If one acts on the commandments but is slight on filial piety, then on what basis would the commandments be founded? Thus, the sutra says, what allows me to rapidly achieve the highest way of supreme truth is through the virtue [de] of filial piety.

The Great Teacher Zhixu (智旭) from the Ming dynasty also saw the virtue of filial piety as the “foundations of bodhi” (菩提之基). He said, Confucianism considers filial piety to be the foremost among all types of actions, Buddhism considers filial piety as the most important origins [宗] of dao. Presumably, the desire to show gratitude is rooted in a disposition which is inextricably bound to all things. […] This disposition is called common dharmas but is in actuality the foundations of bodhi. (“Thoughts on the Biography of Zhi Xiaochun”, Book 7, Spirit Peak [School’s] Essential Treatise)

From the words of the two eminent monks above we can see that from the Song dynasty onwards, Sinicized Chinese Buddhism had already effortlessly absorbed Confucian and Buddhist thought into its corpus, and viewed them as an important foundation for liberation/deliverance. In conclusion from the above discussion, de, as an important concept in traditional Chinese philosophy received distinctive interpretations from both Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. Confucianism approached it from the perspective of selfcultivation, governance and epistemology. Daoism and religious Daoism, on the other hand, linked de with dao, fusing cosmology and religious liberation into one entity. Sinicized Chinese Buddhism, in comparison with Daoism and Confucianism had a relatively weaker discussion of de. In the main, it assimilated the Confucian virtues and saw its practice as a foundation for liberation or deliverance, but its theoretical discussion is not comparable to that of Confucianism and Daoism.

Reference Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall 2001. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Chapter 3

The Heavens (tian, 天)

At a time before the advancements in science, the heavens, or the sky, and its relationship with humans was for ancient Chinese philosophers a key point of investigation and something they keenly sought to resolve. The idea of the heavens therefore played an important role in traditional Chinese philosophy. In the history of Chinese philosophy, there were three ways in which philosophers employed the concept of “the heavens,” first, as major-domo or chief steward of everything in the world. That is, as an anthropomorphized God or Lord of the Heavens. Second as nature itself, that is, as the objective regularities and order of the material world or as the objective environment in which humans inhabit, i.e. the universe per se. Third as the law or moral principle (义理) of the world; that is, as the spirit of the myriad things, the moral principles of human society and the origins of morality itself.

3.1 One The idea of the heavens as an anthropomorphized deity with will and intentions, with supernatural powers, and thus something which is the master of all things is an idea which stretches all the way back to the earliest histories of humankind. Due to their low production rates, primitive societies viewed and worshiped everything in nature as divinities. For primitive societies, the sky was something mysterious and sacred, and so it was considered as one of the divinities, but it was not yet afforded with the most elevated position amongst the pantheon of divinities. By the Xia dynasty (c. 2070 BCE–c. 1600 BCE) monarchical regimes were already widespread and so the sky was also considered foremost amongst all the deities—the Supreme Deity (shangdi, 上帝). During the Shang dynasty, the sky was afforded the position of the most supreme amongst all the spirits, and was variously called Highest God (di, 帝) August Tian (皇天), Sublime Tian (haotian, 昊天), Supreme Tian (shangtian, 上天). In the Shang dynasty, the will of the Supreme Tian was considered more authoritative than that of the kings. In all important decisions and policies of the state, one had to perform divinations in order to ascertain the will of the Supreme Deity. The oracle © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_3

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bones discovered by archaeologists are precisely the records from these divinations. The earthly representative of the Supreme Deity was the king of the Shang dynasty, who also went by the name of “Son of Heaven (tian).” The “Son of Heaven”1 was the earthly executor of the Supreme Deity’s will and intentions and governed the common people on his behalf. The Zhou dynasty which followed the Shang dynasty inherited the Shang concept of the Supreme Deity, as such, the Supreme Deity was also the most supreme amongst all the deities of the Zhou people. When King Wu of the Zhou attacked the King Zhou (the last king of the Shang), he did so in answer to an appeal given to him by the Sublime Tian. In the “Numerous Officials” chapter of the Book of Documents, for example, one reads words to the effect that, “You officials have offended the August Tian, thus the August Tian will no longer protect you, and sent down terrible calamities. We the Zhou people have received the heavens’ (tian) command to replace you.” What is noteworthy is that the tian of the Zhou differs from that of the Shang in that for the Zhou, tian is imbued with ethical connotations. They observed that the command of the heavens was not unchanging and that it is only given to those sovereigns who have virtue (de, 德). If the sovereign lost his virtue then the heavens’ command would shift correspondingly; this is called “there is no constancy in the heavens’ commands” (天命糜常). In the “Announcement to Kang” chapter of the Book of Documents, the Duke of Zhou once warned Shu Feng of Kang that, “Oh! Feng, you are young. The Heavens’ commands are not constant. Ponder on this”. The rulers from the Zhou dynasty concluded from the Shang’s loss of the mandate of heaven that, “the heavens know nothing of the kind of unconditional love between kin, it only assists those with moral virtue [de]. There is no constancy in the hearts of the common people, they only cherish the memory of the benevolent.” (皇天无亲, 惟德是辅, 民心无常, 惟惠之怀) (“Command to Cai Zhong”, Book of Documents) and so formulated the idea of “having virtue (de) in order to be adequate to the heavens” (以德配天). All this is to say that by the time of the Zhou dynasty, the anthropomorphized, Supreme Deity now manifested its power in the domains of religion, politics and morality; and so, the concept of tian as a religious concept was thus transformed into a philosophical one. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, Confucius, the founder of the Confucian school of philosophy used the term tian in a variety of ways. One of which inherited the Shang-Zhou idea of tian as an anthropomorphized deity, the highest commander in the world, with its own will and intentions. We see this use of tian in Analects 9.5: The Master was surrounded in Kuang. He said, “Now that King Wen is dead, is not culture [wen, 文] now invested here in me? If Heaven intended this culture to perish, it would not have given it to those of us who live after King Wen’s death. Since Heaven did not intend that this culture should perish, then what can the people of Kuang do to me?

1 When heaven is capitalised, this is meant to indicate a more religious usage for heaven. When it is

not capitalised it refers to a more naturalistic understanding of the sky. The same principle applies to tian.

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Confucius lived in an era where the old ritual governed society was on the wane, but he also happened to hold the old ritual/music bound Zhou culture in the greatest esteem and so the restoration of this classical Zhou culture became his political program and life-long ambition. Confucius believed that the restoration of order in society rested upon the restoration of this classical Zhou culture and that he, as the person who knew most about the practice of Zhou music and rites, was the man who could carry out this important mission. This is why, as in the above passage, when Confucius was at Kuang and was mistakenly captured for being Yang Hu, he could have had such faith in the idea that, “Since Heaven [tian] did not intend that this culture should perish, then what can the people of Kuang do to me?” The Heaven which Confucius speaks of here is the Heaven which commands all, is the anthropomorphized heaven with will and intentions. Confucius believed that one could not deceive Heaven. When he was gravely ill and his students were preparing to give him the funerary rites of a minister attending to a lord (which Confucius was not), Confucius criticized his students saying, “who would we be deceiving, would we be deceiving the heavens [tian]?” (Analects 9.12) When one of Confucius’s disciples, Yan Hui, passed away, Confucius was distraught and said, “Oh! Heaven has bereft me, Heaven has bereft me!” (Analects 11.9) In response to the fact that he was misunderstood in his own time, Confucius laments, “If I am understood at it, it is perhaps by Heaven.” (Analects 14.35) All of the above references to tian by Confucius refer to a tian that is the almighty commander of all. Mencius inherited the idea that tian is the commander of all and that the authority and position of the sovereign was gifted by tian and so must be approved by tian. How then, does tian give sovereignty or show its approval? Mencius says, “Heaven does not speak but simply reveals its will through actions and affairs.” More specifically, “Let him preside over the ritual sacrifices, and the various spirits were pleased with him. This was Heaven accepting him. Let him be in charge of affairs, and the affairs were well ordered, the common people were at ease with him. This is the common people accepting him.” (Mencius 5A5) A little after the time of Confucius was the philosopher Mozi who founded his own school—Mohism—which was of comparable fame and influence as the Confucian school. The idea of “Heaven’s [tian] intentions” which Mozi proposed is that Heaven’s (tian) intentions are the intentions of the Supreme Deity (上帝) and that Heaven can dole out rewards and punishments. “When the emperor practises virtue Heaven rewards, when the emperor does evil Heaven punishes”, “thus one must heed the will of Heaven.” (Mozi, “Heaven’s Intention II”) If the will of Heaven muse be heeded, then what is the principle by which Heaven allots rewards and punishments? Mozi says: The will of Heaven does not wish for the large states to attack the small states, that the large houses molest the small houses, that the power who plunder the weak, the cunning deceive the stupid, and that honourable the lowly. These are what the will of Heaven does not wish for. Further to this, it desires that people who have the ability help out those in need, and those who possess wealth to share it with others. And it desires that those in superior position attend diligently to government and that the subordinates diligently to attend to their work. (“Heaven’s Intention II”, Mozi)

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As is evident, “the will of Heaven” is in effect, the “universal love” and “mutual aid” which Mozi advocated. Mozi united the political and moral principles of his ideal society into the idea “Heaven’s will” and believed that obeying Heaven’s will was kindness per se, and that disobedience to it was badness per se. At the same time, Mozi united religion, politics and morality into one entity and so into the ultimate arbiter of various human actions. Mozi’s tian—dressed up in the garb of religion—is a transcendent master commander as well as the ideals of a Mohist utopia; and he used this conception of tian to demonstrate and promote his own philosophical values. As such, it can be said that the philosophical implication of his ideas are prominent than those of the Shang-Zhou period, and is a demonstration of the journey which humankind had traversed in its intellectual development. In the early Han period, the great Confucian Dong Zhongshu gave rich exposition to the implications in the concept of tian. The Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn which he authored is a work which is orientated around tian. As Dong Zhongshu sees it, everything in the world is derived from tian and that the various phenomena in human society are all intimately related to tian. One could say that Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy is a philosophy of tian, that tian is the thread which runs through the entirety of his philosophical system. In Dong Zhongshu’s thought, tian is an anthropomorphized deity, and that it is head of all the other spirits. It is simultaneously the origin of the myriad things and the world itself. In the chapter “Sayings Pertaining to the Suburban Sacrifice” of the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn, Dong Zhongshu says, “tian is the great sovereign of the numerous spirits. [Thus] if service to tian is not provided appropriately, then even if [you sacrifice to] the numerous lesser spirits, it will be of no benefit to you.”2 In the “Biography of Dong Zhongshu” chapter of the Book of Han one reads that “Tian is the progenitor of all things, thus it encompasses all without distinction, it creates the sun, moon, wind and rain in order to harmonize them [all things] and goes through yin and yang heat and cold in order to realise them.” “There has never been something which arises without tian. Tian is the progenitor of all things, the myriad things cannot arise without tian.” (“Following Mandate”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) Following this, tian is the creator of human beings; the human form, its spirit, its thoughts, emotions, actions and ethics are all modelled on tian, this is what’s called, “Human Correlates of Heaven’s Regularities” (人副天数). Dong Zhongshu provides a detailed exposition on how humans correlate with Heaven’s regularities: Humans’ form and body was transformed from Heaven’s regularities and so became complete. Humans’ blood and vital energy [qi] was transformed from Heaven’s will and so became humane. Human’s virtue and conduct was transformed from Heaven’s principles [li] and so became righteous. Human’s likes and dislikes was transformed from Heaven’s warmth and coolness. Humans’ happiness and anger was transformed from Heaven’s heat and cold. Humans’ endowment and lifespan was transformed from Heaven’s four seasons. At birth, humans have the response of happiness, anger, sorrow and joy, which [correspond to]

2 Queen

and Major (2016: 514), modified.

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the categories of spring, autumn, winter and summer.3 (“Heaven, the Maker of Humankind”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

It is precisely because human beings are a duplicate of tian that humans and tian enjoy a relationship of mutual responsiveness (ganying, 感应). As Dong Zhongshu sees it, there are two dimensions to this mutual responsiveness. On the one side is the fact that tian responds to humans, and on the other, humans respond to tian. With regard to tian responding to humans, he says, When the state is about to lose the dao, then tian will send out natural disasters and catastrophes to criticize and censure it, [when the state] does not examine oneself, [tian] again sends out catastrophes and freak events in order to warn and frighten it. [If the state] still does not know to change, then harm and vanquishing will befall [it] without cease. From this one can see the humaneness and love tian has for the sovereign and its desire for the state’s chaos to end. (“Biography of Dong Zhongshu”, Book of Han)

With regard to humans responding to tian he says, if the heavens are turning to wood and things moult in spring but become luxuriant in autumn (i.e. the natural order is overturned), then this means that corvée labour and taxes are too high, and in order to remedy this, the ruler should lessen corvée labour and taxes. If it is warm in winter and cold in summer, this means that the ruler is not discerning enough in his meting out of rewards and punishments, and in order to remedy this, the ruler has to promote the worthy and reward good actions, etc. When aberrations in the Five Phases occur, one ought to remedy it with virtue [de] and disseminate it throughout the world and calamities will thereby by eradicated. If one does not remedy it with virtue [de] then before three years have passed, tian will rain down stones.”4 (“Aberrations of the Five Phases and Their Remedies”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

Further to this again, tian is governed by its own order and regularity. In order to give rise to the myriad things, tian follows its own principles of action, and if there is anything which obstructs the carrying out of tian’s actions then one must forthwith remove it at the earliest opportunity. This is tian’s will. Dong Zhongshu says, furthermore, The way [dao] of Heaven has its order and is thereby timely. It has its measures and is thereby regulated. It has its alterations but is constant, is opposite but balanced, is subtle but far-reaching to the utmost, high but meticulous to the utmost, is singular [either yin or yang] but gradually accumulates, is broad but substantial, empty but full. (“Heaven’s Prosperity”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

All this is saying that there is a certain order and regularity to the operations of tian and that humans cannot violate this. From the above discussion, we have ascertained that from the Xia to the Han dynasty, at the hand of philosophers, a purely primitive, purely religious conception of tian as an anthropomorphized god who commands all things was transformed 3 Queen 4 Queen

and Major (2016: 363), modified. and Major (2016: 484), modified.

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into a philosophical concept. A key figure in this story was Dong Zhongshu, who combined in his conception of tian the religious, political and moral dimensions of authority as well as that of an arbiter of good and bad human actions. His highly meticulous philosophical discourses also integrated cosmology, the discourses of yinyang, five phases, mutual reciprocity and so reached an unprecedented level of sophistication. After Dong Zhongshu, therefore, there are a few philosophers who are able to provide deeper and more extensive discussions on the idea of tian in the sense of master commander. It is as if Dong Zhongshu had himself concluded this particular understanding of tian.

3.2 Two The tian of nature (ziran, 自然) is the tian which is stripped of its religious connotations. It is that which objectively constitutes nature with no admixtures of the subjective. For example, natural phenomena such as the courses of the sun and moon and the changes between the seasons. This tian in the sense of nature has no will and does not interfere in or command human affairs. It is not, however, without objective patterns and regularities. The idea of tian as nature is of ancient pedigree. In the Spring and Autumn period, for example, a minister from the state of Zheng, Zichan said, “the dao of the heavens is far, the dao of humans is close, as the two are unrelated, how can the dao of humans be known through the dao of the heavens?” (“Eighteenth Year of Lord Zhao”, Zuo Zhuan) The heavens he is referring to is the tian of nature. When Confucius talks about tian, apart from connotations of being a master commander, there is also the connotations of the tian of nature. In Analects 17.19, for example, Confucius says, “Does Heaven [tian] speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things arise, but does Heaven [tian] say anything?” The tian which Confucius talks of here has no will and does not command nature, the only way that it manifests itself is the succession of the seasons and the arising of the myriad things. In the Warring States period, the Confucian philosopher Xunzi inherited and developed Confucian thought and he especially penned a chapter “Discourse on Tian” to promote the idea of tian as nature, and thus formulated a unique materialist position on the idea of tian as nature itself. His discourse on Tian has the following dimensions. First, tian is natural phenomena itself. Xunzi believed that tian was phenomena such as the movement of the stars, moon, sun the succession of the seasons, the changes in yin and yang, and the wind and rain. Through the changes of these natural phenomena, the myriad things are born and reared; although we cannot ascertain the details of its operations, we can feel its actions and effects, these natural phenomena is called tian. Its service in giving birth to and rearing the myriad things is called spirit (shen, 神). Xunzi explicitly interprets tian as natural phenomena, and interprets spirit (shen, 神) as the miraculous forces which give birth to the myriad things, as such, Xunzi is opposed to the idea of tian as master commander inherited from the Shang-Zhou period. Second, tian’s actions manifest

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its own order and regularity. Xunzi believes that tian is not merely the objectively existing natural phenomena, but also that its processes of change and transformation manifest its own order and regularity. The natural world develops according to its own rhythms. It does not exist because there are sage kings like Yao, nor does it cease to exist because of tyrants like Jie. As such, it is only by respecting the natural order that humans can reap the benefit to themselves; one will only be met with catastrophe should one run counter to it. Xunzi also provided acute criticisms of traditional views on the relationship between tian and spirits: If stars fall or trees groan, the people of the state are all fearful say, “What is this?” I say: it is nothing. These are simply the changes in Heaven [tian] and Earth and the transformations of yin and yang. These are simply rarely occurring things. It is thus permissible to find them strange, but not to be frightened of them. (“Discourse on Heaven”, Xunzi)

Xunzi believed that freak weathers are due to the changes and transformations in yin and yang and so are not a cause for being scared. Third, tian and humans each have their allotted roles and they should not mutually trespass on each other’s domains; this is called, “the mutual demarcation between tian and humans” (天人相分). Xunzi points out that the role of tian is to spontaneously produce, without telos or motives, the myriad things, and this is something that humans cannot interfere or compete with. The role of humans is to order society, and they can do this in the best way possible by respecting and abiding by the natural patterns of the way (dao) of tian. In Xunzi’s discourse on tian, tian is natural phenomena of matter itself. This tian is without any telos or will, and it does not interfere in human affairs, and this is in complete contrast with the tian as anthropomorphized master commander of all things of the previous discussion. This then is another paradigm of tian in the history of Chinese philosophy, that is, full of the characteristics of simple materialism (naïve materialism). The Arguments Weighed composed by the Eastern Han philosopher, Wang Chong, contained 85 chapters (which in actuality is 84 chapters as one of the chapters— “Results of moral behavior”—has not survived) had as its agenda the “distaining of superstitions” (疾虚妄). Full of critical spirit, Wang Chong aimed at cleaning up the various folkloric superstitions which persisted throughout history. Due to its profound influence on Chinese philosophy, he has been gifted with the epithet of “surpassing the scholars of the hundred schools of thought.” Wang Chong’s central concept is also tian, and its central content is that the way (dao) of tian is spontaneous and self-so, that is, is nature itself. During the Han dynasty, the idea that there was a reciprocal relationship between tian and human beings and that changes in yin and yang bring about corresponding catastrophes on earth became ascendant. In Wang Chong’s opinion, however, this kind of talk was the most erroneous of superstitions, as such he gave the most damning criticism to the idea that there is reciprocal responsiveness between tian and humans as well as the idea that tian is an anthropomorphized will capable of governing human affairs. On the basis of these criticisms, Wang Chong gave his own discourse on tian. Tian, for Wang Chong is, first of all, not some mysterious entity, but like everything else, just another material entity. A widespread opinion of the time, which formed

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the basis of the theory that there was a reciprocal responsiveness between tian and humans was that, “tian is vital energy [qi].” The thought goes that, it is because tian is qi and because qi can be circulated that tian and humans can mutually respond to each other. In opposition to this Confucian discourse that tian is qi, Wang Chong countered that tian was a material entity and that qi was merely something that attached itself on this entity, and so there is, in fact, a great distance between tian and humans. Following this, Wang Chong believed that tian, like earth, was a material entity which contains qi, and that the myriad things are born out of the emission of qi form tian and earth. Third, the way (dao) of tian is spontaneous and is without purposive action (wuwei). That things are born in Spring, that they mature in Summer, draw back in on themselves in Autumn and hibernate in Winter was not willed by tian, but rather, was so of itself. The dao of tian is non-purposive action [无为]. Accordingly, in spring it does not purposively do the germinating, in summer it does not purposively do the growing, in autumn it does not purposively do the ripening, in winter it does not purposively do the hiding of the seeds. When the yang vital energy [qi] comes forth of itself, plants will germinate and grow of themselves, and, when the yin vital energy [qi] rises, they ripen and disappear of their own accord.5 (“Ziran” Arguments Weighed)

Wang Chong reasons that in order to effect anything in the world one needs a pair of hands, and that if one maintains that tian had the intention to give rise to the myriad things then, “do Heaven and Earth possess many thousand or many ten thousand hands to produce thousands and ten thousands of things at the same time?”6 (“Ziran” Arguments Weighed) It is because tian’s operations are spontaneous and without action that humans have no way of knowing tian and tian has no way of knowing humans. As such there cannot be the mutual responsiveness between tian and humans as it is supposed to in the popular superstition which Wang Chong denounced. The great literato and thinker of the Tang dynasty Liu Zongyuan also showed great interest in the idea of tian. In his works Answers from Tian (天对) and Sayings from Tian (天说), he expounded on the theory that, “tian and humans do not mutually participate with one another” (天人不相预). In Sayings from Heaven, Liu Zongyuan proposed that tian is not a numinous spirit and that it doesn’t, in fact, have any feelings or will and is nothing other than something just that happens to exist. Like earth, principle vital energy (元气), and grass and trees, tian is nothing more than something that naturally exists. Liu Zongyuan, furthermore, believed that tian is a boundless and limitless entity, and that nothing with shape or form can surpass its size. On the basis of these ideas, Liu Zongyuan believed that tian and humans have different roles to play. The role of tian is in giving birth to the myriad things or bringing famines due to crop failure, whereas the role of people lies in ordering or bring chaos to society; tian and humans thus have nothing to do with each other. Such is Liu Zongyuan’s critique of the discourse of mutual responsiveness between tian and humans. 5 Forke (1907:

99), modified. Throughout the translation, I have benefitted from Forke’s translation of Wang Bi’s Arguments Weighed. 6 Forke (1907: 96), modified.

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The famous Tang dynasty poet and thinker Liu Yuxi (刘禹锡) penned the work Discourse on Tian (天论), in which in discussing the relationship between tian and humans, Liu Yuxi proposed the idea that, “tian and humans mutually overcome each other” (天人交相胜). In Discourse on Tian, Liu Yuxi clearly delimited the respective domains of tian and humans. He writes, “tian is the greatest of those with form; humans are the most exceptional amongst animals.” (“Discourse on Tian”, Collected Works of Liu Binke) That which tian is capable of, however, humans might not necessarily be capable of, and conversely, that which humans are capable of, tian might not be. It is for this reason that “tian and humans mutually overcome each other.” In Discourse on Tian, Liu Yuxi provides a detailed exposition on the different roles that tian and humans play. The role of tian was in giving birth to the myriad things and its law lay in the stronger consuming the weaker. The role of humans was in setting laws to maintain social order, and so its role lay in judging right from wrong. Liu Yuxi points out, furthermore, that tian doesn’t necessarily intentionally wish to overcome humans, it’s just that when humans encounter inexplicable misfortune they attribute it to the workings of tian. Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi’s discourses on tian creatively extended the idea of the tian of nature and represented the highest level of sophistication in Sui-Tang philosophical discussions on the relationship between tian and humans. The philosopher Wang Fuzhi from the Ming-Qing period provided an excellent summary of the traditional Chinese philosophical conception of tian as nature, and proposed the famous tenet of “the creation of tian by people” (以人造天). One of the new interpretations that Wang Fuzhi gave to tian was that tian is that collective name for the will-less vital energy (qi) of Supreme Harmony (太和) and the five phases. Wang Fuzhi also uses the words “force of circumstances” (shi, 势) and “principle” (li, 理) to describe the objective nature of the natural order. Wang Fuzhi said that, “principle” was the patterns and regularity which emerged in the change and transformation of vital energy (qi), and thus hard for humans to perceive. “Force of circumstances,” on the other hand, is the concrete manifestation of things in following “principle” and is thus easy to perceive, and so what causes it is “principle.” If we say that, “principle” is naturally so and “force of circumstances” are necessarily so, then the collective for “principle” and “force of circumstances” is tian. With regard to the relationship between tian and humans, in affirming the idea of, “ordering the people with tian” Wang Fuzhi simultaneously proposed the idea of “the creation of tian by people.” He said, In using heaven to order the people, the person of wisdom will not be burdened with care, the creation of tian by the people will mean that the person of humaneness will be capable of loving, following this, the latter-day things that are of service to heaven and earth will be comprehensively covered. (“Commentary on the Appended Phrases A”, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes)

Wang Fuzhi not only inherited the restraints that the natural order places on people, he also affirmed the creative functions that people can have on nature. The profundity of his thinking is undoubtedly much deeper than his predecessors.

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3.3 Three The idea that tian has laws and principles (义理) is one whereby humans have imbued tian with certain human values so that tian has moral values. These values can be the patterns that society manifests as it develops, or it can be moral principles, or it can be other values. In all, the idea that tian has values and principles takes on different contents at the hands of different philosophers, but they are all derived from tian, are all properties of tian, and have transcendent authority for humans. In this regard, this conception of tian bears some similarities with the conception of tian as master commander. In other words, the tian of righteousness and principles is, in reality, the root-body of the spirit of the universe and the myriad things. In Analects 7.23 Confucius once said, “Heaven [tian] produced the virtue that is in me” and so took tian as the source of his moral nature. The Doctrine of the Mean also explicitly said, “What Heaven [tian] commands is called natural tendencies” and imbued tian and earth with the moral properties of all-inclusiveness, generosity, loftiness, brilliance, the far-reaching and the enduring. Mencius inherited this intellectual paradigm and took tian to be the root of all human morals, and gave tian moral properties. He believed that people’s moral natures are received from the moral nature of tian, therefore human nature and the nature of tian are mutually connected. Mencius said that sincerity is the moral nature of tian, whereas the ability to experience and seek for sincerity is the root of the human dao. Mencius raised moral virtues such as humaneness and righteousness to the level of “heavenly honours” (天爵). This means that tian is the same as humans in that it has properties such as humaneness, righteousness, loyalty and trustworthiness, whereas humans’ moral awareness is “what Heaven has given to us” (Mencius 6A15). On the basis of this, Mencius proposed the idea of the unity between fathoming one’s heart-mind, understanding one’s nature and understanding tian: To fully fathom one’s heart-mind is to understand one’s nature. To understand one’s nature is to understand tian. To preserve one’s heart-mind and nourish one’s nature is the way to serve tian.” (Mencius 7A1)

Here, with the idea that the heart-mind, human nature and tian form a self-completing circle, we see the beginnings of the discourse on the nature of heart-mind (心性论). The Neo-Confucians of the Song-Ming period followed the line of thought of the Doctrine of the Mean and the Mencius and provided creative innovations on this concept of tian as having laws and principles (义理). Zhang Zai was the first to raise the idea of “learning arrives at understanding tian” (学至于知天). He charges that the main error of scholars since the Qin-Han period is “understanding humans but not understanding tian, seeking to become a worthy but not becoming a sage.” (“Biography of Zhang Zai” History of Song) Zhang Zai proposed that in order to really understand people one has to first of all understand tian, and in Zhang Zai’s eyes, tian is what he called the “supreme void” (taixu, 太 虚). Zhang Zai says, From the supreme void, there is heaven. From the transformation of vital energy [qi], there is dao. In the unity of the supreme void and qi, there is nature (of man and things). And in the

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unity of nature and consciousness, there is the heart-mind. (“Great Harmony”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

The logic of Zhang Zai’s thinking goes like this: tian (supreme void), dao (vital energy transformation), human nature (supreme void and vital energy) and heartmind (human nature and sense perception), and there is an evolutionary logic between these concepts. This logic is that human nature is rooted in tian; and this is how Zhang Zai links his thought with that of Mencius. Thus, Zhang Zai says, When Mencius talks about understanding one’s nature, understanding tian and learning so that one understands tian, it is so that one can then continuously understand where things come from. Once one understands where things come from, then the appropriateness or not of things will all be understood. One will not know it wordlessly. (“Reply to Fan Xun”, Collected Works of Surviving Lost Texts)

However, because Zhang Zai added the element of “vital energy (qi)” in “human nature” (a mixture of void and vital energy), Zhang Zai, in effect, split human nature into the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) and the human nature of material qi (气质之性). The human nature bestowed by heaven and earth comes from the way (dao) of heaven (tian) and is thus utterly good and completely pure. The human nature of material qi, on the other hand, comes from the transformations of qi and thus contains both good and bad elements. The process of the human cultivation of virtue thus lies in “transforming material qi,” that is, in getting rid of the flaws in the “material qi of human nature” and so returning to the state of the pure good of the “nature bestowed by heaven and earth.” From the above we can ascertain that in Zhang Zai’s philosophical system, the concept of tian has been endowed with the value and principle of pure goodness and is seen as the origins of human nature. Cheng Yi interpreted tian as principle (li, 理). He expounded upon tian, Highest God (di, 帝) and Spirit (shen, 神), that is, the three concepts which traditionally had characteristics of an anthropomorphized deity. He believed that tian was principle (li), Highest God (di) was the way in which principle commands all things, and Spirit was the subtle and imperceptible processes of transformation in nature. As such, in Cheng Yi’s opinion, tian is the principle of nature itself. For Cheng Yi, when one says, “the August tian is enraged”, “this is not to say that there is someone above who is enraged, it is merely the principles of things.” (Book 22, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) Sayings such as “Heaven [tian] punishes the guilty” or “Heaven [tian] commands those with virtue [de]” is but referring to the fact that, “the principles [li] of Heaven [tian] are naturally so.” (Book 2, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) As the Cheng brothers see it, the tian of natural principles has no will and has no particular desire to plan anything. The Cheng brothers’ interpretation of tian as principle completely washed away any god-like characteristics in tian and so has great significance in the historical development of Chinese philosophy. It should be clarified that the principle (li) which the Cheng brothers talked about has many dimensions. The first is the order and regularity of nature. Second, is the standards and norms of society or its moral nature. Third, is the root-body of the cosmos itself, which is to say, it is the rarefication of the li of concrete, specific

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things. It is not limited by space time and is perennially existing; and it will neither increase nor diminish in correspondence with whether humans know of its existence or not. The relationship between the principle of the myriad things and the principle of the root-body is that of “principle is one but its manifestations diverse,” (理一而分殊) Cheng Yi writes, The principle of all things is one. Although there are diverse paths, their endpoint is the same. Thoughts might be numerous, but their endpoint is the same. Although there is an incalculable diversity of events and phenomena, they all unit in one, and nothing can violate against it. (Chapter 3, Annotations of the Book of Changes by the Cheng brothers)

The rarefication of li into an abstract cosmological, root-body is one of the great contributions that the Cheng brothers made towards Chinese philosophy. Zhu Xi inherited the Cheng brothers’ idea that tian is a principle. He explicitly proposed the idea that principle as tian is the origins of the myriad things and that the existence of heavens and earth cannot precede principle. Zhu Xi says, Before heaven and earth, principle could already be identified. Since there was this principle so there was heaven and earth. If there was no principle, then there would be no heaven and earth, no people and objects since they would all lack the means. (Chapter 1, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

Zhu Xi’s contemporary Lu Jiuyuan included heaven and li in the heart-mind. He proposed that, “completely fathoming the heart-mind [makes it] identifies it with heaven.” He said, “the form [体] of heart-mind is exceedingly big, if our heart-mind is fully fathomed, then it can be one with heaven.” (Book 35, The Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan) Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan both endowed tian with law and principle (义 理). Zhu Xi’s discourse on principle discusses the objective principles (li) of tian whereas Lu Jiuyuan’s discourse on the heart-mind brings tian back into the human heart-mind and so makes it a subjective, internal tian; this is the difference between the two of them. After Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan, Confucian discourse on tian did not break any new ground and merely followed the paradigms of Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Lu Jiuyuan, and so no further exposition will be provided. It is worth mentioning the Daoist discourse on tian. The founder of the Daoist school Laozi united tian with the highest philosophical concept of his school, dao. He endowed tian with the properties of dao—spontaneous, self-so, non-purposive in its action—and this is another aspect of the righteousness and principle (义理) interpretation of tian. Laozi believes that tian, like the earth, does not have any anthropomorphic intentions. Like humaneness (仁), it spontaneously manifests itself. What Laozi is doing, in effect, is to equate tian with nature as well as the non-purposiveness of dao. Zhuangzi continued Laozi’s line of thought and took tian as the original nature of nature itself and took humans as that which destroyed that original nature. Zhuangzi says, ‘What do you mean by tian and by the human?’ North Sea Ruo replied, ‘Oxen and horses have four feet—that is what I call their tian. When horses’ heads are haltered, and the noses of oxen are pierced, that is what is called human.’ (“Autumn Floods” Zhuangzi)

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Zhuangzi distinguishes between tian and humans in order to promote not going against the original natures of things. For Zhuangzi, in this way all things can develop in a way appropriate to themselves and so be unfettered and effortless free. Zhuangzi takes the example of a horse. In its natural state the horse’s hooves can cope with snow and frost, its hair can protect it from the cold, when it is hungry it can eat grass and drink water, and when it is happy it can gallop. Once humans brand it with an iron, cut its hooves and put a halter and harness on it, and shut it away in a stable, then the horse is already twenty or thirty percent dead. Do not by the Human extinguish the tian [constitution]; do not for your [Human] purpose extinguish the mandate [of tian]; do not bury your [proper] reputation in [such] a pursuit of it; carefully guard [the way] and do not lose it. (“Autumn Floods” Zhuangzi)

From this we can see that although the Daoist conception of tian also contains laws and principles (义理), the content of its laws and principles is dao—i.e. self-so, non-purposively acting. It furthermore rejects the idea of tian as having a moral content. This then is the main difference between the Daoist and Confucian conception of tian of laws and principles (义理).

References Forke, Alfred. 1907. Lun-Hêng: Philosophical Essays of Wang Ch‘ung. Translated by Alfred Forke. London: Luzac & Co. Queen and Major, Sarah. A., John S. 2016 Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 4

Mandate (ming, 命)

According to the textual research of Mr. Bo Sinian (傅斯年), “the word ‘mandate’ can be traced to the middle of the Western Zhou and reached ascendancy during the late Western Zhou. ‘Mandate’ (命) is the same word as ‘command’ (令) but in a different form.”1 The Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters explains “mandate” as “issuing commands” (发号也) and explains “command” as “commission” (使也). Ruan Yuan’s (阮元) Commentary on the Classics (经籍纂诂) also employs terms such as “rites and laws” (制令也), “commission” (使也), “teachings” (教也), “government decrees” (政令也) to explain “mandate.” Evidently, the word “mandate” is derived from the word “command.” The transition from “command” to “mandate” shows that people’s attentions were turned from the issuing of commands to the receiving of commands, and this is most paradigmatically seen in the concept of “heaven’s command” (天命). The “Covenant of Tang” chapter of the Book of Documents records that, Cheng Tang went on a punitive expedition against Jie because Jie of the Xia dynasty had committed many crimes, and so Heaven issued a command to punish him. Here, the stress in “heaven’s [tian] mandate” (天命) lies in “heaven.” The “The Lord of the West Conquers Li” chapter of the Book of Documents records that, King Zhou of the Shang Dynasty believed that he himself had the right to rule because he had received heaven’s command. In this case, the “command from heaven” (有命在天) is also referring to heaven’s command, but the stress here is on the recipient of the command. This then became an important point of transition, from heaven as the giver of commands to the king as the receiver of commands. In the Western Zhou, we begin to see the term “receiving command” (受命). The “Proclamations of Zhou” (召诰) chapter of the Book of Zhou records that, “only the king receives the mandate.” The mandate here originates in “heaven” (tian), but here the emphasis is placed on the subject who receives that mandate—the king. The “Great Vow” chapter of the Book of Documents has the saying, “I have the mandate” (己有天命) which means that the mandate is here with me. Again, this Sinian. Exegesis on “Nature” and “Mandate” 性命古训辨. Hebei Education Publishers 河北 教育出版, 1996, p. 10.

1 Bo

© Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_4

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makes prominent the fact that the right to rule is a mandate that is “received” (受) as opposed to heaven’s “conferring” (授) of the mandate. The “Major Bright” (The Major Odes) in the Book of Odes has it that, “There came a mandate [ming] from heaven [tian], mandating [ming] this King Wen.” Although “mandate” refers to tian in its origins, but practically speaking, it is referring to “me.” I, myself and the person who possesses and receives the mandate of tian. Here then is a transition point. That is, the transition from tian as the giver of commands to the sovereign as the receiver of the command. The Duke of Zhou, after seeing the transmission of political power from the Xia to the Shang and Zhou proposed the important idea that, “The Heavens’ commands are not constant” (惟命不于常). “King Wen” (The Major Odes) in the Book of Odes also raised the idea that “there is no constancy in the heavens’ commands” (天命 糜常). Although the mandate is hard to maintain, this does not mean that humans are completely passive and are merely subject to the will of heaven (tian). From the Shang’s loss of the mandate of heaven, the rulers from the Zhou dynasty concluded that, “the heavens know nothing of the kind of unconditional love between kin, it only assists those with moral virtue [de]. There is no constancy in the hearts of the common people, they only cherish the memory of the benevolent.” (皇天无亲, 惟德是辅, 民 心无常, 惟惠之怀) (“Command to Cai Zhong” chapter of the Book of Documents). It is due to this historical experience that they formulated the idea of “having virtue (de) in order to be adequate to the heavens” (以德配天), and the mentality that they must respect heaven and safeguard the common people. These early Zhou dynasty worldviews about mandate (ming) came to have a deep and lasting effect on the later Confucian tradition. In the Analects, there are not many occasions in which Confucius talks about mandate (ming) or heaven’s mandate (tianming). Thus, Confucius’s disciple Zigong lamented in Analects 5.13, “The Master’s discourses about human nature, and the way [dao] of Heaven [tian], cannot be heard.” Despite this, however, Confucius’s most heartfelt expressions and most emotionally complex reflections are related to “heaven” (tian) and “mandate” (ming), and addressed either to “heaven” or related to “mandate.” Confucius believed that tian was undoubtedly the highest commander in our lives and so his deepest requests are often directed at tian. For example, in Analects 11.9, “When Yan Hui passed away, the Master cried, ‘Oh! Heaven has bereft me! Heaven has bereft me!’ Or in Analects 6.28, when “The Master had an audience Nan Zi, and Zi Lu was displeased. Whereupon the Master swore, ‘If I have done improperly, may Heaven punish me! may Heaven punish me!’” As well as Analects 3.13, “He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.” In all these examples “tian” is undoubtedly used in the sense of an ultimate arbiter and highest commander in the human realm, as such, Confucius can be seen as inheriting the Shang-Zhou conception of tian. In the Analects, Confucius’ most profound and helpless reflections are addressed to “mandate.” For example, when Bo Niu contracted a mortal illness and was about to die, apart from saying, “How else should such a man be stricken with such an illness?” Confucius could also attribute his demise to “mandate.” Although Confucius most definitely does not believe that “tian” would forsake the dao, for Confucius,

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profound questions such as the rise and fall of the “proper way” (dao), when and how “dao” gains ascent, are all matters related to “mandate.” Not only is Gong Boliao powerless to change this, even Confucius is without the means to do anything about it. For Confucius, “mandate” is undoubtedly rooted in heaven, but manifests itself in human affairs. It is the direction and tendency of one’s life which one can do nothing about, and as such is a fundamental limit on human freedom. Although Confucius is helpless in the face of the limits that tian and ming impose, Confucius still does not “resent Heaven, nor blame others” (Analects 14.35). Instead, Confucius maintains a mentality and outlook whereby, “in his eagerness to pursue knowledge forgets his food, in his joy forgets his sorrows and who grows old without noticing the passage of time” (Analects 7.19) and faces all that life throws at him with unperturbed selfpossession, to the extent that he believes that those, “who do not know the mandate [ming], have no way of being an exemplary person.” (Analects 20.3). The Doctrine of the Mean proposed that, “Heaven’s [tian] mandate [ming] is called human nature [xing]” and so linked “heaven’s mandate” with human moral nature.” When Zigong said that the Master’s “discourses about human nature, and the way [dao] of Heaven [tian], cannot be heard” he is relating “human nature [xing]” and “way of Heaven.” The nature of this relationship, however, was not explored in the Analects. From Confucius’ statement that those“who do not know the mandate [ming], have no way of being an exemplary person,” we can almost infer that mandate is the moral nature that tian endows in us; it is the means by which we can have proper conduct. Understood in this way we can better understand what Confucius means: one who does not know their human nature (xing) has no way of being an exemplary person. The fact that the opening chapter of the Doctring of the Mean opens with “Heaven’s [tian] mandate [ming] is called human nature [xing]” suggests that it is inheriting and refining Confucius’s ideas. In this way, what was previously an external mandate is now internalized as human being’s moral nature. What was previously an external authority is now a guide and measure within human beings themselves. Mencius inherited the Doctrine of the Mean’s ideas and opened the path between inner nature and the external Heaven’s command. He says, To preserve one’s heart-mind and nourish one’s nature is the means by which to serve Heaven [tian]. To not become conflicted over the length of one’s life but to cultivate oneself and await one’s mandate [ming] is the means by which one establishes one’s mandate [ming]. (7A1)

Here, both “Heaven” and “command” are no longer a transcendent authority beyond the reach of human beings, but something which one can get a handle on through preserving, nourishing and cultivating oneself. “Heaven” is something which can be “served,” and “mandate” is something which can be established. The agency for both serving and establishing lies with human beings, and so the initiative for opening the path between human and Heaven is within human hands. As Mencius says, Everything is mandate. But one only accepts one’s proper mandate. Thus, someone who understands the mandate does not stand beneath a crumbling wall. To die through fathoming the way [dao] is one’s proper mandate. To die as a criminal is not one’s proper mandate. (7A2)

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Mencius believes that one’s fate is in one’s own hands, and thus mandate is not some mysterious thing, but rather something that can be known; one can “understand the mandate” (zhiming, 知命). In the above example, standing beneath a crumbling wall is to court disaster—this is something that everyone knows—to stand underneath it or not is thus up to one’s own decision. From this perspective, therefore, one’s fate is in one’s own hands. The fact that there is birth necessarily means that there will be death, this is but the natural rhythm of things. Mencius believes that a natural birth and death is a proper mandate, but a death due to the punishment of a crime is not a proper death and thus not a proper mandate. Although humans are connected with Heaven, and humans have their own means of understanding Heaven and serving Heaven, “Heaven” and “mandate” still represent the highest authority in one’s life and thus represent an ultimate limit on one’s freedom. Mencius says, “When it is done without anyone doing it, this is due to Heaven. When there is a result without anyone causing it, this is due to Mandate.” (5A6) Of course, Mencius believes that in the face of Heaven and mandate, one should actively seek for those things that one should have, and that one should submit to the mandate with regard to those “external” things that one should not have, or is not necessary to have: Seek it and you will get it, abandon it and you will lose it. In this case, seeking helps in getting it, for the seeking is internal to oneself. Although there is a proper way to seek for it, however, the getting it depends on mandate, thus seeking for it does not help in getting it as the what is sought for is external to us. (7A3)

“Internal to oneself” (在我者) is principally referring to human being’s moral nature. Mencius believes this is what humans should have and originally do have. Having or not having it depends on whether one seeks for it or not. What is “external to us” (在 外者), on the other hand, principally refers to things such as having a long or short life and being rich or poor. For Mencius, therefore, although “there is a proper way to seek for it” (求之有道), whether or not we get it depends on “mandate.” From this, we can see that for Mencius, the connection between Heaven and humans is principally with regard to morality. For Mencius, although it is within human nature to desire pleasant flavours, sights, sounds and odours, whether we fulfil these desires or not is dependent upon “mandate.” The real exemplary person (junzi), therefore, does not consider them as issues pertaining to human nature, and does not see them as necessary conditions for the realization of human nature. Whilst objective circumstances place objective limits on whether fathers and son, rulers and minister, guests and hosts can abide by humaneness (仁), righteousness (义), ritual propriety (礼) and wisdom (知) and whether the sages can carry out the way (dao), the real Confucian never alters their conduct with respect to “humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom.” The real Confucian, furthermore, will only regard their success or failure as owing to their own human nature and allotment (本分), and will not indulge in blaming the objectively existing conditions that are “mandate.” This is what is called “accepting one’s proper mandate” (顺受其正). In life, although there are many limitations and inopportune circumstances, the real exemplary person will necessarily “neither resent Heaven nor blame others.” Even less would they indiscriminately blame all their

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troubles on the mandate. The real exemplary gentleman accepts their troubles, but on the basis of that acceptance, fulfil their role as a human being, in order to realize their human nature. As should be clear then, whilst the Confucians admit the fact of mandate, as well as the limitations that this places on them, they do not conclude thereby that life merely boils down to “mandate” itself. For Xunzi, “There is constancy in Heaven [tian]. It does not exist because of [sage kings like] Yao, nor does it cease to exist because of [tyrants like] Jie.” (“Discourse on Heaven”) Xunzi believes that the processes of nature cannot be altered by human will, as it has its own rhythms and patterns, but humans are also not completely passive with regard to it. He raised the ideas of being “compliant to mandate” (顺命) and “controlling Heaven’s mandate in order to use it.” Being “compliant to mandate” means respecting the natural rhythm of the development of things, and not going against this rhythm. “Controlling Heaven’s mandate in order to use it” means using this natural rhythm in order to serve the people. Both being “compliant to mandate” and “controlling Heaven’s mandate in order to use it” affirm the active role that humans can play. In order to be “compliant to mandate” and to “control Heaven’s mandate in order to use it,” one must first of all “understand mandate” (知命). Xunzi believed that humans have the ability to understand phenomena and, conversely, these phenomena are understandable by humans. As Xunzi sees it, Heaven exists necessarily, but mandate only exists incidentally, this is “When one encounters opportunities, this is called the mandate” (节遇之谓 命) (“Correct Names”) “Encountering opportunities” is merely fortuitous and so not something that humans can control; it is purely external. Xunzi says, Whether one is worthy or unworthy depends on one’s own material. What a person does or does not do depends on the person himself. What one encounters or does not encounter depends on the times. Whether one dies or lives depends on mandate. Now if there is a person, but he does not encounter the right time, then even though he is worthy, can he get anywhere? But if he does encounter the right time, then what difficulties will there be for him?

He also says, If the king of Chu has a thousand chariots following behind him, this is not because he is wise. If the exemplary person only eats wild vegetables and drinks plain water, this is not because he is foolish. It is just because of the circumstances. (“Discourse on Heaven”)

Circumstances are thus merely fortuitous. In the face of the necessarily so, humans can put their agency to full use, but in front of the fortuitous humans are helpless; Xunzi thinks that this is the content of “mandate.” If one is so powerless in the face of one’s fate then what can one do? Like Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi believes that one should fulfil one’s role, and carry out to the utmost what is within one’s abilities. He says, for example, “Thus, the exemplary person learns broadly, considers things deeply, cultivates themselves and straightens their conduct, so as to await his opportunity” (“The Right-Hand Vessel”) and, The exemplary person respects what rests with himself and does not long for what rests with Heaven. The petty man forsakes what rests with himself and longs instead for what rests with Heaven. (“Discourse on Heaven”)

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Mandate is also an important concept in Zhuangzi’s philosophy. In the chapter, “The Full Understanding of Life” Zhuangzi defines mandate as that which is just the way things are, without my knowing why they are the way they are. Zhuangzi’s definition is thus comparable to Mencius’s idea that, “When there is a result without anyone causing it, this is due to mandate.” If in Zhuangzi’s case, my not knowing why they are the way they are is a negative definition of mandate, then, in the following, when he says, “Seeking to find out who had done it but not finding anything,” would be a positive definition of mandate: I was thinking in vain about how it was that I was brought to such extreme state. My parents would surely not wish me to be so poor? Heaven covers all equally and earth supports all equally, so how could they be so partial as to single me out to be poor? Seeking to find out who had done it but not finding anything, and yet I am in this extreme state all the same, this must be the mandate! (“The Great and Honoured Master”)

Zhuangzi believes that humans cannot affect mandate to even the slightest extent. For Zhuangzi, “mandate” is something that is already set in stone, and what people should do is to adapt themselves to it as opposed to changing it. The chapter, “The Great and Honoured Master” (大宗师) says, furthermore, that life and death are all determined by “mandate” and cannot be changed, in the same way that day and night continuously replace each other. Since “mandate cannot be altered” (命不可 变), Zhuangzi asks that people do not undermine the natural changes in nature, and not use cunning in order to resist what the mandate has already planned; the smartest choice is to oblige in what mandate has appointed. Although Zhuangzi’s discourse of “resting in mandate” (安命) has negative elements, it is not unreasonable and without value. The point of life, after all, might not be one of ceaseless resistance; the ideal life might be harmonious and peaceful, and so the point of Zhuangzi’s “resting in mandate” is to help people achieve inner peace. Mozi proposed the idea of “against mandate” and heavily criticized the ShangZhou idea of heaven’s mandate. He juxtaposed “effort” with “mandate” and believed that the order of a state was due to the endeavours of the sovereign. If a worthy gains a good reputation, then this is due to his own efforts, and not because of a pre-ordained mandate: Consider the disorder formerly wrought by Zhou and how King Wu brought order. […] Under Jie and Zhou, the world was in disorder. Under Tang and Wu, the world was well ordered. The good order of the world was due to the efforts of Tang and Wu. The disorder of the world was due to the crimes of Jie and Zhou. From this point of view, peace and danger, order and disorder lie in the ruler’s governance. How, then, can we say that this is mandate [ming]? […] Nowadays, men who are worthy and virtuous respect worthiness and love the Way [dao]. Therefore, they obtain the rewards of kings, dukes and great officers above, and they get the praise of the common people below, so that subsequently and their good name is heard throughout the world. Is this because of mandate? Again, this should be attributed to their efforts. (“Against Mandate III”)

More praiseworthy than this is that Mozi exposed the roots of the idea of mandate. He says, “For mandate was an invention of cruel and tyrannical kings and the practice of poor people.” (“Against Mandate III”) He reasons,

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In this case, then, how do we know that mandate is the way of the wicked? Formerly, the poor people of earlier generations indulged in drink and food and were lazy in the conduct of their affairs, so that the material for clothing and food was insufficient and hunger and cold greatly troubled them. But they did not acknowledge that: “We are weak and unworthy, and not diligent in the conduct of affairs.” Instead, they said: “Our mandate has determined that we are poor.” Formerly, the cruel and tyrannical kings of earlier generations could not control the desires of their ears and eyes or the depravity of their hearts. They were not submissive to their parents so subsequently the kingdom was lost and their state ruined. But they did not acknowledge that: “I am weak and unworthy and I was not diligent in my conduct of government.” Instead, they had to say: “It was my mandate surely to lose it [the kingdom].” (“Against Mandate I”)

4.1 Two In the Han dynasty there was the saying that there are three mandates. The Comprehensive Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion (白虎通) says that: There is the old-age mandate [寿命] [to denote] those who observe the rules; there is the accident mandate [遭命] [to denote] those who meet a violent [death]; there is the merit mandate [随命] [to denote] those who receive according to their desserts.2 (“Destinies”, Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion)

Zhao Qi said that, mandate has three names, if one does good and gets the good, this is called old-age mandate [受命], if one does good but gets the bad, this is called accident mandate, if one does the bad and gets the bad then this is called merit mandate. (Chapter and Verse Exegesis of the Mengzi)

Wang Chong was of the opinion that merit mandate and accident mandate were in conflict with each other. He said, It is said that three different kinds of mandate can be distinguished, the natural mandate [正命], the merit mandate [随命] and the accident mandate [遭命]. […] A merit mandate is mutually exclusive with an accident mandate, and an accident mandate is mutually exclusive with a merit mandate, on what basis then do the Confucians establish the three kinds of mandate? (“What is Meant by Mandate”, Arguments Weighed)

Wang Chong divides mandate into old-age (寿命) mandate and fortune mandate (禄命), and so opposes in principle the notion of merit mandate. The so-called oldage mandate refers to the “mandate of death, birth, longevity and premature death” (死生寿夭之命), whereas the so-called fortune mandate refers to the “mandate of honour, lowliness, poverty and wealth.” Wang Chong believed that one’s mandate is determined by one’s endowment of vital energy. With regard to age-old mandate Wang Chong says, 2 Som

(1952: 572), modified. Throughout this translation, I have made use of Som’s translation of Discussions in White Hall Pavillion.

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Strong and long-living, weak and prematurely dying refer to how much vital energy one is endowed with. […] If one is endowed with a lot of vital energy then one will have a strong constitution. If one has a strong constitution then one can live long [命长]. If one is endowed with little vital energy then one’s constitution will be weak. When one’s constitution is weak then one’s life will be short [命短], when one’s life is short then one will have many illnesses. (“Long Life and Qi”, Arguments Weighed)

With regard to the fortune mandate, he says: As regards the endowment of wealth and honour, it is like the endowment of vital energy in one’s nature, that is, one is receiving the essence [精] that is emanating from each star. Of all the stars in the sky, some are stars of wealth and honour and others are of poverty and lowliness. When one receives the star of wealth and honour then one is wealthy and honourable. When one receives the star of poverty and lowliness then one is poor and lowly. This is why we say it is up to Heaven [tian]. (“What is Meant by Mandate”, Arguments Weighed)

As such, Wang Chong is of the opinion that whether one lives, dies, has a long life or dies prematurely, whether one is honourable or lowly, poor or rich, this is all determined by mandate, and has nothing to do with one’s abilities or moral character. Man’s success as well as his troubles all depend upon mandate. It determines whether he dies, lives, lives lone or dies prematurely and whether he is to be honourable, lowly, poor or wealthy. From the princes and dukes down to the common people, from the sages and worthies down to the illiterate people, all those who have a head and eyes and blood in their veins, none is without a mandate. (“On Mandate and Fortune”, Arguments Weighed)

He says, furthermore, Consequently, men of great talent and good conduct will not necessarily have wealth and honour. Those of little knowledge and virtue will not necessarily be poor and lowly. Sometimes those of great talent and good conduct have a bad mandate, are demoted and cannot advance. Those of little knowledge and virtue, due to a good mandate, are employed and advance greatly. Thus, whether one manages affairs intelligently or stupidly, whether one’s conduct is upright or corrupt is a matter of one’s nature and ability. Whether one is able to gain a government position, whether one is honourable or lowly, whether is able to be poor or wealthy in business is up to mandate and opportunity. (“On Mandate and Fortune”, Arguments Weighed)

As such, Wang Chong absolutely refutes the idea that human agency is able to have any effect: Mandate cannot be forced, and opportunities cannot be gained through effort. Once one knows that everything is up to Heaven, then one can be contented and at peace. (“On Mandate and Fortune”, Arguments Weighed)

In opposition to Wang Chong’s denial of human agency and his fatalism, the Han dynasty scholar, Zhong Changtong proposed that “human conduct is the root, and the way of Heaven is the branch.” There were three dimensions to Zhong Changtong’s claim. First, from the history of the rise and fall of the feudal dynasties, especially the Qin and Han, he thinks that it is evident that each dynasty experiences three stages. The first is when sovereignty is taken from a predecessor, second, when society is relatively stable and third, when society is on the path towards decline. For Zhong

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Changtong, these are all “the tendencies of the eternal nature of the way of Heaven” (天道常然之大数). The reason why a new dynasty becomes established is because the feudal lords “compete with their talent and wisdom and manifest their military prowess” as opposed to a largess from “Heaven above” (上天). Once the new dynasty is established, their valiant spirit is extinguished and officials and the common people have all their ambitions already met, and so they “live peacefully and take pleasure in their professions, bring up their children and grandchildren, all in the world is mild and mellow, and all return to the imperial government. (“Biography of Wang Chong, Wang Fu and Zhongzhang Tong”, Book of the Later Han) When sovereignty is consolidated, even foolish kings are able to “bring about largesses like heaven and earth and intimidate like ghosts and spirits.” (ibid.) This is all affected by the real authority of the ruler and not because of the blessings and protection from heaven. Foolish kings from later periods, “in seeing that no one in the world dares defy them, believe themselves to be comparable to the indestructible nature of heaven and earth.” (ibid.) Thereupon, they start becoming corrupt and degenerate, practice usury on the common people and this results in “the central kingdom in tumult, the four barbarians molesting and revolting, everything collapsing like a house of cards, and everything is gone in a day.” (ibid.) The decline and fall of a dynasty are also not due to “Heaven’s mandate” but because the corruption of the rulers resulted in “the luck of the state and the force of situations passing away” (运徙 势去) As such, Zhong Changtong comes to the following conclusion: “those who trust in the way of Heaven [tiandao] and turn one’s back on human affairs, is a king who is muddled, confused and deluded, is a vassal who overturns a country and destroys the household.” (“Principles in Disorder”, Unrestrained assertions) Following this, from the perspective of production, if one wishes to have gains, then one must put in the work, as how much one gains is correlated with how much work on puts in. Without work, even under the best conditions, one will reap no gain. Finally, Zhong Changtong, following the scientific developments in the medicine of his time, believed that, Coordinating the principal qi [神气], avoiding the wind and dampness, moderating one’s food, following one’s likes and desires, this is the way towards longevity. Should one fall ill through misfortune, then it should be treated through acupuncture and medicine. (“Unrestrained Assertions”, Cited in Book 45, Important Matters of Governance from All Types of Literature3 )

If one relinquished this human effort, and blindly chased after “rituals for absurd ghosts and spirits”, “strange and deceptive talk”, “incantations and amulets for warding away spirits”, then “this is what people with knowledge all deeply despise.” (ibid.)

3 群书治要.

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4.2 Three In the Wei-Jin period, Guo Xiang was the philosopher who brought Neo-Daoism to maturity. His main work was the Commentary on the Zhuangzi. Like Zhuangzi, he also saw mandate as something that was necessarily so. He said, “the way things are, without my knowing why they are the way they are, is mandate” (“Commentary on In the Human World”, Zhuangzi), “mandate refers to the self-so of all things, without purposive action [mediating them].” With regard to Guo Xiang’s conception of “mandate,” what is worth point out is that he takes humanly made things to be the nature of things. Zhuangzi believes that, “When horses’ heads are haltered, and the noses of oxen are pierced” this is to violate the original nature of the horse and oxen, and therefore, opposes it. In Guo Xiang’s interpretation, however, the nature of oxen and horse is to be of service to humans, thus not to refuse halters and piercings is “the proper way of the mandate of Heaven.” (天命之固当). Although they are attached to human affairs, this is necessary for manifesting the original nature of oxen and horses. That the humanly created, Confucian ethical code (名教) does not conflict with human nature is the central theme of Neo-Daoism; this is what is known as the relationship between Confucian ethical codes (名教) and nature. Ji Kang believed that Confucian ethical codes restrict human nature, and so proposed that one should, “transcend Confucian ethical code and yield to the natural.” (越 名教而任自然) Guo Xiang, however, believed that Confucian ethical codes were natural, that Confucian ethical codes are what human nature needs, and so they are not mutually exclusionary. Although the sages reside in the temples, their hearts are still within the mountains and forests, which is to say that having Confucian ethical codes on the outside is no constraint on internal freedom. Guo Xiang’s discourse is a development of Zhuangzi’s idea of “resting one’s heart-mind” (安心). Guo Xiang’s idea that “Confucian ethical codes are natural” (名教即自然) is a self-conscious harmonization of human agency and the mandate of heaven, and has great value for inspiring contentment in one’s life and establishing one’s mandate. Han Yu of the Tang dynasty inherited Mencius’s ideas and believed that one’s character and abilities are determined by oneself whereas whether one is honourable or lowly, lucky or meets with disaster is determined by heaven’s mandate. What one can determine for oneself, one should try one’s best to achieve, but with regard to what one has no control over, one should just let it be and not afford it too much effort. Liu Zongyuan, however, greatly opposed this kind of determinism and believed that everything was determined by oneself and had nothing to do with heaven’s mandate. He said, “transforming catastrophe into prosperity, changing the crooked into the straight, how can this be anything to do with heaven’s mandate? It all resides in my human effort.” (Rhapsody on Curing Fatal Disease of the Vital Organs) This is a maximal trust in human agency. Liu Yuxi exposed the social or genealogical roots of the discourse of heaven’s mandate. First, he used the example of sailing. He points out that when the boat is in a small river, the speed, stopping and starting of the boat are all within human control. That the boat sails smoothly or whether it tips over or gets stranded are all

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because of humans. As such, “nobody on the boat ever talks about Heaven, why is this? Because the principle [li] is clear.” (Part II, Discourse on Heaven) However, when the boat is in the sea, the speed, stopping and starting of the boat are not all fully within human control, as such, “there was nobody on the boat who did not talk about Heaven, why? Because the principle is not clear.” (Part I, Discourse on Heaven) When people cannot control their own fates, it necessarily follows that people will believe in mandate. Even more significant, Liu Yuxi speculated on the social or genealogical roots of fatalism. He was of the opinion that the discourse of fatalism arises whenever laws break down and right and wrong are inverted. If, the law is universally practiced, then what is right is commonly understood to be right, what is wrong is commonly understood to be wrong, then everyone in the world will be awarded if they accord with the way [dao] and will be punished when they violate the good. (Part I, Discourse on Heaven)

In this way, people will trust in their own abilities and not plead to Heaven’s mandate. Ultimately, he comes to the conclusion that when one lives in a well ordered society where the law is clear, then everyone will know the reason for why there is fortune and misfortune, and so will not direct their gratitude or resentment to heaven. When one lives in a badly ordered society where the law is not clear, then people will not understand the reasons for their fortune and misfortune, and so attribute successes and failures that were in fact due to human action, to heaven.

4.3 Four Zhang Zai of the Song dynasty distinguished “mandate” from “happenstance” (遇). He says, the endowment of mandate is the same as human nature, happenstance [遇] is fortuitous [适 然]. […] When the action is the same, but the recompense is different, it is difficult to call this mandate, this can be called happenstance. (“Designations of Qian”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

The fortuitous is accidental, so “happenstance” refers the accidental, “mandate” in contrast to “happenstance” refers to the necessary. In the following, Zhang Zai explicitly points out the content of “mandate”: it is the function of mandate to receive. In receiving, it follows specific principles. […] When in the full development of my nature and the investigation of things to the utmost there are things that cannot be changed, they would be in accord with principles applied to me. Mandate is that whose operation even heaven cannot stop4 (“Enlightenment Resulting from Sincerity”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance).

“that whose operated even heaven cannot stop” means that “mandate” is a kind of necessary force of situations. Cheng Hao does not agree with Zhang Zai’s division 4 Chan (1969: 509–510), modified. Throughout this translaiton, I have made great use of Wing-Tsit

Chan’s A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy.

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of mandate and happenstance into two. The Recorded Conversations of the Cheng brothers says, Q. What is the difference between mandate and happenstance? A. Whether men chance on something or not is mandate. Q. At the battle of Chang Ping four hundred thousand men died. How can the same death have been mandated for all of them? A. This was nonetheless mandate. They chanced on Bai Qi [白起] because it was decreed that it should happen like this. This is the less difficult to understand since the Zhao soldiers were all men of one country; it is common enough for men from all over ‘the five lakes and four seas’ to die together. Q. There are criminals who become kings and ministers who starve to death, men who fall from high rank and men who rise from low rank; are all such things mandate? A. Everything is mandate. It is because of what is called mandate that there are such inequalities of fortune; there is nothing strange about it. (Book 18, The Surviving Works of the Chengs of Henan)

Zhang Zai distinguished between mandate and happenstance and believed that mandate is necessarily so whereas happenstance is accidental. Cheng Yi, however, believes that happenstance is also mandate and so happenstance is also a manifestation of necessity. Cheng Yi thus proposed the idea that “it is not necessary to talk about mandate”: The worthy knows about righteousness and that is all. Mandate is within this [righteousness]. Those peoples below average use mandate to deal with righteousness. For example, it is commonly said, “there is a [correct] way to seek it, but whether or not one obtains it depends on mandate.” This [means] that the seeking does not actually aid in the obtaining. [These people] know that mandate cannot be sought for, and so they do not seek for it. The worthy would seek for it by means of the [correct] way and obtain it through righteousness. [Their obtaining it] is not necessarily due to mandate. (Book 2, ibid.)

The Cheng brothers’ view that “it is not necessary to talk about mandate” expressed a positive attitude of not paying heed to personal benefit or danger and personal harm or prosperity. Zhu Xi greatly appreciated the intellectual direction in the Cheng brothers’ idea of not talking about mandate and said, “[the Cheng brothers’ views on mandate] has a positive effect on scholars and is one of the things that previous sages have not yet mentioned.” Zhu Xi divided “mandate” into the mandate of principle (li) and the mandate of vital energy (qi). For Zhu Xi, the principle within humans is called human nature (xing), and so with regard to humans, the mandate of principle is the mandate of human nature (性命). Humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, for example, all belong to the mandate of human nature. As there are different densities and degrees of clarity to vital energy, so humans are endowed with different vital energies, and so there are differences of poor and wealthy, longevity and premature death, worthy and unworthy; this is the vital energy mandate (气命). Both human (moral) nature and the nature of one’s vital energy, however, are all endowed by Heaven, it is “Heaven’s command” (天令), and so, in this regard, both are called “mandate.” According to Zhu Xi’s theory of the simultaneity of principle and vital

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energy, the principle mandate and the vital energy mandate are inseparable. The Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi records that, Someone asked: “Heaven’s mandate as the mandate of human nature and the mandate of death and life are different, why is this? The Master replied: “death and life are called mandate because they are combined with vital energy. There are differences, however, in the density of the endowment of vital energy. Heaven’s mandate as the mandate of human nature refers to pure principle, but Heaven’s mandate is ultimately inseparable from vital energy. (Book 4)

It is further recorded that, Discussions about mandate are addressed only in terms of principle and only in terms of vital energy. The Master replied: “Both are inseparable from each other. Without vital energy Heaven would be without the means to give the mandate to people, without vital energy people would be without the means to receive the mandate from Heaven. (Book 4)

The mandate of human nature is the human nature of heaven’s mandate, and this is completely good. Everyone has the human nature of heaven’s mandate, but this must be mixed with vital energy and become the human nature of vital energy, and it is from this that there is the distinction between good and bad. The mandate of human nature is endowed by heaven, it can be eclipsed but not lost. The mandate of human nature thus cannot be moved. The mandate of human nature, however, is within humans, and so humans can overcome the interference that vital energy can wreck on the human nature of heaven’s mandate, and so allow the human nature of heaven’s mandate to fully manifest itself. From this perspective, “the mandate of human nature” is something which can be changed. Practice and human nature are complementary, this is why there are such differences between peoples. [Within this] there are necessarily things that cannot be moved and changed. Human nature, however, was originally good, even those of utmost badness, can one day follow the good. [If they] followed the good for one day, then they are good people for one day, [so] how can there be the principle of immovable and unchangeable [human nature]! [We should] follow the saying of Yi Chuan [Cheng Yi], that is “even the nature of people like the brutal, violent, criminal and bad Shang Xin [king Zhou of the Shang] can be moved and changed. (Book 47)

With regard to the “mandate of vital energy,” Zhu Xi believes that because people are endowed with different vital energy, this produces many differences. “Longevity, premature death, poverty or wealth, worthiness or foolishness are all decided by the endowment of vital energy, and so cannot be changed.” Zhu Xi, therefore, believes that what decides someone’s fate is not just the endowment of vital energy, it is also up to the chances and opportunities one gets. It is the combination of the endowment of vital energy and the chances one gets that decides one’s fate. This qi encountering this opportune moment is his good mandate; not encountering this opportune moment is the so-called precisely meeting the [bad] times. For example, at the battle of Chang Ping four hundred thousand men died, this was only because they encountered Bai Qi. Unfortunately, it just so happened that these people encountered [Bai Qi], this is mandate. (Book 4)

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The Tang dynasty politician Li Mi (李泌) once proposed that “sovereigns and ministers can create their own mandate” (君相可以造命). The Ming dynasty Wang Gen (王艮) also proposed that “the great person creates their own mandate.” When one is able, in unpropitious circumstances to try to assert one’s agency and actively influence things, this is called “creating mandate” (造命). Wang Fuzhi not only believed that lords and ministers can create their own mandate, the common people, through self-cultivation, can also create their own mandate. The development changes of events all follow a certain pattern, once one recognizes and respects these patterns, this is, in effect, to hold one’s fate in one’s own hands. The recognition and respect for patterns, in itself, demonstrates human beings’ subjective agency, and as such can be called “creating mandate” (造命). From the discourse on “mandate” from the Shang-Zhou until the Ming-Qing period, one can discern two main patterns of development. One is the development from an external mysterious power towards an objective, natural and social order which can be controlled by humans. Second is the development from mysterious external will towards an internal human nature. The path between Xunzi’s idea of “controlling human’s mandate in order to use it” and Wang Fuzhi’s “creating one’s own mandate” was long and torturous and beset by many setbacks, evidencing the upward-spiralling pattern of historical development. From Confucius and Mencius who began the transformation of command into an internal nature, till the Cheng-Zhu idea of the “mandate of human nature,” the idea of a mysterious, external power was raised to the height of the philosophical discourse of root-body (本体). This evidenced the inner logic of philosophical development. In all, the human understanding of “mandate” was one of progressive rationalism.

References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Som, Tjan Tjoe. 1952. Po Hu T’ung: The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Chapter 5

Heart-Mind (xin, 心)

“Heart-mind” is a concept which appeared very early in Chinese philosophy. In the oracle bones script, we can already find this term, and its original meaning referred to the heart (as organ) in humans and animals. At the same time, “heart-mind” is a very special concept in Chinese philosophy as it was perceived to be the organ of thought. People’s ideas, feelings, understanding, psychology, goodness and badness etc. are all intimately related to the concept of heart-mind. As a result, all Chinese philosophers throughout the dynasties have paid particular attention to “heart-mind” so that it became an important concept from epistemology, morality, self-cultivation to the way of heaven (tiandao, 天道).

5.1 One Heart-mind appeared with great frequency in the earliest classics of the Chinese canon such as the Book of Changes, Book of Documents, Book of Odes and Zouzhuan. In these texts, it referred to both the biological organ and an organ of thought but had not yet become an independent philosophical concept. In the pre-Qin period, those who first provided heart-mind with systematic, philosophical expression were the Confucians, Mencius and Xunzi and the Daoist, Zhuangzi. The key characteristic of the Mencian discourse of heart-mind is that he attributes all social principles such as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom to the root cause of heart-mind so that heart-mind has a moral character. For Mencius, all humans are born with the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐), shame and disdain (羞恶), deference (辞让), approval and disapproval (是非). These four heart-minds are the starting point of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The heart-mind of commiseration and compassion is the sprout of humaneness. The heartmind of shame and disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The heart-mind of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety. The heart-mind of approving and disapproving is the sprout of wisdom.” (Mencius 2A6) © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_5

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As such, moral ideas such as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are congenital to human beings; this is the Mencian discourse on the original goodness of human nature. As Mencius takes humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom as what distinguishes human nature from animals, that which produces the four heart-minds of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom become the root of being human itself. This is why Mencius says: From this we can see that if one is without the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of shame and disdain, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of deference, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of approval and disapproval, one is not human. (Mencius 2A6)

Based on the discourse of the goodness of human nature, in his political thought, Mencius proposed the idea of “humane government” (renzheng, 仁政) and understood humane government to be the result of the sovereign’s extension of his own heart-mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. All men have a heart-mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. The former kings had heart-minds that could not bear to see the suffering of others, so they had governments that could not bear to see the suffering of others. If one puts into practice a government that cannot bear to see the suffering of others by means of a heart-mind that cannot bear the suffering of others, then bringing order to the world is in the palm of your hand. (Mencius 2A6)

In establishing his political thought on the basis of the heart-mind which cannot bear to see others’ suffering, practical political principles are directly related to the concept of heart-mind. Although everyone is equipped with a heart-mind of humaneness and righteousness, it needs to be maintained and preserved. If it is not well cultivated then the original heart-mind of humaneness and righteousness will be lost, and bad actions will be produced. The loss of the original heart-mind is mainly due to temptations of the senses and the desire for profit. The way to cultivate the heart-mind is in having few desires: For cultivating the heart-mind, nothing is better than having few desires. If someone has few desires, in some things he may not be able to keep his heart-mind, but they will be few. If someone has many desires, in some things he may be able to keep his heart-mind, but they will be few. (Mencius 7B35)

It is only in having few desires that one can preserve the original goodness of the heart-mind, as such heart-mind is also a central concept of the Mencius discourse of cultivation. In Mencius’ philosophy, the heart-mind is also the basis for reaching the dao of the heavens (tiandao, 天道). Mencius believes that the heart-mind, like the ears, eyes, mouth and nose, are all human beings’ material organs. What sets the heart-mind apart from the rest, however, is that it has the function of thought and understanding. It is because the ears, eyes, mouth and nose do not have the capacity of thought and understanding that it is often tempted by material desires and are led on by them. Through its capacity for thought, the heart-mind can come to understand phenomena

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and the reasons behind them. It is through giving scope to these epistemological capacities that the heart-mind can come to understand its own good nature and thereby reach heaven’s command and the way of heaven. With regard to this Mencius says, To fully fathom one’s heart-mind is to understand one’s nature. To understand one’s nature is to understand the heavens. To preserve one’s heart-mind and nourish one’s nature is the means to serve the heavens. (Mencius 7A1)

Fully fathoming one’s heart-mind, understanding one’s nature, and understanding the heavens, is both an epistemological process, as well as a process of cultivating moral virtue. What is ultimately arrived at is a state of the union between the heavens and human beings. As we can see from the above, in Mencius’s philosophy the heart-mind is a key concept which links together discourses on human nature, epistemology, selfcultivation, politics and way of the heavens. Mencius’ discourse on the heavens had a profound effect on later Chinese philosophy and is the starting point of the study of the heart-mind (心学) in the Chinese tradition. If Mencius’ discourse on the heart-mind mainly emphasizes the moral content of the heart-mind, then Xunzi’s discourse on the heart-mind mainly emphasizes its epistemological content. Xunzi is of the opinion that the heart-mind is congenitally endowed with the function of thought and understanding. The heart-mind’s capacity for understanding means that it can discipline, order itself, make decisions, make demands, act and desist; the heart-mind is equipped with the capacity for judging good from bad. As naturally endowed organs, the ears, eyes, nose, mouth and body can come to have perceptual knowledge of external phenomena due to their specific perceptual faculties, but they are not able to assume each other’s abilities. The heartmind occupies a central position and can administer the five senses. The ears, eyes, nose, mouth and body are thus called the “heavenly faculties” (tianguan, 天官) whereas the heart-mind is called the “heavenly lord.” (“Discourse on Heaven”). It is precisely due to its naturally endowed epistemological capacities and ability to judge right from wrong that the heart-mind is the commander of the entire body and its spiritual master. It issues commands to the entire body but is not itself subject to the body’s command, “The heart-mind is the lord of the body and the master of one’s spirit and intelligence. It issues orders, but it takes orders from nothing” (“Undoing Fixation”). The heart-mind, however, is not necessarily able to give scope to its epistemological abilities in all contexts. In order to allow its epistemological abilities to display themselves, the heart-mind needs to reside in a condition of “empty single-minded stillness” (虚一而静). “Empty” refers to not letting the existing knowledge that one has interfer in or obstruct the reception of new knowledge. “Single-minded” refers to not letting an understanding of another phenomenon interfere with understanding the phenomenon at hand. “Stillness” refers to not letting one’s free-wheeling thoughts disturb one’s normal understanding. The state of “empty single-minded stillness” is a kind of clarity in one’s frame of mind. In this state of clarity, none of the myriad things which has form cannot be seen. None which is seen cannot also be discussed. None which is discussed loses its proper position. Sitting in the chamber yet

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5 Heart-Mind (xin, 心) seeing all within the four seas. Dwelling in today yet discussing what is long ago and far away in time. Comprehensively observing the myriad things and knowing their true dispositions. Inspecting and examining order and disorder and discerning their measures. Ordering the heavens and earth and making use of the myriad things. Instituting great coherence, and the whole world is understood. (“Undoing Fixation”)

In the process of understanding phenomena, the heart-mind is subject to temptation by external phenomena, the desire for profit and thus being disturbed from its original state of clarity. Xunzi says, The human heart-mind can be compared to a bowl of water. If it is set straight and not moved then the muddy and turbid parts will settle to the bottom, and the clear and bright parts will be on the top, and then one can see one’s beard and eyebrows and inspect the lines on one’s face. If a slight breeze passes over it, then the muddy and turbid parts at the bottom will be stirred and the clear and bright parts will be disturbed on top, and then one cannot see one’s original features. The heart-mind is also like this. (“Undoing Fixation”)

If the state of clarity and brilliance is disturbed, then the heart-mind will not be able to exercise its function of understanding and judging good from bad. “If a small thing disturbs it, then its external correctness will be altered, its internal heart-mind will deviate, and so it is not sufficient for discerning the natures of things.” (“Undoing Fixation”) One must, therefore, protect and cultivate the heart-mind. Specifically speaking, one must first guide it with principle (li, 理) and nourish it with clarity, second is exercising utmost sincerity. With regard to maintaining the heart-mind, Xunzi’s philosophy has both epistemological, as well as self-cultivation elements. The Daoist discourse of Laozi and Zhuangzi, in taking “dao emulates what is spontaneously so” (道法自然) as its orientation, emphasizes the cultivation of the heart-mind so as to reach a state of union with dao and, on this basis, proposed the political idea of non-purposive action. Laozi believes that desires for external profit will disturb one’s heart-mind. The government of the sage thus lies in “emptying their heart-minds” which means removing knowledge and desires so that peoples’ heartminds are kept in a state of ignorance and lack of desire. When there is no desire there will also be no calculative cleverness and deception, and so no fighting over profit and desire, with the result that the world becomes ordered. Laozi’s idea of emptying one’s heart-mind evolves, with Zhuangzi, into the idea of “heart-mind fasting” (xinzhai, 心斋). Zhuangzi believes that everyone has a pre-formed heart-mind (chengxin, 成 心); a pre-formed heart-mind means that one is prejudiced in their understanding. The root of right and wrong is this very pre-formed heart-mind. The strife over right and wrong ruins a dao that is originally without distinctions and leads peoples to have an antagonistic relationship to external phenomena and thereby resulting in an inability to be free and unfettered. Humans also have the heart-mind of calculative cleverness. The existence of this heart-mind of calculative cleverness means that the heart-mind cannot be pure and brilliant, becomes hoodwinked by profit and desires and so deviates from the great dao. It is for this reason that Zhuangzi proposed the idea of “heart-mind fasting.” Fasting one’s heart-mind involves focusing one’s intentions so that it is in a state of empty stillness. In this state, the heart-mind is clear and clean like a mirror rejecting nothing and welcoming nothing. Like vital energy (qi, 气), it is emptily awaiting objects, and so will not be led away by them. Not being

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burdened by objects is the state of being free and unfettered. In treating the world with a heart-mind of emptiness and stillness, the things of the world can be allowed to exist in their natural state. Heart-mind fasting is both a method of self-cultivation, as well as the psychological basis of non-purposive government.

5.2 Two During the Qin-Han period, the Annals of Lü Buwei inherited the idea that the heartmind is the organ of thought and took it to be the seat of wisdom in the human body. The Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor, from the perspective of pathology, took the heart-mind to be the most important organ in the human body and the causal root of human existence and mental activity. From the perspective of human existence, it sends nourishment to all the internal organs and maintains their regular functioning. From the perspective of mental activity, it maintains one’s clarity of mind so as to provide a foundation for all thought processes. It is precisely because the heart-mind is so vital to one’s body and mental well-being that if it is affected by an adverse environment, it can have a direct impact on one’s spirit and lead to death. It is for this reason that the heart-mind must be protected, that the invasion of adverse influences must be guarded against so that the health of one’s heart-mind is safeguarded. The exegesis of the Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord enriched the concept of heart-mind and had a deep and lasting influence on traditional Chinese medicine. Dong Zhongshu introduced the philosophy of yinyang and the five phases into Confucian philosophy. With heaven (tian, 天) as the highest concept, he established a philosophical system whereby human beings correlate with heaven’s regularities (人副天数) and whereby human beings and heaven mutually respond to each other (天人感应). With regard to his exegesis of the heart-mind, Dong Zhongshu separated it into the heart-mind of heaven and the heart-mind of human beings and understood the latter to be correlated with the former. In Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy, heaven is an anthropomorphic god who produces the myriad things. It possesses all the different kinds of emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow and happiness, as well as the intention to reward the good and punish the bad; this is the heart-mind of heaven and expresses itself through the changes in yinyang. The yang vital energy gives birth to the myriad things and is thus the master commander of life and virtues. The yin vital energy is what brings death to the myriad things and is thus the master commander of killing and punishment. Heaven thus favours yang and not yin, favours virtue and not punishment. Heaven esteems virtue and looks down upon punishment, and it is this preference that demonstrates the humane compassion (renai, 仁爱) of heaven’s heart-mind. The humane compassion of heaven is expressed through warning and informing the ruler; when there are problems in the government of the country, heaven sends out natural disasters as a warning to the ruler. If the ruler does not reflect on his actions, then heaven will send out bizarre events in order to startle and terrify him. If he still does not know to change then “harm and vanquishing will befall him without cease.” (Part I, Examination for Promoting the Worthy) This

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displays heaven’s humane compassion towards the ruler, because “humans receive their mandate from heaven” (“Human Correlates of Heaven’s Regularities” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn). As humans are correlated with heaven, and as heaven has the different kinds of emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow and happiness, likewise human beings also have these emotions. Heaven’s heart-mind is humane and compassionate, so the humaneness of the human heart-mind manifests itself through moral behaviours such as loyalty, trustworthiness and sense of propriety. Joy, anger, sorrow and happiness, humaneness, righteousness, benevolence, loyalty and trustworthiness are thus all manifestations of heaven’s heart-mind; the human heart-mind is correlated with the heart-mind of heaven. As there exists this correlation between the human heart-mind and the heart-mind of heaven and because the heartmind of heaven esteems virtue and looks down upon punishment, the ruler should, therefore, implement virtuous government and not kill gratuitously in order to comply with the heart-mind of heaven. Dong Zhongshu’s discourse on the heart-mind of heaven and human’s heart-mind thus constrains the actions of the ruler through the authority of heaven, in order to secure lasting stability in governance. Wang Chong criticized Dong Zhongshu’s philosophical system of human beings being correlated with heaven’s regularities. Wang Chong was of the opinion that the heart-mind was the organ of thought, that it can produce wisdom and express thoughts. The heart-mind can also produce feelings of humaneness and is thus the foundation for understanding phenomena and judging good from bad. Heaven and earth, however, are all formed by natural principal energy (自然元气) and so heaven is without thoughts and intentions and, in turn, without the “heart-mind of heaven” of which Dong Zhongshu spoke. The heart-mind of heaven and the will of heaven is but the expression of the human heart-mind and the human will. Wang Chong provides an example of this. In his succession of Yao, a ceremony was held in Yao’s ancestral temple. This was not the will of heaven but merely complying with the wishes of the common people and the same applies to when later Shun passed sovereignty onto Yu and Yu onto Qi. Their actions are described as heaven’s will because, in ascribing human wishes to heaven, human wishes have the appearance of greater rationality. Wang Chong’s criticism of the idea of heaven as having a heart-mind, had a very positive significance against the backdrop of the divination combined with mystical Confucian philosophy movement (谶纬).

5.3 Three During the Wei-Jin period, Neo-Daoism was all the rage and the investigation into heart-mind took on new characteristics that enriched and deepened its content. Towards the end of the Han and the beginning of the Wei dynasties, before the development of Neo-Daoism, the evaluation of human character was greatly in fashion, and Liu Shao’s (刘邵) Treatise on Human Character (人物志) contains content in which people are described according to the heart-mind. What Liu Shao means

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by heart-mind is one’s psychological mettle, which he calls the quality of the heartmind. It is one’s psychological mettle that decides one’s mien and appearance and conversely, one’s mien and appearance is a direct reflection of one’s psychological mettle. Liu Shao further believes that the heart-mind and will (zhi, 志) possess different functions. The different combinations of heart-mind and will determine the different categories of people: Accordingly, those with small heart-minds and big wills belong to the category of sages and worthies. Those with big heart-minds and big wills are the outstanding among those with exceptional ability. Those with big heart-minds and small wills belong to the category of those who are haughty and unbridled. Those with small heart-minds and small wills are timid and apprehensive. (“The Seven Errors”, Treatise on Human Character)

Liu Shao’s discussion of heart-mind made prominent the importance of the heartmind in the evaluation of human character. The pioneer of Neo-Daoism, Wang Bi advocated taking non-purposive action as the foundation and endowed it with the traditional idea that the heart-mind is the root-body. He says, “although heaven and earth are vast, they take non-being as their heart-mind.” (Chap. 38, Commentary on the Daodejing) Heart-mind here refers to root-body, and its content is “non-being.” In his commentary to the hexagram “return” (fu, 复), Wang Bi says, Return as such means “to revert to what is the root [本],” and for heaven and earth we regard the root to be the heart-mind. […] As this is so, then even though heaven and earth are so vast that they possess the myriad things in great abundance, which activated by thunder and moved by the winds, keep undergoing countless numbers of transformations, yet the root of heaven and earth consists of perfectly quiescent non-being. Thus it is only when earthly activity ceases that the heart-mind of heaven and earth can be seen.1

The heart-mind of heaven and earth is the root (本) of heaven and earth and the root of heaven and earth is perfectly quiescent non-being. Apart from the heart-mind of rootbody, Wang Bi also talks of the heart-mind of all under heaven, the heart-mind of the common people. When the will of the common people is manifested in governance, this is to take the heart-mind of the common people as the one’s own heart-mind and govern according to stillness, not to cause havoc to the common people and so achieve great order in the world. The philosopher who brought Neo-Daoism to its maturity, Guo Xiang, advocated the idea of self-transformation within the dark obscurity (玄冥独化). On the spiritual level, he advocated the idea of having “no heart-mind” which means being compliant with the natural course of things and being content to embrace all hardships as though they were destiny so that one can be without joy and sorrow so as to be free and unfettered. Being without a heart-mind would mean that one will follow the course of phenomena and this is the virtue of the sage; the sage is Guo Xiang’s ideal sovereign. The value of the sage lies in the fact that he orders chaos but treats the changes in affairs with a nonchalant heart-mind. It is precisely because the sage responds to things without a heart-mind that there is nothing which he does that is not 1 Lynn

(1994: 286), modified.

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coherent with the peoples’ desires. No matter where he goes, he is always sovereign, thus it is not having a heart-mind that is the sovereign’s virtue. It is precisely due to the virtue of not having a heart-mind that the sage is compliant with phenomena and so is able to assist in the transformation of the myriad things. The fact that the sage has no heart-mind and is compliant with the course of things implies that the sage both transcends but also abides by that which is merely customary and both transcends and is immanent in the world. This allows the mountains and forests of the Daoist sage to be united with the ancestral temple, Confucian ethical codes to be united with the Daoist esteeming of nature. Under the Neo-Daoist backdrop, Guo Xiang was able to endow the concept of heart-mind with metaphysical profundity.

5.4 Four During the Sui-Tang period, all the different factions of Buddhism were well established. Whether in terms of its theoretical sophistication or the extensiveness of its influence, it had reached an unprecedented level. Faced with the challenge from Buddhism, Confucianism experienced a state of decline and did not produce any great innovations in its investigations in the heart-mind. It was only with NeoConfucianism that philosophers displayed renewed vigour towards heart-mind as a subject of enquiry. They were able to add another dimension to the understanding of heart-mind through investigating its relationship to emotions and human nature. Zhang Zai was the inaugurator of Neo-Confucianism. He maintained that vital energy is the root and argued that the original nature of the myriad things is determined by the supreme void (太虚) and the material vital energy, and that the heart-mind is equipped with the capacity of perceiving the natures of the myriad things. In the process of understanding external phenomena, human understanding can be divided into two kinds. One is perceptual understanding (闻见之知) and the other is understanding from moral nature (德性所知). Perceptual understanding is knowledge gained from the direct interaction between perceptual organs such as the ears and eyes with the object of knowledge. As the perceptual organs are limited in terms of what it can know, one cannot depend on this kind of knowledge to exhaustively understand all phenomena in the world. What the perceptual organs know, furthermore, is also merely the superficial appearances of things; it is incapable of understanding the essence and pattern of things, as this can only be done through understanding from moral nature. Moral knowing is achieved by giving scope to the understanding of the heart-mind. The process of achieving moral knowing requires blocking out the influences of the perceptual organs as what the eyes and ears perceive have an effect on the functioning of the heart-mind’s understanding. Moral knowing is both an understanding of the essence of phenomena and a spiritual state of union between the subject and the world. The Cheng brothers took principle (li, 理) as the highest concept and thereby established Neo-Confucianism (lixue, 理学). In their discourse on the heart-mind, they distinguished the human heart-mind from the heart-mind of dao. The human

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heart-mind refers to the material organ itself, this organ has the capacity for awareness and understanding and is the main body of understanding. In the course of its encounter with external phenomena, the human heart-mind produces thoughts, and through these thoughts, the heart-mind understands the principle of phenomena. With regard to the heart-mind of dao, the heart-mind, mandate, principle and human nature, these all belong to the same plane. Although they have different names, they refer to the same content and signify the root-body of the universe itself. The heart-mind of dao possesses the virtue of the heavens, the virtue of the heavens being human moral norms such as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The human heart-mind and the heart-mind of dao is also distinguished by the private and public. The heart-mind of dao is public whilst the human heart-mind is private. The principle of the heavens is public whilst human desire is private. The heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind is thus also manifested through the antagonism between the principle of the heavens and human desires. In order to preserve the principle of the heavens, human desires must, therefore, be extinguished. As is evident, in the Cheng brothers’ discourse on the heart-mind they have inherited the traditional idea of heart-mind as the main body of understanding, and they also see it as a concept of equal status to principle, mandate, human nature and heaven. With the Cheng brothers, heart-mind possesses the significance of the root-body of the cosmos, and this later inspired Lu Jiuyuan and so became the sprout of the Lu-Wang school of Neo-Confucianism with their stress on “learning of heart-mind.” As the philosopher who gave mature expression to Neo-Confucianism, Zhu Xi inherited Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers’ views on the heart-mind and provided further analysis and elaboration on the content of the heart-mind, its characteristics, as well the relationship between heart-mind, human nature and emotions. In so doing, he established a rigorous and systematic discourse on the heart-mind and took the concept of heart-mind to an unprecedented level of sophistication. Zhu Xi’s understanding of heart-mind can be elucidated from three aspects. First, the function of heart-mind. In Zhu Xi’s philosophy, heart-mind possesses many functions. First, heart-mind has the function of perception. Perception refers to the knowledge that is produced when the perceptual organs are in contact with external phenomena. The perceptual function of the heart-mind is the basis for the heart-mind’s understanding of phenomena, and it has unlimited potential for understanding. Following this, the heart-mind is the organ of thought: it has the capacity for thought and also allows it to judge good from bad. Following this, the heart-mind possesses the capacity for command and decision-making, and for being a master of the whole body. The commanding role that the heart-mind has is mainly manifested in its command over the perceptual organs such as the ears, eyes, mouth and nose. As these perceptual organs cannot think, they are easily led by external objects. It is only through the command and regulation by the heart-mind that they do not stray into error. Second, the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. Zhu Xi also inherits the distinction which the Book of Documents makes between the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. The distinction between the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind is rooted in the nature of heaven and earth (天地之性) and the

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nature of material quality (气质之性) that humans receive. The nature of heaven and earth is manifested in human beings as the impartiality of human nature whereas the nature of vital energy is manifested in humans as the partiality of vital energy. That which is rooted in the partiality of vital energy becomes the human heart-mind whereas the impartiality of human nature becomes the heart-mind of dao. With regard to perceptual knowledge, that which is known from the desires of the ears and eyes is the human heart-mind, and that which is known from moral principles is the heart-mind of dao. The content of the human heart-mind is thus the desires of the ears and eyes whereas the content of the heart-mind of dao is humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. All human beings are endowed with the nature of heaven and earth and the nature of material quality and so are all endowed with the heart-mind of dao and human heart-mind. As the heart-mind of dao is ruled by moral principles, and the human heart-mind is ruled by desire, the heart-mind of dao can thus rule over the human heart-mind and the human heart-mind can take the heart-mind of dao as its measure. If one is able to be ruled by the heart-mind of dao then one can be consistently good and without error. Third, heart-mind is the controlling unifier of human nature and emotions (心统 性情). With regard to the relationship between human nature and emotions, Zhu Xi is of the opinion that human nature is that which has not yet arisen (未发), is the form (体), is stillness. Emotions, on the other hand, are that which has arisen (已发), are the function (用), are the movement. Human nature is talked of in relation to the emotions, whereas the heart-mind is talked of in relation to human nature and the emotions. The heart-mind is the controlling unifier of human nature and the emotions, thus the not yet arisen and the arisen, form and function, movement and stillness are all the not yet arisen and the arisen of the heart-mind, the form and function of the heart-mind and the movement and stillness of the heart-mind. There are two aspects to the idea that the heart-mind is the controlling unifier of human nature and emotions, one is that the heart-mind encompasses human nature and emotions. With regard to the not yet arisen and the arisen, this means “the heart-mind is the connecting point of the arisen and the not yet arisen,” that is, the heart-mind encompasses or governs the arisen and the not yet arisen. With regard to form and function, this means “human nature is the principle of form, whilst emotions are the function of form. The heart-mind encompasses both human nature and emotions.” (Book 20, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) “Human nature is the form and emotions are its functions. Human nature and emotions all come from the heart-mind, thus the heart-mind can be their controlling unifier.” (Book 98, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) With regard to movement and stillness, “within the heart-mind itself, there is movement and stillness, stillness is human nature and movement is emotions.” (Book 99, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Movement and stillness are all ruled by the heart-mind, “heart-mind is the name we give for a ruler. In movement and stillness, there is always a ruler. It is not the case that the heart-mind does not function when there is stillness and only rules when there is movement.” (Book 5, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Second, the heart-mind rules human nature and emotions. Zhu Xi says,

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From the perspective of my heart-mind, there are no manifestations, but [the heart-mind] has consciousness and understanding, is this not because the heart-mind rules human nature? [When the emotions are] already arisen but not chaotic, is this not because of the rule that the heart-mind has over the emotions? (“Reply to Hu Guanzhong” Book 42, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection)

According to this, that heart-mind contains human nature and emotions means that the heart-mind governs and supervises human nature and the emotions so that the emotions do not become trapped by its nature, so that human nature is not led astray by the desire for things. Zhu Xi’s discourse on the heart-mind both inherits and develops Mencius’, the Cheng brothers’, as well as Zhang Zai’s discourse on the heart-mind. His discussion on the function of the heart-mind and the relationship between human nature and emotions, as well as the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind, all exceed his forebears and so enriched the conceptual content of heart-mind and had a profound impact on later generations. Lu Jiuyuan is the founder of the Neo-Confucian “learning of heart-mind” (心学) school. Heart-mind is this school’s highest concept. Its discourse on form and function, epistemology, self-cultivation all revolve around heart-mind. With regard to the discourse of form and function, Lu Jiuyuan admits that external principle is objective, is the reason for the existence of heaven, earth and human beings. At the same time, however, Lu Jiuyuan believes that, “human heart-mind is of utmost numinous-ness. This principle is of utmost clarity, all humans possess this heart-mind, heart-minds are all equipped with this principle.” (“Miscellaneous Sayings”, Book 22, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyan) Following this, Lu Jiuyuan believes that “what heaven has given me is this heart-mind. All human beings possess this heart-mind, all heart-minds possess this principle, [in this sense] the heart-mind is a principle.” (“Reply to Li Zai, 2” Book 11, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan) The heart-mind is principle; thus, the heart-mind becomes the root-body of the universe. It is in this sense that “the universe is my heart-mind, my heart-mind is the universe.” (“Miscellaneous Sayings”, Book 22, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan) It is because the heart-mind is principle that the principles of the myriad things are already contained in the heart-mind. To understand things thus does not require seeking after what is external, rather, focusing on one’s own heart-mind and seeking after intuition of one’s one heart-mind is sufficient. One’s heart-mind is originally pure and clean but is subject to being misled by desires so that it becomes clouded. In terms of self-cultivation, therefore, Lu Jiuyuan advocates discovering one’s original heart-mind, one needs to “order one’s spirit, and be a master of oneself” (“Recorded Conversations II” Chap. 35, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan). The way to discover one’s original heart-mind is in having few desires, so that the heart-mind can achieve clarity. The “learning of heart-mind” system in which Lu Jiuyuan established internalized the objective external principle of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers into a subjective, spiritual self-awareness, and in so doing emphasized the importance of moral self-awareness.

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5.5 Five During the Ming period, investigation into the concept of heart-mind continued unabated. The pioneer of the Ming dynasty “learning of heart-mind” Cheng Xianzhang (陈献章) maintained Liu Jiuyuan’s idea that “heart-mind is principle” and that the heart-mind is the root-body of the universe and thereby proposed the idea “the universe is with me.” The successor of the Cheng-Zhu school of NeoConfucianism, Luo Qinshun (罗钦顺), maintained the objective existence of principle and believed that the “human heart-mind has consciousness” (Part I, Knowledge Painfully Acquired). The heart-mind is naturally endowed with the capacity for thinking and the principle of the myriad things are the objects of the heart-mind’s epistemological enquiry. Luo Qinshun also divides heart-mind into the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind, but in contradistinction to the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, he employs human nature and emotions, as well as form and function to describe the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. He believed that “when the dao is manifested in humans then it is the heart-mind of dao. When emotions are manifested in humans then it is the human heart-mind.” (Knowledge Painfully Acquired Continued Records) The heart-mind of dao is human nature, is the form of dao, whereas the human heart-mind is emotions, is the function of dao. Luo Qinshun’s use of human nature and emotions to talk about the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind is a development on the traditional discourse of the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. Wang Yangming both inherited and developed Lu Jiuyuan’s “learning of heartmind.” In discussing the concept of heart-mind from many different perspectives, Wang Yangming became one of the Ming dynasty figures who gave mature expression to the “learning of heart-mind” school. First, like Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming also believed that heart-mind is principle, that the principle of the myriad things is already within the heart-mind, and emphasized that “the human being is the heart-mind of heaven and earth” (“Letter to Zhao Lan”) and that the heart-mind is the root-body of the myriad things. Second, heart-mind possesses consciousness. The consciousness of the heart-mind rules the perception, speech and movement of the ears, eyes, mouth and the four limbs. Third, the heart-mind possesses moral character, and possesses a priori the virtues of humaneness, righteousness, loyalty and filial piety. In his later years, Wang Yangming also proposed the concept of “moral knowing” (良知) and used it to talk about the heart-mind. First of all, moral knowing is the “heart-mind of approval and disapproval” (是非之心), it is the root-body of the heart-mind. Wang Yangming says, moral knowing is what Mencius calls the heart-mind of approval and disapproval and all peoples have it. It already understands without thinking, it is already capable without learning, this is why it is called moral knowing. (Inquiries on the Great Learning)

Moral knowing is peoples’ capacity for a priori moral understanding, is the root-body of the heart-mind. Knowledge is the root-body of the heart-mind. The heart-mind is self-so able to know. When it perceives the parents, it self-so knows that one should be filial. When it perceives the elder

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brother, it self-so knows that one should be respectful. And when it perceives a child fall into a well, it self-so knows that one should be commiserative. This is moral knowing and need not be sought outside. (Part I, 8, Instructions on Practical Living)

Everybody is equipped with this the heart-mind of approval and disapproval which is moral knowing. Moral knowing is thus the measure of which one judges good from bad. Following this, the moral knowing of the heart-mind is the root-body of the universe. The myriad things of the world all exist and have meaning and value due to the moral knowing of the human being. It is because of this that it can be said: “even heaven and earth cannot exist without that moral knowing that is inherent in humans.” (Part III, 274, Instructions on Practical Living) Following this, extending moral knowing, Wang Yangming believed that everyone has moral knowing but selfish desires can mislead moral knowing. It is for this reason that one needs to remove the selfish desires within one so that moral knowing can manifest itself. This is called extending moral knowing. Based on how one arrives at moral knowing, Wang Yangming gave an innovative interpretation of the idea of “investigating things in order to extend knowledge” (格物致知). He understood extending knowledge as referring to expanding and augmenting the moral knowing of one’s heart-mind in order to arrive at each individual thing and phenomena. Investigating things refers to how each individual thing and phenomena all have their principle and this principle is heaven’s principle and is also the moral knowing of one’s heart-mind in its outward manifestation. Thus, extending knowledge in order to investigate things is the process of overcoming the private in order to return to principle so that moral knowing is externally manifested. It is the unification of epistemology and self-cultivation. Wang Yangming’s contemporary Wang Tingxiang (王廷相) wanted to investigate the heart-mind from an epistemological perspective. He understood the empty numen (虚灵) as the form of the heart-mind and consciousness as the function of the heartmind. The heart-mind has a different function from the ears, eyes and the perceptual organs. The function of the ears and eyes is seeing and hearing whereas the function of the heart-mind is thinking and deliberating. These different functions are particular to each organ, but whereas what the ears and eyes sense is external, what the heartmind thinks about and deliberates on is the principle of things. What the ears and eyes perceive is the foundation of what the heart-mind understands about the principle of things but as understanding the principle of things requires more than just perceptual knowledge of phenomena, a complete understanding is the unification of perceptual knowledge and the thought of the heart-mind. Li Zhi (李贽) is a highly distinctive thinker from the Ming period. With regard to the concept of heart-mind, he proposed the idea of “discourse of a childlike heartmind” (童心说) in order to oppose the Neo-Confucian discourse of principle. Li Zhi believed that what is called the childlike heart-mind refers to people’s real and original heart-mind. The childlike heart-mind refers to the innocent and pure heartmind of the child and determines one’s pure and real original nature. Once one loses the childlike heart-mind then one cannot return to being an authentic person (真人). The main reason for losing the childlike heart-mind is due to the latter-day acquisition of reasons and principles, that is, the actions and moral principles that are acquired

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in the Neo-Confucian discourse of principle. In order to preserve his real original heart-mind, Li Zhi advocated not studying. In this, Li Zhi is criticizing the orthodox philosophy of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism. Li Zhi, furthermore, assumed that human nature is originally selfish. When a farmer “has personally had a good harvest in autumn then he will exert himself in ordering the farm.” (“Collection”, Elevated Occupations of a Ru Minister) When someone has accumulated much wealth at home, then they will exert themselves in governing the country. These are all “natural principles, necessary, objective phenomena.” In his emphasis on the coherence of having private desires with principle, Li Zhi is criticizing the Neo-Confucian moral idea that “in preserving the principle of heaven, one must extinguish desire,” and is thus very liberated. At the end of the Ming and beginning of the Qin dynasty, Wang Fuzhi maintained the traditional idea that the heart-mind is the organ of thought. On the basis of the idea that the heart-mind is the organ of thought, he gave a brilliant investigation into the relationship between the perceptual organs and the heart-mind, human nature and emotions, as well as the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. In so doing, he raised made many penetrating insights and provided a summary of the traditional concept of heart-mind. His discourse can be discussed from the following perspectives. First, the relationship between the perceptual organs and the heart-mind. Wang Fuzhi believes that the heart-mind is the sovereign of the body and resides in the most important position. The heart-mind’s capacity for consciousness and thought is dispersed among the five organs. The heart-mind’s capacity for consciousness and thought is thus based upon the functioning of the five organs. On the one hand, The liver, spleen, kidney, lungs and spirit are the organs of intentions and thought, once one organ loses its principle, then the numinous-ness of the heart-mind is already damaged. Without the eyes then the heart-mind cannot distinguish appearance, without the ears then the heart-mind cannot know sounds, without the hands and feet then the heart-mind cannot command. The loss of one organ results in the destruction of the heart-mind’s numinous-ness. (Book 2, Collected Works of Chuanshan)

This is to say that the heart-mind is reliant upon the other perceptual organs. On the other hand, the perceptual organs are administered by the heart-mind. First, it is only when the heart-mind responds to and accepts external phenomena that the ears and eyes can see and hear. This shows the reliance of the perceptual organs on the heart-mind. From the perspective of epistemology, the perceptual knowledge of phenomena of the perceptual organs is the basis of knowledge but for the ears and eyes to express themselves and understand the essence of phenomena, this depends on the capacity for thought of the heart-mind. Second, the heart-mind and human nature and emotions. With regard to their relationship, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi all believed that the heart-mind is the controlling unifier of human nature and the emotions, but Wang Fuzhi disagrees. Wang Fuzhi says that although the heart-mind can control and drive human nature, it is not tantamount to human nature. From one perspective, human nature is possessed in the heart-mind in the sense that human nature is stored in the heart-mind so that human nature must be rooted in the heart-mind, and so it is when human nature is

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internalized into a human sub-conscious awareness that it becomes realized as real human nature. From another perspective, the heart-mind is the product of human nature being condensed and distilled. “Thus, with regard to the original condition of the heart-mind, [the heart-mind] already includes human nature and [it] is the distillation of human nature, human nature is the standard for how the heart-mind gains its correctness.” (Book 1, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books) With regard to the emotions, emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow and happiness are but one of the contents of the heart-mind. Wang Fuzhi admits the objective existence of the emotions: [With regard to] the heart-mind of the exemplary gentleman, some have the same emotions as heaven and earth, some have the same emotions as the birds, fish, grass and trees, some have the same emotions as women and petty people, some have the same emotions as dao. (Book 1, Extensive Commentary on the Book of Odes)

He, therefore, promoted the idea that “the sage exhausts his heart-mind whereas the exemplary gentleman exhausts his emotions.” (ibid.) Exhausting one’s emotions, however, does not mean that one gives free rein to one’s emotions, they must be guided by the human nature that is within the heart-mind, so that the emotions are coherent with dao. Third, the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. This is also an issue that is given emphasis by Wang Fuzhi. In contradistinction to the Neo-Confucians who used heaven’s principle and human desire to talk about the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind, Wang Fuzhi uses human nature and emotions to talk about the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind. He writes, human nature is the heart-mind of dao. Emotions are the human heart-mind. Commiseration and compassion, shame and disdain, deference, approval and disapproval are the heart-mind of dao. Joy, anger, sorrow and happiness is the heart-mind of humans. (Book 8, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books)

He writes, furthermore, “human nature is the heart-mind of dao, consciousness is the heart-mind of human beings.” (Book 10, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books) The heart-mind of human beings is the emotions that are already developed and manifested, the heart-mind of dao is the undeveloped and un-manifested human nature. “Joy, anger, sorrow and happiness is the human heart-mind whereas that which is not yet developed, although it has the roots of the four emotions, is actually the heart-mind of dao.” (Book 2, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books) From the perspective of the genesis of the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind, the source of the heart-mind of dao is the dao of heaven and is manifested as the virtues of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The source of the human heart-mind is the contact between the self and external objects, and the desires that arise from it, and expresses itself in emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow and happiness. Although there is a difference between the heart-mind of dao and the human heart-mind, there is a porosity between the human nature and emotions. Within commiseration and compassion, shame and disdain, deference, approval and disapproval we can distinguish elements of the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and happiness and conversely, we can see the

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effects of commiseration and compassion, shame and disdain, deference, approval and disapproval on the four emotions. Human nature and the emotions thus mutually stimulate each other, affect each other and are both manifested in one’s conduct. After Wang Fuzhi, Yan Yuan (颜渊) and Dai Zhen (戴震) amongst others continued the traditional discussion on the heart-mind. Yan Yuan, for example, with his discourse on the unity of the body and the heart-mind, took commiseration and compassion, shame and disdain, deference, approval and disapproval as originally existing within humans, and he took the the humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom that arises within the heart-mind to be human nature. The heart-mind, for Yan Yuan, also has a ruling function over the body. Dai Zhen, however, believes that the heart-mind is the organ of thought, and that the numinous-ness of all the different organs is rooted in the heart-mind. He, therefore, raised the idea of “the discernment of blood, vital energy and heart-mind” (血气心知). He believed that human blood, vital energy and heart-mind are all natural and are simultaneously the foundation of the heart-mind’s understanding. In this, he emphasized the rational nature of desire. In modern times, as Western science is received, modern thinkers, in discussing the traditional concept of heart-mind, have also assimilated scientific content. Kang Youwei (康有为), for example, believes that the heart-mind contains the brain and that the brain and the heart together constitute the basis for thought. Tan Sitong (谭 嗣同) also thought that there was an intimate relationship between the brain and the heart. The function of thinking lies in the brain, but the heart provides the blood to nourish the brain. The brain and the heart thus stimulate each other. Liang Qichao (梁启超) believes that the heart-mind is the unification of the understanding and the emotions and gave the heart-mind a psychological meaning. The above is what the meeting of Western scientific thought and traditional Chinese thought produced. It provided the traditional concept of heart-mind with modern scientific content and facilitated the transition from the traditional to the modern.

Reference Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 6

Natural Tendencies (Xing, 性)

Xing is a philosophical concept that refers to the essential character of a thing. In the development of Chinese philosophy, however, different philosophers from different periods have endowed this concept with a great variety of different meanings. The different ideas that have been used to discuss it include life, good and bad, yinyang, vital energy, principle (li, 理), heart-mind, humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, among innumerable others. The discussions on xing generally include its content, its genesis, its good or bad nature, the way it is manifested, the nature of humans or objects, among others. The problem of human nature, however, is the key content of the concept of xing.

6.1 One The original meaning of xing is life. In Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters (Shuowen Jiezi, 说文解字) Xu Shen writes, “xing, human nature is good and belongs to the character of yang vital energy.” Xu Shen is using yang vital energy to explain xing and, in so doing, reflected the traditional philosophical opinion that humans are endowed with yang vital energy. Here we can see the idea that when things are born, they already possess a corresponding character, therefore, in the earliest Chinese classics, xing is already used for referring to the character of things and phenomena. Before the elucidations that the Confucians and the Daoist gave the term, however, and turned it into a philosophical concept, the philosophical significance of xing was not yet very prominent. Confucius rarely gave pronouncements on xing. Confucius’ student Zigong (子 贡) said “The master’s cultural achievements can readily be heard about, but his views on human nature (xing) and the dao of the heavens cannot be heard.” (Analects 5.13) With regard to xing, Confucius only ever said, “Humans are close to one another by nature (xing). They drift apart through practice and habit.” (Analects 17.2) Confucius believed that peoples’ original natures are not so different from each other, and that it is latter-day learning that creates the differences in worthiness, ignorance, goodness © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_6

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and badness between peoples. Confucius did not have more to say about xing than this, he did not discuss the genesis of xing, its concrete content, nor its good or bad nature, but this allowed much scope for development by the later Confucians. The first Confucian philosophy to explore the meaning of xing was the Doctrine of the Mean and the Mencius. The Doctrine of the Mean, according to tradition, is the work of Confucius’ grandson Zisi. It proposed the idea that “what heaven commands (ming, 命) is called xing” and took xing to be something endowed by heaven. Sincerity is the content of the dao of heaven, “sincerity (cheng, 诚) is the dao of heaven” and so the original nature (xing) of things is sincerity, “sincerity is the end and beginning of things, without sincerity there would not be things.” Utmost sincerity is understood to be the great origin of the world, is the principle which regulates all under the heaven. The original natural tendencies (xing) of things are raised to a root-body (benti, 本体) level so that grasping the principle of utmost sincerity is tantamount to fathoming human nature itself. Understanding the natural tendencies of things is here tantamount to bringing things, as well as the self to their completion, and thus assisting in the nourishing and transforming powers of heaven and earth. Mencius put great emphasis on the discussion of xing and proposed an idea that was to have a profound influence on subsequent Chinese philosophy: human nature (xing) is good. Mencius believes that human nature first manifests itself in the desire for sounds and appearances of the ears, eyes, mouth and nose. He says, The mouth in relation to tastes, the eyes in relation to appearances, the ears in relation to sounds, the nose in relation to odours, the four limbs in relation to comfort, this is all natural tendencies [xing]. (Mencius, 7B24)

These desires are all naturally endowed characteristics in human beings, but Mencius does not believe that it is by these natural tendencies that one can be called human. The criterion by which one can be called human is the “heart-mind of humaneness and righteousness” (仁义之心) which we all possess by nature. These are the heartmind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐), shame and disdain (羞恶), deference (恭敬), approval and disapproval (是非). These “four heart-minds” is the original substance of how a person can be considered human. It is for this reason that it is said, if one is without the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of shame and disdain, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of deference, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of approval and disapproval, one is not human. (Mencius 6A6)

It is in these “four heart-minds” wherein the only difference between humans and birds and beasts lie. It is these “four heart-minds” that are the sprouts of the four moral activities of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, The heart-mind of commiseration and compassion is the sprout of humaneness. The heartmind of shame and disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The heart-mind of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety. The heart-mind of approving and disapproving is the sprout of wisdom. (Mencius 2A6)

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“Sprout” refers to the beginning of the “sprout of goodness” (shanduan, 善端). Humans have the “four sprouts” in the same way that humans have four limbs; they are endowed by nature. This is why Mencius says, “Humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not welded onto us from without but rather, we inherently have them.” (Mencius 6A6) This then is Mencius’ discourse on human goodness. It is precisely in this sense of the distinction between human beings and animals that Mencius believes the desire for sounds and appearances is a desire after external things, and so whether or not we obtain them does not depend on human effort but on mandate (ming, 命). Realizing humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, on the other hand, is an internal affair, and so, although realizing them depends to an extent on mandate, it rests principally on our effort as opposed to mandate. It is for this reason that Mencius says, “natural tendencies [xing], there is the mandate [ming] in connection with it, but the exemplary gentleman does not refer to it as human nature [xing].” (Mencius 7B24) In relation to humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom Mencius says, they are “mandate [ming], there are natural tendencies in connection with it, but the exemplary gentleman does not call it mandate.” (Mencius 7B24) Therefore, Mencius’ discussion of human nature is based on our social nature. With regard to whether human nature is good or bad, Gaozi and Mencius carried out a debate. Analogizing human nature to water, Gaozi argued that the original nature and desires that humans have is human nature. Just as water flows both east and west without distinction, it is irrelevant to talk about good and bad in relation to human nature. Gaozi says, Man’s nature is like water swirling. Open a passage for it to the east, and it will flow to the east; open a passage for it to the west, and it will flow to the west. Human nature is indifferent to good and evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and west. (Mencius 6A2)

Gaozi used this argument to criticize Mencius’ argument that human nature is originally endowed with humaneness and righteousness and is thus good. He says that in taking human nature to be originally good Mencius is mixing up the willow tree with cups and bowls; he is confusing the distinction between the original raw material and the finished product. In answer to Gaozi, Mencius argued that if one took human beings’ original nature as its nature, then there is no way to distinguish the nature of dogs from that of cows and so no way to distinguish the nature of cows from that of human beings; ultimately, there would be no way to distinguish human beings’ original nature from that of animals. Following this, in reference to Gaozi’s argument of “nature is like swirling water” Mencius believes that the goodness of human nature is like water’s tendency downwards. There are no humans without goodness just as there is no water that does not tend downwards. With regard to human beings’ non-good actions, Mencius thinks this is akin to when human beings strike water so that it flies up; it is an artificial effect. Following this, with regard to Gaozi’s argument about the willow tree and cups and bowls, Mencius believes that it is precisely because willow trees have the potential to become cups and bowls that willow trees can be made into cups and bowls. Likewise, it is precisely because human nature has the four sprouts of goodness that through being compliant with

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human nature, human nature can be enlarged and augmented into the moral virtues of humaneness and righteousness; these virtues are inherent in human nature. The division between Mencius and Gaozi’s views lies in the fact that one is based on human beings’ social nature whereas the other is based on human being’s original nature. Following Gaozi’s views, Xunzi would propose the idea that human nature is originally bad. Apart from Gaozi’s view that “human nature is neither good nor bad,” according to the Mencius, contemporary debates about human nature also included the argument that “human nature can be made good and it can be made bad” and “there are natures that are good and there are natures that are bad.” From this, we can infer that in Mencius’ time the question of human nature was a hotly debated subject. Xunzi inherited Gaozi’s view that xing is what one is born with. Taking the example of natural materials, Xunzi says that the character of natural materials is present at birth and has nothing to do with latter-day practice. In all cases, the nature [xing] of a thing is accomplished by heaven. It cannot be learned. It cannot be worked at. […] Those things in people which cannot be learned and cannot be worked at are called their nature [xing]. (“Human Nature is Bad”, Xunzi)

From this, Xunzi infers that what is called xing is the natural characters that are inherent in people and these includes two aspects. One, human beings’ ability to make distinctions, and this is the main sign of the difference between humans and animals. The key focus of Xunzi’s investigation into human nature does not lie, however, in human beings’ epistemological abilities. It lies rather in human beings’ natural desires and their innate tendency towards profit and tendency towards avoiding harm. In this respect, there are no differences in human nature. Based on the natural desires of human beings, Xunzi proposed that human nature is bad. Following human beings’ innate desires for profit, cruelty, sounds and sights, disorderly actions such as struggle and contention, cruelty and villainy, lasciviousness and chaos will correspondingly arise. It is for this reason that human nature is originally bad. Although human nature is originally bad for Xunzi, he also thinks that it can be transformed: “Human nature is something I cannot remake, but it can be transformed.” (“On the Achievements of the Ru”) The specific way it can be transformed is through the rituals which the sages instituted so that in undergoing an education one can be made to comply with the rituals, and become a moral and good human being. This is called “transforming human nature (xing) and establishing deliberate effort (wei, 伪).” Although Mencius is of the opinion that human nature is good and Xunzi is of the opinion that human nature is bad, in essence, however, their opinions are not antagonistic. This is because Mencius’ view is based on human beings’ social nature. It is precisely because human nature is originally good that there is the possibility of its transformation through education. This is the basis of the political philosophy of humane governance. The basis of Xunzi’s views, however, human beings’ original nature. It is precisely because human nature is bad that latter-day educative transformation through rituals and law is necessary. This is the basis of his philosophical advocacy of rituals and law. Therefore, Mencius and Xunzi’s discourses

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on human nature actually complement one another. Taken together, they compose a comprehensive discussion of human nature. The central tenet of Daoist philosophy is “dao emulates what is spontaneously so.” Although Laozi’s Daodejing does not use the term xing, the Zhuangzi’s discussion of xing fully manifests Daoist philosophy’s principle of spontaneously so. Zhuangzi takes xing to be what is naturally innate in things and phenomena. Horses, for example, feed on the grass and drink water, they prance with their legs and leap. This is the nature [xing] of horses.” (“Horse’s Hooves”, Zhuangzi) With regard to human beings, being ignorant and without desire is the real natural state of human beings. In using the principle of spontaneity to discuss natural tendencies (xing), Zhuangzi is making a value judgment. What is spontaneous and natural is the best and anything that breaks this natural state is bad. In order to preserve the innate spontaneity of human beings, on the one hand, Zhuangzi points to how external things such as reputation, profit and material desire ruin human nature, and so one must have few desires and a pure and clear heart-mind. Relatedly, Zhuangzi also believes that it is Confucian ritual and Confucian virtues such humaneness and righteousness which leads to the alienation of people and is the main reason for the loss of human nature. It is for this reason that in politics, Zhuangzi proposed the idea of non-purposive action. It is only through non-purposive action that one can allow peoples to be content with the disposition of their mandated natures. Zhuangzi’s discourse on xing emphasizes that human beings’ original nature is of utmost goodness. It is on the basis of this assumption that he developed his distinctive philosophy of being free and unfettered.

6.2 Two The philosophers of the Han dynasty, on the foundations established by the Pre-Qin philosophers, continued their exploration into xing. Among them, Dong Zhongshu’s three grades of human nature, Yang Xiong’s idea that human nature is a mixture of goodness and badness and Wang Chong’s idea that there are those with good natures and those with bad natures, are all developments on their predecessors’ ideas. Dong Zhongshu maintained the traditional idea of using the natural properties (材 质) of things to talk about xing. With this as his foundation, Dong Zhongshu criticized Mencius’ discourse of human nature is good. For Dong Zhongshu xing refers to the original properties of things, but goodness is a property that is produced; goodness is a result of latter-day education and transformation. Goodness comes from human nature but is not itself human nature. Just as the rice kernel comes from the rice plant but is not itself the rice plant, Mencius’ discourse of original human goodness is mixing good nature into the raw material itself. Furthermore, human nature does not necessarily only produce good nature, human nature also contains bad nature. Dong Zhongshu believes that humans receive yinyang vital energies and are then born and this, when manifested in human nature, is greed and humaneness:

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The truth about human beings is that they possess both greed and humaneness. The vital energy of humaneness and greed coexist in the self. The name “self” derives from heaven, heaven has the two manifestations of yin and yang, the “self” also has the two natures of greed and humaneness.1 (“Deeply Examine Names and Designations”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

Greed and humaneness, good and bad are thus all contents of human nature. Following this, Dong Zhongshu absorbed Confucius’ opinion that it is “only the most intelligent and most stupid that cannot be budged” (Analects 17.3) and proposed the idea of “three grades of human nature [xing].” Under this view human nature can be graded as that which is spontaneously good: “the nature of the sage” (圣人之性), the spontaneously bad: “the nature of mere utensils” (斗筲之性), and those who can be both good and bad: “the nature of the average person” (中民之性). The nature of the sage and that of the mere utensil can never be changed, but the nature of the average person can be led towards the good through education. From this perspective, the first two cannot be called “human nature,” only the nature of the average person can be called human nature. Thus, in order for the average person’s nature to do good and remove the bad, one must educate them. This is the reason why human society needs to institute a king. Dong Zhongshu’s discourse on the three grades of human nature contains a strong class component. It had a profound impact on later generations and was inherited by Han Yu of the Tang dynasty. Yang Xiong (杨雄) of the Western Han believed that human nature was a combination of good and bad. When the good developed, one became a good person, when the bad developed, then one became a bad person. Yang Xiong thus advocated that one must educate oneself so as to cultivate one’s good nature. Yang Xiong’s views are thus the same as the Pre-Qin view that “human nature can be made good and it can be made bad.” The Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong synthesized Mencius’ discourse on the goodness of human nature, Xunzi’s view on the badness of human nature, as well as Yang Xiong’s view that human nature is a mixture of good and bad. By drawing lessons from Dong Zhongshu’s views about the three grades of human nature he believed that Mencius’, Xunzi’s and Yang Xiong’s views on human nature only referred to one of the three grades: When Mencius says human nature is good, he is referring to those who are above average. When Xunzi says that human nature is bad, he is referring to those who are below average. When Yang Xiong says that human nature is a mixture of good and bad, he is referring to the average person. (“Original Nature”, Arguments Weighed)

Wang Chong’s discourse on human nature can thus also be seen as having three grades. What distinguishes his theory from Dong Zhongshu’s theory of the three grades of human nature, however, is that Wang Chong takes a naturalistic discourse of principal vital energy as his foundation and considers the goodness and badness of human nature to be naturally determined. That human nature is good or bad, from Wang Chong’s point of view, is just like there are differences in the talented 1 Queen

and Major (2016: 309), modified.

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and untalented, the well-born and the lowly-born. The reason why there are good and bad human natures is because there are differences in the amount of principal vital energy endowed. Like Dong Zhongshu, what Wang Chong means by good and bad human nature refers to those who are above and below average; the rest are the average people who can be both good and bad. For these people who belong neither to the categories of good or bad, they can be pushed up or down and so require education so that they tend toward the good. What sets Wang Chong apart from Dong Zhongshu is that Wang Chong believes those whose nature is bad can, through guidance and education, transform their bad elements into good elements. Wang Chong, therefore, believes that human nature can be changed. The good can become bad and vice versa. Although human nature is born from the endowment of principal vital energy, whether it is good or bad is due to latter-day education and not due to a congenital endowment. Wang Chong’s discourse on human nature has both points of similarity, as well as differences, with Dong Zhongshu’s ideas about the three grades of human nature.

6.3 Three During the Wei-Jin period, due to the discussions on human character, the distinction between one’s capacity and original nature (才性之辨) was triggered. At the time there was the discourse of four foundations (四本论), discourse of capacity and original nature are identical (才性同), discourse of capacity and original nature are different (才性异), discourse of capacity and original nature coincide (才性合) and discourse of material quality and original nature diverge (才性离). Although the content of the discourse of four foundations has not survived, we have much from which to see the importance that contemporaries attached to the concept of human nature. At the beginning of the Wei, Liu Shao (刘邵) wrote Treatise on Human Character (人物志) and discussed one’s human nature according to their material quality. Liu Shao believed that human nature is determined by the vital energies of yin and yang but the human form is determined by the fives phases of gold, wood, water, fire and earth. The different endowments in the qualities of the yinyang vital energies determine the different types of material qualities. The different material qualities possess different characteristics and become different types of people. Liu Shao’s discussion of human nature is the foundation for his judgments on human characters and lay the groundwork for the discussion of human nature in Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism. The founder of Neo-Daoism, Wang Bi, wrote Commentary on the Daodejing and taking “dao emulates what is spontaneously so” as the central tenet, believed that xing is the spontaneous nature that the myriad things already have. If things all possess their own spontaneous natures, then one must act in accordance with their natures: The myriad things follow self-so in forming their natures. This is why one can act in accordance with them but not act on them, can identify with them but not interfere with them.

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Things have their constant nature, so if one tries to create something artificial out of them, he is sure to destroy them.2 (Chapter 29, Commentary on Laozi)

From this, we can see that with the discourse of using spontaneously so to talk about nature, Wang Bi’s aim was in advocating non-purposive governance. Ji Kang (嵇康) followed the idea that vital energy is what gives birth things. He argued that it is the different endowments in principal vital energy that determine the differences in human nature. It is according to this that he clarified the difference between sages and normal peoples. The amount of principal vital energy one receives determines whether human capacity is dim or bright. The sage not only receives more principal vital energy, he also receives the vital energy that is clear; it is for this reason he is a sage. The principal vital energy that the average person receives is lacking and so they are partial in their natures, being either bright or courageous or greedy or moderate. In the Wei-Jin discourse on human nature, it was Guo Xiang who produced the first innovations. Guo Xiang said, “things each have their natural tendencies [xing], natural tendencies each have their limitations just like one’s allotted lifespan and intelligence. This is something that cannot be changed through yearning!” (“Wandering Free and Unfettered Commentary”) “Things each have their natural tendencies means that different things and affairs have different original natures. Natural tendencies have their limitations means that different classes of things and affairs have differences in their limitations. It also means that even among things of the same kind there are different characteristics in their forms, such as their sizes. Guo Xiang believes that the differences in the original natures of things and their limitations are absolute and cannot be overcome. As such, “What the natures of things are capable of, cannot be done. What the natures of things are incapable of, cannot be forced to be done.” (“External Things Commentary”) In relation to humans, once the natures of peoples have determined their intelligence or dimness, it cannot be changed: natures each have their allocated roles, those who are knowing thus do not fail to perform their functions till the end comes. The ignorant guard their ignorance until death, how can there be anyone who can change their natures half-way through. (“Equalizing Assessment of Things Commentary”)

Seeing as the differences between the natures of things and phenomena cannot be changed, one can achieve being free and unfettered as long as the original natures of each thing is fulfilled. If one is sufficient unto one’s own nature, then even the great Peng will have no reason to think itself superior than the little bird, and the little bird will not desire the Pool of Heaven, for one’s greatest desires will be more than fulfilled. Thus, it is that although the small and great differ, they are similarly free and unfettered. (“Wandering Free and Unfettered” Zhuangzi Commentary)

As such, the xing which Guo Xiang focuses on is not the universal or abstract xing, but the xing of each particular thing. In emphasizing the nature of each thing, their 2 Lynn

(1999: 105), modified.

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differences and limitations, Guo Xiang is ultimately justifying that the fulfilment of one’s nature is to be free and unfettered. The discussions that the different Buddhist sects have provided for the question of Buddha nature is also an important constituent of the concept of xing. Buddha nature is the reason and basis for being Buddha. From the Wei-Jin to the Sui-Tang period, the question of Buddha nature became a point of focus for all the Buddhist sects. Just as the Eastern Jin Zhu Daosheng (竺道生) said, “the deluded person who can never attain Liberation and Nirvana [Icchantika] all have Buddha nature” and believed that those who do not have faith (´sraddhendriya) and those who defame the true doctrine can also become Buddha. He, therefore, advocated that all living things have Buddha nature and can become Buddha. During the Sui-Tang period, the various Buddhist sects had already been established and so different opinions about Buddha nature emerged. The founder of the Sanlun school (三论宗), Jizang (吉 藏), for example, taking the combination of causes and conditions (因缘和合) as his theoretical basis, believed that the nature of all things is empty. The founder of Tiantai Buddhism, Zhi Yi (智顗), believed that there were five kinds of Buddha nature: the direct cause of attaining the perfect Buddha nature (正因佛性), the revealing cause of attaining the perfect Buddha nature (了因佛性), the environing cause of attaining the perfect Buddha nature (缘因佛性), the fruition of perfect enlightenment (果佛 性), and the fruition of that fruition, or the revelation of parinirv¯an.a (果果佛性), and thereby linked Buddha nature together with self-cultivation. Zhanran (湛然) raised the idea that “those without emotions [i.e. grass and tiles] also have [Buddha] nature” (无情有性) and emphasized the universal nature of Buddha nature. The founder of the Yogachara school Xuanzang (玄奘) proposed the three discourses on nature: “having an independent nature, not a nature of its own, but constituted of elements” (依他起性), “the nature that maintains the seeming to be real” (遍计 所执) and “the complete and perfect real nature” (圆成实性). The Chan school of Sinicized Buddhism advocated discovering one’s heart-mind in order to discover one’s nature (明心见性) and instant enlightenment to achieve Buddhahood (顿悟 成佛). The investigation into nature that the different sects of Buddhism provided enriched the concept of xing and had a profound impact on the Tang and Song dynasty Confucian’s thinking on xing. The Tang dynasty discussions on xing were conducted against a backdrop of the Buddhist challenge. Han Yu and his student Li Ao are representative examples, and their discussions on xing are all related to the emotions. Han Yu absorbed Dong Zhongshu and Wang Chong’s theory about the three grades of human nature and proposed the idea of “three grades of human nature and emotions” (性情三品). Han Yu believed that human nature exists from birth and can be divided into three grades. The top grade is purely good, the lowest grade is purely bad and the middle grade can be good and bad. The content of human nature is humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. In the top grade of human nature, the virtue of humaneness takes precedence and controls the other four virtues, and so it is purely good. In the middle grade of human nature, the virtue of humanness is relatively lower, and the other four virtues are not complete, thus it can be both good and bad. In the lowest grade of human nature, there is a lack of the five virtues and so

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is completely bad. Corresponding to the theory of the three grades of human nature, Han Yu believes that emotions are produced through the encounter with objects and is manifested as joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire. Corresponding with human nature, emotions also have three grades. In the highest grade of emotions, the amount of emotions triggered is just right, in the middle grade, the amount of emotions triggered is sometimes excessive and sometimes insufficient. In the lowest grade of emotions, the emotions are completely led by external objects. Although the highest and lowest grade of human natures cannot be changed, Han Yu nevertheless believes that moral education can allow the good nature of the top grade to be even more resplendent and allow those of the lowest grade to, for fear of punishment, lessen their bad deeds. Using the five virtues to discuss the goodness and badness of human nature is a development of Dong Zhongshu’s theory. The idea of excessive and insufficient emotions to discuss the three grades of emotions directly inspired Li Ao’s theory of recovery of human nature (复性). Li Ao inherited Han Yu’s basic specification on human nature and the emotions and believed that human nature is what heaven commands (天之命也) and the “means by which a person becomes a sage” (人之所以为圣人者). The emotions, however, are “the means by which a person misleads their nature” (人之所以惑其性者) (Part I, Recovering Human Nature) and are manifested as joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire. Human nature is completely good, but emotions have both good and bad aspects. The emotions are easily influenced by external objects so that human nature is misled, and so human nature manifests itself as bad. This is not, however, to say that human nature itself is originally bad. The relationship between the emotions and human nature is akin to that between sand and water, smoke and fire. Sand can make the water cloudy; smoke can make the fire not bright, but it is not the nature of water not to be clear and the nature of fire not to be bright. If there was no sand then the water would be clear of its own accord, if there was no smoke then the fire would be bright of its own accord. Likewise, if there were no emotions, then human nature would be good of its own accord. Therefore, Li Ao believed that through the cultivation methods of “not thinking and not contemplating” (弗思弗虑) and “neither holding onto activity nor stillness” (动静皆离) one can get rid of the bad emotions, and return to the original good nature. This is the so-called “recovery of human nature” (复性). Li Ao’s theory of taking “neither holding onto activity nor stillness” in order to return to human nature shows clear signs of Buddhist influence. The discussion on human nature and the emotions which Han Yu and Li Ao provided had a profound impact on the Neo-Confucian discourse of human nature.

6.4 Four The rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty marks a new stage in the development of Confucianism. The investigation into human nature is also a key content in Neo-Confucianism. Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan all provided discussions on human nature.

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The question of whether human nature is good or bad was an extremely important question in discussions of human nature in Chinese philosophy. Although there were many different opinions prior to the Song, such as human nature is good, bad, or a mixture, they were unable to resolve this issue. In order to resolve this issue, Zhang Zai proposed the idea that there was a distinction between the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) and the human nature of material qi (气质 之性). Zhang Zai believes that the myriad things are all constituted by vital energy, and the root-body of vital energy is the supreme void. When vital energy assembles, it becomes the myriad things, and when it dissipates it becomes the supreme void. The supreme void itself, however, is also vital energy in its original state. The nature of the supreme void is still and pure and when it is received by humans and the myriad things it becomes the root of the goodness of human nature. Simultaneous with receiving the nature of the supreme void, humans also receive the vital energy of yin and yang and, through this, gain their bodily form. As different peoples receive different amounts and qualities of yinyang vital energies, their vital energies are different and so peoples have different natures. Human nature is thus a combination of human nature bestowed by heaven and earth and the human nature of material qi. The former comes from the supreme void whereas the latter comes from vital energy. The nature of one’s vital energy is manifested as natural propensities such as eating and the desires between males and females; they rely on external objects for their fulfilment. It is in this sense that the nature of vital energy is called the “apprehending nature” (攻取之性). As the nature of vital energy is easily controlled by external objects, it often obstructs the nature of heaven and earth and manifests itself as badness and so is the root of the badness of human nature. Following this distinction between the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth and the human nature of material qi. Zhang Zai advocated changing the quality of one’s vital energy so that it can be transformed into the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth. The best way to effect this transformation is in studying, “if the quality of one’s vital energy is bad, then study can shift it” (“Qi-quality”, The Well-ordered Cave of the Science of the Classics), “the great benefit of studying lies in personally seeking the transformation of the quality of one’s vital energy” (Recorded Conversations II). The distinction which Zhang Zai made between human nature bestowed by heaven and earth and the human nature of material qi provided a relatively good theoretical explanation for the problem of the goodness and badness of human nature. The Cheng brothers endorsed Zhang Zai’s discourse on human nature and believed that discussions of human nature must be combined with vital energy, the study of human nature without taking vital energy into consideration can never be complete whereas the study of vital energy without taking human nature into consideration can never attain clarity and distinctness. (Book 2, Pure Words of the Cheng Brothers)

They, therefore, draw upon the distinction which Zhang Zai made between the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth and the human nature of material qi, but changed the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) into the nature ordained by heaven’s mandate (天命之性). The nature ordained by heaven’s mandate refers to the human nature of the dao of heaven (天道之性) that humans receive. The dao

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of heaven is principle (li, 理), “when this principle is realized within human beings then it becomes human nature” (Book 1, Explanations of the Classics by the Two Chengs) In this sense, human nature is principle, the nature of heaven’s mandate is possessed by everyone without distinction. As the nature of heaven’s mandate is rooted in principle and principle is the root-body of the universe and purely good, the nature of heaven’s mandate is also purely good. This is the root reason why human nature is good. The endowment of vital energy as material nature (气质之性) is produced when humans receive vital energy, in this sense, human nature is vital energy. The differences in the clarity of vital energy manifest itself in the distinctions between good and bad, when vital energy is clear then one’s capacities are good, when vital energy is impure, then one’s capacities are bad. Those who receive completely pure vital energy are sages, those who receive completely impure vital energy are the ignorant (Book 22, Part I, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers). there are those who are good from when they were a child, there are those who were bad since when they were a child. This is due to the endowment of vital energy. If goodness is humans nature, then badness cannot be said to not be human nature. (Book 1, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers).

Thus, it is the endowment of vital energy as material nature that is the root cause of bad human nature. The endowment of vital energy as material nature manifests itself as human desire. All bad actions are the results of the temptations of desires which lead to the obstruction of heavenly principle. The Cheng brother’s discourse on human nature thus ultimately boils down to the ethical advocacy of preserving heaven’s principle and extinguishing human desire: “the extinguishing of selfish desire means the presencing of heaven’s principle” (私欲灭, 则天理明矣) (Book 24, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers). Zhu Xi greatly endorsed Zhang Zai and the Cheng brother’s theory of human nature and believed that their discussions helped resolve the age-old question of the goodness or badness of human nature. In his discourse on human nature, Zhu Xi maintained Zhang Zai’s view and divided human nature into the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth and the human nature of material qi, whilst simultaneously inheriting the Cheng brothers’ view that “human nature is the principle [li, 理].” Zhu Xi believed that human nature bestowed by heaven and earth is derived from the heavenly principle, whereas the human nature of material qi is a mixture of principle and vital energy. Like Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi believes that because human beings’ human nature bestowed by heaven and earth comes from the heavenly principles, it is purely good. From the perspective of human nature bestowed by heaven and earth, there are no bad human natures. It is precisely the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth that determines the difference between humans and objects (物), as well as the pure goodness of human nature. From the perspective of the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth, all human natures are good. From the perspective of the human nature of material qi, there are good and bad human natures; the badness of human nature is rooted in the human nature of material qi. If there are good and bad human natures, then it is due to the different

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endowments of vital energy. Like the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi also believes that one’s vital energy is manifested as the desires of the ears, eyes, mouth and tongue and that heavenly principle and human desire are inversely proportional to each other. The preservation of heavenly principle would mean the extinguishing of human desire and vice versa. On this point, Zhu Xi, therefore, actively promoted the preservation of the heavenly principles and the extinguishing of human desire. As can be seen, Zhu Xi’s discourse on human nature absorbed Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers’ views and combined it with his own philosophical views and acts as a conclusion to the discourse on human nature since the Pre-Qin period. Contemporaries of Zhu Xi who held different views on human nature was the founder of the “learning of heart-mind” school, Lu Jiuyuan, as well as Chen Liang (陈亮) and Ye Shi (叶适) of the Yongjia school (功利学派). For Lu Jiuyuan, human nature has the same significance as the heart-mind “from the perspective of heaven, it is nature [性], from the perspective of humans, it is heart-mind [心]” (Recorded Conversations II). Lu Jiuyuan defined the content of human nature as the five constant virtues of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. On the matter of the goodness and badness of human nature, Lu Jiuyuan believed that human nature is originally good and that bad actions are a result of being misled by external objects. With regard to self-cultivation, Lu Jiuyuan advocates “establishing what is greater” (先立乎其大) and “discovering one’s original heart-mind” (发 明本心). Liu Jiuyuan’s philosophy of the union of heart-mind and human nature was inherited by Wang Yangming. Chen Liang and Ye Shi was against Zhu Xi turning heavenly principle and human desire into antithetical extremes and instead championed starting with human desire itself to discuss human nature and so discovering how external things are coherent with principle. Chen Liang was of the opinion that sounds in relation to the ears, sights in relation to the eyes, odours in relation to the nose, taste in relation to the mouth and ease and comfort in relation to the four limbs are what human nature originally possess. Whether they obtain them or not involves the element of mandate and cannot be determined by human beings. In this, Chen Liang is in complete accord with Mencius’ views. Seeing as these desires arise from human nature, then the desire after external objects are coherent with principle, as such, “how can there be any phenomena in the world that is external to the body, anything that is external to human nature?” (“Question and Answer”, Collected Works of Chen Liang) Ye Shi also believed that human nature cannot exist apart from external objects: “human nature and morality cannot transcend nor set aside objects and be independently established.” (“Great Learning”, Book 7, Collected Works of Shuixin) The Yongjia school’s discourse on human nature was greatly divergent from that of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi in that it reflects an affirmation of utilitarian values and an opposition to the “idle talk” (空谈) discussion of human nature and mandate.

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6.5 Five The person who brought the “learning of heart-mind” to maturation, Wang Yangming, inherited Lu Jiuyuan’s view of the unity of the heart-mind and human nature and combined concepts such as heart-mind, heaven, principle, moral knowing in the concept of human nature. There are nine main points to his discussion of human nature. First, human nature is the heart-mind and heavenly principle. Human nature is heart-mind, it is the basis of human being’s ability to see, listen, speak and move. That human nature is the root-body of things and phenomena means that it is also heavenly principle. Following this, human nature is moral knowing. Moral knowing (良知) is the capacity for knowing morality and is innate in the human heart-mind as it does not depend upon what is external, and it is the commander of the heart-mind. Loyalty, filial piety, humaneness and righteousness are all contents of human nature which arise from moral knowing of the heart-mind. Following this, human nature is the unification of utmost goodness with that which is neutral with regard to good and bad. On the one hand, as the root-body of the heart-mind, moral knowing is utmost goodness, thus human nature is correspondingly utmost goodness. On the other hand, from the perspective of principle, principle transcends good and bad and is neutral with regard to good and bad; this is the original condition of principle. Human nature as a principle is, therefore, also without goodness or badness. It is only during the process of the functioning of the moral knowing of human nature that there are emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and happiness. Wang Yangming calls this the emotions of human nature (性之情). Selfish desires are also produced, and Wang Yangming calls this the obfuscation of human nature (性之蔽). The emotions and obfuscation of human nature are all the result of the movement of vital energy ( 气之动) and so there is both good and bad. It is only when vital energy does not move that there is no good or bad, as such, it is this non-moving state is the state of utmost goodness. In this way, the human nature of utmost goodness and the neutrality of human nature with regard to good and bad is united. Wang Yangming’s contemporary Wang Tingxiang (王廷相), with the intention of criticizing the Cheng-Zhu school of principle, intimately connected human nature and vital energy so as to oppose the Cheng-Zhu discourse of explaining human nature via principle. Wang Tingxiang believed that human nature and vital energy are mutually complementary and cannot be divorced from one another. Vital energy is the host that allows human nature to exist, whereas human nature is the internal reason for why vital energy is alive. On the basis of the idea that human nature and vital energy are mutually inextricable, Wang Tingxiang believes that the Cheng-Zhu discourse of using principle to talk about human nature is the empty and arcane rhetoric of Buddhism. With regard to whether human nature is good or bad, Wang Tingxiang believes that seeing as human nature and vital energy are mutually inextricable, and there are different grades of vital energy (clear, muddy, pure and mixed), then human nature must necessarily have good and bad. It is on this basis that he criticized Mencius’ theory that human nature is good,

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[if we] focus on vital energy, then human nature necessarily has badness, and Mencius’ discourse of the goodness of human nature does not work. […] vital energy has [different grades of] clear, muddy, pure and mixed, so how can human nature not be without the mixture of good and bad. (“Letter in Response to Xue Juncai discussing Human Nature”3 )

It is on this basis that, for Wang Tingxiang, the Cheng-Zhu theory that the human nature of heaven’s command has goodness and no badness is incoherent. If we say the human nature of heaven’s command is good and without any badness, then where would we find this human nature of heaven’s command? If the human nature of heaven’s command cannot exist apart from material qi then how can one say that it is good without any badness? (ibid.)

During the Ming-Qing period, Wang Fuzhi, on the basis of summarizing his predecessor’s discussions of human nature proposed the view that, “goodness continues [it] and human nature completes [it]”4 (继善成性), “practice is what makes human nature” (习与性成), and “daily engendered and daily completed” (日生日成). These are all developments which his predecessors had not touched upon. First, Wang Fuzhi uses the “principle of engendering” (生之理) to talk about human nature. What the principle of engendering means is that in the process of the production of the myriad things, they receive the principle of the flowing vital energy. With regard to human beings, there are two facets. First, one’s natural nature (自然属 性), and this is manifested as the desire for sounds, smells, sights, odours and tastes. Second, one’s moral nature (道德属性), and this is manifested as the principle of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Natural nature is common between human and animals, but the moral nature is unique to human beings, and is, therefore, what distinguishes humans from animals. Following this, Wang Fuzhi believes that human nature is a process of “goodness continues [it] and human nature completes [it]” (继善成性). This is a process whereby the good sprouts in human nature are intuited and expanded upon. Goodness continuing it is merely the prerequisite of completing human nature, but is not human nature itself. The real formation of human nature requires a process of “human nature completes it,” that is, the maintenance over a long period of time of the good sprouts so that there is a potential for its transformation into a reality. In reality, this is a process of moral realization. Following this, Wang Fuzhi proposed the idea of “practice is what makes human nature” (习与性成). What is meant by practice is the latter-day environment and habits in which one is situated and affected by. This is the root of the badness of human nature. The bad social environment exerts an imperceptible influence on people so that they are saturated in it without knowing, such that, gradually, it becomes a habit. The human nature that is a result of practice has nothing to do with what is congenitally endowed. It is a latter-day environment that forms human nature. In this, 3 答薛君采论性书. 4 Translator’s note: this is from Xici

A, “That which allows the Dao to continue to operate is human goodness, and that which allows it to bring things to completion is human nature.” 继之者善也,成 之者性也.

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Wang Fuzhi is emphasizing the influence and effect of the latter-day environment on human nature. Fourth, traditional accounts of human nature usually take human nature to be innate, what latter-day effort needs to accomplish is merely making manifest what was already innate. Wang Fuzhi, on the other hand, thinks that human nature is not congenitally pre-formed but is rather a process which is “daily engendered and daily completed” (日生日成). Human nature is something that is received from heaven’s mandate, however, heaven’s mandate is something that never ceases, and so humans do not cease receiving heaven’s mandate. From their birth to their maturity, old age and death humans are constantly receiving heaven’s mandate. Human nature is thus growing daily and being completed daily. It is precisely due to this that human nature is not something fixed and unchanging. It is instead something which is incomplete and yet to be completed, something which even if already formed, can be reformed. Human nature is thus a process that is in constant production, change and development. Wang Fuzhi’s discourse on human nature is a summary and innovation upon previous discourses. With Wang Fuzhi, Chinese philosophical discourse on human nature reached an unprecedented height. After this, Yan Yuan (颜元) rejected the school of principle’s theory of principle as good and vital energy as bad as well as their idea that human nature bestowed by heaven and earth is good and the human nature of material qi is bad. He proposed instead, on the basis of “principle and vital energy coalesced into a whole” (理气融为一片), that “without vital energy, there is no means for human nature to be, without vital energy, there is no way for the manifestations of human nature.” (“Preserving Human Nature”, Book 1, Four Essays on Preservation) Dai Zhen also started from vital energy and believed that human nature referred to the “understanding of blood, vital energy and the heart-mind” (血 气心知). This is manifested as human desires, emotions and intelligence. For Dai Zhen, nothing like the nature of heaven or earth exists. What is called human nature is merely the nature of vital energy. Although Yan Yuan, Dai Zhen, in using vital energy to talk about human nature, is critical of the school of principle’s discussion of human nature, in their theoretical system, however, none of them have taken leave of the conventional domain of human nature discourse.

References Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Queen, Sarah A., and John S. Major 2016. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu, transl. Sarah A. Queen, and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 7

Human Disposition (qing, 情)

As a philosophical concept, qing refers the human sentiments and sensibilities that are opposed to human nature (性) such as joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love and hate. It also refers to innate human desires such as sexual desires. In Chinese philosophy, the concept of qing is used concurrently with xing, and sometimes it is used together with concepts such as heart-mind and desire. Qing must, therefore, be investigated concurrently with human nature, heart-mind and desire.

7.1 One In the earliest Chinese texts, qing was not necessarily a philosophical concept but referred instead to the true state of affairs (实情) or the pattern of things (情理). One of the first texts to explore the philosophical significance of the term was the Guanzi. The Guanzi believed that human disposition (qing) manifests itself in seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages, as well as various desires. If one achieves one’s desires, then one is happy, and the converse brings sorrow. The Guanzi, furthermore, links qing with xing and believed that the sovereign should be compliant with qing and xing, as this is the basis of governance. From this, we can see that, in Guanzi’s thinking, qing and xing tend towards unification, that human disposition (qing) is tantamount to human nature (xing), and a rigid distinction was not made between qing and xing. During the Pre-Qin period, Confucius did not explore qing from a philosophical perspective. Mencius advocated that human nature is good and believed that humans are born with the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐), shame and disdain (羞恶), deference (辞让), approval and disapproval (是非). These four heartminds can give rise to the four sprouts of virtue (humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom). Mencius did not, however, make a distinction between qing and human nature (xing). He says, “As for their qing, it can become good, this is what is called good. As for their becoming not good, this is not the fault of their capacity.” (Mencius 6A6) Qing here refers to the nature of a person, the state that a © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_7

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person is in of themselves. As such, what Mencius focuses on is one’s moral nature and so did not go into the question of one’s emotions or desires. Daoist philosophy takes “dao emulates what it spontaneously so” as its orientation. With regard to xing and qing, this is manifested as taking one’s original nature as what is most perfect and good. Although the term qing does not appear in the Daodejing, the text nonetheless emphasizes “manifest plainness, embrace simplicity, reduce selfishness, have less desires” (Chap. 19, Daodejing). The Daodejing has, therefore, already noticed the injury that emotions and desires can have on one’s original nature. In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, this idea gained further development. As Zhuangzi sees it, human nature is the original nature that one innately has, but qing is precisely the emotions and desires which are opposed to the spontaneous self-so original nature. As such, Zhuangzi advocates that we be “without qing” (无情). At times, however, Zhuangzi uses xing and qing in conjunction with each other: xingqing (性情) refers to human nature itself. As is clear, therefore, in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, the distinction between qing and xing is not severely made. In Xunzi’s discussion of qing, qing is intimately linked with xing. Xing is the innately endowed natural material (材质), qing is the external manifestation of xing, whereas desire is the external manifestation of qing; xing, qing and desire are thus united. It is in this sense that Xunzi believes that human qing is merely the desire of the ears, eyes, mouth, nose and other perceptual organs. Sometimes Xunzi uses qing and xing in conjunction with each other. It is on the assumption of the mutual complementarity of xing and qing that Xunzi proposed the theory of human nature is bad. Now people’s nature is such that they are born with a fondness for profit. If they follow along with this, then struggle and contention will arise, and deference will perish. They are born with feelings of hate and dislike. If they follow along with these, then cruelty and villainy will arise, and loyalty and trustworthiness will perish therein. They are born with desires of the eyes and ears, a fondness for sights and sounds. If they follow along with these, then lasciviousness and chaos will arise, and ritual and righteousness, proper form and order, will perish. Thus, if people obey their nature and follow their natural dispositions [xing] they are sure to come to struggle and contention, turn to disrupting social divisions and order, and end up becoming violent.1 (Xunzi, “Human Nature is Bad”)

This then is the basis of why Xunzi takes human nature to be bad and this is, in turn, the basis of his advocacy of governance through ritual, righteousness and law. Therefore, they set up ritual and righteousness, and established proper models and measures in order to straighten out and beautify people’s natural dispositions [qing] and nature [xing] and thereby correct them, and in order to train and transform people’s natural dispositions [qing] and nature [xing] and thereby guide them” (Xunzi, “Human Nature is Bad”)

Xunzi’s discussion of the relationship between xing and qing had a great significance. He not only uncovered the complementary relationship between xing and qing, he also initiated the exploration into the distinction between xing and qing which was to have a lasting impact on Chinese philosophy. 1 Hutton

(2014: 284).

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7.2 Two Han dynasty philosophical explorations of qing are also still intimately linked with xing. What is rather distinctive about it is that their discourses draw on the philosophy of yinyang and so attributes the production of qing to heaven. We can take Dong Zhongshu’s works and Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion as the representatives of the philosophical explorations of qing in this period. Dong Zhongshu understood heaven to be an anthropomorphic god with intentions and took this to be his highest concept. He absorbed the philosophy of yinyang and the five phases and established a teleological system which is characterized by “human beings and heaven mutually responding to each other” (天人感应). In his exploration of the concept of qing, Dong Zhongshu opposed it to xing. He believed that qing is human desire, whereas xing is the material that one is made of. He attributed qing and xing to heaven, “What heaven and earth give birth to are called xing and qing” (“Deeply Examine Names and Designations”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn). “The qing and xing of human beings include what is received from heaven.” (“Heaven, the Maker of Humankind”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) Human dispositions such as joy, likes and dislikes do not arise from humans themselves, but are all endowed by heaven. “To praise good, despise bad, cherish renown and loathe disgrace, these cannot be borne of human beings themselves. They are bestowed on human beings by heaven.” (“Bamboo Grove”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) Next, Dong Zhongshu believes that human beings are correlated with heaven. “Heaven has yin and yang, human beings also have yin and yang” (“Things of the Same Kind Activate One Another”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn), “if a grouping is made according to kind, Heaven and human beings are one.”2 (“The meaning of Yin and Yang”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) It is because heaven has yin and yang that humans have their qing and xing, A person has xing and qing just as heaven has yin and yang. To speak of one’s basic substance without mentioning one’s qing is like speaking of heaven’s yang without mentioning its yin.3 (“Deeply Examine Names and Designations”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

Therefore, within human nature (xing), there is already qing and xing, the yang is the good and the yin is the bad. Human nature (xing) is born from yang and qing is born from yin. It is because yang is humane, and yin is lowly that human nature (xing) is humane whereas qing is avaricious. The humaneness of human nature (xing) and the avariciousness of qing co-exist in one body. As qing is human desire, it manifests itself as avariciousness. This is why rules and regulations must be instituted and this is the main content of the kingly way, human desire is called qing. Without regulations qing is not moderated. Thus, the king […] corrects the appropriateness of the models and measures, distinguishes the arrangement of high and low in order to guard against desire. (“Biography of Dong Zhongshu” Book of Han) 2 Queen 3 Queen

and Major (2016: 415). and Major (2016: 198), modified.

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As such, Dong Zhongshu’s exegesis of qing and xing forms the foundation of his political philosophy of the kingly way. The Eastern Han text Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion has a chapter on “xing qing” (性情) which provides a discussion on the concrete content of xing and qing, its origins and its relationship with the internal organs. The Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion believes that, the vital energies of yin and yang produces qing and xing and that human beings has five natures (xing) and six emotions (qing). The five natures refer to humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. The six emotions refer to joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love and hate. It cites the The Decision: Hooking the Mandate (钩命决): The emotions are engendered by yin qi, it is desire [based] on momentary reflection. Human nature is engendered by yang qi and is coherent with principle [li]. As the nature of yang qi is humaneness and the nature of yin qi is covetousness, contained in the emotions are profit and desire [the desire for profit] and contained in human nature is humaneness.

That human nature is coherent with principle and that the emotions desire profit manifest the respective natures of yang (humaneness) and ying (covetousness) vital energies respectively. The Decision: Hooking the Mandate is one of the apocryphal texts (纬书) of the Han period. As we can see, it has become an orthodox assumption that the emotions and human nature are a product of the vital energy of yin and yang and that human nature is humane and emotions are avaricious. The Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion also correlates the five natures and six emotions with the five viscera and six receptacles (五脏六腑) and believes that human beings are born when they receive the vital energy of the six tones (六律) and five phases. This is why humans have five viscera and six receptacles, and this is why there are five natures and six emotions. Following this, the six emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love and hate are correlated with a direction, “joy resides in the west, anger in the east, love in the north, hate in the south, grief in the lower, and happiness in the upper [regions].” This discussion in the Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion shows the influence of the five phases theory on Confucianism. Dong Zhongshu’s and Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion’s discussion of the relationship between xing and qing, the goodness of xing and the badness of qing became a rather influential viewpoint of the time. These viewpoints, however, encountered criticisms from the scholars of the post-Han period. Liu Xiang (刘向), for example, opposed Dong Zhongshu’s claim that “human nature is humane but emotions are avaricious” (性仁 情贪) and believed instead that human nature exists within the self and does not arise and emotions come into contact with external objects and take form externally. He, therefore, believed that emotions and human nature correspond with each other: human nature is not independently good, and emotions are not independently bad. Wang Chong also opposed Dong Zhongshu’s view that the emotions are born from yin and human nature is born from yang and that the emotions are avaricious and human nature is humane and instead believed that both human nature and the emotions are born from yin and yang, so emotions and human nature have both goodness and badness. On the matter of human nature and emotions, Xun Yue

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(荀悦) endorsed Liu Xiang’s views and criticized the discourses of the time which held the viewpoint that: humaneness and righteousness are human nature, love and hate are the emotions. Humaneness and righteousness are constantly good, love and hate are sometimes bad, thus having emotions is bad. (“Miscellaneous Sayings”, Reexaminations of Historical experience)

Xun Yue (荀悦) explicitly held that human emotions are the external manifestations of human nature and that the emotions are rooted in human nature. The emotions of love and hate are all contents of human nature. Love is human nature’s joy, love and preferences, whereas hate is human nature’s disdain, hate and rejection. As such human nature and the emotions are mutually dependent. Human nature is the internal reason for emotions and emotions are the external manifestation of human nature. It is not the case that human nature is good, and emotions are bad, but rather both human nature and emotions have goodness and badness in them. Liu Xiang, Wang Chong and Xun Yue’s viewpoints deepened and enriched the understanding of the problem of human nature and the emotions.

7.3 Three During the Wei-Jin period, Neo-Daoism was the zeitgeist. As an intellectual trend, however, Neo-Daoism was, from its very inception, interwoven with Confucianism. This characteristic is seen from the debate between He Yan and Wang Bi with regard to whether the sage has emotions or not. From the perspective of the distinction between the sage and the average person, He Yan believed that the average person has emotions, but that the sage is without emotions. The average person not only has the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and happiness, but these people will also often be unrestrained with regard to these emotions, with the result that their actions are against principle. It is for this reason that “anger should not extend beyond its measure” (怒不过分) and “anger should accord with what is due” (怒当其理). The sage, however, is different. He Yan believes that the sage is without the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and happiness. The exact content of He Yan’s discourse on how the sage is without emotions has not been passed down, but it has gained the endorsement of people such as Zhong Hui (钟 会); from this, we can see the amount of influence it had at the time. The sage is a key concept in Confucianism, but the idea of being with or without emotions is a Daoist discourse. He Yan wanted to use the Daoist discourse of being with or without emotions to talk about the Confucian sage, and this move reflects the first tentative steps of the bridging and coming together of Confucianism and Daoism. With regard to He Yan’s view that the sage has no emotions, Wang Bi held different opinions. Wang Bi believed that if the sage is without emotions then it would be because he has left the world of affairs and is separated from the mundane world; this would necessarily result in the Confucian and the Daoist worlds being un-bridgeable. Thus, Wang Bi believes that the sage, like the common people, has emotions and so

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will not be without sorrow and happiness in responding to objects; in this way, he is integrated with the mundane world of affairs. Simultaneously, however, the sage has a more abundant “numinous clarity” (神明) than the average person, and they “embody harmony and thus to reach the state of not having anything” (体冲和以通 无) without being burdened by things. This means that they can both be within the mundane realm of human affairs be transcendent of it. The significance of Wang Bi’s theory that the sage has emotions without being dragged down by emotions lies in its attempt at an accommodation between Confucianism and Daoism. Its approach was different from that of He Yan’s theory of the emotionless sage, but had the same end. From this, we can see how, against the backdrop of Neo-Daoism, investigation into the traditional concept of qing took on tones of the abstruse (玄). When the Neo-Daoism movement reached the period of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, the criticism of Confucian ethical codes continued to deepen. Ji Kang (嵇康) proposed “overcoming Confucian ethical codes and reposing one’s trust in the spontaneously so” (越名教而任自然) which meant opposing the restriction that Confucian ethical codes placed on one’s spontaneously so natures, and affirming the reasonableness of one’s natural emotions. He believed that “human nature takes joy in following its desires” and one “becomes spontaneous so by following desires” (Criticizing the Discourse on Spontaneous Eagerness to Learn) At the same time, however, from the health cultivation point of view, Ji Kang advocated the measured control of emotions and desires. Xiang Xiu (向秀), however, was opposed to Ji Kang’s theory of moderating the emotions and desires in order to cultivate health. He advocated instead of the coherence of emotions with principle and with what is natural. If there is life then there are emotions, following one’s emotions [称情] is thus natural, if one rejects it and treats it as external then this is tantamount to having no life [无生], where then would be your value? Desires, loving honour and hating disgrace, loving comfort and hating toil, are all born from what is natural [自然]. (Criticizing the Discourse on Nourishing Life)

The broad and unrestrained manners of the famous Wei-Jin scholars meant that they took the coherence of the emotions with what is natural as their theoretical basis, but this unrestrained manner became a kind of indulgence in desires and emotions towards the end of Neo-Daoism. In his Commentary of Liezi Zhang Zhan (张湛) said, yielding to the emotions and exhausting one’s nature, reaching the end of happiness and exhausting diversion, although it quickens the years, it realizes the joy of being alive. (“Yang Zhu”, Commentary on the Liezi)

He also said, “To love comfort and hate toil is the constant natures of things. Thus, the happiness of being alive lies in having lots of tastes, beautiful clothing, good sights and sounds and tones.” (ibid.) This is a direct expression of the contemporary thought of following emotions and giving free rein to desires. The Wei-Jin scholars’ indulgence of the emotions and desires, especially in those of the later period, was greatly criticized by their contemporaries. It also inspired a reconsideration of emotions and human nature. Liu Zhou (刘昼) of the Northern

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Qi, for example, in his book Liuzi4 had the chapters “Getting Rid of Emotions” (去 情) and “Guarding Against Desires” (防欲) and provided a relatively comprehensive account of the emotions and human nature. Liu Zhou believed that the emotions and human nature arise because of the vital energy that humans receive. When human nature comes into contact with objects, emotions are born, and the concrete manifestation of this are desires. Although emotions are born from human nature, the emotions can be harmful to human nature; although desires are born from the emotions, desires can be harmful to the emotions. That the emotions are damaging to human nature and that the desires are damaging to the emotions is just like the relation of smoke and ice to water and fire. Although smoke is born from fire, it blocks fire. Although ice is born from water, it obstructs water. Thus, when smoke is weak, fire is strong, when ice dissolves, water flows. When human nature is steadfast, then the emotions disintegrate. When the emotions blaze then human nature is extinguished. Following this, Liu Zhou discussed the importance of getting rid of emotions and desires from two perspectives. First, from the perspective of the emotions, the emotions are the root cause of the production of right and wrong, advantage and injury. The emotions obstruct how one receives people and objects and so, through getting rid of emotions, one can attain being “without emotion.” Second, from the perspective that human nature is good, and the emotions are bad. Although human nature is originally good, it can have bad elements because it can be misled by the desires that are born from the emotions. Although Liu Zhou admits the objective existence of the ears, eyes mouth, nose and body’s desiring, he emphasizes the damage that these desires have on life. Too passionate a desire can harm one’s body, thus human desire “is the means by which one nourishes life, and also the means by which one harms life.” As such, one must moderate one’s desires and the key to getting rid of emotions is in restraining the desires of the five senses, as the five senses are the root cause of the production of desire. Apart from this, getting rid of emotions and desires rests in grasping the right moment. One must restrain the emotions when they are just sprouting, otherwise human nature will be completely led by the emotions and desires and there will be no way to extinguish it. Receiving objects without emotions is the state of the sage. Liu Zhou’s exegesis on the emotions and human nature both inherits traditional viewpoints on the emotions and is also a criticism of the later Wei-Jin ideology of unrestrained desire.

7.4 Four The Tang dynasty exploration of emotions is best represented by Han Yu and Li Ao. Han Yu and Li Ao’s discussion of the emotions are all related to human nature. Han Yu believes that human nature is congenital whereas the emotions are born from the 4 There are diverse opinions among scholars as to the question of the authorship of the Liuzi. Some think that is was penned by Liu Zhou, others believe it was Liu Xie (刘勰), yet others believe it was Liu Xiaobiao (刘孝标). The author believes that it was the former.

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encounter with objects. The content of human nature is manifested as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. The emotions manifest themselves as joy, anger, sorrow, fear, happiness, love and hate. On the question of the emotions, Han Yu, corresponding with his discourse of “three grades of human nature” (性三品) proposed the idea of “three grades of emotions” (情三品). In the top grade of emotions, the emotions are only produced according to the mean, and are never exceeding and never insufficient. In the middle grade of emotions, they are sometimes excessive and sometimes insufficient. In the lowest grade of emotions, the emotions are completely led by external objects. The three grades of emotions and the three grades of human natures have a one-to-one correspondence. The top grade of human nature necessarily produces the top grade of emotions, the middle grade of human nature necessarily produces the middle grade of emotions and the lowest grade of human nature necessarily produces the lowest grade of emotions. The three grades of emotions are Han Yu’s innovation on the question of the emotions. Li Ao inherited Han Yu’s basic specifications on human nature and the emotions and believed that human nature was “heaven’s mandate” and “the means by which humans become a sage” and the emotions are “the means by which a person misleads their nature” (Part I, Recovering Human Nature) The emotions manifest themselves as joy, anger, sorrow, fear, happiness, love and hate. On the question of the relationship between the emotions and human nature, Li Ao believes that emotions are inseparable from human nature. The emotions are born from human nature and human nature manifests itself through the emotions. On the question of good and bad, however, there are differences between the emotions and human nature. Human nature is completely good whereas the emotions can be both good and bad. The emotions are easily influenced by external objects and so misleads human nature and are thus manifested as badness. It is not that human nature itself is originally bad; the relationship between the emotions and human nature is precisely like that between sand and water, smoke and fire. Sand can make water muddy and smoke can make fire unclear, but this is not because the original nature of water is unclear, and the original nature of fire is unclear. If there was no sand, then water will be clear of its own accord. If there was no smoke, then fire will be clear of its own accord. Similarly, if there were no emotions then human nature will be good of its own accord. Therefore, Li Ao believed that through the cultivation methods of “not thinking and not contemplating” (弗思弗虑) and “neither holding onto activity nor stillness” (动 静皆离) one can get rid of the bad emotions, and return to the original good nature. This is the so-called “recovering human nature” (复性). Li Ao’s theory of “neither holding onto activity nor stillness” in order to return to human nature shows clear signs of Buddhist influence. Han Yu and Li Ao’s discussion of human nature and the emotions had a profound impact on the Neo-Confucian discourse of human nature. Li Ao’s discourse of human nature as good and emotions as bad can be considered as the first signs of the Song dynasty idea of “preserving principle and extinguishing human desire” (存天理,灭人欲).

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7.5 Five The Neo-Confucianism of the Song dynasty is the mature state in the development of Confucianism; the speculative nature of its philosophy emphasizes this point. In this period, the investigation into the concept of the emotions entered a stage of conclusion and consolidation. The Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, Wang Anshi and Zhu Xi all provided exegesis on the concept of the emotions and the relationship between the emotions and human nature and reached a new height. The Cheng brothers took “principle” or “heavenly principle” as their highest concept. On the question of human nature, they believed that “human nature is principle, what is called principle is human nature” (Book 22, Part I, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) The content of human nature is humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. Emotions are the external manifestation of human nature, and human nature is the basis for the production of the emotions. The emotions manifest themselves as joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love, hate and desire. With regard to the relationship between the emotions and human nature, human nature is the root (本) and is still and not yet arisen. Human nature, in its encounter with external objects, manifests itself externally as emotions; emotions are thus what moves in human nature. Emotions are thus what moves and what is already arisen; the emotions and human nature are thus inseparable. Seeing as emotions are developed from human nature, then one cannot reject the emotions in order to obtain human nature. Trying to regain human nature through rejecting the emotions will not only fail to regain human nature, but it will conversely result in the loss of one’s original nature. This is a criticism of Li Ao’s advocacy of regaining human nature and the Buddhist advocacy of prohibiting the emotions. In relation to the traditional idea that human nature is good and emotions are bad, the Cheng brothers believe that human nature is, of course, heavenly principle and good, but because the emotions are what moves in human nature, there is only the distinction of correct (正) and incorrect (不正), but not the distinction of good and evil. Although incorrect emotions cannot be called bad, they can be harmful to the originally good human nature. One should, therefore, give some measure of restraint to the emotions so that it accords with the mean and with human nature. Conversely, indulging in emotions and desires would result in injury to human nature and lead to its extinction. As such, the Cheng brothers believe that the way to become accomplished is in restraining one’s emotions and desires, correcting one’s heart-mind and nourishing one’s human nature. In Zhang Zai’s philosophy, vital energy is the central concept. On the basis of the idea of the transformation of vital energy (气化), he proposed the distinction between the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) and the human nature of material qi (气质之性) and used this to explain the question of goodness and badness of human nature. The human nature bestowed by heaven and earth is the original nature of the supreme void (太虚), when humans are endowed with this then it becomes the pure goodness of original nature. The human nature of material qi is the vital energy that one receives and becomes one’s concrete nature. As there

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are differences of pureness, muddiness, concentration and thinness of vital energy, the nature of vital energy can be both good and bad. As the emotions arise from the human nature of material qi, and human nature is manifested through the emotions, and the emotions are manifested through a person’s joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, therefore, the emotions are the manifestation of human nature. With regard to the question of the goodness and badness of the emotions, Zhang Zai believes that the emotions are not necessarily bad. If the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, happiness and love are moderated according to the mean then they are harmonious. If they are not moderated according to the mean, then they are bad. Zhang Zai is here evidently inheriting the idea from the Doctrine of the Mean that, The moment at which joy, anger, sorrow and happiness have yet to arise is called a nascent equilibrium, once the emotions have arisen, and have been moderated according to the mean then this is called harmony.

Using the idea of not being moderated according to the mean to talk about the badness of the emotions is a further development on the Doctrine of the Mean. In his definition of the concept of the emotions Wang Anshi was also of the opinion that the emotions are the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love, hate and desire. The relationship between the emotions and human nature is the relationship between what has yet to arise and what has arisen. What is preserved in the heartmind and not externally expressed is human nature, what is externally expressed and seen in one’s actions are the emotions. At root, therefore, the seven emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love, hate and desire all arise from human nature. As such, human nature is the root (本) and the emotions are the function (用) and they form an inseparable body. In using the concepts of root and function, and what has yet to arise and what has arisen to talk about human nature and the emotions, Wang Anshi is merely echoing the Cheng brothers. On the question of the goodness and badness of human nature, however, Wang Anshi raised a view that is different from traditional accounts. Wang Anshi believed that what is designated as good and bad can only refer to the emotions; one cannot talk about human nature in relation to goodness and badness. The mutual dependency of the emotions and human nature is like the cooperation between the bow and the arrow. The goodness or badness of the emotions is akin to whether the arrow hits its mark or not, thus if the emotions arise and it is in accord with principle (理) then it is good, if it does not accord with principle, then it is bad. As such, in Wang Anshi’s view, when Mencius and Xunzi talk about good and bad, they are only talking about the goodness and badness of the emotions and not about human nature itself. Virtues such as humaneness and righteousness are the goodness of the emotions, not being humane and righteous is the badness of the emotions. As such, the five constant virtues of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness are the manifestations of the goodness of the emotions and not the content of human nature. This is the difference between Wang Anshi with Mencius and the Cheng brothers. On the basis of the inseparability of the emotions and human nature and the fact that the emotions can be divided into good and bad whereas human nature cannot be, Wang Anshi criticized the discourse of the

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time which advocated getting rid of emotions in order to enlighten human nature. He said, If one got rid of the emotions then even though human nature is good, what means would there be for it to show itself [自明]. If it really were as contemporary discourse has it that those without emotions are good, then this is like praising wood and stone. (Book 27, Collected Works of Wang Wen Gong)

At the same time, he criticized the traditional view of “human nature is good, and the emotions are bad,” saying, Human nature and the emotions are one. Today there are discourses that say “human nature is good and the emotions are bad.” This is merely to recognize the name of human nature and the emotions but not to know its content. (ibid.)

Wang Anshi’s views on the emotions and human nature are greatly divergent from the traditional discourse which takes human nature to be good and the emotions to be bad. It is also not completely the same as that of his contemporaries, the Cheng brothers. It has a distinctive character of its own. The person who brought Neo-Confucianism to its maturity, Zhu Xi, summarized the existing discourses on the emotions and human nature. His investigation into the concept of the emotions reached a new level. Apart from maintaining the inextricability of the emotions and human nature, under the theory of “heart-mind is the controlling unifier of human nature and the emotions” (心统性情), he fully developed the dialectical relationship of form and function (体用), already arisen and not yet arisen (已发未发), movement and stillness between the emotions and human nature. Zhu Xi believes that the emotions and human nature is originally one entity. There does not exist emotions without human nature nor human nature without emotions. If there is human nature, then there are emotions, and human nature is manifested through the emotions. The relationship between the emotions and human nature is that of form and function, the already arisen and not yet arisen, movement and stillness. Zhu Xi’s idea that the emotions are the function and human nature is the form is directed at Hu Hong’s (胡宏) idea that “human nature is form and heart-mind is function.” Hu Hong once said, “the sages indicated their form and designated it human nature and indicated their function and called it heart-mind. Human nature cannot move, that which moves is heart-mind.” (Misgivings about Master Hu’s The Understanding of Words)5 In reference to this, Zhu Xi believed that the emotions and human nature are all already united in the heart-mind, and that human nature is form and the emotions are function. He said, “the form of human nature and the function of the emotions, human nature and the emotions all come out of the heart-mind, thus the heart-mind can be their controlling unifier” (Book 99, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), “the heart-mind contains human nature and the emotions, human nature is form and the emotions are function” (Book 5, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), 5 胡子知言疑义.

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Today there are those who take human nature as the root-body and heart-mind as its function, if the heart-mind is the function of human nature then the emotions would have a pointless existence and the heart-mind would also tend towards movement.6 (Book 74, “Guidelines for the Mencius”,7 Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection)

Therefore, the heart-mind contains both the emotions and human nature. Following this, the emotions are the arisen, and human nature is that which is yet to arise. Zhu Xi said, “the emotions arise from human nature.” (Book 59, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Before human nature has given rise to the emotions [未发], human nature is the original root-body of the emotions and this is called human nature. Once human nature has given rise [已发] to the emotions and manifests various subtle functions, this is the emotions. (Book 5, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

As such, the emotions as that which has arisen is manifested in the movements of the emotions, but human nature as that which has not yet arisen is the internal moral nature. This is analogous to the relationship between humaneness and love. Humaneness is the human nature which has not yet arisen. Love is the emotions which has already arisen. “Humaneness is human nature, love [which humaneness manifests] is the emotions. The emotions manifest themselves as specific functions, human nature refers to that which has not yet arisen [i.e. when there are no specific functions].” (Book 20, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Following this, the emotions are what is active and human nature is still. Zhu Xi says, “within the heart-mind there is movement and stillness. Stillness is human nature and movement is the emotions.” (Book 98, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) When human nature is touched by external objects, it moves and when this gets expressed this is the emotions, “human nature is that which is yet to move, the emotions are that which already move.” (Book 5, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Stillness refers to human nature and form whereas movement refers to emotions and function. Both movement and stillness, however, are contained within the heart-mind. When the heart-mind is still, it is human nature, when it moves, this is the emotions. Taking the relationship between human nature and the emotions in terms of form and function, movement and stillness, the not yet arisen and the arisen as his basis, Zhu Xi inherited Menciu’s views on the question of the goodness and badness of the emotions and human nature. He believed that because human nature is good, the origins of the emotions is also good. At the same time, Zhu Xi objectively explored the root of why the emotions can be bad. From the subjective perspective, in the process of being touched by external objects, the emotions are misled by these external objects and being unable to moderate them, they become excessive. For example, if one does not check oneself then the emotions will flow into becoming destructive. From an objective perspective, if the vital energy that one receives is not pure then the emotions will flow into being not good. Thus, with regard to the activities of the 6 This

is in reference to Mencius 2A2 in which Mencius speaks of an “unmoved heart-mind” (不动 心). 7 孟子纲领.

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emotions, one cannot indulge them and let them have free rein; they should be given a certain amount of restraint. In Zhu Xi’s philosophy of the emotions and human nature, the emotions are opposed to human nature and the heart-mind is opposed to the emotions and human nature, but they are both united in the heart-mind. Zhu Xi, through investigating the relationship between the emotions and the heart-mind under the framework of the emotions and heart-mind being contained in the heart-mind, was able to offer a more fine-grained and more profound investigation into the emotions and human nature.

7.6 Six Wang Yangming is the philosopher who brought the Ming dynasty “learning of heart-mind” school to maturity. In his philosophy, he emphasized that “there is no thing/event outside the heart-mind” (心外无物) and “there is no principle outside the heart-mind” (心外无理), and took the heart-mind to be the highest concept. In his later years, he also proposed the idea of “moral knowing” (良知) and took moral knowing as the root-body of the heart-mind. With regard to the emotions, Wang Yangming was of the opinion that it is joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love, hate and desire. These emotions are naturally equipped in the heart-mind and these seven emotions in following their own natures, manifests themselves as the function of moral knowing and so are without badness. If these seven emotions are led and guided by external objects, then they will be manifested as desires. Desires are what obscures moral knowing, but when desires are obscuring moral knowing but moral knowing is self-conscious, moral knowing will automatically get rid of desires in order to return to its original state of purity. On the question of the emotions, simultaneous with emphasizing the accordance between the emotions and moral knowing, Wang Yangming laid particular emphasis on the self-consciousness and self-clarifying nature of moral knowing. Luo Qinshun (罗钦顺) inherited the Song dynasty Neo-Confucian views on the emotions and human nature, notably that of Zhu Xi’s form and function, movement and stillness, the not yet arisen and the arisen. He used the idea of “human heartmind” and “heart-mind of dao” of the Book of Documents to enlighten the question of the emotions and human nature. He took the heart-mind of dao as human nature and the human heart-mind as emotions, the heart-mind of dao is human nature. The human heart-mind are the emotions. The heartmind is one, but one speaks of it as two because of the distinction of movement and stillness and the difference of form and function. (Knowledge Painfully Acquired, Part I)

Form is the form of the dao and function is the function of the dao, “The heart-mind of dao is human nature, human nature is the form of dao; the human heart-mind is emotions, emotions are the function of dao.” (“Reply to Assistant Minister Huang Junxi”, Addendum on Knowledge Painfully Acquired)8 As Luo Qinshun sees the 8 答黄筠亚卿

困知记附录.

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emotions and human nature as the form and function of the dao, they are the two aspects of dao. Unlike the Song dynasty Confucians who viewed dao as a heavenly principle and the human heart-mind as human desire, and so promoted “preserving heavenly principle and extinguishing human desire,” he believed that the principle (理) of the seven emotions are all rooted in human nature and are innate in all humans. It can only be complied with and not opposed. As such, Luo Qinshun affirmed that the emotions and desires accorded with principle and so showed how they cannot be eliminated. Luo Qinshun’s emphasis on the emotions’ and desires’ coherence with principle is a criticism of the Song dynasty Confucian distinction between principle and desires, and is very liberating. The great Confucian from the end of the Ming dynasty, Liu Zongzhou (刘宗周) advocated the union of vital energy and principle. From the perspective of the unity of the emotions and human nature, Liu Zongzhou criticized the Song Confucian discourse of using form and function, movement and stillness, the not yet arisen and the already arisen to talk about the relationship between the emotions and human nature. He was of the opinion that the relationship between the emotions and human nature was not comparable to that of the not yet arisen and the already arisen. He takes the example of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom: it is not the case that humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom gives birth to joy, anger, sorrow and happiness, and it is not the case that humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom is human nature and joy, anger, sorrow and happiness are the emotions. (Book 2, Collected Works of Liu Zhou) joy, anger, sorrow and happiness are just another name for humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. When we use vital energy to talk about it, it is joy, anger, sorrow and happiness. When we use principle to talk about it, it is humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. (Book 3, “Extension on the Yijing” Collected Works of Liuzi)

The difference between the emotions and human nature is just a difference in perspective. In substance (实质), the emotions are human nature, and human nature is the emotions. Liu Zongzhou’s views on human nature and the emotions are a direct reflection of his view on the unity of principle and vital energy. Wang Fuzhi from the early Qing dynasty is the philosopher who summarized traditional Chinese philosophy. With regard to the definition of human nature and the emotions, he took the virtues of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom as human nature and joy, anger, sorrow, happiness as the emotions. The emotions and human nature are inseparable and depend upon each other. Human nature manifests itself as the emotions and the emotions fulfil human nature. Although Wang Fuzhi believes that human nature gives rise to the emotions, he does not think, as per tradition, that the emotions arise through human nature’s coming into contact with objects. He says, The emotions are originally the first stirrings [几] of the harmonious union of change and transformation. Human nature is just the concrete tendency of yin and yang. What the emotions have at the beginning is enjoying food and delighting in sights. Later they change and flow and one gains the many types [of emotions] such as joy, anger, sorrow, happiness, love, hate and desire. Human nature is already active in the emotions, and it is not the case that human nature gives rise to the emotions nor that human nature is touched by

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objects and is moved and thereby transforms into emotions. (Book 10, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books)

As such, the relationship between human nature and the emotions is that of form and function and not one of arising. Wang Fuzhi’s views on the relationship between the emotions and human nature are both a succession and development of traditional views. After Wang Fuzhi, Yan Yuan (颜元) introduced the concept of capacity (才) into the discussion on human nature and the emotions. He advocated the union of human nature, the emotions and capacity. Human nature expresses itself as the emotions, and when it is manifested in specific affairs, it is capacity. As such, human nature is manifested through the emotions and capacity: “without emotions, capacity has no means of manifesting human nature.” (Book 2, Preserving Human Nature) Human nature, emotions and capacity are all manifestations of principle “[they are] one principle but with different names.” (ibid.) As such, human nature and the emotions are all good. From the perspective of opposing the school of principle, Dai Zhen (戴 震) advocated that the emotions and desires are coherent with principle and took the emotions and desire to be united with the heavenly principle. For the average person, emotions and desires are necessary, as such, seeking after desire and the emotions accords with principle, and one should give great scope to satisfyone’s emotions and desires. Dai Zhen’s views are a critique of the Song Confucians’ view of “preserving principle and extinguishing human desire” and was very enlightening for its time. From the above discussion, we can see that the emotions were a concept to which was given great attention by Chinese philosophers of every age. As it is closely affiliated with the concept of human nature, one must examine it in reference to human nature. With regard to the question of the emotions are good or bad, some thinkers, from the perspective of the opposition between the two, believed that the emotions are bad. Some approached it from the perspective of the unity between the emotions and human nature and believed that the emotions are good. Yet others believed that the emotions are without good or bad. Although these thinkers all held different views, they all advanced the investigation into the emotions so that the emotions became a key concept of Chinese philosophy.

References Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Queen, Sarah A., and John S. 2016. Major Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu, transl. Sarah A. Queen, and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 8

Sincerity (cheng, 诚)

Cheng is a key concept in Confucian philosophy and its original meaning is sincerity, being authentic in one’s speech, one’s actions according to one’s words, and is connected with the concept of trustworthiness. The concept of sincerity (cheng) appeared quite early and was already widely used in the pre-Qin classics, such as the Book of Documents. Later, the Book of Changes, Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean and Mencius have all discussed the concept, particularly the Doctrine of the Mean, which elevated it to the dao of heaven. Afterwards, it was also greatly elucidated by the Song dynasty school of principle, resulting in sincerity becoming one of the key concepts of Confucian philosophy and this had a profound impact on its development.

8.1 One Although sincerity is a highly important concept in Confucian philosophy, it is rarely mentioned in Confucius’s Analects. What Confucius speaks comparatively more of is trustworthiness. For example, he says, If in word you are dutiful and trustworthy and in deed sincere and respectful, then even in the land of the Man and Mo [蛮貊] you will go forward without obstruction. But if you fail to be dutiful and trustworthy in word or to be sincere and respectful in deed, then can you be sure of going forward without obstruction even in your own region? (Analects 15.6)

He also says, trustworthiness means the same as sincerity and refers to the authenticity of one’s speech and that one isn’t being wilfully misleading. I cannot see how a person without trustworthiness could possibly get along in the world. Imagine a large cart without a linchpin for its yoke, or a small drawn cart without a linchpin for its collar: how could they possibly be driven? (Analects 2.22)

Being dutiful, trustworthy, sincere and respectful is concretely manifested as being dutiful and sincere in one’s discourses with others without being dissimulating. Trustworthiness is here analogized to the linchpin on a cart’s yoke and is taken to be one © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_8

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of a person’s most important qualities, emphasizing that one must be trustworthy in speech without deceiving others, and that this is the manifestation of sincerity. On other occasions, Confucius says, “To say you know when you know and to say that you do not know when you do not, that is knowledge” (Analects 2.17). Here, Confucius is emphasizing that one should not be self-deceiving. He also says, “in his dealings with his friends, [one] is trustworthy in what he says” (Analects 1.7) emphasizing that one should not deceive others. All of the above show the essential demands of sincerity, as such, although Confucius says little about sincerity, what he says about trustworthiness is consistent with sincerity; what he says about trustworthiness is the manifestation of sincerity. The first pre-Qin classic to mention the concept of “sincerity” is the “Ten wings” of the Book of Changes. In the “Commentary on the Words” (文言传) to the hexagram Qian we read, “he cultivates his words and establishes his sincerity, it is by this means that he keeps his task in hand.” Here, sincerity is seen as the basis on which one builds one’s life and one takes one’s stance in life. As one of the Four Books, the Great Learning proposed the famous idea of the “three guiding principles” (三 纲领) and the “eight items” (八条目). The three guiding principles are: “illustrating illustrious virtue” (明明德) “approach the people” (亲民) and “stop at utmost goodness” (止于至善) and these are the Confucian political ideals. The eight items refer to “investigation of things” (格物), “extension of knowledge” (致知), “being sincere in one’s thought” (诚意), “rectifying one’s heart-mind” (正心), “cultivating one’s person” (修身), “regulating the family” (齐家), “governing the state” (治国) and “bringing tranquility to all under heaven” (平天下). In the path to realizing this political ideal, “being sincere in one’s thought” is a key link in the chain. It is the foundation and condition of rectifying one’s heart-mind and is directly related to the realization of cultivating one’s person, regulating the family, governing the state and bringing tranquility to all under heaven. As such, we can see that sincerity is not just a question of personal self-cultivation but is related to the question of governing the state and bringing tranquility to all under heaven. With regard to being sincere in one’s thought, the Great Learning takes this to mean not deceiving oneself. What the Great Learning means by sincerity is not necessarily an action that one intentionally enacts but rather an internal moral nature. As such the Great Learning emphasizes that the exemplary person needs to be cautious over their own state of self-cultivation (慎独) so that even when alone, their actions and internal state are in accord. From the “Ten Wings” to the Great Learning, sincerity had already become an internal moral nature and was gradually garnering attention. The Doctrine of the Mean is also one of the Four Books, and another Confucian classic, and according to tradition is the work of Confucius’s grandson Zisi. The central concept of the Doctrine of the Mean is sincerity. The Doctrine of the Mean endows sincerity with both a philosophical as well as moral content and, in seeing sincerity as that which connects human with heaven, phenomena and the self, raised sincerity to the height of the way of heaven. It is on this basis that Confucian moral metaphysics was founded. The Doctrine of the Mean’s discussion of the concept of sincerity includes the following dimensions.

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First, sincerity is the medium which connects heaven and humans. The Doctrine of the Mean took sincerity to be the essential nature of heaven itself. The sincerity of heaven is innately endowed in sages; thus, the nature of sages is commensurable with the way of heaven. With regard to the average person, one should emulate the sincerity of the way of heaven. The sincerity of the human way, however, is the accumulated product of constantly abiding by the good. It is precisely due to sincerity that the human way and the way of heaven are commensurable and interconnected; it acts as the link which connects heaven and humans. Second, sincerity is the medium that connects objects and the self and the basis by which one assists in the transforming and nourishing powers of heaven and earth. The Doctrine of the Mean is of the opinion that, sincerity is not only the way of heaven and the way of humankind, but is the essential rule by which objects become objects. The Doctrine of the Mean believes that the relationship between sincerity and objects is not necessarily one of engendering and realizing and one of being engendered and being realized, but rather a relationship of root-body (本体) and specific objects (具体). If objects did not truly manifest itself, then it is an empty and dissimulating manifesting, and this is what is meant by “no sincerity, no objects” ( 不诚无物). As such, only sincerity can realize the communication between the self and objects, thus sincerity becomes the medium between the self and objects. It is on the basis of the moral character of sincerity that heaven, earth, humans and objects can be mutually connected and so form a triad: Only those of utmost sincerity in the world are able to make the most of their natural tendencies [xing, 性]. Only if one is able to make the most of one’s own natural tendencies is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies in human beings. Only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of human beings is one able to make the most of tendencies in objects. Only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies in objects can one assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth; and only if one can assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth can humans take their place as members of this triad.

Third, sincerity is the basis on which one achieves the “three eminent virtues” (三达 德) and the “nine canonic principles” (九经). The Doctrine of the Mean believes that the ruler and his minister, father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife and friends are the “five ways forward” (五达道). To carry out these five ways, one needs to be equipped with wisdom, humaneness and courage: the “three methods of excelling” (三达德). The Doctrine of the Mean also believes that in governing the state and all under heaven, there are three areas that attention must be paid to and calls it the “nine canonic principles.” These are: cultivating the self (修身), esteeming those of superior character (尊贤), serving one’s kin (亲亲), respecting the high ministers (敬大臣), making the lower ministers feel like they have a significant role (体群臣), treating the common people as your children (子庶民), being inclusive of artisans (来百工), treating foreign guests gently (柔远人) and cherishing the nobles (怀诸 侯). These principles are the concrete basis of wisdom, humaneness and courage. As can be seen, sincerity is crucially important for all under heaven as well as the state and society.

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In the Confucian classics, the Doctrine of the Mean was the first to raise sincerity to the height of the way of heaven and made it the foundation for the union between heaven and humankind. The elucidation which the Doctrine of the Mean provided for sincerity became the incipient beginning of the Confucian study on human nature and heart-mind. After the Doctrine of the Mean, Mencius inherited its thinking on sincerity, believing that, There is a way to make one’s parents pleased: if one examines oneself and finds a want of sincerity, he will not give pleasure to his parents. There is a way to the attainment of sincerity in one’s self: if one does not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself. (4A12)

Pleasing one’s parents is the precondition for gaining the trust of one’s friends and superior. Understanding what is good is what the Doctrine of the Mean means by “choosing what is good and firmly holding it fast.” On the other hand, Mencius discusses sincerity from the perspective of one’s human nature (xing, 性), believing that sincerity is an internal virtue, and only utmost sincerity can touch and move people. Sincerity is also the means by which one gains spiritual happiness and inner tranquility. This is because those who take sincerity as their basis will be fully honest in their dealings with others and in their conduct. He will also not have any sense of internal shame or guilt, and as such “There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on self-examination.” (7A4). If one can say that Mencius leans towards stressing the importance of sincerity from one’s internal nature, then the great pre-Qin Confucian Xunzi, in discussing human affairs through the way of heaven, leans towards stressing the importance of sincerity from the external perspective of governance. Xunzi believes that, sincerity is the most important original nature of heaven and earth and the four seasons, Heaven does not speak, but people infer its height. Earth does not speak, but people infer its thickness. The four seasons do not speak but the common people anticipate them. These things have such constancy because they have utmost sincerity.1 (“Nothing Improper”)

Following this, sincerity has an extremely important significance for the transformation and nourishing of the myriad things, the sage’s transformation of the myriad peoples, for the proper conduct between father and son and for establishing the authority of the sovereign. Heaven and Earth are most vast, but without sincerity they could not transform the myriad things. The sage is most wise, but without sincerity he could not transform the myriad people. Father and son are most intimate, but without sincerity they will become estranged. Lords and superiors are most exalted, but without sincerity they will be debased.2 (“Nothing Improper”)

It is for this reason that the exemplary person should hold fast to their moral qualities, and this is also the basis for governance. With regard to the moral cultivation of the 1 Hutton

(2014: 20), modified. Throughout this translation I have made great use of Hutton’s translation of the Xunzi and often followed Hutton’s translations. 2 Hutton (2014: 20), modified.

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exemplary person, they take humaneness and righteousness as their root but carry these out through sincerity. “For the exemplary person’s cultivation of their heartmind, nothing is better than sincerity. When you have achieved sincerity, there is nothing more to do.” (“Nothing Improper”)

8.2 Two During the Wei-Jin period, the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi was the zeitgeist, so from the Han to the Wei period, the concept of sincerity raised by the pre-Qin Confucians did not receive any more attention. It was only with the Tang dynasty Li Ao’s Recovering Human Nature (复性书) that the concept of sincerity from the Doctrine of the Mean was again given scope and understood as a means of extinguishing emotions and returning to human nature. From Li Ao onwards, the concept of sincerity was given renewed attention. In Recovery of Human Nature, Li Ao inherited the idea from the Doctrine of the Mean whereby sincerity is understood to be the nature of the sage. He believed that the reason the sage is a sage is because he has the moral quality of sincerity, or we can say that sincerity is the moral nature of the sage. Apart from the sense of being authentic and not dissimulating, however, what Li Ao means by sincerity is also endowed with the sense of “state of repose” (定), “non-movement” (不动) and “emptiness” (虚) such that sincerity becomes a spiritual state of not thinking and not contemplating. This is endowing the pre-Qin concepts with new significance. The reason why Li Ao endowed sincerity with the content of “composedness” and “emptiness” is related to his theory of human nature and the emotions. Li Ao believes that human nature is “heaven’s mandate” (天之命也). The emotions, joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire, on the other hand, are “the means by which a person misleads their nature” (人之所以惑其性者). Human nature is fully good whereas the emotions have both good and bad aspects. The emotions are easily influenced by external objects and so leads human nature to being obscured and are manifested as badness. It is not that human nature itself is originally bad; the relationship between the emotions and human nature is precisely like that between sand and water, smoke and fire. Sand can make water muddy and smoke can make fire unclear, but this is not because the original nature of water is unclear, and the original nature of fire is unclear. If there was no sand, then water will be clear of its own accord. If there was no smoke, then fire will be clear of its own accord. Similarly, if there were no emotions, then human nature will be good of its own accord. As such, Li Ao believed that one should remove the non-good emotions in order to recover the original goodness of human nature. The specific way to recover human nature is to practise “utmost sincerity,” which means removing all thoughts in order to arrive at a completely still state, which is the state of understanding due to sincerity. In this state, bad thoughts extinguish themselves and the original human nature will, of its own accord, become clear. This is what is called “recovery of human nature.”

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From the above, we can see that Li Ao endowed the pre-Qin concept of sincerity with the implication of “composedness” and “emptiness.” Evidently, this was influenced by Daoist and Buddhist thought. Through the elucidation which Li Ao’s Recovering Human Nature gave to the Doctrine of the Mean, after the Tang, the Song Confucians paid great attention to the concept of sincerity, and the concept of sincerity was greatly propagated by them.

8.3 Three By the Song dynasty, the concept of sincerity received great attention. Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi all elucidated this concept. The founder of the school of principle, Zhou Dunyi authored the Penetrating the Book of Changes (通书) and took sincerity as its central concept. In the Penetrating the Book of Changes, Zhou Dunyi believed that the content of sincerity is “no errancy” (无妄) and understood it to be the key link that connected the way of heaven with the way of human beings. Zhou Dunyi believed that sincerity is the way of heaven and earth and originated in the way of the fundamental nature of Qian (乾元). The fundamental nature of Qian is the great ultimate (太极) and is the original condition of heaven and earth. Sincerity as that which is rooted in the fundamental nature of Qian thus has a specific ontological significance. The myriad things receive the flowing and activity of the way of heaven and it becomes their natural tendencies (xing, 性). Sincerity thus exists in the myriad things, which are borne from the activity and change and transformation of heaven and earth. As such, sincerity is the virtue of heaven and earth and is the original nature of the myriad things. The way of heaven and the way of humankind are connected because of sincerity. Within society, sincerity manifests itself as the key to ethics and morality and the basis of all moral actions. With regard to one’s moral character and cultivation, sincerity is a still and unmoving spiritual state; it is the root of the sage becoming a sage. With regard to the exemplary person, in order to arrive at the state of sincerity, he needs to “check his anger and smother his desire” (惩忿窒欲) and “change to the good and reform faults” (迁善改过). Zhou Dunyi’s discussion of sincerity had quite a big influence on the Cheng brothers. In the philosophy of the Cheng brothers, “principle” (li, 理) was the highest concept. Principle is the root-body of the universe, and the concrete existence of principle is manifested as sincerity. As the only root-body of the myriad things of the universe, principle cannot be changed, and this exemplifies sincerity. What sincerity represents, therefore, is authenticity and not spuriousness; it signifies that which really exists. The Cheng brothers call this “no errancy.” They take sincerity as principle, in the root-body sense, as the way of heaven. It is due to the moral character of sincerity that the myriad things are ceaselessly produced and reproduced. It is also precisely because the myriad things receive the moral character of sincerity that they really exist. In this, the Cheng brothers have raised the previous ethical meaning of sincerity to the level of the way of heaven.

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Principle or the sincerity of the way of heaven is also manifested in ethics and morality, self-cultivation, learning and one’s conduct with others, The person who learns cannot be insincere, without sincerity one has no means to be good, without sincerity one has no way to become an exemplary person. If one pursues one’s studies without sincerity, then one’s studies are chaotic. If one handles affairs without sincerity, then the affairs will fail. If one counsels oneself without sincerity, then this is to deceive one’s own heart-mind and forsake one’s fidelity. If one is not sincere with other, then one abandons one’s virtue and increases other peoples’ resentment. (Book 25, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs)

Concretely speaking, first sincerity is the core of ethics and morality. The realization of humaneness, righteousness, wisdom and trustworthiness all require sincerity and sincerity is also the root of filial piety. Following this, sincerity is the pre-requisite of all good actions, “I have never seen those who can do good without sincerity.” (ibid.) Following this, the Cheng brothers also take sincerity and reverence (敬) as an important means for cultivating the self and conducting one’s studies. They hold sincerity in particularly high esteem and take reverence as the means of establishing sincerity. The way to establish sincerity is to be orderly and serious, and to hold sincerity in reverence in one’s heart-mind. Then, after a long period of cultivation, the heavenly principle will become clear of its own accord. Zhang Zai is the representative of the school of vital energy (气学) within the school of principle. In his philosophy, he takes vital energy as the root-body of the universe. When vital energy comes together, they are the myriad things, when they disperse, it becomes the supreme void. The supreme void is the original state of vital energy as well as the formless state of vital energy when it dissipates. With regard to the concept of sincerity, Zhang Zai uses abundant reality (实) to discuss it. He believes that sincerity is the original nature of the supreme void. Although the supreme void is formless, it is really existing (实有) and is the root-body of heaven. It is precisely the really existing nature of the supreme void that allows heaven to be eternal without end. The myriad things, as well as humankind arise, from the supreme void. The original nature of the supreme void—sincerity—is also received by human beings and becomes human nature. The imperceptible and subtle numinous-ness of the way of heaven which transforms and nourishes the myriad things can be known through sincerity. If human can be of utmost sincerity, then they can exhaust their human nature and so exhaust the numinous and understand transformation. As such, sincerity is the basis for the union between heaven and human beings. Specifically speaking, this can be manifested as “achieving clarity through sincerity” (因诚致 明) and “arriving at sincerity through clarity” (因明至诚). The former is to fathom one’s own human nature in order to exhaustively understand principle, whereas the latter is first to infer the nature of heaven through study. The result of both is the union of heaven and humans. When the way of heaven is implemented in specific human actions, then it is manifested as humaneness, filial piety and other such moral actions and these actions are the means for the practical realization of the cultivation of virtue. It is in this way that the sincerity of the way of heaven becomes the basis for human morality.

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The person who brought the school of principle to its maturity, Zhu Xi, gave the concept of sincerity a comprehensive analysis and elaboration. First, in terms of its basic meaning, Zhu Xi inherited the connotation of sincerity from the Cheng brothers of authenticity without errancy. Following this, sincerity possesses the meaning of the form of dao (道体), and the principle of heaven (天理). It is the original state of the principle of heaven. This kind of original condition is the really existing (实有) nature of the heavenly principle and is designated the authentic (真) nature of the heavenly principle. This original state of sincerity of heavenly principle is the way of heaven and earth. Sometimes Zhu Xi directly takes sincerity to be the principle. As such, in taking sincerity as principle or the original nature of the way of heaven, Zhu Xi is emphasizing the authentic and really existing nature of the way of heaven. Following this, when manifested in human society, sincerity becomes the way of human beings. What the way of human beings refers to is that within human ethical relations, “each fulfils their due obligations” (各尽其当然之实) and “without one iota of latter-day human desire to muddy it” (无一豪人欲之伪以杂之). Fourth, sincerity is the key to self-cultivation. Zhu Xi takes the being sincere in one’s thought of the Great Learning as foremost amongst self-cultivation. He understood sincerity to be the basis of establishing the self and being in society. Following this, this is also the basis of following through on one’s task (修业). As such, sincerity has a key function in cultivating the moral bearing of the exemplary person. As to how moral nature specifically comes about, there is a difference between the sage and the average person. “The sage receives pure vital energy upon birth and the quality of the vital energy is clear and bright, and only of principle. He needs no cultivation and is already one with heaven.” (Section and Sentence Commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean) The nature of the sage is, at birth, one of sincerity. With regard to the average person, one needs, Extensive study, detailed enquiry, careful reflection, clear analysis, and earnest practice.3 This is not enough, it is only when one grasps humaneness righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and the dao of loyalty and filial piety such that in one’s daily practice one is coherent with principle, that it is then sincerity. (ibid.)

In this regard, sincerity now has a methodological meaning.

8.4 Four The philosopher of the Ming dynasty, Wang Fuzhi inherited Zhang Zai’s view of a vital energy ontology and believed that vital energy is the only real thing in the universe. The myriad things that exist in the world are all constituted by vital energy. In order to elucidate the reality of the root-body of vital energy, Wang Fuzhi borrowed the concept of sincerity. He took sincerity to signify that which is really existing (实 有). What is meant by the really existent nature of sincerity is the objective existence 3 Translator’s

note: this sentence based on Doctrine of the Mean 20.

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of that which has beginning and end and can be seen and heard. It is that which concretely and inherently exists, just like the wetness of water and its tendency to flow down or the hotness of fire and its tendency upwards; it is something that “is so without depending on anything else” (无所待而然). The vital energy of the supreme void that is the root-body of the myriad things is just this kind of real existence. Wang Fuzhi designates the vital energy of the supreme void and the regularity of the processes of heaven and earth as principle, heavenly principle or the way of heaven. The heavenly principle or way of heaven’s original nature is sincerity. The actual existence of the sincerity of the way of heaven is the natural state of heavenly principle, it does not contain any elements of human artifice. The sincerity of the way of heaven is the root of the transformation of nourishing of the myriad things. In the process of nourishing the myriad things, the sincerity of the way of heaven becomes endowed in human beings and the myriad things and becomes their natures. Therefore, although sincerity is the basis of the vital energy of the supreme void which imperceptibly transforms and nourishes the myriad things, it is also the practical function of the vital energy of the supreme void. In heaven it is the way of heaven, in humans, it is human nature. As such, the myriad things and the way of heaven are commensurable and connected through sincerity. Sincerity is thus the highest concept for signifying objective existence; it is also catch-all for all that is good in the world. Following this, Wang Fuzhi also believes that the real existence of sincerity is universally existing. The function of things and events as well as the operation of moral actions in society and their realization all require sincerity. Utmost sincerity is the utmost of what is really existing. If the eyes are sincere then they are clear, if they ears are sincere then they are astute, when thoughts are sincere then they are sagacious, if the son is sincere then he is filial, is the minister is sincere then he is loyal. As sincerity manifests itself within different shapes and forms, it has different natures. This is one manifestation of qi maintaining its harmonious state. In this way sincerity can become the most common characteristic of things. (“Heavenly Designations Part II” Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

To achieve the substance or moral nature of sincerity, however, requires sustained and daily strenuous effort. In order to arrive at sincerity, one must hold fast to constant effort, and not let the effort let up for even a moment. [If another man succeeds] by one effort, I will use a hundred efforts. [If another man succeeds by ten efforts] I will use a thousand. Through strenuous practice of it, one is deeply familiar with it, and then there is nothing that is not sincere of its own accord. (“Enlightenment Resulting from Sincerity”, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

In conclusion to the above, as a philosophical concept, sincerity was formed through the Doctrine of the Mean, extended through the Great Learning, inherited by Mencius, Xunzi and creatively extended by Li Ao, Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi and Wang Fuzhi. The Doctrine of the Mean, in taking sincerity to be the common basis between the way of heaven and the way of humankind, set the foundation for the direction of thought for later Confucians. The later thinkers

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all followed this train of thought and so allowed sincerity to become a philosophical concept which connected humans and heaven, comprehensively embraced the social mores, the morals of society and self-cultivation.

Reference Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 9

Trustworthiness (xin, 信)

Trustworthiness is an important concept in Chinese philosophy and ethics. From the way that the word is constructed, we can see that it is composed of ren (人) and speech (言). Its basic meaning refers to the authenticity of speech, the coherence between one’s speech and actions and that one’s speech and intentions are the same. Trustworthiness along with humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom has been called the “five constants” (五常) or “five virtues” (五德). After receiving attention from many rulers and thinkers throughout history, it has become an important moral concept in traditional Chinese society.

9.1 One The concept of trustworthiness appeared very early on. In documents from the Shang dynasty, we already see extensive accounts of trustworthiness and it had the meaning of keeping one’s word or credibility. In the Shang dynasty, trustworthiness was already widely used, and it was employed in relation to the governance of the state and whether it survives or disintegrates. During the Spring and Autumn period, trustworthiness was extensively employed as a stand-alone concept. In its earliest usage, it referred to speaking the truth without falsehoods to one’s ancestors when one was performing ritual to them. It gradually cast off its religious connotations and became a moral concept, referring to one’s actions being in accord with one’s words, and keeping one’s promises. For example, in the “Discourse of Jin” chapter of Discourses of the States, we read, “settling one’s self and carrying out one’s affairs is called trustworthiness.” In Zuo Zhuan, “Ninth Year of Lord Xiang” we read, “Trustworthiness is the proof of one’s speech, is the main body of goodness.” In these examples, trustworthiness is understood as one’s speech being in accord with one’s actions, that one’s speech is authentic. In the Zuo Zhuan, however, trustworthiness is not the highest ethical concept. Trustworthiness occupies a subordinate position as compared with humaneness, ritual propriety and © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_9

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righteousness and serves a supplementary role to these moral concepts. For example, “[employ] humaneness to treat affairs, trustworthiness to persevere.” (Zuo Zhuan “Ninth Year of Lord Cheng”) “Ritual propriety is used to carry out righteousness and trustworthiness is used to scrupulously abide by ritual propriety.” (Zuo Zhuan “28th Year of Lord Xi”) As such, trustworthiness is used to maintain humaneness, righteousness and ritual propriety. Real trustworthiness must be in accord with these moral precepts or manifest them whereas blindly carrying out one’s word without regard to context is not necessarily trustworthiness. On the function of trustworthiness, the Zuo Zhuan is of the opinion that trustworthiness is the magic key to governing the state. It says, “trustworthiness is a state’s treasure, it is what protects the common people.” (Zuo Zhuan “25th Year of Lord Xi”) “Abandoning trustworthiness whilst harming the master, within one’s state this would lead to chaos, and in the household of the minister, this would lead to the destruction of the family.” (Zuo Zhuan “Fourth Year of Lord Wen”) The Discourses of the States also believes that a state “does not have a stable foundation without trustworthiness.” The Guanzi takes trustworthiness as the key to ordering all under heaven and as the root of governance, “The former kings prized sincerity and trustworthiness. Sincerity and trustworthiness are the key to all under heaven.” (“Cardinal Sayings”, Guanzi). Trustworthiness is a key concept in Confucius’s thought, it is one of the four teachings (四科) of Confucius. Trustworthiness is also one of the concepts which constitutes humaneness (仁), the highest concept in Confucius’s thought, “To be able to practice five things everywhere under heaven constitutes humaneness.” The “five things” refer to “respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, quickness and generosity” (Analects 17.6). As such, trustworthiness occupies quite an important position in Confucius’s thought. In the Analects, trustworthiness is referred to some thirty times and its basic meaning is as follows. First, being honest and not deceiving and accordance between one’s speech and actions. Second, keeping one’s word and carrying out one’s promises. One of the pre-conditions of carrying out one’s promise, however, is not turning one’s back on what is right. Confucius says, if one keeps one’s promise without paying attention to what is right, then it is not real trustworthiness, but the way of the petty man. With regard to the value of trustworthiness, Confucius discusses it from many different perspectives. First, trustworthiness is the basis of one’s self-cultivation and establishment of virtue. Confucius says, I cannot see how a person without trustworthiness could possibly get along in the world. Imagine a large cart without a linchpin for its yoke, or a small drawn cart without a linchpin for its collar: how could they possibly be driven? (Analects 2.22)

Trustworthiness is here analogized to the linchpin on a cart’s yoke, emphasizing the importance of trustworthiness of one’s self-cultivation and establishment of virtue. Second, trustworthiness is the basic criterion in one’s dealings with friends, Confucius demands that, “in one’s dealings with friends, one’s words are trustworthy” (Analects 1.7). “If he is trustworthy in word his fellow men will entrust him with responsibility.” (Analects 17.6) One of Confucius’ disciples Zeng Zi also took “whether I have been trustworthy in dealings with my friends” as one of the “three points on which I daily examine myself.” Third, it is an important principle for facilitating communication within society,

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If in word you are dutiful and trustworthy and in deed sincere and respectful, then even in the land of the Man and Mo [蛮貊] you will go forward without obstruction. But if you fail to be dutiful and trustworthy in word or to be sincere and respectful in deed, then can you be sure of going forward without obstruction even in your own region? (Analects 15.6)

Lastly, trustworthiness is also an important aspect of the good governance of the state. On this point, Confucius says, In guiding a state of a thousand chariots, approach your duties with reverence and be trustworthy in what you say; keep expenditure under proper regulation and love your fellow men; employ the labour of the common people in the right seasons. (Analects 1.7)

He also says, “When a ruler loves trustworthiness, his people will not dare to be insincere.” (Analects 13.4) Confucius also believed that, “sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the people’s trust in their ruler” are three important contents of governing a country but that “people’s trust in their ruler” is the most important of the three. If pressed, then one can do without food and the military equipment, but one cannot take away trustworthiness, this is because, if one lost the people’s trust, then the basis of the existence of the country would also be lost. Mencius does not say much about trustworthiness, but he was the first to list “between friends there is trustworthiness” as the five ethical principles (along with “between father and children there is affection, between ruler and ministers there is righteousness, between husband and wife there is distinction, between elder and younger there is precedence”), which was to have profound effect on the history of Chinese moral philosophy. Mencius also designated trustworthiness along with humaneness, righteousness and loyalty as the “heavenly honours” (天爵), and these are also the content of human nature itself. In terms of the relationship between trustworthiness and righteousness, Mencius believes that righteousness is the most important and that trustworthiness should serve righteousness. Whether one keeps one’s word, whether one carries out one’s promise should all be judged according to the measure of righteousness. This is why he says, “The words of great people are not necessarily faithful, and their actions are not necessarily resolute. They rest only in righteousness.” (Mencius 4B11) In this Mencius is providing further clarification to the following passage from the Analects: “They are determined to be trustworthy in what they say, and to carry out what they do. They are obstinate little men.” (Analects 13.20) Xunzi is the philosopher who brought Confucian thought to maturity. He took trustworthiness as one of the criteria for separating the exemplary person from the petty person. He said, “the gentleman himself is trustworthy, and wishes others to trust him.” (“On Honour and Disgrace”) He also says, The exemplary person […] can make himself trustworthy but cannot ensure that others will trust him. […] He is ashamed of not being trustworthy, but he is not ashamed of not being trusted.” (“Against the Twelve Masters”) But the petty man is the exact opposite of the exemplary gentleman, his “words are never trustworthy, his actions have no constant standard. As long as there is potential profit, there is nothing to which he will not stoop. One who is like this can be called a petty man.” (Xunzi “Nothing Improper”) As such, trustworthiness is one of the key contents of cultivating oneself and establishing virtue. With regard to the ruler, “If promises that have been made

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are not trustworthy, then the military will be weak.” On the other hand, if the ruler keeps his word then he will prevail. Apart from this, in the promotion of government decrees, the trustworthiness of the state is intimately connected with whether that state is strong or weak, “He whose government decrees are trustworthy will be strong. He whose governmental commands are not trustworthy will be weak.” (“A Debate on Military Affairs”) Trustworthiness is, furthermore, directly connected to whether the state flourishes and prevails or not. As such, Xunzi takes trustworthiness and righteousness as “the great basis of the sovereign” (君人之大本).

9.2 Two The legalists looked down upon ritual and looked highly upon laws and they emphasized, in particular, the trustworthiness of laws. They viewed trustworthiness as one of the three great treasures for governing the state. Shang Yang said, Orderly government is brought about in a state by three things. The first is law, the second trustworthiness, and the third right standards. […] Trustworthiness is established in common by the sovereign and his ministers. (The Book of Lord Shang, “Cultivation of the Right Standard”)

He emphasized that the sovereign should “love right standards and value trustworthiness and not let self-interest does not harm the law” and establish the authority of the law in this way. The representative of the legalist school, Han Fei, also emphasized the importance of the trustworthiness of the law, believing that reward and punishment must be clearly separated in law as, “If law is not trusted, then all the ruler’s actions will be endangered. If penalties are not enforced, then evil will not be surmounted.” (“On Having Standards”, Hanfeizi) At the same time, however, from starting out from the perspective of human natures “loving self-interest and hating harm”, Han Fei believes that all peoples are selfish and that between peoples there is only a relationship of interest and no trust to speak of. Following this, from the perspective of preserving the authority of the sovereign, he stresses the importance of trustworthiness for the sovereign, believing that, once the little trust is completed then the big trust will naturally be established, thus the enlightened sovereign builds his reputation on trustworthiness. If trust is not reposed in rewards and punishments, then prohibitions and commands cannot be carried out. (“Outer Congeries of Sayings The Upper Left Series”, Hanfeizi)

But on the other hand, believing that, “the greatest danger for the sovereign is that he trusts in others, trusting in others will mean that he will be controlled by them.” (“Guarding against the Interior”, Hanfeizi) If one trusts in one’s ministers, then the ministers will constantly covet the sovereign’s power, and it might lead to appropriating the sovereign’s place and regicide. If one trusted one’s son, then “perfidious ministers will use his son in order to accomplish their private calculations.” If one trusts in one’s wife, then “the perfidious ministers will use his wife to accomplish their private calculations.” As such, the sovereign cannot trust in either his ministers,

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his children or wife. As Han Fei sees it, trustworthiness is merely a political tool of self-preservation. The Mohists have three main definitions of trustworthiness. First, they believe that trustworthiness is the coherence between one’s speech and action; this is the same as the Confucian view. Second, they emphasize that one’s words must express what one really thinks and feels. The Mohists, in emphasizing the importance of inner sincerity, have, therefore, expanded the idea of trustworthiness to one’s internal world. Third, they believe that one must take the practical realization of trustworthiness as a criterion. Even if one’s speech really expresses what one thinks, whether what one says really accords with reality or not, must be verified through practical experience. For example, if one tells others that there is gold on the city wall, and the others see that there really was gold, then this is trustworthiness. As we can see, Mozi has a richer and more rigorous understanding of the concept of trustworthiness. Mozi also takes trustworthiness to be an important content of moral cultivation and that whether one is trustworthy or not affects their reputation. If one says something but does not carry it out, then it is making an irresponsible remark. The enforcement of a state’s policies must also take trustworthiness as its basis. For the Mohists, an important element in why the ancient kings were able to rule all under heaven and be head of the feudal lords was because “loyalty and trustworthiness are related.” The Annals of Lü Buwei repeatedly emphasized the importance of trustworthiness for the stability of the state and took trustworthiness to be the basis on which the state is established. It says, rulers must be trustworthy. Beings trustworthy inspires trust, who, then, would not feel close to them? […] the accomplishments that result from trustworthiness are great indeed. When trustworthiness is the ruler’s established practice, empty words can be properly recompensed. When empty words are properly recompensed, all within the Six Conjunctions [六合] become the ruler’s personal storehouse. Trustworthiness leads to complete control.1 (“Prizing Trustworthiness”, Annals of Lü Buwei)

On the other hand, if there was no trust, then all the social relationships will sink into chaos, When the ruler and ministers are not trustworthy, the Hundred Clans criticize and vilify them. The altars of the soil and grain become insecure. When officers are not trustworthy, the young do not fear the elderly, the noble and the base demean each other. When rewards and punishments are not trustworthy, the people easily violate the law and so cannot be governed. When friends and associates are not trustworthy, they become alienated and develop resentment, and so are not capable of being close to one another. When the hundred artisans are not trustworthy, vessels and tools are crude shams and the red cinnabar and black lacquer are not pure.2 (ibid.)

It is for this reason that, It is only with trustworthiness that a person can begin with, that he can end with, that he can enjoy honour and success with, that he can endure dishonour and failure with. Being trustworthy inspires greater trust so double and redouble trustworthiness in yourself, and you 1 Knoblock 2 Knoblock

and Riegel (2000: 500), modified. and Riegel (2000: 501–502), modified.

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will come to understand heaven. If you use trustworthiness to govern other, the enriching rains and sweet dew will fall and the cold and heat of the four seasons will keep to their allotted times.3 (ibid.)

In the Annals of Lü Buwei, however, trustworthiness is not the highest principle. Above trustworthiness is “principle” (理). Principle refers to the principles of things and moral principles. Trustworthiness must be in accord with “principle” in order to be real trustworthiness. If trustworthiness conflicts with principles, then in one’s choice of values, one should forsake trustworthiness and follow principle. “Trustworthiness not being in accord with principle” (“On Being Appropriate to the Circumstances”, Annals of Lü Buwei) is one of the roots for disorder in the world. Just like the cases of Upright Gong who reported his father to the authorities for stealing sheep, this is the trustworthiness which is not in accord with principle, “the trustworthiness of Upright Gong is not as good as not being trustworthy.” (ibid.)

9.3 Third The Han Dynasty Dong Zhongshu, with the intention of preserving the unification of the feudal states, classified humaneness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness as the five constants of the way. From then on, the “five constants” and the “three bonds” became the official moral code for preserving the unity of the state and came to have a profound influence in Chinese history. Dong Zhongshu also used the philosophy of the five phases to elucidate the five constants and believed that trustworthiness is correlated with earth—the most central of the five phases. What it represents is the loyalty and trustworthiness of the minister in relation to the sovereign. As such, in Dong Zhongshu’s system, trustworthiness refers to the unidirectional sincerity, trustworthiness and obedience that the minister has for the sovereign. Wang Chong of the Eastern Han, under the call of “hating superstitions” (疾虚 妄), on the question of trustworthiness, proposed a theory of the genealogy of trustworthiness. With regard to Confucius’s view that, “if the people have no trust in their rulers, there is no standing for the state,” Wang Chong was skeptical. This is because Wang Chong believes that if there was not a material basis for a livelihood, moral principles such as trust would have no means to exist. Wang Chong, therefore, believes that material interest is the foundational condition for the establishment of trustworthiness, “to remove trustworthiness and preserve food, even if one does not desire trustworthiness, it will arise of itself. If one removes food but preserves trustworthiness, even if one desires to practice trustworthiness, it cannot be established.” Wang Chong also believes that trustworthiness is an independent concept and has nothing to do with humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and such concepts. This is in contradistinction to Confucius’s and Mencius’s unification of trustworthiness with righteousness, and to the Annals of Lü Buwei’s unification of 3 Knoblock

and Riegel (2000: 502), modified.

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trustworthiness with principle. At the same time, however, Wang Chong believes that under certain conditions, “one considers the nature of the situation and their actions can vary. According to necessity, one can say different things to different people.” (“Answering the Sophists”, Arguments Weighed,). Such expediency is in accord with principle and he distinguishes between “the expediency of the worthy” and “the expediency of the sophist.” The expediency of the former is for public affairs and for the state, whereas the expediency of the rhetorician is for themselves and for their family.

9.4 Four As listed under one of Zhong Dongshu’s five constant virtues, trustworthiness is given great attention by the Song dynasty Confucians. The Cheng brothers believed that there were two kinds of trustworthiness. One is to trust others and the other is to trust oneself, with trusting oneself being the more important of the two. The Cheng brothers said, there are two kinds of trust, trusting others and trusting oneself. The seventy disciples of Confucius, for example, all understood his speech and spent their whole lives guarding it, but they did not necessarily know what in Confucius’s speech was right and what was wrong. This is to trust others. The scholar must trust in himself; it is only through self-trust that no-one can shake one of one’s beliefs. (Book 8, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers)

It is precisely in this sense that they say, “coming to awareness is trust” (Book 6, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers). It is for this reason that the Cheng brothers particularly emphasized the importance of “understanding” (识) saying, the exemplary gentleman takes understanding as his basis, action is secondary to this. […] If one does not understand the difference from liking and hating on the inside, and right and wrong on the outside, then even if one has the trustworthiness of Wei Sheng [尾声] and the filial piety of Zeng Sheng [曾参], I do not consider it to be valuable. (Book 25, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers)

In their discussions of trustworthiness, the Cheng brothers also talk about it in relation with loyalty (忠), the relation between the two being one of internal-external (表里). The Cheng brothers say, To fully manifest [尽] oneself is called loyalty, to manifest [实] loyalty is called trustworthiness [信]. To fully manifest oneself is called loyalty, to follow [循] objects non-purposively is trustworthiness, this is the meaning of the internal-external [表里] [i.e. loyalty is internal and trustworthiness is external]. (Book 21, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers)

They also say, To fully manifest oneself is loyalty, to fully manifest objects is trustworthiness. Plainly said, those who fully manifest themselves exhaust their human nature [性], those who exhaust objects exhaust the nature of objects. Trustworthiness just means no artifice, that which adds to or subtracts from the heavenly endowed nature [天性] is artifice. (Book 24, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers)

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What is meant by trustworthiness here is honesty and reliability, real and authentic. As an ethical concept, loyalty and trustworthiness is the basic condition of being and becoming human. “The way [dao] of humans lies only in loyalty and trustworthiness, without sincerity then there are no objects [物]” (Book 11, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers). Zhang Zai believes that “internalizing sincerity in one’s heart-mind and having it manifested as goodness is called trustworthiness.” (“Equilibrium and Rectification”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance) Trustworthiness, along with humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom all possess different functions and within these, trustworthiness has the function of regulating human conduct. At the same time, Zhang Zai, along with Zhuangzi, advocates that trustworthiness must be coherent with righteousness and greatly endorsed Mencius’s view that words “may not necessarily be faithful, and actions may not necessarily resolute.” The person who brought the school of principle to its maturity, Zhu Xi, basically followed the traditional definitions of trustworthiness. First, he took trustworthiness to be a uniformity between what is in one’s heart-mind and in one’s speech, being sincere and honest. Second, he took trustworthiness to mean that speech and action are in accord with one another. Zhu Xi focused particular attention on the relationship between trustworthiness and sincerity, loyalty, righteousness and other moral concepts. With regard to trustworthiness and sincerity, sincerity refers to the internal heart-mind whereas trustworthiness refers to external action. With regard to trustworthiness and loyalty, loyalty refers to the external whereas trustworthiness refers to the internal: “loyalty is the root of trustworthiness, trustworthiness is the expression of loyalty” (Book 21, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi.), “trustworthiness cannot be without loyalty, [when one is] loyal then [one is] necessarily trustworthy” (ibid). As such, “loyalty and trustworthiness are just one thing, and are respectively inner and out, beginning and end, root and branch. […] It is feasible to see them as one thing or two things.” (ibid.) With regard to trustworthiness and loyalty, Zhu Xi believes “peoples’ words must of course be trustworthy, however, if these words are not close to righteousness, then the situation should not be touched upon, if one touches upon it then it is damaging to trustworthiness.” (Book 22, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) As such, when persons about going to make an agreement together, before you have given your word you should consider whether it accords with righteousness or not. If it accords with righteousness then give your word, if it does not accord with righteousness then do not give your word. (ibid.)

After Song Neo-Confucianism, there was no shortage of people who discussed trustworthiness, but their discussions basically inherited traditional views and there were no big breakthroughs on the theoretical level.

Reference Knoblock, John, and Jeffrey K. Riegel. 2000. The Annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford: Stanford UP.

Chapter 10

Humaneness (ren, 仁)

Ren is one of the most discussed concepts in Chinese philosophy. When parsed carefully, however, we can see that throughout history, there were divergent if not contrary understandings of its definitions and contents. On the one hand, this shows the richness of ren but on the other, it means that there are unavoidable ambiguities in its interpretation. As such, it is not unbeneficial for our overall understanding of the term to investigate its changing nature throughout history, its meanings for different philosophers and the ways it was interpreted by them.

10.1 One In the classics, from very early on ren had already appeared and was being extensively discussed. The Book of Documents, Book of Odes, Discourses of the States, Zuo Zhuan all discuss ren in many places. In these texts, ren either referred to a kind of virtue or the way to govern a state. Before Confucius, however, ren had not yet been elevated to an independent philosophical concept. Confucius gave ren a systematics elucidation and so formed a philosophically systematic study of ren. From this point onwards, “ren” became an important concept in Confucianism as well as Chinese philosophy in general and came to have a profound influence on later epochs. The theoretical core of Confucius’s thought is ren. Confucius has different prescriptions for what ren is, in general, there are three main areas. First, the person of ren loves people. “Loving people” is the same as what Confucius means by “loving the multitude at large” (泛爱众) (Analects 1.6) and is to care for people. Second, to subdue oneself and return to ritual propriety is ren. Subduing oneself means to subdue selfish interests and returning to ritual propriety is to act according to the stipulations of ritual propriety. Concretely speaking, this means “do not look at what is contrary to ritual propriety, do not listen to what is contrary to ritual propriety, do not say anything that is contrary to ritual propriety, make no movement that is contrary to ritual propriety.” (Analects 12.1) Subduing oneself and returning to ritual propriety are intimately connected. Ritual propriety is the external manifestation of ren and © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_10

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what it relies upon, whereas ren is the internal moral sentiments and disposition of ritual propriety. In order to follow external ritual propriety, one must have internal moral sentiments and dispositions as one’s basis, otherwise ritual would become a merely perfunctory empty shell. Third, ren is the way of loyalty (忠) and reciprocity (恕). Confucius’s whole philosophy can be encapsulated by loyalty and reciprocity, and what is meant by loyalty and reciprocity is inferring what others want from what one wants for oneself. Inferring what one wants for oneself is loyalty and to extend that to others is reciprocity. Concretely speaking, loyalty is “wishing to be established himself, one seeks also to establish others” (Analects 6.30); this is to actively talk about the way that ren operates. Reciprocity is “that which you do not want, do not do it to others”; this is to talk about the way that ren operates in the negative, and means that what one does not wish to happen to oneself, one does not impose onto others. Apart from this, Confucius describes ren from the perspective of its external manifestations. Confucius said, “to be able to practice five things everywhere constitutes ren.” These five things are respectfulness (恭), tolerance (宽), trustworthiness (信), diligence (敏) and generosity (惠) as, If a man is respectful, he will avoid disgrace. If he is tolerant, he will win the multitude, if he is trustworthy then his fellow men will entrust him with responsibility. If he is diligent, he will achieve results. If he is generous his fellow men will be willing to do his bidding. (Analects 17.6)

Another example is when Fan Chi asked Confucius about ren, and Confucius said, While at home hold yourself in a respectful attitude; when serving in an official capacity be reverent [敬]; when dealing with others be loyal [忠]. These are qualities that cannot be put aside, even if you are among the Yi and Di tribes. (Analects 13.19)

Respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, diligence, generosity, reverence and loyalty are all the concrete manifestations of ren in action. Another example is when Sima Niu asked about ren and Confucius said, “the person of ren is hesitant to speak [ren, ].” (Analects 12.3) Ren ( ) means slow and clumsy and not being eloquent and flowery in speech. Confucius also says, “resolute, decisive, straightforward and reticent, these are close to ren.” (Analects 13.27) Hesitancy to speak, resoluteness, decisiveness, straightforward-ness and reticence are all manifestations of ren in speech and its antithesis, “cunning words and an insinuating countenance” (巧言令色), is to depart from ren. Confucius, therefore, says, “cunning words and an insinuating countenance are rarely signs of ren.” (Analects 1.3) From this, we can see that ren is a “comprehensive virtue” (全德) in Confucius’s philosophy. It is the highest moral concept; respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, diligence, generosity, reverence, loyalty, resoluteness, decisiveness, straightforward-ness and reticence are all specific virtues which manifest ren, It is precisely because ren is a “comprehensive virtue,” because it contains all other moral actions, that Confucius views it as the highest ideal that one seeks for. He believes that, “for scholar officials with noble intention and men of ren, it is inconceivable that they should seek to stay alive at the expense of ren. In fact, they

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will even sacrifice their lives in order to accomplish ren.” (Analects 15.9) Ren is the basic moral quality of the exemplary gentleman, it is a moral principle that cannot be transgressed for even an instant. If one turns one’s back on it for even a moment, then one is no longer an exemplary gentleman. As such, If the exemplary gentleman abandons ren, wherein can he make a name for himself? The exemplary gentleman does not go against ren even for the amount of time required to finish a meal. Even in times of urgency or distress, he necessarily accords with it. (Analects 4.5)

Although ren is the highest moral virtue, it is not necessarily impossible to accomplish, this is why Confucius says, Is there a person who can for the space of a single day simply devote his efforts to ren? I have never met anyone whose strength was insufficient for this task. Perhaps such a person exists, but I have yet to meet him. (Analects 4.6)

He also says, If a someone can for one day subdue themselves and return to ritual propriety, all under heaven will ascribe ren to them. However, the practice of ren depends on oneself alone, and not on others.

He also says, “is ren really far away? As soon as I desire it is already here” (Analects 7.30). In all, Confucius emphasizes that being ren rests within the self and, in so doing, he brought to light the human being’s awareness of its own moral consciousness. From this, we can also see that Confucius broke from the religious restrictions of Shang dynasty mysticism so that the self-motivating momentum of human beings is brought to the foreground. As a representative of a lower-class craftsman, Mozi uses universal love (兼爱) to explain humaneness. Universal love is one of Mozi’s most important proposals, it is a love which does not make distinctions between those who are family and those who are distant from oneself. “Loving universally” (兼相爱) is combined with “mutual aid” (交相利). Mozi believes that if everyone was able to accomplish universal love, then the conflict between states and the mutual disturbances between families can be avoided. In this way, there will be no theft, and an orderly respectfulness between the ruler and minister, the father and son will be achieved. He, therefore, believes that what promotes interest and extinguishes harm in the world is ren. In order to achieve this, all the different ranks of ministers be filled by persons of ren. The head of the village (里长) should be the most ren person of the whole village. The head of the district (乡长) should be the most ren person of the village. The lord of the state should be the most ren person of the state. The emperor (天子) should be the most ren person in all under heaven. In his discussion of ren, therefore, Mozi emphasizes its utilitarian value. Mencius inherited Confucius’s discourse of “the person of ren loves people” and developed the concept of ren in many different directions. Confucius explains ren in terms of “loving people” but limits the object of love to the domain of “people”—it is the love of loving the multitudes (泛爱众). What is worth noticing in Mencius’s discourse on ren, however, is that he emphasized the principles of treating one’s

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parents with filiality and fraternal respectfulness. He explicitly took these as the central content of ren love. Thus, Mencius says, “treating one’s parents as parents is ren” (Mencius 7A15), “The core of ren is serving one’s parents” (4A27). As such, treating one’s parents with filiality along with the principle of fraternal respectfulness is the central content of ren. Mencius also thinks, however, that the object of ren love is not limited to that of treating one’s parents with filiality, but that this love should be expanded onto others, as the farther away other peoples and objects are, the weaker the degree of love would be. As such, compared with Confucius, Mencius furthered the scope of ren love and extended it from “loving people” to “loving things” (爱物). With Mencius, ren is different from the “loving the multitudes” ren of Confucius, it is further different from Mozi’s ren of “universal love.” With Mencius, ren is rather a graded sequence of love from loving one’s parents, to being ren towards the people to loving things. Although Confucius took “ren” as central to his philosophy, he did not discuss the root cause of ren or the basis of its existence nor did he provide a metaphysical investigation for ren. From the perspective of human nature, Mencius believed that the existence of ren lies in the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐之 心) or the heart-mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others (不忍人之心), which everyone is congenitally endowed with. Mencius believes that the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion and the heart-mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others is a kind of moral knowing (良知) which is naturally endowed in humans. This kind of moral knowing is “capable without needing to learn” (不学 而能), “knowing without the exercise of thought” (不虑而知), in the same way as a child innately knows to love his or her parents. This kind of intuitive moral knowing is the sprout of ren, “the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion is the sprout of ren.” (Mencius 2A6) It is because this heart-mind of commiseration and compassion is innate in all human beings that Mencius believes ren along with the heart-mind of shame and disdain, the heart-mind of deference as well moral qualities such as righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom that are produced by the heart-mind of approving and disapproving are innate. In this way, Mencius is able to provide an account of where ren, as a real moral principle, comes from, how it is produced and how its existence accords with principle. Mencius also implements ren in the realm of concrete governance and proposed the idea of “humane [ren] governance” (仁政). Mencius believes that the basis of humane governance is the heart-mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others. All men have a heart-mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. The former kings had heart-minds that could not bear to see the suffering of others, so they had governments that could not bear to see the suffering of others. If one puts into practice a government that cannot bear to see the suffering of others by means of a heart-mind that cannot bear the suffering of others, then bringing order to the world is in the palm of your hand. (Mencius 2A6)

Humane governance is the root of the governance of the state. In reality, it is the result of the former kings and the “extending” (推恩) of their ren love from the internal to the external.

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Treat your elders as your elders and extend it to the elders of others. Treat your young as young ones and extend it to the young ones of others and you can turn the world in the palm of your hand. […] Hence, if one extends one’s ren, it will be sufficient to care for all within the four seas. If one does not extend one’s ren, one will lack the means to care for one’s wife and children. (Mencius 1A7)

In attributing the root of humane governance to the heart-mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others of the former kings, Mencius clarified the possibility and reliability of carrying out humane governance and so found an internal basis for external ren-based policies.

10.2 Two During the Qin-Han period, philosophers who discussed ren emphasized the distinction between oneself and objects as well as the distinction between oneself and others. The “Loving One’s Own Kind” (爱类) chapter of the Annals of Lü Buwei, for example, takes the perspective of “Humaneness [ren] means being humane to those of one’s own kind” and explicitly delimited the nature of ren. To be humane [ren] to other things but not to humans cannot be counted as true humaneness. However, not to be humane to other things but only to humans may be regarded as a kind of humaneness. Humaneness means being humane to those of one’s own kind. Therefore, if a humane person can improve the situation of the people he will always do so.1

In terms of its discussion of ren, the Annals of Lü Buwei only refers to “humaneness [ren] to people” (仁于人). It is only the love of people which can be called humaneness (ren). The care and love for other things does not belong in the domain of humaneness. This definition of ren is obviously different to Mencius’s which also attributed loving things (爱物) to ren. After this, Dong Zhongshu, from the point of view of how to treat others, clearly defined the content of ren: What does “humane” [ren] mean? It means that those who are humane earnestly and sincerely love others and are respectfully and harmoniously uncontentious; their likes and dislikes accord with the norms of human relationships. They are without the heart-mind of being hurtful and malicious, intentions that are hidden and evasive, envious and jealous dispositions, impressionable and anxious desires, dangerous and prejudicial affairs, perverse and disobedient conduct. Consequently, their hearts are expansive, their aims are impartial, their dispositions are harmonious, their desires are regulated, their endeavors are simple, their conduct matches the way [dao]. Thus, those who are able to be like this – impartial, simple, harmonious, principled and uncontentious – are called “humane.”2 (“The Necessity of [Being] Humane and Wise”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

Following this, Dong Zhongshu discusses ren from the perspective of the difference between ren and righteousness, others and myself. He is of the opinion that ren is in 1 Knoblock 2 Queen

and Riegel (2000: 559), modified. and Major (2016: 320), modified.

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relation to others, and its function is in pacifying others. Righteousness is in relation to the self and its functions are in correcting oneself. He says, The means by which one brings order to others and the self is humaneness and righteousness. Humaneness is used to pacify others and righteousness to correct the self. Therefore, “humaneness” refers to others and “righteousness” refers to the self. These terms are used to differentiate them. […] The standard of humaneness lies in loving others, not in loving the self. The standard of righteousness lies in correcting the self, not in correcting others. (“Standards of Humaneness and Righteousness”)

He also says, Humaneness refers to what is directed away [from the self]; righteousness refers to what is directed toward [the self]. Humaneness magnifies what is distance; righteousness magnifies what is near. Love of others is called humaneness; appropriateness of the self is called righteousness. Humaneness governs others; righteousness governs the self. Thus I say: “Humaneness [refers to] others; righteousness [refers to] the self.” This is what is meant.3 (“Standards of Humaneness and Righteousness”)

This is why, “humaneness constitutes others, righteousness constitutes the self.” There is a definite boundary between humaneness and righteousness, and they cannot be mixed, If we do not correct ourselves, even if we are capable of correcting other, [the Spring and Autumn] will not grant that this is righteousness. If others are not the recipients of our love, even though we are replete with self-love [the Spring and Autumn] will not grant that this is humaneness.4 (“Standards of Humaneness and Righteousness”)

The distinction which Dong Zhongshu makes between humaneness and righteousness is rooted in the distinction between the self and others. His motivation for corresponding humaneness to “loving others” and righteousness to “rectifying the self” is directed at contemporary rulers who used humaneness in relation to the self and use righteousness to coercively treat unseemly phenomena in society. This is why he emphasizes the difference between humaneness and righteousness: The relationship between humaneness and others and between righteousness and the self must be scrutinized thoroughly. Most people, however, do not scrutinize them, so they use “humaneness” to treat themselves generously while using “righteousness” to treat others coercively. When their applications are reversed [in that way] and their principles are transposed, [the two terms] will rarely fail to create confusion. Thus even though no one wants confusion, deep-seated confusion will predominate. On the while, people are in dark about the distinction between the self and others, so they fail to understand where humaneness and righteousness reside.5 (“Standards of Humaneness and Righteousness”)

Thus, if one is not clear on the distinction between the self and others, then one will not scrutinize where humaneness and righteousness reside, and so one will have loose expectations of oneself and stringent demands of others; this will ultimately result in great chaos. According to this distinction between humaneness and righteousness, 3 Queen

and Major (2000: 316), modified. and Major (2000: 313–314). 5 Queen and Major (2000: 313). 4 Queen

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the ruler must carry out humane governance to the people and demand rigorous order from himself. Only this would count as humaneness and righteousness. This philosophy of Dong Zhongshu had great influence at this time and for later epochs. Dong Zhongshu also used the philosophy of yinyang to explain the source of humaneness. He believed that the two vital energies have different natures. The vital energy of yang is master of humaneness, broadness, love and birth whereas the vital energy of yin is master of transgression, of the high strung, of badness, of death. The nature of humaneness is determined by yang vital energy, “Heaven has its dual manifestation of yin and yang. The self has its dual nature of greed and humaneness.” (“Deeply Examine Names and Designations”) The greed and humaneness of human nature is “one with the way of heaven.” As such, the source of humaneness is elevated to the height of cosmology. In contradistinction to Dong Zhongshu, Yang Xiong defined humaneness as “loving the self” (爱己) and believed that “self-love” (自爱) is the most elevated manifestation of humaneness, A person must first love themselves; thereafter others will love them. A person must first respect themselves; thereafter, others will respect them. Loving oneself is the height of humaneness [ren]. Respecting oneself is the height of the rites [li]. There has never been a case of a person who did not love and respect themselves, yet others loved and respected them. (“The Exemplary Person”, Model Sayings)

Yang Xiong took self-love and self-respect as the condition of gaining the love and respect of others. On this point, he is exactly the opposite of Mencius who says, “The person of humaneness [ren] loves others. The person of propriety shows respect to others. The person who loves others is constantly loved by them. The person who respects others is constantly respected by them.” (Mencius 4B28) Evidently, Mencius is talking about humaneness from the perspective of loving others, and regarded loving and respecting others as the condition for gaining the love and respect of others. Yang Xiong, on the other hand, emphasizes that one must first have self-love and self-respect before one can win the love and respect of others.

10.3 Three The Song Confucian discussion of humaneness not only endowed it with a very rich content, it also emphasized the distinction between emotions (情) and human nature (性) and so deepened the investigation of humaneness and took it to another level. The Tang Dynasty Han Yu, based on Confucius’ saying that “loving the multitudes but feeling a particular affection for those who are humane [ren]” (泛爱众而亲 仁), used “loving extensively” (博爱) to interpret humaneness, saying “loving extensively is called humaneness [ren]” (The Origin of Dao). Zhou Dunyi of the northern Song also used “love” to interpret humanness saying, “loving is called humaneness” (“Sincerity, Incipience and Virtue”, Penetrating the Book of Changes). Zhou Dunyi used “generating” (生) to interpret humaneness saying, “generating is humaneness”

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(“Compliance and Transformation”, Penetrating the Book of Changes) and viewed humaneness as the root of the sage’s transformation and nourishing of the myriad things. “When the sage is above [on the throne] he uses humaneness to nourish the myriad things.” (ibid) Zhang Zai also used “love” to interpret humaneness saying, “using the heart-mind with which you love yourself to love others, this is exhausting humaneness” (“Equilibrium and Rectification”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance) and also saying, respectful and reverent, assiduous in his duties and not going beyond them, retiring and yielding - thus illustrating ritual propriety”6 this is this epitome of humaneness and the utmost of the way of love. (“The Utmost Appropriateness”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

As Zhang Zai advocates the union of heaven and humans and “all peoples are fellows and all things are the same kind” (民胞物与), what he means by love is the universal love to the myriad things. Cheng Yi of the school of principle took “principle” (理) as the central concept of his philosophy and so interpreted humaneness in terms of principle, he said, “humaneness is principle.” (Book 6, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) As humaneness is principle, then humaneness becomes the root-body (本体) basis, but it can have different manifestations. Humaneness has the significance of “growth” (生); “the heart-mind is like seed-grain, its natural tendency [性] to grow is humaneness.” (Book 18, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) The natural tendencies towards growth are the principles of growth. Growth itself, however, is not humaneness, but rather takes humaneness as its root-body. Humaneness also has the significance of public-ness (公): “humaneness is public-ness.” (Book 9, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) Public-ness, however, only approximates humaneness but is not humaneness itself. The way of humaneness only needs the word public-ness but publicness is only the principle of humaneness, it cannot be taken as humaneness per se. It is only through public-ness that humane-ness can be manifested/expressed. This is humaneness. (Book 15, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers)

This means that when people act in a public-minded way, this is a manifestation of humane-ness. In this way, the discussion of humane-ness is raised to a metaphysical, root-body dimension. As Cheng Yi’s discourse on humaneness has the distinction between internal and external, he proceeds to oppose Han Yu’s “loving extensively is humaneness” from the perspective of human nature and emotions. He believed that “The humane person naturally loves extensively, but to take loving extensively as humaneness is not appropriate.” (Book 2, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) This is because humaneness is an internal nature whereas love is an external emotion, humaneness is the basis of love whereas love is the manifestation and function of humaneness. Thus, humaneness is not love but is instead the basis from which humaneness can be produced. As such, although love comes from humaneness, love is not humaneness. 6 From

“Summary of the Rules of Propriety Part 1” Record of the Rites.

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Cheng Hao, from the perspective of the union of heaven and humans, used “being one body with things” (与物同体) to talk about humanness and developed it into a spiritual state. Cheng Hao says, “the one who learns must first understand humaneness. The one who is humane is an undifferentiated union into one body with things” (Book 2, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) To be one body with the myriad thing of the world is the state of humaneness. Cheng Hao also used the idea of unobstructed vital energy from Chinese medicine to talk about this, Books on medicine describe paralysis of the four limbs as absence of humaneness. This is an excellent description. The man of humaneness regards Heaven and Earth and the myriad things as one body. To him there is nothing that is not himself. Since he has recognized all things as himself, can there be any limit to his humaneness? If things are not parts of the self, naturally they have nothing to do with it. As in the case of paralysis of the four limbs, the vital energy no longer penetrates them, and therefore they are no longer parts of the self. (ibid.)

When the blood and vital energy are flowing unobstructed, they have consciousness and so can feel and know every part of one’s body, otherwise one is numb, unfeeling and not humane. To take the myriad things as one’s body is the state of humaneness. Using “being one body with things” to explain humaneness is to interpret it into a lofty spiritual state and was unprecedented. The disciples of the Cheng brothers Xie Liangzuo (谢良佐) and Yangshi (杨 时) all inherited Cheng Hao’s ideas about “being one body with things” to talk about humaneness. Xie Liangzuo developed Cheng Hao’s idea about “flaccidity and numbness in one’s hands and feet is not ren” and used “life” (生) and “enlightenment” (觉) to talk about humaneness. He said, what is the heart-mind, it is humaneness. What is humaneness? Being alive is humaneness, the dead are not humane. Presently, those whose bodies are numb and do not know pain and itchiness are called not humane. The pits of peaches that can be grown and germinate is called humane, it refers to the idea of having life. Extending this, humaneness can be seen. (Book I, Recorded Conversations of Shangcai)

He also says, Humaneness is the humaneness of “the four limbs are not humane.” Being non-humane is not being numb and knowing pain and itchiness. Humane-ness is not being numb and knowing pain and itchiness. Confucianism talks about this as humaneness. Buddhism talks about this as enlightenment [觉]. (Book II, Recorded Conversations of Shangcai)

What is meant by life refers to that which has consciousness and is what Buddhism refers to as enlightenment (觉). It is also the enlightenment that takes “the myriad things in the world as one body.” In “On the Subject of Xiao Yuren’s Great Learning”7 Yang Shi (杨时) said, “[of] the things in the world, principle is one but its manifestations diverse. Knowing this principle, one can arrive at humaneness.” (Book 26, Complete writings of Yang Shi) He also says, “recognizing that principle manifests all things without omission, then the principle of the world is obtained. Having obtained the principle of the world, then I am one with all things.” (ibid.) As 7 题萧欲仁大学篇后.

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humaneness is the principle of the world, if I can be united as one with things, this is the realm of humaneness. Zhu Xi proposed his own insights he said, “humaneness is the principle of love and the virtue of the heart-mind.” (“Xue Er”, Collected commentaries of the Analects) What is designated “principle of love” is that humaneness is the basis of love. Humaneness is the form of love and love is the manifestation and function of humaneness. The form of love is human nature, and the functions of love are the emotions. From this, we can see that on the question of humaneness, Zhu Xi also emphasized the distinction between human nature and the emotions. The “virtue of the heartmind” is explained by Zhu Xi’s disciple Cheng Chun (陈淳) as “when humaneness is viewed alone, it is broader and can combine all four [love, righteousness, propriety and wisdom]. Hence humaneness is the character of the heart-mind.” (Neo-Confucian Terms Explained) He also says, The heavenly principle embodied in the human heart-mind is totally humaneness. That principle is always active, always producing and reproducing without cease. Taken totally, it is called humaneness, but righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are included in it. (Ibid.)

This means that humaneness is not a specific aim of moral education but is a comprehensive virtue which contains righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. In using the heart-mind as a comprehensive virtue to talk about humaneness, humaneness becomes a state of “complete cleansing of selfish desire then heavenly principle flows unobstructed.” Humane-ness is the virtue of the original heart-mind in its wholeness. […] Now, the virtue of the heart-mind in its wholeness is nothing but heavenly principle and thus can only be harmed by human desire. Consequently, to practice true goodness, one must have the wherewithal to subdue selfish desires and thereby return to ritual propriety. […] If each day one subdues it [the self] and finds no difficulty in doing so, the selfish desires will be cleansed entirely and heavenly principle will prevail and one’s humaneness will thereby be more than sufficient. (“Yan Yuan”, Collected commentaries of the Analects)

As Zhu Xi takes humaneness to be “the principle of love,” the relationship between humaneness and love is the relationship between form and function, human nature and emotions. Therefore, he opposes using taking love to be humaneness and believes that using love to explain humaneness is not paying enough attention to the distinction between human nature and emotions. Zhu Xi criticized Xie Liangzuo, Cheng Hao and Yang Shi’s view of humaneness as “being one body with things.” With regard to Xie Liangzuo’s views, he said, “the person of humaneness naturally already has consciousness [觉], to talk about consciousness as humaneness is wrong.” (Book 6, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) “From the fact that the heart-mind has consciousness we can see that humaneness contains wisdom. This is not, however, the basis of why humaneness is called humaneness.” (Book 17, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) “Humaneness already has consciousness, to call consciousness as humaneness, however, does not obtain.” (Book 4, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) “Consciousness can most certainly be called humaneness. As consciousness is fully able to know humaneness, it belongs to wisdom.” (Book 6, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) As Zhu Xi sees it, consciousness belongs to the concept of wisdom, as humaneness is a

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comprehensive virtue, humaneness includes wisdom, thus the person of humaneness must already have consciousness, but the establishment of humaneness is not due to this consciousness. To talk about humaneness through consciousness is only clarifying that humaneness includes consciousness, but one cannot equate consciousness with humaneness. To equate consciousness with humaneness is to take humaneness as function and to take function as form. Zhu Xi criticizes Cheng Hao and Yang Shi’s views, “the person of humaneness can be one with the myriad things, to say that being at one with the myriad things is humaneness, is wrong. […] To talk about being one with the myriad things is merely to talk about a degree of humaneness.” (Book 6, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

The virtue of humaneness allows a person to be one with the myriad things, but to be one with the myriad things is just one aspect of the external manifestation of the virtue of humaneness, so it is a superficial characterization of the capacity of this virtue; it is not the totality of humaneness, and also not its essence. As we can see from the above, in the Song Confucian discussion of humaneness, apart from inheriting the traditional meaning of “loving people,” it was endowed the meaning of “growth” (生), “public-ness” (公) and “consciousness” (觉), so that the content of humaneness was extended. On the other hand, in using the distinction between human nature and the emotions to talk about humaneness, one is raising the discussion of humaneness to the root-body level. As such, the content of the Song Confucian discussion of humaneness was more expansive and became more multi-layered and profound.

10.4 Four The school of heart-mind did not emphasize the humaneness of root-body (本体) in their discussion of humaneness, but emphasized instead discovering the original heart-mind (发明本心) and used the body of the heart-mind (心体) to talk about humaneness. This discussion is exemplified in the philosophy of Wang Yangming, the person who brought the school of heart-mind to its maturity. Wang Yangming proceeded from the humaneness of the original heart-mind to talk about the humaneness of the myriad things being one body. He says, “Heart-mind is one, that is all. In terms of its total commiseration, it is called humaneness. […] one should not seek humaneness outside the heart-mind.” (Part II, Instructions for Practical Living, 134) This is to say that humaneness is not an external principle, so it cannot be sought from the outside, humaneness resides in the heart-mind; all the humanenesses present in the world arise from one’s original heart-mind. The humaneness of the original heart-mind, when extended externally, form what is called “the humaneness of heaven, earth and the myriad things as one body” (天地万物一体之仁). That the great person can become one body with the myriad things, it is not that they intended it, the humaneness of their heart-mind was originally so, it is one with the myriad things of

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heaven and earth. Forming one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is not only true of the great person, even the heart-mind of the small person is also no different. Only he himself makes it small. This is why upon seeing a child falling into a well, he cannot help feeling alarm and distress, this is his humaneness forming one body with the child. It might be objected that the child is still the same kind. Again, seeing the birds and beasts cry and tremble with fear when they are about to be slaughtered, he must necessarily have the heart-mind of not bearing to see suffering [不人之心], this is his humaneness forming one body with the birds and beasts. It might be objected that birds and beasts are still those with awareness and consciousness. When he sees grass and trees being cut, he will necessarily have a heart-mind of grieving and mourning [悯恤], this is his humaneness forming one body with the grasses and trees. Grasses and trees are still living things. Yet, even when he sees tiles and stones shattered and crushed, he cannot help feeling regret. This is his humanity forming one body with the tiles and stones. This means that even the heart-mind of the small man necessarily has the humane-ness that forms one body with all. This is rooted in the human nature that is mandated by heaven, and is naturally intelligent, clear and not beclouded. Therefore, it is called enlightened virtue (明德). (Inquiries on the Great Learning)

As such, the humaneness of the myriad things being one body is the humaneness of one’s original nature. Birds and beasts, grasses and trees, even tiles and stones are all the objects of humane love. If one cannot realize being one body with the myriad things, this will be because one has not forgotten selfish desire, and so one must overcome one’s selfish desires and their obstructions in order to return to the heartmind and the body their original unification. What remains to be pointed out is that humane love which Wang Yangming talks about is not the kind of broad love which sees all things with the same amount of love (一视同仁), but rather a graded love. Although this kind of love has its basis in the heart-mind, it manifests itself in the “love between father and son, elder and younger brother.” This is evidently inheriting Mencius’s idea of “treating parents as parents being humane to the people, being humane to the people and loving things” (亲亲而仁民,仁民而爱物) in which there are different grades of love. Wang Yangming’s discussion of humaneness through one’s original heart-mind is evidently antithetical to those of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi who used an externally existing principle to talk about humaneness. This is also the fundamental difference between the school of heart-mind and the school of principle.

10.5 Five Wang Fuzhi of the early Qing dynasty used the principle of ceaseless production and reproduction (生生) in the world and what is external to the heart-mind to discuss humaneness. For Wang Fuzhi, it is not the heart-mind itself that is humaneness, but the recognition of the heart-mind’s ceaseless producing and reproducing of life that is humaneness. As such, he proposed a different viewpoint to Zhu Xi’s idea that “humaneness is the principle of love and the virtue of the heart-mind.” He believed that humaneness is divided into that which has yet to arise and that which has already arisen. The humaneness that has yet to arise is the “principle/basis of love” and the humaneness of the already arisen is “the love that is manifested through

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principle.” In using principle to talk about humaneness, Zhu is only talking about the “principle/basis of love” and had yet to talk about humaneness as “the love that is manifested through principle”; he was thus too one-sided. For Wang Fuzhi, therefore, the body of the heart-mind is not in itself humaneness, it is only in obtaining love through the process of seeking for humaneness that is humaneness. Dai Zhen (戴震) was against the school of principle’s polarization of principle and desire. He used the “virtue of ceaseless producing and reproducing” (生生之 德) to explain humaneness. He said, “ceaseless producing and reproducing is called humaneness” (生生之谓仁). From the perspective of the way of heaven, humaneness is called the “ceaseless producing and reproducing of vital energy transformation” (气 化生生). From the perspective of the dao of human beings, humaneness is called the “heart-mind of ceaseless producing and reproducing” (生生之心). What is meant by ceaseless producing and reproducing here can be seen in the quotidian nourishment of the common people. He says, humaneness is the virtue of ceaseless producing and reproducing. ‘The common people are contented, For daily they have their drink and food.’8 It is just this that the way of man is produced and reproduced. When one man fulfils his life, and extends this so that he fulfils it in common with all the world, it is humaneness.9 (“Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, Wisdom” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius)

He also says, There can be no greater affliction in a human life than to lack the means to fulfil that life. If, desiring to fulfil one’s own life, one also fulfils the life of others, this is humane-ness. If, desiring to fulfil one’s own life, one reaches the point even of slaying others and paying no heed, this is inhumane-ness. The inhumane-ness actually begins with the desire to fulfil one’s life, and if there were no such desire, necessarily there would be no inhumane-ness. But if there were no such desire, then one would also regard affliction and distress of others in the world with indifference. No one who feels that his own life need not be fulfilled can fulfil the life of another.10 (“Principle” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius)

As we can see from this, what Dai Zhen calls humaneness is taking one’s own feelings and desires, and through the principle of ‘desiring to establish oneself, establishes other,” extending it to others. This shows that humaneness is not a transcendent principle that is elevated above, but something that exists in one’s daily life. Dai Zhen’s use of ceaseless birthing to talk about humaneness is an opposition to the school of principle’s idea of “preserving principle and extinguishing human desire” and so overcame the problem of the abstract obscurity of the school of principle’s discussion of humaneness. The Confucian of the Qing dynasty Ruan Yuan (阮元) discussed humaneness from the perspective of the concrete relationships between people and sought to return the Confucian and Mencian discourse of humaneness to its original state. 8A

line from “Tian Bao”, Minor Odes of the Book of Poetry. (1990: 351), modified. 10 Ewell (1990: 146–147), modified. 9 Ewell

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In his Discussion on the Discussion of Humaneness in the Analects (论语论仁论), Ruan Yuan says, In general humaneness must necessarily be personally verified before it can be manifested. There must also be two people before humaneness is seen. If one person shuts his eyes and lives alone, closes his eyes and sits in stillness, although he has the principle of virtue [德 理] in his heart-mind, ultimately one cannot achieve what Confucius called humaneness.

This means that humaneness refers to the relationship that exists between peoples. Living alone is not called humaneness. He also says, What is called humaneness is, wishing to establish oneself one establishes others, in wishing to realise oneself, realizes others. Thus, there must be a display of mutual respect [相人偶] between two peoples before humaneness can start to be seen.

He also says, “What the disciples of Confucius called humaneness is when one person displays respect to another person and shows their reverence, ritual propriety, loyalty and reciprocity.” (ibid.) This means that humaneness must be displayed interpersonally, there is no humaneness to speak of in a person residing alone. Ruan Yuan also believes that the humaneness of one’s heart-mind is only the “sprout of humaneness” (仁之端) and not humaneness itself. It is only when this “sprout of humaneness” is extended into the realm of affairs that it can be called humaneness. In his Discussion of Mencius’s Discussion of Humaneness (孟子论仁论), Ruan Yuan writes, “an honest scholar [一介之士] has humaneness in his heart-mind, but it is merely the sprout of humaneness; it must be extended and enriched and when it is manifested in affairs then one can start to call it humaneness.” In his discussions of humaneness, therefore, Ruan Yuan did not focus on metaphysics but on the function of the sprout of humaneness. At the end of the Qing dynasty, Kang Youwei (康有为) and Tan Sitong (谭嗣同) borrowed western concepts such as freedom, equality and universal love to discuss humaneness, so that their thinking on humaneness bore new characteristics. Kang Youwei spoke about humaneness from the perspective of the dao of heaven and the human dao. From the perspective of the dao of heaven, humaneness is the principle of ceaseless birthing. From the perspective of the human dao, humaneness manifests itself in the virtue of broad love. “Extending from oneself to others, is the foundation of Confucius’s teachings; sharing it with the people, being self-governing and equal is the basis of Confucius’s governance.” (Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean) From this, an idea of self-governance and equality can be inferred. Kang Youwei also used the natural science idea of force to explain humaneness. He said, “humaneness, is heat [热力]” (“Humans and Myself”, Inner and Outer Chapters of Kangzi); he also said, “the word humaneness comes from two people, the human dao is being together [相偶], it has the meaning of attraction, this is the force of love, which in reality is the force of electricity.” (Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean) Following this, he saw humaneness as the root of the myriad things, The heart-mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others is humaneness, is electricity, is ether [以太], all peoples have it, […] it is the myriad transformations of the sea, it is the root of everything, the source of everything. One kernel becomes the tree that forms a triad

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with heaven, one drop becomes the water that makes up the sea. (Book 1, Explorations of the Mencius)

Tan Sitong used “unobstructed flowing” (通) to explain humaneness and used humaneness to advocate ideas about the equality of the proletariat. In Studies on Humaneness (仁学) he said, “humaneness and unobstructed flowing is the first meaning. Ether, electricity and physical and mental force [心力] all refer to the tools that help in the unobstructed flowing.” This means that the most important content of humaneness is “unobstructed flowing” and the reason why humaneness can carry out this unobstructed flowing is due to tools such as ether, electricity and physical and mental force. Humaneness is unobstructed flowing and the “manifestation [象] of unobstructed flowing is equality”, “equality designates being of one mind. This means unobstructed flowing and unobstructed flowing is humaneness.” Concretely speaking, unobstructed flowing has four meanings: First, China and all foreign countries are equal, this means that all the nations of the world are equal. Second, it means unobstructed flowing from above and below, this means removing the class distinctions of feudal society, so that there is equality above and below. Third, this means unobstructed flowing between men and women, internal and external. This is an advocacy of male and female equality. Four, unobstructed flowing between the self and others. This is an advocacy for the removal of boundaries between persons, for equality between persons. As such, Tan Sitong believes humaneness is the highest and most universal law in the universe and society. Whether one can “treat the myriad things and other peoples as I treat myself” depends only on whether one if humane or not humane. As such, “the most important thing for the scholar to understand the form (体) and function (用) of ether, then one can start discussing humaneness with him.” (ibid.) Sun Zhongshan (孙中山) advocated Han Yu’s idea that “loving extensively is humaneness” and also used broad love to talk about humaneness. In his Education of the Spirit of Soldiers (军人精神教育), he says, throughout Chinese history there have been innumerable scholars who have talked about humaneness. As I see it, the meaning of humaneness is as Han Yu said, “loving extensively is humaneness.” I daresay this is correct. Loving extensively is public love and not selfish love. […] The capacity for loving extensively can be called humaneness.

In using broad love to explain humaneness, however, Sun Zhongshan is taking the revolutionary desire for saving the world as his intention. He, therefore, split humaneness into saving the world, saving people and saving the country: “the humaneness of saving the world” is the “religious humaneness” of “forsaking oneself in order to save the world” (“Lecture Two”, Three Principles of the People). The “humaneness of saving people” is the “kind and benevolent humaneness” of “doing kind acts.” The “humaneness of the gentleman of noble intention’s love for his country” is the “humaneness of saving the country.” The humaneness of these three kinds is all “in their nature, broad love.” In reference to its time, this equates to “the whole population of China [四万万] striving for happiness is broad love.” In using broad love to talk about humaneness, Sun Zhongshan is using humaneness as a revolutionary tool.

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In conclusion to the above, the concept of humaneness experienced complicated changes in history. The different thinkers of different periods not only understood its content in distinctive ways but also interpreted the form of its manifestation in unique ways. It is precisely due to this complicated historical change that the content of humaneness was extended and expanded upon so that its discussion became increasingly profound.

References Ewell, John Woodruff, Jr. (1990). Reinventing the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777). Dissertation. Knoblock, John, and Jeffrey K. Riegel. 2000. The Annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford: Stanford UP. Queen, Sarah. A. and Major, John S. 2016. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 11

Ritual Propriety (li, 礼)

China has always been dignified with the epithet of a country of etiquette and rites (礼仪之邦), from this, we can see the importance of li in traditional Chinese culture. Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters explains li as “li is treading or proceeding along the correct path [履], it is the means by which one serves the gods and achieves prosperity.” Wang Guowei believes that the earliest use of li referred to a vessel holding two strings of jade as offering to the spirits. It later referred also to the wine that is offered to the spirits. After that, it referred to all sacrificial affairs to the spirits. Qian Mu was of the opinion that “li referred to a form of religious sacrifice to the spirits.”1 Yang Kuan (杨宽) was of the opinion that li originated as traditional customs from the final days of clanship rule. In a society of clanship rule, these habits were spontaneously followed by its members. By the time of aristocracy and the rise of states, however, with the aim of preserving aristocratic rule and the patriarchal clan system, the aristocracy used these traditional customs, changed and developed them and so gradually formed the various kinds of ritual (li). Ritual (li) permeated every aspect of historical Chinese culture, and its content was very rich. Today, no one can use any totalizing description to comprehensively define it. Scholars believe that in Confucian culture, ritual has at least six different implications, these are ritual righteousness (礼义), rites and music (礼乐), ritual ceremonials (礼仪), customs ( 礼俗), ritual regulations (礼制) and the Confucian ritual religion (礼教).2 There are scholars who say that “the li of China is in reality is comprehensive term for the Confucian dominated traditional culture.”3

1 Qian

(1994: 72). (2001). 3 Peng (2001). 2 Chen

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11.1 One Before the Spring and Autumn period, li mainly referred stipulations in rituals and regulations (礼制) and the rites of everyday life. The Rites of Zhou (周礼) is primarily focused on the bureaucratic system that is constituted by three hundred official roles and makes stipulations on systems involved with the political and legal dimensions of the state. The Book of Rites and Ceremonial (仪礼) takes rites and ceremonies as its focus and focuses on the rites and ceremonies of aristocrats above the lowlevel aristocratic lineage of the shi (士). It stipulated the form of aristocratic social relationships. In the later Spring and Autumn period, the attention paid to li changed from one of form to one of content. In the fifth year of Lord Zhao (zhao gong), lord Lu Zhao (鲁昭公) visited the state of Jin (晋), all his actions accorded with etiquette, but a minister of Jin, Nü Shuqi (女叔齐), criticized Lord Zhao for not knowing “li”. This is because there were already breakthrough transformations in the concept of “li,” so that there was a distinction between “li” and ceremonials (仪). After this, the Confucians paid particular attention to the development of “li” on the spiritual and concrete level. Confucius focused great attention on “li.” There are many discussions of li in the Analects. Confucius believed that the most perfect li was the li of the Zhou dynasty, so he hoped to restore the Zhou dynasty li. The conventional view is that Zhou dynasty li is a certain system of decrees and regulations (典章), institutions (制度), rules (规矩) and ceremonies (仪节). In Confucius’s time, overstepping the rites was a common phenomenon and this was of great distress to Confucius. He believed that these phenomena of trespassing rites occurred because the human heart-mind and the pervading customs of society had gone bad. Confucius believed that the rites are the measure by which one establishes oneself and conducts affairs. He required that his disciples “do not look at what is contrary to ritual propriety, do not listen to what is contrary to ritual propriety, do not say anything that is contrary to ritual propriety, make no movement that is contrary to ritual propriety.” (Analects 12.1) He taught his own son to study ritual, and he made sure his own actions and words accorded with ritual. Chapter Ten of the Analects records in great detail how Confucius abides by the rituals in his daily activities to meeting with the ruler. Confucius even believes that although rituals have lost their spiritual qualities due to the bad customs of society, the form of rituals must still be preserved. In the past, it was a usual practice for the son of heaven to promulgate to the feudal lords which was to be the first day of each month in the coming year. Once the feudal lords have received this instruction, they keep it in the ancestral temple and ritually sacrifice a lamb in the temple on the first day of every month, after which they return to court. This is the practice of sacrificing a lamb to announce the beginning of the month (告朔) and was intended to show one’s reverence to the son of heaven. In the state of Lu, after Duke Wen, this ritual was phased out, but it was still required that one takes a sacrificial lamb. Zigong was of the opinion that because this ritual only existed in name anymore, one might as well not even send the lamb. Confucius, however, thought that although the spirit of the ritual does not exist anymore, its form must still be preserved, so that people

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still know that such a ritual existed. Following this, Confucius believed, rituals were standards which helped preserve societal order. At the end of the Spring and Autumn period, Guiding rules are lapsed and in chaos. Those below have authority over those above and those above have neglected their duty so there is disorder among the stations. The various feudal lords go to war of their own accord and the grand masters have monopoly over governance. (“23rd Year of King Weilie of Zhou”, Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance)

In reference to this, Confucius proposed the idea of the rectification of names (正 名). Through this process of rectifying names, he hoped to rescue a society that was daily becoming more chaotic and to realize a good social order in which “the lord is a lord, the minster is a minister, the father is a father and the son is a son.” He says, If names are not rectified, what is said will not accord with reality. When what is said does not accord with reality then things will not be successfully accomplished […] This is why the exemplary gentleman only applies names that can be properly spoken and makes sure that what he says can be properly put into action. (Analects 13.3)

Confucius believes that “names” are the real carriers of ritual, that behind each “name” should be a correlative ritual stipulation. The lord, for example, has the rituals that are appropriate to the lord, the minister has rituals that are appropriate for the minister, the father has rituals that are appropriate to the father and the son has rituals that are appropriate for the son. The point of the rectification of names is so that one’s words and actions are in accordance with one’s role and status. If we reach the stage of “only applying names that can be properly spoken and make sure that what one says can be properly put into action” (Analects 13.3), then one can effectively reconstruct a good social order. Third, Confucius gives more attention to the content and emotions or sentiments that are conveyed through rituals. Confucius knows that the degeneration of ritual is because of the degeneration of people’s heart-minds. In order to rescue the whole of society, apart from appealing to the revival of Zhou dynasty, one should pay extra attention to the education and cultivation of peoples’ heart-minds. To revive Zhou dynasty ritual, one must start from peoples’ heartminds. As Confucius says, “A person who is not humane [仁], what has he to do with ritual?” (Analects 3.3) As such we can see the importance of humaneness for ritual. Rituals are an important means for the preservation of the order of society, but behind ritual should be a corresponding content which shows a certain kind of emotion and sentiment. Filial piety is an important content of ritual, but Confucius believes that the essential quality of being filial to one’s parents is deference. Providing for one’s parents without the heart-mind of being deferential to them is not filial piety. This shows that Confucius stresses more the spiritual quality of ritual. Rituals and music are also not merely instruments such as jade, silk, bells and drums, what they represent are instead a deep level of emotions and sentiments within humans. Mencius inherited Confucius’s thought, he regarded ritual as the foundational means by which one establishes oneself and carries out affairs. He says, “do nothing that is not humaneness, do nothing that does not accord with ritual propriety” (Mencius 4B28). He also says, “Now, righteousness is the way, and ritual propriety is the door, but it is only the exemplary gentleman who can follow this way and go out and

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in by this door.” (Mencius 5B7) Here, Mencius points out the relationship between ritual and righteousness. In reality, this is similar to Confucius’s views on the relationship between humaneness and ritual propriety, which is the relationship between content and form. Mencius believes that acting righteously must accord with ritual as ritual and righteousness form a uniform whole. But ritual and righteousness are often not in accord with each other, so what should one do when they are not in accord? Mencius proposed the idea of adapting to circumstances (变通). In the Mencius, we witness a difficult decision to make: a man’s sister in law is drowning, should he (the brother-in-law) reach out his hand in order to save her. If he reaches out, then he will controvert again the ritual regulation (礼制) whereby “males and females shall not allow their hands to touch in giving or receiving anything” but if he does not reach out then he will controvert against humaneness and righteousness. Mencius believes that one should reach out to save her, saying that this is a matter of discretion (权). This shows that Mencius puts more stress on the emotions and sentiments of ritual and its spiritual quality. Mencius’s development of the philosophy of ritual lies in seeing ritual as an inner quality of human beings. Mencius believes that rituals, like humaneness and righteousness, are innate qualities. Through abductive reasoning, Mencius comes to the conclusion that humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are innate characteristics, these then are the famous “four sprouts”: if one is without the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of shame and disdain, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of deference, one is not human. If one is without the heart-mind of approval and disapproval, one is not human. The heart-mind of commiseration and compassion is the sprout of humaneness. The heart-mind of shame and disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The heart-mind of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety. The heart-mind of approving and disapproving is the sprout of wisdom. (Mencius 2A6)

Mencius believes that by which humans differ from birds and beasts is that the humans have the “four sprouts.” This is the essential difference between humans and animals; if it is destroyed or disappears, then there would be no difference between humans and animals. The comprehensive name for the “four sprouts” is what Mencius designates as “moral knowing” (良心). Mencius believes that although everyone already has moral knowing, humans are easily tempted and misled by their desire for material things, resulting in the loss of moral knowing. As such one must put in the effort of recovering the original heart-mind and so restore the original nature of the lost heart-mind. Different to Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi had a tendency to combine ritual with law. The Xunzi as it exists today contains 32 chapters, and almost every chapter touches upon the question of ritual, and within these, “Discourse on Ritual” (礼 论) is a chapter dedicated to ritual. In contrast to Mencius who thought of ritual propriety as an innate facet of human character, Xunzi believes, “In every case, ritual and righteousness are produced from the deliberate effort [伪] of the sage” (“Human Nature is Bad”). “Deliberate effort [伪]” means human action. He says, From what did ritual arise? I say: Humans are born having desires. When they have desires but do not fulfill it, then they cannot but seek some means of satisfaction. If there is no measure or limit to their seeking, then they cannot help but struggle with one other. If they

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struggle with one other then there will be chaos, and if there is chaos then there will be impoverishment. The former kings hated such chaos, and so they established rituals and righteousness in order to divide things among people, to nurture their desires, and to satisfy their seeking. They caused desires never to exhaust material goods and material goods never to be depleted by desires, so that the two support each other and prosper. This is how ritual arose.4 (“Discourse on Ritual”) In order for people to live, they cannot be without community. If they form communities but lack social divisions then they will struggle with each other. If they struggle with each other then there will be chaos, and if there is chaos there will be impoverishment. Thus, to lack social divisions is the greatest harm to people, and to have social divisions is the root benefit for the whole world. And ruler of people is the pivot and crucial point in controlling social divisions.5 (“Enriching the State”)

Here, it is clearly stated that ritual is an important means of preserving the order of the different stations. In content, it is “division” which includes titles and ranks and the allocation of profits and benefits. Xunzi believes that the ruler who is sagely and enlightened is the crucial point in controlling social divisions and is capable of fairly allocating roles to each member of society. To be as noble as the Son of Heaven and to be so rich as to possess the whole world—these are what the natural dispositions of people are all alike in desiring. However, if you followed along with people’s desires, then their power could not be accommodated, and goods could not be made sufficient. Accordingly, for their sake the former kings established ritual and righteousness in order to divide [分] the people up and cause there to be the rankings of noble and base, the distinction between old and young, and the divisions between wise and stupid and capable and incapable. All these cause each person to carry out his proper task and each to attain his proper place. After that, they cause the amount and abundance of their salaries to reach the proper balance. This is the way to achieve community life and harmonious unity.6 (“On Honour and Disgrace”)

Here, Xunzi points out that the Son of Heaven, the feudal lords, the scholar-official, government officials and even common people all reside in the division that ritual determines. The ranks made according to ritual have clear boundaries. The noble and lowly, the worthy and those with bad character all have their stations. The relationship between them is that the lowly must serve the noble, those with bad character must serve the worthy, those above must love those below and those below must respect those above. Xunzi not only affirmed that the social body must have distinctions of rank, the ruler and the ruled, and differences between the amount of material goods allocated, at the same time, he sharply opposed hereditary succession, advocating that divisions between high and nobles and unworthy should be made according to virtue and capability. Xunzi believed that no matter how lowly one’s birth, as long as he is equipped with the virtue and ability of a son of heaven, a feudal lord or a scholar-official, then he is a son of heaven, a feudal lord or a scholar-official. No matter how elevated one’s birth, if he is not equipped with virtue and ability, then he is a commoner. The kind of ideology of governance through ritual contains the seed 4 Hutton

(2014: 201). (2014: 85), modified. 6 Hutton (2014: 30), modified. 5 Hutton

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of rule by the people. A key characteristic of Xunzi’s philosophy of ritual is that it is intimately connected with law. Xunzi points out that ritual and righteousness and law are mutually dependent. The formulation of laws is rooted in ritual righteousness. Ritual righteousness determines people’s ranks and guides and regulates social order in a positive sense. Laws preserve ritual righteousness and punishes those who contravene against ritual action, and so preserves social order in a negative sense.

11.2 Two In the Han dynasty and under his system of correlative cosmology, Dong Zhongshu provided proof for the production of ritual and the feudal class system. He believed that the establishment of ritual is the result of the sages emulating heaven (法天). The way that heaven realizes the myriad things is through “establishing the sun, moon, wind and rain in order to harmonise them, distinguishing between yin, yang, cold and heat in order to realize them.” (“Biography of Dong Zhongshu”, Book of Han) The way that the sages realize the common people is through “establishing ritual so as to guide them.” Dong Zhongshu believes that whether a person is of high or low station, noble or lowly is all decided by heaven. He says, The son of heaven receives his command from heaven, the feudal lords receive their command from the son of heaven, the son receives his command from the father, the male and female receive their command from their lord, the wife receives her command from her husband. What all those who receive orders show respect for, in every case, is Heaven. Although it also permissible to say that they receive their orders from Heaven.7 (“Following Orders”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

From the perspective of correlative cosmology, he argued that, The righteous [relationships] between ruler and minister, husband and wife, and father and son all derive from the way [dao] of yin and yang. The ruler is yang and the manifest is yin. The father is yang and the son is yin. The husband is yang and the wife is yin.8 (“Laying the Foundation of Righteousness, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) Thus, the various allotments of humaneness, righteousness, regulations and limits are all ultimately derived from heaven. Heaven is the ruler who shelters and discloses them. Earth is the minister who nurtures and supports them. Yang is the husband who generates them. Yin is the wife who assists them. Spring is the father who engenders them. Summer is the son who nourishes them. Autumn is the death that enshrouds them. Winter is the pain that mourns them. The Three Bonds of the kingly way may be sought for in heaven.9 (“Laying the Foundation of Righteousness, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

The relationship between the “Confucian ethical code” (名教) and ziran (自然) is a key topic of discourse in the Neo-Daoism of the Wei-Jin period. What is meant by the “Confucian ethical code” are the rules and constants and morals of the ritual 7 Queen

and Major (2016), modified. and Major (2016: 426–427). 9 Queen and Major (2016: 428), modified. 8 Queen

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teachings that Confucianism advocated. What is meant by ziran is the dao. Based on the root-body philosophical system that takes non-being as its foundation, Wang Bi proposed the idea that the Confucian ethical code arises from ziran. Wang Bi believes that the myriad things of the world are all produced by dao, so that to manage the disparate myriad things and affairs, the sages established the Confucian ethical codes. For example, the intention behind establishing the role of the officer in charge and distinguishing between nobility and lowliness, was to unite a scattered society. In other words, the arising of Confucian ethical codes is the result of the sages following ziran. As such, Wang Bi affirmed that the existence of the Confucian ethical codes accorded with principle. Ji Kang (嵇康) put Confucian ethical codes and ziran in complete opposition to each other and believed that ethical codes such as humaneness and righteousness are all opposed to one’s original nature. As such, he proposed the famous idea of “transcending Confucian ethical codes and reposing one’s trust in ziran” (越名教而任自然) which meant breaking through the restrictions that ethical codes placed on one and letting one’s natural nature have free rein, so that one realizes a free life. What needs to be clarified here is that Ji Kang could not completely cut his ties from the Confucian ethical codes. His motive lay in exposing the reality of the hypocritical misconduct of the ruling Sima clan. In opposition to the sons of the upper echelons’ disavowal of the Confucian ethical code, Yue Guang (乐广) proposed the view that “within the Confucian ethical codes, there is joy” and believed that ziran does not depart from the Confucian ethical codes. Pei Wei (裴頠) criticized the ideas in “Discourse on Valuing Non-Being” (贵无论) and affirmed that the institution of having names and ranks is coherent with principle. He asked that people rest content in the distinctions of noble and lowly and believed that only this is “in accordance with principle” (谓之理然). As such, we can see that what Pei Wei calls “principle” is, in fact, the Confucian “ritual.” The antagonism between Confucian ethical codes and ziran received real resolution with Guo Xiang. On the basis of the philosophy of the self-transformation via the dark obscurity (玄冥), whereby the myriad things fulfil their own natures, he proposed the idea that Confucian ethical codes are ziran. Guo Xiang has a famous saying: Although the sage finds himself in the halls of ritual and government, his heart-mind is not different from when he is surrounded by mountains and trees. How could the common people understand him! They only see him having a yellow carriage canopy over his head and a jade seal hung at his belt and they say that this is enough strap and bind his heart-mind. They see him making tours of inspection of mountains and rivers and that he identifies with the affairs of the common people that they say that this is enough to wear out his spirit. How could they comprehend that such a one has reached an ultimate point where he is inexhaustible? (“Wandering Far and Unfettered” Commentary on the Zhuangzi)

Here, the sage of Confucianism and the sage of Daoism are unified. Ritual teachings not only cannot restrict one’s heart-mind, rather, as Guo Xiang sees it, it is precisely in respecting ritual teachings that one’s heart-mind can gain freedom and peace. As we have seen, Confucius and Mencius provided evidence for the existence rituals from the point of view of the heart-mind. Dong Zhongshu tried to find a basis for ritual on the basis of cosmology, and Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism tried to find an ontological basis for ritual. That which really raised ritual to a metaphysical

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height was Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. The school of principle of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi inherited and developed Mencius’ ideas on the heart-mind and human nature and took ritual, humaneness and righteousness to be human nature. Human nature is the heavenly principle which is within humans, so that ritual is principle (理). Zhu Xi says, “ritual is the principle [理] of heaven, what is not ritual is one’s own selfish interest.” (Questions and Answers Concerning the Analects of Confucius) In this, ritual is raised to the height of the root-body of the universe, which provides a root-body basis for social order (including ethical stipulations), moral strictures and ritual ceremonials. The ethical relationships which ritual governs, such as that between lord and minister, father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, friends and moral stipulations such as humaneness and righteousness, are all manifestations of the principle of heaven. Different to Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers who saw ritual as what heavenly principle set down, Lu Jiuyuan (陆九渊) and Wang Yangming saw the heart-mind as the root-body basis for the establishment of ritual. Central to Liu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming’s thought is that “heart-mind is principle” (心即理), with heart-mind referring to people’s original heart-mind. Lu-Wang believe that all moral provisions and social order is not external to human beings but is rather the manifestation of human beings’ original heart-mind. The human heart-mind is the ultimate basis for moral provisions and social order. On the basis of the heart-mind, Wang Yangming later also inherited Mencius’s thought and proposed the idea of moral knowing, believing that everyone innately has the same moral knowing; moral knowing is equipped with the capacity to know good and bad. The natural flowing of moral knowing manifests as the social order and moral provisions which accord with principle. He says, The heart-mind is self-so able to know. When it perceives the parents, it self-so knows that one should be filial. When it perceives the elder brother, it self-so knows that one should be respectful. And when it perceives a child fall into a well, it self-so knows that one should be commiserative. This is moral knowing and need not be sought outside.10 (Part I, Instructions on Practical Living, 8)

Although Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism raised ritual to the height of the root-body of the cosmos, it’s more the case that they viewed ritual as the manifestation of heavenly principle and the measure of human actions. As Zhu Xi sees it, although ritual and principle seem like two separate things, they are actually different manifestations of the same thing. The relationship between them is that of phenomena and original substance (本质). The original substance of ritual is principle and ritual is the manifestation of principle. Original substance cannot be seen whilst phenomena can be seen. For the purposes of educating people rules and norms, the sages formulated ritual according to principle and they are manifested as elegant regulations (文章) so as to make it easy for people to study and imitate. Different to Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming believed that the formulations of rituals should respect the principle of “simple and spare and close to human emotions” (简约而切于人情). They are simple and spare so that they are easy to understand and to follow, being “close to human emotions” allows people to feel that it is coming from one’s original nature so that people will 10 Chan

(1963: 15), modified.

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spontaneously follow rituals as opposed rituals to being a suppressive restriction on people. The customs of the villagers and common people (乡规民约) which Wang Yangming formulated were simple, spare and easy to carry out, and stood in stark contrast to Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals (家礼), which were detailed, complicated and difficult to carry out.

References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings. New York, London: Columbia University Press. Chen, Lai. 2001. Confucian Views on Ritual and the Modern World 儒家礼的观念与现代世界. In Confucius Studies 孔子研究, vol. 1. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Peng, Lin. 2001 Ritual and Chinese Culture 礼与中国文化. In Chinese Literature and History文 史知识, vol. 11. Qian, Mu. 1994. Introduction to the History of Chinese Culture 中国文化史导论. 商务印书馆, p. 72. Queen, Sarah. A. and John S. Major. 2016. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 12

Filial Piety (xiao, 孝)

Xiao is a central concept in Confucian moral philosophy and has a special position within it. There are roughly three senses to xiao. One, supporting and respecting one’s parents. Second, inheriting and continuing the work left by one’s parents, or completing the unfulfilled the undertakings of one’s forebears. Third, to ritually remember the ancestors, that is to perform rituals for one’s deceased forebears. Later, xiao was intimately connected with loyalty (忠), becoming the fundamental law which upheld feudal governance and came to have a profound impact on all of traditional Chinese moral thought, social governance and law.

12.1 One Confucius had much to say with regard to what xiao is and the content of xiao. One of these is, “not being disobedient” (无违) which means never going against the wishes of one’s parents and treating them according to ritual. Its specific content is “That parents, when alive, be served according to propriety; that, when dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety.” (Analects 2.5) Second, “reverence” (敬), which means that one should have a feeling of reverence towards one’s parents. Providing for one’s parents is the lowest expectation of xiao; it is reverence that is the real spiritual quality of xiao. Third, one must have a real feeling of reverence towards one’s parents, and this is manifested externally in one’s attitude of affability and happiness when engaging with one’s parents. Fourth, this is inheriting and continuing the unfinished work of one’s parents. As we can see from the above, the xiao of which Confucius speaks are the duties which the children must fulfil towards one’s parents, it is a demand on the children. Based on this, when the parents are in error, the children should mildly and tactfully counsel them, if the parents do not follow one’s advice, then one should not go against the intentions of one’s parents; even if one has worries, one should not complain. As Confucius’s discourse on xiao is established on the basis of blood relations in one’s clan, “fathers concealing the misconduct of the son, and sons © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_12

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concealing the misconduct of the father” becomes a reasonable act, even becoming an important principle for the law of later generations. In the Analects, xiao is often linked with “ti” (悌)—xiaoti. Xiao is the respect and obedience to one’s parents, ti is the respect and reverence one has for one’s elder brother. Confucius’s disciple Youzi saw xiaoti as the basis of acting on the basis of humaneness and so had a great significance for maintaining the stability of governance, he said, They are few who, being filial and respectful of his elders, are inclined to offending against their superiors. There have been none, who, not liking to offend against their superiors, have been fond of stirring up rebellion. The exemplary gentleman applies himself to the roots. That being established, the way [dao] naturally grows. Filial piety and respect and reverence for one’s elder brother [ti]! - are they not the root of all humane actions? (Analects 1.2)

As such, xiao is also possessed of a political significance. One of Confucius’s most brilliant students, Zengzi (曾子), was famous for his filial actions. The Book of Rites and the Mencius record some discussions he had about filial piety. Zengzi divided filial piety into three levels. Providing for one’s parents is the lowest level whilst not bringing disgrace to the reputation of one’s parents is a relatively higher level and respecting one’s parents is the highest. Respecting one’s parents or revering one’s parents is what Confucius means by reverence. Zengzi takes “loving but reverential” (爱而敬) as the way to serve one’s parents. Like Confucius, what Zengzi means by filial piety is limited to the duty which children owe to their parents, as such, children cannot go against the wishes of the parents. When the parents are in error, the children have an obligation to “offer advice” (致谏), and this is an expression of filial piety. If the parents are determined not to listen, then one cannot go against one’s parents’ wishes. This is what Zengzi means by “offering advice but not disobeying” (谏而不逆). The filial piety that was shown towards their parents not only involves making them happy, not going against their wishes but also loving and revering what one’s parents love and revere. What is worth noting is that Zengzi also saw filiality as the “guiding principle of all under heaven” (天下之大经). If filiality is obtained, then everything would accord with their measure. As such, all human actions can be encompassed by filiality: If a man in his own house and privacy be not grave, he is not filial; if in serving his ruler, he be not loyal, he is not filial; if in discharging the duties of office, he be not reverent, he is not filial; if with friends he be not sincere, he is not filial; if on the field of battle he be not brave, he is not filial. (“The meaning of sacrifices”, Book of Rites)

Filiality is thus not limited to the sentiment of filiality and respect towards one’s parents but is here extended to include being in one’s own house, serving one’s ruler, conducting one’s official duties, making friends and even one’s behaviour in battle.

12.2 Two Mencius saw serving one’s parents as the essential content of humaneness. He believed that “the core of humaneness is serving one’s parents” (Mencius 4A27).

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Serving one’s parents is filial piety, which is to “respect one’s parents.” Concretely speaking, filial piety is divided into “nourishing the will” (养志) and “nourishing the mouth and body” (养口体). The former means complying with the wishes of one’s parents and the latter means nourishing their bodies. Mencius believes that “nourishing the will” is the real filial piety and its concrete content is “pleasing one’s parents” (得乎亲) and “getting along with one’s parents” (顺乎亲). Mencius takes Shun as his example, explaining that, Only Shun could have the world delight in and turn toward him, yet look upon this as if it were a bundle of grass. When he could not please his parents, he considered himself a failure as a human. When he could not get along with his parents, he considered himself a failure as a son. Shun fathomed the way of serving one’s parents, and his father, the “Blind Man,” became pleased. The Blind Man was pleased and the world was transformed. The Blind Man was pleased, and in the world the roles of father and son were settled. This is called great filial piety. (Mencius 4A28)

From this, we can see that “pleasing one’s parents” and “getting along with one’s parents” and letting one’s parents be happy determine the obligations that children have towards their parents. From this, one achieves the aim of transforming all under heaven, and so it is called “great filial piety.” Later, on the question of “offering advice to one’s parents” (谏亲), Zhu Xi further differentiated between “pleasing one’s parents” and “get along with one’s parents.” “Pleasing one’s parents” means to follow one’s parents’ wishes irrespective of what is right or wrong; this is the lowest form of filial piety. “Getting along with one’s parents” means to speak to one’s parents according to reason and not merely to make them happy, and means to prevent them from sinking into unrighteousness; this is the highest level of filial piety. Mencius also listed five types of non-filial actions. He says, There are five things that the world calls “unfilial.” To fail to be concerned about the nourishment of one’s parents because one is lazy is the first. To fail to be concerned about the nourishment of one’s parents because one plays games and is fond of drinking is the second. To fail to be concerned about the nourishment of one’s parents because one is fond of wealth and narrowly concerned for one’s wife and children is the third, To disgrace one’s parents by following the desires of one’s eyes and ears is the fourth. To endanger one’s parents by being fond of conflict and wrath is the fifth.” (Mencius 4B30)

This is setting the standards for filial piety from a negative perspective and had a profound influence on the later practice of filial piety in China. Xunzi’s discourse on filial piety mainly consists in “offering advice to one’s parents.” He believed that, To be filial upon entering [the house] and to be a good younger brother upon going out [into society] is lesser conduct. To be compliant to one’s superiors and devoted to one’s inferiors is middle conduct. To follow the way and not one’s lord, to follow righteousness and not one’s father is the greatest conduct.1 (“The Way to be a Son”, Xunzi)

What Confucius and Mencius saw as the main content of filial piety, that of being “filial upon entering [the house] and to be a good younger brother upon going out [into 1 Hutton

(2016: 325), modified.

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society],” and being “compliant to one’s superiors and devoted to one’s inferiors,” is viewed by Xunzi as the lowest form of filial piety. For Xunzi, it is abiding by the dao and righteousness that is the highest form of filial piety. As such, Xunzi proposed the principle of “offering advice to one’s parents” in which one “follows the way and not one’s lord, follows righteousness and not one’s father.” This means that whether one follows the commands of one’s parents is decided against the measure of whether it accords with the dao and righteousness. Xunzi believes that, There are three cases in which the filial son does not follow orders. When following orders will endanger one’s parents, but not following orders will make them safe, then the filial son will not follow orders, and this is having scruples. When following orders will disgrace one’s parents, but not following orders will bring them honor, then the filial son will not follow orders, and this is being righteous. When following orders requires a beastly act, but not following orders requires cultivation and decorum, then the filial son will not follow orders, and this is being respectful.2 (“The Way to be a Son”, Xunzi)

As such, it is only by understanding the reasons behind being or not being compliant and following this that is the real great filial piety.

12.3 Three The Annals of Lü Buwei held filial piety in the highest regard and believed that filial piety is heavenly nature and took filial piety to be the principle for governing the state, social order as well as the myriad affairs. It discussed the social effects of filial piety. The chapter “Filial Conduct” has it that, As a general principle, in order to govern the world and put a nation in good order, it is necessary to devote one’s efforts first to the root fundamentals and only then to the nonessential branches. […] In working on the root fundamentals, nothing is more prized than being filial. If the ruler is filial, his name will be illustrious, those below will obey him, and the world will sing his praises. If a minister is filial, he will serve his lord loyally, manage his official duties honestly, and confront difficulties even though they might lead to his death. If knight-scholars and commoners are filial, they will tend to agriculture diligently, be stalwart in defending and doing battle, and never run from defeat. Filial piety is the root fundamental to which the Three August Ones and Five Sovereigns devoted themselves. It is the guiding thread that runs through the myriad undertakings.3 (“Filial Conduct”, Annals of Lü Buwei)

It also says that “The person who holds fast to one method in order to bring a hundred good things, who expels one hundred bad things, and is followed by the world can only be a filial man.” The thought here is interconnected to the idea in the Analects that “Filial piety and respect and reverence for one’s elder brother [ti]!—are they not the root of all humane actions?” In terms of its concrete content, the “Filial Conduct” chapter cites Zengzi,

2 Hutton

(2016: 325), modified. and Riegel (2000: 302).

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What his parents create, a child dare not destroy; what they set up, he dare not topple; and what they make whole, he dare not damage. Accordingly, one goes by boat and does not wade, takes the main roads and avoids shortcuts, and keeps his whole body together to preserve worship in this ancestral temple. Such a person can be called filial.4 (“Filial Conduct”, Annals of Lü Buwei)

The Record of the Rites (which was a miscellaneous collection of literature from the pre-Qin to the Qin-Han period and which came into existence during the western Han) also has some discussions on filial piety, for example, what kinds of actions are filial. The “Meaning of Sacrifices” (祭义) chapter writes, “of all that Heaven produces and Earth nourishes, there is none so great as the human being. His parents give birth to his person all complete, and to return it, to them all complete may be called filial propriety.” It also says, “He should not forget his parents in the utterance of a single word, and therefore, bad speech will not issue from his mouth, and an angry word will not come back to his person. Not to disgrace his person and not to cause shame to his parents may be called filial propriety.” The Doctrine of the Mean of the Record of the Rites says, They reverenced those whom they honored, and loved those whom they regarded with affection, served the dead as they would have served them alive; they served the departed as they would have served them when they were still here - the height of filial piety.

“A Summary Account of Sacrifices” (祭统) in the Record of the Rites says, There are three ways that the filial son serves his parents, nourishing them when they are alive, when they are dead, serving them by all the rites of mourning; and when the mourning is over by sacrificing to them. In his nourishing them we see his natural compliance; in his funeral rites we see his sorrow; in his sacrifices we see his reverence and observance of the [proper] seasons. The actions of a filial son consist in carrying out these three things.

The “Meaning of Sacrifices” chapter also distinguished between the filial piety of the former kings and those of the exemplary gentleman (君子). The filial piety taught by the ancient kings required that, “the eyes of the son should not forget the looks [of his parents], nor his ears their voices; and that he should retain the memory of their aims, likings, and wishes.” The filial piety of the exemplary gentleman consists in, “while (his parents) are alive, reverently nourishing them; and, when-they are dead, reverently sacrificing to them; his (chief) thought is how to the end of life not to disgrace them.” The Record of the Rites proposed some demands for how the filial son is supposed to behave when sacrificing to his parents. It says, In this way his ingenuousness and kindness were never absent from his person; his ears and eyes were never withdrawn from what was in his heart; his thoughts never left his parents. What was bound up in his heart was manifested in his countenance; and he was continually examining himself; this is the mind of the filial son. (“Meaning of Sacrifices”, Record of the Rites) Hence in the sacrifices of such a man he brings into exercise all sincerity and good faith, with all loyalty and reverence; he offers the [proper] things; accompanies them with the [proper] rites; employs the soothing of music; does everything suitably to the season. Thus 4 Knoblock

and Riegel (2000: 304).

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intelligently does he offer his sacrifices, without seeking for anything to be gained by them - such is the heart-mind of a filial son. (“A summary account of sacrifices”, Record of the Rites)

With regard to “offering advice to one’s parents,” the “Pattern of the Family” chapter of the Record of the Rites says, If a parent have a fault, [the son] should with bated breath, and bland aspect, and gentle voice, admonish him. If the admonition do not take effect, he will be the more reverential and the more filial; and when the father seems pleased, he will repeat the admonition. If he should be displeased with this, rather than allow him to commit an offence against any one in the neighbourhood or countryside, [the son] should strongly remonstrate. If the parent be angry and [more] displeased, and beat him till the blood flows, he should not presume to be angry and resentful, but be [still] more reverential and more filial.

We can see that the Record of the Rites offers a very comprehensive discussion of filial piety.

12.4 Four The Pre-Qin discussion of filial piety was still in an embryonic form and had not yet become a refined system. What gave filial piety more comprehensive discussion and made it more systematic and theoretical was the Classic of Filial Piety (孝经). The Classic of Filial Piety believes that filial piety comes from people’s heavenly natures, and so it raised filial piety to the height of a cosmic principle. It believed that filial piety is the root of all moral actions and source of educative transformation. Filial piety runs through the whole process of serving one’s parents, one’s lord and establishing oneself. As such, “of all the actions of man there is none greater than filial piety” (人之行,莫大于孝) Here, filial piety is raised to the height of the law of heaven and earth. According to the life process of one’s parents’ life, old age, illness and death, the Classic of Filial Piety has specific regulations for filial piety. These are, In his general conduct to them, he manifests the utmost reverence. In his nourishing of them, his endeavor is to give them the utmost pleasure. When they are ill, he feels the greatest anxiety. In mourning for them, he exhibits every demonstration of grief. In sacrificing to them, he displays the utmost solemnity.5

According to the difference between parents, filial piety is split into five classes and people from the different classes carry out filial piety in different ways. The carrying out of filial piety for a son of heaven involves, “When the love and reverence [of the Son of Heaven] are carried to the utmost in the service of his parents, the lessons of his virtue educate and transform the common people, and he becomes a pattern to [all within] the four seas.” For the feudal lords, this involves, “not being arrogant and though of lofty status they are not in jeopardy of being toppled” and “Adhering to 5 For

the translations of the Classic of Filial Piety, I have relied on James Legge’s translations.

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the right measure and carefully observant of the rules and laws, they are full, without overflowing.” For the ministers and high officials, this involves, If an article of clothing is not sanctioned by the former kinds, then the ministers and high officials would not presume to wear it. If ways of speaking are not sanctioned by the former kinds, they would not presume to use them. If ways of behaving are not consistent with the virtuous conduct of the former kings, they would not presume to act in such a way.

In the lower officials, this involves, “serving their superiors with reverence and obedience.” The filial piety of the common people involves, following the course of heaven (in the revolving seasons); they distinguish the advantages afforded by (different) soils; they are careful of their conduct and economical in their expenditure - in order to nourish their parents.

What is more important is that the Classic of Filial Piety proposed the idea that one can “transfer filial piety into loyalty” (移孝作忠), in which, “The filial piety with which the superior man serves his parents may be transferred as loyalty to the ruler.” As such, the filial piety with which one serves one’s parents can be transferred to the loyalty with which one serves the ruler. Loyalty is the extension and development of filial piety, loyalty and filial piety is one body. Related to this, in the carrying out of filial piety, the Classic of Filial Piety also proposed that one should “remonstrate” (谏诤) one’s father and lord so that the theory and practice of loyalty and filial piety is more complete. Filial piety is thus not limited to the good treatment of one’s parents within the family, it also contains a political demand. Through combining filial piety and loyalty, familial ethics and political ethics are more intimately united. The Classic of Filial Piety also proposed “governing all under heaven through filial propriety” (以孝治天下) so that in “all under heaven peace and harmony can prevail; disasters and calamities do not occur; misfortunes and rebellions do not arise.” The utmost “filial piety and reverence for one’s older brother resonates with the spiritual intelligences and shines through within the four seas and affects everything everywhere.” This extends the effects of filial piety and renders it more mysterious. The Classic of Filial Piety also combines filial piety with legal stipulations, seeing unfilial behaviour as the greatest of crimes and as the “way of great chaos”: There are three thousand offenses against which the five punishments are directed, and there is not one of them greater than being unfilial. When constraint is put upon a ruler, that is the disowning of his superiority. When the authority of the sages is disallowed, that is the disowning of (all) law. When filial piety is put aside, that is the disowning of the principle of affection. These (three things) pave the way to great chaos.

After this, nearly every dynasty took being unfilial as the greatest crime and punished it. Through its advocacy by the Pre-Qin Confucians, Confucius, Zengzi, Mencius and Xunzi, through its consolidation via The Annals of Lü Buwei, Record of the Rites, and finally through the systematic theoretical articulation given to it by the Classic of Filial Piety, filial piety became one of the most important concepts which ran through family morality and political governance, becoming one of the central contents of Confucian moral philosophy. Since the Han dynasty explicitly proposed

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the slogan of “governing the world through filial piety” (以孝治天下), each later dynasty has followed this principle, and revered it as a paradigmatic model. This principle came to have a profound influence on Chinese political, thought, culture and even the characteristics of the Chinese people.

Reference Knoblock, John, and Jeffrey K. Riegel. 2000. The Annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford: Stanford UP. Hutton, Eric. 2016. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Chapter 13

Coherence (li, 理)

Li is one of the most important, richest and widely used concepts in Chinese philosophy. It is used to refer to the regularity through which the myriad things operate or the root-body (本体) of the universe itself and even the common moral standards in human society. Corresponding to this, in the development of the concept of li, some closely connected concepts have arisen such as heavenly principle (天理), principle of names (名理), mysterious principles (玄理), principle of emptiness (´su¯ nyat¯a, 空 理), moral principles (义理), principle of events (事理), principles of morality (伦 理) and principles of organization (条理). From various perspectives, these concepts have all revealed and enriched the philosophical content of the concept of li.

13.1 One In Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters, Xu Shen explains li as “working on jade.” Working on the jade according to its natural veins is li, and inferring on from this, li means administering and ordering. In the relatively early Chinese classics, li was used in this original sense and did not yet have a philosophical meaning. As the patterns (纹理) and order (条理) of things themselves, li here is understood as characteristics originally possessed by the things themselves. As human knowledge increased, the implications of li gradually became more abstract, becoming the regularity and law which the processes of things abide by. When applied to human society, this kind of regularity and law becomes the basis of the moral standards which human society abides by. As such, li became a concept possessed of philosophical meaning. This understanding of li is already widely used by the Pre-Qin philosophers. The early Confucian classics which use li from a philosophical perspective are the Ten Wings of the Book of Changes, the Mencius and the Xunzi. The Ten Wings says, “Looking up, we use it [Yi] to observe the configurations of heaven, and, looking

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down, we use it to examine the patterns [li] of earth”1 (Commentary on the Appended Phrases A). Here, the “patterns on the earth” are juxtaposed with “configurations of heaven” and refer to the li of the earth, that is regularity and standards which the mountains, lakes and myriad things abide by. Explaining the Trigrams also said that the reason the sages made the Changes was so that “It was to be used as a means to stay in accord with the principles [li] of nature and of mandate [性命之理].” The principles of nature and of mandate contains the three daos of heaven, earth and human beings. Concretely speaking, “The dao which determines heaven and earth is yin and yang. The dao which determined earth is hard and soft and the dao which determines the human being is humaneness and righteousness.” Yinyang, hard and soft, humaneness and righteousness are the internal regularities which heaven, earth and human beings abide by. The hexagram, the hexagram lines and the appended phrases are all established on the basis of the observation of the yinyang, hard and soft, as well as moral characteristics of heaven, earth and human beings. Through the hexagram, the hexagram lines and the appended phrases, humans can recognize the characteristics and operative regularities of the myriad things. This is what is called the principle of nature and of mandate. No matter if it is the heavenly dao, the dao of earth or the human dao, the Ten Wings calls them all the “li of all under heaven.” Once one recognizes the li of heaven and earth, one can accomplish achievements. As such, the li which the Ten Wings refers to is the universal regularity which the myriad things abide by. Here, li is already a philosophical concept which possesses a high degree of abstraction. Mencius did not elaborate upon li, but he used it to refer to the moral nature that all human beings possess. Mencius believes that li is “what all heart-minds prefer in common.” To this, Mencius says, “What is it that heart-minds prefer in common? I say that it is order [li] and righteousness. The sages first discovered what our heart-minds prefer in common.” (Mencius 6A7) The concrete content of order (li) and righteousness is the moral natures of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Mencius believes that all humans are born with the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐), shame and disdain (羞恶), deference (辞 让), approval and disapproval (是非). These “four heart-minds” are the sprouts of the moral concepts of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. This is why “Humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not welded onto us from without but rather, we inherently have them.” (Mencius 6A6). It is in this sense that Mencius says, “Therefore the principles of our nature and the determinations of righteousness are agreeable to my mind, just as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth.” (ibid.) As such, the li that Mencius talks about is the overall designation for the moral principles of human society. That human nature is good is the foundation on which moral principles rely. The early implication of humaneness and righteousness which Mencius endowed li with had a profound impact on later ages.

1 Lynn

(1994: 51), modified. Throughout this translation, I have followed Lynn’s translation of the Book of Changes and based many of my own translations on his.

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Xunzi’s discussion of li is split into two main perspectives. One is from the perspective of nature wherein li is understood as the innate regularities of the myriad things of the universe. Second is from the perspective of human society in which li is understood as moral principles and ritual ceremonials. In terms of the former, Xunzi believes that each thing has its own li. Humans have the capacity for understanding things and the different li of things are the objects of human understanding. Through understanding the li of the myriad things of the universe, one can arrive at the understanding of heaven and earth, one can know how to order society and use the myriad things. Those who are good at learning are those who have grasped the li of things. At the same time, understanding li does not only mean understanding the li of a specific thing, this is because the li between different things acts as a mutually relating and constraining influence, so that in understanding these li, one is able to grasp the many types of relationships that exist between the li of different things. This is what is called “great li” (大理). With regard to the latter, Xunzi believes that the main content of li is ritual. Specifically, this is the maintenance of the ritual ceremonies between the elder and younger, lord and minister, father and son, brothers and husband and wife. Li and ritual are the unification of content and form. Xunzi also believes that the order of high and low and noble and lowly in society is eternal and is the existential basis of human society. When the positions of lord and minister, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife all begin and then end, end and then begin again when they are part of the same order with Heaven and Earth, and persist as long as the myriad generations—this is called the great root.2 (“The Rule of a True King” Xunzi)

As such, Xunzi says, ‘ritual is the utmost of the human way” (“Discourse on Ritual” Xunzi). Human conduct should also proceed according to li, “in general when carrying out things, establish it if it benefits li, do away with it if it does not benefit li.” (“The Achievements of Ru” Xunzi) Taking Dao models itself on what is self-so as its main theoretical idea, Daoist philosophy emphasizes what is natural. The Daoist discourse on li is represented by Zhuangzi. In the thought of Zhuangzi, what li represents is the innate characteristics of things themselves. In describing Cook Ding cutting up an ox, he says, I depend on Heaven’s unwrought perforations [天理] and strike the larger gaps, following along with the broad hollows. I go by how they already are, playing them as they lay. So my knife has never had to cut through the knotted nodes where the warp hits the weave, must les the gnarled joints of bones!3 (“The Primacy of Nourishing Life” Zhuangzi)

The cook wields his knife according to the natural constitution of the ox, going into the gaps between the bones and tendons, and following the interstices between the bones. As such there will be no damage to even the points of connection between the vessels (筋脉), the meridian (经络) and the tendons and bones, never mind the big bones! “Heaven’s unwrought perforations” (天理) here refers to the natural 2 Hutton

(2014: 75).

3 Ziporyn (2009: 22). Throughout this translation, I have often followed Brook Ziporyn’s translation

of the Zhuangzi.

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constitution of the ox’s biological make-up. Zhuangzi believes that all the different myriad things of the world possess different characteristics, thus in treating them, the sage needs to abide by their natural characteristics. He needs to employ methods of non-purposive action and the ultimate aim of Zhuangzi’s discussion of the li of the myriad things is the non-purposive action of the political sphere. In human society, Zhuangzi proposed the idea of “human li.” What is meant by human li is gentle filial duty, loyalty and integrity, pleasant enjoyment, sadness and sorrow, amongst others, which are the spontaneous real contents of human nature, Given this truth within, it exercises a spiritual efficacy without, and this is why we count it so valuable. In our relations with others, it appears according to the requirements of each case [li]: in the service of parents, as gentle, filial duty; in the service of rulers, as loyalty and integrity; in festive drinking, as pleasant enjoyment; in the performance of the mourning rites, as sadness and sorrow. (“The Old Fisherman” Zhuangzi)

From this, one can see that, although Zhuangzi’s principle of spontaneous real human nature is opposed to the Confucian morals of humaneness and righteousness and he criticized the Confucians for “not complying with li and not being examined according to dao” (“The Robber Zhi” Zhuangzi), what he really opposes is the alienation of moral principles such as humaneness and righteousness. Humaneness, righteousness, loyalty and integrity which are a reflection of people’s spontaneous natures, on the other hand, are praised. This is why Zhuangzi emphasizes that human actions must “remove wisdom and tradition and follow the li of heaven.” (“Engrained Ideas” Zhuangzi) In Mozi’s discussion of li, apart from the usual sense of seeing li as the regularity behind the existence as well as change and transformation of the myriad things, what is worth noticing is that, in the later Mohist texts, they raised the epistemological idea of the “li of names and stuff” (名实之理). (“Minor Illustrations”, Mozi) Here, it is believed that the point of argumentation lies in distinguishing the difference between right and wrong, thoroughly investigating the principle between order and chaos, elucidating the distinction between sameness and difference, and analyzing the relationship between name and reality. In this way, the relationship between harm and benefit can be dealt with and the uncertainties in knowledge resolved, so that people’s understandings accord with the reality of objects. The “li of names and stuff” here means the principle of names and reality being in accord with each other. Maintaining the “li of names and stuff” is the key to a debate. If one is in accord with the “li of names and stuff,” even if one censures the opponent’s views greatly, this would still be correct. If one is not in accord with the “li of names and stuff,” even if one censures the opponent’s views only slightly, this would still be incorrect. As such, the correctness of one’s censure does not depend on the quantity, but whether or not it accords with li. In expanding the content of li to the domain of epistemology, the Mohists contributed an important development to the concept of li, and this became the source of the school of li (理学). Li also had an important role to play for the legalists and we can take Hanfeizi as representative. Hanfezi borrowed Laozi’s concept of dao and took it to be the existential basis of the myriad things on earth. As the root and that which determines

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things, dao is realized through li, “it is after li has been determined that one can get dao” (“Explaining Laozi”, Hanfeizi) What Hanfeizi means by li are the objective characteristics of things such as their length, size, shape and weight as well as their patterns (纹理) and order (条理). One can judge and employ specific objects and affairs according to these objective li. The li of objects and affairs determine their existence and allows them to be distinguished from each other. The li which specific objects and affairs possess are specific li and reflect their own unique, specific regularities. Dao, on the other hand, is the overall regularity of the operation of the myriad things in the world and governs the li of specific things and affairs. This is why the li of the myriad things are specific li but dao is a general li. Specific li is the content of dao. The understanding of the li of things and affairs is the key to the successful accomplishment of affairs. The division of li into specific li and general li is a further deepening of the understanding of li. As we can see from the above, the Pre-Qin Confucian, Mohist, Daoist and Legalist philosophers all provided relatively systematic discussions on li. Apart from this, the pre-Qin school of Military (兵家) and the school of Guanzhong (管仲) also provided discussions on li. For example, Sun Wu write, “How to make the best of both strong and weak - that is a question involving the proper use [li] of ground.” (“The Nine Situations”, The Art of War) Sun Bin (孙膑) writes, “the pattern [li] of the world is [when things] reach their limit [they] reverse, [when things] are full to excess they will decline” and applied these theories to military affairs. The Guanzi believes that “Yin and yang is the great principle [li] of heaven and earth” (“The Four Seasons”, Guanzi) and took the changes and transformations of yin and yang as the basic regularity of the operation of heaven and earth. As the above discussion makes clear, during the pre-Qin period, li already became an extremely important concept and was given attention to by all the different schools.

13.2 Two During the Qin-Han period, the investigation into li continued apace. During this period, the Annals of Lü Buwei gave a relatively early systematic elucidation of li. As the Annals of Lü Buwei sees it, first li is the necessary momentum and direction (势) that the myriad objects must abide by. The rise and decline, increase and decrease of heaven, the straitened circumstances, impoverishment or accomplishment of people are all the manifestations of li. Heaven and earth all have different characteristics and functions, but they are all operating according to li. Second, li refers to order and righteousness (理义), which means the ethics and morals which people all must abide by. Acts such as the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent people, being despotic and treacherous are all “not knowing righteousness and li.” In this way, li is elevated to a principle which judges whether peoples’ actions accord with ethical and moral standards. Third, li is the standard for judging right from wrong and whether one’s discourse is correct or not. Fourth, li is the principle which the governance of the state should follow and the basis for the formulation of laws. With regard to the sovereign,

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it is only in respecting li and acting on this basis that one can secure the stability of the state. Not respecting li would lead to chaos in the state so that respecting li or not is related to the governance or chaos of a state. At the beginning of the Han dynasty, the Huang-Lao school was ascendant, The Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics reflects the Huang-Lao thought of the early western Han. The “Canon and Law” (经法) chapter, on the basis of summarizing Confucian, Daoist and Mohist thought, proposed the idea of the “li of heaven and earth”, the “li of human beings”, “investigation of names and li” (审查名理) and “abide by names and investigate li” (循名究理) amongst others. The “Canon and Law” chapter says that the seasons’ succession of each other, and the circulation of the sun, moon and stars, all respect a certain regularity, and this is the li of heaven and earth. The flowing or obstruction of the li of heaven and earth as well as its ascendancy or decline is reflected in human society as the li of human beings. Whether li flows or is obstructed effects the governance and chaos, survival or death of a society, thus, “the minister not being close to his lord, the inferior not being close to his superior, peoples of different trades not being attentive to their tasks and affairs, this is going against the li of society.” (ibid.) This kind of phenomenon that is contrary to li must be avoided. The “Canon and Law” chapter also explored the question of names and li from an epistemological perspective. What this investigated was the relationship between names and actuality. In giving different names to different things and affairs, one can make distinctions amongst them. In order to really understand things and affairs, however, it is not enough to merely distinguish the differences between names (名) and designations (号), one must also investigate the li that is behind names and designations, so that names and li are combined. It is only in “investigating names and li” (审察名理), and “abiding by names and investigating li” (循名究理) that one can achieve an accurate understanding of the regularity of things and affairs. Specifically speaking, this is to understand the right and wrong, origin and end of the developmental process of things and affairs. It is only thus that one can “get the actuality of names and li” (得名理之诚). The discussion of names and li which the “Canon and Law” provided, inherited and continued the Mohist discussion of names and li. The great Confucian of the Western Han, Dong Zhongshu, introduced yinyang discourse into Confucianism with the aim of maintaining Han dynasty rule. With heaven (tian, 天) as the highest concept, he established a philosophical system whereby human beings correlate with heaven’s regularities (人副天数) and whereby human beings and heaven mutually respond to each other (天人感应). Dong Zhongshu believed that the succession of yinyang and the four seasons is the li of heaven and earth and exemplified the innate regularity of the operation of heaven and earth. The li of the myriad things abides by and is rooted in the li of yinyang. At the same time, Dong Zhongshu believes that heaven has a will and is the biggest commander of the universe. The ethics and morals of human society are all rooted in heaven and this function of heaven’s command is manifested through the li of yinyang. As yang is guiding and superior and yin is following and inferior, the lord, father and husband are guiding and superior whereas the minister, the son and wife are following and inferior. The moral principles of humaneness and righteousness in human society

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are also formulated on the basis of heaven’s will. This discourse applies the li of heaven and earth to the domain of human society. In taking the will of heaven as authoritative, Dong Zhongshu is, from a theological and teleological perspective, proving that the ethics and morality of human society accords with principle. Dong Zhongshu’s thesis that earth and human beings mutually respond to each other met with criticism from Wang Chong of the Eastern Han. Wang Chong believes that all the change and transformation of the myriad things is due to the mutual influence on each other of yinyang. What the so-called li refers to is the regularity which the operation of the sun, moon and stars abide by as well as the natural veins that the mountains and rivers hills and valleys possess. The generation of the myriad things is the result of the interaction between the principal vital energies of heaven and earth. It is a process that is so of itself and so heaven does not have an intention and will not warn people through disasters and strange phenomena. The discourse of heaven and human beings mutually influencing each other “does not understand the li of the vital energy of things.” (“Change and Movement”, Arguments Weighed) During the early Wei-Jin period, Liu Shao’s (刘劭) work, Treatise on Human Character (人物志), set the standards for describing and judging human character. In Treatise on Human Character, Liu Shao categorized li into four kinds: the li of dao, the li of affairs, the li of righteousness and the li of emotions. The li of dao referred to the regularity of the change and transformation of heaven and earth. The li of affairs referred to the principle of legal institutions for managing affairs. The li of righteousness referred to the stipulations of ritual teachings. The li of emotions referred to the key which determines the changes and transformations of human emotions. Treatise on Human Character thoroughly explained which li becomes which kind of person, When the nature is calm and the thoughts abstract and subtle and can connect with ziran, this belongs in the family of the li of dao. When the nature is alert and penetrating, pragmatic with respect to resolving issues, competent at handling complex and pressing matters, this belongs to the family of the li of affairs. When the nature is harmonious and calm, competent at discussing ritual learnings, can distinguish between the good and bad, this belongs to the family of the li of righteousness. When the nature is sharp-witted, is able to infer a someone else’s motives and internal state of mind, can adapt to its changes, this belongs to the family of the li of the emotions. (“Capacity and Principle”, Treatise on Human Character)

As such, the standard of Liu Shao’s evaluations of human characters is the relationship between names and actuality and this opened the way to the Wei-Jin distinguishing of names and the analysis of li (辨名析理). After Liu Shao, Neo-Daoism became all the rage and the exploration of the concept of li became more abstract and became the intellectual fashion of “obscure li” (玄理). The content of “obscure li” not only reflects the principle (名理) of the relationship between names (名) and corresponding object (实) but more generally refers to the contemporary distinction between being and non-being, root and branch, one and many, movement and stillness. In this way, the discussion of li was elevated to a new height. What is worth paying attention to is the discussion on li from the pioneer of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, Wang Bi, and that of the person who brought it to maturity, Guo Xiang.

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Distinguishing names and analyzing li (辨名析理) is a key methodology of NeoDaoism. Wang Bi said, “If one cannot distinguish amongst names, it is impossible to discuss li with such a person. If one cannot determine how names apply, it is impossible to discuss actualities with such a person.” (“Outline Introduction to the Laozi”) As such, in discussing the obscure li, one must first distinguish the specific content of what the name designates. It is only after one has determined names and actuality that one can analyze the order and principle contained in the name. Li here refers to the specific principles that names and concepts contain. Wang bi also sees li as the root cause of the operation and change and transformation of things and affairs, No thing ever behaves haphazardly but necessarily follows its own principle. To unite things, there is a fundamental regulator [li]; to integrate them, there is a primordial generator. Therefore things are complex but not chaotic, multitudinous but not confused.4 (“Clarifying the Judgments” General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou)

The reason why things and affairs proceed according to an ordered sequence is because li makes the necessary arrangements. Li is the objective necessity behind phenomena and the reason for why things are as they are. In this sense, li has the significance of the root-body of things and affairs. The greatest characteristic of Guo Xiang’s discussion of li is to take li as a kind of principle and necessity (理则). For example, the “li of heaven” or “li of mandate”, “li of things”, “utmost li” and “constant li” are all manifestations of the implications of necessary nature. All of these can, furthermore, be comprehensively called the “li of ziran.” The li of ziran is the necessary li. The contents of his discussion are as follows. First, the self-transformation and production of things and affairs have a necessary nature; they do not depend on any external factors. This is the li of the self-production of the myriad things and cannot be changed through human artifice, they can only be complied with. Second, the nature of things and the compliance with their own natures is decided by li. Third, Guo Xiang believes that there is an objective mutual reliance and complementarity between things and affairs; even if their intentions were not so, the effects are thus, this is the li of ziran. Fourth, all the manifestations of objective things and affairs are determined by li. On the macro level, this is the prosperity, decline, success and failure of a state, on the micro level, this is a person’s birth, encounters in one’s life, nature, emotions wisdom and competence. Even movement and stillness, starting and ending are decided by li. Apart from this, Guo Xiang sees the order of ruler and minister, superior and inferior and a son’s love for his parents as manifestations of li. From the above, we can see that Guo Xiang determined li as an objectively existing necessity. Li encompasses the myriad things of heaven and earth and every aspect of society. Everything is arranged by li and are manifestations of li. Guo Xiang’s discourse allowed the philosophical meaning of li to become more prominent and had a direct influence on Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism’s elucidation of li. During the Wei-Jin period, the concept of li was borrowed by Buddhism to refer to the s´u¯ nya principle, or law, i.e. the unreality of the ego and phenomena (空理). 4 Lynn

(1994: 25).

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Daosheng (道生), for example, said that “observing the li of union of cause and effect and realizing the emptiness of things and thereby reaching nirvana (尽泥洹).” (“The Disciples”, Commentary on the Vimalakirti Sutra) Li here refers to the s´u¯ nya principle of cause and effect (因缘) and combining (和合). The basis of becoming Buddha is the understanding of the s´u¯ nya principle. During the Sui-Tang period, the different Buddhist schools stood in great numbers, and each school expounded greatly on li, notably the Huayan school’s opposition between li and phenomena. They proposed the concept of noumena (理) and phenomena (事), and used the concept of li to refer to the real Buddha nature, and affairs to refer to the phenomena world, “phenomena are what obstructs the heart-mind due to sights; li is the universal Buddha nature.” (One Hundred Issues relating to the Meaning of the Avatam . saka S¯utra) They proposed the famous idea of the four dharma realms so as to explore the relationship between the root-body (本体) of Buddha nature and phenomena. The four dharma realms refer to “first, the phenomenal realm, with differentiation, second noumenal with unity (理法), third, both noumenal [理] and phenomenal [事] are interdependent, fourth, phenomena are also interdependent.” (Book 1, Profound Mirror on the Avatam . saka Dharma Realm) The phenomenal realm refers to the real world. The noumenal with unity realm refers to the realm of the root-body of Buddha. The noumenal and phenomenal are interdependent realms that refer to the unobstructed coalescence of the realm of Buddha nature and the phenomenal. The phenomenal are also interdependent realm refers to the unobstructed coalescence of reality. The discourse of the four dharma realms is not only the Huayan school’s explanation of the relationship between phenomena, but it is also an intuition of the method that the root-body of Buddha abides by. The relationship between noumena and phenomena that Huayan expounded upon allowed the concept of li to gain a richer content.

13.3 Three By the Song period, faced with the challenge from Buddhism, the Cheng brothers on the basis of absorbing the traditional Chinese cultures of Confucianism and Daoism and combining Buddhist culture, established a philosophical system that took li as its highest concept. Under the aegis of contending with Buddhism, li was raised to the height of a cosmological root-body and became the basis of Confucian ethical principles. From this, the school of li was born, and it came to have a profound influence. In the course of the development of the school of li, the relationship between li and vital energy, li and human nature, li and desire, li and heart-mind amongst others were explored in detail. The highest concept in the Cheng brothers’ system was li and li means the heavenly li. Li or heavenly li is the root-body of the myriad things of the universe, which is the basis for the existence of the myriad things. It is universal and objective, it is the same everywhere and does not exist or cease to exist because of human will. Li is not only the root-body of the myriad things and is the ethics and morality of human society. The righteousness between father and son, lord and minister are

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all determined by heavenly li as well as all ritual ceremonials. Here, an unchanging heavenly li is found for the ethical principles of everyday life and so establishing its root-body basis. The Cheng brothers also explored the relationship between li, vital energy, heartmind and desire. With regard to the relationship between li and vital energy, the Cheng brothers believed that li precedes vital energy. Li is dao so that li is the basis of vital energy. The vital energy of yinyang is below physical form, whilst li is above physical form; li is thus first nature whilst vital energy is second nature. With regard to the relationship between li and heart-mind, the Cheng brothers believe that the heartmind is the subject of understanding and that li is the object of understanding. When li exists in people, it is heart-mind so that heart-mind and li are one—this thesis became the source of the school of heart-mind. With regard to the relationship between li and human nature, the Cheng brothers believed that “when this li is realised in human beings it is human nature” (斯理也, 成之在人则为性). (Book 1, Explanations of the Classics by the Two Chengs) As such human nature and li are united into one. With regard to the relationship between li and desire, the Cheng brothers believed that the heavenly li is purely good but human nature is bad and so they are opposed to each other “when human nature is indulged, heavenly li is extinguished” (Book 2, Purified Words of the Two Chengs) As such, in order to preserve heavenly li, one must extinguish human desire. Through the Cheng brothers’ exposition, li gained a root-body meaning and became a concept that meant the same as heaven and dao. From this was established the school of li which took li as central to its philosophical system. Zhu Xi inherited the Cheng brothers’ discussion on li and absorbed Zhang Zai’s discourse on vital energy and fitted it into his own philosophical system. For Zhu Xi, vital energy follows li and he constructed a colossal philosophical system with li and vital energy as its infrastructure. Zhu Xi’s discussion of li reached an unprecedented height and holds a particularly important position in the historical development of the concept of li. Like the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi also took li as the root-body of the myriad things, Within the universe there is one li. When heaven gets it, it becomes heaven, when earth gets it, it becomes earth. The things that are born in heaven and earth each receive it and becomes nature [xing]. (“Reading the Main Rules”, Book 70, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection)

The existence of li precedes the myriad things so that without li, there would not be the myriad things, Before heaven and earth, principle could already be identified. Since there was this principle so there was heaven and earth. If there was no principle, then there would be no heaven and earth, no people and objects since they would all lack the means. (Book 1, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

Li is what transcends the myriad things of heaven and earth and is eternally existing, “if the mountains and rivers all happened to be destroyed, li would still be here.” (ibid.) Li is not only the root-body (本体) of the myriad things; it is also the basis of the order between noble and lowly and other moral principles,

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Of all the affairs in the world none is without li. Lords and ministers have the li of lords and ministers. Fathers and sons have the li of fathers and sons. Husbands and wives, elder and younger brother and friends and even all acts of life, handling affairs and objects, none of these are without li. (“Second Letter to the Emperor in the Informal Palace during the Jia Yin year”, Book 14, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection)

Furthermore, When affairs did not exist, li already existed. For example, before lords and ministers existed, the li and lords and ministers already existed. Before fathers and sons existed, there was already the li of father and son. (Book 95, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

As can be seen, li is the ultimately root-body and basis of moral principles. Other moral principles such as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are all the content of heavenly li and manifestation. From this, moral principles gained a necessary and absolute nature which accorded with li. Opposed to the li of root-body (本体) is vital energy. Li is the root-body of the myriad things and vital energy is the material for the production of things. Zhu Xi explored in great depth the relationship between li and vital energy and his discussions on the topic are composed of the following dimensions. First, li is root (本) and vital energy is branch (末). Li as that which is above physical form is the root and vital energy as that which is below physical form is the branch: “there being this li then there is qi, but li is the basis [本].” (Book 1, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Second, li is inseparable from vital energy. Although li is root and vital energy is branch, “there being this li then there is this qi; there being this qi then there is this li” (Book 39, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), “there does not exist a vital energy without li in the world, and there does not exist a li without vital energy” (Book 1, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). Second, li resides within vital energy, without vital energy then li would have no place to settle, thus “if vital energy operates then li also operates, the two depend on each other and have never departed from each other” (Book 94, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). Third, li precedes vital energy, Zhu Xi believes that although there is originally not a question of whether li or vital energy takes precedence, one must make a distinction of priority. As such, that li precedes vital energy is not a genetic precedence but a logical one. With regard to the relationship between li and the myriad things, Zhu Xi uses “li is one but manifestations are many” (理一分殊). Here, li refers to the great ultimate, To trace its root from its branch, it is the difference between the five phases, but this is [in turn] based on the vital energy of yinyang. Yinyang is ultimately based on li. From the perspective of the unity of the myriad things it is but one great ultimate. From its root to its branch, it is based on just the one li but the myriad things take each division [of li] as its form [体]. Thus, within the myriad things, each contains the great ultimate. (“Principle, Human Nature and Mandate”, Commentary on Penetrating the Book of Changes)

Through “li is one but manifestations are many”, Zhu Xi emphasized the determining effect that li as root-body on specific things and objects and thereby combined li as root-body and specific things and affairs. As Zhu Xi took li to be the eternal root-body which exists independently of objective affairs and phenomena and each thing possesses its own li, on the matter of

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epistemology, Zhu Xi advocated getting close to things and exhausting their li. Once things are investigated to an extent, then one will become suddenly enlightened and understand the myriad things as well as one’s original heart-mind. The understanding of external li, however, is not necessarily related to moral nature and self-cultivation. Although the morals of human society have a certain root-body basis, they cannot be transformed into the moral awareness that is innate within the self. As such, li and heart-mind are split into two, into the way of study and inquiry (道文学) and venerating moral nature (遵德行). In opposition to this, Lu Jiuyuan proposed the idea that “heart-mind is li”. Lu Jiuyuan admits that there is an externally, eternally and objectively existing li but he also emphasizes that human moral nature is of the same nature as that objective li. “What heaven has given me is this heart-mind. All human-beings possess this heart-mind, all heart-minds possess this principle, the heart-mind is principle.” (“To Li Zai, II”, Book 11, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan) “Heart-mind is li” refers to the fact that it through according with one’s moral heart-mind that one realizes li, thus li is within the heart-mind. The heart-mind and li are not separate things but one, so that understanding one’s heart-mind is understanding heavenly li. As such, the moral principles that are represented by heavenly li is rooted in the human heart-mind, so that human moral principles gain a kind of self-awareness. It is for this reason that with regard to self-cultivation, Lu Jiuyuan proposes discovering one’s original heart-mind in order to “order one’s spirit, and be a master of oneself” (“Recorded Conversations II” Book 35, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan) The school of heartmind which Lu Jiuyuan founded transformed the objective and external li of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers into a subjective and internal spiritual self-awareness and so overcame the dualism of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers. Chen Liang (陈亮) and Ye Shi (叶适), were contemporaries of Zhu Xi, and were the representative figures of the Yongjia school (功利学派) and they were opposed to the “idle talk” (空谈) discussion of the li of human nature and mandate. They believed the li is not independently existing but must rely on things and affairs. Chen Liang, for example, said, “what fills the universe are objects, what we daily use are affairs” (Explanations of Themes from the Classics5 ). Ye Shi says, “the li is heaven and earth, yin and yang is most endangered by being discussed through empty talk.” (“Book of Sui”, Prologue of Learning and Taking Notes6 ) “Human nature, mandate and morality, none exists independently of things.” (“Great Learning”, Collected Works of Shuixin) Chen Liang and Ye Shi were opponents of the Cheng-Zhu school.

5 经书发题 6 习学记言序目,隋书.

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13.4 Four Wang Yangming of the Ming dynasty inherited and continued Lu Jiuyuan’s view that “there is no thing/event outside the heart-mind” (心外无物) and “there is no principle outside the heart-mind” (心外无理) and emphasized that there are “no objects outside of heart-mind”, “no li outside of heart-mind” and proposed that “the moral knowing of my heart-mind is what is designated as heavenly li” (Instructions for Practical Living). The li or heavenly li that Wang Yangming talks of mainly refers to moral principles. What he means by moral knowing is our innate moral understanding, Knowledge is the root-body of the heart-mind. The heart-mind is self-so able to know. When it perceives the parents, it self-so knows that one should be filial. When it perceives the elder brother, it self-so knows that one should be respectful. And when it perceives a child fall into a well, it self-so knows that one should be commiserative. This is moral knowing.7 (Part I, Instructions on Practical Living, 8).

As such, external moral principles are not necessarily external to one’s heart-mind but rather the moral intuition that we already possess. Heavenly li is originally possessed in one’s heart-mind, the moral knowing of the heart-mind is heavenly principle. On the basis of “moral knowing is heavenly principle” Wang Yangming reinterpreted investigating things to extend knowledge: What is designated as extending knowing and investigating things is to extend my heart-mind to each and every thing. The moral knowing of my heart-mind is the same as heavenly principle. To extend the moral knowing of my heart-mind to each and every thing, then all things attain their li. To extend the moral knowing of my heart-mind is to extend understanding. For all things to attain their li, this is the investigation of things. (Part II, Instructions on Practical Living, 135)

According to this explanation, the li of all individual things is within the moral knowing of my heart-mind and is the external manifestation of the moral knowing of my heart-mind. Moral knowing thus becomes the root-body of the myriad things. As such, Wang Yangming says, “my clear intelligence [灵明] is the master of heaven and earth and spiritual beings.” (Part III, Instructions on Practical Living, 337) He said that moral knowing “is the spirit of creating and transforming and this spirit creates heaven and earth, realizes ghosts and gods. They all arise from this. Truly nothing can be equal to this.” ( Part II, Instructions on Practical Living, 261) Moral knowing is the root-body of the universe. This is not to say that moral knowing ordered the myriad things to be made but that they possess their meaning and value because of humanity’s moral knowing, as such it can be said that “without the moral knowing of human beings heaven and earth could not be heaven and earth.” (ibid) What is more important is that in using the moral knowing of the heart-mind to explain li, heavenly li and the human heart-mind is combined together and so an internal standard for moral realization established. Through acting on the basis of moral knowing, all actions will be spontaneously in accord with morality. In this way, the moral nature 7 Chan

(1963: 15), modified.

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of human beings is elevated. Wang Yangming’s explanation of li through moral knowing further advanced Lu Jiuyuan’s idea that “heart-mind is li” and so pushed the school of heart-mind to its peak. Wang Yangming’s contemporary Luo Qinshun (罗钦顺) advocated the ChengZhu school of li and was opposed to Wang Yangming’s school of heart-mind. In his philosophical discussions, he differed from the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi. The Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi took li to be the basis of vital energy, but Luo Qinshun took vital energy to be the basis of li. Luo Qinshun believed that, “the which penetrates heaven and earth and connects past and present is nothing but vital energy, which is unitary.”8 (Book I, Knowledge Painfully Acquired) Vital energy is a ceaselessly circulating order which never loses its orderliness, The coming together of vital energy is the li of coming together. The dissipating of vital energy is the li of dissipating. It is merely the fact that there is coming together and dissipating that we refer to it as li. Inferentially, it is the same in the case of the growth and decline of all creation and transformation and the beginning and end of all affairs and things.9 (Book II, Knowledge Painfully Acquired)

Thus, li “depends on vital energy in order to exist or attaches to vital energy in order to operate.” (Book I, Knowledge Painfully Acquired) Li cannot exist apart from vital energy. Luo Qinshun held a critical opinion of the Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming school of heart-mind. He was of the opinion that although li can be possessed by the heart-mind, li is not the heart-mind itself, “the heart-mind is the numinous clarity of human beings. Human nature [性] is the principle of life [生理] of human beings. The place that li resides is called heart-mind. That which the heart-mind possesses is called human nature, but the two cannot be confused and considered as one.” (ibid) Although the heart-mind and li are “always inseparable, yet they should not be confused.” (ibid.) With regard to Wang Yangming’s thesis that “moral knowing is li,” Luo Qinshun says, Today one takes moral knowing as heavenly li, but do [we] know if the myriad things of heaven and earth all have this moral knowing or not? Heaven and earth are high, it is not easy to see them clearly and penetratingly. I have never seen moral knowing in the mountains, rivers and expansive earth. The myriad things are so many that it is hard to enumerate them one by one, but in commonly seen things such as the grass, wood, metal and stone, I have never seen them having moral knowing. (“Letter One in Answer to Ouyang Chengchong”, Book 1, Surviving Works10 )

Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming’s school of heart-mind’s thesis of “heart-mind is li” is premised on people’s moral intuitions, but Luo Qinshun’s criticism of the Lu-Wang school of heart-mind is premised on epistemology, and this reflects their different philosophical positions. Wang Tingxiang is a philosopher from the Ming dynasty who had a highly critical spirit. In his philosophy, he inherited Zhang Zai’s discourse of qi as origin (气本论) 8 Bloom

(1987: 58), modified. (1987: 148), modified. 10 兄答欧阳少司成崇一存稿卷. 9 Bloom

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and believed that vital energy is the origins of all things. He believed that vital energy possesses li and so vital energy is the existential basis of li, that if there is vital energy, then there is li, and that li is born from vital energy. In the process of its being born and transformed, the myriad things of the world are all different, thus li must follow the myriad things and manifest different forms, Between heaven and earth, one vital energy produces and reproduces, sometimes it is constant, sometimes is it changing. The myriad things are all different, thus if there is one vital energy, then there is one li. If there is a myriad vital energy, then there is a myriad li. The vulgar Confucians of superficial learning [世儒] speak of one li giving rise to a myriad li, this is too one-sided and on the wrong track. Heaven has the li of heaven, earth has the li of earth, humans have the li of humans, things have the li of things, the obscure have the li of the obscure, the bright have the li of the bright. Said comprehensively, the differences of each is due to the transformation of vital energy. (Part I, Refined Discussions)

On this basis, Wang Yingxiang criticizes the Cheng-Zhu school of taking li as the basis of vital energy to be “perverse and confused” and believed instead that, “the myriad li all come from vital energy, there is no li that is emptily suspended on its own.” From the many forms in which vital energy manifests itself, Wang Tingxiang recognized the multifaceted nature of li and maintained the primacy of vital energy.

13.5 Five In the Ming-Qing period, the person who summarized traditional philosophy, Wang Fuzhi, in absorbing and criticizing the thought of his forebears, summarized the concept of li. Wang Fuzhi believed that li has two dimensions. First, it refers to the well-orderedness (条理) of the myriad things, and is mainly manifested in the relationship between li and vital energy. Second, it refers to how life gains the principle of life (生理), and is the innate content of human nature. With regard to the former, Wang Fuzhi believes that the myriad things are all constituted by vital energy. The antagonistic action between yinyang produces the myriad things. Li is the well-orderedness (条理) of the rise and fall, sinking and floating, movement and stillness of vital energy. With regard to the relationship between li and vital energy, Wang Fuzhi opposed the Cheng-Zhu splitting into two of vital energy and li and proposed the idea of the inseparability of li and vital energy on two counts. First, li relies on vital energy, it is only by relying on vital energy that it can become the li of vital energy; li cannot exist apart from vital energy. Following this, li and vital energy are mixed together. Li is the li of vital energy and vital energy is the vital energy of li. Due to their intermixing, there is no question of their respective primacies. Following this, vital energy determines li. Wang Fuzhi says, there is of course only one vital energy [as different vital energies have different li]. If there are different [别] li then there are different vital energies. Fundamentally speaking, however, it is only when there are different vital energies that there are different li. If there are no different vital energies, then how could there be li? (Book 6, Collected Works of Chuanshan)

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In essence, this is making li follow vital energy and so removing the superior position that li had in the Cheng-Zhu school of li. With regard to the latter, Wang Fuzhi sees li as the innately possessed content of human nature. In this regard, li is manifested as the morals of humaneness and righteousness as well as the desire for material things. Human nature is the li of life. If we are all human then we are no different with regard to this innately possessed li. Thus, even the most stupid cannot be without the li of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The desire for sounds, sights, smells and tastes cannot be abandoned in even the wisest. All of the above [the virtues as well as desires] are called human nature. (Book 3, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

Seeing as the morals of humaneness and righteousness as well as sounds, smells and tastes are all possessed by human nature, Wang Fuzhi believes that the three guiding principles and five constants (三纲五常) are the moral principles that “people must abide by.” These are all “what my heart-mind innately possess, that is, the li which is produced simultaneously with my original human nature.” (Book 17, Comments on the Four Books) As such, human desire is in accordance with li and li resides within desire. Wang Fuzhi is not, however, advocating the indulgence of one’s desires, but rather in advocating desire’s accordance with li, Simultaneously, he is emphasizing the division of public and private between li and desire. The desires that accord with moral standards are heavenly li, those that are opposed are private desires, thus li must govern desires. Wang Fuzhi’s discussion of the relationship between li and vital energy is a criticism of the Cheng-Zhu school of li and their taking li as the root-body of the universe. As it is also an exegesis on the relationship between li and desire, he is also criticizing the Cheng-Zhu idea of forbidding desire in “preserving heavenly principle and extinguishing human desire.” After Wang Fuzhi, Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen, through their own understanding of li, continued to criticize the school of li. Yan Yuan opposed Song Confucianism’s superficial and empty discussion of human nature, mandate, righteousness and li. He advocated “ordering and being useful to the world” (经世致用) and so his philosophy has been called “practical learning” (实学). Yan Yuan believes that the myriad things are born from both li and vital energy. Li determines the nature of a thing and vital energy constitutes its form and material. Li and vital energy are mutually dependent and cannot be separated. As such, the investigation into li must be on the level of the specific things and affairs; one must experience them for oneself and not go the way of the Song Confucians who merely talked and disregarded action. Due to this reason, Yan Yuan advocated “practicing culture [文], carrying out actions, personally experiencing, being useful, ultimately producing practical results for heaven and earth” (“Preserving Human Nature”, Book 1, Four Essays on Preservation). It is only as such that “the common people can have peace and contentment, and things can flourish” (ibid.). Yan Yuan’s advocating for ordering and being useful to the world highlights the very different opinions of the Cheng-Zhu school and has great significance for correcting the impractical and superficial state of scholarship. Against the root-body li of Cheng-Zhu metaphysics, Dai Zhen proposed the “pattern [li] for separating things” (分理). He believed that li is not emptily suspended but

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is the specific nature of each individual thing and affair. Different things and affairs have their particular and different qualities. It is precisely the quality of things and affairs that distinguishes between things. This quality of things and affairs is li, thus li is the basis for distinguishing amongst different things and affairs. As such, things have different patterns and textures, this is their “li of division.” It is precisely this “li of division” that allows things and affairs to be ordered and not chaotic. In this sense, the li of division is manifested as the well-ordered li (条理) of things and affairs. In explaining li through the “pattern [li] for separating things”, li is understood as the original quality of things and affairs, so that li and specific things and affairs are more intimately integrated and so correcting the dualism of the Cheng-Zhu system. Dai Zhen also discussed the relationship between li and the emotions and desire. Dai Zhen believes that human emotions and desire is “the spontaneity of blood and qi and of knowing” (“Capacities” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius) and so is in accordance with li. With regard to the emotions and li, li is the li of the emotions (情理) and so the emotions are inseparable from li. The Song Confucians, however, separated emotions and li and took li to be good and the emotions to be bad, and for Dai Zhen, this was tantamount to killing people with li. With regard to desire and li, li and desire are, for Dai Zhen, united. Dai Zhen believes that “because this bodily self exists, there are desires of sound, color, smell, and taste”11 (“Capacities” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius). Desire is innate within humans and is a necessary pre-requisite for human survival and so desires cannot be extinguished. Desires, however, also cannot be indulged in and li is the standard which moderates human desire. Heaven’s principle [li] is to restrain one’s desires and not “give the utmost indulgence to human desire.” Hence desires cannot be indulged to the utmost, not that one cannot have them. To have and yet restrain them, making sure they neither exceed nor fall short of [appropriate] feelings: can it be said that this is not heavenly?12 (“Principle” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius)

Here, in criticizing Song Confucianism’s prohibition of desires, li is also united with desires. The Cheng-Zhu school of principle also elevated the social order of superior and inferior and moral principles into an absolute heavenly li. What is meant here by heavenly principle is but a tool of oppression that the noble, elder and more elevated use to oppress the inferior, younger or inferior and Dai Zhen fiercely criticized this phenomenon, When the respected invoke principle to censure the lowly, or the old invoke principle to censure the young, or the noble invoke principle to censure the lowly, or the old invoke principle to censure the young, or the noble invoke principle to censure the base, even if they are mistaken it is called compliance [with principle]; but when the lowly, the young, or the base invoke principle to contend with them, even if they are right it is called rebellion. On account of this, those below cannot rely on the common feelings and desires of all under heaven and make them known to those above. When someone above invokes principle to 11 Ewell 12 Ewell

(1990: 309). (1990: 158), modified.

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censure someone below him, the faults of the one below are [regarded by] everyone as too numerous to count. When a man dies by law there are still some who pity him; but if he dies by principle, who will pity him?13 (“Principle” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius)

Dai Zhen’s sharp criticisms profoundly exposed the school of principle’s suppression of the human heart-mind and its role in maintaining the traditional governance. The exegesis which Dai Zhen gave to li and his analysis of the li and the emotions not only enriched the content of li but interpreted li and desires as not sharply opposed but as complementary. This allowed li and the emotions and desires to be united. This provided a sharp criticism of the school of li and had a liberating effect. In conclusion to the above, the concept of li experienced a developmental process which transformed its most ancient meaning into a concept of philosophical significance. This process involved the exegesis of the Pre-Qin, Han and Wei-Jin period. By the Song dynasty, with the Cheng brothers’ as representative, the elevation of the concept to a cosmological height allowed for the establishment of a philosophical system centred on li. This system had a profound influence on the history of Chinese philosophy and was explored in great depth via the relationship between li and vital energy, li and heart-mind, li and human nature, li and desire. In this way, the philosophical significance of li was elevated to a new level. At the same time, the school of heart-mind arose, as well as the Ming-Qing criticism of the school of li, and this allowed the investigation of li to be more thorough and profound. We can, therefore, say that li threads through the beginning and end of Chinese philosophy and is one of the most important concepts for understanding Chinese philosophy.

References Bloom, Irene. 1987. Knowledge painfully acquired: the K‘un chih chi. New York: Columbia University Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Ewell, John Woodruff. Jr. 1990. Reinventing the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777). Dissertation. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Ziporyn, Brook. 2009. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.

13 Ewell

(1990: 152).

Chapter 14

Vital Energy (qi, 气)

Threading through the entirety of Chinese philosophy, qi is one of the most extensively used and important concepts in Chinese philosophy. As a word, qi appeared very early on and was already seen in the oracle bone scripts and its original meaning denoted the vapours of clouds. It was only later that it evolved into a philosophical concept, referring to the refined and miniscule elements which constitute the myriad things of heaven and earth, thereby producing refined qi (精气), yin qi (阴气), yang qi (阳气) and principal qi (元气) and such related philosophical concepts. Natural, social and mental phenomena are often explicated from the perspective of qi.

14.1 One As early as the Shang and Zhou dynasties, qi was already being used to explain natural phenomena. In the second year of King You of Zhou (周幽王), the grand scribe (太史) used qi to explain earthquakes: The qi of heaven and earth do not lose their positions. If they lose their positions, then it is because human action has interfered with it. Yang lies hidden and cannot come out because it is constrained by yin and so cannot evaporate, and so there was an earthquake. Today, the three rivers [Jing经, Wei渭, Luo洛] have had earthquakes because yang lost its position and was suppressed by yin. (“Discourses of Zhou A” Discourses of the States)

The qi of heaven and earth here refers to the yang qi and yin qi, when yang qi loses its suitable position and is suppressed and cannot evaporate, earthquakes are the result. This is the earliest record of using the effect of yinyang acting upon each other to explain natural phenomena. The Zuo Zhuan further proposed the idea of the “six qi’ which refers to yin, yang, wind, rain, gloominess and brightness. It related the six qi to the five tastes, colours, sounds as well as bodily ailments. The decline and growth of the six qi become the order of the six seasons. If one of the qi is too overabundant, then it will lead to corresponding illness in human bodies. The changes in the human emotions of © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_14

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love, hate, joy, anger, sorrow and joy are all produced from the six qi, and even the determination of rituals and laws in human society is directly related to qi. From this, we can see that in using the six qi to explain nature, society, as well the changes in as illnesses as well in emotions, an attempt is made to make the six qi into the foundation for all these phenomena. The pre-Qin Confucians also discuss qi, but in the philosophy of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, there is a great divergence with respect to what it means. Confucius talks about qi in its conventional sense; the qi he refers to is the blood and qi of human beings, or the tone (qi) of one’s speech, and does not contain any philosophical significance. Mencius, however, from the perspective of moral cultivation, refers to his “flood-like qi” and he says of himself that he is “good at cultivating my flood-like qi.” Specifically speaking, flood-like qi fills one’s body, and through the moral cultivation, it can fill the space between heaven and earth. The cultivation of flood-like qi must be complemented with righteousness and dao or otherwise, it would shrink. The flood-like qi which Mencius refers to, therefore, is not a concrete material element, but rather a moral demeanour or quality (气质) and moral spirit. Xunzi believes that qi is the qi of nature and believes that the production of the myriad things is due to the mutual acting upon each other of yin and yang thus leading to the different changes and transformations of the myriad things. “When heaven and earth unite, then the myriad creatures are born. When yin and yang interact, then changes and transformations arise.” (“Discourse on Ritual” Xunzi) Abnormal natural phenomena such as stars falling, and trees groaning are all the result of the mutual responsiveness of the qi of yin and yang. Mencius used qi to talk about the cultivation of moral character and Xunzi used qi to talk about the change and transformation of the myriad things, this reflects the differences in their philosophies. The pre-Qin Daoist philosophers Laozi and Zhuangzi saw qi as the element that constituted the myriad things. Laozi says, “dao generates one, one generates two, two generates three and three generates the myriad things. The myriad things carry yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms. And blends these qi together to make them harmonious.” (Daodejing 42) It is normally accepted that the one Laozi refers to is the mixed and undifferentiated qi, qi itself contains the two dimensions of yin and yang, that is, yang qi and yin qi. It is due to the mutual acting upon one another of yang and yin qi that the myriad things are created. Thus, the myriad things also contain the two opposed natures of yin qi and yang qi united into one harmonious whole. Zhuangzi believes that, the yinyang qi are the most basic state of qi and uses the coming together and dissipation of qi to explain a person’s life and death. He believes that, “life is due to the coming together of qi. When it comes together there is life, when it dissipates then there is death.” (“Knowing Journeys North”, Zhuangzi) The life and destruction of the myriad things is the result of the coming together and dissipation of qi. In this sense, “the myriad things are one”, “there is one qi that flows in all under heaven” (“Knowing Journeys North” Zhuangzi). It is because dao is the highest concept, the origin of the universe in the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi and because qi is the element that constitutes the myriad things, that qi becomes a medium which connects dao with the myriad things.

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The Guanzi, reflecting the school of Guan Zhong, understood qi to be refined qi (精气) and also called it essence (精). Refined qi can move, change and transform and is the refined and microscopic material element that constitutes the myriad things. Refined qi has no form and appearance but flows through heaven and earth. The five grains, the arrayed stars, humans and the myriad things all receive refined qi and are born. Refined essence is the root of the existence of all lives. “When there is qi then there is life, when there is no qi then there is death, what lives does so due to its qi” (“Cardinal Sayings”, Guanzi). Refined qi is also split into yin and yang, the change and transformation of the four season and the growth and decline of the myriad things is the result of the change and transformation of qi. The Guanzi initiated the discourse of refined qi in Chinese philosophy. When the Ten Wings writes that “refined essence becomes objects” (Commentary on the Appended Phrases A), it is building upon the discourse of refined qi of the Guanzi. The Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor which was compiled during the Warring State and Han period inherited and continued the discourse on qi of the pre-Qin. It not only used qi to explain the production of the myriad things but applied the discourse of qi to Chinese medicine and correlated the five phases with the coordinates to explain the functions of the human body and regularity of its movements. It also used qi to explain the changes in one’s moods and psychology as well as causes for the production of illnesses. On this basis, it applied qi discourse to the diagnosis and treatment of illnesses, and thus forming the qi centred Chinese medicine.

14.2 Two During the Han dynasty, qi discourse was further advanced. The Huainanzi further developed Daoist cosmology and used qi to explain the formation of the myriad things. Dong Zhongshu endowed qi with the emotions and established a discourse of the mutual responsiveness between humans and heaven. Wang Chong used the concept of principal qi to explain the formation of the universe and so formed the philosophy of “spontaneous principal qi” (元气自然论). The “Heavenly Patterns” (天文训) chapter of the Huainanzi absorbed Daoist thought and constructed a cosmogony that is based on qi. It says, Dao originated in the nebulous void [虚廓], the nebulous void produced space-time. Spacetime produced the original qi. A boundary [divided] the original qi. That which was pure and bright spread out to form heaven; that which was heavy and turbid congealed to form earth. […] The conjoined essences [精] of heaven and earth produced yin and yang. The suppressive essences of yin and yang causes the four seasons. The scattered essences of the four seasons created the myriad things.1

In this cosmogony, qi is an objectively existing, material element and is the boundary between the formlessness and the having form of the cosmos. After the production of heaven and earth, the sun, moon, stars, wind, rain, thunder and the myriad things 1 Major

et al. (2010: 114–115).

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receive yin qi or yang qi and are thereby produced. This is a more detailed exposition of Daoist-style cosmogony. Relatively early on, Dong Zhongshu proposed the idea of principal qi (元气) Principal qi is the original substance (物质) for the creation of the universe, and Dong Zhongshu believed that whether principal qi is harmonious and compliant or not is directly related to clarity and brightness of kingly governance. Principal qi is concretely manifested as the qi of yin and yang. The qi of yin and yang have different characteristics, Yang qi is warm and yin qi is cold. Yang qi gives and yin qi deprives. Yang qi is humane and yin qi is fierce and brutal. Yang qi is broad and yin qi is impatient and irascible. Yang qi loves and yin qi hates. Yang qi gives birth and yin qi kills. (“Yang is Lofty Yin is Lowly”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

These different characteristics are all manifestations of the will of heaven. Following this, Dong Zhongshu believed that, “heaven has yin and yang, humans also have yin and yang.” (“Things of the Same Kind Activate Each Other”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn), Yin and yang qi are present above in heaven and also in human beings. In human beings, they constitute love, hate, happiness, and anger. In heaven, they constitute warming, cooling, chilling and heating.2 (“In Imitation of Heaven’s Activities”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

Thus, “heaven also possesses happy and angry qi and a joyful and sorrowful heartmind that mutually complements those of human beings. Thus if a grouping is made according to kind, heaven and human beings are one.”3 (“The Meaning of Yin and Yang” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) It is because humans are correlated with heaven that there is a mutual responsiveness between humans and heaven. The good actions of a ruler will mean that heaven sends down auspicious rewards, the opposite will bring catastrophes and anomalous events as warnings. Through this discourse of the mutual responsiveness between humans and heaven, Dong Zhongshu tried to place certain restraints on ruling sovereigns. Dong Zhongshu gave qi the emotions of happiness, anger, sorrow and joy and qi also became a key component of his discourse on the mutual responsiveness between humans and heaven. Wang Chong’s philosophy takes principal qi as its highest concept and takes qi transformation as its main content. It used principal qi to oppose the contemporary mystical Confucian philosophy movement (谶纬) and Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy of the mutual responsiveness between humans and heaven. Wang Chong believed that principal qi was the refined and microscopic material element between heaven and earth. The myriad things are all born from receiving principal qi. The refined and microscopic principal qi is also called “refined qi” (精气). With regard to the nature of principal qi, it contains both yin and yang and so principal qi is also called the qi of yin and yang. Human beings are also born from receiving principal qi. The yin qi in principal qi becomes human bones and flesh whereas the yang qi becomes humans’ 2 Queen 3 Queen

and Major (2016: 597). and Major (2016: 514).

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spirit. The loftiness and lowliness, poverty and richness, longevity and short-life, sageliness and commonness of people are all a result of the refinement or coarseness of the principal qi they received. People receive qi and are born and when they die, they return to qi. There is nothing here to do with the will of heaven, and nothing here to do with the mutual responsiveness between heaven and humans. Wang Chong’s naturalistic philosophy of qi had great significance for breaking through the mystical Confucian philosophy movement (谶纬). Wang Chong was also the first to take principal qi as the origin of the myriad things and had a profound impact on later qi philosophy. The concept of qi was also absorbed by religious Daoism. The classic of religious Daoism, Classic of Great Peace (太平经) took dao as its highest concept. It took principal qi as arising from dao and as the material which constitutes the myriad things. The myriad things are all produced from principal qi, Principal qi is misty, mixed and self-so. When it converges it becomes heaven and is called one. When it divides, it produces yin qi and becomes earth and is called two. After this it produces heaven and earth. Yin and yang mutually influence each other, and humans are produced, this is called three. (“Missing Topics”, Collation of the Classic of Great Peace)

Here, principal qi is used to explain Laozi’s “dao generates one, one generates two, two generates three and three generates the myriad things.” Succeeding this, religious Daoists generally all maintained this idea and therefore, developed cultivation methods such as circulating qi (行气) and Daoyin (导引) for achieving longevity.

14.3 Three During the Wei-Jin period, Neo-Daoism flourished, and philosophers focused on the distinction between being and non-being, root and branch. They concentrated on exploring the root-body of the universe and their discourses were characterized by abstract and obscure speculations. Although the qi discourse of the pre-Qin and Han was getting weaker and weaker, we can still see discourses related to qi in the works of some philosophers. Liu Shao (刘劭) of the early Wei believed that “human nature is established through receiving qi and form [形] is manifested through realizing [体] the five phases.” (“The Nine Manifestations”, Treatise on Human Character) He believed that human nature was determined by the qi of yin and yang. It is the reception of the differences in the purity of qi that determines the different natures of people. Ji Kang (嵇康) inherited and continued Wang Chong’s line of thought whereby transformations in qi give rise to things. He believed that humans arise from receiving principal qi and explained the differences in human nature based on how much principal qi they receive. The quantity of principal qi they receive decides whether one is muddled or clear. The sages not only receive a lot of principal qi but the qi they receive is all pure and good, and this is why they are sages. Common people’s endowment of qi is somewhat lacking and so cannot be roundly well-cultivated and

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so are one-sided, i.e. either bright or brave or poor or honest and clean. Yang Quan (杨泉) composed Discourse on the Li of Things (物理论) on the basis of the fruits of contemporary astrology and explained the formation of things on the basis of principal qi. Yang Quan believed that principal qi fills the space between heaven and earth and there is nothing else apart from this; heaven and earth themselves are created from principal qi. It is because principal qi is possessed of characteristics such as clear and muddy, yin and yang, hard and soft that different forms of qi become different things and objects. Guo Xiang likewise believed that qi can form different things and objects. Qi has many different changes and transformations but no beginning and end and is differentiated between pure, muddy, righteous and perverse, numinous and subtle amongst others. The sages and common people receive different endowments of qi. He says, “those who especially receive the ziran good qi are extremely rare, among the lower ranks, only conifers and among the higher ranks, only sages.” (“The Seal of Virtue Complete” Commentary on the Zhuangzi) He also says, “everybody eats the five grains yet only some become a spiritual person. This means that it is not the five grains that makes the spiritual person, but rather that he is especially endowed with the subtle qi of ziran.” (“Wandering Far and Unfettered” Commentary on the Zhuangzi). Here, the idea of qi transformation is maintained. In all, the discourse of qi was not the main zeitgeist of the Wei-Jin period, and there were no new theoretical breakthroughs. What is worth noticing, however, is that after Buddhism’s entry into China, it absorbed the concept of qi in Chinese philosophy so that its own philosophy can be better integrated with indigenous Chinese culture. As early as the Han-Wei period, An Shigao (安世高) already used principal qi to explain the theory of the five skandhas (五蕴). Dao An (道安) of the Eastern Jin of the school advocating fundamental non-being (本无宗) combined the Buddhist emptiness with qi and believed that the myriad things were born through receiving principal qi. Principal qi is not, however, the ultimate origin of the myriad things; prior to principal qi is the origins of the world, that is non-being or emptiness, “non-being is prior to the transformations of principal [qi], emptiness is the beginning of the myriad forms [众形], thus it is called original non-being, this is not saying that an empty deficiency [虚豁] is capable of giving rise to the myriad beings.” Thus, whilst principal qi is only the material for the production of the myriad things, it is emptiness or non-being that is the ultimate root of the world. Evidently, this philosophy has been influenced by Neo-Daoism and is using it to explain the Buddhist s´u¯ nya principle (i.e. the unreality of the ego and phenomena) (空理). During the Sui-Tang period, the five founders of the Hua Yan school wrote the Treatise on the Origins of Humanity (华严原人论) and criticized the traditional Confucian and Daoist discourse of principal qi. Zong Mi (宗密) believed that the Confucian and Daoist discourse of principal qi took humans and the myriad things to arise from the endowment of principal qi, but principal qi is without consciousness whereas human beings have consciousness. As such, the Confucian and Daoist discourse of principal qi cannot explain how a principal qi without consciousness can give rise to humans who have consciousness. Therefore, principal qi is not, in fact, the origins of the world, it is Buddha nature itself that is the origins of the world and principal qi is a product of this real heart-mind. Here, Zong

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Mi is using the Buddhist idea of a¯ l¯aya, bodhi-consciousness (阿赖耶) to explain principal qi, where principal qi is the manifestation of the heart-mind (心识). When the domain of the heart-mind is united, it becomes heaven, earth, humans and objects. In this way, the theory of principal qi is absorbed into Daoist philosophy, and thus buddhis-izing it. Under the background of the flourishing of Buddhist and Daoism, Liu Zongyuan (柳宗元) maintained the traditional discourse of principal qi and, on this basis, tried to revive the once dominant position of Confucian culture. Liu Zongyuan believed that before the birth of heaven and earth, a muddled principal qi existed and after the birth of heaven and earth, principal qi resides between heaven and earth. Principal qi spontaneously exists of itself and has no will and wills neither reward goodness nor punishes badness. In this, Liu Zongyuan maintained Wang Chong’s naturalistic views. As compared with the traditional discourse of principal qi, Liu Zongyuan proposed the idea of “principal qi moves of itself” (元气自动). It is the yin and yang within principal qi itself that produces that movements and changes of principal qi itself. This idea had an inspiring influence on Zhang Zai’s qi ontology of the Song dynasty.

14.4 Four The school of principle (li) of the Song dynasty was a new stage in the development of Confucianism. The investigation of qi in the school of li, whether in respect of its expansiveness or depth, exceeded previous generations. There were two main veins to the school of li’s discussions on qi. First, with Zhang Zai as its representative, a system with qi as origin (气本论) was established. Second, with the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi as representatives, a system with li as origin (理本论) was established, with li as its highest concept and qi as an attendant concept, thereby combining qi with li. Zhang Zai is the representative figure of the school of qi. Here, qi is the highest concept and used to explain the being and non-being, change and transformation of the myriad things, thereby establishing a system with qi as origin. Zhang Zai believes that, all things with form are materially made of qi, and qi exists under two states. One is dissipated and is manifested as the supreme void and the other state is when qi is assembled and is manifested as the myriad things. The supreme void is the original state of the myriad things, is the root-body (本体) of qi, and the dissipation and assembly of qi are its momentary states. The supreme void (太虚) is also qi. When qi assembles, it is the myriad things, when the myriad things dissipate, they return to supreme void. The supreme void is itself qi, there does not exist within the cosmos an absolute empty nothingness. As such, the entire universe is the existence of the one qi. Qi is not only the origins of the existence of the myriad things, but the root-body of the myriad things. Here, Zhang Zai is criticizing the Laozian idea that non-being gives rise to being, and the Buddhist discourse of empty non-being.

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Zhang Zai also proposed the idea of “one phenomenon [has] two polarities” (一物两体) and attributed the movement, change and transformation of qi to the antagonism within qi itself. He says, Qi is a phenomenon of unification constituted by polarities; Because it is unifying, it is creatively indeterminate (polarities coexist within it, thus it is indeterminate), and because it is constituted by polarities, it is transformative (polarities push one another into unity). This is why nature is constituted by three dimensions.4 (“Three and Two”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

Qi is a single phenomenon. The two polarities are the emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, assembly and dissipation, purity and muddiness and other such opposing pairs that are contained in qi. These oppositional polarities, however, are united in qi. The relationship between one object and two polarities is the relationship between one and two and two and one. Without the existence of the opposition between emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, assembly and dissipation, purity and muddiness and other such opposing polarities, then qi wouldn’t exist. At the same time, if the united qi did not exist, then the mutual acting upon one another of emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, assembly and dissipation, purity and muddiness would also cease. It is precisely because a united qi contains elements such as emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, assembly and dissipation, purity and muddiness that qi contains limitless vitality and as such forms a triad with the nourishing powers of heaven and earth. “One phenomenon [has] two polarities” attributed the assembly and dissipation and change and transformation of qi to its internal antagonism, and is a further development on Liu Zongyuan’s idea of “principal qi moves of itself.” It completely rejects external causes such as heaven and gods. Zhang Zai’s discourse of qi as origin is a combination of dialectics and discourse on origins (本原论). Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi established a philosophical system with li as its highest concept and qi as the material which gives rise to the myriad things. The production of the myriad things is all a result of qi transformation. When qi assembles, things are born, when qi dissipates, then things die. Qi itself is distinguished between pure and muddy, and the different classes in things and affairs are due to the purity and muddiness of their endowments of qi, “when qi is pure then one’s capacity is for the good, when qi is muddy then one’s capacity is for the bad. When one receives perfectly pure qi then one is a sage, when one receives perfectly muddy qi, then one is a stupid person” (Book 22, Part I, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers), “those that are good since young and those who are bad since young are so due to the endowments of qi.” (Book 1, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) According to this, the Cheng brothers’ views are the same as Zhang Zai’s. What is different from Zhang Zai’s views is that Zhang Zai believes that when qi dissipates, it will still return to supreme void. The Cheng brothers, however, believe that as qi dissipates along with the dissipation of specific things and affairs then qi no longer exists after its dissipation. As such Zhang Zai believes that qi is eternally existing whereas the 4 Kim

(2015: 64). Throughout this translation, I have greatly benefitted from Kim’s work on Zhang Zai and often based my own translations on his.

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Cheng brothers believe that qi has birth and death. With regard to the relationship of qi to li, the Cheng brothers believe that li is inseparable from qi but that li is above physical form whereas qi is below physical form and that in terms of root-body (本 体), li is dao or that dao and li is basis for the movement, change and transformation of qi. As such, li determines and guides qi, li is primary and qi is secondary. Zhu Xi, as the Song dynasty figure who brought the school of li to its maturity, inherited and continued Cheng brothers’ discourse of li as origin and absorbed Zhang Zai’s theory of the transformation of qi, thereby establishing an enormously intricate system based on li. Zhu Xi also took qi to be the material basis that constitutes the myriad things, he believed that there is nothing other than qi in the world. Within qi, there is a further division into yin and yang, the two qi mutually respond to one another and transform into the myriad things. Things are produced from the assembling of qi and things die from the dissipation of qi. After the death of things, the qi that constituted them also dissipate and no longer exist. When they have dissipated, they will not re-constitute other things. Qi is differentiated into pure and muddy, confused and clear. At the moment when things or people are born, they are endowed with different qi and so different things or people are born. Whether one is a sage, worthy or of bad, moral character is all due to the different endowments of qi. The same applied to whether one is superior or inferior, long-living or short-lived, clever or lucky. In this regard, Zhu Xi’s views are the same as that of the Cheng brothers. As compared with the Cheng brothers, however, Zhu Xi further developed the relationship between li and qi. Zhu Xi believed that the relationship between li and qi is mainly composed of the following dimensions. First, li is the origin and qi is the end. That which is above form is li and is the origin whereas that which is below form is qi and is the end. Second, li and qi are inseparable. Although li is origin and qi is the end, “it is with this li that there is qi, it is with qi that there is li” (Book 39, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), there has never been a qi without li nor a li without qi.” (Book 1, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Li belongs with qi, qi is the vehicle of li, without qi, there would be no place for li to reside, thus “when qi moves then li also moves, the two are mutually dependent and have never been separable.” (Book 94, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Third, li is prior to qi. In this regard, Zhu Xi believes that there is originally no distinction about which came first, but if forced to make a distinction then li is prior to qi, as such li’s priority is not a chronological one but a logical one. It is evident that although Zhu Xi absorbed Zhang Zai’s philosophy of qi transformation into his own system, he took li to be primary and qi to be secondary, and so highlighted the primacy of li. On this basis, he also criticized Zhang Zai’s discourse on qi as origin as it took the supreme void— something that is below physical form—as the root-body of the universe, and for Zhu Xi, this is misguided. Zhu Xi’s criticism of Zhang Zai reflects their basic differences on the question of ontology.

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14.5 Five During the Ming period, some philosophers, whilst criticizing the Cheng-Zhu school of li, tried to revive the ontological status of qi and the discourse of qi as origin. Luo Qinshun (罗钦顺), Wang Tingxiang, Liu Zongzhou (刘宗周) and Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲) all made endeavours on this front. Luo Qinshun’s philosophy originally belonged to the Cheng-Zhu school of li but later turned towards criticizing it and advocated qi as origin. Luo Qinshun believed that between heaven and earth, past and present, there is nothing but qi. The movement and stillness, coming and going, opening and shutting, rising and falling of qi is ceaseless, the accumulation and decrease of qi becomes the four seasons of warm, cool, cold and hot, the growth of the myriad things and their decrease and well as the success and failure of human affairs. What is called li is but the regularity which qi abides by when it is moving and is not a specifically existing object and this is why li and qi are inseparable. Understanding li is to understand the movement of qi. If there is anything which commands the movement of qi then this is li. As contrasted with Zhu Xi’s discourse of li, Luo Qinshun only views li as the regularity of qi and took from it its position of root-body and so re-established qi as root-body. Wang Tingxiang, whose philosophy was full of critical spirit, directly inherited Zhang Zai’s discourse of qi as origin and proposed the idea that the myriad things are contained within qi and took supreme void, great ultimate, dao and li as belonging to the concept of qi. This is a great development on the discourse of qi as origin. Wang Tingxiang believed that the myriad things are all qi and that qi is the concrete body of creation and transformation. The myriad things are born from the mutual responsiveness of the yin and yang of principal qi. The assembling of qi produces the myriad things and the dissipation of qi causes their death. Qi itself, however, does not disappear. This is different from the Cheng-Zhu view that qi disappears with the disappearance of things and directly reflects an opposition between the discourse of qi as origin and discourse of li as origin. The reason why principal qi can produce different things is a question which Buddhism posed to the traditional discourse of principal qi and which it was not able to adequately answer. Wang Tingxiang believed, however, that principal qi itself contained the seeds of the myriad things and so although principal qi is one, objects are many. Here, Wang Tingxiang is evidently borrowing the idea of from the idea of “seeds” from Dharmalaks.ana sect (which holds that all is mind in its ultimate nature) (唯识宗) and, in this way, made up for the omissions in the traditional principal qi–discourse on the matter of the production of the myriad things. This is a perfection and development of the traditional discourse on principal qi. In opposition to the Cheng-Zhu view that the great ultimate, li and dao are above physical forms and qi is below physical forms, Wang Tingixang believes that the great ultimate, li and dao are all the order and regularity of the movement of qi and these are the characteristics of qi. With regard to qi’s mixed and whole nature, the fact that it has no beginning or end and has capacity for subtle transformation, these reasons are why it is designated the great ultimate. With regard to principal energy,

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as the “ancestor and commander of the myriad things” (万物之宗统), qi is dao and dao is qi. In the Cheng-Zhu school of li, the great ultimate and dao are li. For Wang Tingxiang, however, as the great ultimate and qi are characteristics of dao, thus li is also a characteristic of regularity of a process. In terms of the relationship between li and qi, it can only be that qi is the basis of li and so between heaven and earth there is only principal qi; qi is the highest root-body with nothing above it. In this, Wang Tingxiang is categorically refuting the Cheng-Zhu discourse of li and maintaining that qi is origin. The philosopher of the late Ming, Liu Zongzhou (刘宗周) is also opposed to the Cheng-Zhu discourse of li as origin. He advocated instead that qi is origin, and that “flowing between heaven and earth there is one qi” (盈天地之间一气也). He also believed that heaven, earth and humans are all born due to qi. Humans and the myriad things have form and substance due to the assembling of qi, following this, they have the functioning of the organs and their own natures. In terms of the relationship between li and qi, Liu Zongzhou believes that it was not the case that li preceded qi but rather only after having qi did li have a place to reside, as such, li is the li of qi and li is not prior or external to qi. Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲) inherited Liu Zongzhou’s teachings and we can see the impact that Liu Zongzhou had on Huang Zongxi’s thought. Huang Zongxi also believed that “there is only one qi which flows through heaven and earth and from past to present” thereby maintaining qi’s position as root-body. With regard to the relationship between li and qi, Huang Zongxi believed that li and qi are but different names for the same thing, From the perspective of its floating and sinking, rising and falling, it is called qi. From the perspective of its floating and sinking, rising and falling but not losing its norms [则], then it is called li. Undoubtedly, it is one object having two names as opposed to two things in one body. (“The Records of the Miscellaneous Scholars”, The Record of the Ming Scholars5 )

Li is merely the well-orderedness (条理) of qi as opposed to being another thing itself, as such, li cannot exist separate from qi, “li is the li of qi, without qi there is no li.” (“The Records of Hedong”, The Record of the Ming Scholars) As such, we can see that Huang Zongxi basically inherited Liu Zongzhou’s views. As we can see from the above, the Ming dynasty discussion of qi basically maintained Zhang Zai’s views about qi as origin, but not in its entirety as the discussion on qi as origin in this period is established on the basis of criticism of the Cheng-Zhu school of li. The discourse of this period uses the vocabulary of li and the relationship between li and qi to talk about qi and is thus a deepening of Zhang Zai’s original discourse.

14.6 Six During the late Ming and early Qing period, in reflecting on the reasons for the fall of the Ming, philosophers were deeply critical of the scholarly fashion of empty 5 明儒学案,

诸儒学案

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discourses on human nature and thereby inaugurated a new intellectual trend. With regard to the investigation into the concept of qi, the primacy of qi was maintained and was used to explain the changes and transformations in the world, emphasizing the qi’s objective existence. Wang Fuzhi is the figure who brought the traditional discourse of qi to its maturity. He inherited Zhang Zai’s views on qi as origin and wrote Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance (张子正蒙注) and so formed a philosophy that was broad in content and deep in insight. Wang Fuzhi’s discussion ofthe concept of qi can be discussed from the following perspectives. First, qi is the origin and root-body of the universe and the myriad things. Wang Fuzhi believes that qi is the only objectively existing material substance in the universe. Between heaven and earth, there exists no real emptiness, even within emptiness, there is still qi. It is because qi is formless and cannot be seen that people believe to be an emptiness. The myriad things are transformed and born through the mutual interaction between yin and yang, as such, the myriad things are endowed with the qi of yin and yang. Although the myriad things are endowed with different forms, their basic substance is the qi of yin and yang. That yin and yang transform and give rise to the myriad things is a natural process and is not constrained by any external powers. In this, Wang Fuzhi is, in essence, rejecting the Cheng-Zhu view that li is the master and commander and instead maintaining the root-body status of qi. Second, qi has the characteristics of yin and yang, movement and stillness, assembling and dissipating. First, qi is divided into yin and yang. That qi is divided into yin and yang is a traditional view in the discourse of qi, and on this basis, Wang Fuzhi believes that the characteristics of the yin and yang of qi are different, “the nature of yang is dissipating, the nature of yin is assembling.” (“Three and Two”, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance) Yin and yang are not, however, totally divided, but within yang there is yin and within yin there is yang. Yin and yang are mutually contained within each other and in the transformation and birthing of the myriad things they respond to each other and together give rise to the myriad things. Second, qi has movement and stillness. The movement and stillness of qi is rooted in the division of yin and yang and are their internal characteristics. Movement and stillness are not separable from yin and yang and as such, it is only after there was the qi of yin and yang that there were the characteristics of movement and stillness. Zhu Xi was wrong when he said that there was first the movement and stillness of the great ultimate and then the production of yin and yang. In terms of the movement and stillness of yin and yang, the two are also not totally divided, rather, yin contains the virtue of movement and yang contains the virtue of stillness, so that movement and stillness are mutually contained in one another. Following this, qi is assembling and dissipating. The birth of the myriad things is due to the assembling of qi and the extinguishing of things is due to the dissipation of qi, thus, “when qi assembles it becomes manifest [显], when it is manifest, this is what people designate as being. When qi dissipates, it is hidden [隐], being hidden is what people designate as non-being.” (“Supreme Harmony”, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance) Assembling and dissipating are the different manifestations of qi, but assembling is a momentary state of qi, whereas dissipating

References

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is its original nature. The dissipation of qi is thus a return to the root-body of the great void and not the extinguishing of qi. Wang Fuzhi’s discussion on the nature of qi is an inheritance and continuation of Zhang Zai’s thought. Third, the relationship between li and qi. Wang Fuzhi does not agree with the Cheng-Zhu view that li is the root-body of the universe and so does not agree with the splitting of qi and li into two. Wang Fuzhi believes instead that li is the order of the change and transformation in the rising and falling, sinking and rising, movement and stillness of qi. In terms of the relationship between li and qi, he proposed that li and qi are inseparable, and that qi determines li. Li and qi are mutually implicated, li is the li of qi and qi is the qi of li. As li and qi are mutually implicated, there is no question of which is prior. Following this, qi determines li, there is of course only one vital energy [as different vital energies have different li]. If there are different [别] li then there are different vital energies. Fundamentally speaking, however, it is only when there are different vital energies that there are different li. If there are no different vital energies, then how could there be li?” (ibid.)

In Wang Fuzhi’s discussion on the relationship between li and qi, he emphasized the primacy of qi, so that li follows qi and so opposed the discourse of li as origin. Whether in terms of content or breadth, Wang Fuzhi’s discussion on qi reached an unprecedented height and is a summation as well as criticism of traditional accounts of qi. After Wang Fuzhi, the “practical learning” (实学) philosopher Yan Yuan (颜元) maintained the traditional view that qi is origin and gives rise to the myriad things. With regard to the relationship between li and qi, Yan Yuan proposed that “li and qi coalesce into one swathe” (理气融为一片) and emphasized that li and qi are inseparable. Dai Zhen believed that qi is a concept of root-body (本体) as well as a concept of material substance (物质). As a root-body concept, qi is the origin of the myriad things and their existential basis. As a concept of material substance, qi constitutes the material basis of the myriad things. At the same time, qi is both above physical form as well as below physical form. Above physical form refers to the state of qi before the formation of yin and yang, whereas below physical form refers to the state of qi after the formation of yin and yang. In this, Dai Zhen united the traditional division between above and below physical forms. With the infiltration of Western thought, qi was also introduced to modern scientific discussions. Kang Youwei, for example, took qi to be the qi of electricity. Yan Fu took concepts from physics such as energy, extension, attraction and repulsion to determine the content of qi and took all chemical elements as belonging to qi, thereby tying the traditional discussions of qi to the theories of chemistry in order to explain the multifaceted and united nature of the world. Tan Sitong (谭嗣同) likewise tried to unite the light and sound of physics and took qi to be the medium that transmitted light and sound. The introduction of modern scientific discourse enriched the traditional discourse but also signalled the end of the traditional discourse on qi.

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References Kim, Jung-Yeup. 2015. Zhang Zai’s Philosophy of Qi: A Practical Understanding. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Lexington Books. Major, John S., Sarah A., Queen, Andrew Seth., Meyer, and Harold D., Roth (Trans and eds.). 2010. The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China. New York: Columbia University Press. Queen, Sarah. A., and John S. Major. 2016. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu, Trans. Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 15

Being and Non-being (youwu, 有无)

Being (you) and non-being (wu) are a pair of extremely important concepts in Chinese philosophy. You designates existing, concretely existing and having form. Wu designates not existing, empty nothingness and not having form. The investigation into the question of being and non-being in Chinese philosophy is mainly manifested in two aspects, one is the significance of being and non-being, and the other is in terms of their relationship. The specific meaning of being and non-being varies according to the discussions of different philosophers and there are differences in their interpretations.

15.1 One The philosopher who first investigated being and non-being as philosophical concepts was Laozi. In Laozi’s philosophy, the relationship between being and non-being contains the following dimensions. First, “being and non-being give rise to each other.” Laozi says, Being and non-being give rise to each other, difficult and easy complement each other, long and short set each other off, high and low complete each other, notes and sounds harmonize with each other and before and after lend sequence to each other.1 (Chapter 2, Daodejing)

Being and non-being here are abstract concepts; being refers to the existing whereas non-being refers to emptiness and nothingness. What is meant by being and nonbeing gives rise to each other is that they exist out of opposition. It is only in relation to non-being that being exists, and without non-being there would not be the so-called being and vice versa. Non-being and being exist in the same way that difficult and easy, long and short, and high and low exist in opposition. Second, “something [you] provides the value, but nothing [wu] provides the utility.” Laozi says, 1 Ames

and Hall (2003: 80), modified.

© Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_15

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The thirty spokes converge at a hub, but the utility of the cart is a function of the nothingness [wu] inside the hub. We throw clay to shape a pot, but the utility of the clay pot is a function of the nothingness [wu] inside it. We bore out doors and windows to make a dwelling, but the utility of the dwelling is a function of the nothingness inside it. Thus, it might be something [you] that provides the value, but it is nothing [wu] that provides the utility.2 (Chapter 11, Daodejing)

The “something” (you) here refers to specific and concrete objects whereas nothing (wu) refers to the space that specific things make up. The concrete spokes make up the emptiness of the hub and it is due to the emptiness of the hub that the cart has utility. The potter makes the pot, the clay is concrete and becomes the vessel; it is because the vessel has emptiness that the vessel has utility. When building a house, there must be doors and windows for entering and exiting; it is only through the emptiness of the doors and windows that the house has utility. The emptiness of the door and windows, however, are due to the concrete walls and beams, as such, you and wu are mutually complementary and need each other. Third, “being arises from non-being.” Here, non-being is taken as the cosmogonic root of the universe. Laozi believes that dao is what produces the myriad things, “dao generates one, one generates two, two generates three and three generates the myriad things” (Chapter 42, Daodejing), he also says, “the myriad things arise from being, but being arises from non-being” (Chapter 40, Daodejing). Non-being here refers to dao and being refers to the mixed totality that dao produces and so means the same as the “one” in “dao generates one.” Dao has no form and no character, sound or smell; it is not a specific existence and so one can call it “nothing” (wu). As such, to call dao “nothing” (wu) is according to its formless, characterless, imperceptible nature. The non-being nature of dao, however, is certainly not a void, within dao there is contained the factors which become specific things, thus dao is also the union of being and non-being. In terms of cosmology, Zhuangzi inherited Loazi’s views and believed that dao was the origin and basis for the generation of the myriad things and that dao is the unification of being and non-being. With regard to the being of dao, it is manifested as “having dispositions and sincerity,” being capable of being transmitted and received as “from of old, it was securely existing” amongst others. With regard to the nonbeing of dao, it is manifested as “having no purposive action and no form”, “not being seen” and “cannot be received” amongst others. These views are in accord with those of Laozi. Zhuangzi, however, does not use wu to designate dao but wuyou, “The heavenly door is non-being [wuyou], for all beings emerge from non-being [wuyou], beings cannot constitute their being out of being; they must come forth from nonbeing [wuyou].” (“Gengsang Chu” Zhuangzi) The reason why Zhuangzi uses “wuyou” to designate dao is to emphasize the lack of distinction of the dao, as any “being” (you) has limitations and distinctions but “non-being” (wuyou) is a direct negation of “being” (you) and is unlimited and without distinctions. Although Zhuangzi’s cosmology still maintains the Laozian view of “being arises from nonbeing,” it has made the theoretical clarification that, in essence, being cannot be 2 Ames

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the origins of non-being. For Zhuangzi, there is no theoretical significance to being arising out of being and so being must arise out of non-being. Further to this, from an epistemological perspective, Zhuangzi also elucidated the uncertainty of the temporal priority of being over non-being. He says that if one believes the universe to have a beginning, then there must have been a stage where there was no beginning. Inferring on from this, before this stage where there was no beginning, there must have been another stage without “no beginning.” With regard to being and non-being, if being is affirmed, then prior to being there necessarily was non-being, but preceding non-being, there was necessarily a stage without nonbeing, preceding this, there was necessarily another stage without “without nonbeing.” Inferred thus, there is no way of establishing with certainty the question of the priority of being or non-being, and no way of establishing whether the essence of the world is being or non-being. The predicament between being and non-being is the epistemological predicament of human understanding; by using human understanding to analyse it, there is no clear way to judge whether being arises from non-being or non-being arises from being. The only way to resolve this is to transcend being and non-being, to attribute the origins of the universe to a dao which has being and non-being as content, but which simultaneously transcends the distinction of being and non-being, this then is “wuyou.” Zhuangzi’s elucidation of this kind of dilemma is naturally a way of understanding the origins of the world from a cosmogonic perspective, on the other hand, however, it comes from a desire to liberate the spirit. As Zhuangzi sees it, human understanding is inevitably perspectival, but humans stubbornly hold onto to their perspectival knowing as Truth, and this mires the human spirit in all sorts of ego-driven conflicts, thus resulting in the imprisonment of the human spirit. From the relationship between being and non-being Zhuangzi highlighted the dilemma of understanding, and that it is precisely in letting go of all “predetermined heartminds” (成心) and to intuitively experience the distinction-less dao that one can gain spiritual freedom. As such, Zhuangzi’s cosmology is intimately connected with his discourse on human life. With regard to the relationship between being and non-being, the later Mohists proposed that it be analysed from real-life situations. Canon II says, “in the case of non-being [无], it is non-being [无] only after there is being [有]. As for the non-being [无] of cases of the sky falling down, they are non-being [无] altogether.”3 Here, the later Mohists have differentiated between the two kinds of wu. First is the wu of “nonbeing [无] only after there is being [有],” which means the transformation from being to non-being. This kind of non-being relies on being and can be called a dialectical non-being. The second is non-being of “non-being altogether”; for example, the non-being of the sky falling down. The phenomenon of the sky falling down is non-existent, and so the non-being here does not need to rely on being to become non-being. This kind of non-being can be called an absolute non-being. On the relationship between being and non-being, what the later Mohists maintained was a scientific rationalism. 3 Graham

(2003: 418), modified.

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15.2 Two During the Han dynasty, Confucianism was the only dignified philosophy and so discussions on being and non-being were scarce. It is only the Huainazi and The Essential Meaning of the Laozi (老子指归) which still discussed the traditional teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi, advocating sayings such as “being arises from non-being, the concrete arises from the empty,” but there were no new innovations. By the Wei-Jin period, during the flourishing of Neo-Daoism, the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi gained renewed vigour and the meaning of being and non-being was again discussed. Not only did being and non-being become the most foundational of concepts, but also there was an intellectual trend of “distinction between being and non-being” (有无之辨). In the “Biography of Wang Yan” of the Book of Jin, it is recorded that, During the Zhengshi period of the Wei [240-249], He Yan and Wang Bi elaborated on the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi and took non-being to be the root of the myriad things. Non-being is that which originates things and completes affairs, non-being exists in the myriad things, yin and yang depend on it in their creative transformation, the myriad things depend on it in acquiring their forms, the worthy depend on it in acquiring their virtuous character, the unworthy depend on it to save their persons. Thus, although the function of non-being is noble without having the rank of nobility.

“Taking non-being as the root” (以无为本) is advocated by He Yan and Wang Bi. He Yan’s Discourse on Dao (道论) says: Beings depend on non-being in coming into existence, in becoming what they are. Affairs on account of non-being come to fruition and become what they are. Now, one tries to speak about non-being, but no words could describe it; name it, but it has no name; look at it, but it does not have any form; listen to it, but it does not give any sound. Then, indeed, it is clear that dao is complete. […] What is dark obtains its blackness from it; what is plain obtains its whiteness from it. The carpenter’s square is able to make a square because of it; the compass is able to make a circle because of it. The round and the square obtain their form, but that which gives them their form itself does not have any form. The white and black obtain their name, but that which gives them their name itself does not have any name.4 (Quoted from Zhang Zhan’s Liezi Commentary, “Heavenly portents”)

Wang Bi says, “the things of the world all arise from being. The reason why being begins is because non-being is the root.” (Commentary on Chapter 40) He also says, Dao is the designation for nonbeing, there is nothing that it does not flow through, there is nothing that does not come from it. As an equivalent, it is called dao, silent and without body, it is not possible to provide images for it [不可为象]. (Resolving Problems in Interpreting the Analects)

As we can see from the above, for He Yan and Wang Bi, the so-called “being” is the general name for the myriad things. What is called “non-being” is another name for dao. What is different in their idea of the dao, in contrast to the idea of dao in Laozi and Zhuangzi, however, is that there is now a root-body (本体) significance, 4 Chan

(2010: 25).

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that is, either being or non-being is the existential basis of the world. It is precisely in this sense of root-body that Wang Bi says, “From the way all things achieve life to the way the potentiality of things reaches completion, all these processes have an origin [由].”5 (Commentary on Chapter 51) He also says, “No thing ever behaves haphazardly but necessarily follows its own principle [li].”6 (“Clarifying the Judgments”, General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou) The “origin” (由) and “principle” here is dao, this means that the myriad things “have” (you) the basis of their existence. As such, the relationship between being and non-being is between root and end. This is one of them. The second is that, it is precisely because non-being is the root basis of existence that the existence of non-being must be manifested through existence, thus non-being is the form (体) and being is the function (用). The relationship between non-being and being is that also the relationship between form and function. The third is that, the relationship between non-being and being is also the relationship between one and many. Wang Bi says, “Although the myriad things exist in a myriad forms, they are revert to the one. What is due to that they all ultimately become one? It is due to non-being. Because it is from non-being that one comes, one can be called ‘non-being.’”7 (Commentary on Chapter 42) He also says, “that which is able to unite thirty spokes in the wheel is non-being. Because non-being is able to receive things, it is able, by means of the minimal to unify everything.” As such, “the many cannot govern the many, that which governs the many is the most solitary [the one].”8 (“Clarifying the Judgments”, General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou) Being is here taken to be many and non-being one. That which governs the many cannot be multiplicity itself but one, that which governs the being cannot be being but must be non-being. Finally, the relationship between non-being and being is the relationship between stillness and movement. Wang Bi believes that the myriad things are all moving and changing but as the root-body, non-being or dao, is still. Movement cannot govern movement, only stillness can govern movement and it is only the still rootbody which can govern the changes of the myriad things. Wang Bi, therefore, says, “Activity cannot govern activity; that which controls all activity that occurs in the world, thanks to constancy, is the one”9 (“Illuminating the Judgments”, General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou). He also says, “Notwithstanding the greatness of the earth and is rich with the myriad things, the thunder and wind moves, there are movements and myriad transformations. Stillness is the utmost non-being and is its root.” (“Commentary on the Hexagram Return”) As can be seen from the above, the relationship between being and non-being is manifested in He Yan and Wang Bi’s thought as the relationship between origin and end, form and form, one and many and movement and stillness. What is even more 5 Lynn

(1999: 149). (1994: 25). 7 Lynn (1999: 135). 8 Lynn (1994: 25). 9 Lynn (1999: 100), modified. 6 Lynn

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important is that the question of “non-being as root” (以无为本) signifies a turn in Chinese philosophical discussion from cosmology to discussions of root-body. This is an advancement of philosophical thought and was a great significance in the history of philosophy. During the Wei-Jin period, the trend of emptiness and being unrestrained was the zeitgeist. Pei Wei (裴頠) of the Western Jin believed that the root of the fashion for being unrestrained was He Yan and Wang Bi’s discourse on “valuing non-being” (贵 无). Because people blindly valued non-being, the result was that they disrespected being and this had the result that people disrespected rituals and laws. As such, Pei Wei was against the idea of “being arises from non-being” (有生于无) and wrote Discourse on Esteeming Being (崇有论) and elucidated anew the relationship between being and non-being. Pei Wei believes that what is designated as being are concrete bodies that have form, and what is designated as non-being is the state of disappearance and so an absolute nothingness (虚无); he calls this “utmost non-being” (至无). As such an absolute nothingness is incapable of producing concrete beings, being must be selfproduced. Seeing as being is self-produced, being is its own root-body, and if being did not exist then things would have no means by which to arise. This is, in essence, a refutation of Laozi and Zhuangzi’s idea of “being arises from non-being” and He Yan and Wang Bi’s thesis of “non-being as root.” Apart from this, Pei Wei also believes that as non-being is an absolute emptiness, non-being has no effect on and significance for being; that which has an effect on being is only being itself. The motivation for Pei Wei’s Discourse on Esteeming Being was in rectifying the errors of the time; his discussion on the relationship between being and non-being thus has a clear political significance and its philosophical significance occupies a subordinate position. Through his commentary on the Zhuangzi, Guo Xiang gave a new explanation to the relationship between being and non-being. First, with regard to the Laozian and Zhuangzian “dao gives rise to the myriad things” or “being arises from non-being” he refuted the idea that there is a creator. This is because, if there was a creator, then its state of existence is either being or non-being, but neither is capable of being the origin of the myriad things. Thus, the existence of a creator is a non-issue. As such, the being and non-being which Guo Xiang speaks of is similar to Pei Wei’s; being refers to the concretely existing things and sometimes refers to the abstract concept of existence. Non-being is an absolute emptiness, nothingness. As dao is also called non-being (wu) in Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s philosophies, in taking non-being to be non-existent, Guo Xiang is simultaneously refuting the idea that dao is the root or origin. Following this, being and non-being do not give rise to each other and do not turn into each other. Pei Wei believes that non-being is the state of the disappearance of being, and so there is a relationship of transforming into each other between being and non-being. As Guo Xiang sees it, however, being is being and non-being is nonbeing, there is no relationship between being and non-being. The myriad things do not arise due to non-being and will not ultimately return to non-being. There has never existed a time where being has not existed.

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Following this, as there is no creator in the world, dao is also not a synonym for empty non-being and so there is absolutely no link between being and non-being. How then, are the myriad things created? Guo Xiang believes that the myriad things do not rely on any external factors to be created but that they create and transform themselves. The intellectual trend of the “distinction between being and non-being” (有无之 辨) in Neo-Daoism started with He Yan and Wang Bi’s discourse on “valuing nonbeing” and was developed by Pei Wei’s “esteeming being” and was completed by Guo Xiang’s discourse of “self-transformation” (独化).

15.3 Three By the Eastern Jin period, Neo-Daoism and Buddhism had already combined; in this period, Zhang Zhan (张湛) was still discussing the relationship between being and non-being. He said, That which is engendered [生者] is not non-being. Non-being does not engender [生]. Thus, being and non-being do not engender each other, the principle is thus. By what then is being engendered? It suddenly engenders itself, but it does not know how it is engendered. (“Heaven’s Gifts”, Commentary on the Liezi)

Here, Zhang Zhan is merely repeating Guo Xiang’s opinions about the relationship between being and non-being. He also says, All that have shapes evolve and change, thus that which is engendered [生] has an end but that which engenders the engendered does not change. The utmost non-being [至无者] is thus able to be the great commander of the myriad changes. (ibid.)

Here, Zhang Zhan is repeating Wang Bi’s discourse of “valuing non-being.” As we can see from the above, Zhang Zhan’s discourse on being and non-being is conflicting and contradictory and did not produce any new views. In this period, it was the Buddhist school of Praj¯ap¯aramit¯a (般若学) which gave being and non-being new meanings. The central concept of the school of Praj¯ap¯aramit¯a is “emptiness” (空). The elucidation of “emptiness” proceeded upon reliance on the concepts of being and non-being. When the school of Praj¯ap¯aramit¯a started to gain popularity, there were many different explanations on “emptiness” thus giving rise to the “six school and seven teachings” (六家七宗). As the representative of the school of non-being as origin (本无宗), Dao An (道安), in using “non-being as origin” (本无) to explain emptiness, says, Non-being precedes the myriad transformations, emptiness is the beginning of the myriad forms. […] The original nature of all things [sarvadharma, 一切诸法] is immaterial [空 寂] thus it is called original non-being [本无]. (Cited in Commentary on the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way10 ) 10 中论疏.

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Zhu Fatai (竺法汰) of the school of “variant school of fundamental non-being” (本 无异宗) also says: Original non-being [本无] does not yet have appearance [色法], it precedes non-being, thus being comes from non-being. As non-being precedes being and being follows non-being, thus it is called original non-being. (ibid.)

He also says, “What is non-being? It is always without form, but the myriad things are produced by it. Although being can produce, it cannot produce the myriad things.” (cited in Notes on Commentary on the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way11 ) These are all explanations of emptiness by using non-being. In terms of the relationship between being and non-being, there is no departure from the logic of “non-being gives rise to being” of Laozi and Zhuangzi. In Emptiness of the Non-Real (不真空论), Seng Zhao (僧肇) uses the Buddhist idea of arising from conditional causation (缘起) and from the perspective of neither being and non-being, both being and non-being, to explain “emptiness.” He says, “dharma is produced from cause and effect, as they are produced from causal conditions, thus they do not have independent natures.” As all existing things are all produced from conditional causation, thus they do not have independent natures. From the perspective of lacking independent natures, all existing things which are “non-being” are “emptiness,” but as all existing things are produced from conditional causation, they are not absolute non-being, but have a phenomenal existence. This is why all existing things are also “not-non-being,” and are “being.” With regard to all existing things, “if you say that they are being [有], but the being is not really being [非真生]. If you say it is non-being [无], but they have images and forms. [Since] images and forms are not non-being, they are not really not existing [非真非实有]”, “although it is called being [有], it is actually non-being [无], this is why it is called non-being [非有]; although it is non-being [无], it is existing [有], this is why it is called not-non-being [非无].” This means that all existing things are the unification into one body of neither being nor non-being and both being and non-being. The non-real is thus emptiness, thus the emptiness of the school of Praj¯ap¯aramit¯a contains a higher concept than (1) being and non-being, (2) neither non-being and being and (3) both being and non-being.

15.4 Four After the Wei-Jing period, the debate around being and non-being fell to a secondary position; some materialist philosophers in that time began to discuss the relationship between being and non-being from the perspective objective being and non-being. The Tang dynasty Liu Yuxi (刘禹锡) proposed the thesis that “emptiness are forms that are thin and small” (空者, 形之希微者也). He said, “Emptiness are forms that are thin and small. As bodies they are not obstructed by objects, but their functions 11 中论疏记.

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always depend upon being, it must depend on objects to have a form.” (Part II, Discourse on Heaven) He believes that the formless emptiness is not an absolute void but rather the state of specific forms being thin and small and so is an existential state for material objects. This kind of emptiness does not obstruct the existence of specific and concrete objects, but its existence and function depends on specific objects to become manifest. This is what Laozi means by it “being [you] that provides the value.” (有之以为利) The Northern Song philosopher, Zhang Zai, on the basis of his theory that qi is originary, believed that the whole world is united in qi and that the supreme void and the myriad things are two states of qi. When qi assembles, it becomes the myriad things and when they dissipate it becomes the supreme void. Although the supreme void is formless, it is also constituted by qi; thus the whole world of things, regardless of whether they are objects with forms or a formless supreme void, are all qi. Once one understands that the supreme void is qi, then one can understand that an absolute non-being cannot exist. The whole world is the existence of “being” and in the whole world there is only the distinction between the obscure and the clear but no distinction between being and non-being. Wang Fuzhi of the early Qin inherited and continued Zhang Zai’s view and took the whole world to be united in qi. What is designated as being and non-being are the two states of the assembly and dissipation of qi. “All formless emptiness is qi, when it assembles, it is manifest [显], when it is manifest, it is what people designate as being. When it dissipates, it is concealed [隐], when it is concealed, it is what people designate as non-being.” (“Great Harmony”, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance) As such, concealing is merely the state of the dissipation of qi; the supreme void is also qi and so there is no question of an absolute nothingness. Following this, the so-called non-being is only relative. What is called non-being is only so-called in relation to being. If one says that a tortoise has no hair, this is in relation to a dog’s hair, if one says that a rabbit is without horns, then this is in relation to the deer’s horns; there does not exist an actual non-being. As non-being is not concretely existing, that which produces a function can only be being. This is a criticism of Wang Bi’s philosophy of non-being as form and being as function. From Laozi’s earliest explorations of the relationship between being and nonbeing, the concept of being and non-being has gained philosophical significance. After the explorations of the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoist movement and their intellectual trend of “distinction between being and non-being,” being and non-being received a more extensive and in-depth discussion. In the intellectual trend of Neo-Daoism, related questions about movement and stillness, origin and end, one and many were also explored, so that the philosophical meaning of the concepts of being and nonbeing became more evident. All this resulted in being and non-being becoming one of the richest philosophical concepts in Chinese philosophy.

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References Ames, Roger., and Hall, David. 2003. Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books. Chan, Alan., and Lo, Yuet-Keung. 2010. Philosophy and Religion in Early Medieval China. Albany: SUNY. Graham, A.C. 2003. Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 16

Yin and Yang (yinyang, 阴阳)

Yin and yang are an extremely important and widely used pair of concepts in Chinese philosophy. The initial meaning of yin and yang referred to whether the topography faced the sun or not: the side that faced the sun is yang and the side with its back to the sun was yin. Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters says: “yin, is dark, it is the south of the water and the north of the mountain.” Xu Kai (徐锴) explains that, “the north of the mountain and the south of the water is not reached by the sun.” With regard to yang, Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters says, “it is high and bright.” This means that the higher places face the sun; this is relative to yin. The poem “Gong Liu” (公刘) of the Greater Odes of the Kingdom of the Book of Odes has it that, “He surveyed the yin and the yang, viewing [also] the [course of the] streams and springs.” Here, the yin and yang refer to the backside of the mountains and it is thus employing yin and yang in their original sense.

16.1 One In the latter part of the Zhou dynasty, the Zhou grand scribe Bo Yangfu (伯阳父) used the relationship of growth and decline to explain earthquakes. He said, The qi of heaven and earth do not lose their positions. If they lose their positions, then it is because human action has interfered with it. Yang lies hidden and cannot come out because it is constrained by yin and so cannot evaporate, and so there was an earthquake. Today, the three rivers [Jing经, Wei渭, Luo洛] have had earthquakes because yang lost its position and was suppressed by yin. When yang loses its position, and is below yin, then the water source will become blocked. Once the water source is blocked, then the state will certainly perish. The water allows the earth to become fertile and is used for the livelihood of the people. Without the fertility of the water and earth, then the people will lack the means to live. Then, apart from ruin of the state what else are we waiting for? (“Discourses of Zhou A” Discourses of the States)

Here, Bo Yangfu classifies yin and yang as the specific content of the qi of heaven and earth. Yang refers to the yang qi and yin refers to the yin qi. If the yang qi lies © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_16

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hidden and cannot come out, if the yin qi constrains the yang and does not let it evaporate, then an earthquake will result. Here, the order of yin and yang is also related to the danger and perishing of the state. In general, this passage from Bo Yangfu is recognized as the earliest discussion of yin and yang in a philosophical sense. According to the Zuo Zhuan, Sixteenth Year of Lord Xi, the Zhou interior historian (内史), in discussing the strange phenomenon of five meteorites falling on the state of Song and six fish hawk birds flying backwards to the state of Song, explained this via yin and yang. He said, this is “an affair of yin and yang, and is not related to auspicious or inauspicious signs for human beings, as auspicious or inauspicious signs are a result of human actions.” Here, unusual natural phenomena are attributed to the change and transformation of yin and yang and are not considered as auspicious or inauspicious signs, as these are a result of human action. In Zuo Zhuan, First Year of Lord Zhao, it is recorded that Yi He, in treating the Marquis of Jin, saw yin and yang as qi, and was of the opinion that when yin qi flourished, it would cause cold-illnesses and the flourishing of yang qi would cause heat-illnesses. During the Spring and Autumn period, the grandee of the state of Yue, Fan Li used yin and yang to discuss the way of employing the military. He said, The way of the heavens is very clear. The operation of the sun and moon has its regularity. When the sun and moon are bright [明] it can be used as the law [法], and when they are weak [微] affairs can be carried out [行]. When yang reaches its zenith it will change to yin, when yin reaches its zenith it will change to yang. The sun falls in the west and rises in the east. After the moon is full, it wanes again. Those in antiquity who were good at military affairs, followed the regularities of heaven and earth and operated in accordance with the four seasons. Those who struck only after the enemy has struck used the yielding way of yin and the person who struck first used the firm way of yang. To deal with enemies who are near one uses the yielding way of yin. To deal with enemies who are far one uses the firm way of yang. (“Discourse of Yue” Discourses of the States)

Here, it is believed that in employing the military, one must first be familiar with and in accord with the changes of yin and yang. Here, the relationship of growth and decline between yin and yang is seen as the regularity of the operations of nature. It is believed that the relationship between yin and yang is a developmental transformation. When yang reaches its zenith, it necessarily transforms into yin and vice versa. From this, we can see that Fan Li was already understanding the relationship between yin and yang in terms of the philosophy of the way of heaven and dialectical thinking. The Daodejing also saw yin and yang as qi, but the yin and yang that Laozi talked of is possessed of a more abstract characteristic and thereby contained a universality that constituted the myriad things. Daodejing Chapter 42 writes, “dao generates one, one generates two, two generates three and three generates the myriad things. The myriad things carry yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms. And blends these qi together to make them harmonious.” Here, it is believed that all of the myriad things are a combination of yin and yang. One the one hand, things and affairs internally contain the two antagonistic elements of yin and yang: “the myriad things carry yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms.” On the other hand, however, these two oppositional elements are in a state of blending together into harmony, so that their

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opposition is united together. As such, yin and yang are the two aspects internal to things that are both opposed and united.

16.2 Two The philosophy of yin and yang is best elucidated and employed in the Book of Changes. The heart of the philosophy of the Book of Changes is yin and yang, so that we can say that the philosophy of yin and yang is the theoretical basis of the Book of Changes. The philosophy of yin and yang is the most basic concept that flows through the entirety of this philosophical system. All the other important concepts and theses of the Book of Changes are all developed upon and discussed on the basis of yin and yang. The “Commentary on the Appended Phrases A” of the Book of Changes proposed the key thesis that, “the reciprocal process of yin and yang is called the Dao.” It also says, “what the yin and yang do not allow us to plumb we call ‘the numinous.’” Here, yin and yang are elevated to the height of dao and are no longer the specific yin and yang of qi, but rather two opposed natures. The “Commentary on the Appended Phrases A” even elevates yin and yang to the highest philosophical concept of “emulating the transformations of heaven and earth” and “following every twist and turn of the myriad things.” It uses the intricate and complex transformations of yin and yang to observe and explain the antagonistic operations of things and affairs and takes yin and yang to be both the nature of things as well as the rule for their change and transformation. It endows many specific things and affairs, including nature and society, with the values of yin and yang. From the perspective of natural phenomena, heaven is yang and earth is yin; the sun is yang and the moon is yin; heat is yang and cold is yin; clarity is yang and darkness is yin; the day is yang and the night is yin. From the perspective of society, the male is yang and the female is yin; the sovereign is yang and the minister is yin; the moral exemplar is yang and the petty man is yin. In the natural and social realms, yang and yin are manifested as firm and yielding, establishing and following, advancing and retreating, extending and constricting, worthy and base, high and low, amongst others. From all these examples we can see that the relationship between yin and yang is oppositional, which is why it is said that yin and yang are the way of heaven and earth. The entirety of the natural and social realms and everything in it is constituted by the unification of the opposition of yin and yang. It is precisely the mutual influencing, contacting and acting upon each other of yin and yang that produces changes that are “long-continued without stopping.” The opposition and mutual effect upon each becomes the source of the change and transformation of things and affairs, therefore it is said, “the firm and the weak displace each other so that change and transformation appear”, “one such closing and one such opening is referred to as change, and the inexhaustibility of their alteration is called their free flow”, “the sun and moon thus take the place each of the other, and their shining is the result”, “it is by this mutual succession of the cold

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and heat that the year is completed.” In this, the philosophy of the Book of Changes is also a philosophy of change, and the philosophy of yin and yang is the theoretical basis of this kind of philosophy. During the later Warring States period, Zou Yan (邹衍) was fond of discussing yin and yang, so his school became the school of yinyang, but his works have all been lost. The representative work of the Huang-Lao school, The Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics, also uses the binaries of yin and yang. It divides all things and affairs, all phenomena and states of affairs into yin and yang. There is a passage in the “Aphorisms” chapter of The Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics which focuses on this discussion: In investigating all things, one must start from the main principle of yin and yang. Heaven belongs to yang whereas earth belongs to yin. Spring belongs to yang whereas and autumn belongs to yin. Summer belongs to yang whereas winter belongs to yin. The day belongs to yang whereas the night belongs to yin. The big state belongs to yang whereas the small state belongs to yin. The strong state belongs to yang whereas the weak state belongs to yin. Thus, action belongs to yang whereas non-purposive action belongs to yin. Extending belongs to yang whereas constriction belongs to yin. The sovereign belongs to yang whereas the minister belongs to yin. Those who occupy a higher position belong to yang whereas those who occupy a lower position belong to yin. The male belongs to yang whereas the female belongs to yin. The father belongs to yang whereas the son belongs to yin. The elder brother belongs to yang whereas the younger brother belongs yin. The elder belong to yang whereas the younger belong to yin. The noble belong to yang and the lowly belong to yin. Being illustrious and influential whereas being destitute is yin. Marriages and giving birth are yang whereas funeral belongs to yin. The ruler belongs to yang whereas those ruled over belongs to yin. The aggressor belongs to yang whereas reacting belongs to yin. The commanding officer belongs to yang whereas the soldier belongs to yin. Speech is yang whereas silence is yin. Giving is yang whereas receiving is yin. All that belongs to yang is modeled on the way of heaven, and heaven most values a constant accuracy; overstepping this constant accuracy is called perverse. Overstepping the limit will redound to the opposite direction. All that belongs to yin is modelled on the way of the earth. The way of the earth is characterized by a quiet and contented leisureliness, it settles heaven and earth with a feminine flexibility, it is good at giving and does not contend.

Here, the myriad things are all treated in terms of yin and yang. The stronger side is considered yang whereas the weaker side is considered yin. Yang models itself on heaven and yin models itself on earth. The thinking here leans towards ennobling heaven and yang and demeaning earth and yin. In all this, the basic thinking here is coherent with the Book of Changes.

16.3 Three The Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor which was completed during the QinHan period further enriched and developed the theory of yin and yang. It used the philosophy of yin and yang to understand and investigate the principles behind bodily sicknesses and to diagnose illnesses. In so doing it made the philosophy of yin and

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yang into the basis of its theoretical system. In the chapter “Comprehensive Discourse on Phenomena Corresponding to Yin and Yang” of the “Questions of Fundamental Nature” (素问), part of the Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor, it is said that yin and yang are the overall regularity of the operations of heaven and earth. It is also the basic root principle of the birth, growth, change, transformation, existence and perishing of the myriad things. The Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor proceeds to discuss the relationship between yin and yang. First, the relationship between yin and yang is that of mutual opposition. The chapter “Comprehensive Discourse on Phenomena Corresponding to Yin and Yang” takes this oppositional relationship between yin and yang to be manifested as the opposition between blood and qi, male and female, left and right, and water and fire. It is precisely this oppositional nature that becomes the basis of the existence of the myriad things. Second, yin and yang are mutually reliant upon each other: “yang gives life, yin stimulates growth”, “the yin is inside, it is the guardian of the yang; the yang is outside, it is employed by the yin.” (“Comprehensive Discourse on Phenomena Corresponding to Yin and Yang” of the “Questions of Fundamental Nature”) Third, under certain conditions, yin and yang can turn into one another: When in the course of the changing four seasons, cold and summer heat alternately dominate, from double yin yang must result, and from double yang yin must emerge. The fact is: yin controls the cold; yang controls the heat. The fact is: if cold has reached its extreme, then it turns into heat; when heat has reached its extreme, then it turns into cold. Hence it is said: cold generates heat; heat generates cold. That are the changes from yin to yang [and vice versa] (“Discussing Illness; Examining the Foot-long Section of the “Spiritual Pivot)

Fourth, it is only when yin and yang reach a certain equilibrium that the normal operations of life can be maintained. Chinese medicine thus puts great emphasis on the equilibrium between yin and yang. Apart from this, the Annals of Lü Buwei also has discussions related to the yinyang theory of how to nourish the self. In the “Stressing the Self” (重己) chapter of “The First Month of Spring” (孟春纪), for example, it is said, If the house is large, there is an excess of yin; if the tower is high, there is an excess of yang. Excess of yin causes lameness; excess of yang causes paralysis. These are the harmful results of not moderating the yin and the yang.

Here, emphasis is placed on the effects that yin and yang can have on one’s health from the perspective of inhabitation. In the “Fulfil Number” (尽数) chapter of “The third month of spring” (季春纪) it is said, Nature produced the yin and yang principles, cold and heat, wet and dry, the transformations of the four seasons, the metamorphoses of the myriad things. Each of these can produce benefit, or it can cause harm. The sage scrutinizes what is appropriate to the yin and yang and discriminates what is beneficial in the myriad things in order to enhance life. Thus, the vital essence and the spirit being secure within the bodily frame, the person’s life span is extended.

Here, yin and yang is discussed from the perspective of experience but its philosophical significance is not that evident. What is worth noticing is that the “Great Music”

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chapter of “The Second Month of Summer,” when investigating the origins of music says, The origins of music lie in the distant past. Born of measurement, founded by the grand one. The grand one brought forth the two modes couple; the two modes brought forth yin and yang. Yin and yang metamorphize and transform, the one rising, the other falling. Joined together in a perfect pattern. […] The myriad things that emerged were created by the great one and transformed by yin and yang.

Although this passage is discussing the origins of music, it touched upon the cosmological discourse of the production of the myriad things. It believes that the cosmos is rooted in the great one (太一), the great one is dao, that is, the origins of the cosmos. The great one gives birth to the two modes (两仪), that is, heaven and earth. Heaven and earth give rise to yin and yang and the myriad things are born from the transformations of yin and yang. The yin and yang that is spoken of here refers to the two qi of yin and yang. Although the myriad things are ultimately rooted in the great one, they depend on the mediation of yin and yang to be produced. Here, the relationship between yin and yang and the arising of the myriad things is already discussed from a philosophical perspective. Dong Zhongshu of the Western Han absorbed some of the views of the yinyang school into the Confucian philosophical system and thereby established a relatively systematic yinyang discourse. This discourse became a key constituent part of his philosophy of the correspondence between humans and heaven. This discourse was motivated by the desire to find a theoretical proof for the imperial governing order of yang is lofty and yin is lowly. Dong Zhongshu believed that heaven is the highest commander of the universe. This heaven is also a anthropomorphized god with wills and intentions. As the qi of yin and yang fills the space between heaven and earth, heaven’s will is manifested through the qi of yin and yang. The nature of these qi, however, is diametrically opposed. Yang qi is warm and yin qi is cold. Yang qi gives and yin qi deprives. Yang qi is humane and yin qi is fierce and brutal. Yang qi is broad and yin qi is impatient and irascible. Yang qi loves and yin qi hates. Yang qi gives birth and yin qi kills. (“Yang is Lofty Yin is Lowly”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

The different characteristics of yin qi and yang qi manifest their different functions and the sequential order between them. Yang qi is in charge of growth and nourishment and so it constantly occupies the concrete position whereas yin qi is in charge of punishment and death and so it constantly occupies the empty position. It is for this reason that yang is lofty, and yin is lowly, and yang is in a position of leadership whereas yin follows. Next, Dong Zhongshu believes that, “heaven has yin and yang [aspects], and people have yin and yang [aspects]” (“Things of the Same Kind Activate Each Other”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn), “if a grouping is made according to kind, heaven and human beings are one.” (“The Meaning of Yin and Yang”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) As such, The righteous [relationships] between sovereign and minister, husband and wife, and father and son all derive from the way of yin and yang. The ruler is yang, the minister is yin. The

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father is yang, the son is yin. The husband is yang, the wife is yin.1 (“Laying the Foundation of Righteousness”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

It is because yang is lofty and yin is lowly that the sovereign, father and husband are lofty and the minister, and the son and the wife are lowly. This kind of order between lofty and lowly is rooted in heaven. In this way, a theoretical basis rooted in the way of heaven itself is afforded to the authority of the sovereign, father and husband as well as the order of imperial society.

16.4 Four During the Wei-Jin period, Neo-Daoism flourished and the Lao-Zhuang discourse of being and non-being was the zeitgeist, so there were rarely any discussions of yin and yang. By the time of the school of li of the Song period, yin and yang became, yet again, a relatively frequently discussed topic of the school of li. The pioneer of the school of li, Zhou Dunyi, in his An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太极图说) proposed a cosmographical model in which, the ultimate of non-being (great ultimate) gives rise to yin and yang. Yin and yang then give rise to the five phases and then the five phases give rise to the myriad things that is the universe. Zhou Dunyi saw the great ultimate and yin and yang as the root of the production of the myriad things. The two qi of yin and yang are the two most primitive material elements produced by the ultimate of non-being (great ultimate)—the most original root of the universe. Once yin and yang are divided then the two modes (两仪) (heaven and earth) are established. Through the change and transformation and coming together of yin and yang qi, the five qi of water, fire, wood, metal and earth arise. When these five phases are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons run their course. Next, the five phases and the essence of yin and yang, through the exchange and responsiveness to each other of yin yang qi, change and become the myriad things. With regard to the specific function of yin and yang in the process of transforming and creating the myriad things, the “Harmony and Transformation” (顺化) chapter of the Penetrating the Book of Changes (通书) says, “the myriad things are produced through yang and are completed through yin.” Here, the production and completion of the myriad things is completely discussed in philosophical terms. Yin and yang are not only the earliest necessary element for the transformation and production of the myriad things, but through the mutual exchange between yin and yang, “the myriad things are produced and reproduced and change and transformation is ceaseless.” As such, in the transformation and production of the myriad things, the function of yin and yang is exceedingly fundamental and important. Zhang Zai called yin and yang as the “two elements” (兩端), that is, two aspects. He believes that although the states of the myriad things are different, they all contain the two aspects of yin and yang. The two elements of yin and yang’s toing and 1 Queen

and Major (2016: 426–427).

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froing, change and transformation, constitute the principle regularity of the change and transformation of heaven and earth. Zhang Zai also says, No two products of creation are alike. From this we know that although the number of things is infinite, at bottom there is nothing without yin and yang. From this we know also that the change and transformation in the universe are due to these two fundamental forces.2 (“Great Harmony”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

The yin and yang spoken of here refer to the two opposing natures of yin and yang. The change and transformation of the myriad things constitute the change and transformation of the myriad things. The change and transformation of the myriad things, however, are in reality, the change and transformation of yin and yang. The change and transformation of heaven and earth are therefore, in essence, nothing but the toing and froing, change and transformation that occurs between yin and yang. Zhang Zai also takes yin and yang as the two qi of yin and yang. The coming together and dissipating and mutual influence of yin and yang qi, their ceaseless operation, the lack of force that controls and commands this operation, and so the toing and froing, and change and transformation between the yin and yang qi is called “the li of nature and mandate” (性命之理). Zhang Zai attributed the change and transformation of heaven and earth to the change and transformation of yin and yang and thereby highlighted the universality of the change and transformation of yin and yang. The Cheng brothers believed that the myriad things all contained two oppositional aspects and that these two aspects exist in a state of the increase of one at the expense of the other and vice versa. Yin and yang are one example of these oppositions. Cheng Hao said, “all the myriad things come in pairs, one yin and one yang, one good and one bad. When yang increases yin decreases, when goodness grows, badness diminishes.” (Book 11, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs) Cheng Yi also says, “all within heaven and earth are in pairs, if there is yin then there is yang, if there is good then there is bad.” (Book 15, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs) What is worth paying attention to is that, according to the saying of the Book of Changes— “the reciprocal process of yin and yang is called the Dao”—Cheng Yi also saw yin and yang as qi. He believed that qi is below physical form, dao is above physical form and that yin and yang are the two qi that constitute the dao. The two qi of yin and yang, however, are not dao itself, as dao is “the reason why it is yin and yang” (所以阴阳者). “The reason why it is yin and yang” refers to that which allows yin and yang to be yin and yang, i.e. dao. This thinking was later inherited by Zhu Xi. Zhu Xi also saw yin and yang as qi. The qi of yin and yang, however, is not necessarily two kinds of qi, but rather two aspects of the same qi. Zhu Xi also believes that the qi of yin and yang produces the five phases and its combining with the five phases becomes the material for the engendering of things. With regard to the movement of qi, its movement is yang and its stillness is yin. Yang is the authority and yin is the subordinate. Zhu Xi also stresses that, “between heaven and earth there is nothing that is not [constituted by] yin and yang” (Book 65, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). He was of the opinion that, 2 Chan

(1969: 506).

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Yin and yang can be oppositional, for example, eastern yang and western yin, southern yang and northern yin. They can be interconnected, for example, day, night, cold and hot, one horizontal and one straight. (ibid.)

He thus proposed that, “within yin, it is itself divided into yin and yang and there is also yin and yang within yang.” (Book 94, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) In this, the dialectical nature of the discourse of yin and yang is augmented. The representative of the images and numbers of the school of li, Shao Yong, was of the opinion that yin and yang do not exist independent of each other. They instead manifest themselves in their mutual dependence. He said, Yang does not exist independently; yin must first be realized before yang can be established. Yin is thus the basis of yang. Yin cannot manifest itself on its own, yang must first be realized before it can be manifested. Yin thus takes yang as its condition. (Inner Chapter on Observing Things)

He thereupon discussed the two different natures of yin and yang and said, Yang knows its beginning and so can enjoy its accomplishments. Yin imitates its law and so can complete its labours. Yang can be known whereas yin cannot be known. Yang can be seen whereas yin cannot be seen. That which can be known and seen is being and so yang-nature is being and yin-nature is non-being. There are places that yang does not pervade but there is nowhere that yin does not pervade. Yang sometimes is not all pervasive whereas yin is all pervasive. That which nowhere does not pervade [不遍] and which constantly abides is really existing [实], therefore, the form of yang is empty whereas the form of yin is full [ 实]. (ibid.)

Chen Liang of the Yongjia school (功利学派) believed that yin and yang turn into each other. Their succession is the main thing and this succession is ceaseless, “the limit of yang is necessarily yin, the limit of yin is necessarily yang. Their succession is the main thing and cannot be exhausted.” (Book 19, Collected Works of Chen Liang)

16.5 Five The Ming dynasty Wang Tingxiang believed that yin and yang was the root of creation and that yin and yang do not depart from one another. He divided the meaning of yin and yang into four aspects from the perspective of form and qi. He said, Yin and yang are [manifested] in forms [形] and qi and there are four senses to this. From the perspective of form there are the classes of male and female. From the perspective of qi, there are the classes of cold, heat, cold, day, night, out-breath and in-breath. In general, all that belongs to qi is yang and all that belongs to forms is yin. Even more generally, all that has form which can be seen, including the yinyun [氤氲] of qi [in which yin and yang intermingle, form a harmonious equilibrium and produce the myriad things] is yin. This is why that which cannot be seen such as change, transformation, movement, rising, falling and flying, are all, are all yang. (Cautious Words, “Form of Dao”)

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With regard to taking yin and yang as qi, yin and yang are the form of qi, and within qi there is the function of movement, stillness, change and transformation. It is through this that ceaseless change and transformation are produced. Wang Fuzhi believed that the two qi of yin and yang fill the space between heaven and earth and that the myriad things are all constituted by qi. Formlessness is the body of qi and its constant nature. Although the diminishing and increasing of yin and yang is impenetrable, the constriction and extension, change and transformation of all things is due to the diminishing and increase of yin and yang. He said, “the diminishing and increasing of yin and yang is hidden and cannot be gauged, but the constriction and extension, change and transformation of all things is nothing but this.” (Book 1, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance) It can be seen that although different philosophers had different definitions of the content of yin and yang, they were all established on the basis of revealing the reason for internal change and transformation of things and affairs. Following this, they used their theories for the opposition between yin and yang to understand whether the order of human society was coherent with principle. With regard to Chinese medicine, the theory of yin and yang became the basis for understanding the changes caused by sickness and so became the theoretical basis for Chinese medicine. It is for this reason that yin and yang became one of the most important conceptual pairs for Chinese philosophy.

References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Queen, Sarah A., and John S., Major. 2016 Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Trans. Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 17

The Five Phases (wuxing, 五行)

The “Five Phases” is an extremely important concept in Chinese philosophy and was used in explaining the development and change in nature and society. It had an extensive and profound impact on Chinese philosophy, politics, ethics, religion, technology, medicine, agriculture, architecture and the entirety of traditional Chinese culture. The philosophy of the five phases is one of the key constituent elements of Chinese culture.

17.1 One With regard to the origins of the philosophy of the five phases, the “Calendar” section in the “Treatises” of Records of the Grand Historian says, “from the time of Huangdi, he investigated patterns of the stars and established the five phases.” Here, it is believed that the five phases thinking was produced at the time of Huangdi. According to the records, the term “five phases” made its earliest appearance in the “Speech at Gan” and “Great Plan” chapters of the Book of Documents. In the “Speech at Gan” it is said, “The lord of Hu wildly wastes and despises the five phases [that regulate the seasons] and has idly abandoned the three acknowledged commencements of the year.” The academic world has differing opinions as to the meaning of the “five phases” used here. Some believe that it refers to the five material elements of water, fire, wood, metal and earth, others believes that it refers to the five stars of Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, yet others believe that they are the five gods of water, fire, wood, metal and earth, amongst others. What the five phases really refers to here is hard to discern, Heaven shared with Yu the Great Plan with its nine sections [九畴]. […] The five are: water, fire, wood, metal and earth. Water pours down; fire blazes and rises. Wood is either crooked or straight. Does as it’s commanded. Earth sprouts crops. What soaks becomes salty. What burns becomes bitter. What is crooked or straight becomes sour. What is hard but melts become acrid. What is sown and reaped is delicious.

© Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_17

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The nine sections are nine main ways for ordering nature and society and the five phases is one of these ways. Here, the five phases are explicitly referred to as the five material elements of water, fire, wood, metal and earth, and an explanation for these material elements is provided. According to this record, the philosophy of the five phases goes back to the time of Great Yu’s control of the floods, and what it reflects is the ancient people’s understanding of the multi-faceted nature of things and events. By the end of the Western Zhou dynasty, Shi Bo proposed the view that “harmony leads to fecundity”: Harmony [he, 和] leads to fecundity [shengwu, 生物], identity [tong, 同] means barrenness. Things accommodating each other on equal terms [ping, 平] is called harmony, and in so doing they are able to flourish and grow, and other things are drawn to them. If identical things [tong, 同] are used to supplement identical things then, once they are used up, nothing will remain. It is for this reason that the former kinds mixed earth with metal, wood, water and fire and so produced the myriad things.” (“Discourse of Zheng” Discourses of the States)

The idea here is that if one simply added the same things together one will not enrich their variety as only things of different material can produce different kinds of things. The arising of the myriad things is the result of the mixing together of earth with metal, wood, water and fire. Here, the richness of the material elements is explained in terms of the mixing together of the five phases and is a simple and plain explanation of the multiplicity of the natures of things. In the Zuo Zhuan there are also records relating to the five phases. In the Twentyfifth year of Lord Zhao, for example, You Ji (游吉) of the state of Zheng said, “[ritual] imitates the brilliant luminaries of heaven and acts in accordance with the nature of earth, produces the six qi, and uses the five phases of the earth.” In the Thirty-Second Year of Lord Zhao, it is recorded that the grand historian of the state of Jin Shi Mo (史墨) said, “thus heaven has the three lights [sun, moon and stars] and the earth has the five phases.” Here, the five phases refer to the five elements of metal, wood, water, fire and earth. Apart from this, in the Zuo Zhuan, there is also mention of the “five resources” (五材): “heaven has engendered the five resources which the people must need use, discarding even one will not do.” (27th Year of Lord Xiang, Zuo Zhuan) We can infer that the “five resources” are the five phases. In the early thinking on the five phases, there was very little discussion on the relationship between the five phases. In the Spring and Autumn period, however, there appeared the idea that the five phases mutually overcome one another. Shi Moyi (史墨已) started using the idea of “water overcomes fire” to predict the outcome of war. The Mozi, however, proposed that “there is no constant victory among the five phases” (五行毋常胜) which means that there is no absolute overcoming amongst the five phases, but it is instead conditional. It explains that if there is plenty of fire then it can melt metal, if there is a lot of metal then it can extinguish fire and that the key to whether fire overcomes metal or vice versa is their quantity. The relationship between the other phases is likewise. At the same time, the five phases depend on each other to exist. Water, for example, is stored up in metal and fire depends on the flammable wood. This mutually dependent relationship between the five phases is comparable to the deer within the forest and the fish in the water. It is not a relationship of which is prior, but rather that the former provides the necessary circumstances for

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the existence of the latter. This is a further investigation of the relationship between the five phases. “Proceedings of Government in the Different Months” (月令) of the Record of Rites correlated the five phases with the four seasons and four directions and thus further enriched the theory of the five phases.

17.2 Two Although the thinking of the five phases has a long history, the early five phases thinking reflected people’s understanding of the way that the things and affairs in nature are constituted. At this early stage, discussions were thus mainly focused on explaining natural questions and rarely touched upon the affairs of people and of society. Zou Yan (邹衍) of the Warring States period classified the various philosophies of the five phases and proposed the idea of the “cycle of the five virtues” (五德终始) and so made the thinking of the five phases into a relatively systematic theory. Zou Yan then used this to explain why different dynasties succeeded each other in history. He believed that from the inception of heaven and earth, human society has followed the cycle of the five virtues. The order of the cycle of the five virtues, in turn, follows the mutual overcoming of one another of the five phases of the natural realm. This is as follows: earth overcomes water, wood overcomes earth, metal overcomes wood, fire overcomes metal and water overcomes fire. In his commentaries to the “Integrating Customs”chapter of the Huainanzi, Gao You (高诱) quoted the Zouzi: “The order of the five phases follow each other in sequence. Thus, Yu was earth, Xia was water, Yin was metal, and Zhou was fire.” He believed that Yu and Shun occupied the virtue of earth, Xia occupied the virtue of water, Yin occupied the virtue of metal and Zhou occupied the virtue of fire. These dynasties are products of the historical process of victory, defeat, change and transformation. The whole history of human society follows the sequence of earth, wood, metal, fire and water in successively replacing each other and this process is ceaseless. Each dynasty in history manifests the necessity of the shift in the five virtues. In the process of the operation of the five phases, it is only the presently flourishing phase which can command affairs. Zou Yan’s philosophy of the five phases provided a theoretical basis for King Min of Qi’s being called the Emperor of the East, King Zhao of Yan’s being called Emperor of the North, and so this theory was much welcomed by them. Zou Yan’s philosophy of “circle of the five virtues” had a tremendous impact on future generations: Whenever an emperor or king is about to arise, heaven is first certain to manifest good omens to the people below. At the time of the Yellow Emperor, heave first causes giant mole crickets and earthworms to appear. The Yellow Emperor announced, “the qi of earth are in ascendance.” Since the qi were ascendant, he honoured the colour yellow and modelled his activities on earth. When it came to the time of Yu, heaven first causes trees and grasses to appear that did not wither in autumn and winter. Yu proclaimed, ‘the qi of wood are in

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ascendance.” Since the qi of wood were ascendant, he honoured the colour green and modelled his affairs on wood. When it came to the time of Tang, heaven first caused metal blades to appear coming forth from water. Tang proclaimed, ‘the qi of metal are in ascendance.” Since the qi of metal were ascendant, he honoured the colour white and modelled his affairs on metal. When it came to the time of King Wen, heaven first caused a fiery-red crow to appear and alight on the altars of Zhou, holding in its beak a document written with cinnabar. King Wen proclaimed, “the qi of fire are in ascendance.” Since the qi of fire were ascendant, he honoured the colour vermilion and modelled his affairs on fire. The successor to fire is certain to be water. Heaven has again first given signs that the qi of water are in ascendance. Since the qi of water are ascendant, the ruler should honour the colour black and model his affairs on water.1 (“Resonating with the Identical” “The Beginning”, The Annals of Lü Buwei)

This kind of theory was later adopted by the first emperor of China to justify his being called “emperor” and to his governance. This kind of theory helped explain the coherence with principle of the Qin dynasty’s succession of the Zhou.

17.3 Three By the Han period, Dong Zhongshu absorbed the philosophy of the yin yang school and proceeded to give a relatively systematic elucidation of the philosophy of the five phases. Dong Zhongshu thus formed a relatively complete theory of the five phases. First, Dong Zhongshu saw the five phases as the qi of heaven and earth’s different manifestations, “The qi of heaven and earth when combined becomes one, when divided becomes yin and yang, when broken up becomes the four seasons, and when arrayed becomes the five phases.”2 (“The Mutual Engendering of the Five Phases” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) The five phases begin with wood, and ends with water, earth occupies the middle, and this sequence was provided by heaven. Heaven has five phases: The first is wood; the second is fire; the third is earth; the fourth is metal; the fifth is water. Wood is the beginning of the five phases; water is the end of the five phases; earth is the middle of the five phases. This is their heavenly endowed sequence.3 (“The Meaning of the Five Phases”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

Second, there is a mutually engendering relationship between the five phases, which corresponds with the four seasons: Wood gives birth to fire; fire gives birth to earth; earth gives birth to metal; metal gives birth to water. Water makes winter; metal makes autumn; earth makes midsummer; fire makes summer. Spring governs birth; summer governs growth; midsummer governs nourishment; autumn governs harvesting; winter governs storing away. Storing away is what winter achieves.4 (“An Official Response Regarding the Five Phases” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) 1 Knoblock

and Riegel (2000): 283, modified. and Major (2016): 467. 3 Queen and Major (2016): 367. 4 Queen and Makor (2016): 357–358. 2 Queen

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Dong Zhongshu believed what the relationship between the mutual engendering of the five phases manifests is the relationship between father and son. The one that does the engendering is the father and the engendered is the son. “Wood gives birth to fire; fire gives birth to earth; earth gives birth to metal; metal gives birth to water; water gives birth to wood. This is their father-son relationship.”5 (“The Meaning of the Five Phases” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) What the sequence of the five phases manifests is the sequence of father-son, Wood dwells on the left; metal dwells on the right; fire dwells in the front; water dwells in the rear; earth dwells in the centre. This is their father-son sequence. [The phases] receive from and distribute to one another.6 (ibid.)

As such, the relationship in society between father-son, sovereign-minister is the way of heaven, and so manifests the will of heaven above, “thus the five phases [exemplify] the conduct of the filial son and the loyal minister.”7 (ibid.) Third, there is a relationship of mutual conquest between the five phases and what it manifests is a relationship of mutual conquest. The chapter “Mutual Conquest of the Five Phases” of the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn explains: [The phase] wood [corresponds to one of] the ruler’s officials. Wood [corresponds to the minister of] agriculture; [the minister of] agriculture [is in charge of] the people. If the people do not submit and [instead] rebel, then to order the minister of mobilization to punish their leaders is the correct [course of action]. Thus, is it said: metal conquers wood. Fire corresponds to the current dynasty. When the minister of war slanders and misleads the ruler, the administrator of the law will punish him. The administrator of the law [corresponds to] water. Thus, it is said: water conquers fire. [Wood corresponds to the minister of public works.] When the ruler is recklessly extravagant, exceeds the proper limits, and loses [his sense of] propriety, the people will rebel. When the people rebel, the ruler will be lost. Thus, it is said: wood conquers earth. Metal [corresponds to] the minister of mobilization. When the minister of mobilization is weak and unable to lead his soldiers, the minister of war will punish him. Thus, is said: fire conquers metal. Water [corresponds to] the administrator of the law [and] the minister of justice. When the administrator of the law is partisan and unjust and manipulates the law to punish others, the minister of public works will punish him. Thus, it is said: earth conquers water.8

Fourth, changes in the five phases have a direct impact on society and human affairs. Changes in the five phases presage changes in society and this is heaven warning the sovereign that when there are certain changes, then one must take certain actions so as to remedy the situation. For example, “when wood encounters aberrations, in spring there is decay and in autumn there is flourishing. In autumn trees are covered with ice, and in spring it rains too much.” This is because corvée labour is excessive, taxes are too burdensome, the populace is impoverished and destitute and the thoroughfares are filled with starving people. The remedy to the situation 5 Queen

and Makor (2016): 367. and Major (2016): 367–368. 7 Queen and Major (2016): 368. 8 Queen and Major (2016): 471–473. 6 Queen

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is to “decrease corvée labour, lighten taxes, distribute the stored grain, and relieve the distressed and destitute.”9 (“Aberrations of the Five Phases and Their Remedies” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) If “fire encounters aberrations, in winter it is warm, and in summer it is cold.”10 These aberrations occur because “the king is unenlightened, the good are not promoted, the bad are not dismissed, fools occupy the positions of authority and when worthies go into hiding, so that cold and warmth lose their proper sequence, and the populace is visited by diseases and epidemics.”11 The way to remedy this is to “promote the worthy and excellent, reward the meritorious, and grant land to the virtuous.”12 (ibid.) The changes in the other elements, earth, metal and water, are all corresponding omens for human affairs and must be met with corresponding virtuous actions. If no remedy is offered then, “before three years have passed, heave will send thunder and rain down stones.”13 (ibid.) Dong Zhongshu’s five phases theory is an important part of his theory of the correspondence between heaven and man (天人感应) and contains a relatively strong religious tone. In the Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion of the Eastern Han dynasty, there is a chapter entitled “The Five Phases” which further transformed the five phases philosophy into a religious system. It was used to explain the high and low, superior and inferior status of men and women in society. One passage reads, “What is meant by the ‘five phases’? Metal, wood, water, fire and earth. The word phase is used to bring out the meaning that [in accordance] with heaven the qi have been put into motion.’”14 In discussing the nature of the five phases it says, Why is it that [according to] the nature of the five phases fire occupies the higher position and water the lower? Fire is yang. It is superior, therefore [it occupies a] high [position]. Water is yin. It is inferior, therefore [it occupies a] low [position]. Wood is the younger yang; metal is the younger yin, it has the nature of equilibrium and harmony, and can therefore be bent and straightened, it can obey and change. Earth is the greatest, containing the [myriad] things, which, growing, leave it, and, returning, enter into it [again]; it neither rejects the pure nor the impure.15

The text also corresponds to the five phases with the five flavours and the four directions. Water occupies the north and so is corresponded with the salty flavour. Wood occupies the eastern position and so is corresponded with the sour flavour. Fire occupies the southern position and so is corresponded with the bitter flavour. Metal occupies the western position and so is corresponded with the tart flavour (辛). Earth occupies the middle position and so is corresponded with the sweet flavour. As the five phases occupy different positions, its relationship with the life of the myriad things is different: 9 Queen

and Major (2016): 484. and Major (2016): 484. 11 Queen and Major (2016): 484–485. 12 Queen and Major (2016): 485. 13 Queen and Major (2016): 484. 14 Som (1952): 429, modified. 15 Som (1952): 430–431. 10 Queen

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Water has its position in the northern quarter. The north is [the place] where the yin qi lies beneath the Yellow Springs, having as its task the nourishment of the myriad things. “Water” means water-level, make level or adjust to standard [准]. It nourishes the things equally, possessing the propensity of always being level. Wood [has its position] in the eastern quarter. The east is [the place] where the yang qi begins to move, and the myriad things begin their life. “Wood” means to run into [触], the yang qi moves and jumps, knocking against the earth to break out. Fire [has its position] in the southern quarter. The south is [the place] where the yang is superior, and the myriad things hang down their [luxuriant] branches. “Fire” to follow as a result [委随] it means that the myriad things have fully unfurled themselves. Fire also means transformation [化]; the yang qi holding sway, the myriad things change themselves and transform. Metal [has its position] in the western quarter. The west is [the place] where the yin begins to rise, and [the development of] the myriad things is called to a stop. “Metal” means to stop [禁]. Earth [has its position] in the centre. The centre is [occupied by] the earth. The earth has as its task to bring forth the myriad things. “Earth” means to bring forth [吐].

With regard to the relationship of mutual engendering and mutual harming of the five phases, the Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion believes that each of the five phases, throughout each cycle, will at one point occupy the main position and so each has an end and a beginning. It is for this reason that the five phases have a certain sequence to them. “Wood engenders fire, fire engenders earth, earth engenders metal, metal engenders water and water engenders wood.” This is how the five phases engender one another. With regard to the reason why the five phases engender one another, Xiao Ji’s The Great Meaning of the Five Phases (五行大义) (萧吉) borrows from Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion and says: That wood engenders fire, [this is because] the nature of wood is warm and [fire] hidden within it, it bores its way out and so fire arises. That fire engenders earth, [this is because] fire is hot and so can set alight wood, wood blazes and then becomes ash and ash is earth, and so fire gives rise to earth. That earth gives rise to metal, [this is because] metal resides in stone and depends upon the mountain, it is engendered through a long process of permeation. it accumulates and becomes mountains, mountains necessarily give rise to stone, and so earth gives rise to metal. That metal gives rise to water, [this is because] the nature of metal is mild and flowing. As metal melts and becomes water, therefore the nature of the clouds in the mountains is mild. This is why metal engenders water. That water gives rise to wood, [this is because] water is moisturizing and so water gives rise to wood.

With regard to the five phases mutually destroying each other, the Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion believes that this is the nature of heaven and earth: The five phases destroying each other is the nature of heaven and earth. The numerous conquer the solitary, so water conquers fire. The fine conquers the firm, so fire conquers metal. The unyielding conquers the yielding, so metal conquers wood. The compact conquers the loose, so wood conquers earth. The full conquers the empty, so earth conquers water.16

The Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion next draws a forced analogy between the five phases and social ethics and believed that all the ethical actions in society can find their basis in the mutual conquest and destruction of the five phases. For example, “according to what pattern does the son succeed after the death of his father? He 16 Som

(1952): 438, modified.

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patterns himself after wood, which, terminating [its rule, is succeeded by] fire.” “According to what pattern does the son revenge [his father]? He patterns himself after earth, which conquers water, and water, which conquers fire.” “According to what pattern does the son not leave his parents? He patterns himself after fire, which does not leave wood. According to what pattern does the daughter leave her parents? She patterns herself after water, which streams away from metal.”17 And so forth.

17.4 Four After the Han period, as the unification of China under imperial rule took shape, the theory of the five phases also gradually diminished and was increasingly used by astrology, divination, choosing lucky days (择日), feng shui (堪舆) and such superstitious thinking. At the same time, it was used as a reference for Chinese medicine and became a key element in Chinese medical theory. By the Song period, the Song dynasty Confucians took the five phases to be a part of their explanation of the arising and development of the universe. In this way, they completely did away with the superstitious qualities of Han dynasty thinking on the five phases and thus allowed the five phases theory to gain a greater philosophical significance. Zhou Dunyi, in his An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太 极图说) proposed the cosmographical model of “the ultimate of non-being (great ultimate) yin and yang the five phases the myriad things that is the universe.” Zhou Dunyi, however, saw the five phases as qi, and believed that “the ultimate of non-being (great ultimate)” is the root-body (本体) of the universe. The movement and stillness of the great ultimate produce yin and yang, the coming together, change and transformation of yin and yang engenders the five qi of water, fire, wood, metal and earth. The sequential changes of the five qi become the four seasons. As such, in essence, “the five phases constitute one system of yin and yang and yin and yang constitute the great ultimate. The great ultimate is fundamentally the nonultimate.” There are some differences here with the Spring and Autumn view of the five phases as the concrete and specific five material elements. Next, the qi of the five phases and the fine and subtle part of yin and yang, through the qi of yin and yang’s responding to each other, become the myriad things. The myriad things are thus the accumulated product of the qi of the five phases’ movement and stillness, change and transformation. With regard to Zhou Dunyi’s An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, Zhu Xi wrote the Commentary on An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太极图说解). Different to Zhou Dunyi, however, Zhu Xi saw yin and yang as qi, and saw the five phases as essence (质), that is, things that have form and essence. The essence of the five phases and the qi of yin and yang are all materials that constitute the myriad things. With regard to the relationship between yin and yang and the myriad things, the essence of the five phases is born from the two 17 Som

(1952): 442.

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qi of yin and yang. Then, the combination of yin and yang becomes the material for engendering objects. As such, in essence, the five phases are the two qi of yin and yang and it’s merely their form that is different. The process of yin and yang engendering the five phases, however, (the process from a formless essence to one with form), is a gradual one; it is a gradual transition. Fire and water belong to this very transitional stage. Wang Anshi wrote Commentary on the Great Plan (洪范传) and it includes a relatively detailed explanation of the meaning of the five phases. Wang Anshi believed that the five phases are the original elements that constitute things and affairs. The reason why metal, wood, water, fire and earth are called the five phases is because “the five phases are what accomplishes change and transformation in an unfathomable way. It is that which comes and goes between heaven and earth and is inexhaustible. This is why they are called the five phases.” He believed that time, position, material, qi, form, affairs, emotions, appearances, sounds, smells and taste, which were all constituted by the five phases, all contain pairs within themselves (耦). This means that there exist a mutually opposed but also united pairs of forces, and the reason why “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦],” (耦之中又有耦) is precisely because “the changes of the myriad things are ceaseless.” Between the myriad things, therefore, exists a relationship of mutual-inhibition, “as they engender one another, they continue one another. As they inhibit one another, they keep each other in line.” Wang Anshi’s explanation of the five phases contains a certain dialectical element. The Ming dynasty Wang Tingxiang composed Debate on the Five Phases (五 行辩) and explained the function of the five phases from a practical perspective. The meaning of the five phases refers to how “the five phases flow between heaven and earth and fits the people’s needs. One cannot be without them for even a day.” Specifically speaking, In the governance of the state, one should first carry out government measures. For example, the excavation of irrigation ditches is a government measure related to water-works. When insects are still hibernating in winter before the jinzhe [惊蛰] period [the 3rd of the 24 solar terms, denoting the awakening of hibernating insects], one should not set fire to the vegetation [in order to hunt for game]. During the different seasons one should use different firewood for fire. These are all government measures related to fire. Instituting the well-field system, clearly demarcating the boundaries are government measures related to the field. Producing metals and casting machines or coins are government measures related to metal. During the second month of winter one should chop the trees on the southern side of the mountain. During the second month of summer, one should chop the trees on the northern side of the mountain. These are government measures related to wood.

Here, the meaning of the five phases and practical social governance is linked together, and it is believed that, “after the water and earth is flattened then the governance of the five phases is practised. After the governance of the five phases is practised then the various governances can be undertaken.” As such, the five phases are the basis of kingly governance and is indispensable. Wang Tingxiang’s discussion of the five phases contains fresh and clear practical guidance. During the Ming-Qing period, Fang Yizhi (方以智) used five qi to discuss the five phases. In the “Heavenly Classifications” of his Fine Observations of Nature (物理小识) wrote,

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Metal is the bone of the earth; wood is the skin of the earth. Water is the moisturizing qi, fire is the dry qi, wood is the engendering qi, metal is the destroying qi – this is the firm qi and wood is the neutral and harmonious qi. This is why they are called the five phases.

This is coherent with his view that “overflowing the space between heaven and earth is all objects [物]”, “all things are made by qi”. Apart from the views on the five phases from the above philosophers, what is worth noticing is that in his “Against the Twelve Masters” Xunzi criticized Zisi and Mencius: Some of these men only roughly model themselves on the former kings and do not understand their overall system. Nevertheless, their talents are many and their intentions grand. What they have seen and heard is broad and haphazard, and following the old past they create new doctrine, calling it the five phases. This doctrine is extremely deviant and does not accord with the proper categories of things. It is murky and has no proper arguments. It is esoteric and has no proper explanation.18

Here, the five phases is mentioned, and with regard to this Yang Jing (杨倞) comments, “the five phases are the five constant virtues [五常], which are humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety wisdom, and trustworthiness.” The explanation of the five phases through humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety wisdom and trustworthiness is exceedingly rare. Xunzi himself, moreover, said, “it is murky and has no proper arguments. It is esoteric and has no proper explanation.” It thus seems very difficult to link the five constant virtues with the five phases. As such, the meaning of the five phases as used by Xunzi is hard to determine.

References Hutton, Eric. 2016. Xunzi: The Complete Translation. Princeton: Princeton UP. Knoblock, John, and Jeffrey K. Riegel. 2000. The annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford: Stanford UP. Queen, Sarah. A. and Major, John S. 2016. Luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn; attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press. Som, Tjan Tjoe and Po Hu T’ung. 1952. The comprehensive discussions in the white tiger hall. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

18 Hutton

(2016: 41), modified.

Chapter 18

The Great Ultimate (taiji, 太极)

The great ultimate is an extremely important concept in studies on the Book of Changes in the history of Chinese philosophy. According to their own understandings, and the needs of their own philosophical systems, different philosophers from different periods have all elaborated on this concept system. “Great ultimate” has thereby become a concept with many different interpretations.

18.1 One The term “great ultimate” is first seen in “The Great Source as Master” chapter of the Zhuangzi: “Dao, […] was before the great ultimate, and yet could not be considered high; It was below the six directions, and yet could not be considered deep.” Judging by the parallelism of this passage, the “great ultimate” here corresponds with “high” and also corresponds with the six directions (up, down and the four coordinates), and so should mean “the highest of the high.” As such, the great ultimate, as it is used here, is not yet a philosophical concept. The earliest appearance of the great ultimate as a philosophical concept is seen in the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases A” of the “Ten Wings”: Therefore, in change there is great ultimate. This is what generates the two modes [yin and yang] [两仪]. The two basic modes generate the four basic images [四象], and the four basic images generate the eight trigrams [八卦].1

There have traditionally been two interpretations of this passage. The first interpretation is that it is talking about divination methods. Under this interpretation, the great ultimate refers to the 49 yarrow stalks when they are all mixed together. The two modes refer to the two lines (yao) of yin and yang. The four images refer to older yin, older yang, younger yin and younger yang. The eight trigrams refer to the eight trigram-images of, Qian, Kun, Zhen, Xun, Kan, Li, Gen and Dui. The second 1 Lynn

(1994: 65), modified.

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interpretation is that it is talking about the generation of the universe. Under this interpretation, the great ultimate refers to the original source that created heaven and earth, or it refers to the mixed and chaotic state of heaven and earth before their arising. The two modes refer to heaven and earth, the four images represent the four seasons and the eight trigrams of the eight natural phenomena: heaven, earth, thunder, wind, water, fire, mountain and lake. In this way, the model for the generation heaven and earth the four seasons of the universe became “great ultimate the eight trigrams.” The different explanations that later philosophers gave to great ultimate were all rooted in the thinking found in this “Commentary on the Appended Phrases A” passage. The scholars of the Han dynasty had many different explanations of the great ultimate. Ma Rong (马融), for example, took great ultimate to be the north star and that the great ultimate engenders the two modes, the two modes then engender the sun and moon. The sun and moon engender the four seasons, the four seasons give rise to the five phases. The five phases then give rise to the 12 months of the year and the 12 months then give rise to the 24 solar terms (二十四气). The north star does not move, the other 49 (i.e. yinyang, sun and moon, the four seasons, the five phases, the 12 months and the 24 solar terms all added together) move and carry out their functions. Liu Xin (刘歆) took great ultimate to be principal qi (元气). Zheng Xuan (郑玄) also took great ultimate as qi. Gao You (高诱) took great ultimate as the mixed body of heaven and earth when they are first taking shape. Apart from this, apocryphal texts on the Confucian Classics (谶纬) greatly flourished during the Han period and there appeared a whole host of apocryphal texts (纬 书). In these, there were many different accounts of great ultimate. The “Coverage of Geography” (括地象) chapter of the Yellow River Map (河图) takes the great ultimate to be a united, mixed qi of heaven and earth prior to its differentiation. As qi is divisible into clear and muddy, the clear qi rises and becomes heaven, whereas the muddy qi sinks and becomes earth. The “Opening the laws of the hexagram Qian” (乾凿度) chapter of the Apocryphal Interpretations of the “Book of Changes” (易纬) also takes great ultimate as the undifferentiated unity of heaven and earth. Apocryphal Interpretations of the Classic of Filial Piety: The Decision: Hooking the Mandate (孝经纬钩命诀) says, Before heaven and earth divided, there was great change [太易], great origin [太初], great beginning [太始], great simplicity [太素], great ultimate [太极]; these are the fivefold cycle [五运]. The form of the images had not yet become distinguished, so it is called great change. Qi was just beginning, so it is called great origin. The sprouts of the form of qi is called great beginning. The changes in forms have substance and is called great simplicity. Once the form of substances is already possessed, it is called great ultimate. The five qi slowly change and is called the fivefold cycle [五运].

Here, the fivefold cycle refers to the operation and transformation of the universe prior to the existence of heaven and earth. The transition from great change to great ultimate is a gradual process that starts from the formless and ends with the possession of form and substance (形质). Under this account, the great ultimate is not the earliest source and origin of the creation of the universe. Prior to it are the four stages of great change, great origin, great beginning and great simplicity. Great ultimate is merely

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the stage that qi passes to arrive at the stage of possession of substance and form. This kind of discourse is a more detailed elaboration on the discourse of the creation of the universe.

18.2 Two During the Wei-Jin period, Neo-Daoism greatly flourished, and the discussions of great ultimate broke through the Han paradigm of cosmological explanation and was replaced with the discourse of the root-body (本体论) of the universe. We can take Wang Bi and Han Kangbo as representative of this trend. In explaining the passage “the number of the great expansion is fifty [yarrow stalks]. Of these we use forty-nine” of the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases A,” Wang Bi explains: After expanding the numbers of heaven and earth, we find that the ones that are of benefit to us number fifty, and of these we actually use forty-nine, thus leaving one unused [其一不用]. Although this one is not used, yet through it the use of the other numbers becomes readily possible [用以之通], and, although this one is not one of the numbers, yet through it the other numbers are formed [数以之成]. As this one represents the great ultimate of change, the other forty-nine constitute the ultimate of numbers. Non-being cannot be brought to light by means of non-being but must take place through being. Therefore, by applying ourselves constantly to this ultimate among things that have being, we shall surely bring to light the primogenitor from which all things derive.2

Here, Wang Bi is using the “one” in the “one unused” (其一不用) of “the number of the great expansion” (大衍之数) as the great ultimate. This one is “unused” and “not one of the numbers” and so is in fact non-being or “dao.” The great ultimate as non-being is the basis by which “the other numbers become readily possible” (用以 之通) and “the other numbers are formed” (数以之成). This then is “not used, yet through it the use of the other numbers becomes readily possible, and, although this one is not one of the numbers, yet through it the other numbers are formed.” At the same time, as the great ultimate is non-being, it needs to borrow concrete “being” in order to manifest itself. It is only in this way that it can show its existence and function. After this, to the passage “Therefore, in change there is the great ultimate. This is what generates the two modes [yin and yang]” Han Kangbo comments, Being necessarily has its origin in non-being. Thus, the great ultimate generates the two modes. Great ultimate is the term for that for which no term is possible. As we cannot lay hold of it and name it, we think of it in terms of the ultimate point to which we can extend being and regard this as equivalent to the great ultimate.3

From the above we can see that in Wang Bi and Han Kangbo’s discussions, the relationship between great ultimate and heaven and earth is no longer one of temporal antecedence or subsequence. It is also not the relationship between deriving (派生) and being derived (被派生), but rather, the myriad things take the great ultimate 2 Lynn 3 Lynn

(1994): 60. (1994): 65.

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as their basis whilst the great ultimate is simultaneously contained within heaven, earth and the myriad things. The relationship between the great ultimate and the myriad things is one of root and branch. From the above, we can see that both Wang Bi and Han Kangbo are using the Daodejing to explain the Book of Changes. This advancement from a cosmogonic discourse to the discourse of the root-body of the universe is a great step forward in philosophical thought. The Tang dynasty Kong Yingda wrote The Rectified Interpretation of the Book of Changes (周易正义) based on Wang Bi and Han Kangbo’s edition of the Commentary on the Book of Changes. In explaining the passage “Therefore, in change there is the great ultimate. This is what generates the two modes [yin and yang]” however, Kong Yingda says, Great ultimate refers to the original qi of the undifferentiated heaven and earth when it is all mixed together. This is the great origin [太初], the great one. Thus, Laozi said, “The dao produced one.” This is the great ultimate. It also refers to the mixed origin which when divided is heaven and earth. Thus, it says, “great ultimate generates the two modes.” This is what Laozi meant when he said “one produced two.”

In taking great ultimate as the principal qi of the undifferentiated heaven and earth, Kong Yingda is using Laozi’s “one” in “dao produced one.” This is evidently inheriting Han Kangbo’s explanation of the great ultimate via qi.

18.3 Three Going into the Song dynasty, investigation into the concept of great ultimate entered into a deeper stage, and many different views formed. The founder of the school of principle, Zhou Dunyi, wrote An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太极图说), in which it is said, The ultimate of non-being [无极] and also the great ultimate. The great ultimate through movement [动] generates yang. When its movement reaches its limit, it becomes still [静]. Through stillness the great ultimate generates yin. When stillness reaches its limit, activity begins again. So, movement and stillness alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to the distinction of yin and yang, and the two modes are thus established. By the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the five phases of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth arise. When these five qi are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons run their course. The five phases constitute one system of yin and yang, and yin and yang constitute one great ultimate. The great ultimate is fundamentally the ultimate of non-being [太极本无极]. The five phases arise, each with its specific nature. When the reality of the ultimate of non-being and the essence of yin, yang and the five phases come into subtle union, integration ensues. Qian constitutes male element and Kun constitutes the female element. The interaction of these two qi engenders and transforms the myriad things. The myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in an unending transformation.4 (An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great ultimate)

4 Chan

(1963): 463, modified.

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Here, Zhou Dunyi is still using the great ultimate to explain the process of the generation and transformation of the universe. What is worth remarking upon, however, are two things. First, with regard to great ultimate, he also proposed the concept of “ultimate of non-being” (无极), but he did not provide further elaboration of this concept. With regard to, “from the ultimate of non-being to become the great ultimate” (自无极而为太极) and “the great ultimate is fundamentally the ultimate of non-being” (太极本无极) we can understand this as follows. First, the great ultimate is itself the ultimate of non-being. Second, the great ultimate originates from the ultimate of non-being; the two flow into one another. This provided later scholars with further room for interpretation. Third, Zhou Dunyi defined movement and stillness as the nature of the great ultimate. One movement and one stillness are also the conditions for the arising of yin and yang, and yin and yang itself contains movement and stillness, in this way, “by the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the five phases of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth arise.” Here, the issue of how the great ultimate can engender yin and yang is, an issue which previous thinkers had never discussed, is resolved. As such, Zhou Dunyi’s thinking is a summation and deepening of Han dynasty thinking about the genesis of the universe. Although the Cheng brothers studied with Zhou Dunyi, they seldom talked about the great ultimate. They only talked of it in Preface to the Book of Changes (易序): Principle [理] is dispersed within the myriad things, thus there are myriad manifestations [ 万殊]. All things are united dao, thus there are no great differences. This is why “Therefore, in change there is great ultimate. This is what generates the two modes.” The great ultimate is dao and the two modes yin and yang. Yin and yang are the one dao and the great ultimate is the ultimate of non-being. The production of the myriad things carries yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms. If there was no great ultimate then there will not be the two modes, the response and contact with each other of the two qi, and ceaseless change and transformation.

Here, the Cheng brothers are using the thinking of “one principle, many manifestations” (理一分殊) to explain “the great ultimate engenders the two modes.” The great ultimate is “principle”, “dao”, “the ultimate of non-being” and the basis of the existence of the myriad things. At the same time, the great ultimate is dispersed in the myriad things and is one body with the myriad things. From the perspective of the myriad things, this “principle” (great ultimate) is dispersed within the myriad things, and so there are the myriad different manifestations. From the perspective of “principle” (great ultimate), the myriad things are also the manifestation of this “principle” (great ultimate), therefore there are no differences between the myriad things. This is an explanation through the discourse of root-body (本体论) and is coherent with the Cheng brother’s philosophy of “principle” as root-body. Li Gou (李覯) criticized Han Kangbo’s explanation of great ultimate through “non-being” and proposed that the great ultimate is qi and simultaneously “contains being and non-being in one body” (有无一体). First, Li Gou believed that the great ultimate is concretely existing; it is “being” and absolutely not the “non-being” that Han Kangbo spoke of. Following this, the “manifestation of qi” (其气已兆) of the concretely existing great ultimate is, however, different from the heaven and earth that has form. Heaven and earth have form, but the great ultimate does not have form. It is in this sense that the great ultimate is also called “non-being.” As such, the

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great ultimate is the name for the “manifestation of qi” that is without form which preceded the formation of heaven and earth. It is the unification into one body of being and non-being. Li Gou’s understanding of the great ultimate is undoubtedly operating at an even higher plane. Shao Yong also saw great ultimate as the original source of heaven and earth and believed that, “heaven can produce the myriad things. The great ultimate can produce heaven. How could great ultimate get its name? Forced to give it a name, we call it great ultimate” (Book 7, Biography of Lord No Name, Collected Works of Shaozi). As the original source of heaven and earth, the great ultimate, like Laozi’s “dao,” is only an imperfect, stop-gap name; in this sense, it can also be said that the great ultimate is dao. As Shao Yong sees it, the original nature of the great ultimate is unmoving, but the unmoving great ultimate can, through the formula of “one divide into two,” split into the yin and yang that contain the mysterious powers of generation and transformation. The mutual interaction of yin and yang generates the four images and the eight trigrams. The criss-crossing of the eight trigrams produces the myriad things. Shao Yong’s understanding of great ultimate still follows a cosmogonic discourse, but his perspective is derived from the school of images and numbers (象数学). Starting from materialist assumptions, Zhang Zai opposed Zhou Dunyi’s idea that, “from the ultimate of non-being to become the great ultimate.” Zhang Zai, instead, directly defined the great ultimate as qi. He said, “‘one phenomenon [has] two polarities’ (一物而两体), this is the great ultimate!” The qi which Zhang Zai speaks of, however, is different from the previous philosopher’s discussion of qi. The qi that he speaks of is one which internally contains dialectical oppositions and has an inner vitality. “One phenomenon” refers to the concrete body of qi, and two forms refer to the oppositional pairs of formless and form, movement and stillness, assembling and dispersing, and pure and muddy. “The two polarities are that of formless and form, movement and stillness, assembling and dispersing, pure and muddy. They are ultimately one.” (“Explanation on the Trigrams” Hengqu Discussions on the Book of Change) “One” and “two” are indivisible, oppositional but united into one. It is precisely the movement of this inner antagonism that results in the great ultimate’s ability to transform and generate the myriad things. Zhang Zai’s explanation of the great ultimate is full of dialectical thinking and reaches a new theoretical height. It had a tremendous impact on the development of later scholarship on the Book of Changes. Scholars of the Book of Changes who belonged to the school of qi, Wang Tingxiang (王廷相) and Wang Fuzhi, for example, all inherited and developed upon Zhang Zai’s discussions on the great ultimate. Zhu Xi is the figure who brought the school of principle to maturity and “principle” is central to his thinking. In explaining the concept of the great ultimate, Zhu Xi used the concept of “principle.” Zhu Xi’s views that are worth remarking upon can be divided as follows. First, Zhu Xi took great ultimate as the principle of that which is above physical form. Zhu Xi touched upon this view in many places, for example, “the great ultimate is principle, is above physical form. Yin and yang are qi and are below physical form.” (Book 5, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) As such, the great ultimate refers to

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the source of the existence of heaven, earth and the myriad things and this can be discussed from two aspects. First, the great ultimate of specific principle. This great ultimate contains everything and every affair. Every person has a great ultimate and every affair has a great ultimate. Second, as the great ultimate of the overall principle. This great ultimate is the overall name for specific principles. The great ultimate of specific principle and the great ultimate of overall principle is in turn combined into a great ultimate. As the great ultimate as a principle is only the root-body (本体) basis of things, “the great ultimate has no direction or location, it is without form; there is no place it can be stationed or arranged.” (Book 94, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Second, Zhu Xi takes Zhou Dunyi’s “from the ultimate of non-being to become the great ultimate” (自无极而为太极) to be a publishing error. Correctly speaking, it should be “the ultimate of non-being and also the great ultimate” (无极而太极), and so Zhu Xi believes that the ultimate of non-being is the great ultimate and that, “the ultimate of non-being and also the great ultimate” is “formless but with principle.” As such, the ultimate of non-being is only a description of the great ultimate and it is not the case that above the great ultimate, there is a further ultimate of non-being. As Zhu Xi sees it, the reasons why Zhou Dunyi talks about an ultimate of nonbeing above the great ultimate are as follows. First, to prevent people from viewing the great ultimate as an object. Second, in using the ultimate of non-being to talk about the great ultimate, one makes explicit that the great ultimate is without sound and smell. Third, if one did not talk about the ultimate of non-being, then the great ultimate would be tantamount to an object. If one did not talk about the great ultimate, however, then the ultimate of non-being would be reduced to an empty stillness, thus the two must be combined into one body: “the ultimate of non-being and also the great ultimate.” Evidently, this was not Zhou Dunyi’s original meaning but only an expression of Zhu Xi’s own views. Third, Zhu Xi believes that the sentence “in change there is great ultimate” of the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases A” is referring to the sequence of the creation of the trigrams. He says, In change there is great ultimate. This is what generates the two modes. The two basic modes generate the four basic images, and the four basic images generate the eight trigrams. Here, the great ultimate is used in reference to the creation of the trigrams. Before the creation of the trigrams, the great ultimate is only an amorphous principle [道理], within which was contained yin and yang, unyielding and yielding, odd and even, as well as all things. When one odd and one even is drawn, then this is the two modes. When an even is drawn on the odd, then this is the yin within the yang. When an odd is drawn onto the odd, then this is the yang within the yang. When an odd is drawn onto the even, then this is the yang within the yin. When an even is drawn onto an even, then this is the yin within yin. This are the four images. With regard to the eight trigrams, there are two lines [yao] on each of the four images, when one adds an odd or an even to each of the four images, the eight trigrams are formed.

This explanation differs from the Han dynasty explanation and was refuted by the early Qing scholar Li Gong (李塨). In the Commentary on the Ten Wings (周易传 注) he says,

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That Bao Xi first created the eight trigrams indicates that the Changes began with the trigrams. [It was unheard of] that the [Changes] began with the great ultimate. Furthermore, the trigrams were created with the two modes [“—”,”- -“] whereas the diagram of the great ultimate is not composed of the two modes. […] The trigram which was created through the emulation of heaven is called Qian, and so it was created first. The trigram which was created through the emulation of earth is called Kun, and so it was created next. Both the Qian and Kun trigrams have three lines [yao]. The represent the three ultimates of heaven, earth and man. [It was unheard of] that one begins with one line [yao] and ends up two lines [yao] and this was called the yang mode, yin mode, great yang, small yin, small yang and great yin.

Under the influence of the school of heart-mind, and different to the above exposition, certain Song-Ming philosophers also used “heart-mind” to explain the great ultimate. This kind of discourse started with Shao Yong, who once said, “the heart-mind is the great ultimate” (心为太极). (“Outer Chapter on Observing Things”, The Book of Highest Principles Ordering the World) He also said, “heaven and earth are born from the great ultimate, and the great ultimate is my heart-mind.” (Dialogue between the Fisherman and the Woodcutter) Here, the heart-mind refers to the heart-mind of the sage, which is to say that the “original learning” (先天之学) principle of the Changes is the direct expression of the heart-mind of the sage. This is why he says, “before heaven learning is the law of the heart-mind” (“Outer Chapter on Observing Things”, The Book of Highest Principles Ordering the World). It is for this reason that he says, “Although my body was engendered subsequent to heaven and earth, my heart-mind is prior to heaven and earth. The sequence of heaven and earth arise from my heart-mind. The rest is not worth discussing.” (“Self-Lament”, Collection of Beating on the Earth) After this, the Yuan dynasty Wu Cheng (吴澄) also said, “The only real commander of the universe [i.e. the heart-mind of the sage] gives order to the ceaselessly changing things. This kind of heart-mind is the great ultimate.” (Collected Works of Lord Wu Wenzheng of the Thatched Cottage) Wang Longxi of the Ming dynasty was also of the opinion that, “The great ultimate is the utmost extent of the heart-mind.” (“Records from Great Ultimate Pavilion” Book 17, Complete Works of Mister Longxi Wang) He Xinyin (何心隐), a disciple of Wang Yangming’s school of heart-mind’s also said, “Human beings are the heart-mind of heaven and earth; whereas humaneness is the human heart-mind. The heart-mind is the great ultimate. What the great ultimate engenders are the two modes [yinyang].” (Lectures on “Original Learning” Book 1, Collected Works of He Xinyi5 )

18.4 Four Some philosophers of the later Ming period maintained the Han dynasty interpretation of the Book of Changes and Zhang Zai’s interpretation of the great ultimate through qi and used this to criticize the Song-Ming school of principle’s empty discourse. Luo Qinshun (罗钦顺), for example, believed that the great ultimate was the 5 原学原讲,

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qi of yin and yang. The great ultimate and yin and yang are thus not split into two. The relationship between this great ultimate as qi of yin and yang and the myriad things is one of “one principle, many manifestations” (理一分殊). He also criticized Zhu Xi’s view that principle and qi are two separate things as this splits the great ultimate and the qi of yin and yang into two. Wang Tingxiang viewed the great ultimate as the source that created and transformed heaven and earth. He called it the amorphous, clear and empty qi or principal qi. Great ultimate, principal qi, yin and yang are different names but are identical in reality. The great ultimate, principal qi and yin and yang are, for Wang Tingxiang, the same thing; there is merely a temporal sequence between them. The great ultimate refers to the original source of the universe that is above principal qi. Principal qi refers to the state of the myriad things before they have been formed. Yin and yang refer to the oppositional unities of pure and muddy, constricting and extending, toing and froing that is the content of the myriad things after they have been formed. In this way, Wang Tingxiang criticized Zhou Dunyi’s discourse of ultimate of non-being and great ultimate for not taking qi as central and taking the root-body of creation as “emptiness” and “non-being.” He also criticized Zhu Xi for taking principle as great ultimate and not talking about qi. For Wang Tingxiang this is to forsake the form and grasp the shadow, and so, like Laozi and Buddhism, to sink into empty stillness and all of this is “talk of emptiness” (谈虚说空), From this we can see that, although Luo Qinshun and Wang Tingxiang inherited the Han dynasty interpretation of the Book of Changes and Zhang Zai’s views, through the depth, detail and new fusions of their theories, there were some innovations. As the person who brought traditional philosophy to its maturity, Wang Fuzhi criticized both Shao Yong’s numerical interpretation of the great ultimate and its superstitious nature, as well as Wang Bi’s “the number of the great expansion” for not avoiding the Laozian discourse of “being arises from non-being.” He also incisively criticized the Cheng-Zhu mistake of seeking for li beyond qi. With regard to the explanation of great ultimate, Wang Fuzhi inherited Zhang Zai’s discourse of qi as origin in explaining the Book of Changes and used the “qi of yin and yang intermingle and form great harmonious equilibrium” (太和氤氲之气) to explain the great ultimate. In this Wang Fuzhi elevated the concept of great ultimate to a new theoretical height. First, the great ultimate is the “qi of yin and yang intermingling and forming a great harmonious equilibrium.” Like Zhang Zai, Wang Fuzhi viewed qi as both containing and uniting yin and yang. “Great harmonious equilibrium” refers to the intermingling of the two qi’s uniting and not harming each other. The great ultimate is the unison of the two qi and the two qi “when united becomes great ultimate, when divided is yin and yang.” As such, the great ultimate is the concrete form of yin and yang. The great ultimate is both yin and yang and concretely and objectively existing. Second, the great ultimate is in constant movement. Wang Fuzhi believes that the original nature of the great ultimate is constant movement. In discussing Zhou Dunyi’s explanation of the great ultimate, he said,

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The movement of the great ultimate engenders yang, this is the movement of movement. Its stillness engenders yin, this is the stillness of movement. How could yin arise from a complete and utter stillness. One movement and one stillness mean closing and opening. It is from closing that there is opening, and from opening that there is closing. This is all movement. A complete and utter stillness [废然之静] is abatement [息]. There is no abatement in perfect sincerity, never mind heaven and earth! […] What stillness can there be? (Inner Chapter, Records of Thinking and Questioning)

This means that the movement of the great ultimate is the “movement of movement”, the stillness of the great ultimate is also only “the stillness of movement.” The great ultimate is constantly moving, and an absolute stillness does not exist. It is precisely due to the “qi of yin and yang intermingling and forming a great harmonious equilibrium” that the great ultimate contains or possesses the original nature of the constant movement, and so the myriad things of the world ceaselessly produce and reproduce, change and transform. Third, with regard to the relationship between the Book of Changes and the great ultimate he proposed the view that, “in the Changes there is great ultimate. Thus, the great ultimate is in the Changes.” (“Commentary on the Appended Phrases A” Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes) Past interpretations of “in the Changes there is great ultimate” have all interpreted the relationship between great ultimate, the two modes, the four images, the eight trigrams to be one of succession. Wang Fuzhi, however, was of the opinion that when the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” says, “in the Changes there is [有] great ultimate,” the “is [有]” refers to the fact that there is already (固有) a great ultimate within the Changes and that simultaneously, the two modes, the four images and the eight trigrams are already contained within the great ultimate. The relationship between them is not one of successive engendering. The relationship between them is that of form and function. The great ultimate is the form, its original body contains within it the two modes, four images and eight trigrams; and these are the function. When the great ultimate manifests itself, the rest is manifested with it. This is why he says, “that which originally contains the two modes, four images, and eight trigrams is the great ultimate.” (ibid.) The relationship between the great ultimate and the Changes is one where each is already contained in the other. In conclusion to the above, the great ultimate is indeed a concept that has drawn many different interpretations. In general, the Han dynasty interpretation of the Book of Changes mostly used cosmogonic thinking to explain the great ultimate as the original body or principal qi that created the universe. This line of thinking was inherited by and developed upon by Kong Yingda, Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Li Gou, Luo Qinshun, Wang Tingxiang and Wang Fuzhi. The representative figures of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, Wang Bi and Han Kangbo used the discourse of root-body to explain the great ultimate. They took the great ultimate to be the root-body basis of heaven, earth and the myriad things. This way of thinking was inherited and developed upon by the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi. During the Song-Ming period, some philosophers also used “heart-mind” to explain the great ultimate, for example, Shao Yong, Wang Longxi and He Xinyin. In the process of investigating the concept of the great ultimate, later philosophers both inherited the thought of earlier philosophers, and

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sometimes developed upon it through criticizing it. This both reflects the differences in their trains of thought and also allowed the content of the great ultimate to become richer and more profound.

References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for practical living and other neo-confucian writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The classic of the changes: a new translation of the I ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 19

Self-so (ziran, 自然)

The idea of self-so had always been important for the Daoists. As a philosophical concept, it is different from the contemporary sense of “nature.” It means instead, so of itself, originally so, the nature of what is so originally, and without artificial action. It also contains the sense of necessarily so, what is determined by mandate (命). Sometimes it also refers to being without intention and without purpose. As a philosophical concept, it is first seen in the Daodejing. It was later inherited by the Zhuangzi and was developed by Wang Chong, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang till it reached its acme.

19.1 One In the Daodejing, “self-so” means so of itself, originally so, so by heaven and without any external additions. This can be split into two dimensions. First, it can refer to the form of the dao. For example, in Chap. 25 of the Daodejing: “human beings model themselves on the earth, the earth models itself on the heavens, the heavens model itself on the dao, the dao models itself on self-so.” The self-so here refers to the nature of the dao itself. The dao modelling itself on self-so means that the dao takes its originally so nature as the measure and rule. Second, it means not imposing any external forces and is so of itself. In Laozi’s philosophy, the original state in which the myriad things exist possesses value and is coherent with principle. This state is a kind of natural and spontaneous beauty, kindness and harmony; therefore, it is unnecessary to impose any external force. If any artificial elements are imposed on its original state, then this is to destroy this kind of originally so natural beauty and harmony. As such, Laozi advocated using the method of non-purposive action (无为) to preserve this originally so state. The root of Laozi’s discourse on self-so is aimed at the promotion of non-purposive governance. In the Zhuangzi, the meaning of “self-so” does not transcend the remit of so of itself, so by heaven, and originally so. With regard to what the concept of selfso wishes to express in the philosophical sense, we can say that Zhuangzi directly inherited Laozi’s philosophy. Essentially, it is also a non-purposive action that is © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_19

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inferred from the coherence with the principle of the self-so and originally so nature of things and affairs. Zhuangzi says, The men of old, while the chaotic condition was yet undeveloped, shared the placid tranquility which belonged to the whole world. […] At this time, there was no action on the part of any one, but a constant manifestation of self-so. (“Correcting the Nature” Zhuangzi)

The “self-so” and “action” in “no action on the part of anyone, but a constant manifestation of self-so” here is mainly referring to political governance. From this, we can see that before purposive governance emerged, the whole of society resided in an originally so, harmonious state. There were no artificial elements mixed in and the original, natural state of human nature was preserved. The emergence of purposive governance, however, is a distortion and destruction of this original nature. This is why it is said “Let your mind find its enjoyment in pure simplicity; blend yourself with [the primary] qi in idle indifference; allow all things to take their natural course; and admit no personal or selfish consideration - do this and the world will be governed.” (“The Normal Course for Rulers and Kings” Zhuangzi) Zhuangzi’s intention in discussing self-so, like Laozi, lay in the non-purposive action of governance.

19.2 Two In its development, the concept of self-so reached a turning point with the eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong, and took on a theoretical form that was completely different from the pre-Qin Lao-Zhuang view. The idea of qi-transformation occupied a central place in Wang Chong’s theory, and the whole qi-transformation theory was developed with the aim of countering the contemporary discourse of heaven having an intention and sending out warnings of catastrophes and calamities. In Wang Chong’s Arguments Weighed, there is especially a “Self-So” chapter which discusses how self-so is qi-transformation. Put simply, what is called self-so is the purposivelessness of heaven and its lack of intentions. That heaven has a purposive intention was a fashionable view since Dong Zhongshu’s promulgation of it in the western Han. Wang Chong, however, believed that this is “not coherent with self-so” (不合自然) as, Heaven emits its qi everywhere. Among the many things of this world grain dispels hunger, and silk and hemp protect from cold. For that reason, man eats the five grains, and wears silk and hemp. That heaven does not produce the five grains, silk, and hemp purposely, in order to feed and clothe mankind.1 (“Self-so”, Arguments Weighed)

People eat the five grains, wear silk and hemp because the five grains dispel hunger and silk and hemp protect from one from the cold. It is not the intention of heaven that the earth produces the five grains, silk and hemp in order to support and nourish people. This means that heaven’s producing of the five grains, silk and hemp and 1 Forke

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people’s eating of the five grains and wearing silk and hemp, have nothing to do with each other. With regard to the meaning of heaven as a self-so intentionless-ness and purposiveless-ness, Wang Chong proposed idea that things are self-generating. When Heaven is moving, it does not desire to produce things thereby, but things are produced of their own accord. That is self-so. Letting out its qi it does not desire to create things, but things are created of themselves. That is non-purposive action. What is the self-so, non-purposive self-so? It is qi.2 (ibid.)

He also says, “By the fusion of the qi of Heaven and Earth all things of the world are produced self-so, just as by the mixture of the qi of husband and wife children are born self-so.”3 (ibid.) The motion of the dao of heaven is not towards the end of producing things, things are produced of themselves; this is self-so. As such, the production of things is not commanded and arranged by heaven but is rather solely the result of the flow and action of qi-transformation. The fact of the self-so of things fundamentally negates the idea that heaven has an intention and purpose. With regard to the intentionless-ness and purposiveless-ness of heaven Wang Chong goes one step further in proving this through analogies of experience. How do we know that heaven acts self-so? Because it has neither mouth nor eyes. Activity is connected with the mouth and the eyes: the mouth wishes to eat, and the eyes to see. These desires within manifest themselves without. That the mouth and the eyes are craving for something, which is considered an advantage, is due to those desires. Now, provided that the mouth and the eye do not affect things, there is nothing which they might long for, why should there be activity then?4 (ibid.)

Although this kind of proof is simple and plain and the reasoning is not very tight, the meaning that it wants to convey is very clear: heaven is without intention and will. From the western Han Dong Zhongshu onwards, everybody took heaven to be an anthropomorphized god with intentions. The discourse of heaven as sending out a warning about catastrophes and calamities was derived from this sense of heaven. Wang Chong’s discourse of self-so produced to oppose this discourse, and this discourse is coherent with his epistemology of “distaining of superstitions” (疾虚妄). Since heaven is without intention, purpose and desire then the discourse of heaven sending out warning about catastrophes and calamities becomes indefensible. Since the way of heaven is self-so, without knowing and without desire and merely follows the flowing of principal qi, then it cannot possess the capacity of sending out a warning about catastrophes and calamities. The occurrence of catastrophes and calamities is thus caused by nothing other than the change and transformation of qi. The phenomena of the “Yellow river gaving forth the map, and the Luo River the book,” as Wang Chong sees it, is only the product of the self-so of the way of heaven. “For how could heaven take a brush and ink, and draw the map or write the 2 Forke

(1907: 93), modified. (1907: 92), modified. 4 Forke (1907: 92), modified. 3 Forke

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book? The principle of Heaven is spontaneity, self-so the plan and the book must have been produced of themselves.” (ibid.) Following this, Wang Chong attributed the discourse of warning about catastrophes and calamities to the decline of society. “Later generations have gradually declined - superiors and inferiors recriminate, and calamitous events continually happen. Hence the hypothesis of warnings has been developed.” (ibid.) Under the superstitious zeitgeist of the Western Han, Wang Chong’s view was undoubtedly a profound and perspicacious one.

19.3 Three Wang Bi not only used self-so to talk about dao and li, but he also used self-so to talk about the nature of objects; and ultimately all came down to the non-purposiveness in a political sense. In his discussion of self-so, Wang Bi’s approach approximates that of Laozi, but his content is far richer than that of Laozi’s. On the relationship between dao and self-so, Laozi said “dao models itself on self-so.” This is not saying that external to dao or above dao there is a separate thing called “self-so” but that dao takes itself as its own model. This meaning, however, underwent a change in Wang Bi’s discussion on the relationship between self-so and nature. With regard to the passage, “human beings model themselves on the earth, the earth models itself on the heavens, the heavens model itself on the dao, the dao models itself on self-so” Wang Bi commented: “To model itself on” means “to follow the example of.” It is by taking his models from earth that humans avoid acting contrary to earth and so obtains perfect safety. It is by taking its models from heaven that earth avoids acting contrary to heaven and so achieves its capacity to uphold everything. It is by taking its models from the dao that heaven avoids acting contrary to the dao and so achieves its capacity to cover everything. It is by takings its models from self-so that the dao avoids acting contrary to self-so and so realizes itself. To take models from self-so means that when it exists in a square, it takes squareness as its model, and when it exists in a circle, it takes circularity as its model: it does nothing that is contrary to self-so. Self-so is a term for that for which no equivalents exist, an expression for that which has infinite reach and scope. […] Dao complies with self-so, which results in heaven having something to rely on [dao].5 (Chapter 25, Commentary on the Daodejing)

From this, we can see that humans and the earth, earth and heaven, heaven and dao are corresponded with each other but separately existing. Dao and self-so are also corresponded with each other but also separately existing. In saying that “dao avoids acting contrary to self-so” and “dao complies with self-so,” Wang Bi almost seems to be suggesting that self-so exists at a higher level than dao. He also says self-so is “a term for that for which no equivalents exist” and so seems to be suggesting that self-so exists above physical forms and so is not expressible through language. The relationship that Wang Bi describes between dao and self-so is related to the direction of Wang Bi’s root-body discourse (本体论). In Wang Bi’s philosophy, dao is not as Laozi describes it, that is, as something that is above forms, but something 5 Lynn

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that exists in a root-body sense. For Wang Bi, it exists in a root-body (本体) sense. The relationship between this root-body (本体) and the objectively existing myriad things is one of the form (体) and function (用) and not of engendering. Self-so is, in reality, the basis of this dao of root-body (本体) manifesting its function (用). In this sense, self-so is the so-called principle (理) or perfect principle (至理), that is, the principle of “nothing ever behaves haphazardly but necessarily follows its own principle.”6 (“Clarifying the Judgments” General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou) Wang Bi also says, My teaching of others does not consist of forcing them to follow what I teach but of helping them make use of self-so, which I cite as a perfect principle, compliance with which means good fortune and opposition to which means misfortune.7 (Chapter 42, Commentary on the Daodejing)

Here, self-so is regarded as one of the perfect principles. When Wang Bi says, “dao avoids acting contrary to self-so and so realizes itself,” he is, in effect, saying that only when this dao of root-body (本体) has the principle of self-so as its content can it display its function for the myriad things. The so-called “dao of self-so” is thus only for making clear that the dao of root-body (本体) takes the principle of self-so as its own content. Wang Bi also talks about self-so through objects. Self-so is the original nature or the heavenly-so nature; it is the nature that all things are originally endowed with and possessed of without having latter-day acquirement. Wang Bi’s objective in using the nature of objects to talk about self-so lies in the non-purposive action in governance. It is for this reason that he talks of self-so as eternal, without purposive action and as: that which by self-so is already sufficient unto itself will only come to grief if one tries to add to it. Therefore, what is the difference between lengthening the duck’s legs and cutting down the legs of the crane? And why should the fear of praise that leads to promotion be any different from the fear of punishment?8 (Chapter 20, Commentary on the Daodejing) The myriad things follow self-so in forming their natures. This is why one can act in accordance with them but not act on them, can identify with them but not interfere with them. (Chapter 29, Commentary on the Daodejing) The sage thoroughly understands people’s self-so nature and allows the innate tendencies of all the myriad things full expression. Therefore he follows and does not act, complies and does not interfere.9 (ibid.)

Here, Wang Bi has directly inherited Laozi’s value principle of the nature of things as coherent with heaven and understood complying with the natures of things (which is also perfect goodness) as the way to preserve the natures of things.

6 Lynn

(1994: 25). (1999: 135–136). 8 Lynn (1999: 83), modified. 9 Lynn (1999: 105), modified. 7 Lynn

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Apart from this, Wang Bi draws lessons from Wang Chong’s intentionless and purposive-less objective self-so, but ultimately this is put into effect in the nonpurposive action of political governance. He says, Heaven and earth allow things to follow their self-so bent and neither engage in conscious effort nor start anything, leaving the myriad things to manage themselves. Thus they “are not humane.” The humane have to establish institutions and influence behaviour, for they are prone to use kindness and make conscious effort. But when institutions are established and behaviour influenced, people lose their authenticity, and when subject to kindness and conscious effort, they no longer preserve their integrity. If people do not preserve their integrity, they no longer have the capacity to uphold the full weight of their existence. Heaven and earth do not make the grass grow for the sake of beasts, yet beasts eat grass. They do not produce dogs for the sake of humans, yet humans eat dogs. Heaven and earth take no conscious effort with respect to the myriad things, yet because each of the myriad things has what is appropriate for its use, not one thing is denied support. As long as you use kindness derived from a personal perspective, it indicates a lack of capacity to leave things to themselves.10 (Chapter 5, Commentary on the Daodejing)

The self-so here is non-purposive, non-creative, without will, intention or purpose and so is not humane (仁). Through this non-purposive and non-creative self-so, the myriad things can “manage themselves.” This kind of managing themselves is the same as the earth not growing grass for the sake of beasts, not producing dogs for the sake of humans but beasts eating grass and humans eating dogs of their own accord. There is no purpose or cause and effect at play between them. Here, Wang Bi already believes that between the myriad things there naturally exists a harmonious relationship of mutual dependence and mutual existence. If there were kindness and conscious effort, it would conversely break down this kind of harmony so that objects would lose their authenticity. This thinking is coherent with Wang Bi’s idea of “holding fast to the mother in order to preserve the child” and “making the branch flourish by enhancing the root.” In Ruan Ji’s Disquisition on understanding Zhuangzi (达庄论), he said: Heaven and earth are engendered by self-so, the myriad things are engendered by heaven and earth. There is nothing that is not encompassed by self-so and so it is designated as heaven and earth. There is space between heaven and earth which allows for the engendering of the myriad things. As there is nothing that is not encompassed by self-so, how can it be said that self-so is not the same as heaven and earth? Since there is space between heaven and earth which allows for the engendering of the myriad things, how can it be said that the myriad things are not the same as heaven and earth?

Clearly, Ruan Ji is using self-so to express the totality of heaven, earth and the myriad things, all of which exists within self-so. From the perspective of opposing the Confucian moral code (名教), Ruan Ji proposed the slogan of “transcending Confucian moral codes and complying with self-so,” and what he means by self-so is the original nature of self-so.

10 Lynn

(1999: 60), modified.

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19.4 Four In the philosophy of Guo Xiang, self-so possesses an even richer content. It is not only what is born of oneself and one’s own nature that is self-so, instead, what is determined by mandate, and non-purposive action are all self-so. First, using what is born of itself to talk about self-so. In his view of how things and affairs are born and completed, Guo Xiang abandoned the view of a master maker and instead used self-so to describe the arising of things. For example, “dao originally cannot allow there to be being, all being exists self-so.” he also says, “The [so-called] understanding of dao refers to the understanding that dao is without function [能]. As dao is without function, then how can it engender me? For this reason, I was engendered self-so (“Autumn Floods”, Commentary on the Zhuangzi). In using self-so to refute the existence of a creator Guo Xiang intends to explain that the self-engendering of things is self-so. He says, Self-engendering refers to how it was not engendered by me. I cannot engender other things and other things cannot engender me. I am self-so. My being self-so is called so of heaven [天然]. So of heaven is not human artifice, and so [we use] heaven to designate it. [Using heaven to designate it] clarifies how things are self-so, does this mean that heaven refers to the vast sky? (“Equalizing Assessments of Things” Commentary on the Zhuangzi)

In attributing the engendering of things to self-so, Guo Xiang’s view is evidently different from the Lao-Zhuang view that the myriad things arise from dao. Here, it is made clear that Guo Xiang returns the basis for the existence of things and affairs to the existence of things and affairs themselves. This is completely discussing the existence of the myriad things through the below physical forms (形而下) world of experience. Second, one’s own nature is self-so. Guo Xiang believes that things and affairs gaining their own nature is a natural process. Simultaneous with their generation, things and affairs spontaneously and of themselves possess an unalterable nature. Human knowledge, however, cannot grasp how things and affairs gain this nature. In attributing the natures of things and affairs to something that is so without knowing why it is so, Guo Xiang is saying that natures of things and affairs are self-so, the way they get their natures is also self-so, and one need not pursue its cause nor can one pursue its cause. In effect, Guo Xiang is putting the source of self-so far into the distance. As such, in Guo Xiang’s investigation into the relationship between one’s nature and self-so, he emphasizes the discussion of one’s nature’s self-manifestation, but does not place weight on investigating the source of one’s nature. Third, using principle (li) to talk about self-so. Principle here refers to a kind of necessity, and so self-so also possesses a sense of necessity. Guo Xiang gives it the overall name “the principle of self-so” (自然之理)—the self-so here referring to the sense of necessity. Guo Xiang says, The utmost humaneness [仁] is perfect. This is why all family members and kin, worthies and ignorant, peoples close and far all have their allotments [分]. The principles of these allotments are all self-so, so what need is there to artificially make divisions [分] between intimate and distant? (“The Revolution of Heaven” Commentary on the Zhuangzi)

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What Guo Xiang means to say is that peoples’ different stations, divisions, allotments are all mandated by self-so. The utmost manifestation of humaneness is only to abide by what was allotted self-so and not contravene against it through human artifice, this in itself is an expression of “the principle of self-so.” Fourth, Guo Xiang also uses “mandate” to talk about self-so. All that cannot be known, cannot be acted upon, all that humans cannot change can all be called “mandate” or the “principle of mandate” (命理). The principle of mandate touches upon an extremely large scope. On the macro level, it touches upon the order of the entire society and state, its flourishing and decline, its success and failure. On the micro level, it touches upon an individual’s birth, what they encounter, personality, disposition, understanding and ability. Even things like movement, stillness, starting and stopping all belong within the remit of the “principle of mandate.” Guo Xiang says, My being engendered is not engendered by me. Furthermore, within my lifetime, within the hundred years of my lifespan, my sitting, getting up, acting, resting, movement, stillness, likes and dislikes, dispositions, nature, knowledge and ability, all that I have, all that I do not have, all that I do, all that I encounter, none of this can be controlled by me. By principle they are so. If all that I spoke of above engender agreeableness or distress, then it is contrary to self-so and is contrary to mandate. (“The Seal of Complete Virtue”, Commentary on the Zhuangzi)

Here, Guo Xiang views all artifice, as well as artificial products as already possessed within self-so; the principle is already perfect and so nothing is accidental. Heaven and earth will tend towards the direction of principle and so return to the “determinations of mandate” (命定). All human artificial exertions act in a way that is contrary to self-so, and to be contrary to self-so is to be contrary to mandate. From this point of view, Guo Xiang’s view of the principle of mandate certainly has tendencies towards determinism. Fifth, Guo Xiang often uses non-purposive action (无为) to talk about self-so. Guo Xiang sometimes uses “non-action” (不为) interchangeably with non-purposive action, which means not adding any human artifice or distortion to the heavenly-so original nature, but rather letting its objective self-so nature manifest itself. Guo Xiang says, that the eyes can see objects, the perceptual organs can know objects are all the original thus-ness of nature. It is not after one knows that the eyes can see that one sees, nor is it after one knows the perceptual organs can know objects that one knows objects. This, precisely, is self-so. If elements of human artifice enter into it, then this is a destruction of the self-so nature and is a conscious action and not a non-purposive action. Moving, as a result, one’s nature is “authentic action” (真为) and “authentic action” is “non-purposive action” and non-purposive action is self-so. From the above, we can see that Guo Xiang’s discourse on self-so covers every aspect of heaven, earth and the myriad things. The “heaven”, “non-being” “dao” and “mandate” in Zhuangzi’s philosophy are all used by Guo Xiang to explain “self-so.” He, furthermore, used self-so to talk about self-engendering, one’s nature, principle, and non-purposive action. It can be said that with Guo Xiang’s discourse of self-so, the Daoist philosophy of self-so became a systematic whole.

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After Guo Xiang, there were also figures who discussed self-so. The Song dynasty Cheng Yi, for example, said “dao endangers the myriad things self-so. […] Dao engenders the myriad things self-so ceaselessly.” (Book 15, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) Cheng Hao also says, “The principle of the myriad things of heaven and earth is that they do not exist singularly but in pairs. This is all self-so and was not arranged thus. (Book 11, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) The self-so that the Cheng brothers talk about is all in the above senses of the word. Shao Yong used non-purposive action to talk about self-so, Having the same intention but different methods must be in accordance with dao. In using dao to enculturate the people, the people will submit in compliance with dao. This is why self-so must be venerated. What is meant by self-so is to not have purposive action/artifice. (Inner Chapter on Observing Things)

The Qing dynasty philosopher Dai Zhen used necessarily so to explain self-so, “when the concrete actuality is entirely self-so and returns to the necessary, the principles of heaven, earth, persons, things affairs and actions are attained.”11 (“Principle” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius) He also says, “When one thoroughly examines [what issues] from the self-so of blood and qi in order thereby to know its necessity, this is what is meant by principle and righteousness.” (ibid.) This means that the necessary is already contained within the self-so, the self-so is the necessary. These discussions, however, did not transcend the scope of Guo Xiang’s discussions.

References Ewell, John Woodruff, Jr. 1990. Reinventing the way: Dai Zhen’s evidential commentary on the meanings of terms in Mencius (1777). Dissertation. Forke, Alfred. 1907. Lun-Hêng: philosophical essays of Wang Ch‘ung. Translated by Alfred Forke. London: Luzac and Co. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The classic of the changes: a new translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The classic of the way and virtue: a new translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

11 Ewell

(1990: 169).

Chapter 20

Above Physical Form and Below Physical Form xingershang xingerxia, (形 形而上形而下)

The concept of “above physical form” and “below physical form” first appeared in the “Ten Wings.” In the “Commentary to the Appended Phrases A” of the Book of Changes we read, “that which is above physical form [形] pertains to the Dao, and that which is below physical form pertains to concrete objects [器].” Here, above and below physical form is defined in terms of the division between dao and concrete objects. That which is above physical form belongs to the concept dao and that which is below physical form belongs to the concept of concrete objects. In the same “Commentary to the Appended Phrases A” of the Book of Changes we also read, “the reciprocal process of yin and yang is called dao”, “as these take physical form, we may say that they are concrete things.” The dao that is above physical form is not “yinyang” but “the reciprocal process of yin and yang.” This seems to say that dao is the relationship or law of antagonism and unification between yin and yang; dao is not merely the two qi of yin and yang on their own. The concrete objects that are below physical forms refer to objects that have physical shapes. The thinkers of later generations have wildly divergent explanations on the idea of above and below physical form. Apart from using it to explain the relationship between dao and concrete objects, they have also used it to explain the relationship between li and qi, dao and qi, li and affairs (事), and even the relationship between China and the West.

20.1 One A relatively early explanation of above and below physical form came from the Tang dynasty Kong Yingda. Kong Yingda believed that what above physical form referred to was “dao,” which was “non-being”: dao is without body or form. Below physical form, on the other hand, referred to “concrete objects” (器), which was “being.” “Physical form” (形), on the other hand, resides between dao and concrete objects; physical form is substantial physical form (形质). The dao without form or body is engendered and established by physical form (形) itself, and this is why © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_20

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the dao above physical form is above and prior to physical form. Physical form is below dao and subsequent to dao. That which has substantial physical form (形质) can have the function of concrete objects (器用), thus what is within and below physical form pertains to concrete objects (器). Although physical form (形) resides between dao and concrete objects, because it has substantial physical form, it can have the function of concrete objects; thus, physical form (形) belongs to the concept of concrete objects (器). This is all using the Laozian and Neo-Daoist idea of “being arises from non-being” (有生于无) to explain above and below physical form. Cui Jing (崔憬) of the Tang dynasty used the idea of the mutual dependence of form and function (体用相资) to explain the dao that is above physical form and the concrete object that is below physical form. He believed that the dao above physical form and the concrete object below physical form all referred to substantial physical form (形质). The concrete object that is above physical form referred to the substantial physical form itself, the dao that is below physical form referred to the subtle and mysterious function of substantial physical form. To make an analogy with heaven and earth, the roundness of heaven and the squareness of earth is specific physical form (形质) and concrete objects. That heaven and earth can give rise to and nourish the myriad things is function (用) and dao. The body of animals is form and concrete objects whilst their spirit is function and dao. With regard to plants, their limbs are concrete objects and form, whilst the life that is contained within their limbs is dao and function. As such, there is no distinction of prior and subsequent between the dao that is above physical form and the concrete object that is below physical form. The dao that is above physical form resides within the concrete object that is below physical form and takes the concrete object that is below physical form as its basis and moves it.

20.2 Two By the Song dynasty, above and below physical form became a question that all Song Confucians discussed, and so there appeared many different views. Zhang Zai used having physical form (有形体) and not having physical form (无形体) to explain above and below physical form. Not having physical form referred to the two qi of yin and yang. Zhang Zai believed that the reciprocal process of yin and yang belonged to the qi of the supreme void (太虚). The qi of the supreme void was neither concrete objects nor had physical form, and so it was called dao. The myriad things of the world all had physical form and so they are called concrete objects. The dao does not leave traces whereas concrete objects do leave traces. The constriction and extension between the two qi of yin and yang is “qi-transformation” (气化) and is also the manifestation of dao. It is through the qi-transformation of yin and yang that the objects with form are engendered—these are the “concrete objects” that are below physical form. Concrete objects are thus a result of qi-transformation. These views are coherent with Zhang Zai’s discourse of qi as origin.

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The Cheng brothers, however, opposed Zhang Zai’s views. They believed that Zhang Zai’s views do not distinguish between dao and concrete objects. They believed that dao is above physical form and concrete objects is below physical form and taking the translucency, emptiness, unity and vastness of qi (清虚一大之 气) as dao is merely to talk about concrete objects, and not to talk about dao. The Cheng brothers believed that the dao that is above physical form referred to principle (li) and not qi. Cheng Yi, however, emphasized that dao and concrete objects are distinguished from each other and paid great attention to the distinction between above and below physical form. Cheng Hao, on the other hand, emphasized the inseparability of dao and concrete objects. Cheng Yi believed that yin and yang are qi, below physical form, and that dao is above physical form. He believed that dao is not yin and yang but the cause of yin and yang, that is, dao is the reason why yin and yang become yin and yang, or, in other words, the reason why yin and yang replace each other. Like the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi maintained the view of “li is origin” (理本论). He believed that li is the dao that is above physical form and that qi is the concrete form that is below physical form”: There is li and qi between heaven and earth. Li is the dao that is above physical form, it is the root that engenders the myriad things. Qi is the concrete object that is below physical form, it is the instrument [具] that engenders the myriad things. In the engendering of people and objects this li must first be received, and then there is nature [性]; it is only after receiving this qi that there are physical forms. Although nature and physical forms are not external to engendering, the distinction between its dao and concrete objects is very clear and cannot be mixed up. (Book 58, “A Reply to Huang Daofu” The Collected Works of Master Zhu)

Here, “li” is taken to be the original source of the world; it is the “root of that engenders the myriad things.” “Qi” is the material that constitutes things and affairs, and has form, and so is the concrete object that is below physical form. With regard to above and below physical form, li is li and qi is qi; the demarcation between them is very clear and cannot be confused. However, li and qi can also not be separated from each other. Li is the existential basis of qi and qi is the place wherein li resides. The two are mutually dependent and cannot be separated. With regard to the issue of whether li and qi are prior to subsequent to one another, Zhu Xi believes that, “there is originally no question of anteriority and posteriority with regard to li and qi, but if one must infer [推] its origins, then one must say that there is first li.” (Book 1, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Book 3 of the Questions and answers on Mencius also says, “when we make an inference about them, then it would seem that li is first and qi is subsequent.” As such, there is no question of temporal priority between li and qi, and what is meant by li being prior to qi is meant from the perspective of the original source and logical priority. Zhu Xi also used above and below physical form to talk about the distinction between li and concrete objects. He said, for example, “that which is above physical form has no shape and no image and this is li. That which is below physical form has disposition [情] and physical aspect [状] and this is concrete objects.” (Book 95, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) He also said,

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That which is above physical form is principle, if principle had a tiny bit of function then it becomes below physical form. No matter if things and affairs are of a big scale, they are still below physical form. The great accomplishments of Yao and Shun, for example, are all below physical form. No matter is principle is of a small scale, they still belong to above physical form. (Book 95, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

As can be seen, Zhu Xi’s elucidation of above and physical form is comprehensive and profound. Lu Jiuyuan also admitted the distinction between above and below physical form. He said, for example, From the perspective of above physical form [it] is called dao, from the perspective of below physical form [it] is called concrete objects. Heaven and earth are concrete objects. There is principle [理] in [Heaven’s] comprehensive embrace of life and earth’s carrying of forms. (Book 35, The Complete Collection of the Works of Lu Xiangshan)

Lu Jiuyuan, however, did not agree with Zhu Xi’s classification of yin and yang as below physical form and so should be considered as a concrete object. He believed that yin and yang is the dao that is above physical form. The reciprocal process of yin and yang is not limited to the two qi of yin and yang but rather, mutual oppositional pairs all belong to the reciprocal process of yin and yang, I am most in disagreement with views that take yin and yang to be concrete forms and not dao. The dao that is expressed in the Book of Changes is nothing more than one yin and one yang. Before and after, begin and end, movement and stillness, darkness and light, above and below, advancing and returning, toing and froing, opening and closing, filling and emptying, decreasing and increasing, high and low, dignified and undignified, external and internal, hidden and manifest, front and back, compliant and contrary, existence and death, gaining and losing, exiting and entering, being active and inactive, these are all expressions of one yin and one yang. The mutual transformation into each other of the odd and even is ceaseless. (ibid.)

These oppositional pairs are dao, and it is not the case that there is another dao external to these situations. The difference between Lu Jiuyuan and Zhu Xi is rooted in the differences between the school of heart-mind and the school of li. The school of heart-mind advocated that “heart-mind is li” and so does not countenance that above yin and yang there is another dao that is above physical form, instead, it takes yin and yang itself as dao. The school of li takes the source of the world itself as li and so necessarily stresses the distinction between dao and concrete objects, and so takes yin and yang as below physical form. This is the essential difference between the two schools. The Southern Song dynasty Zhang Shi (张栻) proposed the idea that “the heartmind is the root and qi is the branch” (心本气末). This meant that the mutual effecting on each other of the two qi of yin and yang engenders the myriad things, but the heartmind has a commanding role over qi. The heart-mind is above physical form and qi is below physical form. “The mouth, ears and eyes all rely on qi; it is thus for all things with form. As the heart-mind have a commanding function over qi, the heart-mind is above physical form.” (Book 6, Discourses on Mencius) As such, the heart-mind is the root and qi is the branch. If one neglected the heart-mind and pursued qi, then

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this is to forsake the root and to pursue the branch, “one must necessarily preserve the heart-mind [i.e. its commanding role]. If one forsook the heart-mind and instead sought for qi then this is to forsake the root and to pursue the branch. In this way, one loses control.” (Book 2, Discourses on Mencius)

20.3 Three In the Ming dynasty Lai Zhide (来知德), in his Explanation of the Classic of Change also used the formless li to explain the dao that is above physical form and used objects with form to explain the concrete objects that are below physical form. The phenomena [象] of yin and yang are all physical form. That which is above physical form transcends physical form and concrete objects and has no sound nor smell. This is li and so is called dao. That which is below physical form is confined to below physical form and concrete objects. It has appearance and images [象], it stops at form and that is it, so it is called concrete object. (Book 13, Explanation of the Classic of Change)

At the same time, Lai Zhide also believed that dao and concrete objects are mutually inseparable. The li that is above physical form resides within the concrete object that is below physical form. Dao and concrete object are inseparable. Just like heaven and earth has the li of great ultimate within it, and like the human body which has the li of the five constants [五性] hidden within it. This is why when Confucius distinguished between above and below physical form, the word “form” is always present. (ibid.)

The Ming dynasty Luo Qinshun (罗钦顺) criticized Zhu Xi’s division of qi into two distinct objects. He advocated instead that, “li and qi are one object” (理气为一物) and believed that, “dao and concrete objects are inseparable” (道器不二). Although he believed that that which is above physical form is dao and that which is below physical form is qi, he thought that this is merely a difference in terminology; in reality, the two are one entity. The dao that is above physical form and the concrete object that is below physical form are all qi. That which penetrates heaven and earth and connects past and present is nothing other than qi, which is unitary. This qi, while originally one, revolves through endless cycles of movement and stillness, going and coming, opening and closing, rising and falling. Having become increasingly obscure, it then becomes manifest; having become manifest, it once again reverts to obscurity. It produces the warmth and coolness and the cold and heat of the four seasons, the birth, growth, gathering in, and storing of all living things, the constant moral relations of the people’s daily life, the victory and defeat, gain and loss in human affairs. And amid all of this prolific variety and phenomenal diversity there is detailed order and an elaborate coherence which cannot ultimately be disturbed, and which is so even without our knowing why it is so. This is what is called principle. Principle is not a separate entity which depends on qi in order to exist or which attaches to qi in order to operate.1 (Book I, Knowledge Painfully Acquired) 1 Bloom

(1987): 58, modified.

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In speaking of the dao that is above physical form and the li that is above physical form, one is not speaking of a separate entity that depends on and is established on the basis qi and operates through it. What one refers to instead is the change and transformation of qi itself; dao and li is within qi. As such, “the coming together of vital energy is the li of coming together. The dissipating of vital energy is the li of dissipating. It is merely the fact that there is coming together and dissipating that we refer to it as li.”2 (Part II, Knowledge Painfully Acquired) It is not as Zhu Xi said that external to the coming together and dissipation of qi, there is a further principle of coming together and dissipation. In his philosophy, Wang Tingxiang advocated “discourse of qi as origin” (气本 论) and took principal qi (元气) as the original source of heaven and earth: Principal qi is the most primordial principle [宗统] of the myriad things. With principal qi then there is engendering, with engendering the dao becomes manifest, thus qi is the form [ 体] of dao and dao is the method [具] of qi. (Five Phases chapter, Cautious Words)

As such, the root-body of the myriad things is principal qi, above principal qi is not yet another even more original thing. As such, Wang Tingxiang believes that that which is above and below physical form is all qi. “Qi is the origin of objects, li is the method [具] of qi, concrete objects is the mature completion [成] of qi.” (“The Form of Dao” Cautious Words) As such, “being is qi and non-being is also qi, dao resides within it” (ibid). With this, Wang Tingxiang opposed Zhu Xi’s discourse on qi and believed that, The myriad li all come from vital energy, there is no li that is emptily suspended on its own. All the changes and transformations in the world go from being to nonbeing, from nonbeing to being. Qi is constantly existing and has never disappeared. (Debating the Great Ultimate)

Thus, it is only once there is qi that there is dao, Principal qi is the form of the dao. Once there is void then there is qi, once there is qi then there is dao. There is change and transformation in qi and so there is change and transformation in dao. Qi is dao and dao is qi, we cannot talk about them in terms of separation and unification” (Part I, Refined Discussions)

Dao or li are two things combined into one and are inseparable.

20.4 Four Wang Fuzhi of the early Qing dynasty proposed the idea of “the world is only concrete objects”; he believed that “all that overflows between heaven and earth is concrete objects” (Chap. 5, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes). Wang Fuzhi interpreted above and below physical form on this basis. He said, the concrete forms that are below physical form are the specific and visible objects. That which is above physical forms is hidden and contained within specific objects and is what 2 Bloom

(1987): 148, modified.

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allows specific objects to become specific objects. A willow tree and its branches and leaves as well as life and death can all be seen and heard and so pertain to that which is below physical form. What allows the branches to be branches, the leaves to be leaves, however, can neither be seen nor heard, and this is the dao that is above physical form. With regard to being heard or not, it can also be said that, “that which is above physical form is hidden, that which is below physical form is manifest” (ibid.). Although the dao that is above physical form cannot be heard or seen, it is not separable from the concrete object that is below physical form. As such, Wang Fuzhi proposed the idea “it is only after there is below physical form that there is above physical form.” This means the precondition for the existence of above physical form is the existence of “form” and this form pertains to below physical form; dao and concrete objects are thus inseparable. As such, an independent dao that exists separate from a concrete object (that is below physical form) is impossible. Dao resides within concrete objects, as such, dao and concrete objects form one body. To exhaustively understand concrete objects is to understand dao. As the dao that is above physical form is inseparable from the concrete object that is below physical form, our understanding of the dao that is above physical form can absolutely never depart from objects that are below physical form. With regard to the relationship between the dao that is above physical form and the concrete object that is below physical form, Wang Fuzi maintained that concrete object takes prior position. There is first the specific existence of concrete objects and then the manifestation of dao. As such, it can only be said that dao is the dao of concrete objects, but it cannot be said that concrete objects are the concrete objects of dao. Dai Zhen (戴震) maintained the discourse of qi-transformation and believed that the whole universe is the process of the flowing of qi-transformation. Dai Zhen uses prior and subsequent to physical form to talk about above and below physical form. When the flow of qi-transformation has not yet become material forms, then this is above physical form. When it has become material forms, then this is below physical forms. As yin and yang do not have physical form they belong to above physical form. As the five phases of water, fire, wood, metal and earth have material form and can be seen, they belong to below physical form. The qi of the five phases which has not yet achieved material form, and which people are all endowed with, belongs to above physical form. It is for this reason that Dai Zhen is of the opinion that the distinction that the school of li made between li and qi is a creation of the later Confucians and not something that exists within the six classics, and the books of Confucius and Mencius. It is thus a mistake to take yin and yang as below physical form. By the modern period, Wang Tao (王韬) used above and below physical form to talk about the distinction between China and the West. He believed that China was above physical form and it excelled at discussions about dao. The West was below physical form. Between dao and concrete objects, however, it is dao that governs the root. “If one only knows to praise Westerners and look down upon that which one oneself holds onto, then this is to not see the root of governance.” (Letters of Wang

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Tao3 ) This is a comparison of Chinese and Western cultures under the backdrop of Western learning spreading to the East. After this, the traditional discussion of above and below physical form basically disappeared without a trace.

Reference Bloom, Irene. 1987. Knowledge painfully acquired: the K‘un chih chi. New York: Columbia University Press.

3 弢园尺牍.

Chapter 21

One and Two (yiliang, 一两)

The concept of “one” and “two” refers to the relationship of opposition and unification in the development of phenomena and is equivalent to the “antithesis” of dialectics. “One” refers to the resolution of opposition into unification, whereas “two” is the oppositional relationship itself. “One” contains “two” but “one” is also only manifested through “two.” With regard to the concept of “one and two,” different philosophers from different epochs have stressed different aspects of the dyad. Some put emphasis on the oppositional relationship and others put emphasis on the resolution into “one,” and others discuss the two aspects simultaneously. Although there are differences in their specific discussions, in the main, they can all be categorized under the concept of “one and two.”

21.1 One In the history of Chinese philosophy, the idea of “one and two” germinated in the Shang-Zhou period, whereas the first expression of this idea comes from the official historian of the state of Jin, Shi Mo (史墨). Shi Mo said, The growth of things come in pairs […] the body has its left and right, each person has its partner, the king has his dignitary [公], the feudal prince has his steward [卿], they all have an assistant [贰]. (32nd Year of Lord Zhao, Zuo Zhuan)

The “left right” and “partner” and “assistant” here refers both to “two” and to that which forms oppositional pairs. This indicates that Shi Mo is already aware that a thing does not exist in the singular, but that it contains the unification into one of two oppositions. Succeeding this, although the works of Laozi, Zhuangzi and the commentaries to the Book of Changes do not specifically use the concept of “one and two,” their thought as a whole can be considered as an elaboration on the concept of “one and two.” Specifically, Laozi elaborated on the idea of “two” and emphasized the mutual © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_21

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reliance of the oppositions and their transformation into each other. Laozi chapter two discusses this: As soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful are beautiful, there is already ugliness. As soon as everyone knows the competent, there is already the incompetent. Being [有] and Non-Being [无] give rise to each other, difficult and easy complete each other, long and short shape each other, high and low fill each other harmonise with each other, tones [音] and sounds [声] harmonize with each other, before and after follow each other.”

Laozi exposed that the opposition between beautiful and ugly, competence and incompetence, being and non-being, long and short, high and low, before and after are all mutual dependent; the existence of the one is conditional upon the existence of the other. The oppositional pairs are, furthermore, not static but can be transformed into one another. As Laozi Chap. 22 says, Flexed then whole, warped then straight, hollow then full, worn then new, less then more, much then bewildered.

Laozi Chap. 58 says, It is upon misfortune that good fortune leans, it is within good fortune that misfortune is hidden, who knows where it all ends? […] The correct reverts to the strange, the good reverts to the freakish.

Although Laozi saw the mutual transformation into each other of the opposite pairs, he did not talk about the conditions for this transformation. In contrast to this, Zhuangzi stressed the “one” in “one and two.” “One” for Zhuangzi is “dao” in the sense that, from the perspective of “dao,” everything is a uniform oneness. The “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” of the Book of Changes proposed the key ideas of “one yin and one yang is the dao” and “the hard and the soft displace each other and change and transformation arises.” Yin and yang and soft and hard are oppositional pairs, are the “two” of “one and two,” and they serve to illustrate how the root of development and movement lies in this oppositional relationship. In the pre-Qin period, another work which provided extensive exposition to the idea of “one and two” was the Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics (黄老四经). The Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics was completed around the end of the Warring States period. With regard to its exposition on the concept of “one and two,” its biggest characteristic is that it uses “yinyang” to explain the opposition relationship in nature and human society. For example, in the natural world, “Heaven [tian] is yang and earth is yin, spring is yang and autumn is yin, summer is yang and winter is yin, morning is yang and night is yin.” In human society, The big state is yang and the small state is yin, the strong state is yang and the weak state is yin, having affairs to attend to is yang and not having affairs to attend to is yin. Those who extend are yang and those who withdraw are yin, the ruler is yang and the minister is yin. Above is yang and below is yin, the father is yang and the son is yin, the elder is yang and the younger is yin. The honourable is yang and the lowly is in, attaining is yang and failing is yin, taking a wife and having offspring is yang and death is yin. Those who control others are yang and those who are controlled by other are yin. The guest is yang and the host is yin, the teacher is yang and the student is yin, speech is yang and silence yin, giving is yang and receiving is yin. (“Aphorisms”, The Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics)

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It is precisely through the oppositional relationship between yin and yang that the basic structures of nature and society are constituted, The way [dao] of heaven and earth is that, cold and dampness, hot and dryness cannot simultaneously take their stances, hard and soft and yin and yang cannot operate together. They mutually nourish each other and complete one another.

“Cannot simultaneously take their stances” and “cannot operate together” refer to the conflictual opposition between the pairs, whereas “mutually nourish each other” and “complete one another” is the resolution of the opposition into one.

21.2 Two The great Confucian of the Western Han, Dong Zhongshu proposed the thesis that, “all things invariably possess complements [合]” which meant that he believed all things have an opposite side, All things invariably possess complements. There must be a superior and a subordinate. There must be a right and a left. There must be a front and a back. There must be an outside and an inside. [When] there is goodness, there must be evil. [When] there is compliance there must be contrariness. [When] there is joy there must be rage. [When] there is cold, there must be heat. [When] there is morning there is night. These are all complements. Yin is yang’s complement, the wife is the husband’s complement, the son is the father’s complement, the minister is the ruler’s complement. There is nothing that does not have a complement, and each pair of complements has both yin and yang.1 (“Laying the Foundation for righteousness”, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn)

The opposition of yin and yang is the regularity which all complements must observe. More specifically, in human society, with regard to the relationship between rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, and husbands and wives, it is the ruler who is yang and the minister who is yin, the father who is yang and the son is yin, and the husband who is yang and the wife is yin. As such, “the righteous relationship between ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife are all derived from the way [dao] of yin and yang.” (ibid.) Here, we see the transformation or rationalization of social roles and classes into the regularities of nature (yin and yang). In contrast to the commentaries to the Book of Changes and the Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics, which took heaven to be yang and earth to be yin, the classic of religious Daoism of the Eastern Han period, the Classic of Great Peace, believed that heaven and earth both contained elements of yin and yang. It also proposed the idea of yin and yang uniting to create a new thing (两两为合). The text says, “although there is no limit to heaven’s extension, it contains yin and yang and unites to become a new thing.” (“Heaven wishes for there to a Fire Phase Lord to Receive Instruction”)

1 Queen

and Major (2016: 426), modified.

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The earth extends all the way down, so how can there be any limit to speak of. Earth also contains its own yin and yang, and these unite to create a new thing [两两为合]. In this way, one yin and one yang become limitless both upwards, downwards, and to the sides. (ibid.)

This means that heaven and earth is constituted by one yin and one yang and that heaven and earth is “one” whereas yin and yang is “two” i.e. contained in the “one” of heaven and earth is the “two” of yinyang. The heaven and earth which is constituted by yin and yang is limitless in space-time and ceaseless in its actions. This can be considered as the first signs of theses such as Wang Anshi’s, “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦],” (耦之中又有耦) Zhang Zai’s, “one phenomenon with two polarities” (一物两体) and Zhu Xi’s “one contains two” (一包两). In the Laozi there is the idea that, “Dao produced one, one gives rise to two.” The “one gives rise to two” here refers to the relationship between “one” and “two,” but it’s not all that clearly stated. In his commentaries on the Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord (黄帝内经), the Sui dynasty Yang Shangshan (杨上善) specifically used “one divides into two” (一分为二) to explain Laozi’s “one gives rise to two.” He writes, furthermore, “when dao gives rise to one, this is called its unworked state [朴]. When one is divided into two, this is called heaven and earth.” (Commentary on “Understanding the Needle and Stone” Chapter in “Grand Simplicity”) “One” is the amorphous state of heaven and earth before it is divided up and is also the united body which contains both heaven and earth. “Two is heaven and earth.” “One divides into two” is thus an explicit statement on the relationship between “one and two.”

21.3 Three The Neo-Confucianism of the Song period pushed Confucianism into its maturity. Whether in terms of the sophistication of its speculative reasoning or in terms of the profundity of its investigations, it represents a peak in the development of Chinese philosophy. It is against this backdrop that the investigation into “one and two” was furthered, with Wang Anshi, Zhang Zai, the Cheng brother, Zhu Xi and Ye Shi (叶适) all providing exciting discussion of the relationship between “one and two.” In his investigation of the root workings of phenomena, Wang Anshi proposed that, “all have its counterpart [偶]” (皆各有偶) and “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦]” (耦之中又有耦). “Counterpart [偶]” and “pairs [耦]” are both “two,” that is they are both opposed pairs as well as the root of how phenomena operate. In his Commentary on the Great Plan (洪范传), there is a passage that elaborates on these two key issues: In phenomena constituted by the five phases [五行], their time, position, material, vital energy [气], nature, shape, affairs [事], disposition, appearance [色], smell, their taste, all have their counterpart. From this we can infer that, there is nothing that we cannot understand [according to this logic]. One soft and one hard, one obscure and one bright, there when there is right [正]and there is perverse [邪], good and bad, ugly and nice, fortune and misfortune. The principle [理] of nature and mandate and the meaning of morality [道德] is all thus.

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Within a pair [耦] there is another [耦], and so the changes in the myriad things proceed onto infinity.

There are three dimensions to this passage. First, the five phases are the principal element that constitutes phenomena. Second, all things have properties such as time, position, material, vital energy, nature, shape, affairs, disposition, and all these properties have dimensions that can affect another, they “all have their counterpart.” Counterpart here refers to the relations between soft and hard, obscure and bright, right and perverse, good and bad, ugly and nice, fortune and misfortune. Third, each side of the pair is, in turn, constituted by oppositions, and so “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦].” This indicates the limitless nature of oppositions; it is precisely this oppositional nature of pairs within pairs which constitutes the endless transformation of phenomena. Zhang Zai also gave the concept of “one and two,” relatively detailed exposition and proposed the idea of “one phenomenon with two polarities” (一物两体). He says, Qi is one phenomenon with two polarities; Because it is unifying, it is creatively indeterminate (polarities coexist within it, thus it is indeterminate), and because it is constituted by polarities, it is transformative (polarities push one another into unity). This is why nature is constituted by three dimensions.2 (“Three and Two” Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

Zhang Zai further explains that, If yin and yang do not exist, the One (great ultimate) cannot be revealed. If the One cannot be revealed, then the function of the two forces will cease. Emptiness and solidity [虚实], motion and rest, grouping and dispersing, and clearness and turbidity are two different substances [体]. In the final analysis, however, they are one. (“Supreme Harmony” Correcting Youthful Ignorance3 )

The “one phenomenon” here refers to vital energy on its own, to the totality of vital energy. The “two polarities” here refers to the oppositional vital energy which contains emptiness and solidity movement and stillness, grouping and dispersing, and clarity and muddiness. “One phenomenon” refers to the vital energy seen from the outside whereas the “two polarities” refers to the internal vital energy seen from the inside. Vital energy as something which unites oppositions into one body acts, changes and transforms in a subtle and imperceptible way because the oppositional pairs it contains (emptiness and solidity, motion and rest, grouping and dispersing, and clearness and turbidity) are the internal agents of movement of phenomena itself. Vital energy is not merely the quantitative addition of the oppositional pairs. It is the oppositional relationship between pairs such as emptiness and solidity movement and stillness, grouping and dispersing, clarity and muddiness which constitutes vital energy itself. This is why the two substances are ultimately one phenomenon. Without the oppositional pairs of emptiness and solidity motion and rest, grouping and dispersing, clearness and turbidity acting upon one another, vital energy itself 2 Kim

(2015: 64), modified. (1969: 505).

3 Chan

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could not exist. Likewise, without vital energy as that which unites the pairs into one unity, then the pairs would cease to act upon each other. This is why the unity which contains all these pairs contains a limitless life force. “Heaven” (tian) itself—what Zhang Zai calls the “supreme void” (太虚)—is in essence also vital energy. It contains a limitless life force, and so heaven can give rise to the myriad things through transforming things, and this is the meaning of “Heaven [tian] is three.” “One phenomenon with two polarities” can be understood as an accurate expression of the law of the unification of opposite pairs into one. It clarified that the reason things and affairs develop, and change is due to the internal opposition between phenomena and things themselves. Zhang Zai’s exposition on the relationship between “one and two” is of great theoretical sophistication and has reached a very great height indeed. In the thought of the Cheng brothers, the relationship between “one and two” is expressed through “opposition” (对) or how they are “depend on one another” (对 待). “Opposition” (对) or “depend on one another” (对待) is “two.” With regard to “one and two” the Cheng brothers have the following theses. The Cheng brothers believe that, “Opposition” (对) and “depend on one another” is the principle inherent in all things, nothing exists on its own and oppositions are universal and necessary. Second, the relationship between the oppositions waxes and wanes, so that up to a certain point they can transform into each other, and the way they do this is “when phenomenon reaches its limit, it necessarily reverts” (物极必反). The relationship between opposites is not a static or still and unchanging one but is an active one which is always in the process of increasing and decreasing and so changing. Once this process of increasing or decreasing reaches a certain limit, it will change into its opposite. This is the so-called, “when phenomenon reaches its limit, it necessarily reverts.” Third, the way that opposites depend on each other is the root reason for why things develop and change, thus “[things] must depend on one another, this is the root of ceaseless arising” (必有对待, 生生之本也). (Purified Words of the Two Chengs) In their exposition on oppositions, the Cheng brothers revealed the universality of oppositional relationships, their transformation into each other, as well as the internal cause of why things develop, and thus provided a more profound and thorough exegesis of “one and two.” With regard to “one and two,” Zhu Xi inherited some of the theses of the abovementioned thinkers and went on to provide comprehensive and profound expositions on this subject. His opinions can be summarized as follows. First, Zhu Xi absorbed Zhang Zai’s idea of “one phenomenon with two polarities” and himself proposed that, “one contains two” (一个包两个). Second, he absorbed the Cheng brothers’ idea that “there is no singularity, there is necessarily pairs” (无独必有对) and Wang Anshi’s idea that “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦],” and proposed that, “within singularity itself there are pairs” (独中自有对). For example, yin and yang, male and female: Generally, we say that yin and yang are two aspects [两端], but within yin itself, there is the division into yin and yang, and within yang there is yin and yang. The dao of Qian completes the male and the dao of Kun completes the female. Although the male belongs to yang, it cannot be said that there is no yin there. Although the female belongs to the yin, one also cannot say that there is no yang there. (Book 94, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

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Third, he proposed “one divides into two and every part is thus” (一分为二, 节节如 此). Although Zhang Zai’s idea of “one phenomenon with two polarities” provided a general overview of the unification of opposition into one, it did not further investigate how the opposites mutually constructed each other. On the foundations which Zhang Zai provided, Zhu Xi said, “one contains two” and that “one divides into two.” The myriad things in the universe are all but “one dividing into two and every part is thus, and so on to infinity, all is because one gives rise to two.” (Book 67, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Evidently, this is a further elaboration of Wang Anshi’s idea that “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦],” because Wang Anshi did not make explicit the idea of limitless development that was implicit in his thesis. Zhu Xi, however, explicitly states that, “one divides into two and every part is thus.” Fourth, Zhu Xi also attributes the development and change of things to the inner opposition that exists within things, All phenomena in the world cannot transform through the singular, only after it is two can it transform. For example, it is through one yin and one yang that the myriad things can be transformed and born [化生]. (Book 98, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

Evidently, Zhu Xi has here taken on Zhang Zai’s idea that, “Because it is one, it is numinous, because of two, there is transformation.” (一故神, 两故化) After Zhu Xi, Ye Shi proposed the idea that, “dao originates in one but is realized in two” and said, dao originates in one but is realized in two. When in former times one spoke of dao it was necessarily in terms of two. In every case of the shapes of things, yin and yang, hard and soft, compliant and contrary, facing and opposed, odd and even, departing and uniting, warp and weft, mainstay and strands, are all two. It is only thus, in every case of that which can be spoken of, it is all two, not one. There is not one thing which isn’t like this, never mind the myriad things. The myriad things are all thus, never mind that which is limitlessly mutually transforming itself [相禅]. (“Equilibrium and Commonality”, “Submission”, Collected Works of Shui Xin)

Here Ye Shi is bringing to light the universality of opposition. From the above discussion, we can see that the thinkers of the Song dynasty discussed “one and two” with extreme profundity and comprehensiveness. Apart from equally stressing that opposition is the root cause of why things change and develop, each philosopher formed his own characteristic theses. Wang Anshi’s thesis that “there are pairs [耦] even in pairs [耦]” brought to light the limitless nature of oppositions from a longitudinal direction. Zhang Zai provided a thorough analysis of the relationship between “one” and “two.” The Cheng brothers, whilst stressing the universality of oppositions, simultaneously disclosed the mutual transformation into each other of opposites, that is, the principle that “when phenomenon reaches its limit, it necessarily reverts.” Zhu Xi absorbed the thought of all the above thinkers and provided the concept of “one and two” with an even more comprehensive and thoroughgoing exegesis. It can be said that investigation into the concept of “one and two” reached a high tide in the Song period, and Zhu Xi’s thought, in uniting the viewpoints of all the philosophers, is the peak of this high tide.

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21.4 Four In the Ming period and early Qing investigation into “one and two” continued unabated, and the figures who provided unique interpretations on it were Wang Tingxiang and Wang Yizhi (王以智) and Wang Fuzhi. Wang Tingxiang took the opposition and complementarity between yin and yang as the inner reason for the transformation and arising of the myriad things. For Wang Tingxiang yin and yang is united in principal vital energy (元气), and yin and yang as the pair which constitutes principal vital energy are mixed with one another and cannot be separated. The phenomena that vital energy gives rise too therefore are also mixtures of inseparable yin and yang. What is particularly worthy of attention is that with regard to the oppositional relationship between yin and yang Wang Tingxiang proposed “the principle that either the guest or host must occupy a commanding position.” (宾主偏胜之义). His thesis was that the dominant side of the pair is what decides the nature of a phenomenon, and so added another dimension to the discussion on “one and two.” Fang Yizhi (方以智) used the concepts of “exchange” (交), “cycle” (轮) and “latent” (几) to describe the mutual infection between “one” and “two” and their subsequent giving rise to things. “Exchange” describes the mutual infection and handing over between the opposites. “Cycle” describes the mutual transformation and evolution into each other of the opposites. “Latent” refers to the subtle beginnings of things before their full manifestation. In summary, “exchange”, “cycle” and “latent” describe the process of mutual infection and transformation between the opposites which causes the changes and transformation in phenomena. Emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, yin and yang, formed objects [行] and vital energy, dao and concrete objects, morning and night, obscurity and clarity, birth and death, in all of heaven and earth and the past and today, all is two. In this world there is nothing which doesn’t exchange, and so nothing which doesn’t become one through two [无不二而 一者]. There is nothing which isn’t opposed [to its opposite] and depends on its [opposite]. Since in reality the pairs help each other therefore if there was not two then there could not be one. (“Three Aspects”, Equilibrium Between East and West)

What is meant by “nothing which doesn’t become one through two” [无不二而一 者] is that there is no pair which doesn’t exchange and infect each other, and unite two into one, which is also to say, “if there was not two then there could not be one.” Through his commentaries on Zhang Zai’s Rectifying Youthful Ignorance (正 蒙), Wang Fuzhi’s elaborated on Zhang Zai’s idea of “one phenomenon with two polarities” and proposed the idea of “dividing one into two” (分一为二) and “uniting two into one” (合二而一). “One” refers to the unity which unites oppositions such as the vital energy of Supreme Harmony (太和) or supreme void (太虚). “Two” refers to the yin and yang within the vital energy of Supreme Harmony as well as states such as emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, clarity and muddiness, grouping and dispersion which is manifested through the conflict between the yin and yang within the vital energy of Supreme Harmony. These states all belong within Supreme Harmony and are all one body, but because they manifest themselves in

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different ways, they are called two. This then is the so-called “dividing one into two” and “uniting two into one.” Second, the vital energy of Supreme Harmony itself is the union into one body of yin and yang; it is because of movement and stillness that yin and yang divide. Although the phenomena which arise as a result of the vital energy of Supreme Harmony is divided into yin and yang, within each yin and each yang there contained once again the complete pair of yin and yang. There is thus yin and yang within yin and yin and yang within yang. Third, it is because of the friction and swaying back and forth of yin and yang that makes the vital energy of Supreme Harmony endless, produce change and transformation. From one perspective this friction manifests itself in conflict: “hard and soft, chilliness and temperateness, birth and killing, they necessarily oppose each other and take each other to be enemies.” (ibid.) This is “dividing one into two.” From the other perspective, the opposing pairs are not “completely separate and necessarily mutually opposed but are dependent upon each other” (截然分析而必相对待) and “utterly separate and delimited with no traffic between them” (截然分疆而不相出入). (Book 7, Inner Commentary on the Book of Changes) Instead, they are “mutually dependent and inseparable” (相倚 而不相离) (Book 5, Inner Commentary on the Book of Changes); this is “uniting two into one.” Fourth, “dividing one into two” is the overall process of the development of phenomena. “Uniting two into one” is thus not necessarily separable from “dividing one into two” but is actually contained in the process of “diving one into two”: “thus, uniting one into two is already contained in dividing one into two” (故合二 而一,既分一为二之所固有矣). (“Commentary on the Appended Phrases”, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes) In all, “one and two” is a very important pair of concepts in Chinese philosophy. The investigation into “one and two” as well as the relationship between them involved a developmental process that started from the shallow and ended at the deep, and from the simple to the complex. It evidences Chinese philosophy’s unique understanding of dialectics. “One and two” is thus a key for understanding traditional Chinese dialectics.

References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kim, Jung-Yeup. 2015. Zhang Zai’s philosophy of Qi: a practical understanding. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Lexington Books. Queen, Sarah A., and Major, John S. 2016. Luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn; attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 22

Movement and Stillness (dongjing, 动静)

In Chinese philosophy, movement and stillness are concepts that have very rich content. Apart from its common meaning of “alteration”, “transition,” movement also contains the meanings of “having desire”, “action” and “vigorous and energetic.” With regard to stillness, apart from its common meaning of “standstill”, “unchanging” it also contains the meanings of “no desire”, “no action” and “flexible and accommodating.” As such, apart from touching upon cosmological and root-body discourses (本体论), movement and stillness also touches upon issues of selfcultivation. Below, we will analyse movement and stillness from the perspective of cosmological or root-body discourse and the discourse of self-cultivation.

22.1 One In cosmological or root-body discourse as well as in physics, “movement” means moving whereas “stillness” means “stopping.” The question of movement and stillness is thus the question of motion and immobility and its content can be summarized from two aspects. First, whether things and affairs as well as the whole universe are moving or not. Second, the relationship between the two. With regard to this question, different philosophers according to their different understandings and their theoretical considerations gave different answers and thereby enriched the content and profundity of the question of movement and stillness. The philosopher who first turned movement and stillness into a philosophical question was Laozi. Laozi saw “dao” as the origin of the universe and all things as a manifestation of “dao.” With regard to the relationship between dao and the myriad things, Laozi believes that the myriad things are produced from dao, and all return to dao. Laozi says, “in the process of the myriad things emerging [作] together, we can witness their reversion.” (Chap. 16, Laozi) What is designated as emerging [作] means “operating” (运作) and change; it means that the myriad things are in constant movement. Laozi, however, believes that the regularity of the movement of things is that of “reversion” (复) which means back and forth and returning. “Witnessing © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_22

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their reversion” is thus understanding and grasping the regularity of the movement of things. The place to which the myriad things return, however, is the place where it gave rise to itself, and that is dao. Although the myriad things are mixed and disorderly and are situated within all kinds of changes and transformations, they will all ultimately return to their root, return to dao. After this returning to their root, there is a state of “stillness.” This return to dao on the part of the myriad things is the manifestation of the regularity of the dao. Laozi thus believes the development of things necessarily revert to its opposite. As such, we can see that dao is still, but the myriad things are moving and that the movement of the myriad things is temporary, but they will all ultimately return to empty stillness. With regard to the relationship between movement and stillness, therefore, stillness is primary whereas movement is secondary. Stillness is absolute whereas movement is relative. Zhuangzi’s view of movement and stillness advocates that the myriad things are within a moving state of change and transformation. In “Autumn Floods” he said, “The life of things is like the hurrying and galloping along of a horse. With every movement there is a change; with every moment there is an alteration.” Following this, Zhuangzi also absolutized the movement of things, believing that the myriad things are all situated within a constant process of change from one minute to the next, “The sun in the meridian may be the sun declining. A creature may be born to life and may die at the same time.” As such “their simultaneous generation is their simultaneous destruction, and vice versa.” (“Equalizing Assessments of Things”) This view of Zhuangzi’s is ultimately aimed at breaking through people’s subjective perspectives and thus gaining freedom. If the myriad things are constantly changing, then a complete understanding of things is impossible; people should therefore let go of subjective judgment, thereby extinguishing the oppositional relationship that exists between the self and the external world and so achieve an unfettered and effortless state of “heaven, earth, and I were produced together, and all things and I are one.” What is worth paying attention to is that in the chapter “The World under Heaven,” Zhuangzi records the 21 key questions of the hundred schools of thought. Within these there were two questions which pertained to the question of movement and stillness. One of these was, “The shadow of a flying bird does not (itself) move.” This passage was probably of the opinion that the flying bird is the subject of movement and it was only the bird itself which moved. The shadow, on the other hand, does not objectively exist and so is a subject which cannot move. That which moves can only be the flying bird and not the shadow; thus the movement of the shadow is a kind of fake movement. This highlighted in a more profound way the relationship between the subject of movement and movement itself. This problem can also be understood as follows: the shadow of the flying bird in every moment occupies a certain and determinate space, and so in every specific moment it is still, the totality of all the moments of stillness is still stillness, thus the flying bird is not moving. Another question was “Swift as the arrowhead is, there is a time when it is neither flying nor at rest.” Here, it is affirmed that when the arrowhead is fired, it partakes of an extremely fast movement, this is what is referred to as “not at rest” but with regard to each moment of its flight, the arrowhead partakes of a space that is determinate

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and not changing. In this regard, the arrowhead is also still, this is the so-called “not flying.” As such, this question raised the relativity of movement and absolute stillness. A remarkably similar question to this was asked by the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno who talked about an “arrow paradox” in which an arrow in flight is said to occupy a determinate location of its overall flight path at every moment and it cannot occupy two locations simultaneously. As the length of the arrow is known, the location of the arrow is determinate, but the known location is motionless. This also exposes the relative motionlessness of movement during the process of motion. The “Ten Wings” are a series of commentaries on the Book of Changes. The authors of the “Ten Wings” believe that the central idea of the Book of Changes is that of “change and movement” (变动). It says, As a book, the Book of Changes is something that cannot be kept at a distance. As a manifestation of the dao the Book of Changes involves frequent shifts. Change and movement never stand still but keep flowing through the six vacancies. Rising and falling without any consistency, the hard and the soft lines change into the other, something for which it is impossible to make definitive laws, since they are doing nothing but keeping pace with change.1 (Xici B)

This passage shows that for the authors of the “Ten Wings” although the changes of the myriad things in the world do not follow the same format, in essence, they are all changing and moving, and so movement is absolute.

22.2 Two During the Han period, the issue of movement and stillness did not receive any in-depth examination. It was only due to the desire to maintain the hierarchies of traditional society that Dong Zhongshu proposed that “the greatness of dao originates in heaven, if heaven does not change then dao also does not change.” These views were not, however, a purely philosophical discussion of the issue of movement and stillness. For an in-depth analysis of issue of movement and stillness, one had to wait till Wang Bi of the Wei-Jin period. Wang Bi proposed the root-body discourse idea of “non-being as origin”; what is designated here as “non-being” is what Laozi refers to as “dao.” Corresponding with this, Wang Bi developed Laozi’s idea that, “stillness is the lord of agitation.” First, Wang Bi believed that the myriad things in the world are all within a state of movement, change and transformation. One cannot put constraints on the movements of any specific thing, and the only thing which can do so is dao. From this we can gather that for Wang Bi, things move but dao is still; in this, Wang Bi is in accord with Laozi. Following this, with regard to movement and stillness, for Wang Bi the movement of the myriad things all ultimately return to empty stillness, and again Wang Bi is completely inheriting Laozi’s idea that, “returning, is how dao moves.” Third, stillness is absolute whereas movement is relative, and stillness is the root whereas movement is the end. With regard to the relationship between movement 1 Lynn

(1994: 89).

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and stillness, on the one hand, at its inception all movement is necessarily still, on the other hand, the coming to rest of movement is necessarily a returning to stillness. As such, the relationship between movement and stillness is not relative. Stillness is absolute whereas movement is relative; stillness is the root whereas movement is the root. For example, just as before and after one speaks there is silence, silence and language are not relative in the same way that movement and stillness are not relative. There does not necessarily exist a mutually dependent relationship between them. As such, the “utter stillness of perfect emptiness” (寂然至无) is the origins of the world, all movement, change and transformation all return to the “utter stillness of great stillness” (寂然大静). It can thus be seen that Wang Bi’s views of movement and stillness is fully coherent with his root-body discourse of “non-being as origin,” but he reversed the relationship between movement and stillness. By the Eastern Jin dynasty, a Buddhist theorist called Seng Zhao (僧肇) wrote, “On the Immobility of Objects” (物不迁论). It opens with “life and death wane successively in a continuous cycle, Winter comes, and Summer departs, the flowing between being and non-being is an ordinary belief of man, but I do not consider it thus” and he demonstrated this from the following perspectives. First, “things from the past do not survive to the present,” Seng Zhao says, If we look for past things in the past, we find that they are never nonexistent in the past, but if we search for past things in the present, we find that they are never existent there. That they are never existent in the present shows that they never come, and that they are never nonexistent in the present shows that they do not go away from it. If we turn our attention to investigate the present, we know that the present, too, does not go anywhere. This means that past things by their very nature exist in the past and have not gone there from the present, and present things by their nature exist in the present and have not come here from the past.2

From this we can see that past objects stay in the past, and have not come to the present, therefore objects do not move. Second, he discusses it with regard to the distinction between past and present, If the present passes on to the past, then there should be the present in the past. If the past reaches to the present, then there should be the past in the present. Since there is no past in the present, we know that it does not come, and since there is no present in the past, we know that it does not go.3

As the past and the present have no dealings with each other, “everything according to its natures, remains for only one period of time. What thing is there to come and go?” Third, he discusses it from the perspective of the relationship between cause and effect, The effect does not exist together with causes, because the effect is produced by the causes. Since the result is produced by the causes, the causes could not have been extinguished in the past. Since the result and the causes do not exist simultaneously, the causes do not come to the present. As they neither perish nor come to the present, the conclusion that they are immovable is clear.4 2 Chan

(1969: 346). (1969: 349). 4 Chan (1969: 350). 3 Chan

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The myriad things in the world exist either as cause or as effect. Seeing as cause and effect have no dealing with each other, then the fact that objects do not move is evident. The reason why Seng Zhao advocates the stillness of the myriad things and not their movement is due to his stance based on Mah¯ay¯ana Prajñ¯a P¯aramit¯a, “nothing has a nature of its own and so are only phenomenal” (性空假有). His aim was to break the common people’s holding onto the “movement” of the myriad things and to make them realise that stillness overcomes movement. To “overcome movement with stillness,” (以静破动) however, is to hold onto “stillness” and so “On the Immobility of Objects” also tried to break with “stillness.” Its ultimate conclusion was not that, “the myriad things do not move” (万物不动) but that it is both “always at rest even though they have gone” (往而常静), they “do not mutate while being gone” (往而弗 迁), as well as they are “always gone although at rest” (静而常往), and they “do not remain while at rest” (静而弗留). As such, as Seng Zhao sees it, the myriad dharmas are both phenomenal and have no nature of their own. The movement or stillness that arises from them is thus only illusory phenomena. As such, with regard to Seng Zhao’s views on the “immobility of objects” we cannot, therefore, simply criticize it as a sophistry that splits movement from stillness but should rather give it a specific analysis.

22.3 Three The question of movement and stillness is one which the Song dynasty NeoConfucians also paid great attention to. Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi all investigated this issue in great detail. They not only enriched the scope of this concept but also increased the profundity of its analysis. Zhou Dunyi’s—the founder of the school of principle—views on movement and stillness can be seen in the “Movement and Stillness” chapter of Penetrating the Book of Changes and An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate. In the “Movement and Stillness” chapter of Penetrating the Book of Changes he says, That which has no stillness in movement and no movement in stillness is a thing. That which has no movement in moving and no stillness in stillness, is spirit. It is not the case that having no movement in movement and having no stillness in stillness is neither movement nor stillness. Things, then, are not penetrating. Spirit renders the myriad things subtle.

In his An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太极图说), The Great Ultimate through movement generates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes still. Through stillness the Great Ultimate generates yin. When stillness reaches its limit, activity begins again. So movement and stillness alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to the distinction of yin and yang, and the two modes are thus established.5

The thought that these passages express can be categorized according to three levels. First, the subject of movement and stillness can be split into two, one is objects 5 Chan

(1969: 463), modified.

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and the other is spirit. Objects are specific things and affairs and are manifested as specifically existing things of determinate form. Spirit is the great ultimate; it is the original basis of the existence of the myriad things and is without form and appearance. Second, with regard to specific things and affairs, because they have specific form and body, they are manifested as “movement without stillness and stillness without movement”—i.e. either moving or still. Third, with regard to the great ultimate, it is manifested as “moving without movement and being still without stillness.” As the great ultimate is without shape or appearance and so is not limited to either pole of movement or stillness, it is impossible to describe it in terms of movement or stillness. The great ultimate is “moving without movement and being still without being still” but is also “neither moving nor still” because the great ultimate contains movement and stillness in one body, so that it is both moving and still. When movement reaches its limit it becomes still, and when stillness reaches its limit, it returns to movement. There is a continuous to and fro between movement and stillness and this gives rise to yang and yin, this is why “movement and stillness alternate and become the root of each other.” Zhou Dunyi’s view of movement and stillness perceived that when specific things are not moving they are still; this is quite reasonable, but he did not take the further step of exposing the absolute and relative relationship between movement and stillness. The Cheng brothers inherited Zhou Dunyi’s views and with regard to movement and stillness believed that, “movement and stillness, yin and yang have no beginning” (“Explanations of the Changes”, Explanations of the Classics by the Two Chengs of Henan), “movement and stillness cause each other, when there is movement then there is stillness and vice versa.” (“Mountain Trigram”, Annotations of the Book of Changes by the Cheng brothers) The Cheng brothers thus confirmed that movement and stillness mutually contain each other and transform into each other. At the same time, however, they believed that movement governs the myriad things, The former Confucians all took stillness to be the heart-mind of the world but they did not know that movement was the heart-mind of the world. How can anyone who does not know dao understand this? (“Return Hexagram” Annotations of the Book of Changes by the Cheng brothers)

This is evidently a criticism of Wang Bi’s view that stillness is the origin. Zhu Xi absorbed Zhou Dunyi’s views on dividing movement and stillness into the movement of things and the stillness of the great ultimate and developed them. First, for Zhu Xi, movement and stillness are mutually opposed but dependent and cannot be separated from each other. Movement and stillness are oppositional but mutually dependent upon each other and cannot be separated from each other. This is the self-so principle of heaven, and not something that can be effected through human artifice. If stillness was not opposed to movement, then it cannot be called stillness; if movement is not opposed to stillness, then it also cannot be called movement. (“Reply to Hu Guangzhong” Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection)

As such, “stillness cannot be without movement and movement cannot be without stillness.” (Book 32, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection) Movement and stillness are also mutually contained within each other: “within stillness there is movement,

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within movement there is stillness, it is because of stillness that there can be movement, it is because there is movement that there can be stillness.” (Book 92, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection) Following this, with regard to specific things and affairs, movement is movement and stillness is stillness, these are completely apart from each other, “when it is still then there is no movement, when there is movement there is no stillness” (ibid.). In this, Zhu Xi follows Zhou Dunyi and is speaking from the perspective of the specific movement and stillness of things and affairs. Following this, Zhu Xi differs from Zhou Dunyi in that Zhu Xi sees the great ultimate as that the principle [理] of that which is above physical forms but “movement, stillness, yin and yang are all below physical form” which means that only those things below physical form with specific form, such as yin and yang, are moving or still. The great ultimate which is above physical form cannot be encompassed by movement and stillness as the great ultimate is only the principle, and whilst principle contains movement and stillness, one cannot use principle to talk about movement and stillness. The movement and stillness of yin and yang is the manifestation of the principle of the movement and stillness of the great ultimate. In this regard, “movement is the movement of the great ultimate, and stillness is the stillness of the great ultimate, but movement and stillness are not the great ultimate” (ibid.). Fourth, from the perspective of logic (理), movement and stillness is in a ceaseless cycle without beginning or end. From the perspective of the great ultimate, although there is a sharp division between the movement and stillness of specific things, from the perspective of logic (理), one cannot talk of prior or antecedent with regard to movement and stillness. As such, Zhu Xi also calls movement and stillness the form (体) and function (用) of the great ultimate. Zhu Xi’s views on movement and stillness thoroughly exemplify the characteristics of his philosophy of principle. After Zhu Xi, Wang Tingxiang (王廷相) and Fang Yizhi (方以智) also discussed the issue of movement and stillness. Wang Tingxiang believed that movement and stillness are relative to each other and take each other as their conditions of existence, but in relation to heaven, although it is ceaseless in its activities, it is guided by stillness. With regard to earth, although there is constancy in its stillness, it is guided by movement. Wang Tingxiang’s view that movement and stillness take each other as their conditions of existence is a dialectical understanding of the issue, but his discourse of the movement and stillness of heaven and earth did not recognize the dialectical relationship between absolute movement and relative stillness. Fang Yizhi also proposed “within stillness there is movement, within movement there is stillness, the limit of stillness is movement and the limit of movement is stillness” (“Mutual Exclusion”, Equilibrium Between East and West), thus exposing the mutual transformation into each other of movement and stillness, but he did not have anything particularly innovative to say. In criticizing and inheriting the thought of his forebears, Wang Fuzhi gave a theoretical summary to this question and thereby endowed the question of movement and stillness with unprecedented sophistication. Wang Fuzhi’s main views can be summarized in four aspects. First, “movement and stillness is the movement and stillness of yin and yang.” In opposition to Zhou Dunyi and Zhu Xi who split movement and stillness into the movement of things and the stillness of the great ultimate, Wang

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Fuzhi maintained that movement and stillness is merely the movement and stillness of yin and yang. In this way he established this view of movement and stillness on the basis of qi discourse and thus affirmed that there is no essential separation between movement and stillness and things themselves, thereby refuting Zhu Xi and Zhou Dunyi’s views on the relationship between movement and stillness and the great ultimate. Second, “movement and stillness mutually contain one another,” he said, “the limit of movement is stillness, the limit of stillness is movement. […] Just at the moment of movement there is stillness, just at the moment of stillness there is immediately movement, stillness contains movement, movement does not relinquish stillness.” (“Out Chapter” Records of Thinking and Questioning) Third, “movement and stillness all movement.” Although Wang Fuzhi believes that, “movement and stillness contain each other,” he simultaneously believes that movement is absolute and stillness is relative. Movement and stillness is like closing and opening. Closing is movement and stillness is also movement. Movement gives rise to yang and is the moving state of movement, stillness, however, gives rise to yin and is the stillness of movement. The stillness which gives rise to yin is not the non-moving stillness of absolute stillness but is a movement that is relative to this absolute stillness, otherwise there would be no way of giving rise to yin. In all, movement and stillness are not equal. Movement is absolute and stillness is a unique form of movement; movement and stillness are all movement. Fourth, “neither movement nor stillness can be neglected.” Although movement is absolute and stillness is relative, both movement and stillness are movement and without movement things cannot arise. Stillness still has an extremely important role in the process of producing the myriad things. One can say that things cannot be produced without stillness, “the two qi communicate and feel each other and when they condense the myriad things are born” (“Supreme Harmony”, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correcting Youthful Ignorance), “that yin and yang have specific shape, they myriad things all have form, […] this is all because of stillness and the cessation of change, and the fact that all movement must return to stillness.” (“Yi and Qi”, Elaborations on the Book of Documents) As we can see from the above, Wang Fuzhi’s view of movement and stillness is a summation of the view on movement and stillness of Chinese philosophy. His view that, “movement is the movement of yin and yang” emphasized the essential subjectivity of movement and stillness and is a sublation of Zhou Dunyi and Zhu Xi’s views. His view that, “movement and stillness mutually contain each other” highlights the dialectical relationship between movement and stillness. His view that, “movement and stillness both move” is an expression of the absolute nature of movement and the relative nature of stillness and is also a criticism of Laozi and Wang Bi’s view that, “stillness is the lord of agitation.” His view that, “neither movement nor stillness can be neglected” is a theoretical innovation of the idea of movement and stillness. In all, Wang Fuzhi’s views on movement and stillness not only resolved the issue of subjectivity but also resolved the crucial issue of their relationship and is the highest achievement in traditional Chinese discussions of movement and stillness.

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22.4 Four From the perspective of self-cultivation, “stillness” mainly refers to “no desire”, “purity and stillness” and “non-purposive action.” Movement, on the other hand, mainly refers to “desire”, “restlessness” and “purposive action.” In the discourse of self-cultivation there were two sects which championed stillness and movement, respectively, but the former held the more prominent position. The “Record of Music” of the Book of Rites says that, “Humans are born still and this is heaven’s nature. [He is] touched off by [external] things and [only then] moves and this is [his nature’s] desires.” It believes that humans are by nature without emotions or desires. It is only after they are affected by external objects that the emotions and desires are produced. It is for this reason that the former kings had to formulate rituals and make music so that human desires can be restrained and channeled properly thereby maintaining a state of “stillness.” Laozi also sees the disorientating effect that external things have on the human heart-mind. It is for this reason that he believes that, “in not desiring, one achieves stillness” (Chap. 37), “purity and stillness can bring proper order to the world” (Chap. 45). He advocated, “extend your utmost emptiness as far as you can and do your best to preserve stillness”, “lessen your concern for yourself and reduce your desires” and returning to simplicity. With regard to self-cultivation, Zhuangzi’s proposed the methods of “sitting and forgetting” such that one “dissolves the connection with the body and its parts, discards the perceptive organs, leaves the material form and bids farewell to knowledge” and the “fasting of the heart-mind” methodology of “not hearing with the ears but with the heart-mind, not hearing with the heart-mind but with qi” as well as having a “body like the branch of a rotten tree, and mind is like slaked lime.” After the rise of Neo-Confucianism, the discourse of self-cultivation advocating stillness became further enriched. Zhou Dunyi believed that the key to emulating the sages consisted in “being unified” (一) To be unified is to be without desire. Without desire one is empty when still and direct in activity. When one is empty when still then one is enlightened, when one is enlightened then one is penetrating. Being direct in activity one is public-minded [公], when one is public-minded then one can be broad and universal [溥]. Being enlightened, penetrating, public-minded and broad and universal, is this not almost perfect! (“Learning to be a Sage”, Penetrating the Book of Changes)

With regard to the discourse on self-cultivation, Cheng Yi advocated “residing in reverence” (主敬). What “residing in reverence” achieves is an emptiness and stillness, “being reverent one will naturally be empty and still.” Being empty and still is not Buddhist meditation; it is not the stillness of ash and dead trees. Emptiness and stillness are also not necessarily just reverence. What is meant by reverence is that within emptiness and stillness one must still be a master of one’s own heart-mind, so that one can distinguish the right or wrong of things. In terms of the discourse of self-cultivation, although Zhu Xi believed that, “one should make sustained effort [工夫] when moving and one should make sustained effort in stillness”, “when it is time to move, then one should move. When it is time to be still, then one should be

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still. If in one’s movement and stillness one is not out of step with the times, then one’s path will be bright and glorious.” (“Reply to Xu Shunzhi”, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection) Zhu Xi thus still believes that stillness should be predominant, as “Putting reverence into practice already contains movement and stillness, but stillness is necessarily still the root” (“Reply to Zhang Qinfu”, Zhu Wen Gong’s Literary Collection). He believed that, “stillness is the root of nourishing movement, movement means that carrying out of stillness, there is stillness within movement” (Book 20, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). In general, however, stillness is predominant. Wang Yangming of the school of heart-mind of Neo-Confucianism advocated the “unity of movement and stillness.” He believed that stillness is the form of the heart-mind and movement is the function of the heart-mind. Nourishing one’s heartmind requires giving consideration to both aspects. As such “the studies of a moral exemplar do not differentiate between movement and stillness” and should “unite movement and stillness.” What is called “uniting movement and stillness” means “acting on the basis of principle,” “acting on the basis of principle is called stillness, following desire is called movement. […] Thus, in following principle, although there are countless changes in its dealings with things, all is stillness.” In order to arrive at “uniting movement and stillness” one must train and polish oneself through the actual affairs of life, “one must be trained and polished in the actual affairs of life. Only then can one stand firm and remain still whether moving or in stillness.”6 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living) As such, Wang Yangming’s “unity of movement and stillness” also belongs to the discourse of advocating stillness. Different to the discourse of advocating stillness, Wang Fuzhi maintained “advocating movement.” Wang Fuzhi believed that human nature is endowed by mandate and is “daily engendered and daily completed.” As such, “the sages’ and worthies’ ability to intuit heaven and understand change and transformation, abide by morality and carry out humaneness, all manifest the word ‘movement.’” (Book 3, Elaborations on the Book of Documents) With regard to self-cultivation, “the exemplary person’s ability to nourish his human nature and ability to enact good actions is not becomes he submits to his self-so natural desires.” “Rather than saying it is stillness, one should say it is movement.” The commanding position that Wang Fuzhi gives to movement in his discourse of self-cultivation is coherent with the commanding position of movement in his cosmological thought. The concept of movement and stillness contains a very rich meaning in Chinese philosophy. The various philosophers who either espoused moving or stillness have all contributed to the deepening understanding of this concept.

6 Chan

(1963: 28).

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References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for practical living and other neo-confucian writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The classic of the changes: a new translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 23

Constancy and Change (changbian, 常变)

In the history of traditional Chinese philosophy, the meaning of the concept of constancy and change is intimately connected with the concept of movement and stillness. The two concepts share both similarities and differences. Constancy and stillness refer not only to the relationship between activity and rest. The previous chapter has already given an exposition of the concept of movement and stillness and so this chapter will give an exposition of the changes in the concept of constancy and change throughout history. Constancy and change reflect ancient philosophers’ thinking about the state of the world. It is the crystallization of reflection on the developmental regularity of the universe and human life and represents ancient philosophers’ attention to and grasp of one’s own self and the universe.

23.1 One In contemporary Chinese “constancy” is usually used in the sense of “lasting”, “often”, “legal code”, “normal human relationships”, “normal” and “average and common.” “Change” is used in the sense of “change and transformation”, “change”, “adapting to circumstances”, and “sudden occurrence”, or abnormal freak events such as natural catastrophes. As such, constancy refers to the natural regularity in the activity and change of events, whereas its opposite “change,” refers to the uniqueness that exists within regularity. Constancy and change are a key constitutive element in the thought of many different traditional Chinese philosophers and many traditional Chinese classics have expounded upon it. In the Chinese classics, the concept of constancy and change appeared very early. During the Shang dynasty, through the observation of the natural world, people formed an understanding of the regularity of nature. The “Minor Odes” of the Book of Odes makes the natural observation that, “High banks become valleys; Deep valleys become hills.” During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, society was in disarray and faced many revolutionary changes. People came to realize the © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_23

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regularities in the changes of political history: “the altar of soil and grain has no constant person to sacrifice to it, and there are no constant positions for sovereigns and ministers” (32nd Year of Lord Zhao, Zuo Zhuan). Constancy and change appeared in other classics such as “Yue Yu II” of Discourses of the States and the “Reform of the Law” chapter of Book of Lord Shang. In these, constancy and change either referred to the changes and reforms of society or reflection on the inconstancy of life. Before Laozi, although many texts noted constancy and change, no one had raised it to the height of a philosophical concept. Laozi was the first to systematically discuss it as a philosophical concept and thus formed his own unique theoretical system. From this point onward, constancy and change became a highly important concept in philosophy and came to have a profound effect on later epochs. Contained in Laozi’s philosophy is a very rich dialectical thought. Through direct perception of the activity of nature and society as well as various human phenomena, he concluded that change is an inevitable force of situations, that at every moment all things in the world are situated within change and transformation. He thus believed that there is a regularity which can be followed in the activity and change of things and affairs. Laozi believes that change is the natural trend of things. All things in the world are in a constant state of change and humans are no exception to this. Violent winds do not last the whole morning and torrential rains do not last the whole day. What is behind these occurrences? It is the heavens and the earth. And if the heavens and the earth cannot sustain things for long, how much less the human being?” (Chapter 23, Daodejing)

The activity and change and transformation of the myriad things are not without any regularity, they follow a certain “constant dao.” This constant dao is the unchanging root-body (本体) in the change and transformation of things and affairs. In order to know this root-body, Laozi proposes the key idea of “returning is how dao moves.” (Chapter 40, Daodejing) Laozi believes that the development of all things and affairs tend towards its reverse direction, and the fact that things and affairs themselves contain a self-negating element is universal and this regularity is the common logic of the myriad things. As the human being resides within the myriad things of heaven and earth, they can observe the phenomena of the toing and froing of the myriad things and thus recognize that when things reach their limit they will return to its original nature and thus achieve a state of stillness. Laozi says, Things proliferate and each again returns to its root. Returning to the root is called stillness. Now as for stillness, this is called returning to its mandate, returning to its mandate is constancy. Knowing constancy is acuity, while failing to do so is to lose control. And to try to do anything while out of control is to court disaster. Using constancy is to be accommodating, being accommodating is tolerance. (Chapter 16, Daodejing)

Here, mandate refers to the original nature of the myriad things whereas constancy means the constant dao, that is, the unchanging root-body in change and transformation. Laozi believes that people should give expression to their own subjective, moving nature so as to understand the root-body of constancy. On the other hand, he also believes that “change” is an irrepressible trend of development. People are

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always situated within these two antagonisms. Faced with the unavoidable nature of “change,” people are helpless, and so when the time is right people should take a step back after they have advanced, do what the moment calls for, and so achieve longevity. Reaching the profoundest depth of the origins of things and affairs and maintaining its root is the way to achieving a “long life and enduring vision” for governing the state, people and serving the heavens.

23.2 Two The pre-Qin classic Book of Changes had a deeper and richer understanding of the concept of constancy and change and the relationship between them. It also systematized the simplicity that we see in Laozi’s philosophy constancy and change. The Book of Changes itself is a philosophy of change. It is a systematic elucidation of the changes of the world and human life. Its discussion of constancy and change is mainly collected in the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” and “Providing the Sequence of the Hexagrams.” The Book of Changes emphasizes that the myriad things are situated within an eternal flow of change. Constancy is only a momentary state within change and transformation and even the regularity contained in things and affairs themselves are in a constant state of change. As such, it is only when one has thoroughly understood the philosophy of change that one can realize the spirit of the Book of Changes. Change is not only absolute and necessary, it is also highly important with regard to the development of things and affairs, it is change which can preserve the endurance and longevity of things and affairs. It is precisely the constant change in things and affairs that pushes them to develop and perfect itself, and so preserve the long-lasting and inexhaustibility of the myriad things of the universe. The most valuable aspect of the “change” in the Book of Changes is that it stresses how change and transformation is the process of the production and innovation of new things and events. The production of new things and events and the extinguishing of the old is the most glorious and virtuous undertaking of heaven and earth and is the necessary trend of change and transformation. “Change” (易) means the constant birthing and production of things and events. Likewise, this view that things are constantly being renewed is applicable to the advancement of history. Society progresses and the Book of Changes affirms the function that change and reform has on society, all changes and reform that are suitable to the times are all in accord with the regular pattern. The Laozi and Book of Changes summarized the dialectical regularity of constancy and change from the perspective of cosmology and human life, but they only approached this from the theoretical plane. The first person to apply constancy and change to the practical governance of society was the famous military strategist of the late Spring and Autumn, Sun Wu (孙武). From his experiences in war, he derived a philosophy of war and used it to guide military strategy. In using the analogy of water, Sun Wu likened it to how in war the force of circumstances is not stable

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and unchanging. In order to restrain the enemy and gain victory, one must change according to the changes in the enemy and construct new military methods. Sun Wu says, An army does not have fixed strategic advantages, [just like] water does not have an invariable position. To be able to take the victory by varying one’s position according to the enemy’s is called being inscrutable. Thus, of the five phases, none is the constant victor; of the four seasons, none occupies a constant position; the days are both short and long; the moon waxes and wanes.1 (“Weak Points and Strong Points” Sun Tzu The Art of War)

Being able to grasp the regularity in the changes of the enemies’ military arrangements and thereby restraining the enemy and securing victory is the acme of wisdom in military strategy. Sun Wu recognized that there are no unchanging circumstances in war, so that change must be controlled by change. He recognized that the circumstances of war are constantly changing just in the same way that the myriad things are constantly changing; this is a universal regularity of the natural world. The great thinker and educator of the later Warring States Xunzi summarized the philosophies of the hundred schools of thought and thereby established his own highly unique philosophical system and thereby enriched the content of constancy and change. In the domain of the history of society he proposed that, “the mandate of heaven is constant, it does not exist for Yao and does not perish for Jie.” (“Discourse on Heaven” Xunzi) “Constant” here means the common rule and the regular pattern. What is meant is that the operation of the myriad things in nature has a regularity and will not be influenced and constrained by society or subjective wills and intentions. He emphasized the objectivity and necessity of the existence of regularity and thus removed the trappings of an anthropomorphized deity with which nature was previously associated. With regard to the occasional appearance of abnormal phenomena in nature, Xunzi believes that this is a normal phenomenon in the operation of heaven and earth and the change and transformation of yin and yang. Whilst they are rare, there is no reason for people to be fearful. He explains, If stars fall or trees groan, the people of the state are all fearful say, “What is this?” I say: it is nothing. These are simply the changes in Heaven [tian] and Earth and the transformations of yin and yang. These are simply rarely occurring things.2 (“Discourse on Heaven”)

The rare occurrences of strange phenomena in nature is the “change” in “constancy,” they are the extraordinary in the ordinary and common, the accidental in the necessary, but is coherent with regular pattern. Xunzi affirmed the accordance with principle of change and transformation and so made an important contribution to the traditional discourse on constancy and change. The representative legalist philosopher of the later warring states Hanfeizi inherited and developed the thought of his forebears and gave a renewed interpretation to the concept of constancy and change. He proposed standards for distinguishing 1 Ames

(1993: 127). (2014: 178).

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between “constancy” and “change”: “Only that which that began with the heavens and does not end when the heavens ends is called ‘constant’.” (“Commentaries on Laozi’s Teachings” Hanfeizi) “The myriad things have life and then death, the moment they start flourishing is the moment they start declining, so this cannot be called ‘constant.’” “Constancy” is eternal, is something that exists with heaven and earth. The process of the birth and decline of things are all not “constancy.” In practical terms of how, through employing constancy and change, one can resolve pragmatic issues, Hanfeizi proposed a standard for judging between “constancy” and “change”: those who do not know how to govern the state fear making changes to the existing institutions and blindly hold on the “constant.” In the eyes of the sage, however, change and constancy are relative, and one must maintain the constant norm when the time calls for it and change when it is necessary to change, that is, according to the circumstances of the state. It is only in this way one can benefit the state. The reality of circumstances is the standard for judging whether one should reform or maintain what has been the constant norm.

23.3 Three At the beginning of the Han dynasty, the rulers needed to learn from the mistakes of the Qin and thus reinforce their own rule. On the other hand, however, they wanted to rejuvenate production so as to maintain the long-term stability of society and their political rule. In this period, the Huainanzi appeared and opposed the blind following and reverence of tradition and instead advocated that laws and rituals need to change according to contemporary customs. Jia Yi (贾谊) proposed that, “change and transformation have their moment” (变化有时), “moment” here means the specific force of circumstances. He believed that in instituting policies the ruler should change according to the changes of the time, and whether one gets rid of a certain method or employs it must accord with a certain regular pattern (The Faults of Qin). Jia Yi proposed many constructive concepts to ensure the longevity of the Western Han state. He inherited and developed the thought of many pre-Qin thinkers and inspired the Han dynasty Dong Zhongshu. By the time of Dong Zhongshu, Han rule had chiefly stabilized and what was needed was an argument in favour of the ruling power. Dong Zhongshu paid great attention to the question of constancy and change and was of the opinion that the myriad things ceaselessly change according to a certain regular pattern and standard. With regard to the dialectical relationship between “change” and “constancy”, however, he was of the opinion that change is merely local and formal but not essential whereas the root cause is stable and unchanging. As such, he emphasized that, “do not, if you happen to encounter an untoward alteration of qi, have doubts about the constancies of daily life.”3 (“Heat of Cold, Which Predominates?” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn) Through his observations on the relationship between 3 Queen

and Major (2016: 425).

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constancy and change, Dong Zhongshu further established the authority of heaven and saw everything as changing according to the heavens and believed that change does not alter reality. He says, “the king reforms regulations in name but does not change the substance of the way”4 (“The King of Chu” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn). Corresponding with this view Dong Zhongshu proposed the ideas of “unchanging principle” (经) and “change according to the exigencies of the situation” (权). Wang Bi of the Three Kingdoms period developed Laozi’s and the Book of Changes’ view of the constancy of change and through abstract, analytical thought implemented the root-body (本体) discourse of “non-being as origin.” He said that phenomena are created through the change and transformation of the operation of things, but that the root-body of non-being is unchanging. The unchanging nonbeing is the root of the change and transformation of the operation of things. Wang Bi affirmed the regular pattern and the natural operation and change of things. In essence, he was using the phenomena of the operation, change and transformation of things to demonstrate the root-body of non-being. Buddhist philosophy believed that the phenomenal world is ceaselessly changing and that humans are necessarily constantly undergoing Sam . s¯ara—the cycle of death and rebirth—and that this is suffering. The nirvana of Buddhism is eternal and unchanging and will extinguish all the suffering of Sam . s¯ara. The Buddhist philosopher of the Eastern Jin Seng Zhao wrote “On the Immobility of Objects” (物不迁论), propagating the Buddhist view on constancy and change and thereby provided a theoretical basis for Buddhist practice and the transcendence of the suffering of Sam . s¯ara. Seng Zhao did not necessarily refute change and transformation but instead believed that change and transformation means not changing, moving means not moving and inconstancy is constancy. Those who believe that all is change or not change, that only phenomena change but root-body does not change are all wrong, one should, in fact, look for constancy in the inconstant. He says, The raging storm that uproots mountains is always not moving, rivers rushing to the sea do not flow, the fleeting forces moving in all directions and pushing about do not move, and the sun and moon revolving in their orbits do not turn around.5 (“On the Immobility of Objects”)

Seng Zhao’s “On the Immobility of Objects” is related to his “On the non-real Emptiness” (不真空论). As he sees it, the myriad things are the product of the blending together of cause and effect and so are without their own independent natures, and so is not the real emptiness. The change and transformation of all things are not a real existence, only the non-changing Buddha nature is real, and as such, in one’s cultivation one must seek for stillness within activity and seek for the real (internal quietude) within activity. Religious Daoism emphasizes “preserving” (守); one must “preserve the one within stillness” and there are “nine preservations” in self-cultivation. It is through combining internal cultivation and externally ingesting medicines that one can transform one’s form and become an immortal and thus seek for an enduring life and long 4 Queen 5 Chan

and Major (2016: 76). (1969: 346).

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vision (长生久视) as well as peace and longevity in government. Wang Xuanlan (王宣览) of the Tang dynasty, on the basis of Laozi’s philosophy, absorbed the Buddhist idea of arising from conditional causation (缘起说) and used the relationship between constancy and change to describe “the form of dao itself” (道自体). He believes that the form of dao itself can be split into the two main categories of “constant dao” (常道) and that which “can be spoken” (可道). The arising and function of the two are different. The constant dao gives rise to heaven and earth whereas that which can be spoken gives rise to the myriad things. As heaven and earth is constant, the constant dao is unchanging. As there is birth and death in the myriad things, that which can be spoken is inconstant. That which can be spoken is superficial whereas the constant dao is the essence. People should seek for the constant dao so as to achieve the eternal.

23.4 Four By the Northern Song period, Cheng Jingyuan developed Wang Xuanlan’s views of “constant dao” (常道) and that which “can be spoken” (可道). He believed that the constant dao is spontaneously so, that it changes according to its specific situation, that it cannot be transmitted verbally and cannot be understood through knowledge, and that it mysteriously creates transforms and leaves nothing undone. The constant dao is the form (体) of the dao and that which can be spoken is the function (用) of the dao. The constant dao is tranquil and unmoving whereas that which can be spoken is changing and moving. The constant dao and that which can be spoken is differentiated between internal and external, shallow and deep, but it is not the case that there is no relationship between the two, rather, they are the form and function of one thing. Corresponding with constancy and change, we can see that constancy is form and change is function. The relationship between constancy and change is that of form and function. The picture changed with the development of the Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. Neo-Confucianism was centered around the relationship between principle (理) and qi (气) and it discussed the formation of the universe as well as how the universe changes and transforms. Neo-Confucianism thereby endowed the concepts of constancy and change with innovative meaning. The famous philosopher of the northern Song, Zhang Zai believed that the myriad things were constituted by qi and that they were situated within a well-regulated state of ceaseless change. He believed that as all things were constituted by qi, the changes in qi are the change and transformation of the myriad things. With regard to the process of change in qi and the stages of qi transformation, Zhang Zai explicitly proposed that in its process of transformation, there are two states of change and transformation. Evident change and transformation is called “change” whereas gradual change and transformation is called transformation. After things and affairs undergo an evident change and transformation, they will turn to a more refined and more minute change and transformation. After gradual change and transformation has reached a certain stage,

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it will lead to an evident transformation. Change and transformation can thus turn into each other, and evident change can evidence minute “transformations.” Change and transformation is thus the relationship of the unification of opposites. The famous politician of the northern Song dynasty Wang Anshi proposed, “the heavenly dao exalts change” and believed that the myriad things of nature and society are all situated within ceaseless change and transformation. That people esteem change and transformation and push for it is in accord with the heavenly dao. He borrows the authority of “heavenly dao” to argue for the accordance with principle of political reform. With regard to the content of change and transformation, Wang Anshi was the first to propose that “the old and new mutually eliminate each other.” He believed that old and new things are mutually antagonistic and that the developmental regularity of both nature and society was necessarily the replacement of the old with the new, that it was a process of mutual replacement of old and new. Cheng Yi believed that change was the constant way and that it is only within ceaseless change that things can preserve their constancy. He said, All things that are produced by heaven and earth, even the rigidity and solidity of the mountains, are not unchanging. The enduring does not mean fixity [一定] and fixity cannot be enduring. It is only in changing along with change that is the constant dao. (Book 3, Annotations of the Book of Changes by the Cheng Brothers)

There is nothing unchanging amongst the myriad things of heaven and earth, the enduring does not mean fixity and not changing, but rather moving with the times and constantly changing and transforming. Cheng Yi believes that there is regularity to the change and transformation of the myriad things. This “constant dao” (regularity) is the dao of the Confucian equilibrium (中) and commonality (庸). He proposed that one use the ethical principle of equilibrium and commonality as the most basic root of change and transformation. The great Neo-Confucian of the Song dynasty Zhu Xi developed Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi’s views on constancy and change and developed a discourse on constancy and change which bears evident characteristics of the school of principle. Zhu Xi inherited Zhang Zai’s views about the two states of change and believed that change is separated into the two states of “change” and “transformation.” “Transformation is gradual transformation whereas change is sudden change” (Book 71, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), “it is necessarily the case that change is the beginning of transformation, transformation is the completion of change” (ibid.) “change is from non-being to being, transformation is from being to non-being” (Book 74, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). Change and transformation are intimately related, they are both distinguished from each other but also transform into each other. With regard to the relationship between constancy and change, Zhu Xi believes that “constancy” is more important than “change,” that it is only with constancy that there can be change. He says, “it is only after there is constancy that there can be change, ceaseless constancy leads to change. Even with change, there is still constancy within it.” (Book 72, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Change is a result of the continued development of constancy and so within change there is constancy. “Constancy” contains the ethical ideals of traditional society. As Zhu Xi sees it, “the constant laws

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endure forever and cannot be destroyed.” (Chap. 24, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) The moral laws of society are constant and unchanged, when changes do appear, they do so in order to fulfil the needs of these moral laws. The Ming dynasty philosopher who proposed that only qi exists, Wang Tingxiang, in inheriting the traditional idea that “the way of heaven exalts change” and in assuming that qi is dao and that qi has change and transformation, inferred that “dao has change and transformation.” He said, principal qi [元气] is the form of dao. When there is emptiness there is qi, when there is qi there is dao. The reason why there is change and transformation in qi is because there is change and transformation in dao. Qi is dao and dao is qi, they cannot be discussed apart from each other. (Part I, Refined Discussions)

Dao and qi form one body and cannot be separated. The universe is constituted by principal qi, and this principal qi is governed by a certain regularity in change and transformation. The “dao” that forms one body with qi is also in a state of constant change. Wang Tingxiang affirms and attaches great importance to change and transformation. He distinguishes certain paradigmatic phenomena in nature in order to elucidate the relationship between constancy and change. He believes that phenomena which commonly appears is “constancy” whereas those phenomena that appear only occasionally are “change.” When applied to everyday life, Wang Tingxiang wants people to deal clearly with the relationship between “constancy” and “change” so as to increase one’s ability in dealing with affairs. Fang Yizhi (方以智) of the late Ming was conversant with both Chinese and Western culture. He absorbed the advanced natural science knowledge of the West whilst simultaneously being systematically well-versed in the Confucian, Daoist and Buddhists systems and was thus able to have a more profound understanding of the antagonism between and operation of “constancy” and “change.” He proposed the idea that “there is something unchanging within change” and that the regularity of things and affairs exist within change and transformation. If one blindly holds onto constancy in all situations and refuses to change then this will result in chaos for all under heaven and society. He also proposed that there is no limit to change, that change is always existing and that change and transformation necessarily develop towards their antithesis. Fang Yizhi gave a more dialectical and antagonistic interpretation of “constancy” and “change” and thereby inspired Wang Fuzhi.

23.5 Five Faced with the great changes in his society, Wang Fuzhi of the later Ming and early Qing had a more profound understanding of the concepts of constancy and change and was able to explicate it with more precision and depth. Wang Fuzhi explored constancy and change from many dimensions and investigated it comprehensively, and thus deepened people’s understanding of this concept.

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First, on the basis of Zhang Zai’s view about the development and transformation of qi he more comprehensively demonstrated that the natural world and society all reside within a constant state of change. He says, “the virtue of heaven and earth does not change but the transformation of heaven and earth is daily renewed.” (“Outer Chapters” Record of Contemplation and Questions) Following this, Wang Fuzhi believes that there is both constancy and change in things and affairs and that one must deal correctly with the relationship between them so that one can better realize and guide one’s life. With regard to the relationship between “constancy” and “change” Wang Fuzhi believes that they refer to the permanent and changing nature of things and affairs as well as the objective regularity and occasional nature of the development process of things and affairs. In order to correctly deal with the relationship between constancy and change, one must first of all give scope to one’s subjective capacity for movement and maintain the close union between flexibility and being principled. In practice, he believes that one must change one’s methods and strategies according to the demands of the time, location and force of circumstances. In Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy of constancy and change, the emphasis on change and innovation occupied the central position, but he also proposed that “in not losing constancy through change, a constant stability will be achieved.” (Chap. 7, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes) He believed that all the changes and reforms in society aim towards the end of maintaining the unchanging “great constancy.” In this there is an element of a conservative metaphysics. By the modern age, the reformist and revolutionary sects of the bourgeoisie, in seeking the way to rescue the world and govern the country, all vigorously advocated the philosophy of “change.” In investigating the dialectical relationship between change and constancy, they emphasized the necessity of change, elevated the status of change and thereby prepared the ground for reform and revolution. During the Constitutional Reform and Modernization of 1898, in General Opinions about Reforms (变法通议) Liang Qichao gave a relatively systematic discussion of the necessity and urgency of reforms. In the chapter “Dangers in Not Reforming” he says, “the law is the common tool of the world whereas change is the common principle of the world.” The democratic reformers and thinkers of the late Ming and early Qing Zhang Taiyan (章太炎) also energetically propagated the theories of revolution. He absorbed western philosophies of mechanistic materialism and evolution and used the idea of competition in the philosophy of evolution to explain the concepts of constancy and change. He believed that change was divided into evolution or regression. If one does not actively use and discover intelligence, then one’s intelligence and body will daily regress, so that one might even regress to becoming an ape-man. Sun Zhongshan believed that the natural world and human society are ceaselessly operating, changing and developing. It is continuously evolving, the new replaces the old, and the more advanced will overtake those that have fallen behind. The development and evolution of things have no ultimate terminus and will never end. He said, “the advancement of the world is limitless, the existence of the country has no end and so political reform also has no end point.” (“A Speech on the Publication

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of National Monthly,” The Collected Works of Sun Zhongshan, Vol. 4) This kind of evolutionary development view is the theoretical weapon of the bourgeoisie’s revolution.

References Ames, Roger. 1993. Sun-Tzu: the art of war. New York: Ballantine Book. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: the complete text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Queen, Sarah A. and Major, John S. 2016. Luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn; attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 24

Change and Transformation (bianhua, 变化)

“Change and transformation” are concepts in Chinese philosophy used to express the state of activity of things and affairs. They are analogous to the ideas of qualitative change and quantitative change in Western philosophy. In Chinese philosophy, the basic meaning of change is alteration and change whereas the basic meaning of transformation is educative transformation, but it also contains the meaning of change.

24.1 One In the relatively early texts, change and transformation were two separate concepts. Change refers to change that is evident whereas transformation refers to change that is gradual. Texts that use the two concepts in conjunction with each other are the Guanzi and Sunzi: The Art of War. In “Art of the Mind, Part I” it is said, “Mistakes are inherent in relying on one’s own opinions. Crimes are inherent in forcing change and transformation. If you force change and transformation, it will give rise to artificiality. If artificiality arises, there will be confusion.” The “Weak Points and Strong Points” chapter of the Sunzi says, An army does not have fixed strategic advantages, [just like] water does not have an invariable position. To be able to take the victory by changing and transforming one’s position according to the enemy’s is called being inscrutable.1 (“Weak Points and Strong Points” Sun Tzu The Art of War)

Here, change and transformation refer to alteration and modification. The “Ten Wings” is of the opinion that the most significant characteristic of the Book of Changes is that it exalts change. Xici B says, As a book, the Book of Changes is something that cannot be kept at a distance. As a manifestation of the dao the Book of Changes involves frequent shifts. Change and movement never 1 Ames

(1993: 127).

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stand still but keep flowing through the six vacancies. Rising and falling without any consistency, the hard and the soft lines change into the other, something for which it is impossible to make definitive laws, since they are doing nothing but keeping pace with change.2

Xici A says, “That which transforms things and regulates them is called ‘change [ 变].’ By extending this to practical action, one may be said to achieve complete success.”3 It also says, “to transform things and regulate them is dependent on the free flow of change.” Here, change is determined through transformation, what is meant is that once transformation reaches a certain stage then it will become change and thus an elementary distinction is drawn between change and transformation. From this one can say that transformation is gradual whereas change is sudden, transformation is foundational whereas change is the product of transformation. Change and transformation refer to the process of the production and disappearance of the myriad things as well as their ceaseless activity. Change and transformation are the common law by which the myriad things abide. Xici A also says, “change and transformation involve images of advance and withdrawal.”4 Advance refers to the production of things and withdrawal refers to the disappearance of things. The Xici A also says, “In heaven this creates images, and on earth it creates physical forms, this is how change and transformation manifest themselves.”5 “Explaining the Trigrams” says, “Mountain and Lake reciprocally circulate qi. Only in consequence of this can change and transformation take place, thus allowing the myriad things to become all that they can be.”6 After heaven and earth take shape then change and transformation can be seen. After the mountains and lakes reciprocally circulate qi then they can transform into the myriad things. Change and transformation here all refer to how, under certain circumstances, things are produced. The “Commentary on Judgement” for the Hexagram 32, “Perseverance” (恒) says, “The four seasons, by their changing and transforming, can perpetuate their production (of things).” The change and transformation here refer to the ceaseless circulation of the four seasons. The Xici A believed that the reason for change and transformation is due to “the soft and hard lines [yao] displacing each other” and that this gives rise to change and transformation. This means that the reason for change and transformation is yin and yang’s effect on each other and the friction between them. The sage follows the dao of the change and transformation of heaven and earth and copies it. He institutes the decrees and ritual regulations according to the activities as well as change and transformation of the myriad things. As such, change and transformation touches upon the way of heaven, the affairs of humans and is the universal principle of the universe. With regard to the content of change and transformation, the Ten Wings uses transformation to explain change. Xunzi, however, uses change to explain transformation. He says that although two affairs with similar forms but are different in essence can 2 Lynn

(1994: 89). (1994: 67). 4 Lynn (1994: 49). 5 Lynn (1994: 47), modified. 6 Lynn (1994: 122). 3 Lynn

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be united, they are ultimately still two different affairs. Thus, when there are changes form, but its essence is unchanging, this is transformation. As such, transformation refers to a gradual advance and quantitative change without a change in essence. A gradual transformation without a change, in essence, means that the thing and affair is still the original thing and affair. In contrast to this, change refers to the essential change in things and affairs. Xunzi also saw change and transformation as the regularity of the activities of heaven; it is precisely because of the change and transformation of the activities of the way of heaven that the myriad things are produced. Through the heavenly way’s activities, certain rare phenomena will appear for example stars falling and trees groaning. These phenomena “are simply rarely occurring things amongst the changes in Heaven and earth and the transformations of yin and yang.”7 (“Discourse on Heaven” Xunzi). Although these phenomena are rare, they are also a result of the change and transformation of heaven and earth and yin and yang. The Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord, which was produced during the Warring States period, took the six qi of wind, cold, heart, damp, dryness and fire as its basis for the investigation of the cause and manifestation of illness. The Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord distinguished between change and transformation and believed that transformation refers to the production of things and their gradual development, whereas change refers to the essential change in a thing after it has developed to a certain stage. The reason for the production of change and transformation lies in the toing and froing of qi and the speed of its effects. It is precisely due to the reciprocal transformation into each other of change and transformation that results in the production of illness. With this as its basis, the Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord gave a specific explanation for the production and change of the qi of wind, cold, heart, damp, dryness and fire as well as the illnesses that are produced as a result of these changes. For example, the activity of wind and qi starts with the blowing of the wind and the sound of the trees, this is a stage in transformation. With the strengthening of the wind, the trees fall, and houses collapse, and this is the stage of change, and when reflected as illness, it is manifested as dizziness. Another example is the activity of heat. The internal accumulation of heat (暄暑郁燠) is the stage of transformation, and as heat increases it boils over and this is change. When manifested as illness it is the blockage of heat (热郁). Other examples such as yin qi, cool qi and cold qi will all undergo such a transition from transformation to change and will manifest corresponding symptoms. The Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord sees transformation as a stage in the gradual change of things and affairs, and change as the stage of sudden change. Once transformation has accumulated to a certain degree, it will necessarily lead to change. The understanding of change and transformation in Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord has thus reached an unprecedented height.

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24.2 Two During the Han and Tang period, although there was no lack of people who discussed change and transformation, these discussions were relatively unsystematic. The Huainanzi, for example, discussed the change and transformation of the body and spirit and believed that what changes is the body and not the spirit. Those peoples whose bodies get worn out but whose spirits do not change, can cope with the myriad external changes. What is designated as transformation refers to the return of the body to formlessness. People’s spirits, however, will not return to the formless but exists together with heaven and earth. The Huainanzi sees the unchanging spirit as the basis of the existence of the changing body. The key to self-cultivation is thus transforming along with transformation. The Huainanzi also investigated the question of changes in social rituals and laws and believed that the governance of the state should have the interests of the people as its basis. Political education should take practical applicability as its priority, and whether one changes or not and corresponding the carrying out of corresponding measures should accord with practical considerations. In discussing the question of catastrophes, the Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion of the Eastern Han defined what constituted change. It believed that change is opposed to constancy. Change is a change in constancy, for example, phenomena such as sudden winds, uprooted trees, thunderstorms, darkness by day, when the fishes leap in the deep and when turtles and snakes come out of their caves, all belong to change. The Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion attributed these catastrophes to heaven and believed that the reason these abnormal events happen is because “it wants to warn the sovereign of men and make him conscious of his deeds, so that he may wish to repent his faults, attend to his spiritual power, and exercise deeper solicitude.”8 (“Calamities and Extraordinary Events” Discussions at White Tiger Pavilions). In this, a more spiritual dimension is endowed to these changes. In the process of commenting on the Book of Changes, the founder of the WeiJin Neo-Daoism movement, Wang Bi attributed the reason for the production of change and transformation to “incompatibility” (不合) which refers to the internal antagonism in things and affairs. In his commentary on the judgement of the 49th hexagram “Radical Change” (革), he writes, “Whenever it happens that things are incompatible, change consequently arises. The reason that such change arises is due to the incompatibility involved. This is why the text selects images of incompatible things to represent Radical Change.”9 The reason why “Radical change” happens is due to conflict and lack of coordinated harmony. From the hexagram of “radical change” we can see that “cohesion” (离) is below and “joy” (兑) is above, and that the image of “cohesion” is fire and that of “joy” is lake. The nature of fire is to blaze and ascend and that of lake is to soak and descend, thus radical change is an image of incompatibility. The lack of harmonious coordination between water and fire will lead to the production of change, “fire wants to go up and water wants to go down. 8 Som 9 Lynn

(1952: 489), modified. (1994: 444).

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Water and fire fight each other, and this then causes change.”10 Wang Bi attributed the cause of change and transformation to antagonism and thus offered a more profound understanding of change and transformation. The person who brought Neo-Daoism to its maturity, Guo Xiang, advocated “selftransformation within the dark obscurity.” What is meant by self-transformation is self-change and self-production. The self-transformation which Guo Xiang talks of emphasizes the independence and un-rootedness of the transformation of things and affairs. Their production “does not depend externally on dao nor is it [consciously] determined internally by itself; it spontaneously came into being by itself.” (“The Great Source as Teacher” Commentary on the Zhuangzi). Self-transformation is thus a sudden transformation from nothing and did not undergo a mediate process of gradual transformation. Guo Xiang also believes that the myriad things are constantly changing as change is the way of heaven. The transformation into each other of day and night is one kind of manifestation of change and transformation. The change of day and night and yin and yang are both eternal and irrepressible. It is precisely due to the existence of change that death cannot be avoided. What is experienced from life to death is a basic change. Guo Xiang sees the process of life as one in which life is constantly in a state of change, but its essence is unchanging. Life is thus a process of gradual change, but death is “the great change” and is a completely different state to life. As contrasted with life, therefore, death is a change in essence. With regard to the change of life and death, Guo Xiang believes that one should “use the heart-mind to intuit the highest mysteries of life and death”, “intuit the change and transformation of heaven and earth and be one with the change and transformation of the myriad things of heaven and earth.” (“The Great Source as Teacher” Commentary on the Zhuangzi). One must “be one with the things, and one with change and transformation,” in this way, “I will still be me regardless of the changes and life or death.” (“The Seal of Complete Virtue” Commentary on the Zhuangzi). This is the spiritual state whereby life and earth are equal in the most profound fashion (玄同生死). In his commentaries on the Book of Changes and the Doctrine of the Mean, the Tang dynasty Kong Yingda also delimited and explicated the concepts of change and transformation, but his views varied amongst his different writings. In his commentaries to the Doctrine of the Mean he had the following to say about change and transformation and the relationship between them, “when there is change there is transformation. The gradual early stage is called change. At the moment of change both new and old exist. Transformation is when the old body has been completely changed and there is a new body.” In his commentaries to the Qian hexagram of the Book of Changes he said, “change means the later changing the earlier. Gradual change is called change whereas transformation refers to when there is a sudden transformation from being to non-being.” Here, change is seen as the process of gradual change, when the later changes the earlier. In this stage of change both the old and the new exist. When the old body has completely changed into a new body, this is transformation. Transformation is a transition from being to non-being or vice versa and is a sudden change. At the same time, Kong Yingda writes in his 10 Lynn

(1994: 444).

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commentary to the “Radical Change” hexagram of the Book of Changes that, “the nature of heat and dampness are different and cannot co-exist. If they co-exist then they will antagonize each other and then change will arise. The arising of change will change its basic nature.” Here, on the one hand, the reason for the production of change is given: the different natures of heat and dampness produce their mutual antagonism and ultimately the arising of change. On the other hand, however, change is categorized as an essential change, this opinion is different to those found in his commentaries to the Doctrine of the Mean that we saw above. In his commentaries to the Xici, he also says, yin and yang change [变] and transform [化], but when they replace each other [裁节] this is called change [变]; this is a change in essence [是得以理之变也]. For example, the transformation of yang qi cannot last long but is replaced by the yin rains; this is a change in essence [是得以理之变也]. The transformation of yin and yang is mutually replacing of its own accord. The sages also emulate this and carry out differentiate things in this way.

Here, change refers to the appearance of antithetical phenomena in the process of yin or yang qi transformation; when, for example, the yin rain restrains the development of yang qi. When yang qi transforms into yin rain, this is change. Transformation is thus a kind of gradual transformation whereas change is the suspension of transformation. As we can see from the above, Kong Yingda’s commentaries giving conflicting accounts of change and transformation.

24.3 Three During the Song period, the Neo-Confucians endowed change and transformation with greater depth and systemization. Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi all give a deeper analysis to change and transformation. Zhang Zai’s philosophy takes qi-transformation as its basis. What he means by qi-transformation is the change and transformation of qi. Zhang Zai gave a clear definition of change and transformation. Transformation is gradual change whereas change is a manifest change and is a change in essence during the process of transformation. As transformation is a slow change it is not easily discerned by people. Although change and transformation take different forms, they are bound together. Change is the necessary result of transformation and change and transformation turn into each other. After the arising of change, it enters the stage of the gradual progress of transformation. This is a process of going from the gross to the minute. After gradual transformation has developed to a certain stage, an evident change will occur. The evident change is an expression of the gradual accumulation of gradual transformation. As such, after every change, a stage of a higher transformation is entered into. The accumulation of transformation will lead to the arising of new changes. Apart from change and transformation, Zhang Zai also talks about inscrutable transformation (神化). Inscrutable refers to the inscrutability of the qi of the great ultimate and transformation refers to the coming together and dissipating of qi. With

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regard to the relationship between inscrutable and transformation, inscrutable is the essence of qi, and so it is called “heavenly virtue” (天德). Transformation is the function of qi, and so it is called the way of heaven. Inscrutable is form and transformation is function. As such, inscrutable is the root of change and transformation. He says, Qi is a phenomenon constituted by two polarities [两体]. Because it is unifying, it is inscrutable (polarities exist within it, thus it is inscrutable), and because it is constituted by polarities, it is transformative (polarities push one another along into unity). This is why nature is constituted by three dimensions. (“Three and Two”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

The two polarities (两体) refer to opposing elements such as emptiness and solidity, movement and stillness, coming together and dissipating, clearness and muddiness. It is precise because qi contains these two opposed elements in one body that is manifested as inscrutable. At the same time, it is because of the existence of these opposed elements that change is produced in one body. Two and one are existentially dependent upon each other and affect each other. One is the form (体) of two and two is the function (用) of one. It is precisely this relationship between one and two, that is, the unification into one of antagonisms, that is the basis of the philosophy of inscrutable transformation. As such, Zhang Zai not only explored the relationship between change and transformation he saw their opposition and antagonism as the reason for the production of change, and thereby reached a new philosophical height. The Cheng brothers believed that, “knowing change and transformation is difficult” (Book 11, Additional Works of the Cheng Brothers in Henan) thus they have few discussions on change and transformation. There are two points that are worth noticing. First, the Cheng brothers believed that change is ceaseless amongst the myriad things. Evident change is rooted in gradual change. The Cheng brother, however, believe that transformation is bigger than change, that change is gradual whereas transformation is an essential change, “change is when things have just changed and have not yet transformed, Transformation refers to when there is no trace of its former aspect, as if it was originally, self-so like this.” (Book 18, Additional Works of the Cheng Brothers in Henan). Second, according to the different stages of development of change and transformation, the Cheng brother proposed the idea of “qitransformation” and “form-transformation” (形化). Qi-transformation refers to the transition from formless qi to a formed object. Form-transformation refers to change and transformation arising in something with form. Following the Cheng brothers’ meaning, logically speaking, qi-transformation is prior to form-transformation, but as soon as qi has taken on form then form-transformation has already begun, thus qitransformation and form-transformation are simultaneous. As form-transformation increases qi-transformation is simultaneously decreasing. The Cheng brothers did not, however, specify which of qi-transformation and form-transformation belongs to change and which to transformation. The figure who brought Neo-Confucianism to its maturity, Zhu Xi, gave a systematic elucidation to the concepts of change and transformation. He was of the opinion that, “transformation is gradual transformation and change is sudden change.”

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(Book 75, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). As such, transformation is gradual and imperceptible, quantitative change whereas change is sudden and evident change in essence. With regard to the relationship between change and transformation, transformation is a gradual evolution whereas change is the cutting short of transformation, “transformation is from the beginning of the month to the end of the month, by the end of the thirty days, we delimit it and call it a month. The following day belongs to the next month and this is change.” Zhu Xi also linked change and transformation with yin and yang non-being and being. From the perspective of yin and yang, he says, Change is the sudden change from yin to yang thus it is called change. Transformation is the gradual dissolving of yang to yin, thus it is called transformation. As the transition from yin to yang is a process of vigorous growth, this is called change whereas the transition from yang to yin is a slow dissolution. (Chapter 74, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

From the perspective of being and non-being, “transformation is a process of gradual depletion till there is non-being. Change is a sudden growth. Change is from non-being to being, whereas transformation is from being to non-being.” (ibid.) Although there is a distinction of gradual and sudden between transformation and change, change and transformation are relative, “broadly speaking, everything is transformation, when transformation has reached its acme, then this is change. In terms of their relative difference, then change belongs to growth and transformation belongs to dissolution.” (Book 74, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi). Change and transformation circulate ceaselessly between mutual growth and dissolution.

24.4 Four The philosopher of the Ming dynasty Wang Tingxiang also believed that there were two kinds of change: gradual and sudden change. What he emphasized, however, was gradual change, as all change starts from the gradual and so the importance of change lies in its gradual nature. Gradual change is not only the universal rule of change in nature, it is also the case in human society. In nature, there is cold and hot weather, “cold turns to warmth, warmth to hot, hot then turns to cool and cool to cold, the manner in which it comes is gradual” (“Upper Chapter” Refined Discussions), “there is no sudden change from winter to summer and from summer to winter.” (ibid.) With regard to human society, although the “force of situations of the world is such that change is irreversible” (“Governing People” Cautious Words), this kind of change is gradual in the same way as the change from winter to summer, as such Wang Tingxiang advocated gradual social change and reform and opposed radical or essential changes in society. He believed that in governing society one should employ the policy of “step by step change” (“Governing People” Cautious Words) and change according to the times and situation. In this way, a great change will not be brought about. A sudden great change is antagonistic to the gradual changes of society and is the great taboo of society, thus the “sage safeguards that which

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has not yet arisen, and only cares about the tendencies of the situation” (“Upper Chapter” Refined Discussions). Wang Tingxiang’s views on change are the basis of his thoughts about societal reform. Wang Fuzhi, the philosopher who summarized traditional Chinese philosophy, on the basis of Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi’s philosophies, gave a more comprehensive elucidation of the concept of change and transformation. He proposed a series of key topics that were related to the concept of change and transformation: “the transformation of heaven and earth brings forth novelty daily”, “essence is daily changed but the form is the same” and “the transformation from old to the new.” Wang Fuzhi was of the opinion that the original source of movement was the great ultimate which constitutes the root-body of the universe. The movement of the great ultimate manifests itself as the assembling and disassembling of qi and this gives rise to the myriad things. This is a process of transition from emptiness to fullness. When qi disassembles then this is the extinguishing of the myriad things; this is the process of transition from fullness to emptiness. The assembling and disassembling of qi is manifested as the birth, death, change and transformation of the myriad things. Although things and affairs have the states of birth and death, qi only has the states of assembling and disassembling and not of birth and death. Specifically speaking, there are only two types of change in things and affairs. One, a quantitative change of self-renewal whereby, although the internal essence of the thing is constantly changing and being renewed, its eternal form has not undergone a fundamental change. Second, an essential change whereby one object changes to another object. Any object or affair experiences a process of assembling and disassembling, life and death and this process contains five stages. Wang Fuzhi says, all things that exist as a result of being engendered contain the followings stages: embryonic form, undergoing its own course of change, effects and is affected by other things, attenuation and disassembling and extinguishing.” (Book 2, Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes)

Embryonic form is when things and affairs are starting to form, undergoing its own course of change is its activity, effects and is affected by other things is the mutual influence between things and affairs, attenuation is the beginning of the destruction of things and affairs, disassembling and extinguishing is the complete disappearance of things and affairs. This process is the process of the complete transformation of specific things and affairs. The disappearance of specific things and affairs will then return to qi and new things and affairs will be produced out of the assembling of qi. This then, is “the transformation from old to the new.” It is because the great ultimate is the original source of movement that the myriad things of the universe are ceaselessly changing. The wind and thunder, sun and moon, one’s body are always in a ceaseless state of change. The wind and thunder, sun and moon and body of today are thus not the same as they were yesterday. It is only because of surface similarities that it seems as though there were no changes. Following this, Wang Fuzhi exposed the essential change which accompanies the process of quantitative change. He says, “form [形] refers to a thing’s dimensions and shape and not to its essence [质]. Essence is daily changing, but the form is the same. There is no constant thing and affair but there is a constant dao [i.e. the

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constancy of change].” (Chapter 12 of Xici A, Divergent explanations of Book of Changes). Form is the external appearance and not the essence of a thing. With regard to specific things and affairs, although its external form seems to not have changed, a new essence will have replaced an old one because things are undergoing constant change. The water of a river and the light of a candle, for example, is the same today as it was in history, but the water and fire is not the same as that of yesterday. Likewise, a person’s muscles are constantly being renewed, and from the external aspect one cannot detect any changes, but in reality, there is constant renewal. It is only when we understand that essence is daily changing, but the form is the same that we can truly understand the logic of daily transformation. In conclusion to the above, the concept of change and transformation underwent a development from a single concept to a paired concept. Although different philosophers had different explanations for the content of change and transformation, all saw it as the process of the development of things. They thereby elucidated the internal connection between change and transformation and the internal source of the production of change. One can say that the development of the concept of change and transformation in Chinese philosophy is the development of Chinese philosopher’s understanding of the regularity of change and transformation of the myriad things.

References Ames, Roger. 1993. Sun-Tzu: The Art of War. New York: Ballantine Book. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Som, Tjan Tjoe. Po Hu T’ung: The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952.

Chapter 25

Root and Branch (benmo, 本末)

The original meaning “root and branch” refers to the root and top of trees. The concept of root and branch generated the related ideas of basic/substantial and minor/inessential, main and secondary, light and heavy, prior and later. In the history of Chinese philosophy, the discussion of the question of root and branch can largely be divided into two aspects. One, using root and branch to distinguish between agricultural and commercial enterprises and this developed into the views of “emphasising the root and restraining the branch” (重本抑末), “strengthening the root and weakening the branch.” In this sense, “root” is also called “essential enterprises” (本业), “essential affairs” (本事), “essential tasks” (本务). Branch is also called “minor enterprises” (末业), “minor productions” (末产). Second, root and branch are used to refer to non-being and being, stillness and movement, one and many, non-purposive action and purposive action and became the basis of the distinction between being and non-being, root and branch in Wei-Jin Neo-Confucianism.

25.1 One A relatively early use of the concept of root and branch is the Great Learning. In talking about the relationship between cultivating the self, ordering the family, governing the state and bringing peace to all under heaven it says, “Things have their root and their branches. Affairs have their branch and their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to dao.” The Great Learning believes that in order to order the family, govern the state and bring peace to all under heaven one must first of all cultivate the self as the root, thus, “From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.” The root here thus refers to the cultivation of the self, whereas the branch refers to ordering the family, governing the state and bringing peace to all under heaven. If one does not cultivate the self then the family cannot be ordered, if the family is not ordered then the state cannot be governed, if the state is not governed then peace cannot be brought to all under heaven. This is why it is said, “it cannot be © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_25

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that the root is in chaos, but the branch is well governed.” The relationship between root and branch is here a relationship between prior and later, and at the same time implies that root is the basis of branch. During the Warring States period, Shang Yang used the relationship between root and branch to express the relationship between agriculture and occupations outside of agriculture. He proposed the idea of emphasizing the root and restraining the branch. Shang Yang believed that agriculture is the wellspring of food, clothing, enrichment of the family and of the state, he thus advocated agriculture as the root. What is more important is that agriculture can provide ample resources for war and this was, at the time, the foundation of the flourishing of the state. The “branch” which Shang Yang spoke of referred mainly to the production and flow of luxury products as well as the scholar-official, reclusive scholars and warriors that poetry and literature talked of but are not agriculturally productive. With the increase of people who undertake these occupations, then “their state will necessarily be weakened.” As such, Shang Yang advocated that one must emphasize agriculture and restrain commercial activities and prohibit the branch. So as to ensure the force of production in the agricultural sector, he encouraged farmers’ enthusiasm for production. Shang Yang’s proposal of the idea of root and branch is directly related to the fight for dominion of the Middle Kingdom between the Seven Warring States. Like Shang Yang, Hanfei also took agriculture as the root, but the “branch” which he talked of covers all of industry and commerce. Hanfei believed that, in the governance of a state the enlightened ruler takes agriculture as the root and, as much as possible, will try to reduce the number of peoples working in industry and commerce and reduce their social standing because these people “there are too many people in the lesser professions and not enough in the primary.” (“Five Vermin” Hanfeizi) Not only this, these people also use their own riches to disabuse farmers of their profit. As such, as Hanfei sees it, people who work in industry, commerce and the crafts are all a scourge upon the state. After Hanfei proposed the idea of industry and commerce as the branch and root as agriculture, the idea that branch is industry and commerce has become a stable idea that has endured till the present day.

25.2 Two During the early Western Han period, Jia Yi (贾谊) and Chao Cuo (晁错), on the issue of root and branch, took agriculture as the root and industry and commerce as the branch and advocated emphasizing agriculture and restraining commerce. Jia Yi once said to the Wendi emperor, Today, in ordering the people to farm, one is making them return to the root. This will mean that all under heaven will eat as much as the labour they put in. Turning idlers of the minor industries towards agriculture will mean that there our stocks will be amply filled, and the common people will have the means to live in contentment. (“Treatise on Foods and Goods”, Hanshu)

Chao Cuo also said,

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Among the key tasks of the day, none is more important than turning the people to agriculture. In order to turn the people to agriculture, the key lies in raising the price of grain, and one can increase the price of grain by getting the people to exchange grain for rewards or exemptions from penalty. (ibid.)

The question of root and branch between agriculture and commerce and industry was raised again during the salt and iron discussions of the reign of emperor Zhao of the Han. In this debate, the two sides were the imperial counsellor (御史大夫) sect headed by Sang Hongyang and the men of textual learning (贤良文学) sect. The heart of the discussion of the question of the monopoly of salt and iron. On the question of root and branch, the imperial counsellor sect admitted that agriculture was the root and industry and commerce was the branch, but at the same time they believed that industry and commerce were able to create wealth very quickly. Industry and commerce were thus seen as the root of the state’s wealth, The ancient founders of the state opened the way for root and branch industries and facilitated the equitable distribution of goods. Thus without artisans, the farmers will be deprived of the use of implements; without merchants, all prized commodities will be cut off. [...] The lack of implements would lead to stoppage of grain production and without prized commodities, wealth would be exhausted.1 (“The Basic Argument”, Discourse on Salt and Iron)

As such, in terms of the economy, the state takes wealth as its root and the way to seek for wealth is to take profit as primary and one need not pay attention to agriculture but instead use the merchant’s way of making getting rich to enrich the state. Following this, the imperial counsellor sect, from the perspective of attacking the merchants and restraining the strong, proposed the measure of a state-run commerce and industry monopoly on salt and iron. The men of textual learning sect emphasized that the farmer is the root and the merchant is the branch and they advocated “strengthening the root and restraining the branch.” They believed that although it was easy for industry and commerce to get rich, it is not the root of state governance. This is because wealth is ultimately generated by agriculture, if there was no agriculture then the merchants would have “no means to carry out the cleverness.” At the same time, what is even more important is that the vigorous espousal of industry and commerce is an act that “displays profit” and to carry out a monopoly on salt and iron is to “compete for profit with the common people” and will result in “dissipating primordial candor and simplicity as well as to sanction propensities to selfishness and greed.” (ibid.) As a result, few among our people take up the fundamental/root pursuits of life, while many flock to the non-essential/branch. Now sturdy natural qualities decay as frivolous adornment thrives, the branch flourishes and the root are depleted. When the branch is cultivated, the people become frivolous; when the roots are developed, the people are simple and kind. The people being simple and kind, wealth will abound; when the people are extravagant, cold and hunger will follow. (ibid.)

1 http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/yantie.xml&

style=xwomen/xsl/dynaxml.xsl&chunk.id=d2.4&toc.depth=1&toc.id=0&doc.lang=bilingual (translation modified).

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As such, they strongly advocated “suppressing the branch profits but opening up humaneness and righteousness” (ibid.), “not letting monetary gain be paraded before the eyes of the people as then transformative education can flourish and customs can be changed [for the better]” (ibid.). Following this, they proposed “abolishing the salt, iron and liquor monopolies and the system of equable marketing so that the root may be encouraged, and the branch deterred, and so agriculture extensively benefitted” (ibid.). The imperial counsellor sect and the men of textual learning sect differ in their views on root and branch and this reflects their political advocacy of “way of the hegemony” and “kingly way.” The traditional view of root and branch was distinguished along the lines of agriculture and industry and commerce. Wang Fu of the Eastern Han took a further step of applying the distinction between root and branch to the internal aspects of agriculture, industry and commerce. He said, In order to enrich the common people, take agriculture and sericulture as the root and the crafts and merchant industries as the branch. All the diverse craftsmen should take practical functionality as the root and adornments as the branch. Merchants should take the exchange of goods of the root and the storing of exotic goods as the branch. (“Attending to the Basics”, Comments of a Recluse)

Here, it is meant that with regard to the common people, agriculture and sericulture is the root, not partaking of the agriculture or sericulture industries is tantamount to not having a permanent profession and is the branch. With regard to all the workmen, the production of things of practical utility is the root, whereas if one produces carvings that are not of practical usage, then this is branch. With regard to the merchants, if they can ensure the flow of goods then this is the root but the storing of exotic goods and waiting for the price to go up is the branch. The distinction which Wang Fu made between root and branch cast aside the one-sidedness of the traditional accounts of root and brand and is more dialectical in nature. Wang Fu, however, still could not completely cast aside the influence of the traditional account of root and branch. Although he believes that within agriculture, industry and commerce there were both root and branch aspects, he still believed that agriculture was the root and commercial activity as the branch. He said, When one man does not till the land, someone in the world will necessarily go hungry, when one woman does not weave then someone in the world will necessarily go cold. Today, if the whole world gives up agriculture and sericulture and inclines toward becoming merchants then horse or ox drawn carts will fill the roads, people with idle hands fill and no occupation will fill the whole city, those who attend to the root will be scarce whereas those who eat without farming will be numerous. The capital of Shang was full of order, the model for all parts of the kingdom, […] if the hundreds of commanderies and thousands of districts of the world and their tens of thousands of towns are all like this, then how can there the agricultural and merchant industries sufficiently provide for them, then how can the people not go hungry and cold? (“On excessive luxury”, Comments of a Recluse)

Wang Fu still opposed industry and commerce to agriculture and believed that the excessive growth of industry and commerce would lead to the common people going hungry and even lead the state to danger. Although Wang Fu did not escape the traditional view of emphasizing agriculture and restraining commerce, in applying root and branch to within agriculture and commerce, Wang Fu advanced one step beyond the traditional view.

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Apart from this, on the political level, Wang Fu advocated transformation through virtue and used the discourse of root and branch to discuss people’s emotions, human nature, education (化) and custom. He said, The common people have human nature, emotions, education and customs. The emotions and human nature are the expressions of the heart-mind, are the root whereas education, custom and actions are the external expressions, are the branch. The branch grows from the root and actions are rooted in the heart-mind. This is why in nurturing the world, the sovereign first acts on the root and then acts on the branch, and so follows the common peoples’ heart-minds and thereby governs their actions. (“On the transforming power of virtue”, Comments of a Recluse)

Here, people’s emotions and heart-minds are taken as the root and their actions and conduct as branch; it is believed that one’s actions and conduct arise from one’s emotions and nature. In the governance of the state, therefore, the sovereign should carry out an education based on morality so as to “follow their heart-mind and thereby govern their actions.” In this way “as long as one’s heart-mind is upright then perfidious vices will have no way of arising and bad intentions will have no place in which to grow.” (ibid.)

25.3 Three During the Wei-Jin period, Neo-Daoism flourished, and the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi gained renewed vigour. An intellectual trend that centred around the “distinction between being and non-being” arose, which gave rise to philosophical discussions around movement and stillness and one and many. In the process of discussing these topics, root and branch broke away from its traditional meaning of agriculture, industry and commerce and was used instead to refer to being and non-being, movement and stillness, one and many and was thereby endowed with a philosophical meaning. The philosophical debate around the “distinction between being and non-being” was initiated by He Yan and Wang Bi, who proposed the idea that “non-being is the root.” In the “Biography of Wang Yan” chapter of the Book of Jin it is recorded that, During the Zhengshi period of the Wei [240-249], He Yan and Wang Bi elaborated on the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi and took non-being to be the root of the myriad things. Non-being is that which originates things and completes affairs and exists in all things, yin and yang depend on it in their creative transformation, the myriad things depend on it in acquiring their forms, the worthy depend on it in acquiring their virtuous character, the unworthy depend on it to save their persons. Thus, although the function of non-being is without rank, it is, however, very noble.

“Non-being as root” is advocated by He Yan and Wang Bi. If non-being is the root then the opposite of non-being, being, is the branch. As He Yan writes in Discourse on Dao Beings depend on non-being in coming into existence, in becoming what they are. Affairs on account of non-being come to fruition and become what they are. Now, one tries to speak

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about non-being, but no words could describe it; name it, but it has no name; look at it, but it does not have any form; listen to it, but it does not give any sound. Then, indeed, it is clear that dao is complete. […] What is dark obtains its blackness from it; what is plain obtains its whiteness from it. The carpenter’s square is able to make a square because of it; the compass is able to make a circle because of it. The round and the square obtain their form, but that which gives them their form itself does not have any form. The white and black obtain their name, but that which gives them their name itself does not have any name. (Quoted from Zhang Zhan’s Liezi Commentary, “Heavenly portents”)

Wang Bi also says, Even though heaven and earth are so vast that they possess the myriad things in great abundance, which, activated by thunder and moved by the winds, keep undergoing countless numbers of transformations, yet the root consists of perfectly quiescent non-being.”2 (Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Return”)

He also says, The way things come into existence and efficacy comes about is that things arise form the formless and efficacy emanates from the nameless. The formless and the nameless is the progenitor of the myriad things.3 (“Outline Introduction to the Laozi”)

It is in this sense that “non-being” is a synonym for dao. The reason non-being or dao becomes the root of being is because the myriad things, as well as beings which have specific form, are all limited. Limited things, however, cannot encompass everything and become the root of existence. It is the formless and nameless non-being which can become the root of the myriad things. As we can tell from the above, the non-being which He Yan and Wang Bi speak of is already different from the original meaning of dao in the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi and possesses the significance of root-body (本体). Wang Bi, however, also discusses the relationship between being and non-being from the perspective of achieving life. He says, “All things under heaven achieve life because of being, but the origin of being has non-being as its root.” (Chapter 40, Commentary on the Daodejing) It is in this sense that Wang Bi also analogizes the relationship between being and non-being with that of the relationship between mother and son. He says, “The mother is the root and the son are the branches” (Chapter 52, Commentary on Laozi), “that heaven and earth have a beginning, we can regard it as the mother of all under heaven.” (Chapter 52, Commentary on the Daodejing) We can see that with Wang Bi, “non-being as the root” still contains traces of cosmogonic discourse. Wang Bi also uses “one” and “many” to talk about the relationship between being and non-being. “One” is dao and “non-being” whereas “many” is the myriad things. The myriad things are governed by “one.” To explain why “one” or “non-being” governs the myriad thing, Wang Bi gives the example of the spokes and hub of a cart, That the hub can unite and control the thirty spokes depends on the non-being there. Because it consists of non-being, it can accommodate anything. This is how the few can unite and control the many. (Chapter 11, Commentary on the Daodejing) 2 Lynn 3 Lynn

(1994: 286), modified. (1999: 30), modified.

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This is why, “the many cannot govern the many. That which governs the many is the most solitary [one].” (“Clarifying the Judgments” General Remarks on the Changes) This also means that being is many and non-being is one. That which governs many cannot be many itself but must be one. That which governs cannot be being but must be non-being. Wang Bi also used stillness and movement to elucidate the relationship between being and non-being. Wang Bi believes that the myriad things are situated within activity and change and transformation. Non-being or dao as the root-body is without activity. Movement and stillness are not opposite to each other but rather stillness gives rise to movement and movement ultimately returns to stillness. Stillness is more primordial than movement as stillness is the ultimate state of things and affairs and is the root of heaven and earth. Movement, on the other hand, is a relative and momentary state. It is for this reason that movement cannot govern movement and only stillness can govern stillness. It also means that it is only with stillness as the root-body that the myriad phenomena of change and transformation can be governed. In Wang Bi’s philosophy, non-being is the root and being is the branch, one is the root, and many is the branch, stillness is the root and movement is the branch. As Wang Bi sees it, it is only when one has grasped the root of non-being, one and stillness that one can govern the branches of being, many and movement. With this as the foundation, Wang Bi advocated the political ideals of “venerating the roots and forgoing the branches” (崇本息末) and “making the branch flourish by enhancing the root” (崇本举末) Root refers to non-purposive action and branches refer to purposive action. Specifically speaking, the reason why one must venerate the root and forgo the branches is because bad and depraved actions are not produced from badness and depravity per se but are a result of purposive action. When the ruler exalts humaneness and filial piety, this results in superficial and fake acts imitating humaneness and filial piety. As such, Thus it is that the prevention of depravity depends on the preservation of sincerity and not on the perfection of scrutiny, and the cessation of licentiousness depends on eliminating superficial frivolity and not on the proliferation of laws and regulations. The eradication of banditry depends on the elimination of desire and not on making punishments more severe, and the cessation of litigation depends on the avoidance of exaltation and not on the perfection of adjudication.4 (“Outline Introduction to the Laozi”)

The key to venerating the root and forgoing the branches lies in, not governing what the people do but encouraging their disinclination to doing anything depraved. Not trying to forbid their desires but encouraging their disinclination to desiring anything. Planning for things while they are still in a premanifested state and act on them before they begin. This is all one has to do.”5 (“Outline Introduction to the Laozi”)

This is venerating the root and forgoing the branches. The philosophy of venerating the root and forgoing the branches can be called a kind of ideal political condition but in practical everyday life, one cannot do without 4 Lynn 5 Lynn

(1994: 37). (1999: 37), modified.

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rituals, music and the exaltation of humaneness and righteousness as well as the purposive activity of ministers. These purposive activities, however, are only the branches and not the root. As such, humaneness and righteousness are only specific measures and so are the branches and not the root. Just as vessels are made by craftsmen but are not the craftsmen themselves, likewise, in these circumstances, one needs to make the branches flourish by enhancing the root. As such, in carrying out purposive actions, one must pay attention to the essence of these measures, it is only in this way that institutions of rites and music will not become alienated. This then is, “venerating the roots and forgoing the branches, holding fast to the mother in order to preserve the child.” (“Outline Introduction to the Laozi”) It is in this way that, forms and names will all exist, but perverse things will not occur. Such great beauty will make a companion worthy of heaven and superficiality will not arise. Therefore the mother must not be kept at a distance and the roots must not be lost.6 (Chapter 38, Commentary on the Daodejing)

If one only pays attention to the institutions of music and rites then this is to “discard the mother and make use of the child, rejecting the roots and taking the branches.” (ibid.) As such, if this is manifest in names, there will be distinctions, and, if this is manifest in forms, there will be limits. One may enlarge their size to the utmost, but there is sure to be something they do not encompass. One may make them as praiseworthy as possible, but there are sure to be those who cause calamity and distress.7 (ibid.)

As such, in making the branch flourish by enhancing the root, the emphasis is in enhancing the root. Once the root is enhanced then the branches will spontaneously flourish. Although there are differences of expression between “venerating the roots and forgoing the branches” (崇本息末) and “making the branch flourish by enhancing the root” (崇本举末), both put emphasis on venerating the root. Forging the branches is the ideal political condition whereas enhancing the root is a realistic political state.

25.4 Four After the Wei-Jin period, the distinction between root and branch in the philosophical sense had terminated and it was rarely discussed again. The discussion of root and branch turned again to its traditional sense of the relationship between agriculture and industry and commerce. This discussion continued till the present day. The traditional view of root and branch emphasized agriculture as the root and industry and commerce as the branch and this was the same in the Tang as it was in 6 Lynn 7 Lynn

(1999: 123), modified. (1999: 124).

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the Qin-Han period. Under the Tang policy of emphasizing agriculture and restraining commerce, the social status of merchants was relatively low, and the offspring of merchants were not allowed to go into government. With regard to craft and commerce, It is only permissible for them to have extensive goods, but they cannot hold government office, they cannot stand shoulder to shoulder with the worthy gentlemen of court nor sit and eat with them. (Book 177, Old Book of the Tang)

As such, “the grandee [大夫] does not get involved in craft and commerce” (Wang Yinglin Chap. 67, Jade Ocean). From this, we can see that the policy of emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce had a profound influence. By the Northern Song period, as commercial economy flourished and developed, the traditional idea of emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce suffered blows. Some philosophers also gave renewed analysis to the status of industry and commerce. Ye Meng (叶梦), for example, saw scholar-officialdom, farming, crafts and commerce as merely four different types of professions. He said, The different occupations have different ways of sustaining their lives. The farmer labours during the day and rests in the evening, this is his way of sustaining his life. To labour in the workshops is the way of the craftsman. To take produce to places where there is a scarcity of them is the way of the merchant. To study day and night is the way of the scholar. (Main Contents Written for Posterity on how to Govern Oneself 8 )

It is merely that there is a different division of labour between scholar-officialdom, farming, crafts and commerce but they are the same in that they are all needed by society, and so there is no distinction between their degrees of worthiness. Ouyang Xiu saw scholar-officialdom, farming, crafts and commerce as the four appendages of a human body and believed that they should be treated equitably: Governing the state is akin to cultivating the body. The four occupations are akin to the four limbs. If one suppresses one of them, then it would be akin to cutting off the toe. If the crafts flourish, then commerce will naturally also flourish. The relationship that exists between the occupations are all mutually effecting. (Book 7, “Sending off the Officer for Salt-transportation Zhu Zhifang” “Recluse Collection”)

As such, although the crafts and commerce are the branch, they are still necessary. Chen Liang (陈亮) and Ye Shi (叶适) of the Yongjia school (功利学派) in the southern Song took further criticized the traditional view of emphasizing agriculture and restraining industry and highlighted the important function of industry and commerce. Chen Liang proposed the view of “merchants rely on farmers to be established and farmers depend on merchants in order to operate.” He said, In former times, the officials and the common people were one family and farming and commerce was one affair. Above and below were mutually solicitous of each other, and gave to each other what the other lacked, when the common people were ailed by something they sought the officials, when the country was ailed by something they sought help from the common people. The merchants relied on farmers to be established and farmers depended on merchants in order to operate. They sought to complement each other and not to hurt 8 石林治生家训要略.

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each other. In this way how could good laws and wonderful intentions fail to be carried out for even a day? (“The Four Maladies”, Collected Works of Chen Liang)

As such the relationship between agriculture and industry and commerce is complementary and not conflictual, and neither of them can be abolished. Ye She tried to use records from the past which supported merchants. He proposed that, “suppressing the branches and nourishing the branches is not the correct discourse.” According to Ye She, prior to the Han, all the states had a supportive attitude to merchants, and the restraining of merchants was a phenomenon that arose in the post-Han period. He pointed out that, it is only with the function of the scholar-officials, farmers, craftsmen as well as merchants that the state can flourish and so the suppressing the branches and nourishing the branches is a misguided idea. The disciple of Ye Shi, Chen Qiqing (陈耆卿) further proposed the view that the scholar-official, farmer, craftsmen and merchants are “all the root professions of the people” (皆百姓之本业). Chen Qiqing believed that the scholar-official, farmer, craftsmen and merchants are the four peoples of antiquity and each held a different profession: The scholar-official is assiduous in the occupation of learning and can by means of it obtain the salary of a government official. The farmer is assiduous in the fields and can by means of it sow and reap. The craftsman is assiduous in crafts and can by means of it change their clothing and food. The merchant is assiduous in trade and can by means of it accumulate wealth and goods.

As such, “these four are all the root professions of the people, and this has been the case since people have existed.” These four have one thing in common and that is, “looking up, by means of this, serving one’s parents, looking down, by means of this, nourishing one’s wife and children, and this is one’s life-long task.” Apart from these four professions, “then there are what is called the people who are the lazy wanderers who do nothing for their keep” (Book 37, Records from Chicheng City of Jiading) In seeing craftsmen and merchants as one of the root occupations of the people, Chen Qiqing is elevating these professions to a status that they never previously enjoyed and is also a refutation of the traditional views of branch and root. By the late Ming and the early Qing Chen Qiqing’s views were further developed by Huang Zongxi’s (黄宗羲) view of “craftsmen and merchants are all the root.” Huang Zongxi said, The conventional Confucians of today have not closely examined the veneration of the root and suppression of the branch that was the way of the ancient sage kings. They are mistaken inasmuch as they take craftsmen and merchant to be the branch. The crafts can bring that which the sage kinds desired and the merchants can make available that which they desire. (“Finance Plan 3”, Waiting for the Dawn)

As Huang Zongxi sees it, crafts, commerce and agriculture all belong to the root. That which can be considered branch are those professions which are not of real use to the people such as professions of superstition, entertainment and those crafts without real skill but make people addicted. These “branch industries” should all be prohibited. As such, Huang Zongxi demarcated anew the tradition divisions of root and branch.

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After the fall of the Qing dynasty, and with the invasion of the great powers, there arose a great fashion in China of studying from the West; this trend was reflected in the question of root and branch. Many philosophers broke from the traditional idea of emphasizing agriculture and restraining commerce, and instead advocated that craft and commerce were both just as important. In the case of Yan Fu, for example, although he believed that “according to reason there is really a distinction between root and branch” of agriculture and commerce “but with regard to the country, they are both of equal importance” (“Notes for”, On Wealth). On the one hand, Wei Yuan believed “in the lesson of the proverbial idea that the appearance of grain means the disappearance of gold and the rightness of emphasizing the root and restraining the branches and that food takes priority over goods” (“Military Reserves chapter one”, Collected Works of Wei Yuan), “gold and jade are not treasures, sowing and reaping are treasures, this old lesion is clear and evident, does this not also apply to the frontier regions?” (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms). On the other hand, he also advocated developing and making maritime trade more robust, “the cheapness of goods depends on the convenience of trade, the convenience of trade depends on improving trade routes. It has never been the case that if the journey stops, the goods still assemble, and if route is open, there is a stoppage in the flow of goods.” (“Choucao 1”, Collected Works of Wei Yuan) As the first envoy to Britain and France Guo Songtao, according to his own understanding of Britain and France, proposed the idea that the “fundamental principles in the conduct of government and instruction is the root and crafts and commerce is the branch.” He said, “there is root and branch to the Western establishment of the state, its root is the church and state, and its branch is merchants, ship-building, and the creation of instruments. Aiding the root is a component of the branch.” (Surveillance Commissioner of Fujian Province Guo Songtao’s Memorial to the Throne on the issue of Coastal Defence). With regard to China, “what is root?” The root is established when the state rectifies the numerous officials and chooses the appropriate people to fulfil the roles. (“Response to Yao Yanjia”, Collected Poems and Essays of Guo Songtao) As such, “in order to become rich and strong, it is necessary to have the root. The accumulation of custom and fundamental principles in the conduct of government and instruction is its root” (Book 11, Collected Works of Guo Songtao). As Guo Songtao sees it, the most pressing task for China is to start from the root of fundamental principles in the conduct of government and instruction and not merely to seek after the branch techniques of wealth accumulation and becoming strong. It is for this reason that he criticized Westernizers such as Li Hongzhang who “only sought after the techniques of increasing power and strength and did not discuss the root sources. This is to govern the branches and to forget the roots.” (Book 3, The Diary of Guo Songtao). In conclusion to the above, the discussion of the traditional idea of root and branch is primarily focused on the relationship between agriculture, craft and commerce. In this sense, the concept of root and branch does not have a philosophical meaning. With the flourishing of Neo-Daoism in the Wei-Jin period, however, the concept of root and branch not only gained a philosophical meaning, but it also became an important concept in Neo-Daoism. With the waning of Neo-Daoism, however, root and branch in its philosophical sense were rarely discussed again. What replaced it

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was still its traditional economic meaning. This phenomenon lasted till the modern period. As such, root and branch in the philosophical sense was merely limited to the distinction between non-being and being of Neo-Daoism.

References Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 26

Name and Corresponding Object (mingshi, 名实)

Name and corresponding object are a key conceptual pair in traditional Chinese philosophy. Name means designation and concept. Corresponding object means reality, things and affairs or the object situation of the thing or affair. The relationship between name and corresponding object is roughly equivalent to the concept and the objective reality that the concept reflects. In Chinese philosophy, the issue of name and corresponding object contains the following four main contents. One, that which the name is based on, two, the rule for producing names, three, the categorization of names and four, the relationship between names and corresponding object. With regard to the relationship between names and reality, it can be further divided into question of whether the name or the object came first. This means whether the name determines the object or vice versa, as well as whether names accurately reflect reality, that is, whether names and objects can correspond with each other.

26.1 One The question of name and reality arose in the Spring and Autumn period and has a deep social and historical basis. During the collapse of ritual and ruination of music (礼崩乐坏) of the later Spring and Autumn period there appeared the dissonant phenomenon of “the conflict between names and corresponding object” (名实相 怨). The various schools of the pre-Qin period, therefore, offered their views on the question of name and corresponding object as well as the relationship between them. By the middle of the Warring States, this became an intellectual trend and the Confucians, Mohists, Daoists and School of Names all proffered their own views on the relationship between name and corresponding object. With regard to the contemporary phenomenon of the violation of Zhou ritual norms in which “the sovereign is not a sovereign, the minister not a minister, the father not a father and the son not a son” Confucius advocated “the rectification of names” and believed that in administering the government, it is necessary to rectify names. (Analects 13.3) This is because, © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_26

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If names be not correct, language will not function properly. If language does not function properly, affairs cannot be carried out successfully. When affairs cannot be carried out successfully, rites and music will not flourish. When rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly administered. When punishments are not properly administered, the people do not know how to move their hand or foot. (Analects 13.3)

Confucius hoped that with the Zhou rites as the basis, through the rectification of names, he will arrive at his goal of correcting the phenomenon whereby “the sovereign is not a sovereign, the minister not a minister, the father not a father and the son not a son.” In this way, he can realize the social order whereby, “the sovereign is a sovereign, the minister a minister, the father a father, the son a son.” As such, Confucius’s thoughts on rectifying names is not based on epistemological considerations, but on political and moral ones. Although Laozi and Zhuangzi’s discussions of name and corresponding object are not voluminous, they do touch on the question of that which is above physical form and that which is below physical form. With regard to specific objects that are below physical form, Laozi believes that the names of things are produced by people for the purpose of understanding them. In this sense, there is a correspondence between names and corresponding object. With regard to dao, which is above physical form, Laozi believes “dao which can be named is not the constant dao, and name that can be named is not the constant name” (Chapter 40, Daodejing), as such, “dao is constantly without name” (Chapter 32, Daodejing) “dao is hidden and has no name” (Chapter 41, Daodejing). In this regard, there is no correspondence between name and object and there is no means of using specific names to refer to the formless dao. The name “dao” is merely a placeholder because one is forced to call it something. In discussing names and corresponding object Zhuangzi, like Laozi, affirms that reality determines the name and so he affirms correspondence between names and object. On the other hand, he also says, “The dao cannot be expressed in words; what can be expressed in words is not it. […] Dao does not admit of being named.” (“Knowing Rambling North” Zhuangzi) On the other hand, Zhuangzi thus also believes that one cannot use a specific name to designate dao. Laozi and Zhuangzi’s views on name and corresponding object became one of the main theoretical bases of the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoist distinction between language and meaning. The Mohists and the later Mohist mainly discussed the relationship between name and corresponding object from an epistemological perspective. Mozi explicitly proposed “designating names according to reality” (取实予名) which means determining names based on reality. As such, “investigating its reality” (察其实) and “discriminating between objects” (分其物) became the precondition and basis for the giving of names. “There are the names of praise without understanding its real meaning” and having the “names of black and white but not being able to discriminate between such objects” are therefore all in error. The later Mohists had the key idea of “names are used to raise stuff” (以名举实) which means that names are a reflection of objective things and affairs, that reality is the basis of names and that names are coherent with the corresponding object. With regard to the categorization of names, the later Mohists divided names into unrestricted (达), classifying (类), and private (私). Unrestricted names are the biggest category and are equivalent to the common

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concept, for example, “object” (物); all things belong to “object.” A Classifying name is a name for a whole category for example “human”, “horse”, “ox.” A private name is equivalent to specific concepts and is used to refer to specific things. For example, “China” and “Great Wall.” The later Mohists in “Canon II” discussed three kinds of permissible and impermissible. First is, the permissibility of that and this (彼此可). This is when that name is confined to that reality and this name is confined to this reality. Second is, the impermissibility of that and this (彼此不可). This is when that name is used to refer to that reality as well as this reality. Third, is when both that and this are permissible (彼此亦可). This refers to the situation when the two different names of that and this refer to the same object, thus, that name and this name are interrelated. The later Mohists also investigated the relationship between names and corresponding object and helped stimulate the development of Chinese logic and so occupies an important position in the history of Chinese logic. The Jixia academy (稷下) of the Warring States also gives systematic elucidation to the relationship between names and corresponding object. The Yinwenzi (尹文 子) and the Guanzi can be taken as representative. The Yinwenzi’s discussion of name and corresponding object aimed at “distinguishing that and this” (别彼此), “investigate real and not real” (检虚实), “investigate name and apportionment” (察 名分), “rectify high and low” (正尊卑) Their discussions can be split into two main dimensions. First, the relationship between name and form, that is the relationship between name and corresponding object. Second, the classification of names. With regard to the relationship between names and forms the Yinwenzi believes that names are first of all an expression and designation of things that have form and that forms have a correlative correspondence with certain names. It is for this reason that names can rectify forms and forms can rectify names. The distinctions between the myriad things depend on the different names to be distinguished, or otherwise they will bring chaos upon each other. The basis for the establishment of the different names, however, are the specific forms of specific object. Without forms as its basis, then names cannot correspond with reality. As such, names must be an appropriate expression of forms, names cannot be amiss, and this is rectifying forms through names. On the other hand, “determining its name according to its form, determining its kind according to its name, checking its name according to its kind” is to rectify the name according to its form. With regard to the classification of names the Yinwenzi proposed the key idea that, “there are three divisions [科] to names” this means that there are three divisions to names. “The Great Dao I” chapter of the Yinwenzi says that, there are three divisions to names […] one is the names for designating objects [命物], this is square, circle, black and white. Second is the names for designating morality [毁誉], this is good, bad, high and low. Third are expressive names [况谓] and these are worthy, ignoble, love and hate.

“Names for designating objects” designate objectively existing and specific things and affairs, for example, square, round, black and white. “Names for designating morality” and “expressive names” are names referring to ethics and morality, for

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example, good, bad, high, low, worthy, ignoble, love and hate. This is the earliest classification of names. The “Art of the Heart-mind I” chapter of the Guanzi says, “Names are what the sage takes as his guidelines for all things” here, an explanation is given for the production of names. It also says, “things have fixed forms; forms have fixed names. This means that the name must not exceed its reality and the reality must not transcend its name.” Here, it is meant that reality is primary, names follow this reality and that names and reality correspond with each other. The relationship between names and reality is related to whether a society is governed or chaotic. “If names are correct then there is order, if names are partial then there is chaos, without names there will be death”, “if names accord with reality then there is order, is they do not accord then there is chaos” as such, the sovereign should “hold actual services accountable according to official names and determine names according to reality” and thus arrive at the aim of “transforming heaven and earth through rectifying names and reality.” Gong Sunlong is the representative figure of the school of names of the pre-Qin period and their forte was analyzing the concepts of names. It is a shame that most of Gong Sunlong’s works are now lost and so it is very hard to piece together his overall philosophy. With regard to the question of names and corresponding object, a surviving work of his is Discourse on Name and Corresponding Object (名实论). What the Discourse on Name and Corresponding Object investigates, as its title indicates, is the relationship between name and corresponding object; but this text is exceedingly difficult to understand. It can be divided into two parts. First, it is a clarification of “object” (物), “reality” (实), “position” (位) and “rectification” (正). The second part is on the principle of “rectification of names.” The first part of Discourse on Name and Corresponding Object discusses Gong Sunlong’s understanding of “object” (物), “reality” (实), “position” (位) and “rectification” (正) and these are the foundations of the “rectification of names.” “Object” is “heaven and earth and what it produces”, “reality” refers to the essential regularity that things possess. “Position” refers to the contexts and domains in which the term can be used. “Rectification” refers to correspondence between the contexts and domains in which the term can be used and what it wishes to express with the concept. The opposite of this is, “not in position” (非位). The second part of Discourse on Name and Corresponding Object discusses the “rectification of names” and its overall principle is that the correct name refers to the correspondence between names and what that name represents. It can be split into two scenarios: 1. “Rectification of names” is used to express the lack of correspondence between that reality and that name, that that name is not accurate and so does not work. By the same principle, it is used to express the lack of correspondence between this reality and this name, that this name is not accurate and so does not pertain. As such, “rectification of names” is used to refer to the correspondence between that reality and that name, and that that name can express that reality and so does pertain and the correspondence between this reality and this name, and that this name can express this reality and so does pertain. Second, with regard to that

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name and this name, if that name is only used to express that reality, this name is only used to express this realty, that name and that reality, this name and this reality, then there must be a correspondence between them. On this basis, that name and this name can be established. If it is used to refer to that name of this reality, then it expresses both that reality as well as this reality, or it is used to refer to this name of that reality, then it expresses both this reality as well as that reality. In this way, there will be no one to one correspondence between that name and this reality, this reality and that name. There will, therefore, be mutual chaos between name and reality, and this is not allowable. 2. If this name has already undergone a change so that it does not cohere with the corresponding object, or if the object which the name refers to has already changed then one cannot anymore use this name to refer to this object. If that name has already undergone a change so that it does not cohere with the corresponding object, or if the object which the name refers to has already changed then one cannot anymore use that name to refer to that object. From this we can see that Gong Sunlong is using pure epistemology or logic to discuss the relationship between name and corresponding object and his discussions are also very profound. His discourse of “white horse is not a horse” can be understood as a specific application of his discussion of name and corresponding object. Xunzi, affected his social context whereby, Nowadays, the sage kings have passed away, and the preservation of these names have become lax. Strange words have arisen, the names and their corresponding objects are disordered, and the forms of right and wrong are unclear.1 (“Correcting Names” Xunzi)

proposed a systematic discourse of the rectification of names and believed that this was of the utmost importance. It is through the rectification of names that, none of the people dared rely on making up strange names so as to disorder the correct names, they were unified in following the proper model of the Way and were diligent in following commands.2 (“Correcting Names” Xunzi)

As such, the state was able to have long-term governance. Xunzi’s views on name and corresponding object are mainly manifested in the chapter “Correcting Names” and it can be discussed from three dimensions. First, Xunzi believes the reason for creating names is to make, clear the distinction between noble and base, and more generally, distinguishing the like and the unlike. When noble and base are clearly distinguished, and like and unlike are differentiated, then the problem of intentions not being understood will not happen, and the disaster of affairs being thereby impeded and abandoned will not occur.3 (“Correct Names” Xunzi)

Thus, it is necessary to create names. 1 Hutton

2014: 237. 2014: 237. 3 Hutton 2014: 237. 2 Hutton

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Second, the reasons for the similarity and difference between different names. Xunzi believes that the different sense organs—the heaven given faculties, that is the ears, eyes, nose, mouth and heart—can know the different aspects of things, but it is the heart-mind that the ability to judge its awareness of the sense organs. Through analyzing different perceptions and distinguishing the sameness and differences of things, the heart-mind can determine the similarity and difference between things. Third, the rules that the creation of names must follow. Specifically speaking there are three types. (1) With regard to single words and combined words, One treats similar things as similar, and one treats different things as different. When a single word is sufficient to make oneself understood, then one uses a single word. When a single word is not sufficient to make oneself understood, then one combines words. When the single and combined words in no way contradict each other, then one considers them a group, and even though one groups them together, this will do no harm, for one understands how different objects are named differently.

(2) With regard to “large-scale group naming” and “large-scale differentiated names,” large-scale group naming is when “by drawing analogies, one groups things together, grouping and grouping, until there is nothing more to group, and then one stops.” With regard to large-scale differentiated names, “by drawing analogies, one differentiates things, differentiating and differentiating, until there is nothing more to differentiate, and then one stops.” (3) “Observing the objects and determining their numbers.” This is mainly in relation to the fact that “some things have a like appearance but reside in unlike classes, and others have unlike appearances but reside in the like class”: For those which have a like appearance but reside in unlike classes, even though they could be combined into one class, they are called two separate objects. If the appearance changes but the object does not become different so as to belong to an unlike class, this is called a transformation. When there is transformation without such difference, it is still called one and the same object.4

Xunzi also refuted the three contemporary errors on the question of name and corresponding object, Xunzi called these the “three classes of confusion” and proposed a methodology for the prohibition of the “three classes of confusion.” First, “confusion about the use of names leading to disordering names.” “Claims such as “To be insulted is not disgraceful”, “The sage does not love himself” and “To kill a robber is not to kill a man” all belong to this category. With regard to this kind of error, “if one tests them against the reason why there are names, and observes what happens when they are carried out thoroughly, then one will be able to reject them.” The second is “confusion about the use of objects leading to disordering names.” Claims such as, “Mountains and gorges are level,” “The desires of one’s natural dispositions are few”, “Fine meats are not any more flavorful” and “Great bells are not any more entertaining” all belong to this category. With regard to this kind of error, “if one tests them against the proper means for distinguishing like and unlike, and observes what happens when they are thoroughly practiced, then one will be able to reject them.” The third is, “confusion about the use of names leading to disordering the 4 Hutton

(2014: 239).

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objects.” Claims such as, “Oxen and horses are not horses” belong to this category. With regard to this kind of error, “if one tests them against the agreement on names, using the fact that what such people accept goes against what they reject, then one will be able to reject them.”5 Xunzi’s discourse on the rectification of names was built upon the foundation of the philosophy of the philosophers described above and can be considered the summary of the pre-Qin philosophy of name and corresponding object.

26.2 Two Since the establishment of the Qin and Han dynasties and as the imperial order was founded and societal order had stabilized, the social conditions for “making up strange names so as to disorder the correct names” had already disappeared and so discussions of name and corresponding object had also calmed down. The only thing that is worth paying attention to is the vestigial residue of the pre-Qin distinction between name and corresponding object that is found in the philosophy of Dong Zhongshu. The main contents of his discussions on the relationship between name and corresponding object can be found in the chapter “Deeply Examine Names and Designations” of the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn. First, Dong Zhongshu believes that the root of ordering the world lies in the reason for why things are different. This means that in order to distinguish between the differences between things, one must deeply investigate the meanings that names and designations represent as well as the basis on which they are established. From this we can see that Dong Zhongshu approaches the question of names and designations from the perspective of governing the world. Following this, Dong Zhongshu believes that the basis of the sages’ invention of names was the will of heaven. The rectification of names and designations derives from heaven and earth. Heaven and earth [themselves] create the general idea of names and designations. The ancient sages shouted in imitation of heaven and earth, and this was called a “designation.” They cried out to put their orders into practice, and this was called a “name.” “Name” means “to call out” and “to order” […] Although names and designations have different sounds, they share one root: both are things that are called out and penetrate heaven’s will. Heaven does not speak but [nevertheless] causes people to communicate its intentions; heaven does not act but [nevertheless] causes people to realize its centrality. Names are the means by which the sage communicates heaven’s intentions. They must be scrutinized.6

As such, names and designations are all expressions of heaven’s intent. Following this, names should have the reality of things and affairs as their basis. Dong Zhongshu believes that the reality of things is the basis for the production of names. Names are the designations of the real qualities of things. The goal for the 5 Hutton 6 Queen

(2014: 239–240). and Major (2016: 343-344).

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sages’ creation of names is to reflect objective reality; this is the principle for the production of names. As such, names and corresponding object are coherent with each other. It is precise because of their coherence that names and designations are the measure for judging the rightness and wrongness of things. From this we can see that Dong Zhongshu’s views on name and corresponding object are not rooted in epistemological investigations into the relationship between name and corresponding object but rather in demonstrating his religious-political philosophy of “the correspondence between heaven and human beings.” His aim was in finding a theoretical basis for the imperial order. In other words, his views on name and corresponding object are a reflection of his religious-political philosophy. It is in this sense that he says, “when each affair complies with its name and each name complies with heaven, the realms of heaven and humankind are united and become one.”7 (“Deeply Examine Names and Designations” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn).

26.3 Three By the end of the Han, there arose the phenomena whereby the election and employment of peoples, names and reality became out of line. It was in opposition to these phenomena whereby names do not correspond with reality that many philosophers advocated combining names and corresponding object. Xu Gan (徐干) of the Eastern Han said, Names are the means by which the corresponding object is named. The corresponding object is first established, and the name follows it. It is not that the name is first established and then the corresponding object follows it. Thus, long shapes are established and they are called long, short shapes are established and they are called short. It is not that the names of long and short are first established and the long and short shapes follow them.

He also said, One venerates names in order to venerate the reality that they represent. Names are tied to reality just like affairs are tied to the times. (“Investigating forgery”, Discussion on the Mean Way)

This means that there is first the object before there is the name, that names are the expression of reality and not vice versa. There is a particularly strong emphasis here on the fact that names and reality must correspond with each other. Within name and corresponding object, it is more important to investigate the object than investigating the name. Liu Yi (刘Ù) also emphasized a comprehensive investigation into whether names were in accord with reality or not as well as the importance of reality. Names must reflect reality and it is only as such that names can be in accord with reality and that names can be used to supervise reality. Zhong Changtong (仲长统) criticized the phenomenon of “venerating names and not knowing the corresponding object” 7 Queen

and Major (2016: 296).

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and he advocated that, “there must be gradations in the five punishments, One must clearly distinguish between their degrees of seriousness. The regulations must have clear rules to be followed, and there must be coherence between the name and the actuality.” (“Increase and Decrease” Unrestrained assertion). The later Han fashion of comprehensively investigating whether names were in accord with reality or not was aimed at the later Han phenomenon whereby in the employment of people names and reality became disjointed. As such, there is a very specific meaning to its discussions. What is meant by “name” is not the usual meaning of designation or concept, but rather the reputation, moral reputation or government position that someone has gained. What is meant by “corresponding object” in this case is not the actual object, but rather refers to the actual moral qualities or the actual achievements of office that should correspond with such a reputation. As such, the late Han discussion of name and corresponding object is actually very narrow. From the distinction between name and corresponding object initiated by the preQin philosophers, to the fashion for comprehensively investigating whether names were in accord with reality in the late-Han as well to the Wei-Jin discussion of language and meaning, we can see the increasingly abstract nature of the question of name and corresponding object. At the same time, we can see that the emergence of the question of name and corresponding object and the disjuncture between them is intimately related to historical conditions. Furthermore, apart from the pure epistemological investigations of the school of names and the Mohists, the question of name and corresponding object was approached most frequently from an ethical and political dimension. This is one of the characteristics of the philosophy of name and corresponding object in Chinese philosophy.

References Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Queen, Sarah. A. and Major, John S. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.

Chapter 27

Public and Private (gongsi, 公私)

Public and private is a key concept in traditional Chinese political and moral philosophy. The investigation into public and private became what is called “the distinction between public and private” (公私之辨) in the history of Chinese thought. Once public and private became a complementary conceptual pair, the idea of “venerating the public and suppressing the private” (崇公抑私) and “extinguishing the private through the public” (以公灭私) became the dominant view in the distinction between public and private in traditional Chinese culture. As early as the Book of the Documents it was already proposed that one should “extinguish all selfish aims by your public feeling, and the people will have confidence in you.” (“Officers of Zhou”, Book of Documents) After this, the Confucians and the Legalists have all followed this view. With the development of society and the changes in the times, there appeared different contents and characteristics in the “distinction between public and private.”

27.1 One With regard to the two words “public” and “private,” historically, public appeared before private. The word public already made its appearance in the oracle bone scripts and its meaning contained the following dimensions. One, “deceased father” (先公) that is, an honorific term for one’s ancestors. This is the earliest meaning of “public.” Second, it refers to an official position or title of nobility (官位) or honour (爵位), or it refers to the person who occupies this title. Third, it refers to the official affairs of an official residence or state. Fourth, it refers to public ownership. Fifth, it refers to equally divided, on an equal footing; from this meaning, one can also infer the meaning of fairness and equality. The meaning of private also has the following dimensions. First, it refers to the concept of status, and in opposition to the terns expressing official position or title of nobility or honour we saw above, it refers to aristocracy, grandee (大夫) and can also refer to the common people. Second, it refers to the opposite of public ownership, © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_27

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that is private ownership. Third, it refers to personal relationships or considerations and private desires. Fourth, it refers to partiality and personal preference. Apart from this, in the Book of Odes, private also has two other meanings. First, it refers to clothing for special occasions and everyday clothing. Second, it refers to a sister’s husband. With the development of society, “public” was mainly used in the sense of public ownership and things held in common and associated with the state, the sovereign and society. Private was used in the sense of self, privately owned, and associated with the self, the individual and private desires. Gradually, public and private became opposed concepts and were endowed with the content of moral and social values.

27.2 Two In Confucius’s philosophy, there are no instances where the public and the private are opposed to each other. Confucius, however, advocated “strengthening the ducal house” (张公室), “suppressing the grandee’s house” (抑私室) and he praised the high minister of the state of Lu, Ji Wenzi (季文子): “he was loyal to the ducal house. He gave assistance to the governance of three generations of sovereigns but did not hoard away any private wealth, is this not loyalty!” (5th Year of Lord Xiang, Zuo Zhuan) In the Analects he also said, “Just [公], [the people] were pleased.” (Analects 20.1) From this we can infer that Confucius advocated publicness and opposed the private. Confucius’s attitude to the public and private also expresses his views on righteousness and self-interest. Righteousness means the righteousness of the dao (道义) and represents the moral norms of society. Whilst Confucius is not opposed to the seeking after private interest and wealth, he believes that the way to gain them must be in accordance with the righteousness of the dao. “Riches and honors are what men desire. But if one cannot get them by means that accord with the way, one cannot accept them. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. But if one cannot avoid them by means that accord with the way, one will not reject them.” (Analects 4.5) Here, the dao/ way refers to the righteousness of the dao which is also the righteousness of publicness (公义). Confucius further took righteousness and selfinterest as the standard for distinguishing between the moral exemplar and the petty man. The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.” (Analects 4.16) Gain refers to private interest and righteousness refers to the righteousness of publicness. From this we can see that on the question of public and private, Confucius advocated following the public. Apart from this, Confucius also said, “those who possess a state or a noble house are not concerned about whether their people are scarce, but rather about uneven distribution [不均]; they are not concerned about poverty, but rather concerned that what wealth they have is fairly distributed.” (Analects 16.1) “Uneven distribution” means unfair or unequal and well-distributed (均) is realized through the extinguishing of private possession. This reflects the function of Confucius’s emphasis on the public: making objections to extinguishing the public through the private.

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Like Confucius, Mencius also rarely talked about the question of public and private. It is only when he talks about the well-field system that he says: A square league is divided into a pattern like the character for “well” [井]. The well fields are nine hundred acres. In their middle is the public field. Eight families each have a private one hundred acres and cultivate the public field in common. Only after the public work is completed do they dare to manage their private work. This is the manner in which one manages the uncultivated people. (Mencius 3A3)

Carrying out the well-field system is the basis of humane governance. Here, Mencius emphasis that it is “only after the public work is completed do they dare to manage their private work.” From this we can see that on the question of public and private, Mencius advocates and attitude of “first public, then private” and “primacy on the public.” By the time of Xunzi, there was much more discussion of the question of public and private. What Xunzi means by “public” is rather broad. Apart from referring to “public interest,” Xunzi also uses it to refer to “fairness” (公平) and “public righteousness” (公义). Apart from referring to “private interest,” private also means “private desire” and “personal opinion.” On the question of public and private, Xunzi believes that they are absolutely antithetical to each other and that public and private is a standard for distinguishing between the moral exemplar and the petty man. “The moral exemplar overcomes capricious personal desires through the avoidance of prejudice and through cultivating righteousness.” (“Cultivating Oneself” Xunzi) Xunzi particularly emphasized the guiding effect that the sovereign has. If the sovereign is not public-minded then his ministers will not be loyal. If the sovereign is publicminded and upright, then those below will follow. In terms of employing people, Xunzi says, “As for the rulers of men, they have kept worthy men outside their inner circle and promoted others in a biased fashion. As for their ministers, they have fought over official posts and been jealous of worthy men.”1 (“The True King and Hegemon” Xunzi) It is for this reason that he advocates being “public-minded and upright and without private desires” and that one should promote “officials that are public-minded and upright” (“The Way to be a Lord” Xunzi) With regard to ministers, Xunzi advocates, “showing proven loyalty by staying free of prejudice” (“The Way to be a Minister” Xunzi). Those ministers who pay great heed to public interest can “respect the sovereign above and love the people below” and Xunzi calls them “sagely ministers” (圣臣). The ministers who seek after private desires are “not loyal to his lord above, but he is good at obtaining repute amongst the people below. He cares nothing for the Way and righteousness that encompass all, and instead forms factions and cliques. He takes deceiving the ruler and plotting personal gain as his task.” Xunzi calls these “the usurping minister” (篡臣). From this we can see that on the question of public and private, Xunzi venerates publicness and debases privateness. His views on public and private have the aim of maintaining the interests of the sovereign. In the idea of the “grand union” in “Ceremonial Usages” chapter of the Book of Rites we can see the effect of the Confucian veneration of publicness” 1 Hutton

(2014: 109).

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When the great dao was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the heaven; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and females had their homes. [They accumulated] articles [of value], disliking that they should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification. [They labored] with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it [only] with a view to their own advantage. In this way [selfish] schemings were repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was [the period of] what we call the grand union [大同].

A key feature of the Confucian ideal of grand union is that “a public and common spirit rule.” In this kind society there will not be any selfish views and all wealth and power will be owned by the public. On this basis, the worthies are promoted and there is only honesty and harmonious co-existence between peoples to the extent that all under heaven is as if a big family. This ideal society which venerates publicness became the societal goal for all Confucians in history and that which they gave elucidation to, even Sun Zhongshan, for example, in the modern epoch still advocated the rule of “a public and common spirit.”

27.3 Three The legalists were the ones who investigated the question of public and private in greatest depth. The legalists believed that human nature is selfish and self-seeking. Shang Yang, for example, believed that, “it is the nature of the people, when they are hungry, to strive for food; when they are tired, to strive for rest; when they suffer hardship, to seek enjoyment; when they are in a state of humiliation, to strive for honour.”2 (“Calculation of Land” Book of Lord Shang) Guanzi believed that, “indeed, it is the nature of men that whenever they see profit, they cannot help chasing after it, and whenever they see harm, they cannot help running away.”3 (“On Maintaining Restraint” Guanzi) Hanfeizi believed that everyone is selfish and self-seeking, he said, “Indeed, to choose safety and profit and leave danger and trouble, this is human nature.” (“Ministers Apt to Betray, Molest, or Murder the Ruler” Hanfeizi) As such, the legalists explicitly believed that there was an antithetical relationship between public and private and that it was only through the law that the public could prevail over the private, that it was only through the law that one can ensure the realization of publicness. The early representative of the legalist school, Shang Yang, elevated the problem of public and private to the height of that which concerns the existence or ruin of the 2 Duyvendak 3 Rickett

(2003: 217). (1998: 219–220).

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state. He said, “the relation between public and private interests is what determines existence or ruin” and proposed the idea of “harming the law for the sake of selfinterest.” Shang Yang believed that if the sovereign and the minister neglect the law and act according to their own self-interest, then the state will necessarily come to chaos. Abandoning the law and acting according to self-interest will have the further consequence of allowing treacherous ministers to use their power to serve their own private interests and allow certain functionaries to prey upon the common people. This will result in the separation between the ruler and the common people and endanger the state. There are certain ministers who, by using their own power for self-interest, will become the main reason for the ruin of the state. The representative legalist scholar Guanzi from the state of Qi also heavily emphasized the distinction between public and private. His main thesis was “relying on impartiality, not on self-serving arguments”4 (“Reliance on Law” Guanzi). Guanzi saw self-interest as one of the reasons for the chaos of the world and so he advocated that the sovereign should have the virtue of publicness and not be self-serving. Having virtue means “loving the people without impartiality.” The sovereign should model himself on the virtue of impartiality of heaven and earth. Being partial in what one sees and hears will lead to being one’s misled and even to losing one’s place as sovereign. As Guanzi sees it, what the law represents is public justice. It is only by preserving the country through law that one can be impartial and not self-serving. It is for this reason that the sovereign relies upon the law and not on expertise (智), relies upon impartiality as opposed to the self-serving. Relying upon impartiality means handling affairs through the law; not relying upon the self-serving means that in handling affairs one “does not privately form cliques of people they like, does not privately punish people they dislike” (ibid.). In employing people, Guanzi believes that one should get rid of self-serving motives and establish impartiality. The employment of people should not rely on the standard of how close a kin one is but must instead depart from an impartial motive. It is only in this way that people will call what you do the dao. It is only in getting rid of self-serving motives and establishing impartiality that one can win the esteem of the common people. As such, the sovereign who is of the dao acts according to law and not according to self-serving motives. The sovereign without dao, however, will forsake the dao and carry out self-interested actions and this self-interestedness will influence those below him so that all will form cliques until finally, “the people abandon impartiality and take to self-serving interests and so they abandon the law and indulge in disorderly conduct.” (ibid.) Hanfeizi starts from the assumption that human nature is selfish, that public and private are antithetically opposed to each other and that everyone seeks after personal interest. With regard to ministers, if they act without private interest and conduct their roles with no corruption then this is publicness. If their conduct is not upright and they seek to profit themselves and their own family interest’s, then this is private-ness. As such, “the magistrates who seek no private profit, are honest” (“Outer Congeries of

4 Rickett

(1998: 150).

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Sayings, The Lower Right Series” Hanfeizi). With regard to the state, “Wherever private righteousness prevails, there is disorder; wherever public justice obtains, there is order.” (On Pretentions and Heresies: A Memorial” Hanfeizi) In order to get rid of private interests and the harm that it can do and give full rein to the function of publicness, Hanfezi believes that one must prohibit private interest via the law. Hanfeizi also emphasized, in particular, the effect that the sovereign’s actions can have on getting rid of private interest and guiding publicness. He says, “if an enlightened sovereign is on the throne, every minister will discard their selfish motives and practise public justice. If a confused sovereign is on the throne, every minister will cast public justice aside and act according to their selfish motives.” (On Pretentions and Heresies: A Memorial” Hanfeizi) As such, as a sovereign, one must pay great attention to the distinction between private and public so that treacherousness and bad acts will have no way of flourishing and thus ensuring the realization of public interest.

27.4 Four By the time of Song-Ming dynasty Confucianism, the issue of public and private had received deeper investigation. Within the domain of the distinction between human desire and heavenly principle, Song Confucianism saw heavenly principle as public and human desire as private. In this way, they deeply investigated the question of publicness and humaneness, public and private, and heavenly principle and human desire and thereby elevated the distinction between public and private to an unprecedented height. The pioneer of the school of principle Zhou Dunyi saw impartiality as a necessary condition of being a sage. He believed that one can learn to become a sage and the key to this learning is to be unified (一): To be unified is to be without desire. Without desire one is empty when still and direct in activity. When one is empty when still then one is enlightened, when one is enlightened then one is penetrating. Being direct in activity one is public-minded [公], when one is public-minded then one can be broad and universal [溥]. Being enlightened, penetrating, public-minded and broad and universal, is this not almost perfect! (“Learning to be a Sage”, Penetrating the Book of Changes)

Impartiality is the opposite of private desire and is a state of magnanimity and broad-mindedness arrived at through self-cultivation and having no private desires. It is a state of utmost impartiality or sageliness which has overcome one’s private self-interests. It is for this reason that Zhou Dunyi says, “the way of the sages is perfectly impartial.” (“Impartiality” Penetrating the Book of Changes). The Cheng brothers also paid great attention to the distinction between public and private. They believed that private and public were opposed to each other. Public refers to not hurting other people’s interests for the benefit of one’s own interests. Private refers to harming other people’s interests for the benefit of one’s own interests. Public is also called the heart-mind of the dao, whereas the private is the human

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heart-mind. In this way, the public and private are elevated to the opposition between heavenly principle and personal desire. The outcomes of private and public are also antithetical. The result of publicness is that one can gain other people’s help, whereas being blinded by the private has the result that “people will aggressively contend with him. Therefore no one willing to help him, but there will be those who wish to attack and grab from him.” (Book 2, Cheng’s Furthered Interpretations of the Book of Changes) Therefore, the Cheng brothers emphasize that one should remove private desires so that one can understand heavenly principle. On the question of public and private, the Cheng brothers emphasized the importance of the original heart-mind (本心), and that if there existed private desires even in dealing with public affairs, then this is private. With this division between the public and the private the Cheng brothers believed in a “broad and open great impartiality” (廓然大公). This means a state whereby one has overcome selfish desires and is one with the world; this is the state of humaneness. What is meant by humaneness, as the Cheng brothers see it, is the state of humane love in which the human being is one with the myriad things. This state of utmost humaneness is to see the myriad things as one’s own body, but this state is very hard to clearly express. It is only impartiality which approximates it, as such “humaneness is hard to name, only impartiality approximates it” (Book 1, Pure Words of the Cheng). The state of utmost impartiality and lack of private-ness is the state of humaneness. In this sense, we can say that, “humaneness is impartiality” (ibid.). Impartiality, however, only approximates humaneness but is not humaneness itself. “Impartiality is only the principle of humaneness and one cannot call impartiality humaneness. It is only when impartiality is embodied that it is humaneness” (Book 15, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs). This means that it is only when one embodies impartiality that it is humaneness. Zhu Xi inherited and continued the Cheng brothers’ philosophy and investigated in depth the relationship between public and private and humaneness. What Zhu Xi means by public is not having any private interests and what he means by private is selfish desires and intentions. With regard to the relationship between publicness and humaneness, Zhu Xi believes that publicness does not equate to humaneness but that if one is able to be both public and without selfish interest then this is humaneness. It can be said that publicness is the way to arrive at humaneness. As such, humaneness is internal, and publicness is external. On the one hand “it is only through humaneness that one can be public,” on the other hand, “publicness is the beginning of humaneness. Without publicness, then there will be no way to carry out humaneness.” In this sense, publicness is humaneness, righteousness and the heavenly way. Private-ness is selfish interest and personal desire. As such the publicness of humaneness and righteousness is antithetical to private-ness of personal desire. If selfish desire is established then humaneness and righteousness will be ruined, if publicness and righteousness are established then humaneness can be carried out. Humaneness is the state where all selfish desire has been cleansed away and the heavenly principle flourishes. The teaching of the sages is nothing but getting rid of all personal desire and returning the world to the publicness of the heavenly principle.

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Zhu Xi also believes that public and private is the standard for distinguishing between the moral exemplar and the petty person. He says, “the actions of the moral exemplar and the petty man are different just like yin and yang and night and day differ, they are opposed to each other. That which divides them is on the point of public and private; it is difference by a hair’s breadth.” (Book 2, Commentaries on the Analects) It is not the case that the moral exemplar does not harm other people, it’s just that his motives all stem from a public-mindedness. With regard to government officials, if they can act in a public-minded way, then even a small official can do spectacular things that demand the respect of others. If they deal with affairs in a manner motivated by personal interests, then even if they were a grand chancellor then they will still have nothing more than a mediocre record. It is for this reason that Zhu Xi stresses that one must overcome personal interests and arrive at a broad publicness, “if one can overcome personal interests and arrive at a broad publicness, then one’s joy will be a public joy, one’s anger will be a public anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desires will be nothing but public. (Book 117, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Wang Yangming also discussed the distinction between public and private from the perspective of the opposition between heavenly principle and personal desire. For Wang Yangming, publicness is heavenly principle and private-ness is personal desire. He emphasized that one must put daily effort into overcoming private-ness and returning to publicness. He said, “the Six Classics was purely for rectifying people’s heart-minds, to preserve the heavenly principle, and to eliminate selfish human desires. In studying the sages, one is doing nothing more than removing selfish human desires and preserving the heavenly principle.” (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living) The specific method for this is self-examination and self-mastery (省察克治). As human beings are easily misled by their selfish desires thus, “before things happen, each and every selfish desire for sex, wealth, and fame must be discovered. The root of the trouble must be pulled up and thrown away so that it will never sprout again. Only then can we feel fine.”5 (ibid.) Once one has fully overcome selfish desires then the heavenly principle will flourish. Only when all such selfish desires as the love for sex, wealth, fame, and so forth in one’s daily life are completely wiped out and cleaned up, so that not the least bit is retained, does the mind becomes broad in its total substance and becomes completely identified with the heavenly principle6 (ibid.).

The lessons of the great person lie only in removing the selfish desires that mislead one in order to return to the publicness of the heart-mind. The investigation into public and private of the Song-Ming Confucians reached a high theoretical level. Their discussions of public and private had a profound influence on their times as well as on later generations.

5 Chan 6 Chan

(1963: 35). (1963: 52).

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27.5 Five By the late Ming and early Qing, due to the nascent rise of capitalism in China and the intensification of antagonism with foreigners, one sees new perspectives arising in the discussion of public and private. It must be said that the thinkers of this period still inherited the traditional idea of valuing publicness, but on the other hand, there were various defences of private-ness and a recognition of the rationality of privateness. What was greatly sought for was an equilibrium that took into account both publicness and private-ness and so the issue of the nation the people was brought into the discussion of public and private. We can take Gu Yanwu (顾炎武) and Wang Fuzhi’s discussions on publicness and private-ness as representative for this period. Gu Yanwu believed that having selfish desires is natural and inevitable. He said, Everybody cares about their own family, treats with partiality their children; this is the constant disposition of peoples. One’s regard for the son of heaven, one’s regard for the common people is necessarily not comparable with one’s regard for oneself, this was already the case before the three dynasties. (Book 1, Collected Works of Tingling)

As such, that is called the great publicness and no private-ness, as Gu Yanwu sees it, is dreamt up by later generations and did not actually exist in reality. If private-ness is a necessary human disposition, then there should not be a blanket prohibition of it. As Gu Yanwu sees it, there is not necessarily a stark opposition between private interest and the interests of others and the public interest of society. Benefiting others also does not necessarily mean damaging one’s own interests. This is a criticism of the stark opposition which the Song dynasty Confucians made between the public and the private. Gu Yanwu also believed that if one was able to use the average person’s selfish motives, then it would not only not harm public interests, but it will help bringing a public spirit to the world. This means that the public resides in the private and can be manifested through the private. He gives the following example, if one allowed a county magistrate to allow a hundred li be under private ownership, then “[He] would rather die trying to guard this place and not leave. In this way, superiors and inferiors would enter into accords whereby they resist foreign invasion. [They do this] not for the son of heaven, but for themselves.” (ibid.) It is precisely this private-ness, however, that allows for the publicness of the son of heaven, “if everybody served their own selfish interests, then this precisely serves the son of heaven; therefore, everyone’s selfish interests becomes the publicness of the son of heaven.” (ibid.) Wang Fuzhi distinguished between the moral and political senses of publicness and private-ness. In the moral sense of publicness and private-ness, he followed the Song Confucians, seeing publicness as the heavenly principle and private-ness as selfish desire and believed that one should preserve heavenly principle and get rid of selfish desires. With regard to the political sense of publicness and private-ness, Wang Fuzhi believed that the succession of the different dynasties is merely the private interests of the ruling family and that it is only the life and death of the common people that is the grand publicness. This view was exactly antithetical to the traditional view which saw the sovereign’s interests as publicness. With regard to

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the distinction between public and private, Wang Fuzhi believes that they are relative, he said: There is personal appropriateness [义], there is the great appropriateness of the times, there is the common appropriateness that is constant throughout history. One must pay great attention to the relative importance and the distinction between publicness and private that pertains to these three. When personal appropriateness is compared with the great appropriateness of the times, then the former is considered private. When the great appropriateness of the times is compared with the common appropriateness that is constant throughout history, then the former is considered private. That which pertains to private-ness is less important than that which pertains to publicness; this [the relative importance of the two] will naturally become evident when the two are compared. (Book 14, Comments after Reading the Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance)

Sometimes there is accord between the three, but sometimes they cannot both be fulfilled. When they cannot both be fulfilled, then “one cannot go against the common appropriateness that is constant throughout history for the great appropriateness of the times. One cannot go forsake all the world for the sake of personal interest.” (ibid.) As such, when faced with the antagonism between the three, the sovereign must clearly distinguish between public and private and put the emphasis on publicness. Specifically speaking, if the sovereign loses the trust of the people then the righteousness [义] that pertains between the sovereign and the minister is merely a personal righteousness [义]. When the sovereign loses the trust of the people, then the righteousness [义] that pertains between the sovereign and the minister [君臣之义] has already disappeared. In this case, one cannot go against the interests of the state for the sake of the righteousness [义] that pertains between the sovereign and the minister.” (ibid.)

When the sovereign has not yet lost the trust of the people and is still the legal sovereign, then the righteousness that pertains between sovereign and minister is still the correct righteousness (义之正者). However, if there is a conflict between the righteousness that pertains between sovereign and minister and the great righteousness of the people in general, then the righteousness that pertains between sovereign and minister becomes the righteousness of a specific time. In this context, the sovereign “should not try to preserve the righteousness that pertains between sovereign and minister and go against the great righteousness of defending the state.” (ibid.)

27.6 Six In the modern period, as Western thought became widely propagated in China, the views on public and private were correspondingly affected and so a new, modern kind of view on public and private was formed. Yan Fu (严复), for example, was influenced by the utilitarianism of Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics and Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and proposed the idea of “an enlightened seeking of one’s own profit” (开明自营). Yan Fu believed that people are born with desires and that this is a heavenly endowed human nature. In order to survive, one must seek after

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one’s own personal interests and this is what he means by “seeking one’s own profit”; seeking after personal interest is the basis of existence. For this reason, he criticized the idea of seldom speaking of profitableness and being ashamed of speaking about profitableness in traditional Chinese culture. He believed, for example, Mencius’ view, “Why must use that word—‘profit?’” and Dong Zhongshu’s view, “the real righteousness does not scheme for profit, and the real enlightened dao does not calculate its achievements” has a very nice intention, but from the perspective of dao, it is very superficial. [This saying] approximates inciting the world to harm humaneness and righteousness. (“Notes”, On Wealth) Yan Fu did not, however, advocate only seeking after private interests and not paying any heed to publicness, but rather advocated that one seek profit within righteousness, this is what he calls “enlightened.” “An enlightened seeking of one’s own profit” means having simultaneously taking the enlightened path but also calculates its achievements is simultaneously really righteous but also schemes for profit. As such, “an enlightened seeking of one’s own profit does not turn its back on the righteousness of the dao” (“Notes”, Evolution and Ethics) With this as his basis, Yan Fu greatly agreed with Gu Yanwu’s views that “publicness is bringing together the private of the world” (合天下之私以为公) and believed that publicness does not depart of the private but is rather the assembling of all private interests. The interest of the whole is constituted by the grouping together of all individual interests so that without the private, there would not be the public. As such, China’s self-strengthening also needs to unite “the millions upon millions of self-interests into a great public one.” It is through safeguarding private interests in order to arrive at the public interest of the state that the self-strengthening of the country can be ensured. Yan Fu’s views on public and private were proposed against the background of the West’s invasion of China and shows clear evidence of the influence of Western thought. Its motive lay in calling the people to combine their private interests into a common public one, in order to strengthen the country. Liang Qichao completely orientated the traditional views on public and private toward the modern world. Liang Qichao believes that Chinese people only knew about the existence of the imperial court but did not know about the existence of the country. This is because historically the imperial court and the sovereign were linked together. The traditional meaning of an imperial court, however, is merely the private property of one family but the country is the public property of the people. What is called public should therefore not be the imperial court but instead the country. Here, a distinction is drawn between the traditional sense of an imperial court and a modern sense of a country and the traditional idea of publicness as “treating all under heaven as family” (家天下) is turned into the idea of “treating all under heaven as the state” (国天下). Corresponding with this, what is called private should no longer be the ministers and people of the imperial court but the common people of the state “who have the notion of the state and can govern themselves” (On the New Citizen). Here, the characteristics of autonomy such as freedom, self-governance and selfrespect are highlighted. On this basis, Liang Qichao discussed public and private virtue, public and private law. By public virtue, Liang Qichao means “the members of the flock treating each other with mutual kindness” and what Liang Qichao means by private virtue is “everyone treating only themselves with kindness” (Discussion

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of Public Virtue). As public virtue refers to the relationship between the individual with the state, society and their common flock, and private virtue refers to one’s personal self-cultivation, private virtue is the basis of public virtue. The cultivation of public virtue must have private virtue as its pre-requisite. With regard to the law, traditional Chinese law is rooted in the personal intentions of the sovereign and so is an arbitrary, private law. The public law, on the other hand, is the manifestation of the entire people’s common intentions. The law in the modern sense should be the public law and should express fairness as opposed to private interests. In all, Liang Qichao’s views on public and private combined the Western ideas of freedom, equality and democracy and helped spur on the modernization of the ideas of public and private. Summarizing the distinction between public and private in Chinese philosophy, public and private are very rich in content. The most dominant public-private views were: “venerating publicness and suppressing the private” and “establishing the public and extinguishing the private.” In the development of this discussion, however, in defending the reasonableness of a certain amount of private interest some philosophers also deepened the relationship between public and private. As a result of this, “venerating publicness and debasing the private” was gradually turned into “promoting simultaneously public and private” and “giving consideration to both public and private interests.”

References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Duyvendak, J. J. L. 2003. The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of The Chinese School of Law. Translated by J. J. L. Duyvendak. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, LTD. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rickett, Allyn W. 1998. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, vol. II. Princeton UP: Princeton.

Chapter 28

Righteousness and Profit (yili, 义利)

The concept of righteousness and profit and their relationship is a key question which runs through Chinese intellectual history and which has been much discussed. In the following, we will first explain the meaning of yi and li, and then discuss them from the perspective of their opposition as well their equilibrium. Finally, we will summarize the characteristics of the relationship between them as well as its meaning.

28.1 One The meaning of yi is, relatively speaking, very rich. The term is often used in everyday life, for example: humaneness and righteousness (仁义), dao and righteousness (道 义) and implication (含义) amongst others. These terms themselves, however, differ from each other in meaning, and so manifest the multi-faceted implications of yi. One sense of yi is that of an impressive and dignified manner. The Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters explains, “yi is one’s own impressive and dignified manner.” What this emphasizes is one’s own character, one’s own manner, and is a prescription for oneself as opposed to for others. This sense of yi as a regulation for one’s own character is rather different from the sense of yi as morality used by later generations. Another sense of yi is that of suitableness, fittingness and appropriateness. In the “Book of Zhou, “Announcement to the Prince of Kang” of the Book of Documents we read, “punishments, and [especially] the penalty of death, be righteous [yi]”, evidently it is believed here that punishment should be appropriate and not indiscriminate and overstepping. The Doctrine of the Mean likewise says, “appropriateness [yi] means doing what is fitting [宜], wherein esteeming those of superior character is most important.”1 Yi thus means appropriateness so as to hit the mark, and to achieve this one must esteem those of superior character. 1 Hall

and Ames (2003: 101). © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_28

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Another sense of yi is that of meaning, implication, sense and import. Of course, the most important sense of yi is that of the righteousness (yi) of dao. This sense of yi is a fitting evolution from the sense of yi as suitableness, fittingness and appropriateness. Once a norm is widely accepted as fitting, then this fittingness gradually evolves into the righteousness of dao. In the 1st year of Lord Yin, Zuo Zhuan we read, “Doing a lot of things that are not righteous [yi] will necessarily lead to one’s own ruin.” If a person does a lot of things that are against the righteousness of dao then it will necessarily result in one’s own destruction. There is also the sense of righteousness as that which is the result of human artifice and not naturally so, such as our everyday usage of “adoptive father” (义 父) and “adoptive brother” (义兄) amongst others. They are not our kin due to a natural, blood relation but a latter-day, non-blood relation. Apart from this, we call the limbs fitted onto those with disabilities artificial limb (义肢) and we also use the term artificial teeth (义齿). These all contain the sense of that which is formed artificially. The most important sense of all these senses of yi is that of the righteousness (yi) of dao. It is this sense of yi that is opposed to profit (li). By the same token, li itself also has more than more sense. Li has the sense of sharp and pointed. Relative to yi, the meaning of li is much simpler, but its original sense is that of sharpness and incisive. It also has the sense of benefit, profit and advantage. The sharp tools of farming and weaponry have their advantages in tilling the field and in military affairs, and so li came to have the sense of benefit and advantage. This sense of li is the most widely used sense in discussions of righteousness (yi) and profit (li). Now that we can clearly understand the basic meanings of yi and li, we can continue to discuss the relationship between them. What must be pointed out is that in traditional philosophical discussions of yi and li, although they are mostly used in the sense of the righteousness (yi) of the dao and the li of profit, at times, philosophers will make their own definitions to discuss the relationship between them.

28.2 Two In the history of Chinese thought, although the relationship between righteousness and profit was often discussed by philosophers and scholars and each endowed it with their own characteristics but, in the main, these discussions can be split into two categories: the opposition between righteousness and profit or the equilibrium between them. The view of an opposition between righteousness and profit can be further split into that which puts weight on profit and that which puts weight on righteousness. Although the view which puts weight on profit is a phenomenon in Chinese philosophy, as its ideas were not in accord with the dominant Confucian ideology, it was not widespread; it was mostly limited to the discourse of Yang Zhu and the legalists of the pre-Qin period.

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Yang Zhu was famous for the idea that “even if he might have benefited the whole kingdom by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it.” It is commonly agreed by scholars that Yang Zhu was a real person, but his ideas have not been completely preserved and passed down. Even though there is a “Zhang Zhu” chapter preserved in the Liezi, scholars question its authenticity. Through the citations of Yang Zhu’s thought in the Mencius and Hanfeizi, however, we can generally see the main outlines of Yang Zhu’s philosophy. The main import of Yang Zhu’s philosophy is that of benefitting the self. Mencius says, “The principle of the philosopher Yang was ‘each one for himself.’ Though he might have benefited the whole kingdom by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it.” (Mencius 7A26) With regard to the dangers of Yang Zhu’s views, Mencius says, “Yang’s principle of ‘each one for himself,’ means not having a ruler.” (Mencius 3B9) The “not having a ruler” which Mencius mentions is imbued with the characteristics of the time. It suggests that because no benefit or profit is brought to the ruler, the result is that one has not respected the ruler. The thinking behind this is that because one only profits oneself and not others, one does not contribute anything to society, and that this is what is harmful about overly benefitting the self. As can be seen, with regard to the relationship between righteousness and profit, Yang Zhu put too much weight on benefitting and protecting the self and so overlooked righteousness, and the contribution that one should make to society. It is for this reason that his philosophy did not gain wide currency and instead became the negative paradigm of Confucian criticism. The legalists advocated using people’s desire for profit as a basis for the sovereign’s rule. First, the legalists assumed that human nature tends towards profit. Shang Yang, for example, says, “people’s attitude towards profit is just like the tendency of water to flow downwards” (“Sovereign and Minister” Book of Lord Shang). The great legalist Hanfeizi proposed that human nature is to “love profit and dislike injury” (“Criticisms of the Ancients, Series Two” Hanfeizi) Following this, the legalists advocated using peoples’ tendency to love profit and avoiding injury to help secure the autocratic rule of the sovereign and the governance of all under heaven. “Indeed, it is the nature of men that whenever they see profit, they cannot help chasing after it” (“On Maintaining Restraint” Guanzi). He advocated that, “among the ways of winning the hearts of men, nothing is as good as benefitting them.” (“The Five Aids” Guanzi) Hanfeizi also believed that benefitting oneself is the basis of interpersonal relationships. It is “where there lies profit” (“Inner Congeries of Sayings, The Upper Series: Seven Tacts” Hanfeizi) that righteousness can be carried out, that the righteousness of the dao can be benefitted, that the ministers will put their utmost effort into serving their sovereign. In this way, the righteousness of the dao is reduced to a tool for benefitting one’s interests, but the sovereign can use this tool to control his ministers as the minister must, “in wanting to benefit himself, benefit his ruler first” (“Outer Congeries of Sayings, The Lower Right Series” Hanfeizi). In all, the legalists put weight on profit and did not put great store by righteousness. They believed that people all tend towards profit and so the sovereign can exploit this human characteristic to rule over them. Even if they want to carry out the righteousness of dao, it is only because in so doing they can gain benefit. From this we can see the characteristics of the legalist view of the relationship between righteousness and profit.

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Although putting weight on profit and not valuing righteousness did not become the dominant view of the relationship between righteousness and profit, during the period of the hundred schools of thought, it was an important philosophy and had great social repercussions. It is for this reason that Mencius said, “the words of Yang Zhu and Mo Di fill the country. If you listen to people’s discourses throughout it, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo” and why he so greatly criticized the discourse of venerating profit and advocated instead venerating righteousness. Confucius advocated that “in the view of gain, one thinks of righteousness” (Analects 14.12) Confucius said, “Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness, are to me as a floating cloud.” (Analects 7.16) When one sees profit, one should consider whether it accords with righteousness or not. If profit is damaging to righteousness, then one should forgo the present interest. This is because to act based on the motive of profit ultimately causes more harm than good. Confucius also emphasized that the ruler should act on the basis of the peoples’ interests. He said, “the moral exemplar is conversant with righteousness; the petty man is conversant with gain.” (Analects 4.16) As Confucius sees it, there are many differences between the moral exemplar and the petty man but the main one is that they seek after righteousness and profit, respectively. The moral exemplar seeks after values and the righteousness of the dao whereas the petty man seeks after the material and profit. This is not to say that Confucius completely rejected profit. In the main, Confucius thinks that it is permissible to seek after profit but that this seeking should not harm righteousness. If one seeks after righteousness, one might end up ranking as a moral exemplar, but conversely, if one only seeks after profit, then one will end up becoming a petty man. Mencius is famous for his idea that human nature is good, and so naturally he affirms righteousness and slights profit. He goes further than Confucius, however, in that he puts even less store by profit. When Mencius went to see King Hui of Liang, there was a famous exchange between them: Mencius went to see king Hui of Liang. The king said, “Venerable sir, since you have not counted it far to come here, a distance of a thousand li, may I presume that you are provided with counsels to profit my kingdom?” Mencius replied, “Why must your Majesty use that word ‘profit?’ What I am provided with, are counsels to humaneness and righteousness, and these are my only topics. If your Majesty say, ‘What is to be done to profit my kingdom?’ the great officers will say, ‘What is to be done to profit our families?’ and the inferior officers and the common people will say, ‘What is to be done to profit our persons?’ Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. In the kingdom of ten thousand chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be the chief of a family of a thousand chariots. In the kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his prince shall be the chief of a family of a hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand, and a hundred in a thousand, cannot be said not to be a large allotment, but if righteousness be put last, and profit be put first, they will not be satisfied without snatching all. There never has been a humane man who neglected his parents. There never has been a righteous man put his ruler last. Let your Majesty also say, ‘humaneness and righteousness, and let these be your only themes.’ Why must you use that word – ‘profit?’.2 (Mencius 1A1) 2 Legge

translation, https://ctext.org/mengzi/liang-hui-wang-i/ens.

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Mencius believed that if one puts too much attention on profit then one will neglect humaneness and righteousness and so lead the country to ruin. It is for this reason that he asks, “why must you use that word—‘profit?’” It is righteousness that should be promoted, and profit should be talked about as little as possible if not at all. When one has to choose between life and righteousness, when there is a conflict between righteousness and life then one must “let life go and choose righteousness” (Mencius 6A10). In order to preserve the greater righteousness, even one’s life, the greatest interest one has, can be completely forsaken. From this we can see the importance that Mencius attached to righteousness. The greatest characteristic of Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy is the union of heaven and earth. First, he believed that righteousness and profit all originated in heaven. Both righteousness and profit were endowed in humans by heaven. For Dong Zhongshu profit means nourishing one’s body and righteousness means nourishing one’s heartmind. Second, he believed that both profit and righteousness should be nourished in order for one to live peacefully and contentedly. At the same time, however, he believes that the heart-mind is the most important thing in one’s body, and so it is more important to nourish one’s heart-mind than one’s body. As such, nourishing righteousness is more important than nourishing profit. Specifically, he believes that whether one takes profit to be more important than righteousness and vice versa is one of the distinctions between animals and humans. He says, it is only animals who would do anything for the sake of preserving life and their own interests. If human beings only sought after profit then they would be no different from animals. It is only humaneness and righteousness which allows people to know shame and so distinguishes humans from animals. Following this, he also believed that profit harms righteousness. Human nature loves righteousness, but if it is unable to achieve it, this is due to profit. It is for this reason that profit should not be overly discussed, so that the root cause of the ruin of righteousness is blocked. Without a doubt, this is a continuation of Mencius’s views and was of the same opinion that the advocation of profit is damaging to both self-cultivation and the state. It is on this basis that he believed that “a humane man is one who corrects his way but does not calculate what benefits that will bring him; adheres to principles without hurrying after success.”3 (“An Official Response to the King of Jiangdu: The Great Officers of Yue Cannot be Considered Humane” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn). What is worth remarking is that even those who vigorously stress righteousness and slighted profit do not necessarily completely reject profit. What they rejected is instead private profit/interest, petty profit/interest but not the public profit/interest, the common profit/interest. They can see the importance of the state’s wealth for the lives of the common peoples and so believed that the state should correctly divide up wealth so as to benefit the people. This point was inherited and continued by the later Neo-Confucians, who all affirmed the necessity and aptness of public profit/interest but pointed to the dangers of private profit/interest. Their characteristic stress on righteousness and slighting of profit is demonstrated in their belief that an undue emphasis on profit is damaging for self-cultivation and the security of the state. It is 3 Queen

and Major (2016: 645).

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only through advocating the importance of righteousness that self-cultivation can be improved and that the social climate of the state and society can be rejuvenated. Both the schools which put stress on profit and slighted righteousness and vice versa, all believed that righteousness and profit cannot be combined. Between the two existed an insurmountable antagonism, and as such either one or the other had to rejected. This is the shared point of commonality between the two schools.

28.3 Three In Chinese philosophy, apart from the schools that believed that profit and righteousness could not be reconciled with each other, there was another school which believed that they could be harmonized with each other. The Mohists were the pioneers in this regard and following them there was Wang Anshi, Li Gou (李觏) and Yan Yuan. We will discuss these figures below. Mohist philosophy was one of the most widespread philosophies of the pre-Qin period. They advocated that heaven has an intention, universal love and condemned aggressive warfare. The Mohists were in favour of the unification of righteousness and profit. The Mohists believed that profit contains three dimensions. First, the common interest of all under heaven, and this is the importance of wealth for the lives of the common people. Second, the interest of others. Third, self-interest. This is because, Such a regime will be beneficial [利] to heaven above, to the spirits in the middle sphere, to the people below. Being beneficial [利] to these three it is beneficial to all. This is called the virtue of heaven; whoever practises this is a sage, magnanimous, gracious, and righteous, loyal, affectionate, and filial, and all such good names in the world will be gathered and attributed to him.4 (“Will of Heaven III” Mozi)

Being able to benefit heaven, the spirits and human beings is the virtue of heaven (天德) and this is humaneness and righteousness. Mozi says, “Whoever loves others is loved by others; whoever benefits others is benefited by others; whoever hates others is hated by others; whoever injures others is injured by others.”5 (“Universal Love II” Mozi) By carrying out righteousness through benefitting others, one will make others benefit oneself. In this way one can achieve the unification of righteousness and profit, that is, it is only through the central Mohist idea of “reciprocal universal love” (兼相爱) that one can achieve “mutually benefitting each other” (交相利). This then is the theoretical root of the Mohist discussion of the unification of righteousness and profit. Of course, on this theoretical basis, the Mohists are also opposed to those people who benefit themselves by harming others and those actions that only look out for one’s own private interests. What is important to stress is that for the Mohists they believe that righteousness and profit can be harmonized and is not irreconcilable. 4 Translation 5 Translation

by W. P. Mei, https://ctext.org/mozi/will-of-heaven-iii. by W. P. Mei, https://ctext.org/mozi/universal-love-ii.

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Based on the great attention he paid to the economy and capital, Wang Anshi championed the unification of righteousness and profit. Specifically speaking, the management of finances is righteousness, he said, “the profit of which Mencius spoke, is for profiting my country. Governance is thus the management of finances and the management of finances is righteousness.” (In Answer to Zeng Gongliang) Wang Anshi believes that within the domain of government affairs, righteousness and profit is united, the “management of finances is righteousness” and so “profit” is the common or public righteousness. Second, the management of finances is the common or public righteousness. Wang Anshi distinguishes between the management of finances and profit-making and believes that the management of finances is the public interest of all peoples and not just for the fulfilment of personal desire. As such, from this perspective, righteousness is tantamount to profit. Third, apart from the unification of righteousness and profit in practice as outlined above, in theory the two are: “profit is a harmonious state of righteous, the ultimate aim of righteousness is profit.” (Book 219, Extended Continuation to the Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance, Xining 4th Year) Wang Anshi explicitly proposed that the aim of “righteousness” is always “profit” and the harmonization of righteousness is profit. Li Gou believed that the rites education of the Confucians are all based on natural human desires and so, at root, the righteousness of the rites (礼义) and the desire for profit are united. Following this, Li Gou believes that profit is something that can be discussed. He says, “can profit be spoken about? Profit is human nature; how can it not be spoken about? Can desires be spoken about? Desires are natural human dispositions; how can they not be spoken about?” (“Original Writings” Collected Works of Li Gou) Li Gou repeatedly affirms human desires and believes that profit and desires can be united with humaneness and righteousness. For example, that Tang of the Shang dynasty and King Wu of the Zhou dynasty used 70 li and 100 li to unite all under heaven is a kind of great interest. Following this, Li Gou also criticized the discourse of venerating righteousness and condescending against profit. He said, I, who am untutored, took the audacity of observing the discussions of the Confucians, and saw that it was rare that they did not venerate righteousness and condescend against profit. Not a word that was not of moral education ever emitted from their mouths. But, the “Great Plan” chapter of the Book of Documents talks of the eight objects of government, the first is food; the second, wealth and articles of convenience. Confucius says, “the requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler.” This is the reality of governance; it must be based on the use of wealth. Without wealth one cannot build the city walls and palaces. Without wealth one cannot have clothing and the amenities for transportation. Without wealth one cannot pay for the upkeep of the government officials and military expeditions, […] It is important to strengthen the root and be measured in one’s expenses, so that below there is nothing wanting and above there is enough to spare. (Stratagem for Enriching the State Number One, Collected Works of Li Gou)

Here, Li Gou principally believes that the wealth of society is a necessity for the common people, and so only venerating righteousness and condescending against profit is of no benefit for the common people. Finally, Li Gou believes that the sages’ desire for profit is the same as the common people, but the sage can have few desires and it is for this reason that they are called sages. He says,

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If the forms [形] are the same then the nature [性] is the same. If the nature is the same then the disposition [情] is the same. The form of the sage is the same as the common people, so how can the nature and disposition be different? The common people, however, have many desires but the sage few. It is not necessarily the case that sages have fewer desires, it’s just that he knows that desires engender catastrophe. […] It is because the sage has few desires that he can achieve the character of sage-ness. The common people have many desires, so they can only use what they wish to gain in order to attend upon others. (“Discourses of the People in the Qingli Year” “Reducing Desire” Collected Works of Li Gou)

Here, Li Gou similarly advocates that people should exercise restraint with regard to private interests, having few desires helps realize righteousness and so it is only through self-cultivation that one can become a sage. During the Ming-Qing dynasty, scholarship was characterized by the “practical studies” (实学). Based on the idea that studying the classics should be aimed at solving practical problems (经世致用) Yan Yuan had a different view about the relationship between righteousness and profit than the Cheng-Zhu school of principle. First, Yan Yuan believed that righteousness and profit can be combined. Profit is the harmonization of righteousness and the moral exemplar venerates the profit within righteousness as well as taking righteousness as profit. The two are thus not antithetical to each other but rather, united. Second, through this, he criticized Dong Zhongshu’s view that, “a humane man is one who corrects his way but does not calculate what benefits that will bring him; adheres to principles without hurrying after success” as well as the teachings of the Song Confucians. Yan Yuan takes the example of tilling the field in order to secure a harvest and throwing out a fishing line for the purposes of catching fish to demonstrate that Confucius himself valued profit. He believes that the idea of “not calculating benefit” and “not hurrying after success” is rooted in the empty nothingness of Buddhism and Daoism. Yan Yuan further points out that the Song Confucian discourse of not calculating after profit is not the way of Confucianism, for Confucianism seeks for interest (利) and success (功). Without seeking after interest and success, the Song Confucians will have no way to ensure a basic living, and so be unable to fulfil the most basic of desires. Third, Yan Yuan opposes seeking after personal interest as what he focuses on is the public interest. From the above discussion, we can see that the profit which Yan Yuan stresses is mainly that of the public interest of the common people and fulfilling the basic needs of life. What Yan Yuan advocated was the great common interest of, “establishing the meritorious feat of a flourishing society and a contented people, attaining the result aiding one’s sovereign in presiding over the people, and aiding the state and caring for the people” (“Main Records of Xizhai”, Book 3, Collected Works of Yan Yuan) and was similarly opposed to small, personal profit. Apart from the above, there was also philosophies such as Chen Liang’s “carrying out both righteousness and profit” (义利双行), Wang Fuzhi’s “venerating righteousness and putting weight on profit” (贵义重利) which all promoted the equal promotion of profit and righteousness as well as their unification. These, however, will not be discussed out of consideration for length. In summary, the thinkers above all promoted the equal importance of righteousness and profit, their harmonization

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and unification and in all, the profit they talked of was the common interest of society and not private, selfish interests. Our discussions have focused on the relationship between profit and righteousness by looking at the opposition between profit and righteousness or on their equal importance. Apart from this, there is also the Daoist discussion of condescending against both righteousness and profit. The Daoists believed that humaneness and righteousness, profit and desire are all harmful to what is nature and so they advocated neither righteousness nor profit. As they did not touch upon the relationship between righteousness and profit, we will not discuss their thought. In conclusion to our discussion of views which stressed profit and slighted righteousness and vice versa as well as those who treated both as equally important, we can see that they share many common themes: First, the dominant view in Chinese philosophy is in putting weight on righteousness and condescending against profit. Apart from the relatively extreme Yang Zhu view of “not plucking out a single hair even if it might have benefited the whole kingdom by plucking,” the legalist view of emphasizing the interests of the sovereign and the Daoist view of reneging on both profit and righteousness, the dominant, Confucian-guided traditional view was that of putting weight on righteousness and condescending against profit. Second, historically, the views which advocated for the unification between righteousness and profit have all focused on the pubic profit and interest of society and the common people. Although the Confucian discourses about uniting righteousness and profit all emphasized profit, this profit was that of the public profit of society at large and the interests of the common people. The profit they refer to is this common profit and thus not a continuation of the thought of Yang Zhu and the legalists. Third, there is an anti-self-interest tendency in traditional Chinese thought. Confucius, Mencius, Dong Zhongshu as well as the later Song-Ming Confucians are all opposed to private interest. Although they affirm that one should satisfy one’s basic interests, they regard excessive desires as selfish interest and so should be opposed. On this point, even philosophers who stress profit such as the Mohists, Wang Anshi and Li Gou are in accord. This is the point which they all have in common and it also demonstrates the tendency towards self-cultivation in traditional Chinese philosophy. Fourth, the relationship between righteousness and profit is, in reality, the extension and practical implementation of the question of principle (理) and desires, but it is not as philosophically sophisticated as the latter. The question of principle and desire is a key one for Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism and is richer in philosophical significance. Principle and righteousness, desire and profit are largely parallel. Desire can be divided into the basic desire for existence and selfish desires. Profit can be divided into satisfying the common interests of the people and one’s own personal profit. Compared with each other, principle is the root-body (本体) of that which is above physical form whereas righteousness is but a facet of the dao. The question of righteousness and profit is thus, in reality, the extension and practical implementation of the question of principle and desire.

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References Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. 2003. Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books. Queen, Sarah. A. and Major, John S. 2016. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu. Translated by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 29

Principle and Desire (liyu, 理欲)

Principle and human desire became a widely known conceptual pair by around the Northern Song dynasty. After the school of principle (li), as represented by the Cheng brothers, took principle as their most important concept, the opposition between principle and desire became even more evident and its content more enriched. The reality is, however, that before the Song, there was already a discussion and debate about principle and desire as well as the relationship between them. We will investigate the concept of principle and desire from the pre-Qin, Han-Tang and Song-Ming periods in which the concept was proposed, developed and enriched.

29.1 One From a philological perspective, at its inception, the word li was not the root-body (本体) that the Neo-Confucians described; its original meaning was that of working on jade. The Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters, for example, explains, “li is to work on jade. It is to follow its patterns and fracture along it.” Many pre-Qin works follow this sense of li as working on jade. Jade which has not been worked on—not li’d—is called unworked jade (璞). It is only the jade which has been li’d which is called jade ware (玉器). The original meaning of li is thus to work on jade. Following this, on the basis of working on jade, li came to acquire many different implications: administer (治理), manage (管理), differentiate (区分) and distinguish (辨别). After the pre-Qin period, the meaning of li became more multi-dimensional and came to mean, amongst many other innumerable meanings, “straightening out one’s appearance” (理妆), pulling and sorting through the threads of silk (理丝), straightening out one’s coiffeur (理鬓), straightening out and making sure all is in order (理顺), repairing (修理) and pay attention to (理睬). The term “desire” (欲) which was later opposed to li had a relatively speaking simpler meaning. In the pre-Qin period, its basic meaning was desire and excessive desire. The Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters, for example, says “desire (yu), is excessive desire.” Of course, desire and excessive desire are two dissimilar © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_29

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words, some desires are in accord with principle and normal whereas it is only abnormal and undue desire that is called excessive desire. The specification that the pre-Qin philosophers gave to principle and desire as well their discussion of the relationship between them was not as precise and systematic as the later Song-Ming’s, but they have already touched upon this conceptual pair. With regard to the concept of principle, it is evident that on the basis of its original meaning of working on jade, as well as its slightly later sense of administer, deal with (处理), manage and organizing (梳理), it could not have become a philosophical concept. It is only when the concept later evolved into the sense of regularity (规 律), regulation (规则) and orderliness (条理) that it was imbued with a philosophical significance. It was Xunzi who first developed the meaning of principle as regularity. In the “Undoing Fixation” chapter of the Xunzi, he said, “for everyone, the ability to know comes from human nature, and what can be known are the underlying patterns [li, 理] of things.” The human being has a capacity for knowing, but what can be known is the regularity, regulation and order of things. In the “Ten Wings” of the Book of Changes and the Book of Rites, li has similar implications. The Record of Music, for example, says, “rites are principles [li, 理] which do not admit of any alteration,” this means that the rites are regulations which cannot be changed. The “Explaining the Trigrams” of the “Ten Wings” says, “exhausting principle [li, 理] and completing nature in order to arrive at the mandate,” this means that one must exhaust the regularities of heaven and earth in order to know what is mandated. As the representative of the legalist school, Xunzi’s student Hanfei had his own discussion of the regularity of li. In his “Commentaries on Laozi’s Teachings” he took li as the regularity (规律) of dao. Different things have different regularities and the different regularities together exhaust dao. Here, li is linked with dao and so endowed with a philosophical meaning. Like the original meaning of li, it is hard to find any philosophical significance to the concept of desire, and its meaning of desire and excessive desire. It is only through opposing desire to principle and so linking them together that it gains in philosophical significance. As such, it is only through placing desire within the conceptual pair of li and desire that it can gain a philosophical meaning. As the pre-Qin philosophers did not pay particular attention to the concept of li, in general, their discussions of the relationship between li and desire are not as clear and precise as the discussions of the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians. It is in the relationship between morality and desire that the conceptual pair of li and desire is manifested, and we can split this discussion into the Daoist, Confucian and Legalist schools. Although there are differences between how the three schools approached this topic, they all paid great attention to li. The difference amongst them amounts to the differing degrees of stringency they applied to desire. On the basis of Laozi’s philosophy, pre-Qin Daoist philosophy basically believed that desire is harmful to the seeking of dao. Chapter 46 of the Daodejing says, “there is no crime more onerous than greed, no misfortune more devastating than avarice. And no calamity that brings with it more grief than insatiability. Thus, knowing when

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enough is enough is really satisfying.”1 Desire is the root of calamity, and therefore the Daoist maintains a fundamental discourse of no desire. In terms of the nature of dao, dao has the character of being without desire. It is spontaneously so and without desire, therefore, those who seek for the dao should similarly be without desire. From the perspective of governance, the best policy for the sage to employ in governing the state is to first be without desire himself. If the ruler is himself without desire, then the people would be simple and without guile. Chapter 3 of the Daodejing says, Not promoting those of superior character will save the common people from becoming contentious. Not prizing property that is hard to come by will save them from becoming thieves. Not making a show of what might be desired will save them from becoming disgruntled. It is for this reason that in the proper governing by the sages, they empty the heart-minds of the people and fill their stomachs, they weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones. Ever teaching the common people to be without purposive knowing and purposive desires.2

In terms of outcome, the ideal condition of a sage’s governance of the state is for the people to be without desire. Later, Zhuangzi similarly advocated having no desire. Zhuangzi said, Yes, in the age of perfect virtue, men lived in common with birds and beasts, and were on terms of equality with all creatures, as forming one family - how could they know among themselves the distinctions of superior men and small men? Equally without knowledge, they did not leave their natural virtue; equally free from desires, they were in the state of pure simplicity. (“Horses’s Hooves” Zhuangzi)

Here, Zhuangzi’s discussion is in complete accord with Laozi’s. Zhuangzi, furthermore, believes that, “where lusts and desires are deep, the springs of the Heavenly are shallow.” (“The Great and Most Honoured Master” Zhuangzi) The more desires one has the more removed one is from understanding the dao. Conversely, it is only those without desire that can become one with the dao. Of course, what must be pointed out is that whilst it is said in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi that one should “lessen selfish interests and reduce desires,” this is second best to having no desires at all. The ultimate value of pre-Qin Daoism is to be without desire, as it is only in this way that one can attain dao and can be one with dao. Confucianism, as represented by Confucius, also advocated having few desires. Although this discourse was perfected with Mencius, its first sprouts first emerged with Confucius. Confucius said that although wealth is something that everyone desires, if it is not obtained in the correct way, it cannot be had. Here, Confucius is already restraining people’s desires through morality. Confucius believed that it is permissible to have desires, but that these desires should not be excessive and must be measured. Mencius both inherited and continued Confucius’s view on desires, he proposed the idea that “for nourishing the heart-mind there is nothing better than having few desires.” Here, having few desires is linked with moral cultivation: it is only through having few desires that one can nourish the heart-mind and so become a moral exemplar or even a sage. By and large, this means the same as 1 Ames 2 Ames

and Hall (2003: 149). and Hall (2003: 44–45).

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Confucius’s view of “not having excessive desires.” As a pragmatic teaching for the practical world, Confucianism obviously cannot be the same as Daoism in advocating having no desires, as in practical life, most people need to survive. As such, the Confucians advocated having few desires and satisfying one’s basic desires. What must be emphasized, however, is that their idea of having few desires is aimed at moral cultivation and this sets them apart from the later legalists. There are three sects to legalism, and Hanfeizi was the one who brought it to maturity. Hanfeizi is Xunzi’s student and although within Xunzi’s philosophy was already the discourse that human nature is bad, and he advocated restraining human desires through ritual, Hanfeizi went further than this. From the vantage point of the legalists, he advocated using intrigues and schemes (权谋) and punishments in order to exploit people’s desires. Hanfeizi said, Generally speaking, the order of all-under-heaven must be in accordance with human feelings. Human feelings have their likes and dislikes, to which reward and punishment can be applied. If reward and punishment can be applied, prohibitions and orders will be established, and the way of government will be accomplished. (“Eight Canons” Hanfeizi)

Governing all under heaven and governing the people must be carried out in accordance with people’s desires, and there are two aspects to this: one is reward and the other is punishment. As people desire profit, one can order the people and ministers through rewards, similarly, as people are scared of punishment, one can use punishment in order to restrain the people and ministers. This then is the legalist discourse of using desires. In general, in the pre-Qin period, the concept of principle and desire had not yet been fully developed. Although each school proposed their own views on how to deal with human desires, li, as the opposite of desire had not yet been paid attention to and proposed; the pre-Qin discussion of li and desire still occupies a relatively benighted stage.

29.2 Two During the Han-Tang period, although Confucianism increasingly became the only respected school and the debates within the hundred schools gradually subsided, the philosophies of these respective schools, and their discussions with regard to li and desire were still passed down. These discourses seeped into Confucianism. Fresh perspectives on the concept of li and desire as well as the relationship between them emerged with the flourishing of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism as well as the sudden appearance of Buddhism in the Sui-Tang period. Below, we will focus on Dong Zhongshu’s, Wang Bi’s and the Buddhists’ views on li and desire. Dong Zhongshu was the great Confucian of the Western Han and is famous for his philosophy of the correspondence between heaven and humans (天人感应). He also has own unique philosophy on the topic of li and desire. First, Dong Zhongshu linked li with the highest concept in his philosophical system—heaven. For Dong Zhongshu,

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Li originates in heaven and so li is the heavenly li (天理). Next, he applied li to human moral conduct so that li exists within people so that li is also human li (人里). The moral conduct of humaneness, ritual, righteousness and wisdom are the results of the transformations of heavenly li; heavenly li undergoes an internal transformation and descends on humans and so li is close to human morality. For Dong Zhongshu, li originates in heaven but is simultaneously internally existing in human beings. Li is therefore one of the media which connects heaven with human beings. As such, Dong Zhongshu takes the further step of proposing “plumbing the principles of things to develop fully what is suitable to the emotion and nature” (“Signs and Omens” Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn). In all, Dong Zhongshu perfected and raised the significance of li. At the same time, he returned to the original Confucian view on the relationship between li and desire in that he strove to perfect li through moderating human desires and so ultimately reaching what he believed to be the highest concept of all—heaven. Wang Bi was a famous Neo-Daoist philosopher from the Wei-Jin period and was famous for his philosophy of non-being as root (无为本). First, Wang Bi believed that each thing possessed its own li. He said, No thing ever behaves haphazardly but necessarily follows its own principle. To unite things, there is a fundamental regulator [li]; to integrate them, there is a primordial generator. Therefore things are complex but not chaotic, multitudinous but not confused.3 (“Clarifying the Judgments” General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou)

In Wang Bi’s entire philosophical system, non-being is the highest concept and so the sagely rule of the sovereign lies in using non-being. In the above passage, Wang Bi evidently believes that li determines the existence of things and affairs, that li is their existential root. In this sense, li is one and the same with his concept of nonbeing. Following this, one of the paths to reaching Wang Bi’s highest concept is the regulation that li provides (统理). At the same time Wang Bi also says, “Because all I desire is to have no desire, the common folk will also become desireless and achieve pristine simplicity by themselves.”4 (Chapter 57, Commentary to the Daodejing) To the passage “he always keeps the common folk free from the capacity for knowing and from feeling desire” (Chapter 3) Wang Bi comments “he preserves their authenticity [真].” As such, for Wang Bi, the point of having no desire is to be simple (朴) and authentic, which is equivalent to dao and non-being. Having no desire is thus one of the ways to arrive at non-being. In conclusion to the above, “no desire” and “li as regulator” sometimes overlap, for “li as regulator” (统理) is “preserving authenticity through having no desire.” Evidently, at Wang Bi’s hands, li gained conceptual development and for him, all things have li. He believed that the ultimate point is having no desire is to preserve authenticity. On this point, li as regulator and having no desire are coherent with each other. Buddhism’s entry into China during the Han dynasty, meant that it gradually collided and coalesced with indigenous cultures. By the Sui-Tang dynasties, Buddhism’s grandeur became truly a spectacle to behold with many different sects and 3 Lynn 4 Lynn

(1994: 25). (1999: 159).

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each sect bearing its own particular characteristics. As these are too numerous to be individually discussed, we will only discuss the root view of li and desire that all the different sects shared in common. First, the root teachings of Buddhism did not give the concept of “li” a complete discussion but the Huayan school of Chinese Buddhism did greatly expounded upon it. They proposed the idea of “the four dharma-realms” (四法界) that is, “the phenomenal realm” (事法界), “li with unity” (理法界), “the universe as both li and phenomenal (事) are interdependent” (理事无碍法界) and “phenomena are also interdependent” (事事无碍法界). The so-called “li with unity” means that although there are differences amongst all the living things, they are still a unity, they still belong to the same li; thus the “li with unity” is the absolute and real or bh¯utatathat¯a (真如), Buddha nature (佛性), the nature of all things (法性). The Huayan school’s definition of li, in fact, has the effect of making it the highest concept in the whole Buddhist system. In the basic Buddhist teachings, the four axioms of truth are, suffering (苦), the aggregation (or exacerbation) of suffering by reason of the passions (集), nirvana, the extinction of desire and its consequences (灭), and the way of such extinction (道). From this we can see that the basic attitude of Buddhism towards desires is to extinguish them. It is believed that because people are unenlightened, they produce many different desires and seek after many different things and that this is the root of all their suffering. They believe that desire (贪), hate (or anger) (嗔), stupor (or ignorance) (痴) are the three poisons and that desire is having too much desires. It is only through extinguishing desires and understanding the truth that one can ultimately depart from suffering, gain happiness and enter the realm of nirvana. In all, Buddhism believes that it is only through extinguishing all troubles and desires that one can gain transcendence. With regard to Huayan Buddhism, it is only through washing oneself of human desires that one can arrive at their highest concept. From the above discussion, we can see that from the Han to the Tang period, Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism all developed their views on li and desire. In particular, there was a deepening understanding and discussion of the concept of li. On the question of how to deal with desire they also had their own unique views. At the same time, with the entrance of Buddhism into China, novel views on li and desire also entered, and these views were evidently different to that of Confucianism and Buddhism. With Huayan Buddhism’s view of “li with unity,” li was raised to the status of root-body (本体), and in reality, became the highest concept in the Huayan philosophical system. This provided a reference point for the concept of li that was proposed by Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism.

29.3 Three After the fall of the Song dynasty, the school of li was ascendant. Lian Xi (濂溪) and the Cheng brothers were its forerunners with Zhu Xi succeeding them. Apart from these figures, there was also the school of heart-mind of Zhang Hengqu (张横渠) and Lu Xiangshan as well as Chen Liang (陈亮) and Ye Shi (叶适) of the Yongjia

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school (功利学派). As the number of schools was multitudinous, we will only focus on the most representative schools from each era: the Cheng-Zhu school from the Song dynasty and Wang Fuzhi and Dai Zhen from the Ming-Qing period. It is usually believed that the school of li was inaugurated with the Cheng brothers. They once proudly proclaimed that “although there are influences on our teachings, the two words heavenly li (天理) were fathomed by ourselves.” (Book 12, Outer Book of the two Cheng Brothers) As such, the most important point is that the Cheng brothers elevated the concept of li and made it into the highest concept of the school of li. In the Cheng-Zhu system, li is the basis of heaven and earth and is also a complete and perfect root-body. It can be said that the concept of li in Cheng-Zhu philosophy contains a clearer meaning and a more elevated position. Following this, the Cheng-Zhu philosophy also has its own definition of desire. The Cheng brothers write, In general, excessive desires are rooted in the nourishment of the people drifting too far from what is necessary and therefore becomes harmful. That the former kings governed the root is the heavenly li, but the later people drifted to the branches that is human desire. The meaning of the hexagram “diminution” [hexagram 41, 损] is to diminish human desire so as to return to the heavenly li. (“Diminution Hexagram” Cheng Brothers’ Interpretation of the Book of Changes)

Zhu Xi writes, “drinking and eating is the heavenly li, but seeking after delicious tastes is human desire.” (Book 13, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Like the early Confucians, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi take the common needs of life as heavenly li and excessive desires as human desire. Finally, because human desire is excessive desire, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi both believe that one must “make clear heavenly li and extinguish human desire.” Zhu Xi explicitly states that, “in all the innumerable statements of the sages and worthies, all that they are teaching is to understand heavenly li and extinguish human desire.” (Book 12, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi) Under the guidance of this relationship between li and desire, the Cheng-Zhu school of li produced many methods of self-cultivation, and thereby constructed an expansive philosophical system. What is worth highlighting is that the Cheng-Zhu doctrine of “understanding heavenly li and extinguishing human desire” (明天理, 灭人欲) later became “preserving heavenly li and extinguishing human desire” and also became more and more ossified. The normal desires of existence also became private human desire and so the Cheng-Zhu doctrine became a tool of “killing people through li.” This, however, was not the original intention of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi. From the above discussion we can see that, for the Cheng-Zhu philosophy, human desire meant only excessive desire and that the normal desires of existence belong to heavenly li and should not be extinguished. Wang Fuzhi has been commonly recognized as the philosopher who brought traditional Chinese philosophy to its summation. He also gave a critical summary and proposed his own views on the concept of li and desire. First, Wang Fuzhi maintained the view that qi is origin (气本论) and so gave the concept of li his own definition. He said, “to speak of heart-mind, human nature, heaven and li one must do so by way of qi. Where there is no qi, nothing can exist.” (“Mencius” The Great Collection of Commentaries on the Four Books) Li does not depart of qi and the position of qi is

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the more foundational; this is greatly different from the Cheng-Zhu definition of li. Following this, he had his own definition of desire. He believed that, “probably, all desire for sounds and sights, goods, power and achievements which can be desired and which I desire are called desire.” (Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books) That which is called “private desire” is the desire for food, drinks, smells and taste, i.e. that which transcends the boundaries of what is appropriate to heavenly li. What is called “public desire” are the universal desires of humankind and which are within the confines of normal desires, for example, “eating when one is hungry and wearing clothes when it is cold.” “Public desire” is in accord with “heavenly li’ whereas “private desire” is antithetical to “heavenly li.” After having clearly defined the respective meanings of li and desire, Wang Fuzhi believes that li and desire exist in a relationship of antagonism and of unity. In terms of their unity, it is public desire and heavenly li that is united. If human desire was public desire, then heavenly li and human desire are united; the sage’s desire, for example, is heavenly desire. Heaven is without desire and its li is human desire. The scholar has li and desire, the utmost of li is in accord with (public) desire, and the utmost fulfilment of this (public) desire is li. In terms of their antagonism, private desire is opposed to heavenly li. He says, “li is heaven; desire is human. Li is not carried out within desire. Sometimes desire trespasses heavenly desire and the functions of heaven and humans are different.” What is designated as “desires” here refers to the greed after sex and food, that is the greed after the “satisfaction that is gained through seizing external things.” This kind of human desire transcends the necessities of human existence and its usual material needs as the maximum limits of what society’s moral norms can take. “Human desires cannot be one and the same as the great and vast li of heaven, there are many aspects in which it goes against heavenly li.” Extinguishing “seizing” is the way to curtail human desire and means giving measure to excessive human desire so that it accords with the constancy of heavenly li. The philosopher of the Qing dynasty Dai Zhen also had his unique take on the concept of li and desire and some of his views were critical of the Cheng-Zhu view of li and desire. First, he believed that li mainly referred to the “pattern [li] for separating things” (分里), these patterns [li] for separating things exist within the myriad things and we understand them as well-ordered (条理). Evidently, this understanding is very different to the Cheng-Zhu view. Following this, Dai Zhen believed that human desire is the basic needs of human existence. Like the early Confucians, therefore, he distinguished between normal and excessive desires. Finally, he united li and human desire, he said “heavenly principle [li] refers to the spontaneous divisions of li [自 然之分理]. Spontaneous divisions of li is precisely a matter of using my feelings to assess the feelings of others so that all reach their proper level.”5 (“Principle”, An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius) “It is ‘principle’ when [appropriate] feelings do not fail. There is never a case of not attaining the [appropriate] feeling and yet still attaining their principle.”6 (“Principle”, An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius) Here, it is explicitly 5 Ewell 6 Ewell

(1990: 106), modified. (1990: 106).

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stated that one needs to understand only one’s own desires before one can understand other people’s desires and thus attain li (分理). The fulfilment of desires can, therefore, find their li. Dai Zhen says, “now you take feelings which do not fail as principle, which is to affirm that principle [li] resides in the desires”7 (“Principle” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius) and thereby explicitly proposed the view of “principle [li] resides in desires.” He also believes that it is precisely because li exists in desire that having no desire means having no li, and this departs from the Cheng-Zhu view. Of course, the subject of “preserving heavenly li and extinguishing human desire” which Dai Zhen criticizes is not the common human desire which the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi talk of, but rather the later ascetic tendency of denigrating even normal desires as bad. It is for this reason that Dai Zhen cries, “when a man dies by law there are still some who pity him; but if he dies by principle, who will pity him?8 (“Principle” An Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius). During the Song-Ming period, due to the flourishing of the school of li, the concept of li and desire was fully developed. As the school of li overly emphasized the function of li, however, the result was that in practice, the most basic human desires necessary for existence were suppressed. This resulted in the later philosophies, criticism and innovations of Wang Fuzhi and Zhen Dai. In this period, the concept of li and desire was very rich and multicoloured.

29.4 Four Li and desire are a pair of important concepts in Chinese philosophy and the relationship between them was focused on by many generations of philosophers. Either implicitly or explicitly many philosophers of every age have discussed this concept. From the above discussion we can make the following conclusions: First, traditional Chinese philosophy usually stressed satisfying people’s basic desires. Whether it was Mencius or the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians, there was never a rejection of people’s basic needs for survival. Although the Daoists and Buddhists advocated having no desire or extinguishing desire, in practice it meant that they tacitly acknowledged people’s basic desire for existence, otherwise their teachings would not have been able to develop till today. This means that the Chinese tradition is not one that blindly rejects people’s desires. What it rejects is merely excessive desire; traditional Chinese philosophy is a very practical and realistic philosophy. Second, there is a general tendency in Chinese philosophy to stress li and condescend against desire. On the basis of satisfying people’s basic desires, traditional Chinese philosophy puts more emphasis on li. This goes without saying for Daoism and Buddhism as the point of their self-cultivation itself is to reduce desire to its minimum, but even for the very this-worldly Confucianism, li was highly important. 7 Ewell 8 Ewell

(1990: 146). (1990: 152).

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Mencius’s idea that, “to nourish the heart-mind there is nothing better than having few desires” and the Song-Ming view that “understanding li and extinguishing human desire” all demonstrate this tendency. This is a common characteristic of traditional Chinese philosophy. Third, this tendency to stress li and condescend against desire demonstrates the spiritual and moral values of traditional Chinese philosophy. Daoism and Buddhism look down upon desire because for them, the ultimate aim of having no desires is to accomplish the dao and become Buddha, transcend the real-life suffering and achieve eternal spiritual happiness. The intention behind the Confucian stress on li and condescension against desire, however, lies in advocating for the elevation of one’s own moral level, so that people do not lose their moral bearing in their excessive seeking after desires. From a higher level, its ultimate value lies in the unification of heaven and humans and thus reaching the state of the sage. This then is what Confucianism values. Fourth, the concept of li and desires and the relationship between them is not merely a theoretical question. Although we have focused our discussions on the theoretical side, even within this theoretical discussion we can still see that this is not merely a theoretical question. Although the starting point of the Song-Ming idea of “understanding heavenly li and extinguishing human desire” is good, in practice, it gradually became alienated until it ultimately rejected the most basic desires of human survival. This invited the criticism of Ming-Qing thinkers. This shows that li and desire is not merely a theoretical question but was verified and improved upon through everyday social life.

References Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. 2003. Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books. Ewell, John Woodruff, Jr. 1990. Reinventing the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777). Dissertation. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 30

King and Hegemon (wangba, 王霸)

King and hegemon is the shortened form of the two terms, “kingly way” (王道) and the “way of the hegemon” (霸道), which are two theories in traditional Chinese philosophy for governance and politics. With regard to the genesis of the concepts “kingly way” and the “way of the hegemon,” the kingly way preceded that of the way of the hegemon. The kingly way represents a kind of ideal moral governance and the standard for the actions and morality of the whole of society. The kingly way is realised through the sovereign’s bringing well-being to the common people, becoming a role-model so that the common people and ministers genuinely accept the authority of the sovereign, applying punishments in a well-judged way, and promoting the worthy. Whether it is the kingly way or the way of the hegemon that should be carried out has occasioned much debate throughout Chinese history and this is historically been called “the distinction between king and hegemon” (王霸 之辨). In reality, this debate represented the opposition between the two different political perspectives of, Confucian rule through virtue, and the legalist view of rule through law. This opposition had a profound and long-lasting impact on the history of Chinese philosophy.

30.1 One During the Spring and Autumn period, the various states underwent various reforms in order to strengthen themselves and tried to annex each other’s territories until this finally led to the appearance of “the five hegemons of the spring and autumn period.” The beginning of the way of the hegemon began when Guan Zhong became the prime minister of the state of Qi which led to lord Huan becoming foremost among the five hegemons. The Guanzi already discusses the question of king and hegemon. In the chapter “Conversations of the Hegemon” (霸言) of the Guanzi we read, “Now, a hegemon or king begins by taking people as the root. If the root is in good order, the state will be secure; if it is in disorder, the state will be endangered.” Here, it is emphasized that no matter if one’s tasks are that of the hegemon or that © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_30

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of the king, the most important thing is to obtain the confidence of the people. It is for this reason that, Those who struggle for [control of] the realm must first struggle for men. Those who understand the great scheme of things will obtain them while those who concentrate on petty calculations will fail. Those who succeed in winning the masses of the realm become kings; those who win only half of them become [mere] hegemons.1 (ibid.)

During the heated power struggles of the Spring and Autumn period, the Guanzi also discussed the strategy for accomplishing the task of the king and hegemon. As the Guanzi sees it, it was necessary to observe the tendencies of the times or the force of circumstances as, When strong states are numerous, he unites with the strong to attack the weak in planning to become a hegemon. When strong states are few, he unites with the small to attack the large in planning to become a king. When strong states are numerous, it is the wisdom of the fools to talk about the influence of a king. When strong states are few, it is a defeatist strategy to proclaim the way of a hegemon.2 (ibid.)

On choosing the occasion for battle then, If strong states are numerous, whoever takes the initiative will be in danger, whilst those who lag behind will reap the benefits. When strong states are few, whoever takes the initiative will become king, while those who lag behind will be lost. When warring states are numerous, whoever lags behind may become hegemon. When warring states are few, whoever takes the initiative may become king.3 (ibid.)

It was under the direction of this philosophy and according to the political situation of the time that Guan Zhong chose a series of measures which helped Lord Huan become a hegemon. With regard to Guan Zhong’s views on hegemony, Confucius believed that in helping Lord Huan become a hegemon, the common people were spared the sufferings of war and that there is thus no greater bounty than this. It is for this reason that Confucius called him humane. Confucius advocated rule through virtue and looked back with great reverence at the kingly way of Yao and Shun and believed in the political governance of the kingly way in which “if for one day you managed to restrain yourself and return to the rites, in this way you could lead the entire world back to humaneness.” (Analects 12.1) Despite this, however, Confucius still gave a very high evaluation of Guan Zhong’s way of the hegemon and held a positive attitude to the way of the hegemon. A sharp opposition in Confucius’s thought between king and hegemon had not yet emerged. The philosopher who did contrast king to hegemon and advocated the distinction between them was Mencius. Mencius clearly differentiated between the two: the kingly way was “carrying out humaneness through virtue” whereas “using force, makes a pretence to benevolence” is the way of the hegemon. Although the common aim of both was to subjugate the people, the kingly way accomplishes this 1 Rickett

(1985: 357), modified. (1985: 361), modified. 3 Rickett (1985: 361), modified. 2 Rickett

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through virtuous actions and thus makes the people comply willingly with the political situation, whereas the way of the hegemon pretends to humaneness but in reality, subjugates the people through force. What the hegemon achieves is thus merely a physical subjugation and not the willing compliance of the people. As such, life under the hegemon is not necessarily bad but is not as happy and free from anxiety as under the rule of a king. It is for this reason that those who live under a king would happily give up their life for the interests of the state, and their own moral state would imperceptibly improve: “Though the king may kill them, they do not murmur. When he benefits them, they do not think of his merit. From day to day they progress towards what is good, without knowing who it is that makes them do so.” (Mencius 7A13) The kingly way of governance which Mencius talks of is the humane governance (仁政) which he advocates. The philosophical basis of humane governance lies in the heart-mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others (不忍人之心) or the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐之心) which everyone is congenitally endowed with. He says, All men have a heart-mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. The former kings had heart-minds that could not bear to see the suffering of others, so they had governments that could not bear to see the suffering of others. If one puts into practice a government that cannot bear to see the suffering of others by means of a heart-mind that cannot bear the suffering of others, then bringing order to the world is in the palm of your hand. (Mencius 2A6)

It is through their virtue of humaneness that the former kings such as Yao, shun, Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu were able to become kings. As Mencius sees it, the support of the people is key to whether one can obtain all under heaven. He said, There is a way to get all under heaven: get the people, and all under heaven is got. There is a way to get the people: get their heart-minds, and the people are got. There is a way to get their heart-minds: it is simply to collect for them what they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike. (Mencius 4A9)

It is for this reason that the key to realizing the kingly way is to win the people’s heartminds, caring for the people’s sufferings and sharing in the joys. Specifically speaking, this means that people must have a constant livelihood as “without a constant livelihood they cannot have a constant heart-mind” therefore, an intelligent ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people, so as to make sure that, for those above them, they shall have sufficient wherewithal to serve their parents, and, for those below them, sufficient wherewithal to support their wives and children; that in good years they shall always be abundantly satisfied, and that in bad years they shall escape the danger of perishing. (Mencius 1A7)

Other requirements for realizing the kingly way are lessening taxes and increasing education so that the people are enlightened through the rites. If one is careful about providing instruction in the village schools, emphasizing the righteousness of filiality and brotherliness, those whose hair has turned gray will not carry loads on the roadways. It has never happened that someone fails to become king when, among his subjects, seventy-year-olds are wearing silk and eating meat, and the black-haired people are neither hungry or cold. (Mencius 1A3)

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In all, Mencius believes that the kingly way involves safeguarding people’s interests in a variety of domains. It is on this basis of the distinction between the king and hegemon that Mencius believes the way of the hegemon which Guan Zhong speaks of is not worth mentioning. The distinction which Mencius made between the king and hegemon had a profound and long-lasting influence on later generations. Xunzi belonged to the latter part of the Warring States when there were frequent warfare between the various states and the governance of the state through ritual propriety was no longer sufficient to ensure social stability. It is for this reason that simultaneous with the advocation of the rites, Xunzi also introduced ritual propriety into legal principles (援法入礼) and proposed the equal valuing of the king and hegemon through “advocating the rites as well as putting weight on the law” (隆 礼重法). Whereas Mencius used humaneness as an arbiter to distinguish between king and hegemon, for Xunzi, the difference between the king and hegemon lay in righteousness and trust. Using righteousness to establish the state is the kingly way whereas using trust to establish the state is the way of the hegemon. As Xunzi sees it, Tang and Wu both had territories of a merely a hundred li in size, but all the feudal lords submitted to them. “There is no reason for this other than that they achieved perfection in righteousness. This is what is meant by saying if righteousness is established as your foundation, they you will be a king.”4 (“The True King and the Hegemon” Xunzi) The way of the hegemon, on the other hand, is when There are some who, even though virtue is not yet completed in them and righteousness is not yet perfected in them, nevertheless order and control for all under heaven advances for them. Their punishments and rewards and their promises to allow or not allow things are trusted by all under heaven. Their ministers and subordinates all clearly know that one can make pacts with them. When governmental orders have been put forth, then even though they see opportunities for gain or loss, they will not cheat their people. When covenants have been settled upon, then even though they see opportunities for gain or loss, they will not cheat their allies.5 (ibid.)

In this way one’s military and city defences will be strong, and the enemy will be intimidated. Compared with Mencius, Xunzi has already changed the standard for evaluating the king and hegemon. In fact, he had already confirmed the positive meaning of the way of the hegemon. Not only did Xunzi not derogate the way of the hegemon, but instead discloses many words of praise for it. He said, for example, Thus, Duke Huan of Qi, Duke Wen of Jin, King Zhuang of Chu, King Helü of Wu, and King Goujian of Yue were all from remote and backward states, but their power to inspire awe shook the whole world, and their strength threatened the central states. There is no other reason for this than that they mastered trustworthiness. This is what is meant by saying, if trustworthiness is established as your foundation, then you will be a hegemon.6 (ibid.)

With regard to the specific content of the kingly way and the way of the hegemon, Xunzi believes that the kingly way venerates humaneness and righteousness and that through actions that are humane and righteous, make people respect and feel close 4 Hutton

(2014: 100), modified. (2014: 100), modified. 6 Hutton (2014: 100). 5 Hutton

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to the him, the enemy fearful of him and ministers compliant without resorting to force. With regard to domestic policies the hegemon, He opens up farmland, fills up his granaries, and makes ready supplies. He then carefully recruits and selects by review men of talent and skill. Thereafter, he advances honors and rewards in order to encourage them, and he makes strict penalties and punishments in order to restrain them.7 (“The Rule of a King” Xunzi)

With regard to foreign policies, the hegemon, “preserves those about to perish and reinstates lineages which have been broken off. He protects the weak and suppresses the violent.”8 (ibid.) He is harmonious with the other states and treats them with friendliness, and so in world where there is no king, he can always be victorious, Hence, he makes clear to them that his conduct really does not aim at taking over others, and he gets them to trust that his way really is to befriend his rivals. If there is no true king or hegemonic ruler in the world, then he will always be victorious.9 (ibid.)

From the above, it can be seen that Xunzi simultaneously promotes the king and hegemon. A salient characteristic in the way of the hegemon which Xunzi talks of is “trustworthiness” and this is very different from the way of the hegemon that Mencius talks of. Xunzi believes that the political governance of the kingly way lies in gaining the faith of the people, in making the feudal lords and the ministers compliant. The political governance of the way of the hegemon, on the other hand, lies in binding the feudal lords with trust and being friends with them. “So in using the state, if righteousness is established as your foundation, then you will be a king. If trustworthiness is established as your foundation, then you will be a hegemon.” (“The King and Hegemon” Xunzi) As the content of the king and hegemon are different, whether one becomes a king or a hegemon lies in how one uses the people; using the methods of a king will result in the kingly way and using methods of a hegemon will result in the way of a hegemon. Although Xunzi simultaneously promotes both the king and hegemon, as both can enrich the state, in comparison, the kingly way is still superior to the way of the hegemon; the kingly way is still a more ideal political governance. The Record of the Rites also discusses the king and hegemon and gives the same value to both. The Record of Music describes the kingly way as: Ritual afforded the defined expression for the [affections of the] people’s heart-minds; music secured the harmonious utterance of their voices; the laws of government were designed to promote the performance [of the rituals and music]; and punishments, to guard against the violation of them. When ceremonies, music, laws, and punishments had everywhere full course, without irregularity or collision, the method of the kingly way was complete.

Here, it is believed that the simultaneous carrying out of ritual, music, punishment and laws of government can complete the kingly way. “The Different Teaching of The Different Kings” (经解) chapter of the Record of Rites writes, 7 Hutton

(2014: 72). (2014: 72) 9 Hutton (2014: 72). 8 Hutton

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When [a ruler] issues his notices and gives forth his orders, and the people are pleased, we have what may be called the condition of harmony. When superiors and inferiors love one another, we have the condition of humaneness. When the people get what they desire without seeking for it, we have the condition of trustworthiness. When all things in the operations of heaven and earth that might be injurious are taken out of the way, we have the condition of righteousness. Righteousness and trustworthiness, harmony and humaneness are the instruments of the hegemon and the king. If anyone wishes to govern the people, and does not employ these instruments, he will not be successful.

Here there is no positive or negative distinction between the king and hegemon and are both given equal worth.

30.2 Two Liu Xiang of the Han distinguished between the “rule of the king”, “rule of the hegemon” and the “rule of the strong.” The “rule of the king” is when the virtue of humaneness is used to educatively transform the people. The “rule of the hegemon” is when force is used to intimidate the people. The “rule of the strong” when punishment is used to threaten the people. Each of the three kinds of rule has their respective merits but the rule of the king is the most ideal political rule and so virtuous rule and transformation through education should be the foremost policy, with force coming next and punishment last. We can see that although Liu Xiang tends towards the kingly way, he does not reject the way of the hegemon. During the salt and iron discussions (盐铁会议) of the reign of Emperor Zhao of the Han, the question of whether humaneness and righteousness should be used to govern the state or punishments and laws was also discussed. This question touched upon the policy orientation of the state as well as the theory of state governance. In this discussion, the men of textual learning (贤良文学) embraced the humaneness and righteousness principles of Confucianism, advocated virtuous rule and believed that one can be peerless throughout the world if one carried out humane rule. They repeatedly cited historical precedents and criticized harsh punishments and denounced severe laws as the way to ruin a state, and they gave the example of Qin as having sealed its fate through harsh punishments and severe laws. Song Hongyang (桑弘羊), however, used legalist thought as his main orientation and opposed virtuous rule and promoted legalist rule. He believed that commands are used for educating the people and laws are for surveilling the people. With harsh laws and severe punishments, the people will be cautious and so scheming and so perverted actions will spontaneously cease. The economic policies and methods for ruling the state which he maintained were all linked with legalist thought. In reality, what the men of textual learning advocated was the kingly way and what Song Hongyang advocated was the way of the hegemon, their opposition was thus a continuation of the pre-Qin distinction between the king and hegemon. The Han dynasty thinker Tan Huan (桓谭) gave equal worth to the king and hegemon. With regard to the distinction between them, Tan Huan believed that “the

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three kings used humaneness and righteousness and the five hegemons used authority and wisdom” (“King and Hegemon” New Discussions), Rewarding the good and punish the bad, when the feudal lords attend to the affairs of court, this is called king. Deploying the troops on a large scale, making treaties of alliances and using trust and righteousness to put the world to right is a hegemon. King means wang “to go to” [往也]. It means that his generosities were abundant and extensive and to whom all under Heaven turned [归往]. (“King and Hegemon” New Discussions)

Specifically speaking, The governance of the kingly way first gets rid of that which harms people and then amply feeds and clothes them and then proceeds to educate them through the rites and intimidates them through punishments so that they know good from bad, when to move away and go towards [something]. In this way, educative transformation flourishes and peoples from all around flock to one, all under heaven is peaceful and contented. This is the way of the king. (ibid.)

It can be seen that Tan Huan has three stipulations for the kingly way: providing ample clothing and food, teaching the rites and putting emphasis on punishments. Where he differs from the previous Confucian discussion of the kingly way is his listing of punishment as one of the main contents of the kingly way. With regard to the way of the hegemon, Tan Huan emphasizes, in particular, the hierarchical relationship between the sovereign and the minister and the trust that has to be reposed in the rewards and punishments of the law. The greatest achievement of the rule of the hegemon is that it venerates the sovereign and makes humble the minister, authority is concentrated in the hands of one person and commands uniformly disseminated. Awards and punishments must be trustworthy, laws and commands must be clear, the hundred ministers each serve their roles and all the commands issued must be carried out. This is the way of hegemon. (ibid.)

The kingly way consists solely of emphasizing moral education whereas the way of the hegemon is more heterogenous, and for the hegemon it is mandatory to give authoritative commands. Both the king and the hegemon, however, can obtain the world and so in essence, they are the same.

30.3 Three By the Song period, the distinction between king and hegemon was still a fiercely debated question. Sima Guang (司马光) believed that there was no essential differences between the king and hegemon. He proposed the view that “there is no different way between the king and hegemon” (王霸无异道). For both the king and the hegemon, What they carry out is all according to humaneness and righteousness. They promote the worthy, reward the good and punish the bad, prohibit violence and punish chaos. It is just that there is a difference of rank between them. There is a difference of degree between their generosities. There is a difference in size between their accomplishments. Their commands

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are either extensive or narrow, but there is no antithesis between them such as between black and white, sweet and bitter. (Book 27, Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance)

As such, there is not an essential difference between the content of the kingly way and the way of the hegemon. It is merely that the name and position of the executor is different and there is a quantitative difference between their generosities, accomplishments and policies of bigness or smallness, extensiveness and narrowness, as opposed to a qualitative difference such as between black and white. Cheng Hao wrote Discussion of the Distinction between King and Hegemon (论 王霸之辨) in which he dignified the king and debased the hegemon. He believed that the kingly way is the correct principle of heaven and earth and the ultimate extent of human morality. The way of the hegemon, however, falsely pretends to humaneness and righteousness but actually serves its own selfish interests. As Cheng Hao sees it whether the kingly way or the way of the hegemon is accomplished depends mainly on the original motives of the sovereign: Thus, the person who sincerely wishes to be a king is a king. If take advantage of one’s status as king to be a hegemon, then be a hegemon. The way of the two are different, and it lies in observing the original intentions, that is all.

As such, with respect to the sovereign, he must establish his intentions and start from a “heart-mind of utmost sincerity” so as to realize the kingly way. If one’s original intention lay in the way of the hegemon, then although superficially one enacts the way of the former kings, in reality, it is still the way of the hegemon. By the Southern Song, at the hands of Zhu Xi and Chen Liang of the Yongjia school, the distinction between king and hegemon evolved into a dispute between the historical outlook of society. Zhu Xi and Chen Liang carried out an argument which lasted for many years and which had a big impact on the history of Chinese thought. Both Zhu Xi and Chen Liang approached the kingly way and the way of the hegemon from the perspective of the distinction between righteousness and profit. Zhu Xi believed that the standard of the king lay in whether he was about “humaneness and righteousness” or about “private desire” that is, whether they cared about “righteousness” or “profit.” The kingly way complies with the heavenly li and is about righteousness with the result that all under heaven spontaneously submits itself. The way of the hegemon uses the cover of humaneness and righteousness to serve its own private interests so that even if it could succeed out of chance for a while, it will ultimately still be the way of the hegemon. As Zhu Xi sees it, the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasty kings all used the “heart-mind of dao” to govern all under heaven. In all things, they “took humaneness and righteousness as foremost and did not take material gain [功利] as urgent.” (Book 75, Zhu Wengong’s Literary Collection) As such, the carrying out of righteousness, and the existence of a pure and utmost goodness is the so-called governance of the kingly way. Since the Qin-Han, Sui-Tang period, however, the emperors have all governed the world through desire for profit (利). Although these people can achieve great success, what they sought after was personal success. This then is starting out from selfish interests and not from humaneness and righteousness which resulted in an uncontrolled overflowing of human desire; these

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are all characteristics of the governance of the way of the hegemon. It is for these reasons that Zhu Xi praises the three dynasties and deprecates the Han-Tang, praises the kingly way and debased the way of the hegemon. In opposition to Zhu Xi’s views, Chen Liang believes that in Zhu Xi’s arguments the “kingly way” and “way of the hegemon”, “righteousness” and “profit” were never isolated and antithetical. It was not the case that only the three dynasties successfully carried out the “kingly way” and that the Han-Tang carried out the “way of the hegemon.” This is because Han-Tang sovereigns such the first emperors of the Han and Tang also “prohibited violence and chaos, loved men and benefitted things; this certainly cannot be refuted.” Although the Han and Tang were not the equal of the three dynasties in terms of their perfection of virtue, they also did not rely solely on scheming to maintain all under heaven nor purely let loose human desires and had no humaneness or righteousness. Furthermore, “the recent Confucian discussion of how the three dynasties ruled all under heaven through the heavenly li along and the Han-Tang ruled through human desires” is not historically accurate. The three dynasties did not actually solely use kingly way to govern. The so-called kingly way of the three dynasties was actually realized through the military campaigns characteristic of the way of the hegemon. Without the way of the hegemon, the kingly way would have no means of being realized. The kingly way and the way of the hegemon cannot, therefore, be opposed to each other. On this basis, Chen Liang criticized the contemporary Confucian view which praised the three dynasties and deprecated the Han and Tang. He believed that since antiquity both righteousness and profit were simultaneously carried out and the way of the king and hegemon were employed simultaneously; these cannot be separated. Those Confucians call their own actions as according with dao, as the kingly way and that the achievements of the Han and Tang is called utility and hegemon. The philosophers may say one thing about themselves and another about others. What was discussed may be good but what was done [by the Han and Tang] was also not bad. This interpretation may be considered as an assertion that righteousness and utility may go together after all, and that the [way of the] king and hegemon can both be used.

The debate between Zhu Xi and Chen Liang reflected their antagonistic views with regard to righteousness and profit. It can be seen that after Mencius, whether to employ the kingly way or the way of the hegemon became a question which was ceaselessly debated throughout the history of Chinese political thought. Even within Confucianism itself, there was no unanimous view on whether to praise the king and deprecate the hegemon or advocate the hegemon and debase the king or simultaneously employ both the way of the king and the hegemon. In all, however, in the Confucian classics, the kingly way as the root basis for governing the state was praised and the way of the hegemon was condescended against and rejected. In terms of the actual course of history, however, in their governance of the state, the sovereigns of successive dynasties often, on the surface, employed Confucianism and, in reality, used legalism. In practice, both the way of the king and the way of the hegemon was simultaneously employed.

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References Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rickett, Allyn W. 1985. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, vol. I. Princeton UP: Princeton.

Chapter 31

Moral Knowing (liangzhi, 良知)

Moral knowing is an important concept in Confucian moral philosophy. It refers to a congenitally endowed moral consciousness and a capacity for moral knowing that exists universally in all peoples. The concept of moral knowing was first proposed by Mencius and was developed upon by Wang Yangming and came to have an extensive influence on the development of Chinese philosophy. At the same time, there were different understandings of the concept of moral knowing, in particular, Wang Yangming’s influential philosophy engendered many different views and led to relatively heated arguments.

31.1 One In Mencius 7A, Mencius says that everyone is naturally endowed with an ability which is present without having to be acquired through learning and which knows without the exercise of reflection and consideration; this is moral knowing. Its specific content is loving one’s parents, loving one’s elder brothers, humaneness and a sense of righteousness. As Mencius sees it, moral knowing is a congenitally possessed moral awareness and under the guidance of this kind of moral awareness, people will act according to morality. The reason why people are endowed with moral knowing, as Mencius sees it, is because everyone is bestowed with the “heart-mind of humaneness and righteousness” For Mencius, all humans are born with the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐), shame and disdain (羞恶), reverence and respect (恭敬), approval and disapproval (是非). The heart-mind of reverence and respect is also the heart-mind of deference (辞让). The existence of the “four heart-minds” is the essential reason as to why human beings are human beings and so “if one is without the feeling of shame disdain, one is not human. If one is without the feeling of deference, one is not human. If one is without the feeling of approval and disapproval, one is not human.” (Mencius 6A6) The four heart-minds are also the “small difference whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small.” At the same © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_31

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time, the “four heart-minds” are also the sprouts of the various moral actions such as humanness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The “sprouts” are the “moral sprouts” and human beings have these four sprouts in the same way that they have the four limbs––they are congenitally endowed. This is why, “humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are not infused into us from without. We are already furnished with them.” (Mencius 6A6) This then is Mencius’s thesis on the goodness of human nature. It is precisely because human nature is good that “even now-a-days, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of commiseration and compassion.” (Mencius 2A6) This feeling does not contain any utilitarian calculus but arises purely out of the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion; this is human beings’ moral knowing. It can be said that Mencius’s thesis of the goodness of human nature is the basis of his theory of moral knowing. It can also be said that the specific content of moral knowing are the heart-minds of commiseration and compassion, shame and disdain, reverence and respect and disapproval. What is worth paying particular attention to is Zhao Qi’s (赵岐) of the Han dynasty and Jiao Xun’s (焦循) of the Qing dynasty interpretations of Mencius’s philosophy of moral knowing. As Zhao Qi explains, “being able without learning is the innate capability of human nature. ‘Moral [良]’ means to the greatest extent. ‘Moral’ is when a person’s capability is particularly prominent.” (7A, Commentary on the Mencius) Jiao Xun explains: Moral capacity [良能] is like saying very capable [甚能], moral knowing [良知] is like saying very knowing [甚知]. Being very capable and very knowing is utmost capacity and utmost knowing. Utmost capacity [最能] and utmost knowing [最知] is being capable to the utmost [能之最] and knowing to the utmost [知之最]. (“Chapter and Verse Commentary on 7A”, Rectified Interpretations of the Mencius)

In interpreting moral knowing as very capable and very knowing, the innate nature of moral knowing, and moral capacity is emphasized.

31.2 Two Although the concept of “moral knowing” originated with Mencius, he did not discuss it in detail. From the Han dynasty to the Tang dynasty, discussions of moral understanding were also few and far between. It was only with the Song dynasty revival of Confucianism that attention was given to the concept of moral knowing once again. Their discussions of moral knowing, however, were relatively sporadic. Zhang Zai divided knowing into perceptual knowing (闻见之知) and the moral knowing of heavenly virtue (天德良知). Perceptual knowing is the knowledge that is gained when human beings’ sense organs are in direct contact with the external world and the object of knowing are external objects. The moral knowing of heavenly virtue, on the other hand, is rooted in the innate moral goodness of the heart-mind and refers to how human beings are equipped, at birth, with a kind of capacity for

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knowing. The content of knowing is getting to the limit of objects and exhausting li (尽物穷理), that is, an understanding of the essential natures of things and affairs. The way that the moral knowing of heavenly virtue knows the essential nature of things and affairs is not through being in specific contact with objects and affairs, but rather through a “sincerity resulting from enlightenment” (自明诚) and a “enlightenment resulting from sincerity” (自诚明): By “sincerity resulting from enlightenment” is meant to develop one’s nature fully through the investigation of things to the utmost, and by “enlightenment resulting from sincerity” is meant to investigate things to the utmost through fully developing one’s nature.1 (“Enlightenment Resulting from Sincerity” Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

This is what Zhang Zai meant by the “expansion of the heart-mind” (大其心), which is an intuitive understanding of the principles of the myriad things through expanding one’s heart-mind. The knowledge that is gained in this way is different from perceptual knowledge. Cheng Hao believed that moral knowing, and moral capacity (良能) are innate in human beings. Whereas moral capacity is shared in common between animals and human beings moral knowing is the unique moral nature of human beings. Zhu Xi explained “moral” (良) as the “goodness that is originally and spontaneously so” (本然之善). (7A, Commentary on the Mencius) Moral knowing is the capacity for understanding morality and Zhu Xi calls it the “heart-mind of dao” (道心); this is also the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion of which Mencius spoke. Zhu Xi believed that everyone is in possession of this heart-mind of dao. Lu Jiuyuan spoke of Mencius’s “four sprouts” as the “original heart-mind” which is equivalent to the moral knowing of which Mencius spoke. The “original heart-mind” (本心) is the root distinction between human beings and animals. It is precisely due to the existence of moral knowing that human beings can act in moral ways, such as showing commiseration, compassion and deference in the appropriate circumstances. Lu Jiuyuan’s understanding of moral knowing completely inherited and continued Mencius’s views.

31.3 Three The person who most systematically developed the concept of moral knowing was the Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Yangming. Wang Yangming inherited and developed Lu Jiuyuan’s philosophy and emphasized that there is “no object outside of the heart-mind” (心外无物) and that there is “no principle outside of the heart-mind” (心外无理). He asserted that the “human being is the heart-mind of heaven and earth” (Letter to Zhao Lan). In his later years, he also proposed the concept of “moral knowing” and believed that moral knowing exists in every heart-mind prior to experience. He gave the concept of moral knowing elucidation from many different perspectives and even took it to be the force that controls heaven, earth, 1 Chan

(1969: 508).

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ghosts and spirits. In this way, Wang Yangming pushed the study of the heart-mind to the highest peak. Wang Yangming’s concept of moral knowing is comprised of the following dimensions. First, moral knowing is the “heart-mind of approval and disapproval.” Wang Yangming says that, this moral knowing is what Mencius means by the heart-mind of approval and disapproval and is possessed by all human beings. This heart-mind of approval and disapproval requires no deliberation to know, nor does it depend on learning to function. This is why it is called moral knowing. (Inquiry on the Great Learning)

It is in this sense that moral knowing is a moral understanding that is prior to experience; it is the root-body of the heart-mind: Knowledge is the root-body of the heart-mind. The heart-mind is naturally able to know. When it perceives the parents, it naturally knows that one should be filial. When it perceives the elder brother, it naturally knows that one should be respectful. And when it perceives a child fall into a well, it naturally knows that one should be commiserative and compassionate. This is moral knowing and need not be sought outside.2 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living)

All human beings are innately in possession of this moral knowing, that is, a heartmind that knows approval and disapproval. As such, moral knowing is the measure for judging wrong and right: Moral knowing is nothing but the sense of right and wrong, and the sense of right and wrong is nothing but to love [the right] and to hate [the wrong]. To love [the right] and to hate [the wrong] cover all affairs and their variations.3 (Part III, Instructions for Practical Living)

As such, “apart from moral knowing, there is no other knowledge.” (Part II, Instructions for Practical Living) Second, moral knowing is the root-body (本体) of the heart-mind and is also the heavenly li. Wang Yangming advocated that “there is no principle external to the heart-mind” and believed that, “the root-body of the heart-mind is heavenly principle. The bright awareness and numinous clarity of heavenly principle is what is called moral knowing.” (Part II, Wenlu) As such, the heart-mind or moral knowing corresponds perfectly with heavenly principle. Moral knowing is heavenly principle, which is simultaneously the heart-mind and human nature: Knowledge is principle made intelligent. In terms of its position as master [of the body], it is called the heart-mind. In terms of its position as endowment, it is called our human nature.4 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living)

As the root-body of the heart-mind, moral knowing is of utmost goodness. As long as moral knowing is not misled by selfish desires, it will display moral principles such as filial piety and respect for one’s elder brother: 2 Chan

(1963: 15), modified. (1963: 228), modified. 4 Chan (1963: 76), modified. 3 Chan

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All infants know how to love their parents and respect their elder brothers. The simple truth is that when the intelligent faculty is not obstructed by selfish desires, but is developed and extended to the limit, it is then completely the root-body of the mind and can identify its character with that of heaven and earth.5 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living)

Third, moral knowing is the root-body (本体) of the universe. Starting from the discourse of heart-mind as origin, Wang Yangming believed that moral knowing is the root-body of the myriad things of the universe. He said, The vacuity of moral knowing is the vacuity of heaven and earth. The non-being of moral knowing is the formlessness of the Great Void. Sun, moon, wind, thunder, mountains, rivers, people, and things, and all things that have figure, form, or colour, all function and operate within this formlessness of the Great Void.”6 (Part III, Instructions for Practical Living). This is saying, from a value perspective, that all things of the world possess meaning and value due to the existence of people’s moral knowing. It is for this reason that, “even heaven and earth cannot exist without the moral knowing that is inherent in human beings” (ibid.), “in all that fills heaven and earth there is but this clear intelligence” (ibid). We can so far as to say that, “moral knowing is the spirit of creation. This spirit produces heaven and earth, spiritual beings, and the lord [帝]. They all come from it. Truly nothing can be equal to this”7 (ibid.) thus “my clear intelligence is the master of heaven and earth and spiritual beings” (ibid.) The affirmation of moral knowing as the root-body of the universe highlights the agency of the human being. Wang Yangming believed that everyone is in possession of moral knowing and “even a thief realizes in himself that he should not be a thief. If you call him a thief, he will still blush.”8 (Part III, 207, Instructions for Practical Living) Selfish desires, however, can obstruct moral knowing. With regard to the average person, the reason why moral knowing does not always manifest itself in them and why sometimes act immorally, is because human desires for objects obstructs moral knowing. Although the desire for objects can obstruct moral knowing, moral knowing does not completely disappear. Just as clouds can obscure the sun, but the sun is still existent. As such, one must get rid of the private desires in one’s heart-mind so that one’s moral knowing can have the chance to manifest itself. This is called the “extension of moral knowing.” Since moral knowing needs “extension” (致) then the specific effort that goes into moral knowing cannot be lacking. As such, Wang Yangming proposed certain paths and methodologies for extending moral knowing. First among these is the preservation of heavenly principle and the elimination of human desire. Seeing as moral knowing can be obscured by selfish desire, then human desire must be eliminated

5 Chan

(1963: 76), modified. (1963: 220), modified. 7 Chan (1963: 216). 8 Chan (1963: 194). 6 Chan

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in order to return moral knowing to the clarity of heavenly principle. Second, selfexamination and self-mastery. As human beings are easily misled by selfish desire, thus, Before things happen, each and every selfish desire for sex, wealth, and fame must be discovered. The root of the trouble must be pulled up and thrown away so that it will never sprout again. Only then can we feel fine.9 (Part I, 39, Instructions for Practical Living). Third, the unity of knowledge and action. Wang Yangming: Knowledge is the direction for action and action is the effort of knowledge, and that knowledge is the beginning of action and action the completion of knowledge. If this is understood, then when only knowledge is mentioned, action is included, and when only action is mentioned, knowledge is included.10 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living). As such, knowledge and action cannot be separated into two separate affairs, to the extent that, “when a thought is aroused it is already action” (Part III, Instructions for Practical Living). It is for this reason that, If there is anything not good when the thought is aroused, one must overcome is non-good thought. One must go to the root and go to the bottom and not allow that non-good thought to lie latent in his breast.11 (Part III, Instructions for Practical Living)

It is in this way that one can fully eliminate selfish desires and moral knowing can flourish. Extending moral knowing is, therefore, a developmental process that starts from the root-body of moral knowing to its full functioning. It is also the process of eliminating selfish intentions and desires for objects so that the root-body of moral knowing can be restored. With the extension of knowledge as his basis, Wang Yangming opposed Zhu Xi’s methodology of extending knowing through the investigation of things in order to arrive at an intuitive understanding of heavenly principle, which in turn realizes a sagely character that “rests in the highest goodness.” Wang Yangming’s opposition to Zhu Xi rested on the fact that Zhu Xi’s method for arriving at virtue starts from the external and aims towards the internal and as such lacks any foundation for turning from the external to the internal. Wang Yangming, therefore, believes that this is “dividing the heart-mind and principle into two.” On this basis Wang Yangming give a new interpretation to the idea of “investigating things in order to extend knowledge.” He said, What I mean by the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge is to extend the moral knowing of my heart-mind to each and every thing. The moral knowing of my heart-mind is the same as the heavenly principle. When the heavenly principle in the moral knowing of my heart-mind is extended to all things, all things will attain their principle. To extend the moral knowing of my heart-mind is the matter of the extension of knowledge,

9 Chan

(1963: 35). (1963: 11). 11 Chan (1963: 201), modified. 10 Chan

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and for all things to attain their principle is the matter of the investigation of things.12 (Part II, Instructions for Practical Living)

Here, the moral knowing of my heart-mind is used as a starting point and extended outward, so that it arrives at all things; in this way knowledge is extended. The socalled investigation of things refers to how everything attains their principle; this principle being the heavenly principle, and is also the outward manifestation of the moral knowing of my heart-mind. As such, the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things is the process of overcoming selfishness and returning to principle so that moral knowing is externally manifested. In this way, Wang Yangming turned Zhu Xi’s external-to-internal “investigate things in order to extend knowledge” to an internal-to-external “extending knowledge so that all things attain their principle.” Wang Yangming thus united the heart-mind and principle which the school of principle had separated into two, and also avoided the gradualist, accumulative self-cultivation methods of Zhu Xi’s investigating things to exhaust principle. Effort is instead made directly on the heart-mind itself. In this way, a theoretical basis for the possibility of morality and becoming a sage was provided.

31.4 Four After Wang Yangming’s death, the school of Wang Yangming witnessed rapid fragmentation and many different opinions formed on the precise nature of Wang Yangming’s idea of “moral knowing.” We can take the views of Wang Ji (王畿), Wang Gen (王艮) and Wang Dong (王栋) as representative of these divisions. Wang Ji was the principal disciple of Wang Yangming. In Wang Yangming’s later years he formulated a “four verse teaching” (四句教) to express the main thesis of his ideas. This was: “In the form of the heart-mind there is no distinction of good and bad. When the will becomes active, however, such a distinction exists. The faculty of moral knowing is to know good and bad. The investigation of things is to do good and remove bad.” With regard to this, Wang Ji and another of Wang Yangming’s disciples, Qian Dehong (钱德洪), held different opinions. Wang Ji believed that since the heart-mind is without notions of good and bad, then the will (意) that arises from the heart-mind, the objects that are known by the will and knowledge, is also without notions of good or bad. This is why he says, If one understands that the heart-mind is without notions of good and bad, then the will is without notions of good and bad, then knowledge is without notions of good and bad, then objects are without good or bad. A heart-mind without notions of good and bad contains profound subtlety [藏密]. A will that is without notions of good and bad, in its response to things, is perfectly accommodating [圆]. Knowledge that is without notions of good and bad is still [体寂]. Knowing objects without notions of good and bad means that the function of the objects is numinous and hard to grasp [神]. (Account for Confirming the Way at the Tian-quan Bridge; Book 1, Collected Works of Wang Longxi) 12 Chan

(1963: 99).

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This is Wang Ji’s discourse of “four nothings” (四无). According to this discourse of “four nothings” moral knowing is already complete in itself and already perfect; it does not need any polishing and is already fully self-possessed. This is why Wang Ji says, Moral knowing does not depend on learning and deliberating. The ultimate aim of studying is to return moral knowing to an unlearned form. The ultimate aim of deliberation is to return it to an un-deliberated form. The real effort that resides in no effort is not added by having [effort]. Effort only seeks a daily diminution, not a daily increase. Once it is completely diminished, then one is a sage. (Biographies of the Zhezhong Disciples of Wang Yangming; Book 2 in Biographies of the Ming Confucians, Book 12)

What is meant by “effort only seeks a daily diminution” refers to how one should seek direct intuition of how the heart-mind is without notions of good and bad. One should need to seek to overcome bad thoughts through deliberate effort, as such the effort that goes into doing the good and eliminating the bad is superfluous. Qian Dehong, however, does not agree with Wang Ji’s “four nothings” view. He believed that the reason the heart-mind is without good and bad is because the heart-mind transcends the specific good and bad. The will, however, arises from the heart-mind and belongs to the “already arisen” and so contains good and bad. It is precisely because the will that has already arisen has good and bad that the effort of removing the bad is indispensable. With regard to their discussions, Wang Yangming said, The views of the two gentlemen are exactly complementary and are not mutually detrimental. You need the effort of Dehong whereas Dehong needs the root-body that you speak of. (Chronicle, 3)

This means that Wang Ji emphasizes intuition whereas Qian Dehong emphasizes cultivation, but this does not mean that the two are antithetical to each other, rather, they need each other. Wang Yangming, furthermore, repeatedly advised Wang Ji that his theory of “four nothings” should not be easily shown to the public as those who are easy to enlighten are few in number and energetic promotion of his sayings will result in the unwanted consequence of “empty words on root-body led to emptiness and stillness.” Wang Gen was the founder of the school of Taizhou (泰州). Although Wang Gen’s ideas on moral knowing are rooted in Wang Yangming’s philosophy, he advocated the view that moral knowing is already complete in itself, so that ultimately, he departed from Wang Yangming’s philosophy of moral knowing. Like Wang Yangming, Wang Gen believed that moral knowing is the heavenly principle so that moral knowing, and heavenly principle actually form a unity, but he put it in different terms. Wang Gen put particular emphasis on the idea that moral knowing is the natural flowing of moral knowing. At the same time, because moral knowing is the clear intelligence of human nature, moral knowing can spontaneously respond to the various changes in the external world. There is thus no need whatsoever for using wisdom or deliberation as a medial step. Moral knowing presents itself in just as lively a manner as birds and fish do and do not need human intervention. Even if bound by selfish desires, moral knowing possesses the capacity for dissolving this selfish desire.

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Addressing Wang Yangming’s idea of “extending moral knowing” (致良知), Wang Gen proposed the idea of “moral knowing’s extension” (良知致). This refers to the spontaneous self-manifestation of moral knowing, and is not adulterated by any artificial, human actions. As Wang Gen sees it, since moral knowing is already complete in itself and does not require any intervention, then why does one need to “extend” it? As such, “extending” is artificial human intervention that acts with will. From this, it can be seen that Wang Gen stresses the natural and spontaneous nature of moral knowing. Everyday actions such as eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty, wearing less and more clothes in summer and winter, having encounters with people and objects, are all manifestations of moral knowing. Moral knowing is thus spontaneously in accordance with nature (天然率性), is utterly without the need for cultivation and so does not need the effort of cultivation and examination. The fact that Wang Gen overly stressed that moral knowing is spontaneously in accordance with nature and so one can do without external restrictions for inspecting one’s heart-mind, however, resulted in the Taizhou school’s trend of giving way to excessive desires. Wang Gen’s kinsmen Wang Dong was a key figure of the Taizhou school. On the one hand, Wang Dong highly praised Wang Yangming’s views on moral knowing, on the other hand, however, Wang Dong put particular emphasis on the spontaneous nature of moral knowing. He believed that moral knowing was clear and complete in itself and so does not need cultivating. It does not need human artifice for it to return to clarity, what needs to be done is instead to “understand and recognize” (识认) moral knowing. As such, Wang Dong believes that the “extending” in Wang Yangming’s “extending moral knowledge” is redundant. He said, “with regard to moral knowing, the scholar only needs to understand and recognize it, this is enough, it does not need the additional word ‘extension’”. The so-called investigation of things in order to extend knowledge is also nothing else than understanding moral knowing itself. It is for this reason that one only needs an apprehension of the form of moral knowing and one does not need the specific effort of cultivating it in order to become a sage or a worthy person. Wang Ji, Wang Gen and Wang Dong’s view that moral knowing is already present resulted in the effort of self-cultivation being neglected. They believed that a correct understanding of the root-body of moral knowing itself was enough for entering into the realm of sagehood. This trend evolved into the rootless, unrestrained and shallow late-Ming phenomenon of scholars making non-sensical, groundless statements. The worry that Wang Yangming initially had for the “four nothings” discourse thus ultimately became reality. Due to Wang Ji and Wang Gen, Wang Yangming’s discourse of moral knowing became widespread, but it is also due to them that the discourse of moral knowing became a kind of unrestrained Chan Buddhism and gradually passed out of existence. By the time of Wang Gen’s own disciples, such was Yan Jun (颜均), He Xinyin (何心隐), Luo Rufang (罗汝芳), even more emphasis was placed on giving free rein to the emotion and doing what one desires. They saw all the efforts of cultivation as the root cause of hypocritical people. This meant that although human nature was greatly promoted, at the same time, the moral knowing that Wang Yangming advocated saw complete disintegration.

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References Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 32

Sage (shengren, 圣人)

“Sage” is an extremely important concept in Chinese philosophy; discussions in Confucianism, Daoism and Mohism have all revolved around this term. The ancient texts have explained “sage” as rui (睿) which means sagacious, sapient, percipient and farsighted and as tong (通) which means unimpeded access, passing through and going all the way (to the desired destination). In all, the term “sage” can be explained as “reaching in an unimpeded manner; percipient and wise” (通达睿智). The person that the sage refers to is someone who is above the common herd, of surpassing wisdom, and possessed of an ability to act in an unimpeded, far-reaching manner. In Chinese philosophy, what the sage represents contains two levels of meaning. First, it is the idealized character which the ancients sought to emulate; it is a value-orientation for self-improvement; this is the way of the “inner sage.” Second, it represents the model of the ideal sovereign, which reflects the pursuit after the ideal political model; this is the way of the “outer king.” Chinese philosophy’s investigation into the concept of the sage developed under this paradigm of “inner sage and outer king.” Apart from this, discussions about the sage also touched upon whether the sage is a product of nature or of latter-day cultivation.

32.1 One In the pre-Qin Confucian philosophy, on the one hand, the concept of the sage largely returned the content of “penetrating and perspicacious” (通达睿智), on the other hand, the concept was endowed with the content of an ideal morality and character. From this latter concept, an idea of the sage developed as a sovereign as a political actor. In the pre-Qin Confucian conception of a sage, there the inner sage and external king was united in one body. Confucius’s discussions of the sage in the Analects are not that numerous. Confucius believes that one is a sage if one is able to “extensively confer benefits on the people and is able to assist all” (Analects 6.30). Few, however, are capable of achieving this, as even enlightened sovereigns such as Yao and Shun were unable to © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_32

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achieve it. This is why although Confucius praised Yao, Shun and Ye’s great accomplishments, he never called them “sages.” From this we can see that for Confucius, being a sage is something to aim for, but which can never be attained. This is why he says, “a sage I will never get to meet, could I see a man of real talent and virtue, that would satisfy me” (Analects 7.26). Even in his own lifetime, however, there were already people who viewed him as a sage. A Prime Minister, for example, asked Zigong, “your master is a sage, is he not? How is it, then, that he is skilled at so many tasks?” Zigong replied, “surely, heaven not only intends him for sagehood, but also gave him many other talents.” (Analects 9.6) Confucius, however, rejected this idea that he was a sage. His definition of the sage as one who “extensively confer benefits on the people and is able to assist” is coherent with his advocacy of governance through virtue, and so the sage for Confucius is one who is an inner sage and an outer king. This idea was later developed upon by Mencius and Xunzi. On the basis of inheriting and continuing Confucius’s ideas, Mencius also gave a relatively comprehensive discussion of the sage. As compared with Confucius’s sparing words on the sage, Mencius explicitly classed Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, King Wen, King Wu and the Duke of Zhou as sages. All these sages are distinguished peoples among their societies and are the highest embodiments of morality. The sage not only extends virtues such as goodness and morality to their utmost but internalizes these virtues within themselves. Following this Mencius also categorized the sage into four types. “Bo Yi was a sage of purity; Yi Yin was a sage of responsibility; Liu-xia Hui was a sage of harmony; Confucius was a sage of timeliness.” (Mencius 5B1) In Mencius’s categorization, the sage of timeliness is the highest level and it is for this reason that “Confucius is called a complete symphony” (Mencius 5B1), and “since there have been humans, there never was another Confucius.” (Mencius 2A2) This not only greatly increased the scope of the sage but also confirmed Confucius’s position as a sage thereby allowing later generations to see Confucius as a sage and the uncrowned “sage king.” On the basis that all peoples are all endowed with the heart-mind of commiseration and compassion (恻隐), shame and disdain (羞恶), reverence and respect (恭敬), approval and disapproval (是非), and so capable of developing the “four sprouts” of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, Mencius believed that all human beings possess a moral nature. Once these sprouts of goodness are developed to their full extent, then one is a sage/worthy; all peoples can, therefore, become sages like Yao or Shun. Xunzi similarly discussed the sage from the perspective of the union of the sage and the king. Xunzi believed that the sage and the king have different occupational capacities. The role of the sage is in understanding morality and transforming the people through education, whereas the role of the king is in establishing rules and laws and governing the people. In Xunzi’s philosophy, however, the sage and the king are united and so there arises the concept of the sage-king, which is comprised of the following dimensions. First, the sage is someone of perfect morality. Xunzi says, “the sage is the ultimate in the way” (“Discourse on Ritual”) and the main content of dao are the moral regulations of ritual propriety, righteousness, deference, loyalty and trustworthiness. That the sage reaches the ultimate of ritual propriety is because they are a paradigm

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for respecting moral regulations such as ritual propriety. Looked at from significance its root source, ritual propriety was produced by the sage on the basis of the fact that people’s natures are bad. Xunzi believes that by nature, humans wish for profit and have many desires. If one merely followed these biological desires and did not provide guidance, then there will be many conflicts between peoples. It is for this reason that the sages instituted rituals so that people can be restrained through these rituals and morals and transformed through this education. This is “the sage transforms nature and establishes deliberate effort.” Following this, the sage is comprehensively knowing and there is nothing that he cannot do. The sage is endowed with the characters of utmost strength, discernment and clarity. It is only the sage that is fit to be named a king and to govern and order the world. It is because the sage possesses these abilities that “as for the world, its size is supremely great. Nobody except a sage is able to possess it.” (“Correct Judgments”) Following this, Xunzi believed that one can become a sage through correct education. He believed that the sages “were not born perfect. They began by changing their original substance and perfected themselves through cultivation.”1 (“On Honour and Disgrace”) Specifically speaking, being “humaneness, righteousness, lawfulness, and correctness” is the content of becoming a sage. Humaneness, righteousness, lawfulness and correctness are things that can all be known and can be carried out. As all peoples have the capacity for possessing these qualities, all peoples can become sages. It is for this reason that, “If ordinary men in the street and the common people accumulate goodness and make it whole and complete, they are called sages. […] So, the sage is the product of people’s accumulated efforts.”2 (“The Achievements of Ru”) Xunzi, therefore, believed that all peoples can becomes sages, “anyone on the streets can become a [sage] Yu” (“Human Nature is Bad”), “If you accumulate enough goodness to achieve virtue, then you will naturally attain to spirit-like powers and enlightenment, and the heart of a sage is complete”3 (“Exhortation to Learning”).

32.2 Two In the Daodejing, the founder of Daoism, Laozi, talked about the sage a total of thirty times. From this we can see that the sage occupies a very important position in his philosophy. In Laozi’s philosophy, the sage is someone who manifests the dao and is endowed with deep sagacity, “sages know without going anywhere out of the ordinary, understand clearly without seeing anything out of the ordinary, and get things done without doing anything out of the ordinary.”4 (Daodejing 47) In carrying out affairs, the sage does not go to extremes, “it is for this reason that the sages eschew the excessive, the superlative, and the extravagant.” (Daodejing 29) At 1 Hutton

(2014: 28). (2014: 65–66). 3 Hutton (2014: 3). 4 Hall and Ames (2003: 150). 2 Hutton

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the same time the sage is also a sage-king who orders the state and the people and emulates the great dao so as to order the world. As the “dao models itself on self-so,” in his governance of the state, the sage acts in a non-purposive way. Non-purposive action is the most characteristic aspect of sagely governance. In their governance of the state, the sage takes the people as the starting point of action. It is for this reason that “the sage is always skillful at saving men, and so he does not cast away any man; he is always skillful at saving things, and so he does not cast away anything.” (Daodejing 27) In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, Zhuangzi vigorously criticized the sage, as described by Confucianism, who instituted rituals and music. Taking “dao models itself on selfso” as the basis of his philosophy, Zhuangzi believed that the original, spontaneous human nature is the highest good. The sages’ institution of rituals and music for regulating human actions is conversely a destruction of human nature’s original, spontaneous nature. Zhuangzi believes that, The people stayed at home without knowing what they were doing, ventured out without knowing where they were going. Filling their mouths they were merry, drumming their bellies they amused themselves. This was the extent of the people’s abilities.5 (“Horses’ Hooves” Zhuangzi)

With the arrival of the sages, however, this completely natural state was utterly changed, Then came along the sage, bending and twisting over ritual and music to reform the bodies of the world, dangling Humaneness and Righteousness overhead ‘to comfort the hearts of everyone in the world.’ Only then did the people begin groping on tiptoe in their eagerness for knowledge. From there it was inevitable that they would end up struggling for profit and advantage above all. And this, all this, is really the fault of the sages. (ibid.)

What is even more tragic is that the so-called ways of the sage’s wisdom were not only incapable of guarding against disasters but became the tools of criminals of the state in seeking after their own interests. It is based on this alienation of the rites and music that Zhuangzi laments, “Hence, only when sagacity is destroyed and wisdom abandoned will the great robbers disappear”, “only when we decimate the sagely laws throughout the world will the people be able to listen to reason”, “humaneness and righteousness seized and thrown aside, the virtue of all men would begin to display its mysterious excellence.” (“Cutting Open Satchels” Zhuangzi) On the basis of criticizing the Confucian view of the sage, Zhuangzi proposed sagely characteristics which intuitively comprised knowing the great dao, paying attention to spiritual freedom, and is transcendent of this vulgar world. He said, “to regard heaven as his source, virtuosity as his root, and the dao as his gate, alive to the portents of every transformation, is called a sage.” (“The World Under Heaven” Zhuangzi) The sage dissolves into a union with heaven and earth, his spirit is transcendent of this world and accords with what is spontaneously so. The reason why the sage’s spirit is transcending is because he attains a spiritual level of “no sense of self”, “no particular merit” and “no name.” It is because the sage has no sense of 5 Ziporyn

(2009: 62).

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self, no particular merit and no name that he attains an absolute spiritual freedom of “not eating any of the five grains, but inhaling instead the wind and drinking the dew; mounting on the clouds, driving along the flying dragons, rambling and enjoying oneself beyond the four seas.” (“Wandering Far and Unfettered” Zhuangzi) As the sage is one with the dao and resides in the centre of the flowing and transformations of the universe, the sage “is hidden in the heavenly constitution, and therefore nothing can injure him.” (“The Full Understanding of Life” Zhuangzi) With regard to all changes, even death, the sage follows the natural course of things, The life of the sage is [like] the action of heaven; and his death is the transformation of [all] things. In his stillness his virtue is the same as that of yin, and in his movement his diffusiveness is like that yang. He does not take the initiative in producing either happiness or calamity. He responds to what acts on him, and moves as he feels the pressure. He rises to act only when he absolutely has to. He discards wisdom and the memories of the past; he follows the lines of his heaven [-given nature]; […] His life seems to be a floating; his death seems to be a resting. (“Ingrained Ideas” Zhuangzi)

This is why the sage transcends the changes of life and death. From this we can see that the character of the sage which Zhuangzi advocated was a spirit which escaped the vulgar world.

32.3 Three The Mohists also paid attention to the sage. In Mohist thought, the sage and the king was also united and so Mozi called him “sage-king” (圣王). Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, King Wen, King Wu and Duke of Zhou were all considered as sage-kings by Mozi. The likes of Jizi (箕子) and Weizi (微字) were also considered as sages. Mozi believed that the sage possessed an extremely high moral quality. The values that Mozi promoted, universal love, the will of heaven, understanding the ghosts and spirits, promoting the worthy and economizing on expenditures, can all be seen in the person of the sage. The most important quality of the sage was that he makes all under heaven practice “universal love and mutual aid” as universal aid is “what gives peace to the rulers and sustenance to the people.” (“Universal Love III” Mozi) As such, universal love is the way of the sage-king. Through understanding what the ghosts and spirits want, the sage-king can also allow all under heaven to profit and do away with the harm in the world. With regard to the employment of people, the sage takes his law from heaven and takes promoting the worthy as his root. Mozi says, “the sage-kings in exalting the virtuous and employing the capable in government were following the ways of Heaven.”6 (“Promoting the Worthy II” Mozi) He also said, “in administering the government, the sage-kings ranked the morally excellent high and exalted the virtuous.” (“Promoting the Worthy Part I” Mozi) Apart from this, Mozi put particular emphasis on the sage-king’s virtue of being economical, he 6 Translated by W. P. Mei, https://ctext.org/mozi/exaltation-of-the-virtuous-ii. Throughout this trans-

lation, I have benefitted from W. P. Mei’s translation of the Mozi and often based my own on this version.

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believed that this economical attitude can be seen in the sage-king’s own practice with regard to food, clothing and abode.

32.4 Four During the Han-Wei period, it was the dominant fashion to discuss the sage according to his material substance (材质). The Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion, for example, believed that sages such as Fuxi, Huangdi, Di Ku, Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, Duke of Zhou and Confucius all possessed distinctive appearances. The idea was that their distinctive appearances were endowments of heaven’s command, and this meant that in determining a person’s character, emphasis was placed on their congenital qualities and had nothing to do with latter-day learning. This idea that sagehood cannot be learned is antithetical to Mencius and Xunzi’s views that sageliness can be learned. Liu Shao believed that “the mean harmony [中和] is the best material quality [质量] for people to be endowed with” (“The Nine Manifestations” About Human Character) “Material quality” refers to the natural qualities that people are endowed with and the “mean harmony” refers to how the five phases of metal, wood, water, fire and soil do not incline to extremes but rather arrive at a pure and harmonious balance. It is only the sage that possesses the material quality of the mean harmony. Apart from this, the sage is also in possession of an intelligent nature, and his intelligence is due to the endowment of the pure and clear qi of yin and yang. That the sage is of a mean harmony and that he has an intelligent nature are all determined by qi-endowment and has nothing to do with latter-day practice. During the initial phases of Wei-Jin Neo-Confucianism, the distinction between being and non-being was a central question for Neo-Daoism and discussions on the sage were also imbued with the colours of Neo-Daoism. This is most clearly seen in the discussions of who among Confucius and Laozi was really a sage and whether the sage has emotions or not. The view that Confucius was a sage and Laozi not a sage was a relatively widespread opinion before the Wei-Jin period. He Yan (何晏), however, believed that Laozi and Confucius were the same; they were both sages. Wang Bi, however, endowed Confucius with the state of “embodying non-being” (体无) but that Laozi did not reach the level of the sage (老不及圣). Apart from this, the likes of He Yan also believed that the sage is without joy, anger, sorrow and happiness and promoted the idea that the sage is without emotions. Wang Bi, on the other hand, promoted the idea that the sages do have emotions: He believed that the sage surpasses the common people in his spirit-like perspicacity, but he is the same as everyone in having the five emotions. Because of his deep spirit-like perspicacity, he is thus able to embody harmony and reach the state of not having anything. Because he shares the same five emotions, he cannot but have sorrow and joy in response to phenomena. However, although the affective capacity of the sage responds to things, he is not burdened by them.7 (Biography of Wang Bi) 7 Chan

(2008: 124), modified.

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Wang Bi believed that like everyone else Confucius had emotions, and thus could not respond to phenomena without sorrow and joy. At the same time, however, Confucius had a surpassing spirit-like perspicacity and so was able to “embody harmony and reach the state of non-being.” “Embodying non-being” and “embodying harmony and reach the state of non-being” are all Daoist ideals, for Wang Bi therefore, Confucius embodied both Confucian and Daoist ideals. At the hands of Neo-Daoism, Confucius had thus been transformed into a sage. Although there were differences in He Yan and Wang Bi’s views on the sage, both manifested the Neo-Daoist demand for inter-fusing Confucianism and Daoism. Taking on the demands of the zeitgeist for combining Confucianism and Daoism, Guo Xiang, through discussions of the character of the sage, combined Confucianism and Daoism in theory. Guo Xiang believed that the sage is a “spiritlike person” (神人) He said, “the spirit-like person is the sage. The sage refers to his external aspect and spirit-like refers to his internal aspect.” (“External Things”, Commentary on the Zhuangzi) The sage possesses the virtue of having no heart-mind and thus following the myriad things. Having no heart-mind refers to the aspect of the sage that transcends all things, and following the myriad things refers to the aspect of the sage that has his feet firmly within this world. Guo Xiang also says: “Although the sage finds himself in the halls of ritual and government, his heart-mind is not different from when he is surrounded by mountains and trees.” (“Wandering Far and Unfettered”, Commentary on the Zhuangzi) Although the sage resides among the halls of ritual and government and uses the Confucian moral code to order society, his heart-mind is actually outside of the mundane, human world itself and among the mountains and trees. As such, although the sage resides within the mundane, human world, he is not fettered and dragged down by this world. The sage’s external actions and his internal spirit is united. His external actions are coherent with his internal aspect. His internal aspect is manifested externally. As such, inner sage and outer king, transcending the world and being in the mundane world, purposive action and non-purposive action, the Confucian moral codes and self-so are not antithetical to each other but can be combined and inter-fused. Guo Xiang’s view of the sage provided many perspectives for the inter-penetration of Confucianism and Daoism. Out of a sense of duty for inheriting and continuing the Confucian lineage (道 统), Han Yu saw the sage as the “people’s sovereign and the people’s teacher.” He believed that the sage arose due to there being “many dangers that threatened people in antiquity.” In all aspects of life, the sage had a guiding function, for example, he Drove away the snakes, insects, birds and beasts and settled the people in the central plains. When the weather was cold, they taught the people to produce clothing. When the people were hungry, they taught them to farm. As it was easy to fall down when resting in the trees and it was easy to become ill, thereupon they taught them to build houses. (“Origin of the Way”)

According to the needs of society, the sage will produce instruments, increase the flow of goods, and institute ritual, music and punishment for society. The sage saw the deception that existed between people and “invented the seal, weighing instruments, and the scales in order to ensure trustworthiness.” The sage saw the conflict between

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them and “invented moat, armour, and weaponry to guard the city. When danger arrived, he instituted defences and when they were about to happen, he made prior preparations.” It is precisely because of the importance of the sage for society that Han Yu disagreed with the fierce criticism that Zhuangzi had for the Confucian sage. As Han Yu saw it, the sage had an integral role for society, “if there were no sages in antiquity, then humanity would have long ago perished. Why is this? Because humans do not have feathers, fur, scales or shells to bear against the heat and cold, and they do not have sharp claws and teeth to fight for food.” (“Origins of the Way”)

32.5 Five Before the Song dynasty, “sage” was often discussed in connection with “king” and sage generally had the meaning of “sage-king.” In Song-Ming Daoism, although the sense of sage as sage-king still existed, it was already not as strong as in previous eras. What was particularly prominent was the Song-Ming development of the sage in the direction of human and moral character; the sage had already been completely moralized. Apart from this, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism inherited the Mencian and Xunzi-an view that sagehood could be arrived at through study and effort, and so all philosophers of this period believed that it was possible to become a sage through learning. The founder of Neo-Confucianism, Zhou Dunyi combined the sage with “sincerity” and believed that the sage possesses the virtues of “sincerity [诚], spirit [神] and subtle incipient activation [几]” and the ability to observe minute changes. The state of absolute quiet and inactivity is sincerity. The spirit is that which, when acted on, immediately penetrates all things. And the state of subtle incipient activation is the undifferentiated state between being and non-being when activity has started but has not manifested itself in physical form. Sincerity is infinitely pure and hence evident. The spirit is responsive and hence works wonders. And incipient activation is subtle and hence abstruse. The sage is one who is in the state of sincerity, spirit, and subtle incipient activation.8 (“Sagehood”, Penetrating the Book of Changes)

Within sincerity, spirit and subtle incipient activation, it is sincerity that is the basic nature of the sage, and this shows the moral nature of the sage. The sage also shoulders the mission of transforming the people through moral education in humaneness and righteousness, and in this sense, the sage in united with the king. Apart from this, Zhou Dunyi explicitly affirmed that the sage can be learned and the root method for learning to become a sage is to be without desire. Zhou Dunyi said, “Question: can sagehood be learnt? Answer: Yes. Question: is there a key kernel? Answer: Yes. Question: What is it? Question: I beg to hear them. Answer: To be unified is essential. To be unified is to have no desire.” (“Learning to be a Sage”, Penetrating the Book of Changes) 8 Chan

(1969: 467), modified.

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“Heavenly Principle” (天理) was the heart of the Cheng brothers’ philosophy. In their description of the sage, the Cheng brothers proposed the key idea that the “sage is one with principle.” They said, “they sage is one with principle, thus he never exceeds and is never not reaching, he hits the mark [the mean] and that is all.” They also said, the way of the sage does not differentiate between the refined and the coarse, from household chores and greeting guests to investigating the nature and reasons to the utmost inscrutability and spirit-like, it is the same principle that pervades them all.” (Book 15, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs)

The Cheng brothers believed that, in appearance and substance, the sage was no different from normal people, and as such, sagehood can be learned. The point of learning is ultimately to cultivate the state of the sagehood and during the process of learning to become a sage, one must be “controlled by reverence” (主敬) and one must “extend one’s knowledge” (致知). One must continuously strengthen one’s spirit so as to nourish and cultivate one’s moral nature; in this way, one can ultimately arrive at the state of the sage. “All peoples belong to the same kind […] Mostly, they require a continuous self-strengthening and then they can reach the domain of sagehood, and their qi-aspect [气貌] will naturally change.” (Book 22, Surviving Works of the Two Chengs) Zhang Zai also paid great attention to the character of the sage, he said, “one must not cease learning until one has become a sage.” (“Biography of Zhang Zai” History of the Song) Zhang Zai’s exploration of the sage is intimately connected with his discussions of human nature. Zhang Zai believed that human nature is distinguished between the human nature bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) and the human nature of material qi (气质之性). The former is rooted in heaven and earth and is of utmost goodness. The latter is rooted in the material that constitutes the myriad things—qi—and is manifested as hard and yielding, slow and fast, pure and muddy and is distinguished between the good and the bad. Within the human nature of material qi, the parts that are bad can obscure the purely good human nature bestowed by heaven and earth. Becoming a sage thus involves getting rid of the bad parts in one’s qi-quality, so that the good parts can be extended and one’s human nature bestowed by heaven and earth can be manifested. This is called “the realization of one’s nature” (成性) and what is involved in becoming a sage is precisely “realizing one’s nature.” At the same time Zhang Zai also proposed that there are many dimensions to becoming a sage. First, “manifesting one aspect of the nature of heaven and earth to realize human nature” (一节而成性). This means that, The manifestation of the nature of heaven and earth is becoming a sage. Just like how Bo Yi [伯夷] was pure and lofty, Liu Xiahui [柳下惠] was gentle and yielding, one does not need manifest every excellent quality. Just as Bo Yi and Liu Xiahui, for example, only manifested one aspect of the nature of heaven and earth and were able to realise human nature. (Part I, Hengqu Discussions on the Book of Change)

Second, “completely transforming the bad aspect of one’s qi-quality” (于大以成性). Purity and harmony are just one aspect of human nature. If one can completely get rid of the bad part of one’s qi-quality (气质) and thus fully manifest one’s human

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nature bestowed by heaven and earth, then this is “completely transforming the bad aspect of one’s qi-quality.” This means being one with heaven and earth, and this is the perfect moral state of a union of humaneness and wisdom. Zhu Xi discussed the sage from the perspective of innate ability and intelligence, educative transformation and moral cultivation. As Zhu Xi sees it, the sage combines innate ability, accomplishments and morality. First, the sage possesses an extremely high ability and intelligence, there is nothing that he does not know and cannot do. Following this, the sage has the air and manner of a king and so cultivates himself and establishes education in order to educatively transform the common people. In this sense, the sage is one who institutes education on behalf of heaven. Next, although Zhu Xi believed that having many abilities and competencies is the key sign of the sage, the key reason why a sage is a sage lies in morality, and he must be in possession, without the slightest lack, of all the good virtues. Zhu Xi also approached the sage from the perspective of “preserving heavenly li” and “extinguishing human desire,” and believed the sage is the manifestation of heavenly li. Heavenly li and human desire thus also became a root difference between the sage and the common person. As Zhu Xi believed the li (理) that is the dao above physical form is manifested in the vessel (器) that is below physical form, he promoted the epistemological method of “investigating things in order to extend knowledge” (格物致知). This method also became the method of becoming a sage. This way of seeking to become a sage through seeking after the external was opposed by his contemporary Lu Jiuyuan who ridiculed it as “obscure and fragmented teachings” (支离事业). This antagonism between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan demonstrated the opposition and division between the school of li, represented by Zhu Xi, and the school of heart-mind, represented by Lu Jiuyuan. Although there were scholarly differences between the school of li and the school of heart-mind, they all discussed the character of the sage from the perspective of everyday human relationships, heavenly li and human desire, both also believed that one can learn to become a sage. This is their point of similarity. Lu Jiuyuan, for example, said, “the sage’s education of the common people starts from the everyday.” (Part III, Recorded Conversation of Xiangshan) Lu Jiuyuan also started from the school of heart-mind assumption that “human beings are alike with regard to this heart-mind, and the heart-mind is alike with regard to this li” and believed that sagehood can be learned, “the sage is of the same kind as me, who can say that our heart-minds and li are not the same? (Book 13, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan) The person who brought the school of heart-mind to its maturity was Wang Yangming and his discussion of the sage was also based on the perspective of heavenly li and human desire. He said, “The reason the sage has become a sage is that his heart-mind has become completely identified with the heavenly li and is no longer mixed with any impurity of selfish human desires.”9 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living) Wang Yangming analogises this to gold. The sage becomes a sage because he is only heavenly li and without any admixture of human desire, in the same way that pure gold is pure gold because it is not mixed with copper or led. With regard to the degree of their abilities, although there are some differences that exist between sages, 9 Chan

(1963: 60), modified.

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there is not an essential difference. The degree of their abilities is akin to the weight of gold, but it does not qualitatively affect the nature of the gold. As such, learning to become a sage must happen through purifying one’s heavenly li, and not in putting effort into increasing one’s abilities, as this would be tantamount to not refining the quality of gold in terms of its purity but in putting attention to increasing its quantity. The result is that one “throws in mixed elements of pewter, lead, brass, and iron with the result that the greater the quantity, the lower the degree of purity. In the end it is no longer gold at all.”10 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living) It is for this reason that in order to become a sage one must “preserve heavenly li and extinguish human desire.” In this, Wang Yangming’s view is no different from the Cheng-Zhu school of li. Following this, on the basis of the school of heart-mind assumption that all peoples possess moral knowing (良知), he believed that one could learn to become a sage as “one’s moral knowing is originally the same as that of the sage. If I personally realize my own moral knowing with clarity, it means that the feelings and dispositions of the sage are not with the sage but with me.”11 (Part II, Instructions for Practical Living) The specific effort that goes into becoming a sage lies in restoring the heavenly li that the heart-mind originally possesses, “Therefore, even an ordinary person, if he is willing to learn so as to enable his heart-mind to become completely identified with the heavenly li, can also become a sage.”12 (Part I, Instructions for Practical Living) This is the so-called “extending moral knowing” (致良知). It is for this reason that Wang Yangming opposes Zhu Xi’s view of investigating things in order to extend knowledge. He believed instead that, there is really nothing in the things in the world to investigate, that the effort to investigate things is only to be carried out in and with reference to one’s body and heart-mind, and that if one firmly believes that everyone can become a sage, one will naturally be able to take up the task of investigating things.13 (Part III, Instructions for Practical Living)

What the school of li and school of heart-mind advocated leaned to the “inner sage” character of the sage and was met with criticism during the end of the Ming dynasty. The school of “practical learning” (实学) philosopher Yan Yuan, for example, said, If one learns in order to accomplish one thing well, then it is useful, then one is of the highest class of sages and worthies. If we look at the five ministers of Yu Ting (虞廷), they each had one undertaking which did not change during their entire lives, and in a certain regard, they were sages. The many disciples of Confucius all had but one undertaking; there was no need for them to be multi-talented, and they were still considered worthies. The three outstanding heroes of the Han each had one undertaking, there never performed more than one duty and were still considered excellent among men. (Book III, Biography of Xizhai)

This implies that the sage is not necessarily as the school of li or the school of heartmind described, that is, a person of perfected morality. They were instead proficient in one particular area and did not emptily discourse on morality and human nature 10 Chan

(1963: 62). (1963: 127), modified. 12 Chan (1963: 61), modified. 13 Chan (1963: 249). 11 Chan

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but were instead practical people who attached importance to pragmatic functionality. Yan Yuan’s definition of the sage is a direct reflection of his advocacy of his philosophy of practical learning (实学). After this, philosophical discussions about the sage gradually broke free from the one-dimensional way of thinking of the SongMing period in which the sage was defined from his moral character. Discussions gradually tended instead towards many different directions such as establishing great accomplishments or expounding their ideas through writing. In summary of the above discussion of the development of the idea of the sage in Chinese philosophy, we can see that the concept of the sage began as the sage of a sage-king and developed towards the sage of idealized personal qualities. In general, before the Song dynasty, what the sage represented was the sage king who governed state and ordered the people. From the Song onwards, the concept of the sage gradually transformed into an idealized personal character with an emphasis on moral self-cultivation. At the same time, the personality of the sage experienced a change from one of equal emphasis on both moral self-cultivation and the external management of affairs of the king towards one in which only emphasized selfcultivation. Although there were philosophers in the later Ming and early Qing period who emphasized the aspect of the sage who accomplished tasks, it did not create a big impact.

References Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. 2003. Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1963. Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chan, Alan. “Do Sages Have Emotions?” Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVII. Edited by Vincent Shen and Kwong-loi Shun. Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ziporyn, Brook. 2009. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.

Chapter 33

Exemplary Person ( junzi, 君子)

In Chinese philosophy, exemplary person represents an ideal personality. Discussions of this idea is extremely widespread and can be found in Confucian, Mohist, Daoist and legalists philosophies. Even to this day, the personality that the exemplary person represents, and the desire to emulate this personality, effects and guides people’s moral behaviour and their conduct of affairs.

33.1 One The term “junzi” had already made an appearance in the Book of Documents and in its original sense referred to someone with a high social status. In the Zhou dynasty at least, the term junzi was already making its appearance with great frequency. Later, in the Book of Odes, junzi was also very widely employed but was used in a greater variety of ways. In its first sense, it was used in its original sense, referring to someone who occupied a ruling position or an aristocrat. In its second sense, it referred to all men. Apart from this, there appeared in the Book of Odes a concept of the junzi as someone who possessed morality or moral qualities, and thus referred to a moral person or someone of high morals. The junzi in this third moral sense appears often in the Book of Changes. The “Commentary on the Images” for the Qian hexagram, for example, is “The action of heaven is strong and dynamic. In the same manner, the junzi never ceases to strengthen himself.”1 The “Commentary on the Images” for the Kun hexagram, for example, is “Here is the basic disposition of Earth: this constitutes the image of Kun. In the same manner, the junzi with his generous virtue carries everything.”2 Here, it is said that the junzi models himself on heaven and earth and possesses the virtue of ceaseless self-strengthening and carrying all things. The “Commentary on the Images” for the Xian (reciprocity) hexagram, for example, is “the junzi receives others with self-effacement.” This means that the 1 Lynn

(1994: 130), modified. (1994: 144), modified. © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_33

2 Lynn

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junzi is broad-spirited and all-embracing like an empty valley. The “Commentary on the Words of the Text” (文言) for the Kun hexagram, for example, is “The junzi keeps his outer life square by means of righteousness. With the establishment of reverence and righteousness, one keeps one’s virtue free from isolation.”3 The “Commentary on the Images” for the Dazhuang (great strength) hexagram, for example, is, “the junzi will not tread any course that is not commensurate with ritual propriety.” This means that the junzi uses reverence, righteousness and ritual propriety to establish his moral actions, carry out affairs and regulates both the internal and the external. From the above we can see that by the Zhou dynasty, the concept of the junzi was already widely used. The concept of the junzi in the moral sense, through Confucius’s forceful promotion, became the very definition of an ideal personal character in Chinese philosophy. In Confucius’s philosophy, junzi sometimes refers to one who occupied a ruling position, for example, “the virtue of a junzi is like the wind, and the virtue of the petty person is like the grass” (Analects 12.19). Sometimes the term is used exclusively to refer to people’s moral qualities, for example, “Of course the junzi encounters hardship. The difference is that the petty man, encountering hardship, is overwhelmed by it.” (Analects 15.2) In Confucius’s discussions of the junzi, it is the latter sense that is more prevalent, we will, therefore, focus on this latter sense of the junzi. First, the junzi possesses qualities such as humaneness, righteousness, wisdom, courage, modesty, loyalty and trustworthiness. Humaneness is the heart of Confucius’s philosophy; Confucius believes that humaneness is one of the most important moral qualities of the junzi, and that under no circumstances can he depart from the virtue of humaneness. Confucius said, “If the junzi abandons humaneness, how can he merit the name? The junzi does not go against humaneness even for the amount of time required to finish a meal. Even in times of urgency or distress, he necessarily accords with it.” (Analects 4.5) The other moral qualities are also important contents of the junzi’s morality, for example, “with regard to the world, the junzi has no predispositions for or against anything. He will follow what is righteous.” (Analects 4.10) “The gentleman understands righteousness.” (Analects 4.16) “Wealth and social eminence are things that all people desire, and yet unless they are acquired in the proper way, the junzi will not abide them. Poverty and disgrace are things that all people hate, and yet unless they are avoided in the proper way, the junzi will not despise them. (Analects 4.5) Here the proper way refers to “righteousness” and means that the junzi takes righteousness as the standard for acting. Confucius also says, “The way of the junzi is threefold, […] “the humane do not worry, the wise are not confused and the courageous do not fear.” (Analects 14.28) Here, Confucius is of the opinion that the junzi possesses the three virtues of humaneness, wisdom and courage. He also said, “The junzi takes righteousness as his substance, puts it into practice by means of ritual, gives it expression through modesty, and perfects it by being trustworthy.” (Analects 15.18) Here, it is meant that ritual propriety, modesty and trustworthiness are important qualities of the junzi. Apart from this, the junzi also needs to “let his actions be governed by loyalty and trustworthiness” (Analects 1.8). The junzi also 3 Lynn

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needs to be “benevolent [惠] without being wasteful, impose labour upon the people without incurring their resentment, desire without being covetous, grand without being arrogant, and awe-inspiring without being severe.” (Analects 20.2) These ae all discussions of the virtues of the junzi. Second, the junzi is fond of studying and being a person of action. Confucius says, The gentleman is not motivated by the desire for a full belly or a comfortable abode. He is simply scrupulous in behaviour and careful in speech, drawing near to those who possess the way in order to be set straight by them. Surely this and nothing else is what it means to love learning. (Analects 1.14)

The desire to learn is one of the key characteristics of the junzi. Apart from a great willingness to learn, the junzi is also careful about being of few words but diligent in action. The junzi “acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his actions.” (Analects 2.13) “The junzi wishes to be slow to speak, but quick to act.” (Analects 4.24) “The junzi is ashamed to have his words exceed his actions.” (Analects 14.27). Third, via a comparison between the junzi and the petty person, the junzi’s virtues are made more prominent. There are many instances of a comparison between the junzi and the petty person in the Analects. Confucius believes that the difference between the junzi and the petty person lies in the fact that they hold different views towards life and seek after different things; from their juxtaposition, one can better understand the virtue of the junzi. The junzi acts according to righteousness and so he is magnanimous and broad-minded, whereas the petty person acts according to the seeking after profit, and so he is often weighed down by distress. The junzi is sociable and not partisan nor forms cliques for selfish interests, whereas the opposite is true of the petty person. The junzi has peace of mind and is not proud whereas the opposite describes the petty person. The junzi, in encountering non-optimal affairs, self-critiques whereas when the petty person encounters affairs resents heaven and blames others. The junzi looks at the bigger picture, is enlightened about righteousness on a global scale, and puts the upright way into practice. The petty person is only able to parochially understand the rules of his locale and has no shame or limits when seeking after personal gain. Through this juxtaposition between the qualities of the junzi and the petty person, the singularity and value of the junzi’s virtues become even more prominent. Fourth, in everything, the junzi has the most stringent demands on himself. Confucius believes that apart from self-cultivation, the junzi needs to make strict demands on himself. With regard to this, Confucius proposed the standards of “three things to guard against”, “three things to stand in awe of” and “nine subjects of thoughtful consideration.” With regard to the “three things to guard against” Confucius says, There are three things which the junzi guards against. In youth, when the physical powers are not yet settled, he guards against lust. When he is strong and the physical powers are full of vigor, he guards against quarrelsomeness. When he is old, and the animal powers are decayed, he guards against covetousness.” (Analects 16.7)

In this, Confucius is bringing to attention the things that the junzi must watch out for in the three different stages of life. With regard to the three things to stand in awe of,

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Confucius says, “There are three things of which the junzi stands in awe. He stands in awe of the heaven’s mandate. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of the words of sages.” (Analects 16.8) Here, from three perspectives, it is proposed that the sage should be reverent in his conduct of affairs and guard against becoming wild and unrestrained. With regard to the nine subjects of thoughtful consideration, Confucius says, The junzi has nine things which are subjects that concern him. In regard to the use of his eyes, he is concerned to see clearly. In regard to the use of his ears, he is concerned to hear distinctly. In regard to his countenance, he is concerned that it should be benign. In regard to his demeanor, he is concerned that it should be respectful. In regard to his speech, he is concerned that it should be sincere. In regard to his doing of business, he is concerned that it should be reverently careful. In regard to what he doubts about, he is concerned to question others. When he is angry, he thinks of the potential negative consequences of his anger. When he sees gain to be got, he thinks of righteousness. (Analects 16.10)

Here, from nine different aspects, the junzi is reminded of needing to be constantly vigilant and careful in his conduct of affairs and so to relentlessly place stringent demands on himself. In Mencius’s thought, the junzi sometimes also refers to the one who occupies a ruling position, but in Mencius’s discussions it more often refers to the person of moral quality. In general, the junzi is comprised of the following dimensions. (1), the junzi pays great attention to his own moral cultivation and is possessed of moral qualities such as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Mencius believes that humaneness is the common quality among junzi and that not only is he himself in possession of humaneness, when he assists a ruler in the governance of a country, but he must also guide the ruler in carrying out humane governance. The junzi differs from the average person in that he carries out humaneness and preserves humaneness and ritual propriety in his heart-mind. It is for this reason that the junzi loves and respects others and is loved and respected in return. As Mencius sees it, righteousness is the way of acting and ritual propriety is the door through which one enters and exits. It is only the junzi who acts through righteousness and ritual propriety as the junzi pays great attention to his own self-cultivation and so if moral qualities such as humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are deeply rooted in him then they will overflow in his speech and manners. (2) Following this, the junzi treats others with kindness, does not hide his own trespasses and corrects himself once he knows that he has been in error. (3) Next, there are three things in which the junzi takes delight and fives ways in which he affects his teachings. The first of the three delights is, “that his father and mother are both alive, and that the condition of his brothers affords no cause for anxiety; this is one delight.” This means that the junzi puts great store by filial piety and respect for the elder brother. The second, “that, when looking up, he has no occasion for shame before Heaven, and, below, he has no occasion to blush before men; this is a second delight.” This means that the junzi is magnanimous and broad-minded. The third, “that he can get from the whole kingdom the most talented individuals and teach and nourish them.” (Mencius 7A20) This means that the junzi takes cultivating talents as a personal mission. The fives ways in which he effects his teachings refer to the five ways in which the junzi

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educates people. Sometimes the junzi’s teachings are like the seasonable rain which imperceptibly nourishes things, sometimes it perfects people’s moral, sometimes he assists in the development of people’s talents, sometimes he answers people’s queries and sometimes he leaves behind lessons for later generations to learn from on their own. (4) Mencius also proposed the standards of three situations for taking and leaving office. First, They took office if they were invited with the utmost reverence and ritual, and were told that their teachings would be put into effect. But if their teachings were not put into effect, then even if there were no decline in propriety, they would leave office.

From this we can see that the junzi values very highly whether the ideals he promotes can be put into practice or not. Second, they took office if they were invited with the utmost reverence and ritual, even if their teachings were not put into effect. But if there were a decline in propriety, they would leave office.

When one’s own ideals cannot be carried out, but one has the respect of others, then the junzi can take office, otherwise he can leave office. The most basic condition is that one avoids death: Third, suppose they were starving to the point that they could not even go out their door, not eating either breakfast or supper, and a ruler heard of it and said, “I cannot do what is most important – putting into effect his way or following his teachings. But I am ashamed to have him starve in my territory.” If the ruler assists him, he may accept it, but only if it is needed to avoid dying. (Mencius 6B14)

As the pre-Qin Confucian who brought Confucianism to maturity, Xunzi provided a detailed account of the qualities of the junzi. In Xunzi’s philosophy, the junzi has two main meanings, first it means the one who occupies a ruling position and second, it means the person with morality and who preserves ritual propriety and righteousness. With regard to the sense of the junzi as a ruler, Xunzi believes that junzi is the person who institutes ritual propriety and righteousness and orders society. Without the junzi then there would be chaos in the world. The status and function of the ruler is thus elevated to an extremely central position. Xunzi focuses most of his discussion, however, on the second sense of junzi, that is as someone of perfected morality, with surpassing ability and who respects ritual propriety and righteousness. First, internally, the junzi pays great attention to his self-cultivation and to accumulating virtue and externally, he acts according to ritual propriety. The specific content of internal self-cultivation, the junzi takes humaneness, righteousness and ritual propriety as his standards. The junzi dwells in humaneness by means of righteousness, and only then is it humaneness. He carries out righteousness by means of ritual, and only then is it righteousness. In implementing ritual, he returns to the roots and completes the branches, and only then is it ritual. When all three are thoroughly mastered, only then is it the Way.”4 (“The Grand Digest” Xunzi) 4 Hutton

(2014: 293), modified.

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The junzi is also ashamed when he is not well-cultivated, when his words are untrustworthy and by his own lack of ability. Second, the quality of the junzi is manifested in his attitude to ritual, duties and affairs, other people, himself, the myriad things and going about traveling. With regard to ritual propriety, “the junzi respects and finds comfort in it.” With regard to duties and affairs “he is swift but does not neglect things.” His attitude to other people is that “he complains little and is broadminded and generous but does not toady to them.” With regard to his own conduct, “he is diligent in self-cultivation and self-improvement, but without being precarious [i.e. to haven an unsteady grip on morality, so that one has to force oneself to act correctly, instead of doing so with ease].” In adapting to changing conditions, he is “prompt and quick without being confused.” In his approach to heaven, earth and the myriad things, he “does not work at explaining why they are as they are, but rather is extremely good at making use of the resource they provide.” With regard to the work of the hundred officials and men of skill and art, “he does not try to compete with their abilities, but rather is extremely good at making use of their accomplishments.” With regard to his superiors, “he is loyal, compliant, and not lazy.” With regard to his subordinates, “he is even-handed, inclusive, and not one-sided.” With regard to going about travelling, “he follows righteousness and accords with the proper categories for things.” In dwelling in his village and neighborhood, “he is easygoing and not disorderly.” (“The Way of the Junzi” Xunzi) Third, the junzi’s action, personality and words are all in accord with the way of equilibrium and commonality. Xunzi says, The junzi is tolerant yet not lax, principled yet not oppressive. He debates but is not quarrelsome, investigates keenly but does not aim to astound. He stands alone without being superior and is strong without being violent. He is flexible and yielding yet not unscrupulous. He is respectful and cautious yet congenial.5 (“Nothing Improper” Xunzi)

This is the expression of the perfected virtues of the junzi. The real junzi is a great Confucian and his abilities are manifested in, assigning people ranks based on their virtues, measuring people’s abilities and giving them official positions, so that the worthy and unworthy each obtain their proper places, the capable and the incapable each receive their proper offices, the myriad things all get what is appropriate for them, and changes in affairs are each met with the proper response, so that Shen Dao and Mozi have nowhere to advance their doctrines, so that Hui Shi and Deng Xi do not dare to smuggle in their investigations, and so that people’s words always fit with good order and their work is always directed to appropriate tasks – this, at last, is what the junzi excels in. (“The Achievements of the Confucians” Xunzi)

Fourth, Xunzi also used jade to analogize the virtue of the junzi, and gave a relatively comprehensive description of the personality of the junzi: As for jade, the junzi compares it with virtue. The way it is warm, smooth, and lustrous resembles humaneness. The way it has structure and contains patterns resembles wisdom. The way it is firm and unyielding resembles righteousness. The way it is sharp but does not cut resembles proper conduct. The way it can be broken but does not bend resembles courage. The way that even its flaws are visible resembles genuineness. In the way that when 5 Hutton

(2014: 17), modified.

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struck, its sound is pure, rises high, and can be heard far away, but when it stops, it finishes completely, it resembles proper speech. Thus, though there is ornately decorated min, it is not as good as the elegance of jade.6 (“The Proper Model and Proper Conduct”)

Here, it is affirmed that the junzi possesses the virtues of humaneness, wisdom, righteousness and courage and his actions are upright and his speech is clear and flowing. Apart from this, Xunzi also believes that the junzi puts more store by righteousness and condescends against self-interest and that he disciplines himself with great strictness but treats others with laxity and lenience. The junzi observes the law and can restrain his own desires according to the law and overcomes the private with the public/common interest. It is clear that Xunzi’s discussion on the personality of the junzi is more comprehensive than his predecessors and came to have a deep and extensive impact on later generations.

33.2 Two As the Mohists were intimately connected with the Confucians in terms of their learning, the ideal personality that they postulated was exceedingly similar to the Confucian one. Mozi believed that the junzi was a person of great determination, courageous in taking on responsibilities, did not fear hardship and had the utmost trust of others. Mozi said, The junzi is strict with one’s self but lenient with others (in matters of conduct) while the multitude are lenient with themselves but strict with others. The superior man carries out his ambitions successfully in action and studies the situation when he is at leisure. Even when he is taken as a mediocre individual, he feels no dissatisfaction. This is because he has self-confidence.7 (“Befriending the learned” Mozi)

In the person of the junzi is, therefore, manifested a kind of positive enterprising attitude and a spirit of self-strengthening. At the same time, the junzi pays great attention to his own self-cultivation. The way of the junzi does not only consist in carrying out humaneness and righteousness but it is also to possess the qualities of honesty and uprightness. The Mohists also thought that the junzi must also try to seek for the common profit of the world. This characteristic reflects their utilitarian thinking. Zhuangzi was critical of the Confucian view of the junzi that “if the junzi be not humane, then he is incomplete, if he is not righteous then he might as well have not been born” (“The Way of Heaven” Zhuangzi) Zhuangzi believed that what is customarily called the junzi is not essentially different from the petty person, as the junzi’s sacrificing himself for humaneness and profit, like the petty person’s sacrificing himself for profit and material goods is similarly a destruction of the nature of things. 6 Hutton

(2014: 331), modified. by W. P. Mei, https://ctext.org/mozi/befriending-the-learned/ens.

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From the perspective of seeking after spiritual freedom, Zhuangzi believes that the junzi should be someone who understands the great dao. The different definitions of the junzi that Zhuangzi and Confucianism holds is rooted in the different natures of their respective philosophies. Although the legalists advocated governance through law and opposed governance through virtue, in legalist philosophy there is no shortage of discussions of the junzi. Guan Zhong, for example, uses a seedling to analogize the virtue of the junzi: When it begins, a grain sprout – how tender it is – how like a suckling bade. As it grows strong – how impressive it becomes – how like a knight. When it matures – how richly endowed it is – how like a junzi. When the world has such a junzi, it is at peace; when it does not, it is in peril. Therefore, mature grain is called a mature grain. In this way, it can be compared with the character of a junzi.8 (“Minor Queries”, Guanzi)

Here, it is meant that the cultivation of the qualities of the junzi is a continuous process. The junzi, furthermore, is of utmost importance for the state and the peaceful existence of the state or otherwise depends on him. Hanfei, however, believed that the difference between the junzi and the petty person lay in the possession of virtue and the cultivation of the self. In this, whether one maintained righteousness or not is the main distinction between the junzi and the petty person. Those who possess the qualities of the junzi do not easily trust insincere words whereas the petty person does the opposite. Hanfei also believed that the junzi must hit the mark, doing exactly what is appropriate, and not go to extremes. This view is an expression and development of Laozian thought.

33.3 Three In the Han dynasty, whilst discussions on the personality of the junzi continued, the junzi of these discussions was not used in the original sense of a ruler but referred exclusively to a moral person. In the Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion, for example, says “why is the junzi designated as such? It is the designation of one how has morality.” (“Appellations” Discussions at White Tiger Pavilion) Discussions about the personality of the junzi in this sense is best represented by Yang Xiong and Liu Xiang. Yang Xiong believes that, “with regard to humaneness, the junzi is flexible, with regard to righteousness, he is firm.” (“The Junzi,” Model Sayings) The junzi is flexible as he uses humaneness to love other people and he is firm as he uses righteousness to do away with the bad. This makes clear that humaneness and righteousness are important qualities of the junzi. The junzi also regulates himself through ritual propriety, “The junzi’s actions are determined according to the situation [事], and the situation is understood according to ritual propriety.” (“The Priority of Filial Propriety” Model Sayings) Yang Xiong also distinguished between the junzi and the petty person to clarify that the junzi possesses the virtues of “liking others” and “loyalty.” 8 Rickett

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He says, “The junzi likes what is good in others, and forgets about what is good in himself; the petty person likes what is bad in himself and forgets about what is good in others.” (“The Junzi” Model Sayings) He also says, “The junzi is honest with others—how much more so with himself! The petty person deceives himself—how much more so does he deceive others!” (ibid.) Yang Xiong also uses the jade to analogise the junzi, he says, “the junzi resembles jade.” (ibid.) The junzi “is pure and rippled, warm and glossy, soft but solid, rounded but clean edged—his depth cannot be described.”9 (ibid.) With regard to the personality of the junzi, Liu Xiang also principally employed “jade” and “water” to analogize his virtue. Liu Xiang says, There are six aspects of the jade that the sage holds in esteem. From afar, it looks warm and gentle, but close-up, it is substantial and patterned. From nearby, the sound of the jade is mild, but it travels far. It would rather break than bend, it would rather become incomplete than be yielding. Although it has edges, it is not harmful. If there is a blemish than it is necessarily manifested externally. It is for these reasons that the junzi holds it in esteem. From afar, it looks warm and gentle, symbolizing the virtue of the junzi. close-up, it is substantial and patterned, symbolizes his wisdom. That its sound is mild but travels far, symbolizes his righteousness. That it would rather break than bend symbolizes his courage. That, although it has edges, it is not harmful symbolizes his humaneness. That if there is a blemish than it is necessarily manifested externally symbolizes his sentimentality [情]. (“Miscellaneous Sayings” Garden of Persuasions)

This is using jade to elucidate that the junzi possesses the virtues of morality, wisdom, righteousness, humaneness and sentimentality. Apart from this, Liu Xiang also uses water to analogize the virtue of the junzi. Water symbolizes the virtue of the junzi. That it gives universally [to the myriad things] without partiality resembles the virtues that the junzi possesses. All that water nourishes grows and this resembles the junzi’s humaneness. Water flows downwards and windingly follows a particular course; this resembles the sage’s righteousness. Shallow water flows and deep water is hard to fathom, and this resembles the junzi’s wisdom. Water flows towards deep valleys without hesitation, and this resembles the junzi’s courage. Although water is flexible and yielding, it can reach into the most minute places; this resembles the junzi’s discernment. Upon encountering bad things, it does not desist, and this resembles the junzi’s resolve. When unclean things enter it, they leave fresh and clean; this resembles the junzi’s competence in carrying out transformative education. Using water to measure things, water will maintain its balance; this resembles the junzi’s correctness. When water fills a vessel, water becomes level with it; this resembles the junzi’s sense of judgment. Through myriad circuitous trials, water necessarily tends east; this resembles the junzi’s intention. This is why when the junzi sees the sea, the river or a lake, he will stop to admire it. (ibid.)

This analogy elucidates the junzi’s virtue of impartiality, and virtues such as his possession of humaneness, righteousness, courage, discernment, resolve, competence in carrying out transformative education, correctness, sense of judgment, intention. The analogy of jade and water expresses the standards of the junzi which Liu Xiang defined. From the pre-Qin Confucian, Mohist, Daoist and Legalist discussions of the personality of the junzi as well as the increasing richness that Han dynasty philosophers 9 Jeffrey

S. Bullock translation, https://ctext.org/yangzi-fayan/juan-shi-er.

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imbued the term with, junzi already became one of the most important personality ideals. In later periods, there was no shortage of philosophical discussions of the junzi. The Tang dynasty Liu Yuxi, for example, used jade to analogize the junzi, “Distinguished, but not hiding its own flaws, pure and clean but objects cannot contaminate it, possessed of an inner firmness but gentle and mild on the outside, that which is like the junzi is jade. (“Discourse on Gift Presented to an Elder at the First Meeting,” Collected works of Liu Yuxi) Zhou Dunyi of the Song dynasty used the lotus as an analogy for the junzi. I love only the lotus plant. It emerges from the mud but is not contaminated by any dirt. It purifies itself in the clear water but is not overly bewitching. Its stem is empty on the inside but upright on the outside. It does not grow side-branches, its fresh fragrance carries far. It stands straight and upright. One can admire it from afar but cannot be on such intimate terms with it that it can be toyed with. (“On Loving the Lotus”)

The junzi was also analogized to the Chinese plum, the orchid, the bamboo and the chrysanthemum; all were used to praise the noble and unsullied personality of the junzi. Even today, the junzi is still the ideal personality in moral cultivation that people most assiduously seek to emulate and hold in the highest esteem.

References Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Rickett, Allyn W. 1998. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, vol. I. Princeton UP: Princeton.

Chapter 34

Equilibrium and Commonality (zhongyong, 中庸)

Equilibrium and commonality is a key concept in Chinese philosophy and is also called equilibrium (中), equilibrium and harmony (中和) and the middle path (中 道). There are two main dimensions to its content. First, it refers to the constant way which is never in excess and never insufficient and functions in practical, daily affairs. Second, it refers to the “function of harmony” which is the functioning and the basic principle of harmony. The idea of centrality and commonality is rooted in the relatively ancient Chinese cultural concept of “equilibrium” (中). Confucius was the first to formally raise the concept of equilibrium and commonality. Through the elucidation of the Doctrine of the Mean, the idea gained a root-body discourse (本 体论) significance. After the elucidations of the Han and Song dynasty Confucians, the philosophical content of equilibrium and commonality was further enriched. Through these stages, equilibrium and commonality became a principle not only for epistemology and action but also a method of moral cultivation as well as a description of moral character and came to have a profound influence on Chinese art, medicine, architecture and traditional Chinese culture.

34.1 One In traditional Chinese culture, the idea of equilibrium or “esteeming equilibrium” (尚中) appeared very early on. In the Book of Change, Book of Documents and other such relatively early classics we can already see relatively sophisticated ideas about equilibrium. In the Book of Changes, we can see many instances where the idea of acting in equilibrium (中行) is proposed. The Book of Documents much esteemed the virtue of equilibrium and correctness (中正之德) and all demanded that in judging cases, one must be impartial and correct (中正). It demanded that humans should often reflect so that that their speech and action are in accord with the virtue of equilibrium and correctness. “The Great Plan” (洪范) chapter of the Book of Documents believed that to carry out the kingly way one must be without © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_34

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partiality and partisanship; reflecting the esteem with which the ancient Chinese held the concept of equilibrium. Confucius linked “equilibrium” with “commonality” and proposed the idea of “equilibrium and commonality.” Confucius saw equilibrium and commonality as the highest moral precepts and as something that few people can attain. According to some related discussions, Confucius was of the opinion that equilibrium and commonality is a principle for establishing the self and handling affairs which is never in excess and never insufficient. “Failing to find perfectly balanced men for associates, I suppose you might settle for the wild or the fastidious. In their pursuit of the way, the wild plunge right in, while the fastidious are always careful not to get their hands dirty.”1 (Analects 13.21) The wild and fastidious are two extremes in action, the wild are impulsive whilst the fastidious are cowardly; it is only the moderate which hits the most efficient mark and so equilibrated conduct is the way of equilibrium and commonality. Confucius also says, “To go beyond is as wrong as to fall short” for both going beyond and falling short are the two extremes of action and do not accord with the principle of equilibrium and commonality. Confucius was a great advocate for the way of equilibrium and commonality and believed that it is the most important quality of moral exemplar. He says, for example, “The moral exemplar is dignified, but does not wrangle. He is sociable, but not a partisan.” (Analects 15.22) “The moral exemplar is benevolent [惠] without being wasteful, imposes labour on the people without incurring their resentment, desires without being covetous, is grand without being arrogant, and is awe-inspiring without being severe.” (Analects 20.2) The reason why the moral exemplar can be dignified without wrangling, sociable without being partisan, benevolent without being wasteful, imposing labour without incurring the people’s resent, can be desired without being covetous, grand without being arrogant, and awe-inspiring without being severe is because he is competent in simultaneously being never excessive nor insufficient. He hits precisely where he should and so embodies equilibrium and commonality. Confucius also applied the principle of equilibrium and commonality to other domains. In education, for example, Confucius believed that students who are too aggressive should be restrained, whereas those whose natures are too meek should be encouraged. In terms of education, Where the substance is in excess of refinement, we have rusticity; where the refinements are in excess of substance, we have the manners of a clerk. When the refinements and substance are equally blended, we then have the junzi. (Analects 6.18)

In terms of personal conduct, Confucius “was mild, and yet dignified; majestic, and yet not fierce; respectful, and yet easy.” (Analects 7.38) In terms of the arts, he advocated that music should be expressive of enjoyment without being licentious, and of grief without being hurtfully excessive.” (Analects 3.20) As can be seen, the idea of equilibrium and commonality or the middle path occupies a key position in Confucius’s philosophy. After Confucius, the Doctrine of the Mean inherited and continued Confucius’s thought. According to received tradition, the Doctrine of the Mean was authored 1 Slingerland

(2003: 40). Throughout this translation, I have consulted Slingerland’s translation of the Analects and often based my own translations on his.

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by Confucius’s grandson Zisi. In the Doctrine of the Mean through an account of Confucius’s words expressed the utmost regard for the virtue of equilibrium and commonality. First, the Doctrine of the Mean regarded equilibrium and commonality as the utmost virtue, following this, it took the distinction between the moral exemplar and the petty man to be whether one maintains the virtue of equilibrium and commonality. The “equilibrium” of equilibrium and commonality is not the equilibrium of compromise but that of a timely maintenance of equilibrium (时中) which constantly adjusts to change so as to accord with the middle path. It is a union between flexibility and steadfastness with regard to principle. Following this, the reason that the dao is not realized or is obscured is that in carrying out the dao, people either overreach or not do not quite reach, resulting in the middle path of the dao not being achieved. Lastly, when applied to the common people, equilibrium is the sagely way of ruling the state. The reason why Shun could become a sage of great wisdom was that he was able to determine the mean (中) through holding onto both extremes and then using this mean (i.e. the equilibrium and centrality of the dao) on the people. Apart from this, the Doctrine of the Mean also understood equilibrium to be the great root of all under heaven and the common principle of action of the myriad things; equilibrium is the ultimate basis for the existence of the myriad things. “Harmony” (和) brings to light the relationship of harmony and accord between things. The myriad things in the world can only exist and develop in a harmonious and orderly fashion if both an internal and external condition of harmony exists. In this way equilibrium and harmony (中和) is elevated to a height of root-body discourse (本体 论). The dao of the equilibrium and harmony of heaven and earth when manifested in human being are human nature and the emotions. The state of equilibrium is when the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and happiness have not yet arisen (未发) and not partial. The state of harmony is when the emotions have already arisen but are neither excessive nor insufficient but according to with correct measure. In this way, equilibrium and harmony are equipped with the significance of human-nature discourse (心性论). The discussion of the ideas of equilibrium and commonality and equilibrium and harmony in the Doctrine of the Mean is an inheritance and development on Confucius’s ideas of equilibrium and commonality and was to have a direct and profound influence on Neo-Confucianism. Mencius explained in greater detail Confucius’s idea that of “Failing to find perfectly balanced men for associates, I suppose you might settle for the wild or the fastidious.” Mencius believed that Confucius also wanted to realize the dao of equilibrium but as it could not be achieved, he had to settle for second best. Being wild is excessive whereas being fastidious is not quite reaching and both are not in accord with the dao. The reason why the dao of equilibrium cannot be achieved and one has to settle for wildness or fastidiousness is because although the wild and fastidious do not accord with dao, they also differ from those village worthies (乡愿)—i.e. the prude moralist—who “agree with the current customs and consent with an impure age.” Whilst the village worthy is the thief of virtue, the wild and excessive do not harm virtue. Mencius also held in great esteem the principle of the dao of equilibrium that Confucius advocated. He believed that the dao of equilibrium is the principle that one should respect, and it should not be revoked just because people cannot reach it.

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It is only through the effort of those who wish to progress that the dao of equilibrium can be arrived at. Mencius also advocated that, “those who keep the equilibrium, [should] train up those who do not, and those who have abilities, [should] train up those who have not” (Mencius 4B7) so that those who do not accord with the dao of equilibrium can accord with it. The dao of equilibrium or equilibrium which Mencius talks of is not simply the midpoint of two extremes; is not a simple holding onto the mean. Whilst taking the middle and the dao of equilibrium are similar, if one only blindly holds onto the mean and does not adapt to circumstances, this is, in fact, precisely to thieve from the dao; as it is to take up one point whilst disregarding a hundred others. Holding onto the mean is thus not really the real dao of equilibrium. The real dao of equilibrium means integration with the changing circumstances; it means that in dynamic circumstances, one has to decide what to maintain and what to disregard and to act on this basis. Examples of how in concrete situations and in changes of circumstances one maintains the principle of the dao of equilibrium are: “Tang held fast to the equilibrium, and employed men of talents and virtue without regard to where they came from” (Mencius 4B20), “The words of great people are not necessarily faithful, and their actions are not necessarily resolute. They rest only in righteousness”2 (Mencius 4B11), “For males and females not to allow their hands to touch in giving and receiving is the general rule; when a sister-in-law is drowning, to rescue her with the hand is a peculiar exigency.” (4A17) The combination of the dao of equilibrium with the changes in circumstances is Mencius development on the dao of Confucius and of the Doctrine of the Mean. The high esteem in which equilibrium is held in the Ten Wings of the Book of Changes is particularly evident. In discussing harmony, the Ten Wings used the idea of equilibrium, the dao of equilibrium, the equilibrated action (中行), equilibrium and correctness (中正), occupying exactly the central place (正中) and acting to due degree (中节). It believed that it is propitious to follow the dao of the equilibrium and unpropitious to go against the dao of equilibrium or that one will achieve a great success by acting to due degree through adversity. Evidently, the Ten Wings highly respected the idea of the dao of equilibrium and at the time of its composition, admiring equilibrium had already become a universal idea that had seeped into peoples’ daily lives.

34.2 Two Dong Zhongshu of the western Han inherited the idea of fully realizing equilibrium and harmony of the Doctrine of the Mean and believed that equilibrium and harmony is the way of heaven and earth we well as the basis of the engendering of the myriad things. Equilibrium and harmony are the utmost virtues as well the utmost dao. Only actions that accord with equilibrium and harmony can be effective and the dao of 2 Van

Nordern (2008: 50). Throughout this translation, I have consulted Van Nordern’s translation of the Mencius and often based my own translations on his.

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equilibrium and harmony is also the means by which the sage governs the state. Dong Zhongshu also applied the idea of equilibrium and harmony to self-cultivation and believed that one can achieve longevity through practising equilibrium. The reason why peoples of humaneness can achieve longevity is because they have a heart-mind that is clear, still and harmonious and never deviate from equilibrium and correctness. Here people are required to maintain a state whereby they are neither in excessive nor insufficient with regard to their clothing, food, abode and actions as well as their mental lives. In this way one can arrive at a state whereby “equilibrium and harmony are constantly within one” and so prolong one’s life. The application of equilibrium and harmony to self-cultivation is Dong Zhongshu’s development of the idea of equilibrium and commonality and is the same as the equilibrium between yin and yang that is advocated by Chinese medicine. During the late Han and the beginning of the Wei, the zeitgeist was the evaluation of human character, and Liu Shao introduced the ideas of the equilibrium and commonality into his treatise on human character. In Treatise on Human Character Liu Shao believed that there are those who are restrained and those who are combative. The combative are in excess whereas the restrained are insufficient and both contravene against the principle of equilibrium and harmony. Liu Shao gave many examples of “restraint and combativeness going against equilibrium” (拘抗 违中). With regard to peoples who are serious and upright and of steely resolve, their “talent lies in correcting [their mistakes] but their flaw is in aggressively pointing out other peoples’ trespasses.” (ibid.) With regard to people who are flexible, accommodating, pacific and forgiving “their virtue is that they are tolerant and broad minded but where they are lacking is that they lack resolve.” (ibid.) With regard to people who are careful and full of caution “they are good at being respectful but where they go amiss is that they are full of suspicion.” (ibid.) With regard to people who are upright and uncompromising “they are dependable, but their flaw is that they are authoritarian and stubborn.” (ibid.) These human types, amongst others, have advantages and disadvantages, have parts which are excessive and parts that are insufficient, but none have reached equilibrium and harmony. Liu Shao also used the philosophy of the five phases to explain the differences in human character. He believed that metal, wood, water, fire and earth constituted the material nature (自然 材质) for human types. The five different materials manifest themselves in people as the five constant virtues of humaneness, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Those who have one ingredient in excessive are called “characters who are partial’ those who are possessed of many different ingredients are “characters with many elements.” Those who are possessed of all five ingredients can be “called equilibrium and commonality.” Equilibrium and harmony is the utmost of all the virtues (兼德而至), is the virtue of the sage. As the virtue of equilibrium and commonality is the possession of all five constant virtues so it cannot be named by any particular one virtue and “changes unpredictably without constancy” (变化无方). The virtue of equilibrium and commonality is also called the substance (质) of equilibrium and harmony. In the substance of equilibrium and commonality, the five ingredients are pure and well-coordinated, and are therefore designated in terms of equilibrium and harmony, stillness and blandness. As the substance of equilibrium and harmony can

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coordinate the five ingredients into a harmonious proportion, in the evaluation of human character one should first of all pay attention to the substance of equilibrium and harmony; with intelligence and wisdom taking a secondary position. In using the ides of equilibrium and commonality in the evaluation of human character, Liu Shao opened a new domain for thinking on equilibrium and commonality.

34.3 Three During the Song dynasty, the Confucians paid great attention to the Doctrine of the Mean and the philosophy of equilibrium and commonality was further developed. In this development, it was the Cheng brothers’ exegesis that reached the highest level of sophistication, greatly influencing later generations’ understanding of equilibrium and commonality. The Cheng brothers believed that not being partial (不偏) is equilibrium and not changing (不易) is commonality. They believed that equilibrium is the correct way of the world and commonality is the fixed principle of the world. They took equilibrium and commonality as the correct and unchanging fixed principle of the world and so raised equilibrium and commonality to the height of the heavenly dao. The Cheng brothers believed that the transformations of heaven and earth, the changes of sun and moon, cold and hot are all manifestations of equilibrium and commonality. The Cheng brothers believed there were the two senses to “harmony”: “in harmony” (在中) and the “dao of equilibrium” (中之道). “In harmony” is when the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and happiness have not yet arisen and so is impartial. The “dao of equilibrium” is when “all things and affairs have a spontaneous harmony in it and do not depend on human organisation.” (Book 18, Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers) Thus, “in harmony” refers to human nature and the “dao of equilibrium” refers to how all things have an element of abiding by a harmony which suits them. The Cheng brothers also inherited Mencius idea about adapting to circumstances. They believed that grasping the equilibrium does not describe mechanically finding the midpoint of two extremes. That stubbornly holding onto the mean and not understanding how to be flexible will often result in actually contravening against the principle of equilibrium. They give the example whereby “even though it is the equilibrium to wear a thin coat when it is just beginning to get cold, it is not the equilibrium if one uses the thin coat during the height of coldness.” As such, hitting precisely the right mark in accordance with the specific circumstances and grasping the dao of equilibrium is a “timely maintenance of equilibrium.” As we can see from the above, the Cheng brothers advocated an equilibrium which contains adaptation to circumstances, and which is impartial and able to hit the mark. Equilibrium and commonality are not only a specific way of acting but also the regularity of the process of the heavenly dao. Zhu Xi’s view of equilibrium and harmony brings into play both the thought of the Cheng brothers as well as his own interpretations. He was of the opinion that equilibrium is impartiality and being neither excessive nor insufficient whereas commonality is the ordinary (平常). In using impartiality and being neither excessive

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nor insufficient to explain equilibrium, Zhu Xi is inheriting the traditional Confucian view, but he combined these views with the Cheng brothers’ views of “in harmony” and the “dao of equilibrium.” He believed that impartiality is what the Cheng brothers meant by “in harmony”; it is that which prior to arising. Being neither excessive nor insufficient, on the other hand, is what the Cheng brothers mean by the “dao of equilibrium” and is after arising. “In harmony” refers to human nature whereas the “dao of equilibrium” refers to dao because the “dao of equilibrium” demands that one “observe the specific circumstances so that each gets its equilibrium.” In specific actions one should “after taking stock of the two extremes, one takes its mean and then apply the mean.” (Section and Sentence Commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean) One needs to be careful as Taking the middle of two extremes does not refer to the exact middle. For example, in the extremes of light and heavy, it is possible that the middle resides in the light part or that the middle resides in the heavy part. (Book 62, Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi)

As such, in order to realize the “dao of equilibrium” one must act according to specific circumstances in a way that hits the mark. As such, the “dao of equilibrium” is “a timely maintenance of equilibrium.” This is also a continuation of Mencius idea that “by holding onto the mean and without leaving room for the exigency of circumstances” (执中无权). The explanation of commonality as the ordinary is Zhu Xi’s personal innovation. He believed that commonality is manifested in the principles of the ordinary and common. The ordinary contains what the Cheng brothers meant by the unchanging. Summarizing Zhu Xi’s views, what he means by equilibrium and commonality refers to the constant way in people’s daily lives which is never excessive and never not reaching. This constant way is manifested as the natural necessity of heaven’s mandate and so functions as the “common principle, the natural necessity of heaven’s mandate and the utmost of the subtle and refined” (Section and Sentence Commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean) of equilibrium and commonality. From the perspective of morality and cultivation, Zhu Xi also saw equilibrium and commonality as the virtue of the moral exemplar and the means of moral cultivation: The reason why the morally exemplary is one of equilibrium and commonality is because he has the virtue of the morally exemplary and also because he can reside in the equilibrium according to the times and circumstances. […] Equilibrium has no fixed form but forms according to the circumstances, this is the principle of the ordinary. The morally exemplary does not wait till he sees things to be cautious, nor till he hears things to be apprehensive. And at no point does he not reside in equilibrium. (Section and Sentence Commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean)

34.4 Four Wang Fuzhi both criticized and summarized the traditional views on equilibrium and commonality. He focused in particular on the traditional idea of equilibrium as that

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which is neither excessive nor insufficient as well as the ideas of the Neo-Confucians and thereby further developed the philosophy of equilibrium and commonality. First Wang Fuzhi opposed the explanation of equilibrium and commonality through that which is neither excessive nor insufficient. He believed instead that equilibrium and commonality was the way of the sage, perfect goodness, the ultimate and the highest standard of action. For Wang Fuzhi, there is only not reaching it but not overreaching; when people usually speak of overreaching, this is only also refers to not reaching. Wang Fuzhi says, equilibrium and commonality, not reaching and overreaching are not three separate states. Equilibrium and commonality are not external to not reaching and overreaching, nor is it simply the middle point of the two. Equilibrium and commonality both contain reaching and overreaching as well as being enterprising and not enterprising, The act of being in equilibrium cannot be equilibrium if it did not contain both being enterprising and not being enterprising. Having initiative [进取] means making oneself coherent with dao. That there are some things that need not be done is because they do not need to be done from the perspective of dao. The act of being in equilibrium is the expression of initiative. Not doing some things [有所不为] is precisely doing things [有为]. (Book 6, Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books)

As such, not reaching and overreaching, being wild and fastidious are all manifestations of dao. This is an innovative interpretation of the idea of equilibrium and commonality. Further to this, Wang Fuzhi also criticized Zhu Xi’s interpretation of commonality as the ordinary. He believed that in the Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters and the Book of Documents “commonality” was always explained in terms of functionality and so believed that the basic meaning of commonality is function. Previously, Zhu Xi did not explain commonality in terms of function, as such Wang Fuzhi believed that equilibrium and commonality was the function of commonality. Wang Fuzhi’s explanation coheres with the substance of Mencius’s thought on equilibrium and commonality. Following this, Wang Fuzhi used the relationship between form and function (体用) to explain equilibrium and commonality. He took equilibrium to be form and commonality to be function. From the macro to the micro, all things have a spontaneous equilibrium within them, thus equilibrium is form and commonality is function. That commonality is function is due to the way equilibrium as form is used in specific circumstances. The use of form and function to talk about equilibrium and commonality introduced dialectical elements to thinking on equilibrium and commonality. In summary of the above, we can see that although ideas about equilibrium and commonality have been ceaselessly developed and perfected upon and that different thinkers from different periods have all provided different explanations to its significance. What is common among all these different interpretations, however, is that equilibrium and commonality have always meant neither being excessive nor insufficient and instead of hitting the right mark. The philosophy of equilibrium and commonality has directly influenced the traditional ideas about valuing equilibrium. We see this, for example, in the “beauty of equilibrium and harmony” (中和之美)

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of Chinese art, in the injunction “to take equilibrium as venerable” (以中为贵) in architecture which emphasized that architecture must be in harmonious accord with its environment. It can also be seen in that theory of balance between yin and yang in Chinese medicine and its principle of treatment of “make hotter what is cold, make colder what is hot, nourish what is thin, discharge what is too solid.” The principles for combining different medicines are practical deployments of the idea of equilibrium and harmony. From this we can see that the ideas about equilibrium and harmony had a profound effect on the traditional culture. What needs to be further remarked upon is that the way of equilibrium and commonality is essentially different from a blind compromise. It would be a mistake to think that the way of equilibrium and harmony is merely being sycophantic and preserving one’s own interests in all circumstances. As a methodology, the way of equilibrium and commonality is a kind of wisdom, it is an ability to grasp and to judge of when and what is neither excessive nor insufficient. It is a guide that rectifies practical actions that incline towards extremes and either-or approaches that think dualistically in terms of black and white; it has a practical significance for our actions.

References Slingerland, Edward. 2003. Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Trans. Edward Slingerland. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Van Norden, Bryan W. 2008. Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Chapter 35

Unfettered and Effortless (xiaoyao, 逍遥)

Unfettered and effortless is a key concept in the history of Chinese philosophy. The words themselves mean actions that are free, unrestrained by anything, leisurely and carefree and doing what one pleases. In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, the idea of unfettered and effortless gained a meticulous and profound exegesis. “Unfettered and effortless” comprises two dimensions. First, it designates a state in life where one is not limited by anything material, where one escapes the restraint of all the things that matter in the vulgar world such as accomplishments, reputation, interest, title, authority, influence and position. In this way one can have no hang-ups, no obstructions, and one can transcend all cares and have peace of mind. After Zhuangzi, many different thinkers have put this idea into play. As these thinkers all lived in different periods, their foci were different and so their understanding of unfettered and effortless was imbued with correspondingly different characteristics.

35.1 One Unfettered and effortless was originally a verb and its meaning can be explained as going towards (“xiao,” 逍) or going away from (“yao,” 遥), wandering around, and is close to walking back and forth, strolling and pacing up and down. It also has the significance of walking far and not being restrained. In the Book of Odes and Songs from the South, unfettered and effortless is used in the same way as “soaring flight” (翱翔) and “to play” (游戏) and has the meaning of being without restraint or ties. “Unfettered and effortless” was elevated into the philosophical dimension by the Zhuangzi. Apart from preserving its original meaning of leisure and carefreeness and doing what one pleases, unfettered and effortless was transformed into an ideal of life, into a way of living or a description of a state of existence. The “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter of the Zhuangzi has been deemed the crown of the inner chapters, the key of the whole book, and is an encapsulation of the main themes in Zhuangzi’s thought. In order to understand the philosophy of the Zhuangzi, one must begin with the concept of “unfettered and effortless” of the “Wandering © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_35

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Unfettered and Effortless” chapter. In this way one can understand the ideas such as formless emptiness, stillness, spontaneous self-so which derive from “unfettered and effortless.” The “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter is the first chapter of the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi. It portrayed many nameless spiritual personas and proposed a central concept of Zhuangzi’s philosophy: “unfettered and effortless.” The main subject of “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” is the state of existence which sees through accomplishments and reputation, profit and title, one that escapes the restraints of authority and influence, power and interest and reaches a state of spiritual freedom. In this state, one’s spiritual life attains a carefree state of being in which one is without care and nothing can hinder one. The “unfettered and effortless-ness” which Zhuangzi talks of is a philosophical state. It is the philosophy of how to be in the world which assumes a complete understanding of life itself; it can be described as a worldview. In the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter we read of “saunter idly [彷徨] by its side, or in the enjoyment of unfettered and effortless [逍遥] sleep beneath it. In the “The Great and Most Honoured Master” chapter we read that “they ignorantly saunter idly [彷 徨] outside the dust and dirt [of the world], and are unfettered and effortless [逍遥] in the business of doing nothing in particular.” In both these cases unfettered and effortless means that same as saunter idly (彷徨). When “unfettered and effortless” is linked with “wandering” (游), it has the meaning of keeping company (交游) and travelling for pleasure (游历). In the Zhuangzi, however, it means the wandering of the heart-mind and means a free unrestrained and state. In many other chapters of the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, “unfettered and effortless” is often linked with non-purposive action (无为) or being unbothered (无事). As such, with Zhuangzi, “unfettered and effortless” also means a transcendent state whereby one journeys through the world whilst maintaining a clear distance. As such, in the Zhuangzi, apart from referring to an inner subjective state, “unfettered and effortless” also refers to a way of life whereby one walks or strolls through the human and material world but is not limited by this world. “Wandering unfettered and effortless” is an intellectual construct that both indicates a spiritual state as well as a way of life. “Unfettered and effortless” means being independent, not relying on anything, and a freedom from not only the vulgar world but also from the world itself, so that one forms an undifferentiated whole with the myriad things.

35.2 Two During the Han dynasty, with the unification of China, Confucian thought gained the highest position of esteem, meaning that the rudimentary education which most scholars received was Confucianism. Cultivating the self, ordering the family, ruling the country and bringing peace to the world became the highest Confucian ideals. The state of being “unfettered and effortless” as an ideal was imbued with the characteristics of the time. For example, in the Huainanzi, although many ideas were

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borrowed from Zhuangzi’s “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” and associated passages, its main theme has already imperceptible shifted. What in the Zhuangzi was about extricating oneself and forgetting the self had become in the Huainanzi an advocacy of a method of self-cultivation whereby the sovereign will “internally possess the means to lodge their spirit and nourish their qi and they will provide the means to respond and attend to the myriad aspects of the world.”1 The sage, “perfected person” (至人) and the “genuine person” (真人) and many other descriptions in the Huainazi are endowed with the characteristics of being interconnected with dao and transcending life, death and the affairs of the human world, wandering freely through heaven and earth and not being hurt by catastrophes and disasters. These are all very similar to the state of “wandering unfettered and effortless” of the Zhuangzi. In the Huainanzi, however, the subject of “unfettered and effortless” is the sovereign, and its main theme is how the sovereign can combine an unfettered and effortless personal life with the activities of governing the state. Its ideal state is one whereby the sovereign, because he follows a non-purposive course of action, also achieves all that he needs to, and simultaneously maintains an unfettered and effortless personal life. By the Wei-Jin period, due to the chaos that society and politics was in, the Zhuangzian style of pacifying one’s heart-mind and spirit once again entered peoples’ purviews. As one of the “three obscurities” (三玄) of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, Zhuangzi’s philosophy gained attention and was developed upon. Although there are slight differences between the thinking of the seven worthies of the bamboo grove, what they have in common was that they were not limited to rituals and advocated being still and without purposive action. They often met in the bamboo groves to drink wine and sing and advocated a lifestyle that is unfettered and effortless, set apart from the vulgar world. Among them, Ruan Ji’s (阮籍) “wandering effortless and unfettered” most accurately encapsulates the characteristics of being both Confucian and Daoist scholars of these times. Ruan Ji received an early education in traditional Confucianism and pursued the Confucian path of trying to accomplish a great work and career as an official of the state. He lived, however, during a time of great chaos where the political environment was precarious and dangerous. Although Confucian scholars everywhere had grand ambitions to save the world, the circumstances in which their talents could be made use of were lacking. Ruan Ji gradually started to develop a double persona which was simultaneously wild and fastidious, simultaneously Confucian and Zhuangzian. He never evaluated other people, was extremely careful but at the same time rolled his eyes at people and did not stick to ritual propriety and was unrestrained and wild in his behavior; “wandering unfettered and effortless” describes him when he could not help himself and acted in an escapist way. In Book 19 of the “Biographies” of the Book of Jin, it is said of Ruan Ji that he “often, on impulse he would ride off on his own and not follow the road. When he reached the place where there were no tracks, he would then howl with cries and return.” Ruan Ji’s impulsive riding off is here an expression of his style of “wandering unfettered and effortless.” It is not a transcendent, impulsive 1 Major

et al. (2010: 858–859).

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letting oneself free, but an inner bitterness which at times takes flight from the norm. It is an impulsive wandering which ultimately still has to be dragged back crying to the real world. From his early years of elevated ambitions, lofty intentions and spirit till the later years of wildness and guile or wavering between frustrated bitterness and or lofty leisure, Ruan Ji’s style of wandering “unfettered and effortless” can be encapsulated by “escapism.” This kind of escapism is not forthright, complete and willed, nor is it done with a graceful resolve. Avoiding disaster and preserving oneself, both wishing to leave but also to return, both desiring the transcendence of wandering to a more spiritual realm but not having the determination to leave behind the dream of saving the world from its plight, superficially pretending to be without care of the vulgar but holding on ever more tightly to life, this was Ruan Ji’s style of “unfettered and effortless wandering.” This was not a unique example of the time, but a common phenomenon and a very profound aspect of the Wei-Jin era. After Ruan Ji, Guo Xiang’s interpretation of “unfettered and effortless” had the most profound and extensive effect on the history of Chinese philosophy. In his Commentary on Unfettered and Effortless Wandering, Guo Xiang says, Although big and small are different, as long as they themselves go in the realm of selffulfillment, creatures follow their natures, their behavior corresponds with their abilities and each fulfils its capacity, in terms of unfettered and effortless they are the same, how could being better or worse have any place here!

Guo Xiang believes that whether one can be unfettered and effortless depends on whether one can achieve “natures having a place to reside.” (“Commentary on Autumn Floods”) As Guo Xiang sees it, “natures all have their capacity” and it is not possible to change their natures halfway through. (“Equalizing Assessments of Things”) As such, it is only in the realm of self-fulfillment where all things follow their natures, where their behavior corresponds to their abilities, where each fulfils its capacity that things can return to themselves and achieve the state of “unfettered and effortless.” Guo Xiang is not opposed to Zhuangzi’s idea of “unfettered and effortless” and he calls it an “unfettered and effortlessness that does not depend on anything” (无待逍遥). This is the unfettered and effortlessness of the perfected person, the spirit-like person and sage when they “chariot upon what is true both to heaven and to earth, riding atop the back-and-forth of the six atmospheric qi, so that your wandering could nowhere be brought to a halt.”2 This is not, however, a state at which everyone can arrive. Guo Xiang believes that for the majority of us, as long as we rest content in our nature so that we let “the springs of heaven unfold,” so that irrespective of what kind of dependence we have, as long as we “fulfill that on which we depend” then we can still achieve unfettered effortlessness. This is the “unfettered and effortlessness which depends on things.” Guo Xiang’s “unfettered and effortless” is not only a realization of the obscure principle (玄理) of heaven and earth, it is moreover a lesson to humans on how to preserve oneself in the world whilst maintaining an inner tranquillity. This method is “being content with the allocation one has received” (安于所受之分) (“Commentary 2 Ziporyn

(2009: 5–6), modified.

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on Autumn Floods”), which means not striving or insisting upon reaching things but instead accepting everything so that one’s emotions are not riled up. In this way, “no matter where one goes one will be unfettered and effortless” (无往而非逍遥). (“Commentary on Autumn Floods”) Guo Xiang’s kind of “unfettered and effortless” has provided a spiritual escape for scholar-officials throughout the ages who have hit upon hard times. The Zhuangzian kind of “unfettered and effortless” is too absolutely obscure and unreachable; it can be looked upon longingly but never reached. Guo Xiang’s “unfettered and effortlessness of being content with one’s nature” (适性逍 遥), however, is particularly coherent with the needs of Chinese people in history, that is “trusting in Confucianism when one fulfils one’s ambitions, and revering Daoism when they have not fulfilled their ambitions” (得意信儒, 失意崇道). The embodiment of “unfettered and effortless,” on the other hand, gives scholar-officials who have lost out on their ambitions a sense of transcendence, allowing them a degree of spiritual comfort. Many of Guo Xiang’s contemporaries criticized his idea of “unfettered and effortlessness of being content with one’s nature.” Zhidun (支遁), for example, introduced the idea that everything is void (般若性空) into the explanation of unfettered and effortless and proposed a new understanding of unfettered and effortless as “understanding the heart-mind of the perfected person” (明至人之心). Zhidun believed that it is only in completely forgetting the vulgar world, escaping all the chains on one’s body and not being tied down by material things and inner desires that one can subtly unite with the formless and empty dao, that one can reach the state of the “perfected person” and so achieve the state of “unfettered and effortlessness.” In Zhidun’s eyes, being unfettered and effortless is a spiritual freedom that is not weighed down by anything. Zhidun’s unfettered and effortlessness comes from the Buddhist perspective, is coherent with Zhuangzi’s “wandering unfettered and effortlessness” and contains a spirit of transcendence as well as clear Neo-Daoist characteristics.

35.3 Three By the Sui-Tang period, the political realm was gradually tending towards stability and state power was daily increasing. Encouraged by the atmosphere of the high Tang, the literati all desired to accomplish a name for themselves and so eagerly entered society. As a result, there were no real achievements in the exegesis of Zhuangzi’s “Unfettered and Effortless Wandering.” Only Lu Deming (陆德明) thought that being “free and at leisure and being content and self-fulfilled” (闲放不拘,怡适自 得) was unfettered and effortless. (“On the Sounds and Meaning of Zhuangzi, Textual Explanations of Classics and Canons) Cheng Xuanying took Guo Xiang’s “unfettered and effortlessness of being content with one’s nature” as his basis and proposed that to take “all things that are created suit their natures and are content [所造皆适]” is unfettered and effortless. (Sub-commentary to the Zhuangzi) In their creation of poetry, Tang poets took the Peng bird as an emblem of being unfettered and effortless. The literati imagined themselves as the Peng, soaring on the wind and breaking

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waves, rising all the way up to the clouds, condescendingly looking down on all the heroes of the age and all under heaven. Li Bai’s “Rhapsody on the Great Peng” epitomizes this kind of thinking. In contrast to Guo Xiang’s view that everyone can be unfettered and effortless, Cheng Xuanying believed that only those who have perfectly arrived at the dao, that is, those who possess the spiritual qualities of “wisdom, virtue, clarity and sharpness” can arrive at the state of being unfettered and effortless. Apart from this, Cheng Xuanying also believed that the content of unfettered and effortless is to live an easy and comfortable life of pleasure. In this condition people will forget their bodies and their scheming, completely escape the binds of the material world that tie them down and thereby achieve absolute freedom of body and spirit. Cheng Xuanying is not necessarily opposed to Guo Xiang’s “unfettered and effortlessness of being content with one’s nature” but he believes that one should not settle for the unfettered and effortlessness which depends on things but instead should strive for the highest realm of unfettered and effortlessness which does not depend on things. If one pays attention to the joy that one has already attained, then this is to limit oneself to the limited and so become incapable of reaching the “subtle perfection of unfettered and effortless.” As such, one can think of Cheng Xuanying’s “unfettered and effortless” as a process which aims at the Zhuangzian “unfettered and effortless.” In the Zhuangzi, the great Peng bird has a particular significance. Although it is extremely big and can fly high and far, it is dependent upon the wind and sea. Although its horizon is broader than the cicada and the little dove, in essence it depends on things and so is not “unfettered and effortless.” In the poetry of the Tang dynasty poets, the great Peng bird had evolved to something that fulfils its own ambitions, ascends a whirlwind straight up into the sky and gives free rein to its emotions and desires. It does what it wants, is unfettered and effortless and was greatly admired by many literati. By the high Tang period, the great Peng bird is represented as spreading its wings and flying south with all its ambitions fulfilled in an unfettered and effortless manner. By this period, “unfettered and effortless” had already lost its Zhuangzian meaning and become a kind of unfettered and effortless which depends on things. The image of the Peng as a towering figure who transcends the desires and ambitions of the vulgar world had completely evolved to one which does desire being valued, wishes to be employed by the sovereign and wishing to accomplish a great life’s work. “Unfettered and effortless” no longer has any sense of transcending the vulgar world and has instead become a symbol of accomplishing a great life’s work and the fulfillment of personal ambitions. Like the myriad other Confucians of the high Tang, Li Bai longed to accomplish a great feat and achieve a distinguished reputation. Although he did not lack a desire for a hermit’s life removed from society, he only desired it for himself after he had accomplished his life’s work. It was only after his ambitions were fulfilled, that he desired to live a reclusive life with some kindred spirits, exploring and travelling all the famous sights. These ideals of Li Bai’s were typical of Chinese literati. There is a clear difference between immediately leading a reclusive life and only going into seclusion after one has left an august legacy behind. The former is the person of

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leisure whilst the latter is the scholar-official in seclusion. For Li Bai, it is only after one has achieved one’s life ambitions that one can seclude oneself in the mountains and forests; for him this is the correct meaning of unfettered and effortless. As such, Li Bai compared himself to the great Peng bird throughout his life and wished to “strike for the sovereign and fly on a whirlwind through the highest of the heavens.” (Collected Works of Li Taibai) His “Rhapsody on the Great Peng” perfectly expressed the strange and beautiful image of the Peng bird in flight and the unrestrained spirit of great ambition. For Li Bai, the Peng bird spreading its wings in flight and flapping its wings on the water for 3000 li is the paradigmatic expression of being unfettered and effortless. The bitter longing of his whole life was to spread his wings, if only once, in the same uninhibited manner as the great Peng. By the Sui-Tang period, “unfettered and effortless” seemed to almost completely lose the original connotations that it had in the Zhuangzi, but the literati had imbued it with a new vigour. The new unfettered and effortless is not a state of blandness, recoiling, losing out on one’s ambitions, having no cares. It is instead high-spirited, eager to make progress and self-satisfied. It is imbued with a spirit of condescendingly looking down upon all others and anticipating the realization of one’s great ambitions.

35.4 Four On the Song literary arena, it was always fashionable to use the school of images and numbers (象数) of the Book of Changes to explain the “unfettered and effortless” of Zhuangzi. Many different thinkers, from different perspectives, corresponded peoples’ names and place names and numbers of the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter of the Zhuangzi with the way that yin and yang changes in the Book of Changes. In this way, “shackled” (累) and “unshackled” became a measure of whether something is unfettered and effortless or not. Wang Anshi’s son Wang Pang (王雱) was one of the earliest figures in the Song dynasty to use this method to understand Zhuangzi. He absorbed the school of images and numbers’ theory of how the numbers “six” and “nine” represent the lines (yao) of yin and yang and pointed out that the myriad things all have things that shackle them and so cannot achieve the state of unfettered and effortless. No matter how big the Peng bird is, it is still limited by creation and transformation, is constrained by yin and yang and cannot be unfettered and effortless. How then can one achieve being unfettered and effortless? Wang Pang believed that the real “unfettered and effortless” should be “unshackled” and it is only the dao that is directionless (无方), “objectless” (无物) and “not tied down by material vessels” (无形器 之累) as well as those sages who have fully intuited the dao, are “without self,” “without heart-mind” who are not shackled by external objects and can arrive at the state of being unfettered and effortless. Here, Wang Pang’s unfettered and effortless is very similar to Zhaungzi’s original idea and has already departed from the previous’ dynasty’s “unfettered and effortlessness of being content with one’s nature.”

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Apart from Wang Pang, Lü Huiqing (吕惠卿), a former disciple of Wang Anshi who was greatly influenced by his thought, correlated yin and yang with achieving (有为) and not achieving (无为) and believed that like yin and yang the two can mutually transform into each other. One only needs to excise the “shackle” in one’s heart-mind, and irrespective of whether one achieves or not, one would be unfettered and effortless. Another disciple of Wang Anshi, Chen Xiangdao (陈详道) took yin and yang to be the pivot that linked the myriad things and believed that “if one comes out of yin and yang and returns to dao then one is unfettered and effortless no matter what. If one goes into yin and yang but still depends on objects, then one is shackled no matter what.” (Commentary on the Zhuangzi) Zhao Yifu of the Southern Song took the transformation of Kun and Peng and the movement of the sea as the transformation into each other of the yin and yang of heaven and earth. Apart from this, Linzi (林自), Chen Jingyuan (陈景元), Chu Boxiu (褚伯秀), each with different foci, explained the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter of the Zhuangzi with theories from the Book of Changes. Although there were differences among their methodologies, their explanations of unfettered and effortless all broadly followed Wang Pang’s idea of “unshackled.” Lin Xiyi (林希逸) repudiated Wang Pang’s correlation of the names of peoples, names of places and numbers of the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter of the Zhuangzi with yin yang, images and numbers. He believed instead that Kun and Peng only symbolized “the joy that comes with broad-mindedness.” (Juan Zhai’s Oral Significances of the Zhuangzi) He took the “joy” (乐) of the Analects and the Book of Odes and analogized it to the state of being unfettered and effortless. He interpreted the leisurely and carefree self-contentment of the Zhuangzi as NeoConfucianism’s ideal of the joy of Confucius and Yanhui when they are without material wealth but are spiritually content (孔颜乐处). Although Lin Xiyi went against the fashions of his time and tried to rectify the Song dynasty fashion of explicating the Zhuangzi through the Book of Changes, he himself deviated from the original meaning of the Zhuangzi in using Confucianism to explain Zhuangzi, so that the lofty state of being unfettered and effortless was lowered to a state of spiritual contentment. Apart from Lin Xiyi, another famous literati, Luo Miandao (罗勉道), of the Ming dynasty also criticized the methodology of explicating the Zhuangzi through the Book of Changes. Luo Miandao used “transformation” to explain the meaning of unfettered and effortless. He divided the state of unfettered and effortless into two classes of “big transformation” and “little transformation” and believed that the “perfected person without a self” was the best kind of wandering unfettered and effortless. In the Zhuangzi, transformation (化) is indeed an extremely important concept. Apart from Kun and Peng, there is Zhuangzi’s transformation into a butterfly, “the myriad things all transform” (“Perfect Enjoyment”) and “transformation with the changing character of the times” (“The Tree on the Mountain”). Focusing on “transformation,” Luo Miandao took the scale of “transformation” as the measure of the distinction between the state of unfettered and effortless. Luo Miandao believed that “myriad transformations” (万化) refers to specific phenomena that are realized artificially by humans, “one transformation” (一化), on the other hand, refers to the root-body

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transformation of the great dao. The great Peng as the transformation of the big Kun of the northern ocean is huge and can fly far and high; it is a big “transformation” and so a high state of unfettered and effortless. The cicada and little dove, however, are narrow in their horizon and so are representative of little “transformation” and so can only reach a low state of unfettered and effortless. As humans are endowed with different capacities and their knowledge are different in quantity, among humans, there are also distinction of “big transformation” and “little transformation” and high and low degrees of wandering unfettered and effortless. Even the “spirit-like person, sage, and perfected person” that Zhuangzi talks of synonymously are considered by Luo Miandao to belong to different grades. The “spirit-like person without accomplishments” (神人无功) is higher than the “sage without reputation” (圣人无名) as “without accomplishments then there are no undertakings and so no reputations.” (Retrieving the Original Meaning of the True Classic of Hanhua) The “perfected person without a self” (至人无己) is yet higher than the “spirit-like person without accomplishments” for “without a self means being without a body and so there is no undertakings.” (Retrieving the Original Meaning of the True Classic of Hanhua) As such the “perfected person without a self” is the highest level of being unfettered and effortless.

35.5 Five Taking Luo Miandao’s “big transformation” as their starting point, literati and scholar-officials started to pay attention to the state that “big” (大) refers to in the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter. By the Ming-Qing period there arose a fashion that took “big” as the key to understanding the Zhuangzi. Unfettered and effortless was accordingly understood as a state of magnanimity, broad-mindedness and grand creation. The Ming dynasty Lu Xixing (陆西星) believed that the Zhuangzi in its entirety is the “flowing forth from a broad-mindedness (自广大胸中流出) and that the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter is the paradigmatic example of this. In his eyes, the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter intends, through a state of open-mindedness, to rectify conventional narrow-mindedness and so to arrive at the realization of dao. This kind of “big” is the truth of unfettered and effortless. Lu Xixing believes that it is only the spirit-like person of the hill of Gu Ye (藐姑射神) that one can arrive at this state whereas Song Rongzi (宋荣子), Yao (尧), Xuyou (许由) are all those who are “big of not yet [truly] big” (大之未大) and the cicada, little dove all belong to the understanding that is limited, “small” and superficial. After Lu Xixing, the Ming dynasty Wu Mo (吴默) officially proposed using “big” as the key to investigating the unfettered and effortlessness of the Zhuangzi. From then on, the trend of using “big” to explicate the Zhuangzian unfettered and effortless became more and more vigorous so that by the Qing dynasty it became a great spectacle. The Qing dynasty Lin Yunming (林云铭), Xuanying (宣颖), Hu

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Wenying (胡文英) and Liu Fengpao (刘凤苞) directly inherited the thinking of the previous dynasty and saw “big” as the main theme of the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter. Through a thorough analysis of the chapter, they provided an evaluation from a literary perspective and their language was elaborate and full of emotion. A philosophical trend represented by Wang Fuzhi, Lin Zhongyi (林 仲懿), Wu Shishang (吴世尚), Sun Jiagan (孙嘉淦), Fangqian (方潜) gravitated towards explaining Zhuangzi through Confucianism. Whilst continuing the trend of using “big” to understand unfettered and effortless, they introduced, in great quantity, the philosophy of Song Neo-Confucianism. The took elements such as the joy of Confucius and Yanhui when they are without material wealth but are spiritually content, “The hawks soar to the limits of the heavens; the fishes plunge to the furthest depths” (i.e. each fulfilling its nature), and Zengdian’s spirit of wishing to be at one with nature, to explicate unfettered and effortless. Although they were innovative and their thinking was rather rational, they leaned towards a Confucian style of thought that departs from the original Zhuangzian meaning. In the modern period, unfettered and effortless is often linked with concepts such as “absolute freedom” and “spiritual freedom.” Many scholars believed that the state which the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” chapter of the Zhuangzi advocated was close what the West called “freedom.” Their interpretation of the Zhuangzi was thus imbued with the zeitgeist. As early as 1922, Zhang Taiyan (章太炎) said that, Zhuangzi’s invention of the idea of freedom and equality can be seen in the “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless” and “Equalizing Assessments of Things” chapters. Wandering unfettered and effortless is freedom and equalizing assessment of things is equality. […] I do not infringe on other people’s freedom and others do not infringe on my freedom.

In his translation of the Zhuangzi, the American scholar Burton Watson says, “The central theme of the Chuang Tzu may be summed up in a single word: freedom” and a kind of spiritual freedom at that. He also points out that, Zhuangzi is the only early Chinese work which does not discuss political governance but instead focuses on one’s personal life. In Wandering Unfettered and Effortless: Liberating One’s Spirit and Reassessing Values, he points out that “‘Wandering Unfettered and Effortless’ describes a lively spiritual realm, a state in which one is content and at ease. This chapter describes a liberated spirit that flies freely and shows a state that is broad and unimpeded and is mysteriously united with objects.” Cui Dahua (崔大华) believes that, Zhuangzi divides human existence into whether one is or is not without an unburdened freedom. As Zhuangzi sees it, it is only the person who depends on nothing and who “chariots upon what is true both to heaven and to earth, riding atop the back-and-forth of the six atmospheric qi, so that your wandering could nowhere be brought to a halt” that is really free. For the rest, although there are differences in circumstances, they are all still the unfreedom of still depending on something. In actuality, this means that there are the two states of the sage, (perfected person, spirit-like person and sage) and the common people.

Liu Xiaogan in his doctoral dissertation points out that “the subject of wandering unfettered and effortless is one’s spirit, the place that it wanders is the imaginary

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homeland of not-even-anything. The content of wandering unfettered and effortless is the limitless flight of one’s thought within the boundlessness one’s spirit.” “Unfettered and effortless” is Zhuangzi’s investigation into the way of human existence and the spiritual realm. It is a transcendence of one’s own life and body. In the hundreds and thousands of years after Zhuangzi, however, “wandering unfettered and effortless” became the choice that literati, left with no choice, were forced to take when they had failed in their ambitions. It never became a standard state of existence in society, nor did it become an ideal of life. This not only does not accord with Zhuangzi’s original intent; it actually departs from the existential state that is displayed in the chapter “Wandering Unfettered and Effortless.” What gives us comfort, however, is that in the long stream of history there were always some worthy scholars who took on Zhuangzi’s dream of unfettered and effortlessness which depends on nothing and gave it innovative elucidation and thereby created a lasting influence which can still be felt today.

References Major, John S., Queen, Sarah A., Seth Meyer, Andrew., and Roth, Harold D., (Translator and Editors) 2010. The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China. New York: Columbia University Press. Ziporyn, Brook. 2009. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.

Chapter 36

Language and Meaning ( yanyi, 言意)

“Yanyi” is a key concept is Chinese epistemology. “Yan” refers to one’s words (言辞), nouns (名词), concept (概念), exposition and argument (论说) and writings (著述). In traditional Chinese philosophy, “yi” contains two dimensions of meaning, one means intention and the other means ideal (理想), the argument of a speech or essay (义理) and purpose (宗旨). When the two terms are united, “yi” refers to idea, argument and purpose. Key to the concept of “yanyi” is the relationship between “yan” and “yi,” and this relationship differed throughout different historical epochs and at the hands of different philosophers. Due to their different understandings of “yanyi,” there were also differences in their understanding of the relationship between “yan” and “yi.”

36.1 One As early as the pre-Qin period philosophers were already paying great attention to language and meaning. It appears explicitly in Xici A of the Ten Wings. The Master said: “Writing does not fully express speech [言], and speech [言] does not fully express thought.” “This being so, then how can the thoughts of the sages be seen?” The Master said, “The sages established symbols [象] in order to express fully their ideas, and set up hexagrams in order to express fully the characteristics (of things), appended statements to them in order to express fully their words [言].

Here, yan [言] refers to the phrases that explain the hexagram and the lines ( yao) whereas yi (意) refers to the argument that is contained in the hexagram or line ( yao); it is the basic meaning that the sage Fuxi gained when the observed heaven above and earth below. That the conceptual pair appears together reflects the recognition, on the part of the ancient thinkers, of both the antagonism and the connection between language and meaning. For the resolution of the problem that “speech [言] does not fully express thought” they proposed “establishing symbols in order to fully express their ideas.” In this way “symbols” becomes the intermediary between language © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_36

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and meaning. This represents the focus and thinking of ancient philosophers on the relationship between language and meaning. The pre-Qin Confucian thinkers often stressed that language exhausts meaning. Confucius believed that through knowing a person’s speech or language, one can know the person as language manifests a person’s views and emotions and does not merely refer to the words themselves. Confucius also believed that as long as words can clearly express one’s thoughts, then it is sufficient. From this we can see Confucius’s belief that in ordinary life, language has the function of expressing feelings and intentions and his implicit confirmation that language is, to an extent, capable of exhausting meaning. As a follower of Confucius, Mencius also had great faith in language’s capacity for expressing intent and communication. He believed that language was commensurable with one’s meaning and so through language, one can know someone else’s meaning. Xunzi is also relatively optimistic about whether language can exhaust meaning. In the “Correcting Names” chapter of the Xunzi he writes, “sentences combine the names of different objects so as to discuss a single idea.”1 He also says, “thus, when the names he [the moral exemplar] uses are sufficient to indicate their objects, and the terms he uses are sufficient to make apparent his central standard, then he adopts them.”2 Here, he is saying that language and sentences are capable of exhausting meaning. Like the Confucians, the pre-Qin Mohists also advocated that language can exhaust meaning. In “Canon I” of “Book Ten” of the Mozi, we read, hearing [闻] is what the ears perceive. Going by what one hears and deriving its meaning is the capacity [察] of thought of the heart-mind. Language is the fluency with the mouth. Going by to what is said and getting its meaning is the discernment [辩] of the heart-mind.

When the heart-mind follows what one hears and what is said, it can derive the meaning contained. Mozi is thus affirming that through certain language one can gain a certain meaning. In the “Minor Illustrations” chapter of “Book 11” we read, “Names are used to raise stuff [实]; phrases are used to express intention [意].” Here, it is affirmed that language is able to express meaning and that language and meaning correspond with each other. Like Mencius, Mozi affirms the function of language for expressing feelings and meanings. In “Canon II” of “Book Ten” Mozi says that “to say that all sayings contradict [悖] itself is self-contradictory [悖]” and thus criticized the cynicism about and refutation of the ability of language to express meaning. Represented by Zhuangzi, pre-Qin Daoism took a sceptical attitude with regard to whether language could express meaning, and even refuted it outright. They leaned towards advocating “language does not exhaust meaning.” The first chapter of the Daodejing clearly states that that the dao which can be spoken is not the real dao and so explicitly specified that from the perspective of dao, language cannot exhaust meaning. Zhuangzi, a figure intimately related to Laozi, from the perspective of dao also said that, “The Dao cannot be seen; what can be seen is not It. The Dao cannot be expressed in words; what can be expressed in words is not it.” (Knowledge 1 Hutton 2 Hutton

(2014: 241). (2014: 242).

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Rambling in the North”) According to this logic, meaning cannot be expressed and what is expressed is not meaning. Zhuangzi also said, “What can be discoursed about in words is the grossness of things; what can be reached in idea is the subtilty of things” (“Autumn Floods”), “what is valuable in words is the ideas they convey. But those ideas are a sequence of something else - and what that something else is cannot be conveyed by words.” (“The Way of Heaven”) Fishing-stakes are employed to catch fish; but when the fish are got, the men forget the stakes. Snares are employed to catch hares, but when the hares are got, men forget the snares. Words are employed to convey ideas; but when the ideas are apprehended, men forget the words. Fain would I talk with such a man who has forgot the words! (“What Comes from Without”)

Zhuangzi believes that language can only express the grossness of objects but only meaning can arrive at the subtlety of objects. In comparison, meaning is relatively more important than language, as such, he advocates forgetting language and gaining meaning. In terms of the relationship between language and meaning, he advocates forgetting language, he believed that language is merely a medium and a middle link whereas meaning is the root and ultimate end. Of course, apart from the above, there were also other discussions on language and meaning. “Minor Illustrations”, Book 11 of the Mozi, for example said, “Phrases are used to express intention” (以辞抒意) Xunzi proposed that “sentences combine the names of different objects so as to discuss a single idea.”3 (“Rectification of Names”, Xunzi) The Annals of Lü Buwei says that “language is used to express meaning” (“Departing from the Import”). These discussions, however, were not very deep or systematic, and so were not very influential. In all, discussions on language and meaning in the pre-Qin period was not developed to its fullest extent.

36.2 Two In the Han period, the relationship between language and meaning was generally less complicated and heterogeneous as compared with the pre-Qin period whereby each school maintained a different position. Apart from the Huainanzi, which maintained the Laozian and Zhuangzian view that language does not exhaust meaning, all the other schools basically affirmed the idea that language does exhaust meaning. There were, however, some new signs and changes, for example, Dong Zhongshu did not abide by the traditional commentarial tradition and tried to explain the classics through images (意象) and spiritual intuition (境界). Yang Xiong used profound and obscure language to express subtle principles, but despite his innovativeness, he encountered fierce criticism from Wang Chong. During the Wei-Jin period, the question of language and meaning became a common problem for many different sects of Neo-Daoism. Because the Han Confucians stuck too stubbornly to the commentarial or philological tradition, they often glossed 3 Hutton

(2014: 241).

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over the actual meaning or spirit of the text. The result was that the study of the classics became more and more baroque and complicated. This was particularly the case in explanations of the Book of Changes where the use of numbers and images to explain the hexagrams over-explained ideas so that the ideas itself, paradoxically, became unclear. In refuting the exegetical tradition of the Han dynasty, the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoist tradition was naturally met with the question of the relationship between language and meaning. As such, the complicated relationship between language and meaning drew the universal attention of Neo-Daoist philosophers and became a focus of discussion. In the Neo-Daoist discussion of the relationship between language and meaning, Wang Bi advocated “getting the meaning and forgetting language” (得意忘言) and Ji Kang followed him. Guo Xiang, however, proposed “relying on language to manifest meaning” (寄言出意) and a major intellectual movement of “distinction between language and meaning” was thereby initiated. In the main, the basic thought of this movement was rooted in the philosophy of the pre-Qin philosophers and can be divided into the three camps of “language exhausts meaning”, “language does not exhaust meaning”, and “getting the meaning and forgetting language.” In terms of the theoretical content, however, it was characterized by the zeitgeist and a more profound epistemological-methodological significance. The “distinction between language and meaning” began with the Han and Wei dynasty inclination towards evaluating human characters, combined and furthered the investigation into whether names accorded with reality. According to the description in Discourse on Language Exhausts Meaning (言尽意论) by Ouyang Jian, in their discussions of human nature, Jiang Ji (蒋济) Zhong Hui (钟会) Fu Gu (傅嘏) all borrowed from the discourse of “language does not exhaust meaning.” As they see it, Heaven does not speak, but the four seasons proceed. The sage does not speak but they can identify existence. Form does not depend on names, but the round and the square make themselves visible. Sights do not depend on names but black and white make themselves manifest.

As such, “a name cannot change anything about an object, language cannot change anything about li.” This view reached its peak with the Jin dynasty Zhang Han (张韩). Zhang Han believed that in the Analects when Zigong said, “the master’s views on human nature (xing) and the dao of the heavens cannot be heard” he is making evident that principle of the utmost subtly (至精) is harder to hear (愈不可闻). Language cannot communicate principle and it is only through the language-less communication of heart-minds that principle can be communicated. As such, he believed “heaven, earth and humans cannot be expressed through language language.” He advocated “resting meaning in language is not as good as resting meaning in the language-less” and vigorously championed “not using discourse.” In opposition to this discourse of the inutility of language and names, Ouyang Jian comprehensively argued for the theory that language exhausts meaning. He believed that without language and names humans will have no means of communicating their thought and have no means of distinguishing the similarity and difference between people and objects.

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He points out that objects do not have a spontaneous and natural name and principle does not have a necessary name. People made different names and established names according to the differences between objects and principle, in order to distinguish between people and objects, to communicate their thought. As such, “names follow their changes in the objects, language changes due to principle.” The relationship between the two is analogous to how “echoes respond to sounds, shadows follow forms: they cannot be separated.” Language and reality, language and meaning are in complete accord with each other. The “discourse of language does not exhaust meaning” is represented by Ji Kang and also comprised Xun Can (荀粲), Yin Hao (殷浩), Yin Rong (殷融), Liu Shen (刘 慎) and He Xiang (何襄). Xun Xan is one of the earliest Neo-Daoist figures to hold the view that “language does not exhaust meaning.” He believed that language can express meaning but not exhaust meaning. Beyond normal language and symbols, there exists a “meaning beyond the symbol” (象外之意) and “profound sayings” (系 表之言). These are subtle in principle, hard to understand, “deep and not manifest” (蕴而不出) and cannot be expressed with symbols and language; they transcend language and symbols and are beyond the reach of language. Here, Xun Can is distinguishing between language and meaning, pointing out that what language itself expresses is not meaning per se. Ji Kang authored Language does not exhaust Meaning (言不尽意论) which is no longer in extant. In his Discourse Sounds do not have Sorrow or Joy (声无哀乐论), however, we can still find his thoughts on “language does not exhaust meaning.” Here, he gives the example of music and demonstrated that there was no relationship between the heart-mind’s intent and music, between one’s emotions and objectively existing sounds. He said, the sounds that the great bells, drums, reed pipes play, and the qin and se (金石管弦者) make, are all objectively existing natural phenomena. The sorrow and joy within one’s heart-mind is, on the other hand, subjective; the two are separate things. Based the heart-mind and sounds, Ji Kang furthered the discourse of “language does not exhaust meaning.” He said, “the dao of knowing this [知之之道] cannot depend on language. […] Language is not a natural thing fixed in its nature. There are different customs in the five directions, the same thing is given different names, but one picks one name and take it as representing what we know.” “The dao of knowing this” is meaning, it is the knowledge of the world and although it is subjective, it has a universality. Language, on the other hand, is a kind of “signified knowing” (标识). It is because there exist geographical differences that “language is not a naturally determined thing.” As Ji Kang sees it, once language is formed, although it contains a certain amount of social content and has a certain connection with thought, is not internal and necessary to society and thought. From this he derived the conclusion that “the heart-mind does not depend on language; language does not evidence the heart-mind” and that one’s spiritual life can only be sensed but not expressed through language. In Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, the person who gave the most sophisticated theoretical analysis of the relationship between language and meaning, and person who made the greatest contribution to it was the representative of Neo-Daoism, Wang Bi. Wang Bi proposed the discourse of “forgetting language after getting the meaning.” His discourse of “getting meaning and forgetting language” shares both similarities and

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differences with the discourse of “language does not exhaust meaning.” In his Outline Introduction to the Laozi, he writes, A name necessarily involves how one thing is distinct from other things, and a comparison [称] necessarily involves how the tenor of one thing depends on the vehicle of another. Making distinctions, any name would fail to be inclusive; being dependent, any comparison would fail to be short of all that it is. As it cannot be perfectly inclusive, any name for it would deviate greatly from the truth; as it is cannot express all that it is, any comparison for it would fail to designate what it really is. […] As such, those who speak of it do violence to its constancy; those who give it a name separate themselves from its authenticity […] Thus, as the sage does not confuse words for it with its sovereignty, he does nothing in opposition to its constancy, he does not separate himself from its authenticity.4

Here, name and comparison (称) are talking about language. Once one has names and comparisons then there will necessarily be distinctions; once there is distinction then there will not be the complete whole. As names and comparisons have the characteristics of not being inclusive and not exhaustive, then they cannot reflect the complete character and real nature of things. Evidently, this passage contains the philosophy of “language does not exhaust meaning.” In his General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou, “Clarifying the Images” Wang Bi believed on the one hand that “To yield up meaning completely, there is nothing better than the symbols [象], and yet to yield up the meaning of the symbols, there is nothing better than words.”5 “One can ponder the words and so observe what the symbols are” and “one can ponder the symbols and so observe what the meaning are.” Symbols are produced from meaning for expressing meaning and language is produced from symbols for expressing symbols; the function of language is for expressing meaning. As such, to exhaust meaning one must utilize language, as once one departs from language then there is no means of exhausting meaning. In using language to express meaning, meaning is the content and language is the form, and the content depends on the external conditions of the form in order to be expressed. From another perspective, however, language is not tantamount to symbols and symbols are not tantamount to meaning. Language and symbols are just fishing stakes and snares for getting meaning. It is only through forgetting symbols that one can get the meaning and in forgetting language that one can get the symbols. Symbols and language are not the meaning but merely the tools for getting meaning. Without these tools, however, one cannot get the meaning. Wang Bi correctly points out that although there is a connection between symbols and meaning, language and symbols, language and symbols are not the same. With regard to meaning, symbols are merely a medium, with regard to symbols, language is also only a tool. Media and tools are not tantamount to the aim and limiting oneself to symbols might result in language obstructing symbols and symbols obstructing meaning. The difference and antagonism between language and symbols, and symbols and meaning which Wang Bi manifest the profundity of his thought. This philosophy of his had a very positive influence on the baroque system of interpretation on the Book of Changes of the Han dynasty. 4 Lynn 5 Lynn

(1999: 32–33). (1994: 31), modified.

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What needs to be re-emphasized is Ouyang Jian (欧阳建) of the Western Jin’s philosophy of “language exhausts meaning,” which is opposed to Wang Bi’s philosophy of “language does not exhaust meaning.” In his Discourse of Language Exhausts Meaning (言尽意论), Ouyang Jian argued three points. First, the processes of nature, the discernments of the sage as well as the states of the things and affairs exist without relying on language; language or designations do not alter the essence and form of things and affairs. Second, the function of language and designations lies in making distinctions between things and affairs, elucidating their logic and in making communication more robust. Language and designations are not, however, innately possessed by things and affairs themselves; they only arose as a result of the desire to ease communication between people. Third, designations change according to the changes in things and affairs and language changes according to the logic of affairs. The relationship between names and objects, language and principle are akin to the relationship between forms and their shadow and cannot be taken as separate. Although Ouyang Jian’s philosophy has a certain correctness about it, his view that names and language cannot be separated from objects and principle is lacking in sophisticated theoretical demonstration. His proposed view that “language exhausts meaning” is thus comparatively simple and arbitrarily asserted. After Ouyang Jian, another approach in the Wei-Jin on the relationship between language and meaning which had certain a degree of influence was the Buddhist thinker Zhu Daosheng. Zhu Daosheng mainly approached the question of language and meaning from the Buddhist perspective. In History of Buddhism in the Han and Wei-Jin Period (汉魏两晋南北朝佛教史) Tang Youngtong said, Prajñ¯a cannot be expressed, this means that language cannot be held onto. Thus, Zhu Daosheng said, one should forget symbols once one has got the meaning. Once one has entered truth [理], one should extinguish language. Thus, although symbols are used to exhaust meaning, one cannot cling onto them. Although language is used to explain truth, it cannot be stubbornly held onto. Thus, one discards all types of appearances [相] in order to like the form of things become more manifest. Casting aside specific languages is also so that what language represents is made more evident. Languages and symbols [象] are diverse and multitudinous, but in substance they are the same. “Although there are different dharmas, they are all due to the intermingling of causes. (Commentary to the Lotus Sutra) […] If people can understand the real nature of phenomena and of the various dharma (Commentary on Vimalakirti Sutra), understand that “although the languages of the Buddhist scriptures are various, but they all express this same meaning” and one can thereby “turn one’s back on confusion and return to the ultimate, and upon returning the ultimate one can get the root.”

Zhu Daosheng’s discourse on language and meaning was highly innovative. Although it bears the Laozian and Zhuangzian spirit of transcendence, it is not a merely a replica of Wang Bi’s methodology for reading the Book of Changes. It instead reaches a wordless, religious state of nirvana whereby one forgets both self and objects, where being and non-being are the same. It is only under this system of ideological understanding that he believes both language and meaning are merely linking media, and that the ultimate aim is to arrive at a state whereby one forgets both objects and the self. To ultimately arrive at the real intuition of life whereby being and nonbeing are the same, where language is broken, and the actions of the heart-mind are

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extinguished and where illusions and burdens are got rid of and one arrives at an enlightenment of the reality of life. From the analysis of language and meaning of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, we can see that the purpose of these philosophers’ investigations into the relationship between language and meaning did not lie in a hair-splitting analysis of language and meaning itself, but rather in transcending the bitterness and pain of life and so to achieve a spiritual liberation. This applied to Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism as well as Wei-Jin Buddhism. The so-called breaking of illusion so as to know reality aimed at truly understanding the present life. The so-called not holding onto illusions, names and language is nothing other than freeing the self from one’s binds and pain. As such, the distinction between language and meaning of the Wei-Jin period as a stage in the development of Chinese philosophy was of great importance.

36.3 Three After the Wei-Jin period, in the domain of Buddhism, Buddhist thinkers took over the discourse of “language does not exhaust meaning” and “forgetting language once one has got the meaning.” These concepts thus became a powerful weapon in the pioneering of Buddhist discourse, and even pushed it towards the extreme of “not using language” (不立文字). As the limited nature of the methodology of geyi (“analogising concepts”, 格义, i.e. using Confucian concepts to understand Buddhism) became more pronounced daily, Neo-Daoist thinkers began to explore the idea that “language does not exhaust meaning” and “forgetting language once one has got the meaning”; in order to break free from the methodology of geyi, it was necessary to innovate methodologically. This new methodology was precisely the classical interpretive methods of “relying on language to manifest meaning” (寄言出 意), “employing language in order to observe meaning” (寻言观意) and “discarding language once one has got the meaning” (得意忘言). In his Commentary on the Treatises of Sengzhao (肇论疏), Huida’s (慧达) writes, The master of the law Zhu Daosheng [竺道生] has this to say with regard to what is immediate enlightenment [顿悟]: the reason why it is called immediate is to clarify that principle cannot be divided. What is called immediate enlightenment refers to a complete understanding. Immediate understanding is thus a complete understanding of the indivisible principle. […] Having some insights onto things and affairs is called enlightenment […] just like a fruit will spontaneously fall when it is ripe. Enlightenment is not produced self-so, it must rely on a steadfast faith and the gradual accumulation of self-cultivation.

According to the doctrine of the “four things to depend on and not depend on” (四依 四不依) in “The Offering of the Law” chapter of the Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra, Zhu Daosheng advocated the idea of “immediate enlightenment” in the sense that one should not cling onto language and concepts, the language of the Buddhist classics, but direct intuition of the meaning of Buddhist principle. As Huilin (慧琳) explains in reference to this,

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Principle relies on concepts, but if one clings onto concepts then they will obscure principle. Buddhist education is an instrument for transforming the person [i.e. make them understand principle], but if one restricts oneself to this kind of education then they will become a hindrance to understanding principle. This is why if one merely restricted oneself to concepts in understanding the substance of Buddhism, then one will be blinded by empty talk. If one conducts affairs according to the understanding of concepts, then one cannot clearly distinguish the true meaning of Buddhist wisdom. (“Eulogy on Master Daosheng”, Expanded Collection of the Propagation and Clarification [of Buddhism])

In the biography of Zhu Daosheng of the Biographies of Eminent Monks, it is said, Through a long period of contemplation, Zhu Daosheng realized the principle of Buddhism. He thereupon sighed, “concepts are for expressing meaning, once one has got the meaning then one should discard the concepts. Language is used for explaining principle, once one has understood the principle, then language should be extinguished. Since the Buddhist canons entered the Middle Kingdom, translators of Buddhist scriptures have encountered various hurdles and most of them stick rigidly to superficial words and rarely understand the perfect harmony of the Buddhist teachings. If one can forget the stakes after getting the fish, then one can start discussing the dao.” Thus, he proof read against the true and the vulgar texts, thought about karma, talk about good does not get reward, and then proclaimed that one should carry out good acts without seeking for honours and that immediate enlightenment leads to Buddhahood.

The development of the discourse of sudden enlightenment developed until the Tang dynasty and directly influenced the creation of Chan Buddhism. Chang Buddhism believed that Buddhism does not rely on words and is characterized by “not using language, clarifying the heart-mind and seeing human nature.” It believed in the state of “suddenly being enlightened and becoming Buddha” (Book I, mah¯avaipulya Treasure Chest) cannot be analysed by language and can only be mysteriously experienced by one’s inner heart-mind. It is for this reason that they closely followed the stricture of “not using words and not holding onto language”, “using heart-mind to communicate heart-mind, so that people are enlightened and understand on their own.” (“The First Section on the Source of [My/Huineng’s] Practice”, Platform Sutra) in passing down the canon and epistemology. As such, after the Tang dynasty Chan Buddhism’s complete refutation of language became a new kind of view on the language and meaning. After the Tang dynasty, Chan Buddhism’s influence expanded ceaselessly, so that it later overtook Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism to become the dominant school. Chan Buddhism is split into the sects of sudden and gradual enlightenment. The Southern school advocated “sudden enlightenment” and they were the ones who prevailed and came to dominate. By the northern Song it was already popular to talk about the five teachings and seven doctrines (五宗七家). After the southern Song, only Linji (临济) and Caodong (曹 洞) flourished. Chan Buddhism mainly flourished in the middle Tang and the Song dynasties, in particular during the Song. In the development of Chan Buddhism, at times, they completely rejected language so there is the so-called chan of to meditate on a k¯oan (看话禅), silent illumination (默照禅) and to strike and shout at a student (棒喝禅) amongst others. For Chan Buddhism, is only when all else fails that language is used, and even then, the usual grammar is distorted so that language is made to operate in the same way as striking and shouting at a student. Recorded in the

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various Record of the Transmission of the Lamp (传灯录), are koans of innovative counter-logics. Huineng, for example, said, “we possess prajñ¯a in our own nature, and we should always contemplate [观照] by using our own wisdom, without going through scriptures [文字].” Chan Buddhism advocated illuminating the heart-mind in order to see one’s human nature, where one’s heart-mind is Buddha. They advocated relying on one’s personal efforts to maintain self-cultivation, immediate, complete enlightenment and accomplishing Buddhahood. They were established outside the authority of the Buddhist canon and emphasized that achieving Buddhahood is a process of internal selfrecognition, and that Buddhahood is to be achieved in this life as opposed to a future life. This basic characteristic of Chan Buddhism is not only an outright refutation of the basic principles of the Buddhist canon and of the importance of hearing and pondering the noble truths (闻思正见), it is also a refutation of the standards found in the Buddhist classics of for achieving Buddhahood. Does becoming Buddha actually have a universal standard? How can one prove Buddhahood? These questions became an internal problem for Chan Buddhism that became had to escape. The manifestation of this basic problem, on the one hand, benefitted the expression of the subjective agency and originality of Chan Buddhism, on the other hand, it also had a negative impact on the development of Chan Buddhism. As such, under the influence of fundamental congruence of the meditative and doctrinal approach (禅 教一致), Song dynasty Buddhism formed a very characteristic method––Chan Buddhism through Writing (文字禅)––which means examining the recorded sayings and koan from the Chan schools so as to grasp the methods of self-cultivation. It emphasized using language and words to study, teach, examine Chan, and to come to enlightenment of Chan. From “no dependence on words or writing” (不立文字) it became “not departing from words or writing” (不离文字) and thereby changed the Buddhist attitude of looking down upon scripture and language. All of these factors no doubt gave fertile intellectual resources for the synthetic innovations of Song Neo-Confucianism.

36.4 Four After the Song dynasty, in order to revive the status of Confucianism within the zeitgeist of an intellectual milieu dominated by Daoism, Neo-Daoism and Chan Buddhism, it was necessary to accord with the demands of the times and explain Confucian principles according to the theory and methodology of the “distinction between language and meaning.” In explaining Confucianism, Zhang Zai approached the passage, “the master’s personal displays of his principles [文章] may be heard; his discourses about human nature (xing) and the dao of the heavens cannot be heard” from a metaphysical perspective and gave it a new interpretation. He said,

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Zigong once heard that the master’s views on human nature and the dao of the heavens but Zigong did not understand it and so he said “it cannot be heard.” If it was the master’s personal displays of his principles [文章], however, then Zigong would naturally know it. As a sage, all his words and actions communicate dao to people, it’s just that people do not investigate it. (Part I, Records of Master Zhang)

He also said, The ears cannot hear the dao. Zigong thought that the master’s views on human nature and the dao of the heavens cannot be heard because it is hearing which cannot be heard by the ears. (“The grand origin of learning Part I”, The Well-ordered Cave of the Science of the Classics

He believed that it is not the fact that “human nature and the dao of the heavens” cannot be heard, but rather it cannot be known through the senses and that dao cannot be gained through the ears. Here, Zhang Zai is emphasizing that in believing “human nature and the dao of the heavens cannot be known” is “not to take minimal knowing [苟知] as attainment but realization [了悟] as knowing [闻].” Through this, Zhang Zai is demonstrating that only intuitive enlightenment is capable of understanding human nature and the dao of the heavens. In fact, Zhang Zai is here further elucidating and developing ideas on language and meaning, demonstrating that the importance of meaning lies in intuition and not merely the transmission of language which is merely a perceptual, “minimal knowing.” With regard to the same question of human nature and the dao of the heavens and whether it can be heard or not, the Cheng brothers also used the methodology of “distinction between language and meaning.” The Cheng brothers answer to whether it can really be heard or not is that, “it can be gained for oneself but not transmitted.” The Cheng brothers turned “cannot be heard” to “can be heard but not transmitted.” They emphasized that “gained for oneself” lies in grasping human nature and the dao of the heavens. As the disciple of the Cheng brothers Xie Liangzuo (谢良佐) said, Zigong understood human nature and the dao of heaven through the personal displays of Confucius’s principles. If he didn’t hear of it then how could he say what he said? Confucius was good at speaking and Zigong was good at listening. (“Heart-mind and Human Nature”, Purified Words)

Cheng Yi said, Confucius’s discourse on human nature and the way of heaven cannot be heard. It was only Zigong who understood what Confucius wanted to express; it was for this reason that he could he give such expressions of admiration. When Zigong said Confucius’s discourses about human nature and the dao of the heavens cannot be heard, he merely means that other people have not heard it. (Book 6, Additional Works)

The Cheng brothers innovatively limited “cannot be heard” to “the masses” and did not include Confucius’s disciples such as Zigong. It is precisely through language (文章) that Zigong personally experienced the principle of human nature and the dao of the heavens and so expressed such words of eulogy. It can, therefore, be seen that in elucidating the Confucian classics, the Cheng brothers were able to innovate due to the “distinction between language and meaning.”

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After the song dynasty, there were no great breakthroughs with regard to the concepts of language and meaning and tended to follow the theoretical discourse of the “distinction between language and meaning.”

References Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1999. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 37

Harmony and Sameness (hetong, 和同)

Harmony and sameness are concepts that appeared very early in the history of Chinese philosophy, making their appearance as early as in the oracle bone scripts and the bronze inscriptions. The Book of Documents, Book of Changes, Rites of Zhou, Discourses of the States and the Zuo Zhuan all have records of these terms. “Harmony” comprises the meanings of “harmonious proportion” (调和), “peace” (和 平) and “cordial and harmonious” (和谐). “Sameness” comprises the meanings of “same” (相同), “equality” (相等) and coincident (相合). What needs to be mentioned is that in the early classics, “harmony” and “sameness” had approximately the same meaning or meanings that were very close to each other and did not yet have the implication of being opposed to each other. In the following discussion, we will see how these concepts came to take on antithetical meanings.

37.1 One In Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters, harmony is explained as “harmony means responding to each other.” It can be inferred from this that harmony refers to a relationship where different things accord with one another. Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters explains “sameness” as “coming together.” It can be inferred from this that sameness means things coming together and reaching an accord. The use of harmony in the early Confucian classics referred to “cordial and harmonious”, “harmonious proportion” and fusion (融合). “Sameness” is its conceptual antithesis and contains the idea of “togetherness” (共通) and “approximate sameness” (差同) in the concept of “harmony.” The antithetical and dialectical relationship between harmony and sameness is first mentioned by Shi Bo (史伯), in conversation with Duke Huan of the state of Zheng, in the “Discourses of Zheng” (郑语) chapter of the Discourses of the States (国语). Here, Shi Bo clearly explained the difference between “harmony” and “sameness.” He pointed out that harmony means to temper (平和) and to bring into proportion (调和) things that are different from each other, so that heterogeneous things with © Nanjing University Press 2020 Y. Wang et al., History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_37

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different natures can be brought together and gain development. “Sameness,” on the other hand, is to use same things to complement each other, so that in this extinguishing of difference, things cannot gain development. In order to make this difference clear, Shi Bo gave the following examples, only when “earth is mixed with metal, wood, water and fire” can “the myriad things be produced,” only when the “five flavours are harmonised” can there be delicious food, only when the four limbs take turns can there be a healthy body and only when the six notes are harmonized can there be pleasing music, and so on. In this passage, Shi Bo did not give a precise definition of “sameness” but only said that “sameness” is an absolute sameness and is the antithesis of “harmony.” This is clearly different from the previous understanding of harmony and sameness. On this basis, Shi Bo also elucidated the “way of the sovereign,” he believed that “Harmony [he, 和] leads to fecundity [shengwu, 生物], sameness [tong, 同] means barrenness” as such, “the former kings took consorts from different clans, allowed riches to flow in from different regions, allowed for a plurality of different opinions and tried to effect harmony among difference.” The “sovereign of proper action” should “do away with sameness and champion harmony” and should be able to accept the differences among people and things and affairs and impose one’s own preferences on others and expect them to conform with it. Through Shi Bo’s comparison of “harmony” and “sameness”, he emphasized that “harmony leads to fecundity” and “sameness means barrenness” and so took them be essentially antithetical. Harmony is the organic result of uniting heterogeneous things; through the process of harmony, differences and antitheses are fused together into a new harmoniously integrated entity. As such, we can say that in the history of Chinese philosophy, Shi Bo was the first to propose the “distinction between sameness and difference,” the first to summarise and differentiate between sameness and difference and laid the foundations for the clarification of the separation between harmony and sameness. After the spring and autumn period, on the basis of Shi Bo’s thought and in combining the contemporary historical and cultural background of his times, Yanzi (晏子) proposed his own philosophy of “harmony and sameness”. In the Twentieth Year of Lord Zhao of the Zuo Zhuan there is recorded a dialogue between an official of the state of Qi, Yanzi, with the Duke Jing of Qi. This dialogue profoundly reflected Yanzi’s understanding of “harmony and sameness.” He believed that “harmony” is like making a soup and one needs water, fire, vinegar, sauce, salt, plum, fish and meat as ingredients. One needs to cook them with water and fire and coordinate the five flavours as well as use different cooking methods before one can gain a delicious dish. If one merely “complements [济] water with water,” then this cannot result in a good dish. “Harmony” is the existence of all the five flavours, whereas there is only one taste in sameness. Apart from this he also used the example of music, saying that “the short and the long,” the “fast and the slow,” the “sorrowful and the joyful,” the “strong and the tender” can reciprocally compensate for and mutually complete and each other. As such, “not being the same” is the basic condition for the composition and development of things. It is only on the basis of difference and heterogeneity that things can ceaselessly develop. Blindly seeking after “sameness,” like Liang Qiuju

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(梁丘据) saying yes when the sovereign says yes, saying no when the sovereign says no, will not bring any benefit to the sovereign. Yanzi’s discussion of “harmony is different to sameness” (和与同异), is a development on the traditional idea of “harmony and sameness.” He realized that the harmony of things and affairs is due to heterogeneous and even antithetical elements complementing and completing each other. They can “compensate for deficiencies and reduce excessiveness” and so reach a state where the different elements complete one another and become transformed thus reaching a new unity. Apart from this, in the Yanzi Chunqiu, inner chapters, “Remonstrances A, 18,” Yanzi also says that what is meant by harmony is that if the sovereign is sweet, then the minister should be sour. If the sovereign is bland, then the minister should be salty. This means that the role of the sovereign and the minister as well as their capabilities should be different and complementary. The minister should advance the worthy and not simply follow the desires of the sovereign, he should abolish what is bad upon seeing it and not simply make way for what the sovereign’s preferences. Here, Yanzi is further elaborating on what constitutes the complementary nature of “harmony.” As is evident, in this passage, the antagonistic pairs “sovereign and minister”, “sweet and sour” and “bland and salty” are used for explaining harmony and sameness and so has already a great leap from the passage we have seen in the Zuo Zhuan. With regard to the antithesis between harmony and difference, Yanzi holds the same view as Shi Bo: they both believe that “harmony” is a unity which contains difference and is a concretely manifested unity, for example, a soup. Sameness, however, is an abstract unity which rejects difference and opposition, for example, “using water to complement water.” In terms of how to arrive at “harmony,” however, Yanzi emphasized the complementary and mutually compensating function of opposites, Shi Bo, on the other hand, only saw the difference between harmony and difference and the unity of oppositions but did not see exactly how it is that harmony and sameness are united.

37.2 Two As the founder of the Confucian school, Confucius provided a sophisticated summary of the philosophy of harmony on the basis of Shi Bo and Yanzi’s thoughts and, for the first time, explicitly discussed harmony and sameness in relation to the social sphere. In the Analects, the term harmony appears nine times and sameness appears eight times and it is this text that we see the key thesis of “the moral exemplar harmonises but does not make himself the same, the petty man makes himself the same but he does not harmonise.” (Analects 13.23). Confucius’s life mission was the advocacy of the “dao of equilibrium and harmony” (中和之道). Proceeding from the practical circumstances of his time he transformed “harmony” into a concrete way of conducting one’s affairs and a virtue of the sovereign, thereby transforming it into a methodological principle for practical action in both society and personal life. As we have seen, in the Analects it is recorded that “the moral exemplar harmonises but

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does not make himself the same, the petty man makes himself the same, but he does not harmonise.” Here, whilst inheriting Shi Bo and Yanzi’s thinking on harmony and sameness, Confucius is introducing the distinction between harmony and difference into the social sphere and distinguishing between the moral exemplar and the petty man. Confucius, however, has also jumped out of the dialectical relationship between harmony and sameness and introduced harmony and difference into “ritual” (li). The harmony which Confucius talks about operates within the realm of ritual. Harmony cannot be carried out without the use ritual to provide specification and restraint, and it is only with the restraint and norms provided by ritual that one can arrive at the state of being calm and leisurely, that one can arrive at the state of harmony. Ritual is the necessary limitation that people need in handling different relationships; it is only with the existence of this kind of ritual that harmony is made possible. The pre-Qin Confucians all “valued harmony” (贵和). There are two basic dimensions to the meaning of harmony.First, is coordinating (协调) and being in accord (和谐); these meanings are no different from the previous discussion. The second is a moderate mean (适中) and hitting precisely the most effective point (恰到好处). There is the further idea of affection and harmony among kin (亲睦), a harmonious fusion (融洽) and cooperation (合作). In Analects 1.12 we read that, “of all the things brought about by ritual, harmony is the most valuable.” Mencius says, “Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the harmony of people.” Xunzi not only saw that “above they will not miss out on the seasons of heaven, below they will not miss out on the advantages of the earth, in the middle they will obtain harmonious cooperation among people and the hundred tasks will not be neglected” he also said, “if they [people] are harmonized then they will be unified. If they are unified then they will have more force. If they have more force then they will be strong. If they are strong then they will be able to overcome animals.”1 The Doctrine of the Mean says “this notion of equilibrium [中] is the great root of the world, harmony is the advancing of the proper way in the world. When equilibrium is sustained, and harmony is fully realized when the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world.”2 As can be seen, for the pre-Qin Confucians, harmony possesses the capacity for “forming a triad with heaven and earth” “assist in transforming and educating” give rise to the myriad things and morally transform the people. In the pre-Qin Confucian classics, however, one is not supposed to value harmony in an unprincipled way and what is stressed is “harmonizing but not being the same.” The Doctrine of the Mean advocated “harmony but not moved by the common flow” (和而不流) which means not being carried along without any principles, losing one’s sense of self in seeking to be in accord with common opinion. The reason why Mencius both praises valuing harmony and severely criticized those who are superficially virtuous in Mencius 7B37, is because as the superficially virtuous accord 1 Hutton

(2014: 76). and Hall (2001: 35). Throughout this translation, I have made use of Ames and Hall’s translation of the Doctrine of the Mean and often based my own translation on theirs.

2 Ames

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with the all the customary principles (乡愿) of their milieu; they “agree with the current customs and consent with an impure age.” In terms of the relationship between harmony and sameness, the pre-Qin Daoist Laozi advocated taking harmony as the basic principle of things and affairs. He believed that things and affairs cannot exist independent of harmony. The oppositional relationship between harmony and sameness has, however, been eliminated in Laozi, so that their antagonism tends to disappear. Daodejing chapter 42 says, “Everything carries yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms and blends these qi together to make them harmonious.”3 Qi here is the harmonious integration (和合) of the two qi of yin and yang. Daodejing Chap. 55 says that, “Understanding harmony is commonsense, and using common sense is acuity.”4 In both these examples, one can see Laozi’s preference for harmony, but it can also be seen that the opposition between harmony and sameness tends to disappear. Daodejing 56 says that “Blunt the sharp edges, untangle the knots. Harmonising the glare. Bring himself into agreement [同] with the obscurity [of others]. This is what is called the profoundest sameness [同].” The fact that harmonizing the glare and being in agreement with others is said in parallel means that the opposition between harmony and sameness is not made clear here. The Mohists were the Confucians’ contemporaries and, on the question of harmony and sameness, opposed the Confucian idea of “valuing harmony” and “harmonising without being the same.” Instead, Mozi advocated “exalting unity” (尚同). Through elucidating how a state would inevitably come to chaos if a common ritual propriety was not carried out, Mozi defended his idea of “exalting unity.” In fact, what Mozi means by exalting unity is “unifying the standards in the world,” so that a system will be established whereby each station will be regulated from the lowest to the highest. From the son of heaven to all the stages below, everyone will have their rulers. Installing the rulers was not for making their ranks high, and their emoluments substantial, to give them wealth and honour, and let them live in comfort and free of care. It was to procure benefits and eliminate adversities for the people, and to enrich the poor and increase the few, and to bring safety where there is danger and to restore order where there is confusion.5 (“Exalting Unity II” Mozi).

In this way, the standard for thought and right and wrong can be unified and an absolute obedience to the authority of this standard can be demanded. As can be seen, Mozi tried to realise “universal love” through sanctions on the state’s authority and the unification of all under heaven. Undoubtedly, Mozi’s thinking is not only different from that of Shi Bo and Yanzi, it is also different from that of the Confucians. Later, his thinking was taken on and developed by the legalists and became the blueprint for Dong Zhongshu’s idea that “the son of heaven receives mandate from heaven, and all under heaven receives mandate from the son of heaven.” 3 Ames

and Hall (2003: 143), modifed. Throughout this translation, I have often based my own translations of the Daodejing one their work. 4 Ames and Hall (2003: 163) 5 Translated by W. P. Mei. https://ctext.org/mozi/identification-with-the-superior-ii.

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By the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, the “distinction between harmony and sameness,” in following the idea of “equilibrium [中] and harmony [ 和]” proposed by the Doctrine of the Mean, was officially located in the “distinction between equilibrium and harmony.” From this point onwards, Chinese philosophy began its theoretical development of the “distinction between equilibrium and harmony.” It is traditionally believed that the Doctrine of the Mean was written by Zisi. Zisi developed the idea of equilibrium and commonality (中庸) that Confucius advocated and proposed the concept of “equilibrium and harmony.” He elevated equilibrium (中) to the basic principle which the myriad things rely on in order to exist and grow, as such, human beings also necessarily need to respect the dao of equilibrium and harmony. In explaining “equilibrium” and “harmony,” the Doctrine of the Mean points out that, The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure have not yet arisen is called equilibrium; once the emotions have arisen, but they are to their due degree this is called harmony. This equilibrium is the great root of all in the world. Harmony is the advancing of the proper way [dao].6 (Chap. 1, Doctrine of the Mean)

Joy and anger, grief and pleasure all belong to the domain of the emotions, and before they have arisen, they are hidden within one’s heart-mind and are impartial, neither overstepping nor not reaching the mark. The state of equilibrium is what is designated as “due degree” (中节). This is when the emotions have already arisen, are present and active in real life and are externally manifested. It refers to how once the arising has reached a certain stage they must be focused by ritual so that it accords with the stipulations of demands of ritual propriety. Here, “harmony” is mainly understood as the proper degree and harmony of emotional life. “Equilibrium and harmony” are not merely a kind of worldview but a state of moral cultivation. Once this state is arrived at then it can establish heaven and earth, nourish the myriad things and form a triad with heaven and earth. This kind of “equilibrium and harmony” is, in reality, a harmony of the union of heaven, earth and human beings.

37.3 Three The great Confucian of the Han dynasty, Dong Zhongshu, developed the Warring States philosophy of “equilibrium and harmony” and in the chapter “Conform to Heaven’s Way” of the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn” he comprehensively discussed his discourse of harmony. He pointed out that “there is no greater virtue than harmony.” With regard to their giving rise to things, if they do not arrive at the place of harmony, things will not be able to produce and grow. With regard to their nourishing things, if they do not arrive at the place of harmony, things will not be able to mature and ripen. [The myriad things] are completed by harmony, their birth must also arise from harmony. They begin at the equilibrium [中] they ending must also be at the equilibrium. The equilibrium is that by 6 Ames

and Hall (2001: 89).

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which heaven and earth begin and end things. Harmony is that by which heaven and earth engender and complete things.7

From the perspective of “harmony engendering things” (和生) and being “harmony completing things” to (成于和) “harmony is that by which heaven and earth engender things” (天地之所生成也) Dong Zhongshu gave a comprehensive description of the principle of harmony from the micro to the macro. He also elevated this principle of “harmony engendering things” and “harmony completing things” to a political philosophy dimension, Therefore [the ruler] leads and the people harmonise [和]; moves and the people follow. This is because he knows to arouse those things that their heaven-endowed natures cherish and to repress those things that their emotions despise. Being like this, although his words are restrained, his speech will certainly resonate widely; although his undertakings are modest, his achievements will certainly be great.8 (“The Rectifying Thread”)

He also applied this “harmony completing things” and “harmony engendering things” to the political “the people harmonise with” (民和) and “move and people follow” ( 动而民随之). This not only reflects the idea of “nourishing the people” (与民休息) of the Han Wudi period, it also reflected Wudi’s “expanding the territory” (开疆拓 土). The reigns of Emperor Wen of Han and his son Emperor Jing of Han as well the grand ambitions and great daring of Wudi’s reign show us the profound political effect that the idea of “equilibrium and harmony” that Dong Zhongshu developed had in the historical period of political unification. By the Song dynasty, Confucianism had already continuously absorbed and assimilated Buddhist and Daoist thought and, on this basis, formulated a new kind of Confucianism, this is the school of li or Neo-Confucianism. Thinking about harmony had also been ceaselessly evolving and had developed to the stage of “without harmony then heaven cannot be established, without harmony things cannot be engendered.” The question of harmony and sameness had evolved into the question of “divisions” (分) and “unity” (统). If the content of the question of harmony and sameness in the pre-Qin period was a continuous development from one of nature and human life to one of society and politics, then by the Southern Song, it contained the philosophical content of military affairs. The Song dynasty Neo-Confucian Yang Wan (杨万) said “nobody gave the command [令], but all things are harmonious, this is called mandate [命]. Nobody endowed [禀] things with harmony, but they were endowed [with harmony], this is called nature [性].” What is meant here is that the principle of harmony is objective without command and endowment. With regard to commanding and endowing harmony, Yang Wan also says, “the one who did this, it’s just the origin of Qian” which means that harmony is elevated to the status of the dao of heaven. In Confucian culture, both small harmony and big harmony are advocated. With regard to sameness, it is believed that “all in the world ultimately comes to the same end [同], though the roads to it are different, so there is an ultimate congruence in 7 Queen 8 Queen

and Major (2016: 570–571), modified. and Major (2016: 168).

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thought, though there might be hundreds of ways to deliberate about it.”9 (Xici B) It is only through hundreds of deliberations that one can arrive at a united opinion. Although the Confucians did not enter into the Daoist and Mohist debates on the “distinction between sameness and difference” (同异之辨), as the main culture of the later imperial period, Confucian culture did not exalt “small sameness” (小同) or “small union” (which is why they had the idea that “the moral exemplary harmonizes and is not the same”). They exalted instead “big sameness” (大同) or “grand union.” The “Liyun” chapter of the Book of Rites says, When the great dao was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under heaven; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus, men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and females had their homes. [They accumulated] articles [of value], disliking that they should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification. [They labored] with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it [only] with a view to their own advantage. In this way [selfish] scheming were repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was [the period of] what we call the grand union [大同].10

Although the “grand union” comes from the “Liyun” chapter of the Book of Rites, it did not belong exclusively to Confucian thought and can be instead understood as a summary, under Confucius’s aegis, of an ideal shared by many thinkers of the preQin period. The “Liyun” chapter of the Book of Rites did not give practical measures for realizing the grand union, what it described is instead a portrait of an already departed antiquity and what the sages called “considering all under heaven as one family, and on all in the central states as one man.” It is just as the Cheng brothers said, “the common world takes being compliant with the customs as harmony, this is wrong as this is merely following the common flow. The harmony of the morally exemplary is harmony according to righteousness [义]” (Book 1, Purified Words of the Two Chengs). The common people can recognise sameness [同] when they see it. The sage understands that the li of things are at bottom the same [同], thus he can bring accord [同] to all under heaven and harmoniously integrates [和合] with the myriad classes [of things]. This can be elucidated through the example of heaven and earth, man and woman and the myriad things. Heaven its above and earth is below, their forms are divergent, but yang falls, and yin rises. They are the same [同] with respect to the fact that they unite and complete, transform and nourish things. Man and woman are different in essence and they are divergent, but they desire to seek after each other is the same. There are myriad differences in living things, they are divergent but they all receive the harmony [和] of heaven and earth and are endowed with the qi of yin and yang, and so they are similar in kind. Although objects are different from each other their li is at bottom the same [同]. […] The moral exemplar sees the phenomena 9 Lynn

(1994: 81). translation. https://ctext.org/liji/li-yun.

10 Legge

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of divergence and difference. He knows what in the grand union [大同] should be considered different. Residing in the world, the sage acts according to the same ethical norms as everyone else, but within this sameness sometimes displays difference, […] The key thing is to be different within sameness.

As such, The arrayed stars follow each other in their revolutions, the sun and the moon take turns shining, the four seasons proceed in succession, yin and yang undergo their great transformations, and winds and rain are broadly bestowed. Their harmony keeps the myriad things alive. Their nurturing helps the myriad things to thrive.11 (“Discourse on Heaven” Xunzi)

In the human realm, between fathers and sons there is love, between sovereign and minister there is righteousness, between husbands and wives there is distinction, and between senior and junior there is order, between friends there is trust. The sovereign respects heaven above and loves the people. In this way one has reached what the Confucians advocated as the state of the union of heaven, earth and man in which “All things are nurtured together and do not cause injury to one another; the various ways [dao, 道] travel together and do not harm each other [xiangbei, 相悖].” Zhang Zai inherited and continued the idea of the Supreme Harmony (太和) of the Ten Wings and took the Supreme Harmony to be the overall process of qi transformation. He says, The Supreme Harmony is called dao. It embraces the nature which underlies all counter processes of floating and sinking, rising and falling, and motion and rest. It is the origin of the process of fusion of intermingling, of overcoming and being overcome, and of expansion and contraction. […] Unless the whole universe is in the process of fusion and intermingling like fleeting forces moving in all directions, it may not be called the Supreme Harmony.12 (“Supreme Harmony” Correcting Youthful Ignorance)

He also says, “from qi-transformation there is dao.” (“Supreme Harmony” Correcting Youthful Ignorance) Wang Fuzhi explains that “Supreme Harmony” is “the utmost of harmony.” In fact, what they mean by Supreme Harmony is the united and undifferentiated qi of yin and yang. Its basic idea is that although the myriad things contain antagonisms and conflicts, oppositions and mutual overcomings, there also exists a magnanimous harmony. If this theory is raised to another level, then it affirms that between people and the myriad things there exists a basic and common nature: “sameness.” It is precisely due to this common nature (共通) and “sameness” that people can love their parents, be humane to the people and so love all things until ultimately, “the common people are considered as my kin [同胞] and things are all of the same kind as me [与]” (“Designation of Qian”, Correcting Youthful Ignorance) and so arrive at the state of Supreme Harmony. This reflects the content of harmony thinking in the Song periods and afterwards. The representative of the Yongjia school (功利学派) of the Southern Song, Ye Shi, apart from talking about the dao of equilibrium and harmony in the same way as the past generations, also discussed the content of harmony and sameness from the 11 Hutton 12 Chan

(2014: 176). (1969: 500–501).

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perspective of the flourishing, declining, order and disorder of the state. He believed that there were two kinds of sameness. One is sameness of “same heart-mind and same virtue” (同心同德) and the other is sameness of “not the sameness of same heart-mind and virtue but the sameness of the force of circumstances [势利].” What Ye Shi means by “harmony” is the coalescing and fusion of oppositional things and affairs. As he sees it, this kind of fusing is not created through human artifice but by objective circumstances (势). Harmony is the objective order which accords with the objective circumstances (势). People need to respect this and not contravene against it. With regard to the distinction between harmony and sameness, Ye Shi advocated that one “abandon sameness and take after harmony” (弃同取和) and opposed “abandoning harmony and taking after sameness.” As he sees it the reason why King You of Zhou lost his kingdom was because he “abandoned harmony and took after sameness.” Integrating practical considerations of the every day, for Ye Shi, With regard to what it preserves and discards, what it likes and dislikes, seeking the same things, the human heart-mind is the same. There are very few, however, who seek for harmony. There are even fewer who would usurp the throne according to the demands of the circumstances. The worthy and the unworthy, the sage and the crazy person are not the same. Order and chaos, existence and death are not constant, the key moment lies in whether one chooses harmony or sameness; is this not worthy of being held in respect and awe?

As such, from the perspective of the order, chaos, survival and destruction of the state, and with an eye towards the flourishing of the state, Ye Shi passionately advocated the idea of “abandon sameness and take after harmony.” The philosopher of the late Ming, Wang Fuzhi took Zhang Zai’s philosophy of qi as origin as the basis of his philosophy. He inherited and developed Zhang Zai’s philosophy of “Supreme Harmony.” In his Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Enlightenment Through Confucian Teachings he further developed Zhang Zai’s philosophy of “Supreme Harmony” and thus pushed traditional Chinese thinking on harmony to a new height. Wang Fuzhi, first of all, gave “Supreme Harmony” a precise definition, taking it to be “the utmost harmony” (和之至) and pointed out that the formation of the different natures of yin and yang and their antagonisms do not harm each and is instead a harmony of “union and accord” (合同). What he elucidates is a kind of discourse on engendering and transformation (生化论) of Supreme Harmony that begins from mutual antagonism, turns to mutual transformation and ends with a mutual union. It is a theoretical development of his predecessors’ views on harmony and sameness. In his Book of Great Harmony, Kang Youwei of the late Qing elucidated the concept of sameness. He believed that the “grand union” is the most perfect and utmost good state of humanity. In this he inherited the Confucian concept of “a public and common spirit in all under heaven” (天下为公). Sun Zhongshan further developed this idea and gave it a practical realization. If we can say that Kang Youwei is the theoretician who designed the society of grand union, then Sun Zhongshun forcefully tried to explore the practical avenues for realizing this ideal society of

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grand union. From this it can be seen that the culture of harmony and union has already become a major intellectual resource of traditional Chinese culture. As a key concept of the pre-Qin philosophers, harmony and sameness were furthered by generations of philosophers. The idea of “harmony but not sameness” contains the wisdom of China’s forebears and was passed down from generation to generation, inspiring moral agents throughout history to dedicate their intelligence and labour in the service of the ideal society.

References Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. 2003. Daodejing “Making This Life Significant”: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books. Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. 2001. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1969. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hutton, Eric L. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynn, Richard J. 1994. The Classic of the Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Queen, Sarah A., and John S. Major. 2016. Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn; Attributed to Dong Zhongshu, trans. Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major. New York: Columbia University Press.

Translator’s Notes

I have left proper names such as “heaven” “dao” in lower case to emphasize the secular nature in which the terms, in general, are used. Where there are used in the upper case, it is intended to indicate a more religious usage. Where possible, I have also avoided using the definite article “the” before “heaven” and “dao” so as not to encourage the idea that there is a single-order ontology assumed in these terms. Where possible, I have striven to find published translations for key translations to ensure maximal accuracy. I have consulted the following works in the process of my translation and am grateful for the work of previous scholars from which I have learnt much. I would like to thank Dr. Qinggang Bao for all the help he has given me in explaining passages that I was unsure about and for his great patience. I would also like to thank Dr. Randy LaPolla for his help in looking over a few tricky passages with me. I would like to thank Jacob Bender for bearing with me during the process of translating such a lengthy project.

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Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1986. Neo-Confucianism Terms Explained (The Pei-hsi tzu-i) by Ch’en Ch’un, 1159–1223. New York: Columbia University Press. Gardner, Daniel K. 2003. Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary, and the Classical Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. Graham, A. C. 1992. Two Chinese Philosophers: The Metaphysics of the Cheng Brothers. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. https://mahajana.net/texts/soothill-hodous.html. http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/listtexts.xml& style=xwomen/xsl/dynaxml.xsl&chunk.id=d1.1&toc.depth=1&toc.id=0&doc.lang=bilingual. http://www.chinaknowledge.de/. Kroll, Paul W. 2015. A Student’s Dictionary of Classical and Medieval Chinese. Leiden: Brill. Legge, James. 1967. Li Chi (The Book of Rites), vol. I. New York: University Books. Legge, James. The Texts of Taoism. Translated by James Legge. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. Makeham, John. (ed.) 2010. Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Springer. Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2007. Daodejing: A Complete Translation and Commentary. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. Wagner, Rudolf, G. Making Sense: Wang Bi’s Commentary on the Lun Yu. 中国 《四书》 诠释传统 初探(上). pp. 109–158. Yang, Bojun and Lau, D.C. (trans.) 2008. Confucius: The Analects. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Ziporyn, Brook. 2018. The Ti-Yong 體用Model and Its Discontents: Models of Ambiguous Priority in Chinese Buddhism and Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism. The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought. Edited by John Makeham (pp. 193–266). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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