History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty 9811589623, 9789811589621

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Xuezhi Zhang

History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty

History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty

Xuezhi Zhang

History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty

123

Xuezhi Zhang Department of Philosophy Peking University Beijing, China Translated by Benjamin Michael Coles Huaqiao University Xiamen, China

Supported by Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences (本书获中华社会科学 基金资助) ISBN 978-981-15-8962-1 ISBN 978-981-15-8963-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8

(eBook)

Jointly published with Higher Education Press The print edition is not for sale in China Mainland. Customers from China Mainland please order the print book from: Higher Education Press. © Higher Education Press 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Introduction

The Ming Dynasty [1368–1644] was a unique period in Chinese history. For most of the period, the imperial state was relatively weak, and towards the end of the Ming, the country fell into a very desperate situation. However, the Ming was also a period when the whole society began to modernize at a high speed in a wide range of aspects. Due to advances in productive technology, development of industry and commerce, expansion of the scale of cities, and a continued rise in the class status of city residents, the life of city residents became a central focus of attention for the whole society. Of key importance is the imperial examination (keju 科举) system of the Ming Dynasty, which promoted the influence of Neo-Confucianism in all aspects of social life with an unprecedented depth and breadth. Since Buddhism and Daoism were already in decline, they had no choice but to attempt to ride the coattails of Confucianism in order to survive. Within Buddhism and Daoism themselves, the tendency towards a syncretic unification of the Three Teachings (sanjiao 三教 [i.e. Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism]) was very strong. All of these trends influenced the situation of philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, giving it a distinct quality different from that of earlier periods. The mainstream academic thought of the Ming Dynasty was Neo-Confucianism (lixue 理学 [lit. Learning of Principle]). A distinctive quality of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism was the fading of interest in theories of principle (li 理) and qi 气 (material force), and the rise of theories of mind (xin 心) and inherent nature (xing 性) to become the central focus of thought. An important reason for this is that with the efforts of promotion of great Confucians in the Song and Yuan dynasties, Neo-Confucianism had been thoroughly developed, and increasingly became a doctrine concerned with value, such that exploring the ultimate reality of the myriad things had already become a question of empirical demonstration, and thus gradually fell into a place of secondary importance in the view of many people. There was thus little space remaining in which to continue to pursue questions of principle and qi. Questions of mind and inherent nature, however, represent the fundamental understanding of philosophers concerning the essence of humanity and its relation with the wider cosmos. In particular, after a prolonged period of absorption, conflict, and synthesis between Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, the Three v

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Introduction

Teachings had come into a state of harmonious integration, which gave questions of mind and inherent nature a unique importance and depth. Furthermore, in the Ming Dynasty [Confucian] Classical Learning (jingxue 经学) had become very worn-out and took a separate path from Neo-Confucianism. In the absence of new methodologies and social demands, it was very difficult for the Study of Classics to develop further. The influence of the imperial examination system meant that the study of meanings and principles (yili 义理) became firmly fixed at the center of the intellectual world, and innovation and development in meanings and principles required personal experience of mind and inherent nature. Theories of mind and inherent nature were best able to express a thinker’s level of fundamental knowledge. From the perspective of methodologies of thought, theories of principle and qi took their described objects as systems existing outside the mind, using a method of separation between subject and object; the laws of objects themselves, as well as the relationships between their various parts, were still taken as existing outside the self. Theories of mind and inherent nature, however, were aimed at the relationship between subject and object, with objects as projections of the subjective plane, already imprinted with the stamp of subjectivity. For Neo-Confucians, “mind” generally referred not to a rational subject, but to a complex synthesis of rationality, intuition, individual experience, and awareness, in which the subjective and objective worlds were inseparably connected together. “Inherent nature” generally referred not to external principles obtained rationally, but rather to a self-positing set within the frame of the unity of Heaven and humanity (tian ren he yi 天人合一). It represented the basic view of Neo-Confucians concerning the essential nature of the cosmos, the position of humanity within this cosmos, and relationships between people. Understanding these questions through grasping the myriad phenomena of the cosmos in terms of their meaning and value was not something that could be achieved through rational analysis alone. Reason is always an important aspect of thought, and regardless of which method was used to grasp an object, in expressing their thoughts and communicating this information to others, scholars could not leave rationality behind. However, for Neo-Confucians, especially the Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucians focused on mind and inherent nature, simply relying on the instrument of rationality was insufficient. The method used in this book is first to establish the field of problems of the particular thinker under consideration based on a thorough reading of original texts, and then to uncover all the concepts and categories related to this field of problems; using the principle of the unification of logic and history, and taking key concepts as a guide, to construct conceptual and categorical framework; and sorting out the logical relations within this framework, then laying these out according to their logical order. In this process, the emphasis is placed on explaining the formation of the main concepts in this framework, and their relationship with other concepts. However, it is relatively difficult to precisely define the problems a particular thinker was attempting to solve. Influenced by their tradition, the works of thinkers in the Song and Ming dynasties are mostly not systematic or consistent from beginning to end, with their key concepts often diffused throughout records of sayings (yulu 语录) or scholarly letters, and their arguments often fragmented, requiring that one

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summarize through delving into the depths of a great quantity of material. Once a field of problems has been defined, it is then necessary to analyze the concepts used. Most of the concepts used by Ming Dynasty thinkers were taken up from their predecessors, and [Huang Zongxi’s 黄宗羲] Case Studies of MingConfucians (Mingru xue’an 明儒学案) generally already uncovered the core concepts of the important thinkers, however, the difficulty of differentiating between the various meanings expressed in identical words and phrases remains. This book expends a lot of effort in this regard, as it is only by first clarifying the concrete, singular meanings of a particular concept that the threads of a philosopher’s thought can be uncovered. The method of dealing with a philosopher’s thought by arranging it in a logical structure has been frequently questioned in recent years, being viewed as having the deficiency of forcing ancient figures into a fixed schema. However, if a thinker’s thought is systematic, if its different parts are clearly logically related, it can be dealt with according to a framework. In researching the history of thought, one should aim to make a thinker fresh and alive, rich and full, possessing clear levels and stages, and set out through main points, rather than careless and scattered, fragmented and various, with no main points; ideally, one should make the object of one’s study into a reconstruction in one’s own thought. Researchers do not remold ancient figures or force them to fit into fixed schemas, but rather attempt to represent the structural form of the thought-processes of a thinker based on a full grasp of his material, such that even if the thought of the figure being studied does not have a strict systematic form, one can still find the structural relations between the various parts of his thought. The task of the researcher is precisely in revealing these structural relations. As the historian Chen Yinke 陈寅恪 once noted, researching ancient thought is just like appreciating ancient paintings or statues, the researcher has to help damaged places return to their original form, to make vague places become clear. The quality of such restorative work entirely depends on the researcher’s ability to grasp a thought system that has already passed away. In order to achieve this goal, the method of individual experience (tiyan 体验) is indispensable. Individual experience is an extremely important method in the research of Chinese philosophy, especially Neo-Confucianism. Most NeoConfucians placed great emphasis on [a person’s] ambience (qixiang 气象) and spiritual plane (jingjie 境界), which formed an organic, constitutive part of their academic studies. Their plane and ambience are sometimes expressed within their writings, sometimes outside; some concern the content of their thoughts, others their distinctive styles. Ambience, plane and content of thought are unified. When researching Chinese thinkers, especially Neo-Confucians, one truly grasps them only when one has grasped their ambience and plane, and ambience and plane depend on individual experience. Individual experience does not only mean standing in the same position as the objects of one’s research, using an attitude of sympathetic understanding to interpret them, but more importantly refers to experiencing and observing their ambience, the emotion expressed in their words and in between their lines, and the role played by this emotion in the construction of their thought. Philosophy is not merely a communication of meanings and principles, but is simultaneously an expression of emotion, even if this expression is not as direct or explicit as in literature. Researchers should aim to reveal this emotion in their research.

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This book takes its primary task the revealing of the thinkers’ thought itself. Philosophy is a general, indirect theoretical reflection of social life, certainly, but it itself is also a kind of synthetic intellectual activity. This synthesis refers to a speculative, intuitive, experiential mode of grasping objects. The activity of philosophical thought is sufficient to itself. Philosophers, especially Chinese philosophers, have always had a very close relationship with political reality, yet most Chinese philosophers did not use their philosophical thought to allude to or make analogies of political reality. Given the combined official-scholar identity of Chinese thinkers, they had the channel to voice political opinions; even where the path of speech was blocked and they had no choice but to utilize the method of allusion, these contents were not the mainstream. Furthermore, a great many Ming Dynasty thinkers still chose to use the traditional method of commentating on the classics in order to express their thought. Commentating on the classics was a rather pure theoretical activity. This book selects rather pure philosophical content and elaborates on this, rather than assimilating intellectual activity to indirect political claims or veiled expressions. Other than for important thinkers, it generally does not deal with the background of social life against which thought was produced, but rather focuses on the logical structure of thoughts themselves. The goal of this is to make its content more clear and vivid, with higher consistency. In relation to a few important points of thought, it is not sufficient to merely summarize specific problems discussed at the time, but is necessary to further explicate the general philosophical meaning contained within a specific problem, in order to more deeply grasp the thought’s meaning and value. Finally, concerning the period of the thinkers Huang Zongxi, Fang Yizhi 方以 智, and Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, who are generally described as thinkers of the Ming-Qing transition, in terms of the division of periods, works on the history of philosophy, use different methods, and some have placed them in the Qing Dynasty. This book holds that placing Huang Zongxi, Fang Yizhi, and Wang Fuzhi in the history of Ming Dynasty philosophy is more reasonable. In terms of time, when Li Zicheng 李自成 entered Beijing in the year in which the Ming Dynasty collapsed (1644), these thinkers had all already formed their thought, and after this Ming political power persisted in the south of China, for almost 20 more years, a period in which the philosophical creativity of these thinkers reached its peak. In particular, these thinkers all experienced the desperate drifting of the chaos of war, feeling agony at the collapse of the country and pain at the hardships of the people. Their emotion towards the preservation of Chinese culture and the consciousness of problems expressed within their works both represent a continuation of Ming Dynasty thought. For example, Huang Zongxi’s teacher Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 was one of the great Confucians of the late Ming, who had already begun to summarize Ming Dynasty Confucian thought, and warned against the harms caused by the tendency to neglect effort (gongfu 功夫) and directly rely on original substance (benti 本体) as found in the “innate moral knowing” (xiantian liangzhi 先天良知) faction, his attempts to correct the academic fashion of the time being plainly evident. The most clear and penetrating expression of Huang Zongxi’s philosophical thought is found in his Case Studies of Ming Confucians, a work whose

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fundamental points in its reviews of each thinker are entirely inherited from Liu Zongzhou. The problems that he worked hard to emphasize, including innate and acquired (xiantian houtian 先天后天), original substance, and effort were all classic Ming Dynasty problems. Placing Huang Zongxi in the context of Ming Dynasty philosophy and describing his direct inheritance from Liu Zongzhou is thus both natural and reasonable. The same is true for Fang Yizhi, who in his early years was fond of fine culture and encyclopedic investigation along with the study of penetrating inflections (tongji 通几), but who after the events of the Jiashen 甲申 coup [of 1644] was reduced to wandering the land, leading to great changes in his thought. After being forced to leave his home, his thought came to be full of disconsolation, strange absurdity, and feelings of unfathomable restlessness. The most important and representative work of his late period was The Equalisation of East and West (Dong xi jun 东西均) which was completed in the sixth year of the Yongli 永历 period in the Southern Ming (1652). His fundamental “three as one” (sanyi 三一) model had already come to maturity by this time. Also, the most important origin of his thought was the tradition of study of the [Book of] Changes (yi 易) passed down in his family, which also represents a continuation of Ming Dynasty scholarship. After fleeing in panic and hiding in the Yao caves, Wang Fuzhi also entered into creative scholarship activities with a self-conscious awareness of being an inheritor and innovator of Chinese culture. His important works were all completed while he was living in hiding in Xiangxi Cottage, a time during which he was almost completely isolated from the world of society. His lofty aspiration to inaugurate a new form of Chinese culture and his recognition of his identity as a surviving citizen of the Ming are both expressed in his couplet, “the Six Classics demand that I open them up anew, this poor body follows Heaven [i.e., the Ming] at the price of being buried alive [by the Qing] 六经责我开生面, 七尺从 天乞活埋”. The collapse of the Ming provoked in all these great thinkers a desire to rectify the corruption of culture and innovate new forms of thought and scholarship, and thus considering these problems by situating them against the background of Ming Dynasty scholarly culture is more appropriate. The founding of Qing Dynasty scholarship had to wait until Qing imperial rule was stabilized, when they gathered Han ethnicity scholars to take part in scholarly activities, and only really began in earnest once intellectuals had begun to accept in their minds the rule of an imperial house of a foreign ethnicity and to gradually give up their desire to resist the Qing and restore the Ming (fan Qing fu Ming 反清复明). Based on these considerations, this book includes the thinkers Huang Zongxi, Fang Yizhi, and Wang Fuzhi in the history of Ming Dynasty philosophy. One regret is that a complete history of philosophy in the Ming Dynasty should also include some discussion of problems of philosophical methodology in [Confucian] Classical Learning. Identifying the lines of development in Ming Dynasty Classical Learning, picking out changes in methodology and their reasons is, however, a topic requiring time-consuming and painstaking research, and is lacking in this book.

Contents

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Cao Duan and the Rise of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism 1 The Supreme Polarity, Principle, and Qi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sincerity and Nature-Endowment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Sincere Respect and Benevolence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Xue Xuan’s Hedong Learning and Ming Dynasty Guanzhong Scholars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Non-polarity and the Supreme Polarity, One Principle and Its Many Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Knowing and Restoring Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Investigating Things and Abiding in Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Xue Xuan and Ming Dynasty Guanzhong Scholars . . . . . . . .

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Wu Yubi’s Self-governance and Hu Juren’s Holding to Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Wu Yubi’s Self-governance and Diligent Practice . . . . . . 2 Hu Juren’s Holding to Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Hu Juren’s Theories of Principle, Qi, Mind and Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Hu Juren’s Criticisms of Buddhism and Daoism . . . . . . .

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Chen Xianzhang and the Origins of the Learning of the Mind . 1 The Learning of Self-attainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Plane of the Mind Together with Dao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fusing Principles, Dispersing Fixation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Chen Xianzhang’s Poetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Chen Xianzhang’s Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

Zhan Ruoshui’s ‘Ubiquitous Realisation of Heavenly Principle’ and His Academic Lineage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Mind Embodies Things Without Omission . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Ubiquitous Realisation of Heavenly Principle . . . . . . . . . . 3 Zhan Ruoshui’s Debates with Wang Yangming . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Zhan Ruoshui’s Academic Lineage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wang Yangming’s Learning of Innate Moral Knowing . . . 1 The Highlighting of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 No Principle Outside the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 No Principle Outside the Mind-the Investigation of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Substance of the Mind-Mind Is Inherent Nature 3 The Unification of Knowledge and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Extension of Innate Moral Knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Proposing of the Extension of Innate Moral Knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Various Meanings of Innate Moral Knowing . . . 4.3 The Extension of Innate Moral Knowing . . . . . . . . . 5 The Four-Sentence Teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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125 129 132 141

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141 145 158 163

Wang Longxi’s A Priori Rightness of Mind and Qian Dehong’s A Posteriori Sincerity of Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Wang Longxi’s Learning of the a Priori Rightness of Mind . . . . 2 Quietude and Affectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Qian Dehong’s Learning of the a Posteriori Sincerity of Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Huang Wan’s “Rest-Stopping” and Ji Ben’s “Fear of the Dragon” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Meaning of “Rest-Stopping” . . . . . . . . 2 Criticism of Wang Yangming . . . . . . . . . . 3 Ji Ben’s “Vigilance of the Dragon” . . . . . .

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Zou Shouyi’s Precept of “Vigilance” and His Family Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Core Precept of “Vigilance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Criticism of His Fellow Students as Departing from Yangming’s Original Precepts . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Zou Shouyi’s Family Tradition of Learning . . . . . .

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10 Ouyang De’s Doctrine of the Unification of Activity and Stillness and of Substance and Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 1 The Relationship Between Innate Moral Knowing and Knowing Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

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2 The Unity of Activity and Stillness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 3 Elaboration of the Unity of Substance and Function . . . . . . . . . . . 249 11 Nie Bao’s Learning of Returning to Quietude . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Opposition Between Quietude and Affectivity . . . . . 2 Debates with Various Followers of Wang Yangming . . . . 3 The Expansion of the Learning of Returning to Quietude

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12 Luo Hongxian’s Comprehensive Exposition of the Doctrines of Returning to Quietude and Holding to Stillness . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Core Precept of Holding to Stillness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Rejection of the School of Pre-formed Innate Moral Knowing . 3 Luo Hongxian’s Process of Theoretical Development Through His Life and His Transcendence of the Jiangyou School . . . . . 13 Wang Shihuai’s Doctrines of Penetrating Inherent and Scrutinising Inflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Empty Stillness, Production and Reproduction . . 2 Penetrating Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Scrutinising Inflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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291 292 297 303

14 Hu Zhi’s Development of the Core Precept of the Learning of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 1 Principle Is Not Separate from the Mind; Preserving the Spirit and Transforming that Which Passes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 2 Things Are Not External to the Mind; No Things Outside Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 15 Li Cai’s Learning of “Stopping-Cultivation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Knowing and Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Core Precept of Stopping-Cultivation and Its Internal Contradictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stopping-Cultivation, Rest-Stopping and Returning to Quietude . 4 Cultivating the Self, Governing and Pacifying . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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16 Wang Gen and the Formation of Taizhou Learning . . . . . . 1 Innate Moral Knowing as Pre-Formed and Self-Present . . . 2 Ordinary People and Elites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Huainan Investigation of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Learning and Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Different Directions Taken by Wang Gen’s Followers

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343 346 350 354 359 361

17 Luo Rufang’s Studies of the “Innate Moral Mind of the Infant” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Great Dao Is Present Only in This Body . . . . . . 2 Following and According with the Immediate Present 3 The Illumination of Heaven and the Vision of Light .

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367 368 372 374

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4 Luo Rufang and Wang Longxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 5 Being Careful When Alone and Filial Kindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 18 Geng Dingxiang’s Studies of “Allowing No Stopping” . 1 “The True Impulse that Allows No Stopping” . . . . . . . 2 The Taizhou Precept of “Plain Simplicity” . . . . . . . . . 3 “Learning Has Three Key Steps” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Unity of Confucianism and Buddhism; Buddhism as Useful for Confucianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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385 386 391 396

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19 Jiao Hong’s Studies of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism 1 Confucianism: Knowing and Restoring Inherent Nature . . . . . 2 Buddhism: No Duality Between Confucianism and Buddhism 3 Daoism: Using Daoism to Supplement Confucianism . . . . . . 4 A Metaphysical Explanation of Ritual Propriety . . . . . . . . . .

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407 408 414 422 427

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21 The Philosophical Thought of Luo Qinshun . . . . . . . . . 1 Principle and Qi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Mind and Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Criticisms of Buddhism and the Learning of the Mind 4 Theory of the Investigation of Things and Debate with Wang Yangming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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459 460 467 475

Zhi’s Explanation of the Childlike Mind . . . . . . . The Childlike Mind: Returning to the True Self . . . The Foregrounding of the Principle of Individuality The Pure and Clear Root-Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Li Zhi’s Posthumous Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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22 Wang Tingxiang’s Theory of Qi and His Empiricist Tendencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Supreme Polarity Dao-Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Theory of Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Theory of Cultivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Criticisms of Buddhism, Daoism and Various Neo-Confucians 23 The Philosophical Thought of Wu Tinghan . . . . . . 1 The Chaos of Qi as the Ancestor of Heaven, Earth and the Myriad Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Criticisms of the Learning of the Mind . . . . . . . . . 3 Theory of Cultivation and Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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493 494 501 509 516

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24 Chen Jian’s Elaboration of Master Zhu Learning in His Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 1 Zhu and Lu as Diverging Only in Their Later Years . . . . . . . . . . . 553 2 Debates Concerning Confucianism and Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562

Contents

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25 Gu Xiancheng’s Reconciliation Between Master Zhu Learning and Yangming Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 An Equal Emphasis on a Priori Innate Moral Knowing and a Posteriori Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Distinctions Concerning “Neither Good Nor Bad” . . . . . . . . . . 3 Being Careful—Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . 575 . . . 576 . . . 585 . . . 594

26 Gao Panlong’s Learning of Investigation of Things and Knowing the Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Qi, Mind, Inherent Nature, Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Investigating Things and Knowing the Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Enlightenment and Cultivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Respect and Following the Natural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Liu Zongzhou’s Studies of Sincere Intention and Being Careful When Alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dao-Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Intentionality and Making One’s Intentions Sincere . . . . . . . . . . 3 Uncovering the Word “Intention” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Content of the Word “Intention” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Criticisms of Wang Yangming and Later Students of the Wang School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Mind, Inherent Nature and Being Careful When Alone . . . . . . .

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601 602 610 616 620

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629 630 637 637 639

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28 Huang Zongxi’s Summation of the Learning of the Mind . 1 The Unification of Principle and Qi, and of Mind and Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 All that Fills Heaven and Earth Is Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Methodology in the History of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Political Thought in Waiting for the Dawn . . . . . . . . . . .

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666 671 678 688

29 The Philosophical Thought of Chen Que . . . . . . . 1 Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning . . . . 2 Distinctions Concerning Knowledge and Action . 3 Distinctions Concerning Inherent Nature as Good 4 Distinctions Concerning Principle and Desire . . . 5 Distinctions Concerning Burials . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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697 698 705 707 714 719

30 The Philosophical Thought of Fang Yizhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Academic Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Material Measurement and Penetrating Inflections . . . . . . 3 Qi and Fire; the Supreme Polarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Unification of the Three Teachings and Overturning the Three Truths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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725 726 729 737

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31 The Philosophical Thought of Wang Fuzhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Supreme Polarity: Substance and Function as Contained in All and Mutually Required for Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Harmony of Heaven and Earth and the Transformations of Daily Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Mind and Inherent Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contents

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Chapter 1

Cao Duan and the Rise of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism

Neo-Confucianism at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty was based on the theories of Zhu Xi 朱熹. Scholars of Neo-Confucianism were divided into schools of the extension of knowledge (zhizhi 致知) and personal practice (gongxing 躬行) according to the different emphases they placed on Zhu Xi’s principle of learning, that “Cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge.” The former took the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge (gewu zhizhi 格物致知) as well as profound knowledge and extensive learning as their approach and effort, while the latter emphasised dwelling in respect and preserving sincerity as well as cultivating the mind and inherent nature. All these approaches and efforts were within the range of Zhu Xi’s theories with limited theoretical breakthroughs. Therefore, in the Biographies of Confucian Scholars (Rulin zhuan儒林传) chapter of the History of the Ming Dynasty (Ming shi 明史) it states: “Scholars at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty all belonged to different branches of Zhu Xi’s disciples, each inheriting from their teacher, with orderly rules and standards.” Famous scholars at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty included Song Lian 宋濂, Liu Ji 刘基, Wang Wei 王祎, and Fang Xiaoru 方孝儒. Most of these scholars were literati who inherited the academic patterns of the Yuan Dynasty, until Cao Duan, who devoted his whole life to Neo-Confucianism with great achievements and was followed by the masters of Neo-Confucianism Xue Xuan 薛瑄 and Hu Juren 胡居仁. Cao Duan 曹端 (1376–1434; zi 字 Zhengfu 正夫, hao 号 Yuechuan 月川) was from Yingchi 渑池 in Henan province. He was a successful candidate in the highest imperial examination during the reign of the Yongle Emperor and was conferred as an educational instructor 学正 in Huozhou 霍州 and Puzhou 蒲州 in Shanxi province. He died in Huozhou. According to his historical biography, Cao did not believe in the superstitions and divination that were popular in common society, such as reincarnation, good and bad fortune, witches and shamans, and fengshui. Since his father was fond of Buddhism and the thought of Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 庄子, Cao wrote “Candles for Night Walking” (Yexingzhu 夜行烛) to admonish him and exhort the neighbourhood not to perform Daoist sacrificial ceremonies. He © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_1

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taught scholars to read only Confucian books and perform only Confucian rituals. The main aspects of his theory were preserving and cultivating inherent nature and principle, and he made many corrections to important Neo-Confucian propositions. His works include Collected Works of Yuechuan (Yuechuan ji 月川集), Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo shujie 太极图说述解), and Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes (Tongshu shujie 通书述解).

1 The Supreme Polarity, Principle, and Qi The Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极) is the highest category of Zhu Xi’s philosophical theory. Before Zhu Xi, scholars mostly explained the Supreme Polarity as qi 气. For example, in Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太极图说), the Supreme Polarity refers to the united qi before Heaven and Earth became separated and distinct. Zhu Xi argued that the Supreme Polarity is principle (li 理), but he thought that as long as there is principle, there is also qi. Principle is logically prior to qi, and is the basis of the existence and movement of qi. Cao Duan inherited Zhu Xi’s theory of the Supreme Polarity, arguing that the Supreme Polarity is principle, and, based on Zhu Xi’s Explanation of the Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo jie 太极图说解), wrote his Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, in which he stated in the preface that: The Supreme Polarity is another name for principle. The qi of the dao of Heaven was actually the work of principle. The origin of the learning of principle was actually produced by Heaven. Thus the river producing a diagram was Heaven giving it to Fuxi; the Luo producing an inscription was Heaven bestowing it on Yu. Fuxi followed the diagram and produced the Changes, drawing the Eight Trigrams; Yu followed the inscription and explained his Plan, elaborating the nine categories. The minds of the sages were simply one Heavenly principle, and the productions of the sages were simply one non-action. (Original preface to Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity)

Here, the Supreme Polarity is principle and the foundation of the movement of all things between Heaven and Earth. The theory of the Supreme Polarity originated from the River Diagram (hetu 河图) and the Luo Inscription (luoshu 洛书) and were in fact given by Heaven. Fuxi 伏羲drew the Eight Trigrams (bagua 八卦) according to the River Diagram, and Great Yu 大禹 wrote “Great Plan” (Hongfan 洪范) based on the Luo Inscription. The principles contained in the Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易) and “Great Plan” were revealed by Heaven to humans. Therefore, the minds of the sages were rooted in Heavenly principle, and the productions of the sages stemmed from what is so by Heaven. Here, although Cao inherited the tradition that the River Diagram and Luo Inscription were both conferred by Heaven, his central idea was that the Supreme Polarity is principle and the foundation of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and the dao-principle contained

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within the Supreme Polarity is the law for Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Cao provided a very precise and appropriate summary of this idea: “The Supreme Polarity is a term for the principle that was already present before images and numbers formed, a name for the principle without sign once forms and implements are present” (original preface to Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity), meaning that before Heaven, Earth and the myriad things were formed, the principle of the Supreme Polarity already existed; after the formation of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, the Supreme Polarity exists within all things as the principles of the specific things but does not appear itself. This explanation indicates that Cao accepted Zhu Xi’s idea of the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations (liyi fenshu 理一分殊). As for “Change has its Supreme Polarity, and this produces the Two Modes, which produce the Four Images, which in turn produce the Eight Trigrams” in the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), Cao explained that “Change has its Supreme Polarity” means the Supreme Polarity is so in and of itself; “this produces the Two Modes” means that the Supreme Polarity expresses itself as the Two Modes; while the Four Images, the Eight Trigrams, down to the sixty-four hexagrams, “were all generated by the Supreme Polarity.” The word “generate” does not mean that being is produced from non-being, but refers to a logical dependence as precondition and basis. Cao always used principle to discuss the Supreme Polarity and was dissatisfied with scholars who explained the Supreme Polarity as qi. He wrote: After Confucius, scholars discussing the Supreme Polarity all explained it as qi. Laozi said “Dao generates the One” and only then produces two; Zhuangzi said “Dao existed before the Supreme Polarity.” “The One” and “Supreme Polarity” were both names for Heaven, Earth, and humanity when they had form and qi but were not separate and distinct. Since dao was the mother of the One and before the Supreme Polarity, they didn’t know dao is the Supreme Polarity and the Supreme Polarity is dao. In terms of its penetration and conduct it is called dao, in terms of its perfection it is called the Supreme Polarity, and in terms of its purity it is called the One. How could there be two? “Chaos” in Liezi 列子 and “including the three as one” in the Record of the Han Dynasty 汉志 both meant the same. Were it not for Zhouzi [Zhou Dunyi] unveiling the secret not passed down for a thousand years, who would know the Supreme Polarity is principle and not qi? (Original preface to Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity)

Before the Song Dynasty, the Supreme Polarity was usually explained as qi. In his Commentary on the Book of Changes (Zhouyi zhu 周易注), Zheng Xuan 郑玄 explained the Supreme Polarity as “qi that is in pure harmony and not separated.” In the apocrypha 纬书 “Image of the River Diagram Covering the Earth” (hetukuodixiang 河图括地象), it explains: “Change has its Supreme Polarity, and this produces the Two Modes. The Two Modes are not separated and their qi is chaos.” The “Record of Temperament and Calendar” (Lüli zhi 律历志) in the History of the Han Dynasty (Han shu 汉书) also states: “The original qi of the Supreme Polarity includes Heaven, Earth, and humanity as one” and “The Supreme Polarity, the central elemental qi.” All explained the Supreme Polarity as qi. In the Jin Dynasty, Han Kangbo 韩康伯 wrote a commentary on the “Appended Phrases”

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(Xici 系辞) inheriting Wang Bi’s 王弼 theory that “Being was created from non-being.” In his commentary on “Change has its Supreme Polarity, and this produces the Two Modes,” Han Kangbo said: “As being must be created from non-being, so the Supreme Polarity produces the Two Modes. The Supreme Polarity is a name for that which is without polarity (wuji, 无极). Since we cannot obtain and name it, we take the utmost point of being and regard it as the Supreme Polarity.” Hence the Supreme Polarity is non-being, and the Two Modes are being. Kong Yingda 孔颖达 in the Tang Dynasty explained the Supreme Polarity as the original qi before Heaven and Earth were separated in his Correct Meaning of the Book of Changes (Zhouyi zhengyi 周易正义), saying: “The Supreme Polarity is the Supreme Beginning or Supreme One, which was the original qi that was mingled as one before Heaven and Earth were separated… It is also said that after the chaotic origin separated, there were Heaven and Earth, and so the Supreme Polarity produced the Two Modes.” Zhou Dunyi in the Song Dynasty wrote as the first sentence to his Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity: “Without polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity,” taking non-polarity as nothing and the Supreme Polarity as the original qi before yin and yang were separated. Zhu Xi’s commentary on Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity explained the Supreme Polarity as principle, taking “Without polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” to mean “formless yet possessing principle.” Cao Duan inherited Zhu’s explanation of the Supreme Polarity, regarding the Supreme Polarity as principle, and opposed the theory made by past commentators and sub-commentators who argued that the Supreme Polarity is qi. He was particularly opposed to Laozi’s “Dao generates the one,” holding that Laozi’s theory added a creator above the highest concept, the Supreme Polarity. Cao also disagreed with the statement that [dao] “produces Heaven and Earth, divinises ghosts and the Lord-on-High, is above the Supreme Polarity yet not high, below the Supreme Polarity yet not deep” in the Zhuangzi. Cao thought that the Supreme Polarity is dao, and dao is not above the Supreme Polarity. Dao, the One and the Supreme Polarity are simply the same thing with different names, all referring to principle that was potentially possessed before things had qi and form. The relationship between dao and the Supreme Polarity should thus not be interpreted as producing and being produced. Cao regarded the most correct explanation of the meaning of the Supreme Polarity as that given by Zhu Xi. However, in Zhu’s Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity and his Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei 朱子语 类), there are different explanations. In this situation, the explanation given in Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity should be taken as the correct one. This is because Categorised Sayings includes a lot of incomplete theories, or answers given in haste without deep consideration, and Zhu did not write the book himself. Some Neo-Confucians used statements in Categorised Sayings to those in Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity. This is no different from “Taking hard rock but throwing away fine jade, picking up broken iron pieces but throwing away a complete utensil.” In this respect, Cao Duan stuck to Zhu Xi’s theory of the Supreme Polarity as principle and as the ultimate basis of the whole cosmos. Cao’s Account and Explanation of

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Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity and his Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes both take this as a fundamental principle. Regarding the activity or stillness of the Supreme Polarity, Cao Duan pointed out that there are different arguments in Zhu Xi’s Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity and his Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu. Cao stated: Zhouzi [Zhou Dunyi] said, “The activity of the Supreme Polarity generated yang, and the stillness of the Supreme Polarity generated yin,” hence the creation of yin and yang was caused by the activity and stillness of the Supreme Polarity. Master Zhu’s explanation about this was exceedingly clear and complete. He said: “There was the Supreme Polarity, and its activity and stillness produced the Two Modes; there were yin and yang, and their change or unity formed the five phases.” Are they not different? And yet in his Recorded Sayings 语录, he said: “The Supreme Polarity could not spontaneously become active or still, but only ride on yin and yang’s activity and stillness.” Hence he said, “Principle rides on qi as people ride horses. The horse comes and goes, and the rider also comes and goes” in order to show metaphorically that when qi moves or becomes still, principle also moves or becomes still along with it. In that case, then people are dead people, and are insufficient to be the most numinous of the myriad things; principle is a dead principle, and is insufficient to be the origin of the myriad things. How then could principle be noble and people valuable? Wouldn’t it be better if we now make a living person ride the horse, then the coming and going, activity and stillness, as well as the fast or slow movements are all caused by the rider’s control? It is the same for the living principle. (“Discriminating Perversity” [Bianli辨戾], Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, 3)

Regarding the activity and stillness of the Supreme Polarity or principle, Zhu Xi had different views that seemed to be apparently contradictory, yet if we take a sweeping view of Zhu’s theory of the Supreme Polarity, principle and qi, we can find a consistency in his views. Zhu’s general view was that principle or the Supreme Polarity belongs to the metaphysical, which transcends activity and stillness, while qi is that which is physical, and has activity and stillness. Hence the statement that principle is capable of activity and stillness has two meanings. One refers to the Supreme Polarity or principle including the principle of activity and the principle of stillness. The principle of activity and stillness is the basis of qi’s activity and stillness. The second meaning is that the principle that expresses itself as above qi becomes active or still following qi’s activity and stillness. As Zhu said: “Principle has activity and stillness, so qi also has activity and stillness. If principle does not have activity and stillness, how can qi spontaneously have activity and stillness?” (“Reply to Zheng Zishang, No. 14” [Da Zheng Zishang shisi 答郑子上 十四] in Collected Writings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集], Vol. 56) and “The Supreme Polarity is principle, that which is above form, while yin and yang are qi, that which is below form. However, principle is formless, but qi has its traces. If qi has activity and stillness, then how can the principle above qi not have activity and stillness?” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu, Vol. 5). The former refers to the first meaning, and the latter to the second meaning. Zhu had many statements like this. When he spoke of qi’s activity and stillness, he was referring to

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actual activity in time and space; when he spoke of the activity and stillness of the Supreme Polarity and principle, he was referring to the metaphysical basis that can lead to the activity and stillness of qi. Although the concepts of activity and stillness are the same, they have different specific meanings. As for the apparent contradiction Cao Duan noted between Categorised Sayings and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, he further mixed in Zhu Xi’s transformation of Zhou Dunyi’s original meaning, thus adding to the possibility of ambiguity. For example, what Zhou Dunyi called the Supreme Polarity is the chaotic and undivided qi that has the potential to divide itself into yin and yang. When Zhou said the activity of the Supreme Polarity generated yang and the stillness of the Supreme Polarity generated yin, he meant that the chaotic and undivided qi divides into yin and yang because of the potential contained within, whereas Zhu Xi explained the Supreme Polarity as the overall basis of the activity of the myriad things of the cosmos. The activity of the Supreme Polarity shows the flowing and circulation of the original substance (benti 本体) of the cosmos; the stillness of the Supreme Polarity shows that such flowing and circulation are expressed as concrete things and events. Hence Zhu Xi explained this by saying: “Its activity is the penetrating quality of sincerity, what continues it is good, and the myriad things rely on it in beginning. Its stillness is the recovery of sincerity, what completes it is inherent nature, and the myriad things each corrects its inherent nature and endowment” (Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity). This focuses on the flowing and circulation of the cosmos, the highest and most abstract aspect. Here, the Supreme Polarity is sincerity (cheng 诚), namely the original substance of the cosmos, not the principle that is shown in concrete things and events. Zhu Xi’s explanation of the activity and stillness of the Supreme Polarity is ontology and not cosmology, whereas Zhou Dunyi’s statement in his Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity: “Without polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity. The Supreme Polarity in activity generates yang, then at the limit of activity it becomes still. In stillness it generates yin, then at the limit of stillness it becomes active. Activity and stillness alternate, such that each is the basis for the other. In distinguishing yin and yang, the Two Modes are thereby established” is cosmology. Zhu used Zhou’s Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity to develop his own theory about principle as the root of qi. Cao Duan thought Zhu’s explanation conformed to Zhou’s original meaning, but in reality he was unable to distinguish the difference between the two. For example, Cao held that Zhu’s “There is the Supreme Polarity, and its activity and stillness produces the Two Modes; there are yin and yang, and their change or unity forms the five phases” was identical to Zhou’s “The Supreme Polarity in activity generates yang; In stillness it generates yin,” but in reality there are consistent only in language and not in meaning. Therefore, what Zhu Xi actually meant in this sentence is that the principle of activity and stillness is present in the Supreme Polarity, and thus yin and yang qi can separate out from the chaotic and undivided. This is different from Zhou Dunyi’s meaning that a qi undivided into yin and yang then separates into yin and yang qi.

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Cao Duan also held that Zhu Xi’s metaphor comparing principle riding on qi to a person riding a horse did not demonstrate principle’s controlling and dominating function with regards to qi. This point is correct, because Zhu’s metaphor only points out one of the meanings mentioned above concerning the activity and stillness of the Supreme Polarity, namely that after principle is expressed in concrete things, it co-exists with concrete things, becoming active and still with the activity and stillness of concrete things. However, the metaphor does not demonstrate the meaning that the Supreme Polarity itself possesses the principle of activity and stillness, that qi becomes active or still after it obtains this principle, and that the Supreme Polarity does not become active or still following qi’s activity and stillness. In fact, the latter meaning is more important. The meanings of principle as “basis” (genju 根据) and “law” (faze 法则) are the most basic and explicit in Zhu Xi’s theory of principle, but the above metaphor does not reveal these meanings. The reason Cao Duan raised this point was precisely to highlight principle as a metaphysical basis, as the reason for physical activity and stillness, with principle as absolute and active (not a displacement of the physical), which has the functions of dominating, controlling, governing, etc. the actual activity of concrete things and events, an idea that embodies profound meanings within it. This question had lingered in Cao’s thinking for a long time and is of great importance, therefore Cao named his clarification concerning this question “Discriminating Perversity” (Bianli 辨戾) and stated that he himself “passed many years without deviation in order to inform gentlemen with the same ambition” (“Discriminating Perversity,” Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, 3). Cao’s theory of the activity and stillness of the Supreme Polarity is basically the same as Zhu Xi’s in his Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity. The reason he pointed out some apparent differences between Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity was to highlight principle’s absolute and active nature. His Account and Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity basically adopted Zhu Xi’s views, and some explanation used Zhu’s comments directly. It would not appropriate to overstate the differences between Cao’s thought and that of Zhu Xi.

2 Sincerity and Nature-Endowment Sincerity (cheng 诚) is an important concept in Chinese philosophy. There are detailed discussions about sincerity in the two important pre-Qin classics the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) and Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸). Zhou Dunyi’s Penetrating the Book of Changes (Tongshu 通书) placed sincerity in a fundamental position, holding that sincerity is the substantial characteristic that makes a person a sage, the original substance of the cosmos, the origin that the myriad things depend on in beginning, as well as the process through which the myriad things complete themselves in the circulation and transformation of the

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cosmos. Sincerity is an absolute good, because sincerity is the foundation of the beginning and birth of the myriad things. Zhou Dunyi’s elaboration of the concept of sincerity was the source for many later Neo-Confucians. Cao Duan wrote an account and explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, taking sincerity as principle, and the substantial characteristic that makes a person a sage. He said: Sincerity refers to real principle without falsity, the upright principle endowed by Heaven and received by things. People all have it, but the qi they receive restricts it, desire for things blocks it, and habitual customs lead it away, such that most people are unable to perfect it. The reason why sages are sages lies in nothing but this, that they are alone able to perfect it. Sincerity is what is called the Supreme Polarity. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 3)

Zhou Dunyi regarded sincerity as the original substance of the cosmos based on Centrality in the Ordinary and Commentaries on the Changes; Cao Duan followed Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi in regarding sincerity as principle. Such a change removed the rich meaning of the original substance of the cosmos, such as the process of great transformation and flowing, the free spirit of great virtue in mighty transformations and of small virtue in the flowing of rivers within this process, the inclusive spirit of the myriad things being produced together without mutual harm, the productive intention in the vigour of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, etc., such that the only remaining meaning was the regularity of function of the original substance of the cosmos and the concrete regularities of the myriad things of the cosmos. Regarding original substance, Cao Duan focused more on the principles of concrete things and events rather than the complete dao. Therefore, he explained [Zhou Dunyi’s] “In this way sincerity is established” as: “Real principles are thus established, each as the master of one thing. It is like the flying of kites, the leaping of fish, above the fire, beneath the water, all fixed and unchangeable.” This was meant to emphasise that sincerity is principle and the inevitability of the myriad things, abandoning the profound and easeful meanings of vigorousness and the myriad things being produced together without mutual harm that can be found in the explanations of the original substance of the cosmos made by Cheng Yi and Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊. This is the case in Cao Duan’s explanation of [Zhou Dunyi’s] “Origination and flourishing characterise the penetration of sincerity, and advantage and firmness are its completion.” When he said “What is called penetration is really the issuing of upright principle and its gift to things, the continuation of the good; what is called completion is that received by the myriad things and stored in themselves, the sincerity of inherent nature” (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 4), he emphasised that sincerity is principle, that the penetration and completion of sincerity are endowed by principle, and that the myriad things receive such principle and store it in themselves to become their inherent nature. The rich content about the original substance of the cosmos in “It is the endowment of Heaven, so solemn and endless” [from the Book of Poetry (Shi jing 诗经)] is almost invisible, with his principle also lacking a vast and profound spirit and appearing only as solemn and just, upright and honest.

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Cao Duan explained sincerity as principle. His important concepts of “inherent nature” (xing 性) and “endowment” (ming 命) are also elaborated around principle. He explained the statement “The dao of Qian 乾 is to change and transform such that everything obtains its correct nature and endowment” in Zhou Dunyi’s Penetrating the Book of Changes as: What Heaven gives is endowment, what things receive is inherent nature, such that in speaking about the dao of Qian to change and transform, the myriad things all receive the upright principle it gives, just like saying that in the generation of the five phases, each depends on its nature. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 3)

The explanation for “nature-endowment” here obviously comes from Zhu Xi. Endowment is the process whereby the original substance of the cosmos is expressed as individuals. The original substance of the cosmos is the issuer, and individuals are the receiver. This issuing is an inevitable process that complies with regularities. The cosmos does not have any will, so cannot dominate or control concrete things and events. What is known as endowment is simply the dao of Heaven in the functioning of nature, expressing purposiveness amidst the purposeless. As Chen Chun 陈淳 said: “Endowment is like an order, as in phrases like ‘your instructions’ or ‘your commands.’ Heaven has no speech or actions, so how does it endow? It is just the great transformation and flowing; when qi comes to this thing, it produces this thing, when it comes to that thing, it produces that thing, just like instructing or ordering it” (Character Meanings of Beixi [Beixi ziyi 北溪字义], 1). Chen Chun’s explanation paraphrases Zhu Xi’s meaning, and Cao Duan’s above argument is also based on Zhu Xi. Cao explicated the specific meaning of endowment when making his commentary on the “Principle, Inherent Nature and Endowment” chapter [Ch. 22] of Penetrating the Book of Changes. In the original text of this chapter, the characters for principle, inherent nature and endowment do not appear, hence Cao Duan thought that “It is sometimes manifest and sometimes subtle, only the inspired can illuminate it” was speaking of principle, and “Firmness may be good or bad and the same is true of weakness. Abide in the mean between them” was speaking of inherent nature, while “The myriad things are created and transformed out of the two qi and the five phases” and hereafter concerned endowment. Concerning the passage “The two qi and the five phases transform and generate the myriad things. The differentiation of the Five finds its reality in the two, and the root of the two is one. Thus, the myriad are one and the one is really a myriad divisions. The myriad and the one are each correct, and the great and the small are each defined,” he commented: The two qi and the five phases are the means by which Heaven is distributed in the myriad things and produces them. Tracing the branches to their root, the difference of the five phases is originally the reality of the two qi; the reality of the two qi is also the polarity of principle. Thus speaking of the myriad things combined, they are simply one Supreme Polarity. Tracing the root to its branches, there is the reality of the one principle, which the myriad things divide as their substance, but speaking of their division, it is not cutting apart or slicing off, but rather like the moon reflected in a myriad rivers. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 28)

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Endowment as understood by Cao Duan is actually the process by which the Supreme Polarity is expressed as the myriad things and the myriads things are enfolded in the Supreme Polarity. This process is both a functioning process of qi and a folding and unfolding, opening and closing process of principle. Of course, this opening and closing is not the activity and stillness of principle itself, because principle is metaphysical, and transcends activity and stillness. The folding and unfolding, opening and closing of principle here refers to the patterns, standards, boundaries, etc. which appear during the process of circulation of qi. The transformation and generation of the myriad things is a process in which the form of this thing transforms into the form of that thing, and the concrete things that constitute this process can be divided into different levels, from qi to matter, from matter to things. This constitutive process is endowment. To speak of endowment is to emphasise the situation of being necessarily so without knowing why shown by the myriad things according to the dual functioning of the necessity of their own original natures along with their external conditions. Thus in terms of qi, endowment as understood by Cao Duan is the process of the great transformation and flowing of the cosmos; in terms of principle, it is the reciprocal process of the One to the myriad things and the myriad things back to the One in which the Supreme Polarity is expressed as the principles of the myriad things and the principles of the myriad things are enfolded in the Supreme Polarity. At the same time, this process is also a way of observing belonging to the subject. Ways of observing exist because of different points of view, while this change of focus is obtained through accumulated learning as well as being a result of understanding the fundamental laws of the Heaven, Earth and the myriad things along with awareness and comprehension of concepts such as “sincerity,” “Supreme Polarity” etc. that indicate the original substance of the cosmos. The degree and level of such awareness and comprehension determine whether one’s way of observing is exquisite or awkward, refined or rough. Cao Duan’s view of endowment in terms of qi was inherited from Zhu Xi’s account. In terms of principle, there is one principle, and the myriad things divide it as their substance, but this division is not a physical separation in time and space, not a “cutting apart or slicing off,” but a metaphysical analogy and transformation between the fundamental principle of the cosmos and the principle of concrete things and events, “like the moon reflected in a myriad rivers.” “The myriad and the one are each correct” means that between the one principle and the principles of the myriad things, it can be seen as one and also as myriad, and the change between the one and the myriad is due to the different point of view and way of observing of the subject. The whole cosmos is a unity of diversity and simplicity in the great transformation and flowing. Cao Duan’s discussions of inherent nature inherited the views of Zhang Zai 张 载, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, who spoke of both the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth (tiandi zhi xing 天地之性) as well as the inherent nature of material qi (qizhi zhi xing 气质之性). This differed from Zhou Dunyi. Zhou discussed inherent nature in terms of material qi, and thus inherent nature for him referred to the hard and soft, good and bad of a person’s material qi. He said: “Inherent nature includes hard and soft, good and bad, and the central mean” (Penetrating the Book of Changes,

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Ch. 7 “The Teacher” [Shi 师]). Cao Duan’s commentary on this sentence added the meaning of “Inherent nature as principle” from Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. He said: What is called inherent nature here is in relation to received qi. The numbers of the Supreme Polarity from one to two are firm and soft, while from one to four are firm-good and firm-bad. So adding “the central Mean” makes the five phases. When Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi] spoke of inherent nature, he was referring to these five. He also spoke of inherent nature of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. When speaking of the inherent nature of received qi, then it does not go beyond these five. However, the inherent nature of received qi is simply the inherent nature of the four inklings [see Mencius, 2A.6], there is no another nature. The inherent nature of all under Heaven does not go beyond these five, i.e. firm, soft, good, bad and the central mean. Although when analysed in detail, there are many diversities that cannot be fully investigated, they still do not go beyond these five. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 28)

Here, Cao Duan believed that Zhou Dunyi spoke of both the inherent nature of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, as well as the inherent nature of firm and soft, good and bad. However, Zhou did not specify that the former was the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and the latter the inherent nature of material qi. When he commented on Zhou’s concept of “sincerity,” Cao said: “Inherent nature is that which is already established by principle. The reason why sages are sages is simply all this real principle, namely what is called the Supreme Polarity. The five constant virtues, benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and fidelity, are the inherent nature of the behaviour of sages” (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 4). Zhou also held that “Sincerity is the root of the five constant virtues,” but did not clarify that the five constant virtues are the inherent nature of humanity and things. Cao’s commentary clearly regarded the five constant virtues as the inherent nature of humanity. Here, he used Zhu Xi’s thought to supplement that of Zhou. Another notable fact is that Zhou used firm and soft, good and bad to talk about inherent nature, while the “central mean” was simply an appropriate mean or achieved plane of firm and soft after the transformation of material qi. Cao on the other hand regarded the central mean as a single inherent nature to match the five constant virtues, benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and fidelity. Cao also pointed out there is not a total separation between the inherent nature of received qi and that of the four inklings, between the inherent nature of material qi and that of Heaven and Earth. They are both different expressions of the same single qi. The inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is issued when the principle of qi has not been covered over, while the inherent nature of material qi is an external expression of received qi. He said: Inherent nature is simply principle. However, without the images of Heaven and the quality of Earth, there is no position for such principle, but with the clearness and brightness of qi, then principle will not be covered and fixed. Since this principle is issued smoothly, Heavenly principle will win out in those for whom principle is less covered and fixed, while selfish desire will win out in those for whom principle is more covered and fixed. Thus we can see that original inherent nature contains nothing that is not good. It is only muddied by material qi, and then becomes separated. If one studies to reverse it, then the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is preserved. This is why inherent nature needs to possess both qi and

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1 Cao Duan and the Rise of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism quality. Such inherent nature is the nature of material qi, the central mean of the four, abolishing firm and soft, good and bad, and selecting the central mean and host from between the two goods of firm and soft. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 11)

By changing and transforming material qi, one returns to the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth. This is inherited from the theories of Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi. The idea of getting rid of firm and soft, good and bad, and choosing the central mean between firm-good and soft-good was adopted from Zhou Dunyi. Cao Duan’s theory of inherent nature was mainly built on the separation between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and the inherent nature of material qi in Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, and supplemented with ideas from Zhou Dunyi. In terms of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth, Cao used Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi to reinforce Zhou Dunyi’s weak point of not emphasising the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth. In terms of the inherent nature of material qi, he used Zhou Dunyi’s theory about firm and soft to remedy Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi’s error of speaking about material qi in a general manner without detailed arguments. In general, Cao adopted many old ideas and created few of his own, and his image as emphasising sound and solid personal practice but disregarding theoretical development is very striking.

3 Sincere Respect and Benevolence Cao Duan’s theory of effort (gongfu lun 功夫论) focused on applying effort directly to the base of the mind through realisation of dao-substance as well as through critical self-examination and self-control in relation to concrete things and affairs. He rarely talked about the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, which was quite different from Zhu Xi’s approach of self-cultivation starting with the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. Because he emphasised applying effort directly to the mind, Cao regarded preserving sincerity as primary. He said: “Learning from sages and aspiring to become a worthy lies only in preserving sincerity, then the five constant virtues and various moral conducts will all be possessed spontaneously. Without desire, one will feel at ease in oneself” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 1066). He thought preserving sincerity meant the body would become one with morality and justice, and that morality and justice possessed substance and function, with the substance of morality and justice being the principles of Heaven and Earth, and the function of morality and justice being the appropriacy of behaviour. The reason why humans are dignified and noble is because the human body is a concrete expression of morality and justice. He said: When speaking of morality and justice, they are discussed together with substance and function. Dao extends throughout Heaven and Earth, past and present, and is simply morality and justice. To deal with things appropriately according to time and events is what is called the constant order and the morality penetrating past and present. When humans

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possess morality and justice in their bodies, they are respectable and good. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 31)

Sincerity and principle being united as one was the goal of self-cultivation for Cao Duan, and the entryway was respectfulness (jing 敬). He said: In all our actions, we never leave respectfulness behind, and thus we never make major mistakes. One instance of sincerity is sufficient to eliminate a myriad falsities, and one instance of respectfulness is sufficient to fight a thousand evils; in what is called first establishing what is great, there is nothing more crucial than this. Scholars must place themselves in the midst of moral standards, without one moment of presumptuousness, and thus it is said that ritual propriety and music should not leave one’s body for even a moment. (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1065)

Cao Duan proposed “diligence” (qin 勤) as the fundamental characteristic of sages. In fact, “diligence” is just respectfulness. He said: That which makes a sage a sage is only this mind of concern about diligence and care about striving, not daring to lose oneself for one moment. Principle has no fixed presence, and only with diligence can it be preserved for long. The mind is originally a living thing, yet only with diligence can it not die. Common people are unable to be concerned about diligence and careful about striving, so human desire is unbridled and Heavenly principle dies, such that although the body is preserved, the mind is already dead; is this not very sad? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1066)

Among Neo-Confucians, Zhou Dunyi proposed “maintaining stillness” (zhujing 主静) as the fundamental effort of self-cultivation. The Cheng brothers thought that the word “stillness” sounded too passive and easily led into Daoism and Buddhism, hence they changed stillness into respectfulness. Zhu Xi inherited Cheng Yi’s idea of using respectfulness to connect activity and stillness, holding that “With respect there will spontaneously be stillness; one cannot call stillness respectfulness” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu, Vol. 96). Respectfulness is an approach that was faithfully followed by later Confucians. Cao Duan thought that Zhou Dunyi’s effort started with “Oneness is essential,” and was a momentary realisation, whereas Cheng Yi’s “respectfulness” represented a gradual cultivation. He commented on the statement “Oneness is essential. To be one is to be without desire” in Penetrating the Book of Changes saying: The word “one” is essential to sages and worthies. The One is the Supreme Polarity, pure and unmixed. It is purely Heavenly principle without any selfish desire. And without desires one will feel at ease in oneself. Zhouzi [Zhou Dunyi] only said to be one is to be without desire, but this topic is lofty, and if one is rushed and hasty it is difficult to pull together. How can ordinary people come to be without desire? Therefore, Yichuan [Cheng Yi] only spoke of respectfulness to teach people to put their efforts into respectfulness, so they could perhaps grasp and attain calmness, having somewhere to start. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 26)

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This is to say that the One is the Supreme Polarity, the Supreme Polarity is the whole of principle, and the whole of principle is sincerity, pure and unmixed. If one wishes to unify with the Supreme Polarity, one must have no selfish desires in one’s mind, and directly combine the whole substance of one’s mind with the Supreme Polarity as one. This is a momentary realisation, whereas respectfulness is a gradual cultivation with critical self-examination as well as self-control in one’s daily life practice, such that one gradually elevates one’s spiritual plane and eventually unites with principle. Cao Duan here distinguished the approaches of cultivation of Zhou Dunyi and Cheng Yi, holding that Zhou’s was close to a momentary realisation, while Cheng Yi’s was more of a gradual cultivation. This coincides with the divisions made by some modern researchers on Neo-Confucianism, but Cao Duan didn’t open up any further discussion on this issue. In his commentary on Penetrating the Book of Changes, Cao Duan also developed the important concept of benevolence (ren 仁). Zhou Dunyi held that the highest pursuit for Confucians is the joy of Confucius and Yan [Hui] 颜回. Cao developed this, writing: The most valuable and noble, lovely and desirable thing between Heaven and Earth is nothing but benevolence. Benevolence is the mind of Heaven, Earth and living creatures, and is what people are endowed with to enable them to live. It is the perfect virtue of one mind and a generic term for the myriad goods. Its substance is the substance of Heaven and Earth, and its function is the function of Heaven and Earth. Preserving it, one is penetrating, and fully abiding in it, one’s body is secure. Now I myself say that the joy of Confucius and Yan [Hui] is benevolence. It is not that one is joyful at this benevolence, but that benevolence itself has its own joy. So Confucius rested in benevolence and found joy in this, while Yanzi [Yan Hui] did nothing against benevolence and did not alter his joy. One who rests in benevolence naturally has his own benevolence, and one who finds joy in this naturally has his own joy. One who does nothing against benevolence has the benevolence of one who conserves it, while one who does not alter his joy has the joy of one who preserves it. (Account and Explanation of Penetrating the Book of Changes, 30)

Cao inherited the views of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, holding that benevolence is the mind of Heaven, Earth and living creatures, and the principle of generation of life expressed in Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. People are endowed with the mind of Heaven, Earth and living creatures and become benevolent. Benevolence is not merely one of the four virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, but is also the perfection of virtue, such that benevolence includes benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom can be seen as different expressions of benevolence. Benevolence is the substance of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and love is the function of benevolence. If benevolence is preserved and cultivated in the mind, then it can encompass oneself and other people; if benevolence fully fills one’s body, then one’s body will be at ease. Zhou Dunyi instructed the Cheng brothers to search for the location of the joy of Confucius and Yan [Hui], which is a kind of spiritual plane. With such a plane, one will spontaneously possess the joy of the mind. It is not that one undertakes spiritual cultivation in order to pursue such joy, but that joy is a spontaneous result of spiritual cultivation, and not a practical goal. Confucius said: “The benevolent are free from

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anxiety, the wise from perplexities, and the brave from fear.” People with the virtue of benevolence will spontaneously find joy in it. People with different spiritual planes perceive benevolence in different ways. Confucius rested in benevolence, while Yan Hui did nothing against benevolence. Resting in benevolence means there is already benevolence and one trusts in it, while doing nothing against benevolence means seeking and attaining benevolence and then conserving it, taking benevolence as a moral standard and not violating it. These two types of plane have different ways of experiencing benevolence. Many arguments and discussions concerning benevolence were offered by Neo-Confucians in the Song Dynasty, particularly the Cheng brothers. In his On Understanding Benevolence (Shiren pian 识仁篇), Cheng Yi put forward the basic direction for spiritual cultivation in Neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi’s Discourse on Benevolence (Renshuo 仁说) elaborated the Cheng brothers’ theories in a more complete and comprehensive manner. Cao Duan regarded benevolence as the most valuable and noble, lovely and desirable thing between Heaven and Earth, as the highest value. This shows that he followed the basic direction of cultivation proposed by Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers. However, the approach to seeking benevolence proposed by Cao abandoned Zhu’s theory of the investigation of things and the probing of principle, and instead directly regarded using substance to demonstrate the substance of benevolence and dwelling in respect and self-discipline as the root. His theory represents the general situation of Confucians in the early Ming Dynasty. In the early Ming, Zhu Xi’s theories held a dominant position. Scholars generally inherited and followed the orientation of Zhu’s thought and his approach to cultivation. However, as Neo-Confucianism developed over several hundred years, its structure underwent changes. Zhu Xi’s tendency towards the investigation of things and the probing of principle was corrected and more emphasis was placed on dwelling in respect and self-discipline. Because of this, early Ming Confucians did not make any great developments in the theories of principle and qi or mind and inherent nature, emphasising instead soundness in personal practice, and putting effort into the mind. Their strictness, firmness and moral integrity was not reached by Neo-Confucians in the Song and Yuan dynasties, but at the same time they lost the academic atmosphere of Confucians in the Song Dynasty who emphasised the supporting relation of empirical knowledge towards knowledge from virtue and inherent nature, and also placed equal stress on epistemological and moral reason. This situation would change somewhat when Wang Yangming 王阳明 later made his breakthrough from the Zhu Xi learning of the early Ming and established new patterns. Cao Duan’s learning began from the most even, sound and steady aspects of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers, thus his theory is even and reasonable without making any great waves. Cao’s main works are his accounts and explanations of [Zhang Zai’s] Western Inscription (Ximing 西铭), and [Zhou Dunyi’s] Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity and Penetrating the Book of Changes, in which he aimed to praise the theories of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi. He dedicated his whole life to soundness in personal practice, and so produced few works. The

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above three accounts and explanations are his representative works. The Summary of the Complete Library of the Four Branches of Literature (Siku quanshu tiyao 四 库全书提要) states: “In the Ming Dynasty, Cao Duan, Hu Juren, and Xue Xuan were the most pure Confucians, and Cao Duan was ahead of the other two.” In the “Biography of Cao Duan” (Cao Duan zhuan曹端传) in the History of the Ming Dynasty (Ming shi 明史), it is stated: “In the first thirty years since the Ming arose, Cao Duan from Yingchi in Henan promoted and illuminated lost learning, coming to be regarded by critics as the crown of early Ming Neo-Confucianism.” The above comments recognise Cao Duan’s position in the history of academic development in the Ming Dynasty. In Case Studies of Ming Confucians, it also states: “The Master’s learning was not received from teachers, but exclusively by deriving problems of ancient scholars from ancient books, through which he profoundly realised the principle of creation and transformation, embodying his teachings in “Moon River” (Yuechuan 月川). Returning to seek in one’s own mind, the mind is the Supreme Polarity, the activity and stillness of the mind is yin and yang, the daily use and intercourse of the mind is the change and unity of the five phases, and unity serving the mind is the path to enter dao. Thus his insights are penetrating but not empty, his learning refined but not muddled, and he can justly be regarded as the present-day Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi].” “Deriving problems of ancient scholars from ancient books” means that Cao Duan developed and elaborated key questions in his accounts and explanations of works by Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi. “Embodying his teachings in ‘Moon River’ [Cao’s own hao]” means that Cao Duan’s view of the relationship between the fundamental principle of the cosmos, the principles of the myriad things and the principle of the mind basically remained within the scope of Zhu Xi’s “All people have the one Supreme Polarity, all things have the Supreme Polarity,” which he summarised in a Moon River poem: “The moon in Heaven revolves and is reflected in a myriad rivers, the myriad rivers each having the roundness of the moon. Even when the rivers are exhausted and become flat ground, there is still one revolving moon in Heaven.” “Unity serving the mind is the path to enter dao” means that Cao Duan abandoned Zhu Xi’s theory of the investigation of things and the probing of principle, and used respect and self-discipline to directly put effort into the mind. This assessment points out the characteristics of Cao Duan’s approach to effort, indirectly indicating the general tendency of purpose among Confucians in the early Ming Dynasty, and is quite perceptive.

Chapter 2

Xue Xuan’s Hedong Learning and Ming Dynasty Guanzhong Scholars

Among the great Confucians at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, after Cao Duan came Xue Xuan. Xue Xuan’s learning came in its entirety from his careful reading and subtle reflections on the works of Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi 朱熹. He special character lay in his comprehending the Cheng-Zhu theory and putting it into practice, with rather few creative developments. The Hedong 河东 Learning that he initiated took “comprehending inherent nature and Heaven” as its core principle, and sincere and concrete practice as its particular quality, with disciples spreading over the Shandong, Henan and Guanzhong 关中 area, with a particularly strong trend in northern regions. His disciple Lü Nan 吕柟 was a key figure among Ming Dynasty Guanzhong scholars, and played an important role in the strong revival of Guan Learning关学in the Ming Dynasty. Xue Xuan 薛瑄 (1389–1464; zi 字 Dewen 德温, hao 号 Jingxuan 敬轩) was from Hejin 河津 in Shanxi province. When he was young he read books with his father, but what he learnt did not concern Neo-Confucianism. When he grew up, he travelled to visit the famous local Neo-Confucians Wei Xiwen 魏希文 and Fan Ruzhou 范汝舟, and completely abandoned his old studies. In the Yongle 永乐 period he passed as a metropolitan graduate with honors, and at the beginning of the Xuande 宣德 period was made an investigating censor at the Huguang 湖广 silver mines, where in his spare time he read the Great Compendium on Inherent Nature and Principle (Xingli daquan 性理大全), recording what he learned in his notes. In the Zhengtong 正统 period he became an education-intendant censor in Shandong, then a vice-minister in the Court of Judicial Review 大理寺, where he managed to offend the powerful eunuch Wang Zhen 王振 and was imprisoned and sentenced to death, though he was later released and reinstated. In the first year of the Jingtai 景 泰 period [1450], he was promoted to a minister in the Court of Judicial Review in Nanjing. When the Ying Emperor 英宗 was reinstated, he was transferred to the Ministry of Rites as a right vice-minister, working at the same time as an academician in the Hanlin 翰林 Academy and entering the Grand Secretariat 内阁. When Cao Jixiang 曹吉祥 and Shi Heng 石亨 gained power, he asked to resign. He then lived at home for eight years, busying himself with lecturing and writing, and © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_2

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died at the age of 76. The poems he left behind include the sentence, “In the 76th year when there was no business, this mind began to feel the interconnectedness of inherent nature and Heaven.” His works were compiled by modern scholars into the Complete Works of Xue Xuan (Xue xuan quanji 薛瑄全集), which includes his most important philosophical work, the Record of Reading Books (Dushu lu 读书 录).1

1 The Non-polarity and the Supreme Polarity, One Principle and Its Many Divisions Although Xue Xuan’s learning was focused on practice, his practical efforts were all based on his understanding of fundamental Neo-Confucian categories such as dao 道, inherent nature, and Heaven, and hence he frequently discussed daosubstance, Supreme Polarity, principle, and qi 气, on which point he can be said to have followed Zhu Xi. He discussed the dao-substance (daoti 道体) saying: Qi transforms and flows in activity, without ever being interrupted, in which one can see that dao-substance never stops or rests for a moment. Substance and function have a single origin, with no gap between the manifest and the subtle; movement and stillness have no end, and yin and yang have no beginning; their greatness has no outside, there smallness no inside. Other than those who know the dao, who can know this? (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

For Xue Xuan, dao is the totality of qi transforming and flowing in activity, the substance of this flowing activity is qi, and the ordered pattern of this qi is principle. Dao transcends all concrete things, and is their substance; the things of qi-transformation are manifest and visible, and are its function. The two poles of yin and yang are the mutual basis for each other, without beginning or end. In terms of the dao-substance, its greatness has no outside; in terms of specific things, their smallness has no inside. Substance and function, manifest and subtle, movement and stillness, yin and yang, etc. each depend on their principles, while dao in general displays the qualities of vastness, change and movement without form. Xue Xuan’s ideas and even his sentences were all taken from the Cheng brothers 二程 and Zhu Xi, but with his own profound appreciation. The dao-substance is the great transformation and flowing activity of the cosmos, within which there is principle (li 理) and qi. Between the two, Xue Xuan emphasised principle and the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极). On this point he followed Zhu Xi, saying:

[Trans.] References are to Xue Xuan, Dushu lu and Dushu xulu 读书续录, both editions from Wanyou wenku 万有文库.

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1 The Non-polarity and the Supreme Polarity, One …

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In speaking of its greatness, there is nothing in the world that can carry it, and in speaking of its smallness, there is nothing in the world that can break it; this is the Supreme Polarity. The Supreme Polarity is inherent nature, so as there are no things in the world outside inherent nature, so inherent nature is omnipresent. The great root is the whole substance of the Supreme Polarity; the realisation of the dao is the flowing into activity of the Supreme Polarity. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 2)

Here, Xue Xuan used Neo-Confucian thought, especially that of Zhu Xi, to explain Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸). The Supreme Polarity is the fundamental principle of the cosmos, which has infinitely many forms of expression, and hence it cannot be described as great or small. The Supreme Polarity is expressed as the inherent nature of concrete things and affairs, and “there are no things in the world outside inherent nature,” so no things lack principle, and no things lack inherent nature. “The great root” (daben 大本) refers to the totality of the Supreme Polarity; “the realisation of the dao” (dadao 达道) refers to the Supreme Polarity being expressed as the principles of concrete things and affairs. Principle dominates qi, riding on the movements of qi and flowing into activity. “Flowing into activity” (liuxing 流行) does not mean the movement or stillness of the Supreme Polarity itself, since the Supreme Polarity is a “pure and empty world,” and as such does not have the quality of being able to move or be still. The flowing into activity of the Supreme Polarity refers to principle being the basis and pattern for the movements of qi, such that it is co-present with the moving qi. Xue Xuan’s explanations of “non-polarity” (wuji 无极) and “Supreme Polarity” also followed those of Zhu Xi: “The non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” [from Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐] does not refer to two things, but rather in speaking of its having no sound or smell, we call it the non-polarity; in terms of its being the principle of utmost polarity, we call it the Supreme Polarity. Since it is without sound or smell and has contains the utmost principle, it says it is the non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 1)

Xue Xuan did not think that non-polarity was another stage prior to the Supreme Polarity, but rather that it was a description of the Supreme Polarity. The non-polarity and the Supreme Polarity are not two things, as non-polarity rather simply describes the Supreme Polarity’s lacking location or sign. The Supreme Polarity is principle. The non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity is thus Zhu Xi’s “having no form yet having principle.” Xue Xuan also noted the relation between the Supreme Polarity and the multitude of principles, connecting Zhu Xi’s view of one principle with diverse particularisations (liyi fenshu 理一分殊) with the view of great virtue as grand transformation (dade dunhua 大德敦化) and small virtue as rivers flowing (xiaode chuanliu 小德川流) from Centrality in the Ordinary, saying: “The unifying substance is the one Supreme Polarity, the one root of the myriad divisions; what each possesses is one Supreme Polarity, the myriad divisions of the one root. The unifying substance is the grand transformation of great virtue; what each possesses is the rivers flowing of small virtue” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 1). “The unifying substance is the one Supreme Polarity” refers to the fundamental principle of the cosmos; “what each possesses is one Supreme Polarity” refers to the

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principles of concrete things. The Supreme Polarity is both the fundamental principle of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, and also the divided principles possessed by each and every thing. The grand transformation of great virtue is seeing from the perspective of the dao, of the “great whole.” The rivers flowing of small virtue is seeing from the perspective of concrete things. One root is not another one substance outside of the myriad divisions, and the myriad divisions are not a myriad divisions outside of the one root. Thus, “The unifying substance is that which contains each individual, seeming to contain them despite their never being undivided. Each individual is that which divides the unifying substance, seeming to divide it despite it never not containing them” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 2). The two are like unfolding and folding dividing a whole, each with a different function and plane. “Small virtue is rivers flowing, great virtue is grand transformation” from Centrality in the Ordinary is one of the important foundations for Confucian metaphysics. Centrality in the Ordinary regards the co-nourishment of the myriad things without mutual harm and the co-implementation of daos without mutual opposition as the basis for “why Heaven is great.” The essential meaning in this is that the myriad things collectively constitute one Heaven, and the function and status of the myriad things within Heaven is equal. In the cyclical operation of Heaven, neither fine nor large are omitted, so the great realises its greatness and the small realises its smallness. The cyclical operation of the dao of Heaven is expressed as the myriad things, and the myriad things each rely on the cyclical transformation of their own inherent natures and collectively constitute the dao of Heaven. No single thing among these is the ruler, and the myriad things do not deliberately act in this way, rather everything spontaneously occurs and moves, abundant in productive significance, lively and active. This is the important principle of the Confucian view of the dao of Heaven, and also the metaphysical basis for “benevolence” (ren 仁) as the fundamental Confucian virtue. When Xue Xuan connected one principle and its many divisions with the cyclical operation of the dao of Heaven, this shows that although he took up Zhu Xi’s view of one root with many divisions, he spoke not simply of principle but even more of the dao-substance. His emphasis had already expanded from Zhu Xi’s stress on the myriad principles as distinct expressions of the one principle to the dao of Heaven as unfolding and folding dividing a whole with its lively vitality. This was a natural tendency in Ming dynasty Neo-Confucianism due to its emphasis on individual experience and its consequent attention to individual life within the “majestic and unending” [see Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经), Odes of Zhou (Zhou song 周颂), Decade of Qing Miao (清庙之什)] dao of Heaven. Xue Xuan’s views of the priority and movement or stillness of principle and qi also basically followed those of Zhu Xi. He said: Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as a whole are a mass of principle and qi. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 4) The four directions, above and below, and past and future are solid principle and solid qi, with not the slightest empty gap and not a moment’s interruption. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 122)

1 The Non-polarity and the Supreme Polarity, One …

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Since between principle and qi there is not even a hair, how can one divide them into one as prior and one as later? (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 3)

He held that principle and qi could not be separated into prior and later, since there is no principle without qi and no qi without principle. However, in terms of the relation between principle and qi, he did not simply rest on the basis of monism like Zhu Xi. He rejected both Zhu Xi’s view of principle as logically prior and especially the reckless and absolute language he used to emphasise the ruling and leading quality of principle in phrases such as “Before Heaven and Earth existed, there was still only this principle” and “Even if mountains, rivers and the Earth itself were destroyed, there would still only be this principle” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类], Vol. 1), believing that these phrases could easily lead people to view principle as a separate thing that exists independently. Xue Xuan only said that principle and qi could not be separated into prior and later: Principle only exists within qi, and one absolutely cannot separate them into prior and later, as if the Supreme Polarity moved and produced yang, but before this movement there was stillness, and stillness is qi; how can one say that principle is prior and qi later? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 118) What is the beginning? The resting of qi is the beginning. Before the beginning is the end, and before the end is another beginning, so there is no way to know which is the end and which the beginning. Thus there must be that which is capable of beginning and ending abiding between them which finally is without beginning and ending. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 3)

This says that principle and qi cannot be spoken of in terms of prior and later, while principle is the cause and foundation for the cyclical movement of qi. On this latter point, he said even more clearly: “Although principle and qi cannot be separated into prior and later, the reason why qi is like this is because it is made so by principle” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 4). Although principle is the reason why qi is so, “the reason why” (suoyi ran 所以然) is not another thing, and does not necessarily contain the meaning of logical priority. He opposed Zhu Xi’s use of metaphysical and physical to separate principle and qi into prior and later, and did not think that the metaphysical is necessarily prior, but rather merely emphasised that principle and qi are not separate and nor are they mixed. This shows that from Zhu Xi, Xue Xuan merely took his most clear and comprehensive points, and did not expand his arguments. Where Xue Xuan did offer an explanation of the relation between principle and qi was with his analogy of sunlight and flying birds, which aimed at explaining how principle rides on qi and moves, and is not another thing existing outside of or prior to qi. He said: Principle is like the sunlight while qi is like flying birds, so principle rides the activity of qi and moves like the sunlight riding on the back of birds and flying. Birds fly, and although the sunlight does not leave their backs, in reality it does not move with them nor is it interrupted at any point. In this way, qi moves, and although principle does not separate from it, in reality it is never exhausted with it nor is it extinguished at any time. This can be seen in the fact that qi has gathering and dispersion, while principle has no gathering or dispersion. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 119)

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Understood properly, this analogy says that that which is able to actually move is only qi; within qi there is principle, which moves following concrete things. However, this principle is also the expression of the fundamental principle of the cosmos, which does not appear and disappear following the appearance and disappearance of concrete things. The general is not cut apart to form the specific, yet the general also is not separate from the specific. This is what he meant when he said: “Principle is like the light of the sun and moon, since things both great and small each get a part of this light, yet when things are present then light is present in things, and when things are exhausted then light is present in light” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 119). Zhu Xi’s “Principle rides on qi just like people ride on horses” emphasised that the principles in concrete things and affairs and these things and affairs themselves are co-present and never separate, sharing their movement and stillness. Xue Xuan’s analogy of sunlight and flying birds emphasised that the principles embodied in concrete things and affairs and the fundamental principle of the cosmos have a relationship of one principle with many divisions, such that the fundamental principle of the cosmos does not move following the movements of concrete things and affairs. Of course, no analogy is perfect, especially using two concrete things as an analogy for philosophical entities with different metaphysical and physical qualities like principle and qi, with the constant danger of speciousness, so later figures criticised Xue Xuan for his “misplaced analogy.” Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 for example thought that Xue Xuan’s idea of sunlight and flying birds “cannot be used as an analogy.” In fact, the analogy of sunlight and flying birds was based on a passage from Zhu Xi: “I doubt that this qi is dependent on this principle in moving, yet wherever this principle gathers, principle is also present” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu, Vol. 4). Xue Xuan’s analogy actually includes a meaning unspoken in this passage from Zhu Xi: When this qi disperses and has not gathered, principle is just principle; principle in qi and principle not in qi have a relation of “one principle with many divisions,” namely the meaning expressed by the sentence “things both great and small each get a part of this light, yet when things are present then light is present in things, and when things are exhausted then light is present in light” above. Viewed comprehensively, the emphasis of Xue Xuan’s Record of Reading Books is not on discussing the problems of the priority or movement and stillness of principle and qi, but rather on experiencing the refined and subtle aspects of the mind and inherent nature along with arguments concerning effort in cultivation, which were the focus of Ming dynasty scholars’ attention. Principle and qi were only referred to by scholars as the basis for mind and inherent nature, and the questions of their priority or movement and stillness had already been exhaustively explored by Zhu Xi, so there was no further space for their theoretical exploration, unless, like later scholars such as Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, one was to redefine their meanings and treat them as problems of empirical science. This already differed greatly in form from early Ming dynasty scholars such as Cao Duan and Xue Xuan who followed the spiritual direction of Song dynasty Neo-Confucianism and discussed principle and qi as part of spiritual plane theories of dao-substance, Supreme Polarity, yin and yang, etc.

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2 Knowing and Restoring Inherent Nature The problem of human nature and the inherent nature of things had already been discussed a great deal by Song dynasty Neo-Confucians, and Xue Xuan synthesised the theories of inherent nature of Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai 张载 and Zhu Xi, providing a further step of explanation. Xue Xuan’s conception of inherent nature had several levels. The highest level of inherent nature was the Supreme Polarity. He said: “Master Zhang [Zai] said: ‘Inherent nature is the one origin of the myriad things,’ namely what Master Zhou [Dunyi] spoke of as the non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). Zhang Zai’s inherent nature as “the one origin of the myriad things” refers to the fundamental principle of the cosmos, which is the common collective source of the principles of concrete things and affairs. The principle spoken of by Zhang Zai generally referred to the patterned order displayed by the movement of qi, as when he said: “Although the qi of Heaven and Earth gathers, disperses, advances and seizes in a hundred different ways, in terms of its principle, it follows without error” (“Supreme Harmony” [Taihe 太和], Correcting the Unenlightened [Zhengmeng 正 蒙]). To express the fundamental principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, he used the word inherent nature. Xue Xuan differed from this, since for him, inherent nature generally referred to the nature and quality of concrete things and affairs. He approved more the Cheng brothers’ view that “inherent nature is principle,” saying: “Master Cheng said: ‘Inherent nature is principle.’ Hence everything that fills the space between Heaven and Earth is principle, and everything that fills the space between Heaven and Earth is inherent nature. This is the dao that joins internal and external” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). Inherent nature and quality are external and perceptible, while principle is internal and attained through deduction. Principle is the internal basis for inherent nature, while inherent nature is the external expression of principle, so the two are unified. Hence, inherent nature is principle. The unity of inherent nature and principle is the dao that joins internal and external. He also said: Inherent nature is not only that which is uniquely present in the mind, since it is also all the principles of the ears and eyes, mouth and nose, hands and feet, and movement and stillness. It is not only that of the ears and eyes, mouth and nose, hands and feet, and movement and stillness, since it is also all the principles of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Hence it can be said: “There are no things in the world outside inherent nature, so inherent nature is omnipresent.” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

Here, inherent nature is principle, and since this principle is within Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, so there are no things in the world outside inherent nature. In ancient Chinese philosophy, inherent nature and principle are both epistemological categories and also categories of moral cultivation. The former meaning mainly speaks of the qualities and regularities of concrete things and affairs, and can thus be grasped using knowledge. The latter represents the necessity and purposiveness of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and thus requires the use of individual experience (tiren 体认), since it represents a spiritual plane (jingjie 境界) and

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mentality of unity with the regularity of the dao of Heaven. The latter meaning is an extension, transformation or projection of the former. When Xue Xuan developed propositions from Zhang and the Chengs such as “Inherent nature is the one origin of the myriad things,” “There are no things in the world outside inherent nature” and “Inherent nature is principle,” he mainly expressed what he had learned through moral cultivation and individual experience of a spiritual plane. In terms of his theory of human nature, Xue Xuan took most from Zhu Xi, viewing Zhu Xi’s theory of inherent nature as a synthesis and elaboration of those of Mencius 孟子, the Cheng brothers and Zhang Zai. He said: “Mencius spoke of inherent nature as good, expanding on that which previous sages did not develop. Master Cheng’s ‘inherent nature is principle’ and Master Zhang’s discussions of the inherent nature of material qi then expanded on that which Mencius had not developed. When Master Zhu [Xi] gathered together the discussions of inherent nature by Zhang and the Chengs, he perfected it” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). Zhu Xi’s theory of human nature held that the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth (tiandi zhi xing 天地之性) and that of material qi (qizhi 气质) were neither separate nor mixed, with the former taken from Cheng Yi’s “inherent nature is principle,” and the latter directly from Zhang Zai. Xue Xuan praised and developed Zhu Xi’s theory of human nature, believing that the inkling of goodness in human nature is a continuation of the principle of Heaven and Earth, and that this was in fact already the meaning of Mencius’ theory of inherent nature as good. He said: The [Book of] Changes [Yi 易] says: “That which produces it is good.” This word “good” [shan 善] in fact refers to principle. When Mencius spoke of human nature as good, the word “good” spoke emptily of inherent nature as having goodness and no badness. However, when Mencius spoke of human nature as good, this in fact came from “that which continues it is good,” since it is because that which continues it is good that inherent nature has goodness and no badness. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

He believed that Mencius’ theory of inherent nature as good did not clearly state that this goodness is a continuation of the principle of the cosmos, and hence one can say he spoke emptily. This empty speech is an abstract hypothesis. He thus found the source for Mencius’ theory of inherent nature as good: inherent nature is formed by continuing the principle of Heaven and Earth, and thus has goodness and no badness. Xue Xuan thought that he himself could use the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传) and the theories of the Cheng brothers to supplement the foundation that Mencius had not stated clearly, connecting the theory of inherent nature as good with the regularity of the cosmos and thus locating a metaphysical foundation for the theory of inherent nature as good. Understood according to this line of thought, the ideas of Mencius, the Commentaries on the Changes, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi are all consistent, since they all follow the path of arguing that since Heavenly principle is originally good so human nature contains nothing that is not good, and “inherent nature is principle.”

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Based on Zhang, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, Xue Xuan developed the distinction between the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment (tianming 天命) and that of material qi, saying: “The human mind is the inherent nature of food and sex, while the dao-mind is the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). Strictly speaking, his expression here differs from Zhu Xi, since for Zhu, the dao-mind and the human mind belong to the category of mind, while the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment and that of material qi belong to the category of inherent nature, and Zhu Xi did not mix discussions of the two together. Xue Xuan’s meaning here is clear: the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment is the inherent nature of Master Cheng’s “inherent nature is principle,” while the inherent nature of material qi is Zhang Zai’s “inherent nature of advancing and seising,” and the two cannot be confused. He said: Master Cheng said: “Inherent nature is principle, and principle is one from Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 to the man in the street.” This discusses the original inherent nature. He also said: “Talent is endowed through qi, and since qi is clear or turbid, so those endowed with the clear become worthies, while those endowed with the turbid become fools.” This discusses the inherent nature of material qi. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

The content of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is principle, this was the view held by all Neo-Confucians. As for the content of the inherent nature of material qi, there were different views. Zhou Dunyi spoke of inherent nature in terms of the hardness or softness of material qi, and did not use the names of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of material qi. The Cheng brothers spoke of the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment as “the inherent nature of the polar root that fathoms the origin,” and spoke of qi-endowment as “life is what is called inherent nature” [see Mencius, 6A.3]. As for Zhang Zai, he clearly proposed the opposition between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of material qi. His inherent nature of material qi in fact referred to the clear or turbid quality of qi-endowment. Zhu Xi synthesised Zhang and the Cheng brothers, regarding that which people are given by Heavenly endowment as the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth, with principle as its content, and regarding the expression of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth in human qi-endowment as the inherent nature of material qi. The partiality of qi-endowment is the source of badness. Xue Xuan took up Zhu Xi’s idea here, speaking of inherent nature in terms of the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment as neither separate from nor mixed with material qi. He said: When within material qi one points out how benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not mixed up with material qi, we call these the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth; insofar as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are mixed up with material qi, we speak of the inherent nature of material qi. It is not that there are two. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

The inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is the same for all people, while the inherent nature of material qi differs for each individual; if one explains this using Zhu Xi’s “principle is one with many divisions,” then that which is the same for all people is the one principle, and that which differs is the many divisions. His explanation of “one principle with many divisions” is: “Heavenly principle is

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originally one, its unevenness arises through the movement of yin and yang; human nature is originally one, differences of good and bad arise through the confusion of the human mind” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). Xue Xuan also used the notion of inherent nature to connect together categories that express the fundamental regularity of the cosmos and the ultimate goal of moral cultivation, such as principle, dao, virtue, sincerity, endowment, faithfulness, forbearance, etc., making the Confucian appreciation of the fundamental principles of the cosmos more complete and integrated. He said: Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are inherent nature; it is not that beyond these four there is another principle that is inherent nature. The dao is simply to follow this principle and carry it out; it is not that beyond inherent nature there is another principle that is the dao. Virtue is to carry out this dao and attain it in one’s mind; it is not that beyond inherent nature there is another principle that is virtue. Sincerity is simply the true reality and inerrancy of inherent nature; it is not that beyond inherent nature there is another principle that is sincerity. Endowment is where inherent nature originates from; it is not that beyond inherent nature there is another principle that is endowment. Faithfulness is to exhaust this inherent nature in one’s mind; it is not that beyond inherent nature there is another principle that is faithfulness. Forbearance is to see this inherent nature in others; it is not that beyond inherent nature there is another principle that is forbearance. This being so, inherent nature is truly the unifying ancestor of the myriad principles! Although the names of principles are myriad and divergent, in reality they are nothing but a single inherent nature. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

Here, inherent nature is the fundamental regularity of the cosmos, and has a twofold ontological and moral significance. Concepts such as dao, virtue, sincerity, etc. are its different expressions. Xue Xuan used the universality of moral rationality and the diversity of its forms of expression to connect together the dao of Heaven (inherent nature, principle, sincerity, etc.) and human affairs (faithfulness, forbearance, benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom, etc.), connecting texts that mainly discuss the dao of Heaven, inherent nature and endowment such as Centrality in the Ordinary and the Commentaries on the Changes with texts that mainly discuss the human relations and daily usages such as the Analects (Lunyu 论 语) and the Mencius. This shows that although Xue Xuan was primarily a practicing Confucian, he had some personal comprehension of the spiritual plane of Confucian metaphysics. In this he differed from those Confucians who only stressed experiencing the four inklings in the mind and were unable to advance these to the ontological plane. As well as using the idea of one principle with many divisions to discuss the distinction between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of material qi, Xue Xuan also accepted Zhu Xi’s view of the state before arousal as inherent nature and that after arousal as the feelings, and connected this idea to Zhou Dunyi’s view that “Sincerity is without action, inflections are good and bad” [see Tongshu 通书, Pt. 3]. He said: That which is vast in great openness is inherent nature; that which follows and responds when things come is the feelings. Inherent nature is the substance of the feelings, while the feelings are the function of inherent nature; this is why inherent nature has no internal or external. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

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When the original substance of inherent nature has yet to be affected by things, it is wholly good; when it is affected by things and begins to move, there is good and not good, what Master Zhou called “inflections [ji 几].” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

Once his new account of centrality and harmony was fixed, Zhu Xi comprehensively connected together inherent nature and the feelings, substance and function, and the states before and after arousal, and he held the unchanging view that inherent nature is the state before arousal while the feelings are that after arousal and that inherent nature is the substance while the feelings are its function for the rest of his life. This view was accepted by Xue Xuan, who also regarded inherent nature as the original substance and the feelings that are affected by things into movement as the function of inherent nature, such that before being affected by things the one inherent nature is undifferentiated. When affected by things into movement, inherent nature is expressed as the feelings, and at this time goodness and badness sprout into being. The earliest sprouts of goodness and badness are what Zhou Dunyi called “inflections.” As for the mind, before it is aroused it is vast in great openness, and after it is aroused it follows and responds to the things that come. When it is vast in great openness, the substance of inherent nature is manifested, and it follows and responds to the things that come, inherent nature is expressed as the feelings. Although these views were all inherited from Zhu Xi, Xue Xuan’s elaborations were exceptionally clear and concise. Starting from the idea that the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of material qi are neither separate nor mixed, Xue Xuan took the approach in cultivation of changing and transforming material qi (bianhua qizhi 变化气质) and restoring inherent nature (fuxing 复性). He said: The most important matter in learning is changing and transforming material qi, since otherwise it is simply lecturing. In learning one should simply know and restore inherent nature, what Master Zhu [Xi] meant by knowing what is possessed by one’s inherent nature and completing it. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

To know inherent nature one must first know the difference between the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment and that of material qi, and knowing this difference means one must change and transform one’s material qi and restore one’s inherent nature. Xue Xuan spoke of changing and transforming material qi in many places, in which their basic content was based on the views of Zhang Zai. He said: Master Zhang said: “After one has a physical form, one has the inherent nature of material qi, and if one is good at reversing it, then the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is preserved. Hence in the inherent nature of material qi, the superior man has that which is not inherent nature.” This says that if material qi is dim and turbid, it obscures the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth, and hence it is the inherent nature of material qi. If one is good at reversing it and changing its dimness and turbidity, then the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth can restore its brightness, while if material qi is originally clear, then the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is spontaneously preserved, and is not first dependent on the effort to reverse it. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

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When material qi is dim, its obscuring is serious, and thus reversing it is difficult; when material qi is clear, the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is directly revealed, and is not dependent on the effort to reverse it. Hence in changing and transforming material qi, the dim can be made bright and the turbid made clear. The obscuring and obstructing function of material qi for inherent nature is strong, so one must be courageous in purifying and treating it. Xue Xuan said: Since qi is strong and principle is weak, so dimness and brightness, goodness and badness all follow the activity of qi, and there is that which principle cannot gain control over. Even when principle occasionally appears, it is then once again hidden by qi, and finally cannot be opened up for long. In learning, we precisely want to change this unpleasant material qi, making principle constantly appear and flow into activity. However, unless one applies a hundredfold of effort, one cannot reach this point. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

“Qi is strong and principle is weak” expresses the fact that people’s instinctive desires are stronger in comparison to their innate moral awareness, so qi has a kind of natural rebellion against the prohibitions of principle. Whether or not principle can control desire depends completely on whether or not the ability at suppression based on the effort at cultivation of the moral subject is able to overcome this rebellion. Xue Xuan still followed the Neo-Confucian approach to cultivation of “eliminating human desire and preserving Heavenly principle,” regarding the conflict between moral rationality and people’s instinctive desires along with the overcoming of this conflict as the content of moral cultivation. This is completely different from the later view of “people each attaining their desires is the great openness of Heavenly principle,” which stressed reconciling the conflict between Heavenly principle and human desire and placed more emphasis on accommodating people’s natural instincts. As an illustrious and industrious scholar and official who constantly examined his own behaviour, Xue Xuan’s image did not go beyond the appearance of the Neo-Confucian school of personal practice. His approach to cultivation mainly lay in eliminating human desire and preserving Heavenly principle, so he said: “In general, learning simply means, in one’s own affairs, eliminating the selfish desires that were originally absent, and completing the Heavenly principle that was originally present” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). On this point, former scholars were justified in their summary of Xue Xuan’s effort at cultivation as “taking the restoration of inherent nature as its core” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, “Case Studies from Hedong”). When in a poem he wrote shortly before his death, Xue Xuan said, “In the 76th year when there was no business, this mind began to feel the interconnectedness of inherent nature and Heaven,” this precisely expressed the final result of his effort to restore inherent nature.

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3 Investigating Things and Abiding in Respect The central principle of Xue Xuan’s cultivation was changing and transforming material qi in order to restore inherent nature, and changing and transforming material qi must be done through concrete efforts at cultivation, in which for him the most important were abiding in respect (jujing 居敬) and fathoming principle (qiongli 穷理). These were the most important items taught to people by Cheng and Zhu. Cheng Yi’s “Cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge” was regarded by scholars as their jade standard. Xue Xuan regarded the investigation of things (gewu 格物) as the first step in efforts at cultivation, and for him this included a very broad variety of aspects, greater than the items listed in Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s “fathoming principle has many facets” in both number and detail. He said: The content of the investigation of things is very broad. In terms of a body, the ears, eyes, mouth, nose, body and mind are all things. For example, in terms of the ears, one should investigate the principle of their sharpness; in terms of eyes, one should investigate the principle of their clarity; in terms of the mouth, nose and four limbs, one should investigate the principles of their stopping, solemnity, respectfulness and seriousness; in terms of the body and mind, one should investigate the principles of their movement and stillness, their inherent nature and feelings. Extending this to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, they are all the same. In terms of Heaven and Earth, one should investigate the principles of their power and compliance; in terms of human social relations, one should investigate the principles of their faithfulness, filial piety, benevolence, respectfulness, wisdom and trust; in terms of ghosts and spirits, one should investigate the principles of their flexion and extension, their change and transformation. Extended to grass, wood, birds, beasts and insects, one should investigate the principles possessed by each. Extending this again to the books of the sages and worthies, the texts of the six arts, and the politics and governance of successive dynasties, these can all be called things, so again one should seek the moral principles in each, their refinement and coarseness, their roots and branches, their rights and wrongs, their successes and failures, and this can all be called investigating things. However, the things under Heaven are manifold, so how can one comprehensively investigate them and exhaust their knowledge? One can merely accord with their connections, estimating one’s abilities and investigating them in sequence, neither so vague as to be neglectful nor so detailed as to be exhausted, clear in one’s mind and refined in one’s intentions, in order to gradually examine their ultimate polarity. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 2)

Xue Xuan pointed out not only the various aspects contained in the investigation of things as an activity, but also the result that it should attain. His investigation of things included almost everything, beginning with seeing that each thing has its own principle, and ending with seeing that the myriad things collectively share a single principle. This is the kind of spiritual plane finally attained in Zhu Xi’s “reaching all the surfaces and insides and the fineness and coarseness of things, illuminating all the complete substance and great function of my mind.” Knowing the principles possessed by each of the myriad things is “things being investigated” (wuge 物格), and seeing that the myriad principles are collectively this one principle is “knowledge being reached” (zhizhi 知至) [both from the Great Learning (Daxue 大学)]. To attain this kind of spiritual plane is to know the original inherent

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nature of the cosmos, to know the Supreme Polarity and Heavenly principle, hence he said: “Things being investigated and knowledge being reached, the Supreme Polarity is known,” “The place reached in knowledge is the one origin of inherent nature,” “Knowledge being reached, inherent nature and Heaven are known” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 2). This process is a leap from the principle of many divisions up to the principle of one principle, rising from concrete knowledge up to the level of both ethics and aesthetics. This level is a kind of spiritual plane and mentality that emerges from personal realisation and transcends concrete images. In terms of the mind itself, this is a kind of personal experience in which the substance and function of the mind both attain their perfection and permeate each other as one. Although in his account of the investigation of things, Xue Xuan basically followed Zhu Xi, yet in comparison he placed more emphasis on the personal realisation of the fundamental principle of the cosmos. Zhu Xi was a scholar with a great interest in empirical knowledge, and although the ultimate goal of his investigation of things was to illuminate Heavenly principle, he spoke less of the final achievement and more of the concrete, empirical epistemological process. This was a main aspect of the criticisms of him from his contemporary Lu Jiuyuan 陆九 渊 and later Wang Yangming 王阳明, and he himself said he “did more in terms of academic dao-learning.” Zhu Xi’s thought contains quite a lot of elements from empirical knowledge. As a practical Confucian, Xue Xuan emphasised the cultivation of mind and inherent nature, and he passed over and seldom spoke of Zhu Xi’s many discussions concerned with empirical knowledge, and in his notes on reading books there is very little discussion or elaboration of empirical knowledge. Although this is certainly due to the difference between Xue Xuan as an official and Zhu Xi as a scholar who received meager remuneration and expended the vast majority of his effort on writing and lecturing, it is more importantly connected to the stronger interest in personal experience of mind and inherent nature among Ming dynasty Confucians. The Neo-Confucianism of the first years of the Ming dynasty was somewhat different in form from that of the Song dynasty, clearly placing more emphasis on personal experience of mind and inherent nature, with the investigation of things and the fathoming of principle directly pointing toward cultivation of mind and inherent nature. Hence it can be said that the correction of the excessive emphasis on empirical knowledge in Zhu Xi’s account of the investigation of things did not begin with Wang Yangming, but was already begun in a circuitous way by various Confucians at the beginning of the Ming dynasty. This point is even more manifest in Xue Xuan’s elaboration of respect. Respect is a basic aspect of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi’s effort in cultivation, with the Cheng brothers wishing to eliminate Zhou Dunyi’s influence from Daoism, and therefore replacing the term “stillness” (jing 静) with “respect” (jing 敬). Zhu Xi concretised the Cheng brothers’ conception of respect as “Cultivating through self-discipline when still, reflecting through self-examination when moving,” in order that it correspond with his accounts of the state before and after arousal, centrality and harmony, and inherent nature and the feelings. Xue Xuan continued Zhu Xi’s idea of respect as the foundation of cultivation, saying: “The core method

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of learning throughout the ages has been nothing more than respect, since with respect the mind has a ruler and the various affairs can be carried out” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). The main content of respect is the mind having a ruler (zhu 主). The ruler rules over it with Heavenly principle, and this is fullness (shi 实); since it rules over it with Heavenly principle, the mind can receive external things and not become lost among them, and this is emptiness (xu 虚). When comparing discussions of ruling with respectfulness (zhujing 主敬) from Cheng Hao 程颢 and Cheng Yi, he said: Cheng Mingdao 程明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao] said: “When the centre has a ruler, it is full, and external troubles cannot enter.” This word “full” referred to ruling with respectfulness. When it is ruled with respectfulness, Heavenly principle is preserved and the mind is full, so external troubles are spontaneously unable to enter. Yichuan 伊川 [i.e. Cheng Yi] said: “When the centre has a ruler, it is empty, and when it is empty, external evils cannot enter.” These words “the centre has a ruler” refer to the “ruler” in ruling with respectfulness, and when it is ruled with respectfulness, although principle is full, the substance of the mind is constantly empty, and since it is empty, external evils cannot enter. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

This says that both the fullness spoken of by Cheng Hao and the emptiness spoken of by Cheng Yi refer to ruling with respectfulness. Xue Xuan’s ruling with respectfulness does not simply refer to emptily observing respectful caution, but is mutually dependent on righteousness (yi 义), so he often referred to respectfulness and righteousness together. He said: “The term ‘respectfulness’ was used beginning with [Book of] Documents (Shangshu 尚书), and when Confucius explained the second yin line of hexagram Kun 坤 [in the Book of Changes], he discussed respectfulness and righteousness in much detail. The core of learning does not go beyond this” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). Here he followed the traditional account that the “Ten Wings” [i.e. the Commentaries on the Changes] were written by Confucius, and although this is not exact, he believed that the words commenting on the image of the second yin line of hexagram Kun, “Straight and thus square,” expressed the meaning of respectfulness and righteousness being held together, since “straight” meant respectful, and “square” meant righteousness. Xue Xuan often referred to the mutual illumination between abiding in respect and fathoming principle, saying: Abide with respect in order to establish the root, fathom principle in order to realise its function. When abiding in respect possesses force, fathoming principle is more refined; when fathoming principle has attainment, then abiding in respect is more secure. When one focuses on abiding in respect and does not fathom principle, then one has the problem of withering silence; when one focuses on fathoming principle and does not abide in respect, then one has the trouble of convoluted disorder. (For all the above, see Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

Here, abiding in respect means establishing kind of mental state and spiritual direction, while fathoming principle means refined thinking concerning moral principle. The former is the preparation for the latter, while the latter is the

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fulfillment of the former. This is what Xue Xuan meant when he said: “Where there is self-restraint of self and mind, there is abiding in respect, and where there is consideration of moral principle, there is fathoming of principle; the two exchange their resources and are both necessary” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). However, among these two, Xue Xuan in fact placed more emphasis on abiding in respect, and he divided the Cheng brothers’ parallel conception of abiding in respect and fathoming principle into root and branches, primary and secondary. He said: When Master Cheng discussed deference and respect, he said that sharpness, clearness, astuteness and wisdom all emerge from this. Thus when people can be deferential and respectful, the mind is solemn and grand, the sight is clear and the hearing sharp, and then one can fathom the subtlety of the manifold principles. Without respect, the will and qi are dim and confused, the four limbs unbridled, such that even in coarse and shallow affairs, one is at a loss and unable to examine them, to say nothing of refined and subtle affairs. Through this one can know that abiding in respect and fathoming principle cannot be partially given up, yet abiding in respect is the root of fathoming principle. (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

He also said: An ancient phrase said: “Respect is the examination of virtue.” This phrase is most appropriate for the latent substance. The subtleties of the dao are inscrutable and cannot be fixed, and only in respect can one condense and gather this principle and attain its constant presence. If the mind is respectful, then the virtue attained can be condensed and gathered in the mind; if the countenance is respectful, then the virtue attained can be condensed and gathered in the countenance. As for things like the ears, eyes, mouth and nose, these are all the same. Where there is disrespect, the mind’s ruler is abandoned and lost, and the virtue of Heaven is abolished; the hundred organs of the body become slack and lax, and things are thus wasted. Even though one can say there is still the physical figure of a person, in reality it is but a bodily lump of blood and qi, no different from things. Is this one term of respect not the root of accumulating virtue and the core of exercising the body and exhausting inherent nature? (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5)

For Xue Xuan however, after effort at cultivation becomes practiced, abiding in respect and fathoming principle are in reality a single affair, or rather the two aspects of a single piece of effort. He realised especially profoundly that respect is the root of accumulating virtue. As a practical Confucian, Xue Xuan used the term respect to order the self and mind, disciplining the self very strictly, and he said of himself: “Every night when my head rests of the pillow, I must think of the affairs I have carried out that day. Where I have carried them out according to principle, I go sleep calmly; where I have not accorded with principle, I toss and turn and cannot sleep, thinking of how to correct my mistakes. I also worry that I may begin conscientiously but end in remiss, and so rely on keeping a written record to warn myself.” “I always call to my mind, saying: ‘Is the old master at home or not?’ When evening falls I must reflect on myself, saying: ‘Did the affairs I carried out today accord with principle or not?’” (Record of Reading Books, Vol. 5). He can truly be said to have been diligent and careful from morning till night, present in his mind at every moment.

4 Xue Xuan and Ming Dynasty Guanzhong Scholars

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4 Xue Xuan and Ming Dynasty Guanzhong Scholars Guan Learning 关学 was an important branch of Song dynasty Neo-Confucianism, and its founder Zhang Zai studied bitterly and thought carefully, fathoming Heaven, humanity, inherent nature and endowment, his learning characterised by the personal practice of the teachings of ritual propriety. After Zhang Zai died, his disciples scattered like the stars, and Guan Learning went into decline. A number of his disciples went east to Luoyang and studied with the Cheng brothers. From the northern Song to the middle of the Ming dynasty, although Guan Learning was never completely interrupted, no powerful figures emerged from within it. After the Chenghua and Zhengde periods, figures including Wang Shu 王恕, Xue Jingzhi 薛 敬之 and Lü Nan spread some glory to Guanzhong, and although they could not match the greatness of Zhang Zai, they echoed in quiet isolation. It should be noted that for Zhang Zai’s Guan Learning in the Song dynasty, the learning style of his disciples was generally very similar, being received and passed on from teacher to student, so his theories were inherited and had the scope of an academic school. However, although Ming dynasty Guan scholars were all from Shaanxi, their official positions and academic activities were generally not in Guanzhong, and they did not have a generally similar academic principles or styles, nor did they have clear teacher-student relations. Hence they cannot really be called “Guan Learning,” and will here be called “Guanzhong scholars.” According to the disciples and visiting students listed in the Record of the Academy of the Honorable Xue Wenqing (Xue Wenqing gong shuyuan ji 薛文清公书院记) compiled by Wang Sheng 王盛, more than ten of them were scholars of Guanzhong, yet none became well-known for their studies. Among the Guanzhong scholars who were able to pass on [Xue Xuan’s] Hedong Learning recorded in Case Studies of Ming Confucians, foremost was Zhang Ding 张鼎. He came from Xianning 咸宁 in Shaanxi, passed the imperial examination in the Chenghua period, and was appointed as a vice minister in the Ministry of Revenue. In his youth he followed his father who served in Puzhou 蒲州, and having become one of Xue Xuan’s disciples, he scrupulously abided by his master’s teachings for the rest of his life. After Xue Xuan died, Zhang Ding collected, compiled and corrected his Collected Writings (Wenji 文集). After Zhang Ding came figures such as Duan Jian 段坚, Zhang Jie 张杰, Zhou Xiaoquan 周小泉, and Xue Jingzhi, all of whom made some achievements in their studies. Among later scholars, Lü Nan was one of the more renowned. Lü Nan 吕柟 (zi Zhongmu 仲木, hao Jingye 泾野) was from Gaoling 高陵 in Shaanxi, passed the imperial examination in the Zhengde period, and held positions including a compiler in the Hanlin Academy and chancellor in the Imperial Academy. Lü Nan remained in Nanjing for nine years, where he held lectures together with Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水 and Zou Shouyi 邹守益, “gathering together a great number of students from throughout the empire, with those who surrounded them to listen numbering in the thousands” (Compilation of Guan Learning [Guanxue bian 关学 编], Vol. 4). Case Studies of Ming Confucians also said that Lü Nan’s “lectures almost vied for magnificence with those of Mr. [Wang] Yangming, and at one time

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most of the earnest and dignified scholars came from among his disciples” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, “On the Masters” [Shishuo 师说]). He wrote many works, among which the most famous was his Inner Chapters of Master Jingye (Jingyezi neipian 泾野子内篇), a compilation of his lectures and conversations from various periods that collects together and reflects his philosophical thought. Lü Nan’s learning was based on that of Zhu Xi, and also inherited Zhang Zai’s characteristic focus on practice. He once discussed his method of learning with his students, regarding the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, broad study of literature and restraint through ritual propriety as its core. He opposed Wang Yangming’s learning of the extension of innate moral knowing, believing that the term innate moral knowing was too ambiguous, and one should follow Zhu Xi’s method of learning, maintaining the order of the steps of investigation, extension, making sincere, and rectification. The investigation of things and fathoming of principles is the first step of effort, and only once who has accumulated much study can one’s intentions be made sincere. However, in terms of the content of the investigation of things, his view was different to that of Zhu Xi. He believed that the content of Zhu Xi’s investigation of things was too vast, and could easily lead to the problem of students focusing on the investigation of things at the expense of making their intentions sincere, only concentrating on knowledge and being unable to connect this to bodily and mental cultivation at all times. Lü Nan stressed that the things in the investigation of things must be connected to bodily and mental cultivation, and that one must approach the dao through the cultivation of ritual propriety and music. He proposed: “One must apply the words and actions of the sages to one’s body one by one, exchanging this body for the limbs and bones of the sages and worthies. Then when one situates one’s body amidst the rules and norms of ritual propriety and music, this does not lose the intention of one’s parents in producing one’s body” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 151). Here, the influence of Zhang Zai’s “personal practice of ritual teachings” and his academic style emphasising practice is clearly visible. Lü Nan also strongly emphasised being careful when alone, believing that this concerns the place where people unconsciously already know alone, in which pretense, embellishment, dissemblance, falsity, etc. are unable to intrude. Being careful when alone is the most essential method for accumulating effort on the heart and mind. It can include Zhu Xi’s two efforts of “cultivating through self-discipline when still, reflecting through self-examination when moving.” His “Recorded Sayings” (Yulu 语录) records a question: “If fearful caution and being careful when alone can be divided into the two matters of preserving Heavenly principle and restraining human desire, I am afraid this is wrong.” The teacher replied: “This is just a single effort, as when the [Book of] Changes states that if one guards against depravity then sincerity is automatically preserved [see the commentary to hexagram Qian 乾]. It is not that the alone is simply the time before connecting and responding to things and affairs, since the time of connecting and responding to things and affairs also contains the place of the alone. How can people know this? Only through knowing and attaining on one’s own. This effort must really be carried out strictly” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 149). “Preserving Heavenly

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principle” is cultivating through self-discipline when still, while “restraining human desire” is reflecting through self-examination when moving.” Yet the single effort of being careful when alone can include both these two aspects, since when human desire is restrained, there is Heavenly principle. Being careful when alone is the effort of the core of the mind entering its most subtle regions. On the question of knowledge and action, Lü Nan held that neither of the two could be partially abolished, and that one should first know and then act. He believed that the methods of cultivation taught by the great Confucians of the Song and Ming seemed to be biased toward knowledge, so the notion of action should be used to remedy this. He said: Human knowledge and action spontaneously have their order of priority, in which one must first know and then act, and not be biased to any one side. Fu Yue 傅说 said: “It is not knowing that is difficult,” and the sages and worthies never regarded knowledge as action. When Master Zhou [Dunyi] taught people, he spoke of stillness and sincerity; when Master Cheng taught people, he spoke of respect; when Master Zhang [Zai] taught people, he used ritual propriety; none of these worthies was wrong, yet they each grasped one side of the matter. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 142)

Although here he is speaking of knowledge and action with respect to moral cultivation, and not of their relation in theoretical terms, he nonetheless has a clear view, namely that one first knows and then acts, and that the two are equally important. This order of priority only describes the order of concrete knowledge and actions, and not their priority or importance in terms of value. Ming dynasty philosophy mostly discussed personal experience of mind and inherent nature, and did not emphasise abstract theoretical problems such as knowledge and action. Likewise, Lü Nan simply generally referred to these. Corresponding to his view of knowledge and action as equally important, in terms of the relation between empirical knowledge and knowledge of virtuous inherent nature, he opposed Zhang Zai’s account of knowledge of virtuous inherent nature as not germinating in experience, holding that knowledge of virtuous inherent nature and empirical knowledge function as mutually complementary. For example, when his student asked: “Why did Master Zhang say ‘Don’t be fettered by what you see and hear’?” Lü Nan replied: “Our knowledge is originally good, but it becomes obstructed by selfish desire, so we must rely on experience to open it up, and when one’s teacher’s and friends grasp it firmly, this is sufficient. Even one is born with the knowledge of Fu Xi 伏羲, one must still observe that which is above and examine that which is below…. Many do not realise that virtuous inherent nature and experience are mutually connected, so there is originally no need for much hierarchical grading between them” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 140). That is to say, knowledge is an assistant of moral cultivation, with the function of awakening the innate moral knowing of virtuous inherent nature originally present in the mind, and so fundamentally speaking, the two are the same. This can be seen as rectifying Zhang Zai’s excessive emphasis on knowledge of virtuous inherent nature. In summary, Lü Nan was a scholar who maintained the theories of Cheng-Zhu and inherited the style and charm of Zhang Zai’s Guan Learning, without much

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originality. Many of his students settled in the south, so it was difficult to avoid them being influenced by Yangming Learning. The academic style of Hedong Learning was plain and simple, displaying its brilliance through this plainness and simplicity, and was unlike the concentration on seeking novelty and high degree of self-flaunting of some of the later students of the Wang [Yangming] school, who ridiculed Hedong Learning as “not seeing inherent nature.” The later Donglin 东林 scholar Gao Panlong 高攀龙 said: “In the recorded sayings of Xue Wenqing [i.e. Xue Xuan] and Lü Jingye [i.e. Lü Nan], there is little penetrating realisation. Later people sometimes disdained it, without knowing that its great uprightness lay in this” (“Conversations from Meetings” [Huiyu 会语], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao [Gaozi yishu 高子遗书], Vol. 5). Huang Zongxi said: “Hedong Learning was completely sincere with no splendour, scrupulously abiding by the rules set down by people from the Song. Hence even after being passed down several times, one can know that its comments and arrangements come from Hedong without asking. As for the school of Yangming, despite personally leaving their mark on their students, they often betray the theories of their teachers, since their words were excessively lofty” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 109). These both focus on correcting the biased tendencies of later students of the Wang school, praising the plainness, simplicity, and blandness of Hedong Learning, and are naturally different from the critical assessments of scholars from the Wang school.

Chapter 3

Wu Yubi’s Self-governance and Hu Juren’s Holding to Respect

Among the representative figures of early Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism, after Cao Duan and Xue Xuan came Wu Yubi. Wu Yubi especially emphasised personal practice, and particularly the reflection on and control of thoughts that have already arisen. Wu Yubi’s disciples included Hu Juren and Chen Xianzhang. Hu Juren’s learning of holding to respect was an important inheritor of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 theories in Jiangxi, while Chen Xianzhang’s Jiangmen Learning was a crucial node in the transition from Zhu Xi’s theories to the Ming Dynasty Learning of the Mind (xinxue 心学).

1 Wu Yubi’s Self-governance and Diligent Practice Wu Yubi 吴与弼 (1391–1469; zi 字 Zifu 子傅, hao 号 Kangzhai 康斋) was from Chongren 崇仁 in Jiangxi province. In his youth he studied the Learning of Principle with Yang Tuan 杨漙, and upon reading [Zhu Xi’s] Records from the Yiluo Source (Yiluo yuanyuan lu 伊洛渊源录) he suddenly felt driven towards the dao. He abandoned his examination studies and concentrated on the Five Classics, the Four Books and the recorded sayings of various Confucians, working on them independently, lecturing, and teaching his followers. In his later years he was recommended and called up to the capital, where he was appointed as an adviser to the heir to the throne, but he resigned before taking up the position. He once presented a “Statement on Ten Affairs” (Chenyan shishi 陈言十事) to the Yingzong Emperor. After he returned home, he continued to lecture, and eventually died of old age. His Collected Works of Kangzhai (Kangzhai ji 康斋集) consists largely of his notes on reading.1

[Trans.] References to Kangzhai ji refer to the Wenyuan Chamber 文渊阁 Siku quanshu 四库全 书 edition.

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© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_3

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Wu Yubi’s learning focused on the examination and governance of that which is already aroused, and in terms of the aspects of philosophy and metaphysics he was not particularly original. For his whole life, he “was between action and stopping, speech and silence, diligently seeking their unity with the dao,” and he generally remained in quietude, in anguished self-reproaching. Later scholars said that he “judged and viewed himself too strictly” (“Annotation for the Complete Works of Kangzhai” [Kangzhai ji tiyao 康斋集提要], Annotated Catalogue of the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries [Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao 四库全是总目提要]), and that his “assiduous pushing of himself was mostly attained from the pillow at the fifth watch [of the night], through flowing sweat and tears” (“On the Masters” [Shi shuo 师说], Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案]). In Daily Record (Rilu 日录), his notes on reading, he repeatedly recounted how he “dreamt he met Confucius” or “dreamt he met Master Zhu [Xi],” from which can be seen his anxiety over seeking the dao. The most obvious aspect of Wu Yubi’s learning is his observance of the Song Dynasty Confucian maxim “preserve Heavenly principle, eliminate human desire” (cun tianli, qu renyu 存天理,去人欲) in his strict governance of himself. He once said: “At night I am pained in self-inspection of my behaviour such that I have no leisure time; how then could I make the effort to inspect the behaviour of others? To censure others is familiar, while to govern oneself is unfamiliar; this must be scrupulously observed!” (Complete Works of Kangzhai [Kangzhai ji 康斋集], Vol. 11).2 Most of Wu Yubi’s reading notes are not explications or developments of the ideas contained in books, but rather a concrete record of his struggle with his own thoughts and desires. For example: My sick body, feeble and exhausted, is tangled up in family matters, and I am unable to concentrate my mind and will on the scriptures of the sages and the commentaries of worthy men, so vulgar pretences increase in my mind with no way to apply my knowledge, hot-tempered sluggishness increases in my external appearance with no way to force my conduct! The months and years flow by with mournful sadness, just like this. Many days of family matters follow on from one another, concern for relatives is incessant, my reading course is interrupted and my breast settles into miserliness, it is truly shameful. The reason why I cannot be like the sages and worthy men is that I cannot avoid swaying between trifling benefits and harms, my examination of principle is not refined, and my personal conduct is not proficient. (Collected Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11)

One can say, the direction of Wu Yubi’s learning lay in examining oneself, gradually changing one’s character through examination and self-governance. Hence, Wu Yubi’s learning was not a “penetration above” but rather a “studying below” [see Analects, 14.35]; it concerned the theory of cultivation and effort (gongfu 功 夫), not that of original substance (benti 本体). Here one can see the particular characteristic of early Ming Dynasty Confucianism, namely its special emphasis on theories of effort. Song Dynasty Neo-Confucians generally emphasised theories of [Trans.] Quotations from Kangzhai ji and Juye lu 居业录 in this chapter are given as in Professor Zhang’s text, based on the Siku quanshu 四库全书 edition.

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original substance, with Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐, Zhang Zai 张载, the Cheng brothers 二程, Shao Yong 邵雍, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊, Yang Jian 杨简, etc. all providing discussions of the metaphysical original substance, and regarding a theory of original substance as the basis for a theory of effort. Early Ming Dynasty Confucians, especially Xue Xuan and Wu Yubi, offered relatively few discussions of theories of original substance, regarding these as empty and mysterious. They believed that concerning theories of original substance, earlier worthy men had already said everything that could be said, and that later Confucians simply needed to abide by the paths of cultivation they had established in their practical conduct. Personal conduct and practice was the direction universally pursued by early Ming Dynasty Confucians. Thus in general, Song Dynasty Neo-Confucians were more brilliant and transcendent, with large systems and comprehensive content, lofty spiritual planes and realistic effort. Early Ming Dynasty Confucians were all urgent in their scope, with no ambiance of grace or comfort. Although their self-discipline was very strict, as can be seen from their accounts of deeply felt experience and steadfast practice, their theoretical content was not deep or broad and lacked an academic probing into Heaven and humanity in terms of knowledge, instead solely following a path of earnest practice. Huang Zongxi’s 黄宗羲 statement that “Hedong Learning was completely sincere with no splendour, scrupulously abiding by the rules set down by people from the Song” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 109) is a judgment from Wang Learning’s position of not accepting past steps and daring to create new frameworks for oneself, and thus has its validity. Wu Yubi also made a few comments that advocated reading books and fathoming principles, such as: “Reading books and fathoming principles, devoting oneself to respect and forbearance, gradually entering into the realm of overcoming oneself and restoring ritual propriety.” “Looking through [Zhu Xi’s] Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu 近思录), one feels one’s spirit restrained, one’s self and mind checked and restricted, with an apologetic sense of not daring to be self-indulgent, a fearful sense of being pulled up and dragged forward” (Complete Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11). For Zhu Xi, reading books was one of the methods for the investigation of things, and the investigation of things was aimed at understanding principles. However, when Wu Yubi read books, he was more concerned with using them to govern the weaker points of his own character. Unlike for Zhu Xi, reading books for Wu Yubi meant using the moral principles contained within to eliminate the miserly vulgarity in the mind, relying on reading books to calm the mind’s wavering hesitation and external seeking. He said: In poverty, matters arise confusedly, doubling their harm, and one cannot avoid sometimes being resentful and impatient, yet when one slowly arranges one’s gown and cap and reads a book, one feels the meaning is clear and smooth. The mind is a living thing, so when its self-restraint is not mature, it cannot avoid being swayed. Merely by constantly settling oneself in books, one can avoid being overcome by external things. After responding to affairs, one should read books to avoid making this mind momentarily overactive. (For all the above see Complete Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11)

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He especially yearned after the spiritual plane of great joy in reading felt by the ancients, such as: “Nanxuan 南轩 [i.e. Zhang Shi 张栻] took great joy in reading the Mencius, feeling a limpid clarity like the qi at dawn with no disturbance, the shade of trees or the freshness of the day, a warm breeze slowly arriving, the quiet stillness of a mountains forest, the spontaneous vastness of Heaven and Earth, the spontaneous growth of sun and moon. When Master Shao [Yong] said, ‘Only when the mind is still can it know the brightness of the sun, and when the eyes are clear they begin to grasp and recognise the azure heavens,’ this demonstrates the point” (Complete Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11). He set for himself a daily lesson: “What should be done today is to rise early, wash oneself and comb one’s hair, complete the rituals of the family shrine, straighten one’s gown and sit upright, read the books of sages and worthy men, restrain this mind, and not be confused by external things. When at night one is tired, one should sleep, and one should plan for nothing other than this.” He also wrote two lines of a poem and set them on the right side of his seat to encourage himself: “Bland like the taste of the autumn rains in poverty, mild like the work of the spring breeze after stillness” (Complete Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11). Since Wu Yubi himself was aware that his character tended towards inflexibility and anger, he often exercised a method of inclusive tolerance. In his reading notes, there are many points where he warns himself against inflexibility and anger, such as: “If in a single matter there is less inclusive tolerance, then that single matter is deficient. Thus one ought to painstakingly add effort to overcome oneself and return to ritual propriety, working to make this mind limpid and clear, since then one’s responses to matters can be without error. Practicing self-restraint when still and self-examination when active, one cannot be neglectful for a moment.” “Lodge your body in an easeful realm without competition, ramble your mind in a tranquil land without disturbance, enrich them daily with the fine words and good conduct of sages and worthy men, and you will be close to making some progress!” (Complete Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11). Wu Yubi exerted his efforts for several decades, taking great pains to overcome his failing of inflexibility and anger, but felt that his grasping management was overly strict, and since he was unable to dispel it, he shifted towards the cultivation of the state before arousal, becoming enlightened that “to control without acting is both hard and bitter, while to deal with things through principle is smooth and unhindered.” Thus he again regarded reading books and fathoming principle as self-restraint, not desiring a rapid effect, but gradually combining the already aroused and the state before arousal on a single plane. Wu Yubi spent his whole life in poverty, using Zhang Zai’s “Wealth, honor, poverty and lowliness can be used to encourage me to achievement” [see his Western Inscription (Ximing 西铭)] and Mencius’ “it moves one’s mind and toughens one’s inherent nature, making good one’s deficiencies” [see Mencius, 6B.15] as lessons to encourage himself not to be concerned about poverty or illness. His notes contain many such records, such as:

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With a clear window and one’s own brush and ink stone, one’s mind is greatly cooled and refreshed, and one forgets one’s degree of impoverishment. Last night I was offended by my poverty and illness, and could not concentrate on my books, unable to avoid the unrest in my mind. After thinking it over for some time, I ought to apply my efforts to this point, teaching myself to be composed in my mind, constantly according with my share as my studies progress. Otherwise, it will be something I cannot overcome. Sitting at night, thinking of myself and my family, I managed to attain some peace, feeling deeply fortunate, since although my poverty is great, I simply have to accord with my share. As the Master [i.e. Confucius] said: “If one does not know fate, one has no way to be a superior man.” Upon my pillow I pondered my family and reckoned in poor in the extreme, and being unable to bear their predicament, I repeatedly thought of it, yet to no avail. By noon I had still not arisen, but finally worked it out: there is no other cunning method, only according with my share, economising, and being content with poverty, that is all. I pledged that no matter my cold, hunger or death, I would not dare to change my original aspiration, and then was able to get up happily. Also, if I wish my enlightenment to become mature, I must set out from here. In poverty, affairs entangle people, yet despite this, one must still strive, one side remaining in poverty, the other side making progress in study. (For all the above see Complete Works of Kangzhai, Vol. 11)

In Wu Yubi’s collected writings, the most common records are of this kind of overcoming one’s own weaknesses, being content with poverty and finding joy in the dao. It can be seen that Wu Yubi was a scholar who tended toward effort at internal self-governance and had the characteristics of purity, directness, drive and integrity. His contemporary Zhang Gun 章衮 said: “His Daily Record is one man’s history, all him speaking of his own affairs, unlike the way others take their own intentions and attach completed theories, or take completed theories and attach their own intentions, speaking extensively and discussing broadly in comparison” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 16). The Annotated Four Treasuries [see above] commented that he “was truly able to incorporate the strong points of both Zhu [Xi] and Lu [Jiuyuan], and was assiduous in his independence.” Wu Yubi’s assiduous independence is ubiquitous, and does not require further comment, but his incorporation of points from both Zhu and Lu lies roughly in his direct application of effort in the realm of the mind, without making use of the investigation of things and fathoming of principles or sudden comprehending enlightenment, which is close to Lu Jiuyuan’s discovery of the original mind; while his use of reading books as a method of changing one’s character, along with his practicing self-restraint when still and self-examination when active, are close to Zhu Xi’s method of learning. However, concerning these aspects, Wu Yubi did not offer any profound discussions. In general, he tended more toward Zhu’s learning. Although Wu Yubi’s learning could not avoid being somewhat limited and simplistic, its theoretical advances very faint, his disciple Hu Juren’s Yugan Learning was much more innovative in relation to Zhu Xi’s theories, while Chen Xianzhang was a key figure in the transition in academic learning in the Ming Dynasty. Both men studied with Wu Yubi. Huang Zongxi said: “Rustic wheels are

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the origin of great carriages, thick ice is comprised of accumulated water [see the Preface to Selections of Refined Literature (Wenxuan 文选)]. If one leaves out Kangzhai, how could there have been the flourishing of later times!” (“Case Studies from Chongren, 1” [Chongren xue’an yi 崇仁学案一], Case Studies of Ming Confucians). One can say that this states Wu Yubi’s academic status: although his own academic studies were not much to look at, as the source for both Hu Juren’s Yugan Learning and Chen Xianzhang’s Jiangmen 江门 Learning, he played a role in the history of the development of Ming Dynasty philosophy.

2 Hu Juren’s Holding to Respect Hu Juren 胡居仁 (1434–1484; zi 字 Shuxin 叔心, hao 号 Jingzhai 敬斋) was from Yugan 余干 in Jiangxi province. In his youth he studied with Wu Yubi, giving up his intention to take the imperial examination and building a hut on Meixi Mountain 梅溪山, where he concentrated on his writing and lecturing. He travelled through Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian participating in studies and inquiring concerning the dao. He once accepted an offer to direct the White Deer Grotto Academy (Bailudong shuyuan 白鹿洞书院). He had very many disciples. His main works include his notes on reading, Record of Working at Home (Juye lu 居业录), and the collection of poems and essays Collected Writings of Hu Jingzhai [Hu Jingzhai ji 胡敬斋集] in 3 volumes, compiled and edited by Yu You 余佑 after his death.3 Wu Yubi’s learning focused on examining and governing one’s thoughts, not forgetting for a moment, not allowing the slightest aberration, hence his learning could not avoid being confined and tense. Hu Juren had two important differences from Wu Yubi: first, he paid more attention to cultivating the state before arousal; second, he emphasised the comprehension of meaningful principles. Owing to these two points of difference, Hu Juren’s learning emphasised the use of respect to cultivate the substance of the mind, while at the same time using meaningful principles to enrich it, such that sincerity and illumination proceed together, and respect and meaning are held together. This is a typical approach of Zhu Learning. His academic scope was on the whole broader and greater than that of his teacher. Hu Juren especially praised Zhu Xi’s holding to respect and fathoming principle, regarding this as Cheng-Zhu Learning’s basic point and introductory effort. He said: “Cheng and Zhu opened the gateway to sage-learning, merely through holding to respect and fathoming principles, thereby teaching scholars to have a place to abide” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 2). Between holding to respect and fathoming principle, Hu Juren placed more emphasis on the former. He believed that holding to respect (zhujing 主敬) was the essence of Confucius’ doctrine, since Mencius’ introductory point of “seeking one’s lost mind” [see Mencius, 6A.11] was

[Trans.] References to Juye lu refer to the Wenyuan Chamber 文渊阁 Siku quanshu 四库全书 edition. 3

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too high, leading scholars to have no place to set to work. Following Confucius’ method of holding to respect, seeking one’s lost mind is naturally included within this. The term respect exhausts all the essentials of Confucius and Mencius’ effort. He said: “Confucius merely taught people to work at being faithful, honest, earnest and respectful, with one’s lost mind naturally being received and virtue naturally being cultivated” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 2). Hu Juren revered Zhou Dunyi, believing that he was the greatest Confucian of his generation, yet he thought his approach to effort through “holding to stillness” was mistaken, leading scholars to concentrate on sitting still in meditation, which can easily slip into heterodoxy. Holding to stillness as a method of cultivation is biased toward stillness, and thus differs from the Confucian ethos of learning based on robust activity and lively vitality. Habitual stillness also concentrates still qi, which differs from using meaningful principles to cultivate virtue. Hence he opposed the term “stillness” (jing 静), and changed it to respect (jing 敬), by which he meant Cheng Hao’s 程颢 “in activity there is calmness, in stillness there is also calmness.” Quietude only calms qi, while in respect both activity and stillness are included. Hu Juren inherited Zhu Xi’s “self-restraint when still, self-examination when active” cultivation method, believing that stillness and activity have a substance-function (tiyong 体用) relation: stillness is the state before arousal, i.e. substance; activity is the state after arousal, i.e. function, with substance and function having a single source. He said: “Stillness is the substance, and activity is its function; stillness is the host [or subject], and activity is the guest [or object], hence in holding to stillness, the substance is established and the function operates” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 3). He believed that respect included activity and stillness, cultivation of inherent nature and of mind, since in respect the mind is not confused or restless, and can govern activity and stillness. Hu Juren particularly paid attention to the distinction between stillness and respect, with his stillness being the state before arousal, i.e. “before thoughts have sprouted, before things and affairs have arrived,” yet despite being still this does not abolish operation, since respect connects activity and stillness. In terms of the relation between holding to respect and preserving principle, Hu Juren advocated respect and meaning being held together. He took up Cheng Yi 程 颐 and Zhu Xi’s view that “self-restraint requires the use of respect, while progress in learning requires the extension of knowledge,” holding that the two can be mutually cultivated and developed. Respect penetrates through all times, yet before knowledge has been extended it needs to be fostered, and this fostering is in order to cleanse the mind’s self-grasping and self-perception, so as to better recognise the principles of things and affairs. Having recognised the principles of things and affairs, one also needs to use respect in cultivation, but at this time cultivation emphasises using principle to enrich the mind, to cultivate a kind of spiritual plane. Hence holding to respect penetrates through all times: “The effort of the extension of knowledge has its time, while the effort of cultivation never rests” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 2). Other than this, Hu Juren also thought that using principle to enrich the mind can make the mind constantly joyful. Mencius’ “principle and righteousness please my

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mind, just as those beasts that feed upon grass and grain are agreeable to my mouth” [see Mencius, 6A.7] had precisely this meaning. He thought that holding to respect was a restriction of oneself, yet if this restriction was driven by some kind of belief or conviction of principle, it could produce joy within the mind. This kind of joy is a unity of moral and aesthetic feeling. He said: “Even though people hold to respect, they still need meaningful principle to enrich it, in order to attain the joy of the mind, otherwise it is simply a rigid maintenance” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 2). This joy has two aspects of content: on one hand, it makes people treat moral conduct as a kind of enjoyment to seek a higher spiritual plane; on the other hand, the lofty and dignified feeling brought about by moral conduct can turn moral conduct into a voluntary and aesthetic activity, and not something forced. Moral conduct itself is self-discipline, and can sometimes even cause pain, yet as a victory of reason over emotion, as the understanding’s awakening of the meaning of moral conduct, it can also produce a feeling of beauty. Hu Juren differed from Wu Yubi in that what the latter attained was “mostly attained from the pillow at the fifth watch [of the night], through flowing sweat and tears.” Wu Yubi did not speak much on fathoming principle, yet without the fathoming of principle, the concentration of righteousness is a “rigid maintenance.” Hu Juren however took respect and forbearance as his orientation, and meaningful principles as his cultivation, holding respect and meaning together, and those displayed a more carefree, easeful and gradual entry into the dao than Wu Yubi. Here we come across a difference between Song Confucians such as the school of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi and those in the early Ming Dynasty who followed them. Cheng and Zhu especially emphasised the investigation of things and the fathoming of principle, regarding it as a necessary conduit for elevating one’s moral and spiritual plane, and hence they advocated seeking to penetrate the higher in one’s lower studies, to seek Heavenly principle in the principles of things and affairs, to seek “to flow together with Heaven and Earth above and below” in “a multitude of things with their surfaces and interiors or refinement and crudeness all arriving, the great function of the complete substance of my mind all illuminated.” Moral advancement cannot be separated from exploring the principles of things and affairs. Early Ming Dynasty Confucians mostly focused on moral dignity: morality is not necessarily related to knowledge, since a moral and spiritual plane is rather an achievement of the exercise of the will, one which must be trained through severe moral decisions and a struggle between good and bad. They believed that without going through the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, one could directly approach the sincerity of intention and the rectification of the mind. They mostly lacked a carefree ethos and seemed rather confined and tense. This characteristic can be seen in the academic learning of Fang Xiaoru 方孝孺, Cao Duan 曹端, and especially Wu Yubi. Although Hu Juren also held himself “in a strict and puritan manner, surrounded with restraints,” and belonged to the school of respectful awe in his approach to cultivation, he nonetheless consciously used Cheng-Zhu’s method of using meaningful principle to cultivate virtue to correct Wu Yubi’s confined and tense quality, and thus what he attained was rather more grand and broadminded than his teacher.

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Hu Juren’s holding to respect included many aspects of content. One function of respect is to make the mind refined and clear, meaning that it becomes concentrated on unity and avoids being dazed and confused. He said: “The refinement and clarity of the mind is the effect of respect, and when one’s talents are focused in unity they are refined and clear, while if they are dual or triple, they are dazed and confused” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 1). Hu Juren opposed observing the ambiances of happiness, anger, sadness and joy in still sitting. He thought that the state before arousal cannot be observed, and all that can be experience is the state after arousal; one can see the state before arousal in the state after arousal, deducing the centrality before arousal from the harmony after arousal. When one is still, one can only cultivate restraint. He advocated Zhu Xi’s method of “self-restraint when still, self-examination when active,” using the term respect to illuminate both activity and stillness. Although he opposed observing the state before arousal through still sitting, he also opposed not applying effort when still, believing that without effort, stillness slipped into Buddhism and Daoism. Cultivation through restraint is the effort when still. He opposed using “In all under Heaven, what thought is there? What anxiety is there?” from the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传) as an excuse to abandon effort in stillness. He thought “when the inner is upright, the outer will necessarily be ordered,” that there are none who are upright internally yet not ordered externally. Hu Juren’s inward uprightness and outward order referred to the inward cultivation of the emotions of inherent nature and the external ordering of physical appearance. He said: Applying effort to one’s appearance and manner is concrete learning. Being serious and solemn, strict and dignified is where to begin with respect. (For both the above see Record of Working at Home, Vol. 2) Where the mind is serious, Heavenly principle is present. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 3)

This aspect of respect was also inherited from Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. Zhu Xi emphasised that moral cultivation must begin from making one’s external appearance ordered and serious, and that a person’s external appearance and character are an expression of his inner mental cultivation. At the same time, by making one’s external appearance ordered and serious, one can make one’s inner mind respectful, such that one does not dare to give rise to any hastiness or tardiness of mind. Hence Zhu Xi taught that “Rectifying one’s gown and cap and a respectful look come first,” and set down a series of rules and frameworks like “one’s head should be upright, one’s eyes straight, one’s feet firm, one’s hands respectful…” Hu Juren’s respect included being solemn and orderly, and he believed that the so-called sages and worthy men had both an inner mind of caution and fear, and an outer appearance of gravity and seriousness. In his daily life, he himself, “despite devaluing implements and objects, took great care in distinguishing and checking them, such that not a single cog was disordered (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 29). Holding to respect cannot be called lenient.

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Holding to respect was the most important part of Hu Juren’s thought, and he named his own study the “Hall of Respect,” displaying his approach to effort. His holding to respect mainly absorbed Cheng Hao’s “in activity there is calmness, in stillness there is also calmness” and Zhu Xi’s ideas concerning sincere respect and preserving the mind. The content of Zhu Xi’s respect was very rich, but its gist was respectful awe, self-restraint, concentrated unity, self-examination in one’s affairs, being constantly clearheaded in one’s mind, being solemn and well-ordered, etc. The content of Hu Juren’s discussions of respect did not go much beyond those of Zhu Xi, simply following his own experience in their emphasis and development.

3 Hu Juren’s Theories of Principle, Qi, Mind and Inherent Nature Hu Juren’s so-called principle refers to the regularity and standard of things and affairs necessarily and certainly being thus and so. In dealing with affairs and using things, Confucians should accord with their principles, and not introduce their own selfish intentions. He said: “All affairs preserve their certain principles, and if the self does not interfere, then this is the affair of the king” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 4). Hu Juren also emphasised Zhu Xi’s view of one principle with diverse particularisations (liyi fenshu 理一分殊), although for Zhu Xi this was a proposition used to explain the relation between the fundamental principle of the cosmos and the specific principles of things and affairs. For Hu Juren however, one principle with manifold divisions was a kind of accumulation of the effort of investigating things and fathoming principle, a method of observation after meaningful principles have gradually become complete and mature. This kind of observational method can assist people in adopting different methods to deal with different problems. The one of one principle is simplicity; the multiplicity of its manifold divisions is breadth. Breadth focuses on individuals, while simplicity focuses on the whole. By grasping the whole one can more profoundly recognise its parts, and a deeper understanding of the parts can then lead to a better grasp of the whole. He said: One root with myriad diversities, myriad diversities with one root. Scholars must fathom and probe the myriad diversities one by one, and then comprehend their one root. If one does not examine the myriad diversities but rather seeks to directly explore the one root, one inevitably falls into heterodoxy. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 1) When people reach the point of interconnected penetration in meaningful principles, they automatically have what is important in dealing with affairs… All affairs necessarily have their principles, and although at first each affair has its own principle, when one has fathomed principle further, these are gathered into one. With unity, their operations become simpler, and when one governs affairs, one is necessarily able to lead them by the head and order their various elements, to hit the mark in the opportunities they afford and be without regret or stinginess. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 2)

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Hu Juren emphasised the interconnection of breadth and simplicity, and grasping what is crucial in this interconnection. As for one principle with manifold divisions, he understood it more as a kind of method. “To lead them by the head and order their various elements” means mutual illumination and progression through analysis and synthesis. In terms of moral cultivation, “to lead them by the head” emphasises cultivation through self-restraint, while “order their various elements” emphasises fathoming principle, using cultivation to govern the fathoming of principle, and the fathoming of principle to advance cultivation. In general terms, this is still the holding to respect and fathoming principle approach of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. In terms of the relation between principle and qi 气, Hu Juren opposed the views that there is only qi once there is principle, and that qi is produced by principle, holding that principle and qi cannot be divided into prior and posterior. He said: “Since there is this principle, there is this qi, and qi is made by principle.” This is backward. Since there is this qi, there is this principle, so principle is made by qi. “That which establishes the dao of Heaven is yin 阴 and yang 阳.” Yin and yang are qi, and principle is within them. “That which establishes the dao of Earth is softness and firmness.” Softness and firmness are characters, and form their principles based on qi. “That which establishes the dao of humanity is benevolence and righteousness.” Benevolence and righteousness are ritual propriety, and are contained within qi and its character. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 3)

“Since there is this qi, there is this principle”: here Hu Juren explicitly opposes Zhu Xi’s statement that “Since there is this principle, there is this qi.” Yin and yang, softness and firmness all being categories that belong to qi, principle being within qi, and principle being formed based on qi are all opposite to the views emphasised by Zhu Xi. However, Hu Juren also proposed a view of principle as prior to qi, saying: “Once there is principle there is qi, and once there is qi there are images and numbers, hence principle, qi, images and numbers can all be used to know good and bad fortune, since the four are originally one” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 5). That principle, qi, images and numbers are originally one was a viewpoint approved by Song-Ming Neo-Confucians, although within this there were different points of emphasis. The phrase “Once there is principle there is qi” is in contradiction with the view expressed above that principle is within qi. Hu Juren also made statements to the effect that though principle always exists and is always concrete, qi can be void or actual. He said: In terms of principle, this principle flows into movement without cease, and this inherent nature that is endowed has its fixity, so how can one speak of emptiness or non-being? In terms of qi, there are differences between gathered and dispersed or void and actual, so when it gathers there is being, and when it disperses there is non-being. In principle, where there is gathering there is a principle of gathering, and where there is dispersal there is a principle of dispersal, so one cannot speak of its as non-being. When qi has a form and body it is actual, and when it has no form or body it is void, yet principle is always actual. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 3)

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The statement that principle is always actual is a continuation of the Cheng brothers’ viewpoint that “There is nothing in the world more actual than principle.” However, in terms of qi as being and non-being or void and reality, Hu Juren also made differing statements. He once said: “Between Heaven and Earth there is nothing that is not qi, and thus Master Zhang [Zai] thought that the void of non-being is also qi.” Yet he also said: “Hengqu [i.e. Zhang Zai] spoke of the gathering and dispersal of qi in the great void as like the freezing and thawing of ice in water, yet I cannot accept this, since when qi gathers it takes on forms, while when it disperse these are gone. How is this like when ice has not yet frozen and is water, and once it has thawed, it is again just this original element of water? (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 6). As for the contradiction here, a reasonable explanation is that, just like with Zhu Xi’s responses concerning principle and qi, since the times, places, objects and points of emphasis were different, he made different statements. The contradictions in Hu Juren’s view of principle and qi can be seen in this way. In general, Hu Juren’s view of principle and qi did not depart from the Cheng brothers’ basic points, yet his discussions were not very systematic or consistent. In terms of his theory of mind and inherent nature, Hu Juren held that the mind governs inherent nature and emotion. In his formulation of inherent nature, he held that inherent nature is principle. In this aspects he followed the ideas of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, yet his discussions were few. One prominent difference is that the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi spoke much of the inherent nature of things, while Hu Juren mostly discussed that of people. For Zhu Xi, inherent nature referred to the expression of the common principle of Heaven and Earth in people and things, as in “This principle is just the common principle of Heaven and Earth, which once it has been endowed becomes something I possess.” Zhu Xi emphasised the inherent nature of both people and things, and described in detail how this common principle comes to be expressed differently in people and things in his views that “principle is the same while qi differs” and “qi is the same while principle differs.” However, Hu Juren mostly spoke of human nature, and very seldom of the inherent nature of things. Hu Juren also followed Song Confucians’ statements concerning the distinction between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of material qi [qizhi 气质], believing that the goodness of humanity originates in the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth while badness originates in the inherent nature of material qi: “Heavenly principle has goodness and no badness, and badness arises from excess or insufficiency. Human nature has goodness and no badness, and badness arises from the material desires that qi endows” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 1). Moral cultivation thus lies only in examining and overcoming the material desires of one’s qi-endowment, so as not to allow to them to confuse one’s inherent nature of Heaven and Earth. Since examining and overcoming themselves are the content of “respect,” so Hu Juren’s theory of human nature and his tenet of holding to respect are consistent. Both Hu Juren and Wu Yubi emphasised moral practice, and did not develop their views much through discussion. Neither of them attempted to write any books, and the academic works they left behind are notes on reading. Although Hu Juren was rather plain and simple, and not strict and tense like Wu Yubi, many of his

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analyses of principle were not refined. The contradictions and inconsistencies in his theory of principle and qi demonstrate that he mostly vaguely followed the doctrines of Cheng and Zhu, with no profound understanding or accurate expression. What he finally obtained was merely a sincere and upright gentleman, a broadminded ethos without theoretical advancement or self-attainment. This shows that in the learning of early Ming Dynasty Confucians, the problem of principle and qi had already gradually faded, and the focus of discussion and learning had shifted onto experience of mind and inherent nature. Hence the rise of the learning of Chen Xianzhang and Wang Yangming can be said to have had its reasons.

4 Hu Juren’s Criticisms of Buddhism and Daoism Among Confucians at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, there were many who believed in Buddhism. In his reading of books, Hu Juren felt that the principles of Buddhist works were in conflict with Confucian doctrines, and was dissatisfied with contemporary scholars who used Buddhist principles to explain Confucian texts. Hence in his criticisms of Buddhism and Daoism, he mostly focused on their theoretical content and not their social effect. His views mostly came from Cheng and Zhu, and although they did not contain many original ideas, the harshness of their criticisms were seldom found among scholars of his time. He also attacked his fellow student Chen Xianzhang, believing that his doctrines were similar to Chan 禅 [i.e. Zen] Buddhism. In his criticisms of Buddhism, Hu Juren mostly attacked it for regarding “function as inherent nature,” while in his criticisms of Daoism, he mostly focused on its “regarding the void of non-being as the root.” Hu Juren pointed out that the biggest difference between Confucianism on the one hand and Buddhism and Daoism on the other was that Confucians regarded principle as the highest and most real thing between Heaven and Earth, while Buddhists and Daoists regarded the essence of the myriad things between Heaven and Earth as emptiness. He said: “Confucians cultivate a-principle, while Buddhists and Daoists cultivate a spirit” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 7). The spirit he speaks of here is people’s numinous clarity, the original substance that can be aware and move. He believed that the principle spoken of by Confucians is both in the myriad things of the cosmos, and also in the human mind. The principle in the human mind is inherent nature, and inherent nature is the fundamental principle of the cosmos that is endowed to people, something that is possessed by everyone. Although the numinous clarity of awareness is also possessed by everyone, the content of which it is aware is different for each person. He said: “Confucians cultivate the upright qi of the body, and thus they speak of no separation between Heaven and Earth; Buddhists and Daoists cultivate the private qi of the body, and thus they go against Heaven and violate principle” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 7). Since this upright qi is one with principle, one should enter into worldly affairs, carry out moral cultivation, and be of benefit to communal life. Buddhists

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and Daoists however merely practice individual cultivation aimed at liberation, not speaking of worldly ethical rules and codes, and thus are private matters of the individual. Confucians speak of preserving the mind (cun xin 存心), as do Buddhists, yet the mind preserved by Buddhism is the empty mind that is originally without any things, “the original state before one’s parents were born,” while the mind preserved by Confucianism is the principle of inherent nature, “that which Heaven and Earth have endowed me with.” In terms of the method for preserving the mind, Confucians rely on holding to respect, preserving cultivation and self-examination, while Buddhists merely preserve the mind of the empty void and silent annihilation, “not concerning themselves with human relations and worldly matters.” Hu Juren said: Chan Buddhists’ preserving of the mind takes several forms. One is seeking the non-mind, the emptying of one’s mind, one is harnessing and restraining one’s mind, and one is observing and illuminating one’s mind. Confucians on the other hand inwardly preserve their sincerity and respect, outwardly fulfil moral principle, and thus the mind is preserved. Thus when Confucians have preserved the mind, the myriad principles in all their variety are all included, while when Chan Buddhists have preserved the mind, they are in silent annihilation with no principles. When Confucians have preserved the mind there is a ruler, while when Chan Buddhists preserve the mind there is no ruler. When Confucians have preserved the mind there is life, while when heterodox teachings have preserved the mind there is death. Thus Chan Buddhists are in fact not able to preserve their minds, but rather to empty their minds, kill their minds, restrain their minds, and trick their minds. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 6)

“Emptying their minds” refers to the original substance of the mind having no ethical content. “Killing their minds” refers to concentrating one’s intentions on entering into silence and sitting in meditation in terms of their method of cultivation. “Restraining their minds” refers to firmly grasping this mind so that it is not moved by external things. “Tricking their minds” refers to Chan Buddhists’ use of witty points, koans and various other skilful means to make students enlightened as to their dao. Hu Juren believed that the mistakes in Buddhist theory could be summarised with the single sentence “function as inherent nature.” He said: The Buddhists mistakenly taken emotion and awareness as principle, hence they regard function as inherent nature. They hardly imagine that numinous awareness is the heroic spirit of qi, and thus they marvel at this as principle. Yet to take numinous awareness as principle is unacceptable. Inherent nature is the principle of my body, while function is the qi of my body. To accept qi as principle is to take the phenomenal for the metaphysical. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 7)

His meaning is that Buddhists regarded people’s psychological functions of being able to think and move as human nature, unaware that these are simply functions of qi, natural functions of the human body. These natural functions contain and apply the principles of inherent nature, but they are not the principles of inherent nature themselves. Buddhists use the idea of epistemological functioning as human nature to reject the principles of inherent nature that are already present in the mind, which is to regard the phenomenal as the metaphysical. Hu Juren’s statements here regard

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principle as metaphysical, qi as phenomenal, metaphysical principle as human nature, and the numinous awareness function of qi as the path and site of expression for humanity’s principles of inherent nature to take effect. These all originate from the thought of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, especially the Cheng brothers’ view that “We Confucians find the root in Heaven, while Buddhists find the root in the mind” and Zhu Xi’s view that “Inherent nature is the substance, emotion is its function, and the mind is the ruler of inherent nature and emotion.” Hu Juren’s criticisms of Buddhism followed the main point of Song Confucians’ rejection of Buddhism, which Huang Zongxi thought was somewhat mistaken. Although he affirmed Hu Juren’s intention of protecting the [Confucian] dao, he thought the theoretical basis for his criticisms of Buddhism failed to grasp the essential point. Huang Zongxi thought that what makes Buddhists Buddhist is their regarding flowing movement as substance, and not their regarding empty silence as substance. He said: “Buddhists only see how the substance of flowing movement changes and transforms unpredictably, and thus regard awareness and movement as inherent nature, seeing inherent nature in function. Their so-called inextinguishable is their ultimate change. Sweeping away level by level, not retaining a single dharma, the changes and transformations of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are also my changes and transformations, while as for that which does not change amidst the ultimate change, there is no way to serve it” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 30). His meaning was that Buddhists, especially Chan Buddhists, regard the flowing movement that changes and transforms unpredictably as original substance, such that everything exists in arising and extinguishing, while the only unchanging thing is this unending reality of arising and extinguishing. Hence the change and transformation of flowing movement is inherent nature. Since the myriad things all change, and there is nothing unchanging, so the myriad things are all empty with no self-nature [i.e. no svabhāva]. This is the meaning of the phrase “not retaining a single dharma.” Since the myriad things all change, and there is no eternal entity in the cosmos, so there cannot be what the Confucians describe as that which is “not made existent by Yao 尧 and not made inexistent by Jie 桀” [see Xunzi 荀子, “Discourse on Heaven” (Tianlun 天论)], i.e. the principle that has been such from time immemorial. Huang Zongxi’s “that which does not change amidst the ultimate change” refers to this principle. The weakness of Buddhist theory is that it accepts that the myriad things all change but not the principle that is unchanging. When Buddhists regard this flowing movement as inherent nature, this is to hold that “inherent nature is function.” Hu Juren never spoke of this. How should we regard Huang Zongxi’s criticism of Hu Juren? We believe that both of their criticisms of Buddhism have some validity. Hu Juren focused on Buddhism’s general theory, the “emptiness” that was advocated equally by all schools, the “nirvana is quiet stillness” in the three dharma seals [i.e. the trilakṣaṇa], and hence concentrated his criticism on the absence of principle in their “emptiness.” Huang Zongxi focused on the substance of flowing movement in Chan Buddhism, the “all saṅkhāras [i.e. movements] are impermanent” in the “three dharma seals,” and hence concentrated his criticism on the absence of a ruler (zhuzai 主宰) in their flowing transformations. Huang Zongxi’s view was based on

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his summary of Ming Dynasty academic learning, especially his correction of the faults of the followers of Longxi 龙溪 in Taizhou 泰州 from the later Wang [Yangming] School, namely their reliance on pre-formed innate moral knowing and denial of a ruler in flowing transformation, and hence his focus differed from that of Hu Juren. Hu Juren’s criticisms of Daoism and religious Daoism mainly lay in their stubbornly regarding the lively mind that is adaptably active or still as a dead thing; in their regarding the numinous clarity that can possess a multitude of principles and respond to the myriad affairs as an impassive and unconscious thing of void and emptiness with no inherent nature or principle. He thought that the mind could be seen both as being and also as non-being. When the mind has a preserved ruler, then holding to respect is being, while when it follows the inevitability of principle and is without the addition or subtraction of private intention, this is non-being. He said: Holding to respect as having intention speaks in terms of the mind; carrying out that which has no undertakings speaks in terms of principle. Since the mind has a preserved ruler, it has intention; since it follows the inevitability of its principle, it has no undertakings. This is never once being in being, never once not being in non-being, in which the mind and principle are one. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 3)

Hu Juren criticised the Daoist method of regulating breathing, believing that the Daoist method of cultivating the mind was in fact cultivating the physical body, while in terms of the mind they forcefully and stubbornly prevented it from giving rise to thoughts. He said: Focusing on the tip of one’s nose until one’s breath becomes white in order to regulate one’s breathing and eliminate illness is acceptable, but using it to preserve the mind is absolutely not. To take the nearest thing on the body to fix one’s mind, as in reflective observation or internal vision, is also this method, as is the Buddhists’ use of beads, harnessing the mind so that it does not move wildly. Ah! The spiritual numinosity of the mind is sufficient to possess a multitude of principles and respond to the myriad affairs, so to respond to being unable to preserve it through respect by harnessing it to one tiny thing and installing it in a useless location, is this not lamentable? (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 7)

Hu Juren pointed out that the Confucian holding to respect is the best method for preserving and cultivating the mind, since if one abides in respect and accumulates righteousness then the mind is naturally preserved, without the need for methods such as stilling one’s qi or regulating one’s breathing. Using these methods to preserve one’s mind can indeed even harm the mind. Hence he also criticised the Notice on Regulating Breathing (Tiaoxi zhen 调息箴) that Zhu Xi wrote under the influence of religious Daoism: “People regard Master Zhu’s Notice on Regulating Breathing as able to preserve the mind, when this is merely to regulate the qi. Only respect and serenity are methods to preserve the mind, so how could regulating breathing be used to regulate the mind? If one regards this as preserving the mind, its harm to the dao is serious” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 7).

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Hu Juren also gave criticisms of the Daoist precepts of “non-action,” “no thoughts,” “no suitability that is not dao,” etc., in which he offered his explanations of these concepts. He said: As soon as learning is not up to scratch, it falls into heterodox teachings, among which there are many misunderstandings of the intentions of sages and worthy men. They spoke of non-action, meaning no artificial action based on selfish intention, yet others came along and thought this was really empty, silent non-action. They spoke of the mind as void, meaning that the mind has a ruler that prevents external evils from entering, and hence is not filled with confusion, yet others came along and thought this meant it was really empty with no things. They spoke of no thoughts, meaning that the myriad principles are all present in the quietude that does not move, yet others came along and thought this meant really having no thoughts. They spoke of no suitability that is not dao, meaning that the principles of dao are not absent from any place, so one ought to exercise and preserve reflective self-examination and not hastily leave it behind in dejection, yet others came along and thought this meant that anything they find suitable is nothing but the dao. Hence they trust in their savage self-indulgence without consideration. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 5)

Here, Hu Juren explained very clearly the differences between Confucian and Buddhist or Daoist understandings of several important concepts. These differences were the main point of early Ming Dynasty Confucians’ criticisms of so-called “heterodoxies.” Hu Juren also pointed out that in terms of the fundamental question of “being” and “non-being,” the Daoist theory is contradictory. For example, when Laozi 老子 spoke of dao, its content was “non-being” (wu 无), yet he also said of dao, “Though dull and obscure, within it there is essence; though muddled and chaotic, within it there are things” [a rough paraphrase of phrases from Laozi, Ch. 21]. The same is true for Buddhism’s so-called true inherent nature that is neither produced nor extinguished, its so-called liberation from saṃsāra, and its so-called emptiness. Hence, “The learning of Daoism and Buddhism is perverted and fallacious.” Hu Juren put forward his basic view of the question of being and non-being, in which he distinguished between the different levels of principle and qi: In terms of principle, this principle flows into movement without cease, and this inherent nature that is endowed has its fixity, so how can one speak of emptiness or non-being? In terms of qi, there are differences between gathered and dispersed or void and actual, so when it gathers there is being, and when it disperses there is non-being. In principle, where there is gathering there is a principle of gathering, and where there is dispersal there is a principle of dispersal, so one cannot speak of its as non-being. When qi has a form and body it is actual, and when it has no form or body it is void, yet principle is always actual. (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 7)

This point states that neither inherent nature nor principle can be said to be void or empty under any conditions, while when qi gathers into form it is being, and when it disperses into formlessness it is non-being. This is clearly based on Cheng Hao’s “Under Heaven there is nothing more actual than principle” and “Heavenly principle is all present, originally without any deficiency; it is not made existent by Yao and not made inexistent by Jie,” along with Zhu Xi’s related ideas. As for the

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statements about qi, they are significantly different from Zhang Zai’s view that “Knowing that the empty void is qi, there is no non-being.” As for Laozi’s phrase that “being is produced from non-being” [see Laozi, Ch. 40], Hu Juren pointed out that this regards an absolute void of non-being that is empty and without any things as the root-source of the world. He thought that the process of the qi-transformation of Heaven and Earth has no gaps, no pauses and no breaks, so there was no time of empty non-being: “In the qi-transformation of Heaven and Earth, there is not a moment’s rest; in the production of humanity and things, there is not a second of deficiency. Today the human talent under Heaven exhausts being, yet because sage-learning is not discussed, there is confusion about this” (Record of Working at Home, Vol. 6). Since Mr. Lao [i.e. Laozi] regarded empty non-being as the original substance, his learning has no substance. Due to his standpoint of defending the Confucian orthodox dao, Hu Juren distinguished Confucianism very strictly from Daoism and Buddhism, and in the process explained his own basic viewpoint concerning various aspects of principle, qi, mind and inherent nature, which in general did not go beyond the scope of Cheng and Zhu. Compared with Wu Yubi, Hu Juren was rather more wide-ranging in scope, and his ambiance was also rather more carefree and easeful. Wu Yubi generally entered into the subtle part of his own inner mind in reflective self-examination and self-governance, his learning honest and sincere, yet he could not avoid the problem of being confined and tense. Seen in general terms, the scope of academic learning of the early Ming Dynasty was not particularly broad. Huang Zongxi said, “In Ming academic learning, there were those who were previously familiar with the existing doctrines of earlier Confucians, but never reflected on them and grasped them for themselves, deducing and glimpsing their secrets, ‘this one restating Zhu, that one also restating Zhu’ and nothing more” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 179). This was a well-founded view, and should not merely be seen as a sectarian view from the perspective of the Learning of the Mind.

Chapter 4

Chen Xianzhang and the Origins of the Learning of the Mind

Chen Xianzhang is an important figure in the development of philosophy in the Ming Dynasty. His learning of self-attainment took up where Lu Xiangshan 陆象山 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊] left off and was in turn taken up by Wang Yangming 王阳明, becoming a turning point in the transition from the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 Learning of Principle (lixue 理学) to the Learning of the Mind (xinxue 心学). Chen Xianzhang 陈献章 (1428–1500; zi Gongfu 公甫, hao Shizhai 石斋) was from Baisha 白沙 in the Xinhui 新会region of Guangdong province, and was thus referred to as the Master of Baisha 白沙先生, with his school known as the School of Jiangmen 江门. He passed the provincial examination in 1447 and went on to study in the Guozijian 国子监 imperial academy. At the age of 27 he studied under Wu Yubi 吴与弼, but returned home after half a year to study in private, where he realised the meaning of self-attainment. In 1466 he travelled back to the imperial academy, where he gradually made a name for himself. In 1482 he was called to the capital on the recommendation of Peng Shao 彭韶 and Zhu Ying 朱英 to take the examination to enter the Ministry of Personnel 吏部, but refused on grounds of ill health and requested to return to nurse his aging parents, eventually receiving permission to return to the Hanlin Academy 翰林院. After this he did not take up any recommendations, and passed his later years around the Hanlin Academy. In modern times his works have been edited into the Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang (Chen Xianzhang ji 陈献章集).1

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[Trans.] References are to Chen Xianzhang ji, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987.

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_4

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1 The Learning of Self-attainment Although Chen Xianzhang studied under Wu Yubi, the central idea of his studies differed greatly from that of Wu. The areas in which he applied his critical exertions were all concerned with self-attainment (zide 自得). He described his own experience of study in this way: Mere talent being insufficient, at the age of 27 I resolved to study under Wu [Yubi] of Jiangyou 江右 [Jiangxi]. Of the books and teachings left by ancient sages and worthies, there were none he did not lecture on, yet I did not know where to begin. Thus I returned to Baisha, closing my door and not going out, seeking only how I ought to exert my efforts. Since I had no teachers or friends to offer direction, I relied only on books and papers in my pursuits, forgetting even to sleep and to eat, yet after many years like this I had still attained nothing. By no attainment, I mean that my mind and principle had still not yet come together as one. Thus I abandoned my previous exertions and decided that my future pursuit should be only sitting in stillness. After much time, I saw the substance of the mind latently revealing itself, constant as if it were a thing, responding and returning amidst its many daily uses, following that which I desired, like the bridle and reins used in riding a horse. Realising the principle of things, I found that the teachings of the many sages each had its own thread and derivation, just as water has its source and end. Thus my doubts dissolved and I confidently stated: is not the effort to become a sage found in this? (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 145)

Chen Xianzhang’s learning differed completely from that of Wu Yubi. Wu took Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 “self-discipline when still, self-reflection when active” as the path for effort (gongfu 功夫). His notes on his readings are filled with his impressive studies, painstaking investigations, and careful, cautious words. His self-attainment all arose from hitting his pillow late at night, letting his sweat flow and tears fall. Strict in his resolution amid hardships, his mood was one of constraint and forcing. In his understanding of Cheng-Zhu’s “self-discipline requires the use of respect, progress in studies is found in the extension of knowledge,” he focused on self-discipline and the use of respect. Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 described him as “demanding in his physical exertions, always aiming for the space between words and silence, emerging to work and retiring to rest, never forgetting himself for a moment, eventually working himself into fragments. He never let any words concerning the abstruse or distant ever leave his mouth” (“Case Studies from Chongren” [Chongren xue’an 崇仁学案], Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 1). This can be said to reveal the characteristics of his effort in cultivation. Those who studied with him were frequently practical and upright, yet included few truly brilliant or exceptional literati. Chen Xianzhang’s character was originally natural and unrestrained, and could not be constrained by rules or restrictions. He accepted the spirit of Wu Yubi’s learning concerning setting one’s ambitions on the sages and worthies, establishing oneself through hardships, and being willing to accept indifference. However, owing to the differences in their natural characters and talents, the paths of effort taken by the two men were totally different.

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Chen Xianzhang was a poet, and he had made significant achievements in this field even before he studied with Wu Yubi. With his poet’s temperament, devoting himself to Wu Yubi and suddenly being taught the learning of self-discipline and self-reflection, extending knowledge and investigating things, his poetic talents naturally withered, his will and spirit dissipating and disappearing such that he had to seek some form of liberal, dispersed learning to suit himself. His poetic mode of thought in which the simple drove the complicated found little value in Wu Yubi’s mode of thought based on strict resolution amid hardships and emphasis on moral training, hence he “did not know where to begin.” After taking his leave of Wu Yubi and returning to Baisha, Chen went through a period of exploration concerning methods of cultivation. His chronicle (nianpu 年谱) records: After returning from Linchuan, my feet did not once reach the city. As a consultant at the time of Zhu Ying, visitors came seeking an audience, yet I frankly avoided them. I closed my door and read my books, the better to probe the classic works of past and present, not sleeping the whole night and only rinsing my feet with water if I felt drowsy. After some time I exclaimed, “What is valuable in learning is self-attainment. Having attained for oneself, one can then broaden this with historical records and classic works.” Thereupon I constructed a platform and named it Spring Yang; sitting in silence within, my feet did not cross the threshold for many years. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 807)

Chen was unable to find in Zhu Xi’s learning a method that corresponded to his own talent and temperament, a situation in which the greatest tension was that between the broad investigation of classics and histories on the one hand, and experience of human inherent nature (xing 性) on the other. The lyrical contemplation and realisation of the cosmos and human life demanded by poets is difficult to connect to the self-discipline and exertions of morality. The passage from respectful reverence to liberal dispersion is the most notable aspect of Chen Xianzhang’s academic transformation. Respectful reverence (敬畏 jingwei) and liberal dispersion (洒落 saluo) are a pair of concepts used to express forms of cultivation and individual characteristics in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, which provide important grounds that determine paths of cultivation. Confucians demand a unification of respectful reverence and liberal dispersion. However, beginners’ efforts are crude and their sedimented habits have yet to be transformed, thus they are frequently unable to achieve this unification. After Chen returned from Jiangyou, he “shut his door and did not emerge for many years, even his family members seldom seeing his face” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 883), seeking his path of self-attainment in classic works, but achieved nothing. Thus he abandoned the complicated and worked on the simple, concentrating his mind on sitting in stillness, and from this stillness emerged a first inkling. This first inkling was in reality the unification of good intention on the one hand with principles that are able to govern and direct concrete behaviour on the other. The initial form of this kind of unification is dim and easily dissipates, thus it can be called a first inkling (端倪 duanni). It can be attained through stillness because in stillness the myriad causes can be set aside, the mind becoming as a clear mirror, clearing and enlightening the ground of the mind that is confused by diverse and

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muddled thoughts in daily life, this ground transforming from latent to evident through the accumulation of self-meditation and self-enlightenment. Chen’s stillness is the Confucian seeking for stillness within activity, not the constant stillness and silence of Buddhism and Daoism, while his “cultivation” (yang养) is equally a process sought through stillness in activity, leading out the first inkling and causing it to be expressed. The good intention found in this first inkling is an endowment of Heaven, while the principles governing and directing concrete behaviour are attained by ordinary experience through the appearance of a state of mystical cohesion in the mind. This is the content contained in Chen’s view of “cultivating the first inkling through stillness” (静中养出端倪 jing zhong yangchu duanni). His doubts dissolved and he confidently proclaimed this condensation of good intention and behavioural principles to be the basis of the effort involved in being a sage. This a merging and fusion of Mencius’ “four inklings,” Lu Jiuyuan’s “original mind,” and Cheng-Zhu’s “Heavenly principle.” The first inkling cultivated through stillness is precisely the initial and sprouting state of this merging and fusion. The revelation of this state is self-conscious, and differs from purely rational thought. The expansion of this state takes the experience and principles gained in immediate concrete time and space, and merges them into an intention and tendency that is constantly revealed and without temporal or spatial limits, turning the former into an internal implication of the latter. Thus once one has this first inkling, then one can penetrate and merge all sides and directions, past and present into one. This so-called penetration and merging refers to connecting one’s experience of history, the cosmos and the myriad things together with this first inkling through mental association. Thus, although Chen’s method of cultivation includes a degree of mysticism, it is clearly not impossible to experience through cultivation practices. After Chen had this realisation, the direction of his studies underwent a fundamental change, merging and reducing the experience and principles grasped through external experience of events with the first inkling cultivated through stillness, and substituting this for the activities of the investigation of things (gewu 格物) and the extension of knowledge (zhizhi 致知). In this he differs greatly from Wang Yangming. Wang’s “extension of innate moral knowing” (致良知 zhi liangzhi) refers to integrating the inkling of goodness revealed in the mind with the outward-directed investigation of things, using innate moral knowing to govern the investigation of things, and continually expanding this in depth and breadth. Every step of the extension of innate moral knowing is a process of continual enrichment and clarification of the content of innate moral knowing, continually changing the substance of inherent nature (abstract being) into the substance of mind (concrete being). When innate moral knowing is extended to the limit, the substance of mind becomes vast and brilliant, and behaviour reaches to the concrete. This development depends on the concrete effort of investigating things, and not on mystical introspection. This is the biggest difference between Wang Yangming and Chen Xianzhang. For Wang, Chen’s vision of vastness in mystical experience and abstruse meditation is inferior to enriching and cultivating such vastness in concrete practice. Hence, Wang did not consider Chen as one of his own theoretical forerunners. Huang Zongxi regarded it as strange that Wang never referred to Chen, yet

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considering Wang’s development through his life, this is not in the least strange. Chen concentrated on stillness while Wang unified activity and stillness; Chen was empty and abstruse while Wang was realistic. On this point, Luo Qinshun 罗钦顺 later perceptively noted, “He [Chen Xianzhang] only saw the ultimately numinous and then took dao to be found in this, but was unable to reach its depths or penetrate its incipience, and his problem lay in this (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 79). This criticism is very weighty indeed.

2 The Plane of the Mind Together with Dao Chen Xianzhang thought that dao was the original substance of the world, such that the relationship between dao and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is one of original substance and its expressions, saying: Dao is extremely vast, Heaven and Earth are also extremely vast, and thus Heaven, Earth and dao can be regarded as comparable. However, if one uses Heaven and Earth to view dao, then dao is the root of Heaven and Earth; if one uses dao to view Heaven and Earth, then Heaven and Earth are but one grain in a great storehouse or one spoonful in the deep blue sea, so how are they sufficient to be compared to dao? Since the vastness of Heaven and Earth cannot be compared with dao, extreme vastness belongs to dao alone. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 54)

For Chen, dao in terms of existence is the whole substance of the myriad things of the cosmos, while in terms of its content it is the root and origin of all principles. Heaven and Earth refer to the concrete Heaven and Earth. From the perspective of experience, Heaven and Earth are extremely vast, but since they are concrete objects of experience, they necessarily have their locations, and thus also their limits. Dao on the other hand is a kind of rational postulate, not a concrete thing, thus it can be infinitely vast. This kind of infinity is an infinity in logic or thought. Dao is the root of Heaven and Earth, and root (本 ben) here refers to a source or origin. It can also be said that dao is the substance, while Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are its function, such that dao and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things have a relationship of original substance and its expressions. For Chen Xianzhang, dao as the source of principle (li 理) has its prescriptivity, and this prescriptivity is “sincerity” (诚 cheng), where sincerity refers to the quality of regularity and purposivity expressed by concrete things according to the necessity of their original inherent natures. The operative laws of concrete things can be described, such as the revolving of the sun and moon or the flowing of rivers, but the operation of dao cannot be described. The prescriptivity of the daosubstance can only be expressed using “sincerity,” such that: The vastness of Heaven and Earth, the richness of the myriad things, what made them this way? It is the doing of sincerity. Since there is this sincerity, so there are these things; since there are these things, there must be this sincerity. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 57)

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The motion of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things must have a principle for why it is thus and not otherwise. This principle is sincerity. Only with this sincerity are there these things, such that sincerity is the ground for the formation and motion of things. Concrete things have the sincerity of concrete things, while dao has the sincerity of dao. The sincerity of dao and the sincerity expressed in the human mind are the same. Chen said, “Where is sincerity located in a human being? It is possessed in the mind alone. That which the mind possesses is this sincerity, while that which made Heaven and Earth is also this sincerity” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 57). Chen’s ideas here are very similar to those of Lu Jiuyuan. Lu said: That which fills Heaven and Earth is one principle alone. (Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan [Lu Jiuyuan ji陆九渊集], 161) The mind is one mind; principle is one principle. Extreme appropriacy returns to one, essential righteousness knows no duality; this mind and this principle do not in reality admit of any duality. (Ibid., 4) That the myriad things are densely-packed within one square inch, filling the mind and issuing outward, pervading the cosmos, is nothing but this principle. (Ibid., 423)

That is to say, the moral consciousness already present within the mind and the morality expressed by the principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are identical. This “extreme appropriacy” and “essential righteousness” are precisely this kind of principle that is simultaneously both ethical and physical. Where Lu Jiuyuan said “The internal is this principle, the external is also this principle,” in Chen Xianzhang this becomes “The internal is this sincerity, the external is also this sincerity.” The sincerity of Heaven and Earth and the sincerity of my mind are identical. What is the content of this sincerity? Chen never specified clearly, but it can be inferred. Chen’s sincerity refers to the one identical moral principle apparent within the different regularities of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, including the human mind. This principle governs Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and also connects Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. It is one, but when illuminated amidst Heaven, Earth and the myriad things it is many. This principle is one in principle, while diverse in its particularisations. From an empirical perspective, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things present only their appearance; that which people are able to experience is only a perception of concrete appearances. That which Neo-Confucians refer to as “the unity of principle” is the result of subjects applying a kind of “ethical projection” onto the regularities presented by concrete things. Positivists oppose and reject precisely this kind of projection, but to Neo-Confucians who regarded the ethical plane as their highest aspiration it was required. If that which is seen is only the appearance of things, what use can this have for the subject’s moral cultivation? That which Neo-Confucians required and enjoyed was an awareness of this kind of thing that had undergone an ethical projection. In the proliferation of grass and trees, for example, Neo-Confucians saw “benevolence” or “the productivity of intention.” For Neo Confucians, physical principles were external, and administering external physical principles was “playing with things and sapping the will.” The philosophy of the Cheng 程 brothers clearly highlighted the meaning of this projection, and described it as a sacred principle originally and necessarily possessed by things. In his youth, Wang

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Yangming’s inability to attain anything through investigating bamboo was precisely due to his lack of understanding at that time, and his being unable to enjoy this kind of awareness. An important aspect of the advances of the Learning of the Mind in the Ming Dynasty over that in the Song lies precisely in removing this principle that is both things and mind from dualism and placing it in a monistic context; from “The internal is this principle, the external is also this principle,” developing into “Outside the mind there is no principle, outside the mind there are no things.” Chen Xianzhang can be seen as a transitional figure in this development. Lu Jiuyuan accepted the independence of the principles of the cosmos, but he regarded the principles of the cosmos and the principle of the mind as identical. His statement that “The cosmos is my mind, my mind is the cosmos” expresses precisely the identity of the two. Although he set out from the “four inklings” and the “original mind,” he thought that the principle of the four inklings and the original mind was also the principle of the myriad things of the cosmos. Chen Xianzhang represents a transition between Lu Jiuyuan’s “The mind is principle” to Wang Yangming’s “Outside the mind there are no principles.” On the one hand he accepted that “That which the mind possesses is this sincerity, while that which made Heaven and Earth is also this sincerity” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 57), while on the other hand he also accepted that “In the one mind of the superior man, the myriad principles are completely present such that despite the multiplicity of things, none of them are not within me, and once this self is present, essential spirit follows it” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 55). The core of Chen Xianzhang’s philosophy is his transformation of Cheng-Zhu’s complex method of the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge into an experience of the inner mind, and he therefore emphasised both ease and self-attainment. He said: If scholars seek not only from books but seek from their own minds, observing the impulse of both activity and stillness and being and non-being, extending and cultivating that which is within themselves and not allowing that which they see or hear to disorder it, casting off the fragmented functions of the ears and eyes and completing the spirit of empty perfection and unpredictability, then as soon as they open their volumes they will attain it completely. This is not attaining from books, but attaining from oneself. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 20)

Seeking from books is broad, seeking from one’s own mind is simple, observing the impulse of both being and non-being and activity and stillness, extending and cultivating that which is within oneself is returning from breadth to simplicity. Not seeking from books but from oneself means using the mind to govern the myriad things. Reduced to one point, Chen’s central idea is precisely this self-attainment and self-realisation. This self-attainment and self-realisation is internal to the mind, and he was therefore opposed to composing commentaries and lecturing on philological matters, saying, “In matters of study nothing comes above the distinction between ‘for oneself’ and ‘for others,’ this is the first step in one’s path” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 88). Differentiating between “for oneself” and

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“for others” is the first step for Confucian scholars teaching people to establish their intentions, but Chen here emphasised that “for oneself” a unique use of the mind. For earlier Confucians, “for oneself” meant the demand that academic enquiry should serve moral cultivation, and not be used as a tool for achieving recognition, fame, wealth or status. For Chen, “for oneself” meant that on the path of cultivation, one must “give priority to the user” and not just follow earlier scholars or blindly accept what is passed down and merely give oral explanations. Emphasising self-attainment means emphasising doubt, and Chen took doubting as an important condition for academic progress: Doubt is the impulse for enlightenment. Every instance of enlightenment is an instance of progression; there is no other method. This is just what levels of study refer to. In study, one should value knowing and doubting, a small doubt leads to small progress, a great doubt leads to great progress. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 165)

The doubt referred to here is also different from that of previous generations: the doubts of earlier scholars generally concerned textual research on names, facts and institutions, exegetical studies on the meaning of characters or explanation of sentences; the doubt referred to by Chen refers to doubting whether or not the common experiences or arguments provided by earlier scholars are of use in one’s own cultivation of self and mind. In Chen’s learning, self-attainment is entirely found in “cultivating the first inkling from stillness,” and this forms the starting point for his method of cultivation. He said, “In learning one must cultivate the first inkling from out of stillness, and only then is there room for discussion” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 84). This is however only the linchpin and beginning of his learning, and not its entirety. After cultivating the first inkling there is more to be done, namely expanding one’s spiritual plane (境界 jingjie) such that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things combine within the mind in this plane and form a single effort of awareness. For Chen, cultivating the first inkling is a kind of natural revelation, yet this revelation is only “faint” and “constant as if there was a thing,” and not yet clear and secure, still requiring a process from an original state to self-consciousness, from dimness to clarity. As a kind of sprout of moral sense, the first inkling requires further development into a vast and stable spiritual potential. After many years of experience, Chen attained a kind of spiritual plane in which the principle in the mind fused into a unity with the myriad things of the cosmos in such a spontaneous way that it seemed to have been originally so. In a letter to his student Lin Guang 林光, he described this plane clearly: Striving ceaselessly all day long, one simply collects this. This principle is extremely vast in its intervention, without inside or outside, without end or beginning, not failing to reach a single place or carry a single breath. Gathering this, Heaven and Earth are established by me, a myriad transformations emerging from myself, the cosmos within me. Attaining this handle and commencing, what more is there to do? The past and present, all sides and directions, are connected together simultaneously, collected together simultaneously, at any time and any place, all are filled in this way. With all kinds trusting in their original state, what need is their to fatigue your feet or put your hands to work? The small groups beside

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the Rain Altar exemplify precisely this state in between not forgetting and not assisting. Zeng Dian’s 曾点 little work was packed together by Mencius into one phrase, becoming the kites flying and the fish leaping. Without Mencius’ efforts, to suddenly relate Zeng Dian’s vision of delight would be like speaking in a dream. Attaining this gathering, even the undertakings of Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 are merely like floating clouds passing before one’s eyes, so why would one need to derive it from affairs? This principle encompasses above and below, penetrating from beginning to end and rolling everything together as one, without any separation or distinction, so infinite is its store. Onward from this, there is then a place for separation and diversity, combining the essential in the gathering of principle. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 217)

Here, Chen expressed the fundamental idea of his thought: the unity of mind and principle. “Striving ceaselessly all day long, one simply collects this” refers to after cultivating the first inkling in stillness, grasping and holding onto it, not allowing it to slip away, and then expanding it. The process of expanding this first inkling is just the process of becoming aware of the myriad beings of the cosmos. In this principle, this rolling together of things and the mind into one, wherever the mind is, principle is there, and wherever things are, there is mind. At this time, subject and object are obscurely unified as one, without inside or outside, beginning or end. The subject senses this unity of mind and things as the only presence, such that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, being rolled together into one, become an expression of mind, a symbol of mind. Possessing this sense, one possesses a spiritual plane in which Heaven and Earth are my Heaven and Earth, and the myriad things are my myriad things. Spiritual planes depend on experience and awareness, and awareness then becomes “gathering.” The self at this time is not an addition of my ethical sentiment onto external things, but all without separation and distinction, the epistemological and ethical selves unified without division, the self and the cosmos unified as one in intuition. The various directions, the past and the present appear together as one, such that that which appears is all fused, released and reduced by this mind and this principle, and is this mind and this principle at all times and in all places. Possessing this kind of awareness and plane, and allowing this plane to fill and flow forth, the subject has no need to add any further effort of cultivation; this is “With all kinds trusting in their original state, what need is their to fatigue your feet or put your hands to work?” and “this state in between not forgetting and not assisting.” Confucius’ “bathing in the Yi River and reveling at the Rain Altar” [Analects, 11.26] and “kites flying and fish leaping” from Centrality in the Ordinary [Zhongyong 中庸] describe precisely this kind of plane. In this plane, the joy produced through the correspondence and unity of mind and dao is unique, such that even “the works of Yao and Shun” cannot compare with it. This plane is not one that Wu Yubi with his constantly impressive studies, his careful, cautious words, and his constrained forcing could even dream of, and also differs greatly in its import from Zhu Xi’s sudden penetration of understanding after an accumulated investigation of things and extension of knowledge. Although Zhu Xi’s sudden penetration of understanding is also a unity of mind and principle, it emphasises a rational penetration of understanding, and does not represent a rolling together of mind and things into one without any separation or distinction, with the

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joy accompanying this rational penetration of understanding being one of achieving wisdom. Chen Xianzhang’s plane however, is one in which the rational, emotional and aesthetic are rolled together into one without any separation or distinction. Accompanying this plane is what can be called a kind of sense of sublimity in which truth, goodness and beauty are unified. When Huang Zongxi said that he “was Zeng Dian when distant, and Yao when near,” he was referring to just this kind of plane. Only under the guidance of this plane can one gain an understanding of the concrete principles of things, yet to Chen this was unimportant. He only truly emphasised the attainment of the plane in which mind and principle is one. Chen wrote this letter in 1471, when he was 44 years old. According to the account of his student Zhang Yi 张翊, this was a time when he “sometimes sang grandly in wide forests, sometimes whistled alone on isolated islands, sometimes took a boat and went fishing on creeks, river banks and twisting coastlines, losing his physical body, abandoning his ears and eyes, and casting off his intellectual mind, eventually reaching an attainment at which he felt spontaneously trusting and joyful” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 883). At this time Chen was lucid and brilliant, with his realisation of the myriad things focused on the mind’s togetherness with dao and on lively, healthy activity. Thus this letter has a quality that both moves and touches people, taking them away from vulgarity. Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 made a very pertinent assessment of Chen: The core of the Master’s learning is spontaneity, while its essentials can be reduced to self-attainment. If one inquires concerning this attainment, it can be said to be “cultivating the first inkling in stillness.” Directed towards seeking from classic texts, he laboured for years with no attainment, yet attained after one morning of sitting in stillness, apparently differing from what the ancients said of self-attainment. Mencius said, “The superior man deepens his studies in the dao, desiring to attain through himself” [Mencius, 4B.14]. I have not heard that he attained spontaneously. Sitting in stillness on one occasion, is this not simply dabbling and then hastily taking? … “Cultivating the first inkling in stillness;” I don’t know what kind of thing the result can be? Those who speak of first inklings, which the mind can attain and contemplate yet the mouth cannot gain and speak of, are finally not so far from those who speak of spirits. If we now assess the Master’s many words on evidence and study, the vast majority speak generally of the spontaneity of effort, their marvellous aspect not admitting close inspection, ending up just where people fool around with spirits. Thus the Master’s insight was near that of Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐] yet his probing into principle was incomplete, while his learning was similar to that of Kangjie [Shao Yong 邵雍] yet was enjoyed too early. In matters of sagehood, it is difficult to avoid the fault of a narrowness of vision brought about by the desire for haste. (“On the Masters [Shi shuo 师说],” Case Studies of Ming Confucians)

Liu Zongzhou’s assessment here specifically refers to and expands Chen’s fundamental idea of “cultivating the first inkling through stillness.” He argues that, in moral cultivation, one must first have a period of deep accumulation, and then when this deep accumulation is expressed, one’s insights will spontaneously excel. Since Chen lacked this period of in-depth study, when he spoke of self-attainment, he used his lucid, brilliant quality to directly realise the marvellous plane of the unity of mind and principle, the mind together with dao. This kind of plane mainly relies on mystical meditation, and as such can only be self-aware in the mind and not declared with the mouth; it is merely one’s own experience, and cannot provide a

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practicable, realistic means of effort for other people; although it is described wonderfully, it simply amounts to playing around with one’s own mystical experience. One must have made a deep effort in probing principle before one can make that which one has cultivated emerge spontaneously. Although Chen possessed the liberally dispersed heart of Zhou Dunyi, he lacked his effort at investigating things and probing principle; although he possessed Shao Yong’s harmonious joy in spontaneity, this was not expressed after deep accumulation. Since he used his transcendent realisation to replace practical efforts, it was difficult for him to avoid the fault of a narrowness of vision brought about by the desire for haste. Since Liu Zongzhou’s assessment focuses on Chen Xianzhang’s fundamental idea, it has a degree of validity. However, Chen was a poet, and as such his ability in intuitive realisation was stronger than most other Neo-Confucians, with his experience of the plane of intention or spiritual realm being much more profound. His experience was attained through his own hidden cultivation and this is precisely where he gained. He was not using empty views to deceive himself and others, and indeed after cultivating the first inkling he also acknowledged the necessity of efforts such as being aware of the principles of things, examining the teachings of sages, and being aware at every moment such that vast and lofty brilliance is never separate from one’s daily life. Although Chen did not provide detailed elaborations of these aspects, they were also included in the content of his learning. Liu Zongzhou was standing in a position of summarising Ming Dynasty studies, especially the post-Yangming Taizhou 泰州 and Longxi 龙溪 schools with their casting off of the practical effort of extending innate moral knowing and their reliance on the spontaneous expression of an innately possessed original mind, and he was thus pained by and remonstrated against the danger of potentially becoming lost in wild dissipation, leading him to censure all and any ideas which spoke of original states without adding effort or relying solely on the innate without adding cultivation, confirmation and preservation. Clearly Liu Zongzhou believed that Chen Xianzhang’s cultivation of the first inkling through stillness was a form of self-attainment without in-depth study based on responding to events and connecting with things, and thus was unable to avoid the fault of trusting in one’s inherent nature in savage impertinence. Huang Zongxi’s assessment of Chen clearly showed the influence of this view of his teacher. Hu Juren 胡居仁, Chen’s fellow student who differed completely in his quality of spirit, shared a similar criticism.

3 Fusing Principles, Dispersing Fixation Chen Xianzhang’s theory of effort can be broadly summarised into the following several points: stillness (静 jing)—cultivating the first inkling through stillness; emptiness (虚 xu)—preserving this first inkling with the empty clarity of the mind; fusing principles (义理之融液 yili zhi rongye) and dispersing fixation (操存之洒落 caocun zhi saluo)—a complete penetration of awareness, conducting oneself with

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liberal dispersion. Among these, the third aspect is the most important and most represents the culmination of his thought. As Huang Zongxi pointed out, Chen’s learning “took emptiness as its basis, stillness as its gateway, the penetration and merging of all sides and directions, past and present into one as its remedial breadth, the diversity of constant conduct in daily life as its function, the state in between not forgetting and not assisting as the rule of experience, and not failing in application despite not being dedicated as its real attainment” (“Case Studies from Baisha, Pt. I” [Baisha xue’an shang 白沙学案 上], Case Studies of Ming Confucians). These phrases pick out the core of Chen’s theory of effort. The concept of emptiness has two possible meanings: one is empty and nothing, while the other is empty but real. Emptiness as nothing refers to setting aside the myriad causal threads, such that the plane of the mind is empty and numinous, all sensations, sentiments and knowledge returning to nothing. This kind of emptiness is similar to the emptiness spoken of by Daoism. Emptiness as real refers to that which is formless yet really existing, such as the metaphysical dao or principle, where “empty” refers to its being empty of form and “real” to its being real in its functioning. The emptiness spoken of by Chen Xianzhang refers to the latter form. He said: Dao is the ultimately non-existing yet is active, the ultimately near and yet is numinous, thus it is hidden and then released, forms and is thereby preserved… Activity is that which has already formed, it has form and is thereby real. Prior to being formed, it is simply emptiness. Emptiness is its root, and extending emptiness is how one establishes the root. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 131)

Here, dao has no formed body and no location, yet its functioning can be perceived in everything, and it is thus not distant from humanity. In terms of its lack of a formed body, dao is hidden and empty; in terms of its actual functioning and expression, it is near and formed. Activity refers to the phenomena expressed by dao, which have forms and can be experienced, while dao itself cannot be experienced. That which cannot be seen is the original substance of that which is seen; this is what is meant by “emptiness is its root.” Extending emptiness means unifying the human mind with dao’s quality of being formally empty yet functioning at all times and places; hence “extending emptiness is how one establishes the root.” Chen said, “Taking this mind that clings to nothing and deploying it in the world, where could one roam without attaining!” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 84). The “mind that clings to nothing” is similar to the “not clinging to appearances” and “not lodging in anything or producing the mind” of Chan 禅 Buddhism, yet its actual quality differs somewhat. The “mind” spoken of by Chan Buddhism lacks the content of inherent nature, four inklings, innate moral knowing, etc. spoken of by Confucians, while the “inherent nature” spoken of by Chan Buddhism is simply a formal function of the mind. Chen Xianzhang on the other hand regarded the original substance as being, and its forms of expression as non-being, and thus he often began from the aspect of non-being when speaking of effort, as in: “If the human mind allows even one thing to be unattained, then it clings to one thing, and thus is obstructed… Hence the mind of sages and worthies is as vast as non-being,

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being stimulated and then responding, and not responding without stimulation. Indeed, it is not only are sages and worthies who are like this, as the original section of the human mind is all the same, and as long as one cultivates it through stillness, it spontaneously expands,” and “It is in forgetting both attainment and things, blending with the ambience of Heaven and Earth, that one can begin to make some achievements” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 84), both of which use the emptiness of effort to manifest the being of original substance. Since Chen often spoke in such a way, some people at the time ridiculed him as a Chan Buddhist. Chen made no attempt to conceal this, as in a letter he wrote to education intendant Zhao Yao 赵瑶: The Buddhists teach people by speaking of sitting in stillness, I also speak of sitting in stillness; they speak of anxiousness, I also speak of anxiousness; regulating breathing is close to counting breaths, concentrating one’s composure has similarities with Chan meditation. Those who speak of “slipping into Chan learning,” are they not just like this? (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 147)

He believed that his own effort at cultivation was the same as Zhou Dunyi’s “maintaining stillness” and “unity as the essential.” He was similar to Chan or not Chan, and there is not much more to debate. Many later scholars argued that Chen Xianzhang was not Chan. A passage by Chen Shize 陈世泽 of the Qing Dynasty reads: It was said: “The world takes him [Chen Xianzhang] to be Chan learning, is this true?” Ze [i.e. Chen Shize] replied: “No, followers of Chan do not know of the existence of constancy in relations. As for him, he took kites flying and fish leaping to be principle, and saw this amidst human relations and daily life. As filial and friendly as he was, of which you have heard much, how could a Chan be like this?” It was said: “If he was not Chan, why did he speak of stillness and emptiness?” Ze replied: “How is what he meant by stillness and emptiness the same as the stillness and emptiness of Chan? Followers of Chan advocate quiet extinction; they have stillness but lack activity. They advocate emptiness, but this is emptiness without reality. He said that in learning one must attain the so-called empty clarity of still unity as its root, thus we can know that his stillness was the stillness of still unity and not that of still quietude; his emptiness was the emptiness of empty clarity, and not that of empty nothingness. The words of the Buddhists seem the same as we Confucians but differ, a hair’s breadth between the sky and the soil, while what is valuable is refinement of selection. He once spoke of this, why not set your mind at rest and seek it out.” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 914)

Qu Dajun 屈大均 in the Qing Dynasty shared the same view: Baisha [Chen Xianzhang] was rooted in Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi], Lianxi maintained stillness while Baisha extended emptiness, though their import remained unchanged. Zhuzi [Zhu Xi] spoke not of stillness but of respect, since he was concerned that people would slip into Chan, and thus only after respect could one enter into stillness. Respect is the essential in maintaining stillness. Thus when we Confucians speak of stillness, our terms are the same as those of Chan learning but their meanings differ. We Confucians achieve stillness via the absence of desire, and thus are sincere and respectful. Chan achieves stillness through the absence of affairs, and thus they fall into quiet extinction and abandon the constancy in relations; this you must not fail to examine. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 921)

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The arguments of these two scholars for Chen Xianzhang not being Chan both concern two aspects. Firstly, Chen’s stillness takes accepting the Confucian conception of good inherent nature as a condition, while Chan Buddhism conserves an empty quietude. Chen’s stillness and emptiness refer to effort and not to original substance, with the non-being and emptiness by precisely that which is used to cultivate the being of original substance. The stillness of Chan Buddhism means having no thoughts whatsoever in one’s mind, like withered wood or dead ashes. Chen’s stillness does not demand that the “profound and unceasing” [Centrality in the Ordinary] vigorously living mind stop its activity, but rather than it is vast in its great universality, following stimuli and responding. The stillness of Chan on the other hand demands that mental activity cease in its entirety, reaching a state of fixity. Secondly, Chen’s stillness is an effort in initial learning, such that through stillness one can lead confused mental activity to calmness. The plane of mature, complete effort is like Cheng Hao’s 程颢 phrase, “activity is also fixity, stillness is also fixity.” Cultivating the first inkling through stillness requires maintaining nurturing through practice in daily life, and thus he also upheld the idea that activity and stillness have no fixed method. The stillness of Chan Buddhism is an effort than persists from one’s first entry to the completion of its dao. Its methods that accompany later study such as witticisms, koans, etc. are merely convenient means to achieve stillness. In his comments in the “Case Studies from Baisha” [Baisha xue’an 白沙学案] chapter of Case Studies of Ming Confucians, Huang Zongxi explained the reason why Confucian and Buddhists must inevitably possess some common points in their efforts of cultivation, and defended Chen Xianzhang, saying: “Some say he was close to Chan, but there are mainly two reasons for this: The learning of the sages had long been obscured, with a general rushing into the inessential branches of affairs and action, possessing activity to be examined but without any stillness preserved, and therefore everything connected to humanity being born in stillness and above entered into neighboring and external lineages [i.e. Buddhism and Daoism]. This is thus a view of mediocre people, and is not worth debating.” In Huang Zongxi’s view, Confucianism should include two aspects, namely a theoretical aspect and a practical aspect. The theoretical aspect should probe deeply into the boundary between Heaven and humanity, the subtleties of mind and inherent nature. In reality, in terms of their elucidations of mind and inherent nature, the contributions of Confucians before the Song Dynasty were insufficient, and on the contrary it was the two lineages of Buddhism and Daoism that enquired most deeply into the most refined and subtle features of mind and inherent nature, due to the requirements of their cultivation practices. Neo-Confucianism originally developed by absorbing achievements of Buddhist and Daoist thought, especially their methods of cultivation, such that these elements became internal and organic components of it. Therefore, the fact that deeper aspects concerned with cultivation of mind and inherent nature entered into the set patterns of these two lineages is not surprising. On the other hand, Huang Zongxi’s “general rushing into the inessential branches of affairs and action” indeed pronounces the partiality of the development of Confucianism prior to the Song Dynasty. Confucianism should follow a path of development in which theory and

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practice are equally important, enriching and expanding itself, and enabling it to better fit the requirements of developing theoretical exploration to a deeper and broader level. Thus Chen Xianzhang’s “from breadth to simplicity, from crude to fine,” turning back to the refinement and subtlety of mind and inherent nature, is his contribution to the development of Confucianism. He was similar to Chan but not Chan, and there is no need to get into debates over this. The most important part of Chen’s theory of effort is his unity of fusing principles and dispersing fixation, which he believed was the highest level of Confucian effort and therefore the most difficult to reach. He said: “fusing principles us not easy to discuss, dispersing fixation is not easy to discuss” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 131). The fusing of principles includes the two aspects of acquisition and application, and the latter in particular is not easy to carry out proficiently. In acquiring principles, the most common method is the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, yet due to factors including the subject’s knowledge and the purpose and direction of this investigation and extension, its results vary greatly. The accumulation of knowledge is a necessary condition for realisation. The deeper one’s accumulation of knowledge, the more meaning and value one will be able to realise concerning the same single thing or event, and the easier it will be to blend and connect this with other principles. Chen’s fusing of principles emphasises not the quantity or depth of acquisition of principles, but rather the ability to fuse, accommodate and integrate many principles. This ability cannot be acquired from books alone, as more important is realisation in concrete affairs, flexibility and spontaneity, and not clinging to traces. Therefore, the fusing of principles must give priority to moral practice, with the accumulation of knowledge being secondary. Chen once said: “The base of the mind should be broad and smooth, its knowledge and experience should be exceptional, its scale should be vast and far-reaching, and its practice should be honest and sincere” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 84). These can be viewed as his requirements for scholars, and also as his explanation of the fusing of principles. In the fusing of principles, it is necessary to break down the solidification and petrification of views, as Chen said: Humanity shares the same substance with Heaven and Earth, the four seasons use it and shift, the hundred things use it and are produced. If it stagnated in one place, how could it be the master of creation and transformation? The excellent scholars of old often took up this mind in a place without things and utilised it in attaining changes. Scholars taking natural spontaneity as their goal must pay attention to grasping this. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 192)

This “not stagnating in one place” in Chen’s theory of effort is unified with spontaneity in his vision of the dao of Heaven. The mind’s not sticking to concrete objects is the primary condition for the fusing of principles. In terms of the mind, one must not watch over it too strictly or hold on too tightly, but one equally must not lack a guiding principle to connect and unify, and scattering must not lead to fragmentation. He said: “In learning to govern the mind, one must not hold on too tightly, as having lost the primary segment, one can notice that principles of dao do

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not emerge. Yet one equally must not be too loose, as in being loose one slips into overflowing and has nowhere to return to” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 88). He also emphasised the cultivation of ambience (气象 qixiang), believing that a good ambience is the precondition for the fusing of principles. He often taught people to pay attention to ambience: “Scholars must first pay attention to ambience. When one’s ambience is good, the hundred affairs are spontaneously appropriate; it is most important to ponder these words. In speech and words, activity and stillness, the goal is to pay attention to ambience. If one changes haste into steadiness and vehemence into peacefulness, then one’s achievement is great” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 159). Also, the fusing of principles does not mean teaching people to become hypocritical, but advocates observing ritual propriety and having regulation. Chen Xianzhang said: Abandoning ritual propriety and following the vulgar, gaining a bad name in educating affairs, this is something worthies do not do. They are further willing to spread this mind into all affairs, never allowing it to be set down. Name and regulation are the barriers of dao, if these barriers are not observed, there are none who can exist alone within it. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 236)

Having personal integrity, emphasising name and regulation, one should make appropriate accommodations in the concrete application of one’s principles according to different situations. If one melts principles into one’s daily practices, one can accord with principle in all times and affairs and yet not conflict with present circumstances. The fusing of principle is expressed as the unification of constancy and adaptability. The more distinctive and representative part of Chen’s theory of effort is his discussion of fixation (操存 caocun) and dispersion (洒落 saluo). Fixation refers to constant concentration without relaxation in cultivation efforts, while dispersion refers to not stubbornly holding onto certain principles, not seeking certain results, and being spontaneously so. “Spontaneity” (自然 ziran) is the main expression of dispersion. Chen’s learning took spontaneity as its central objective; the joy of spontaneity is the highest form of happiness. He said: “The joy of spontaneity is true joy. What other affairs are there in the cosmos?” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 193). For Confucians, moral cultivation emerges from self-awareness, and joy is a spontaneous result of moral cultivation. Even Wu Yubi’s painstaking studies and cultivation, “hitting his pillow late at night, letting his sweat flow and tears fall,” still has this joy. Yet Chen’s joy of spontaneity differs from this. Chen’s joy is not a happiness occurring through morality overcoming one’s sensual desires, the subject thereby perceiving its own sublimity, but rather a happiness at the spontaneous conforming of one’s will and behaviour with the laws of nature, not a unity produced through forcing but a spontaneous conformity, in which the subject experiences a kind of spiritual plane. Returning to his home after studying under Wu Yubi, Chen spent over 20 years in his transition from quiet cultivation and painstaking study to realising this joy of spontaneity. He once recounted his feeling at attaining this spiritual plane:

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What other affairs are there in the cosmos? Heaven spontaneously trusts in Heaven, Earth spontaneously trusts in the Earth, I spontaneously trust in myself; spontaneous activity, spontaneous stillness, spontaneous closing, spontaneous opening, spontaneous rolling, spontaneous unrolling; one does not ask the other to provide, the other does not depend on one in giving; oxen are spontaneously oxen, horses are spontaneously horses; stimulated by this, responding to that, send from near, seen in the far away. Hence for those who attain this, Heaven and Earth give their conformity, the sun and moon give their brightness, the ghosts and divinities give their fortune, the myriad people give their sincerity, a hundred generations give their good name, and not a single thing violates amidst all this. Ah, how great it is! (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 242)

The things and events within the cosmos are all self-sufficient, so towards these things and events self-sufficient in their original natures, one can only conform. As soon as there is any addition or subtraction amidst them, it destroys the self-sufficiency of the things and events themselves; desiring to add deliberate action onto the self-sufficiency of things and events is like giving feet to a snake. The things and events of the cosmos each rely on their inherent natures, firmly active without rest in a harmonious whole, and this is kites flying and fish leaping. Experiencing these kites flying and fish leaping and unifying with them spiritually is the highest spiritual plane. This differs from Centrality in the Ordinary’s “forming a triad with Heaven and Earth” and “assisting the transforming and nurturing of Heaven and Earth.” Assisting the transforming and nurturing of Heaven and Earth, seeing the reality of all the myriad things of the cosmos, these all amount to the subject making use of altered objects. Understanding these altered objects requires empirical knowledge, such that the relations between the subject and these objects are external. What was attained by Chen here, however, was a kind of plane, and the things and events on this plane are the symbols of a kind of spiritual awareness. They have value, and form a scene intuited by people; they are dependent on the subject such that the relations between them and the subject are internal, just as in Chen’s “rolling everything together as one, without any separation or distinction.” “Heaven and Earth give their conformity, the sun and moon give their brightness” implies that the subject forms one body with Heaven, Earth, the sun and the moon, and these are symbols of the subject’s awareness. Wherever the subject’s thought extends, these symbols are present. The subject at this time feels like a lord supervising the myriad things. The subject of this kind of plane can be said to be “great” indeed. Chen was full of praise for achieving this kind of spiritual plane, saying: “People struggle for a single awareness, and upon gaining this awareness the self is great and things small, things exhaustible and the self inexhaustible” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 243). Gaining this plane, the subject both tosses and turns with things while also being independent and reliant on nothing. Tossing and turning with things implies the subject fusing amidst things, following things and being carried off, without any obstruction. Being independent and reliant on nothing implies seeing things through this kind of spiritual plane, having a feeling of “the subtle dust of the world, the twinkling ephemera of the ages, living without knowledge of love, dying without knowledge of hate.”

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Setting out from this kind of awareness, Chen Xianzhang advocated spontaneity and opposed toiling and labouring, saying: “If one toils and labours in learning, one has no means of perceiving dao” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 269). That which the subject does is simply to spontaneously coincide with objects. This kind of coincidence is intuitive and not intellectual or gradual. On this kind of plane, the self is forgotten such that the self and its milieu become one, the self and its milieu becoming one such that the self is nowhere absent, the self being nowhere absent such that the self is great and things small, hence “one does not seek to overcome things yet things are unable to disturb one.” This kind of greatness shares similarities with Mencius’ “flood-like qi” (浩然之气 haoran zhi qi), and is a kind of feeling of power on a moral plane. Chen took this to be the ultimate purport of Confucian learning, saying: “When kites fly and fish leap, their impulse is within me; those who know this can be called good at learning, while for those who do not know this, even learning is of no benefit” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 269). For him, spontaneity is a complete experience of the cosmos and life. Rooted in spontaneity, one can unite with the regularities of the myriad things of the cosmos above, while attaining the fusing of principles below. Yet self-will leads toil and labour to be without achievement. He said: “The utmost clumsiness is found in the will, while the utmost skill is found in the mind” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 71). “Will” (意 yi) here refers to the self-will of deliberate action separated from spontaneity, and with self-will there is clinging and binding. The mind is the empty and numinous subject without self-will, and since it is empty and numinous it can toss and turn with things, uniting with the spontaneous regularities of nature. He took “the dao of Heaven is the ultimate non-mind (will)” to show the unity of the fusing of principles with the dispersion of fixation. Chen Xianzhang’s learning took emptiness as its gateway and stillness as its basic root, yet did not claim that outside of emptiness and stillness there were no other affairs; he sought a unity of the mind and principle, to unify the dispersion of fixation with the fusing of principles, and this was his whole effort. The single method of “cultivating the first inkling through stillness” is insufficient to give a complete picture of his theory of effort.

4 Chen Xianzhang’s Poetics Chen Xianzhang’s learning took spontaneity as its central objective and self-attainment as its real benefit, thus he did not enjoy writing commentaries, and instead put all his heart into poetry alone. His student Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水 said: “Master Baisha wrote no works, but lodged his will to write in poetry. Hence the essence of morality had to be expressed in poems” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 699). His relative Chen Yanzong 陈炎宗 also said: “The dao of Master Baisha rang out under Heaven, though he did not write books, but only liked making poems. Poetry was the method of his mind, and that by which he taught” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 700). Over 2,000 of Chen’s poems still exist

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today, and some of his poems were already printed and circulated while he was still living. His poems include four-character poems, five-character classical poems, seven-character classical poems, five-character regulated poems and seven-character regulated poems, as well as extended regulated verse, quatrains, etc., among which the five-character classical poems were most exceptionally refined. The Ming Dynasty man of letters Wang Shizhen 王世祯 once discussed Chen’s poetic writings, saying: “Gongfu’s [Chen Xianzhang’s] poems did not enter into methods, his writings did not enter into forms, and his meanings did not enter into topics. Their marvellous quality was all in excess of standards, forms and topics” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 918). Huang Chun 黄淳 said: “The learning of the gentleman was the learning of the mind. Where the gentleman’s learning of the mind flowed forth was in his poetic writings. Good readers can perceive his breadth of mind and his achievements in [the tradition of] Lian 濂 [Zhou Dunyi] and Luo 洛 [the Cheng brothers]. Without this, they simply amount to dregs” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 903). These assessments are all penetrating judgments of Chen Xianzhang’s poetics. Although Chen’s poems are numerous, he seldom discussed poetry. His most detailed discussion is found in the text “Second postscript on Wang Banshan’s 王半 山 [Wang Anshi 王安石] rhymed verse” [Ci wang banshan yun shi ba 次王半山韵 诗跋], which states: In writing poetry, elegance and firmness come first, while vulgarity and weakness should be avoided. I once loved to read the poems of Zimei 子美 [Du Fu 杜甫], Houshan 后山 [Chen Shidao 陈师道], etc., since I enjoyed their elegance and firmness. When one discusses the principles of dao, one must follow the depth or shallowness of people, yet with one’s brush one must express a refined spirit, writing with feeling such that one’s readers are spontaneously inspired and moved; only then has one succeeded. One must express the principles of dao by means of one’s own temperament, and cannot include judgments or discussions, since once separated from the original substance of poetry, one wears the hat of old Song scholars. It is generally like this. In between the sentences, meters, tones and regulations, one must cleanse the habituated qi of daily life piece by piece, and let the new burn through. The so-called cleansing away of stale views and letting new meanings arrive is precisely what should make use of in composing poetry. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 72)

From this relatively complete discussion we can see that, in composing poetry, Chen primarily emphasised spirit (气概 qigai). Spirit in poetry is like the temperament in people. Chen’s poems took elegance and firmness as their spirit. The plane of conception of his poems was tall and straight, lofty and refreshing, with hardly any air of malaise or confusion. Even his cries during illness or thoughts on his pillow are always fine and forceful, bright and clear. This is perhaps connected to his temperament. Chen’s student Zhang Yi wrote: “His body was eight chi long, his bright eyes were like stars, the left of his face had seven dark spots like the shape of the Big Dipper, his speech was clear and rounded, much as if he was produced in the Central Plains. He sometimes wore a Fangshan [Confucian] hat and wandered freely in the forest, with those who saw him taking him for one of the divine immortals” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 868). Other than a short period travelling to study in the capital, Chen spent his whole life in the forest,

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entertaining himself with wine and poetry, very seldom taking any salaried work as an official. His poems are steeped in an air of fertility, sleekness, formality, and opulence, with most of them unmistakably clear and fresh. Although they do not shun vulgar terms, the poems as a whole ignore vulgar content, with the few vulgar terms on the contrary adding to the spontaneous spirit of the poems. In his poems he enjoyed selecting characters exactly, similar to Du Fu, so that reading his poems made people feel like they were seeing wondrous pine trees on the edge of a cliff, slender bamboos beside a creek, an old man leaning on a staff, or a stone path leading to a wooden door, without any sense of gaudiness. Chen also emphasised elegance, though his elegance was lodged within firm characters. His plane of conception was elegant but his poems were in general firm. Elegance and firmness were fused into one in his poems. Chen’s learning esteemed spontaneity, a spontaneity that included the two aspects of elegance and firmness. The fusing of principles can speak to its elegance, while the dispersing of fixation can speak to its firmness. In general, the two aesthetic categories of elegance and firmness can easily form opposing stylistic qualities. Elegance frequently implies a pure and lofty style, an air of books and scrolls overflowing from the paper, while firmness generally implies strong winds and fierce flames or frontier fortresses and battle horses. Elegance and firmness are precisely an aesthetic summary of the qualities of Chen’s Learning of the Mind. People sometimes see his elegance but omit his firmness or see his spontaneity but forget his fixation, with both of these views missing his central objective. Chen thought that the principles of dao should be expressed as temperament, and, although he was not opposed to all lodging of teachings within poetry, he believed that the principles of dao need to make use of imagery and sentiment, and one should not directly speak of principles. Directly speaking of principles falls into the trap of men in the Song. He said: In general, in discussing poetry one should discuss temperament, in discussing temperament one should first discuss charm, and without charm there is no poetry. Those who speak of poetry today are different to this, they form their pieces and chapters and call them poetry while knowing nothing of charm, it is truly laughable. When temperament is good, charm is spontaneously good; when temperament is false, it is difficult to force it to speak. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 203)

In Chen’s view, the original substance of poetry is temperament. The strongest point of poetry lies in describing temperament, using images to lodge feeling and meaning. The production of aesthetic feeling in poetry lies in leading people into an emotional plane, a kind of mood, causing the feelings of the appreciator and those depicted in the poem to correspond, producing resonance. It is not that poems cannot speak of principle, but that they shun judgment and argument, and must transform principle into feeling, as only temperament is able to move people. The principles of dao can also touch people, and can also produce resonances in listeners, but they do not depend on images or a plane of conception. Being fond of expressing judgments and arguments and using principles to represent temperament are important reasons why the artistic feeling of Song poetry was generally inferior

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to that of Tang poetry, criticised by Chen Xianzhang as “the hat of old Song scholars.” The reason Chen praised Du Fu’s poetry was because he expressed all the principles of dao he wished to communicate through artistic images in his poems, and it is best for poems not to speak of principles. Although Chen praised Du Fu, he thought that he was not of the highest level, since Du’s poems were inferior to those of Tao Yuanming 陶渊明. He once wrote a two sentence poem that said: “I sometimes doubt that the sagehood of Zimei [Du Fu], is perhaps not as bland as that of Tao Qian 陶潜 [Tao Yuanming]” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 765). The poems of the sage of poetry Du Fu are wondrously divine and diligently polished, yet in the end they cannot match the diluted, spontaneous naturalness of those of Tao Yuanming. From this we can perceive Chen’s aesthetic tendency, as well as the fact that in the poet Chen’s studies, intellect, feeling and meaning are united, and that this unity is expressed in a spontaneous, traceless form. This is the artistic quality sought by Chen’s poetry. His “working and retiring, speech and silence, all are led by spontaneity” and “the joy of spontaneity is true joy” are found in his poems as their lack of any visible trace of arrangement: not only are the images of principle presented with no visible trace of arrangement, the sentences of the poems themselves also display no trace of arrangement, but flow forth spontaneously from the mind. He once said: Those who were good at writing in the past never betrayed any traces of arrangement, as if they trusted their mouths to speak, and were spontaneously marvellous. Although the styles all differ, I consider any that are rooted in spontaneity and not arranged to be good. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 163) The work of poetry is the waning of poetry. Speech is the sound of the heart… The variety of the sound is due to changes in feeling. Leading my feelings such that they exuberantly overflow, nothing suitable can be disallowed. If one is concerned over the praise or censure of others, then like [Sima Xiangru’s 司马相如] “Sir Vacuous 子虚” and [Yang Xiong’s 扬 雄] “Tall Poplars 长杨” one embellishes with skill and exaggerates wealth, flattering the ears and eyes of others and playing the court jester; this is not the teaching of poetry. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 5)

In his discussions of poetry, Chen regarded spontaneous naturalness and absence of marks of chiselling as the highest level, which constitutes an expression of his central objective of spontaneity in the aesthetic style of poetry. Chen did not endorse introducing principles into poetry, and even did not endorse artificially fabricating images in order to communicate any kind of principles of dao. His great student Zhan Ruoshui opposed this point. Zhan’s temperament was rather more serious than Chen, and he believed that Chen focused on spontaneity at the expense of deliberate action, such that feeling flourished and principle was weak. Wanting to correct this point, he selected over 160 classical-style poems from all periods of Chen’s writings, added explanations one by one, and titled his work Explanations of Classical Poetic Teachings from the Master of Baisha (Baishazi gushi jiaojie 白沙子古诗教解). The poems selected by Zhan all reflect his teacher’s Neo-Confucian thought, creating a powerful impression that Chen was a Confucian, not a Daoist and certainly not a Chan Buddhist,

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and that his poems were written for self-cultivation and the illumination of virtue, packed with moralising meanings. In his “Original Preface to Explanations of Poetic Teachings” (Shijiao jie yuanxu 诗教解原序), Zhan bluntly proposed: “What does Baisha’s poetic teaching mean? It means using poems as teachings. This is because the essence of morality had to be expressed in poetry. Later generations in the world received these and passed them on, and thus they became teachings” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 699). In the explanations he made, he took parts of Chen’s poems that originally had no moral meaning and extended them in his explanations so that they gained a moral meaning, taking parts that had no lesson concerning principles and extending them in his explanations so that they gained lessons concerning principles. This in fact went against Chen Xianzhang’s poetics, and the explanations reveal more about the academic inclinations of Zhan Ruoshui, having little to do with Chen.

5 Chen Xianzhang’s Students Chen spent his whole life in the forest, and also in a remote area near Nanhai 南海, hence although in middle age his name was fairly prominent, he had few students. Among his students, Zhan Ruoshui, Lin Guang, Zhang Yi, Li Chengji 李承箕 and He Qin 贺钦 were the most famous. Zhan Ruoshui’s learning was profound and broad, and he was chosen by Chen himself to be the inheritor of the Jiangmen School. However, his achievements took the harmonious combination of the Lu [Xiangshan] and Zhu [Xi] lines as their basis, his learning going beyond that of Baisha, and hence they will be discussed in a separate chapter. Zhang, Lin, Li, and He were all Chen’s direct students, and among them, Zhang Yi and Lin Guang were particularly outstanding peers. Despite this, the academic inclinations of the two were rather different, and they can be viewed as the unrestrained and timid branches of his followers. Zhang Yi 张翊 (zi Yanshi 延实, hao Dongsuo 东所) was from Nanhai in Guangdong province, and was a successful imperial examination candidate, becoming a left secretary 左参议 in the Court of Transmission 通政司 in Nanjing. Concerning Zhang Yi’s studies, Chen Xianzhang gave a very clear summary: Yanshi’s studies took spontaneity as their central objective, forgetting the self as great, and absence of desire as the utmost, the immediate mind observing the wondrous to approximate the usage of the sages. He observed that Heaven and Earth, the darkness and brightness of the sun and moon, the flowing and peaks of mountains and rivers, and that by which the four seasons shift and the myriad things are produced, are nothing but the polarity within the self, such that thought grasps its pivotal impulse and carries its bridle and rein, putting it into practice in everyday things and events, to participate in them without end. (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 12)

“Spontaneity as central objective,” “forgetting the self as great,” and “absence of desire as the utmost” are Zhang Yanshi’s theory of effort, in many ways continuing that of Chen Xianzhang. “The immediate mind observing the wondrous” and “the myriad things all present within the self” are his ontology, while “grasping its

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pivotal impulse and carrying its bridle and rein” is his methodology; although these are in part taken from his teacher, there is self-realisation and self-attainment present in them. “The immediate mind observing the wondrous” refers to a kind of aesthetically awakened observing of external things, rather than an intellectual direct perception. Aesthetically awakened observing means taking external things as symbols of a kind of affective thought within one’s own mind, viewing these symbols as existences that are both subject and object, both mind and things; viewing the regularities and principles of external things as conforming to the principle already principle in my mind, not probing for principle within external things but realising the principle that unifies internal and external as one. Self-attainment thus refers to attaining this plane in which feeling and principle fuse without separation. Hence Zhang Yi summarised his own studies as: “The milieu and the mind attaining, principle and the mind converging.” He recounted his attainment saying: When I was small I followed my father in service to Linchuan 临川. I was following the embankment with its erect willows when I lay down and looked up at the waving leaves between the morning mist and the curtain of rain, seeing a thousand forms and a myriad shapes, some including as many as ten trees. The water of the embankment formed subtle ripples and great waves, following the strength and weakness of the wind and transforming, some as high as ten zhang 丈. The songs and calls of parrots and swallows, the diving and leaping of fish and shrimp, the appearance and disappearance of rosy clouds, none of these could not be concretely described. Just then the milieu and my mind attained, yet I suddenly did not know the reason for this joy. After I had grown a little, I read the sentences “At the willow embankment the spring water overflows” and “At the surface of poplar and willow the wind comes and blows” from someone in the past, and just then my mind and the sentences attained, yet I again was at a loss as to where the wonder was lodged. In recent years I was recovering from the residue of an illness and concentrated in stillness for lengthy periods, principle and my mind converging without the need for a milieu in front of my eyes, feeling and spirit fusing without the need for a poem to leave my mouth. The so-called highest joy and utmost wonder are never attained through artificial external seeking. (“Record of the Willow Embankment” [Liu tang ji 柳塘记], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 96)

When he was young and observing the willow embankment, it was merely a coincidence of the plane of conception expressed by the external scene and the immediate mood at observing this external scene that produced an aesthetic feeling. This aesthetic feeling was spontaneous and obscure, such that he did not know what was the reason for his joy. Later, reading lines of poetry, the milieu depicted in the poems gradually sunk into his mind, a chance poetic milieu and a scene before his eyes converging and issuing forth in fusion, such that the poetic milieu and the scene before his eyes were inseparably united as one, and the presently appearing scene and things transforming into a poetic scene in his so-called “mind and sentences attaining.” Yet he did not know whether the aesthetic feeling produced at this time was attained from the poetic milieu or from the mind. Later, when he had read and experienced more, he once concentrated in stillness and the substance of the mind was revealed, at which he became aware that the substance of the mind is a unity of principle and feeling, spirit and milieu. This kind of unity does not need to

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rely on the fusion and issuing of a milieu, but spontaneously flows forth from the breast. Zhang Yi’s experience here can be divided into three phases of effort: In the first phase, the real feeling and real scene before his eyes were a medium for thought. In the second phase, there was no real scene, but it was necessary to rely on the plane of conception in the poetic sentences to fuse and then trigger the issuing forth. These two phases still remained in a phase in which subject and object, mind and milieu were separate or obscurely unified. In the third phase, the ripened plane of unity of feeling and scene spontaneously flowed forth. This phase can be said to have reached the extent of unity of mind and principle, feeling and milieu. “Spontaneity as central objective” means that this plane is an artistic plane fused and triggered spontaneously, without need for planning or arrangement. “Forgetting the self as great” means that feeling and milieu fuse, principle and mind converge, and on this plane the subject completely forgets its own existence. It is not that the subject engulfs or assimilates the object, pulling along the other to accomplish the self, but rather that internal and external are both forgotten, the scene and things both subject and object, both mind and things, appearing brightly in front. At this time there is not a drop of self-consciousness, not a drop of thought of self or ego; as soon as there is this idea, the mental conception disappears, the scene and things change hue, and the interest is gone. This is “absence of desire as the utmost.” “Grasping its pivotal impulse and carrying its bridle and rein, putting it into practice in everyday things and events” takes this artistic, imagistic plane of conception as fundamental, and seeks this plane of conception. The daily practice, realisation at all places, and prolonged cultivation and expansion of Confucians are all found beneath the rich, fertile opening of this artistic plane of conception. The objective of Zhang Yi’s studies is consistent with his depiction of the artistic plane of conception of Chen Xianzhang’s realisation of dao in his later years: “Thus, having swiftly skimmed though his morning practice, he sometimes sang grandly in wide forests, sometimes whistled alone on isolated islands, sometimes took a boat and went fishing on creeks, river banks and twisting coastlines, losing his physical body, abandoning his ears and eyes, and casting off his intellectual mind, eventually reaching an attainment at which he felt spontaneously trusting and joyful” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 883). Zhang Yi concentrated on the wondrous realisation of an artistic plane of conception, thus his studies met with reproach from his fellow students and friends Zhan Ruoshui and Lin Guang. Zhan Ruoshui said that Zhang Yi “possessed a beautiful temperament, and in breadth of mind he was the highest. However in what he cherished and did, there is much that he departed from and abandoned” (Collected Works of Chen Xianzhang, 767). Lin Guang however directly pointed out the transcendent realisations and brave strides in his desire to study and illuminate dao, casting aside the extension of knowledge and probing of principles with regard to concrete things and events. Lin Guang’s studies followed Zhu Xi’s path of self-discipline and further study in seeking self-attainment. He said:

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Self-encouragement now means wishing to seek without being forced, cultivating in peaceful abundance, and checking the classics of the sages to broadly harmonise with them. They do not have it in their minds, and prefer to refine and bring it out through tossing and turning from morning to night, not daring to delve into the cacophony of the confused mass of commentaries and theories lest they fragment it. As for not being careless about a single affair, not ignoring a single thought, accumulating dust and storing up droplets, pondering by day and urging by night, this is working earnestly. (“Letter of Respect to Master Chen Shizhai” [Feng Chen Shizhai xiansheng shu 奉陈石斋先生书], Nanchuan bingnie quanji 南川冰蘖全集, Vol. 4) My studies lie in the smallest matters, and I do not object to paying meticulous attention. If one attains the essential in seeking, weights and measures are as clear as the sun, and one can then trust in oneself and train to the point of having no doubts. If one has not yet attained it, then store it up and nurture it, and then, having accumulated it for a long period, one will not be dependent on romantic nostalgia for stale words, but will spontaneously find it simple to exercise it. (“Letter in Reply to He Shiju” [Da He Shiju shu 答何时矩书], ibid.)

From this it can be seen that Lin Guang differed from Zhang Yi’s wondrous realisation, his studies emphasising self-discipline, refined consideration of principles, and gradual penetration. In terms of principles, he valued paying meticulous attention to details in order to attain the standard and ground for a balanced mind. First broad and then simple, first external and then internal, he especially stressed accumulation, preservation and cultivation. Although Lin Guang was a follower of Baisha, his learning still followed older paths of study. Chen Xianzhang’s learning was to a great degree the realisation of a poet, and very different from Wang Yangming’s achieving of “the extension of innate moral knowing” through multifaceted academic exploration and practical pursuit. The realisation of a poet necessarily seeks a mind together with dao, a shared feeling and milieu. Hence, Chen’s learning cannot strictly be classed as Learning of the Mind, but at most as the sprouts of Learning of the Mind. The greatness of Learning of the Mind would have to wait until Wang Yangming had completed his learning of the extension of innate moral knowing and promoted it across the greater part of China before it would gain the force of a great flood-wave.

Chapter 5

Zhan Ruoshui’s ‘Ubiquitous Realisation of Heavenly Principle’ and His Academic Lineage

Chen Xianzhang was the pioneer of Ming Dynasty Learning of the Mind, and he consistently opposed the cautiousness and conventionality of the early Ming learning that followed Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, particularly that of figures like Wu Yubi and Hu Juren, instead advocating spontaneity and self-attainment. However, Chen Xianzhang embarked on his learning as a poet, and most traditional scholars viewed his theory of original substance as tending towards the abstruse and his theory of effort as tending towards emptiness. Chen Xianzhang’s disciple Zhan Ruoshui wished to make amends for his teacher’s deficiencies, and thus proposed his theory of the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle, turning Jiangmen 江 门 learning back towards the concrete. Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水 (1466–1560; original name Lu 露, zi 字 Minze 民泽; original name changed to Yu 雨 due to imperial taboo, later fixed as Ruoshui, zi Guangming 光明) was from Zengcheng 增城 in Guangdong province. Since he lived in the Ganquan 甘泉 district of Zengcheng, scholars referred to him as Master Ganquan. In the sixth year of the Hongzhi Emperor [1493], he took the examination but did not pass, and the next year he headed to Jiangmen to study with Chen Xianzhang, becoming personally appointed by him as the transmitter of Jiangmen learning. According to the traces of his personal life, he determined to establish an academy dedicated to Chen Xianzhang. In the 18th year of the Hongzhi Emperor [1505] he passed the imperial examination, and gained a temporary position in the Imperial Hanlin Academy 翰林院. He later served in Nanjing as an official in the Ministry of Rites, the Ministry of Personnel, and the Ministry of War, and as a chancellor in the Imperial Academy. At the age of 75 he resigned, and in his retirement he continued to lecture for over 20 years, gaining a multitude of disciples. He left behind a great wealth of works, including Collected Writings of

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_5

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Ganquan (Ganquan wenji 甘泉文集), Correct Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu zhengzhuan 春秋正传), and Penetrating the Investigation of Things in Sage-Learning (Shengxue gewu tong 圣学格物通).1

1 The Mind Embodies Things Without Omission Zhan Ruoshui’s learning continued his teacher’s thought of “Heaven and Earth are established by me, a myriad transformations emerge from me, the cosmos is within me,” holding that the mind and things are unified. In Zhan’s view, the myriad things between Heaven and Earth are all the mind and things unified as one body [or substance, ti 体]. He said: The human mind forms a body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and the mind embodies things without omission. If one understands the breadth and greatness of the substance of the mind, then things cannot be external. (“To Minister Yangming” [Yu Yangming honglu 与阳明鸿胪], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 1) The mind omits nothing; it is that which embodies Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. (“Explanation of the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature” [Xinxing tushuo 心性图说], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 21, 1)

That is to say, the things that are seen by the eye and touched by the body are the mind and things unified as one body, and things are not objects outside the mind waiting to be known by it, but are both mind and thing, both subjective and objective existence. This kind of unified body of mind and things is different from Wang Yangming’s view that “there are no things outside the mind, no principles outside the mind, no affairs outside the mind,” which was intended from the perspective of the will of the subject as the most fundamental element in action. The mind referred to by Zhan Ruoshui is that which embodies the myriad things and combines them into one. The breadth and greatness of the substance of the mind is such that nothing is excluded, and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all contained within the mind. This kind of mind is a combination of two aspects, namely the epistemological form of the mind and the form of the mind as a spiritual plane; the unification of mind and things as one body can be considered as derivative of the combination of the epistemological and spiritual plane as one. Zhan Ruoshui’s unification of mind and things was a blend of the theories of original substance of the Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang schools, where the guiding principle for study in the Cheng-Zhu school was that “Cultivation through self-discipline requires use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge,” and that the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things. Things here refers to objects outside the subject, while the

[Trans.] References to Ganquan wenji refer to a Qing Dynasty Tongzhi 同治 period carved edition from the Zizheng Hall 资政堂. 1

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investigation of things means approaching things to probe their principles, such that when the principles one has probed are present in the mind, then they can be cultivated and disciplined through sincerity and respect. Lu Jiuyuan understood the original mind as the original substance of the mind, such that effort should be aimed at seeking one’s lost mind. Lu’s fundamental proposition “the mind is principle” means that Heavenly principle is originally present within the mind, and that the Heavenly principle originally present within the mind and the ethical laws of the cosmos are one and not two. Wang Yangming proposed that “there are no principles outside the mind, no things outside the mind,” but his “things” here refers to affairs, and no things outside the mind emphasises that every activity of the subject is penetrated with moral will, such that the moral will of the subject is the prerequisite condition for the establishing of any moral activity. Zhan Ruoshui thought that for Cheng-Zhu the relationship between the mind and things was external, and it was thus hard for them to avoid the fault of “dividing the mind and principle into two,” while Wang Yangming replaced the mind with things and thus “affirmed the internal and negated the external.” He believed he himself had avoided he weaknesses of the two schools, and that his theory of original substance in which “the mind includes the outside of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and penetrates to the centre of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, such that the centre and the outside are not two, Heaven and Earth have no internal or external, and the mind also has no internal or external” had fused the theories of the relationship between mind and things or Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang. Zhan Ruoshui’s theory of original substance includes the concepts of principle, qi, mind, and inherent nature. First, qi. Zhan Ruoshui held that the mind is unified with things, but he also thought we can infer their composing element, and this element is qi. He said: The cosmos (yuzhou 宇宙) is an undivided whole, its qi is the same. (“Explanation of the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 21, 1) Up, down and the four directions of space, the past, present and future of time, within cosmic space and time (yuzhou 宇宙) there is only one qi that fills up and flows; taking dao as the substance, where is there any non-being? Where is there any emptiness to speak of? Even if Heaven and Earth wear out and are destroyed, if humans and things vanish completely, this qi and this dao will never pass away, and will never become emptiness. (“Sent to Yangming” [Ji Yangming 寄阳明], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 3)

Here, qi is the root-origin that composes Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Root-origin (benyuan 本原) and original substance (benti 本体) are different, since root-origin refers to the ultimate affiliation of the myriad things, and this kind of affiliation is inferred speculatively. When examining the composition of the myriad things, Zhan Ruoshui pointed to qi, while when expounding his theory of original substance in which the mind and things are unified, he pointed to things. These are two different levels. The former is a logical inference, while the latter is an empirical intuition. In terms of the root-origin of things, Zhan Ruoshui held a qimonism, while in terms of the theory of original substance he held a view of the mind and things as unified. This is not a contradiction, since they are questions at

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two levels: the former is a concrete question of science, while the latter is an axiological question of meaning. Second, inherent nature. Inherent nature in Zhan Ruoshui generally refers to human nature, and the content of human nature is the benevolence of production and reproduction without cease, which he also referred to as productive principle (shengli 生理). He said: Inherent nature is Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body. … Inherent nature is the productive principle of the mind, such that the mind and inherent nature are not two. It can be compared to a valley, which possesses productive intention but has yet been aroused, and since it is not aroused it is undivided and cannot be seen. (“Explanation of the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 21, 2) When the mind possesses productive principle, it is called inherent nature. When inherent nature comes into contact with things and is aroused, it is called feeling. When it is aroused and is central and correct, it is called true feeling, and otherwise it is false. Inherent nature is produced together with the mind, and its patterns follow the mind and follow production, hence it is the productive principle of the mind. (“Reply to Graduate Zheng Qifan” [Fu Zheng Qifan jinshi 复郑启范进士], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 20)

Here, Zhan Ruoshui did not follow Cheng-Zhu’s “inherent nature is principle” in explaining inherent nature, but rather used “The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is production” from the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), Mencius’ “The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence,” and Chen Xianzhang’s “The substance of my mind is dimly revealed, constant as if there was a thing” to explain inherent nature. The specification of inherent nature in “inherent nature is principle” is formal, while Zhan Ruoshui’s conception focuses on content: inherent nature is the productive intention expressed in the myriad things. His definition of inherent nature here is closely related to his theory of effort. His theory of effort is the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle, and this Heavenly principle is also “the central and correct original substance of my mind.” In “the central and correct original substance of my mind,” “productive principle” and “benevolence” are the main content, and if this spark of productive principle is preserved undamaged, then it will be central and correct, and will be Heavenly principle. Because of this, Zhan Ruoshui also said that inherent nature is principle, but this inherent nature is “the productive principle of the mind,” “productive intention,” and “benevolence.” Inherent nature is the productive principle of the mind, such that mind and inherent nature have the same content. The productive principle of the mind in Confucius was “twos and threes at the rain altar” [see Analects, 11.26], in Centrality in the Ordinary it was “hawks flying and fish leaping,” and in Chen Xianzhang it was “the inexhaustible store” (wujin cang 无尽 藏). The emphasis in Zhan Ruoshui’s argument is on the content of inherent nature and not its form. Chen Xianzhang’s poetic realisation of the lively productive intention between Heaven and Earth was the primary source for Zhan Ruoshui’s theory of inherent nature. In this theory one can say he synthesised Cheng-Zhu and

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Lu-Wang: he infused the form of “inherent nature is principle” with content from the Learning of the Mind. Third, principle. In Zhan Ruoshui’s philosophy, principle is a rather ambiguous concept, since he wanted to blend the two schools of Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang, and in his specifications of principle some come from Cheng-Zhu and others from Lu-Wang. For example: The mind responds to affairs, and thus Heavenly principle is visible. Heavenly principle is not external, but specifically appears because of affairs, following stimuli and responding. Hence in the appearance of affairs and things, that which embodies them is the mind. When the mind attains centrality and correctness, there is Heavenly principle. (“Reply to Attendant Censor Nie Wenwei” [Da Nie Wenwei shiyu 答聂文蔚侍御], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 29) “When the mind seeks centrality and correctness, there is Heavenly principle” is good and well. But it is also the case that it must attain Heavenly principle before it can be central and correct. And there are those that do not attain Heavenly principle, such as the Buddhists with their “one should be without attachments in order to produce one’s mind.” When did they ever attain Heavenly principle? What I mean by Heavenly principle is embodied and realised in the mind, and this is the learning of the mind. Whether they are affairs or not, there is originally this mind. When there are no affairs, the myriad things form one body, and when there are affairs, things each connect with things; these are both the filling and flowing of Heavenly principle, and their reality is not an affair. (“Record of Questions and Clarifications at Xinquan” [Xinquan wenbian lu 新泉问辨录], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 8, 15)

Combining Zhan Ruoshui’s comments on principle in other places, it can be seen that his conception of principle contains the following aspects: First, principle is when responses to affairs and things accord with their rules or standards. Here, Zhan Ruoshui held that principle lies within affairs, and he went to great efforts to avoid any statements that might suggest a separation between principle and qi or that principle was another thing outside of affairs. This demonstrates that he did not agree with Zhu Xi’s views on principle and qi. Second, he took principle to be the central and correct position in affairs, where “central and correct” (zhongzheng 中 正) merely expresses things in motion according to their appropriate time and place, and in which the appropriate time and place is variable, and hence Heavenly principle is also variable. Luo Qinshun once criticised Zhan Ruoshui for this, pointing out that if principle were the centrality and correctness of qi, then the non-centrality and incorrectness of qi would not be principle. In this case, there would be times when there was qi but not principle, and this is inconsistent with Zhan Ruoshui’s premise that principle and qi form one body. Third, principle has content, and the content of principle is inherent nature, i.e. the productive principle in the human mind. This is in fact unified with the second aspect: principle attaining centrality and correctness must be an expression of the productive principle of the mind. We can say that for Zhan Ruoshui, principle is the form, inherent nature is the content, and principle (centrality and correctness) is at the same time a necessary condition for inherent nature to be able to be manifested. Zhan Ruoshui opposed

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both an empty principle outside or above affairs and things, and also an unrestrained qi without regulation. His specifications of principle embody his attempt to fuse Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang. Fourth, mind. For Zhan Ruoshui, mind has two main meanings, one is the mind as a spiritual plane, and the other is the ethical mind. When one reaches the highest level of cultivation, these two aspects are combined into one. The mind as a spiritual plane considers the cosmos in general, and at this time it contemplates the undivided cosmos as a whole. The ethical mind considers individual affairs and things, and at this time it experiences specific affairs and things that have gone through an ethical projection and possess ethical meaning. In Explanation of the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature, his important work explicating his theory of mind and inherent nature, Zhan Ruoshui said: The mind both includes the outside of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and penetrates to the centre of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. The centre and the outside are not two, Heaven and Earth have no internal or external, and the mind also has no internal or external. This is simply to speak of their polarity. (Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 21, 2)

This says that the affairs and things that exist between Heaven and Earth are all contained by the mind, and are all permeated by the experience within the mind. This kind of permeation and containment is realised intuitively, and not knowledge analysed by the intellect. These affairs and things that are permeated by and contained within the mind all take their ideal forms full of productive intention, and are thus necessarily central and correct. This centrality and correctness is both the principle of things and their inherent nature. Therefore, Zhan Ruoshui’s “the mind includes the outside of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” contains the implication that within the cosmos there are an uncountable number of central and correct bodies in which the mind and things are unified, and that the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle means the ubiquitous realisation of the inherent nature and principle that are embodied within these central and correct bodies in which the mind and things are unified. Since what is realised are not pure objects without any subjective participation, so the investigation of things does not imply seeking from outside. If we say the mind including the outside of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things emphasises its meaning as a spiritual plane, then the mind penetrating to the centre of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things emphasises its ethical meaning. Zhan Ruoshui’s Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature (Xinxing tu 心性图) contains three circles, upper, middle and lower. In the upper circle, the state of the mind is initial respect (shijing 始敬), where respect implies focused concentration. The mind at this time is in an unaroused state, one in which the inherent nature innately present in the mind (the dao of centrality and correctness) emerges spontaneously, and this is a time when the mind and inherent nature are originally one. In the middle circle, the mind and the myriad things develop stimulation and response, the unaroused state is broken, and the mind shifts into an aroused state in which inherent nature is expressed as feeling. Yet since respect is maintained within this, feeling is expressed in an aroused harmony, and the productive intention of inherent

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nature is concretised into the feelings of the four inklings [see Mencius, 2A.6]. In the lower circle, the state of the mind is final respect (zhongjing 终敬), and since there is the participation of the aroused feelings from the middle circle, at this time Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all experienced as the unification of the mind and things as one body, all having undergone the projection and contemplation of the subject’s spiritual plane, “the mind of the myriad events, the myriad things, and Heaven and Earth.” At this time that which is penetrated by the mind and that which is contained by the mind are combined into one, such that “containing and penetrating are in reality not two.” In terms of its spiritual plane, this circle is higher than the former two, and the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle means the realisation of the mind of Heaven and Earth as expressed in specific affairs and things. From the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature and Zhan Ruoshui’s explanation of it, we can see that his theory of original substance is indeed different from that of his teacher Chen Xianzhang. Chen Xianzhang spoke much of spiritual planes, while Zhan Ruoshui had both spiritual planes and their concretisation; Chen Xianzhang had an intuitive fusion of plane and image after cultivating the first inkling in stillness, while Zhan Ruoshui had both spiritual planes and the realisation of the mind of Heaven and Earth in concrete affairs and things; Chen Xianzhang had the ease and fusion of the Learning of the Mind, hence people of the time referred to him as “a living Mencius,” while Zhan Ruoshui had the carefulness of Cheng-Zhu Learning of Principle, hence he still followed the set path of unaroused and aroused, the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, etc., yet his endpoint was still using respect to realise the mind of Heaven and Earth as expressed in the myriad things. Zhan Ruoshui’s correction and modification of Chen Xianzhang lay in taking his teacher’s experience of a poet’s spiritual plane and setting it within the concrete practice of the Neo-Confucians, and hence his learning was rather more reserved than that of his teacher.

2 The Ubiquitous Realisation of Heavenly Principle Zhan Ruoshui’s discussions of principle, qi, mind and inherent nature can be finally traced back to his core precept of learning: “ubiquitously realise Heavenly principle” (suichu tiren tianli 随处体认天理). A great number of his arguments in his records of discussion and letters are all clustered around this fundamental precept. For Zhan Ruoshui, Heavenly principle is the original substance of the centrality and correctness of my mind; since he held that the mind and things are unified, this original substance of centrality and correctness is both subject and object. For Zhu Xi, the probing of principle begins from concrete epistemological activity, and then on the basis of accumulating enough for a sudden penetration of understanding, realising this as Heavenly principle with an ethical meaning. For Zhan Ruoshui, the things to be investigated are things of value that have undergone the conversion of “the mind including the outside of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and

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penetrating to the centre of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” and are thus open to people, and not actual objective things that can be investigated one at a time each day as for Zhu Xi; for Zhan Ruoshui, the principles to be probed are projections of the value ideals of the mind onto specific affairs and things that have undergone an activity of value conversion, hence principle at this time is the original substance of the centrality and correctness of my mind, and not an objective principle of things. Therefore, the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle does not imply seeking from outside. Zhan Ruoshui said: Those who take the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle to imply seeking from outside are wrong. The mind responds to affairs, and thus Heavenly principle is visible. Heavenly principle is not external, but specifically appears because of affairs, following stimuli and responding. Hence in the appearance of affairs and things, that which embodies them is the mind. When the mind attains centrality and correctness, there is Heavenly principle. People are one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and nothing in the cosmos forms two things with people. Hence that in the cosmos there is not one affair or one thing to be combined is something few people truly attain. (“Reply to Attendant Censor Nie Wenwei,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 29)

“People are one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” has the meaning of the unification of the mind and things, as discussed above. “Nothing in the cosmos forms two things with people” means “the mind both includes the outside of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and penetrates to the centre of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” Heavenly principle is not a law of things, but rather the state of the mind attaining centrality and correctness when people respond to affairs and things. Therefore, Heavenly principle does not exist separate from the mind. The ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle means that in responding to every affair and thing the mind attains centrality and correctness and is conscious of this centrality and correctness, hence effort for Zhan Ruoshui does not mean probing and investigating the principles of things and gaining a sudden penetration of understanding, and his investigation of things just means the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle: Investigation [ge 格] means to come to [zhi 至], as in “[Shun] came to the [temple of the] Cultured Ancestor” [see Book of Documents, “Canon of Shun”] and “the Miao came” [see Book of Documents, “Counsels of Great Yu”]; things refers to Heavenly principle, as in “the words [of the superior man] have principles” [see Book of Changes, Hexagram 37, “Family Members”] and “Shun clearly understood [the principles of] the many things” [see Mencius, 4B.19], i.e. dao. Investigation thus has the meaning of attainment, and the investigation of things means to attain the dao. (“Reply to Yangming” [Da Yangming 答阳 明], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 19)

“To come to” here does not refer to the “setting out” at the beginning of action, but rather the “arriving” at the completion of action; “things” also does not refer to objective external things, but rather the Heavenly principle embodied in the myriad things. Thus, the investigation of things means the attainment of dao. Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” differed from both the “approaching things to probe their principles” of Cheng-Zhu and also the

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“rectification of thoughts” of Wang Yangming. Cheng-Zhu’s approaching things to probe principle was overly external, while Yangming’s rectification of thoughts was overly internal. Zhan Ruoshui thought that his “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” was neither overly external nor overly internal, neither swamped down with the examination of specific principles of things and wandering without return, nor abandoning the concrete affairs of the family, state, and world under Heaven. “Ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” was his fusion of the Learning of Principle and the Learning of the Mind. In proposing his “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle,” Zhan Ruoshui was indebted to the Cheng brothers and Li Tong 李侗. In a letter to Chen Xianzhang, he wrote: All at once I was suddenly enlightened, and felt Master Cheng’s words, “Although my learning was in part received from others, I realised the two words ‘Heavenly principle’ for myself” and Li Yanping’s [i.e. Li Tong] “Sitting silently my mind cleared, and I realised Heavenly principle.” I say that within the two words Heavenly principle, the core thread running through thousand sages and a thousand worthies from Yao and Shun down to Confucius and Mencius, who spoke of centrality and of polarity, of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, a thousand words and myriad phrases were all already included. If one can ubiquitously realise this, truly seeing and attaining, then in one’s everyday life one will find it in front of oneself as if it were attached to a carriage [see Analects, 15.6], there will be nothing but this substance, and people simply need cultivation through self-discipline to possess it within themselves. (“Letter of Summary to Master Baisha” [Shang Baisha xiansheng qilue 上白沙先生启略], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 17, 12)

However, Zhan Ruoshui’s drawing from the Cheng brothers and Li Tong was formal, taking their phrase “realise Heavenly principle.’ In terms of how and what to realise, Zhan Ruoshui differed from both the Cheng brothers and Li Tong. What is important to notice in this passage is that, after ubiquitously realising Heavenly principle, Zhan Ruoshui strongly emphasised the effort of cultivation through self-discipline (hanyang 涵养). He once expressed this idea in a reply to a question from Wang Yangming: The investigation of things means attaining the dao. Knowing and action progress hand in hand, such that learning, questioning, thinking, discriminating and acting are all ways to attain the dao. Reading books, expressing affection for one’s teachers and friends, engaging in society, at any time and any place one can realise Heavenly principle and cultivate it through self-discipline, such that the effort to attain the dao is in everything. Efforts at sincerity, uprightness and cultivation should all be applied in the investigation of things. The family, the state, and the world under Heaven are all expansions of this, so there are not two stages of effort. This is what is called stopping at the highest good [see the Great Learning]. When it was said that if one stops at the highest good then one also grasps manifesting virtue and loving the people, this is what was meant. (“Reply to Wang Yangming,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 19)

This cultivation through self-discipline was different from that of Zhu Xi. For Zhu Xi, the investigation of things was an activity, a process, while for Zhan Ruoshui it was “things having been investigated” and “stopping at the highest good.” His

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stress was on expressing the result, that of “having obtained Heavenly principle.” Hence for Zhu Xi, cultivation through discipline involves a process in which the principles of things obtained by approaching things to probe their principles undergo spiritual activities including rumination, self-discipline, embodied experience, and reduction and are transformed into Heavenly principle, into things of value. For Zhan Ruoshui, cultivation through self-discipline involves taking the principle of inherent nature obtained through “ubiquitous realisation” and “investigating things,” developing it, expanding it, and applying it in cultivating [the self], ordering [the family], governing [the state], and pacifying [the world under Heaven]. This is the idea implied in his view that “Mencius’ ‘profound attainment through the dao’ refers to the investigation of things, his ‘obtaining it in oneself’ refers to knowledge having been reached, and his ‘residing calmly,’ ‘relying deeply’ and ‘meeting its source’ refer to cultivating, ordering, governing, and pacifying” [see Mencius, 4B.14]. Since Zhan Ruoshui emphasised cultivation through self-discipline, and cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, so the word “respect” (jing 敬) has an important position in his philosophy. He said: Cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge, just like the two wheels of a carriage. When one starts from one faint idea and reaches to the point of affairs being carried out and lectures being practiced, with cultivation through self-discipline and the extension of knowledge arriving together at one and the same time, then this is good learning. (“Reply to Chen Weijun” [Da Chen Weijun 答陈惟浚], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 9) What is essential to me is only the effort of managing affairs through using respect; from residing alone to reading books and engaging socially, I have no other intention. A single thread running through, from inside to out and top to bottom, there is nothing but this principle; what other affairs could there be? (“Reply to Xu Yueren” [Da Xu Yueren 答徐曰 仁], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 3) Managing affairs respectfully is of the utmost importance; it penetrates from top to bottom, and when one grasps this, one grasps everything else. In the extension of knowledge and cultivation through self-discipline, this is their ground. (“Reply to Brothers Deng Zhan” [Da Deng Zhan xiongdi 答邓瞻兄弟], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 20)

Respect runs through the entirety of Zhan Ruoshui’s theory of effort, with his Explanation of the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature containing initial respect and final respect, the unaroused and aroused states of the mind, with respect present at all times. Without respect, it is hard to maintain the centrality and correctness of the original mind, and there is no way to implement the core precept of the “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle.” Yet his notion of respect differed from the cautious and conscientious preoccupation without release of many Confucians at the beginning of the Ming such as Hu Juren and Wu Yubi. His notion of respect emphasised the supportive conservation and expansive development of the principle obtained through the investigation of things. As for its form of expression, one should “neither forget nor assist” (wuwang wuzhu 勿忘勿助), as he said:

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You say “Respect means the mind being present in this and never letting it go,” but I am afraid this is not all there is to it. Master Cheng said: Maintaining unity is respect. In maintaining unity, there is not a single thing present in one’s mind, and thus he spoke of unity. If there were anything present, there would be two. Unity is found between not forgetting and not assisting. Now, when you say “the mind present in affairs and never letting go,” this can be called not forgetting, but I am afraid it cannot but become fixated on this affair, and thus cannot avoid assisting. Can it then be called respect? (“Reply to Attendant Censor Nie Wenwei,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 29)

Here he thought not only that the preoccupation without release and excessive control of Hu Juren etc. could easily fall into the trap of “assisting growth” [see Mencius, 2A.2], but also that the “returning to stillness,” “maintaining respect” and “the mind present in this and never letting go” of Nie Bao, Luo Hongxian, etc. of the Jiangyou School could easily fall into the trap of having respect and reverence but lacking liberal dispersion (saluo 洒落). Zhan Ruoshui’s conception of respect was one of “maintaining unity” (zhuyi 主一). He explained this maintaining of unity saying: When I speak of maintaining unity, this is maintaining the unity of a centre, similar to the idea that maintaining unity is maintaining Heavenly principle. However, in maintaining unity there is not even a single thing. If one maintains the centre or maintains Heavenly principle, then there is an additional centre or Heavenly principle, and this means there are two. In maintaining unity however, the centre and Heavenly principle are spontaneously present within. (“Reply to Deng Kezhao” [Da Deng Kezhao 答邓恪昭], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 21)

This is not only a criticism of Nie Bao’s precept of returning to stillness, but also contains an objection to Wang Yangming’s idea that “maintaining unity means concentrating on maintaining one Heavenly principle.” Since Zhan Ruoshui was influenced by Chen Xianzhang’s precept of “spontaneity” (ziran 自然), although he advocated the realisation of Heavenly principle, he thought that what was realised was the central and correct substance of my mind, such that the more one’s effort was dispersed, the more the original substance would be revealed; the more one’s effort was intangible, the more the original substance would be substantial. This was also a continuation of Mencius’ method of cultivation in which he stressed both the accumulation of righteousness and neither forgetting nor assisting [see Mencius, 2A.2]. Zhan Ruoshui also explained neither forgetting nor assisting in terms of the relationship between mind, inherent nature and feelings: That which is supremely empty is the mind, and not the substance of inherent nature. Inherent nature has no emptiness or fullness; one speaks of its great numinosity or brightness. When the mind possesses productive principle, it is called inherent nature. When inherent nature comes into contact with things and is aroused, it is called feeling. When it is aroused and is central and correct, it is called true feeling, and otherwise it is false. The dao is the principle of centrality and correctness, and when its feelings are aroused in human relations and daily life without losing their centrality and correctness, there is the dao. One neither forgets nor assists, and between the two is the place of centrality and correctness. This is the correct dao of removing feeling and returning to inherent nature. (“Reply to Zheng Qifan” [Fu Zheng Qifan 复郑启范], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 21)

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The mind is an empty and numinous substance, inherent nature is the productive principle of the mind, feelings are the expression of inherent nature, and dao is the principle of centrality and correctness. Forgetting and assisting both mean losing this centrality and correctness, and thus neither forgetting nor assisting is the precondition for attaining the dao. Zhan Ruoshui also used the idea of neither forgetting nor assisting to explain “respect,” saying: In neither forgetting nor assisting, I am only speaking of one word, namely respect. Forgetting and assisting are both not the original substance of the mind, and this is the most delicate and precise part of the Learning of the Mind, which cannot contain even a speck of human force. Thus when my former teacher proposed his account of “spontaneity,” he was exactly right.… Between not forgetting and not assisting, there is simply the place of centrality and correctness. When students begin their work, they must pay attention to this effort of spontaneity and not doubt it as only an affair for mature sages, leaving it aside to be sought by others. In the learning of sages there is only this single path, and no others. (“Reply to Attendant Censor Nie Wenwei,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 31)

In Zhan Ruoshui’s thought, the word respect has many meanings, but he emphasised the accumulation of righteousness and neither forgetting nor assisting. He combined Mencius’ productive principle possessed by the mind together with Chen Xianzhang’s precept of spontaneity, the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle together with neither forgetting nor assisting, making him one of the more fair and unbiased among the Ming Confucians. Zhan Ruoshui’s ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle emphasised not separating either movement and stillness or knowledge and action, aiming always to taking Heavenly principle as the final goal. He said: In the realisation of Heavenly principle I speak of ubiquity [i.e. all places], thus movement, stillness, mind, and affairs are all permeated with it. If one were to speak instead of all affairs, I am afraid this would suggest the error of being all external. When Confucius said, “in retirement, abide with reverence,” he was talking about realisation in the absence of affairs, and when he said, “in managing affairs, be respectful; in engaging with others, be loyal,” he was talking about realisation when movement and stillness accord with each other in affairs [see Analects, 13.19]. The effort of realisation penetrates right through movement, stillness, prominence, and reclusion, and is thus the one phase of effort. (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒 学案], 904)

Zhan Ruoshui said that his own effort was one in which knowledge and action were unified, in which realising Heavenly principle in the mind means attaining the principle of centrality and correctness in one’s ideas, while realising Heavenly principle in affairs means attaining the principle of centrality and correctness in one’s conduct. The former is knowledge, while the latter is action; the former is “in retirement, abide with reverence,” while the latter is “in managing affairs, be respectful.” The effort of realisation penetrates into everything. As for following Heavenly principle in one’s actions after realising it, this is all the more a meaning that should be present in the unification of knowledge and action.

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Since the realisation of Heavenly principle does not separate either movement and stillness or knowledge and action, Zhan Ruoshui opposed the method of sitting in stillness [jingzuo 静坐] inherited from Cheng Yi and Li Tong, saying: Sitting in stillness was a tradition passed down by the Chengs’ disciples; when Yichuan [Cheng Yi] saw people sitting in silence he acclaimed it as good learning, and yet this goes against constant principle. The sun going down and the moon coming, winter being followed by summer, this is all the spontaneous flowing movement of constant principle; how can it be separated into movement and stillness or difficulty and ease? If one does not investigate and perceive Heavenly principle, but rather follows others into seclusion and meditation for three or nine years, what does this have to do with Heavenly principle? If one successfully perceives Heavenly principle, then whether ploughing fields and sinking wells, a hundred officials and a myriad tasks, or weapons and armor in their millions, all this multitude is merely the spontaneous flowing of Heavenly principle. (ibid., 894)

When one sits in stillness, the mind is empty and quiet, ideas and thoughts stop moving, all thinking and willing activity ceases, and the effort of ubiquitous realisation is interrupted, hence it cannot be advocated. The cosmos and the myriad things are overflowing with productive intention, their circulation never pausing for even a moment. The central and correct substance of my mind is like this, and the effort of ubiquitous realisation should also be like this, attaining the dao of centrality and correctness amidst spontaneous flowing movement. Wang Yangming once led his beginner students to sit in stillness, allowing their confused minds to become clear and settled, before he taught them introspection and self-restraint. Zhan Ruoshui however [advocated] direct realisation amidst spontaneous flowing movement, and in this respect his effort was different.

3 Zhan Ruoshui’s Debates with Wang Yangming Those who had the closest academic relationships with Zhan Ruoshui were firstly his teacher Chen Xianzhang, secondly his disciples, and thirdly his friend Wang Yangming. Zhan Ruoshui and Wang Yangming met very early, and the two of them “fixed their friendship at their first meeting, both taking the advocation and illumination of sage-learning as their task.” However, Zhan Ruoshui’s studies differed greatly from those of Wang Yangming, each of them leading academic groups of the time, and they exchanged numerous letters and replies in debates. Clarifying these debates can help us to deepen our understanding of the central principles of the two schools, grasp the core questions that concerned scholars in the mid-Ming period, as well as glimpse the points where their respective disciples later diverged. Zhan Ruoshui and Wang Yangming’s debates focused on three questions, namely: the question of internal and external in the theory of original substance, the question of the investigation of things in the theory of effort, and the question of “neither forgetting nor assisting” in the method of realising Heavenly principle.

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Firstly, concerning internal and external. Wang Yangming took the extension of innate moral knowing as his central tenet, which included original substance and effort, containing internal and external, activity and stillness, and knowledge and action. He thought that the extension of innate moral knowing meant applying effort to the mind, exactly opposed to the path of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi in which effort should be applied to seeking fixed principles in specific things and affairs, as well as opposed to the current intellectual style of memorising and reciting phrases and passages such that “everything looks good externally.” After his realisation of the dao at Longchang, Wang Yangming never altered this basic orientation, and he opposed all forms and kinds of “seeking externally.” Although his and Zhan Ruoshui’s friendship lasted a long time, he believed that Zhan Ruoshui’s central tenet of the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle amounted to “seeking externally.” The ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle implied seeking fixed principles in all things and affairs, and did not cast off the old academic influence of fathoming principles in things. Zhan Ruoshui however thought that Wang Yangming’s understanding of “things” in “the investigation of things” as the objects of intention was biased toward the internal. In a letter to Wang, he wrote: During our meeting you explained the meaning of “the investigation of things” in the Great Learning, saying that “things” refers to the objects of the intentions of the mind. You meant perhaps only that you worried people would abandon the mind and seek externally, and thus proposed this idea. I however suggest that the human mind forms one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, such that the mind embodies things without omission. If one recognises the vast greatness of the substance of the mind, then things cannot be external. Hence, the investigation of things is not done externally, nor is the mind that does the investigating or extending external. If one takes things to be the objects of the intentions of the mind, I am afraid one will not avoid the problem of taking things to be external. (“To Yangming” [Yu Yangming 与阳明], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 1)

Here, Zhan Ruoshui pointed out that when Wang Yangming took his ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle to be seeking externally, he misunderstood the meanings of Heavenly principle, realisation, etc. For him, things are not external, but rather the things of “the mind embodies things without omission,” i.e. things that have undergone the mind’s intuition, cultivation and regulation. At this time, things are the things of the unification of the mind and things as one, such that things are not external to the mind. The investigation of things is the realisation of Heavenly principle, but this Heavenly principle is the central and correct substance of my mind and not the principles of external things and affairs, hence the activity of the investigation of things is also not external. In the letter to Nie Bao quoted above, Zhan Ruoshui refuted Wang Yangming’s criticism of his ideas: When some questioned whether ubiquitous realisation implies seeking externally, they all failed to see this meaning… The mind responds to affairs, and thus Heavenly principle is visible. Heavenly principle is not external, but specifically appears because of affairs, following stimuli and responding. Hence in the appearance of affairs and things, that which embodies them is the mind. When the mind attains centrality and correctness, there is Heavenly principle. Humanity is one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and

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nothing within the cosmos is a separate thing from humanity. (“Reply to Attendant Censor Nie Wenwei,” Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 29)

This states that the so-called ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle is simply the mind’s responding to affairs, such that Heavenly principle is not a fixed principle inherent within things and affairs, but rather people’s responses to them in their specific times and places according to how they ought to be. This oughtness is identical to the original substance of the mind. This is the meaning expressed by “When the mind attains centrality and correctness, there is Heavenly principle.” Since all the things and affairs in the cosmos are the mind and things unified as one body, they are not separate things from humanity. Since Heavenly principle is the human mind attaining centrality and correctness, it is also not external. Zhan Ruoshui clearly picked out his point of divergence from Wang Yangming: The disagreements between my theories and those of Yangming have their reason, namely that Yangming and I view the mind differently. By the mind, I mean that which embodies the myriad things without omission, hence there is no internal and external. By the mind, Yangming means that which is within one’s body and speaks, hence he takes my theory to be external. (“Reply to Yang Shaomo” [Da Yang Shaomo 答杨少默], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 24)

Here Zhan Ruoshui believed that the mind is for Yangming simply the numinous clarity that is capable of knowing and experiencing. This cannot include the content of the mind and innate moral knowing for Yangming, which will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. However, Zhan Ruoshui’s statement that for him the mind is “that which embodies the myriad things without omission” indeed expresses his view of the world and the myriad things as both mind and things, the mind and things unified as one. This unification as one is not the result of Kantian logical analysis, but the result of Chinese intuitive realisation. From the thought of Zhan Ruoshui and many other scholars of the same period, it can be seen that, with the exception of a few thinkers with strong positivist tendencies, Neo-Confucians of the mid-Ming period generally viewed the original substance of the cosmos as both mental and material, breaking through the static, subject-object duality mode of viewing the world, and viewing it as an object-world inseparable from people themselves, infused with their own intuitions and ideals, and blended with the material and spiritual achievements of humanity in knowing and changing the world. Secondly, concerning the investigation of things. This question is closely connected to the previous one. Wang Yangming’s investigation of things referred to rectifying incorrect intentions and thoughts, while Zhan Ruoshui’s investigation of things refers to the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle. Zhan Ruoshui thought that Wang Yangming’s explanation of the investigation of things as rectifying thoughts contained four contradictions: firstly, glossing “investigate” as “rectify,” “things” as “the objects of intentions and thoughts,” and “the investigation of things” as “rectifying thoughts” simply repeats the meanings of making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying one’s mind from elsewhere in the text. Secondly, if one takes the investigation of things as the rectification of thoughts, then this does not cohere with either “knowing where to rest, one will be able to attain” earlier in the text or with the explanation of the meaning of the investigation

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of things and extension of knowledge as personal cultivation later in the text. Thirdly, if one takes the investigation of things to be the rectification of thoughts, one must possess a standard for the correctness and incorrectness of thoughts. “The ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” takes the investigation of things to mean “reaching the dao,” and “the central and correct original substance of my mind” as the standard, while “the rectification of thoughts” has no standard, and its meaning is thus incomplete. Fourthly, the investigation of things involves an effort in which knowledge and action progress together, but if one merely rectifies thoughts, there is only knowledge but no action, which does not correspond with the tradition of not separating knowing and acting as emphasised by the worthy and wise from ancient times. Zhan Ruoshui argued that by glossing the investigation of things as “the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” he could avoid these contradictions. He explained his meaning of the investigation of things, saying: I explained the investigation of things as arriving at their principles; arriving at their principles means embodying Heavenly principle; embodying Heavenly principle means combining knowledge and action and unifying internal and external. As Heavenly principle has no internal or external, so seeking has no internal or external. (“Reply to Yangming’s Discussion of the Investigation of Things” [Da Yangming lun gewu 答阳明论格物], Collected Writings of Ganquan, Vol. 7, 27)

Wang Yangming responded to all these criticisms from Zhan Ruoshui, his general view as stated above. It is worth noticing that he thought that although Zhan Ruoshui’s theories diverged from his own, they could be accommodated. He pointed out that the root of their differences lay in their intellectual methods: The ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle is genuine and not false, indeed my own theory was originally also like this. Although probing into the source of your intention, there seems to be some small discrepancy, yet in the end it seems we are simply taking different paths to the same destination. Cultivation, regulation, governance and bringing peace can be generally named the investigation of things, yet if one wishes to separate the different stages in this way, it seems one has said too much. (“Reply to Ganquan” [Da Ganquan 答甘泉], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming [Wang Yangming quanji 王阳明全集], 181)

Yangming’s meaning here is that embodying Heavenly principle is he and Zhan Ruoshui’s common aspiration, and that for some time before his realisation of the dao at Longchang, he once took this as the final goal of cultivation effort. However, after he established the position of the Learning of the Mind, he came to see this as seeking externally. Zhan Ruoshui’s motivation for embodying Heavenly principle was good, but when he spoke of “ubiquitous,” he already fell into the trap of seeking fixed principles in things and affairs as in the old learning. Yet at the same time, Wang Yangming noted that seeking principles externally and his own extension of innate moral knowing could be regarded as different paths to the same destination. Here we can see Wang Yangming’s attempt to fuse the Learning of Principle and the Learning of the Mind as one in his Learning of the Mind position, as well as his acceptance of different approaches to effort under the general goal of “realising Heavenly principle.”

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In terms of intellectual method, Wang Yangming regarded synthesis as fundamental, hence his statement that “Cultivation, regulation, governance and bringing peace can be generally named the investigation of things.” He took the cultivation of moral reason and its application in specific things and affairs as the governing rule for all activities. His mature theory took the extension of innate moral knowing as its central tenet, in which the extension of innate moral knowing is the positive rectification of thoughts, i.e. extending correct thoughts and intentions into specific actions, while the investigation of things is the negative rectification of thoughts, i.e. rectifying the incorrect to return to correctness. He emphasised both placing oneself in another’s shoes and reflection and self-control. The investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, the making-sincere of intentions, the rectification of the mind, and even cultivation, regulation, governance and bringing peace are all unified in Yangming’s conception of effort, such that any one of them can include and imply the others. Thus, there is no need to treat investigation, extension, making-sincere and rectification as different items for effort, separating them into successive sections or progressive levels. This reflects Wang Yangming’s intellectual style of fusion and detail, expansiveness and subtlety. Zhan Ruoshui’s studies were also broad and expansive, and his tendency toward Learning of the Mind is very clear, but in Wang Yangming’s view his theories of the “ubiquitous,” the “investigation of things,” etc. seemed rather scattered and unfocused, and hence they met with his criticism. It can be said that Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” fused the Learning of Principle with the Learning of the Mind and thereby avoided the two schools’ weak points, yet still retained some residual elements of the old learning, and thus was viewed as sloppy by Wang Yangming, who had thoroughly transitioned away from the old intellectual position. In fact, it is quite clear that both of them started out with the intention of emerging victorious in their debates, and thereby consciously or unconsciously misinterpreted their opponent. Thirdly, neither forgetting nor assisting. “Neither forgetting nor assisting” is the precondition for Zhan Ruoshui’s embodying Heavenly principle, and hence he expounded on it constantly in his writings. For example, he said: Neither forgetting nor assisting, at the central and correct place of the mind, at this moment, Heavenly principle spontaneously appears, along with the unity of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body. When activity and stillness are all fixed, and forgetting and assisting are all nothing, then the original substance spontaneously unifies with the dao and becomes sagely, such that Heavenly virtue and the kingly dao are complete. Since Heavenly principle is within the mind, when one seeks it one attains it, as the Master [i.e. Confucius] said: “When I desire to be benevolent, then benevolence comes” [see Analects, 7.30]. Nonetheless, seeking has its method, namely neither forgetting nor assisting… Only when one neither forgets nor assists, then one attains neither increase nor decrease, but Heavenly principle spontaneously appears, with no question of difficulty or ease. (The above all from “Recorded Sayings,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 906–910)

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However, in Wang Yangming’s system, the extension of innate moral knowing is the guiding tenet and the core of effort, while neither forgetting nor assisting only concerns the psychological state in specific cultivation, and is only a minor issue, hence Yangming did not regard it as fundamental. He said: In my discussions here I talk only about the point that “One must always be engaged in something” and not about neither forgetting nor assisting. “One must always be engaged in something” means that one should accumulate righteousness at all times. If one devotes all his time to the effort of ensuring one is always engaged in something and yet he is interrupted at times, it means he forgets, and the immediate task here is thus not to forget. If one devotes all his time to the effort of being always engaged in something and is impatient and seeks quick results, it means he assists, and the immediate task here is not to assist. The task lies wholly in the practice of the teaching that one must always be engaged in something. In this situation the injunctions to neither forget nor help are meant only to hold the individual’s attention and keep him alert. If from the start the task is not interrupted, there is no further need of talking about not forgetting, and if from the start one is not impatient and does not seek quick results, there is no further need of talking about not assisting. How clear, simple, and easy is this effort, how free and spontaneous! Now if one does not devote himself to the effort of being always engaged in something and clings in a vacuum to neither forgetting nor assisting, this is like heating a pot to cook rice without first putting in water and rice, just adding fuel and starting the fire. I do not know what can finally be cooked in this way. I am afraid that before the intensity of the fire can be adjusted the pot will already be cracked. Nowadays, the problems of those who devote their efforts only to neither forgetting nor assisting are precisely like this. All day long they attempt to practice not forgetting in a vacuum and also attempt to practice not assisting in a vacuum. Pushing and rushing, they completely lack a concrete starting point. In the end their efforts only result in their sinking into emptiness and maintaining quietness, and they only learn to be stupid fools. As soon as any affair arrives, they become entangled and confused and cannot manage or control it. (“Second Reply to Nie Wenwei” [Da Nie Wenwei er 答聂文 蔚二], Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II, in Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 83)

Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing includes the efforts of the accumulation of righteousness, the investigation of things, making one’s intentions sincere, and rectifying one’s mind, hence the extension of innate moral knowing implies that one must always be engaged in something, and neither forgetting nor assisting is simply a supplementary explanation of being always engaged in something. However, for Zhan Ruoshui, neither forgetting nor assisting is the fundamental effort, and he strongly disagreed with Wang Yangming’s criticism, repeatedly rebutting it: Ah, Wang Yangming always wants to correct my theory of neither forgetting nor assisting, he is truly mistaken! (“Recorded Sayings,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 909) Simply seeking to always be engaged in something and regarding neither forgetting nor assisting as hollow, this is the view of Yangming. He does not know that neither rectifying nor forgetting nor assisting is precisely the effort of being engaged in something. If one casts off neither forgetting nor assisting, then there is nothing to be engaged in and Heavenly principle is extinguished. Not grasping the impartial intelligence of this, not knowing this important subtlety, not seeing this wondrous vista, this is truly unfortunate, what a pity, what a pity! (“Recorded Sayings,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 903)

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From Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui’s debate concerning neither forgetting nor assisting, it can be seen that the innate moral knowing that Wang built up and realised through his long experience of practical activity is an integral whole that includes everything, and can be said to be spiritual activity itself. It includes the intellect, the will, the feelings, as well as the control and regulation of one’s own spiritual activity. Since innate moral knowing is driven by moral reason, and constantly displays its intrinsic moral feeling, so it “must always be engaged in something.” Innate moral knowing is also driven by its regulatory function to be constantly aware of not being interrupted and not seeking quick results, meaning that “always being engaged in something” is carried out in a natural and easeful psychological state. It does not seek centrality or correctness but is spontaneously central and correct, and does not stress ubiquity but is ubiquitously genuine. This is the sublime plane of the activity of innate moral knowing. Reflecting on Zhan Ruoshui’s neither forgetting nor assisting from this sublime plane, it naturally seems superfluous and fragmented. However, for Zhan Ruoshui, neither forgetting nor assisting is the precondition for the realisation of the central and correct substance of the mind, and as such is an essential part of his conceptual structure. Since Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui criticised each other starting from their own positions, they were inevitably unable to convince each other. When Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 in his “Case Studies from Ganquan” in Case Studies of Ming Confucians said that Zhan Ruoshui was constrained by old theories, this was a criticism of the old learning from his Learning of the Mind position. Seen from a more neutral and unbiased position, the old learning did not necessarily need to be refuted. He also criticised Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” as realising in affect, and regarded such realisation through affect as improper, yet this criticism also does not necessarily hit the mark. In fact, although Zhan Ruoshui advocated the realisation of “the central and correct original substance” in affects that are already aroused, the central and correct principle that he realised also has the qualities of “attaining neither increase nor decrease” and being precisely appropriate, both consistent with the “unaroused centrality” of the tranquil substance. Since tranquility and affect as with substance and function have a single origin, one cannot say that realisation in affect is wrong.

4 Zhan Ruoshui’s Academic Lineage Zhan Ruoshui’s entire official life was smooth, and in his time away from political affairs, he was mainly concerned with teaching and studying. He travelled all over China, and at the age of 90, he even toured around Mount Heng. Although his disciples were not as successful as those of Wang Yangming, they nonetheless had a great influence. Case Studies of Ming Confucians records: “The two schools of Wang and Zhan each established their guiding tenets. Although the disciples of Mr. Zhan were not as successful as those of Mr. Wang, those who studied with Zhan often ended up studying with Wang, and those who studied with Wang often ended

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up studying with Zhan. This was similar to the way the disciples of Zhu [Xi] and Lu [Jiuyuan] frequently exchanged places. In the long-standing and well-established traditions of later times, other than that of Mr. Wang, those who call themselves students of Mr. Zhan still continue to the present day. Although they do not necessarily continue his guiding tenets, his originality cannot be ignored” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 876). This can be regarded as a true record of the time. Among Zhan Ruoshui’s disciples, the most famous were Lü Huai, He Qian, Hong Yuan, and Tang Shu. 1. Lü Huai 吕怀 (zi Rude 汝德, hao Jinshi 巾石) was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations in the Jiajing period, and became a vice minister in the Court of the Imperial Stud in Nanjing. His works include The Ancient Interpretation of the Twelve-Pitch Scale (Lülü guyi 律吕古义) and An Examination of History (Li kao 历考). In general, Lü Huai’s studies continued Zhan Ruoshui’s guiding tenet of taking Heavenly principle as the central and correct original substance of my mind, neither forgetting nor assisting, and ubiquitous realisation. He said: That which is neither seen nor heard is the originally central and correct substance of my mind, in which nothing is produced or not produced, nothing is preserved and nothing is not preserved. If there is even a speck of human force, then one’s intentions will be fixed on oneself, and the principle of production and preservation is extinguished. Hence the superior man is cautious and fearful, keeping himself in a constant state of anxiety, and this is the method for production and preservation. (“Reply to Qi Nanshan” [Da Qi Nanshan 答 戚南山], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 913) The centrality that is endowed by Heaven and is all encompassing, this is the original substance of my mind. This mind is together, this principle is together, and that which it encompasses is all together. In the flowing action of divine principle, where is there any distinction of abundance or lack, thickness or thinness? Only once it has flowed and taken shape, then the two qi separate, the five phases divide, and these interact unevenly, and the divinity of principle begins to be limited. When yin, yang and the five phases accord with their beginning then they are central, when they are central then the mind is preserved, and when the mind is preserved then the original substance is profoundly clear with no obstructions. (“Letter to Jiang Daolin” [Yu Jiang Daolin 与蒋道林], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 914)

Lü Huai in fact thought that there was a central and correct substance, and that this is the principle of inherent nature, which exists between Heaven and Earth as well as in the human mind, such that the two are the same. People are unable to either increase nor decrease it. The myriad things circulating and moving according to its rules and people responding to affairs attaining its appropriateness are both simply realisations of this centrality and correctness. This idea is the same as that of Zhan Ruoshui in that it tends to blend the Learning of Principle with the Learning of the Mind. He also said: Since inherent nature rules in the mind, there is originally no error, but since people have a body, they also have qi-temperament, since they have qi-temperament, there is error, and since there is error, there is cultivation. Thus, investigation, extension, making-sincere and rectification are the means for cultivation, and being cautious and fearful are the means to

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cultivate the dao. When the body moves and the dao is established, then one is empty in stillness and direct in activity, Heavenly principle is attained and the highest good is preserved. (“Letter to Jiang Daolin,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 914)

Here, his account of the relation between mind, inherent nature and feeling follows the old theory. Lü Huai’s unique point was his emphasis on changing and transforming qi-temperament (bianhua qizhi 变化气质). He thought that learning lay entirely in changing and transforming qi—temperament, such that in both Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing and Zhan Ruoshui’s ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle, the effort required was all in changing and transforming qi—temperament. In terms of undertaking the changing and transforming of qi—temperament, the guiding tenets of Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui were originally one; if one did not begin from this point, then any kind of theory could be permitted, but they would all be fooling with the spirit in vain. He said: Heavenly principle and innate moral knowing originally share the same guiding tenet, such that if one recognises this original cause in setting out, then a myriad of paths and roads all lead to the same state. If one simply follows opinion and appearance, then not only can one not reconcile the theories of the two gentlemen, one cannot even know which of the myriad of ancient schools it is appropriate to follow. Even if one were to now establish another view beyond innate moral knowing and Heavenly principle, the result would be the same. Thus there is no need for this. Hence one ought simply to point out that if in all these theories there is an all-pervading central axis, it simply lies in changing and transforming qi-temperament. If learning does not set out from this point, but rather relies on theories of the investigation of things, of caution and fear, of seeking benevolence and accumulating righteousness, of the extension of innate moral knowing, or of the realisation of Heavenly principle, the result is simply fooling with the spirit in vain, and effort has nowhere to set out from. (“Reply to Ye Dehe” [Da Ye Dehe 答叶德和], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 918)

In general, the view that effort for Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui lies mainly in changing and transforming qi—temperament is not wrong, but beneath the general condition of accepting the changing and transforming of qi-temperament, Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui still had many differences. In particular, in his lifetime Wang Yangming was continually refining and progressing, and the essential points of his theory of effort underwent many changes, which cannot all be captured in the single phrase of changing and transforming qi—temperament. Changing and transforming qi—temperament had been a core tenet of Confucian theories of effort from Mencius onward, one that Zhang Zai 张载, Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang all accepted. Thus, to take this point as signifying the common point shared by his teacher and Wang Yangming was not particularly appropriate. Nonetheless, Lü Huai’s theory of changing and transforming qi—temperament did not depart from the tenets of his teacher’s school. In Zhan Ruoshui’s “Explanation of the Diagram of Mind and Inherent Nature” (Xinxing tushuo 心性图说), the word “respect” recurs throughout, and his “Reply to Yangming’s Letter Discussing the Investigation of Things” also says:

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In speaking of the extension of knowledge, one knows that this real substance, Heavenly principle, the highest good, and things are all my innate moral knowing and ability, and that there is no need to seek externally. However, people are occluded from this by qi-habits, and thus are born into ignorance, and if they grow without learning become stupid. Hence, study and learning, speculative thought, earnest practice and repeated instruction are means to break through this stupidity and remove these occlusions, such that one is alerted to exert his innate moral knowing and ability. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 887)

This also advocates the theory of changing and transforming qi—temperament. Lü Huai’s theory can be said to have grasped one side of that of his teacher. For students in relation to their teachers’ theories, some completely inherit and abide by their meaning, some inherit one point and develop and expand it, while others grasp one corner and dissolve its implications. In relation to Zhan Ruoshui, Lü Huai can be said to be the latter. 2. He Qian 何迁 (zi Yizhi 益之, hao Jiyang 吉阳) was an assistant minister in the Nanjing Ministry of Justice. He once advocated re-establishing the meeting of officials at Lingji 灵济 in the capital. He Qian’s learning centred around “knowing where to rest” (zhizhi 知止). He once said: Just as the dao has its root and branches and learning has its order of priority, so the Great Learning teaches people to begin from “knowing where to rest,” and then to determine one’s object, become still, achieve calmness, and then to deliberate on this basis. One who knows where to rest and then determines his object, becomes still, achieves calmness, and deliberates extends his knowledge in order to investigate things; one who determines his object, becomes still, achieves calmness, deliberates and is then able to attain his aim, having investigated things, extends his knowledge. This is thus the meaning of knowing where to rest, such that even among lofty and bright scholars, there are those who cannot do without it in their development. (“Preface Presented to Cangshou Huzi” [Zeng Cangshou Huzi xu 赠沧守胡子序], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 924)

He Qian’s knowing where to rest refers to “resting in the highest good” from the Great Learning, in which “where to rest” refers to original substance and “knowing” to effort. He explained his knowing where to rest, saying: Being at rest refers to the mind’s impulse in responding to stimuli, the clarity of which does not rely on thoughts, and the regularity of which cannot be disturbed. In this respect, that which is good without goodness is the highest good. When there is something not at rest, being disturbed by thoughts, this is not the original substance. Hence the sages were repeatedly pointed to this, and desired to reach it through their knowledge. Trusting in this substance in which originally nothing is not at rest, probing into the reason why there is something not at rest, and investigating the ruler of flowing operation between stimuli and response, they made that which is clear without thoughts and regular without being able to be disturbed appear preeminently in a clarified and emptied space, established on a stately and condensed ground. This is the meaning of knowing where to rest. (“Preface Presented to Cangshou Huzi,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 925)

“Where to rest” refers to when one’s effort has become proficient, and the mind’s responses to external things are spontaneously in accord with principle and regularity. Its expression is also an attainment without thought, perfectly divine and

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unpredictable. “Knowing” refers to the unity of seeking with this original substance. In the effort of seeking, first comes “Trusting in this substance in which originally nothing is not at rest,” i.e. Lu Jiuyuan’s “first establish its greatness.” Second comes probing into the reason why there is something not at rest, i.e. Lu Jiuyuan’s using study and learning, speculative thought and practice to remove the occlusions of the original mind, such that one is “established on a stately and condensed ground,” and this is the meaning of knowing where to rest. He Qian’s knowing where to rest has the significance of correcting the excesses of Yangming’s later followers, as generally equivalent to Huang Wan’s 黄绾 genresting [see Chap. 8 below]. He once said: Having been passed down, each inheritance produced a hundred mistakes, taking the mind of the master as sagely, not relying on work or study, internally galloping their views in an abstruse void, and externally fleeing from mistakes in personal practice. Later students did not investigate this, but rather went on to say that speech and conduct need not be rooted in the mind and that the learning of the sage is insufficient to be applied in practice, and thus it was only taken up on the margins. Innate moral knowing is referred to as being extended, and thus one must call attention to its numinous distinction and perfect divinity that arises from the spontaneous, suddenly becoming clarified and fixed in an emptied and condensed space. Yet upon progressively seeing its realisation established ahead, and cultivating it through growth and abundance, it gradually dissolves, giving it a subtle and refined focusing in the ordinary, it all becomes complete in exhausting one’s talents, approaching an integrated unity. (“Preface to Selected Manuscripts from Longgang” [Longgang zhaigao xu 龙冈摘稿序], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 925)

Here He Qian especially emphasised that the numinous distinction and perfect divinity of innate moral knowing must be combined with the effort of clarification, fixation, emptying and condensation, in order to ensure it is constantly focused on the ordinary, in accordance with Heavenly principle. This is the same approach to that of Jiangyou 江右 figures such as Nie Bao 聂豹 and Luo Hongxian 罗洪先 who emphasised that innate moral knowing must be combined with the effort of retracting, subduing, maintaining and gathering. He Qian’s knowing where to rest was also a result of his absorbing Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” and recasting it in a new form. Zhan Ruoshui once said: “The investigation of things implies resting in the highest good, since the sages and worthies did not regard them as two affairs, instead seeing everything from the intentions, the mind and the body to the family, the state and the world as nothing but the constant realisation of Heavenly principle, such that the realisation of Heavenly principle implies the investigation of things (“Reply to Wang Yixue” [Da Wang Yixue 答王宜学], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 884). In Zhan Ruoshui’s ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle, realisation implies resting and arriving. The realisation of Heavenly principle implies resting in Heavenly principle and arriving at Heavenly principle, and this is the meaning of his “investigation implies attainment” and “the investigation of things implies reaching the dao.” Hence He Qian’s “knowing where to rest” was closest to Zhan Ruoshui, and his gained more from his teacher than did Lü Huai.

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3. Hong Yuan 洪垣 (zi Junzhi 峻之, hao Jueshan 觉山) was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations in the Jiajing period and became a magistrate in Wenzhou. Hong Yuan studied with Zhan Ruoshui for a long time, and Zhan was particularly fond of him, seeing him as “one to whom I can pass on the wind and moon of my fishing platform.” Hong Yuan inherited his teacher’s guiding tenet of “the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle,” but emphasised that “The realisation of Heavenly principle is a realisation that one is not separate from the root” (“Conversations Concerning the Learning of Principle” [Lixue wenyan 理 学闻言], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 934). Hong Yuan worried that students would misunderstand “the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” and enter onto the old Cheng-Zhu path of probing for principles in things, and hence he advocated the realisation that one is not separate from the root. His intention was to point out that ubiquitous realisation means realising the principle possessed by the original mind, and that this principle is one with the principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Not being separate from the root further emphasised that ubiquitous realisation must take for its task the pure cultivation of virtue, and not be concerned with external merit or benefit. As soon as one is concerned with merit or benefit, then realisation has separated from the root. Hence, Hong Yuan advocated seeking centrality and correctness in that which is prior to being affected, and not seeking the appropriate in that which is already aroused. He said: I would suggest that effort applied to the affairs and traces of caution and fear is easy, while effort applied to the thought and consideration of caution and fear is difficult; that effort applied to the thought and consideration of caution and fear is easy, while effort applied to the original substance of caution and fear is difficult. Caution and fear in the original substance can only be achieved by the rule of the will. People today only discuss learning in terms of ideas and principles, and not in conjunction with the application of effort; they only discuss problems and ailments in terms of learning, and not in terms of the reality of their own will. I would also suggest that scholars of today only discuss the will in terms of intention, temperament and conduct, and not in terms of the ruling and generative operation of Heaven. Thus they never have any place to anchor themselves. (“Note to Zou Dongkuo” [Jian Zou Dongkuo 柬邹东廓], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 939)

Here he emphasises exerting one’s efforts on original substance and that which is not yet aroused, and not on teaching theories and the traces of that which is already aroused; he stresses setting one’s will on moral cultivation, and not on merit or benefit. This is his realisation that one is not separate from the root. Hong Yuan advocated “beginning from establishing the will in achieving the penetration of the sprouts,” i.e. exerting one’s efforts on original substance and that which is not yet aroused, such that the release of thoughts (sprouts; ji 几) then all flows out from the goodness of original substance. He said: Observe only the ruler, do not discuss the bodily segments; seek only the utmost emptiness, do not discuss the application of force. Reflect inwardly without remorse, and do no harm to the will. The will is the ruler. Robust and vigorous, pure and absolute, it penetrates the activity and stillness, the hidden and apparent of each body and operates them. (“Reply to Xu Wenquan” [Da Xu Wenquan 答徐温泉], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 941)

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Prior to being affected, there is nothing of which to speak, and only one true will is present. Hence I have said that the will is prior to the sprouts, and the effort is at the time of the sprouts. The will is present from the love of learning, and the sprouts are attained through the love of learning. Without the will, the sprouts are not divine. Without the will or the sprouts, vaguely establishing the centrality of the unaroused in that which is prior to responses, and taking this to be the master that responds to affairs, responding as if there were no mind, there is either influence or empty appearance. (“Letter to Ge Donggang” [Yu Ge Donggang 与葛洞冈], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 941)

When the will is established then the ruler (zhuzai 主宰) is correct, and when the ruler is correct then that which is released into sprouts is all correct. However, Hong Yuan held that “the will is prior to the sprouts, and the effort is at the time of the sprouts.” This means that while one’s aim should be pointed at original substance, effort should be exerted on that which is already aroused, since original substance has no sound or smell, and hence there is nothing on which to effort. One must exert effort on that which is already aroused, and this is precisely the means to purify its original substance before it is aroused. If one takes the so-called original substance that has not undergone the exertion of effort on its sprouts and uses this as the basis for responding to affairs and connecting with things, then one cannot avoid being influenced vaguely, floating in a void of unreality. Hence in Hong Yuan’s learning, the metaphysical and physical, substance and function all have a single origin. He used the a priori establishment of the will to command the a posteriori penetration of the sprouts, and the a posteriori penetration of the sprouts to supplement and complete the cultivation of the a priori establishment of the will. In this way, Hong Yuan opposed “the learning of the a priori correct mind,” thinking that the centrality of that which is not yet aroused must be exercised through responding to affairs in order to have any attainments, and that if one simply relies on spontaneity without adding the effort of exercise, he will inevitable fall into wild licentiousness. He wrote a “Letter in Reply to Yan Jun” [Da Yan Jun shu 答颜钧书] in which he clearly opposed the Taizhou School’s tenet of giving free rein to spontaneity: Today there are those who say that inherent nature is like a bright pearl, originally without any dust or contamination, with no need for vision or hearing and no use for caution or fear, and thus they go on to say that at most times on should simply give free rein to one’s inherent nature in conduct. Yet that to which they give rein, their so-called dao, do they really know whether or not these are in fact the root of inherent nature and the dao?… If one speaks of simply trusting in spontaneity and calls this the dao, I am afraid he will finally become entangled in the ignorance of the daily practices of the common people. The petty who propose this theory never speak of giving free rein to non-spontaneity. Being careful when alone and refining one’s unity, not accepting opinion and appearance as spontaneity, this is the height of spontaneity. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 940)

Hong Yuan opposed simply relying on spontaneity, and advocated combining it with deliberate efforts in cultivation such as being careful when alone and refining one’s unity. He also strongly supported reconciling the two schools of Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui, pointing out that Wang and Zhan’s studies have commonalities as well as differences. Their commonalities are that Wang

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Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing and Zhan Ruoshui’s ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle both break down the branches of merit and benefit or forms and traces, both advocate returning to Heavenly principle, and both use the inner sage to guide the outer king. Their differences lie in the degree of prominence of exerting effort. Yangming took innate moral knowing to be knowledge when one is alone, divine in utmost stillness, and combined the extension of innate moral knowing with the unity of action and knowledge, such that he did not abolish effort. Yet he also said things like “Without perceiving or knowing, one follows the regularities of the Lord.” His later followers rejoiced in this simplicity and ease, and took the knowing of the non-mind as true knowledge, neglecting to probe into the Heavenly principle contained within the knowing of the non-mind, and directly relying on spontaneity. Hong Yuan pointed out that Yangming’s later followers “took the knowing of the non-mind as true knowledge, and did not delve into the a priori or enquire into the regularities of the Lord, as if they could rely on the subtle without the support of Heaven above, mistakenly relying on that which is not innately good” (“Reply to Xu Cunzhai” [Da Xu Cunzhai 答徐存斋], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 942). Zhan Ruoshui’s ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle was precisely able to rectify the excesses of Yangming’s later followers: Master Ganquan was worried by this, and thus proposed the mental method of holding to the centre as taught by Yao and Shun, earnestly supplementing it with central and correct phrases. Thus he said: “The alone is the original substance, the whole substance. This is not simply the knowledge of knowing alone as knowledge, but rather the principle of knowing alone.” Thus we can know that once there are things, things have no internal or external, and knowing is embodied in things without cease; this is what is called principle. (“Reply to Xu Cunzhai,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 943)

Hong Yuan pointed out that what Zhan Ruoshui supplemented was principle, that this word “principle” was precisely what those among Yangming’s later followers who directly relied on spontaneity were lacking. Knowledge is not an empty knowing, but must take principle as its ruler. Ubiquitous realisation means realising this principle. However, because Zhan Ruoshui spoke of “ubiquitous realisation,” his later followers thought this principle was in things and not in the mind, and sought for its fixed principles in things and affairs, thereby seeking it externally. Therefore, “The learning of Master Ganquan’s students seemed again to rely on the realm of apparent existents, mistakenly relying on that which is not central” (“Reply to Xu Cunzhai,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 943). Nonetheless, among the mistakes of Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui’s followers, Hong Yuan especially censured those of Yangming, believing that their excesses were greater than those of Zhan Ruoshui: the mistakes of the apparent at least still have norms that can be followed; the mistakes of the subtle simply fall into dissolution. Hong Yuan also thought that both Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui belonged to the Learning of the Mind, such that if one cast off their minor differences and preserved their greater commonalities, then one could obtain the truth of the two schools’ guiding tenets. Hong Yuan lived at a time when the excesses in the learning of the followers of Wang and Zhan were becoming apparent, as well as having some contact with the later followers of the Taizhou School, and hence his comments on the excesses of the two schools are quite accurate.

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4. Tang Shu 唐枢 (zi Weizhong 惟中, hao Yi’an 一庵) was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations in the Jiajing period, and became a secretary in the Ministry of Justice. After exposing the misdeeds of powerful officials, he lost his position and retired to the country where he taught and wrote for over 40 years. In his youth he admired the learning of Yangming but was unable to meet him, and he later became a house disciple of Zhan Ruoshui. His three-character guiding tenet of the “pursuit of the true mind” (tao zhenxin 讨真心) was derived from Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle,” but was also close to Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing.” The intention of Tang Shu’s learning to reconcile the two schools of Wang and Zhan was especially clear. He explained his “pursuit of the true mind” saying: The true mind is the mind really possessed by humanity, the fundamental root by which Heaven and Earth produced humanity, spanning from ancient times to the present without change, not clinging to any things. Hence it was said, “The central is the great root of all under Heaven.” Who among people has no mind? It is just because the mind that is produced when they follow feelings and chase after things is not the original mind of the great centre of Heaven and Earth, and is not capable of becoming the master of things and affairs. One must pursue the essential and comprehensive, discriminating its truth and applying it. Without assistance, supplementation or external seeking, yet also without searching in the abstruse wonders of the formless, one spontaneously advances thoughts in accord with the regularities of Heaven, proposing that which completes change and transformation. (“Explanation of the Diagram of the True Mind” [Zhenxin tushuo 真心图 说], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 957)

Tang Shu’s “pursuit of the true mind” is a blend of the guiding tenets of the two Wang and Zhan schools. The “true mind” was derived from Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing, while “pursuit” was derived from Zhan Ruoshui’s ubiquitous realisation. Tang Shu clearly stated: “My true mind is this innate moral knowing.” Nonetheless, innate moral knowing cannot avoid being occluded by things, and people cannot avoid losing their original mind, thus they must apply the effort of “pursuit.” The effort of pursuit is simply to eliminate the occlusions of innate moral knowing, and not to use external principles to supplement the numinous illumination of the mind. “Pursue the essential and comprehensive” above refers to discriminating the truth or falsity of the intentions and thoughts produced in the mind, and seeking their accordance with the original substance of centrality and correctness. Thus, pursuit is Zhan Ruoshui’s “realisation.” Tang Shu said: The mind is one, and the reason we speak of its truth or falsity is because when the mind attains the substance of its mind it is true, while when some cause makes it active it receives faults and is false. When the substance has a fault then its function must be inappropriate, but when it commands the five senses and hundred bones from its centre, then it never begins to not be the mind. (“Explanation of the Diagram of the True Mind,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 957)

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The true mind is innate moral knowing, and “the mind attaining the substance of its mind” is Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing and Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle.” Tang Shu’s “pursuit of the true mind” took up the guiding tenets of Wang and Zhan’s two schools and blending them into one, yet also included the intention to correct the excesses of their later followers. In his comments on Tang Shu, Huang Zongxi pointed out: “The true mind is the dao-mind spoken of in the court of Yu 虞 [see “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟), Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书)]. Pursuit refers to the effort of study and learning, speculative thought and conduct, i.e. the refinement and unity spoken of in the court of Yu. The ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle originally meant this, yet some scholars foolishly sought it in returning to the self. The extension of innate moral knowing also referred to this, yet some scholars mistakenly sought it in directly relying on numinous clarity, and hence it was necessary to establish the idea of pursuing the true mind” (“Case Studies from Ganquan 4,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). This assessment was very accurate. Although Tang Shu’s learning did not have many original points, his lineage passed through Xu Fuyuan and developed into Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周, and was thus very important. Liu Zongzhou’s attempt to reconcile the learning of Wang Yangming with that of Zhu Xi formed gradually, and the basis for his various discussions of principle, qi, mind and inherent nature can be found in the theories of Tang Shu and Zhan Ruoshui. Another of Xu Fuyuan’s students Feng Congwu 冯从 吾 wrote A Compilation of Guan Learning (Guanxue bian 关学编) in an attempt to revive Zhang Zai’s tradition of Guan Learning, and thus became a significant figure for Ming dynasty Guanzhong 关中 Learning. Xu Fuyuan 许孚远 (zi Mengzhong 孟仲, hao Jing’an 敬庵) was from Deqing 德清 in Zhejiang province. He was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations in the Jiajing period, and became a Right Vice Minister in the Ministry of War in Nanjing. In his youth, Xu Fuyuan studied under Tang Shu, and his learning took overcoming the self as its priority. He attempted to teach together with Zhou Rudeng 周汝登 and Yang Fusuo 杨复所 of the Taizhou School, but their guiding tenets were incompatible. Xu Fuyuan’s influence on Liu Zongzhou can be summarised into the following points: Firstly, neither good nor bad refers to the mind, and not to inherent nature. Xu Fuyuan once sent a letter to Hu Zhi 胡直 discussing mind and inherent nature, in which he said: The concept of giving free rein to inherent nature refers to the central core descended from Heaven, and cannot be spoken of apart from material forms and qi. The concept of the mind is spoken of in terms of unifying the numinous with qi. Inherent nature is simply an original substance endowed by Heaven, hence it is the regularity of the Lord, the illumination of endowment, the illumination of virtue, the highest good, the central, and benevolence, all of which are simply other names for inherent nature. This includes nothing outside the numinous awareness of the mind, yet numinous awareness seems insufficient to exhaust it. The mind is numinous in its utmost emptiness, and preserves the inherent nature of Heaven, yet cannot avoid being mixed with material forms and qi, hence the court of Yu distinguished between the human mind and the dao-mind. Later Confucians also frequently spoke of the

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true mind and the false mind, the impartial mind and the selfish mind. In speaking of the dao-mind, the true mind and the impartial mind, its activity follows inherent nature, and the mind implies inherent nature; in speaking of the human mind, the false mind and the selfish mind, it emerges mixed with material forms and qi, and the mind cannot be called inherent nature. The learning of the superior man lies in being able to preserve his mind, and thereby being able to restore his inherent nature, such that this mind returns to the dao, and this humanity reverts to Heaven, and numinous awareness is the regularity of Heaven. How could they be two? (“Letter to Hu Lushan Discussing Mind and Inherent Nature” [Yu Hu Lushan lun xinxing 与胡庐山论心性], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 983)

Here, Xu Fuyuan argued that the mind is simply a numinous awareness. The substance of the mind is inherent nature, such that the mind and inherent nature are neither separate nor mixed. He opposed the idea that “in the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” arguing that if there is no good or bad in inherent nature, then inherent nature is the same as the mind, and this is no different from how Buddhists discuss inherent nature in terms of the operation and activity of knowing awareness. Xu Fuyuan’s view here directly influenced Liu Zongzhou, who noticed discrepancies in the way Yangming’s later followers understood his Record of Transmission and Practice and therefore selected those parts of it that most clearly expressed Yangming’s essential idea, added his own comments, and titled the resultant work “A Record of the Message Transmitted by Yangming” (Yangming chuanxin lu 阳明传信录). In his postscript, he offered his refutation and correction of the idea that “in the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” continuing Xu Fuyuan’s intentions. In addition, Xu Fuyuan also inherited the attempt to reconcile Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui’s learning from Tang Shu, and further attempted to blend the ideas of the two Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang schools, a point which also influenced Liu Zongzhou. Secondly, the mind is qi. Tang Shu inherited Zhan Ruoshui’s view that qi constitutes the real substance of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, such that mind, inherent nature, principle and dao are all named through qi. He said: Since between Heaven and Earth there is only one qi, so when qi attains evenness it is called void, when evenness manifests its order it is called principle, when principle accords with its application it is called dao, that which is able to control its application is called the mind, that which is able to express its manifestation is called inherent nature, and these five are all Heaven. (“Conversation with Wang Tongye at Mingzhou” [Mingzhou yu Wang Tongye tan 明州与王同野谈], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 962)

Here, void is the even state of qi, the order of operation manifested in this even state is principle, the application of qi all following this principle is dao, the ruler of the flowing of qi is the mind, and the basis for the operation of qi neither exceeding nor coming up short is inherent nature. These are all originally so by Heaven, and are all given names through qi. Thus, beginning from qi as the fundamental root, one can view mind, inherent nature, principle and dao as all being spoken in terms of qi, and thereby say that the mind is qi. He also said: “The mind is the root of the

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flowing inflexion of qi, contracting and expanding, closing and opening, following its endowment” (“On the True Mind” [Lun zhenxin 论真心], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 959). This states that the mind is the ruler of qi, and that the mind is never separate from qi. The passage above generally discusses the qi within the cosmos, while this passage only discusses the qi within the human body. The former “mind” is a metaphor, referring to the ruler within the flow of the qi of the cosmos, while the latter refers to the human faculties. However, Tang Shu thought that the regularities of the qi within the cosmos and that within the human body are identical. By the time of Xu Fuyuan, the emphasis was on using the relation between the mind and qi to speak of personal cultivation, and taking principle to be the central and regulated feature of the desires expressed by the mind’s qi. By the time of Liu Zongzhou, the fundamental guiding tenet became “Principle is just the principle of qi, and is absolutely not prior to qi, nor is it external to qi. Knowing this, one knows that the dao-mind is the original mind of the human mind, and that the inherent nature of moral principle is the original inherent nature of the qitemperament” (“Recorded Sayings,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1521), such that benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are simply the happiness, anger, sadness and joy of the mind’s qi. The idea that the mind is qi is one of Liu Zongzhou’s most important theories, and went on to influence Huang Zongxi. Thirdly, intention as principal. Tang Shu took the pursuit of the true mind as his guiding tenet, in which the true mind is inherent nature, and in its centre is a ruler. Tang Shu said: “Since the myriad things are all complete within me [see Mencius, 7A.4], one cubic inch [i.e. the mind] can intuit and absorb the principle of things, simplifying and refining it, such that its dao is brightly illuminated” (“Explanation of the Diagram of the True Mind,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 959). For Xu Fuyuan, this intuiting and absorbing, this ruler, is “intention” (yi 意). Xu Fuyuan established his theory of making one’s intentions sincere in order to oppose the excesses of Yangming’s later followers, who cast aside this ruler, relied on the illuminated void of the free and uninhibited mind, and rejected any examination and restriction. In his “Letter to Li Tongye” (Yu Li Tongye shu 与李同野书), Xu Fuyuan clearly expressed his opposition to being “without intention”: You regard being without intention as principal. In learning that leads people to be without intention, can there not be a question of desiring to be hasty yet failing to arrive? The Great Learning states that those who desire to rectify their minds, first make their intentions sincere. Making one’s intentions sincere simply refers to not deceiving oneself and seeking self-satisfaction. This is the basic effort of learning… Whenever in our everyday life we feel relaxed and dispersed, whenever our responses to affects follow what is suitable, this is an inkling of sincere intention. One simply has to go ahead and preserve, cultivate and expand this. If one explains this as being without intention, then the spirit will all be scattered. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 981)

Although Xu Fuyuan did not regard intention as that which the mind preserves, he stressed the preservation, cultivation and expansion of the inklings of sincere intention, which is the basis of Liu Zongzhou’s idea that intention is that which the mind preserves and not that which it expresses. Liu Zongzhou also connected the

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character “intention” to the regular operation of the dao of Heaven as the “lone-substance,” giving the character “intention” a metaphysical basis, and developing a broad range of philosophical meaning around the character “intention.” In this, the influence of Zhan Ruoshui and his students as well as his inheritance of their core conception is clear and unmistakable.

Chapter 6

Wang Yangming’s Learning of Innate Moral Knowing

Wang Yangming is the representative figure of the Learning of the Mind (xinxue 心 学) in the Ming Dynasty, and also one of the thinkers of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties who has had the greatest influence on later generations. Wang Yangming 王阳明 (1472–1529; ming Shouren 守仁, zi Bo’an 伯安) was from Yuyao 余姚 in Zhejiang. He gave himself the hao Yangmingzi 阳明子 because he built and lived in a hut in Yangming Cave outside the city of Yue 越, and scholars thus called him Master Yangming (Yangming xiansheng 阳明先生). Thirty-eight volumes of the Complete Writings of Yangming (Yangming quanshu 阳明全书) have been handed down to the present.1 Wang Yangming’s entire life was magnificent, unusual and legendary. His path was quite different from the usual people with their imperial examination backgrounds. His theories are closed connected to his life experience, and are an embodiment and summary of his heroic character.

1 The Highlighting of Morality The periods of the Hongzhi 弘治, Zhengde 正德 and Jiajing 嘉靖 emperors in the Ming Dynasty, when Wang Yangming was active, were periods when the Ming Dynasty suffered from severe internal disorder and external invasion. Oirat Mongols and Tartars in the northwest constantly invaded the border areas, which fell into successive years of wars. The vassal kings around the country all coveted the central authority and launched rebellions constantly. Emperors, eunuchs and outstanding officials built grand manors, and landlords took any opportunity to steal the fields of the people, land annexation becoming more and more fierce, until

1 [Trans.] References are to Complete Works of Wang Yangming [Wang Yangming quanji 王阳明 全集], Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992.

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_6

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landless peasants launched several violent uprisings. Extremely ruthless politics, dissolute emperors, eunuchs who monopolised power and constant partisan conflicts all shook the rule of the Ming Dynasty enormously. On the other hand, since the middle of the Ming Dynasty, a commodity economy had substantially developed and a citizen stratum had gradually arisen. Utilitarianism gradually became a powerful ideological trend, weakening the role of Neo-Confucianism in binding together people’s mentality. Cheng-Zhu 程朱 learning [i.e. the theories of the two Cheng brothers 二程 and Zhu Xi 朱熹 in the Song Dynasty] had become a tool for scholars to deal with the imperial examinations. The whole society exhibited an atmosphere of low intellectual ethos and moral decline. Wang Yangming depicted the social situation at the time saying: Since the learning of the sages [i.e. Confucianism] had been discarded and the tradition of the technique of despotism had become strongly entrenched, even the worthy and wise could not help being influenced by it. The doctrines elucidated and embellished in order to make them clear to the people, make them prevail, and restore them to the world, merely served to fortify the strongholds of despots. As a result, the door of the learning of the sages was blocked, and it was no longer to be seen. Therefore the learning of textual criticism developed and those perpetuating it were regarded as famous. The practice of memorisation and recitation developed and those advocating it were regarded as extensively learned. The writing of flowery compositions developed and those indulging in it were regarded as elegant. Thus with great confusion and tremendous noise they set themselves up and competed with one another, and no one knew how many schools there were. Among tens of thousands of paths and thousands of tracks, none knew which to follow. Students of the world found themselves in a theatre where a hundred plays were being presented, as it were. Actors cheered, jeered, hopped, and skipped. They emulated one another in novelty and in ingenuity. They forced smiles to please the audience and competed in appearing beautiful. All this rivalry appeared on all sides. The audience looked to the left and to the right and could not cope with the situation. Their ears and eyes became obscured and dizzy and their spirit dazed and confused. They drifted day and night and remained for a long time in this atmosphere as if they were insane and had lost their minds, and none had the self-realisation to return to his family heritage [i.e. Confucianism]. Rulers of the time were also fooled and confounded by those doctrines and devoted their whole lives to useless superficialities without knowing what they meant. Occasionally some rulers realised the emptiness, falsehood, fragmentariness, and unnaturalness of their ways, and heroically roused themselves to great effort, which they wished to demonstrate in concrete action. But the most they could do was no more than to achieve national wealth, power, success, and profit, such as those of the Five Despots. Consequently the learning of the sages became more and more distant and obscured, while the current of success and profit ran deeper and deeper. Some students turned to Buddhism and Daoism and were deceived by them. But at bottom there was nothing in these systems that could overcome their desire for success and profit. Others sought to reconcile the conflicting doctrines within the Confucian school. But in the final analysis there was nothing in these doctrines that could destroy the view of success and profit. For up to the present time it has been several thousand years since the poison of the doctrine of success and profit has infected the innermost recesses of man’s mind and become his second nature. (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II)2 2

[Trans.] Translations from Wang Yangming’s Chuanxi lu are based on Wing-Tsit Chan (trans.), Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, with some modifications. References are as given by Professor Zhang.

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In this passage, the long depiction of the social trend and intellectual ethos of his time given by Wang Yangming is precisely the background for the rise of his thought, the root he wished to extirpate as well as the origin he wished to block up in his “theory of extirpating the root and blocking up the wellspring” (baben saiyuan lun 拔本塞源论). When Wang Yangming was a young boy, he was bold and uninhibited, and demonstrated an orientation of thought that stood out from the crowd. His chronicle (nianpu 年谱) records when Yangming was 11 years old, he once asked his teacher, “Which concern is of primary importance?” His teacher replied saying, “Only reading books and passing the imperial examination.” Yangming then said, “I’m afraid that passing the imperial examination is not of primary importance, only reading books and learning to become a sage or worthy.” The young Wang Yangming already regarded reading books and entering on an official career as an insignificant path, and he would seek a new road to the realm of sages and worthies through moral cultivation. When Wang Yangming went to Jiangxi to marry at the age of seventeen, he paid a visit to Wu Yubi’s 吴与弼 disciple Lou Liang 娄谅. Lou Liang introduced him to the Cheng-Zhu theory of the investigation of things (gewu 格物), and told him that sagehood can be reached through learning. Yangming accordingly began to “apply himself to studying the learning of the Confucians of the Song Dynasty concerning the investigation of things,” yet found that there are contradictions in the Cheng-Zhu account of the investigation of things: Former Confucians interpreted the investigation of things as investigating all the things in the world. How can the myriad things in the world be successfully studied? [Cheng Yi 程 颐] even said, ‘Every blade of grass and every tree possesses principle.’ How can we study them? Even if we can succeed in investigating every blade of grass and every tree, how can we return to ourselves and make our intentions sincere? (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

According to Wang Yangming, the reason why sages are sages is because their minds are as pure as Heavenly principle (tianli 天理) and their intentions are sincere, whereas what are gained through the investigation of things are the principles of concrete things, which cannot directly become the basis for sincerity of intention. For Cheng-Zhu, the guiding principle of effort (gongfu 功夫 [i.e. effort in self-cultivation]) was that “self-discipline requires the use of respect, and progress in study lies in the extension of knowledge (zhizhi 致知),” holding that one should first probe the principles in things, and then use the effort of “respectfulness” (jing 敬) to restrain oneself according to the principles one has probed. According to Cheng-Zhu, the Heavenly principle required by moral cultivation and the principles of things acquired through the investigation of things are fundamentally one and the same, and so “as soon as one is clear about that, one understands this.” However, to change the principles of things into “Heavenly principle” also requires a certain insight, and this is not possessed naturally but must be cultivated. Before this insight is obtained, Heavenly principle and the principles of things are divided into two. Wang Yangming discovered this dualistic division in Cheng-Zhu’s theory, saying:

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According to the new edition [i.e. Zhu Xi’s rearrangement of the Great Learning (Daxue 大 学)], the first step is to probe and study the principles of things and affairs. In that case one will drift aimlessly with nowhere to apply oneself. It will then be necessary to add “respectfulness” before the investigation of things can be related to one’s self and mind, yet even then there will be no root-wellspring. If it is necessary to add the word “respectfulness,” why did the Confucian school leave out the most important word, and wait more than a thousand years for someone to make the correction? The fact is that if sincerity of intention is taken as primary, the addition of the word “respectfulness” is unnecessary. The reason why sincerity of intention is singled out for discussion is precisely because it is the great guiding thread of learning. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Wang Yangming thought that respectfulness should be originally included in the effort of the Great Learning, and this original respectfulness is sincerity of intention (chengyi 诚意). Only when one investigates things with sincerity of intention as one’s goal can one practice it concretely in moral cultivation. Otherwise, what are gained from the investigation of things are merely the principles of concrete things that have no relation to one’s own cultivation of self and mind. Yangming emphasised repeatedly, “Only if one takes sincerity of intention as primary in one’s efforts on the investigation of things and the extension of knowing, can effort find its application.” He criticised Zhu Xi many times for his “dividing mind and principle into two.” In his view, “stopping at the highest good” (zhi zhishan 止至 善) in the Great Learning and “assisting the transforming and nurturing of Heaven and Earth” (zan tiandi zhi huayu 赞天地之化育) in Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸) refer to the highest spiritual plane (jingjie 境界) achieved by the extension of knowing driven by sincerity of intention. On this spiritual plane, it is not that “sincerity and clarity both advance”, but that “with sincerity, there is clarity, and with clarity, sincerity.” Regarding moral reason as primary and epistemological reason as supplementary is the basic guiding principle of Wang Yangming’s learning of the mind. Wang Yangming’s view of the relationship between morality and knowledge contains a profound insight. He understood that morality cannot be reduced to knowledge, since morality is an activity of the will and knowing is an activity of the intellect. The advancement of morality lies in the training and exercise of the will, while increases in knowledge depend on progress in intellectual ability and accumulation of experience. Comparing the two, the advancement of morality is more difficult because it has to contend with many things that are entrenched in the root-nature of humanity and difficult to eliminate. One’s degree of knowledge and ability does not determine one’s level of morality. Here Wang Yangming clearly demarcated the differences between morality and knowledge, aiming to correct the malpractice of people competing in knowledge but abandoning moral cultivation. He said: Later generations did not realise that the root of becoming a sage is to be purely identified with Heavenly principle, but instead sought sagehood only in knowing and ability. They regarded sages as omniscient and omnipotent, and felt they had to grasp all the knowledge and abilities of the sages before they could succeed. Consequently they did not direct their efforts toward Heavenly principle but merely crippled their spirit and exhausted their energy in scrutinising books, investigating the names and varieties of things, and imitating

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the forms and traces [of the acts of the ancients]. As their knowledge became more extensive, their human desires became more numerous, and as their abilities became greater and greater, Heavenly principle became increasingly obscured from them. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Wang Yangming’s purpose in establishing a new theory was to drag people back from their path departing from moral cultivation, back to the learning of the sages. According to him, “the learning of the sages is the learning of the mind.” Learning of the mind (xinxue 心学) here means concentrating one’s efforts on the self and mind, regarding the elevation of one’s whole quality of character and spiritual plane as one’s final goal. The essence of this learning of the mind lies in the “sixteen-character transmission of the mind” (shiliuzi xinchuan 十六字心传) [see “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟), Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚 书)]: “The human mind is precarious, the mind of dao is subtle; only through refinement and unity can one hold fast to what is central” (renxin wei wei, daoxin wei wei; wei jing wei yi, yunzhi juezhong 人心惟危,道心惟微;惟精惟一,允执厥 中). This 16-character transmission of the mind was respected and followed by all Neo-Confucians, with Zhu Xi regarding it as the complete essence of Centrality in the Ordinary. However, Wang Yangming thought that although Zhu Xi regarded it as a standard, there were prejudices and faults in his specific interpretation and method of implementation, among which the most important was his division of the human mind and the mind of dao into two different minds, as well as refinement and unity into two different tasks. He said: There is only one mind. Before it is mixed with the human, it is called the mind of dao, and after it is mixed with human artificiality, it is called the human mind. When the human mind is rectified it is the mind of dao, and when the mind of dao loses its correctness, it is called the human mind; there were not two minds at the beginning. To say that the mind of dao is the master and the human mind obeys its commands is to say that there are two minds. Since Heavenly principle and human desire are not established side by side, how can there be a Heavenly principle as master with a human desire to obey it? (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

He thought that if the mind of dao and the human mind were separated, it would lead to the problems of the original substance of morality (daode benti 道德本体) becoming obscure and not manifest, and the effort of the learning of the sages becoming separated into two parts. Therefore, he emphasised that the mind of dao is the original substance of the human mind. As for “only through refinement and unity,” Yangming proposed an interpretation that differed from previous scholars: “only through refinement and unity” does not refer to two different things. Refinement is broad, while unity is simple; refinement is effort, unity the “guiding thread” (tounao 头脑). Refinement must be applied in unity, while unity must have refinement as its effort. Thus everywhere and at any moment there is nothing but “learning to preserve Heavenly principle.” Wang Yangming’s learning emphasised one “guiding thread,” and this was morality as governing and leading all other aspects. His Record of Transmission and Practice states:

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[Xue] Kan 薛侃 asked, “If one confines his effort entirely to self-discipline and does not devote himself to study, one is likely to mistake his desires for principle. What can be done?” The Master said, “One must understand the true meaning of learning. To study is nothing but self-discipline. Not to study merely means that one’s will to self-discipline is not sufficiently serious or concrete.” “What is meant by understanding the true meaning of learning?” “Suppose you tell me what learning is for, and what there is to learn.” “I have heard you teach us saying that to learn is to learn to preserve Heavenly principle, that the original substance of the mind is Heavenly principle, and that in order to realise this personally, it is merely necessary to have no selfish intentions in one’s mind.” “Then it is only necessary to overcome and get rid of selfish intentions. Why worry about not being clear about principle and desires?” “I am simply afraid that these selfish intentions are not truly recognised.” “This is only because the will is not yet serious or concrete. If it is, that which the eye sees and the ear hears will all be directed in this regard. Where then can there be any dao or principle that is not truly recognised? All people have a mind of right and wrong, so one need not seek it externally. To study merely means to realise personally what one’s own mind has seen, and not to possess something seen outside the mind.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Self-discipline is morality, to study is to know, and study is precisely for the purpose of self-discipline. In Wang Yangming’s view, all learning is for the cultivation of one’s character and the elevating of one’s spiritual plane. Therefore, in Yangming’s eyes, what makes a sage a sage is primarily his virtue: “That sages are omniscient merely means that they know the one Heavenly principle; that they are omnipotent merely means that they are able to practice this Heavenly principle” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). His summary of the entire effort of the Great Learning and Centrality in the Ordinary as making one’s intentions sincere had just this meaning: “The teaching in Centrality in the Ordinary that ‘without sincerity there is nothing’ (bucheng wuwu 不诚无物) and the effort to ‘illuminate one’s illustrious virtue’ (ming mingde 明明德) described in the Great Learning mean nothing more than the effort to make one’s intentions sincere” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). In terms of the relationship between the cultivation of morality and the pursuit of knowledge, Wang regarded the former as primary. He expressed his fundamental position on the relationship between morality and knowledge in his response to his disciples on the relation between the mind of filial piety (xiaoxin 孝心) and concrete knowledge concerning how to enact filial piety: Why not endeavour to study them? The main thing is to have a guiding thread. The main thing is to endeavour to study them by ridding the mind of human desires and preserving Heavenly principle. For instance, to study the provision of warmth for parents in the winter is nothing but the extension of the filial piety of this mind to the utmost, for fear that a trifle of human desire might creep in, and to study the provision of coolness for parents in the summer is nothing but the extension of the filial piety of this mind to the utmost, for fear that a trifle of human desire might creep in. The main thing is to study to attain this mind. If this mind is free from human desires and has become purely identical with Heavenly principle, if it is a mind that is sincere in its filial piety toward relations, then in the winter it will naturally think of the cold of parents and seek a way to provide warmth for them, and in the summer it will naturally think of the heat of parents and seek a way to provide coolness for them. These are all offshoots of the mind that is sincere in its filial piety. Nevertheless, there must first be such a mind before there can be these offshoots. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

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Wang Yangming emphasised throughout his works that morality is primary and is the original substance of all concrete knowing. Morality governs and leads, and knowledge is supplementary, such that moral cultivation can drive the pursuit of knowledge. When morality is cultivated well, knowledge will be naturally included within it. Even if one’s knowledge has deficiencies in some respects and situations, a moral mind will drive the subject automatically to master the necessary knowledge. For Yangming, morality is given a great initiative. The moral subject is the real subject, which possesses the ability to proactively aim towards value objectives and proactively create the means to realise these objectives. The epistemological subject on the other hand is passive, only having the function to gradually and accumulatively increase knowledge, and its orientation becomes meaningful only when it is guided by value rationality. Wang Yangming therefore strongly emphasised moral reason’s superiority over epistemological reason, placing moral cultivation in a position above all else. The reason why Wang Yangming thought the moral subject could proactively aim towards value objectives and use its own initiative to create knowledge as the means to achieve these objectives is connected to the particular characteristics of his theory of effort (gongfu lun 功夫论). The primary characteristic of Yangming’s theory of effort is the unification of knowledge and action (zhi xing heyi 知行合一). Since a detailed analysis of the unification of knowledge and action will be given below, I will here only discuss its role in moral cultivation and the increase of knowledge. The starting point of Wang Yangming’s moral cultivation is the original substance of the mind (xin zhi benti 心之本体), which is the sprout of goodness possessed by people innately, that which Mencius called the four inklings (si duan 四端) and Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 called the original mind (benxin 本心). Yangming’s effort was to actively expand this good nature and extend it into all thoughts and actions, placing them under the regulation of good intention such that every thought and action is a result of the joint participation of a value objective and knowledge as its means. Thus, for every action accomplished, its gain is double: both an enhancement of virtue and increase in knowledge, the two being synchronous. The cultivation of virtue is endless, and so is the increase of knowledge. Yangming opposed any cultivation of virtue detached from concrete affairs and actions and casting aside knowledge as its means. Therefore, he stressed that innate moral knowing must be reached in concrete affairs, that making one’s intentions sincere must be found in the investigation of things, etc. Although he sometimes emphasised the pure cultivation of virtue, this was simply his prescribing medicine according to the illness and establishing teachings according to the times. Wang Yangming did not especially emphasise the training of epistemological reason, and sometimes even belittled knowledge in order to highlight the ruling and commanding position of moral reason and criticise the tendency toward memorising and reciting the classics as well as that toward competing to produce extravagant literary works. Nonetheless, it is implicit in his philosophy, and the ideas that the increase of knowledge should be driven by the objective of moral cultivation and that the realisation of value objectives should be guaranteed by knowledge should be included in its topics. Hence, in Yangming’s thought, “pursuing study and inquiry”

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and “honoring virtue” are not two different affairs, the pursuit of study and inquiry is the means to honor virtue, taking the refined and subtle to the limit is the means to achieve breadth and greatness, refinement is the means to unity, the extensive study of literature is the means to restrain oneself with ritual propriety, and manifesting virtue and loving the people is the means to stop at the highest good. Wang Yangming’s unification of the two was precisely aimed at correcting Zhu Xi’s division of the two, and because of this he frequently mocked Zhu Xi as “fragmentary” and “deficient in the guiding thread.” Highlighting moral reason was the remedy Wang Yangming prescribed for society at a time in which morality was in decline and scholars competed for secular fame and profit, no longer paying attention to self and mind or inherent nature and endowment. His direct goal was to reform society and rectify the social ethos. However, as a philosopher meeting the theoretical demands of the society at the time and the leader of a school that triggered a philosophical upheaval, Wang Yangming’s remedy for society included philosophical content that shook the society of the time and influenced later generations. Firstly, the theoretical boldness Wang Yangming showed in his opposition to the authority of tradition is outstanding among great philosophers of all ages. He lived in a time at which everyone was habituated to the established academic situation, calm and unaware in mutual peace and profit. Through his fame and heroism in all kinds of practical activities, Yangming discovered and pointed out the contradictions in the authoritative theories followed and practiced by many people, and thereby established his new theory. The shock and impact this had on the academic circle at the time was obvious. His first disciple Xu Ai 徐爱 once revealed: Because the original doctrine has disappeared, I was shocked and hesitant when I first heard the Master’s teachings, and did not know where to begin. Later on as I heard him more and more, I gradually realised that his teachings must be applied to one’s own life and concretely demonstrated, and I then came to believe that his learning represents the direct heritage of the Confucian school, and that all the rest is but byways and minor paths, dead ends and dried up rivers. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Significant parts of Record of Transmission and Practice are Yangming’s explanations and explications of his new theory to scholars who were accustomed to the old theories. His letters and debates were also generally of this kind. He even remained unruffled when certain scholars attacked his ideas as false learning and demanded they be banned, still firmly convinced by and adhering to his new theory. The reason he dared to risk the condemnation of the world and express his new theory despite the domination of Zhu Xi’s learning was because “in the way I feel there is something that cannot be helped, and I am not concerned whether people believe me or not” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). He once recounted his aching desire to save society: Whenever I think of the people’s degeneration and difficulties, I feel pity with a pain in my heart, overlooking the fact that I myself am of little worth and wishing to save them with this, not knowing the limits of my ability. When the people of the world see me like this, they join together in criticising, ridiculing, insulting, and cursing me, regarding me as an

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insane madman who has lost his mind. Alas! Is this not worthy of pity? (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

With his painstaking efforts in advocation, his charismatic character, as well as the inspiration of the power of his theory, “Yangming Learning” spread widely, sweeping more than half of China, becoming a prevailing trend and reenergising Neo-Confucianism and adding new content to it. Secondly, Wang Yangming advocated and earnestly practiced a path of inner sageliness driving outer kingliness. His whole life’s experience was a footnote to inner sageliness and outer kingliness; the path of development of his life illuminates for us a way to cultivate a character of inner sageliness and outer kingliness, which is the highest ideal personality for Confucians. There are truly not many Confucians in history with great achievements both in morality and writing as well as in governing the state and benefiting the people. Wang Yangming got very close to this. He can be seen as one of the few great men in Chinese history who combined both inner sageliness and outer kingliness in one. Liu Zongzhou summarised Wang Yangming’s academic characteristics as: “knowledge with action, mind with things, activity with stillness, substance with function, effort with original substance, below with above, none of these are not unified” (“On the Masters” [Shi shuo 师说], Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案]). “None of these are not unified” is the root factor that shaped Yangming’s personality of inner sageliness and outer kingliness. His cultivation focused on inner sageliness, and he used his inner sageliness to drive his outer kingliness, or one could say his inner sageliness opened out into his outer kingliness. The most fundamental point of his theory is found taking in mind with principle, knowledge with action. Taking mind with principle enabled him to link every concrete thought and action with moral cultivation, combining moral reason and epistemological reason in concrete things and actions, consciously transforming epistemological activity into a provision that is useful for the accomplishment of personal character. Taking knowledge with action guaranteed that the activity of accomplishment of personal character simultaneously both has realistic results and is concerned with the individual’s inner mind, and also belongs to social groups. He said: To learn is to extirpate human desires and to preserve Heavenly principle. If we devote ourselves to extirpating human desires and preserving Heavenly principle, we will naturally be as correct as those who were the first to be enlightened. When we go into the ancient meaning of the term “learning,” in its derived meaning, it involves questioning, discrimination of ideas, thinking, deliberation, preservation of the mind, self-examination, self-overcoming, self-governance, and other efforts. But all these are nothing more than the desire to extirpate human desires from the mind and preserve the Heavenly principle in the mind. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I) The one is Heavenly principle, and by concentrating on the one is meant concentrating the mind on Heavenly principle. If one only knows how to concentrate on the one and does not know that the one is the same as Heavenly principle, he will chase after material things when he is busy and his mind will become a blank when he is at leisure. If whether one is busy or at leisure, one’s mind nonetheless completely devotes its efforts to Heavenly principle, then the way to dwell in seriousness is no different from the probing of principles. Dwelling in respect is then the probing of principle in its aspect of concentration, and the

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probing of principle is dwelling in respect in its aspect of thoroughness and care. It is neither that alongside dwelling in respect there is another mind probing principle, nor that along with the probing of principle there is another mind dwelling in respect. Although they differ in name, they are one task. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

This “one task” combines inner sageliness with outer kingliness as one, and takes mind with principle and knowledge with action. It is not that morality and knowledge develop in parallel, but that morality leads and drives knowledge. Here, intention is far superior to knowledge, and intention is given the initiative to proactively acquire knowledge in order to accomplish its own value objectives. Wang Yangming’s whole life’s experience is a footnote to his personal character of inner sageliness and outer kingliness. He possessed learning and cultivation in many aspects and had many profound and complex experiences, some of which were even life-death struggles and almost cost him his life. This was the basis for his rich knowledge and outstanding wisdom of human life. He was born into a family that produced generations of government officials, and began to display a poetic talent when he was a child. After he passed the imperial examination at the provincial level and embarked on an official career, he once used his literary talent to compete with members of the “former Seven Masters” such as Li Mengyang 李 梦阳 and He Jingming 何景明. However, he abandoned literary writing because he was not willing to “use a limited spirit to serve useless and empty writing,” despite already reaching quite high attainments in poetry and prose. When he was living in Beijing with his father during his boyhood, he visited Juyong Pass and went riding and shooting together with the northern tribal groups at the frontier, learning defensive techniques and often practicing tactical formations with the stones of fruit after dinner. He enjoyed reading books on military tactics, and when he started his official career, he supervised work using methods from military tactics, drilling with the Eight Front Diagram (bazhen tu 八阵图). This prepared him with experience and abilities for his later military activities including capturing [Zhu] Chenhao 朱宸 濠 [Prince of Ning 宁王 and descendant of first Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang 朱 元璋] and crushing the rebellions of ethnic minorities near the southwestern border. He was also interested in [Daoist] immortals and Buddhism, studying health preservation with Daoist priests, building a hut at Yangming Cave to learn physical and breathing exercises (daoyin shu 导引术), and even spending his wedding night meditating with Daoist priests and forgetting to return home. This laid a foundation for his later extensive adoption of thoughts and materials from Daoism and Buddhism in the creation of his own theories. When he was a young boy, he tried to practice the Cheng-Zhu conception of “the investigation of things” by investigating the bamboos outside his window, discovering the contradictions in Zhu Xi’s theory in his later explorations of theories and investigations of practices. As for the famous realisation of dao at Longchang 龙场, after living in difficulties with tribal groups, which stimulated his mind as well as tempering his nature, he suddenly realised that “the dao of the sages is self-sufficient in our inherent nature, so it is a mistake to seek principle externally.” In his capture of [Zhu] Chenhao and his political struggle with [Zhang] Zhong 张忠 and [Xu] Tai 许泰, he overcame difficulties through adapting as the occasions required during fierce battles and

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political struggles, and in this way revealed the principle of “the extension of innate moral knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知) and these were both great turning points on his spiritual journey through tests of life and death. Wang Yangming was a legendary figure, his learning and experience in many areas giving him an aptitude in many fields, and also establishing in him a firm conviction concerning the way of effort focusing on the unification of moral and epistemological reason and using morality to drive knowing. Zhu Xi dedicated his whole life to academic study, and his short official career was not as dramatic as that of Wang Yangming. Zhu’s academic method was scholarly. Wang Yangming spent his whole life with working as an official and teaching of equal importance, yet his life was dramatic while his learning was quite ordinary. Compared with Zhu Xi’s typical academic life, Yangming’s learning was extremely plebeian: any person with a spiritual plane and knowledge of morality can start from the present, from specific trivial affairs. What he called “the extension of innate moral knowing to the utmost” had no fixed standard, and what he emphasised was “the extension of innate moral knowing” as a process. He claimed that his learning “can be applied by people from high officials to the local marketplace,” such that “even people selling wood can also study and attain it.” Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 also said, “Since Yaojiang 姚江 [Wang Yangming’s school] pointed out that innate moral knowing is possessed by everyone, with reflection and self-attainment, everyone has a path to become a sage” (“Case Studies from Yaojiang” [Yaojiang xue’an 姚江学案], Case Studies of Ming Confucians). Everyone can perform inner sageliness and outer kingliness, and everyone can have their own inner sage and outer king. Through his own example, Wang Yangming pushed the cultivation and practice of Neo-Confucianism a big step forward from scholars to common people. Wang Yangming’s approach of using inner sageliness to drive outer kingliness can give rise to some new reflections on the relationship between morality and science. Philosophers throughout history have had different views on the relationship between morality and knowledge. Some used knowledge to replace morality, like ancient Greek philosopher Socrates with his famous phrase, “knowledge is virtue,” and Heraclitus who held that if people want to live a moral life, they must act according to “logos.” Others regarded knowledge and morality as two completely different areas, like Laozi 老子 who said, “The pursuit of learning means increasing daily, the pursuit of dao means decreasing daily” (Ch. 48), “To regard not knowing as knowing is the highest; not to regard knowing as knowing is harmful” (Ch. 71), separating virtue and knowledge and holding that the elevation of morality and the increase of knowledge are two completely unrelated and even contrary aspects. Empiricist ethicists also did not regard morality and knowledge as developing in parallel, even though they accepted that all ethical ideas and principles originate from experience and that there are no innate ideas of any kind. The relationship between morality and knowledge in Wang Yangming’s theory of the extension of innate moral knowing has a striking Chinese philosophical character. His ideas of

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mind with principle and knowing with action regard every idea and action as a combination of both morality and knowledge, requiring a double result from every affair: an advancement of morality and an increase of knowledge. For example, in his eyes, daily activities like warming quilts for one’s parents in winter, cooling rooms for them in summer, and greeting them in the morning and evening are primarily expressions of a mind of filial piety. Without a mind of filial piety, such activities are merely shows with no moral value. However, there is also a question of appropriateness in such kinds of activities. Wang Yangming’s view was: “If this mind is free from human desires and has become purely identical with Heavenly principle, if it is a mind that is sincere in its filial piety toward relations, then in the winter it will naturally think of the cold of parents and seek a way to provide warmth for them, and in the summer it will naturally think of the heat of parents and seek a way to provide coolness for them. These are all offshoots of the mind that is sincere in its filial piety.” If one first applies one’s effort to rectifying one’s motivations, then the result will be that good motivations come to be generated naturally. Here, it is not that Wang Yangming did not know the possibility of motivations and their effects being inconsistent. He was not using theoretical methods to push the problem to an extreme and then propose an unreasonable explanation. He was an advocate for practice, demanding that people combine morality and knowledge in their regular activities so as to achieve their dual advancement. His entire life was a demonstration of his learning. This intellectual trend of combining morality and knowledge did not originate with Wang Yangming but was a long-standing and well-established tradition in Chinese pan-moralistic culture. Yangming simply particularly highlighted it in order to oppose the prevailing theories of Zhu Xi. This highlighting gave rise to two results: on the one hand, a rectification of the moral degeneration of the society at the time; on the other hand, a smothering of the scientific elements that had always been a weak point of Chinese academia, and thereby strengthened the trend of already pervasive pan-moralism. Compared with the Song Dynasty, positivistic science had in the Ming Dynasty become increasingly separated from the muddled relation between reason and value, becoming the expert field of a significant minority, whereas Neo-Confucianism as an explication concerned with value had increasingly developed in the direction of the refinement and subtlety of mind and inherent nature. This can explain why Neo-Confucianism in the Ming Dynasty displayed an increasing focus on the personal experience of mind and inherent nature, relegating theories of principle and qi 气 to a secondary position. The gradual separation of positive science from Neo-Confucianism was a change brought about by the reaction of Yangming Learning against Zhu Xi in the academic system. Elevating the initiative of moral reason however made morality lose its role of restraining the human mind. The growth of a citizen class and the irrepressibility of utilitarian thought both had a strong influence on Yangming Learning and brought about a result completely different from his original aspirations.

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2 No Principle Outside the Mind 2.1

No Principle Outside the Mind-the Investigation of Things

“No principle outside the mind” (xin wai wu li 心外无理) was the first proposition put forward by Wang Yangming after he had established the line that moral reason is superior to epistemological reason in which the former is primary and the latter supplementary. This proposition was not directly inherited from Lu Jiuyuan, but was formed through self-demonstration and self-realisation after Wang Yangming had studied Zhu Xi’s theories and discovered their inconsistencies, as well as coming after some important changes in his life. The realisation at Longchang was Wang Yangming’s most painful experience among the various changes in his academic principles, as well as the most meaningful for him. The direct result of this realisation was to enable Yangming to see the tremendous role moral intention plays in life and death, suffering and hardship. What he realised was that “the dao of the sages is self-sufficient in our inherent nature, so it is a mistake to seek principle from things and affairs” (“Chronicle” [Nianpu 年谱], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming [Wang Yangming quanji 王阳明全集], 1228). When Yangming failed in the investigation of bamboos as a young man, he already had his doubts concerning Zhu Xi’s investigation of things and probing of principles. His experience stimulating his mind and hardening his inherent nature through living in difficulties with tribal groups at Longchang provided the perfect occasion for him to change, and enabled him to gain what he had failed to gain from the investigation of the bamboos. Yangming later summarised what he gained, saying: “After I had lived among the barbarians for [almost] three years, I understood what all this meant and realised that there is really nothing in the things of the world to investigate, that the effort to investigate things is only to be carried out in and with reference to one’s self and mind, and that if one firmly believes that everyone can become a sage, one will naturally be able to take up the task [of investigating things]” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). The realisation at Longchang was the foundation upon which he established his theory of “no principle outside the mind.” Its central meaning is that the mind is the ruling master of a person, and that in the mind moral reason is primary. The most important aspect of a person is his or her mind, and the mind is the site for his or her power and wisdom. Therefore, he often emphasised the ruling function of the mind: The mind is the ruling master of the body. Although the eye sees, what makes it see is the mind. Although the ear hears, what makes it hear is the mind. And although the mouth and the four limbs speak and move, what makes them speak and move is the mind. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III) When you want to not look, listen, speak, or move against the rules of propriety in any way, are your ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and four limbs themselves capable of not doing so? It must come from your mind. These activities of seeing, listening, speaking, and moving all belong to your mind. The sight of your mind emanates through the channel of the eyes, the

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hearing of your mind through the channel of the ears, the speech of your mind through the channel of the mouth, and the movement of your mind through the channel of your four limbs. If you had no mind, there would be no ears, eyes, mouth, or nose. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

The “ruling master” (zhuzai 主宰) of the mind mentioned above does not refer to epistemological reason, which is the perceptive numinous clarity of the mind. Yangming did not deny the perceptive function of the mind, but his “no principle outside the mind” stressed the ruling function of moral reason: any activity not arising from moral reason has no moral meaning. Record of Transmission and Practice states: [Xu] Ai asked, “If the highest good is to be sought only in the mind, I am afraid the principles of things in the world cannot be exhausted.” The Master said, “The mind is principle. Is there any affair in the world outside the mind? Is there any principle outside the mind?” Ai said, “In filial piety in serving one’s father, loyalty in serving one’s ruler, faithfulness in intercourse with friends, or benevolence in governing the people, there are many principles which I believe should not be left unexamined.” The Master said with a sigh, “This idea has been obscuring the understanding of people for a long time. Can they be awakened by one speech? Nonetheless, I shall comment along the line of your question. For instance, in the matter of serving one’s father, one cannot seek the principle of filial piety in one’s father. In serving one’s ruler, one cannot seek the principle of loyalty in one’s ruler. In intercourse with friends and in governing the people, one cannot seek the principles of faithfulness and benevolence in friends and the people. These are all only in the mind, for the mind is principle. When the mind is free from the obscuration of selfish desires, it is Heavenly principle, which requires not one scrap to be added from outside. When this mind of pure Heavenly principle is exerted in the service of one’s father, there is filial piety; when it is exerted in the service of the ruler, there is loyalty; when it is exerted in dealing with friends or governing the people, there are faithfulness and benevolence. The main thing is for this mind to apply its efforts to extirpating human desires and preserving Heavenly principle.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

The value of moral affairs and matters such as serving one’s parents, serving one’s ruler, intercourse with friends, and governing the people all comes from the mind, so affairs and matters that lack the involvement of moral reason have no moral meaning. They are like acting, in which actors and actresses do not share the moral emotions of their characters, and the moral affairs and matters in plays have no moral value. Because he took the ruling function of moral reason as fundamental, Wang Yangming’s explanation of the investigation of things, the extension of knowing, making one’s intentions sincere, and the rectification the mind (zheng xin 正心) in the Great Learning was completely different from tradition, and especially from that of Zhu Xi. His explanation was: “The ruling master of the body is the mind, that which emanates from the mind is intention, the original substance of intention is knowing, and wherever intention is directed is a thing” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). This definition is precisely opposed to the traditional order of explanation. The traditional order was investigation, extension, making sincere and rectification, whereas his order was mind, intention, knowing and things. This inverted order shows precisely how, in relation to Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming was a

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revolution, the result of which was extraordinary. This can be seen from the greater tendency of the academic shifts during the whole of the Ming Dynasty. This difference also concerns differences in the meaning of “mind” (xin 心). Traditionally, the mind was mainly understood in its perceptive function, primarily in terms of the cognition, perception, receptivity and organisation of the sensations acquired in responding to affairs and connecting with things. Zhu Xi once said: “The mind is human perceptive consciousness, ruling over affairs and responding to events and things” (“Explanation of ‘Counsels of Yu the Great’” [Da Yu mo jie 大禹谟解], Collected Writings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集], Vol. 65). For Zhu Xi, the main role of the mind is to demonstrate, guide, and command the activities of seeing, listening, speaking, and moving, as well as the application of perception. As he said: “In the human body, the application of perception is nothing but the action of the mind, and the mind is originally that by which the body is ruled, without motion or stillness, speech or silence” (“Reply 49 to Zhang Qinfu” [Da Zhang Qinfu 49 答张钦夫四十 九], Collected Writings of Master Zhu, Vol. 32). For Yangming however, “mind” refers mainly to moral reason. Zhu Xi regarded the inherent nature (xing 性) of Heavenly endowment as the source of morality, and the accumulation of knowledge as well as the sudden comprehension and understanding of it as the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment penetrating the mind and becoming a self-conscious stimulant of the subject. Although Wang accepted inherent nature as the source of morality, he held that “mind is inherent nature,” that mind and inherent nature are always interconnected, that moral reason is directly manifested in the mind, and that without the obscuration of selfish desires, the substance of inherent nature is constantly manifested self-consciously in the mind. For Zhu Xi, using the mind to manifest inherent nature comes after the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, whereas in Yangming’s opinion, the mind is always interconnected with inherent nature. Corresponding to their different views of the mind, Yangming regarded intention as “that which is issued by the mind,” knowing as “the original substance of intention,” and things as “the place of intention.” This “intention” (yi 意) is a thought issued from the mind, and knowing is the essential quality of intention. The “knowing” spoken of here is not innate moral knowing, but a general mental activity. “The original substance of intention is knowing” means that the essential quality of intention is mental activity, not actual behaviour like lifting one’s feet or holding with one’s hands. In Yangming’s philosophy, what later generations questioned and criticised most were his two concepts of “mind” and “things” [or “objects”] (wu 物). The “things” Yangming spoke of refer to “the place of intention”: When one’s intention is in serving one’s parents, then serving one’s parents is a ‘thing.’ When one’s intention is in serving one’s ruler, then serving one’s ruler is a ‘thing.’ When one’s intention is in being benevolent to the people and feeling love toward things, then being benevolent to the people and feeling love toward things are ‘things,’ and when one’s intention is directed toward seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting, then each of these is a ‘thing.’ (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

The “things” Yangming spoke of here are not “objective external things” outside the subject, which are the target of epistemological reason and not important for

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Yangming. His things refer to “affairs” (shi 事) that involve moral reason as well as specific ends and means. He said: For an intention to function, there must be its ‘thing’ [i.e. its object], and things are affairs. When one’s intention functions in the service of one’s parents, then serving one’s parents is a thing. When one’s intention functions in governing the people, then governing the people is a thing. When the intention functions in studying, then studying is a thing. When one’s intention functions in hearing a law suit, then hearing a lawsuit is a thing. Whenever an intention functions, there cannot be nothing [i.e. no object]. Where there is a particular intention, there is a particular thing corresponding to it, and where there is no particular intention, there is no particular thing corresponding to it. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Only with “affairs” involving moral reason can there be subjective choice, judgment, experience and appraisal, and thus a relationship with moral reason. Yangming opposed the traditional theory of the investigation of things that had nothing to do with self and mind, inherent nature and endowment, and his idea of viewing things as affairs was precisely aimed at filling this gap, yet it also changed the explanation of the investigation of things greatly: The word “investigation” [ge 格] in “the investigation of things” [gewu 格物] is the same as the “rectified” [ge 格] in Mencius’ saying that “A great man rectifies the ruler’s mind” [see Mencius, 4A.20], and means to eliminate what is incorrect in the mind so as to preserve the correctness of its original substance. Wherever intention is, incorrectness must be eliminated so correctness may be preserved. In other words, in all places and at all times Heavenly principle must be preserved. This is the probing of principle. Heavenly principle is illustrious virtue, and to probe principle is to manifest one’s illustrious virtue. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

This investigation of things is “rectifying thoughts,” which is making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying one’s mind, illuminating one’s illustrious virtue, as well as stopping at the highest good. Thus there is “no thing outside the mind, no affair outside the mind, no principle outside the mind, no righteousness outside the mind, and no goodness outside the mind” (“Letter to Wang Chunfu” [Yu Wang Chunfu 与 王纯甫], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 156). With this change, Yangming combined the three guiding principles and eight items from the Great Learning into one affair, in which “all is spoken of from the mind.” He thought his explanation combined mind and principle into one, and was a key step in eliminating the fault of separating mind and principle into two in Zhu Xi’s theory: What Zhuzi [Zhu Xi] meant by the investigation of things is probing the principles in things as we come into contact with them. To investigate the principles in things as we come into contact with them means to look into each individual thing and affair for its so-called definite principles. This means applying one’s mind to each individual thing and affair and looking for principle in it, and divides the mind and principle into two. For all things and affairs to attain their principle is the matter of the investigation of things, and this means combining the mind and principle into one. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Yangming’s definition of the investigation of things aimed to emphasise the universality of morality, taking every affair and matter as a medium for the advancement of morality.

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The Substance of the Mind-Mind Is Inherent Nature

Another important meaning of the ideas that mind is principle and there is no principle outside the mind is that goodness as the origin of moral behaviour is endowed by Heaven in people’s minds in a nascent form. The goodness endowed by Heaven is principle, thus “mind is principle.” Wang Yangming concluded this after he had established the supreme position of moral reason in his realisation at Longchang, proceeded to seek out the origin of moral reason, and then verified all this using classic texts. Since childhood, he had been well acquainted with Mencius’ theory of the four inklings and Lu Jiuyuan’s theory of the original mind, but this was merely his inheriting the theories of predecessors without deep experience of his own. It was only after Longchang that Yangming began to repeatedly emphasise that mind is principle, and to take it as the source of moral reason. Before Longchang, he followed a path of using the principles of things attained through the investigation of things to replenish the numinous clarity of mind and then transform this into Heavenly principle through self-discipline. After Longchang, he used the principle originally possessed in the mind to reduce and resolve the external principles of things. He said: “Inherent nature is the substance of the mind, and Heaven is the source of inherent nature. To exert one’s mind to the utmost is to fully develop one’s inherent nature” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). However, this inherent nature does not exist in the mind as a complete, mature form as “extensive and profound as a deep pool,” but as a weak rudiment. This is the original substance of mind, innate moral knowing. Record of Transmission and Practice states: [Ji] Weiqian 冀惟乾 asked, “How is it that knowing is the original substance of the mind?” The Master said, “Knowing is the numinous aspect of principle. In terms of its aspect as ruling master [of the body], it is called the mind. In terms of its aspect as innate endowment, it is called our inherent nature. That all infant children know how to love their parents and respect their elder brothers is simply due to this numinosity. If it is not obstructed by selfish desires, but rather developed and extended to the utmost, then it is completely its original substance and can unify its virtue with that of Heaven and Earth. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Another passage of Yangming’s can be seen as an explanation of this paragraph: Inherent nature is simply one. As physical form or body it is called Heaven. As ruling master it is called the Lord. In its flowing operation it is called endowment. As endowed to man it is called inherent nature. As master of the body it is called the mind. When it emanates from the mind we have filial piety when it is applied to the father, loyalty when it is applied to the ruler, and from this it goes on without end, nothing but this one inherent nature alone. … If we understand distinctly the single term “inherent nature,” all the myriad principles will become illuminated. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Yangming’s “mind is principle” penetrates the unity of Heaven and humanity, and understands the mind by placing it within the great system of the cosmos. For him, when one gathers together this unique inherent nature, it is the fundamental law of the cosmos. In the way that it necessarily manifests as a diverse multiplicity of

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concrete things and affairs, it is called Heaven, an aggregate of the infinite concrete things and affairs. Though the myriad things are numerous, there is an ancestral axis (zong 宗) that gathers them together. In the way that it is the ruling master of the myriad things, it is called the Lord (di 帝). The myriad things move according to the necessity of their own original natures without rest or cease, without missing out a single place. These are the necessity amidst contingency, and this is called endowment (ming 命). The endlessly productive and eternally unchanging quality of the necessity of this original nature when endowed to humanity becomes human nature, and is concretely expressed as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The fundamental law of the cosmos as the ruling master of the myriad things in the cosmos is called the Lord, while as the ruling master of the human body it is called the mind. This ruling function of the mind controls and directs human thought and action through reason, will, and emotion. The fundamental law of the cosmos is primevally one, and Heaven, the Lord, inherent nature, endowment and the mind all grasp a certain aspect of it. Hence, Yangming has propositions such as “mind is principle,” “mind is inherent nature,” “mind is dao,” “mind is Heaven,” etc. This is the philosophical basis for ideas of Yangming’s such as “humanity is the mind of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things” and “Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are originally my one substance,” and Yangming’s grounds for thinking his theory was simple and direct: since mind is principle and innate moral knowing is the germinal stage of the fundamental law of the cosmos, expanding and extending to the utmost this innate moral knowing in the mind to all things and affairs, enabling moral reason and epistemological reason to be developed and elevated, is a convenient and accessible path for everyone. When Huang Zongxi said, “Since Yaojiang pointed out that innate moral knowing is possessed by everyone, with reflection and self-attainment, everyone has a path to become a sage,” he commended Yangming’s contribution in highlighting the original substance of the mind submerged by later Confucians’ focus on seeking externally, and enabled people to follow their own moral reason in making efforts to become sages. Wang Yangming’s “mind is principle” also included the idea that the moral consciousness endowed by Heaven is sincerity, the highest good, and the state of centrality before the feelings are aroused. He said: Innate moral knowing is nothing other than a place where Heavenly principle spontaneously reveals itself in clear consciousness, and its original substance is simply true sincerity and compassion. Therefore, when the true sincerity and compassion of this innate moral knowing is extended to serve one’s parents, it becomes filial piety. When the true sincerity and compassion of this innate moral knowing is extended to obey one’s elder brother, it becomes brotherly respect. And when the true sincerity and compassion of this innate moral knowing is extended to serve one’s ruler, it becomes loyalty. There is but one innate moral knowing, one true sincerity and compassion. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Sincerity (cheng 诚) was originally a functional and descriptive concept that described the sincere quality of things and affairs operating necessarily according to their original natures, as in the phrase “sincerity is the dao of Heaven” from Centrality in the Ordinary. However, Neo-Confucians changed sincerity into an

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ontological concept, a value concept reflecting the awakening of the subject to the myriad things. For Wang Yangming, the original mind is sincerity, yet he tended to rather say that innate moral knowing is sincerity. Since mind is a concept that mixes together the metaphysical and the actual, the original substance and its expressions, so if one directly states that mind is inherent nature, is principle, or is true sincerity and commiseration, then one will have no way to eliminate the actual states of the mind moving qi and the seven feelings going to excess as described by Yangming. Therefore, when one speaks of the mind as principle, there must be analysis and restricted definition. Yangming often used innate moral knowing as a synonym for the original mind and the mind without any contamination. This original mind is also simultaneously the state of centrality before the feelings are aroused. He said: The inherent nature of all people is good. They all originally possess the qualities of centrality and harmony. How can we say that they are without them? However, since the mind of the ordinary man is obscured and darkened to some extent, although its original substance reveals itself from time to time, nevertheless it appears one moment and disappears the next. It is not the mind in its complete substance and great functioning. Only when the mind attains centrality at all times can it be named the great foundation, and only when it attains harmony at all times can it be said to have reached dao. Only those in the world who are perfectly sincere can establish the great foundation for the world.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Yangming regarded the state of centrality before feelings are aroused as originally possessed, meaning that in theory he accepted that the mind humans originally possess is rectified (zheng 正). Later, Wang Longxi 王龙溪 followed this point and developed it into the theory of the a priori rightness of mind, holding that preserving and trusting in the a priori original rightness of mind, not allowing it to be mixed up with the bad, and realising this original substance is effort. This point is further discussed in detail in the chapter on Wang Longxi. Although Yangming held that centrality and harmony are originally possessed by people, he thought that centrality and harmony are the substance of the mind in terms of its ideal state, while for actual people, their minds are necessarily affected by their endowment of qi [qibing 气禀, i.e. their physical bodies] and blinded by material desires. Therefore, people must exert effort to preserve Heavenly principle and eliminate human desires so as to return to the a priori originally possessed rightness. In Yangming’s thought, especially his early thought, this is consistent and holds a prominent position. He said: It cannot be said that ordinary people possess the state of centrality before feelings are aroused. Since “substance and function have one source,” given this substance, there is this function, and given the centrality before feelings are aroused, there is the harmony in which feelings are aroused and all attain due measure and degree. Since the people of today are not able to possess this harmony, we should accordingly know that they have not completely attained this state of centrality. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Since ordinary people cannot attain the state of centrality before feelings are aroused, the effort of preserving principle and eliminating desires is needed. However, since people originally possess the goodness endowed by Heaven, and it is not manifested only because it is obscured by material desires, so once human desires are eliminated, Heavenly principle will appear spontaneously. Thus,

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preserving Heavenly principle and eliminating human desires is only the single effort to eliminate human desires. Wang Yangming said: The human mind is a deep pool [yuan 渊] of Heaven. The original substance of the mind contains everything, and is originally a single Heaven. Only because it is hidden by selfish desires is the original substance of Heaven lost. The principle of the mind is infinite, and is originally one deep pool. Only because it is obstructed by selfish desires is the original substance of this deep pool lost. Now if one extends innate moral knowing in every thought and removes all these hindrances and obstacles, its original substance will return and it will be a deep pool of Heaven. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Preserving principle and eliminating desires was the main content of effort for Neo-Confucians in the Song and Ming dynasties, and was especially emphasised in the Learning of the Mind. The phrases “eliminate human desires and preserve Heavenly principle in every thought” and “reflect on, examine, overcome and govern [the self]” can be found throughout Yangming‘s works. His theory of effort has a very obvious characteristic, namely an emphasis on preserving principle and eliminating desires in actual affairs and actions and not in reading books or meditation. Therefore, he strongly advocated the theory of the unification of knowledge and action, which both was the backbone of all his effort and also a feature of his character. His guiding principle of moral reason leading and driving epistemological reason must also be filled out and implemented in the unification of knowledge and action.

3 The Unification of Knowledge and Action The theory of the unification of knowledge and action was proposed by Wang Yangming quite early. At Longchang, when the vice superintendent of training Xi Shu 席书 invited him to be a director at Guiyang Academy, Yangming had already started to lecture on the theory of the unification of knowledge and action. His theory was poles apart from the theory of knowledge first and action later that prevailed at the time, and therefore most of the students did not believe it. The following year, he taught his students to meditate and understand the substance of inherent nature for themselves. He also had his regrets, saying: “I regretted once teaching the theory of the unification of knowledge and action at Guiyang. There were many disagreements and they did not know where to begin. Since then I practice meditation with students in temples so that they can realise the substance of inherent nature for themselves” (“Chronicle,” Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1230). The most detailed exposition of the unification of knowledge and action can be found in Yangming’s response to Xu Ai’s question about learning in Record of Transmission and Practice: Ai did not understand the Master’s theory of the unification of knowledge and action, debating it back and forth with [Huang] Zongxian 黄宗贤 and [Gu] Weixian 顾惟贤 without coming to any conclusion, and therefore took the matter to the Master. The Master said, “Give an example and let me see.” Ai said, “For example, there are people who know

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that parents should be served with filial piety and elder brothers with respect, but cannot put these things into practice. This shows that knowledge and action are clearly two different things.” The Master said, “The knowledge and action you refer to are already separated by selfish desires and are no longer knowledge and action in their original substance. There have never been people who know but do not act. Those who are thought to know but do not act simply do not yet know. When sages and worthies taught people about knowledge and action, it was precisely because they wanted them to restore their original substance, and not simply to do this or that and be satisfied. Therefore the Great Learning points out true knowledge and action for people to see, saying they are ‘like loving beautiful colours and hating bad odours.’ Seeing beautiful colours appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colours appertains to action. However, as soon as one sees a beautiful colour, he already loves it. It is not that he sees it first and then makes up his mind to love it. Smelling a bad odour appertains to knowledge, while hating a bad odour appertains to action. However, as soon as one smells a bad odour, he already hates it. It is not that he smells it first and then makes up his mind to hate it. A person with his nose stuffed up does not smell the bad odour even if he sees a malodourous object before him, and so he does not hate it. This amounts to not knowing bad odour. Suppose we say that so-and-so knows filial piety and so-and-so knows brotherly respect. They must have actually practiced filial piety and brotherly respect before they can be said to know them. It will not do to say that they know filial piety and brotherly respect simply because they show them in words. Or take one’s knowledge of pain. Only after one has experienced pain can one know pain. The same is true of cold or hunger. How can knowledge and action be separated? This is the original substance of knowledge and action, which has not yet been cut off by selfish desires. In teaching people, the sages insisted that only this can be called knowledge. Otherwise, one does not yet know. This is a serious and practical business. What is the point of desperately insisting on knowledge and action being two different things? And what is the point of my insisting that they are one? What is the use of insisting on their being one or two unless one knows the principal purpose of establishing the doctrine?” Ai said, “In saying that knowledge and action are two different things, the ancients intended to have people distinguish and understand them, so that they make an effort to know on the one hand and to act on the other, as only then can the effort find its application.” The Master said, “This is to lose sight of the principal purpose of the ancients. I have said that knowledge is the direction for action and action the effort of knowledge, and that knowledge is the beginning of action and action the completion of knowledge. If this is understood, then when only knowledge is mentioned, action is included, and when only action is mentioned, knowledge is included. The reason why the ancients talked about knowledge and action separately is that there are people in the world who are confused and act on impulse without any sense of deliberation or self-examination, and who thus always behave blindly and erroneously. Therefore it is necessary to talk to them about knowledge before their action becomes correct. There are also those who are intellectually vague and undisciplined and think in a vacuum. They are not at all willing to make the effort of concrete practice. They only pursue shadows and echoes, as it were. It is therefore necessary to talk to them about action before their knowledge becomes true. The ancients could not help talking this way in order to restore balance and remedy defects. If we understand this motive, then a single word [either knowledge or action] will do. Yet people today distinguish between knowledge and action and pursue them separately, believing that one must first know before he can act. They will discuss and learn the business of knowledge first, they say, and wait until they truly know before they put their knowledge into practice. Consequently, to the last day of their life, they will never act and also never know. This theory of knowing first and acting later is not a minor disease and it did not come about only yesterday. My present advocacy of the unification of knowledge and action is precisely the treatment for this disease. The theory is not my baseless imagination, for it is the original substance of knowledge and action [that they are one]. Now that we know this principal purpose, it will do no harm to

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talk about them separately, since they are only one. If the principal purpose is not understood, however, even if we say they are one, what is the use? It is just idle talk. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

In this long conversation, Wang Yangming explained the true meaning of the unification of knowledge and action and his painstaking effort in advocating it. Before Yangming, what was generally discussed about the question of knowledge and action was the sequence, degree of importance, and relationship between knowledge and action. Most scholars believed in knowledge as prior to action, that action is more important than knowledge, and that knowledge and action develop mutually. Yangming did not comment on these. In his theory, knowledge and action are two sides of the same activity, like the two wheels of one cart or the two wings of one bird, which cannot be separated. When speaking of knowledge, action is logically included; when speaking of action, knowledge is also logically included. In Yangming’s opinion, a single action must consist of two factors: one is reason and its guidance of action; the other is the actual movement guided by reason. Any actual activity is a unification of reason and action. The guidance of reason in actual activity belongs to knowledge, while the concrete movement belongs to action: the direction of action expresses rational will, while the skillfulness or clumsiness of action expresses the refinement or roughness of reason. Knowledge is expressed as the intention, reasoning and resolution of action, while action is expressed as the actual conduct of a rational directive in a specific time and space. As Yangming said, “Action in its conscious and discriminating aspect is knowledge, and knowledge in its genuine and earnest aspect is action” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Generally speaking, an actual activity is always created and intended in knowledge, and actually carried out in action. One can also say that it begins in knowledge, and is completed in action. Hence Yangming said, “Knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Here Yangming took the stance of a practitioner, making a point about the elements of activity in general and their respective roles. He did not discuss the question of the origins of knowledge and action, which is a chicken and egg question that can be argued in circles. He did not get involved in discussions about the sequence and the relative degree of importance of knowledge and action either, since the unification of knowledge and action itself eliminates the meaning of these questions. He took knowledge and action as two sides of the same activity, which was one step forward than former scholars in terms of his method of thinking about the question: he did not regard knowledge and action as existing in isolation, instead situating the two in a unified whole: man’s actual activity, in which it is not possible to separate knowledge from action. Discussing knowledge and action in separation is a result of people’s speculative abstraction. Wang Yangming restored these things that originally could not be separated, making knowledge and action interconnected, permeating and containing one another. Therefore Yangming said: “When has the learning of the superior man ever departed from practical affairs and discarded discussions? However, whenever he is engaged in practical affairs or discussion, he insists that the efforts of

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knowledge and action are combined. He is unlike those who devote themselves to merely talking and listening as though that were knowledge, and divide knowledge and action into two separate affairs” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Moreover, Wang Yangming‘s philosophy is in essence an ethical philosophy. The knowledge and action he speaks of mainly mean moral significance and moral behaviour. In his discussions of the unification of knowledge and action, most of the examples he gave were related to morality, such as the activity of serving one’s parents, being loyal to one’s ruler, etc. In terms of moral activity, the unification of knowledge and action emphasises that moral activity must be an activity involving and guided by the commands of moral reason, such that the reason why a particular action is good is because it arises from the self-determination and self-consciousness of moral reason. An unconscious, “unexpected bull’s-eye” and an “action compelled under the pressure of circumstances” in which reason loses control have no moral meaning, no matter what their effect may be. Next, if Yangming’s unification of knowledge and action without separation, as two sides of the same one activity, is extended to the utmost, then we can say that any behaviour is a unification of knowledge and action, and it is impossible for anyone or any behaviour not to be a unification of knowledge and action. However, Yangming emphasised the original substance of knowledge and action, that “one who knows is necessarily able to act,” such that if one can know but not act, this means the original substance of knowledge and action has been cut off by selfish desires. Those people who are confused and act without knowing and those who are intellectually vague or undisciplined and know without acting have all lost the original substance of knowledge and action and need to eliminate selfish desires so as to restore the original substance of the unification of knowledge and action. Yangming mainly focused on correcting the fault of knowing but not acting among scholars at the time. When Yangming said: “But people today distinguish between knowledge and action and pursue them separately, believing that one must know before he can act. They will discuss and learn the business of knowledge first, they say, and wait till they truly know before they put their knowledge into practice. Consequently, to the last day of life, they will never act and also will never know” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II), he was clearly targeting those who believe in knowing first and acting later. In Yangming’s opinion, moral activity should be expressed in behavioural. A difference between moral activity and cognitive activity is that cognitive activity can be pure knowledge and is not necessarily realised in action. Moral activity on the other hand must be realised in action, as Yangming said: “Suppose we say that so-and-so knows filial piety and so-and-so knows brotherly respect. They must have actually practiced filial piety and brotherly respect… It will not do to say that they know filial piety and brotherly respect simply because they show them in words.” Yangming’s aim in proposing the original substance of knowledge and action was to rectify the malady of knowing but not acting. Many of his criticisms of Zhu Xi were from the perspective of the unification of knowledge and action. In his view, Zhu Xi’s concept of knowledge was mainly epistemological activity, and mainly knowledge from books, “all his energy expended on volumes” instead of on actual moral activity.

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Moreover, Yangming’s original intention in proposing the theory of the unification of knowledge and action was also to rectify the worst aspect of the scholarly ethos: hypocrisy and deception. “Record of the Provincial Examination in Shandong” (Shandong xiangshi lu 山东乡试录) described the ethos of the time: The trouble with present social customs lies in the focus on circulation instead of loyalty and trust, valuing advancement rather than integrity, stressing cunning instead of simplicity and straightforwardness, discussing style and grammar but neglecting morality and justice, discussing forms and traces but leaving behind their original intention, upholding harmony and alliance but despising uprightness. These troubles have been immersing, contaminating and habituating people for a long time, and the people of the world have now already lost themselves in it without being aware. (Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, Appendix to Vol. XXII, 866)

He also said in a dedication to one of his friends: In later times, utilitarian ideas have come to increasingly prevail, and people no longer know the reality of illuminating one’s illustrious virtue and loving the people. Scholars are all skilful at using words for disguise and pretence, imitating one other with falseness, and befriending one another for profit. They are all very well dressed on the outside but are as beasts inside, and yet still think they are devoted to the learning of the sages and worthies. With the situation like this, if one desires to reverse the trend and return to the Three Dynasties [i.e. the ancient Xia, Shang and Zhou], it will be extremely difficult! Fearing this, I proposed my theory of the unification of knowledge and action, and corrected the mistakes concerning the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things, wishing to use these to rectify people’s minds and extinguish heretical theories, so as to seek to illuminate the learning of the sages of the past. (“Volume of Lessons for Literati Circles” [书林司训 卷], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 282)

Wang Yangming’s proposition of the theory of the unification of knowledge and action and his correction of the Cheng-Zhu theory of the investigation of things were both aimed at rectifying the ethos of the time and restoring the original substance of knowledge with action, of simplicity and honesty, sincerity and respectfulness. He particularly emphasised “true knowledge” (zhenzhi 真知), which according to him, is “that which by which one carries out actions, and unless it is acted on it cannot be called true knowledge” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). There are two aspects of true knowledge. The first aspect is necessarily acting after knowing, and this intrinsic requirement for action is the original meaning and logical content of knowledge. If there is fear or laziness, true knowledge will be hidden; when these obstacles are eliminated, action will proceed by itself. The second aspect is that true knowledge knows how to act. This is a spontaneous demand of the moral reason within true knowledge for epistemological reason and for means of action. As analysed above, moral reason possesses the initiative power to urge epistemological reason to actively seek knowledge and improve the means of action. This is a characteristic of Yangming’s learning of the mind, and also his profound realisation and expression of the characteristic of Chinese philosophy of commanding knowledge with ethics. His true knowledge combines aims and means into one. When one applies effort in true knowledge, the reasonableness of behaviour will naturally be present. Therefore, when his disciple asked him, “A former Confucian said, ‘Every blade of grass and every tree

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possesses principle, and so must be examined.’ What do you say to that?” Yangming replied saying, “I have no time for that. You had better understand your own inherent nature and feelings first. It is necessary to first develop one’s own inherent nature to the fullest extent before one can fully develop that of things” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). That is to say, the primary significance of learning lies in understanding the substance of one’s own mind, then once the substance of one’s mind is understood and is true knowledge, then both one’s own inherent nature and that of things can be developed to the fullest extent. The true essence of virtue and the clarity of understanding are two aspects of the same one mind. Yangming’s true knowledge can be regarded as an organic integration of knowledge, emotion and intention, a dynamic, balanced system that constantly achieves harmony in practice. Among these three, intention demands lucid clarity of the substance of the mind, chooses a good motivation, requires reason to provide it with the means to realise this motivation, and evaluates the action after it is completed. Under the control of intention, reason judges and extrapolates, pursuing the realisation of the best result through the action. Emotion on the other hand accepts the evaluation of intention, meeting the demand for balance in the subject’s mental state through regret and unease. Here, the lucid clarity of the substance of the mind required by true knowledge is a precondition. Lucid clarity is refinement, as Yangming said: “If one is refined, he will be bright, single-minded, spiritual, and sincere“(Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Only if one is refined can his knowledge, emotions and intentions function effectively. Setting out from his aim of eliminating the impractical atmosphere of knowing but not acting in order to rectify the social ethos, Wang Yangming also proposed the idea that “when a thought is aroused it is already action.” As recorded in Record of Transmission and Practice, when his disciple asked him about the unification of knowledge and action, he said: “You need to understand the basic purpose of my doctrine. In their learning, the people of today separate knowledge and action into two different things. Therefore when a thought is aroused, although it is bad, they do not stop it because it has not been translated into action. I advocate the unification of knowledge and action precisely because I want people to understand that when a thought is aroused it is already action. If there is anything bad when a thought is aroused, one must overcome the bad thought. One must penetrate to the root and the base and not allow that bad thought to lie latent in his mind. This is the basic purpose of my doctrine” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). The correct explanation of the unification of knowledge and action is knowledge together with action, knowledge and action as two sides of the same single effort. The reason he held that “when a thought is aroused it is already action” was to rectify the mistaken approach emphasising doing good and eliminating bad in action but neglecting it in the mind. Wang once used a Chan Buddhist allusion to compare eliminating the bad to a cat catching mice, which requires total concentration and firm determination, as only then bad thoughts can be eliminated, leaving not even the smallest way out. “When a thought is aroused it is already action” aims to emphasise this and cannot be seen as the correct explanation for the unification of

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knowledge and action. However, if Yangming’s “no things outside the mind, no principle outside the mind” is pushed to its extreme, then the statement “when a thought is aroused it is already action” can be derived from it. Since Yangming argued that “wherever the intention is directed is a thing,” what he called a thing does not always necessarily have to be an objective action manifested in a subject, but can be in thought or consciousness. What is emphasised in “when a thought is aroused it is already action” is the reflection, examination, overcoming and governing of the mind. This is much more difficult than the correction of actual action, so must be emphasised. This is consistent with his idea of the investigation of things as “rectifying thoughts” and making one’s intentions sincere. However, “the unification of knowledge and action” focuses on rectifying the faults of taking knowledge and action as two efforts, knowing first and acting later, and even neither knowing nor acting for one’s entire life. Although “true knowledge is that which by which one carries out actions, and unless it is acted on it cannot be called true knowledge” and “when a thought is aroused it is already action” are both meanings originally present in Yangming’s thought, the former is primary. The unification of knowledge and action is a slogan Wang Yangming proposed after his realisation at Longchang, and although he often spoke of the meanings contained within it, he seldom mentioned the slogan itself. In his later years he mentioned it during his debates with friends, but in the records of his conversations and letters during his middle age it scarcely appears. Since he proposed the central principle of “the extension of innate moral knowing” at the age of fifty, the unification of knowledge and action became an important connotation of “the extension of innate moral knowing” and was embedded within it. Liu Zongzhou once pointed out: “When the Master taught people, the most important was to eliminate human desires and preserve Heavenly principle, and then to further this with the idea of the unification of knowledge and action, the core of which is embedded in the extension of innate moral knowing. Though he accumulated hundreds and thousands of words, they are all merely explanations revolving around these three characters [i.e. the extension of innate moral knowing]” (“Preface to ‘A Record of the Message Transmitted by Yangming’” [Yangming chuanxin lu 阳明传信录], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 184). Huang Zongxi also said: “The Master extended it [i.e. innate moral knowing] to things and affairs, with the word ‘extension’ being also the word ‘action,’ in order to remedy the empty probing of principles, and demanded only a difference in the results of knowledge” (“Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). The unification of knowledge and action is an important theoretical basis for Wang Yangming’s views on morality driving knowledge, completing the cultivation of character in practice, and mustering the effort of inner sageliness and outer kingliness. His own life experience is a footnote to this idea. His academic learning and concrete contributions came from the unification of knowledge and action, and his Confucian manner lay in his unification of knowledge and action. Later, Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 criticism of Wang Yangming as “taking knowledge as action” was because he did not see this characteristic of Yangming, or rather, because he had another intended position.

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Wang Yangming’s theory of the unification of knowledge and action was no longer mentioned after he proposed the extension of innate moral knowing, and scholars at this time mostly discussed his extension of innate moral knowing and his Four-Sentence Teaching, the teaching of the unification of knowledge and action having almost totally disappeared. However, in the school of the “New Learning of Mind” in modern Chinese philosophy in the mid-20th century, the theory of the unification of knowledge and action was developed further. He Lin 贺麟 [1902–1992], the representative figure of the New Learning of Mind, took over the theory that knowledge and action are two sides of the same single activity and added the Absolute Spirit as both knowledge and action from neo-Hegelianism, along with the theory of body-mind parallelism from Spinoza, to give an elucidation of the question of knowledge and action with modern philosophical significance. Firstly, He Lin proposed two theories of the unification of knowledge and action: “the spontaneous unification of knowledge and action” and “the unification of knowledge and action as a value.” The knowledge in the spontaneous unification of knowledge and action refers to all conscious activity, while action refers to all physiological activity. Knowing is spiritual while action is material. Knowing and action are two aspects of the same process, and any activity is a combination of conscious and physical activities, although the relative degrees of knowledge and action differ. Some activities are mainly conscious activities, such as reading books, while other activities are mainly physiological activities, such as sports. The former are explicitly knowledge and implicitly action, while the latter are explicitly action and implicitly knowledge. However, both of them express the identity of knowledge (consciousness) and action (physics). He Lin’s unification of knowledge and action has several meanings, including that knowledge and action initiate simultaneously, that knowledge and action operate in parallel, and that knowledge and action are two sides of the same single physical-mental activity. He called this unification of knowledge and action a “spontaneous unification of knowledge and action” because, “As long as man has conscious activity (knowledge), the following of the body can never be cancelled. Wherever there is the order of consciousness, there will be always the fact of the unification of knowledge and action” (Chinese Philosophy in the Past Fifty Years [Wushi nianlai de Zhongguo zhexue 五十年来的 中国哲学], 136). “The unification of knowledge and action as a value” means that the unification of knowledge and action is an ideal that should be so, something that can only be achieved through human striving and not just a ready-made fact. The knowledge and action in the unification of knowledge and action as a value is similar in its meaning to the “knowledge” and “action” in the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. The unification of knowledge and action as a value first divided knowledge and action into two affairs according to common sense, and then used various efforts to seek their unification. He Lin held that regardless whether one considers the spontaneous unification of knowledge and action or the unification of knowledge and action as a value, if analysed speculatively, one can derive the following conclusions. Firstly, knowledge is the essence of action, and action is an expression of knowledge. This is because the distinguishing

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characteristic of human activity is that it is guided by knowledge, not by instinct. Without the meaning of knowledge, human activity is purely physical activity. Therefore, knowledge is substance and action is function. “Action is a tool for expressing or conveying knowledge, and knowledge is the ruling master that guides action” (Chinese Philosophy in the Past Fifty Years, 141). Secondly, knowledge dominates and action follows; knowledge always determines action, and action is forever determined by knowledge. Incorrect actions are determined by incorrect knowledge, and correct actions are determined by correct knowledge, with no exception. Thirdly, knowledge is the purpose and action is the tool. Action is always the means and function of knowledge. He Lin’s first and third conclusions absorbed the thought of Hegel: Absolute Spirit determines all its self-externalisations, and all activities that have occurred in human history are expressions of Absolute Spirit, all having the purpose of completing Absolute Spirit. His second conclusion absorbed Spinoza’s ideas that behaviour is always determined by thought, that correct knowledge is expressed as free behaviour, and that knowledge of Heavenly principle is a precondition for acting according to Heavenly principle. He Lin also criticised the “epiphenomenalism” which holds that body and mind are always in parallel, but that spiritual activity is a mere shadow of bodily activity, and thus that “the body dominates and action follows.” He Lin thought that this theory was precisely in opposition to the thought of Wang Yangming. He also pointed out that Wang Yangming’s unification of knowledge and action actually contains two accounts: one is the unification of knowledge and action as a correction of deviations and remedy for faults, the other is the original unification of knowledge and action, or their original form or structure. The correction of deviations and remedying of faults means separating knowledge and action from their original unification in order to correct and remedy the two faults of knowing without acting, or speculating on effects, and acting without knowing, or behaving absurdly and blindly. Such a unification of knowledge and action is an ideal that requires hard work if it is to be achieved. The original unification of knowledge and action means that knowledge and action are so spontaneously and originally, such that even if one desired them to not be unified it could not be achieved. He Lin held that although Wang Yangming’s unification of knowledge and action was close to the “spontaneous unification of knowledge and action,” it was nonetheless not completely identical to it. What Yangming actually emphasised was the unification of knowledge and action as a value. The unification of knowledge and action as a value can be further divided into two schools: one is the ideal unification of knowledge and action as a value, as advocated by Zhu Xi, because he took the investigation of things with the extension of knowledge and self-discipline with the use of respect to be two affairs, the unification of the two being an ideal pursued by people. The other school is the forthright and sincere unification of knowledge and action as a value (the original form and structure of knowledge and action) that was advocated by Wang Yangming. It was an inevitable development from Zhu Xi’s ideal unification of knowledge and action as a value to Wang Yangming’s intuitive forthright and sincere unification of knowledge and action as a value. He Lin’s view here is consistent with his views that contemporary

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Chinese philosophy is a magnificent development of the learning of Lu [Jiuyuan] and Wang [Yangming], and that from Zhu Xi to Wang Yangming, from the Learning of Principle to the unification of the Learning of Mind and the Learning of Principle was an inevitable process of development. The theory of the unification of knowledge and action in the New Learning of Mind was influenced by the theories of Hegel and Spinoza, and borrowed the views and analytical method concerning questions of knowledge and action from contemporary Western behavioural psychology. He Lin’s aims were: first, to emphasise the guiding function of knowledge towards action, breaking dogmatic ethics and finding an epistemological foundation for correct action. This was an improvement he proposed concerning the lack of epistemology in Chinese ethics after he compared the different characters of Chinese and Western moral philosophy. Second, he wanted to emphasise the determinacy and primacy of knowledge and guide people to put their main effort into knowledge, so as to break the old theory that “knowing is easy but acting is difficult,” to coordinate with Sun Yat-sen’s 孙中山 theory that knowing is difficult and action is easy, and to provide theoretical proof for Sun’s great plan to remould the citizens‘deep-rooted habits of being lazy, afraid of difficulties and comfort-seeking and embark on “psychological construction.” He Lin’s new theory of the unification of knowledge and action was an echo of Wang Yangming’s theory in modern China, and also He Lin’s attempt to adapt the ancient for use in the present.

4 The Extension of Innate Moral Knowing 4.1

The Proposing of the Extension of Innate Moral Knowing

“The extension of innate moral knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知) was proposed by Wang Yangming as an academic goal when he summarised the principles of his teachings across different periods of the past after crushing the revolt of [Zhu] Chenhao, especially his realisations concerning a series of significant philosophical questions reached during several important military and political activities. He once said: “The meaning of my term innate moral knowing was not yet revealed after Longchang. The words were pointed out but the meaning was not revealed, and I argued with scholars, wasting many words on different ideas. Now I am fortunate to perceive this meaning, to have insight to the complete substance under this one word, it is truly delightful” (Qian Dehong 钱德洪, “Introductory Comments on Record of Carved Writings” [Kewen lu xushuo 刻文录序说], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1575). The realisation at Longchang enabled Wang Yangming to conclude that “the dao of the sages is self-sufficient in our inherent nature, so it is a mistake to seek principle from things and affairs.” “Self-sufficient in our inherent nature” means that innate moral knowing is originally possessed.

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Not to seek principle from affairs and things but to seek it in the mind is the extension of knowledge. But the “extension of innate moral knowing” at this time only specified the path of Yangming’s effort from internal to external, and a lot of concrete content needed to be filled out gradually along with the expansion of the range of practice and the deepening of realisation. Crushing the revolt of [Zhu] Chenhao and the following political struggle with [Zhang] Zhong and [Xu] Tai were great tests of will and wisdom for Yangming. Along the way, many vital trials and life-death struggles provoked in him a thorough reflection on his past studies. Yangming and his disciples discussed the meaning of this event for his progress in his studies many times, as recorded in his chronicle: After experiencing the incidents of Chenhao and of [Zhang] Zhong and [Xu] Tai, he increasingly believed that innate moral knowing is truly sufficient to forget one’s troubles and struggles, and detach oneself from life and death. The so-called trials of the three [ancient] kings, the establishing of Heaven and Earth, the questioning of ghosts and spirits, and the waiting for later sages, these are all the same as this. (Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1278)

Yangming himself also said: Recently I have come to believe that the extension of innate moral knowing is the entrance to sagehood, the right dharma, and the true insight. In past years my doubts were not exhausted, yet now after experiencing many events, this innate moral knowing alone is sufficient. It is like navigating a boat, in that when one steers with its rudder, then there are smooth waves and shallow ripples such that all is pleasing. Even if there is a strong wind and cross-waves, as long as the rudder is under control, one can avoid the danger of being drowned. (Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1278)

He also said: This theory of the extension of innate moral knowing was attained through innumerable hardships and life-death struggles. It was not easy to attain this insight. (Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1575)

His disciple Qian Dehong also said: The theory of innate moral knowing was developed in the year of Xin Si 辛巳 during the Zhengde period, and after the Master suffered through the incident of [Zhu] Chenhao and the struggle of [Zhang] Zhong and [Xu] Tai, the theory was further confirmed and developed. (Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1575) In the fierce political and military environment, among truculent petty men who enjoyed framing others, Wang Yangming mastered changes in power, coping steadily and calmly, and finally extricated himself from difficult situations, turning danger to safety. In this situation in which “nine people out of every ten face death,” the intention, reason, and emotion contained in his innate moral knowing were greatly exercised, and he achieved a more thorough understanding of the truth of human life and the essence of the human world. Various false masks, entanglements, and concealments of the past were all cut off at this point; the so-called true self and innate moral knowing became more pure and refined, more clear and penetrating. Yangming once described this kind of change, saying:

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“Before I went to the southern capital [i.e. Nanjing], I still harboured a few ideas from the hypocritical villagers; I now believe in the true right and wrong of innate moral knowing. I trust in acting freely without any effort to cover up or to conceal. Only now have I come to achieve the mind of the madman. Let all the people in the world go ahead and say that my actions do not betray my words.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Actions not betraying words and believing in the true right and wrong of innate moral knowing is “sincerity,” while “smooth waves and shallow ripples such that all is pleasing” is illumination. Yangming here truly achieved the stage of sincerity with illumination, illumination with sincerity, and sincerity and illumination both advancing. Wang Yangming’s high levels of wisdom in dealing with others and ability to respond to changes were not gained in one fell stroke, or suddenly achieved in a single battle or incident, but were rather attained through the long-term exercise and cultivation of his theories and practice. The most important two aspects of his theory of innate moral knowing are will and intellect. According to Yangming, the path of effort in Zhu Xi’s learning can at most provide people with wisdom and knowledge, but not will. In an arduous environment (such as Longchang) or a complex and dangerous situation (such as the political struggle with Zhang [Zhong] and Xu [Tai]), will can function more effectively than wisdom, and is most important in the whole personality structure. His whole life, he advocated a path that placed morality as the primary task, used morality to drive and motivate knowledge, and put the improvement of the overall quality of man as an end-result. He usually taught his disciples to pay more attention to exerting effort on moral reason and will, using his own experiences to teach people to exercise their will during changing events: Changes and transformations of temperament cannot be seen when living in ordinary life. Only when facing gains and losses, experiencing changes and accidents, or suffering humiliations do people who used to be angry no longer feel angry and people who used to panic no longer feel panic, and then we can say that these people have attained their place of strength, which is also where strength should be exerted. Although affairs in the world undergo a myriad changes, what one can respond with is nothing more than happiness, anger, sadness and joy. This is the core of learning, and the means for politics is also contained within. (“Letter to Wang Chunfu” [Yu Wang Chunfu 与王纯甫], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 154)

Yangming often asked his disciples to seek their place of strength, which is a real experience of self and mind, not endless discussions and lectures. His theories of the unification of knowledge and action, no principle outside the mind, and the extension of innate moral knowing were all results of his own experience. The core principle of his “extension of innate moral knowing” is a summary of half a lifetime of military and political experience, and also a summary and purification of his life-long teaching principles. With his superior ability of incorporation and explanation, he folded Confucian philosophical categories including the three cardinal bonds and eight terms (sangang bamu 三纲八目) from the Great Learning, personal integrity when alone (shen du 慎独), sincerity, inherent nature, dao and teaching from Centrality in the Ordinary, and “only through refinement and unity” from the Book of

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Documents into his “extension of innate moral knowing,” enabling innate moral knowing to be more broadly inclusive. He even equated innate moral knowing with the changes (yi 易) [of the Book of Changes (Yijing 易经)]: Innate moral knowing is also the changes. As the dao, it changes frequently. It changes and moves without staying in one place, flowing around into the six empty places [of the hexagrams]. It ascends and descends without constancy, and its elements of strength and weakness interchange. It cannot be considered as an invariable standard, since it changes to suit the circumstances. How can this knowing be grasped? When one sees it transparently, he is a sage. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

This broad, expanded notion of “innate moral knowing” led to results in two aspects: on the one hand, it showed that Wang Yangming’s doctrine reached a creative pinnacle and possessed a great inclusivity. He was able to use the three-character term “extension of innate moral knowing” to explain almost every related academic question, such that “though he accumulated hundreds and thousands of words, they were all merely explanations revolving around these three characters.” This was the “simplicity and directness” of his theories. Because of this simplicity and adaptability, Yangming’s theories won many followers, spreading rapidly across vast areas and becoming the prominent learning of the time. On the other hand, such simplicity and adaptability led to divergence among later scholars concerning many aspects of how to understand the extension of innate moral knowing, deviating from Wang Yangming’s original intention in establishing his theory. Huang Zongxi once said: “Since the theory of the extension of innate moral knowing was proposed in [Wang Yangming’s] old age and he did not have the opportunity to probe deeply into its meaning with his students, his later disciples mixed in their own views, discussing the abstruse and the wonderful almost like they were playing [the ancient guessing game] shefu 射覆, and not returning to his original meaning in establishing his theory” (“Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). There are some inaccuracies in Huang Zongxi’s assessment. The purpose of Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing was very clear in its meaning. It is true that development in their studies and the needs of the time meant that Yangming’s disciples deviated from their master’s original meaning, but it is definitely not the case that he “did not have the opportunity to probe deeply into its meaning with his students.” From his proposing of the theory of the extension of innate moral knowing at fifty to his death at fifty-seven, Yangming gave a great number of explanations concerning the extension of innate moral knowing, especially when he was living in Yue 越 in mourning after the death of his father, where his teaching activities reached a peak and he had repeated discussions and arguments with his disciples concerning the extension of innate moral knowing. He used the extension of innate moral knowing to thread together the various meanings of the Great Learning in his Inquiry on the Great Learning (Daxue wen 大学问), which was written in his late years as a summary of the core principle of his whole life’s studies.

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(1) The illumination and numinous awareness of heavenly principle The concept of innate moral knowing originated from the Mencius. Mencius once said: “That which a man is able to do without having to learn is his innate ability; that which he knows without having to reflect on is his innate knowing. There are no young children who do not know to love their parents, and when they grow up, there are none who do not respect their elder brothers” (Mencius, 7A.15), holding that people naturally possess a moral consciousness that does not need to be learned or deliberated, the original manifestation of which is loving one’s parents and respecting one’s elder brothers. The reason this is called “innate moral knowing” (liangzhi 良知), is firstly because this moral consciousness is good, and secondly because it is possessed transcendentally. Moral cultivation lies in taking this transcendental moral consciousness and cultivating it from being like “a fire catching light or a spring bursting through” [Mencius, 2A.6] to the status of being “broad and all-embracing, deep and unceasingly springing forth” [Centrality in the Ordinary]. All of Mencius’ methods of self-discipline, such as accumulating righteousness and cultivating qi, took this as a starting point. Wang Yangming inherited this idea from Mencius. He said: The mind is spontaneously able to know. When it perceives one’s father, it spontaneously knows that one should be filial. When it perceives one’s elder brother, it spontaneously knows that one should be respectful. And when it perceives a child falling into a well, it spontaneously knows that one should be compassionate. This is innate moral knowing and need not be sought externally. If that which issues from innate moral knowing is not obstructed by selfish intentions, the result will be like the saying that if a man gives full development to his compassionate mind, his benevolence will be more than he can ever put into practice. However, the ordinary man is not able to be free from the obstruction of selfish desires, and therefore requires the effort of the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things in order to overcome his selfishness and return to principle. Then the mind’s innate moral knowing will no longer be obstructed, and will be able to fill up and flow out, thereby extending its knowing. When knowing is extended, the intentions become sincere.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

This complete explanation includes both original substance and effort, clearly expressing the meaning of Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing. Compared with Mencius’ definition of innate moral knowing, we can say that Yangming placed more emphasis on innate moral knowing’s characteristic of spontaneously manifesting in the mind and being consciously perceived by the subject. If innate moral knowing was for Mencius mainly an obscure “feeling” (the feeling of the four inklings) in its germinal stage, then for Yangming, innate moral knowing was mainly an “awareness” clearly apparent at the level of perception. Yangming invested such awareness with a greater tint of “knowing.” Next, this paragraph adds the effort in cultivation from Confucians after Mencius, especially the content of “overcoming selfishness and returning to principle” repeatedly emphasised by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, giving a status of equal importance to the two aspects of the effort of innate moral knowing, namely the positive aspect of

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preserving and trusting in innate moral knowing to fill up and flow out and the negative aspect of overcoming selfishness and returning to principle, and combining these with the extension of knowledge and making one’s intentions sincere from the Great Learning. The above passage was recorded by Xu Ai, showing that in Yangming’s early thought he had already fused Mencius’ innate moral knowing with the extension of knowledge and making one’s intentions sincere from the Great Learning. Although Yangming augmented it somewhat, his thought here is still largely found in Mencius, and remains simple, plain and most basic compared with the many complex and subtle ideas he invested into innate moral knowing in his later years. In his work Inquiry on the Great Learning, which represents the mature thought of his later years, Yangming used this as the starting point for all effort: This means that even the mind of the petty man necessarily possesses the benevolence of [forming] one body [with the myriad things]. Such a mind is rooted in his Heaven-endowed inherent nature, is spontaneously numinous, bright, and unclouded, and for this reason is called “illustrious virtue.” Although the mind of the petty man is divided and narrow, yet his mind of [forming] one body can remain unclouded. … Thus the learning of the great man consists only in getting rid of the obscuration of selfish desires in order to spontaneously illuminate his illustrious virtue, so as to restore his original inherent nature of forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, that is all. It is not that outside of original substance something else can be added. (Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 968)3

In Yangming’s view, “humanity is the mind of Heaven and Earth,” and maximally and most perfectly embodies the fundamental regulation of the cosmos. In this sense, a human is a concrete and microscopic cosmos. The human mind is also where humans’ perception and numinous clarity are to be found, and therefore “the human mind is the place in which Heaven and Earth issue forth into the open.” The fundamental regulation of the cosmos is expressed through this aperture in the human mind. The entire essence of the cosmos is present in the human mind, and innate moral knowing is an expression of Heavenly principle. Yangming said: Knowing is the numinous aspect of principle. In terms of its aspect as ruling master [of the body], it is called the mind. In terms of its aspect as innate endowment, it is called our inherent nature. That all infant children know how to love their parents and respect their elder brothers is simply due to this numinosity. If it is not obstructed by selfish desires, but rather developed and extended to the utmost, then it is completely its original substance and can unify its virtue with that of Heaven and Earth. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

He also said: Innate moral knowing is nothing but the place where the spontaneous clear consciousness of Heavenly principle reveals itself, nothing but a true sincerity and compassion, and this is also original substance. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

3 [Translator’s note: Translations from Inquiry on the Great Learning are based on that found in Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 659-667, with some modifications.].

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This is the clearest explanation of Yangming’s “innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle” (liangzhi ji tianli 良知即天理). It is more succinct than Lu Jiuyuan’s “mind is principle” (xin ji li 心即理) in terms of its expression of the relationship between the mind and moral reason: the mind in “mind is principle” does not clearly distinguish the metaphysical principle of inherent nature from actual emotions and desires, merely speaking of mind generally, and therefore received much criticism. “Innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle” however contains the delimitations of “innate moral” and “Heavenly principle” which guarantee the purity of the content of innate moral knowing. Furthermore, in Yangming’s philosophy, the expression of Heavenly principle in the mind is proactive, and as long as it is not obscured by selfish desires, the mind will spontaneously express itself as Heavenly principle. Innate moral knowing is the self-awareness of Heavenly principle in the mind. On this point, Liu Zongzhou explained very clearly: “The Master inherited abandoned learning after the dominance of techniques of writing and interpretation of ancient texts, advocating turning back and seeking within one’s mind to attain an awareness of inherent nature, and he thus spoke of ‘innate moral knowing.’ Because he showed people the importance of seeking the inklings [of the good] and exerting effort, he spoke of ‘the extension of innate moral knowing’” (“On the Masters,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). The most basic content of innate moral knowing is inherent nature and awareness (jue 觉). “Awareness of inherent nature” is Heavenly principle as spontaneously revealed and known by the subject. Since innate moral knowing is the manifestation of the principle of inherent nature in the human mind, so humanity and Heavenly principle are connected, humanity and the myriad things in the cosmos are situated within a great system, and Heaven, principle, inherent nature, mind, qi, etc. are merely descriptions of different aspects of this great system: “Principle is one and nothing more. In terms of its condensation and concentration [in an individual], it is called inherent nature. In terms of the ruling master of its accumulation, it is called mind. In terms of its emanation and operation under this ruling master, it is called intention. In terms of the clear awareness of its emanation and operation, it is called knowing. In terms of the affects and responses of its clear awareness, it is called things” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). He also said: “Inherent nature is one and nothing more,” “mind is one and nothing more,” etc. Yangming spoke many times of wanting to eliminate the division between internal and external, his focus was on this great system of the cosmos, and his highest personality ideal was the unification of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body. All of these originated from the unity of Heaven and humanity as well as innate moral knowing as the place in which Heaven, Earth and the myriad things issue forth into the open. (2) The sense of right and wrong The sense of right and wrong is another important aspect of the content of Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing. He said: “The sense of right and wrong is knowledge without deliberation and ability without learning, and this is what we call innate moral knowing. This innate moral knowing is present in the human mind regardless of whether one is sagely or ignorant, the same for the whole world, from

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ancient to present” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). The sense of right and wrong includes two aspects of meaning: one is “right is right and wrong is wrong,” which means loving something because it is right and hating something because it is wrong, as well as loving the good and hating the bad. The quotation from Yangming above has this meaning, i.e. that innate moral knowing has an intrinsic tendency to love the good and hate the bad. The other meaning is “knowing right and wrong,” meaning that innate moral knowing knows what is right and what is wrong, as Yangming said: Your speck of innate moral knowing is your own personal standard. When applied to your thoughts, your innate moral knowing knows that it is right if it is right and wrong if it is wrong. You cannot keep anything from it. Innate moral knowing is originally perfect and complete. It regards what is right as right and what is wrong as wrong. If we only rely on it with regard to what is right and wrong, everything will be correct. This innate moral knowing is, after all, your wise teacher. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

These two aspects are the principal meaning of Yangming’s sense of right and wrong. The Four-Sentence Teaching of his later years also emphasised this point: knowing what is good and bad is innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing here includes these two as one. Loving the good and hating the bad is an emotion, while knowing what is good and bad is an ability. Innate moral knowing is a unity of moral emotion with the ability of moral judgment. Knowing what is good and bad is based on loving the good and hating the bad. Only with the emotions of loving the good and hating the bad that “know no end” can actual judgments of knowing what is right or wrong occur. Therefore, Yangming also summarised knowing what is right and wrong as loving the good and hating the bad: Innate moral knowing is nothing but the sense of right and wrong, and the sense of right and wrong is nothing but loving [the right] and hating [the wrong]. Loving [the right] and hating [the wrong] exhausts right and wrong, and right and wrong exhausts the myriad affairs and their variations. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

The division of these two aspects is necessary and important, because in both the records of Yangming’s conversations and his letters, there are key points that focus on these two aspects, with “loving the good and hating the bad” as a characteristic of the will, and knowing what is right or wrong as a characteristic of the intellect. With regard to the former, Yangming emphasised “sincerity of intention,” because only with sincerity of intention will one truly be able to love the good and hate the bad. He said: There are grades in the effort of study. In the beginning, if one does not earnestly use his intention to love the good and hate the bad, how can he do the good and remove the bad? This earnest use of intention is making the intentions sincere. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

He also said: One simply has to love the good as he loves beautiful colours and hate the bad as he hates a bad smell, then he is a sage. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

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With regard to this latter, Yangming emphasised improving one’s ability to distinguish between right and wrong in practice: Moral principles exist in no fixed place and are inexhaustible. Please do not think, when you have gained something from conversations with me, that that is all there is to it. There will be no end even if we talk for ten, twenty, or fifty more years. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Yangming educated his disciples to apply their effort on actual affairs, holding that only through actual affairs can the will and intellect in innate moral knowing be exercised. Therefore, his account of the sense of right and wrong is unified with the unification of knowledge and action. In tempering oneself in actual affairs, one can have a thought oneself and know it to be good, and thus truly love it; one can have a thought and know it to be bad, and thus truly hate it. With regard to the rights and wrongs of others, only through tempering oneself in actual affairs can one cultivate a keen ability of judgment. Therefore, although the later Yangming did not speak much of the unification of knowledge and action, it was already embedded in the extension of innate moral knowing. Truly extending one’s innate moral knowing means one will also be able to unify knowledge and action, and the unification of knowledge and action is a meaning that should be included in the extension of innate moral knowing. With regard to the ways in which the sense of right and wrong makes judgments, Yangming’s earlier and later understandings were different. In the early period and before he proposed the core principle of the extension of innate moral knowing, it mainly took an intellectual form. An intellectual form means that innate moral knowing adopts rational methods like analysis, inference, verification, etc. to respond to the external world. Yangming once said: “In our thousands of thoughts and myriad deliberations, we must only extend innate moral knowing. The more innate moral knowing thinks, the more refined and clear it becomes. If it does not think carefully but vaguely responds to affairs as they come, it becomes crude” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). Through his long-term tempering in actual affairs, especially his encounters with several significant events, the responsive ability of Yangming’s innate moral knowing became more and more mature, and he increasingly depended on innate moral knowing and was more and more inclined to regard it as an intuitive ability. As “the loving and hating in making one’s intentions sincere,” when one has a thought, innate moral knowing knows spontaneously to love or hate it; even with regard to judgments of other people’s words and actions, these also occur through intuition. For external judgments, if innate moral knowing loves something, then it must be right, and if innate moral knowing hates something, then it must be wrong. Loving and hating follows innate moral knowing, and nothing goes against Heavenly principle. For Yangming, rational judgments in the long-term mature into instincts in the present that are accompanied by the love or hatred of emotions, moral consciousness and moral emotions already so completely integrated that the rational thought process of moral judgment has cohered into moral emotions in the present. Yangming’s disciple Wang Longxi described this spiritual plane of Yangming saying: “As that

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which he exercised became more mature, that which he attained became more transformed. He always knew right from wrong, yet was also always without right or wrong. Whenever he opened his mouth, he attained the original mind, and there was no need to make use of or appeal to anything else, like the bright sun in the sky shining on everything beneath it” (quoted in “Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). Innate moral knowing’s judgments of right and wrong were for Yangming based on the experience of assessing right and wrong accumulated by him over half his life. Therefore, his maturation and intuition were not reckless or willful, but well founded. This foundation is what Yangming called the “spontaneous order in innate moral knowing.” This order can also be divided into innate and acquired parts. The innate order is the tendency that the human mind naturally possesses to distinguish between different ranks and treat them accordingly. The acquired order refers to these different treatments cohering and accumulating in the minds of individuals through intellect and experience, transforming into the original and spontaneous structure of reason, and playing a role in man’s responses to the external world. This “spontaneous order in innate moral knowing” has the advantage of being swift and direct. It does not engage in rational thinking, comparison and summarisation of every affair, but instead appeals to a value structure formed through the long-term integration of intellect and experience. Yangming said: There is only one innate moral knowing. According to the sites of its manifestation and flowing operation, it is self-sufficient in the present, with no coming or going, depending on nothing. However, in its sites of manifestation and flowing operation, there are degrees of importance and intensity to and from which not the slightest amount can be added or subtracted. This is called the centrality that is naturally present in everything. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Also, a disciple of Yangming once asked: “If the great man forms one body with things, why then does the Great Learning speak of degrees of importance?” Yangming replied: It is because principles themselves include relative importance. Take for example the body, which is one. If we use the hands and feet to protect the head and eyes, how could mean we are biased in treating the former as less important? Their principles are consistent with this. We love both plants and animals, yet we can tolerate feeding animals with plants. We love both animals and men, yet we can tolerate butchering animals to feed our parents, provide for religious sacrifices, and entertain guests. We love both parents and strangers. But suppose here are a small basket of rice and a platter of soup. With them one will survive and without them one will die. Since this meager food cannot save both our parent and a stranger, we will prefer to save our parent instead of a stranger. This we can tolerate, because it is consistent with principle that it should be so. As for the relationship between ourselves and our parents, there cannot be any distinction of this or that or of greater or lesser importance. This is because being benevolent to all people and feeling love for all things comes from this affection toward parents. If in this relationship we can tolerate any relative importance, then anything can be tolerated. What the Great Learning calls relative importance means that in innate moral knowing there is a spontaneous order which should not be skipped over. This is called righteousness. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

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In Yangming’s internal structure here, innate moral knowing starts in benevolence and acts in righteousness. “Benevolence” (ren 仁) is loving one’s parents, respecting one’s elder brothers, and the later developing spiritual plane of the myriad things as one body. In this spiritual plane, if different treatment is required, innate moral knowing can distinguish this by itself. This kind of differentiation that is also unified in moral principle, is “righteousness” (yi 义). Righteousness is both differentiated and appropriate. This internal evaluation system concerning appropriate and inappropriate is innate moral knowing, and that which accepts commands from innate moral knowing and carries out actions according to the differentiation of innate moral knowing is also innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is a unity of both ruler and actor. This kind of ruling and action according to rules is merely a habitual tendency at the level of the endowment of benevolence, yet in the maturation process from reason to intuition, it also becomes spontaneous and intuitive. This expresses a remarkable thought of Wang Yangming: the ruling action and evaluation system of righteousness (appropriateness), i.e. innate moral knowing, is primarily a result acquired through training. It has a process of accumulation through exercise, gradual formation, and becoming keen. This process must be acquired through practice, and must result from long-term interaction between subject and object. This is a very valuable idea Yangming proposed concerning the process of virtue cultivation. Yangming’s thought concerning the sense of right and wrong also has another extraordinary aspect: innate moral knowing is the only standard to judge right and wrong, and there is no standard other than this. Hence, Yangming did not accept any external authority. He thought the teachers of his generation all taught knowledge based on hearsay, made conjectures and estimations, and used knowledge to set up their own domain, thus they easily developed a sense of respect and yearning in relation to those scholars with extensive learning and experience. Yangming’s own learning spoke in terms of self and mind, and was concerned with that which one really possesses within oneself. This meant it primarily took one’s own innate moral knowing as the standard by which to judge all right and wrong. He stated: What is valuable in learning is to attain from the mind. If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong, even when they have come from Confucius, I dare not accept them as correct. How much is this less so for those from people inferior to Confucius! If words are examined in the mind and found to be correct, even when they have come from ordinary people, I dare not regard them as wrong. How much is this less so for those of Confucius! (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Although this paragraph is clearly criticising Zhu Xi’s explanation and supplementation of the Great Learning, it includes the bold thought of rejecting all authority. This proved useful in breaking out of the rigid contemporary academic situation in which “this one follows Zhu [Xi], and that one follows Zhu as well.” Yangming’s view here was both an inheritance from thinkers in history of a critical spirit that consists taking a skeptical attitude towards the authority of classics, not blindly following or believing in authoritative scholars, and also an inevitable result

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of his pursuit of “true knowing.” For Yangming, classics are external records of the activity of human minds, not sacred and unchallengeable. He once said: “The Five Classics are also only history. History is for illustrating good and bad, and for giving instructions and warnings” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). This already anticipated Zhang Xuecheng’s 章学诚 “the Six Classics are all history” from the Qing Dynasty. Classics are histories, simply records of ancient people’s bodily and mental activity, and should not be given in a status such that no one dares to question or offer opinions on them. Yangming said: The Six Classics are nothing but the constant dao of our minds…. The Six Classics are records of our minds, and the reality of the Six Classics is possessed in our minds. (“Record from the Pavilion of Respecting Classics at Jishan Academy” [Jishan shuyuan zunjing ge ji 稽山书院尊经阁记], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 254)

The status of our minds is higher than the Six Classics. Our minds are the final arbiter of right and wrong. Through Yangming’s disciples’ development, this spirit of boldly despising all authority and taking only one’s own innate moral knowing as the standard to judge right and wrong played a role in promoting the liberation of thought in the late Ming Dynasty. Its direct result was to create a group of wild literati who dared to criticise the authorities of old and question all sacred and inviolable things. This had a positive significance in breaking through the old doctrines and creating a new academic situation. (3) Thinking as the issuing and functioning of innate moral knowing Another meaning of innate moral knowing is the subject of thinking. This is not the main meaning of innate moral knowing, and Yangming’s application of this meaning of innate moral knowing was not very strict. Originally, there should be a great difference between innate moral knowing and the mind. As the organ for spiritual activity, the mind includes everything related to epistemological reason, moral reason, and aesthetics, whereas innate moral knowing is mainly moral reason and related to moral activity, including the functions of the issuing, monitoring, evaluation, judgment, etc. of moral consciousness and moral emotion. Among the activity that takes place in the mind, only that related to moral reason can enter the system of innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is like a guard, with every occurrence of conscious activity walking past it, while its innate system of recognition only orders it to check those conscious activities related to morality. In Yangming’s later years, since innate moral knowing came to include much more content than in his early period, that attributed to the “mind” also gradually came to be included in innate moral knowing. That is, innate moral knowing as “the illuminated and numinously aware aspect of Heavenly principle” is aware not only of “Heavenly principle” but also of general things and affairs. “Awareness” as an essential attribute of innate moral knowing expanded from moral awareness to general awareness. Yangming once said: “The mind is the master of the body, and the empty numinosity and clear awareness of the mind is what is called original innate moral knowing. When this innate moral knowing which is empty numinosity and clear awareness is affected and responds with activity, it is called intention”

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(Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). The statement here that innate moral knowing is the empty numinosity and clear awareness of the mind means that innate moral knowing is the subject of rational activities such as consciousness, thinking, etc. Yangming also said: “Thinking is the issuing and functioning of innate moral knowing”: Innate moral knowing is the illuminated and numinously aware aspect of Heavenly principle, and thus innate moral knowing is identical with Heavenly principle. Thinking is the issuing and functioning of innate moral knowing. If one’s thinking is the issuing and functioning of innate moral knowing, whatever one thinks will be Heavenly principle. Thoughts resulting from the issuing and functioning of innate moral knowing are spontaneously clear, plain, simple, and easy, and innate moral knowing spontaneously knows them. However, thoughts issuing from manipulation according to one’s selfish intentions are spontaneously troublesome and disturbing, and innate moral knowing is spontaneously able to distinguish them. For whether thoughts are right or wrong, correct or perverse, innate moral knowing spontaneously knows them all. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Innate moral knowing is the self-awareness of Heavenly principle, and also thinks about things and affairs in general in which good and bad are expressed. Therefore, Yangming needed to affirm this quality of the co-existence of these two aspects in innate moral knowing. In this way, innate moral knowing is not an observer of concrete things and affairs but a participant, and concrete things and affairs are not external with regards to innate moral knowing but the site where it can be applied. For this reason, Yangming particularly emphasised the relationship of inseparability and yet non-mixture between innate moral knowing and knowledge from the senses: Innate moral knowing is not derived from hearing and seeing, rather hearing and seeing are nothing but the functioning of innate moral knowing. Therefore, innate moral knowing is neither impeded by nor separated from hearing and seeing. … If the basic idea and guiding thread is solely to engage in the extension of innate moral knowing, then, however much one may hear or see, all belongs to the task of the extension of innate moral knowing. For in one’s daily life, although there is an infinite variety of experiences and dealings with others, there is nothing but the functioning and flowing operation of innate moral knowing. Without experiences and dealings with others, there will be no innate moral knowing to be extended. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Experiences and dealings with others in daily life serve as the site where innate moral knowing is issued and functions, as well as that where it is exercised. These are originally two in one, such that innate moral knowing only expands and illuminates within its extension. Innate moral knowing is also the monitor and judge of experiences and dealings with others, and thus innate moral knowing and experiential activity must be neither separated nor mixed. Yangming even thought that those events in which innate moral knowing has to make judgments and the two forces of good and bad fight fiercely within the mind are the best sites for exercising one’s innate moral knowing. Therefore, he also advocated innate moral knowing exerting its effort on music, sex, wealth, and profit:

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I asked, “I am afraid innate moral knowing cannot eradicate the desires for music, sex, wealth, or profit.” The Master said, “Of course not. But in his effort the beginner must wipe these desires all out and clean them up and not allow any to stay or accumulate. Then as they occur and as he encounters them, they will not be a cause for trouble, and he will spontaneously respond to them and handle them smoothly. Innate moral knowing operates only in [human experience with things such as] music, sex, wealth, and profit. If one can extend his innate moral knowing in a most refined and clear way without the least obscuration, then in all his dealings with music, sex, wealth, and profit, there will be nothing but the flowing operation of Heavenly regulation.” Pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire are the seven feelings. These seven are all present in the human mind, but you should understand innate moral knowing clearly. … When the seven feelings follow their spontaneous flowing operation, they are all functions of innate moral knowing, and cannot be distinguished as good or bad. However, we should not have any attachment to them. When there is such an attachment, they all become what we call desires, obscurations to innate moral knowing. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

In Yangming’s opinion, the seven feelings are spontaneously produced by human minds, and one cannot impair and even annihilate natural human feelings, as Buddhism and Daoism do. Yangming advocated the establishment of the “innate moral knowing” which masters, evaluates and controls the natural desires, enabling it to lead and organise natural human feelings. Yangming accepted that emotions and desires also issue from innate moral knowing, yet they also train innate moral knowing at the same time. Innate moral knowing should govern the seven feelings such that each follows its own flowing operation without any attachment. Yangming’s innate moral knowing here has both substance and function. Its substance is its evaluation and judgment system of moral reason, while its function is the emotions and desires that emerge from innate moral knowing’s issuing, functioning, and flowing operation. This point is consistent with his account of inherent nature and qi. He once said: The beginnings of the goodness of human nature can be seen only in qi. Without qi, they have no way to be revealed. … Qi is inherent nature and inherent nature is qi, and originally there is no way the two can be separated. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Inherent nature is the substance of innate moral knowing and qi is the function of innate moral knowing, and transcendental things cannot be separated from empirical things, but only expressed through empirical things. Therefore, the content of thoughts and of feelings, as the site where innate moral knowing is applied, forms an indispensable part of the logical structure of innate moral knowing. (4) Innate moral knowing as the numinous spirit of creation Since Wang Yangming included within innate moral knowing innate moral emotions, knowing good and bad, loving good and hating bad as the standard for value judgments, as well as the knowing of empty numinosity and clear awareness, so innate moral knowing for him includes almost all the content of spiritual activity. With the continuing expansion of its range of practice, the function of innate moral knowing became increasingly broad, and Yangming elevated innate moral knowing

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to the absolute height of the original substance of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, that with no equal among things (yu wu wu dui 与物无对). He said: Innate moral knowing is the numinous spirit of creation. This numinous spirit produces Heaven and Earth and completes ghosts and gods, all of which come from it. Truly it has no equal among things. If people can recover it in its complete totality, without even the least deficiency, they will unconsciously begin dancing with their hands and feet. I don’t know if there is anything in the world happier than this. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III) Here Yangming regarded innate moral knowing as the highest spirituality in the cosmos, the highest embodiment of fundamental law of the cosmos and the top representative of the myriad things under Heaven and Earth. In Yangming’s eyes, concrete things and affairs are all relative and cannot be regarded as the origin of Heaven and Earth, whereas innate moral knowing is the absolute with no equal among things, and Heaven, Earth, ghosts, gods, and the myriad things all exist because of innate moral knowing, and are all derivations of it. Yangming’s elevation of innate moral knowing to become the origin of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things was reached through stages including morality, cognition, etc. In terms of morality, innate moral knowing is primarily a focused embodiment of the regulation of the cosmos. It cohesively manifests the regulation of the cosmos in the human mind in a most direct and vivid form. In Yangming’s view, the regulation of the cosmos is primarily benevolence, the mind that regards Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body. He called the ideal figure who embodies this regulation of the cosmos the great man (da ren 大人). The mind of the great man is purely innate moral knowing. He said: “The great man is he who regards Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body. He regards the world as one family and the country as one person. As for those who separate objects and distinguish between the self and others, they are petty men. That the great man can regard Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body is not because he deliberately intends to do so, but because the benevolent substance of his mind is like this” (Inquiry on the Great Learning). Yangming’s conception of benevolence as regarding Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body was a condensation of Confucius’ “being able to judge the feelings of others by one’s own” [see Analects, 6.30], Mencius’ “mind that cannot bear the suffering of others” [see Mencius, 2A.6], “the great virtue of Heaven and Earth is life” from the Commentaries on the Changes [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. II” (Xici xia 系辞下)], Dong Zhongshu’s 董 仲舒 “to observe the intentions of Heaven is the benevolence of the infinite polarity” [see “The Kingly Way Connects the Three” (Wang dao tong san 王道通 三), Luxurious Dew from the Springs and Autumns (Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露)], Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 “not cutting the grass outside one’s window,” Cheng Hao’s 程颢 “the life and vitality of the myriad things are most worthy to observe,” and Zhang Zai’s 张载 “all people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions,” etc. The life and vitality of Heaven and Earth is expressed in humanity as the innate moral consciousness of “perceiving one’s father and spontaneously knowing to be filial, perceiving one’s elder brother and spontaneously knowing to be respectful, and perceiving a child fall into a well and

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spontaneously knowing to be compassionate.” In this sense, innate moral knowing is the essential numen of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and a focused embodiment of the law of the cosmos. Yangming said “the human mind is the place in which Heaven and Earth issue forth into the open,” meaning that human mind is supremely numinous, like a hole from which things can issue forth, and the fundamental regulation of the cosmos and the life and vitality of the myriad things are all concentrated and accumulated in innate moral knowing, which is thus the numinous spirit of creation and the highest embodiment of the regulation of the cosmos. Another path is the path of cognition. In Yangming’s view, empty numinosity (xuling 虚灵) and clear awareness (mingjue 明觉) are the fundamental attributes of innate moral knowing, and people’s control of things and affairs must pass through this empty numinosity and clear awareness. In this sense, the function of innate moral knowing is decisive. Yangming once asked a disciple: “Among the things between Heaven and Earth, which do you consider to be the mind of Heaven and Earth?” The disciple replied: “I have heard that man is the mind of Heaven and Earth.” Yangming then asked: “What does man have that can be called mind?” The disciple answered: “Only his numinous clarity.” Wang further developed this, saying: “We know, then, that in all that fills the space between Heaven and Earth there is nothing but this numinous clarity, and it is only because of their physical forms and bodies that men are separated. My numinous clarity is the ruling master of Heaven and Earth, ghosts and spirits. If Heaven were deprived of my numinous clarity, who would gaze up at its height? If Earth were deprived of my numinous clarity, who would peer down into its depths? If ghosts and spirits were deprived of my numinous clarity, who would distinguish their fortune or misfortune, the calamities and blessings they bring? Without my numinous clarity, there would be no Heaven and Earth, ghosts and spirits, or myriad things, and without these, there would not be my numinous clarity. Thus they are all flowing and permeated with one qi. How could they be separated?” I asked further, “Heaven and Earth, ghosts and spirits, and the myriad things have existed from great antiquity. How can it be that if my numinous clarity is gone, they will all cease to exist?” “Consider a dead man. His essential numen has drifted away and dispersed. Where are his Heaven and Earth and myriad things?” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Numinous clarity (lingming 灵明) here refers to people’s cognitive ability. Humanity is the numen of the myriad things, and in this sense, humanity is the essential numen of Heaven and Earth. The things and affairs known by people are all phenomena arranged by numinous clarity. Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all products of man’s numinous clarity. The height of Heaven, the depth of Earth, and the fortune or misfortune and calamities or blessings of ghosts and spirits are all endowed by humanity. Without humanity’s numinous clarity, all things and affairs would be meaningless, and there would be no way to judge their existence or absence. Hence, Yangming’s famous comment while observing flowers in Nanzhen 南镇 was meant to emphasise the absolute significance of numinous clarity in cognitive activity and that there are no phenomena outside cognition. The emphasis on numinous clarity was a way for Yangming to absolutise the subject and treat it as the origin of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Because of this emphasis,

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Yangming’s “no things outside the mind” gained new explanations: in terms of morality, “no things outside the mind” means there is no moral activity without the involvement of moral intention and moral motivation; in terms of cognition, it means there is no pure object without the involvement of the cognitive activity of the subject. Although the latter only took up a very small portion of Yangming’s entire comment, nonetheless, Yangming and his disciples were aware of the question of whether there are “no things outside the mind” in terms of cognition, and included it in a purely speculative form within the learning of innate moral knowing as an unavoidable question, inducing Yangming to expand the content of his thought and opening up a new field. Yangming’s third path in absolutising innate moral knowing is the path of ontology. Yangming once said: “In preceding Heaven such that Heaven offers no opposition, Heaven is innate moral knowing; in following Heaven and according with the times of Heaven, innate moral knowing is Heaven” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). “Innate moral knowing is Heaven” is one of Yangming’s important thoughts. The physical forms and regularities of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are principle (li 理), their constitutive base material is qi, while qi’s mysterious and unpredictable functioning is spirit (shen 神). Yangming thought that innate moral knowing is a unity of essence (jing 精), qi and spirit: Innate moral knowing is one. In terms of its wondrous functioning, it is called spirit; in terms of its flowing operation, it is called qi; and in terms of its condensation and concentration, it is called essence. How can it be understood in terms of shapes and localities? (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

That is to say, in terms of Heaven and Earth as a system, Heaven and Earth are one innate moral knowing; in terms of humanity as a system, humanity is one innate moral knowing. The dominating, grounding, regulating, etc. aspect in innate moral knowing, which is shapeless yet nonetheless has its wondrous functioning and efficacy, is called spirit. Its concrete aspect that flows and operates in time and space with visible shapes, always moving without cease, is called qi. From the perspective of innate moral knowing’s flowing operation, its functioning, and its concrete existence in time and space, innate moral knowing is Heaven, Earth and the myriad things themselves. Heaven, Earth, the myriad things and man constitute a system with qi and principle, with dominance and functioning, and with condensation and dispersal, and this system itself is innate moral knowing. A disciple of Yangming asked: “Man has innate moral knowing because he possesses empty numinosity. Do such things as grass and trees or tiles and stones have innate moral knowing also?” Yangming replied saying: The innate moral knowing of man is the same as that of grass and trees or tiles and stones. Without the innate moral knowing inherent in man, there could not be grass and trees or tiles and stones. This is not true of these only. Even Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the innate moral knowing that is inherent in man. Now Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man originally form one body, and the point at which this unity issues forth at its most refined is the numinous clarity of the human mind. Wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun and moon, stars, animals and plants, mountains and rivers, earth and stones are originally of one

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body with man. It is for this reason that such things as the five grains or birds and animals can nourish man and that such things as medicines and minerals can heal diseases. Since they are this same single qi, they are able to penetrate into one another. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

When Yangming said “The innate moral knowing of man is the same as that of grass and trees or tiles and stones,” he regarded humans together with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one system. In this great system, the inherent natures of humans, grass, trees, tiles and stones are the differentiated expression of a general law. Because they all reflect the law of the cosmos, their content is the same. Of course, here Yangming focused on “the unity of principle” (liyi 理一) and did not discuss “the diversity of its particularisations” (fenshu 分殊). “Without the innate moral knowing inherent in man, there could not be grass and trees or tiles and stones” means that without their inherent nature and principle, grass and trees or tiles and stones could not be grass and trees or tiles and stones, and their inherent nature and principle is identical to innate moral knowing as the inherent nature of humanity. Humanity’s innate moral knowing is in essence the same as the innate moral knowing of grass and trees or tiles and stones, since both are expressions of the fundamental law of the cosmos. Where humanity’s innate moral knowing is higher than the innate moral knowing of grass and trees or tiles and stones is that through its numinous clarity it is able to be a focused expression of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and “issue forth” (faqiao 发窍) as an integration of moral and epistemological reason. In the passage above, Yangming regarded the original substance of the cosmos as a mixture of principle and qi, mind and inherent nature, with the inherent nature and principle of any part of this mixture having the same meaning and content. Its highest manifestation is found in humanity’s innate moral knowing. Through these three stages of elevation, innate moral knowing absorbed other content that far exceeded its own original meaning, and changed from an aspect of man’s spiritual activity to an absolute with no equal among things. Yangming’s divinisation of innate moral knowing was a divinisation of humanity’s spiritual power, and especially a divinisation of moral power. The divinisation of humanity’s moral power aimed to use morality to command all spiritual activity and form a character of high quality. Yangming used his practice during his entire life to provide a footnote to this process from realisation to deepening and then to divinisation in innate moral knowing.

4.3

The Extension of Innate Moral Knowing

The extension of innate moral knowing is a summation of Wang Yangming’s entire thought. Although he concentrated on teaching the extension of innate moral knowing after his time in Jiangxi, he first proposed the idea quite early. The following passage from Yangming can be seen as an early definition of the extension of innate moral knowing:

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Knowledge is the original substance of the mind, and the mind is spontaneously able to know. When it perceives one’s father, it spontaneously knows that one should be filial. When it perceives one’s elder brother, it spontaneously knows that one should be respectful. And when it perceives a child falling into a well, it spontaneously knows that one should be compassionate. This is innate moral knowing and need not be sought externally. If that which issues from innate moral knowing is not obstructed by selfish intentions, the result will be like the saying that if a man gives full development to his compassionate mind, his benevolence will be more than he can ever put into practice. However, the ordinary man is not able to be free from the obstruction of selfish desires, and therefore requires the effort of the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things in order to overcome his selfishness and return to principle. Then the mind’s innate moral knowing will no longer be obstructed, and will be able to fill up and flow out, thereby extending its knowing. When knowing is extended, the intentions become sincere.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Here, the extension of innate moral knowing means making the innate moral knowing that is the substance of the mind fill up and flow out. The precondition of innate moral knowing’s filling up and flowing out is the absence of any obstruction from selfish intentions, thus we must eliminate selfish intentions with the effort of the investigation of things. Yangming later developed this meaning somewhat. When he was debating with friends about the central principle of the investigation of things, Yangming clearly proposed his definition of the extension of innate moral knowing: What I mean by the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge is to extend the innate moral knowing of our minds to each and every thing and affair. The innate moral knowing of our minds is Heavenly principle. When the Heavenly principle in the innate moral knowing of our minds is extended to each and every thing and affair, all things and affairs will attain their principle. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

The development here is that in the earlier passage he defined the extension of innate moral knowing as the filling up and flowing out of innate moral knowing, and the investigation of things as the precondition for the filling up and flowing out of innate moral knowing. He did not yet regard the investigation of things directly as the effort of the extension of innate moral knowing itself. In the later passage however, the meaning of “extension” (zhi 致) focuses more on the meaning of “pushing towards.” The object of this pushing towards, i.e. Heavenly principle, and its place of application, i.e. all things and affairs, are both very obvious and clear. In the final version of the Inquiry on the Great Learning from Yangming’s later years, the definition of the extension of innate moral knowing is both clearer and more complete: The extension of knowledge is not enriching and broadening knowledge, as later Confucians understood it, but simply extending the innate moral knowing of our minds. This innate moral knowing is what Mencius meant when he said, “The sense of right and wrong is possessed by all men.” The sense of right and wrong requires no deliberation to be known, nor does it depend on learning for its ability, and this is why it is called innate moral knowing. It is the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, the original substance of our minds, spontaneously illuminated and numinously aware. … If what innate moral knowing knows to be good or bad is all sincerely loved or hated, then one does not deceive one’s own innate moral knowing and one’s intentions can be made sincere.

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This clearly states that the extension of innate moral knowing means extending the good known by innate moral knowing to concrete things and affairs such that they all attain their principles, with our minds also having sincere intentions and becoming self-content. It does not merely point out innate moral knowing’s expression in feelings and emotions as a monitoring system: a satisfaction or unease concerning one’s own actions. More importantly, the Heavenly principle known to innate moral knowing is already a seamless combination of moral and epistemological reason, and has not only the exemplary guidance of a good will, but also a whole system consisting of the means of action provided by reason as well as the supervision and evaluation of results. This extension of innate moral knowing is a unity of motivation and effect as well as one of purposiveness and lawfulness. This is the essential meaning of Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing during his later years. Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing is a unification of knowledge and action, not in terms of the comprehensiveness of the effort of “innate moral knowing is knowing, the extension of innate moral knowing is action,” but rather, in comparison with the meanings of expanding innate moral knowing and extension to the utmost, in terms of his focus on the meanings of extending towards and concrete action. This point is the most prominent aspect of Yangming’s Learning of the Mind, and also where Yangming was dissatisfied with Lu Jiuyuan. It is necessary to analyse the difference between Lu and Yangming here, since through this difference, the particular quality of Yangming’s Learning of the Mind is more visible. In Yangming’s recorded conversations and letters, he criticises Lu Jiuyuan several times. Yangming’s disciple Chen Jiuchuan 陈九川 asked: “What do you think of the teachings of Luzi 陆子 [Lu Jiuyuan]?” Yangming replied saying: “Since the time of Lianxi 濂溪 [Zhou Dunyi] and Mingdao 明道 [Cheng Hao], there has been only Xiangshan 象山 [Lu Jiuyuan]. But he was still somewhat crude.” Jiuchuan said, “In his discussions of learning, every chapter reveals the innermost fundamentals [of what is right] and every sentence seems to attack the underlying causes [of what is wrong]. I do not see where he is crude.” Yangming said, “He exerted some effort on his mind and was of course different from those who imitated and depended on others, or sought only textual meanings. However, if you look carefully, there are crude spots. You will see for yourself if you continue your effort long enough” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). Although this does not specify where exactly Lu Jiuyuan’s teaching is crude, from his letters we can know that Yangming thought Lu’s crudeness was that he “did not avoid the weakness of following others.” He said: The extension of knowledge and the investigation of things have been followed by all Confucians from the beginning. Therefore, Xiangshan [Lu Jiuyuan] also followed this line, only failing to question or extend it. But after all, this is a point where Xiangshan’s view is imperfect, and it should not be hidden. (“Reply to a Friend” [Da youren 答友人], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 210)

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Xiangshan’s learning was simple and direct, and in this he comes in first place after Mencius. Although in his academic studies, his speculative thought and his account of the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things he did not avoid the weakness of following others, his great root and origin was definitely beyond the reach of anyone else. (“Letter to Xi Yuanshan” [Yu Xi Yuanshan 与席元山], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 180)

These both affirm the correctness of Lu Jiuyuan’s great root and origin, with his main crude point being that he followed the theories of the extension of knowledge, the investigation of things, etc. that prevailed among Confucians in the Song Dynasty. Lu advocated the theory that the mind is principle, holding that the main effort should be to eliminate material desires so as to enable the good of the original mind to issue forth and flow into operation. However, Lu did not have an account of the unification of knowledge and action, and although he also emphasised exerting effort in human feelings and changing affairs, he did not clearly explain either how to exert this effort or the relation of order between this effort and the effort emphasised in classic texts such as the Great Learning. The unification of knowledge and action is the core of Wang Yangming’s theory of the extension of innate moral knowing, with Huang Zongxi pointing to this core in his explanation that in the extension of innate moral knowing, “the word ‘extension’ refers to action.” Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing means to extend the Heavenly principle known by the innate moral knowing of one’s own mind to concrete things, but this Heavenly principle is not only the good will possessed by moral reason, since it also includes the accumulated knowledge attained through its long-term exercise on concrete affairs. The innate moral knowing and Heavenly principle extended in Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing is knowledge driven by morality, whereas Lu Jiuyuan took the clear manifestation of the original mind as his core principle, within which there is no position for epistemological reason. Based on this point, this book argues that the standard English translation of zhi 致 as “extension” is not entirely satisfactory, since this does not include the meanings of pushing toward and putting into practice which best represent the character of Yangming’s thought. For Yangming, empirical knowledge is the site where innate moral knowing is applied, and thus the extension of innate moral knowing does not abolish empirical knowledge, whereas Lu Jiuyuan “had no trick other than first establishing its greatness and completeness.” Lu exclusively regarded respecting virtue and inherent nature as a task, while Yangming combined respect for virtue and inherent nature with constant inquiry and study as one, such that constant inquiry and study is the means to respect virtue and inherent nature, refinement is the means for unifying as one, and broad discussion is the means for returning to simplicity. Lu Jiuyuan inherited the philosophical propositions of his period, but did not fuse them into the different aspects of a new system, whereas Wang Yangming created new meanings and established out new standards of his own, fusing existing philosophical propositions into organic components of his theory of the extension of innate moral knowing. Yangming praised Lu’s theory because of its simplicity and directness, as well as its analysis of the difference between righteousness and advantage, establishing the great root and pursuing a

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calm mind, and demonstrating to scholars the dao of earnest honesty and care of the self. Lu’s crude point is that, while he proposed the basic direction and theoretical structure of the Learning of the Mind, he did not carefully polish this and produce tight arguments concerning detailed aspects or thoroughly eradicate the influence of Zhu Xi’s learning, and especially did not integrate its theoretical content through knowledge with action, internal with external, and effort with original substance. Lu’s learning can only be used as a direction for scholars to temper their character and establish their will, and is not yet a learning that contains the entirety of great application. Comparing Lu Jiuyuan with Yangming, we can see that Yangming formed a comprehensive expression of the Learning of the Mind and exceeded Lu in almost all its aspects, achieving the philosophical pinnacle of his period. The word “extension” in Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing has the two meanings of pushing toward and expanding to the utmost, where pushing toward is an action while expanding to the utmost is the result of this action. As stated above, Yangming’s innate moral knowing is originally just moral consciousness and moral emotion at a germinal stage which need to be expanded and cultivated from “a fire catching light or a spring bursting through” [see Mencius, 2A.6] to the status of being “broad and all-embracing, deep and unceasingly springing forth” [see Centrality in the Ordinary]. This expansion is also a process of overcoming and eliminating selfish desires and restoring the original substance of innate moral knowing. This is the meaning of Mencius “[water] fills up holes [on its way] and then flows forwards“and Lu Jiuyuan’s “streams flow, gather and reach the deep dark sea, boulders pile up and form the lofty peak of Mount Tai.” The unique point of Yangming is that his extension of innate moral knowing includes both moral and epistemological reason, with the former driving the latter to advance simultaneously. His thought contains the idea that humanity’s value objective gradually comes to correspond to natural laws and regularities with the unfolding of practice. In Yangming’s view, innate moral knowing’s ability to know right and wrong is not endowed by Heaven, but gradually acquired through training in practice. Innate moral knowing’s ability to respond to external things is a process of a continuous expansion to the utmost. The knowledge accumulation of innate moral knowing is also a process from thin to profound. Heavenly principle is a unity of purposiveness and lawfulness, but this unity also needs to be realised through long-term training in practice. Yangming said: In the extension of knowledge, each should do so according to the limits of his capacity. Given our innate moral knowing today, we should extend it to the utmost according to what we know today. As our innate moral knowing is further realised tomorrow, we should extend it to the utmost according to what we know then. Only this can be said to be the effort of refinement and unity. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

In Yangming’s concept of innate moral knowing, moral reason and epistemological reason do not constantly correspond to each other in the beginning, thus there are often affairs that proceed from good motivations but have less than satisfactory results. Yangming thought that as long as one constantly keeps innate moral

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knowing as one’s intention, and acts truly and honestly, moral reason and epistemological reason will be gradually united. His “Whenever he opened his mouth he attained the original mind, and there was no need to make use of or appeal to anything else” was just such a spiritual plane achieved through his long-term tempering on concrete affairs. In Yangming’s view, the unity of purposiveness and conformity with Heavenly principle is the pinnacle of cultivation. At this pinnacle, Heaven and man are completely integrated, and the principles of the internal (innate moral knowing) and the external (Heavenly principle) attain their highest unity. This unity is a process, a process of progression to a higher form and a higher spiritual plane. This point is the essence of Yangming’s theory. In previous studies on Wang Yangming, people paid attention mostly to the aspect of subjective initiative in his learning, but did not thoroughly research Yangming’s ideal of inner sageliness developing into outer kingliness, and his realisation as well as verification of this ideal through practice during his lifetime. In Yangming’s “innate moral knowing,” innate moral knowing as the object of extension to the outside is actively manifested in the human mind. Innate moral knowing as a unity of moral and epistemological reason has the power to infiltrate to the level of knowledge and include knowledge within itself. That is to say, innate moral knowing actively manifests itself, and is not passively raised to the level of consciousness by other things; innate moral knowing actively unfolds itself through actual things and things at the level of knowledge, and does not artificially assemble the two together. Therefore, innate moral knowing itself is animated, lively, and uninterrupted.

5 The Four-Sentence Teaching The Four-Sentence Teaching (siju jiao 四句教) refers to the four sentences Wang Yangming proposed when summarising his academic thought in his later years. The four sentences are: “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad; when the intention moves, there is good and bad; innate moral knowing is to know good and bad; the investigation of things is to do good and remove bad.” These four sentences together form a whole that completely depicts Yangming’s entire thought. Different understandings of these four sentences were the basis for the differentiation into different schools of Yangming’s disciples, and also constituted the main questions scholars debated over during the late Ming Dynasty. The Four-Sentence Teaching is a self-explanation concerning an argument about Yangming’s core academic principle between his disciples Qian Dehong and Wang Longxi the evening before he left to subdue a rebellion in Sizhou and Tianzhou. In history, this came to be called “the demonstration of the dao at Tianquan 天泉.” Record of Transmission and Practice contains a record of this famous conversation: In the ninth month of the sixth year of the Jiajing Emperor [1527], the Master had been called from retirement and appointed to subdue once more the rebellion in Sizhou and

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Tianzhou [when the earlier expedition under another official had failed]. As he was about to start, Ruzhong 汝中 [i.e. Wang Longxi] and [Qian] Dehong discussed learning. Ruzhong repeated the words of the Master’s instructions as follows: “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad; when the intention moves, there is good and bad; innate moral knowing is to know good and bad; the investigation of things is to do good and remove bad.” Dehong asked, “What do you think this means?” Ruzhong said, “This is perhaps not the final conclusion. If we say that in the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad, then there must be no such distinction in intention, in knowledge, and in things. If we say that there is good and bad in intention, then in the final analysis there must also be such a distinction in the substance of the mind.” Dehong said, “The substance of the mind is the inherent nature endowed in us by Heaven, and is originally neither good nor bad. But because we have a mind dominated by habits, we see good and bad in our thoughts. The effort of investigation, extension, making sincere, rectification, and cultivation is aimed precisely at recovering that substance of inherent nature. If there were no good or bad to start with, what would be the necessity of such effort?” That evening they sat down beside the Master at the Tianquan Bridge. Each stated his view and asked to be corrected. The Master said, “I am about to leave. I wanted to have you come and talk this matter through. The views of you two gentlemen complement each other very well in use, and neither should cling to one side. Here I deal originally with these two types of people: Men of sharp root-nature attain realisation directly from the source. The original substance of the human mind is in fact crystal-clear without any impediment and is the centrality before the feelings are aroused. Men of sharp root-nature have completed their effort as soon as they have apprehended the original substance, simultaneously penetrating self and others, internal and external. On the other hand, there are inevitably those whose minds are dominated by habits, so that the original substance of the mind is obstructed. I therefore teach them definitely and sincerely to do good and remove bad in their intentions and thoughts. When they become expert at this effort and their impurities are completely eliminated, the original substance will become wholly clear. Ruzhong’s view is the one I use in dealing with men of sharp root-nature, while Dehong’s view establishes rules for the second type. If you two gentlemen use your views interchangeably, you will be able to lead all people — of the highest, average, and lowest intelligence — into the dao. If each of you clings to one side, you will immediately err in dealing with men, and each will in his own way fail to fully understand the substance of the dao.” After a while he spoke again, saying, “From now on, whenever you discuss learning with friends, be sure not to lose sight of my core principle: In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad; when the intention moves, there is good and bad; innate moral knowing is to know good and bad; the investigation of things is to do good and remove bad. Just keep to these words of mine, instruct people according to their types, and there will be no faults, as this is originally an effort that penetrates both higher and lower levels. It is not easy to meet with people of a sharp root-nature in society, and even Yan Hui 颜回 and Mingdao [i.e. Cheng Hao] did not dare to assume that they could fully penetrate the original substance of the mind in a single realisation. How can we expect this from people lightly? People’s minds are dominated by habits. If we do not teach them to devote themselves to the concrete effort of doing good and removing bad in their innate moral knowing but rather to merely emptily contemplate the original substance, none of their affairs will be genuine and they will do no more than cultivate a mind of vacuity and quietness. This fault is no small matter and must be exposed as early as possible.” On that day both Dehong and Ruzhong attained some enlightenment. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

This event is also recorded in Yangming’s chronicle as recorded and edited by Qian Dehong and others, as well as in “Record of the Demonstration of the Dao at Tianquan” (Tianquan zhengdao ji 天泉证道记) arranged by Wang Longxi’s disciples based on Longxi’s dictation, but there are some differences in wording. Both

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Qian Dehong and Wang Longxi were Yangming’s outstanding disciples who had followed him for a long time, so the arguments between these two inevitably concerned key questions in Yangming’s philosophy. Moreover, we can see from Yangming’s works that the views of both these two disciples are related to Yangming’s thought, and their basis can be found in Yangming’s works. Longxi however was more subtle and fond of the lofty path of the theory of “four non-beings” (siwu 四无), whereas Dehong was more quiet and fond of the more down-to-earth path of the theory of “four beings” (siyou 四有). Yangming affirmed that their views were both included in his meaning, but that the theory of four non-beings applies to people with a sharp root-nature, while the theory of four beings applies to people with average and lower root-natures, and there were only different accounts because of the different aptitudes of students. Wang Yangming’s core academic principle changed several times through his life, and there were different emphases in different periods. Before he went to Jiangyou [Jiangxi], he emphasised making one’s intentions sincere and the investigation of things, while after Jiangyou, his emphasis changed to the extension of innate moral knowing. While he was living in Yue for six years, he specifically used “the extension of innate moral knowing” to summarise his core teaching principle in different periods. Dehong mainly took up his making one’s intentions sincere and investigation of things, while Longxi mainly took up his extension of innate moral knowing. Making one’s intentions sincere and the investigation of things and the extension of innate moral knowing are both the same thing in principle, but the two have different focuses. Making one’s intentions sincere and the investigation of things focus on “using effort to realise the original substance,” whereas the extension of innate moral knowing focuses on “using the original substance to drive effort.” Making one’s intentions sincere and the investigation of things focus on the rectification of thoughts that are not good, such that one’s intentions become sincere and one’s mind is rectified. The extension of innate moral knowing focuses on extending good thoughts so as to make them guide one’s every thought and behaviour. Yangming worked very hard in his early years, mostly teaching his disciples to do good and remove bad, and to overcome selfishness and restore principle. His effort was mostly exerted on the investigation of things and making one’s intentions sincere. In his later years, “what he exercised was increasingly proficient, and what he gained was increasingly changeable,” and he mostly taught disciples “the extension of innate moral knowing,” to “extend the Heavenly principle in the innate moral knowing of one’s mind to all things and affairs.” Qian Dehong mainly relied on Yangming’s early and middle period thought, while Wang Longxi mainly relied on Yangming’s later thought. The differences in Yangming’s thought between his early and later years are also reflected in Record of Transmission and Practice. The first part of Record of Transmission and Practice was compiled by Xu Ai and Part II was compiled by Lu Cheng 陆澄 and Xue Kan, mostly from records of Yangming’s teaching in his early and middle periods about conscientiously and sincerely doing good and removing bad, as well as making one’s intentions sincere, the investigation of things, etc. Part III is mostly a record of Yangming’s teaching in his later period, especially

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after he moved to Yue, and thus mostly concerns maturing effort, expressing one’s feelings directly, etc. Yangming once clearly explained the change between his early and later periods, saying: “Before I went to the southern capital [i.e. Nanjing], I still harboured a few ideas from the hypocritical villagers; I now believe in the true right and wrong of innate moral knowing. I trust in acting freely without any effort to cover up or to conceal. Only now have I come to achieve the mind of the madman. Let all the people in the world go ahead and say that my actions do not betray my words” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). Nie Bao 聂豹 from the Jiangyou School also said: “Those today who study the extension of innate moral knowing skip over all the clear and unmistakable records in the early sections of Record of Transmission and Practice, and establish veiled words based on emptiness, appearing to draw near but in reality vague and indistinct” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 222). We can see that there were indeed changes of academic focus between Yangming’s earlier and later periods, with both Longxi and Dehong’s accounts having some basis in one or the other, and therefore Yangming mediated between them and said their views should be regarded as mutually complementary and reinforcing, such that one should cling to neither side in isolation. In Yangming’s later years, his attainments were already mature, his effort already integrated with original substance, and he indeed had the intention of directly pointing to this original substance. Scholars in the later Ming Dynasty often subtly disagreed with the above view of Wang Yangming, with Liu Zongzhou saying: “Since he was especially eager to illuminate the dao, he frequently elevated to a higher method, neglecting to offer specific directions, giving rise to the fault of skipping over the proper steps among later scholars” (“On the Masters,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). Scholars from the Jiangyou School such as Nie Bao, Luo Hongxian 罗洪先, etc. could not criticise Yangming directly, since they were his disciples, and they thus spared no effort in criticising Longxi. The Four-Sentence Teaching and the debate between Longxi and Dehong simply reveal the different paths of cultivation of original substance and effort, yet they also encompass many questions concerning Yangming’s studies, such as being and non-being, a priori and a posteriori, respectful reverence and liberal dispersal, Confucianism and Buddhism, etc. There have been many arguments in history concerning the first sentence of the Four-Sentence Teaching, “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad.” According to Yangming’s meaning, it states that there are originally no good or bad ideas in the mind. Good and bad ideas are “intentions” (yi 意) which arise a posteriori, and thus we should not say that there are good and bad ideas in the mind a priori. Yangming used the analogy of the Supreme Void (taixu 太虚) to describe this state: Being only exists from you yourself, the original substance of innate moral knowing originally has no being, and the original substance is simply the Supreme Void. In the Supreme Void, from the sun, moon and stars to rain, dew, wind, frost, mist, smoke and gas, which things are not existent? Yet of these, which is able to obstruct the Supreme Void? The original substance of the human mind is also like this, a Supreme Void without form, [things] transforming once they pass, so where is it necessary to exert even the slightest effort? (“Chronicle,” Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1306)

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In Yangming’s view, only when the original substance of the mind is crystal-clear without any impediment, can it respond correctly to the affects of the myriad things. If there is any idea in the substance of the mind, then this idea will become harmful. Even if it is a good idea, it will still be an obstruction of the substance of the mind. Yangming said: “Not a single idea should be allowed to attach to the substance of the mind, just as not the least dirt should be allowed to stick to the eye. It does not take much dirt for the whole eye to see nothing but complete darkness.” He further said, “This idea need not be a selfish idea. Even if it is good, it should not be attached to the mind. If you put some gold or jade dust in the eye, just the same it cannot open.” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Yangming often educated his disciples to seek the centrality before feelings are aroused (weifa zhi zhong 未发之中). Only with the centrality before feelings are aroused can there be the harmony in which feelings are aroused such that all attain due measure and degree. The centrality before feelings are aroused is the state of the substance of the mind that is crystal-clear without any impediment, broad and impartial. This state is the ideal state of the mind, and even daily efforts like doing good and removing bad should not become blind attachments. Yangming said: There are grades of depth and shallowness in the task of study. In the beginning, if one does not earnestly use his intention to love good and hate bad, how can he do good and remove bad? This earnest use of intention is to make one’s intentions sincere. However, if one does not realise that the original substance of the mind is devoid of all things [that is, completely pure and open], and attaches his mind solely to loving good and hating bad, he will merely add to his mind this much of his own intention and therefore his mind will not be broad and impartial. Only the “not making any special effort to like or dislike” described in the Book of Documents is original substance. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

Not making any special effort to like or dislike is the original substance of the mind. However, since people live everyday in the phenomenal world, they inevitably have feelings and desires. In Yangming’s view, feelings and desires should not be forcibly repressed and cut off such that they do not arise, but instead should pass by leaving no trace. A disciple of Yangming asked: if innate moral knowing can be compared to the sun, and feelings and desires to clouds, then though clouds can obscure the sun, they are rightly part of the heavens. Are feelings and desires also rightly part of the human mind? Yangming responded: Pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire are the seven feelings. These seven are all real parts of the mind, but you must understand innate moral knowing clearly. … When the seven feelings follow their spontaneous flowing operation, they are all functions of innate moral knowing, and cannot be distinguished as good or bad. However, we should not have any attachment to them. When there is such attachment, they all become desires and obscurations of innate moral knowing. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

That is to say, the seven feelings themselves cannot be called bad, and it is only when there is attachment that they become obscurations. The seven feelings are like the “rain, dew, wind, frost, mist, smoke and gas” in the Supreme Void, passing through and transforming without being becoming obscurations.

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Up to this point, Yangming was still discussing the question at the level of the actual. The substance of mind and the original substance of mind here both refer to the real mind with seven feelings and six desires that is able to produce ideas. The original appearance of this real mind is emptiness (kong 空), to be originally without any things. However, if one moves to the level of the metaphysical, the “original substance of the mind” has other meanings. With regard to the original substance of mind, Yangming gave many different accounts: The substance of mind is inherent nature. Inherent nature is principle. In investigating the principle of benevolence to the utmost, one must really extend the benevolence [in one’s actions] to the ultimate of benevolence, and in investigating the principle of righteousness to the utmost, one must really extend the righteousness [in one’s actions] to the ultimate of righteousness. Benevolence and righteousness are inherent in our inherent nature, and therefore to investigate principle to the utmost is fully to develop one’s inherent nature. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I) Weiqian asked, “How is it that knowing is the original substance of the mind?” The Master said, “Knowing is the numinous aspect of principle. In terms of its aspect as ruling master [of the body], it is called the mind. In terms of its aspect as innate endowment, it is called our inherent nature. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I) Calmness, the original substance of the mind, is Heavenly principle. Activity and stillness pertain to the times when it [the mind] comes into contact [with things]. The original substance of the mind is Heavenly principle. Since Heavenly principle is singular, what can be attained by thinking or deliberation? Innate moral knowing, the original substance of the mind, is what I have just referred to as that which constantly illuminates. The original substance of the mind neither rises nor does not rise. Joy is the original substance of the mind. Though this is not identical with the joy of the seven feelings, it is not found outside of it. (Above quotations all from Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II) The highest good is the original substance of the mind. When one deviates a little from this original substance, there is bad. It is not that there is a good and there is also a bad to oppose it. The mind has no substance of its own. Its original substance consists of the right or wrong of the affects and responses of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things. The original substance [of the mind] originally knows nothing and yet is ignorant of nothing. For example, the sun does not have a mind to shine on anything and yet there is nothing it does not shine on. Not [having a mind] to shine and yet shining on everything is characteristic of the original substance of the sun. Innate moral knowing originally knows nothing and now we want it to know. Originally it is ignorant of nothing and now we suspect that there is something it does not know. This is because we have not sufficient confidence in it. (Above quotations all from Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Looking at all of Yangming’s accounts of the original substance of the mind, they can be divided into four types: (1) The metaphysical setting up of the mind as the highest good without any bad, such that the original substance of the mind is inherent nature, and inherent

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nature is principle. This is an innately endowed good that differs from the actual good and bad thoughts that constantly arise, as it is the highest good with only good but no bad. (2) The actual state of the mind as neither good nor bad, which is the original appearance and figure of the mind, i.e. the Supreme Void mentioned above. (3) The description of the various qualities of the mind, such as joy as the original substance of the mind, calmness as the original substance of the mind, the original substance of the mind as that which constantly illuminates, etc. (4) The mind has no substance. That is to say, from the perspective of epistemology the mind is like a whiteboard and takes the reflection of external things as its substance, just like eyes and ears rely on the reflection of external sounds and colours as their substance. Among these four types, the first and second are closely related to the “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” discussed above. Linking the first and second types, we can see that “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” in the Four-Sentence Teaching means that there are originally neither good nor bad thoughts in the mind, and that good and bad thoughts arise a posteriori, but that there is an innately endowed good inherent nature in the mind; only under the state of neither good nor bad of the substance of the mind can the inherent nature of the highest good without bad emanate. The more empty and numinous the mind, the more filled out the good inherent nature will become. Neither good nor bad is the spiritual plane cultivation wishes to achieve, and achieving this plane is precisely in order to manifest the innately endowed good inherent nature. This is the “learning of being being produced within non-being” spoken of by Yangming. Non-being is the means, while being is the end. The flowing of the substance of inherent nature within the mind is precisely the time when concrete good and bad thoughts retreat and listen. With regard to this point, Huang Zongxi’s view was very accurate: Actually, no good and no bad means no good thoughts and no bad thoughts, and does not mean inherent nature is neither good nor bad. When the next sentence speaks of intentions as being good or bad, this also means that there are good thoughts and bad thoughts. These two sentences simply complete the explanation of activity and stillness. (“Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians)

Activity (dong 动) and stillness (jing 静) are as in Yangming’s description, “in the stillness of principle there is neither good nor bad, in the activity of qi there is good and bad.” In the stillness of principle there is neither good nor bad simply means that the myriad things all function according to their inherent natures with no so-called good and bad, yet good and bad appear from the motivation which applies this principle, just as how there is originally neither good nor bad in flowers and grass, yet they are defined as either good or bad based on people’s acceptance or rejection of them. This speaks of the principles of things. However, when speaking of man, Yangming was determined that innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle, and that there is originally not a trace of badness in inherent nature. The theory of the goodness of inherent nature is the sole proper way Yangming gained

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from his Confucian predecessors, especially Mencius and Xiangshan [Lu Jiuyuan]. His theory of the extension of innate moral knowing aims precisely to extend this goodness into all activities. If there is neither good nor bad in inherent nature, then there will be no basis for this extension. Therefore, Huang Zongxi said, “To do good and remove bad is simply expressing inherent nature and acting, it is spontaneously without any intermingling of good or bad, as in what the Master [Yangming] called ‘extending the innate moral knowing of our minds to things and affairs.’ There is originally no fault in the four sentences, scholars simply misunderstood the text” (“Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). Wang Yangming also had a theory that “the streets are full of sages.” This does not mean that people are already completed sages, but rather that everyone possesses Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing and good inherent nature, and this good inherent nature is the internal basis for people to become sages. Because of this, people are all potential sages. To transform this potential sage into a real sage, the only effort necessary is to extend the goodness of innate moral knowing to things and affairs. With constant extension, one will finally achieve a beautiful, great, and sagely spirit. Thus, innate moral knowing as the highest good without badness is a necessary precondition. In fact, in their debate, Wang Longxi and Qian Dehong both accepted the first sentence of the Four-Sentence Teaching, “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” and their disagreement concerned the last three sentences. According to Wang Longxi, the mind that is neither good nor bad is precisely the condition that guarantees the flowing of the substance of inherent nature as the highest good without badness. To maintain and trust in the flowing of the a priori goodness of inherent nature, innate moral knowing does not need to judge the intentions aroused as good or bad, and then to do good and remove bad. Effort only needs to be exerted on original substance, and the realisation of original substance is effort. This is what was called “untying the mooring rope and releasing the boat, following the wind and opening out one’s oars.” Although Qian Dehong also believed that “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” included the inherent nature of the highest good, he also thought that the substance of inherent nature is obscured by the arising of good and bad thoughts, so one must exert concrete effort to do good and remove bad. Therefore, Wang Longxi’s learning concerns the a priori rectified mind: to maintain and trust in the flowing of the a priori and originally rectified substance of the mind, and not to allow it to be intermingled with a posteriori intentions. Qian Dehong’s learning concerns making one’s intentions sincere a posteriori: to exert concrete effort to do good and remove bad, gradually making one’s intentions sincere. Wang Longxi established his foundation from the priori and originally rectified mind, and his learning concerned the four non-beings, whereas Qian Dehong started from doing good and removing bad in a posteriori thoughts, and his learning concerned the four beings. From an overall view of all of Yangming’s accounts, only “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” completely expresses his fundamental meaning, and when he said “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” we must

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connect this to his idea that the substance of inherent nature as the highest good without badness manifests spontaneously, since only then can it encompass both non-being and being, interconnecting the earlier and later aspects. The last three sentences in the Four-Sentence Teaching are clear in their meanings, so there were no major disagreements between scholars’ understandings, thus we can leave them without analysis. Besides the above, a correct understanding of Yangming’s “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” is key to grasping his integration of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. Yangming’s connections with Buddhism and Daoism can be seen as a process in which he first entered into them based on interest, then gradually found some shortcomings and rejected them, and finally integrated them into Confucianism. In his early years, Yangming wandered into and out of Buddhism and Daoism for some time, and anecdotes concerning these experiences became well known. For example, on his wedding day he went to Tiezhu Temple 铁柱宫 [in Nanchang], where he heard Daoist priests discussing theories of health preservation, eventually spending his wedding night with them in meditation and forgetting to return home; after he became ill following his investigation of bamboo, he practiced Daoist health preservation exercises and intended to leave society and enter the mountains [to live as a hermit]; after he began to work as an official, he visited Jiuhua Mountain 九华山 to consult the Daoist priest Cai Pengtou 蔡蓬头 to discuss the highest level of Confucianism; he built a hut in Yangming Cave and practiced physical and breathing exercises to the point of being able to “know in advance,” etc. Several of his poems express his yearning for the dao of the Daoist immortals, such as “Desiring to knock on the gate of the numinous realm in search of the secrets of alchemy, I was obstructed by gusts of spring breeze and layers of vines” in his poem “Traveling to Fufeng Temple” (You Fufeng si 游浮峰寺), “Feeling self-pity about when my bones will transform into those of an immortal, I toss and turn in the ocean of worldly dust and realise the futility of this life. Suddenly excited at the thought of Penglai 蓬莱 in the depths of the night, I fly to the twelve towers [of the immortals] in the azure sky” in “Traveling to Huacheng Temple” (You Huacheng si 游化城寺), “Immortals calling me to leave, I wave my hands and step into the azure clouds” in “The Peak of Arrayed Immortals” (Liexian feng 列仙峰), and “Expecting to meet [Daoist immortal] Guangchengzi 广成子, the Supreme Void displays an invitation to roam” in “Climbing Mount Tai” (Deng Taishan 登泰山; for all the above see Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, Vol. 19). What sentiments made Yangming so interested in Daoist immortals and Buddhism, and what events led him to later reject them? I believe this can be mainly attributed to his tendency to like imagining and exploring things of a mystical nature in the literati temperament of his early period. When he was young, due to his poetic talent, he was educated by his grandfather who was interested in writing poetry, so he was able to have frequent contact with his grandfather’s poet friends. Influenced by his experiences with them, Yangming developed an interest in poetry. The artistic conception of poetry and the detached, transcendent sentiments of poets aroused in him a strong desire to explore things of a mystical nature. When he was a young man, he had a strongly

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idealistic temperament and a tendency towards escaping from the social world. However, he was born into a family that had produced generations of officials, so from a young age he had also been strongly affected by the ideal of entering the political stratum through the imperial examination, governing the society and benefiting the people. The ambitions he established when he was young, such as “reading books and learning to become sages and worthies are the most important affairs” and “possessing the will to govern and plan affairs of state at early age” also produced in him a strong desire to enter the social world. Being and non-being, escaping and entering the social world, being fond of Daoist immortals and Buddhism and being a [Confucian] sage, these contradictions were constantly the biggest problems that troubled the young Yangming before his realisation of the dao at Longchang. The direct cause that led Wang Yangming to thoroughly abandon Buddhism and Daoism was the realisation at Longchang. Yangming described it himself thus: “From my youth I also was earnestly devoted to the two traditions [i.e. Daoism and Buddhism]. I thought I had attained something, and that the Confucians were not worth studying. Later, when I lived among primitive tribes for [nearly] three years, I saw how simple, easy, broad, and great the learning of the sages is, and I then began to sigh and regret having misapplied my energies for thirty years” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). It was not only the fierce environment and life-death ordeal at Longchang that led to Yangming no longer having the leisurely and carefree mentality to discuss the abstruse [of Daoism] and empty [of Buddhism]. More importantly, the greatest and strongest spiritual power that supported him in overcoming his difficulties was mainly derived from the Confucian Learning of the Mind. After he realised the dao at Longchang, he verified what he had realised through the Five Classics, which also increasingly reinforced his faith in Confucianism. From this point on, his entanglement with the two traditions [of Buddhism and Daoism] was cut off. Accordingly, the style of his poems also changed from beautiful arrangements and lyrical, vivid expressions to simple plainness, speaking of principles and stating ambitions. He also exhorted scholars to reject Buddhism and Daoism, directly attacking the two traditions in his teaching. From middle age, he gradually began to change from criticising Buddhism and Daoism to integrating them into Confucianism, with the latter as the core. He believed that Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism in their most refined and subtle aspects all talk about the mind, and their disagreements only concern minor details. Their greatest difference lies in original substance and not in effort. As recorded in Record of Transmission and Practice, a disciple once asked, since Buddhists also hold [that original substance is] neither good nor bad, how do they differ from Confucians? Yangming replied: Since they are attached to the non-being of good and bad, Buddhists neglect everything and are therefore incapable of governing the world under Heaven. The non-being of good and bad of the sage, however, is merely his “not making a deliberate effort to like or dislike,” not moving in his qi. As he “pursues the kingly dao and grasps its perfect excellence,” he is one in his following Heavenly principle and it becomes possible for him to intervene in and

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complete [the dao of Heaven and Earth] and assist in and complement [the harmony of Heaven and Earth]. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)

In Yangming’s view, Confucianism and Buddhism both speak of the concept of neither good nor bad, but in Buddhism and Daoism, the original substance of the mind is emptiness, while in Confucianism, it is principle. In the neither good nor bad of Buddhism, what is attained through its effort is emptiness, in order to liberate oneself from the ocean of suffering, and as a result its only achievement is private. Confucianism however follows principle and respects dao, taking achieving the public interest as its goal. Buddhists escape from the world, shirking the ethical duties of father-son and ruler-minister relations, which means precisely clinging to external images, whereas Confucians do not cling to external images because they believe that people cannot escape from their ethical duties. They accept the ethical duties they should fulfill and treat them in line with principle, and accomplish their ideal personality in ethical life. Confucianism does not reject what Buddhism and Daoism call nothingness, but nothingness in Confucianism is simply the effort of cultivating the mind. In terms of the completeness of both substance and function, nothingness is originally present in Confucianism. The core of Daoist learning is to respect and cultivate life, while the core of Buddhist learning is to maintain the clear and clean original substance of the mind and not allow it to be contaminated by the dirt of custom. These meanings are both originally present in Confucianism: Both the functions of the two traditions [of Buddhism and Daoism] are our functions: in our complete cultivation of the self when fully developing our inherent nature and fulfilling our endowment, we can be called [Daoist] immortals; in our not being contaminated by worldly stains when fully developing our inherent nature and fulfilling our endowment, we can be called Buddhists. … Sages share the same substance with Heaven, Earth, people and things, and Confucianism, Buddhism, and Lao-Zhuang [i.e. Daoism] are all our functions, this is what is called the Great Dao. (“Chronicle,” Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1289)

However, Yangming repeatedly pointed out that the similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism lie in effort, while their original substance is radically different. The original substance of Buddhism is nothingness which “cannot be used to govern the world under Heaven,” whereas the original substance of Confucianism is inherent nature and principle, the means to govern the world under Heaven. Huang Zongxi particularly praised Yangming’s point here: Yet some skeptics thought the Buddhist theory of the original mind was very similar to the Learning of the Mind, not knowing that only the single word “principle” divides Confucianism and Buddhism. … The Master pointed out that that which makes the mind the mind does not lie in clear awareness but in Heavenly principle, a golden mirror that was dropped but has been gathered again, so as to make the borderland between Confucianism and Buddhism as vast as if they were separated by mountains and rivers. (“Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians)

Yangming strictly distinguished Confucianism and Buddhism, but also used the theories of Buddhism and Daoism to complement the theories of Confucianism, especially its theory of mind and inherent nature, making its originally weak areas replenished and full, replete with both substance and function. With regard to this

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point, Yangming was still on the path of wandering into and out of Buddhism and Daoism, then upon entering turning the gun around to fiercely attack the two teachings, and then eventually integrating Confucianism and Buddhism, as great Confucians such as Zhang Zai 张载, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi had done in the Song Dynasty. This is much wiser than the insularity and haste shown in the criticisms of “Yangming Chan” made by scholars of the same and later periods. The dialogue at Yantan 严滩, which occurred slightly after the demonstration of the dao at Tianquan, offers another example of how Yangming absorbed and used the theories of Buddhism and Daoism to enrich his own. Record of Transmission and Practice records: When the Master began his journey to Sizhou and Tianzhou to subdue the rebellion, Dehong and Ruzhong [i.e. Wang Longxi] followed after him and saw him off at Yantan. Ruzhong raised the question of the Buddhist doctrine of the real and illusory states of dharmas [i.e. elements of existence]. The Master said, “Wherever the mind is, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is not, there is the illusory state. At the same time, wherever the mind is not, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is, there is the illusory state.” Ruzhong said, “When you say ‘Wherever the mind is, there is the real state and wherever the mind is not, there is the illusory state,’ you are talking about effort from the point of view of original substance, and when you say, ‘Wherever the mind is not, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is, there is the illusory state,’ you are talking about original substance from the point of view of effort.” The Master agreed with his words. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

In Chan Buddhism, “Wherever the mind is, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is not, there is the illusory state” refers to original substance, and “wherever the mind is not, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is, there is the illusory state” refers to effort. Their meaning is that whether or not a practitioner attains dao depends on whether or not they are enlightened. Those who are enlightened add their understanding of things and affairs onto things and affairs, giving things and affairs an all-new meaning for those who are enlightened. In the eyes of the enlightened, the external forms of things and affairs are unchanged, but their meaning has changed. Take the famous Chan Buddhist story about the wind and the flag [a debate between two monks over which of the two is moving] as an example; Huineng’s 惠能 answer was “It is your minds that are moving.” Puyuan 普愿 of Nanquan 南泉 temple also said: “Head directly to the other side to comprehend it, then come to this side to practice it.” These both emphasise the significance of the interpretation of the enlightened for the original substance of things. In Chan Buddhism, original substance is “milieu joined with the spirit” (jing yu shen hui 境 与神会), “principle merged with the understanding” (li yu zhi ming 理与智冥). For the enlightened, pure external things are things with no meaning. In Chan Buddhism, the three relationships between the knower and the mountain-river landscape can provide an excellent explanation of this idea: before enlightenment, mountains are mountains, rivers are rivers, and the relationship between the mountain-river landscape and the awakened is external. With a little enlightenment, mountains are not mountains, rivers are not rivers, and the mountain-river landscape and the enlightened exist as others. After true enlightenment, mountains are

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still mountains, rivers are still rivers, but they already form a “milieu joined with the spirit,” with the mountain-river landscape and the enlightened now completely integrated to form one body. Another example is when Chan Buddhist masters test their disciples with keen words, which often feature demonstrative actions. If disciples are unconscious of the meanings embedded in the actions and merely mechanically imitate them, then even if their actions are the same, they still cannot be said to have understood. With regard to this kind of situation, the masters would say the imitators “don’t know where it falls” (buzhi luochu 不知落处), meaning they do not understand the meaning embedded in the action. This is also to say that original substance must involve participation of the mind of the enlightened. Without the involvement of the enlightenment and interpretation of the mind, things have no meaning to the cultivation of dao. This is precisely the true meaning of the sentence “Wherever the mind is, there is the real state. Wherever the mind is not, there is the illusory state.” However, cultivation in Chan Buddhism is also a spontaneous process, and the practitioner should not become attached, since attachments become evil karmic hindrances. Chan Buddhists often said: “Taking meals when hungry and going to sleep when drowsy, in this cultivation is more profound than profound” (Dazhu Huihai 大珠慧海), “There is no need to exert effort to learn the doctrines of Buddhism, simply live ordinary life with no troubles” (Linji Yixuan 临济义玄). This is the sentence “Wherever the mind is not, there is the real state. Wherever the mind is, there is the illusory state.” In Chan Buddhism, being refers to original substance, while non-being refers to effort. The mind is being and non-being as one, a unity of original substance and effort. In the dialogue at Yantan, Wang Yangming agreed with Wang Longxi’s statement that “Wherever the mind is, there is the real state and wherever the mind is not, there is the illusory state” was speaking of effort from the level of original substance, while “wherever the mind is not, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is, there is the illusory state” was speaking of original substance from the level of effort. What Yangming meant was that one must rely on the innate moral knowing in one’s own original mind in acting, that innate moral knowing is really existing, and that this is the precondition for all effort. Deny the reality of innate moral knowing, and all effort is out of question, hence “Wherever the mind is, there is the real state and wherever the mind is not, there is the illusory state.” The extension of innate moral knowing is effort, thus this sentence speaks of effort from the perspective of original substance. On the other hand, innate moral knowing must be extended, and only when effort is applied can the original substance be realised. There is no pre-existent original mind or pre-existent innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing without effort is an illusory being, an abstract being. This speaks of original substance from the perspective of effort, so “Wherever the mind is not, there is the real state, and wherever the mind is, there is the illusory state.” The “Yantan Dialogue” completely expresses the whole of Wang Yangming’s thought on original substance and effort, and restates the meaning of his reproach to Wang Longxi and Qian Dehong that “The views of you two gentlemen complement each other very well in use” during the demonstration of the dao at Tianquan.

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The “Four-Sentence Teaching” is a unity of liberal dispersal (saluo 洒落) and respectful reverence (jingwei 敬畏). Huang Tingjian 黄庭坚 said Zhou Dunyi was “dispersed like a light breeze after rain or a clear moon after snow.” Liberal dispersal represents a relaxed and carefree spiritual plane neither restrained by the forms of dao and principle nor burdened by worldly honor and profit, while respectful reverence on the contrary represents a psychological state of submission and assiduity. Dwelling in respect was a main aspect of the cultivation method advocated by the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy. Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties always regarded respectful reverence and liberal dispersal as two opposed personality types. Wang Yangming’s entire life was a process in which the relation between respectful reverence and liberal dispersal changed from division to unity. In his youth, Yangming was bold and uninhibited, and the Song Dynasty Confucians’ cultivation methods focused on respectful reverence were never able to satisfy his mind. However, for a long period after he established his position in the Learning of the Mind, he nonetheless focused on respectful reverence. “It is simply the resolution, in every thought, to preserve Heavenly principle. If one does not neglect this, in due time it will spontaneously crystallise in one’s mind and become what the Daoists call ‘binding an embryonic sage’,” “Essence and spirit, morality and virtue, and speech and action all generally demand collection and concentration as fundamental. Only in unavoidable circumstances should they be allowed to become diffused. This is true of Heaven, Earth, humans, and things” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I) represent the mainstream direction of his effort in this period. After meeting with several great misfortunes, he let go of life and death and gain and loss, and became more and more liberally dispersed. After he moved to Yue, he shook off the yoke of officialdom, and devoted himself to teaching and discussion with students. His theories became more and more mature, respectful reverence and liberal dispersal becoming perfectly integrated with each other. Wang Longxi described three changes in Yangming’s general thought after Longchang: Since then, after removing all the branches and leaves, [Wang Yangming] concentrated his intentions on the root and origin. Silent meditation to purify the mind was the principle of [his] learning. Given the centrality before feelings are aroused, there is the harmony in which feelings are aroused such that all attain due measure and degree. Seeing and hearing, speech and action all generally demand collection and concentration as fundamental. Only in unavoidable circumstances should they be allowed to become diffused. After coming to Jiangyou [Jiangxi], he focused on the extension of innate moral knowing, according to which silence does not depend on sitting in meditation and the mind does not wait to be purified, since without learning and considering, these emerge from spontaneously existing Heavenly principle. Since innate moral knowing is the centrality before feelings are aroused, there was no further state before feelings were aroused before this knowing; since innate moral knowing is the harmony in which feelings all attain due measure and degree, there is no further state after feelings are aroused after this knowing. This knowing can collect and self-restrain on its own, and there is no need to further dwell on collection and concentration; since this knowing can diffuse on its own, there is no need to further expect it to diffuse. What collects and self-restrains is the substance of affects, still and yet active; what diffuses is the function of stillness, active and yet still. Knowing in its genuine and earnest aspect is action, and action in its aware and discriminating aspect is knowing, so there is no division. After he moved to Yue, that which he exercised became more mature,

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and that which he attained became more transformed. He always knew right from wrong, yet was also always without right or wrong. Whenever he opened his mouth, he attained the original mind, and there was no need to make use of or appeal to anything else, like the bright sun in the sky shining on everything beneath it. After his learning was established, there were the above three changes. (“Case Studies from Yaojiang,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians)

“Silent meditation to purify the mind” and seeking “the centrality before feelings are aroused” refers to respectful reverence, while “without learning and considering, these emerge from spontaneously existing Heavenly principle” refers to liberal dispersal. “He always knew right from wrong, yet was also always without right or wrong. Whenever he opened his mouth, he attained the original mind, and there was no need to make use of or appeal to anything else” is a perfect combination of respectful reverence and liberal dispersal. At this stage, there is liberal dispersal in respectful reverence, and respectful reverence in liberal dispersal. There is a unity of activity with stillness, quietude with affect, knowing with action, before feelings are aroused with after, collection and concentration with diffusion, and knowing right and wrong with neither right nor wrong. This spiritual plane can be called “a carefree mind, flowing together with Heaven above and Earth below.” Yangming’s understanding of the relationship between respectful reverence and liberal dispersal was based on this spiritual plane: A gentleman who is liberally dispersed is not dissolute and dissipated, self-indulgent and reckless, but rather is a person whose substance of mind is not hindered by desires, and who can be self-content in any place. The original substance of mind is Heavenly principle, and the illumination and numinous awareness of Heavenly principle is innate moral knowing. The gentleman’s caution and apprehension only concerns the possibility that this illumination and numinous awareness might be dulled or dissipated, becoming false, isolated, biased and rash and losing the rectification of its original substance. When the effort of caution and apprehension is never interrupted, then Heavenly principle exists constantly, and there is nothing its original substance of illumination and numinous awareness that is obscured or disturbed, afraid or worried, fond or happy, angry or resentful, arbitrary or dogmatic, stubborn or self-centred, regretful or discouraged, guilty or ashamed; it is harmonious and integrated, clear and transparent, penetrating and flowing; its manner, appearance and dealings all accord with ritual propriety, following the desires of the mind but not overstepping the boundaries. This is what is called true liberal dispersal. Since this liberal dispersal is produced from the constant being of Heavenly principle, and the constant being of Heavenly principle is produced from the non-interruption of caution and apprehension, who can say that the increase of respectful reverence is instead hindered by liberal dispersal? If one does not know that liberal dispersal is the substance of one’s mind and that respectful reverence is the effort of liberal dispersal, but divides them into two things and separates the use of their mind, then they will contradict and work against each other, leading to increasingly conflicting effects. (“Reply to Shu Guoyong” [Da Shu Guoyong 答舒国用], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 190)

Respectful reverence is not a psychological state of worship, seriousness, fear and anxiety, but an intention toward the self-aware pursuit of good and self-aware cautiousness concerning bad, and therefore, respectful reverence is not a destruction of the original empty numinosity of the mind. Likewise, liberal dispersal is not indulgence and recklessness, but a spiritual plane in which the mind is not hindered

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by external desires and profit, but constantly at ease and always self-content. True liberal dispersal derives from respectful reverence, because only respectful reverence can prevent bad from harming the mind, such that the original substance of the mind—innate moral knowing—can fill up and flow out, so as to form a unity of subjective action and external standards. This unity is true liberal dispersal, and this liberal dispersal and respectful reverence are not separate or contradictory, but two sides of one unity that supplement one another. Wang Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching is a summary of the academic achievements of his entire life. For the remainder of the Ming Dynasty, debates around the Four-Sentence Teaching never stopped. Because of the influence of the social, political and cultural upheaval of the late Ming Dynasty on philosophy, the theoretical content provoked by the Four-Sentence Teaching extended well beyond the Four-Sentence Teaching itself. This can be taken as a thread to grasp the development of Ming Dynasty philosophy after Wang Yangming.

Chapter 7

Wang Longxi’s A Priori Rightness of Mind and Qian Dehong’s A Posteriori Sincerity of Intention

Wang Yangming 王阳明 changed the themes of his teaching many times during his life, and his disciples also absorbed different parts of his theories based on their different understandings, the different times they became his disciples, and their different personalities. Therefore, after Wang Yangming died, the theories of his disciples displayed very different characteristics, the debates among them constituting the major content of academic study in the middle and later periods of the Ming Dynasty. Wang Longxi 王龙溪 and Qian Dehong 钱德洪 were among the best of Wang Yangming’s disciples, and the central principles of their theories are quite different. These differences initiated the different paths of learning among Wang Yangming’s disciples after his death.

1 Wang Longxi’s Learning of the a Priori Rightness of Mind Wang Ji 王畿 (1498–1583; zi Ruzhong 汝中, alias Longxi 龙溪) was from Shanyin 山阴, Zhejiang province and belonged to the same clan as Wang Yangming. He was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations during the period of the Jiajing 嘉靖 emperor and served as director of the department of appointments in the Ministry of War in Nanjing. Because of his hostility to the current prime minister Xia Yan 夏言, he submitted a memorial to the emperor asking for retirement. After being granted his retirement, he became Wang Yangming’s disciple while Wang Yangming was living and teaching in Yue 越. Wang Longxi had an intelligent and sharp character, and was good at speaking and debating, his perspicacity going beyond the other disciples. Together with Qian Dehong, they assisted Wang Yangming with teaching his disciples. When disciples first came to Wang Yangming, Longxi and Dehong taught them first, and they then conducted further study with Wang Yangming before graduating. Because of this, © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_7

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Longxi and Dehong were both referred to as “lecturers.” Since Wang Longxi had followed Wang Yangming for a long time, he considered himself to be the only one who had obtained the core principles of Wang Yangming’s thought, and thus regarded advocating Wang Yangming’s theories as his own special task. Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 said he “lived in retirement for about forty years, and gave lectures constantly. He appeared in lecturing halls all over the two capitals [Nanjing and Beijing], Wu 吴, Chu 楚, Min 闽, Yue, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and his lectures were all based on his master’s core principles. He still travelled almost continually even when he was eighty years old” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 238). His main works are included in the twelve volumes of the Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi (Wang Longxi xiansheng quanji 王龙溪先生全集).1 After settling in Yue, Wang Yangming was able to discuss and develop the academic accumulations of his previous periods with other scholars, and thus his works became more subtle. Wang Longxi frequently heard Wang Yangming’s teaching at this period, thus his learning specialised in its more lofty and enlightened aspects. Wang Longxi’s learning focused on the a priori original rightness of the substance of the mind, and can thus be called a “learning of the a priori rightness of the mind” (xiantian zheng xin zhi xue 先天正心之学), which was mainly based on Wang Yangming’s principle that “When the Heavenly principle in the innate moral knowing [liangzhi 良知] of my mind is extended to all affairs and things, all affairs and things will attain their principles.” This principle of Wang Yangming originally had two aspects, positive and negative. The positive effort was for people of a sharp root-nature (gen 根) who have a clear and transparent substance of mind, their impure dregs transformed, the obscuration of their innate moral knowing by material desires relatively light, so their efforts should be focused on maintaining the flowing of innate moral knowing. The negative aspect was for people of a dull root-nature whose minds are confused, distracting thoughts spreading disorder, and the obscuration of their innate moral knowing relatively heavy, so their effort should be focused on reflection and self-overcoming. The good known through innate moral knowing should be followed, while the bad known through innate moral knowing should be removed. The process of the extension of innate moral knowing is the process of doing the good and removing the bad in concrete things and affairs. Wang Longxi’s learning of the a priori rightness of mind mainly absorbed the positive effort of Wang Yangming, taking the Heavenly principle in innate moral knowing as originally possessed a priori, with a posteriori effort simply maintaining this original substance of innate moral knowing and ensuring that innate moral knowing can be found everywhere, such that the there is nowhere for a posteriori intentions to be aroused, and hence Wang Longxi’s learning first distinguished the a priori mind (xiantian zhi xin 先天之心) from a posteriori intentions (houtian zhi yi 后天之意). He said:

1

[Trans.] References to Wang Longxi xiansheng quanji refer to a carved edition from the Daoguang 道光 period of the Qing Dynasty.

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The rightness of mind is a priori learning; making one’s intentions sincere is a posteriori learning. … All worldly sentiments and physical desires of we humans are produced from intentions. The mind is originally of the highest good, and only when intentions are aroused does the bad begin to emerge. If one can establish his root-nature on the a priori substance of mind, then what is aroused by intentions will not be bad, and all worldly sentiments as well as physical desires will be found nowhere, so the effort of extending knowledge will naturally be simple and easy, what is known as “after Heaven yet following the times of Heaven.” If one establishes his root-nature on intentions aroused a posteriori, then it is inevitable that there will be a miscellany of worldly affairs and physical desires, and talents will fall into entanglements which will be difficult to cut off, so the transformation from the effort of the extension of knowledge to its realisation will be complex and difficult. (“Records in Sanshan Lize” [Sanshan Lize lu 三山丽泽录], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 1)

The division of effort into the rightness of mind and making one’s intentions sincere, a priori and a posteriori, is based on Wang Yangming’s thought, as stated in Record of Transmission and Practice (Chuan xi lu 传习录): The difficult part of our effort lies entirely in the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. This is precisely the matter of making one’s intentions sincere. If the intentions are sincere, then, to a large extent, the mind is naturally rectified, and the personal life is also naturally cultivated. However, effort is also required to rectify the mind and cultivate one’s personal life. The cultivation of personal life is the part after the feelings are aroused, whereas the rightness of the mind is the part before the feelings are aroused. If the mind is rectified, there will be equilibrium. If personal life is cultivated, there will be harmony. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I)2

“Before the feelings are aroused” means a priori, and “after the feelings are aroused” means a posteriori. The original substance of the mind is a priori original rightness, and thus is above being affected by effort. If one can make the numinous clarity of the mind occupied purely by a priori original good, the intentions aroused all good with the bad unable to intrude, then Heavenly principle will flow into everything. Wang Longxi regarded his a priori rightness of mind as a simple and direct effort, precisely because it “did not establish root-nature on intentions aroused a posteriori.” If one establishes one’s root-nature on intention, then good and bad thoughts will emerge in disorder and innate moral knowing will be needed to distinguish and overcome them, so “the transformation from the effort of the extension of knowledge to its realisation will be complex and difficult.” Wang Longxi extended Wang Yangming’s idea that “innate moral knowing is present in everyone” and “the streets are filled with sages” to the utmost, giving the learning of the “a priori rightness of mind” a strongly idealistic character. Since Wang Longxi hoped to make the a priori substance of mind flow, he had to first open the channel that enables this flowing, and thus the arousing of a posteriori

2

[Translator’s note:] Translations from Wang Yangming are based where possible on the work of Wing-Tsit Chan (Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) with modifications. References are as given by Professor Zhang.

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intention must be reduced as far as possible. However, since it is impossible for people living in the real world of experience not to produce intentions towards their surroundings, Wang Longxi’s effort to ensure the flowing of the a priori original good was to be “in thoughts but without thought”: thoughts originally exist, but they belong to the matter of intentions, so if one can have thoughts but not be bound by thoughts, making thoughts become “nothing” with regard to the a priori substance of the mind, then the pure substance of inherent nature will flow: We deal with others every day, never departing from present existence, a maze of sentiments and inklings all controlled by this one thought. When thoughts return to unity, the spirit will spontaneously avoid wandering and scattering. … The distinction between sages and the crazy is nothing but the difference between the reality and falsity of this one thought. When this one thought is clearly defined, there is then the learning of bright illumination. The one thought is without thoughts, has thoughts but is not bound by thoughts. Therefore the learning of the superior man takes non-thought as its basis. (“Casual Courtyard Dialogue for My Son Yingbin” [Quting manyu fu Yingbin er 趋庭漫语 付应斌儿], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 15) We protect our minds like protecting our eyes, such that neither good thoughts nor bad thoughts can touch them. … During leisure in daily life, if you try to continually grasp your thoughts together, can you set aside everything such that there is not even one single thing remaining? All knowledge and explanation, if not separated from worldly affairs, simply increases one’s burden, and the heavier the burden, the more difficult it is to be detached. (“Record and Instruction at Jiulong” [Jiulong jihui 九龙纪诲], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 3)

Wang Longxi’s learning was strongly influenced by Chan 禅宗 Buddhism. “Non-thought as the basis” (wunian wei zong 无念为宗) is the key of the effort of Chan Sixth Patriarch Huineng 六祖惠能. Wang Yangming had already absorbed the cultivation effort from Chan Buddhism into his theories, and Wang Longxi went even further on this point. He did not avoid speaking of Chan Buddhism, instead making it an organic component of his theory. He also thought that the essence of Chan Buddhism, which is not arousing thoughts towards one’s surroundings and keeping the substance of the mind empty, still and without things, was originally present in the ideas of Confucianism. Later Confucians did not keep hold of this, and Buddhism and Daoism took advantage such that afterwards Confucianism gradually declined while Buddhism and Daoism increased their influence. It is a tragedy of Confucianism that Confucians did not apprehend this meaning that was originally present in Confucianism, but rather willingly yielded it to Buddhism and Daoism. The learning of innate moral knowing originally covered the essence of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, and Buddhism and Daoism were included in the original content of innate moral knowing. Wang Longxi said: Humans receive the centrality of Heaven and Earth in being born, such that all have their constant inherent nature. In the beginning, there was no distinction of some as Confucian, others Buddhist and others Daoist, and all received their share. Innate moral knowing is the numinosity of inherent nature, taking Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one, and delimiting the hub of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. It does not comply with standards or involve thinking and action, falsehood and reality mutually producing each other without becoming nothing, quietude and affectivity opposing each other without

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extermination. If people who learn Buddhism and Daoism can restore inherent nature as the basis, and not fall into void and falsehood, then they are Confucians of Daoism and Buddhism. (“Record of Rebuilding Bailu Academy” [Chongxiu bailu shuyuan ji 重修白鹿 书院记], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 17)

Wang Longxi’s statement above absorbed Wang Yangming’s ideas. Wang Yangming thought that the thoughts of Buddhism and Daoism were originally present in Confucianism. He said: It is incorrect to say it [Confucianism] adopted thoughts [from Buddhism and Daoism]. Sages can fully develop their inherent nature to the point of fulfilling their endowment and encompass all things, what would they need to adopt from others? The functions of the two traditions [Buddhism and Daoism] are our function: our self-discipline when fully developing inherent nature to the point of fulfilling endowment is equivalent to Daoism; our not being contaminated by worldly stains when developing inherent nature to the point of fulfilling endowment is equivalent to Buddhism. However, later Confucians could not see the whole of the learning of the sages, and thus took Buddhism and Daoism as two different views. This is like a house with three rooms making up one hall: the Confucians did not know they were all ours, so when they saw Buddhists, they divided off the left room and gave it to them, and when they saw Daoists, they divided the right room for them, while Confucians kept the middle room. This is holding up one but abandoning hundreds. Sages share the same substance with Heaven, Earth, people and things, Confucianism, Buddhism, Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 庄子 are all our function. (“Chronicle” [Nianpu 年谱], Complete Collected Works of Wang Yangming [Wang Yangming quanji 王阳明全集], 1289)

Wang Longxi inherited Wang Yangming’s thoughts on melding Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism all together, but he mainly absorbed the theory of effort from Buddhism and Daoism, while the original substance was still Confucian. In Wang Longxi’s view, being is the original substance (benti 本体) while non-being is an effort (gongfu 功夫). Emphasising non-being is precisely done in order to manifest being. Innate moral knowing has the function of self-discipline (non-being) and self-manifestation (being), and there is no need for human power to force it arise or disappear. From Wang Longxi’s time onward, many criticisms of him can be summed up the single word “Chan,” without distinguishing original substance and effort. Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 once commented that Wang Longxi “did not establish being and non-being, eliminating both good and bad, allowing the qi 气 of empty spirit and consciousness to be unbridled and unrestrained. This was evident at every moment, which never departed from this point. How could he possibly not fall into the abyss of Buddhism!” (“On the Masters” [Shi shuo 师说], Case Studies of Ming Confucians) When Huang Zongxi analysed Wang Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching, he argued that, ““In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” means there are no good or bad thoughts in the mind, and that the substance of inherent nature flows. This statement is quite correct. Wang Longxi inherited precisely this thought from Wang Yangming, but placed more emphasis on “non-being,” regarding “non-being” as the precondition of “being.” Wang Longxi once quoted Wang Yangming’s words to argue that his own theory concerned “being produced within non-being”: taking effort as non-being, original substance

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as being, and not clinging to good or bad thoughts with the highest good originally present within the mind flowing naturally. He said: Innate moral knowing is the equilibrium before the feelings are aroused, and before this knowing there was no state before the feelings were aroused; innate moral knowing is the harmony in which the feelings are aroused and all attain due measure and degree, and after this knowing there is no state in which the feelings are aroused. This knowing can restrain itself, and does not need to be further controlled by restraints; this knowing can diffuse itself, and does not need to be further expected to diffuse. … Innate moral knowing is originally being produced within non-being, without knowing or non-knowing.” (“Dialogue at the meeting in Chuyang” [Chuyang huiyu 滁阳会语], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 2)

Innate moral knowing is present all the time, and it is “true inherent nature flowing, naturally manifesting the regulation of Heaven.” As long as good and bad thoughts are not aroused, the substance of the mind is empty and silent, the metaphysical substance of inherent nature naturally manifesting itself in the actual substance of the mind. Innate moral knowing has the function of spiritually sensing and responding, transforming the goodness of the substance of inherent nature into the concrete goodness of the substance of the mind which coincides with the regulations of the empirical world. Innate moral knowing transforms constantly with things, and the goodness of the substance of inherent nature flows in all places. He said: Innate moral knowing is a Heavenly numinous aperture, constantly functioning and revolving following the impulse of Heaven, changing and transforming speech and action, naturally manifesting the regulation of Heaven with no need for precautions or restraint, investigation or speculation; why should one be concerned or not about attaining it? (“Responses to Questions When Passing Fengcheng” [Guo Fengcheng dawen 过丰城答 问], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 4)

Wang Longxi said innate moral knowing is a Heavenly numinous aperture, which means innate moral knowing is the manifestation of the metaphysical principle of inherent nature in the actual mind. Since eliminating both good and bad is precisely for the purpose of the manifestation of this inherent nature and this principle, Wang Longxi certainly did not, as described by Liu Zongzhou, “not establish being and non-being, eliminating both good and bad, allowing the qi of empty numinosity and consciousness to be unbridled and unrestrained.” Not establishing being and non-being along with eliminating good and bad are Longxi’s effort. However, what is unbridled and unrestrained is definitely not the qi of empty numinosity and consciousness, but rather the a priori substance of inherent nature transformed into the highest good of the a posteriori substance of mind. Thus, as Wang Longxi said, “For one who sees his inherent nature, his true inherent nature flows and evenly fills any place, the impulse of Heaven constantly lively with no persisting remnants, natural and without any arrangement” (“Dialogue at the Meeting in Longnan” [Longnan huiyu 龙南会语], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 7). This “true inherent nature flowing and evenly filling any place” is definitely not the “qi of empty numinosity.” Further, Wang Longxi explained his theory of

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“four withouts” (si wu 四无) in his “Record of the Demonstration of the Dao at Tianquan” (Tianquan zhengdao ji 天泉证道记): The mind without mind hides secrets, the intention without intentions responds in completeness, the knowing without knowing embodies quietude, and the thing without things employs the spirit. Heaven-endowed inherent nature is purely the highest good, spiritually sensing and responding, its impulse spontaneously not allowing any ending, with no goodness to be named. The bad is originally non-existent, while the good also cannot be attained as existing. This is what is meant by there being neither good nor bad. (Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 1)

That is to say, the “four withouts” are the substance of the mind, the inherent nature endowed by Heaven is the substance of inherent nature, the actual substance of the mind rejects and eliminates both good and bad, and the metaphysical substance of inherent nature flows spontaneously. Spiritually sensing and responding is precisely the substance of inherent nature in the mind flowing, sensing and responding according to impulses and uniting with whatever it may encounter. Innate moral knowing is the metaphysical substance of inherent nature transforming into the actual substance of the mind; it is the highest good, and has its content. Thus Liu Zongzhou’s criticism of Wang Longxi as “directly regarding innate moral knowing as Buddha-nature, suspended in expectation of realisation, in the end becoming just a foolish spectacle” (“On the Masters,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians) is not accurate. Although Wang Longxi’s effort of “not establishing being and non-being, eliminating both good and bad” is the same as Chan Buddhism, innate moral knowing is clearly not identical to Buddha-nature. Innate moral knowing is being and the highest good, whereas Buddha-nature is empty from beginning to end. Wang Longxi’s realisation is a realisation of the highest good, and not a realisation of emptiness. Huang Zongxi commented that when Wang Longxi said, “in the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” in his “Record of Demonstrating the Dao at Tianquan”, and then said, “the highest good with no bad is the substance of the mind” in his “Response to Wu Wuzhai” (Da Wu Wuzhai 答 吴悟斋), the two views could not be unified. In fact, the substance of the mind with no distinction of good and bad exists precisely in order to manifest the substance of the mind with highest good with no badness. Although these two views refer to different levels, they are unified. Huang Zongxi also commented that Wang Longxi’s innate moral knowing is “the flowing of consciousness” (zhijue zhi liuxing 知觉之流行), which is an even greater misunderstanding of Wang Longxi. Huang Zongxi’s theory was inherited from his teacher Liu Zongzhou, who warned of the harms of being “reckless and self-indulgent” or “putrid fish and rotten meat” among Wang Yangming’s followers, wishing to correct and rescue Wang Yangming’s learning from its roots, restoring the academic ethos of discretion and assiduity, respectfulness and diligence, and the unification of knowledge and action displayed throughout Yangming’s entire life, especially in his early years. Therefore, he censured and criticised those in Yangming’s school who advocated “elevating to a higher method” and sought to begin from a lofty and illuminated position through realisation. Both men argued that the deviation from Yangming among his

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followers started from the ‘two Wangs,” Wang Gen 王艮 and Wang Ji 王畿, and that Wang Longxi bore much of the blame. Liu Zongzhou said that Wang Longxi “learnt the dao diligently for about eighty years yet still didn’t find his final destination, inevitably borrowing and begging from different schools, passing his entire life in vain, unable to establish his root and foundation. How pitiful!” (“On the Masters,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians) It would be wrong to say that Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi were not well-intentioned in their efforts to correct and rescue Wang Yangming’s school, but their words were surely too strong. In taking non-being as effort and being as original substance, and his learning of realising original substance as effort, Wang Longxi truly had his brilliant aspects. This brilliance lies in his breaking with the fixed patterns of “preserving Heavenly principle and eliminating human desires” and “doing good and removing the bad” of Confucians in the Song and Ming dynasties. Instead, he opened up a new path according to which the road along which a posteriori intention occurs is blocked, such that the a priori original good substance of inherent nature can penetrate directly into the substance of the mind. The a priori substance of inherent nature is moral reason, and when this is realised by the actual mind, it is immediately attached to the epistemological reason of the substance of the mind and enables it to “respond in completeness” and “employ the spirit.” This moment is a unity of the internal and external, of mind and things. The substance of inherent nature transforms into wisdom in epistemological reason, tossing and turning with things, constantly flowing and penetrating, changing and shifting, without the entanglement of responding to traces. Wang Longxi said: Our mind’s innate moral knowing naturally knows that one should be filial when one meets with one’s father, naturally knows that one should be respectful when one meets with one’s elder brother, naturally knows that one should be deferential when one meets with one’s ruler, naturally knows that one should feel pity when one meets with a child falling into a well, and naturally knows that one should feel distressed when one meets with a bull outside a hall [to be slaughtered as a sacrifice]. These can be extended to the five constant virtues and expanded to a hundred deeds. The changes of the myriad things cannot be exhaustively investigated, yet everyone possesses that with which to respond to them. This means that the changes of the myriad things are fully present in our innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is able to contain the changes of the myriad things through its being void. Extending this void, there is spontaneously no gap between things and desires, and our innate moral knowing spontaneously flows with and penetrates the myriad things without any stagnation. (“Dialogue at the Meeting in Wanling” [Wanling huiyu 宛陵会语], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 2)

Innate moral knowing and the myriad things flow and penetrate each other, and moral reason and epistemological reason are unified. This shares the same meaning with the quotation above that “Innate moral knowing is a Heavenly numinous aperture, constantly functioning and revolving following the impulse of Heaven, changing and transforming speech and action, naturally manifesting the regulation of Heaven.” Wang Longxi’s learning of the a priori rightness of mind focuses on the a priori good substance of inherent nature, avoiding the strong psychological shock caused

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by the fierce conflict between Heavenly principle and human desire in moral reason, and his theory does not possess the tragic character of the struggle between spirit and flesh. On the contrary, his theory developed the aspects of accordance, adaptation, harmony and joy in the cultivation methods of traditional Chinese Confucians. As is well known, almost all Neo-Confucians ultimately found it hard to avoid the four words “preserving principle, eliminating desires” when speaking of theories of effort, no matter how profound their ontologies. Therefore, Neo-Confucianism generally advocated applying effort in areas known only by oneself and not by others, with phrases such as “being careful when alone” (shen du 慎独) and “not deceiving oneself even in dark rooms” (bu qi an shi 不欺暗室). As its branches developed further, they were often shallow and stubborn, focusing only on the struggle between principle and desire, as in Yuan Liaofan’s 袁了凡 “Table of Merits and Faults” (Gongguo ge 功过格). Even Yan Yuan 颜元, who expressed the fiercest opposition towards Neo-Confucianism, also used the method of tables of merits and faults: “Not only words, but the thoughts of the mind, the actions of the body, all should be recorded every day and every instant. The mind should not be relaxed even for one moment, and there should not be even one moment of leisure for the body. As the days pass, through this reciprocal interaction, merits can be encouraged and faults punished.” “If one remembers even small faults every day, only then can one begin not deceiving oneself. Even if one makes a mistake in a dark room that one is unable to write down, one must still write down the two words ‘hidden fault’” (Chronicle of Yan Yuan [Yan Yuan nianpu 颜元年 谱], Vol. I). Such a method of self cultivation smothers every moment of joy of life and vitality of self and mind, with no hint of relief and leisure, only a mood of insularity and urgency. In this manner, not only is it impossible to expect to achieve Confucius’ “I find inspiration in poetry, take my stand by observing ritual propriety, take my sojourn in the arts, and find fulfilment in music” [see Analects, 8.8], even Mencius’ “understanding words and cultivating qi” [see Mencius, 2A2] is hard to achieve. Thus, strict moral dogma and pedantic gentlemen of moral teaching filled the world, the world becoming obdurate and stiff and life becoming dull. Although Wang Longxi was also a Neo-Confucian, his learning contains much joy of life. He also talked about joy, for example: “Joy is the original substance of the mind, which is originally vivid and unrestrained, without the constraints of concern” (“Responses to Questions from Wangzi of Nanming” [Da Nanming Wangzi wen 答 南明汪子问], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 3), but his joy is not the joy of the mind attained through the triumph of one’s own moral power overcoming sensuous desires, his joy is an original substance and pre-existent. His cultivation method is to extract the bright side of human nature and take this as a dominant factor to eliminate and dissolve the dark side of human nature. Therefore, he advocated not arousing thoughts, not establishing being and non-being, and eliminating both good and bad, allowing the highest good of the substance of inherent nature to flow in the actual substance of the mind. This is the original meaning of Wang Longxi’s theory of the a priori rightness of the mind.

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2 Quietude and Affectivity Wang Longxi advocated the a priori taking the place of the a posteriori. His basis was that the human mind is a priori sufficient, so there is no need to use the a posteriori cultivation and demonstration to complete it. He said: Innate moral knowing is the numinous root of inherent nature, and what is known as original substance. Knowing this and then extending it, enfolding and gathering brightness, to accomplish the one without desire, this is called effort. Innate moral knowing is present in humanity, without studying or thinking, carefree because already existing; it spiritually senses and responds, abundantly emerging from Heaven’s completion. It is an original appearance, so there is no need for cultivation and demonstration to complete it. (“Shu tong xin cejuan 书同心册卷,” Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 5)

Since it is originally sufficient a priori, and all a posteriori effort is simply directed at maintaining this originally sufficient a priori substance, so the mind itself does not need to make any effort. With regard to this point, there is a radical difference between Wang Longxi and the Jiangyou 江右 School’s “returning to quietude” (guiji 归寂) and “maintaining stillness” (zhu jing 主静) in terms of the core principle of effort on the substance of the mind, and he had a detailed debate with Nie Bao 聂豹, the most senior figure in the Jiangyou School. The question of the debate concerned the relationship between quietude (ji 寂) and affectivity (gan 感), the states before and after feelings are aroused. Nie Bao held that quietude is the substance of inherent nature, while affectivity is the function of inherent nature; quietude is internal, while affectivity is external; quietude is before the feelings are aroused, while affectivity is after the feelings are aroused. There must be an effort of returning to quietude, which enables the substance of quietude to remain constantly still, as only then can affectivity and response occur without error. This cultivation effort has an order of internal and external, first and last. He used this to criticise Wang Longxi’s theory of the a priori rightness of the mind as “only concerned with the initial creation in chaos with no contamination, taking the present as sufficient and complete, and ‘not violating with work’ as a wondrous realisation. It is fine to amuse oneself with all this, but I fear it is something that is beyond the reach of people of average and lower intelligence” (“Arguments Concerning the Extension of Knowledge” [Zhizhi yibian 致知议辩], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 6). Wang Longxi however held that Nie Bao’s division of quietude and affectivity into first and last, internal and external, as well as before and after feelings are aroused already established a radical separation between quietude and affectivity. Wang Longxi criticised both the view of abandoning quietude and depending on affectivity along with that of departing from affectivity and conserving quietude, holding that these inevitably lead to the two evils of pursuing external things and clinging to the void respectively. He held that the effort of the a priori should be applied to the a posteriori, and that the effort before the feelings are aroused should be applied to the state after the feelings are aroused. Effort cannot be applied to the a priori and the state before the feelings are aroused. When he said the effort of the a priori should be applied to the

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a posteriori, he was not referring to allowing the feelings of happiness, anger, sadness and joy to be aroused so as to control them from outside, but rather being in thought but without thoughts, allowing the Heavenly regulation of the a priori substance of inherent nature to flow freely, while humans simply maintain and trust in this Heavenly regulation. Therefore, his effort was to be “after Heaven yet following the times of Heaven,” “relying on the times of Heaven in acting, the power of man having no choice but to participate.” He was opposed to Nie Bao’s applying the effort of returning to quietude on the a priori original substance, saying: The a priori is the mind, the a posteriori is intention, and the highest good is the original substance of the mind. The substance of the mind is originally rectified, thus if one only now rectifies the mind then there is a fault with rectifying the mind, since if one only now wants to rectify the mind, then this already belongs to intention. (“Arguments Concerning the Extension of Knowledge,” Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 6)

He thought that innate moral knowing is a tranquil substance, things are a function of being affected, and intention is the occasion seized by quietude and affectivity. In the “extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things,” the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things are combined in a single moment. Thus there is affectivity at all times and also returning to quietude at all times, with quietude and affectivity as one, and no need to make a specific effort to return to quietude prior to being affected. For example, with regard to “being careful when alone” (shen du 慎独), Nie Bao held that “alone” (du 独) is the place from where innate moral knowing sprouts, not innate moral knowing itself, and being careful when alone is “cultivation along the way,” still slightly separate from original substance. Only when one applies the effort of extending the void and conserving quietude to the original substance, can one “return to the root and restore one’s endowment.” Wang Longxi however thought that being careful when alone simply means maintaining and trusting in the flowing of innate moral knowing, preventing it from incorporating thoughts and desires. Since innate moral knowing is sufficient and complete in itself, there is no need to extend the void and conserve quietude. Wang Longxi explained his effort of being careful when alone as follows: “knowing alone is not knowing after thoughts begin to move, but is an a priori numinous aperture which is not dependent on thoughts to be present, does not moving following thoughts, and is not opposed to the myriad things. When we speak of being careful, this does not mean forced restraint, but rather simply assiduously maintaining and trusting in this numinous intelligence to restore its original purity and stillness” (“Reply to Wang Lihu” [Da Wang Lihu 答王鲤湖], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 10). This is how he used his principle of the a priori rightness of the mind to explain being careful when alone. Wang Longxi was also opposed to the retreat and meditation advocated by Nie Bao. Nie Bao thought that one must first cultivate a body with no desires, and only then is it appropriate to express function. Wang Longxi however argued that this not only means abandoning all present efforts, but could also lead to the fault of preferring stillness and disliking activity. He repeatedly stated that: “The mind of

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benevolence and righteousness is originally completely present, being affected, sensing, and spiritually responding, capable without learning. If we say that innate moral knowing needs cultivation to become complete, this is to twist its substance” (“Dialogue on Meeting at Nixian Tower in Fuzhou” [Fuzhou Nixiantai huiyu 抚州 拟岘台会语], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 1). With regard to the statement of Luo Hongxian 罗洪先, another representative figure of the Jiangyou School, that “there is no pre-existing innate moral knowing in the world, so without efforts risking death it cannot be attained,” Wang Longxi also pointed out that this view is not without its use in criticising those who merely chime in with others and lack views of their own, but inevitably falls into the fault of excessive correction if it implies a deficit in present innate moral knowing which requires the effort of cultivation and demonstration in order to be completed. Wang Longxi’s debates with various scholars in the Jiangyou School differed from his debate with Qian Dehong. The debate between Wang and Qian was between the a priori rightness of the mind and the a posteriori sincerity of intention. Both of their theories are based on the premise of accepting that innate moral knowing is originally sufficient and complete, but Qian Dehong held that the a priori rightness of the mind (innate moral knowing) cannot avoid becoming mixed with selfish intentions aroused a posteriori, and thus doing the good and removing the bad in intention is the correct path for effort. Wang Longxi’s debate with Nie Bao however focused on their different understandings of the a priori, with Wang Longxi holding that the a priori is originally right and has no need for effort, effort only needing to be applied in the a posteriori maintenance or trust in the a priori. The Jiangyou School however argued that only when the a priori mind undergoes a return to quietude and maintains stillness can the state before the feelings are aroused be preserved, affects be responded to without fixed methods, and feelings aroused yet sustain equilibrium. If Wang Longxi is regarded as wild, then the scholars of the Jiangyou School and Qian Dehong can be regarded as overcautious, though the kinds of overcautiousness of the Jiangyou and Zhezhong 浙中 schools were different. Wang Longxi focused on the a priori rightness of the mind, holding that the substance of inherent nature flows constantly, the original mind is complete and sufficient at each moment, and the intentions and thoughts aroused following this arise from the original mind, so naturally respond to the substance of inherent nature. However, the changes in thought produced by selfish intentions give rise to grasping and anticipation, intentions and demands, which do not respond to the substance of inherent nature. He said: Thoughts have two meanings: when this mind thinks, this refers to the present mind, and is called right thought; when the dual mind thinks, this refers to the mind that grasps and anticipates, and is called deviant thought. When the mind is the present mind, then thoughts are present thoughts, knowing is present knowing, and things are present things. The extension of knowledge and investigation of things is the effort to overcome thoughts. When there is presence, there is no assuming and expecting, and there is unity. (“Niantang shuo 念堂说,” Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 17)

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The immediate and present mind mentioned here is such that “When one sees a child fall into a well he will be alarmed, and will not have the distraction of the three thoughts. This is the true mind which is not moved by desires, which is known as innate moral knowing” (“Songyuan wuyu shounian’an luozhang 松原晤语寿念 庵罗丈,” Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 14). Wang Longxi’s view here is derived from Mencius’ theory of the four inklings (si duan 四 端), and is also indebted to Wang Yangming’s “As soon as one opens one’s mouth one attains the original mind, with no need to appeal to or make use of anything else.” “Transforming thoughts” and “the distraction of the three thoughts” refer to the mind of making contacts and pursuing a good reputation that was criticised by Mencius. Wang Longxi emphasised the immediate mind with the aim of rejecting intentions aroused a posteriori. In his view, although intentions aroused a posteriori are not all bad, if the root of human desires is not eliminated, intentions, demands, obstinacies and selfishness will be constantly mixed into the a priori substance of inherent nature. To focus on the immediate mind is to maintain and trust in innate moral knowing and keep it free from selfish intentions. He said: Where the intention touches is obstinate and demanding selfishness, is “having an object,” which is not the flowing of true inherent nature. When true inherent nature flows, the regulation of Heaven will be manifested. (“Volume of Writings to Jianluo and Presented to Simo” [Shu Jianluo juan jianzeng Simo 书见罗卷兼赠思默], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 16) Pursue affects and responses daily, merely silently comprehending immediate thoughts, firmly then dispersedly, with no arising and no non-arising. Sometimes facing things in mutual manifestation, sometimes dropping everything, with no praise, mockery, resistance or compliance entering into the mind. … When one moves with a direct mind, the regulation of Heaven is naturally manifested. (“Comments at Wanlu’an” [Wanlu’an manyu 万 履庵漫语], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 16)

Wang Longxi’s recognition of the immediate is a unity of being and non-being. The firm, in which innate moral knowing is manifested, is being; the dispersed, in which innate moral knowing flows spontaneously without clinging to traces, is non-being, hence there is neither arising nor non-arising. Things facing each other is being; dropping everything is non-being. Being and non-being are united as one, innate moral knowing flowing and moving as well as enfolding and gathering, ruling the intentions aroused by the actual as well as withdrawing to the a priori substance of original non-being. Sometimes manifesting, sometimes withdrawn, it neither grasps being nor clings to non-being. This is what Wang Longxi called higher effort. His recognition of the immediate thought of mind is what he called learning, teaching, or investigation, extension, sincerity and rectification. He said: The sage learning of ancient times achieved recognition simply through one thought of numinous clarity, and only this is entering into the true veins of the sages. Immediately maintaining this one thought of numinous clarity is learning. Using this to trigger affective rapport is teaching. Never covering up this one thought of numinous clarity is the investigation of things. Not deceiving this one thought of numinous clarity is making one’s intentions sincere. A single thought of openness without even a hair’s breadth of obstinate, demanding selfishness is called rightness of mind. This is the root-spring of simplicity and

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directness. (“Farewell Words at the West of the River” [Shuixi bieyan 水西别言], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 16)

This one thought of numinous clarity is not what Buddhists called “consciousness-nature,” but what Wang Yangming called innate moral knowing, the “empty, numinous, clear and illuminated place of Heavenly principle in our minds.” Because this metaphysical inherent nature flows into the actual mind, and becomes conscious through the mind, so it is also called numinous clarity (lingming 灵明). Recognising the immediate and maintaining the flowing of this innate moral knowing is the whole of the effort of learning. This is also the meaning of Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing.” However, Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing is a unification of knowledge and action, which focuses on extending innate moral knowing into concrete affairs, while Wang Longxi’s extension of innate moral knowing focuses mainly on the flowing of the original substance of innate moral knowing, which is full and sufficient wherever it flows. Compared with Wang Yangming’s effort in self-cultivation, this is more general and superficial. Wang Longxi’s recognition of the immediately sufficient and complete thought owes much to the idea that “the direct mind is the field of dao” in Chan Buddhism. Southern Chan Buddhism, especially the Linji 临济 school, which had a sharp and forceful style, advocated setting off at the touch of an opportunity, with everything spontaneously flowing from numinous clarity and artlessness, while it opposed planning and consideration, holding that only the direct mind can instantly transcend and directly enter the Buddha-stage, directly uniting with what is momentarily realised without any clinging or attachment to external forms and traces. Wang Longxi’s recognition of the immediate took much from this. However, as discussed above, the direct mind in Chan Buddhism focuses on not arousing thoughts such that where thoughts are not aroused, only true emptiness remains, whereas Wang Longxi’s direct mind lies in not arousing thoughts such that where thoughts are not aroused, true inherent nature and innate moral knowing flow. Wang Longxi said his own effort is “being produced within non-being”: his one thought of recognition is “being”; his “not planning or considering,” eliminating intentions aroused a posteriori and mixed with the a priori substance of inherent nature, is non-being. Hence, Wang Longxi also used the notions of the Heavenly root (tiangen 天根) and the lunar cave (yueku 月窟): “The place where innate moral knowing is consciously realised is called the Heavenly root, while the place where innate moral knowing enfolds and gathers is called the lunar cave” (“Responses to Questions from Chutong Gengzi” [Da chutong gengzi wen 答楚侗耿子问], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 4). This is to say that when the actual mind becomes conscious of the inherent nature-substance of a priori innate moral knowing, it is the Heavenly root; when the actual mind is not conscious of innate moral knowing, and innate moral knowing maintains its original state as the metaphysical substance of inherent nature, it is called the lunar cave. The single immediate thought is the Heavenly root taking control; while when selfish intentions arise, the lunar cave becomes a cave of ghosts. This is as Wang

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Longxi noted: “The speck of numinous clarity in our minds is the true seed, which is originally the impulse of ceaseless production and reproduction. The entirety of the spirit exists simply in order to protect it, and this spirit cannot be used to assist or benefit it” (“Record of Meeting at Liudu” [Liudu huiji 留都会纪], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 4). Wang Longxi advocated the recognition of a single immediate thought, directly realising one’s own true disposition. He wished to totally cut off all kinds of worldly minds and ingrained attitudes, taking one’s own true self of innate moral knowing as master, arriving and departing in solitude. While he was debating with Qian Dehong during the demonstration of the dao at Tianquan, he said: “Learning must be through self-demonstration and self-realisation, never following at the heels of others. If one clings to the authorised doctrines of a master and takes them to be definitive texts, one will get stuck in explaining the words of others, and this is not good learning” (“Record of Demonstrating the Dao at Tianquan” [Tianquan zhengdao ji 天泉证道记], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 1). He respected and admired Wang Yangming’s unrestrained breadth of vision and hated the hypocritical habits of common people. He thought that the present ethos of his society was the result of an accumulation over hundreds of years of conformity with custom and habituated errors; most people leaned at the gates of others and watched for their words and moods. He advocated a kind of “true man who transcends worldly affairs,” “washing oneself clean of any intention of gratifying the world,” such that the numinous root of innate moral knowing is lost because of constraints, and true inherent nature can manifest itself constantly. He often talked to his disciples about the changes in Wang Yangming’s life: before Longchang 龙 场, nine out of ten people praised him; before he was promoted to minister at the Court of State Ceremonials in Nanjing, five out of ten people praised him while the other half criticised him; after this, nine out of ten people criticised him. These changes precisely demonstrate that Wang Yangming gradually cast off the mind of concealment and dissimulation, allowing his true disposition to emerge. Wang Longxi praised this spirit, saying: “In establishing theories and statements, these must also flow one by one from the perfect clear aperture, covering Heaven and Earth, and this only a great man can do. Leaning on the gates of others, competing and scheming, these are all merely small tricks” (“Speech of Farewell to Zeng Shunzheng” [Zeng Shunzheng bieyan 曾舜徵别言], Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi, Vol. 16). This also means taking the true disposition that flows from one’s own innate moral knowing as master, proceeding with a direct mind. Other disciples of Wang Yangming such as Ji Ben 季本 and Huang Wan 黄绾 from the Zhezhong school and Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian from the Jiangyou School disapproved of this method of “directly trusting in innate moral knowing, giving it a free hand in action.” Luo Hongxian once said: “If one ignores right and wrong or good and bad, inverting them in action, one will eventually become an unscrupulous petty man” (Collected Works of Luo Nian’an [Luo Nian’an ji 罗念庵 集], Vol. 3). He also pointed out that when they spoke of innate moral knowing, there were differences between Wang Longxi and Wang Yangming:

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Master Yangming attained the term “innate moral knowing” after a lifetime of experience and made it proceed from the mind, so if it fails to respond to what is known, it goes against its original principle. At the time, in order to accommodate his new students and make it easy to begin with, he could not avoid taking its present functioning for granted. With regard to self-attainment, it certainly cannot be hastily and mistakenly inherited. Yet because people persist with his statements, using excuses to make people unscrupulous and self-indulgent, they stray far [from its original meaning]. (Collected Works of Luo Nian’an, Vol. 3)

Luo Hongxian’s criticism pointed out the difference between Wang Yangming and Wang Longxi, and also raised the question of the relationship between Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing and a posteriori experience. Wang Longxi took the innate moral knowing originally possessed by all people without learning or thinking as his starting point, and his effort was to maintain and trust in the flowing of this inherent nature-substance of a priori innate moral knowing. Although this maintenance and trust also makes use of the effort of removing the bad, compared with the a priori, its function is much more limited. Wang Longxi occupied the key post of the a priori, using it as the subject to stave off and dispel a posteriori intentions. When the a priori rightness of mind flows, then intentions aroused a posteriori will melt away at a touch just like snowflakes on a hot stove. However, if one allows the good and bad to arise freely, and innate moral knowing then makes decisions on which are to be overcome, then the bad will be like fierce floods or savage beasts which it is difficult to put an end to. It is for this reason that the a priori takes an absolutely dominant position in Wang Longxi’s learning. Wang Longxi regarded the a priori as extremely important but seldom talked about the a posteriori. Although he occasionally uttered words like “attained from practicing human affairs,” in his collected writings, these are still quite rare. This is different from Wang Yangming, who went through a period of “living with minority tribes in difficulties, stimulating his mind as well as hardening his inherent nature” at Longchang, followed by a series of large practical activities like capturing Zhu Chenhao 朱宸濠 [Prince of Ning 宁王 and descendant of first Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋], going through his political struggle with Zhang Zhong 张忠 and Xu Tai 许泰, and crushing violent peasant uprisings in Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangxi and Guangdong. After these experiences, he fused a priori innate moral knowing with a posteriori experience, the long-term tempering of his will was unified with his rational powers, and connected with his emotional experience. Innate moral knowing as a power of the subject was already a combination of moral and epistemological reason, as well as a powerful tool honed over his entire life. Hegel once noted that the same idiom has different meanings when it is spoken by a naïve child and by an old man with abundant experience in life. Innate moral knowing was an attainment of Wang Yangming’s whole life. When he taught his disciples, he earnestly warned them, asking them to understand the spiritual lifeblood of his entire life embodied in the theory of innate moral knowing. They however still usually only talked about the principle of “the extension of innate moral knowing,” but ignored his experiences of undergoing dangers and escaping from darkness. Liu Zongzhou once commented that Wang Yangming was

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“Especially eager to manifest the dao, usually elevating to a higher method and taking guidance lightly, giving rise to to the faults of later scholars who skipped necessary steps” (“On the Masters,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). As one of Wang Yangming’s inner disciples, Wang Longxi knew a lot about Wang Yangming’s life-long and painstaking efforts, yet because he didn’t experience these for himself, he was not so keenly affected. In addition, his innate talent was limited and he was good at apprehending Chan Buddhism but weak in making concrete efforts, thus he only partially developed one aspect of Wang Yangming’s principle, namely innate moral knowing is originally existent, an a priori rightness of the mind, while he did not speak of many other aspects such as the a posteriori sincerity of intention, the unification of knowledge and action, and reflection and self-overcoming. Therefore, though both of them spoke of innate moral knowing, Wang Yangming demonstrated and attained it by himself, whereas Wang Longxi merely inherited his teacher’s principle which, due to a lack of a posteriori effort, relied only on realisation: realising the original substance is effort. Huang Zongxi said: “After Yangming died, scholars inherited his tone of speech, but gradually lost the true essence, taking weighing and considering as perspicacity, self-indulgence as a state of joy, love as the substance of benevolence, following along as spontaneity, and confusion as re-unification” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 438). This mainly refers to the school of a priori rightness of mind. After Wang Yangming died, his disciples mostly followed one of two approaches to effort: one was “The fundamental principle should be that of collecting and concentrating one’s sight, hearing, speech, and movement” after Longchang, while the other was “As soon as one opens one’s mouth one attains the original mind, with no need to appeal to or make use of anything else” when Wang Yangming was living in Yue. The latter started precisely with Wang Longxi. Longxi regarded the present inherent nature-substance of innate moral knowing as the original substance, and held that effort was setting aside a myriad causes, not arousing intentions, and maintaining and trusting the flowing of this innate moral knowing. There is a possibility embodied here: selfish intentions mix into it and are regarded as the flowing of innate moral knowing. Qian Dehong once pointed out: Innate moral knowing is an ability without learning and thinking, a knowing spontaneously possessed in oneself. People who visit the master now all say that innate moral knowing lacks the affairs of learning and thinking, such that if one relies on intentions and intelligence in action then knowing has already fallen into the immoral with no awareness; how then can this be called innate moral knowing? What is known as the extension of knowledge is extending one’s original knowing to the limit through highly secret efforts. The people who visit the master now thus speak of depending only on innate moral knowing, with everything as the ultimate dao, while the effort of extension is not referred to at all here. Even self-indulgence and unrestraint are believed to still be innate moral knowing. Is the original principle upon which this learning was established really like this? (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun [Xu Ai, Qian Dehong, Dong Yun ji 徐爱 钱德洪 董澐集], 122)

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Since it neglected a posteriori effort, Wang Longxi’s a priori rightness of mind made “no choice between clean and filthy,” and did not place the reflection and overcoming of selfish desires in a prominent position as the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming did, leaving an open opportunity for mixing in the theory of human nature as natural. Even more importantly, although innate moral knowing “knows what is good and bad,” this knowing is a kind of subjective activity, and there is no objective standard of good and bad. With social, economic, political and cultural development, the distinction between principle and desire would inevitably break out of its original style, and that which was originally regarded as human desire would gradually come to be accepted by the prevailing value conception of society. It was precisely against such a background, when the entire social and ideological trend of the late Ming Dynasty gradually turned to more acceptance of the development of human natural desires, that scholars like He Xinyin 何心隐 and Li Zhi 李贽 etc. were brave enough to break through the “former Confucians’ style of speaking of principle.” In terms of the inner logic of the development of the history of thought, Wang Longxi’s learning is an important segment of the new ideological trend of “destructive enlightenment” that emerged in the late Ming Dynasty. In terms of philosophical theory itself, Wang Longxi “personally inherited Wang Yangming’s final purpose,” and his theory of the a priori rightness of the mind focused on discussions of a priori and a posteriori, rightness of mind and sincerity of intention, equilibrium and harmony, apprehension and spontaneity, etc., further deepening Wang Yangming’s theory. At the same time, the ethos of “purely relying on spontaneity” particularly emphasised by Wang Longxi also paved the way for exposing the misdeeds and correcting the learning of Wang Yangming. Huang Zongxi said: “There cannot be no Cihu 慈湖 [Yang Jian] after Xiangshan [Lu Jiuyuan], just as there cannot be no Longxi after Wencheng [Wang Yangming], since they are considered as following the rise and decline in academia” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 240). This is indeed accurate.

3 Qian Dehong’s Learning of the a Posteriori Sincerity of Intention Qian Dehong’s theory of the a posteriori sincerity of intention runs exactly contrary to Wang Longxi’s theory of the a priori rightness of the mind. Qian Dehong 钱德洪 (1496–1574; zi Hongfu 洪甫, hao Xushan 绪山) was from Yuyao 余姚 in Zhejiang province. He was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations the period of the Jiajing 嘉靖 emperor and served as assistant director in the Shaanxi department of the Ministry of Punishments. He was sent to jail due to his disobedience against the Jiajing emperor in the case of Guo Xun 郭勋 and was released only after Guo Xun died. During the period of the Longqing 隆庆 emperor, he was promoted to Grand Master for Court Precedence until he retired. He taught for about 30 years during his retirement and toured around regions including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Chu

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and Guang. When he was seventy years old, he wrote his Note on Convalescence and Leisure (Yixian shu 颐闲疏) to announce to the world that he would no longer travel. His edited works include the three volume Chronicle of Yangming (Yangming nianpu 阳明年谱) and the one volume Record of Haoyuan (Haoyuan ji 濠园记). Most of his works were lost, and records of his teaching, letters, poems and compositions are now edited as A Collection of Scattered Writings, Poems and Records of Teaching by Qian Dehong (Qian Dehong yulu shiwen jiyi 钱德洪语录 诗文辑佚) and included in the Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun (Xu Ai, Qian Dehong, Dong Yun ji 徐爱 钱德洪 董澐集).3 Qian Dehong became a disciple of Wang Yangming once Wang returned to Yue 越 after putting down Zhu Chenhao’s 朱宸濠 uprising, so Qian was familiar with his theory of the extension of innate moral knowing from his later years. Qian Dehong’s character was more practical, so his path of effort differed from that of Wang Longxi. Qian advocated doing good and removing bad in a posteriori intentions, so as to restore one’s a priori inherent nature, whereas Wang Longxi advocated not arousing intentions to maintain the flowing of the a priori highest good in the mind. Longxi’s effort was stillness, while Dehong’s effort was activity; Longxi emphasised the a priori, whereas Dehong emphasised the a posteriori; Longxi regarded mind, intention, knowledge and things as one, whereas Dehong divided the mind from intention, knowledge and things as two separate things, advocating making intentions sincere and rectifying the mind through the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. The paths of their effort were thus completely contrary. When Wang Yangming was still alive, the academic divergence between Qian Dehong and Wang Longxi was already quite obvious. After Yangming died, the influence of Wang Longxi’s learning became greater, but there was a tendency that scholars following his learning became somewhat shallow. Noticing this, Qian Dehong strongly criticised Wang Longxi’s learning, aiming to restore a full view of Yangming’s inclusion of both substance and function, profoundness and practicality. Thus he reproached Wang Longxi: Recently when discussing original substance, your words were quite refined. Yet in terms of carrying out affairs, there were a lot of omissions and neglected points, and this is where your learning is falls into emptiness. (“Reply to Wang Longxi” [Fu Wang Longxi 复王龙 溪], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 152)

This was a criticism of Wang Longxi’s account of focusing on a priori original substance but neglecting reflection and self-overcoming in a posteriori concrete affairs. He also said: Longxi’s views are clever and direct. Those whose efforts cling to birth and extinction should examine themselves after listening to his views. However, his views still seem to have their points of attachment, such that when he opens his mouth in discussion, his many turns of arguments do not depart from his own meanings. Thus I feel there are still some

3

[Trans.] References are to Xu Ai, Qian Dehong, Dong Yun ji, Fenghuang chubanshe, 2007.

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omissions when he speaks with others. (“To Ji Pengshan” [Yu Ji Pengshan 与季彭山], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 152)

In terms of Wang Longxi’s simplicity, his directness, and his directly targeting the original substance, Qian Dehong also gave him credit, but in his emphasis on self-belief and using his own meanings to explain their teacher’s doctrines, Qian was somewhat dissatisfied. He also pointed out Wang Longxi’s shortcomings in terms of his direct realisation of original substance, particularly his focus on realisation of original substance in place of practical effort: Outside of social engagement there is no original substance, yet if one loses the original substance, it is not social engagement. If this substance is conserved with every affair and at every place during social engagement, then where on this present Earth is not gold? If one is dissatisfied with social engagement and insists on wandering amid the mountains, cultivating disinterest and quietude, I’m afraid this is to take gold and mix it back into stubborn iron. (“Reply to Wang Longxi,” Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 150)

Qian Dehong’s thought was a continuation of Wang Yangming’s “There is no substance of the mind, it simply takes the right and wrong of the affects and responses of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as its substance.” Substance should not be separate from function, and where the effort ultimately reaches is original substance. This is a precursor of Huang Zongxi’s “There is no substance of the mind, and where effort ultimately reaches is original substance.” Nonetheless, the faults of the school of existing innate moral knowing were not very serious at this moment, and only in the late Ming Dynasty did this style became popular, thus Huang Zongxi’s criticism of this school was much more fierce than that of Qian Dehong. Among the disciples of Wang Yangming, Qian Dehong believed in a kind of middle way that both recognised a priori innate moral knowing and added the effort of investigation, extension, making sincere and rectification. He opposed two kinds of shortcomings: one is only focusing on effort and neglecting original substance. Its shortcoming lies in its confinement of original substance, blocking up its flow. Its effort itself is also not spontaneous, toiling away fruitlessly. The other kind is the one that focuses on original substance but neglects effort; its shortcoming lies in its cultivation of false views. Hence he agreed with Wang Longxi’s firm belief in the original substance of innate moral knowing, but fiercely criticised Wang’s neglect of effort. Qian’s own path of effort admitted the importance of the original substance of the mind in the overall system of effort, yet also emphasised the a posteriori overcoming of selfish desires and bad habits, restoring the goodness of the original substance through the effort of investigation, extension, rectification and making one’s intentions sincere. He said: The original substance of the mind, pure and without contamination, is the highest good. Innate moral knowing is the apprehension of the highest good, so innate moral knowing is the highest good. … The substance of inherent nature flows, spontaneous without cease, penetrating the dao of days and nights and becoming known. The learning of the superior

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man must be carried out without desire. Without desire, there is no need to stop speaking or still the mind from moving. (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 124)

Qian Dehong’s learning focused on the a posteriori sincerity of intention. He thought that the a posteriori sincerity of intention was the core of Wang Yangming’s entire academic achievement. Qian’s learning of the a posteriori sincerity of intention was handed down in a true line from his teacher Wang Yangming. He said: Before when my master established his teachings, he revealed that sincerity is the key of the Great Learning [Daxue 大学], pointing out that the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things are the effort of making one’s intentions sincere. Hearing this, his disciples all gained areas where they could start to work on. Those who worked hard fathomed the substance of this knowledge to the utmost, making Heavenly regulation flow, finely concealed with no action, a thousand affects and a myriad responses, while the true substance is constantly tranquil. This is the ultimate limit of making one’s intentions sincere. Therefore, the effort of making one’s intentions sincere can be obtained through applying from new learners at the beginning to sages’ refined achievement of the infinite. After our master died, our fellow disciples with faulty understanding regarded opportunities for good and bad as appearing and disappearing without end, placing too much emphasis on original substance, and people who heard about this therefore said that making one’s intentions sincere is not sufficient to exhaust the entire dao, that there must be realisation first and only then will intention spontaneously not be produced; the investigation of things is not that by which we speak of effort, so one must first return to quietude and then things will transform spontaneously. Therefore together with their empty views they sought realisation, and did not stick to the norms of human relations and the regulations of things; holding onto substance to seek quietude, and having nothing to do with the perfect and divine vital impulse. Hoping for the lofty while disdaining control, influencing each other into perversities, our master’s simple and practical principle was covered up and not manifested. Our master said: “making one’s intentions sincere to the utmost is simply to stop at the highest good.” This stopping at the highest good cannot be gained through separating from the sincerity of intentions. If we speak of stopping, then there is no need to speak of quietude, since quietude is within this; if we speak of the highest good, then there is no need to speak of realisation, since realisation is within this. However, both of these are based on sincerity of intention. Why is this? Because there is no substance of the mind, and effort should not be spoken of as above the mind. Responding to affects gives rise to things, likes and dislikes are formed, and it is thus that there is the effort of self-examination and self-overcoming. When the effort of making one’s intentions sincere is taken to the limit, then substance is spontaneously tranquil and responses spontaneously smooth; from beginners’ learning to the completion of virtue, from start to end there is no other effort. Hence to neglect work on making one’s intentions sincere yet seek quietude and realisation is like not entering the doorway yet thinking of meeting the various officials of the ancestral temple; to know quietude and realisation and yet not manifest this to people through the effort of making one’s intentions sincere is like desiring for people to come in and meet the various officials of the ancestral temple yet closing the door. They are all ones who are not in harmony with the dao. (Ibid., 123)

Qian Dehong’s long passage above is a detailed explanation of his learning of the a posteriori sincerity of intention. He held that a posteriori sincerity of intention is the effort for both beginners and sages. A posteriori sincerity of intention is definitely

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not only for people of average and lower intelligence, which is in fact already a denial of Wang Yangming’s view that a posteriori sincerity of intention was aimed at establishing teachings for people of average and lower intelligence. Qian also fiercely criticised the theoretical and practical shortcomings of Wang Longxi’s theory of the a priori rightness of the mind. He pointed out that the relationship between the investigation of things and making one’s intentions sincere is the same as the one between ends and means. Focusing on the a priori inevitably neglects the a posteriori effort of the investigation of things. This was a deviation from Wang Yangming’s “the investigation of things is the extension of innate moral knowing” and “the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things.” More importantly, the mind as a epistemological subject responds to affects without fixed models, and is active and dynamic. Wang Longxi ‘s “not establishing being and non-being” and “eliminating both good and bad” forcibly prohibited the originally active and lively mind, and blocked what is most valuable and vital to man. Through reflecting on and overcoming the intentions arising in the mind, the substance of mind can, when one’s effort is proficient, be spontaneously still and the substance of inherent nature spontaneously manifested. This is the meaning of Yangming’s “making one’s intentions sincere to the utmost is simply to stop at the highest good.” It is worth noting that Qian Dehong wrote a letter to describe how after going through changes in their lives, both he and Wang Longxi’s studies underwent changes as well. Earlier scholars studying Wang Longxi have overlooked these changes. Qian Dehong said: Longxi’s studies are more and more concrete, every time he falls into redundant disputes of praise or blame, he becomes more hard-working and cautious. I often have different views from him. Although we both inherited our master’s purpose, and complement each other very well, we eventually went on different paths and couldn’t integrate with each other. I’ve been through quite a few changes in life and I started to purely believe in the original mind. Wang Longxi also affirms cultivation and cleansing through concrete affairs, and from then on we were quite commensurate to each other.” (“To Zhang Fufeng” [Yu Zhang Fufeng 与 张浮峰], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 153)

The ideas in this letter of Qian’s differ from his earlier commentary on Wang Longxi. In his earlier commentary, he often criticised Wang Longxi as being lofty, illusory and abstruse, refusing to make practical efforts to do good and remove the bad. In this letter, however, he praises Wang Longxi as able to cultivate and cleanse himself through concrete affairs. In his earlier commentary, he criticised Wang Longxi as being firm in his self-belief, whereas in this letter, he notes he also changed to purely believe in the original mind. The reason for Qian’s change was probably his experience in prison due to the Guo Xun case. Qian Dehong once wrote a letter to Wang Longxi while he was in prison, which can well explain his academic change and its root cause in his mind: Stepping into the true realm of life and death, life became entirely empty with only a thought of glimmering soul remaining. Troubled in the middle of the night, I suddenly realised it was Heaven above that set up this phenomenon for me to manifest my original

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true inherent nature, not allowing even the slightest entanglement. In the past, I often thought the thought of tolerance and convention was not sufficient to harm the dao, but seen from here, even a speck of dust can obstruct the eyes, and one finger can block out the sky, this is indeed horrific. Oh! Ancient people dealt with movements with endurance and gained increased benefits, but I know not what these increased benefits are, only that their reduction is already exhausted.” (Letter to Longxi from Prison” [Yuzhong ji Longxi 狱中 寄龙溪], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 152)

This is to say that at the crucial moment of life and death, all thoughts of the earthly world are abandoned, the substance of the mind becoming clear and illuminated, that which ordinarily concealed innate moral knowing now becoming glimmering and translucent. Here he realised that all external things are derivative products of the mind, and Heaven, Earth, and all phenomena are symbols of my true disposition. When Mencius said “[Heaven] moves [a man’s] mind and tempers his inherent nature, supplementing his inabilities” [Mencius, 6B.15], it would be better to say that after reducing desires’ obstruction of the original mind, the original substance of the mind becomes more and more apparent. This is in some ways in accordance with “In the way of the sages, the sage’s inherent nature is self-sufficient” Wang Yangming realised at Longchang. Qian Dehong’s pure belief in the original mind and Wang Longxi’s being “cultivated and cleansed through affairs” show that they each made concessions on their standpoints and benefited from each other. This also shows that Wang Yangming’s admonishment “The views of you two gentlemen function precisely to complement each other” while demonstrating the dao at Tianquan was effective. Qian Dehong and Wang Longxi agreed on one point, which is that they both thought innate moral knowing is a priori sufficient and complete, and does not itself require effort. They both criticised the view of the Jiangyou School concerning returning to quietude and maintaining stillness on the a priori substance of the mind. Qian Dehong once wrote to Nie Bao debating this question: The specks, dirt and heterogeneous things in our minds exist only after the affects of human feelings, things and affairs. Since this is so, then to extend knowledge now is to take that before the interference of affects of human feelings, things and affairs, and to first add this effort of extension; where then then can you apply the effort of extension as you call it?” (“Response to Nie Shuangjiang” [Da Nie Shuangjiang 答聂双江], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 153)

Qian Dehong’s criticism of Nie Bao was slightly different from Wang Longxi’s. Wang Longxi held that the mind is a priori originally sufficient and does not require effort. Effort is only needed to maintain and trust in the a priori. Qian Dehong however thought that although the mind is a priori sufficient and complete, the bad is mixed in with a posteriori intention, so the effort of doing good and removing the bad is needed to restore the substance of the mind. Therefore, effort should not depart from the a posteriori. That the effort of maintaining stillness can be separate from the state after the feelings are aroused as held by Nie Bao was a separation between a priori and a posteriori, quietude and affectivity. Qian Dehong pointed out that:

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Our former master said, “There is neither good nor bad in the substance of mind,” Shuangjiang [Nie Bao] then said: “There is neither good nor bad in innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is the tranquil substance before the feelings are aroused. Cultivate this, and things will be investigated by themselves. Now following the boundaries of its being affected by things and then adding the effort of investigating things is to confuse its substance in order to seek its function, muddying the the origin so as to make the flow clear. Effort has fallen into the second meaning.” This is well argued, however none know that the tranquil substance before feelings are aroused has never separated from the affects of family, state and all under Heaven, but is another thing within it. Since it is in the affects of family, state and all under Heaven, where is the quietude before feelings are aroused? This investigation of things is the concrete effort of extension of knowledge, penetrating quietude and affectivity, substance and function without separation, this is the learning of expressing one’s inherent nature to the utmost. (“Reply to Zhou Luoshan” [Fu Zhou Luoshan 复周罗山], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 154)

Dehong held that substance and function, quietude and affectivity should be united, yet effort should be made on affectivity and the a posteriori sincerity of intention. The sincerity of intention when affected is the clear illumination during quietude, which is called “penetrating quietude and affectivity, substance and function without separation.” He also pointed out the possible fault the Jiangyou School might give rise to by applying effort on the quietude of the state before feelings are aroused: Where can the equilibrium before feelings are aroused be found? It can never be found if one seeks the state before the feelings are aroused in separation from the state after the feelings are aroused. In the course of time, a kind of disinterested and tranquil weakness will be developed, taking insubstantial images as concrete attainments, viewing knowledge and ideas as the truth of inherent nature, this is indeed frustrating. Therefore when scholars start out, they should not separate innate moral knowing. Good and bad thoughts are difficult to control once they arise, so they either should be prevented in the state before feelings are aroused, or controlled in the state when feelings are about to be aroused, or repented in the state after the feelings have been aroused, all of which are concrete efforts. (“Response to He Jiyang” [Fu He Jiyang 复何吉阳], Collected Works of Xu Ai, Qian Dehong and Dong Yun, 155)

Here he not only criticised the error the Jiangyou School made in their account of returning to quietude and maintaining stillness in the state before feelings are aroused, but also stated his theory of the sincerity of intention: as long as the applied effort of doing good and removing bad is guided by innate moral knowing, then the states before, when, and after feelings are aroused will all be concrete. We can say that Wang Longxi was a crazy scholar among Yangming’s disciples, the scholars of the Jiangyou School were overcautious, while Qian Dehong gained the equilibrium of dao. His theory restrained both Wang Longxi and the Jiangyou School, and he was probably Yangming’s true inheritor. However, it is indeed a pity that most of his writings were not handed down so we cannot see their importance. Among Wang Yangming’s disciples, only the theory of Gu Yingxiang 顾应祥 from the Zhezhong school was similar to that of Qian Dehong.

Chapter 8

Huang Wan’s “Rest-Stopping” and Ji Ben’s “Fear of the Dragon”

Wang Yangming’s disciples spread throughout the empire, and among them the earliest to receive students and those with the most students were scholars from Yangming’s hometown. Among the Zhezhong 浙中 Wang school, Huang Wan was a very special figure. Huang Wan 黄绾 (1480–1554; zi 字 Zongxian 宗贤, hao 号 Jiu’an 久庵) was from the Huangyan 黄岩 district of Taizhou 台州. Since he was from an aristocratic family, he attained an official position by this means, being appointed as a minister in the Ministry of Rites and an academician in the Hanlin Academy 翰林院. He once took part in the preparatory compilation of the Great Canon Elucidating Social Order [Minglun dadian 明伦大典]. In his youth he studied with Xie Duo 谢 铎, who instructed him using the words Huang Gan 黄干 used to teach He Ji 何基: “One must have both an authentic mind and apply effort assiduously, only this is acceptable.” Because of this, he took “Fathoming the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, realising the methods of Yi [Yin] 伊尹 and [the Duke of] Zhou 周公” as his motto. In the fifth year of the Zhengde 正德 period (1510), Wang Yangming left Longchang 龙场, was appointed as a county magistrate in Luling 庐陵, then went to the capital to present himself to the Emperor, where Huang Wan asked to see him to discuss learning and made the acquaintance of Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水. After Yangming put down Hao [i.e. the Zhu Chenhao 朱宸濠 rebellion] and returned to Yue 越, Huang Wan came to see him and heard him lecture on the learning of “extending innate moral knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知). Admiring this greatly, he began to call himself a disciple of the school. After Yangming went south on the Si-Tian 思田 campaign and died in the army, Gui E 桂萼 attacked Yangming as false learning and demanded that it should be forbidden. Huang Wan submitted a petition in his defence, stating that Yangming’s thought did not deviate from Confucius and Mencius, “Lofty in achievements and being viewed jealously, ancient in learning and being misunderstood; this is why Shouren 守仁 [i.e. Wang Yangming] cannot be tolerated by the world” (Complete Works of Wang Yangming [Wang Yangming quanji 王阳明全集], 1325). He also pledged his daughter’s hand in marriage to Yangming’s son Zhengyi 正亿, taking him to Nanjing to escape © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_8

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from adversity. Huang Wan wrote many works, among which his Compendium Illuminating the Dao (Mingdao bian 明道编) best reflects his philosophical thought.1 Huang Zongxi’s 黄宗羲 Case Studies of Ming Confucians (Mingru xue’an 明儒学案) however did not select a single word from Compendium Illuminating the Dao, since the book contains many criticisms of Song Confucians and contemporary figures. What he selected was the preface to his Tracing the Ancient Five Classics (Wujing yuangu 五经原古), which Huang Zongxi criticised as “using the mind of the teacher for oneself, overturning the classics of the sages” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 281), and whose viewpoints he refuted one by one.

1 The Meaning of “Rest-Stopping” The name of Huang Wan’s learning of “rest-stopping” (genzhi 艮止) came from the [Book of] Changes (Yijing 易经) and the Great Learning (Daxue 大学). The commentary on the judgment (tuan 彖) for the Gen 艮 [Rest] hexagram in the Changes [see hexagram 52] says: “Gen [Rest] means stopping. When it is time to stop, one stops; when it is time to act, one acts. If movement and stillness are not misplaced in their times, their dao is bright and illuminated. Resting in one’s stopping means stopping in one’s proper place.” The Great Learning says: “The dao of the great learning lies in illuminating one’s illustrious virtue, in loving the people, and in stopping at the highest good. When one knows where to stop, one has a fixed point; when one has a fixed point, one can be still; when one is still, one can be secure; when one is secure, one can deliberate; when one deliberates, one can attain. Things have roots and branches, affairs have beginnings and ends; when one knows their priority, one approaches the dao.” Huang Wan believed that the meaning of his rest-stopping was formed by combining the essence of the Changes and the Great Learning, manifesting their basic spirit. In his view, in learning one must know when to stop, since if one does not know when to stop, one will sway from point to point with nowhere to return to. The core meaning of the Gen hexagram of the Changes is “stopping” (zhi 止). “Stopping” in fact refers to the rhythm, regular pattern, etc. manifested in the cyclical activity of the myriad things. The flowing activity of great transformation is never confused or disorderly, with each following its rule and attaining its proper place, and thus lies in each of the myriad things having a stopping-point. Learning lies in knowing when to stop, and thereby stopping where one ought to stop. Huang Wan said: When the Great Learning said “King Wen 文 was careful, content and respectful concerning where to stop,” it referred to the substance of stopping. Once its substance is established, it can be applied to the relations between ruler and minister, father and son, and state and people such that each stops in its proper stopping place, as in “Resting in one’s

1

[Trans.] References are to Huang Wan, Mingdao bian, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959.

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stopping means stopping in one’s proper place”; when each attains its proper stopping-point, this is “movement and stillness are not misplaced in their times, their dao is bright and illuminated.” King Wen’s learning in fact originated with Fu Xi 伏羲, while Confucius’ learning in turn originated with King Wen; they were all simply concerned with stopping at one’s proper stopping-point. If we can locate this and preserve it, can locate it and reflect on it, then the dao lies in this. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

According to Huang Wan’s explanation, “stopping” has both substance and function, both root and branches. The substance of stopping originates in Heaven. When Heaven produces the myriad things, each has its stopping-point, its movement and stillness have their rule, and its appearance and disappearance have their proper times; this all happens spontaneously, with nothing making it so. This is the substance of stopping. When the human mind is one with the stopping of the natural world, following its stopping in its rise and fall, neither excessive nor deficient, this is to hold to stopping. To hold to stopping means to hold to the rhythm and regular pattern of the cyclical activity of the dao of Heaven. When one implements this principle of stopping in all things and affairs, making all things and affairs accord with this stopping, this is the function of stopping. Recognising and holding to stopping is the basis for its implementation in affairs. All learning in the world can be reduced to “stopping in one’s proper stopping place,” and all effort at learning and speculation should focus on “stopping in one’s proper stopping-point.” In Huang Wan’s view, stopping is the principle of things and affairs, and concrete things and affairs are the supporting body of stopping, so the learning of rest-stopping combines principle and qi 气, substance and function. He said: “Resting in one’s stopping means stopping in one’s proper place.” When stopping knows its place, qi and principle are combined together, substance and function both complete; the root of the learning of the sages lies in this. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

This speaks in terms of the principle and qi of natural things and events, while in terms of the principle and qi of the human mind, when one knows where to stop, one’s mind can be fixed, when one’s mind is fixed one is still, and when one is still one can be secure. Thus, when one knows where to stop, the substance of the mind is established, and when one is still and can be secure, the function of the mind is manifest. Hence knowing where to stop is the foundation for knowing the regularity of nature and fixing the directionality of the substance of the mind. Put another way, the human mind is a locus of condensation for Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, so the principles of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all present in the mind, and when the mind is able to stop in the place where it should stop, this is simultaneously to stop in the place where Heaven, Earth and the myriad things should stop. That is to say, the meaning of his rest-stopping unifies and connects Heaven and humanity. He said: When “Resting in one’s stopping means stopping in one’s proper place” speaks of stopping this is not a general stopping, since stopping must have its proper place, and this place is the aperture in the mind, a single yang like a seed. This place where one stops is what is called the root of Heaven and Earth, the gate of yin and yang, and the kingly inherent nature is all

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contained in this. Hence it was said: “When inherent nature is completed and preserved with constancy, this is the gate of the righteousness of the dao” [see the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传)]. Hence it is called the qi-impulse, the unity of soul and body, the descending of the heart of the Lord, the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment, the divine, and benevolence, all of which are in this place. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

For Huang Wan here, Heaven and humanity and combined as one, so to stop at the place where one should stop in the mind is to stop at the fundamental principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. At the same time, that which is spoken of in the Four Books and the Five Classics is nothing but the one word, “stop.” To stop at the place where one should stop in the mind encompasses all the effort of the Four Books and the Five Classics, because “the core of the learning of the sages lies in knowing where to stop.” What Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 passed down and received, what was faithfully followed by generations of Confucians, is nothing but the “sixteen-character transmission of the mind” [see “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟), Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书)]: “The human mind is precarious, the mind of dao is subtle; only through refinement and unity can one hold fast to what is central.” Here, “hold fast to what is central” (yunzhi juezhong 允执厥 中) and “refinement and unity” (jingyi 精一) all have the meaning of rest-stopping. Rest-stopping is holding to the centre. He said: Yao and Shun’s learning of holding to what is central is Fu Xi’s learning of rest-stopping. As contained in the Documents, they spoke of “precarious and subtle” (wei wei 危微) to explain the end of rest-stopping; they spoke of “refinement and unity” as the core of the use of effort. They spoke of “security and thoughtfulness” (an si 安思) to make visible the security of the precarious and the manifestation of the subtle; they spoke of “reverence and enlightenment” (qin ming 钦明) to make visible the polarity of refinement and the constancy of unity. This is all nothing but seeking to stop in one’s stopping place. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

He also said: Fu Xi, Yao and Shun passed down their learning through rest-stopping and holding to the centre. Fu Xi’s learning is contained in the Changes, while that of Yao and Shun is contained in the Documents. Among the subtle words of the Changes, none is as important as rest-stopping, while among the important tenets of the Documents, none is as important as holding to the centre. Passed down from sage to sage, they all led through this dao. When Zhongni 仲尼 [i.e. Confucius] appeared, the great dao had been amassed, with the stopping-point of knowing when to stop pointing to the substance of the mind, the extension of knowing revealing its effort, the investigation of things revealing its efficacy, the overcoming of the self as the actualisation of the extension of knowing, and the restoration of ritual propriety as the actualisation of the investigation of things, in which all of these are true veins flowing from rest-stopping and holding to the centre. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

Here, rest-stopping can encompass all Confucian effort, and that which Fu Xi, Yao, Shun, Confucius and other sages passed down to each other was simply the meaning of rest-stopping.

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The causes behind Huang Wan’s proposal of rest-stopping can be divided into social, political and economic aspects and academic and intellectual aspects. In terms of its social and political aspects, Huang Wan thought that the scholar-officials of the time used reputation to judge one another, competing to chase after private interests, and thus morality increasingly fell into decline, people’s minds becoming increasingly shallow and superficial. This was the greatest social problem of the time. He said: The material qi of scholars is hard to change, since they are all bound up in the style of reputation and the atmosphere of habit. Since our dynasty established the state, I do not at what point it changed to this habit of loving reputation and esteeming moral integrity, with elders of that time and of my hometown all devoting themselves to this, whether they lived as officials or in the countryside, such that although they were very intimate in social relations, those above and below communicating, their behaviour in this regard was already serious and their words shocking, and down to the present they are clearly present to people’s eyes and ears in innumerable examples. Their style and reputation was passed on, such that later scholars and those from my hometown all have minds that love to compete with others and are impatient for material gain, writing in order to establish their reputations; their conduct in esteeming moral integrity being used to further the selfish interests. Although they speak always of morality, they never awaken to themselves. Why is material qi is the most difficult to change? They establish reputation and esteem moral integrity, knowing the greatness of reputation and integrity but not knowing that when the sages dealt with ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, senior and junior, friends, relatives, old acquaintances, and communication between those above and below, they dealt with each according to its dao. The later world did not know this dao, and merely desired to establish their own reputations and realise their own integrity, doing everything contrarily without compassion, weak and meager in patience, yet thinking of themselves as worthy men, as succeeding in their scheming, their corruption becoming inveterate. Hence the ancients regarded reputation and integrity as the superficialities of morality and the exhortations of scholars. Those who discuss other people however regard these as the business of sages and worthies, adopting them and becoming famous Neo-Confucian officials, not aware that they are slipping lower and lower. Thus officials today strive to make their name through various cunning tricks, worrying only that they are not sufficiently distinguished; they praise the oppressive and cruel as talented, worrying only that they cannot match them; they overturn disorder and authenticity, only worrying that they are not sufficiently remarkable; they persevere in their destructive accomplishments, worrying only that they are not sufficiently unique; in their minds they all harbour thoughts of great profit while overtly displaying their absence of desire, inwardly preserving their cold-heartedness yet outwardly acting with benevolence and righteousness. Those who discuss the world especially regard the affairs of the empire as impossible to carry out without this talent and impossible to arouse without this style and reputation; is this not a calamity for the dao of the world and a disaster for the state, the family and all living people? (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 2)

The description of the contemporary atmosphere among officials and the world at large in this long passage is very close to Wang Yangming’s description of the mentality of officials in his theory of “extirpating the root and blocking up the wellspring,” with both regarding competition for material profit and reputation as the fundamental cause behind the degeneration in the atmosphere among officials and the world at large. The habitual atmosphere of material profit was the root Wang Yangming wished to extirpate and the wellspring he wished to block up, as

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well as the disease Huang Wan eagerly wished to remove. From this perspective, the objective behind Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing” and Huang Wan’s “rest-stopping” was the same, namely to change society’s mood and customs and rectify the human mind. Huang Wan believed that among the causes that led to the degeneration of social atmosphere and the decline of morality, foremost was confusion in academic learning, so if one wishes to treat the above social harms, the most urgent task is to explain academic learning clearly. He said: Waste in the empire today is a problem harming both great and small, and in reality originates from academic learning being confused and techniques of the mind being incorrect, so the mood of scholars gets worse and worse, cunning eunuchs become more and more numerous, officials’ problems are on the increase, and greed and cruelty are spreading. The more regulations are tightened, the more wickedness and fraud appear and violent disputes arise, those above and below ingratiate themselves with each other, and vain expenditure spreads ever more widely, so the people are increasingly exhausted. If one does not have the heart to purify the root of this and simply works at altering it, the more alterations one makes, the more the harms will expand, assisting in the pointless exhaustion of those above and below and adding to the waste; just regard how prosperous the people were in the time of our ancestors! This is something that our party should know, and we must consider whether the situation can be saved, and if so how? Simply by explaining academic learning clearly. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 4)

The remedy he proposed to cure the atmosphere of society was explaining academic learning clearly, and the meaning of his rest-stopping was precisely to let people all know where to stop: stopping at Heavenly principle, stopping at the highest good. However, the academic learning respected and believed by people of the time was mostly heterodox. Huang Wan pointed out that the greatest public nuisance in the academic learning of the time was Chan Buddhism, so explaining academic learning clearly meant first and foremost criticising Chan. He believed that Chan Buddhism had the least knowledge of rest-stopping. Chan Buddhism used thinking of neither good nor bad, and regarded recognising the original state of things (benlai mianmu 本来面目) as its core principle, yet this original state of things is emptiness and so does not contain any place where one should stop, such as ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, senior and junior, etc. Not knowing rest-stopping means not knowing Heavenly principle, and one who does not know Heavenly principle must retreat from the world. Those worldly Confucians who regarded emptiness, nothingness, the void and silence as learning were all ignorant of rest-stopping, and thus all slipped into Chan learning. Among the scholars who were ignorant of stopping and slipped into Chan, he included great Confucians from both Song and Ming dynasties, saying: “In the learning of Song Confucians, they all entered their studies through Chan. Lianxi 濂溪 [i.e. Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐], Mingdao 明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao 程颢], Hengqu 横渠 [i.e. Zhang Zai 张载], and Xiangshan 象山 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊] came through Mahayana [or the Great Vehicle of Buddhism], while Yichuan 伊川 [i.e. Cheng Yi 程颐] and Hui’an 晦庵 [i.e. Zhu Xi 朱熹] came through Hinayana [or the Lesser Vehicle of Buddhism]. Although it is said that the learning of the sages was re-initiated in the Song, yet

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many of them spoke of it without sufficient detail, selecting from it and missing its essence” (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1). Huang Wan voiced his doubts concerning the view that Song Confucians inherited the sage-learning of Confucius and Mencius, believing the view that sage-learning flourished in the Song lacked adequate evidence. The great Confucians of the Song dynasty were all half mixed-up in Chan studies, and thus lost the meaning of rest-stopping. Regarding Zhou Dunyi, Huang Wan particularly criticised his cultivation method as Chan learning. Zhou Dunyi once described the essential method of his learning, saying: “Can sagehood be learned? I said: ‘It can.’ ‘Is there an essential method?’ I said: ‘There is.’ ‘May I be told what it is?’ I said: ‘Oneness is the essential method. To be one is to be without desire. Since one is without desire, one’s stillness is empty and one’s movement is direct. Since one’s stillness is empty, one is clear, and that which is clear is open; since one’s movement is direct, one is impartial, and that which is impartial is universal. The clear, open, impartial and universal, is it not the common people?’” (Tongshu 通书, Ch. 20). Huang Wang believed that the essential method of sage-learning is the “sixteen-character transmission of the mind,” and Zhou Dunyi’s view that “Oneness is the essential method” already departed from the tradition passed down by Yao and Shun. Furthermore, concerning “desire” (yu 欲), some of this comes from the dao-mind and some from the human mind. That which comes from the dao-mind is the desire of Heavenly principle, as in examples like Confucius’ “desiring to establish himself, he establishes others” [see Analects, 6.30]. This desire absolutely cannot be absent. Zhou Dunyi’s absence of desire and still oneness are transformations that came from the Chan Buddhist “originally not even one thing” [see the Platform Sutra (Tanjing 坛 经)]. Zhou Dunyi also mixed in Daoism, with his “non-polarity” (wuji 无极) being both Laozi’s 老子 “The nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth” [see Laozi, Ch. 1] and also Chan Buddhism’s “There was something before Heaven and Earth, formless and originally silent” [from Fu Daishi’s 傅大士 “Verse on the Dharma-Body” (Fashen jie 法身偈)]. For Confucians however, the Changes states that “In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity” [see the Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)], the “Great Plan” (Hongfan 洪范) [in the Book of Documents] states that “In the establishment of the sovereign, there is the polarity,” and the Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经) states that “Heaven produced the multitude of people, providing them with things and regulations” [see “Greater Odes” (Daya 大雅), “Decade of Dang” (Dang zhi shi 荡之 什), “Zheng Min” 烝民], all of which speaking of being and never of nothingness. In speaking of nothingness, one falls into emptiness, the void, silence and extinction, which is absolutely inconsistent with the meaning of rest-stopping. As for Cheng Hao, Huang Wan strongly attacked the thought of his Letter on Settling Inherent Nature (Dingxing shu 定性书). The Letter states: “The constancy of Heaven and Earth is that their mind covers the myriad things and they themselves are without mind; the constancy of the sage is that his feelings accord with the myriad things and he himself is without feelings. Hence in the learning of the superior man, there is nothing better than becoming vast with great impartiality, such that when things come one responds to them accordingly.” In Huang Wan’s

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view, “without mind,” “without feelings” and “vast with great impartiality” all lack the content of rest-stopping, and thus are not only inconsistent with the core principle of being “cautious concerning that which is unseen, and apprehensive concerning that which is unheard” from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中 庸), but also go against Mencius’ teaching of “seeking one’s lost mind” [see Mencius 孟子, 6A.11]. He pointed out that the real character of Cheng Hao’s learning is Chan learning, so one must correct the root and purify the wellspring, not allowing people to borrow Cheng Hao’s words to promote false learning. As for Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, Huang Wan’s criticisms were even more severe. He pointed out that the guiding principle of Cheng-Zhu’s effort was the two sentences, “Cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge.” The former mostly referred to closing one’s eyes and sitting upright, while the latter mostly referred to seeking confirmation from books and pamphlets. Later Confucians frequently told the story of [a disciple] “standing in the snow at the Chengs’ door” [so as not to disturb his teacher Cheng Yi while he was meditating] as a fine exemplary tale, yet for Huang Wan, to close one’s eyes and sit upright, not knowing how deep the snow outside one’s door is, is precisely where there was Chan learning. Zhu Xi’s “Exhortation on Regulating the Breath” (Tiaoxi zhen 调息箴) is not only mixed up with Chan, but also mixes in Daoism. The extension of knowing in Zhu Xi’s Amended Great Learning with Commentary (Daxue buzhuan 大学补传) is also not the original meaning of the extension of knowing in the Great Learning. Huang Wan pointed out that the problem with Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi was that they both failed to see the brightness originally present within the substance of the mind and sought it outside, neither of them knowing the meaning of rest-stopping. Not only should one not expect to find in them sage-learning, but even to seek in them the Mahayana of Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi] and Mingdao [Cheng Hao] is futile. As for Lu Jiuyuan, Huang Wan’s criticism was rather more moderate, though he spared no effort in his attacks on Lu Jiuyuan’s disciple Yang Jian 杨简. He said: “Cihu’s 慈湖 [i.e. Yang Jian] learning came from Xiangshan [Lu Jiuyuan]. However, while Xiangshan was not purely Chan, when it came to Cihu, he was purely Chan” (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1). Yang Jian’s learning was Chan because it took “not arousing intention” as its core guiding principle. With “not arousing intention,” the “considering, deliberating and accomplishing change and transformation” spoken of in the Commentaries on the Changes must be regarded as insufficient, and the Confucian cultivation effort of “willing the dao, holding firmly to virtue, according with benevolence, and strolling in the arts” [see Analects, 7.6] must be abolished. Huang Wan also pointed out that the aspects of Lu Jiuyuan inherited in Yang Jian’s learning, such as acknowledging the spontaneous goodness, numinosity and brightness of the human mind, and regarding the latter as the dao, were no different from the guiding principles of his own academic learning, with the difference being that he had rest-stopping while Yang Jian did not. He said:

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Where I am different is that I have standards while Cihu has no standards, I have efficacious effort while Cihu has no efficacious effort, and I have a sequence of daily renewal while Cihu has no sequence of daily renewal; thus I say: When one knows where to stop, one has a fixed point; when one has a fixed point, one can be still; when one is still, one can be secure [see the Great Learning]. The fixed point, stillness and security are all rooted in stopping, and stopping is in the mind yet has its place, so the myriad things and affairs all follow from my stopping and cannot be disordered. Cihu however follows where he ends up and stops, stopping at the general and having no place, so the myriad things and affairs each follow their own stopping and cannot be restrained. My establishment of the mind lies in sincere intention, eliminating selfish intention; Cihu combines sincere intention and its elimination, saying “do not arouse intention” and “when one arouses intention, one is obscured.” My effort lies in thinking, and eliminating that which should not be thought; Cihu however combines what should be thought and its elimination, saying “do not think” and “without thought, the myriad things are completely illuminated.” (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

In Huang Wan’s view, when there is rest-stopping then one sees Heavenly principle, so rest-stopping is both the central method in learning, and also the result sought by effort; with rest-stopping, the sincerity of intention can be established, i.e. the so-called “realisation of inherent nature constantly preserved.” All bad conduct arises from swaying from point to point with nowhere to return to, flowing without stopping. Hence he repeatedly stressed rest-stopping. He believed that rest-stopping is the root, and that all achievement and arrangement in affairs is a function of the occurrence of rest-stopping. Whenever the root of rest-stopping is lost, its effects all fall into misuse. Huang Wan repeatedly stated the meaning of his guiding principle of rest-stopping: “I use rest-stopping to preserve the mind, use holding to the centre as my will, use thinking as learning, sometimes stopping and sometimes acting, ‘not offending against benevolence even for the space of a single meal’ [see Analects, 4.5], illustrious and enterprising, without daring to be reckless in a single word or careless in a single action” (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1). That is to say, when the mind preserves rest-stopping, not daring to be neglectful, then the mind attains sincerity and respect. Then, taking the centre and Heavenly principle as one’s goal and thinking of the appropriateness of Heavenly principle in all affairs, all one’s conduct stops at the place where it should stop, and all takes principle as its place of return. He believed that this meaning is the meaning repeatedly sermonised in the Confucian classics, as well as the watershed between Confucianism and Buddhism. For Huang Wan, rest-stopping obtained this meaning comprehensively, and thus is one and the same as the rhythm and regularity of the cyclical operation of the dao of Heaven. The substance of rest-stopping is the sincerity of the dao of Heaven. Since the human mind originally possesses Heavenly principle, it spontaneously has the rhythm of advance or retreat and action or stopping, and manifests rest-stopping. Gathering one’s spiritual essence and having no unbridled will or reckless action is rest-stopping in cultivation effort.

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2 Criticism of Wang Yangming When Huang Wan proposed his guiding principle of rest-stopping as the fundamental law of Heaven and humanity, his purpose was to oppose various forms of flowing and swaying with no place of return. His opposition to Chan learning was precisely because it flowed and swayed with no place of return; his criticism of his teacher Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui was also that they flowed and swayed with no place of return. He once said: In past years I taught with one or two gentlemen of the empire, some of who understood the extension of knowledge as making their innate moral knowing reach its limit and the investigation of things as investigating that which is not the mind. They also said that investigation means rectification, rectifying that which is incorrect so that it returns to correctness. Extension means reaching, and making their innate moral knowing reach its limit means making it lack any deficiencies and obstructions. They combined the body, mind, intention, knowledge, and things together as one thing, connecting them with the patterning principle of innate moral knowing; they combined investigation, extension, making sincere, rectification, and cultivation together as one affair, connecting them with the effort of innate moral knowing. They also said that the effort to overcome the self should be completely applied in the investigation of things, overcoming the selfishness of the self, by investigating that which is not the mind. They also led people to read the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing 六祖坛经), gathering together its original absence of things, thought of neither good nor bad, view of the original state of things, and direct transcendence to the Mahayana, and regarding these as consistent with innate moral knowing reaching its limit. At first I did not believe this, then I came to believe it, but after some time examining it, I eventually knew the delusory nature of the empty void, which misleads people to no small degree. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

Although this passage’s criticism is not explicitly directed against Wang Yangming, the academic viewpoints within were all proposed by him. Huang Wan believed that Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing was Chan Buddhism’s “original state of things,” and his extension of innate moral meant extending this original state of things to its limits; his investigation of things was the investigation of that which is not the mind, namely to eliminate selfish desire and preserve the original state of things. Hence effort for Yangming only lay in removing selfishness, and removing selfishness lay in not arousing intentions, regarding this as the method for attaining the original substance of innate moral knowing. If this is sufficient, then the willing the dao, holding firmly to virtue, etc. of Confucians are superfluous matters. This all lacked the meaning of rest-stopping, and therefore fell into empty void. Huang Wan also criticised Wang Yangming’s view that “the benevolent person regards Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body.” This phrase was a summary of Wang Yangming’s broad vision and embrace in his later years, the perfection of cultivation, yet Huang Wan also criticised this: Gentlemen today always say the benevolent person regards Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body, believing that the learning of the great man is like this. Yet if one scrutinises this idea, it means joining my father and son with the fathers and sons of other people, joining the fathers and sons of the people under Heaven as one body; joining my elder and younger brother with the elder and younger brothers of other people, joining the

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elder and younger brothers of the people under Heaven as one body; joining my husband and wife with the husbands and wives of other people, joining the husbands and wives of the people under Heaven as one body; joining my friends with the friends of other people, joining the friends of the people under Heaven as one body. Even the mountains and rivers, the ghosts and spirits, the birds and beasts, the grass and trees, the tiles and stones are all one body, all with the same love, all with the same intimacy, and they believe the benevolence of one body is like this. Examining words like these, they imply that when the sages spoke of being intimate with one’s relations and benevolent to the people, of being benevolent to the people and loving things, that feelings include the intimate and the distant, that love has degrees and levels, they were all wrong. In reality, they are unaware that their ideas have already fallen into the universal love of the Mohists, slipping into an empty void, swaying without limit. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

This criticises Wang Yangming’s benevolence of one body as love without degrees or levels, love without rest-stopping or distinctions, which finally cannot avoid swaying with no place to return. He believed that the love of the human mind has degrees and levels, has rest-stopping. Rest-stopping and degrees or levels here all arise from the reality of Heavenly inherent nature and human feelings. The great man accords with these degrees and levels, dealing with them such that none lose their proper stopping place. This is dao, this is benevolence. Huang Wan’s criticisms of Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing and idea of the myriad things as one body all come from certain arbitrary expressions and are unavoidably superficial and scattered, so, like his Tracing the Ancient Five Classics, they have the problem of “using the mind of the teacher for oneself.” From the fifth year of the Zhengde period, when Huang Wan made the acquaintance of Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui in the capital and lectured together with them, through the first year of the Jiajing 嘉靖 period, when Yangming returned to Yue and he heard his teaching of the extension of innate moral knowing and declared himself his disciple, to when Yangming went south on the Si-Tian campaign and died in the army, over a period of twenty years in total, Huang Wan cannot be said to have had a superficial knowledge of Wang Yangming’s theories. During this period, Yangming wrote more than a dozen letters to Huang Wan, in which he discussed his cultivation efforts very earnestly. For example, in “Reply to Huang Zongxian and Ying Yuanzhong” [Da Huang Zongxian Ying Yuanzhong 答黄宗贤应原忠] he wrote: “The mind of the sage is like a fine screen that retains no content and does not need to be worn down, while the mind of the ordinary person is like a mirror that is spotted with dirt that must be painfully worn down to remove its covering, such that the fine dust then appears of itself and can then be wiped away, requiring great effort” (Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 146). Also, in “Preface on Departing from Huang Zongxian and Returning to Tiantai” [Bie Huang Zongxian gui Tiantai xu 别黄宗贤归天台序], he wrote: “The learning of the superior man consists in illuminating his mind. His mind is originally without dullness, yet it becomes obscured by desire and damaged by habit, so one must remove this obscurity and damage and return it to illumination, which cannot be attained from outside. The mind is like water in that when dirt enters it, it becomes turbid; it is like a mirror in that dirt accumulates and its

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light becomes dulled. Confucius told Yan Hui that to overcome the self and return to ritual propriety is benevolence [see Analects, 12.1], while Mencius said that the myriad things are all present within us, and we can reflect on ourselves in sincerity [see Mencius, 7A.4]. Overcoming the self and being sincere are truly not dependent on anything external.” (Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 233). Here, the concreteness of Wang Yangming’s effort, the diligence of his exertion, and the practicality of his elevation are all very evident. That Huang Wan ignored these in his discussions shows that he had his own intentions. Seen from his overall meaning in writing his Compendium Illuminating the Dao, what he was opposed to was not knowing rest-stopping, and swaying with no place of return. His reason for criticising Wang Yangming’s late views of the extension of innate moral knowing and the myriad things as one body was that in his late years his effort gradually entered a transformative plane, the elements of “opening the mouth and immediately attaining the original mind, without any external assistance” and “today I finally achieved the heart of a madman” in his thought gradually becoming dominant, and his lecturing mostly took a brilliant approach. This tendency in his academic thought and lectures was indeed very distant from the meaning of Huang Wan’s rest-stopping. In his postface to Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Huang Wan’s student Wu Guoding 吴国鼎 related the words of his teacher: I once tempered myself with Yangming and Ganquan 甘泉 [i.e. Zhan Ruoshui], acting together with their elevation, yet in the learning of the two gentlemen, one focused on the extension of innate moral knowing while the other focused on the realisation of Heavenly principle, and in my mind I still felt somewhat unenlightened, until I uncovered the precepts of holding to the centre and rest-stopping and declared them to my companions, taking them to be the most important keys in opening up the gate to sagehood and the true effort of scholars, so that the point lies in these and apart from them no other entrance can be taken.

Here Huang Wan clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with the precepts of Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui, and his holding to the centre and rest-stopping were precisely aimed at remedying and rectifying “the extension of innate moral knowing” and “the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle.” Huang Wan criticised Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle,” saying: Among the gentlemen of today, there are some who dabble in Hinayana Chan, not seeing that the appropriateness of things and their laws is all in the self, and regarding the principles of the world as present in things, hence they speak of “the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” and say that effort all lies in the investigation of things. When they speak of the investigation of things, they say: “Investigation means reaching. Things mean the principles of things. This mind affectively penetrates the affairs and principles of the world under Heaven. Investigating these means that one’s intentions, mind and body all reach them. This is the ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle.” Their learning is fragmented and inadequate to order the world, and this is why Yichuan [i.e. Cheng Yi] and Hui’an [i.e. Zhu Xi] are problematic. (Compendium Illuminating the Dao, Vol. 1)

When Huang Wan criticised Zhan Ruoshui, he also thought that his “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” means seeking the principles of external things, and has no meaning of rest-stopping.

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Huang Wan explained how the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things, regarding the extension of knowledge as the effort of the investigation of things and the investigation of things as the efficacy of the extension of knowledge. For him, “extension” (zhi 致) means “concentrated thought” (zhisi 致思), while “investigation” (ge 格) means lawful regulation. “The extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things” thus means “thinking deeply on things and affairs, making them accord with lawful regularity.” Thinking deeply on things and affairs is action, while accordance with lawful regularity is the result of this action. He also called lawful regularity “canonical regularity” (dianze 典则), i.e. the “place where one should stop” in his “rest-stopping.” Huang Wan’s explanation of the investigation of things emphasised its efficacy, consistent with the three elements of his guiding principle of rest-stopping, i.e. “preserving the mind, holding to the centre, thinking.” According with lawful regularity, not swaying with no place to return, is preserving the mind; having a canon and regularity is holding to the centre, and the extension of knowledge is thinking. His explanations of the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things are elaborations of his precept of rest-stopping. Hence he criticised the two explanations of the investigation of things from Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming: Zhu Xi regarded the investigation of things as the effort of the extension of knowledge, in which the investigation of things meant fathoming the principles of things and affairs, but he did not know that the investigation of things means having a canon and regularity, so their sequence was precisely opposed to his own. His mistake lay in seeking principle in external things, fragmented and broken apart. Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing meant the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, and also regarded investigating things as the effort of the extension of innate moral knowing, such that also it meant investigating that which is not the mind, rectifying its incorrectness and returning to correctness, and also did not know about having a canon and regularity, and thus sought it in the mind. His mistake lay in affirming the internal and negating the external, empty and unrestricted. He pointed out that Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming’s errors both lay in regarding the investigation of things as effort (gongfu 功夫) and not as efficacy (gongxiao 功效) and canonical regularity, simply speaking of effort but not requiring a complete result. In the propositions of both Zhu Xi’s approaching things to fathom principle and Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, there is no way to see the purpose to be achieved. Where the guiding principle has no purpose or result, it can only be either biased toward the internal or biased toward the external. In rest-stopping however, one can see the purpose and result. Rest-stopping combines the subject and object, the Heavenly and human as one, and represents a unity of subjective purpose and objective lawful regularity. This unity is the “centre” [zhong 中], it is sincerity. When he repeatedly referred to stopping at certain times and acting at others, he was emphasising the correspondence between subjective acting or stopping and objective times and places, i.e. that “In ritual propriety, timing is of great importance” [see “Instruments of Rites” (Liqi 礼器), Record of Rites (Liji 礼记)]. He then used this unity of purposiveness and regularity to criticise the precepts of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. Of course, what he criticised was his understanding of Zhu Xi and

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Wang Yangming. As for whether or not Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming were actually as simple and crude as his criticisms imply, that is another matter. Here we need not defend the true meaning of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming’s precepts, but simply demonstrate how is Huang Wan’s criticisms of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, the general tendency of his own philosophical thought can be seen. Huang Wan’s learning of rest-stopping was attained through his experience of studying the Book of Changes and the learning of inherent nature and principle, and then realising these in the self and mind. In his youth he learned the Changes, studying the hexagram diagrams, seeking out the precepts of its words, and carefully unravelling their meaning, yet did not have any real achievements. In his middle age, he stepped onto the path of an official, applying what he had attained from the Changes in the world, yet found it difficult to fit in, and began to develop ideas of disdaining the world and giving free reign to his will. Later he felt this was unacceptable, and from engaging in moral practice, he became aware that his progress was very little, meeting rather with ridicule and slander, and became depressed at not attaining his ambitions, engaging in the learning of inherent nature and principle in order to seek joy and contentment in his fate. After some time he grasped the teaching of the Learning of the Mind, and fused this with what he had attained from the Changes in his youth. From the learning of inherent nature and principle he realised the idea that Heaven and humanity are not two, while from the Changes he realised the appropriateness in acting and stopping along with the method for observing Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and then he knew that the changes and the self, Heaven and humanity are one and not two, and thereby established his precept of rest-stopping. He once described his experience of progress in learning, saying: Seeking and progressing, I saw that principle, inherent nature, Heaven and endowment are all present in the self; though they cannot be fathomed, exhausted, enjoyed or known in the self, they are one and not two. One only rests one’s stopping, stopping in one’s place, stopping when it is time to stop and acting when it is time to act, in order to observe the myriad images. Going on, I observed the strength of Heaven and the depth of Earth, as well as the changes of the words and the divination of the images; going on, I observed the loftiness of Heaven and the baseness of Earth, and then movement and stillness could not lose their times, and their dao could be brightly illuminated. Yet this is still insufficient, since I did not really know why the self is the self, the changes are the changes, the sage is the sage, and the multitude is the multitude. Holding onto this and moving forward, when I came across worries and hardships, this was only the appropriateness of strength and depth, loftiness and baseness, industriously manifesting their endlessness, and so I knew that the changes are present in the self. This was all attained based on worries and hardships. This is how difficult learning can be. (“Preface to Tracing the Ancient Book of Changes” [Yijing yuangu xu 易经原古序])

From this it can be seen that Huang Wan’s learning of rest-stopping includes Heaven and humanity, combines substance and function, and involves things and the self, being attained only through the experience of worries and hardships, and this is in fact its essential meaning.

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In his youth, Huang Wan was painstaking and self-motivated, and after he followed his teacher Xie Duo who told him “One must have both an authentic mind and apply effort assiduously, only this is acceptable,” he followed this advice for the rest of his life, emphasising practical learning. When in his late years he wrote his Compendium Illuminating the Dao, he did not value empty discussion, but mostly expressed the idea of Mencius’ “affecting one’s mind and restraining one’s inherent nature” [see Mencius, 6B.15] and Confucius’ “the writer of the Changes indeed knew worries and hardships” [see Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. II”]. The views it contains concerning aspects such as the management of officials, finance and taxation, supervision and investigation, the imperial examination, and household servants were all very perceptive. However, the everyday understanding and experience of the learning of inherent nature and principle it records is insubstantial and crude, without much invention. His other works also mostly deal with practical learning. The precept of “rest-stopping” was his guiding thought. It can be said that Huang Wan was a person who had a talent for practical learning but neglected inherent nature and principle. He spent most of his career as an official, and did not engage in as much purely theoretical exposition as Wang Yangming. His learning of rest-stopping stressed the rhythms and regularities of things and affairs, regarding this as the central dao (zhongdao 中道), such that through concrete learning and thinking one can attain this central dao and thereby coincide with the rhythms and regularities of things and affairs. In terms of the form of his propositions, he used purpose and result to encompass effort, somewhat different from the usual propositions that stressed effort as enveloping. In terms of its rectification of the corruption of the Wang school, Huang Wan’s rest-stopping has its undeniable brilliance.

3 Ji Ben’s “Vigilance of the Dragon” Among Yangming’s disciples, closest to Huang Wan’s precept of rest-stopping was Ji Ben’s “vigilance of the dragon.” Ji Ben 季本 (1485–1563; zi 字 Mingde 明德, hao 号 Pengshan 彭山) was from Kuaiji 会稽 in Zhejiang. In the 12th year of the Zhengde period he was a successful candidate in the imperial examination, and when Yangming was promoted to a chief minister in the Court of State Ceremonial 鸿胪寺, he came to pay his respects. When Yangming put down the [Zhu] Chenhao [rebellion], Ji Ben was for a time a judge at Jianning 建宁 prefecture in Fujian, where he guarded the pass and blocked their road into Min 闽 [i.e. Fujian]. He was promoted to a prefecture magistrate in Changsha, yet because his eradication was excessively tyrannical, he was dismissed and returned home. Ji Ben’s learning tended toward the practical and he did not like empty discussions of inherent nature and principle, making on-site inspections of the old course of the Yellow River, ruins from past maritime transportation, the borders of his homeland, etc. His written works amounted to over 120 volumes, and other than commentaries and explications of the Four Books and the Five Classics, these also include works on

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the temple system, musical temperament, and yarrow stalk divination methods, with quite detailed examinations and explanations. While Yangming was living in Yue, he once wrote him a letter, in which he said: “Whenever one reads the classical books, the point is to extend one’s own innate moral knowing, taking from them that which is of benefit to learning and nothing more. In a thousand classics and myriad books, from top to bottom and back to front, all is for my own use, and as soon as they become analogically inflexible, they become restrictions” (Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 214), warning him not to be constrained by classical texts. Among Ji Ben’s works on the aspects of inherent nature and principle, the most important is his Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle (Shuoli huibian 说理会编).2 With his prominent pragmatic spirit, Ji Ben opposed the unruly academic atmosphere of denying the ruler in the mind and purely relying on spontaneity, and thus revealed his precept of “vigilance of the dragon” (longti 龙惕). He believed that the spirit embodied by the dragon best expressed his guiding precept in academic learning, and that the dragon was a most appropriate metaphor for the substance of the mind. The dragon has two important spirits: the first is change and transformation (bianhua 变化), and the second is watchful vigilance (jingti 警惕); because it changes and transforms, it is not inflexible, and because it is watchfully vigilant, it is not self-indulgent. Amidst its change and transformation it never loses its watchful vigilance, and its watchful vigilance never obstructs its change and transformation. Watchful vigilance expresses that the mind has a governing ruler (zhuzai 主宰), while change and transformation expresses that the mind’s application has no fixed form. Ji Ben pointed out that as a metaphor for the mind, a dragon was better than a mirror, since a mirror has no content of its own and its function is simply to reflect things and receive illumination from outside, so it has no ability to shape things and can only rely on spontaneity. Spontaneity however should imply that the governing ruler is constantly established and is not held back by anything else. In Ji Ben’s “vigilance of the dragon,” change and transformation is flowing activity, while watchful vigilance is the governing ruler, and just as in the relationship between principle and qi, they are two inseparable aspects of one thing. He said: Principle is the governing ruler of yang, while qi is the container of yin. When it is yang, the governing ruler is manifest, yet it must attain yin to be contained within it, then its qi will not be dispersed. When it is yin, the container is close, yet it must attain yang as its governing ruler within, then its principle will not be dimmed. This yin containing yang and yang containing yin is what is called the dao. … In the governing ruler’s responding to the external, although it meets with confusion, it maintains its own constancy with ease; in the governing ruler being stored internally, although it enters into the dim and obscure, it is watchful and aware. This only one whose virtue combines yin and yang can attain. (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 1, 4)

Here, Ji Ben elevated his esteem for the governing ruler and dislike of spontaneity from a theory of effort to the height of the dao of Heaven in order to demonstrate it:

[Trans.] References to Shuoli huibian refer to a Ming Dynasty Jiajing 嘉靖 period carved edition by Feng Jike 冯继科. 2

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the dao of Heaven is the flowing activity of a myriad changes and transformations, yet the myriad things all have two aspects, namely their existence and flowing activity in terms of the movement of their physical forms, and their governing ruler in terms of the properties of their physical forms and the regularity of their movement. Using the idea of the relationship between yin and yang as two inseparable yet unmixed aspects of one body, yang is the governing ruler, while yin is the flowing activity; when yang is dominant, the governing ruler is manifest and flowing activity is hidden, while when yin is dominant, flowing activity is dominant while the governing ruler is hidden. Although there is a difference between yin and yang as hidden or manifest, neither the governing ruler nor flowing activity are ever lost. The constant presence of the governing ruler is the principle of qi; the constant presence of flowing activity is the qi of principle. There is constantly the governing ruler, and there is constantly watchful awareness. This is the vigilance of the dragon as embodied in the dao of Heaven. Ji Ben’s vigilance of the dragon highlighted the meaning of the governing ruler. In Ji Ben’s view, although principle and qi are substance and function with one source, and are thus inseparable, the position of principle is more important. When yang is dominant, principle spontaneously manifests, and at this time the function of principle is that of the governing ruler; when yin is dominant, principle is hidden within, and at this time the function of principle is watchful awareness. Using the language of the Commentaries on the Changes, this function of principle is “Qian 乾 knows (i.e. rules over) the great beginning, while Kun 坤 works to complete things.” That is to say, flowing activity is always under the jurisdiction of the governing ruler. He said: “Kun is the spontaneous, yet it takes receiving Qian as its virtue. Hence the ruler of Kun is Qian” (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 1, 10). In the earlier Confucian words [from Centrality in the Ordinary] “That which Heaven endows is called inherent nature,” Heaven is the governing ruler of endowment; in “exercising inherent nature is called the dao,” inherent nature is the governing ruler of the dao; in “[the feelings] being aroused yet central and regulated is harmony,” centrality is the governing ruler of harmony. In his view, if flowing activity has no governing ruler, it will necessarily exceed its rule and regularity. Hence, regardless of whether he spoke of Heaven or humanity, he always esteemed the governing ruler and disliked spontaneity. When Ji Ben advocated esteeming the governing ruler and disliking spontaneity, his intention was to oppose those among Yangming’s disciples who believed in directly relying on spontaneity, especially Wang Longxi 王龙溪. Wang Longxi held that “realising the original substance is effort,” that the original substance is the governing ruler with no need for a separate governing ruler, and that the original substance is spontaneity with no need to seek a separate spontaneity. Ji Ben’s “vigilance of the dragon” was precisely opposed to Wang Longxi, holding that in flowing activity there must be a governing ruler, since if there is no governing ruler then desire rides on the impulse of qi and mixes into it, and this leads to the evil of drifting and losing one’s place. He said:

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With respect there is vigilance and watchfulness, and this is the dao of Qian. With simplicity there is spontaneity and non-action, and this is the dao of Kun. If one relies on spontaneity and does not take respect as its ruler, then the will does not command qi but follows its spontaneous movement. Even if there is no action, is this not too simple? (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 2, 6)

In terms of Heaven and Earth or Qian and Kun, Heaven is the governing ruler while Earth is spontaneity, so Qian is the governing ruler of Kun; in terms of inherent nature and endowment, endowment is flowing activity while inherent nature is the governing ruler, endowment belongs to qi while inherent nature belongs to principle, endowment comes from outside while inherent nature emerges from inside, and inherent nature is the governing ruler of endowment. Hence the desires of the ears, eyes, mouth and nose are endowment, and are attained from what is naturally so; through people’s watchful awareness, the governing ruler makes them accord with laws and standards, hence desire attains its principle. In Ji Ben’s view, the governing ruler is originally possessed by all things and affairs, so Heaven and humanity are both like this, and there is no exception. When previous figures regarded Heaven as the “Supreme Void” (taixu 太虚), in fact within this void there is a governing ruler. He said: As for Heaven, it must be said to be void, yet if one simply speaks of Heaven as void, I fear this clings to the void. It also relies on qi, and its movement is the transformation of qi. … What is esteemed in the void is that there is a ruler, and in the void with a ruler, sincerity is preserved within; this is the virtue of strength. With strength, the void is illuminated and responds when affected, basing itself on the twisting completion of things, such that none fails to attain its place; this is the compliance of things. (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 1, 17)

Strength (jian 健) is the governing ruler, while compliance (shun 顺) is the flowing activity under the domination of the governing ruler. Hence compliance does not mean trusting in and relying on spontaneity, swaying with no place of return. The inherent nature of humanity and that of Heaven and Earth are consistent, in that it is because there is a governing ruler that they can flow in activity, and it is because there is strength that there can be compliance. This still emphasises the decisive role of the governing ruler. Ji Ben also used the presence or absence of a governing ruler to distinguish Confucianism and Buddhism, since, in his view, the Confucian dao of Heaven is ruled by principle dominating qi, while the dao of humanity is ruled by inherent nature dominating the feelings, and because the myriad things each has its own governing ruler and its own distinction, so the myriad things each taking its inherent nature to its limit is the central dao. Since Buddhism and Daoism trust in and rely on the spontaneity of the one qi, denying the inherent nature and principle that are included within, so they deny the governing ruler within. He said: In terms of expressing people’s inherent nature, that which those who follow the sages call dao governs and rules over qi-transformation through firmness and strength. Hence that which it arouses is most refined and not mixed up, and can be called central and regulated. If one does not speak of dao in terms of a governing ruler, then floating and sinking, rising

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and falling, and coming and going are all simply the movements of qi, and people are entirely no different from dogs and cows. The learning of the Buddhists and Daoists is not precise in its meaning, following the movements of qi, merely relying on spontaneity and not knowing its falsity. (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 1, 24)

When Song-Ming Confucians distinguished Confucianism and Buddhism, the key lay in whether or not one had the term “principle,” while when Ji Ben distinguished Confucianism and Buddhism, they key lay in whether or not one had a governing ruler. In fact, the governing ruler is principle, is inherent nature, it was simply that he wished to emphasise the meaning of governing and dominating as opposed to spontaneity, and hence repeatedly spoke of the “governing ruler.” Ji Ben emphasised the governing ruler, yet this governing ruler is also present in the mind, and hence he especially stressed being careful when alone (shendu 慎独), regarding this as the fundamental effort for keeping the governing ruler constantly refined and clear. He said: For all the bad done by people, the numinosity of the original substance is spontaneously capable of becoming aware of it. Where it is aware and yet accommodates it somewhat, this amounts to self-deception, and where there is deception one is not clearheaded. Hence one must be cautious and apprehensive concerning the place of lone-knowing [duzhi 独知], not letting any badness become mixed into it, then one will be clearheaded and respectful. (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 3, 6)

Being careful when alone, being respectful and being clearheaded all mean the governing ruler in the mind not becoming dulled. As soon as the governing ruler is dulled, then qi follows its spontaneous tendencies without regulation or command, following its tendencies and becoming biased. However, since people’s innate moral knowing is constantly refined and clear, when the governing ruler is dulled, innate moral knowing also knows this, and so provided one does not deceive oneself and lets the governing ruler restore its original luminous clarity, the centre will have a ruler and not make mistakes. Ji Ben also used being careful when alone to discuss the unity of knowledge and action, saying: When one is careful concerning lone-knowing, this is the extension of knowledge. When the effort of being careful when alone is unceasing, this is forceful action. Hence outside of lone-knowing there is no knowing, and outside of constant knowing there is no action. How easy and simply this effort is! (Compendium Gathering Discussions of Principle, Vol. 4, 1)

He believed that this meaning coincided with Wang Yangming’s unity of knowledge and action. Yangming’s “knowledge” was innate moral knowing, while “action” was extending that which innate moral knowing knows to be Heavenly principle into affairs and actions. Knowledge was spoken of in terms of luminous awareness, and action in terms of concrete practice, so knowledge and action were originally united as one. In terms of being careful when alone, lone-knowing is innate moral knowing, and the unceasing effort of being careful is action. Thus being careful when alone is the unity of knowledge and action. Being careful when

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alone cannot be divided into knowledge and action or earlier and later, being both knowledge and action, with both occurring simultaneously. Ji Ben’s unity of knowledge and action and that of Wang Yangming seem similar but are in fact different. Yangming’s action mainly meant extending the good known by innate moral knowing into concrete affairs and actions such as serving one’s relatives or ruler, in which effort mainly lay in concrete actions. In Ji Ben’s being careful when alone however, his action was only being “clearheaded” (xingxing 惺惺), meaning that the governing ruler is not dulled, with his effort mainly being placed on the mind having a ruler, and hence his unity of knowledge and action did not depart from the precept of the “vigilance of the dragon.” Ji Ben’s aspect of practical learning was mainly found in his explorations of old ruins and his investigations and corrections of the temple system, musical temperament, etc. In this the elements of knowledge predominated, and in terms of the breadth of his practice and the profundity of his experience, he was no match for Wang Yangming. Ji Ben’s vigilance of the dragon was partly derived from the hexagram and line judgments of hexagram Qian from the Changes, and mainly emphasised the meaning of “esteeming the governing ruler and disliking spontaneity,” with his entire theory simply aimed at explaining how “If one abandons the governing ruler and speaks of spontaneity, then spontaneity is simply qi-transformation, and one inevitably neglects the fine and subtle and transgresses the correctness of moral principle” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 276). His idea here originated from Yangming’s early view of “self-restraint as the core, emanation as unavoidable.” In his early years, Yangming indeed held the view of esteeming the governing ruler and disliking spontaneity. One passage in his works is very close to Ji Ben’s thought described above, and is possibly its source: “In the dynamic qi-impulse of Heaven and Earth, there is originally not a moment of rest, yet there is a governing ruler, hence it is neither early nor late, neither hurried nor delayed, such that even amidst a thousand changes and myriad transformations, the governing ruler is constantly calm, and people attain this in life. If while the governing ruler is calm, one is as restless as the cyclical movements of Heaven, then even though one is busy with a myriad changes, one will be at ease in self-possession, as when the Heavenly Lord [i.e. the mind] remains calm and the hundred parts of the body follows its commands. If there is no governing ruler, then there is just this bold and unrestrained qi, so how can one not feel busy?” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. I). Although Ji Ben’s writings concerning inherent nature and principle are not as strongly targeted as those of Huang Wan, they are also written with a purpose. Huang Zongxi said: “The gentleman was concerned about scholars being empty and scattered, only busying themselves with lecturing, so he worked assiduously to fathom the classics” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 272). This explains his reason for writing his investigatory works on studies of the Confucian classics. As for his reason for proposing his precept of vigilance of the dragon and the effect it had, Huang Zongxi also pointed out: “During his time, many of the superior men from the same school only regarded flowing activity as the original substance, playing around with light and shade, yet their rise and fall returned to uniformity and having nothing to do. Thus the

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gentleman’s phrase ‘governing ruler’ was strongly connected to academic learning” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 273). Like that of Huang Wan, the point of Ji Ben’s academic learning lay in developing Yangming’s thought of the constant calmness of the governing ruler from his early years, and opposing the tendency toward a lofty and brilliant approach that regarded flowing activity as original substance and denied the presence of the governing ruler at the centre, as exemplified by Wang Longxi. This view was later forcefully expounded and propagated by Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周. In terms of holding back Yangming Learning’s development in a wild and uninhibited direction and leading it back onto firm ground, Ji Ben’s academic learning played a certain guiding role.

Chapter 9

Zou Shouyi’s Precept of “Vigilance” and His Family Learning

In ancient times, Jiangxi 江西 province was called Jiangyou 江右, and Wang Yangming’s 王阳明 lifetime of military, political and academic activities were deeply connected with Jiangxi, with “the extension of innate moral knowing,” the core precept that encapsulates his lifetime of academic learning, being revealed in Jiangxi. Yangming had a great many students in Jiangxi, among whom those with the most prominent learning and conduct were several dozen figures including Zou Shouyi, Ouyang De 欧阳德, Nie Bao 聂豹, Luo Hongxian 罗洪先, Liu Wenmin 刘文敏, Liu Bangcai 刘邦采, Wang Shihuai 王时槐, Hu Zhi 胡直, and Song Yiwang 宋仪望. Although there was some variety in their academic learning, they generally tended toward the view that innate moral knowing could be relied upon once it had been built up through exercise, advocated methods of cultivation such as returning to quietude and holding to stillness or retraction and concentration, and this differed completely from Wang Longxi’s 王龙溪 direct reliance on a priori innate moral knowing. Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 once said: “Only in Jiangyou was Yaojiang 姚江 learning [i.e. the orthodox teaching of Wang Yangming] passed on,” and “The spirit of Yangming’s life was completely in Jiangyou” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], “Case Studies from Yaojiang 1”). Zou Shouyi was one of the scholars who best embodied the academic ethos of Jiangyou. Zou Shouyi 邹守益 (1491–1562; zi 字 Qianzhi 谦之, hao 号 Dongkuo 东廓) was from Anfu 安福 in Jiangxi province. He successfully became a metropolitan graduate in the Zhengde 正德 period, and was appointed as a junior compiler in the Hanlin Academy 翰林院. When [Zhu] Chenhao 朱宸濠 rebelled, he [i.e. Zou] once followed Yangming on a campaign, assisting him with military affairs. At the court of Emperor Shizong 世宗 [i.e. the Jiajing 嘉靖 Emperor], because a memorial he submitted during the Great Rites Controversy caused offence, he was first sentenced to jail, then demoted to an administrative assistant in the Guangde 广德 region. He was later promoted to a director in the Ministry of Rites 礼部, and then promoted in position to a chancellor in the Directorate of Education 国子 in Nanjing. When his frank speech offended his superiors, he lost his position. He then resided at home for more than twenty years, travelling around and lecturing. Upon his death, he was © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_9

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honored as a vice minister on the right in the Ministry of Rites, and awarded the title Wenzhuang 文庄. His works were compiled by his students into the Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou (Dongkuo Zou xiansheng wenji 东廓邹先生文 集) in twelve volumes and Posthumous Manuscripts of Master Dongkuo (Dongkuo xiansheng yigao 东廓先生遗稿) in thirteen volumes.1 When Zou Shouyi first met Yangming, he meant to request that he compose an epigraph for his father, yet upon hearing Yangming lecture, his many years of doubts were dispelled, and he thus took Yangming as his teacher. He later went to Yue 越 twice to visit Yangming, and after his departure Yangming sent him many letters expressing his fond and sorrowful thoughts. When his disciples asked about the reason for this, Yangming replied: “Zengzi 曾子 once said, ‘Having the ability to ask about one’s inabilities, using one’s sufficiency to ask about one’s deficiencies, possessing yet seeming to lack, full yet seeming empty, being offended yet not retaliating’ [see Analects 论语, 8.5], and one like Qianzhi [i.e. Zou Shouyi] indeed comes close to this” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. III). His learning and conduct thus received profound praise from Yangming.

1 The Core Precept of “Vigilance” Zou Shouyi’s learning took “vigilance” (jieju 戒惧) as its core precept. The concept of vigilance was taken from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸): “[Thus the superior man is] vigilant over that which he does not see, and apprehensive over that which he does not hear,” the original meaning of which was to maintain a constant watchful awareness and not allow the slightest neglect in the mind. Even in the most hidden locations, one ought not be remiss and allow this to be interrupted. Zhu Xi distinguished vigilance from being careful when alone (shendu 慎独), believing that vigilance is a constant watchful awareness before thoughts arise, while being careful when alone is a caution and care when thoughts have arisen yet are still unknown. Wang Yangming disagreed with Zhu Xi’s distinction here, believing that: “There is but a single effort, so when one is doing nothing one knows alone, and when one is busy with affairs one still knows alone. Vigilance is this knowing, so if one does not know oneself, who is it that is vigilant? This kind of explanation can easily slip into the annihilation of Chan meditation” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). Yangming’s view originated from his doctrine that innate moral knowing is constantly perfect and bright and is never extinguished for a moment. Zou Shouyi took up Yangming’s idea, and regarded vigilance as the entire content of the effort of moral cultivation. For Zou Shouyi, vigilance is what Confucius’ students called “respect” (jing 敬). He said:

[Trans.] References to Dongkuo xiansheng wenji refer to a carved edition from the Jiajing 嘉靖 period of the Ming Dynasty.

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The main precept of the lineage of the sage is simply to cultivate oneself through respect. Respect means the refined clarity innate moral knowing which is not mixed up with the dust of vulgarity. With vigilance and fear, constant refinement and clarity, one goes out into the world like a guest, and undertakes affairs like a ceremonial sacrifice. Hence in putting a state of a thousand chariots into order, one should directly take respect in affairs as one’s guiding principle. (“Letter to Great Minister Hu Luya” [Jian Hu Luya juqing 简胡鹿崖巨 卿], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

The goal of respect and vigilance is to not allow innate moral knowing to become contaminated and impaired, to preserve a refined and clear state; only when innate moral knowing is refined and clear can it flow into operation and making that which it touches upon all accord with principle, making judgments of right and wrong all focused and regulated. For Zou Shouyi, vigilance is effort, while innate moral knowing is original substance. Since the original substance of innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle, its flowing operation contains its own spontaneous centrality, as he said: The refined and clear site of innate moral knowing has its own spontaneous and specific regularity, carrying out what can be carried out and stopping what can be stopped, and is thus truly hawks flying and fish leaping [see Centrality in the Ordinary], the vitality of the Heavenly impulse; there is originally neither obstruction nor choice. The only trouble is the selfishness of love of fame and profit, since as soon as this occludes its refined clarity, its chaff leads the eye astray, and Heaven and Earth are thereby made to change places. (“Reply to Zhou Shunzhi” [Da Zhou Shunzhi 答周顺之], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

Innate moral knowing is originally refined and clear with no occlusion, and effort lies in being vigilant to remove its occlusions. Hence Zou Shouyi’s doctrine of vigilance was in fact a restoration of inherent nature: “The original substance of my mind is refined and clear, numinous and enlightened, vast like the constant illumination of the sun and moon, and deep like the persistent flowing of rivers. When it has any occlusion or obstruction, this should be swept away and eliminated so that one can once again see its original substance. The reason why the ancients took such haste and trouble over this was precisely because they wished to complete this substance of constant illumination and brightness” (“Letter to Friends Junliang and Boguang” [Jian Junliang Boguang zhuyou 简君亮伯广诸友], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5). Zou Shouyi connected vigilance to the “illuminating illustrious virtue” (ming mingde 明明德) of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学), and thought that innate moral knowing is luminous virtue, and that vigilance is the effort of illuminating illustrious virtue. He said: The luminosity of luminous virtue is complete and sufficient in everyone, such that when one meets one’s relatives and is filial, meets one’s ruler and is loyal, or meets one’s friends and is faithful, this is all but the flowing operation of luminous virtue; the accordant and appropriate point of this flowing operation is called the good, while its obstruction and congestion is called the not good. The dao 道 of learning is nothing but removing the not good and returning to the good. (“Letter to Bao Fuzhi” [Jian Bao Fuzhi 简鲍复之], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

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Zou Shouyi’s innate moral knowing was in general the same as that of Wang Yangming, and mainly had two aspects: the first was the self-awareness of the good inherent nature that one originally possesses, namely what Yangming called “the awareness belonging to inherent nature” (suo xing zhi jue 所性之觉), while the second was the subject’s function of judging right and wrong together with its standard. Seeking “the awareness belonging to inherent nature” lies only in “illuminating the mind” (ming xin 明心); the effort of illuminating the mind lies in removing its obstruction and restoring its original substance, and not in reducing or adding to this original substance. He said: The teaching of innate moral knowing comes from the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, and, in terms of its spiritual and numinous awareness, compassion, shame, yielding, and right and wrong are all nothing but the operative functioning of innate moral knowing. Hence by reaching centrality and harmony through vigilance, one can achieve a state of adaptation; by expanding the four inklings, one can protect all within the four seas. Originally there are no worries over its insufficiency; that which is worrisome is simply that one is unable to illuminate it. Inquiring and examining well in order to apply centrality, reciting poetry and writing in order to esteem one’s friends, and speaking and acting boldly in order to accumulate one’s virtue, these are all the effort of seeking its illumination. Only this original beginning is illuminated, and even by combining together the luminosity of all under Heaven from ancient times to the present, one could not increase it. (“Reply to Chief Minister Xia Dunfu of the Imperial Stud” [Fu Xia taipu Dunfu 复夏太仆敦夫], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

Here, Zou Shouyi regarded the inherent nature endowed by Heaven as that from which the feelings of the four inklings emerge, such that inherent nature is the basis for feeling and feeling is the operative functioning of inherent nature. The use of vigilance to reach a state of centrality and harmony is his negative effort; the expansion of the four inklings is his positive effort. Vigilance is “resisting that which is not the mind” (ge qi feixin 格其非心), the expansion of the four inklings is the extension of innate moral knowing, and the extension of innate moral knowing is the investigation of things. Hence Zou Shouyi said: “Broadening one’s learning and investigating things are vigilance and expansion; these are a single effort, not dual” (“Reply to Chief Minister Xia Dunfu of the Imperial Stud,” Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5). This was also the meaning of Wang Yangming’s statements that “to broaden one’s learning is to restrict oneself with ritual propriety” and “to accumulate knowledge through learning is to respect the virtue of inherent nature.” Zou Shouyi’s effort was completely applied to studying the lower, and studying the lower was the means for penetrating the higher, hence he advocated a unity of substance and function, of quietude and affectivity, and opposed seeking quietude outside of affectivity. He said: Quietude and affectivity are never dual, and substance and function do not have two realms, like speaking of names and written characters. When one speaks of names, characters are present within, and when one speaks of characters, names are present within. Hence centrality and harmony do not have a dual reference, and in being careful when alone there is no duality of effort. (“Letter to Yu Liuxi” [Jian Yu Liuxi 简余柳溪], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

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By unifying vigilance and being careful when alone as a single effort, application when one is affected means application when one is in quietude, and the substance and function of quietude and affect are not dual, such that when one speaks of one, the other is naturally included within. Zou Shouyi opposed the view that regarded quietude as the original state of things and regarded affective response and operative application as the effect of the substance of quietude, in which effort was thereby solely applied to quietude and in affectivity one could find no trace of effort. He believed that this kind of explanation split apart the relation of substance and function between quietude and affectivity, either relying on affectivity and thus seeking externally or relying on quietude and thus focusing on the internal, both of which are blind to the non-duality of the substance and function of inherent nature. Hence he advocated vigilance and being careful when alone amidst everyday human relationships and general dealings with things, and effort of studying the lower and penetrating the higher. He said: Human relationships and general dealings with things are daily connected with me, and I am never separated from them for even a moment. Hence in the conduct of common virtue and the cautiousness of common speech, careful reverence can never be set aside, like how when a weaver is threading silk into a button, not a single thread can be broken; this is combing and arranging the threads of the great warp. (“Words Upon Meeting at Longhua” [Longhua huiyu 龙华会语], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 7). Whenever there is the slightest unease in one’s bosom, there is vigilance and apprehension, and this is precisely to constantly study the lower and constantly penetrate the higher, valid everywhere within the four seas, as far as the hundred sages, combining virtue with its illumination. (“Words of Encouragement at Qingyuan” [Qingyuan zengchu 青原赠处], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 2).

Zou Shouyi advocated the unity of quietude and affectivity, substance and function, and opposed any absolute “stillness” that transcends activity and stillness. In his view, scholars of the time generally misunderstood Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 precept of “holding to stillness” (zhujing 主静), and he pointed out that holding to stillness did not mean separating from or transcending activity and stillness, but rather referred to the original state of the mind without any selfish desire. Although this original state is still in itself, it is in fact the hub that governs and administers the myriad affairs and things, and thus is still without ever being still, with activity and stillness as one. He said: “When not a single thing remains, this is the complete illumination of the myriad things. When not a single thing remains, this is the substance of constant quietude; when the myriad things are completely illuminated, this is the function of constant affectivity” (Collected Works of Zou Shouyi [Zou Shouyi ji 邹守益集], 733). Zou Shouyi believed that this quality of non-duality in quietude and affectivity or substance and function came from “Heaven,” such that Heaven and humanity are united as one, Heavenly principle is the principle of human affairs, and Heaven is the paradigm that people are modeled on and from which they extract images. Heaven in itself has no sound or scent, and in this respect, it is the non-polarity (wuji 无极); however, this soundless and scentless Heaven guides and binds the myriad transformations, the operations of Heaven never cease for even a moment, the Heavenly impulse is vital and lively, and the

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myriad things each maximise their inherent natures, so in this respect, it is the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极). People model themselves on Heaven, the mind of the sage is uncontaminated by selfish desires, benevolence, righteousness, centrality and uprightness constantly flow into operation, never ceasing for a moment, and the order of human relationships and daily functions is thereby completed. In terms of its absence of desire, it is “unseen and unheard,” while in terms of the constant flowing operation of its benevolence, righteousness, centrality and uprightness, it is “neither manifest nor visible.” Hence Zou Shouyi said: “Knowing that the Supreme Polarity is originally the non-polarity, one recognises the wonder of the dao of Heaven; knowing benevolence, righteousness, centrality and uprightness and holding to stillness, one recognises the completeness of the learning of the sages” (Collected Works of Zou Shouyi, 733). He believed that “the transcendent impulse of true inherent nature” must be grasped through the non-polarity and the Supreme Polarity: [Zhou Dunyi’s phrase] “the non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” simply means perceiving the Supreme Polarity in the constant procession of the four seasons and the constant life of the hundred things, perceiving true inherent nature in the three hundred ritual ceremonies and the three thousand dignified comportments. He believed this idea was consistent with Wang Yangming’s spirit of penetrating the higher not being separate from studying the lower, and substance and function, activity and stillness being comprehensively united in non-duality. However, one must be constantly vigilant, making one’s innate moral knowing refined and clear, before the principle originally possessed by the mind can spontaneously flow into operation. Zou Shouyi advocated the unity of activity and stillness, substance and function, believing that vigilance cannot be separated from people’s sensuous desires, since if it is separated from sensuous desires, the effort of vigilance becomes empty. His friend Liu Shiquan 刘师泉 once compared sounds, sights, goods and profit to mists, vapors, spirits and devils, but Zou Shouyi held a diametrically opposite viewpoint. He believed that love of sounds, sights, goods and profit is people’s original inherent nature, so sounds, sights, goods and profit themselves are certainly not bad, and as long as one can make one’s mind broad and impartial, then when things come they will all accord with principle, and hence sounds, sights, goods and profit are not in fact obstructions to the substance of the mind. He said: “Forms and sights are the inherent nature of Heaven, and originally not excessive desires. Yet when sages act on forms, they simply impartially accord with and respond to them, being constant like the sun and moon or the luan 鸾and the phoenix in the fields” (“Letter to Liu Shiquan Junliang” [Jian Liu Shiquan Junliang 简刘师泉君亮], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 6). This is consistent with Wang Yangming’s idea that “When the seven feelings follow their spontaneous flowing operations, they are all the functioning of innate moral knowing, and can neither be divided into good and bad, nor contain any attachment; when the seven feelings contain attachment, they can all be called desires, and all become obstructions to innate moral knowing” and that “When one can extend innate moral knowing such that it is refined and clear without the slightest obstruction, then the interactions of sounds, sights, goods and profit are nothing but the flowing operation of Heavenly

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regularity” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). Zou Shouyi believed that if one can use vigilance to make the mind broad and impartial, preserving the original substance of innate moral knowing, then sounds, sights, goods and profit will each attain their appropriacy, and that this is a method of “guiding” (dao 导), while forcibly cutting them off so that they are not produced is a method of “restraint” (e 遏). He agreed with guiding desires and opposed controlling desires. As a result of this, Zou Shouyi opposed the Song Confucian distinction between the inherent nature mandated by Heaven and the inherent nature of material qi 气, believing that the two are originally one, that one can see the inherent nature mandated by Heaven in the inherent nature of material qi, and that without the inherent nature of material qi, there is nowhere to seek the inherent nature mandated by Heaven. He said: Heavenly inherent nature and material qi are not two components. These bodies of people are all functional affairs of material qi: that the eyes can see, the ears can here, the mouth can speak, and the hands and feet can grasp and walk is all material qi. Heavenly inherent nature flows into operation from this, so since material qi and Heavenly inherent nature are rolled up together, how can one speak of “discussing inherent nature and not discussing qi”? Without material qi, where can one seek the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth? (“Recorded Sayings of Dongkuo” [Dongkuo yulu 东廓语录], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 345).

That is to say, the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is the aspect of the inherent nature of material qi that accords with principle. However, if one wishes to attain Heavenly principle, one must first have the effort of vigilance, in order to make the innate moral knowing that judges right from wrong refined and clear with no obstruction. Hence Zou Shouyi repeatedly emphasised that: “Centrality and harmony do not lie outside of vigilance, but are simply the aspect of happiness, anger, sadness and joy that accords and responds impartially. Adaptation does not lie outside of centrality and harmony, but is simply the aspect of according and responding impartially in interactions between ruler and minister, father and son” (Collected Works of Zou Shouyi, 731). From the above discussion, Zou Shouyi’s accounts of the original substance of innate moral knowing, the effort of vigilance and being careful when alone, the unity of the quietude and affectivity or substance and function of the original substance of the mind, studying the lower and penetrating the higher, and the relationship between inherent nature and feeling, are all rooted in Yangming’s unswerving core precept. When Yangming established his teachings, he adapted his instruction based on the sharpness or dullness of his students and the depth or shallowness of their understanding, and thereby stressed different points, especially when he reached the pinnacle of his mastery in his later years, when his views gained more free rein and differed significantly from those of his early years. However, if viewed comprehensively, they did not lack a single unswerving guiding precept. Zou Shouyi was foremost among those who grasped this precept and its simple effort most clearly, hence Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 once said: “When Dongkuo regarded knowing alone as innate moral knowing, and vigilance and being careful when alone as the effort of extending innate moral knowing, this was

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his master’s fundamental precept. When his students lost it and gradually slipped onto a crazed and rampant path, only Dongkuo was preoccupied with personally embodying it, and realised his intentions through practical effort, eminently abiding by the regulations of the sages, without the slightest hint of being domineering. None of his many discussions fell into the set patterns others followed in explicating innate moral knowing, and in giving expression his dependence on Yangming’s teachings without degeneration, he can be said to have made a contribution to his master’s lineage” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, “On the Masters” [Shishuo 师说]). Although Liu Zongzhou’s assessment here was made to rectify the malpractices of Wang [Yangming] Learning, yet in its illumination of the reality of Zou Shouyi’s studies and practice, it is quite to the point.

2 Criticism of His Fellow Students as Departing from Yangming’s Original Precepts Zou Shouyi took the continuation of Yangming’s true precepts as his personal mission, opposed dividing substance and function, quietude and affectivity, and a priori and a posteriori, and vehemently criticised Wang Longxi of Zhezhong’s 浙中 pure reliance on the a priori, Qian Dehong’s 钱德洪 focus on applying effort to a posteriori thoughts, and Nie Bao of Jiangyou’s seeking quietude apart from affectivity. He once said: The views of Yuezhong 越中 are truly too lofty, forgetting words and abolishing meaning in their debates, and have always astonished me. (“Reply to Nie Shuangjiang Wenwei” [Fu Nie Shuangjiang Wenwei 复聂双江文蔚], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5). In recent years there has been a kind of lofty ingenuity, mouths speaking with neither thought nor striving, at ease in the refined content of the dao of centrality, yet afraid of the restraints of vigilance, as if wandering in a remote village, striving to depict the beauty of an ancestral temple or the opulence of a hundred palaces for their own benefit, without the slightest intervention. (“Record of Chongxuan” [Chongxuan lu 冲玄录], Collected Works of Zou Shouyi, 743).

Here, “The views of Yuezhong are truly too lofty” does not only refer to Wang Longxi. Huang Zongxi said: “At this time, the malpractices of Yuezhong were emerging, forcing their master’s views to shut the mouths of students, and Jiangyou alone was able to break with this” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 333). This shows that “those who hold views that are too lofty” did not refer only to a single person, and the doctrines of Wang Longxi were their representative. In Zou Shouyi’s view, the a priori group strove to speak of original substance, but neglected effort. If however one wants original substance to flow into operation without obstruction, one must first have the effort of vigilance, and make the original substance of the mind constantly refined and clear. Without the effort of vigilance, although one speaks of the flowing operation of the substance of inherent

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nature, it is hard to contamination by material desires. Neither thinking nor striving and being at ease in the dao of centrality is a higher level effort, and if it lacks the precondition of vigilance and being careful when alone, it simply amounts to giving free rein to one’s selfish intentions. The actual things in experience are what really benefit people, and understanding the actual is precisely the means for penetrating the metaphysical original substance. If one avoids speaking of actual effort, then original substance is but a fantasy. Fantasising all day long and not touching upon the real world is finally simply playing with shadows. Guarding against anger, obstructing desire, shifting to the good and correcting one’s mistakes are all the concrete effort of extending innate moral knowing; if one regards these are secondary in significance, and concentrates instead on a priori innate moral knowing, not knowing to add the effort of removing blockages and breaking down obstructions, then one goes against Yangming’s original precepts. Zou Shouyi also opposed the other fault of concentrating on examining and restraining intentions and thoughts that have arisen a posteriori and forgetting the goodness of original substance. In his view, the a priori mind and a posteriori intentions possess the non-duality of substance and function. Overcoming and removing a posteriori selfish intention guides and releases the a priori original mind; as soon as selfish intentions are absent, the original substance spontaneously flows into operation. If having removed selfish intentions, one seeks the goodness of inherent nature elsewhere, one’s faith in the goodness originally possessed by innate moral knowing is insufficient, and there is the danger of reduplicating the original excess. He said: If one is indeed able to be vigilant and fearful, maintaining constant refinement and illumination, and not being obstructed by material desires, then this is already the good, so what need is there for a further step? If this is already not in error, what need is there for further correction? As soon as there is obstruction, one must sweep it away with the vigour of thunder and the resoluteness of the wind, and thus restore one’s perception of original substance. When people speak of falling into the inferior order, this only refers to inspecting in affairs, in which there is thus arising and extinguishing, and not the flowing operation of original substance. (“Reply to Xu Zibi” [Da Xu Zibi 答徐子弼], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

Another Jiangyou scholar Huang Honggang 黄弘纲 also denounced this approach to effort as “only applying effort to arising and extinguishing thoughts, such that in one’s whole life one never accords with original substance” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 450). Zou Shouyi opposed focusing on examining and restraining the arising and extinguishing of intentions and thoughts, and held fast to Yangming’s core precept of the unity of a priori and a posteriori, of substance and function. His record of Yangming’s “four sentence teaching” differed from that in Wang Longxi’s “Record of the Demonstration of the Dao at Tianquan” [Tianquan zhengdao ji 天泉证道记] (see Collected Writings of Master Wang Longxi [Wang Longxi xiansheng wenji 王龙溪先生文集], Vol. 1), as well as from that recorded by Qian Dehong and preserved in Record of Transmission and Practice. His version ran as follows: “That which possesses the highest good with none of the bad is the mind, that which has both good and bad is intention, knowledge of good and

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bad is innate moral knowing, and to do good and remove the bad is to investigate things” (“Words of Encouragement at Qingyuan,” Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 2). “That which possesses the highest good with none of the bad is the mind” was in reference to the moral content possessed by the original substance of the mind, and not to its actual state or activity. In terms of the innate moral knowing of the substance of the mind, the mind is principle and inherent nature, is nothing but good at any moment, and never fails to flow into operation; in terms of the actual state of the mind, it possesses activity and stillness, such that when it is still, not a single thought arises, and it is all empty openness and quiet extinction. Zou Shouyi’s vigilance means maintaining constant watchfulness and alertness, eliminating the obstructions of selfish intention, and making the substance of inherent nature flow into operation. He believed that, where scholars of the time did not fall into the bias of relying on original substance alone and regarding vigilance as an obstacle to the spontaneous flowing substance of original substance, they fell into the bias of applying effort to arising and extinguishing intentions and thoughts alone, and being ignorant of the original substance of innate moral knowing. He said: The lecturing and learning of recent times has mostly been enthusiasm, has not applied its exertions to the practical effort of vigilance, and indeed has regarded the latter as a hindrance to the spontaneity of original substance. Hence its spirit has been abstract and hollow, completely lacking the aspect of returning to the root and establishing one’s mission. Amongst this, those who affirmed the use of the effort of vigilance stopped at inspecting affairs and actions and taking care of thoughts, never entering into the subtlety of the unseen and unheard. (“Letter to Yu Liuxi,” Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 6).

This is precisely the meaning of Wang Yangming’s warning that “[Qian] Dehong needs to recognise Ruzhong’s 汝中 [i.e. Wang Longxi’s] original substance, while Ruzhong needs to recognise Dehong’s effort; the two gentlemen can thus be of use to one another.” Zou Shouyi’s “Words of Encouragement at Qingyuan” expressed Yangming’s idea as, “If the two masters were combined together as one, they would not lose my transmission,” making his intention even more obvious. Yangming’s intention here was the root of Zou Shouyi’s opposition to the above two biased tendencies. Zou Shouyi also opposed any view that split quietude and affectivity in two or held that there was a state of absolute empty quietude prior to affectivity. He said: “If activity and stillness are two phases or substance and function are two realms, this clearly fractures the substance of the mind” (“Record of Chongxuan,” Collected Works of Zou Shouyi, 742). This was put forward in opposition to his fellow student Nie Bao, who believed that the substance of the mind was originally quiet and still, that it only moved into activity after being affected by things, that effort lay in returning to quietude, and that a condensed and unmoving substance of quietude was the root of the myriad transformations, such that one could affectively connect them by returning to quietude. Zou Shouyi believed that quietude and affectivity are not separate phases and that substance and function are not separate realms, so to

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seek quietude prior to affectivity or substance outside of function is to split things into fragments. He claimed that vigilance implies no division between quietude and affectivity, saying: To retract vision and restrain hearing is the lesson of vigilance; the virtue of Heaven and the dao of kings are simply this single vein. In the statement, “Eliminate the fragmentary functions of the ears and eyes, complete the inscrutable spirit of empty integration,” where is this spirit? It is unseen and unheard, with neither form nor sound, yet it is bright and numinous, embodying things with no remainder. Quietude and affectivity are not separate phases, and substance and function are not separate realms, they simply follow the constant procession of the four seasons and constant production of all things in appropriately manifesting the Heavenly mind, and thus spontaneously attain the reality of the non-polarity. (“Second Letter to Shuangjiang” [Zai jian Shuangjiang 再简双江], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 6).

Here, Zou Shouyi believed that the unseen and unheard is bright and numinous, the constant procession of the four seasons and constant production of all things is the reality of the non-polarity, the inscrutable spirit of empty integration is found within the fragmentary functions of the ears and eyes, and there is no absolutely empty and quiet substance outside of affective responses, so quietude and affectivity form a unity and substance and function are not dual. Thus, when Nie Bao believed that innate moral knowing was originally quiet and without any opposition between right and wrong or acceptable and unacceptable, and that it was qi that possessed such oppositions, Zou Shouyi questioned this, saying: “Does the aspect of refined clarity and true purity with nothing wrong or unacceptable belong to qi or not?” His meaning was that the refined clarity and true purity of metaphysical substance and the rights and wrongs of actual activities are connected as one with no duality, such that quietude and affectivity are both qi, and there was no period without qi. This was precisely the meaning of Yangming’s statements that “The human mind never rests for a moment” and “To say concerning substance that function lies in substance and concerning function that substance lies in function is to say that substance and function have a single source.” Ouyang De, another important representative of the Jiangyou group, also used this point to criticise Nie Bao. Zou Shouyi also opposed Ji Ben 季本 of the Wang students in Zhezhong for his precept of “disapproving of spontaneity and valuing watchful fear.” Ji Ben using the dragon as a metaphor for the meaning of change and transformation within watchful fear. Although Zou Shouyi and Ji Ben both advocated vigilance and being careful when alone, Zou Shouyi’s vigilance was a unity of vigilance and spontaneity, of respectful reverence and liberal dispersion. Although he advocated vigilance, he was not obsessed with vigilance; his vigilance mainly meant watchful awareness so as not to lose the original substance of the mind, rather than keeping within one’s breast a constant mentality of treading on thin ice over a deep abyss. He once wrote a letter to Ji Ben, saying: There is originally no difference between the precept of change and transformation in watchful fear and that of change and transformation in spontaneity. The absence of watchful fear is not enough to speak of spontaneity, and the absence of spontaneity is not enough to speak of watchful fear. Where there is watchful fear but not spontaneity, the error

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is fixation; where there is spontaneity but not watchful fear, the error is dissolution. Both dissolution and attachment have their appropriate and inappropriate degrees, and cannot be used to speak metaphorically about the meaning of change and transformation. (“Second Letter to Ji Pengshan” [Zai jian Ji Pengshan 再简季彭山], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

Zou Shouyi’s intention of fusing watchful fear and spontaneity into one and being neither fixated nor dissolute was also taken from Wang Yangming. Zou Shouyi also connected this intention to the dao of Heaven, believing that there is an aspect of dominion within the operations of Heaven, and this is vigilance, while the aspect of change and transformation having no fixed form is spontaneity. The dao of Heaven is thus a unity of vigilance and spontaneity. Ji Ben’s “fear of the dragon” that valued watchful fear and disapproved of spontaneity lost not only the meaning of the operations of Heaven proceeding reverently without cease, but also Yangming’s teaching of the unity of reverence and liberal dispersion. Ji Ben’s use of the dragon as a metaphor emphasised watchful fear and change and transformation, but neglected spontaneity and liberal dispersion. Although his intention was to prevent people slipping into dissolution, his own view slipped into fixation. When Zou Shouyi criticised various members of Wang’s academic lineage, his purpose was to protect the authenticity and completeness of Yangming’s doctrine. Yangming’s disciples such as Wang Ji 王畿, Qian Dehong, Nie Bao, and Ji Ben all partially developed one aspect of Yangming’s doctrine, regarding the aspect that they themselves emphasised as the core precept and quintessence of Yangming’s whole doctrine. However, since that which they learnt was broad or narrow and their temperaments were distant or near, none of them attained the entirety of Yangming, and thus all went against his doctrine in some respect. The core precept of Zou Shouyi’s learning was “vigilance,” and although this was only one aspect of Yangming’s doctrine, the fact that he grasped Yangming’s spirit of substance and function having one source, quietude and affectivity being as one, effort as not separate from original substance, respectful reverence not hindering liberal dispersion, and studying the lower as the means for penetrating the higher meant that, despite his core precept simply consisting of ideas such as vigilance, respect, and being careful when alone, which were commonly referred to by both Yangming and his fellow followers, it in fact encompassed the quintessence of Yangming’s lifetime of academic studies. He used vigilance to integrate Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing. He once said: Innate moral knowing is one, yet when it refers to substance, it is quiet and immobile, and when it refers to function, it is affected and thus interconnected with the all causes under Heaven. In reference to its quietude, it is called the centrality before arousal [see Centrality in the Ordinary], the spirit of that which one conserves [see Mencius, 7A.13], and the vastness of broad impartiality; in reference to its aspect of affective interconnection, it is called the harmony after arousal, the transformation of that which one passes by [see Mencius, 7A.13], and adaptively responding to things as they come. Substance and function are not two things. If scholars are able to be vigilant and fearful, to apply their exertions practically, and to not allow the obstructions of selfishness and the use of intelligence to harm it, then they will be constant in their quietude and affectivity, constant

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in their spirit and transformation, and constant in their broad impartiality and adaptive responding. If the clear mirror is lustrous, the myriad things will all be illuminated. That which has not yet responded is not prior, and that which has already responded is not posterior. Holding to stillness and reducing desires are both simply different names for the extension of innate moral knowing, so if one discusses the extension of innate moral knowing, there is no need to speak of holding to stillness, if one discusses holding to stillness, there is no need to speak of reducing desires, and if one discusses reducing desires, there is no need to speak of vigilance and fear. Although their names are different, their bloodline is the same, so that even without mutual borrowing or supplementation, their effort is already sufficient. This is what our former teacher meant when he said that whenever the ancients discussed learning or spoke of effort, then without any mixing or connecting together, they were spontaneously in accord in their comprehension. (“To Governor Huang Fuzhai” [Zhi Huang Fuzhai shijun 致黄复斋使君], Collected Writings of Master Dongkuo Zou, Vol. 5).

In Zou Shouyi’s view, Yangming’s core precept of the extension of innate moral knowing took innate moral knowing as original substance and the extension of innate moral knowing as effort. The original substance of innate moral knowing includes the two aspects of quietude and affectivity as substance and function, in which its substance is quietude, the centrality before arousal, and the vastness of broad impartiality, while its function is affectivity, the harmony of central regulation, and adaptively responding to things as they come. Its substance and function are originally like this. People’s selfish use of their intelligence occludes its substance and obstructs its function. The effort of cultivation lies in removing this occlusion and restoring its original substance and function. The entire content of the effort of cultivation is “vigilance and fear, and applying one’s exertions practically.” Vigilance is not only a psychological state, but also effort itself. This effort is Zhou Dunyi’s holding to stillness, Cheng-Zhu’s reducing of desires, and Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing. Although their names are different, the effort is one and the same. Zou Shouyi believed that his own “vigilance” included the whole meaning of Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, while at the same time also including the whole meaning of the Great Learning and Centrality in the Ordinary. Since its meaning is self-sufficient, there is no need to borrow other precepts to supplement it. As the great master of the Learning of the Mind, Wang Yangming’s mode of thought already particularly tended toward comprehensiveness, and many of the important concepts that he proposed could be explicated reciprocally. For example, the investigation of things was the extension of innate moral knowing, the extension of innate moral knowing was being careful when alone, being careful when alone was respect, etc., and there different names simply reflected their respective emphases on different aspects of his thought as a whole. At the same time, Yangming’s important concepts were all both substance and function, uniting substance and function as one, such that if one discusses any one of them, then the other is included within. Yangming’s recorded lectures also mainly criticised errors such as fragmentary separation and fixation on accomplished states. Provided one does not use the words to harm the meaning, they are naturally in accordance and interconnected. For example, Yangming also used the extension of innate moral

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knowing to connect together all the important categories of the Great Learning and Centrality in the Ordinary. When Zou Shouyi used vigilance to replace Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, this contained an intention to rectify bias and correct mistakes. Although his learning was nowhere near as broad and groundbreaking as that of Yangming, it can nonetheless be said not to have lost the spirit Yangming’s lifetime. Hence Luo Hongxian, another Jiangyou scholar, said he “was able to abide by his teacher’s transmission without doubting them, and expound his teacher’s doctrines without adulterating them.” Wang Gen 王艮, the founder of Taizhou 泰州 Learning, also said: “Formerly, Wencheng 文成 [i.e. Wang Yangming] declared that the gentleman approached Master Yan 颜子 [i.e. Confucius’ best student Yan Hui 颜回], and had far-reaching hopes for him” (Geng Dingxiang 耿定向, “Biography of Master Zou” [Zou xiansheng zhuan 邹先生传]). Likewise, Huang Zongxi said: “After Yangming passed away, the gentleman must be regarded as the foremost master among those who did not lose his transmission” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, “The Wang Lineage of Jiangyou, Case Study 1 [Jiangyou Wangmen xue’an yi 江右王门学案一]). All of these regarded Zou Shouyi as the official heir of Wang Learning. Zou Shouyi also expected that he himself would represent the orthodox learning of the Wang lineage, regarding identifying and rectifying his teacher’s precepts and correcting the biases of his fellow students as his own responsibility, and his diligence in maintaining Yangming’s doctrines was indeed painstaking.

3 Zou Shouyi’s Family Tradition of Learning Zou Shouyi passed on his learning to his son Zou Shan 邹善, who scrupulously followed his father’s doctrines, regarding vigilance, holding to respect, and restraining one’s self and mind in order to attain stillness as his core precepts. He said: When former Confucians said that learning finds its accomplishment in stillness, this was based on people’s tendency to gallop ahead in turmoil, and its intention was that they restrain themselves. If one probes this to its limits, then what it calls the unseen and unheard, the stillness in holding to stillness, is the truth of my mind, and it was originally not spoken of as relative to activity. This is what Master Zhou [Dunyi] called unity, and what Master Cheng [Yi] 程颐 called stabilising. When there is activity or stillness yet the mind is without activity or stillness, this is the true stillness. Hejing 和靖 [i.e. Yin Tun 尹焞, a student of Cheng Yi] said: “Does respect have a form and a shadow? Provided one restrains one’s self and mind, it holds to unity. For example, when people go to a shrine to pay their respect, their minds are restrained, and there is no longer the slightest trouble; if this is not holding to unity, what is it?” This best attained the approach of Lian-Luo 濂洛 [i.e. of Zhou Dunyi and the Cheng brothers]. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 346).

These both explained the doctrines of previous Confucians, and display no great originality.

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Since Zou Shan’s eldest son Zou Dehan 邹德涵 studied with Geng Dingxiang of the Taizhou School and also held discussions with Jiao Hong 焦竑 concerning learning, his learning was influenced by various figures from Taizhou, and differed from that of his grandfather and father. Zou Dehan spoke not of careful reverence, respectful caution, vigilance, and being careful when alone, but rather of enlightenment in stillness. For example, he said: If you simply sit in stillness and set aside all thoughts, just like the blue sky without a single spot of cloud obstructing it, then you will experience something of enlightenment. Do not be afraid of emptiness, since if you are able to attain through emptiness, you will spontaneously experience something of enlightenment. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 352).

However, what he realised in this enlightenment was not and absolutely empty quietude, since his emptiness was the condition for the real flowing out. He believed that the Buddhist emptiness was a deliberate attempt at emptiness, with all things and affairs being obstructions to emptiness, and thus one must constantly situate oneself in a site of emptiness and void; the Confucian emptiness however was an emptiness that contained the real. He said: Our Confucian emptiness is like the Supreme Void, with the sun, moon, wind, and thunder, the mountains, rivers, people, and things, everything with form, colour and appearance all flowing into operation within this Supreme Void, a constantly stable ruler amidst a myriad of changes and transformations, such that they cannot obstruct each other. This is both non-being and being, both the void and the real. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 352).

His equation of the void and the real was Wang Gen’s “without thought yet everything is interconnected.” The void is without thought, while the real is everything being interconnected, and he often raised Wang Gen’s ordering a servant boy to carry tea to explain his equation of the void and the real: calling the boy, he responded; ordering him to fetch some tea, he carried tea here, and after fetching it and coming here, he was again without any affairs as before. The boy had no mind to anticipate what would come, everything following spontaneously, and this is “without thought yet everything is interconnected.” From this it can be seen that Zou Dehan’s learning indeed had the school style of Taizhou. Hence Huang Zongxi said of Zou Shan and his son that, “When Yingquan 颖泉 (i.e. Zou Shan) discussed learning, he never departed from the teachings of Wenzhuang (i.e. Zou Shouyi), and entering into the marvellous and connecting with the obscure all became illusory obstructions. The gentleman (i.e. Zou Dehan) however regarded enlightenment as his entryway, and this represented another shift in his family tradition of learning” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, “The Wang Lineage of Jiangyou, Case Study 1. Zou Shan’s youngest son Zou Deyong 邹德泳 inherited his family tradition of learning, and abided by the precepts of his father and grandfather. Although his works were not numerous, and they cannot all be seen today, yet from them one can still perceive the tendency of his learning. Zou Deyong inherited Zou Shouyi’s precept of vigilance, saying:

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If amidst Heaven and Earth or ghosts and spirits, one meets with affairs and is careful and reverent, yet fears stepping onto misfortune and fortune or benefit and harm, then one’s experience will finally be scanty and shallow. The ancients both faced dangers and were guarded, like the abyss and the ice, and regardless of whether they were engaged in affairs or not, they were constant in their fear and dread, and originally acted as a ruler. Attainment in learning is found within self-restraint and guarded concentration. Even in a poor hut, if one’s will and conduct increase in their exertions, then one will increasingly perceive brilliance. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 357).

Zou Deyong also inherited Zou Shouyi’s sincere learning of substance and function having one source and the investigation of things lying in the extension of knowing. His explanation of “the investigation of things” (gewu 格物) integrated the Great Learning with the Mencius 孟子 and the Book of Changes 周易 as one. He said: I regard the learning of the sages as being entirely found in the extension of knowing; yet it is only after forms are produced and the spirit expressed that one possesses this knowing, and thus it simply belongs to things. Hence one must investigate things and then attain knowing and transformation. Hence the Great Learning text here added the words “lies in” (zai 在) to show that it is not the case that outside of the extension of knowing there is another effort of investigating things. When the Changes said “The knowing of Qian 乾 is the great beginning,” it went on by saying “the acting of Kun 坤 accomplishes things” [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)], since without things, knowing has nowhere to belong, and without knowing, things leave no traces. When Mencius said, “that which is passed by is transformed,” this spoke of the investigation of things; when he said, “that which is conserved becomes spirit” [see Mencius, 7A.13], this spoke of knowing being reached. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 358).

The knowing mentioned here followed the explanations of Cheng-Zhu, referring to the numinous clarity of the mind, and thus regarded the substance of knowing as an actual thing. The fact that the extension of knowing must lie in the investigation of things is just like how, in the Changes, “The knowing of Qian 乾 as the great beginning” must rely on “the acting of Kun 坤 accomplishing things,” and its perfection can then reach “that which is passed by transforming and that which is conserved becoming spirit.” Deyong’s explanation here was in fact the intention behind Wang Yangming’s statements “the extension of knowing lies in the investigation of things” and “If one eliminates responses to what is seen and heard, there is no innate moral knowing that can be extended.” His development lay in connecting “the extension of knowing lies in the investigation of things” with the Book of Changes and the Mencius. In formal terms, the investigation of things and the extension of knowing cannot be separated; in terms of their results, things being investigated and knowing being reached is “that which is passed by transforming and that which is conserved becoming spirit,” such that the end and the means are not separate, and that which effort reaches is original substance. Hence Huang Zongxi said that he “had a particular deep realisation of the investigation of things” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 336).

Chapter 10

Ouyang De’s Doctrine of the Unification of Activity and Stillness and of Substance and Function

Wang Yangming’s 王阳明 extension of innate moral knowing included many aspects of content, among which the relation between innate moral knowing and empirical knowledge as well as innate moral knowing’s activity and stillness or substance and function were repeatedly discussed by Wang Yangming himself, and had an important position in his thought as a whole. Ouyang De of the Jiangyou 江右 Wang lineage gave these aspects a comparatively thorough explication and development. Ouyang De 欧阳德 (1496–1554; zi 字 Chongyi 崇一, hao 号 Nanye 南野) was from Taihe 泰和 in Jiangxi province. While Wang Yangming was in Ganzhou 赣州 after capturing [Zhu] Chenhao 朱宸濠, Ouyang De came to request to become his student, and among his fellow disciples he was the youngest. In the second year of the Jiajing 嘉靖 period [1523], he became a metropolitan graduate with honors, and was sent to Lu’an 六安 as a subprefectural magistrate, before being transferred to the Directorate of Education 国子 in Nanjing as a director of studies. His position was then upgraded to minister in the Ministry of Rites 礼部 and an academician at the Hanlin 翰林 Academy. Upon his death, he was honored as a junior guardian of the heir apparent, and awarded the title Wenzhuang 文庄. His works include Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye (Ouyang Nanye xiansheng wenji 欧阳 南野先生文集) in thirty-nine volumes.1

1 The Relationship Between Innate Moral Knowing and Knowing Awareness Wang Yangming originally proposed his doctrine of innate moral knowing (zhi liangzhi 致良知) based on his doubts concerning Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 cultivation method. In Wang Yangming’s view, there was a rupture between Zhu Xi’s 1

[Trans.] References to Ouyang Nanye xiansheng wenji refer to a carved edition from the Jiajing 嘉靖 period of the Ming Dynasty. © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_10

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investigation of things and extension of knowing and his making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying the mind, since “cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect” and “progress in learning lies in the extension of knowing” were two parallel aspects, and were not constantly combined as one. The doctrine of innate moral knowing placed morality in a dominant position, with knowledge assisting and cooperating with it, such that the two were unifying as one and progressed together. For Wang Yangming, morality and knowledge were very clearly demarcated, yet also integrated as one. Ouyang De inherited this point from Yangming, and discussed both the distinction between innate moral knowing and knowing awareness (zhijue 知觉) of what is seen and heard, and also innate moral knowing’s inseparability from knowing awareness of what is seen and heard. He pointed out that, although innate moral knowing and knowing awareness are both called “knowing” (zhi 知), they are fundamentally different: Knowing awareness and innate moral knowing have the same name but a different reality. The knowing of vision, hearing, speech, and movement is all knowing awareness, and is not all necessarily good. Innate moral knowing is the knowing of compassion, shame, respect, and right and wrong, and is what is called the original goodness. (“Reply to Master Luo Zheng’an’s [i.e. Luo Qinshun 罗钦顺] Sending His Knowledge Painfully Acquired” [Da Luo Zheng’an xiansheng ji Kunzhi ji], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 1)

That is to say, knowing awareness is that which emerges from general psychological and physiological activities such as sight, hearing, speech, and movement, and is itself without any good or bad, while assessments of its content as good or bad come from innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is a knowing awareness that emerges from moral consciousness and moral feeling, like Mencius’ “four inklings” (siduan 四端), and is thus an original goodness. To call it original goodness is to say that it is endowed by Heaven, and is self-evident. Although innate moral knowing and knowing awareness each have their respective responsibilities, the former cannot be expressed separately from the activities that knowing awareness is responsible for, and is thus expressed through intellectual activities in general. He said: Original goodness regards knowing as substance, and holds that there can be no substance apart from knowing. This is the real of Heavenly inherent nature, the spontaneity of clear awareness that follows affects and interconnects with them, and thus itself possesses orderly principle. Innate moral knowing is the numinous clarity of Heavenly principle, and knowing awareness is insufficient to speak of it. ((“Reply to Master Luo Zheng’an’s Sending His Knowledge Painfully Acquired,” Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 1)

The “substance” (ti 体) spoken of here refers to a supporting body. Innate moral knowing must have a supporting body, and this is epistemological activity in general. In other words, the aspects of moral feeling, moral assessment, etc. contained in intellectual activity in general are the content of innate moral knowing, and there can be no activity of innate moral knowing apart from these. When people are stimulated by anything that has a kind of moral quality, innate moral knowing

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takes the intentional direction that deals with this thing according to the instinctive love of the good and dislike of the bad, and passes it on to general psychological activities, thereby expressing it through the latter. Innate moral knowing is the “numinous clarity of Heavenly principle” in people’s unified activity, and this is different from purely epistemological activities, hence he said, “knowing awareness is insufficient to speak of it.” On this basis, Ouyang De believed that innate moral knowing and knowledge of what is seen and heard have a relationship that is inseparable but not mixed. He said: Knowledge of what is seen and heard is a confused mixture of true and false, and to mistakenly take this for innate moral knowing and doubt that it is incomplete is to be ignorant of the original substance of our minds that is able without learning and knows without thinking, which cannot be confused by knowledge of what is seen and heard. Yet knowledge of what is seen and heard is nothing but marvellous function with no truth or falsity worth speaking of, since true and false, right and wrong, trivial and weighty, and thick and thin all contain such spontaneous knowing. (“Reply to Chen Panxi, 3” [Da Chen Panxi san 答陈盘溪三], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 1)

Innate moral knowing is inseparable from what is seen and heard, yet also unadulterated by what is seen and heard. Moral rationality differs from epistemological rationality, yet must be expressed through the activity of epistemological rationality. At the same time, Ouyang De saw the relationship between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard as one of substance and function (tiyong 体 用): innate moral knowing is substance, while what is seen and heard is function, and substance and function are inseparable yet unmixed, hence innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard are also inseparable yet unmixed. Ouyang De’s explanation of the inseparable yet unmixed relation between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard was derived from Wang Yangming. In the Jiajing 嘉靖 period, when Yangming spent five years living in Yue 越, Ouyang De once wrote a letter asking about the relation between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard, to which Yangming replied in considerable detail. Since this letter is closely related to the correct understanding of the precept of the extension of innate moral knowing, it was collected in Record of Transmission and Practice (Chuanxi lu 传习录) by Yangming’s student Nan Daji 南大吉. Part of the letter said: Innate moral knowing is not possessed by virtue of what is seen and heard, yet what is seen and heard is nothing but the functioning of innate moral knowing, hence innate moral knowing is not fixated by what is seen and heard, yet is also inseparable from what is seen and heard. ... If one concentrates one’s intentions and mind specifically on the affair of extending innate moral knowing, then all that one hears and sees is nothing but the effort of extending innate moral knowing. Hence, amidst one’s daily functions, although what one sees and hears along with one’s interactions constitute a complicated multitude, this is nothing but the expressive functioning and flowing operation of innate moral knowing, and if one eliminates what is seen and heard along with one’s interactions, there is also no innate moral knowing that can be extended, hence there is but one affair. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

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Here, innate moral knowing refers to a priori moral reason, while what is seen and heard refers to a posteriori experience. Innate moral knowing is a Heavenly endowment, and thus not dependent on a posteriori experience, yet is also inseparable from a posteriori experience; the relation between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard is thus one of non-identity yet inseparability. Ouyang De inherited this point from Yangming, and not only repeatedly expounded the inseparable yet unmixed relation between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard, but also emphasised Yangming’s point that the investigation of things is the extension of innate moral knowing, and that innate moral knowing must thus be extended in concrete affairs. He said: The words “investigation of things” were regarded by our former teacher as the concrete reality of the extension of knowing. Hence inherent nature has no substance, and takes knowing as its substance; knowing has no concrete reality, since things and affairs are its reality. Apart from things and affairs, there is no knowing to be extended, and also no effort of using them to extend it. ... In general, when one attains this, then dao 道 and instruments, the hidden and manifest, being and non-being, and root and branches are all in accord; when one does not attain it, then one is fixated by being and falls into emptiness, and this is sufficient to lead to error. (“Reply to Chen Mingshui, 2” [Da Chen Mingshui er 答陈明水 二], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 3)

He emphasised that metaphysical aspects such as inherent nature and innate moral knowing must be concretised in actual things and affairs, that dao is inseparable from its instruments (qi 器). Only if understands this principle, can one avoid the two biased tendencies of slipping into things and falling into emptiness. Although Ouyang De’s point concerning innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard was derived from Wang Yangming, its emphasis what somewhat different from that of Yangming. Yangming’s main intellectual method was synthesis, a fact that was due firstly to his opposition to Zhu Xi’s great habit of “analysing with too much refinement, discriminating in too much detail,” and secondly to his explanations differing depending on student he was talking to, and often emphasised synthesis and comprehensive views in order to prevent their becoming biased. In terms of the relation between innate moral knowing and experience, although Yangming and Ouyang De both accepted that they were inseparable yet unmixed, on this basis, Yangming emphasised their inseparability, while Ouyang De emphasised their unmixed quality. Yangming’s point was to explain that specific things and affairs are the site for the extension of innate moral knowing, that the expressive functioning and flowing operation of innate moral knowing must depend on specific things and affairs. Ouyang De’s point was to explain that moral rationality and epistemological rationality are two different forms of thought, each of which has its responsibility. Although they are expressed in the same things and affairs of experience, the two absolutely cannot be confused. Although Ouyang De also discussed the relationship between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard as one of substance and function, he mainly used their form, namely their relationship of being inseparable yet unmixed. When Yangming discussed the relationship of substance and function between innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard, he mainly used their content. For Yangming, innate moral knowing

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is substance, while that which one sees and hears along with one’s interactions are function, the latter is the expressive functioning and flowing operation of the former, and the extension of innate moral knowing means extending the goodness of the original substance of innate moral knowing into everything one sees and hears along with one’s interactions, to make them all attain its principle. The general activities of knowing awareness are the supporting body that innate moral knowing takes as its vehicle, and thus become the expression and function of the original substance of innate moral knowing. This was an inevitable result of Yangming’s elevation of a moral original substance. Ouyang De worried that Yangming’s students would directly rely on innate moral knowing and extinguish the supplementary function of epistemological rationality, and thus, on the basis of accepting that innate moral knowing and what is seen and heard are inseparable yet unmixed, he emphasised the difference between the two. This point indeed should not be overlooked.

2 The Unity of Activity and Stillness In terms of the activity (dong 动) and stillness (jing 静) of innate moral knowing, Ouyang De held that activity and stillness are united and stillness should be sought in activity, and rejected the ideas that there was stillness before activity or a state before arousal (weifa 未发) prior to the already aroused (yifa 已发). The activity and stillness or centrality and harmony of innate moral knowing was a question Wang Yangming discussed a great deal, and his students each had explanations of it. Ouyang De believed that activity and stillness are states of innate moral knowing taking effect, that there is no activity and stillness in the original substance of innate moral knowing, and that one cannot use the categories of activity and stillness to describe the original substance of innate moral knowing. Centrality and harmony are connected to activity and stillness, since centrality means following innate moral knowing when still, and harmony means following innate moral knowing when active, yet centrality and harmony themselves are not activity and stillness. He said: To be still and follow one’s innate moral knowing is called reaching centrality, but centrality is not stillness; to be active and follow one’s innate moral knowing is called reaching harmony, but harmony is not activity. The marvellous functioning of innate moral knowing has its constancy and the original substance never ceases. Since it never ceases, it is constantly active, and since it is constant, it is constantly still. Since it is constantly active and constantly still, it is active yet inactive, and still yet not still. (“Reply to Chen Panxi,” Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 1)

In terms of innate moral knowing’s responding to things, there is activity and stillness. To follow one’s innate moral knowing when still is called centrality, but centrality is not therefore stillness; to follow one’s innate moral knowing when active is called harmony, but harmony is not therefore activity. Centrality and harmony are concepts that express value, while activity and stillness are concepts

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that express temporal positions. Innate moral knowing is constantly affected and responds, and so is constantly active. Yet innate moral knowing’s responding to things has a certain specific regularity, one that is unchanging, and this is innate moral knowing’s stillness. Hence, at all times, innate moral knowing is constantly active yet constantly still. The effort of cultivation simply lies in removing selfish desire’s obstruction of innate moral knowing and making its activity and stillness both refined and clear with no obscurity, and then it is active yet inactive, still and yet not still. Corresponding to this, the human mind is also a unity of activity and stillness. Ouyang De described the activity and stillness of the mind, saying: The human mind’s productive intention, flowing operation, and change and transformation without fixed form are called intention. When it is suddenly diverse and confused, this is the activity of intention; when it is suddenly concentrated and unified, this is the stillness of intention. Stillness is not the absence of intention, and activity is not the beginning of its presence. Hence diversity and confusion or concentration and unity are correlated yet mutually differing, and this is called the changes [yi 易]. Quietude speaks of their substance not being moved by desire; affectivity and interconnection speaks of their function not being hindered by selfishness. Substance and function have one source, and there is no gap between the manifest and the subtle. It is not the case that there is quietude at one time and affectivity at another, nor that before there is affectivity, there was another time prior to arousal. Thus even if one’s various thoughts entirely vanish, careful reverence is preserved within, and this is fearful intention, and thus arousal; even if one’s worries and concerns lead one not to act, placid tranquility is unrestricted, and this is joyful intention, and thus arousal. “The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality” [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)] takes the arousal of happiness, anger, sadness and joy, and points out that they contain that which is before arousal. The feelings of the sages follow the myriad affairs and are thus without feeling, and this is constantly having intentions yet being constantly without intention. Since they constantly have intentions, their change and transformation have no fixed forms and their flowing operations never cease, hence they have no beginning; since they are constantly without intention, their flowing operations change and transform and never become delayed or fixated, hence they have no location. (“Reply to Wang Yuzhai, 2” [Da Wang Yuzhai er 答王堣斋二], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 4)

Since the productive intention of the human mind never ceases, so the activity of the mind never ceases. The arousal of the mind is intention, and intentions can be hidden or manifest, where manifest intentions are sometimes diverse and confused and sometimes concentrated and condensed, while hidden or latent intentions never cease for a moment. Hence he said, “Stillness is not the absence of intention, and activity is not the beginning of its presence.” The quietude and confusion of the mind is also like this, so even if thoughts are extinguished, intention still remains. For example, careful reverence is fearful intention, and placid tranquility is joyful intention. Such intention is not spoken of in terms of quietude and affectivity, but exists constantly. Sages model themselves on the regularity of Heaven, and hence “constantly have intentions yet are constantly without intention.” Their having refers to following the rise and fall in the flowing operation of the myriad things, while their not having refers to their not being fixed in any particular form or location. Sages are thus also a unity of activity and stillness. The unity of activity

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and stillness is the general law of the dao of Heaven, Earth and humanity. Hence one must seek stillness through activity, and seek the state before arousal in the already aroused. To speak of the quietude of affective interconnection is not to speak in terms of temporal position, but in terms of value, and refers to the different method of affective response when the human mind is without selfish desires. Ouyang De’s unity of activity and stillness, like that of quietude and affectivity, was derived from Wang Yangming. In terms of the question of the activity and stillness or centrality and harmony of innate moral knowing, Wang Yangming held that innate moral knowing itself transcends activity and stillness, which manage the distribution of desire for themselves. He said: The centrality before arousal is innate moral knowing, which forms an integrated whole with no priority and posterity or internal and external. Where affairs are present or absent, one can speak of activity and stillness, yet innate moral knowing is not divided into the presence or absence of affairs; Where there is quietude or affective interconnection, one can speak of activity and stillness, yet innate moral knowing is not divided into quietude or affective interconnection. Activity and stillness concern that which one meets with at certain times, yet the original substance of the mind remains firmly undivided into activity and stillness. Principle is without activity, and activity is acting on desire. If one follows principle, then despite a myriad changes in one’s interactions, one is never active, whereas if one follows desire, then even if one’s mind is withered and without a single thought, one is never still. Since there is stillness within activity, and activity within stillness, what is there to doubt? The state before arousal lies within the already aroused, yet the state before arousal has never existed separately within the already aroused; the already aroused lies within the state before arousal, yet the already aroused has never existed separately within the state before arousal. Thus it has never been without activity and stillness, yet cannot be divided into activity and stillness. (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Wang Yangming’s mode of thought here that discusses activity and stillness according to value represents a strong affirmation of the question of morality. This is consistent with his idea that “when active, think constantly of extending innate moral knowing, and when still, think constantly of extending innate moral knowing.” Ouyang De also emphasised this point, his purpose being to remind people to apply their efforts to innate moral knowing and not to become fixated on activity and stillness. In applying effort to innate moral knowing, there is no division between activity and stillness or studying the lower and penetrating the higher, and the extension of harmony is the means for the extension of centrality; in applying effort to activity and stillness, doing good and removing the bad only concerns thoughts, and has no effect on the original substance of innate moral knowing, hence one only sees it flickering back and forth, laboured and cumbersome. Although innate moral knowing is still on the surface, selfish intention lurks unmoved, and the same old faults will thus re-emerge. Furthermore, if one applies effort to activity and stillness, then there is one innate moral knowing when active and another when still, and one thus faces the problem of having divided innate moral knowing in two. Hence Ouyang De said: “In applying effort to innate moral knowing, activity and stillness are naturally united. If one applies effort to activity and stillness, then one perceives innate moral knowing as dual, and it cannot be unified” (“Replies to Questions” [Dawen 答问], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 1).

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Since Ouyang De advocated the unity of activity and stillness, seeking centrality in harmony, he criticised any kind of doctrine that severed this relationship, especially Nie Bao’s 聂豹 doctrine of “returning to quietude.” His conception of seeking stillness in activity and the state before arousal in the already aroused was proposed to counter Nie Bao’s view of seeking stillness before activity and the state before arousal prior to the already aroused. On this point, he was generally in accord with his fellow student Zou Shouyi 邹守益, although the perspective of his argument was different. He said: The hidden and the manifest, activity and stillness, are both interconnected with a single principle, and only appear different based on their names in language. Hence although centrality and harmony have two names, their reality is a single lone-knowing [duzhi 独知]. Hence affirming what is right and rejecting what is wrong is the rule of the affective responses of lone-knowing, that which leads to dao being realised in all under Heaven. Its knowledge is the so-called true stillness of hidden subtlety, the centrality before arousal, the great root of all under Heaven. In terms of the knowledge that affirms what is right and rejects what is wrong, it is of the utmost expense yet hidden, without the slightest bias or partiality, and hence is called the centrality before arousal; in terms of affirming what is right and rejecting what is wrong in knowledge, it is most subtle yet manifest, without the slightest perversity, and hence is called the harmony of central regulation. It is not that there is another substance of true stillness and hidden subtlety apart from the manifest appearance of activity and stillness, and it thus cannot be spoken of in terms of knowledge of right and wrong. (“To Shuangjiang” [Ji Shuangjiang 寄双江], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 4)

Activity and stillness or hiddenness and manifestation are different states of innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing has both substance and function, with its substance being the moral subject that knows right and wrong, and its function being actual epistemological activities. “Dao being realised in all under Heaven” refers to a posteriori activity of moral knowing and moral assessment, while “the great root of all under Heaven” refers to the a priori subject that carries out such activity. This a priori moral subject is true, still, hidden and subtle, is not biased or partial, and hence it is called centrality (zhong 中). The activity of affirming what is right and rejecting what is wrong that this a priori subject produces from its original substance when it is not occluded by material desires is externally transforming and manifest, without the slightest perversity, and hence is called harmony. The substance and function of centrality and harmony are not dual, and it is not the case that there is another so-called “stillness” apart from actual “activity.” Thus, Ouyang De said: Since there is no time when there is absolutely no knowing awareness, there is no time when it is not aroused. Since there is no time when it is not aroused, how could there be any so-called prior state before arousal? Yet the already aroused also cannot be called centrality, and thus centrality as the dao and its connection with the so-called state before arousal absolutely can be known. Yet how can its so-called centrality be sought in a state prior to that before arousal? (“To Shuangjiang,” Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 4)

That is to say, there is no moment without knowing awareness, no moment without arousal. There is no state before arousal prior to the already aroused. Hence seeking centrality must be done in the already aroused. Nie Bao believed that the empty

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numinosity of innate moral knowing was its substance, and knowing awareness its function, hence one must first restore the a priori substance of empty numinosity, and this is “returning to quietude,” as well as “extending centrality”; since quietude has the effect of affectivity, and centrality has the effect of harmony, returning to quietude can spontaneously interconnect with affectivity, and reaching centrality can spontaneously reach harmony. Ouyang De believed that the state before arousal must be expressed as the already aroused, innate moral knowing must be expressed as affirming what is right and rejecting what is wrong in relation to specific things and affairs, and the extension of innate moral knowing must be expressed as the investigation of things. If one splits apart the state before arousal and the already aroused, the extension of knowing and the investigation of things, then one falls into one of two biased tendencies: a vulgar learning of the investigation of things that lacks the guidance of innate moral knowing and thus slips into utilitarian practice, or a vulgar learning of the extension of knowing that lacks the concrete effort of investigating things and thus slips into the empty void of Chan 禅 Buddhist learning. He repeatedly emphasised that the relation between centrality and harmony is not one of precondition and result, since they are one and the same, and mutually implicated. Effort does not solely lie in centrality, nor in harmony, since reaching harmony is the means to reach centrality, reaching centrality is the means to reach harmony, and they are interconnected as one and not dual. Ouyang De’s criticism of Nie Bao grasped the fact that he had deviated from Yangming’s advocated principle of the non-duality of activity and stillness, centrality and harmony, the extension of knowing and the investigation of things, and substance and function, thereby making the mistake of seeking stillness prior to activity and centrality outside of harmony. It thus expressed a steadfast position of defending his master’s school.

3 Elaboration of the Unity of Substance and Function The basic quality of Wang Yangming’s philosophy is synthesis, and he saw many mutually opposed concepts from Song Confucians as unified. Liu Zongzhou 刘宗 周 once noted this point, saying that the spirit of Yangming’s life was “both knowledge and action, both mind and things, both activity and stillness, both substance and function, both effort and original substance, both lower and higher, all forming a unity” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], “On the Masters” [Shishuo 师说]). Wang Yangming applied this conception of “all forming a unity” precisely to remedy contemporary scholars’ errors of fragmentation, hastiness, and working on the branches but neglecting the root. Yangming’s view of all forming a unity was an expression of his high level of ability at theoretical synthesis. Ouyang De took up this point, and underlined it by elaborating the mutual implication of substance and function as a non-duality. His arguments concerning the relation between innate moral knowing and general empirical knowledge, and between activity and stillness together with centrality and

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harmony, all tightly grasped this central principle. In his thought, all the qualities of innate moral knowing embody such a unity of substance and function. For example, at the level of innate moral knowing itself, inherent nature is substance, and awareness is function; at the level of the metaphysical and actual, inherent nature is substance, and the flowing operation of the good is function; at the level of the original substance and function of “awareness,” awareness is substance, and illumination is function; in terms of the relation between innate moral knowing and general empirical knowledge, innate moral knowing is substance, and sight, hearing, speech and movement are function; in terms of “the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations” (liyi fenshu 理一分殊), the unity of principle is substance, and the diversity of its particularisations is function; the mind of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body is substance, and the ordered principles of close and distant, internal and external are function. These all express the unity of substance and function. Under the contemplation of the unity of substance and function, Ouyang De gave a unique elaboration of the doctrine of Heaven and humanity having a single root (tianren yiben 天人一本) as found in Wang Learning and indeed the whole of Song Confucianism. Heaven and humanity having a single root is the basis for the whole of Confucian theory. Mencius’ “exhausting one’s mind, knowing inherent nature and knowing Heaven” [see Mencius 孟子, 7A.1] and “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature” from Centrality in the Ordinary are prominent expressions of this. Heaven and humanity having a single root means that Heaven and humanity both receive guidance from the same single principle, that the principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and the principle of humanity are fundamentally one, and that the nature and standard for activities of human beings are a part of the dao of Heaven. Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism in general and the Learning of the Mind in particular especially highlighted this aspect, regarding the mind as a concentrated expression of Heaven and dao. For example, Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 famously proposed that “The cosmos is my mind, and my mind is the cosmos,” and Wang Yangming that “Only the mind is Heaven” and “innate moral knowing is Heaven.” Ouyang De used his own unique form to elaborate on this fundamental idea of the Learning of the Mind, that people attain from Heaven yet also command Heaven. He said: Dao fills the space between Heaven and Earth, and this is “the spirit that yin and yang cannot penetrate” [see Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)]. This spirit condenses and develops forms, being aroused and becoming conscious knowing, and when this knowing is stimulated and activated, the myriad things emerge. The myriad things emerge from knowing, and hence they were said to be “complete within me” [see Mencius, 7A.4]; knowing is also that from which the myriad affairs take their rightness, hence it was said that “there were things and standards” [see Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经), “Zheng Min” 烝民]. Knowing is thus an action of spirit. Spirit has no fixed form or substance, and in humanity it is sight and hearing, speech and movement, and happiness, anger, sadness and joy, while in Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, it is the lofty peaks of flourishing growth, i.e. the sight, hearing, speech and movement, and happiness, anger, sadness and joy of humanity. Hence the happiness, anger, sadness and joy, and sight and hearing, speech and movement of humanity thoroughly

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penetrate the circumfluence of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, working when they work and resting when they rest, with no gap between one another, all because spirit has no fixed form or substance. Outside of sight, hearing, happiness and anger, what else is there? Hence when the ancients spoke of sight, hearing, happiness and anger, their words were based on their perception that spirit interconnects with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. When later people spoke of sight, hearing, happiness and anger, their words were based on their perception that forms correspond to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Where there is interconnection, there is unity, and where there is correspondence, there is duality; this must be examined. (“Reply to Xiang Oudong” [Da Xiang Oudong 项瓯东], Collected Writings of Master Ouyang Nanye, Vol. 3)

This passage expresses Ouyang De’s fundamental explication of the relationship between humanity and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. First, he believed that people were produced by dao, and that people’s physical form and spirit were both attained from dao. Dao is a summation of all things and their activities. People are the most numinous of the myriad things, and represent the highest development of spiritual activity. Specific things are a result of people’s spiritual moulding and regulating. When Mencius said, “The myriad things are all complete within me,” he expressed this meaning. The regularity of the cosmos that people represent is also the highest standard for the correctness or incorrectness of things and affairs. All people’s activities are governed by spirit, and this spirit is one and the same as the spirit of the cosmos. The function of the spirit of the cosmos is to produce, grow and develop the myriad things and make each reach its utmost limit, while the function of the human spirit is to govern all of people’s activities. The two are applications of one and the same dao at different levels, and thus, from an epistemological perspective, it can also be said that, since human beings as epistemological subjects give objects their natures, so the nature of objects as recognised by human beings is in fact the nature of human beings themselves. His statement “Spirit has no fixed form or substance” means that the movement of the spirit of the cosmos has no fixed spatiotemporal position to speak of, but rather surrounds and interpenetrates all times and locations. People’s cultivation lies in realising and experiencing this unity between people and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, realising and experiencing the consistency of dao as expressed in people and things. To regard people and things as two radically separate and even mutually opposed entities is to completely lack the power of understanding. Ouyang De’s view here regarded subjective spirit as that from which objects emerge, and was consistent with Wang Yangming’s fundamental view that “There is no principle outside the mind, and no affairs outside the mind,” although the perspective of his argument differed. Yangming argued from the aspect of all the subject’s activities being inseparable from the domination and governance of spirit, and of moral rationality being the fundamental source of all moral activity, while Ouyang De argued from the perspective of the activities of subjects and objects all being different expressions of the operation of dao, and of subjects being that which moulds and regulates objects, giving them their meanings. Yangming mainly argued from a moral standpoint, while Ouyang De expanded this to ontology. From this, the emphasis of Ouyang De’s elaboration of his master’s doctrines can be seen.

Chapter 11

Nie Bao’s Learning of Returning to Quietude

After Wang Yangming 王阳明 taught his students using the learning of innate moral knowing, his disciples’ discussions of the topic never stopped. In terms of the content and quality of innate moral knowing, as well as the method of its extension, Wang Yangming proposed arguments covering many aspects, and his students each gave these different development based on what they had heard. Among these, there were two main directions: one thought that innate moral knowing was naturally self-sufficient, and it was only necessary to follow its flowing movement, while the other thought that the effort of the extension of innate moral knowing was only applied in the a posteriori work of doing good and removing the bad, and that there was no effort other than this. These two views both thought that innate moral knowing itself did not require effort, and Nie Bao’s learning of “returning to quietude” was aimed at rectifying this kind of bias. Nie Bao 聂豹 (1487–1563; zi 字 Wenwei 文蔚, hao 号 Shuangjiang 双江) was from Yongfeng 永丰 in Jiangxi. He became a metropolitan graduate in the twelfth year of the Zhengde 正德 period [1517], and was appointed as a district magistrate in Huating 华亭, where he revived the school, repaired the irrigation works, reduced the tax burden, and reformed accumulated abuses, gaining a reputation for governance. He was summoned to be a censor, and spoke frankly, daring to admonish his superiors. He took up a position as a prefect in Pingyang 平阳 in Shanxi province, where he repaired passes and trained troops, effectively resisting bandits, and was then promoted to vice commissioner in the Provincial Surveillance Commission 按察司 for Shaanxi province, yet was disliked by Xia Yan 夏言, a prominent minister of the time, and an affair caused him to be sentenced to jail, from which he only emerged some years later. He subsequently rose to the position of a minister in the Ministry of War 兵部, yet when a memorial he submitted offended the grand councilor Yan Song 严嵩, he resigned his post and returned home. Upon his death he was honored as a junior guardian of the heir apparent, and

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awarded the title Zhenxiang 贞襄. His works include Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie (Shuangjiang Nie xiansheng wenji 双江聂先生文集) in fourteen volumes.1

1 The Opposition Between Quietude and Affectivity For Nie Bao, the core precept of learning was “returning to quietude” (guiji 归寂). Quietude here referred to a spiritual plane or original substance, and not merely to a temporary quiet and still state of the mind. Returning to quietude means the mind that flickers back and forth with thoughts in turmoil returning back to its original state of limpid transparency and emptiness without a single thing, a state that also illuminates all things. Only by returning to quietude can one interconnect affectively (tonggan 通感), and only with the effort of returning to quietude can one better illuminate, observe and respond to external things. Returning to quietude first of all requires that one affirm the originally quiet state of the substance of the mind, as Nie Bao said: “To say that the mind has no fixed substance misses the substance of the mind by a long way. Shining in the centre, quiet and inactive yet grounding the myriad transformations, this is its fixed substance” (“To Ouyang Nanye” [Yu Ouyang Nanye 与欧阳南野], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8). Among Yangming’s students, some inherited his idea that “The mind has no substance, but takes the rights and wrongs of the affective responses of the myriad things as substance,” believing that the mind has no fixed substance but is constantly aroused and affected, and that the content of this affectivity and its responses are the substance of the mind. That which affects and is responded to never ceases, while the mind that is affected and responds has no fixed substance. Nie Bao believed that the substance of the mind is originally quiet and still, containing nothing, while affective response is the effect produced by this quiet substance, so one cannot confuse this effect with the substance of the mind and thereby erase and forget the still substance that produces this effect. He said: Innate moral knowing is originally quiet, yet it is affected by things and then becomes known, so knowing is its arousal. One cannot then regard this knowing arousal as innate moral knowing, and forget where this arousal comes from. The mind abides internally, yet responds to the external and then becomes external, so the external is its shadow. One cannot regard its external responses as the mind, and thereby seek the mind externally. Hence when students seek the dao 道, they should seek it beginning from the quietude of its internal abiding, making it still and constantly settled. (“To Ouyang Nanye,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

Innate moral knowing here is the substance of the mind, and not merely the subject of moral judgment that knows right from wrong. The effort of cultivation lies in 1

[Trans.] References to Shuangjiang Nie xiansheng wenji refer to a carved edition from the Longqing 隆庆 period of the Ming Dynasty.

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making the mind return to its substance of original quietude. Nie Bao believed that applying effort to quiet substance was what Song Confucians called the learning of “cultivating the original source through self-discipline.” To do good and remove the bad at the level of the mind’s affective responses to changes and transformations and be ignorant of restoring the substance of original quietude is to merely embellish superficial signs, and is not only wearisome in terms of effort, but can also easily develop into a bad opportunistic and perfunctory habit, while returning to quietude solves all such issues in one fell swoop. He said: The site of the original source cannot be sought outside of the unseen and unheard substance of quietude. If the unseen and unheard substance of quietude is obtained as a result of affective responses to changes and transformations, then reaching it through affective responses to changes and transformations is acceptable. In reality, it is that by which affective responses to changes and transformations are dominated, while affective responses to changes and transformations themselves are but superficial signs of our substance of quietude. One can seek amidst these endlessly, yet if one is unable to unify their endlessness and purify their unity, then one’s substance of quietude is but their flickering shadow! If the substance of quietude does not overcome their flickering, then anger will still remain and desire still flow, and if on a good day one can extinguish them, they will simply reemerge a few days later. Even if one punishes them and obstructs them, shifting them and correcting them, one has already failed to avoid incidental acts of righteousness being obtained externally [see Mencius 孟子, 2A.2], and thus it is doubtful whether this has any connection to the effort of cultivating the original source through self-discipline. (“To Ouyang Nanye,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

Here he argued that the substance of quietude is the original source of affective responses, and thus, although doing good and removing the bad in relation to a posteriori thoughts is certainly not wrong, it is simply a means and not an end, with the end being returning to the substance of original quietude. Since the substance of the mind is quietude, by purifying its unity, thoughts that flicker back and forth can be broken down with a single glance, and passions and opinions can be extinguished as soon as one illuminates them. To apply one’s efforts only in relation to thoughts and forget to return to the substance of quietude is thus to cast aside the root and chase the branches. The result of this is that one goes against the “purifying one’s mind and retiring to hide amidst its secrets” spoken of in the [Book of] Changes (Zhouyi 周易) [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)], and thus, even if all thoughts of innate moral knowing are refined and clear, and are grasped at the site of their aroused functioning, this remains a level apart from the centrality before arousal, the substance of purity and the highest good. Nie Bao believed that the precept of returning to quietude encompassed effort and original substance, and could thus include all the content of Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing.” Since the substance of quietude is innate moral knowing, returning to quietude is the extension of innate moral knowing, and can thus spontaneously interconnect with affectivity. Interconnecting with affectivity is what Wang Yangming called the investigation of things. He said:

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Knowing is the substance of the mind, an empty numinosity that is unblemished, and is thus illuminated virtue. To extend means to be filled with this original substance of empty numinosity, and to extend knowing is to extend centrality. That which is quiet and inactive is that which is prior to Heaven yet Heaven does not oppose. The investigation of things is the effort and functioning of the extension of knowing, things each being entrusted to things, being affected and thereby interconnecting with the causes of all under Heaven, being without thought or consideration, that which is posterior to Heaven yet reverently upholds the times of Heaven. (“Reply to Kang Ziyi” [Da Kang Ziyi 答亢子益], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

Although Nie Bao himself believed that his central tenet of returning to quietude was the same as Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, the two were in reality very different. For Nie Bao, the substance of the mind is originally quiet, and, although the originally quiet substance of the mind latently possesses the ability of knowing, it is itself limpidly quiet and still, and its original substance is “non-being.” For Wang Yangming however, the substance of the mind is innate moral knowing, which is a synthesis of moral will, moral feeling, and the ability of moral judgment, and is constantly revealed in the substance of the mind, hence its original substance is “being.” Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing meant extending that which innate moral knowing judges to be good into all affairs and actions, placing the acting subject that carries out these affairs under the command of moral will. For Nie Bao however, the substance of the mind is originally still and empty, an empty numinosity that is unblemished. When he spoke of knowing, his emphasis was on “illumination,” namely the state of the substance of the mind as empty quietude that illuminates all things. Hence Nie Bao’s substance of quietude, knowing, etc. differed from Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing. Nie Bao repeatedly stated that his returning to quietude was aimed at interconnecting affectively, so that although the substance of the mind is originally quiet, affectivity is its function, and quietude and affectivity have a relation of substance and function, rather than being two functions produced by the substance of the mind, hence “quietude and affectivity do not exist at two separate times.” Thus he opposed both severing the relation between quietude and affectivity, and also mixing the two together and not differentiating between them. He advocated holding to the substance in order to apply its function and returning to quietude in order to interconnect affectively, saying: That which is constantly quiet and yet constantly affective is the substance of the mind. Being affected only at its time and governing this with quietude is the effort of learning. Hence to say that quietude and affectivity occur at two different times is wrong; how then could it be right to say that effort makes no distinction between quietude and affectivity, and be ignorant of returning to quietude in order to manage affects? (“Reply to Dongkuo” [Da Dongkuo 答东廓], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

For Nie Bao, the substance of quietude is metaphysical, and transcends the occurrence and ceasing of specific thoughts, while affectivity is actual, and occurs and ceases. One is “affected only at its time,” yet “governs this with quietude.”

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Because of this, he made a very clear distinction between the “quietude” of the substance of quietude and the “quietude” of the state when affective responses cease. He said: The two words “emptiness” and “quietude” were specifically highlighted by the Master in the Xian 咸 hexagram [see the Book of Changes, Hexagram 31], which speaks of establishing the substance of affective response, and not of quietude and affectivity as relative. Quietude is inherent nature; affectivity is feeling. If one says that inherent nature originally has no returning, then affectivity is equated with inherent nature, and in terms of true inherent nature, I am afraid one’s words are mistaken. (“Reply to Huang Luocun” [Da Huang Luocun 答黄洛村], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 9)

For him, this kind of distinction was very important, since the substance of quietude is inherent nature, while specific instances of quietude are feelings. Quietude is original substance, and transcends specific instances of activity and stillness or quietude and affectivity. Inherent nature and feeling, metaphysical and actual, are distinguished very clearly. Nie Bao also believed that returning to quietude in order to interconnect affectively was the source of the difference between Confucianism and Chan 禅 Buddhism. At the time, some people believed that Nie Bao’s learning of returning to quietude was Chan, because the core precept of Chan was returning to quietude. Nie Bao argued strongly for the difference between his own learning and Chan, saying: “The difference between Chan and Confucianism is that the former regards affective response as a dirty irritant, and cuts off it all in order to extinguish it. Here we return to quietude in order to interconnect with the affections of all under Heaven, extend emptiness in order to establish the beings of all under Heaven, and hold to stillness in order to fulfil the activity of all under Heaven, so how can one suspect this to be Chan?” (“Reply to Dongkuo,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8). In Nie Bao’s view, in terms of their approach to original substance of the mind, the learning of returning to quietude and Chan learning have certain points in common, and there is no need to avoid speaking of these. However, Chan regards emptiness and extinction as its end, wishes to eliminate all affective responses and constantly maintain the empty and quiet state of the mind, and does not allow any external sensation or representation to be held in the mind, since otherwise the empty and quiet state of the mind will become blocked. Hence it necessarily “regards affective response as a dirty irritant, and cuts off it all in order to extinguish it.” Confucianism on the other hand regards quietude and affectivity as one, substance and function as a non-duality. Returning to quietude is aimed at interconnecting affectively, extending emptiness is aimed at establishing beings, and holding to stillness is aimed and accomplishing activity. Confucians do not regard returning to quietude as an end, but rather as a means. Wang Yangming also once argued strongly that his learning was not Chan. However, he believed that the greatest difference between his learning and Chan was his acknowledgement of the cardinal guides and constant virtues of ethics. Chan regards the functioning of knowing awareness as inherent nature, and when it speaks of the flowing operation of the substance of inherent nature and the reality of all its sites of establishment,

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these never depart from emptiness. In his own learning of innate moral knowing however, innate moral knowing is inherent nature, and is Heavenly principle; the flowing operation of the substance of inherent nature contains differences of trivial or weighty and profound or shallow concerning all ethical affairs, and this is “the spontaneous orderly principle in innate moral knowing.” Nie Bao criticised Chan because it had quietude but not affectivity. Wang Yangming spoke in terms of a difference in original substance (i.e. between emptiness and principle), while Nie Bao spoke in terms of a difference in function (i.e. between the presence or absence of affectivity). From this, it can be seen that, in Wang Yangming’s view of the original substance of innate moral knowing, he included a great deal more ethical content than Nie Bao. For Yangming, innate moral knowing was mainly an ethical category, and its epistemological aspect was secondary. For Nie Bao however, innate moral knowing had almost the same meaning as the mind in general, with its epistemological meaning being primary and its ethical meaning secondary. Although when he spoke of affectivity and the investigation of things, these had a significant amount of ethical meaning, when he spoke of the substance of quietude, it mainly referred to the mind in a general sense, including the three aspects of knowing, feeling and intention, but mainly referring to the mind in an epistemological sense. Hence, he saw the original substance of the mind or innate moral knowing as “quietude.” Nie Bao believed that his learning of returning to quietude was not his own fabrication, but was derived from Wang Yangming. Yangming once said: “Innate moral knowing is the centrality before arousal, the original substance that is broad in its great impartiality, quiet in its inactivity, and possessed equally by all people” (“Reply to Lu Yuanjing” [Da Lu Yuanjing 答陆元静], Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II). However, Yangming’s “original substance that is quiet in its inactivity” and Nie Bao’s substance of quietude had two major differences. First, Yangming’s substance of quietude was actual, and it was the substance on inherent nature that was metaphysical. That is to say, Yangming’s quietude referred to the quiet stillness of the mind, a ceasing and extinguishing of actual experience. Nie Bao’s substance of quietude however was metaphysical, the original state of the mind, an absolutely empty and quiet state possessed before the original substance of the mind has come into contact with an outside, and such a state does not possess the goodness of innate moral knowing. Second, Yangming’s actual quietude was aimed at enabling the flowing operation of the metaphysical substance of inherent nature. Yangming’s innate moral knowing was a unity of the two aspects of inherent nature and awareness, and he often said that the human mind was the profundity of Heaven, so once one removes bad thoughts, there will be good thoughts; once one removes actual thoughts, the metaphysics substance of inherent nature will spontaneously flow into operation. Nie Bao’s returning to quietude however was aimed at interconnecting affectively: only by preventing the substance of quietude from the interference of confused thoughts, can one attain the result of “things each being entrusted to things.” Yangming was mainly ethical,

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while was mainly epistemological. This last point is of extreme importance, since this was precisely the most important reason why Yangming’s other students thought that Nie Bao went against his master’s doctrines and therefore gathered round to attack him.

2 Debates with Various Followers of Wang Yangming After Nie Bao’s learning of returning to quietude emerged, it not only met with disagreement from Wang’s followers in Zhezhong 浙中, from whose academic tendencies it manifestly diverged, but was also questioned and doubted by figures from the same Jiangyou 江右 group such as Zou Shouyi 邹守益, Ouyang De 欧阳 德 and Chen Jiuchuan 陈九川, who exchanged letters with him to debate it. These accusations toward Nie Bao focused on one point, namely that they believed he had severed activity from stillness and quietude from affectivity, and sought quietude prior to affectivity. In a letter in reply to Zou Shouyi, Nie Bao summarised these criticisms into three points: Scholars that question me generally fall into three groups: one says that the dao cannot be departed from for a moment [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)], and that to now say that there is no effort in activity is to depart from it; one says that dao contains no division between activity and stillness, and that to now say effort lies only in holding to stillness is to divide it in two; and one says that the mind and affairs are united, with benevolence embodying affairs and being omnipresent, and that to now say that the flowing operation of affective response calls for no exertion is to detach oneself from action in affairs, and is thus similar to the enlightenment of Chan. (“Reply to Dongkuo,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

Since the core precepts of the various figures differed, their criticisms of this aspect also set out from different standpoints. Wang Longxi 王龙溪 once wrote a letter to Nie Bao in which he discussed the relationship between the investigation of things and the extension of knowing: If one thoroughly understands the precept of the state before arousal, one takes it as the root of the flowing operation of aroused function; to say that innate moral knowing can spontaneously know and be aware, yet not to take knowing awareness as innate moral knowing, can lead people to experience the site before arousal. The treasury of the true method of the master’s school was revealed in a single sentence of the older gentleman, who immediately grasped its beginning and did not make the mistake of dividing explications of dao and principle, and thereby made a great contribution to the master’s school. My meaning is that innate moral knowing is not divided into the state before arousal and the already aroused, and is what is called the single integrated substance that is without prior or posterior and internal or external. When it was said that “the extension of knowing lies in the investigation of things” [see Great Learning (Daxue 大学)], the investigation of things was precisely regarded as the site for the concrete exertion of the extension of knowing, and cannot be divided into internal and external. If one says that effort is only the extension of knowing, and that the investigation of things has no effort, the error one slips into goes so far as cutting off things, which is the learning of immortals [i.e. Daoism] and Buddhas; if one only knows that the

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extension of knowing lies in the investigation of things, and not that the investigation of things is precisely the extension of the knowing of the state before arousal, the error one slips into goes so far as chasing after things, which is the learning of fragmentation. (“Reply to Nie Shuangjiang” [Da Nie Shuangjiang 答聂双江], Collected Writings of Master Wang Longxi [Wang Longxi xiansheng wenji 王龙溪先生文集], Vol. 9)

Wang Longxi’s learning and that of Nie Bao had both similarities and differences. Their similarity lay in regarding the state before arousal as the root of the already aroused, taking “experience of the site before arousal” to be the treasury of the true method of their master’s school, and not establishing their standpoint on the basis on the a posteriori explication of dao and principle. Their difference lay in the fact that what Wang Longxi referred to as innate moral knowing was the “illumination and numinous awareness of Heavenly principle” repeatedly emphasised by Wang Yangming; his effort of returning to stillness lay in setting aside the myriad dependent causes and relying on the flowing operation of the goodness that is possessed originally and a priori. What Nie Bao referred to as innate moral knowing was the substance of quietude that is possessed originally and a priori, with the effort of returning to quietude lying in attaining this substance of quietude so as to better “interconnect affectively.” Wang Longxi emphasised that, in innate moral knowing, the already aroused and the state before arousal are integrate as one substance, while Nie Bao emphasised that one must first possess the state before arousal in order to then be better able to dominate and govern the already aroused. Although Wang Longxi and Nie Bao both emphasised that the extension of knowing is the investigation of things, Wang Longxi used the attainment of the flowing operation of the a priori substance of the mind, the goodness of original nature, to hold back and extinguish the bad produced at the level of thoughts, while Nie Bao’s investigation of things was a function of the substance of quietude, and “things each being entrusted to things.” For Wang Longxi, the effort of the extension of knowing and that of the investigation of things were one, while for Nie Bao they were divided into two. Hence Wang Longxi thought that he himself was rooted in the Yangming’s orthodox learning of the extension of knowing and the investigation of things as one, knowledge and action as one, quietude and affectivity as one, and substance and function as one, while Nie Bao separated quietude from affectivity and substance from function, and was thereby tricked into side tracks and minor pathways. Nie Bao and Qian Dehong’s divergence lay in applying effort to the a priori or to the a posteriori. Nie Bao’s criticism of Qian Dehong’s learning of making intentions sincere a posteriori was much more vehement than his criticism of Wang Longxi, since, although his and Wang Longxi’s understandings of the original substance of innate moral knowing were different, they both had a tendency toward working directly on a priori original substance. In his eyes, pointing directly to the substance of the mind was a manifest quality of Wang Learning, and although Qian Dehong’s learning had the name of honest sincerity, it was in fact suspiciously similar to Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 investigation of things and extension of knowing. He criticised Qian Dehong saying:

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The extension of knowing speaks of fully charging the knowing of our substance of empty numinosity, and not being deluding oneself with the slightest intention or desire, and this is called the delineation of the a priori, the centrality before arousal, which not the slightest human exertion can participate in. Since there is not the slightest participation of human exertion, this is intention yet without intention. If now one does not cultivate this root of goodness, but rather seeks the love of beautiful appearances, or if one does not extirpate the root of badness, but rather seeks the disliking of bad odours, this can be called being human by perfunctorily following the external. How can this be called sincerity? Intentions appear following affects, responding to their changes and shifts with a myriad of arisings and extinctions, their extremities becoming endless. If one wishes to restrain these one by one, using human exertion to remove their deception and return to contentment, this is to make scholars beginning their learning never again perceive the spiritual plane of calm stillness and peaceful consideration, but rather toil without achievement, merely tiring themselves out by attempting to accelerate their transformation. (“Reply to Xushan” [Da Xushan 答绪 山], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 9)

Nie Bao’s meaning here was very clear: the result of effort in learning should be a remoulding of the human mind’s entire moral and epistemological rationality itself, producing an effect at a fundamental level, and not at the level of the thoughts produced by the substance of the mind. Making one’s intentions sincere means making the substance of the mind sincere, and not making the thoughts produced by the substance of the mind sincere. If the substance of the mind is sincere, then in terms of the good and bad thoughts produced, there will be a spontaneous response like that of loving a beautiful appearance or disliking a bad odour. If one only applies effort at the level of thoughts, then thoughts will flicker in their sudden arising and extinction and one cannot expect to situate them all appropriately, while the efforts at judgment and selection of the subject will be excessively complicated and laborious. At the same time, this approach to effort can easily develop into the fault of seeking externally through embellishment and concealment or “obtaining through incidental acts of righteousness.” Hence he once said: “After Zisi 子思, there was nobody who recognised the word ‘centrality’ (zhong 中), and people followed affairs and times in seeking the appropriate, calling this finding the centre and holding to it; how far off they were!” (“Reply to Ying Rong’an” [Da Ying Rong’an 答应容庵], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 9). Thus he also opposed the fault of recognising “centrality” at the level of affairs and times rather than of the mind. Nie Bao’s criticism of Qian Dehong’s learning of “making intentions sincere a posteriori” expresses one of his very clear tendencies: his love of things that are originally possessed at a metaphysical level. Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 once wrote that Nie Bao’s learning of returning to quietude was derived from his own experience: “As for the gentleman’s learning, when he was in prison, after being unoccupied for a long time and extremely still, he suddenly perceived the bright illumination and translucence of the true substance of the mind, in which all things are complete, and joyfully exclaimed: ‘This is the centrality before arousal. It should be conserved and not lost, since all the principles under Heaven emerge from it.’ When he emerged, he taught students using the method of sitting in stillness, leading them to return to quietude in order to interconnect affectively, to hold to the substance in order to

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apply its function” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 372). This is the idea that “when one thinks of neither good nor bad, one recognises the original state of things,” what Chen Xianzhang 陈献章 called “cultivating the first inkling through stillness.” It can be seen that Nie Bao’s tendency was to use the approach of stillness to work directly on the a priori original substance. He believed that only when learning was established at the level of original substance could it have a stable foundation. His love of original substance led him to oppose scholars from any school who used a posteriori effort to substitute for a priori original substance. Qian Dehong’s learning of making intentions sincere a posteriori originally came from Wang Yangming, and not only had the sentence “doing good and removing the bad is the investigation of things” from his Four Sentence Teaching already become definitive for his school, but from his numerous common sentences such as “Practically implement doing good and removing the bad” and “When active, think constantly of removing human desire and preserving Heavenly principle, and when still, think constantly of removing human desire and preserving Heavenly principle,” it can be seen that this was precisely the basic spirit of Yangming Learning. Nie Bao’s tendency to work directly on a priori original substance thus led him not only to criticise Qian Dehong, but also to feel dissatisfied with Yangming’s core theoretical doctrine of understanding the investigation of things as “investigating their incorrectness to return to rectitude.” He said: Investigating their incorrectness to return to rectitude was our former master’s method of setting to work to gradually return to rectitude, and hence he had no choice but to make this expression. Incorrectness here also refers to that which intention reaches, and not to original substance containing something incorrect. Those who are not good at embodying this are often tricked into taking up stale patterns, and thereby accidentally establishing empty banners for the despotic. This is what worries me. (“Reply to Kang Ziyi,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

What concerned Nie Bao was “only wishing to make the external surface look good, and not making efforts at the level of the mind,” departing from original substance and discussing marginal issues. Aside from his real experience in prison, he also grasped Yangming’s spirit of “By learning through silent sitting and purifying the mind, when one has attained the centrality before arousal, one can begin to attain the harmony of central regulation in that which is aroused. Sight, hearing, speech and movement should generally be guided using self-restraint, since dispersal is unavoidable” from his early years. Thus, Nie Bao’s criticism of Qian Dehong in fact used that which he attained from Yangming in order to criticise that which Qian Dehong had attained from Yangming. Here, individual experiences (such as being unoccupied for a long time and extremely still in prison), likes and tendencies all played a facilitative role in the formation of his core ideas. Nie Bao also criticised Zou Shouyi and Ouyang De, who belonged to the same Jiangyou Wang Learning group as he did. In his view, Zou Shouyi and Ouyang De’s seeking quietude in affectivity, substance in function, and centrality in harmony mixed up root and branches together as one. He believed that his own learning rectified the root in order to purify the source: the “quietude” of returning

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to quietude is the root, and only with the “centrality” of this root can one attain the “harmony” of central regulation in that which is aroused. He once wrote a letter to Zou Shouyi in which he elaborated on this point: If one speaks in terms of the original substance of empty numinosity, it is pure and highest good, and originally without any bad opposed to it. If one sets out from manifest thoughts, affairs and actions, and applies one’s own knowing to their goodness or badness, then even if one knows to act on them or remove them, I do not know how this is any different from incidental acts of righteousness. Thus those who extend their knowing must be filled with their original substance of empty numinosity in order to establish the great root of all under Heaven and make it expressed such that all is good. This is called penetrating the manifest, the subtle, the internal, and the external and unifying them. (“Reply to Dongkuo,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

The highest good he spoke of was not the good inherent nature or Heavenly principle spoken of by most Confucians, but rather the empty and numinous original substance of the mind itself, i.e. quietude. This quietude is not relative to affectivity, and thus not relative to good or bad. If the effort of cultivation is not applied to returning to quietude, then one must seek the a priori original substance by following the a posteriori doing of the good and removing of the bad. However, any effort that is not applied to the substance of quietude is what Mencius called “obtaining through incidental acts of righteousness” [see Mencius, 2A.2] that luckily accord with the principle of goodness, and do not emerge from the original mind. The learning of returning to quietude is the means to establish the great root, and only when there is the great root can the dao be attained. Hence he believed that his learning did not separate root and branches or internal and external, as some scholars accused it of doing, but rather returned to quietude in order to interconnect affectively, establishing the root in order to attain the dao. He also wrote a letter to Ouyang De in which he repeatedly elaborated on this idea using the metaphors of water in relation to its wellspring, and branches, leaves, flowers and fruit in relation to their roots: Wellsprings are that from which the four rivers emerge. Yet without these rivers, there would also be no means to perceive what are called wellsprings. Hence those who deepen wellsprings deepen the wellsprings from which the rivers emerge, rather than using the rivers to act on the wellsprings in order to deepen them. Roots are that from which branches, leaves, flowers and fruit emerge. Those who cultivate roots cultivate the roots from which branches, leaves, flowers and fruit emerge, rather than using the branches, leaves, flowers and fruit to act on the roots in order to cultivate them. Now, to not reach the knowing from which the changes and transformations of affective responses emerge, but rather to use the knowing of the changes and transformations of affective responses themselves to reach it, is like seeking the sun and moon in the sites that their light illuminates, and forgetting the greatness of their bright suspended images. (“To Ouyang Nanye,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 8)

Here, wellsprings and roots all refer to the substance of quietude, and only when there is the substance of quietude can one interconnect affectively; the extension of knowing is returning to quietude, and not “extending the good known by the innate moral knowing of my mind into all things and affairs.” Hence Nie Bao believed that

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the learning of returning to quietude was not only that which Song Confucians from Zhou [Dunyi] 周敦颐 and [the] Cheng 程 [brothers] onward had advocated, but also accorded with Wang Yangming’s central, unswerving tenet, and was thus the treasury of the true method of Wang Learning: Someone asked: What is the learning of innate moral knowing like? He said: This is the method transmitted in the Wang school. The former master (i.e. Wang Yangming) saw that the scholars of his generation regarded the omniscient and omnipotent as sages, and those with limited knowledge who could not become Confucians as deeply shameful, with all beginners starting from accumulating studies and knowledge, delving into investigation, research, memorising and reciting, toiling painfully and becoming all tangled up, a process which stalled an unlimited number of talented people of the world under Heaven. Thus he said that innate moral knowing is spontaneous knowing, and if it is extended and cultivated, then without awaiting studies or reflection, a myriad of changes and multitude of transformations all emerge from it. When Mencius spoke of not studying or reflecting, of loving one’s relatives and respecting one’s seniors [see Mencius, 7A.15], he was referring to the expressive functioning and flowing operation of innate moral knowing that approaches refined authenticity. Yet those who are unenlightened went on to regard love and respect as innate moral knowing, becoming attached to seeking from marginal details, and thus even exceptional masters could not avoid being deceived into demonic ways, and eventually merely provided a superficial mask to despotic learning. Hence the love and respect that begin from childhood are the mind of dao, and as soon as one relies on the pure unity of the state before arousal, it spontaneously flows into operation, without the slightest participation from reflective thought or desire for gain. Thus in the extension of innate moral knowing, one only extends and cultivates this original substance of pure unity before arousal. When the original substance is restored, the myriad things are complete, and this is what is called establishing the great root of all under Heaven. The former master said: innate moral knowing is the original substance of centrality before arousal and boundlessly great impartiality, which is spontaneously able to be affective and thus interconnect, and which is spontaneously able to follow and respond to things as they come. This is the treasury of the true method of Record of Transmission and Practice. (“Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points: Debates on Sincerity” [Kunbian lu: Bian cheng 困辨录
辩诚], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14)

Here, Nie Bao believed that his learning of returning to quietude was precisely designed to correct the biases in Wang Learning. Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing arose from academic spheres’ obliteration of morality with knowledge, and hence held that innate moral knowing was something possessed by everyone, using innate moral knowing to mould and regulate specific doctrines of knowledge. However, innate moral knowing is an aroused effect that must be rooted in the centrality before arousal, and this centrality before arousal is empty, numinous, limpid, and unified. To extend innate moral knowing is to cultivate this empty, numinous, limpid, and unified substance, and thereby attain the function of affectivity leading to interconnection. This passage by Nie Bao was not only aimed at defending his own position as the orthodoxy of Wang Learning, but also gave a profound statement of the background from which Wang Yangming’s learning emerged and the transformation in academic ethos that it gave rise to. This perhaps provided a basis for the later work of Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 and Huang Zongxi. Concerning the role of his learning of returning to quietude in correcting the biases of Wang Learning, Huang

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Zongxi gave a fair assessment: “Although Yangming took the extension of innate moral knowing to be his central tenet, his followers gradually lost its transmission, generally regarding the centrality before arousal as the harmony of the already aroused, and hence only exerted their efforts at extending harmony, becoming increasingly frivolous and shallow, waiting for their good and bad to form before acting to restrain them, and were thus unable overcome their difficult and mixed up state. Hence Shuangjiang [i.e. Nie Bao] and Nianan 念庵 [i.e. Luo Hongxian 罗洪 先] used returning to quietude to remedy this, and thus were on the same path as Yanping 延平 [i.e. Li Dong 李侗]” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 458). Another scholar of the Jiangyou Wang school, Chen Jiuchuan 陈九川, praised Nie Bao’s learning of returning to quietude for its fine meaning of concentrating intention on the root-origin and sweeping aside fragmentation, but also criticised its mistake of separating quietude and affectivity. He said: Formerly, Old Man Hui 晦翁 [i.e. Zhu Xi] regarded vigilance as the root-origin of cultivation through self-restraint, as the state before arousal, and as the extension of centrality; he regarded being careful when alone as the first inkling of cognizance, as the already aroused, and as the extension of harmony. With comprehensive mutual cultivation, this may seem to be refined and precise, yet it forcibly analyses activity and stillness into two forms of effort, and does not return to refined unity. Now our respected gentleman [i.e. Nie Bao] regards the first inkling of cognizance as a secondary meaning and accepts only his doctrine of the root-origin of cultivation through self-restraint, thereby already sweeping aside the fault of fragmentation. However, our respected gentleman also treats the aroused function of affective response as another level, seeing it from behind, as if it emerges and flows out from this, and hence there is still a slight discrepancy here. (“To Nie Shuangjiang” [Yu Nie Shuangjiang 与聂双江], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 463)

Chen Jiuchuan believed that quietude and affectivity as well as the root-origin and its aroused functioning cannot be divided, and thus that, although the effort of the investigation of things is at the level of aroused functioning, applying effort at this level is the same as applying it at the level of the root-origin, since attaining function is the same as establishing the root. If one emphasises applying effort to the root-origin, and waiting until the root-origin is cultivated before its aroused function is central and regulated, this was the learning followed by Song Confucians from Li Yanping onward, and despite being refined and subtle, it in fact went against the Confucian school’s core precept of substance and function having one source. Once Nie Bao’s learning of returning to quietude had emerged, it met with challenges and attacks from many students of Wang’s school, and although Nie Bao sent individual letters debating it and replied carefully and repeatedly, only Luo Hongxian and Liu Wenmin 刘文敏 of the Jiangyou group expressed their agreement. Luo Hongxian once said: “What Shuangjiang spoke of was truly a shocking method, and although many heroic figures were blinded by ignorance and noted his outspokenness, it was like the broad road and could not be doubted” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 373). In his late years, Liu Wenmin also said, “What Shuangjiang said was true indeed,” and his last words to his followers said: “The substance of knowing is originally empty, and because it is empty, it can produce

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and reproduce, hence the empty is origin of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Our dao takes emptiness as its precept, and you must all remember this! When talking with later students, although your modifications will differ, simply be careful not to go against our precept” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 432). This expressed his profound praise for Nie Bao’s learning. Nie Bao’s above debates concerned a real philosophical problem, namely, is the original substance of the mind absolute or relative? Is it ruled by epistemological and moral rationality, or is it merely a blank slate? For Zou Shouyi and Ouyang De, the original substance of the mind was relative, and must become manifest in the things and affairs that reflect it. Hence this group advocated the unity of substance and function. Ouyang De used the relation between water and flowing to explain this idea. For their teacher Wang Yangming, the original substance of the mind was both relative and absolute. Moral rationality was absolute, since innate moral knowing’s feeling of filiality to parents and relatives was an innate endowment, and must be expressed, yet its combination with epistemological rationality was an on-going process of cultivation. The tendency to make judgments of good and bad concerning things and affairs was a priori, yet the ability to know right from wrong could only become richer and perfected through a posteriori cultivation. Wang Longxi also believed that innate moral knowing as the original substance of the mind was absolute, with the role of the a posteriori being to fully express this original substance of innate moral knowing, i.e. “to dredge the path of the river to free its flowing.” Qian Dehong believed that the innate moral knowing of the substance of the mind was relative, and this original substance could only be completed in specific moral activities of doing good and removing the bad. For Nie Bao, the original substance of the mind was absolute, and can be said to be a blank slate that only manifests moral and epistemological significance in its functioning and affectivity. This absolute substance of the mind is “the substance of quietude,” and it transcends specific activity and stillness, which are responses of affectivity and function to external things and affairs. These responses themselves are a unity of epistemological and moral activity: the investigation of things is “things each being entrusted to things,” making things each attain their place. This kind of things each attaining their place was both acting in accordance with the inexorable laws of things and affairs in terms of knowledge, and also “knowing the transformation and growth of Heaven and Earth” in terms of morality. This was the philosophical meaning of his view that “innate moral knowing is originally quiet, so return to quietude to interconnect affectively, holding to the substance to apply its function.” Because Nie Bao’s learning mainly discussed problems such as activity and stillness, substance and function, and quietude and affectivity, he did not go beyond the approach of Wang Learning, yet because his conclusions differed from Wang Yangming’s statements concerning the unity of morality and knowledge, substance and function, and quietude and affectivity, he invited opposition from the various groups of the Wang school.

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3 The Expansion of the Learning of Returning to Quietude Nie Bao’s learning of returning to quietude was attained from his experience in prison. Before this, he had followed Wang Yangming’s doctrine of “knowing right from wrong, doing the good and removing the bad” for a long time, but made little progress. When he was imprisoned, through his weariness and distress, he perceived that the substance of the mind is originally quiet, that stillness governs movement and the state before arousal governs the already aroused, and thereby established his core precept of returning to quietude. Luo Hongxian once described the change between Nie Bao’s earlier and later doctrines: Formerly, he heard of the learning of innate moral knowing and was overjoyed by it, believing that the mind of right and wrong is possessed by everyone, and that one need merely seek the spontaneous regulation in affectivity, which thereby has its basis. After examining this for himself, he found that by holding to affectivity as a basis, one could not avoid being enslaved by affectivity. Since our minds cannot rest for a moment, in right and wrong, they are also temporary and confused. He also tried concentrating its refinement and awaiting things with emptiness, without calculating whether it will be affected or not. Our minds temporarily rest, yet the laws of right and wrong apparently cannot be obtained and deceived. Thus he reflected for himself, saying: That which formerly enslaved me was pursuing in the already aroused; that which now rests approaches the state before arousal! (“Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points: Preface” [Kunbian lu: Xu 困辨 录
序], Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14)

Once his core precept of returning to quietude was established, Nie Bao used it to explicate important Confucian categories, such as centrality, change, benevolence, and sincerity, all of which gained in exposition, and thus he grasped it even more firmly. His explication here can be seen as an expansion of the learning of returning to quietude. Nie Bao firstly used it to explicate Centrality in the Ordinary. In his view, the substance of quietude is the mind of dao, as well as centrality, and to return to quietude is to extend centrality. He said: Centrality is the original substance of the mind of dao, and when there is the centrality before arousal, there will be the harmony of arousal with central regulation. The unseen and unheard is the centrality before arousal, while excess and insufficiency are all bad. Centrality is harmony; to speak of centrality is to speak of harmony, and when one extends centrality, harmony emerges. (“Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14)

For this reason, he praised the Guishan 龟山 group among the students of the Cheng brothers 二程 for their experiencing in stillness. In his view, holding to stillness is a form of learning for higher-level people that directly points to original substance, and he opposed the view of scholars at the time that slandered the two words “stillness” and “respect” as Chan learning, saying: “Alas, scholars of recent times are wild and self-indulgent, frequently regarding holding to stillness as Chan learning and holding to respect as doctrinaire learning!” (“Record of

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Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14). What Nie Bao called centrality was the centrality of original substance, the mind containing nothing and being neither biased nor partial. This centrality is a kind of state or spiritual plane, and at the moment of responding to affairs or connecting with things, this centrality is manifested as adaptivity (quan 权). Adaptivity means a flexible application of fixed rules in accordance with specific spatio-temporal conditions, what Centrality in the Ordinary called “harmony.” Adaptivity is a spontaneous function of centrality. He said: Centrality has no fixed substance, adaptivity is its only substance; adaptivity has no fixed function, dao is its only function. Adaptivity is the regularity naturally present in our minds, so as long as one is vigilant concerning the unseen and fearful concerning the unheard, it can be aroused without any non-centrality, changing following the dao, such that there is nothing but the functioning of spontaneity. (“Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14)

Nie Bao’s meaning here is excellent. “Adaptivity is its only substance” means that when there is the centrality before arousal, there can be the harmony of arousal with central regulation. Yet harmony is but the spontaneous flowing operation of centrality, and thus returning to quietude is a fundamental effort. Nie Bao compared his precept of returning to quietude to “change” (yi 易): the substance of quietude is pre-Heavenly (xiantian 先天), while interconnecting affectively is post-Heavenly (houtian 后天); the substance of quietude is the Supreme Void (taixu 太虚), while interconnecting affectively is the things contained in the Supreme Void. He said: Quietude and inactivity, a centrality containing the Supreme Void, is the pre-Heavenly; the thousand changes and myriad transformations all emerge from this. It can accord with virtue, with illumination, with order, and with fortune and misfortune, hence the phrase, “Heaven does not oppose” [see Book of Changes, Hexagram Qian 乾]. Its being touched and activated, being affected and responding, is the post-Heavenly; without thought or reflection, it interconnects and accordingly responds, hence the phrase, “reverently upholds the times of Heaven” [ibid.], which states that human exertion has not the slightest participation. (“Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14)

Returning to quietude can spontaneously interconnect affectively, and interconnecting affectively means following the inherent natures of things and not disturbing them with selfish intention, hence he said there is not the slightest human exertion. Returning to quietude in order to interconnect affectively is a spontaneous process, and not an analogical consideration of centrality. Finally, Nie Bao believed that his learning of returning to quietude was aimed at opposing the academic ethos of the time, as he pointed out: Among scholars of the current age, the best have three hindrances: one is a hindrance of dao-principle, one is a hindrance of fixed forms, and one is a hindrance of knowledge. They are particular about seeking moral principle, they mimic the traces of the actions and affairs of the ancients, they hear and see much and are broad in learning, and their activities thus have their referents. Although these are three hindrances, dao-principle and forms both

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emerge from knowledge, and thus they are all hindrances of knowledge. (“Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points,” Collected Writings of Master Shuangjiang Nie, Vol. 14)

He pointed out that moral principle is applied by adaptively following changes in affairs, so one cannot be pre-emptively particular about seeking correctness, and then mechanically apply this in affairs. Changes in affairs are the result of the complex functioning of various elements in time, and so one cannot establish a fixed form in advance. Hence one must apply one’s efforts to original substance, return to quietude and then use the one to steer the myriad. Although the theoretical depth of Nie Bao’s development of the learning of returning to quietude was somewhat lacking in comparison with his arguments concerning the precept of returning to quietude, from this can be seen the true meaning of his precept of returning to quietude, and the true orientation of his effort. A comprehensive summary and deeper exposition of the theory of holding to stillness would have to wait for the great master of the Jiangyou school, Luo Hongxian.

Chapter 12

Luo Hongxian’s Comprehensive Exposition of the Doctrines of Returning to Quietude and Holding to Stillness

Luo Hongxian 罗洪先 (1504–1564; zi 字 Dafu 达夫, hao 号 Nianan 念庵) was from Jishui 吉水 in Jiangxi. In his youth he admired the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 scholar Luo Lun 罗伦, and set his mind on learning. When he heard Wang Yangming 王阳 明 lecturing in Ganzhou 赣州, he admired him greatly, and wished to go to learn from him, yet was prevented by his father. When [Wang Yangming’s most famous work] Record of Transmission and Practice (Chuanxi lu 传习录) emerged, he read it intently to the point of forgetting to sleep and eat. In the eighth year of the Jiajing 嘉靖 period [1529], he was recommended as a metropolitan graduate, and was appointed as a senior compiler in the Hanlin Academy 翰林院. In the eighteenth year of the Jiajing period [1539], he visited the left admonisher in the Left Secretariat of the Heir Apparent 左春坊, and in the next year came to the capital, but because a memorial he submitted mentioned the affair of the betrayal of the heir, it offended his superiors, and he was dismissed and made a commoner. He resided at home for almost twenty years, leaving four times for academic visits. He gave almost all the property his forefathers had left behind to his father’s concubine’s son, and built another humble room for himself, where he read his books. In the thirty-seventh year of the Jiajing period [1558], Yan Song 严嵩 wished to promote him to an official position, but he refused, saying he wished to fulfill his ambition in the woods and ravines, and six years later he died at home. During the Longqing 隆 庆 period he was honored as a vice minister in the Court of Imperial Entertainments 光禄寺, and awarded the title Wengong 文恭. His works include Collected Works of Luo Nianan (Luo Nianan ji 罗念庵集) and Collected Works of Luo Hongxian (Luo Hongxian ji 罗洪先集).1

1

[Trans.] References are to Luo Hongxian ji, Fenghuang chubanshe, 2007.

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_12

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1 The Core Precept of Holding to Stillness Although in Luo Hongxian’s learning, each period had a different precept, the main core precept of his prime years was holding to stillness (zhujing 主静). He was most noted by others for his doctrine of holding to stillness. For the precept of holding to stillness, Luo Hongxian was deeply indebted to Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 doctrine of “being without desire in stillness” (wuyu gujing 无欲故静), and he was therefore extremely fond of Zhou Dunyi. He once said: The holding to stillness spoken of by Master Zhou is the true vein stemming from the non-polarity (wuji 无极). His own commentary said, “It is without desire, and hence still,” meaning that there is no trace of contamination or activity to be found, it is without any admiration or assertion, and approaches what scholar Zhuang [i.e. Zhuangzi 庄子] called “chaos” (hundun 混沌), and can thus be the seed that establishes polarity. A gentle ease and serene leisureliness recognised in knowing and feeling cannot substitute for this thing. (“Reply to a Disciple” [Da menren 答门人], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 403)

In Luo Hongxian’s view, what Zhou Dunyi called stillness was consistent with the law embodied by original substance of the myriad things of the cosmos, and this law was what Luo Hongxian called “the true vein stemming from the non-polarity,” equivalent to Zhuangzi’s spiritual plane of great interconnectedness that involves no arrangement and gives rise to no desire. When one reaches this spiritual plane, none of the toil and turmoil of the external realm can produce any contamination or disturbance. Holding to stillness is also different from any leisurely and carefree mood, because the former is a spiritual plane attained through cultivation, while the latter is a temporary cessation of feeling and knowing or an incidental mental feeling of ease and comfort. Stillness is thus both a result of cultivation and also the standard for all conduct. This standard is consistent with the original substance of the myriad things of the cosmos that is without thought and reflection, spontaneously so, and yet harmonious in its flowing operation. When one reaches the spiritual plane of stillness, the hidden and lurking seeds of selfish desire all vanish, and one directly flows together with the rising and falling of Heaven and Earth. The ease and comfort of feeling and knowing is either a purely incidental stillness, a forced stillness through the use of the intellect, or simply selfish desire temporarily hiding itself so as not to be perceived. Luo Hongxian denounced this kind of stillness or method of seeking stillness as “wild fox Chan [Buddhism]” (yehu chan 野狐禅), saying: To refer to its aspect of establishing polarity, it joins its virtue with Heaven and Earth, and thus produces and grows without end; it joins its illumination with the sun and moon, and thus illuminates and responds without omission; it joins its order with the four seasons, and thus shifts and circulates without error; it joins its fortune and misfortune with ghosts and spirits, and thus affects and responds without deviation. To cultivate this and forget

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arrangements is called fortune; to go against this and toil in futility is called misfortune…. If one recognises a leisurely and carefree mood and takes this to be holding to stillness, this is similar to wild fox Chan, and thus includes desire. All enjoyment and play, settlement and convenience, and weary neglect and indulgent eagerness hide and tolerate the faults of the beastly, and confusedly sink into unawareness. Even if one isolates oneself in purity, protecting one’s own corner, one will still not avoid biased hearing and self-appointment, and will be insufficient to take the lead in preventive examination, hence in the task of aiding all under Heaven, how is this different from scholars with no knowledge? (“Reply to a Disciple,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 403)

In Luo Hongxian’s works, he frequently depicted his spiritual plane of holding to stillness, for example in a letter he wrote to the Nanzhong 南中 Wang school scholar Jiang Daolin 蒋道林, in which he said: When I was in extreme stillness, I suddenly realised my mind was an empty quietude that contains nothing, open and interconnecting without end, somewhat like the flowing movement of clouds in the vast sky, without end or limit, or like the changes and transformations of fish and dragons in the great sea, with no separation. There was no internal or external to point to, no activity or stillness to divide, and the above and below, the four directions, the past that has gone and the present that comes, all became melded together as one, in what is called the placeless omnipresence. Neither form nor matter could then limit my single body with its issuing apertures. Hence by freeing my eyes, Heaven and Earth did not overflow my vision; by pricking up my ears, Heaven and Earth did not exceed my hearing; by deepening my mind, Heaven and Earth did not escape my thoughts. As for the ancients of times past, the pinnacle of their spirit was my spirit, and it never passed away. (“Reply to Jiang Daolin” [Da Jiang Daolin 答蒋道林], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 298)

This is a kind of mystical experience, the scenes of the cosmos all rushing through the mind, their vital qi 气 flowing freely, continuous and infinite, changing and transforming unfathomably, melded together as one body, and all at once appearing within the mind. One experiences no gap between things and oneself, that one is the bearer of the spirit of Heaven and Earth, and that one is the inheritor of the cultural meanings of the ancients. This kind of experience is the spiritual plane of “melding into the same body with things.” Luo Hongxian’s experience of the spiritual plane of stillness and the myriad things as one body was dependent on being without desire as its condition. He said: Formerly, what Hongxian attempted in his exertions was mainly based on being without desire. Discriminating the presence or absence of desire is mainly based on the mind’s site of subtle awareness. This site of awareness is extremely subtle, and unless one’s will is eager and one’s qi settled, one will not perceive it. (“Reply to Li Ershou” [Da Li Ershou 答 李二守], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 331)

To be without desire is a kind of state, a kind of psychological sensation, and its emergence requires a moment when one’s will and intention are concentrated and one’s vital breathing is settled. The will and intention being concentrated means one’s entire spirit is focused on the spiritual plane of being without desire in stillness, and one’s mind has no other interests. If there is the slightest motion or action, then it is contaminated by successive thoughts and one’s qi moves, and then

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the spiritual plane without desire cannot be expected to emerge. Luo Hongxian’s being without desire had a very strong religious flavour, and his method of cultivation had much in common with Chan Buddhism. Luo Hongxian’s doctrine of returning to quietude also took something from Chen Xianzhang’s 陈献章 extension of emptiness (zhixu 致虚). He said: Baisha’s 白沙 [i.e. Chen Xianzhang’s] doctrine of extending emptiness is a unique vision through the ages, extending knowing and continuing awakening, with no omission of substance or function. Now there are some who mistakenly view him as wild in his vastness, as being fond of activity and artificiality, calling this the substance of the mind, and as indulging feeling and desire, with opinions running wild. Later there emerged some minor figures who dared to offer lofty arguments, despising Song Confucians yet rashly attempting to imitate them, stealing thoughts and leaving behind many disasters for the world. (“To Wu Shushan” [Yu Wu Shushan 与吴疏山], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 415)

At the time, many thought Chen Xianzhang’s words concerned the abstruse and subtle, that his effort was biased toward stillness, and doubted it as similar to Chan Buddhism, yet Luo Hongxian alone commended him, believing that his learning included both substance and function, with its substance being the extension of emptiness, and its function the extension of knowing. To extend emptiness is to seek to unify the substance of the mind with the vast emptiness of the cosmos, while to extend knowing is to take the first inkling cultivating in stillness and extend it externally. After extending emptiness, there is the centrality before arousal, and after the centrality before arousal, there is the harmony of centrally regulated arousal. In Luo Hongxian’s view, what Chen Xianzhang called spontaneity was an combination of the extension of the emptiness of the substance of the mind together with the illumination of things with no loss. With effort applied to the extension of emptiness, the empty clarity of the substance of the mind spontaneously illuminates things, with no gap between activity and stillness, hence he also said: “The learning of Master Hejian Zhai 和兼斋 (Baisha) took spontaneity as its precept, and as for its virtuous essentials, it followed both activity and stillness, constantly illuminating and responding without separation” (“Postscript to Baisha’s Hejian Zhai Poems” [Ba Baisha hejian zhai shi 跋白沙和兼斋诗], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 684). In Luo Hongxian’s doctrine of returning to quietude and holding to stillness, he regarded himself as attaining unity with the original substance of the cosmos. In his view, empty quietude is the original state of the cosmos, as well as the original state of the substance of the mind: Before being affected, quietude has never increased, and it is not the case that because one has no thoughts or knowledge, one has quietude. After being affected, quietude has never decreased, and it is not the case that because one has thoughts and knowledge, there is no quietude. This substance of empty numinosity that is unblemished is what is called the highest good; the comparison between good and bad is insufficient to name it. Knowledge is touched by affects; thoughts are refined by responses. Both knowledge and thoughts are intermittent, yet this quietude has no interruptions, and this is what is meant by saying that

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affectivity has a myriad diversities yet quietude is only one. (“Reply to Guo Pingchuan” [Da Guo Pingchuan 答郭平川], Collected Works of Luo Nianan, Vol. 1)

Quietude is originally as it is, and the absence of knowledge or thought cannot add anything to it. The substance of quietude has affectivity as its function, but the knowledge and thought when one is affected cannot reduce it. This state is an absolute that is not relative to specific arising or extinguishing. Knowledge and thought are responses of this substance of quietude to external stimuli, yet although there are these responses, the substance of quietude remains constant, and one must return to quietude in order to be able to interconnect affectively. In Luo Hongxian’s view, quietude is original substance, and is prior to affectivity, yet when one is affected, this substance of quietude lies within affectivity and acts as its ruler (zhuzai 主宰), hence the substance of quietude penetrates through all times. He said: “Quietude is one, and has no prior and posterior or central and external. Yet in relation to affectivity, quietude is prior, and in relation to arousal, quietude is central” (“Reply to Xiang Oudong” [Da Xiang Oudong 答项瓯东], Collected Works of Luo Nianan, Vol. 1). This quietude within affectivity is Zhou Dunyi’s “stillness” that transcends specific activity and stillness, and the “settled” in Cheng Hao’s 程颢 “when active, it is settled, and when still, it is also settled.” Since one can be still and settled, there is a central ruler, and one will not be swayed by chaotic things and affairs. Hence affects are changing, yet quietude is eternal; affects are phenomena, while quietude is original substance; affects have internal and external, while quietude has neither. Quietude has no division between activity and stillness or internal and external, the substance of quietude is the ruler, and the original meaning of Luo Hongxian’s returning to quietude lay in the constant clarity of the ruler, having a ruler in the centre. He said: Innate moral knowing speaks of that which without learning or reflection has the clear awareness of spontaneity, and this is to speak of the highest good. The goodness of my mind, I know; the badness of my mind, I also know, and it cannot be said that this is not knowledge. If badness is mixed up with it, can there be a ruler in the centre? If the centre has no ruler, I am afraid one cannot say that knowing is originally constant and clear. If knowing is not yet clear, and one relies on this in conduct, then I am afraid one cannot avoid perversity in that which is already aroused, and one will be unable to follow and respond to things and affairs as they come. Hence the knowing that knows good and bad emerges and disappears, and is thus simply a discovery at one specific time. A discovery at one specific time is unable to exhaustively refer to original substance, and thus the clear awareness of spontaneity must be sought be returning to the root-source. People are still when they are born [see “Record of Music” (Yueji 乐记), Book of Rites (Liji 礼记)], without anything that is not good, and that which is not good is an error of activity. By holding to stillness to restore it, dao 道 is thereby condensed and does not flow away. When the spirit is aroused into knowing, innate moral knowing is still and clear, but when erroneous activity contaminates it, it soon begins to be lost and is difficult to recover. Hence there must be the effort of retraction and concentration [shouduo baoju 收掇保聚] in order to work on the site of fulfilled realisation and lasting cultivation, then settlement, stillness, tranquility, and reflection emerge from this, one’s affectivity in the family, state, and all under Heaven will all be correct, and one will never be moved by things; this can be called the investigation of things. Being situated in that which contains nothing incorrect,

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knowledge then contains nothing incorrect, and this is why the extension of knowing must lie in the investigation of things, since once things are investigated, knowing is reached. Hence to extend knowing is to extend its stillness of non-being and thereby its activity of being. (“Record of Summer Travel in the Year of Jiayin [1554]” [Jiayin xiayou ji 甲寅夏游 记], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 81–82)

Innate moral knowing is that which knows good and bad, yet if one wishes to eliminate innate moral knowing’s contamination by false thoughts and maintain the correctness of its judgments of good and bad, one must have the effort of returning to quietude, holding to stillness, retraction and concentration, making innate moral knowing fulfilled in realisation and lasting in cultivation, constantly refined and clear. Hence the so-called investigation of things is a process of returning to quietude; to extend knowing is to obtain the substance of quietude. This was the core precept of learning for Luo Hongxian, as he said: “Learning can be captured in a single phrase. For example, by retracting one’s spirit and returning it to a unity, constantly leading it to coalesce, one can be the ruler of the myriad things and affairs; this single phrase captures it” (“To Xiao Yungao” [Yu Xiao Yungao 与萧云 皋], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 264).

2 Rejection of the School of Pre-formed Innate Moral Knowing Luo Hongxian’s learning of returning to quietude and holding to stillness regarded the process of innate moral knowing returning back to the substance of quietude as the investigation of things and extension of knowing, believing that innate moral knowing can only be attained through practical exercise, and thus he opposed Wang Longxi’s 王龙溪 “pre-formed innate moral knowing,” and opposed the idea that “the a priori mind is originally and spontaneously correct.” Wang Longxi advocated establishing the root in the a priori substance of the mind, and held that a posteriori effort lay in blocking the pathway by which intention sneaks into a priori innate moral knowing and relying on the functioning and flowing operation of innate moral knowing, which is “using the a priori to govern the a posteriori.” Luo Hongxian disagreed with Wang Longxi’s core precept for learning, and although the two men maintained a very sincere and friendly relationship, their debates concerning the a priori rectified mind and a posteriori returning to quietude and holding to stillness went on endlessly. Luo Hongxian assessed Wang Longxi thus: “As for Longxi’s learning, I have long since known its details, and not waited until now. Yet what he calls effort in fact contains no usable effort, hence he called it ‘using innate moral knowing to extend innate moral knowing,’ as with the Daoists’ idea of ‘governing the a posteriori with the a priori.’ Although his doctrine did come from the oral teachings of the esteemed Mr. Yangming, its overall root lies in the Buddhists” (“To the Esteemed Mr. Shuangjiang” [Yu Shuangjiang gong 与双江 公], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 185). “Using innate moral knowing to

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extend innate moral knowing” and “governing the a posteriori with the a priori” both capture the true meaning of Longxi’s learning in a single phrase. Luo Hongxian believed that the a priori rectified mind was derived from the Buddhists, yet was too weak to direct later generations, leading later scholars to abandon effort and cultivation, and directly take up original substance. He pointed out: “From the beginning, the learning of sages and worthies has never included statements to not set to work, and there has never been learning that did not proceed via work. Only the Buddhists immediately ascended to the seat of the sages. On this point, Longxi truly misled people” (“Brief Questions on Reading the Esteemed Mr. Shuangjiang’s Meaning of Extending Knowing” [Du Shuangjiang gong zhizhi yi lue zhiyu 读双江 公致知义略质语], Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 428). Here, Luo Hongxian denounced Wang Longxi as Chan [Buddhism], regarding his rejection of work and direct reliance on the original mind as the illuminating the mind and perceiving inherent nature of Chan, in which one immediately becomes a Buddha. This was perhaps the root of Liu Zongzhou’s 刘宗 周 denunciation of Wang Longxi as “stepping into the deep pit of the Buddhists.” What Wang Longxi was at pains to take up was the meaning of the dao-mind in Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing, believing that innate moral knowing was a unity of the inherent nature endowed by Heaven with the awareness of inherent nature, without internal or external, quietude or affectivity. To not be ignorant of this single thought of numinous clarity was to extend knowing and investigate things. If one thought that innate moral knowing did not exhaust the wonders of the original mind, and required the incorporation of knowledge, intention and perception, this would be heterodox and vulgar learning. Once one trusts in innate moral knowing, “intention” is the flowing operation of innate moral knowing, and perception is the illuminating examination of innate moral knowing, penetrating internal and external, so stopping at this innate moral knowing is the so-called magical pill that turns iron into gold. Luo Hongxian however believed that Longxi’s words here only attained a partial aspect of Yangming’s doctrine, since although Yangming said that his innate moral knowing was the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, this inherent nature must undergo retraction and concentration, an effort of stopping, in order to become a basis for actual moral conduct. The inherent nature endowed by Heaven and the good that is originally possessed are theoretical and abstract, while the effort of stopping at the highest good is practical and specific. The core precept of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) is concentrated in one point, namely stopping at the highest good. Its effort lies entirely in being able to stop. In Luo Hongxian’s view, people’s various feelings and desires that love benefits, goods and beauty are present from birth, and constantly assault their innate moral knowing, so only by restraining and stopping them to make them serve a priori innate moral knowing can the a priori be applied in actuality. He refuted Longxi, saying:

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Now people say things like “Once one trusts in innate moral knowing, intention is the flowing operation of innate moral knowing, and perception is the illuminating examination of innate moral knowing.” Yet the desire for benefit is stubborn, so if one has not successfully restrained and stopped it, then desire is indulged in that which knowing arouses, and is taken for the substance of the mind; the bodily spirits float freely, so if one has not successfully held them back, then desire is trusted in that which intention carries out, and is taken for effort. Those who are afraid of difficulties and seek momentary comfort take up that which is easily followed; those who perceive the minor and desire haste are firm in their self-belief…. If one leads the people under Heaven toward dissolution without return and brazenness without consideration, then in terms of the depths of their addictions, I do not know how this is anything but vulgar learning! (“Record of Summer Travel in the Year of Jiayin,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 73)

That is to say, if the a priori innate moral knowing that Longxi relied upon is not supplemented by the effort of returning to quietude and holding to stillness, not “polished to make it brilliant,” then it will inevitably be mixed up with desire for benefit and bodily spirit, with the result that it leads people to confuse principle and desire, and fall into a condition of dissolution with no return. Hence a priori innate moral knowing must have the effort of returning to quietude and holding to stillness before it can be truly present in the individual. He once said: “If one gives priority to the present state of innate moral knowing, there can be no expectation of entering into sagehood.” He also said: “It is simply that there can never be any deficiency in the effort of retraction and concentration, and to make the spirit return to unity, in constant emptiness and settlement with daily refinement and strengthening, one cannot directly rely on the present and remain at this as sufficient” (“Record of Summer Travel in the Year of Jiayin,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 86). The spirit of Luo Hongxian’s lifetime of learning was all present in this. The origins of his proposing his doctrines lay in his taking up the pure reliance on the a priori of the Zhezhong 浙中 Wang school and especially Wang Longxi, and on this basis stressing the effort of condensation and polishing. He once clearly declared his painstaking efforts in establishing his doctrine: For three or four years, I used the phrase “hold to stillness” to accuse those who discuss innate moral knowing, taking innate moral knowing to originally emerge from the spontaneity of endowment, and to never be extinguished. If one wishes to attain the constancy of its flowing operation and manifestation as in infancy, one must have the effort of extending it; only when it has undergone withering and solitude does all withdraw from acquiescence and Heavenly principle become brilliant, never changing from this, as with Yangming at Longchang 龙场. For scholars to cast aside the punishing trial of Longchang and only discuss the maturity of his later years is like embarking on a ten-thousand li 里 journey yet being unable to meet with dangers or emerge from seclusion, and wishing simply to enjoy the ease of the open road; does this not amount to trying to advance hastily by skipping over the necessary steps? (“Sent to Xie Gaoquan” [Ji Xie Gaoquan 寄谢高泉], Collected Works of Luo Nianan, Vol. 2)

He also accepted pre-formed innate moral knowing, but believed that once people are born, this pre-formed innate moral knowing is invaded and contaminated by selfish desires, and cannot be as constant as in infancy, hence one must have the effort of returning to quietude and concentration. Yangming’s difficult experience of

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living with tribal people at Longchang, in which his mind was moved and his nature endured much, and was precisely the result of his long period of tempering his will and expanding his knowledge. Wang Longxi however simply relied on pre-formed innate moral knowing, casting aside the effort of tempering and polishing, and headed directly for the mature spiritual plane of Yangming’s later years. This kind of simple and easy effort has the fault of skipping over necessary steps. Luo Hongxian believed that this fault could be attributed to two aspects, namely Wang Yangming’s accommodating attitude to beginners in learning, which was deficient in guidance, and his later learning’s tendency toward loftiness, which was taken up carelessly. He once earnestly pointed this out: Master Yangming attained the words “innate moral knowing” from his lifetime of experience, and it is difficult to believe them without confusion. As for what emerges from the mind, as soon as this does not correspond to what one knows, it is not his original precept. At the time, to accommodate beginners in learning and lead them in easily, he could not avoid pointing to its present functioning as if it were guaranteed. As for spontaneous attainment, it really cannot be taken up carelessly. Hence those who follow his doctrines borrow them as a pretext to make people wild and self-indulgent, thereby missing their point by a long way. (“Sent to Zhang Xuye” [Ji Zhang Xuye 寄张须野], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 416)

Here, Luo Hongxian pointed out the fundamental differences between Yangming’s innate moral knowing and what later scholars called innate moral knowing: spontaneously attaining after undergoing hardships and difficulties as opposed to inheriting its tone, a result of returning to quietude and concentration as opposed to directly trusting in spontaneity, and a combination of specific knowledge, feelings and intentions as opposed to an abstract inherent nature endowed by Heaven. As discussed earlier, Yangming’s innate moral knowing was tied up with the spiritual veins of his life, in which the innate moral knowing that he originally possessed had already become integrated with a long-term tempering of the will and an expansion of knowledge. By this time, innate moral knowing was not merely the self-awareness of “Heavenly principle” in the mind, but rather a synthesis of a series of activities including how Heavenly principle was applied in specific practices together with assessments and perceptions of its practical results. When Yangming taught his students, the complex innate moral knowing system of this aggregated state was diluted and interpreted by his students based on their own different educational backgrounds and practical experience, without grinding out and experiencing its full and rich content, with some even borrowing innate moral knowing as a pretext to carry out their wild and self-indulgent intentions. As Luo Hongxian pointed out: “Once the esteemed Mr. Yangming broke with the period of ‘fathoming principle in affairs,’ scholars frequently took following their intentions and trusting in feelings as innate moral knowing, neglecting to take care of detailed and complex matters” (“Reply to Liu Ruzhou” [Da Liu Ruzhou 答刘汝周], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 278). For beginners in learning, the mature words of his spiritual plane in his late years should not be frequently raised, and they should be taught with effort in concrete matters. Luo Hongxian once wrote a

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letter to Wang Longxi in which he directly urged him [on this point]: “That the highest treasure is not to be fooled with is a phrase from the elixir experts [i.e. Daoists], yet it is somewhat similar to this matter. Sages and worthies down through the ages only used methods of retraction and concentration, and never affirmed fooling around even to the point of death. Hence it was said: ‘They lived their lives with reverential care” (“Sent to Wang Longxi” [Ji Wang Longxi 寄王龙溪], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 216). Here, the highest treasure refers to innate moral knowing, and that the highest treasure is not to be fooled with means that one should not speak lightly of pre-formed innate moral knowing, but must rather have the effort of retraction and concentration. Wang Longxi’s learning was lofty and brilliant, different from the Jiangyou 江右 scholars’ tendency to return to a quiet and earnest path, and he did not accept their criticisms of him. He opposed Luo Hongxian’s precept of retraction and concentration, believing that this was a result of being unable to fully trust in innate moral knowing, and that not trusting in pre-formed innate moral knowing meant not being able to personally bear the responsibility of the authentic disposition originally present within oneself. Wang Longxi once directly argued with Luo Hongxian, saying: “Your learning does not detach from opinion, and what benefit are empty opinions? It seems that in general they are not real. If one is real in wielding one’s sword to go into battle, unaware and unprepared, with direct intentions and a direct mind, people will all be able to perceive it, and there would not be so much fussy bickering and concealed ignorance” (Wang Longxi’s words as recorded in “Record of Winter Travel” [Dongyou ji 冬游记], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 61). Longxi believed that if people’s obsessive concern with loss or gain and praise or condemnation was not broken down, they would generally depend on the mouths and eyes of others, developing into a world based on pandering, and that this was an expression of their lack of belief in the authenticity of innate moral knowing. He advocated breaking down this kind of world based on pandering, allowing one’s own authentic nature and endowment to run free in the world, [since] “That which nature has endowed me with, horizontal or slanted, bent or straight, fine or ugly, high or low, is always acceptable.” Hence, Wang Longxi proposed, “to struggle to attain one’s nature and endowment, this is nature and endowment,” meaning that only by nakedly breaking with all corrupt practices and not considering one’s body, family, nature or endowment can one maintain one’s own authentic disposition. He proposed: In learning, one must recognise one’s authentic inherent nature, coming and going alone, and making one’s authentic inherent nature constantly manifest, since only then can one begin to avoid falling into fawning obsequiousness. Luo Hongxian however did not agree with Wang Longxi’s spirit of coming and going alone, believing it would inevitably sink into an indulgence of feeling and desire, abolishing all moral cultivation. He thought that Wang Longxi’s words above were all “factional phrases” that “directly trusted in innate moral knowing and Buddha-nature,” and that [anyone following] such an approach “showed no concern for right and wrong or fine and ugly, overturned action and rejection, and believed they had perceived inherent nature, eventually simply becoming an unscrupulous and petty person” (“Record of Winter Travel in the Year of Jihai [1539]” [Jihai

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dongyou ji 己亥冬游记], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 412). The pre-formed innate moral knowing that Wang Longxi trusted in all too easily changed into something that sheltered and smuggled in selfish intentions, hence he emphasised the effort of returning to quietude and concentration. Luo Hongxian’s “Discriminations Concerning Innate Moral Knowing” (Liangzhi bian 良知辨) recorded his debates with Wang Longxi concerning this question: Master Longxi said: “When innate moral knowing is affected and touched, is responds in spirit, with fools and their wives being one with sages. Why then act using quietude or retraction?” I did not reply. Then we stopped, I felt hunger in my stomach and began to search for food, and Master Longxi said: “Does this require quietude or not? Does it require retraction or not?” I said: “If this is so, then what is gained by learning? Is there really no distinction between a gluttonous monster and dining with ritual propriety?” (Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 16)

Feeling hungry and seeking food originates in nature, and does not need to be investigated, since it can respond spontaneously. In Wang Longxi’s view, innate moral knowing’s being affected by and responding to external things is like feeling hungry and seeking food, a spontaneous process. This instinct is possessed by both sages and ordinary people, and hence it has no need for the application of the effort of returning to quietude or retraction. Luo Hongxian however believed that people’s instinctive reactions do not fail to pass through the supervision of moral rationality, and the standard for this supervision is not natural. Hence feeling hungry and seeking food is indeed an instinct that is natural and does not require investigation; however, whether dining accords with ritual propriety or not is a matter infused with moral rationality. The refined clarity of moral rationality and responding to external things in accordance with principle are results of retraction and concentration. The harmonious regulation of principle (moral rationality), qi (sensory desires), will, and desire is a benefit from learning, and not something that can be achieved by trusting in spontaneity. He said: That which cannot be extinguished is the constancy of principle, and this is called inherent nature; that which cannot be easily settled is the activity of qi, and this is called desire; that which one ought not dare to forget is the condensation of the will, the ruler of endowment, and this is called learning. To trust in inherent nature and not know to discriminate desires is the error of arbitrariness; to discuss learning and not root it in real inherent nature is the error of undermining; to speak of inherent nature and not devote one’s exertions to learning is the error of dissolution. (“Discriminations Concerning Innate Moral Knowing,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 17)

From this it can be seen that Luo Hongxian’s precept of returning to quietude and holding to stillness indeed emphasised rational principle’s ruling and dominating function in relation to sensuous desire. Luo Hongxian’s discussions with Wang Longxi concerned an important philosophical question, namely the relation between moral rationality and the natural sensuous desire that people originally possess. This was a question that had long been debated both within Confucianism itself and between Confucianism and other doctrines, and in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism it was raised with unprecedented

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sharpness and directness. According to Wang Longxi, moral rationality is the most direct and powerful aspect among the various elements in a person’s spiritual life, and it is constantly shining, reflecting, and developing. Although sensuous desire cannot be absent, it is secondary in importance in comparison the shining and developing of moral rationality, and can be submerged and cleansed by the flowing operation of moral rationality. When moral rationality emerges, it can also be cut off or blocked. However, one should fully trust one’s own moral rationality, and believe that it has the power to break through sensuous desire. This was Wang Longxi’s “using innate moral knowing to extend innate moral knowing.” He was deeply convinced by Wang Yangming’s idea that “As soon as one opens one’s mouth one attains the original mind, with no need to appeal to or make use of anything else.” His fundamental method was to set aside all reasons, and directly rely on the originality of innate moral knowing, eradicating everything that infiltrates and impairs the original substance of moral rationality, and making innate moral knowing hold sway with all its lively restlessness and spontaneous arising. Hence when he criticised Luo Hongxian for “not detaching from opinions that are not real,” this was precisely based on this point, and Wang Yangming said that Wang Longxi’s method was a teaching established for superior people with shallow obstructions to innate moral knowing. In Luo Hongxian’s view however, innate moral knowing is moral feeling, is weak, and needs to be strengthened before it can become great. Only when moral feeling has undergone polishing and tempering can it rise into the scope of rationality. The attainment of moral rationality is a process of combining the a priori and the a posteriori, and within this, the most important role is that of the a posteriori. The a posteriori strengthening of innate moral knowing must be carried out through a struggle with sensuous desire. This was the effort of preserving principle and eliminating desire, restoring inherent nature, and transforming material qi spoken of by Song Confucians. Luo Hongxian believed that the theory he firmly held was consistent with the direction emphasised by the great Confucians of the Song and Ming, but that Wang Longxi’s method had already incorporated the “rampant opportunism” and “affirmation of the present moment” of Chan Buddhism. Thus Luo Hongxian accused Wang Longxi of “speaking all day of original substance yet never of effort, and only noting effort to point to it as heretical. Concerning these points, I am afraid that if Yangming came back to life, he would certainly furrow his brow” (“Sent to Wang Longxi,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 213). Whether in terms of the distinction it made between moral rationality and moral feeling, or its emphasis on the aspect of the attainment of moral rationality having to go through a practical process of tempering and concentration, Luo Hongxian’s doctrine of returning to quietude and holding to stillness was very prominent among the masters of Jiangyou, and even among the schools of effort of the whole Ming dynasty. Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 would later offer a perspective concerning this point in their summaries of Ming dynasty academic learning.

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3 Luo Hongxian’s Process of Theoretical Development Through His Life and His Transcendence of the Jiangyou School When Luo Hongxian took holding to stillness as his core precept and advocated carrying out a retraction and concentration of innate moral knowing, his intention was to rectify the faults of abandoning effort, relying directly on original substance, following a teacher’s doctrines, and guiding too lightly. The establishment of this academic precept was a result of his repeated personal experience, reflection and practice, and within these, there were different periods of development and different points of emphasis. His academic learning contained a process of development from relying on natural and spontaneous attainment, then applying his exertions in practical conduct, then returning to holding to stillness, before finally using innate moral knowing to penetrate Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and regarding the substance of the mind as an original sincerity. In his review of the main transitions in Luo Hongxian’s academic life, Huang Zongxi summarised this process as “applying exertions in practice in his beginning period, returning and retracting to quietude and stillness in his middle period, and becoming thoroughly enlightened to the substance of benevolence in his late period” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 388). Most people who discuss Luo Hongxian’s thought have followed this statement. However, it in fact failed to refer to Luo Hongxian’s academic tendency prior to his applying exertions in practice. Luo Hongxian’s old friend Nie Bao 聂豹 spoke of this tendency in much detail: Concerning Dafu’s learning in his early years, his fault was that he sought to detach and dissolve too rapidly. Such detachment and dissolution are originally not terms for effort, but for the spiritual plane once effort is mature. Since he sought them rapidly, he became attracted by Cihu’s 慈湖 [i.e. Yang Jian’s 杨简] doctrines, regarded the present as self-sufficient, knowing awareness as innate moral knowing, and not giving rise to intention as effort, took joy in sudden transcendence yet despised arduous rigor, and venerated empty insight yet neglected practical effort. He described himself as dangling over a precipice, the ground covered in gold, while in the Six Classics and Four Books he could find not a single word that matched his intention. He toyed with the spirit, saying he met with self-attainment, and remained like this for a decade. When he was eventually tied up in hardships, and what he met with went against his condition, he was at a loss with nothing to depend on, and could not but feel the pain of Master [Yang] Zhu’s 杨朱 tears. He stopped and was suddenly enlightened, examining the [Book of] Changes (Zhouyi 周易), the [Great] Learning, the [Doctrine of the] Mean (Zhongyong 中庸), and his own self and mind, and then knew that learning has its source. The mind is ruled internally, is quietude yet interconnects affectively, stops yet arouses reflection, and is omnipresent; the means preserve it and cultivate it are stopping in its place without activity, since activity is its shadow, illumination, and arousal; arousal has activity and stillness, yet quietude has neither. At this he regarded cleansing the mind and retreating to the hidden as of utmost priority, with the empty quietude of the state before arousal as of utmost importance, and set down this result, each day seeing more of the essence of Heaven, that which does not

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belong to the seen and heard. This is how in recent times he has returned to the root and restored his life, eliminating his hardships. Is it not so? (“Sent to Wang Longxi,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 268)

Nie Bao’s letter clearly states that Luo Hongxian had a period of excessively rapid detachment and dissolution when he was attracted by Yang Jian’s learning. Furthermore, in his appendix to the Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, Luo Hongxian’s student Hu Zhi 胡直 once described the process of Luo Hongxian’s academic life, saying: Once the learning of innate moral knowing had begun to spread, the lofty relied on the incidental illuminations of quietude and said that it could be found in this, while others recognised the qi-impulse as the flowing operation of innate moral knowing. At first, the master was confused by this, and regretfully said: Only through being without desire can one then enter the subtle; only through the subtle can one then know that there is nothing that is not good. Now all combine the impulse of desire with the substance of subtlety, and thus the mind seeking dao cannot be attained. Hence once it was robust, his learning constantly advocated being without desire, and promoted holding to stillness and returning to quietude. Even when his discriminations and replies numbered in the thousands, their essential point did not exceed this precept. After exerting himself in practice for over twenty years, he felt vastly enlightened and rich in true attainment, and began to have confidence in his absence of confusion, and wrote “On Heterodoxies” [Yiduan lun 异端论] as verification of this. In his teaching of students, he always took his evidence from words concerning stillness as non-being and activity as being. After much time, when his virtue had advanced with his years, he said: Since there has never been something existent and something non-existent, how can there be the being and non-being of activity and stillness, or quietude and affectivity as prior and posterior? Hence the utmost subtlety is still one, reaching to the virtue of Heaven above, and this is not something that shallow learning can fathom. If one ventures to scrutinise it, his lifetime of learning included three changes, and his writings were based on this. (Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, Appendix, 1046– 1047)

According to Hu Zhi’s words, Luo Hongxian went through three stages: directly trusting in innate moral knowing, returning to quietude and holding to stillness, and not dividing quietude from affectivity or activity from stillness and regarding original substance as one. Nie Bao and Hu Zhi were both contemporaries of Luo Hongxian, and their statements are more accurate than Huang Zongxi’s summary. Furthermore, if one examines the Collected Works of Luo Nianan, his early statements concerning directly trusting in innate moral knowing can frequently be seen, as in his “Letter in Reply to Xiao Zhongjing” [Da Xiao Zhongjing shu 答萧仲 敬书]: If one truly believes the highest good is present within us, and does not rely on seeking externally, then one sees it at all times and in all things, without going to the trouble of the slightest preparation or arrangement. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 392)

His “Letter to Lin Ganshan” [Yu Lin Ganshan shu 与林澉山书] also states:

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If one takes innate moral knowing to be external, and still has some so-called moral principles present, then this has not yet avoided the fault of supplementary improvising, and is indeed far from self-belief! Not partaking in the seen and heard, but solely trusting in true sincerity and pledging one’s life to this end, without any other thought; who but an exceptional hero can trust in this? (Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 291)

In a letter to Wang Longxi, he also said: In learning today there is nothing but directly trusting in innate moral knowing at all times, regarding condensed inactivity as original substance, and being aware that there is progress to be made. However, thoughts sometimes arise again, and they should not be allowed to fragment this. With earnest sincerity, I say apply effort to original substance. (“To Wang Longxi” [Yu Wang Longxi 与王龙溪], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 208)

These materials demonstrate that Luo Hongxian did indeed have a period of solely trusting in innate moral knowing and not depending on returning to quietude in his early years, and this period was roughly in the ten or so years after he acknowledged Huang Honggang 黄宏纲 and He Tingren 何廷仁 from the same prefecture as his teachers and sought Yangming’s precept of “the extension of knowing.” After this, he realised the indulgence of his early years was wrong, and began to emphasise practice. When Luo Hongxian was twenty years old, he once acknowledged Li Zhong 李中 of Guping 谷平 in the same district as his teacher, and in his youth he also once admired the Master Zhu 朱子 scholar Luo Lun, both of whom stressed an ethos of practice and must have heard a certain influence on the young Luo Hongxian, even if this was less attractive to him than Wang Learning. Luo Hongxian’s turn toward practice differed from the practice of Master Zhu Learning, as well as from that of Wang Yangming. In the former, the emphasis was on investigating concrete affairs and finely probing the diverse particularisations of principle, while in the latter, the emphasis was on carrying out the effort of doing good and removing the bad in concrete situations on the basis of the good and bad known by innate moral knowing. For Luo Hongxian however, practice mainly referred to experiencing innate moral knowing in concrete practice, in order to establish it as a standard for conduct. He once said: “Learning must begin with stillness and centrality, yet one also cannot be biased toward this centrality and evade mistakes. One must examine where all difficult points and undesirable thoughts come from. If amongst this there is anything that one cannot bear, then it is like gold that fears fire, and there must be copper, lead, tin or iron mixed up in it, and it cannot be covered up or even temporarily tolerated, trusting in its passing superficiality. Aside from this, there is nowhere to begin in punishment” (“To Wang Youxun” [Yu Wang Youxun 与王有训], Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 233). In addition, we can also see the change in emphasis between his earlier and later thought in his own autobiographical notes. He said: When in past years I saw people who discussed learning, they all said that knowledge of good and bad is innate moral knowing, and that acting according to this is the extension of knowing. I once applied my efforts at this, yet found nowhere to begin, and later regretted it…. A year or two later, things were different. At that time, retraction and concentration were my biases. My recognition of the original state of my mind was still incomplete, and I

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regarded quietude as prior to affectivity, and affectivity as being aroused by quietude. Although it is acceptable to say that affectivity is aroused by quietude, this does not avoid clinging to quietude as if it had a place; although it is acceptable to say that quietude is prior to affectivity, this does not avoid referring to affectivity as if it had a time. Once they are divided from one another, activity and stillness become dual, and this is where the two families [i.e. Buddhism and Daoism] are deeply wrong with their extreme views that harm the dao, yet I firmly believed and held to this. The faults this leads to are that one inevitably emphasises acting for oneself and neglects responding to things, and after some time I again doubted it…. The mind is extremely spiritual. When seen through the absence of things, it is vanishing; when seen through the presence of things, it is shining. If one wishes to completely restrain it, then it must be firm in its unknowing and solid in its inactivity, such that not a single thing can enter; if one wishes to use its duality, then it must be suddenly here and immediately there, such that it can unite substance without omission…. Applied to the first inkling of true quietude, one can examine its results, follow activity and stillness without emergence or disappearance, not oppose oneself to the things and affairs of the world, not rely on one’s own opinions as a ruling subject, not use itemised dao-principles to produce explanations, and not record words and phrases of expression to add to the spirit; in this I was gradually able to find my own beliefs. Since I was able to believe for myself, the effort of retraction and concentration spontaneously found their standard. Mingdao 明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao] once said: “Recognising the substance of benevolence, and using sincerity and respect to preserve it, there is no need for inspection or seeking. ‘There must be work but one ought not be fixated, the mind should be neither neglectful nor assist its growth’ [see Mencius, 2A.2], so there is no need to apply the slightest force.” This is the dao of preserving it, and also its standard. (“Record of Summer Travel in the Year of Jiayin,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 83)

At first, Luo Hongxian followed his teacher’s lesson that “knowledge of good and bad is innate moral knowing” in his work, feeling that the mind indeed has an instinctive love of the good and dislike for the bad, yet he could not know whether or not the good and bad judged by the mind are truly good and bad, i.e. whether or not subjective likes and dislikes are mixed up in them, and hence at this time he had not yet established a moral standard in his mind. In order to guarantee that there is no distortion in one’s judgments of good and bad, one must apply the effort of holding to stillness and returning to quietude, retracting and concentration so as to strengthen and cultivate innate moral knowing’s ability to judge right from wrong. At this time he regarded quietude as the condition for affectivity, with quietude as prior to affectivity, and affectivity as being aroused by quietude. Thus he believed that quietude is original substance, while affectivity is phenomenal; that quietude is absolute, while affectivity is relative. To regard quietude and affectivity or activity and stillness as divided into two is to depart from the principle that activity and stillness have no fixed forms and quietude and affectivity are as one. Its misuse inevitably leads to regarding the quietude and stillness within one’s individual mind as central and neglecting action in affairs, to loving stillness and disliking activity, thereby repressing the ceaseless flowing operation of the substance of the mind. Later he realised the biased fault of this kind of effort, and knew that activity and stillness, quietude and affectivity, and internal and external are all interconnected as one with no duality. In his later years, he regarded this mind in which activity and stillness, quietude and affectivity, and internal and external are all interconnected as one with no duality as the original mind, and, within this, recognised the first

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inkling and experienced the substance of benevolence, realising that this is self-sufficient in itself as an originally possessed standard that needs no inspection, one that ceaselessly flows into operation for itself with no need to apply force. These were the various stages of Luo Hongxian’s advances in effort, with the spiritual plane he attained in his later years already being a unity of returning to quietude and holding to stillness together with pre-formed innate moral knowing. He neither abandoned the substance of the mind to seek another source for moral rationality, nor depended on pre-formed innate moral knowing. He once synthesised the different viewpoints of Liu Shiquan 刘师泉 and Wang Longxi concerning the doctrine of innate moral knowing, and expressed his own final attainment: The sages and worthies down through the ages only asked that people seek the source from the present, and never sought too replace one mind with this mind. Shiquan wished set to work with anxiousness and attraction, never enjoying the present, and thus his words were painstaking, and could not avoid becoming divorced from reality. It is simply that at all times, one can never be without the effort of retraction and concentration, to make the spirit return to unity… One cannot directly rely on the present and stop at this as sufficient. (“Record of Summer Travel in the Year of Jiayin,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 86)

What Luo Hongxian attained already transcended the group who advocated effort at cultivation and demonstration such as Zou Shouyi 邹守益 and Nie Bao. This transcendence lay in the fact that he did not cast aside all the doctrines of the group who advocated pre-formed innate moral knowing, but rather absorbed their point concerning innate moral knowing as the origin and the human mind as the source of moral rationality, yet at the same time emphasised that this source must go through returning to quietude and holding to stillness before it can be relied upon. This placed an equal emphasis on original substance and effort. The preface he wrote for “On Reading a Copy of Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points” [Du kunbian lu chao 读困辨录抄] clearly expressed this point: When I began transcribing this record, I felt that every single word and sentence accorded with my mind. To look at it now however, I have some discriminations to make. The words of the gentleman (refers to Nie Bao) say: “The ruler of the mind is internal, yet responds externally, and then there is externality, which is its shadow.” Does the mind really have internal and external? He also says: “The state before arousal is not substance, yet at the time before arousal, one can perceive one’s substance of quietude.” The state before arousal is not a time; quietude has no substance, and cannot be perceived. One sees it and calls it benevolence, another sees it and calls it knowledge; this is the rarity of the dao. I was afraid that what I perceived as quietude was not quietude, and hence when I spoke of it from its being aroused yet not transgressing its position, I called it quietude; when I spoke of it from its constant quietude and interconnection with subtlety, I called it arousal. In tracing its ability to be vigilant and without thought or action, there is nothing actual to refer to, and one can but wait until it is shown to people. Hence one can speak of retraction and concentration in terms of stillness, yet one cannot call this a substance of quietude; one can speak of happiness, anger, sadness and joy in terms of time, yet one cannot say there is no centrality before arousal. Why? The mind has no time, and also no substance; it is only when it grasps and perceives that there is something to refer to. (“Preface to On Reading a Copy of Record of Discriminations Concerning Difficult Points,” Collected Works of Luo Hongxian, 474–475)

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In Luo Hongxian’s view, Nie Bao’s views on the ruler on the mind as internal and that which is outside the mind as its shadows, and on quietude as substance and the state before arousal as a period in time, all separate internal from external and substance from function, grasping the mind that has no location and no form as having a location and a form. Luo Hongxian believed that quietude and affectivity are as one, so affectivity that does not transgress its position is quietude, and its not transgressing its position and interconnecting with subtlety is affectivity. It is not that quietude has an actual substance, but rather that “being able to be vigilant and without selfishness” is quietude. This was the meaning of Cheng Mingdao’s [i.e. Cheng Hao] phrase “when active, it is settled, and when still, it is also settled.” Luo Hongxian derived his meaning from Cheng Mingdao. Speaking from Luo Hongxian’s attainment in his later years, the time of retraction and concentration is stillness, and not a substance of quietude, since quietude has no substance. In relation to Nie Shuangjiang 聂双江 [i.e. Nie Bao], who still held that the substance of quietude was actually existent, this was certainly breakthrough. This breakthrough brought him closer to Wang Yangming’s “Activity and stillness concern that which one meets with at certain times, yet the original substance of the mind remains firmly undivided into activity and stillness…. If one follows principle, then despite a myriad changes in one’s interactions, one is never active, whereas if one follows desire, then even if one’s mind is withered and without a single thought, one is never still” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Luo Hongxian’s thorough realisation of the substance of benevolence in his later years was a further development of his effort of holding to stillness. Luo Hongxian’s learning in his early years was closest to Nie Bao. After Luo Hongxian, none of the various scholars of Jiangyou were stronger than him, and although they made minor deviations concerning aspects such as the priority or posterity of quietude and affectivity and the being or non-being of activity and stillness, in general, no major philosophical systems emerged. Huang Zongxi frequently referred to the role played by Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian in correcting the pre-formed innate moral knowing school of Wang Learning: “After Yangming died, scholars were unable to fathom the deeper meaning of his words concerning the extension of innate moral knowing, and most regarded feeling and knowledge as bearing it, perceiving it in carrying out affairs, without any real benefit. Shuangjiang and Nianan promoted the state before arousal to correct their mistake, and like a floating pot in a flowing river, Wang Learning depended on this so as not to sink” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 468). He also said: “Although Yangming took the extension of innate moral knowing to be his central tenet, his followers gradually lost its transmission, generally regarding the centrality before arousal as the harmony of the already aroused, and hence only exerted their efforts at extending harmony, becoming increasingly frivolous and shallow, waiting for their good and bad to form before acting to restrain them, and were thus unable overcome their difficult and mixed up state. Hence Shuangjiang and Nianan used returning to quietude to remedy this, and thus were on the same path as Yanping 延 平 [i.e. Li Dong 李侗]” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 458). These assessments are sound, giving a clear thread for us to grasp the theoretical particularities and

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historical role of the Wang school in Jiangyou. However, through his direct reliance on innate moral knowing in his early years, his emphasis on returning to quietude and holding to stillness in his middle period, and his thorough realisation of the substance of benevolence in his later years, Luo Hongxian’s attainment in transcending the various figures of Jiangyou should not be neglected.

Chapter 13

Wang Shihuai’s Doctrines of Penetrating Inherent Nature and Scrutinising Inflections

The doctrines of returning to quietude and holding to stillness held by Nie Bao 聂 豹 and Luo Hongxian 罗洪先 of the Jiangyou 江右 Wang [Yangming] 王阳明 school advocated applying effort to the state before arousal, first using the efforts of retraction and gathering in order to make the substance of the mind already possess the quality of open, broad impartiality before it is affected by and responds to external things. This kind of approach to effort necessarily implies accepting the state before arousal as an independent stage, one that can exist independently of the already aroused. This not only contradicts the doctrine of “one source for substance and function, no gap between the manifest and subtle” that was the basic starting point for Song-Ming Confucians, but also differs from Wang Yangming’s lesson that “Once separated from the already aroused, where can one start from in seeking the state before arousal?” Thus for many scholars at the same time as and later than Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian, although they initially affirmed their returning to quietude in order to interconnect affectively and their holding to substance in order to respond to function, as well as their use of these to correct the errors of those who purely relied on the a priori, they bitterly criticised their theoretical mistake of severing the already aroused and the state before arousal, activity and stillness, and the mind and things. Wang Shihuai was a member of this group. Wang Shihuai 王时槐 (1521–1605; zi 字 Zizhi 子植, hao 号 Tangnan 塘南) was from Anfu 安福 in Jiangxi province. He became a metropolitan graduate during the Jiajing 嘉靖 period, before taking up positions including secretary in the Ministry of War 兵部 in Nanjing, chief minister in the Court of the Imperial Stud 太仆寺, and administration vice commissioner for Shaanxi province, before requesting to return home. During the Wanli 万历 period, he was called up to be administration vice commissioner for Guizhou province, and sought out for promotions including chief minister of the Court of State Ceremonial 鸿胪寺 in Nanjing and chief minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices 太常寺, but refused them all, devoting himself to academic study. His letters discussing learning and his

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lecture records are preserved in Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall (Youqing tang hegao 友庆堂合稿).1 Wang Shihuai belonged to the Wang school in Jiangyou, and in his youth he learned under his fellow townsman Liu Wenmin 刘文敏 ([hao 号] Liangfeng 两 峰), regarded holding to stillness as the main point for applying effort, and even affirmed Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian’s returning to quietude and holding to stillness. After he took up official position, his social circle progressively broadened and his learning increasingly progressed, and he gradually felt dissatisfied with the doctrines of returning to quietude and holding to stillness. In his later years, he took “penetrating inherent nature” as his core precept, “scrutinising inflections” as his approach to effort, and the non-duality of a priori and a posteriori substance and function together with implementing the production and reproduction of the substance of benevolence in both action and stillness as his final aim.

1 Empty Stillness, Production and Reproduction Although Liu Wenmin’s learning agreed with the academic direction of returning to quietude and holding to stillness, in terms of questions such as the relationship between a priori and a posteriori and the quality of mind and inherent nature a priori, his views differed from Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian. Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian emphasised applying effort to the state before arousal prior to the already aroused. Liu Wenmin believed that the state before arousal and the already aroused could not be strictly divided, and that, although the substance of mind and inherent nature is soundless and scentless, it has latent within it the productive impulse (shengji 生机) of the myriad things, and the flowing operation of this productive impulse contains a ruler (zhuzai 主宰) within it. The original substance of the mind and inherent nature is both activity and stillness, both movement and stopping, both flowing in operation and ruled over. He said: “My inherent nature is rooted in constant production and also in constant stopping. Coming and going or rising and falling are not constant production; concentrating on quietude and condensing into solidity are not constant stopping. Producing yet not pursuing is what is called constant stopping; stopping yet not lodging is what is called constant production. The ruler is the ruler of flowing operation, and flowing operation is the flowing operation of the ruler” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学 案], 432). Constant production is flowing operation, constant stopping is the ruler, and neither can be emphasised at the expense of the other. Like his fellow students Chen Jiamo 陈嘉谟 and He Jing 贺泾, Wang Shihuai accepted the core precept of Liu Wenmin’s learning, and thus from the beginning his learning emphasised production and reproduction (shengsheng 生生) and the non-duality of activity and

[Trans.] References to Youqing tang hegao refer to a re-carved edition from the Guangxu 光绪 period of the Qing Dynasty.

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stillness; although he belonged to the cultivation and demonstration of innate moral knowing school (liangzhi xiuzheng pai 良知修证派) together with Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian, and thus opposed pre-formed innate moral knowing, his understanding differed completely from that of Nie and Luo in terms of ontology. In Wang Shihuai’s view, stillness was only a temporary method for beginner students to enter into the dao 道, and it cannot be taken as the central approach of learning for one’s life. He said: Although learning is not divided between activity and stillness, scholars at the beginning of their learning in particular have been confused for a long time, and the authentic impulse of their original mind has been completely submerged in the dust and dirt of the world. Thus when former Confucians established their teachings, they wished people to have somewhere to set to work, and thus temporarily set aside external affairs and eased off from the fate of the world, leading them to silently recognise the true original state of their mind through sitting in stillness, until at last their deviant obstructions were penetrated and the numinous light was revealed. How can it be said that people should sever human relations and abandon things for their whole lives, sitting in boredom like a lump, only conserving obstinate emptiness and cold stillness, as if this were a final outcome? (“Reply to Zhou Shoufu” [Da Zhou Shoufu 答 周守甫], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 5)

This is the same meaning as Wang Yangming’s exhortation for beginners in learning to not allow indulging in emptiness and conserving quietude to lead to a habit of laziness. Wang Shihuai believed that activity and stillness are as one, and that the authentic impulse of activity is contained within stillness, hence seeking stillness is the means, while the manifestation of the authentic impulse within stillness is the end. This manifestation cannot be forced, and when the effort of stillness is accomplished, the authentic impulse will spontaneously manifest itself. He once described his experience of this manifestation of the authentic impulse within stillness, saying: In past years I began by merely probing the root and fathoming the source, and was truly not without attachment to withered quietude. However, when this attachment reached its peak, the authentic impulse was spontaneously produced; that which is said to be one body with the myriad things emerged in all its vitality, such that it could not be stopped. This was not attained through taking up what others said, nor was it a conversion in learning, but rather was almost like the return of yang 阳 at the end of the twelfth lunar month, without knowing why it is so. (“To Xiao Duiyu” [Yu Xiao Duiyu 与萧兑嵎], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 13)

Wang Shihuai saw this authentic impulse within stillness as a kind of spontaneous manifestation. The plenitude of this authentic impulse is the spiritual plane of the myriad things as one body. The authentic impulse never halts for even a moment, but constantly emerges in people’s innermost mind. Even when the human mind is in extreme stillness, this conscious intention is still lively and sprightly. In Wang Shihuai’s view, this is the original substance of the mind, which he also called “intention” (yi 意). Intention is the productive impulse, which is an expression of the cosmos’ principle of “production and reproduction is what is called change” [see Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”

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(Xici shang 系辞上)] within the human mind. Wang Shihuai viewed the role of “intention” as extremely important, saying: The productive impulse is that from which Heaven, Earth and the myriad things emerge, which does not belong to being or non-being, and cannot be divided into substance and function. Before this impulse, there is no state before arousal, and after this impulse, there is no already aroused. If one says that before this productive impulse, there was a non-productive original substance, one falls into dualistic views…. Master Yangming said: The essential point of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) is simply to make one’s intentions sincere (chengyi 诚意). The investigation of things and the extension of knowing are the effort of making one’s intentions sincere. Knowing is the substance of intention, and not something existing outside intention; things are the function of intention, and not things existing outside intention. When one raises the single word intention, quietude, affectivity, substance and function are all present and complete. Intention does not refer to the arising and extinguishing of thoughts and reflections, but is the activity of the productive impulse prior to form, and lies between being and non-being. The alone (du 独) is intention’s entrance into subtlety, and is not dual. Intention is original production and reproduction, and if the impulse of creative transformation is not full then it cannot produce. Hence what is valued in learning is to begin from self-restraint, which is to be careful when alone, since this concentrates the central pivot of the dao. (“To He Ruding” [Yu He Ruding 与贺汝定], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 32)

The meaning expressed in this passage is the core precept of Wang Shihuai’s learning, as well as the theoretical precondition for his so-called “penetrating inherent nature” and “scrutinising inflections.” Here, the core of what he emphasised is “intention.” Intention is the most fundamental, and in the three guiding principles and eight items from the Great Learning, their effort can all be resolved into intention. Wang Yangming regarded the investigation of things as the starting point for making one’s intentions sincere, and this point was taken up by Wang Shihuai, although he cast aside the point emphasised by Wang Yangming, that making one’s intentions sincere means doing good and removing the bad at the level of thoughts, and directly headed toward the ceaseless production and reproduction of the original substance of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. For Wang Shihuai, “intention” can be understood in terms of the two aspects of original substance and effective function. At the level of original substance, intention is a concentration of the cosmos’ principle of production and reproduction, an expression of this principle of production and reproduction in human nature. He said: The cosmos has never ceased through the ages, and is simply this principle of production and reproduction, which has no substance and function that can be divided and no sound or scent that can be reached, and cannot be attained through forcible probing or seeking. The productive principle of this mind is originally without sound or scent yet is not withered and dry, but is in fact the source from which Heaven, Earth and the myriad things all emerge, and is called inherent nature. The manifestation of productive principle is continuous and without rest, is originally without sound or scent, and is called intention. (“Reply to He Ruding” [Da He Ruding 答贺汝定], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 34)

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That is to say, the fundamental law of the cosmos is production and reproduction without cease, the mind and inherent nature of people are a concentration of the cosmos’ principle of production and reproduction, and “intention” is a revelation and manifestation of inherent nature, hence intention is the original substance of the mind. Since it is original substance, it transcends the oppositions between being and non-being, substance and function, and the state before arousal and the already aroused. Its essential quality is “production and reproduction.” Although the impulse of creative transformation replenishes its substance, people’s selfish desires are obstructions to this, so it cannot be constantly revealed. Self-restraint (shoulian 收敛) is precisely in order to ensure that the cosmos’ impulse of production and transformation is manifest at all times. Hence Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian’s returning to quietude and holding to stillness is not completely without its uses. This kind of self-restraint is precisely the precondition for the manifestation of the productive impulse, and thus self-restraint is making one’s intentions sincere. Wang Shihuai said: This mind is limpid in its utmost emptiness, vast and without any things; it is the original substance of the mind that is like this. When it can constantly be like this, this is called respect, what Yangming called “the effort of combining with and attaining original substance.” (“Reply to Guo Yiji” [Da Guo Yiji 答郭以济], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 14)

Although being limpid in utmost emptiness and production and reproduction without cease both belong to “the original substance of the mind,” the former speaks of its mode and the latter of its essence, such that the former is the condition for the aroused function and flowing operation of the latter. At the level of effective functioning, Wang Shihuai held that “knowing is the substance of intention, while things are the function of intention.” The word “knowing” here refers to innate moral knowing, and is the mind’s knowing awareness of productive impulse of the original substance of the cosmos; “intention” is the dynamic power of the productive impulse of the substance of the mind as it shows itself at the level of consciousness. Intention differs from the transient arising and vanishing of thoughts. Thoughts are “superficial signs [biaomo 标末] of intention.” The intention of original substance is mystical and subtle, and hence it can be experienced in “activity without form, between being and non-being.” Although it can become manifest as knowing awareness, it itself does not always become manifest as knowing awareness, and hence “quietude, affectivity, substance and function are all present and complete.” In the “things” spoken of here, the emphasis is not in objects independent of and external to people, but to thing-images (wuxiang 物象) that have passed through the mind’s integrative function, during which process intention gives them the quality of production and reproduction without cease. That is to say, things are natural things that have had the fundamental law of the cosmos (the authentic impulse of production and reproduction without cease) projected onto them and thereby gained a significance of meaning and value.

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Wang Shihuai strongly emphasised the disciplined cultivation of intention, and he regarded abiding in respect (jujing 居敬) as the specific method of cultivating intention through discipline. He said: In speaking of abiding in respect and probing principle, neither of the two can be given up, yet their essential point is exhausted by the words “abiding in respect.” In terms of the aspect of refined clarity and enlightenment in abiding in respect, it is what is called probing principle, and they are not two affairs. Even investigating past and present and discussing classics and histories are simply one factor within abiding in respect. Respect is all-inclusive, and outside of respect there is nothing more to be done. Thus I say that the words “abiding in respect” are exhaustive. If one recognises that there is but the one matter of abiding in respect, then effort can have not even a moment’s rest. (“Reply to Guo Yiji,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 12)

That is to say, in the “cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge” spoken of by Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi 朱熹, the meaning of respect comprises two aspects, and thus there is really only the single affair of abiding in respect: enlightenment and knowing awareness concerning the principle embodied in objects, and the disciplined cultivation and maintenance of this principle. Hence abiding in respect includes probing principle, and both are a posteriori affairs of the use of effort. For this reason, Wang Shihuai opposed Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian’s doctrine of returning to quietude and holding to stillness, believing that, although they opposed some of Wang Yangming’s students’ fault of regarding feeling and recognition (qingshi 情识) as innate moral knowing and advocated applying effort to the state before arousal, this state is as Cheng Hao 程颢 said, “Anything prior to people being born in stillness cannot be spoken of,” so one cannot apply effort to the state before arousal. He said: The centrality before arousal is inherent nature. Some say one must first retract and concentrate in order to return to the substance before arousal, but I fear this is not so. The inherent nature before arousal cannot be modelled in advance or jumbled together; it can be silently comprehended, but cannot be forcibly grasped. In feeling and recognition, one can retract and concentrate, but as for original inherent nature, there is nothing to manage, and there is thus no means to carry out the effort of retraction and concentration. (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 4, 26)

On this point, Wang Shihuai was in agreement with the school of pre-formed innate moral knowing, believing that innate moral knowing itself is quietude and affectivity as one, and that innate moral knowing is the centrality before arousal. To believe that innate moral knowing must be retracted and concentration before it can become the centrality before arousal is “to install a head above the head, to put up a house above the house.” Although Nie and Luo warned against the wilder approach of later Wang Learning scholars who took feeling and recognition to be innate moral knowing, and advocated the method of retraction and concentration, this effort of retraction and concentration was applied to the state before the arousal of innate moral knowing, and thus was applied to the wrong place. He pointed out:

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The phrase “extension of innate moral knowing” was the essence of Master Yangming’s instruction. Unfortunately the master expressed this in his later years, and was not able to fully probe its import for his students. After the master died, scholars generally took feeling and recognition to be innate moral knowing, and thus perceived it in carrying out affairs, without any real benefit. Luo Nianan proposed the state before arousal to correct their error, yet seemingly did not avoid installing a head above the head. The so-called innate moral knowing is the authentic clarity of original inherent nature without reflection, which is originally in quietude, and brooks no distinction. How could there be any state before arousal outside of this? (“Recorded Sayings,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 4, 16)

Here, he was somewhat dissatisfied with Luo Hongxian’s doctrine of returning to quietude and holding to stillness, but his view was consistent with Wang Yangming’s repeated exhortation that “innate moral knowing is the centrality before arousal, which is the original substance of quietude without activity,” and hence it was taken up by Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 in his comments on the cultivation and demonstration of innate moral knowing school.

2 Penetrating Inherent Nature Wang Shihuai regarded intention as a manifestation of inherent nature (xing 性), and for him, inherent nature was an exceptionally important concept. If one analyses his concept of inherent nature, the real meaning of his doctrine of penetrating inherent nature (touxing 透性) can be seen. Explaining inherent nature by means of “the principle of production and reproduction” was Wang Shihuai’s most important idea. He said: That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is but one principle of production and reproduction, and this is what is called inherent nature. If scholars recognise it in silence and preserve it in stillness, then intimacy with relatives, benevolence for the people and love for things will spontaneously brook no stopping. Why? This inherent nature originally and spontaneously produces and reproduces from root to branch, producing and reproducing down through the ages, so who can hold it back? Thus illuminating things and examining relationships is not forced action, but the exhaustive expression of inherent nature. (“Reply to He Ruding,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 35)

Cheng Yi proposed that “inherent nature is principle,” thinking that the inherent natures of people and things are all an expression of the fundamental principle of the cosmos. Wang Shihuai said that within the cosmos all is but one principle of production and reproduction, and this is what is called inherent nature, thereby accepting that inherent nature is principle. However, in terms of the content of inherent nature and principle, Wang Shihuai clearly absorbed meanings including those of Mencius’ “the mind of the four inklings is something I originally possess” [paraphrase of Mencius, 6A.6], “the great virtue of Heaven and Earth is called production” from the Commentaries on the Changes [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. II” (Xici xia 系辞下)], and Cheng Hao’s “recognising and attaining this

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benevolence, use sincerity and respect to preserve it,” regarding the virtue of production and reproduction as the fundamental principle of the cosmos. Cheng Yi’s “inherent nature is principle” referred to the specific dao-principles of the myriad things of the cosmos latently governing these things’ actual activities and developmental processes, focusing on the inherent regularity of these things and affairs. Wang Shihuai’s “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is but one principle of production and reproduction” referred to observing and experiencing the vigorous productive impulse and unceasing vital and creative force of the myriad things, and elevating it to the level of a cosmic principle, a principle that must be recognised in silence and preserved in stillness, and cannot be attained through rational analysis. Wang Shihuai believed that the principle of production and reproduction was the law of the cosmos as well as that of the human mind, that the two were one and the same. Hence in his view, the Learning of the Mind and the Learning of Principle were consistent in fundamental terms, and Cheng-Zhu 程朱 and Lu-Wang 陆王 were not irreconcilable, because the two doctrines both believed that the fundamental principle of the cosmos was the principle of people and things, and to probe the principles of things and affairs was to exhaustively express one’s own inherent nature. He said: Under Heaven there are no things outside inherent nature, and no things outside principle. Hence if one probes this principle in all things, there is one principle running throughout, and that which fills the cosmos, extending continuously down through the ages to the present, is in sum nothing but one single principle. This is what is called the learning of probing principle and exhaustively expressing inherent nature; how is it any different from Yangming’s precept of the extension of innate moral knowing? It is simply that when speaking in terms of the illuminating clarity of this principle, we call it innate moral knowing, and innate moral knowing does not refer to feeling and recognition, but is what the Cheng school called principle or inherent nature. Innate moral knowing runs throughout Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and cannot be spoken of in terms of internal and external. If one comprehends this, then it should be clear that Master Zhu’s investigation of things is not a pursuit of the external, and Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing is not solely internal. (“Reply to Yang Jinshan” [Da Yang Jinshan 答杨晋山], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 2, 19)

The grandeur of comprehension in Wang Shihuai’s explication here was seldom matched among the masters of Jiangyou. He was not entrenched in the doctrines of any single school, but took a broad view of the whole of Neo-Confucianism. His “in sum but one single principle” was Zhu Xi’s, the probing of principle and exhaustive expression of inherent nature was Zhang Zai’s 张载, while recognising innate moral knowing as the illuminating clarity of principle was completely consistent with Wang Yangming’s “innate moral knowing is the aspect of illuminating clarity and numinous awareness in Heavenly principle.” When he said that “innate moral knowing runs throughout Heaven, Earth and the myriad things,” he used innate moral knowing as a synonym for “Heavenly principle,” and this Heavenly principle is one and the same as the principle in the mind. Hence Wang Shihuai was a Learning of the Mind thinker who reconciled the two great schools of

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Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang. This reconciliation represented a new tendency that emerged among the students of Wang Yangming’s students in the late Ming period. Wang Shihuai’s doctrines of principle and qi 气 and of inherent nature and endowment (ming 命) were closely connected, and he discussed the meaning of inherent nature and endowment, saying: Although the word inherent nature can originally not be spoken of, and force cannot be applied to it, knowing awareness and intentional thoughts are all manifestations of inherent nature, and are endowment…. Inherent nature is the principle of the a priori, while knowing belongs to its aperture of arousal, and is the child of the a priori and the mother of the a posteriori. This knowing lies between substance and function, so if one seeks substance prior to knowing, one meets with emptiness, and if one seeks function after knowing, one pursues things. Prior to knowing there is no further state before arousal, and after knowing there is no further already aroused, while if one combines them together, there are not two efforts, and thus it is said to be alone. The alone has no opposite. Since it has no opposite, it is one, and hence it is said to be non-duality. Intention is the silent operation of knowing, and does not stand opposed to it to make a duality. For this reason, inherent nature cannot be artificially cultivated, but can only be suddenly realised. Endowment is the manifestation of inherent nature, but is not without habituated qi lying concealed within it, and thus has something that can be cultivated. The cultivation of endowment is the effort of exhaustively expressing inherent nature. (“Reply to Xiao Wuan” [Da Xiao Wuan 答萧勿庵], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 54)

For Wang Shihuai, inherent nature is the principle of the a priori; innate moral knowing is the aperture of arousal of inherent nature; knowing awareness and intentional thoughts are the site for the embodiment and dwelling of inherent nature and innate moral knowing, which is actual, and thus belongs to endowment. These three important categories respectively constitute three levels of one and the same original substance. Inherent nature is principle, and effort cannot be applied to this. Innate moral knowing is the aperture of arousal of inherent nature and principle, i.e. the point of knowing awareness of the law of the cosmos. As the aperture of arousal, it is an expression of something (inherent nature, principle) on another higher level, and is thus a child. Yet as the foundation for all of a person’s good conduct, it is also a producer, and is thus a mother. Wang Shihuai spoke of innate moral knowing as a combination of moral rationality and epistemological rationality. Moral rationality is inherent nature and principle, epistemological rationality is knowing awareness, and innate moral knowing is the self-awareness of inherent nature and principle. Innate moral knowing lies between substance and function, and can be said to be both substance and function. It belongs neither to the metaphysical level of inherent nature, principle and the Supreme Polarity, nor to the actual level of knowing awareness. It can also be said to be the function of inherent nature and principle, and the substance of knowing awareness and intentional thoughts. It is the channel by which penetrating the higher can attain inherent nature and principle, and the foundation by which studying the lower can seek knowing awareness and intentional thoughts. Hence it is also a unity of the state before arousal and the already aroused. Innate moral knowing and intentional thought belong to endowment. Endowment here signifies the flowing operation of qi at the actual level. Since inherent nature has nothing that can be cultivated, the effort of

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cultivating inherent nature must be applied to endowment, and hence he said: “The cultivation of endowment is the effort of exhaustively expressing inherent nature.” What must be emphasised here is that, for Wang Shihuai, intention (yi 意) and intentional thought (yinian 意念) are two completely different concepts. Intention is a faint affective arousal of the productive impulse of inherent nature, and is an intermediate link between inherent nature and endowment, while intentional thought is an actual specific psychological activity that contains interruptions, content, and representations. Wang Shihuai discussed the distinction between intention and thought in detail, saying: Intention cannot be spoken of in terms of activity and stillness, since activity and stillness are thought, not intention. Intention is the secret impulse of production and reproduction, and where there is inherent nature, it is constantly productive and becomes intention, while where there is intention, it gradually appears and becomes thought. There has never been inherent nature but not intention, since inherent nature without intention would be a stubborn emptiness; there has never been intention but not thought, since intention without thought would be a stagnant impulse. (“Reply to Yang Jinshan,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 2, 21)

Intention is inherent nature and principle expressed as a kind of faint tendency, one that has not yet become expressed as specific intentional thoughts, and has as its content the impulse of production and reproduction without cease, while specific intentional thoughts are the conveyor of intention, intention as expressed in actual thoughts that can be known. Without intention, inherent nature is an abstract entity, and thus empty; without thoughts, intention has nowhere to be actualised, and without a specific site to be actualised, the productive impulse is obstructed. Here, Wang Shihuai’s intention had already provided a precedent for Liu Zongzhou’s 刘宗周 views of intention as a latent tendency that governs a posteriori thoughts, and as the ruler of the mind. Wang Shihuai’s discussions of the relationship between inherent nature, endowment and innate moral knowing prepared the theoretical basis for his doctrines of penetrating inherent nature and scrutinising inflections. In his analysis of the relationship between inherent nature and endowment, his emphasis was on their quality of being single yet dual and dual yet single, inseparable and yet unmixed. He said: Although inherent nature and endowment are said to be non-dual, they also cannot be described as mixed. Thus in terms of authentic, constant and unchanging principle, one speaks of inherent nature; in terms of the silent and unceasing operation of its impulse, one speaks of endowment. Endowment is the endowment of inherent nature, while inherent nature is the inherent nature of endowment; they are single yet dual, and dual yet single. (“Reply to Zou Ziyin” [Da Zou Ziyin 答邹子尹], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 59)

Wang Shihuai’s detailed analyses of the categories of inherent nature and endowment together with their relationship were aimed at leading people to understand that that which the Confucian sages and worthies held was but a single principle, that although there were differences between the metaphysical and the

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actual, original substance and effective function, inherent nature or principle and feeling or recognition, etc., there was only one fundamental precept. To understand this relationship between the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations is to gain insight into the site where one can settle oneself and establish one’s life. This is where the foundation of his doctrine of “penetrating inherent nature” was located. He said: Although inherent nature originally cannot be spoken of, when forced to speak of it, the court of Yu 虞 [i.e. legendary emperor Shun 舜] said “The mind of dao is subtle” [see Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书), “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟)], Confucius said “the centrality before arousal,” “that means by which they are put into practice is one” [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)], “that which is above forms [i.e. metaphysical]” [see Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”], and “what is unseen and unheard” [see Centrality in the Ordinary], Master Zhou [Dunyi] 周 敦颐 said “the non-polarity,” and Master Cheng 程子 said “that which lies before people being born in stillness.” These are all what is called “secret” or “without thought or action,” and in general, are just other names for a single inherent nature. If scholars are truly able to penetrate and realise this substance, then in all the length and breadth of their discussions, there is just this principle. All words and speech simply amount to depictions, and one need not cling to them. (“Reply to the Esteemed Mr. Gong Xiumo of the Lingbei Circuit” [Da Lingbei dao Gong Xiumo gong 答岭北道龚修默公], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 2, 42)

According to this, “penetrating inherent nature” refers to penetrating realisation of this inherent nature, which means knowing that the legacy of a thousand sages is but the one word “inherent nature.” The word “inherent nature” is connected to all Confucian categories and concepts, and covers all Confucian learning and effort. By penetrating inherent nature, one can avoid being confused by the written words and precepts of different thinkers. Wang Shihuai provided lengthy and detailed discussions of all categories connected to inherent nature and endowment, and gave definitions of each of them as requiring people to penetrate inherent nature. He was a metaphysician, and his ontological comprehension was most prominent. The debates of the masters of Jiangyou frequently fell within the scope of innate moral knowing, activity and stillness, centrality and harmony, etc., yet since Wang Shihuai focused on the metaphysical and actual distinctions of inherent nature, endowment, intention, thought, etc., the range of his reflections greatly outclassed other Jiangyou scholars, and displayed a clear tendency to reconcile Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang. His precept of penetrating inherent nature escaped from the narrow approach of the cultivation and demonstration of innate moral knowing school’s “authentic cultivation and practical learning” with its focus on specific practices, and headed directly toward the vast and brilliant spiritual plane of metaphysics. He said: The substance of inherent nature is originally vast and brilliant, and the function of inherent nature is spontaneously subtle and moderate…. If one still doubts this, fearing that to regard only the penetration of inherent nature as learning is to slip into the empty dissolution of Buddhism and Daoism, and thus takes the pursuit of minor matters to be practical learning, believing that one can thereby differentiate oneself from these two families, this is to be ignorant of the difference of the two families, which can be spontaneously distinguished

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after penetrating inherent nature. To not penetrate inherent nature but rather forcibly use conjecture to establish one’s doctrines is to scratch an itch from outside one’s boot, and is of questionable use. (“Reply to the Venerable Mr. Gong Xiumo of the Lingbei Circuit,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 2, 43)

Here, his approach differed from that of most scholars: Most scholars believed that what the defining characteristics of Buddhism were its empty discussion of mind and inherent nature and its lack of practical learning, and thus used specific practices to differentiate themselves from the empty quietude of the Buddhists. Wang Shihuai however used the vastness and subtlety of penetrating inherent nature and realising original substance to distinguish Buddhism and Confucianism. This distinction is theoretical and attained through metaphysical realisation, rather than being minor and inessential. He pointed out that, although Buddhists and especially Chan Buddhism frequently discussed the illumination of the mind and perception of inherent nature, and Confucianism also advocated the perception of inherent nature, the inherent natures perceived by the two were completely different. The inherent nature perceived by Buddhism was “emptiness,” what they called “the emptiness of inherent nature,” and [they held that] as soon as the emptiness of inherent nature is realised, everything is finished; in the Confucian penetration of inherent nature however, one perceives the Heavenly principle within inherent nature, and really applies the effort of cultivation to preserve and sustain it. He said: In general, the Buddhists advocate renouncing the world, hence as soon as one is enlightened, everything is finished, and there is no further discussion of being careful when alone (shendu 慎独). We Confucians advocate the learning of governing the world, applying practical cultivation precisely in human relations, things and affairs, and thus regard being careful when alone as critical. As soon as one is careful concerning that which is alone, then human relations, things and affairs all attain central regulation. Why? The alone is the child of the a priori and the mother of the a posteriori, the pivotal impulse that sets out from being and enters non-being, and there is nothing more important than this. If one speaks only of penetrating inherent nature and not of being careful when alone, I am afraid that later scholars will simply gain a vague perception of the substance of inherent nature and not be truly enlightened, saying that within inherent nature there are originally no human relations, things and affairs and everything departs from being and tends toward non-being, and thereby dividing substance from function and affairs from principle, to the point of not cultivating care in conduct and saying this has nothing to do with inherent nature; the harm of this cannot be overstated. Thus scholars do not only have one path, since there are those who penetratingly realise original nature and include being careful when alone within this, and there are those who intensively scrutinise being careful when alone and include the realisation of inherent nature within this. In general, if one profoundly and authentically penetrates this principle, then one can neither sharply cling to these as two views, nor give them a confused generalisation with no distinction, but can only find a tacit accord between them in self-attainment. (“Reply to Guo Cunfu” [Da Guo Cunfu 答郭存 甫], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 2, 52)

Wang Shihuai used whether or not they spoke of being careful when alone to distinguish Confucianism and Buddhism. Since “alone” here refers to innate moral knowing, being careful when alone refers to putting innate moral knowing into effect in specific things and affairs. He pointed out the approaches to learning: one is to use original substance to encompass effort, i.e. to “penetratingly realise original

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nature and include being careful when alone within this,” and one is to take that which effort reaches as original substance, i.e. to “intensively study being careful when alone and include the realisation of inherent nature within this.” This is a synthesis of the a priori innate moral knowing school and the cultivation and demonstration through effort school. Since penetrating inherent nature and being careful when alone are neither dual nor singular, this is to hold that the two schools can be fused, with the ultimate goal being that one “profoundly and authentically penetrates this principle.” Under this unified goal, the core precepts of the two schools can be compatible. Wang Shihuai’s doctrine of penetrating inherent nature represented a transcendence of the Jiangyou school, and a great step forward on the basis of Luo Hongxian’s thorough realisation of the substance of benevolence in his later years. It can be said to represent a departure from the boundaries of the Wang school in Jiangyou that sought to reconcile with the other branches of the Wang school, and as such had the most grand insights and the most lofty enlightenment.

3 Scrutinising Inflections If “penetrating inherent nature” can be described as Wang Shihuai’s theory of original substance, then in his theory of effort, the most important element was “scrutinising inflections” (yanji 研几). “Inflection” was an important category in the Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易), where it referred to the state of extreme subtlety of things and affairs (including thoughts and ideas) when they first emerge. The “Appended Phrases” appendix to the Changes states: “Inflections are the subtleties of activity, the first appearances of good fortune. The superior man perceives inflections and acts, without waiting until the end of the day” [see Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. II”]. It meant that one must promptly grasp the impulses of affairs that can easily slip away, and take corresponding measures without the slightest delay. The Book of Changes also held that the state of things and affairs when they first emerge is very subtle, and that the ability to know this subtle quality of things and affairs and its development is extremely mysterious, hence it said: “Is one who knows inflection not spiritual?” The Book of Changes also advocated “fathoming the profound and scrutinising inflections” [see Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”], i.e. thoroughly experiencing and observing things and affairs, and studying the subtle signs and symptoms of their beginnings. Zhou Dunyi developed this idea from the Book of Changes, using “sincerity, spirit, and inflection” to depict original substance, flowing operation and the linchpin within them. He said: “That which is quiet in its inactivity is sincerity; that which is affected and becomes interconnected is spirit; that which is active but not yet formed and lies between being and non-being is inflection. Since sincerity is refined, it is clear; since spirit responds, it is wondrous; since inflection is subtle, it is obscure. Sincerity, spirit and inflection speak of the sage.” He also said: “In sincerity there is action, while in inflection there is good and bad” (Penetrating the Book of Changes [Tongshu 通书], Ch. 4 “Sagehood”

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[Sheng 圣]). Wang Shihuai borrowed the concept of “scrutinising inflections” from the Book of Changes. He believed that since inherent nature belonged to the metaphysical, effort could not be applied to it, and one must thus apply one’s exertions to the site where inherent nature is manifested. According to his statements, inherent nature lies in intuition, cultivation lies in the a posteriori, and cultivating the a posteriori is the precondition for realising the a priori. He said: Inherent nature is a priori. As soon as a lone inflection emerges, it belongs to the a posteriori, and the a posteriori cannot be without latent habituated qi. If habituated qi is not eliminated, it eventually becomes an obstruction to inherent nature, and thus one must be careful about it. Once habituated qi is completely dissolved, it later becomes the reality of enlightenment. Hence true cultivation is the means to achieve one’s enlightenment, and there are not two affairs. (“A Summary of the Meaning of the Stone Inscription of the Great Learning” [Shijing Daxue lueyi 石经大学略义], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 5, 44) In inherent nature, it is enlightenment alone that is precious, and there is nothing that can be arranged by the mind, since as soon as one takes up any activity, this belongs to contamination. The alone is the function of inherent nature, and when it hides in function, form and qi have no need for affairs to return to their original state. This is what is called yin necessarily following yang, Kun 坤 necessarily “losing friends in the north-east” yet finally having grounds for celebration, being posterior to Heaven yet reverently upholding the times of Heaven. (“A Summary of the Meaning of the Stone Inscription of the Great Learning,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 5, 45)

This clearly points out that cultivation of inherent nature must be a posteriori. Inflections are also called the alone, while intention is the subtlety of emergent arousal, which is not known by others but by the self alone. At this time one should be careful about it, preventing contamination by habituated qi, and preserving the translucency of authentic inherent nature. This is the effort of realising the a priori. It can also be called overcoming feelings and restoring inherent nature, or yin (feelings) necessarily following yang (inherent nature). Wang Shihuai also borrowed Zhou Dunyi’s explanations of sincerity, spirit and inflection to expound his own thought, saying: That which is quiet in its inactivity is sincerity, that which is affected and becomes interconnected is spirit, that which is active but not yet formed and lies between being and non-being is inflection.” This depicts the most intimate point of the original mind. The mind is one, quietude is its substance, affectivity is its function, and inflection is the first inkling in which substance and function are not dual. One should know that there is no other substance prior to inflection, no other function posterior to inflection, and that the single word inflection alone exhaustively expresses this. Those who hope for sagehood work strenuously all day [see Book of Changes, Hexagram Qian 乾], yet only scrutinising inflections is important. (“Recorded Sayings,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 490)

That is to say, the substance of the mind is original quietude, that quietude is the original state of the substance of the mind. However, the mind has the function of affective arousal, its affective responses have no fixed form and are wondrous and unfathomable, and when it is not affected it returns again to quietude, hence it is called spirit. Inflections are the subtle aroused but not yet aroused state of the

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mind’s affective responsiveness when it produces affective responses to the exterior and thoughts are emerging but have not yet emerged, i.e. “the first inkling in which substance and function are not dual.” One can say they are substance, yet they have already manifested as function; one can say they are function, yet they are not clearly defined feelings, recognitions, intentions or thoughts. Substance is known by means of inflections, inflections function for substance, and scrutinising inflections is being careful when alone. Wang Shihuai gave a clear statement of the difference between “inflections” and thoughts, saying: Someone asked about the doctrine of scrutinising intentions. He said: Master Zhou [Dunyi] regarded that which is active but not yet formed and lies between being and non-being as inflection. The original mind is constantly productive and constantly quiet, and cannot be spoken of in terms of being and non-being, but being forced to name it, one speaks of inflection. Inflections are subtle, so one speaks of their being soundless and scentless yet never being annihilated. Now people regard thoughts when they first arise as inflections, but this cannot avoid falling into a dualistic meaning, and is not what the school of the sages spoke of as inflection. (“Recorded Sayings,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 4, 27) Inherent nature is vast and boundless, and productive inflections are the point at which inherent nature is revealed. Since inherent nature contains nothing to which exertion can be applied, those who are good at learning only scrutinise inflections. To scrutinise inflections does not mean to discriminate between the deviant and the upright in the emergent activity of thoughts, since these inflections are productive yet non-productive, extremely subtle and secret, and neither being nor non-being. Only “Continuous and unbroken, as if preserved” [see Laozi 老子, Ch. 6] and “retiring to hide in secrecy” [see Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”] approach somewhat close to them. (“Enlightened Words on Conserving in Stillness” [Jingshe wuyan 静摄寤言], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 5, 15)

These two passages both reject the view that the point when thoughts first arise and intentions emerge into activity is inflection. The first regards the original mind’s soundlessness and scentlessness that is not annihilated into stubborn emptiness as inflection, while the second regards the time when inherent nature is revealed, extremely subtle and secret, and neither being nor non-being as inflection. This is different from the sentence “in inflection there is good and bad” quoted above, which defined “inflection” as the time when thoughts emerge into activity and can be divided into good and bad. Viewed from this passage, Wang Shihuai’s “inflection” is roughly approximate to what he called “intention.” His “scrutinising inflections” is thus making one’s intentions sincere. Wang Shihuai clearly stated that in the a priori there is nowhere to apply one’s exertions, so scrutinising inflections must be done a posteriori. Thus for Wang Shihuai, the a posteriori has two aspects: one is called intention, and the other called thought. The relation between inherent nature, intention and thought is: “Inherent nature is something with no action, and the function of inherent nature is spirit; spirit is secret, and the constant productivity of the secret is called intention; the numinous substance of intention is called recognition, and in terms of its activity it is called thought. Intention, recognition and thought have three names but only one reality, and in general they are called spirit” (“Reading Notes on Latent Thoughts” [Qiansi zhaji

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潜思札记], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 485). The “spirit” (shen 神) spoken of here is what we today call spirit (jingshen 精神). Spirit is the function of the substance of inherent nature, a concept with many levels and an exquisite, unfathomable quality, which is thus called “secret.” Inherent nature is substance, spirit is function, and inherent nature’s production and reproduction without cease is called intention. Intention has two aspects: in terms of its being an essentially spiritual activity that has the quality of numinous clarity, it is called the substance of recognition (shiti 识体), while in terms of its activity being expressed as thoughts, it is called thought. Although intention is already a posteriori, form and qi have yet to contaminate it. This point can be likened to his account of “innate moral knowing.” He said: Knowing is the aperture of arousal of the a priori. Since it is called an aperture of arousal, it already belongs to the a posteriori. However, although it belongs to the a posteriori, form and qi are insufficient to interfere with it. Thus the single word “knowing” does not tend toward an empty void internally or fall into form and qi externally, and this is what the Confucian school calls centrality. Later generations of scholars all too often fell into regarding the numinous recognition of form and qi as knowing, and this is why the learning of the sages is increasingly obscured. (“Reply to Zhu Yian” [Da Zhu Yian 答朱易庵], Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 1, 4)

What Wang Shihuai called “intention” was precisely the time that is a posteriori yet has not been contaminated by material qi, i.e. the “authentic impulse of production and reproduction” spoken of above, while thoughts are its superficial signs. His “scrutinising inflections” did not mean discriminating between good and bad in intentions that have already become thoughts, and then examining and overcoming them, but rather recognising and maintaining this “intention.” The “scrutinising” (yan 研) in scrutinising intentions did not refer to polishing (yanmo 研磨), and was not an a posteriori activity of discriminating and investigating or doing good and removing bad, but rather a kind of extremely fine and subtle meaning. His effort of “scrutinising inflections” differed both from Wang Longxi’s 王龙溪 direct reliance on the a priori and also from Qian Dehong’s 钱德洪 doing good and removing bad in concrete affairs, and meant instead recognising the speck of the authentic impulse of production and reproduction that emerges from inherent nature. That is to say, his scrutinising inflections can also be said to be “penetrating inherent nature.” This penetrating is that of “penetrating through a tight encirclement” (touchu chongwei 透出重围), and penetrating inherent nature means original inherent nature spontaneously and subtly penetrating through metaphysical categories and becoming an authentic impulse of production and reproduction. Penetrating inherent nature emphasises inherent nature appearing as intention, while scrutinising inflections emphasises actually recognising and grasping this intention. Scrutinising inflections can also be called being careful when alone, where this “alone” is the authentic impulse of production and reproduction, i.e. intention; the effort of being careful is then “scrutinising.” In this way, Wang Shihuai’s opposition to two kinds of approach to effort can be understood: He both opposed the application of effort to original substance in Luo Hongxian’s learning of returning to quietude, believing

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that this was to needlessly pile one bed upon another, and also opposed Qian Dehong’s examination and overcoming of thoughts that have already formed, believing that this had already fallen into a dualistic meaning, and was not of the highest order. The true meaning of Wang Shihuai’s doctrines of penetrating inherent nature and scrutinising inflections can also be seen from his view of knowledge and action. Although Wang Shihuai’s discussions of knowledge and action are very limited, they are nonetheless a logical development of his doctrines of penetrating inherent nature and scrutinising inflections: When asked about the debate concerning knowledge and action, he said: The authentic clarity of the original mind is knowledge, and the implementation of the authentic clarity of the original mind throughout thought and conduct in affairs without the slightest occlusion is action. Knowledge is the substance and action the function, and they cannot be separated into two. (“Recorded Sayings,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 4, 17)

The “authentic clarity” spoken of here is in fact what Wang Shihuai called innate moral knowing, a self-awareness of moral consciousness which he thus called “knowledge.” “The authentic clarity of the original mind is knowledge” means that “knowledge” is the penetrating through of the inherent nature already possessed by the original mind, and to thoroughly implement this moral consciousness in specific thought and conduct in affairs is action. This is mainly a moral activity and not an epistemological activity. Furthermore, in Wang Shihuai’s thought, knowledge and action cannot be separated into two, so rather than it being the case that one should “wait until true knowledge is attained before putting it into action,” every action is a unity of knowledge and action, within which the self-awareness of moral rationality and moral consciousness is knowledge, while the conduct this knowledge produces, including thoughts and ways of thinking, is all action. In terms of the relation between substance and function, knowledge is substance and action is function, with the value and role of the former being higher than the latter. Every specific is thus an actualisation of moral will. Wang Shihuai’s doctrine of knowledge and action was very close to Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing,” i.e. “extending the good known by the innate moral knowing of my mind into all things and affairs.” However, the “all things and affairs” Yangming spoke of were “where intention is present,” i.e. the objects that intentional thoughts are involved with. Yangming’s word “intention” was thus different to Wang Shihuai, since intention meant intentional thoughts. Wang Shihuai agreed with Yangming’s view of things as where intention is present, saying: Master Yangming viewed the sites where intention is present as things, and this meaning was most splendid. Before a single thought emerges, the myriad realms are all in quietude, yet when thought is involved, realms are produced alongside…. Hence the sites where intention is present are things. These “things” are neither internal nor external, but are shadows of the original mind. (“Recorded Sayings,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 4, 8)

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The things spoken of here are not separate from the consciousness of the subject or the orientation of moral rationality, and hence he said they are “shadows of the original mind” that cannot be divided into internal and external. According to Wang Shihuai’s statement here, things that one’s own moral rationality is involved with and that intention is present in are the things that should be investigated. Hence he also said: “The entities that fill the space between Heaven and Earth are all things, yet how can they be investigated? If one takes the sites where intention is present as things, then the effort of investigating things neither pursues the external nor separates from things, and is thus most extensive yet most restrained” (“Recorded Sayings,” Combined Manuscripts from Youqing Hall, Vol. 4, 8). Pursuing the external here refers to moral rationality being covered by the purely cognitive activity of epistemological rationality, while separating from things refers to emptily abiding by this moral rationality but not applying it in specific activities, hence each is biased to one side. Wang Shihuai’s doctrines of the investigation of things and of knowledge and action were connected to his doctrines of penetrating inherent nature and scrutinising inflections, and were an extension of these. In the decades after Yangming died, Wang Shihuai alone designated the doctrines of penetrating inherent nature and scrutinising inflections in an attempt to overcome Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian’s early biases toward stillness and effort that neglected original substance, and thereby to return Wang Learning to its original state in which original substance and effort were integrated as one and neither the a priori nor the a posteriori could be emphasised at the expense of the other. His doctrines were broad in subsumption and yet precise in their analyses of specific concepts, and went beyond the other masters of Jiangyou in the aspects of profundity and comprehensiveness. They also had a significant influence on Liu Zongzhou. Among the scholars of the Wang [Yangming] School, Wang Shihuai was a figure rich in theoretical creativity who was able to carry Wang Learning forward. His unique doctrines constitute an important link in the development of Wang Learning, one that should not be overlooked.

Chapter 14

Hu Zhi’s Development of the Core Precept of the Learning of the Mind

Ever since Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 proposed that “the mind is principle,” scholars of later generations with a tendency toward the Learning of the Mind have generally held to it closely. However, “the mind is principle” can be understood both as claiming that the “principle” represented by the moral consciousness in the mind and the principles embodied in Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are fundamentally one and the same, and also as claiming that the principles of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are created and endowed by my mind. The difference between Lu Jiuyuan and his student Yang Jian 杨简 indeed lay precisely in this, and the Jiangyou 江右 Wang [Yangming] 王阳明 school scholar Hu Zhi synthesised these two, simultaneously absorbing the Buddhist view that the myriad dharmas are all merely created by the mind, and proposed his thought that principle is not separate from the mind and that there are no things outside of observation. Hu Zhi 胡直 (1517–1585; zi 字 Zhengfu 正甫, hao 号 Lushan 庐山) was from Taihe 泰和 in Jiangxi province. He became a metropolitan graduate in the Jiajing 嘉靖 period, and then successively took up posts including secretary in the Ministry of Justice 刑部, assistant commissioner for Huguang 湖广 province, assistant administration commissioner for Sichuan province, education commissioner for Sichuan province, education intendant for Huguang province, administration vice commissioner for Guangxi province, and surveillance commissioner for Guangdong and Fujian provinces, before dying at his post in the thirteenth year of the Wanli 万历 period (1585). His works were compiled by later scholars into Stored Manuscripts from Henglu Hall (Henglu jingshe canggao 衡庐精舍藏稿) in thirty volumes and Further Manuscripts (Xugao 续稿) in eleven volumes, within which his most important philosophical work was Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness

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(Huzi hengqi 胡子衡齐).1 His “Record of Difficulties in Learning” (Kunxue ji 困学 记) also records the important transitions of his lifetime of learning in detail. When he was young, Hu Zhi’s character was bold and unrestrained, disliking any restriction or caution, and he admired figures such as Kong Rong 孔融, Li Bai 李白 and Su Shi 苏轼, displaying a deep love for prose and verse, copying the classical style of Li Mengyang 李梦阳 and He Jingming 何景明, and once writing “On the Investigation of Things” (Gewu lun 格物论) to refute the doctrines of [Wang] Yangming. When he was twenty-six, he became a student of Ouyang De 欧 阳德, appreciating his doctrine that “Only when there is authenticity will one’s knowing spontaneously have neither obstructions nor deficiencies.” At the age of thirty-one, he went to visit Luo Hongxian 罗洪先 at Stone Lotus Cave 石莲洞, where, after residing for a month listening to Luo lecturing on his learning of holding to stillness with no desire, his mind was moved and inspired, and he requested to learn with him as his disciple. The following year, he travelled in Shaozhou 韶州 where the Mingjing Academy 明经书院 had recruited the prefect Chen Dalun 陈大伦 as an instructor, since he wished to study metaphysics with him. He also practiced Chan 禅 Buddhism with his schoolmate Deng Dunfeng 邓钝 锋, an experience from which he learned much, saying: “One day, my mind suddenly awakened and I was spontaneously without disordered thoughts, clearly perceiving that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all the substance of my mind. I sighed and exclaimed: ‘I now know that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are not external.’ From then on, when affairs arose, I no longer gave them much thought, yet was apparently more able to follow and respond to them, my limbs moving with effortless ease, while the fire illness that I had had for over ten years began to improve, and I was able to get to sleep at night. I was secretly joyful in my mind, and told Dunfeng, who said: ‘Your inherent nature has been revealed’” (“Record of Difficulties in Learning,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 521). This experience of practicing Chan and sitting in silence gave him a mystical understanding of subject and object as fused into one body, of the mind and the myriad phenomena of the cosmos integrating into a single entity. This had a great effect on him, helping him to later establish his core philosophical precepts of “no principle outside observation” and “the mind giving rise to the myriad things.” He believed that this understanding of the myriad things as one body was the same spiritual plane as Zisi’s 子思 “observing above and below” [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)], Mencius’ 孟子 “The myriad things are all complete within me” [see Mencius, 7A.4], Cheng Hao’s 程颢 “One who is benevolent integrates to form a common body with things,” and Lu Jiuyuan’s “The cosmos is my mind.” The core precept of Hu Zhi’s philosophy can be captured in a single point, namely “The mind creates Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” He once said:

References to Huzi hengqi refer to a carved edition from the Wanli 万历 period of the Ming Dynasty. References to Henglu jingshe canggao refer to the Siku quanshu 四库全书 edition from the Wenyuan Chamber 文渊阁.

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“My mind is that by which the sun, moon, Heaven, Earth, and myriad things are created. … If not for it, there would be nothing but pitch-dark barren ignorance, and the sun, moon, Heaven, Earth, and myriad things would be extinguished” (“Questions Concerning Principle” [Liwen 理问] Pt. II, Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, Vol. 1). Hu Zhi’s “The mind creates Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” includes two aspects: first, principle is not separate from the mind; second, things are not external to the mind, such that outside of observation there are neither things nor principles.

1 Principle Is Not Separate from the Mind; Preserving the Spirit and Transforming that Which Passes Hu Zhi’s thought was influenced greatly by his father, who accepted Wang Yangming’s core precept of “no principle outside the mind” and was dissatisfied with Cheng Yi’s 程颐 “principle is present in things,” with Hu Zhi once recounting: “In the past my honoured father once read the words of the younger [Cheng] brother, and wrote a statement to refute them, saying: ‘If one says “principle is present in things,” yet also says “dealing with things is righteousness,” then is it acceptable to say that righteousness not principle? If one says “principle is present in things,” yet also says “inherent nature is principle,” then is it acceptable to say that inherent nature is present in things? These two phrases are very clear. Does the mistake of the younger brother not await refutation?’ Alas, my honoured father’s statements are now scattered and incomplete” (“Questions Concerning Principle” [Liwen 理问], Stored Manuscripts from Henglu Hall, Vol. 28). Hu Zhi’s doubts concerning Cheng Yi’s learning were deeply influenced by his father, and he believed that “principle is present in things” referred to things being endowed with the fundamental principle of the cosmos, which gives them their patterns and order, while “dealing with things is righteousness” refers to dealing with things and affairs according to a moral standard. The former is a Heaven-endowed inherent nature, and the latter an artificial good, yet in fundamental terms, the principle in things and the righteousness in the human mind are different forms of expression of one and the same principle of the cosmos, so the two are one and the same affair, and hence principle can also be said to lie within the mind. Hu Zhi quoted his father’s refutation of Cheng Yi’s words in order to demonstrate that principle is present within the mind. The principles present in things that do not involve the mind have no meaning for the subject. In his view, if principle has no involvement of mental understanding, then things are just things and the self just the self, and this not only falls into the error of branching the principles of things and the principled nature of people into two, but also changes the effort of investigating things into a purely epistemological activity, one that does not have the slightest connection with moral cultivation. If one wishes to overcome these two biases, one must accept that principle is present within the mind. He said: “How could the reality of the myriad

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principles end in things? They are called real principles, and this is the reality of the mind” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Empty and Real” [Xushi 虚实]). Hu Zhi believed that his theory here could be demonstrated by “The myriad things are all complete within me” from the Mencius and “no things without sincerity” from Centrality in the Ordinary. He distinguished the mind he spoke of from that spoken of by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi 朱熹, believing that the mind he spoke of was the mind of principle, and thus real, while the mind spoken of by Cheng-Zhu merely referred to the mind’s epistemological ability or “numinous clarity” (lingming 灵明), which contained no content of principle, and was thus simply an empty illusion. He said: “The Confucians of the world start out from an illusory view of their original and real mind, and go on to look around and search for things to seek their principles, recognising the external as if it were real; this is what is called using illusion to seek illusion, and their illusions cannot come to an end” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Empty and Real”). Based on this, Hu Zhi criticised Confucians of the world for taking Cheng Yi’s “Sages are rooted in Heaven, while Buddhists are rooted in the mind” as a basis to declare war on the Learning of the Mind. He pointed out that Confucians of the world all believed that the great origin of the dao emerged from Heaven, and that the human mind should not be increased or diminished, otherwise one would inevitably fall into the Buddhists’ error of using the dharmas of the mind to extinguish Heaven and Earth. In fact, the mind spoken of by Confucians of the world was not the same concept as that spoken of by Learning of the Mind. In Hu Zhi’s view, what Confucians of the world called the mind was epistemological rationality, and its function was to know, examine, and represent external things; however, what the Learning of the Mind called the mind subsumed the fundamental principle of the cosmos, and its most essential aspect was moral rationality, with epistemological rationality being secondary and minor. He said: “Since there is the heart descended from the august, the inherent nature endowed by Heaven has long been present within the human mind. Sages are rooted in Heaven, yet apart from the human mind, where is this root? It is not that there is another Heaven outside the mind” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Empty and Real”). He pointed out that if one cannot believe that one’s mind is the concentrated site of Heavenly principle, and regards the mind of knowledge as the original substance of the mind, the Confucian search for moral cultivation can only follow the approach of “probing principles in things,” seeking principle in the diverse manifold of external things and using the principles attained from external things to fill up the numinous clarity of the mind. This error inevitably leads to “splitting into increasingly dismembered fragments, sticking stubbornly to their scattered contents, and overcoming neither speculation nor arrangement. One’s probing becomes increasingly refined, and one’s modelling increasingly exact, yet Heaven becomes increasingly separate” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Heaven and Humanity” [Tianren 天人]). A prominent quality of Hu Zhi’s theory is its exceptionally strong tendency to discriminate the differences between the Learning of the Mind and the Learning of Principle (especially the school of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi) in terms of mind and inherent nature, and, continuing on from Wang Yangming, he self-consciously

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rejected the tendency to regard knowing awareness (zhijue 知觉) as the mind and to separate the mind and inherent nature into two. He believed that a great theoretical mistake of the Cheng-Zhu school in terms of mind and inherent nature was to regard the mind as an organ of knowing awareness that can be filled with and store external principles. Hence Cheng-Zhu scholars had a common understanding: “That which can be aware is the mind, while that which it becomes aware of is principle.” This analyses subject and object as well as mind and inherent nature into two, believing that awareness is empty and principle is real, that the mind is empty and inherent nature is real, such that the two are clearly separated. In Hu Zhi’s view, the relationship between mind, inherent nature and feelings is one in which they are neither separate not mixed, in which inherent nature (principle) is originally possessed by the mind, feelings are an expression of inherent nature, and the three are unified in one mind. To use the analogy of fire, the mind is fire, and inherent nature is the brightness of fire, which is not external to fire, while feelings are the light produced by this brightness, which is not posterior to brightness. Mind, inherent nature and feelings can have different names, but they cannot be separated completely. Awareness (jue 觉) is a function of the mind, and is the site for inherent nature, yet inherent nature is also expressed as feelings, and hence awareness is the vehicle for both inherent nature and feelings. He once said: “Awareness is inherent nature, and it is not the case that there is inherent nature outside of awareness; inherent nature is principle, and it is not the case that there is principle outside of inherent nature” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Mind and Inherent Nature” [xinxing 心性]). When Hu Zhi proposed the statement “awareness is inherent nature,” he intended to emphasise three points: First, inherent nature and mind are interconnected, with the level of abstract inherent nature being constantly actualised and expressed at the level of the mind, while the mind is the site of illuminating clarity and numinous awareness in Heavenly principle, and inherent nature constantly emanates externally, so it is not the case that the form of an abstract principle of inherent nature exists within the mind in a logical and external way, but that it manifests within the mind in a real and internal way. Second, moral rationality and epistemological rationality are intertwined together at all times, collectively constituting the actual content of the mind, so the mind is not merely the numinous clarity of knowing awareness, nor merely moral feeling or moral consciousness, but is rather a complex unity of the two. Third, inherent nature’s governing function in relation to feelings is dependent on actual awareness in exerting its effect, the intentionality of feeling is dependent on awareness for its discovery, and inherent nature’s system of monitoring, judging and assessing feelings is dependent on awareness for its implementation. The complex and united effects and functions of the mind must ultimately all be actualised through awareness, and awareness is the essential quality of inherent nature, hence he said that “awareness is inherent nature”; awareness is the vehicle of feelings, hence he said that “awareness carries them.” The governing effect of inherent nature and the germinal effect of feelings are constantly united together, hence he said that “when it governs, everything is carried, and when it carries, everything is governed.” The mind is a unity of awareness with inherent nature and feelings, hence he said that it is “utmost

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emptiness yet everything is real, utmost reality yet everything is empty.” Hu Zhi’s discussions of the relationship between mind with inherent nature and feelings were relatively profound among philosophers of the Ming dynasty. In terms of the relationship of mind and inherent nature with principle and qi 气, Hu Zhi also provided a unique account. He opposed the conception of “the inherent nature of material qi” (qizhi zhi xing 气质之性) spoken of by Song dynasty Neo-Confucians, saying: Qi has yin-yang and five phases, and is mingled and inconsistent. The qi of two and five develops into material qualities and takes on forms, and inherent nature inhabits these. Inherent nature is an ordinance of Heaven [see Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经), “Wei tian zhi ming” 维天之命], by which it governs yin-yang and the five phases. In Heaven it is an ordinance and in humanity it is inherent nature, yet they are united in the mind. Hence to speak of the mind is to speak of inherent nature, just as to speak of water is to speak of its wellspring. Since the wellspring is perfectly clear, even when it later becomes bogged down with mud, if it is allowed to settle, its clarity returns. Since inherent nature is perfectly good, even when it later becomes bogged down with qi-qualities, if it is preserved, its goodness returns. Seen in this way, inherent nature is inherent nature and material qi is material qi, so how could there be an inherent nature of material qi? (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Further Questions” [Xuwen 续问])

Here, Hu Zhi still took up the position of the Learning of the Mind and opposed Cheng-Zhu Learning. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 once opposed Zhu Xi’s distinction between the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment and the inherent nature of material qi, believing that there was only the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment, and no inherent nature of material qi. Hu Zhi was in agreement with Lu Jiuyuan on this point, believing that inherent nature is only the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment, the principle embodied in the operation and transformation of the cosmos and the governor of things such as yin-yang and the five phases that belong to the aspects of form and qi, a principle that, along with the moral consciousness originally present in the human mind, is an expression of the fundamental principle of the cosmos. This inherent nature has goodness but no badness, and although it can be bogged down by material qi, there is no other inherent nature of material qi. Hu Zhi’s account here still stubbornly held to the position of the Learning of the Mind, and his understanding of what Song Confucians called the inherent nature of material qi does not accord with its original meaning. Hu Zhi once said: “When things die, their material qualities still persist, but where is their life? When people first die, their qi seems to persist, but where is its life? Thus to speak of an inherent nature of material qi is both superfluous and mistaken” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Further Questions”). In his view, the phrase “the inherent nature of material qi” itself makes no sense, since only things that have life (shengming 生命) have inherent nature (xing 性), and things without life have qi but not life, and thus have no inherent nature. Things without life can have principle, but cannot be said to have inherent nature. Hu Zhi’s understanding of the inherent nature of material qi here differs from the inherent nature of material qi spoken of by Cheng-Zhu. The distinction between the inherent nature of material qi and the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment (also

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called the inherent nature of moral principle [yili zhi xing 义理之性]) originated with Zhang Zai 张载, who said: “Once there is form then there is the inherent nature of material qi, yet if one is good at turning it back, then the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is preserved. Hence the superior man does not regard the inherent nature of material qi as his inherent nature” (Correcting the Unenlightened [Zhengmeng 正蒙], “Sincere Illumination” [Chengming 诚明]). Cheng Yi believed that Zhang Zai’s distinction was “an exceptional contribution to the school of the sages,” and accepted that there was an inherent nature according to which “life is what is called inherent nature” [see Mencius, 6A.3], but also believed that this was not the original substance of inherent nature, since “‘life is what is called inherent nature’ discusses that which one has received,” i.e. the qi that people receive, while “the inherent nature of the supreme root and ultimate source,” such as the inherent nature of good nature spoken of by Mencius, is actually the root of inherent nature. Zhu Xi took this up from Cheng Yi, and provided detailed explications of the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment and the inherent nature of material qi, his statements of which became the basic model for later Confucians’ discussions of inherent nature. Zhu Xi said: “Generally speaking, since people have this form and qi, it is this principle that is originally possessed within form and qi that is called inherent nature. Once we speak of this as inherent nature, it already involves life and is thus combined with material qi, yet does not attain the original substance of inherent nature, which remains unmixed. We simply wish that, in this respect, people perceive that their original substance was originally never separate and never mixed” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类], Vol. 95). Zhu Xi believed that the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment is the original substance of inherent nature, but that this original substance is abstract, and must be possessed within form and qi. Once the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment is possessed within form and qi, it is necessarily influenced by qi-qualities, which make one’s original inherent nature biased and mixed, and thus it is “combined with material qi, yet does not attain the original substance of inherent nature.” The inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is purely good, while the inherent nature of material qi contains both good and bad. Although the good that people express in reality originates from the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment, and the bad originates from the inherent nature of material qi, the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment is necessarily unable to separate from material qi and gain a different immediate release. In the doctrines of Cheng-Zhu, the inherent nature of material qi absolutely cannot be absent, and their fundamental effort of cultivation through self-discipline and probing principle also lie in removing or reducing as far as possible the influence of material qi on the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment, and thereby completing one’s inherent nature of Heavenly endowment. The contribution of this distinction from Zhang Zai to Zhu Xi lay in perceiving the difference between actual, specific human nature (the inherent nature of material qi) and ideal, abstract human nature (the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment), perceiving the absoluteness of actual people’s influence from the material qi that they receive, and adopting a relatively moderate attitude toward the inevitable weak points of human nature. Learning of the Mind from Lu-Wang to Hu Zhi however

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clearly brought out the conflict between Heavenly endowment and form-qi: inherent nature is not qi, and there is no “inherent nature of material qi.” Hu Zhi’s rejection of the inherent nature of material qi aimed at revealing this directness, and highlighting the severing involved in the path of effort. This can be seen as an expression of the simple and easy effort of the Learning of the Mind. Hu Zhi especially emphasised the absoluteness of the governor (zhuzai 主宰): If one attempts to observe it, the space between Heaven and Earth is filled with rising and falling, closing and opening; does everything that gathers and disperses not belong to qi? Who governs it? Thus the sovereign Heaven acts as its governor, and this is ordinance [ming 命], which is principle. Hence the [Book of] Poetry states, “The ordinances of Heaven, how majestic and unending!” [see Odes of Zhou (Zhou song 周颂), “Decade of Qing Miao” 清庙之什] People live between Heaven and Earth, breathing in and out, acting and stopping; does everything that gathers and disperses not belong to qi? Who governs it? Thus the mind’s awareness acts as its governor, and this is inherent nature, which is principle. Hence the [Book of] Documents [Shangshu 尚书] states, “The august sovereign above has bestowed a heart on the people below, granting them a constant nature” [see “Announcement of Tang” (Tanggao 汤诰)]. Hence since principle is present in people, they are governed with a single mind, and if this is extended to all under Heaven, they will be correct without expectation; they are mastered with a single time, and if this is applied to the myriad generations, they will be harmonious without prior agreement. Thus my knowing awareness is originally interconnected with the knowing awareness of other people and with the knowing awareness of later generations under Heaven, and is originally not my own private attainment. To say that I am my own master and that awareness is inherent nature is originally not wrong, yet these are also not private. Awareness is principle. However, when it comes to those without the rectitude that gives authority, this is what is called being affected by things and moving, and they have lost their original knowing and original awareness. (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Explanatory Statements” [Shenyan 申言])

That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is qi, and its governor is ordinance, which is principle; people are made up of qi, their governor is “the mind’s awareness,” and this “mind’s awareness” is the appearance of inherent nature in the mind, which is thus a unity of mind and inherent nature. Since human nature and the principles of things are both expressions of one and the same law of the cosmos, the two are in essence one and the same. Since people, things and other people are all one and the same law, they have the quality of being “correct without expectation” and “harmonious without prior agreement.” To be one’s own master is thus to take principle as the master, to take inherent nature as the master. The original substance is like this, and the loss of its balance lies in losing this original substance when one is affected by things and moved a posteriori. Hu Zhi’s discussions of mind and inherent nature regarded inherent nature and endowment [i.e. ordinance; ming 命] as a governor, as original substance and balance, and thus his effort took exhaustively expressing inherent nature and realising endowment as its core precept, with preserving the spirit [cunshen 存神] and transforming that which passes [guohua 过化; see Mencius, 7A.13] as its concrete effort. He provided a detailed explanation and exposition of this:

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A follower asked: “How did the master learn?” He said: “My learning took exhaustively expressing inherent nature and realising endowment as its core precept, and preserving the spirit and transforming that which passes as its effort. Inherent nature is spirit. Spirit cannot be obstructed by intentional thoughts, and thus it constantly transforms. The elder Master Cheng [i.e. Cheng Hao] said ‘clear awareness is spontaneous,’ which spoke of preserving the spirit; he said ‘deliberate action responds to traces,’ which spoke of transforming that which passes. Those who today speak of exhaustively expressing inherent nature miss this, and thus it is tied down by intentional thoughts.” He said: “Please lower it.” He said: “Take benevolence as ancestral, awareness as effort, the myriad things each attaining its place as the measure, interconnecting night and day and forgetting the self and things as the test, and the soundless and scentless as the destination.” He said: “Please lower it again.” He said: “Regard one body as ancestral, lone-knowing as substance, vigilance and lucidity as effort, reverence, faithfulness and respect as daily exercise, and reaching numinous clarity without desire as the destination.” (Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, “Further Questions”)

Although the highest precept of his effort was exhaustively expressing inherent nature and realising endowment, this was a common purport of cultivation for Neo-Confucians, and Hu Zhi’s distinctive point lay in his specification of this general precept as preserving the spirit and transforming that which passes. He clearly stated that “the spirit is inherent nature,” meaning that, when inherent nature appears at the level of the mind, its function and expression are exceptionally marvellous, rising and falling with things, and displaying a unity of the stability of a standard and the flexibility of a situation. Preserving the spirit meant that the mind has no interference from selfish desire, maintaining the constant manifestation and flowing operation of this quality of inherent nature. Transforming that which passes meant making the specific intentional thoughts and conduct that it governs and controls all be transformed by it. This transformation is spontaneous and original. Preserving the spirit is original substance, while transforming that which passes is its effective function, and preserving the spirit is not interrupted yet also has no form or trace that can be sought. If one cannot reach this spiritual plane and seeks a secondary one, then one should take seeking benevolence as one’s core precept, and the constant experience of benevolence in the mind as effort. The goal to be reached here is that the myriad things each attains its place, i.e. a spiritual plane filled with vitality and order, one of “hawks flying and fish leaping” [see Centrality in the Ordinary] and “liveliness.” The direct result of this spiritual plane is an experience of things and the self as one body, yet one that does not reveal traces, and that arrives spontaneously without forced seeking. If one cannot reach this spiritual plane and seeks yet another, then one should regard the myriad things as one body as one’s core precept, being careful when alone as effort, Confucius’ “be reverent in your dwelling, respectful in carrying out affairs, and faithful when dealing with other people” [see Analects, 13.19] as daily practice, and being without desire with the base of the mind clear and lucid as the most excellent affectivity. These three spiritual planes of effort differ both in degree and in sequence. Preserving the spirit and transforming that which passes emphasises interpenetration of the metaphysical with the actual, original substance with effort, and inherent nature and endowment with self and mind. Seeking benevolence emphasises experiencing the a priori, while being careful when alone emphasises a posteriori daily practice. Everyone

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who aspires to the learning of cultivating inherent nature and endowment should select according to the aptitude of their inherent nature and ability, taking real existence in the self as the ultimate goal. Hu Zhi’s theory of effort took the spiritual plane of flowing together with Heaven and Earth above and below as its purport, regarded recognising and embodying benevolence as its core precept, displayed the characteristic of connecting the spiritual plane and effort as one, and had a tendency in effort of using virtue to transform qi and the spiritual plane to drive effort. This characteristic differed significantly from his teacher Luo Hongxian’s core precept of holding to stillness and returning to quietude from his prime years, but was close to his “thorough realisation of the substance of benevolence in his later years.” It can be said that, in general, the Wang lineage in Jiangyou laid particular stress on effort, yet within this, the theories of effort of Wang Shihuai and Hu Zhi both had the characteristic of focusing on metaphysical understanding and using such understanding to transform form and quality. This point was especially prominent in Wang Shihuai. Although Hu Zhi also had this tendency, the breadth and brilliance of his metaphysical speculation was inferior to that of Wang Shihuai.

2 Things Are Not External to the Mind; No Things Outside Observation Although in terms of the ultimate constitution of things, Hu Zhi accepted qi as the root-origin of the myriad things, that “The qi of two and five develops into material qualities and takes on forms,” he believed that specific thing-images (wuxiang 物 象) are not directly presented to people by the qi of two and five, but are rather composed by the human mind. He said: It is my mind that makes Heaven lofty and covering; it is my mind that makes Earth thick and supporting; it is my mind that makes the sun and moon bright and illuminating; it is my mind that makes the stars arrayed and shining. The rain and dew are the moisture of my mind, the thunder and wind are the meanness of my mind, the four seasons are the procession of my mind, and the ghosts and spirits are seclusion of my mind. The rivers and streams, mountains and hills, birds and beasts, and grass and trees in all their flowing, towering, breeding and multiplying, the heat of fire and moisture of water, the grain in wood and the veins in stone, none of these are anything but my mind; mole crickets and ants, tigers and wolves, swans and geese, and ospreys and doves, none of these are anything but my mind; one body with various apertures, the hundred things with their diverse uses, none of these are anything but my mind. Thus the blazing sun is that by which Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are created; my mind is that by which the sun and moon along with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are created. Is this not all simply observation? Without this, all would be pitch-dark obscurity and desolate oblivion, and the sun and moon along with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things would be extinguished. If the sun and moon along with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things were all extinguished, how could one see any so-called principles? Thus I say: Outside of observation there is no principle. (“Questions Concerning Principle” Pt. II, Master Hu’s Balanced Evenness, Vol. 1)

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This passage is focused on explaining his view that “the mind creates Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” Since he accepted that the root-origin of the myriad things was the two qi and the five phases, yet also believed that the myriad things were created by the mind, this “creation” (zao 造) must be epistemological. In Hu Zhi’s view, qualities such as being lofty and covering, thick and supporting, bright and illuminating, and arrayed and shining are all a result of people endowing Heaven and Earth, the sun and moon, and the stars with their knowledge. Whether or not things and affairs themselves originally possess these qualities is something that people’s epistemological abilities have no way to ascertain. The human mind’s knowledge and responses to things and affairs are what he called observation (cha 察). Observation is the human mind’s organising function in relation to the myriad things, a process of people endowing things with the results of their knowledge. Separated from observation, what remains is simply pitch-dark obscurity and desolate oblivion, a pitch-black lump absolutely devoid of difference. The shining Heaven, Earth and the myriad things that fill the eyes are all thing-images that human epistemological activity presents to people. Hence, concerning the myriad things between Heaven and Earth, “Is this not all simply observation?” “Outside of observation there are no things.” Hu Zhi’s thought here held that the mind gives rise to the myriad things from an epistemological perspective. This point found its direct intellectual source in Lu Jiuyuan’s student Yang Jian 杨简 and in Yogācāra [weishi 唯识; i.e. Consciousness-Only] Buddhism, yet to some degree went against Wang Yangming’s thought. Yang Jian was a famous student of Lu Jiuyuan who developed the latter’s view that “my mind is the cosmos” in a more subjective direction. Yang Jian believed that the original substance of the world was chaotic, without difference, without distinction, and interconnected as one body. He described his mystical glimpse of this original substance of the world, saying: A senior gentleman once gave the lesson: “Frequently reflect back your observations.” On one occasion of such reflective observation, I suddenly became aware of an empty cavity with no internal or external and no boundary or border, in which the three potencies [i.e. Heaven, Earth and humanity] and the myriad things, the myriad transformations and affairs, dark and bright, and being and non-being were all interconnected as one body, without any seam or rifpt. (Further Posthumous Writings of Cihu [Cihu yishu xu 慈湖遗书续], Vol. 1)

This state of being interconnected as one body is consistent with the “pitch-dark obscurity and desolate oblivion” spoken of by Hu Zhi, with both referring to the chaotic, pitch-black state before people have endowed things and affairs with forms and images. The original substance of the world is like this, yet the myriad images of birds flying, beasts walking, mountains towering, and rivers flowing that enter people’s representations each have their appearance, with each moving ceaselessly according to the necessity of its original inherent nature. In Yang Jian’s view, the appearances of things and affairs are endowed by human knowledge, and this knowledge is “reflective observation” (fanguan 反观). What people are able to grasp are images that have passed through the organising of human reflective

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observation that gives the myriad things their appearances. Thus Yang Jian thought that the human mind was that which endows the myriad things with their appearances, and in this sense, the myriad images of the cosmos are created by the human mind, and the cosmos is a creation of the “self” (ji 己). Thus “changes” (yi 易) as the great transformation and flowing operation of the cosmos are creations of the human mind. He said: Changes are the self, and there is no other. To regard changes as a book [i.e. the Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易)] and not as the self is unacceptable. To regard changes as the change and transformation of Heaven and Earth and not as the change and transformation of the self is unacceptable. Heaven and Earth are my Heaven and Earth; change and transformation are my change and transformation, and not anything other. ... Clarity and brightness are my clarity and brightness; breadth and thickness are my breadth and thickness, yet people do not know themselves. Since people do not know themselves, they deal with signifying names and say that that is Heaven and that is Earth, which is like not knowing oneself and one’s own hands and feet, and saying those hands or those feet. ... That these are myself is not simply to speak of blood and qi or form and appearance. My inherent nature is settled in its clarity and brightness and becomes things, it is profoundly without boundaries and not a quantity. Heaven is an image within my inherent nature; Earth is a form within my inherent nature. Hence it was said: “In Heaven it becomes images, while on Earth it becomes forms” [see Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)], which is all an action of myself. (“Self-Changes” [Jiyi 己易], Posthumous Writings of Cihu [Cihu yishu 慈湖遗书], Vol. 7, 1–2)

For Yang Jian here, the original substance of the cosmos is “chaotically fused without internal or external, interpenetrated and connected without difference or divergence.” However, the actual myriad things have all manner of differences in appearance, and it is the epistemological role of the “I” (wo 我) that produces the images of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. This is the same way of thinking as Hu Zhi’s “it is my mind that makes Heaven and Earth lofty and thick, covering and supporting,” and the two have many points of similarity. From an epistemological perspective, Hu Zhi and Yang Jian both uncovered an aspect of the Learning of the Mind: human epistemological activity is the creator of the things that people know. Human epistemological activity is not a direct reflection like looking in a mirror, but is rather permeated with subjective intentionality toward the objects that one wishes to know. Knowing is not a simple activity of perception, and perception does not simply and directly give us external reality. That which has not gone through the moulding of epistemological activity is an undifferentiated chaos. Although in ancient Chinese philosophy, there were extremely few works that discussed epistemological activity and its specific mechanisms and processes, the arguments concerning the mind creating Heaven, Earth and the myriad things in works of Yang Jian and Hu Zhi undoubtedly viewed things from an epistemological perspective, and this was a unique approach in an ancient Chinese philosophy in which naïve epistemology held a position of absolute dominance. Both Hu Zhi and Yang Jian’s focus on arguing that the mind creates Heaven, Earth and the myriad things from an epistemological perspective went against the precepts of their teachers. Although Lu Jiuyuan held that the mind is principle, what

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he emphasised was that the principle of the myriad things of the cosmos and the principle in the human mind are one and the same from an ethical perspective, and thus that there is no need to seek principle outside of the mind, since one can simply discover it as the original mind. His statements that “The utmost appropriacy reduces to unity and the essential meaning is not dual, since this mind and this principle in fact admit of no duality,” “When the mind is full and aroused, it fills up the cosmos, and there is nothing but this principle,” and “The cosmos is my mind, and my mind is the cosmos” all had this meaning. Yang Jian however expanded this from ethical significance into the field of epistemology, extending Lu Jiuyuan’s “the mind is principle” to become “Heaven and Earth are my Heaven and Earth; change and transformation are my change and transformation.” This was a fundamental shift in the perspective of the argument, and is a rare example of a break from an ethical framework in ancient Chinese philosophy. Although Yang Jian’s shift here has been denounced by certain modern academic viewpoints as “naked solipsism,” his shift and break are meaningful, since they added a new interpretive dimension to the traditional Chinese views of the unity of Heaven and humanity and the unity of internal and external. Hu Zhi also made a similar shift in relation to Wang Yangming. Wang Yangming expanded Lu Jiuyuan’s “the mind is principle” into “no principle outside the mind, no things outside the mind.” No principle outside the mind meant that, apart from people’s good will, there is no moral conduct in the true sense; so-called moral matters separated from good will are merely “false embellishment” and “putting on a show.” Serving one’s father filially or one’s ruler faithfully must be “the mind of pure Heavenly principle” expressed as specific faithful or filial conduct, and this mind of pure Heavenly principle is nothing but an expansion of one’s Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing, hence there is “no principle outside the mind.” Wang Yangming’s “no things outside the mind” meant that people should apply their efforts to affairs in which the moral will participates, and so-called “things” are “the site of intention” and “where intention is involved,” i.e. the intentional objects of the will, and not a purely “objective reality” in which people are not involved. In these famous propositions from Wang Yangming, the focus was on ethics. Hu Zhi did not fail to notice the ethical aspects of the Learning of the Mind, as his doctrines of the learning of mind and inherent nature have already shown. However, his arguments concerning the mind creating Heaven, Earth and the myriad things nonetheless viewed things from the aspect of knowledge. This was thus equally a shift from Wang Yangming’s focus on the ethical aspect. In Hu Zhi’s thought, this shift was logical, not merely because his theoretical courage of “directly probing this learning to its end, without concern for the face of former Confucians” led him to persist in exploring a new field, but more importantly because he and Yang Jian both had a similar history of studying Chan [Buddhism], and a similar mystical experience of “Heaven, Earth and the myriad things all being created by my mind.” This kind of experience could be developed into an probing of epistemological activity itself, and as a result of this probing, deriving the conclusion that “Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are nothing but my mind.”

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Hu Zhi’s conception of “the mind creating Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” and “the myriad things between Heaven and Earth as all simply observation” clearly originated from Chan Buddhism. As discussed above, when Hu Zhi was in Shaozhou, he once followed Deng Dunfeng in practicing Chan: “Every day, you could see me sitting together with the other students after my lecture had finished. We would sit either on beds or on mats on the floor, and usually sat until midnight, slept for a while, and then resumed sitting at the first cockcrow. Our effort was focused on stopping the mind so that it was without disordered thoughts, while our goal was to perceive inherent nature. … One day, my mind suddenly awakened and I was spontaneously without disordered thoughts, clearly perceiving that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all the substance of my mind. I sighed and exclaimed: ‘I now know that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are not external.’” (“Record of Difficulties in Learning,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 521). Hu Zhi’s practice of Chan at Shaozhou occurred when he was thirty-two years old, after which Chan learning as a form of cultivation became an organic constitutive part of Hu Zhi’s thought. Because of this experience of Chan enlightenment, Hu Zhi did not have an attitude of closed-minded rejection toward Chan, as did most Neo-Confucians, but rather believed that Chan learning and the Confucian learning of mind and inherent nature had many points in common. He once said: Some believe that the words of Daoism and Buddhism are somewhat similar to our Confucianism, yet our Confucian words also have some similarities with Daoism and Buddhism. This is like eating rice or wearing fine clothes, which even Zhuangzi 庄 and the Buddha did. (“Letter in Reply to District Magistrate Tang” [Da Tang Mingfu shu 答唐明府 书], Stored Manuscripts from Henglu Hall, Vol. 20) As for the what the Buddhists say of the three realms being only the mind [sanjie weixin 三 界唯心], that mountains, rivers and the great Earth are things in the mind of wondrous clarity, although their words are slightly biased, they are not seriously mistaken. (“Six Occlusions” [Liugu 六锢], Stored Manuscripts from Henglu Hall, Vol. 28)

Hu Zhi believed that the slight bias of the Buddhists lay in their approach of renouncing the world, their abandoning the cardinal guides and constant virtues of human relations. As for their view of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, the Buddhists were not necessarily different from Confucians. Hu Zhi’s view of “no principle outside the mind” was the Buddhist view that “the myriad dharmas are only consciousness” (wanfa weishi 万法唯识), and his “It is my mind that makes Heaven lofty and covering; it is my mind that makes Earth thick and supporting” was the Buddhist “mountains, rivers and the great Earth are things in the mind of wondrous clarity.” Chan Buddhism regarded the mind as the original substance of the myriad dharmas, the basis for the arising and extinguishing of Heaven and Earth, and its approach to thought was epistemological and not ethical. Although in epistemological terms, Hu Zhi took much from Buddhism, in terms of ethics, he held firmly to Confucian principles. Another important aspect that Hu Zhi accepted from Chan Buddhism was his view that “awareness is inherent nature.” He said:

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Apart from the awareness of the human mind there is no inherent nature, so how could there be principle? Hence awareness is inherent nature, and it is not the case that there is inherent nature outside of awareness. Inherent nature is principle, and it is not the case that there is principle outside of awareness. How can it be said that awareness is empty and principle real or the mind empty and inherent nature real? ... That which one is aware of is also able to be aware and to act. (“Six Occlusions,” Stored Manuscripts from Henglu Hall, Vol. 28)

His original meaning was that the mind is inseparable from inherent nature and feelings, and that inherent nature and feelings must make use of awareness in order to be expressed. The three are different aspects of one and the same entity, and he opposed sharply separating the mind, inherent nature and principle. The Cheng-Zhu school emphasised the difference between the mind, inherent nature and principle, while Hu Zhi emphasised their inseparability. Hence he opposed views such as “awareness is empty and principle real” and “the mind is empty and inherent nature real” that could easily be understood as separating the three, and held that without awareness there is no inherent nature and thus also no principle. Hu Zhi’s prominence lay in his direct absorption of Chan Buddhism’s doctrine of the mind and inherent nature as originally aware, which used awareness to replace the mind, and changed the unity of the mind, inherent nature and principle into awareness being the producer and basis of inherent nature and principle. Although the content of the inherent nature and principle he spoke of was Confucian, he highlighted their inseparability from awareness. This was thus to highlight the importance of the awareness and measuring of the mind in the relationship between the mind and inherent nature. He said: If one says that fixed principles are not aware, who fixed them? If the most refined principle is not aware, who refined it? If the standards of high and low and the measures of trivial and weighty are not given Heavenly authority, Heavenly measure, Heavenly reference, and Heavenly scale by this awareness, then who is it that gives them? Recent Confucians inevitably desire to seek principle outside of awareness, but this is what is called seeking illumination outside of fire or seeking clarity outside of water, and though this not especially disallowed, it is inevitably impossible. This is like using awareness to divide mind and inherent nature or using the mind to divide Confucianism and Buddhism, and I am afraid neither mind and inherent nature nor Confucianism and Buddhism will attain satisfaction. (“Explanatory Statements” Pt. II, Stored Manuscripts from Henglu Hall, Vol. 30)

That is to say, the mind is the basis for the production of inherent nature and principle, as well as the bearer and operator by which inherent nature and principle are actualised in conduct. Everything is a function of the awareness of the mind, and hence awareness, inherent nature and principle are one and the same, and are indivisible. Throughout his lifetime, Hu Zhi had an extremely strong spirit of questioning, and he raised doubts concerning the learning of both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, which held dominant positions in the academic world of the time. He himself said: “Repeatedly analysing things and seeking them fairly, I do not dare to follow recent Confucians, nor to consult my own opinions” (“Record of Difficulties in Learning,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 523). He pointed out three doubts concerning

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former Confucians, and four concerning contemporary Confucians. These questions focused on one point, namely his opposition to seeking principle in various things and affairs and forgetting one’s own mind. This was an inevitable conclusion of his Learning of the Mind, and these questions express the individuality of his respect for self-attainment and his daring to challenge authority.

Chapter 15

Li Cai’s Learning of “Stopping-Cultivation”

Wang Yangming 王阳明 regarding innate moral knowing as “the awareness belonging to inherent nature” and “the site from whence Heaven, Earth and the myriad things issue forth,” taking it to be both the inherent nature endowed by Heaven and also the substance of knowledge that can become aware of and reveal this inherent nature. This kind of unification of two aspects implies the possibility of conscious awareness obscuring or occluding Heavenly principle, and this kind of obscuring or occluding would lead to an elevation of the spontaneous and instinctive side of human nature, breaking down the barrier between principle and desire. A few scholars saw this danger, and highlighted the distinction between epistemological rationality and moral rationality, making the Confucian tradition of self-cultivation as the root and precondition for governing of the state and pacifying the world become constantly self-aware. Li Cai was a representative figure among these scholars, and his doctrines have similar tendencies to the rest-stopping of Huang Wan 黄绾 and the returning to quietude of Nie Bao 聂豹 discussed above. Li Cai 李材 (1519–1595; zi 字 Mengcheng 孟诚, hao 号 Jianluo 见罗) was from Fengcheng 丰城 in Jiangxi province. He became a metropolitan graduate in the forty-first year of the Jiajing 嘉靖 period [1562], being first appointed as a secretary in the Ministry of Justice 刑部, and then promoted to a surveillance commissioner in Yunnan province. He once employed the “using the barbarians to attack the barbarians” method to defeat the Burmese army and pacify the unrest at the southwestern border, and for his achievement was raised to assistant censor-in-chief on the right in charge of pacifying and governing Yunyang 郧阳. Later he was falsely accused of having stolen the achievement of the barbarians in the campaign that defeated Burma, and was captured and interrogated in the capital. At first he was sentenced to beheading, but he spoke to the officials based on principle with strong arguments, and eventually had his sentence reduced to more than ten years of imprisonment, finally being sent to a garrison in Fujian province, and spending his remaining years in retirement. His works include Writings of

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Master Jianluo (Jianluo xiansheng shu 见罗先生书) in twenty volumes.1 “Case Studies of Stopping-Cultivation” (Zhixiu xue’an 止修学案) in [Huang Zongxi’s 黄 宗羲] Case Studies of Ming Confucians (Mingru xue’an 明儒学案) contains his letters discussing learning and works including “Brief Words on the Great Learning” (Daxue yueyan 大学约言) and “Compilation on the Goodness of the Inherent Nature of the Dao” (Daoxing shan bian 道性善编).

1 Knowing and Inherent Nature The distinction between knowing (zhi 知) and inherent nature (xing 性) held a prominent position in Li Cai’s thought, and was the precondition for his core precept of stopping-cultivation. He believed that distinguishing knowing and inherent nature was the unanimous opinion of the great Song Dynasty Neo-Confucians. He said: Ever since the teaching was established, there have never been any who regarded knowing as substance. ... Master Mingdao 明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao 程颢] said: “The substance of the mind is inherent nature.” Master Yichuan 伊川 [i.e. Cheng Yi 程颐] said: “The mind is like a grain seed, and benevolence is its principle of production.” Master Hengqu 横渠 [i.e. Zhang Zai 张载] said: “Combine inherent nature with knowing awareness, and there is the name of the mind.” This is to regard inherent nature as that which is perceived as the substance of the mind. Master Hui’an 晦庵 [i.e. Zhu Xi 朱熹] said: “The benevolent must be aware, yet awareness cannot be named benevolence.” If knowing is truly the substance of the mind, can one then say that knowing is inherent nature? Benevolence is productive principle, and productive principle is inherent nature; awareness cannot be named benevolence, so can knowing alone be named benevolence? Knowing cannot be named benevolence, so can it be considered the substance of the mind? “The Buddhists are rooted in the mind, while sages are rooted in Heaven.” This phrase from Master Yichuan is quite to the point. (“Reply to Dong Rongshan” [Da Dong Rongshan 答董蓉山], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 12, 6)

Here, Li Cai explained that Cheng Hao viewed the substance of the mind as inherent nature, and thus the mind is not inherent nature. Cheng Yi’s meaning was the same as Mingdao, with inherent nature as the principle in the mind. Zhang Zai’s “mind” was a combination of inherent nature and knowing awareness, so the mind is neither inherent nature, nor knowing awareness. Zhu Xi held that inherent nature is principle, that the mind is not principle, and that the mind’s function of knowing awareness is also not benevolence. If one regards the knowing awareness of the mind as inherent nature, then one falls into the Buddhist pitfall of regarding function as inherent nature. Li Cai especially praised Cheng Yi’s phrase distinguishing Confucianism from Buddhism: “The Buddhists are rooted in the mind, while sages are rooted in Heaven.” Buddhism abandons the cardinal guides and

[Trans.] References to Jianluo xiansheng shu refer to a carved edition from the Wanli 万历 period of the Ming Dynasty. 1

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constant virtues, probes the mind in empty quietude, and is rooted in regarding function as inherent nature. Here, Li Cai’s view concerning knowing and inherent nature is very clear: knowing is a function of the mind, and inherent nature is the original substance of the mind, so knowing is a matter of knowledge, while inherent nature is a matter of virtue, and thus knowing and inherent nature absolutely cannot be confused. “Stopping-cultivation” (zhixiu 止修) thus meant passing through the effort of cultivation and stopping at the highest good of original substance. In Li Cai’s view, the whole precept of the important Confucian classic the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) lay in making clear the distinction between knowing and inherent nature, and teaching people to stop at the goodness of the substance of inherent nature. He said: The Great Learning never attempted to abolish knowing, but simply did not regard it as substance, since knowing was originally not substance. The Great Learning never attempted to stop the extension of knowing, but simply did not reveal knowing as the ancestral model [zong 宗]. Knowing was originally function, and cannot be an ancestral model. One sincere and edificatory piece of classical text fixed the ancestral model for establishing teachings down through the ages and summed up the thread for the source of a thousand sages, simply teaching people to know the root, simply teaching them to know to stop. (“Reply to Dong Rongshan,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 12, 5)

He believed that the “knowing” in the “extension of knowing” (zhizhi 致知) of the Great Learning referred to knowledge, and not to virtue, and hence it cannot be substance. Knowledge is a function of the original substance of morality, and not morality itself. The core precept of the Great Learning lay in stopping at the highest good (zhishan 至善), and this is the root. The investigation of things and the extension of knowing must take rectifying the mind and making one’s intentions sincere as their endpoint. Here, Li Cai what emphasised was the goal and endpoint. In terms of progress in effort, he still followed Zhu Xi’s approach of first investigating and extending, then making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying the mind, before finally stopping at the highest good. Although Li Cai expressed his extreme admiration for Wang Yangming throughout his life, he believed that Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing” was biased. Although Wang Yangming proposed “the extension of innate moral knowing” in order to correct later Cheng-Zhu 程朱 learning’s biased focus on observing and studying specific things and affairs at the expense of dealing with one’s body, mind, inherent nature and endowment, he still did not make the intention of cultivating the self and establishing the root sufficiently clear, and was still suspiciously biased toward knowing. His own core precept of stopping-cultivation however revealed the fundamental effort of the Great Learning, including stopping at the highest good and cultivating the self. Stopping-cultivation comprised substance and function and included both knowledge and action, and was thus a comprehensive approach to cultivation. Li Cai repeatedly emphasised the distinction between knowing and inherent nature, as well as that between original substance and effective function. He even believed that the proposition “The essential spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness” [see the

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Kong Family Masters Anthology (Kongcongzi 孔丛子), 4.4], which had always been regarded as a Confucian maxim, also had its debatable points: “essential spirit” (jingshen 精神) is a function of the substance of the mind that belongs to the categories of epistemological rationality, and epistemological rationality is not the essential quality that makes sages sagely. He pointed out: The two words “essential spirit” are still one level away from original substance. When people now actively desire to discriminate substance, they simply continue to regard knowing as original substance, and hence generally equate the latter with the nomadic and lively. (“Reply to Zhu Ruqin” [Da Zhu Ruqin 朱汝钦], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 670)

“The nomadic and lively” refers to the mind’s function of knowing awareness, movement, etc., since this is not original substance, but rather the effective functioning of the original substance of the mind. Although this is a constant numinous knowing that is not obscured and responds affectively to external things, it does not itself have a governor (zhuzai 主宰), and must be returned to inherent nature. Returning to inherent nature is stopping in the good. Knowing to stop is the responses of knowledge to the external world being under the dominion of moral rationality. Hence he said: “In general, as soon as its numinosity is aroused, it gallops day and night toward the external, hearing sounds and following them, seeing sights and following them. Here there is nothing prior to sounds and sights but blind thought and speculation, and thus inherent nature is abolished and left behind. Hence if one approaches one step closer to inherent nature, there is nothing but goodness, and all is correct; if one departs one step further away from inherent nature, the opposite is the case. This is why the method of stopping is the primary meaning of the Great Learning” (“Reply to Li Ruqian” [Da Li Ruqian 答李汝潜], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 9, 3). In Li Cai’s view, inherent nature and feelings have a relationship of substance and function, in which inherent nature is substance and feelings are the effective function of inherent nature. The relationship between knowing and the mind is the same. He repeatedly stated that inherent nature cannot be replaced by innate moral knowing, since even though innate moral knowing is headed by the words “innate moral” (liang 良), it is still knowing, and falls into the category of epistemological rationality. The main functions of knowing are to understand and distinguish, and it does not have the meaning of governing. Even if, as Yangming said, innate moral knowing can “know to be filial, know to honor seniority, know to love, and know to respect,” such knowing is still merely a differentiation. Regardless of whether it is “innate” and “moral” or not, knowing is simply concerned with differentiating; whether it is innate and moral or not is a function of “inherent nature.” To regard innate moral knowing as inherent nature is thus “to force the function of the mind to be substance.” If one lacks the effort of stopping, then one establishes teachings on the basis of knowing and regards knowing as substance, and thereby annihilates inherent nature and Heaven. Li Cai became aware of the distinction between knowing and inherent nature very early, and thus also established his core precept of regarding inherent nature as

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the substance of the mind very early, later focusing mainly on knowing to stop. He himself described this process, saying: Ever since the teaching was established, there have never been any who regarded knowing as substance. Twenty years ago I myself did not believe this, and hence proposed that “Those who extend knowing, extend their substance of knowing.” Innate moral knowing is knowing that is aroused yet does not add to its original substance, and not a substance of knowing. In the year of Xinyou 辛酉 I became aware that this was wrong, and went back to the doctrine of the awareness of inherent nature. When I think of it now, this was all merely a mouse moving in its hole, and did not depart from a set pattern. Master Yangming said: “Innate moral knowing is the centrality before arousal, and is thus quietly inactive, the original substance of vast impartiality,” exhausting his exertions in pushing it toward the side of substance, yet in fact innate moral knowing is function after all, so how can it be moved? In general, in order to save people from error and make up for their bias, Master Yangming had no choice but to make such statements, and they have already been greatly beneficial to the contemporary world, so there is no need to bother oneself with replacing them. ... In extending knowing, knowing is regarded as substance, while in knowing the root, knowing is regarded as function. If one takes the extension of knowing as one’s precept, then what is critical is to seek knowing; if one takes knowing the root as one’s precept, then what is critical is to illuminate the root. If one trusts in this learning, then one directly begins from stopping, seeking the site of the root. If one needlessly adds another bed on top of the bed, constructing a house under the house, then regardless of whether one speaks of the light that envelops the internal or the external, the knowing of knowing awareness or that of virtuous inherent nature, whether one regards lone-knowing as innate moral knowing or the single word “alone” [du 独] as innate moral knowing, this is all simply idle chitchat, and can thus be left idle on the shelf. (“Reply to Zhan Yangdan” [Da Zhan Yangdan 答詹养澹], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 11, 21–22)

At first, Li Cai focused on the difference between knowing and the substance of knowing (zhiti 知体). According to Wang Yangming’s statement, innate moral knowing is “the awareness belonging to inherent nature” (suo xing zhi jue 所性之 觉), and innate moral knowing is thus inherent nature. Li Cai however believed that innate moral knowing is simply knowing, and inherent nature is the substance of innate moral knowing. Since innate moral knowing is not the substance of knowing, this particularly revealed that the extension of knowing means extending the substance of inherent nature within the mind, and not extending its knowledge. By the Xinyou year of the Jiajing period [1561], Li Cai was forty-two years old, and he again changed his core precept, returning to the doctrine of the awareness of inherent nature, believing that the mind is both inherent nature and awareness. However, all this was simply turning round and round within the old patterns, and was unable to clearly put forward the governing function of moral rationality, hence he promoted the core precept of stopping-cultivation. Stopping meant stopping at the highest good, while cultivation meant cultivating the self, and its intended meaning was very prominent. He believed that when Wang Yangming took innate moral knowing to be original substance, this forcibly dragged innate moral knowing from function toward substance, while in fact innate moral knowing was simply function. Since Yangming’s recognition of innate moral knowing was not clear, he abandoned illuminating the root and sought innate moral knowing, abandoning stopping at the highest good and seeking its effective function, and therefore what

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he sought was simply knowledge. Being able to know the root and stop is actually to seek at the level of moral rationality. Here, Li Cai’s understanding of Wang Yangming was very partial, and he emphasised the difference between knowledge and morality much more than Wang Yangming, emphasising the governing and dominating position of morality. Li Cai believed that whether one took knowing awareness or the substance of inherent nature as the foundation for one’s whole theory was the fundamental difference between Confucianism and Buddhism. He pointed out: When Confucians discuss learning, all affairs return to reality, while when Buddhists discuss learning, all affairs return to emptiness. ... As soon as one’s perception of inherent nature is flawed, the fault will lead to this. Deduced back to its original cause, this is because they only see substance in terms of function, heading directly into the operations of knowing awareness and recognising the innate goodness of their impulse of arousal, and basing everything on this as if it were the substance endowed by Heaven. Seen from this perspective, one knows that the operation of knowing awareness cannot be spoken of as inherent nature, and that Confucian learning absolutely must be rooted in Heaven. (“Reply to Xu Qingfu” [Da Xu Qingfu 答徐清甫], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 13, 5)

He believed that the fault of the Buddhists lay in their regarding people’s function of knowing awareness as inherent nature, and believing that, as a function of knowing awareness, its inherent nature was rooted in emptiness. Some Confucian scholars also had this fault, thinking that the innate morality of that which is aroused within knowing awareness is the inherent nature endowed by Heaven. In Li Cai’s view, the intentional thoughts, judgments, etc. that are produced within knowing awareness, even if they are good, are nonetheless still classed as categories of actual knowledge, while the source of this goodness is inherent nature, which is metaphysical. Inherent nature is soundless and scentless, unseen and unheard, and extremely hidden and subtle, yet because it is the governor of the actual, this does not affect its being real. In terms of the metaphysical and the actual, the operations of knowing awareness cannot be spoken of as inherent nature. The inherent nature spoken of by Confucians must belong to “the inherent nature endowed by Heaven,” must belong to a metaphysical substance. Hence when Cheng-Zhu strictly distinguished between the metaphysical and the actual, as well as the difference between mind and inherent nature, this has a value that can be overlooked. From the above, it can be seen that Li Cai’s learning of stopping-cultivation heavily emphasised the difference between inherent nature and knowing along with that between moral rationality and epistemological rationality, and this constituted the theoretical precondition for his core precept of stopping-cultivation. He believed that this difference could put an end to Cheng-Zhu’s view of knowledge as the goal of one’s pursuits, to Lu-Wang’s 陆王 view of the mind and inherent nature combined into one and of actual intentional views as the metaphysical base of inherent nature, and to the Buddhist view of the function of knowing awareness as inherent nature, thereby casting aside theoretical errors such as a moral substance of inherent nature and seeking empty quietude. This was why he went to great lengths to repeatedly explain this point.

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2 The Core Precept of Stopping-Cultivation and Its Internal Contradictions The core precept of Li Cai’s learning was stopping-cultivation (zhixiu 止修). The two words “stopping” and “cultivation” were taken from “stopping at the highest good” (zhi zhishan 止至善) and “cultivating the self” (xiushen 修身) in the Great Learning. Li Cai once said: “Stopping is a decisive intention, and cultivation is effort, so they are originally not two affairs” (“Reply to Li Ruqian,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 7, 14). The core precept of stopping-cultivation was in fact simply the single word “stopping” (zhi 止), since the site of stopping is the site of cultivation, and being able to stop is cultivation. Hence he repeatedly discussed stopping, since if one is able to stop the cultivation is included within this. Li Cai had a fundamental proposition concerning stopping, which was “assimilating knowing and returning to stopping” (shezhi guizhi 摄知归止). He said: Some doubt whether the dual proposal of stopping-cultivation is excessively ornamental, not knowing that the whole classic all illuminates stopping at the highest good, twisting and turning, before directly stating that self-cultivation is the root, which is its great conclusion and the concrete place to start work. This is why I specifically exposed self-cultivation as the root, with its concrete uprightness being practical work to stop at the highest good. Hence I said that one should know self-cultivation as the root and stop at this. (“Reply to Jiang Chongwen” [Da Jiang Chongwen 答蒋崇文], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 681)

Stopping-cultivation was not sharply divided into two, but was an integrated whole, with its entire spirit not going beyond the core precepts of the Great Learning. Cultivating the self is a summary of the three guiding principles and eight items (sangang bamu 三纲八目), and the three guiding principles and eight items can be reduced to cultivating the self. To cultivate the self is simply to stop at the highest good. He explained his core precept of stopping-cultivation, saying: The vein that one must think along is simply a single good, and its technique is simply a single stopping. Regardless of how often one repeats it, it must be said that it boil downs to self-cultivation as the root, it must be revealed that self-cultivation is the root. One must realise this, since then stopping will truly become a method, the good will truly become meaningful, and one will not fall into marginal views. (“Reply to Gong Geshan” [Da Gong Geshan 答龚葛山], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 680)

The whole vein of stopping-cultivation lies in stopping at the highest good, in which the highest good is the goal, and the effort lies in stopping. If one stops at the highest good, then the self will naturally be cultivated, and so stopping-cultivation is not divided into two different phases. Although stopping-cultivation is simply one effort, two words must be used to state it completely. Stopping at the highest good is the result, and cultivating the self is the process. However, one could also say that cultivating the self is the final destination, and stopping at the highest good is its procedure and phase. The most fundamental aspect of stopping at the highest good is assimilating knowing and returning to stopping. To assimilate knowing and return to stopping means to place epistemological rationality under the command of

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moral rationality, making moral rationality the governor. In Li Cai’s view, knowledge and passions both belong to the actual, and their issuer and producer is the mind. However, if one wishes to make that which issues forth in the mind all arise from the substance of inherent nature, one must have the effort of assimilating knowing and returning to stopping. He said: Substance means the myriad things all being complete, while function means each thing acting as an impulse. Those who investigate things investigate the things that each act as an impulse. ... If one simply practically and surely takes the proposed knowing of the root as one’s final precept, and knowing to stop as one’s method, leading people to follow things and affairs and concretely stop at them and cultivate them, i.e. the so-called investigating, extending, making sincere, and rectifying [from the Great Learning], then everything becomes concrete work and concrete effort. Is it not joyful and simple? (“Reply to Li Ruqian,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 10, 2)

To know the root is to know that self-cultivation is the root, to know to stop is to know to stop at the highest good, and to investigate things is to stop at the highest good in following things and affairs. All effort of cultivation can be reduced to stopping at the highest good, while stopping at the highest good includes the three guiding principles and eight items, and is simple and direct. Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation was exactly opposite to Wang Yangming’s approach of applying effort to “the extension of innate moral knowing.” The extension of innate moral knowing particularly emphasised flowing operation, and stopping-cultivation particularly emphasised original substance. The precondition of innate moral knowing is that the mind is inherent nature, that the mind is principle, such that as long as it has no obstruction from selfish desires, this mind is Heavenly principle. In the extension of innate moral knowing, the emphasis was placed on extension in the external, such that, although original substance and effort were united, the emphasis was on effort, and original substance was implicit. Hence Yangming believed that the extension of innate moral knowing was a unification of knowledge and action. In Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation however, self-cultivation was the goal, and stopping at the highest good was the effort. The accumulation of the highest good was original substance, and the process of accumulating the highest good was a process of completing original substance. Hence in general terms, stopping-cultivation tended more toward original substance. However, Li Cai’s “stopping-cultivation” was merely a guiding principle, and this guiding principle signified the difference between moral cultivation and obtaining knowledge. However, self-cultivation and stopping at the highest good were typical orientations of Neo-Confucian theories of effort, and Li Cai did not display any remarkable or specific approach. Hence Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 said that stopping-cultivation was “seeking a good title to write an essay, and had nothing to do with sitting down [to write]” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 13). His meaning was that stopping-cultivation was a final destination, but not an realistic effort. Thus stopping-cultivation amounts to stopping, and in terms of how to stop, he spoke of assimilating knowing and returning to stopping; in terms of where to stop, he spoke of stopping at the highest good; in terms of what is the highest good,

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how to stop, and how to cultivate, Li Cai gave no practical explanations, and his arguments did not go beyond the usual content of Neo-Confucianism. It can be said that Li Cai’s core precept of stopping-cultivation simply pointed out a grand yet general goal, and he did not concretise it. On this point, Li Cai cannot compare to Wang Yangming, nor to those students of Wang’s school who gave clear and precise precepts. Furthermore, there was a significant flaw in Li Cai’s theory, namely its separation of metaphysical and actual, mind and principle, and inherent nature and feelings. Li Cai’s focus was on the distinction between knowing and inherent nature. However, since he overstated the division between the two, this severed the Neo-Confucian tradition’s inseparable yet unmixed relation of substance and function having one source, with no gap between manifest and the subtle, inherent nature as substance and feeling as function, activity and stillness as one, etc. Huang Zongxi saw this point, and sharply pointed out that Li Cai’s understanding of the relation between inherent nature and feeling, activity and stillness, etc. was unclear: The gentleman’s two terms “inherent nature” and “feeling” could originally not be analysed apart, since without feelings, how could one find inherent nature? Mencius said that compassion, shame, yielding, and right and wrong are benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom [see Mencius, 6A.6], and not that above compassion, shame, yielding, and right and wrong, there is another level of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. The court of Yu 虞 [i.e. legendary emperor Shun 舜] spoke of “the mind of dao 道” [see Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书), “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟], meaning centrality; how could the mind of dao issue forth from centrality? Concerning this, former worthy men could not be indifferent, and the gentleman’s division between them is simply excessive. Similarly, for the cultivation that the gentleman spoke of, how could one cast aside this compassion, shame, yielding, and right and wrong that can be a governor, and seek it in some dim and obscure unknowable? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 668)

These words can be said to hit precisely on his mistake. The relationship between inherent nature and feelings was a big question in Neo-Confucianism. Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐 believed that the inherent nature of benevolence originated from the original substance of the cosmos, which he believed to be “non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” (wuji er taiji 无极而太极), where the Supreme Polarity is active and produces yang 阳 and is still and produces yin 阴, while the Supreme Polarity itself transcends specific activity and stillness. The human mind was also like this, with its original substance as sincerity, where “sincerity” (cheng 诚) was absolute stillness. The first arising of intentional thoughts in the mind was called “inflection” (ji 几). “Sincerity is without action, while inflections are good or bad” meant that the original substance is without good and bad, and that good and bad arise later. This already contained a tendency to separate the a priori [or pre-Heavenly; xiantian 先天] from the a posteriori [or post-Heavenly; houtian 后天]. Zhang Zai proposed that “the mind unifies inherent nature and feeling,” believing that the mind has the two aspects of inherent nature and feeling, in which inherent nature originates in the clear, interconnected, limpid and unified Supreme Void (taixu 太虚), while feeling originates in the qi 气 of yin-yang with its give and take in mutual resistance, the

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former being called “the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth,” and the latter “the inherent nature of material qi [qizhi 气质].” Actual human nature is the inherent nature of material qi, and the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is not another inherent nature, but rather a naturally possessed quality of qi in which it returns to the state of the Supreme Void. Hence he said, “If one is good at turning it back, then the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is preserved.” The relationship between inherent nature and feeling as discussed by Wang Anshi 王安石 differed greatly from those of Zhou and Zhang, as he said: “When happiness, anger, sadness, joy, likes, dislikes, and desires do not issue forth externally but are preserved in the mind, this is inherent nature; when happiness, anger, sadness, joy, likes, dislikes, and desires issue forth externally and are perceived in conduct, this is feeling. Inherent nature is the root of feeling, while feeling is a function of inherent nature” (“Inherent Nature and Feeling” [Xingqing 性情], Collected Papers of Wang Wengong [Wang Wengong wenji 王文公文集], 315). He regarded inherent nature and feeling as a relation of substance and function. However, the substance and function he spoke of in fact referred to issuing forth externally and preserving within, different from the substance and function spoken of by Zhu Xi. Zhu Xi believed that, in Mencius’ four inklings, “Compassion, shame, yielding, and right and wrong are feeling; benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are inherent nature. The mind is that which unifies inherent nature and feeling” (Collected Commentaries on the Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books [Sishu zhangju jizhu 四书章句集注], New Edition of the Collected Works of the Various Masters [Xinbian zhuzi jicheng 新编诸子集成], 238). For Zhu Xi here, substance referred to principle, and function referred to qi; inherent nature was the state before arousal, feeling was the already aroused. The state before arousal could precisely be perceived in the already aroused. Zhu Xi’s theory of the relation between inherent nature and feeling exerted the biggest influence on later generations. Li Cai strictly separated knowing and inherent nature as two affairs, so inherent nature was not the aspect of feeling in accord with principle, but was another entity, the place where people ought to stop, and stopping-cultivation meant stopping at this place. In Zhu Xi’s theory of inherent nature, inherent nature was a logical postulate, referring to the source and final destination of feeling. Although inherent nature was metaphysical, it could not be separated from the actual activity of the mind. Li Cai however divided inherent nature and knowing into two, so that the feeling active in the thoughts of the mind lost its direct link to its source and final destination, yet he also theoretically regarded inherent nature as the place where one ought to stop, and thus was in a contradictory dilemma. Inherent nature’s governing function in relation to knowing thus also fell into a void. As Wang Yangming once pointed out: “The highest good is the original substance of the mind; where is there anything not good in the original substance of the mind? If one now wishes to rectify the mind, how should one apply his or her effort to this original substance? One can inevitably apply one’s exertions only to the site where the mind is aroused into activity” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. III). This was also to apply one’s efforts to actual feelings, and not to “stop at the highest good.” Li Cai’s core precept was stopping at inherent nature and stopping at the highest good,

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so his goal was self-cultivation in general, and not to actualise self-cultivation in the investigation of things and extension of knowing, as it was for Zhu Xi, or to actualise it in the extension of innate moral knowing, as it was for Wang Yangming. On this point, Huang Zongxi once earnestly noted: “The Great Learning regarded self-cultivation as the root, and self-cultivation as the method, yet finally reduced this to investigation and extension, and thus it was clear that work begins with investigation and extension. Hence to speak in terms of all under Heaven, the state, and the family, the self is the root; to speak in terms of self-cultivation, investigation and extension is its root. The gentleman wished to collapse everything into self-cultivation, and thus combined the ‘root’ [ben 本] of ‘knowing the root’ and the ‘root’ of ‘self-cultivation as the root’ into one, which I finally feel is jarring and unsatisfactory” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 668). His meaning was that self-cultivation as the root was the final destination, while knowing the root was specific effort. Li Cai only proposed the final destination of stopping at the highest good, while not pointing to a specific approach for “cultivation,” and on this point, Huang Zongxi’s criticism was most pertinent.

3 Stopping-Cultivation, Rest-Stopping and Returning to Quietude Li Cai’s aim in proposing his learning of stopping-cultivation was to correct the biases of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, especially the fault of regarding numinous clarity as the substance of inherent nature among later followers of Yangming. According to the tendencies of its effort, stopping-cultivation belonging to the path of self-restraint. In his letters to his friends discussing learning, Li Cai often highlighted this orientation. For example, he said: Simply stick to self-cultivation as the root, taking up the corresponding spirit and exhausting your exertions to infuse it into yourself, concentrating as if grasping something, upright as if standing erect, awakened and constant as if perceiving something, cautious and careful, brilliantly serving the sovereign above, with the sovereign above looking down on you, and no duality in your mind. Between sight, hearing, speaking and moving, frequently check your state of awakening closely, managing things to return to the regularity of Heaven, and carnal desires will spontaneously be unable to interfere, wild waves will be unable to snatch you away, and through constant stopping and cultivation, you will gradually approach the principle of the dao. (“Reply to Di Mengqian” [Da Di Mengqian 答 弟孟乾], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 8, 2)

Although Li Cai’s precept of stopping-cultivation appears quite general, his tendency of effort shared certain similarities with Huang Wan’s rest-stopping. The “rest” (gen 艮) in “rest-stopping” also meant “stop,” and the whole spirit of rest-stopping lay in learning to have self-restraint, stopping where one ought to stop, in which where one ought to stop was centrality (zhong 中). The whole spirit of learning of stopping-cultivation lay in stopping at the highest good, where this

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highest good was also centrality. Huang Wan’s rest-stopping was taken from the Gen hexagram of the Book of Changes [Yijing 易经; see hexagram 52]: “Resting in one’s stopping means stopping in one’s place”; “Resting means stopping. When one stops when it is time to stop and moves when it is time to moves, one’s activity and stillness do not miss their proper times, and one’s dao is bright and illuminating.” He gave repeated arguments concerning this meaning. Li Cai also reduced all the meaning of the Confucian classics to stopping, as he said: “The Six Classics have no simple oral formula, but each time I speak of them there is but the single sentence ‘Resting like one’s back.’ It is really simply knowing to stop” (“Reply to Li Ruqian,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 9, 6). He also agreed with Zhu Xi in regarding rest-stopping as the secret of cultivation for sages and worthy men, quoting Zhu Xi’s words and saying: “Ever since there has been human life, this mind has constantly issued forth, galloping outwardly at every moment and all times, so unless one knows to stop, how can one put it in order? Unless one’s ‘rest is like one’s back,’ how can one stop and lodge it? This is why resting like the back was the secret of the thousand sages” (“Reply to Li Ruqian,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 9, 6). In Li Cai’s view, the entire essence of the Changes lay only in hexagram Gen, and the meaning contained in the hexagram Gen could explain all the hexagrams. For example, hexagram Bo 剥 [Peeling] and hexagram Fu 复 [Return] both contain five yin lines and one yang line. Hexagram Fu’s yang line is at the bottom, and the bottom is the inside, which is the ruler, and since the yang line on the inside is the ruler, the yin lines all follow it, and thus it is able to return. Fu is an image of the growth of yang qi. Hexagram Bo’s image is opposite to this, its yang line is on the top as ascendant, and cannot be the ruler, hence yin grows and yang subsides. Bo is an image the ablation of yang qi. Hexagram Fu contains stopping, while hexagram Bo contains no stopping, and their results are exactly the opposite. Temporary returning is Fu, while constant returning is Gen, and the meaning expressed by hexagram Fu is stopping, which is the spirit of the Book of Changes as a whole. Seen in this way, Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation was a synthesis of the thought of the Book of Changes with that of the Great Learning. This point was somewhat different from Huang Wan, since he merely took the Book of Changes and especially hexagram Gen as the basis of the classics, and his exposition was closely concerned with the meaning of “Resting in one’s stopping” from hexagram Gen, while Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation mainly came from the Great Learning, and he used the meaning of hexagram Gen from the Book of Changes to develop his exposition. Furthermore, in the sentence “When one stops when it is time to stop and moves when it is time to moves, one’s activity and stillness do not miss their proper times” in hexagram Gen, the emphasis was on the meaning of “timely centrality” (shizhong 时中), and hence Huang Wan especially emphasised “centrality,” saying: “Fu Xi 伏羲, Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 passed on the learning of rest-stopping and holding to centrality” (Compendium Illuminating the Dao [Mingdao bian 明道编], Vol. 1). Holding to centrality meant rest-stopping, and rest-stopping meant stopping at centrality, stopping at the place where one ought to stop. The “centrality” in Li Cai’s “stopping-cultivation” mainly came from the ““sixteen-character transmission

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of the mind” (shiliuzi xinchuan 十六字心传) [see “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟), Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书)]. He once said: Every time I speak of the learning of self-cultivation as the root, this is the learning of “holding fast to what is central” [yunzhi juezhong 允执厥中; from the sixteen-character transmission of the mind; see the chapter on Wang Yangming above]. Without knowing the root, one certainly cannot hold to centrality, and without the centrality that one holds fast to, one cannot yet speak of knowing the root. When left does not go left, right does not go right, the front does not go forward, the back does not go backward, and everything is in place, straight up and straight down, then one takes place through one’s centrality, and the great root of all under Heaven is established. Investigating, extending, making sincere and rectifying are nothing but the gaps and omissions in one’s centrality being managed, illuminated, and pulled together to make them constantly stop at centrality. Constant stopping is constant cultivation: one’s mind being constantly upright, one’s intention constantly sincere, one’s knowing constantly extended, and things spontaneously investigated. (“Reply to Fang Xianxun” [Da Fang Xiansun 答方宪孙], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 7, 10)

The goal to be reached in self-cultivation is holding to centrality at all times, and only by holding to centrality can one speak of knowing the root, of the learning of self-cultivation. In investigating, extending, making sincere and rectifying, the goal is to attain centrality, and investigating, extending, making sincere and rectifying themselves are stopping, and also cultivation. Stopping-cultivation and holding fast to what is central can be mutually explicated. Seen in this way, Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation indeed shares similar points with Huang Wan’s rest-stopping. Huang Wan’s rest-stopping forcefully repudiated Chan [Buddhist] learning’s mistake of being without stopping, and he once criticised figures including Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊, Yang Jian 杨简, Wang Yangming, and Wang Longxi 王龙溪 for being mixed up in Chan learning, even accusing figures who were regarded by later scholars as purer than pure, such as Cheng Hao and Zhang Zai. Hence his precept of rest-stopping was aimed at making scholars stop where they ought to stop, and not be immersed in Chan learning. In Li Cai’s learning of stopping-cultivation however, the emphasis was on denouncing the fault of “not knowing where to stop,” as found in later followers of Yangming who regarded knowledge as the substance of inherent nature, and in the Chan learning that regarded effective function as inherent nature. He also criticised Yangming’s doctrine that regarded innate moral knowing as the substance of inherent nature, although his degree of vehemence was much lower than that of Huang Wan. Former scholars have also thought that there are certain similarities between Li Cai’s knowing to stop and Nie Bao’s “returning to quietude.” Nie Bao’s emphasis was on the distinction between quietude and affectivity, and he thought that quietude was inherent nature, that affectivity was feeling, that only by returning to quietude could one interconnect affectively, and that only by holding to substance could one respond to function, hence one must make the substance of the mind constantly quiet. Li Cai spoke of stopping at inherent nature, stopping at principle. It was in this sense that Huang Zongxi thought that Li Cai’s assimilating knowing and returning to stopping and Nie Bao’s “returning to quietude” were

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fundamentally consistent. In terms of general tendency of the form of their learning, Zou Shouyi 邹守益, Ouyang De 欧阳德, Nie Bao, Luo Hongxian 罗洪先, and Li Cai all belonged to the path of self-restraint, yet if examined closely, each of their core precepts were different. Huang Zongxi’s judgment concerned the general tendency of their learning, and in fact the difference between Li Cai and Nie Bao was much greater than that between him and Huang Wan. First, Nie Bao belonged to the Wang [Yangming] school and had the basic characteristics of Wang Learning, accepting Wang Yangming’s basic proposition “innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle,” and regarding the extension of innate moral knowing as the effort to expand and extend the substance of inherent nature. They key point of his theory was the distinction between quietude and affectivity; quietude and affectivity were forms of innate moral knowing, and not its essence or content. His debates with figures such as Ouyang De and Liu Wenmin 刘文敏 were debates concerning the key points of doctrines internal to the Wang school, or differences in understanding concerning Yangming’s core precepts. Li Cai however did not belong to the Wang school, and his core precept of stopping-cultivation primarily lay in distinguishing the difference between knowing and inherent nature, holding that inherent nature is internal to the mind but not identical to the mind, a point which already differs from the Wang school. He believed that innate moral knowing was simply the mind and not inherent nature, and denounced scholars who took innate moral knowing as their central academic precept as “Buddhists who regard effective function as inherent nature,” in clear disagreement with the methods of the Wang school. Furthermore, Li Cai’s knowing to stop meant stopping at every point within flowing operation, while Nie Bao held returning to quietude in substance, holding to substance to apply its function. The two have significant differences. Li Cai extracted his core precept of stopping-cultivation from the Great Learning, and the two words “stopping” and “cultivation” were commonplace in the effort of Song-Ming Confucians, and Li Cai simply took them up in particular as his core precept. Liu Zongzhou once said: “After Wencheng 文成 [i.e. Wang Yangming], Master Li came up with his own approach, tirelessly using the two words ‘stopping-cultivation’ to repress ‘innate moral knowing,’ saying that he had checked Confucius and Zengzi 曾子 and awaited later sages, unyieldingly taking the seat of a master, and leading all under Heaven to follow him, the same as Wencheng. Formerly, people said that innate moral knowing was lucid but dissolute, and apparently lacked a basis as firm as that of the two words ‘stopping-cultivation.’ However, the latter was simply seeking a good title to write an essay, and had nothing to do with sitting down [to write]” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 13). Here, he still said that Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation was grand but useless, its core precept apparently sticking closely to the key Confucian task of cultivation, yet without proposing a practical approach for effort. This assessment accords with the reality of Li Cai’s learning.

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4 Cultivating the Self, Governing and Pacifying Another important meaning of Li Cai’s core precept of stopping-cultivation was viewing self-cultivation as the foundation for ordering the family, governing the state, and pacifying all under Heaven, such that all the achievements in a person’s life were tied to self-cultivation; the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning can be summed up in one phrase: self-cultivation as the root. Without the foundation of self-cultivation, there would be no undertakings of the family, state, and world under Heaven. He said: Outside the self, there is no family, state, and world under Heaven, and outside cultivation, there is no investigation, extension, making sincere, and rectification. There may be equalising, pacifying, ordering, and governing, but if there is but one affair that is not rooted in the self, this is just the utilitarian learning of the Five Hegemons; in investigating, extending, making sincere, and rectifying, if there is but one thought that is not rooted in the self, this is just the empty and obscure learning of Buddhism and Daoism. Hence the self is the root, the beginning, and that which should be placed first. To know the self-cultivation is the root is to know the root, to know to stop, to know what comes first and what comes later. (“The Ancient Meaning of the Great Learning” [Daxue guyi 大学古义], Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 1, 3)

Ordering the family, governing the state, and pacifying all under Heaven start from self-cultivation, so self-cultivation is the root, while the family, state, and world under Heaven are the branches; self-cultivation is substance, while the family, state, and world under Heaven are function. In the sentence “to know what comes first and what comes later is to approach the dao” in the Great Learning, self-cultivation is what should come first. If the family, state, and world under Heaven do not have self-cultivation acting as their root and giving them guidance, they will inevitably slip into utilitarian gain; if the investigation of things, extension of knowing, making one’s intentions sincere, and rectification of one’s mind are not rooted in self-cultivation, they will inevitably slip into empty obscurity. Hence, other than the meaning of stopping at the base of inherent nature as self-cultivation discussed above, the two words “stopping-cultivation” also contain the meaning of “stopping at the base of self-cultivation, taking it as the root of governing the state and pacifying all under Heaven.” The former is relatively specific, and can be seen as the main point of effort. The latter is rather broad, and in fact is a general principle of human life, and a vague restatement of the content of Neo-Confucianism. Furthermore, Li Cai also extended the meaning of the term “self” (shen 身), proposing the concepts of family, state, and all under Heaven, and pointing out that in the so-called cultivating, ordering, governing, and pacifying, dealing with actual things and affairs was not the fundamental purpose, and these should instead should be seen as matters of self-cultivation, with the family, state, and world under Heaven being seen as sites for self-cultivation. That is to say, the purpose of external enterprises was to accomplish internal character:

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Ordering the family was not soliciting for the family, but rather that, for the self in the family, the family is a matter of cultivation. Governing the state was not soliciting for the state, but rather that, for the self in the state, the state is a matter of cultivation. Pacifying all under Heaven was not soliciting for the world under Heaven, but rather that, for the self in the world under Heaven, all under Heaven is a matter of cultivation. Hence the family, state, and world under Heaven are quantities; equalising, pacifying, ordering, and governing are undertakings. I once said: The family, state, and world under Heaven are sites for self-cultivation. This is why the Son of Heaven and the common people are one. (“Brief Words on the Great Learning,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 686)

That is to say, every place is a site for self-cultivation, and accomplishing moral character lies in the specific activities before one’s eyes, such that, aside from the affairs that each person carries out, there is no accomplishment of morality. This was the meaning expressed by the Confucian statement “not leaving behind the constant conduct of daily usages, yet directly reaching the a priori state before depiction,” and was consistent with that of Wang Yangming’s statement, “If one leaves behind notebooks and lawsuits, there is no innate moral knowing that can be extended.” Although the family, state, and world under Heaven are different in importance, and they require different abilities, this simply indicates quantity, and not quality, and in terms of the fact that one can cultivate the self in any position, the family, state, and world under Heaven have no difference in quality, and their affairs are affairs of self-cultivation. Li Cai’s conception of self-cultivation as the root and the family, state, and world under Heaven as the branches was very close to Wang Yangming’s famous student Wang Gen’s 王艮 doctrine of “the Huainan investigation of things.” Here, it cannot be said that either one of them absorbed this from the other, since they were explications that they each attained for themselves, based on their common appreciation for the Great Learning. Self-cultivation as the root was the fundamental precept of the Great Learning. Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation was in accord with his thoughts concerning knowledge and action, although his discussions of the latter topic were very scarce. Case Studies of Ming Confucians only selected one passage: Knowledge is action, and action is simply knowledge; this is why knowledge and action were originally conjoined in substance. When knowledge is exhaustive, one only embodies that which ought to be acted; when action is exhaustive, one only understands that which ought to be known. This is why knowledge and action were originally common in function. (“Reply to Li Ruqian,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 10, 13; Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 671)

This was very close to Wang Yangming’s conception of the unification of knowledge and action: knowledge and action were originally conjoined in substance, knowledge being knowledge of how to act, and action being the completion of that which one knows, so knowledge and action were simply two aspects of one and the same affair, and this is what he called their being “common in function.” “Conjoined in substance” (heti 合体) and “common in function” (tongyong 同用) were the essence of Wang Yangming’s thought: “Knowledge is the decision of action, and action is the effort of knowledge”; “Knowledge and action uses two

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words to express a single effort, and this single effort requires these two words in order to be fully expressed” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). Although Li Cai did not discuss the relation between knowledge and action in any great detail, unlike Wang Yangming, and also did not have Yangming’s broad theoretical vision, from this sentence, the outline of his conception of knowledge and action can be glimpsed. He can be said to have taken this conception from Wang Yangming, and he once said: “Yangming was truly a world-ordering talent, with a vision that traversed the ages. Among his various works, there was not one that was not the true accomplishment of learning to be a sage” (“Reply to Dong Rongshan,” Writings of Master Jianluo, Vol. 12, 1). Although he was dissatisfied with his core precept of the extension of innate moral knowing, he strongly admired the achievements of his life, and thus learned from Wang Yangming in the half of his life he spent handling affairs. The most prominent aspect of Li Cai’s theory was his distinction between inherent nature and knowing, putting forward the necessity of assimilating knowing and returning to stopping with unprecedented clarity. He vividly revealed the essence of morality qua morality and the relationship between morality and knowledge, to the point of breaking apart Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism’s central ideas of “substance and function having one source” and principle and qi being inseparable yet unmixed, and thereby unsurprisingly attracted criticism from figures including Huang Zongxi, Xu Fuyuan 许孚远, and Gao Panlong 高攀龙.

Chapter 16

Wang Gen and the Formation of Taizhou Learning

Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案] lists a “Case Studies from Taizhou” [Taizhou xue’an 泰州学案], and now whenever general works of research on Ming Dynasty academic studies discuss anything concerning Wang Gen or people from Taizhou, they are called the “Taizhou School” (Taizhou xuepai 泰州学派). However, detailed examination shows that Taizhou cannot count as an academic school in the strict sense. Unlike the Jiangyou 江右 School, whose members were all from Jiangxi, it had neither a generally similar academic tendency nor a common ancestral base, and unlike the Donglin 东林 School, it neither had an academic centre to support it nor developed into an organisation based on political views or academic activities. People from Taizhou were listed as a case study entirely based on their relations of inheritance from their masters. However, based on the records in Case Studies of Ming Confucians, relations of inheritance from masters could be deep friendships, with scholars studying together for many decades, they could be based entirely on reputation, with scholars staying for a few months and then leaving, or they could be scholars who obtained enlightenment from merely a few phrases and then for the rest of their life declared someone their master. With so-called masters and disciples, the differences in academic features could be very great. People from Taizhou also did not form a regional academic community, since under the same banner of Taizhou, famous scholars included Yan Shannong 颜山农 and He Xinyin 何心隐 from Jiangyou, Xu Yue 徐樾 and Luo Rufang 罗汝芳 from Shu 蜀, Geng Dingxiang 耿定向 and Geng Dingli 耿定理 from Chu 楚, Zhou Rudeng 周汝登 and Tao Wangling 陶望龄 from Zhe 浙, Yang Qiyuan 杨起元 from Yue 粤, Jiao Hong 焦竑 from Nanjing, etc. Although they all once studied under masters from Taizhou, their academic precepts were a numerous and varied jumble. At the end of the Qing Dynasty when Yuan Chengye 袁承业 was compiling his Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, he compiled a record of the names of Taizhou School disciples based on names of lecture audiences mentioned in Wang Dong 王栋 and Wang Bi’s 王襞 collected writings along with those listed in local gazettes and other contemporary collections, but this record mostly just contains names with no deeds or birthplaces. This © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_16

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can only swell the ranks of the Taizhou School, and is of little assistance in researching the thought of the people from Taizhou. Other than Wang Gen and his son and nephew, the people listed in “Case Studies from Taizhou” cannot really constitute a school in the strict sense. Yan Shannong and He Xinyin were important figures under the Taizhou School, and as Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 said, “After Taizhou, many of its people [considered themselves] able to tie up dragons and snakes with their bare hands, and by the time it was transmitted to the school of Yan Shannong and He Xinyin, the Teaching of Names was completely unable to restrain or hold them” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 703). What Huang Zongxi stressed was in fact the fearless spirit the later Taizhou followers expressed in handling affairs, such as He Xinyin using a commoner’s trick to get rid of [notorious corrupt minister] Yan Song 严嵩 and his opposition to [Legalist reformer] Zhang Juzheng 张居正. None of the examples given as evidence for the statement that “the Teaching of Names was completely unable to restrain or hold them” are particularly shocking. At the time, Huang Zongxi had not seen the works of Yan Shannong, and he later discovered that the thought expressed in Yan Shannong’s collected writings once they were arranged and published differed very greatly from the description of Yan Shannong in the phrases of earlier cases in “Case Studies from Taizhou,” that “his learning used the human mind to mystify the myriad things and was unpredictable. Inherent nature was like a bright pearl, absent of any dusty contamination, and there was nothing to see or hear, no need for discipline or anxiety. Most of the time he simply exerted the movements of his inherent nature, totally trusting in spontaneity, and then called this the dao. At appropriate times he would set aside his ease, and use discipline, anxiety and fear to cultivate it. All the formulations of dao and principle seen and heard by former Confucians were merely adequate to obstruct the dao. These were his major precepts.” His “seven day arrival and return” (qiri laifu 七日来复) was mostly mystical experience, with very few theoretical elements. “Urgent rescue from the fire of the mind” (jijiu xinhuo 急救心火) also meant preserving principle and extirpating desire, only switched for a more appealing and stirring formulation. In correcting his disciples’ methods of cultivation, he put forward the idea that “controlling desire is not embodying benevolence,” yet this also simply advocated positively developing people’s inner moral resources, and opposed things like strenuously forcing the mind not to arouse intentions. In He Xinyin’s collected writings there is also little by way of theoretical originality, hence this book omits discussion of them both. From Taizhou Learning, those with systematic theories include its founder Wang Gen, his son and nephew Wang Dong and Wang Bi, and the later scholars Luo Rufang, Geng Dingxiang, Jiao Hong, and the fiercely anti-traditional figure Li Zhi 李贽. Wang Gen 王艮 (1483–1541; zi 字 Ruzhi 汝止, hao 号 Xinzhai 心斋) was from Anfeng 安丰 in Taizhou 泰州, and was born into a family of kitchen workers. At the age of seven he entered a private village school, but the poverty of his family forced him to stop his studies and follow his father on his travels around Shandong

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with his business. He constantly carried with him books including the Analects and the Classic of Filial Piety, consulting people he met as to their meaning, eventually coming to know them thoroughly and be able to discourse freely concerning their explanation. Case Studies of Ming Confucians relates an account of how one day he dreamt that the sky was falling and crushing him, a myriad people rushing about calling for help, yet he was able to hold it up with one arm and rearrange the jumbled stars with his hand. When he awoke, he was dripping with sweat, and from that moment on he clearly understood the substance of the mind. This shows how from his youth he had an ambition to shoulder heavy burdens and save the myriad peoples. Another day he heard someone discussing Wang Yangming’s lectures in Jiangxi, which sounded similar to the precepts of his own academic studies, and he thus set off to pay a visit to him wearing an ancient cap and gown. “When he first entered, he sat in the seat of honor. After a long time debating problems he began to feel some admiration and moved his seat to the side. When the discussion concluded he sighed and said, ‘So simple and straightforward, I cannot match it.’ He knelt down and showed his respect, calling himself a disciple. He retired and reviewed what he had heard, but felt that it did not fit together and said in regret, ‘I was too hasty.’ The next day he went to see [Yangming] again and told him of his regret. Yangming said, ‘Excellent! One should not easily believe or follow others.’ He returned to his seat of honor, and after a long time debating problems, began to feel greatly convinced, and eventually became a disciple he had originally intended. Yangming told his followers, ‘Previously when I captured [Zhu] Chenhao 朱宸濠 [the Prince of Ning 宁王 and leader of a rebellion] I was totally unmoved, but now I have been moved by this man’” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 710). Wang Gen was originally named Yin 银, but Wang Yangming took the meaning of the hexagram Gen [No. 52, “Unmoved/Mountain”] from the Book of Changes and changed his name to Gen and his zi to Ruzhi [lit. “You stop”]. After capturing Chenhao, Yangming returned home to give lectures and Wang Gen accompanied him to Yue 越. When there were many students, they were first instructed by Wang Gen, and then asked to study with Wang Yangming. Later he returned home, making his own bulrush-padded carriage wheels that swayed in the road all the way from Taizhou to the capital, causing it to be blocked with crowds of onlookers. Since his cap, clothes, speech and movements all differed from those of others, the people of the capital looked upon him as a freak. After returning to Taizhou he began to receive followers, and his academic studies became simpler. Later he traveled all over the Jiangsu-Zhejiang region giving lectures, and at talks for members of the same school, Wang Gen would always be asked to chair. After his death, his works were compiled by the Wang family along with those of his son Wang Bi and his younger relative Wang Dong to become the Complete Writings of the Three Worthies of the Huainan Wang Family [Huainan Wangshi sanxian quanshu 淮南王氏三贤全书]. At the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic period, Yuan Chengye from Dongtai 东台 revised his work on the basis of the Complete Writings of the Three Worthies text, supplementing his own

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“Genealogy of the Wang Family Disciples” [Wangshi dizi puxi 王氏弟子谱系], and compiled and published the Collected Posthumous Works of Ming Confucian Master Wang Xinzhai [Mingru Wang Xinzhai xiansheng yiji 明儒王心斋先生遗集].1

1 Innate Moral Knowing as Pre-Formed and Self-Present Wang Gen studied with Wang Yangming after the latter lived in Yue, and by this time Yangming had already uncovered his core principle of the extension of innate moral knowing (zhi liangzhi 致良知), and his academic studies had already transitioned from convergence to divergence. With his lofty spirit and stubborn character, Wang Gen was also personally able to receive Yangming’s mature thought of his late period, and thus he held that innate moral knowing is pre-formed (xiancheng 现成). He said: If the mind has any direction, this is desire; if it has any vision, this is delusion. Once it has no direction and no vision, this is the non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity. The single point of innate moral knowing is clear and bright, settled and proper, so there is no need to prepare one’s thoughts. The reason why the sages and divinities were able to govern and arrange changes and transformations, positioning, nourishing, assisting and participating, was all based on this. (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1)

In “the non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” (wuji er taiji 无极而太极 [originally from Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐]) here, non-polarity refers to empty silence with no things, i.e. no direction (wusuo xiang 无所向) and no vision (wusuo jian 无所见) from the same sentence. The Supreme Polarity is principle, i.e. innate moral knowing. When the mind is empty and silent with no things, innate moral knowing can spontaneously emerge, and there is no need to prepare one’s thoughts. Clear and bright (fenfen mingming 分分明明) means that its existence and function are manifest, not veiled and hard to find. Settled and proper (tingting dangdang 停停当当) means that it is immediately sufficient and naturally central. The effort of cultivation is thus to condense the mind and thought together as one, with no directionality and no desiring thoughts, and allow innate moral knowing to spontaneously manifest itself. On this point, he took up Wang Yangming’s “being emerging from nothing,” and was very close to Wang Longxi’s 王龙溪 thought of setting aside the myriad reasons and trusting in the flowing movement of the a priori substance of the mind. Since effort is found in “the non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity,” all a posteriori cultivation of innate moral knowing has nowhere to be applied, such that even commonplace Neo-Confucian cultivation methods such as serious respectfulness (zhuangjing 庄敬) and maintaining cultivation (chiyang 持养) become superfluous:

1

[Trans.] References to Wang Xinzhai xiansheng yiji refer to a recompiled edition by Yuan Chengye 袁承业.

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Asked about serious respectfulness and maintaining cultivation, he said: “The dao is simply one and nothing more. Centrality is innate moral knowing, is inherent nature, is one. If one recognises this principle, then it is pre-formed and self-present. As long as this is not lost, then there is serious respectfulness; as long as this constantly exists, then there is maintaining cultivation. There is no need to guard or check. If one does not recognise this principle, then serious respectfulness cannot avoid being excessively painstaking, and since it is excessively painstaking there is the selfish mind. (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1)

Here, Wang Gen’s effort clearly absorbed Cheng Hao’s 程颢 method of “recognising this principle and preserving it through sincerity and respect.” The innate moral knowing recognised by Wang Gen is simultaneously inherent nature and centrality. They are one and the same as dao as the fundamental law of the cosmos. Since innate moral knowing is originally pre-formed, and possessed sufficiently by all people, so the key of cultivation lies in recognising the self-presence of innate moral knowing, maintaining it such that it is not lost. Maintaining innate moral knowing lies in returning it to its original state of spontaneity and self-presence, and if one only aims for serious respectfulness, it will be unspontaneous and pretentious, and pretentiousness is the selfish mind. For Wang Gen here, innate moral knowing is always refined and bright, always lively and active, with no need for preparation from the selfish will: The substance of innate moral knowing is one and the same lively and active place as hawks and fishes, thinking when one should think, and comprehending since one thinks, so what need is there for convoluted methods? It is simply the spontaneous regularity of Heaven, and does not require preparation from human exertion. (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1)

This states that innate moral knowing is not simply being, it is also activity, and its activity is consistent with the regularity and rhythm of nature, without any barrier. When innate moral knowing is expressed as thought, this thought coincides with the regularity and rhythm of nature, and this is “the spontaneous regularity of Heaven” (ziran tianze 自然天则). For Wang Gen here, innate moral knowing has both substance and function: its substance is inherent nature, dao, and centrality, while its function is thought and awareness. In terms of content, the original substance of innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle, while in terms of its form of expression it is spontaneity and self-presence. Innate moral knowing is the unity of these two aspects. A passage of dialogue between Wang Gen and his student clearly demonstrates this meaning: Someone asked: “Is the learning of Heavenly principle the same as that of innate moral knowing?” He said: “The same.” “Is there any difference?” He said: “No difference. Heavenly principle is the principle originally possessed by innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is that which one knows without thinking and can do without learning. It is only because one knows it without thinking and can do it without learning that it is a natural and original principle. It is only because it is a natural and original principle that one can know it without thinking and can do it without learning. (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1)

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The difference between sages and worthies on the one hand and common people on the other is that sages are self-aware of this innate moral knowing and are secure in it. Worthies eliminate desires and restore principle, seeking this innate moral knowing. Ordinary people “use it everyday without knowing” [see the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传)], and await the transformative education of those who are aware. Yet transformative education (jiaohua 教化) is also simply pointing out that the innate moral knowing of the common people and that of sages and worthies is originally the same. Thus Wang Gen proposed that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” (baixing riyong ji dao 百姓日 用即道), which is a natural consequence of his above views on innate moral knowing. Wang Gen’s view that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” contains two aspects of meaning: first, the pattern of not thinking, not preparing, and acting spontaneously with easy directness that is embodied in the daily usages and routine conduct of the common people is the dao, and the dao is one with the spontaneous rhythms of things and affairs; second, the affairs of the sages are the affairs of the daily usages of the common people, and the dao of the sages is the wearing clothes and eating food of the common people. These two aspects of his thought both originated from Wang Yangming, who once said: “What is shared with foolish men and women is called common virtue; what differs from foolish men and women is called heterodox.” He also once instructed his students saying: “If you were to grab a sage and get him to lecture to people, they’d see a sage coming and run a mile, so how could he talk to them! You must become like the foolish men and women, and only then can you lecture to them” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. III). For Wang Yangming here, “What is shared with foolish men and women,” in terms of form, is the innate moral knowing possessed by all people, which is natural and completely sufficient, so that although foolish men and women have many deficiencies, their innate moral knowing is the same as that of the sage. In terms of content, the so-called Heavenly principle of innate moral knowing is nothing but the affairs of the common people in their daily usages and routine conduct. Lecturing on the daily usages and routine conduct of the common people is lecturing on the abstruse and profound truths of Heaven, dao, inherent nature, principle, etc. Wang Gen’s view that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” took up both these two aspects from Wang Yangming: first, he derived his view of innate moral knowing as immediately present without the need for deep and distant searching; second, he derived his view of the transformative education of customs, a path of transition from elite culture to the culture of the common people. As discussed above, Wang Gen thought that the so-called dao and principle are expressed in the human mind as innate moral knowing, such that innate moral knowing is consistent with the principles embodied in the myriad things. In the context of everyday conduct, innate moral knowing is expressed in the form of not thinking, being immediately present, appearing when called on, and not adding deliberation or preparation, so as soon as there is deliberation and preparation, there

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are second thoughts and tentative proposals, and there is not spontaneity. His “Chronicle” (Nianpu 年谱) states: When the master said that the daily usages of the common people are the dao, at first many did not believe him. The master pointed to the coming and going, seeing and hearing, holding the line in conduct, and general responding actions of the servants, in which without preparation, all follow the regularity of the Lord, approaching nothing yet existing, approaching the close-at-hand yet divine. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 2)

People’s everyday conduct passes through numerous repetitions and develops a set of the most reasonable, simple, efficient modes of response. Since these modes become familiar and their specific process of response is forgotten, they often have the quality of being without deliberation and immediately complete, yet also according with rules and final purposes. Wang Gen took precisely this point to be innate moral knowing. Following the regularity of the Lord points to this quality of according with rules; approaching nothing yet existing means responding on first contact without consciousness or knowledge; approaching the close-at-hand yet divine means that although these are matters concerned with the habits and views of everyday life, they are consistent with the wondrous character of the metaphysical dao. A passage of dialogue in Zou Dehan’s 邹德涵 recorded sayings vividly explains this point: In former years, a friend asked Master Xinzhai [i.e. Wang Gen]: “How can things be ‘without thought and yet all-comprehending’?” The master called his servant, who responded; he ordered him to fetch some tea, and he soon arrived carrying tea. His friend later asked about this, and the master said: “Since the servant did not already have the mind that expected me to call him, he responded as soon as I called, and this is being ‘without thought and yet all-comprehending’.” The friend said: “If this is so then all the world is a sage.” The master said: “Although daily usage is without knowing, sometimes people are lazy or tired, or pretend not to respond, and then this is not the mind of the moment. One day Master Yangming was lecturing his disciples on the great communality following and responding, but they did not understand. Suddenly, he took his disciples out to wander amid the fields, where they saw a farmer’s wife bringing him a meal, which her husband received and ate, and when he had finished and given it back to her, she took it away. The master said: ‘This is the great communality following and responding.’ When his disciples doubted this, the master said: ‘He certainly was using it everyday without knowing, yet if some affair came up and upset him, he would lose this substance of the mind.” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 354)

The boy carrying tea responding as soon as he was called, without deliberation or tentative opinion and not lingering afterward, this is precisely where his innate moral knowing is pre-formed, self-present, immediate and accommodating. The farmer digging his field, his wife bringing him a meal, his finishing and giving his rice-bowl back to his wife, and her taking it back home, this all happens spontaneously and easily without the need for deliberation or preparation. The so-called innate moral knowing is just such a pre-formed and spontaneous thing with no need for pretentiousness that accords with the regularity of Heaven as soon as it appears. Wang Gen’s thought here is very similar to the Chan 禅 Buddhist ideas of “the ordinary mind is the dao” and “the cultivation that does not cultivate.” At present

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there is no material to demonstrate that Wang Gen ever dabbled in Chan Buddhism, and in his works there is no text that comments on Chan, which can be said to be due to his experiences as a lower-class worker and his mode of education through self-instruction. In this he differed from disciples of Yangming such as Wang Longxi and Nie Bao 聂豹 who had the airs of a scholar. However, Wang Gen was taught by Yangming personally for a long time, and Yangming’s Chan thought also indirectly influenced him. This point should not be overlooked. In Wang Gen’s view that the daily usages of the common people are the dao, if one casts aside the elements of “dao” and principle, and only focuses on the form of response of innate moral knowing, then it is certainly hard to avoid the Chan Buddhist comment that “function is inherent nature.” Hence, when Huang Zongxi said that Longxi of Taizhou “increasingly unlocked the secrets of Gautama [Buddha] and attributed them to his teacher, thereby climbing Yangming to reach Chan” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 703), he was not without grounds, and was not only referring to the later followers of the Taizhou School. Wang Gen’s conception of innate moral knowing as spontaneous and pre-formed had a great influence on his followers, especially his son Wang Bi 王襞 and his disciple Xu Yue 徐樾. Via Wang Gen’s emphasis on the idea of a pre-formed innate moral knowing, as well as its promotion and elaboration by Wang Bi, Xu Yue and Luo Rufang 罗汝芳, the spontaneous and pre-formed aspect of human nature was developed, until it flowed together with the tendency towards the liberation of human nature brought about by the rise of an urban citizen class at the end of the Ming dynasty, gradually constituting a strong intellectual movement based on a natural theory of human nature, among which the dredging and originating function of the view that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” was very obvious.

2 Ordinary People and Elites Another significance of the idea that the daily usages of the common people are the dao is that the ultimate concerns of Confucians such as Heaven, dao, inherent nature and endowment were no longer the sole concern of a minority of scholars, since the dao is expressed in the everyday things and affairs of the common people, and dao is thus intimately connected to the common people’s everyday life. Wang Gen said: “The dao of the sages is no different from the daily usages of the common people, and anything different is called heterodox;” “The order in the daily usages of the common people is the order of the sages;” “The sages’ governance of the world is simply the routine affairs of the home” (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). That is to say, apart from the daily usages of the common people, apart from the “routine affairs of the home,” there is no dao to speak of, and to specifically focus on investigating the dao of Heaven, inherent nature, endowment, etc. in the metaphysical realm, rather than sticking close to the daily life of the common people, is heterodox. Wang Gen’s

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theory here shows how he wanted to take the scholarly, elite culture of Confucianism that was based on the self-cultivation of gentleman-officials and push it toward the ordinary people, making self-cultivation become a self-conscious pursuit of the ordinary common people. Wang Gen’s practical activities after he studied with Yangming mainly unfolded revolving around the realisation of this aspiration. For example, while he was still a student of Yangming, Wang Gen once had the following wish: “After a thousand years of discarded learning, Heaven awakened my teacher; can I make it so that under Heaven there is nobody who has not heard?” After returning home, he made a light carriage, and submitted a memorial proposing that “The world is but one, and the myriad things form one body, so go into the mountains and forests to seek to meet those in reclusion, and pass through the marketplace to awaken the foolish and ignorant. Follow the dao of the sages and Heaven and Earth will not oppose, extend innate moral knowing and ghosts and divinities will be inscrutable, desire to be together with the people under Heaven in doing good, without this flaunting it cannot be done,” taking on the instruction of the lower-class masses as his own personal mission. Dressed in ancient cap and gown, he flaunted these in the street, precisely in order to gain the attention of more lower-class people. Wang Gen was born into a family of cooks, and from a young age he joined in the hard work of boiling seawater for salt, so his grasp of the Confucian classics was pragmatic. This determined that the path he would follow would not be that of the imperial examination and becoming a official usually followed by scholars, but rather one of taking the knowledge gained from the most simple Confucian childhood education reading material such as the Great Learning (Daxue 大学), the Analects (Lunyu 论语) and the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝经), combining this with his own practical experience, and using the dao to transform the world of vulgar customs. This aspiration was expressed clearly in his later “Rhapsody on the Loach and the Eels” (Qiushan fu 鳅鳝赋): A Daoist monk walking leisurely in the city came across a vat of live eels in front of a shop, pressed together and intertwined, struggling to breathe as if they were dying. Suddenly he saw a loach appear from among them, sometimes above and sometimes below, sometimes left and sometimes right, sometimes in front and sometimes behind, flowing in endless circles and changing without rest, like a divine dragon. It was because of the loach that the eels were able to turn their bodies, breathe freely and thereby to live. This turning of the eels’ bodies, unblocking of their breath and preserving of their life was all the work of the loach. Despite this, it was also the joy of the loach. It was not done simply out of pity for these eels, or in the hope that they would repay the favour, but was simply a spontaneous expression of its inherent nature and nothing more. At this, the monk was moved, and sighed deeply, saying: “When me and my kind were raised together between Heaven and Earth, is this not like the loach and the eels being raised together in this vat? I have heard that the great man regards Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body, establishing a mind for Heaven and Earth and a destiny for the living people; is this not to be found here?” Thus his thoughts ran to preparing a cart and a bundle, and he felt a profound urge to wander around all four corners of the world. After a few moments, he suddenly saw wind, cloud, thunder and rain playing across the sky, and the loach built up its momentum and leapt into the great sea, heading away unhurriedly, free and at ease, boundless in its joy. Looking back at the imprisoned eels, he considered how he could rescue them. Exerting all his might, he transformed into a dragon and made thunder and rain, which completely filled

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the vat of eels. Thus those who were intertwined and pressed together were now all cheerful and full of life. After waiting a moment to recover their spirits, they returned back together to the long river and the great sea. The monk cheerfully returned to his road and moved on. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 4)

This rhapsody is a vivid depiction of Wang Gen’s aspiration to use the dao to transform customs and save the myriad people. Comparing himself to the loach, and the myriad people to the eels “pressed together and intertwined, struggling to take a single breath,” he did not wish to please himself in the rivers and waterways, but to save the eels in the vat, first enabling them turn to their bodies, breathe freely and preserve their lives, then assisting them to escape from the vat and return together to the long river and the great sea. He once pledged to himself: “When in service, one must be the teacher of the emperor; when in retirement, one must be the teacher of the myriad generations.” He assumed himself to be a saviour of the world. His actions in using the dao of the sages to transform the people were a real expression of the Confucian ideal of the myriad things as one body and the theory that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao.” Wang Gen’s idea that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” was embodied in education as the view that there are no social distinctions in teaching. His disciples included not only scholar-officials like Xu Yue, but also hired labourers like Lin Chun 林春 and woodsmen like Zhu Shu 朱恕. Under the influence of his thought that there are no social distinctions in teaching, the students welcomed by his son Wang Bi also included potters and farmers. Wang Bi successively spent twenty years in Yue, and also attempted to become a student of Wang Longxi and Qian Dehong 钱德洪, yet eventually set his mind on assisting his father in lecturing, and not attend the imperial examination. After his father died, he continued teaching in his place, traveling all around to give lectures. His potter student Han Zhen 韩贞 was even more of a keen proponent and propagator of the ordinary people’s culture: After some time, I felt I had attained some awakening, and thus took transforming customs as my task, giving instruction where I found the opportunity, to farmers, workers, tradesmen and merchants, with more than a thousand fellow travellers. In the autumn when the farming season was out, I gathered my followers and went lecturing, finishing in one village and moving on to the next, first singing and then answering questions, the sound of singing and reciting to music filling the air. (“Case Studies from Taizhou 1,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians)

The books he read did not extend further than such Confucian childhood education reading material as the Four Books, and he did not get mired in commentaries, but rather focused on experiencing their meaning first-hand. The farmer Xia Tingmei 夏廷美 said that when he read Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 Four Books with Collected Commentaries (Sishu jizhu 四书集注), he did not really understand it, but when he used the original text of the Four Books to reflect on himself thoughtfully, he attained some understanding. Their purpose in studying was not to pass the imperial examination, but for their own benefit and to transform the masses through education, as Han Zhen once said in reply to a county magistrate’s question concerning government: “I am a poor man, and have no use for influence, yet of all those who

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live with me, I am fortunate that none have caused any hassle or disturbance for your public office, and this is what I can offer in return to your enlightened office” (“Case Studies from Taizhou 1,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians). Records such as “farmers, workers, tradesmen and merchants, more than a thousand fellow travellers” and “finishing in one village and moving on to the next” demonstrate that the educational practice of Wang Gen and his followers, as determined by their theory that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao,” their background as common people and their experience as labourers, exerted quite a large influence at the time. Its significance lies in that it took the elite culture that was the mainstream of Chinese traditional education and extended it to lower classes of people, took the purely theoretical exploration of the dao of Heaven, inherent nature, endowment, etc. and normalised it into the daily usages of the common people, and took the ideal of cultivation, ordering, governing and pacifying [from the Great Learning] and actualised it in transforming customs and teaching people using Confucian childhood education reading material. In Chinese history, Buddhists had the elite pathway of translating, commenting and explicating Buddhist sutras, as well as the common people’s pathway of leading people to abandon the bad and follow the good through reciting and singing precious scrolls, and promoting belief in karma. In Confucianism, however, the ancient precept that “when one attains one’s aspiration one improves all the world; when one does not attain one’s aspiration one improves one’s own self alone” [see Mencius 孟子, 7A.9] led scholars to follow the two paths of either taking the imperial examination and becoming an official or retreating to the mountains and forests to become a recluse. Neither of these two paths spread down to the people, which led the form of Chinese culture to manifest an extreme elitist quality. The subject of intellectuals with a background in the imperial examination, along with scholastic theoretical exploration and a method of cultivation based on and self-examination, self-discipline, reflection and personal experience, all led to a disjunction between cultural elites and the ordinary masses, such that what the masses received was a mixture of Confucian ethical principles and core Buddhist or Daoist tenets, and the task of teaching the people and transforming customs mainly fell to folk religious movements. Those who were both followers of Confucianism and took teaching the people and transforming customs as their personal task, spreading Confucian culture among the lower classes, were few indeed. The theory and practice of later students from Taizhou demonstrates that they were they active promoters of the transformation from an elite culture to a culture of the ordinary people. They discarded the two paths of obtaining a ruler to implement the dao and improving one’s own self alone, and took Confucius’ troubled and restless concrete activity of saving the world and teaching the people as their model. Wang Gen once said: “Confucius cultivated himself and lectured, never going into hiding for even a day;” “I cannot carry out the affairs of Yi [Yin] 伊尹 and Fu [Yue] 傅说, and their learning I cannot follow. That Yi and Fu obtained their rulers can be seen as fortunate meetings; if they had not met with them, they would have simply spent their lives improving themselves. Confucius was not like this” (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). Although this tradition of the Taizhou School did not continue,

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and their activities were restricted to Taizhou without influencing other areas, this event is significant in itself, since it accords with the early modern spirit of the popularisation of culture and the collective participation of the masses. Even at the time, Wang Gen’s practice of flaunting his ancient cap and gown in the street and “passing through the marketplace to awaken the foolish and ignorant” aroused the opposition of his fellow disciples, and even of his teacher Wang Yangming. Wang Gen once asked Yangming about the manufacture of Confucius’s carriage when he travelled around the states, to which Yangming laughed and gave no reply; after Wang Gen went from Taizhou to the capital, Wang Yangming wrote a letter urging him to return; after he returned to Yue, Yangming then refused to see him. Wang Yangming wished to restrain Wang Gen’s “excessive enthusiasm and eccentric conduct.” Yangming was certainly not opposed to Wang Gen transforming the masses through education, but he was opposed to his practice of superficially imitating Confucius (e.g. with bulrush-padded carriage wheels) and flaunting himself in the street (with cap, gown, speech and action that differed from others). This precisely demonstrates that in Wang Gen’s eyes, Confucius was not a lofty and unreachable sage, but rather mainly an enlightening teacher who educated the people and transformed their customs. Indeed, Huang Zongxi did not agree with Wang Gen’s comments on Yi and Fu above, saying: “This is finally just an opinion on bulrush-padded carriage wheels and traveling around the states… in comparison with retiring from the world and not displaying one’s knowledge yet being without regret, it is ultimately somewhat different” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 711). His meaning was that Wang Gen was overly eager to change the world, and failed to comprehend the ancients’ aspect of inner mental tenacity in realising their own personality objective and never altering their aspiration despite not being known or successful. These all show that Wang Gen’s direction was indeed very different from those of other groups of Wang disciples.

3 The Huainan Investigation of Things The theory of cultivation corresponding to Wang Gen’s view that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” is his account of the investigation of things (gewu 格物). Among a great many explanations of the investigation of things, Wang Gen developed his own conception with a strong flavour of the ordinary people, which people called the Huainan 淮南 investigation of things. Wang Gen gave clear explanations of his account of the investigation of things in two passages: The self forms one thing with the world, the state and the family. Although there is but one thing, it can be spoken of in terms of root and branches. “Investigation” means to ascertain the degree [jiedu 絜度], and when one ascertains the degree between root and branches, then one knows that it is impossible that the root be disordered yet the branches ordered. This is the investigation of things. When things are investigated, one knows the root, and to know the root is the supreme knowledge. Thus it was said: “From the Son of Heaven down

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to the common people, all take self-cultivation as the root” [see the Great Learning]. To cultivate the self is to establish the root, and to establish the root is to secure the self. Someone asked the meaning of the word “investigation.” He said: “Investigation [ge 格] is like the ‘standard’ in ‘standard form’ [geshi 格式], namely to ascertain the rule [jieju 絜矩]. The self is a rule, while the world, the state and the family are a square, so if one ascertains the rule, then one knows that the square’s not being right is due to the rule not being right, and thus one can only try to rectify the rule, and not seek the solution in the square. When the rule is right, the square will be right, and when the square is right it becomes a standard, and thus we speak of the investigation of things. The self in relation to higher and lower, front and behind, left and right is a thing, while ascertaining the rule is investigation. Since it is impossible that the root is disordered yet the branches ordered, so one can see that ascertaining the rule is the meaning of the word investigation. Investigating things means knowing the root; establishing the root means securing the self. When one secures the self to secure the family then the family is ordered, when one secures the self to secure the state then the state is governed, and when one secures the self to secure the world then the world is pacified. Hence it was said that one cultivates the self to secure people, and cultivates the self to secure the common people [see Analects, 14.42], and that when the self is cultivated, the world is pacified [see Mencius, 7B.32].” (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1)

Wang Gen’s explanation of the investigation of things contains the following points of important content: First, Wang Gen’s investigation differs both from Zhu Xi’s “approaching things to seek their principles” and from Wang Yangming’s “rectifying thoughts,” and even more so from Yan Yuan’s 颜元 “fight wild beasts with bare fists” and “setting the hand to beating and kneading.” Wang Gen’s investigation of things meant to compare people and the external myriad things, to see that people are the root and the world, state and family are the branches, such that the result of investigating things is knowing the root, knowing that self-cultivation is the root. The knowledge that self-cultivation is the root is the most important knowledge, it is “the supreme knowledge.” There is not much theoretical explanation here, and there is even less meaning of scholastic exploration or discussion. Knowing is not the accumulation of knowledge from investigating one thing today and another tomorrow, nor is it the personal knowledge based on one’s spiritual plane found in exhausting the mind, knowing inherent nature and knowing Heaven [see Mencius, 7A.1], since these all require the participation of knowledge and an enlightened understanding of the cosmos and human life based on moral elevation. Wang Gen’s investigation of things is just “to know that self-cultivation is the root.” The self and the world, state and family are all things, and things have differences of root and branches, insignificance and importance. The self is the root, and the world, state and family are branches, so self-cultivation is the basis for ordering the family, governing the state and pacifying the world under Heaven [in the Great Learning]. Investigation thus means measuring, and the investigation of things means comparing the self with the world, state and family, and knowing that self-cultivation is the root. It is impossible that the root be disordered yet the branches ordered. Wang Gen’s account of the investigation of things is essentially the view of morality as the root found in the Confucian tradition, in which when moral cultivation is done well, the governance of the state and the pacification of the world are contained within, the old path in which moral cultivation is the basis

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for the governance of the state and the pacification of the world under Heaven. It is thus a development of Confucius’ idea that “people can broaden the dao; the dao cannot broaden people” [see Analects, 15.29]. Second, cultivating the self means securing the self (anshen 安身), which for Wang Gen means, firstly, using virtue to secure the self, i.e. the idea that “wealth benefits a house, virtue benefits the self,” and secondly, protecting the physical body of the self so that it remains undamaged, since if the body is lost, then the fundamental root of the governance of the state and the pacification of the world is also lost. Wang Gen gave a great many discussions concerned with securing the self, for example he said: To remain in the supreme good is to secure the self, and to secure the self is the great root of establishing the world under Heaven. When the root is governed then the branches are governed, so when the self is rectified then things are correct; this is the learning of the great man. Thus the self is the root of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things; Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are the branches. When one knows that the self is the root, one’s illustrious virtue will be illuminated and one will care for the people [see the Great Learning]. If the self is not secure, then the root cannot be established. If one does not know to establish the self, then the illumination of illustrious virtue and the care for the people cannot be established as the root of the world, the state and the family, and thus it cannot rule over Heaven and Earth or mediate in Creation. (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1)

Here, Wang Gen only generally proposed securing the self, without distinguishing between securing the mind and protecting the body, and most of his discussions of securing the self were of this kind. Yet in fact, he gave a clear explanation of the relationship between securing the mind and protecting the body: “Securing both the body and the mind is the highest; securing the mind but not the body is next; lowest is securing neither the body nor the mind. Endangering the body amidst the myriad things under Heaven is called losing the root; purifying the body of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is called omitting the branches” (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). His ideal was the security of both body and mind: both having a high level of moral cultivation, and also being able to keep one’s own physical body intact. If one cannot attain this highest level and seeks the next, then one should secure one’s mind and not one’s body. He placed the securing of the mind in a more important position than the securing of the body, and so Wang Gen was still a moral idealist. Here, this implies that at a key moment one can give up one’s life (not securing one’s body) and choose righteousness (securing one’s mind). On this point, Liu Zongzhou’s 刘宗周 criticism of Wang Gen set out from the position of an upright and frank gentleman, when he said: “The so-called securing of the self is also simply securing the mind, and not merely attaining the security of this physical body.” After quoting Wang Gen’s above three kinds of securing the self, he believed that this “opened a gap for ignoble avoidance when faced with death.” He thought that although the Huainan investigation of things was correct, one ought highlight the securing of the mind within the securing of the self, highlighting the meaning of giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause. In fact, Wang Gen’s statement was more comprehensive than that of

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Liu Zongzhou, speaking of more general conditions, since not everyone will necessarily face the dilemma of choosing between one’s life and one’s virtue. In usual conditions, securing the mind and protecting the body is the highest ideal, and next comes giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause. Giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause is not the highest ideal for a Confucian. A Confucian’s highest ideal should be the inner sage and outer king (neisheng waiwang 内圣外王): inwardly having a high degree of moral cultivation, and outwardly having the achievement of providing liberal aid to the masses. Thus, the three levels in Wang Gen’s account of securing the self accord with the core thread of Confucian thought. Giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause may be unavoidable. The usual meaning of endangering the self, such as by entering a dangerous state, taking up residence in a disordered country, etc. is losing the root, while protecting the self through improving one’s own self alone is omitting the branches. The ideal state of affairs should be that one cultivates oneself and the state is governed, such that the root and the branches are both achieved. He used the words of Mencius to explain this idea: “Suddenly seeing a child falling into a well and feeling compassion is the benevolence of the masses; not seeking to live at the expense of benevolence and giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause is the benevolence of the worthy man; ‘I have never seen a man die from treading the course of virtue” [see Analects, 15.35] is the benevolence of the sage” (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). This distinction is a detailed reply to those who doubt the idea of securing the body. Yet in most situations, Wang Gen only spoke of securing the body. He once proposed his famous theory of the clear wisdom that protects the body (mingzhe baoshen 明哲保身): Clear wisdom is innate moral knowing. The clear wisdom that protects the body is innate moral knowing and an innate ability. One who knows to protect his body must love that body as a treasure; one who is able to love his body cannot but love others, and one who is able to love others must be loved by others; when one is loved by others, one’s body will be protected. One who is able to love his body must respect that body, and one who is able to respect his body cannot but respect others; one who is able to respect others will inevitably be respected by others, and when one is respected by others, one’s body will be protected. Hence when one is loved by a family, one’s body is protected, and when one’s body is protected, one can protect a family; when one is loved by a state, one’s body is protected, and when one’s body is protected, one can protect a state; when one is loved by the world, one’s body is protected, and when one’s body is protected, one can protect the world. One who knows to protect his body but not to love others will inevitably suit himself and do as he pleases, benefiting himself and harming others, and since others will do this to him in return, his body cannot attain protection. If one’s body is not protected, how can one protect the world, the state and the family? One who is able to know to love others but not to know to love his body must eventually find his body stewed and dismembered, giving up his life and killing his body, such that the latter cannot be protected. If one’s body is not protected, how then can one protect one’s ruler or father? (“The Theory of the Clear Wisdom that Protects the Body” [Mingzhe baoshen lun 明哲保身论], Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 2)

Wang Gen regarded protecting and loving one’s body as an instinct possessed by people from birth. Here, preserving one’s own body is instinctive and innate, while giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause is acquired and learned. His argument is:

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one who loves his own body must love others, one who loves others must be loved by others, and the body of one who is loved by others will be protected. This argument comes from Mencius’s conception of extending oneself to others (tuiji jiren 推己及人 [see Mencius, 1A.7]), and here emphasises loving other people as a condition and effective means for preserving oneself. The wider the scope of the love of others, the more one will be loved by others, and the more secure will be one’s body. The result of not loving others is then incurring retaliation, making one unable to protect oneself. As for those who love others but not themselves, like those in history whose bodies were stewed and dismembered to sustain their ruler or father, they are unable to protect their own bodies, and thus lose the prerequisite for protecting other people and even their rulers and fathers. Hence Wang Gen proposed: “Affairs of the present are learning, affairs of the present are the dao. If people are trapped in poverty, their bodies cold and hungry, they are losing their root and not learning” (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). One’s body being cold and hungry merely demonstrates that one’s learning is still insufficient, and one is still clear about the dao, hence one is unable to preserve oneself. People’s bodies being stewed and dismembered is also a result of their not having the dao of preserving the ruler and father, and thereby disabling themselves in sacrifice. This also demonstrates one’s learning is insufficient. Wang Gen thus proposed the view that honoring the body is honoring the dao: The body and the dao are originally one, so the highest honor belongs to this dao, and also to this body. Honoring the body but not the dao cannot be called honoring the body; honoring the dao but not the body cannot be called honoring the dao. Only when both the dao and the body are honored is it the highest good. (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 2)

The dao here is not an abstract dao suspended in midair, but the concrete dao of things and affairs. Wang Gen’s view of honoring both the body and the dao equally in reality states that if one wants to protect one’s body, one must honor the dao and recognise the principles of concrete things and affairs, such that they not only do not tire out one’s own body, but also assist in the survival of one’s own body. Hence to honor one’s body one must honor the dao, and honoring the dao means honoring one’s body. On the other hand, in honoring the body it must not be honored emptily, but by making sure one grasps the dao of concrete things and affairs. Otherwise, since one cannot protect one’s own body, one also loses the condition for honoring the dao. This is consistent with his statement that “If people are trapped in poverty, their bodies cold and hungry, they are losing their root and not learning.” Furthermore, Wang Gen also understood the relation between honoring the body and honoring the dao from the perspective of “people can broaden the dao” [see Analects, 15.29], saying: “Since the sage uses the dao to aid the world, so the dao has the highest honor, and ‘people can broaden the dao;’ since people can broaden the dao, so the body has the highest honor. When the dao is honored, the body is honored; when the body is honored, the dao is honored” (“Chronicle,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 3). This was an idea

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from two years before his death, so in comparison to his former view it is more broad and plain. He thought that the dao was for saving and aiding the myriad people of the world, so if the myriad people desire health and happiness, they must obey the dao, otherwise their bodies will be cold and hungry. For the dao to save and aid the world, it must be recognised and implemented by people, people being the practitioners of the dao, hence one can say, “people can broaden the dao.” Seen in this respect, the honoring of the dao and that of the body are mutually conditional; people’s health and happiness is co-created by people together with the dao, so both dao and the body must be respected. From his position as a philosopher of the ordinary people, Wang Gen provided a philosophical encapsulation of the principles recognised by average common people in their daily life. His philosophy contained very few comments like those of elite philosophers based on reading and discussing history and the rise and fall of dynasties, which therefore emphasised the interests of the whole, individual moral responsibility and giving up one’s life for a virtuous cause. He began from an ordinary person’s view of the relation between self and others and that between the interests of the whole and those of the individual, emphasising the harmonious co-existence of the self and others, the body and the mind, and the natural and social aspects of humanity. His arguments were natural and plain. He placed the basic principles of Confucianism that had been pushed to an extreme by generations of Confucians and placed them in plain, conventional situations, combined people’s instinctive and moral principles, and was not biased to one side or the other. He looked down on those people in history who acted in extreme ways for fame or fortune. His basis of mutual love between self and others was aimed at mutual benefit and not at morality. These all demonstrate his basis quality and value orientation as a philosopher of the ordinary people.

4 Learning and Joy Setting out from his view that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao,” Wang Gen also believed that the goal of Confucian sage-learning was to attain “joy” (le 乐), and that pursuing Confucian sage-learning is a joyful affair. Wang Gen’s “joy” contains four aspects of meaning: First, the original substance of the mind is joy. He once said: “The substance of innate moral knowing and the hawks and fishes are one and the same lively activity,” and “The substance of Heavenly inherent nature is originally lively, and the hawks flying and fish leaping are also this substance” (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). In Wang Gen’s view, the human mind is a miniaturisation of the cosmos, the great flowing movement of the cosmos manifests a vigorous vitality, the myriad things all move necessarily according to their original inherent natures, and the cosmos as a whole is harmonious. The human mind is also like this, possesses a myriad principles, responds divinely when affected, its impulse firing when set off, changing and transforming in countless ways, hence “the human mind

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is originates in joy.” As long as it is not obstructed by selfish desire, it is the original substance of joy. The so-called anxiety, the so-called anger are all obstructions to the joy of innate moral knowing. Hence Wang Gen said: “The human mind is originally without affairs, and when there are affairs the mind is not joyful” (“To Instruct Scholars” [Shixuezhe 示学者], Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 2). Wang Gen’s thought here came from Wang Yangming’s ideas that “joy is the original substance of the mind,” “innate moral knowing is originally joyful,” etc. Second, the learning of the sage is simply and easy, easy to learn and easy to enter. Wang Gen once said: “In the learning of the world, only the learning of the sage is easy to learn, not requiring much effort, and containing an infinity of happiness and joy. If one has to expend much effort, this is not the learning of the sage, and is not joyful” (“Recorded Sayings,” Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 1). As discussed above, in Wang Gen’s view, the daoprinciples of the sage are all to be found in the daily usages of the common people. The daily usages of the common people are nothing but wearing clothes and eating food, the coming and going and general responding of servants, etc., that which everyone usually sees and hears, that which people say and that which they do, so these are the principles of the dao. Self-cultivation is thus to be found in the daily usages of the common people; establishing the root is just the root of establishing the self; remaining in the supreme good is nothing but being clear about the root and the branches. Since “the sages’ governance of the world is simply the routine affairs of the home,” so it is easy to learn and does not require much effort. In Wang Gen’s view, the complex and difficult dao-principles, rigorous self-cultivation and various difficult and esoteric affairs sought by elite scholars are all heterodox. This idea had a great influence on Li Zhi’s view of wearing clothes and eating food as human relations and principles of things. Third, studying the learning of the sage can produce a kind of joy in attaining the dao. This is the “joy of Confucius and Yan Hui 颜回.” The learning of the sage can give people a kind of enjoyment; in terms of one’s own inner mind, by seeking moral cultivation one can attain a kind of awakening that can lead people into a higher plane of enlightenment. In terms of external conduct, one can “serve, retire, remain or withdraw [see Mencius, 2A.2], flexibly accommodating the trend of the times,” attaining a kind of joy through the unity of purpose and regularity. In terms of saving the world and supporting the weak, one can lead the common people out of their state of plight, such that they are healthy, happy, wealthy and satisfied, each secure in his living and employment, and thereby cause the sympathy of the myriad things as one body to transform into a moral joy at helping and assisting living things. This is what is shown through the analogy of the monk “cheerfully returning to his road” after seeing the loach lead the eels to escape from their imprisonment, recover their spirit, and together return to the rivers and seas from the “Rhapsody on the Loach and the Eels.” Learning is precisely aimed at attaining this kind of moral joy. Fourth, people are happy to study the learning of the sage, since through it they can attain the above kinds of joy. Studying the learning of the sage is not to be forced by others, nor is it for the purpose of taking the imperial examination, but

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rather is a voluntary and self-aware action arising from one’s own moral ideal, and hence it is constantly filled with an atmosphere of freedom and happiness. This is the meaning of Wang Yangming’s statement that “The learning of the sage is not a kind of suffering, nor is it to take up the pretense of dao-learning.” The above meanings are all expressed in Wang Gen’s “Song of Joyful Learning” (Lexue ge 乐学歌): The human mind is originally joyful in itself, but it becomes restricted with selfish desires. As soon as selfish desires emerge, innate moral knowing also becomes self-aware. As soon as it is aware, they are eradicated, and the human mind retains its former joy. Joy means taking joy in this learning, and learning means learning this joy. That which is not joyful is not learning, and that which is not learning is not joyful. When one is joyful, one learns, and when one learns, one is joyful. Joy is learning, and learning is joy. Ah! What is the joy of the world but this learning? What is the learning of the world but this joy? (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai, Vol. 2)

Here, there is none of the obscurity and dreariness found in classic Confucian scriptures, none of the pain and heroism displayed in the fierce struggle between Heavenly principles and human desire, and none of the abstruseness and affectedness of elite culture; instead, everything is smooth and easy, everything is in spontaneous harmony. This displays a strong spirit of the ordinary people. Joy is a spontaneous result of Confucian cultivation, and the joy of Confucius and Yan Hui is the highest spiritual plane sought by Confucians. Zhou Dunyi taught the Cheng brothers 二程 to “seek out where Confucius and Yan Hui found joy, and in what affairs they rejoiced,” while Wang Yangming said that “Joy is the original substance of the mind.” However, Wang Gen’s learning and joy differed from these, since they took joy as a spiritual plane (jingjie 境界), while Wang Gen’s joy was both a spiritual plane and a concrete psychological affect. As a spiritual plane, joy is more a feeling of sublimity and grandeur, while as an affect it is a concrete sentiment, a concrete experience. From the two aspects of spiritual plane and sentiment, the “Song of Joyful Learning” situated the highest spirit sought be Confucians within an integration of ideal and reality, of goal and process, situating the “tortured learning” of Confucian cultivation on a basis of harmonious joy and smooth ease. This is also a characteristic of his culture of the ordinary people.

5 The Different Directions Taken by Wang Gen’s Followers When Wang Gen lectured in Huainan, he had many followers, and among them his son Wang Bi, his younger relative Wang Dong, and his disciple Xu Yue were the most famous. Although their studies had a great influence on later Taizhou learning, their academic tendencies were somewhat different. Wang Bi and Xu Yue were rather close, regarding pre-formed innate moral knowing and immediate accommodation as their central principles, while Wang Dong picked out the notion of

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intention, and emphasised the ruling aspect of innate moral knowing. This difference was connected to the divergence between Wang Longxi’s learning of the innately rectified mind and the Jiangyou school’s returning to silence and maintaining stillness. Wang Dong’s picking out of the notion of “intention” (yi 意) already heralded Liu Zongzhou’s learning of making one’s intentions sincere and being careful when alone. Wang Bi 王襞 (zi 字 Zongshun 宗顺, hao 号 Dongya 东崖) was the second son of Wang Gen, and at the age of nine followed his father to Yue. He was told by Wang Yangming to study with Wang Longxi and Qian Dehong, in total remaining in Yue for more than twenty years, and later assisted Wang Gen with his lecturing. After Wang Gen died, he inherited his teaching position and traveled to many places giving lectures. Wang Bi’s learning was greatly influenced by Wang Gen’s concept of “pre-formed innate moral knowing, constantly self-present” and Wang Longxi’s conception of setting aside the myriad reasons and relying on the smooth flowing of the original substance of innate moral knowing. He said: The numinous illumination of inherent nature is called innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing can spontaneously respond to affects, spontaneously arranging the thoughts of the mind and accommodating a myriad changes. What is known is known and what is unknown is unknown, without a sliver of toil, forcing or tweaking, so those who use their intellect are simply meddling. When people propose the notion of learning, it seems as if they wish to propose several levels of meaning, without knowing that originally there is no thing, it is originally and spontaneously pre-formed and simply follows the natural responses of illuminating awareness. From morning until evening, movements and actions are all nothing but the dao. If one wishes for something further, this is painting feet on a snake. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Dongya, Vol. 1)

Here, innate moral knowing is the self-awareness of the substance of inherent nature, and at the same time the numinous illumination that affective responses and accommodations rely on. When faced with all kinds of complex situations, it can provide spontaneous and appropriate responses, such that there is no need to use any intellect outside of the accommodation of innate moral knowing. Such use of the intellect is thus like adding feet when painting a snake. He also said: Human nature is nothing but the endowment of Heaven that sees, hears, speaks and moves without the slightest calculation yet lacks nothing in knowledge or ability, hence it is called the perceptivity of Heaven. If one is unable to self-attain through this, but rather blinds oneself to the reality of its flowing in daily usages, this is called being unwise and unskilful. Then one’s learning simply comes from reflective thought and subjective calculation, tossing and turning in endless seeking; how can this be what is called the endowment of Heaven! (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Dongya, Vol. 1)

“The perceptivity of Heaven” (tian congming 天聪明) is pre-formed innate moral knowing, and learning lies in spontaneously realising this innate moral knowing and accommodating it, otherwise one falls into the secondhand effort of using the intellect and reactively calculating, and not than the reality of its natural flowing movement. Wang Bi criticised the methods of those schools of effort that did not

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follow pre-formed innate moral knowing, deliberately calculated, grasped hold without release, etc.: Among discussions and lectures, between rules and restrictions, there is work but the mind is increasingly laboured, there is diligence but movements are increasingly awkward; desires are restrained in expectation of reputation while goodness and kindness are exaggerated, thoughts are controlled to hide dirt while one says one is correcting one’s mistakes. If one takes this as learning, a hundred thoughts intersect and solidify, and one’s spirits cannot be at peace. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Dongya, Vol. 1)

The more tightly one grasps hold, the more one wastes one’s energy; the more diligently one cultivates, the less one achieves. It is better to accommodate innate moral knowing with its original pre-formation and immediate presence, then one will spontaneously accord with the dao. Hence Wang Bi said: “Birds crowing and blossom falling, mountains towering aloft and rivers flowing, eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty, hemp in summer and fur in winter, the utmost dao has no other content.” Huang Zongxi summarised the central principle of his learning as “Regarding not having skillful hands as wonderful.” Xu Yue’s learning was close to that of Wang Bi, advocating the free expression of inherent nature and innate moral knowing. He said: The learning of the sage simply consists of not deceiving one’s Heavenly inherent nature. When perceptive scholars express their inherent natures and put it into practice, this is not deceiving oneself. Those who express their inherent natures simply express this luminous virtue. When fathers are loving and sons filial, when ears are sharp and eyes clear, this is the Heavenly nature of innate moral knowing, and when one cultivates this without thought or deliberation, this is illuminating one’s illustrious virtue [from the Great Learning]. As soon as one enters into thoughts and plans, falling into intentions and obligations, then this is not original, and this is what is called self-deception. (“Recorded Sayings,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 728)

Huang Zongxi also commented on this, saying: “This speaks of pre-formed innate moral knowing, regarding not having skillful hands as the most wonderful knack” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 725). The tendency of Wang Dong’s learning was very different from that of the above two men. Wang Dong 王栋 (zi 字 Longji 隆吉, hao 号 Yi’an 一庵) was a younger relative of Wang Gen, and after studying with him, he went to teach at places including Nancheng 南城 and Tai’an 泰安 as a tribute student, being promoted to an instructor at Nanfeng 南丰. Wherever he went, he busied himself with lecturing. His works were later edited into the Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Yi’an (Wang Yi’an xiansheng yiji 王一庵先生遗集) in one volume, which was attached to the Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Xinzhai. Wang Dong’s learning took intention as the ruler of the mind and not as a thought occurring within the mind, took the constant illumination of the ruler in the mind as its central principle, and took being careful when alone as its core effort. He said: Formerly it was said that intentions are produced by the mind, teaching people to examine closely the origin of moving thoughts. I doubt this, since once thoughts have already moved, how can sincerity reach them! Rather, in speaking of the ruler of the body, we call it the mind; in speaking of the ruler of the mind, we call it intention. The mind is empty,

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numinous and good at responding, while intention has a fixed direction and central content. It is not that the mind has no ruler and depends on intention to rule it, but rather that within the empty numinosity of the mind there is truly a ruler, and it is simply named as intention…. That which distinguishes the sage and the madman is simply whether this ruler is sincere or not. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Yi’an)

According to Wang Yangming’s explanation, “That which the mind produces is intention,” and effort lies in distinguishing between good and bad after intentions occur, then treating them appropriately. Wang Dong believed that once intentions have already occurred, the effort of making intentions sincere is a posteriori. He took the notion of intention and turned it into the ruler of the mind. Since the mind has intention as its ruler at all times, so when there is intention there is an a priori moral will, and when there is no intention the mind is simply the numinous illumination of conscious awareness. The distinction between the superior man and the petty man simply lies in whether or not one is able to preserve the sincere intention originally possessed a priori, and the effort of making one’s intentions sincere is being careful when alone. He said: The sages’ learning of making one’s intentions sincere is the knack of a priori ease and simplicity. The effort of making one’s intentions sincere lies in being careful when alone, where “alone” [du 独] is simply another name for intention, and “careful” [shen 慎] is simply the exertion of sincerity. If one knows that to make one’s intentions sincere is to be careful when alone, then one knows that if one exerts one’s efforts after thoughts have moved, one can never reach them. Hence being careful originally meant being rigorously respectful without slack remiss, and not inspecting selfishness and preventing desire. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Yi’an)

For Wang Dong here, intention as the ruler of the mind is alone, and to make one’s intentions sincere is to be careful when alone. Making one’s intentions sincere does not mean scrutinising and overcoming one’s selfish desires after a posteriori intentions have occurred, but rather giving rigorously respectful and not slack or remiss examination to the a priori ruler. His notion of effort here differs both from the a priori rectified mind school’s view of relying on the flowing of a priori innate moral knowing, and also from the a posteriori sincere intention school’s view of using innate moral knowing to distinguish between good and bad after intentions have arisen and then eliminating selfish desires. His notion of effort is situated between a priori and a posteriori, cultivating the moral will originally present within the mind, and making intention as the ruler constantly refined and clear. Hence he opposed the a posteriori school, saying: “Later Confucians wished to examine the movements of the inflections in the mind, discriminating the good and bad and restraining them, yet if one uses effort in this way, it is truly difficult to find one’s bearings” (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Yi’an). His effort lay in preserving intention as the ruler, and using the goodness or badness of the thoughts that arise the check whether or not one’s intention is sincere. For him, making one’s intentions sincere meant: “Only carefully preserving this numinous root, being constantly unoccupied and still, cheerful and harmonious, such that it gains its

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cultivation” (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Yi’an). He especially opposed the pure reliance on originally possessed innate moral knowing and rejection of effort at rectification of the a priori rectified mind school, and denounced it saying: Nowadays, many refuse refined meditation and the ease of the middle way, and instead rely on the functioning of qi, expressing their intentions and following their feelings, while calling to people and saying: This is the wondrous function of my spontaneous innate moral knowing, which cares nothing for people’s views of right and wrong; this is the flowing movement of my spontaneous inherent nature, which cares nothing for flawless perfection. They seldom follow rules and regulations, calling these obstinate dao-principles; they seldom exhaust their obligations and applications, calling these serving the world. (Collected Posthumous Works of Master Wang Yi’an)

Although this does not clearly refer to [Wang] Longxi, it unquestionably refers to the school of pre-formed innate moral knowing, and demonstrates that the tendency of Wang Dong’s learning was completely different from Wang Bi and Xu Yue, and that a distinct school of sincere intention emerged in later Taizhou learning. Wang Dong’s learning was aimed at correcting the excessive focus on expressing and relying on spontaneity in later Taizhou learning, and in this point it is very similar to the later views of Liu Zongzhou. Liu Zongzhou wanted to remedy the school of pre-formed innate moral knowing in Wang learning, regarded intention as the ruler of the mind, and stressed the effort of being careful when alone. Before Liu Zongzhou, Wang Dong already proposed intention as the ruler of the mind, and regarded being careful when alone as the effort of making one’s intentions sincere. Hence Huang Zongxi said that Liu Zongzhou and Wang Dong’s discussions fit together like two halves of a tally. However, in later Taizhou learning it was the pre-formed innate moral knowing school that made greater waves, and the “tying up dragons and snakes with their bare hands” and “each generation higher than the last” of later Taizhou learning followed the thread of pre-formed innate moral knowing. This point will be discussed in more detail in the following several chapters.

Chapter 17

Luo Rufang’s Studies of the “Innate Moral Mind of the Infant”

The founder of Taizhou 泰州 Learning Wang Gen’s 王艮 idea of “innate moral knowing as pre-formed and self-present” underwent development and expansion by Wang Bi 王襞 and Xu Yue 徐樾, until it reached Luo Rufang, who fused it with the [Book of] Changes and Chan 禅 [Buddhism] and proposed his guiding precept of “the infant’s innate moral mind, without learning or consideration,” taking the idea of innate moral knowing as pre-formed and developing it to an extreme. Luo Rufang 罗汝芳 (1515–1588; zi 字 Weide 惟德, hao 号 Jinxi 近溪) was from Nancheng 南城 in Jiangxi province. He passed the imperial examination in the twenty-third year of the Jiajing period [1544], and served successively as a county magistrate in Taihu 太湖, a secretary in the Ministry of Justice, a prefectural magistrate in Ningguo 宁国 and Dongchang 东昌, and a vice-commissioner and administrative vice-commissioner in Yunnan. After his lectures earned the enmity of Zhang Juzheng 张居正, he was impeached for the crime of “completing his affairs unsatisfactorily, secretly taking up residence in the capital,” and compelled to resign his post. After returning home he travelled around Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong with his disciples giving lectures, and his Collected Works of Master Jinxi (Jinxizi ji 近溪子集) is still extant.1 Luo Rufang was born into a family of Confucian learning, and in his youth was taught to read Confucian texts by his mother. At the age of fifteen while studying for an examination, he met Zhang Ji 张玑 from Xincheng 新城 who instructed him in dao–learning, and he eagerly took up the dao for himself. He especially liked Xue Xuan’s 薛瑄 Record of Reading Books (Dushu lu 读书录). At the age of eighteen, he isolated himself in Lintian Temple 临田寺, placing water and a mirror on his table and sitting facing them in silence, making his mind as pure and clear as the water and mirror. After some time he developed an illness of mental agitation, his father gave him [Wang Yangming’s] Record of Transmission and Practice

1 [Trans.] References to Jinxizi ji and Jinxizi xuji 近溪子续集 refer to carved editions from the Wanli 万历 period of the Ming Dynasty.

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_17

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(Chuanxi lu 传习录), and when he followed the words within, he his illness gradually improved. At the age of 26, he entered the provincial capital to take part in the provincial examination, where he listened to a lecture meeting of retired officials. While happening to pass a Buddhist temple, he saw a notice stating that it was possible to relieve mental agitation, and, believing it to be a famous doctor, paid a visit, only to find Yan Shannong 颜山农 lecturing in the temple. After listening, Luo Rufang was deeply convinced by his precepts, and said, “This truly can cure my mental agitation.” When he explained his method of cultivation through not moving the mind, Yan Shannong said that this was forcefully inhibiting the arising of desires and thoughts, and did not realise Mencius’ compassionate benevolence. After hearing this, Luo Rufang felt as if he had begun to awaken from a great dream, and at dawn the next morning he went to visit and ask to be accepted as his disciple. To repay the grace of Yan Shannong’s enlightenment, he served him as if he were his parent. Later, when Yan Shannong was imprisoned through his connection with an affair, Luo Rufang sold most of his land and property to enable him to be released from jail. At the age of 34, he heard that Hu Zongzheng 胡宗正 was proficient in Changes learning and went to study with him, completely attaining his expertise after three months. At the age of 46, he contracted a serious illness, and during his sickness realised the precept of the innate moral mind of the infant that is spontaneous and naturally complete without learning or thinking. From his realisation of this learning onward, he held it for the rest of his life. Also, from his youth, Luo Rufang kept company with Buddhists and Daoist priests, and he did quite a lot of reading about their learning. The Jiangyou 江右 Wang Learning scholar Wang Shihuai 王时槐 said that he “was around Buddhist sutras and the dark [i.e. Daoist] tradition in his youth, exploring them all, and of the black kind [i.e. Buddhists] and the feathered ilk [i.e. Daoist priests], he accommodated them all without refusal” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒 学案], “Case Studies of the Jiangyou Wang School 3” [Jiangyou Wangmen xue’an san 江右王门学案三]), from which the varied nature of his source and course can be seen.

1 The Great Dao Is Present Only in This Body Luo Rufang’s academic learning used the “production and reproduction is what is called change” from the Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易) to merge together the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) and Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸), regarding the benevolence of production and reproduction as the law of the cosmos, people as the fundamental embodiment of the great dao 道 of the cosmos, filial piety and kindness as the concrete application of this law of production and reproduction, and immersion and accommodation as the essentials of effort. He recounted the basis of his learning as follows:

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From when I was graded [in the imperial examination] at 30 until I returned to the mountains at 60, in between I served and supported my two parents, promoted friendly relations between the nine degrees of relatives, entered the court and befriended many good and worthy men, and kept away from officialdom and personally warded off evil men, until I was deep into my years and had accumulated much experience, when I acclaimed that the Confucian school’s [Great] Learning and [Doctrine of the] Mean were completely derived from the one phrase “production and reproduction” in the Changes. Since the endowment of Heaven never ceases, there is production and then reproduction; since there is production and then reproduction, there are one’s parents and then oneself, oneself and one’s son, one’s son and then one’s grandson, reaching far back and into obscurity. Thus parents, brothers, sons and grandsons take the place of the unceasing production and reproduction of the endowment of Heaven as it manifests in skin; the unceasing production and reproduction of the endowment of Heaven takes the place of filial piety toward parents, respect toward elder brothers, and kindness toward sons and grandsons as it passes through the marrow. Erected vertically, this becomes higher and lower, present and past; extended horizontally, it makes up the family, the state, and the empire. (Further Collected Works of Master Jinxi [Jinxizi xuji 近溪子续集], Qian 乾 section, 16)

In his view, Confucius’s benevolence, Mencius’s good human nature, Centrality in the Ordinary’s inherent nature of Heavenly endowment, and the Great Learning’s illumination of virtue and loving the people can be entirely encompassed by the “production and reproduction without cease” (shengsheng buyi 生生不已) of the Book of Changes. The benevolence of production and reproduction governs the cosmos, and everything in the world is an embodiment of the benevolence of production and reproduction. Within this, there is nothing closer to it than the hereditary descent of human life, and the human state of the infant best manifests this law of production and reproduction. He said: In Centrality in the Ordinary, the dao of inherent nature is initiated by Heavenly endowment, hence it was said, “The great source of the dao emerges from Heaven” [see Book of Han (Hanshu 汉书), “Biography of Dong Zhongshu” (Dong Zhongshu zhuan 董仲舒传)]. It was also said: “Sages aspire to become Heaven” [see Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐, Tongshu 通 书, Ch. 10]. Heaven is that which acts when no one acts and which makes things happen when nothing makes them happen, while a sage is one who attains without thinking and is central without striving. Hence in seeking by aspiring to become a sage and aspiring to become Heaven, do not consider whether you already possess some thing that could make you equal with them; you are not lacking a single hair, so how could you aspire to attain them? When Heaven first produced me, I was but an infant; the mind of the infant is wholly Heavenly principle. (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Archery [She 射] section, 6)

The mind of the infant has not yet received the corrupting influence of the material desires of the human world, so their mind most directly and completely embodies the law of the cosmos, and thus is “wholly Heavenly principle.” When infants are born, they express love for their mothers. This root of love is benevolence, and one who becomes self-aware of this root of love and puts it into effect in in the daily usage of human relations is a sage. He said: The knowledge of Heavenly inherent nature originally does not contain dullness, yet if one can exhaust one’s mind in seeking it, transparent in illuminating awareness, its impulse manifests itself without obstruction. Hence the learning of sages and worthies is rooted in the mind of the infant as its wellspring, yet requires the various minds of the common people in its daily usage. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 771)

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The content of human nature is Heaven’s benevolence of production and reproduction; the learning of sages and worthies takes the mind of the infant as its foundation. The dao of Heaven and Earth realised by Luo Rufang was the vigorous vital force of the cosmos; in the human mind, this is the root of love originally possessed by the infant at birth. The vital force and the root of love are originally one, as Heaven and humanity are not separated in two. This vigorous vital force is both the law of the cosmos and the original substance of the human mind, and this is the first aspect of the content of the infant mind. The second aspect is that the infant mind is capable without learning and knows without thinking, affirming immediately without needing any assistance. Since the infant constantly relies on its original mind, it does not have as much falsity and pretense as adults. He said: When people are first born, their sight, hearing, speech, movement and thought are unified as a whole. As people grow older, their sight, hearing, speech, movement and thought are divided into two. Hence if one wishes to preserve the mind of today that has already grown, one must first know the original mind when one was first born. If you observe people when they are first born, their eyes are able to see, yet that which they see is only their parents and elder brothers; their ears are able to hear, yet that which they hear is only their parents and elder brothers; their mouths are able to cry and their hands and feet to grope around, yet that which they cry and grope for is only their parents and elder brothers. As far as they recognise their parents and elder brothers, they have a mind that thinks, yet that which this thinking mind reveals is only what the eyes and ears see and hear, what the body and mouth move and call. When one sees the mind in this way, one sees its true substance as an undivided whole, and one recognises the pure, highest good of the Heavenly impulse. (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Music [Yue 乐] section, 10)

This passage can clearly demonstrate the guiding precept and special characteristic of Luo Rufang’s academic studies: the mind of the infant with being and nothing combined as one. When an infant is first born, its mind is a direct expression of the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, what its eyes and ears see and hear is only love for parents and respect for elders, and this is “being” (you 有); however, the love for parents of the infant is not attained as a result of thought and deliberation, is not an ability that is the result of accumulated practice, has no utilitarian calculation or external coercion, but is immediate on opening its mouth, without needing any assistance, and this is “nothing” (wu 无). That is to say, the innate moral mind of the infant is expressed as a kind of instinct that is a known without learning, capable without deliberation, and immediately affirmed. This is the original state of the human mind before it becomes contaminated. The innate moral mind of the infant is the highest spiritual plane sought by people. What Luo Rufang stressed and revealed was the infant mind’s aspects of absorptive accordance, immediate attainment, spontaneous ordinariness, and natural completion. The inherent nature endowed by Heaven was already a kind of internal store, hiding in unlearned and non-deliberate instinct. What people can be aware of and know on the other hand is a slice of empty luminosity and limpid clarity. Luo Rufang said: When infants are young, they are happy and constantly laughing, since at this time, their body and mind cohere together. When they grow up a little, the thinking mind interferes and disturbs this, and their distress is hard to bear. …Only those people who possess the root-apparatus can spontaneously find the turning path, and consciously possess the point of

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enlightenment. When one believes that the great dao is present only in this body, then this body is wholly that of an infant, and the wholeness of the infant releases its knowing and abilities, which are originally not learned or deliberate. At this point one’s spirit is spontaneously considerate and the mind is enlightened in empty illumination, the mind of Heaven and the pulse of the dao being truly pure and subtle. (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Music section, 3)

When one reaches the state of the infant, one’s spirit coheres, one’s mind is empty and illuminated, “being” is latent and “nothing” is manifest. One only sees that it moves without thinking, is able without deliberating, does not require preparation, and spontaneously unites with the laws of things and affairs. Luo Rufang often borrowed conduct like that of a boy carrying tea to explain the spontaneous and natural completion of the infant mind, indicating the spiritual plane that should be attained in cultivation: Someone asked: “We spoke sometimes of observing the mind, sometimes of conducting oneself, sometimes of broad learning, and sometimes of maintaining stillness, yet the master did not see any as acceptable, so who is able to speak of the dao?” He said: “This boy carrying tea is in fact the dao.” Everyone was silent. After a few moments, a friend rashly said: “How could a boy be able to be cautious and fearful?” Master Luo said: “From the tea room to here, how many floors of halls are there?” He was answered: “Three floors.” He said: “The boy crossed many doors and steps, yet never broke even a single teacup.” His friend understood and said: “What a boy like this knows of caution is simply daily usage with no understanding.” Master Luo interrogated him, saying: “If he had no understanding, how would he be able to carry tea? Does carrying tea not also require caution?” His friend was lost for words. Xu 徐 explained for him, saying: “Knowledge has two kinds. The boy’s daily usage in carrying tea is one kind of knowledge, a kind of knowledge without deliberation, one that belongs to Heaven. Being aware that this knowledge can carry tea is another kind of knowledge, a kind of knowledge that uses deliberation, one that belongs to the human. Heavenly knowledge emerges through following, while human knowledge is in fact sought through turning back. …When people are able to use their aperture of enlightenment to wonderfully accord with the innate morality without deliberation, making it wholly unified and purely uninterrupted, they are perspicacious enough to penetrate the subtle, and their numinous illumination is unfathomable. (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Music section, 12)

Here, the knowledge without deliberation of the boy is Heavenly [i.e. natural], while to be consciously aware of this knowledge without deliberation and then seek accord with it through effort of cultivation is human action. Human action should take the Heavenly as its model. The boy carrying tea passes through rooms and crosses halls, entering and leaving, ascending and descending, stable and proper, without the need for thought, deliberation or preparation. The effort of cultivation lies precisely in attaining this kind of spontaneous natural completion, without the need for preparation. Another passage of dialogue between Luo Rufang and his disciples explains this point: Someone asked: “When it is cautious and fearful, the calm stillness of one’s mind cannot avoid being toiled.” Master Luo said: “Set aside caution and fearfulness for the moment, and please speak of the nature of the calm still state of the mind.” His friend replied slowly with “The original state endowed by Heaven, originally the Supreme Void with no things.” Master Luo said: “This speaks of your original situation, and is not relevant to the substance

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of the mind at this time.” The various scholars were silent for quite some time, until someone ordered a servant to offer tea, who went round the room in order, without any deficiency or excess. Master Luo watched him and told the scholars: “Observe closely the various servants carrying out these serving tasks; are their minds calm and still or not?” The scholars all happily arose, saying: “When the various servants enter and leave respectfully, the inner certainly does not emerge, yet the outer also does not enter, so even though one does not want to say their minds are still and calm, they cannot attain.” He said: “In this case, calm stillness is exactly unified with caution, so where is there any mutual hindrance?” They said: “Caution and fearfulness are similar. The intention to use effort perhaps should not be pre-formed in this way.” He said: “Can you scholars say that just now when the young boy sang his poem and the servant came in with tea, they were not completely cautious? Was their caution not also completely without the use of effort? One can say that making effort refers to the fine and through points of the dao-substance, while dao-substance refers to the place for putting effort into effect.” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 784)

The spontaneous and natural completion of affairs like serving tea is calm stillness, which internally includes caution, except that caution has already transformed into immediate and spontaneous accordance with lawfulness, the fine subtlety of the dao-substance being expressed as the pre-formation of effort. Luo Rufang took up Wang Yangming’s theory of respectful reverence and liberal dispersal (saluo 洒落) and altered it, greatly highlighting the aspect of liberal dispersal, regarding it as spontaneity. In the spontaneity that emerges from the original substance, everything is appropriate, with calm stillness, caution, central harmony and refined unity all contained within the immediate affirmation of the present.

2 Following and According with the Immediate Present While Luo Rufang took the innate moral mind of the infant without learning or deliberation as his guiding precept, his effort lay in following and according with the immediate present (shunshi dangxia 顺适当下). He thought that the flickering of thought and deliberation in the human mind was either recollection of past events or anticipation about future circumstances, which thus fell into what Mencius called “forgetting” and “assisting” [see Mencius, 2A.2], and so he proposed the approach for effort of following and according with the immediate present. The Recorded Sayings of Jinxi [Jinxi yulu 近溪语录] recounts: One of his friends maintained himself with earnestness, yet long felt it was excessively painful and sought an effort of liberating dispersal. [Luo Rufang] said: “Try not seeking any effort, coming to lectures together, lying down and getting up at any time, and after that we will discuss it.” After ten days, his friend suddenly appeared overjoyed and said: “Recently I have felt that my central mind is alive with productive intention, and even though I used no force, I am clear and understand everything thoroughly, and can be spontaneously loving and joyful.” [Luo] said: “Do you now believe that the immediate present is effort or not?” He said: “Now I too can believe it. But I don’t know how I can avoid forgetting it.” [Luo] said: “Forgetting originally corresponds with assisting. If you desire to not forget, there will necessarily be a time when you forget. Do not chase after the mind once it has passed, and do not anticipate the mind’s future coming, but trust in its magnanimous

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vivacity and accumulate its gradual edification. The truth is that when water flows, things come to life, so one can rely on the spontaneity of the Heavenly impulse and fulfil it, up to the point when it is lasting and cannot be challenged. (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Mathematics [Shu 数] section, 35)

Following the multitude in getting up and sitting down, forgetting everything, external discipline and restrictions gradually disappear, and all one can feel is the vitality of productive intention, in which this productive intention is the mind of original substance. This is the mind of original substance as it appears in the immediate present, the vivacity of the Heavenly impulse. When one simply follows and accords with the immediate present and does not seek anything else, one is unified with the innate moral mind of the infant. In Luo Rufang’s view, the innate moral mind of the infant was originally the “illuminated virtue” (mingde 明德) spoken of in the Great Learning, and is a unity of being and nothing. The more one can be empty, the more one will be numinous; to follow and accord with the immediate present is to seek the greatest degree of emptiness, and thereby to attain the greatest degree of numinosity. The Recorded Sayings of Jinxi recounts: Someone asked: “‘Who really knows innate moral knowing?’ If one now wants to know innate moral knowing, from where should one begin?” Master Luo said: “One who illuminates virtue is empty and numinous without dullness. Although empty numinosity is just one phrase, it in fact has two meanings. If one now says that innate moral knowing is something numinous, one will work strenuously to seek its refined illumination, little knowing that the more one demands it be refined, the less refined it is; the more one demands it be illuminated, the less illuminated it is. Not only will one not attain refined illumination, but one will even go so far as sitting down and sinking into in a deep sleep, which is even more unsustainable. If one can turn one’s head back, setting aside everything, then one will attain a smooth openness with no more worried thoughts and no more flickering disturbances, and this is indeed to apply effort to emptiness. How could there be anyone in the world whose substance was already empty yet whose function was not numinous? (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Charioteering [Yu 御] section, 10)

To seek the refined illumination of innate moral knowing is to intentionally attempt to make efforts, and if there are intentions, then one cannot set everything aside; if one cannot set everything aside, then the original mind cannot be smooth in its flowing activity. Hence Luo Rufang held that: “When everything awakens, there is no need to remove these points of calculating and seeking, yet the integrated whole of the original mind is attained, and simply by not combining distinctions, they are spontaneously without disconnections; this is truly a smooth openness and leisurely accordance” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 770). To follow and accord with the immediate present is to attain the flowing activity of original inherent nature, while if there are things traversing the mind, then they act as obstructions to the mind. He summarised his effort of following and according with the immediate present as follows: If one truly has a great breadth of mind, a great power of qi, and great knowledge and experience, then use this to settle one’s mind, please one’s intentions, and reside in the broad abode of the world, to clear one’s eyes, expand one’s courage, and put into practice the great dao of the world. In effort what is difficult to attain is a firm anchoring point, namely to take disdain for firm anchoring points as one’s effort; the mind is boundless and

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without boundary or shore, hence one should take being independent of boundaries or shores as the mind. When one unties the rope and releases the boat, following the wind and opening out the oars, then one is immersed in an oceanic vastness, free in one’s self-reliance; is this not a great joy? (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Music section, 40)

Accepting the immediate present, integrating and according with it, is Mencius’ “residing in the broad abode of the world, putting into practice the great dao of the world” [see Mencius, 3B.2]. If one feels that effort is difficult to make, then take not making effort as effort; have no fixed goals, no anticipated hopes, and no standards, norms and forms, and just follow and accord with the immediate present, free and at ease. When Wang Yangming’s learning reached Wang Longxi 王龙溪 it entered onto a brilliant yet indulgent path, and when Taizhou Learning reached Luo Rufang it entered onto a more subjective spiritual plane. In Wang Gen’s “the daily usages of the common people are the dao,” this dao still has the external, compulsory content of a law and standard, it is just that this content is consistent with the rhythm and regularity displayed in the common people’s daily life. Also, concepts related to people following Heaven such as “solemn respectfulness” (zhuangjing 庄敬), “maintaining cultivation” (chiyang 持养), and “changing and transforming material qi” (bianhua qizhi 变化气质) still often appear in Wang Gen’s recorded sayings. Luo Rufang was different to this, taking up the aspect of pre-formed innate moral knowing and immediate affirmation of the present that Wang Gen received from Wang Yangming and significantly pushing it a step forward. His original substance of the cosmos was a productive intention or vital impulse, something surging with vigorous life. His original substance of the human mind was the innate moral mind of the infant, while his effort was to follow and accord with the immediate present. In his thought, the meanings of the dao as an external law, rhythm, standard, etc. faded away. Efforts of cultivation through self-discipline and self-control such as solemn respectfulness, maintaining cultivation, etc. were blended into forms of cultivation such as integrating and according, not thinking or deliberating, etc. in which the position occupied by intuitive aspects was greatly elevated. Points of gradual cultivation effort such as training oneself in affairs, expanding and extending, etc. were given extremely minor positions. This is why Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 said that Luo Rufang was “one who really obtained the Chan [Buddhist] essence of his school’s founder.”

3 The Illumination of Heaven and the Vision of Light Although Luo Rufang regarded acceptance of the immediate present along with integration and accordance as his approach to effort, in terms of being pre-formed without adherence or stagnation, experiencing or seeking any kind of specific mental state was unnecessary. For him, moral cultivation is spontaneous, and not anticipated; it spontaneously progresses without knowing its progress, and is not anxiously clung to without release. Not using thought or preparation, but rather allowing the original substance of the mind to immediately present itself, he called “illumination of Heaven” (tianming 天明). Forcibly controlling oneself, experiencing and

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observing the state of one’s mind through effort at cultivation through self-discipline, he called “the vision of light” (guangjing 光景). For example, the “first inkling” (duanni 端倪) in Chen Xianzhang’s 陈献章 “cultivating the first inkling through stillness” is the vision of light. Experiencing and observing this vision of light, believing it to be attained through cultivation, rejoicing in it, being nostalgic for it, and clinging to it without release is a hindrance to following and according with the immediate present. The Recorded Sayings of Jinxi recounts: When one of his friends applied his efforts, every time he sat he would close his eyes and observe his mind. Master Luo asked him: “Now you are face to face, how do you see you are in your mind?” He said: “Bright and shining. Yet I often fear that I cannot conserve it, what can I do?” [Luo] said: “Best not to discuss conservation, just be afraid that it is not true.” He said: “This place can have no empty falsity, how could it not be true? Furthermore, everyone is together sitting here, yet the mind is still bright and shining, and until now has never changed.” Master Luo said: “The knowledge of Heavenly inherent nature originally does not contain dullness, yet if one can exhaust one’s mind in seeking it, transparent in illuminating awareness, its impulse manifests itself without obstruction. If one sits down and the mind is bright and shining, this is actually not brought about originally by the infant mind, and is also unusual in comparison with the multitude of people. You should know that this bright and shining is wholly not a Heavenly inherent nature, but arises from human action. Today’s division between the Heavenly and the human is the juncture for future ghosts and spirits. For those today who can regard the illumination of Heaven as illumination before the end of their life, their speech and movement will be orderly and clear, their intentions and qi will relax and unfold, until when their bodies die, those who do not become spirits will be few and far between. If some today do not regard the illumination of Heaven as illumination, but merely sink into their chests in nostalgia for the vision’s light, then once they have been in the shade for so long, those who do not become ghosts when they die will be few and far between. (Further Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Kun 坤 section, 28)

The mind of the infant is full of loving intention, yet it is expressed as the daily conduct of ordinary people, and is thus also very plain, without even the slightest affectation. This is “nothing and yet being, being and yet nothing.” The bright shining in the mind is purely illuminating awareness, with no loving intention, and illuminating awareness is attained through forcibly inhibiting thoughts and deliberations from arising, and thus enters on a perverted path. If one is nostalgic for this kind of experience, and clings to this kind of vision’s light, then one is like the “laboring in a den of ghosts” spoken of in Chan [Buddhism]. If one is able to follow the mind of the infant that affirms the immediate present, making the knowledge of Heavenly inherent nature illuminated and transparent, setting aside forcible clinging and speculative anticipation, then one’s speech and movement will be smooth, one’s intentions and qi will relax and unfold, and one’s body and mind will both be open and calm. Here, Luo Rufang already turned the traditional Confucian “cultivation of the centrality before arousal,” “cultivation through the use of respect,” etc. onto a completely different path, one that also differed from Wang Yangming’s “thinking of neither good nor bad, accepting the original state of things,” but was close to the customary style of “spontaneous in swift emission, passing but not retaining” represented by the “now beating, now shouting, meeting the impulse and running wild” of Chan Buddhism.

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Luo Rufang’s “illumination of Heaven” was connected to his view of people as moral and conscious subjects. In his view, a person is just “a lump of numinous stuff.” The vital impulse of this numinous thing is lively and vivacious, being stimulated and responding without fixed form. When people add their various understandings, anticipations and experiences of things and affairs onto their original minds, they destroy the numinosity of the infant that they originally possessed, and so the effort of cultivation should be “reducing the load,” i.e. removing people’s various additions to people, and restoring the mind’s original state of responding immediately, integrating and according. The mind suddenly arises and is extinguished, with nothing that can be clung to or probed. Whenever there is clinging or probing, there is false thinking. He said: When Heaven and Earth give birth to people, they are originally a lump of numinous stuff, a myriad stimulations and responses whose root and source cannot be probed, an integral whole originally without name or colour, just a single mind-space that is also strongly established. Later, people do not reflect but follow this in giving rise to thoughts, and in this way produce knowledge and experience. Because knowledge reveals a vision of light, they say that their mind really has an original substance like this, that this original substance is really as bright and shining as this, really as clear and limpid as this, really as at ease and comfortable as this. They do not know that this vision of light originally arises from an illusion, and must be extinguished following the illusion. When it comes to responding to affairs and connecting to things, one must still use the numinous and wondrous integral mind produced by Heaven. (Further Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Kun section, 33)

He even thought that the mind has no real and unchanging so-called original substance that is bright and shining, clear and limpid, at ease and comfortable, etc. If one thinks there is such an original substance, then one will think the mind is an actual thing that can be clung to, probed, and remained in, and one will undertake cultivation in order to attain this original substance. Yet seen from the perspective of the great transformation of the cosmos that produces and extinguishes ceaselessly, people are originally one thing among the myriad things, and their difference from other things only lies in the fact that people have numinous illumination, yet numinous illumination is nothing but the place where the productive intention of the cosmos manifests itself. Recognising his point, one will eliminate all clinging, reject the cultivation of overcoming the self, and not be nostalgic for the various qualities that the body and spirit are able to produce. Here, Luo Rufang already recognised humanity from the perspective of “Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body,” recognising people’s responsive activities from the viewpoint of things suddenly arising and being extinguished, things passing and then returning to their original beginning, hence he emphasised accepting the immediate present. Speaking from the aspect of worshiping the Heavenly [i.e. natural] and spontaneous, Luo Rufang already had the sense of Zhuangzi 庄子, yet he cannot be said to be Zhuang learning, because in his theory of the innate moral mind of the infant in which being and nothing are united as one, Zhuangzi only corresponds at most to the aspect of “nothing,” while the “mind of the infant” originating in Mencius and the “production and reproduction” originating in the Book of Changes are the most essential parts of his theory.

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4 Luo Rufang and Wang Longxi Among the various strands of the Wang [Yangming] school, Luo Rufang’s academic learning was closest to Wang Longxi of Zhezhong 浙中, and previous studies often discussed the two men together. For examples, Huang Zongxi stated that “In Longxi, the pen conquered the tongue, while in Jinxi [i.e. Luo Rufang], the tongue conquered the pen,” saying that in his lectures and discussions, Luo Rufang was good at using language to move people. Luo Rufang’s learning was indeed close to Wang Longxi. Wang Longxi studied under Wang Yangming together with the founder of Taizhou Learning Wang Gen for a very long time, Wang Gen’s son Wang Bi studied under Longxi from a young age, the direction of the academic learning of Wang Bi’s classmate and friend Xu Yue was close to Wang Bi, and Yan Shannong studied under Xu Yue, where he “obtained the transmission of Taizhou.” Luo Rufang studied under Yan Shannong, and when he heard his phrase “this is restraining desire, not embodying benevolence,” he began to change his direction, following Taizhou Learning and seeking it out. Thus Luo Rufang’s learning has a relation of common origin with Wang Longxi. Their difference is that Wang Longxi’s inborn character was bright and perceptive, he did not stick to careful conduct, enjoyed transcendent enlightenment, and his learning directly explored Wang Yangming’s “establishing teachings for people of the higher root.” Luo Rufang’s learning changed many times during his life, and it was only after he came to verify the dao from the Old Man of Tai Mountain (Taishan zhangren 泰山丈人) that his learning started to become settled, with his free and easy learning of the affirmation of the immediate present mainly obtained through his realisation that his excessively forcible management of his own life had led to physical and mental problems, and his later gradual reduction in obsessiveness. Wang Longxi and Luo Rufang advocated establishing one’s root in the a priori, and did not highly regard the a posteriori effort of sincerely intending to do the good and removing the bad. Wang Longxi thought that it was difficult for the a posteriori effort of sincere intention to avoid being mixed up with selfish desire, while Luo Rufang thought that a posteriori sincerity of intention was sloppy and bedraggled, since even if one made some attainments, they would only lead to the problem of nostalgia for the vision of light. The academic learning of both Wang Longxi and Luo Rufang originated in Mencius, with both innate moral knowing and the mind of the infant being Mencius’ so-called “mind of four inklings” [see Mencius, 3A.6]. The difference was that Wang Longxi accepted his teacher Wang Yangming’s guiding precept of “the extension of innate moral knowing,” believing that conserving and relying on this innate moral knowing requires setting aside the myriad causes, blocking up the chinks through which selfish desire can infiltrate into innate moral knowing. Luo Rufang did not have this blocking up, and only taught accepting the immediate present. Wang Longxi cut off divided flows and relied on the wellspring, while Luo Rufang relied on acceptance from one’s position, yet both saw the water of the wellspring. Hence Wang Longxi regarded the “extension” (zhi 致) in the extension of innate moral knowing as effort: “Meeting face to face and mutually appearing at all times, setting everything aside at all times, no praise or ridicule and success or

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adversity enter into the mind. … Straightening the mind and moving, one spontaneously sees the laws of Heaven. Although one’s traces are mixed up in worldly dirt, one’s mind is as if transcendent in time immemorial” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 253). For Luo Rufang however, effort lay entirely in the two notions of following and according. Wang Longxi accepted selfish desire and blocked up its channel toward infiltrating innate moral knowing. Luo Rufang however thought that once one realises the innate moral mind of the infant, it fills the whole mind, with no effort needed to conserve and rely on it. Wang Longxi advocated setting aside the myriad causes and recognising the source; Luo Rufang advocated arousing not even a single thought, and following and according with the immediate present. Recognising the source includes the effort of conservation and reliance, while relying on the immediate present lies only in awareness and unawareness. Concerning the differences between his own academic learning and that of Luo Rufang, Wang Longxi made some comments. He said: Jinxi’s [i.e. Luo Rufang] learning already attained much, transforming chance into perfection, and although he himself said he had no attachments, he did not yet leave behind visible presence. Although he said he set everything aside, and indeed in terms of vision he successfully undertook this, when it came to real situations of meeting with slander or reputation and profit or loss, he still could not avoid being moved. He in fact took the place of movement and shrouded it by taking it as true inherent nature, regarding vexation as bodhi [i.e. enlightenment], and thus remained a world apart from our Confucian effort of “exhausting the refined and subtle” and being “constant and bright at all times.” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 246)

Here, Wang Longxi said that although Luo Rufang’s academic learning attained the main points of Confucianism, its greatest weak point was that the innate moral mind of the child that he followed and accorded with had not undergone the tempering of effort and thereby completely eradicated the channel through which selfish intention could infiltrate, but rather directly relied on the immediate present. Whether or not this immediate present was in fact the original substance of the innate moral mind of the infant remained something unknowable. Indeed, if one takes the knowledge and experience of the immediate present as real, then when one meets with slander or reputation and profit or loss, it is hard to avoid one’s mind being moved. Where there is movement, selfish desire is mixed up within, yet he still regarded this as the innate moral mind of the infant, the flowing activity of true inherent nature. Thus in comparison with the ideal Confucian spiritual plane of ubiquitous refinement and subtlety and constant brightness and illumination, he still kept a large distance. Wang Longxi believed that although his own learning was also based on the a priori upright mind, it used the a priori upright mind to replace the a priori sincerity intention, so the place for the flowing activity of innate moral knowing was in the time of overcoming the interference of selfish desire, as follows: “Never dulling the numinous illumination of this one thought is the investigation of things, not deceiving the numinous illumination of this one thought is making one’s intentions sincere, and when the one thought is opened out, with not even a hair’s breadth of stubborn selfishness, this is the upright mind” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 252). Thus Wang Longxi himself believed his academic learning did not abolish the investigation of things,

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making the intentions sincere, or the rectification of the mind, but regarded investigation, extension, making sincere and rectification as the effort of “the extension of innate moral knowing.” He believed that Luo Rufang’s academic learning had enlightenment and vision but no cultivation, and thus was not as pure, refined and subtle as his own. However, if one disregards these differences and focuses on the general form of academic development, the two both belong to the group of pre-formed innate moral knowing, and their academic learning represents the wild and unrestrained path within the Wang [Yangming] tradition. The ideas of Luo Rufang and Wang Longxi touch upon a real philosophical problem, namely the problem of the relation between moral reason and experience. In Wang Longxi and Luo Rufang’s view, their theories can better represent orthodox Confucianism or orthodox Wang Learning, and better fit the developmental direction of Neo-Confucianism. Different from Nie Bao 聂豹 and Luo Hongxian’s 罗洪先 group of returning to silence and maintaining stillness, Wang Longxi and Luo Rufang represented a direct display of moral reason, while Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian mixed in empirical elements. Their so-called returning to silence and maintaining stillness meant that innate moral knowing added in actual content, turning moral reason into a mixture of a priori original substance and a posteriori experience. These things added a posteriori damage moral reason itself as the dignity of the legislator. The two Xis 溪 [i.e. Wang Longxi and Luo Jinxi (Rufang)] only submitted to moral reason itself, while the group of returning to silence took orders from a mixture of moral reason and knowledge in experience. The returning to silence group proposed the questions of whether or not pre-formed innate moral knowing was reliable or dependable and whether or not by following it one could attain the expected results in practice, and in the two Xis view, this was to speak of the vision of light or of efficacy, and thus was already not the refined, pure and clean original substance of moral reason. Luo Hongxian once said: “The words ‘innate moral knowing’ were attained by Master Yangming after a lifetime of experience, so for that which is expressed in the mind, as soon as it does not correspond to this knowing, it is not his original precept. At that time he accommodated himself to beginners and led them in easily, but thus could not avoid pointing to its current functioning as if it were guaranteed. As for self-attainment (zide 自得), this surely cannot be hastily and falsely taken up. Yet those who carry on his theories mimic and borrow this as a pretext, leading people to be crazy and unbridled, and thus are even further from his true meaning” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 405). In his view, only by mixing in actual experience and pragmatic wisdom and fusing these with a priori innate moral knowing can one attain true moral reason. The “current functioning” of the a priori group is merely formal and abstract moral reason, and without fusing with experience, it cannot count as true self-attainment. He criticised Wang Longxi, saying: “When he discussed effort, there was in fact no usable effort, hence he said: ‘use innate moral knowing to extend innate moral knowing,’ like the Daoist idea of using the a priori to govern the a posteriori. This absolutely cannot be confused with our Confucian aspect of grand industriousness and the necessity of tasks, and one must clearly distinguish the styles of the two schools” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 407). This passage

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could not be more clear about the divergence between the two groups: “no usable effort” and “use innate moral knowing to extend innate moral knowing” state that the two Xis abandoned all effort and directly recognised original substance, while “the a priori governing the a posteriori” means giving all power to something purely a priori, making things in a posteriori experience submit to the control and dominance of the a priori. The Jiangyou School’s criticism of the two Xis precisely shows that their theories exactly fit the standard discussed by Kant for why the moral is moral and the good is good, since they maintained the purity and empty clarity of moral reason. Seen from the perspective of moral reason itself, the above discussion of the difference between the two Xis in fact represents two forms of pure moral reason: dynamic and static, or we can say, temporal and spatial. Moral reason as understood by Wang Longxi is a dynamic flowing activity, with the words “flowing activity” (liuxing 流行) repeatedly appearing in his statements, as when he often speaks of “the flowing activity of true inherent nature.” This flowing activity is the place of spontaneous inklings flowing actively into sight, hearing, speech and movement. This process can be seen as the process of the metaphysical substance of inherent nature flowing into the actual substance of the mind, in which process it must endure the infiltration of intentions and thoughts and maintain its original state; this is called “using the a priori to unite the a posteriori.” In this sense, moral reason is a vertical flowing activity in time. On the other hand, moral reason as understood by Luo Rufang is spatial, evenly filling all places, absorbing all the present. That is to say, moral reason is expressed in the spontaneous behaviour of all places, so he often spoke of “only discussing that which is before one’s eyes” and “integrating, following and according.” It does not have a flowing activity in time, but evenly fills all places, and hence he thought that “In effort what is difficult to attain is a firm anchoring point, namely to take disdain for firm anchoring points as one’s effort; the mind is boundless and without boundary or shore, hence one should take being independent of boundaries or shores as the mind.” His effort is horizontal and point-planar (dianmian 点面), while Wang Longxi’s is vertical and thread-linked (tiaoguan 条贯). Wang Longxi said: “Innate moral knowing originally is the archetype (zong 宗) that combines inherent nature and endowment as one, it is both the governing ruler and the flowing activity, hence the effort of extending knowledge has only one place where it can be applied” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 245). “Effort has only one place where it can be applied” means applied in flowing activity, in which the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, and making the intentions sincere are all different ways to describe this flowing activity, which is to say that Wang Longxi’s “innate moral knowing in extension” includes the efforts of investigation, extension, making sincere and rectification. Luo Rufang’s effort on the other hand is static, and does not mould the external realm in a process of flowing movement. His approach to effort here met with Longxi’s criticism: “He takes this substance and immerses it unhurriedly… and thus meets with several different spiritual planes, which are then organised and governed without end.” This is consistent with his comments on Luo Rufang described above.

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Comparing Wang Longxi and Luo Rufang’s differences in academic learning is rather interesting, since through this one can discover many fine differences in the cultivation efforts of Ming Confucians, and these differences truly represent the spiritual lifeblood of these philosophers.

5 Being Careful When Alone and Filial Kindness The guiding precept of Luo Rufang’s academic learning was the innate moral mind of the infant without learning or deliberation, yet he also discussed being careful when alone (shendu 慎独). However, his notion of being careful when alone was very different from that of the group of effort in cultivation and confirmation. The Recorded Sayings of Jinxi recounts: Someone asked: “When applying effort at being careful when alone on usual days, I am quite earnest. Yet jumbled thoughts confuse me, and in the end it is hard to stop them; what can I do?” Master Luo said: “In efforts of learning, one must first the source and the outcome, then things will have their sequence. Yet tell me, how do you understand aloneness?” He said: “Aloneness is the place where one’s mind alone knows.” [Luo said:] “And how do you understand being careful when alone?” He said: “The thoughts and deliberations in one’s mind are numerous and complicated, sometimes being clear and sometimes dull, sometimes fixed and sometimes disordered, so need to be carefully examined and strictly governed, and this is being careful.” [Luo] said: “According to what you have said, this is being careful about complexity, not being careful when alone. The alone is what is spontaneously known, the substance of the mind that is one and not two. What complicates this knowing is the illumination of the mind, which is two and not one. In this regard, the superior man realises that the substance of the mind is within himself, the height of latency and subtlety, neither visible not manifest, and his spirit returns to unity, never separating or dispersing for even a moment, hence this is called being careful when alone. (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Archery section, 41)

Here, being careful when alone is not like the traditional explanation of being cautious and fearful when one alone knows and others do not, but rather experiencing the original mind and making it the governing ruler. His “alone” (du 独) refers to the substance of the mind, while careful refers to realising the original mind and returning the spirit to unity. Luo Rufang said the a posteriori sincere intention group’s distinguishing the goodness and badness of thoughts and acting on them or removing them was “being careful about complexity” (shenza 慎杂), not being careful when alone. His being careful when alone referred to the easeful appearance of the original substance of the mind: The alone is the knowing of numinous illumination, and this is the original substance of the mind. This mind penetrates the beginning and the end, the internal and the external, and there is nothing else, only this one numinous knowing, hence it is called the alone. Being careful is thus revering its circulation and keeping it constantly easeful. Using effort in this way, the alone is the head of being careful, while being careful takes the alone as its viewpoint. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 786)

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Revering circulation here absolutely does not mean constantly grasping without release or examining in detail and governing strictly, but rather takes the realisation of original substance as its effort. As soon as the original substance appears, thoughts and deliberations submit and obey, just as when the sun emerges, devils and demons go into hiding. He gave an analogy for this, saying: “The minor officials in their government offices and the soldiers in their military camps; the various thoughts are like this. When the censorial officials enter the court, the minor officials are spontaneously respectful, and when the senior generals ascend the platform, the soldiers are spontaneously stern; the relation between being careful when alone and the various thoughts is like this” (Collected Works of Master Jinxi, Archery section, 42). Here it is clear that Luo Rufang’s being careful when alone is indeed consistent with his innate moral mind of the infant and his affirmation of the immediate present. Luo Rufang’s conception of being careful and Wang Yangming’s being careful when alone have their similarities and differences. Wang Yangming regarded innate moral knowing as the lone-substance (duti 独体), and the extension of innate moral knowing as being careful when alone. Wang Yangming’s view of innate moral knowing as the lone-substance and Luo Rufang’s view of the original substance of the mind as the lone-substance are consistent, and this is their similarity. However, Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing refers to extending the innate moral knowing of my mind into all things and affairs, and the extension of innate moral knowing is the investigation of things, namely rectifying thoughts and making the intentions sincere, and the effort of making intentions sincere requires doing good and removing the bad in concrete situations, so his extension of innate moral knowing is at the same time the unity of knowledge and action. Luo Rufang’s effort of being careful when alone on the other hand means to realise the original substance; when one realises the highest good of the substance of the mind, badness spontaneously submits and obeys, and there is no anxious use of the effort of doing good and removing the bad. This is a method of bursting waves dashing against a dyke. Luo Rufang took the original substance of the mind as the “alone” in being careful when alone, and if one were to sum up the content of the original substance of the mind, it is nothing but filial kindness (xiaoci 孝慈). When Luo Rufang was a child, his mother taught him using the Analects and the Mencius, and every time he read words concerning filial piety and fraternal duty, he was moved to the point of tears. Later he met Hu Zongzheng who taught him the Changes, and also used filial piety, fraternal duty and parental kindness to summarise the guiding precept of the Changes. He fused Confucius and Mencius’ filial kindness with the “production and reproduction” of the Changes, “and from this, all the classics and books must be traced back to Confucius and Mencius, and the words of Confucius and Mencius must all be traced back to filial piety and fraternal duty” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 790). In his later years, he took filial piety, fraternal duty and parental kindness as his guiding precepts. His ideal was to take the spontaneous and Heaven-accomplished “innate morality of infants’ love and respect” that everyone possesses without learning or deliberation, and extend this to the family, the state and the world under Heaven: “Using the filial piety, fraternal duty and parental

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kindness of oneself to observe one family, in one family there is not a single person who is not filial, fraternal and parental; using the filial piety, fraternal duty and parental kindness of one family to observe one state, in one state there is not a single person who is not filial, fraternal and parental; using the filial piety, fraternal duty and parental kindness of one state to observe the world under Heaven, in the greatness of the world under Heaven, there is not a single person who is not filial, fraternal and parental” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 782). He believed that filial piety, fraternal duty, and parental kindness are the root of the human mind, the basis and resting place for all effort in Confucian learning, such that “the dao of Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 is nothing but filial piety and fraternal duty.” Although Luo Rufang held his learning of the innate moral mind of the infant all his life, his emphasis in effort differed between his early and later years. In his early years, he mostly followed the method of former Confucians, forcibly controlling desires and thoughts in order to preserve this innate moral mind of the infant. In his middle age, he rejected controlling desire and focused his attention on the innate moral mind of the infant covering all things and fused this completely with daily life, as well as blending in methods from Chan Buddhism. In his later years, he concentrated on filial piety, fraternal duty and parental kindness as the expression of the essence of the innate moral mind of the infant, his effort gradually returning to the ordinary, completely different from the “tying up dragons and snakes with their bare hands” of later Taizhou Learning. His integration, accordance, and acceptance of the immediate present were however the direct theoretical basis for latter.

Chapter 18

Geng Dingxiang’s Studies of “Allowing No Stopping”

The central ideas of Taizhou 泰州 Learning, “the daily usages of the common people are the dao 道” and “according with what is natural,” reached their peak with Luo Rufang 罗汝芳, and in later Taizhou Learning their was no one as forceful as Luo Rufang. Although the independence and individuality of Yan Shannong 颜山农 and He Xinyin 何心隐 created a sensation among their contemporaries, their philosophical theories were all very plain. Geng Dingxiang took up Wang Yangming 王阳明 and Wang Gen’s 王艮 doctrines of the “root mind” and the “investigation of things,” joining them with Master Zhu [Xi] 朱熹 Learning and Buddhism and fusing them together to propose his doctrine of “allowing no stopping.” Although Geng Dingxiang belonged to the group of Taizhou disciples, after he returned from the capital to the countryside, he mostly lectured in his hometown Huang’an, and thus had a significant influence on the Chuzhong 楚中 group of Wang [Yangming’s] disciples. Geng Dingxiang 耿定向 (1524–1596; zi 字 Zailun 在伦, hao 号 Tiantai 天台) was from Huang’an 黄安 in Hubei province. He passed the imperial examinations in the Jiajing 嘉靖 period, after which he was promoted to an investigating censor and assigned to Gansu province, later taking up posts including vice minister in the Court of the Imperial Stud, assistant censor-in-chief on the right, vice minister in the Ministry of Justice, censor-in-chief on the right in Nanjing, and minister in the Ministry of Revenue, and then residing at home and lecturing after he retired. His works were collected in the Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai (Geng Tiantai xiansheng quanshu 耿天台先生全书) in 16 volumes.1

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[Trans.] References to Geng Tiantai xiansheng quanshu refer to a carved edition from the Wanli 万历 period of the Ming Dynasty. © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_18

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1 “The True Impulse that Allows No Stopping” Geng Dingxiang took up Wang Gen’s approach of innate moral knowing (liangzhi 良知) as pre-formed, with effort as exerting this Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing. Wang Gen thought that innate moral knowing is pre-formed at all times, constantly manifesting in the mind, such that even the material desires received from qi 气 cannot occlude it. Luo Rufang advocated untying the rope and releasing the boat [see Chap. 17], relying on the innate moral mind of the child, and according with the immediate present, as well as regarding the constant manifestation of innate moral knowing as a precondition. Geng Dingxiang’s “the true impulse that allows no stopping” was the same as this keynote of Taizhou Learning. His so-called “true impulse” (zhenji 真机) is innate moral knowing, and combines innate moral knowing with mind and inherent nature as one. Inherent nature is stillness, the original substance of the highest good, while the mind is movement, the manifestation of innate moral knowing. If the true impulse is the manifesting and forceful creativity of innate moral knowing, then “allowing no stopping” (burongyi 不容已) is the spontaneous operation of this manifesting and forceful creativity that never stops for a moment. Its basis in the dao of Heaven is the profound and unremitting quality of Heaven and its production and reproduction without cease. Geng Dingxiang said: As the ordinance of Heaven is profound and unremitting [see Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗 经), “Decade of Qing Miao” (Qingmiao zhi shi 清庙之什)], so the ancients inherited Heaven’s allowing no stopping as the mind, and even if they wished to stop, they would not allow themselves to stop. (“Letter to the Venerable Mr. Li” [Yu Li gong shu 与李公书], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3)

The great transformation and flowing movement of the cosmos does not cease for a moment, and even if one wishes for it to stop for a moment, this is impossible. This quality of the great transformation of the cosmos, in terms of change, is “production and reproduction” [shengsheng 生生; see the Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易), “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)]; in terms of inherent nature, it is benevolence (ren 仁). Geng Dingxiang’s doctrine of the true impulse allowing no stopping was based on the benevolence of the great transformation of the cosmos that does not cease for a moment, and he believed that this root of benevolence was the foundation for the entire Confucian project. He said: Our teaching of Confucius and Mencius takes only this root of benevolence that allows no stopping as its core precept. How could the sages’ ordinary daily usages, their governance of the world and their rule over things not be the result of this quality of allowing no stopping? Yet though it is this root of benevolence that allows no stopping, it is not caused or made, but originally comes from within a void of non-being and cannot be directly seen, as if it were directly seen it would be split into two. (“Letter to Jiao Ruohou” [Yu Jiao Ruohou 与焦弱侯], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3)

For Geng Dingxiang here, all action is an expression of this root of benevolence that allows no stopping, and the root of benevolence that allows no stopping is obtained from Heaven, naturally possessed and manifested without the arrangement

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of individual intention. That which is arranged by individual intention, even if it is in accordance with principle and regularity, is already not originally possessed through Heaven. For example, when one of Confucius’ disciples advocated a shorter period of mourning, Confucius set out from the unease of the mind in leading him to self-examination. When the Mohists advocated frugal burial, Mencius likewise set out from not being able to bare the sight of one’s relative’s corpse “being eaten away at by foxes and bitten at my gnats and flies” and from “sweat on the forehead” [see Mencius 孟子, 3A.5] in leading them to self-examination. This kind of unease of the mind and sweat on the forehead is the true impulse’s quality of allowing no stopping. The true impulse that allows no stopping is a kind of moral consciousness of forceful creativity in the mind, not a rational re-creation, but a kind of inexorable holistic consciousness or emotion such that without this the mind is not settled. His phrase “comes from within a void of non-being and cannot be directly seen” does not have any mystical implications, but rather states that the true impulse’s quality of allowing no stopping is a manifestation of the metaphysical substance of inherent nature and the regularity of the cosmos within the human mind. Geng Dingxiang particularly focused on the metaphysical basis for this manifestation, saying: Scholars must thoroughly comprehend from the deepest site of the substance of the mind, such that they know the true substance of inherent nature that is originally without thought or action, such that they know the conveyance of Heaven above that is originally without sound or scent, a single integral whole. The so-called deepest site of the substance of the mind is what was formerly called the site where thoughts and concerns have not yet arisen, where ghosts and gods are unknown, a site that cannot be seen or heard. That among sons, junior officials, younger brothers and friends we are able to not let things pass lightly, working on concrete matters and exhausting our minds, this is the truth of inherent nature not allowing itself to stop. (“Letter to Zhou Liutang” [Yu Zhou Liutang 与周柳塘], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3)

Here, Geng Dingxiang followed Mencius’ approach of exhausting the mind, knowing inherent nature and knowing Heaven [see Mencius, 7A.1]: when one exhausts the mind one is aware that one’s own true impulse allows no stopping, when one knows inherent nature one thoroughly comprehends one’s own substance of benevolence, and when one knows Heaven one knows that one’s own mind and inherent nature are manifestations of the ordinance of Heaven, a condensation of the regularity of the cosmos. The mind, inherent nature and Heaven are united. The true impulse that allows no stopping is certainly not “emotion” (qing 情), since the latter for Geng Dingxiang referred to feelings connected with external benefits and needs. The most prominent characteristic of the true impulse that allows no stopping is that it does not arise from the emotional entanglements, but is rather directly grounded in the root of inherent nature, the virtue of Heaven. Geng Dingxiang believed that his true impulse that allows no stopping is directly recognised and obtained from the unconcealable and untransferable site of mind and inherent nature, a simple and efficient effort. This approach to method was not far from Luo Rufang’s following and according with the immediate present, and different from the approach of fathoming principle in things. He said:

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When Master Luo spoke of dao, he referred directly to the immediate present, leading people to reflect on themselves in silent recognition, not imitating those worldly Confucians who busied themselves with annotating and explicating textual meaning. This can be compared with the way that Han [i.e. Han Dynasty military leader Han Xin 韩信] and Bai [i.e. Warring States general Bai Qi 白起] used troops to attack the nucleus head on; they captured the flag and slew the generals rather than fighting in the wilds. (“Preface to the Collected Works of Master Jinxi” [Jinxizi ji xu 近溪子集序], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 12)

Starting from the manifestation of the phenomenal mind and obtaining the hiddenness of the metaphysical inherent nature or Heavenly, the mind and inherent nature are directly connected, and there is no seeking of Heavenly principle at the level of knowledge or the principles of things. Hence he repeatedly proclaimed the essence of his use of effort: “The thread of benevolence of Confucius and Mencius was recognised and obtained from the site where one does not allow oneself to stop” (“Letter to the Venerable Mr. Li,” Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3). Geng Dingxiang pointed out that his so-called true impulse that allows no stopping is the nearest and most sincere, since in reflecting on oneself and observing, it is not difficult to recognise and obtain. The true impulse that allows no stopping germinates from the very core of the mind, and thus excludes instrumental benefit; the mind, inherent nature and Heaven are one, and thus they exclude empty abstruseness; the theory is established from that which everyone can see and follow, and thus is not divided into noble and humble or worthy and foolish, but rather can be followed and enacted by everyone. He said: Mencius started only from the sweat on one’s forehead and the sudden sight of apprehension in recognising and obtaining it, while the import of Yangming’s innate moral knowing also started from this in demanding and seeking this message, that which originally penetrates above and below, beginning and end. It neither slips into lofty formulae of empty quietude, nor gets mixed up in base mechanisms of instrumental benefit. When knowledge is reached, one reaches this, and that which is not recognised or known and is without sound or scent is thereby manifested; when knowledge is completed, it completes this, and then the development of things, the accomplishment of tasks and the daily usages of speech and action all attain their true ruler. That which both the foolish and the honored can trust without doubt is returning to seek the original mind and finding accordance, not relying on the mouths of others. (“Letter to Mr. Wang Longxi” [Yu Wang Longxi xiansheng 与王龙溪先生], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3)

In his view, although the true impulse that allows no stopping seems ordinary, it in fact contains an essential significance; the true impulse unifies the mind, inherent nature and Heaven, and is an expression of the regularity of the cosmos. The so-called Heavenly principle is in the forceful and creative revealing of the true impulse of the substance of the mind. The true impulse of the substance of the mind is not only a manifestation of the substance of inherent nature “without sound or scent,” it is also the ruler of people’s thoughts and actions. That is to say, it is a bridge between the dao of Heaven and human affairs, and takes the form of not being able to be otherwise and the mind being uneasy if otherwise in order to transmit the message people get from the substance of inherent nature. The true impulse that allows no stopping unifies and interconnects mind and inherent nature,

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relating the phenomenal and the metaphysical, avoiding both the quiet void of the pure substance of inherent nature that does not express itself as actual psychological activity, and also the calculating mind of instrumental benefit controlled by emotional awareness and rationality. Geng Dingxiang pointed out that although the principal import of the true impulse that allows no stopping does not go beyond Mencius’ four inklings [see Mencius, 3A.6] and Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing, he himself experienced it vividly and had his own particular grasp of it, and did not depend on or plagiarise its principal import from others. Geng Dingxiang believed that the true impulse that allows no stopping was the essential point of all Confucian effort, and that the Five Classics and Four Books in fact only taught this single principle; that the orthodox tradition of the Confucian dao in fact passed down this single idea. Once the benevolent mind of Confucius and Mencius overflowed and manifested in the mind, their concern over the world and mind of love for the myriad people naturally could not be stopped. Among the disciples of Confucius, Zengzi 曾子 and Zisi 子思 both followed this true impulse that allows no stopping: Zengzi was free from worry and true to his word, following Confucius’ precept of interconnecting unity; the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) were all experienced in the mind, recognised and obtained from the true impulse that allows no stopping; in Zisi’s Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸), he silently recognised the true impulse that allows no stopping, regarding it as the original substance of centrality before arousal, and advocated caution and fear to preserve and foster it, cultivating it to its limit and forming a triad with Heaven and Earth, in all of which he depending on the true impulse that allows no stopping. Hence the true impulse that allows no stopping is that which makes human beings human. He said: Reflecting on oneself in internal observation, there is nothing to be found but these few seeds shining there, and one begins to believe in that which makes human beings human, only this substance of bright wisdom. If this substance is clear and penetrating, then this body is one’s own possession, if not then it cannot be obtained and possessed, and what use would it be to preserve such an empty shell? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 821)

This point was summarised by his student Jiao Hong 焦竑 as “the precept of recognising benevolence” and “the precept of seeking benevolence.” Geng Dingxiang also used Shao Yong’s so-called “Heavenly root” (tiangen 天 根) and “lunar cavern” (yueku 月窟) to explain the states of activity of the true impulse that allows no stopping: When a single thought becomes active, there is no contemplation or deliberation, and the impulse that allows no stopping is the Heavenly root; when that single thought is over, there is no sound or scent, and its retreat into seclusion is the lunar cavern. (“Master Geng’s Commonplace Remarks” [Gengzi yongyan 耿子庸言], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 1)

Shao Yong’s “Heavenly root” originally referred to the point in the 64-hexagram orientation diagram when the first yang 阳 is about to emerge, while “lunar cavern” was the point when the first yin 阴 is about to emerge, since when yin emerges,

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yang retreats in defence and returns to its origin. Geng Dingxiang used the Heavenly root to describe the moment when the true impulse initiates and is manifested in the mind, and the lunar cavern to describe the moment when the true impulse retreats and returns to the soundless and scentless substance of inherent nature. When it manifests in the mind, it does not allow itself to become mixed up with selfish desire, and when it retreats and returns to original substance, it does not allow selfish desire to be carried with it; these are the Heavenly root and the lunar cavern. He said: When people suddenly see a child falling into a well, the site where the mind of apprehension and compassion is active is the Heavenly root, while when it returns to its origin it is the lunar cavern. Only when it becomes mixed up with intentions concerning social intercourse, the demand for reputation, or malicious abuse does it become a human root and not the Heavenly root, a ghostly cavern and not the lunar cavern. Even in the twelve [two-hour] periods of a day, one can inhibit rash causes and eliminate confused deliberations, as well as leading the spirit to retract its vision and reflect on itself in observation, seeking to see this root and this cavern, truly attaining comprehension…. Names, emotions and the various other karmic obstacles can make people’s hands busy and their feet disordered. Simply because one does not recognise this root and this cavern, one’s whole life can be laboured and troubled with no firm anchor. (“Master Geng’s Commonplace Remarks,” Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 1)

Preserving this true impulse such that it constantly allows no stopping means extinguishing idle thoughts and false ideas, leading the substance of inherent nature to directly penetrate down to the mind, and making the Heavenly root and lunar cavern fine, subtle and docile. Although Geng Dingxiang’s “true impulse that allows no stopping” arose from his own experience and proclaimed itself under a new banner, its basic spirit was still Confucius’ benevolence, Mencius’ innate moral knowing, and the Book of Changes’ production and reproduction. His effort at cultivation mostly lay in reflecting on oneself in internal observation, eliminating evil thoughts and false ideas, and leading this manifestation to be without obstacles. This was still the approach of most Neo-Confucians, except that his proposition was more direct and obvious. He was not as original and expansive as Luo Rufang, but he was more quiet and sincere. Geng Dingxiang’s proposal of his precept of the true impulse that allows no stopping benefitted from his younger brother Geng Dingli 耿定理. Concerning this matter, Geng Dingxiang’s “Master Geng’s Commonplace Remarks” and Geng Dingli’s “Chukong’s Sayings on Learning” (Chukong lunxue yu 楚倥论学语) both contain records, although their wording is somewhat different. Geng Dingxiang said: In autumn of the 58th year of Jiajing 嘉靖, I accompanied Zhongzi (i.e. Geng Dingli) to meet Hu Zhengfu 胡正甫 by the banks of the Han River 汉江 in order to fix our core precepts of learning. At the time, I firmly believed Wencheng’s 文成 [i.e. Wang Yangming’s] learning of innate moral knowing, and regarded constancy of knowledge as learning. Zhengfu however said: “My learning regards the non-thought as its core.” Zhongzi said: “My learning regards allowing no stopping as the core.” Zhengfu nodded

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several times in agreement. I lost myself in awe, shocked that Zhongzi had suddenly established this new theory. That which I had built up in my breast for more than 10 years through careful investigation of clear evidence, scrutinising the distant and doubting the near, I suddenly reflected on in frustration. I was secretly convinced by Zhengfu’s wise words, and sighed over Zhongzi’s Heavenly revelation. Even more than in my earlier years, I firmly believed that this was the thread of benevolence of Yao 尧, Shun 舜, the Duke of Zhou 周 and Confucius, such that even if a sage arose again it could not be changed. Why? Zhongzi’s so-called allowing no stopping grows its roots from the soundless and scentless, so it is lofty yet not empty or abstruse; its results can be demonstrated in commonplace virtues and conduct, so it is lowly without falling into emotional thinking. The inherent nature endowed by Heaven is like this, hence it was said, “The ordinance of Heaven is profound and unremitting” [see above]. If one does not take this allowing no stopping as one’s bloodline, one is merely shifting earth and peeling wood to make idols. (Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 1)

Based on this recorded passage, although the three words “allowing no stopping” were said by Geng Dingli, the meanings it comprised were ones that Geng Dingxiang had mulled over for many years without expressing. After revealing this core precept, Geng Dingxiang used it to argue for almost every aspect of his thought, as well as using it as a program in teaching his students. Geng Dingli however did not regard it as a core precept of his own learning. His learning was not as broad as that of his older brother, and that a slogan he proposed came to be taken up by his older brother as the core precept of his learning was quite natural.

2 The Taizhou Precept of “Plain Simplicity” The Taizhou Learning established by Wang Gen had a very strong flavour of the common people. Later Taizhou Learning in general developed following three aspects, the first of which was Luo Rufang’s innate moral mind of the infant with its affirmation of the immediate present and its reliance on opportunity and chance, in which the phenomenal substance of the mind directly expresses the metaphysical substance of inherent nature, directly connecting the phenomenal and metaphysical. With its untying the rope and releasing the boat, following the wind and opening out the oars, it can be called the clear and bright group. The second was Wang Dong’s 王栋 [see Chap. 16 above] strict distinction between intention and thoughts, in which he regarded a priori intention as the ruler and being careful when alone as effort, making the ruler in the mind constantly bright. This was very similar to the later Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周, and opposite to Luo Rufang’s reliance on the original mind and following and according with the immediate present, and it can be called the serious and strict group. The third was Geng Dingxiang’s unification of mind, inherent nature and Heaven, in which he regarded innate moral knowing’s true impulse that allows no stopping as original substance, and reflecting on oneself in inner observation, extinguishing emotional entanglements and recognising the true impulse as effort, connecting the phenomenal and metaphysical as one. The distinction between these three is based on their different configurations of mind and

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inherent nature. From Wang Gen’s view of the daily usages of the common people as the dao, Luo Rufang emphasised its aspects of affirming the immediate present and not relying on deliberation; Wang Dong emphasised its aspects of “the innate moral knowing of Heavenly inherent nature that can itself connect affectively and respond accordingly”; Geng Dingxiang emphasised its non-abstruse and non-profound aspect of refined subtlety within coarse shallowness. Geng Dingxiang can thus be said to have followed a middle path between the two. Wang Gen’s view of the daily usages of the common people as the dao contained two main aspects of meaning: first, the dao is extremely ordinary, a servant boy carrying tea, his movements responding to everything without deliberation, affirming the immediate present; as soon as there is wasteful deliberation and tentative opinion, this is not the original substance of the dao. Second, the content of the dao does not go beyond the everyday life of the common people, and to seek for the dao apart from this is heterodoxy. Geng Dingxiang’s carrying forward of the Taizhou tradition mainly lay in these two aspects. He regarded the common people’s everyday conduct of wearing clothes, eating food, etc. as a direct expression of the dao, once saying: “This entering in filial piety and leaving in fraternal duty is simply wearing clothes and eating food, and this wearing clothes and eating food is originally soundless and scentless, neither produced nor extinguished, and extremely subtle. … The dao of the sages attains being through non-being, while the teaching of the sages depends on the coarse to manifest the refined” (“Letter to Zhou Liutang,” Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3). That is to say, the dao of refined subtlety is not beyond the coarse traces of constant daily conduct, depending on the latter to realise the former. The common people wearing clothes and eating food is the dao. Geng Dingxiang also used this to criticise worldly Confucians who severed knowledge from action, dao from the common people’s daily usages, slipping into the error of empty abstruseness. He said: Any dao that cannot be known and enacted by foolish men and women, that cannot deal with creation and transformation and connect the people with things, is an evil doctrine and a confused dao. The hidden within everyday expenses, the marvellous within the regular, the refined and subtle within the coarse and shallow, these were originally the straight thread of Confucius and Mencius that has not changed since time immemorial, and not in fact one who supports Heaven and leans on Earth, risking oneself and forgetting one’s family; those who authentically develop and learn from Confucius’ wishes have never changed to believe this. (“Reply to Qiao of the Ministry of Revenue” [Fu Qiao hubu 复乔 户部], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 5)

The daily usages of the common people are manifest, while the dao of Heaven contained within is hidden; the daily usages of the common people are simply the minute affairs of the marketplace, yet the dao-principles within are refined and subtle. Confucians’ will of regarding the people as siblings and things as companions [see Zhang Zai’s 张载 Western Inscription (Ximing 西铭)], their effort at benefiting the world and saving the people, should all follow this approach, beginning from the daily usages of the common people. Yet Confucians mostly believe that this work is trivial and not worth doing, an error that Geng Dingxiang criticised saying: “For scholars today, discussions of theory are on one side, while

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practical matters are on the other; original substance and effort are on one side, while the state and the family of the world under Heaven are on the other. When the dao is barely to be found in the world, there is nothing more to rely on” (“Reply to Qiao of the Ministry of Revenue,” Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 5). “Among people today, it is precisely those who do not engage in studies who deal with matters appropriately; as for those who do engage in studies, as soon as they meet with a few small matters, they deal with them improperly. The reason for this is simply that they cling to certain ideas, not knowing that Yao and Shun were simply the same as other people” (“Statement to Liu Diaofu” [Liu Diaofu shuyan 刘 调父述言], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 824). “Cling to certain ideas” means they hope for grandeur and yearn for greatness, not paying attention to the daily usages of the common people; they believe that the dao of Yao and Shun was abstruse and mystical, not knowing that the affairs of Yao and Shun were the affairs of the daily usages of the common people. He pointed out that the dao of the sages is not only to be found in the Confucian elite, but also in the lowly people of the marketplace; the dao is not distant from people [see Centrality in the Ordinary], but rather is in whatever meets the eye. Since Geng Dingxiang advocated focusing attention on the daily usages of the common people and recognising the dao of Heaven through these, he bitterly criticised later scholars in the Wang [Yangming] School for their errors in separating the a priori from the a posteriori, the phenomenal from the metaphysical, and the refined subtlety of mind and inherent nature from the daily usages of the common people. In those who were persistently abstruse and lofty, he found especially many faults, even denouncing them as magic: We Confucians find the marvellous within the regular, the hidden within everyday expenses, beginning from their conjunction in our experience and observation. The lofty however frequently enter into a kind of lofty magic, even taking the dao of centrality in the ordinary [zhongyong 中庸] that is before one’s very eyes and holding it up as a miscellaneous triviality! When it was said that the dao is not put into practice since the knowing go beyond it [see Centrality in the Ordinary], was this not true indeed! (“Letter to Hu Lushan” [Yu Hu Lushan 与胡庐山], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 3)

What Geng Dingxiang denounced as lofty magic was empty discussion of mind and inherent nature that does not stick closely to the daily usages of the common people, speaking of mind and inherent nature only in terms of awareness and enlightenment, with no practical application in cultivation and action. Geng Dingxiang repeatedly stated that the so-called dao of Confucians conjoins Heaven and humanity, uniting the manifest and the subtle, connecting the abstract and the concrete, and unifying inherent nature and emotion. Anything that strays from this is a heretical obstruction. Geng Dingxiang once wrote a letter to Wang Longxi 王龙溪, warning him that “one cannot hold one’s theories too loftily.” Geng Dingxiang believed that in Wang Longxi’s “four withouts” [see Chap. 7 above], “the mind is a mind without good or bad,” so the first sentence is already wrong, since the mind is the site for the conjunction of inherent nature and the Heavenly, with the mind unifying inherent nature and emotion. The mind is the central point of the “great opening of the cross” (shizi

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dakai 十字大开): vertically, the principle of Heaven and humanity as one body is contained within the mind, while horizontally, the benevolence of other people and the self as one body is rooted in the mind, so the single sentence “without good or bad” completely obliterates the basic Confucian view. Hence Longxi’s phrase “The mind without mind hides secrets, the intention without intentions responds in completeness, the knowing without knowing embodies quietude, and the thing without things employs the spirit” completely slips into non-being, and has nothing whatever to do with Mencius’ “true impulse that allows no stopping.” Geng Dingxiang also criticised Wang Longxi for his attacks on Song Confucians. Wang Longxi mostly attacked Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi, and in this he also followed the lead of [Wang] Yangming. Wang Longxi said: “Abandoning the mind but retaining knowledge, abandoning the preservation of the mind but retaining the effort of the extension of knowledge, these are all mistakes in Yichuan’s 伊川 [i.e. Cheng Yi’s] doctrine.” He also said: “Hui’an 晦庵 [i.e. Zhu Xi] regarded honoring the virtue of inherent nature as preserving the mind, and inquiring and learning about the dao as the extension of knowledge, as evidenced by his doctrine of ‘cultivation through self-discipline requiring the use of respect, and advancement in learning lying in the extension of knowledge,’ regarding this as the mutual cultivation of internal and external…. In this way, having cultivated the root, one then cultivates again from the branches, and this is thus a fragmented learning with two roots” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 247). “Wengong 文公 [i.e. Zhu Xi] separated the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things as prior knowledge from making intention sincere and rectifying the mind as posterior action, and thus has the anxiety of a wandering ride with nowhere to return. One must be respectful to complete the beginning, cultivate the root-origin through self-discipline, beginning with that which concerns the self and mind” (“Reply to Wu Wuzhai” [Da Wu Wuzhai 答吴悟斋], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 260). Wang Longxi believed that Zhu Xi divided the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge from making intention sincere and rectifying the mind as two phases of effort, and hence had cultivation through self-discipline and advancement in learning as two kinds of approach, rather than a single interconnecting purpose. Geng Dingxiang was very dissatisfied with Wang Longxi’s criticism of Song Confucians, saying: Recently, when Longxi and various others ridiculed Song learning, their views and theories were especially confused and stunted. In terms of their experience of this mind, it did not surpass Mingdao’s [i.e. Cheng Hao’s 程颢] view of great impartiality following and responding, and was merely a non-selfish use of the understanding. When scholars of today speak of enlightenment, they simply insert a touch of empty knowledge and opinion, adding a little frivolous ambiance, which have absolutely nothing to do with this learning. (“Letter to Tian Sheng of Huoqiu” [Yu Huoqiu Tian Sheng 与霍丘田生], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 4)

His meaning was that the learning of Song scholars was honest and sincere, so although in Cheng and Zhu’s use of respect in cultivation through self-discipline, their views were somewhat fragmented, its spirit was nonetheless consistent. The investigation of things, extension of knowledge, making intention sincere, and rectifying the mind of Song scholars were all practical efforts for cultivation, as he

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pointed out: “Scholars examining the inflections within thoughts, quieting evil and eradicating partiality, is also the concrete effort of restoring inherent nature, and it seems it cannot be abolished” (“Letter to Yang Fusuo” [Yu Yang Fusuo 与杨复所], Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 818). Geng Dingxiang’s learning had a strong tendency of unifying the Learning of Principle (lixue 理学) and the Learning of the Mind (xinxue 心学): his original substance of the true impulse that allows no stopping is from the Learning of the Mind, the effort of preserving the true impulse that allows no stopping through the investigation of things and extension of knowledge is from the Learning of Principle, yet both were rooted in Song Confucianism, and he did not reject all Song learning like Longxi. Geng Dingxiang also criticised Song Confucians, yet his focus was different from that Wang Longxi, setting out from the standpoint of Taizhou Learning and holding that Song Confucians mostly attempted to forcefully control the true impulse of the original mind, using certain rules or principles as standards to be followed and maintained, rather than trusting in the spontaneity of the Heavenly impulse. Hence Song Confucians’ efforts at cultivation were cumbersome, being designed specifically for the self-cultivation of scholar-officials, and not fused together with the daily usages of the common people. He once said: “The learning of Confucius and Mencius truly found the hidden within everyday expenses. Song learning never cast off the ways of the two lineages [i.e. Buddhism and Daoism], with their hidden in the hidden…. Song Confucians mostly only spoke of approaching and entering the subtle, and in this they had simply not cast off opinion” (“Letter to Hu Lushan,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 816). What he criticised was Song Confucians’ forced exploring and seeking, in which they only focused on the refined subtlety of the mind and inherent nature and neglected the daily usages of the common people, thereby deviating from Confucius and Mencius’ orientation of “the hidden within everyday expenses” with their excessive lofty virtuosity and insufficient plain simplicity. Seen from the standpoint of Taizhou Learning, this criticism is sound. The methods of cultivation of the great Confucians of the Song Dynasty were indeed designed purely for the self-cultivation of scholar-officials, a typical elite culture that deviated from the daily usages of the common people. Scholars at the beginning of the Ming such as Xue Xuan 薛瑄 and Hu Juren 胡居仁 all followed the path of “the hidden in the hidden” spoken of by Geng Dingxiang in their method of cultivation. Wang Yangming’s learning of innate moral knowing set out from the innate moral knowing possessed by all people, taking expanding and extending innate moral knowing as the pathway, an approach to effort that “foolish men and women can all know and enact,” in which “from firewood sellers to aristocrats, everyone applies this effort.” Wang Yangming used the simplicity and directness of extending innate moral knowing together with the rejection of social distinctions in teaching students to close the gap between the elite and the ordinary people. Wang Gen’s “the daily usages of the common people are the dao” even more strongly advocated the spirit of the ordinary people, spreading the culture of the ordinary people. Geng Dingxiang took up this approach to cultivation and style of learning, implementing it across all aspects [of his thought].

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3 “Learning Has Three Key Steps” Geng Dingxiang took “the true impulse that allows no stopping” as the central purpose of learning, together with the identity of the daily usages of the common people with the dao as the direction for effort, and concretised these as “three key steps” (san guan 三关), namely the key steps of grasping the mind and the dao, the mind and affairs, and intellectual principles and concrete methods. He said: I remember that when some years ago Liu Diaofu visited me in the mountains, I said these words to him: “Learning has three key steps: first one understands that the mind and the dao are coextensive, then once one has understood that affairs and the mind are coextensive, one’s probing must be careful about techniques.” Thus in recent times, among those who consider themselves as scholars, they either base their studies on hearsay and recognised truths, taking this to be knowledge, or they cultivate carefulness based on fixed patterns, taking this to be action, and there are few who know that the mind and the dao are coextensive. Among those who know to reflect on themselves and observe that which is near at hand, they mostly abandon themselves to the void and cling to what they see, and those who know that affairs and the mind are coextensive are few indeed. Even those who directly proceed with their undertakings, trusting that affairs and the mind are coextensive, are in fact unrestrained and indiscriminate, flagrant in their inconsideration, increasingly tending to develop the minor and drift apart in division, ending up as people with whom one cannot study and who one cannot accompany in the dao [see Analects, 9.30], since they do not know to be careful about techniques. Why? When they depart from affairs in speaking of the mind, deluding their minds, this is not learning; when they confuse affairs in speaking of the mind, they wander aimlessly with their minds, this is especially not learning. Only Mencius’ passage on care about techniques [see Mencius, 2A.7] fully penetrates to the essentials of our minds. Selecting techniques through the mind, understanding the mind based on techniques, developing the secret formulae of the ancient service of the mind, is this not straightforward and easy? (“Care About Techniques” [Shen shu 慎术], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 1)

This passage clearly states the real meanings of his “three key steps” and proposes the reasons for them. Geng Dingxiang’s three key steps are the coextension of the mind and the dao, the coextension of affairs and the mind, and care about techniques. The coextension of the mind and the dao is his theory of original substance, the coextension of affairs and mind is his theory of effort, and care about techniques is his theory of knowledge and practice. To understand his “three key steps” is to understand the whole of his academic learning. The coextension of the mind and the dao (jixin jidao 即心即道) is his “true impulse that allows no stopping.” In Geng Dingxiang’s view, the mind is a coalescence of the dao, while the dao is the fundamental regularity of the cosmos, and thus the mind concretely and subtly contains the regularity of the cosmos. He said: In terms of that which makes humans human, their vision, hearing, speech and movement are all Heaven, yet only this tiny aperture of numinosity itself interpenetrates and connects these. As soon as one clearly understands that humans are not different from Heaven, that Heaven is not apart from humanity, then vision is the brightness of Heaven, hearing is the

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acuity of Heaven, movement is the impulse of Heaven, and when these are conjoined together they are the virtue of Heaven. (“Knowing Heaven” [Zhi tian 知天], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 1)

The coextension of the mind and the dao is a fundamental proposition of the Learning of the Mind, and from Lu Jiuyuan’s 陆九渊 “My mind is the cosmos, the cosmos is my mind” onward, none of the later continuations of the Learning of the Mind failed to uphold this. For example, Yang Jian杨简 wrote his “Self-Changes” [Jiyi 己易] in which he stated that the trinity of Heaven, Earth and humanity are expressions of the same unitary dao, inherent nature, and change. Although there are three names, the reality is one. Wang Yangming also made statements such as “innate moral knowing is Heaven,” “innate moral knowing is the dao,” and “only the mind is actually Heaven.” Wang Gen even directly stated, “the body and the dao-origin are one thing.” Geng Dingxiang’s coextension of the mind and the dao represented a continuation of Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming, and his teacher Wang Gen. His coextension of the mind and the dao regarded the mind as the true impulse that allows no stopping, while the basis for this true impulse is the dao of Heaven. The fundamental specific quality of the dao of Heaven is to be “profound and unremitting.” Geng Dingxiang said: The aperture from which this mind issues is the aperture from which the mind of Heaven and Earth issues. (“Statement to Liu Diaofu,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 821) As the spontaneity of mind and inherent nature in fact originates in Heaven, the ordinance of Heaven that is profound and unremitting, so the true impulse of the spontaneity of mind and inherent nature spontaneously also allows no stopping. (“Judgments on Learning” [Xuetuan 学彖], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 2)

“The ordinance of Heaven that is profound and unremitting” [from the Book of Poetry; see above] is the metaphysical basis for his “true impulse that allows no stopping.” The coextension of the mind and the dao means that the core precept of his academic learning has both root and branches, unifying and connecting Heaven and humanity. If the coextension of the mind and the dao is the core precept of Geng Dingxiang’s academic learning, as well as its first introductory step, the second step is “the coextension of the mind and affairs” (jixin jishi 即心即事). “The coextension of the mind and affairs” is another way of saying “the daily usages of the common people are the dao.” Wang Yangming’s proposition “The mind has no substance [of its own], it takes the affirmations and negations of the affective responses of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as its substance” emphasised the non-duality of the mind and affairs, that the mind becomes manifest through affairs. Geng Dingxiang particularly advocated this key step, repeatedly stating and explaining its meaning, emphasising it even more strongly than the first step “the coextension of the mind and the dao.” This was because, in his view, the coextension of the mind and the dao was an idea universally recognised and accepted by Song-Ming Neo-Confucians, especially those following the Learning of the Mind, while as for the coextension of the mind and affairs, because scholars often either

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buried themselves in their books, becoming detached from the practicalities of life, or spoke of enlightenment and realisation or emptiness and the abstruse, they very easily divided the mind and affairs in two. Geng Dingxiang denounced this phenomenon, saying: In academic learning of recent times, whether it is the superficial stream who bear an authentic will and lay claim to attainment, gathering together casual remarks from Boyang 伯阳 [i.e. Laozi 老子], the self-professed marvels of enlightenment who plagiarise half-explanations of the Śūraṅgama (Leng 楞) and Platform (Tan 坛) sutras, or the earnest cultivators who venerate the fixed patterns of former Confucians, they are all far indeed from the true thread of learning of Yao, Shun, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. Thus those of the loftier class are mostly neglectful, while those of the cautious class are mostly pedantic; how can they be relied on? (“Letter to Zhang Yanghe” [Yu Zhang Yanghe 与张 阳和], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 4)

Geng Dingxiang’s coextension of the mind and affairs was precisely intended to correct this kind of climate. In his view, the great enemy of academic learning lay in dividing the mind and affairs, with scholars hovering around the elbows of Buddhism and Daoism, and attaining nothing but emptiness and quietude; even if such cultivation was of benefit to their own bodies and minds, it nonetheless committed the error of leaving out affairs and action. The coextension of the mind and affairs means that what is learnt and what is useful is one and not two, learning being applied in what is useful and use being a manifestation of learning, the mind, body, inherent nature and endowment being fused seamlessly with the practical affairs of the military, agriculture, finance and sustenance; only this is the tradition of the Confucian school. Thus Geng Dingxiang’s “coextension of the mind and affairs” is not only a continuation of the Taizhou view that “the daily usages of the common people are the dao,” but also incorporated the intention of remedying the errors of contemporary scholar-officials. Geng Dingxiang believed that understanding “the coextension of the mind and the dao” meant one had grasped the thread of learning, and understanding “the coextension of the mind and affairs” meant one had found the right approach, so what remained was choosing the correct psychological techniques to guide one’s concrete conduct. Hence the third key step is care about techniques (shenshu 慎术). The phrase care about techniques comes from the Mencius [see 2A.7], which Geng Dingxiang developed, saying: What is care about techniques? I say: Affairs and incidents are all the mind. However, there are the affairs of great people and those of petty people. Is one learning to become a great person or a petty person? Minds are separated and judged by this, affairs are also separated and judged by this, and people are also separated and judged by this. Learning the learning of Confucius is like engaging in the techniques of the priest and the armor-maker, in that there is no need for an additional effort at governing the mind, and there are none who are not benevolent. If one abandons the techniques of Confucius and attempts learning, even if it is equally aimed at benevolence, there will inevitably be some who fall into the techniques of the arrow-maker or coffin-maker. Thus its investigation is care about techniques. (“Care About Techniques,” Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 1)

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That is to say, human conduct is ruled over by the mind, and whether people end up as great or petty is completely dependent on what kind of psychological technique acts as this ruler, hence one must choose the correct psychological technique. Geng Dingxiang’s so-called care about techniques thus means selecting the learning of Confucius to guide one’s thoughts. In this way, regardless of one’s vocation, one can always be accompanied in the dao. This is also the meaning of “Daos are nourished together without mutual harm, and are pursued together without mutual conflict” from Centrality in the Ordinary. For Geng Dingxiang, the above three key steps form a single whole. If one has fully penetrated these three key steps, then one has an awareness and understanding of original substance, a grasp and accordance with the principles of effort, and instructions for the concrete approach to advancement in learning. His academic learning expresses a well-rounded form of central harmony that is neither extreme nor biased. Here we should discuss Huang Zongxi’s 黄宗羲 understanding and assessment of Geng Dingxiang’s care about techniques. His Case Studies of Ming Confucians comments on Geng Dingxiang, saying: Care about techniques regards innate moral knowing as pre-formed and pre-existing, possessed by all people, yet when it is used for this it becomes this, and when it is used for that it becomes that. Hence when it is used by those who wish to illustrate their illustrious virtue to the world under Heaven, there is no need for an additional effort at governing the mind, and there are none who are not benevolent. Innate moral knowing is the centrality before arousal, which possesses goodness and is without badness, just as water necessarily descends or a compass necessarily points south. Wishing to illustrate illustrious virtue to the world under Heaven, it is then called innate moral knowing, and it is not dependent on use. Hence anything that can become either this or that is all knowledge from emotion and recognition, and cannot be called innately moral. The gentleman’s recognition of innate moral knowing was still not yet clear. Nonetheless, he went along with the distorted record of Yangming’s words in Later Record of Transmission and Practice (Chuanxi houlu 传习 后录), as when he said: “[Zhang] Yi 张仪 and [Su] Qin 苏秦 also glimpsed the site of the marvellous functioning of innate moral knowing, except that they used it for bad.” The gentleman was misled in this. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 816)

This concerns the problem of the distinction between the mind and innate moral knowing. For Geng Dingxiang, the mind had several meanings, among which the most fundamental was the authentic emanation of moral emotion, i.e. the site of the true impulse that allows no stopping. Next was the will, i.e. the “mind” in “Affairs and incidents are all the mind.” The “psychological techniques” Geng Dingxiang selected in his “selection of techniques” in fact referred to the will, and selecting techniques meant selecting the correct aspiration for the will. The third was the functions of thinking and feeling, i.e. the mind in Geng Dingxiang’s statement that “Before the human mind has interacted with affects, it is simply a limpid void. Once knowledge arises, the affects of fortune, misfortune, regret and meanness are produced, and thereby it is attacked and seized by suffering, wavering back and forth, and the void becomes muddled” (“Statement to Liu Diaofu,” Case Studies of Ming

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Confucians, 821). Geng Dingxiang talked a lot about the mind and very little about innate moral knowing, since he connected the mind and inherent nature as one, with the true impulse that allows no stopping being recognised and adopted from the “sweat on the forehead” and the “sudden sight of apprehension.” Understood according to Wang Yangming’s view that “Heavenly principle’s site of luminous brightness and numinous awareness is what we call innate moral knowing,” Geng Dingxiang’s “true impulse” is a unification of mind and inherent nature, i.e. what is called “innate moral knowing.” Huang Zongxi criticised Geng Dingxiang’s care about techniques as implying that “when innate moral knowing is used for this it becomes this, and when it is used for that it becomes that,” i.e. that in between there is no moral rationality to act as a ruler. In fact this is a misunderstanding of Geng Dingxiang, taking “care about techniques” to be the phenomenal mind of the choices of the will or its aspiration, and not the mind of the true impulse that allows no stopping as a direct manifestation of the substance of the dao. Hence there is the comment that “The gentleman’s recognition of innate moral knowing was still not yet clear.” As discussed above, Geng Dingxiang’s three key steps were in fact three levels, namely the coextension of the mind and the dao as the original substance, the coextension of affairs and the mind as the approach to effort, and care about techniques as the choices in actual conduct. Although the responsibility born by the subject in these three aspects is different, it is nonetheless a whole. Furthermore, Huang Zongxi’s explanation of innate moral knowing regarded Liu Zongzhou as correct, and hence he said that the record of Yangming’s words in Later Record of Transmission and Practice was distorted. In fact, Wang Yangming’s explanations of innate moral knowing in his later years were very broad, with all the functions of the mind or the spirit being incorporated within “innate moral knowing,” and thus “the seven emotions following their natural flowing movement is all the function of innate moral knowing,” “Yi and Qin also glimpsed the site of the marvellous functioning of innate moral knowing,” “I am afraid that sounds, appearances, goods, and profit also cannot be absent from innate moral knowing,” “innate moral knowing is change,” etc. were indeed contained within Yangming’s thought, so one cannot say the record was distorted. Huang Zongxi’s criticism of Geng Dingxiang was mainly based on the strict distinction between great and petty people found in upright Donglin people, taking up Geng Dingxiang’s unwillingness to offend Zhang Juzheng 张居正 in order to save He Xinyin from jail, and using this to mock his care about techniques as mostly conceived on the basis of actual advantages and disadvantages, and thus as unable to support daring action that purely relies on innate moral knowing without concern for oneself. As for saying that Later Record of Transmission and Practice was distorted, this was a warning against the mistakes of later scholars in the Wang [Yangming] lineage, one that made use of criticism of Geng Dingxiang in order to indirectly criticise Wang Yangming.

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4 The Unity of Confucianism and Buddhism; Buddhism as Useful for Confucianism Many Song-Ming Confucians dabbled in Buddhism and Daoism, and their attitudes toward Buddhism can be generally grouped into the following kinds: first were those who ventured into Buddhism in their early years, later left it behind for various reasons, yet nonetheless fused Buddhist thought into their own thought, and hence were in fact influenced by Buddhism despite their criticisms; second were those who saw Buddhism as a dangerous flood or savage beast, were afraid of becoming stuck within it and contaminated by it, and hence were familiar with the general meaning of Buddhism but did their utmost to vilify it; third were those who ventured into Buddhism and appreciated it, went on to respectfully believe it, never retreated from this position, and thus obscured Confucianism with Buddhist thought; fourth were those who could venture in and out of Buddhism, neither vilifying it nor respectfully believing it, and thus integrated Confucianism with Buddhism and used Buddhism to interpret Confucianism, absorbing its philosophical principles but casting aside its religious cultivation practices and ceremonial protocols. This last direction was the one taken by Geng Dingxiang. The complete works of Geng Dingxiang include a section entitled Compiled Interpretations of Heterodoxy (Yiyi bian 译异编), which is a representative example of his integration of Confucian thought and Buddhism. “Interpretation” means detailed explication and extension, and “heterodoxy” means heresies or texts from other territories. “Interpretations of Heterodoxy” means expounding Confucian thought through extending certain sentences or meanings from Buddhist texts. In the foreword to Compiled Interpretations of Heterodoxy, he said: Formerly, Song Confucians had a saying: “The refined subtleties of Buddhist texts do not go beyond our texts, while we do not believe their absurdities.” I say: “No, no! Those who read Buddhist texts simply see what the delusion and enlightenment of the mind is like. If the mind is truly enlightened, then regardless of whether the refined subtleties attained are the same as one’s own, the absurdities within will be seen as like the images in the [Book of] Changes, the evocations in the [Book of] Poetry, the fables in the Zhuangzi 庄子 and Liezi 列子, the meaning of which must be sought outside of the language itself. If the mind remains deluded, then it is not only the absurdities that will not be believed, since the refined subtleties within will also merely be adopted to embellish the four inches in between [the mouth and the ears]. The Buddhists have a saying: “When the mind is enlightened it turns the flower of the dharma, when the mind is deluded it is turned by the flower of the dharma.” This saying is true indeed! I commonly neither kowtow to Buddhism nor repudiate Buddhism, simply relying on this mind that can turn Buddhist texts. The mainstream Confucians’ doctrinaire repudiations of Buddhism come in countless varieties, yet none of them can satisfy my heart. (Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 7)

Geng Dingxiang’s attitude was very clear, neither kowtowing to Buddhism nor repudiating Buddhism. He wished to maintain a Confucian position, while using Buddhist texts to explain and reinforce Confucianism. What he cast aside was Buddhism’s “coarse traces like shaving the head and being stripped to the waist, prostrating worship and sitting cross-legged in meditation, chanting hymns and

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incantations, and karmic retribution and reincarnation” (Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 7), and its doctrine of the supremacy of quietude and extinction. In terms of its main features, Geng Dingxiang’s melding of Buddhism can be summarised into the following points: First, Zhu [Xi]-Lu [Jiuyuan] and doctrine-Chan 禅 [lit. “meditation”]. Geng Dingxiang viewed the debate between Zhu and Lu through the Buddhist split between doctrine and Chan, using the original unity of doctrine and Chan to argue that both Zhu and Lu represented the learning of the sages. He said: We Confucians nowadays either slander Zhonghui’s 仲晦 [i.e. Zhu Xi’s] doctrine of the investigation of things and his being restrained by texts in his meandering discussions, or misunderstand the import of Zijing’s 子静 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan’s] “establish the great” and fail to recognise the original mind, and all are just like this. Ah! Divisions over religious doctrine were the decline of the Buddhist dao; the endless prattle over Zhu and Lu will also obscure our dao! (“Interpretations of Ancestral Doctrines” [Zongjiao yi 宗教译], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 7)

In his view, the Chan tradition uses the mind to transmit the mind and does not set down written words, in which it differs greatly from the doctrinal tradition that emphasises explications, developments and arguments based on Buddhist scriptures. In the early period when Buddhism entered China, doctrine and Chan were not yet separated into two, and the separation between doctrine and its purport led to endless increasingly acrimonious debates, an expression of the decline of Buddhism. Among Song Confucians, Lu Jiuyuan’s style of work and approach to effort can be compared to Chan, while Zhu Xi’s can be compared to doctrine, making the debates between Zhu and Lu similar to those between doctrine and Chan, and thus similarly a sign of the decline of Confucianism. Zhu and Lu are different tendencies within the learning of the sages, with the latter containing both Lu Jiuyuan’s prior establishing of the great and Zhu Xi’s investigation of things and fathoming of principle, the two not being in conflict. Contemporary people criticised Zhu Xi for being fragmented and slipping into “the restraint of texts with no observation, meandering discussions with no root,” and Lu Jiuyuan for his crazy Chan ways and slipping into the rejection of people’s “true mind that allows no stopping,” both being seen as slipping into heretical approaches. He [i.e. Geng Dingxiang] thought that Zhu and Lu could and indeed must be reconciled, since only in this way could one discuss the original appearance of Confucianism that was both inclusive and expansive. This kind of view displayed a greater breadth of vision and mind than those in the Wang [Yangming] School who defended their threshold, regarded themselves loftily and repelled others at a great distance. Second, the highest good is the pure land (jingtu 净土), the cosmos is my mind. Geng Dingxiang once carefully studied the three great works of Pure Land Buddhism, comparing the pure land of the Buddha country in the west spoken of by Pure Land Buddhism with the “highest good” (zhishan 至善) spoken of by Confucians. He said: Among my friends there are those who study the Pure Land teaching of the Buddhists, saying that among the Buddhists there are Buddhas with infinite lifespans who have their

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estates in the west, where they promote transformation through virtue. Those who follow this teaching regard that place as the pure land, a country of great happiness, while the east is the filthy land…. If one really knows that one’s mind is the cosmos and the cosmos is one’s mind, then “When sages emerge in the northern, southern, eastern or western oceans, this mind is the same, and this principle is the same.” Thus, to regard the east as the pure land is acceptable. The learning of we Confucians lies in remaining in the highest good [see the Great Learning (Daxue 大学)], and this highest good is the eternal pure land of our Zhongni 仲尼 [i.e. Confucius]. (“Interpretation of the Pure Land” [Jingtu yi 净土译], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 7)

What Geng Dingxiang said here was in fact a mixture of the thought of Chan Buddhism and that of Lu Jiuyuan. The Sixth Patriarch [of Chan Buddhism] Huineng 慧能 established the tenet that one’s own mind is the pure land, such that “Before when thought is deluded, Buddha is all living things; after the mind is enlightened, all living things are Buddha,” rejecting the view that the pure land has a location. However, the method of pure land in the mind achieved by Huineng was “to regard non-thought as venerable,” such that “in all the various realms, the mind is not contaminated.” Lu Jiuyuan’s view that my mind is the cosmos and the cosmos is my mind stated that the fundamental law of the cosmos is one with the moral law of my original mind, and thus my mind is the highest good. Geng Dingxiang synthesised these two views, regarding my mind as the pure land, and the highest good of my mind’s true impulse that allows no stopping as the Confucian version of the pure land of the Buddha country. For him, the pure land was nothing but another name for the site of the highest good, and he borrowed Buddhism to explain Confucian thought. Third, the six comprehensions (liutong 六通) are the comprehension of the one mind. Buddhism has the doctrine of six comprehensions, and Geng Dingxiang used one’s own mind to summarise them. He said: The Buddhists have six comprehensions, which they call the comprehension of the Heavenly eye, the comprehension of the Heavenly ear, the comprehension of other minds, the comprehension of abiding in endowment, the comprehension of according with intention, and the comprehension of ending seepage. I say it is only necessary to seek the single comprehension of one’s own mind. With the single comprehension of one’s own mind, when one hears good words or sees good conduct, it is great and unstoppable like an overflowing river, and this is the comprehension of the Heavenly eye and Heavenly ear. When one does not force on others that which one would not wish for oneself [see Analects, 12.2, 15.24], regulating one’s behaviour according to this guideline above, below and on all sides, this is the comprehension of other minds. When a sage emerges in any of a hundred thousand worlds, and this mind and this principle are the same, past and present in one moment, this is the comprehension of abiding in endowment. When one resides in this firmly and with deep resources, successfully meeting with the source on all fronts [see Mencius, 4B.14], this is the comprehension of according with intention. When sounds, sights, scents and tastes all have no contamination, and vision, hearing, speech and action are all held firmly within ritual propriety, this is the comprehension of ending seepage. Thus the single comprehension of one’s own mind makes the myriad transformations all attain comprehension, not merely these six comprehensions! (“Interpretation of the Six Comprehensions” [Liutong yi 六通译], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 7)

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In Geng Dingxiang’s view, the fundamental dao-principle of Confucianism lies in the unity of the mind, with the mind as the ruler of the organs of the ears and eyes, so when the ruler aims toward the good, the ears and eyes gain this comprehension. The mind is the original substance of the dao of regulating according to the guideline, and with regulation according to the guideline, other people and oneself are both comprehended, to the point of becoming one body with all the myriad things. The dao of regulating according to the guideline (jieju zhi dao 絜矩之道) was an important proposition of Taizhou Learning, and Geng Dingxiang regarded it as the fundamental principle governing relations between others and oneself. In terms of the four inklings of the original mind, people are all the same, and when Lu Jiuyuan’s poem said, “Amidst the rise and fall of ruins and graves, ancestral temples are respected; through the ages, this person has never polished the mind,” it had precisely this meaning. If one is to speak of abiding in endowment, it only refers to abiding in this single endowment. According with this intention, the intentions of all people can be satisfied. However, only with the residing firmly and with deep resources spoken of by Mencius can one successfully meet with the source on all fronts. That in which one resides and which offers resources is also only people’s unified mind, which contains vast greatness and operates exquisitely and subtly. Seepage refers to annoyance, yet if vision, hearing, speech and action all follow ritual propriety, then one “dwells yet does not dwell on things,” and if one does not dwell on things, then annoyance comes to an end. Since “the marvellousness of operation is preserved in this unified mind,” when the mind attains comprehension, the myriad transformations can all attain comprehension. Geng Dingxiang’s explanation used the fundamental spirit of the Learning of the Mind along with the traditional method of Taizhou Learning to emphasise the ruling and operating functions of the mind. Fourth, the emptiness of the Heart Sutra (Xinjing 心经) and the centrality before arousal. Geng Dingxiang believed that the Heart Sutra was a representative Buddhist scripture, that its core meaning “emptiness” (kong 空) was the fundamental thought of Buddhism, and that the emptiness of the Heart Sutra and the centrality spoken of by Confucians displayed the marvellous quality of being different in approach but having the same effect. He said: In my dabbling in Buddhist scripture, the sentence “clearly saw that the Five Aggregates are all empty” from the Heart Sutra expresses the great purport of Buddhist truth. Only with emptiness is awareness perfect, only with emptiness is there no dwelling on things…. For those who are adept at reading Buddhist texts, if they are really able to grasp this single sentence from the Heart Sutra then the five thousand-plus volumes of the twelve works are all superfluous words. The impression of the mind that has been passed down by we Confucians ever since Yao and Shun is nothing but a single word “centrality” (zhong 中). Master Zisi 子思 referred to it directly when he said: “The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality” [see Centrality in the Ordinary]. A poem by Baisha 白沙 [i.e. Chen Xianzhang 陈献章] says: “Since we Confucians have centrality and harmony as present, who would seek them in the state before arousal?” What image could represent the state before arousal? Confucius’ “completely empty” [kongkong 空空; see Analects, 9.8] and Yan [Hui’s] 颜回 “frequently empty” [lükong 屡空; see Analects, 11.19] both refer to this. If one sincerely grasps this, then even this sentence from the Heart

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Sutra is perhaps superfluous words. If not, then even countless varieties of subtle words and marvellous arguments will just act as karmic obstructions for all living things. (“Interpretation of the Heart Sutra” [Xinjing yi 心经译], Complete Writings of Master Geng Tiantai, Vol. 7)

Geng Dingxiang thought that the innumerable thousands upon thousands of Buddhist texts together with their tortuous explications were all simply interpretations of the word emptiness. He connected “emptiness” to the core Confucian idea of “centrality,” thinking that emptiness is a necessary condition for centrality, such that without emptiness, centrality is impossible. Connecting this to Geng Dingxiang’s philosophical thought, only when there is “emptiness” in the mind can one make the “true impulse that allows no stopping” manifest in the mind. “Allows no stopping” describes the quality of the benevolence in the mind, namely flowing movement without cease. The centrality before arousal is non-being, while the true impulse that allows no stopping is being. Confucius’ “completely empty” is the precondition, while “benevolence” and “dutifulness and forbearance” are the original substance. Geng Dingxiang here in fact borrowed Buddhist doctrines to argue for his true impulse that allows no stopping. Geng Dingxiang’s melding of Confucianism and Buddhism was based on borrowing Buddhist concepts to explicate Confucian thought, especially that of Taizhou Learning. Here, Buddhism and Confucianism are not blended in complete harmony, but rather separated like oil and water, with only an external similarity. His fundamental thought was Confucian, and he was unable to enter deeply into Buddhist texts in order to make use of the intellectual resources of Buddhist doctrines. Buddhist names, terms, affairs and numbered lists were here simply borrowed as a medium in order to explicate Confucian thought. His purpose was simply that stated by Jiao Hong in his postscript to Compiled Interpretations of Heterodoxy, namely “to gather together those scholars under Heaven who were fond of heterodoxies and urge them toward the dao of great centrality and utmost uprightness.” Huang Zongxi said that he “hauled mud to bring water, half believing and half not believing in Buddhism,” yet in fact he completely did not believe in it, but rather simply “neither kowtowed to Buddhism nor repudiated Buddhism.” Geng Dingxiang was rather an important figure in later Taizhou Learning, with a great many students and a considerable contemporary influence, especially on the ethos of scholarly circles. In his “Chronicle of Master Geng of Tiantai” [Tiantai Geng xiansheng xingzhuang 天台耿先生行状], Jiao Hong said: “Having established the Chongzheng Academy 崇正书院 and written ‘Gathering Ceremony’ [Huiyi 会仪], he selected a group of young scholars from fourteen counties and trained them. At that time, Wenzhen 文贞 (Xu Jie 徐阶) was using his position as a renowned Neo-Confucian official and Senior Grand Secretary to establish empty positions that awaited worthy men, reaching down as far as warehouse managers, and viewed the master as like a talented and venerable personage. The master occupied his position as a Confucian teacher for six years, sweeping away vacillations and giving encouragement, stating and explaining heresies, cracking open and dissolving problems, and sprouting new and original meanings, all with a prominent and upright spirit. Scholars were revived and rose up, giving him

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unprecedented acclaim, and all of them passed on his call, thunderously following him. Even those who were bound to other teachers also made use of the name of Master Geng, and the practices of scholars in the realm were almost all changed” (Collected Works of Danyuan [Danyuan ji 澹园集], Vol. 33). In the past, most introductions to Geng Dingxiang discussed his debates with Li Zhi 李贽, but his and Li Zhi’s disagreement was actually more concerned with individual character or attitudes toward dealing with the world, and in terms of philosophical thought, their divergence was not significant. For example, Li Zhi’s “explanation of the childlike mind,” “the common people wearing clothes and eating food is the order of human relations and the principle of things,” etc. [see Chap. 20 below] are all not significantly different from Geng Dingxiang’s “true impulse that allows no stopping,” “the hidden within everyday expenses,” “refined subtlety within coarse shallowness,” etc. Li Zhi always sustained a close friendship with Geng Dingxiang’s younger brother Dingli, and Geng Dingli’s learning was close to that of his elder brother. Also, Li Zhi’s “Biography of Master Geng Dingli” [Geng Chukong xiansheng zhuan 耿楚倥先生传] states that Geng Dingxiang maintained the proposition “the utmost attainment in human relations” (renlun zhi zhi 人伦之至), while he himself maintained the proposition “the centrality before arousal,” over which they debated for some time, yet Li Zhi’s final conclusion was that “the utmost attainment in human relations” is “the centrality before arousal,” and thus that the core tenets of the academic learning of the two men were not in contradiction. Geng Dingxiang later did not refer to “the utmost attainment in human relations,” and Li Zhi also abandoned “the centrality before arousal,” and concerning this, Li Zhi commented: “We thus came to know the dao of learning: when both set themselves aside, they follow each other, while when both maintain themselves, they find fault in each other; the propensity is inevitable. When both set themselves aside, they forget each other, and when they forget each other, they are blended together as one body, and there are no further troubles. Thus, neither put off by my old age nor intimidated by the cold, I went directly to Huang’an to meet Tiantai [i.e. Geng Dingxiang] in the mountains. When Tiantai heard I was arriving, he was also wild with joy, since our sharing the same intention and conjoined dao could be no mere coincidence!” (A Book to Burn [Fenshu 焚书], 143). This all demonstrates that Geng Dingxiang and Li Zhi’s disagreement was not as great as it is depicted in usual works, and also did not concern their fundamental thoughts, so both men can be viewed as belonging to the wild group within later Taizhou Learning.

Chapter 19

Jiao Hong’s Studies of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism

Taizhou 泰州 Learning took self-cultivation and establishing the root as its core precepts, the everyday usages of the ordinary people as its approach, and had an extremely strong commoner flavour. When it came down to Jiao Hong, a scholar of broad learning who researched the classics and histories, as well as being thoroughly familiar with the scriptures of Buddhism and Daoism, it was cast into a new system that fused the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, took knowing inherent nature and seeking benevolence as its core precepts, regarded the classics, histories and hundred schools [of the pre-Qin masters] as supporting wings, and proposed a return to simplicity through breadth as its methodology, opening up a new vein in later Taizhou Learning. Jiao Hong’s learning shared Wang Gen’s 王艮 plain simplicity and personal intimacy, while avoiding his stubborn and narrow qualities; it shared He Xinyin 何心隐 and Li Zhi’s 李贽 spirit of majestic self-reliance and self-respect, while avoiding their weak points of excessive indignation in theory and excessive indulgence in conduct. Jiao Hong also differed from his teacher Geng Dingxiang 耿定向 in that the latter’s learning ended with the Four Books and Buddhism, was excessively restrained, and tended towards practical tasks, while Jiao Hong also consulted the classics and histories with a much broader scope, giving his learning a strongly academic flavour. Jiao Hong 焦竤 (1541–1620; zi 字 Ruohou 弱侯, hao 号 Yiyuan 漪园, alternative hao Danyuan 澹园) was a guard of the standard-bearer in Nanjing. He was a successful candidate in the imperial examinations in the Wanli 万历 period, and was appointed as a senior compiler at the Hanlin Academy 翰林院. Grand Secretary Chen Yubi 陈于陛 wished to gather many officials together under Jiao Hong’s leadership to correct the histories, but Jiao Hong wrote a memorandum to gratefully decline, and privately completed A Record of Personages from the National Dynasty (Guochao xianzheng lu 国朝献征录) in 120 volumes and A Record of National Histories and Classics (Guoshi jingji zhi 国史经籍志) in five volumes. He once took up a position as an instructional official in the Eastern Palace, where he wrote An Illustrated Explanation of Nourishing Life (Yangsheng tujie 养生图解), a collection of the exemplary affairs of crown princes through the © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_19

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ages compiled them into one book, complete with painted illustrations, which he hoped to present to the crown prince, only to be opposed by other officials. Later, he became an assistant provincial examiner in Shuntian 顺天 county, only to be impeached due to “his selected scholars’ writings containing many dangerous and fantastic words,” and demoted to a sub-prefect in Funing 福宁 prefecture. After two years, he resigned his official position and returned to Nanjing, never to leave again, busying himself with teaching and studying. His works include the books Collected Works of Danyuan (Danyuan ji 澹园集) in 49 volumes, Further Collected Works of Danyuan (Danyuan xuji 澹园续集) in 27 volumes, Mr. Jiao’s Brush Annals (Jiaoshi bisheng 焦氏笔乘) in 6 volumes, Further Brush Annals (Xu bisheng 续笔 乘) in 8 volumes, Wings to the Laozi (Laozi yi 老子翼) and Wings to the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi yi 庄子翼).1

1 Confucianism: Knowing and Restoring Inherent Nature Jiao Hong took up the tradition of learning of the mind that began with Mencius 孟 子, especially Wang Yangming’s 王阳明 “doctrine of innate moral knowing,” Luo Rufang’s 罗汝芳 “doctrine of the innate moral mind of the child,” and Geng Dingxiang’s theory of “allowing no stopping,” and proposed “knowing inherent nature” (zhixing 知性) as the central principle of his learning. He said: “The learning of the superior man is simply knowing inherent nature. Inherent nature is complete in itself, so by knowing one’s inherent nature and expressing it through activity, benevolence and righteousness emerge” (“Preface to Important Sayings from the National Dynasty’s Secondary Sacrifices to the Four Masters” [Guochao congsi si xiansheng yaoyu xu 国朝从祀四先生要语序], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 14). Jiao Hong believed that the Confucian effort at cultivation primarily lay in knowing inherent nature, knowing that the myriad principles are originally self-sufficient in one’s own inherent nature, and there is no need to seek them externally. After knowing inherent nature, one can exhaustively express inherent nature [see Mencius, 7A.1]. The content of inherent nature is benevolence, righteousness, filial piety, and kindness (ci 慈), and when one exhaustively expresses inherent nature, these appear in the mind. This still represented a continuation of the pre-formed innate moral knowing (xiancheng liangzhi 现成良知) of Taizhou Learning. Jiao Hong’s unique point was his view of exhaustively expressing inherent nature as a kind of sudden enlightenment within inner experience: People today labour and toil as if things had long since been lacking, not knowing that everything is present within inherent nature. Hence Mencius said that “The myriad things are all complete within me” [see Mencius, 7A.4], and I really contain them. If I cannot

[Trans.] References to Danyuan ji and Jiaoshi bisheng both refer to Jinling congshu 金陵丛书 editions. 1

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make use of them, and seek them one by one externally, this is what is called “casting aside that which is not exhaustively stored in one’s own home to go door to door clutching a begging bowl following the example of a pauper.” If one can return the light in reflective illumination, glancing at the earth for a moment, one will see that all is ready and pre-formed, originally without any deficiency or lack, and is this not a sizable joy? (“Questions and Answers from the Hall of Illuminating Virtue” [Mingde tang wenda 明德 堂问答], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 49)

Pre-formed innate moral knowing is a unity of mind and inherent nature, in which innate moral knowing appears as the actual realm of the mind from the metaphysical realm of inherent nature, and is a kind of sudden and transcendent enlightenment, accompanied by a psychological sensation of joy. This kind of joy is a unity of the beautiful and the good. When one has this sensation, there is a sudden awareness of lively vitality and replete plenitude in the mind, and one is free without obstinate attachments. This kind of joy is different from the happiness of “living in a humble lane with a single gourd to drink from but not allowing this to alter one’s happiness” attributed to Confucius’ student Yan Hui 颜回 [see Analects 论语, 6.11]. It is not simply the moral joy obtained when moral rationality overcomes feelings and desires, but is more an aesthetic joy at the unity of mind with principle, Heaven and humanity as one body, and replete plenitude. This had been passed down continually in the Taizhou School, beginning with Wang Gen’s “Song of Joyful Learning” (Lexue ge 乐学歌), and was the highest spiritual plane of Jiao Hong’s “recognition of inherent nature.” Jiao Hong proposed that, if one wishes to attain such a spiritual plane, the most fundamental method is to overcome one’s feelings of anger, rage, liking and happiness through “learning,” and thereby to restores the inherent nature that one originally possessed. He said: What is the purpose of learning? It is that by which one restores one’s inherent nature. In terms of people’s inherent nature, there is no [legendary Emperor] Shun 舜 or [notorious robber] Zhi 跖, no past and present, there is only one. So what is there to do? Learn in order to restore it. Inherent nature is spontaneously clear and self-sufficient, yet if one does not learn then one cannot possess it in oneself…. When feelings are established, the reality of inherent nature begins to be shackled, and thus, although inherent nature cannot be without feelings, feelings cannot be without delusions, and with delusions there must be learning. Learners are those who wipe out their delusions in order to return to being without delusions. When one is without delusions, inherent nature is then restored. (“Original Learning” [Yuanxue 原学], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 4)

Ever since Li Ao 李翱 proposed the doctrine of restoring inherent nature (fuxing 复 性), Song-Ming Neo-Confucians mostly venerated it, especially those who followed the Learning of the Mind. Jiao Hong also held a doctrine of restoring inherent nature. In knowing and restoring inherent nature, one must control one’s feelings and desires, and in terms of the relation between inherent nature and feeling, Jiao Hong advocated the production of feeling being based on inherent nature, transforming feelings to return to inherent nature. He said: “Inherent nature is the water and feelings are the waves, so when the waves surge, the water is muddied, and when feelings are intense, disorder is produced. Waves are produced from water yet are also that which muddies water, just as feelings are produced

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from inherent nature yet are also that which harms inherent nature. Hence it was said that the superior man’s inherent nature governs his feelings, while the petty man’s feelings govern his inherent nature” (“Questions and Answers from Gucheng” [Gucheng wenda 古城问答], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 48). Feelings harm inherent nature, but they cannot be completely absent, so the method for governing them is to experience the centrality before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused: When asked about the sentence, “The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality” [from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)], the master (Jiao Hong) said: “This is the most critical saying for sages and worthy men, and the Cheng 程 school from Mingdao 明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao 程颢] to Yanping 延平 [i.e. Li Tong 李侗] took this message as the vein of their learning. If one truly believes this point, since as was said, ‘By simply attaining the root, there is no worry over the branches,’ what affairs are not known? When the ancients spoke of thinking neither of good nor of bad, and of that time being the original appearance of things, this was what was meant. This is the endowment of the root and the time of the origin [benming yuanchen 本命元辰], and if one can not lose this, it is called holding to centrality. As I have said, when intentions, demands, obstinacy and the self are absent [see Analects, 9.4], and before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused, is what is most important to experience.” (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 48)

“Intentions, demands, obstinacy and the self” are thoughts, the will, and self-consciousness, while happiness, anger, sadness and joy are feelings. When there are no feelings and no will, the mind is a plane of empty clarity. When there is empty clarity, the base of inherent nature spontaneously appears. This is what he meant when he said, “When one strips back as much as can be stripped back, until one can strip back no more, then true reality spontaneously appears.” The base of inherent nature is centrality and the original appearance of things, and hence he spoke of “the endowment of the root and the time of the origin.” When one establishes this as the root, then there is nothing that is not correct. Jiao Hong particularly praised Centrality in the Ordinary, believing it to be a collection of Confucius’ subtle sayings; what Centrality in the Ordinary spoke of was nothing but calling people to experience the centrality before arousal. Jiao Hong’s theory of the relation between inherent nature and feeling mostly followed orthodox Confucian statements, and differently greatly from both He Xinyin, who also belonged to later Taizhou Learning, and Li Zhi, a figure who vehemently opposed tradition. He Xinyin said: “One has inherent nature with flavours, inherent nature with appearances, inherent nature with sounds, and inherent nature with comforts. Inherent nature avails itself of one’s desires, and endowment is what drives it” (Collected Works of He Xinyin [He Xinyin ji 何心隐集], 40). This accepts that sensory desires for sounds, appearances, smells, flavours, etc. are the content of human nature, which one cannot be without, and thus calls them one’s endowment. Endowment is thus simply an actually necessity. Morality must be realised in peoples sensory desires, and apart from desire there is nothing called inherent nature, so concerning desires, one can only seek their reasonable satisfaction, and cannot do without them. Hence He Xinyin opposed the “being without desires” spoken of by Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐. He Xinyin also believed that, provided

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one shared one’s desires with the common people, this desire was positive, and not only could not be suppressed, but also should be fostered. Li Zhi also believed that pursuing benefit and avoiding harm was a human instinct that was so by nature, in which people were all the same. Hence the selfish (si 私) and utilitarian mind is a person’s original mind: “Selfishness is the human mind, people must have selfishness before their minds can appear, and without selfishness there is no mind. This is a principle of nature, a tally that must be accorded with, and one cannot make any other fanciful and farfetched assumptions. Thus those who discuss doctrines of selflessness are all engaging in pie-in-the-sky chattering” (A Book to Keep (Hidden) [Cangshu 藏 书], “Further Discussion of Confucian Officials of Virtue and Achievement” [Deye ruchen houlun 德业儒臣后论]). That Jiao Hong advocated experiencing the centrality before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused, as well as removing feelings and restoring inherent nature, shows that, in terms of his theory of the relation between inherent nature and feeling, he belonged to a moderate group that differed both from Wang Bi 王襞 and Luo Rufang, and also from He Xinyin and Li Zhi. His moderate attitude here was closest to his teacher Geng Dingxiang. In the aspect of Confucian theory, his experience was not as deep as that of the earlier Luo Rufang or the later Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周, and he often rigidly followed the fixed doctrines of his predecessors, and created few new ideas. This was determined by has moderate position and the scholarly nature of his Neo-Confucianism. Jiao Hong’s learning was exceptionally broad, and he read all kinds of books. On this point, he differed somewhat from Neo-Confucians in general and early Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucians in particular, who often stopped at the Four Books and exerted all their effort on the experience of mind and inherent nature. However, he also emphasised returning from the broad to the simple, studying the lower and penetrating the higher, as he said: “In learning one aims to penetrate the higher, just as how in sinking a well one aims to reach a spring. If one does not reach a spring, why sink the well? If one does not know inherent nature and endowment, what use is learning?” (“Reply to Teacher Geng” [Da Geng shi 答耿师], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 12). He opposed the academic tendencies of Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi 朱熹, believing that Cheng-Zhu applied their exertions at accumulating empirical knowledge, and showed little concern for their own minds. The Cheng-Zhu theory of the investigation of things was a misreading of the Confucian-Mencian tradition of self-cultivation. He said: When the learning of Confucius and Mencius reach Song Confucians it had become obscure. Yichuan 伊川 [i.e. Cheng Yi] and Yuanhui 元晦 [i.e. Zhu Xi] misunderstood the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, directing scholars to exhaust their energies in the peripheral search for the principles of things, while setting aside and discussing nothing of the self and the mind. When Master Yangming began to advocate the term innate moral knowing, he showed scholars to turn back and seek from themselves, and this can be called a great contribution. Although Master Zhu was not without his achievements in interpreting the classics, in terms of the great precept of sages and worthy men, he was too busy to take note of it. (“Reply to a Question from a Friend” [Da youren wen 答友人问], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 12)

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From these criticisms, it seems that Jiao Hong’s view of Zhu Xi followed the basic viewpoint of Wang Yangming and the students of the Wang school. Although he especially emphasised observing broadly and reading widely, he also criticised Zhu Xi’s investigation of things and extension of knowledge for leaving behind the cultivation of mind and inherent nature. This shows that Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism had already taken a turn away from Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism, with the learning of mind and inherent nature becoming the core of discussions, and Neo-Confucianism displaying the characteristics of being more ethical, more internal, and more concerned with the refined subtleties of experience. Even for a philosopher like Zhu Xi, who strongly emphasised theories of mind and inherent nature, the prominence of his rational spirit meant that he still met with attacks from many Ming Dynasty Confucians. Jiao Hong also proposed the idea that “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all the mind,” and explained his theory of original substance from the two aspects of Confucianism and Buddhism. Here is a passage of questions and answers between Jiao Hong and his students: Zhongjin 仲晋 said: “The mind only exists within the aperture of the heart.” The master said: “This is the mind of flesh and blood, not the true mind.” Xiesheng 谢生 said: “The whole body is all the mind.” The master said: “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all the mind. An ancient man once said: If one recognises the mind, the great Earth has not an inch of soil.” (“Questions and Answers from Gucheng,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 48)

For Jiao Hong here, the mind is primarily not the faculty of thinking, feeling, etc., but rather the “mind of the cosmos.” The former is the mind of flesh and blood within the aperture of the heart (fangcun 方寸), and its main function is to govern one’s sight, hearing, speech and movement. The “mind of the cosmos” is the fundamental principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things in symbolic form, and this mind is the “true mind” (zhenxin 真心). Principle is one and its particularisations are diverse, and it is expressed as the inherent natures of specific things and affairs. Since inherent nature is omnipresent, “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all the mind.” For Jiao Hong here, the mind and inherent nature are one and the same, and the “mind of the cosmos,” the “true mind,” and the fundamental principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are one and the same, a view from the perspective of the Learning of the Mind’s theory of a moral original substance. From the perspective of Buddhism, the “mind” in “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all the mind” is consciousness (shi 识), Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all created by consciousness, the myriad things are all false appearances, and their inherent nature is empty. If one can recognise the absolute, empty and quiet original substance of the mind, then within one’s mind there is not even a speck of reflection of external appearances, and all that is left in the mind is a plane of empty quietude, hence “not an inch of soil can be attained.” Jiao Hong’s “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all the mind” can be explained with either Confucian thought or Buddhist thought. Since he respected and believed the doctrines of Mencius and

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Wang Yangming, the mind is inherent nature and inherent nature is the mind; since he used Buddhism to explain Confucianism, and Buddhism and Confucianism to explain each other’s doctrines, the mind is consciousness, and the “true mind” is the empty and quiet “original appearance of things.” In his early years, Jiao Hong still sharply divided the mind from things and being from non-being, and had not yet developed a perspective of being as non-being, activity as stillness, and things as the mind. Only in his later years did being and non-being, activity and stillness, and the mind and things become one plane. He himself described his experience in developing his learning, saying: When I was young, I liked being unyielding and easily lost my temper, and when I read the book Laozi 老子 it was as if I had heard nothing. When I was twenty-three, I heard the teachings of my friends and gained a little ambition in learning, but felt it arduous to begin with. Some who I spoke with used the “illuminating and numinous” to lead me in, and I was joyful as if I had found something correct. Reflecting on it in my mind, it was as if a horse had its bridle or a door its hinge. I compared this with recent Confucians and found them in accordance, thinking the dao 道 lay in this. However, in the following years, everything became obstructed, and where there are obstructions there must be doubts; I met with many perversities in examining the ancients, and where there are perversities there must be reactions, which I never eliminated from my breast. Before too long I felt greatly afflicted by my deliberations, since they had long accumulated and become a sickness. After laying down and resting, I suddenly felt a singular sense of enlightenment, and sighed deeply, saying: Previously, although I never rejected consciousness, I often thought to seek quietude apart from consciousness; although I always valued the non-mind [wuxin 无心], I did not know that the original mind was spontaneously without knowing; I yearned for purity and cleanliness, but did not know that being unstained was not cleanliness; I knew of the true self [zhenwo 真 我], but did not know that there was nothing that was not the self; these were all misunderstandings that people made in their discussions. Thus they eagerly sought out opinions and views, with neither sign nor trace, while I had almost nothing to do with others. (“Preface to Wings to the Laozi” [Laozi yi xu 老子翼序], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 14)

This “illuminating and numinous” [zhaozhao lingling 昭昭灵灵] means the mind; however, the mind here is not the mind that is both mind and things of Wang Yangming, but rather the mind of empty quietude. As a kind of vista contemplated in the mind, although this experience and enlightenment concerning emptiness can be compared to the “contemplating a vision” (wanwei guangjing 玩味光景) spoken of by Wang Yangming, as soon as it is confronted with reality, it becomes obstructed and blocked up. Later, he met with banishment from court, and in his confused deliberations, he explored, experienced, and speculated across many aspects, before realising the error of seeking stillness outside activity, speaking of the mind apart from things, and seeking the empty quietude of the substance of the mind apart from external situations. He recognised that the original mind is both without knowing and also has knowing, that the myriad things are both contaminations and also cleanliness, that the self and things are not dual, and that the mind and situations are originally one, realising “the wonder of the human mind that embraces the Supreme Void, that cannot be sought in being or in non-being, nor attained through acceptance or rejection” (“Volume Written for Tang Zizhang” [Shu Tang Zizhang juan 书唐子张卷], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 23).

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Jiao Hong’s Confucianism transitioned from recognising inherent nature and experiencing benevolence, eliminating feelings and restoring inherent nature, to experiencing the centrality before arousal; from criticising Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi for separating the inherent nature of the mind and the principles of things into two, to “That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all the mind,” and then from this to both being and non-being, the mind and things united as one. This reflected the gradual deepening of his thought, in which process Buddhism was an important guiding element.

2 Buddhism: No Duality Between Confucianism and Buddhism Ever since Jiao Hong studied with Geng Dingxiang when he was a student, Geng’s method of using Buddhism to explain Confucianism had a great influence on him. Luo Rufang, another of his teachers, also had a very strong flavour of Chan 禅 [Buddhist] learning. Furthermore, while Jiao Hong was friends with Li Zhi, the sincere warmth of their friendship went beyond the usual associations between scholars, and Li Zhi’s view of “fusing the three teachings [i.e. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism]” also had a significant influence on him. Under the influence of his teachers and friends, Jiao Hong delved deeply into Buddhist scriptures, and Buddhism became a large part of his academic constitution. However, his absorption of Buddhist thought was unlike Geng Dingxiang, who simply made external borrowings from Buddhism in explaining Confucianism, and was more similar to Luo Rufang and Li Zhi, who harmoniously blended Confucian learning with Buddhist learning. His fusion of Confucianism and Buddhism had the following several aspects: First, Confucianism and Buddhism were originally not two. Jiao Hong believed that, although the teachings of the two schools of Confucianism and Buddhism were different, their dao was one, so Buddhist argumentation and the core precepts of Confucianism could be mutually accommodated. He wrote works including “Ode to Maitreya” (Mile zan 弥勒赞) and “Ode to the Bodhisattva Guanyin” (Guanshiyin pus azan 观世音菩萨赞), and his “Branch Sayings” (Zhiyu 枝语) from his later years consisted purely of using Buddhist dharma to explain Confucianism. He also wrote prefaces to new carvings of Buddhist sutras, which widely disseminated his core precept of fusing Confucianism and Buddhism. For example, in his “Preface for a Carving of the Mahāvaipulya Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra” (Ke Dafangguang Fohuayan jing xu 刻大方广佛华严经序 [i.e. the Flower Garland Sutra]), he said: The Record [of Rites; Liji 礼记] states: “Expressing inherent nature is what is called the dao, and cultivating the dao is what is called teaching” [see Centrality in the Ordinary]. The teachings of the sages are different, but in terms of cultivating the dao to restore inherent nature, they are simply one. Thus the vast and true man [of Daoism] is indifferently alone with the divine clarity, and is thus indeed different from the [Confucian] sage who purifies

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his mind, retires into the secret, and shares his fortune and misfortune with the concerns of the people, and as for the one of great kindness [i.e. Maitreya] who takes dream and illusion as his body and the dust of the world as his mind, is aloof and held aloft on the surface of Heaven and humanity, and alone shows the wondrous limpidity of avidyā [wuming 无明; i.e. ignorance], tathātā [zhenru 真如; i.e. thusness], and svabhāva [zixing 自性; i.e. own-being] to the myriad worlds, how could one insist on his being completely in accord with the sages of the Middle Kingdom? Later I read the Flower Garland [Sutra] and knew that the ancient sages have various paths but the same destination, and the doubts of those who came before dissolved like melted ice. As for why, in the perfect teaching of the Flower Garland, inherent nature has no own-being, and there is no inherent nature that is not the dharma; dharma has no difference of dharma, and there is no dharma that is not inherent nature. It does not spurn the causes of the world, and this is what is called perching the mind in the non-dependent. Thus it displays non-action in the realm of action, and shows that the dharma of non-action does not destroy action. How is this any different from the one who purifies his mind, retires into the secret, and shares the concerns of the people? Who is Confucian and who is Buddhist? Which is different and which is the same? (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 16)

The differences between Confucianism and Buddhism lie in aspects including their value orientations, their ways of life, and their clothes and ceremonial systems. If one discusses the perfection of their principles, such as the unity of being and non-being or of principle and affairs, then they have no difference, and even in terms of original substance, effort, the inherent nature of the mind, etc., they have many points that are the same or similar. He agreed with the statement of the great Sui Dynasty Confucian Wang Tong 王通 concerning the differences and similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism: the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism lie in their external signs, things such as “screened carriages not being allowed to go to [the Zhou state of] Yue 越 and official headwear not being allowed into court”; as for their essential points, such as the inherent nature of the mind, they have no differences. Thus the Flower Garland Sutra is a book that both Confucians and Buddhists must read, and both Confucian classics and Buddhist scriptures along with Confucian sages and the Buddha are interconnected. He also said: I say that one can read this sutra and then know that the Six Classics, the Analects and the Mencius are nothing but Chan, and that Yao 尧, Shun, [the Duke of] Zhou 周公, and Confucius were Buddhas. One can break through the false view of sinking into emptiness, and correct the erroneous mind that clings to appearances. Superiors can be without the disasters of Xiao Yan 萧衍, while inferiors can be without the confusions of Wang Jin 王 缙; is this not of great benefit to the standing of our Confucius? (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 16)

He believed that the essence of the Flower Garland Sutra lay in its making dharma and inherent nature compatible with no gaps, and this could not only break through sinking into emptiness and adhering to quietude at the level of original substance, but also break through clinging to affairs and appearances at the level of effort, and thereby attain a state of mutual fusion without obstruction between principle and affairs. This is the unified vision of studying the lower in order to penetrate the higher and inherent nature and the dao of Heaven as identical to the everyday usages of the common people found in the Confucian classics. Hence Buddhism

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can be of assistance to Confucius’ learning rather than harming it. He thought of himself as not like Sima Guang 司马光 of the Song Dynasty, who knew Buddhism yet did not speak of it for fear it would hinder Confucianism, but rather as directly speaking of and realising it, since Confucianism and Buddhism could assist and not harm one another. He opposed debating the rights and wrongs of Confucianism and Buddhism, raising their ramparts, and advocated not debating but preserving them both. He said: For scholars who have sincerely set their mind on the dao, I would suggest that the strengths and weakness of Confucianism and Buddhism can be set aside and not discussed, and that they instead turn back to their own mind and inherent nature. Once they attain their inherent nature, to call it Buddhist learning is acceptable, to call it the learning of Confucius and Mencius is acceptable, and to call it neither Buddhist learning nor the learning of Confucius and Mencius but rather its own single school of learning is also acceptable. (“Reply to Teacher Geng,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 16) There are many in the world who debate with Buddhists, mostly resisting its quiet extinguishing and void of non-being, or its destruction of forms and abandoning of human relations, thinking that these cannot serve the world under Heaven, the state, or the family. The dao is one and nothing more, yet by virtue of its being without thought and action we call it quietude, by virtue of its incapability of being seen or heard we call it void, by virtue of its being without desire we call it stillness, and by virtue of its knowledge encompassing the myriad things without excess we call it awareness. These are all the marvellous principles of Confucianism…. Hence rather than rejecting it, scholars would do better to simultaneously preserve it, to selectively take up its strengths and not step onto its faults. (“The Buddhist School” [Shijia 释家], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 36)

Here, Jiao Hong expressed a positive tolerance for Buddhism, as opposed to those worldly Confucians who merely quibbled over its signs or repeated millennium-old anti-Buddhist arguments, saying that Buddhists cast aside human relationships and could not serve the world under Heaven, the state, or the family. His focus was on academic learning, on the fact that, despite their differences in emphasis, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism all embodied the original substance of the cosmos, and he believed that the empty quietude, stillness and awareness that worldly Confucians rejected were all marvellous principles possessed by both Confucianism and Buddhism. This was one and the same spirit as Wang Yangming’s statement that “The dao is one and nothing more, yet the benevolent see it and say it is benevolence, the wise see it and say it is wisdom, and the reason why Buddhists are Buddhists and Daoists are Daoist is all this dao, so how could there be two?” (“Sent to Zou Qianzhi” [Ji Zou Qianzhi 寄邹谦之], Complete Works of Wang Yangming [Wang Yangming quanji 王阳明全集], Vol. 6). Furthermore, Jiao Hong believed that the introduction of Buddhism together with its growth and expansion in China both had profound social roots, as well as their necessity of existence. Rather than rejecting it, it would be better to simultaneously preserve it; rather than debating with it, it would be better to fuse it with Confucian thought, making it become an organic constitutive part of Chinese traditional thought, a nutrient for scholar-officials to cultivate themselves and their inherent natures and increase their academic abilities.

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Second, reading Buddhist texts can increase one’s understanding. Since Jiao Hong held that Confucianism and Buddhism were fundamental consistent in terms of principles of learning, he believed that reading Buddhist scriptures would not harm one’s understanding of Confucianism, but rather be of benefit to it. In his view, Confucianism and Buddhism were both forms of learning that sought inherent nature and endowment, except that the Confucian learning of Confucius and Mencius had been fragmented and shattered by commentators down through the dynasties, and its subtle intention had become obscure and unclear. Together with the farfetched interpretations of all kinds of vulgar and jumbled learning, this meant that the essence of inherent nature and endowment had been almost completely lost. Seen from this perspective, Buddhist works excluded jumbled learning and headed directly for inherent nature, endowment and the source of the mind, and could thus illuminate the Confucian learning of inherent nature and endowment. Hence there was nothing unacceptable in seeing Buddhism as an explanation of Confucianism, as he said: The learning of Confucius and Mencius was the learning of exhaustively expressing inherent nature and attaining endowment, and only their simplicity of mind and subtlety of precept was not thoroughly explicated. Scholars of the world also became fettered by commentaries and subcommentaries, trifling with mouths and ears, without being able to swiftly gain their meaning. That which is illuminated by the various sutras of the Buddhists is all their principle. If one is able to illuminate this principle, making it the compass of one’s inherent nature and endowment, then the various scriptures of the Buddhists are simply a further explication of the meaning of our Confucius and Mencius. (“Reply to Teacher Geng,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 12)

For example, the idea of “the mind as the Buddha” in Buddhist scriptures can be used to help understand the core precept of the Confucian Learning of the Mind. [Cheng] Hao’s recognising benevolence, Lu Jiuyuan’s 陆九渊 first establishing its greatness, and Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing all benefited from these words in Buddhist texts, to which their thought can also be traced back. Even filial piety and fraternal loyalty as well as [the ideal Confucian sage-kings] Yao and Shun can be seen in this way: Filial piety and fraternal loyalty as well as Yao and Shun originally did not constitute two doctrines with that of the mind as the Buddha. The human mind is one thing, and benevolence and innate moral knowing are all simply its names. This principle is contained in Confucian books, yet scholars have been confused by commentaries and subcommentaries, drowning and failing to attain their truth. Buddhists however point directly at the human mind, and are without the Confucians’ faults of fragmentation and intertwinement. … When Zhang Shangying 张商英 said: “I studied Buddhism and then knew Confucianism,” his meaning was similar to this. (“Reply to a Question from a Friend,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 12)

Zhang Shangying entered into Buddhism by reading the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (Weimo jing 维摩经), later discussed learning with the Chan masters Donglin Changzong 东林常总 and Doushuai Congyue 兜率从悦, and as his Buddhist learning progressed, so did his Confucian learning. He believed that only possessing the

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worldly dharma of Confucianism was insufficient, and that one should also have the world-renouncing dharma of Buddhism. Worldly dharma can govern the world, while world-renouncing dharma can govern the mind. In terms of remedying social problems, Confucian dharma can govern external symptoms, while Buddhist dharma can govern the core of the mind. Jiao Hong greatly admired Zhang Shangying’s view here, and said in his Mr. Jiao’s Brush Annals: “As soon as one understands Buddhist scriptures, one immediately realises the words of Confucius. Zhang Shangying’s statement ‘I studied Buddhism and then knew Confucianism’ was truly a sound view” (Further Brush Annals, Vol. 2). Or for example, later scholars’ held greatly divergent understandings of the meaning of Wang Yangming’s “being” (you 有) and non-being” (wu 无), and thus their explanations of his “four-sentence teaching” completely lost Yangming’s original meaning. However, the sentence “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” can in fact be interpreted according to the two so-called “concealing and manifesting” (zhebiao 遮表) methods of Buddhism. Using this method of explanation, Wang Yangming’s “the mind is inherent nature,” “innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle,” and “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” can be interconnected as one, without the slightest obstruction of meaning. Mr. Jiao’s Brush Annals records: “Someone asked: ‘The tathāgatagarbha [rulai zang 如来藏; i.e. the “womb of the Buddha”] possesses all kinds of merits and virtues, yet if we now merely detach from all appearances, how can we fulfil the dharma-body of the Buddha?’ He said: ‘In the offered teaching, there is both manifestation and concealment. Detaching from all appearances is concealment, while possessing all kinds of merits and virtues is manifestation, yet in fact manifestation is within concealment” (Further Brush Annals, Vol. 2). “Neither good nor bad” is concealment, and this is what is called “detaching from all appearances”; the appearance of the highest good of innate moral knowing is manifestation, and this is what is called “the tathāgatagarbha possessing all kinds of merits and virtues”; “manifestation being within concealment” means a unity of being and non-being. “Neither good nor bad” and “the highest good is without badness” are one and yet two, two and yet one. The Buddhist method of concealment and manifestation is in fact of assistance in understanding Wang Yangming’s theory of being and non-being. “Studying Buddhism and then knowing Confucianism” is truly not an empty phrase. Or for example, Jiao Hong very much admired Su Shi 苏轼, thinking that he was a genius unmatched among his [Song Dynasty] contemporaries. However, he pointed out that the transcendent nature of his understanding and the ethereal numinosity of his manner of writing owed much to his exertions in reading Buddhist scriptures. Su Shi’s understanding of the Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易) in particular was permeated with Buddhist principles. Jiao Hong said: Su Zizhan 苏子瞻 [i.e. Su Shi] was able to write from a young age, and regarded himself as a Jia Yi 贾谊 or Lu Zhi 陆贽. From his travels with the military man Wang Peng 王彭, he had already obtained the sayings of India [Zhuqian 竺乾; i.e. Buddhism] and liked them, and, his mind becoming concentrated and his spirit released, he realised the ancestral precept of non-thought and non-action, sighing passionately: “The writings of the Twelve

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Divisions of the Tripiṭaka are all the principles of the Changes.” (“Preface for a Carving of the Collected Works of the Venerable Mr. Su the Elder” [Ke Su zhanggong ji xu 刻苏长公 集序], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 46)

Here he clearly stated that Su Shi’s realisation and understanding of the principles of the Changes was obtained from Buddhist principles. Third, defending Buddhism. Jiao Hong regarded Buddhism as an explanation of the meaning of Confucianism, and believed that one could “study Buddhism and then know Confucianism,” seeing Buddhism as an auxiliary wing of Confucianism. Therefore, he opposed previous Confucians’ criticisms of Buddhism that arose from their intention to defend their dao, and did his utmost to explain the points of equivalence between Buddhism and Confucianism. He once criticised Han Yu 韩愈 and Ouyang Xiu’s 欧阳修 rejections of Buddhism: “The two gentlemen originally obtained nothing of Confucian principles, their repudiations of Buddhism and Daoism were simply made based on their admiration for Mencius’ attacks on Yang [Zhu] 杨朱 and Mo[zi] 墨子, and they were not people with their feet on the ground. One ought to have nothing to do with them” (“Questions and Answers from Chongzheng Hall” [Chongzheng tang wenda 崇正堂问答], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 47). He proposed that Han Yu’s rejection of Buddhism was entirely superficial, and simply amounted to saying that Buddhism was a teaching of the barbarians, that followers of Buddhism did not speak of the laws of the former kings of Confucianism, that they did not wear Confucian clothes, that they did not know of the righteousness of ruler and minister or the kindness of father and son, etc., which were all simply collections of earlier attacks on Buddhism. Han Yu’s purpose in rejecting Buddhism was to reestablish the orthodox status of Confucianism. However, the core precepts of Confucianism that Han Yu spoke of, such as benevolence, righteousness, dao, virtue, etc., were simply crude external aspects; if one enters into its fine subtleties, it is interconnected with the Buddhism that he forcefully rejected. For example, Han Yu had dealings with the monk Dadian 大颠, and attained a spiritual plane in which he was without obstruction and able to externalise the physical body, which was precisely the realisation to be attained through studying Buddhism, as well as the result sought by Confucian cultivation. This precisely demonstrates the benefit of studying Buddhism: studying Buddhism can make one’s mind and inherent nature refined and subtle, and one can attain that which Confucian cultivation cannot attain. Although Ouyang Xiu was most stubborn and unyielding, in his later years he saw Fu Bi 富弼 obtain the dharma at Jingci 净慈 Temple, and did not feel his mind was moved, but felt slightly closer to and admiring of the learning of Huayan 华严 [Buddhism]. It can be seen that Ouyang Xiu was equally unable to cling to his view. In fact, neither of the two men had gained a deep understanding of Confucianism, they did not give detailed consideration to the fine and subtle points of mind and inherent nature, and they were especially separated from the precept of interconnecting Confucianism and Buddhism. In their rejection of Buddhism, they simply admired Mencius’ fame for distancing himself from Yang and Mo, placing themselves in a narrow and obstinate position. Jiao Hong believed that those of his time who repudiated

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Buddhism mostly lacked a thorough understanding of Buddhist principles, while those who flattered Buddhism simply admired its external traces, and neither of them could truly understand Buddhism. Jiao Hong also refuted Cheng Hao’s attacks on Buddhism. Cheng Hao was a figure who Jiao Hong very much admired, but nonetheless, he attacked his criticisms of Buddhism vehemently. He once collected together all of Cheng Hao’s repudiations of Buddhism and refuted them one by one, calling the resultant work “Reply to a Friend’s Questions Concerning the Buddhists” (Da youren wen Shishi 答友人问释氏). Jiao Hong’s refutations concentrated on four aspects: First, the emptiness of Buddhism and the principle of Confucianism. Cheng Hao criticised Buddhism for “the Buddhists’ direct desire to completely abolish all our the laws of our endowed nature,” meaning that since Buddhism holds that everything is empty, this means that the inherent nature and principle spoken of by Confucianism are also annihilated; the flourishing of Buddhism means that the cardinal guides and constant virtues of Confucian ethics must be ruined. Refuting this, Jiao Hong said that to believe that Buddhism only speaks of emptiness and not of being is a twisting of Buddhism. Cheng Hao’s statement is precisely what Buddhists refute as “the nihilistic views of the Two Vehicles [i.e. Buddhists who do not accept the Mahāyāna sutras].” Buddhists hold that true emptiness is wondrous being (miaoyou 妙有), and thus do not abolish the cardinal guides and constant virtues of Confucian ethics. Buddhists hold that mountains, rivers and the great Earth itself are all created by the mind, yet do not abolish their wondrous being. If one falls into one side of being and non-being, this is an obstruction of the mind. Cheng Hao’s “feeling following along with the myriad worlds and being without feeling” is precisely the true spirit of Buddhism. Feeling following along with the myriad worlds is being, while being unmoved in one’s mind is non-being. The unity of being and non-being is precisely the wondrous truth of Buddhism. Second, whether or not renunciation of life and death is the self-interested mind. Cheng Hao pointed out that the purpose of Buddhism is to require people to renounce life and death, and is thus a “selfish and self-interested mind.” Life and death cannot be renounced, but only followed along with. Jiao Hong refuted this, saying that when Buddhists speak of renouncing life and death, this is pity for worldly people’s clinging to the site of wealth and status, and leading people into the righteousness of dao; since worldly people cling to life, it teaches them to renounce life and death. However, if one truly accomplishes Buddha-wisdom, one understands that people originally have no death. The perfection of Buddhist learning lies in a kind of breadth of mind, a kind of spiritual plane. This kind of spiritual plane signifies the perfection of human life and the purity of the mind; whether or not one transcends life and death is another matter. Buddhism does not use life and death to entrap people. Here, Buddhism as understood by Jiao Hong already took refining the mind and inherent nature as its highest purpose, and was mainly not a religion, but rather a kind of learning and cultivation. He already saw purely religious aspects such as the eternal cycle of life and death, this life and the next life, and the Buddha-kingdom or pure land as vulgar parts of Buddhism that should be cast aside and not spoken of.

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Third, spiritual cultivation and practical tasks. Cheng Hao believed that Buddhist learning only spoke of the cultivation of the individual’s innermost mind, and had nothing to do with practical tasks, hence Buddhism only had “respect to straighten the internal” but not “righteousness to regulate the external”; it only had “fathoming spirit and knowing transformation” but not “developing things and accomplishing tasks.” Jiao Hong believed that this was a misunderstanding of Buddhism, since Buddhist learning in fact had no internal or external, so fathoming spirit and knowing transformation were one with developing things and accomplishing tasks, and not two. He pointed out that when Cheng Hao saw the monks of a temple entering and leaving with ritual propriety, he said, “The grand dignity of the Three Dynasties is indeed exhaustively present in this”; he also said that the sprinkling water, sweeping the floor, and responding to others of Confucianism were tacitly in accord with Buddhism. These all state that Buddhists do indeed develop things and accomplish tasks, and it is simply that the things and tasks that Buddhism develops and accomplishes differ from those of Confucians. The Buddhist “awareness has no internal or external” is consistent with the Confucian “substance and function have one source,” and there is no need to say that Buddhism divides internal and external or principle and affairs. Fourth, illuminating the mind and perceiving inherent nature or preserving the mind and fostering inherent nature. Cheng Hao believed that Buddhism only included illuminating the mind and perceiving inherent nature, and did not include preserving the mind and fostering inherent nature. This point was especially aimed at the sudden enlightenment of Chan Buddhism. Jiao Hong believed that the illuminating the mind and perceiving inherent nature of the Buddhists was the same as Mencius’ exhaustively expressing the mind and knowing inherent nature. If one is truly able to know inherent nature and know Heaven, there is no need for further preserving and fostering. Cheng Hao once said, “When one illuminates exhaustively, the dregs all become integrated and transformed.” Since they are “integrated and transformed,” there is no need for further preserving and fostering, and sudden enlightenment is already preserving and fostering. If one insists on speaking of preserving and fostering, the Buddhist “If there is a clouding in one’s eyes, empty splendour descends in confusion” contains the meaning of maintaining the substance of the mind and not allowing worthless chaff to blind one’s eyes. Here, Jiao Hong clearly included meanings from Chan Buddhism, emphasising sudden enlightenment rather than gradual cultivation, and regarding enlightenment as fostering, without the need for a separate effort to foster the mind. As for examples of external systems of clothing, rules and ceremonies such as “shaving one’s hair and draping oneself in black,” Jiao Hong believed there was no need to rebut them. In general, he believed that none of Cheng Hao’s repudiations of Buddhism truly understood Buddhism: “Bochun 伯淳 [i.e. Cheng Hao] did not probe into the Buddhist vehicle, and hence in his attacking words he tried hastily to figure it out but did not attain the right target. This is like listening to a lawsuit in which neither party is present, and deciding subjectively on who is right and wrong; if before the evidence of theft has appeared, one fabricates the details of the case, who would be convinced? As a scholar or teacher, one ought to redress its case,

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regarding it as being hastily passed down the ages, and not simply follow the customary opinions that one hears” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 835). From the above arguments Jiao Hong gave for the interconnection of Confucianism and Buddhism, his thought contained extremely strong Buddhist elements. This is consistent with the general atmosphere of Confucian-Buddhist interconnection in the intellectual world of the late Ming Dynasty. In the late Ming Dynasty, following the establishment and development of Yangming Learning, the latter’s absorption and fusion of Buddhism and Daoism was emulated by scholars and gradually became a trend. Scholars mostly looked to Buddhist principles when seeking theoretical nourishment, and later Taizhou Learning was the first to be affected by this. For scholars within the Taizhou School (such as Luo Rufang, Geng Dingxiang, and Jiao Hong), Buddhist learning became a powerful benefit that enabled their philosophical thought to attain its profundity and refined subtlety. For practitioners (such as He Xinyin and Li Zhuowu 李卓吾 [i.e. Li Zhi]), it became a tool for them to break through the barrier of the teaching of names [i.e. the Confucian ethical code] and “stir up the wildness of Chan.”

3 Daoism: Using Daoism to Supplement Confucianism As well as taking pleasure in Buddhist texts and treating them as aids to Confucianism, Jiao Hong also dipped into Daoist works. He wrote both Wings to the Laozi and Wings to the Zhuangzi to expound Lao-Zhuang thought, his purpose being to supplement Confucianism. As with his treatment of Buddhism, from Daoism, Jiao Hong mostly absorbed its doctrines of inherent nature and endowment, while setting aside and ignoring its alchemical cultivation, dietary regimens, talismanic registers, and furnace and crucible techniques. There is a specific section discussing Daoism in the Collected Works of Danyuan, in which he said: Among the Nine Schools [of Thought], only Daoism had many branches. Formerly, Huang-Lao 黄老 [i.e. the Yellow Emperor and Laozi] and Zhuang-Lie 庄列 [i.e. Zhuangzi and Liezi] spoke of tranquility and non-action, while saying nothing of alchemical cultivation or dietary regimens. Chi Songzi 赤松子 and Wei Boyang 魏伯阳 spoke of alchemical cultivation but not of tranquility, Lu Sheng 卢生 and Li Shaojun 李少君 spoke of dietary regimens but not of alchemical cultivation, Zhang Daoling 张道陵 and Kou Qianzhi 寇谦之 spoke of talismanic registers but not of alchemical cultivation or dietary regimens, and Du Guangting 杜光庭 down to the yellow hatted priests of recent times only spoke of classic scriptures and specialised teachings. Thus not only was the objective of tranquility silent and thus unheard, but the texts of alchemical cultivation and dietary regimens have also never been skimmed and asked about. Yet all these honored Laozi in order to make use of the school of the Daoists in being passed down, is it not absurd? The dao takes depth as its root, restraint as its discipline, and the polarity of the void and the sincerity of stillness as its destination, hence it was said that the void is the constancy of the dao, and accordance the cardinal guide of the ruler. This was the ancient sages’ technique of making use of what is important and holding to centrality, facing south in non-action. Does this have anything at all to do with longevity? (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 26)

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In Jiao Hong’s view, one must distinguish Daoism as a philosophy (daojia 道家) and Daoism as a religion (daojiao 道教). Religious Daoism traces its ancestry back to Laozi, Zhuangzi and Liezi, and the central theoretical precept of philosophical Daoism was tranquility and non-action, while as for aspects that religious Daoism especially emphasised such as alchemical cultivation and dietary regimens, the early Daoist philosophers had heard nothing of these. The various sects of alchemical cultivation and talismanic registers in religious Daoism all went against the core precept of early philosophical Daoism, as when Du Guangting redacted religious Daoist historical records and cast aside Laozi and Zhuangzi’s precept of tranquility and non-action. What Jiao Hong emphasised was the theory of mind and inherent nature of the philosophical Daoists Laozi, Zhuangzi and Liezi, their perfection of the polarity of the void and the sincerity of stillness, and how their theories were expressed as a series of arguments concerning the dao and virtue. Longevity with excellent sensory abilities was a secondary matter within this, and the physical body becoming immortal was something Laozi and Zhuangzi simply did not speak of. Jiao Hong saw Daoist philosophical theory as “the technique of facing south for rulers.” Precisely because of this, it could supplement Confucianism, and assist it in accomplishing education through transformation. He particularly disdained those aspects within religious Daoism that went beyond theories of inherent nature and endowment. He once wrote a preference for Recorded Sayings of Panshan (Panshan yulu 盘山语录), in which he said: I liked this book in my youth, since with no need for lead and mercury or dragons and tigers [i.e. water and fire in alchemy], adding extra items and designations, partaking in the transmutation of gold or driving of women, or falling into heterodoxies, it takes diligent governance of the mind and cultivation of inherent nature as its task. This is the orthodox sect of the Seven Realised Ones. Those masters of method who speak of longevity all too frequently offer farfetched interpretations that go beyond inherent nature and endowment, not knowing that cultivating inherent nature is the means for longevity; worldly Confucians speak of inherent nature and endowment yet denounce longevity, not knowing that those who cultivate their inherent nature become one with the dao of Heaven and thus do not die. (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 16)

Recorded Sayings of Panshan is a Daoist text, and Jiao Hong liked it in his youth. However, that which he likes was the theory in inherent nature and endowment in the work. He believed that the theory of inherent nature and endowment was the essence of Quanzhen 全真 Daoism, while methods such as alchemical elixirs and sexual techniques were heterodoxies that should all be rejected. He shared with Wang Yangming the idea that “cultivating the mind is the means to cultivate the body.” Wang Yangming once replied to a student who asked about the Daoist original qi 气, original spirit, and original essence, and claimed that the three are simply one: its flowing operation is qi, its concentration is essence, and its wondrous functioning is spirit. To cultivate the mind is thus to cultivate the essence, qi, and spirit. Jiao Hong was in agreement with Wang Yangming on this point, believing that the cultivating life spoken of by Confucians lay in cultivating inherent nature and cultivating the mind; when one cultivates inherent nature and the mind, one unites with the dao of Heaven and spontaneously gains longevity.

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In terms of the theory of inherent nature and endowment, Jiao Hong emphasised the use of the categories of “being” and “non-being” to supplement Confucianism. This point was prominently expressed in his exposition of Laozi’s core precept. In the preface to his Wings to the Laozi, Jiao Hong said: Laozi did not speak of the non-being of non-being, but rather illuminated the non-being of being. The non-being of non-being extinguishes being in order to pursue non-being, and its name is corner-cutting; the non-being of being uses being to demonstrate non-being, and its learning is returning to the root. If things each return to their root, then although they act together in all their multiplicity, they can never attain the name of being; this it the apex of extending the void and holding to stillness. Since scholars know implements but not the dao, the Changes made it clear that implements [qi 器] are the dao; since they perceive appearances but do not perceive emptiness, Buddhism made it clear that appearances are emptiness; since they attain being but do not attain non-being, Laozi said that being is non-being. If one sincerely knows that being is non-being, then one acts through non-action and serves through non-serving, yet the raising of action and service is insufficient to obstruct it; how then could this amount to abandoning being? (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 14)

Down through the dynasties there have been all kinds of explanations of the central principle of the Laozi text. For example, Tang Wangzhen 唐王真 regarded the Laozi as a military text. Jiao Hong’s view was that the Laozi is “a text that illuminates the dao.” The core precept of the Laozi is maintaining softness and valuing the female, being tender and modest, and non-action. However, non-action should be a unity of being and non-being, which is the non-being of being and the being of non-being. The non-being of being is “using being to demonstrate non-being,” which is equivalent to the “appearance is emptiness” spoken of by Buddhism, and not that one should extinguish appearances to speak of emptiness, which is what Buddhism denounced as annihilation, and Zhuangzi denounced as corner-cutting [see Zhuangzi, “The World Under Heaven” (Tianxia 天下)]. In the non-being of being, its core precept is “returning to the root” (guigen 归根), which is what Confucianism called “things being entrusted to things”; “things being entrusted to things” means the myriad things all moving with the necessity of their original inherent natures without any perversity. This is “spontaneity and non-action,” non-action and non-serving, yet neither action nor service obstruct its being. In this way, the benevolence, righteousness, sagehood, and wisdom that Zhuangzi vehemently attacked need not by abandoned. Jiao Hong’s understanding here is in fact a development of [Wei-Jin period Zhuangzi commentator] Guo Xiang’s 郭象 theory of “using the non-mind to follow along with being” and “being and yet non-being” in which being and non-being were unified. Furthermore, Jiao Hong here viewed as equivalent the idea of implements as dao from the Changes [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)], the Buddhist idea of appearance as emptiness, and Laozi’s idea of being as non-being, from which can again be seen his objective of fusing Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. The Changes is the metaphysics of Confucianism, in which dao is its original substance, and implements are its phenomena, as in “That which is above form [i.e. metaphysical] is called dao, while that which is below form is called implements.” Buddhists believed that the essence

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of the myriad things is emptiness, such that “Whatever has emerged dependently must be explained as empty” [see Nāgārjuna’s 龙树 Treatise on the Middle Way (Zhonglun 中论), 24:18], yet the original substance of emptiness and the phenomena of being are perfectly fused with no obstruction. Laozi’s dao (non-being) is original substance and regards things (being) as phenomena, hence dao is prior to phenomena in logical terms, and thus more fundamental than phenomena, so he said “being is produced from non-being” [see Laozi, Ch. 40]. However, original substance and phenomena, being and non-being, are perfectly fused with no obstruction. Here, Jiao Hong believed that, in terms of the relation between original substance and phenomena, the doctrines of the three schools of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism are ultimately consistent. Hence the Confucian benevolence, righteousness, sagehood and wisdom need not be abandoned, and the Buddhist and Daoist renunciation of the world need not leave behind the world in independence, since participating in the world is renouncing the world, and benevolence, righteousness, sagehood and wisdom are no obstacle to tranquility and non-action. On this point, Jiao Hong borrowed from Laozi and Zhuangzi and formed a unique understanding of Confucian metaphysics, one first enters into a spiritual plane of transcendence, attaining a “non-being” that externally transcends images and is absolutely beyond signification, and then seeks its tacit accordance with “being.” The benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music that are understood on the basis of this transcendent spiritual plane are no longer as shallow as those understood by worldly Confucians. He once said: Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music are the dao, yet the benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music spoken of by worldly Confucians are simply traces (ji 迹). If one clings to its traces and does not know that by which the traces arise, how can the dao become illuminated? Hence one has no choice but to reject and abandon them. To make people know the dao, one establishes that which is prior to images and transcends signification, yet for that which one grasps in order to act, it is as if one can go on to seek it in being. If one seeks it and being accords, then one knows that images are all real, signs are all principle, and benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music also need not be cut off and abandoned. (“Seven Points from Reading the Zhuangzi” [Du Zhuangzi qize 读庄子七则], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 22)

If one first transcends signification and established that which is prior to images, illuminating the original substance of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music, and then interconnects original substance and phenomena, making original substance and phenomena both real and fused without duality, then the bias of emphasising “non-being” and regarding phenomena as false and that of emphasising being and clinging to it without transformation, can be reconciled. Jiao Hong believed that although the Daoist spirit lay in non-being, and this should not be denied, the Daoist non-being could precisely supplement the Confucian being. This kind of supplementation was not that of later worldly Confucians who saw where it was useful and drew from it, but was one that was deliberately made by Daoists such as Laozi and Zhuangzi who saw the inadequacies of later Confucian learning. In the preface to his Wings to the Zhuangzi, he said:

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It was not that Confucius and Mencius did not speak of non-being, but that their non-being was implicit in being. Confucius and Mencius tentatively followed what the world understood and led it along, what was called studying the lower to penetrate the higher [see Analects, 14.35]. As for Laozi and Zhuangzi, at the time in which they lived, they saw how scholars of Confucius and Mencius were limited to being and meagre in their penetration, and thought that one must first comprehend non-being before one can make good use of the being of Confucius and Mencius. Hence they took up what was brief and detailed it, as if in order to assist with what Confucius and Mencius did not touch upon. (Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 14)

That is to say, being and non-being are unified, and non-being is implicit in being; this was a truth perceived by Confucius and Mencius as well as Laozi and Zhuangzi. However, the approaches of the two schools were different. Confucius and Mencius studied the lower to penetrate the higher and led people at the level of clear and comprehensible “being,” passing to non-being through being. Worldly Confucians were limited to being, only saw the study of the lower, and were unable to penetrate the higher. Seeing this, Laozi and Zhuangzi thought that comprehending non-being could help in understanding being, and thus highlighted the aspect of “non-being.” Laozi and Zhuangzi were in fact helping Confucius and Mencius. Jiao Hong’s view here saw Confucius, Mencius, Laozi and Zhuangzi as all fundamentally consistent, except that their approaches were different, and thus each had their own particular emphasis. This idea is even more evident in the following passage: Laozi and Zhuangzi spoke grandly of the principle of the void of non-being, not in order to abolish worldly teachings, but because the void of non-being is that by which worldly teachings are established. They knew that beings and things cannot regard things as things, and saw that non-being is sufficient to manage being, and thus “established it on the constant non-being of being.” Without this, the sages’ enterprise would attempt to accomplish change and transformation and carry out the tasks of ghosts and spirits, yet demand a clinging and hurried heart; how could this be possible? Those who drive being must partake of non-being. (“Seven Points from Reading the Zhuangzi,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 22)

Here, Jiao Hong used the theory of [Wei-Jin period Laozi and Book of Changes commentator] Wang Bi 王弼 to explain the supplementary relation of Confucius and Mencius with Laozi and Zhuangzi: the multitude cannot govern the multitude, so that which governs the multitude must be the most solitary; activity cannot regulate activity, so that which regulates the activity of the world under Heaven must be the constant One [see Wang Bi, Commentary to the Book of Changes (Zhouyi zhu 周易注), “Illuminating the Judgments” (Mingtuan 明彖)]. Hence “beings and things cannot regard things as things,” and “non-being is sufficient to manage being.” The Confucian sage has a great responsibility on his shoulders, and must have a mind of tranquility and non-action in order to accomplish this, and hence he must partake of non-being to support being. This is sufficient to demonstrate that Laozi and Zhuangzi can supplement Confucius and Mencius, that Laozi and Zhuangzi were assistants of Confucius and Mencius and not opponents. Jiao Hong pointed out that, on this point, [Han Dynasty historian] Sima Qian’s 司

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马迁 breadth of vision was no match for that of Su Shi, since he said that Zhuangzi defamed Confucius, while Su Shi said that, in relation to Confucius, Zhuangzi was “in reality with him but in writing not with him,” criticising him in words but praising him in reality. Worldly Confucians knew nothing of this, and Su Shi alone had this vision, so his views “attained the core of Confucius and Mencius.” Worldly Confucians clung to the traces of Confucius and Mencius, while what Zhuangzi discussed was Confucius’ essential meaning, hence “among those who respected Confucius, there were none who matched Zhuangzi.” From the above analysis, Jiao Hong’s attitude toward philosophical and religious Daoism was the same as his attitude toward Buddhism, rejecting the parts that belonged to religion, and absorbing its theoretical essence. These nutrients of Daoist thought were the same as those of Buddhist thought, and were an indispensable part of his learning and cultivation. Yet it was precisely because he included Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism that his thought was able to present such a vast and expansive ambiance. His attitude in fusing the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism reflected the trend toward fusing the three teachings in the late Ming Dynasty. In this respect, he was not a defender of Confucianism in the usual sense, but rather a more ordinary, comprehensive and non-partisan expounder and developer of Confucian learning.

4 A Metaphysical Explanation of Ritual Propriety Jiao Hong’s characteristic of fusing the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism and including the classics and histories led his thought to present an impartial and unbiased moderate hue. Yet apart from this, he also wished to warn against the fault of wildness and self-indulgence in later strands of Wang Learning, advocated standards and institutions, and hence provided a unique exposition of “ritual propriety.” His central philosophical precept of “knowing inherent nature” was thus at the same time “illuminating ritual propriety.” “Ritual propriety” (li 礼) originally meant ceremony, protocol and external expressions of status in the social hierarchy. The Confucian text Record of Ritual (Liji 礼记) contains explanations and descriptions of various forms of ritual, such as capping [i.e. coming of age] ceremonies, marriages, funerals, and sacrifices. Jiao Hong gave a new survey of “ritual propriety” from a metaphysical height, explaining it as the quality of regularity and purposivity of the cosmos and the human mind. He said: Although our responses to affairs are diverse and confused, that which acts as their pivot is indeed one single thing. The so-called experiencing at any time (suishi tiyan 随时体验) simply refers to recognising this one single thing amidst the diversity and confusion. If one attains this in setting out, it is like a horse having a bridle, such that even if it roams for a thousand miles, it all accords with one’s intentions. This is what Master Yan [Hui] 颜回 called ritual propriety. Master Yan’s effort was only to restore ritual propriety. If one can restrain oneself with ritual propriety, then one’s sight, hearing, speech, and movements will

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all be orderly and in accord with the dao, so what complex or toilsome thoughts would there be? (“Reply to Chen Jinghu” [Da Chen Jinghu 答陈景湖], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 12)

Here, “ritual propriety” is explained as “principle.” In Jiao Hong’s view, ritual propriety is the regularity and order expressed in the functioning of things and affairs. In the great transformation and flowing operation of the cosmos, each of the myriad things makes the most of its inherent laws yet they are not disorderly, which shows that the operative movement of the cosmos has a regularity and order governing it from within. This kind of governor (zhuzai 主宰) does not have an artificial quality, and is not the arrangement of a Creator, but is automatic and inevitable. This kind of automaticity and inevitability is also the principle why things are as they are as well as the rule for how things should be, which governs the operative movement of the myriad things. Hence “ritual propriety” is “principle,” except that the emphasis in “ritual propriety” falls on the meanings of order and rhythm, while the emphasis in “principle” falls on the meanings of foundation and essence. The core of the learning of Confucius and Mencius lies in restoring ritual propriety, and those who experience, experience this; those who follow, follow this. For Jiao Hong here, ritual propriety is not an external ceremonial protocol, but rather the original substance of the human mind. He said: Ritual propriety is substance, the regularity of Heaven. This ritual propriety can see and hear, speak and move, be filial and loyal, value the worthy, serve the ruler, and make friends; it can act as Yao and Shun, interconnect Heaven and Earth, and bring up the myriad things. It is sufficient and integrated in all people. When people speak of becoming one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, their substance is like this of itself, and not forced to become one with them. The learning of Confucius and Mencius is just to clearly recognise ritual propriety as a substance. Once one recognises this clearly, then true ritual propriety is present in oneself, and whenever anything against ritual propriety appears, it spontaneously finds nowhere that can accommodate it or become contaminated. (“Reply to a Question from a Friend,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 12)

For Jiao Hong here, since ritual propriety has the meaning of the rhythm and order inherently present in things and affairs, it is original substance or the regularity of Heaven. This original substance and regularity of Heaven is at the same time also people’s moral rationality, the foundation for people’s sight, hearing, speech, and movement, as well as their moral activities. Since it is moral rationality and original substance, everyone possesses it. At the same time, it is a kind a spiritual plane of one substance with a myriad diversities, in which the myriad things are unified as one while each possesses its own inherent nature, “great virtue as grand transformation, small virtue as rivers flowing” [see Centrality in the Ordinary]. This is also one and the same as “Sincerity is the dao of Heaven, while thinking of sincerity is the dao of humanity” from Centrality in the Ordinary. Since ritual propriety is original substance, Jiao Hong believed that ritual propriety penetrates throughout everything. The three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism all include ritual propriety. Ritual propriety in Confucianism is not a constraint on cultivating morality, but an assistant to it. This is the same

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principle as Buddhism’s view that discipline can produce stability, which produces wisdom. He said: The Buddhists having discipline is like Confucians having ritual propriety. Buddha used the Six Pāramitās [i.e. perfections] to instruct people, and Dhyāna [i.e. Chan] particularly picked out one. However, the ignorant desire to use the one to abolish the five, and thus their so-called one can be known. Why? Benevolence and righteousness are established through ritual propriety, and without ritual propriety, benevolence and righteousness are ruined; stability and wisdom are grasped through discipline, and without discipline, stability and wisdom are lost. (“Preface to a Confession Presented to the Adept Yu’an” [Zeng Yu’an shangren shuojie xu 赠愚庵上人说戒序], Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 17)

The discipline of Buddhism can produce stability and wisdom, while the ritual propriety of Confucianism can establish benevolence and righteousness. The wild and self-indulgent faction in later Yangming learning were Confucian scholars yet advocated unhindered Chan, despised morality, and abandon ritual propriety and law. Jiao Hong denounced this faction of people, saying: In recent times there are some who speak of unhindered Chan, and, knowing half an explanation, declare themselves thoroughly liberated. When it comes to establishing and comporting themselves, there is nothing worth noting, so what use is it when all is said and done? These are precisely petty people who cannot abstain from Chan. (“Questions and Answers from Gucheng,” Collected Works of Danyuan, Vol. 48)

In terms of the relation between breadth and simplicity, this faction of people only saw simplicity, and were unwilling to make the effort to “broaden their learning with culture” [see Analects, 6.27]; in terms of the relation between ritual propriety and the self, they did not understand the ontological meaning of ritual propriety, and despised it as external ceremonial protocol. Jiao Hong believed that “There is no dao outside of ritual propriety, and no ritual propriety outside of dao.” Laozi once said that when dao is lost there is virtue, when virtue is lost there is benevolence, and when benevolence is lost there is ritual propriety, but this was because he saw how worldly people clung to the external details of the ritual system and were ignorant of the reality of the great dao. If one can return to the dao, to reality, casting aside empty formalities, then ritual propriety as substance and the dao are originally one and the same. In terms of the relation between breadth or simplicity and ritual propriety, ritual propriety is the original substance and original simplicity of the cosmos and the human mind, yet this simplicity cannot be attained immediately, but must pass through breadth to become illuminated. Hence outside of the breadth of culture, there is no simplicity of ritual propriety. Jiao Hong believed that the sentence “honest and earnest in one’s reverence for ritual propriety” from Centrality in the Ordinary was able to best express the essence of Confucian ritual propriety. Honesty and earnestness is breadth; reverence for ritual propriety is simplicity. Honesty and earnestness is the myriad things each making the most of its inherent laws; reverence for ritual propriety is the particular highlighting of their governor and guiding thread. In terms of ontology, “honest and earnest in one’s reverence for ritual propriety” is a metaphysical summary and explanation of the

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sentence “That which is endowed by Heaven is what is called inherent nature, and expressing inherent nature is what is called the dao.” The book Record of Rites explains a multitude of rites, and is broad, honest, and earnest, while the chapter Centrality in the Ordinary, although it does not enumerate rites, expounds the metaphysics of ritual propriety, discusses inherent nature and dao, as well as “issuing forth and nourishing the myriad things, ascending to the height of Heaven,” and thereby attains the essence of the Record of Rites. The fine and subtle aspect of Confucianism is all found in the term “ritual propriety.” Jiao Hong even believed that the Six Classics of Confucianism did not go beyond the single term “ritual propriety,” and his statement that “Ritual propriety is substance, and since benevolence cannot be named, ritual propriety was borrowed to name it, as in the ‘Heavenly law’ of the Changes [see hexagram Qian 乾] and the ‘laws of things’ in the [Book of] Poetry [Shijing 诗经; see “Zheng Min” 烝民], which are all names” (Further Brush Annals, Vol. 1) also elevated ritual propriety to the height of the law and governor of the myriad things. In Jiao Hong’s metaphysical explanation of ritual propriety, has perspective was entirely new, and this was something seldom seen among Ming Dynasty Confucians. His explanation here was in accord with the core precepts of his philosophy as a whole. Reviewing Jiao Hong’s life, although his official career never met with glory, his academic learning had a significant influence of later Ming Dynasty thought. His academic learning ranged across Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, as well as the classics and histories, yet was able to fuse them. It can be said that, from within Taizhou Learning, he opened up a new path.

Chapter 20

Li Zhi’s Explanation of the Childlike Mind

Li Zhi is the strangest and most unique figure in the history of Ming Dynasty thought. His thought embodies the trend of the times among intellectuals living under the repression of traditional ideas, calling for a return to a true self and to give human nature back its freedom. His thought is filled with contradictions between new and old, ideal and actual, individual freedom and social restrictions, Confucianism and Buddhism, heroes and hermits, etc. His thought was a result of a further development against the background of late Ming Dynasty society of the Taizhou 泰州 learning originated by Wang Gen 王艮 as explicated and developed by Wang Bi 王襞 and Luo Rufang 罗汝芳, with its fundamental spirit of self-confidence and independence, relying on nothing, facing the life of the lower classes, and not talking hollowly about mind and inner nature. From a broader perspective, it offers a portrait of Chinese intellectuals yearning for a social atmosphere that would be more open, more liberal, and richer with individual spirit, demanding the breaking of social and cultural restrictions (mainly a vulgarised, bureaucratised Confucianism). Li Zhi 李贽 (1537–1602; originally named Lin Zaizhi 林载贽, zi Zhuowu 卓吾, hao Hongfu 宏甫) came from Jinjiang 晋江, Quanzhou 泉州 in Fujian province. Since Quanzhou was the place of residence of Chan Buddhist Master Wenling 温 陵, he also gave himself the hao Layman Wenling 温陵居士. He was of Hui 回 ethnicity. At the age of 26 he passed the examination in his province and was awarded a teaching position at Gongcheng 共城 in Henan province, later serving in positions including court scholar 博士 at the Imperial College 国子 in Nanjing, official of miscellaneous affairs 司务 in the Ministry of Personnel 吏部, and chancellor 主事 in the Ministry of Punishments 刑部. When he was 51 he took up a post as a prefect 知府 at Yao’an 姚安 in Yunnan province, but resigned three years later and went to stay with Geng Dingli 耿定理 at Huang’an 黄安 in Hubei province. After Geng died, he moved to live in the Cloister of the Flourishing Buddha 芝佛院 next to Dragon Pool Lake 龙潭湖 in Macheng 麻城, where he read and wrote for almost 20 years. Later he travelled to Tongzhou 通州 to stay with Ma Jinglun 马经纶. Accused of the crime of “daring to advocate the dao of disorder, © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_20

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confusing the world and slandering the people,” he was seized and taken to Beijing, where he used a razor to slit his own throat in prison. His writings were voluminous, the most important among which are A Book to Keep (Hidden) (Cang shu 藏 书), Another Book to Keep (Hidden) (Xu cang shu 续藏书), A Book to Burn (Fen shu 焚书), Another Book to Burn (Xu fen shu 续焚书), and the Collected Works of Li Wenling (Li Wenling ji 李温陵集).1

1 The Childlike Mind: Returning to the True Self In his youth, Li Zhi received education from Wang Gen’s son Wang Bi, as well as studying with Luo Rufang, and hence he was deeply influenced by the Taizhou School. Indeed, his central idea, the “explanation of the childlike mind” (tongxin shuo 童心说), came from the Taizhou School. Based on Wang Gen’s tenet of spontaneity and the not-studying and not-worrying of Luo Rufang’s mind of a newborn babe, he vehemently criticised the phenomenon of people losing their true selves and occluding their pure original mind with the contaminating habits of acquired learning and hearing or seeing moral principles, saying: The childlike mind is the true mind. If one considers the childlike mind unacceptable, then he considers the true mind unacceptable. As for the childlike mind, free from all falsehood and entirely true, it is the original mind at the very beginning of one’s first thought. If one loses one’s childlike mind, one loses the true mind. Losing the true mind is losing one’s true self. A person who is not true will never regain that with which he began. (“Explanation of the Childlike Mind,” A Book to Burn, 98)

In Li Zhi’s view, a child is the beginning of a person, and the childlike mind is the beginning of the mind. Only children preserve the pure original source of the mind. The mind of the child is a purely true mind without any falsity or external contamination. To preserve the childlike mind is to preserve the original and true self; only with the original and true self can the words one speaks and the actions one carries out all be true. Once this original and true self can receive acquired principles, it is lost: From the beginning, sounds and sights enter through our eyes and ears, and when one allows these to dominate what is within oneself, then the childlike mind is lost. As one grows older, moral principles also enter by being seen or heard, and when one allows these to dominate what is within oneself, then the childlike mind is lost. With time, the moral principles that one hears and sees increase day by day, and what one knows and is conscious of thus also increases daily. Eventually, since one comes to believe it is a good thing [Trans.] See Fen shu—Xu fen shu 焚书
续焚书, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975 and Cang shu 藏书, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974. Translations from Li Zhi’s works are based where possible on Li Zhi, A Book to Burn and A Book to Keep (Hidden): Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Rivi Handler-Spitz, Pauline C. Lee and Haun Saussy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016) with some modifications. Page references are to the original Chinese texts as provided by Professor Zhang. 1

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to have an excellent reputation, one endeavours and desires to enhance this, and thereby one’s childlike mind is lost; since one believes that one should disdain those who have a bad reputation, one endeavours and desires to conceal this, and thereby one’s childlike mind is lost. The moral principles that one hears and sees all come from extensive study of books and learning of moral principles. (“Explanation of the Childlike Mind,” A Book to Burn, 98)

The moral principles one sees and hears, reading books and learning moral principles, these are all sufficient to cover and occlude the childlike mind. Here, Li Zhi is not calling for people to close their eyes and block their ears to avoid coming into contact with the external world, but rather attacking ugly phenomena such as the contemporary trend of false pretense, the attachment and fixity of vulgar and superficial Confucians on the moral principles found in classical works which they consumed without digesting, even using such writings to conceal their own faults, taking them as an excuse for base and mean acts. He attacked this kind of person, saying: The scholars of today regard office as more important than reputation, and reputation as more important than study. Using study to gain reputation, and reputation to gain office, they mutually increase in a circular manner, with only death finally more important than office. If one makes study insufficient to gain reputation, and reputation insufficient to gain office, then one will see casting off reputation as a shabby old broom. (“Reply to Jiao Ruohou” [Fu Jiao Ruohou 复焦弱侯], A Book to Burn, 47) The so-called sages of today are the same as the so-called recluses of today, their only difference is in being fortunate or unfortunate. Those who are fortunate and can write poetry call themselves recluses, while the unfortunate who cannot write poetry decline to be recluses and name themselves sages. Those who are fortunate and can expound on innate moral knowing call themselves sages, while the unfortunate who cannot expound on innate moral knowing gratefully decline to be sages and call themselves recluses. They repeat this cycle, deceiving the world and obtaining profit. They are named recluses but their minds are the same as merchants, their mouths speak of morality and virtue yet their ambition is in burglary. (“Another Letter to Jiao Ruohou” [You yu Jiao Ruohou 又与焦弱侯], A Book to Burn, 49)

He believed that Yao, Shun, Confucius and Yan [Hui] were true Confucians, but that after Yan, the [pre-Qin] masters never set their minds on hearing the dao, instead aiming for wealth, eminence, profit and success. The Confucians of the Han and Song dynasties offered strained interpretations and explanations of Confucius’ thoughts, their abuse reaching the point of “taking yang as learning the dao and yin as wealth and eminence, dressed in garb of Confucian elegance while acting like dogs and swine” (“How the Three Teachings Lead Back to Confucianism” [Sanjiao gui ru shuo 三教归儒说], Another Book to Burn, 76). With the flood of false dao-learning, the trend of the times degenerated to the point that there was no person and no affair that was not false, and not even one true person could be found: Once the childlike mind has been occluded, one loses the ability to put into words one’s innermost feelings, one’s efforts to participate in government prove unsuccessful, and one’s written compositions fail to express their meanings. When beauty does not emanate from

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within and brightness does not arise from true sincerity, any attempt to utter virtuous words will end in failure. Why is this so? Because the childlike mind has been occluded, and the moral principles one hears and sees that enter from outside become one’s mind. (“Explanation of the Childlike Mind,” A Book to Burn, 98)

Li Zhi proposed his explanation of the childlike mind to lead people back to the mind of a newborn babe, to the original, true self, in order to rectify the false trend of the times. Li Zhi also traced his criticism of false dao-learning back to the Six Classics, the Analects and the Mencius, on which this dao-learning was based, saying: As for the Six Classics, the Analects, and the Mencius, if they are not words of excessive reverence from official historians, they are phrases of bloated praise from loyal subjects. If not one of these, they are what misguided followers and simple-minded disciples wrote down of what they recalled their teacher had said. What they wrote had a beginning but was missing an ending, or the followers remembered the conclusion but forgot the introduction. These disciples simply put down in writing whatever they happened to see. Later scholars did not examine this, but simply declared that these words came from the mouths of sages and decided to view them as classics. Who knows whether even half these writings are in fact words from the mouths of sages? Even if these words are those of the sages, still, they were uttered in response to a specific situation, like prescribing a medication for a particular illness, applying a remedy based on the circumstances at the time in order to cure a particular simple-minded disciple or misguided follower. The medicine prescribed depends on the illness, and prescriptions are difficult to fix and grasp; how then can these writings be accepted as a perfect doctrine for a myriad generations? Thus the Six Classics, the Analects, and the Mencius have become nothing more than crib sheets for dao-learning, a fountainhead for phonies, and it is impossible to describe such writings as “words of the childlike mind.” (“Explanation of the Childlike Mind,” A Book to Burn, 98)

Li Zhi thought the classic texts such as the Six Classics, the Analects and the Mencius believed in by Confucians did not all come from the mouths of sages, and even if they did, they could not be taken as perfect doctrines for a myriad ages, could not be clung to as creeds to be acted by for a myriad ages. This was a very bold view. It is not that there were no essays criticising false dao-learning at the time, and there was even no lack of people attacking great Confucians such as Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐, the two Cheng brothers 二程, Zhang Zai 张载, and Zhu Xi 朱熹, such as Huang Wan 黄绾 in his Compilation Illuminating the Dao (Mingdao bian 明道编). Yet he was truly the only one who directly criticised the Six Classics, the Analects and the Mencius, judging them to be “crib sheets for dao-learning, a fountainhead for phonies.” From this point alone, one can already see Li Zhi’s great fearless spirit of disregard for the words of others and willingness to reveal the faults of the world. Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind was a result of the theoretical developments of the Taizhou School and [Wang] Longxi 王龙溪. Wang Gen of Taizhou advocated that the idea that the daily practices of the ordinary people are the dao. This idea had two meanings. Firstly, that the daily behaviour of the ordinary people in wearing clothes and eating food are the content of the dao, such that the dao is not deep and abstruse or empty and mysterious. Secondly, that the

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dao is not something to be gained through considerations, discussions, calculations, proposals and arrangements, but rather lies in that which occurs spontaneously and naturally. A child’s perfunctory movements in offering tea are the dao. Wang Bi continued his father’s thoughts on the daily behaviour of the ordinary people as the dao, especially that the dao is rooted in the natural, advocating the principle of “not violating with work,” thinking that “birds twitter and flowers fall, mountains stand erect and rivers flow, the hungry eat and the thirsty drink, hemp in the summer and fur in the winter, the ultimate dao does not go beyond this.” “The learning of the sages lies simply in not deceiving one’s Heavenly inherent nature, such that intelligent and bright scholars simply exercise their inherent nature and act, and this is not deceiving oneself. Exercising one’s inherent nature simply means exercising this illustrious virtue. The kindness of fathers and filial piety of sons, keen hearing and sharp vision, Heavenly innate moral knowing, cultivated without depending on thought or deliberation: this is illuminating one’s illustrious virtue. As soon as one enters thought and planning, falling into intention and necessity, there is no more truth, and this is called self-deception” (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 728). As for Luo Rufang, he raised up the principle of “a newborn babe’s innate moral knowing, without study or deliberation,” advocating following and according with the natural, and that a moment’s single thought also arises from the substance of the original mind; following this moment is making efforts, without rules, precepts, discussion or explanation, “untying the mooring rope and releasing the boat, following the wind and opening out one’s oars.” Li Zhi highly respected the members of the Taizhou School, having words of praise for all those from Wang Gen to Cheng Xueyan 程学颜. He said: Though the students of [Wang] Yangming王阳明 filled the world, only Xinzhai 心斋 [i.e. Wang Gen] was most heroic and spirited… After Xinzhai came Xu Boshi 徐波石 and Yan Shannong 颜山农. Shannong wore commoner’s clothes when he lectured and possessed a rare heroic vision, yet fell prey to slander; Boshi was a commissioner in the provincial administration where he mustered troops and supervised battles, yet died in the southwest. “Clouds follow the dragon while wind follows the tiger, each according to its own kind” (from the Book of Changes); how true this is! Xinzhai was a true hero, so his disciples were also heroic. After Boshi came Zhao Dazhou 赵大洲, and after Dazhou came Deng Huoqu 邓 豁渠. After Shannong came Luo Rufang and He Xinyin 何心隐. After Xinyin came Qian Huaisu 钱怀苏 and Cheng Houtai 程后台. Each generation was nobler than the last. It is said that “The great ocean is not home to dead bodies, and the Dragon Gate does not admit those with beaten heads”; is this not so? (“Three Essays for Two Monks of Huang’an” [Wei Huang’an er shangren san shou 为黄安二上人三首], A Book to Burn, 80)

Li Zhi’s respect for the members of the Taizhou School mainly concerned their spirit of direct-minded action without looking left or glancing right. However, he also noted the obstinacy, frivolity and love of reputation that arose from the Taizhou members’ exuberant spirit, as in his late letter to Jiao Hong 焦竤, in which he wrote: Xinzhai’s carved edition I must gratefully decline; please with good fortune find it enclosed. This fellow’s breadth of spirit and force truly overcomes others, thus over half his

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family’s sons and grandsons are like this, each also in his own way. Yet at the time this fellow’s breadth of spirit also had its deficiency, and hence he was unable to exhaust his master’s teachings, eventually undertaking to grasp them entirely through force. Since his views were too numerous, his habitual patterns gradually became fixed; what could even a true master or true friend do about this? … Master Jinxi 近溪 [i.e. Luo Rufang] originally held the great affairs of life and death in his thoughts, and later, although he liked to receive Confucian students, bringing in the Analects and Centrality in the Ordinary, these also simply accompanied his mouth in passing the days. Hence we can know that Confucians finally have no day of lucidity, base Confucians having no knowledge, vulgar Confucians no truth, doctrinaire Confucians stinking even before their deaths, and renowned Confucians dying for integrity, martyrs for reputation! The highest Confucians are those who have stopped being martyrs for a good name, and Master Xinzhai was one of these. As soon as one toils for a good name, entering into the web of reputation, it is undoubtedly hard to escape, and by this we can know that learning to be a Confucian is too be feared. (“Letter to Grand Scribe Jiao Yiyuan” [Yu Jiao Yiyuan taishi 与焦漪园太史], Another Book to Burn, 27–28)

Although this was written in Li Zhi’s later years, when he had cut off all thought of reputation or profit and took a position transcending all restrictions and restraints from which he denounced a generation of Confucians, yet it can also be seen that in relation to the Taizhou School, he most admired their breadth of spirit and bold courage, while their theories and manner of handling affairs did not necessarily accord with his mind. For example, when in the above quotation he criticised Wang Gen as having too many views and fixed patterns, or Luo Rufang as “originally holding the great affairs of life and death in his thoughts,” his meaning was that they were unable to thoroughly liberate themselves, still possessing the restraints of rules and precepts. The figure most admired by Li Zhi, for whom he never uttered even a veiled word of criticism, was Wang Longxi of Zhezhong 浙中. He was convinced by Longxi because “his every word concerned the way of liberation,” his learning was exuberant and forthright, and he directly penetrated to the original root of the substance of the mind. Li Zhi said: Among those in the world whose lectures and learning on the many texts are lucid, lively and penetrate to the marrow, from the ancient to the present, none can match Master Longxi. (“Reply to Jiao Ruohou,” A Book to Burn, 47) Everything recently carved by Master Wang Longxi is truly the great and complete work of a heroic man, who can be called the great master of the three teachings. It is a pity that those who lived at the same time merely valued their ears and disdained their eyes. (“Letter to Jiao Ruohou” [Yu Jiao Ruohou 与焦弱侯], Another Book to Burn, 25) After Wang Yangming, his learning became greatly illuminated, yet if it were not for the enlightening continuation of Master Longxi, it is very possible that no one would have perceived the wondrous aspects of Master Yangming. This is why those with a family background are more precious than capable worthies, and those with the dao more excellent than descendants who admire capability. (“Letter to Grand Scribe Jiao Yiyuan,” Another Book to Burn, 28)

After Wang Longxi passed away, Li Zhi wrote “In Memoriam, Master Wang Longxi” (Wang Longxi xiansheng gaowen 王龙溪先生告文) in which he praised

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him as “Leading Confucian for a generation of sages, dharma-eye of humanity and Heaven, he was like flawless piece of translucent jade, like gold refined a hundred times.” He believed that Wang Longxi’s greatest achievement was revealing the true import of Wang Yangming’s idea of innate moral knowing, leading scholars in directly probing the a priori substance of the mind, using the a priori originally rectified mind to regulate the feelings of inherent nature, and penetrating the metaphysical and the actual, thereby expressing his heroic spirit of boldness in self-belief, directly proceeding from within the spontaneous mind, establishing the ruling master, and becoming unmoved by extraneous feelings. As can be seen, Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind, with its characteristics of transcending worldly feelings and seeking the original and true self, was a theory formed in his own unadorned and solitary life under the influence of the spirit of seeking the a priori self, self-respect, and self-belief of Longxi and the Taizhou School. His inheritance from Longxi and the Taizhou School mainly concerned their boldness and spiritual direction, while rejecting the Heaven-endowed moral consciousness contained in their a priori substance of the mind. For example, the fundamental principle of Wang Longxi’s learning of the a priori rectified mind is found in setting aside the a posteriori and directly trusting in the flowing operation of a priori innate moral knowing, with effort as non-existence and original substance as existence. The original substance of innate moral knowing contains Heavenly principle, and this was the basic premise for Wang Yangming and the scholars of the Wang set. Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind involves cutting off the false and purifying the true, the original mind of the first thought. The childlike mind is pure and clean, with no moral principles or formal patterns within it, and therefore does not include innate moral consciousness. In Li Zhi’s view, the loss of the childlike mind is precisely the result of moral consciousness and moral rules occupying and thus harming the original mind. This is the greatest difference between Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind and Longxi and the Taizhou School’s theory of innate moral knowing. In Li Zhi’s concept of the childlike mind, his emphasis was on the single word “true” (zhen 真), an original and authentic state that has not yet been contaminated by worldly ideas, especially honor and profit, name and position, wealth and beauty, etc. When one has a true mind, one has the childlike mind. The childlike mind does not mean an absolute substance of mind that has not received any ideas or experience, since people’s substance of mind cannot possibly avoid receiving any moral principles or empirical information. In this sense, Li Zhi’s conception of the childlike mind is in fact not primarily a philosophical idea, but rather a literary one. Li Zhi did not think of the childlike mind he spoke of as like the “clear and quiet self-nature” of Buddhism, but rather as a real human mind. A real human mind is an interweaved ensemble of psychological contents including affect, intellect, will, etc., and even if the childlike mind lacks the content of Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing spoken of by Wang Longxi, it is nonetheless not a blank slate that can persist for long without being carved upon. Thus, people can only preserve a literary childlike mind, i.e. the true mind, and not a philosophical childlike mind, i.e. a blank slate.

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Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind was composed after he was affected by reading the preface to [Yuan Dynasty drama] the Record of the Western Chamber (Xixiang ji 西厢记) written by [an author referring to himself as] the Mountain Farmer of Dragon Cave (Longdong Shannong 龙洞山农). The childlike mind is a concept proposed by the Mountain Farmer of Dragon Cave: “It is acceptable that those who know may not say that I still possess a childlike mind.” Li Zhi commented on this, saying: All the most exquisite literature in the world flows directly from the childlike mind. As long as the childlike mind is constantly preserved, then moral principles will not operate, hearsay will not be established, no period will be without literature, no person will be without literary talent, and not a single pattern, genre, or word will fail to be literary. Why must poetry necessarily be that of the ancients or the Selections [of Refined Literature]? Why must prose necessarily be that of the pre-Qin period? [Writing] descended and became that of the Six Dynasties, which changed and became the regulated verse [of the Tang], which then changed again and became the fantastic tales [of the late Tang], which changed and became the theater scripts [of the early Yuan], which became mixed comedies [of the Yuan], which became The Record of the Western Chamber, which became The Water Margin, which have become the examination essays of today; all these are the exquisite literature of the past and present, which cannot be understood through discussions of trends of the times or precedents and influences. Thus, based on this I was affected by the spontaneous writing of those with childlike minds. Why speak of the Six Classics? Why speak of the Analects or the Mencius? (“Explanation of the Childlike Mind,” A Book to Burn, 99)

Here we can see that Li Zhi’s childlike mind is primarily a literary concept. In literature, Li Zhi emphasised natural spontaneity and true feeling; those who set out from and express the true feelings of inherent nature are those who set out from the childlike mind; regardless of what kind of literary form, as long as one sets out from the childlike mind, the result will be the most exquisite writing in the world. Even in the parallel prose of the Six Dynasties that was sneered at as “lightweight and frivolous in writing,” the eight-legged examination essays that merely emphasised form and were devoid of content, and the fantastic tales, theater scripts and mixed comedies that were dismissed by orthodox scholars of literature, as long as one set out from the childlike mind, nothing prevented the result from becoming the most exquisite writing in the world. He said: In their manifestation, sound and façade issue from the feelings of inherent nature, and arise through spontaneity; can they be reached through arranging or forcing? Thus if they spontaneously issue from the feelings of inherent nature, they spontaneously stop at ritual propriety and righteousness; it is not the case that ritual propriety and righteousness existing outside of the feelings of inherent nature can stop them. Only forcing them leads to their being lost, hence beauty is found in their spontaneity, and outside of the feelings of inherent nature there are no other so-called spontaneous occurrences. (“Superficial Thoughts on Reading Metrical Verse” [Du lü fushuo 读律肤说], A Book to Burn, 132)

Here, Li Zhi proposed his thoughts on aesthetics: natural spontaneity is beauty. He believed that spontaneous things emerge from the true feelings of inherent nature, are beautiful in their form and good in their content, forming a unity of the true, the

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beautiful and the good. That which emerges from the true feelings of inherent nature spontaneously expresses itself in beautiful forms, without the need for deliberate human arrangement, as in music: The sound and tone of those who have a clear and lucid character are spontaneously open and smooth, the sound and tone of those who have a relaxed and gentle character are spontaneously distant and slow, the free and big-hearted are spontaneously broad and majestic, the heroic are spontaneously brave, the gloomy are spontaneously bitter, and the eccentric are spontaneously strange. One who has a certain character will have a certain tone; this is all what is called the spontaneity of the feelings of inherent nature. (“Superficial Thoughts on Reading Metrical Verse,” A Book to Burn, 133)

“Clear and lucid,” “relaxed and gentle,” “free and big-hearted,” etc. are all aesthetic styles, while “open and smooth,” “distant and slow,” “broad and majestic,” etc. are forms of expression. The contents of works that emerge from the true feelings of inherent nature are spontaneously expressed in forms that fit their own aesthetic styles. Li Zhi extended this from poetic meter into a general form for literature and art, expressing his view of spontaneity as beauty and his conception of spontaneous things as internally possessing a quality of unified beauty and goodness. Li Zhi’s conception of spontaneity [or nature; ziran 自然] as beauty can also be expressed using another proposition: “The transformative work of Heaven and Earth is the no work of Heaven and Earth.” When commenting on the different attainments and spiritual planes of mixed comedies, he wrote: Bowing to the Moon [Bai yue 拜月] and The Western Chamber are both works of transformation, while The Lute [Pipa 琵琶] is a work of an artisan. So-called artisans use their abilities to seize the transformative work of Heaven and Earth, but who among them knows the non-work of Heaven and Earth? Now, people see and delight in that which Heaven produces, that which Earth nurtures, and the varieties of vegetation all around. Yet when they come to search for their workings, they are unable to find any. How could it be that their intelligence is simply unable to find them! One should know that the transformations of Creation have no work. Even one with the spirit of a sage cannot discern or know where transformative work resides, so who else could attain it? (“On Miscellaneous Matters” [Za shuo 杂说], A Book to Burn, 96)

“Work” (gong 工) means the artificial, and “work of an artisan” (hua gong 画工) means the ingenuity in artificial artworks. “Work of transformation” (hua gong 化工) refers to an ultimate ingenuity in artworks that seems not to be achievable by human effort. In terms of the rankings of artworks, the “work of an artisan” cannot match the “work of transformation,” and the work of transformation is no work. “No work” means spontaneous natural accomplishment with no trace of craftsmanship, exactly as with the beauty possessed and manifested by nature itself. “The work of transformation is no work,” means that spontaneous things are the most beautiful, and artworks return from extremes of dazzling splendour back to ordinary blandness, such that even if one wishes to seek out their beauty, one cannot attain it, since beauty is found in this very seeking without attaining. This kind of great beauty of spontaneity, this no work of the transformation of Creation cannot be known or enacted unless one

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is a complete master. Hence, Li Zhi believed, the most exquisite writing in the world is never produced intentionally, but all attained from the unconscious: Among those in the world who are truly able to write, when one compares their beginnings, none of them begins with an intention to try to write. Their bosoms contain certain indescribable and wondrous events, their throats contain certain things that they desire to spit out but dare not, on the tips of their tongues they repeatedly have countless things they wish to say but no one to whom to express them. They store these up until eventually their force cannot be stopped. As soon as they see a scene that arouses their feelings or come across something that catches their eye and sets them sighing, they snatch up another’s wine cup and drown their accumulated burdens, pouring out the discontentment in their hearts and moving others with their ill fortune for thousands of years. After spewing out jade, spitting pearls, illuminating the Milky Way, and producing heavenly writings, they gradually become conceited, going crazy and howling loudly, shedding tears and moaning with sorrow, and are unable to stop. They would rather cause their readers and listeners to gnash and grind their teeth with the desire to kill them and cut them up, than for their writings to be forever unknown, hidden atop some famous mountain, or cast into fire or water. (“On Miscellaneous Matters,” A Book to Burn, 97)

The writings produced through the stimulation of this kind of force of feeling emerge from the spontaneous, from that which is unavoidably so, and hence are able to seize the subtlety of the work of transformation. The articles Li Zhi wrote are precisely an embodiment of his aesthetic position here. He led a lonely and solitary life, is noble and unsullied character meaning he found it hard to engage with the mundane world, his incorruptible attitude not being tolerated by his superiors or colleagues, and his judgments of right and wrong not being spoken by his historical predecessors. His children meeting with sudden deaths, his family scattered, he lived as a guest in distant regions, lodging in Buddhist convents, only able to speak with a few friends, and only able to come and go in the world of books and letters. Thus, his qi becoming stagnant and his feelings accumulating, he expressed this through writing articles. His writing was true, as his disciple Wang Benke 汪本钶 said: “His language was exceedingly truthful and to the point, and his diction shocked Heaven and shook the Earth; it could make the deaf hear, the blind see, the dreaming awaken, the drunk sober up, the sick arise, the dead revive, the fidgety calm, and the noisy settle down; it could make those with icy innards hot and those with inflamed organs cold; it could make those ‘hemmed in by pickets and pegs’ [Zhuangzi, Ch. 12] tear these out, and make the stubbornly unyielding bow their heads in admiration and respect” (“Preface to the Second Printing of the Writings of Mr. Li” [Xu ke Li shi shu xu 续刻李氏书序], Another Book to Burn, 4). The power of Li Zhi’s articles was such that it could lead those around him both in his lifetime and after close to madness. His articles were indeed a powerful practice of his “explanation of the childlike mind.”

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2 The Foregrounding of the Principle of Individuality Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind opposed the contemporary social mood of empty artificiality, and held that speech and action should emerge from the true feelings of inherent nature, displaying his intention to break through old norms and foreground the principle of individuality. This foregrounding of the principle of individuality was first expressed in his bold rejection of the authority of Confucius. The kernel of the Learning of the Mind lay in self-respect and self-confidence, in self-improvement and self-reliance. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 proposed “exertion in establishing oneself,” being “passionate in strictness, vigorous in swiftness, bursting and breaking through nets and webs, burning and incinerating thistles and thorns, razing and clearing dirt and damp.” In his assessment of historical figures, he supported “self-attainment, self-completion, laying down one’s own dao, not relying on teachers and friends or records and books” (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan [Lu Jiuyuan ji 陆九渊集], Vol. 35). Among Song Dynasty Neo-Confucians, this kind of promotion of the principle of individuality was very distinctive. However, what Lu Jiuyuan wished to burst open was the restrictions on individual nature from the stale doctrines within Confucianism, and he did not yet make any effort to touch the figure who had been respected and venerated for countless generations, Confucius himself. When Wang Yangming proposed his learning of the extension of innate moral knowing, at the same time as further expanding the content of innate moral knowing, he also included elements of affective feeling, and thereby the principle of individuality was also emphasised. For example, in moral judgments of right and wrong, Wang Yangming held that dao is the common dao of all under Heaven and learning the common learning of all under Heaven, such that these could not be attained by or personally attributed to Zhu Xi or even Confucius himself. He argued that, “What is valuable in learning is to attain from the mind. If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong, even when they have come from Confucius, I dare not accept them as correct” (“Letter in Reply to Junior Steward Luo Zheng’an” [Da Luo Zheng’an shaozai shu 答罗整庵少宰书], Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II). In proposing this principle, Wang Yangming was in fact referring to the authority of Zhu Xi. However, this already to a certain degree represented a diminishing of the unquestionable, inarguable supreme position of Confucius. Li Zhi boldly proposed: “When Heaven gives birth to someone, then that person naturally has the functionality of a complete person, and doesn’t need to wait to be made complete by Confucius. If everyone needed to wait to be made complete by Confucius, then wouldn’t that mean that people in the ancient times before Confucius ended up forever unable to attain personhood?” (“Reply to Censor Geng” [Da Geng zhongcheng 答耿中丞], A Book to Burn, 16). This in fact argues that each person has his or her own independent value, and that individuals are independent, complete, and sufficient entities who do not need to rely on the authority of idols. This already elevated the value of the individual to a new level.

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Li Zhi also proposed that the orthodox tradition of the dao (daotong 道统) believed in by Song and Ming dynasty Confucians was untenable, and refuted it saying: The dao is in people just as water is in the earth; people’s seeking the dao is just like digging in the earth to seek water. Since this is so, and water is present everywhere in the earth, then that people all carry the dao with them is also valid. Hence, is it acceptable to say that water sometimes does not flow, or that the dao is sometimes not transmitted? (“Preliminary Discussion of Confucian Officials of Virtue and Achievement” [Deye ruchen qianlun 德业儒臣前论], A Book to Keep (Hidden), 517)

He argued that the view of the orthodox tradition of the dao proposed by Han Yu 韩 愈, in which the orthodoxy was discontinued after the death of Mencius, only for his transmission to be taken up again by the Song Confucians Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng Brothers, Zhang Zai, and Zhu Xi, was simply ridiculous. Since the dao is present everywhere, the tradition of the dao is never discontinued, just as water is present everywhere on earth, such that those who seek the dao simply need to dig down in order to attain it. From the Qin through the Han to the Tang, passing through the Jin and the Five Dynasties, people seeking the dao appeared in large numbers, and the dao itself never sunk without trace. The view of the orthodox tradition of the dao claiming that it “did not attain transmission after the death of Mencius” misled people for hundreds if not thousands of years. Here, Li Zhi’s view is that the orthodox tradition of the dao is not only born by the great Confucians who appear from time to time, but also manifests in ordinary seekers of the dao; as long as one seeks the dao, and exerts one’s energies in continuing the orthodox tradition of the dao, then one is a bearer of the orthodox tradition of the dao. On the traditional account, those responsible for continuing the orthodox tradition of the dao are the transmitters and bearers of the destiny of cultural wisdom, and ordinary people are obscured by these peerless great men. Yet for Li Zhi, the creation and continuation of the orthodox tradition of the dao, and even culture in general, is the common responsibility of all seekers of the dao. The role of the individual seeker of the dao that had been hidden or forgotten was here re-emphasised. This is a clear reflection of Li Zhi’s stress on the principle of individuality. Li Zhi’s stress on the principle of individuality is also expressed in his emphasis on the everyday life and productive work of ordinary people. He said: Wearing clothes and eating food are human relations and the principles of things, such that without wearing clothes and eating food, there are no relations or things, and everything in this world is simply similar to clothes and food. Hence if one speaks of clothes and food, then everything in the world is naturally contained within; it is not that there are some so-called things outside of clothes and food that are radically different from the ordinary people. (“Reply to Deng Shiyang” [Da Deng Shiyang 答邓石阳], A Book to Burn, 4)

Although Li Zhi here took up the Taizhou School’s view of the everyday uses of the ordinary people as the dao, his approach to it was different. Due to their tradition of attaining their ambitions, putting the dao into practice, and benefiting the people of the world, Confucians emphasised the everyday life of the common

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people, advocating seeking the dao without departing from human relations and the principles of things. However, in the Neo-Confucian approach to seeking the dao, the human relations and principles of things in everyday life are merely a site for them to complete their task of individual moral cultivation, such that the dao and human relations or principles of things have the relation of end and means. The subtle efforts concerning mind and inherent nature were even more pronounced in Ming Neo-Confucians compared to those of the Song, while “from ox-hair to cocoon silk, there was nothing they did not analyse,” such that everyday life and theoretical explorations of self, mind, inherent nature, endowment, etc. increasingly divided in two. Wang Yangming’s practical learning of innate moral knowing advocated the unity of knowing and action, the extension of innate moral knowing in concrete affairs, etc., both knowing and action, both internal and external, fusing everyday life and self, mind, inherent nature, and endowment together as one. However, apart from the Taizhou School, Wang’s disciples did not highlight the value and status of everyday life itself. In treating everyday life itself as the object of theoretical exploration, raising it from the status of an instrument for cultivating the dao to a fundamental status as something that must be emphasised, Li Zhi went beyond traditional Confucianism. Even in the Taizhou School, Wang Gen’s proposal that the everyday uses of the ordinary people are the dao was simply meant to emphasise the immediately present and self-organising qualities of the dao, and later Taizhou scholars’ stress on wearing clothes and eating food as human relations and the principles of things did not reach the height it did in Li Zhi. Li Zhi’s arguments concerning the utilitarian mind as expressing people’s inner requirements also manifest his emphasis on the principle of individuality. He said: Self-interest is the human mind. People must have self-interest before their minds can be manifest. If there is no self-interest, then there is no mind. For example, those who serve in the fields must self-interestedly possess the profit of autumn before they can be required to exert themselves in managing their fields; those who live at home must self-interestedly accumulate the profit of the storehouse before they can be required to exert themselves in managing their homes; those who are engaged in studies must self-interestedly work towards the profit of being selected before they can be required to exert themselves in managing their examinations. … This is a principle of nature, a standard that must be accorded with, and something that cannot be emptily hypothesised about. Ideas of selflessness are all pie in the sky discussions. (“Further Discussion of Confucian Officials of Virtue and Achievement” [Deye ruchen houlun 德业儒臣 后论], A Book to Keep (Hidden), 544)

The self-interest (si 私) spoken of here actually refers to the utilitarian mind. In accepting that the utilitarian mind is the inner original inherent nature of people, emphasising that the utilitarian mind is possessed by everyone, Wang Yangming’s gradations of status between “those who are born with knowledge rest in their actions,” “those who learn knowledge perfect their actions,” and “those who are poor in knowledge struggle in their actions” no longer exist, particularly the distinction between the gradation of moral status between “those who read books and understand moral principles” and the petty people of the marketplace, changing the situation in which ordinary labourers were morally disparaged. Li Zhi said: “From

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love of goods to love of beauty, from diligent studies to working toward selection and accumulating gold and treasures, from purchasing land and property to provide for one’s descendants to seeking out geomantic omens to deliver good fortune for one’s descendants, all the various affairs of living and producing in human society are commonly loved and commonly practiced, commonly known and commonly discussed” (“Reply to District Magistrate Deng” [Da Deng Mingfu 答邓明府], A Book to Burn, 40). Taking “all the various affairs of living and producing in society” as people’s common desires and everyday requirements means benefit is the essence of all action, such that Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 “Uphold what is right and do not seek for personal benefit” and Zhang Shi’s 张栻 “The learning of the sages means acting without any purpose for one’s action” are both “groundless views.” With the petty people of the marketplace, “when their bodies are engaged in a certain affair, their mouths speak of this affair: those who do business speak of business, and those who labour in the fields speak of labouring in the fields. Their talk has real substance and their words are truly virtuous, such that when others hear them it leads them to forget their troubles and cares” (“Reply to Justice Minister Geng” [Da Geng Sikou 答耿司寇], A Book to Burn, 30), and this is more full of warmth and affection than “the mouth speaking of dao and virtue yet the mind harbouring thoughts of senior office; overtly pursuing the learning of the dao while covertly pursuing wealth and status” of false dao-learning. This can all be viewed as a call for real feelings in society, and an elevation of the principle of individuality. In the principles he fixed on in his assessments of historical figures, Li Zhi also fully applied the spirit of individuality. One important objective of his A Book to Keep (Hidden) was to promote the contention between the Hundred Schools of Thought in his assessment of historical figures, and “not to use Confucius’ edited edition [of the Spring and Autumn Annals] to dispense rewards and punishments.” He said: Concerning what people view as right and wrong, there is no fixed standard, and concerning people’s judgments of others as right or wrong, there is no fixed view. If there are no fixed standards then what one person views as right and another as wrong can both be nurtured without harming each other; if there are no fixed views then judging one person as right and another as wrong can also both proceed together without conflict. Thus as for the judgments of right and wrong presented here, if one were to say that they are the judgments of just one person – namely me, Li Zhuowu – that would be acceptable; if one were to say that they represent the collective judgments of thousands and thousands of generations of great worthies and men, this would also be acceptable; and if one were to say that they overturn the judgments of right and wrong of thousands and thousands of generations, again judging what is right as wrong as I have done before, that would also be acceptable. In that case, my view of right and wrong itself may truly be acceptable. (“Introduction to the Table of Contents of the Historical Annals and Biographies in A Book to Keep (Hidden)” [Cangshu shiji liezhuan zongmu qianlun 藏书世纪列传总目前论], A Book to Keep (Hidden))

Li Zhi’s works on historiography, A Book to Keep (Hidden) and Another Book to Keep (Hidden), use the forms of annals and biographies, leaving out those of official positions, musical and calendric science, the art of literature, etc., and discussing

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only historical figures. In his assessments of figures, he did not copy the fixed views of earlier history, exaggerate his wisdom, show off his eccentricity, or specifically attempt to produce articles that reversed historical verdicts, but rather directly expressed his subjective feeling based on that which he had seen for himself. His general view on historical criticism was that the there is no fixed standard for the rights and wrongs of historical figures, and no fixed view for the praise or censure of historical figures. In assessing historical figures, one should follow the principle of the myriad things being nurtured together without harming each other from the Zhongyong, allowing various different and even completely opposed conclusions, and not follow the orthodox historians who based their judgments on classical Confucian writings. He thought that the historiography of the more than one thousand years between the Han, Tang and Song dynasties lacked any individual historiography. People all treated Confucius’ judgments of right and wrong as right and wrong, and did not foreground the principle of individuality; based on judgments of right and wrong fixed in earlier history, a multitude of mouths spoke only one word, and there were in reality no judgments of right and wrong. With his spirit of “overturning the judgments of right and wrong of thousands and thousands of generations,” Li Zhi proposed conclusions concerning historical figures that differed completely from those of his predecessors. At the same time, he proposed that other people’s judgments of right and wrong or praise and blame of figures based on their true subjective feelings could equally overturn his own judgments. This implies a principle of individuality in historiography, such that “rather absurd judgments of right and wrong concerning the sages” are acceptable, and “overturning the judgments of right and wrong of thousands and thousands of generations” is also acceptable. This implies that the “public judgments of right and wrong” of thousands and thousands of generations of great worthies and the “private judgments of right and wrong” of a single person have an equivalent value. Here, Li Zhi displayed a very prominent consciousness of the individual: in his assessments of personalities, he advocated taking one’s own understanding as a basis, neither respecting the ancient and despising the present nor respecting others and despising the self, and even allowed conclusions that overturned ancient sages and worthies. This was a heroic spirit of self-belief and self-reliance, and an elevation of the principle of individuality. In Li Zhi’s view, the principle of individuality is the “great” in Mencius’ “first establish yourself in the greater part [i.e. the thinking mind]” [see Mencius, 6A.15], the source of strength and understanding. Li Zhi once said to a friend: The word “great” (da 大) speaks of a medicine that is commonly required. If one has no greatness then one cannot take care of oneself, and how then can one take care of others? There has never been a true man who was unable to take care of others and spent his whole life being taken care of by others. The great man takes care of others; the petty man is taken care of by others. The understanding and strength of those great men that differ from the multitude all arises from taking care of others. If one is merely taken care of by others, then one will spend one’s whole life without a single day of understanding and strength. … Heroism is shared by all people, but can only be recognised in taking care of others or being taken care of by others. (“Farewell to Liu Xiaofu” [Bie Liu Xiaofu 别刘肖甫], Another Book to Burn, 48)

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He viewed the principle of individuality as an effective medicine to treat the sicknesses of cowardice and dejection, and thought that what people in society lacked was just this heroic spirit, accusing them by saying: The people of today are all taken care of by other people, and begin to not even know that there is such an affair as taking care of people. When residing at home they are taken care of by their parents, when residing as officials they are taken care of by senior officials, when established in court they seek to be taken care of by senior ministers, when acting as frontier commanders they seek to be taken care of by eunuchs, when acting towards becoming sages and worthies they seek to be taken care of by Confucius and Mencius, and when writing articles they seek to be taken care of by Ban Gu 班固 and Sima Qian 司马迁. In all these kinds of self-regard, people take themselves to be men, while in reality they are all children without knowing it. (“Farewell to Liu Xiaofu,” Another Book to Burn, 48)

All these kinds of seeking to be taken care of lose sight of the principle of individuality and the heroic spirit. He required that people depend upon nothing and possess self-reliance and self-belief. In his assessments of specific personalities, Li Zhi consistently implemented the principle of individuality. For example, Ban Gu’s Book of Han [Han shu 汉书] was continually praised by earlier writers, and referred to together with Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji 史记) as “Ban-Ma” 班马. Li Zhi was extremely dissatisfied with this, believing that Ban Gu lacked historical understanding, and that, although his writing was beautiful, in his assessments of historical figures, he “did not avoid mixing in other received views from classic histories, and they thereby became dirtied things.” He thought that in assessing ancient people, “when praising one must keep one eye on the whole of ancient times, and this is not something that those with a smattering of literary talent can manage” (“Readings of History” [Du shi 读史], A Book to Burn, 201). Here he emphasised that historical knowledge is more important than historical talent, and that in writing histories one must take one’s own individual view. In the histories he produced, Li Zhi did not rely on the examples of previous histories, but based them entirely on his own initiative. For example, in his comments on emperors and kings, he listed Qin Shi Huang 秦始皇, Chen Sheng 陈胜, Xiang Yu 项羽, Emperor Wen of Han汉文帝, etc. respectively under the names of “The One Who Amalgamated the Lords Together as One,” “The Ordinary Man Who Became an Initiator,” “The Hero Who Began Anew,” and “The Illuminated Sage Who Continued the Tradition,” as well as listing “The Traitorous Official Who Usurped the Throne,” “The One Who Assaulted and Opposed the Rightful Throne,” “The One Who Sought to Govern Over the True Ruler,” etc., listing famous kings and prominent rulers one by one. In his comments on officials, he included kinds such as “Renowned Official of a Strong Ruler,” “Renowned Official of a Wealthy State,” “Official Renowned for Economics,” “Official Renowned for Wise Planning,” etc. It was not only his style and form that differed from previous histories, with his assessments also generally displaying great subtlety. Li Zhi described himself saying:

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Heaven favoured me at birth with audacity, for those who were envied and admired as worthies in earlier times, I have generally regarded as fakes, as pedantic, rotten, worthless, and useless, while those who were despised, abandoned, reviled, and cursed, I without exception regarded as capable of being entrusted with a state, a family, or an individual. Since my judgments of right and wrong so gravely go against those of earlier people, what is this if not audacity? (“The Joy of Reading” [Du shu le 读书乐], A Book to Burn, 226)

His contemporary Liu Dongxing 刘东星 also said of Li Zhi’s A Book to Keep (Hidden): “The order and chaos, rise and fall, faithfulness and flattery, and worthiness and treachery contained within all come from his breast and emerge as embellished, his rankings, comments, and distinctions all based on affairs and written frankly. He can truly be said to be one whose judgments stem from the original mind, and who does not follow the words of others” (Liu’s preface, A Book to Keep (Hidden)). These are not empty words, and accurately note the principle of individuality in Li Zhi’s comments on history. As for praising Zhuo Wenjun 卓文 君 as a woman of insight for eloping with Sima Xiangru 司马相如, lauding Hong Fu 红拂 personally selecting her preferred partner as “the best form of marriage in all of history,” and criticising those who thought women were too shortsighted to study the dao, these are but small examples from among his bold and brilliant views. Li Zhi also proposed the view that “the Six Classics are all histories” and that “classics and histories mutually form exterior and interior,” saying: Classics and histories form one thing. If histories had no classics, they would be but histories of dirt, and how then could they leave behind warnings and reflections? If classics had no histories, they would be but speeches in plain language, and how then could they manifest actual affairs? Hence the Spring and Autumn Annals as a classic, is also a history of the period of Springs and Autumns. The Book of Songs and Book of Documents are histories of the period beginning from the Two Emperors and Three Kings. While the Book of Changes shows people how the classics themselves emerged, and from where the histories came, how working for the dao repeatedly shifts, changing and alternating without constancy, and cannot be grasped with a single fixed view. Thus it is acceptable to say that the Six Classics are all histories. (“Readings of History,” A Book to Burn, 214)

Li Zhi’s view here is a continuation of Wang Yangming’s statement that “the Five Classics are only histories.” In discussing the relationship between classics and histories, he thought that classics and histories are two sides of a single thing, such that if historical works have no central thread, no soul, no thoroughly penetrating unique insights, then histories are merely an account of actual historical affairs, and that without theoretical summarisation, they would be unable to provide empirical lessons for later generations. If there were only classics with no histories, then the content of the classics would be but empty words, without evidence from historical actuality. The Confucian Six Classics are thus both classics and histories. The Songs, the Documents, the Spring and Autumn Annals, etc. either teach reflections and warnings, or offer historical actualities that can be proven, or form a portrait of the feelings of inherent nature and the thoughts of the mind, and these are all realistic reflections of ancient social life. The Book of Changes provides a

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methodology for classics and histories. The fundamental principle of the Book of Changes is “change and alternation”: “one who acts for the dao repeatedly shifts, changing and alternating without constancy.” The classics and histories all illuminate and follow this principle. Although Li Zhi’s view that “the Six Classics are all histories” has its roots, and is not as detailed or filled out as Zhang Xuecheng’s 章学诚 later views in his General Meaning of Literature and History (Wenshi tongyi 文史通义), its innovative aspects are very clear. Li Zhi’s elevation of the principle of individuality was a response to the expansion of the urban class and increase in individual consciousness in the late Ming Dynasty. The late Ming was a period in which China’s industry and commerce developed rapidly, as well as one in which its imperial court politics were chaotic. However, since there were relatively few wars at this time, the economy developed smoothly, and the people lived safely, and especially with the expansion of trade in southeastern coastal cities and the development of commercial economy in the capital, the urban population of cities increased rather quickly, and the urban class gradually expanded. Following the growth of the urban economy and the gradual formation of an urban lifestyle, the pursuit of personal freedom, wealth, and worldly pleasures gradually became an ethos. One characteristic of the urban class was a smaller reliance on land and owners, with a demand to dispense with the traditional idea of emphasising agriculture and scorning commerce, and achieve a higher social status. This all implied a strengthening of conceptions of the individual, as can be clearly seen in literary works that reflect urban life in the middle and late Ming Dynasty. Li Zhi’s family had for generations been involved in commerce, and from a young age he lived in a city, Quanzhou, that had developed a commodity economy rather early and had a fully developed urban class; he also lived in a Hui 回族 family for whom there existed a certain distance from China’s typical agricultural economy and scholar-official cultural tradition. These factors inevitably had an influence on the formation of Li Zhi’s thought. When added to his gruff and formidable character, his aloof and unsociable personality, his resolute dislike of associating with the vulgar, his special partialities in historiography, his detest of life in court, and his solitary life away from family and rejecting students and friends in his later years, these all led to his generally entering onto the path of tenaciously expressing his individual thoughts and views.

3 The Pure and Clear Root-Origin As a thinker and a historian, Li Zhi was skilled at commenting and discussing history, while his writings on philosophy are rather few and mainly concerned with Buddhism. He was neither fond of nor skilled at the Confucian metaphysics focused on principle, qi, mind, and inherent nature. Yet through these limited writings, we can nonetheless perceive his philosophical ontology. First, Li Zhi thought that all things that are able to produce are double and not single; that the myriad things under Heaven are all produced from two and not from

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one. Hence, the two qi of yin and yang are the root of the world, and above this there cannot be another producer, just as a male-female couple is the beginning of a human being. Therefore, when Laozi said “the dao produces the one, the one produces the two,” Zhu Xi said “principle produces qi,” and the Commentaries on the Changes said “the Supreme Polarity produces the Two Modes,” they were all mistaken. He said: In the beginning when humans were first produced, there were only the two qi of yin and yang, the two destinies of a man and woman; in the beginning there was no so-called “one” or “principle,” and certainly Supreme Polarity! (“On Husband and Wife” [Fu fu lun 夫妇 论], A Book to Burn, 90)

He argues saying, if the two was produced from one, then how was the one produced? If examined to its limit, this must enter into the Daoist theory that “the void can produce qi.” If there is a so-called one, then one and two also make two, the producer and the produced making two. If one traces back the producer of production, one will necessarily reach to infinity, which is all two. Hence, there is clearly no “one” that is not opposed with a two. We cannot speak of a principle that produces qi or a Supreme Polarity that produces the Two Modes; the two qi of yin and yang are the ultimate root. Li Zhi’s idea here has a very strongly positivist character. Although two is also a kind of abstraction, this abstraction is an abstraction of the visible myriad things, based on concrete facts, while the “one” comes about from metaphysical speculation. From a positivist perspective, metaphysics is untenable. In both Li Zhi’s “At the beginning when a human being is produced, there is only the two qi of yin and yang, the two lives of a man and woman” and his “Heaven, Earth, humans and things collectively find their beginnings between husband and wife, and there find nourishment and rest, sharing in conversation” (“On Husband and Wife,” A Book to Burn, 90), one can see his intention to eliminate metaphysics. Mountains, rivers and the Great Earth are all produced from the two qi of yin and yang. However, mountains, rivers and the Great Earth and the pure and still root-origin spoken of in Buddhism also have a relationship of substance and function, root-origin and expression. Li Zhi inherited the Islamic faith, and from the instructions for burial he gave before his death, it seems he never abandoned his belief in Islam. As a result of the influence of his family from a young age, Li Zhi was not fond of Buddhism and religious Daoism, and he once wrote of himself, “Since I was young I was stubborn and hard to teach, not believing in study, not believing in dao, and not believing in immortals or Buddhism. Thus when I saw Daoist priests or Buddhist monks I disliked them, and when I saw Confucian scholars of the dao I especially disliked them” (“A Selection of the Dao-Learning Papers of Master Wang Yangming” [Wang Yangming xiansheng daoxue chao 王阳 明先生道学钞]). Later he came to respect Wang Yangming, being particularly convinced by Wang Longxi, and gradually paid more attention to Buddhist scriptures. While in Yao’an, he once entered Cock’s Claw Mountain to read Tibetan sutras and did not leave. When he came to Macheng, he resided in the Cloister of the Flourishing Buddha next to Dragon Pool Lake for over 20 years, where he

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examined Buddhist texts. Thus, Li Zhi later believed deeply in Buddhism, his positivist standpoint gradually turning into one of speculative studies, and he thus also accepted the so-called pure and clear root-origin (qingjing benyuan 清净本原) of Buddhism. He discussed the relationship between the myriad existents and this root as follows: If there were no mountains, rivers or Great Earth, then the pure and clear root-origin would not be complete, hence to say that mountains, rivers and the Great Earth are the pure and clear root-origin is acceptable. If there were no mountains, rivers or Great Earth, then the pure and clear root-origin would be an insensate and useless thing, an annihilated and empty thing incapable of producing or transforming, and not the mother of the myriad things. Would it then be worth even half a cent? If however at every moment and every place it is the producer of mountains, rivers and the Great Earth, then how could one regard mountains, rivers and the Great Earth as obstructions and wish to abolish them? (“Questions from Guanyin” [Guanyin wen 观音问], A Book to Burn, 171)

Li Zhi regarded the pure and clear root-origin as the basis of the myriad things. The term “root-origin” (benyuan 本原) here differs from the “root” (bengen 本根) mentioned above, since that root refers to the original material that constitutes things, which for Li Zhi is the two qi of yin and yang, while root-origin is a metaphysical concept which refers to the true original nature of the myriad things. Li Zhi believed that mountains, rivers and the Great Earth are simultaneously the pure and clear root-origin, and not that there is a pure and clear root-origin outside or after mountains, rivers and the Great Earth. The pure and clear root-origin is a form of speculative existence, and not one with a concrete place or time. This pure and clear root-origin and the myriad existents have a relationship of substance and function, in which since there are mountains, rivers and the Great Earth, we can know there is a pure and clear root-origin, and this pure and clear root-origin is within mountains, rivers and the Great Earth, as with a pigment and the gel that binds the pigment, in which there is an I in you and a you in me, where the two cannot be cleanly separated. The pure and clear root-origin is not “annihilated and empty” and not a concretely existing thing; the root-origin and phenomena are one and not two. Phenomena are not void, and the root-origin is not concrete. Without mountains, rivers and the Great Earth, there would be no pure and clear root-origin. The pure and clear root-origin is in reality a metaphysical, speculative presupposition. As his belief in Buddhism became gradually deeper, Li Zhi came to accept the fundamental idea of Buddhism, that the myriad images are false material forms, that mental images are false thoughts, and that the true mind is the root-origin; from this he drew the conclusion that “the Great Rivers and the Great Earth are all discrete things appearing within my wondrous and illuminated true mind.” The wondrous and illuminated true mind (miaoming zhenxin 妙明真心) spoken of here is not the mind within the material body of a human, but the “pure and clear root-origin.” He opposed the view the idea that the mind is within the material body, saying:

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Since false material forms and false thoughts mix together to form the body, so within the body the false mind with its implicated dependencies and agitated movements gathers together day and night, while outside the body false appearances of visible dust and flights of fancy stream past day and night, like surging waves chasing other waves, never stopping or ceasing, forming confused and disturbing appearances whose shape language fails to contain. These are appearances of the mind, not the true mind. How can one take appearances to be the mind? This is self-delusion. Once one is deluded as to the mind, one will necessarily decide that the mind is within the material body, and that it must be emptied of all disturbing appearances, and thus the idea of emptying arises again. (“Explanation of a Sutra Text” [Jie jingwen 解经文], A Book to Burn, 136)

The “true mind” (zhen xin 真心) is the root-origin of the myriad existents in the world; this true mind is not the mind within the corporeal body, since the mind within the corporeal body is consciousness (shi 识). Viewing the corporeal mind as the true mind is a false delusion. This kind of false delusion consists in believing that the human mind is originally an empty void without any appearances, and that people take images of the external world as various appearances and thoughts as various ideas, which then mix together in the mind, making it no longer empty. Then one must make the various ideas and appearances empty in order to restore the mind to its original state. This view is a false delusion. Even if one were able to empty the mind of its various disturbing appearances, the root-origin would already be lost. Even in regarding the original substance of the mind as empty and seeking it in the disturbing appearances, the seeking of emptiness is still an idea, and thus agitations are produced, and there is no moment of true emptiness. In Li Zhi’s view, one must first realise that the true mind is not the mind within the material body, but rather the pure and clear root-origin, and thus that the mountains, rivers and Great Earth and the mind within the material body are both concrete physical things, and thus both phenomena of the root-origin, the “true mind.” Hence the appearances of the mind cannot be made empty, and do not need to be made empty. The correct relationship between the “true mind” and phenomena is one in which the root-origin is the seawater and the various appearances are the floating bubbles. This is his meaning when he said: “The mountains and rivers my material body reaches outside, the Great Earth surrounding it, and the Great Void, emptiness, etc. that it sees, these are all merely discrete things appearing within my wondrous and illuminated true mind. Since they are all spontaneous appearances of the mind, who could make them empty? Since appearances of the mind are always things seen within the true mind, how could this true mind really be within the material body?” (“Explanation of a Sutra Text,” A Book to Burn, 136). The ideas of mountains, rivers and the Great Earth and the pure and clear root-origin come from “Questions from Guanyin,” while those of the true mind and the appearances of the mind come from “Explanation of a Sutra Text,” and, in comparison, the emphasis in the thought of the two is somewhat different. “Questions from Guanyin” emphasises that substance and function have a single source, and that one cannot seek the original substance outside of phenomena, while “Explanation of a Sutra Text” uses the truth of the original substance to display the emptiness of phenomena. Although the emphasis in the two is different,

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their thought is consistent from beginning to end. That “the mountains, rivers and Great Earth are all discrete things appearing within my wondrous and illuminated true mind” is their most fundamental thought. Li Zhi had a stubborn character, did not take pleasure in associating with the common world, and only enjoyed reading books. After he left Huang’an for the Cloister of the Flourishing Buddha next to Dragon Pool Lake at Macheng, he spent everyday engaged in reading, working through an incredible variety of books. His Confucianism derived from Wang Yangming and Wang Longxi. Those he attacked were common Confucians, base Confucians, vulgar Confucians, corrupt Confucians, and false Confucians who were “superficially engaged in learning the dao, while in reality seeking wealth and privilege.” As for such heroic Confucians as Wang Yangming, Wang Gen, Wang Longxi, and Luo Rufang, he deeply admired them. In his later years, he also enjoyed working on the Book of Changes: “Following a Changes scholar, I read the Changes for three years, exhausting my energy day and night, with the return that the 64-hexagrams of my Causes of the Changes [Yi yin 易因] were carved and distributed” (“A Brief Introduction to the Teachings of the Sages” [Shengjiao xiaoyin 圣教小引], Another Book to Burn, 66). As a result of his admiration for ancient recluses such as Zhuangzi, Yan Guang 严光, Tao Yuanming 陶渊明, and Shao Yong 邵雍, he began to enjoy reading works of Daoism, specifically Laozi’s Daodejing, Guan Yin’s 关尹 True Scripture of Master Wenshi (Wenshi zhenjing 文始真经), and Tan Qiao’s 谭峭 Book of Transformations (Huashu 化书]), keeping them on his desk when at home and carrying them with him when travelling, so that they could be easily recited. He also made commentaries for the seven inner chapters of the Zhuangzi and also Laozi’s Daodejing, praising Daoism saying: The Daoists consider their founder to be the Lord Lao whom Confucius once consulted about ritual. When we reflect on the words of teaching Laozi offered our master, how can it be that scholars fail to wear them on their bodies at all times and inscribe them on their hearts with every breath? If there is a single breath in which this teaching is not inscribed on the heart, then arrogant airs will arise, affected appearances will emerge, excessive ambitions will be produced, and disaster will swiftly follow. (“A Brief Introduction to a Selection of Daoist Teachings” [Daojiao chao xiaoyin 道教钞小引], Another Book to Burn, 66)

He also wrote a “Preface to Su Zhe’s 苏辙 Explication of the Laozi” (Ziyou jie Lao xu 子由解老序), in which he said: All foods are alike if they fill the belly. Southern people are pleased with eating rice, while northern people are pleased with eating millet, yet neither of the two has ever envied the other on this account. If however the two were to switch places and try the food, neither would they reject it. The dao in Confucius and Laozi is like the rice and millet in the south and north: since there is enough of one, even if one does not covet the other, how could one reject it? Why not? Because each is sufficient to fill the belly, and one who is truly starving is not picky. … If my eagerness for the dao were the same as my yearning for food at such a time, how could I choose between Confucius and Laozi? Since then, I have concentrated on studying the Laozi, and have frequently benefited from consulting Su Zhe’s Explication of the Laozi [Laozi jie 老子解]. (A Book to Burn, 110)

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Here, Li Zhi suggests that Daoist thought can extinguish the arrogant and extravagant airs among Confucian scholars, and regulate the corruption and competition among officials and the seeking after name and profit among literati. In reality, Li Zhi advocated a fusion of the three teachings. The character he yearned for was that of a person who truly acted according to their nature and endowment, who expressed the true emotions of his nature, and thus he accepted all three teachings, without clinging to any one. Li Zhi’s life in his later years was a practical realisation of this view. He settled himself in a monastic institution yet did not take the vows of a monk, was not restrained or managed by the monastery, and did not take the daily classes of the monks. He lived in the world, yet did not associate with vulgar people. He rejected mundane tasks, including maintaining a distance from his family. He freely attacked everything he thought hollow or false. Those who hated him did so in their very bones, and those who liked him did so to the point of madness. Through his essays and his life, he announced his character to the people of the world: a writer who preserved his “childlike mind” and was thus difficult for the world to receive.

4 Li Zhi’s Posthumous Influence All his life, Li Zhi despised the world and detested its customs, and never fitted in with the world around him. The only thing that was never extinguished was the thought of freedom that surged and raged in his lonely mind. He once sighed: “Simply because I refuse to be controlled by others, I have suffered to such an extreme and had such a rough life that even if the Great Earth was turned into ink, it would hardly be sufficient to put it all down in writing” (“Reflections on My Life” [Gankai pingsheng 感慨平生], A Book to Burn, 187). After passing the imperial examination and becoming an official, in each of his several positions, he never failed to come into conflict with his superiors and colleagues. When he left behind officialdom and went to Huang’an and Macheng, he again came into conflict with the celebrated local literati and Confucian followers, and was expelled several times. Many of his children died young, he left his wife to go and stay in a Buddhist monastery, and finally was imprisoned for his speech and writings, committing suicide in prison. After his death, his works were banned many times, yet the higher his fame the better they sold, to the point that falsely attributed works forged for profit filled the stores. His thought spread widely, and exerted a great influence on the intellectual world of the late Ming Dynasty. Posthumous assessments of Li Zhi were poles apart. Orthodox Confucians entrenched in their intellectual camps generally disparaged and vilified him, while scholars of a liberal spirit revered him as a sage. For example, in his “On Reading the Writings of Old Master Zhuowu” (Du Zhuowu laozi shushu 读卓吾老子书述), Zhang Nai 张鼐 held him in high estimation:

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Even though Zhuowu has died, his books remain important. Yet since they are so important, real and fake editions circulate in the world together. … Zhuowu hated the latter day Confucians who study to impress others, borrow meanings and principles, and set up walls everywhere. They offer all kinds of explanations of passages and sentences, following along with whatever flows past their eyes and ears, and have no understanding of the source of inherent nature and endowment. Because he cast off the paths of established models, exposing the commonplace practice of two-facedness in interactions, his deeds could cause bewilderment but his mind was true, the traces he left were often peculiar but his heart was warm. Moreover, he had no concern for the praise or slander of society, and worries over life and death never burdened his breast. His brush cut through affairs of right and wrong no matter whether these happened a thousand years earlier or later, and none were able to gainsay his judgments. In sum, he wanted people to cut clean through the branches and vines and perceive the root-mind directly, such that ministers would die for loyalty, sons for filial piety, friends for fellowship, and combatants for battle. This is a message that only people of the highest character can trust and accept, so in a world filled with five kinds of degeneration, where can one find a singular man who is able to read the works of Zhuowu and distinguish their rights and wrongs? Today, common men surpass Li Zhi in their outrageousness and self-indulgence, and, taking pleasure in the unscrupulousness of the petty man, take up their brushes and ink to throw the works of his hand into disorder, claiming that their own words are lost writings of Old Master Zhuowu. With an ancient book, someone with a solid foundation might pick up his brush to establish a definitive edition, and in doing so “dot the eyes on the painted dragon.” However, those without a solid foundation merely add careless comments, and in doing so “mark the gunwale to record where the oar sank.” Alas! Where can I find a person with the eyes to read the works of Mr. Zhuowu? (Another Book to Burn, 2)

In his “Biography of Li Wenling” (Li Wenling zhuan 李温陵传), Yuan Zhongdao 袁中道 also took a similar view: Up to now, they [i.e. Confucian scholars] have received and passed on each other’s views such that their conformist views have sunk deeply into the marrow of people’s bones and can no longer be removed. Thus across these thousands of years there has emerged a new hand and eye, attacking for their faults all those who had long been considered as great men, and rediscovering the good qualities of those who had been considered as petty or worthless men. His purpose in this was mainly to banish inane writings and seek the really useful, to push aside the skin and hair and perceive the spirit and bones, and to discard vain debates and promote human feeling. Although he can be too demanding and is not without unbalanced judgments, if one disregards his excesses of invective and sarcasm and reads him carefully, the many points where his criticisms hit the mark can be of great assistance to the thoughts and ways of people today. However, people persist in believing he caused offence to the orthodox social teachings and regard him as destroying the sages and betraying the dao; this is a mistake. (A Book to Burn, 5)

In his Collected Works of Zunshui Garden (Zunshui yuan ji 尊水园集), Lu Shique 卢世榷 said of Li Zhi: As a person he left behind the world and fled into Buddhism, driving his nature in anger. He seemed as if he was far detached from things, yet was most able to embody human feeling. In dealing with affairs, he refused to falsely employ a single word of respectful language. Expressed in his essays set down with paper and ink, he was outlandish and incisive, yet always returned to simplicity. He can revive the times, and can be transmitted to the world. Good readers are comprehensive and natural, their minds calm and their tempers harmonious; bad readers merely increase their fragmentation. Because of this, Old Zhuo

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[i.e. Li Zhi] has gradually come to be denounced by the world. Alas! How is the world qualified to criticise Old Zhuo? … When one’s chest is filled with gloom and one feels desolated, one merely intones his works once and it is like quenching one’s thirst with a fine tea or breaking one’s mood with a renowned wine; there is no greater pleasure in the world. (“Assorted Writings of Li Zhuowu” [Li Zhuowu zazhu 李卓吾杂著], Collected Works of Zunshui Garden, Vol. 7)

Tang Xianzu 汤显祖 also once wrote, “When I heard of Li Baiquan’s [i.e. Li Zhi’s] excellence, I sought out his words, and it was like gaining a fine sword” (“Reply to Guan Dongming” [Da Guan Dongming 答管东溟], Collected Works of Tang Xianzu [Tang Xianzu ji 汤显祖集], Vol. 44). These figures were all late Ming literary authors, and Tang Xianzu’s advocacy of a romantic emotionalist literature was greatly influenced by Li Zhi’s “explanation of the childlike mind.” The brothers Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道 and Yuan Zhongdao were associates of Li Zhi, and their literary principle of “only expressing the spirit of one’s inherent nature” and opposition to the vintage classicism of the Former Seven Masters (qian qizi 前七子) as “scraping up drops of saliva from others” was also indebted to Li Zhi’s explanation of the childlike mind. Orthodox Confucians, especially those scholars who respected and believed in the theories of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, generally disliked Li Zhi, regarding the assessments of ancient figures in his A Book to Keep (Hidden) as “right and wrong being used falsely against sages,” and the many passionate words of anger in his A Book to Burn as reasons for his bringing disaster and death upon himself. As the leader of the late Ming Donglin Movement 东林党 Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成 wrote: When Li Zhuowu lectured on the learning of the mind in Nanjing, he used the spontaneity of the present to criticise later scholars, saying that people are all ready-made sages, and that talent and learning are superfluous. When he heard of loyal, honest, filial or righteous men, he said these were all invented, and that originally there was no such thing as loyalty, honesty, filial piety or righteousness. Students rejoiced at this convenience, and followed him as if mad. I don’t know how many people were thus misled. (“Unravelling the Present” [Dangxia yi 当下绎], Posthumous Works of Master Gu Duanwen [Gu Duanwen gong yishu 顾端文公遗书], Vol. 14)

He also wrote in “A Letter to Gao Panlong” (Yu Gao Panlong shu 与高攀龙书): In general, Li Zhuowu affirmed what others denied and denied what others affirmed, simply regarding victory and defeat as right and wrong. When academic studies reach this point, they have truly become mud and ashes, and other than look up at the ceiling and sigh in despair, what can be done? (Jinggao canggao [泾皋藏稿], Vol. 5)

In his works including On Reading the Comprehensive Mirror (Du Tongjian lun 读 通鉴论], Extended Meaning of the Book of Documents (Shangshu yinyi 尚书引义), Complete Explanations on Reading the Four Books (Du sishu daquan shuo 读四书 大全说), Elaboration on the Laozi (Laozi yan 老子衍), Head-scratching Questions (Saotou wen 搔头问), and Awaiting Explanation (Si jie 俟解), Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 frequently criticised Li Zhi. In On Reading the Comprehensive Mirror, he wrote:

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As for those of recent times who follow Li Zhi and Zhong Xing 钟惺, leading the world into vile debauchery, brewing disaster for the ritual customs of China, are they not more dangerous than floodwater and more fierce than wild beasts? (Final volume, “Exposition, 3” [Xu lun san 叙论三])

He also commented on Li Zhi’s A Book to Keep (Hidden), saying: Li Hongfu went on to write A Book to Keep (Hidden), in which he increased his liking of praising selfishness. He was a deluded man, and is not worth further mention. (“Preface to Wild Harvest from the Ming Period” [Mingji yehuo xu 明纪野获序])

Fang Yizhi 方以智 also wrote: Those who are angry at the world all seek to speak and make their name heard, forbidding no speech or names, so I shall not refrain from adding my voice. I often sigh at how Li Zhuowu took the burden of shrill wit and petty talent upon himself, indulging in his prejudices and wishing to wipe the world under Heaven clean with one hand, to be the first human being. When officialdom did not match with his expectations, he gradually released his anger and began spitting blood, which assisted him in wielding his magic wand, and increasingly overturned his views to please himself. Without any consideration, he thought that by disturbing and shocking the world he could more rapidly make his name, and thus began to especially insult those with a good reputation. He praised people such as Wu Zetian 武则天 and Feng Dao 冯道, and gradually became a great rebel. Since he offended Heaven and Earth, the world disparaged him as a heretic. Did they know that he thus benefited and achieve his goal in this? He knew that being so diabolically destroyed would both be sufficient to satisfy the human feelings of craving for eccentricity and rejoicing in novelty, as well as being sufficient to stir up the world’s condemnation, and thus that his reputation would become more fierce. He could also have known that even if among later generations there were upright men who denounced him, these would never overcome those who would feel an outer sympathy with a shrill wit and petty talent and would be partial to him. Thus he managed to achieve the goal of his unscrupulousness. (“The Teaching of Names” [Mingjiao 名教], The Equality of East and West [Dongxi jun 东西均])

The Complete Imperial Library in Four Treasuries (Siku quanshu 四库全书) abused the works of Li Zhi extremely strongly, seeing them as floodwaters and wild beasts: Zhi’s writings are all mad, offensive, perverse and absurd, negating the sages and without laws. His A Book to Keep (Hidden) alone attacks Confucius, establishing its own standards for praise and blame, and overturning and switching every single one of the standards of good and bad passed down from the ancients for millennia, a particular crime for which he could not but deserve death. His books can be burned, his name is not even worth dirtying bamboo or wooden slips. (“A Book to Keep (Hidden),” Annotated Catalogue of the Complete Imperial Library [Siku quansu zongmu tiyao 四库全书总目提要])

These diametrically opposed assessments reflect the situation of struggle between different positions during the late Ming Dynasty when, with the rise of an urban class, there occurred radical changes in social ideology which shook traditional ideas and the old value system. That Li Zhi was seen as an extreme heretic and denounced by those in power and even by first-rate intellectuals of the time shows

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that a new thought that transcended most people’s conceptions had not yet been recognised by society. While those who praised him were mainly certain literary and aesthetic radicals, and those who attacked him were mostly opponents of Wang [Yangming] Learning, all of these lacked a sympathetic understanding of the way in which Wang Learning and especially the Taizhou Longxi school had consciously or unconsciously gone beyond the ruling social ideology of the time, and were still unable to adapt to liberal thinking, an anti-traditional thinking that broke through the old views that had restricted Confucianism for hundreds or thousands of years. The Donglin school who, during the period when “rain from the mountains was coming and wind filled the buildings” before the change of dynasty at the end of the Ming, dared to mock and criticise the imperial government, in their judgments of historical figures, could not tolerate a single Li Zhi. Even Huang Zongxi, who wrote such an audacious work as Waiting for the Dawn (Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待访录), nonetheless denounced Li Zhi as “putrid fish and rotten meat.” This shows how even those who dare criticise the old system in economic and political terms do not necessarily dare to risk the great approbation of the world by breaking through the orthodox system of ideas. This is the shortsighted and cowardly side of thinkers who consider themselves as orthodox.

Chapter 21

The Philosophical Thought of Luo Qinshun

Luo Qinshun 罗钦顺 (1465–1547; zi Yunsheng 允升, hao Zheng’an 整庵) was born in Taihe 泰和 County in Jiangxi province. After passing the imperial examinations, he gained a position as a compiler 编修 at the Hanlin Academy 翰林院, and by 1502 had been promoted to the Imperial University in Nanjing, where the chancellor was the noted Confucian scholar Zhang Fengshan 章枫山. When the eunuch Liu Jin 刘瑾 took power, Luo refused to submit to his rule and in 1508 lost his position and was reduced to a commoner. After Liu was executed in 1510, his status was returned, and he received successive promotions to ministerial positions in the courts at Nanjing and Beijing in the years that followed. He went into mourning upon the death of his father in 1523, and, after subsequently declining two requests to return to ministerial positions, was finally granted retirement in 1527. He spent the next twenty years at his home studying and writing up his works, which include the six juan of Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired (Kunzhi ji 困知记) containing the core of his philosophical thought, and the twenty juan of Collected Papers of Zheng’an (Zheng’an cungao 整庵存稿).1 In his philosophy, Luo generally continued in the tradition of Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi 朱熹, focusing on questions such as the relation between principle (li 理) and qi 气, the mind (xin 心) and inherent nature (xing 性), investigating things and probing principle to the utmost, the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, and the mind of dao and that of man, even referring to himself as “an after-effect of Zhu [Xi]’s learning.” He sought the dao assiduously his whole life, straining his mind in reflection. In his early life, he was much attracted to the enlightenment methods of Chan Buddhism, only later in his life coming to recognise the teachings of the Confucian teaching on inherent nature and principle. When he was almost sixty, he finally felt he had grasped the fundamental truth of inherent nature and endowment (ming 命). He describes this process of study as follows: [Trans.] See Kunzhi ji 困知记, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990. Translations from this work are based on Irene Bloom, Knowledge Painfully Acquired: The Kun-chih chi by Lo Ch’in-shun (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) with some modifications. Translations from various other sources have been made consulting Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 1

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The Philosophical Thought of Luo Qinshun

From the time I began my education I was only aware of the instructions of the sages and worthies and knew nothing whatever about Chan. Then when I was employed in the capital, I encountered an old Buddhist priest and questioned him casually about how to become a Buddha. With equal casualness the priest resorted to Chan language in his reply, saying, “The Buddha is in the pine tree in the courtyard.” I supposed that there must be something in what he said and gave it my undivided thought until dawn. As I grasped my clothing and was about to arise, I became suddenly enlightened and was unaware that my entire body was bathed in perspiration. Later I obtained the “Song of Enlightenment” (Zhengdao ge 证 道歌). Reading it, I found that it accorded perfectly with my own experience. I regarded this as most wonderful and mysterious and thought that in all the principles of the world there was nothing to add to it. Later when I held office at the Imperial University in Nanjing, I never put the books of the sages and worthies out of my hands for even a day. I entered into the spirit of the books and savoured them over a long period of time, gradually realising their truth. Only then did I understand that what I had perceived on that former occasion was the mysterious activity of the mind’s pure spirituality and not the principle of inherent nature. From this point on, with day following upon day, I devoted my mind and my most painstaking effort to careful inquiry and personal realisation. Only when I was approaching the age of sixty did I finally attain clear insight into the reality of the mind and inherent nature and truly acquire the basis for self-confidence. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 34)

Comparing Luo’s “Zheng’an’s Record of Personal Details” (Zheng’an lüli ji 整庵 履历记) with his “Biography of Luo Zheng’an” (Luo Zheng’an zizhi 罗整庵自志), it is clear that each change in his theoretical conception stemmed from bitter experience, thus it cannot be said that his search for the Way was not valiant nor that his belief in his goal was not firm. Luo’s theory of principle and qi, although it took Zhu Xi as a starting point, already clearly displayed features from Zhang Zai’s 张载 theory of qi, and his theory of mind and inherent nature also differed from Zhu Xi’s in certain respects. Thus although Luo generally followed the path laid down by Zhu Xi, his specific theoretical viewpoints already contained many divergences. His two main theories, those of principle and qi and of mind and inherent nature, are in some respects in contradiction with each other, and these contradictions clearly reflect the characteristic features of Neo-Confucianism in the Ming Dynasty.

1 Principle and Qi The relationship between principle 理 and qi 气 was a core problem of Neo-Confucianism. Although Zhu Xi attempted to explain his view of the priority of principle as valid logically but not temporally, his desire to emphasise reality and dominance of principle meant that however much he tried he was unable to escape the suspicion of splitting principle and qi into two separate things. In terms of the relationship between principle and qi, Luo Qinshun endorses “identifying principle as an aspect of qi,” and that principle and qi cannot be separated or mixed. He argues that:

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Principle must be identified as an aspect of qi, and yet to identify qi with principle would be incorrect. The distinction between the two is very slight, and hence it is extremely difficult to explain. Rather we must perceive it within ourselves and comprehend it in silence. It is one thing to speak of “identifying principle as an aspect of qi” and another to speak of “identifying principle with qi.” There is a clear difference between them. If this is not apparent, there is no point in explaining further. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 32)

Identifying principle as an aspect of qi means taking principle to be the order and coherence of qi, which refers to a quality or property. Qi is a category that expresses existence, thus qualities and order must be recognised from concrete existents. Quality refers to the quality of an existent, and the two cannot be separated temporally into prior and posterior, but can only be considered as two aspects of one thing. Qi cannot be considered as principle, yet we can also not speak of principle in the absence of qi, and this makes their relationship abstruse and obscure. If they are not distinguished clearly, it is easy to fall into the mistakes of one’s predecessors. Furthermore, these are basic views concerning the cosmos and human existence; if these are not clarified, it will be difficult to gain a correct understanding of any other theories constructed on this foundation. Concerning this relationship between principle and qi, Luo gives many clear arguments, for example: What, in fact, was meant by principle? That which penetrates Heaven and earth and connects past and present is nothing other than qi, which is unitary. This qi, while originally one, revolves through endless cycles of movement and tranquility, going and coming, opening and closing, rising and falling. Having become increasingly obscure, it then becomes manifest; having become manifest, it once again reverts to obscurity. It produces the warmth and coolness and the cold and heat of the four seasons, the birth, growth, gathering in, and storing of all living things, the constant moral relations of the people’s daily life, the victory and defeat, gain and loss in human affairs. And amid all of this prolific variety and phenomenal diversity there is a detailed order and an elaborate coherence which cannot ultimately be disturbed, and which is so even without our knowing why it is so. This is what is called principle. Principle is not a separate entity which depends on qi in order to exist or which “attaches to qi in order to operate.” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 4)

If principle is not another thing outside of qi, we cannot say that principle depends on qi in order to exist or attaches to it in order to operate. Although Zhu Xi repeatedly states that principle and qi cannot be separated, his statements that “principle is built on yin and yang, just as a man straddles a horse” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类], Vol. 94) and “without this qi, this principle would have no place to attach to” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu, Vol. 1) undoubtedly imply a conception of principle as depending on or attached to qi. Perceiving this ambiguity in Zhu Xi’s theory of principle and qi, along with the potential misunderstandings to which it could lead, Luo repeatedly uses the idea of “speaking of principle in terms of qi” to correct it. In his thought, qi is the only substance in the world, and principle is the nothing but the order displayed by the opening and closing, rising and falling, movement and stillness, and coming and going of qi. It is thus through the order of qi that the qualities of things and the differences between them are embodied.

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Luo Qinshun’s core view of the relation between principle and qi appears repeatedly in his works, and he often dwells at great length upon it, deepening his analysis. For example: Principle is only the principle of qi. It must be observed in the phenomenon of revolving and turning of qi. Departing is followed by returning, and returning is followed by departing: this is the phenomenon of revolving and turning. And in the fact that departure must be followed by return, and return must be followed by departure, there is that which is so even without our knowing why it is so. It is as if there were a single entity acting as a regulating power within things and causing them to be as they are. This is what we designate as principle and what is referred to in the statement, “In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity.” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 68)

The point being emphasised here is that although principle is the mode of movement of qi, it does not intentionally govern qi to force it to appear with this mode of movement; rather, the mode of movement of qi is spontaneously so, “so even without our knowing why it is so,” and this quality of principle is the “Supreme Polarity” (taiji 太极) of the Book of Changes. Luo also suggests that the returning and departing of qi represents its affect and response (ganying 感应), and that this alternation of affect and response repeats endlessly, with principle present within its alternations. Affect and response thus have a constant pattern, as in Luo’s statement, “Stable and settled, rising and falling according to a proper principle, without allowing a moment’s rest in between” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 98). In terms of the specific qualities of principle, Luo especially emphasised its fixed aspect, that is, principle as a method and regulation with the corresponding stability and identity. In these terms, he refers to principle as a fixed principle, saying: There is nowhere that principle is not fixed. Were it not fixed, it would not be principle. But when the student probes principle to get to the utmost, it is necessary that he perceive it in a flexible way and not get bogged down. Many of our Confucian predecessors spoke about “careful observation,” and this is what they meant. If we perceive it in a flexible way, principle is vital and animated and is always right before us. And yet one can neither augment nor diminish it by the slightest bit, nor can one raise or lower it by the slightest fraction. By perceiving principle in this way, one realises that there is nowhere that principle is not fixed. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 67)

Here, Luo emphasises the absolute and consistent nature of principle. On this point he is in agreement with the two Cheng brothers 二程, who argued, “Speaking of the principle of Heaven, its dao and principle cannot be exhausted. It did not preserve Yao; it did not destroy Jie. Thus how can one speak of preservation and destruction, increase and decrease? It originally lacks nothing” (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers [Er Cheng yishu 二程遗书], Vol. 2a). However, Luo differs from the Cheng brothers’ in that they took principle to be a permanently existing substance transcending Heaven, earth and the myriad things. For Luo, it is only on the basis of identifying principle as an aspect of qi that one can speak of its stability and identity, and although he emphasises “Were [principle] not fixed, it would not be principle,” he further stresses that flexibility is required in recognising and grasping principle: although principle is fixed, in grasping and applying principle there are

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differences of fine and rough, skilled and clumsy, and this is what he means by “perceive it in a flexible way.” According to Luo, principle is not a dead material object, but a living principle that can function flexibly in accordance with different spatial and temporal conditions. In this way, Luo highlights the active nature of man’s recognising and grasping natural laws, avoiding the ossified, rigid understanding of principle proposed by earlier thinkers, implying that principle primarily refers to real physical principle and not to metaphorical, symbolic ethical principle. Luo’s conception of the principle-qi relation as “identifying principle through qi” represents a significant departure from that of Zhu Xi, a departure which appears clearly in their differing views of which among principle and qi plays the determinative role. For Zhu Xi, that which determines a thing or event to be that particular thing or event is principle, hence he defines principle as “the reason why things are so, the rule why things should be so.” Zhu Xi’s core view of the relationship between principle and qi is that principle is the metaphysical dao, the root that gives birth to things, while qi is a physical object (qi 器), an instrument by which living things arise. People and things all receive principle which provides their inherent nature (xing 性), and qi which provides their physical form. Principle is that which determines a thing to be that particular thing, while qi is merely the raw material that fills out the structure provided by principle. Principle is the root, qi is the branches; qi is homogeneous, while principle differentiates. Hence, principle is the cause why things are so, while the things and events produced by this cause are effects. Cause produce effects, effects do not possess causal power, so logically principle must precede things. For Zhu Xi, the reason why things are so and the rule why things should be so are two aspects of principle. The reason why things are so constitutes the basis and cause of things and events, while the rule why things should be so provides their model and regulation. Although the rule why things should be so cannot be separated from specific things, as soon as it is perceived, projected and assimilated by people, becoming transformed into ideas with ethical implications such as “Heavenly principle” (tianli 天理) or “the principle of inherent nature” (xingli 性理), the rule why things are so logically becomes an eternal ethical law which can be separated from specific things and events. Thus, Zhu Xi’s definitions of principle and qi, along with his general mode of thought, naturally gave later thinkers a theoretical space to divide principle and qi into two separate things. Although Zhu Xi repeatedly declares that “a thing’s nature and its form are nothing but one body,” his main emphasis is clearly on the fact that “principle and qi must be two things,” that “between dao and physical objects, the distinction is clear.” Luo Qinshun recognised the deficiencies in Zhu Xi’s theory, repeatedly stating that “principle is the order and coherence [tiaoli 条理] of qi.” Order and coherence is not the reason why things are so, their cause or basis, but rather a naturally emergent property that is separate from relations of cause and effect. Similarly, it is not the rule why things should be so, a pre-existing model or regulation with prescriptive implications, but is natural and secondary. “Discussing principle in terms of qi” entirely rules out any logical possibility of dividing principle and qi into two things, and thus represents the key move in Luo’s return to Zhang Zai, using his conception to correct that of Zhu Xi.

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Starting from this point, Luo criticises Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi many times in his Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired. For example he states: The phrase ‘In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity’ [from the Commentaries to the Changes] has led some to suspect that there is a single entity that acts as a controlling power amid the transformations of yin and yang. But this is not the case. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 59)

For Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, ‘changes’ refers to the great transforming and flowing process of yin and yang, while ‘Supreme Polarity’ is the general name for the myriad principles. Cheng Yi once said: Empty and tranquil, and without any sign, and yet all things are luxuriantly present. The state before there is any response to it is not an earlier one, and the state after there has been response to it is not a later one… What makes [qi] yin or yang is the dao. Yin and yang are qi. (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers, Vol. 15)

Zhu Xi also said: The Supreme Polarity is the metaphysical dao; yin and yang are physical objects. Thus although when viewed in terms of their phenomenal aspect, movement and stillness have their different times and yin and yang their different positions, the Supreme Polarity is nonetheless never absent. And when viewed in terms of their subtle nature, although it is faint and serene with no sign, the principle [li] of movement and stillness, yin and yang is already completely present within. (Explication of [Zhou Dunyi’s] Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity [Taijitu shuo jie 太极图说解])

Here, changes of yin and yang have the Supreme Polarity or principle dominating them from within. Although principle is faint and aloof with no sign, it is the reason for the functioning of qi as yin and yang, and hence there is already a suspicion of speaking of principle separately from qi, of principle as prior to qi. It is this that forms the basis for Luo Qinshun’s criticisms of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. He points out that in Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s statements that “dao is the reason for yin and yang” and “dao is the reason for opening and closing,” ‘the reason for’ (suo yi 所以) already seems to separate principle and qi into two things. Zhu Xi’s arguments that “principle and qi must be two things” and “without a particular qi, a particular principle would have no resting place” only serve to make the separation of principle and qi into two things even clearer. The same suspicion of separation can also be found in Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 statement in his Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taiji tu shuo 太极图说) that “When the reality of the Ultimate of Non-being and the essence of yin, yang, and the Five Agents come into mysterious union, integration ensues,” since things must first be separated before one can speak of coming into union. In this statement, ‘the Ultimate of Non-being’ is also the Supreme Polarity, which is also principle, while yin and yang are qi, thus the fact that the Supreme Polarity and qi come into mysterious union and integration clearly implies that they were originally two things. Luo Qinshun asks, if the Supreme Polarity and yin and yang are two, then where were they before they came into union? Zhou Dunyi was the originator of Neo-Confucianism and Zhu Xi

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wrote a commentary on his Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, thus the fact that Zhu Xi consistently considered principle and qi as two things can ultimately be traced back to this idea of Zhou Dunyi’s. Although Zhu Xi’s disciples and scholars such as Yin Tun 尹焞 and Hu Juren 胡居仁 who faithfully followed his thought were outstanding in the honesty and sincerity they cultivated, nonetheless they still followed Zhu Xi in his view of principle and qi, making the same mistake he did. In his Record of Residing in Study (Juye lu 居业录), Hu Juren wrote that “qi is that by which inherent nature acts,” “that which produces the Great Harmony is dao,” “there is principle and later there is qi” and “the changes are made by dao,” in all of which his view is not yet crystal clear. For Xue Xuan 薛瑄, although in his Record of Reading Books (Dushu lu 读书录) he states “There is no gap between principle and qi, hence it can be said that dao is physical objects [qi 器], and physical objects are dao,” a view praised by Luo Qinshun, his work also contains the statement that “qi gathers and disperses, while principle does not gather or disperse,” which seems to be in contradiction with the former view. Luo Qinshun points out that the gathering of qi is the gathering of principle, and the dispersal of qi is the dispersal of principle. Principle only displays gathering and dispersal as an aspect of qi, and there is absolutely no eternal principle that does not gather or disperse, hence Xue Xuan regarded principle and qi as two things throughout his work. In his metaphor of sunlight and a bird in flight, principle is the sunlight and qi the bird; principle rides qi and moves, just as a bird ‘carries’ sunlight when it flies. Although a bird in flight is never without sunlight, the sunlight on its back does not exhaust sunlight itself, an idea that still separates principle and qi into two. For Luo, “the gathering of qi is itself the principle of gathering and the dispersal of qi is itself the principle of dispersal” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 148). Principle is recognised through qi, and principle is not to be found outside of qi. Since he opposed any formal separation of principle and qi into two things, Luo greatly praised the views of Cheng Hao, which differed from those of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. Cheng Hao’s conception of inherent nature (xing 性) and qi as forming an integral whole with no gaps is in line with Luo’s own view, and Luo commended his conception of the unity of the changes, dao, spirit (shen 神) and inherent nature, saying: The statements of the elder Master Cheng… include the following: “‘The workings of high Heaven have neither sound nor smell’ [from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)]. As substance, it is called change; as principle, it is called the dao; in its functioning, it is called spirit; as an endowment in human beings, it is called inherent nature.” Employing only a few words, he was utterly incisive and incomparably intelligent! If the student gets to this point and is still unable to understand, I am afraid that he will always be confused by various theories and cannot expect to resolve them into unity. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 30)

In Luo’s view, Cheng Hao’s view of the unity of change, dao and spirit as one, taking them to be different aspects of the great flowing becoming of the cosmos, is the most reasonable and balanced. The substance of the cosmos is qi, the general process of its movement and transformation is change (yi 易), the moving patterns

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of qi as expressed in change are dao, the mysterious and unfathomable functioning of qi’s contraction, expansion, rising, falling, closing and opening is spirit, and all these are simply different aspects of the general process of change in the cosmos. This view of Cheng Hao’s, in which principle and qi are integrated, speaking of both qi and principle simultaneously, met with Luo’s highest approval. He considered that Cheng Yi’s “dao is the reason for yin and yang” was not as accurate as Cheng Hao’s “originally there is only this dao” which has no breaks in its wholeness, not needing to add “the reason for” which could only lead to the separation of principle from qi. Among the various explanations of the key concepts of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism such as principle, qi, the mind and inherent nature, he was only satisfied with that of Cheng Hao, saying: I have taken up all of the writings of Cheng and Zhu, meditating deeply and reflecting carefully on them, reading them over and over again without putting them down. It is only in the case of the views of the elder Master Cheng that I feel not the slightest doubt. The writings of the younger Master Cheng and Master Zhu are numerous, and they often probe the furthest depths and attain the utmost subtlety. Both sides of an argument are explored to the fullest. The reason I have doubts is that I have yet to see that they finally achieved unity. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 6)

“Yet to see that they finally achieved unity” means they had not yet achieved wholeness, still retaining a division between principle and qi as two things. The more deeply and subtly they probed, the more difficult it was to compensate for this deficiency. This is precisely where Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s view of the unity of the dao of Heaven was split. Luo Qinshun combined Zhang Zai’s theory of spiritual transformation (shenhua 神化) with Cheng Hao’s theory of changes, dao and spirit, proposing his own theory of the Supreme Polarity, yin and yang, spiritual transformation, inherent nature and endowment, taking the overall functioning of the cosmos as spiritual transformation and the coherence expressed by this functioning as the Supreme Polarity, and combining yin and yang with the Supreme Polarity, spirit with transformation, to form an undivided unity. He stated: Spirit (shen 神) and transformation (hua 化) are the mysterious functioning of Heaven and earth. Were it not for yin and yang, there would be no transformation in the world, and were it not for the Supreme Polarity, there would be no spirit. However, to conclude from this that the Supreme Polarity is spirit and that yin and yang are transformation would be invalid. For transformation results from the action of yin and yang, but yin and yang are not transformation. Spirit results from the action of the Supreme Polarity, and yet the Supreme Polarity is not spirit. The word “action” (wei 为) expresses what [Mencius] called “that which is enacted without an agent.” Master Zhang [Zai] said, “Unity is the condition for spirit. Duality is the condition for transformation.” The word “transformation” here refers to movement and action, whereas the word “spirit” refers to permanence and abiding. Although transformation involves duality, its action is always unitary. Spirit is originally unitary, and yet it is always present within duality. United, we call it spirit; divided, we call it transformation. Thus when one speaks of transformation, spirit is included, and when one speaks of spirit, transformation is included. Yin and yang included the Supreme Polarity, and the Supreme Polarity includes yin and yang. Unity implies duality, and duality implies unity. The student must realise this so as to distinguish clearly between substance and function. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 14)

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Here Luo uses Zhang Zai’s discussion concerning the unity of duality, but his explanation differs from Zhang’s. In Zhang Zai’s view of the unity of duality, duality refers to the division of the Supreme Vacuity (tai xu 太虚) of qi into the two opposing forces of yin and yang, while unity refers to the combination of the two opposing forces of yin and yang into the Supreme Vacuity of qi. The unity of yin and yang as the Supreme Vacuity of qi implies that their functioning is mysterious and unpredictable, while the division of the Supreme Vacuity of qi into yin and yang implies that there are the transportations and transformations of mutual contact and oscillation, progress and retreat, extension and retraction, coming and going, rise and fall. In Luo’s view of the unity of duality, unity refers to the Supreme Polarity, and duality refers to yin and yang. Transformation is the functioning of yin and yang, while spirit is the mysterious functioning of the Supreme Polarity. The Supreme Polarity is not to be found outside of yin and yang. Further, this mysterious functioning is naturally produced by the Supreme Polarity, “enacted without an agent,” rather than the Supreme Polarity having any intention, purpose, plan, or artifice. The Supreme Polarity and yin-yang, spirit and transformation, simply describe different aspects of the same single great flowing cosmos. Yin and yang are the substance, while transformation is the function; the Supreme Polarity is the order and coherence of the substance, while spirit is the mysterious functioning of this order and coherence. Analysed from different perspectives, their names are different, but they are all unified in the great flow of the cosmos. Here, Luo Qinshun is still following through with his basic principle of “recognising principle through qi.”

2 Mind and Inherent Nature Mind (xin 心) and inherent nature (xing 性) are also central concepts in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, and, compared with principle and qi, play a more direct and evident role in a particular school or philosopher’s direction of thought and practice of cultivation. Luo Qinshun’s conception of mind and inherent nature differs from those of both the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 and Lu-Wang 陆王 schools, and has its own distinctive approach. In Luo’s philosophy, mind generally refers to an organ that can think, can produce, and be filled with thoughts. There are thus two basic functions of mind, one is thinking, which is also often referred to as spiritual intelligence (shen ming 神明 or ling ming 灵明), and the other is as the location for inherent nature, i.e. the place where that which makes humans human can express and reveal itself. Inherent nature is thus the basic characteristic of humanity, the essential provisions that make humans human. Luo gives a clear definition for both the concepts of mind and inherent nature:

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Mind is the spiritual intelligence of man. Inherent nature is his vital principle. The place where principle resides is called the mind. That which the mind possesses is called inherent nature. The two must not be confused and considered as one… The two are always inseparable, yet they should not be confused. If one refines his understanding again and again, he will perceive them as they really are. If one mistakes the mind for inherent nature, it will truly be a case of an infinitesimal mistake in the beginning leading to an infinite error at the end. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 1)

The distinction and difference between mind and inherent nature is here made very clear. Mind here is not the mind found in Lu Jiuyuan’s 陆九渊 “mind is principle,” but rather the organ that receives and expresses sensible data from the eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body. The basic functions of the mind are thus to sense, distinguish, recognise, remember, reason, etc. Inherent nature for Luo is not the inherent nature found in Gaozi’s 告子 “What is inborn is called inherent nature” [see Mencius, 6A.3], but rather the essential provisions that make humans human, the unique quality that makes humans different from animals, i.e. the “vital principle” of humanity. The vital principle of humanity is a rather vague concept. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi held that “inherent nature is principle,” viewing inherent nature as the fundamental law of the cosmos as expressed in the human mind, which does not include temperament. That which makes humans human then, is that humans can govern their minds with ethical principles. However, for Cheng Hao, the meaning of “inherent nature” was much broader, with his “vital principle of humanity” encompassing the two aspects of inherent nature and qi, such that “‘that which is inborn is inherent nature’, inherent nature is qi and qi is inherent nature,” and “man’s nature is indeed good, but it cannot be said that evil is not in his nature.” The fundamental principle of the cosmos cannot be separated from humanity’s sensibility and temperament; human nature is always a real nature affected by changes in temperament, and there is no bare, pure and clear “original nature.” Hence, “‘By nature man is tranquil at birth’ [from the Record of Rites (Liji礼记), “Record of Music” (Yueji 乐记)]. The state preceding this cannot be discussed. As soon as we talk about human nature, we already go beyond it” (Chan 1963, 528). As discussed above, in his discussions of principle and qi, Luo Qinshun commended Cheng Hao’s view of principle and qi as an integral whole and opposed Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s separation of principle and qi, but in his discussions of mind and inherent nature, he favoured Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, holding that “the place where principle resides is called the mind.” Here, he generally takes the mind to be the organ that can be filled with and display inherent nature, hence it is originally spiritually intelligent. “That which the mind possesses is called inherent nature” is simply a reversal of this definition. “The place where principle resides is called the mind” here emphasises that the basic provisions and essential quality of man are his modes of action and mental qualities set according to ethical principles, along with the psychological states these produce. When all people are born and receive qi, they are also bestowed with this essential quality. This is given, innate and impossible to refuse, and necessarily expresses itself as the modes of action and psychological qualities of living humans. Thus, mind and inherent nature are inseparable and yet not mixed. The difference between the two however can only be

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seen clearly after a certain amount of experience in study and effort. This difference is fine and subtle, and if one is not absolutely clear about it, one may easily go far astray. Luo Qinshun’s conception of mind and inherent nature is essentially the same as that of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. His statement that “pure intelligence and consciousness are the wonder of the mind, while perfect subtlety and absolute unity are the reality of inherent nature” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 51-2) is precisely Zhu Xi’s basic idea concerning mind and inherent nature. Luo also states, “the thing that is ‘most perfect’ is inherent nature, the thing that is ‘most changing’ is the feelings, and the thing that is ‘most spiritual’ is the mind” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 50). In terms of the relationship between inherent nature and feelings (qing 情), Luo views inherent nature as “the mind of dao” and the feelings as “the human mind,” a view which follows that put forward by Zhu Xi in his Commentary on the Sections and Phrases of Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong zhang ju 中庸章句). The mind of dao referred to by Zhu Xi is the mind that can apprehend moral principle, while the human mind is that which apprehends the desires of the eyes and ears. Although Luo Qinshun takes up Zhu Xi’s concepts of the mind of dao and the human mind, the meaning he gives them is somewhat changed from that given by Zhu Xi. In explaining the difference between them, Luo says: The mind of dao is inherent nature. The human mind is the feelings. The mind is one, but one speaks of it as two because of the distinction of activity and tranquility and the difference of substance and function. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 2)

Here, the human mind is active while the mind of dao is tranquil; the human mind is function (yong 用) while the mind of dao is substance (ti 体). Or, in other words, “that before feelings are aroused is the mind of dao, while that after feelings are aroused is the human mind.” Activity and tranquility are concepts that express the state of the mind, substance and function are concepts that express the level of the mind, while the mind of dao and the human mind are concepts that express an ethical meaning. Combining the two together, Luo Qinshun’s idea is that before feelings arouse the mind it exists in a tranquil state as substance, or Heavenly principle, while once it has been aroused by feelings it exists in an active state as function, and has both principle and desire. However, according to the original meaning of the concepts of substance and function, there is no substance that does not express itself as function, and no function without substance. The view that substance is the mind of dao, or Heavenly principle, and function is the human mind, or human desire, thus leads to confusion and contradiction. This weakness in Luo’s view of mind and inherent nature would later be criticised by Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi, and even in Luo’s time Wang Yangming had raised the same point. As Wang noted in his “Letter in Reply to Lu Yuanjing” (Da Lu Yuanjing shu 答陆原静书): The state of centrality when feelings have not yet been aroused is innate conscience, it is an integrated whole with no distinction of before and after or inner and outer. Working and not

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working can be described as activity or tranquility, but innate conscience cannot be divided into working and not working; stillness and inspiration can be spoken of as activity and tranquility, but innate conscience cannot be separated into stillness and inspiration. Activity and tranquility concern what we meet with; the original state of the mind can never be divided into activity and tranquility. Principle is that which is inactive, when active it becomes desire. When following principle, even if one is busily engaged in a myriad of changes, there is no activity; when following desire, even if one’s mind is reduced to one single idea, there is no tranquility. Within activity there is tranquility, and within tranquility there is activity, is there any doubt about this? (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II)

Luo’s use of activity and tranquility, substance and function to separate Heavenly principle from human desire is one area where his theory is not as clear as that of Wang Yangming. However, in the course of the later development of his thought, Luo made some alterations to his account of principle and desire, the mind of dao and the human mind. He said: “The human mind is human desire; the mind of dao is Heavenly principle.” Chengzi’s statement stems from the Record of Music, and makes a clear distinction. Later, many scholars often regarded the words ‘human desire’ as excessive, and thus there was a lack of consistency between various views. That inherent nature must have desire, this is not due to man but to Heaven; since this is from Heaven, can it be eradicated? That desire has moderation and excess, this is not due to Heaven but to man; since this is from man, can it be indulged? (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 90)

Since so-called human desire, the natural desire that all people have, in fact comes from Heaven, it cannot be eradicated but only reasonably moderated and not indulged. Reasonable human desire is in fact Heavenly principle, and, as something shared equally by all people, cannot be removed. Luo had in fact already explained this idea in his earlier criticism of Lu Jiuyuan: The fact that man has desires definitely derives from Heaven. Some are necessary and cannot be repressed; some are appropriate and cannot be changed. If those that are irrepressible all conform to the principle of what is appropriate, how can they not be good? It is only heedlessly giving way to the passions, indulging the desires, and not knowing how to turn back that is evil. Confucians of the past often spoke about eliminating or restraining human desires and thought it necessary to resort to severe means in order to repress them. But their mode of expression seems one-sided and exaggerated. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 28)

In this passage, Luo clearly saw the error of later followers of Neo-Confucianism in viewing all human desire as evil, and, by returning to earlier Confucian thinkers, attempted to give desire a reasonable position rather than dismissing it as entirely evil and attempting to eradicate it. His hope was to find a way of satisfying human desire reasonably, using principle to moderate desire. However, he accepted the idea that “It is the inherent nature of Heaven that man is born tranquil, while it is the nature of desire that when he comes into contact with things he becomes active” from the Record of Music chapter of the Record of Rites, and thus used activity and

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tranquility to separate inherent nature and feelings, opening up the debate concerning inherent nature as tranquil and feelings as active, inherent nature as good and feelings as evil. Thus although Luo castigated the later followers of Wang Yangming for their biased statements, he was still unable to point out the minor theoretical error in this Record of Music passage, and consequently unable to call attention to the logical jump from regarding inherent nature as tranquil and feelings as active to regarding inherent nature as good and the feelings as evil. This already foreshadows the latent contradiction between his theory of principle and qi and his theory of mind and inherent nature. In his explanation of the ‘sixteen character teaching on the mind’, he states that: The mind of dao is quiescent and does not move. Its substance, which is most perfect, cannot be seen. Therefore it is subtle. The human mind, when it is stimulated, penetrates. Its function, which is most changing, cannot be fathomed. Therefore it is insecure. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 1)

Here he clearly uses activity and tranquility, substance and function to separate subtlety and insecurity, an idea difficult to distinguish from the biased conception he criticised above, and this exact point would later be powerfully refuted by Huang Zongxi. Luo Qinshun was deeply convinced by Zhu Xi’s idea that “principle is one; its particularisations are diverse” (li yi fen shu 理一分殊) and used it as the guiding principle in his theory of inherent nature and endowment (ming 命). He once said: “Principle is one; its particularisations are diverse” derives from a statement made by Master Cheng [Yi] in his discussion of the “Western Inscription” (“Xi ming”) [西铭, by Zhang Zai]. These words are extremely simple, and yet when they are extended to the principles of the universe, there is nothing that is not comprehended. This is definitely true for Heaven (or nature), it is likewise true for man, and it is true for all living things. It is equally true for the individual, for the family, and for the world. It is true for a year, for a single day, and for all time. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 9)

This is to say, “principle is one; its particularisations are diverse” can be used to explain all principles for Heaven, earth and the myriad things from ancient times down to the present, with nothing excluded. Luo uses this idea to explicate his position concerning inherent nature and endowment. For Luo, inherent nature refers to the embodiment of the fundamental principle of the cosmos in people and things, while endowment refers to the inevitability of this embodiment, which happens without our knowing any reason why, along with the necessity of differences between individuals based on their different experiences and encounters. Inherent nature is usually spoken of in subjective terms, while endowment is usually spoken of in objective terms. In general, the principle of inherent nature and endowment is the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, which can be used to explain the difference and identity of things and events. Luo states: I submit that the subtle truth of inherent nature and endowment is summarised in the formulation, “Principle is one; its particularisations are diverse”… At the inception of life when they are first endowed with qi, the principle of human beings and things is just one.

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After having attained physical form, their particularisations are diverse. That their particularisations are diverse is nothing but natural principle, for the oneness of their principle always exists within diverse particularisations. This is the explanation for the subtle truth of inherent nature and endowment. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 7)

Here, human beings and things are endowed with the same principle and originally share the same nature, but are affected by the conditions of their differing environments during their process of development, and thus have different features. These differences develop naturally and spontaneously, without anything ruling over them, and this forms their respective endowment or fate. The one principle is thus found within its multiple particularisations, and inherent nature is found within endowment. In this sense, the views that inherent nature is good and that it is both good and evil both have a certain truth: inherent nature is good in terms of the one principle, and both good and evil in terms of its multiple particularisations. Human beings necessarily receive Heavenly principle, so must have inherent nature; they necessarily receive qi while they live, and thus must also have its endowment. Luo Qinshun opposed juxtaposing the nature endowed by Heaven and that of physical qi, pointing out that to claim people have two separate natures is a mistake. Since the nature endowed by Heaven necessarily expresses itself as physical qi, it does not have the possibility of independent existence. Hence, in speaking of the nature endowed by Heaven, one has already logically implied the nature of physical qi; it is not the case that the latter forms another second nature. He argues: But when we speak of the nature endowed by Heaven, this already entails the physical being. And when we speak of the physical nature, isn't this the nature endowed by Heaven? To a single nature, they applied two names, and, moreover, spoke of the physical being and the endowment of Heaven as if they were opposed, so that in the final analysis their argument turned out to be unclear. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 66)

In this text, Luo bases his view on his own idea of “identifying principle as an aspect of qi” along with Cheng Hao’s view that “‘By nature man is tranquil at birth’. The state preceding this cannot be discussed. As soon as we talk about human nature, we already go beyond it.” Original nature is not an independently existing nature, thus it cannot be spoken of, and what we can speak of is just the original nature included within the nature of physical qi. Strictly speaking, even to say “the original nature included within the nature of physical qi” is already to suggest the possibility of two natures. Thus, Luo was opposed to Zhu Xi’s explanation of the nature of physical qi: “The nature of physical qi is simply the whole of the Supreme Polarity fallen into physical qi.” By speaking of “falling” (duo 堕), it is implied that there was something else before this falling, which would be incompatible with the principles of “identifying principle as an aspect of qi” and “no gap between principle and qi.” In speaking of the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, Zhu Xi was attempting to explain the relationship between the basic law of the cosmos (the unity of principle) and its different incarnations (its diverse particularisations). In fact, this is a proposition with ethical meaning, and its actual physical meaning is very slight. The statement that “all

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people have a Supreme Polarity, and all things have a Supreme Polarity” means that people and things all contain the basic law of the cosmos, but because the qi received by the each of the myriad things is different, so the basic law of the cosmos expresses itself differently in each specific thing, just as the same clear water when poured into a black bowl will appear to be one colour, while when poured into a blue bowl will appear to be another colour. When explaining the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, Zhu Xi uses the fundamental view that “principle is the same while qi is different,” but when explaining the actual physical differences of the myriad things, he uses the view that the qi they receive is different in terms of its thickness and clarity. This is a question of different levels of explanation, and does not imply a contradiction in Zhu Xi’s theory of principle. The unity and sameness of principle and the diversity and difference of its particularisations in qi form a unified whole in Zhu Xi’s system, but since he views the principles of the myriad things as different expressions of an identical and absolute “one principle,” it is difficult for him to avoid the suspicion that principle and the Supreme Polarity are independent of qi and yin-yang. In terms of his theory of principle and qi, Luo Qinshun held that principle should be identified as an aspect of qi, but in terms of mind and inherent nature he agreed with Zhu Xi’s unity of principle and diversity of particularisations, accepting a single principle prior to its diverse manifestations. This constitutes a very conspicuous contradiction in Luo’s theoretical system, one that appears very clearly in his explanation of Cheng Hao’s “‘By nature man is tranquil at birth’. The state preceding this cannot be discussed.” Luo comments: “the tranquility at birth is the centrality before the feelings have been aroused and the reality of inherent nature, which is unitary” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 20). Inherent nature and principle are here clearly regarded as one thing, at a time when they are separate from form and qi, a view that cannot be reconciled with his principle of identifying principle through qi. The contradiction between Luo’s theories of principle-qi and mind-nature were noted by Liu Zongzhou, who wrote in his comments on Luo: The names of mind and inherent nature cannot be confused, just as with principle and qi, yet the two can also not be completely grasped and separated, again as with principle and qi. The gentleman [Luo] correctly shunned the Song Dynasty Confucians’ theories of Heavenly endowment and physical qi, retaining only their “unity of principle and diversity of particularisations” and saying, “principle is just the principle of qi,” but why then did he not also say “inherent nature is just the nature of the mind”? The mind is just qi concentrated in human beings, while inherent nature is just principle concentrated in human beings; principle and qi are one, so the mind and inherent nature must not be two. Since the mind and inherent nature are one, inherent nature and feelings must not be two. Separating and then combining the three will always leave some duality, in which case what are principle and qi? What are the mind and inherent nature-feelings? If between Heaven and earth there is a principle joined with qi and also a principle separated from qi, if there is a nature separated from the mind and feelings separated from inherent nature, how then can these all have one root? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Ming ru xue an 明儒学案], 10)

Huang Zongxi took over his teacher’s viewpoint, and, in the section on Luo Qinshun in Case Studies of Ming Confucians, offered similar criticisms:

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The gentleman [Luo] discussed principle and qi most lucidly… However, his discussion of the mind and inherent nature are somewhat in contradiction with his views on principle and qi. That which in Heaven is qi, in human beings is the mind; that which in Heaven is principle, in human beings is inherent nature. Principle and qi are thus, so mind and inherent nature should also be thus, there is certainly no difference. Human beings receive qi from Heaven at birth, and are only given one mind which moves and is still, showing happiness, anger, sadness and joy in a cycle without end. In compassion it feels compassionate, in shame it feels shameful, in respect it feels respectful, in judging it feels right and wrong, a myriad of different feelings, reacting in all manner of ways, none of which can be ignored; this is what is known as inherent nature. It is not the case that at first there is another thing, established before the mind, attached within the mind. (ibid., 1109)

The above criticisms of Luo Qinshun from Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi have a great deal of force. For a systematic thinker, his theories of principle-qi and mind-nature should be unified, that of mind-nature being logically derived from that of principle-qi. For Luo, principle means the patterns of qi, its regularities of movement, that which remains orderly throughout the myriad changes and interactions. That which he calls inherent nature should thus also be the appropriateness of feelings, that which remains orderly throughout the myriad of emotions and reactions. The substance of the cosmos is unified through qi, so human beings’ ethical activities should be unified through the mind. In other words, according to his theory of principle and qi, his theory of the mind and inherent nature should be similar to that later put forward by Dai Zhen 戴震 that “the feelings that do not err.” Luo Qinshun took the unity of principle to be something equally possessed by all human beings, the diversity of its manifestations to be the basis for that which in the diverse physical qi expresses itself as the differences between different human beings, and those between human beings and things. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that principle is another thing outside of qi. According to Luo’s theory of principle and qi, the differences between things in the world should also have different principles due to the differences in qi they receive, i.e. “different qi, different principles,” yet his theory of the mind and inherent nature is actually one of “the same principle, different qi.” In reality, in terms of the differences and similarities between people and things, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi had already proposed a view of “different qi, different nature,” and Luo had already noticed this. He thought that Cheng Yi held both the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, and also that the differences in people’s abilities stemmed from differences in reception of qi, and that these two were not in contradiction. He said: Yichuan [Cheng Yi] did use such terms [i.e. the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations], yet he also thought that “capacity (cai [才]) comes from qi. Could it be that when he spoke of the diversity of particularisations he was referring only to qi? (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 9)

Here, he had already noted that Cheng Yi was inconsistent in his view of the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations. Yet as a result of this same view Luo himself gave up his idea that different qi implies different principle, and was thus equally inconsistent.

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The main reason for Luo’s contradiction was that he attempted to combine the fundamentally different theories of Mencius and Gaozi, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan together. He tried to overcome Zhu Xi’s view of principle as fundamental category, of principle ruling over qi, yet in terms of mind-nature he still continued the view found in the Record of Music chapter of the Record of Rites, Centrality in the Ordinary and Zhu Xi. He attempted to bring in Lu Xiangshan’s view of “mind as principle,” using the view that “the location of principle is the mind, that which the mind has is inherent nature” to express a comprehensive idea, yet also brought in ideas of the separation between activity and tranquility, substance and function, and centrality and harmony from Zhu Xi and the Record of Rites, rejecting Lu Xiangshan’s unification of the metaphysical and physical, substance and function, and activity and tranquility in his concept of the mind. In terms of principle and qi, he tried to go back to Zhang Zai to correct Zhu Xi, but generally still followed Zhu Xi in his view of the mind and inherent nature. At a time when the prevailing view was Wang Yangming’s Learning of the Mind, Luo Qinshun’s philosophy represented an effort to correct the views of Wang’s school while also avoiding the contradictions of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s theories of principle and qi.

3 Criticisms of Buddhism and the Learning of the Mind Luo Qinshun’s studies began with Chan Buddhism in his early years, with him first achieving enlightenment through the “pine tree in the courtyard” phrase, and then confirming this through Chan Master Yongjia Xuanjue’s 永嘉玄觉Chan Buddhist Song of Enlightenment, an experience through which he gained much. However, after he gained office at the Imperial University in Nanjing, he gradually abandoned Buddhism, returning to Confucius and Mencius, and in his later years strongly criticised Buddhism. From the argumentative content in Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, it seems the Buddhist sutras Luo had read include the Diamond Sutra, the Heart Sutra, the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra, and the Flower Garland Sutra, and from his analyses of Buddhist concepts including mind (xin 心), intention (yi 意), and consciousness (shi 识), the effort he had put into his Buddhist studies is evident. Luo’s criticisms of Buddhism are concentrated around the views of mind as inherent nature, inherent nature as enlightenment, no further tasks other than enlightenment, and abandoning effort in extension of knowledge and investigation of things. Luo believed that the greatest difference between Confucianism and Buddhism lay in their different understandings of the concept of “inherent nature” (xing 性). He said: What the Buddhists refer to as inherent nature is awareness (jue [觉]), while what we Confucians refer to as inherent nature is principle. There is no need to get into the question of what is right and who is wrong in this instance, since, at birth, human beings and other living things all possess both principle and awareness. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 33)

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The most important concept for Buddhists is “inherent nature,” and this “nature” is also called “Buddha-nature.” Luo points out that the content of what Buddhism calls inherent nature is awareness, and awareness is the original nature that is capable of understanding. When Buddhists say, “human beings and other things all possess Buddha-nature,” this means that human beings and other things all possess the original nature capable of enlightenment. In terms of human beings, “icchantikas can all become Buddhas”; in terms of things, “the absolute greenness of verdant bamboo, all this is prajñā; a perfect profusion of yellow flowers, nothing but Buddha-nature.” This is fundamental for Buddhist argument. The nature for Buddhists is the internal basis for all human beings and all things to become Buddhas, and thus the foundation of the whole of Buddhist theory. Luo argues that the Buddhist conception of inherent nature lacks the content of the Confucian benevolence (ren 仁). Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi both held that “inherent nature is principle,” and this principle is pattern and law, and at the same time ethical rule; principle is both the object of scientific knowledge, and also that of ethical knowledge, the two are both two and one, both one and two. The Buddhist conception of inherent nature contains no principle, thus Buddhists discard the thorough inquiry into principle and exhaustive use of inherent nature, abandoning the growth and transformation of Heaven and earth along with the values of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom in human relations. This constitutes the biggest difference between Confucianism and Buddhism. At the same time, Luo also believed that all things in the world possess both principle and awareness, and while Confucians emphasise knowledge of principle, Buddhists forget about principle and exclusively seek awareness. Luo argues: That which the thousand sages passed down is nothing but one principle… Thus the principle connecting Heaven, earth, man and things is originally one, and diversifies into particularisations. One must have investigated its diverse particularisations before one can perceive its unity. Once one has perceived this, one must follow and firmly hold onto it, and then in one’s worldly engagements one will have no possibility of error. This broadness and cultivation are why we Confucians’ emphasise practical study. That which is perceived by Chan Buddhists is nothing but a state of endless hollow emptiness. They fail to see the fine subtleties of principle as present in the mind and in things, and thus view principle as an obstruction. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 84)

That which Confucians seek is principle, a principle which is one in itself but diverse in its particularisations. The principle at the root of the myriad things is one, but as soon as it is expressed in particular things it becomes diverse. Confucians perceive this principle and, through sincerity, respect and self-control, turn it into the standard by which they cultivate themselves and respond to things. Thorough inquiry into principle and self-control, broadness and selectivity, these are the practical studies of Confucians. That which Buddhists seek is “emptiness” (kong 空), holding on to this one character as the technique for cultivating inherent nature, thus they not only do not inquire into principle, but even take principle to be an obstruction to preserving emptiness. Luo Qinshun criticised this, saying:

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The teaching of the Great Learning does not say, “have no will” [wu yi 无意], but only “make your will sincere” [cheng yi 诚意]. The lesson of Centrality in the Ordinary is not “have no thoughts,” but only “think carefully.” This is the gateway for entry into the Confucian Way, the basis for accumulating virtue; the thorough inquiry into principle and the exhaustive use of one’s nature must be done through this. Undoubtedly this is something that cannot be changed, and yet some come up with extreme heresies to confuse it! Those Chan scholars only concentrate on enlightenment, needing to eradicate all will and opinion, refusing all thoughts, blocking off paths in every direction, leaving their minds with no line to connect, securely closed off, in the hope that one day they will suddenly become awakened. Finally, all that they see is the aura of spiritual awareness, having not even an inkling of the principle of inherent nature and its endowment. How can people raise this up and ruin our Confucian way of thorough inquiry into principle and exhaustive use of one’s nature! [Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 81]

From the content of inherent nature, Luo’s criticisms of Buddhism extend to the method of enlightenment. He points out that the objective of the Buddhist discussions of “having no will,” “taking non-thought as the highest purpose,” “emptying one’s mind,” etc. is simply enlightenment. In Chan Buddhism, “a single moment of enlightenment is the Buddha,” meaning that the state of having a clear and empty mind with nothing whatever within is the spiritual realm of the Buddha. The goal of all cultivation and effort is to achieve this realm. In order to achieve and sustain this realm, one must “use thought to achieve non-thought,” closing off one’s sensory organs and the paths of one’s mind, such that that which is seen by the mind is nothing but clear emptiness. This is what Luo refers to as “the aura of spiritual awareness.” Although Confucians also speak of having no will, this simply means having no selfish will, having no pre-existing subjective views, maintaining the openness and impartiality of the mind, and not refusing to allow any thoughts whatsoever to arise. The Confucian form of having no will actually means simply making one’s will sincere. The goal of making one’s will sincere is not to achieve an aura of empty spirituality, but to establish the basis for the thorough inquiry into principle and the exhaustive use of one’s nature. Through this, one can internally achieve the ideal personality of the sages and men of virtue, while externally assisting in the transformation and growth of Heaven and earth. This is the fundamental difference between Confucianism and Buddhism. Explanations like this appear frequently in Luo’s Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired. However, they are essentially just a development of the criticisms of Buddhism made by earlier Song Dynasty Confucians, such as Cheng Hao’s “sages find their root in Heaven, Buddhists find their root in the mind,” Zhang Zai’s “Buddhists do not know Heaven’s endowment, and use mental methods to extinguish Heaven and earth,” and Zhu Xi’s “Buddhists from the beginning know nothing, but only recognise the operations of consciousness as their nature.” Luo developed his criticisms on the basis of these, commending their achievements in repelling Buddhism. In terms of theory, Luo advanced further in his deeper analysis and dissection of Buddhist concepts, and in the arguments he made concerning the mistakes in Buddhist theory. These were both more cutting and more comprehensive than those of previous thinkers.

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For example, Luo penetratingly analysed the core concept of Buddhism, jue 觉, i.e. “awareness” or “enlightenment.” The original meaning of Buddha was “the awakened or enlightened one,” and jue was another name for the Buddha, hence the concept held a centrally important place in the list of Buddhist categories and terminology. From the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (Dacheng qi xin lun 大 乘起信论) scripture, Luo took up the idea of separating awareness into “initial awareness” (shi jue 始觉) and “original awareness” (ben jue 本觉). Initial awareness refers to the process of gaining enlightenment from confusion through effort, while original awareness refers to human beings’ original mind-substance or tathātā. Original awareness is possessed from birth, and not won through later efforts. Through cultivation, people can pass through confusion and achieve enlightenment, becoming one with this original tathātā, at which point initial awareness vanishes and original awareness alone remains. This is what Luo refers to as “attaining original awareness on the basis of initial awareness, this is the dao of achieving Buddhahood” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 48). Luo also examined Buddhism’s epistemological methods. In his view, Buddhist epistemology regards original awareness as substance, and perceptual consciousness (jianwen zhijue 见闻知觉) as function; original awareness is the knowing subject, while perceptual consciousness is the known object. Without original awareness there is no way to produce perceptual consciousness, but, equally, without perceptual consciousness there is no way to see original awareness. That with the ability of knowing is the consciousness [shi 识] of the subject, and that which is known is what Buddhism calls the eighteen sensory domains. Thus, for Buddhism the knowing subject and the known object are both consciousness, both the mind. On this basis, Luo examined the concept of “consciousness” in detail. In Buddhist discussions of consciousness, the most common idea is that of “eight consciousnesses.” The eighth among these eight consciousnesses is often referred to as “storehouse-consciousness” (cangshi 藏识), and can be separated into root and branch, with intelligence as the root and consciousness as the branch. “Root” here implies “tathāgata clear and pure intelligence,” “the eternally abiding,” etc., while “consciousness” refers to “karma forms,” “birth and death,” etc. The object of Buddhist practice is to “transform consciousness into intelligence,” to “extinguish illusory thoughts and consciousness and achieve nirvana.” Luo points out that there is a contradiction in this Buddhist theory, in that it regards the original substance as real and phenomena as illusory. However, since root and branch, substance and function are unified as one, how can it be possible to distinguish real and illusory here? He reproaches this view, saying: Since consciousness is nothing but the spiritual brightness of the human mind, how can it be regarded as inherent nature? By taking the root substance as real and the flowing branches as illusory, it separates root and branch into two sections, while by claiming that the real becomes illusory in confusion, and the illusory becomes real in enlightenment, it thus also mixes real and illusory together. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 53)

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Luo Qinshun takes up the position of a Confucian, pointing out that the so-called real is simply the ineffable self-so, i.e. Heavenly principle, while the so-called illusory is simply that which comes from mindlessly following feelings, i.e. human desire. Conserving the real and removing the illusory thus simply means upholding Heavenly principle and abolishing human desires. This is the basic Confucian procedure for internally governing the body and mind and externally governing the state and world. According to the Buddhist idea of using confusion and enlightenment to separate real and illusory, before one is enlightened one is living in illusion, regardless of whether or not one is in accord with Heavenly principle, while once one is enlightened everything becomes real, with no distinction between Heavenly principle and human desire. This means that human desire is indulged while Heavenly principle is extinguished, a result caused by the view that “consciousness is inherent nature.” Luo also criticised the Buddhist view that “mind” is the original substance of the world. A famous Chan poem states: “That which existed prior to Heaven and earth, in formless and original solitude, is able to master the myriad images, and withers not with the passing of the seasons’.” This thing existing before Heaven and earth is “awareness,” “mind,” or “the real mind of original awareness,” formless and imageless, profound and still, hence “in formless and original solitude.” This real mind of original awareness is able to produce a myriad of dharmas, as shown in “the mountains, rivers and great earth itself are all merely images in my wondrously bright and true mind” hence it “is able to master the myriad images.” This mind is present eternally without disappearing, preeminently superior, not sharing in the activity and tranquility of the myriad things, and hence it “withers not with the passing of the seasons.” This 4-line poem was also used by certain Confucians in connection with the cosmological theory of “the Supreme Polarity producing the two modes [of yin and yang]” from the Commentaries on the [Book of] Changes [Yi zhuan 易传], an idea also analysed by Luo. He points out that although the idea of “the Supreme Polarity producing the two modes” superficially seems similar to the Chan master’s “that which existed prior to Heaven and earth,” in fact the Confucian idea of the Supreme Polarity cannot be spoken of separately from yin and yang, and is simply the substance corresponding to the function of yin and yang. Although it can be said that the Supreme Polarity is without sound or smell, in its mystical functioning it expresses itself in yin, yang and the operations of the myriad things, and is not “in formless and original solitude.” Further, the myriad things produced by the Supreme Polarity, yin, and yang, constitute a diverse multitude of ceaselessly reproducing, actual and real things. The “rich abundance referred to as the great enterprise” and the “ceaseless production and reproduction referred to as change” in the Commentaries on the Changes are not merely illusory images produced by “my wondrously bright and true mind.” That is to say, the thing existing “prior to Heaven and earth” is not the real mind of original awareness, and the myriad images it is “able to master” are not simply false images produced by the real mind of original awareness. This is a point of distinction between Confucianism and Buddhism, and cannot be confused.

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Luo Qinshun’s analyses of important Buddhist concepts are in certain places more penetrating and detailed than those of Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, more clearly safeguarding the basic Confucian position against the confusions of the Buddhist “mind of suffering.” However, he did not, as Wang Yangming did, take resources from Buddhist thought as useful aids in constructing his own philosophical system, and did not absorb the results of Buddhism’s rich ways of thinking into his own system of thought. Any possible further investigations into Buddhist theory were obstructed by the wholesale rejection of Buddhism produced by his “mind of suffering” in defence of the [Confucian] dao. When compared with Wang Yangming and the various great thinkers of the late Ming period, Luo Qinshun’s insularity is clearly visible. Luo not only criticised Buddhism, but also severely criticised Lu Jiuyuan and Yang Jian’s 杨简 Learning of the Mind (xin xue 心学), which he believed had been influenced by Buddhism or was even simply Buddhism in Confucian disguise. In criticising Buddhism, Luo was trying to defend the Confucian orthodoxy in general; in criticising the Learning of the Mind, he was trying to defend the specific Confucian orthodoxy derived from Zhu Xi. Luo was born slightly earlier than Wang Yangming, and was around thirty years older than Wang Ji 王畿, thus the Chan tendencies of the later [Wang] Yangming school were not yet a target of his criticism, but the theoretical points he criticised included some of their abuses. Luo once said: I see all too clearly that [Lu] Xiangshan’s learning is Chan… Buddhists see something of the mind, but nothing of inherent nature, and Xiangshan is the same. The “reaching the dao” he speaks of never exceeds the wondrousness of spiritual awareness. This taking spiritual awareness as reaching the dao is the source of his errors, and his difference from we Confucians is also really just found in this. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 114)

Luo upheld Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s view that “inherent nature is principle.” Inherent nature is that which is given to all human beings and things by principle, and this principle is the endowment in Heaven and inherent nature in human beings, while mind is the spiritual brightness of human beings, hence principle is stored in the mind but it is not the case that mind simply is principle. This is the general outline of Luo’s conception of mind and inherent nature. He believed that the mind spoken of by Mencius generally referred to the organ of thinking, as in Mencius’ “the function of the mind is to think” [see Mencius, 6A.15], such that that which thinks is the mind, and that which is thought is principle. The key of Mencius’ theory is the word “think.” Although Lu Jiuyuan described himself as following Mencius, taking Mencius’ “first build up the nobler part of our nature” (ibid.) as his example, the “nobler part” built up by Lu Jiuyuan was not Mencius’ mind that thinks. “While this mind still exists, this principle makes itself clear; in compassion it feels compassionate, in shame it feels shameful.” Judgments of right and wrong come first, and this mind is itself capable of distinguishing them. If this is the case, there is no need for the thinking spoken of by Mencius. Hence Luo criticised Lu Jiuyuan, saying: “Thus getting hold of the spiritual consciousness and considering this to be reaching the dao, if this is not Chan then what is?” (Record of Knowledge

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Painfully Acquired, 140). He also argued that Confucians believe in the investigation of things and inquiry into principle while Lu Jiuyuan turned all his efforts inward, investigating the things of this mind and inquiring into the principle of this mind, and hence departed from the teachings of Cheng-Zhu. The investigation of things spoken of by Cheng-Zhu meant investigating the principles of things in order to reach up to the principle of Heaven, while Lu Jiuyuan’s investigation of things only meant reflecting on one’s own mind, with no need to seek the principles of things. This idea is also incompatible with the teachings of the Great Learning. Thus for Luo, Lu Jiuyuan’s idea that “mind is principle” is simply a fabrication. He particularly denounced Lu Jiuyuan’s view that “the Six Classics are all footnotes to me,” arguing that Confucianism’s valuable teachings, in all their vast number, are nothing but inquiries into the principles of things. The task of scholars is thus to read carefully and think clearly, taking the words of the ancient sages and repeatedly attempting to grasp their meaning. Lu Jiuyuan’s theory was clearly welcome news to those who desired to swiftly reach the heights of thought, but simply seeking this in the body and mind places insufficient value on the classic Confucian texts, to the point of claiming that there is no need to read books, and in reading no need to painstakingly seek explanations. The result of this would clearly be that people all think there is no point in reading books: “To bring infinite harm to later scholars with just one sentence, Xiangshan’s crime was truly great!” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 72). As for Xiangshan’s methodology, in order that his student Yang Jian “suddenly realise the pure brightness of this mind, suddenly realise the endless infinity of this mind, suddenly realise that there is nothing outside the grasp of this mind,” he was to sit with eyes closed in meditation and achieve enlightenment; his student Zhan Fumin 詹阜民 meditated with eyes closed for half a month, and then one day on descending some steps was suddenly aware that his mind was already clear, upon which Lu Jiuyuan inspected his pupils and declared that his mind had indeed opened, and already displayed Heavenly principle; these kind of methods belong to Chan, and are not to be found in Confucianism. Lu Jiuyuan’s poem, “Raising my head to climb to the Southern Dipper, turning my body to rest upon the North Star, craning my neck to gaze outside the heavens, this person ‘I’ does not exist,” even more clearly displays the style of Chan chants. Luo criticised Lu Jiuyuan, saying: This principle in human beings is called inherent nature, in Heaven is called endowment. The mind is human beings’ spiritual brightness and the location where principle is stored, so how can it be said that the mind is principle and inquiring into things taken as inquiring into this mind? The expressions of the innate mind, as the mechanism for responding spontaneously, are the highest spirituality under Heaven, and certainly not dependent on thinking. But if we wish them all to attain due measure and degree, this is not possible without thinking. The effort of study lies precisely in this… If this mind is established roughly, without reaching the knowledge of where to stop, responding to stimulus entirely by relying on spontaneity, and this taken to be the dao, is this not only a fraction away from savage madness? These statements from Xiangshan have misled numerous people, and even today their effects grow worse. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 114)

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Luo Qinshun’s criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan are severe indeed, taking him to be the classic example of a ‘Chan Confucian’. They focus on one point, which is Lu Jiuyuan’s “taking spiritual awareness to be reaching the Way.” However, whether or not the mind spoken of by Lu Jiuyuan is merely spiritual awareness, as understood by Luo, and whether or not Lu Jiuyuan “only recognised manifest spirituality” without any content from inherent nature or principle, as Zhu Xi thought, these questions relate to how to correctly understand the Learning of the Mind of Lu Jiuyuan and later Wang Yangming, and require further analysis. Actually, the meaning of Lu Jiuyuan’s central idea that “mind is principle” is quite clear. “Mind is principle,” means that my mind originally contains compassion, shame, etc., and that these are an expression of the theoretical laws of the cosmos, that these two are identical. Compassion, shame, etc. are feelings, but they are an expression of inherent nature, and thus we can say, “mind is principle.” This idea was later encompassed in Wang Yangming’s view that “innate conscience is Heavenly principle.” Lu Jiuyuan begins from the idea that the compassion, shame, etc. in the human mind and the theoretical laws of the cosmos are identical, and claims that the principle within the human mind and the moral rules embodied in the cosmos are one at root, saying “Perfect truth is reduced to a unity; the essential principle is never a duality. The mind and principle can never be separated into two.” Thus the mind spoken of by Lu Jiuyuan is certainly not merely a spiritual awareness, but contains ethical content, with the basic functions and aspects of the mind such as knowing, feeling, willing, etc. being mixed together as one, such that the meaning embraced within the proposition “mind is principle” is very broad. The reason for Lu Jiuyuan’s many debates and arguments is that he believed many people failed to grasp the true meaning of his concept of “mind.” Lu Jiuyuan certainly did not refuse to accept that principle existed in the cosmos, as he clearly stated, “This principle fills the universe. Who can escape from it? Those who follow it will enjoy good fortune and those who violate it will encounter calamities” (“Explanation of the Changes” [Yi shuo 易说], Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan [Lu Jiuyuan ji 陆九渊集], Vol. 21), he merely believed that the principle of the cosmos and that in the human mind are identical. His statement, “The establishment of the firmament and the ethical order cannot be opposed, and nor can they change; they are the cardinal ultimate, rooted in the human heart and filling the space between Heaven and earth” (“Assorted Explanations” [Za shuo 杂 说], Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan, vol. 22), is the clearest explanation for his famous idea that “the cosmos is my mind, and my mind is the cosmos.” His advice to “first establish the noble [part of one’s nature],” meaning first honor virtue and only then enter into inquiry, did not, as Luo Qinshun suggested, mean removing and rejecting the classic texts. His view that “if one knows the root, then the Six Classics are footnotes to oneself” similarly meant viewing the self qua ethical subject as primary, using ethics to guide intellectual activities such as the reading of texts and investigation of things. This is the true meaning of what he referred to as “collecting one’s spirit, being one’s own ruler.” His debate with Zhu Xi was thus merely a matter of method in study. Lu Jiuyuan’s conception of the mind was clearly not that of Chan Buddhism, and Luo’s criticisms correspond to the attacks of the Zhu Xi school against the Learning of the Mind. He used a similar position to attack other scholars in this

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group, thus it is fair to consider him as a “late effect of the Zhu Xi school.” However, it should be recognised that his criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan are in many cases merely based on a superficial understanding of his words, and are often overly rash and careless. As for Luo Qinshun’s view that Lu Jiuyuan’s idea, “when relaxed and gentle, one is naturally relaxed and gentle; when steadfast and resolute, one is naturally steadfast and resolute,” implying that anything that originates from the mind is reasonable, is not the case for everyone, that obtaining without thinking is “a matter reserved for sages,” this criticism indeed hits directly at a weak point. That anyone who can think has ethical awareness is a view accepted by both Cheng-Zhu and Lu Jiuyuan, but there is no guarantee that that which originates in the mind will fit appropriately with the external world. Coincidence between motive and result is not naturally given, but rather the result of a long process of training one’s knowledge and will. Luo Qinshun points out that in Lu Jiuyuan’s idea of ‘when thus, one is naturally thus,” its suitability is actually the result of human choice, not spontaneous reasonableness. Later, Wang Yangming would also realise this point, with his claim that Lu Jiuyuan’s thought “has its rough points” referring to precisely this problem of not viewing the coincidence between morality and knowledge as a process of development. To compensate for this weakness, he introduced his idea of “extending [one’s] innate moral knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知), in which “innate moral knowing” is knowledge and “extending innate moral knowing” is action, with innate moral knowing being continually built up in a process of practice, continually filled out and adjusted in order to achieve the unity of mind and principle, motive and result, and morality and knowledge. Here, innate moral knowing and Heavenly principle form a process of dynamic unification, resolving the above problem with Lu Jiuyuan’s idea of spontaneous unification. Although Luo Qinshun noticed this problem with Lu Jiuyuan’s theory, he took the position of the Zhu Xi school in his criticism, and hence failed to truly grasp its precise location. His explanation of the investigation of things thus also did not reach the profound level of Wang Yangming’s. If Luo Qinshun’s criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan are not without their problems, his criticisms of Lu's student Yang Jian are much more penetrating. Although Yang Jian’s thought originated from that of Lu Jiuyuan, it also differs from it greatly. While Lu Jiuyuan reduced the principle of the cosmos to the principle in the mind, Yang Jian used his mind’s awareness to encompass the cosmos. Where Lu Jiuyuan emphasised ethics, Yang Jian emphasised knowledge. Luo Qinshun’s criticism of Yang Jian’s “Self-Changes” (Jiyi 己易) as equivalent to Buddhism’s “using the mind to extinguish Heaven and earth” shows great insight. Luo criticised Yang Jian much more severely than he did Lu Jiuyuan. Much of the fourth volume of Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired is directed at Posthumous Writings of Cihu (Cihu yishu 慈湖遗书), with almost every paragraph containing some criticism of him. These criticisms can be reduced to one point, namely the sentence “the essential spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness.” Yang Jian’s Learning of the Mind is concentrated in his piece “Self-Changes.” Luo Qinshun pointed out:

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Cihu’s [i.e. Yang Jian] commitment to the dao cannot be viewed as insincere, but he was finally trapped in his own opinions. Directly taking ethereal consciousness as the mind of the dao, how can this not be regarded as absurd? As concentrated in the one chapter “Self-Changes,” this is where he most deliberately tries to lure in scholars… However, having carefully investigated his overall meaning, it does not depart from ethereal consciousness, and has absolutely nothing to do with the [Book of] Changes of the four sages. When placed side by side with the texts of Buddhism, they truly fit together like a tally. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 79)

As Luo Qinshun points out, “Self-Changes” exhortation to “Suddenly realise the pure brightness of this mind, suddenly realise the endless infinity of this mind, suddenly realise that there is nothing outside the grasp of this mind” is equivalent to Sakyamuni Buddha’s “self-realise the realm of sagely wisdom.” Its view that “My nature is pure, clear, bright and like no thing, my nature is insightful without limit and has no measure. Heaven is but an image within my nature, earth is but a shape within my nature, hence it is said [in the Book of Changes], ‘In the heavens it forms images, on the earth in forms shapes’, this is all my doing,” this is simply what the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra describes as “The mountains, rivers and great earth itself are all merely things in my wondrously bright and true mind.” Its sentences like “Heaven is not great, earth is not small, day is not bright, night is not dark” are simply what the Diamond Sutra describes as “The world spoken of by the Buddha is not the world.” Yang Jian’s starting point is the “self,” and the fundamental content of this “self” is “mind.” The essence of the mind is its ethereal awareness that can produce a myriad of images. He views the scenes and images in the mind as necessarily being based on participation in the ethereal awareness’ ability to know, reducing Heaven, earth and the myriad things to inventions of my mind, thus Yang Jian’s “using the mind to extinguish Heaven and earth, relying on feeling to draw things together, necessarily aims at confusing Confucianism and Buddhism as one path” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 80). Luo Qinshun notes that in Yang Jian’s core maxim “the essential spirit of the mind constitutes the sage,” this “mind” has two aspects, namely that which can understand as the spirit of the mind and that which is understood as principle or the dao. The difference between Confucianism and Buddhism lies in their different explanations of principle or the dao. The Confucian idea of principle, i.e. the order by which the dao of Heaven functions, the law of the cosmos as expressed in Heaven, earth and the myriad things, the standard of good and evil in society, these are all real. Following and completing them constitutes expressing principle and one’s nature. When Yang Jian states, “He whose mind is aware understands that Heaven, earth and the myriad things are all within the measure of my nature, that the transformations of Heaven, earth and the myriad things are all transformations of my nature,” this uses the mind to swallow really existing things, what the Buddhists call “using the mind to extinguish Heaven and earth.” [Luo] once wrote, “Truly, Cihu [Yang Jian] was mistaken! Despising physical bodies, and wanting to selfishly transform them all into his own possessions, he truly did not know measure! (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 81), and argued that the relationship between human beings and Heaven, earth and the myriad things, i.e. human beings’ position and function, should be considered

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according to the view of the Commentaries on the Changes that “The great man is he whose virtue is in harmony with Heaven and earth, whose illumination is in harmony with the sun and moon, whose order is in harmony with the four seasons, whose fortune and misfortune are in harmony with the ghosts and spirits, who acts before Heaven without Heaven going against him, and acts after Heaven respecting the times of Heaven.” That is to say, he first grasps the dao of Heaven and earth, and then participates in its productive transformations. Yang Jian’s thought and that of Luo Qinshun belong to different academic traditions. [Yang] took up Lu Jiuyuan’s view of mind as principle, taking it to an extreme. His ideas nonetheless have one valuable point, namely his attempt to prevent people clinging to external formalised truths and adhering to fixed secular rules, encouraging them to have confidence in and to establish themselves, not to deceive themselves with vulgarity, maintaining the moral integrity of their minds. As Yang once said, “Scholars of recent times have fallen into opinionated argument, continually preserving in their minds a principle which cannot be abandoned, which if lost would leave them suddenly without anything to rely on, and have thus set up the word ‘principle’ [in their minds], without realising that in the sage’s mind there was originally no such opinion” (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 84). “Originally no opinion” means no pre-assumed forms of argument, that principle originates from the mind. This is Yang Jian’s original meaning, and the ontological understanding that “the transformations of Heaven, earth and the myriad things are all transformations of my nature” developed on this basis implies swallowing all external things within the subject. Luo Qinshun’s criticism on this point thus truly hit the mark.

4 Theory of the Investigation of Things and Debate with Wang Yangming The investigation of things (gewu 格物) and the extension of knowledge (zhizhi 致知) [both from the Great Learning] are central concepts in Chinese philosophy, with the important Song-Ming philosophers in particular each offering their own explanations, and the decisive shifts caused by certain thinkers often started from their radical new interpretation of this idea. Luo Qinshun also had his own theory of the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, which he used in his debates with Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui, who he viewed as having departed from the fundamental Confucian position. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi glossed the investigation of things as going to things and inquiring into their principles, Wang Yangming glossed it as “correcting [one’s] thoughts,” while for Song dynasty Neo-Confucian Lü Zuqian 吕祖谦 it meant “penetrating the three primal powers with no separation.” Luo Qinshun viewed Lü Zuqian’s theory as clearer and more comprehensive than that of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, saying:

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Lü Donglai [Zuqian] explained it [ge 格; investigation] as a “rule,” as in “the rule governing the natural span of life,” and also as “penetrating the ‘three primal powers’ with no separation.” I would note that “penetrating with no separation” also has the meaning of “reaching,” though by comparison with the word “reach,” its import is much more clear, profound, and far-reaching. If, for example, one explained the phrase “reached [Heaven] above and [earth] below,” by saying, “penetrated above and below with no separation,” who would say that this was incorrect? The ‘ge’ in ‘gewu’ has precisely the meaning of “penetrating everywhere with no separation.” For when my endeavour approaches completion, it will involve penetration with no separation. Then things are myself and I am things, altogether unified without any differentiation. At this point the word “identify” (he 合) becomes superfluous. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 4)

He believed that “penetrating the three primal powers with no separation” could cover the general meanings of the investigation of things, and also had more profound implications, as Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang’s definitions only included its meanings in terms of practice, without also including the effects or goal of this practice, and failed to connect things and the self together as an organic whole. “Penetrating the three primal powers with no separation” however, explicated the investigation of things as both a practice and its effects as a whole, such that as well as having an effect on the object, it would also simultaneously elevate the state of the subject. The deeper meaning of Luo Qinshun’s view is that the investigation of things should illuminate both things and the self, fusing together the internal and external, such that the investigation of principle in things and the illumination of mind in the self form one harmonious body. He says: Principle as it operates in the world is such that out of unity there proceed the myriad things without the intervention of any artificial contrivance. And when the many reconverge into the one, what possibility could there be for the interference of any selfish manipulation? Thus to “seek within oneself” one must begin with one’s own nature and feelings. One then goes on to extend to other things what one has perceived in oneself, and if it is found to be inconsistent, it is not ultimate principle. Seeking it in external things, there is no difference in respect to birds and beasts or plants and trees. If one has perceived something there, but refers back to one’s own mind and finds any incongruity, it is not ultimate principle. Only with luminous clarity of insight into the mystery of the unity of all being does one realise that, while there is no difference of self and other, the differences in its particularisations, being in themselves immensely prolific, cannot be confused. This is the consummate task [of investigating things and extending knowledge]. But how can it be accomplished without genuine and unremitting effort over a long period of time? (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 3)

This is his complete explanation of “penetrating the three primal powers with no separation.” “Three primal powers” refers to Heaven, earth, and mankind, while “penetrating” means connecting together with no obstruction, seeking to combine the principle found in the investigation of things with that in human nature, the principle found in the investigation of human nature with that in things, and the principle found in both things and inherent nature with the fundamental principle of the cosmos. The unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, Heaven and human beings, things and the self all form one luminous and penetrating body. Luo Qinshun’s adoption of Lü Zuqian’s proposition and his own explanation of it

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express his intention to connect the Great Learning with Centrality in the Ordinary, to revise the earlier series of Neo-Confucian theories, and to return to the original Confucian unification of Heaven, earth and human beings, combining mind and principle in one body. Luo Qinshun argued that his theory of the investigation of things comprehends the aspects of beginnings and ends, knowledge and action, principle and mind, such that the investigation of things comprises the entirety of his effort of cultivation, saying: The investigation of things and the extension of knowledge are the beginning of learning. Subduing the self and returning to propriety are the end of learning. … When things are investigated, it is no longer things but only principle that is perceived, and when the self has been subdued, it is no longer ego but only principle that one follows. (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 10)

The investigation of things is the beginning, the aspect of things, while the subduing of the self is the end, the aspect of the self. The investigation of things and extension of knowledge is a process of practice, the subduing of the self is the effect of this practice, while the state finally achieved is one in which things and the self both disappear, with only “the flowing of copious Heavenly principle” remaining. This state is precisely the state of “a carefree mind, flowing above and below together with Heavenly principle” described by Zhu Xi, the state of benevolence. Achieving this state, cultivation, reflection, comprehension of language, nourishment of qi, expression of inherent nature, and knowledge of Heaven, all the cultivating efforts of Neo-Confucianism are simultaneously completed. Achieving this kind of state must start from specific effort in the investigation of things, and requires genuine and unremitting effort over a long period of time. Based on his own understanding of the investigation of things, Luo Qinshun wrote to Wang Yangming to debate the issue. Wang Yangming sent copies of his newly completed “Ancient Text of the Great Learning” (Daxue guben 大学古本) and “Master Zhu [Xi]’s Final Conclusions in his Late Years” (Zhuzi wannian dinglun 朱子晚年定论) to Luo, who, in his reply to Wang, discussed the investigation of things and issues concerning the date of various pieces included in the latter work. Based on his maintaining the position of the Zhu Xi school, Luo criticised Wang Yangming’s viewpoint, and Wang wrote his “Letter in Reply to Assistant Minister Luo Zheng’an” [Da Luo Zheng’an shaozai shu 答罗整庵少宰 书] in defence. Luo wrote another letter in response, but, before sending his letter, received word of Yangming’s death. Luo’s debate with Wang Yangming covers the fundamental reasons for the separation between the Learning of Principle and the Learning of the Mind, as well as the distinctive features of the Zhu Xi school in the Ming dynasty, and thus has great theoretical importance. Luo Qinshun scrupulously abided by Zhu Xi’s theory of the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations, maintaining that all things and events under Heaven share the same original principle, and that, given that human beings are one of the myriad things, the principles they share with them form an undivided unity. When the Great Learning spoke of the investigation of things, its intention

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was that we perceive the unity of principle amidst its diverse particularisations. The final goal of the investigation of things, the state when should be achieved, is one in which “there is neither subject nor object, neither deficiency nor surplus, and one has truly achieved unity and convergence” (“Letter to Yangming” [Yu Yangming shu 与阳明书], Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 109). Only when one realises the “unity of principle” can the investigation of things and extension of knowledge reach its ultimate resolution, only then can one establish the great root and carry out the realisation of the Way spoken of by Mencius, only then can the making-sincere of one’s intentions, rectification of the mind, cultivation, governance and peace of the Great Learning become a unity all-pervading. However, the variation in the innate resources people receive, along with the differences in effort, some shallow and some deep, some sluggish and some rapid, all these must lead to differences in level, the so-called “marked difference in class.” Further, the investigation of things must proceed via the pursuit of principle in specific things and events, and this is an outward-directed activity. Only having achieved an open and clear comprehension can one unify the internal and external, can one hold together the three cardinal guides and eight goals [of the Great Learning] as one. Luo Qinshun’s view here is still the traditional conception of the investigation of things. Wang Yangming however held that “principle knows no internal and external, inherent nature knows no internal and external, hence study also knows no internal and external” (“Letter in Reply to Assistant Minister Luo Zheng’an,” Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Things are “the location of intention,” they are not simply objects but are actions of the subject as perceived in objects, primarily actions with and ethical meaning such as loyalty to one’s ruler and filial piety to one’s parents. This kind of action must be thoroughly penetrated by the ethical intention of the subject, as Wang Yangming argues: “Things are events. When one’s intention is to serve one’s relatives, then serving one’s relatives is a thing; when one’s intention is to serve one’s ruler, then serving one’s ruler is a thing” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). “Investigation” for him means rectification: “Investigation means rectification, rectification of that which is not correct to return to that which is correct.” His meaning here is that the investigation of things refers to the rectification of the subject’s incorrect intention to make it return to Heavenly principle. This process is the effect of extending the innate conscience of one’s mind. The investigation of things and extension of knowledge is thus simultaneously the making sincere of the intentions and the rectification of the mind. To explain his own conception of the investigation of things, Wang Yangming says: The rectification of the mind and making sincere of the intentions, along with the investigation of things and extension of knowledge, all these refer to self-cultivation, with the investigation of things referring to the location where the effort to realise this becomes visible. Thus the investigation of things refers to the investigation of the things of the mind, the things of the intentions, the things of knowledge. The rectification of the mind refers to the rectification of the mind of things; the making sincere of the intentions refers to the making sincere of the intentions of things; the extension of knowledge refers to the extension of the knowledge of things, hence how can there be any separation between internal and external, self and other? (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

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Yangming’s view here is an attempt to correct Zhu Xi’s error of “fragmentation,” focusing on the location of the fundamental principle of the cosmos in the establishment of his theory, embodying the commensurability of all the individual concepts belonging to this fundamental principle. Hence he says: Principle is simply one. When speaking of the coherence of this principle, we speak of inherent nature; when speaking of the ruler of this coherence, we speak of the mind; when speaking of the activation of this ruler, we speak of intention; when speaking of the illuminating awareness of this activation, we speak of knowledge; and when speaking of the responsiveness of this illuminating awareness, we speak of things. Thus in relation to things we speak of investigation, in relation to knowledge we speak of extension, in relation to the intentions we speak of making sincere, and in relation to the mind we speak of rectification. Rectification means rectifying this, making sincere means making this sincere, extension means extending this, and investigation means investigating this. All of this is but the way to inquire into principle and express inherent nature. (ibid.)

Yangming treats investigation, extension, making sincere, and rectification as one affair, and the mind, intentions, knowledge and things as one thing, such that the various aspects of specific things all embody “the unity of principle,” are all thoroughly penetrated by ethical principles, and, in opposition to Zhu Xi and Luo Qinshun, the “unity of principle” in the investigation of things is the result of open and clear comprehension. Luo Qinshun’s concepts of the mind, intentions, knowledge and things each have their own specific scopes that cannot be confused, while for Wang Yangming, the mind, intentions, knowledge and things represent different aspects of the same affair, and this affair can be viewed as an indivisible whole. For Luo Qinshun, the transitions from the investigation of things to the cultivation of the self represent successive levels, while for Wang Yangming, there are no steps to follow in these aims, with the three cardinal guides and eight goals of the Great Learning all fused into one, all efforts simultaneously present. The differences between these two conceptions all originate from differences in modes of thought. Hence in his letter in reply to Wang Yangming, Luo Qinshun argues that, concerning Wang’s theory, “never since the Great Learning was written has such a view been proposed.” Yangming’s definition of the investigation of things takes things to be “the location for the intentions” and their investigation to be “the rectification of that which is not correct to return to that which is correct;” e.g. if one’s intention is to serve one’s ruler or parents, this thought can be rectified. However, many thoughts run freely, holding to no particular direction, as with kites flying or fish jumping, and these “things as locations for intentions” do not produce value judgments. This kind of “thing” produces no thought that can be rectified. Luo’s “Letter to Yangming” also states that the “extension of knowledge and investigation of things” of the Great Learning becomes for Yangming, “the investigation of things through the extension of knowledge,” while the “things being investigated, knowledge can be reached” of the Great Learning becomes for Yangming, “knowledge having reached its end, things are investigated,” with Yangming’s theory thus incompatible with the teachings of the sage. Yangming never saw this letter, but on the basis of his the consistent nature of his thought, it is not difficult to reconstruct a response to these two problems. For the first, according

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to Wang Yangming’s theory, ethical values can be embodied in any activities of the investigation of things, hence those which do not produce value judgments can have such values projected onto them, making them all possess ethical import. For example, in observing kites flying or fish jumping we can appreciate the vigorous vitality of the cosmos, the comprehensive harmony and lively spontaneity of the mind-substance, in which each thing conveys its own meaning, such that observing the flow of water in a river can produce the exclamation, “How it passes away!” [see Analects, 9.17]. Any thing or event can thus act as an instrument for displaying the beauty and goodness of the mind-substance. As for the second problem, the accusation that Yangming betrayed the teachings of the sage, in his statement, “In study, value obtaining from the mind; if you seek within the mind and find falsity, even if the words come from Confucius himself, do not dare to affirm them” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I), Yangming had already provided an answer. Regarding “Master Zhu’s Final Conclusions in his Late Years,” Yangming accepts that “the years for certain pieces within are indeed unconfirmed,” but argues that these small issues do not affect the general import of his thesis. Yangming also notes that his theory of the investigation of things does not simply affirm the internal and reject the external, is not solely focused on the fluctuating effort of internal reflection and meditation, abandoning the principles of things. His conception of the investigation of things includes the entire content of Zhu Xi’s theory of the investigation of things and extension of knowledge while also having the advantages of concentrating its core theses and directly penetrating the moral noumenon. Luo Qinshun’s “penetrating with no separation” and “investigation of things as the beginning, subduing the self as the goal” still follow the path of “from clarity to sincerity such that sincerity and clarity progress in step,” and thus differ from Wang Yangming’s approach of the extension of innate conscience in which the extension of knowledge and practice of self-discipline become two aspects of the same affair, such that sincerity means clarity and clarity means sincerity, morality and knowledge relentlessly unified into a single method. Luo’s mode of thought tends toward a path of division and detailed analysis, with an honest and upright theory of effort that can be straightforwardly carried out. However, as a result of his sincere belief in Zhu Xi’s approach, holding that one first investigate things and then make one’s intentions sincere, he still has no way to prevent the possibility of these two aspects separating. Hence Huang Zongxi, a supporter of Wang [Yangming]’s approach, would later argue that even though there was not one incorrect word in [Luo’s] theories of principle-qi and mind-nature, their theoretical analysis was overly elaborate and unconnected with actual moral cultivation. This meant that his whole life of deep and unsullied virtue, like uncut jade or unrefined gold, was merely the result of the pure beauty of his natural endowment of qi, and not won through the general doctrine of his studies. This kind of criticism is representative of the Wang school’s criticism of the Zhu school, displaying a strong sectarian bias. Luo Qinshun was an important thinker in the middle period of the Ming dynasty, with his theory overcoming the tendency towards a dualism of principle and qi, continuing the thought of Zhang Zai and pointing toward that of Wang Fuzhi and

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Dai Zhen. Although his theories of mind-nature and principle-qi cannot ultimately be reconciled, the accurate definitions and clear analysis of relationships in his concepts of mind and inherent nature are still unparalleled in many respects. His standpoint in support of the Zhu Xi school, criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan and Yang Jian, and debate with Wang Yangming can be seen as a Zhu school reaction to the gradual rise of the Wang school in the mid to late Ming dynasty, along with its academic tendency towards sweeping generalities and chaotic social mores. Luo Qinshun’s thought had a definite influence on later scholars tending towards the Zhu school, as is expressed especially clearly in the Donglin 东林 school.

Chapter 22

Wang Tingxiang’s Theory of Qi and His Empiricist Tendencies

Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 (1474–1544; zi 字 Ziheng 子衡, hao 号 Junchuan 浚川) was from Yifeng 仪封 in Henan province. He passed the imperial examination in the fifteenth year of the Hongzhi Emperor [1502] and was selected for a temporary position in the Imperial Hanlin Academy 翰林院, then as a supervising secretary in the Ministry of War. He served successively as an administrative assistant in Bozhou 亳州, a county magistrate in Gaochun 高淳, an investigating censor in Sichuan, a surveillance commissioner in Shaanxi and Huguang 湖广, a provincial administration commissioner in Shandong, and an assistant minister, minister and censor in the Ministry of War. As an official he was honest and incorruptible, and not overawed by power or wealth. Once, as a result of severely punishing the eunuch Liao Tang’s 廖镗 unlawfulness and refusing a request from the eunuchs to intervene, he was framed and imprisoned. During the Jiajing period he denounced Yan Song 严嵩 for abusing his powers, and was much respected for his moral integrity. Wang Tingxiang was one of the “Former Seven Masters” (qian qizi 前七子) of the literary world in the Ming Dynasty, and achieved great success with his poetic writings. In philosophy, he discussed topics including the original substance of the cosmos and its becoming, the qualities of the Supreme Polarity, yin and yang, and the activity and stillness of qi-seeds. His theory of cultivation blended the Book of Changes, Centrality in the Ordinary and the Zhuangzi, and took the sage’s plane of transformation as its highest goal. All his life he enjoyed learning and thought deeply, offering his comments on Buddhism, Daoism, and various Neo-Confucians. His works include Collected Works Stored by the Family of Mr. Wang (Wangshi jiacang ji 王氏家藏集) and Letters Written by Wang Junchuan (Wang Junchuan suo zhushu 王俊川所著书), now arranged into Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang (Wang Tingxiang ji 王廷相集) in 85 volumes, among which are philosophical works including Cautious Words (Shenyan 慎言), Elegant Expositions (Yashu 雅 述), and various letters discussing learning.1

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[Trans.] See Wang Tingxiang, Wang Tingxiang ji, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989.

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_22

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1 The Supreme Polarity Dao-Substance Wang Tingxiang’s highest philosophical category is dao-substance (daoti 道体). Dao-substance includes the two aspects of root-origin (benyuan 本原) qi and the flowing of qi. He discussed dao-substance as follows: The dao-substance cannot be said to be produced from nothing, as it includes both being and nothing. Before Heaven and Earth divided, primordial qi was mixed and inclusive, a pure void with no division, the primordial impulse of creation through transformation. Since there was the void there was qi, as the void is not separate from qi and qi is not separate from the void, and this was the wonder of that which has no beginning or end. Since one cannot know its extent, it is called the Supreme Polarity, and since it cannot be made into an image, it is called the Supreme Void; this does not mean that there is a polarity or void outside of yin and yang. The two qi affected each other and transformed, groups of images appeared and were set up, and through this Heaven, Earth and the myriad things were produced; is this not then a real substance? Thus in terms of its images we can call it being, and in terms of its transformation we can call it non-being, yet the primordial impulse of creation through transformation is in reality never extinguished. Hence I say that the dao-substance cannot be said to be produced from nothing, as it includes both being and nothing. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 751)

This passage refers to many important concepts, including dao-substance, primordial qi, the Supreme Polarity, the Supreme Void, being, nothing, and the primordial impulse. Wang Tingxiang argued that the dao-substance itself is being, a process of qi-transformation without beginning or end, which has no beginning stage of absolute nothingness, and no final stage in which humanity disappears and things are extinguished. Since the dao-substance transcends being and non-being, one cannot say that it was produced from a more fundamental, temporally prior “nothing.” Since Daoists believed that the cosmos was produced from the boundless void, Zhang Zai 张载 criticised the Daoist “being is produced from nothing” [see Laozi, Ch. 40], and advocated the idea that “the empty void is qi,” hence his philosophy began with “being.” Wang Tingxiang inherited Zhang Zai’s view, rejected the view that there was a time when the cosmos was an empty void of nothingness, arguing that before Heaven and Earth divided and individual things were produced, there was only primordial qi (yuanqi 元气). The Supreme Void (taixu 太虚) is the original state of primordial qi and not absolute nothingness. The Supreme Void includes the latent potential for qi to transform into the myriad images, and this latent potential is qi-impulse (qiji 气机). Since the qi of the Supreme Void is without limit or boundary, without edges or sides, and its extent cannot be known, it can be called the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极). Since before the qi of the Supreme Void transformed to produce the myriad things, it was without sound or scent, and cannot be grasped through the senses, it can be called the Supreme Void. The Supreme Polarity and Supreme Void do not imply that there is another thing outside of yin and yang qi. Wang Tingxiang’s definitions of dao-substance, the Supreme Polarity, the Supreme Void, and the primordial impulse (yuanji 元机) are all based on qi. Because of this, he criticised Zhu Xi’s view of the “Supreme Polarity”:

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The Supreme Polarity is a name for the ultimate limit of dao-transformation with no image or number. Heaven, Earth and the myriad things were all produced from this, in reality the chaotic state of qi before it divided. Confucians say: “The Supreme Polarity is dispersed into the myriad things such that the myriad things each have a Supreme Polarity.” This is wrong. Why? Primordial qi transformed into the myriad things, and the myriad things each receive primordial qi when they are produced, hence they have beauty and badness, partiality and completeness, some people and some things, some big and some small, a myriad of irregularities. To say that each receives the singular qi of the Supreme Polarity is acceptable, but to say that each has its own Supreme Polarity is unacceptable. Supreme Polarity is a term for the mixed whole of primordial qi, of which the myriad things each only possess one branch. Even the great transformations of water and fire only implicate one part, so what of people and things? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 849)

Zhu Xi’s “Supreme Polarity” refers to “the general principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things,” the highest abstraction from the specific principles of things. At the same time, it is also the highest standard of value, and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things separately yet completely embody the principle of the Supreme Polarity, hence “People each have a Supreme Polarity, and things each have a Supreme Polarity.” Zhu Xi’s idea here had a great influence on later Neo-Confucianism. Setting out from his monism of primordial qi, Wang Tingxiang argued that the Supreme Polarity was simply primordial qi, which was called the Supreme Polarity because it is without image or form yet the myriad things were all produced from it. Since the myriad things are each endowed with the primordial qi of the Supreme Polarity, one can say that they each possess a part of the Supreme Polarity, but one cannot say that they each possess a complete Supreme Polarity. Zhu Xi regarded the Supreme Polarity as principle, while Wang Tingxiang regarded it as qi, and this fundamental difference led to great divergences in the specific views they derived from it. Since Wang Tingxiang regarded the Supreme Polarity as primordial qi, and did not accept that prior to primordial qi there was a stage of void and nothing, he criticised the view found in the Liezi 列子 that regarded the supreme simplicity (taiyi 太易), the supreme initiation (taichu 太初), the supreme beginning (taishi 太 始), and the supreme plainness (taisu 太素) as stages in the development of the cosmos, and the supreme simplicity as a time when there was no qi: The Liezi states: “The supreme simplicity preceded the appearance of qi, the supreme initiation was the beginning of qi, the supreme beginning was the beginning of forms, and the supreme plainness was the beginning of matter” [see Ch. 1, “Heaven’s Gifts”]. These sentences have serious problems, and are not the view of someone who knows the dao. Before Heaven and Earth formed, there was only supreme emptiness, and emptiness is the Supreme Void, primordial qi in its vacancy. Qi is not separate from the void, and the void is not separate from qi. The seeds of Heaven, Earth, the sun, the moon and the myriad forms were all contained within, a single dense cloud of germinal sprouts that formed the material for the myriad beings. This qi is something that was inherently present in the Supreme Void, it did not come from anywhere else, nor did it go anywhere else. Here it says, “preceded the appearance of qi,” implying that the Supreme Void had a time when there was no qi. It also says, “the beginning of qi,” implying that qi arose from another origin. If this is so, how could it happen? There was nothing prior to primordial qi, and one cannot know from where it came, hence it is called the Supreme Polarity; it cannot be given and image, name or shape, hence it is called the Supreme Void. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 849)

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This passage in the Liezi also appears in the “Qian Opens the Channel” (Qianzaodu 乾凿度) chapter of the Apocrypha of the Changes (Yiwei 易纬). The Apocrypha of the Changes proposed a model for the becoming of the cosmos: the supreme simplicity, a time when there was no qi but only an empty void; the supreme initiation, when qi began but was without form or matter; the supreme beginning, when forms began to appear but without matter; and the supreme plainness, when there were forms and matter but Heaven, Earth and the myriad things had yet to appear. Wang Tingxiang criticised this view, arguing that it implies the existence of a time of absolutely empty nothingness, which would contradict the idea that primordial qi has no beginning or end. Wang Tingxiang also criticised the Daoist idea that dao produced Heaven and Earth and the Song Dynasty Neo-Confucian idea that principle preceded qi. He said: Laozi and Zhuangzi said that dao produced Heaven and Earth, while the Song Confucians said that before Heaven and Earth there was only this principle. This is changing the external surface to establish a theory, how is it different from the idea of Laozi and Zhuangzi? I suggest that before Heaven and Earth were produced, there was simply primordial qi; since there was primordial qi, the dao and principle that created humanity and things through transformation was already present in it. Hence before primordial qi there were no things, no dao and no principle. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 841)

Although Daoists regarded the Supreme Polarity as chaotic and undivided qi, they thought that dao was prior to the Supreme Polarity which originated from dao, and that dao itself was the highest abstraction without any definitive properties, that from which the Supreme Polarity and primordial qi were produced. Zhu Xi regarded the Supreme Polarity as “a term for when images and numbers were yet to form but their principle was already present,” meaning that principle was prior to qi. Although he debated fiercely concerning the priority of principle and qi, he nonetheless held the view that principle was prior to qi. Wang Tingxiang clearly pointed out that qi is the real substance of dao, and that prior to or outside of qi there is no dao or principle. He stated this repeatedly: “Primordial qi is the daosubstance. When there is the void there is qi, and when there is qi there is dao. Qi has change and transformation, so dao also has change and transformation. Qi is dao and dao is qi, so one cannot discuss them in terms of separation and combination” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 848). Wang Tingxiang’s “dao” includes the two aspects of the real substance of primordial qi and the flowing of qi-transformation. According to his statements, primordial qi contains the latent potential for movement and activity, and he calls this latent potential the qi-impulse or primordial impulse. That the two qi of yin and yang interact and affect one another to become the myriad things, and that the movement and activity of the myriad things never ceases, are all because of this qiimpulse. Although the movement of qi is a function of the qi-impulse, the stillness of qi does not imply the extinction of the qi-impulse. Wang Tingxiang did not investigate his originary principle of the functioning of the qi-impulse deeply like Zhang Zai did with his “one thing with two substances,” yet in terms of the process

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and stages of qi-transformation his discussions were more detailed. This was due to the influence of the astronomical studies of the period and their intention to attempt to find an empirical process for the transformation and production of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. He divided qi into the two stages of primordial qi and productive qi (shengqi 生气), in which primordial qi is qi in its Supreme Void state before the formation of physical things, and productive qi is primordial qi in the state of formed things producing and transforming without cease. He said: “That with forms is productive qi, while that without forms is primordial qi. Since primordial qi never ceases, dao also never ceases. Hence the formless is the foundation of dao, while the formed is the manifestation of dao” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 751). The content of dao is qi and its movement and activity, so before things and images have formed, its movement and activity never ceases but is simply not manifest, while after things and images have formed, its movement and activity can be sensed and known by the sense organs. He also called the formed qi “gathered qi” (juqi 聚气), and the formless qi “wandering qi” (youqi 游气). Wandering qi gathers and unites to form gathered qi, while gathered qi disperses and scatters in wandering movements to form wandering qi, yet the root of both is primordial qi. Hence Wang Tingxiang said: Before the two modes [i.e. yin and yang] divided, the Supreme Void was originally qi; once Heaven and Earth had been produced, the central void was also qi. Thus Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are simply the gathering and dispersal of the qi-impulse. Hence, “the Supreme Void is formless, and the original substance of qi,” clear and all-penetrating, it cannot be made into an image; “the supreme harmony is a dense cloud, and the myriad things transform and ripen,” producing and reproducing without allowing a moment’s cease. Is this not the root-origin of inherent nature and endowment? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 758)

Wang Tingxiang also investigated the concept of principle, saying: Between Heaven and Earth, a single qi produces and reproduces, constant yet changing, a myriad beings without uniformity. Thus if qi is one then principle is one, and if qi is myriad then principles are myriad. Confucians of the age specifically state that principle is one and neglect the myriad, and in this they are biased. Heaven has the principle of Heaven, Earth the principle of Earth, humanity the principle of humanity, things the principle of things, darkness the principle of darkness, and brightness the principle of brightness, each with its own difference. If one speaks of their unity, they are all transformations of qi, their great virtue authentic in its transformation, rooted and beginning from a single source; if one speaks of their separation, then qi has a hundred flourishes, their lesser virtues streaming and flowing, each correct in its inherent nature and endowment. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 848)

Wang Tingxiang was a philosopher with a rather scientific spirit, and his philosophy has a very strong tint of empiricism, such that he was dissatisfied with the theories of the Lu-Wang school that were rich in ethical fantasy and hence stressed the ethical laws of the cosmos, and instead emphasised the regularities of individual things and affairs themselves. Wang Tingxiang’s conception of principle was very different from that of Zhu Xi, and apart from their fundamentally different

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explanations of the basic principle of the cosmos, their focus in terms of the principles of specific things and affairs also differed greatly. Principle for Zhu Xi is “that by which things are so and cannot cease, and that by which things should be so and cannot be changed,” i.e. both the ground and reason why things and affairs are so, and also the patterns and rules that are embodied in things and affairs. Zhu Xi used principle to explain the reason why things differ from each other: principle is the ground for why a thing is this thing and not another thing. Wang Tingxiang however argued that there are no completed and unchanging principles, and differences in principles are due to differences in qi, hence the origin of the differences between things is found in qi, “if qi is one then principle is one, and if qi is myriad then principles are myriad.” How does qi determine the differences between the myriad things? Wang Tingxiang proposed a “theory of qi-seeds” (qizhong shuo 气 种说): I have said that Heaven and Earth, water and fire and the myriad things all transformed from primordial qi, and thus it is because the original substance of primordial qi possessed these seeds that it was able to transform and give rise to Heaven and Earth, water and fire and the myriad things. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 974)

That is to say, the myriad things in the cosmos were all made so by the seeds latently hidden in primordial qi, and the later development of these seeds was already pre-determined in the stage of primordial qi. Wang Tingxiang’s theory of qi-seeds is consistent with his theory of foundational qi in which if qi is one then principle is one, and if qi is myriad then principles are myriad. However, in terms of an explanation of the differences between the myriad things, the theory of qi-seeds is a regression compared with Zhu Xi’s theory of principle and qi. According to Zhu Xi’s explanation, principle is both the reason why a thing is so and the rule why it should be so. Things are different because the “reason why it is so” that constitutes this thing is different, and this difference already existed before this thing was formed, while the rule why it should be so is the pattern and law expressed in things, and this is expressed in this thing after this thing is formed. Zhu Xi’s investigation of things and probing of principle includes probing and fathoming the patterns and laws embodied in things and affairs, as well as exploring the ground and reason that formed this thing or affair. This kind of exploration of things and affairs is comprehensive and scientific. The theory of qi-seeds however can only explore the patterns and laws embodied in things and affairs, while because the formative causes of things and affairs are pre-existent, compulsory and autogenetic, they cannot be included in such exploration. Although Wang Tingxiang did not state this, it can be derived logically from his theories. As Zhu Xi once said, simply to explore the phenomena already formed by things and affairs is insufficient, since that which is already formed has “already” departed, so one must also explore the various grounds and conditions for why things and affairs are formed. Seen from this point of view, Wang Tingxiang’s theory of qi-seeds is not as profound as Zhu Xi’s theory of principle and qi in terms of explaining the formative causes of things and affairs. Precisely for this reason, Wang Tingxiang’s theory concerning the investigation of things is not as elaborate

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as that of Zhu Xi. Although Zhu Xi’s excessive emphasis on the determinative function of principle in the formation of things and affairs led to his views that principle was prior to qi and produced qi, his use of differences in principle to explain differences in things and affairs was more profound than Wang Tingxiang’s theory of qi-seeds, especially with its concomitant emphasis on knowing and grasping these differences through the investigation of things and the probing of principle. Wang Tingxiang and Zhu Xi were both philosophers with a prominent rational spirit, with Zhu Xi’s theory using the probing and fathoming of the principles of things along with insight into the principles of inherent nature to penetrate and connect the fundamental laws of the cosmos, using the diversity of particularisations to reach the unity of principle, and using the unity of principle to observe the diversity of its particularisations. Wang Tingxiang’s theory is focused on clarifying the root-origin of the cosmos, i.e. his account of the Supreme Polarity and primordial qi, but in other respects is not as extensive or refined as that of Zhu Xi. He attributed the diversity of things and affairs to differences in qi, and differences in qi to differences in qi-seeds. In this way his emphasis on the theory of primordial qi blocked off the path to many aspects of exploring the formative causes of things and affairs. Wang Tingxiang’s discussions of his view of the dao of Heaven were in some respects more profound than Luo Qinshun 罗钦顺, largely because Wang Tingxiang was greatly interested in empirical science. His understanding of the dao of Heaven was based on the astronomical achievements of the time, and this was very different from Luo Qinshun’s expositions of the dao of Heaven based on philosophical thought. In Wang Tingxiang’s representative philosophical work Cautious Words, the first chapter “The Substance of Dao” expounds his basic view of the real substance of the cosmos and its great transformative flowing, while the second chapter “The Movements of Qian” (Qianyun 乾运) recounts his many explanations of the movements of celestial phenomena, such as the orbital movements of the planets, the causes of wind, frost, hail and snow, the principles of shooting stars and meteorites, the images of solar and lunar eclipses, and the reasons for the lengths of day and night. Although there are some metaphysical speculations and conjectures amidst all this, most of them were explanations given based on the knowledge available at the time concerning celestial bodies. Even seen from a modern perspective, some of these explanations are fairly scientific. For example, his explanation of the phenomena of solar and lunar eclipses states: “When the moon eclipses the sun, its bodily form hides it; when the sun eclipses the moon, its dark shadow is projected onto it. The light of the sun is direct in its illumination, so when a halo builds up it becomes occluded, and we speak of a dark shadow. Observe how lamps and candles project flames upward into the dark, then occlude the light so it cannot illuminate, and this can be known” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 758). Or, for example, his explanation of the dark shadows on the moon states: “The dark shadows on the moon are not shadows of the earth, but are simply because its material contains leftover residues, and they do not receive the light of the sun” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 758). Explaining the

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formative cause of hailstones, he said: “Hail begins as rain, but is affected by the cold of yin qi and thus rotates and condenses, gradually becoming larger” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 756). Explaining meteorites, he said: “Falling stars with their excess of illuminating qi have not begun to exhaust their original quality, but rather fall and are the extinguished… In those that fall and disperse to extinction, the illuminating qi becomes faint; when they fall as stones, they are affected by the qi of the earth and condense” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 757). In others, such as his collection and examination of the shapes of snowflakes and his observation of the relationship between digger wasps and solitary wasps in order to explain the meaning of the phrase “son of a bollworm” (mingling zhi zi 螟蛉之子) [meaning adopted son], he displayed a very strong empirical scientific spirit. During the Han Dynasty, Chinese academia displayed an extremely strong empirical spirit, and at this time yin and yang, the five phases, the Eight Trigrams, etc. were integrated with astronomical studies, and their influence enveloped everything. The distinctive characteristics of the whole of Han Dynasty philosophy in terms of its mode of thought were specificity, empiricism, intuitive experience, and image-numbers. Its prominent expressions in terms of philosophy were the models of the becoming of the cosmos in the apocrypha texts, the theory of hexagrams and qi in the Book of Changes, and the systematic exposition of the theory of meridians and collaterals in the Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor. The ethereal, artistic and speculative modes of thought characteristic of Wei-Jin Dark Learning were in opposition to the mode of thought of the Han, breaking open new paths in the form of philosophy. One of the results of this innovation in philosophy was that science and philosophy went their separate ways. Philosophy no longer went beyond its proper place and played the part of a scientific framework, but rather returned to its original appearance as speculative, explicatory, indicating the sources of value, etc. This together with Buddhist philosophy’s achievements in modes of thought were absorbed by Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. In Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, scholars with a profound background in Daoist learning such as Shao Yong 邵雍 attempted to recover the status of empirical (even if attained through logical deductions from hypothetical conditions, such as Shao Yong’s numerical theory of the evolution of the cosmos) modes of thought, but their endeavours were eventually unable to turn back the larger trend of speculative and hermeneutic modes of thought in Neo-Confucianism as a whole. Zhu Xi was a scholar with an extremely strong scientific spirit, and his theories of the investigation of things and the probing of principle had a powerful tendency toward probing and fathoming the empirical principles of specific things and affairs, such that even if his final purpose was sudden comprehension and understanding in order to illuminate Heavenly principle, this comprehension and understanding must be based on the accumulation of specific knowledge, and his mode of thought was analytic. One of the results of the Learning of the Mind was that it led the elements of empirical science in the Cheng-Zhu theory back into an ethical framework, and thus eliminated these empirical elements. From investigating things and probing principles externally, it turned back to illuminating the mind and perceiving inherent nature internally. In Lu Jiuyuan’s 陆九渊 “first establish its greatness,” this

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“greatness” (da 大) referred to ethical principles. Wang Yangming’s tendency toward eliminating elements of empirical science is even more obvious, since in his view, scientific activity is an activity concerned with knowledge, while ethical activity is an activity concerned with the will and aesthetic appreciation. Among the mind’s many epistemological, volitional, and aesthetic functions, volitional activity is the most important, since it can comprehend other activities. In Wang Yangming’s famous comments such as “Even if we could successfully investigate every blade of grass and every tree, how could we return to ourselves and make our own intentions sincere?” and “The student should be work on what is most urgent. Even if one becomes thoroughly familiar with these calculations, they may not necessarily be of any use. It is necessary that one's mind should first possess the root of ritual propriety and music” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录]), he precisely worried that the exploration of empirical knowledge left out the ultimate tasks of moral cultivation such as rectifying one’s mind and making one’s intentions sincere. Thus Wang Yangming criticised all scholars such as Shao Yong, Cai Yuanding 蔡元定 and Zhu Xi who had empiricist tendencies, mocking them as fragmented. Wang Tingxiang however censured the Learning of the Mind as empty and shallow and attempted to recover the true, broad meaning of philosophy, to turn back from Yangming Learning’s rather constricted intellectual ethos, which nonetheless is representative of Chinese philosophy’s tendency toward pan-moralism. His theories were greatly influenced by astronomical studies, and in this he was similar to Zhang Zai. The elements of empirical science in Chinese philosophy have always attempted to break through the restraints of pan-moralism, and take up their rightful position. However, the true realisation of this endeavour can only be said to have truly and firmly gained a steady foothold after the Opium Wars, when the Chinese suffered from falling behind in science and technology and desired to renovate their philosophical tradition. Wang Tingxiang lived in the mid-Ming period, in which Neo-Confucianism held a position of absolute dominance, and his scientistic elements and tendency (even if weak) toward an empiricist mode of thought were a revolt against the Neo-Confucian tide of the time. This revolt presaged the rise and expansion of the intellectual trend of Practical Learning (shixue 实学). In this sense, some commentators describe him as an anti-Neo-Confucian thinker. However, viewing Wang Tingxiang’s thought as a whole, especially his theory of inherent nature, we can still describe him as a Neo-Confucian.

2 Theory of Inherent Nature Wang Tingxiang’s theory of inherent nature is an important aspect of his philosophy. For Wang Tingxiang, “inherent nature” (xing 性) includes the inherent nature of humanity and that of things, but he focused mostly on that of humanity. Wang Tingxiang gave very clear definitions of inherent nature:

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Inherent nature is the divine principle of yin and yang, which is produced in formed qi but is more wondrous than formed qi. Inherent nature refers to the ruler of a life. Essence and qi are unified and numinous, and cannot be separated into two. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 767)

In Wang Tingxiang’s view, inherent nature is a function of qi, it is the quality and ruler that explains why things in the cosmos are the way they are. Wang Tingxiang’s definitions of inherent nature are permeated by his theory of foundational qi, with all qualities being based on qi, inseparable from qi, and naturally possessed by qi without being imposed by an external force or given by people. This is his view that “inherent nature is the divine principle of yin and yang.” Wang Tingxiang was thus opposed to all discussions of human nature that departed from qi in speaking of inherent nature. He once said: Apart from qi, there is no inherent nature. The view that outside of qi there is an original inherent nature is a fault with the propositions of many Confucians. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 814) Inherent nature is produced from qi, and this is true for all the myriad things. Since Song Confucians only wanted to force Mencius’ theory that inherent nature is good, they departed from qi in discussing inherent nature. Whose fault is it that the reality of inherent nature was not clear to later generations, leading to the confused debates between various Confucians? Master Mingdao 明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao 程颢] said: “Inherent nature is qi and qi is inherent nature; this is said of production.” He also said: “If one discusses inherent nature without discussing qi, it is incomplete; if one discusses qi without discussing inherent nature, it is unclear. The two are both wrong.” He also said: “Badness also cannot not be called inherent nature.” These three statements clearly express inherent nature to its limits, yet later scholars were shackled by Zhu Xi’s theory of the two inherent natures, original and qi-temperament, and were thus unable to think. How unfortunate! (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 837)

Among Song Dynasty Confucians, Wang Tingxiang was convinced by Cheng Hao’s theory of inherent nature because it was based on qi and opposed the idea that there was another inherent nature outside of qi. Song Confucians all upheld Mencius’ theory of the four inklings (si duan 四端) and thought that human nature was originally good, taking this good nature as the principle as that which makes human beings human, and thus had the view that “inherent nature is principle.” Wang Tingxiang repeatedly pointed out that Mencius’ view of human nature as good did not exclude the view that inherent nature is bad. When Mencius spoke of human nature as good, he was speaking of the good aspects of humanity, and not suggesting that the bad aspects of humanity do not exist. When Mencius said that people all have the mind of the four inklings, he was speaking of the good aspects, so when he spoke of people’s mouths wanting to taste delicious flavours, their eyes wanting to see beautiful sights, their ears wanting to hear beautiful sounds, and their four limbs wanting ease and comfort, he did not say that these are not inherent nature. Mencius took this kind of inherent nature as shared between humanity and animals, hence he specifically pointed to the mind of the four inklings as the basis for the goodness of inherent nature. This was aimed at giving people a convenient

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approach to cultivation through “reflecting on oneself and finding sincerity” [see Mencius, 7A.4] and “exhausting one’s mind such that one knows one’s inherent nature and thus knows Heaven” [see Mencius, 7A.1]. Mencius did not regard the demands from people’s bodily form and qi as not their inherent nature, as his statement that “Inherent nature has its endowment, but the superior man does not call this his nature” [see Mencius, 7B.24] clearly demonstrates. Thus, Wang Tingxiang point out: “The goodness and badness of inherent nature are possessed by all people. When Song Confucians established their theories directly through the goodness of inherent nature, neglecting the view that it is not rectified, was this not deluded? Although their intention was to venerate and believe in Mencius, they were unaware that they were going against his work” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 850). Wang Tingxiang held that there is goodness and badness in inherent nature, and that these are both functions of qi, both based on qi. He said: I believe that the inherent nature of people and things is nothing but the result of qitemperament. If one leaves behind qi in speaking of inherent nature, then inherent nature has no place, and returns to the same place as the void; if one leaves behind inherent nature in speaking of qi, then qi has no life or activity, and is on the same path as death. Hence inherent nature and qi are mutually reinforcing, and cannot be separated. However, since it is founded on qi-temperament, inherent nature inevitably contains badness, and Mencius’ theory of the goodness of inherent nature is misguided. If one therefore forces the view of original inherent nature as something unmixed and outside of bodily form and qi in order to support the tenet that inherent nature is good, thereby reducing Confucius’ discussions to an inferior status, is this acceptable? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 518)

Wang Tingxiang extended his theory of foundational qi into every aspect. Since inherent nature is based on qi, it cannot only have goodness without badness. Cheng Yi 程颐 proposed the theory that “inherent nature is principle,” connecting the goodness of humanity to the fundamental laws of the cosmos, with the intention of finding a basis for the theory of inherent nature as good in the dao of Heaven. Zhang Zai attempted to reconcile the contradiction between original human nature and actual human nature by proposing two kinds of inherent nature, “the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth” and “the inherent nature of qi-temperament.” The inherent nature of Heaven and Earth comes from the pure, penetrating, limpid and unified Supreme Void, while the inherent nature of qi-temperament comes from the brushing, surging, confronting and appropriating of yin and yang qi, “When the void and qi are combined, there is the name of inherent nature.” Zhu Xi inherited Zhang Zai’s theory of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of qitemperament, but regarded the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth as emerging from principle and the inherent nature of qi-temperament as emerging from qi, such that the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is an expression of the ethical laws of the cosmos in the human mind, while the inherent nature of qi-temperament is an expression of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth after it has been influenced by people’s qi-endowment. In actual people or things, their inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is occluded by qi-temperament, and hence they need to apply effort in preserving principle and eliminating desire in order to recover the inherent

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nature of Heaven and Earth. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi both accepted that there is an “inherent nature of Heaven and Earth” that is not based on qi, and although they stated that the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth could not exist in separation from qi-temperament, they nonetheless did not regard it as originating in qi. This is different from Wang Tingxiang’s fundamental view that “Inherent nature is the divine principle of yin and yang.” Wang Tingxiang openly stated that his theory of inherent nature contained contradictions with those of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi: “Master Cheng regarded inherent nature as principle, and I pondered over this for many years without agreeing with it” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 518). He criticised his student Xue Juncai 薛君采 for sincerely believing Cheng Yi’s account of inherent nature: When Juncai discusses inherent nature, he only bases it on Yichuan [i.e. Cheng Yi]. How can one use a former gentleman’s theory to encompass all of creation and transformation, penetrating the entire cosmos, such that whenever one sees his words they are completely unified with the wonders of dao and thus should be defended, believed and never doubted? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 517)

He also criticised Zhu Xi’s idea that “inherent nature is principle”: Master Zhu said: “Inherent nature is simply principle, and cannot be spoken of in terms of gathering or dispersal; that which gathers in life and disperses in death is simply qi. As for principle, it originally cannot gather or disperse into being or nothing.” According to this, inherent nature and qi are originally two things, and although qi has existence, inherent nature pre-eminently establishes itself outside of qi, and is not preserved or lost with the gathering and dispersal of qi. Ah! This is seriously wrong. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 602) In reply to Cai Jitong 蔡季通, Master Zhu said: “That people have life is simply due to the combination of inherent nature with qi. If one takes this existing combination and analyses it, then inherent nature is based on principle and is formless, while qi is based on material form and has temperament.” From these various statements, it can be seen that the former gentleman’s discussions of inherent nature were off the mark from the beginning. Only once people have material form and qi does inherent nature emerge, so to now regard inherent nature and qi as combining is to regard inherent nature as a distinct thing and not as emerging from qi, such that only after people have life do they converge and combine; is this reasonable? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 851)

In Wang Tingxiang’s view, human nature is based on qi, and thus contains both goodness and badness. The different is simply that the material form and qi of the sage is pure, so the inherent nature of the sage has no badness, while the material form and qi of the multitude is mixed, so their inherent nature contains much that is bad, even though it is not completely without goodness. Human goodness does not emerge from principle, but from qi, and outside of qi there is absolutely no inherent nature. Wang Tingxiang also debated the question of the activity or stillness of inherent nature, as well as its centrality (zhong 中) and harmony (he 和). He was opposed to the idea from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸) that “The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality, and the state once

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they are aroused and centrally regulated is called harmony,” and was even more opposed to Zhu Xi’s explanation of this centrality and harmony. Zhu Xi held that the state before arousal is inherent nature and is still, while the state after arousal is feeling and is active. The effort of cultivation lies in self-restraint at the time before arousal, and self-examination at the time after arousal. Activity and stillness are both maintaining respectfulness. Wang Tingxiang held that the centrality before arousal could only be attained by the small minority of sages, while the vast majority of people are unable to reach it. He said: Centrality means neither exceeding nor coming up short. Only the sage can follow the dao and attain smoothness, fully grasping its centrality in self-restraint and refined unity. In this state of the mind before arousal, all is central and poised, and when it responds to affairs, all is centrally regulated. For everyone else, whether unworthy, wise or stupid, they are either overly excessive or come up short. Even if one accumulates study and learning, one will still be unable to attain this centrality, so how could one place the state before arousal first and then achieve centrality? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 520)

Wang Tingxiang pointed out that the error in the theories of inherent nature of Centrality in the Ordinary and Zhu Xi is that they sought another original inherent nature over and above qi-temperament, in order to provide a basis for the state of centrality before arousal. Instead, one should seek centrality after the effort of cultivation. If one does not discuss the effort of cultivation and does not distinguish between sages, worthies and the mediocre multitude, thinking that all possess the state of centrality before arousal, one’s theory is in error. Wang Tingxiang also criticised the idea that stillness is good while activity is bad: Someone asked: “The state when the human mind is still and not yet affected by things can be used to confirm that inherent nature is good, is that right?” He said: “No. For the great Shun 舜 and Confucius I can vouch for their goodness, but I would not venture to do so for Robber Zhi 盗跖 or Yang Hu 阳虎. Why? That which is expressed externally all has its internal foundation. Where does this thing come from? What makes it so? If one says that when the minds of Zhi and Hu were still they were able to be good, and that they only did bad when they were active, then how could they suddenly change? There can be stillness, yet if the images of badness have simply yet to form, then the internal root of badness is still the same, and as soon as it is affected there will be badness. The Confucians using stillness to confirm the goodness of inherent nature is akin to the sages and worthies achieving their inherent nature and embodying it. They use themselves and not the multitude, and hence it is not a universal view. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 767)

Wang Tingxiang held that stillness and activity were insufficient to explain inherent nature and feeling. When there is stillness there is not necessarily only inherent nature, and as stillness is expressed in the state and temporal sequence of the mind, so inherent nature and feeling express goodness or badness. Before the mediocre multitude is aroused, badness is already in a latent state and is simply yet to form externally, hence it cannot be said to be absent since as soon as it is affected it will form externally. This is like Wang Yangming saying of people with intermittent fever that before it is manifest, their disease is already latent and hidden in their

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chest, so they cannot be said to be healthy. To use activity and stillness to confirm goodness and badness is to erase the difference between sages and worthies and the mediocre multitude. As Wang Tingxiang repeatedly stated, in his account of human nature he distinguished between two situations, namely discussing inherent nature in terms of inherent nature and discussing inherent nature in terms of aptitude and qi. In the former case he followed the “sixteen-character transmission of the mind” (shiliuzi xinchuan 十六字心传) [see “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟), Book of Documents], while in the latter case he followed Confucius’ view that “Inherent natures are fairly similar, but become differentiated through practice” [see Analects, 17.2]. Speaking only in terms of inherent nature, Mencius’ “innate moral knowing” (liangzhi 良知) and Shun’s “dao-mind” (daoxin 道心) can both be confirmed through experience, for example through the alarm and compassion of the mind upon seeing a child about to fall into a well [see Mencius, 2A.6] or the sweat that forms on one’s brow when one feels guilty and remorseful in one’s mind. However, Mencius’ “desires of Heavenly nature” and Shun’s “human mind,” such as “the mouth wanting flavours, the ears wanting sounds, the eyes wanting beauty, and the four limbs wanting ease and comfort,” can also be confirmed through experience. Hence, inherent nature and feelings are bestowed equally upon the sagely and the stupid. Following the human mind, the mediocre multitude finally return to badness; following the dao-mind, sages and worthies finally return to goodness. Since the dao-mind and the human mind are universally possessed, one can say “Inherent natures are fairly similar”; since their minute disparities lead to vast differences, one can say they “become differentiated through practice.” Wang Tingxiang mainly emphasised the latter, hence he repeatedly said: “In Zhongni’s 仲 尼 [i.e. Confucius] discussions of inherent nature, he already gave a most complete account that left nothing out” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 520). In his opposition to the idea of centrality before arousal and that of stillness as good and badness as beginning with activity, Wang Tingxiang was indebted to Cheng Hao. Cheng Hao once said: “That which one is born with is called inherent nature [see Mencius, 6A.3], but since one cannot speak of the stillness prior to people being born, as soon as one speaks of inherent nature, it is already no longer inherent nature. Whenever people speak of inherent nature, they are only speaking of how ‘that which continues it is good’ [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上), Book of Changes], and Mencius speaking of human nature as good was like this” (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers [Er Cheng yishu 二程遗书], Vol. 1). His point is that people can only speak of inherent nature and feelings on the basis of experience. Inherent nature belongs to that which is metaphysical, i.e. “the stillness prior to people being born,” the realm in which “the way of language breaks off and the path of mental operations end,” and hence cannot be spoken of. That which people can speak of is only the physical forms of qi. Metaphysical inherent nature must be seen in physical forms of qi, and physical forms of qi must change and alter metaphysical inherent nature. “That which continues it” are the feelings that can be experienced a posteriori. In discussing the goodness of inherent nature, Mencius spoke precisely of the four inklings of feeling. Taking up this idea, Wang Tingxiang noted: “That which is prior to forms cannot be obtained and

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spoken of, so on what basis can it be said to be the highest good? Since it is only after things have formed that one can speak of inherent nature, if one says badness is not possessed by inherent nature, from where does it come? When Master Cheng said ‘Badness cannot be said not to be inherent nature,’ he realised this” (“Questions on the Accomplishment of Inherent Nature” [Wen chengxing pian 问成 性篇], Cautious Words, Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 765). However, Wang Tingxiang made very significant changes to Cheng Hao’s idea. Cheng Hao “viewed inherent nature in feelings,” while Wang Tingxiang held that “goodness and badness are both originally present in inherent nature,” which was entirely based on his theory of people being endowed with qi at birth: “Since qi can be clear or turbid, pure or variegated, how can inherent nature not contain a mixture of goodness and badness?” Thus Wang Tingxiang took up certain aspects of Cheng Hao’s discussions of inherent nature and discarded others, while he almost entirely rejected those of Zhu Xi. Wang Tingxiang was also opposed to Song Dynasty Confucians’ distinction between the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment (tianming 天命) and that of qi-temperament, and gave a new explanation of the idea that that which is endowed by Heaven is inherent nature [from Centrality in the Ordinary] based on his qi monism. He said: When we refer to something as being endowed by Heaven, we are originally speaking of that which emerges from qi and not from human ability. Hence we say “Heaven.” Since inherent nature emerges from qi-endowment and becomes turbid and variegated when it is produced, when people receive the capacity for badness, what is this but something from Heaven? Hence it was said, “That which is endowed by Heaven is inherent nature.” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 519)

In his view, the essence of Heaven is qi, Heaven is endowed to people through qi, and the Heavenly qi that people receive is the substrate of life. Hence the phrase, “That which is endowed by Heaven is inherent nature.” Since people and things possess inherent nature by receiving the qi of Heaven, so the inherent nature of qi is the inherent nature of people. Since the inherent nature of qi can be pure or variegated, so the inherent nature of people contains goodness and badness. The goodness and badness of people is all due to the qi they received, not acquired a posteriori, and a posteriori one can only change or strengthen the goodness or badness determined a priori by qi. Thus, the inherent nature of the sage is purely good without badness, while that of the multitude contains goodness and badness. He said: In terms of the goodness and badness of inherent nature, there are none that go beyond the sage, and though his inherent nature is also simply contained in his qi-temperament, the qi he receives is clear, bright, fine and pure, different from that of the multitude, hence when his inherent nature is accomplished, it is purely good with no badness. That the inherent nature of the sage is not separate from his qi-temperament can be known by the multitude. Since qi can be clear or turbid, pure or variegated, how can inherent nature not contain a mixture of goodness and badness? Hence it was said that, “Only the highest in wisdom and the lowest in stupidity cannot be changed” [see Analects, 17.3]. This is inherent nature, the principle of production of qi, the dao of the single root. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 518)

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That the inherent nature of the sage is purely good with no badness is due to his received qi being entirely clear, bright, fine and pure; that the inherent nature of the multitude is a mixture of goodness and badness is entirely due to their received qi being a mingled mixture of the pure and the variegated. Since it overlooks humanity’s social nature and characteristics moulded over the long-term development of human culture, explaining human nature entirely through natural material, Wang Tingxiang’s explanation of human nature falls into partiality, and it neither as profound or as comprehensive as Zhu Xi’s account of inherent nature focusing on humanity’s differences from other animals. In his account of human nature, Zhu Xi absorbed the Cheng brothers’ principle that “If one discusses inherent nature but not qi, it is incomplete; if one discusses qi but not inherent nature, it is unclear. It is wrong to separate the two,” proposing a complete and profound theory of human nature. Zhu Xi discussed inherent nature in terms of two levels, namely that of humanity as a living community higher than any other biological species, and that of it as a body of blood and flesh composed of matter. Zhu Xi’s so-called qi-temperament did not concern goodness or badness, but mainly concerned the non-ethical factors of strength or weakness, wisdom or stupidity, etc. Zhu Xi inherited his inherent nature of Heavenly endowment (also called the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth or the inherent nature of moral principle) from Mencius and Centrality in the Ordinary. Mencius did not simply take the physiological instincts of animal nature as humanity’s fundamental character, but rather regarded humanity as a special animal with a high degree of development. Over a long period of social life, humanity has developed the ethical principles necessary to maintain the existence of the species. These ethical principles have been refined and sanctified by generation after generation of thinkers, placing them in a supreme position and giving them sufficient authority to govern the human mind. One of the characteristics of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism is its attempt to elevate ethical principles to the height of the original substance of the cosmos, and to explain them through humanity’s relation to and position in the cosmos. Thus when first-rate thinkers of the time like Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi strictly distinguished between the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment and that of qi-temperament, their aim was to coordinate the part concerned with human ethical principles and the part universally possessed by individual living things. Over a long period of social life, humanity came to feel that ethical principles are indispensable and have an inviolable sanctity, and thus defined them as an essential attribute of humanity. Their discovery, elevation and highlighting from out of humanity’s biological nature in itself signified a progression in human civilisation. Hence in terms of knowledge on humanity’s essential characteristics, a dualism of inherent nature that speaks of the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment and also that of qi-temperament is much more profound than a view that regards human nature as an aggregate of biological instincts and sensory activity. Highlighting the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment implies highlighting humanity’s species and social characteristic. To regard this characteristic as “endowed by Heaven” is not to believe it was arranged by an anthropomorphic ruler, but rather to highlight the irresistibility of humanity’s

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species characteristic and to take its use in restraining human behaviour as an activity of self-discipline. When Mencius said “In terms of its feelings, it is able to be good, and thus I call I good” (Mencius, 6A.6), he regarded the foundation of the goodness of human nature as the human instincts’ tendency toward the good and not their actual goodness. The “instincts’ tendency toward the good” is the result of humanity’s highlighting, refinement, inheritance and fixing over a long period of evolutionary activity of the few good elements within animal nature that are beneficial for the existence and continuation of the species and society. To project this onto the cosmos and the myriad things enables it both to coincide with humanity’s hopes, and also to react back and play a role in cultivating humanity’s inklings of goodness. This is the cultural anthropological meaning of “daily renewal is what is called magnificent virtue” and “production and reproduction is what is called change” [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. I,” Book of Changes]. Also, the so-called inherent nature of qi-temperament does not refer to all the attributes people receive from qi, as Wang Tingxiang thought, but only to the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment expressed by through that of qi-temperament in actual human nature. Thus, the division of the inherent nature of Heavenly endowment from that of qitemperament is better able to explain the reality of human nature, and is more convincing that an explanation of human nature purely in terms of qi. Of course, placing an excessive emphasis on the ethical principles necessary for humanity to maintain its species will result in the smothering of individuality. Similarly, placing an excessive emphasis on humanity’s individuality and biological instincts will affect and even destroy the species existence of humanity as a social group. Humanity’s entire wisdom of life lies in respecting and developing humanity’s ethical principles as a species while at the same time satisfying humanity’s sensory demands to the greatest degree possible, in order to achieve a reasonable accommodation between the two.

3 Theory of Cultivation Wang Tingxiang placed great emphasis on moral cultivation. Chapters of his philosophical work Cautious Words such as “Being a Sage” (zuosheng 作圣), “The Latent Mind” (qianxin 潜心) and “The Superior Man” (junzi 君子) specifically discuss cultivation. His theory of cultivation is connected to many other aspects. Firstly, he divided people into four kinds: sages, secondary sages (yasheng 亚圣), great worthies (daxian 大贤) and ordinary people. These four kinds of people represent different spiritual planes or levels of moral cultivation. He said: Sages are the authentic standard for morality, the governors of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music, and are not ever really fully seen by the world. Next best are the secondary sages, who accord with the reality of the dao, and who lead a generation with their instructions. Next best are the great worthies, who are strict in their adherence to the dao, and not confused into letting various heterodox streams disturb the reality of the dao. Below this are those who follow the waves and submit to the vulgar, using their personal

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wisdom to damage the upright; full of defects and entanglements, I do not know of what benefit they are to the dao. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 762)

The sage is an incarnation of the moral ideal and the scholars’ standard for progress in virtue, as well as the judge and explicator of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and music. Wang Tingxiang only referred to several figures as sages, namely Yao 尧, Shun, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. The next level is the secondary sage. They accord with the dao of the sages, and use it to educate and transform others. Wang Tingxiang referred to [Confucius’ student] Yan Yuan 颜渊 and Mencius as secondary sages. Yan Yuan’s natural endowment approached that of a sage, as did Mencius’ talent, yet neither of them were sages since they did not possess both of these together. Among the many differences between sages and worthies, the most obvious is that the moral cultivation and intellectual learning of the sage has already reached a plane of transformation in which he is one with the dao and leaves no traces that can be followed, and hence can maintain his self-attainment in any situation. Wang Tingxiang especially yearned for and admired the “plane of transformation” (huajing 化境) of the sage, saying: Easy proficiency that coincides with the dao is transformation. When learning reaches transformation, the traces of greatness vanish. Why then it is said that “After one transforms, one is able to possess greatness”? Greatness has traces, as it has external affairs, and the external includes preservation and loss, so how can it be kept and possessed? One who transforms accumulates in essence, and is connected in unity. Since his comings and goings are from the self, he can be said to possess it. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 760)

Transformation is the highest spiritual plane of the sage, and when one reaches this spiritual plane one has already become proficient in cultivation such that that which one spontaneously emits is all in accord with the dao, yet one is at ease and carefree, without any images of exploration or seeking. When Centrality in the Ordinary spoke of “Attained without thinking, at ease in the dao of centrality,” it was speaking of this spiritual plane. “Greatness” (da 大) is insufficient to describe this spiritual plane, since greatness still has its external traces, and therefore is tied to specific methods and locations, while if one is traceless then one revolves discreetly together with the dao. Attaining this spiritual plane is when the subjective spirit is most elevated, when one most thoroughly masters the transformation and nourishing of Heaven and Earth [see Centrality in the Ordinary]. Wang Tingxiang described this spiritual plane thus: “Only the technique of the dao of the sage does not cling to any one, but rather mingles, balances, interacts and retracts, folds and unfolds, slows and accelerates, composes and recomposes, just as the hundred rivers in their winding ways each reach the sea. Assisting worldly affairs and expanding achievements, where do they ever end?” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 762). This is a spiritual plane of unity with the dao, “flowing together with Heaven above and Earth below.” Neo-Confucians offered many descriptions of this spiritual plane, and Wang Tingxiang’s unique point was his integration of the views of the sage from Centrality in the Ordinary, the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传) and the Zhuangzi: the sage is not merely a paradigm of

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morality, he is also a symbol of the spirit of the cosmos. The sage has not only the strength in activity of the great changes, but also the centrality and harmony of Centrality in the Ordinary, and Zhuangzi’s unity with the dao, taking creation and transformation as achievement. Wang Tingxiang’s view of the sage is a combination of the humanistic spirit of the Analects and the Mencius, the cosmic spirit of the Commentaries on the Changes and Centrality in the Ordinary, and the natural spirit of the Zhuangzi. Among the various virtues of the sage, Wang Tingxiang especially valued unity with the dao and moving together with the times, hence he emphasised “the sage accords with the times”: Since the dao has no fixed location, the sage accords with the times. Yao and Shun passed on the crown through abdication, Tang 汤 [of the Shang Dynasty] and Wu 武 [of the Zhou Dynasty] used punitive expeditions, while Tai Jia 太甲 [of the Shang Dynasty] and King Cheng 成王 [of the Zhou Dynasty] inherited it in sequence. Since the dao has no end or limit, the sage has that which he is unable to do. In the affairs of Yao and Shun, there was that which Fuxi 伏羲 and Xuanyuan 轩辕 [i.e. the Yellow Emperor] were unable to carry out; in the affairs of the Three Dynasties [i.e. the Xia, Shang and Zhou], there was that which Yao and Shun were unable to carry out. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 763)

His meaning is that each position in time has certain affairs that are most suitable to carry out, and that each affair also has its most ideal position in time. The sage is able to carry out a particular affair appropriately and to the greatest degree possible according to particular temporal and spatial conditions. By extension, principle refers to the principles of specific times and places, and the aggregate of the principles of specific times and places is the dao. Yao and Shun, Tang and Wu, Tai Jia and King Cheng were all the sages of their own times, and abdication, punitive expedition and inheriting the crown in sequence were all done to the best of principle in each of their respective times. Thus for Wang Tingxiang, dao has a historical sense, and different from the majority of Neo-Confucians who stressed dao’s absoluteness and eternality, Wang Tingxiang stressed its specificity. The sage is thus for him also not “valid in a changed location,” able to act entirely appropriately in a variety of different situations. One must combine the three factors of talent, position and an appropriate time in order to become a sage, and none of them is dispensable. He said: “One who is able to act has talent; one who is able to wield power has position; one whose affairs gather the springs of things has an appropriate time. If one of these three is missing, none of them will be able to act. Hence the sage attains position and awaits an appropriate time” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 764). The sage has talent and ability, power and position, these are basic, but he must also be good at grasping opportune moments. The most basic condition for grasping opportune moments lies in knowing the springs of things. Knowing the springs of things means predicting the future state of development of things and affairs from the signs of their changes and movements when they are subtle and minute. For Wang Tingxiang, the “springs of things” (ji 几) are spontaneously expressed in the movements of the myriad things, as Cautious Words records: “Someone said: ‘The myriad things transform according to the regularities

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of the Lord yet do not know it, why is this?’ He said: ‘If one desires to know it, it is not transformation. The sage does not boast of his achievements, does not allow virtue to return to himself, does not use his mind in speaking with people, moves in the realm where there are no choices, and resides on the paths where there are no benefits; he does not know and the world moves dimly and suddenly changes. Who has knowledge of this? This is why we speak of the divine springs of things’” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 763). The myriad things all produce and transform according to the regularities intrinsically possessed by the dao of Heaven, but production and transformation themselves do not have any will or purpose, hence since the sage unifies with the dao of Heaven, he knows the necessity of the original inherent nature of the myriad things and rises and falls with it. Entirely naturally, change and transformation are spontaneously produced, and have no concern for instrumental purposes. Here, Wang Tingxiang’s so-called divine springs of things clearly have the same meaning as Zhuangzi’s view of the myriad things as spontaneous and self-so, and can also be said to be influenced by Guo Xiang’s 郭象 view of the myriad things “singularly transforming on a plane of dark obscurity.” Wang Tingxiang stressed that if one wants to know the springs of things, one must first understand the dao, and understanding the dao entirely lies in the effort in the mutual cultivation of internal and external. In internal cultivation, the emphasis is on cultivation through self-discipline (hanyang 涵养), while in external cultivation the emphasis is on the extension of knowledge. The extension of knowledge and cultivation through self-discipline both require effort on concrete matters. He said: For understanding the dao, there is nothing better than the extension of knowledge, and in embodying the dao, there is nothing more important than cultivation through self-discipline. If one seeks its apex, there is the dao of mutual extension of the internal and external. When one does not simply pay particular attention and regard this as knowledge, then human affairs and social intercourse attain their excellence, and this is the concrete site for the extension of knowledge; when one does not simply maintain stillness and self-discipline and regard this as cultivation, then speech, conduct and careful control attain their regularity, and this is the familiar path for real cultivation through extension. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 778)

Although the extension of knowledge and cultivation through self-discipline were two important aspects of effort in cultivation for Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, for them what is attained through the extension of knowledge is the principles of specific things and affairs, and cultivation through self-discipline is a process of savouring, reviewing, and rumination on these principles in order to deepen one’s understanding of them. Once one has accumulated enough principles, one will suddenly gain a penetrating understanding, and only then can one attain the heights of the dao of Heaven. Wang Tingxiang however emphasised that understanding the dao means understanding the specific principles of things and affairs, and understanding these specific principles of things and affairs is sufficient to experience a penetrating understanding of the dao of Heaven. Thus, Wang Tingxiang’s writings do not

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include discussions of accumulation to seek penetrating understanding, and his idea of concreteness in effort also differed from that of Cheng-Zhu. Although Zhu Xi also spoke of applying one’s efforts to concrete matters, he especially stressed lecturing and studying. He put his whole life’s energy into lecturing and teaching his disciples and writing books and essays. Cheng Yi stressed effort in stillness and centrality. From phrases such as “spend half the day reading books, and half the day sitting in stillness” and “every time he saw people sitting in stillness, he exclaimed that they were good at studying,” the main focus of his effort can be glimpsed. Wang Tingxiang was a government official who stressed practical learning, and he especially emphasised the extension of knowledge in practice, frequently instructing people to receive training through human affairs and social intercourse. His cultivation through self-discipline also stressed not savouring and ruminating on the principles of things, but rather checking whether or not one’s speech and conduct accord with the morality of the dao in practice. Seen from this perspective, an emphasis on empirical evidence in the aspect of knowledge and an emphasis on a penetrating understanding of knowledge and morality in the aspect of cultivation method coexist in Wang Tingxiang’s thought. Secondly, Wang Tingxiang emphasised the two aspects of cultivating the mind through moral principle and cultivating the body through ritual propriety and music. He said: In learning, people of ancient times first used moral principle to cultivate their mind, and then used ritual propriety and music to cultivate their body, such that internal and external were mutually cultivated, and their virtuous inherent nature was thereby accomplished. Through this, their actions accorded with the regularities of Heaven and they were one with the dao. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 814)

Cultivating the mind through moral principle refers to using the exploration of the dao-principles of things and affairs, especially experiencing the Confucian moral principles concerning the dao of Heaven and human affairs, in order to expand one’s horizons, cultivate a comprehensively thorough intellectual method, deepen one’s awareness of the cosmos and human life, and increase one’s self-awareness in the cultivation of character. Cultivating the body through ritual propriety and music refers to breaking free from both sitting in idle stillness and from the fierce struggle between Heavenly principle and human desire, leading people to gradually enter into the dao through the edifying influence of ritual propriety and music, to seek elegance in both spiritual enjoyment and bodily comfort, to realise the beauty of life through aestheticised living, to mutually cultivate the internal and external, and thereby to achieve a unity of setting their will on the dao and wandering freely in art. Only in this way can one’s conduct accord with the dao of Heaven and one’s virtuous inherent nature attain completion in spontaneity such that one is cultivated into a refined and urbane gentleman. Through the mutual cultivation of internal and external one can avoid becoming any kind of boorish, vulgar or unsophisticated Confucian. He denounced a variety of the Confucian behaviour of his time: “The pedantic Confucians are forced and obsessive, and are unaware of the adaptability between ancient and modern; the

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despicable Confucians depend on obsequiousness, and do not consider the planning of the state; the vulgar Confucians are shallow and uncultivated, and do not understand when to control and when to overlook; none of these should be permitted to gain appointment” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 815). Pedantic and stubborn Confucians cling to fixed existing views, lack the insight to be flexible and adaptable in meeting with changing situations, as well as the ability to deal with the past and the present, hence their studies do not assist their ability and insight but rather occlude it. Despicable Confucians have some insight into how to deal appropriately with their times, but calculating as to their wealth and position and that of their family, they compromise their views in order to gain power, and such Confucians can be found in every generation. As for vulgar Confucians, they have neither insight nor ability worth speaking of, are ignorant as to the inflections of changing affairs, and are narrow-minded and shallow. None of these kinds of people can be entrusted with important positions. If one examines how Wang Tingxiang carried out affairs during his life, it can be seen that he self-consciously regarded cultivating himself into an ideal Confucian as his lifelong aspiration, especially emphasised practical learning as well as the cultivation of character, and stressed “applying effort in practical matters, and gaining experience in human affairs.” Wang Tingxiang divided the mutual cultivation of internal and external into two aspects, namely the extension of knowledge and diligent practice (lixing 力行). He said: The learning of the superior man is broadly knowledgeable and stresses memorisation in order that he has resources and information; it examines through questioning and makes clear discriminations in order that he may seek to gather and unify; it is refined in thinking and research, in order that it extend his self-attainment. When these three are fulfilled then the dao of the extension of knowledge is attained. Through deep reflection and close scrutiny, he can examine the springs of goodness and badness; through earnest implementation in practice, he can hold to the centrality of moral principle; through rectification of mistakes and locating righteousness, he can maximise the concrete application of morality. When these three are fulfilled then the dao of diligent practice is attained. In this way, when principle is not completely illuminated and dao has not reached its apex, this is not the fault of one’s ability, but rather harm caused by one’s recklessness and perversion. It is for this reason that the superior man maintains respect to cultivate his mind and refines his righteousness to embody the dao. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 778)

In the extension of knowledge and diligent practice here, their content is taken from the “broad studies, investigative questioning, careful thinking, clear discrimination and earnest practice” of Centrality in the Ordinary. Wang Tingxiang regarded “broad learning, investigative questioning, clear discrimination and refined thinking” as the affairs of knowledge, and “deep reflection and close scrutiny, earnest practice and rectification of mistakes” as the affairs of practice. In the affairs of knowledge, his emphasis was on the absorption of moral principles, turning them into resources for personal cultivation and carrying out practical affairs; in the affairs of practice, his emphasis was on moral practice, such as self-reflection and examination of selfish desires, and the rectification of mistakes and offenses. In this

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kind of mutual cultivation of internal and external, virtue and knowledge are both extended, with the internal aimed at accomplishing an ideal character, and the external aimed at completing the undertakings of ordering the world and assisting the people. Only this kind of learning is true learning, hence he said: “Cultivating inherent nature in order to accomplish one’s virtue, responding to affairs in accordance with the dao, this is what can be called learning” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 779). If Wang Tingxiang’s method of cultivation was a mutual cultivation of internal and external in which both virtue and knowledge are extended, then his principle for conduct was to “reach up to the highest and brightest through achieving centrality in the ordinary” [see Centrality in the Ordinary]. He opposed intentionally seeking either to be different from or to conform with the commonplace and ordinary. He said: If one seeks to be different, then the dao is insufficient, it will be entangled by either the shallowness of one’s insight or the partiality of one’s inherent nature, and hence one will separate oneself through trickery and fail to enter into sagehood. If one seeks to conform, then one’s will is insufficient, one will be entangled in cherishing profit and self-preservation, and hence one will be unable to be independent and will unite with the corrupt. If one fails to enter into sagehood, where is greatness? If one unites with the corrupt, where is righteousness? Hence when it said, “reach up to the highest and brightest through achieving centrality in the ordinary,” this refers to not valuing difference in conduct, while “the superior man is harmonious but does not flow with the popular” refers to not valuing conformity with common custom. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 761)

Among the scholars of ancient times, there was no lack of those who stood out and acted independently (teli duxing 特立独行 [see Record of Rites (Liji 礼记), “The Conduct of a Confucian” (Ruxing 儒行)]), yet many of them sought fame and status, hence their conduct was strange and different; or, their inherent natures were cramped and narrow, hence their conduct separated them from the multitude. Wang Tingxiang held that intentionally seeking to be different was caused by one’s knowledge of the dao being insufficiently comprehensive. The dao is broad and great yet also natural and spontaneous, and it is because the sage “reaches up to the highest and brightest through achieving centrality in the ordinary” that he is united with the dao. True Confucians also do not conform with popular custom. Those who conform with popular custom lack both the will to seek the dao and the conduct of the noble, and their conformity with the mediocre multitude is simply aimed at self-preservation. Although the superior man does not intentionally seek to be different, he also does not alter his individual conduct for profit or support. “Reaching up to the highest and brightest through achieving centrality in the ordinary” absolutely does not mean conforming with the common and ordinary, but rather internally cherishing the will to seek the dao and externally observing simply and plain conduct. Being “harmonious but not flowing with the popular” refers to harmonising with the ordinary multitude but not altering one’s independent will. His ideal was “wisdom is round and smooth while righteousness is square and just.” He said: “His righteousness is square and just to distinguish him from the inclinations of the crowd, while his wisdom is round and smooth to encompass the will

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of the multitude, hence the sage is united with the dao” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 761). In terms of spiritual principles, one must stand out and act independently, otherwise these are insufficient to distinguish oneself from the ordinary multitude; in terms of specific wisdom in dealing with the world, one must accumulate principles and become proficient, otherwise it is insufficient to live among the multitude and keep oneself safe. Action for the dao should include these two mutually reinforcing aspects. His requirement for scholarly conduct was: “One who makes his choices and decisions with authenticity will find his dao is pure; one who strengthens his resolution with stability will find his virtue is Heavenly; one who changes and transforms with subtlety will find his spring is divine” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 761). Choosing and deciding is the aspiration of the scholar, a strengthening resolution is the virtuous conduct of the scholar, and penetrating changes is the insight of the scholar. Choosing and deciding takes dao as its standard, morality takes Heaven as its model and rule, and insight takes divine wonder as its ancestral polarity; only when these three are all present, can one be classed as a true scholar. The standard Wang Tingxiang established for the scholar was undoubtedly lofty and strict. Wang Tingxiang’s theory of effort covered every aspect of moral cultivation, and respected the pre-existing methods of Neo-Confucianism. Although it contained many of his own unique insights, much of them were words from the studio library, and lacked both Wang Yangming’s unforgettable phrases of profound experience, and also his power to shift the ethos and overturn the heroes of a whole generation. In terms of influence, his was naturally not as wide and far-reaching as that of Wang Yangming.

4 Criticisms of Buddhism, Daoism and Various Neo-Confucians Wang Tingxiang’s works contain many criticisms of earlier Neo-Confucian worthies, and especially fierce criticisms of Buddhism and Lao-Zhuang Daoism. Wang Tingxiang applied quite significant effort to studying classic Buddhist texts, and his criticisms mainly emerged from his own experience, such as his criticism of the relation between inherent nature and enlightenment in Buddhism, in which he said: Buddhism teaches people to rely on holding onto self-nature, and holding onto self-nature means clinging to one’s own original inherent nature. To say that all the multitude of living beings possess original enlightenment is to say that although the numinously enlightened part of original inherent nature flows and turns through the six realms of existence, receiving all manner of bodies, this enlightened inherent nature is never lost or extinguished. Hence they regard this as true inherent nature, as perfect enlightenment. Their view of that which produces and is able to disentangle consciousness means that the multitude of living things gaining realisation and entering into knowledge is all produced from out of enlightened inherent nature, hence they say that perfect enlightenment produces bodhi, nirvana and prajna… Seen from this perspective, one can approach the major tenets of Buddhism. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 875)

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These words display a deep knowledge of the major meaning of the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment (Yuanjue jing 圆觉经), as well as a profound grasp of the Buddhist theory that regards perfect enlightenment as inherent nature. He firmly grasped that Buddhism regards enlightenment as inherent nature, and that this inherent nature is neither produced nor extinguished, is a function that comes along with anything possessing feeling and life, and is the basis for all effort and virtue in achieving the fruits of the path. In this he can be said to have grasped the fundamental tenets of Buddhism. He further proposed that since enlightened inherent nature is neither produced nor extinguished, it is not one with qi. Any theory that divides and separates inherent nature from qi falls into this theory of the Buddhists. For example, Zhu Xi held that the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth did not come from material form and qi, so Wang Tingxiang claimed that Zhu Xi’s view “in fact came from the Buddhists’ numinous enlightenment of original inherent nature” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 875). Inherent nature is produced from qi, and all theories that diverge from qi in speaking of inherent nature inevitably repeat Zhu Xi’s error. Wang Tingxiang also pointed out that Buddhism regards the perfectly enlightened pure and still mind as the root-origin, regards the myriad phenomena of the cosmos as illusory transformations, and desires to dispel these illusory transformations and return to original purity and stillness through cultivation, a view which he thought was greatly mistaken. Starting from his theory of qi, he refuted this view, saying: Since there is primordial qi, one cannot be detached from the illusory transformations of Heaven and Earth; since there is the clear enlightenment of inherent nature, one cannot be detached from the illusory consciousness of human life; this is the unavoidable dao. Since the Buddhists desire to cast off and detach from the illusory mind, they must extinguish inherent nature. Once one has extinguished inherent nature and detached from illusion, if there is still enlightened awareness, then this must also be an illusion, so should it not also be cut off? Can one be detached from the illusions of spontaneous production? Can one make Heaven and Earth detach from illusory transformation? In the twelve divisions of the scriptures, there is much that is the illusory consciousness of the Buddha, so should one not wish the multitude of living beings to dissociate from these? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 875)

From Wang Tingxiang’s philosophical standpoint, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things constituted by qi all really have their substantiality, and cannot be called illusory transformations. Even if one calls them “illusory transformations” (huanhua 幻化) using Buddhist language, these illusory transformations cannot be extinguished or detached from. The same is true for spiritual activity. Regardless of whether or not mind and inherent nature are originally enlightened, people’s spiritual activity is real and cannot be called an empty and illusory, and also cannot be extinguished. If one regards all spiritual activity as empty and illusory, then the enlightenment spoken of by Buddhism is also empty and illusory. The Tripiṭaka with its twelve divisions are all the result of spiritual activity, so can also be said to all be illusory. It is clearly absurd to use illusory consciousness to teach the multitude of people to detach from illusory feelings. Wang Tingxiang grasped the most

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fundamental deficiency in Buddhist doctrine, and applied the method of “using one’s opponent’s spear to attack his own shield” to argue for the falsity of Buddhism’s view that the existence of things and spiritual activity are illusory. Starting from his theory of qi, Wang Tingxiang valued activity and action, and hence the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi also became targets of his criticism. He criticised Laozi, saying: The dao of Laozi takes withdrawal as fundamental and only wishes to benefit the self, and his obscurantism is of harm to governance. Thus it is that those who obtain his cultivation through stillness end up with the bodily deformations of the occultists (fangshi 方士); those who obtain his parsimony end up with the ascetic frugality of Yanzi 晏子 and Mozi 墨子; those who obtain his tolerance end up with the laws and punishments of Shen Buhai 申不 害 and Hanfeizi 韩非子; those who obtain his detaching from sagehood and abolishing wisdom end up with the unrestrained libertinism of Zhuangzi and Liezi; those who obtain his not daring to take precedence in affairs end up with the violation of holding both ends at once; those who obtain his skill at preservation and maintenance end up with the art of avoiding difficulties; those who obtain his unification and conformity and do not detach from customs end up with the despicable man’s blunt stubbornness. This dao starts out by constantly saying it can govern the world under Heaven, yet it ends up on the contrary being used to harm the world under Heaven. Be careful with the dao! Be careful with the dao! (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 844)

The 5,000 characters of the Laozi are concise in words but rich in meaning, and Wang Tingxiang’s comments cover almost every aspect of Laozi’s theory. He held that the core thread of the Laozi is modest withdrawal and non-action, yet Laozi’s modest withdrawal regarded withdrawal as advance, and his non-action was aimed at action. Among the various aspects covered by the Laozi, those who believe his theory of cultivation through stillness end up as occultists engaged in alchemy; those who abide by his views of thrift and frugality end up with the “extreme asceticism” of the Mohists, which “goes against the minds of those under Heaven, who cannot endure it” [see Zhuangzi, Ch. 33 “The World Under Heaven”]. Those who abide by his cruel and merciless views end up with the severe laws of Shen Buhai and Hanfeizi. Zhuangzi’s wandering in a realm of nothingness and Liezi’s moving by riding the wind seek absolute freedom and renounce the Confucian dao of governing the state, and both are derived from the Laozi’s view of cutting off sagehood and casting off wisdom. Among the Three Treasures of the Laozi, one of them is “not daring to take precedence in the world under Heaven” [see Ch. 67], and thus those who drift carelessly in self-attainment and do not dare to stick their neck out and assume responsibilities all take this as an excuse. Those who muddle along with popular custom and use their clarity and wisdom to protect their bodies all derive these ideas from the Laozi. If used well, the theory of the Laozi can offer techniques for managing the state and governing the people, yet if used badly, it is capable of great harm. Hence Wang Tingxiang repeatedly cautioned and warned: “In Laozi and Zhuangzi, if the superior man does not seek to share their techniques but takes their shared principles, this is acceptable” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 845).

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Wang Tingxiang’s criticisms of Laozi’s fundamental principles such as “non-action” (wuwei 无为), “the dao takes its rule as what is so spontaneously” (dao fa ziran 道法自然 [see Ch. 25]) and “cut off sagehood and cast off wisdom” (juesheng qizhi 绝圣弃智) were especially fierce. He said: The dao of Laozi takes spontaneity as primary and non-action as useful, hence he said “regard the common people as straw dogs” [see Ch. 5]. If one relies on their spontaneous action, I can only see that the strong will abuse the weak and the multitude will injure the minority, leading to resentment and grievances, to say nothing of the incursions of the barbarians! He also said “cut off sagehood and cast off wisdom, and the people will benefit 100-fold” [see Ch. 19]. Benefiting the lives of the people is something that has been passed down through many generations of the sagely and wise; if the above is so, then when Yao worried about finding Shun and Shun about finding Yu 禹, their intentions were absurd; is this possible? Action is something that sages have no choice about; demanding that they desire to be non-active and rely on their people is the dao of great disorder. Hence if one uses the dao of Laozi to govern one’s body then one can preserve one’s life, but if one uses it to govern the state then there will be prolonged disorder. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 807)

Wang Tingxiang held that the social phenomena of Laozi’s time were that the strong bullied and abused the weak, and large states invaded small states. If one follows Laozi’s view of the dao taking its rule as what is so spontaneously and relies on its spontaneous action, how could these phenomena of inequality be extinguished? Laozi’s idea of “cutting off sagehood and casting off wisdom” can be followed even less. Benefiting the lives of the people is a result of the accumulated heritage of many generations of the sagely and wise. Confucian sage-rulers worried that they would not find a successor precisely because the world often fails to meet with the sagely and wise. If one follows Laozi’s view to “cut off sagehood and cast off wisdom, and the people will benefit 100-fold,” then worrying about the state and the people and willing to save those in crisis and aid the poor is entirely superfluous. Using Laozi’s theory of spontaneity to govern one’s body is acceptable, but using it to govern the state will lead the state into disorder. Here, Wang Tingxiang started out from the Confucian theory of action in attacking Laozi. In terms of his view of the dao of Heaven, Wang Tingxiang advocated spontaneity and non-action and opposed the idea that Heaven has any kind of intention or purpose, yet in terms of society and politics, he opposed theories of spontaneity and advocated human action to reconcile or reduce phenomena of inequality and achieve general social harmony. Wang Tingxiang also opposed Laozi and Zhuangzi’s proposal to abolish penal law. He noted that Laozi and Zhuangzi saw how rulers used penal law to injure and harm the common people, penal law becoming a tool for great robbers who steal states to injure the people and thereby get their way, and thus proposed abolishing penal law. A world without penal law was not only yearned for by Laozi and Zhuangzi, it was also the ideal of the Confucian sages. The safety of the people and cultivation of virtue without the use of penal law was something the sage-kings keenly sought. However, in reality a variety of immoral behaviours demand the use of legal sanction. Not using penal law was a vain fantasy of Laozi and Zhuangzi that did not face reality. Without using penal law, the state would be in great disorder.

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Since Wang Tingxiang opposed Laozi’s principles of purity, stillness and non-action and advocated activity and effort, he also opposed Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 theory of maintaining stillness. He pointed out: When Master Zhou advocated the theory of “maintaining stillness and establishing the polarity of humanity,” he was mistaken. Since activity and stillness are cultivated mutually, and the dao is thereby accomplished, if one maintains stillness then the dao is involved in partiality, having yin without yang, cultivation without application, so how then can the polarity of humanity be established? For this reason, when later students concentrated their efforts on gaining understanding through sitting in stillness, slipping into Chan Buddhism without knowing it, this was all initiated by the former gentleman. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 857)

Zhou Dunyi’s guiding tenet of “maintaining stillness” (zhujing 主静) was denounced by many people, who believed that it was plagiarised from the theories of the two schools [of Daoism and Buddhism]. Wang Tingxiang was dissatisfied with Zhou Dunyi’s “maintaining stillness,” holding that “maintaining stillness” implied stillness without activity, yin without yang. This led to the problem of later students liking stillness and disliking activity. Starting out from the Confucian mutual cultivation of activity and stillness, Wang Tingxiang opposed “maintaining stillness” as well as the theory that “people are born in stillness” (ren sheng er jing 人生而静) from the “Record of Music” [Yueji 乐记] chapter of the Record of Rites: “That people are born in stillness, this is the inherent nature of Heaven. When they are affected by things and become active, this is the desire of inherent nature.” These are not the words of a sage. Stillness belongs to the inherent nature of Heaven, but activity is also the inherent nature of Heaven…. Indeed, inherent nature is the dao of the unification of internal and external as one. When activity accords with Heavenly principle, stillness must have principle to maintain it; when activity accords with human desire, stillness must have desire to ground it. When stillness is regarded as the inherent nature of Heaven and activity gradually becomes human desire, this is the internal and external, the mind and traces not being mutually united as one; where under Heaven is there such a principle? (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 852)

Wang Tingxiang was opposed to regarding inherent nature as still and feelings as active or stillness as principle and activity as desire, holding that activity and stillness are simply names for the internal and external, the apparent and subtle. The two cannot be separated, and that which is apparent externally must have an internal ground. Theories that regard inherent nature as still and feelings as active or stillness as principle and activity as desire separate activity and stillness, and are not the words of those who know the dao. Wang Tingxiang proposed the view that “Stillness is the original substance and activity is its expressive functioning,” yet this original substance and expressive functioning are not divided into producer and produced or primary and secondary, but are only distinguished into internal and external, apparent and subtle. Hence he held that “activity and stillness are complementary” and “activity and stillness are mutually apparent,” saying:

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Stillness without activity leads to stagnation, while activity without stillness leads to instability, hence neither can be lasting, this is the cunning of the dao. One who knows this can be said to see the dao. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 774) Activity and stillness are the dao of the unification of internal and external as one… When common Confucians regard activity as the affection of objects and only stress stillness, this is to take stillness as true and activity as false, stillness as the reality of the self and activity as the falseness of objects, and the internal and external as two, close to the Buddhists’ meditation and disgust with the external. (ibid.)

Here, Wang Tingxiang’s view of activity and stillness is precise and appropriate. Wang Tingxiang also severely criticised Shao Yong 邵雍. His criticism concerned Book of Changes learning, and was directed against the image-number school (xiangshu pai 象数派) from the standpoint of the meaning-principle school (yili pai 义理派). Shao Yong was a representative figure of the image-number school of Changes learning who took number as the fundamental principle, and from this deduced his model of the becoming and transformation of the cosmos. Wang Tingxiang held that Heaven, Earth, humanity and things all have principle, and that the rhythmic patterns of principle give rise to numbers. Numbers are the manifest forms of principle, and principle is not derived from numbers. If one regards number as the fundamental principle of the cosmos, as the producer of the myriad things, then it will be difficult to avoid the restrictions of fatalism. He said: Although the changes have numbers, the sages did not discuss numbers but rather principles, since they wished to thoroughly express human affairs. Hence it was said, “if one obtains their meanings then images and numbers are contained within.” Ever since Master Shao used numbers to discuss the changes of Heaven, Earth, humanity and things, abandoning human action and valuing determined fate, this led later scholars into all kinds of confused discussions of numbers that set aside human affairs as useless, producing yet another heterodoxy and seriously harming the dao. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 842)

Wang Tingxiang advocated using the meanings and principles of the changes [in the Book of Changes] to demonstrate human affairs, and opposed abandoning meaning and principle and deducing affairs purely through images and numbers. He held that images and numbers are a general structure set up by people, while principles are specific and individual. Deduction through images and numbers is very easy, and Shao Yong’s methods of “doubling” (jia yibei 加一倍) and “one divides into two” are not particularly advanced or profound, setting aside the meanings and principles expressed in the hexagram and line statements and the order of the hexagrams, hence he cannot be considered as someone who truly understood the changes. As for the “Diagram of Earlier Heaven” (Xiantian tu 先天 图), which had historically been regarded as inscrutable, advanced and profound, Wang Tingxiang expressed his disdain, saying: “Kangjie’s 康节 [i.e. Shao Yong’s] ‘Diagram of Earlier Heaven’ was made by setting the pictures of the hexagrams down in yin-yang order, but this could be done by anyone who understands the changes. What refined creativity or mysterious achievement was contained within it? Carefully deducing the 64 hexagrams, explaining each hexagram according to its

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own meaning and then in terms of their mutual relationships, this has nothing to do with the diagram” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 869). He pointed out that the Diagram of Earlier Heaven was simply an artificial arrangement made according to the images and numbers of the hexagram pictures, and there was no refined meaning contained within it. Wang Tingxiang also criticised the law of the evolution of the cosmos through eras, epochs, ages and generations that Shao Yong deduced on the basis of images and numbers, saying: Master Shao postulated his fixed frame of four periods and produced his “Diagram of Earlier Heaven” in order to explain the Changes, yet none of these were the original purpose of the Changes. He ordered the sixty-year cycle of dead numbers and wrote his Book on Ordering the World (jingshi shu 经世书) in order to explain his investigations into Heaven and humanity, yet none of these captured the spontaneity of Heavenly and human affairs. This was indeed heterodox, and was secretly attached to Confucianism. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 871)

“Ordered the sixty-year cycle of dead numbers” here refers to Shao Yong’s method of calculating eras, epochs, ages and generations. This method took the twelve Earthly Branches as one era (yuan 元) composed of twelve epochs (hui 会), the ten Heavenly Stems repeated three times as one epoch composed of thirty ages (yun 运), one age as composed of twelve generations (shi 世), and one generation as thirty years, such that one could go on deducing in this way infinitely. Wang Tingxiang thought that this was simply dead numbers. The essential content of Heaven and humanity lies in their principles, and the diverse and confused changes and transformations of the dao of Heaven and human affairs cannot be encompassed within this sixty-year cycle of dead numbers. Wang Tingxiang paid particular attention to researching the specific principles of things, as clearly shown by his examination of how a robe sleeve carries snow in order to research differences in how snowflakes crystallise in winter and spring, or his collection of the nests of digger wasps in order to confirm the relationship between bollworms and solitary wasps. Hence he was especially dissatisfied with the use of specific laws as principles of the world to deduce the changes and transformations of the cosmos and human life. His criticism of Shao Yong’s image-number learning was an expression of his emphasis on empirical modes of thought. He also commented on the various schools of Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism, saying: “Guan-Luo 关洛 Learning [i.e. that of Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers] was similar to Mencius, with the elder Master Cheng [i.e. Cheng Hao] being pure, lofty, bright and at ease in the dao, his discussions attaining the centrality and correctness of the sages, and it was thus of the highest class. Min-Yue 闽越 Learning [i.e. that of Zhu Xi] sincerely believed the former philosophers, and was admirable; however it was extensive in its explorations and broad in its investigations, its interpretive choices were not authentic, and it still had some objectionable elements, and was thus second-class” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 819). He also criticised Zhu Xi: “Yin-yang, divination, geomancy, astrology, he believed all these delusions” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 861). Although Wang Tingxiang himself also read very widely, he believed that he

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unified this through the dao, and hence was extensive without being confused. Wang Tingxiang possessed an extremely strong scientific and empiricist spirit, which penetrated throughout all the discussions of topics such as divination in his works. He held that what the ancient sages and worthies taught people was simply “to settle the arrangements for the common people,” “to respectfully teach people the appropriate times,” “to plant the various grains,” “the Six Mansions [i.e. the basic elements of metal, wood, water, fire, earth and grain] and the Three Affairs [i.e. to rectify virtue, use beneficially and enrich life],” etc., and these are all “concrete affairs leading to governance,” while as for divination, astrology, the affection and response between Heaven and humanity, auguries and apocrypha, etc., he was strongly opposed to them all his life. Among the various academic subjects, Wang Tingxiang especially excelled at astronomy, and his works contain many discussions of astronomy, perhaps reflecting the influence of Zhang Zai. Although Wang Tingxiang frequently criticised Zhu Xi, his comments on the dispute between Zhu and Lu Jiuyuan were impartial and appropriate. He said: Mr. Wengong 文公 [i.e. Zhu Xi] once repented that he had the fault of being biased toward lecturing and writing, while Mr. Zijing 子静 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan] also frequently lectured and taught, yet their disciples lacked understanding and each struggled for the triumph of his school, rejecting and slandering each other, until eventually the two gentleman were differentiated into fragmentation and Chan meditation. Later students were unable to deeply examine the details of the matter and simply echoed each other blindly with no penetrating insight, with those who esteemed Zhu regarding lecturing as the true meaning and those who defended Lu regarding Chan meditation as the right path, spending their whole lives circling around the learning of the sages without being aware of it, until each became fixed in their views which misled later scholars of the world, a state that still persists down to the present. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 849)

The dispute between Zhu and Lu was a great affair in Neo-Confucianism, both in their lives and after their deaths, with scholars of the two schools debating constantly without respite. Even in the Qing Dynasty after Wang Tingxiang’s death, the dispute between Zhu and Lu remained a hot topic in the academic world. Wang Tingxiang’s superior insight lay in his assessment that he divergence between the two men was nowhere near as great as that between their later followers, and that the dispute was largely stirred up by the sectarian views of these followers, with affairs such as Cao Lizhi’s 曹立之 gravestone inscription and the meeting with Fu Ziyuan 傅子渊 in Nankang 南康 becoming important points of disagreement between the Zhu and Lu schools. Disciples of the schools each took defending of their school through triumphing over the other in debates as their goal, thereby diverging from the real learning of Zhu and Lu themselves. Wang Tingxiang here considered the Zhu-Lu dispute from the perspective of its historical development, criticising the negative academic ethos in Zhu and Lu’s later students, a view with profound insight. In addition, Wang Tingxiang opposed the contemporary trend towards empty discussions of inherent nature and principle based on his conception of “concrete learning leading to governance,” saying:

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In recent times high-aiming and pedantic Confucians, ignorant of the state’s training worthies and educating talents in order that they assist with governance, advocate paying attention to theories of innate moral knowing and realising Heavenly principle, leading to their later students and disciples clearing their minds in futile sitting and gathering for empty discussions, spending the whole year clamoring about the abstruse mysteries of mind and inherent nature, in dim ignorance of seeking techniques for encouraging the dao and bringing about governance, opportunities for achieving balance and responding to changes. If one takes this learning and these people and affords them with the offices of the family, state and empire, then when they finally meet with extraordinary and unforeseen events, their qi lacks accomplishment and they have no training in affairs, hence they become emotional and their tempers flare, they propose initiatives in panic, and those who can avoid misleading others and the affairs of family and state are few indeed! This is even worse among the Confucians from the Southern Song onward with their constant lecturing. (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 873)

Here he was primarily denouncing Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水. The disciples of the Wang and Zhan schools spread throughout the empire, and their learning was sufficient to stimulate the ethos of a generation. Wang Tingxiang was a near contemporary of Wang and Zhan, and he spent his whole life advocating practical learning and opposing the empty and abstruse academic atmosphere of the Neo-Confucians. However, the Wang and Zhan schools themselves both regarded their “extension of innate moral knowing” and “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle” as practical learning. Wang Yangming in particular was not purely a scholar of the studio library, and made especially brilliant political and practical achievements. His learning of the extension of innate moral knowing stressed the extension of innate moral knowing in concrete affairs, regarding innate moral knowing and Heavenly principle as the commander and concrete affairs and achievements as its assistants, maintaining the unity of knowledge and action at all times, and hence being entirely practical learning. Teaching later students and disciples to clear their minds by sitting in silence was simply a matter for beginner students. Wang Yangming constantly emphasised the commanding function of moral reason, and in lecturing to students he “never departed from the three-character guiding tenet of extending moral knowing.” While his learning may have seemed abstruse and empty, it was in reality a learning of both substance and function. Liu Zongzhou even thought that “Innate moral knowing was a knowing that saw that knowledge is not limited to what is heard and seen, while the extension of innate moral knowing was an action that saw that action does not stagnate in fixed fields. Both mind and things, activity and stillness, substance and function, effort and original substance, lower and higher, all these were united in order to rescue scholars from the problems of fragmentary and bewildered ambition and devoting themselves to the blossom but cutting off its root. One can say it was a shocking thunderbolt that awoke people from their slumbers, violently and dazzlingly breaking through their confusions, and ever since Confucius and Mencius, there was no one so profoundly outstanding and enlightened” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 7). Wang Tingxiang’s attacks on Wang Yangming suggest he did not deeply probe into the essence of Wang Yangming’s learning of innate moral knowing.

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Wang Tingxiang’s criticisms of abstruse and empty learning originate from his profound feeling of saving the country and the people. He held that the great concern of the time was that people were not concerned with politics, while the greatest malady of politics was that the imperial house absorbed an excessive amount of wealth and supplies and the national treasury was empty, so the frontier defence was failing and unruly soldiers were difficult to control. These two great maladies were sufficient to bring about the calamity of the collapse of the state, i.e. the “eyebrow-scorching and skin-stripping disaster” of the time, a situation concerning which those in charge of the state must swiftly deliberate. Maladies of the human mind and popular customs are matters that accumulate gradually, and are insufficient to overturn the imperial house of the state. Thus, the discussions of pedantic Confucians regarded “rectifying the human mind” as an urgent task. As can be seen, although Wang Tingxiang and Wang Yangming both had a profound awareness of concern for the affairs of the state and the hardships of the people, the former advocated dealing with these through political measures, while the latter advocated dealing with them from the fundamental aspect of the human mind; the former emphasised researching actual problems, while the latter emphasised rectifying morality and the human mind. In this respect, Wang Tingxiang’s empiricist mode of thought is evident. Wang Tingxiang’s learning was most notable for its theory of qi, and when earlier commentators said that his learning was derived from that of Zhang Zai, they had good reason to do so. His theory of qi was more complete than that of Luo Qinshun. Later, Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成, Gao Panlong 高攀龙, Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi were all influenced by him. However, the theory of mind and inherent nature was the most prominent feature of Neo-Confucianism in the Ming Dynasty, and this was what Huang Zongxi was mainly referring to when he said he “analysed even ox hair and cocoon silk.” Wang Tingxiang’s contributions to the theory of mind and inherent nature were not great, since he was strong at rational thinking and weak at realising mind and inherent nature, and also paid special attention to empirical studies. His opposition to auguries and apocrypha, the affection and response between Heaven and humanity, divination and astrology, and fengshui 风水 geomancy was connected to the rationalism and empiricism he adopted from astronomy. The preface to his Cautious Words includes the sentence “Ever since I came to know the dao, I observed that above and inspected that below, examining the hidden and checking the manifest, comprehending it all in my mind, and then recording it in my books” (Collected Works of Wang Tingxiang, 750), which reflects his use of this mode of thought from one aspect.

Chapter 23

The Philosophical Thought of Wu Tinghan

After Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, Wu Tinghan was another thinker who based his philosophy on a theory of qi 气, and his cosmology, theory of inherent nature and theory of effort all have their unique points. Although his criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 and Wang Yangming 王阳明 are not without their partiality, they all have a certain theoretical basis. His views of principle and desire, knowledge and action, and the diversity of particularization and the sum of interpenetration all seem simple yet are in fact profound. Wu Tinghan 吴廷翰 (1490–1559; zi 字 Songbo 崧伯) was from Wuwei 无为 county in the south of Zhili 直隶 province. In his youth he was unusually gifted, and he began to learn the [Book of] Changes (Zhouyi 周易) at the age of twelve, passing the provincial examination at twenty-nine, and the imperial examination the next year. He was appointed as a secretary in the Ministry of War 兵部, and then transferred to a director in the Bureau of Appointments 文选司 of the Ministry of Personnel 吏部. During the selection for the Ministry of Personnel, he argued with his superiors over their stinginess, and was sent out to be an assistant commissioner in Guangdong province, being transferred first to the General Surveillance Circuit 分巡道 in Lingnan 岭南 as an education intendant, not long after moving to become an assistant administration commissioner first in Zhejiang province and then in Shanxi province. In a year of great natural disasters, he requested that the lending of goods be abolished, temples for prostitution demolished, and the grain stored in state depositories distributed to relieve the affected people. His character was upright, stern, outspoken and unyielding, and he frequently offended the powerful. In his forties he resigned his official position, and then resided at home for more than thirty years. He once sent letters to Wang Yangming discussing learning. He took great pleasure in the strong fragrance of the purple perilla (zisu 紫苏) produced in his hometown, and thus built a hut on the shores of Baiwan 百万 Lake that he named Perilla Origin (suyuan 苏原), calling himself the Recluse of Perilla Origin (suyuan jushi 苏原居士). On most days he busied himself with reading, placing an earthen pot next to his seat so that when he learned something, he could write it down on paper and toss it into the pot. His Notes from the Pot (Wengji 瓮记) and Notes from the Box (Duji 椟记) were both edited © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_23

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compilations of this kind of reading notes. His works also include Casual Record from Auspicious Studio (Jizhai manlu 吉斋漫录), Collected Writings (Wenji 文集), Collected Poems (Shiji 诗集), and Minor Manuscripts from Hushan (Hushan xiaogao 湖山小稿), which were compiled by modern scholars to form the Collected Works of Wu Tinghan (Wu Tinghan ji 吴廷翰集).1 Although Wu Tinghan’s works were very seldom seen in China, they spread very widely in Japan, and had an important influence on Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斋, the founder of the Study of Ancient Meanings (Kogigaku 古义学) school in Japan. Wu Tinghan’s learning was greatly influenced by his maternal grandfather Zhang Lun 张纶, and he expressed his profound admiration for both Zhang Lun’s learning and his character, feeling an especially deep gratitude when he remembered Zhang Lun’s teaching in his later years. Furthermore, Wu Tinghan’s thought was clearly influenced by Wang Tingxiang, and in his works he often quoted Wang Tingxiang and expressed approval for his viewpoints.

1 The Chaos of Qi as the Ancestor of Heaven, Earth and the Myriad Things Wu Tinghan regarded qi [i.e. material force, pneuma] as the starting point of the cosmos, with dao 道, principle (li 理), yin 阴 and yang 阳, the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极), inherent nature (xing 性), spirit (shen 神), etc. all being based on qi as specifications of its different aspects. The opening chapter of his Casual Record from Auspicious Studio gives clear definitions of qi and other important categories: What is dao? One yin and one yang is what is called dao. What is qi? One yin and one yang is what is called qi. So then what kind of thing are yin and yang? I say they are qi. So then what is called dao? I say that qi is dao, and dao is qi. Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are simply one qi and nothing more; it is not that there is another thing called dao from which they all emerge. The chaos of qi is the ancestor of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, supreme and unsurpassable, the extreme to which nothing can be added, and thus it is called the Supreme Polarity. As for its division, the light and clear spreads out and diffuses, while the heavy and turbid gathers together and condenses, and thus we speak of yin and yang. Once yin and yang have separated, the two modes, four images, five phases, four seasons, myriad transformations and myriad affairs all emerge from this, and thus we speak of dao. The Supreme Polarity is spoken of based on the ultimate polarity of this qi. Yin and yang are spoken of based on the activity and stillness of this qi. Dao is spoken of based on this qi being that by which Heaven, Earth, people and things all emerge, and not of these as two entities. Based on its alternations and changes, it can also be called change, as in “Production and reproduction is what is called change”; based on its wondrous ethereality, it can be called spirit, as in “The unfathomability of yin and yang is what is called spirit”; based on it being that by which Heaven, Earth, people and things are produced and accomplished, it can be called inherent nature, as in “That which

1

[Trans.] See Wu Tinghan, Wu Tinghan ji, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984.

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accomplishes this is called inherent nature” [all quotations from Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)]. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 5)

This long passage of explanation is clear in its meaning and terminology, simple in its phrasing, and supported by the Commentaries on the Changes. The ancestor of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is the starting point and original substance of the myriad images of the cosmos, namely the time when the chaos of qi was not yet divided. Chaos (hunlun 混沦) speaks of its being rolled together with no gaps, no cracks, and no boundaries. This chaotic qi is the Supreme Polarity. The Supreme Polarity speaks of its being most fundamental, most primeval, and that from which Heaven, Earth and the myriad things all emerge, hence it is the utmost polarity and most highly venerated. The Supreme Polarity here was taken from the original meaning of “Supreme Polarity” in the Commentaries on the Changes, referring to the chaotic original qi when yin and yang had yet to divide. Yin and yang refer to the two opposed forces of activity and stillness, light purity and heavy turbidity, and spreading diffusion and concentrating condensation that are originally present with qi. His phrase “dao is qi” has two aspects of meaning: First, dao is composed of the qi of yin and yang, the meaning of “one yin and one yang is what is called dao” from the Commentaries on the Changes, which states that a lone yin or yang cannot be called dao, and dao must be the qi of yin and yang. Second, dao is the ancestor of the myriad things, that which Heaven, Earth and the myriad things all emerge from, so dao is the source of all things and affairs between Heaven and Earth. Qi is also the change of production and reproduction, because the production and change of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is all the circulating of qi, emerging from that and entering into this, producing and reproducing without cease, down through the ages. Spirit states that the change and transformation of the yin and yang of qi is subtle and unfathomable, that we do not know its limits. However, it is his explanation of inherent nature that is most unique, in which inherent nature refers to the qualities of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. The qualities of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are myriad in their differences, and are all accomplished through qi, hence it was said, “That which accomplishes this is called inherent nature.” Compared with previous thinkers who said that the differences between the myriad things were due to principle and that qi was simply a pure material that fills out the forms of things and affairs, this explanation was different. In terms of the relationship between principle and qi that had been debated continually since the Song Dynasty, Wu Tinghan also gave a detailed analysis. His fundamental viewpoint was that principles are the organised patterns (tiaoli 条理) of qi, and that qi is the primordial base of principle. Principle is not another thing existing outside of qi, nor is it prior to qi as “that by which it is so” (suoyi ran 所以 然). He said: The principles of qi are diverse yet without anything suspect, and the beginning of the one qi was simply chaos. Without the name of qi, how could there be the name of principle? When it reaches its division, it becomes the two modes, four images, five phases, four seasons, people and things, men and women, past and present, right down to the myriad

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changes and transformations, all of which are orderly and arranged, each with its organised pattern; this what is called veins being clear and distinct. This is why this qi is also called principle. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 6) Principle is a named for qi attaining its principles, similar to how its change and alternation is called the changes or its unfathomability is called spirit; it is not that there is another principle existing outside of qi. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 5)

Here he clearly stated that principle is a category that expresses function or state, rather than existence. Principle has qi as its basis. Abnormal movements in the natural world, such as disasters, foul miasmas, and turbid disorders, seem to be errors in the organised patterns of qi. However, they in fact also have their basis, are also originally present in the movement, change and transformation of qi, and hence must also be regarded as principle. Wu Tinghan’s explication here was a criticism of Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 view of dao as principle, and of dao and principle as that by which qi is so, in which principle was logically prior to qi, and was thus more fundamental. In reference to the sentence “one yin and one yang is what is called dao” from the Commentaries on the Changes, Cheng Yi once explained: “Apart from yin and yang there is no further dao. That by which there are yin and yang is the dao, while yin and yang are qi. Qi is the actual, while dao is the metaphysical.” He also said: “That by which opening and closing happens is the dao, and opening and closing are yin and yang” (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers [Er Cheng yishu 二 程遗书], Vol. 15). Zhu Xi also once said: “Yin and yang are qi and not dao; dao is that by which there is yin and yang.” “Yin and yang are only yin and yang, while dao is the Supreme Polarity.” For Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi here, dao and principle are that by which qi is so, qi is the actual, dao is metaphysical, and both dao and principle are logically prior to qi. Although Zhu Xi repeatedly emphasised that principle is not prior to qi in chronological or cosmological terms, principle is the basis for qi being as it is and internally constrains qi, so principle is more fundamental than qi. As Zhu Xi said: “Once there is this principle, there is this qi, but principle is the root.” “Only once there is this principle is this qi produced” (Categorised Sayings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类], Vol. 1). “If one discusses the root-origin, once there is principle, then there is qi” (“Letter in Reply to Zhao Zhidao” [Da Zhao Zhidao shu 答赵致道书], Collected Writings of Master Zhu [Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集], Vol. 59). Wu Tinghan did not agree with Zhu Xi’s thought above. He said: According to these few doctrines, although one cannot speak of dao apart from yin and yang, when they speak of “that by which there is yin and yang,” this still finally regards something as prior to yin and yang. When they say “Apart from yin and yang there is no further dao,” they go on to compare it to forms and their shadows, as if there were first yin and yang and only then dao. They say “One should see them as both separate and combined,” yet if they can be separated and combined, then ultimately dao is dao and yin and yang are yin and yang. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 6)

His view here firmly grasps the suspicion that Zhu Xi’s exposition divides principle and qi into two, and penetrates throughout his fundamental conception of principle

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as the organised patterns of qi. His explanations of concepts such as the “Supreme Polarity” and “inherent nature and endowment” also follow this path. Wu Tinghan provided repeated discussions and discriminations concerning the “Supreme Polarity,” aiming to eliminate the influence of Zhu Xi’s view of the Supreme Polarity as the principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. In his commentary on Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太极图说), Zhu Xi regarded the Supreme Polarity as “The vehicle of Heaven above, soundless and scentless, yet in reality the pivot of creation and transformation, the foundation of types and categories.” Wu Tinghan believed that the Supreme Polarity was only an expression of the supreme and final quality of qi, meaning that it was ultimate and could not be added to. To say that the Supreme Polarity is the pivot of creation and transformation or the foundation of types and categories is simply to say that the chaos of primordial qi is the root-origin of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and not that it is another thing above the myriad things. To regard the Supreme Polarity as the pivot and foundation of the myriad transformations is not inconsistent with Laozi’s 老子 doctrine of “Dao producing Heaven and Earth.” Although he did not agree with Zhu Xi’s explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, he praised Cheng Hao’s 程颢 view that “the metaphysical is dao, the actual is implements [qi 器], implements are dao, dao is implements,” saying “this discussion of dao is most excellent,” and developing it by saying: “The affairs of Heaven above are simply qi 气. Principle refers to the organised patterns of qi, function refers to the wondrous functioning of qi, and when it is endowed to people, it is qi that provides this endowment” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 8). He also expressed his agreement with Yuan Dynasty thinker Wu Cheng’s 吴澄 explanation of “The non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” [the opening lines of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity], in which he said: “Dao is principle, sincerity, Heaven, the sovereign, spirit, endowment, inherent nature, virtue, and the Supreme Polarity; although their names are different, their reality is one.” However, he expressed his regret that Wu Cheng did not point out that these concepts are all unified in qi, believing that Wu only recognised that these concepts could be mutually explained and borrowed, was unable to point out their unified basis, and thus still proposed an ungrounded doctrine. He supplemented this, saying: “The dao and principle he spoke of must have something to bear them, and this can be nothing but this qi” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 12). Wu Tinghan also probed into the activity (dong 动) and stillness (jing 静) of qi, opposing later scholars’ view of stillness as the original substance of the Supreme Polarity based on Zhou Dunyi’s doctrine of “holding to stillness” (zhujing 主静), and praising Cheng Hao’s statement that “activity and stillness have no end, yin and yang no beginning.” He believed that qi was the ancestor of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, that qi originally has the two mutually opposed forces of yin and yang, and that yin and yang are activity and stillness. Yin and yang are two ends that cycle ceaselessly, so there was indeed stillness before activity, but there was also activity before stillness, and the two cannot be divided into prior and posterior. He pointed out: “‘In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity’ [from Commentaries

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on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”] included yin-yang and activity-stillness when it spoke, as a kind of chaos. Hence those who speak one-sidedly of yin or yang and activity or stillness all only point to one end, and do not speak of the whole substance of the Supreme Polarity” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 13). The whole substance of the Supreme Polarity is yin and yang. Neither yin nor yang alone can state the Supreme Polarity. He also pointed out that, in the sentence “The sage settles these [affairs] with centrality, rectitude, benevolence, and righteousness, and holds to stillness” from Zhou Dunyi’s Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, the word “stillness” was not the “stillness” of “the Supreme Polarity moves and produces yang, and is still and produces yin,” but rather meant “settled” (ding 定) in the sense of the “settled” from Cheng Hao’s sentence “settled in both activity and stillness” in his “Letter on Settling Inherent Nature” (Dingxing shu 定性书). “Settled” refers to “the stopping-point of centrality, rectitude, benevolence, and righteousness” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 13). Hence for stillness as a doctrine of cultivation and effort, “the stillness of holding to stillness must encompass activity and stillness” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 14). The content of the holding to stillness he referred to is thus “being without desire.” Being without desire is not what Chan 禅 Buddhism called not producing a single thought, but rather that, when “the five inherent natures are affected into activity, good and bad divide, and the myriad affairs emerge,” moral principles such as centrality, rectitude, benevolence, and righteousness regulate them. Wu Tinghan’s doctrine here included the intention of opposing regarding stillness as the root-origin of the world. He thought not only that “holding to stillness must encompass activity and stillness, since only then is it correct and appropriate” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 15), but also clearly expressed an opposition and refutation of Zhu Xi’s explanation of stillness as “the restoration of sincerity and the reality of inherent nature,” which regarded the effort of concentration, retraction, etc. within stillness as the foundation of unfolding and diffusion, and which he saw as a biased view. From this, it can be seen that Wu Tinghan’s view of activity and stillness took “activity and stillness have no end, yin and yang no beginning” as its orientation, consistent with his qi-based ontology. In his theory of cultivation, Wu Tinghan advocated “holding to stillness.” However, what he called “holding to stillness” was in fact “holding to respect” (zhujing 主敬). Although he agreed with Zhu Xi’s statements that “since holding to stillness seems biased, Master Cheng only spoke of respect” and “the word holding to ‘stillness’ is better seen as ‘respect,’” he still believed that the word “stillness” included respect, but contained more cosmological significance than “respect,” since it was not only a reverent state of mind. He said: “It is better to recognise the word ‘stillness’ as a chaotic whole, since then the meaning of respect is included within it” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 16). His meaning was that the word “stillness” included both “respect to make the internal straightforward” and “righteousness to rectify the external,” possessing the characteristic of penetrating throughout the Heavenly and the human, the internal and the external. Holding to stillness meant “being without desire,” and included both the presence and absence of affairs, inherent nature and feeling, and centrality and harmony, and was a

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learning of uniting activity and stillness. He said: “Simply being without desire is holding to stillness. As long as people can be without desire, then even though they are amidst lush concealment or under duress, this mind is without things; even though they are tangled up in disputes or turmoil, this mind is without affairs. Since it is without affairs or things, it is a pure state of stillness. However, being without affairs takes participation in affairs as its effort, while being without things takes the presence of things as its ruler, and this is the learning of uniting activity and stillness” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 16). From this, it can be seen that although he used Zhou Dunyi’s words “since one is without desire, one is still” in his theory of effort, in terms of its meaning, he had already added the content of the Cheng brothers’ “holding to respect,” and had already changed it to comprise activity and stillness as one from beginning to end through respect. Wu Tinghan’s explanation of “inherent nature” was most unique. This uniqueness lay in its differentiation between inherent nature in a physiological sense and inherent nature in an ethical sense. However, he also did not agree with the Song Confucian distinction between “the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth” and “the inherent nature of material qi.” Inherent nature in a physiological sense is the foundation for human beings’ activities in life, and has qi as its basis. Wu Tinghan said: Life is the inherent nature of human beings. Inherent nature is that by which human beings live. Thus that people have life is simply due to the one qi. At the beginning of signs and auguries, the numinous and excellent qi of Heaven and Earth is pregnant in formlessness, and this is the root of inherent nature; later it gradually solidifies, and forms and colors, images and appearances, essences and spirits, and ethereal and physical souls are all produced by inherent nature, while the mind is the greatest. Due to the wondrousness of its numinous illumination, forms, colors, images, and appearances have a ruler, while essences, spirits, and ethereal and physical souls have a lodging, and inherent nature is thus complete. Hence it can be said: the mind is the dao of life; inherent nature is that by which the mind lives. Both the operative activity of knowing awareness and the numinous illumination of the mind in fact emerge from inherent nature. Without inherent nature there is no operative activity of knowing awareness, and without the operative activity of knowing awareness there is no mind. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 28)

Here, Wu Tinghan understood inherent nature from the perspective of the essence of people’s physiological activity, viewing inherent nature as the foundation of life and life as an unfolding of inherent nature. Human nature fixes the character and scope of people’s living activities in life, as well as the differences between people’s activities in life and those of other animals. Human nature is the essence that makes humans human, and determines everything that is a posteriori about them, from the activity of their physical body to their spiritual world. “Life is the inherent nature of human beings. Inherent nature is that by which human beings live” is a summary of the meaning stated above. Wu Tinghan’s explanation of inherent nature here was different from Gaozi’s 告子 “life is what is called inherent nature” [see Mencius 孟子, 6A.3], from “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature” in Centrality in the Ordinary [Zhongyong 中庸], and even more so from the “inherent nature of the five constant virtues” of “benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety,

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wisdom, and fidelity” in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. For Gaozi, inherent nature mainly referred to people’s physiological instincts, especially those concerning food and sex. In Centrality in the Ordinary, inherent nature referred to the moral principle that people receive from Heaven. The inherent nature of the five constant virtues was a concretization of this moral principle. In his recognition of “inherent nature,” Wu Tinghan however focused his attention on all the richness that differentiates people from other living things, on the essence of human life, and on the foundation that makes human life what it is, a higher perspective that has a very strong flavour of vitalist ontology. Wu Tinghan’s tracing of the source of inherent nature was also unique. He believed that, in terms of its most essential source, human life was simply qi. Individual life develops through the germination of numinous and excellent qi between Heaven and Earth, so qi is the basis of human life. From people’s conception to their gradual growth, from the structure of their physical bodies and the qualities of their appearance to their spiritual activity, all is ultimately the effective functioning of qi. However, as soon as qi becomes the substrate of the human body, its effective functioning is fixed by “inherent nature” as the trait of a biological species. Among all the various elements that people obtain from and which are produced by qi, the mind is the most important. The essence of the mind is numinous illumination (lingming 灵明), and the mind is the ruler of people’s physical bodies, the site where spiritual activity occurs. However, the activity of the mind also has inherent nature as its foundation, hence Wu Tinghan said: “inherent nature is that by which the mind lives. Both the operative activity of knowing awareness and the numinous illumination of the mind in fact emerge from inherent nature” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 28). It cannot be dominated (tong 统) by the mind, hence Wu Tinghan opposed Song Confucians’ view that “the mind dominates inherent nature and feeling,” which he refuted, saying: “Since inherent nature produces the mind and is more wondrous that the mind, how could the mind be capable of dominating it?” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 28). His meaning was that since the mind emerges from inherent nature, inherent nature constrains its activity, and thus it cannot dominate inherent nature. Wu Tinghan explained the structural elements and mode of activity of people from the essence of their biological species, a view that was more comprehensive and profound than simply focusing on their ethical or social nature. Wu Tinghan also investigated people’s ethical nature, namely the so-called “five constant virtues” (wuchang 五常), yet he also explained this using qi: Someone asked: “Why does inherent nature have the name of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom?” He said: “Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are Heaven’s two qi of yin and yang: benevolence and ritual propriety are the yang of qi, while righteousness and wisdom are the yin of qi. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 28)

Here, the view of benevolence and ritual propriety as the yang of qi and righteousness and wisdom as the yin of qi was taken from Zhu Xi, who believed that benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom each had its own flavour: “Benevolence has a warm sense, righteousness a harsh and firm sense, ritual

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propriety a demonstrative and expressive sense, and wisdom a restrained and seamless sense” (quoted in Commentary to Reflections on Things at Hand [Jinsi lu zhu 近思录注], Vol. 1). Warmness and expressiveness are yang, while harshness and restraint are yin. However, Zhu Xi regarded benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom as inherent nature, and compassion, shame, yielding, and right and wrong as feeling, in which inherent nature was the metaphysical and feeling the actual, hence he could not speak of the qi of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. To speak of the warmth of benevolence, harshness and firmness of righteousness, etc. referred symbolically to the inherent nature of benevolence and righteousness after it had expressed itself as the feelings of compassion and shame, and Wu Tinghan’s statements above followed Zhu Xi’s symbolic sense. Wu Tinghan also discussed the relation between the yin and yang qi of Heaven and the inherent nature and feelings of humanity. He said: As it is in Heaven, this qi flows and spreads, enshrouding all in supreme harmony, hence it is simply called yin and yang, dao, or good. When it is in humanity, people receive it as the root of life, and forms and colours, external appearances, essence and spirit, and ethereal and physical souls are all the result of its action, with the mind as where the whole substance is present, which is thus called inherent nature. Yet amidst this it is not easily glimpsed, and has no name, but simply forms a chaotic whole. When it is affected and moved, there is compassion and one knows it as benevolence, there is shame and one knows it to be righteousness, there is yielding and one knows it to be ritual propriety, there is right and wrong and one knows it to be knowing, and the names of inherent nature thereby arise. It is not that the substance of inherent nature itself has these names, but that we follow the expression of feeling in each of its organised patterns and differentiate them. This is why former Confucians spoke of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom solely in terms of principle. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 28)

This statement is both similar to and different from Zhu Xi’s viewpoint. Their similarity is that both used the state before arousal and the already aroused to distinguish inherent nature and feeling, regarding inherent nature as principle and feeling as qi. Their difference is that Zhu Xi took “the inherent nature endowed by Heaven” and “inherent nature is principle” as his basis, regarding inherent nature as received from Heaven as a single undivided whole, and having different expressions as a result of its different affective arousals, as when the feeling of compassion is aroused upon seeing a child falling into a well, in which the basis is the benevolence in inherent nature. Wu Tinghan however took qi as the final basis, which, “When it is in humanity, people receive it as the root of life.” The mind is the hub of the physical body constituted by qi, what he called “where the whole substance is present,” while inherent nature is the content of the mind, the basis of which is also qi. Thus the activity of the mind is ultimately an activity of qi, in which the mind as a special form of qi is affected by the external world and produces different responses. These responses are feelings, and the basis for feelings producing responses is inherent nature. Hence Wu Tinghan also said: “Thus the reason human beings are human is because of the work of the mind’s activity of knowing awareness, and the reason the mind has this ability is because of the work

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of inherent nature, yet since inherent nature cannot be seen, it is only seen based on feelings” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 28). Wu Tinghan established his theory of inherent nature on the basis of qi, and even the four virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom had qi as their ultimate foundation. Since Wu Tinghan explained inherent nature in terms of qi, he was opposed to the Song Confucian distinction between “the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth” and “the inherent nature of material qi” (qizhi zhi xing 气质之性). He believed that, since inherent nature was already qi, to add the words “material qi” in front of something that already originally belonged to qi was simply superfluous. Since the inherent nature of material qi does not make sense, the “inherent nature of Heaven and Earth” that was opposed to it also does not stand up. Former Confucians used what Mencius called “the goodness of inherent nature” to speak of the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, and people’s physiological instincts to speak of the inherent nature of material qi. However, the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth is the organised patterns of the qi of the mind, and the inherent nature of material qi is the original character of people’s physical qi, so both have qi as their basis. He asked rhetorically: “Since all talk of inherent nature is concerned with material qi, if one says there is an ‘inherent nature of material qi,’ is there an inherent nature that is not material qi?” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 29). In the same way, he also opposed Cheng Hao’s statement that “To discuss inherent nature and not discuss qi is incomplete, while to discuss qi and not discuss inherent nature is unclear, and both are wrong.” Although among the various Neo-Confucian thinkers, Wu Tinghan criticised Cheng Hao the least, and indeed strongly praised his phrase “life is what is called inherent nature,” he directly denounced the dualism expressed in the above viewpoint as “an uncomprehending theory.” Wu Tinghan believed that, since inherent nature is qi, to discuss inherent nature is to discuss qi, and since qi is inherent nature, to discuss qi is to discuss inherent nature. The mistake of Cheng Hao’s statement thus lay in its regarding inherent nature as principle, and taking inherent nature and qi to be two absolutely opposite things. He pointed out that the key to Mencius’ precept of the goodness of inherent nature lay in [his statement] “Given its feelings, it can be used to do good” [see Mencius, 6A.6], in which “its feelings” (qi qing 其情) are precisely the effective functioning of qi. Mencius’ goodness of inherent nature lay in probing into the source of inherent nature, and its foothold was qi. Indeed, Gaozi’s view that “life is what is called inherent nature,” if understood correctly, also took qi as its foothold, and could be fused with Confucius’ statement that “Inherent natures are similar to one another” [see Analects 论语, 17.2]. Here, Wu Tinghan used qi to interconnect Confucius, Mencius and Gaozi’s doctrines of inherent nature. Although his explanation is quite distant from Confucian orthodoxy, this does not prevent it being a relatively accommodating viewpoint, and one that shares many consistent points with later philosophers who used qi to discuss inherent nature. Furthermore, Wu Tinghan also criticised Zhang Zai’s 张载 “Western Inscription (Ximing 西铭), a work often celebrated for its theory of qi. He pointed out that the meaning of the two sentences “That which fills Heaven and Earth is my body, and that which directs Heaven and Earth is my inherent nature” was not completely

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correct. “That which fills Heaven and Earth” refers to qi, while “that which directs Heaven and Earth” refers to the will, i.e. the mind of Heaven or Heavenly principle. Since it accepts that people’s physical body is qi, yet at the same time accepts the mind of Heaven or Heavenly principle are people’s inherent nature, it is in error. Wu Tinghan proposed that when Heaven and Earth produced people, this was simply one qi, and thus this qi is the root-source of human nature. “Internally it is a person’s mind, externally it is a person’s body, with the body as the fullness of qi and the mind as the numinosity of qi; how could these be two?” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 39). To regard the mind of Heaven or Heavenly principle (that which directs Heaven and Earth) as inherent nature is to be ignorant of the distinction between mind and inherent nature. Wu Tinghan’s distinction between mind and inherent nature was very fine, as he often explained: “What is the distinction between mind and inherent nature? Inherent nature is produced in the mind and finds its root in the mind. When people are first born, they receive qi as the root that produces them, pure, refined and united, the name of which is inherent nature; inherent nature is their root, and the external of physical form and the internal of the mind are both produced from this. Thus physical form and the mind are both produced by means of inherent nature” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 23). “Produced in the mind” here states that once people have minds, they have the name of inherent nature, that the mind is both produced by inherent nature and is its site of residence. Yet in terms of the root-source, inherent nature is the most fundamental, since it is the basis of that by which humans are human. People’s bodily form and spirit are both qi, and the qi of people’s bodily form and spirit is produced because of inherent nature. Hence Wu Tinghan also said: “When the mind is first produced, it exists through inherent nature; when it is completely developed, inherent nature is still present” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 23). If one uses the imperial court and the emperor as an analogy, then one can say that the mind is the imperial court, and inherent nature is the emperor; the imperial court is that from which political and religious orders emerge, analogous to how the human mind is the site where feelings are expressed. However, the emperor rules over the imperial court, analogous to how the human mind is ruled over by inherent nature. The imperial court is established by the emperor yet is also the site where he resides, analogous to how the mind is established by inherent nature yet inherent nature also resides within the mind. Viewed comprehensively, Wu Tinghan’s explanations of the concepts of the supreme ultimate, yin and yang, dao, principle, inherent nature, and the mind demonstrate that he was a qi-monist who took qi as the fundamental starting point for his philosophy, and everything was unified under qi. Even categories and propositions with an extremely strong ethical flavour such as Mencius’ goodness of inherent nature, Centrality in the Ordinary’s “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature,” or the Song Confucians’ “knowing of virtuous inherent nature” were all indirectly explained through qi, and he criticised those statements that spoke of inherent nature as separate from qi or viewed the two dualistically. His qi-monism was very thoroughgoing.

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However, Wu Tinghan’s use of qi to discuss inherent nature also had its clear shortcomings, since he also used the clarity and turbidity or profundity and shallowness of qi-endowment to explain the goodness and badness of people’s conduct. The clarity and turbidity or beauty and ugliness of qi determine people’s amount or degree of benevolence and righteousness. Where benevolence and righteousness are greater and more profound, inherent nature is good, and where they are lesser and more shallow, inherent nature is not good. To explain in this way excludes discussing good and bad in terms of a posteriori cultivation, and ascribes ethics completely to nature, thereby weakening his theory’s consistency and completeness.

2 Criticisms of the Learning of the Mind Based on his qi-monism, Wu Tinghan criticised Song-Ming Neo-Confucians including Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan, Yang Jian 杨简, and Wang Yangming. His criticisms of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi focused on the essence of inherent nature and principle, as he said: “Among the differences between my discussions and those of former Confucians, my simply regarding qi as principle and inherent nature as qi is the greatest” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 33). His criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming were entirely found in the words “regarding the mind as inherent nature.” Wu Tinghan denounced the learning of Lu and Wang very strongly. He said: Ever since the learning of Master Lu, there have been those who said things like “first establish the greater part” and “seek the lost mind,” as if referring to the mind alone, which already made the error of relying solely on the original mind. When this came down to his follower Yang Jingzhong 杨敬仲 [i.e. Yang Jian], he went so far as to regard the mind as inherent nature. He also spoke of “the dao-mind,” saying that the mind is dao, and “the essential spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness,” saying that the mind is sageliness. If one takes the mind to be dao and sageliness, and everything happens through this, then one thinks that beneath words there is enlightenment, beneath the mind there is spontaneous reflection, and this is dao, and one is a sage. If this is not the Buddhists’ precept of illuminating the mind, perceiving inherent nature and becoming a Buddha, then what is it? People today like to distinguish themselves as lofty, and thus take his doctrines and expand on them, speaking of “the extension of innate moral knowing.” Their followers go along with what they hear, thinking it to be a wondrous dao and fine meaning; they point people toward empty opinions and views as if they were wondrous explanations and spiritual enlightenment, and their learning is ignorant of inherent nature and relies solely on the mind; their abuses go so far as this. Yet the gap between the mind and inherent nature, is this not precisely the distinction between Confucianism and Buddhism? (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 34)

Here, Wu Tinghan criticised the entire learning of mind and inherent nature from Lu Jiuyuan to Yang Jian, then to Wang Yangming and the later scholars of his school. Lu Jiuyuan’s sole reliance on the original mind had already been pointed out by Zhu Xi in the debate at Goose Lake (Ehu 鹅湖), in which he criticised Lu

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Jiuyuan for only considering respect for virtuous inherent nature, omitting learning and study, and regarding the mind as principle and as inherent nature. Wu Tinghan’s criticism of Lu Jiuyuan followed this direction, believing that he regarded only “first establishing the greater part” [see Mencius, 6A.15] as learning, and was deficient in studies concerning the investigation of the principles of things: “The learning of Master Lu only seeks the original mind, and lacks a single reference to the word ‘think’ [si 思]” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 59). He also accused Lu Jiuyuan of only discussed seeking the mind, and neglecting inherent nature: “When Master Lu discussed learning, he only made little exposition concerning inherent nature” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 61). Lu Jiuyuan’s student Yang Jian pushed the mind to an extreme, and his “Self-Changes” (Jiyi 己易) used the identity of the mind with the dao of the [Book of] Changes to expand it. He also quoted the doctrine that “the essential spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness” [see the Kong Family Masters Anthology (Kongcongzi 孔丛子), 4.4], regarding the mind as dao and as sageliness, and thinking that everything happens through this. Effort lay only in enlightenment and internal reflection, and once one is immediately enlightened, one is then a sage. Wu Tinghan believed that this was identical with the illumination of the mind and perception of inherent nature spoken of in Chan Buddhism. Here, Wu Tinghan used the view that mind and inherent nature are both qi and are equally important to criticise Lu Jiuyuan for his error of leading his followers to rely on the mind and neglect inherent nature. While Wu Tinghan’s criticisms of Lu Jiuyuan and Yang Jian do not amount to a large part of his works, his criticisms of Wang Yangming were much more numerous. What he criticised most was Wang Yangming’s “regarding the mind as inherent nature.” In his theory of mind and inherent nature, he first distinguished the mind and inherent nature as two: “The words ‘mind’ [xin 心] and ‘inherent nature’ [xing 性] seem to be one yet are two, and since people of today know their unity but are ignorant of their duality, they easily go astray in their learning” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 35). The relatively vague points in [Wang Yangming’s] Record of Transmission and Practice (Chuanxi lu 传习录) were all taken up by Wu Tinghan as examples of confusing mind and inherent nature, such as the passage “Inherent nature is simply one, yet from its physical body we call it Heaven, from its rulership we call it sovereign [di 帝], from its flowing operation we call it ordinance (ming 命), from what endows to people we call it inherent nature, and from its ruling over the body we call it mind. When the mind is aroused, it meets with one’s father and we call it filial piety, it meets with one’s ruler and we call it loyalty, and from here onward its names approach infinity, yet there is but a single inherent nature.” Wu Tinghan believed that when this passage did not distinguish inherent nature, Heaven, sovereign, ordinance, mind, loyalty, and filial piety, it erased the distinction between mind and inherent nature. He denounced Wang Yangming: “To regard the mind as inherent nature is an old but fundamental mistake” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 35). He denounced the following passage even more, seeing it as the Buddhist view that “regarded the operative function of knowing awareness as inherent nature”: “Knowing is the numinous aspect of principle, and from its aspect of rulership we call it mind, while from its

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aspect of endowment we call it inherent nature; when children in their infancy all know to love their parents and respect their elders, this is just this numinosity [ling 灵]” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 35). Wu Tinghan believed that Wang Yangming’s mistake lay in regarding the mind as inherent nature, i.e. regarding that which flows out within the mind as inherent nature, hence his effort lay in the extension of innate moral knowing, and if one could extend this fully, everything would accord with the dao. Wu Tinghan pointed out that the mind is produced from inherent nature, and the root-source of inherent nature is qi. Within the mind there is the badness that is produced from the qi of physical forms. That which is aroused from inherent nature can be called the dao-mind, yet the badness latent within the mind also avails itself of this and emerges. If one relies on the arousal of the mind, taking this to be innate moral knowing and dao, then there is the danger that one takes an imposter for one’s child. Wu Tinghan proposed that that which flows forth within the mind must be examined and distinguished to reveal what is the arousal of inherent nature and what is affected by something other than inherent nature, otherwise one would slip into wildness and self-indulgence. Wu Tinghan not only criticised Wang Yangming for regarding the mind as inherent nature, but also believed that there were flaws in Wang Yangming’s core precept of learning, the theory of the extension of innate moral knowing. He said: Any talk of knowing must concern the mind as already aroused, since if there was a knowing of the state before arousal, integral in its morality, where could one start from in extending it? Yet knowing of the already aroused is always either moral or not moral, so how could people come to know it, and where to start from in extending it? If one says that innate moral knowing is spontaneous knowing, who but a sage has this ability? ... Hence in the learning of the sages, one must investigate things in order to extend one’s knowledge. For example, the Documents spoke of “learning from ancient lessons” [see Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书), “Charge to Yue, Pt. III” (Yueming xia 说命下)], the Changes spoke of “learning, accumulating, asking, and discriminating” and “learning much of earlier speeches and past conduct” [see Book of Changes, hexagram Qian 乾; hexagram Da Xu 大 畜], Confucius spoke of broadening oneself with culture, learning culture, and illuminating the good [see Analects, 6.27; 1.6; Great Learning (Daxue 大学)], and Mencius spoke of broad learning and detailed discussion [see Mencius, 4B.15]. Only when one examines with one’s mind and obtains from the ancients does one know how to clearly differentiate the right and wrong of principles and the good and bad of thoughts, and only then can one’s knowing perhaps be attained and extended. Otherwise, even with an average person’s talents, the substance of the mind is not transparent, and when knowing emerges, good and bad are entangled together, so how can one use it to examine and verify? All one’s thoughts and considerations are not the real substance. Those who can avoid going so far as jealously defending their own mind, clinging to empty and false thoughts, taking ignorant delusions to be ethereal numinosity, crying out feeling and desire as if they were the highest principle, becoming wildly self-indulgent and utterly unscrupulous, and ending up resorting to Buddhism and Daoism or joining petty cliques, such people are few indeed! (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 64)

Here, what Wu Tinghan pointed out was indeed a critical problem with Wang Yangming’s learning, as well as one of the points that scholars outside Wang Learning found most difficult to agree with and therefore criticised the most. In Master Zhu Learning, the already aroused (yifa 已发) and the state before arousal

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(未发) were split apart. The already aroused was feeling and was actual, while the state before arousal was inherent nature and was metaphysical, and the metaphysical inherent nature could not be extended into the external. Furthermore, the examination of the already aroused was an actual activity, a recognition and judgment of the already aroused carried out by the mind as an organ of verification. Wu Tinghan also followed this viewpoint, and hence was unfamiliar with and did not comprehend Wang Yangming’s learning of the extension of innate moral knowing. What he proposed to replace Wang Yangming’s learning was the traditional method of Master Zhu Learning. Wu Tinghan believed that the only thing could be extended into the external was the already aroused, which must be a product of the activity of the actual mind. The state before arousal cannot be extended, since the expression and emanation of the mind and the one who makes value judgments concerning this expression and emanation are one and the same person. Before one has made the effort to investigate things, before innate moral knowing’s function of judging right from wrong has been trained, how could people judge good from bad and right from wrong? The only one who could guarantee that everything they extended was good would be a sage. Hence one must change the extension of innate moral knowing into the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge; one must have the various efforts of studying inquisitively, thinking discriminately, learning broadly, discussing in detail, illuminating the good and making oneself sincere, before one can have sharp discernment and judgment concerning good or bad and right or wrong. Only in this way is that which is extended a filtered, screened and regulated knowing. Without these forms of effort, that which is aroused by the mind will inevitably be a mingling of good and bad, and one will inevitably “take ignorant delusions to be ethereal numinosity, and cry out feeling and desire as if they were the highest principle,” becoming an unscrupulous person. Here, Wu Tinghan took up the traditional position of Master Zhu Learning in questioning Wang Yangming. For people who stuck to tradition, Yangming’s learning was indeed like when Xu Ai 徐爱 first heard Wang Yangming’s teachings: “When I first heard it I was shocked, then later I doubted it.” Yet from the standpoint of Wang Learning, the questions put forward by Wu Tinghan are insufficient to constitute problems for Yangming. As discussed above, Wang Yangming’s learning of innate moral knowing was attained by following Zhu Xi’s doctrine of the investigation of things yet finding it ill-fitting, then shifting to the Learning of the Mind following his realisation at Longchang 龙场, before passing through a series of great tests and incidents, and undergoing practical realisation and theoretical refinement. In Yangming’s learning of innate moral knowing, metaphysical inherent nature and the actual mind are interconnected, a view based on his long-term moral practice, in which he overcame his selfish desire, concentrated his wisdom, and elevated his spiritual plane. Its theoretical foundation was the spontaneous expression of Mencius’ “innate moral knowing and innate moral ability” [see Mencius, 7A.15]. His student Wang Longxi 王龙溪 gave a summary of his final spiritual plane as “Whenever he opened his mouth, he attained the original mind, and there was no need to make use of or appeal to anything else,” meaning that what flowed out in the mind was the original mind, and the original

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mind was inherent nature. Hence Wang Yangming said that “innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle” and “innate moral knowing is inherent nature.” Also, in Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, the word “extension” (zhi 致) was the word “practice” (xing 行), and the site where innate moral knowing is to be extended was the site where selfish desire is to be overcome and Heavenly principle flows into practice. Hence the extension of innate moral knowing was at the same time the “investigation of things,” i.e. “correcting its incorrectness so as to make it return to correctness.” Wang Yangming clearly defined innate moral knowing as “the awareness of inherent nature,” i.e. the manifestation, presentation and knowing awareness in the mind of innate moral knowing and Heavenly principle at all times. In the process of its extension, innate moral knowing also trains the ability to judge good from bad and right from wrong. His plane of transformation in his later years reached a state Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 described as being “like the blazing sun in an empty sky with the myriad images all illuminated.” Although Wu Tinghan criticised Wang Yangming, he was in fact unable to understand the quintessence of his learning of innate moral knowing. His criticisms mostly set out from existing learning, and appeared uncomprehending and misplaced. Wu Tinghan also proposed censures of Yangming’s doctrines of the investigation of things and of knowledge and action: People today who propose the doctrine of the investigation of things say, “The principles of things are in the mind, and should not be sought externally; if one seeks them externally, one splits the mind and principle in two, and is fragmented.” This view is mistaken. Though the principles of things are in the mind, things are still external, the principles of things are the principles of the mind, and the things of the mind are the things of things. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 45)

He also said: In “The extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things” [see the Great Learning], the investigation of things is simply arriving at things appropriately. ... Clear division makes the extension of knowledge perceive principles in things one by one, and thereby attain this reality. If knowing stops at this mind, and the extension of knowing only seeks in the mind, then this is empty views and opinions, hence it must be tested in things and attained in the mind, before it can be true knowledge. This was precisely the learning of sages and worthy men, and the means to unify the internal and external principles of things. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 45)

Here, Wu Tinghan acknowledged that there is principle in the mind, and that this principle is one and the same as the principles of external things. Only when the principle in the mind is confirmed to accord with the principles of external things is it a real principle that can be employed. Thus he believed that the investigation of things is arriving at things (zhiwu 至物), where arriving at things means coming to know the principles in external things and affairs and then confirming them with the principle in the mind. This is what he meant when he said that they “must be tested in things and attained in the mind,” and is what he called “the means to unify the internal and external principles of things.” Both seeking principles only in external

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things and seeking them only in the mind are one-sided. If one seeks only in the mind, what one attains is but “empty views and opinions,” which must be confirmed with the principles in external things. Wang Yangming’s “The principles of things are in the mind, and should not be sought externally” affirms the internal but negates the external, and thus falls into one-sidedness. His fundamental viewpoint was seeking principles in things are confirming them with the principle in the mind. Because of this, he disagreed with Wang Yangming’s gloss of “investigating things” (gewu 格物) as “correcting things” (zhengwu 正物), which he denounced, saying: “When scholars today say that to investigate things is to correct things, this is an erroneous statement” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 49). His meaning was that, when Wang Yangming glossed “investigating things” as “correcting thoughts” (zheng niantou 正念头), if one’s intentions were not yet sincere and one’s mind was not yet correct, how could one correct thoughts? If the effort of extending knowledge, making intentions sincere, rectifying the mind and cultivating the self all came after correcting thoughts, then where was the standard for thoughts being correct or not? Hence, as Cheng-Zhu suggested, “investigating things” should be glossed as “arriving at things.” In terms of the priority of effort, “the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things are the beginning of probing principles, and probing principles is the end of the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 48). Wu Tinghan’s argument here was also insufficient to trouble Yangming. When Wang Yangming regarded the investigation of things as “correcting thoughts,” this was precisely the meaning it ought to have in his theoretical system. For Wang Yangming, the “things” in the investigation of things were “affairs” (shi 事), which included both the acting subject and the object being dealt with. When Wang Yangming spoke of affairs, he was mainly referring to ethical conduct. The investigation of things was at the same time the “extension of innate moral knowing.” Innate moral knowing was “the awareness belonging to inherent nature,” i.e. the manifestation and presentation of the good, the use of the manifestation and presentation of the good as a guide and motive in carrying out affairs, and the rectification of bad thoughts in conduct. Hence if innate moral knowing is sincerely extended, then thoughts are necessarily correct, “if knowing is extended things are necessarily investigated.” It is not that one can only investigate things once one’s intentions are sincere and one’s mind rectified, but that the investigation of things is the means to make one’s intentions sincere and rectify one’s mind. Although Wu Tinghan accepted Mencius’ view that “The myriad things are all complete within me” [see Mencius, 7A.4], he was still unfamiliar with Yangming Learning as the complete form of the Learning of the Mind. Wu Tinghan’s criticism of Wang Yangming’s unity of knowledge and action was aimed at his view that if one is able to know one is necessarily able to act, which he believed inevitably led to regarding knowledge as action. Wu Tinghan said:

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The reason I do not adopt the view that regards the extension of knowledge as diligent action is because it claims that to know to a certain degree is to act to a certain degree, and regards action as knowledge in its beginning and knowledge as action in its development, so that those who discuss this today have not a single word to rest on, and its final result is simply the production of an empty falsity. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 54)

Wu Tinghan believed that the extension of knowledge and diligent action are two categories, yet in Wang Yangming’s unity of knowledge and action, where there is knowledge one is also able to act, and to the extent that there is knowledge there is also action, a view that inevitably leads to the fault of regarding knowledge as action. In fact, in Wang Yangming’s unity of knowledge and action, his point of emphasis differed between his early years and his late years. In his early years, he emphasised that knowledge and action are two aspects of a single affair, with knowledge as the idea aspect of conduct, such as motives, plans, measures, etc., and action as the practical aspect of conduct, i.e. actually putting one’s plans and measures into action. There is no action without thought, and also no thought without action. This was the real meaning of Yangming’s statements that “The real and honest aspect of knowledge is action, and the clear awareness and fine inspection aspect of action is knowledge” and “Knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the accomplishment of knowledge.” In this sense, knowledge and action are like the two wheels of a carriage or the two wings of a bird, and are two aspects of a single affair. Yet when he discussed the unity of knowledge and action in his later years, he regarded knowledge as innate moral knowing, and action as the concrete conduct that extends innate moral knowing. Hence, after he uncovered his core precept of the extension of innate moral knowing, he no longer raised the unity of knowledge and action, since the unity of knowledge and action was a meaning that should be included in the extension of innate moral knowing. Yangming said, “True knowing is that by which one acts, so if one does not act, it is insufficient to call it true knowing.” In his unity of knowledge and action, knowledge refers to true knowing (zhenzhi 真知), in which not only is one’s motive innate moral knowing—the highest good, but one also knows that one must put it into practice, and knows how to put it into practice. The unity of knowledge and action was thus a unity of that which should be so with that which is in fact so, a unity of moral conduct with epistemological conduct. Seen in this way, Wang Yangming’s unity of knowledge and action is neither knowing yet not acting, nor regarding knowing as acting, but rather a view of knowledge and action that is not biased to either side. In Yangming’s lifetime, his conduct was outstanding, and his knowing was consummate; his knowing was not knowledge of the chapter and verse of scripture, and his acting was not an action of reckless obliteration. His lifetime was an embodiment of his doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. In order to avoid regarding knowledge as action, Wu Tinghan proposed a view of applying effort to the two aspects of knowing and acting, and the order of priority of knowing before acting. He said: The unity of knowledge and action must be discriminated in its falsity for no other reason than that one must apply effort to both knowing and acting, and it is only the root that is one. If one regards knowing as already acting, then people’s learning is simply diligent conduct and nothing more, so why would it be necessary to extend one’s knowing?

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Knowing and acting originally have an order of priority, as well as an effective function, so although they cannot be radically separated into two approaches, how could they be mixed together as one? (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 56)

Wu Tinghan opposed integrating knowledge and action with no distinction, believing that this would lead to regarding knowledge as action. However, Wang Yangming opposed his views of applying effort to both knowing and acting, and of knowing and acting having an order of priority. In Wang Yangming’s view, these were both a hotbed for severing morality from knowledge and knowledge from action, and were a root cause for knowing yet not acting. He said: “People today divide knowing and acting into two affairs to be pursued separately, thinking that one must first know before one can act, as if one can discuss and debate the effort of knowing first, and then wait until one truly knows before putting one’s efforts into practice. This is no minor disease and it did not only emerge yesterday. When I today advocate the unity of knowledge and action, it is precisely the remedy for this disease” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. I). Here, Wang Yangming felt greatly troubled by the error of severing knowledge from action, and expressed very clearly his painstaking effort in proposing the unity of knowledge and action. As for Wu Tinghan’s attempt to use the divisions found in the Book of Documents (Shujing 书经) statement “It is not knowing that is difficult, only acting” [see “Charge to Yue, Pt. III”] and Mencius’ “the organized pattern at the beginning, the organized pattern at the end” [see Mencius, 5B.1] in order to demonstrate the falsity of the unity of knowledge and action, these appear even more insufficient as evidence. Wu Tinghan’s above criticisms of Lu and Wang show that he was basically a scholar of Master Zhu Learning, lacked insight into the causes for the rise of the Learning of the Mind, and lacked a profound understanding of the essential meaning of the Learning of the Mind and especially of Wang Yangming’s doctrines. Other than certain novel points in his discussions of the original substance of the cosmos, he was unable to propose new viewpoints concerning the aspects of the investigation of things and knowledge and action.

3 Theory of Cultivation and Effort Wu Tinghan’s theory of effort took the Neo-Confucian “sixteen-character transmission of the mind” as its foundation, and advocated seeking a dao of centrality in human desire. The “sixteen-character transmission of the mind” [see “Counsels of Yu the Great” (Da Yu mo 大禹谟), Book of Documents] was revered by Neo-Confucians as a golden standard. According to Wu Tinghan’s explanation, the mind of dao lies within the human mind as its stubborn preference for the good. Hence the mind of dao is not a posteriori knowledge being in accord with a priori inherent nature, but rather conduct being in accord with the standard of the good. Thus the effort of

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cultivation lies in “relying on both the human mind and the mind of dao in seeking what is called centrality,” rather than leaving behind human desire and seeking Heavenly principle elsewhere. He said: The words “The human mind is precarious...” [i.e. the sixteen-character transmission of the mind] were taught and received by sages and worthy men, and those who have spoken of inherent nature and the mind for a myriad generations since have found nothing to add to them. To follow this is then the orthodox dao, while to depart from this is heresy and heterodoxy. When the sages and worthy men spoke of the mind, they combined it with inherent nature in speaking, and thus relied on both the human mind and the mind of dao in seeking what is called centrality. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 36) Human desire is just that which people desire, and is also something present in Heavenly principle, except that since it flows toward dissolution, it simply came to be referred to as selfish desire. In reality, original substance is Heavenly principle. The learning of the sages relies on people’s desires and regulates them such that nothing goes against Heavenly principle, rather than eliminating human desire and taking this to be Heavenly principle, or seeking Heavenly principle in human desire. The [Book of] Documents states: “The people were born with desires, so without a ruler there is disorder” [see “Announcement of Zhonghui” (Zhonghui zhi gao仲虺之诰)]. The “ruler” (zhu 主) spoken of here simply regulated their desires and governed their disorder; how could he lead the people to completely extirpate their desires? (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 37)

He believed that so-called selfish desire (siyu 私欲) was not an originally possessed desire that was opposed to Heavenly principle, but simply referred to people’s everyday desires being excessive or insufficient. Hence principle and desire have the same source. When human desire attains centrality (zhong 中), this is Heavenly principle, and when it flows into dissolution and loses its place, this is selfish desire. Seeking Heavenly principle is thus not done outside of human desire, but rather means regulating human desire such that it accords with the dao of centrality. Wu Tinghan’s thought here did not in fact differ from Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s “preserve Heavenly principle, eliminate human desire,” it was simply that the reference of his “human desire” (renyu 人欲) differed from that of Cheng-Zhu. For Cheng-Zhu, “human desire” was what Wu Tinghan called “selfish desire.” Although Cheng-Zhu advocated eliminating human desire, while Wu Tinghan advocated regulating human desire so that it accords with the dao of centrality, there was no great difference between the two. The difference between Cheng-Zhu and Wu Tinghan lay in the source of the “mind of dao” (daoxin 道心) and the “human mind” (renxin 人心). Zhu Xi regarded the subject’s knowing awareness of Heavenly principle as the mind of dao, which comes from principle, and the subject’s knowing awareness of desire as the human mind, which comes from feelings. For Wu Tinghan, the mind of dao was human desire being regulated to make it in accordance with the dao of centrality. The source of the mind of dao lay in human desire, and Heavenly principle was human desire not deviating or losing its way. The ultimate root-source of Zhu Xi’s Heavenly principle lay in the metaphysical realm of Heavenly endowment, Heavenly inherent nature, etc. The ultimate root-source of what Wu Tinghan called Heavenly principle lay in human desire, and meant seeking a dao of centrality in the actual realm of qi.

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Wu Tinghan’s explanation of righteousness (yi 义) and benefit (li 利) was connected to this. He said: “Righteousness and benefit are simply Heavenly principle, and human desire is not outside of Heavenly principle.” He also said: “Righteousness and benefit are originally one thing, with no distinction. Hence it was said: ‘Benefit is the harmony of righteousness.’ It was also said: ‘Benefitting things is sufficient for harmony and righteousness’ [both from Book of Changes, hexagram Qian]. Thus the harmonious aspect of righteousness is benefit, and one must benefit things before one can attain righteousness and harmony” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 66). This was also seeking righteousness in benefit, seeking the mind of dao in the human mind. Wu Tinghan took seeking centrality as his core precept of effort, and hence he especially admired Centrality in the Ordinary. However, his explanation of the title “centrality in the ordinary” (zhongyong 中庸) differed from previous scholars. He emphasised the meaning of “centrality through timeliness” (shizhong 时中), saying: In “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature, expressing inherent nature is called the dao, and cultivating the dao is called teaching,” there is only this centrality. The principles of all under Heaven are centrality and stopping (zhi 止). Why then did they also speak of the ordinary? The centrality they spoke of is constant principle. If they spoke of centrality but not of constancy, they feared people would regard this as lofty and wondrous and seek centrality in places where it had no firm application, hence they supplemented this with the ordinary. In reality there is simply this centrality. In “the superior man acts with timeliness,” he follows the changes and shifts of the times in seeking centrality, and thus he can be constant and unchanging. If one clings to a single fixity and takes this as constancy, then one’s time will be finite, one’s dao will be changing, and one will in fact be unable to be constant. Hence the meaning of the ordinary was to supplement centrality and not something apart from centrality. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 37)

Wu Tinghan’s intention was to amend the errors of certain Neo-Confucians who took centrality to be a fixed and unchanging external standard, or who took it to come from Heaven and thereby looked to it to produce fear in order to manage things excessively strictly, injuring life and harming inherent nature. He believed that the whole of the essential meaning of Centrality in the Ordinary lay in the first three sentences, yet past explanations placed too much emphasis on the metaphysical flavour of these sentences. In fact, the first three sentences of Centrality in the Ordinary say nothing but the single word “centrality,” and the same is true for the principles of the world under Heaven. This single word “centrality” has “the ordinary” (yong 庸) as its supplement. “The ordinary” is the usual and constant. However, “constant” (chang 常) has the two meanings of “constant” (hengchang 恒常) and “usual” (pingchang 平常). When Wu Tinghan used the two meanings of the word “ordinary” to supplement “centrality,” he believed that only “usual” got close to it, since thereby one could follow the changes and shifts of the times in seeking centrality. Only following the changes and shifts of the times is capable of being a constant principle, otherwise it is simply a dead dogma with no vital force. “Centrality” lies in “constancy,” and only “constancy” can supplement “centrality.” Here, Wu Tinghan proposed to excellent ideas. First, only when ethical principles are connected to concrete situations can they be universal and living. Second,

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change and constancy form a contradictory whole, only change can be constant, and change must be included within constancy. This was the meaning behind using “the ordinary” to supplement “centrality.” Wu Tinghan also advocated synthesising the different cultivation efforts of the Great Learning and Centrality in the Ordinary, using them to mutually supplement one another, and making them interconnected as one. He believed that the effort of the Great Learning was the warp while the effort of the Centrality in the Ordinary was the weft, in which the warp emphasises accordance and order, while the weft emphasises transversal interconnection. Effort at cultivation should be a complex of warp and weft. He said: When sages and worthy men spoke of learning, the complex of warp and weft was all accepted. The Great Learning set out from investigation and extension and reached self-cultivation, following the natural order it its implementation, and this is the warp. If there is vigilance and being careful when alone, then the natural efforts of investigation, extension, making sincere and rectification are transversally connected, and this is the weft. ... One must understand the doctrine of warp and weft before one can know the precepts of breadth with simplicity and refinement with unity, together with the meanings of investigation, extension, making sincere, rectification, vigilance and being careful when alone, which move horizontally and vertically, and run in parallel without contradiction. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 38)

Concerning the Great Learning and Centrality in the Ordinary, most scholars throughout history believed that they represented two completely different systems of effort, yet their standards for differentiation were completely different from that of Wu Tinghan. He believed that the emphasis in Centrality in the Ordinary fell on discussing the internal cultivation effort of vigilance and being careful when alone, which was completely separate from the Great Learning’s discussion of the different steps in the overall goal of cultivation, yet the internal cultivation of the mind could in fact penetrate throughout each step of cultivation. Maintaining constant vigilance in each step of cultivation is the horizontal in the vertical, while carrying out the different steps of cultivation in a state of vigilance is the vertical within the horizontal. If the breadth with simplicity and refinement with unity of the Centrality in the Ordinary are bound together with the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning, the vertical and horizontal intersect. On the basis of advocating the warp-weft intersection of vigilance and being careful when alone with investigation, extension, making sincere and rectification, Wu Tinghan advocated uniting “respect for virtue and inherent nature” (zun dexing 尊德性) and “constant inquiry and study” (dao wenxue 道问学) as one. He said: Without constant inquiry and study there is nothing to act as the beginning of respect for virtue and inherent nature, and without respect for virtue and inherent nature there is nothing to act as the end of constant inquiry and study. Yet respect and constancy both always go through vigilance and being careful when alone. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 71)

Here, Wu Tinghan regarded constant inquiry and study as the initial affair and respect for virtue and inherent nature as the final affair, as two aspects of the same

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united effort. The correct relationship between the two is “constant inquiry and study in order to respect virtue and inherent nature, respect for virtue and inherent nature requiring constant inquiry and study.” Constant inquiry and study is the means for respect for virtue and inherent nature, while respect for virtue and inherent nature must pass through constant inquiry and study. Yet both respect for virtue and inherent nature and constant inquiry and study must be constantly penetrated by vigilance, sincerity and respect. As for the “unity of penetrating threads” (yiguan 一贯 [see Analects, 4.15; 15.3]), Wu Tinghan also gave a subtle exposition. He said: The principles of the world under Heaven never depart from unity, and hence if one sets out from unity the principles of the world under Heaven can be attained. This is what was meant by “With ease and simplicity, the principles of the world under Heaven are attained” [see Commentaries on the Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”]. This is the root precept of the unity of penetrating threads. Yet this was an affair of the sages, and from great worthy men onward, none have been capable of this, hence one must apply effort to the penetrating threads. After much time, the unity of these threads penetrates all. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 68)

The doctrine of the unity of penetrating threads was his doctrine of breadth and simplicity. The penetrating threads are multiplicity, while their unity is totality; the penetrating threads refer to the diversity of particularization, while their unity refers to the unity of principle. What is valuable in learning is the ability to be wide-ranging and then to interconnect. To directly grasp “unity” is something that very few people can achieve, and the vast majority of people can only first apply effort to diverse particularizations, and only then does “the unity of these threads penetrate everything.” Hence he opposed the Learning of the Mind, thinking that the mistake of the Learning of the Mind lay in “only speaking of the great root and great thread, and not seeking its penetrating threads and thereby seeking their unity” (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 68). He even believed that the distinction between Confucianism and heterodoxy lay in the different way in which they dealt with the relation between unity and its threads: The unity of the sages uses the one to unify penetrating threads. Heterodoxy holds to the one and nothing more; what of the existence of penetrating threads? The distinction between Confucianism and Buddhism precisely lies in this. If one does not know unity and extensively seeks the penetrating threads, this is not the learning of the sages. If one abandons the penetrating threads and directly seeks unity, this is also not the learning of the sages. Hence the learning of the sages must be a “unity of threads that penetrates all,” a dao that unifies internal and external. (Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 68)

Heterodoxy here refers to Buddhism and Daoism. Confucians seek not only the fundamental principle of the cosmos, regarding this as an ethical principle and guide for action, but also the principles of specific things and affairs, regarding this as the basis for managing the state, governing the people, and making beneficial use of resources to improve their livelihood. Heterodoxy only explains spiritual cultivation and lacks the affairs of the family and state, hence it does not seek the principles of specific things and affairs. This distinguishes Confucianism and

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heterodoxy from the perspective of unity and its threads, and made use previous scholars’ criticisms of Buddhism. Although Wu Tinghan’s thought was very heavily influenced by Wang Tingxiang, he generally regarded Zhu Xi’s thought as its foundation, although he was dissatisfied with Zhu Xi’s excessive emphasis on principle. Furthermore, Wu Tinghan had a fiercely independent spirit, and dared to boldly doubt Confucian classic texts, as when he said: “Among the words of the Record of Rites (Liji 礼记), there are some that are pure, some that are half pure and half mixed, and some that are very mixed indeed. For those that are half pure and half mixed, they are records of the followers of Confucius’ school that may have mistakes. For those that are extremely mixed, they are the result of Han Confucians over-reading and offering far-fetched interpretations, and thereby disordering their truth,” and “The text of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝经) is mostly not the words of Confucius, and no doubt came from the far-fetched interpretations of Han Confucians.” He also said: the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli 周礼) “is full of trivialities of the legal system, while the rest is scattered and misplaced, and cannot be wholly trusted” (for the above, see Collected Works of Wu Tinghan, 153–155). He also made relatively deep studies of astronomy, and the research contained in his Notes from the Box on subjects such as the precession of the equinoxes, the positions of the heavenly stems, earthly branches and constellations, solar motion, and the ecliptic variations in the length of day and night also has a certain value.

Chapter 24

Chen Jian’s Elaboration of Master Zhu Learning in His Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured

After [Wang] Yangming 王阳明 rose up in Zhezhong 浙中, his disciples and students covered the realm, with Wang Learning for a time becoming the prevailing trend, its momentum largely obscuring Master Zhu [Xi] 朱熹 Learning. Within this trend however there were some who kept Master Zhu Learning in mind, rising up and crying out for Zhu Learning, and among these, Chen Jian was the most persistent and radical. Chen Jian 陈建 (1497–1567; zi 字 Tingzhao 廷肇, hao 号 Qinglan 清澜) was from Dongguan 东莞 in Guangdong province. From an early age he was earnest about learning, and at the age of twenty-three was appointed as a government student in his town. In the seventh year of the Jiajing 嘉靖 period [1528], he became a provincial graduate, and took the metropolitan exam twice, both times making the supplementary list. At the age of thirty-six, he was selected and appointed as an instructor in Houguan 侯官 county in Fujian province. After seven years, he was promoted to an instructor in the prefectural school in Linjiang 临江 in Jiangxi province. In between, he was appointed as an examiner for the provincial examinations in Jiangxi, Guangxi, Huguang 湖广, and Yunnan provinces. He had no interest in making his fortune as an official, and whenever he was recommended for a post, he forcefully declined. At the age of forty-eight, after his aging mother requested him to return home, he constructed a humble cottage to the north of the town, where he proceeded to do his reading and writing, and in which for the next twenty years, after his mother passed away, he lived as a hermit, never leaving again. While Chen Jian was in Fujian, he once discussed the differences and similarities between Zhu [Xi] and Lu [Jiuyuan] 陆九渊 with the educational inspector Pan Huang 潘璜, after which he wrote his Compilation on Zhu and Lu (Zhu Lu bian 朱 陆编). While he was working as an instructor in the prefectural school in Linjiang, he edited the Complete Writings of Master Zhou [Dunyi] 周敦颐 (Zhouzi quanshu 周子全书) and a Categorized Compilation of the Posthumous Writings of the Chengs [i.e. Cheng Hao 程颢 and Cheng Yi 程颐] (Chengshi yishu leibian 程氏遗 书类编). After he retired from his official position and returned home, he obtained Master Zhu’s “Chronicle” (Nianpu 年谱), “Biographical Sketch” (Xingzhuang 行 © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_24

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状), Collected Papers (Wenji 文集) and Categorized Sayings (Yulei 语类), along with the correspondence between him and the Lu brothers, and repeatedly compared them, re-editing his earlier Compilation on Zhu and Lu, and dividing it into four sections, namely “Prior” (qian 前), “Subsequent” (hou 后), “Further” (xu 续) and “Final” (zhong 终), making up a total of twelve volumes, which he titled Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured (Xuebu tongbian 学蔀通辨).1 As for the meaning of this title, in the general preface to the work, Chen Jian said: The [Book of] Changes (Yi 易) states: “When abundance is obscured, the polar constellation can be seen in daylight” [see Hexagram 55 (Feng 丰, Abundance), fourth line]. This profoundly states the harm of being hidden and occluded. Buddhism is similar in its deluding people, and its obscuring effect is already not simply that of one day. During the Song, a Xiangshan 象山 of the Lu clan [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan] emerged and took its similarity and used it to confuse the reality of our school [i.e. Confucianism], citing Confucian words in order to hide the reality of Buddhist learning. Thus he disguised it with a new appearance, using the yang 阳 of Confucianism to set ablaze the obscure Buddhist yin 阴. Fortunately, Master Zhu was living at the same time, and he profoundly examined his errors and spent his whole life forcefully rejecting them, his words as clear as day. Unfortunately, in recent times a doctrine of early and late has been fabricated, one that says Master Zhu’s views in his early years were not finalized, so he mistakenly doubted Xiangshan, but that in his later years he began to regret this and joined together with Xiangshan. ... Ever since this doctrine was completed, later people were too busy to re-examine it, and based everything on their belief in it, not knowing that it inverted early and late, contentiously defaming Master Zhu in order to patch up Lu’s learning. Its obscuring is thus even more serious! Jian [i.e. Chen himself] was frightened by this, and could not control himself, becoming indignantly determined to investigate its core and provide a comprehensive analysis, specifically illuminating this one fact in order to root out three obscurities.

“Obscuring” here refers to hiding and occluding orthodox learning. As for the “three obscurities,” the first is Buddhism, the second is Lu Jiuyuan’s learning, and the third is the doctrine that Zhu and Lu were different in their early years but accorded in their later years. In the four sections of Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, the “Prior” section explains how Zhu and Lu accorded in their early years but different in their later years, the “Subsequent” section denounces Lu Jiuyuan’s view of yang Confucianism and yin Buddhism, the “Further” section attacks Buddhism, while the “Final” section expounds Master Zhu Learning in order to explain the inclination of his own learning. The whole work constantly denounces Buddhism and Lu-Wang, and thus has a strongly argumentative flavor.

1

[Trans.] References to Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured refer to a Judetang congshu 聚德堂丛书 edition.

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1 Zhu and Lu as Diverging Only in Their Later Years The debate between Zhu and Lu was a great affair in Neo-Confucianism. From Zhu Xi’s lifetime until the end of the Qing Dynasty, arguments concerning this question went on for generation after generation. From the Southern Song Dynasty onward, there were those who advocated reconciling Zhu and Lu, such as Yuan Jue 袁桷, who claimed that as Zhu and Lu lived at the same time and served the same dynasty, their arguments simply amounted to an exchange of views between friends, or Tang Han 汤汉 of Poyang 鄱阳, who strongly argued for the commonalities between the two figures. Tang Han’s follower Cheng Shaokai 程绍开 even established a Unity of the Dao Academy (Daoyi shuyuan 道一书院) in which the theories of Zhu and Lu were both taught. Cheng Shaokai’s student Wu Cheng 吴澄 based his learning on Zhu Xi but also respected Lu Jiuyuan, and advocated a compromise between Zhu and Lu. When scholars from the Yuan and Ming dynasties participated in these debates, they usually distinguished between the early and late studies of Zhu and Lu, and generally held the view that they although they differed in their early periods, they converged in their later periods. For example, in his “Note on Six Gentlemen from Jiangyou” (Dui Jiangyou liu junzi ce 对江右六 君子策), Zhao Fang 赵汸 held this view. In his Compilation on the Unity of the Dao (Daoyi bian 道一编), Cheng Minzheng 程敏政 divided the differences and similarities between Zhu and Lu into three periods: at first they were opposed like ice and hot coals, later they were split between doubting and believing, and eventually they were mutually dependent. When Wang Yangming wrote Master Zhu’s Final Conclusions in His Later Years (Zhuzi wannian dinglun 朱子晚年定 论), he took words and phrases from Master Zhu’s Collected Papers that accorded with Lu Jiuyuan’s ideas, and used them to demonstrate that Zhu and Lu differed in their early periods but later converged. In A Textual Study of the Final Conclusions in Later Years (Kaozheng wannian dinglun 考证晚年定论), Qing Dynasty scholar Sun Chengze 孙承泽 claimed that after the age of forty-five, Master Zhu said not only nothing that accorded with Lu Xiangshan, but also nothing that suggested regret [for his earlier ideas]. In response to Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, Li Mutang 李穆堂 wrote On Master Zhu’s Complete Conclusions in His Later Years (Zhuzi wannian quanlun 朱子晚年全论) in which he examined over three hundred of Master Zhu’s letters, and stated that, “if one sees in the letters words such as ‘mind,’ ‘self-discipline’ and ‘sitting in stillness’ and concludes that they accord with Mr. Lu, one has simply ignored the surrounding textual logic and tone” (Xia Xin 夏炘, “Letter to Graduate Zhan Xiaojian Discussing On Master Zhu’s Complete Conclusions in His Later Years” [Yu Zhan Xiaojian maocai lun Zhuzi wannian quanlun shu 与詹小涧茂才论《朱子晚年全论》书]). His intention to engage in a factional dispute concerning Lu’s learning is very clear. Around the same time, the Master Zhu Learning scholar Wang Maohong 王懋竑 wrote A Chronicle of Master Zhu (Zhuzi nianpu 朱子年谱), some of which concerned the debate over the differences and convergence between Zhu and Lu. However, Wang Maohong’s work did not specifically debate this issue, but rather provided a textual

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study and correction of Zhu Xi’s speech and action throughout his life. After Wang Maohong, Xia Xin’s On Doubts Concerning Zhu (Shu Zhu zhiyi 述朱质疑) supplemented and revised his work, but was dissatisfied with Chen Jian’s claim in his Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured that Zhu Xi “accorded with Chan 禅 Buddhism and Lu before the age of forty.” From this it can be seen that the dispute between Zhu and Lu was an academic problem that persisted for several centuries, and that although a great many scholars devoted significant effort to it, much of this simply reflected factional disputes. In writing his Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, Chen Jian was directly triggered by letters from Zhao Fang, Cheng Minzheng and Wang Yangming. While these three figures all held that Zhu and Lu differed in their early periods but later converged, Chen Jian held the opposite view, and specifically argued that they accorded in their early periods but later diverged. However, his arguments mainly focused on a specific point, and did not concern the rest. For example, he pointed out that when the young Lu Jiuyuan read the word “cosmos” (yuzhou 宇宙) in a book, he suddenly felt greatly enlightened, writing: “The affairs of the cosmos are the affairs of one’s own lot, the affairs of one’s own lot are those of the cosmos,” and “My mind is the cosmos, the cosmos is my mind.” He believed that Lu Jiuyuan’s academic studies and writings were all “opportune cases of Chan Buddhist enlightenment.’ As for Zhu Xi, in his early years he dabbled in both Buddhism and Daoism, with Chan learning having an especially large influence on him, as he himself later recounted many times, for example: From an early age, I was rather obtuse, finding it difficult to relate to people in various matters, yet when I came across the remaining teachings of former gentlemen, I had the vague thought to set my mind to learning, and sought to do so without finding its method. Hence for more than twenty years, I cast off the nearby and sought the distant, abiding below and peering at the lofty, and racing my mind in the realm of the wondrous void, a situation which later pained me and over which I feel much regret. (“Letter to Xue Shilong” [Yu Xue Shilong shu 与薛士龙书]) For a long time I muddied the truth of Confucius and Mencius with the semblances of Buddhism and Daoism, and thus often met with the problem of being excessively lofty. Although in recent years I have finally realized this is wrong, I am still unable to completely change myself. (“Letter in Reply to Xu Shunzhi” [Da Xu Shunzhi shu 答许顺之书]) I at one time tried to teach my followers with the theories of the Buddhists, respecting their dao, and in this pursuit I met with some success. (“Letter in Reply to Minister Wang” [Da Wang shangshu shu 答汪尚书书])

Chen Jian believed that the above were sufficient to prove that Zhu Xi studied Chan Buddhism in his youth and learned much from it, and that it was only in middle age that he began to feel it was wrong and to return to Confucianism, just as Lu Jiuyuan was tainted by Chan learning in his enlightenment concerning the identity of the cosmos and the mind in his early years. Hence in their early years, Zhu and Lu’s studies were in accord. Based on Zhu Xi’s discussions of the mind, he also believed that in his early years, Zhu Xi only spoke of seeking the mind and perceiving the mind, in accord with Lu Jiuyuan. For example, his Record of Preserving Abstinence (Cunzhai ji 存

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斋记), which he wrote at the age of twenty-nine, states: “The reason why people are situated at the centre of Heaven and Earth and are the most numinous of the myriad things is simply the mind. However, as a substance, the mind cannot be attained by hearing or sight, nor can it be sought through thinking and pondering.” In “ He Shujing” (Da He Shujing 答何叔京), which he wrote at thirty-nine, he stated: “People always foolishly discuss the theory of holding on to respect, yet do not remember what they are speaking of. Yet the subtle manifestation of innate moral knowing, with sudden reflection and realization that reveals the mind, is in fact the basic faculty of effort. Once this faculty is established, one will naturally study the lower and penetrate the higher.” Another “ He Shujing” states: “The principle of the teaching of broad observation is very clear, so what doubt can there be? If the dao could be attained by more listening and broad observation, then there would be many people in the world who know the dao. Various matters have recently led me to reflect much on this.” Chen Jian’s purpose in quoting these letters was to prove that, although in his early years Zhu Xi was bogged down in Chan learning and focused his effort solely on seeking the mind, in middle age he realized his mistake and ceased this approach. Lu Jiuyuan however held to the Learning of the Mind without deviation. Thus it can be seen that Zhu and Lu accorded in their early periods but later diverged. Zhu Xi indeed studied Chan in his youth, as frequently recounted in his Collected Papers and Categorized Sayings. However, studying Chan was at the same time of help in broadening his perspective and seeking new modes of thought, and as such cannot and need not be concealed. Here it should be noted that, when Chen Jian analysed Zhu and Lu, he attempted as far as possible to use records of their lives and thoughts to compare various differences and similarities in the two men’s academic content, spiritual temperament, and even approach to managing affairs, and did not attempt to reveal their “early accord and later divergence” specifically in order to refute Wang Yangming’s view of “early difference and later convergence.” In fact, Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan accorded in neither early nor late periods. Zhu Xi’s academic studies underwent a process of development and evolution, and the same is true for Lu Jiuyuan. They each held to their own theories, and refused to bend or submit to others. Zhu and Lu differed in terms of their academic orientation, the basis for their thought, and their temperamental tendencies. In his youth, Lu Jiuyuan rejected Chan learning, and Zhu Xi did the same. Lu Jiuyuan’s “illumination of the original mind” and “first establishing the greater part [of human nature]” were both rooted in the Mencius [see 6A.15], while his “respect for virtuous inherent nature” came from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中 庸), and stripping back material desires was a typical cultivation method of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. Hence none of this can be used to prove that he belonged to Chan learning in his youth. Even though Lu Jiuyuan realized that “the cosmos is my mind, my mind is the cosmos” in his youth, this was not necessarily Chan enlightenment. Since enlightenment is precious in learning, and especially in Chinese philosophy, which emphasizes personal realization and enlightenment concerning the fundamental principles of the cosmos and human life, so enlightenment cannot be regarded as a method solely belonging to Chan learning. The

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important ideas and propositions of a great many philosophers came from personal enlightenment, the so-called “an instance of enlightenment is one of novelty.” It is thus groundless to judge someone as Chan simply because one sees the word “enlightenment” (wu 悟), or to take a belittling attitude toward “Chan enlightenment.” Another reason Chen Jian offered for Zhu and Lu’s accord in their early years was that in their youth, both of them “abandoned books, ceased studying and painstakingly sought the mind.” As evidence for Zhu and Lu’s accord in their early years, this point is somewhat problematic. In his Record of Preserving Abstinence, Zhu Xi indeed said that that which makes humans the most numinous of the myriad things is the mind alone, yet this cannot serve as evidence that he solely sought the mind. That the main difference between humans and other living things is that the former can think is common knowledge, and a view expressed by worthy and wise men since ancient times. As for Chen Jian’s pointing to “the subtle manifestation of innate moral knowing, with sudden reflection and realization that reveals the mind,” this can even less serve as evidence that Zhu Xi solely sought the mind, and thus that he accorded with Lu Jiuyuan in his early years. This was a primary meaning of the Mencius, and Mencius was a great Confucian master revered by both the Learning of Principle and the Learning of the Mind. The difference between Zhu and Lu cannot be reduced to whether or not they accepted “the manifestation of innate moral knowing” as a method for cultivation. The view that the dao cannot be attained by more listening and observation also cannot serve as a reason to conclude that Zhu Xi solely sought the mind in his early years. Zhu Xi revered virtue and respected study in equal measure, and the core of his cultivation was Cheng Yi’s phrase, “Cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge.” Cultivation through self-discipline and the use of respect means revering the virtue of inherent nature, while advancement in learning and the extension of knowledge means respect for study, although Zhu Xi placed these side by side and did not use the extension of innate moral knowing to govern cultivation through self-discipline and the extension of knowledge, unlike Wang Yangming. Zhu Xi advocated studying the lower in order to penetrate the higher, passing from the investigation of things and the fathoming of principles through sudden realization to attain a conception of comprehensive unity, as opposed to how he was criticized by Lu Jiuyuan and understood narrowly by shallow later scholars, who held that he merely advocated scholastic study. Furthermore, the “dao” spoken of by Song-Ming Neo-Confucians referred to the fundamental principle of the cosmos, to the general regularities of things and events, and also to the ethical rules of human society. Zhu Xi advocated beginning from the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge in seeking the dao, but he did not believe that the dao could be attained simply by relying on more listening and knowledge or broader observation. Amongst these, personal experience, enlightenment, analogical assimilation, and interconnection are key and essential steps in the transition from the specific principles of things attained through the investigation of things to the ethical rules of the cosmos. Hence Zhu Xi’s believing that dao cannot be attained by more listening and broader

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observation cannot serve as evidence that he and Lu were in accord in their early years but later diverged. The letters pointed to by Chen Jian above were all written before Zhu Xi was forty-one, and can be used to refute Cheng Minzheng’s view that “In his later years, Master Zhu deeply regretted the mistake of his fragmented approach and his ignorance of the words of Master Lu” and Wang Yangming’s view that “In his later years, Master Zhu had the great realization that his old theories were mistaken” in his Master Zhu’s Final Conclusions in His Later Years, but cannot be taken as evidence that Zhu and Lu “were in accord in their early years.” Chen Jian’s second point in demonstrating that Zhu and Lu were in accord in their early years but later diverged was that when Zhu Xi was acquainted with Lu Jiuyuan in his middle age, his views were generally split between doubting and believing, gathering the strong points and discarding the weak, while in his later years he began to realize his mistake and attack him. Chen Jian said that in Zhu Xi’s life, there were “two junctures,” “three segments,” and “three facts.” The first of the “two junctures” was “the juncture of fleeing to Chan and then returning to orthodoxy,” meaning that Zhu Xi was overflowing with Chan learning in his early years, but that after meeting Li Dong 李侗, he returned to the orthodox learning of Confucianism. Hence Zhu Xi was indeed deeply “tainted by Chan learning,” and his knowledge of the errors of Chan learning was firm, so he could use its weapons against it. The second was “the juncture of Zhu and Lu beginning in accord but ending in difference,” meaning that Zhu and Lu’s academic tendencies and precepts were in accord in their early years but different in their later years. The so-called “three segments” referred to Zhu Xi’s longing for Chan learning in his early years, his deep affection for Lu Jiuyuan in his middle age, and his rejection of both Chan and Lu’s learning in his later years. The so-called “three facts” referred to Master Zhu’s definite and unquestionable rejection in his later years of both Chan learning and Lu’s learning, and his illumination of orthodox learning. “If scholars examine these two junctures, three segments and three facts, they should have no concerns over abundance being obscured” (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Prior” section B, 12). Chen Jian’s two junctures, three segments and three facts in fact had a single meaning, namely that Zhu Xi studied Chan in his early years, rejected and attacked Chan and Lu’s learning after returning to Confucianism, and illuminated the orthodox learning of Confucius and Mencius. As a general account of Zhu Xi, this is acceptable. However, to take Master Zhu’s studies of Chan in his early years as evidence that Zhu and Lu were “in accord in their early years” would be a great mistake. That Master Zhu only knew [Lu] Xiangshan in his middle age is also a self-evident fact. However, to say that Zhu Xi “was secretly fond of Xiangshan in his middle age, but rejected Chan learning and Lu’s learning in his later years” would also be a great mistake. In fact, before Zhu Xi met Lu Jiuyuan, he had first heard about the tendencies of his learning, and had already judged it to be Chan learning. For example, in the first year of the Chunxi 淳熙 period (1174) when Zhu Xi was forty-five, he had already written in a letter to Lü Ziyue 吕子约: “I have long heard of Lu Zijing’s 陆子静 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan’s] worth, yet I also seem to have

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heard that he has the intention to disregard the written word and directly aim for the fundamental root, and I am unsure how this sits with Centrality in the Ordinary’s precept of study and thought before earnest practice.” In another letter in Lü Ziyue, he also wrote: “I have recently heard something of Lu Zijing’s views and style, namely that they are all simply Chan learning under a different name. I fear that in competing to mimic the ancients, he will mislead later students. It is regretful that he does not know this and cannot severely restrain his views, and I would thus offer my doubts. However, I fear that once his views are put into practice, he will not necessarily deign to listen to the common discourse of this old man, but will merely sigh anxiously in secret.” Chen Jian selected these two letters for the “Prior” section of his Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured in order to prove that Zhu Xi only knew Xiangshan in his middle age. In fact however, the information revealed in them is that before Zhu Xi had even met Lu Jiuyuan, he had already judged him to be Chan, and hence he was not only not “split between doubting and believing,” it was even less the case that “in his later years he began to realize his mistake and attack him,” and he certainly had no idea of being “secretly fond of Xiangshan.” Zhu Xi’s worried mind at this time together with his wish to offer his doubts to Lu Jiuyuan constitute one of the reasons for their famous meeting at Goose Lake (Ehu 鹅湖). When he first met Lu Jiuyuan, Zhu Xi was already forty-six, and twenty-two years had passed since he went to meet with Li Dong as an official registrar in Tong’an 同安, after which he established the general precepts of his learning. After Zhu Xi’s enlightenment in the year of Jichou 己丑 (1169), his thought was already mature and his representative works Questions on the Four Books (Sishu huowen 四书或问) and Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu jizhu 四书集注) were already essentially complete, with later work simply amounting to minor textual revisions. Explanation of Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitushuo jie 太极图说解) and Explanation of the Meaning of the Western Inscription (Ximing jieyi 西铭解义), the important works that represent his philosophical thought, were both also complete. Although they later underwent some changes and developments in minor questions, the basic points of all aspects of his learning had already been established, and from then until his death, there were no fundamental changes. Throughout, Zhu Xi always took a critical attitude to Lu Jiuyuan’s learning. Although in some places, in order to prevent the intensification of contradictions and continue to preserve their friendship, there are some ambivalent phrases of reconciliation, these do not represent Zhu Xi’s true thought or consistent attitude. Zhu Xi also offered some words of polite deference toward Lu Jiuyuan’s “handling matters carefully and with authenticity,” but these were nowhere near his friend Lü Zuqian’s 吕祖谦 praise for Lu Jiuyuan. When he invited Lu Jiuyuan to White Deer Grotto 白鹿洞 to lecture his students on one section of the Analects, and later carved his lecture in stone, this only expressed his praise for this lecture of Lu Jiuyuan’s, and not that he agreed with Lu Jiuyuan’s fundamental viewpoint and tendency in learning. As for Wang Yangming’s quotation of the phrase “experienced some regret” from Master Zhu’s letters in his Master Zhu’s Final Conclusions in His Later Years, this merely expressed Zhu Xi’s self-correction of his spending too much effort on writing and not enough on

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practice, and not at all that he agreed with Lu Jiuyuan’s views in learning, nor that he compromised his own position and gave some ground to Learning of the Mind. Thus when Chen Jian said that Zhu Xi in his middle age was “secretly fond of Xiangshan,” his lack of fond words is in fact very clear. As for the whole process of the debate between Zhu and Lu, the academic world has already arrived at basically reliable research conclusions. In the meeting at Goose Lake, on the first day, after a poem written by Lu Jiuyuan’s brothers suggested ridicule, the two men departed unhappily. For the next two days, because of their sharp opposition from which neither wished to back down or yield, they made little real progress. After this, Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan’s elder brother Lu Jiuling 陆 九龄 met at Yanshan 铅山 in Xinzhou 信州, and although their discussions did not completely accord, Lu Jiuling “always used the Analects as evidence when discussing affairs” and spoke much of concrete practice, unlike Lu Jiuyuan’s approach of setting out from obscure, lofty phrases. Lu Jiuling also highly praised Zhu Xi’s Explanation of Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong jie 中庸解). At the Yanshan meeting, the atmosphere was relatively harmonious, and much less confrontational than the Goose Lake meeting. A year after the Yanshan meeting, Lu Jiuling was dying, and when Zhu Xi heard this, he was pained and lamented, writing a funereal elegy recounting the two men’s friendship. Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan’s meeting and Nankang 南康 was due to Lu Jiuyuan inviting Zhu Xi to write an epitaph for Lu Jiuling, and when Zhu Xi invited Lu Jiuyuan to lecture on the “The exemplary man speaks in terms of righteousness” section of the Analects [see 4.16] at the White Deer Grotto Academy, the two men did not engage in a debate concerning their respective tendencies in learning, but simply gave them a brief mention and stopped at that. Concerning this meeting, Zhu Xi merely said that “Zijing’s old scope still remained,” and that “At the time he expressed some ideas from Chan, but his views were too excessive.” When Chen Jian said that, in his view of Lu’s learning, Zhu Xi “gathered the strong points but discarded the weak, split between doubting and believing,” this view was very inaccurate. In a letter replying to Wu Maoshi 吴茂实 in the seventh year of the Chunxi period, Zhu Xi said: The discussion of recent days with the Lu Zishou 陆子寿 [i.e. Lu Jiuling] brothers differed greatly from previous occasions, and it seemed we were able understand something and discuss learning. His followers Cao Lizhi 曹立之 and Wan Zhengchun 万正淳 came to the meet me, and the atmosphere was excellent. We first affirmed applying one’s efforts to the maintenance the sentiments of inherent nature, and this idea was a good one. However, the views upon which we could not reach agreement were too excessive, and they demanded reflection and realization, hence they slipped into peculiarity. If they were to discard their weak points and gather their strong points, there would be nothing to stop them entering into the school of virtue. (“To Wu Maoshi, 1” [Yu Wu Maoshi yi 与吴茂实一], Collected Papers of Master Zhu, Vol. 44)

This letter clearly states that the followers of Lu’s learning should discard their weak points and gather their strong points, not that his own learning should discard the weak points and gather the strong points of Lu’s learning. In wanting the followers of Lu’s learning to gather their strong points, they should gather the strong point of “applying one’s efforts to the maintenance the sentiments of inherent

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nature”; in discarding their weak points, they should discard the weak point of “their views being too excessive, demanding reflection and realization, and slipping into peculiarity.” Zhu Xi’s letter clearly expresses admonition and exhortation, not reconciliation and compromise. In a letter replying to Zhuge Cheng 诸葛诚 in the thirteenth year of the Chunxi period, Zhu Xi indeed spoke of “gathering the strong points of the two schools,” but this letter was a response to the intensification of old grievances and anger on both sides aroused by Cao Lizhi’s gravestone inscription, in which Zhu Xi attempted to calm the indignation and encourage unity. The letter said: Although your letter made clear the reason for the debate, after three replies I am still disappointed. My humble intention has always been that I would urge fellow scholars to adopt the strong points of both the two schools, and not look lightly upon slandering one another. Despite the absence of agreement, set this aside for the time being, and do your utmost to work at that which is of more concern. Do not speak of this as the fault of Cao’s inscription and thereby arouse further indignation. ... [Lu] Zijing regularly proclaimed that he wished to personally lead scholars to unite under Heavenly principle and not be sullied by an iota of human desire, and I am afraid he certainly would not act as you gentlemen suspect. Although moral principle is common to all under Heaven, that which men perceive can never be in complete accordance, and this is precisely why one ought to be modest and calm, engaging with experienced discussions and gradually investigating them in order to return to what is right, as is the responsibility of those of our party. In the recent discussions, however, I have seen many worthy gentlemen frequently have the intention to establish themselves and their own rightness with a stern countenance and indignant words, as if speaking to their enemy, without any of the etiquette of junior and senior or the appearance of customary modesty. When some even secretly smirk, as if they are dealing with their true enemy, how could it come to this! (Collected Papers of Master Zhu, Vol. 54)

After quoting this letter, Chen Jian commented on it, saying: Because of the excessive debating of his followers, Master Zhu wrote this letter to resolve the situation. The words “regularly proclaimed...” speak from the perspective of Xiangshan, and still express the view of being split between doubting and believing from his middle age. To point to this as evidence that Master Zhu respected Lu in his later years would be a mistake. (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Prior” section B, 8)

To say that this letter cannot serve as evidence that Master Zhu respected Lu in his later years is very true. However, to take Zhu Xi’s praise for Xiangshan’s “personally leading scholars to unite under Heavenly principle and not be sullied by an iota of human desire” and his criticism of his followers’ excessively fierce attitude in this letter and draw from these the conclusion that Zhu Xi’s view of Lu Jiuyuan was “split between doubting and believing in his middle age” would be unjustifiable. Zhu Xi never expressed anything toward Lu Jiuyuan that resembled being “split between doubting and believing in his middle age,” and he attacked Lu’s learning vehemently for the rest of his life. Furthermore, Zhu Xi’s attacks on Lu’s learning mainly focused on its theory of effort, since Lu Jiuyuan did not particularly discuss reading texts or fathoming principles, but rather took illuminating the original mind as the entirety of effort. However, Lu’s learning was also one branch of Neo-Confucianism, and in terms of the general aspects of Neo-Confucianism

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such as stressing moral cultivation, regarding the teachings of Confucius and Mencius as the standard for carrying out affairs and establishing oneself, viewing the fundamental principles of the cosmos and ethical principles as one and not dual, and regarding the preservation of Heavenly principle and extinguishing of human desire as the basic content of cultivation, there was indeed little different between the two schools. Their differences concerned the approach to cultivation and the sequence of effort. Hence Zhu Xi would certainly not attack all aspects of Lu Jiuyuan’s learning, and he would necessarily offer some words of praise for the points of Lu’s learning that accord with the basic principles of Neo-Confucianism. To say based on such words that Zhu Xi’s view of Lu’s learning was “split between doubting and believing” is both rash and partial. Another piece of evidence in Chen Jian’s demonstration that Zhu Xi’s view of Lu’s learning was “split between doubting and believing” was that the letter that Zhu Xi wrote in Lu Jiuyuan after hearing that it was Lu’s turn to submit a memorial to the throne and seeking out the memorial himself to examine it. This letter was written in the summer of the twelfth year of the Chunxi period (1185), when Zhu Xi was fifty-six, and said: “I have received your memorial piece and examined its excellent views, which I found reassuring, rich, fine, and profound. The language is seamless and the meaning vivid, it is wide-ranging and fluent, and its author’s profundity of cultivation and depth of accumulation are evident. However, if the path upwards never turns back, it cannot but lead people to suspect that it comes from the Pamir Mountains. Concerning this, one can but laugh” (Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan [Lu Jiuyuan ji 陆九渊集], Vol. 18). Examining Lu Jiuyuan’s memorial to the throne, it takes up ancient examples in order to make proposals for the governance of the time. However, such turn-based memorials were often full of vague and unhurried proposals, and Lu Jiuyuan’s piece belonged to this kind. Zhu Xi’s words of praise upon reading it were also all standard polite phrases. Furthermore, this memorial concerns nothing remotely related to the core precepts of his thought, while its phrase “if the path upwards never turns back” seems to criticize the emphasis on individual will in the memorial’s sentence “It is men who can broaden the dao, not the dao that broadens men” [from Analects, 15.29], and to urge Emperor Xiaozong 孝宗 to not “share one’s affairs with the trivial and petty each day or trust in their conventional ears and common eyes in assessing the rights and wrongs of past and present and deciding whether or not to retain individuals” (“Redacted Official Turn Document, 3” [Shanding guan lundui zhazi san 删定官轮 对札子三], Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan, Vol. 18), which might suggest abandoning reading texts and fathoming principles. Hence Zhu Xi said that this was the original state of Lu’s learning, and inserted the jocular phrase “comes from the Pamir Mountains.” Later, in a letter to Liu Zicheng 刘子澄, he also said that this memorial piece “unfortunately did not avoid some ideas from Chan.” However, this memorial note did not contain a single sentence that concerned his fundamental thought, and no intention to defame anyone. Although Zhu Xi’s phrase “comes from the Pamir Mountains” was meant as a joke, it was perhaps somewhat meddlesome, in that it groundlessly touched on Lu’s sore point and increased his

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indisposition. For Chen Jian to take this letter of Zhu Xi’s as evidence that he was “split between doubting and believing in his middle age” was also clearly wrong. After Cao Lizhi’s gravestone inscription and the meeting with Fu Ziyuan 傅子 渊, the mutual suspicion between Zhu and Lu became deeper and deeper, especially with their students and followers becoming more passionate and debating on all sides, and their contradictions becoming increasingly intense. After this, Zhu Xi’s attitude toward Lu’s learning also changed into one of direct attacks, and he no longer had any intention of compromise or avoiding confrontation. There are a great many letters in which Zhu Xi directly denounces Lu’s learning, and Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured selects many of the letters Zhu Xi wrote after the age of fifty-eight in order to demonstrate that “Zhu and Lu were opposed like ice and hot coals in their later years.” While the main aim of this section has been to refute the “accorded in their early years” aspect of Chen Jian’s view that Zhu and Lu accorded in their early years but later diverged, the “later diverged” aspect is an evident fact, and earlier scholars have all spoken of it with no disagreement. Although Cheng Minzheng’s Compilation on the Unity of the Dao and Wang Yangming’s Master Zhu’s Final Conclusions in His Later Years both claimed that Zhu and Lu differed in their early years but later converged, it can be seen at a glance that this is wrong, and I will add no further discussion of it here.

2 Debates Concerning Confucianism and Buddhism Another point that Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured goes to some length to demonstrate is that the learning of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming is Chan Buddhism; that since Lu Jiuyuan’s learning consists of both the Confucian yang and the Buddhist yin, its doubtful points could confuse Confucianism, and thus its obscuring qualities are especially strong. In Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, the entirety of the “Subsequent” and “Further” sections and part of the “Final” section, amounting to seven volumes in total, are dedicated to demonstrating that Lu and Wang belong to Chan through numerous references and wide-ranging quotations, applying even more effort than to the debate over Zhu and Lu according or diverging in their early or later years. Chen Jian’s arguments focus on three aspects: First, in Lu’s learning there are many places where Lu Jiuyuan induced his followers to seek enlightenment, in which both his conduct and his methods are similar to the opportune prongs and koans of Chan. Second, Lu’s learning cast aside things and affairs, rejecting thought and dismissing reflection, and focused entirely on using emptiness and stillness to complete and cultivate one’s spirit, and this is Chan meditation. Third, Lu Jiuyuan’s younger students were all wild and headstrong, similar to the scolding of Buddha and insulting of ancestors in patriarchal Chan. Chen Jian pointed out that the first step that Chan learning taught people was to extinguish the desire for gain, cast aside things and affairs, dismiss thought and reflection, and focus on emptiness and stillness. After a long period of

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accumulation, one’s spirit should become coalescent, clear, luminous and reflective, such that its functions become marvellous and it becomes infinite in its vastness. This was the essence of Chan learning, and also that of Lu’s learning. For his whole life, Lu Jiuyuan focused on the internalization of spirit as his teaching, for example: “The spirit should be entirely internal, and should not be external. If it is external, there is nothing to affirm in one’s life.” “If a man’s spirit is external, he will labour and toil until his death, so one must gather together one’s spirit and be one’s own ruler.” “Although Zhu Yuanhui 朱元晦 [i.e. Zhu Xi] is a figure as towering as Mount Tai 泰山, in his learning he unfortunately failed to perceive the dao, wasted his spirit, and was thereby hindered.” “I would request my honored brother to now sit up straight, fold your hands, gather your spirit, and be your own ruler, since the myriad things are all present in yourself [see Mencius, 7A.4] and there is nothing you lack” (“Recorded Sayings” [Yulu 语录], Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan, Vol. 34). These all show that Lu Jiuyuan’s learning focused on the path of completion and cultivation of the spirit, and there is no doubt that this is Chan learning. The phrase “The refined spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness” from the Kong Family Masters Anthology (Kongcongzi 孔丛子; see 4.4) was the original ancestor of Lu’s learning. Lu’s learning focused on advocating gathering the spirit and no longer regarded language and writing as significant, consistent with what Buddhist texts refer to as the approach of non-duality (bu er famen 不二法门). In Chen Jian’s above views, the key question is to what degree Lu’s learning accepted Chan learning, and whether or not Confucianism and especially Neo-Confucianism can accommodate Buddhist content. Questions such as whether or not the value of Confucianism is reduced if it accepts Buddhist learning and whether the absorption of Buddhism was beneficial or harmful for the development of Chinese philosophy are important questions in the history of Chinese philosophy. That Lu Jiuyuan accepted Buddhist learning is an indisputable fact. However, Neo-Confucianism accepting the intellectual resources of the two schools of Buddhism and Daoism to enrich itself was precisely the precondition for its development, by which it led Chinese philosophy into a new era. Zhu Xi also accepted certain elements of Buddhism and Daoism, and these played a role in his expansion of philosophical content and his strengthening of the refinement and consistency of his analyses and arguments. As organic elements of his thought, Buddhism and Daoism were already fused with his theory as a whole. After accepting Buddhism, Lu Jiuyuan used its spirit of simplicity and directness together with its thorough penetration of the source of the mind to cleanse muddiness, clear away vulgarity, establish a greater vision, and attain a greater boldness. This was beneficial in helping to sweep away the air of malaise leftover from the Five Dynasties period, develop the Confucian spirituality that had been constrained by classical texts, and cultivate a spirit of self-respect, self-confidence, self-empowerment and independence in daily life. As both an opposition and a supplement to Cheng-Zhu’s Learning of Principle, Lu’s learning provided beneficial nourishment for the theoretical development of Chinese philosophy and molding the character of Chinese intellectuals. The Chan learning that Lu Jiuyuan absorbed was a Chan learning that had already been thoroughly Sinicized. This

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form of Chan learning was an organic element of Chinese philosophy, and as Lu’s learning was an academic branch of Chinese philosophy, for it to absorb a Chan learning that had already been thoroughly Sinicized and become a part of Chinese philosophy was perfectly natural and beyond significant reproach. When Chen Jian regarded Lu Jiuyuan’s learning as “fleeing to Chan” and energetically assaulted it, he saw Buddhism as a fierce flood or savage beast, such that any thought that accepted Buddhist learning and regarded it as an academic resource should be attacked. For Chen Jian, the pre-Qin theories of Confucius and Mencius were complete, and any absorption of alien academic ideas to modify, replenish and develop them deserved universal condemnation and ought to be attacked by all defenders of orthodoxy. Lu Jiuyuan’s main philosophical precepts included the mind as principle, illuminating the original mind, and stripping back material desires. What he emphasized was that the basis for the cultivation of an ideal character lies within one’s own mind. Hence Lu Jiuyuan’s “mind as principle” was not the Buddhist “Using the dharmas of the mind to abolish Heaven and Earth” or “When the mind appears, every kind of dharma appears; when the mind is extinguished, every kind of dharma is extinguished.” Both Lu Jiuyuan’s direction for effort of first establishing the greater part and his method for cultivation of stripping back material desires were Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, and it cannot be said that he deviated from Confucianism. Lu Jiuyuan’s deficiency was simply that, according to the requirements of the perfect character and the standard of the inner sage and outer king, his sole focus on illuminating the original mind and neglect of knowledge of concrete things and affairs meant that he highlighted the dominant position of moral rationality but paid insufficient attention to epistemological rationality. His belief that, provided the original mind is not harmed, “When one should feel sympathy one will naturally feel sympathy, and when one should feel ashamed, one will naturally feel ashamed,” i.e. that the rightness of moral awareness naturally produces the correct way of dealing with things and affairs, is an aspect of his thought that lacks convincing argument. This point was denounced by Zhu Xi and many other thinkers from the Learning of Principle, and was also considered to be a “negligent point” by Wang Yangming’s learning of innate moral knowing, the complete form of the Learning of the Mind. Since Lu Jiuyuan advocated the mind as principle and the illumination of the original mind, how the original mind as an innate moral awareness could manifest in a complete and pure form at the level of actual consciousness was a point that the Learning of the Mind exerted much effort in explaining. According to the Neo-Confucian account, on the one hand, the manifestation of the original mind is natural, automatic, and never ceases for a moment; on the other hand, the original mind is also constantly tainted by the material desires of one’s qi-endowment, so for it to penetrate through at the level of consciousness and become an actual moral resource for people requires the self-conscious seeking and realization of the subject. That the methods of realization are numerous and various is a point that was Chan learning’s greatest inspiration for the Learning of the Mind, and this is precisely what gives rise to the uniqueness of the one who realizes and the

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incomprehensibility of the content and process of realization. For this reason, thinkers who had been habituated to conventional rational modes of thought referred to it as “a hundred peculiarities all emerging.” Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured listed a great many of Lu Jiuyuan and his students’ methods for realising the dao, and referred to them as similar to Chan. For example, a dialogues between Lu Jiuyuan and Zhan Fumin 詹阜民 states: “The Master (Lu Jiuyuan) spoke, saying: ‘If students can keep their eyes constantly closed, this would be excellent.’ Because of this, someone did nothing but sit in quietude with eyes shut, exerting much effort to persist tenaciously day after day, and remained thus for half a month. One day he went outside and suddenly felt that his mind had returned to clarity, yet Zhongli 中立 (i.e. Yang Jian 杨简) secretly wondered at this, so he went to see the Master. The Master faced his eyes and looked at them, saying: ‘Here principle is already manifest.’ Someone asked the Master how he knew this, and he replied: ‘I simply divined it from his pupils.’ Based on this, he said to someone: ‘Is the dao not near at hand?’ He replied: ‘It is’” (“Recorded Sayings” 2, Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan, Vol. 35). In his comment on this, Chen Jian said: “Doing nothing but sitting in quietude with eyes shut and tenaciously persisting is the effort with which Chan learning begins. It is also Xiangshan’s independently sitting upright and gathering the spirit, [medieval Chan monk] Bodhidharma’s 达磨 teaching of facing the wall and sitting in stillness in silent illumination, as well as [Song Chan master] Zonggao’s 宗杲 teaching of doing nothing, reflecting on co-dependence, sitting in stillness and examining one’s experience. ‘One day he went outside and suddenly felt that his mind had returned to clarity’ is the intended effect of Chan learning’s sudden enlightenment and recognition of the mind. Quoted phrases like ‘the dao is near at hand’ are expressions of assertive assistance” (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Subsequent” section A, 5). When Chen Jian said that Lu’s learning was all Chan learning from its beginning effort to its sudden enlightenment, this was inaccurate. Although Lu Jiuyuan absorbed some methods of cultivation from Chan learning, their content was still Confucian. Sitting in quietude with eyes shut was a method taught to people by the Cheng brothers, who represented the orthodoxy of Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism. The intention behind sitting in quietude with eyes shut was to quiet and still the tumult of the mind, and thereby to allow the original mind to be revealed. Neo-Confucians all accepted that the greatest difference between Confucianism and Buddhism was that captured in Cheng Mingdao’s 程明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao’s] statement that “We Confucians are rooted in Heaven, while the Buddhists are rooted in the mind.” According to this division, Lu Jiuyuan’s sitting in quietude with eyes shut was “rooted in Heaven.” When Lu Jiuyuan asked his student “Is the dao not near at hand?” this dao referred to the ethical regularity of the cosmos, and even the oft-denounced phrase “I divined it from his pupils” was in fact not solely present in heterodox learning. The Mencius includes the view that “from a brightness in the face and fullness in the back, it [i.e. the manifestation of the goodness of inherent nature] reaches to the four limbs” [paraphrased from Mencius, 7A.21], believing that once people’s moral cultivation reaches a certain spiritual plane, the ease and serenity of the inner heart-mind can express itself in

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one’s physique and motion. That the pupils light up when the substance of the mind is thoroughly understood is thus not an unusual view. Another piece of evidence given in Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured for Lu’s learning being Chan is that Lu Jiuyuan enlightened Yang Jian by using a legal dispute concerning fans. He quoted A Biography of Cihu (Cihu xingzhuang 慈湖行状): “At first, when [Yang] Cihu was in the Following Principle Room (Xunli zhai 循理斋) of the Imperial Academy, he often stayed awake into the night recollecting former lessons and silently reflecting, and already felt that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things were interconnected as one body, rather than affairs external to one’s own mind. After he came to Master Lu’s new mansion, they returned to Fuyang 富阳 where Cihu persuaded him to remain, and they gathered together at night on the Double Brightness Tower (Shuangming ge 双明阁). Since they often referred to the two words ‘original mind’ (benxin 本心), he casually asked: ‘What is the original mind?’ Since he had that morning heard a dispute concerning fans, Master Lu raised his voice and replied: ‘When you were judging the fan dispute, that which saw who was wrong and who was right is the original mind.’ When Cihu heard this, he suddenly felt that his mind was settled with clarity and brightness, and earnestly asked: ‘Does it stop at this?’ Lu replied: ‘What else could there be?’ At this, Cihu faced north and showed his respect, acknowledging him as his master for life” (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Subsequent” section A, 7). He also quoted Cihu’s Record of Brilliant Permanence (Zhaorong ji 昭融记): “The spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness, this mind that is empty and bright without body, thoroughly illuminating like a mirror, in which the myriad things all appear without being stored.” In his comment on this, Chen Jian said: This is precisely the old wisdom the Buddhists use to toy with the spirit when they say that to recognize the mind and perceive inherent nature is to recognize this and perceive this. How could Cihu recklessly point at this as benevolence and the dao, as the learning of Confucius! If one does not recognize benevolence and the dao, there are vaguely related things one can mess around with. This kind of absurd and assertive assistance that refers to deer as horses is both shocking and ridiculous. (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Subsequent” section A, 8)

Chinese philosophy especially emphasizes people’s spiritual plane, and a spiritual plane is not a spontaneous result of the accumulation of knowledge, but rather a unique kind of sensation and vision. A spiritual plane depends on personal experience, and personal experience has no fixed approach. Some reflect within themselves in silence, others are stimulated by external affairs. The unity of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as an interconnected body is a kind of spiritual plane, and also a kind of personal experience. A spiritual plane is attained through cultivation, while personal experience can be attained by accident. From Lu Jiuyuan’s use of the dispute concerning fans to enlighten Yang Jian, his aptitude for teaching can be seen. Lu Jiuyuan’s “original mind” was taken from Mencius’ “four inklings,” one of which is the mind of right and wrong [see Mencius, 2A.6]. When he heard the dispute, he had to use the mind that knows right and wrong. In judgments

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of right and wrong, the original mind is operating. When Cihu asked, “Does it stop at this?” and Lu Jiuyuan replied to him by saying, “What else could there be?” his meaning was that the mind of right and wrong is also the mind of sympathy and the mind of shame, i.e. that the original mind is only one mind. When this one mind should be sympathetic it is spontaneously sympathetic, when it should feel shame it spontaneously feels shame, when it should be comfortable and gentle it is spontaneously comfortable and gentle, and when it should be firm and resolute it is firm and resolute. The original mind thus manifests itself in different expressive forms in different situations, and is something possessed by all people. Cihu’s firm conviction at this was because he understood Lu Jiuyuan’s core precept here. This kind of random teacher-student direction between Lu Jiuyuan and Yang Jian cannot be deemed to be “the old wisdom the Buddhists use to toy with the spirit,” since even if it contains the meaning of recognising the mind and perceiving inherent nature, that which is perceived is the Confucian inherent nature of the original mind. When Yang Jian said that “The spirit of the mind is what is called sageliness,” spirit here also refers to a spiritual plane, and not to knowledge. Only by viewing Lu Jiuyuan from a relatively open-minded perspective can his apparently grand and preposterous speech and conduct be understood correctly. Another piece of evidence Chen Jian offered for Lu’s learning being Chan is that it cast aside things and affairs, rejected thought and dismissed reflection, and focused entirely on using emptiness and stillness to complete and cultivate one’s spirit. To demonstrate this, he listed many passages from Lu Jiuyuan’s recorded sayings and letters that he thought focused entirely on emptiness and stillness, such as: Wu Xianzhong 吴显仲 asked: “Why are some people more ignorant?” Master Lu said: “People differ in the clarity or turbidity of their qi-endowments. Only by cultivating the self and not chasing after things can one follow the clear and bright. As soon as one chases after things, one becomes ignorant and light-headed. Since the human mind has its problems, one must strip it back, and each time one strips it back is an instance of clarity and brightness. If it continues arising, one must strip it back again and become clear and bright again, and one must keep on stripping it back until it is completely eliminated. The mind cannot be tethered to any single affair; it should only establish the mind itself. The human is originally without any affairs, but is carelessly pulled away being things and affairs. If it has spirit, then they immediately depart, and it improves. Once One Knows to Establish This Mind, When One Does Nothing One Must Cultivate Through Self-Restraint, and Cannot Go to Deal with Affairs. The Human Mind Only Loves to Tether Itself to Affairs. When One Teaches It to Cast Aside Affairs, like a Monkey Losing Its Tree, It Has Nowhere to Reside. The ancients did not use the spirit in their spare time, such that when they were not working they stopped, and whenever they worked it was not to no avail. Hence when they worked at affairs they were completed. One must cleanse away everything and not leave anything behind; only then can one attain. (For all the above, see “Recorded Sayings,” Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan, Vols. 34-35)

Chen Jian’s commented on these, saying: “These are all Lu learning’s formulas for cultivating the spirit. They are also the Buddhist precept that affairs are

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obstructions.” “To say ‘Only by cultivating the self’ and ‘not chasing after things,’ or that one should not be concerned with other affairs but only comprehend oneself, this is the approach of returning from managing to doing nothing but sitting in quietude, closing one’s eyes, and cultivating the spirit.” “These passages only demand that one be idle and carefree, empty and still, and indifferent and withdrawn, that one forget all thoughts without the slightest weariness and trust in one’s spontaneity and self-possession, regarding this as the locus for completing and cultivating the spirit” (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Subsequent” section B). He also quoted sentences such as “To be simple and pure with no adulteration, still and uniform with no change, indifferent with no action, in motion yet in accordance with Heaven, this is the dao of cultivating the spirit” from the Zhuangzi 庄子 [see Ch. 15 “Ingrained Ideas”] and “When humans and dharmas are both stilled, good and bad both forgotten, the mind is spontaneously authentic and becomes the Bodhimanda [i.e. the site of enlightenment]” from the Buddhist Inscription on Extinguishing the Mind (Xixin ming 息心铭) as a comparison, in order to demonstrate that Lu’s learning was similar to Chan and Daoism. However, Chen Jian’s use of these to demonstrate that Lu’s learning was similar to Chan is unconvincing, because caring and cultivating the spirit to preserve the tranquility and clarity of the mind is not unique to Buddhism and Daoism, and very similar content was originally present in Confucianism. Although it is not completely wrong to say that Confucianism essentially values action, is directed externally, and affirms participation in worldly affairs, while Buddhism and Daoism essentially value stillness, are directed internally, and affirm withdrawal from worldly affairs, this kind of dichotomy is something of a simplification and absolutization. It may be somewhat acceptable to use this kind of dichotomy discuss Confucianism and Buddhism prior to the Song-Ming period, but to use it to discuss Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism after the Song-Ming period would be a serious mistake. Even before the Song Dynasty, the three schools of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism had already gone through a process of mutual absorption and fusion, of mutual modification and invention, each containing the other for mutual improvement and benefit. When Confucius yearned for the joy of “bathing in the Yi 沂 River and enjoying the breeze upon the Rain Altar” and sighed “I am with Dian 点” [i.e. with Zengxi 曾皙, who had proposed the above activities; see Analects, 11.26], was he not precisely setting aside all objectives and immersing himself in the purity and freshness of nature to nurture his spirit? Does the sentence “The superior man has an easy grandeur but is not proud” [see Analects, 13.26] not precisely ask people to cultivate a serene and peaceful state of mind? Does the sentence “The resolute, steadfast, slow and prudent are close to benevolence” [see Analects, 13.27] not precisely ask people to be cautious in their speech and nurture their spirit? Texts such as Mencius’ view that nothing is so beneficial for cultivating the mind as reducing one’s desires [see Mencius, 7B.35], Xunzi’s 荀子 “Emptiness, unity and stillness” [see Xunzi, Ch. 21 “Dispelling Blindness”], and “The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality” from Centrality in the Ordinary all express similar ideas. Although pre-Qin Confucians did not yet use expressions as extreme as those of Song-Ming Neo-Confucians, the

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ideas of nurturing the spirit through tranquility and peacefulness and casting aside miscellaneous affairs and encumbrances were originally present in Confucian thought. Confucian thought was a relatively moderate and mild kind of theory. In aspects such as action and stillness, principle and desire, Heaven and humanity, and loss and gain, it did not fall into either side, and thus it did not reject the aspect of tranquility and stillness, and the above somewhat extreme expressions should not lead one to immediately conclude that these are Buddhist or Daoist. The reason for the greatness and subtlety of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism was precisely that it absorbed intellectual content from Buddhism and Daoism, taking as many elements as possible from Chinese culture and fusing them into one. Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism’s absorption and fusion was precisely the fundamental condition for Chinese culture’s characteristics of encompassing both action and stillness, raising up both internal and external, the lofty brilliance of the polarity within the dao of centrality in the ordinary, and seeking transcendence within participation in worldly affairs. Although there are always historical cases where heterodoxies were attacked by the defenders of orthodox culture or purged for various purposes by rulers, the general trend of cultural fusion and innovation is irreversible. Under the basic condition of preserving its emphasis on moral education, individual spiritual cultivation, mutual aid and benefit in social groups, and tranquility and harmony in human life, Neo-Confucianism absorbed the thoughts of various schools. That some Neo-Confucians absorbed somewhat more (such as Chan for Lu’s learning and Daoism for Zhou Dunyi), and displayed somewhat more extreme speech and action should be regarded with an attitude of sympathetic understanding, and there is no need to send in the troops to punish them. As for comments with exaggerated language stemming from the defence of factional interests, disputes over personal feeling, or narrow, selfish grievances, these are even more unacceptable. From a perspective of sympathetic understanding, Lu Jiuyuan’s demands such as those for people to “only cultivate the self and not chase after things,” to “strip back material desires,” to not be constantly bound up with external affairs, and to “cleanse away everything and not leave anything behind” are all necessary conditions for maintaining the purity and clarity of the original mind and not being obstructed or deluded. Furthermore, Lu’s theory of effort in his learning did not in fact include only this approach, but simply mainly emphasized “keeping the mulberry field clean and spotless.” What Lu Jiuyuan wished to rectify were the various malpractices of people’s minds being obsessed with books, the devastation of the individual spirit, people being bound up with external affairs, and not being able to be one’s own ruler in affairs. What he advocated was an attitude of spiritual elevation, uninhibited vitality, self-respect and self-belief, and boldness in undertakings. Chen Jian failed to see this, and his criticisms of Lu’s learning were mostly exaggerations, such as when he said: I once investigated the self-stated view of “first establishing the greater part” in Lu’s learning, and it is indeed truly deceptive! In Mencius’ idea of first establishing the greater part [see Mencius, 6A.15], the mind of the dao is central, and one should not allow desires to harm the mind. For Mr. Lu, cultivating the spirit is central, and he only feared that affairs

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would harm the mind, that the good would harm the mind. This is the difference between Heaven and the abyss, how could they be equated? In the seven chapters of the Mencius, it at first seems that he spoke of the mind in much detail, yet if one investigates his precepts, they in fact all spoke of using the innate moral mind to deal with interests and desires. When [Lu] Xiangshan spoke of the mind, he spoke in terms of affairs. One advocated reducing one’s desires and preserving the mind, while the other spoke of casting aside affairs and purifying the mind. The language of the two is similar, but their import is very different, and this is precisely the way that between Confucianism and Buddhism, a hairbreadth’s difference in the beginning leads people a thousand miles astray. (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Subsequent” section B, 6)

His prejudicial aspect can be clearly seen here. Hence it was inevitable that Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured would give rise to counterattacks from scholars of the Learning of the Mind. Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured also attacked Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing,” selecting and quoting several passages from Yangming’s letters and his Record of Transmission and Practice (Chuanxi lu 传习录) in order to show that the source of Yangming’s learning lay entirely in Chan learning. For example: When one thinks of neither good nor bad, one recognizes the original state of things. This is why the Buddhists designed this convenient means for those who have not yet recognized the original state of things. The original state of things is what our sages called innate moral knowing, and investigating things as they come is the effort of the extension of such knowing. This is the Buddhists’ constant awareness, and also the constant preservation of their original state of things. The effort of the form of substance is generally similar. However, the Buddhists have a self-centred and self-interested mind, hence the beginnings are somewhat different. The sages’ effort at extending knowing is of the utmost sincerity and without rest, the substance of their innate moral knowing sparkling like a bright mirror, so beauty and ugliness arrive following the apparent shapes of things yet the bright mirror never retains any trace; this is what is called feeling following the myriad things and thus being without feeling. That there is nowhere [for things] to remain and give rise to the mind is a phrase once used by the Buddhists, and it is not wrong. (“Letter in Lu Yuanjing [i.e. Lu Cheng 陆澄]” [Da Lu Yuanjing shu 答陆原静书], Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II)

Although Wang Yangming’s words here relate to Buddhism, their real referent is Confucianism. Wang Yangming’s important propositions include “no principle outside the mind,” “no things outside the mind,” and “the unity of knowing and acting,” but his core precepts can be reduced to “the extension of innate moral knowing.” All his discussions and theories are centred on these words. One important meaning of his so-called innate moral knowing is the self-awareness of Heavenly principle and the inherent nature of Heaven in the human mind, and in this he inherited Mencius’ “four inklings,” such that what Lu Jiuyuan called the “original mind,” Wang Yangming called the original state of things (benlai mianmu 本来面目). Wang Yangming’s effort was more detailed than that of Lu Jiuyuan, since the latter mostly discussed “first establishing the greater part,” and was vague

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about the steps of effort to be taken after establishing the greater part. Wang Yangming uncovered the teaching of “the extension of innate moral knowing,” and its main meaning was: “To extend the Heavenly principle known by the innate moral knowing of my mind to all things and affairs, such that all things and affairs attain their principle” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). In extending the good moral will in the mind to specific things and affairs and completing specific actions under the rule and guidance of the good moral will, there is not only a “main thread,” namely the guidance of innate moral knowing, but also “detailed items,” namely the participation of the knowledge required to complete the specific actions. Hence Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing is an integration of moral rationality and epistemological rationality. The word “extension” (zhi 致) is a word for practice, both effort and original substance, both internal and external. The original state of things is innate moral knowing, and constant awareness is the constant awakening of innate moral knowing, without ignorance. Here he borrowed the terms of Buddhism, but the real import of his effort lay entirely within Confucianism. His borrowing of Buddhist terms and phrases was a convenient means for scholars to grasp his meaning under the conditions of time in which the average reader recited Buddhist texts. This precisely displays Wang Yangming’s talent for teaching. As for the key difference between Confucianism and Buddhism, Wang Yangming disclosed this perfectly clearly: the Buddhist root is awareness, and their substance of the mind contains no ethical content, while the Confucian root is innate moral knowing, and its content is Heavenly principle. Although innate moral knowing constantly manifests itself, it is not an actual, constantly perceptible idea. Hence he said that when there are no affairs, it is sparkling like a bright mirror, while when there are affairs, it follows the apparent shapes of things, the so-called “feeling following the myriad things and thus being without feeling.” Wang Yangming absorbed certain ideas from Buddhism, and in particular its methods of cultivation, from which he drew many points. However, this drawing from and absorption were precisely what led to Wang Yangming’s greatness and subtlety. Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured also attacked Wang Yangming for his absorbing points from Daoism. He listed the following two passages from Record of Transmission and Practice and added his comments: “When asked about the school of immortals’ [i.e. Daoism] original qi 气, original essence (jing 精) and original spirit (shen 神), Master Yangming said: These are just a single entity, whose flowing operation is qi, condensing and gathering is essence, and wondrous functioning is spirit.” “The essence in essential unity is speaking in terms of principle, while the essence in essential spirit is speaking in terms of qi; principle is the patterning principle of qi, while qi is the operative functioning of principle. The two are originally one and the same affair, but the theories of later Confucians and those of nourishing life [yangsheng 养生, i.e. Daoism] each got fixated on one side, and thus did not allow them to function mutually.” Chen Jian’s comments said: Yangming’s learning of innate moral knowing was rooted in the Buddhists’ original state of things, but also in accord with the original essence, original qi and original spirit of the

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school of immortals, as can be clearly seen from Yangming’s own words, and does not require any discrimination from others. How can it possibly be forcibly called the learning of the sages when it so recklessly accords with Confucian texts in order to confuse people! I would say that Yangming’s theory of innate moral knowing is both jumbled up and erroneous in the extreme. In recent times, some among the scholar-officials regard Yangming as the true learning of the sages, respectfully believing it, passing it on, and following its voice in slandering Master Zhu [Xi]; what on earth can be done about this? (Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured, “Further” section C, 2-3)

Yangming’s relationship with Buddhism and Daoism has already been thoroughly researched in academic spheres, and the chapter on Yangming above has already covered some of this, so it will not be discussed in detail here. Here it should be noted that Wang Yangming did absolutely not simply repeat and echo Buddhism and Daoism, but rather used their intellectual resources to develop his own theories. For examples, the phrase “flowing operation is qi, condensing and gathering is essence, and wondrous functioning is spirit” precisely expresses Yangming’s intellectual tendency to place greater emphasis on synthesis over analysis and the whole over the parts. The core precept of Yangming’s philosophy is the extension of innate moral knowing, which is both his theory of original substance and also his theory of effort. Yangming’s theory can be said to be an ethical theory in the broad sense, since although concerning the myriad things he emphasized both their qualities in themselves and also the ethical significance they express, the latter was where the focus of his intentions lay. In Yangming’s view, the most fundamental material that constitutes the world is qi. Qi flows into operation and fullness, and moves without cease. The condensing and gathering of qi is essence, and this essence is a distillation of qi, and not anything like a sprite or demon. In wondrous functioning as spirit, this spirit is similar to Zhang Zai’s 张载 statement that “ghosts and spirits are the innate ability of the two qi,” referring to the wondrous and unpredictable functioning of qi, and not the existence of any spirituality. Yangming’s “principle is the patterning principle of qi, while qi is the operative functioning of principle” is in fact a view of principle as existing within qi, in which qi is material existence and principle is the regularity and lawfulness expressed in the movement of qi. This regularity and lawfulness takes qi as its support and operative functioning, while qi takes this regularity and lawfulness as its commander and ruler, such that the two are different aspects of a qi that is united and moves according to certain laws. This idea’s borrowing of Daoist concepts in its expression is perfectly appropriate. Whether or not an idea or theory has value lies not in it absorbing or borrowing from theories regarded by people of the time as heterodox, but in how many new creative elements it provides for the progress of human thought. On the basis of the existing Learning of the Mind, Yangming used his breadth of spirit to push Confucianism a step forward and propose unique responses to a series of important theoretical questions raised by his time, such as the relationship between honoring virtuous inherent nature and accumulating knowledge, the relationship between the investigation of things and extension of knowing and the sincerity of the will and rectification of the mind, the relationship between moral elevation and progress in knowledge, the relationship between

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principle and desire, the relationship between the inner sage and the outer king, the basis of moral cultivation, and the approach to the formation of an ideal character. His contribution in terms of deeds precisely constituted a footnote to these theories. Although in Yangming’s time his theories met with suppression, the creative elements contained within them, the degree to which his theories satisfied the needs of the time, and his own unique charismatic appeal meant that after the middle Ming period, his theories were rapidly disseminated and gained a great influence within Neo-Confucianism, with Wang Learning becoming an important link in the development of Chinese thought. In the formation of Yangming’s thought, Buddhist and Daoist theories provided important support, and any attempt to belittle it based on factional views or attack it for absorbing and accepting “Buddhist and Daoist heterodoxies” is simply an expression of a shallow and mean viewpoint. Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured is a polemical work, and Chen Jian’s purpose in writing it was to take back the territory occupied by the Learning of the Mind and Chan learning and restore the orthodox status of Master Zhu Learning, so he therefore adopted an attitude of direct assault on the Learning of the Mind viewpoints of Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming, Cheng Minzheng and others. When Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured was first published, it by no means gained immediate renown, but subsequently, owing to praise from Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成 of the Donglin 东林 School and then from later figures such as Gu Yanwu 顾炎武, Zhang Lüxiang 张履祥 and Lu Longqi 陆陇其, it gradually became better known. After this book, Sun Chengze, Wei Yijie 魏裔介, Xiong Cilü 熊赐履, and Zhang Lie 张烈 all wrote works honoring Zhu and rejecting Lu and Wang. Scholars from the Lu-Wang school also rallied together to refute them, and the Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang schools each stuck to their factional views and quarreled on and on, the issue becoming a hot spot of the early Qing Dynasty academic world. The modern scholar Qian Mu 钱穆 once said: “Within the great academic realm of the time, they first marked out the small circle of Neo-Confucianism, then within the small circle of Neo-Confucianism, they specifically extracted the line of difference and similarity between Zhu and Lu, and then on this single line, they advanced and retreated, refusing to give in. Scholars who studied Lu-Wang said that Master Zhu’s thought in his later years turned to converge with Lu, and as if this was enough to boost the arrogance of Lu learning. Scholars who studied Master Zhu disproved this by arguing that Master Zhu’s thought in his later years in fact displayed no trace of a turn to follow Lu, as if the value of Master Zhu Learning was originally to be found in this. … This was indeed an astonishing affair in the academic world” (A New Case Study on Master Zhu [Zhuzi xin xue’an 朱子新学案], 159). This single remark truly reveals the stubbornness and parochialism of scholars of moral principle in the early Qing Dynasty. Chen Jian wrote Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured as a historian, expressing his own philosophical views through his criticisms of Lu and Wang. Most of these views came from Zhu Xi. Although the factional viewpoint of Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured meant that it was not discussed by many people, it represented an academic tendency of the later Ming Dynasty:

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striving for the orthodoxy of Zhu Learning in a situation where Wang Learning in a situation where Wang Learning was sweeping across the academic world. Ever since Master Zhu Learning had been confirmed as the official ideology of the state, it had been the learning passed down in the families and recited in the homes of all educated people, and combined with its promotion in the imperial examination, it possessed an unshakeable position and exerted a profound and wide-ranging influence. In addition to the element of serving as a political, cultural and educational ideology of the state, the breadth and depth of its content, its complete form, and its simple and unadorned style all meant that Zhu Xi’s thought had an irreplaceable and lofty status among educated people. Although after the rise of Wang Yangming, his learning was disseminated rapidly around the whole country and created a sensation in the academic spheres of the time, as an academic thought that had deeply entered people’s minds over several centuries, Zhu Learning still exerted a great influence over the academic world. In this context, it was an inevitable phenomenon in academic development that those who served Master Zhu Learning would arise and make their voices heard. Chen Jian’s Comprehensive Analysis of Learning Obscured was a precursor of the intellectual trend of turning back from Wang Learning to Master Zhu Learning that began in the late Ming Dynasty, a trend that later developed into the reflections on and analyses of Wang Learning by thinkers who were provoked by the national shame of the collapse of the Ming. This intellectual trend was a major affair in the history of Chinese thought. As the beginning of this intellectual trend, it exerted a notable influence on its later development.

Chapter 25

Gu Xiancheng’s Reconciliation Between Master Zhu Learning and Yangming Learning

After the idea of pre-formed innate moral knowing in [Wang] Yangming 王阳明 Learning was promoted and explicated by figures such as Wang Longxi 王龙溪 and Luo Rufang 罗汝芳, its aspect of “without learning or considering, what emerges from it spontaneously possesses Heavenly regularity” was greatly developed, highlighting the spirit of purely relying on innate moral knowing and expedient action, and setting off great waves in the intellectual world. The Jiangyou 江右 Wang [Yangming] lineage of Zou Shouyi 邹守益, Nie Bao 聂豹, Luo Hongxian 罗洪先, etc. arose and attempted to correct this, advocating the doctrine of returning to quietude and holding to stillness. The debates in the Wang tradition between the a priori innate moral knowing group and the a posteriori effort group concerning the Four-Sentence Teaching were a major affair in the intellectual world of the late Ming Dynasty. By the end of the Ming, scholars accepted the reality of the later Wang Learning’s development towards wild unrestraint and the concealing of Master Zhu [Xi] 朱熹 Learning, and advocated effort in concrete situations. This tendency gradually developed to become the mainstream in the intellectual world. Gu Xiancheng, Gao Panlong 高攀龙, and Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 were the main representatives of this intellectual trend. Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成 (1550–1612; zi 字 Shushi 叔时, hao 号 Jingyang 泾阳) was from Wuxi 无锡 in Jiangsu province. He became a metropolitan graduate in the eighth year of the Wanli 万历 period [1580], and was appointed as a secretary in the Ministry of Revenue 户部. He made an oath of friendship with Wei Yunzhong 魏允中 of Nanle 南乐 and Liu Yanlan 刘延兰 of Zhangpu 漳浦, and the three of them were called the “Three First Place Men” (san jieyuan 三解元) by people at the time. Later he was appointed as a secretary in the Bureau of Honors 验封司 in the Ministry of Personnel 吏部, but because a memorial he submitted to the throne satirized those in power, he was demoted to an assistant department magistrate in Guiyang 桂阳 county. He was then transferred again to Chuzhou 处州 and Quanzhou 泉州 as a prefectural judge, then promoted to a director in the Bureau of Appointments 文选司. For gathering and pushing cabinet members to oppose the intentions of the powerful minister Wang Xijue 王锡爵, he was stripped of his © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_25

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position and demoted to a commoner. After returning to his hometown, he met with his fellow colleagues from the town at the Second Spring 二泉, where they read books and lectured on learning. In the thirty-second year of the Wanli period [1604], he renovated the old location of the Donglin Academy 东林书院 where Yang Shi 杨时 had lectured in the Song Dynasty, and lectured there with his younger brother Yuncheng 允成 together with his fellow townsmen including Gao Panlong 高攀龙, Qian Yiben 钱一本, Xue Fujiao 薛敷教, and Shi Menglin 史孟 麟, at one point attracting scholars from all corners of the realm who heard about their ethos. Based on Zhu Xi’s “Academy Rules for White Deer Grotto Academy” [Bailu dong shuyuan yuangui 白鹿洞书院院规], he drew up his “Donglin Association Regulations” [Donglin huiyue 东林会约]. He held that learning should not be separated from worldly affairs, and thus in the association he often judged and evaluated well-known figures, criticising the failings of the national government, and was thus widely acclaimed as a leader of the pure discussion (qingyi 清 议) movement [of political criticism]. In the fortieth year of the Wanli period [1612], he died at home. His works include Notes from Careful Studio [Xiaoxin zhai zhaji 小心斋札记], Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature [Zhengxing bian 证性编], Speeches from Discussions [Shangyu 商语], and Hidden Manuscripts from Jing Riverbank [Jinggao canggao 泾皋藏稿], which were later compiled into Posthumous Writings of the Venerable Gu Duanwen (Gu Duanwen gong yishu 顾端文公遗书).1

1 An Equal Emphasis on a Priori Innate Moral Knowing and a Posteriori Effort The basis of Gu Xiancheng’s academic learning was Master Zhu Learning, yet he also kept in mind Yangming’s doctrine of innate moral knowing (liangzhi 良知). He took Master Zhu’s theory of inherent nature (xing 性), and integrated Yangming’s doctrine of innate moral knowing. Thus, he both acknowledged pre-formed (xiancheng 现成) innate moral knowing, and also emphasized the extension of innate moral knowing through effort in concrete occasions. He once refuted Luo Hongxian of the Jiangyou Wang lineage, saying: Master Luo Nianan [i.e. Luo Hongxian] said: “Where in the world is there any pre-formed innate moral knowing?” If innate moral knowing is not pre-formed, what is pre-formed? And if innate moral knowing is not pre-formed, is it possible that it is artificially formed? This logic is the kind spoken of by scholars with a little knowledge. Yet when Nianan said “Where in the world is there any pre-formed innate moral knowing,” he surely wished to stimulate the ignorant and cowardly and eliminate the arrogant and absurd, in order that they could truly extend their innate moral knowing. In this, his achievement was greater than Yangming. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 11)

1

[Trans.] References to Gu Duanwen gong yishu and Jinggao canggao refer to carved editions from the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty.

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Luo Hongxian advocated absorption and accumulation, holding to stillness without desire, in order to rectify the “crazed fearlessness” of the a priori innate moral knowing branch, and thus he opposed any pre-formed innate moral knowing that lacks learning and consideration. Gu Xiancheng disagreed with Luo Nianan’s rejection of pre-formed innate moral knowing, believing that innate moral knowing is both pre-formed and endowed by Heaven. His basis was Mencius’ 孟子 “that which [people] are able to do without learning is their innate moral ability, that which people know without consideration is their innate moral knowing” [see Mencius, 7A.15] and Zhu Xi’s explanation of “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature” [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)]. That people all possess Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing was Gu Xiancheng’s fundamental starting point. He once said: “In terms of innate moral knowing, it is not only that of [the sage-kings] Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 that is pre-formed, since even that of [the tyrants] Jie 桀 and Zhou 纣 is pre-formed. This being so, what is it that on the one hand made Yao and Shun, while on the other made Jie and Zhou? To become aware of this we must examine how Yao and Shun became Yao and Shun, and how Jie and Zhou became Jie and Zhou. In this way we can observe whether or not the pre-formed is sufficient to be relied upon” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 11). People of the utmost goodness and those of great evil are all produced a posteriori, and there is no difference in the innate moral knowing that they originally possess a priori. Thus, although they all possess a priori goodness, this is insufficient to be relied upon, and that which must be relied upon is a posteriori effort. Hence Gu Xiancheng opposed the views that there is no pre-formed innate moral knowing and that in the human mind there is neither good nor bad. However, he also believed that Luo Hongxian’s opposition to pre-formed innate moral knowing, in which he emphasized that innate moral knowing is formed through the exercise of a posteriori effort, could spur people to consciously make effort in concrete affairs. In this way, one can both stimulate the ignorant and cowardly, and also repress the arrogant and absurd. This is consistent with Yangming’s emphasis on both the original and spontaneous pre-formed nature of innate moral knowing and also the concrete effort of extending innate moral knowing in his late years. Since Gu Xiancheng accepted pre-formed innate moral knowing, while Luo Hongxian opposed it, the two were seemingly exactly opposed on this point. In fact, their phrases “pre-formed innate moral knowing” did not refer to exactly the same thing. For Gu Xiancheng, innate moral knowing referred to the Heaven-endowed sprouts of moral consciousness, with none of the broader content included in the concept of innate moral knowing from Yangming’s later years. Gu Xiancheng’s approach to effort was to set out from these Heaven-endowed sprouts of moral consciousness, and use the a posteriori effort of nurturing and expansion to attain an ideal character with moral integrity and complete knowledge. To say that this kind of innate moral knowing is pre-formed means that it is Heaven-endowed, with all a posteriori effort being applied to it, such that outside of this there can be no other site to apply effort. For Luo Hongxian on the other hand, “pre-formed innate moral knowing” referred to knowledge of right from wrong and good from bad that is spontaneously able to give rise to caution and fear, to attain centrality and harmony,

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to diffuse and to restrain itself, a spiritual subject that combines the integrity of moral reason with a consummate epistemological reason, i.e. the “innate moral knowing” with a variety of meanings from Wang Yangming’s later years. When Luo Hongxian said that there is no pre-formed innate moral knowing, he meant that there is no innate moral knowing that can be naturally relied and depended upon without having undergone the effort of absorption and accumulation. Thus although the reference of “pre-formed innate moral knowing” was different for the two men, their emphasis on a posteriori effort was the same. When Gu Xiancheng emphasized the importance of a posteriori effort under the basic condition of accepting Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing, there was on this point no fundamental contradiction between his thought and that of Wang Yangming’s later years, and it was also consistent with Zhu Xi’s approach to effort. Zhu Xi accepted that “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature,” praised Zhang Zai’s 张载 “The mind rules over inherent nature and feeling,” and in fact also held that innate moral knowing is Heaven-endowed, although Zhu Xi regarded the mind as the site that holds the multitude of principles and responds to the myriad affairs, and this mind is not directly the same as inherent nature. The principles of inherent nature originally possessed within the mind can only become manifest in the mind through the stimulation and guidance of the principles of things attained through the investigation of things, and thereby the mind and inherent nature can be interconnected as one. Yangming however held that “the mind is principle,” with the principles of inherent nature in the mind constantly manifesting and resonating at the level of the mind, so as long as no selfish desire occludes this, the immediate mind is already principle. When Gu Xiancheng accepted Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing and also emphasized a posteriori effort, he in fact took something from both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. Hence Gu Xiancheng was neither purely a scholar of Master Zhu, not purely a scholar of Yangming, but mixed elements of Master Zhu and Yangming. He once said: While Master Zhu is steady, Yangming is lofty; while Master Zhu is refined and concrete, Yangming is open and grand; while Master Zhu includes both cultivation and enlightenment, Yangming includes both enlightenment and cultivation. Seen in this way, although if the two gentlemen are “examined in terms of the prominence of their deeds, observed in the subtlety of their thoughts, sought in the centrality of their writings, and pursued in the space between their discussions,” they have their points of difference, in terms of their attainment of the dao 道, they are equal. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 7)

Master Zhu’s plain concreteness and refined precision and Yangming’s lofty illumination and broad grandness are simply differences in the ambiance and characteristic qualities of their learning, with no more fundamental difference, and thus the two can be used to mutually reinforce one another. It is also not as summarized by later scholars who said, “Master Zhu emphasized cultivation, Yangming emphasized enlightenment,” since the two equally included “both cultivation and enlightenment.” For Gu Xiancheng, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming are not as incompatible as the followers of their respective lineages took them to be. He calmly took up points from the learning of both Master Zhu and Yangming, without

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the narrow and mean mentality that blindly worships one side as master and disdains the other as slave. Gu Xiancheng also thought that Zhu Xi’s introductory effort of investigating things and extending knowledge and the core of Yangming’s learning of extending innate moral knowing, if understood properly, could be connected together. The core tenet of the two men’s academic learning was not only not “incredibly difficult to fuse together,” as later scholars believed, but was even the same. He said: “Yangming’s ‘knowing’ is Master Zhu’s ‘things,’ and Master Zhu’s reason for investigating things is Yangming’s reason for extending knowing. In general they are the same, and the various commonalities and differences that exist can remain unspoken” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 7). Gu Xiancheng can be said to be someone who had a deep grasp of both Master Zhu Learning and Yangming Learning, and who perceived the commonalities within the differences between Master Zhu and Yangming from a macroscopic perspective. Yangming’s knowing is “innate moral knowing,” which, according to Yangming’s explanation in his later years, is “the awareness of inherent nature,” i.e. the self-awareness of Heaven-endowed good nature, the subject that knows good from bad and right from wrong, the ultimate foothold of which is moral reason. The “things” in Zhu Xi’s investigation of things in fact emphasized the Heavenly principle embodied in things, and his focus was thus also on morality. In Master Zhu’s investigation of things, the ultimate purpose was to attain Heavenly principle, to combine the mind and principle as one. In Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, regardless of whether this is the expansion of innate moral knowing internally or the extension of innate moral knowing externally, the ultimate purpose was always to attain Heavenly principle. Thus in terms of their ultimate purpose being to attain Heavenly principle, to use Heavenly principle to govern the human mind, the two men were the same. In terms of their approach to effort, namely Zhu Xi’s sincerity in one’s efforts to probe principles in things, and the emphasis on applying one’s efforts in concrete affairs found in Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, the two were also the same. Thus Gu Xiancheng’s attempt to connect together Zhu and Wang in fact praised the two as both ultimately returning to the cultivation of virtue, both emphasising the concrete cultivation and attainment of the subject, and this is an extremely important aspect of his thought. The significance of his connecting together Master Zhu and Yangming lies in its opposition to the later followers of Yangming who departed from the sincere and concrete effort of their master and solely toyed with a priori innate moral knowing. Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 noted this point very profoundly: The gentleman reflected deeply on the interests and pleasures of recent scholars, their rash endorsement of spontaneity, and hence he probed the origin of neither thinking nor striving and of affirming the immediate present, and found it to be whether one’s inherent nature and endowment had been thoroughly penetrated or not. Investigating their key juncture, he found it to be whether one’s spiritual plane had been reached or not. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 1379)

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Thoroughly penetrating one’s inherent nature and endowment and reaching one’s spiritual plane both mean one must make sincere efforts in moral cultivation. This was Gu Xiancheng’s fundamental intention in connecting together Zhu and Wang. Gu Xiancheng also thought that both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming were outstanding figures of their times, and that their academic learning was a great contribution to later ages. However, although their theories were originally thorough and detailed, if they were not used well, they could both become biased to one side and lead people onto a wrong path. He said: Master Zhu revealed the investigation of things, yet those who did not use it well fell into excessive caution; Yangming used innate moral knowing to break through this, making its concreteness more abstruse. Yangming revealed the extension of knowing, yet those who did not use it well fell into dissolution; Jianluo 见罗 [i.e. Li Cai 李材] used the cultivation of the self to restrain it, making its abstruseness more concrete. These were all great contributions to the teaching of their times. Yet their three accounts all originated and were based on the single chapter of the Great Learning [Daxue 大学]. Hence they can be used to enlighten each other, but cannot be used to reject each other; they can be used to remedy each other, but cannot be used to exclude each other. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 11)

Zhu Xi’s effort was practical and concrete, and it was difficult to skip over its steps. Regarding Zhu Xi’s theories as excessively cautious was the common view among wild and unrestrained people. Yangming’s “demonstration of the dao at Tianquan” regarded the fact that “realization of original substance is effort” as “establishing a teaching for people of a higher character,” and thus many loftier and brighter people cast aside concrete efforts and concentrated on methods for realising original substance. Li Cai’s learning of “stopping-cultivation” (zhixiu 止修) advocated stopping at the highest good through specific effort at cultivation, and thus was precisely able to remedy the “abstruseness” (xu 虚) of this kind of people. Gu Xiancheng believed that Zhu Xi’s investigation of things, Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, and Li Cai’s stopping-cultivation each developed one aspect of the Great Learning, and hence the three could be used to benefit each other but not to reject each other. Here we can see Gu Xiancheng’s painstaking effort to remedy abuses of learning through broad tolerance and inclusiveness. When Gu Xiancheng said here that for Zhu Xi’s investigation of things, those who did not use it well fell into excessive caution, while for Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, those who did not use it well fell into dissolution, he meant that Zhu Xi and Yangming themselves were neither excessively cautious nor dissolute. In his view, in Zhu Xi’s investigation of things, enlightenment was included in cultivation; in Yangming’s extension of knowing, cultivation was included in enlightenment. Both the two men affirmed cultivation and enlightenment, enlightenment and cultivation. For Gu Xiancheng, high-level effort meant attainment in both enlightenment and cultivation. Cultivation without enlightenment means one is bogged down in learning, with no awakened understanding of the fundamental principles of the cosmos and human life, and thus it is difficult to enter the lofty and illuminated realm. Enlightenment without cultivation means one is grand but useless, lacking a basis in concrete effort, and thus one’s enlightenment

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will inevitably become trapped in abstruse fantasy. He thought that Zhu Xi and Yangming attained in both enlightenment and cultivation. Zhu Xi’s path from investigating the principles of things to knowing Heavenly principle was enlightenment, while Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing into concrete affairs was cultivation. The two men’s learning originally had no shortcomings, but they were extended in a biased manner by their followers, and thus gave rise to mistakes. Although Gu Xiancheng equally emphasized cultivation and enlightenment, given the situation of the time with the great waves stirred up by the a priori rectified mind branch of the Wang [Yangming] school, he placed greater stress on cultivation. He said: Emphasising cultivation is the means to emphasize enlightenment. Enlightenment is never reached except through cultivation. Thus, was it not said: “Study the lower in order to penetrate the higher”? [see Analects, 14.35] Studying the lower is cultivation; penetrating the higher is enlightenment. There is nothing to be affirmed in casting aside study of the lower and speaking of penetrating the higher. (“Notes from Tiger Forest Academy” [Hulin shuyuan ji 虎林书院记], Hidden Manuscripts from Jing Riverbank, Vol. 11)

What Gu Xiancheng emphasized was that cultivation is the basis for enlightenment, so to stress cultivation is to stress enlightenment; to penetrate the higher, one must first study the lower, since studying the lower is precisely the means to penetrate the higher. Studying the lower means experiencing and examining affairs, while penetrating the higher means fusing and interconnecting affairs. Studying the lower in order to penetrate the higher is the orthodox transmission of the Confucian school. His explanation of the relation between “sincerity” (cheng 诚) and “achieving centrality without striving and attainment without thinking” demonstrates this point: Centrality in the Ordinary states: “One who is sincere achieves centrality without striving and attainment without thinking.” “Sincerity” is the main channel, while “attainment” [de 得] and “centrality” [zhong 中] are the collateral channels. If one does not order and grasp the main channel clearly, indulging desires without thought or striving, how can one force one’s attainment? If one does not check and investigate the details of the collateral channels, indulging one’s abilities without thought or striving, how can this be of any use? (“Notes from Tiger Forest Academy,” Hidden Manuscripts from Jing Riverbank, Vol. 11)

The main channel spoken of here refers to the foundation or effort, while the collateral channels are the results. Only with sincere efforts can there be the results of “centrality” and “attainment.” Not striving and not thinking are merely the form of expression for these results. Ordering and grasping the main channel emphasizes effort; checking and investigating the collateral channels means examining whether or not “centrality” and “attainment” have been put to good use. Here, Gu Xiancheng was still emphasising effort in concrete situations, emphasising that a foundation of effort is the condition for thorough enlightenment. His elaboration of “spontaneity” (ziran 自然) also contained this meaning: Mr. Baisha 白沙 [i.e. Chen Xianzhang 陈献章] regarded spontaneity as his core tenet, as did scholars of recent times, and the idea of neither thinking nor striving filled the realm. This cannot be said to be wrong, but one must recognize what is meant by spontaneity.

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Carrying out what Heavenly principle cannot but carry out and stopping where Heavenly principle cannot but stop is what is called spontaneity. ... Its having affairs is the means to having no affairs. This is the doctrine of spontaneity. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 13)

When Gu Xiancheng spoke of spontaneity, he meant the form of spiritual plane that is manifested when one passes through effort and attains from original substance. Attaining from original substance refers to attaining from Heavenly principle. Carrying out that which cannot but be carried out and stopping where one cannot but stop refers to the operative functioning of Heavenly principle according with the rhythms and cycles of things and affairs without forceful arrangement, and not to one’s thoughts and actions spontaneously according with the dao through relying on Heaven-endowed innate moral knowing without the exercise of effort. Because of this, the “a priori establishing the root” and “recognising the immediate present” of the Taizhou Longxi branch are precisely not spontaneous, since they lack the specific effort of doing the good and eradicating the bad. Since Gu Xiancheng regarded cultivation and studying the lower as his points of emphasis, so when he taught those who came to learn from him, he did not only teach them to attain enlightenment from recorded sayings, but also stressed the study of Classical Learning (jingxue 经学). In the “Donglin Association Regulations” he drew up for the Donglin Academy, Gu Xiancheng proposed three basic requirements for later scholars: first, know the root; second, determine your aspiration; third, respect the classics; and fourth, examine inflections. Although these four requirements were drawn up based on Zhu Xi’s “Academy Rules for White Deer Grotto Academy,” these explanations were aimed at malpractices in contemporary academic learning. The requirement to respect the classics in particular was aimed at the defect of scholars who, after hearing a few recorded sayings, began to speak of the abstruse and enlightenment, and to disdain Classical Learning. Gu Xiancheng said: What is meant by respect for the classics? The classics are the constant dao. When Confucius compiled the Six Classics, when Master Cheng compiled the Four Books, they were all aimed at illuminating the past and indicating the future, upholding the teachings of the era, awakening men’s minds, and leaving behind this constant dao for the realm. ... If scholars can sincerely embody each word and sentence they read, their minds divinely illuminating it and their bodies confirming it, they will progress more with each passing day and month, following it ceaselessly. Those with a high ability and broad understanding will certainly find something to curb their lofty qi 气, leading them to restrainedly think to put their heads down and get to work, and not become excessively dissolute; those who earnestly adhere to the rules will certainly find something to open up their limited and biased views, leading them to toweringly think to lift up their heads up in expectation, and not become trapped by the inessential. Is this not to probe principle and give full play to inherent nature, completing the partial without omission, such that worthy or foolish, lofty or lower, all abide by its benefits? If one is tired of its simple blandness, and instead produces novel oddities to appear transcendent, this is called stretching the truth. Or, if one is overawed by its upright severity, and twists its comprehensive texts to please oneself, this is called false dissemblance. Or again, if one follows along with the most prevalent writings, becoming habituated and ignorant of their significance, this is called toying with things. Or, if one is like playing a zither with its pegs glued, becoming mired and ignorant of its changes, this is called clinging to one side. Thus there are those who, following their

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minds on an empty stomach and contemptuous of all ages, see Zilu 子路 saying, “Why must one read books before one can be considered as learned?” [see Analects, 11.25], and follow him in chorus, saying “Why must one read books before one can be considered as learned?” They see Xiangshan 象山 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊] saying, “The Six Classics are commentaries on me, I am a commentary on the Six Classics,” and follow him in chorus, saying “The Six Classics are commentaries on me, I am a commentary on the Six Classics.” Alas! If these examinations are valid, then all the painstaking efforts of the great sage Confucius, the lifelong striving of the great Confucians Cheng [Yi] 程颐 and Zhu [Xi], all are cast to the east wind and finished. This being the case, what can be held onto and followed in our heritage of learning? Are heterodoxies and twisted theories, a profuse disorder of texts, to be taken up and affirmed as correct? What can be the result of this? (“Donglin Association Regulations”)

Here, Gu Xiancheng admonished malpractices in learning and advocated respect for the classics, his earnest and sincere sentiment overflowing from his words. His purpose was to revive the Confucian tradition of Classical Learning and sweep aside evils such as dissolution, obstinacy, stretching the truth, and false dissemblance, especially those of not reading books and empty and shallow learning. By the Ming Dynasty, Classical Learning was already in serious decline, with scholars squabbling over their understanding and interpretations, and refusing to really read the classics carefully. In Gu Xiancheng’s view, Classical Learning was the most important part of Confucianism and the basis for all learning, such that without Classical Learning, all learning lacks a firm foundation. In early Ming academic learning, “This side explicated Zhu, and that side also explicated Zhu,” and most of these explications of Zhu Xi focused on his theories of principle, qi, mind, and inherent nature, while his studies of the [Book of] Changes [Yijing 易经], the [Book of] Poetry [Shijing 诗经], the Spring and Autumn Annals [Chunqiu 春 秋], and the [Book of] Rites [Liji 礼记] all being set aside and neglected. With the rise of Wang Yangming in the middle Ming, the emphasis was on thought and argument, and Classical Learning declined even further. Among Yangming’s students, many did not read classical texts, works of the philosophical masters, or histories. “Not even glancing at restraining books, engaging in wandering discussions without roots” was a satirical description of Yangming’s later followers. Gu Xiancheng lived at a time when this trend was at its peak, and he wished to revive the ancient Confucianism that was based on Classical Learning and comprehended both the philosophical masters and the histories, and to supplement this with the upright academic ethos of economic studies. Therefore, respect for the classics was an important aspect of his academy regulations. This aspect indicates the academic scope of the students he wished to train. Since Gu Xiancheng respected the classics and revered practical learning, although he affirmed Yangming Learning’s function of broadening one’s mind and eliminating one’s fixations, he thought that Wang Yangming bore no small share of blame for the empty, shallow, wild, and dissolute ambiance among late Ming literati. He said:

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Master Yangming’s openness was in excess, and his restraint was insufficient. The literati of the time were shackled by exegetical glosses and phraseology, so when they suddenly heard the doctrine of innate moral knowing, their mind’s eyes were all at once awakened, and it was as if they had parted the cloud and mist and seen the bright sun; was this not a great joy? Yet as soon as this crack had been opened, chaos destroyed almost everything. They all too often relied on their abstruse views and toyed with spirits and ghosts, trusting in spontaneity and despising grand enterprise. This decline continues right down to the present, with debates becoming increasingly abstruse and customs increasingly degraded. The haughty become wanton and inconstant, while the lowly become obstinate and shameless. Benevolent and superior men look at each other and pace back and forth, sighing in exasperation, and think that its initiator was indeed dangerous and ought not to be considered without misgivings or overly cherished. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 3)

He also disagreed with Wang Yangming’s view of one’s own mind as the standard for judging right from wrong, pointing out that taking one’s own mind as the standard was Yangming’s strong point but also his mistake. The core tenets of Yangming’s learning such as “the extension of innate moral knowing,” “no principles outside the mind,” and “no things outside the mind” were all developed from taking one’s own mind as sovereign. In Yangming’s famous words, “If one seeks [the truth] in one’s mind and finds it, then even if the words are not from Confucius, one should not dare to regard them as wrong. If one seeks [the truth] in one’s mind and does not find it, then even if the words are from Confucius, one should not dare to regard them as right” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II), although this had a positive effect in terms of abolishing idols and raising subjective consciousness, it also required a precondition, namely that the ability of one’s mind to judge right from wrong and the right and wrong that are so judged are in general not mistaken. Otherwise, Yangming’s words here are nothing more than an excuse for the wild, unrestrained, and magniloquent. Gu Xiancheng believed that, although human nature is good and the human mind is rooted in Heavenly principle, people all face qi-constraints and material deterioration, so few are able to preserve and manifest this original mind. Thus Yangming’s words here are only applicable to sages. Ordinary people can guarantee neither that their own mind is not mingled up with badness, nor that the judgments their own mind makes have no error. He explained this point saying: Scholars are far indeed from sages, and it is appropriate that, in seeking it, some attain it while others do not. Hence what one should do is to concentrate one’s energies and ruminate upon this, emptying one’s heart in expectation, and even more to consult from those who are more enlightened, to verify it from ancient teachings, to retire and increase one’s cultivation, and to purify one’s mind and protect its profound quietude, such that its integrity is eventually equal to that of the sage. If having done this one still fails to attain it, but then calmly judges one’s rights and wrongs, it is not too late. If however one is unable to do this, and instead simply follows these two sentences from Yangming and gauges according to one’s breast, affirming as right whatever one attains and negating as wrong whatever one does not attain, then regardless of whether or not one’s words come from Confucius, one will not inquire about them. This propensity will inevitably result in the monopoly of the self and its purposes, relying only on intelligence and cunning, scorning all earlier sages, regarding the Six Classics as mere footnotes, discussing loudly and emptily, and never returning to fearful restraint; is this not to be misled indeed? (Hidden Manuscripts from Jing Riverbank, Vol. 2)

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When Gu Xiancheng pointed out Yangming mistakes, he precisely wished to use the Master Zhu’s learning to neutralize and correct Yangming, in order to lead the ethos of literati officials and scholars back to uprightness and integrity.

2 Distinctions Concerning “Neither Good Nor Bad” Although Gu Xiancheng found fault with Wang Yangming’s view of one’s own mind as the standard for judging right from wrong, he still praised its spirit for abolishing idols and raising subjective consciousness. What he most vehemently opposed was the phrase “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” in Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching. In his explanation of the “know the root” requirement from his “Donglin Association Regulations,” he discussed the falsity of “neither good nor bad” in detail, and he later engaged in a back-and-forth debate on this question with Guan Zhidao 管志道 (zi Dongming 东溟), a later follower of Taizhou 泰州 Learning. It can be said that discriminating the falsity of the idea of neither good nor bad was an extremely important aspect in Gu Xiancheng’s academic activities throughout his life, and words castigating the idea of neither good nor bad can be found throughout Notes from Careful Studio, Hidden Manuscripts from Jing Riverbank, and Speeches from Discussions. Indeed, his Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature specifically consists of discriminations concerning the idea of neither good nor bad. Why Gu Xiancheng devote so much effort to the question of the goodness or badness of inherent nature, debating it tirelessly all his life? This was because, in his view, the question of the goodness or badness of inherent nature is the anchor point of the Confucian doctrine, such that if the theory of the goodness of inherent nature is cast aside, all kinds of malpractice will emerge from within it. Gu Xiancheng pointed out: Master Yangming said: “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad; when the intention moves, there is good and bad; innate moral knowing is to know good from bad; the investigation of things is to do good and remove bad.” Is his expression not most precise? Why then does it seem to be not entirely without its shortcomings? Original substance and effort are originally united as one. Where there is already neither good nor bad, how is it necessary to do good and remove bad? Where one has already done good and removed the bad, how can it be neither good nor bad? In this case, are original substance and effort one, or two? Is this not self-contradictory? Thus if one extends the doctrine of neither good nor bad, the doctrine of doing good and removing bad must be withdrawn. If the doctrine of doing good and removing bad is withdrawn, then one will regard the order and distinctions of familial relations and righteousness as mere dregs, the intellectual discriminations and conduct of learning becoming mere fetters, and all those who disdain without serving inevitably being extended. Even if a sage was then to reappear, he could do nothing. Can the situation still be grasped and rectified? Yangming’s unveiling of innate moral knowing was truly sufficient to awaken people’s minds, all at once breaking with the vulgarity of customary learning, yet concerning this one phrase indicating his core tenet on inherent nature alone I was unable to suppress my mind and go along with it, repeatedly seeking to until I was finally unable to reconcile with and accept it, its abuses being so great. (“Donglin Association Regulations”)

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Gu Xiancheng’s meaning was that, since the substance of the mind is inherent nature, inherent nature is good. Inherent nature is original substance, and all effort must be applied to original substance, as well as emerge from original substance, otherwise effort will inevitably be external. Effort being external is the fundamental cause that leads to the phenomena of pettiness and hypocrisy. In Mencius’ doctrine of fully expressing one’s mind to recognize one’s inherent nature [see Mencius, 7A.1], its precondition is that inherent nature is good. If the a priori substance of the mind has no good or bad to speak of, where can the a posteriori effort to do good and remove bad be applied? The effort to do good and remove bad is nothing but a nurturing expansion and conserving accumulation of the a priori good. The doctrine of the goodness of inherent nature is the logical starting point for his theory of the unity of original substance and effort. Thus the first item in his “Donglin Association Regulations” is to know the root, and to know the root is “to recognize inherent nature” (shixing 识性), and to recognize inherent nature is to recognize it as good. In his discriminations concerning the goodness of inherent nature, Gu Xiancheng emphasized refuting the theoretical error of the doctrine that inherent nature is neither good nor bad, as well as the negative consequences it produced. When Gu Xiancheng set down the refutation of inherent nature being neither good nor bad in his “Donglin Association Regulations,” he treated this question as an important aspect of the thought and theory of the Donglin School. He proposed that if one trusted and followed the doctrine of neither good nor bad, then the effort of doing good and removing bad would be superfluous; if the effort of doing good and removing bad was superfluous, then both the great root for attaining the dao spoken of in Centrality in the Ordinary and the intellectual discriminations and conduct of learning spoken of in the Great Learning would be useless. If these concrete sites for the effort of cultivation were cast aside, then it would inevitably be hard to avoid denigrating ritual propriety and law and disdaining the affairs of sages and worthy men. At the same time, since Buddhism regards neither good nor bad as the original state of things, and Daoism regards “non-being” as its highest concept, so to advocate neither good nor bad is precisely a way to extend the doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism. Gu Xiancheng said: The four words “neither good nor bad” gained acceptance by lofty, carefree people above and clever, cunning people below, and it was only those in the middle who could not accept it, yet these people were the fewest. That is to say, wild and unrestrained people used neither good nor bad as an excuse to increase their wild and unrestrained conduct, while opportunistic and cunning people used it as an excuse to increase their unscrupulous behaviour. Gu Xiancheng defined good as “the essence of Heavenly principle,” and bad as “human desires acting as the master.” Where there is no good there is bad, and where there is no bad there is good, so human nature cannot possibly be both not good and not bad. Gu Xiancheng further pointed out that the negative “wu 无” [lit. non-being, nothingness, absence] in “neither good nor bad” (wu shan wu e 无善无恶) has two modes: one in which it is non-being as separated from being [you 有], and one in which it is non-being together with being. When non-being is separated from being, being and non-being are relative, and are sharply divided in two. When non-being is

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separated from being, non-being is an absolute and empty nothing, and non-being is original substance. If non-being is separated from being, then the good is being, it is an objective form that is not worth valuing, and thus this opens up a mystical approach. If non-being is together with being, then being and non-being are one, there is no difference between being and non-being, and thus bad will be regarded as good, opening up a crafty approach. The harm of the mystical approach lies in abstruseness and impracticality, slipping into discussions of the abstruse and emptiness. The crafty approach is self-seeking, obliterating good and bad, and slipping into obstinate shamelessness. Hence the theory of neither good nor bad cannot easily be established, as Gu Xiancheng argued saying: The doctrine of the goodness of inherent nature only aims to do away with the word “bad,” while the doctrine of neither good nor bad also aims to do away with the word “good,” yet it says “when there is neither good nor bad, this is the highest good,” and thus in the end is unable to do away with the word “good.” By simply adding this extra turn, it indeed falls into mere opinion and chatter. Hence those of an outstanding character use this to come up with unlimited peculiarities, magnifying their status, while those of a slippery character use this to come up with unlimited convenient means, bursting open all barriers. At first glance I regarded “neither good nor bad” as a most penetrating phrase, yet now I know it to be a most dangerous phrase. (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Culpable Words” [Zuiyan 罪言], Pt. I)

That is to say, the goodness of inherent nature is the foundation of Confucian philosophy, so as soon as the word “good” is done away with, effort and original substance are unconnected, leading the lofty to slip into empty abstruseness and fall into opinion and chatter, and the base to slip into stubborn obstinacy and fall into abolishing all regulations and rules. Since these all contain the danger of departing from Confucian self-cultivation in establishing the root, he said that neither good nor bad is a “most dangerous phrase.” Gu Xiancheng also said: If one says there is no good, then there is bad, yet they also say there is no bad; if one says there is no bad, then there is good, yet they also say there is no good. Merely in these two turns, there are so many twists, so many connotations, everything is enveloped and bundled up, masquerading and patching up mistakes, fleeing and avoiding being trapped with shifting concessions and defensive evasions; is there anything that cannot be stirred up by this? Master Yangming said, “When there is neither good nor bad, this is the highest good,” yet if one probes this to the limit of its abuses, were one to say, “When there is neither good nor bad, this is the highest bad,” it would be equally appropriate. (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Culpable Words,” Pt. I)

Here, Gu Xiancheng extended the idea of neither good nor bad to the inverse side of autonomous morality in order to expound its abuses. His purpose was to show how the goodness of inherent nature is the basis upon which autonomous morality depends for its establishment. Without this basis, there can be no autonomous morality. For morality to be morality, it must be based on some kind of a priori principle, and not on a posteriori experience. If one denies such a principle, the purity of the good along with its diametric opposition from the bad will be lost, and measures such as enveloping, bundling up, masquerading, and patching up

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mistakes will take advantage of this for their own benefit. For the Confucian cultivation of character, this is a blasphemy. When Gu Xiancheng repeatedly debated the error of “neither good nor bad,” his focus lay on this. Gu Xiancheng analysed representative theories of inherent nature from history, saying: “That is neither good nor not good is the recognising spirit, not inherent nature. That which is either good or not good is qi-endowment, not inherent nature. That which can do good or not do good is habitual contamination, not inherent nature” (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Culpable Words,” Pt. II). His meaning was that that which is neither good nor bad is not inherent nature, but rather the human cognitive faculty. This takes the green, yellow, blue or white of things and sees it as green, yellow, blue or white, or takes the squareness, roundness, shortness or length of things and sees it as square, round, short or long, and has no fixed unchanging quality of its own, being thus unable to add anything to the object of its functioning. That some people are good while others are bad is due to differences in the purity or turbidity and thickness or thinness of the qi that they are endowed with, which leads to hardness or softness and slowness or urgency, which can all become good or bad. “That which can do good or not do good” refers to people’s a posteriori plasticity, with differences in people’s habituated contamination leading to good or bad results. Gu Xiancheng believed that, strictly speaking, all the above cannot be called inherent nature. Inherent nature refers to the fundamental quality that makes humans human, an a priori standard that differentiates humanity from other living species. For him, this is the goodness of inherent nature. This goodness is different from a posteriori specific goods, since it is an a priori logical stipulation. When Gu Xiancheng stipulated that human nature is a priori, he thereby elevated the severity of moral autonomy, completely excluding all specific a posteriori empirical goods from the stipulation of the fundamental quality of humanity, to prevent them from mingling with and corrupting the fundamental standard that makes humans human. On this basis, Gu Xiancheng vehemently opposed Wang Yangming’s statement that “In the quietude of principle there is neither good nor bad, while in the activity of qi there is both good and bad.” He said: Master Yangming said: “In the quietude of principle there is neither good nor bad, while in the activity of qi there is both good and bad. Where principle is followed, there is good, and where qi is active, there is bad.” This is to regard being and non-being as good and bad. He also said: “That sages are neither good nor bad means simply that they do not deliberately do anything good nor anything bad.” This is also to regard likes and dislikes as good and bad. To regard being and non-being as good and bad seems like a deeper level, while to regard likes and dislikes as good and bad seems like a more shallow level, yet neither of these in fact says anything relevant to the original state of good and bad. (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Culpable Words,” Pt. I)

Here, “the quietude of principle” and “the activity of qi” are principle’s forms of expression, and not value judgments concerning inherent nature itself. The “good” and “bad” in “Where principle is followed, there is good, and where qi is active, there is bad” are judgments concerning the direction of a posteriori actions, and not

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a priori standards possessed originally. “They do not deliberately do anything good nor anything bad” means that intentions do not arise, and not that this is “the original state of good and bad.” Using being and non-being to discuss good and bad leads people into theoretical explorations of being and non-being or good and bad, into the empty abstruseness of the lofty mentioned above, hence he said this “seems like a deeper level.” Regarding likes and dislikes as good and bad cancels the a priori and severe characteristics of inherent nature, replacing them with the ephemeral arising and extinguishing of intention, and can thus give rise to the “stubborn obstinacy of the base” spoken of above, hence he said this “seems like a more shallow level.” From this, it can be seen that Gu Xiancheng believed “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” to be fundamentally wrong, and, unlike the disciples of the Wang school, did not attempt to shield and obstruct in order to demonstrate that the doctrines of “neither good nor bad” and “the goodness of inherent nature” were not contradictory. For example, Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi both thought that the first sentence of Wang Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching meant that in the mind there were originally no good or bad thoughts, and not that inherent nature itself was neither good nor bad. That the highest good is the original substance of the mind “was Yangming’s final word.” Although what Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi expressed was indeed Yangming’s original meaning, Gu Xiancheng thought that later scholars in Yangming’s lineage did not understand his Four-Sentence Teaching in this way, and thus gave rise to all kinds of malpractice. When he criticized Yangming’s sentence “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” he was in fact criticising the “original meaning of Yangming” that later scholars in the Yangming lineage relied upon. The empty abstruseness of the lofty and the stubborn obstinacy of the base that he repeatedly denounced were the two main errors of Yangming’s disciples, and through his criticisms of these errors he traced them back to Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching. Gu Xiancheng also entered into a debate with the later Taizhou Learning scholar Guan Dongming concerning the relationships between the unified, holistic good and distributed, differentiated goods, and between the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极) and non-polarity (wuji 无极). This debate was also connected to “neither good nor bad.” Guan Dongming distinguished between the good as a unified, holistic good and distributed, differentiated goods. The unified, holistic good refers to the general or collective good, and thus is also the “highest good” (zhishan 至善), while distributed, differentiated goods refer to specific moral norms, such as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Guan Dongming thought that the unified, holistic good differs from distributed, differentiated goods, and that the two are not interconnected. The substance of the mind is the highest good, the unified, holistic good, and cannot contain any specific good or bad. Hence “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” is tenable. Gu Xiancheng however used Zhu Xi’s view that “principle is one, while its particularizations are diverse” (li yi fen shu 理一分殊) to explain the relationship between the two, believing that the unified, holistic good is the distributed, differentiated goods. “Good” is a general name, which must include names of its diverse particularizations such as

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benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, such that without benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, there is no highest good, and the highest good is expressed within diverse particularized goods such as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not divisions of the highest good, but rather are each respectively the totality of the good. He used the sentence “Great virtue is like mighty transformation, lesser virtue is like flowing rivers” from Centrality in the Ordinary to demonstrate the relationship between the unified, holistic good and distributed, differentiated goods: “One refers to its unified whole, the so-called great virtue of mighty transformation; the other refers to its distributed differentiations, the so-called lesser virtue of flowing rivers. Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom constitute a list of four names, and thus belong to distributed differentiations… yet the unified, holistic good is the distributed, differentiated goods, without the slightest surplus; the distributed, differentiated goods are the unified, holistic good, without the slightest deficiency. Now, to regard them as distributed differentiations and not to attain their parity with the holistic unity, and thus to distinguish and name them, already betrays a slight excess of analysis” (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Questions and Doubts” [Zhiyi 质疑], Pt. II). The purpose of Gu Xiancheng’s debate with Guan Dongming concerning the unified, holistic good and distributed, differentiated goods was still to demonstrate that Wang Yangming’s sentence “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” is incorrect. He once noted this point in his account of the critical point of his divergence from Yangming: The good I speak of is the goodness of original substance, while the good without goodness spoken of by Yangming is the goodness of particular names and forms. His analysis is indeed precise. However, where does the goodness of names and forms finally come from? If it comes from outside of inherent nature, then everything comes from arrangement and artificiality, and is not worthy of being called good. If it comes from within inherent nature, then everything is already present in my mind, and cannot be called non-being. Centrality in the Ordinary states: “The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality; when they are aroused and attain centrality and integrity, this is called harmony.” Centrality is the goodness of inherent nature; harmony is the goodness of particular names and forms. Overall, there is only one. (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Culpable Words,” Pt. I)

Here, Gu Xiancheng thought that original substance is inherent nature, and that the goodness of original substance is the goodness of inherent nature; specific goods do not come from outside, but are rather expressions of this collective good; the centrality before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is the goodness of original substance, and the harmony when they are aroused and attain centrality and integrity is the specific goods; the centrality before arousal is inherent nature, and the centrality and integrity when they are aroused is the “appropriateness” (yi 宜) of inherent nature under specific spatio-temporal conditions. His purposes remained to demonstrate that the substance of the mind included an original goodness, and that “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” is untenable.

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When Gu Xiancheng opposed the view that “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” his intention was to extend moral cultivation to the original substance of the mind, i.e. to inherent nature, and not to establish its foundation on thoughts that develop a posteriori. He once said: Scholars study in order to seek the full expression of their minds. Since the mind originally has good and no bad, when the sages and worthies taught people, they only said to do good and remove bad. To do good, one follows that which is there and makes it present, while to remove bad, one follows that which is not there and removes it. Original substance is like this, and effort is like this, so they simply result in unity. Now when people speak of the mind as neither good nor bad, and speak of the investigation of things as doing good and removing bad, they seemingly already cannot avoid distinguishing them as two different things. If one says that intentions are good and bad, then this means to do good and remove bad. However, to check one’s intentions once again means to cast aside the source and seek its course. Furthermore, if one’s emphasis is on the “four withouts” [siwu 四无; see below and Ch. 7 above], then one will neglect the “four withs” [siyou 四有], and finally will also be unable to resist their running side by side. (Compilation of Arguments Concerning Inherent Nature, “Questions and Doubts,” Pt. II)

To do good and remove bad, one must establish one’s basis on the substance of inherent nature that is originally possessed a priori, i.e. one must regard the goodness of inherent nature as one’s starting point. Thus to do good is to follow that which is originally present in inherent nature and expand it, while to remove bad is to follow that which is originally absent in inherent nature and remove it. If one establishes one’s basis on the substance of inherent nature in this way, then original substance and effort do not go beyond the single term “inherent nature.” If one discusses the mind as neither good nor bad, then the effort to do good and remove bad and the a priori original substance are divided into two. If one then does good and removes bad based on thoughts that arise a posteriori, one faces the danger of casting aside the source and seeking its course. Whether to apply effort to the a priori or to the a posteriori was the focus of the debate between Nie Bao of Jiangyou and Wang Longxi of Zhezhong 浙中. Wang Longxi’s learning of the a priori rectified mind was established based on the a priori originally rectified substance of the mind, with effort consisting in setting aside the myriad causes, severing a posteriori adulteration and contamination of the a priori, and relying on the flowing operation of the a priori originally rectified substance of the mind. Although Nie Bao and others accepted a priori innate moral knowing, they thought that it could not avoid becoming mixed up with qi-endowment and material desires, and thus requires the effort of absorption and accumulation before it can be relied upon. Hence scholars from Jiangyou all stressed the a posteriori effort of making one’s intentions sincere. Gu Xiancheng reconciled Longxi and Jiangyou, emphasising that one must establish the basis on the a priori root, and that to do good and remove bad in thought is already to fall behind. However, Gu Xiancheng also opposed the idea that “the realization of original substance is effort,” advocating doing good and removing bad in concrete occasions, and that doing good and removing bad must be applied to a priori inherent nature. Hence although Gu Xiancheng opposed both the “four withouts” and also the “four withs,”

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he especially opposed the “four withouts.” He in fact advocated using the specificity of Master Zhu Learning to supplement the generality of Yangming Learning, and using the latter’s direct reference to the source of the mind to supplement the former’s division of mind and inherent nature into two. His view of the mind thus embodied his aim of reconciling the a priori rectified mind with making intentions sincere a posteriori: Although the single mind of humans is entirely Heavenly principle, affirming the real rights of the world and negating the real wrongs of the world, how many are there who can completely express it? There are only the sages. From them downward, it is either biased or mixed up, whereupon each simply affirms their own rightness. If one wishes to attain their reality one by one, I think this would be most difficult. (“Letter to Master Li Jianluo [i.e. Li Cai]” [Yu Li Jianluo xiansheng shu 与李见罗先生书], Hidden Manuscripts from Jing Riverbank, Vol. 2)

If one accepts that the mind is entirely Heavenly principle, then the affirmations and negations in the mind, if not contaminated by selfish desires, correspond to real rights and wrongs. This shows that he accepted Yangming’s view that “the mind is principle,” and that the affirmations and negations of innate moral knowing correspond to real rights and wrongs. However, he emphasized that one must use the effort of investigating things in concrete situations from Zhu Learning to supplement Yangming: people’s actual minds inevitably contain bias and admixture, so it is difficult to attain the reality of original substance, and they must use effort in concrete situations to remove the bad and restore the good. When Gu Xiancheng said “Master Zhu’s investigation of things and Yangming’s extension of knowing can each be set up as separate tenets. If one is discussing the original import of the Great Learning, they did not exhaust its conjunction” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 14), he meant to point out that neither of the two exhausted the full meaning of effort, and to advocate that they be used to supplement one another. Gu Xiancheng’s opposition to the view that “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” also implied a corresponding opposition to Buddhism. Although in his youth Gu Xiancheng liked to speak of Chan 禅 Buddhism, his view of Chan later changed greatly, passing from liking to speak of it, through being tired of speaking of it, to feeling ashamed and fearing to speak of it. What he tired of was how it enjoyed stirring up discord, along with its paucity of concrete regulations; what he felt ashamed of was that, as a firm believer in Confucianism, he should share the company of Chan Buddhists; what he feared was that “neither good nor bad” would fill the realm, and that literati scholars would compete to speak of Chan and cast aside Confucianism. Furthermore, Gu Xiancheng’s opposition to Buddhism was also based on Buddhists’ firm belief in neither good nor bad. He thought that, although Confucianism also included discussions of non-being or absence (wu 无), such as in its accounts of the soundless and scentless, and of the centrality before arousal of the mind, the Confucian wu was completely different from the “neither good nor bad” of the Buddhists. When Confucians speak of “emptiness” (kong 空), this is a form of expression of concrete principle, and, although principle has no sound or scent to be found, “there is nothing in the world

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more concrete than principle.” When Buddhists speak of emptiness, they seek an absolute form of empty quietude, such that original substance and effort are both nothing. Or, for example, when Buddhists say, “When one thinks of neither good nor bad, one recognizes the original state of things,” and Centrality in the Ordinary speaks of “the state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused,” the two seem the same but are in fact different. The centrality spoken of in Centrality in the Ordinary is inherent nature and is good, while the Buddhists’ state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is emptiness, and the two cannot be confused. The Buddhist “neither good nor bad” despises and casts aside dao and law, yet dao and law absolutely cannot be regarded as nothing. Dao is the basis for the cardinal guides and constant virtues in ethics, as in the statement, “The order of Heaven has its ceremonies, the hierarchy of Heaven has its rituals” [from “Counsels of Gao Yao” (Gao Yao mo 皋陶谟), Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书)]. Law is a powerful instrument for governing the world, and the basis for demotion and promotion or bestowing and depriving. If dao and law are swept aside and destroyed with nothing remaining, the world would be overturned into chaos, and would no longer be the world. Thus the Buddhists’ “neither good nor bad” is absolutely unacceptable. Gu Xiancheng also opposed Gaozi 告子 for holding that human nature is neither good nor bad. He said: When the sages and worthies of the past discussed inherent nature, they spoke of “the innermost feelings of the Lord” [Di zhong 帝衷; see “Announcement of Tang” (Tang gao 汤诰), Book of Documents], “the cardinal principles of the people” [minyi 民彝; see “Announcement to the Prince of Kang” (Kang gao 康诰), Book of Documents], “the regularities of things” [wuze 物则; see “Zheng Min” 烝民, Book of Poetry], “sincerity,” and “centrality and harmony,” which always meant simply one goodness, yet Gaozi said that “Inherent nature is neither good nor not good” [see Mencius, 6A.6]. This is equivalent to smashing apart the word “good.” When the sages and worthies of the past discussed learning, some spoke in terms of ability, and they always meant seeking from the mind; others spoke in terms of its effect, and they always meant seeking from qi. Yet Gaozi said that “What is not attained in words should not be sought in the mind; what is not attained in the mind should not be sought in qi” [see Mencius, 2A.2], which is equivalent to smashing apart the word “seek.” If one smashes apart the word “good,” original substance is merely emptiness, and if one smashes apart the word “seek,” effort is merely emptiness. Hence I say: Gaozi is a Chan Buddhist. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 3)

Here, the two sentences “What is not attained in words should not be sought in the mind” can be given different explanations. Nonetheless, Gu Xiancheng’s intention to denounce Gaozi is very clear. Confucians regard the goodness of inherent nature as the starting point. The goodness of inherent nature for Confucians finds its basis in the dao of Heaven. “The cardinal principles of the people,” “the regularities of things,” “sincerity,” “centrality and harmony,” etc. are all different expressions of this dao. The Confucian effort of cultivation is in fact a single word, namely “seek” (qiu 求): to seek to remove feelings and revive inherent nature, to seek to unify with the original substance of the mind, goals which both cannot be achieved by “neither good nor bad.” Gaozi’s view of inherent nature as neither good nor bad negates the

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content of “inherent nature” and the process of “seeking,” reducing both original substance and effort to nothing. The mistake in Gaozi’s doctrine is thus the same as that in Chan Buddhism. Gu Xiancheng’s opposition to Chan Buddhism and Gaozi was directed at their common doctrine of “neither good nor bad,” and was aimed at defending the theoretical basis of Confucianism: the doctrine of the goodness of inherent nature. His purpose in advocating the doctrine of the goodness of inherent nature also lay in upholding the orthodox teaching and rescuing the human mind. A passage by Gu Xiancheng stated this very earnestly: If one regards the original substance of the mind as neither good nor bad, it immediately becomes emptiness; if one regards neither good nor bad as simply the mind not being attached to being, it eventually becomes chaos. Emptiness is liberation from everything with no further concerns, which the lofty and bright enter into with joy, and thereby end up saying things like: benevolence and righteousness are fetters, ritual propriety and laws are dregs, everyday usages are co-dependent dust, managing affairs is grasping attachment, reflecting on oneself as one’s situation changes is chasing after circumstances, disputing regrets and shifting alterations are the cycle of wandering existence, studying the lower in order to penetrate the higher is falling into rigid steps, and honed integrity, tempered conduct and fearless independence are acting impulsively. Chaos is everything being vague with no need for further selection, which those of perfect integration tend toward out of convenience, and thereby end up saying things like: indulging one’s feelings is expressing inherent nature, going along with vulgar custom and following falsity is centrality in the common, covertly flattering the world is regarding the myriad things as one body, compromising the major to benefit the minor is sacrificing oneself to benefit the realm, reluctantly conceding is finding nothing acceptable or unacceptable, wild unrestraint is not being fond of reputation, seeking temporary avoidance when faced with difficulties is the sage having no place of death, and obstinate shamelessness is the dispassionate mind. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 18)

This was in fact Gu Xiancheng’s criticism of the contemporary literati ethos and the mood of the age. He believed that this debased atmosphere had a significant connection with the phrase “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad,” and thus vehemently denounced the doctrine of “neither good nor bad,” and advocated the restoration of the Confucian tenet of the goodness of inherent nature. This was the intention behind his devotion of such attention to theories of mind and inherent nature.

3 Being Careful—Respect In his distinctions concerning “neither good nor bad,” Gu Xiancheng focussed on the original substance of the mind, and the effort he advocated lay in the two words “being careful” (xiaoxin 小心). “Being careful” was in fact simply another way of saying “respect” (jing 敬). Gu Xiancheng believed that the entirety of the Confucian effort at cultivation could be encapsulated in the two words “being careful,” and that the essential meaning of the effort at cultivation of the Confucian sage lay in “being careful.” He

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said: “The mind not overstepping its bounds [see Analects, 2.4] was Confucius’ being careful; the mind not going against benevolence was Master Yan [Hui]’s 颜回 being careful. In speaking of original substance, there is only the words ‘goodness of inherent nature’; in speaking of effort, there is only the words ‘being careful’” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 18). In his view, the original substance of the goodness of inherent nature must be supplemented with the effort of “being careful.” The good of the goodness of inherent nature is not complete and perfect at birth, but rather simply exists as an inkling of goodness; this inkling of goodness must be cultivated from “a fire beginning to burn, a spring beginning to flow” to reach a state of “a broad and deep wellspring.” In the whole of this process of cultivation, “being careful” must be applied continually. Gu Xiancheng’s distinctions concerning “neither good nor bad” were meant to establish the basis for his effort of cultivation, and once this basis is established, it must be continued through the effort of “being careful.” Speaking from the situation of contemporary academic spheres, emphasising the necessity of effort took priority over emphasising original substance. He said: People all too often like to uphold original substance, and when it comes to speaking of effort, they view it as secondary in significance. In his time, Confucius only depended on effort. ... However, what Confucius meant by effort was precisely original substance, while what people mean by original substance is a mere prospect for the loftiest, a mere impression for the lower, and a mere talking point for the lowest. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 15)

Effort is simply original substance, its development and completion. Original substance is a kind of latent existence, and must rely on effort in being realized. In this sense, effort is the life of original substance; it is original substance. If there is only original substance and no effort, then those with a talent for imagination simply entertain a prospect, those with a talent for experience simply indulge their impressions, and those with a talent for explication simply make it an empty talking point. Here, although Gu Xiancheng did not explicitly state that “there is no original substance in the mind; whatever effort attains is its original substance,” he already implied this meaning. From this, we can see that the Donglin School led by Gu Xiancheng and the Jishan 蕺山 School represented by Liu Zongzhou had a point in common, namely that they both perceived the abuses brought about by the a priori innate moral knowing of Wang [Yangming] Learning with its neglect of effort and sole reliance on original substance, and both took up the task of turning back the rising tide of decadence. The direction their rectification took was an emphasis on effort. When Gu Xiancheng named his study “Careful Studio,” it implied this intention: Someone asked: “When you named your study ‘Careful,’ you must have had your reasons. In your letters you never once mentioned these two words. Now they appear here, I cannot but have some doubts, and would request an explanation.” I said: “Although I never explicitly raised them by name, I have spoken of nothing but these two words, as you will appreciate if you reflect on them. ... When the [Book of] Poetry said: ‘Carefully and cautiously, he [i.e. King Wen 文王] served the Lord on High with utmost clarity’ [see

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‘Greater Odes’ (Daya 大雅), ‘Da Ming’ 大明], this is what was meant.” Someone said: “‘Being careful’ is a kind of respect. When Master Cheng spoke of respect, he said ‘Hold fast to unity with no digression’; when Xie Shangcai 谢上蔡 [i.e. Xie Liangzuo 谢良佐] spoke of respect, he said ‘Maintain constant clarity,’ and when Yin Hejing 尹和靖 spoke of respect, he said ‘One’s mind is restrained, and does not contain a single thing.’ It seems they spoke of it with more refinement.” I said: “They never exceeded the two words ‘being careful.’ What is there in these two words that is not refined?” Someone said: “Among today’s Confucians there are many who act brazenly, and proposing these two words is exactly the remedy for this disease.” I said: “This is a grain of panacea among the various herbs, and regardless of whether one is diseased or not, one cannot do without it. What is necessary today is to apply it as a practical remedy, and not simply to make from it a fine prescription.” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 12)

Gu Xiancheng believed that his two words “being careful” exhaustively encompassed the effort of Confucians from ancient times to the present. The essentials of effort from the followers of the Cheng brothers did not exceed the single word “respect.” Respect is “being careful.” The two words “being careful” were aimed exactly at dealing with people who “go ahead brazenly.” Gu Xiancheng was here clearly referring to the Longxi branch from Taizhou. Gu Xiancheng once said: “Luo Jinxi 罗近溪 [i.e. Luo Rufang] regarded Yan Shannong 颜山农 as a sage, Yang Fusuo 杨复所 regarded Luo Jinxi as a sage, and Li Zhuowu 李卓吾 [i.e. Li Zhi 李贽] regarded He Xinyin 何心隐 as a sage” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 14). He also said: “[Su] Dongpo 苏东坡 [i.e. Su Shi 苏轼] mocked Yichuan 伊 川 [i.e. Cheng Yi], saying: ‘When will you break away from the word “respect”?’ I would suggest that in recent times those such as the Yan [Shannong]He [Xinyin] branch under Wang of Taizhou [i.e. Wang Gen 王艮] have directly broken away from the word ‘respect’” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 9). When Gu Xiancheng discussed brazen and unscrupulous people, he generally referred to Yan and He, and this point was taken up by Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi. When Huang Zongxi in his Case Studies of Ming Confucians said of Yan and He that “the Teaching of Names was completely unable to restrain or hold them,” that [they were as decadent as] “putrid fish and rotten meat,” etc., he was taking up the words of Gu Xiancheng. Gu Xiancheng’s two words “being careful” covered a broad range of meanings, with Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 “stillness without desire” and the Cheng branch’s sitting in stillness all being comprised within it. He once directed beginner students, saying: When fellow students meet, they often discuss the initial effort for beginners, which is indeed a vital matter. However, it is also difficult to give fixed direction on this point, since if one does so the remedy all too often causes more disease, hence one must enter into upright stability from the base of inherent nature. If I must, I would offer two suggestions: one is when Zhou Yuangong 周元公 [i.e. Zhou Dunyi] led Master Cheng to seek that in which Confucius and Yan [Hui] found joy, the other is when those under Yang Guishan 杨 龟山 [i.e. Yang Shi 杨时] handed down the teaching to enable people to sit in stillness and perceive the state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 8)

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“From the base of inherent nature” is the direction, while the effort of Zhou and Cheng is the beginner’s introduction, and the latter, in his view, does not exceed the single word “respect.” Gu Xiancheng especially praised Zhou Dunyi’s “holding to stillness” (zhujing 主静), saying: “Master Zhou’s stillness comes from the non-polarity, and is an eventual matter. The sitting in stillness that Master Cheng liked people to engage in, on the other hand, is a beginner’s matter for starting work” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 9). He distinguished holding to stillness and sitting in stillness: holding to stillness means seeking to accord with original substance, and is a direction for effort; sitting in stillness means seeking to quieten the fixed concerns of the mind, and is a kind of specific method for cultivation. Holding to stillness is a matter for satisfied learners to settle themselves and pursue their work, while sitting in stillness is a matter for beginner learners to adjust their bodies and minds. The two thus cannot be spoken of together. However, they have a certain point of correspondence, namely regarding stillness as the foundation, and emphasising the state before arousal. At the same time as affirming the Cheng brothers’ view of sitting in stillness as good learning and Li Dong’s 李侗 view of perceiving the state before arousal, Gu Xiancheng particularly raised Zhu Xi’s view of illuminated principle as stillness, and once said: “Whenever Master Cheng saw people sitting in stillness, he sighed at it as good learning, while Luo Yuzhang 罗豫章 [i.e. Luo Congyan 罗从彦] taught Li Yanping 李延平 [i.e. Li Dong] to perceive in stillness the state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused. Yet Master Zhu also said: ‘When one has simply comprehended the principle of dao with lucidity, there will spontaneously be stillness, and one cannot then demand to sit in stillness.’ The three are all reasonable, and one must consult them together before one can begin to make progress” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 1). In his view, the three aspects of sitting in stillness, experiencing the state before arousal in stillness, and comprehending the principle of dao with lucidity are all necessary. Sitting in stillness can make the body and mind calm, and is a method of mutual body-mind cultivation that belongs to the relatively low level of effort. Experiencing the state before arousal in stillness can extinguish arbitrary sentiments and unite with the original substance of the mind, and is a relatively higher level of effort. Comprehending the principle of dao is an intuition of the fundamental principle of the cosmos, a matter of understanding inherent nature and realising endowment, and thus incorporates the two former methods of seeking stillness, and is an even higher level of effort. Gu Xiancheng advocated consulting the three together, i.e. the coexistence of the three, with each having its place for application. However, his emphasis was on comprehending the principle of dao, especially for people with a relatively high level of theoretical cultivation. In Gu Xiancheng’s “being careful,” the most important point was to be without desire (wuyu 无欲). He said: I have long thought that the two words “without desire” are most excellent. Without desire there is emptiness, and with emptiness there is no obstruction. Without desire there is purity, and with purity there is no disarray. Without desire there is firmness, and with firmness there is no submission. Without desire there is simplicity, and with simplicity there is no weariness. Without desire there is stillness, and with stillness there is no disturbance. Without desire there is loftiness, and with loftiness there is no vulgarity. (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 13)

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Here, Gu Xiancheng’s explanations of being without desire blend together the views of Zhang Zai, Zhou Dunyi and the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), and can be said to be the requirements for the spiritual plane of the subject who “takes care,” the purpose of which is to prevent desire from harming the original mind and maintain the expression of original substance into flowing operation. Since he wished to rectify the abuses brought about by the idea of “neither good nor bad,” Gu Xiancheng expended a great deal of effort in distinguishing the goodness and badness of inherent nature. His guiding principle of “being careful” was a continuation of Cheng and Zhu’s view of respect, and a correction of the disregard for effort and “going ahead brazenly” of the pre-formed innate moral knowing branch of Wang Learning. He was a precursor of those who advocated returning to Cheng-Zhu Learning after the abuses of Wang Learning had become a general trend. Later, Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi arose to rectify the bias of Wang Learning, and they were both influenced by Gu Xiancheng. Qing Dynasty Confucians’ returning to Zhu from Wang together with their emphasis on practical learning can both be traced back to Gu Xiancheng. However, in terms both of the scope of his academic learning and of the breadth and depth of his theories, he was no match for Liu Zongzhou, and a systematic summary of Wang Learning would have to wait for Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi as the rearguards of Ming Dynasty Confucianism. Finally, it should be mentioned that the Donglin School founded by Gu Xiancheng was a political-academic force that exerted a very great influence on late Ming politics. Gu Xiancheng was not an academic in an ivory tower, but hoped to influence politics through his lecturing and to control public opinion through his political criticism, and thereby to realize his aspiration of saving the country. He once said: “When officials are at the carriage’s hub, their thoughts are not on their ruler and father; when they are in the frontier lands, their thoughts are not on the common people; as for those in the rivers and forests, they gather in groups and lecture to one another on inherent nature and endowment, mutually polishing their virtue and righteousness, yet their thoughts are not on the worldly dao, and thus even where they possess other merits, the superior man would not deign to mention them” (Notes from Careful Studio, Vol. 11). As an official, one must report to the state above and take care of the common people below; in lecturing, one must cultivate a sense of morality, justice, and the urgency of aiding the people. Through his advocacy, the Donglin Academy “also frequently judged public figures and criticized the governance of the state.” People at the time also saw Donglin as the core of political critique in the realm. Later, “Donglin” gradually developed into a synonym for all figures and actions that we not afraid of the powerful, boldly took on responsibility, did not follow the popular and vulgar, and dared to resist: “Thus those who spoke of the root of the state were called Donglin, those who disputed the seat of the imperial examination were called Donglin, and those who accused

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traitorous eunuchs were called Donglin, to the point that anyone who spoke of duoqing 夺情 [i.e. people being deprived of their filial mourning], treacherous ministers, or assaulting enemies, anyone who spoke with uprightness and did not follow the popular and vulgar, would all be called Donglin” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1375). Because of this, “Donglin” became a great taboo for eunuchs and powerful ministers. The exemplary men of Donglin used their flesh and blood to support the fate of the state, such that “For many decades, when brave men sacrificed their wives and children and weak men were buried in earthen chambers, the magnificence of loyalty and righteousness being passed from generation to generation, this was the lingering influence of the Donglin ethos. In a hall of teachers and friends, the cold wind and hot blood cleansed Heaven and Earth” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1375). In the history of China, this was a uniquely brilliant but also lamentable period.

Chapter 26

Gao Panlong’s Learning of Investigation of Things and Knowing the Root

Another representative figure of the Donglin School was Gao Panlong. Gao Panlong 高攀龙 (1562–1626; zi 字 Yuncong 云从, later zi Cunzhi 存之, hao 号 Jingyi 景逸) was from Wuxi 无锡. In his youth he displayed a talent for writing, at the age of fifteen took part in the apprentice examination, and at twenty became a prefecture-level student. In the 17th year of the Wanli 万历 period, he was recommended for the imperial examination [1589], and was appointed as a messenger in the Messenger Office 行人司. The following year, because he exposed the powerful minister Wang Xijue’s 王锡爵 framing of honest men, he was demoted to a clerk in Jieyang 揭阳. After half a year he returned to his hometown, where he suffered the deaths of his father and mother in quick succession. After completing his period of mourning, he went to stay in the wetlands, where he meditated and read widely, editing Essential Selections from Master Zhu (Zhuzi jieyao 朱子节要) and writing a commentary to Zhang Zai’s 张载 Correcting Ignorance (Zhengmeng 正蒙). In the 32nd year of the Wanli period [1604], he together with Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成restored the Donglin Academy 东林书院, where he lectured and taught, residing there for almost thirty years. With the founding of the Tianqi 天启 period [1621], he was appointed as an assistant in the Court of Imperial Entertainments 光 禄寺, then in the following year was promoted to a vice minister, and then transferred to a vice minister on the right in the Court of Judicial Review 大理寺 and a chief minister in the Court of the Imperial Stud 太仆寺. He requested to be sent back to his hometown to restore the Donglin society. Not long after, he was appointed as a vice minister in the Ministry of Justice, then promoted to a censor in the Censorate 都察院. He investigated Wei Zhongxian’s 魏忠贤 firm supporter Cui Chengxiu 崔呈秀, but Wei conspired with Wei Guangwei 魏广微, taking the chance to promote his collaborators and eliminate his opponents, and Gao Panlong had to return to his hometown. When he was caught up in the Case of Moving Palaces (yigong an 移宫案), his status was reduced to a commoner, and the Donglin Academy was shut down. In the 6th year of the Tianqi period [1626], Wei Zhongxian ordered the arrest and dismissal from office of the seven Donglin members who had been confined to their homes, and when Gao Panlong heard the © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_26

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Gao Panlong’s Learning of Investigation of Things and Knowing the Root

Red Riders (tiqi 缇骑) [from the imperial secret police] were on their way, he ended his life by throwing himself into a lake. In his posthumous writings, he said: “This humble servant has to wander with Li Yuanli 李元礼 and Fan Mengbo 范孟博 (all figures from the Partisan Prohibitions [danggu 党锢] affair in the Eastern Han Dynasty who were killed). A lifetime of effort in learning has as yet attained little power. The mind is like the Supreme Void, originally without life and death, so what is there worth longing for in illusory matter?” (Posthumous Writings of Master Gao [Gaozi yishu 高子遗书], Vol. 8, Pt. 1). His posthumous notes, lectures, recorded sayings and letters were compiled by his disciple Chen Longzheng 陈龙 正 into the Posthumous Writings of Master Gao in 12 volumes. His Main Points of Master Zhu [Xi] (Zhuzi jieyao 朱子节要) and Commentary on [Zhang Zai’s] Correcting Ignorance (Zhengmeng zhu 正蒙注) are now both lost.1 Gao Panlong’s course in forming his teachings was recorded in detail in his Record of Three Times (Sanshi ji 三时记). At first, he practiced quiet sitting, using this stillness to experience “inflections” (ji 几), “sincerity” (cheng 诚), “the state before arousal” (weifa 未发), etc. Later in his lodging house, he realised the meaning of “the six directions are all the mind, the body is the realm of the mind, and the mind has no form or place to speak of,” and thus further cast off activity and sought stillness. He thought that scholars should immerse themselves in reading books and attaining the cultivation and infusion of moral principle, but at the same time also sit in silence, remove improper thoughts, and condense, settle and rectify their qi 气. Thus he took quiet sitting and reading books as the method for changing and transforming one’s material qi (qizhi 气质). After the age of 45, he firmly believed Mencius’ 孟子 theory of human nature as good, and also realised Cheng Hao’s 程颢 precept of “hawks flying and fish leaping” [from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)]. He regarded the Heavenly as inherent nature, and spontaneity as cultivation. The guiding precept of his learning took Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 investigation of things and fused it with Wang Yangming’s 王 阳明 extension of innate moral knowing, also consulting Li Cai’s 李材 “stopping-cultivation” (zhixiu 止修), and promoted the precept of investigating things and knowing the root, displaying a clear tendency toward reconciling the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 and Lu-Wang 陆王 traditions.

1 Qi, Mind, Inherent Nature, Principle Neo-Confucianism in the Ming Dynasty especially emphasised personal experience of mind and inherent nature (xing 性), and was rather weak in its discussions of qi. However, many thinkers in the late Ming Dynasty arose who tried to rectify the faults of Wang [Yangming] learning, many of whom displayed a tendency toward

1

[Trans.] References to Gaozi yishu refer to a carved edition from the Chongzhen period of the Ming Dynasty.

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reconciling Master Zhu [Xi] and Yangming, and thus discussions of qi gradually increased. Nonetheless, most late Ming thinkers’ discussions of qi were directly connected to mind and inherent nature. When Gao Panlong discussed qi, it was generally in combination with mind and inherent nature, sometimes regarding principle, qi, mind and inherent nature as different aspects of the same single material substance. He said: Between Heaven and Earth there is but one holistic qi, as when Master Zhang [Zai] said, “The empty void is qi.” It is perfectly empty and perfectly numinous, possessing both order and principle. Since it is perfectly empty and perfectly numinous, in people it becomes the mind; since it possesses both order and principle, in people it becomes inherent nature. If it is purified it is clear, and becomes principle; if it is muddled it is turbid, and becomes desire. (Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 4)

Gao Panlong accepted Zhang Zai’s thought, regarding qi as the only substance between Heaven and Earth. Qi has two most fundamental qualities, namely empty numinosity (xuling 虚灵) and orderly principle (tiaoli 条理). The empty numinosity of qi is expressed as the human mind, while the orderly principle of qi is expressed as human nature. However, Zhang Zai mostly discussed the orderly principle of qi and not its empty numinosity, so when Gao Panlong regarded qi as empty and numinous, he absorbed the thought of the Learning of the Mind (xinxue 心学), especially Wang Yangming. He also said: “The essence and numinosity of qi is the mind, and that which fills the mind is qi; there are not two” (Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 4). This reduced all the phenomena in the world to two, namely the qi that fills the world and the mind of empty numinosity, regarding the mind and qi as two aspects of the united phenomena of the world. This reduction is very important, since it demonstrates that Gao Panlong synthesised the Learning of Principle (lixue 理学) and the Learning of the Mind, combining qi as the root-source of the world in the Learning of Principle with the mind as the root-source of the world in the Learning of the Mind into one, believing that the world is both matter and mind. This point already set a precedent for Huang Zongxi’s 黄宗羲 view that “the mind is qi,” uniting “that which fills Heaven and Earth is all the mind” and “that which fills Heaven and Earth is all qi” as one. Gao Panlong’s unification of mind and matter, in which he regarded both qi and the mind as the essence of the myriad phenomena of the world, was attained through two occasions of realisation. One occasion was when he heard Li Fuyang 李复阳 and Gu Xiancheng lecturing and realised that “the mind is not concentrated in the heart’s aperture [fangcun 方寸],” while the second was in the lodging house when he passed through Dingzhou 汀州 and realised that “the six directions are all the mind.” In his Record of Struggles in Learning (Kunxue ji 困学记) he said: When I was twenty-five, I heard Director Li Yuanchong 李元冲 [i.e. Li Fuyang] and Master Gu Jingyang 顾泾阳 [i.e. Gu Xiancheng] lecturing, and began to fix my will on learning. I thought that the reason why sages are sages must include a point of application, yet I did not know its method. I looked at the “Questions on the Great Learning” (Daxue huowen 大学或问), in which I read Master Zhu [Xi] saying: “Among the essential methods for entering the dao, there is nothing as good as respect,” and thus I concentrated my efforts

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on solemn respect and self-restraint. I held back my mind within the heart’s aperture, yet felt my qi was depressed and my body constrained, and I was very uneasy. So I set it aside, and was once again as dispersed and undisciplined as before, feeling there was nothing I could do. After some time, I suddenly thought of Master Cheng’s saying, “The core of the mind is in the cavity,” yet did not know what this cavity (qiangzi 腔子) referred to, was it really within the aperture or not? I sought commentaries and explanations yet found none. Then suddenly I came across his explanation in the Minor Learning (Xiaoxue 小学) [by Zhu Xi]: “The cavity is just like speaking of the body.” I was overjoyed, thinking that the mind is not concentrated in the heart’s aperture, since the whole body is the mind, and I was suddenly relaxed and cheerful. ... Passing Dingzhou, I came to a lodging house with a small tower, the front of which faced the mountains while the rear overlooked a ravine, and when I ascended the tower I felt very joyful. In my hand I held a book by the Cheng brothers 二 程, and I came across Master Mingdao’s 明道 [i.e. Cheng Hao] saying: “A hundred officials with a myriad tasks, a million-strong multitude in armor, water to drink and a bent arm [upon which to rest one’s head], joy can be found in all these. The myriad changes are all present in humanity, and in reality there is not a single affair.” All of a sudden I was enlightened: “It was always like this, there is really not a single affair.” In an instant, all my lingering emotions abruptly vanished, and all at once it was as if a hundred-jin weight suddenly fell to the ground, or as if lightning flashed, penetrating my substance in all-encompassing illumination. Then I was fused with the great transformation without boundaries, and there was no longer any separation between Heaven and humanity or internal and external. At this moment, I saw that the six directions are all the mind, the cavity is its realm, the heart’s aperture is also its original substance, that which is divine and illuminates it, and there is never any form or place to speak of. (Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

In the first realisation, he realised that “the whole body is all the mind,” such that the mind is no longer an epistemological function opposed to things, but penetrates throughout this body, such that it is both mind and body. The function of the mind is no longer primarily logical thought, but is the bearer and conscious subject of such spiritual planes as personal experience, imagination, intuition, etc. The body is also not merely a single thing in the cosmos, but is an empty and numinous substance penetrated by the mind that “wonders at the myriad things and makes them speak.” In this realisation, he realised that the mind is within the heart’s aperture, but is not limited to this aperture, setting the tone for the second realisation, in which he realised that “the six directions are all the mind.” Although the mind takes the body as the place where it is stationed, it can also become one with the myriad phenomena of the cosmos and has no spatial or temporal limitations, fusing seamlessly with the flowing activity of great transformation. The myriad phenomena of the cosmos are both mental and material, and one’s own mind is also both mental and material. Between the mind and things there are no limits, no boundaries, and no divisions. The myriad phenomena of the cosmos become symbols of people’s spiritual plane and intuition, and the relation between people and the cosmos is not one of intellectual epistemology, but of personal experience and observant illumination; it is not cognitive, but aesthetic. Here, Gao Panlong’s unity of mind and things is both a kind of original substance (benti 本体) and also a kind of spiritual plane (jingjie 境界). As an original substance, it is both mind and things, a fusion of mind and things, while as a spiritual plane, every single thing in the cosmos has an ethical significance

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projected upon it by the human mind. Explaining Zhu Xi’s “that which fills the cavity is the mind of compassion,” he said: When Master Zhu said “that which fills the cavity is the mind of compassion,” he was pointing out that in people’s bodies, the place filled by this principle is the most intimate. Thus when the mind of Heaven and Earth fills the human body, it is the mind of compassion; when the human mind fills Heaven and Earth, it is the mind of Heaven and Earth. The human body is a small cavity, while Heaven and Earth are the great cavity. (“Sayings” [Yu 语], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 1)

People are a concretion of the principle of the cosmos, and the cosmos is a magnification of the principle of the human mind. Heaven and Earth are a great mind, and the human mind is a small Heaven and Earth. There is no radical division between mind and qi. Gao Panlong’s so-called mind here is already the existence of mind, qi, principle and inherent nature as a seamless whole. This idea was expressed similarly in his comments on Hu Zhi 胡直: People like Mr. Hu Lushan 胡庐山 [i.e. Hu Zhi] believe that the mind is principle, and that abandoning the mind to seek after various things is to leave behind the internal in favour of the external, to abandon the root and chase after the branches. Ah! How could there be anything in the world under Heaven that is outside the mind? When it is silent, the mind is the principle in things, and morality is hidden without a sign; when it is stimulated, the mind is the morality situated amidst things, and principle is manifest in the appropriateness of each. When the mind is the principle in things, the myriad phenomena spread out in profusion, and the mind always takes things as its substance; when the mind is the morality situated amidst things, the one numinously changes and transforms, and things all take the mind as their function. Substance and function are one wellspring, and cannot be made into two. Things appear in the mind, and the mind wonders at things. The mind that wonders at things has no things in the mind, and only when there are no things in the mind can it wonder at things. ... Others only know that the illuminated and numinous is the mind, and expel the things of the world under Heaven, so this mind is a mind without regulation; in responding to the things of the world under Heaven, they simply lead with the mind’s use of itself, and thus are as far apart from the place of action of sages and worthies as Heaven is from Earth. (“Explanation of Principle and Morality” [Liyi shuo 理义说], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

Hu Zhi criticised abandoning the mind and seeking things as “leaving behind the internal in favour of the external, abandoning the root and chasing after the branches.” Gao Panlong thought that there are originally no things in the world under Heaven outside of the mind, so Hu Zhi’s criticism in fact already contained a division between internal and external, root and branches. In the relation between mind and things, before the mind is stimulated and responds, the one inherent nature is a whole, and benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom exist latently within this; when the mind is stimulated and responds, the principle of inherent nature within the mind are expressed as the unity of moral reason and epistemological reason, and produce judgments concerning things and affairs, in which the original substance of the mind manifests itself as the opportunistic manifestation of different moral standards, hence “principle is manifest in the appropriateness of each.” Before there is stimulation, the mind and things are

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obscurely unified, the substance of things is manifest while the function of the mind is obscure; when there is already stimulation, the mind and things are opposed, things become the place where moral reason is manifest in the mind, the mind as the substance and things as function, the mind manifest and things obscure. The mind and things are one at all times. “Things appear in the mind, and the mind wonders at things,” such that the two cannot be made dual. What Gao Panlong criticised was only the viewpoint that separated the mind and things into two opposed elements, regarding the mind as a thing of numinous illumination that can think, and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as dull obscure things outside the mind, such that the mind has no moral reason and things have no projection from moral reason. When the mind is regarded as a subject that can know and things as objects that can be known, dividing the mind and things into two, and then using the principles of things attained through the investigation of things to make up for the numinous illumination of the human mind, this is the kind of thought held by the Confucians represented by Xunzi 荀子. One of the notable characteristics of Neo-Confucianism in the Ming Dynasty, especially the Learning of the Mind, is the unity of the mind and things. The mind is both the numinous illumination that can know and also moral reason; things are both objects outside the self and also “significant forms” upon which the moral awareness of the subject is projected. This point was expressed very prominently in Gao Panlong. In his eyes, the mind and things are both things of value, and investigations of the mind, things, inherent nature, principle, etc. are all for the purpose of value. In terms of the relation between mind and inherent nature, Gao Panlong held the view of illuminating the mind and seeing inherent nature (mingxin jianxing 明心见 性) from the Learning of the Mind, yet also mixed in Zhu Xi’s theory of the levels of effort. He said: The human mind is a slice of great emptiness, a place of expansive circulation, such that as soon as this substance is manifest it is manifest, and there is no gradual succession to be awaited. When this is done thoroughly, this is illuminating the mind. The single point of highest goodness is the place of the true governor, such that the more this substance is fathomed the more subtle it is, and there are hierarchical levels that can be spoken of. Someone said: “Knowledge of the good is a pre-formed Heavenly regularity, so what hierarchical levels can there be?” [Gao] Panlong said: “To speak of hierarchical levels is to speak in terms of the places of human sight, such that when the body reaches one place, it sees this place, progressing one level at a time. When one sees the place of Heavenly settlement and arrangement, all is Heavenly regularity, and this is what is called fathoming principle.” Someone said: “When emptiness reaches this extreme place, one sees the highest good. How is emptiness this emptiness, the good this good?” He said: “This is to only see how it is when people enter a place. When one enters from fathoming principle, then emptiness is principle, and empty numinosity is benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom; when one does not enter from fathoming principle, then qi is emptiness, and benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are only the knowing awareness of empty numinosity. Originally the mind and inherent nature are neither one nor two, they are only separated by thin slivers of momentary neglect.” (“Reply to Qian Jian’an” [复钱渐庵] 2, Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A)

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When Gao Panlong speaks of the mind here, he refers to the functions of intelligence and imagination in the mind. “The human mind is a slice of great emptiness” means that since the mind is originally without any thoughts, it can imagine any far-reaching things and events. When the mind of intelligence and imagination is manifest then it is wholly substance, with no parts or levels to speak of. Yet when we speak of the whole substance of the mind, the mind is not simply the subject of intelligence and imagination, but is also the ground where the highest good is stationed. In fathoming this highest good, one can speak of hierarchical levels, and it is not an intuitive activity. Gao Panlong disagreed with the views of the pre-formed innate moral knowing group, believing that the good is not pre-formed and holistically unified. The good has levels, and the accumulation of the good is the highest good. The attainment of the good is not an intuition of the form of illuminating the mind and seeing inherent nature, but rather attained gradually through effort with levels. Hence he did not agree with the view that “when emptiness reaches this extreme place, one sees the highest good,” and advocated an effort of investigating things one drop at a time. Although what gradual cultivation finally attains is “the place of Heavenly settlement and arrangement,” this spiritual realm is attained through the effort of gradual accumulation. Here Gao Panlong clearly held that what is reached through effort is original substance. If looked at through the combination of various meanings of the mind, we can say that Gao Panlong had the idea both of “illuminating the mind” and of seeing inherent nature through gradual cultivation, yet the latter had a more important position, hence he especially emphasised effort: Do not worry that original substance is not illuminated, only that effort is not careful; do not worry that the locus of the unity of principle is not combined, only that there is a discrepancy in the locus of its manifold divisions. Only when that which one must do is sufficiently severe can one’s attainment be sufficiently penetrating. (“Qian Jian’an” 1, Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A) When one preserves and cultivates this mind’s proficiency to the point of refined subtlety and pure unity, then it is both the mind and inherent nature, and there is no need to speak of combining; if it is not, then it is as Master Zhu [Xi] said: “The empty numinosity of conscious awareness is simply one and nothing more.” (“Letter to Qian Qixin” [Yu Qian Qixin 与钱启新] 1, Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A)

Gao Panlong implemented this point in the relation between the mind and principle, emphasising that only the mind reached by effort can be principle. He said: Principle is the mind, and that which fathoms it is also the mind. However, the mind that has not fathomed cannot be called principle, the principle that has not been fathomed cannot be called the mind, and this point cannot be grasped without fathoming participation and wondrous enlightenment. With such enlightenment, all things have their Heavenly regularity, such that amidst daily tasks, things return to their regularities, and they are like this without any interference from the self. (“Reply to Liu Niantai” [Fu Liu Niantai 复刘念 台] 2, Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A)

Here as noted above, the unity of the mind and principle is the spiritual plane after all effort has reached its goal. Before principle is fathomed, the mind is not

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principle, and principle does not manifest as the mind. Effort at cultivation is the only bridge by which the mind and principle can come into contact. Acknowledging that “principle is the mind” and emphasising effort, using Master Zhu’s effort to manifest [Wang] Yangming’s original substance, this is the unique point of Gao Panlong’s thought. In terms of effort, Gao Panlong followed Cheng and Zhu, while in terms of original substance he followed Yangming. His emphasis on the mind and even his descriptions of the mind mainly came from Yangming, such as when he said: “The substance of the mind has no form or body, no edges or borders, no inside or outside, no exit or entrance; it is steady and true, is directly above and below, and does not contain even a hair’s breadth of human power. Even when it is dulled and confused, it simply lacks a moment’s awakening, and once awakened, its original substance shines in its immediate presence, without awaiting recognition to be combined. If it awaits recognition to be combined, then it and the dao are dual, thereby leading to urgency and rash hastiness” (“Letter to Ziwang” [Yu Ziwang 与子往] 3, Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A). Here, the so-called “mind” refers to the realm where the substance of inherent nature and dao become manifest. When dullness and confusion are removed, there is original substance. This is clearly the path of Wang [Yangming] Learning. Once Wang Learning had become the fashion all over the land, Gao Panlong wished to correct its problems of hollowness and shallowness and return it to concreteness, taking the approach of harmonising the learning of Master Zhu with that of Yangming. Gao Panlong’s view of the original substance of the world as both mind and things, along with his view of the moral subject as both mind and principle, together constitute the most important points he took from Wang Learning. In terms of the three central concepts of qi, mind, and inherent nature, Gao Panlong placed most emphasis on inherent nature. In his view, the different definitions of inherent nature constitute the most important distinction between Confucian learning and that of Buddhism and Daoism. He said: The difference between the learning of the sages and that of the Buddhists lies simply in the single term inherent nature. The difference between the sages’ discussions of inherent nature and those of the Buddhists lies simply in the single term principle. Principle is Heavenly principle. Heavenly principle is the patterned principle that is spontaneously possessed from Heaven. (“Explanation of Mind and Inherent Nature” [Xinxing shuo 心性 说], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3) While the Daoists focus on qi and the Buddhists focus on the mind, the learning of the sages is what is called the learning of inherent nature. What the Daoists refer to as the mind and inherent nature is simply qi. What the Buddhists refer to as inherent nature is simply the mind. It is not that qi, mind, and inherent nature are dual, but that they are differentiated by habit. What is inherent nature? It is Heavenly principle. ...If one speaks of qi apart from this, this qi is then the qi of the Daoists; if one speaks of the mind apart from this, this mind is then the mind of the Buddhists. For the sages, qi means cultivating the qi of dao and righteousness, while mind means preserving the mind of benevolence and righteousness, such that qi is inherent nature, and mind is inherent nature. (“Explanation of Qi, Mind and Inherent Nature” [Qixinxing shuo 气心性说], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

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Song-Ming Neo-Confucians’ criticisms of Buddhism generally claimed that it “saw inherent nature through its functioning” (zuoyong jianxing 作用见性), i.e. that it regarded the functioning of the mind in the ears hearing sharply, the eyes seeing clearly, the feet walking, the hands grasping, etc. as inherent nature, without any content from Heavenly principle. Gao Panlong followed this view, claiming that inherent nature is principle, and that the mind and qi are both functions of inherent nature that should come under the jurisdiction of the latter. Daoists however “cut off sageliness and cast off wisdom” [see Laozi, Ch. 19], denying that dao possesses any moral content, and this dao is thus simply qi. The dao of ingesting medicine and practicing alchemic cultivation to attain longevity and health as found in religious Daoism directs all its effort at qi, hence he said, “the Daoists focus on qi.” In Buddhism, the mind is the highest concept, such that the self, dharmas, and the phenomena of reality are all created by the mind, with all living things and Buddha being complete in one mind. The mind spoken of by Buddhists also contains no content of inherent nature or principle, and hence he said, “the Buddhists focus on the mind.” Confucians however regard the principle of inherent nature as the most important content of the mind. For Gao Panlong, inherent nature, qi and mind are three aspects of the same single thing. Qi is the material basis that constitutes the mind, the mind is numinous and luminous qi, the realm where inherent nature resides and flows, and inherent nature is the original quality of qi and mind. Focusing on the aspect of cultivation, to cultivate qi and mind is to cultivate inherent nature. “The qi of dao and righteousness” is the expression of the original substance of inherent nature at this level, as for example in Mencius’ “flood-like qi” [see Mencius, 2A.2]. “The mind of benevolence and righteousness” is the expression of the original substance of inherent nature at the level of psychological activities such as emotional experience, as for example in Mencius’ “mind of compassion” and “mind of shame and disgust” [see Mencius, 2A.6]. To cultivate the qi of dao and righteousness is not to cultivate “qi,” but to make inherent nature manifest at the level of qi through effort at cultivation, and then to preserve this so it is not lost. To cultivate the mind of benevolence and righteousness is to make inherent nature directly penetrate to the level of the mind, such that it overflows and is revealed at every moment. Mind, inherent nature, and qi are different expressions of the same single thing, hence “qi is inherent nature, and mind is inherent nature.” Since Daoists reduce everything to qi, their inherent nature and mind are both qi. Since the Buddhists reduce everything to the mind, their inherent nature and qi are both mind. Since Confucians regard the principles of inherent nature as the core, their qi and mind are both inherent nature, and to cultivate qi and the mind is to cultivate the principles of inherent nature. From the above analysis, it can be seen that Gao Panlong absorbed and fused the two schools of Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang, and his theory of original substance was gradually refined, hence among Donglin Learning his attainment was the highest. After participating in Donglin lectures, he benefited from exchanges with friends, and continually attained new realisations. This point can be seen from his theory of effort.

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2 Investigating Things and Knowing the Root Gao Panlong was naturally reserved in character, and for most of his life took “diligent affairs and harmonious relations, careful speech and respectful conduct, illustriousness enterprise” as the standard for his conduct. The investigation of things and the fathoming of principles were the rules of effort that he held to throughout his life. In the records of his lecturing he often taught students to investigate things and fathom principles, such as: Where there are things there must be rules, and the rule is the highest good. When one’s fathoming reaches the principles of things and affairs, one’s fathoming reaches the locus of the highest good. (“Sayings,” Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 1) In the correct vein of sage-learning, only fathoming principle is given priority, so if one does not fathom principle this is a serious mistake. (“Sayings from Meetings” [Huiyu 会 语], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 5) What is the investigation of things? I say: “The words of Cheng [Yi] and Zhu [Xi] got to the core. What is called one’s fathoming reaching the principles of things and affairs is fathoming and probing to the ultimate locus, i.e. where the root is, where the highest good is. (“Broad Meaning of the Opening Section of the Great Learning” [Daxue shouzhang guangyi 大学首章广义], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

For Gao Panlong, the investigation of things means reaching things, i.e. one’s fathoming reaching the principles of things and affairs. However, from the above it can be seen that his investigation of things and fathoming of principles is not like those of Cheng and Zhu, in which one fathoms the principles of specific things and affairs and then transforms these into the principle of inherent nature through a sudden penetrating comprehension. Instead, by combining the Learning of the Mind and the Learning of Principle, he viewed the myriad images of the cosmos as both principle and mind. The investigation of things and fathoming of principles thus directly stops at the highest good. This highest good is already a thing of value that is both ethical and epistemological. Gao Panlong consciously avoided the “fragmentation” that Cheng-Zhu were ridiculed for, and directly transformed the principles of things into principles of inherent nature that can be directly useful in the cultivation of mind and inherent nature. He said: “To fathom principles is to investigate things, and to know the root is for things to be investigated. In fathoming principles, there is one root with a myriad differences; in knowing the root, there is a myriad of differences with one root” (Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 1). The principles of things are already no longer the qualities and regularities of things and affairs, but an expression of Heavenly principle. Thus, the investigation of things is directly the effort of making oneself sincere, and is the same affair as knowing the root. Gao Panlong certainly already differed from Cheng-Zhu’s “investigating one thing today and another thing tomorrow, until when one’s accumulated practice is sufficient, one suddenly and spontaneously attains a penetrating comprehension.” Every time a thing is investigated, this is directly the effort of cultivating the self and knowing the root; this both emphasises effort and also avoids becoming trapped in fragmentation. This was noted by Huang Zongxi:

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The gentleman’s learning found one root in Cheng and Zhu, and thus regarded the investigation of things as key. However Cheng and Zhu’s investigation of things regarded the mind as the ruler of one body and principle as scattered between the myriad things, with the preservation of the mind and the fathoming of principle as mutually required to progress together. The gentleman said, “I then knew that turning back and seeking in oneself means that one is truly one who can investigate things.” This was quite close to when Yang Zhongli 杨中立 said, “When one turns back to oneself in sincerity, then all the things under Heaven are present in oneself.” This differs from the doctrine of Cheng and Zhu. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 1402)

Gao Panlong himself also said: In our investigation of things, we investigate the highest good; we regard the good as our tenet, and not knowledge. (“Reply to Secondary Governor Wang Yihuan” [Da Wang Yihuan ershou 答王仪寰二守], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A)

That is to say, to investigate things is not to investigate the principles of specific things and affairs, but rather to directly obtain the Heavenly principle that is embodied in them, otherwise it is detached from the search for value and becomes a simple search for knowledge. To directly obtain things of value requires that one project the moral consciousness of the subject onto things, and thus requires the premise that the principles of things are the principles of inherent nature. This kind of investigation of things, in which one turns back and seeks in oneself at the same time as investigating the principles of specific things and affairs, had already broken with the approach of “cultivation through self-discipline requires the use of respect, and advancement in learning lies in the extension of knowledge” in which morality and knowledge were mutually required to progress together. Gao Panlong regarded investigating things and knowing the root as the essentials of effort, believing that the various aspects of Confucian effort were all affairs to be undertaken after investigating things; if one does not speak of investigating things, everything is heretical. He particularly opposed the Taizhou 泰州 Longxi 龙溪 school’s avoidance of effort, which regarded the enlightenment of original substance as effort, as he once said: “For those who speak of innate moral knowing, the extension of knowing is not in the investigation of things. Hence the functioning of empty numinosity is mostly just emotional recognition and not the spontaneity of Heavenly regularity, and is thus far from knowledge of the good” (“Reply to Secondary Governor Wang Yihuan,” Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A). He meant that the school of pre-formed innate moral knowing regarded innate moral knowing as a thing that was complete and sufficient a priori, and applied this innate moral knowing that had not undergone rectification through effort in things and affairs, hence their innate moral knowing was merely the functioning of empty numinous awareness and not the original substance of morality, and since this cannot be necessarily good, it must undergo “the investigation of things,” which thus becomes the precondition for the extension of innate moral knowing. Gao Panlong not only used this fundamental understanding to criticise the later followers of the Wang [Yangming] school, but also directly criticised Yangming himself, once saying:

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In relation to Master Zhu’s investigation of things, it was as if Yangming never entered into it. His extension of innate moral knowing was simply the illumination of illustrious virtue. Yet since this was not rooted in the investigation of things, he gradually came to see illustrious virtue as without good or bad. Hence although illustrious virtue is one, if one enters into it through the investigation of things, one’s learning is solid, and its illumination is both mind and inherent nature; if one enters into it without the investigation of things, one’s learning is empty, and its illumination is mind but not inherent nature. How can mind and inherent nature contain duality? Thus in terms of where one enters into it, there is a slight distinction. (“Reply to Fang Ben’an” [Da Fang Ben’an 答方本庵], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A) The learning of the two gentlemen (referring to Lu Xiangshan 陆象山 and Wang Yangming) both began from the extension of knowing, while the learning of the sages must begin from the investigation of things. The extension of knowing does not lie in the investigation of things, and although empty and numinous awareness is wondrous, it does not look into the refined subtlety of Heavenly principle. How can there be any duality? There is knowing that is not extended. The slight distinction lies in this. (“Sayings from Meetings,” Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 5)

He thought that both Lu Jiuyuan’s 陆九渊 first establishing the great and Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing went from the internal to the external, while the effort of the learning of the sages was from external to internal, implementing the extension of knowing through the investigation of things. Without obtaining the principles of inherent nature by going through the investigation of things, the extension of knowing is simply the extension of the knowing of empty numinous awareness. Here, Gao Panlong’s emphasis on the meaning of investigating things is very clear. However when he thought that Wang Yangming had no effort of the investigation of things and never crossed into the realm of Master Zhu, he in fact failed to recognise Yangming’s learning. From his youth, when Yangming visited Lou Liang 娄谅 to inquire about learning, he thought that “the learning of the sages could be attained through study,” and followed Master Zhu’s method of investigating things. His failure to attain through investigating bamboo merely shows that he did not conform to Master Zhu’s method of investigating things, and not that after this he never investigated things. After his realisation of the dao at Longchang, he fixed his direction as the Learning of the Mind, and then with his later capture of Chenhao 宸濠 and his struggles with Zhong 忠 and Tai 泰 [see Ch. 6 above], he revealed his teaching of the extension of innate moral knowing, and thereby progressively fused the investigation of things and extension of knowing from the Great Learning with Mencius’ theory of “innate moral knowing,” such that the extension of innate moral knowing is the investigation of things, and once things are investigated, then innate moral knowing is extended. Here, there is both knowing and acting, both morality and knowledge, with morality in command and knowledge as supplementary, such that the two are fused as one. Yangming certainly began from the learning of Master Zhu, but felt it awkward and unreasonable, and hence created his new theory. His new theory however encompassed the refined meaning of Zhu Xi’s learning, combining the Learning of the Mind and the Learning of Principle as one. When he regarded Lu Jiuyuan’s learning as crude, this was because he merely first established the great

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without the concrete effort of the extension of innate moral knowing and the unification of knowledge and action. Wang Yangming’s practical learning of innate moral knowing can be said to have made up for the deficiencies in Lu Jiuyuan’s theory of effort. When Gao Panlong viewed Wang Yangming and Lu Xiangshan together, believing that their efforts were both crude, he in fact failed to recognise the refined meaning of Lu-Wang learning, as well as the difference between Wang Yangming and Lu Xiangshan. Gao Panlong also criticised Wang Yangming for “sweeping away good and bad with empty thought,” based on the sentence “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” from the Four-Sentence Teaching. The Donglin School strongly opposed the view that “there is neither good nor bad.” Gu Xiancheng indeed wrote his Compilation Demonstrating Inherent Nature (Zhengxing bian 证 性编) specifically for this purpose. The Donglin scholars Qian Yiben 钱一本, Wu Jinhua 吴觐华 and their associates including Fang Xuejian 方学渐, Xu Fuyuan 许 孚远 and Feng Congwu 冯从吾 also participated in this debate, arguing with scholars who held that “there is neither good nor bad” such as Guan Dongming 管 东溟, Zhou Rudeng 周汝登 and Qian Jian’an 钱渐庵. Gao Panlong’s view was expressed most fully in his preface to Fang Xuejian’s Explication of the Goodness of Inherent Nature (Xingshan yi 性善绎), in which he pointed out that when the debaters avoided criticising the worthy, thinking that the view of neither good nor bad were the words of Wang Longxi 王龙溪 that he attributed to Wang Yangming, this was not a certain conclusion. Although the view of neither good nor bad came from Wang Yangming, and there were no contradictory statements in all the records of his demonstration of the dao at Tianquan 天泉 [see Ch. 6 above], the key was how it should be understood. Gao Panlong argued that the “good” in neither good nor bad was not the “good” of the goodness of inherent nature. The second sentence in the Four-Sentence Teaching says that when the intention moves, there is good and bad, hence the “good” and “bad” of “neither good nor bad” in the first sentence refers to intention, to good or bad thoughts. Thus, “In the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” means that there were originally no good or bad thoughts in the mind. Gao Panlong explanation here accords with the original meaning of the Four-Sentence Teaching. However, he also thought that his divergence from Wang Yangming was that he regarded goodness as inherent nature, while Wang Yangming regarded it as thought. The first sentence of Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching thus says that there are no good or bad thoughts in the mind, and the latter is simply an empty numinous awareness. In fact, Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing and substance of the mind penetrate and encompass the metaphysical and phenomenal, the inherent nature before arousal and the emotions that are already aroused. Innate moral knowing is the manifestation, flowing and reflection of the substance of inherent nature in the human mind, the so-called “awareness of inherent nature.” To regard Yangming’s so-called good as the mind’s moving thoughts and then having feelings is to be unaware that innate moral knowing is the manifestation of the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, and this is to misunderstand Yangming’s learning.

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Gao Panlong strictly held to the Donglin rules of learning set down by Gu Xiancheng, and thus strictly rejected and non-Confucian learning or impure Confucian learning, a view clearly expressed in his criticism of Guan Dongming’s theory of the unification of the three teachings. When Gao Panlong criticised the unity of the three teachings, his purpose was to reverse the situation of the time in which Confucian scholars dabbled in Buddhism and Daoism, and thereby to restore the Confucian tradition. He once said: “In summer of the 42nd year, I wandered in Wulin 武林 [i.e. Hangzhou], residing by the West Lake, where I met many scholars, half of whom followed heretical teachings, and my mind was inwardly worried” (“Distinction of Heresies” [Yiduan bian 异端辨], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3). His criticisms of Guan Dongming mainly concerned distinguishing the places where Confucianism and Buddhism appeared similar, and opposing forced comparisons. He said: This senior gentleman spent his whole life simply trying to unify the three teachings, and his various kinds of manoeuvres were merely aimed at attaining this goal. He picked out a Zhou Yuangong 周元公 [i.e. Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐] in order to harmonise them at the level of dao-principles; he picked out a founding Emperor in order to harmonise them at the level of temporal affairs; he picked out the flock of dragons without heads [from the Book of Changes] in order to secretly seize the tradition of the Plain King [i.e. Confucius] and enable the Buddha to covertly usurp the place of the flying dragon. He picked out mighty transformations and rivers flowing [see Centrality in the Ordinary, section 31] in order to solely manifest Vairocana’s sea of inherent nature and make the Confucian doctrine retreat to the rank of rivers flowing. Others who respect Confucianism simply tried to reconcile the situation, quoting the words of Confucians merely in order to make questionable comparisons. Thus the non-polarity and Supreme Polarity are similar to the empty dharma-realm, and thus they follow them; hearing in the morning and dying in the evening [see Analects, 4.8] is like the great affair of life and death, hence they follow it. However, their so-called Supreme Polarity, their so-called dao, is simply Vairocana. As for their respecting Cheng-Zhu and disparaging the crazed Chan 禅 [i.e. Zen Buddhism], yet finally rejecting both Cheng-Zhu’s centrality in the ordinary and the Buddha-nature of the five schools, this is even more somewhere they trouble their minds and exert their strength, wishing that those who would keep away from Buddhism have nothing more to say. Yet in terms of the central issue, they fritter away their life, labouring away until the end, yet the three teachings are simply different subjects. (“Reply to Jinyang [i.e. Gu Xiancheng] on Guan Dongming” [Da Jingyang lun Guan Dongming 答泾阳论管东溟], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A)

He noted that Guan Dongming’s belief in Zhou Dunyi was because Zhou’s Discussion of the Diagram of Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太极图说) could be compared to Buddhism. In the Discussion’s “Without polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity,” “Supreme Polarity” is a term frequently used by Daoists, one that can also be used to make a comparison with the Buddhist’s original substance of emptiness. Zhou Dunyi’s statements that “the Supreme Polarity is originally without polarity” and “the Supreme Polarity produces yin and yang” is consistent with both the Daoist “being is produced from non-being,” and the Buddhist “mountains, rivers and the great Earth are the pure and clear root-source.” “Founding Emperor” above refers to the founder of the Ming Dynasty Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, who in his youth once entered Huangjue Monastery 皇觉寺 as

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an apprentice, and then once the Ming Dynasty was established paid special respect to Buddhism, believing that although state governance should be based on Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism could assist Confucianism in its edificatory transformation. His basic view of the relation between the three teachings was: “Among the three teachings, the dao of Confucius originated with Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 and was passed on to the Three Kings, culminating in the deletion of poems and the creation of scriptures [by Confucius], and can be eternally relied on for a myriad ages. The spirits of Buddhist immortals are of hidden use to the king’s rule, benefiting the world infinitely, and bringing only good fortune. I hear that in the world there are no two daos, and the sages have no two minds. When the three teachings are established, although their precepts for honor and frugality in self-conduct are different, the principle of the assistance they provide is one. Hence for the foolish people of this world today, among the three teachings, all are needed” (“On the Three Teachings” [Sanjiao lun 三教论], Collected Works of Great Progenitor of the Ming [Ming Taizu ji 明太祖集], Vol. 10). When Gao Panlong referred to Guan Dongming as picking out the founder of the Ming as “to harmonise them at the level of temporal affairs,” he referred to Guan Dongming’s unification of the three teachings, in which he generally took the perspective that Buddhism and Daoism “are of hidden use to the king’s rule, benefiting the world infinitely.” “A flock of dragons without heads” is the line commentary on the use of the nine [i.e. yang] 用九 for hexagram Qian 乾 in the Changes: “Seeing a flock of dragons without heads, there will be good fortune.” In his “The Subtle Doctrine of the Unity of the ‘Six Dragons Without Heads’ of the Dao of the Changes With the Ten Stages as the Head in Huayan [Buddhism]” [Yidao “liulong wushou” he huayan shidi weishou weishi 易道 “六龙无首”合华严十地为首微旨], Guan Dongming said: “The Changes says, ‘Seeing a flock of dragons without heads, there will be good fortune,’ while the Ten Stages of Huayan [Huayan shidi pin 华严十地品] says, ‘I am the head and victor of all living things.’” Hence Gao Panlong said he aimed “to secretly seize the tradition of the Plain King and enable the Buddha to covertly usurp the place of the flying dragon.” The words “mighty transformation and flowing rivers” come from the “Lesser virtue is like flowing rivers, great virtue is like mighty transformation” in Centrality in the Ordinary, meaning that when the great dao makes the myriad things transform and produce, they produce and reproduce without cease. Vairocana’s sea of inherent nature refers to the dharma-body of the Buddha as the spiritual realm that covers everything. Gao Panlong thought that Guan Dongming picked out “mighty transformation and flowing rivers” in order to use the Buddha’s dharma-body as the spiritual realm that covers everything to replace the great dao of “mighty transformation,” leading Confucianism to cede its ruling position to Buddhism and become a mere flowing river. Gao Panlong’s criticism of “the unification of the three teachings” set out from the standpoint of defending the Confucian orthodoxy, and he indeed went to great pains to achieve this. However, the unification of the three teachings was an intellectual trend that was greatly influential in the later Ming Dynasty. It was the ethos of the intellectual sphere of the time, upheld by scholars, and can even be said

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to reflect the tendency of development of the whole culture. Viewed from a wider perspective, in terms of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism as organic parts of Chinese traditional culture, the right position in managing their relations is to deepen research into them and preserve each of their characteristics, such that in their separations and unifications, their declines and growths, their contradictions can be encompassed while they each develop their own theories, improving the quality of the whole of Chinese culture. Any simple criticism of the unification of the three teachings inevitably appears narrow and insular.

3 Enlightenment and Cultivation Gao Panlong regarded the investigation of things and knowledge of the root as the guiding program for learning. One who knows the root knows that self-cultivation is the root; the investigation of things is the practical effort of self-cultivation. Thus Gao Panlong especially emphasised practical cultivation. In his theory of original substance however, his views that “the whole body is the mind” and that “the six directions of the world are all mind,” and his experience of the mind and things as inseparable, all these were attained through enlightenment. Hence the characteristics of his lifelong efforts were an equal stress on enlightenment (wu 悟) and cultivation, and an equal attainment of conduct and explication. In Gao Panlong’s first discussions of the qualities of enlightenment and cultivation, he compared them to the knowledge of Qian and the ability of Kun 坤 [in the Book of Changes], explaining their respective roles in the entire effort of cultivation. He said: All those with an understanding enlightenment are Qian, and all those with a cultivated mastery are Kun. When people who are deluded suddenly awaken and realise its falsity, this belongs to the knowledge of Qian; once they are awakened and begin to respect the dao in their conduct, this belongs to the ability of Kun. ... One must reach the point of using effort for much time, then once one is suddenly clear, it is as the top nine of [hexagram] Da Xu 大 畜; when accumulation reaches its peak and attains comprehension, as it says, “Thus is the open road of Heaven,” is it not like this? The plane of the mind is all forgotten, the cosmos begins to open up; this is the knowledge of Qian. Since knowledge of it is true, one must hold to it with force; careful conduct overcome with restraint, the smallest things overcome with caution, vision, hearing, speech and movement guarded like a pass or ford, calm like a mountain peak; this is the ability of Kun. Compared with a valley, Qian is the yang side, where life develops, while the roots and shoots, flowers and fruits all belong to Kun. Thus Qian knows its beginning, while Kun completes its end, and without Kun things are incomplete. Hence scholars’ understanding enlightenment occurs in a moment, while cultivated mastery occurs over a complete lifetime. If one says, “I have attained enlightenment,” everything radiating suspicion and destroying barriers, and says, “My dao is so great, what is the need for these constraints?” then there is life without completion, shoots that do not sprout, sprouts that do not bear fruit, how pitiful! (“Explanation of Qian and Kun” [Qian Kun shuo 乾坤说], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

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Gao Panlong believed that enlightenment was a sudden form of attainment, in which as soon as one comes into contact with things and feels that one was formerly wrong, the realm of the mind becomes open and clear, opening up a new plane. Cultivation is the application of gradual effort on the basis on this sudden attainment. Enlightenment relies on gradually accumulated study, such that when one’s accumulation is sufficiently deep, one suddenly comprehends. However, the truth of knowledge still depends on the force of observance. The force of observance is cultivation, and cultivation is more important than enlightenment, since “understanding enlightenment occurs in a moment, while cultivated mastery occurs over a complete lifetime.” Enlightenment is a point of open brightness, while cultivation makes it consolidated. This is like Qian and Kun, in which Qian is the beginning while Kun is the successive completion. Qian establishes the foundation, while Kun grows its strength. Hence between “enlightenment” and “cultivation,” Gao Panlong set more emphasis on cultivation and “completion.” Although this point was aimed at the view that “enlightenment of original substance is effort” found in the pre-formed innate moral knowing school of Wang Learning, who focused on enlightenment and did not apply effort to specific concrete cultivation, leading to the problem that “as soon as one is enlightened, nothing remains to be done,” yet it was also something he attained through painful experience in his own course of learning. In terms of the emphasis on cultivation, Gao Panlong and Gu Xiancheng held the same view, along with the later Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 and Huang Zongxi. Gao Panlong also gave some explanation of the direction of effort for enlightenment and cultivation, and through this criticised those who departed from the correct direction for enlightenment. He said: Keeping silent and recognising it is called enlightenment, while following and embodying it is called cultivation. When one cultivates it, then one orders one’s relationships and daily tasks, while when one is enlightened to it one divinises and transforms one’s inherent nature and endowment. The sage’s lower studies and higher penetration, flowing together with Heaven and Earth, are simply like this. ... What of those who are enlightened today? They either control their mind and glimpse the open clarity of the mental plane, or concentrate their qi and briefly attain the flowing smoothness of qi-activity, taking this as enlightenment, so if one then wishes to raise our sages’ teaching of illuminating the good and making oneself sincere, this is swept away into nothing. Bursting the embankments in self-indulgence, extinguishing right and wrong to pacify their minds, they say they can understand life and death. Alas! They do not even stop at leading beasts to devour men, but lead men to devour each other. (“Preface for a Resetting of [Zhu Xi’s] Reflections on Things at Hand” [Chongqie Jinsilu xu 重锲近思录序], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 9A)

Gao Panlong acknowledged the importance of enlightenment in learning, believing it to be a necessary step in the refinement of learning, one that is very valuable to scholars, and can determine their level of attainment. Many people take enlightenment to belong to the Chan School [of Buddhism] and avoid speaking of it, thinking it insignificant. Yet enlightenment means seeing something of the fundamental principles of the cosmos, and the form this takes is a sudden awareness in the mind. Enlightenment must be supported by cultivation, and cultivation means

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the practical application of the principles one realised through enlightenment in human relationships and daily tasks, and the form this takes is being seen in concrete conduct. Only when enlightenment and cultivation are grasped and applied in this way, can one’s spiritual plane continually develop and progress. Zhu Xi’s “above and below flowing together with Heaven and Earth” is the perfection of the spiritual plane, yet this is also attained through gradual enlightenment and cultivation. The enlightenment he denounced is either an occasional realisation of the marvellous functioning of the mind, or a momentary joyfulness and liberation due to a sudden and incidental flow of feeling, and this kind of enlightenment is all a surge of qi-activity, all “a spectacular vision,” all without any awareness of the fundamental principles of the cosmos and human life, and thus cannot count as a true form of enlightenment. If one has this enlightenment and relies upon it, abandoning the real effort of illuminating the good and making oneself sincere, developing indulgent and unregulated habits, then this deviates from the direction of Confucian self-cultivation. Gao Panlong emphasised cultivation, but he advocated cultivation on the basis of enlightenment, lower studies for the purpose of higher penetration; as for cultivation without enlightenment and enlightenment without clarity, he held a critical attitude. He said: Those who cultivate without enlightenment comply with the branches but lose the root; those whose enlightenment is without clarity recognise things yet take them as regularities. They do not know that those who wish to cultivate precisely need the original substance of seeking, while those who wish to be enlightened precisely need the effort of seeking. Without original substance there is no effort, and without effort there is no original substance. (“Preface for the Collected Works of Mr. Feng Shaoxu” [Feng Shaoxu xiansheng ji xu 冯少墟先生集序], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 9A)

Cultivation is specific effort, and is lower studies; enlightenment is having some awareness of the dao-substance, and is higher penetration. Cultivation without enlightenment remains trapped within lower studies, while enlightenment without cultivation is empty with only knowing awareness. Cultivation should cultivate that which is attained through enlightenment, and thus have enlightenment as its basis; enlightenment should undergo the accumulation of effort and thus be completed. Original substance and effort have a relation of substance and function, such that the two are neither separated nor mixed. Without original substance, effort is fragmented, and without effort, original substance is empty and quiet. One must be enlightened to know the dao and cultivate to follow the dao, studying below to penetrate above, with both effort and original substance. If one goes against this correct approach, enlightenment and cultivation will both be in error: “Cultivation without enlightenment stops at ornamentation; enlightenment without cultivation stops at understanding. They are both simply what the sages called culture, how could this speak of personal practice?” (“Reply to Xiao Kanghou” [Da Xiao Kanghou 答萧康侯], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A). Although between the two efforts of enlightenment and cultivation, Gao Panlong placed more emphasis on the aspect of cultivation, in order to address the

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unrestraint in effort, he actually thought that if one wanted the realm of inherent nature to become transparent, the term enlightenment was most important. If enlightenment is not thorough, effort has nowhere to fall upon. Thus if one says his emphasis on cultivation was only aimed at the minority of people who are lofty, bright and gifted, then emphasising enlightenment is aimed at the vast majority of Confucians who stick to regulations and follow rules. Among his senior scholars, the aspect he most admired and respected was thorough enlightenment. He used the presence or absence of thorough enlightenment to compare the depth or shallowness of senior scholars’ attainments. For example, he once commented on the great Confucians Chen Xianzhang 陈献章, Wu Yubi 吴与弼 and Xue Xuan 薛瑄: “It is said that Kangzhai 康斋 [i.e. Wu Yubi] was not as thoroughly enlightened as Baisha 白沙 [i.e. Chen Xianzhang]. This is because Baisha probed fathomed the extremes of the realm of inherent nature, and attained a sudden openness; Kangzhai was merely friendly in conduct and pure in cultivation, his mental plane still and joyful, like one who enjoys his pre-existing family property. As for Mr. Jingxuan 敬 轩 [i.e. Xue Xuan], he was also never seen to have made this kind of effort. Yet his deathbed poem said: ‘This mind began to feel the interconnectedness of inherent nature and Heaven,” and since it was this kind of spiritual plane, he cannot be said to have been unenlightened” (“Reply to Cao Zhenyu on a Letter from Xin Fuyuan” [Da Cao Zhenyu lun Xin Fuyuan shu 答曹真予论辛复元书], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A). Wu Yubi’s path of effort continued that of Song Confucians, grasping with respect and righteousness, and took the dual progress of sincerity and illumination as its method for cultivation. Xue Xuan regarded respect as the gateway, and took recovering inherent nature as his precept, “completely sincere with no splendour, scrupulously abiding by the rules set down by people from the Song,” and hence he was mocked for not seeing inherent nature. Chen Xianzhang was a key figure in the transition from Master Zhu Learning to the Learning of the Mind, and the phrase “In Ming learning, only with Baisha did it enter into refined subtlety, and only with Yangming did it become great” has its grounds. Chen Xianzhang’s learning was based on realisation in stillness, and his enlightenment was of both mind and principle. His learning went beyond that of Xue Xuan and Wu Yubi in its thorough enlightenment. Gao Panlong’s emphasis on enlightenment can be seen as due to the influence on him of the general academic tendency of the Ming Dynasty. In Ming Dynasty academic learning, Wang Learning was the main thread, theories of principle and qi were no longer emphasised by scholars, and theories of mind and inherent nature represented scholars’ characteristics, differentiated their respective associations, and even became the standard by which to judge the depth or shallowness of their attainment. Even for scholars with a comparatively broad system of thought, if they wished to engage with a generation of academic learning, theories of qi had to an important content of philosophy, yet they mostly synthesised principle, qi, mind and inherent nature as one; this was characteristic of Ming Dynasty academic learning. Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi are clear examples of this. The emphasis in most Confucian academic learning was generally placed on theories of mind and inherent nature, with scholars focusing most on experiences of the inner mind such as

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internal and external, activity and stillness, aroused and not yet aroused, a priori and a posteriori, and liberal dispersal and respectful awe, and hence they paid special attention to enlightenment. In other words, inwardly directed forms of effort were more prominent in Ming Dynasty Confucians, and thus they placed more emphasis on enlightenment. Gao Panlong noted this point, and combined with the fact that many key turning points in his life’s course of learning were attained from enlightenment, this meant that emphasising enlightenment was a natural tendency for him, yet he also opposed the neglect of effort found in the pre-formed innate moral knowing school, and thus in the end stressed both enlightenment and cultivation. The relation between the two thus became an important problem in his academic learning.

4 Respect and Following the Natural Gao Panlong’s learning began from Zhu Xi’s phrase “Among the essential methods for entering the dao, there is nothing as good as respect,” and for his whole life he was careful, respectful and endlessly diligent, the spiritual plane of his learning changing repeatedly until, at the age of fifty, he realised the tenet of Centrality in the Ordinary, which became the final resting point for his spiritual plane of effort. He himself recounted his attainment, saying: In the 49th year [of the 60 year cycle], I finally really believed the tenet of Centrality in the Ordinary. This dao absolutely cannot be formed with names and words, yet while Master Cheng [Yi] called it “Heavenly principle” and Yangming named it “innate moral knowing,” yet neither of these are as exhaustive as “centrality in the ordinary.” “Centrality” is steady and true, while “the ordinary” is usual and commonplace, so if there is even a hint of motion, it is not steady and true; if there is even a hint of affection, it is not usual and commonplace. The original substance is like this, and effort is also like this. Heaven, Earth and the sages cannot be finally fathomed, so as for us, how could we have any limits? (“Record of Painstaking Learning” [Kunxue ji 困学记], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

The tenet of Centrality in the Ordinary can be grasped from many aspects, with some people focusing on its elaboration of “sincerity,” some on its development of “inherent nature, dao and teaching,” and others on its explanations of “central harmony” and “care when alone.” Gao Panlong emphasised the explication of the original meaning of the two terms zhong 中 [centrality, the mean] and yong 庸 [ordinary, commonplace]. For him, the dao has two aspects: one is its content, and another is its form of expression. From Centrality in the Ordinary, Gao Panlong attained the formal aspect of the dao: steady and true (tingting dangdang 停停当当), usual and constant (pingping changchang 平平常常). His so-called “original substance” and effort can all be found in these eight characters. Gao Panlong’s course of learning in fact began from respectful awe, and then through many experiences of “enlightenment,” gradually shifted from respectful awe to liberal dispersal, a process of transition from firm human grasping to following the natural. This was a process of dregs

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becoming integrated and temperament mellowing. The characteristics of Neo-Confucianism, its pan-moralism, its unification of learning and self-cultivation, its emphasis on personal experience and obtaining spiritual enjoyment, etc. all determined that Neo-Confucians concerned with Heaven, humanity, inherent nature and endowment generally underwent a process of progress in learning being followed by a gradual elevation of their spiritual plane. In the six levels of Wang Yangming’s course of learning, “With each of the first three changes in his learning, he began to attain its method,” and then “After his learning was established, there were three more changes” [see Ch. 6]. After Luo Qinshun 罗钦顺 experienced an enlightenment of the mind’s empty numinosity from “the pine tree in the courtyard” [see Ch. 21], he began to probe the mind and inherent nature, and after accumulating ten years of experience, he saw the reality of mind and inherent nature. Though at first, Chen Xianzhang did not grasp the tenet of the unification of mind and inherent nature, he later cast off the complex and concerned himself with reduction, cultivating the first inkling in stillness [see Ch. 4]; he then passed from stillness to activity, until finally, after more than twenty years, he became enlightened as to the tenet of the single thread unifying internal and external, stillness and activity. These are all matters that are commonly known in the history of academic learning in the Ming Dynasty. According to Gao Panlong’s own account, the key moments in the deepening of his lifelong learning were: first, his becoming enlightened that “the mind is not concentrated in the heart’s aperture”; second, his becoming enlightened that “the six directions are all the mind, the cavity is its realm, the heart’s aperture is also its original substance, that which is divine and illuminates it, and there is never any form or place to speak of” in the lodging house in Dingzhou; third, when at the age of forty-five (the 43rd year) he came to firmly believe in Mencius’ tenet of the goodness of human nature, thinking that “In this inherent nature there is no past or present, no sage or commoner, and Heaven, Earth and humanity all possess only a single one. Only when the highest root is pure and clear with no occlusion can one believe in humanity. The rest all lies in force of learning. When one is even slightly separated from dirt, one can immediately be liberated for a thousand miles (“Record of Painstaking Learning,” Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3); fourth, when in the next year (the 44th year) he came to believe Cheng Hao’s 程颢 tenet that “As with kites flying and fish jumping, there must be constant practice”; fifth, when he came to believe the tenet of Centrality in the Ordinary. There is no significant difference between the content of the last two instances of enlightenment. Gao Panlong himself described what he attained in the enlightenment of the 44th year: That which is called inherent nature is heavenly and natural in all its variety, and is not from human effort; when kites fly and fish jump, who is it that makes them do so? “Neither forgetting nor assisting,” [see Mencius, 2A.2] means to warn scholars about their exertions. When the machinery of the real flows into movement, it diffuses and spreads, deploying in cascades from time immemorial to the present without even a moment’s rest, so where could there be forgetting or assisting? Thus there must be constant practice as with planting grain, whose roots, shoots, flowers and fruits, although they change and transform naturally, nonetheless require cultivation and irrigation, and everything lies in encouraging effort in learning. (“Record of Painstaking Learning,” Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 3)

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We can say, the enlightenment of the 43rd year mainly concerned a stronger understanding of the content of inherent nature, while the enlightenment of the 44th year mainly concerned its form. Although later “his cultivation became purer and his effort more refined,” the gist of his learning never departed from this. For Gao Panlong, the function of effort is to lead that which is present at the level of original substance from its latent state into the level of actuality, that is, to make principle manifest in the mind, such that the mind and principle become one. As quoted above: “Principle is the mind, and that which fathoms it is also the mind. However, the mind that has not fathomed cannot be called principle, the principle that has not been fathomed cannot be called the mind, and this point cannot be grasped without fathoming participation and marvellous enlightenment. With such enlightenment, all things have their Heavenly regularity, such that amidst daily tasks, things return to their regularities, and they are like this without any interference from the self” (“Reply to Liu Niantai” 2, Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 8A). “Principle is the mind” refers to the mind at the latent level; in “that which fathoms it is also the mind,” this mind refers to an actual and phenomenal numinous brightness. If the mind does not fathom principle, it cannot achieve “mind and principle as one,” and a principle that has not undergone the effort of being manifested in numinous brightness is not an actual principle. Here, the original substance is latent while effort is actual, and what Gao Panlong emphasised is that although that which effort reaches is original substance, this is simply “things returning to their regularity,” and the subject does not add anything that was not originally present. This is different from Yangming, especially in his later years. Wang Yangming thought that innate moral knowing is an appearance, “inherent nature” manifesting at the level of “awareness,” and that this is innate moral knowing’s autonomous and automatic quality. As long as this “awareness” has not been occluded, the internal nature of innate moral knowing’s manifestation on the surface level of the mind is inevitable, and cannot be obstructed. Gao Panlong however emphasised effort. Inherent nature has no function of active manifestation. The active quality of inherent nature is much weaker in Gao Panlong in comparison to Wang Yangming. While Yangming’s innate moral knowing is both mind and principle, Gao Panlong’s latent metaphysical principle is not constantly revealed in the mind. For Gao Panlong, effort is a medium, a precondition for the intersection of the principle of inherent nature and the mind. The substance of inherent nature will not spontaneously flow into the external, and depends on the activation of effort. This is also unlike Wang Longxi, for whom setting the myriad causal influences aside is effort, and the flowing movement of the substance of inherent nature is spontaneous. Thus, on condition that the mind is not separate from things, he still did not abolish effort. Gao Panlong also had other similar expressions, such as when he said: Where does human life have the slightest part that is not steady and true? Where is there the slightest part that is not perfect? When one’s actions are not steady and true, or one’s awareness is not perfect, this is all something added on after one is born, a thought added on. In its original state and root quality, where is there any of this? Yet if one constantly illuminates its root quality, maintaining respect from morning till night, not becoming lost

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in incidental matters, then one will reach the status of a sage, which is just like this. (“Lecture Notes: ‘Man is Upright at Birth’ Section [see Analects, 6.19]” [Jiangyi: Ren zhi sheng ye zhi zhang 讲义
人之生也直章], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 4)

Once scholars of the middle Ming Dynasty had received the baptism of Yangming Learning, they had been already altered from the rut of Song Confucianism. Other than the single school of Lu Jiuyuan, Song Confucians seldom talked of the interconnectedness of inherent nature and mind. Zhu Xi strictly distinguished between the mind, inherent nature and emotion, with inherent nature as metaphysical and emotion as phenomenal, inherent nature as substance and emotion as function, the mind ruling over inherent nature and emotion, and the mind as the site for the concentrated gathering of inherent nature and emotion. Lu Jiuyuan spoke of the mind as principle, yet he only established his theory from the phenomenal “original mind.” Wang Yangming connected together mind and inherent nature, but although inherent nature was metaphysical, it possessed the active ability to manifest as mind, with mind as the site for the appearance of inherent nature, and the inherent nature that appears in the mind as innate moral knowing. “Innate moral knowing is inherent nature,” innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle, and inherent nature and mind are directly connected. Gao Panlong was greatly influenced by the Learning of the Mind, and he not only said that the myriad phenomena of the cosmos are both mind and things, but also believed that inherent nature and mind are directly connected. Hence he held the view that “Where does human life have the slightest part that is not steady and true… the slightest part that is not perfect?” This is also “centrality in the ordinary”: centrality is the inherent nature of the original mind, while the ordinary is following inherent nature in daily tasks and ordinary conduct. Hence Gao Panlong explained Centrality in the Ordinary by saying: Centrality in the ordinary is not a spoken theory suspended in mid-air, but is manifested through people’s bodies. If scholars want to recognise centrality in the ordinary, they need to each recognise it immediately through their own bodies. What is “centrality”? It is my body and mind; what is “the ordinary”? It is my daily tasks. How can the mind and body be central? Only when they are solely pure and clean, extensive in their great impartiality, then they are. The body and mind are not central, but when one can be extensive without any things, they are central. How can daily tasks be called the ordinary? Only when they are usual and ordinary, following and responding to things as they come, then they are. Daily tasks are not the ordinary, but when one can follow affairs without any emotion, they are ordinary. At this point one is left with nothing, it is a pinnacle that has been reached, and above this there is nothing more to remove. Hence the text says, “Centrality in the ordinary, is this not perfection?” [see Centrality in the Ordinary, Sect. 3] This is the Heavenly root quality of people at birth. (“Lecture Notes: ‘Centrality in the ordinary as a virtue’ Section [see Analects, 6.29]” [Jiangyi: Zhongyong zhiwei de zhang 讲义
中庸之谓德章], Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 4)

Here, Gao Panlong’s view already raised centrality in the ordinary to the level of a unity of original substance and effort. Centrality in the ordinary is both original substance and also effort. Extensive in great impartiality, following and responding to things as they come, this is just to restore its original quality. Here, Gao

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Panlong’s approach is already not the respect spoken of by the Cheng brothers, but rather following inherent nature, centrality in the ordinary. At this time, the so-called “respect” is a kind of function that makes the realm of the mind clear and quiet. To be respectful is to be suddenly open with no affairs. When one is suddenly open with no affairs, the substance of inherent nature naturally flows into movement. Gao Panlong had indeed already left behind Zhu Xi’s triple division of mind, inherent nature and emotion, and moved toward an interconnectedness of mind and inherent nature. His theory had a clear tendency toward harmonising Master Zhu Learning and Wang Learning as one. When earlier scholars researched Gao Panlong, they mostly noted his aspect of personal practice and concrete exercise, thinking him to be close to Xue Xuan, yet this alone is insufficient to discuss his work as a whole. Gao Panlong wanted to warn against the excesses of the later stages of Wang Learning and correct them by bringing them back to the concrete, yet his theory of original substance in fact differed from that of Xue Xuan. Xue Xuan had not yet passed through the crucible of Wang Learning, and still followed the old path of Master Zhu Learning. Gao Panlong however had passed through the crucible of the Learning of the Mind and his investigation of things was knowledge of the root, his investigation of things and fathoming of principle directly a matter of cultivation with no separation between them, so there was no need for the investigation of things and maintaining respect to be equal, progress together and be in constant codependence. He repeatedly emphasised concrete cultivation and attainment, yet regarded enlightenment as a path that must be followed in order to obtain the right spiritual plane for cultivation. This is the final purpose of the investigation of things. His academic learning indeed was a process from entering through Master Zhu to unifying Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang as one. This point is important to understand. This last thing to note is that Gao Panlong once categorised the representative figures of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism into groups. His categorisation shares some similarities with those proposed by modern scholars, that is to say, it is not entirely wrong to argue that Gao Panlong was a precursor to modern figures (such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三) in terms of his division of Song-Ming Neo-Confucian schools. Gao Panlong once discussed the relative merits and deficiencies of various Neo-Confucian scholars with his students: Someone asked: “Between Kangzhai [i.e. Wu Yubi] and Baisha [i.e. Chen Xianzhang], who was more enlightened?” He said: “He was not as thoroughly clear as Baisha.” “And what was Mr. Hu Jingzhai 胡敬斋 [i.e. Hu Juren 胡居仁] like?” He said: “Jingzhai was one who completed inherent nature through respect.” “What of the learning of Yangming and Baisha?” He said: “They are different. Yangming and Lu Zijing 陆子静 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan] belong to the same vein as Mencius. Yangming’s talent was greater than that of Zijing, while Zijing’s mind was cruder than Mencius. Ever since ancient times, in terms of the achievements of sages and worthies, they all belong to a certain vein. Lianxi [i.e. Zhou Dunyi], Mingdao [i.e. Cheng Hao] and Master Yan [i.e. Yan Hui 颜回] belong to one vein, Yangming, Zijing and Mencius to another, Hengqu 横渠 [i.e. Zhang Zai], Yichuan 伊川 [i.e. Cheng Yi], Master Zhu and Master Zeng 曾子 to another, and Baisha, Kangjie 康节 [i.e. Shao Yong 邵雍] and Zeng Dian 曾点 to another.” Yanwen 彦文 said: “What of

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Jingzhai and Kangzhai?” He said: “They were one vein with Yin Hejing 尹和靖 and Zixia 子夏.” (“Sayings from Meetings,” Posthumous Writings of Master Gao, Vol. 5)

Here, Gao Panlong divided Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism’s representative figures into five groups: Lianxi and Mingdao made up one group, continuing a line from Master Yan; Yangming and Xiangshan made up another, continuing a line from Mencius; Hengqu, Yichuan and Master Zhu made up another; continuing a line from Master Zeng; Baisha and Kangjie made up one group, continuing a line from Zeng Dian; Hu Juren and Wu Yubi made up one group, continuing a line from Zixia. The division between the first three groups was clearly based on differences in their learning of mind and inherent nature. The latter two groups were based on the unrestrained, impetuous spirit of their effort. Lianxi and Mingdao combined Heaven and humanity on a single plane, rooting humanity’s substance of inherent nature in the dao of Heaven and the Supreme Polarity, such that mind and inherent nature are one. In terms of effort in cultivation, they both directly reached the substance of inherent nature, with Lianxi having no desire in maintaining stillness and Mingdao recognising and preserving benevolence. Yangming and Xiangshan regarded the mind as manifesting inherent nature, with inherent nature as the spontaneous manifestation of the mind in its state of original substance. Effort thus lies in removing the occlusions of the mind, and making the substance of inherent nature in the mind flow into movement. Xiangshan’s stripping away of material desires and Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing (correction of thoughts) all display this approach. For Yichuan and Master Zhu, inherent nature is present in the mind, yet the mind is not directly inherent nature, and effort lies in the mutual progress and reinforcement of fathoming principle and self-cultivation. Placing Hengqu in the Yichuan-Master Zhu group and not the Lianxi-Mingdao group clearly views his emphasis on fathoming numinosity and knowing transformation as close to Yichuan and Master Zhu’s emphasis on the investigation of things and fathoming of principles, with Hengqu’s view of mind as ruling over inherent nature and emotion being a basis for Master Zhu, and the two schools both emphasising the study of the objective. Modern scholar Mou Zongsan divided Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism into four groups. The general and holistic group who had not yet become separated in terms of the direction of their effort included Lianxi, Hengqu and Mingdao, with this group’s characteristic being their unifying of the substance of dao, that of inherent nature, of sincerity, of numinosity, of benevolence and even of the mind as one. Thus, in comparison with the state of natural indistinction of effort and original substance found in pre-Qin Confucianism, theirs can be called a “perfectly rounded teaching” (yuanjiao 圆教). Beneath the perfectly rounded teaching, three groups can be distinguished: one containing Wufeng 五峰 [i.e.Hu Hong 胡宏] and Jishan 蕺山 [i.e. Liu Zongzhou], one containing Xiangshan and Yangming, and one containing Yichuan and Master Zhu. The group of Wufeng and Jishan set out by inheriting the perfectly rounded teaching of Lianxi and Mingdao, emphasised the original unity of the substance of the mind and the holistic completion of the perfectly rounded teaching, except with fine distinctions or distinctions that can be

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combined through a fundamental concept, and did not unilaterally emphasise the mind. The group of Xiangshan and Yangming emphasised the mind, regarding the mind as the basis for all illumination (emphasising its epistemological meaning), all embellishment (emphasising its moral meaning), and all expansion (emphasising its unity with original substance). The group of Yichuan and Master Zhu held that inherent nature was present in the mind, but that it is not simply the mind, separating the mind and inherent nature. They regarded the investigation of things and fathoming of principle along with cultivation and maintaining respect as the preconditions for the transformation of the substance of knowledge and that of inherent nature. Mou Zongsan regarded Hengqu as an integration above these three groups, believing that his learning of the empty void as qi “unified being and non-being, the hidden and manifest, numinosity and transformation, and inherent nature and endowment as one with no duality,” and that his views such as “only the great mind is able to embody the things under Heaven” and “that which the virtuous inherent nature knows does not stem from that which is seen and heard” also do not emphasise conscious understanding, and do not regard the mind as an original source that encompasses everything. Gao Panlong did not emphasise Hu Hong, perhaps because although the latter’s learning covered a very broad range, he did not have a status in academic history like those of Master Zhu or Yangming, and the special characteristics of his thought were not as obvious as theirs. Mou Zongsan also did not emphasise Chen Xianzhang and Hu Juren. This was because, in his categorisation, he selected representative figures in the history of Neo-Confucianism and focused purely on theories of original substance, based on scholars’ views of the relation between mind, inherent nature and emotion, as well as how they understood the relation between epistemology and theories of original substance. Since Chen Xianzhang and Hu Juren’s status in the history of Neo-Confucianism cannot be compared with those of the above three groups, and their particular points only concern theories of effort with no special contribution to theories of original substance, so they naturally fell outside his arguments. Mou Zongsan was a scholar baptised into modern philosophy, one who delved deeply into the core of Western ontology and epistemology, and whose own philosophy belonged to the Learning of the Mind. He used this to analyze and expound representative thought in Chinese philosophy, and hence developed this method of categorisation. Gao Panlong and Gu Xiancheng were both leaders of the Donglin School, and since Gu Xiancheng was focused on denouncing the excesses of the later stages of Wang Learning and debating the tenet of the goodness of human nature, his theories of original substance and effort were both simple and unembellished, his arguments not particularly profound. Gao Panlong discussed various aspects of original substance and effort, and in ways that were both more complete and more profound than Gu Xiancheng. In particular, Gao Panlong’s emphasis on both enlightenment and cultivation, together with his continual deepening and progress, meant that the questions is came into contact with and reflected upon were far more numerous than those of Gu Xiancheng. For example, in terms of aspects including the purpose of the investigation of things, the relation between the investigation of things and

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self-cultivation, enlightenment and cultivation, and abiding in stillness and spontaneity, he provided detailed discussions. The depth and breadth of his theories were a step ahead in comparison with those of Gu Xiancheng. Thus Huang Zongxi said: “In Donglin learning, Jingyang [i.e. Gu Xiancheng] guided it at its source, but Jingyi [i.e. Gao Panlong] began to enter its fine points” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1449). The Donglin School’s criticisms of later developments in Wang Learning, its combination of Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang, its emphasis on cultivation and effort, and even its moral integrity all exerted an important influence on the Jishan School.

Chapter 27

Liu Zongzhou’s Studies of Sincere Intention and Being Careful When Alone

Liu Zongzhou was the last great Confucian of the Ming Dynasty. His thought took the unity and non-duality of Heaven and humanity, principle and qi 气, inherent nature and endowment, aroused and non-aroused and effort and original substance as fundamental, and took sincere intention and being careful when alone as central. It was a continuation of [Wang] Yangming and the Donglin 东林 School, and was developed by Huang Zongxi, representing a culmination of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism by a foremost scholar of the Ming-Qing changeover, and to a certain degree anticipated the direction of development taken by learning of meaning and principle (yili 义理) in the Qing Dynasty. Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 (1578–1645; zi 字 Qidong 起东, hao 号 Niantai 念台) was from Shanyin 山阴 in Zhejiang province. Since he lectured at Jishan 蕺山, he was referred to by scholars as Master Jishan. During the reign of the Wanli Emperor he passed the imperial examination and was appointed as a senior messenger in the Messenger Office. Later he became secretary in the Ministry of Rites, assistant in the Court of Imperial Entertainments, vice minister in the Office of Seals, vice minister in the Court of the Imperial Stud, and right vice commissioner in the Office of Transmission, but after repeatedly presenting letters of resignation, his superiors criticised him as “quarrelsome and cynical” and he was stripped of his position and returned to being a commoner. At the beginning of the reign of the Chongzhen Emperor he took a position as governor of Shuntian 顺天 prefecture, but presented letters discussing affairs that disagreed with the intentions of certain powerful ministers, and was again stripped of his position and returned to being a commoner. He was reinstated as a left assistant minister in the Ministry of Personnel, rose to a censor in the Left Sector, but when he presented letters disagreeing with the intentions of his superiors, he was stripped of his position once again and returned to being a commoner. When the royal house of the Ming crossed to the south they reinstated his original position, but, not being tolerated by certain powerful ministers, he declared he wished to return to his home. The Qing army moved south, Zhejiang fell, and, seeing that there was no hope for a restoration of the imperial house of the Ming, he refused to eat for twenty days and died. © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_27

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In his youth Liu Zongzhou was educated by his maternal grandfather Zhang Ying 章颍, when he passed the imperial examination he was presented to Xu Fuyuan 许孚远, and he was encouraged in his studies by Liu Yongcheng 刘永澄 and Gao Panlong 高攀龙 of the Donglin School. Later he established an academic society of “proven men” (zhengren 证人) in the countryside, and clearly stated his educational precepts in his Regulations of the Society of Proven Men (Zhengren sheyue 证人社约). His theories unified Cheng-Zhu 程朱 and Lu-Wang 陆王 with Zhang Zai 张载 and Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, yet also possessed originality, opening up a unique approach that was a product of Neo-Confucianism developing into its period of culmination.1

1 Dao-Substance Liu Zongzhou differed from Wang Yangming’s speaking of dao in terms of innate moral knowing, and also from Zhu Xi’s speaking of dao in terms of principle. Liu Zongzhou’s dao-substance (daoti 道体) referred to the overall circulation and transformation of the myriad images of the cosmos, i.e. an inclusive vision of the overall process of the cosmos. He said: The Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经) says: “The ordinances of Heaven, how majestic and unending!” [see Odes of Zhou (Zhou song 周颂), “Decade of Qing Miao” 清庙之什] It also says: “The virtue of King Wen is pure, pure and unending” [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)]. Is this unceasing not the substance of the dao? The dao cannot be seen, it rides upon the inflexions of qi and flows into movement, folding and unfolding within it. This passing on is its inflexion, hence it is said: “First yin and now yang, this is the dao” [see the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系 辞上)]. The myriad transformations advancing and shifting is all this. (“Case Studies of the Analects” [Lunyu xue’an 论语学案] No. 2, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 1, 404)

“Majestic and unending” and “pure and unending” use phrases from the Book of Poetry to describe the majestic and vast circulation and transformation of the dao of Heaven, producing and reproducing without rest, eternally thus. Heaven, Earth and the myriad things each transform and are produced according to their inherent natures, and the dao of Heaven is the general substance of these myriad transformations. Qi is the primordial basis of the myriad things, and the real substance of all thing myriad things in the dao of Heaven is qi. Hence the dao of Heaven rides on qi in circulating and transforming, and the circulation and transformation of the dao is in reality the activity and stillness, the opening and closing of yin and yang qi. “Passing on” comes from “Confucius standing by a stream, said: ‘That which passes on is just like this, not ceasing day or night!’” [see Analects, 9.17], and refers

1

[Trans.] References are to Liu Zongzhou, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou (Liu Zongzhou quanji 刘宗周全集), Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2007.

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to the flowing of specific things within the dao of Heaven. The flowing of specific things all operates by riding upon the inflexions of qi. In Liu Zongzhou’s philosophy, qi is an extremely important concept, yet he did not analyse qi’s states of quality and movement in detail as Zhang Zai did, nor did he go to great lengths to prove the relationship between principle and qi as Zhu Xi did, and even less did he regard qi as the material aspect of the mind as Wang Yangming did. Instead, he generally argued that qi is the foundation of the daosubstance, inherent nature-substance (xingti 性体) and mind-substance (xinti 心体), such that dao, inherent nature, mind, central harmony (zhonghe 中和), etc. are all names focusing on different aspects of qi, and none of them can exist in separation from qi. Qi is the only real substance between Heaven and Earth. He said: That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is simply one qi. Since there is qi, there are numbers, since there are numbers, there are images, since there are images, there are names, since there are names, there are things, since there are things, there are inherent natures, and since there are inherent natures, there is the dao, hence the dao is something that arises later. Those who seek the dao always seek it before there began to be qi, thinking that dao produced qi, but in this case what kind of thing is dao that it can produce qi? (“Words on Learning” [Xueyan 学言] Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 407)

Qi is the most fundamental existent, numbers are the qualities and regularities of operation of qi, images are the forms and images possessed by qi when it condenses to form things, and names are referential signs given on the basis of forms and images. Only once there are names can one indicate that things have unique qualities to differentiate them from other things. Here, dao is principle, denoting the eternal and unchanging qualities of things, and this is why he said that since there are inherent natures, there is the dao. Dao here is different from dao as the general substance of the myriad transformations, and different from dao in “the dao of Heaven is simply an accumulation of qi.” The various designations such as name, thing, inherent nature and dao that emerge from qi each have their referents and cannot be used indiscriminately. The existence of the specific things constituted by qi along with their movements constitutes the dao, so the foundation of dao is qi, and qi is the ultimate existent. He said: Some say: “The void produces qi.” The void is qi, how could it produce it? If one traces back to the state before qi began to exist, wherever one goes there is nothing but qi. When it inflects, it moves from nothing to being, so there is being but has never begun to be being; when it extends, it moves from being to nothing, so there is nothing but has never begun to be nothing. That which is between non-being and non-nothing, and is both being and non-being, this is called the Great Void [taixu 太虚], and it can also be expressed and honoured as the Great Polarity [taiji 太极]. (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 407-408)

Here Liu Zongzhou invoked Zhang Zai’s account of the empty void as qi, and denied absolute nothingness. Qi condenses and forms things, instead of things being produced from absolute nothingness, so there is being but has never begun to be being; things disperse and return to qi, instead of things disappearing and

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vanishing completely, hence there is nothing but has never begun to be nothing. Qi is both non-being and non-nothing, and also being and nothing. When Liu Zongzhou argued that qi is the primordial basis of the myriad things, he wanted to point out a kind of direction for thought: the dao of Heaven is the natural foundation for human existence, but the dao of Heaven is simply qi, and there is no ultimate, primordial original substance outside of physical qi. Humanity is a duplicate of the dao of Heaven, the reference for effort in cultivation is the dao of Heaven, and its basis is internal to humanity itself. He repeatedly stressed the immanence of the dao of Heaven, saying: Heaven is a general name for the myriad things, and not the sovereign of things; dao is a general name for the myriad apparatuses (qi 器), and not the substance of apparatuses; inherent nature is a general name for the myriad forms, and not the partner of forms. (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 408)

Here, although the analysis of things, apparatuses and forms is excessive, his intention is very clear. Heaven, dao and inherent nature are not external or superior to the myriad things, but are different names given on the basis of focusing on different aspects of things: Heaven is spoken of in relation to specific things, and emphasises the aspect of being all-encompassing. Here, “things” includes all modes of formed, formless, physical, human, natural and artificial existents. All modes of existents are included in the scope of Heaven, such that “the myriad things collectively constitute one Heaven” [see Guo Xiang 郭象, Commentary to the Zhuangzi 庄子注]. Dao is spoken of in relation to specific formed apparatuses, and is an abstraction from the regularities of the myriad apparatuses. The myriad apparatuses and dao have a relation of principle as one and its particularisations as diverse (liyi fenshu 理一分殊). Inherent nature focuses on the profound and subtle essences of specific things, and refers to the sum total of the attributes and properties of material things. Here, none of Heaven, dao and inherent nature refers to an absolute above or beyond specific things. Liu Zongzhou not only emphasised the flowing of the great transformations of the cosmos, but also noted the ruler (zhuzai 主宰) amidst the flowing of great transformations. In his view, the dao of Heaven is not a confused, disorderly and chaotic field, but rather an orderly movement under the command of a ruler. In the dao of Heaven, the myriad things each accords with the necessary movement of its own original inherent nature, but the revolution of the dao of Heaven as a whole all follows a certain kind of established order and direction. The dao of Heaven is an eternal and ceaseless process that is both under command and also flows. Liu Zongzhou said: The single qi of Heaven circulates and flows, revolving and operating at all times, yet the singular point of the North Star does not move, like the heart of a mill or the hub of a carriage wheel. Since the myriad transformations all emerge from this, it is called the celestial pivot. (“Case Studies of the Analects” No. 1, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 1, 277) The celestial pivot is eternally unmoving, while the revolution and operation of the one qi, now opening and now returning, all emerge from this. The theory of “maintaining stillness

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and establishing the polarity” was based on this. (“Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 378) The dao of Heaven is simply an accumulation of qi, and the location of its pivot is the North Star, hence its revolution is the wonder of a single unit. The five phases come forth in sequence, never transgressing in transgressing in yang or submitting in yin in their work. Since it faces towards the subtle, unmoving celestial pivot and takes it as its master, the fullness of the empty void is merely a single lump of wandering qi, and if this dispersed in an instant, would people not disappear and things come to an end? (“Miscellaneous Explanations in Proven Learning” [Zhengxue zajie 证学杂解], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 269)

For Liu Zongzhou here, there is no thing that does not move, and no moment without movement. The celestial pivot (tianshu 天枢) he mentions is in reality also in motion, except that its movement is extremely subtle, and so in relation to the other celestial bodies that revolve around it, one can say in does not move. Liu Zongzhou once gave an explanation for the statement that “Heaven moves at all times, while the celestial pivot does not move”: “The movement of the celestial pivot is extremely subtle, so like the tiniest point of the thread from the tube of a spinning wheel, where can its movement be seen? Hence it was said, ‘it resides in its place’ [see Analects, 2.1]. In reality the subtlety of one thread and that of the circumference of a carriage wheel are one and the same revolution, never ceasing for even a moment, hence it was said, ‘The ordinances of Heaven, how majestic and unending!’” (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 428). Liu Zongzhou stressed the importance of the fact that Heaven has a central pivot and a ruler because he saw things from the perspective of Heaven and humanity as one substance, and held that the revolution of Heaven is consistent with that of the human mind. The celestial pivot is the macrocosmic “singular substance” (duti 独体), while “intentionality” (yi 意) is the microcosmic “singular substance,” as he said: “‘Without polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity’ [see Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐, Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太极图说)], this is the substance of the singularity.” He also said: “‘That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature’ [see Centrality in the Ordinary], this is the singular substance” (both from “Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 395–396). The former refers to the celestial pivot, the latter to the pivot of the human mind. The dao of Heaven is the ground of the human mind, while the human mind is a specific and subtle dao of Heaven; just as Heaven has its unmoving celestial pivot, so the human mind has its “profoundly fixed direction,” i.e. “intentionality.” Liu Zongzhou once said: The celestial pivot revolves around its profundity, the axis of the earth stretches along its centre, and the human mind hides in its singular consciousness. (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 409) Heaven is one, and speaking in terms of its rulership we call it Lord (di 帝). The mind is one, and speaking in terms of its rulership we call it intentionality. (“Words on Learning” Pt. III, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 442)

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The pivot of Heaven is the northern polestar, the pivot of Earth is the earth’s axis, and the pivot of humanity is “singular consciousness” (dujue 独觉). This singular consciousness is “intentionality,” and it is called singular consciousness because it is an a priori intentional direction that commands and regulates all of a person’s thoughts, is the most profound and subtle existence of the human mind, is not opposed to things, and is only possessed and known by individual people. Liu Zongzhou expounded the celestial pivot in order to explain the existence of the “intentionality” of the human mind, to provide a basis for his effort of cultivation, and to provide the grounds for his criticism of the Longxi 龙溪 Taizhou School’s view of flowing with no ruler. The idea of intentionality is of paramount importance in Liu Zongzhou’s philosophy, and will be discussed in detail in the next section. Here we simply examine the dao of Heaven as the basis for intentionality. Although Liu Zongzhou said “that which fills Heaven and Earth is simply one qi” and “the dao of Heaven is an accumulation of qi,” he also said “that which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is the dao,” “that which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is the mind,” “that which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is inherent nature,” and “that which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is principle.” For Liu Zongzhou, these propositions are not in contradiction, since the dao-substance is a synthetic complex that can be defined and described from many aspects. These multifaceted descriptions of the dao-substance precisely demonstrate the grand comprehension of Liu Zongzhou’s theory of original substance. Only such multifaceted description can exhaust the vastness and refinement of the dao-substance and manifest the richness and depth of human understanding. The richness and comprehension of the dao-substance Liu Zongzhou formed through extensively absorbing points from the studies of Cheng-Zhu, Lu-Wang and even Zhang Zai and Wang Tingxiang was outstanding among thinkers of his time and thereafter. Liu Zongzhou was an exceptional metaphysician, and his “method of intimate realisation” (qinqie tiren fa 亲切体认法) best expresses his intuitive understanding of the cosmos and human life: The body is in the middle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and not something that can be obtained privately by the self; the mind includes the externality of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and is not something that can be enclosed within a single membrane. Since that which penetrates Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is one mind, there is no other middle or externality to speak of; since that which embodies Heaven, Earth and the myriad things is one root, there is no other original root-mind to seek. (“Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 394)

The first sentence explains the nature of human beings. In Liu Zongzhou’s view, human beings are things in the middle of Heaven and Earth, they are not their own private possessions, and the regularities of their existence and activity is a part of the cosmos. The correct approach is to place human beings in a position of equality with the myriad things, understanding and accomplishing human beings through their relations with the myriad things. If one regards human beings as one’s own private possessions, one’s own degree of understanding will necessarily be bound and limited by the ego, one will inevitably be unable to possess the benevolence of

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being one body with the myriad things, to possess the mind of production and reproduction without end, and to be broad-minded enough to accommodate the multitude, and in terms of methods of cultivation one will necessarily sink down to “empty nothingness and quiet extinction” and “doing good to oneself alone.” Therefore, “The body is in the middle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and not something that can be obtained privately by the self” is the first step of a person’s “great man” sentiment, and is the foundation for the latter three sentences. The second sentence explains the nature of the mind. In Liu Zongzhou’s view, the mind is not simply a rational subject, but is more importantly a subject with intuitive understanding (juejie 觉解), imagination and spiritual plane (jingjie 境界). “The mind includes the externality of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” does not mean that the mind exists in some place outside of the human world, but rather that although the mind is within the heart and chest, the scope of its activity and content it covers can reach everywhere. Phrases such as “spirit roaming the eight extremities” and “thoughts connecting through the ages” are excellent descriptions of the activity of the mind. The mind cannot be held back by the specific things perceived by the senses. The thoughts, imagination, metaphors and contemplation of the mind are infinite. Only because the mind has this nature can people transcend the scope of their activities, break through their limitations, and achieve perfection in moral cultivation. Human beings are the most numinous of the myriad things, not simply because they are superior to other things in rationality, but because what it means to be human is to have intuitive understanding: intuitive understanding of the myriad things of the cosmos, intuitive understanding of the nature of humanity itself, intuitive understanding of the relation between humanity and the myriad things, and intuitive understanding of the significance of every specific activity in which they participate. Intuitive understanding allows all human activities to transcend the limits of specific interests and goals, and connect together with the elevation of cultivation and the sublimation of one’s spiritual plane. The mind’s not being confined by the scope of specific activities is the basis for the emergence of intuitive understanding. The third sentence explains the nature of things, smoothly following on from the previous two sentences. In the human mind that is not constrained by the privacy of the individual self or by specific perceptions, things are the things that are understood by and leave their impressions on the mind. The mind and external things no longer have the relation of subject and object or knower and known, since through the mind’s fusing and regulating activity toward things, both mind and things are endowed with much more content and significance than they originally possessed. The mind is no longer a small thing within the chest, since “that which fills Heaven and Earth is all mind”; things are no longer pure objects without any subjective properties, but are things that are both things and mind. In this kind of relation, mind and things are not external and juxtaposed on a par, but are perfectly fused and internal. Things are no longer merely objects to be conquered and taken advantage of by people, but become organic parts of humanity’s “greater self,” i.e. the “all people are my siblings and all things are my companions” spoken of by Zhang Zai [see his Western Inscription (Ximing 西铭)]. In terms of intellectual

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method, things in a relation of mind and things as one body are no longer objects perceived by human intellect, but objects illuminated by human intuition. Things are not analytic, directly manifesting their constitutive elements, but are synthetic, directly manifesting their holistic mode; they are not divided into their spatiotemporal locations, but rush forward before one’s very eyes and are present within the mind. This kind of relation of both mind and things clearly shows that the more lofty someone’s spiritual plane and thorough their understanding of apparatuses, the more significance this person endows to things and the greater the value things have to people. The degree of “mental transformation” (xinhua 心化) of things and “thing-transformation” (wuhua 物化) of the mind signifies a person’s degree of intuitive understanding. The fourth sentence explains the relation between humanity and the cosmos. Under the perception of human intuitive understanding, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things lose their previous barriers, and all become members of the great family of the cosmos; at this time, regardless of whether their root-origin is qi or mind, in the eyes of people with intuitive understanding they are homogeneous and no longer divided into self and other, hence there is no original mind to seek. In this state, human reason, imagination and intuitive understanding gradually fade, as do inherent nature, dao and principle, and all that is intuited is simply “one’s chest full of the mind of compassion.” At this time, the relation between mind and things is dissolved, and all that remains is the the benevolence of one body. When realisation reaches this point, we can say it has reached perfection. This kind of supreme intuitive understanding is precisely what Liu Zongzhou’s “method of intimate realisation” aims to achieve. What Liu Zongzhou’s “method of intimate realisation” relies on and achieves is Heaven and humanity as the root of each other, Heaven and humanity as the reciprocal basis for existence and knowledge. He said: There is one mind, yet in Heaven it is called sincerity and is the root of humanity, while in humanity it is called illumination and is the root of Heaven. Hence humanity is rooted in Heaven, and Heaven is also rooted in humanity. (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 408)

Here, although all is the one dao-substance, this dao-substance is a spiritual plane that people only have once they have intuitive understanding, and hence this daosubstance is at the same time also the mind. That is to say, although all is the one mind, this mind is necessarily one with the dao-substance. This dao-substance (mind-substance) in Heaven is sincerity: “sincerity” (cheng 诚) means integrity and non-deception, and refers to the eternal thusness of the dao of Heaven, authentic, real and without illusion. This is the starting point for all human activity, and hence it is “the root of humanity.” Yet since human beings can come to know this sincerity and become one with it, they simultaneously endow Heaven with significance, and hence are “the root of Heaven.” It is easy to see that “humanity is rooted in Heaven,” but that “Heaven is rooted in humanity” is something that was only spoken by a few outstanding metaphysicians with a profound understanding of the relation between Heaven and humanity. To say that Heaven is rooted in

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humanity is not merely to say that Heaven, Earth and the myriad things rely on the participation and assistance of humanity in their transformation and proliferation, as this is only a shallow and concrete level. More importantly, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are objects entrusted with human understanding, objects expressed from the human bosom, and objects projected from the human moral and spiritual plane, and this aspect can only be achieved if one has profound experience and intuitive understanding. The participation and assistance of humanity in transformation and proliferation can be obtained through practical benefit, while humanity’s intuitive understanding of the cosmos is a purely spiritual demand, the natural result of a spiritual plane that transcends utility and material gain. Here, Liu Zongzhou set out entirely from humanity’s purpose in cultivation, and viewed the relation between humanity and the cosmos in terms of developing humanity’s various latent abilities to perfection, possessing a broad and far-reaching vision.

2 Intentionality and Making One’s Intentions Sincere Liu Zongzhou’s unique explanation of the word “intention” (yi 意) is one of the most important aspects of his philosophy. The word “intention” is a natural extension of his view of dao-substance, with Liu setting out from his rectification of the corrupt practices of Wang Yangming’s followers and explicating it especially in terms of the theme of the directionality and dominance of the mind, giving the word “intention” deeper and broader theoretical content than its original meaning.

3 Uncovering the Word “Intention” Viewed in general terms, the effort of cultivation of Song-Ming Neo-Confucians did not go beyond the two approaches of the Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang schools. Cheng Yi 程颐 and Zhu Xi’s horizontal laying out of the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) was unable to connect these together through a single central concept. In the Great Learning, Cheng and Zhu placed most emphasis on the two concepts of the investigation of things and making one’s intentions sincere, in which the investigation of things refers to approaching things and seeking their principles, while making one’s intentions sincere refers to making the thoughts that arise within the mind return to goodness. However, that which is attained through the investigation of things is empirical knowledge, i.e. the principles of things, while that which is sought is the principles of inherent nature that directly serve the purposes of moral cultivation. If the investigation of things is to be of assistance to making one’s intentions sincere, then empirical knowledge must be converted through analogy and projection into moral knowledge, i.e. transforming the principles of things into Heavenly principle. For Cheng and Zhu, the effort of cultivation is that “self-discipline requires the use of respect, and

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progress in study lies in the extension of knowledge.” Here, the extension of knowledge and self-discipline are mutually advancing, such that “through illumination one extends sincerity, and through sincerity one extends illumination, so sincerity and illumination both progress.” However, the conversion of the principles of things into the principles of inherent nature is a kind of insight, a kind of spiritual plane, so that if one lacks this kind of insight or spiritual plane, one will inevitably slip into the search for empirical knowledge and be unable to gain any assistance in moral cultivation. Even Zhu Xi’s so-called spiritual plane of sudden comprehension, in which one reaches a state where “the refined and coarse outer surfaces and inner principles of things are all reached, and the complete substance and great functioning of my mind is all illuminated,” is still unable to guarantee that the knowledge extended necessarily ascends to or converts into Heavenly principle. For Confucian scholars who regarded moral cultivation as their primary task and ultimate goal, Cheng and Zhu’s approach to effort indeed contained the danger of “wandering without destination.” Seeing precisely this danger, Wang Yangming’s early failure to investigate bamboo along with his “residing in hardship with the barbarians, disturbing the mind and holding back inherent nature” at Longchang led him to see the separation between the investigation of things and making one’s intentions sincere implied in the Cheng-Zhu approach to effort, as he pointed out: When former Confucians explained the investigation of things as the investigation of the things of the world, how should the things of the world be investigated? Since they said that each and every grass and tree possesses principle, how should one investigate these? If one is constantly investigating grasses and trees, how can one reflect back and make one’s own intentions sincere? (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. III)

At Longchang, he grasped that “None of the things of the world can be investigated, the effort at investigating things can only be applied on one’s own mind” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). Later, from his own experience of “a myriad trials and tribulations,” Wang Yangming extracted his core principle of “the extension of innate moral knowing,” taking innate moral knowing as the root-substance and its extension as effort, such that the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying one’s mind are all unified into one affair. Wang Yangming’s approach to effort can be summed up in one point, namely, “When moving, think always of eliminating human desire and preserving Heavenly principle, and when still, think always of eliminating human desire and preserving Heavenly principle.” However, for Wang Yangming, the basis for judging the correctness or incorrectness of intentions is innate moral knowing, and since innate moral knowing is itself also a kind of knowing, is it necessarily always “innately moral” (liang 良)? Even though in his late years Wang Yangming’s cultivation attained a consummate state of “achieving the original mind whenever one opens one’s mouth, no longer needing any external assistance,” yet in theoretical terms, innate moral knowing itself as the basis for judgments of rightness and wrongness or goodness and badness still cannot guarantee that no badness intrudes. Among Wang Yangming’s followers, the school of ready-made innate moral knowing in general and Wang Longxi, Luo Rufang, etc. in particular

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advocated “solely trusting in one’s original mind” and “following and conforming to the spontaneous,” and therefore found it difficult to avoid the standards for conduct and for right and wrong becoming contaminated with content from personal feeling and subjective will, and thereby going against “Heavenly principle” as designated social moral norms. Liu Zongzhou saw this point, and, wanting to rectify the harms of Cheng-Zhu along with those of Yangming and his followers, attempted in theoretical terms to seek an a priori ruler for behaviour or a priori standard for judgments of right and wrong. As something corresponding to the ruler and pivot of the dao of Heaven, “intention” can precisely act as a ruler originally present in the mind. For this reason, Liu Zongzhou picked out the word “intention,” and took making one’s intentions sincere and being careful when alone as his core principles. Much of his theoretical work is an elaboration of the word “intention” from the aspects of the dao of Heaven and human affairs, the metaphysical and physical, the aroused and unaroused, and the centrality and harmony of inherent nature and feelings.

4 The Content of the Word “Intention” As a philosophical concept, the word “intention” (yi 意) originates from the Great Learning. In the “making one’s intentions sincere” (chengyi 诚意) spoken of in the Great Learning, “intentions” refers to the thoughts that occur within the mind. Although the paths of effort taken by Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming differed, their explanations of the word “intention” were the same, namely following the original meaning of the Great Learning in explaining it as the thoughts that occur within the mind. Regarding intentions as “thoughts” (yinian 意念) is the most common usage in the history of philosophy. However, a minority of Neo-Confucians also regarded intention as the deep and subtle directionality of the mind, such as Hu Juren’s 胡居 仁 comment that: “Intention refers to the mind possessing a focusing ruler [zhuanzhu 专主], so when An Explanation of the Great Learning [Daxue jie 大学 解] took it as something aroused by the mind, I’m afraid this is incorrect. That which is aroused by the mind is the feelings [qing 情]. Only Master Zhu’s comment in his Poems for Instructing Children [Xunmeng shi 训蒙诗] that ‘intention refers to the moment when feelings are focused by their ruler’ got close to this” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians [Mingru xue’an 明儒学案], 38). Here, he regarded intentions as the guide and controller of the thoughts that occur within the mind, rather than as the thoughts themselves, and was thus already very close to Liu Zongzhou’s view that “intentions are that which the mind preserves, not that which the mind produces.” Liu Zongzhou however was not satisfied with this kind of explanation, and said: I would say that Jingzhai 敬斋 [i.e. Hu Juren] was close, but not completely right. “The mind possessing a focusing ruler” speaks of their being a focusing ruler; since there is a focusing ruler, this is still the mind that pursues things, i.e. Master Zhu’s idea that “feelings are focused by their ruler.” When one reads the original Great Learning commentary’s

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statement that this is “like hating a bad smell or loving a beautiful face” however, one can see that this focusing ruler and spirit is simply goodness. Intention is originally like this, it is not only so after being made sincere. (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 441)

That is to say, “focusing ruler” only speaks of a state of the mind, and not of the content being ruled, and this content should be “intention,” namely the original intentionality of loving goodness and hating badness. The Jiangyou 江右 scholar Wang Shihuai’s 王时槐 usage of the word “intention” was also very special. He said: Intentions cannot be spoken of in terms of activity or stillness, since that which is moving or still are thoughts, not intentions. Intentions are a secret vitality of productive life, so anything that has inherent nature is constant in its life and makes intentions, and since it has intentions, these gradually concretise and make thoughts. ...There is nothing in the world that has inherent nature and does not intend, and inherent nature without intending would simply be obstinate emptiness; there is also nothing that has intentions but does not think, and intention without thoughts would simply be a sluggish machine. (“Reply to Yang Jinshan” [Da Yang Jinshan 答杨晋山], Collected Writings from Youqing Hall [Youqing tang he gao 友庆堂合稿], Vol. II, 20-21)

Here, he regards intentions as a certain kind of sincere feeling in the mind, and not the thoughts produced within the mind. Thoughts have activity or stillness, while intentions transcend activity and stillness. Unravelling Wang Shihuai’s meaning, intention for him refers to a kind of affect or feeling whose content is the vital impulse (shengji 生机) of endlessly productive life, the basis of which is inherent nature, such that anything possessing inherent nature has this vital impulse, and anything possessing this vital impulse manifests the thoughts aroused by it. Intention here is also something preserved by the mind and not aroused by it. However, Wang Shihuai’s “intentions” are concrete and have content, and their content is in reality just productive intention, which is different from Liu Zongzhou’s conception of intention as a ruler or dominator that is deeply hidden within the mind and determines the direction of occurrence of a posteriori thoughts. For Liu Zongzhou, intentions are not concrete, but rather a kind of directionality, albeit one that only points towards goodness or badness and not towards specific processes of conduct, and are also not a kind of specific affective feeling. Wang Dong 王栋 of Taizhou’s 泰州 discussions of intention are more detailed, and even closer to the meaning of the “intention” discussed by Liu Zongzhou. He said: In the past it was said that intentions are produced by the mind, to teach people to take care over the beginnings of the activity of thoughts. I doubt however, that if thoughts are moving, how can they be sincere? Hence the ruler of one’s body is called the mind, and the ruler of one’s mind is called intention. The mind is empty numinosity and good at responding, while the intentions have determinate directionality and central content. It is not the case that the mind is without a ruler, but that it depends on intention ruling it. Within the empty numinosity of one’s mind there is truly a ruler, and we can simply call it intention. In general, the refined essence of the mind is never motionless for even a moment, hence its vital impulse never rests and its wondrous responsiveness has no fixed pattern. However, there must be a ruler at its

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centre that is quietly motionless, and this is called intention. This is like the “intention” in the common word “idea” [zhuyi 主意, lit. “ruling intention”]. (“Correct Collection of Words from Meetings” [Huiyu zhengji 会语正集], Complete Collected Works of Wang Xinzhai [Wang Xinzhai quanji 王心斋全集], 148)

Wang Dong here already clearly stated that intention is not produced by the mind but rather contained by the mind, and criticised the method of effort based on taking care after moving thoughts arise, clearly arguing that intention is the ruler within the mind, and that this ruler itself is quietly motionless. This can be said to be very close to Liu Zongzhou’s conception of intention. However, it should be noted that Liu Zongzhou’s intention has a basis in the dao of Heaven: the pivot of the dao of Heaven is the ruler of the movements of Heaven. In the human mind, thoughts arise and disappear, flowing endlessly, yet “intention” is the stipulator and ruler of the thoughts and judgments that occur within the mind. In terms of a unified cosmos (including the dao of Heaven and the human mind), the laws of the two are the same. Liu Zongzhou’s conception of intention is thus a natural extension of his theory of the dao of Heaven. On the other hand, Liu Zongzhou never saw the works of Wang Dong, as was stated clearly in the declaration by the editor Dong Chang 董 玚 at the beginning of his Complete Writings of Master Liu [Liuzi quanshu 刘子全 书] and by Huang Zongxi in his preface to the Complete Writings. It can be said that Liu Zongzhou’s conception of intention was a product of his own self-attainment and self-realisation, or rather a combination of his theory of the dao of Heaven with his aspiration to rectify the harms of the actual learning of his time. We can summarise Liu Zongzhou’s own explanations of the word “intention” into the following contents: First, intention refers to the initial intentionality originally possessed within the mind that directs a posteriori thoughts. In Zhu Xi’s explanation of the Great Learning, he defined the word “intention” as the thoughts that arise within the mind. Liu Zongzhou disagreed with this kind of explanation, and he criticised Zhu Xi, saying: Intention is that which is preserved by the mind, not produced by the mind. Master Zhu’s gloss of intention as that which is produced is thus wrong. When the commentary section states that it is “like hating a bad smell or loving a beautiful face,” this states that the loves and hates coming from the centre are united in goodness and not divided in badness. Since they are united in goodness and not divided in badness, this shows precisely that this ruler preserved in the mind possesses goodness and no badness. (“Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 390)

This means that “intention” is not a thought arising within the mind. Thoughts are already aroused, while intention is the unaroused. Seeing a beautiful face and loving it or smelling a bad smell and hating it are both “thoughts” (nian 念), and are thus affairs belonging to the already aroused. However, this already aroused necessarily follows the “intention” to love a beautiful face or hate a bad smell originally present within the mind. This “intention” is the preserved ruler (cunzhu 存主), the initial intentionality that forms the basis for thoughts that arise. In this sense, it is a kind of existence that is always together with the mind whose content is “loving the good

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and hating the bad,” and thus in terms of the directionality of value it is purely good and without badness. Liu Zongzhou compared “intention” to the characteristic of a compass to always align with south: Intention is that by which the mind is the mind, and when one only speaks of the mind, the mind is simply an empty substance with a diameter of an inch. In focusing on the word intention, one can see its compass needle, and its meridian can be pointed to. However, the needle and the compass disc are always two different things. In comparison to the mind, intention is just a point of refined essence within this empty substance, and since there is just this one mind that is originally not attached to beings, how can one speak of it as nothing? (“Questions and Responses” [Wenda 问答] Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 337)

For Liu Zongzhou here, the distinction between mind, thought and intention is very clear, with the mind as an empty substance that produces and contains thoughts, and intention as the direction followed by the arising of thoughts. Thoughts belong to the experiential realm of psychological phenomena, while intention is deduced from the directionality of thoughts, and thus belongs to the metaphysical. Just as with a compass, its actual direction is its thoughts, while its quality of necessarily pointing south is its intention, such that the two are different things. Here, the distinction between intention and thoughts is very clear. Liu Zongzhou believed that since “intention” is not an actual activity, but rather a kind of metaphysical existence, so intention is not movement, but rather a kind of absolute stillness that transcends the activity or stillness and being or nothingness of concrete mental thoughts. He said: Since intentions are that which is preserved by the mind, so there is nothing as ultimately still as intention. Hence when Master Yangming said, “when the intention moves, there is good and bad,” what did he mean? Intention has no difference of good and bad, but simply loves the good and hates the bad. Loving and hating are the initial impulses of the mind, the most subtle substance. (“Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 390)

Since intention is the ruler that is always together with the mind and exists latently within it, it is called the preserved ruler. It is not the aroused, since the aroused are thoughts. Thoughts have activity or stillness, while intention transcends activity and stillness. In this sense, the sentence “when the intention moves, there is good and bad” in Wang Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching is wrong, since it regards “intention” as a thought with goodness or badness, as with Zhu Xi’s “produced by the mind.” Liu Zongzhou repeatedly emphasised that “intention” is simply the a priori intentionality that must love the good and hate the bad, and not the a posteriori activity of loving the good or hating the bad. This kind of intentionality is the “dao-mind” spoken of in the “sixteen-character transmission of the mind” [in the Book of Documents], hence he said it is “most subtle” (weiwei 惟微). This intentionality can also be called the “impulse” (ji 机), but this impulse is not the “inflections” (ji 几) of Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 “Sincerity is without action, inflections are good and bad” [see Tongshu 通书, Pt. 3]. Zhou Dunyi’s “inflections” are also affairs that are already aroused, and thus although their activity is subtle, they

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already belong to thoughts. Liu Zongzhou believed that his “impulse” was the “earliest indication of good fortune” spoken of in the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), namely the intentionality that forms the basis for the good or bad fortune of actual thoughts. Second, intention is the ruler of the mind. Since intention is the latent intentionality that determines the direction of mental thoughts, its most essential characteristic is that of the ruler. Liu Zongzhou believed that people’s thoughts and behaviour are all directed by “intention,” and because intention is “united in goodness and not divided in badness,” so it can also be called the “substance of sincerity” (chengti 诚体). People’s thoughts and behaviour depart from Heavenly principle precisely because the substance of sincerity becomes obscured. If the substance of sincerity were always clear, always illuminated, then behaviour directed by intention would be in accord with Heavenly principle. Replying to the question of a student concerning the difference between sages and ordinary people, he said: The common people use it [the dao] daily without knowing [see the Commentaries on the Changes] because their compass needle is constantly acting as ruler, and hence they use it every day. In unknowing knowing, the substance of sincerity is suddenly revealed. Hence the sages know this and share the same daily use with the common people, and their intentions are thereby sincere. “Sincerity is without action,” and hence where there is thought and exertion, one is not sincere, and when one is not sincere, this is not the original substance of intention. Observing the sincerity of intention can assist in realising that intention is the ruler of the mind, and does not belong to moving thought. (“Questions and Responses” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 339-340)

The sage and the common people both only have “intention” and the “substance of sincerity”; there difference lies in the fact that the common people are unaware of their own “intention,” while the sage is self-aware. However, regardless of whether one is self-aware or not, the substance of sincerity is always exerting its effect, always ruling people’s thoughts and behaviour. If one is self-aware, one can “make one’s intentions sincere,” i.e. maintain the clear state of the original substance of intention. If one is unaware, then intention may become obscured. In terms of being the ruler of behaviour, “will” (zhi 志) and “intention” can both be regarded as rulers. However, for Liu Zongzhou, will and intention should be clearly distinguished. Will is the directionality of behaviour and action, while intention is the latent intentionality that determines the direction of action. In terms of the complex Chinese philosophical category “qi 气,” intention is “the central [zhong 中] qi of the mind,” while will is “the root [gen 根] qi of the mind.” Liu Zongzhou said: The direction of the mind is called intention, just as the needle of a compass must point south. It only points south, and does not arise to head south. Any talk of direction refers to a fixed direction, and without the word “fixed” [ding 定] there can be no talk of direction, hence one can know that intention is the ruler of the mind. Where the mind aims is called the will, as when one says “aim one’s will at the dao” [zhidao 志道] or “aim one’s will on study,” which all say that it must be the mind of the sages and worthies, and thus still speak in terms of a ruler. Where the mind aims and where it heads [wang 往] are different. If one

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uses heading somewhere and walking a road to explain the word “aim” [zhi 之], then one casts aside the step of standing fixed on one’s heels. ... Intention is the qi qi (“Questions and Responses” Pt. I, , Vol. 2, 343)

Intention is a latent intentionality originally possessed a priori, like a compass needle necessarily pointing south, while will is the direction of a posteriori actions. Intention has its fixity, and the content of this fixity is loving goodness and hating badness, hence “intention” is a concept with ethical significance, while “will” has no ethical significance. The will must be ruled by intention, while intention is not ruled by the will. If one takes walking a road as an analogy, “aiming” has no fixed direction, while any talk of “going” [qu 去] or “heading” implies a fixed direction; “aiming” is an analogy for “will,” while “heading” is an analogy for “intention.” Thus, “will” is the “root qi” with no ethical direction, while “intention” is the “central qi” with an ethical direction. Third, intention is the centrality before arousal. The content of “intention” is both the latent intentionality of loving the good and hating the bad, and also transcends the activity or stillness of specific mental thoughts and is that which is preserved rather than aroused, hence it is also the centrality before arousal (weifa zhi zhong 未发之中). A dialogue between Liu Zongzhou and one of his students expresses this clearly: Someone asked: “Before any thought arises, where is intention located?” The master said: “Before any thought arises, intention is in precisely the correct and appropriate place. Thoughts have arising and disappearing, but intention does not have these. ...” Someone else asked: “After an affair passes and it responds quietly, where does intention return to?” The master said: “Intention is profoundly present at the centre, and since when there is movement it does not move, so when there is stillness it is not still. It originally has no place of origin, and it also has no place to return to. (“Questions and Responses” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 339)

Regardless of whether thoughts have arisen or not, intention is always in the central position, without activity or stillness, production or destruction, arrival or departure. Although intention never disappears, it can be illuminated or darkened, as when intention obscured by selfish desires is unable to penetrate concrete mental thoughts, and badness is thus produced. However, for Liu Zongzhou, specific bad thoughts can never be a function of the eternal centre. Centrality is the substance of sincerity, i.e. intention, and rectifying the mind means making one’s thoughts and behaviour accord with Heavenly principle. The substance of sincerity is the root, while the rectification of the mind is the branches, as Liu Zongzhou said: “Sincerity is spoken of in terms of substance, while rectification is spoken of in terms of function, hence in rectifying the mind one should first make one’s intentions sincere, returning to the root via the branches” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1552). Here, substance and function mean the root and the branches, the spring and the stream. Liu Zongzhou thus regarded “intention” as the centrality before arousal, different from all the representative views of Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊, Wang Yangming, etc.

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The mind spoken of by Zhu Xi mainly refers to the epistemological subject that receives external impressions, and it is empty of any things, a limpid void of illumination. In his Questions on the Great Learning (Daxue huowen 大学或问), he said: “People have one mind, a limpid void of illumination, like the emptiness of a mirror or the equilibrium of a balance. Since it can be taken as the ruler of a body, so its true substance is originally so.” Although Zhu Xi regarded inherent nature as before arousal and feelings as already aroused, with the mind dominating inherent nature and feelings, inherent nature is a category used to represent qualities, and does not exert an effect in reality. Although before the mind is aroused, it is inherent nature, however inherent nature does not directly interact with the mind, but rather exerts an effect on the mind in reality through the medium of concretely existing feelings. Hence Zhu Xi’s centrality before arousal is only the empty and still state before thoughts have appeared. Liu Zongzhou criticised this understanding of the centrality before arousal, believing that Zhu Xi’s idea was confused by Chan Buddhism, such that since there is no ruler within the mind, effort was severed into the two segments of the investigation of things and the preservation of the mind (cunxin 存心), while the preservation of the mind was again divided into the two paths of “preserving and cultivating in stillness, reflecting and observing in movement” with no main thread of cultivation uniting everything, and hence it fell apart into fragments. Liu Zongzhou also disagreed with Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming’s explanations of the centrality before arousal. Lu Jiuyuan held the view that “mind is principle,” took the “original mind” as his philosophical starting point, and advocated “gathering together the refined essence, becoming one’s own ruler, the myriad things all present within the self.” However, if the original mind lacks any effort of refinement, it can easily become mixed up with the habitual mind. Seeing this point, Wang Yangming specifically picked out the concept of “innate moral knowing” from within the original mind, regarding this as the original substance of the mind. Innate moral knowing thus is the centrality before arousal. However, although Wang Yangming replaced Lu Jiuyuan’s original mind with innate moral knowing, and proposed “preserving Heavenly principle and eliminating human desire” as the concrete effort of extending innate moral knowing, yet innate moral knowing is still a kind of knowledge, and there is no originally possessed “intention” of loving the good and hating the bad present within it. Liu Zongzhou thought that: “If one takes up making one’s intentions sincere and uses the effort of extending knowledge, it is still possible that one’s knowledge is incomplete, lost without destination” (“Questions and Responses” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 348). In his view, the fundamental mistake made by all these three thinkers was that they did not know the true meaning of the centrality before arousal. As noted above, Liu Zongzhou’s explanation of “intention” has an ontological basis. His “making one’s intentions sincere” is the being careful when alone spoken of in the Great Learning and Centrality in the Ordinary. The word “intention” is the singular [or lone, du 独] substance, while the effort of making sincere is the being careful (shen 慎). The alone in “being careful when alone” (shendu 慎独) is the singular substance, the condensation and expression of the inherent nature

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endowed by Heaven. In the great transformation and flowing movement of the cosmos, there is a ruler or celestial pivot. This celestial pivot is “without polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity” (wuji er taiji 无极而太极), it itself does not move and acts as the ruler of the myriad transformations. The celestial pivot is the singular substance of the cosmos, while the singular substance in the human mind is “intention.” Liu Zongzhou said: “The root of intention is most subtle, and the substance of sincerity is rooted in Heaven. That which is rooted in Heaven is that which is supremely good. Through its supreme goodness, along with its utmost subtlety, one can see the true stopping point” (“Words on Learning” Pt. II, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 453). That is to say, the sincerity of the dao of Heaven is the basis for the “intention” in the mind, and this root of intention is the singular substance. This singular substance can be protected through the method of being careful, so “being careful when alone” is protecting this root of intention so that it is not obscured and is constantly refined and subtle. Thus one can say, “Outside of the singular there is no other original substance, and outside of being careful when alone there is no effort.”

5 Criticisms of Wang Yangming and Later Students of the Wang School In proposing the notion of “intention,” Liu Zongzhou’s most important purpose was to correct the mistaken view that there is no ruler in the mind, and thus the most important points he wanted to refute were Wang Yangming’s “Four-Sentence Teaching” as fixed in his later years, and Wang Longxi’s development of this into his theory of the “four withouts.” He criticised Yangming and Longxi, saying: In terms of knowing the stopping point, Master Yangming failed to examine deeply, merely teaching people to use the force of acting out the good and removing the bad when thoughts arise and disappear, finally not getting to the bottom of the matter. ... Thus, when he replied to his students, he proposed views such as “seeking the substance in its functioning” and “extending harmony is the means to extend centrality;” does this not seem to contradict the school of the followers of Guishan 龟山 [i.e. Song Neo-Confucian Yang Shi 杨时]? However, regardless of whether one says Yangming’s learning was lost in the coarse or shallow, or failed to see the dao, one cannot accuse him of being a Chan Buddhist. If Yangming was a Chan Buddhist, how could he have got along with [Neo-Confucian schools like those from] Yuzhang 豫章 and Yanping 延平? It is simply that his followers took the four words “without goodness or badness” and turned them into extravagant nonsense, thereby dragging him into Chan Buddhism, completely erasing his repeated statements that “innate moral knowing is Heavenly principle” and “innate moral knowing is the supreme good;” how could this not lead later generations into confusion? It was Yangming’s misfortune to have [Wang] Longxi, just as it was Xiangshan’s 象山 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan] to have Cihu 慈湖 [i.e. Yang Jian 杨简], since both were disasters for our culture. (“Reply to Han Canfu” [Da Han Canfu 答韩参夫], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 3, 359)

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Here, Liu Zongzhou differed from usual criticisms of Wang Yangming. Yangming was usually regarded as a Chan Buddhist, but Liu Zongzhou singularly argued that Yangming was “like Chan but not Chan.” When Yangming was usually regarded as a Chan Buddhist, it was meant that his “seeing the realm before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused” was the same as the Chan Buddhist “when one thinks neither of good nor bad, one can recognise the original truth.” Liu Zongzhou believed that this point alone was insufficient to justify the claim that Yangming was a Chan Buddhist, since seeing the realm before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused was “a formula also proposed by” Zhou Dunyi and the Cheng brothers.[Song Neo-Confucians] Luo Congyan 罗从彦 and Li Dong 李侗 both followed this path. In Liu Zongzhou’s view, the realm before arousal was precisely his “intention” and “singular substance.” Seeing the realm before arousal meant just seeking this notion of “intention” and taking it as the basis for the harmony of centrality and regulation, hence this is precisely the correct approach for Confucian cultivation. To criticise Wang Yangming’s recognition of that before arousal as Chan means to regard the time before arousal as empty and quiet, and this is precisely to fall into Chan. Wang Yangming’s mistake was rather that he often failed to recognise the realm before arousal, and taught people to use innate moral knowing to judge the goodness or badness of thoughts after they have arisen, and then at this point to do the good and remove the bad. In Liu Zongzhou’s view, how can one overcome thoughts once they have already been aroused? This method of Wang Yangming amounts to one of seeing the substance through its functions and extending harmony as the means to extend centrality. As for the “intention” and “singular substance” that transcends all oppositions, the a priori intentionality that governs a posteriori thoughts, he failed to penetrate it. Hence, Wang Yangming’s fundamental error was that he did not realise the a priori stopping point, and thus was lost in the coarse and shallow. Wang Longxi’s theory of “four withouts,” which claimed that “the mind is the mind without goodness or badness, intention is intention without goodness or badness,” thus erased the “intention” originally possessed in the mind, turning it into an empty, quiet void of nothingness, and thus also slipped into Chan learning. Liu Zongzhou’s criticism of Wang Yangming concentrated on his “Four-Sentence Teaching.” In his view, the fundamental mistake of the Four-Sentence Teaching was its incorrect understanding of the word intention. He repeatedly stated that “Yangming understood the word intention all wrong” and “In his explanations of the Great Learning, the master failed to see the word intention clearly.” He thought that the sentence “in the substance of the mind there is neither good nor bad” should be written as “in the substance of the mind there is good and no bad,” since the original substance of the mind is intention, and intention is the latent intentionality of loving the good and hating the bad possessed a priori, and hence is supremely good with no badness. If one says that the substance of the mind is without goodness or badness, this would amount to negating the primary existence of this notion of intention in the substance of the mind. In the second sentence, “when intention moves, there is good and bad,” the word intention is equated to the word thought, regarding it as the already aroused, and hence has already lost

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the meaning of the centrality before arousal. Although the third sentence “innate moral knowing is to know good and bad” is acceptable, yet since the first sentence is already wrong, the mind that has neither goodness nor badness has no standard for judgment, so how can it judge the goodness or badness of thoughts[?] In the fourth sentence, “the investigation of things is to do good and remove bad,” since the root of intention that governs good and bad has been lost, how can one guarantee that the good or bad of that which is investigated is not mistaken, and how can “the ruling intention be bound into effort”? Once the root of intention is lost, every sentence is wrong. Hence Huang Zongxi questioned it on this basis, saying: “If the substance of the mind is without good or bad, then where can the intention that has good and bad come from? Where can the knowing that knows good and bad come from? Where can the effort that does good and removes bad come from? Without this the words cease to flow and have no outlet! (Postscript to “Yangming’s Record of Transmission and Practice,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 218). He held that the root of intention that was originally sincere a priori ran throughout the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning, hence he agreed with Wang Yangming’s idea that “the intention of the mind and knowing things are one and the same affair”: the substance of the mind is the root of intention, making one’s intentions sincere is the root of intention being originally sincere, knowing is the ability to discriminate good from bad based on the rule of the root of intention, while things are behaviour that is permeated by sincere intention. He pointed out that the intention of the mind and knowing things are a single affair, but that this single affair is not nothing. He advocated changing the “four withouts” theory to one of “four withs” (siyou 四有): “The mind is the mind with good and no bad, hence intention is intention with good and no bad, knowing is knowing with good and no bad, and things are things with good and no bad” (Postscript to “Yangming’s Record of Transmission and Practice,” Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 219). In Liu Zongzhou’s view, Wang Yangming’s Four-Sentence Teaching simply got the word intention wrong, while Wang Longxi’s theory of four withouts went against Yangming’s original meaning and complete entered into Chan learning. Since Wang Longxi imitated his teacher but lost the truth and fell into Chan learning, Liu Zongzhou frequently criticised Chan. The aim of his criticism of Chan learning was also to point out that it has no ruler, and thereby to see the mistake of later students of the Wang school. When he criticised Chan learning, he was in reality simply criticising Wang Longxi. He said: Buddhist learning is rooted in the mind, and our Confucian learning is also rooted in the mind, yet we Confucians start from the mind and derive intention and knowledge, in which the concrete place for effort is the investigation of things, hence the mind is continuous with Heaven. When Buddhists speak of the mind, they speak of enlightenment, and thus go on to leave behind intention. Without intention there is no knowledge, and without knowledge there are no things. There so-called enlightenment is simply the enlightenment of the empty void of perfect silence, different from our Confucian knowledge of substance and things; their so-called mind is likewise simply the mind as an empty void of perfect silence, different from our Confucian mind that encompasses things. (“Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 370)

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Buddhist learning simply focuses on numinous illumination, and erases the two meanings of good and bad, hence it says: “When one thinks neither of good nor bad, one can recognise the original truth.” The original truth is nothing but a single point of numinous illumination. Later views of the Great Learning were based on this. (“Record of Meetings” [Huilu 会录], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 544)

His idea is that the content of the mind spoken of by Chan learning is simply emptiness (kong 空), whereas the mind spoken of by Confucianism contains intention. Since the original substance of the mind recognised by the two schools is different, their conceptions of effort are also fundamentally different. The effort of Chan learning is enlightenment, to realise that this mind is empty and that the myriad affairs then cease, while the effort of Confucianism is the investigation of things, to do good and remove bad under the guidance of the “intention” that loves the good and hates the bad. Wang Longxi’s “four withouts” speaks of inherent nature through enlightenment, so as soon as one achieves enlightenment there are no more affairs, and this is leading the world into Chan. Here, what Liu Zongzhou emphasised is still the distinction between being “with intention” and “without intention.” In his life, Liu Zongzhou’s attitude towards Wang Yangming’s ideas underwent several large changes. When Liu Zongzhou’s son Liu Zhuo 刘汋 edited his “Chronicle” (Nianpu 年谱), he said: “The master’s view of Yangming learning underwent three changes: first he doubted it, then he believed it, and finally he spared no effort in challenging it” (Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 6, 147). As noted above, Liu Zongzhou’s dissatisfaction with Wang Yangming’s theory mainly concerned the fact that Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing is without a ruler. Here there is a question, namely is the fault Liu Zongzhou denounced in Yangming’s theory really an essential omission by Yangming? Is there really no idea of a ruler in Yangming’s innate moral knowing? As scholars have consistently noted, Wang Yangming’s core academic principle is “the extension of innate moral knowing.” However, in terms of the meaning of the extension of innate moral knowing, there are different explanations. For Yangming, the most important meaning of “the extension of innate moral knowing” is “extending the Heavenly principle in the innate moral knowing of my mind to all things and affairs, such that all things and affairs attain this principle” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). In Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing, there are three most essential meanings: The first is the innate moral awareness of “seeing one’s father and spontaneously knowing to be filial, seeing one’s elder brother and spontaneously knowing to be deferential, seeing a child falling into a well and spontaneously knowing to feel compassion,” where the extension of innate moral knowing means applying this moral awareness in all situations. The second is the ability of moral judgment in “knowing good and bad,” where the extension of innate moral knowing means strengthening and expanding this ability through practice. The third is the highest expression of the law of the cosmos, namely his “innate moral knowing is the numinous spirit of Creation,” where the extension of innate moral knowing means becoming one with the law of

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the cosmos. He summarised the above meanings as “The illuminating brightness and numinous enlightenment of Heavenly principle is what is meant by innate moral knowing” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. II). Innate moral knowing is just the self-awareness of moral reason in the mind. Thus the innate moral knowing extended by Wang Yangming is not a feeling or knowledge, but rather moral reason. If one wishes to obtain moral reason, one must make efforts to eliminate selfish desires, for which Wang Yangming often used the metaphor of dispersing nebulous clouds to reveal the depths of the heavens. The extension of innate moral knowing is also a unity of knowledge and action, in which innate moral knowing is the substance and the extension of innate moral knowing is the effort, and with the extension of innate moral knowing, “investigation, extension, sincerity and uprightness are immediately complete.” Innate moral knowing penetrating into everything is precisely the location of the ruler in his effort. Thus, although Wang Yangming did not especially pick out the word “intention,” the meaning of the word intention was already contained within innate moral knowing. Innate moral knowing is the ruler. Innate moral knowing means knowing good and bad, as well as loving the good and hating the bad. The “ruling intention being bound into effort” emphasised by Liu Zongzhou was also repeatedly emphasised by Wang Yangming, with words such as “mental thread” (tounao 头脑) and “ruling intention” (zhuyi 主意) frequently appearing in Yangming’s recorded sayings and collected writings. There difference is that since Liu Zongzhou’s notion of “intention” is not mixed up with the a posteriori, so its meaning of “ruler” is very strong and clear, while Wang Yangming’s “innate moral knowing” is blended into one with the other meanings of the mind, being both ruler and flowing movement, both centrality and harmony, and so its meaning of “ruler” is somewhat weaker. If further analysed, we can say that for Wang Yangming, innate moral knowing as moral reason and innate moral knowing as epistemological reason are blended, while Liu Zongzhou’s “intention” is purely moral reason. Wang Yangming’s moral reason constantly manifests in the actual mind, while Liu Zongzhou’s moral reason is metaphysical and lofty. For this reason, it can be said that Wang Yangming’s “intention” was not separated from “knowledge,” but it cannot be said that he had no ruler or stopping point. Even the “substance of the mind without good or bad” repeatedly criticised by Liu Zongzhou, provided it is understood correctly, can be easily accommodated. Wang Yangming’s effort of cultivation in his later years included the two aspects of “being” (you 有) and “nothingness” (wu 无), and did not cling to constantly doing good and removing the bad. When trusting in spontaneity, situating the splendid in the plain, making the mind constantly limpid in its illuminating penetration, this can be called “nothingness;” yet as soon as one achieves “nothingness,” the innate moral knowing originally present in the mind spontaneously reveals itself, and this is “being.” The actual substance of the mind is without good and bad, the metaphysical substance of inherent nature is supremely good without badness, and the nothingness of the substance of the mind is precisely that by which the being of the substance of inherent nature is revealed. If Yangming’s theory can be said to have any deficiency, this is entirely a result of the blended nature of innate moral knowing: it contains all the important

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categories of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. Further, since Wang Yangming taught according to his opportunities and established his methods according to the problem at hand, the same meaning was often expressed in different ways. Later students clung to these without transforming them, producing varying interpretations; often, they took up one aspect and expanded it into their own theories. Liu Zongzhou believed that there were two most important points where Yangming’s theory was mistaken: first, its belief that that which is produced by the mind is all the original substance of innate moral knowing, while in reality feelings and knowledge are already mixed up in it, and second, its belief that the original substance of innate moral knowing is nothingness, not containing any moral reason within it. He said: At present, in terms of the mistakes of those who argue over innate moral knowing, the crazy mix it up with feelings and knowledge, affirming all as innately moral, while the pure rinse it with the dark void, wiping out the moral with the cunning, yet both of these are the fault of those who use knowledge. Yangming’s innate moral knowing was originally proposed in order to relieve the fragmentation of recent years, aiming to illuminate this through the Great Learning, and thus did not necessarily exhaust the point of the Great Learning. However, later people specifically used it to discuss the Great Learning, and thus muddied the point of the Great Learning; they also borrowed it to comprehend the dark enlightenment of the Buddhists, making Yangming’s point doubly obfuscated. ... These are all the result of the fault of being insincere, and those who seek it in the root of intention are few indeed. (“Miscellaneous Explanations in Proven Learning,” Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 278)

This passage points out the oversight in Yangming’s theory, and the fact that the mistakes of Yangming’s followers were based on this, along with the fact that he himself painstakingly proposed the notion of intention in order to make amends for this bias and remedy this error, both clearly show that Liu Zongzhou was not a fundamental opponent of Yangming’s learning, but rather was attempting to make up for its deficiencies; what he especially opposed was the “crazy and unbridled” and “abstruse and impulsive” among the later students of the Wang school, and not Yangming himself. His criticisms discerned the mistakes of the later followers of the Wang school and traced them back to Yangming. One basis for the difference between Wang Yangming and Liu Zongzhou was their focus on different classics. Wang Yangming used Mencius’ “innate moral knowing” to connect together the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning along with the inherent nature, dao, teaching, sincerity, and being careful when alone of Centrality in the Ordinary, and thus the classic on which he most relied was the Mencius. Liu Zongzhou’s learning of making the intentions sincere and being careful when alone was mainly derived from Centrality in the Ordinary, and used it to connect together the Great Learning and the Commentaries on the Changes. The distinctive point of the Mencius is its unity of mind, inherent nature and feeling, and its style is blended; Centrality in the Ordinary instead regards the substance of sincerity as refined and subtle, severing inherent nature from feeling, and its style is lofty. The consistency of the two lies in their emphasis on the purity of moral reason, focusing on entering into the subtle

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from the innermost essence of the mind and excluding the intrusion of any utilitarian considerations. The emphasis on different classics led both the content and the form of Liu Zongzhou’s academic studies to display a significant difference from Wang Yangming. The difference in terms of content has been discussed above, and as for form, Liu Zongzhou’s advocation of making one’s intentions sincere and being careful when alone severed the metaphysical from the actual and divided inherent nature from feeling, such that in between not even the slightest gap remained, and thus was very different from Wang Yangming’s blended style. When Wang Yangming lectured he was harmonious, joyful, open hearted and easy-going, teaching skilfully and patiently, unconsciously arousing people’s attachment, and accommodating scholars, peasants, workers and merchants. Liu Zongzhou on the other hand analysed with care and subtlety, was profound and lofty, and specifically directed his learning at the self-cultivation of gentlemen through making their intentions sincere. Wang Yangming had unique experiences throughout his life, and his concrete achievements were outstanding, carrying out affairs consummately with genius. Liu Zongzhou on the other hand was firm and upright in his manner, frank and steadfast, his words and conduct direct and hard to accommodate. Although these differences were based on their different historical backgrounds and personal characteristics, the difference in the classics they emphasised was also an important factor. Liu Zongzhou’s learning of making one’s intentions sincere and being careful when alone put forward an important problem in moral philosophy, namely the problem of the purity of moral reason. Liu Zongzhou’s notion of “intention” is a profound and subtle intentionality that determines the direction of all a posteriori thoughts in the mind, and is thus the ruler of people’s will and thought. It is a priori, and not mixed up with any empirical elements; it is the centrality before arousal, and does have a substance-function relationship with the already aroused. These qualities all demonstrate that intention is the most profound and subtle guarantor of moral reason. For Zhu Xi, the mind dominates inherent nature and feelings, inherent nature is that which is before arousal, and feelings are that which is already aroused, such that the harmony in centrality and regulation of the aroused is precisely that which manifests the centrality before arousal. Wang Yangming disagreed with Zhu Xi’s divisions of inherent nature and feeling, the already aroused and the before arousal, and proposed the blended concept of innate moral knowing to combine them: “Innate moral knowing is both the centrality before arousal and also the harmony of centrality and regulation after arousal,” “The seven feelings are already present in innate moral knowing.” Zhu Xi’s “inherent nature” is the centrality before arousal, and in this there is no ruling “intention,” while Wang Yangming’s innate moral knowing unifies inherent nature and feeling, the metaphysical and the actual, yet in Liu Zongzhou’s view these are all insufficiently pure, hence he especially emphasised the a priori nature of “intention” along with its character of not forming a relationship of substance and function with the a posteriori. When Wang Yangming proposed that “there is no principle outside the mind,” he already raised moral self-discipline to an unprecedentedly high level, yet

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owing to the blended nature of the mind, along with the particular quality of holistic integration found in Yangming’s thought, he was unable to enter into a deeper level of reflection on this problem. Liu Zongzhou however delved into the most hidden and subtle regions of the mind, stripping back to the a priori latent intentionality that determines the direction of thoughts itself, and thus put forward the self-discipline of morality in a more revealing and profound manner. This theory found its footnotes in the various transcendent expressions of Liu Zongzhou himself: his constant criticism of the imperial court, his relentless denunciations of the powerful and wealthy, and his refusal to withdraw despite repeated dismissal from office, to the point of going on hunger strike and risking his life for illumination. Wang Yangming was a figure whom Liu Zongzhou highly respected and admired, yet in his later years he spared no effort in challenging his ideas, to the point of warning his students before his death that “As for the theory of innate moral knowing, there are few who can avoid it flowing into Chan” (Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 6, 170), that is to say, it did not reach the most hidden, subtle and inescapable region of the mind. In his later years, Liu Zongzhou strenuously commended the returning to silence [guiji 归寂] and maintaining stillness [zhujing 主静] of Zou Shouyi 邹守益, Nie Bao 聂豹 and Luo Hongxian 罗洪先 of the Jiangyou school, holding that the function of intention was found in this. In his view, returning to silence and maintaining stillness means applying a filtering function to innate moral knowing, leading moral reason to return to the clean, pure, refined and subtle original substance to the greatest degree possible. In highlighting the word “intention,” Liu Zongzhou stripped directly back to the most refined, subtle and inescapable region of the mind, establishing the moral cultivation most stressed by Neo-Confucian on a most profound, subtle and firm basis, and arguing for this broadly from the perspective of the single principle of Heaven and humanity. In this respect, Liu Zongzhou can be said to have summed up Neo-Confucianism in the Ming dynasty to a certain degree. It is precisely in this sense that his student Huang Zongxi placed him as the rear-guard of the Ming Confucians, and held up his thought as a mirror for the whole of Ming dynasty Confucianism.

6 Mind, Inherent Nature and Being Careful When Alone The relation between inherent nature and the mind was also an important point elaborated by Liu Zongzhou. In his philosophy, the mind is a category expressing concrete existence, while inherent nature is the order of the mind. The relation between inherent nature and the mind shares the same sequence as that between principle and qi, as Liu Zongzhou said: Inherent nature is the principle of the mind; the mind is discussed in terms of qi, while inherent nature is its order. Apart from the mind there is no inherent nature, and apart from qi there is no principle. Although it can be said that qi is inherent nature and inherent nature is qi, this seems to treat them as two. Compassion, shame, deference and right and wrong

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all refer to the impulse of the one qi’s flowing movement as it appears in consciousness, with its principle like this, and it is not the case that outside of consciousness there are the names and forms of the four inklings. (“Reply to Shen Shichen” [Fu Shen Shichen 复沈石 臣], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 3, 363)

For Liu Zongzhou here, concretely existing things in terms of their most fundamental root-source are all qi. The mind is a kind of concrete existence, so it is also qi. The principle of the mind is inherent nature. Inherent nature is the order of the mind as this special form of qi. Cheng Hao’s 程颢 statement that “Qi is inherent nature, and inherent nature is qi” still divides inherent nature and qi into two. Mencius’ four inklings (si duan 四端) are the mind as a kind of flowing qi as it manifests in consciousness, and it is not the case that outside of consciousness there are another four inklings. From the perspective of Liu Zongzhou’s point here, when Zhu Xi explained benevolence as “the virtue of the mind and the principle of love,” such that this inherent nature and this principle first exist in the mind and then manifest as the four inklings, his expression gets this backwards. It is not the case that there is first the principle of benevolence, which then manifests as the inkling of compassion, but rather that the inkling of compassion itself is benevolence. Liu Zongzhou expressed this point very clearly: There is one inherent nature, but in terms of principle, one can speak of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom; in terms of qi, one can speak of happiness, anger, sadness and joy. There is one principle, but in terms of inherent nature, one can speak of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom; in terms of the mind, one can speak of happiness, anger, sadness and joy. (“Words on Learning” Pt. I, Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 391)

Inherent nature is principle, the mind is qi, and the happiness, anger, sadness and joy of the mind and qi are the benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom of inherent nature and principle, so it is not the case that outside of happiness, anger, sadness and joy there are benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. One thing has different names, and there is no distinction of precedence. Happiness, anger, sadness and joy here are not the seven feelings, but rather the four virtues, which are the rhythm of the rise and fall of the qi-impulse in its endless circulation, and not “the inherent nature endowed by Heaven” contained within the mind. Huang Zongxi especially stressed this point, regarding it as one of Liu Zongzhou’s theoretical achievements in which he “expressed what earlier Confucians had not yet expressed.” He summarised Liu Zongzhou’s argument, saying: Happiness, anger, sadness and joy should not be spoken of as the seven feelings. The mind is simply one, but at the boundary of the flowing movement of the qi-impulse, in terms of its abundant arising, it can be called pleasure, and this is the virtue of benevolence. In terms of its smooth fluency, it can be called joy, and this is the virtue of ritual propriety. In terms of its solemn restraint, it can be called anger, and this is the virtue of righteousness. In terms of its lonesome silence in stopping, it can be called sorrow, and this is the virtue of wisdom. Thus the qi of the four seasons circulates endlessly, yet it is singularly dependent on the existence of a central qi in its midst, and when this it is aroused it becomes the primary qi of

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supreme harmony, which can be called centrality or harmony, and this is the virtue of inherent nature. Thus there is a time when people are without the seven feelings, but no time when they are without the four virtues. When Confucians take pains to seek the realm prior to arousal, is this not deluded? One should know that as soon as there is happiness, anger, sadness and joy, in terms of their preservation of their centre, they can be called central, and this is the originality, flourishing, benefiting and perseverance of the dao of Heaven circulating in its majesty, the movement of yang; in terms of their outward expression, they can be called harmonious, and this is the originality, flourishing, benefiting and perseverance of the dao of Heaven manifesting in transformative reproduction, the stillness of yin. Preservation and expression together compose the one impulse, and centrality and harmony blend to compose the one inherent nature. (“Brief Biography of Master Liu” [Zi Liuzi xingzhuang 子刘子行状], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi [Huang Zongxi quanji 黄宗羲全集], Vol. 1, 251)

This passage is an accurate summary of Liu Zongzhou’s similar discussions. For Liu Zongzhou, happiness, anger, sadness and joy are the order and rhythm of the special form of flowing qi that is the mind. Qi has its abundant arising and smooth fluency, and these are happiness and joy. From pleasure and joy, there are the names of benevolence and ritual propriety, and it is not the case that benevolence and ritual propriety are the basis that is expressed as happiness and joy. Since the qi of the mind flows endlessly, so happiness, anger, sadness and joy never rest, and benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom circulate without cease. This is the original substance of the mind, and from its being contained in the centre without excess or deficiency, it can be called central qi; from its role as the basis for the harmony of the concrete feelings in the human mind, it is also harmonious qi. The alternation of qi in its circulation is the mind, while the centrality and harmony of qi is inherent nature. This inherent nature is not an abstract being, but is rather the form of expression of the qi of the mind. Since qi never rests for a moment and inherent nature never ceases to exist, so “mind and inherent nature cannot be spoken of in terms of division or combination.” Even when the mind has not yet given rise to a single thought, centrality and harmony still exist in the mind. Centrality and harmony are the four virtues, while happiness, anger, worry, thinking, sadness, fear and surpriseare the seven feelings. The seven feelings arise due to external stimulation, while centrality and harmony are the spontaneous order of the mind, hence it was said that “there is a time when people are without the seven feelings, but no time when they are without the four virtues,” since in terms of their qualities the two are completely different. In Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s effort of maintaining respect, with self-restraint when still and self-reflection when moving, in which when one is still one experiences the realm before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused, and when one moves one reflects on the goodness or badness of thoughts, they did not regard happiness, anger, sadness and joy as the order of the mind, but rather as feelings that are already aroused. Wang Yangming also taught people to experience before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused, regarding this as the precondition for the production of innate moral knowing, and thus also did not distinguish the four virtues from the seven feelings. Liu Zongzhou’s conception of the centrality and harmony of mind and inherent nature is a concentration of his view of the dao of Heaven: the dao of

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Heaven is majestic and unending, circulating in the four seasons, and this is its originality, flourishing, benefiting and perseverance, this is the centrality and harmony of the dao of Heaven. When this originality, flourishing, benefiting and perseverance is expressed as the specific, concrete, transforming and reproducing myriad things, this is the actuality of centrality and harmony. In regarding originality, flourishing, benefiting and perseverance themselves as movement, and transformative reproduction as stillness, this expresses that the former is substantial, eternal and active, while the latter is functional, temporary, and passive. Centrality and harmony themselves are inherent nature, while preservation and expression are the flowing movement of the qi-impulse. Liu Zongzhou’s idea here is quite unique. He wanted to correct the mistake of earlier thinkers, namely their inability to unify the theory of the dao of Heaven with that of mind and inherent nature, as well as the theory of mind and inherent nature with that of cultivation, viewing their thoughts as lacking a unified material basis, which he aimed to provide. For example, Zhu Xi’s theory of principle and qi gave principle a logical priority over qi, which could lead to the mistake of viewing principle and qi as two; in “that which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature” [from Centrality in the Ordinary], that which is before arousal is inherent nature, and the already aroused are feelings, which could lead to the possibility of inherent nature and endowment or inherent nature and feelings becoming divided into two, or inherent nature being regarded as a separate thing apart from feelings; his views of self-restraint and use of respect along with those of progress in learning and extending knowledge could also not be united. Although Wang Yangming was able to combine the inner with the outer, principle with the mind, the higher with the lower, knowledge with action, and effort with original substance, rolling different aspects together as one and dominating them with the container of innate moral knowing, his innate moral knowing lacked a clear material basis. Liu Zongzhou regarded qi as this basis, such that the mind is also qi, and principle is the principle of qi; regarding the centrality and harmony of the qi of the mind as inherent nature, and the thoughts that are produced when the mind is stimulated and responds as feelings, his theory of the dao of Heaven and that of mind and inherent nature both have a firm and united material basis and run in parallel with a metaphysical basis. In these aspects, Liu Zongzhou fused Cheng-Zhu with Lu-Wang, as well as absorbing the reasonable views of Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 and others, melding them together to develop a new theoretical path. In his “Treatise on Inherent Nature” (Xinglun 性论), Liu Zongzhou gave a clear summary of the above views, correcting representative historical explanations of inherent nature. He said: Inherent nature is named according to the mind. That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is one inherent nature, while in people it is especially spoken of in terms of the mind. Inherent nature is the inherent nature of the mind. That which is the same in the mind is principle, and that which is born with this principle can be called inherent nature, so inherent nature is not the principle of the mind. If one says that the mind is but a thing, which attains the principle of inherent nature and stores it to become numinous, then the mind and inherent nature are severed asunder and cannot be made into a single thing. ...

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That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is but one qi, which gathers into forms, which bear qualities, which are collected to form bodies, which are arranged and have organs, which appear and manifest inherent nature, thus there are the names of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom. (“On Original Inherent Nature” [Yuan xing 原性], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 280)

His view is that inherent nature is not a separate thing apart from the mind, but rather is omnipresent, since qi is omnipresent. Since the inherent nature of humanity is possessed by people as a special form of qi, he says that “inherent nature is the inherent nature of the mind.” The essence of inherent nature is principle, but this principle is the principle of qi, and not another thing residing in the mind, so inherent nature and qi are coexistent, and are possessed at birth. One cannot speak of inherent nature apart from qi. Qi gathers into forms and qualities, which for people are bodies and organs, while inherent nature is a function of the mind as a special organ. Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are the order of the mind and its different expressions. Therefore, he criticised Gaozi’s 告子 view of inherent nature as being neither not good nor all good [see Mencius, 6A.1], believing that since inherent nature is the order of the mind, it cannot have the quality of being good or bad, but rather must transcend assessments of good and bad. Even Mencius’ theory that “inherent nature is good” was proposed based on discussions at the time, and thus was made under pressure of necessity. As for later views of inherent nature as bad, mixed or coming in three grades, they are all unacceptable, and the Song Confucian separation of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth from the inherent nature of material qi, this is even more fragmented. Mencius’ view of inherent nature as good spoke in terms of qi, so benevolence is nothing but the mind of compassion, and righteousness is nothing but the mind of shame. Inherent nature and the mind are not two things. Even the inherent nature “endowed by Heaven” of Centrality in the Ordinary spoke in terms of centrality and harmony, so the order and rhythm of the qi of the mind as happiness, anger, sadness and joy are also benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, and hence are also inherent nature. Thus, Centrality in the Ordinary also “spoke of inherent nature in terms of the mind.” The contradictions of later thinkers in terms of mind and inherent nature all stemmed from principle being principle and qi being qi, and thus being divided into two. Earlier Confucians’ continuation of the view that “inherent nature is principle” is still acceptable, but should be distinguished, since in terms of their division, benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom each have their own principle, while in terms of their unity, benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are unified as one principle. The view that “principle is metaphysical” is also acceptable, but it should be recognised that the metaphysical and actual are two parts of one substance, and not divided as two things. He pointed out that the various mistakes above all stem from speaking of inherent nature as apart from the mind. “In speaking of inherent nature as apart from the mind, the problem is not simply in inherent nature, but also in the mind, the mind and inherent nature becoming two problems, and thus our dao begins

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to split apart the world” (“On Original Inherent Nature,” Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 281). As for Wang Yangming’s theory of “no principle outside the mind” that was popular at the time, Liu Zongzhou also used his own theory of inherent nature to give a different explanation: Since the theory of innate moral knowing became popular, people all know the value of this mind and this principle, and summarise it saying: “In the world there is no principle outside the mind,” taking the original mind that has lain obscured in darkness for thousands of years and attempting to restore it in one morning, which can be called retrieving the sun from its abyss and bathing its light in a salt pool [see Huainanzi 淮南子, Chap. 3], yet in terms of inherent nature they still lack discrimination. I would like to say one thing further to these people: “In the world there is no inherent nature outside the mind.” It is only because in the world there is no inherent nature outside the mind that in the world there is no principle outside the mind. ... As for those with rash ideas of what inherent nature is, they are unaware that it comes from this mind. (“On Original Learning” [Yuan xue 原学], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 285)

Liu Zongzhou approved of Wang Yangming’s idea that “there is no principle outside the mind,” believing that it had the effect of renewing and promoting the implications and honour of the mind. However, he pointed out that one should also promote the theory that “there is no inherent nature outside the mind,” since the latter is the basis for the former. This is because inherent nature is directly rooted in the mind and qi, and principle is simply another name for inherent nature. Here, Liu Zongzhou in fact wanted to make amends for the insufficiencies of Yangming. In its original meaning, Wang Yangming’s “no principle outside the mind” stressed the importance of people’s innately good motivations: all valuable conduct in the world comes from people’s innately good motivations; in assessing the goodness or badness of conduct, this can be the only standard, in order to cut off that idea that “righteousness is something incidental and external.” However, “no principle outside the mind” can easily be understood as saying that the mind is simply principle, and overlooking the specific effort needed to transform one’s character. This intention is clearly displayed in his fundamental direction for learning: Thus it is that the gentleman values learning. What should learning preserve? It can also be said that if one furnishes the mind with judgment and returns to its knowledge, then the insufficiencies of qi and blood can be governed. Thus in extending it forward to govern feelings, such that it is stimulated and responds in social interactions, it can be attained and followed. Thus in extending it backward to govern desire, such that it becomes the Heavenly and human inflection of perseverance and overcoming, it can be attained and determined. Thus in extending its refinement to govern knowledge, such that it becomes the place for the experience of the senses, it can be attained and clarified. Thus in extending its blending to govern forms and implements, such that it becomes the path for good or bad fortune and cultivation or confusion, it can be attained and sharpened. All this belongs to qi and blood, so if one completes each of these steps and governs them, then one’s qi and blood will all transform into inherent nature. When inherent nature transforms and the innate morality of knowing is extended, then the mind gains in honour. Is this not why learning is of supreme importance? (“On Original Learning,” Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 286)

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He believed that Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing only focused on positive effort of extending the Heavenly principle known by the innate moral knowing of my mind into all things and affairs. However, since Yangming’s learning never directly dealt with the level of qi, his innate moral knowing could easily become contaminated with habitual desires and unable to be revealed, and his extension of innate moral knowing did not directly pick out this aspect. Liu Zongzhou proposed that learning simply means making innate moral knowing become the judge and ruler of the mind, such that it does not become obscured by habitual desires. In using this to govern feelings, desires, knowledge and physical implements thus, in a word, means transforming habitual desires into the principle of inherent nature. At this point one can truly extend innate moral knowing. This is the meaning behind Liu Zongzhou’s especially proposing that the mind as inherent nature is the basis for the mind as principle. While Liu Zongzhou used his own theory of mind and inherent nature to put forward his doubts concerning many popular conceptions of Song-Ming Confucians, such as the inherent nature before arousal and the feelings after arousal, principle producing qi, the mind dominating inherent nature and feelings, etc., he especially opposed the distinctions between the inherent nature of moral principle [yili 义理] and that of material qi [qizhi 气质], and between the dao-mind and the human mind. He said: It must be known that inherent nature is simply the inherent nature of material qi, and moral principle is simply the originality of material qi, that by which it is inherent nature. The mind is just the human mind, and the dao is that which is proper in the human, that by which it is mind. The human mind and the dao-mind are one and the same mind; material qi and moral principle are one and the same inherent nature. If one recognises that the mind is one and inherent nature is one, then effort must also be one. Apart from stillness and preservation, there is no movement and reflection; apart from maintaining respect, there is no fathoming of principle. The result is that effort and original substance are one. This is the theory of being careful when alone, yet later explanations all too often missed it. (“A Discussion of the Opening Passage of Centrality in the Ordinary” [Zhongyong shouzhang shuo 中庸首章说], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 301)

For Liu Zongzhou here, principle is the order of qi, so moral principle is the originality of material qi, and since moral principle is the content of inherent nature, so he says it is “that by which it is inherent nature.” Inherent nature is the rhythm of the rise and fall of the qi of the mind, a concept that expresses the mode of operation of qi, while dao is a value-ideal, a concept that expresses a goal and standard, hence it is that which is proper. However, for Liu Zongzhou here, the proper is simply the ontological state of the actual, and the original centrality and harmony of the mind is just its ideal. Thus the dao-mind is the human mind, and the inherent nature of material qi is the inherent nature of moral principle. Liu Zongzhou opposed describing the inherent nature of moral principle and the inherent nature of material qi as two essentially different inherent natures, and even more opposed regarding the inherent nature of moral principle as coming from Heavenly principle and the inherent nature of material qi as coming from qi-endowment, so he naturally also opposed Zhu Xi’s view that “The dao-mind consciously attains Heavenly principle,

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while the human mind consciously attains sounds, sights, smells and tastes.” Liu Zongzhou criticised Cheng Hao’s view that “When discussing inherent nature, to discuss qi is incomplete, while when discussing qi, to discuss inherent nature is unenlightening,” believing that this divided inherent nature and qi into two; despite saying that “inherent nature is qi, and qi is inherent nature; they cannot be made into two,” since Cheng Hao did not regard inherent nature as the principle of the mind and qi, his words were too ambiguous. Liu Zongzhou also discussed the relation between inherent nature and habituation (xi 习), saying: Discussed generally, the inherent nature of material qi is the inherent nature of moral principle, and the inherent nature of moral principle is the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, the goodness of which is thus complete goodness. When Master Zisi 子思 said that “the state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused is called centrality,” is this not the pure state of material qi? Its non-goodness is nothing but joy becoming wanton and sorrow becoming harmful, such that whether there is the difference of a speck or a yard, it is the same excess or insufficiency, and all flows from its goodness. Yet where there is already the separation of excess or insufficiency, if one accumulates this in going forward, it can easily grow exponentially until it becomes uncountable. This is why habituation is harmful, and not the fault of inherent nature. (“Reply to Prefect Wang Youzhong [Da Wang Youzhong zhouci 答王右仲州刺], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 3, 331)

The inherent nature of material qi is happiness, anger, sadness and joy, while the inherent nature of moral principle is benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, thus benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom is an acceptable expression that can be followed, since it is the inherent nature endowed by Heaven. The state before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused refers to the centrality and harmony of the flowing movement of the qi of the mind, which in itself is good. The so-called non-goodness is simply the excess or insufficiency of happiness, anger, sadness and joy that departs from centrality and harmony, and if one seeks its cause, it all arises from habituation. Habituation refers to the a posteriori contamination of habit, and is not the fault of inherent nature. Liu Zongzhou firmly grasped this point: the circulation of the dao of Heaven never makes mistakes, and, in its original substance, the human body as a condensation of the dao of Heaven also never makes mistakes. Humans are originally a self-sufficient form of existence, and their errors all come from the a posteriori contamination of habit. Hence Liu Zongzhou’s effort of cultivation is very strict and plain, namely ruthlessly applying the effort of restraint and governance at the point where thoughts arise. Unlike most other Neo-Confucians, Liu Zongzhou did not attribute human goodness to the endowment of Heaven and human mistakes and badness to their physical bodies, but rather thought that human bodies also have no faults, and human mistakes and badness arises from the a posteriori contamination of habituation, so the human body as a special form of qi also exists and flows naturally. The effort of cultivation lies in preserving its original centrality and harmony. This is especially poles apart from the view of the mind as the origin of inherent nature and the body as a foul bag of skin, and set down a basis for the later revival of views that promoted physical practice (jianxing 践形).

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In his later years, Liu Zongzhou used being careful when alone to encompass all effort, in which being careful when alone included not only preserving “intention” as the ruler at all times and ensuring that the centrality and harmony of the qi of the mind is never lost, but also exercising restraint upon a posteriori habituation, which in fact amounts to a theory of the restoration of inherent nature: That people are born in stillness is the inherent nature of Heaven, which is complete in its supreme goodness. When it is stimulated by things and moves, it shifts into habituation. When it is habituated into the good it is good, and when it is habituated into the bad it is bad, and thus is daily ever more distant from inherent nature. When it is habituated into the bad, it is no longer inherent nature; even with habituation into the good, how can this be the goodness of good inherent nature? ... Since speech and words lead one into habituation, one must know about speech and words and be careful about them; since habitual desires lead one into habituation, one must know about habitual desires and be careful about them; since daily life leads one into habituation, one must know about daily life and be careful about it; since social intercourse leads one into habituation, one must know about social intercourse and be careful about it; in this way, habituation is also inherent nature. All planes are planes of inherent nature, all that is heard is heard by inherent nature, and all that is seen is seen by inherent nature. There is no mind that is not inherent nature, and no inherent nature that is not habituation, and in general thus who do not depart rom singular knowing get close to this. (“A Discussion of Habituation” [Xishuo 习说], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 311-312)

Good inherent nature in its completion is the original centrality and harmony of the human mind. Habituation is the mind being stimulated by external things and moving, and thereby acquiring a kind of tendency or custom, and when it has a custom, the boundary between central qi and responding to things is shifted and altered by custom, and thus becomes distant from inherent nature. When custom is known by singular knowledge, one becomes careful in one’s habits, and thus restores one’s inherent nature. This process of effort is being careful when alone [or singular, du 独]. Being careful when alone is the general program for the whole of Liu Zongzhou’s theory of effort, as he once said: “Ever since the disciples of Confucius passed down the methods of the mind, the first was being careful when alone, and the second was being careful when alone” (“Fundamentals of the Proven Man” [Zhengren yaozhi 证人要旨], Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 5). His specific effort of the “lesson in six affairs” (liushi gongke 六事功课) was an implementation of the fundamental principle of being careful when alone. For example, for the first of the six affairs, “Be severe when residing at leisure to experience being alone,” Liu Zongzhou explained it saying: “The human mind has a singular substance, namely the inherent nature endowed by Heaven, from where the dao of exerting inherent nature emerges. When one is careful when alone, the place of centrality and harmony can be cultivated, and then the capabilities of the world can be completed. However, the singular substance is supremely subtle, so how should one take care of it? Only spending time residing alone can be the beginning method” (“Fundamentals of the Proven Man,” Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 5). Liu Zongzhou’s being careful when alone did not mean applying effort to the singular substance itself, but rather ensuring that the

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smooth flowing of the originally possessed singular substance is not harmed by habituation. Experiencing being alone refers to the level when the singular substance flows to the point of being stimulated by things and moving, when the knowledge of the subject unifies with it, especially when one resides at leisure and it is easy to be idle. As for the second of the six affairs, “Select the movements of thought to know their inflections,” this refers to the singular substance being the ruler when thoughts first begin to move: “The singular substance is originally without movement or stillness, but moving thoughts are its inklings. When it moves and produces yang, the seven feelings are manifested. If thought is present at the beginning, then feelings return to inherent nature. When movement contains nothing but the good, movement is stillness” (“Fundamentals of the Proven Man,” Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 6). In the third, “Maintain strict and dignified conduct to settle your life,” this means implementing the effort of being careful when alone in strict and dignified conduct: “The learning of being careful when alone means selecting between faithfulness and deviancy among moving thoughts, which is already sufficient to fathom the root and clarify the source. Since that which is sincere in the centre is formed into the external, so amidst one’s appearance and tone of speech, there are the signs of deliberate action. This is what is meant by stillness producing yang. Thus although when the senses stop, the spirit moves spontaneously [see Zhuangzi 庄子, Chap. 3], one must still guard them one by one through the singular substance, and once they are still then they will combine marvellously in movement” (“Fundamentals of the Proven Man,” Complete Collected Works of Liu Zongzhou, Vol. 2, 7). Moving thoughts are movements, while tone of speech and appearance are still, so if one uses the singular substance to guard against the deviances of the mind, then one’s tone of speech and appearance will be spontaneously correct. This is what he meant by sentences such as “One’s temper and appearance should be solemn, and one should not lose this through the flights of the mind,” “One’s facial appearance should be direct, and one should not lose this through the deviances of the mind,” etc. The remainder [of the affairs], “Be honest in the great human relations to solidify the dao,” “Be accomplished in the hundred conducts to verify your circulation” and “Apply goodness and correct mi stakes to become a sage” all implement the effort of being careful when alone in ethical principles and daily conduct. In his “Categorised Record of the Spectrum of Humanity” (Renpu leiji 人谱类记), he used the words, conduct and historical deeds of ancient figures as a method for teaching, to warn and provide standards for later people. In this there is much that is excessively severe and could not be endured by most people. Hence Huang Zongxi said of Liu Zongzhou: “Amidst his strictness and plainness, there emerged a light breeze and a clear moon. The rhythm of his movement and stillness appeared in every step of his real experience” (“Brief Biography of Master Liu,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 250). After Wang Yangming, Liu Zongzhou was the philosopher with the most complete system, the most comprehensive arguments, and the most profound thought, and especially in terms of the grandeur and subtlety of his metaphysics, he can be said to be without compare. His isolated and lofty style was a practical realisation of his

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metaphysics. However, as he was still a Neo-Confucian gentleman, in terms of statecraft and pragmatic learning, he never made any arrangements, nor did he even consider doing so worthwhile, and thus in certain respects, he even appeared somewhat pedantic and inflexible. For example, when Censor Yang Ruoqiao 杨若桥 recommended Western missionary Johann Adam Schall von Bell as an expert in firearms, requesting the Chongzhen Emperor to attempt to use them, Liu Zongzhou submitted a memorial in opposition: “Your minister has heard that in the dao of using the military, there was originally the benevolence and righteousness of [Shang] Tang 商汤 and [King] Wu [of Zhou] 周武王, then there was the restraint and control of [Duke] Huan [of Qi] 齐桓公 and [Duke] Wen [of Jin] 晋文公, and beyond this there is nothing worth discussing. Recently a minister came with a proposal to pacify disturbances and resist invasion, a method for war, defence and garrisons, speaking not of their general placement, but of relying on firearms as the master of fate, since today how could the destruction of cities and capture of towns be possible without firearms? If we use them to control others, people will obtain them and also be able to control us. Have we not seen the destruction caused by firearms between the rivers? In terms of strategic fortifications, your former minister Qi Jiguang 戚继光 took great care with beacon fires and lambasted the earthen watchtowers, cultivating and selecting military tactics, and for decades we have not seen any frontier trouble, all without especially relying on firearms. If we rely on tools and not on people, the might of the nation will come to an end. Tang Ruowang 汤若望 [i.e. Schall von Bell] promoted deviant ideas to throw the great dao into disorder, which would already not be tolerated in the time of Yao 尧 and Shun 舜, and now that he also uses strange ingenuities to confuse the mind of the ruler, his crimes are even more incomparable. I beg your imperial majesty to restore this country, and forever reject foreign teachings” (“Brief Biography of Master Liu,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 235). In terms of his attitude toward Western missionaries and Western practical technology, Liu Zongzhou was apparently not as tolerant as the more perspicacious thinkers of the time who advocated absorbing any advanced technology and using it for their own country. He denounced Western firearms as strange technologies and obscene ingenuities with the same tone as the closed-minded and conservative side of the later dispute over East and West, and this was the biased aspect of his identity as a Neo-Confucian gentleman. The sole focus on making the intentions sincerer and rectifying the mind while maintaining a distance from learning concerning governance, and the excesses to which this led, was one of the main reasons for the rise of the practical learning (shixue 实学) of the late Ming and early Qing. Yan Yuan 颜元 from the early Qing already saw that Neo-Confucianism placed excessive weight on rectifying the mind and making the intentions sincere, and promoted “habituating conduct” (xixing 习行). Yan Yuan’s phrase “Keeping one’s hands clean of affairs and discussing mind and inherent nature, then reporting to one’s ruler when one faces dangers and death” could well have taken Liu Zongzhou as the object of its denunciation. However, the style of Liu Zongzhou’s learning has its own ineffaceable splendour, which cannot be erased simply by his being a somewhat stubborn gentleman.

Chapter 28

Huang Zongxi’s Summation of the Learning of the Mind

Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610–1695; zi 字 Taichong 太冲, hao 号 Nanlei 南雷) was referred to by scholars as Master Lizhou 梨洲. His father Huang Zunsu 黄尊素 was a celebrated member of the Donglin 东林 school, but during the Tianqi 天启 period [1621–1627] he accused Wei Zhongxian 魏忠贤 of official misconduct and was captured and sent to prison, where he died. At the beginning of the Chongzhen 崇 祯 period [1628–1644], Huang Zongxi entered the capital to seek redress for his father’s unjust treatment, personally drilling into figures such as Xu Xianchun 许显 纯 from the eunuch clique, and thus gradually gaining some renown. He was an important member of the Society for Restoration 复社. As the Qing army headed south, he led his fellow townsmen in organizing “Mr. Huang’s Brigade of Loyalty to the World” (Huangshi shizhong ying 黄氏世忠营), which worked together with the loyalist army to resist the Qing. After this failed, he fled into exile at sea. After the collapse of the Ming, he lived in seclusion and wrote books, repeatedly refusing calls to take an appointment at the Qing court. He restored the Academy of Proven Men (Zhengren shuyuan 证人书院) established by Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周, and lectured there. Apart from a short time when he went to the imperial encampment of the southern Ming to take up a position as a vice censor-in-chief on the left, the great majority of his time was spent in writing books and lecturing. His learning was very broad, and he made deep study of subjects such as astronomy and calendric calculation, musical temperament, scriptures and histories, and literature. His main philosophical works include Case Studies of Ming Confucians (Mingru xue’an 明儒学案), Waiting for the Dawn (Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待访录), Master’s Explanations of the Mencius (Mengzhi shishuo 孟子师说), and On Images and Numbers in Book of Changes Learning (Yixue xiangshu lun 易学象数 论). His writings include a great quantity of poetry, and he also compiled A Sea of Literature from the Ming (Mingwen hai 明文海) and Literary Cases from the Ming (Mingwen an 明文案). His unfinished work Case Studies from the Song and Yuan (Song Yuan xue’an 宋元学案) was continued and completed by his son Huang Baijia 黄百家 and early Qing scholar Quan Zuwang 全祖望. He also had several © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_28

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works on astronomy and calendric calculation. Modern scholars have compiled his works as the Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi (Huang Zongxi quanji 黄 宗羲全集).1 Huang Zongxi’s thought was greatly influenced by his teacher Liu Zongzhou, with his views on aspects such as principle, qi 气, mind, inherent nature, original substance, and effort, in which he inherited and criticized the ideas of Master Zhu [Xi] 朱熹 and [Wang] Yangming 王阳明, all being directly taken from the views of Liu Zongzhou. The comments on the main Neo-Confucians of the Ming Dynasty in his most important philosophical work Case Studies of Ming Confucians were mostly based on his teacher’s doctrines, with some even directly quoting the words of Liu Zongzhou. His explanations of the Mencius 孟子 were also based on Liu Zongzhou’s ideas, and thus he named the notes developed through his reading of the text Master’s Explanations of the Mencius. However, Liu Zongzhou’s focus in learning was on the cultivation of mind and inherent nature, and he made relatively few explorations of questions concerning society, politics, and the practical affairs of people’s lives. Huang Zongxi lived amidst the social turbulence of the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Qing, personally experiencing the fate of miserable wandering after the collapse of the state, and so had a more sorrowful awareness of the corruption of the Ming Dynasty. He also particularly stressed historical studies, holding that anyone who deals with classical scriptures must also deal with history. He opposed empty discussions of inherent nature and endowment, and advocated applying one’s learning in the practical management of state affairs. The series of works that he wrote during his life of wandering after the collapse of the Ming provide important historical material on the history of the Southern Ming. His propositions concerning historical studies had a great influence on scholars from the Zhedong 浙东 region. His works on [Book of] Changes learning (yixue 易学) advocated evidential research on historical facts, providing philological studies and criticisms of image-number learning from the Han Dynasty onward, especially that of the Song Dynasty, and had some influence on Changes learning in the Qing Dynasty.

1 The Unification of Principle and Qi, and of Mind and Inherent Nature Huang Zongxi’s thought was in all respects established on the basis of his theory of original substance (bentilun 本体论), and his theory of mind and inherent nature was a direct extension of his theory of original substance. The original substance of the cosmos that he spoke of was consistent with that of Liu Zongzhou, referring to the profound and unceasing dao 道 of Heaven, and the dao of Heaven having qi 气 1

[Trans.] See Huang Zongxi, Huang Zongxi quanji, Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1985; Mingru xue’an, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985.

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as its actual substance (shiti 实体). He clearly expressed this viewpoint in his comments on Luo Qinshun’s 罗钦顺 view of principle and qi: The gentleman’s discussions of principle and qi were most accurate, saying that that which interconnects Heaven and Earth and spans from ancient times to the present is nothing but a single qi. Qi is originally one, yet it is active at one moment and still the next, coming and going, opening and closing, rising and falling, circulating ceaselessly, accumulating subtlety and becoming manifest, then returning from manifestation to subtlety, producing the warmth and coolness or cold and heat of the four seasons, the productive growth and contractive storing up of the myriad things, the daily uses and cardinal human relationships of the people, and the success and failure or gain and loss in human affairs, with a thousand strands and myriad threads, diverse and entangled yet finally not falling into disorder, and being so with no one knowing why it is so; this is what is called principle. Originally it was not that there was another thing that relies on qi in being established, and was attached to qi in its operation. Based on the phrase “In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity” [from “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上), Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传)], some wonder whether there is a single thing that acts as ruler amidst the changes of yin 阴 and yang 阳, but this is not so. This phrase is like Zhu Xi’s various arguments that “principle and qi are two things” and “principle is weak while qi is strong,” which need not be debated since they are self-illuminating. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1109)

Here, although he borrowed Luo Qinshun’s words discussing the relationship between principle and qi from his work Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired (Kunzhi ji 困知记), this can in fact be seen as Huang Zongxi’s own viewpoint. Although Huang Zongxi did not agree with Luo Qinshun’s theory of mind and inherent nature, believing it to be in contradiction with his theory of principle and qi, he had nothing but praise for the latter. Like Liu Zongzhou, Huang Zongxi regarded qi as the only actual substance between Heaven and Earth, its circulating operations being without beginning or end, without interruption, and penetrating everywhere. The basis of the circulating operation of qi, and the orderly patterns expressed in this circulating operation, are principle (li 理). Principle is not a separate thing, nor is it the ruler of qi. Although Zhu Xi did not think that principle was another actual substance, his phrases such as “Principle and qi are similar to a person astride a horse,” “If all the mountains, rivers and even the great Earth itself collapsed, principle would still be here after all” and “Principle and qi are absolutely two things” in fact seemed to suggest they were two actual substances. In his works, Huang Zongxi frequently criticised and corrected this kind of expression of Zhu Xi’s that could easily led to principle and qi being two things. In Master’s Explanations of the Mencius, Huang Zongxi gave clear definitions of various concepts such as principle, qi, mind and inherent nature as well as their relationships: Between Heaven and Earth there is but one qi filling everywhere, which produces people and things. People receive this qi in being born, and the mind is the numinous point of this qi, what is called “knowing qi being above” [see “The Operations of Ritual” (Liyun 礼运), Record of Rites (Liji 礼记)]. The substance of the mind flows into operation, and its flowing operation that has orderly patterns is inherent nature. This is like the qi of the four seasons, in which it is harmonious to become spring, then harmony flourishes and warms to become summer, then warmth declines and cools to become autumn, then coolness flourishes and turns to cold to become winter, and then cold declines and it returns to

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spring; it has been like this through the ages, as if there were dividing lines between them. It flows into movement yet does not lose its order, and this is principle. Principle cannot be seen directly, but only seen in qi, just as inherent nature cannot be seen directly, but only seen in the mind, and hence the mind is qi. (Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 60)

This states that between Heaven and Earth there is but one actual substance, and this is qi. People and things all receive qi in being born, and the mind is also qi, except that it is a numinous knowing qi, hence he spoke of “knowing qi” (zhiqi 知 气). The orderly patterns manifest in the flowing movement of qi are principle, while the orderly patterns manifest in the flowing movement of the qi of the mind are inherent nature. To seek another so-called principle or inherent nature outside of the flowing movement of qi and its orderly patterns is the doctrine of “Zang 臧 having three ears” from the Kong Family Masters Anthology (Kongcongzi 孔丛子). When commenting on Liu Bangcai 刘邦采 of the Jiangyou 江右 Wang [Yangming] school, he also said: “In creation and transformation there is but one qi flowing into operation, this flowing operation not losing its regularity is the ruler, and it is not that there is a thing that rules over this flowing operation. Yet in flowing operation one cannot apply effort, but rather simply experience its not losing regularity” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 439). Here, although Huang Zongxi used the word “ruler” (zhuzai 主宰), he clearly stated that this so-called ruler is not another thing that gives orders from above qi, but rather simply flowing operation not losing its regularity. This not losing its regularity means that the movements of qi itself are like this. Since Huang Zongxi regarded qi as the only actual substance, principle and the various names of mind and inherent nature all take qi as their basis, rely on qi in their establishment, and arise through qi. The natural movement of qi is what Huang Zongxi called “central qi” (zhongqi 中气), in which although abnormal states appear, these abnormal states themselves can also be seen as variants of the normal state. Abnormal states can ultimately never alter the normal state. He also took up this point from Liu Zongzhou. When he explained Liu Zongzhou’s core precept of being careful when alone (shendu 慎 独), he thought that central qi was the metaphysical basis for the lone-substance (duti 独体) of being careful when alone: The learning of the former master lay in being careful when alone. In the past there were many who took being careful when alone as their core precept, either recognising the original substance and falling into vagueness, or relying on lone-knowing and forcibly moving their thoughts. Only the former master experienced the interpenetration of the single qi of happiness, anger, sadness and joy… The lone-substance is like this, as if Heaven advanced and retreated with a single qi, evenly dividing the four seasons, the warm, cool, cold and hot, with no discrepancy in its regularity, so that one year is like this, and down through the ages it has been like this. Even if yang transgresses and yin submits, resulting in signs of impending fortune or misfortune, this will ultimately never change the great constancy of creation and transformation. Being careful simply means being careful concerning this. (“Preface to Collected Writings of the Former Master Mr. Jishan” [Xianshi Jishan xiansheng wenji xu 先师蕺山先生文集序], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 10, 51)

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Central qi is the spontaneous flowing operation of qi, which naturally divides into the four seasons with their warmth, coolness, cold and heat, and has its unchanging regularity. Although this is not without its abnormal states, as when he said that “yang transgresses and yin submits,” these cannot change the original state of Heaven. This single qi is sincere in its interpenetration and returning, and has been so down through the ages. To be careful when alone is to experience the spontaneous flowing operation of happiness, anger, sadness and joy (the four virtues and not the seven feelings), so as to ensure the substance of the mind does not lose the virtue of central harmony. In his discussion of Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, Huang Zongxi also expressed the same meaning: The qi of Heaven and Earth has excess and insufficiency, as well as yang transgressing and yin submitting, yet how can one on this basis doubt that there is anything not good in the qi of Heaven and Earth? Although at one time there is excess and insufficiency, the central qi down through the ages is the same as ever, and this is the unchanging nature of principle. When people receive qi, although there is unevenness of pure and turbid or strong and weak, in terms of one’s bosom being filled with the mind of compassion that is revealed when touched, people are all the same, and this is what is called inherent nature, so amid the pure and turbid or strong and weak, how could one say there is anything not good? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1174)

Huang Zongxi’s theory of principle and qi was rooted in the thought of his teacher Liu Zongzhou, and was the theoretical basis of his theories of mind and inherent nature and of effort. His theory of principle and qi was different from Zhang Zai 张 载, Luo Qinshun and Wang Tingxiang. Zhang Zai’s theory of qi was based on astronomy, and focused on the specific qualities of qi itself, regarding the struggle between pure, limpid unity and qi with physical form as the basis of the distinction between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and that of material qi. Zhang Zai’s concept of “mind” was not directly explained as “the qi of numinous knowing.” Although the theories of principle and qi of Luo Qinshun and Wang Tingxiang were more thoroughgoing, they differed somewhat from Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi’s direct use of the qi of the mind to explain inherent nature and principle. Hence although Huang Zongxi praised Luo Qinshun’s theory of principle and qi, he vehemently criticised his theory of mind and inherent nature, believing the two aspects of his thought could not be united. It can be said that, in terms of the thoroughness of their qi–monism and their use of qi as a basis for explaining concepts such as mind and inherent nature, the theories of Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi were the most comprehensive, interconnected and consistent. For this reason, Liu Zongzhou can be regarded as the last great master of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism. Huang Zongxi inherited and echoed this, making some corrections and expansions. Huang Zongxi’s theory of mind and inherent nature was derived from his theory of principle and qi as an expression of the latter in the specific form of qi found in human beings, hence his discussions of mind and inherent nature were all based on qi. He said: That which is qi in Heaven is the mind in human beings, and that which is principle in Heaven is inherent nature in human beings. Principle and qi are like this, and hence mind

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and inherent nature are like this, with no difference. When people receive the qi of Heaven in being born, there is only one mind, yet its activity and stillness, its happiness, anger, sadness and joy, these revolve endlessly. Where it should be compassionate it is spontaneously compassionate, where it should feel shame and disgust it is shameful and disgusted, where it should be respectful it is respectful, and where it should feel right and wrong it feels right and wrong, with a myriad threads all being affected and responding in confusion, yet never becoming dulled; this is what is called inherent nature. It was originally no other thing, but was established prior to the mind and is attached within the mind. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 1109)

For Huang Zongxi here, principle-qi and mind-inherent nature each have the same order as different expressions of the same single qi, a point on which he differed from both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. What Zhu Xi referred to as the mind was mainly the organ of knowing, “the numinosity of the human mind all possesses knowing,” and was the basis for the activities of the sense-organs, encompassing and unifying the sense of the ears, eyes, mouth and nose, in order to form definite and systematic knowledge. Another function of the mind was to encompass “inherent nature,” a point that took up Zhang Zai’s view of the mind as dominating inherent nature and feeling and Shao Yong’s view of “the mind as the outer wall of inherent nature,” thinking that inherent nature resides within the mind, and that the mind has the function of making inherent nature and feelings manifest. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 thought that the mind is the site for the expression of moral rationality, and that the moral rationality inherent in the mind is one and the same as the fundamental principle of the cosmos, hence he proposed the propositions that “the mind is principle” and “my mind is the cosmos.” Wang Yangming’s thought was a fused whole, with the moral rationality and epistemological rationality of the mind fused as one, with no differentiated analysis of principle, qi, mind and inherent nature, hence he said: “Innate moral knowing is one, yet in terms of its wondrous function it can be called spirit, in terms of its flowing operation it can be called qi, and in terms of its condensed coherence it can be called essence” and “Principle is the orderly pattern of qi, while qi is the operative function of principle” (Record of Transmission and Practice [Chuanxi lu 传习录], Pt. II). This idea had a great influence on Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi’s proposal that “the mind is qi.” Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi set out from this, absorbed ideas from Zhang Zai, Luo Qinshun and Wang Tingxiang, and proposed the proposition that “the mind is qi.” However, their proposals and arguments concerning “the mind as principle” were both different from Wang Yangming. Wang Yangming’s theory of original substance was oriented around “both the mind and things, both activity and stillness, both knowing and action,” such that this original substance was a holistic existence that could not be divided into mind or things. Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi however regarded qi as the substance of the cosmos and the foundation for all existence, so inherent nature and principle are forms of expression of qi. In comparison with Wang Yangming, Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi can be said to have had a concept of the original basis (shiji 始基) of the cosmos, while Wang Yangming did not. Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi also included more empiricist elements than Wang Yangming, who spoke completely in terms of a spiritual plane

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(jingjie 境界). The idea of “nothing without unity” in Wang Yangming’s theory of a spiritual plane was broadly praised by Liu Zongzhou and Huang Zongxi, yet they preferred to set out from a more traditional and more popular view of qi as the substance of the cosmos, and to derive other concepts from this, in order to encompass the monumental and deep-rooted tradition of Master Zhu Learning, and establish philosophy on a more broad and stable foundation.

2 All that Fills Heaven and Earth Is Mind For Huang Zongxi, the relation between principle and qi and that between mind and inherent nature were one and the same. In terms of actual physical existence, people are simply qi, and the mind is qi with numinous knowing. The mind is a concept that signifies a substance that can be active, one with a special material composition. The relation between the mind and qi can form two structures, one being qi ! mind, and the other being mind ! inherent nature. In the structure of qi ! mind, the mind is the numinous part of qi, and the two are two states of one homogeneous thing. In the structure of mind ! inherent nature, the mind signifies the material basis of inherent nature, while inherent nature is the orderly pattern of this material in its process of flowing operation, and the two have completely different qualities. These are two different contexts of meaning. Huang Zongxi left out the difference between mind and qi (numinosity and stubborn ignorance) in the first structure, directly focusing on the essence of their composition, and derived the conclusion that “the mind is qi.” However, for Huang Zongxi here, “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind” had another system of meaning and principle. The entrance to this system lay in seeing the myriad things and affairs in the cosmos as simultaneously both qi and mind, since people give meaning to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and for people, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are a kind of meaningful existence, a kind of structure of meaning and value. This structure of meaning and value must use all that people obtain to observe and explicate Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, making them become “things within me” (zai wo zhi wu 在我之物). Hence Huang Zongxi could say “all that fills the space between Heaven and Earth is qi” and “between Heaven and Earth there is but one qi filling everywhere,” and also that “all that fills the space between Heaven and Earth is mind.” For him, there was no contradiction between the two points. To see the cosmos as a structure of meaning (yiyi jiegou 意义结构), imbue the cosmos with one’s own intuition and thereby obtain a kind of spiritual plane (jingshen jingjie 精神境界) is a kind of sentiment people have when they attain a certain kind of dual ethical-aesthetic insight into themselves and the cosmos in which they dwell, one in which people borrow metaphors and symbols to express their ultimate concern for people and the cosmos. In Chinese philosophy, Heaven (tian 天) is a composite category representing certain kind of unchangeable tendency or irresistible necessity, albeit one without the character of a personal god. Heaven can be said to be a highest structure of meaning. The Commentaries on the

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Changes repeatedly use meaning and value to speak of Heaven, saying “The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is called production” and “Daily renewal is what is called flourishing virtue, production and reproduction is what is called change,” seeing the cosmos as structure of meaning, a thing of value. It is both an object, and also a subject. Since the Learning of the Mind school in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism emphasised the unity of the human mind and the fundamental principle of the cosmos, it often an existence that was both mind and thing. Lu Jiuyuan’s student Yang Jian 杨简 can in this respect be said to have reached the peak of perfection, as when he said in his “Self-Changes” (Jiyi 己易): Changes are the self and not something else. To regard changes as a book and not the self is impermissible. To regard changes as the change and transformation of Heaven and Earth and not the change and transformation of the self is impermissible. Heaven and Earth are my Heaven and Earth, change and transformation is my change and transformation, and not another thing…. These are all made by me, fused and mixed with no internal or external, interpenetrating and interconnected with no difference or diversity. (Case Studies from the Song and Yuan [Song Yuan xue’an 宋元学案], 2467–2468)

Changes are not merely the changes of the cosmos, nor are they merely the change and transformation of the hexagrams and lines in the Changes book, but are rather a structure of meaning that combines the change and transformation of my mind, the change and transformation of the cosmos and the change and transformation of hexagrams, lines and images as one. In this structure, one cannot speak of the cosmos as separate from one’s mind. As a product of human culture, the fact that the Book of Changes is a creation of the human mind goes without saying, yet the objective cosmos as an object that is understood and given value and meaning by people is also a result of the creativity of the human spirit. This approach always held a central and guiding position in Chinese philosophy and especially in Confucian doctrine. The highest human vocation is to learn to become a sage, and the prominent characteristic of sages is their spiritual plane of being one with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Attaining such a spiritual plane requires one to regard the cosmos as a structure of meaning, and such a structure is not based on rational thought of the understanding, but on a value-oriented personal experience and intuition of the cosmos. Huang Zongxi’s “all that fills the space between Heaven and Earth is mind” as a structure of value and meaning that saw Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one was most deeply influenced by Wang Yangming. In his late years, Wang Yangming’s learning attained a plane of transformation characterised by its breadth, grandeur and fusion, quite different from the sincere and subdued quality of his early years. In much of the recorded speech from the lectures of his late years, his words concerning personal experience of a spiritual plane and directing orientation outweighed his words concerning the understanding of principles. Hence the Jiangyou scholar Luo Hongxian 罗洪先 who emphasised effort and concrete practice saw him as “building all-enveloping words in thin air.” As Wang Yangming said:

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That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is simply this numinous clarity, and it is only because people have a bodily form that they there are gaps in it. My numinous clarity is the ruler of Heaven, Earth, ghosts and spirits. If Heaven did not have my numinous clarity, who would raise it on high? If Earth did not have my numinous clarity, who would lower it into the depths? If ghosts and spirits did not have my numinous clarity, who would distinguish between their fortune and misfortune? If Heaven, Earth, ghosts, spirits and the myriad things were separated from my numinous clarity, there would be nothing concerned with Heaven, Earth, ghosts, spirits and the myriad things; if my numinous clarity were separated from Heaven, Earth, ghosts, spirits and the myriad things, there would also no longer be my numinous clarity. In this way there is a single qi flowing and interconnecting, so how could there be any gaps in it? (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III)

Wang Yangming’s meaning was that the human mind is the numinous essence of Heaven and Earth. People are the highest expression of the law of the cosmos. The innate moral knowing of people and the innate moral knowing of the myriad things (the spirit of the cosmos embodied in the myriad things) are the embodiment of one and the same principle and one and the same value. The spirituality of the cosmos is given by people, people are the highest achievement of the cosmos, yet people also give what they have obtained to the cosmos. In relation to people, the cosmos has a new kind of meaning and value. This is what Wang Yangming referred to when he said, “Innate moral knowing is the numinous essence of creation and transformation. This numinous essence produces Heaven and Earth and completes ghosts and spirits, which all emerge from it, and thus is truly has no match among things” (Record of Transmission and Practice, Pt. III). Huang Zongxi saw the original substance of the cosmos as a thing of value, a structure of meaning that is both mind and thing. In fact, other than speaking at the level of the ultimate constitution of things, between the two propositions of “all that fills Heaven and Earth is qi” and “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind,” Huang Zongxi in general tended more towards the latter. In the preface to Case Studies of Ming Confucians and its revised version that he dictated orally to his son from his deathbed in the last two years before his death, the first sentences both read “all that fills the space between Heaven and Earth is mind.” Why did Huang Zongxi tend more towards “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind”? Tracing his train of thought, there are roughly the following two points. First, “mind” (xin 心) can better express the inseparable relation between subject and object. In Huang Zongxi’s eyes, the cosmos was a structure of meaning and a thing of value, not an actual structure of logical cognition. It was not a pure object unrelated to the subject, a black hole of dark depths “outside of me,” but rather a “thing within me” that was known and intuited by the subject and imbued with great significance. “All that fills Heaven and Earth is mind” spoke from the perspective of understanding, in which the myriad things of the cosmos are all representations in the mind, and that by which the myriad things depend on to reciprocally distinguish themselves and determine their respective qualities are “images” (xiang 象). Although the changes and transformations of the myriad images are diverse and complex, the essence of the myriad things is one, in that they are all “mind.” Hence

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in general terms, to speak of “mind” means that the representations and significance of the myriad things appears brightly within the subject. Thus fathoming principle means probing how the mind knows and intuits the myriad things, and not probing the myriad things themselves. When the mind extracts the images of the myriad things and returns them to itself, this is a process of the mind applying its function to things, i.e. effort. When people give meaning to things, they must first extract their images and obliquely combine with them before this is possible. In general, things are the things of a unity between mind and things, since only when things are relative to the subject do they have meaning. Huang Zongxi expressed this idea very clearly in Master’s Explanations of the Mencius: Filling the space between Heaven and Earth there is no so-called myriad things, since the myriad things are all named because of me. For example, a father is one’s father and a ruler is one’s ruler, so how could the two words “ruler” and “father” be pushed outside of one’s body? Yet one must really have the mind of filial piety toward a father before he becomes one’s father; one must really have the mind of loyalty toward a ruler before he becomes one’s ruler; this is what is called “To reflect on oneself and find sincerity” [see Mencius, 7A.4]. It is only then that the myriad things are not the myriad things and I am not I, and all form a single undivided whole. This body between Heaven and Earth, without the slightest deficiency; what joy can compare to it? (Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 149)

This was Huang Zongxi’s explanation of Mencius’ sentence “The myriad things are all complete in me.” Although it mainly discussed ethical categories such as loyalty and filial piety being named because of the subject, the righteousness of father-son and ruler-minister only being complete because of the actual conduct of the subject, it can be extended to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. “The myriad things are named because of me” means that the myriad things between Heaven and Earth do not have different connecting subjects. If the myriad things are separated from the subject, there are no so-called myriad things. The subject not only names the myriad things, but also more importantly recognises and intuits the myriad things. Recognising concerns the qualities of specific things and affairs, while intuiting concerns a thing or affair’s position and meaning in the cosmos as a whole. The myriad things are like this, and ethical principles are also like this. All ethical principles exist because of the subject, and all ethical principles cannot together two sides: giver and receiver, subject and object. However, objects are always spoken of relative to the subject, and objects separated from the subject are meaningless. The highest spiritual plane is subject and object as a single undivided whole, without clear awareness of subject and object, forgetting or erasing the division between subject and object, so that “things are not things and I am not I, and all form a single undivided whole.” However, this kind of forgetting or erasure is a forgetting or erasure on condition that one accepts that there is a connection between subject and object, that the object cannot have its meaning if separated from the subject, and as such is a spiritual plane after effort is proficient and insight is excellent. This is then Mencius’ “sincerity.” Second, “mind” can better express the precept of one root and myriad diversities.

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One root and myriad diversities (yiben wanshu 一本万殊) was Huang Zongxi’s fundamental idea, and this idea was implemented throughout every aspect of his thought, including methodology in the history of philosophy. This idea was greatly influenced by his teacher Liu Zongzhou. Liu Zongzhou believed that there was only a single qi in the cosmos, and it flowed to become spring, summer, autumn and winter; the human mind was also one qi, and it flowed to become happiness, anger, sadness and joy (the four inklings, not the seven feelings). The single dao of Heaven and Earth divided and became the Supreme Polarity, yin and yang, the Four Images and the Eight Trigrams. Hence if viewed as a totality it is one, and if divided and analysed it is diverse. Huang Zongxi took the idea of “Under Heaven there are a hundred thoughts but one result, diverse paths but one destination” from the Commentaries on the Changes [see “Appended Phrases, Pt. II” (Xici xia 系辞下)] to summarise this thought. Huang Zongxi summarised Liu Zongzhou’s thought into four points: first, there is no active examination outside of quiet preservation; second, intention is that which the mind preserves, and not that which the mind discharges; third, the already aroused and the state before arousal should be handled and spoken of in terms of surface and inner, not of former and later; fourth, the Supreme Polarity is a general name for the myriad things. These four points state the precept of one root and myriad diversities from the aspects of the original substance of the cosmos (the Supreme Polarity and the myriad things), the original substance of the mind (mind and intention), the activity and stillness of the mind (the already aroused and the state before arousal), and the cultivation of the mind (cultivation through self-discipline and reflective examination): Heaven is a general name for the myriad things [see Guo Xiang 郭象, Commentary to the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi zhu 庄子注), Ch. 2 “Equalising Views of Things” (Qiwulun 齐物论)], and not the ruler of things. Dao is a general name for the myriad implements, and not the substance of implements. Inherent nature is a general name for the myriad forms, and not a counterpart to forms. If one knows this, then the dao-mind is the original mind of the human mind, and the inherent nature of moral principle is the inherent nature of material qi. (“Brief Biography of Master Liu” [Zi Liuzi xingzhuang 子刘子行状], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 252)

Here, the one root is an aggregate of the myriad diversities and not something outside of them, so they are two different observational perspectives and not two different kinds of existence. This thought had an obvious purport, namely to reject any theory of two roots: Heaven, dao, inherent nature, etc. are not something else outside of the myriad things and forms, but are rather aggregates of the myriad things and forms. In Huang Zongxi’s view, many of Neo-Confucianism’s conceptual pairs, such as the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and of material qi, the dao-mind and the human mind, the already aroused and the state before arousal, and cultivation through self-discipline and reflective examination, were all theories of two roots, and were thus not established on a firm basis. Only a theory of one root could fathom the root-source of the myriad things and put an end to the emergence of all kinds of abuses. In this regard, Huang Zongxi continued both Wang Yangming’s use of innate moral knowing to connect together all

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philosophical categories, and Liu Zongzhou’s theory of one root in which qi was the root-source of the myriad things. Huang Zongxi’s “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind” provided an excellent explanation of his precept of one root and myriad diversities. For Huang Zongxi, “mind” could signify both the aggregate of specific things and affairs, seeing the cosmos as one “great mind,” and also specific things and affairs, seeing them as “individual minds.” Mind could focus on the whole, but could also focus on the parts. In focusing on the whole, it is a holistic or totalising thought, which is the forte of dao (the original substance of the cosmos), the Supreme Polarity (the fundamental law of the cosmos), great transformation and flowing operation (the general process of the myriad things), etc., can give people a lofty state of mind and penetrating understanding of implements, and has the advantage of rising to a unique peak and seeing the multitude of mountains as small. In focusing on the parts, it is a specific or extractive thought, which is the forte of principles (the foundation and regularity of specific things and affairs), inherent nature (the qualities of specific things and affairs), etc., can give people fine thoughts and practical direction, and has the benefit of becoming more proficient, exploring the subtle and seeking the obscure. Mind is not attached to any site, can be partial or holistic, changes and transforms in a myriad ways, and furls or unfurls as it pleases. If one uses Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦颐 concepts of “sincerity, spirit and inflections” (cheng shen ji 诚神几) to model it, then holistic thinking is close to spirit, detailed thinking is close to inflections, and furling or unfurling as it pleases yet never exceeding the scope of the mind is sincerity. Hence the mind is best at speaking of change and transformation. If one wishes to find a word to summarise the unpredictable change and transformation of the myriad images of the cosmos with their activity and stillness of no fixed form, as well as the flexibility of perspectives for observing things, then “mind” should be the first choice. More importantly, Huang Zongxi praised the basic philosophical views of Wang Yangming and Liu Zongzhou, taking the Learning of the Mind as his central precept. Since he wished to use Song-Ming Confucians’ means of expression, to use one word or number to summarise the quality of Heaven, Earth and the myriad images, he had no choice but to use “mind” as a sign. This relationship between one root and myriad diversities and “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind” was also implemented in the guiding thought of Huang Zongxi’s compilation of academic histories. There are two prefaces for Case Studies of Ming Confucians included in his collected works, and in the revised version, there is a long passage of text that was not in the original preface: Since people form one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, in fathoming the principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, this lies within one’s mind. Later scholars misunderstood the intention of earlier worthy men and thought that this principle was suspended in thin air between Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, so when one goes on to fathom it, is it not close to “righteousness being external” [see Mencius, 6A.4]? If this point goes even slightly wrong, then the myriad diversities cannot be returned to unity. If effort is realised and there is no separation from this mind, then the myriad diversities are all consistent, and differences in academic learning lie precisely in perception of the

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dao-substance being incomplete. As for the gentlemen of today, they insist on proceeding from one path, plagiarising its existing doctrines to assess the past and present, and if there is the slightest discrepancy, they vilify it as departing from scripture and betraying the dao, until as the ethos of the times and the tendency of the multitude, it cannot avoid the fate of becoming an indistinct mass of yellow grass or white reeds. The dao is like the sea, since all the different rivers and streams from their clear upper heights to their muddy lower reaches wind their ways inexorably toward it day and night. Each of them is originally water, and when they reach the sea they become a single body of water. Imagine if the sea was dismissively self-satisfied, and said: “When all you various waters guide your sources here, do you not all have differences of urgency, tranquility, purity and distance? You cannot be said to be exactly the same as me. Why do you not then each return to your original places?” If this were the case, there would be no release from their lower reaches, and thus [the mythical island of the immortals] Penglai 蓬莱 would face the danger of drying up. How are those today who love uniformity and feel disgusted by difference any different from this? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 7)

This passage is full of profound significance, and its central purport is to state the precepts of “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind” and one root and myriad diversities, regarding the two as intimately connected. Fathoming principle means seeking within the human mind, and not in Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, because “all that fills Heaven and Earth is mind,” and “people form one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” The “principle” spoken of here is a principle that unites “Heavenly principle” with the principles of things. The principles of things are necessarily each different, yet the Heavenly principle projected onto the principles of things is one and the same. This principle is also one and the same as the principle of inherent nature originally present in the mind. The reason why he disagreed with seeking principle among Heaven, Earth and the myriad things was that this word “principle” is then the principles of things and not Heavenly principle. The principles of things are all different, and their myriad diversities cannot be returned to unity. When he said “If effort is realised,” this referred to using a special degree of understanding and insight to transform the investigated principles of things into Heavenly principle, making them into something that benefits one’s spiritual plane. Only the mind can embrace the myriad images and return them to unity, and only when they have passed through the mind’s recognition do they have the character of being both Heavenly principle and the principles of things. For Huang Zongxi, different forms of academic learning are different expressions of the human spirit, and it is both unnecessary and impossible to make them all the same. This common human spirit is what Huang Zongxi called mind. Different forms of academic learning can satisfy different spiritual needs. The spiritual products provided by thinkers must be the result of effort, having insight into the principles of the myriad diversities and on this basis illuminating the dao-substance of the one root. This purport was embodied in his assessments of each of the thinkers of the Ming Dynasty.

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3 Methodology in the History of Philosophy The Case Studies of Ming Confucians that Huang Zongxi painstakingly compiled in his late years was the first complete history of philosophy in China to cover a specific period. In this book, he gave an account of the lives and general academic precepts of more than two hundred Ming Dynasty thinkers, and then attached selections from their important works. Both in its comments of individual figures and its choices of material, this work amounted to a significant achievement. In Case Studies from the Song and Yuan, which was begun by Huang Zongxi, continued and supplemented by his son Huang Baijia and self-styled disciple Quan Zuwang, and finally revised and arranged by Wang Zicai 王梓材 and Feng Yunhao 冯云濠, although most of the comments on individual cases came from the hand of Quan Zuwang, the framework of the work as a whole was formulated by Huang Zongxi. These two books, especially Case Studies of Ming Confucians, reflect Huang Zongxi’s methodology in the history of philosophy. “One root and myriad diversities” was Huang Zongxi’s basic guiding principle in writing the history of philosophy. In terms of the original substance of the cosmos, “one root” refers to dao, the Supreme Polarity, and the general law of the cosmos. In terms of academic history, it refers to the spirit of a culture, the governing thread of academic learning, and a humanistic concern. “Myriad diversities” refers to each period having respective systems of thought that founded and can represent the attainment of the academic development of the time. One root and myriad diversities thus refers to the spirit of a culture and governing thread of academic learning being embodied in the different philosophical thoughts and precepts of the philosophers of each period. Conversely, the thinkers of each different period collectively constitute the spirit of a culture and governing thread of academic learning. This “one root” is a crystallisation of the outstanding spiritual wisdom of each period. It is not something pre-established, nor is it a simply confluence or mechanical combination of the academic thought of the thinkers of each period, but is rather a result of integrating and fusing the intellectual positions proposed by each thinker based on their cultural standpoint and humanistic concern with the ethos and academic trend of their period. This one root and myriad diversities is both mind and thing. The one root appears as the change and transformation of the myriad diversities, while the unpredictable change and transformation of the myriad diversities collectively expresses this one root. The role played by these myriad diversities in constituting one root and their value for this root are different when seen from different points of view. This view represents a degree of understanding, and attaining this kind of degree of understanding depends on “cultivating virtue,” i.e. attaining a thorough and multifaceted understanding of the relation between one root and myriad diversities through cultivation. The contrary of cultivating virtue is clinging to fixed and pre-existing views, elevating the one and abolishing the many. Huang Zongxi gave an extremely clear statement of the above thoughts:

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All that which fills Heaven and Earth is mind, unpredictable change and transformation that cannot but be myriad in its diversities, so the mind has no original substance and that which effort reaches is its original substance. Hence those who fathom principle fathom the myriad diversities of this mind, and not those of the myriad things. Therefore the superior men of ancient times preferred to dig out the separate roads of the five strong men (wuding 五丁) rather than borrow the wild horses of Handan 邯郸, and thus their paths could not but be diverse. The superior men of today however insist on proceeding from one path, taking the beauty of the numinous root and transforming it into scorched buds and drained streams. The recorded sayings of former Confucians all differed, and only imprinted the continual change and movement of the substance of their own minds. If one clings to fixed and pre-existing views, then one will never attain the benefit of one’s efforts. There is nothing else to say but that one must cultivate virtue before one can lecture on learning. Since people today lecture on learning without cultivating virtue, is it any wonder that they elevate the one and abolish the many? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 9)

The superior men who “insist on proceeding from one path” here referred to those in power who did not like lecturing on learning and took advantage of the label of consolidating academic learning to trample on and repress free lecturing on learning, as well as those vulgar Confucians who restricted and limited themselves while denouncing different opinions. What Huang Zongxi advocated was intellectual systems that apply people’s efforts and exhaust their mental powers to produce a special contribution to the development of the whole of academic learning, and thereby illuminate, assist and benefit from the one root. On the basis of this general guiding principle, he selected those thinkers that he thought should be expounded and recounted. The introduction that Huang Zongxi formulated for Case Studies of Ming Confucians represented his basic viewpoints on the compilation of histories of academic learning, and these viewpoints were a specific implementation of his precept of one root and myriad diversities. Among them, the most important were: First, selecting the most representative philosophers for case studies. His standard for selection was having independent views, really having applied effort, not plagiarising the existing doctrines of previous thinkers, and having expounded and illuminated the “one root.” Huang Zongxi said: When I composed Case Studies of Ming Confucians, the various masters each attained their own depth or shallowness, displaying each other’s purity and defects, which should have all be reached through effort, exhausting the myriad diversities of their minds and then developing this into a school, and never muddying their spirit by falsely taking up the dregs of others. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 10)

In compiling a history of academic learning, the most crucial point is formulating the standard for selection: for which people cases should be established and how to assess scholars’ achievements is in reality a comprehensive test of academic conscience, degree of understanding, and aptitude. These are what earlier scholars called historical virtue, historical understanding and historical aptitude. Among historians of academic learning, there are some who make use of academic learning to pander to those in power, some who reject opposing opinions and repress freedom of thought, some who select following their own personal likes and dislikes, and some who do not understand the academic achievements of the scholars

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they have selected and thus are inappropriate in distributing praise and blame. Huang Zongxi’s standard was to select those who had truly applied effort, had independent views, and had established their own school of thought. Only those with independent views and their own school of thought can be said to have illuminated the one root, otherwise they were “adding water to water.” Case Studies of Ming Confucians in total established seventeen case studies, and selected 210 scholars. Although their achievements were all different and their central precepts each distinct, they had all truly applied effort and had independent views. Although some of those selected did not display any great academic achievements, they either differed from the popular and vulgar in their speech and conduct or sought what they attained especially painstakingly, and their spirit was thus sufficient to be transmitted to future generations, such as the woodcutter and potter from the Taizhou 泰州 School. Some scholars have criticised Case Studies of Ming Confucians for “protecting the doctrines of its author’s master and advocating the Yaojiang 姚江 faction [represented by Wang Yangming]” (Shen Weiqiao 沈维鐈, Minor Knowledge of Case Studies of the National Dynasty [Guochao xue’an xiaoshi 国朝学案小识], preface). This was perhaps not a particularly fair view. It is true that the comments on some of the scholars in Case Studies of Ming Confucians were based on related arguments from Liu Zongzhou, but the fundamental thoughts in compiling the work were Huang Zongxi’s own. More importantly, Huang Zongxi lived through the Ming-Qing transition, and passed a significant length of time in the relatively calm period after the rule of the Qing court was established. Both the problems he faced and the schemes he concocted to deal with these problems were thus different from those of Liu Zongzhou. Even just in terms of their assessments of specific figures, the two men had their discrepant points, for example, in relation to Yangming learning, Liu Zongzhou “first doubted it, then believed it, and finally spared no effort in challenging it,” and the devotion of his desire to correct the faults of the Wang school was very clear. Huang Zongxi however was full of praise for Wang Yangming, although concerning Yangming’s students, especially the followers of Longxi 龙溪 in Taizhou, his criticisms were very severe. Even though in a significant proportion of his viewpoints, Huang Zongxi was in accord with Liu Zongzhou, this should be seen as Huang Zongxi agreeing with and inheriting his master’s viewpoints, and not as his differing with his master but twisting things to protect him from criticism. To criticise Case Studies of Ming Confucians for “advocating the Yaojiang 姚江 faction” is an even more superficial view that fails to understand the course of development of Ming Dynasty academic learning. After Wang Yangming arose, the whole complexion of Ming Dynasty academic learning underwent a great change. Since Wang Yangming did not go against the basic Confucian standpoint yet was quite creative in his thought, opposed the ossification of Zhu Xi’s learning at the time yet was able to transcend it, and opposed the utilitarian trend of the time yet was also able to accommodate it in his doctrines, these aspects all fitted the social needs of the time. When the great inspirational force of his personality was added to this, it led him to become the object of much esteem and admiration at the time. His students spread all over the world under Heaven, and among them a minority of the

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best were powerful enough to add fuel to the fire, leading Yangming’s doctrines to become an intellectual trend that was the fashion over much of China and held a leading position in the intellectual world. That Wang Learning was the core was a fact of the academic world of the time. Case Studies of Ming Confucians narrated and relayed this fact, and did not display unfair partiality to personal preference and twist things in order to promote it. Other than the Wang school, Case Studies of Ming Confucians also expounded case studies from the early Ming such as the Chongren 崇仁 [represented by Wu Yubi 吴与弼], Hedong 河东 [represented by Xue Xuan 薛瑄] and Sanyuan 三原 [represented by Wang Shu 王恕] schools that followed Master Zhu Learning, a case study of the Ganquan 甘泉 school [represented by Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水] that responded to Yaojiang, and case studies from the Zhixiu 止修 [represented by Li Cai 李材], Donglin 东林 [represented by Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成] and Jishan 蕺山 [represented by Liu Zongzhou] schools that criticised and amended Yaojiang. Among these, the doctrines of the schools that were simultaneous with or after Yangming could not ignore or avoid Yangming Learning and its great influence at the time, and that their works included praise, criticism, discussion and adoption of it was all quite reasonable. That Wang Learning was the centre of attention in the academic world was the real situation at the time. When Case Studies of Ming Confucians took Wang Learning as its core, this was a faithful record of the situation of academic learning at the time, and not a factional contention. Furthermore, Wang Learning’s thread of development can be followed step by step, making it easy to recount, clear to assign affiliation, and enabling the various schools and factions of Wang Learning to be given case studies. For the various Confucians whose lineage is unclear, he could only set up a general “Case Study of Various Confucians” (Zhuru xue’an 诸儒学案). This is not to emphasise the Wang School and make light of the various Confucians. In fact, although “Case Study of Various Confucians” has a single name, it is divided into three sections, gives an account of a great many figures, takes up a large proportion of the book, and includes almost all the important thinkers outside of the Wang School. Also, whether or not the Donglin and Jishan schools belong to the Wang School is still a debatable question. These points all demonstrate that the claim that Case Studies of Ming Confucians was “protecting the doctrines of its author’s master and advocating the Yaojiang faction” is untrue. In order to make Master Zhu Learning regain its hold on the academic world, scholars of Zhu Learning deliberately repressed Wang Learning, reduced its influence and shrunk its scope, which was precisely a factional contention on behalf of Zhu Learning. This phenomenon was especially clear in the early Qing Dynasty. Since Huang Zongxi took “all being reached through effort, exhausting the myriad diversities of their minds and then developing this into a school” as his standard for selection, he did not exclude opposing opinions. As long as scholars applied effort, truly benefited from this in body and mind, and truly illuminated the one root, he set up a case for them, and especially pointed out their outstanding aspects in his comments. In the introduction to Case Studies of Ming Confucians, he said:

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The dao of learning regards that which is of use for an individual person as authentic, while all those who lean on schools and factions or rely on likenesses in painting gourds are either gentlemen who follow the common fashion, or they do the work of students of the classics. Those listed in this compilation include biased views and opposing theories, since the different points of scholars are precisely what ought to be focused on and noted; this is what is called the one root and myriad diversities. If one simply adds water to water, how is this learning? (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 15)

Here, he proposed the standard of learning in his eyes: anything that is useful for one’s own cultivation of character or contributes to the development of human culture is true academic learning. “That which is of use for an individual person” does not lie in the amount of books one has read, nor in the breadth of one’s knowledge, and not even in the carefulness or devotion of one’s specific effort at cultivation, but rather entirely in the cultivation of a spiritual plane. All knowledge and effort should touch upon and stimulate the subject of cultivation, and thereby provide some inspiration and benefit. The implied condition here is that which is of use for oneself may not necessarily be of use for other people. Since the learning, cultivation and temperament of each person is different, the problems they face and the means to solve them are different. Since the needs of the spirit and mind are also different, scholars should be allowed to choose different schools of learning and different central precepts. Case Studies of Ming Confucians includes many cases individuals who studied under one master but attained enlightenment under another, or found one school unsuitable but excelled under another. This includes a principle of intellectual freedom: in order for their minds to truly benefit, scholars can change their school, not abide by their master’s doctrines, wander all around like Chan monks, and seek out masters to ask about the dao. In fact, almost every case in Case Studies of Ming Confucians was divided according to region, and the central precepts of the scholars from one and the same region were often different and even mutually contradictory. This demonstrates that Huang Zongxi was a scholar who possessed a freedom of spirit, one who emphasised the real attainment of the mind and not external factions or inheritance from one’s master. What he opposed and disdained was “leaning on schools and factions or relying on likenesses in painting gourds.” Academic learning should have no format for truth and not stress protocol or dead letters, and the real benefit of the mind should be the only standard. Knowledge outside of the benefit of the mind is “the work of students of the classics,” while to slavishly follow the old paths of earlier scholars to no real benefit is the learning of common gentlemen. What scholars should focus on is real benefit, and even biased views or opposing theories should be allowed to exist if they are of use. The dao, the one root, is something that is collectively produced and realised by every different central precept, and not something pre-existing, presupposed, or unconnected to scholars’ minds. Huang Zongxi’s theory of one root and myriad diversities was his highest standard for selecting individual figures. Second, selecting primary sources that can best represent a philosopher’s thought. Case Studies of Ming Confucians is the model example of the case study style, and its stylistic layout first has some case words, recounting the life and general doctrinal precept of the philosopher, then some refutations and corrections

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of others’ comments and finally a compilation of selected works by the philosopher himself. Concerning the selection of works, Huang Zongxi said in the introduction to Case Studies of Ming Confucians: Every time I saw transcriptions of the recorded sayings of former Confucians gathered together in various branches, I did not know what intention lay behind the selection. If the spirit of a person’s life has not been revealed, how can one perceive their academic learning? This compilation has all been edited from various complete works to sum up their important aspects and draw out their profound truth, and has not copied the old editions of former scholars. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 14)

Whether or not material has been selected carefully is an important marker to judge whether or not a history of academic learning and especially a case study has been successful. If a history of academic learning selects material in a mixed and disorderly manner, without knowing which works contain the spirit of a scholar’s life and fully transmit his aptitude, it will preserve the wooden casket and leave behind the pearls inside. Case Studies of Ming Confucians selected from the works of the various philosophers very carefully. Huang Zongxi spent many years of painstaking effort to read almost all the collected writings of Ming scholars. The works of ancient Chinese scholars were all collections of letters, prefaces, postfaces, memorial inscriptions, recorded sayings, and poetic literature, and even specifically academic writings were mostly short pieces. In compiling the works of Chinese scholars, one must sort the wheat from the chaff among these scattered materials, a task that is fraught with difficulty. The selection in Case Studies of Ming Confucians was made on the foundation of reading a great quantity of Ming scholars’ collected writings, based on his principle of “that which is of use is authentic,” and selected material that could best represent a philosopher’s ideas, was most original, and was connected to the overall development of academic learning. He recorded the short in their entirety, while picking out the essentials from the long. He did not record any routine, frivolous or casual remarks. Those he recorded were all words of the essence of the mind that entered into subtlety, words of distinct benefit. When earlier scholars said that Case Studies of Ming Confucians was more philosophy than history, this judgment was to a great degree due to Huang Zongxi’s particular emphasis on the selection of material. Before Huang Zongxi, Ming scholars had already produced works on the history of Neo-Confucianism, among which the most famous were Zhou Rudeng’s 周汝登 Biographies from the School of Sage Learning (Shengxue zong zhuan 圣学宗传) and Sun Qifeng’s 孙奇逢 Biographies from the School of Principle Learning (Lixue zong zhuan 理学宗传). If one examines their merits and defects, one can find that, in terms of selection of material and judgments on individual figures, neither of these two works could match Case Studies of Ming Confucians. Huang Zongxi himself said: Each master had his own central precepts, yet Haimen 海门 (Zhou Rudeng) advocated Chan 禅 learning, mixing gold, silver, copper and iron into one implement, which was Haimen’s own individual precept and not that of each master. Although Zhongyuan 钟元 (Sun Qifeng) gathered miscellaneously without discrimination, and his comments did not necessarily reach the important points, his awareness was better than Haimen. When

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scholars observe this book of mine, they will know the negligence of these two masters. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 14)

These were indeed not empty words. Zhou Rudeng used Chan learning to digest the central precept of each master, did not state the points where scholars differed from one another, and already missed the original meaning of each master in his selection of material and judgments. Sun Qifeng’s Biographies from the School of Principle Learning imitated Zhu Xi’s Records from the Yiluo Source (Yiluo yuanyuan lu 伊洛 渊源录), and recounted the thought of famous Neo-Confucians from the Northern Song to the late Ming. Although he also attached extracts from their works, these were mostly taken from existing compilations of material such as [Zhu Xi’s] Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu 近思录) and Records from the Yiluo Source, and merely gathered them into several branches, most of which were already familiar. Case Studies of Ming Confucians was different from this, such as in the cases of Jiangyou and Longxi, in which the debates between Huang Honggang 黄 弘纲, Liu Bangcai and Liu Wenmin 刘文敏 on the one hand and Nie Bao 聂豹 and Luo Hongxian on the other were precise and subtle, and able to represent the spirit of each individual, so Huang Zongxi recorded them all. He once said: “Although in essays and achievements the Ming was no match for earlier dynasties, in Neo-Confucianism alone, there were points that earlier dynasties failed to reach. Like ox hair or silk, they discriminated all things clearly, and were truly able to express that which former Confucians had not yet expressed” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 14). Huang Zongxi’s selection of material was as fine as ox hair or silk, never letting anything slip, to display the subtle and fine differences of each individual. These materials were all picked out from various complete works, and its wise discernment cannot be matched by those who compiled unimportant histories of academic learning. If one follows its selection and looks into scholars’ complete works, one need not worry about being misled. In writing histories of academic learning, one should first stress the selection of material, and then one’s judgments. Even if one’s selection of material is not lacking in general, if one’s judgments lack particular understanding and one lacks a good eye, it would also be difficult to attain the important points of each individual. Huang Zongxi’s judgments were all based on the material that he selected, and he never made any fanciful comments. Because he had a philosopher’s profundity and incisiveness, and his writings attained a high degree of clarity and purity, his comments on cases did not discuss strong and weak points, but were able to reveal the main spirit of their individuals, and were incisive, lucid and expressive in their language. This was one of the reasons why Case Studies of Ming Confucians was able to become a noted academic work. Third, grasping central precepts (zongzhi 宗旨), and selecting material and expounding it based on these central precepts. One point on which Ming Confucians differed from Song Confucians was that Song Confucians lacked central precepts, while Ming Confucians all displayed their central precepts. Huang Zongxi once noted this point: “Song Confucian learning valued distinction, hence they were diligent at commentaries; Ming Confucian learning valued blending,

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hence they established central precepts” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 330). He meant that Song Confucians were a case of “me commenting on the Six Classics” in which each individual abided by a single classic or group of several classics, and Neo-Confucianism was an annex of Classical Learning (jingxue 经学), hence they had no central precepts to speak of. Ming Confucians opposed this, and were a case of “the Six Classics commenting on me” that regarded the Four Books as the core and used Classical Learning to corroborate them. Scholars all dug out titles from the Four Books to use as the central precept for their own learning. Liu Zongzhou once said: “From the single book of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学), Cheng-Zhu 程朱 spoke of sincerity and rectification, Yangming spoke of the extension of knowing, Xinzhai 心斋 (Wang Gen 王艮) spoke of the investigation of things, Xujiang 旴江 (Luo Rufang 罗汝芳) spoke of illuminating virtue, and Jianjiang 剑江 (Li Cai) spoke of cultivating the self. Is there now any further content remaining?” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 13). In fact, Cheng-Zhu did not concentrate on making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying the mind, while it was indeed the case that the Ming Confucians who liked to signify their central precepts. Huang Zongxi believed that a central precept of academic learning contained what a scholar had learned in his whole life, so to understand a scholar’s academic thought, one must grasp the central precept of his learning; in researching an individual scholar, one must begin from this central precept of academic learning. A central precept of academic learning was however often an extremely simply phrase of a few characters, and when Huang Zongxi wrote Case Studies of Ming Confucians, he clearly revealed each scholar’s central precept of academic learning, allowing readers of the book to begin by concentrating on the key points and not sink into a vast foggy sea of material. He said: In most cases, learning has a central precept, and this is both where the individual gained most benefit, and where scholars should begin. The meanings and principles of the world under Heaven are endless, so unless one fixes them with one or two words, how can one simplify them to make them present in oneself? Hence if one lectures without a central precept, then even if one speaks well, it will be a tangled mess with no guiding thread; if scholars cannot attain an individual’s central precept, then even if they read their books, it will be like when [Han Dynasty diplomat-explorer] Zhang Qian 张骞 first arrived at Daxia 大夏 [i.e. Bactria] and was unable to attain the important points of the Yuezhi 月氏people. When this compilation distinguishes central precepts, it is like using a lamp to capture an image, as [Tang poet] Du Mu 杜牧 said: “When marbles roll around a plate, their direction and path cannot be exhaustively known, but what can be known with certainty is that the marbles cannot leave the plate.” Central precepts are also just like this. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 17)

Huang Zongxi accurately grasped the central precept of each scholar and used a very pithy two or three character phrase to summarise it, such as Chen Xianzhang’s 陈献章 “cultivating the first inkling from stillness,” Wang Yangming’s “extension of innate moral knowing,” Wang Gen’s “investigation of things,” Wang Longxi’s 王龙溪 “a priori rectified mind,” Zou Shouyi’s 邹守益 “vigilance,” Nie Bao’s “returning to quietude,” Li Cai’s “stopping-cultivation,” Zhan Ruoshui’s “ubiquitous realisation of Heavenly principle,” Luo Rufang’s “innate moral mind of the infant, without learning or consideration,” Liu Zongzhou’s “being careful when

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alone,” etc. As discussed above, the works of Chinese scholars mostly consisted of collections of their letters, recorded sayings, poetic literature, etc., and scholars seldom gave detailed deductions and arguments for their central precepts. Hence it can be very difficult to grasp their central precepts and understand the veins of their thinking. Case Studies of Ming Confucians clearly pointed out the central precept of each master. If readers grasp their central precept to attain their skeleton and venation, then read their complete works to fill this out with blood, flesh, hair and skin, the complete image of the philosopher will stand before their eyes. This is the reason why Case Studies of Ming Confucians became a famous work among histories of academic learning, and an important classic that must be read by anyone researching Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. Although Huang Zongxi liked to signify central precepts, and was good at it, he believed that one must use the fundamental guiding principle of one root and myriad diversities to unify the central precepts of each master. That is to say, one must see the central precept of each master as a different aspect of dao, of the human spirit. The only correct approach is to link dao together with specific central precepts, to perceive both general and particular, both human spirit as a whole and its different forms of expression. If one does not perceive the substance of the dao but merely indicates central precepts, perceiving the parts but not the whole, this is a monotonous learning. One is then still separated from the precept of one root and myriad diversities. If one indicates central precepts in this way, it would be better not to indicate them at all. When distinguishing the different particularities of Song and Ming Confucians, Huang Zongxi said: “When Ming Confucians disliked the fragmentation of exegesis and insisted on indicating a central precept, their fault was no less than that of exegesis. Since the dao is the common dao of the world under Heaven, and learning is the common learning of the world under Heaven, why is it necessary to indicate a distinct central precept?” (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 330). Here, Huang Zongxi’s opposition to indicating a central precept was an opposition to only perceiving one’s own central precept and not perceiving the substance of the dao, holding excessively to one’s own central precept, the narrow, base learning of clinging to this and rejecting that. It can be seen that Huang Zongxi used the grand and broad vision of a philosopher and a historian of philosophy to view the academic learning of the ages, seeing the relation between individual thinkers and the achievements of the human spirit as a whole. Fourth, emphasising the particularities of individual doctrines yet opposing forcibly establishing schools or factions. Writing a history of academic learning inevitably touches upon the problem of schools of learning, although the term “school of learning” (xuepai 学派) is troublesome to analyse. Case Studies of Ming Confucians did not use the term “school of learning.” For convenience of narration and to make it easier to grasp networks of learning, Case Studies of Ming Confucians divided Yangming’s students according to regions, forming the seven case studies of Zhezhong 浙中, Jiangyou, Nanzhong 南中, Chuzhong 楚中, Beifang 北方, Yuemin 粤闽 and Taizhou. The central precepts of academic learning of the scholars who belonged to the same case included significant differences. He made separate individual cases for Yangming and Jishan [i.e. Liu

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Zongzhou]. Prior to Yangming, he placed the four case studies of Chongren, Baisha [represented by Chen Xianzhang], Hedong and Sanyuan. Contemporaneous with Yangming, he placed the case study of Ganquan. After Yangming, he placed the two case studies of Zhixiu and Donglin. For those who did not belong to the Wang School and had no other clear affiliation, he made a separate case study of various Confucians. This method of dealing with scholars in Case Studies of Ming Confucians was based on Huang Zongxi’s important viewpoint concerning the problem of schools of learning: not emphasising school divisions in academic learning, and opposing factional disputes. In his notes to Case Studies of Ming Confucians, Huang Zongxi said: Confucian learning differs from the five schools of the Buddhists, which inevitably penetrate right down to [the Chan Buddhist schools of] Qingyuan 青原 and Nanyue 南岳. Confucius learned from everywhere [see Analects, 19.22], Lianxi 濂溪 [i.e. Zhou Dunyi] arose without dependence, and Xiangshan 象山 [i.e. Lu Jiuyuan] did not hear that which he received, yet between these, from the Cheng 程 brothers and Zhu [Xi] to He [Ji] 何基, Wang [Bo] 王柏, Jin [Lüxiang] 金履祥 and Xu [Qian] 许谦, although for several centuries after they still used the rules of high ancestor [gao 高] and first ancestor [zeng 曾], this was not the same as the Buddhists’ farfetched views of source and course [yuanliu 源流]. Hence this compilation distributes those who gave and received teaching into each case, while for those who arose uniquely and were not followed by especially famous scholars, they are all listed in the case for various Confucians. (Case Studies of Ming Confucians, 18)

That is to say, the different schools in Buddhism contended for orthodox status, and especially stressed the source and course model of apprenticeship with a master. For Confucian scholars however, the most important thing was the continuation of the spiritual tradition, and the specific giving and receiving of teaching through apprenticeship with a master was not emphasised. Many great Confucian scholars had no clear relationship of apprenticeship with a master. Confucius regarded anyone with ability as his teacher, and did not limit himself to a single master or school. Zhou Dunyi and Lu Jiuyuan both had no clear relationship of apprenticeship with a master. Although the learning of the Cheng brothers was passed down to He, Wang, Jin and Xu of the Yuan Dynasty, what was emphasised was still the teaching methods and central precepts of the Cheng School, and not the source and course model of apprenticeship with a master. Having a clear relationship of apprenticeship with a master did not prevent one from continuing to use rules that specifically belonged to another school, and having no relationship of apprenticeship with a master did not mean one had to struggle with factional issues and forcibly join an inherited tradition. It was even less acceptable to regard those with a lineage as authentic descendants and those without a lineage as proposing evil heterodox doctrines. Concerning the so-called dispute between Zhu [Xi] and Lu [Jiuyuan], Huang Zongxi dealt with this especially evenhandedly. In his view, the difference in academic learning between Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming was not as great as most scholars believed, and he thought that Ming Dynasty in fact still regarded Master Zhu Learning and Yangming Learning as two main aspects. It was unnecessary for scholars to vainly argue over who was a scholar of Master Zhu Learning and who was a scholar of Yangming Learning, since everything

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ultimately belongs to the Confucian circle. Differences in academic learning can be preserved and continued, allowing later scholars to select for themselves which to take up (see “Official Letter to the Historiography Institute on the Inappropriateness of Establishing Biographies of Neo-Confucians” [Yi shiguan lun buyi li lixuezhuan shu 移史馆论不宜立理学传书]). Hence when his Case Studies of Ming Confucians established cases for Ming Dynasty Confucianism, it was not an attempt to contend for orthodoxy by any particular school. There was no distinction of superiority and inferiority between the Wang School and the various other Confucians. Although Huang Zongxi in general said he belonged to Wang Learning, he inherited the faults of later threads of Wang Learning, and his intention to fuse Master Zhu Learning and Wang Learning was very clear. What he depended on in summarizing Ming Dynasty academic learning was a fusion of Master Zhu Learning and Wang Learning. When he compiled and wrote Case Studies of Ming Confucians, he did so with the evenhanded attitude of a historian of philosophy.

4 Political Thought in Waiting for the Dawn Huang Zongxi was not only a historian and literary writer, but was also a political thinker. Throughout his life he was focused on concrete social problems, and especially after the fall of the Ming, in order to summarise this historical experience and provide later ages with strategies for governance, he comprehensively examined all aspects of the society and politics of the Ming Dynasty, and wrote the representative work of his political thought, Waiting for the Dawn (Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待访录). In both this work and A Book to Leave Behind (Liushu 留书) written in the previous ten years, he proposed his own unique insights into the relationship between ruler and minister, the essence of law, the function of schools, and various other aspects such as the selection of officials, taxation, government finance and the military system. The vehemence of his words and the incisiveness and passion of his analyses and disclosures were all unprecedented, especially in the criticisms he proposed of the relationship between ruler and minister. Waiting for the Dawn was listed as an officially forbidden book by the Qing court, and in both the Hundred Days’ Reform 戊戌变法 movement and the Xinhai Revolution 辛亥革命, it was used by revolutionary parties as a piece of propaganda to oppose the imperial system, exerting a significant social effect. Huang Zongxi proposed his own views of the origin and position of the highest ruler and sovereign of Chinese society, which he based on the ideal Confucian sage-kings of the Three Dynasties. He believed that the origins of the sovereign lay in people’s public need to promote benefits and remove harms when they emerged from animal ignorance and entered into a primitive social era. The sovereign at this time “did not regard his own personal benefit as a benefit, but led all under Heaven to receive their benefits; he did not regard his own personal harm as a harm, but led all under Heaven to be relieved of their harms” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The

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Origins of the Sovereign” [Yuanjun 原君], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 2). The origin and position of the sovereign lay in working for the benefit of the group and not for his own personal benefit. This kind of sovereign would necessarily have many times more hardships than the people. Hence, the fact that the ancients either avoided the position of the sovereign for fear of their lives, or first became a sovereign only to give it up, or were supported by the people and thus had no choice but to become a sovereign, were all quite natural affairs, and all arose from people’s original nature of “liking ease and disliking toil.” That people later came to struggle for the position of sovereign was because the position of the sovereign had changed: The ancients regarded all under Heaven as the host and the sovereign as a guest, and all sovereigns spent the whole lives working for all under Heaven. Now however people regard the sovereign as the host and all under Heaven as guests, and that none under Heaven can find anywhere to gain peace and rest is due to the sovereign. (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Sovereign,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 2)

The sovereigns of the world today are situated at the apex of a totalitarian autocracy, and see the state that was originally established to promote public benefits and remove public harms as their own private property, such that the benefits of the world under Heaven all return to themselves and the harms of the world under Heaven all return to the people, “making the people under Heaven not dare to be selfish or benefit themselves, and regarding their own great selfishness as the great public benefit of the world under Heaven. Although at first they felt ashamed, they later became contented, seeing the world under Heaven as their great estate, passing it down to their children and grandchildren, and enjoying it without end” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Sovereign,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 2). In order to attain the position of sovereign, emperors of later ages did not hesitate to harm the common people under Heaven in order to contend for positions of power; after attaining political power, they also did not hesitate to harm the common people under Heaven in order to preserve their political power: Thus before they had attained it, they slaughtered the people under Heaven and left their sons and daughters homeless in order to expand their own estate, feeling no sense of sadness and saying: “I am simply setting up an estate for my sons and grandsons.” Once they had attained it, they exploited the people under Heaven and left their sons and daughters homeless in order to attend to their own dissolute pleasures, seeing this as normal and saying: “These are the profits of my estate.” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Sovereign,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 2)

Huang Zongxi angrily attacked this, saying: “Thus the great harm of the world under Heaven is nothing but the sovereign” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Sovereign,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 3). Huang Zongxi also criticised later petty Confucians’ theory that “The righteousness of sovereign and minister cannot be escaped anywhere between Heaven and Earth” [from Zhuangzi 庄子, Ch. 4 “The Human World” (Renjianshi 人间世)]. He believed that the reason ancient people loved and supported their rulers,

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comparing them to a father and to Heaven, was because ancient rulers worked for the common people. The reason people today resent and hate their rulers, seeing them as enemies and despots, is because rulers today regard their own personal selfishness as the great benefit of the world under Heaven. When King Wu 武 attacked Zhou 纣 [the last ruler of the Shang Dynasty], this was killing a despot and a traitor to the people, and thus promoting the benefit and removing a harm for the people. When Mencius said, “The people are of the most importance, the altars of soil and grain are next, and the sovereign is of the least importance” [see Mencius, 7B.14], this established a law for all later ages under Heaven. Autocratic sovereigns of later ages did not wish the rights of the people to be above those of the sovereign, or for people to cast aside the notions of the sovereign as father and Heaven, so they did away with or edited the Mencius, regarding its words as disadvantageous for their autocratic rule. Huang Zongxi pointed out that, although sovereigns of later ages regarded the position of sovereign as their own private property, wishing it to be passed down to their sons and grandsons in perpetuity, in fact, within a few generations, it was always attained by someone with another family name, and the sovereigns of the final generation were regularly deposed in a very cruel manner, a fact that should be able to dampen people’s desire to attain the world under Heaven. He also believed that a sovereign is not an absolute entity that transcends the myriad officials, and that a sovereign’s power is not unlimited. Although the Son of Heaven [i.e. the Emperor] had a difference in rank from ministers and officials, this was simply a difference between different ranks, and not between transcending rank and having a rank. Huang Zongxi’s idea here was exceptionally valuable. It had an extremely strong actual significance in abolishing the worship of the sovereign, cutting down the absolute power of the sovereign, establishing a system of institutions to effectively restrain the power of the sovereign, and to maintain a correct relationship between sovereign and minister. In his investigation of the position of the sovereign, Huang Zongxi wished to turn back the dao of the sovereign that had been twisted by later ages, to restore to Confucian ideal of the sage-sovereign. Although this was excessively idealised, his attack on the twisting of the position of the sovereign by autocratic sovereigns of later ages who saw the world under Heaven as their own private property, together with his criticism of petty Confucians who ignored the change in the position of the sovereign and unconditionally defended the power of the sovereign, both focused on the fundamental arrangement of political institutions and ideas concerning the right to govern, and broke free from the narrow viewpoint of judging sovereigns based only on their individual morality and ability to govern the state. At his time in history this was particularly daring, and contained notable enlightenment significance. Huang Zongxi also investigated the position of the minister. He believed that a minister was meant to assist the sovereign in governing the common people, and that a minister was thus established for the common people and not for the sovereign. Given the large size of the state of all under Heaven, a sovereign as a single man is unable to govern it, and so he must establish ministerial positions to shoulder the responsibility of governing the state. People who are ministers thus

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serve the world under Heaven, and not the sovereign; they serve the myriad people, and not one family name. Hence, in focusing on the myriad people under Heaven, a minister should not take any actions that are neither righteous nor beneficial to the myriad people under Heaven, even if the sovereign compels him. Huang Zongxi had a very remarkable insight into what was called order and disorder: “The order and disorder of the world under Heaven does not lie in the rise and fall of a single family name, but in the joys and sorrows of the myriad people” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Minister” [Yuanchen 原臣], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 5). The destruction of a tyrannical government in history is precisely the great order of the world under Heaven; the rise of a tyrannical government is the beginning of disaster and disorder. As a minister, if one does not understand this principle and focus on the joys and sorrows of the myriad people, then even if one assists one’s sovereign in governing or dies for the moral integrity of one’s sovereign, this is not in accord with the dao of the minister. The extravagant and debauched sovereigns of later ages did not think of the myriad people of the world under Heaven, but in choosing their officials, simply wanted people who would rush about serving them. The officials of the world did not understand this principle, and thought that a minister was established for a sovereign, and that the sovereign would share out the responsibility of governing the common people to his ministers. This was to see the people of the world under Heaven as private things in the pocket of the sovereign. However the ministers thought that if there was toil on all sides and the common people were suffering, this would endanger the sovereign, hence they made some improvements to their techniques for shepherding the people; if it did not endanger the political power of the sovereign, then even if the world under Heaven was toiling and the common people were suffering, this was simply a minor problem. Those who held such views focused on the safety and danger of the single family name of the sovereign, and thus even if they governed well, they had already gone against the dao of the minister. The relationship between sovereign and minister should be that both sovereign and minister both carry out affairs for the common people under Heaven, except that that there is a difference in their positions. Governing the world under Heaven is just like many people dragging a large log together, with both sovereign and minister being people dragging the log. “If one comes out to serve the sovereign, yet does not regard the world under Heaven as one’s affair, then one is but a servant or concubine of the sovereign; if one regards the world under Heaven as one’s affair, then one is a teacher and friend of the sovereign” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Minister” [Yuanchen 原臣], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 5). Huang Zongxi’s understanding of the essence of sovereign and minister was exceptionally outstanding, and revolved around a single central viewpoint, namely that the world under Heaven is the world under Heaven of the myriad people, and not the world under Heaven of the single family name of the sovereign; the sovereign and minister are both simply different positions in the governance of the world under Heaven of the myriad people. These ideas had an obvious people-oriented (minben 民本) spirit. Huang Zongxi’s elaboration of the dao of the

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minister also had a very strong practical relevance, since it was a reflection on the domineering eunuch-officials of the dark politics of the late Ming Dynasty, in which the eunuch-officials colluded with the consort kin in a factional struggle against upright gentlemen, and the court ministers mostly held their tongues and shrunk back in order to protect themselves. Huang Zongxi’s critical spearhead was also aimed at ancient and contemporary legal institutions. What he referred to as the law (fa 法) was not limited to specific laws and decrees, but referred broadly to the state, its system, its institutions, etc. He believed that there was law in the Three Dynasties [i.e. the Xia, Shang and Zhou] and before, but that there was no law after the Three Dynasties. The law of the Three Dynasties was based on the needs of the common people, and the establishment of various political decrees and institutions all set out from the actual interests of the people. Yet under later sovereigns, all laws, decrees and political institutions were aimed at consolidating their own rule, at extending their own family name’s time on the throne. He said: The law of the Three Dynasties and before was never established for a single self. Yet later sovereigns, after they gained the world under Heaven, only worried that their time on the throne would not be long, and that their sons and grandsons would be unable to preserve it, so they thought about what might happen in advance and made laws for it. What they called law was in reality the law of a single family and not the law of all under Heaven. (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Law” [Yuanfa 原法], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 6)

For example, when Qin Shi Huang 秦始皇 [the first emperor of the Qin] changed the feudal system (fengjian 封建) into the province and county system (junxian 郡 县), this was because the province and county system was convenient for consolidating the rule of central concentrated power. When the Han Dynasty conferred titles on princes and established vassals (fan 藩), this was because vassal states could serve as a protective screen for the central government. When the Song Dynasty dissolved the military power of the buffer towns (fanzhen 藩镇), this was because buffer towns did not obey the commands of the imperial court, and the trend of subordination was already increasingly developing. These were all made to facilitate the rule of the sovereign himself, and not for the common people. Huang Zongxi compared the law of the Three Dynasties and that of later ages, saying: The law of the Three Dynasties hid the world under Heaven in the world under Heaven [from Zhuangzi, Ch. 6 “The Great Ancestral Master” (Dazongshi 大宗师)]. They did not insist that the profits of mountain and marsh should entirely accrue to themselves, or suspect that the right to punish and reward might fall into the hands of others, and nobility was not always associated with the imperial court, nor baseness with the wilderness. People in later ages might argue that this law was simplistic and naïve, but the people under Heaven did not view high positions as desirable nor low positions as detestable, so the more simple the law, the less disorder was produced, and this is what was called “the law without laws.” The law of later ages hid the world under Heaven in a secure chest. They did not wish any profit to be left behind for the lower, and insisted that good fortune must all be gathered for the higher. In employing one man they suspected him of selfishness, and thus employed another man to restrict his selfishness; in implementing one policy they wondered whether it might lead to deception, and thus implemented another policy to prevent

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its deception. Since the people under Heaven all knew where the secure chest was, the sovereign spent his days consumed with worry over it, and thus his laws had to be tight and strict. As laws became stricter, the disorder of the world under Heaven appeared within the law, and this is what was called “the unlawfulness of the law.” (Waiting for the Dawn: “The Origins of the Law,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 6)

The fundamental difference was that the law of the Three Dynasties was a public law, while the law of later ages was the private law of one man. In the private law of one man, the creator of the law was originally selfish, and the reformers of the law also never departed from selfishness. Under private law, even if there were man who were able governors, that which they governed remained within the realm of private law. Huang Zongxi pointed out that whether law was public or private was the most fundamental question, since “only when the law is governed can people be governed.” In law for the public, there is still a large space outside the law. Under public law, the law naturally permits correct behaviour, while incorrect behaviour does not bring upon one a criminal charge, and is not harmed by the law. Huang Zongxi’s criticisms of the old political system and law had a strong people-oriented flavour, yet also contained a great deal of fantastical elements. His distinction between public law and private law was also based on the ideal law of the Three Dynasties. However, the reality of the law of the Three Dynasties is something that later people already had no way of knowing in detail. When written laws already have thousands of years of history, and laws have long since become indispensable elements of social life, to still regard the fantasy of the law of the Three Dynasties as an ideal of governance is unrealistic. Huang Zongxi also had a unique conception of the nature and function of schools. As he conceived it, a school was not simply an educational institution as was the practice in later ages, but was similar to the edificatory institutions of ancient society, whose responsibility was to use pure criticism (qingyi 清议) to influence politics, education to train talented people, and ritual and music to transform the people and develop their customs. Huang Zongxi said: “Schools are a means to train scholars. However, for the ancient sage-kings, their meaning was not limited to this. All the methods for governing the world under Heaven must be made to emerge from schools, and only then will the intention behind the establishment of schools begin to be realised” (Waiting for the Dawn: “Schools” [Xuexiao 学校], Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 10). Training and raising intellectuals is not the entirety of the task of schools, since they should at the same time be a place to represent to direction of the people’s intentions, reflect the political situation, and produce a tolerant atmosphere. The primary responsibility of a school is pure criticism, and pure criticism is free. Schools can “gradually influence both the heights of the imperial court and the narrowness of the provincial lanes, giving them all the breadth of atmosphere found in poetry and books. What the Son of Heaven affirms is not necessarily right, and what he denies is not necessarily wrong, so he will then not dare to judge right and wrong for himself, but will make the task of judging right and wrong a public matter for schools” (Waiting for the Dawn: “Schools,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 10). The existence of schools can produce a kind of tolerant

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atmosphere that develops into a kind of formless supervision such that, from the sovereign to the various officials, their political decrees and institutions all consider the views of schools, and all emerge from under their formless supervision. The Son of Heaven will not dare to establish himself in a position of transcendent power and refuse the supervision of schools, and the various officials will also be fearful of pure criticism, not daring to use the power of their office for personal profit. Huang Zongxi believed that after the Three Dynasties, the pure criticism function of schools gradually disappeared, and other than a minority of events, such as students of the Imperial College 太学 in the Eastern Han satirising court politics and assessing notable personalities such that tyrannical figures did not dare to publicly do wrong for fear of drawing their condemnation, and students of the Imperial College in the Northern Song gathering outside the palace gate and banging drums to demand the reinstatement of Li Gang 李纲, the situation of schools influencing politics through the power of the intellectual community had already been lost. Once the imperial court had lost the supervision of public opinion, everything fell under the shadow of the unlimited power of the Son of Heaven: After the Three Dynasties, all the judgments of right and wrong of the world under Heaven emerged from the imperial court, so whatever the Son of Heaven honoured, the crowd flocked to affirm, and whatever he insulted, the crowd picked out to negate. Documents, deadlines, taxation, justice and the military were all handed over to petty clerks, and if outside of this trend of the times, some able men happened to appear, they regarded schools as routine places of little importance. However, what they called schools were simply places to bustle and compete for the imperial examination and become blinded by wealth and status, hence they took advantage of the power and influence of the imperial court to change their nature. Hence scholars with any talent, ability or learning more often than not emerged from among the grassroots people, and at first had nothing to do with schools. Thus in the end, even the matter of training scholars was lost. (Waiting for the Dawn: “Schools,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 10)

Under the direction and pressure of the imperial court, schools lost their function of being places where pure criticism could supervise politics, and turned into mere locations to train for the imperial examination. Scholars tended toward paths of wealth and salary, while schools’ function of cultivating talent also degenerated. Huang Zongxi bitterly denounced this phenomenon: Thus schools transformed into academies. However, whenever they thought something was wrong, the imperial court would inevitably regard it as right and honour it; whenever they thought something was right, the imperial court would inevitably regard it as wrong and censure it. In the bans on false learning and destruction of academies, they inevitably wished to use the power of the imperial court to struggle with and overcome them. (Waiting for the Dawn: “Schools,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 11)

Huang Zongxi’s discussion here reflected the vicious struggles between the imperial court and grassroots intellectuals in the late Ming Dynasty, as well as the misdeeds of domineering eunuch-officials, such as their persecution of upright men, bans on “false learning” and destruction of academies, with the intent to attack the damage wrought by the imperial court’s pressure on upright intellectuals.

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Huang Zongxi also proposed a new conception of schools’ function of cultivating talent. He proposed that the official schools of provinces and counties should invite famous Confucians to manage them, based on the public opinion of the province or county. Provincial or county schools should all set up teachers in the Five Confucian Classics 五经, as well as in military strategy, calendrical calculation, medicine, archery and chariot driving. Other than major centres of learning, monasteries, temples and nunneries could all be changed into academies and primary schools, and the property of temples could be returned to schools, to provide for poor students. The Imperial College, the highest school of the state, should select a great Confucian of the time or a retired Prime Minister as its Chancellor. On the first day of every month, the Son of Heaven should lead the Prime Minister, the Six Ministers and the Grand Master of Remonstrance 谏议大夫 to the Imperial College to listen to lectures, where the Son of Heaven and the various officials would all line up as students. If there was any deficiency in politics, the Chancellor could speak of it directly without any taboo. When the son of the Son of Heaven reached the age of fifteen, he should come to study at the Imperial College, so that he would know the feelings of the people and get used to hard work, and could avoid being closed up in the palace, where what he heard and saw would not exceed the confines of the eunuch-officials and palace concubines, leading him to develop the bad habits of self-importance and false pride. Twice a month, the provinces and counties should carry out the same procedures as the Imperial College. In selecting talents, the Educational Officials 学官 of schools should not be attached to the imperial court’s Education Intendants 提学 in charge of regional education, but should rather have a relationship of mentors and friends with the Education Intendants. The Educational Officials should be in charge of selecting regional talents to supplement the Imperial College, while talents in the Imperial College should be sent to the Ministry of Rites 礼部 for examination and to be awarded with positions. The demotion and promotion of students at each level of schools should be managed by the Educational Officials, and Education Intendants should not be involved in their affairs. At the same time, schools should be institutions for transforming the people and developing their customs. In the township wine-drinking ceremony, the officials and scholars of the province or county should gather together with all the elders among the scholars and ordinary people with an unblemished record, who should take their seats according to seniority, and then receive supplications for good words from the educational, provincial and county officials according to the ritual for those of senior generations, in order to develop an atmosphere of respect for the elderly. The ancestral halls of local worthies and famous officials should not be given respect according to power or position. Their establishment or abolition should all be done in accord with their achievements, writings and academic conduct. The embellishment and commendation of the tombs and ancestral halls of a particular region’s former worthy men should all be a matter for the Educational Officials. The ceremonies for weddings and funerals among the people should all be carried out according to Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals of Master Zhu (Zhuzi jiali 朱子家 礼). If the ordinary people do not understand any of this, they should ask the

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Educational Officials. “If upon entering a particular region, there are ancestral halls that go against ritual propriety, clothing that goes against regulations, things for sale in the markets that are without practical value, bodies on the ground that have yet to be buried, songs from actors around one’s ears, or coarse words filling the streets, then the duties of the Educational Officials have not be carried out effectively” (Waiting for the Dawn: “Schools,” Complete Collected Works of Huang Zongxi, Vol. 1, 14). Although Huang Zongxi’s conception of schools was also based on the ideal blueprint of the schools of the Three Dynasties, it contained many more realistic and practicable elements than his discussions of the sovereign, ministers and legal institutions. His conception represented an ideal in which, although intellectuals without office could not actually participate in national politics, they could still participate in social tasks through the special functions of the school, in which pure criticism, education and transformation of customs were fused as one. Huang Zongxi was a thinker with an acute vision and rich critical spirit, and his Waiting for the Dawn also covered questions including government finance, taxation, the military system, the selection and employment of talent, and the national disaster of eunuch-officials. Although his conception had rather a lot of fantastical elements, in general, he saw the trend of future society more accurately than other intellectuals of the same period. That his book exerted a very great influence in later democratic movements was certainly not coincidental. From this perspective, there is some justification for seeing him as “the pioneer of a new era” (in Feng Youlan’s 冯友兰 words).

Chapter 29

The Philosophical Thought of Chen Que

Chen Que was a thinker from the Ming-Qing transition. His thought displays the characteristics of the period of transition from the Ming Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty, namely emphasizing moral integrity and esteeming personal cultivation on the one hand, while also stressing practical reality and paying attention to solving social problems on the other. Chen Que 陈确 (1604–1677; original name Daoyong 道永, zi 字 Feixuan 非玄; in the Qing, name changed to Que, zi Qianchu 乾初) was from Haining 海宁 in Ningbo, Zhejiang province. When he was a child his older brother taught him to read, and in his youth he gained a reputation for his talent, but he was not successful in the examination hall. In the thirteenth year of the Chongzhen Emperor [1640] he took a position as a scholar with a government salary, and in his whole life he never went into service. At the age of 40, he went to Shanyin 山阴 with Zhu Kaimei 祝开 美 and Wu Zhongmu 吴仲木 from his hometown in order to study with Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周, who taught him his Ancient Changes (Guyi 古易), returning after several months. He later went back to Shanyin twice to pay his respects to Liu Zongzhou. When Liu died from self-imposed starvation, Chen was invited by his son Liu Zhuo 刘汋 to edit his posthumous writings. Together with Zhang Lüxiang 张履祥, he once started a burial society, advocating the reform of traditional burial customs. In his later years he suffered from cramping pains, and did not leave his home for 15 years. His main works include “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning” (Daxue bian 大学辨), “Explicating Inherent Nature” (Xingjie 性解), and “Burial Books” (Zangshu 葬书). All his works have now been compiled into the Collected Works of Chen Que (Chen Que ji 陈确集).1 His edited works also included [Liu Zongzhou’s] Recorded Sayings of Master Jishan (Jishan xiansheng yulu 蕺山先生语录), but this is now lost.

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[Trans.] See Chen Que, Chen Que ji, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979.

© Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_29

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1 Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning” was written in 1654, and is one of Chen Que’s most important philosophical works. After it was completed, he showed it to many of the famous scholars of the time, including Huang Zongxi 黄 宗羲, Zhang Lüxiang, Liu Zhuo, and Yun Zhongsheng 恽仲升. The work criticized the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) very fiercely, and since the scholars of the time were used to hearing the old meanings of the Four Books, those who heard it were furious and submitted memorials attacking it. Chen Que went back and forth with his replies, hiding his feelings and compromising, and going to great lengths to explain himself. The Great Learning is a chapter in the Record of Rites (Liji 礼记), and before Han Yu 韩愈 in the Tang Dynasty singled it out for special praise, scholars of previous dynasties did not view it as a core Confucian classic whose importance exceeded the other chapters in the Record of Rites, and even less so as a work by Confucius himself. After it was praised by Han Yu, the two Cheng brothers 二程 especially took it to be the work of a sage, and Zhu Xi 朱熹 combined it with the Analects (Lunyu 论语), the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) and Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸) to form the Four Books, also providing a commentary. After Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu jizhu 四书集注) became the textbook for the imperial examination, the Great Learning continually grew in status. However, in past dynasties there were always some scholars who doubted whether the Great Learning was in fact written by Confucius, and Wang Yangming 王阳明 was among them. Chen Que’s attitude was particularly fierce, since he not only opposed the view of the Great Learning as a work by Confucius, but also thought the purport of the Great Learning did not conform to Confucius’ precepts: Its words are apparently sagely, yet its precept is in fact altered according to Chan 禅 [Buddhism], its phrasing wandering and rootless, its purport deceptive and ultimately confusing, and it is fragmented and absurd. Such things were not said by the followers of [Confucius’ students] Ziyou 子游 and Zixia 子夏, and we can know that it was absolutely not composed by any Confucians prior to the Qin Dynasty. If one finally believes it to be a work of Confucius and Zengzi 曾子, one is slandering past sages and misleading future students, and the harm of this is unfathomable. (“Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 552)

Chen Que firstly pointed out that the “great” (da 大) in Great Learning does not accord with Confucius’ precepts, since Confucius spoke of “studying the lower to penetrate the higher” [see Analects, 14.35], and thus attained his precept of the unity of penetrating threads (yiguan 一贯). In learning there is no distinction of greater and lesser, since regardless of one’s age or youth, there is only one method, which should not be divided into great learning and lesser learning. Great learning is the learning of adults, yet the cultivation effort of adults and children is the same, “in the learning of the ancients, from the young to the old, there was but one path.” The result of distinguishing great learning and lesser learning is that the young wait until they grow up before learning, yet in moral cultivation there is nothing to wait

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for, and from children to adults, one must not cease for even a moment. Hence the term “great learning” in itself does not makes sense. Chen Que also pointed out that the three guiding principles of the Great Learning are “not the words of one who knows the dao 道.” The “illuminating virtue” (mingde 明德), “loving the people” (qinmin 亲民), and “stopping at the highest good” (zhi yu zhishan 止于至善) of the Great Learning all emerged from the “Canon of Yao” (Yao dian 尧典) chapter of the Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚书), the intention of which was to connect the three affairs together such that they were mutually inclusive, yet the Great Learning seems to sharply divide them into three affairs. Furthermore, the “illumination” of “illuminating illustrious virtue” can easily imply a void of non-being, and the “love” of “loving the people” has the suspicion of implying closeness, yet “the superior men of ancient times did not display any closeness to the people.” As for “stopping at the highest good,” this is especially erroneous. The good should not have any stopping, and neither should learning. When the Great Learning speaks of knowing stopping, this implies that knowing stops at this, with no further knowing, and this is the “once one is enlightened, there are no further affairs” spoken of in Chan learning. Knowing should not have any sealed limits, nor should it have any ceasing: “What exhaustion is there in learning? In the good there is yet another good, and in the highest good there is yet another highest good, so they are not like the hilly regions around the state where one can stop and rest.” Hence Chen Que believed that the three guiding principles of the Great Learning were “all the exaggerated words of superficial learning, the shallow doctrines of false scholars” (“Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 554). Chen Que also opposed the doctrine of “a single sudden penetration of understanding” in Zhu Xi’s Supplementary Commentary to the Great Learning (Daxue buzhuan 大学补传), pointing out: The learning of the superior man is a lifelong affair, and thus his knowing is also a lifelong affair. Hence today has today’s highest good, while tomorrow has tomorrow’s highest good, and this is neither something one can seek to know in advance, nor something that can be known in general, nor something that my intelligent knowing can subjectively exhaust. … The principles of the world under Heaven are endless, while the human mind has its limits, hence if one is proudly self-confident, imagining that one’s knowing is without omission, one must count as one of the most deluded and presumptuous people in the world, so how could there be a day when one has a single penetration of understanding and unravels the principles of all the affairs under Heaven? (“Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 554)

In Chen Que’s view, the good is inexhaustible, and doing the good has no final stopping point. The good is not something already completed, but rather a process. In terms of fathoming principles in things, the moral principles of the world are endless, so one person’s effort can never fathom the principles of all under Heaven, and there is no time of “a single sudden penetration of understanding.” Here it can be seen that the good and the principles that Chen Que spoke of were all specific. Principles are the principles of specific things and affairs, and not some “Heavenly principle” that penetrates throughout or is embodied in Heaven, Earth and the

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myriad things. Heavenly principle can penetrate throughout and be known, while the principles of things are each individually different. Fathoming principles is an increase and an accumulation, rather than a qualitative leap. There is no day when one experiences a sudden penetration of understanding and the principles of the world can be set aside and ignored. Here, Chen Que used the principles of things to understand and oppose the “Heavenly principle” that Zhu Xi wish to penetratingly understand, an approach with a very strong empirical hue that was already vastly different from the Neo-Confucian approach of teaching people to experience Heavenly principle from the specific principles of things; his understanding of Zhu Xi’s “The surfaces and principles, the fine and coarse of things all being attained, the whole substance and great function of my mind are all illuminated” was also very distant from Zhu Xi’s original meaning. Chen Que went on to point out that from “making one’s intentions sincere” and “rectifying the mind” onward, the Great Learning becomes increasingly erroneous. “Rectifying the mind” and “making one’s intentions sincere” are the same phrase repeated, and having spoken of rectifying the mind, there is no need to go on to speak of making one’s intentions sincere; the mind and intentions cannot be strictly divided into two. Any talk of sincerity must speak of uniting the internal and external, and Centrality in the Ordinary speaks of making oneself sincere, not of making one’s intentions sincere; if one only speaks of making one’s intentions sincere, this is not sincerity. Here, Chen Que meant that “sincerity” (cheng 诚) is a concept that expresses a quality and state of the subject, one that also encompasses conduct, and not merely intentions and thoughts. The “making oneself sincere” (chengshen 诚身) of Centrality in the Ordinary includes these two aspects, and is thus more comprehensive than “making one’s intentions sincere” (chengyi 诚意). If one speaks solely of making one’s intentions sincere, this will lead to bookish form of “sincerity” that only rectifies thoughts and neglects concrete action, and this form of sincerity is in fact insincerity. “One must attend to matters personally through concrete action before one can be truly sincere.” Furthermore, in Chen Que’s view, making one’s intentions sincere is also “rectifying the mind,” the guiding principle of effort. “To now seek not first to rectify the mind, but to desire to put this off until after investigating [things] and extending [knowing], is precisely what is called holding a sword backward and giving the handle to others, and is dangerous indeed!” (“Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 555). Making one’s intentions sincere is what the Cheng brothers called “holding to respect” (zhujing 主敬), what Wang Yangming called “the extension of innate moral knowing,” and what Liu Zongzhou called “being careful when alone.” When the Great Learning placed the investigation of things before making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying the mind, it did not accord with this core precept. When various Neo-Confucians explained the investigation of things and extension of knowing as going against the words of the Great Learning, this was not because their arguments cannot be reconciled, but because the Great Learning cannot be sought through principle. Chen Que also pointed out: “When the Great Learning speaks of knowing and not of action, this must without doubt be Chan learning, and although it speaks of

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loving the people, and of ordering, governing and pacifying, it is as if these are an intersection of internal and external cultivation, a rootless arrangement of phrases. Its refined thought is concentrated only on words like ‘extending knowledge’ and ‘knowing stopping,’ and is thus in fact a learning of empty quietude” (“Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 557). Here, Chen Que set out from the Confucian standpoint of emphasising practice, believing that anything that speaks of knowledge and not of action is all Chan learning. Chan learning only spoke of cultivating the mind, without the concrete affairs of cultivating order, governance and pacification. What the ancient sages and former worthy men of China emphasised was practice, an intention clearly stated in the [Book of] Documents: “It is not knowing that is difficult, only acting” [see “Charge to Yue, Pt. III” (Yueming xia 说命下)]. When the Great Learning emphasised inward effort such as “extending knowing” and “knowing stopping,” it precisely went against this. Chen Que even believed, “That the learning of the sages is unclear must be due to this, hence when the Great Learning is abolished, the dao of the sages naturally becomes clear, while when the Great Learning circulates, the dao of the sages is unclear; since this has tremendous bearing on Confucian teaching, one does not dare not dispute it, and this is not from love of argument” (“Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 557). The Great Learning is not merely not a book of the sages, it actively harms the dao. His distinctions concerning the Great Learning were precisely aimed at removing illusions and confusions, in order to restore the firm and sincere tradition of the learning of the sages. Chen Que also used the Great Learning’s process of dissemination to demonstrate that it was not originally a Confucian classic. He pointed out that the Great Learning quotes a variety of words from Confucius and Zengzi, yet other than a very small minority, their sources are all unknown. Furthermore, in more than a thousand years from the emergence of the Record of Rites compiled by the two Dai’s 戴 [i.e. Dai De 戴德 and his nephew Dai Sheng 戴圣] in the Western Han Dynasty until the Song Dynasty, there was nobody who claimed that the Great Learning was a work written by Confucius and Zengzi. It was only after Cheng and Zhu commended the Great Learning that it was added to the Four Books and took its place among the classic Confucian scriptures. The fact that, in the five hundred years from Cheng and Zhu to the end of the Ming, there was no one who doubted whether the work might be a false scripture, is sufficient to show how scholars “believe their ears and not their minds.” His doubts concerning the greater learning were based on the principle of seeking truth from facts, in order to return the Great Learning to its old appearance. When Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing emphasised being careful when alone, this was in order to correct the Great Learning, yet its confusions were already too ingrained, accumulated falsities had become truths, and the situation was irretrievable, so it was better to simply dismiss it, remove its façade of being a sagely scripture transmitted by worthies, and return it to being a single chapter in the Record of Rites. Chen Que said that, although worldly Confucians would inevitably not accept his bold views and

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methods, he “simply believed his mind, believed in principle.” He stated the purpose and determination of his distinctions concerning the Great Learning, saying: I wished to return the [Great] Learning and the [Centrality in the] Ordinary to their places in the Dai Record 戴记 [of Rites], to erase the peripheral words of inherent nature and principle, refine down Cheng-Zhu and restore Confucius and Mencius, to free scholars from their tight confinement and gather in the innate moral mind from its remaining stubborn occlusions. (Preface to “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 559)

This demonstrates that Chen Que’s distinctions concerning the Great Learning were not merely a momentary impulse, nor were they a deliberate attempt to compose a revolutionary article, but were rather the result of serious consideration. After Chen Que’s “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning” appeared, scholars were stunned and incensed, and went on to surround him with refutations, yet Chen Que stood his ground and leisurely replied to them one by one. His “Reply to a Question on Investigation, Extension, Making Sincere and Rectification” (Da gezhi chengzheng wen 答格致诚正问) was a specific reply concerning the order of the eight items in the Great Learning. He believed that when the Great Learning placed making one’s intentions sincere ahead of rectifying the mind, and the investigation of things and extension of knowing ahead of making one’s intentions sincere and rectifying the mind, this was a great mistake. Placing making one’s intentions sincere ahead of rectifying the mind implied regarding intentions and the mind as dual, yet intentions and the mind are originally one, and if one divides them in two, this is fragmented. He believed that sincerity was “the ultimate learning,” which spoke of unifying the body and the mind, while rectifying the mind merely spoke of rectifying the thoughts in the mind, hence sincerity was a dual cultivation of body and mind, and not merely making one’s “intentions” sincere. Here, Chen Que’s explanation of mind and intention differed from Liu Zongzhou. For Liu Zongzhou, intention is preserved by the mind as the a priori propensity that determines a posteriori thoughts, and the metaphysical basis for which is the singular substance (duti 独体). Chen Que’s intention however was something produced by the mind, a thought that emerges a posteriori, consistent with the explanations of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. If one examines Chen Que’s main works, although he studied under Liu Zongzhou, his approach differed greatly from that of Liu. Liu Zongzhou’s attainment was profound and broad, and he studied [the views of] Cheng-Zhu, Lu-Wang 陆王 and Yangming’s students intensively, experiencing them with his body and mind, while Chen Que’s attainment was very shallow, especially in terms of his learning of mind and inherent nature. In this regard, he was not only no match for Liu Zongzhou, but also very far behind Huang Zongxi. Chen Que also opposed Wang Yangming’s “Ancient Edition of the Great Learning” (Guben daxue 古本大学). He believed that Wang Yangming’s removal of Master Zhu’s separation of sections and paring back of his commentarial text to restore the original appearance of the Great Learning was worth praising, yet when he said that the Great Learning was a work by Confucius and Zengzi, this could not

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be followed. In the restoration of the ancient edition of the Great Learning, although the sections and phrases differed from the new edition, it was the same in regarding the Great Learning as a work by Confucius. Hence Wang Yangming’s belief in the ancient text “was only one step away from Cheng-Zhu.” Wang Yangming’s quarrel with Master Zhu concerning the Great Learning was not over the root issue but over trivial branches, and his quarrel could thus be put to one side. Chen Que went on to point out that Wang Yangming’s quarrel with Master Zhu focused on the explanation of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge.” While Yangming explained the investigation of things as “rectifying thoughts,” Master Zhu explained it as “reaching things”; while Wang Yangming explained the extension of knowledge as “the extension of innate moral knowing,” Master Zhu explained it as “fathoming principle.” Wang Since Yangming went from the internal to the external, and Master Zhu from the external to the internal, they apparently could not be reconciled. Yet since the Great Learning was not in fact an independent Confucian classic, the quarrel between Master Zhu and Yangming all concerned crude leftovers. Chen Que believed that after Han Yu praised the Great Learning, the text began to be emphasized; Emperor Zhenzong 真 宗 of the Song also used phrases from both the Great Learning and the Centrality in the Ordinary to confer honours on new graduates of the imperial examinations. From then on, since those above liked it, those below began to imitate this, and scholars switched to adorning it with forced interpretations, thereby elevating its value, while in fact the Great Learning contained no profound meaning. Chen Que’s distinction that the Great Learning was not a classic of the sages or a commentary of worthy men demonstrated a great deal of theoretical courage. Especially after Neo-Confucianism had entered deeply into people’s minds and the Four Books had become classics that were studied and followed by all scholars, to doubt these was to take a very great risk. Concerning this, Chen Que had a clear awareness. However, he bravely trusted in his approach with a firm will, and once said: “The dao collectively belongs to a thousand sages and hundred kings, has been collectively followed and known by the world under Heaven for a myriad generations, and cannot be attained and owned privately by any one man. Where it is trustworthy, one speaks of it, and where it is doubtful, one inspects it; where it is right, one inherits it, and where it is wrong, one goes against it. Why should suspicions and taboos give rise to resistance and fear?” (“Room Notice for Cui Boshan” [Cui Boshan fangtie 翠薄山房帖], Collected Works of Chen Que, 565). Chen Que spent his whole life away from society, never went lecturing, and never opened a school or received students, and his debates concerning the Great Learning were the most important theoretical activity of his life. As for his motivation in taking up this matter, he gave a clear statement: Ever since the teachings of the Great Learning went into circulation, scholars all abandon the effort of sitting and argue over investigation and extension. The base slip into the habit of exegetical glosses, while the lofty flee to the empty and obscure learning of Buddhism and Daoism. The techniques of the dao divide and collapse, while the teachings of the sages decline and cease; for over five hundred years it has been like this. Even those scholars who comprehend the times and grasp the task simply gather together in fear and dread, retracting

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and not daring to utter a single word; this is something I have been pained, shed tears and sighed over for many years. (“Reply to a Letter from Shen Langsi” [Da Shen Langsi shu 答 沈朗思书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 565)

Chen Que pointed out that the greatest error of the Great Learning lay in regarding the investigation of things and the extension of knowing as the primary tasks, while these were in fact mostly marginal affairs of knowledge. Scholars practiced this without examining it, the lofty and bright following the extension of knowing into Buddhism and Daoism, while the quiet and conscientious followed the extension of knowledge into exegetical glosses on terms and things. The learning of the investigation of things became something unrelated to self-cultivation, and thus departed from the fundamental and core precept of Confucianism. Confucian students became satisfied with this kind of accumulated practice, and were nonchalant in their lack of self-awareness. Even those who perceived the harm in this and thought of changing it were afraid of the opinions of others, and did not dare to raise their points. Chen Que wished to oppose all this as a single commoner, overturning the accumulated harms for later generations, and hence he initiated his criticism of the Great Learning. He lived in the turbulent period of the Ming-Qing transition, where there was much to be done, both concerning affairs of state and the suffering of the people, and there were many important matters to be dealt with, yet he wrangled over arguments concerning the Great Learning. If we examine his hidden motivations, the political authority of the Manchurians was already gradually stabilising, and that China did not fall completely was entirely due to the fact that the dao and learning remained. However, due to faults in learning, there was a danger that the dao was not transmitted. To argue over the Great Learning at this time was to preserve the correct academic root of Chinese culture, and to continue the transmission of the orthodox dao. The Great Learning as a book was of extreme importance to the Confucian tradition, and the Confucian tradition was of extreme importance to the survival and continuation or downfall and severing of the dao of China, hence he ignored the mocking laughter of others, disregarded their opinions, and rose up to debate it. He said: “Alas! They regard the Great Learning and its commentaries as of no great relevance to the obscurity or clarity and severing and continuation of the teaching of the sages, thinking that even if the book is of dubious authenticity, one certainly must not dare to argue against it, and if one does argue against it, one must not do so with such force. … Yet this is really like relying to the end on something other, and I do not dare to show concern for a single man’s reputation at the cost of forgetting the dao-techniques of a thousand autumns” (“Postface to Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning” [Daxue bian hou 大学 辨后], Collected Works of Chen Que, 609). This shows that Chen Que regarded his distinctions concerning the Great Learning as fundamental to the inheritance and transmission of Chinese academic learning. At the cusp of the Ming-Qing transition, when the latent danger of a foreign culture supplanting the native culture was constantly present, Chen Que’s painstaking attempt to preserve the correct root of academic learning was particularly meaningful.

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2 Distinctions Concerning Knowledge and Action In Chen Que’s distinctions concerning the Great Learning, another important purpose was to correct the academic ethos of stressing knowledge and neglecting action, with regard to which his core precept was that knowledge and action progress together, and that knowledge and action cannot be divided into prior and posterior. In a letter to Zhang Lüxiang, he said: I do not inveigh against investigation and extension, but only against regarding investigation and extension as the beginning affairs of great learning. If one says that investigation and extension are the naturally the beginning and end of learning, and that learning is endless, then investigation and extension are also endless, so how can one cut them off as the beginning affairs of learning? If one cuts them off as the beginning affairs of learning, then knowledge and action are divided; if knowledge and action are divided, then there will inevitably be knowledge without action, which will eventually return to ignorance. This is the fault that scholars today fall into, and it is already visible. (“Reply to a Letter from Zhang Kaofu” [Da Zhang Kaofu shu 答张考夫书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 586)

His meaning was that the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge are affairs of knowledge. If one regards knowledge as the beginning of effort at cultivation, one will inevitably regard action as the end of effort at cultivation, and this will inevitably lead to severing knowledge and action. Knowledge and action should progress together, and should penetrate learning from beginning to end. He praised Wang Yangming’s doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action very highly, and once said: When Master Yangming spoke of “the unity of knowledge and action,” “knowledge and action having no distinction between prior and posterior,” and “knowledge and action progressing together,” this was truly the highest gate of enlightenment of the Song Confucians. (“Reply to a Letter from Zhang Kaofu,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 588)

In his view, the mistake of the Great Learning lay in emphasising knowledge over action. In Chen Que and Zhang Lüxiang’s debate over the priority of knowledge over action, Zhang Lüxiang held the Cheng-Zhu doctrine of knowledge as prior to action, believing that “one must first see, and only then can one act.” Chen Que however believed that in speaking of first seeing, one must act before one can see. For things and affairs that are not yet known, one still needs to act and then one can know: “Action is reached and then knowledge is reached,” and there is no knowledge without acting, no sitting in empty meditation and then knowing. On this point, Wang Yangming’s view of the unity of knowledge and action can correct the faults of first knowing then acting, knowing but not acting, etc. He said: Confucius originally spoke of inherent natures being similar, while Mencius particularly spoke of the goodness of inherent nature; Centrality in the Ordinary already divided knowledge and action, while Master Yangming particularly wished to combine knowledge and action; the Great Learning spoke clearly of prior and posterior, while Master Yangming particularly spoke of there being no priority between knowledge and action. Were these not indeed new theories, in which they surpassed their predecessors? They simply had no other choice. When Mencius spoke of the goodness of inherent nature, he was prompted by those who injure or abandon themselves. When Master Yangming unified knowledge and action,

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he was prompted by those who knew but did not act. (“Another Reply to a Letter from Zhang Kaofu” [You da Zhang Kaofu shu 又答张考夫书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 591)

He also composed a poem to explicate this meaning: “People say that to walk a path one must know the path, yet I say that to know a path one must walk the path. When one is on a path one asks about the path as one goes, while when one discusses it at home one is never clear how it goes. Even if one thinks one is clear after discussing it at home, when one arises to walk it one is still as if blind. Knowledge and action were originally united yet are now divided, thus Yangming revived their true appearance” (“Song on Walking a Path” [Xinglu ge 行路歌], Collected Works of Chen Que, 693). Chen Que respected and believed Yangming’s learning, and he repeatedly spoke of Yangming’s doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action, the effect of which he compared to Mencius’ doctrine of the goodness of inherent nature. Based on the viewpoint of the Cheng-Zhu school, Zhang Lüxiang accused Chen Que of being profoundly contaminated by the habits of frivolous absurdity and wild pride found in Wang Yangming and his students, who had “no former sages behind them and no future wisdom ahead of them.” Chen Que however dealt with this calmly, believing that Lu-Wang learning was not the “floodwaters and savage beasts” that Cheng-Zhu scholars accused it of being. He declared that in Lu Xiangshan’s 陆象山 learning, about thirty to forty percent was wrong, while in Yangming’s learning, about ten to twenty percent was wrong. This was not a partisan view that twisted them to cover up their faults. When scholars praised Wang Yangming’s precept of knowledge and action progressing together, yet opposed the unity of knowledge and action, they failed to realise that the two were essentially one and the same: to praise knowledge and action progressing together is to oppose knowledge as prior and action as posterior; to oppose knowledge as prior and action as posterior is to praise the unity of knowledge and action. Some scholars warned against the empty absurdities found among Yangming’s students, and thus went on to oppose Wang Yangming’s doctrine of the extension of innate moral knowing. In fact, the extension of innate moral knowing of Yangming’s students differed from that of Yangming himself. The original meaning of Wang Yangming’s extension of innate moral knowing was that in innate moral knowing one can know one’s mistakes, and that to extend innate moral knowing is to correct one’s mistakes. Knowing mistakes is knowledge, while correcting mistakes is action. One must thus concretely extend one’s innate moral knowing, and correct one’s mistakes in concrete action. Hence the extension of innate moral knowing is the unity of knowledge and action. Chen Que’s thoughts concerning knowledge and action shared many common points with those of Wang Yangming. In particular, his view of knowing and acting together, and that the extension of innate moral knowing is the unity of knowledge and action, were both in accord with the spirit of Wang Yangming’s teaching of the extension of innate moral knowing. However, they differed considerably from Liu Zongzhou. While Liu Zongzhou emphasised the internal, making one’s intentions sincere and being careful when alone, Chen Que emphasised the external, making

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oneself sincere and actual practice. In fact, Chen Que’s studies with Liu Zongzhou only lasted less than two months from beginning to end. His later two visits were both very short, and were already after the national upheaval [of the Ming-Qing transition], so people’s minds were dazed and confused, with no meaning in inquiring about learning, and he dared not remain for long. Not long after he returned home from the second visit, he heard the announcement of Liu Zongzhou’s death. In Liu Zongzhou’s lifetime of learning, his most able successors were his son Liu Zhuo 刘宗周 and Huang Zongxi. However, Chen Que’s core precepts of learning were not in accord with those of Liu Zhuo and Huang Zongxi. In a letter to Chen Que, Huang Zongxi directly pointed out: “In general, you old chap do not like to speak of the state before arousal, and thus you erase anything that approaches what Song Confucians spoke of as the state before arousal, taking it to be a Chan obstruction.” He also clearly told him: “The substance of centrality and harmony before arousal cannot be called Chan, and when you old chap establish everything starting from affairs and actions, this is in fact the Buddhist precept of perceiving inherent nature in effective function” (“Letter to Chen Qianchu Discussing Learning” [Yu Chen Qianchu lunxue shu 与陈乾初论学书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 149, addendum). Here, Huang Zongxi set out from Liu Zongzhou’s position of emphasizing the word “intention” and the state before arousal in order to rule over the already aroused, and opposed Chen Que’s viewpoint that emphasised a posteriori affairs and actions as well as the already aroused, thereby clearly demonstrating the difference between his and Chen Que’s academic tendencies. In total, Huang Zongxi wrote four pieces as epitaphs for Chen Que. Since the first piece did not concern academic learning, he felt guilty for his good friendship, and thus wrote a second piece. Later he also produced two more revised versions. In his second piece, he said that Chen Que “attained forty to fifty percent of his former teacher’s learning,” and quoted a great many of Chen Que’s words discussing learning. In the first revised version, he said that he “attained twenty to thirty percent of his former teacher’s learning,” and did not quote many of Chen Que’s words. The final revised version was even shorter, with very few quotations (for the above, see [Huang Zongxi’s] Finalised Writings from Nanlei [Nanlei wending 南雷 文定]). From this, it can be seen how Huang Zongxi became less and less satisfied with the core precept of Chen Que’s academic learning, and came to think he was not in accord with Liu Zongzhou. When Liu Zhuo disapproved of “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning,” this was also because it did not emphasise a priori centrality and harmony but rather a posteriori practice.

3 Distinctions Concerning Inherent Nature as Good In terms of his theory of human nature, Chen Que continued Mencius’ theory of the goodness of inherent nature, but also significantly developed it. He pointed out that the theory of the goodness of inherent nature originated with Confucius, and Mencius provided it with detailed proofs. After Confucius and Mencius, the theory

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of inherent nature had already been greatly illuminated, and later Confucians simply needed to follow it in their actions, with no need to establish another new doctrine. However, although when Confucius spoke of inherent nature, he merely said that “Inherent natures are similar to one another, and it is practice that leads them apart” [see Analects, 17.2] without clearly stating the goodness of inherent nature, goodness was in fact contained within this. When Confucius spoke of being similar to one another, “he was originally speaking from the aspect of goodness.” Mencius’ contribution lay in providing a basis for Confucius’ precept of the goodness of inherent nature. The mind of the four inklings (siduan 四端) that Mencius spoke of was an expression of the four virtues [see Mencius, 2A.6]. The four virtues are originally possessed by the human mind, so by following affects and responding, there is the mind of the four inklings. However, the goodness of inherent nature already exists as a latent presence, and is only realised through a process. Although what is originally possessed is not lacking in goodness, its expansion is more important. Chen Que said: The sentence “One who exhaustively expresses his mind knows his inherent nature” [see Mencius, 7A.1] was Mencius’ statement of his original precept of the goodness of inherent nature. Although human nature is not lacking in goodness, it is only after it is exhaustively expanded that one perceives it. This is like the inherent nature of the five grains, since without skillful planting and weeding the seedlings, how could one know the beauty of their seeds? … If scholars really exhaustively express the minds in this way, what doubt would remain about the goodness of inherent nature? (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Explanations of Inherent Nature I” [Guyan san xingjie shang 瞽言三
性解上], Collected Works of Chen Que, 447)

Inherent nature is like the seeds of grains, which have the capability of growing to become fine grains, although actual fine grains are dependent on the effort of planting and weeding. Inherent nature has a root of goodness, but actual goodness is dependent on a posteriori cultivation. Here, Chen Que believed that goodness is only an a priori basis, i.e. a “tendency toward goodness,” and cannot be called already good; from this tendency toward goodness to the already good, from the basis or tendency of goodness to the actualisation of goodness, is achieved by human effort. Chen Que repeatedly stating this idea, and used the phrases in the Commentaries on the Changes (Yizhuan 易传) concerning continuing goodness and accomplishing inherent nature [jishan chengxing 继善成性; see “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” (Xici shang 系辞上)] to summarise it: The “continuing goodness and accomplishing inherent nature” in the Changes is all the complete effort of embodying the dao. … That which continues it continues this dao of one yin 阴 and one yang 阳, and thus the firm and soft are not biased and are pure in their utmost goodness. As for the saying: “The mind of compassion is the inkling of benevolence” [see Mencius, 2A.6], although this is so, this cannot yet be goodness. When it is followed and continued, there is compassion, and along with this there is the mind of shame and dislike, modesty and yielding, and right and wrong. When there is no thought but compassion, no thought but the mind of shame and dislike, modesty and yielding, and right and wrong, which constantly emerges without end, this is goodness. That which accomplishes it accomplishes this effort of continuing it. If the tendency does not accomplish it, then there is no way to perceive the entirety of one’s Heavenly endowment, and one’s

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inherent nature is almost extinguished. Hence it was said that accomplishment is called inherent nature, and hence it was said that it speaks of the complete effort of embodying the dao. (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Explanations of Inherent Nature I,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 447–448)

Chen Que’s viewpoint concerning human nature emphasised the a posteriori and effort, completely different from Liu Zongzhou’s emphasis on a priori “intention,” hence Huang Zongxi said that he “did not like to speak of the state before arousal.” This view of disliking talk of the state before arousal and stressing “continuing goodness and accomplishing inherent nature” was a correction of the biases of the Taizhou 泰州 Longxi 龙溪 school, such as their liking to speak of original substance and casting aside of effort, their liking to speak of “the a priori rectified mind” and disdain for “making intentions sincere a posteriori,” and their reliance on pre-formed innate moral knowing and opposition to diligent maintenance. Moreover, Chen Que’s viewpoint of emphasising the a posteriori and effort was greatly influenced by the conception of “continuing goodness and accomplishing inherent nature” in the Commentaries on the Changes. His important work “Explanations of Inherent Nature” purely used the changes to develop the precept of accomplishing inherent nature. For example, he believed that the “providing beginnings” (zishi 资始) and “preserving union” (baohe 保合) spoken of in the Commentaries on the Changes [see hexagram Qian 乾, “Commentary on the Judgments” (Tuanzhuan 彖传)] referred to Heaven’s accomplishment of things. When Heaven produces things, this must await accomplishment, and when Heaven accomplishes things, this must depend on production. When things are accomplished, then their inherent nature is rectified, and when people are accomplished, then their inherent natures are whole. The accomplishment of things relies on the flowing operation and transformation of qi 气, and the accomplishment of people relies on the learning of accomplishing inherent nature. Or again, for example, the Changes speaks of originality, flourishing, beneficence and constancy (yuanheng lizhen 元亨利贞 [see hexagram Qian]). Using this as an analogy for human nature, originality and flourishing are the production of inherent nature, the root beginning of the tendency toward goodness, while beneficence and constancy are the accomplishment of inherent nature, the completion of the whole of goodness. Chen Que summarised his thought here, saying: “At the time of providing beginnings and flowing into forms, inherent nature is already possessed, yet one must perceive the wholeness of the inherent nature of living things in each being rectified and preserving union. When a child is raised and the young grow, their inherent is already innately moral, yet one must perceive the wholeness of the inherent nature of living people in benevolence being reached and righteousness being exhaustively expressed. When one continues goodness and accomplishes inherent nature, what doubt can there be?” (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Explanations of Inherent Nature I,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 449). Chen Que also expounded his theory of human nature from the perspective of Heaven and humanity uniting and effort thereby being accomplished, pointing out that the “Sincerity is the dao of Heaven” spoken of in Centrality in the Ordinary referred to the necessary movements of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, each

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of which is based on its original nature, with no ruler emerging from amidst them. “Achieving sincerity is the dao of humanity” referred to people’s a posteriori endeavours to participate in creation and transformation, in which they accomplish the myriad things based on their necessities. The tendency toward goodness is the original inherent nature that is possessed innately from Heaven, namely the “sincerity” of Centrality in the Ordinary, while the a posteriori effort at training and cultivation is the accomplishment of the original inherent nature that is possessed a priori, namely the “achieving sincerity” (chengzhi 诚之) of Centrality in the Ordinary. To complete the a posteriori goodness of inherent nature based on the a priori tendency toward goodness is an effort accomplished collectively by humanity and Heaven. When the “sincerity” of Heaven is perceived in its “achieving sincerity,” the important point lies in a posteriori effort. Hence Chen Que believed that what the Mencius emphasised was in fact the a posteriori: “Whenever classical texts speak of curbing inherent nature, cultivating inherent nature, exhaustively expressing inherent nature or accomplishing inherent nature, these all demand that one stress the dao of humanity in order to restore the dao of Heaven” (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Explanations of Inherent Nature II,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 450). Mencius’ “exhaustively expressing one’s mind, knowing one’s inherent nature and knowing Heaven” and the “continuing goodness and accomplishing inherent nature” of the Commentaries on the Changes are thus mutually illuminating. Hence although Mencius never spoke of the changes, he was in fact deeply rooted in the dao of the changes. Chen Que also examined inherent nature’s relationship with qi, feeling and aptitude from the perspective of the abstract and the specific, the original substance and its expression. He believed that inherent nature was a general name, and the expressions of inherent nature were qi, feeling and aptitude. He said: Although there is one inherent nature, when one speaks of inferring its root one speaks of the endowment of Heaven, and when one speaks of inferring its expansion one speaks of qi, feeling and aptitude; how could these be two? When we speak in terms of the outpouring of inherent nature, we call it feeling; when we speak in terms of the functioning of inherent nature, we call it aptitude; and when we speak in terms of the overall fulfilment of inherent nature, we call it qi; these are simply one. (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Explanations of Inherent Nature II,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 451)

“Inferring its root” here refers to inferring it up to where it came from, while “inferring its expansion” refers to inferring it down to its expression. Inherent nature and its expression are different aspects of one and the same thing. Outpouring refers to spontaneous external expression, while functioning refers to facilities of operation. The capabilities expressed in inherent nature’s facilities of operation are called aptitude (cai 才). As for qi, this is what supports feeling and aptitude, the matter or material that inherent nature relies upon in order to be expressed. Inherent nature is thus for Chen Que here an abstract kind of existence, one that must be perceived in its expressions. He said: “The goodness of inherent nature cannot be perceived, but is perceived as divided into qi, feeling and aptitude. Feeling, aptitude and qi are all intrinsic functions of inherent nature” (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Distinctions Concerning Qi, Feeling and Aptitude” [Qi qing cai bian

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气情才辨], Collected Works of Chen Que, 452). Inherent functions refers to real things included within it itself. Inherent nature, feeling and aptitude all rely on qi. Qi is divided into clear and turbid, with those with clear qi being intelligent and sharp, and those with turbid qi being obtuse and slow. Although the clarity or turbidity of qi is the basis for higher and lower levels of aptitude and ability, the latter are not concerned with the goodness or badness of inherent nature. Since human nature is originally good, those with clear qi are good, and so are those with turbid qi. Qi is a concept that refers to one’s endowment of aptitude and intelligence, and is not concerned with affairs of morality. In terms of actual people, those with clear qi rely on their intelligence may go so far as to use this for bad ends, and thus become unflinchingly wicked people, while those with turbid qi have nothing to rely on so can only diligently take care in cultivation, and thus many become honest and good-mannered people. Nonetheless, both the unflinching and the honest are brought about by habituated practice. Hence regardless of whether qi is clear or turbid, if one is habituated into good then one will become good, while if one is habituated into badness then one will become bad, and thus one must be careful about habituated practices. This was still consistent with Chen Que’s emphasis on a posteriori endeavour in his general account of inherent nature, and was fundamentally opposed to attributing goodness and badness to one’s endowment of qi. Setting out from his view of inherent nature as a general name, and qi, feeling and aptitude as its expressions, Chen Que opposed the Neo-Confucian distinction between the inherent nature endowed by Heaven and the inherent nature of material qi. He said: “If one knows that aptitude, feeling and qi are rooted in Heaven, then one knows that what is called the inherent nature endowed by Heaven is nothing beyond aptitude, feeling and material qi, and there is no need to seek it deep inside some obscure and sombre realm” (“Blind Words, Pt. 4: Letter in Reply to Zhu Kangliu” [Da Zhu Kangliu shu 答朱康流书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 472). That is to say, the inherent nature endowed by Heaven is perceived in material qi, and cannot be a separately existing root-source separate from material qi. If one knows that Heavenly endowment is rooted in material qi, then the doctrine that the inherent nature endowed by Heaven originates from principles cannot stand up. The world of principle belongs to the metaphysical, a silent and scentless plane of dark obscurity and still solemnity. If one knows that the inherent nature endowed by Heaven cannot be separated from material qi, then there is no need to seek it in the metaphysical world. Here, Chen Que in fact thought that there is only the inherent nature of material qi, and the inherent nature endowed by Heaven is simply the rationality expressed by the inherent nature of material qi. It is not that the inherent nature endowed by Heaven is the root-source of the inherent nature of material qi, but rather that the inherent nature of material qi is the basis of the inherent nature endowed by Heaven. Hence there are not two root-sources. He said: How could inherent nature contain a difference between original substance and material qi? Mencius clearly stated that qi, feeling and aptitude are all good in order to demonstrate that there is nothing that is not good in inherent nature. Many masters opposed this, stating baldly that qi, feeling and aptitude all contain goodness, but further postulating a still and

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empty plane that cannot be named or spoken as existing before form and matter were present, calling this the original substance of inherent nature. (“Blind Words, Pt. 2: Sage Learning” [Shengxue 圣学], Collected Works of Chen Que, 442)

Chen Que’s method of demonstrating the goodness of inherent nature was the same as that of Mencius: using the four inklings, the mind of compassion, shame and dislike, modesty and yielding, and right and wrong demonstrates the goodness of inherent nature. The actual is only qi, feeling and aptitude, and the name of inherent nature was only established based on qi, feeling and aptitude. Song and Ming Confucians were mostly opposite to this, believing that inherent nature is original substance and that feeling has inherent nature as its foundation. For example, Zhu Xi thought that the basis of the feelings of the four inklings was inherent nature, that the benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom of inherent nature were the foundation of compassion, shame and dislike, modesty and yielding, and right and wrong. He explained benevolence as “the virtue of the mind, the principle of love,” and since the mind has this virtue and this principle, the affect of coming across a child falling into a well should give rise to the response of the feeling of compassion. Inherent nature thus originates in that which was endowed by Heaven. If one regards inherent nature as the foundation of feeling, then one must regard the inherent nature endowed by Heaven as a real existent, and if one regards the inherent nature endowed by Heaven as a real existent, then one must attribute any actual lack of goodness to material qi. Thus one must hold some form of dualism in which both the inherent nature endowed by Heaven and the inherent nature of material qi exist. Chen Que opposed dividing the inherent nature endowed by Heaven and the inherent nature of material qi, saying: Song Confucians also forcibly divided an inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and an inherent nature of material qi, saying that qi, feeling and aptitude are not original nature and all contain something that is not good, and that there is another original substance of the goodness of inherent nature “above people being born in stillness.” How could this be merely an illusory indication from the west [i.e. Buddhism]? When one sang, a hundred joined in as a chorus, with scholars going with the flow and venerating this as if the whole state were drunk and all speaking drunken words together, so where could those who remained awake intervene? Ah, how grievous! (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Explanations of Inherent Nature II,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 451)

The division between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and the inherent nature of material qi was initially proposed by Zhang Zai 张载, and later Neo-Confucians looked up to it as a standard, thinking that they had found a way to reconcile the conflict between the goodness of human nature and the badness of material qi. Zhu Xi believed that Zhang Zai’s doctrine was a significant contribution to the school of the sages. Chen Que however opposed seeking an inherent nature of Heaven and Earth over and above qi, feeling and aptitude, “above people being born in stillness,” believing that the doctrine of “people being born in stillness” from the Record of Music (Yueji 乐记) was equivalent to Chan Buddhism calling for people to seek “the appearance of things before one’s father and mother were born.” Ever since this doctrine emerged, when one sang, a hundred joined in as a chorus, until it finally became a general ethos. Chen Que believed that the words of

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Mencius were least biased, since when he used compassion, shame and dislike, modesty and yielding, and right and wrong to illuminate the goodness of inherent nature, he based his argument on qi, feeling and aptitude. Since qi, feeling and aptitude are all good, this inherent nature contains nothing that is not good. Since Chen Que used feeling to demonstrate inherent nature, and feelings are a natural expressive function for people, he advocated the practice of bodily form (jianxing 践形 [see Mencius, 7A.38])—devoting oneself to the cultivation of the material qi of mind and body. He regarded the practice of bodily form as the means to cultivate inherent nature, saying: To practice one’s bodily form is to recover inherent nature, to cultivate qi is to cultivate inherent nature, and to exhaustively express one’s mind and aptitude is to exhaustively express one’s inherent nature; there are not two things, so how else could one see the original substance of inherent nature? If one wishes to recognise the inherent nature of original substance, these are words from the [Buddhist] prayer mat that were spoken by Song Confucians, and neither Confucius nor Mencius ever said any such thing. (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Distinctions Concerning Qi, Feeling and Aptitude,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 454)

Inherent nature can only be perceived in feeling, and cultivating inherent nature can only be perceived in cultivating qi, since there is no other original substance apart from these. Chen Que denounced the dichotomy between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and the inherent nature of material qi as a “Chan obstruction,” and he proposed severe criticisms of figures who were revered as gods by later generations, including Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐, the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi. He pointed out that when Zhou Dunyi’s Discussion of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijitu shuo 太极图说) spoke of the non-polarity (wuji 无极), being without desire and holding to stillness (zhujing 主静), these were all bewildered by Chan learning and went against the Confucian doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. The non-polarity regarded non-being as original substance, and spurned a posteriori effort. Holding to stillness left behind the practice of bodily form to devote oneself to that which was “above people being born in stillness,” and was thus entirely a Chan obstruction. Every time Cheng Yi 程颐 saw people sitting in stillness, he praised them as good students, and when his followers asked about the importance of energetic action, he said, “Just sit in stillness,” which both show how he avoided mentioning effort. Also, for example, Cheng Yi’s statement that “When one speaks of inherent nature it is already not inherent nature” took there to be an inherent nature prior to bodily forms, yet this inherent nature must also be realised in material qi. When Zhang Zai said “The dao of inherent nature reaches its limit in non-being,” this was either Laozi’s 老子 non-being or the Buddhists’ emptiness. Chen Que denounced all such Song Confucian explications as contradictory and nonsensical, saying: Later Confucians were lacking in awareness and foolishly wished to mediate between Mencius and Gaozi 告子, so they separated out an inherent nature of material qi to satisfy Gaozi and an inherent nature of original substance to satisfy Mencius. They did not know that if one leaves behind material qi, what original substance remains to be spoken of? They also said that “the already aroused is what is called feeling” and “aptitude emerges from qi,

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and thus contains both good and bad,” not knowing that if one casts aside the goodness of feeling and aptitude, how can one illuminate the goodness of inherent nature? These are all contradictory doctrines. (“Blind Words, Pt. 3: Distinctions Concerning Qi, Feeling and Aptitude,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 452)

He gave a moderate affirmation only to Cheng Hao’s 程颢 one statement that “Inherent nature is qi, and qi is inherent nature,” while denouncing the rest as wild and perverse. In both his view of inherent nature in relation to feeling, aptitude and qi and his criticism of the dichotomy between the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and the inherent nature of material qi, Chen Que in certain respects took up the work of Liu Zongzhou, since they both looked to the actual for testimony of the metaphysical, and went from inherent nature producing or being expressed as feeling to representing or inferring inherent nature through feeling. This was a result of the development of the intellectual movement in the late Ming that sought to fuse Cheng-Zhu, Lu-Wang and qi-learning (such as Zhang Zai and Wang Tingxiang 王 廷相) as one. However, Chen Que did not speak of the relation of correspondence between the dao of Heaven and the dao of humanity, and for him, the relation between inherent nature and feeling did not have a foundation in the dao of Heaven. He was also not as thorough as Liu Zongzhou in his discussions of the origins of specific moral standards such as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom.

4 Distinctions Concerning Principle and Desire The distinction between principle and desire was also a central problem discussed by Chen Que. His distinctions concerning principle and desire were inseparable from those concerning human nature. In his theory of human nature, Chen Que advocated perceiving inherent nature in qi, feeling and aptitude, while in terms of the problem of principle and desire he also advocated perceiving Heavenly principle in human desire. In his distinctions concerning principle and desire, Chen Que had two propositions, the first being that human desire need not be overly restricted, and the second that human desire being taken to just the right point is Heavenly principle. Chen Que believed that although wealth, status, good fortune and favour are things that people desire, loyalty, filial piety, integrity and righteousness are also things that people desire. Since they are things that people desire, they are “human desire.” The “human desire” spoken of here is different from the “human desire” in the Neo-Confucian distinction between Heavenly principle and human desire. The human desire spoken of by Neo-Confucianism generally referred to selfish desire, i.e. desires that go against universal moral principles, and these contradict and directly conflict with Heavenly principle. Hence Song-Ming Confucians often said, “Whatever is not Heavenly principle is human desire” and “When human desire is completely eradicated, Heavenly principle flows into operation.” The human desire

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spoken of by Chen Que referred the natural demands of people’s material and spiritual lives. These demands need not be and cannot be restricted. When Chen Que said that human desire need not be excessively restricted, this was not in fact in contradiction with the Neo-Confucian injunction to “preserve Heavenly principle and remove human desire.” What Chen Que opposed was a kind of being without desire that reduced the basic demands of people’s lives, especially the being without desire spoken of by Chan Buddhism. Chen Que once wrote “Distinctions Concerning Being Without Desire as Sagely” (Wuyu zuosheng bian 无欲作圣辨), in which he criticised Zhou Dunyi’s “Being without desire, there is stillness,” saying: “Master Zhou’s teaching of being without desire is not Chan yet still Chan. We Confucians only speak of reducing desires. … Master Zhou used non-being to establish his teaching, and thereby cast aside the difficulties of we Confucians to follow the ease of heterodoxy. Although he wished to not be Chan, he was unable to achieve this. When he spoke of the non-polarity and holding to stillness, these were also faults” (“Blind Words, Pt. 4,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 461). Zhou Dunyi was a figure most highly praised by Zhu Xi, yet in later generations there were many people who pointed out that his learning was profoundly influenced by religious Daoism and Buddhism. When Chen Que often criticised Zhou Dunyi in his letters, he focused on his doctrines of “Being without desire, there is stillness” and “The non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity.” Chen Que believed that people cannot be without desire, but can only reduce desires; on this point the mind of the sage and the mind of ordinary people are the same, and that which ordinary people desire the sage also desires. The reason why the sage is a sage is that he regulates his desires to just the right point. The sage has desires but does not indulge his desires. People’s ordinary desires are a necessary part of people’s existence as living things, hence “Desire is the productive intention of the human mind, and the hundred goods all emerge from this, so there is only a division between excess and insufficiency, and not between presence and absence” (“Distinctions Concerning Being Without Desire as Sagely,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 461). In Zhou Dunyi’s being without desire as sagely, one can only be a sage of the two teachings of Buddhism and Daoism, and not of Confucianism. The Confucian sage neither cuts off all desire nor indulges his desires, but rather observes a central dao between desire and principle. This is the most even and unbiased, yet is also the most difficult. Chen Que also thought that human desire taken to just the right point was Heavenly principle. He said: The human mind is originally without Heavenly principle, Heavenly principle can only be perceived in human desire, and human desire taken to just the right point is Heavenly principle. If one aims to be without human desire, there will also be no Heavenly principle to speak of. (“Distinctions Concerning Being Without Desire as Sagely,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 461) Heavenly principle is all perceived in human desire. Since human desire taken to just the right point is principle, if one is without desire, what principle remains? (“Blind Words, Pt. 4: Letter to Liu Bosheng” [Yu Liu Bosheng shu 与刘伯绳书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 468)

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Chen Que did not regard human desire as excessive and bad in relation to Heavenly principle, but rather as the basic demands of people’s existence. Principle is then not some kind of eternal principle that transcends space and time, but rather expresses desire not going against ordinary standards of good and bad. This kind of principle is not pre-given, but is rather a value judgment given by people to conduct under specific conditions in reference to ordinary standards. Appropriate human desire is Heavenly principle. Principle is not a legislative principle from the human mind, nor does it have a foundation in the dao of Heaven, but rather comes from actual life. Chen Que once boldly proposed: “Food, drink, men and women are all where moral principle emerges, while achievement, good name, wealth and status are all that to which morality belongs” (“Distinctions Concerning Being Without Desire as Sagely,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 461). He even believed that principle also emerged from things that ordinary people saw as floodwaters and savage beasts such as “wine, beauty, property and qi”: Concerning the four words “wine, beauty, property and qi,” the two families [i.e. Buddhism and Daoism] only feared that they could not keep far enough away from them, as if they were sworn enemies. The superior man however never completely denies them, but rather simply sees their appropriateness as principle. For example, not being intoxicated by wine [see Analects, 9.16] is the principle in wine, not being wanton or getting hurt [see Analects, 3.20] is the principle in beauty, not declining nine hundred measures of grain [see Analects, 6.5] is the principle in property, and not transferring one’s anger [see Analects, 6.3] is the principle in qi. Although this points to the wondrous function the dao and centrality, how is it not possible to be carried out? … The five relationships are all affection for kinds of people, yet the Buddhists empty them out; the myriad things are all equal objects of my love, yet the Daoists leave them behind, and hence they speak of non-being. How could Confucians say this? (“Blind Words, Pt. 4: Letter to Liu Bosheng,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 468)

Although Chen Que’s words of this kind had their basis, such as Mencius’ “King Tai was fond of beauty, Gong Liu was fond of wealth” [see Mencius, 1B.5], He Xinyin 何心隐 of the Taizhou School had already proposed this doctrine. However, to state it so plainly and directly was rather unusual. Although Huang Zongxi did not explicitly denounce Chen Que’s words here, when reviewing the various gentlemen from the Donglin 东林 school in his Case Studies of Ming Confucians (Mingru xue’an 明儒学案), he once praised their criticisms of the view that “wine, beauty, property and qi do not obstruct the path to enlightenment” from the Taizhou scholars Yan Shannong 颜山农 and He Xinyin. Huang Zongxi in fact did not praise this kind of viewpoint, since he believed that although the cultivation of Confucians is not separate from desire, it is a “torturous learning,” and if one is even slightly unable to maintain control, there is the danger of falling into the irrational. If one lacks Confucius’ effort of “following what the mind desires but not going beyond norms of propriety” [see Analects, 2.4], it is very difficult to avoiding being led astray by wine, beauty, property and qi. Huang Zongxi pointed out: “Heavenly principle must be sought at just the right point of human desire, and then in one’s lifetime of troubles, one will not go transgress the feelings of the world. I suspect that that which you see as Heavenly principle is but a superficial change of appearance in human desire” (“Letter to Chen Qianchu Discussing Learning,”

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Collected Works of Chen Que, 149, addendum). Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成 of the Donglin school saw precisely how scholars at the time relied purely on spontaneity, disliked cultivation and intentional action, rashly affirmed the present as correct, and did not penetrate their faults through experience of inherent nature and endowment, hence he advocated his core precept of “being careful” (xiaoxin 小心). Most of the Donglin school’s attacks were focused on later Taizhou learning. However, their assessments of the Taizhou School can in fact be turned and used to assess Chen Que. Although Chen Que’s views that “Desire is the productive intention of the human mind” and that “Heavenly principle can only be perceived in human desire, and human desire taken to just the right point is Heavenly principle” were in part taken from Liu Zongzhou’s views that “The spontaneity of the productive impulse that allows no stopping is desire, while its absence of excess or insufficiency is principle” and that “The mind of dao is the original mind of the human mind, and the inherent nature of moral principle is the original inherent nature of material qi,” the actual substance of their thought was completely different. What Liu Zongzhou called principle was internal, while the “principle” of Chen Que’s “human desire taken to just the right point is Heavenly principle” was external; Liu Zongzhou’s principle was spoken of in terms of the four inklings, while Chen Que’s principle was spoken of in terms of the seven feelings being taken to just the right point. Liu Zongzhou did not speak in terms of efficacy or results, while Chen Que spoke only of efficacy and results. The difference here is both clear and important. Furthermore, Chen Que held that one ought not distinguish too strictly between the gentleman (junzi 君子) and the petty man (xiaoren 小人). If one distinguishes too strictly between gentlemen and petty men, then in terms of establishing an imperial court, things can easily intensify into partisan struggles, while in terms of individual cultivation of body and mind, things can easily slip into excessive severity. He said: If the distinction between gentlemen and petty men is too strict, this leaves the petty no place to get a foothold, and the ruin of the state begins to be acute, as began from various gentlemen of the Eastern Han. If the division between Heavenly principle and human desire is too strict, this leaves human desire with no place to evade it, and damages to body and mind emerge one after another, as began from various Confucians of the Song. (“Blind Words, Pt. 1: Collection of Nearby Words” [Jinyan ji 近言集], Collected Works of Chen Que, 425)

Here, Chen Que obviously did not advocate making no distinction between Heavenly principle and human desire or gentlemen and petty men, but rather advocated treating gentlemen and petty men relatively tolerantly when putting things into practice, and not being constantly severe. Especially given that the distinction between gentlemen and petty men concerns the political situation of the state, one should make judgments between right and wrong or good and bad, but one should discuss matters strategically setting out from the general political situation, and cannot rely on personal feeling. When Chen Que advocated tolerance in distinguishing between gentlemen and petty men, this was absolutely not hypocritical, as can be seen from his unflinching attitude when he met with attacks after

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not hesitating to give up his chance in the provincial examination to submit a petition to the government in order to remove greedy officials who tyrannised the people. His advocation of this view was perhaps based on two reasons: First, his being affected by tragic fate and toxicity of various gentlemen of the Donglin school. Various Donglin gentlemen were sincerely attached to the late Ming state, and can be said to have “propped it up with their flesh and blood, sinking into the abyss of Yu 虞 to retrieve the fallen sun.” However, since they were strict concerning the distinction between gentlemen and petty men and did not consider the evolving political circumstances, they repeatedly attacked the great villains in the court and showed no mercy, so although in general their loyalty and righteousness was admirable, in terms of specific strategies they were not without a degree of extremism. Many figures from the Donglin School met with tragic fates, “brave men sacrificed their wives and children and weak men were buried in earthen chambers,” and this stirred up several decades of partisan struggles. Both late Ming politics and the national fate of the Ming Dynasty were in fact closely related to the rise and fall of Donglin, and hence men from the Donglin party were compared to figures from the Eastern Han partisan prohibitions (danggu 党锢) affair. Chen Que’s “as began from various gentlemen of the Eastern Han” was in fact an allusion to Donglin. Second, after he opted to learn with Liu Zongzhou, Chen Que’s boldness of personal feeling in his early years meant he lost a great deal. Xu Sanli’s 许三礼 “Neo-Confucian Biographies” [Lixue zhuan 理学传] in his Haining County Annals [Haining xianzhi 海宁县志] said of him: “Ever since he followed the teachings of Jishan 蕺山 [i.e. Liu Zongzhou], he saw all techniques for expressing the feelings of inherent nature as harmful to the dao and rejected them. His braveness in perceiving righteousness, meeting unfairness and speaking out, he also saw as relying on qi and did not retread, while as for the grandeur of overcoming oneself through internal reflection, expelling falsity and preserving sincerity, this alone he was too busy to attend to” (Collected Works of Chen Que, 1). This is probably also one of the reasons why he advocated not being too strict in the distinction between gentlemen and petty men. As for his tolerance in distinguishing between Heavenly principle and human desire, Confucians through the ages often advocated this in order to correct the fault of grasping too firmly and harming both the mind and affairs. Judged from his view of the distinction between Heavenly principle and human desire, Chen Que affirmed the rationality of people’s basic material desires, and held that human desire being taken to just the right point is Heavenly principle, rather than following Liu Zongzhou in directly probing the profound subtlety of the “intention” of the utmost mind that determines a posteriori thoughts, and does not permit even the slightest indulgence. However, human desire being taken to just the right point is a statement with a relatively tolerant limiting threshold, and the standard and measure of the principle he spoke of was not as strict as that of Liu Zongzhou. From a young age, Chen Que “did not like the words of Neo-Confucians or the books of Neo-Confucianism, and for forty years he did not read them.” Only after Liu Zongzhou died did he get hold of Posthumous Writings of Master Liu (Liuzi yishu 刘子遗书) and read it. Although he took up a book he had not read for forty years and read it, he found it jarring and unsuitable.

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For example, he often disagreed with many of the affairs that Liu Zongzhou’s “Chronicle” (Nianpu 年谱) warned against. The “merit and demerit forms” (gongguo ge 功过格) that were popular at the time strictly divided Heavenly principle and human desire, constantly and sharply penalising so-called selfish desires, yet Chen Que did not engage in this. Chen Que was mainly a literary scholar. In his “Biography of the Neo-Confucian Master Chen Qianchu” (Chenshi lixue Qianchu xiansheng zhuan 陈氏理学乾初先生传), his younger clan member Chen Yuanlong 陈元龙 said: “His poetry and writings were pure, authentic and elegant, with profound and far-reaching hopes. His originality in Neo-Confucianism mostly stemmed from his own attainments. When he sat down to write, he was without the slightest concealment. His calligraphy was almost equal to that of Zhong [Yao] 钟繇 and Wang [Xizhi] 王羲之, and he played the qin 琴 and whistled, often performing in the mountains and by the waterside. He also displayed some skill in his various hobbies such as seal-carving and games” (Collected Works of Chen Que, 10). As can be seen, he followed Confucius’ approach of setting his mind on the dao and relying on virtue, trusting in benevolence and roaming in the arts, and did not merely assiduously work on internal effort. Also, Chen Que was proficient at ancient ritual, and in all capping, marriages, funerals and sacrifices, he followed the ancient rites. Although ordinarily at home he conducted himself very strictly, he had absolutely none of the excessive affectation often displayed by Neo-Confucians. He once applied to cut back the Confucian classics, and had frequent dealings with the rustic old men of the countryside. In his late years, he suffered from cramping pains, and remained at home for more than fifteen years. It was quite natural that he did not strictly abide by the Neo-Confucian distinction between Heavenly principle and human desire, and often criticised and ridiculed Neo-Confucians.

5 Distinctions Concerning Burials Confucians from ancient times onward always emphasised burials, and specific stipulations and theoretical explanations concerning burials take up a significant proportion of the three Confucian classics on the Rites (Li 礼). Confucian writings down through the ages often contained discussions of burials, and Zhu Xi’s Family Ritual (Jiali 家礼) contained especially detailed discussions of rituals concerning burials. In Chen Que’s time, burials already included many customs such as astrological superstitions and yin-yang geomancy (fengshui 风水), with verbose ritual texts, many taboos, and a popular ethos of extravagant and prolonged funerals. Chen Que was very dissatisfied with this, and wrote texts including “On Burials” (Zanglun 葬论) and “Scripture on Burials” (Zangjing 葬经), proposing his own views on a series of contents concerning burial activities. He also established a burial society and fixed the society’s regulations with his fellow villagers, in the hope of being able to change social customs and rescue the people from poverty.

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Chen Que firstly proposed his own essential view of burials, namely that burial activities are an expression of people’s “benevolent mind” (renxin 仁心) and a continuation of the exhaustive expression of filiality toward the dead when they were living. He said: Burying the dead is an important matter, and one that ancient people especially emphasised. … At first they could not stand the sight of the dead, so wrapped them up to cover them. They were still not satisfied in their minds, so made coffins to cover their clothes, laying them in the eastern chamber to cover their coffin. Yet again, since their covering was still not firm and could not last, they buried them in a tomb to firmly cover them. (“On Burials,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 476–477)

That is to say, the original meaning of burials was that people could not stand to leave the bodies of the dead exposed to the outside. Mencius once said that, although at first people simply just abandoned the bodies of dead people in the wilds, they later saw flies feeding on them and wild dogs eating them, which moved their compassionate minds, so they buried the bodies [see Mencius, 3A.5]. Thus burials began from “the mind that cannot bear the sufferings of others.” The essence of burials (zang 葬) is concealment (cang 藏), as the Record of Rites noted: “Burying means concealing” [see “Tan Gong I” (Tan Gong shang 檀弓上)]. Chen Que also believed that burials began from people being unable to stand to see the bodies of the dead exposed in the wilds, hence they used various methods to cover and bury them, and thus the ritual utensils became increasingly complete. At the same time, burial activities also included respect for the status and character of the dead when they were living, and hence burials had hierarchical divisions, such as variations in the length of time between death and burial, the thickness of the clothes, coverlet and inner and outer coffins, and the complexity of the ceremonial text for the burial rites, all of which was reasonable. However, if geomancy was sought in order to seek good fortune from the dead, if ostentation and extravagance were used in order to exaggerate one’s wealth, or if the burial was delayed because of certain taboos, this was all wrong. Among these, Chen Que was most opposed to consulting geomancers for burials. He said: Today there are many harmful heterodoxies in the world, among which burial experts are the worst, followed by Buddhism, and then Daoism. All books that speak of good and bad fortune are evil books, and books on burials are the worst; all people who speak of good and bad fortune are evil men, and burial experts are the worst. As for the proliferation of burial books against all reason, this fault is one that neither the books of Buddhism nor of Daoism can match, yet Confucians never distinguish this. Burial books are malicious, and burial experts are worse, yet Confucians never dismiss them; I again personally urge them to warn against such things. (All from “Burial Books, Pt. 2: Worst and Next” [Shenci 甚次], Collected Works of Chen Que, 489)

He believed that when people die they are like withered wood, without any living qi, and thus certainly cannot bring good fortune to living people, so when burial experts speak grandly of benefit and harm, saying that a burial site has a great effect on the good and bad fortune of living people, this is absurd and false. He argued

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that burial is unrelated to people’s good and bad fortune based on the relationship between Heaven and humanity, saying: Heaven offers no selfish support, hence the rain and dew it provides do not choose between things. Whether things are capable or not is due to spontaneous vicissitudes, and not intentional vicissitudes from Heaven. When Earth carries and Heaven provides, it is simply like this. Whether people are good or not is due to spontaneous fortune and misfortune, and Heaven and Earth are not able to make them fortunate or misfortunate. (“Burial Books, Pt. 1: On Burials,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 477)

Heaven is of utmost impartiality with no selfishness, hence it is unrelated to people’s good and bad fortune; Earth has no consciousness or knowledge, hence the myriad things each follow their inherent natures, and spontaneously make their vicissitudes. Although this principle is very clear, people selfishly seek good fortune, thinking that the selfless Heaven, Earth and the myriad things have a will and purpose, and can deliberately make people fortunate or misfortunate; this is a great folly. A person’s fortune or misfortune is all brought on himself or herself. Although there are some fortunes and misfortunes that human effort cannot intervene in, explain or even avoid, which can be attributed to the ordinances of Heaven, these have absolutely nothing to do with burial sites and geomancy. Fortune and misfortune all have their principles, and are all the result of people’s actions. To believe geomancy in burials is extremely foolish and malicious. The doctrine of good and bad fortune originated in the bribery of geomancy experts, who thus exaggerated their words in order to mislead people and profit from them. Yet foolish people were deluded by their words, and competed to promote them and fan their flames, leading this attitude to greatly flourish, until by his time it had become an unstoppable trend that left behind terrible consequences. He pointed out that, owing to the superstitious belief in geomancy, “Competition for sites made enemies out of fellow villagers, and competition for profit made enemies of blood brothers, increasing lawsuits and leading to disasters, with some even ruining their families and losing their lives. The harm of heterodoxies has never been this poisonous; is it not painful indeed?” (“On Burials,” Collected Works of Chen Que, 479). Chen Que also pointed out that selecting a site is of course acceptable, but not for reason of good or bad fortune. In selecting a site, one should only select one that is elevated and clear with no ants or water, one that is nearby and convenient for burying, visiting and sweeping, and one must absolutely not use geomancy. He pointed out that, in selecting a burial site, one ought to avoid five troubles: that it will not later become a city wall, a road, or a water channel, that it will not be seized by a powerful family, and that it will not be reached by ploughing; this is sufficient. If one says that a burial site ought to be selected by geomancy, one is seriously deluded. He sorrowfully pointed out: If the fate of families includes both flourishing and obliteration, schemes and actions include both success and failure, longevities include both long and short, and descendants include both propagation and squandering, either through human affairs or through the ordinances of Heaven, then how can the impulse of fortune and misfortune receive any profound discussion? If one insists on that a burial site be perfect in all respects, one will

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only be increasingly deluded. (“Burial Books, Pt. 1: Letter to Fellow Society Members” [Yu tongshe shu 与同社书], Collected Works of Chen Que, 485)

Chen Que’s view of burials was summed up in these words: “timeliness, clan burial, deep burial and solid construction.” Timeliness refers to timely placing of the body in a coffin, timely lying of the coffin in a hall, and timely burial, to not delaying or extending the time periods. One should accord with ancient ritual, and lay the coffin in a hall after three days, and bury it after three months, with the delay for burial not exceeding three months. There were some who did not bury a body for several decades, or even several generations, and some who eventually could not distinguish between tens of different unburied coffins, all of which is not in accord with ritual propriety. Even if a family is poor and lacking in ability, a simply and swift burial is better than waiting and wishing for a lavish burial. Clan burial referred to being buried together with one’s clan. Chen Que held this very forcefully. He once wrote “Five Benefits of Clan Burial” (Zuzang wushan 族 葬五善) to comprehensively state the advantages of clan burial: first, their bones and flesh are complete and together; second, it does not waste farmland; third, clan burial can fix the location of tombs according to seniority, which is both swift and avoids argument; fourth, burial experts and landlords are unable to wring out a profit, and those burying can reduce the cost of burial; fifth, the people sacrificed to are in one place, which is convenient for sacrifice and neither disrespectful nor annoying to others. Chen Que also thought that clan burials could be mutually exchanged, since in this way the poorer and less able of the clan could avoid worries over having no site for burial. This meant one could assist those in distress and offer help to the needy in the matter of burials. Chen Que was not particularly active in forming societies concerning things such as poetry and literature, thinking that these were not of assistance to the worldly dao, and only actively participated in a burial society, for which he drew up regulations. When there was the matter of a burial, the members of the burial society assisted the bereaved family in organising it, and helped with the cost of the burial. From Chen Que’s “Burial Society Opening” (Zangshe qi 葬社启), the great results of this can be seen: “There are a great many burials, and the affairs of the society have never flourished like today” (Collected Works of Chen Que, 504). The standards of deep burial and solid construction used deep holes for dryness and cold, since with dry and cold, the body of the dead person would condense and not decompose, foxes and rabbits could not dig down to it, ants could not reach it, exhumers would not do so easily, the roots of bamboo and trees would not easily pass through it, and the climate above ground would not influence it. With solid construction, a stone pestle would be used to beat it until firm, to prevent water from seeping in. “Burial Books” was one of Chen Que’s important works, in which his arguments concerning the nature of burials and denouncing the error of using geomancy to select burial sites all have their valid points, and express his spirit of using concrete facts to change customs. His specific views concerning burial methods and the diagrams he left behind also provide valuable material for research on folk customs.

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Although Chen Que’s works were never carved and printed in his lifetime, and only a few of his essays were seen by his friends, his main philosophical work “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning” was widely known by fellow scholars. Also, due to his debates back and forth with many people, he made significant waves among Liu’s students. However, in general, Chen Que’s thought did not exert a great influence at the time. In his works, he did not specifically discuss any of the important questions of the time, such as principle and qi or mind and inherent nature, and the discussion of various problems concerning great learning in his “Distinctions Concerning the Great Learning” was relatively shallow, which to some degree weakened the value of his thought. His value lay in his daring to doubt the Great Learning as a scripture of a sage with a commentary of worthy men, daring to denounce the errors of the Great Learning, and daring to criticise the explanations of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, in which regard he echoed the critical spirit of the whole of the late Ming intellectual world. His distinctions concerning principle and desire affirmed the rationality of people’s basic material needs, advocated tolerance in distinctions between righteousness and benefit, and opposed certain excessively severe methods of cultivation, thereby expressing his characteristic spirit of openness and intimate connections with secular social life.

Chapter 30

The Philosophical Thought of Fang Yizhi

During the Ming-Qing transition, after Wang [Yangming] 王阳明 Learning reached its peak and went into decline, a group of outstanding thinkers emerged who advocated returning from vacuity to the concrete, and emphasized natural science, natural history and other empirical knowledge. Although they also studied philosophy, they rejected questions of mind, inherent nature and morality, and instead focused their attention on studying the fundamental principles of the cosmos and the laws of the existence and movement of things. However, since they personally felt pained at the collapse of the Ming, they generally had both the ambitious aspiration to preserve and summarize Chinese academic thought, and the forceful intention to integrate the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. However, their philosophies often also displayed an elusive feeling of desolation at not knowing where they and their families belonged. Fang Yizhi was the most prominent figure among such thinkers. Fang Yizhi 方以智 (1611–1671; zi 字 Mizhi 密之, hao 号 Mangong 曼公; full name changed to Wu Shigong 吴石公 after the fall of the Ming; name changed to Wuke 无可 after he became a monk; hao include Wulao 五老, Yaodi 药地, Moli 墨历, and Jiwan 极丸) was from Tongcheng 桐城 in Anhui province. In his youth he travelled around Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces studying, where he befriended famous scholars of the time, becoming a leader of the Society for Revival [of Classical Learning] (Fushe 复社), and taking part in the movement to drive out Ruan Dacheng 阮大铖 of the eunuch clique. At the age of thirty he passed the imperial examination, and was appointed as an examining editor in the Hanlin Academy 翰林院. When Li Zicheng’s 李自成 army entered Beijing, he wished to retain his services, but Fang refused on pain of death, found an opportunity to escape, and fled to the Hongguang 弘光 court of the Southern Ming. When he was not tolerated by Ruan Dacheng, he fled south to Guangzhou, where he sold medicines in the market. He later fled to the regime of the Prince of Gui 桂王 and Yongli 永历 Emperor at Zhaoqing 肇庆, and was promoted to a Companion on the Left and a Grand Secretary in the East Hall. Having been accused of crimes by [the eunuch] Wang Kun 王坤, he hung up his official’s cap and went to live as a recluse © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_30

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in Wuzhou, but was arrested in Xianhui 仙回by the Qing army, who attempted to coerce him into becoming an official. However, he yielded to neither threats nor bribes, and was finally allowed to return to Wuzhou become a monk in Yungai Temple 云盖寺. He was formally initiated into monkhood three years later at Gaozuo Temple 高座寺 in Nanjing, where he remained in seclusion for three more years. He returned to his hometown to mourn for his father, and upon completing his period of mourning roamed around Jiangxi province, eventually entering Jingju Temple 净居寺 on Qingyuan 青原 Mountain. He was later captured again by the Qing army, and died of illness on a boat while being escorted to the south. Fang Yizhi had a deep heritage of family learning, with his great-grandfather, grandfather, father, and three sons all being renowned scholars. He was a very intelligent child, and “at the age of fifteen, was able to recite most of the classical scriptures, histories, and works of the philosophical masters.” He was especially fond of the natural sciences, and “from Heaven and humanity, ritual propriety and music, temperament and number, sound and tone, writing and characters, calligraphy and painting, medicine and drugs, all the way down to the zither and sword, technique and valour, there was nothing he did not probe for its purport, writing books that amounted to many hundreds of thousands of words.” His words include [the encyclopaedic dictionary] Comprehensive Standard (Tongya 通雅) and [the work on physics] Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things (Wuli xiaoshi 物理 小识). In his later years he devoted himself to philosophy, writing works including Equalization of East and West (Dongxi jun 东西均), Monk Yaodi Roasts the Zhuangzi (Yaodi pao Zhuang 药地炮庄), Remnants on the Book of Changes (Yiyu 易余), Original Inherent Nature (Xinggu 性故), Questions and Answers on the All-Pervading One (Yiguan wenda 一贯问答), and Recorded Sayings of the Foolish Chan Master (Yuzhe chanshi yulu 愚者禅师语录), and his learning was respected by Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 and Wang Fuzhi 王夫之.1

1 Academic Origins Fang Yizhi was a philosopher with a fiercely empiricist tendency, and differed greatly both from those Neo-Confucians who regarded mind and inherent nature as the core of their doctrines, and from Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 who inherited the traditional theory of foundational qi 气 and had a strong flavour of practical learning. His thought can be divided into three periods. Before the national upheaval [i.e. the establishment of the Qing Dynasty] of the Jiashen 甲申 year (1644), he researched a variety of specific knowledge, especially focusing on knowledge concerning nature, from which he summarised and extracted 1

[Trans.] See Fang Yizhi, Dongxi jun, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962; Tongya, Wenyuan Chamber 文渊阁 Siku quanshu 四库全书 edition; Wuli xiaoshi, Qing Dynasty Guangxu 光绪 printed edition; Zhouyi shilun hebian 周易时论合编, Qing Dynasty Shunzhi 顺治 printed edition; Yiyu, edition stored in Anhui Library.

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philosophical principles. He devoted himself to both studying the lower and penetrating the higher, and advocated both material measurement and penetrating inflections. After the national upheaval, he entered into a life of drifting destitution, and poured all his energies into philosophical research, especially in his later years after he became a monk. Fang Yizhi’s academic interests in his early years were largely gained from his studies in his family. His great-grandfather Fang Xuejian 方学渐 once studied under Geng Dingxiang’s 耿定向 younger brother Geng Dingli 耿定理, esteeming concrete learning, and his work Ordinary Words (Yongyan 庸言) included a chapter named “Esteem for the Concrete” (Chongshi 崇实) in which he said: “All things with a beginning must have that which began the beginning, hence the vacant cannot but be concrete, and creation and transformation cannot but be concrete yet vacant,” emphasising investigating the actual basis for things and affairs. This point was of great importance for Fang Yizhi’s later particular emphasis on studying that by which things and affairs are so. Equalization of East and West, Fang Yizhi’s important work from his late years, used the phrase “that by which” (suoyi 所以) as a title chapter. His grandfather Fang Dazhen 方大镇 had a work entitled The Intentionality of the Changes (Yiyi 易意) which incorporated elements from both the image-number (xiangshu 象数) and moral principle (yili 义理) schools [of Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易) learning], which he resolved into an elaboration of morality and moral principles. His father Fang Kongzhao 方孔炤 excelled in Changes learning, composed works including On Time in the Book of Changes (Zhouyi shilun 周易时论), especially emphasised images and numbers, and stressed uncovering the general philosophical theory contained in the Book of Changes. Fang Kongzhao regarded the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极) as the highest category in the Book of Changes, as well as the root-origin of the cosmos. The Supreme Polarity is expressed as both the polarity of being (youji 有极) and the polarity of non-being (wuji 无极), where the polarity of being refers to the myriad things with their physical forms, and the polarity of non-being to the time when there had not yet begun to be physical things and was only abstract principle. The Supreme Polarity penetrates throughout the polarity of being and the polarity of non-being, so it itself falls into neither being nor non-being. Fang Kongzhao’s thought had a highly speculative tone, and was not limited by the specific principles of things. In his late years, Fang Yizhi edited and recompiled the original text of On Time in the Book of Changes, adding comments and explanations to each chapter and section, calling the resultant text Collaboration on Time in the Book of Changes (Zhouyi shilun hebian 周易时论合编) and writing a postscript for it. In his philosophy, Fang Yizhi was mainly influenced by the Changes learning of his family, while in his studies of natural history, he was indebted to Wang Xuan 王 宣. Wang Xuan (hao Xuzhou 虚舟) was the teacher selected for Fang Yizhi by Fang Kongzhao, who was both an expert in Changes learning who often studied the principles of the Changes with the Fangs, and also proficient in the principles of things [i.e. physics], with his works including A Place for the Principles of Things (Wuli suo 物理所). Fang Yizhi once said: “When Zhi [i.e. Fang Yizhi himself] was seventeen or eighteen, he heard the introductory discussions of the master, which

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roamed over a thousand generations in their discussions, quoting many figures and views of the dao 道, and demonstrating the more profound with images and numbers, his various works often speaking of the principles of things. At this time the master was around seventy years old, and was more profound than the River Diagram (Hetu 河图) and the Book of Luo (Luoshu 洛书), with none of Yang (Xiong) 扬雄, Jing (Fang) 京房, Guan (Lang) 关朗 or Shao (Yong) 邵雍 being able to exceed his mastery” (“Biography of Master Xuzhou” [Xuzhou xiansheng zhuan 虚舟先生传], Collected Works of Fushan: Later Compilation of Collected Writings [Fushan ji: Wenji houbian 浮山集
文集后编]). Fang Yizhi himself said that his Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things was based on A Place for the Principles of Things, which he then expanded. Fang Yizhi’s empiricist way of thinking was mostly gained from Wang Xuan. Fang Yizhi was also very fond of the Western learning brought into China by Jesuit scholars in the late Ming Dynasty, and he read dozens of books of Western learning written or translated by Jesuits, the content of which included mathematics, astronomy, geography, medicine, mechanics and water management. He was not fond of books concerning Catholicism. This enabled his tendency to enjoy natural history and research concerning the principles of things to gain full development, yet also led him to the conclusion that, in comparison to Chinese classical texts, “The learning of the Western world that has been introduced is detailed in material measurements yet clumsy in speaking of penetrating inflections.” Fang Yizhi’s maternal grandfather Wu Yingbin 吴应宾 (zi Guanwo 观我, hao Zongyi 宗一) also had a significant influence on him. Wu Yingbin was an expert in Buddhist learning, used Buddhist principles to explicate the Confucian and Daoist classics, and advocated uniting the three teachings as one. His works included On the Ancestral Unity of the Sagely (Zongyi shenglun 宗一圣论), in which he advocated “Mutual comprehension of the central principle, ancestral unity (zongyi 宗一) with three justifications,” believing that the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism are different expressions of one and the same spirit, and hence he took the hao Zongyi. Wu Yingbin’s “three teachings united as one” and “ancestral unity with three justifications” both had a significant influence on Fang Yizhi. In general, Fang Yizhi’s thought had three main aspects, namely speculative philosophy, in which he was influenced by the Changes learning of his family, studies of natural history, in which he was influenced by his teacher Wang Xuan, and combining the three teachings, in which he was influenced by Wu Yingbin. These three aspects had already taken root when Fang Yizhi was still in his youth. In his early years he was something of a dandy, living a luxurious life of stout horses and fine furs, amusing himself with poetry and wine, and taking pleasure in natural history. After the upheaval of the Ming-Qing transition, he was thrust into homeless wandering, and gradually gained a more profound understanding of human life and worldly affairs, becoming more interested in pure philosophy, though without forgetting his liking for natural history. After becoming a monk, he read widely in Buddhist texts, using Buddhist learning to unify what he had learnt in his youth, roasting them in a single cauldron until the moral principles of the

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three teachings were fused as one. In Fang Yizhi, one can clearly see how the influence of the times and an academic foundation combined their effects to produce the intellectual results of a specific era. Among the Chinese classics, those with the greatest influence on Fang Yizhi were the Book of Changes and the Zhuangzi 庄子. He was also influenced somewhat by the synthesis of speculative tendencies and empiricist spirit found in the Neo-Confucian patriarch Zhu Xi 朱熹, as well as the ideas of the Supreme Polarity evolving into the myriad beings with both imaged expressions and numerical specifications as proposed by Shao Yong, the patriarch of the image-number school of Song Dynasty Changes learning. Among the Buddhist classics, those with a significant influence on Fang Yizhi included the Tiantai 天台 school’s views of a single mind with three contemplations (yixin sanguan 一心三观) and three truths in perfect fusion (sandi yuanrong 三谛圆融), and the Huayan 华严 school’s doctrine of the mutual fusion of one and many (yiduo xiangrong 一多相融) finally returning to a single mind. Fang Yizhi did not like the learning of inherent nature and principle, and the Analects (Lunyu 论语) and the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), the books with the greatest influence on Neo-Confucians, did not have a particularly important position in his thought. Although his norms in conduct and standards in morality were naturally influenced by the all-encompassing Neo-Confucian moral creeds of the time, in terms of the main elements that constituted his thought, the most important were Changes learning, the Zhuangzi and Buddhism. As the most important work representing his intellectual interests and level of speculation in his late years, Equalization of East and West demonstrates the influence of the Zhuangzi and Buddhist learning in both the vast and holistic quality of its intellectual framework, as well as in the tricky and shifting quality of its writing and the free manner of its various methods. His entire life was spent putting into practice his aspiration of “sitting down together with the wisdoms of the ages and finding a compromise between them” that he fixed upon in his early years, to roast all kinds of knowledge together in one furnace.

2 Material Measurement and Penetrating Inflections Fang Yizhi had a strong interest in both natural history and philosophy. He differed from the Neo-Confucians of the time. Although Neo-Confucians did not reject investigations into specific things and affairs, their investigations into specific things and affairs were made in order to know the Heavenly principle embodied in the principles of things. To know the principles of things and to know Heavenly principle had a relationship of means and end or medium and end-result, and this kind of relationship served the needs of Neo-Confucian self-cultivation. However, when Fang Yizhi wished to derive fundamental philosophical dao-principles from the specific principles of things, these dao-principles were not merely a kind of ethical awareness of the laws of the cosmos, but a direct understanding of the laws of the cosmos themselves. From the beginning, Fang Yizhi distinguished between

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the various specific principles of things, the socio-political principles of governance and education, and the general philosophical dao-principles embodied in things and affairs. He said: The experts who examine and measure Heaven and Earth with doctrines of images and numbers, musical temperament and calendrics, sound and phonology, and healing and medicine are all concerned with the comprehension of material, and all concern the principles of things. Specific discussions of governance and education concern the principles of ruling. Specific discussions of penetrating inflections concern the ultimate principles by which there are things. (Comprehensive Standard, “The Torch Flame in Writing” [Wenzhang xinhuo 文章薪火])

The experts who examine and measure Heaven and Earth are scholars engaged in research on specific things and affairs, and the work they do is material measurement (zhice 质测). The object of material measurement is the principles of things. The principles of ruling refer to the principles of governance and education, i.e. the principles and laws of governing and ordering the state. Penetrating inflections refers to grasping “the ultimate principles by which there are things,” i.e. comprehending the philosophical dao-principles in things. The “material” (zhi 质) in “material measurement” refers to the forms and qualities of things and affairs, the bearers and lodgings of the principles of things. “Measurement” (ce 测) refers to activities such as examining and measuring that use numerical and quantitative relations to grasp the principles of things and affairs. Material measurement is thus an epistemological activity of concrete evidence. He said: Things have their causes, and concrete examination probes these. As large as the assemblage of the elements and as small as grass, trees, crickets and worms, when one compares their inherent natures and qualities, demonstrates their affinities and antipathies, and deduces their constancies and changes, this is called material measurement. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface” [Zixu 自序])

The causes of things are the principles of things. In investigating the principles of things, the large reach to the evolution of the cosmos, while the small reach to the lives of grass, trees and insects, yet in general, the natures and qualities, modes of activity, routine manifestations, and incidental changes and transformations of all things between Heaven and Earth should be investigated. In his youth, Fang Yizhi was fond of natural history studies, and he tried studying all those listed here, such as images and numbers, musical temperament and calendrics, sound and phonology, and healing and medicine. Fang Yizhi once spoke of his own path of study: “When I began learning in my childhood, I was fond of vast views and thought about them deeply. When I grew older, I studied broadly and worked on writing and diction; after that, I became fond of investigation; after that, I became fond of the principles of things; after that, I read the [Book of] Changes” (Remnants on the Book of Changes, “Record of the Three Masters” [Sanzi ji 三子记]). His fondness for the specific principles of things led him to delve widely into a great variety of subjects, and he wrote works on images and numbers, musical temperament and calendrics, sound and phonology, and healing and medicine, while also touching on fields such as the explanations and glosses of classical texts, inscriptions on

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implements, bodily cultivation, and geography. This fondness for empirical knowledge continued into his later years, and his studies of material measurement can be described as lifelong. At the same time, he was also fond of poetic composition, and he once regretted that writing poetry took up time he could have spent on explaining and writing glosses for classical texts. However, his dandyish habit of enjoying himself through poetry and wine made him reluctant to give up writing poetic composition, and this often left him in a conflicted state of mind. Unrestrained and uninhibited poetic composition and the calm and steady investigation of implements were curiously combined together in his person. This played a dual role in his poetic style: On the one hand, his broad knowledge of nature and history along with his familiarity with writing and phonology made his poetry full of unusual terms and allusions, while on the other, these unusual terms and allusions also gave his poetic compositions a kind of flowing and eccentric beauty. His studies of material measurement were an element that exerted a prominent effect on his thought. As for penetrating inflections (tongji 通几), Fang Yizhi explained this by saying: If one observes Heaven and Earth penetratingly, Heaven and Earth constitute a single thing. Deducing from this to the unknowable, it turns around and is assimilated by the knowable. Using the superficial to know the hidden, the twofold obscurity is a single reality, and this is the profound inflection of all things and kinds. As for the implicit content of quietude and affectivity, to profoundly probe that by which it spontaneously comes is what is called penetrating inflections. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface”)

The term “inflections” (ji 几) came from the Commentaries to the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), and refers to the subtle and minuscule signs of the changes and transformations of things and affairs; to penetrate inflections is thus to grasp the profound and subtle aspect of things and affairs, which he referred to grasping that by which things and affairs are so, that which is contained within things and affairs and governs their qualities and ways of movement. The method of penetrating inflections is “to use the superficial to know the hidden” (yi fei zhi yin 以费知隐), that is, to use the aspects of things and affairs that can be grasped by the senses to probe into the invisible, profound and subtle dao-principle within. Fang Yizhi’s condition here was that the principle of things and affairs and the phenomena that express this principle have a relation of substance and function, thus one can know the substance through its functioning and use the visible to deduce knowledge of the invisible. When he said that “the twofold obscurity is a single reality” (chongxuan yi shi 重玄一实), he meant that Laozi’s 老子 dao of “obscurity upon obscurity (xuan zhi you xuan 玄之又玄 [see Laozi, Ch. 1]) is expressed in actually existing specific things and affairs with their forms and qualities, so dao is the hidden and subtle basis that enables things and affairs to become things and affairs, and that makes their movements, changes and transformations mysterious and unpredictable. It itself exists in quietude (ji 寂), yet the specific things and affairs that express it are affective (gan 感). To investigate and grasp this general daoprinciple is what is meant be “penetrating inflections.” To penetrate inflections is to

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deduce knowledge of the general from the particular, a philosophical activity of deducing knowledge of the invisible dao from the visible principles of things. As for the relation between material measurement and penetrating inflections, Fang Yizhi proposed two profound viewpoints: “Material measurement is that which contains penetrating inflections” and “Penetrating inflections protects the limits of material measurement.” The former concerns the origins of penetrating inflections, while the latter concerns the function of penetrating inflections for material measurement. Fang Yizhi believed that penetrating inflections cannot be separated from material measurement, that seeking profound and subtle principle cannot be separated from empirical examination of things and affairs, and that if separated from examination of specific thing and affairs, one cannot obtain philosophical principle. He said: “Material measurement is that which contains penetrating inflections. One can completely exhaust material measurement yet boldly raise the penetration of inflections to display its profound and secretive spirit, how its flowing leaves behind things” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface”). In Fang Yizhi’s view, philosophical principle lies within specific things and affairs, and the empirical activity of seeking the principles of things is the activity of grasping philosophical principle. For Fang Yizhi, philosophical principle is a generalisation and abstraction of the principles of things, not a quasi-aesthetic spiritual activity of projection, analogy, metonymy, or symbolism like the Neo-Confucian personal experience and intuition, but rather an intellectual activity of abstracting philosophical principle from the among the principles of things. Philosophy is not a personal experience of some kind of spiritual thing, nor is it a logical deduction and conversion between philosophical propositions, but is rather oriented toward specific existence; this was a particular quality of Fang Yizhi’s philosophy. For him here, the vague is the mysterious. He opposed any abstract, vague principle separated from the specific principles of things. He said: “The signs of its inklings and inflections are inseparable from images and numbers. When others sweep aside implements to speak of dao and withdraw from the superficial to fathom the hidden, this deviates from balance” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “On Images and Numbers, Principle and Qi, and Signs and Inflections” [Xiangshu liqi zhengji lun 象数理气征几论]). Image-number here refers to images and numbers, i.e. to the external appearances of things and affairs as well as to certain quantitative rules that determine the structural and spatial relations between the various parts of things and affairs. Grasping the dao-principles of things and affairs is inseparable from exploring their external appearance, structure and relations. To seek a profound and subtle dao-principle separate from specific, visible signs is to be biased. Conversely, to explore the profound and subtle dao-principle of things and affairs can also overcome the limits of empirical knowledge, using the logical structure of the dao-principle itself to recover that which the eyes, ears and other senses have no way to grasp. This is the content of “Penetrating inflections protects the limits of material measurement.” Fang Yizhi’s thought here was particularly excellent, demonstrating that he saw the consistency between the original substance and logic of things and affairs, the mutual relationship between induction and

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deduction. For him here, logic is not abstract and general, but rather the necessary relationship between each detail. Original substance is also not chaotic or isolated, but rather includes the internal logic that opens out into each specific link. Original substance and logic are consistent. Hence one can use the necessity of logic to supplement the links that are unknown in specific things and affairs. This is one aspect of penetrating inflections protecting material measurement. Another aspect is that the dao-principles obtained by penetrating inflections are general, while material measurement is affected by the limits of the eyes, ears and other senses, hence penetrating inflections can lead material measurement to escape its limits and survey things from a more vast perspective. Material measurement observes things through things (yi wu guan wu 以物观物), while penetrating inflections observes things through dao [see Zhuangzi, Ch. 17 “Autumn Floods” (Qiushui 秋水) and Shao Yong’s Inner Chapters on Observing Things (Guanwu neipian 观物内篇)]. Only under the guidance and expansion of penetrating inflections can the principles of material measurement obtain a more profound understanding. Hence Fang Yizhi opposed two biases, the first being to speak of dao separately from specific things and affairs, the fault of which is “to sweep away things and respect the mind.” The dao spoken of here is not in accord with the things perceived by the eyes and ears or with empirical principles, and often falls into fantastic and far-fetched conclusions. The second fault was to be limited by the knowledge experienced by the eyes, ears and other senses, and to unable to rise to the height of abstract principles. He said: The root and the branches, the source and the flow; if one knows this then one will be good at commanding. If one casts aside things the principles have no location, so what is there to investigate? The fault in speaking of things lies in curious gentlemen who are fond of speaking of that which the eyes and ears cannot reach, making their doctrines far-fetched to the point of outrageous fantasy; as for the overcautious, they haggle over that which lies before their eyes and ears, and categorically do not believe in anything outside this. Their faults are the same. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “General Discussion” [Zonglun 总论])

One doubts and disbelieves anything outside of that they have seen and heard for themselves, while the other fails to recognise the relation of dependence between general theories and specific empirical knowledge. Among the two, one can be said to chisel into the concrete, while the other can be said to leap into the void, and both are harmful for comprehensively and thoroughly grasping both specific things and affairs and their dao-principles. Based on the above understanding, Fang Yizhi had some criticisms of the knowledge of the natural sciences brought in by the Jesuits. He said: “In the Wanli 万历 years [1563-1620], learning from the distant West was brought in which was detailed in material measurement yet lacking in penetrating inflections; however, when wise men promoted it, their material measurement was also incomplete” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface”). In general, the missionaries of the time grasped the relatively advanced scientific and technological achievements of the West, and, except a very small minority (such as those concerning the heliocentric doctrine in astronomy), the works they translated and wrote could represent the level of Western science and technology at the time. Fang Yizhi

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read several dozen of the Western academic works the missionaries translated and introduced, though not many of those concerning Catholicism. Even when he read these, Fang Yizhi with his talent and ambition regarded the missionaries’ works promoting Catholic doctrine with its dogmatic theology as evidently naïve in comparison with the level attained by Chinese philosophy at the time. For a great philosopher like Fang Yizhi, those simple religious pamphlets preaching to the masses were singularly lacking in philosophical content. Hence Fang Yizhi said that Western people were detailed in material measurement yet lacking in penetrating inflections. Furthermore, Fang Yizhi was a person with high attainments in natural history studies, and thus, given his strict attitude and scientific spirit concerning empirical knowledge, as well as his understanding of contemporary Chinese achievements in aspects of science and technology such as astronomy and calendrics, musical temperament, medicine and mechanics, for him to draw the conclusion that Western “material measurement was also incomplete” was not without reason. However, his comments abut Western people’s material measurement and penetrating inflections were somewhat different at different times. In Comprehensive Standard that he wrote in his youth, he said: “The material measurement of the Western world is quite refined, yet they have not begun to penetrate inflections” (Comprehensive Standard, first volume). In Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things that was written after Comprehensive Standard and completed in his middle age, he said: “their material measurement was also incomplete.” In general, he affirmed the point that Western people were refined in empirical knowledge, and he clearly took Western people’s studies of material measurement as an object for his study and an important aspect of his intellectual framework. Fang Yizhi once described his ambition: “To rely on Shao and Cai as precursors, to verify the comprehensive signs of the River and Luo, to borrow the far West as a Master Tan 郯子 [one of Confucius’ teachers], to expound the standards accumulated by Yu 禹 [the Great] and the Zhou 周 [Dynasty]” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “General Discussion”). He meant that he wished to continue the image-number learning of Shao Yong and Cai Chen 蔡沉, to use the general dao-principles in the River Diagram and Book of Luo to verify the specific principles of things, to take the learning of material measurement of Western people as an object of emulation, and to extend and develop ancient Chinese theories of natural science. Since these four sentences are found in the general discussion of Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, they can be seen as the guiding principle of Fang Yizhi’s methodology of empirical science. This guiding principle shows that Fang Yizhi’s thought took image-number learning as its keynote, except that, for Fang Yizhi, the two words “image” and “number” emphasised not the derivation of schemas and framing of numbers, but rather the empirical quality in images and numbers of using quantitative relations in representation, as well as a rational and not vague or mystical intellectual method. Hence when he said, “The sun, moon and stars are what the images and numbers suspended in Heaven are like; the organs, limbs and meridians are also what Heaven manifest in the human body is like,” he wished to express the empirical spirit of “examining the actual is

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difficult, leaping into the void is easy,” and to oppose the idea that “since the cause of shimmering flows of the ocean cannot truly be known, one should regard blowing shadows and carving emptiness as wondrous” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “On Images and Numbers, Principle and Qi, and Signs and Inflections”). He opposed leaving behind the empirical and simply relying on the mechanical derivation of schemas and evolution of numbers, the kind of “image-number” that forces facts into imaginary frameworks. He said: “What they speak of as images and numbers are similar to slipping into the minor arts, fragmented and far-fetched without no examination of their reality, and thus deserve to give rise to disdain” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “On Images and Numbers, Principle and Qi, and Signs and Inflections”). Hence it can be said that Fang Yizhi was the first person to take up the practical learning of the late Ming Dynasty and begin the positivist trend of the Qing Dynasty. Previously, Gu Yanwu 顾炎武 was often pushed forward as the founding master of Qing learning, yet in fact Fang Yizhi’s contribution should be obvious. If it can be said that Gu Yanwu mainly implemented positivist thinking in relatively general social knowledge and ideas, as well as in commentaries on classic texts, then Fang Yizhi mainly applied positivist methods in statements and explanations of certain concepts in natural science. However, they were united in criticism of assumptions and conjectures that went against empiricist principles. Based on his empiricist principles, Fang Yizhi criticised Neo-Confucians, saying: “Song Confucians only defended a ruling principle, but as for investigating the principles of things and systems of time, they did not attain their reality, and relied half on the work of earlier people” (Comprehensive Standard, first volume). He criticised Neo-Confucians for mainly exploring Heaven and humanity, inherent nature and endowment, and socio-political doctrines, yet neglecting the investigation of the specific principles of things. Even where they did investigate these, they mainly proposed mistaken doctrines or depended on the work of earlier people. Fang Yizhi believed that his stress on empirical knowledge continued traditions present in the original Confucians, yet discarded by later Confucians. He said: From the Yellow Emperor illuminating the circulation of qi, through Tang 唐 and Yu 虞 [i.e. the semi-mythical emperors Yao 尧 and Shun 舜] examining the celestial globe, to Confucius studying the Changes in order to divine the intercalary month [see Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I (Xici shang 系辞上)] and derive the fives of Heaven and Earth, calendrics and musical temperament were originally emphasised, yet most Confucians did not ask about it. Hence the origin of the order of changes and transformations could not be illuminated, so it is no surprise that when they raised ritual regulation and musical temperament, these were spurned, and when they raised the ethics of things and old texts, these were cast aside. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “On Images and Numbers, Principle and Qi, and Signs and Inflections”)

He pointed out that the doctrines of Heaven, humanity, inherent nature and endowment must be verified through specific things and affairs, that the metaphysical dao and physical implements are two sides of the same coin, and that one cannot speak of Heaven, humanity, inherent nature and endowment in isolation from the specific principles of things. He thus proposed his ideal for learning:

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The sages comprehended the divine illumination, categorised the myriad things, and stored them in the Changes. Breathing in its diagrams and text, points of inflection reach the essential, so that calendrics, musical temperament, medicine and divination can all be touched upon, yet how many scholars can study it to its limits? (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface”)

Comprehending divine illumination here referred to examining the hidden, subtle and invisible dao-principle, while categorising the myriad things referred to exploring the qualities and principles of specific things and affairs, connecting them together with the dao-principle taught in the Book of Changes, and using diagrams and numbers to demonstrate the fine and subtle points and make them accurate, so that certain strongly empirical subjects with clear numerical qualities can be compared and comprehended by analogy. He also quoted the words of his father Fang Kongzhao, saying: In Hidden Grass (Qiancao 潜草), he said: In speaking of meaning and principle, of economics, of essay writing, of temperament and calendrics, of inherent nature and endowment, and of the principles of things, each is its own specialised subject. Yet the principle of things lies within all, and the Changes used images, numbers and points of inflection to investigate and comprehend it. Even for inherent nature and endowment, life and death, and ghosts and spirits, there is but one great principle of things. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “General Discussion”)

As can be seen here, Fang Yizhi continued his father’s method of Changes studies, believing that the myriad things all have their principles, yet that the original principle of number contained in the images and numbers of the Book of Changes can encompass and depict all the principles of things. In studying abstruse philosophical problems such as inherent nature and endowment, life and death, and ghosts and spirits, Fang Yizhi treated them all as questions of the empirical principles of things, and here, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, including one’s own body, all contain the same common original principle, and thus can all be depicted and simulated using images and numbers. He said: Heaven displays its measures, Earth produces its shapes, things present their regularities, bodies possess their symptoms, the mind spontaneously and abstrusely responds, and yet they never seek their causes. If scholars are still and upright, not joining their rise and fall or distance and nearness but reciprocally observing them, then what is there to seek? (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “On Images and Numbers, Principle and Qi, and Signs and Inflections”)

His focus was on the rhythms, mutual compliance, qualities and regularities of the myriad things, in which respects they are all different, yet also have a common point and general original principle, and these can all be examined empirically. Scholars should take up a quiet and stable frame of mind, and study these aspects of things and affairs individually, comprehensively, and comparatively. This method was implemented throughout the academic activities of his early period, and when his son Fang Zhongtong 方中通 recorded his method in compiling Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, he said: “Every time he heard of something, he recorded it in a separate entry, such as the Classic of Mountains and Seas (Shanhaijing 山海 经), the Pictures from the Beast of the White Marsh (Baizetu 白泽图), the Record of

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Natural History (Bowuzhi 博物志) of Zhang Hua 张华 and Li Shi 李石, Ge Hong’s 葛洪 Baopuzi 抱朴子 and the Materia Medica (Bencao 本草), selecting a multitude of words concerning things that either had no evidence or that had not been proved. In this he valued material measurement, and simply sought those that could be confirmed” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “The Origins of the Catalogue” [Bianlu yuanqi 编录缘起]). This was a faithful record of Fang Yizhi’s academic method in his early period. It should be noted that, as a procedure for exploring empirical knowledge, Fang Yizhi’s above intellectual method was rather precise, and his explanations of many specific things and affairs that took it as a guiding principle were both accurate and profound. However, his criticisms of Neo-Confucians were rather partial, since the Neo-Confucian method and goal in exploring things and affairs were different from philosophers who follow an empiricist approach. Neo-Confucianism was not an empirical form of learning, but was humanistic and explanatory. It emphasised a lofty spiritual plane and degree of understanding rather than the accuracy and abundance of specific knowledge, and its goal lay in giving people spiritual enjoyment rather than concrete knowledge. The dao-principles of specific things and affairs were merely a medium or instrument for Neo-Confucians to recognise Heavenly principle and elevate their spiritual plane. Neo-Confucianism was a form of philosophy that differed from empiricist philosophy. For empirically minded philosophers, the arguments and methods of Neo-Confucians were full of vague and scattered points, were hollow, and did not correspond to reality. However, for Neo-Confucians, empiricist philosophers perceived things and not people, were bound by empirical principles, and were unable to rise to a lofty and broad-minded realm. The empirical tendency of Fang Yizhi’s philosophy in his early period was very clear, and his continuation of his family learning with its tradition of image-number studies together with his adoption of the methodology of knowledge of nature from Western learning constituted the empiricist aspect of his thought. This aspect was very firmly rooted, and influenced him for practically his whole life. Even in his later years, when the philosophy of spiritual planes (jingjie 境界) that he developed after absorbing Zhuangzi and Buddhist learning played a guiding role, his empiricist aspect still found its expression. For example, he held a critical attitude toward Neo-Confucians his whole life, and this point shared similar temporal connotations with Gu Yanwu’s critique of Neo-Confucians.

3 Qi and Fire; the Supreme Polarity Under the influence of both his empiricist method and his theory of spiritual planes, Fang Yizhi’s theory of original substance can be divided into two levels, one concerning what constitutes the material substance of the myriad things of the cosmos, and one concerning how to explain and regard the myriad things of the cosmos at a more expansive level. In his early thought, Fang Yizhi regarded qi as the material substance, while in his mid-period and later thought, especially after he

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became a monk and absorbed other thoughts, at which time he expressed his view of the myriad things from the ultimate aspect of the cosmos, he also regarded the Supreme Polarity as the original substance of the cosmos. 1. Qi and Fire Fang Yizhi believed that all the existence between Heaven and Earth could be resolved into things (wu 物), and he proposed the proposition that “all that fills the space between Heaven and Earth are things,” which was a premise for his empiricist philosophy. He said: All that fills the space between Heaven and Earth are things, people receive its centrality in living, life is contained in the body and the body in the world, while everything that is perceived or used is nothing but an affair (shi 事), and an affair is a thing. Sages make implements and make use of them to situate their lives, and rely on the exterior and interior to govern their minds. Implements are solid things, and the mind is also a thing. Speaking profoundly of inherent nature and endowment, inherent nature and endowment is a thing; penetratingly observing Heaven and Earth, Heaven and Earth is a thing. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface”)

Affairs are things, implements are things, the mind is a thing, inherent nature and endowment is a thing, so speaking in general, everything that exists between Heaven and Earth is a thing. The phrases “the mind is also a thing” and “inherent nature and endowment is a thing” here were meant to emphasise that the mind as the human organ of thought is an actual thing, that people’s existence and circumstances as expressed by inherent nature and endowment are also an actual thing, that the final support for spiritual existence is things, and that everything that exists in the world can be investigated in its traces and images, and can be described in its state. In Fang Yizhi’s eyes, everything has a foundation in forms and qualities. Fang Yizhi’s investigation of the forms and qualities of things continued the ancient Chinese theory of foundational qi, and saw qi as the substance of things. He said: All things are made by qi. Emptiness is all filled by qi. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Author’s Preface”) Quality is all qi, and the signs of its inklings and inflections are inseparable from images and numbers. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “On Images and Numbers, Principle and Qi, and Signs and Inflections”) The void is originally qi, and solid forms are also condensed from qi. There is just one qi yet the two paths mutually assist one another. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Explanation of the Four Phases and Five Phases” [Sixing wuxing shuo 四行五行 说])

He believed that not only were the forms and qualities of things qi, but light and sound were also qi. He said: Qi condenses to make forms, its accumulations are emitted to make light, its apertures are excited to make sound, and all are qi. However, there is still more qi that is not yet condensed, emitted or excited, hence one can generally list qi, forms, light and sound as

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four inflections. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “The Doctrines of Four Phases and Five Phases”)

Qi is the original substance of all things with form, qi condenses to make things with bodily forms, things with form gather energy and emit light, and this creates empty places that emit sound. Light and sound are all formed by qi. Qi, forms, light and sound are four states of things, and are also four routes to know things and affairs. Strictly speaking, the qi of qi, forms, light and sound on the one hand and qi as the substance of the myriad things on the other are different. Qi as substance is a kind of abstract sign used to express that which constitutes things, and in reality it has no name, so to call it qi is to “forcibly name it” [see Laozi, Ch. 25]. The “qi” of qi, forms, light and sound however is a specific thing, albeit an invisible thing. Only because it is a specific thing can it have inklings and inflections, i.e. fine and subtle expressions that can be known. Qi as substance has no possibility of being expressed, since it is merely a kind of formal or inferred existence. In traditional Chinese philosophy however, these two kinds of “qi” were not distinguished. Fang Yizhi also did not distinguish between qi as the substance of the myriad things and the fine, subtle and invisible qi of the air [kongqi 空气], and that which he described as the original substance of the myriad things in the “Theory of Qi” (Qilun 气论) chapter of Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things was “empty qi” (kongqi 空 气 [i.e. air]). He quotes his father’s description of qi, saying: The world only grasps forms as that which is perceived, yet qi is subtle. However, when one’s breathes out in winter, one’s qi is like smoke; when people stand under the sun, vapour evaporates above their heads, and its shadow rises on the ground; when they are examination bells or war drums, the paper of the window lattice all shakes. Thus qi as a material can in fact be perceived. How can there be any more doubt that it fills all voids and penetrates all actuality? (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Theory of Qi”)

The qi spoken of by Fang Kongzhao was also the invisible air, and did not signify the abstract sign of “qi” constituted by matter. Fang Yizhi’s idea that all things are made by qi was also continuation of his father’s statement. Fang Yizhi also said: The movement of qi in Heaven is called the five revolutions, and its production on Earth is called the five materials; as for the seven planets and array of stars, its essence is in Heaven while its dispersal is on Earth. Hence it makes mountains and rivers, makes things like scales, feathers, hair, shells, grass and wood, with sounds, appearances, smells and flavours, distinguishing their inklings and inflections. (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “General Discussion”)

That is to say, all things between Heaven and Earth are made up of qi, with its quintessence as the planets and stars, and its bulk as mountains, rivers, animals and plants. All things with internal qualities and external expressions are made by qi. Qi exists eternally, and is neither produced nor extinguished. Hence he said: “Investigating their reality, everything that is between Heaven and Earth and has a form decays, and only qi does not decay” (Equalization of East and West, “That By Which”). It can be said that the qi spoken of by Fang Yizhi was in fact a specific state of things.

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Since Fang Yizhi was guided by his empiricist principle to regard the material state of qi as the origin of the myriad things, he could also use another material state as the origin of the myriad things, namely fire. For Fang Yizhi, this was not contradictory, because light and fire are different states of expression of qi. In order to more vividly explain the kinetic energy of the origin of the myriad things and the mechanism by which the origin functions in developing the myriad things, he used fire to replace qi as the origin of the myriad things. For him here, fire is qi, possesses kinetic energy and endless vital force, and can use the internal contradiction of its two aspects of being continually broken down and re-establishing balance to express its active source and equilibrium. Qi emphasises the constitutive element of things, while fire emphasises things’ kinetic energy and the constitutive factors of advance and retreat or production and overcoming. This point was in fact also continued from his family learning, with his grandfather Fang Dazhen once pointing out: “That which fills empty space is all fire, and the vital impulse of all things is all fire. Fire possesses the function of producing, transforming and illuminating things” (quoted in Monk Yaodi Roasts the Zhuangzi, “The Essentials of Cultivating Life” [Yangshengzhu 养生主]). His father Fang Kongzhao also said: “The light between the two is all the fire of the sun” (quoted in Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, Vol. 1). He also quoted the viewpoint of Yuan Dynasty medical scientist Zhu Zhenheng 朱震亨: “Heaven moves eternally and human life also moves eternally, following the action of fire” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Fire” [Huo 火]). Fang Yizhi’s purpose in quoting these passages lay in proving fire was the most important among the Five Phases (wuxing 五行), and that all movement between Heaven and Earth had fire as its basis. This in fact placed fire’s qualities of being dynamic and able to change other matter over and above qi. It can also be said that, for Fang Yizhi here, qi was only the element that constitutes the myriad things, while actual things are situated at the level of forms and qualities, forms and qualities take the Five Phases as their constituents, and fire is the most important among the Five Phases. Fang Yizhi wrote “Explanation of the Five Phases Respecting Five as Ancestral” (Wuxing zun huo wei zong shuo 五行尊火为宗说) to prove his point here: People of the world only know that fire can produce earth, but not that fire can produce metal, water and wood. Yet without fire, metal could not be produced and completed, water could not rise and fall, and wood could not grow and flourish. … Now, among earth, stone, metal, the sea and trees, if one knocks, strikes or drills into them, fire emerges from all. Hence this fire can hide its spirit in the myriad things, and can also produce things. (Collaboration on Time in the Book of Changes, “Diagrams and Images, Inflections and Surfaces” [Tuxiang jibiao 图象几表])

This focuses on fire’s quality of being able to change other things, and of originally containing potential energy and releasing this to become other forms of matter. Fang Yizhi also used the function of “fire” in the human body to prove the all-pervasiveness of fire: “The Five Phases honour fire, activity and stillness return to wind, and the human body uses the activity of things to support the stillness of principle, hence one can regard fire as life and death. That which makes people sick is fire, and that by which there is life is fire” (Collaboration on Time in the Book of

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Changes, “Diagrams and Images, Inflections and Surfaces,” “Explanation of the Breathing of the Human Body According With the Hexagram Qi of Heaven and Earth” [Renshen huxi he tiandi guiqi shuo 人身呼吸合天地卦气说]). People never cease to be active for even a moment, and if activity is extinguished they die; fire is the source of activity, hence he regarded fire as that by which life is so. Sickness is then fire losing its balance with the other four phases. Hence he also said: “Yang unifies yin and yang, fire drives water and fire, so one lives by fire, dies by fire, becomes sick from fire, and cultivates one’s body through this fire. Water and fire mutually assist one another, one that which governs them is mind. Fire has no substance but relies on things as substance, and the human mind is the same” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Fire”). Here, the fire of “fire drives water and fire” and that of “Fire has no substance” refer to the kinetic energy and vital impulse (shengji 生机) of matter. Kinetic energy and vital impulse must rely of specific water and fire to take effect, and this kinetic energy also has the function of controlling and driving specific water and fire. This statement absorbed Zhu Zhenheng’s medical concepts of “ruling fire” (junhuo 君火) and “assisting fire” (xianghuo 相火), which he used to express principal and subordinate, yin and yang. He said: “In the Supreme Polarity, activity and stillness, and yin and yang, which produce the Five Phases, each has a single inherent nature, while only fire has two: ruling fire, which is the fire of people, and assisting fire, which is the fire of Heaven. Fire is internally yin but externally yang, and is that which governs activity” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Fire”). Ruling fire referred to the vital impulse and kinetic energy possessed by the human body, hence he called it the fire of people. Assisting fire referred to various material factors outside the human body, while “internally yin but externally yang, and governing activity” referred to fire’s quality of being internally empty yet externally hot, and having kinetic propensity. Fang Yizhi developed Zhu Zhenheng’s statement, pointing out: “Illuminating through full emptiness is all fire, in which the dao of the ruler and assistant combine, the cause of both life and death and inherent nature and endowment; who could cheat this?” (Minor Knowledge of the Principles of Things, “Fire”). That is to say, all things in the world are in movement, and movement has both internal and external causes, both principal and tributary causes, what he called “the dao of the ruler and assistant combine.” The coordination and harmony of two aspects of things and affairs, their internal kinetic energy and various external factors, are the foundation for the existence of all things and affairs. The activity of human life is like this, and the myriad things are no different. Fire can be neither extinguished nor indulged, and what is valuable is its harmony and balance. Fang Yizhi’s discussions of fire and qi took place on two levels: fire was spoken of in terms of material, while qi was spoken of in terms of the element that constitutes matter, and the two were not contradictory. However, if one reviews Fang Yizhi’s thought as a whole, he placed more emphasis on fire, because fire explained the cause of movement, the relation between internal and external, Heaven and humanity, and ruling and following. This was the key point of his doctrines. Although he did not invent the idea of the Five Phases honouring fire, his borrowing of the intellectual results of earlier scholars to explain the kinetic energy

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of things and affairs together with the relation between internal and external, Heaven and humanity, and ruling and following was indeed insightful. More importantly, he broke with the weak point of philosophers in general, who regarded qi as the origin of the myriad things and refused to delve into a deeper level, and sought an explanation of things and affairs from the two aspects of elements and the quality and manner in which elements exerted their effects. This demonstrates that he placed more emphasis on empirically exploring the qualities and states of things and affairs, rather than merely speculatively generalising about the origin of things and affairs. As a philosopher who emphasised the empirical, his explorations of things and affairs had already extended from the constitutive elements of things to the level of their structures and qualities, even though these explorations and statements were still very superficial. 2. The Supreme Polarity Fang Yizhi was both an scholar of image-number learning, and a philosopher with a theory of original substance, and he both explored the constitution and qualities of things at the level of qi and matter, and also sought the basis and reason for the existence of the myriad things at the level of the relation between the myriad things and humanity. Fang Yizhi believed that this reason [or “that by which things are so”] was the Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极). He gave the following description of the Supreme Polarity: The Supreme Polarity is both prior to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and posterior to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, ending them and starting them, yet in fact vanishes into Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, and cannot be divided into prior and posterior or end and beginning. It produces two and then four and eight, and is sufficient at each moment. From the ancient to the present, it exists at all times and is present at all places, and is Heaven, inherent nature, endowment and mind. As soon as there is one stroke, there are three hundred and eighty four [i.e. the individual lines of the Book of Changes]. They all alternate and change, and are all unchanging; they are all active and all still, and hence penetrate quietude and affectivity, and transcend activity and stillness. In these three hundred and eighty four real existents, there is always an empty void persisting. Confucius opened up the Heavenly wastes and created its sign, which he called “Supreme Polarity.” The “Supreme Polarity” is like saying “supreme non-being” [taiwu 太无]. “Supreme non-being” says that it falls into neither being nor non-being. When the post-Heavenly hexagrams and lines have already been arranged, this is called “the polarity of being”; before the pre-Heavenly hexagrams and lines have opened up, this is called the “polarity of non-being.” The two polarities are mutually dependent, while the Supreme Polarity that cuts off dependence is called the centre of Heaven (zhongtian 中天). The centre of Heaven is within the prior and posterior, while the pre-Heavenly lies within the post-Heavenly. It is three and yet one. (Equalization of East and West, “Three Signs” [Sanzheng 三征])

This marvellous passage of text described the Supreme Polarity comprehensively, from the level of people’s intuition, and from original substance to method. First, The Supreme Polarity as an original substance differs from the “non-being” of the Daoist “being is produced from non-being” [see Laozi, Ch. 40]. The “non-being” of being produced from non-being is the original substance of the cosmos, which represents a stage of the cosmos, and has a temporal relationship with the myriad things of producer and produced. Fang Yizhi’s Supreme Polarity is an ontological

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original substance, which represents a philosopher’s degree of understanding, in which the Supreme Polarity and the myriad things have a relationship of general and particular or abstract and specific. It has no temporal division between prior and posterior, no spatial relationship of whole and part, and cannot be specified using existence and non-existence in space and time. In terms of its being the basis of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, it is prior to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things; in terms of its actually being a specific existence in space and time, it is posterior to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Strictly speaking, “the basis of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things” cannot be spoken, since this is a metaphysical proposition. From the perspective of empiricist philosophy and the philosophy of nature, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are all particular actual things, and they have no so-called basis or original substance. Fang Yizhi here however was clearly discussing things from a metaphysical perspective, hence pre-Heavenly, post-Heavenly, metaphysical and actual can all be used to describe the Supreme Polarity as an original substance. The Supreme Polarity is prior to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, but also posterior to Heaven, Earth and the myriad things; it is both the beginning of things, and also the end of things. It is abstract and has no specific shape, hence is “vanishes into Heaven, Earth and the myriad things”; however, it is also specific and real, hence “two (yin-yang) and then four (the Four Images) and eight (the Eight Trigrams), and is sufficient at each moment.” The Supreme Polarity is present at the same time as the myriad things, “As soon as there is one stroke, there are three hundred and eighty four lines,” with each stroke including the three hundred and eighty four lines, and the three hundred and eighty four lines being able to be gathered into one stroke. Specific alternations, changes, activity and stillness are properties of the myriad things, while the Supreme Polarity transcends both activity and stillness, and quietude and affectivity. In this way it can also be said to be non-being. “Supreme non-being” expresses that it is original substance, and not specific, while original substance does not fall into the mutual dependence of being and non-being. In relation to the pre-Heavenly and post-Heavenly, this original substance that does not fall into mutual dependence and cuts off dependence is the centre of Heaven, and the centre of Heaven expresses that the pre-Heavenly lies within the post-Heavenly. His methodology was three yet one, one yet three, with one and three both raised, and neither unity nor difference. Fang Yizhi’s descriptions of the Supreme Polarity continued ideas from the history of Chinese philosophy about the relationship between original substance and the myriad things, and were also a continuation of the family learning of the Fangs. His views of the Supreme Polarity, the Two Modes, the Four Images and the Eight Trigrams as sufficient at each moment, and of the three hundred and eighty four actual existents all preserving the empty void, were consistent with Wang Bi’s 王弼 ideas concerning the meaning of the great expansion [dayanyi 大衍义; see Wang Bi, Commentary on the Book of Changes (Zhouyi zhu 周易注), “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”]. Wang Bi however emphasized that one is the basis of many, that by which the many exerts its effects; what Fang Yizhi emphasised was that one is many, many is one. This idea was consistent with the “powerful yet different without sign, the myriad images are already present in their luxuriance” spoken of

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by Neo-Confucians, although the Neo-Confucians mostly established their theories in relation to morality, while Fang Yizhi used it to express his purely metaphysical viewpoint. For Fang Yizhi here, the Supreme Polarity was a comprehension of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, the totality (zongti 总体) of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. This totality is not a mechanical addition of individuals. The Supreme Polarity sees Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as a mutually connected totality in which individuals cannot move separately. In this sense, the Supreme Polarity is also the governor (tongxia 统辖) and ruler of the myriad things. Fang Yizhi said: In saying that the root is not active, it is not still, but profound and unceasing. To know inflections before inflections, penetrating regularities as one, making the large small, the small large, the full empty and the empty full, while there are no large, small, empty or full. There are also no three signs. Production and completion unite and divide, dividing and uniting, uniting and dividing, so division is unity. Hearing the Hundred Schools each overcoming one another, while being the great constancy that rules constant change, it comprehends the in-itself. Knowing the Heaven by which this is so, it pacifies the Heaven that cannot but be so. (Equalization of East and West, “Three Signs”)

That is to say, the original substance of the Supreme Polarity is “The ordinance of Heaven, majestic and unending” [see Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经), Odes of Zhou (Zhou song 周颂), “Decade of Qing Miao” 清庙之什], which transcends activity and stillness, and is both prior to the movements of the myriad things, and also amidst them. Of course this “prior to” does not refer to time, but rather logic. It is separate from all dharmas, yet penetrates all dharmas. It is the basis for the largeness or smallness, emptiness and fullness, and division and unity, yet this basis does not participate in any of the activities of specific things and affairs, but rather relies on the spontaneous action of the myriad things. The myriad things acting spontaneously yet collectively comprising one Supreme Polarity is “Hearing the Hundred Schools each overcoming one another.” The Supreme Polarity uses non-ruling yet in reality rules over them, knowing the necessity of the myriad things, while pacifying that which for the myriad things cannot but be so, rather than making any artificial actions amidst them. It furls and unfurls freely without obstruction. Hence Fang Yizhi’s original substance of the Supreme Polarity was formal, and without actual content; it was a speculative product, and not an empirical existence. The Supreme Polarity was not an assemblage of the myriad things, nor was it their source, but rather considered the myriad things as a totality and attained a kind of intelligent understanding. This intelligent understanding shows that Fang Yizhi had already broken through the level of empirical existence and entered the realm of the metaphysical. 3. “That by Which” For Fang Yizhi here, the existence and qualities of the myriad things all had their basis and their “that by which” [i.e. their reasons]. The Supreme Polarity is the basis for all existence, and the highest “that by which.” He said: “Between the profound and the superficial, that by which they are so is called the Supreme Polarity” (Collaboration on Time in the Book of Changes, “Diagrams and Images, Inflections

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and Surfaces”). In his view, the myriad things all have the necessity, and this necessity arises from their original natures, rather than being something given from outside; that is to say, the myriad things are “never not so” Yet behind this “so” (ran 然), there is a “that by which they are so.” The Supreme Polarity is the “that by which things are so within that which is never not so” (Remnants on the Book of Changes, “Cutting Off Dependence, Combining Dependence, Penetrating Dependence” [Juedai bingdai guandai 绝待并待贯待]). While this “that by which” was both used to express original substance, and also to express the connections between things and affairs, when expressing original substance, it referred both to a cosmological original substance and an ontological original substance. This is because specific things both have a beginning, and also “collectively constitute one Heaven” with other things; they can be seen both as something produced, and also as an independent existence; they can be seen both as things of qitransformation with no purpose, intention or desire, and also as active substances with qualities, desires and wills. Because the “that by which” has many different definitive properties, each definitive property has a quality of indeterminacy, and can be said to be named only because there is no other choice. Fang Yizhi’s descriptions of the “that by which” set out from various different perspectives: In inferring “that by which,” one begins with a vast and hazy egg as the shell of the Supreme Polarity, where that which fills the empty and penetrates the full is all qi. It is only called qi because there is no other choice. Because it is the source of creation and transformation, and not forced artificiality, it is called “spontaneity” (ziran 自然). Since it is the common mind of Heaven, Earth, people and things, it is called “mind.” Since it is the root of life, it is called “inherent nature.” Since it endows everything, it is called “endowment.” Since it rules everything, it is called “Heaven”; its collective pathway is called “dao,” and in saying that it differs from affairs and can be closely examined, it is called “principle.” (Remnants on the Book of Changes, “Contents” [Mulu 目录])

“A vast and hazy egg” refers to the theory of the Heavenly sphere (huntian shuo 浑 天说), while the things in the cosmos all take qi as their element, hence qi is the “that by which.” Since the “that by which” is the basis of the myriad things, it is the source of creation and transformation. Yet the governance and rule of this “that by which” over specific things has no will or purpose, and hence can also be called “spontaneity.” Since the “that by which” has no selfish intention or artificiality, and sees the myriad things as one with no differences in degree of care, it can also be called the “common mind.” Since this “that by which” is the essential property of one thing, it can be called “inherent nature.” Other names such as “Heaven” and “endowment” speak in terms of its ruling and endowing, while “dao” and “principle” speak in terms of its collective pathway and pattern. The above passage describes the “that by which” as the basis of the myriad things comprehensively from various sides. These sides combined together form the quality and function of the “that by which.” This “that by which” is in fact the Supreme Polarity. However, the Supreme Polarity and the “that by which” take on different roles in language. At some points, “that by which” is equated to the Supreme Polarity, as when Fang Yizhi said: “In ancient and new, its name is ‘Supreme Polarity,’ in foolish and awakened it is called ‘supreme non-being,’ while in reality it is called ‘that by

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which’” (Equalization of East and West, “Returning to the Cause” [Fanyin 反因]). However, the two have different functions in different contexts. In general, the Supreme Polarity emphasised original substance, while “that by which” emphasised the basis. “That by which” referred to actual functions, while the Supreme Polarity cannot produce actual functions, but rather expresses logical relations. That is to say, “that by which” takes on the mission of the Supreme Polarity, and is a bridge between the Supreme Polarity and specific things and affairs. Fang Yizhi’s conception of the Supreme Polarity was a synthetic product of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. In terms of Confucianism, Fang Yizhi was most heavily influenced by Shao Yong, Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐 and Zhu Xi, and he once said: “When Master Shao regarded the Supreme Polarity as nameless and common, this was most marvellous. When Master Zhou discussed the great outline of beginning and end, empty and full, being and non-being, and dao and implements, there was emptiness in the full and fullness in the empty; there was non-being before being, and being before non-being. … The presence and absence of hexagrams and lines form a pair, while the Supreme Polarity has no partner” (Equalization of East and West, “Three Signs”). His absorption of Shao Yong and Zhou Dunyi’s conceptions of the Supreme Polarity was here most clear, and Fang Yizhi’s idea of the Supreme Polarity as supreme non-being was influenced by Zhou Dunyi’s “The non-polarity and yet the Supreme Polarity”; his idea of the Supreme Polarity and the things between the two as both one and myriad, furling and unfurling freely was influenced by both Zhou Dunyi’s “Things are not penetrating, while spirit makes the myriad things marvelous” and Zhu Xi’s “All people have a Supreme Polarity, all things have a Supreme Polarity,” although he removed the cosmogonic aspects of Zhou Dunyi’s “Yin and yang make one Supreme Polarity, and the Supreme Polarity is originally without polarity.” Fang Yizhi’s ideas concerning the Supreme Polarity were also influenced by Huayan 华严 Buddhism, and he once said: “Huayan returns to a dharma-realm with no obstructions between various affairs, beginning to bind one true dharma-realm” (Equalization of East and West, “Complete and Partial” [quanpian 全偏]). The one true dharma-realm is the Supreme Polarity, while no obstructions between various affairs (shishi wu’ai 事事 无碍) refers to the myriad beings. The one true dharma-realm lies within the dharma-realm of no obstructions between various affairs, with the one truth and myriad beings free and unobstructed.

4 The Unification of the Three Teachings and Overturning the Three Truths Although Fang Yizhi spoke of the original substance and ultimate (jiujing 究竟) in terms of everything not being established, people cannot separate themselves from the phenomenal world, and everything within the phenomenal world has names and images, rights and wrongs. Actual people must live with the secular world. Even if

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one is as detached as Zhuangzi, one must be “alone to come and go with the spirit of Heaven and Earth” on the one hand, and “not condemn right and wrong, living with the common world” on the other [see Zhuangzi, Ch. 33 “The World Under Heaven (Tianxia 天下)]. Fang Yizhi’s thought also had these two aspects. As a thinker who both had a profound understanding of the fundamental principles of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things yet also lived through the chaotic life of the Ming-Qing transition, who both had a deep knowledge of Confucian thought yet also absorbed the doctrines of various schools, and who both had a firm belief in his thought yet was also full of bitterness and helplessness, faced with a confused and chaotic world, he advocated “lodging and yet not lodging” (zhu er wuzhu 住而 无住). The first step in lodging and yet not lodging was to abolish differences. This was expressed in his treatment of different thoughts and ideas, namely his unification of the Three Teachings. His proposal here had elements both of Confucian thought, and also of Daoist and Buddhist thought. The first of the Confucian elements was Mencius’ “understanding words” (zhiyan 知言). He said: Words arise from one-sidedness, become excessive in licentiousness, are complete in deviance, and reach their peak in evasiveness, passing through the mind’s beginning in occlusion, becoming deeper in entrapment, rebelling in separation, and ending in exhaustion. If one knows the reason for this hiding, then one knows the importance of knowing evasiveness. Its core lies in using the substance that is originally without right and wrong, using even temperament to determine the weight of right and wrong, which is called impartial balance (gongheng 公衡). There is nothing so impartial as Heaven and Earth, which had no right and wrong until the sages established them. Only when they could contain them could they establish them; only when they could establish them could they forget them. The mind of the sage is Heaven and Earth. Later generations each defended that which they were afraid would be challenged and found evasion in convenience, thereby affirming what was wrong and denying what was right, leading right and wrong into disorder. Yet if one says that those who learn the dao ought to regard having no rights and wrongs as the supreme law, without illuminating the impartial right and wrong that leads to balance, then this produces the mind and harms affairs, each becoming unscrupulous, and the mind that Heaven, Earth and humanity all possess is completely lost, so how can debate ever come to an end? (Equalization of East and West, “Containing Evasion” [Rongdun 容 遁])

One-sidedness, licentiousness, deviance and evasiveness came from the Mencius’ sentence, “From one-sided words, one knows what they occlude; from licentious words, one knows what they corrupt; from deviant words, one knows that from which they stray; from evasive words, one knows what they exhaust” (Mencius, 2A.2). Fang Yizhi believed that words have “one-sidedness, licentiousness, deviance and evasiveness” because the mind has ignorance and entrapment. If one wishes to avoid this fault, the key is to use the substance that is originally without right and wrong to seek the weighted balance of the impartial right and wrong. To be originally without right and wrong yet be impartial concerning right and wrong is to emulate Heaven and Earth. The specific method for people living in actual societies to emulate Heaven and Earth is to use the mind that is originally without right and wrong to establish right and wrong, to establish right and wrong yet tolerate right and wrong, to tolerate right and wrong yet forget right and wrong,

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since only in this way can be originally without right and wrong and yet impartial concerning right and wrong. If one is only without right and wrong yet forgets the impartial right and wrong, this necessarily “produces the mind and harms affairs.” The Hundred Schools each flaunt their techniques to the world, affirming that which they affirm and rejecting that which they reject, leading right and wrong into disorder. Each clinging to its own biased partiality and denigrating the impartial right and wrong is the greatest disaster, hence Fang Yizhi wished to combine the Hundred Schools with their multitude of techniques and make them impartial. He said: The whole cannot be attained, and since the Hundred Schools with their multitude of techniques are all contained and supported by Heaven and Earth, it has always been possible to succeed for oneself through one biased partiality. What I call injustice is each wishing to use its single biased partiality to denigrate the great impartiality and seek to overcome it. Where can one attain the great man who unites all in impartiality and wipes this out? (Equalization of East and West, “Containing Evasion”)

There is no doctrine in the world that includes everything, and all kinds of doctrines are always specific, so the combination of the Hundred Schools with their multitude of techniques is the whole that includes everything. The end of the Ming and beginning of the Qing when Fang Yizhi lived was a time when Confucianism had a ruling position yet Buddhism and Daoism each sought to fuse with Confucianism in order to exist. Fang Yizhi’s education included all three of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, and among the several scholars who influenced him the most, his father Fang Kongzhao was famous for the Changes, and his family had long abided by the maxim of “Making Confucianism one’s enterprise, passing poetry and writing on to the family.” From a young age, Fang Yizhi obeyed the family teaching of “Do good for the world, exhaustively express one’s mind, and know what one has been destined for.” His teacher Wang Xuan was deeply versed in Daoist learning, while his maternal grandfather Wu Yingbin was talented in the Changes and also profound in Buddhist learning. Fang Yizhi was influenced by this academic environment, and in the latter half of his life entered into Buddhism, so for him to advocate the unification of the Three Teachings was quite natural. The “Record of Awakening from a Ring of Images” (Xianghuan wu ji 象环寤记) that he wrote when he was shut in Gaozuo Temple after becoming a monk used a vision in a dream to clearly express his view of unifying the Three Teachings on the basis of Confucianism. In this work, his grandfather Fang Dazhen represented Confucianism, Wang Xuan represented Daoism and Wu Yingbin represented Buddhism, and in their teachings to Fang Yizhi they expressed each of their positions. Fang Yizhi spoke through Fang Dazhen, saying: Thus when I look to those with knowledge of the whole to remedy teaching, this must be based on a comprehensive synthesis, and cannot be divided in two. If one traces their original unity, they return to the Changes. In the myriad ages, illuminated substance suits function, and there is originally no substance without function. Confucius studied the lower to penetrate the higher, was detailed in functions yet did not exhaust function. What he regarded as highest was to await people’s self-attainment. … Laozi on the other hand focused on abiding by non-function in order to be whole through the partial, only

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responding when it was necessary. If considered calmly, they were one in their mind of goodness to the world. In establishing it as a school, one should regard love of learning as upright grandeur and central harmony, each settling in productive principle, with roots and branches, internal and external consistently following the times. Yet using swift methods of the two schools [of Buddhism and Daoism] to aid the sufferings of later Confucians, others suspended the azure of distant peaks, thinking that amidst the city walls and rivers there must be a great deal. Exhaustively expressing the mind, knowing one’s endowment and not separating life and death; how are they different? In what I call spirit, spirit is not separate from traces, and since traces transform through spirit, the traces are also spirit. Since one possesses the whole of spirit, why must one take care to supplement the incompleteness of traces? Retain the causes of reincarnation to assist the teaching of the spiritual dao, use the forced excitation of the free and easy to supplement the restrictions of stern admonishments, use weakness to govern the conceit of unique respect, and use the stick and shout to ward off the retreat of those who drag their tails. Luoxia 洛下 and Kaoting 考亭 did not prevent the establishment of brush, pinch and hammer, Xiangshan 象山 and Cihu 慈湖 confirmed the mind through images and numbers; in concentrating on one’s own self-attainment, is reciting the Six Classics alone to be despised, while the selfish mind runs riot? Xiuwu 修武 and Luling 庐陵 are suited to passing time in forced isolation, while Linji 临济 and Zhaozhou 赵州 need not dislike higher learning. Taking the two and joining them, the broad and simply can be used together, augmenting and reducing according the times, a mountain at one time and an earthquake at another. Do not overlook accumulated knowledge, for it is sufficient to perceive the mind; are cultivating speech and establishing sincerity not the peak of the human dao found in the third line in [hexagram] Qian 乾, where knowledge of the enterprise of virtue ends? Self-improvement without cease, without lodging the unruly mind; refined meaning enters into spirit, developing things and completing tasks. Nothing is acceptable or unacceptable, and through non-action all action is accomplished. Ah, the whole! Yet I do not dare to expect it. (“Record of Awakening from a Ring of Images,” Equalization of East and West, appendix)

This long passage was his concentrated expression of the relation between the Three Teachings, as well as a collection of his scattered criticisms of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism from other chapters. His meaning was that since the Three Teachings each have their biases, so one only someone who concentrates the best points of the Three Teachings can be expected to rectify them, and such a person must take Confucianism as his basis. Yet Confucianism also has the Changes as its most complete expression, since the Changes can be used to illuminate substance and penetrate function. Confucius’ learning was studying the lower to penetrate the higher, with the affairs of daily life as its material, seeking through this to reach the ordinances of Heaven. What he looked to was waiting until people could attain for themselves. Laozi took weakness and modesty, holding to softness and valuing the female, and not using the world as his teachings, and this also contains its unavoidable unspoken pains, thus shares the same mind of care for the world with Confucianism. However, its establishment as a school should be modified to love learning, with the methods of upright grandeur and central harmony, while maintaining its strong point of rising and falling according with the times. Confucianism must take Buddhism and Daoism to supplement and remedy it, regarding them as its necessary resources. Ultimately, the Confucian exhaustive expression of the mind, the Daoist knowledge of endowment, and the Buddhist non-duality of life and death are one and the same. The Buddhist doctrine of the cycle of life and death can supplement Confucianism’s establishment of teachings through the dao of the

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spirit, the impulsive words and koans of Chan Buddhism with their freedom and excitation can supplement the stern admonishments of the positive guidance of Confucian teachings, the Daoist weakness and modesty can correct Buddhism’s solipsistic self-respect, while Chan Buddhism’s stick and shout method can correct Daoism’s tendencies to avoidance and retreat. In Neo-Confucianism, Cheng Yi 程 颐 and Zhu Xi’s transmission did not prevent the absorption of Chan Buddhism’s instantaneous opportune enlightenment, Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 and Yang Jian’s 杨 简’s Learning of the Mind did not prevent the implantation of images and numbers to correct the self-will of their wielding the mind and their disdain for the classics. It is suitable for those who avoid the Buddha to go into isolation to experience the benefits of the Buddhist method of cultivating discipline, while it is suitable for Chan Buddhism to read more classics, to understand that the dao-principles of Chan were originally consistent with these. In sum, the various schools and factions can mutually supplement one another, the broad and simple can be used together, augmentation and reduction can both be raised, activity and stillness can be of mutual assistance, self-improvement without cease and not lodging the unruly mind can be fused, and refined meaning entering into spirit does not leave behind developing things and completing tasks. This was Fang Yizhi’s proposal for the Hundred Schools and multitude of arts. His proposal clearly included the ideas of unifying the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, unifying Chan and teaching [in Buddhism], and unifying the Learning of Principle and the Learning of the Mind. Fang Yizhi’s view of the Three Teachings was conditioned by his understanding of the relation between “spirit” (shen 神) and “traces” (ji 迹). He believed that Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism were all expressions of one aspect of the dao-substance, and thus all traces, hence if one stuck to the traces and did not know the spirit, one did not know the highest meaning. The Three Teachings are all traces, yet they are also all spirit. Since they are all traces, they do not prevent the use of traces to remedy traces; since they are all spirit, they originally do not need any remedy, but can be heard and allowed. In Fang Yizhi’s view, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism can all use traces to remedy traces, and thus can all be therapeutic. The Buddhism liberation can treat people bound up with addictions and desires, the Daoist weakness and modesty can treat people who struggle for strength and love to overcome, while the Confucian salvation can treat the escapist tendencies of Buddhism and Daoism. However, treatments should be applied according to the illness, and thus although they can be mutually therapeutic, they also cannot be clung to or fixed. Fang Yizhi’s attitude toward the Three Teachings was: “From now on, none of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism can be simply accepted, nor can they be refused. … Was it not said that Heaven and Earth are great? They perhaps should also have this use of the useless” (Equalization of East and West, “Spirit and Traces” [Shenji 神迹]). This is not lodging in one method, but not leaving behind one method. Neither Buddhist nor Daoist not Confucian, yet also Buddhism, Daoist and Confucian; neither biased toward traces, nor biased toward spirit.

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However, Fang Yizhi also thought that, seen from the perspective of no obstruction between affairs, the doctrines of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism were interconnected, hence the Three Teachings are originally one, and there is no need to speak of unifying. He spoke through Wang Xuan, saying: The unobstructed penetrates through the dependent, so the dependent is the non-dependent; if one realises that the root of the square is round, one knows that the square is the round. … Buddha was born in the West, Confucius was born in the East, and Laozi was born in the East but travelled to the West, yet the three names are one person. People have their doubts, saying that the East differs from the West, and the West from the East, do people believe it? This is what is called the Great Unity (datong 大同). (“Record of Awakening from a Ring of Images”)

If we say that the Three Teachings each have their doctrines, yet these can mutually supplement and correct one another, then since they are originally interconnected, the facts that there is no need to unify them and that they are all unified are opposites, otherwise “mountains come from mountains, seas come from seas, and supplements cannot shift them!” (Equalization of East and West, “Spirit and Traces”). In terms of the doctrines of the Three Teachings being originally interconnected, the Three Teachings can all cast aside their original natures, and become a single unthinkable thing that is both this and that and neither this nor that. Yet in terms of the Three Teachings each having their doctrines, clinging to their doctrines and not wishing to transform, the Three Teachings are rigid and not interconnected. Synthesising these two meanings, one can say that the Three Teachings are all “clumps of prickly chestnuts” (jili peng 棘栗蓬). “Clumps of prickly chestnuts” spin with the wind without knowing any end, their bodies cover with defensive fortifications, difficult to grasp, tangled and intertwined, and impervious to reason. Fang Yizhi said: In the centre of eighty revolutions of the well pulley are “zi 玆, yi 燚 and tou黈.” Chiseling and breaking them down, breaking and mending them, with breaking there is enlightenment, and with enlightenment there is emendation. Images and numbers can express principles that cannot be spoken, and thereby reach that with neither image nor number, while voices and sounds can penetrate the subtlety that cannot be expressed in images and numbers, and thereby reach that with neither voice nor sound. When the dao of language is severed yet one never stops speaking, form is emptiness, and constancy and repentance are opposed. (Equalization of East and West, “Zi, Yi and Tou” (Zi yi tou 玆燚黈])

“Zi 玆” is the darkest of the dark (xuan zhi you xuan 玄之又玄 [from Laozi, Ch. 1]), the colour black, and the black clothes of Buddhists. “Yi 燚” is a combination of four “fires” (huo 火) or two “burnings” (yan 炎), and since fire is red, it signifies red. “Tou 黈” is yellow (huang 黄). Black represents Buddhism, red represents Confucianism, and yellow represents Daoism. In “Record of Awakening from a Ring of Images,” the three representatives of the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism were the Old Man Red, Old Man Black and Old Man Yellow. That which covers the region of China is nothing but the Three Teachings. They absorb from one another, become entangled with one another, fuse to become one, and assemble to form a clump of prickly chestnuts. Hence one must chisel them and break them down, and then one can reinforce them. In chiselling and

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breaking down, one becomes enlightened, and with enlightenment one thinks to reinforce them. However, one should know that such reinforcement is at the level of “weighing dharmas” (quanfa 权法), and at this level there are images and numbers, voices and sounds, and language. At the ultimate level there are neither images and numbers nor voices and sounds, and the dao of language is severed, hence form is emptiness. If the unspeakable realm of things is a clump of prickly chestnuts, one can use artificial tools such as “intersection, continuity and inflections” (jiao lun ji 交轮几) to chisel and break it down, yet after chiselling and breaking down, it is still a “clump of prickly chestnuts.” Hence for the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, the reinforced are each like themselves, the non-reinforced are each like themselves, and since they are each like themselves, one does not see the reinforcement and they are naturally reinforced. The final spiritual plane is one where “there is originally not a single dharma,” it “overturns the three truths,” and “the great Earth as a vast expanse of white is truly clean.” In “Record of Awakening from a Ring of Images,” after Old Man Red, Old Man Black and Old Man Yellow have debated, a female immortal speaks, representing Fang Yizhi’s depiction of this spiritual plane: You gentlemen have remedied confusions, but what of the supreme confusion! Masters from ancient times to the present have had fixations on their own slight indications. They abide by them as if they were answers from the sages, for which the sages must feel aggrieved, yet those who speak of remedying this find no other possibility. … Between Heaven and Earth things are produced and then devoured, so how can this be remedied? How would it be if it were remedied? A temporary measure however is at least possible, and this is called convenient means. With this occluding method, opposites overcome on another, which is sufficient to do something, even if finally it can only achieve nothing. Although nothing can be attained, there is a dao of doing something. Are the means to interconnect through alternating clarity and intersecting operation alone not seen? When the sun acts, what of the moon? When the moon acts, what of the sun? When the spring acts, what of the autumn? When the autumn acts, what of the spring? Only this treatment is possible, and by shifting them this interconnects them. (“Record of Awakening from a Ring of Images”)

His meaning was that the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism all think to use their dao to remedy the confusion of the others, yet remedying itself is also an example of confusion. From ancient times to the present, people have never avoided bias, taking this bias and claiming to have attained the true meaning of the sages, concerning which sages must feel aggrieved. To use this bias to reciprocally remedy others is simply “to confuse one another’s minds, to use confusion to remedy confusion,” and is a method when there is no other option. Heaven and Earth produce and reproduce endlessly, and are also destroyed endlessly, so how could it be remedied? How much good would a remedy be for those who received it? To know that it cannot be remedied but temporarily remedy it is a method for when there is no method. This is what Fang Yizhi meant when he said, “The world is all sick, and sickness is also a medicine, yet using medicine to treat medicine, how can one be without sickness? Medicine combines becoming sick again with treating medicine, yet there is truly no other option” (Equalization of East and West, “Opening Chapter” [Kaizhang 开章]). When the Three Teachings

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remedy the world, this is sufficient to produce an effect in the world, yet this effect also includes new phenomena waiting to take effect, and this is endless, hence a final remedy cannot be attained. Although a remedy cannot be attained, there is a method for remedy, and this is to regard remedies as no remedy. Do you not see Heaven and Earth? The sun and moon take turns in illuminating Heaven and Earth, the four seasons intersect in their operation, yet although the myriad things between Heaven and Earth do not interfere with one another, each follows its affirmation and the whole of Heaven revolves in harmony. To allow Heaven, Earth and the myriad things to each operate according to the necessity of their own inherent nature is how to remedy Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. This was Fang Yizhi’s final understanding. This understanding did not set out from a secular standpoint, but rather from the standpoint of Heaven and dao, from the perspective of breaking down all dharmas and opening the eye of Heaven and Earth. In Confucianism, this idea is “The myriad things being raised together yet not harming one another, courses being travelled together without any collisions” [see Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸)]; in Daoism, it is “Things interact in diversity, while I observe their return” [see Laozi, Ch. 16] and “Not using the human to extinguish the Heavenly, not using the deliberate to extinguish endowment” [see Zhuangzi, Ch. 17 “Autumn Floods” (Qiushui 秋水)]; while in Buddhism, it is “Though the beautiful and ugly are present before one’s eyes, one’s mind is as calm as the ocean” [see Fazang 法藏, “Huayan Essay on the Golden Lion” (Huayan jin shizi zhang 华严金狮子章)]. In Fang Yizhi’s view, the fundamental spirit of the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism is consistent, since from the standpoint of Heaven and dao, everything that is done is suitable: “Open the eyes of the crown, back and face, break through and do not fall into the realms of being or non-being, and overlay the curtain of existing and perishing as simultaneous. With a single laugh, the Three Teachings are complete” (Equalization of East and West, “Three Signs”). Fang Yizhi’s modes of thought and argument were full of paradox, yet he finally fell into the Buddhist view of not lodging in a single dharma yet also not discarding a single dharma, dismissing both surfaces and concealment, and both speaking and sweeping away freely. Fang Yizhi was not a scholar of dao-learning, but rather a philosopher, and his thought broke through the pan-moralistic influence of Neo-Confucianism, setting to work directly from the fundamental principles of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things. Although his thought is filled with the magnificence of philosophical wisdom, it is also filled with the desolation at living through the disaster of the collapse of the state and having no choice but to sink into Buddhism. His language is most similar to Zhuangzi, with whom he also considered himself as sharing the same inclinations, and his thought has the same character as that of Zhuangzi: a robust vigour that brings suffering along with it, a vast breadth that brings sadness along with it, and a deep profundity that brings helplessness along with it. He could not forget his feelings for the world, and even in his later works, the bold unconventionality given to him by the dandyish life of his youth can still be seen, even though he had no choice but to flee from reality. Although he was deeply influenced by Buddhism and Daoism, had no choice but to

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become a monk in his later life. Although his education in the Three Teachings and the special time in which he lived produced his greatness, they also produced his disillusionment and paradox. In a confessional passage in the “Opening Chapter” of his Equalization of East and West, he described this aspect of his character: I regard twelve and a half as my forge, seventy-two as my saddle, three hundred and sixty five as my textbook, the cycle of ten thousand eight hundred as my casebook, and diamond-sharp wisdom as my axe of Kunwu 昆吾; I chop the multitude equally like firewood, regarding not deceiving oneself as the fire in the emptiness, and set to cooking whenever I meet with the opportunity, stewing the material until it is suitable for use, responding to offerings and transforming them, mutually aiding East and West, returning to causes for antidotes, and benefitting from treatment through non-action. Without self yet not without a self, I perfect the three to transform the four, and do not reside in a single name. Thus I can mould the plain utensils of the five colours and bake the great ocarina of festival music, and hence can respond to the spherical bell without the shang 商 note and change the fourth daybreak without a zheng 徵 note; by producing images without fixity, music and diet return to the elementary. I know Mañjuśrī’s centrality in which there is neither centre nor edge, and that it does not obstruct the regular use of the centralities of Zihua 子华’s centrality of the courtyard and palace. This name is wholly equal, this name is without equality, and this name is truly equal. (Equalization of East and West, “Opening Chapter”)

This is all typical Zhuangzi-style language. That is, regarding Heaven and Earth as one’s forge, the myriad things as one’s material, wisdom as one’s sharp axe, and cutting down all accepted doctrines into firewood and roasting or stewing them. The products of this roasting and stewing can provide what is needed for all places and times and all purposes, yet they themselves are originally without any fixed quality. All is one, one is all, without centre or edge, and this is what is most real. This was Fang Yizhi in his later years, a difference from the empiricist tendency of his youth like that between Heaven and the abyss! Seen from one aspect, the shift from specific, determined knowledge to abstract, elusive knowledge was a case of degeneration, even though this degeneration was unavoidable. Yet seen from another aspect, the shift from knowledge of one corner to all-encompassing knowledge, from knowledge of forms and traces to knowledge with neither, from secular knowledge to transcendent knowledge, was a kind of sublimation. Fang Yizhi was an exceptional eccentric produced and grown by the complex era of the Ming-Qing transition. Compared with Wang Fuzhi and Gu Yanwu, the other great thinkers of the same period, his speculative thought was similar to Wang Chuanshan 王船山 [Wang Fuzhi] yet more paradoxical, while his empiricism was similar to Gu Yanwu yet more vast and grasping. His thought was a reflection of the heroic yet anguished state of mind of thinkers during the Ming-Qing transition with a powerful sense of cultural burden.

Chapter 31

The Philosophical Thought of Wang Fuzhi

Wang Fuzhi was a prominent philosopher of the Ming-Qing transition. Living at the historical juncture of the change of regime from the Ming to the Qing, provoked by the fall of the Ming into a vehement spirit of taking responsibility for the perpetuation of the Chinese cultural tradition, and on the basis of his profound study and systematic digestion of fields including the Classical Learning, history, Neo-Confucianism, and literature, he conducted a comprehensive review of ancient Chinese academic learning, in the hope of creating a new philosophical system that could mould a sound national spirit, eliminate cultural corruption, and lead people to attain an ideal form of human life. His mind was heavy with concern for his country, his feelings were ardent with pity for his people, and his care and concern for his culture was keen. His philosophy continually leapt beyond the pulse of his time, and embodied a self-consciously critical spirit. His thought represented a peak in the development of Chinese philosophy. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692; zi 字 Ernong 而农, hao 号 Jiangzhai 姜斋) was from Hengyang 衡阳 in Hunan province. From his middle age onward, he also called himself names including Old Man Selling Ginger (Maijiang weng 卖姜翁), One Pot Man of the Dao (Yihu daoren 一壶道人), and Double-Knotted Unofficial Historian (Shuangji waishi 双髻外史). In his later years, he lived in seclusion in a humble cottage in western Hunan province at the foot of the Shichuanshan 石船山 mountains in Hengyang, giving himself the titles Old Farmer of Chuanshan (Chuanshan laonong 船山老农) and Lost Old Man of Chuanshan (Chuanshan yilao 船山逸老), and was called Master Chuanshan (Chuanshan xiansheng 船山先 生) by scholars. He was taught to read by his father and older brother when he was a child, passed the county-level examination at the age of fourteen and the province-level examination at twenty-four, and organized various literary societies including the “Society for Rectification” (Kuangshe 匡社). Admiring him, [rebel leader] Zhang Xianzhong 张献忠 invited him to join his peasant regime, but he injured his own limbs in order to refuse. After the fall of the Ming, he submitted a petition to Zhang Kuang 章旷, the grand coordinator of Hubei province, proposing that the warlord armies of the north and south unite with the peasant armies to resist © Higher Education Press 2021 X. Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8_31

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the Qing, but it was not adopted. When the army of the [short-lived] Shun Dynasty united with government troops for a counterattack on Hunan province, he raised an army in response. When the war was lost and the army collapsed, he fled to the Yongli 永历 Emperor’s Southern Ming regime, where he was recommended for a temporary position in the Hanlin Academy 翰林院, which he declined due to the death of his father. Two years later, he returned to Wuzhou 梧州 to take up a position as an intermediary messenger in the Messenger Office of the Yongli regime. When one of his petitions censured powerful officials, he was arrested and imprisoned, and after he was rescued, he went into exile in the Chenzhou 郴州 region of southern Hunan, where he hid himself in the caves of the Yao 瑶 people. In his late years he lived a humble cottage in western Hunan province at the foot of the Shichuanshan mountains, where he industriously wrote books, leaving behind more than a hundred posthumous works in more than four hundred volumes. His most important philosophical works include Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes (Zhouyi waizhuan 周易外传), Inner Commentary on the Book of Changes (Zhouyi neizhuan 周易内传), Extended Meanings of the Book of Documents (Shangshu yinyi 尚书引以), Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened (Zhangzi Zhengmeng zhu 张子正蒙注), Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books (Du Sishu daquan shuo 读四书大全说), Record of Thoughts and Questions (Siwen lu 思问录), Awaited Explanations (Sijie 俟解), Expansion of the Laozi (Laozi yan 老子衍), Penetrating the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi tong 庄子通), On Reading the Comprehensive Mirror (Du Tongjian lun 读通鉴论), and On the Song (Song lun 宋论), and were later compiled as Posthumous Writings of Chuanshan (Chuanshan yishu 船山遗书).1

1 The Supreme Polarity: Substance and Function as Contained in All and Mutually Required for Reality Wang Fuzhi continued the thought of the philosophers who held a theory of foundational qi 气, especially Zhang Zai 张载, and regarded being as the point of departure for his philosophy. In regarding being as the point of departure, he believed that the essence of the cosmos is “being” (you 有), and that just as in time there was never a period of absolute, empty non-existence, so in space there is no realm of absolute, empty non-existence. Wang Fuzhi called this absolute existent substance the Supreme Polarity, supreme harmony, or dao 道.

1 [Trans.] See Wang Fuzhi, Complete Writings of Chuanshan (Chuanshan quanshu 船山全书), Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1996; Shangshu yinyi, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962; Du Sishu daquan shuo, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975; Siwen lu – Sijie, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984; Zhangzi Zhengmeng zhu, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959; Du Tongjian lun, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984; Songlun, Shanghai: Shanghai taipingyang shudian, 1933.

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1. The Supreme Polarity as Derived from the Changes in Order to Have the Changes The Supreme Polarity (taiji 太极) was a fundamental concept of Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy. In Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, he explained the Supreme Polarity as follows: For the Supreme Polarity between the two, it has no beginning or end and cannot be separated, and has no that or this and cannot be broken apart. From great to minute, images are all its images, and from one to myriad, numbers are all its numbers. Hence the empty does not flow and the full does not obstruct, the numinous is not private and the obstinate is not left behind, and stillness is not prior and activity is not posterior. Only for those who go from non-being to being is there first stillness and then activity, yet stillness is not their stillness; from being to increased being, there is no prior or posterior, yet movement must given priority. If using numbers for prediction, people use that which they already have to then predict and perceive. Images can be used to predict numbers, and numbers can also be used to predict images. Images view that which is already so, and belong to stillness; numbers take advantage of what they themselves possess, and belong to activity. Hence numbers can also be used to predict images. It is important that the Supreme Polarity is entirely complete in its chaos, and can be neither analysed nor assembled. Since it completes the assembling of the world under Heaven, it cannot be analysed; since it enters into the analysing of the world under Heaven, it cannot be assembled. Despite this, the reason why people make efforts in the dao is by relying on what is already so and increasing their predictions to exhaust its infinity; yet in making it spirited and illuminating it, dividing and regulating it, and gathering and increasing it, only the sage can manifest and make it spirited. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” [Xici shang 系辞上] Sect. 9, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1016)

This passage explains, first, that the Supreme Polarity is the highest substance, has no end or beginning in time and no realm in space, and is an absolute substance that transcends time and space. To say that it is an absolute substance that transcends time and space is not to say that it is a “prime mover” outside the actual world that rules the actual world, but rather that it is the great whole of the world itself. It is being, eternal existence, the largest with no outside and the smallest with no inside, and time and space are insufficient to describe or determine it. Its content is the myriad things as a totality, where this “myriad things as a totality” is an aggregate concept obtained by taking the myriad things in the world all-inclusively as the object of one’s observation. His world from the beginning excluded any possibility of non-being, hence the “being” of the Supreme Polarity is the being of an original substance, and not the being of becoming. Ontology [i.e. “theory of original substance” (bentilun 本体论)] and cosmogony [i.e. “theory of the becoming of the cosmos” (yuzhou shengcheng lun 宇宙生成论)] are two different ways of looking at things and affairs, and the emphasis in ontology lies in seeking the essence of the myriad things, the basis for their existence, and the logical relations between them. It establishes its theory concerning being, and is a speculative investigation of being. The emphasis in cosmogony lies in probing the history of the becoming and evolution of the cosmos, where it came from, and where it will end up. It establishes its theory concerning the source of the myriad beings, and is a historical investigation of being. Chinese philosophy investigated

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ontology and cosmogony very early, and the two were often entangled together without distinction. Wang Fuzhi’s Supreme Polarity was an ontological concept, one in which categories that express existence and modality, such as substance and function, activity and stillness, change and constancy, and duality and unity, were indivisible, and were two aspects of one thing. In Wang Fuzhi’s philosophical system, the Supreme Polarity is the original substance, while specific things and affairs are expressions of the Supreme Polarity, such that the two are both real. The Supreme Polarity refers to the totality of the myriad beings, and is a real existence from the perspective of the whole, while specific things and affairs are individualised real existents. Wang Fuzhi used one sentence to summarise his fundamental thought concerning the real existence of the world: substance and function are contained in all and mutually required for reality (tiyong xuyou er xiangxu yi shi 体用胥有而相需以实). He said: The functioning of the world under Heaven is all its being. I know the being of its substance from its function, so how could it be doubted? The being of function is its efficacy, while the being of substance is inherent nature and feeling. Substance and function are contained in all and mutually required for reality, and hence they fill the world under Heaven and are both the dao of supporting and following. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “[Hexagram] Dayou” 大有, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 861)

The totality of the Supreme Polarity is a product of speculative thought, while the functioning of the Supreme Polarity and specific, visible things and affairs are objects grasped by the sense organs of the ears and eyes. The existence of specific things and affairs is a result of people’s direct perception, while the existence of the Supreme Polarity is inferred through the existence of specific things and affairs, hence “I know the being of its substance from its function.” Wang Fuzhi was not an empiricist, and he did not draw an unbridgeable abyss between the perception of the ears and eyes and speculative construction, but rather used the construction of thought to make the perception of the ears and eyes more broad and interrelated. Actual functions are produced through people’s grasping and use of specific existents, while the qualities and functions of specific things and affairs are rooted in original substance. The essential idea here is that, only when the qualities and functions of things and affairs are seen as a part of the myriad being of the cosmos, and only when its effects lie within the community of the myriad things of the cosmos, can these take effect. This is the meaning contained in his statement, “The being of function is its efficacy, while the being of substance is inherent nature and feeling.” Second, in Wang Fuzhi’s concept of the Supreme Polarity, the activities of the specific things and affairs that express the substance of the Supreme Polarity can all be grasped using the sense organs of the ears and eyes, while grasping specific things and affairs can be achieved through the two methods of images and numbers. Images and numbers are concepts from Changes learning (Yixue 易学), while Changes learning includes both the opposition between the Image-Number School (xiangshu pai 象数派) and the Meaning-Principle School (yili pai 义理派), as well as, within the Image-Number School itself, an opposition between emphasis on

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images and emphasis on numbers. The images and numbers Wang Fuzhi spoke of here referred to the determinacy of the image-forms and numerical quantities of specific things and affairs. Images and numbers really and accurately express the essences of things and their ways of moving. In terms of Changes learning, the quality and regularity of the totality of the changes are expressed through the phrases of the hexagrams and lines, the images of the hexagrams and lines, and the numbers that the hexagrams and lines embody. The “Images can be used to predict numbers” and “numbers can also be used to predict images” that Wang Fuzhi spoke of here have two possible expressions, namely those of Changes learning and actual things and affairs, and correspondingly have two forms of language in which they can be expressed, namely philosophy and Changes learning. In terms of philosophy, the external appearances of things and affairs can be obtained by analysing their determinacies, while the numerical quantities of things can be obtained by analysing and determining their appearances. Image-forms are the real materials that appear before people’s sense organs, and although he said that image-forms are continually changing and transforming, their relatively motionless aspect allows people to statically grasp and analyse them. Hence he said, “Images view that which is already so, and belong to stillness.” The quality of numerical quantity is the determinacy of the numerical and spatial relations of things and affairs, and its existence has itself as its basis. However, numerical quantity is derived via an abstraction from image-forms, while relations of numerical quantity in the movements of things and affairs continually undergo change and transformation, hence, in comparison with the image-forms of things and affairs, they have a greater degree of elusiveness and fluidity, thus he said, “numbers take advantage of what they themselves possess, and belong to activity.” Although Wang Fuzhi said that “Images can be used to predict numbers, and numbers can also be used to predict images,” the two were different in both method and result. “Using numbers to predict images” means using something regular to predict the distribution and sustaining of the image-forms expressed and governed by numerical quantity in space and time, the result of which is to a great extent already logically contained with its conditions. “Using images to predict numbers” however brings with it a certain quality of actual measurement. Hence while “using numbers to predict images” is deductive, “using images to predict numbers” is inductive. The methods and results of the two are thus different. They also differ in their actual efficacy, with the former mainly being used for prediction, and the latter for measurement. Wang Fuzhi’s distinctions of “activity” and “stillness” as well as “viewing that which is already so” and “taking advantage of what they themselves possess” in relation to images and numbers in fact implies a distinction between the different quality and result of these two different methods of measurement. Third, the Supreme Polarity cannot be analysed or assembled. Since the Supreme Polarity is original substance, since it is obtained through holistic observation, it is a single whole, and a whole is not equal to a mechanical addition of individuals. If the Supreme Polarity could be separated and analysed, the relations between the specific things and affairs within the Supreme Polarity would be external and mechanical. However, for Wang Fuzhi here, the relation between the

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Supreme Polarity and specific things and affairs is the internal one of a living whole. It also cannot be assembled, because it is severally and wholly embodied in specific things and affairs. If the Supreme Polarity could be assembled, this assemblage would be a mechanical accumulation of an uncountable number of supreme polarities embodied in specific things and affairs, and the Supreme Polarity would be a superposition of itself. The proposition that the Supreme Polarity cannot be analysed already logically includes the proposition that it cannot be assembled, because in a single whole, assembly means a superposition or accumulation of things divided into parts. This quality of the Supreme Polarity demonstrates that, in grasping the Supreme Polarity, the so-called “analysis and synthesis” method of thought cannot be mechanically applied. For Wang Fuzhi here, grasping the Supreme Polarity and grasping its phenomena are two different methods of thought. Grasping phenomena is specific, empirical, linear and superposed. For the Supreme Polarity however it is a speculative, non-perceptual and philosophical grasping. For the Supreme Polarity, one cannot describe it using empirical evidence, but can only use intuition to personally experience it. Grasping the phenomena of the Supreme Polarity can have actual utility, while grasping the Supreme Polarity is non-utilitarian and takes the form of a spiritual plane. Thus what it gives to us is not specific knowledge, but rather a kind of spiritual plane, breadth of mind or degree of understanding. Hence although most people’s understanding takes the form of grasping specific things and affairs empirically and thereby entering into a higher level of understanding, this so-called higher level still falls within the scope of empirical knowledge, and an infinite quantity or refined depth of empirical knowledge is not equivalent to an intuitive, value-based, spiritual plane-centred grasp or the Supreme Polarity as original substance. This is the meaning implied by Wang Fuzhi’s distinction between “relying on what is already so and increasing one’s predictions to exhaust its infinity” and “making it spirited and illuminating it, dividing and regulating it, and gathering and increasing it” as two different methods of grasping. Wang Fuzhi’s definition of the Supreme Polarity’s quality of being unable to be analysed and assembled shows that he was influenced by Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 idea of “the unity of principle and the diversity of its particularisations” (liyi fenshu 理一分 殊). That the Supreme Polarity cannot be assembled is because it “enters into the analysing of the world under Heaven,” and this is Zhu Xi’s view that “Each thing has a Supreme Polarity, and each person has a Supreme Polarity.” That in the Supreme Polarity “the numinous is not private and the obstinate is not left behind” shows that the Supreme Polarity is severally embodied in each of the myriad things. Zhu Xi’s ontology played a decisive role in the construction of his philosophical system. However, at times he muddled together ontology and cosmology in a sloppy manner; in Wang Fuzhi however they were radically separated, and from the beginning his established his entire foundation on ontology, and criticised methods that applied cosmogony to ontology. Hence his theory was consistent from beginning to end, and could not be misunderstood. Concerning the relation between Supreme Polarity and the myriad things and the true connotations of the Supreme Polarity as original substance, Wang Fuzhi gave a

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clear exposition in his explanation of the sentence “In the changes there is the Supreme Polarity, and this produces the Two Modes” [from the Commentaries to the Changes (Yizhuan 易传), “Appended Phrases, Pt. I”]. “Produce” (sheng 生) is a relatively difficult term to define and explain in philosophy, because there is the specific production in space and time of a mother producing a child, the logical and speculative production of premises producing a conclusion, and also the mutually contained and mutually grounding “production” of original substance and phenomena. In the sentence “In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity, and this produces the Two Modes,” producer and produced and mutually contained and mutually grounding. Wang Fuzhi explained this meaning, saying: In the changes, there is the Supreme Polarity, and this is originally present, present together. The Supreme Polarity produces the Two Modes, the Two Modes produce the Four Images, and the Four Images produce the Eight Trigrams, yet they are originally present and thus produce, present together and thus produce together. Hence it states that “this produces” (shisheng 是生). This produces means established in this and producing, and not that one must push it back to another to produce it. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 11, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1023– 1024)

When he said “originally present” (guyou 固有), this stated that the changes and the Supreme Polarity are mutually contained in their original being, and not added externally; since they are originally present, the changes and the Supreme Polarity, the Supreme Polarity and the Two Modes, the Two Modes and the Four Images are all present at one time, and do not have a relation of prior and posterior in time. Since they are originally present, they must be mutually manifest and demonstrated, and since they are present together, they must both be present at one time. As Wang Fuzhi said: Yin 阴 and yang 阳 have no beginning. The Supreme Polarity does not stand alone above yin and yang. (Inner Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 562) In production, it is not that the produced is the son and the producer is the father…. In production, it occurs in the previous, as when the human face produces ears, eyes, mouth and nose, and they are completely possessed, yet when they are distinguished and spoken of, we speak of production. (Casual Sub-Commentary on the Book of Changes [Zhouyi baishu 周易稗疏], “Appended Phrases,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 789)

The Supreme Polarity is not another thing over and above yin and yang, so when the Supreme Polarity produces the Two Modes, etc., this means that the Two Modes originally present in the Supreme Polarity arise within it, and not that it is like a father producing a son. If one mechanically applies the categories of inherent nature, feeling, substance and function, then the Supreme Polarity and yin-yang are like “Inherent nature is used to express feeling, feeling to fill out inherent nature, the beginning to commence the end, the end to gather up the beginning, substance to extend function, and function to complete substance… The six are written differently but present together, present together and reaching everywhere” (Outer

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Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 11, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1023). Wang Fuzhi thus proposed an exceptionally profound proposition: “The Supreme Polarity is derived from the changes in order to have the changes” (taiji you yu yi yi you yi 太极有于易以有易). “The Supreme Polarity is derived from the changes” states that the existence of the Supreme Polarity is demonstrated by the changes, i.e. the Two Modes, Four Images, Eight Trigrams, etc., and hence the Supreme Polarity is the produced and the changes are the producer. “The Supreme Polarity has the changes” states that the existence of the Two Modes, Four Images and Eight Trigrams is because there is the Supreme Polarity, and hence the Supreme Polarity is the producer and the changes are the produced. “The Supreme Polarity is derived from the changes in order to have the changes” thus states that the reason why the Supreme Polarity has the changes is because it is derived from the changes, so the Supreme Polarity and the changes are mutually implicated and dependent, mutually produced and mutually existing. The Supreme Polarity is the basis for the production of specific things and affairs, yet it itself is not outside of specific things and affairs; the Supreme Polarity is that from which the laws of movement of specific things and affairs emerge, yet the Supreme Polarity itself has no laws. The organic whole constituted by specific things and affairs is the Supreme Polarity, and the laws of specific things and affairs are the laws of the Supreme Polarity. Wang Fuzhi said: “The Supreme Polarity has no image in the River Diagram (Hetu 河图), no number in the changes, no sum in divination, and no prognostication in the hexagrams. Images are all its images, numbers are all its numbers, divinations are all its divinations, and prognostications are all its prognostications; it is derived from the changes in order to have the changes, and nothing can be obtained to make it prior or posterior” (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 11, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1024). This uses the uses of the Book of Changes including images, numbers, divination and prognostication to explain the relation between the Supreme Polarity and the Two Modes, Four Images and Eight Trigrams, since these are also “derived from the changes in order to have the changes” and not a temporal or spatial relation of producer and produced. 2. Substance and Function as Contained in All and Mutually Required for Reality Wang Fuzhi’s relation between the Supreme Polarity and the multitude of beings was one of substance and function, and the substance of the Supreme Polarity was a concept obtained by taking the myriad beings as a whole as the object of observation. The original substance of the Supreme Polarity is being, and both the Supreme Polarity and the specific things and affairs contained in the Supreme Polarity, hence “great being” and “substance and function as contained in all and mutually required for reality” were the starting point of Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy, and the basis for his judgments of all philosophical theories. In Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy, all ideas and conduct have being as their basis: dao is being, implements are being, images are being, numbers are being, activity is being, stillness is

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being, constancy is being, change is being, so separated from being, nothing can begin to be spoken of. He said: Dao is embodied in things to produce the functions of the world under Heaven. Things are produced and have images, images are completed and have numbers, numbers supply movement in order to arise and being shifts, and when it shifts and being attains from dao, there is virtue. Relying on numbers to deduce images is the spontaneity of the dao. The dao is spontaneous and borrows nothing from people, taking advantage of function in order to observe virtue, and virtue allows no stopping. By achieving this allowing no stopping, people can assist the dao. Since dao does not borrow from people, people and things are produced together to await for the flowing operation of Heaven, yet people abolish the dao; if people assist the dao, they select the essence of yin and yang in order to examine the warp of Heaven and Earth, and the Changes leads Heaven. Hence Qian 乾 takes up the virtue of function and not the image of the dao, and the sages thus help people in accomplishing their capability. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Hexagram Qian,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 821)

Here, the relationship between dao and things is consistent with that between the Supreme Polarity and the Two Modes, Four Images and Eight Trigrams. Dao is embodied in specific things and makes specific things have their functions. The functions of specific things are produced by specific things, yet at the same time dao also makes them so. The myriad things as isolated particulars all cannot produce their functions, and only by connecting the myriad beings under Heaven into a mutually interconnected whole can dao as this whole make its parts produce their functions. This is an exceptionally splendid idea. This idea demonstrates that Wang Fuzhi was not an empiricist or a mechanist, but regarded both substance and function as being, with both whole and parts. Yet the activity of both the whole and of the parts had being as their basis. Based on this idea, Wang Fuzhi proposed his doctrine of “the world under Heaven as only implements” (tianxia wei qi 天下惟器). The doctrine of the world under Heaven as only implements (qi 器) was a continuation and extension of the relation between the original substance of the Supreme Polarity and the myriad things, and broke with the doctrine of dao producing implements. He developed the idea of “that which is above forms [i.e. metaphysical] is called the dao, and that which are below forms [i.e. actual] are called implements,” saying: Their being called this is based on being spoken of as such. Above and below originally had no fixed realms, but were drafted in this way and bestowed with these names. However, that above and below have no distinct boundaries and dao and implements have no changing substances is clear. The world under Heaven is nothing but implements. Dao is the dao of implements, yet implements cannot be called the implements of dao. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 12, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1027)

The so-called metaphysical and actual were both based on “forms” (xing 形) in being established, and without forms there would be no division between the metaphysical and the actual. The division between above and below originally had no boundaries, and from different theoretical perspectives they have different names. That which actually exists in the cosmos is only specific implement-things,

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and the so-called dao is the dao of specific implement-things, yet it cannot be said that specific implement-things are the implement-things of dao. Here, Wang Fuzhi placed the emphasis of his explanation on specific things and affairs, repeatedly arguing for the basic and original position of specific things and affairs. He believed that the Changes as a whole was not a set of diagrammatic derivations, but rather was mainly a simulation of actual thing-implements. He said: Hence the Changes has images, and the images resemble implements. The hexagrams have lines, and the lines imitate implements. The lines have phrases, and the phrases distinguish implements. Hence the sages were simply good at managing implements. In terms of their management, the name of “above” was set up. Once the name “above” was set up, the name of “below” was also set up. Above and below are both names, and not two limited quantities that can be distinguished. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Sect. 12, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1028)

Here, “images resemble” and “lines imitate” borrowed the Han Confucian approach to explaining the classics, and he clearly believed that the hexagrams, lines and images were a simulation of specific implement-things, and that the sages observed what was above and below in designing the hexagrams. The sages however dealt directly with affairs, which was a specific activity of manufacturing implements. Because there were implements with forms, there was the name of that which is above forms, and because there was the name of that which is above forms, there was the name of that which is below forms. It was not that in reality there is one realm “above forms” and another “below forms.” Wang Fuzhi also said: That which fills the space between Heaven and Earth is all implements, implements have their surfaces and their insides, forming the respective functions of surface and inside, and by combining these functions they reach completion. Is this not the meaning of the Heavenly virtue of Qian and the Earthly virtue of Kun 坤? (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 12, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1026)

The surface of implements refers to the image-forms of implement-things; the inside of implements refers to the qualities of implement-things. Actual activities must work on the image-forms of things and make use of their qualities, so although they are divided, they are in fact combined in their completion. The so-called dao is an aggregate of implement-things, and to manage implements is to deal with the dao. He also said: “Thus the ancient sages could manage implements but could not manage the dao, since managing implements was called the dao, the dao being attained was called virtue, implements being completed was called conduct, the breadth of the use of implements was called flexible versatility, and the composition of imitating implements was called the enterprise” (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 12, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1028). Actual activities are all specific, and what the Commentaries to the Changes called the dao of change and transformation, the virtue of spiritual illumination, and “breadth and grandeur matching that of Heaven and Earth, flexible versatility matching that of the four seasons” all had

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implement-things as their basis, and were all activities implement-things. Wang Fuzhi summarised this saying:

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That without the dao there would not be implements is something that people can say, but despite this, if there are implements, why worry that there might be no dao?… That without implements there would be no dao is something that people can seldom say, yet in fact this is truly so. Just as in primordial times there was no dao of bowing to show deference, in the time of Tang and Yu 唐虞 [i.e. Yao 尧 and Shun 舜] there was no dao of punitive expeditions based on sympathy, and in the Han and the Tang the dao of today did not exist, so today there are many aspects of the dao of other years that do not exist. Before there were bows and arrows there was no dao of archery, before there were chariots and horses there was no dao of driving, and before there were sacrificial animals, wine, jade bi 璧 and coins, or bells, chimes, pipes and strings, there was no dao of ritual propriety and music. Thus before there were sons there was no dao of the father, before there were younger brothers there was no dao of the older brother, and there are many different aspects of the dao that can be present or absent. Hence that without implements there would not be the dao is indeed a true saying. Yet people have simply never examined this. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 12, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1028)

The dao is the dao of implements, and dao has being as its basis. For Wang Fuzhi here, not only is being the existence of specific implement-things, non-being also has being as its determinacy: non-being is being’s state of the non-existence, has being as its reference, something that has never had existence, and there is no so-called non-being. He said: “Those who speak of non-being are aroused by talk of being and do away with it, taking the so-called being of those who speak of being and negating its being. What in the world under Heaven is there anything that can finally be spoken of as non-being? If one speaks of turtles having no hair, one speaks of dogs and not of turtles; if one speaks of rabbits having no horns, one speaks of elk and not of rabbits. Speech must be established based on being, and then what is said is complete” (Record of Thoughts and Questions, inner chapter, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 411). Corresponding to his viewpoint on dao and implements, Wang Fuzhi believed that people’s spirit and physical body also each took the other as its foundation. He said: The implements of clustered being all have dao as their substance. Hence without spirit, forms do not move, and without forms, spirit has nothing to depend on. Forms lose that by which they move, and this is why the dead have eyes and ears but not sight and hearing; the spirit loses that on which it depends, and this is why ghosts and demons have influence but no inherent nature or feeling…. Hence the persistent transformation of Heaven and Earth condenses and gathers to form souls, filling them to become inherent nature and feeling. The daily bestowing of inherent nature and feeling to make them fill the soul is an affair of Heaven; the daily ordering of the soul in order to store up its inherent nature and feeling is an affair of humanity. Then its centrality is accumulated and not lost. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Hexagram Dayou 大有,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 862)

Here, inherent nature and feeling refer to people’s spiritual activity, while the soul (hunpo 魂魄) refers to people’s organ of thought and feeling. In a person as a co-dependent whole of bodily form and spirit, spirit is the ruler of bodily form,

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while bodily form is the basis for spirit. The spiritual activity of humanity is a process of continually obtaining resources from the outside world to enrich and grow its content. This is bestowed by Heaven, yet at the same time depends on the human activity of maintaining one’s mind in order to fulfill and substantiate spiritual activity. Then spiritual activity continually accumulates and the functioning of the mind is correspondingly expanded. The relation between inherent nature and feeling and the soul is one of “substance and function as contained in all and mutually required for reality.” In his works, Wang Fuzhi frequently criticised the doctrines of the Buddhist and Daoist schools. The focus of his criticism was on their regarding the emptiness as the highest concept, and taking nothingness as original substance. He said: The Daoists are confused by this and say that dao is empty, that emptiness is the emptiness of implements. The Buddhists are confused by this and say that dao is quietude, that quietude is the quietude of implements. Perverse words proliferated, yet they could not be separated from implements. Even if such signs separate from the names of implements to become more spiritual, who would be deceived by this? (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 12, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1029)

Wang Fuzhi believed that the mistake of the Buddhist and Daoist schools lay in their not understanding that the world under Heaven is only implements, that the world under Heaven is all the dao-principles of concrete existing things, and in taking nothingness as the original substance of the cosmos. In order to demonstrate this theory, they wasted innumerable words and doctrines. In fact, what the Buddhists and Daoists called dao was an original substance that can produce Heaven and Earth, another thing that lay outside of and above the multitude of implements. Thus what the Buddhists and Daoists called the nothingness of the dao was in fact the nothingness of implements. In order to demonstrate the marvelousness and abstruseness of the dao, the Buddhists and Daoists spoke of it as existing apart from implements. The Buddhist and Daoist schools regarded dao as metaphysical, but in fact, there is only the metaphysical once there are implements with forms; this is an easily comprehensible truth. He also said: The dao is the function of the quintessence of Heaven and Earth, which moves together with Heaven and Earth and does not have any priority or posterity. If one makes it prior to the production of Heaven and Earth, then there was a day when there was dao but no Heaven and Earth. Where then was it lodged? And who was able to “title it as dao”? (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Hexagram Qian,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 823)

Based on “Heaven acts with strength and firmness” (tian xing jian 天行健) and “The disposition of Earth is Kun” (Di shi Kun 地势坤) from the Book of Changes [see Hexagrams Qian and Kun], Wang Fuzhi here criticised Laozi’s “There was something chaotic and becoming, living prior to Heaven and Earth” [see Laozi 老 子, Ch. 25]. He believed that the so-called dao was Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, that dao and Heaven, Earth and the myriad things moved together. Dao producing Heaven and Earth means Heaven, Earth and the myriad things

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collectively living within a single unified whole. The myriad things obtain their qualities and positions from the cosmos as a whole, and this was no dao prior to the myriad things. The so-called division of dao refers to focusing on individual things and affairs, which each have their differences. The so-called combining of dao focuses on Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as a whole, perceiving that the whole is all implements with forms, and individuals all have their positions and shares within this whole without deviating from it. This was the meaning of “There was something chaotic and becoming.” He also proposed criticism of the [Han Dynasty] apocryphal writings (weishu 纬书) with their severing of the substance-function relation between the Supreme Polarity and the myriad beings, seeking the Supreme Polarity prior to the myriad beings, or making divisions between earlier and later or different levels within a vast and formless material state. He said: “‘Qian Opens the Channel’ states: ‘There was the supreme simplicity, the supreme initiation, the supreme beginning, the supreme plainness,’ loftily constructing four polarities prior to the formless. Alas! How they daily practice in the Supreme Polarity but not examine it!” (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 11, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1024). The supreme simplicity (taiyi 太易), supreme initiation (taichu 太初), etc. in the “Qian Opens the Channel” (Qianzaodu 乾凿度) chapter of the Apocrypha of the Changes (Yiwei 易纬) traced back various stages of the material constitution of the cosmos. Wang Fuzhi however believed that what people come into contact with everyday is simply the Supreme Polarity, since the Supreme Polarity is implements, and for them to ignore and not examine that which they habitually see and hear everyday, and instead seek a subtle and invisible entity in ethereal nothingness, then to divided it into early and late or different levels, all this is completely unnecessary. If one understands the dao-principle of “The Supreme Polarity is derived from the changes in order to have the changes,” “how can one seek it in repeated levels?” The mistake of Buddhism lay in establishing an original substance of true emptiness, and thereby seeing all the phenomena within original substance as empty. Wang Fuzhi criticised this, saying: The words of the Buddhists cancel the six characteristics [xiang 相] of wholeness, particularity, identity, difference, integration and disintegration, making them interdependent and interpenetrating, yet they say “one thought co-dependently arises without production.” Thus they wish to equalise success and failure, gain and loss as one, in order to establish their ancestral principle of true emptiness. Yet they do not know that failure fails in that which it has succeeded, and loss loses that which it has gained, hence loss and failure are perceived as a result of gain and success; this is already so in affairs and principle, and can tolerate no ignorance. Hence we reward success and gain to manifest the efficacy of the flowing operation of Heavenly principle, and let people know that failure and loss are all accumulations of the weakness of human feeling, and not originally present in affairs and principle. Thus the perverse doctrine of the dual extinction of affairs and principle and the abandonment of human relations and things cannot get established. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Hexagram Qian,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 826)

He pointed out that the fundamental teaching of Buddhism lies in regarding all things and affairs in the world as only existing in the co-dependent arising of one thought,

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and thus as unreal existence, as in the phrase “All dharmas that arise dependently, I explain as empty” [by Nāgārjuna]. Under this central precept, for the characteristics of things and affairs, wholeness is particularity, identity is difference, integration is disintegration, and in general everything is empty. Wang Fuzhi believed that all actual existence is real, so the so-called failure is the failure of something that had already succeeded, loss is the loss of something that had already been gained, and both loss and failure must be dependent on gain and success before they can exist. Thus one should reward success and gain, because these are the basis for the regularity of things and affairs to take effect, while failure and loss both develop due to the accumulation of people’s inability, and are not originally present in things and affairs. If one understands this principle, Buddhism’s views of the extinction of everything, original substance and phenomena as both false, and abandoning human relations and the principles of things have no way to get established. Wang Fuzhi believed that the mistake of the methodologies of Buddhism and Daoism could be reduced to one point, namely severing substance and function, establishing a separate “dao” prior to the myriad beings, and then regarding this separately established dao as a root-origin, as real, and regarding the myriad beings as empty and unreal. He pointed out: Those who are good at speaking of the dao use the function to attain the substance; those who are good at speaking of the dao erroneously establish one substance and eliminate function to follow it. Prior to people being born in stillness there not anything else that can be attained and perceived, yet others rely on the changes of their intelligence to apply decoration to an empty void, and then forcibly name it substance. Their intelligence giving them what they sought, they assess the myriad things and attain their effects, and then they can eliminate all their functions with no remainder, their perverse doctrine henceforth succeeding. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Hexagram Dayou,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 862)

“Erroneously establish one substance” refers to the Daoist “dao,” the Buddhist “true emptiness” and “nirvana”; “eliminate function to follow it” refers to Laozi’s “its being provides the benefit, its non-being provides the function” [see Ch. 11] and “Cut off sagehood and cast off knowledge, return to infanthood” [see Chs. 19 and 28], Zhuangzi’s “earth and wood as bodily form, ashes and deadwood as the mind,” the Buddhist “form is emptiness” and “all dharmas are false signs with no reality,” etc. Although in general, Wang Fuzhi’s criticisms of the two teachings of Buddhism and Daoism were overly simplistic, as noted above, he wrote them with a deliberate goal, and did not give a fine and purely theoretical analysis of them. He faced the problems of the time, and, based on his fundamental thoughts on how to solve these problems, he criticised all those systems of thought that he thought were pathological and weak. It was not the case that he did not understand the negative philosophical methods of Buddhism and Daoism, as is comprehensively shown by his explanations of Buddhism and Daoism in his Expansion of the Laozi and Penetrating the Zhuangzi. In Wang Fuzhi’s veneration and praise for being and opposition to all thoughts that cancel or devalue being, there was indeed an element of helplessness. At a time of foreign invasion and Chinese culture facing an

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uncertain future existence, his fundamental goal lay in reflecting on the elements in Chinese culture that were not beneficial for ethnic strength and prosperity, and creating a kind of firm, forceful, vigorous and positive thought. As a powerful tool to respond to an ethnic and cultural crisis, it established and fixed a basis for the culture of the future. From the above discussions, it can be seen that Wang Fuzhi’s thought took being as its basis, a conclusion that was stimulated by the fall of the Ming and derived from his summaries of ancient Chinese philosophy. This conclusion was not the result of the usual intellectual activities of Neo-Confucians in their studies, but was a response to his witnessing the darkness of actual politics, his bodily suffering from wandering lost and homeless, and his tasting the pain of foreign invasion, the overturning of the state, years of war and chaos, and the destitution of the people’s lives. This response was not a simple return to the ancient philosophical thought that took being as original substance, nor a general criticism of differing academic viewpoints, but rather an exposition of his philosophical propositions from the heights of rescuing a lost state, returning to the root and developing the new in ethnic learning, and amending biases and rectifying falsity in ethnic culture. His criticisms of theories that he believed to be totally mistaken can all be seen as his efforts to reestablish a new form of healthy, honest, sustainable and powerful academic learning.

2 The Harmony of Heaven and Earth and the Transformations of Daily Renewal If Wang Fuzhi’s theory of the relation between the Supreme Polarity and the myriad things can be seen as his metaphysics, then the aspect of qi’s modes of existence, qualities, process of evolution, etc. can be seen as his philosophy of nature. While Wang Fuzhi’s metaphysics was mainly based on the Book of Changes, his philosophy of nature was mainly expressed through his explications of Zhang Zai’s doctrines concerning qi. In this explications, although he continued Zhang Zai’s thought, the permeation of his metaphysical ideas made his philosophy of nature more profound and systematic. 1. The Supreme Void and Supreme Harmony The Supreme Void (taixu 太虚) was the fundamental concept of Zhang Zai’s philosophy, and “The Supreme Void is qi” was its fundamental starting point. His main work Correcting the Unenlightened (Zhengmeng 正蒙) offered arguments concerning various aspects such as the Supreme Void, supreme harmony, activity and stillness, unity and duality, spirit and transformation, and inherent nature and endowment. In his commentary on Correcting the Unenlightened, Wang Fuzhi expounded his philosophy of nature.

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First, Wang Fuzhi followed Zhang Zai in regarding qi as the base material that constitutes things and affairs. In his commentary on the passage “The Supreme Void without form is the original substance of qi” Wang Fuzhi said: In the centre of the Supreme Polarity where there is being yet it has not yet taken form, qi is self-sufficient. It gathers and disperses, changes and transforms, and yet its original substance is not thereby diminished or augmented. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony” [Taihe 太和], Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 17) Though it gathers to take on forms and disperses to return to the Supreme Void, qi is still qi. Since spirit is the numinosity of qi, and does not separate from qi to take it as a substance, so spirit is still spirit. Though it gathers and can be seen, and disperses and cannot be seen, how could its substance have anything false and not in accord? (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 23)

The Supreme Void is a hollow, boundless, vast and unlimited space that is filled with qi, in which the total volume of qi neither increases nor decreases. Concerning the gathering and dispersing of qi, the two Cheng 二程 brothers did not agree with Zhang Zai’s theory of qi having neither production nor extinction, believing that Zhang Zai took the qi of the past for the qi of the future and was thereby trapped in the Buddhist doctrine of reincarnation, while the qi of Heaven and Earth in fact produces and reproduces without end, and there is no need to borrow the qi of the past for the qi of the future. Concerning this question, Wang Fuzhi agreed with Zhang Zai’s viewpoint, and believed that gathering to take on forms and dispersing to return to the Supreme Void was all this one qi. In Ming Dynasty philosophy, discussions of qi were not particularly prominent, and where the Ming Dynasty went beyond previous dynasties was in discussions of mind and inherent nature. This was because there were no new modes of explanation for the constitutive base material of things, so there was already little space for development concerning this point. More importantly however, many thinkers of the Ming Dynasty believed that explorations of qi were in fact empirical questions, and not like personal experience of mind and inherent nature with unique individual explanations. The reason why Wang Fuzhi still had a quite strong interest in this was because he wanted to find a firm foundation for his own philosophy of “being.” Next, Wang Fuzhi proposed a new explanation of the concept of “spirit” (shen 神). In Zhang Zai’s philosophy, spirit referred to the marvellous functioning of qi, as well as to its enshrouding and relaxed state, as in “spirit is extension (shen 伸).” In Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy, “spirit” also referred to the marvellous functioning of qi, as he said: Spirit is pure, penetrating and cannot be given an image, yet it is strong and submits to the principles of the five constants in its accord, the warp of Heaven and Earth in its penetration, the governance of the myriad affairs in its attainment, and the wills of the myriad things are all contained within it. Those who preserve it are not moved by material desires, but learn to gather it, ask to distinguish it, are tolerant to lodge in it, and benevolent to abide by it, so as to unite perfectly with the original substance of supreme harmony and enshrouding, and thereby live by exhaustively expressing the human dao with no regrets,

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and die by returning to the Supreme Void with no attachments. Whole in living it, and whole in returning to it, this is the sagely virtue of the sage. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 20)

For Wang Fuzhi here, spirit is the original nature of the qi of the Supreme Void, and latently possesses the ability to make qi develop into physical bodies and make the movement of physical bodies regular. Thus the principles of things and affairs in fact accord with the latent principle of the Supreme Void. The laws of Heaven and Earth and the regularities of the myriad affairs and myriad things are all actualisations and expansions of “spirit.” What he spoke of as “preserving spirit” (cunshen 存神) referred to grasping the regularities of the myriad things and the laws of the cosmos, and thereby according perfectly with the spirit contained in the original substance of Supreme Void. This is the perfection of the sage. Wang Fuzhi gave Zhang Zai’s concept of spirit a more realistic, more knowable and graspable quality, while rejecting its more mystical elements. What Wang Fuzhi called spirit was in fact the potentiality possessed by qi during the period of the Supreme Void when it had not yet spread out as physical bodies. Furthermore, Wang Fuzhi also gave a new exposition of the relation between principle and qi. He explained Zhang Zai’s sentence “The empty void is qi” by saying: The empty void is the measure of qi, since qi fills up the boundless yet is subtle and unformed, and hence people see an empty void and do not see qi. All empty voids are qi. Since it gathers, it is manifest, and since it is manifest, people call it being; since it disperses, it is hidden, and since it is hidden, people call it non-being. Spirit and transformation are the marvelousness of the unpredictable gathering and dispersal of qi, after which there are traces that can be seen in inherent nature and endowment. The strength and accordance of qi has the principle of constancy, and although it directs spirit and transformation and lodges within these, it leaves no traces that can be seen. As for its concreteness, principle is present within, and qi is nothing but principle; qi is present in emptiness, and interpenetrates in unity with no duality. When it gathers and emerges as people and things, it has forms, while when it disperses and enters into the Supreme Void, it is formless, yet must have somewhere it came from. Yin and yang are the two bodies of qi, and activity and stillness are the two inflections of qi, such that when the body is the same and the function different, they mutually affect one another and become active, yet when the active develops into images it becomes still. The inflections of activity and stillness are where gathering and dispersal, emergence and entrance, and formed and formless come from. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 23)

The empty void has qi as its substance, and qi fills up the boundless yet cannot be seen. The gathering and dispersal of qi makes it manifest or hidden, spirit is the singular functioning manifested in qi’s process of gathering and dispersal, and transformation (hua 化) is qi’s process of flowing operation and change and transformation. Spirit and transformation have traces that can be seen. Inherent nature and endowment are the latent principle of qi, which rules the direction and process of spirit and transformation. Inherent nature (xing 性) refers to original nature, while endowment refers to the necessity of inherent nature moving in this

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way. Inherent nature and endowment as expressed in things are the regularity of the original nature and movement, change and transformation of things. This kind of original nature and necessity are both not objects of the sense organs, but rather obtained through rational reflection on the basis of the movement of things and affairs together with their actual processes, and hence cannot be seen. Wang Fuzhi’s view of “principle within qi” can be divided into three levels. In terms of the invisible qi of the Supreme Void that is pure and unobstructed latently having laws and regularity, one can say that “principle is within qi.” In terms of this principle that is latently possessed being the ruler and regulator of specific things and affairs that are actual and visible, one which determines the direction of movement and process of development of specific things and affairs, one can say that “principle is both prior to qi and within qi”; in terms of principle being the pattern, order and regularity embodied in specific things and affairs, one can say that “principle is above qi.” The principles in these three meanings all cannot exist in apart from qi, hence he said, “There is no ungrounded and independent principle outside of qi.” Principle as within qi and principle as prior to qi was a debate of fundamental significance in Song-Ming philosophy, and this debate to a great extent arose from different definitions of “principle” (li 理). Wang Fuzhi distinguished different situations, from qi’s state of the Supreme Void to its gathering to form the myriad things, and gave different explanations for the function of principle in these different stages and states. Wang Fuzhi’s continuation and modification of Zhang Zai is also embodied in his exposition of the concept of “supreme harmony” (taihe 太和). In Zhang Zai, supreme harmony was a concept at the same level as the Supreme Void, and both of them expressed the quality and function of qi as original substance. Supreme Void was a positional concept that represented a vast and unlimited space that is filled with a fine and subtle qi. It was an attempt to state the original state of qi. Supreme harmony on the other hand most clearly expressed the movement of qi and its harmonious original nature. Hence supreme harmony was used as the title of the opening chapter of Correcting the Unenlightened. In Wang Fuzhi’s explanations of supreme harmony, his emphasis lay on the function of “spirit” and “principle” in supreme harmony and the overall harmony of the cosmos. In his explanation of the sentence “supreme harmony is what is called dao,” Wang Fuzhi said: Supreme harmony is the utmost harmony. Dao is the comprehensive principle of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, what is called the Supreme Polarity. Yin and yang are differentially composed, yet they are enshrouded within the Supreme Void, united together and yet not mutually conflicting or harmful, a blended whole without separation, the utmost harmony. Before there were forms or implements, there was originally no disharmony; after there were forms and implements, this harmony was not lost, and thus he spoke of supreme harmony. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 15)

Supreme harmony is the highest harmony, the broadest harmony. Supreme harmony contains both principle and qi, where principle is what is called dao, and qi is

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the qi of yin and yang. The qi of yin and yang is enshrouded within the Supreme Void, and represents the two opposed forces of qi, which are united and yet not mutually conflicting or harmful, divided and yet with no visible edge or boundary; this is supreme harmony. Supreme harmony and qi share the same beginning and end. The state before the two qi of yin and yang have developed into specific things and affairs with forms is the harmonious state of qi; after they develop into specific things and affairs, things and affairs each depend on their inherent natures in moving, and the cosmos as a whole is harmonious. The dao Wang Fuzhi spoke of here differed from the account of dao as the original substance of the myriad things of the cosmos in his Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, since here both dao and the Supreme Polarity referred to principle. Wang Fuzhi’s concept of supreme harmony included not only the harmony of yin and yang, but also the harmony of qi and spirit. He said: In supreme harmony, there is both spirit and qi, and spirit is nothing but the principle of the two qi as pure and interpenetrating. It cannot be given an image, yet lies within images. When yin and yang are harmonious and qi and spirit are harmonious, this is what is called supreme harmony. When people are born, things affect and interact with them, and qi chases after things, enslaving qi and leaving behind spirit. Spirit becomes employed and loses its inherent nature of strength and accordance, negating the original state of its production. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 16)

Spirit was a very important concept in the philosophies of both Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi. In Zhang Zai’s philosophy, spirit referred to the marvellous original nature of the qi of supreme harmony, and Wang Fuzhi extended this, reinforcing its meaning of latent possession and rulership of the movement of qi. It cannot be grasped using the sense organs, but can only be inferred through the movement of things and affairs. The harmony of yin and yang in supreme harmony was the most fundamental. The harmony of qi and spirit however was a formal account, one that did not have meaning in actuality. Because spirit was the latent basis for the activity of qi, this activity and its basis were one and the same. When he said “When people are born, things affect and interact with them, and qi chases after things, enslaving qi and leaving behind spirit” however, qi and spirit here were already concepts with an implication of value, i.e. that qi belongs to the aspect of the fleshly body, and is avaricious and perverse, while spirit belongs to the aspect of the spiritual, and is the source of virtue. Spirit becoming employed and losing its inherent nature of strength and accordance refers to people being blinded by voracious desire and losing their pursuit of virtue. The discussion of people’s spirit and qi here and that concerning spirit and qi in the realm of nature reflected problems at different levels. Due to the pan-moralistic quality of Chinese philosophy, the philosophy of nature and ethical philosophy were often blended together in discussions, and ethical philosophy took the philosophy of nature as its blueprint and model. Wang Fuzhi could also not avoid this. In his commentary of Zhang Zai’s “If the enshrouding is not like that of wild horses, it is insufficient to be called supreme harmony,” an account that belonged entirely to the philosophy of nature, he infused a content that

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belonged completely to ethics: “This speaks of one who embodies the dao not being affected by things or interacting, [having] the centrality prior to the partiality of happiness, anger, sadness and joy, uniting qi and spirit as well as spirit and inherent nature, using the strong and submitting principle of the five constants to fuse with the pure and interpenetrating, producing its change and transformation. Where there is stagnancy and cessation, it is insufficient to resemble the original substance of supreme harmony, and its function is also insufficient to be put into action” (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 17). The emphasis in Wang Fuzhi’s commentary lay on making people unite with the Supreme Void’s original substance of purity, interpenetration, limpidity and unity, at which time it “unites qi and spirit as well as spirit and inherent nature,” and the strong and submitting principle of the five constants within purity, interpenetration, limpidity and unity is directly present in a person. This is using the human to unite with the Heavenly, “resembling the original substance of supreme harmony.” In addition, the original state of people is not yet interacting with or being affected by things, before happiness, anger, sadness and joy are aroused, and at this time, people’s original nature is full and unharmed, and one with the Supreme Void. Hence he said: “Before one interacts with or is affected by things, there is the centrality of utmost stillness, the nature of strength and submission continued from Heaven, which is inherent and not lost, possessing the root without end” (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 18). 2. Constancy and Change Constancy (chang 常) and change (bian 变) are categories that depict the relationship between the incidental changes and transformations of things and affairs and general laws. Wang Fuzhi had a profound insight into the pair of categories of constancy and change, and proposed the two unique concepts of “great constancy” and “divination” (zhen 贞). Wang Fuzhi believed that constancy and change originated in observations of the images and numbers of things and affairs. He said: Images are the beginning of qi, and reside before there were tasks; numbers are a gathering of time, and reside at the cusp of the existence of tasks. Where they were before there were tasks, they reside, and where they are at the cusp of the existence of tasks, they are in motion. Residing based on their constancy, images are the utmost constants; moving based on changes, numbers are the utmost changes. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Sect. 2, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 994)

Images are the image-forms displayed by specific things and affairs, while numbers refer to things and affairs’ expression of regularity under specific spatio-temporal conditions, and tasks (wu 务) referred to the movements and functions of things and affairs. Images are things and affairs maintaining their own external determinacy, which are displayed before they produce manifest change and transformation, while numbers are the result of an integration of various causal conditions under specific

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spatio-temporal conditions, and are displayed at the cusp of things and affairs between activity and non-activity. Before things and affairs have produced manifest changes, they maintain stability, and in this they display a general rule or regularity. When things and affairs produce manifest changes, under special spatio-temporal conditions they give rise to changes and transformations in such general regularity. Wang Fuzhi said: The superior man is constant in their constancy and changes when they change, and hence his position is secure. Using constancy to govern changes and changes to divine constancy, his achievements arise. Images are utmost constancy and have no end, while numbers are the peak of changes and have determinacy. Since they have no end, changes can be governed, and since they have determinacy, constancy can be divined. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. I” Section 2, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 994)

Constant in their constancy means that he maintains stability when things and affairs are relatively stable, while changing when they change means that when things and affairs change and transform, he follows their change and transformation and changes and transforms. His constancy and changes all depend on things and affairs in managing them, following things in rising and falling, with no special intention to produce any artifice, and hence he can reside in a stable position. This however is only a passive accommodation, and active management should grasp the laws of constancy and changes in order to exert an effect. This requires that one grasp a general rule and harness changes and transformations, using general rules flexibly through change and transformation, while constantly maintaining the stability of the general rule in this use. In a stable stage, the image-forms of things and affairs and generally consistent, yet they have an infinity of possible changes. Although a general rule of things and affairs has different expressions under different spatio-temporal conditions, it is also stable, and there is constancy within change. If one understands this point, then one can grasp the one to drive the myriad, finding the one in the myriad. The reverse of the above truth would be to grasp images as constant and not know change, or to grasp numbers as change and not know determinacy. These two biases both arise from clinging to one partial aspect. Knowing its constancy, one simultaneously knows that there is change within constancy; knowing its change, one simultaneously knows that there is determinacy in change; only in this way can one be said to have grasped the law of things and affairs. Concerning the two contradictory aspects of change and constancy, Wang Fuzhi did not regard equate them absolutely, but rather divided them according to their importance and priority. Wang Fuzhi said: The world under Heaven also changes. If there is change yet this cannot alter its constancy, then there must be something acting as its ruler. Without a ruler there is insufficient to begin, and without a ruler there is insufficient to continue; how could it be the case that only the family has an ancestral shrine and the state the altars to soil and grain? If one leaves behind the beginning before yin and yang have interacted as the ruler, and is instead lost in dusky, obscure and vague shadows, then the dispersal of external things and scholars will be insufficient to rule the central kingdom. If one rides on the subtle movements of yin and

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yang in selecting a ruler, opportunely meeting with the trivial and weighty and the impulse of stillness and impetuosity, with the support of the minor ancestral, this is insufficient to take up the ancestral line. Thus the world under Heaven also changes, hence that which changes is also constant. This is mutual production and extinction yet all is constant, mutual extension and replacement yet with no change. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Hexagram Zhen 震,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 946)

Wang Fuzhi believed that all things and affairs under Heaven change, yet within change there is constancy, and change cannot alter this constancy. In the two of change and constancy, there must be one to act as ruler. That there is primary and secondary, important and trivial is a necessary condition for the production and development of things and affairs. Which is the ruler? One must regard the constant state of things and affairs as the ruler, namely their most general quality and regularity, while the temporary states in change and movement cannot act as ruler, let alone dusky and obscure or fantastic and unreal things. Things and affairs all change, yet their ground must lie in a state of constancy. The production, development, continuation, progressive transmission, etc. of things and affairs are all change, yet they are also constancy, changes within constancy. The emphasis in Wang Fuzhi’s thought here lay on using the constant to observe the changing, using the one to harness the myriad, and he examined the change and transformation of things and affairs under the contemplation of the essence and regularity of things and affairs. Between constancy and change, Wang Fuzhi placed more emphasis on constancy, and thus between holding to the upright (shouzheng 守正) and adaptating to circumstances (quanbian 权变), he placed more emphasis on holding to the upright. However, his constancy was a constancy within change, and his understanding of change and constancy was “change as its time, constancy as its virtue” (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. II” [Xici xia 系辞下] Sect. 7). Virtue referred to character and regularity, while time referred to specific spatio-temporal conditions. He advocated “governing change through constancy, possessing constancy through change,” and this was his fundamental viewpoint on dealing with hardships. He said: Time has constancy and change, numbers have fortune and misfortune, depending on constancy and being constant, depending on change and changing, residing amidst hardships yet always relying on time as dao, hence “This is how the Changes fills and empties with time and acts with adaptation.” Relying on constancy and being constant, qi fills and is released and lost; relying on change and changing, feelings empty and follow craftiness; hence constancy must summon change, and change has no way to restore constancy. Now the moon has its fullness and emptiness, the time it illuminates is life and death, and the soul thus divines its degree of constancy…. Hence the sage governs change through constancy, and possesses constancy through change, shifting together with the times in order to deal with hardships. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. II” Section 7, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1056)

Wang Fuzhi believed that things and affairs existed in ceaseless change and movement, and in coming into contact with things and affairs, people meet with fortune and misfortune. People who have an anxious awareness of constancy,

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change, fortune and misfortune often excessively focus on specific spatio-temporal change and transformation, seeking to rise and fall with the times, and rely on time and change and carrying out their adaptation to circumstances. They often slip into the partial fault of “relying on constancy and being constant, relying on change and changing,” clinging to it without openness. If one only knows constancy and not change, it is easy to always head straight ahead, excessively overflowing, not knowing that things are full of twists and turns, that clouds return and flows turn back. If one only knows change and not constancy, it is easy to follow along with the times, slipping into tricks and stratagems, with no rules or standards to act as a backbone, and thus people are often tempted by profit. The law of things and affairs is that “constancy must summon change, and change has no way to restore constancy.” As with the moon’s waxing and waning in change, although it must have this waxing and waning, the degree of waxing and waning has a determinate quantity, and this is constancy. Using one’s understanding and grasp of constancy to view change, one can move with the times and not alter one’s constancy, sitting and awaiting hardships and regarding constancy as governance. Wang Fuzhi used these dao-principles concerning constancy and change in comparing the Book of Changes and the [Record of] Rites (Liji 礼记), believing that: “The Changes comprises constancy and change, while the Rites only divines constancy. The dao of the Changes is grand and without shame, while the numbers of the Rites restrict and hold to the upright. Hence the Changes is the apex of change while the Rites solely resides in constancy” (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Appended Phrases, Pt. II” Sect. 7, Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1057). The Changes comprises both constancy and change, while the Rites places more emphasis on constancy. Thus one needs to learn the Rites to hold to the upright, and to learn the Changes to illuminate the principle of constancy and change. Grasping the above dao-principles concerning constancy and change means attaining “great constancy” (dachang 大常). Great constancy was one of Wang Fuzhi’s important concepts. He said: Times repeatedly change yet the dao is always constant, changing and yet not losing its constancy, and after great constancy was divined, it exists forever to harmonise into unity. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Commentary on Mixed Hexagrams” [Zagua zhuan 杂卦传], Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1112)

What he called great constancy meant venerating constancy to deal with change, i.e. changing and yet not losing one’s constancy, and this is an eternally unchanging standard. If one can abide by this standard, then one can have a correct understanding and utilisation of mutually opposed relations such as inherent nature and dao, the myriad and the one, activity and stillness, taking and giving, enmity and relief, and pure and mixed. He also said: Minor changes are conveyed in that which shifts, while great changes turn back in collision. Inherent nature meets with the times and carries out the dao, while times depend on the protection of the dao in accomplishing inherent nature. They all provide that which they provide, in order to each fulfil their realities. (Outer Commentary on the Book of Changes, “Commentary on Mixed Hexagrams,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 1, 1112)

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In great constancy, because the contradictions in minor changes and transformations are subtle and small, they are subsumed in their parent body. Because the contradictions in major changes and transformations are fierce, they accumulate their impulsive force to form a counteraction. Things and affairs all exist in time and space, and their essences manifest different ways of existing in different spaces and times, yet the different ways that specific spaces and times reveal things and affairs precisely unfold their fundamental qualities. Things and affairs are one in a myriad, a myriad in one, change in constancy, constancy lodged in change, the pure and mixed all complete, collectively constituting the profound and unceasing dao of Heaven. This is the true image of the cosmos; this is Wang Fuzhi’s great constancy. This is also “sincerity” that transcends specific activity and stillness, constancy and change, one and many. For Wang Fuzhi, “great constancy” was a kind of image of the cosmos, a kind of thorough understanding of the mind in its numinosity, as well as a kind of spiritual plane of cultivation. Only when one has this thorough insight can one have this image, this spiritual plane; only when one has this spiritual plane can one attain this thorough understanding and perceive this image, such that with a single laugh, the three affairs are all complete. Wang Fuzhi’s view of constancy and change demonstrates that he had a profound intuition of the relationship between the general and particular aspects of things and affairs.

3 Mind and Inherent Nature Wang Fuzhi’s theory of mind and inherent nature was a specific embodiment of his fundamental view of the dao of Heaven, as well as the basic ground for his ideal personality. Although the theory of mind and inherent nature had a very important position in Wang Fuzhi’s philosophical thought as a whole, previous research has often focused mainly on his theory of original substance and of great transformation, paying insufficient attention to his theory of mind and inherent nature. This was due to a one-sided understanding of what Wang Fuzhi called mind, seeing it as merely concerned with intellectual ability. Although Wang Fuzhi’s theory of mind and inherent nature continued the basic approach and propositions of Neo-Confucianism, he researched deeply into many scholars’ theories, introduced his own special understanding, and thereby created and explicated a theory of mind and inherent nature that was rich in meaning and broad in scope. In Wang Fuzhi’s theory, mind (xin 心) was a concept extremely rich in meaning, including the abundant site of inherent nature, and the subject of sensation, will, intellect, etc. Wang Fuzhi said: Since people have inherent nature, they envelop it in the mind and are affected by things to the point of interconnection, images are shown and numbers displayed, names are established and meanings arising, practicing their cause until the mind makes it known. Form, spirit, things – these three are mutually interconnected and knowing awareness thus issues forth. Hence knowing is produced from inherent nature, using knowing to know inherent nature, interaction contained in gathering with space in the centre, unified in one mind, and

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speaking from this one calls it mind. According with this in speaking, only Heaven has the dao, and when one uses the dao to complete inherent nature, inherent nature issues forth knowledge of the dao; deducing this in reverse, one exhaustively expresses inherent nature using the mind, unifies with the dao using inherent nature, and serves Heaven using the dao. Since its principle alone is rooted in one origin, the human mind is Heaven. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Supreme Harmony,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 33)

This was a development of Zhang Zai’s sentence “Unifying inherent nature and knowing awareness, there is the name of the mind.” “Since people have inherent nature, they envelop it in the mind” refers to the human mind being the site where inherent nature is stationed. Any activity of the human mind is conditioned by human nature. “Affected by things to the point of interconnection, images being shown and numbers displayed… until the mind makes it known” etc. refer to the mind at the same time being the organ of sensation and knowing awareness produced by inherent nature. Form refers to the human body, spirit to spiritual functioning, and things to objects with forms and images outside of people. The mind’s knowing awareness of things must possess these three conditions, and this mainly speaks of the mind’s function of cognition. “Knowing is produced from inherent nature” shows that he accepted the traditional doctrine of the mind dominating inherent nature and feeling, “inherent nature as substance and feeling as function,” and developed it somewhat, seeing the mind’s activity of knowing awareness as a function of human nature, i.e. the perceptual function of the mind produced by the inherent nature endowed to people by Heaven. That Wang Fuzhi believed that “Knowing is produced from inherent nature” shows that he regarded inherent nature in the broad sense, an integrated whole with moral rationality as its backbone but also including functions such as knowing, willing and aesthetic appreciation, as the essence that makes humans human. Wang Fuzhi also said: The statement that the mind dominates inherent nature and feeling speaks from the perspective of the origin that it contains, namely a condensation of inherent nature. When its form is seen, this is the body, and when its secrecy is concealed, this is the mind. Although this mind dominates inherent nature, it itself is substance. Hence that which inherent nature produces is produced together with the five sense organs and hundred bones yet acts as their ruler. It is constantly within a person’s heart, yet one who acts depends upon it as the will. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 8)

That is to say, the mind dominating inherent nature and feeling speaks of the origin that is contained within the mind. Inherent nature is the origin and substance, while the body and the mind are both produced by inherent nature as the site where it can settle and conserve itself, and hence although the mind dominates inherent nature and feeling, it is produced by inherent nature. This all shows that what Wang Fuzhi emphasised was human nature, and what he highlighted was human nature’s position of priority as original substance. Of course, the “produced” in knowing being produced from inherent nature is logical and formal, and not actual, hence the two are united in one mind. Wang Fuzhi’s account of “according” (shun 顺) and

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“reversing” (ni 逆) was taken from Centrality in the Ordinary (Zhongyong 中庸) and the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子). When he said, “According with this in speaking, only Heaven has the dao, and one uses the dao to complete inherent nature,” this deduced inherent nature from the dao of Heaven, as in “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature” from Centrality in the Ordinary. When he said, “Deducing this in reverse, one exhaustively expresses inherent nature using the mind, unifies with the dao using inherent nature, and serves Heaven using the dao,” this was Mencius’ “By exhaustively expressing one’s mind, one knows inherent nature and Heaven, while by preserving one’s mind and cultivating one’s inherent nature, one serves Heaven” [see Mencius, 7A.1]. His “Since principle and affairs have a single origin, the human mind is Heaven” was a summary of the above relations between dao, principle, inherent nature, mind and knowing. If one views this summary comprehensively, it can be seen that, in his explorations of the relation between mind and inherent nature, Wang Fuzhi was still unable to break free from the mode of thought of an “inherent nature” from value theory and moral theory commanding, governing and producing the mind and knowledge. At the same time, “knowing is produced from inherent nature” shows that, when Wang Fuzhi explicated Zhang Zai’s “Unifying inherent nature and knowing awareness, there is the name of the mind,” he already changed the relation of juxtaposition between inherent nature and knowing awareness in Zhang Zai’s thought to one of producer and produced. This misreading shows that, having reflected on Wang [Yangming] 王阳明 Learning, especially Wang Longxi’s 王龙溪 doctrine of four withouts (siwu 四无), as well as on Chan Buddhism’s “seeing inherent nature in function,” he wanted to restore the Master Zhu [Xi] 朱熹 Learning tradition of “That which is endowed by Heaven is called inherent nature” and “inherent nature is principle,” to downgrade the function of the mind and place it back under to rule of inherent nature. The mind of the mode of thought in which inherent nature produces knowing awareness can also find a basis in Wang Fuzhi’s theory of original substance: inherent nature is the essence of the cosmos, and the mind is inherent nature’s site of appearance in the human body. Thus inherent nature is more fundamental, logically produces the mind, and includes the mind. In a long passage of exposition explaining Mencius’ “The faculty of the mind is thinking” [see Mencius, 6A.15], Wang Fuzhi clearly expressed his above meaning: Now it is even said that this word “thinking” refers to the mind of benevolence and righteousness, but this is certainly impossible. Benevolence and righteousness are come from this inherent nature, and are affairs of Heaven; thinking is this faculty of thinking, and is an affair of humanity. When Heaven gives humanity this mind of benevolence and righteousness, it is only in the mind. Only because it has the mind of benevolence and righteousness does the mind have this ability to think, otherwise it is merely explained as an operation of knowing awareness (Comment: Dogs and cows have this fourfold mind, yet cannot think). This benevolence and righteousness is the root and produces thinking. Hence in yin and yang, benevolence and righteousness are the innate moral ability that they must imitate, while in change and combination they are their orderly pattern of utmost goodness in which the veins of the germinal impulse are present (Comment: Veins are orderly patterns, while the germinal impulse is innate moral ability). Hence here they are produced

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as thinking. As a shell must split, the bent shoots must straighten; it is not that there is a lump of qi, mixed and insensate, that cannot have any possibility of enlightenment. Hence he spoke of “that which Heaven has given to me,” giving me benevolence and righteousness, and thereby giving me thinking. This speaks from the beginnings of life. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 700)

Here he clearly stated that the word “thinking” (si 思) in Mencius’ “The faculty of the mind is thinking” cannot be directly explained as the mind of benevolence and righteousness. Benevolence and righteousness are inherent nature, and are that which people obtain from Heaven. Thinking differs from the activity of knowing awareness, since thinking is uniquely possessed by people as a higher-level animal; thinking is produced from the mind of benevolence and righteousness. For Wang Fuzhi here, there was also another side, namely “the mind produces inherent nature.” That is to say, in terms of the actual obtaining of inherent nature, of inherent nature reaching the actual, physical level from the latent, metaphysical level, inherent nature must also pass through the mind, and the mind has knowing awareness, thinking, will, desires, etc. Not everything people desire can be attained, and without desiring, there is sometimes “unexpected attainment.” Only with benevolence and righteousness is it the case that “If one thinks, one attains it, and if one does not think, one does not attain it” (see Mencius, 6A.15). This shows that actual benevolence and righteousness are completely attained through one’s own thought and seeking. In terms of the completion of inherent nature, one can say that the mind is the root, and that it produces benevolence and righteousness. Wang Fuzhi said: If the mind only has this thinking, then benevolence and righteousness are attained in this, and that which is attained also must be benevolence and righteousness. When people are hungry they think of eating, when thirsty they think of drinking, when young they think of beauty, when strong they think of fighting, and when old they think of attaining; these have never not been called thinking, yet what think of is not necessarily attained, and without thinking they are also sometimes attained (Comment: Attaining them through fate). That whose attainment or non-attainment is wholly due to thinking is only benevolence and righteousness alone. This thinking is the root, and it produces benevolence and righteousness. This is the thinking that Heaven has given to me, namely that it has given me benevolence and righteousness. This speaks from the completion of inherent nature. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 700)

The former speaks in terms of Heaven of endowing people with inherent nature in the theory of original substance, and says that inherent nature produces the mind that can think. The latter speaks in terms of humanity attaining benevolence and righteousness through thinking in the theory of effort, and says that thinking produces benevolence and righteousness. This two aspects are both indispensable. The former discusses the root-source of goodness, and is the basis for his various theories of the inherent nature of Heaven and Earth and the inherent nature of material qi, while the latter discusses the actual obtaining of goodness, and is the theoretical foundation for his conception of “inherent nature as produced and completed daily.”

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In the relation between mind and inherent nature, when Wang Fuzhi emphasised that inherent nature produces knowing, he believed that inherent nature producing knowing must pass through the medium of “form” (xing 形), namely actualisation in people’s bodily form. He said: The spontaneity of Heavenly principle is that which in the qi of supreme harmony embodies things without omission, and is inherent nature; it is condensed in people and contained in form, while the knowing ability that arises as a result of the functioning of form is the mind. Inherent nature is the dao of Heaven, while the mind is the dao of humanity; the dao of Heaven is hidden, while the dao of humanity is manifest. Since it is manifest, it fulfils the mind of compassion, and benevolence is exhaustively expressed; it advances the mind of shame and disgust, and righteousness is exhaustively expressed. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Sincerity and Illumination” [Chengming 诚明], Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 124)

The explanation here takes “inherent nature is principle” as its starting point: Heavenly principle embodied in the bodily forms created by qi is inherent nature. Although this is a universal proposition, and does not only refer to people, people also do not go beyond this meaning. Heavenly principle embodied in people is human nature. That which is dependent on the body and based on the functions of knowing and ability produced by inherent nature is the mind. Inherent nature is a condensation of Heavenly principle and the endowment of Heaven, a specific yet subtle dao of Heaven, and hence he said “inherent nature is the dao of Heaven.” Since the mind produces its functions based on people’s bodily form, he said that the mind is the dao of humanity. Inherent nature is the hidden and subtle basis, and hence is hidden; the mind is an embodiment of inherent nature, expressed as the four inklings of “the mind of compassion,” “the mind of shame and disgust,” etc., and hence is manifest. If one expands the four inklings of the mind, one can reach the inherent nature of benevolence and righteousness. The self-completion of inherent nature must pass through the mind, and thus must pass through the form in which the mind is placed. For Wang Fuzhi here, the main task of the mind is to recognise and take up the inherent nature originally present in the mind, and images in the external world are a kind of auxiliary cause to stimulate the mind into recognising and taking up inherent nature. Wang Fuzhi said: Where things have images, principle is present. The mind has its principle, and if one takes up images to demonstrate it, all is comprehended. If what the mind does not understand arises from images and is used to recognise the mind, then one submits to the partiality of images and loses the great whole of the mind. Hence by suddenly seeing a child falling into a well, one can recognise the mind of compassion, yet one must one must examine the reality of what this mind goes on to produce before one can speak of benevolence. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Great Mind” [Daxin 大 心], Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 145)

The things of the external world have images and principle. However, although the principle of the myriad things is originally present in the mind, one must rely on the images of external things the mind has obtained to activate and demonstrate it. If

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one thinks that there is no principle in the mind, and that what the mind obtains is merely images of external things, then one does not understand the essence of the mind, the mind is occupied by a single partial knowledge, and the mind as a whole is lost. This is what Wang Fuzhi denounced as submitting to images and losing the mind (xunxiang sangxin 徇象丧心). If the mind originally possesses the virtue of benevolence, seeing a child falling into a well arouses the mind of compassion, and through the mind of compassion one can see the benevolence that it goes on to produce. Here, Wang Fuzhi clearly absorbed the thought of Zhu Xi: Although the mind originally possesses inherent nature, the inherent nature in the mind is present at a metaphysical and latent level, and needs to be aroused and induced by knowledge obtained from the investigation of things before inherent nature can transform into the actual, and appear within the mind. The investigation of things and extension of knowledge is a means and necessary path for fathoming principle and exhaustively expressing inherent nature. If one merely obtains knowledge of things and forgets the role of this knowledge in activating inherent nature and principle, this is submitting to images and losing the mind. Wang Fuzhi also said: If one preserves images in the mind and relies on them as knowledge, that which one knows is nothing but images. If images transform one’s mind and the mind only has images, one cannot say that this is the knowledge of one’s mind being illuminated. That which is obtained through sight and hearing is images, and one simply knows their implements, their numbers, and their names. As for the righteousness by which one’s mind governs these, how can one say they can illuminate it? (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Great Mind,” Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 145)

This still said that the most essential content of the mind is moral rationality. If one preserves images in the mind and takes this to be the entirety of knowledge, one does not understand the value of the mind. Behind the implements, numbers and names attained through what is seen and heard, there is also a mind that distinguishes between right and wrong. Although this mind is hidden and subtle, it is the most essential content of the mind. In his commentary on the “Great Mind” chapter of Correcting the Unenlightened, Wang Fuzhi expounded this idea many times, repeatedly warning people of the importance of the great mind, of fully understanding the content of the mind, and of placing the inherent nature of sincerity and illumination in the most essential position of the mind, while at the same time using obtained knowledge to assist in revealing the inherent nature and principle in the mind. His fundamental precept concerning the relation between inherent nature and mind was expressed especially clearly in the following passage: In people, to sincerely possess one’s inherent nature is to sincerely possess one’s principle, and by sincerely possessing it one knows it, hence numinous illumination issues forth. That which is seen and heard through the eyes and ears is all one partial aspect of that which it issues forth, while one envelops its entirety in the mind as the true knowing by which one responds. Knowing this, what is seen and heard is insufficient to burden one’s mind, and are of suitable assistance in obtaining the mind. In the vast and unpredictable spirit and transformation, nothing fails to hit its mark. This is what is important in exhaustively

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expressing inherent nature and knowing Heaven. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Great Mind”)

That people originally possess inherent nature and principle was the basic point of Wang Fuzhi’s theory of mind and inherent nature, while the mind’s function of knowing awareness is inherent nature and principle wanting to manifest itself, the inner demand for it to make itself penetrate from the metaphysical level of inherent nature to the actual level of the mind and knowing awareness. The mind obtaining specific knowledge is of assistance in making the mind reach the vast and unpredictable spirit and transformation, and thereby unify with the inherent nature that it originally possesses. Thus Wang Fuzhi on the one hand emphasised that inherent nature and principle are the essence of the mind, but at the same time also affirmed the role of the mind obtaining specific knowledge in activating and inducing inherent nature and principle. He ultimately believed that these two supplemented each other, and were both indispensable. He said: In using the mind to seek dao, one perceives righteousness as external, and regards the awareness of the knowing mind as the mind. When inherent nature is enveloped in the mind and principle is completely present, and the mind exhaustively expresses its capacity, then the principles of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things all manifest in the innate moral ability of my mind, such that where the mind does not reach, the dao is also not present. (Commentary on Master Zhang’s Correcting the Unenlightened, “Centrality and Rectitude” [Zhongzheng 中正], Complete Writings of Chuanshan, Vol. 12, 182)

“Using the mind to seek dao” refers to views that regard the dao as external to one’s own mind and the mind as the numinous illumination of knowing awareness, dividing the mind from inherent nature and principle. Wang Fuzhi believed that inherent nature is contained in the mind, and that inherent nature is principle. The mind exhaustively expresses its capacity means making the inherent nature and principle originally present in the mind manifest through investigating things and fathoming principles. Without the effort of investigating things and fathoming principles, the inherent nature and principle in the mind is not manifest, and dao is also an external thing. In this way, Wang Fuzhi’s theory of mind and inherent nature naturally includes the effort of investigating things. For Wang Fuzhi, the investigation of things is not merely an activity of epistemological rationality, but is rather an activity of the spirit as a whole in which moral rationality and epistemological rationality arouse and assist one another, and collectively rise to a higher level and spiritual plane. Setting out from his fundamental insight into the relationship between mind and inherent nature, Wang Fuzhi held that the mind’s operations of knowing awareness must be under the governance of inherent nature, imitating inherent nature and then being put into practice. He said: Benevolence and righteousness are goodness, the virtue of inherent nature. The mind contains inherent nature and moves in imitation, and hence we speak of the mind of benevolence and righteousness. Benevolence and righteousness are the reality of the mind, like Heaven has yin and yang. The operations of knowing awareness are the inflections of

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the mind, like yin and yang have changes and combinations. If one casts aside its reality and simply speaks of its impulse, then the clearheaded quality of this operation of knowing awareness is intrinsically perverse and wasteful if indulged, and merely exhausts the use of the give or take of likes and dislikes if sought; even to gradually preserve it well is just like the Buddhists’ three masters of calling out [to awaken themselves]. Scholars urgently need to recognise this word “mind,” so as not to be preoccupied by its quick-witted and shrewd things and affairs, and forget the reality that it contains…. Since inherent nature is dominated by the mind and the mind is produced by inherent nature, the mind and inherent nature simply cannot be divided into two, and hence Mencius spoke of mind and the goodness of inherent nature without distinction. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 502)

“The mind contains inherent nature and moves in imitation” means that the mind contains inherent nature and principle, and that the activities of the mind are completely aimed at actualising the content of inherent nature and principle. Inherent nature is essence, and this is like “Heaven has yin and yang”; the mind is function, and this is like “yin and yang have changes and combinations.” The perverse thoughts and rash actions of the mind are due to its deviating from the inherent nature that is originally present in the mind. When Wang Fuzhi emphasised that “inherent nature is dominated by the mind and the mind is produced by inherent nature,” he wished to bring the function of the mind under the jurisdiction of inherent nature and principle at the level of theoretical foundations, making moral rationality the ruler of epistemological rationality at a fundamental level.

4 Epistemology Though Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy was very broad in what it included, ontology, the theory of grand transformation and the theory of mind and inherent nature were its backbone. He also particularly emphasised topics such as people’s relations with external things, the forms of their knowledge of things, the relation between knowledge and practice, the relation between knowledge and virtuous conduct, and the specific processes of obtaining knowledge, and these form the content of his epistemology. 1. Subject and Object In Buddhism, the categories of subject (neng 能) and object (suo 所) referred to the relation between the agent and recipient of an action. In knowledge, the subject is the agent of knowledge, which refers to the knowing ability of the subject (zhuti 主 体). The object is the recipient of knowledge, which refers to the result obtained when the knowing ability of the subject is applied to know an object (duixiang 对 象). Wang Fuzhi took over the Buddhist categories of subject and object, and gave them a new explanation. He said: The awaited function of experience is called the object, and that which successfully applies this function to experience is called the subject. The division between subject and object

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was originally present, and when the Buddhists divided them and gave them names, they were not mistaken. Thus when an awaited function of experience is an object, it must really have its substance; when that which applies an awaited function and can achieve success is a subject, it must really have its function. Since substance awaits function, it relies on an object in producing a subject; since function uses substance, a subject must correspond to its object. When substance and function unite in according with their realities, and do not go against their cause, then names and realities correspond to each other. (Extended Meanings of the Book of Documents, 121)

This passage is very precise and appropriate, and represents Wang Fuzhi’s basic view concerning the roles and functions of subject and object in constituting knowledge. An object is something that is outside of a person and awaits a person’s application of knowledge and practice, while a subject is the person who applies work to experience and can obtain actual utility. Subject and object form a pair of mutually dependent categories. Deduced from the actual meaning of subject and object, an object must have a real substance, while a subject must have a real function. Since an object awaits a subject’s effect upon it, an object induces a subject. Since a subject applies an effect to an object, a subject and an object must correspond to one another. Both substance and function and subject and object have their activities based on their actual existence and use. “Function uses substance” indicates that a subject is active, and is compelled by its own original nature to use an object, while “a subject must correspond to its object” states that a subject obtaining an object is an intuitive reflection like looking in a mirror. When a subject and object meet, the apparent state of the object is completely and wholly reflected within the subject, and hence “a subject must correspond to its object.” If however the sense organs ruled over by the subject respectively and disjunctively take in the apparent states of an object, synthesising, assembling and representing them in the subject, then the representation of the object in the subject will have some change, and will not necessarily completely “correspond to its object.” What Wang Fuzhi emphasised was that both subject and object have their reality, and that the mutual functioning of subject and object collectively completes the activity of knowing. However, as for the subject’s taking in of objects, or the specific way objects are reflected in a subject, such as the specific processes and mechanisms of sensation and representation, Wang Fuzhi did not provide a more detailed examination. Wang Fuzhi’s studies of the process of the activity of knowing were not as deep or detailed as Buddhism, especially those of Yogācāra (Weishi 唯识) Buddhism. In Chinese philosophy, in which theories of knowledge were not developed and naïve, mechanical theories of reflection and intuition were the main doctrines, such a way of dealing with the problem is understandable. When Wang Fuzhi emphasised “successfully applying this function to experience,” he referred not only to the occurrence of actual activities of knowing, but also to a subject having corresponding practice and conduct after an activity of knowing occurs in order to produce results of benefit to people. That is to say, the goal of “function using substance” lies in its actual results. However, the way “function uses substance” is merely a mechanical response. Hence “it relies on an object in producing a subject,” and an object is only a medium that excites the sense organs to produce a reflection

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of knowing awareness. When Wang Fuzhi emphasised that subject and object both have their real substances, this was consistent with his ontology of “great being” (dayou 大有), and when he emphasised the mutual functioning of subject and object as well as the occurrence of a result, this was also consistent with the unity of two and one in his theory of grand transformation. In his discussions of the relation between subject and object, Wang Fuzhi stressed that both subject and object are real beings, which was in opposition to Buddhism’s doctrine of “the three realms as only the mind, the myriad dharmas as only consciousness.” He pointed out: The Buddhists regard being as illusion, and non-being as reality. When the doctrine of “only the mind, only consciousness” was drawn up, its contradictions attacked themselves and could not be established, and hence they played tricks with their words and said: When one is emptied of self-attachment, there is no subject, and when one is emptied of dharma-attachment, there are no objects. However, when one uses the mind to unites with the dao, there are both subject and objects, yet it again still allows no ignorance. Since for this reason their doctrine could not be established, they planned to make the object a subject and the subject an object, eliminating objects to enter the subject, and call the subject an object in order to establish their doctrine, which was thereby established. Hence the Buddhists changed three times in all and their doctrine of the subject as an object was complete. (Extended Meanings of the Book of Documents, 121)

Here, Wang Fuzhi wished to trace the process of logical evolution by which Buddhism came to regard the subject as an object. He believed that the fundamental precept of Buddhism was to regard being as an illusion and non-being as reality. However, when the Yogācāra doctrine of “only the mind, only consciousness” regarded both the mind and consciousness as real being, although this emptied the object it did not empty the subject, which was contradictory and difficult to establish, and hence they changed its words to say “When one is emptied of self-attachment, there is no subject, and when one is emptied of dharma-attachment, there are no objects,” using the mind to unite with the dao. Yet since they “used the mind to unite with the dao,” there is both the mind and the dao, both subject and object, and hence this meaning is also contradictory and difficult to establish. Thus they changed again to say that the subject is an object and objects are subjects, coming to the eventual result of eliminating objects and entering the subject, regarding the subject as an object. Seen like this, Wang Fuzhi believed that the development of Buddhism was the School of Being (youzong 有宗 [i.e. Yogācāra], the School of Emptiness (kongzong 空宗 [i.e. Madhyamaka, Zhongguan 中观]), and a fusion of emptiness and being. Although the meaning of the fusion of emptiness and being in Buddhism claimed to be relatively perfect, it was in fundamental contradiction with Wang Fuzhi’s ontology of “great being” and “establishing Qian and Kun together.” From today’s academic position of pluralistic coexistence, Buddhism’s theoretical doctrines each have their own argumentative foundations, their own human problems they aim at, and their own value ideal they seek. Wang Fuzhi’s criticism of Buddhism can be said to be “affirming that which he affirmed and negating that which he negated.” However, it should be known that his criticism here, like his criticism of the Confucian doctrine of “In the substance

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of the mind there is neither good nor bad” [see Wang Yangming], was a summary of the lessons of the fall of the Ming, in which he set out by criticising the abstruse, empty and weak ethos of the time and re-establishing a new, vigorous and active philosophical system, and thus had its historical significance. Wang Fuzhi’s new extension of the categories of subject and object viewed them as core thoughts of Confucianism. He said: Although the distinct names of subject and object were prominent in the Buddhists, they did not in fact begin with the Buddhists. Their so-called subject corresponds to function, while their so-called object corresponds to substance, and Han Confucians already spoke of these. Their so-called subject corresponds to thought, while their so-called object corresponds to position, and the great Changes already spoke of these. Their so-called subject corresponds to the self, while their so-called object corresponds to things, and Centrality in the Ordinary already spoke of these. Their so-called subject corresponds to people expanding the dao, while their so-called object corresponds to the dao not being able to expand people, and Confucius already spoke of these. Once they have been given actual, fixed names, no one can change them. Yin and yang are objects, while change and combination are subjects. Benevolence and wisdom are subjects, while mountains and water are objects. Centrality and harmony are subjects, while ritual propriety and music are objects. (Extended Meanings of the Book of Documents, 122)

Here, Wang Fuzhi generalised the relationship between subject and object to the relationships between substance and function, thought and position, self and things, and people being able to expand the dao and the dao not expanding people. He not only continued his basic position of upholding actual being, but also extended the categories of subject and object into aspects of ethics and value. He regarded all people’s active development of themselves and completion of their moral character as the subject, and things that are of assistance in accomplishing people’s moral character as objects. For example, yin and yang are real, existing things in the cosmos, and thus are objects, yet their regulation, division, and combination belong to people’s subjectivity. Mountains and water are real, existing things, and are objects, yet “The wise take pleasure in water while the benevolent take pleasure in mountains” [see Analects (Lunyu 论语), 6.23] is an expression of people’s spiritual activity, and is the subject. Ritual propriety and music are real, existing things, yet the centrality and harmony that develop through practicing ritual propriety and music are activities belonging to people, and belong to the subject. By expanding the relation between subject and object and generalizing it into processes including substance and function and thought and position, Wang Fuzhi overcame the simple mechanical response model of subject-object relations, broke through the limits of specific activities of knowing, and restored their philosophical character of strong, ceaseless activity and firm action. 2. Investigating Things and Extending Knowledge An important aspect Wang Fuzhi’s epistemology was his exploration of how to transform the perceptual knowledge obtained through the sense organs of the eyes and ears into universal and necessary knowledge that was broadly subsuming yet also had an empirical basis. His discussions of this aspect were concentrated on

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the different functions and mutual relationship between investigating things (gewu 格物) and extending knowledge (zhizhi 致知). Concerning the original meaning and mutual relationship between investigating things and extending knowledge, previous scholars had already provided a great many discussions, yet their divergences were very great. Zhu Xi’s Chapters and Sentences of the Great Learning (Daxue zhangju 大学章句) explained the investigation of things as arriving at things, the extension of knowledge as fathoming principles, and investigating things and extending knowledge as fathoming and arriving at the principles of things and affairs. Wang Yangming regarded the investigation of things and extension of knowledge as extending knowledge and investigating things, which meant rectifying incorrect thoughts in the process of extending innate moral knowing. These two typical explanations in Neo-Confucianism both regarded the investigation of things and extension of knowledge as one affair, or two aspects of one affair. Wang Fuzhi opposed regarding the investigation of things and extension of knowledge as one, and held that the investigation of things and extension of knowledge were two affairs with different qualities. He said: If discussed generally, then from the investigation of things to pacifying the world under Heaven all stops at one affair. If one speaks of them separately, then the success of the investigation of things is things being investigated, so “things are investigated and then knowledge arrives,” [a process] in which there are three transitions. If one uses an order to generalise them as one, then the steps of investigation are unclear, and when it is said that in the investigation of things, knowledge spontaneously arrives, this is actually to erase the word “extension” (zhi 致) and its stage of effort. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 10)

Here, although Wang Fuzhi distinguished between general and separate discussions, he in fact advocated speak of things separately, since if one discusses them generally, the three guiding principles and eight items of the Great Learning (Daxue 大学) are simply one affair, namely the affair of becoming a “great man” (daren 大人 [i.e. an adult]). The affair of becoming a great man however contains a great many specific contents, and these cannot be spoken of in sweeping terms. If one speaks of them separately, the investigation of things is the study of the principles of external things, while the content of the extension of knowledge is much more complicated. In terms of value rationality, the concept of extending knowledge has the meaning of making the moral rationality that one originally possesses manifest at the level of the mind, and thereby being known by the mind. In terms of epistemological rationality, the extension of knowledge includes the introspective epistemological activities of thinking, distinguishing, deducing, etc. initiated by investigating the principles of external things. Investigating things is the primary level of effort, the purpose and function of which is to induce the production of the activity of “extending knowledge.” The site for the application of effort in the investigation of things lies outside the body, while the site for the application of effort in the extension of knowledge lies in the mind. The investigation of things is the condition and basis for the activity of “extending

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knowledge,” hence “once things are investigated, knowledge arrives.” However, the extension of knowledge after the activity of investigating things is a more important step. Because Wang Fuzhi’s definition of knowledge included both the moral aspect of knowing Heavenly principle and the intellectual aspect of knowing the principles of things, the two have different mechanisms of occurrence as knowledge. Hence the aspect of extending knowledge must on the one hand make the principles of things obtained through the investigation of things change into Heavenly principle that is connected to people’s cultivation of virtue, while on the other hand it must arrive at new general knowledge after its distinguishing, deducing, etc. activities. When Wang Fuzhi said, “things are investigated and then knowledge arrives, [a process] in which there are three transitions,” these three transitions referred to investigating things, “extending knowledge” (one step in the unified activity of extending knowledge, with quotes added to distinguish it) and knowledge arriving. That things are investigated indicates the completion of the activity of investigating things, and the obtaining of the principles of external things in this activity; this is the first step. “Extending knowledge” refers to applying purely introspective activities such as imagination, analogy, distinction, deduction, etc. to the principles of things obtained through investigation. “Extending knowledge” is a single step in the unified activity of extending knowledge, and represents the process and purpose of the activity; this is the second step. Knowledge arriving is the conclusion of the activity of extending knowledge and the attainment of new knowledge. Knowledge arriving represents a result. The “arriving” (zhi 至) of knowledge arriving has levels, because “knowledge arriving” is not the attainment of a result of knowledge in the ultimate sense, but signifies the attainment of the result of stage of the extension of knowledge or a specific activity of extending knowledge; this is the third step. Wang Fuzhi especially emphasised the third stage after the investigation of things, because the main effort all lies in this third step. When Wang Fuzhi opposed viewing the investigation of things and extension of knowledge as simply one affair, he was opposing speaking of “investigating things and extending knowledge” in a sweeping manner, eliminating or neglecting the meticulous effort after the investigation of things. Wang Fuzhi’s extension of knowledge included the content of moral rationality manifesting in the mind, and in this kind of activity, the investigation of things was the inducing cause, the inherent nature and principle originally present in the mind was the basis, and metaphysical inherent nature and principle manifesting in the mind was the result. He said: For this reason, filial piety is known without learning, an ability without reflection; mothers do not learn to raise children and only then marry. That intentions do not depend on knowledge and knowledge does not depend on things is indeed so. Only for the dao of serving one’s parents is there suitability in constancy and expediency in change. There are those who have a private intention to serve themselves, and are thus like Shensheng 申生 and Kuang Zhang 匡章 sinking into the unfilial, yet if one makes use of the investigation of things to extend one’s principle, making it without the slightest doubt or suspicion, one can then use its sincerity. Thus it is that investigation and extension depend on one another, and when it was said that “the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things” [in the

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Great Learning], this is all that was meant. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 11)

Here, Wang Fuzhi believed that there was original knowing (benran zhi zhi 本然之 知) and actual knowing (xianshi zhi zhi 现实之知). Original knowing is the Heaven-endowed moral awareness of knowing without learning, an ability without reflection. All people possess Heaven-endowed moral awareness, hence “knowledge does not depend on things,” as in cases like filial piety and motherly love. Yet the realisation of filial piety and motherly love in conduct, i.e. actual knowing, must pass through people’s activity of investigating things before it can be attained. Actual knowing includes what is “suitability in constancy” and what is “expediency in change,” since these are people’s actual epistemological activities of deducing, distinguishing, etc. However, the final goal of this kind of epistemological activity is still to eliminate the private intention to serve oneself, and make sincere intention manifest. This is to “make use of the investigation of things to extend one’s principle,” to make moral rationality manifest and rule in epistemological activity. This is “investigation and extension depending on one another.” Wang Fuzhi believed that his above explanations captured the entire meaning of “the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things” from the Great Learning. The sentence “the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things” states that the investigation of things is an inducing cause, while the extension of knowledge is the goal and result. In purely epistemological activity, Wang Fuzhi also emphasised the extension of knowledge. In his view, carrying out reflection and introspection on the basis of the principles investigated was more important that the investigation of things itself. This point can be seen from his opposition to exhaustively investigating the things of the world under Heaven. He said: The things of the world under Heaven are endless, yet my investigations have an end. That which I know has a quantity, yet when it is extended, it is no longer limited to this quantity. Master Yan [Hui] 颜回 heard one thing and knew ten, which is to investigate one and extend ten. Zigong 子贡 heard one and knew two, which is to investigate one and extend two [see Analects, 5.9]. If one must wait until one has exhaustively investigated the things of the world under Heaven before one can exhaustively know the principles of the myriad things, this would inevitably be an unattainable number. Thus its supplementary commentary [by Zhu Xi] stated: “Once one has applied effort for a long period, one will one day suddenly attain a thorough comprehension.” At first one has not yet begun to accumulate what one investigates, and yet one’s knowledge has already all arrived. When knowledge arrives, “the whole substance and great function of one’s mind is all illuminated” [from Zhu Xi’s commentary]. The extension of knowledge however also seeks to exhaust whole substance and great function of one’s mind, so how could this merely mean seeking from things? Mencius said: “A carpenter or wheelwright can give a man a compass and square, but he cannot make him skilful at using them” [see Mencius, 7B.5]. A compass and square are things that can be investigated, while being skilful is not a thing, but is knowledge, and cannot be investigated. Skill indeed lies in a compass and square, hence it said, “the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things”; however, there is no skill in a compass and square, hence the investigation of things and extension of knowledge are originally two, and neither can be partially abolished. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 11)

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This passage indicates that he had some insight into the relations between perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge, between principles that are already known and principles known by deducing, and local knowledge and suddenly attaining a thorough comprehension. In terms of the relation between the known and the unknown, he believed that the things and affairs an individual comes into contact with are finite, but the things and affairs of the world under Heaven are infinite; the knowledge people obtain on the basis of the things and affairs they come into contact with is finite, but the knowledge they can have is not limited by the knowledge they experience. Master Yan heard one thing and knew ten, while Zigong heard one and knew two; the knowledge they could have was much greater than what they saw and heard. Hence there is no need to exhaustively investigate the things of the world under Heaven, and then know the principles of the world under Heaven. Here, Wang Fuzhi strongly affirmed people’s initiative in obtaining the unknown on the basis of the known, since people’s epistemological activity does not merely concern what they themselves hear and see, but also includes obtaining rational knowledge on the basis of perceptual knowledge, and relying on known principles to deduce unknown principles. Thus epistemological activity cannot be limited to the scope of the reach of the eyes, ears and other sense organs. As for the relationship between local knowledge and suddenly attaining a thorough comprehension (huoran guantong 豁然贯通), Wang Fuzhi believed that, through the dynamic creative activity of the mind and on the basis of local knowledge, people could produce a leap and thereby attain a thorough insight into the whole. He liked Zhu Xi’s account of “applying effort for a long period” (yongli zhi jiu 用力之久) from his “Supplementary Commentary on Investigating Things in the Great Learning” (Bu Daxue gewu zhuan 补大学格物传), and believed that applying effort for a long period was not merely a simply accumulation and addition of known principles, but a qualitative leap. “Applying effort for a long period” must include intellectual or intuitive processes such as imagination, speculation, deduction and enlightenment. This was in fact to recognise that, in epistemological activity, various forms of obtaining knowledge including rational and non-rational forms are all necessary. In terms of the goals of epistemological activity, Wang Fuzhi believed that epistemological activity is not only about attaining specific pragmatic knowledge, but is more importantly aimed at exercising the ability to think. That is to say, epistemological activity is not only specific, but also general. Specific knowledge is a catalyst for thoroughly understanding the substance of the mind and knowing great illumination. Epistemological activity has both pragmatic goals and also non-pragmatic goals. Or it can be said that, although its motivations are specific and local, its results are general and total. Investigating things gives people specific knowledge, while extending knowledge means the subject using its epistemological ability to actively seek knowledge, in which what it attains is a kind of ability to synthesise. Obtaining this kind of ability lies in specific epistemological activity, but is also not in specific epistemological activity. Hence there must not only be a distinction between investigating things and extending knowledge, but one must

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especially emphasise the importance of actively extending knowledge. This is the meaning conveyed by his statement “being skilful is not a thing, but is knowledge, and cannot be investigated.” This demonstrates that Wang Fuzhi was a dialectician of knowledge who accepted that the investigation of things is the basis of the extension of knowledge, but placed more emphasis on deepening epistemological activity on the basis of the investigation of things. Concerning the distinction between and mutual function of investigating things and extending knowledge as two forms of seeking knowledge, Wang Fuzhi gave more a specific and particular exposition. He said: s In general, in the effort of investigating things, the faculty of the mind and the eyes and ears are used equally, academic scholarship is the core while speculative thought assists it, and that which is thought and speculated are all affairs that belong to academic scholarship. The effort of extending knowledge only lies in the faculty of the mind, speculative thought is the core while academic scholarship assists it, and academic scholarship is used to resolve the doubts raised by speculative thought. The statement “extending knowledge lies in investigating things” uses the eyes and ears to support the functions of the mind and give them something to abide by, rather than regarding the operations of the eyes and ears as the complete exercise of the mind such that the mind itself can be abolished. (Complete Collection of Explanations on Reading the Four Books, 12)

Here, Wang Fuzhi believed that the investigation of things has perceptual activity as its core, and it is assisted by the activities of thought. In the stage of investigating things, the content of thought is mainly perceptual material. The stage of extending knowledge is however a pure activity of thought that mainly includes activities such as imagination, speculation and deduction, while perceptual epistemological activity is supplementary. Although the material used by the extension of knowledge is also supplied by the sense organs, the activity of extending knowledge itself and the results it attains greatly transcend the scope of perceptual material. The investigation of things is the supporting cause of the extension of knowledge, which supplies it with intellectual material; the extension of knowledge is a pure activity of thought on the basis on the investigation of things, hence the results of extending knowledge are a substantiation, expansion and purification of the knowledge attained by investigating things. The two supplement and complete one another. When discussing epistemological activity in general, Wang Fuzhi said: There are two methods of knowing, and they are mutually supportive. However, they each have that which they follow. Broadly extracting images and numbers and distantly demonstrating the ancient and the contemporary in order to exhaustively seek principles is what is called investigating things. Emptying in order to seek its illumination and thinking in order to fathom its hidden aspects is what is called extending knowledge. Without extending knowledge, things have nothing to support them and toying with things dissipates the will; without investigating things, knowing has nothing to use and the intellect is squandered, entering into perversity. The two are mutually supportive, so there can be no extension of each. (Extended Meanings of the Book of Documents, 66)

“Broadly extracting images and numbers and distantly demonstrating the ancient and the contemporary” are both epistemological activities with specific objects of

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examination. “Emptying in order to seek its illumination” refers to the empty numinosity of the mind possessing general knowledge due to its synthesis and abstraction of specific information. “Thinking in order to fathom its hidden aspects” refers to passing through a process of logical thought including imagination and deduction to make doubtful things manifest and supplemented. Without the extension of knowledge, the specific knowledge obtained by investigating things cannot be elevated to knowledge of regularity at a deeper level, and it is hard to avoid the fault of “toying with things and dissipating the will.” However, without the investigation of things, thought has no specific material or actual content and uses its intellectual ability in vain, and it is hard to avoid the fault of “the intellect being squandered and entering into perversity.” Hence investigating things and extending knowledge are mutually supportive and accomplished, and neither side can be absent. Wang Fuzhi’s explanations of the relationship between investigating things and extending knowledge express a distinctive quality of his epistemology, namely apart from emphasising China’s deeply rooted tradition of empiricism, he especially emphasised the work, sublimation and deduction of rational thought on perceptual material, in particular the content it logically contains. This indicates that he had a much great methodological self-awareness in comparison with earlier philosophers, and that his epistemology had already moved from Neo-Confucian’s main approach, in which it went from the principles of things to inherent nature and principle by analogy and projection, to an emphasis on thinking itself; it also indicates that his understanding of the kinds of thought and on the relationships between specific and abstract, perceptual and deductive, local and whole, empirical and rational in epistemological activity had made a great step forward, going from emphasising a spiritual plane to emphasising both thought and a spiritual plane, and from emphasising moral rationality to emphasising a synthesis of moral rationality and epistemological rationality. In this sense we can say that Wang Fuzhi was both a summative figure in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, and a turning point and founder of the new academic ethos from the Ming to the Qing.