Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on Human Knowledge: (Articles 2-5) (Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations, 25) 9042945575, 9789042945579

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D A L L A S M E D I E VA L T E X T S A N D T R A N S L AT I O N S

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Henry of Ghent’s Summa The Questions on Human Knowledge (Articles 2–5) Text from the Leuven Edition Translation, Introduction, and Notes by Juan Carlos Flores

PEETERS

Henry of Ghent’s Summa The Questions on Human Knowledge (Articles 2–5)

DALLAS MEDIEVAL TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

EDITORS

Kelly Gibson (University of Dallas) Philipp W. Rosemann (National University of Ireland, Maynooth) EDITORIAL BOARD

Charles S. F. Burnett (Warburg Institute); Marcia L. Colish (Yale University); Kent Emery, Jr. (University of Notre Dame); Hugh Bernard Feiss, O.S.B. (Monastery of the Ascension); Donald J. Kagay (University of Dallas); Theresa Kenney (University of Dallas); James J. Lehrberger, O.Cist. (University of Dallas); James McEvoy (†); Bernard McGinn (University of Chicago); James J. Murphy (University of California, Davis); Jonathan J. Sanford (University of Dallas); Francis R. Swietek (University of Dallas); Baudouin van den Abeele (Université catholique de Louvain); Nancy van Deusen (Claremont Graduate University); Bonnie Wheeler (Southern Methodist University)

SPONSORED BY

DALLAS MEDIEVAL TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

25

Henry of Ghent’s Summa The Questions on Human Knowledge: (Articles 2–5)

TEXT FROM THE LEUVEN EDITION TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION, AND NOTES BY

Juan Carlos Flores (University of Detroit Mercy)

PEETERS LEUVEN - PARIS - BRISTOL, CT 2021

Cover illustration: The opening of Henry of Ghent’s Summa in MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15355, fol. 2r. This manuscript, which belonged to Henry’s student Godfrey of Fontaines, is known to be very close to the autograph. By kind permission of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. © 2021 – Peeters – Bondgenotenlaan 153 – B-3000 Leuven – Belgium. ISBN 978-90-429-4557-9 eISBN 978-90-429-4558-6 D/2021/0602/83 All rights reserved. No part of this publiction may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Para mis hijos, Nicolás y Alex, con quienes la traducción es más que un arte.

Frontispiece: The beginning of Article II in MS. Toulouse, Bibliothèque municipale, 199, fol. 18v. By kind permission of the Bibliothèque municipale, Toulouse.

Foreword With this volume, we are continuing our series of translations of Henry of Ghent’s Summa quaestionum ordinarium, a series begun many years ago by Jos Decorte and Father Roland Teske, who have now both passed away. Volumes 5 and 6 included articles 21 through 24 and 25 through 30 respectively, containing material devoted to the philosophy of God. Father Teske subsequently added several further translations of the Summa, without facing Latin texts, most of which appeared in Marquette’s “Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation” series. These volumes were devoted to article 1; articles 6 through 10; articles 31 and 32; articles 35, 36, 42, and 45; and articles 53 through 55.1 Father Teske was an indefatigable translator, not only of Henry of Ghent, but of Augustine and William of Auvergne as well, as he realized that English versions were required to promote the study of medieval thinkers outside the small circle of specialized medievalist scholars. Teske’s translations left an important gap between article 1 and articles 6 through 10; for in articles 2 through 5 Henry of Ghent develops his characteristic positions on human knowledge. Here, in the wake of the condemnation of 1277, Henry distances himself from some of the views of Thomas Aquinas, influenced as those were by Aristotelian notions of a human intellect functioning outside the light of grace. Henry subtly rebalances the account, emphasizing more strongly Augustinian insights into the ultimate insufficiency of the human mind not illuminated by faith and informed by the study of Sacred Scripture. He thus reinvigorates the old Augustinian view, from the De doctrina christiana, according to which all study not only ultimately serves the study of Scripture, but is worthless without charity.  The five volumes, all with translation, introduction, and notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J., are: (1) Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions, Article One: On the Possibility of Knowledge (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008); (2) Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions: Articles Six to Ten on Theology, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 48 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2011); (3) Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions: Articles Thirty-One and Thirty-Two on God’s Eternity and the Divine Attributes in General, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 49 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2012); (4) Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions: Articles Thirty-Five, Thirty-Six, Forty-Two, and Forty-Five on Potency, Perfection, and Will in God, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 50 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2013); (5) Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions: Articles 53–55, on the Divine Persons, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 52 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2015).

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Foreword

This volume, then, offers us an English translation of articles 2 through 5, expertly prepared by Professor Juan Carlos Flores together with an introduction and notes. The Latin text is reprinted, by kind permission of Leuven University Press, from Professor Gordon Wilson’s critical edition, which appeared in the Leuven series of Henry of Ghent’s complete works. Philipp W. Rosemann January 20, 2021

Table of Contents FOREWORD

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INTRODUCTION The Author Henry of Ghent Articles 2 to 5 of the Summa Henry and Divine Illumination Certitude Human Nature’s Aim Faith and Reason Note on the Latin Text, Translation, and Endnotes Annotated Bibliography

1 1 2 3 7 10 13 15 16

HENRY OF GHENT’S SUMMA: THE QUESTIONS ON HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (ARTICLES 2–5) Article II: Concerning how to know Question 1: Whether it is possible for a human being to know something with certainty Question 2: Whether any human being knows with certainty whatever he knows Question 3: Whether any human being knows with equal certitude whatever he knows Question 4: Whether all human beings who happen to know the same things know them with equal certitude Question 5: Whether all human beings are equally apt to know with certitude Question 6: Whether all knowable things are apt to be known with equal certitude Article III: Concerning the character of knowable things Question 1: Whether it is possible for a human being to know nonbeings Question 2: Whether it is possible for a human being to know all beings Question 3: Whether it is possible for a human being to know all things through the philosophical sciences

21 22 22 28 34 40 46 58 68 68 74 78

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Question 4: Whether it is possible for a human being to know all things through purely natural means Question 5: Whether it is possible for a human being to know through grace those things which exceed nature Article IV: Concerning the desire to know Question 1: Whether a human being desires to know Question 2: Whether every human being desires to know Question 3: Whether a human being by nature desires to know Question 4: Whether all human beings equally desire to know Question 5: Whether a human being desires to know those things that exceed the knowledge of natural reason Question 6: Whether a human being desires to know all things Question 7: Whether a human being desires to know each single thing equally Question 8: Whether there is any one thing that a human being chiefly desires to know Question 9: Whether a human being desires to know all other things on account of that which he chiefly desires to know Article V: Concerning the pursuit of knowledge Question 1: Whether a human being should study in order to know Question 2: Whether a human being should study in order to know all things Question 3: Whether a human being should study in order to know realities that exceed the philosophical sciences Question 4: Whether a human being should study in order to know all that is contained in the philosophical sciences Question 5: Whether a human being should employ the same method of study in order to know each thing Question 6: Whether a human being should pursue knowledge for its own sake Question 7: Whether a human being should impose a limit on his studies

82 86 92 94 98 104 110 114 124 128 132 140 146 146 152 158 170 178 186 198

NOTES

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

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Introduction The Author Henry of Ghent The dominant theologian in Europe between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent (d. 1293)1 produced a massive Summa of Ordinary Questions (Summa quaestionum ordinariarum), as well as fifteen quodlibets (Quodlibeta), during his long tenure at the University of Paris.2 His work constituted a new synthesis of faith and reason which competed with that of Thomas Aquinas and which influenced the history of both philosophy and theology. Although Aquinas and Henry both developed Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in light of the Christian faith, Aquinas favored Aristotle in terms of fundamental principles. Henry, on the other hand, favored Plato as interpreted by Augustine and by his predecessor at Paris, Bonaventure. This preference appears clearly in the first article of the Summa (entitled “On the Possibility of Knowing”), where Henry develops the view that human knowledge is rooted in divine illumination, even though the first stage of knowledge does entail the abstraction of universal concepts from sensible particulars (Aristotle’s general explanation of the process of knowledge).3 As in other key topics, Henry’s treatment is original, among other factors, by addressing Aristotelian sources more explicitly and perhaps more incisively than his Augustinian predecessors ever did. Henry’s seminal work fed currents, both Platonic and Aristotelian, well beyond the scholastic period and outside university walls.4 1

 Details on Henry’s life may be found in Pasquale Porro, “An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent,” in Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293), ed. Willy Vanhamel, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, XV (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 373–403. 2  For a chronology of his works (cross-referencing the Summa articles with dates from his various Quodlibeta, that is, works derived from public disputations which Henry held at the University of Paris), see José Gómez Caffarena, “Cronología de la ‘Suma’ de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus ‘Quodlibetos,’” Gregorianum 38 (1957): 116–33. 3  See Henrici de Gandavo Summa, art. I–V, ed. Gordon A. Wilson, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 2 (Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia), XXI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), art. 1, qu. 2. All subsequent references to articles 1–5 of the Summa are based on this volume. 4  See Juan Carlos Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, with a Critical Edition of Question Six of Article Fifty-Five of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, XXXVI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006), 1–2.

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Introduction

The first five articles of the Summa, dealing with various issues associated with human knowledge, constitute an adequate introduction to Henry’s thought. In them we find his basic approach to fundamental principles and themes developed in detail in the rest of his corpus. Of the five, only the first article has appeared as a whole in English translation;5 in it we find an account of the origin and operation of human knowledge. The next four articles of the Summa (art. 2–5) reinforce and develop the findings of this account, and provide additional treatments that indicate Henry’s principles and orientation. In fact, these four articles alone provide a condensed but remarkably rich portrait of Henry’s basic thought, and so are an invaluable resource for beginning and advanced students alike. Articles 2 to 5 of the Summa Articles 2 to 5 include important positions on knowledge and reality, a conception of humanity’s ultimate purpose (and the pursuits most conducive to it), and an approach to faith and reason. Article two examines the question of certitude, and contains thereby Henry’s basic understanding of the quality and scope of human knowledge—fundamental elements of his epistemology. Article three deals with the character of knowable things, both as objects of knowledge and as beings within the order of reality. Henry’s metaphysics complements his epistemology here, informing his understanding of divine illumination (in questions four and five of this article). Article four deals with the desire to know, and indicates how human life is ultimately ordered to the knowledge and love of God, the source of all wisdom and goodness. Henry’s view of happiness—the central question in classical ethics— comes here to the fore. Finally, article five investigates how knowledge should be pursued, including the order among the sciences, their methods, and the ultimate goal of all scientific pursuit. Henry’s view of the proper relation between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, is here delineated. Accordingly, these articles develop foundations of Henry’s philosophy and theology. Naturally, the explicit topic of each article is not treated in isolation; all four articles mutually inform and reinforce the development of certain basic themes. We shall discuss briefly three of these themes below, which run like a red thread throughout the four articles. These themes are (1) certitude, (2) human nature’s aim, and (3) faith and reason. As a background to articles two to five, however, it is important

 See Henry of Ghent, Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions, Article One: On the Possibility of Knowing, trans. Roland J. Teske, S.J. (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008). 5

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to say a few words on the main theme introduced in article one of the Summa, which plays a major role is several other sections of Henry’s work, and which is also basic to Augustine and Bonaventure. This theme is divine illumination. Henry and Divine Illumination Henry grants not only that human beings can know how to act and make things,6 but also that they can know reality, since the intellect—through its own natural powers—can gather universal forms or natures from the sensible particulars classed under them. However, these abstracted universal forms or natures, of themselves, do not suffice for the complete grasp of the truth, since they are drawn from the changing, sensible realm of contingent individuals. Moreover, they are grasped by the human intellect in cooperation with the body, the senses, and the imagination, all of which are subject to change and error. In other words, knowing truth absolutely would require knowing the eternal and perfect cause of the natures of sensible things. This cause, for Henry, is God, whose eternal knowledge contains the ideas that are the models of creation. Knowing truth in this sense would require the open vision of God’s essence, which is not possible for human beings in the state of the present life. Only God’s saving grace can lift us beyond what is humanly possible in order to reach this state of beatific insight and union. For believers in revelation, this is the hope for the next life. Still, human beings can experience truth in this life through indirect illumination from God, insofar as the human intellect may reach some comparison between the universal abstracted from sensible things and the eternal, creative exemplar in the mind of God. This comparison, in this life, is never based on the direct vision of the eternal exemplars. Rather, God’s illumination is the foundation, not the object, of human understanding.7 As Plato8 and Neoplatonists like Plotinus9 had pointed out, we recognize and judge, for instance, beautiful things in virtue of our awareness of the form of beauty. All particular, sensible, beautiful things share or participate in the form of beauty, but they are all beautiful only in a particular way and to a limited extent, and so fall short of being beautiful in an absolute sense. Only the form of beauty, Beauty itself,  See Summa, art. 1, qu. 1. For Henry, showing this is enough to establish the possibility of human knowledge, and thus deny pure skepticism and relativism. 7  See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2–3. See also Flores, Metaphysics and the Trinity, 19–21. 8  See, for example, Republic V, 476a–d. 9  See Plotinus, Ennead I.6: “On Beauty.” 6

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is beautiful absolutely. This is the standard and origin of all particular beautiful things, which derive their beauty from it. The human soul is reminded of this absolute form when it recognizes beautiful things and realizes that they fall short of absolute beauty. Since no particular, sensible thing is Beauty itself, but rather only shares in beauty, Beauty itself is present to the soul as an intelligible and not as a sensible object. Sensible objects only remind the soul of absolute beauty, but they do not supply the knowledge of absolute beauty.10 This means that some knowledge of the forms is inherently present to the soul, even though a given soul may not recognize it through ignorance or vice. The soul somehow employs absolute beauty as a standard for recognizing and judging particular beautiful things, but even virtuous souls in this life fail to grasp absolute beauty completely and permanently. For, the human soul here and now is tied to the body and the sensible world, and thus is not able to commune fully with the intelligible realm of forms.11 In other words, the form in this life serves more as the basis, and not as the perfect and adequate object, of human understanding.12 One could say that the forms are the light of the soul, since they are the basis from which the soul sees things intellectually.13 This explanation applies to the experience of all instances of a form, to just things in reference to justice, good things in reference to goodness, etc.14 Therefore, in Plato and Neoplatonism, one already finds elements of a philosophy of illumination that influences medieval treatments of divine illumination.

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 Since the soul does not derive its knowledge of the forms from sense-experience of the physical world, but rather is only reminded of them through sense-experience, Plato argues that the soul must possess some knowledge of the forms prior to its earthly life in the body, and consequently that it must exist as an intellectual substance prior to physical birth. See Phaedo, 74b–77b. 11  In Phaedo, 64a–69d, Plato famously argues that philosophy is training for death, since death is the separation of soul and body, and philosophy trains the soul in this life to transcend the body as much as possible through the pursuit of wisdom, which consists in the knowledge of true (intelligible) reality. But only through death will the virtuous soul be freed from the body completely, and so be able to commune fully with the eternal forms. 12  Plotinus (among other followers of Plato) would claim that it is possible to reach some vision of the Good (the highest form) through our own efforts in this life (see, for instance, the last section of Ennead I.6: “On Beauty”). Plato suggests this in his Symposium and other places. However, this vision can never be permanent or complete in the strict sense of the word, due to the soul’s lived experience in the body. 13  Plato’s analogy between the Good (the highest form) and the sun is well known. As the sun provides the conditions for life on earth, as well the light necessary for physical vision, so the Good is the cause of intelligible (and thereby, sensible) reality, as well as the source of the soul’s intellectual vision. See Republic VI, 508 b–e. 14  For a more detailed explanation of this theme in Plato, see Juan Carlos Flores, Reexamining Love of Wisdom: Philosophical Desire from Socrates to Nietzsche (Eugene, Oreg.: Cascade Books, 2016), 16–20.

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Augustine revised this understanding by explicitly identifying the Platonic forms with God’s creative art.15 The Platonic ideas are not subsistent essences, necessary in themselves, as some interpreters of Plato might be inclined to think. Rather, they exist in the mind of the unique, necessary, transcendent, and omnipotent God of revelation, who creates and governs all things through his infinite knowledge and will. Human beings can know some degree of truth because of divine illumination: the human mind is able to recognize the truth of creatures through the light of the Creator, but without seeing the source of illumination directly or perfectly in this life. On the other hand, the direct vision of God is a free gift of divine grace; reaching this knowledge is ultimately not up to us.16 As already mentioned, Henry nuances this understanding by incorporating Aristotle within his view of illumination. The first stage of knowledge does entail the abstraction of universal forms from sensible and particular individuals, as Aristotle explains in On the Soul (De anima). This process is based on the natural powers of the human soul, which senses, imagines, and (from sensible images in the imagination) generates universal concepts, such as the concept dog, which applies to all the different, particular dogs, and indeed to the entire species of dogs as such. To have knowledge of something is to know its universal form or essence, along with its inherent properties. Anything short of this is merely experience, not knowledge. I may have seen and experienced a vast array of dogs, but if I do not know what makes a dog a dog, what belongs essentially to all dogs—the universal form—then I do not possess knowledge in the proper sense of the word. I have only opinion, acquaintance with contingent and fluctuating aspects of the various dogs of my experience, what Aristotle calls accidents. Without the universal form, I am unable to make judgments that apply necessarily to any and all dogs insofar as they are dogs. It is this consistency, this permanence or necessity, which characterizes knowledge. In Aristotle, the universal form, abstracted from sensible and particular individuals, provides the permanent and necessary foundation for knowledge. For Aristotle, it is unnecessary (and in fact problematic) to appeal to a separate, intelligible realm of forms, as Plato does.17 The sensible world is intelligible in its own right, since the intellect can draw out its universal forms and patterns and come to understand it properly.18  See, for example, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 46. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qu. 84, art. 5. 16  For a summary of Augustine’s thought, see Flores, Reexamining Love of Wisdom, 63–76 (on the topic of knowledge and illumination: 68–71). 17  Aristotle criticizes Plato’s theory of forms, among other places, in Metaphysics I, chap. 9. Of course, Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato is another question. As is well known, several ancient and medieval students of Aristotle still favored Plato. 18  For a treatment of Aristotle’s philosophy, see Flores, Reexamining Love of Wisdom, 31–55. 15

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For Henry, this (abstracted) universal form is indeed a respectable beginning for truth and knowledge. Moreover, it is one which evidences the integrity of the natural powers of the human soul, which can gather knowledge from the sensible world through its own agency. Knowledge is not in each instance an inscrutable occasion of supernatural intervention—a divine gift pure and simple,19 but rather a natural process engendered by the natural affinity between the human life-form and the other natural forms in the surrounding natural world. However, Henry’s key point is that this (abstracted) universal form—the created exemplar, as he often calls it—is only a first step in knowledge, and therefore not sufficient for higher levels of knowledge. After all (as mentioned), this created exemplar is derived from the changing realm of the senses; it can yield only so much purity. Knowledge in a higher sense would be what Augustine and Bonaventure gathered from the Platonic tradition: the human mind recognizes and judges the imperfections in all created things—including the created exemplar, because the mind has some connection with the perfect models of creation, with God as the ultimate ground of truth. In other words, the mind recognizes these perfect models as the basis or light of its knowledge, but does not grasp them directly as the objects of its knowledge. In this life, the human mind can strengthen this connection to some degree through a life of virtue and contemplation, and through revelation and grace. However, the highest level of knowledge is available only through salvation and the next life. This is the open, beatific vision of God’s essence, the first truth and ultimate good. Henry often employs these distinctions in the Summa articles translated here, and in the rest of his work: the knowledge, truth, and certitude available naturally (from the senses) is necessary and legitimate, but not sufficient for the higher levels of understanding to which the soul aspires. In later articles of the Summa,20 Henry nuances his view of illumination further by grounding it in metaphysics. Ultimately, illumination is based on the intellect’s notion of being. The intellect’s first concept, that of being, is in fact the concept of God—pure being.21 This is the ultimate regulative notion, by which it can judge degrees and kinds of being as deficient in comparison with absolute being, even though the intellect in this life cannot see pure being itself perfectly. However, as already noted, the doctrine of divine illumination is operative in Henry from the very beginning of the Summa. For Henry, the intellect can discern created essences 19

 This is not meant to suggest that any theory of illumination without this incorporation of Aristotle results in this view. This is far from being the case. 20  See, for example, Summa, art. 21, qu. 2. 21  Henry is clearly developing the tradition of Bonaventure (see Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, chap. 3).

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through some comparison with their uncreated models, without seeing directly into these models, just as the eye sees by means of the illumination of the sun, although it cannot penetrate directly and fully into the sun. Human beings can know a variety of true things, although the very truth of things—God himself—is known only indirectly through our limited awareness of being and perfection while judging the lesser objects of our experience. Still, some truth is available in this life, through our natural powers of abstraction and through the first concepts of the intellect. Moreover, these natural powers are ordered not only toward what they can achieve naturally through human effort and dedication, but also toward their ultimate and supernatural goal: the perfect knowledge and love of God, the first truth and ultimate good. Although this is not possible for us here and now, Henry claims that in this life we can reach some understanding of what is beyond the strict scope of unaided reason, such as the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. For the believer, these mysteries are first held by faith alone. However, it is possible to gain some understanding of them in this life. This level of understanding is proper to theology as the science of revelation, in which reason is strengthened and purified by faith. Henry exemplifies this type of understanding (among other topics) through his Trinitarian theology in the latter part of the Summa,22 where we see him, perhaps more intensely than anywhere else, developing reason alongside faith beyond the limits of philosophy taken on its own. Certitude Article two of the Summa (“Concerning How to Know”), developed in six questions, concentrates on the certitude of knowledge, and the five questions of article three (“Concerning the Character of Knowable Things”) complement this investigation by considering the entities that are known. Needless to say, certitude is a fundamental issue in the history of philosophy, the treatment of which alone defines a variety of schools—skeptic, Cartesian, agnostic, etc. Henry’s view on the issue, therefore, is basic to his thought and helps reveal his place in the broader spectrum of philosophical positions. His position (like virtually all of his positions) is not a simple one, but rather one that is nuanced by a number of factors. For Henry, certitude is to be understood in two senses, as either (1) knowledge that is free from error or (2) knowledge that is the open vision of truth. Strictly, certitude is attainable for human beings only in the first sense, since the second sense  The core of Henry’s Trinitarian thought is found in Summa, art. 53 to 61. A study of this thought, and of the philosophy included therein, is Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity. 22

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would require the open vision of the ground of truth—God’s essence—which, again, is not possible in this life. In the first sense, the principles of theoretical and practical reasoning are evident and free from error, and the conclusions properly drawn from these principles are also evident and free from error. The first principle of theoretical reasoning is the concept of being, which the mind has to know in order to know anything else, since a thing is known to the extent that it is a being. This is the basis for the theoretical sciences: metaphysics (which includes natural theology), mathematics, and physics (or natural science). Moreover, theology understood as the science of revelation still relies on the concept of being, but it makes it more explicit in its discussion of divine reality with the assistance of revelation and faith (as mentioned earlier). The first principle of practical science is the concept of the good, which the mind has to know in order to seek any end, since an end is sought insofar as it is seen as good. This is the basis of ethics, politics, and law. Certitude in the sciences, moreover, depends on two additional factors, namely, (1) the disposition of the knower and (2) the character of what is knowable. In terms of the former, not everyone is equally disposed to know certainly. Diversity among human bodies (including sensitive and imaginative powers), modes of upbringing and education, habits, inclination to study, sharpness of intellect, morals, and character—all play a role in a person’s disposition to attain certitude in different fields. In terms of what is knowable, Henry relies on Aristotle’s classical distinction (developed by Aquinas and others) between what is evident in itself and what is evident to us. God and other intellectual substances (that is, angels) are most evident in themselves, or in their own nature, since they have a higher degree of reality than fleeting sensible substances. However, they are scarcely evident to us (in fact, many people deny their very existence), since our knowledge originates in the senses while these realities are far removed from sense. On the other hand, the bodies that we sense and that are the objects of our everyday experience are least evident in themselves. They are contingent, in a continual process of change, and have a low degree of reality; yet they are evident to us through sense-experience. Due to the differences among the very natures of what is knowable, Henry emphasizes (as Aristotle often does) the crucial importance of approaching different sciences through the methods appropriate to them. In question five of article five, he claims that there is no greater obstacle to the pursuit of truth than trying to follow same method in every science.23 Thus, each of the three traditional theoretical sciences— namely, mathematics, physics (natural science), and metaphysics—has its own proper method and thereby its own level of certitude, as explained in question six of article 23

 Note the sharp contrast with Descartes, who sought to establish certitude in all areas through the one method of clear and distinct ideas (as found in his Meditations).

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two (“Whether all knowable things are apt to be known with equal certitude”).24 Mathematics is for us most certain, since it considers sensible objects (where our knowledge begins) through an unchanging aspect, namely, abstracted quantity. Thus it is close to our experience and at the same time offers fixed truths. Natural science is second in terms of our certitude, since it deals with evident objects of our experience, which are nevertheless in a process of change and therefore less certain than the objects of mathematics. Last in terms of human certitude are the immaterial substances which are the principles and causes in metaphysics, since they are far removed from our sense-bound knowledge, and yet they are most certain in themselves. As seekers of knowledge, it is crucial to understand the basic distinctions among knowable objects, and observe the scientific methods rooted in them, lest we misrepresent the character and order of reality. The task for us, as seekers of truth and certitude, is to work our way from the realm of sense toward the first causes, above all God, who is in himself the ultimate and most certain truth. This we do, first, through the methods of the philosophical sciences, and second, beyond purely natural means, by relying on revelation in order to arrive at some understanding of the realities of the faith. Our knowledge of being, which begins with sensible reality, can be made more and more adequate as we reason from sensible effects to their immaterial causes. Philosophy can teach us that the beings of our experience depend on a first cause, but philosophy (as based on natural reason) envisions this cause only insofar as the effects reveal it, and not adequately in terms of its essence. However, revelation and holy living can help natural reason reach beyond this limitation, and gain some understanding of what is believed (such as the tenet that the essence of the first cause is triune, as explained later in the Summa). But only in the next life, through the gift of salvation, is the human soul able to achieve its final (beatific) end. The key point for Henry, however, is that the certitude of the philosophical sciences is ultimately grounded in God’s essence,25 and therefore the theology that employs both reason and revelation in order to elevate human knowledge beyond purely natural means is higher and more authoritative than any strictly philosophical science. For, this theology of divine revelation envisions more adequately and explicitly than any other (human) science the essence of the first principle.26 The basic 24  In question two of article two (response to the second argument), and in question five of article five (solution), Henry addresses the level of certitude found in morals and law. 25  This is mentioned in the very first question of the text translated here (art. 2, qu. 1, solution), and in many other places throughout these four articles. 26  For Henry’s understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology, see Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, 13–35. See also Juan Carlos Flores, “The Intersection of Philosophy

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elements of this position, developed in Henry’s properly theological treatments later in the Summa, as well as in relevant quodlibets, are already set down in the articles included in this volume. Human Nature’s Aim In terms of the present volume, this theme is developed primarily (but not exclusively) in the nine questions of article four (“Concerning the Desire to Know”). Human nature is defined by the possession of a rational soul, whose proper faculties are intellect and will, and whose proper end is the attainment of truth and goodness, which are found above all in God. Henry emphasizes that human nature is indeed equipped with the capabilities to reach the perfect knowledge and love of God. But this needs to be understood in a precise sense. Human nature is not capable of reaching this goal on its own, through its own efforts. Human nature can go only so far; grace is necessary to get there. However, human nature has the potential for union with God through knowledge and love. First, the fact that the human intellect is inherently impressed with the general concept of being, by which it understands anything that it understands, means that it potentially can know all being, since all being as such is intelligible, including God’s being. However, this capacity can be exercised naturally, through human direction and control, only in relation to sensible reality. The intellect begins with sense experience and can then infer the existence of higher spiritual realities related to sensible reality as causes to effects. In other words, these higher substances are revealed to the intellect not in themselves, but rather only insofar as the effects reveal them. In its natural condition, the intellect cannot grasp adequately the essence of these higher realities, since it remains tied to sensible reality as to the origin from which it draws the content of its knowledge. However, through divine assistance the potency of the intellect can be activated beyond purely natural means, to the point that its general understanding of being becomes a more specific understanding of the causes of being that transcend the realm of the senses. In other words, Henry’s position on the intellect’s potential is twofold. First, the intellect’s fundamental awareness of being means that it has the potential to know all being, including God’s. Second, even though the intellect, through its own efforts and as grounded in the senses, can only ascertain the being of immaterial substances in general, that is as causes of sensible reality, the intellect has the potential to receive and Theology: Henry of Ghent on the Scope of Metaphysics and the Background in Aquinas and Bonaventure,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71:2–3 (2015): 531–44.

Introduction

11

the supplement of a higher light, by which it can then actualize its potential beyond its natural limitations and grasp adequately the essence of the ground of all being. In this way, the intellect’s predisposition to the knowledge of all being can come to fruition. Again, the intellect cannot reach this purely on its own, but it need not remain at the level of what it can achieve on its own. Even more, the intellect is meant inherently for a goal that, although it requires divine assistance, actualizes its very own natural potency. This view is complemented by Henry’s insights on human desire. First, for Henry, the will is sovereign among the faculties of the soul. The will commands even the intellect because it either directs it to, or withdraws it from, seeking knowledge. The intellect conditions the will only in the sense that the will can will an end only insofar as the end is known to some extent through the intellect. The intellect is a necessary condition for the will. However, the will governs the intellect in the proper sense, by moving it toward or away from its end. The will directs all the faculties of the soul toward their proper goods, which goods are means toward the attainment of the soul’s ultimate good—blessedness through union with God, who is the perfect good and truth, just as the sovereign of a city commands all officials, magistrates, and administrators to perform their proper tasks, which contribute to the well-being of the city as a whole (as explained in the first question of article four). Accordingly, Henry interprets Aristotle’s famous first line in the Metaphysics—“all human beings by nature desire to know”—in the sense that the will prompts the intellect to seek the proper good of the intellect, which is truth. The will incites the intellect to seek adequate knowledge of what it at first knows only incompletely. Since the intellect’s nature is its potential to know all being, and all things seek the actualization of their potential, the good of the intellect consists in the complete knowledge of being and truth. Strictly speaking, the object of the intellect is truth, while the object of the will is the absolute good. Every end is sought insofar as it is good, insofar as it falls within the scope of the will, which directs all faculties toward their proper goods. Fundamentally, therefore, it is the will which summons the intellect toward the actualization of its potential, since truth is sought insofar as it is the proper good of the intellect. It is crucial for Henry to show that, just as the intellect’s potential for knowledge extends beyond the strict limits of nature, and is in fact meant for the perfect knowledge of God, so too the will’s desire for the good extends beyond the strict limits of nature and is meant for the perfect love of God. At their core, will and intellect are mutually interdependent, though distinguishable, faculties of one mind. The mind, as will, seeks the good insofar as it is already known at a basic level through the intellect, while the will commands the intellect to know it perfectly so that it may love it perfectly. The mind also knows, as intellect, that it desires, that

12

Introduction

truth is good, and that it should seek perfect knowledge in order to achieve the perfect good. God is the absolute truth and perfect good, and the origin of every truth and good. Accordingly, Henry claims, not only do human beings desire God—the perfect good—above all things, but they also desire everything else on account of God. For, every good is good by participation in the first good, just as every truth is true by participation in the first truth. Every truth and good is known and desired to the extent that it bears the imprint of what is truth and good by essence. At the same time, these lesser truths and goods are desired as stepping stones toward the ultimate truth and good. Therefore, we desire every good on account of God in two senses: (1) insofar as every good draws its goodness from God, and (2) insofar as every good points and leads to God. Therefore, the desire for God is at the heart of human nature, as explained in the last question of article four. The discovery of truth through purely natural means ends in ascertaining the existence of God as the first cause of experienced effects, but again, stops short of understanding the essence of God and other intellectual substances. Yet, the will always desires the perfect knowledge of what is known only imperfectly. Through purely natural means, will and intellect fall short of their ultimate goal: intellectual capacity is only partially actualized; desire for the good is only partially fulfilled. Therefore, the basic desire to know and thereby love God perfectly is inscribed in the very core of the soul, since the soul is aware of its imperfect knowledge of a transcendent reality, and thus desires to penetrate the essence of this reality. What is more, the awareness of this very limitation of nature and of the need of supernatural assistance is at the heart of human nature. In other words, human nature’s aim is ordered not only toward the completion of its natural capacity as far as human efforts allow, but also toward the seeking of supernatural sources that can lift it from its poverty toward the consummation of its inherent potencies and desires. In other words, essential to human nature’s aim is reliance on revelation and grace. It is a mistake to interpret the aim of human nature either (1) as capable of reaching transcendent realities on its own, or (2) as tending toward a proper fulfillment that falls below God himself. Many philosophers have erred by adopting either extreme. Rather, the accurate and honest appraisal of human nature lies in acknowledging its aim towards a transcendent goal, its incapacity to reach this through purely natural means, and thereby its inherent need and desire for supernatural assistance.27 27

 On this topic, see Juan Carlos Flores, “The Roots of Love of Wisdom: Henry of Ghent on Platonic and Aristotelian Forms,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, ed. Kent Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman, and Andreas Speer, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 623–40.

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This is the sound conclusion on the human condition, one that strictly speaking does not need revealed data, but rather only the integrity of genuine and honest philosophical thinking. Henry criticizes the many who have failed to see this point (as seen in question five of article four). Philosophy itself—love of wisdom—is oriented toward the synthesis of reason and faith, through the awareness that the core drives of human nature cannot achieve what they are meant for without the supernatural assistance that brings these drives to fruition. Philosophy, reason’s pursuit of truth through purely natural means, is meant to go beyond its limits and transform itself into theological wisdom, whereby reason, purified and strengthened by revelation and holy living, can arrive at some understanding of the realities of the faith in this life, and hopefully be granted full vision and beatitude in the next. Faith and Reason In terms of the present volume, this theme is developed primarily (but not exclusively) in the seven questions of article five (“Concerning the Pursuit of Knowledge”). Philosophy is by definition subordinate to theology, which relies on the higher light of revelation. However, theology and faith do not leave reason behind, but rather purify and strengthen it. Through revelation and grace, reason can come to understand realities that it would be otherwise unable to see, even in this life. Here, an important difference with Thomas Aquinas is clear: for Aquinas, reason and faith, philosophy and theology, are separate domains, since philosophy is based on reason, while theology is based on faith in the sense that its premises are taken on faith. For Aquinas, there is a formal distinction between philosophy and theology, since the perspective of the former is qualitatively different from that of the latter, just as the perspective of sight differs from that of hearing, although both are legitimate sense faculties.28 For Aquinas, theology is superior to philosophy because it is based on God’s revelation, a higher source than natural reason, which is still legitimate in its own domain. On the other hand, Henry (following Bonaventure) conceives the distinction between philosophy and theology in a different way: revelation purifies and strengthens the domain of reason itself. Natural reason and philosophy are indeed distinct from faith and revelation, since the former can exist without the latter. However, they are not distinct in the sense that they are by definition qualitatively different. The difference for Henry is one of degree: reason reaches greater

 See, for instance, his remarks in Summa theologiae I, qu. 1, art. 3.

28

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insight and clarity through the supplement of revelation and faith.29 Of course, both Aquinas and Henry would agree that the subordinate role of reason and philosophy should not be interpreted in the sense that theological wisdom is simply a divine gift in which rational studies have no place. Theology for both entails the thorough employment of reason. However, since one should study for the sake of the next life, Henry does delimit clearly the appropriate extent of non-theological studies (as he explains in question four of article five: “Whether a human being should study in order to know all that is contained in the philosophical sciences”). All non-theological studies (barring superstitious and dark arts, which are to be avoided completely) are merely useful in providing what is necessary in training the mind for the truly important study of revelation, which alone concerns itself with humanity’s ultimate aim, namely, salvation. Therefore, the investigation of the world, with its infinite researches, subspecialties, and applications, can easily become vain curiosity that absorbs entire lives, and therefore an obstacle to the highest pursuit. One should not dwell on any discipline to such an extent that it takes away from what needs to be learned from Sacred Scripture. What matters ultimately is grasping what is essential in Sacred Scripture, in terms of knowledge of God and right conduct, for the sake of salvation. Scientific truth is desirable for its own sake, in the way that virtue and health are desirable in themselves, namely, as intrinsically worthy. However, just as the virtues are both desirable in themselves, as well as desirable for the sake of a further end (that is, happiness),30 every truth is ordered to the final end of salvation. This is clarified in question six of article five (“Whether a human being should pursue knowledge for its own sake”). For this reason, one should never sacrifice the pursuit of what is necessary for salvation through inordinate or inappropriate engagement with lesser disciplines. Studying the universe in its rich variety is perhaps not intrinsically injurious, if this leads to the consideration of higher insights useful in our path to God, and if it does not prevent us from understanding the matters that are most conducive to this aim—matters that are contained in Sacred Scripture. Henry is aware that not everyone possesses the requisite education, opportunities, talents, and leisure to pursue rigorous academic studies—many individuals gain salvation through simple faith and right conduct. However, for those with predisposition for higher studies it would be a mistake to dwell too long on preparatory studies without devoting enough to what one should be preparing for in this life.

29

 See Flores, “The Intersection of Philosophy and Theology,” 534–8.  The background for this specific point is found in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, chap. 7, 1097b 2–7.

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15

Henry is also not advocating here the supremacy of action over contemplation, namely, the view that intellectual studies are strictly for the purpose of ordering our actions, our everyday doings, so that they are deserving of salvation. On the contrary, knowledge of truth and love of the good are ultimately the guides of action and of our way of life; so contemplation understood as the pursuit of truth and goodness is of a higher rank than practical activity. Contemplation is not merely instrumental for action insofar as it generates knowledge of how to act. Rather, Henry emphasizes, contemplation is in itself meritorious activity, since it cultivates the ruling faculties of the soul. In fact, it is rather the other way around: good and virtuous actions are means to contemplation since they polish the higher faculties of the mind (intellect and will) by freeing them from vice and sin. But this does not mean that these higher faculties are ordered simply toward the pursuit and enjoyment of knowledge for its own sake, toward happiness understood as the cultivation of (above all intellectual) virtue in this life, as Aristotle and his followers seem to maintain. Rather, intellect and will are ordered toward beatific union with God through knowledge and love. Even though this is not the same as good works, the ultimate goal of all intellectual pursuits is fundamentally practical—eternal blessedness. Henry clarifies these distinctions in question six of article five. The themes of certitude, human nature’s aim, and faith and reason do not exhaust the content of the four Summa articles translated here. Moreover, our comments on these themes are merely introductory. There is much more in this text for the reader to find, including many more connections to related treatments and topics in the rest of Henry’s work. Nevertheless, this introduction does indicate the significance of these articles in terms of their development of vital elements in Henry’s views, attitudes, and orientation. It is hoped that the present volume enhances the reader’s study of this important thinker, and that it adds in some small way to the rich field of medieval philosophy and theology. Note on the Latin Text, Translation, and Endnotes Articles two, three, four, and five of the Summa are translated into English in the present volume alongside the Latin text. This Latin corresponds to the main text, without apparatus, in the modern critical edition of these articles, which is part of the ongoing Opera Omnia series of Henry of Ghent’s works published by Leuven University Press. This provides a reliable and accessible textual basis for the translation. We wish to thank Leuven University Press for its generous permission to include the Latin text in the present volume.

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Additionally, the Leuven critical edition was the main guide in identifying the references for Henry’s sources provided in the endnotes. The endnotes refer to modern editions for these sources when such are available, and generally restrict themselves to those sources explicitly mentioned or quoted by Henry. The reader is encouraged to consult the Leuven critical edition for additional references, as well as for an account of the manuscripts and methodology used in establishing the Latin text. Henry of Ghent cites abundantly from many sources. In the English translation presented here, only quotations from biblical sources are rendered in italics, as is the practice in the present series. However, the Leuven text uses italics to designate literal citations or parts of citations from both biblical and non-biblical sources. This gives the reader a more exact portrait of Henry’s references, so this use of italics has been preserved in the Latin text included here. Additionally, as explained in the “Symbols” section of the Leuven edition, the Latin text uses single angle brackets () to designate the addition of words or letters that, according to the editor, the author would have wanted to include, and square brackets ([ …]) to indicate “words added in the manuscript tradition, but judged to be inauthentic.”31 On the other hand, in the English translation square brackets are used to indicate words that do not correspond literally to the Latin text but were supplied by the translator to convey the sense in English. Finally, Henry used different translations of certain works of Aristotle, such as the Metaphysics, and he also cited sayings (dicta) attributed to Aristotle. The endnotes reference the different editions corresponding to the citations of his various Aristotelian sources. More information on these sources is found in the “Technique of the Edition” section of the Leuven volume, and in the article “Aristotelian Sources in Henry of Ghent” mentioned in item #4 of our annotated bibliography. Annotated Bibliography (1) The basic source for the study of Henry of Ghent is the Opera Omnia series of critical editions of his works: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 2 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979–). These editions provide the reliable foundation for studies and translations. The Latin text included here corresponds to the main text in the following volume: Henrici de

31

 Henrici de Gandavo Summa, art. I–V, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (note 3 above), p. xcvii.

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Gandavo Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae), art. I–V, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 2, XXI, ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005). (2) For parts of Henry’s works that have not yet appeared in the Leuven Opera omnia series, this volume references the valuable Renaissance editions of Badius Ascensius. For the Summa, the relevant volume is: Summae quaestionum ordinariarum theologi recepto praeconio solennis Henrici a Gandavo, cum duplici repertorio, 2 vols. (Paris: I. Badius Ascensius, 1520; reprinted, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953); for the Quodlibeta: Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo, doctoris solennis, 2 vols. (Paris: I. Badius Ascensius, 1518; reprinted: Leuven: Bibliothèque S.J., 1961). (3) The following translation of article one of Henry’s Summa is a helpful supplement to the present volume (since Henry often refers back to article one in the next four articles): Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions, Article One: On the Possibility of Knowing, trans. Roland Teske, S.J. (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008). The Introduction is a helpful presentation of the content of this article, and treats the themes of knowledge and divine illumination. (4) The following is a standard collection of articles on Henry of Ghent by recognized scholars: Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293), ed. Willy Vanhamel, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, XV (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996). The contribution by Jerome Brown (“Henry’s Theory of Knowledge: Henry of Ghent on Avicenna and Augustine”) bears upon the epistemological themes in the present volume. The two articles by the late Jos Decorte are worth mentioning as well. The first (“Henry of Ghent on Analogy. Critical Reflections on Jean Paulus’ Interpretation”) is helpful in reassessing key points of Henry’s metaphysics with reference to a previous and influential interpretation (that of Jean Paulus in his book referenced in item #7 below). The second (“Aristotelian Sources in Henry of Ghent”) provides valuable information on the texts and translations of Aristotle that were available to Henry, who quotes this author often. The article by Roland Teske (“Henry of Ghent’s Rejection of the Principle: ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’”) focuses on the freedom and sovereignty of the will, an important theme in the present volume. The article by Matthias Laarmann (“God as Primum Cognitum: Some Remarks on the Theory of Initial Knowledge of Esse and God According to Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent”) develops the basic topic of knowledge of God in Henry. Finally, both contributions by Pasquale Porro are worth mentioning: “An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent” is a valuable biographical account, and the “Bibliography” provides a comprehensive list of works on Henry to that date (Porro later provides a supplement to this important resource; see item #5 below).

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(5) A second Leuven volume also provides a wide range of contributions by Henry of Ghent experts (in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and theology): Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, XXXI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003). The contribution by Andreas Speer (“Certitude and Wisdom in Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent”) relates to basic themes in the present volume, developing important connections between Henry and Bonaventure. The article by Carlos Steel (“Henricus Gandavensis Platonicus”) develops Henry’s Platonic background with regard to his epistemology (the forms and divine illumination), with special attention to the beginning of the Summa. The article by Juan Carlos Flores (“Intellect and Will as Natural Principles”) shows the importance of intellect and will in Henry’s thought as a whole, by looking at their role in his account of the Trinity. Finally, the bibliography by Pasquale Porro, “Bibliography on Henry of Ghent (1994–2002),” represents a supplement to his previous bibliography (mentioned in item #4 above). (6) A Companion to Henry of Ghent, ed. Gordon Wilson, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 23 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011). This is a particularly well-balanced collection of articles by Henry of Ghent scholars, with sections covering historical perspectives, theology, philosophy (with subsections on metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy), and influence. Each subsection includes several contributions. (7) As one of the first attempts to provide a comprehensive account of Henry’s philosophy, the following book opened up avenues for research and has had a good deal of influence: Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique, Etudes de philosophie médiévale 25 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938). Much work has been produced on Henry since then, and scholars have argued for revisions to some of Paulus’s interpretations (see, for instance, the article by Jos Decorte on Henry and Paulus mentioned in item #4 above), but the book is still a valuable resource. (8) The following is an important book on Henry’s philosophy (particularly metaphysics) that accurately places the details of his views within the Platonic tradition: José Gómez Caffarena, Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante, Analecta Gregoriana 93 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1958). (9) Another important and influential book on Henry’s philosophy, specifically epistemology, is: Steven Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent, Speculum Anniversary Monographs 11 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1985). Marrone’s work is a basic source on Henry of Ghent’s view of divine illumination. (10) On the important topic of God as the primary object of the intellect (and its historical development), the following book is worth consulting: Matthias Laarmann,

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Deus, primum cognitum. Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge 52 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1999). (11) The following title reassesses Henry’s philosophy in light of his theology, particularly his account of the Trinity (a vast area of Henry’s corpus, which was largely unstudied previously): Juan Carlos Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, with a Critical Edition of Question Six of Article Fifty-Five of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, XXXVI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006). The book shows the unity of Henry’s thought traversing both philosophy and theology. (12) The following article explores the theme of love of wisdom in Henry of Ghent, which closely bears upon article four (“Concerning the Desire to Know”) and other sections of the present volume: Juan Carlos Flores, “The Roots of Love of Wisdom: Henry of Ghent on Platonic and Aristotelian Forms,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, ed. Kent Emery, Jr., Russell Friedman, and Andreas Speer, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 623–40. (13) This article examines Henry’s understanding of the relation between theology and philosophy (faith and reason) as well as his position with reference to Aquinas and Bonaventure, and shows how for Henry theological wisdom strengthens philosophy as such: Juan Carlos Flores, “The Intersection of Philosophy and Theology: Henry of Ghent on the Scope of Metaphysics and the Background in Aquinas and Bonaventure,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71:2–3 (2015): 531–44. (14) Another useful article on philosophy and theology in Henry is: Pasquale Porro, “Metaphysics and Theology in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century: Henry of Ghent Reconsidered,” in Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 27 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2000), 265–82. Porro makes some useful remarks clarifying how for Henry theology can go beyond the natural light of reason in this life (see, for instance, pp. 279–80). (15) The following (long) article is a valuable study on the progression of knowledge in Henry (from sense perception to the beatific vision): Kent Emery, Jr., “The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent,” in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2001), 59–104. (16) A useful article on the sovereignty of the will in Henry (and its historical context) is: Roland Teske, S.J., “The Will as King over the Powers of the Soul:

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Uses and Sources of an Image in the Thirteenth Century,” Vivarium 32:1 (1994): 62–71. (17) Finally, the following encyclopedia entry can serve as a good introductory source on Henry: Pasquale Porro, “Henry of Ghent,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta (https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2014/entries/henry-ghent/).

Henry of Ghent’s Summa: The Questions on Human Knowledge (Articles 2–5)

Articulus II De modo sciendi Quia non contingit scire rem absque eo quod sciatur modus eius, viso de possibilitate sciendi et scientiam acquirendi, consequenter de modo sciendi videndum est. Ubi circa sciendi certitudinem sex sunt inquirenda: primum, si contingit hominem aliquid scire certitudinaliter; secundum, si quilibet homo certitudinaliter scit quaecumque ipse scit; tertium, si quilibet homo quaecumque scit scit ea aeque certitudinaliter; quartum, si omnes homines quicumque sciunt eadem sciunt ea aeque certitudinaliter; quintum, si omnes homines apti sunt aeque certitudinaliter scire; sextum, si omnia scibilia nata sunt aeque certitudinaliter sciri. Quaestio 1 Utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire certitudinaliter Circa primum arguitur quod non contingit hominem aliquid scire certitudinaliter. Primo sic. Augustinus dicit 83 Quaestionum quaestione 9a: “A sensibus corporis non est expetenda sinceritas veritatis.” Sed homo per se nihil scit nisi ex sensibus, quia ab ipsis omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet, Io Metaphysicae, IIo Posteriorum, et IIIo De anima. Ergo homo non potest scire sinceritatem veritatis. Nihil autem scitur certitudinaliter nisi sciendo sinceram veritatem, quia non est scientia nisi ex veritatis cognitione. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Augustinus ibidem: “Nihil est sensibile quod non habeat simile falso, ita ut internosci non possit.” Veritas autem certitudinaliter sciri non potest nisi “notis dissimilibus falso,” ut dicitur in IIo De Academicis. Ergo per sensibile nulla veritas potest cognosci certitudinaliter, sed homo non cognoscit nisi per sensibilia. Ergo etc. Contra. Habens certam regulam sciendi, in qua non contingit eum errare, potest certitudinaliter scire, quia potest scire in illa et per illam, et ipsa fallere non potest. Talis autem regula est veritas primorum principiorum. Secundum

Article II Concerning how to know Since it is not possible to know a thing without knowing how it is a thing, having already investigated the possibility of knowing and acquiring knowledge, we must now therefore investigate how to know. In this regard—concerning the certitude of knowing, we must investigate six questions: first, whether it is possible for a human being to know something with certainty; second, if a human being knows with certainty whatever he knows; third, if whatever things a human being knows, he knows them with equal certitude; fourth, if all human beings who happen to know these things, know them with equal certitude; fifth, if all human beings are equally apt to know with certitude; sixth, if all knowable things are by nature equally knowable with certitude. Question 1 Whether it is possible for a human being to know something with certainty Concerning the first question, it is argued that it is not possible for a human being to know something with certainty. First, as follows. Augustine says in question 9 of On Eighty-Three Questions: “From the bodily senses, the purity of truth cannot be drawn.”1 But a human being per se knows nothing except as derived from the senses, because all our cognition originates in the senses, as stated in Metaphysics I,2 Posterior Analytics II,3 and De anima III.4 Therefore, a human being cannot know truth in its purity. Nothing, however, is known with certainty unless its pure truth is known, because knowledge exists only from the cognition of truth. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Augustine says in the same place: “Nothing is sensible that does not have a similarity to what is false, so as such it cannot be distinguished [from what is false].”5 However, the truth cannot be known with certainty except by its “clear differences from what is false,” as is said in book II of On the Academics.6 Therefore, through what is sensible no truth can be known with certainty, but a human being cannot know except through sensible things. Therefore, etc. The argument against goes as follows. Someone having a sure rule for knowing, with which it is not possible for him to err, can know with certainty, because he knows in this rule and through this rule and this rule itself cannot fail. But such a rule

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enim Philosophum IVo Metaphysicae, “principium est valde manifestum et notum. Homines autem non decipiuntur nisi in eo quod nesciunt.” Hoc autem non habet dubitationem. Talem autem regulam habet in se homo naturaliter acquisitam, ut patet ex praedeterminatis. Ergo etc.

Dicendum est hic ex praedeterminatis quod cum hominem contingit habere notitiam primorum principiorum, quae sunt notissima in sua veritate et certissima, ita quod in illis non contingit eum errare, et ex illis via rationalis deductionis contingit eum scire posteriora, in quibus similiter non contingit errare postquam intellectus videt ea reducta in principia, et talis notitia certa est, necessario est ponendum quod contingit hominem non solummodo scire, quod quodammodo concedebant Academici, sed et certitudinaliter scire, quod omnino negabant, et hoc etiam secundum communem hominis modum cognoscendi in statu huius vitae. Verum intelligendum quod certa notitia duplex est secundum duo quae faciunt notitiam certam, quorum unum est quod sit libera ab omni errore, alterum quod sit in aperta veritatis visione. Primo modo notitia est certa qua ita veritatem cognoscimus, quod nequaquam de ea dubitare possumus; secundo modo illa est certa notitia qua veritatem clare videmus in luce intellectuali ad modum quo videmus visibile in luce solari. Primo modo certam notitiam contingit hominem hic habere secundum dictum modum sciendi ex primis principiis speculabilium, ad quem potest attingere actione praecisa naturalium virium animae, aspiciendo ad solum exemplar creatum abstractum a re, si tamen ad hoc sufficiat illud exemplar sine illustratione exemplaris aeterni; secundo modo nequaquam nisi aspiciendo ad exemplar increatum, quod est causa rei secundum modum praedeterminatum. Cognitio enim quae acquiritur per phantasmata non potest esse, quin quantum est de se aliquo modo sit quodammodo obscurata, secundum quod dicit Augustinus IIIo De Academicis: “Istae imagines sunt quae consuetudine rerum corporalium nos etiam cum veritas tenetur et quasi in manibus habetur, decipere atque illudere moliuntur.” Unde per species intelligibiles puras, quia non sunt nisi idolum, non veritas ipsa, hominem non contingit hic secundum communem statum viae sinceram et liquidam sive claram veritatem vel etiam qualemcumque scire nisi aspiciendo ad exemplar lucis increatae, ut praedeterminatum est, secundum

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is the truth of first principles. For, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV, “the principle is openly manifest and evident. Human beings, on the other hand, cannot be deceived except through what they ignore.”7 Moreover, this admits of no doubt. But a human being possesses such a rule in himself as naturally acquired, as is evident from the aforementioned.8 Therefore, etc.

Based on the aforementioned,9 it must be stated here that, since a human being can know first principles, which are known to the highest degree in their truth and are most certain, so that he cannot err about them, and from them through rational deduction he can know consequences, about which likewise he cannot err after the intellect traces them back to the principles, and such knowledge is certain, we must necessarily maintain that a human being can not only know, which in a certain sense the Academics granted, but also that he can know with certainty, which they altogether denied,10 and this too [we maintain] according to the ordinary way of human knowing in the state of the present life. Indeed, we must understand that sure knowledge is twofold according to two factors that constitute sure knowledge, one of which is that it be free from all error, another that it be [seen] in the open sight of truth. In the first way, that knowledge is certain whereby we recognize the truth in such a way that we can never doubt it; in the second way, that knowledge is certain whereby we see the truth clearly in an intellectual light, like the way we see something visible in the light of the sun. In the first way, it is possible for a human being to have sure knowledge here and now according to the aforesaid way of knowing through first theoretical principles, which he can attain by the proper action of the natural powers of the soul, by regarding only the created exemplar abstracted from the thing, if indeed that exemplar suffices for this without the representation of the eternal exemplar;11 in the second way, this is never possible except by regarding the uncreated exemplar, which is the cause of the thing according to the aforesaid way.12 For, the cognition which is acquired through phantasms of itself is always in some respect somewhat dark, according to what Augustine says in On the Academics III: “These images are those which, even when truth is had and, as it were, at hand, are mixed with the customary experience of corporeal things to fool and deceive us.”13 Hence, through plain intelligible species, since they are nothing but images, not truth itself, it is not possible for a human being here and now according to the ordinary state of this life to know the pure, clean, or clear truth, or anything else of this sort, except by regarding the exemplar of uncreated light, as determined, according to what Augustine says when discussing

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quod dicit Augustinus loquens de huiusmodi speciebus puris XIIo De Trinitate: “Rerum transeuntium stant utique intelligibiles, non sensibiles rationes, ad quas mentis acie pervenire paucorum est, et cum pervenitur quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse perventor, sed velut acie ipsa reverberata repellitur.” Et adhuc aspiciendo ad exemplar increatum sicut ad rationem intelligendi tantum, non sicut ad obiectum intellectum, secundum quod supra determinatum est, non contingit hominem perfecta certitudine cognoscere veritatem. Et quia secundum communem statum non contingit scire aliquid aspiciendo ad exemplar increatum ut ad obiectum in praesenti vita, sed solum in futura, et ideo dicit Augustinus IXo De Trinitate in principio quod “certa cognitio nobis non perficitur nisi post hanc vitam.” De qua certitudine dicit XVo De Trinitate: “Ibi veritatem sine ulla difficultate videbimus, eaque clarissima et certissima perfruemur, nec aliquid quaeremus mente ratiocinante, sed contemplante cernemus.” Unde ex hac obumbratione vitae praesentis frequenter contingit quod homo qui certe scit nescit quanta certitudine sciat. Propter hoc dixit quidam: “Hoc solum scire me scio, quod nescio”; et e converso qui nescit scire se credit, secundum quod dicit Chrysostomus: “Adhuc multa nescimus, et illa quidem didicisse nos credimus,” et Philosophus in VIIo Ethicorum: “Quidam opinantium non dubitant, sed aestimant certe scire.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “a sensibus non est expetenda sincera veritas,” dicendum quod verum est quantum aspiciendo ad exemplar lucis increatae, et hoc non quia ipsa veritas in se in aliquo sit impura, sed quia in nobis sit impura quando est phantasmatibus obumbrata, sicut lux solis oculis fumo caligantibus impura quodammodo est, tamen certitudo aliqua veritatis ex sensibus haberi potest, ut dictum est, non stando in sensibus et eorum iudicio, quia facillime decipiuntur sensus, sed per intellectum intelligibilem speciem quantum possibile est depuratam a sensibus abstrahendo, et ibi penes se iudicando. Unde ad litteram Augustini illo dicto suo hortatur nos, ne stemus in iudicio sensus, sed abstrahamus nos quantum possumus a sensibus, et coniungamur intelligibilibus, secundum quod dicit concludendo in fine quaestionis: “quapropter,” inquit, “saluberrime admonemur averti ab hoc mundo, qui profecto corporeus est atque sensibilis, et ad Deum et ad veritatem, quae intellectu

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such plain species in On the Trinity XII: “The intelligible, not the sensible, reasons of temporal things certainly abide, which very few reach with the sight of the mind, and when brought there as far as possible, he who arrives does not remain in them, but rather is repelled as his very sight is beaten back.”14 And to this extent, regarding the uncreated exemplar as the principle of understanding only, not as the object understood, according to what was determined above,15 it is not possible for a human being to know truth with perfect certitude. Moreover, since in our current state it is not possible to know something by regarding the uncreated exemplar as an object in the present life, but rather only in the future life, therefore Augustine says at the beginning of On the Trinity IX that “sure knowledge is not reached by us except after this life.”16 Regarding such certitude, he comments in On the Trinity XV: “There we will see truth without any difficulty, and enjoy it most clearly and certainly; we will not search for anything with the reasoning mind, but will see with the contemplating mind.”17 Hence, due to this overshadowing [of truth] in the present life, it frequently happens that a human being who knows certainly, ignores with how much certitude he knows. On account of this, someone said: “I know that I know this alone, that I do not know”;18 and conversely he who does not know, believes himself to know, according to what Chrysostom says: “We still ignore many things, and believe indeed to have mastered them,”19 and the Philosopher in Ethics VII: “Some of those who only suppose, do not doubt, but rather judge that they know with certainty.”20

To the first argument in opposition, that “from the senses the pure truth cannot be drawn,” we must say that this is true insofar as one considers the exemplar of uncreated light, not because the very truth itself is impure in some way, but rather because for us it becomes impure when it is obscured by phantasms, just as the light of the sun is in a way impure for the eyes with the darkening by smoke. Nevertheless, some certitude of truth can be had from the senses, as was said,21 not by remaining at the level of the senses and their opinion, because the senses are most easily deceived, but rather by understanding the intelligible species as far as it is able to be cleaned by abstracting from the senses, and therein judging in possession of this very thing. Hence, by that saying of his, taken in Augustine’s precise sense, he exhorts us, lest we remain in the opinion of sense, instead to draw ourselves away from the senses as much as possible, and connect with intelligible things, as he says at the end of the question, in conclusion: “wherefore,” it says, “we are advised most wholesomely to turn away from this world, which is indeed bodily and sensible, and turn with full resolve towards God and the truth, which is grasped by the intellect and the interior

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et interiore mente capitur, quae non habet imaginem falsi a qua discerni non possit, tota alacritate converti.” Per haec patet ad secundum, quod “omne sensibile habet simile falso,” dicendum quod verum est quantum est ex parte speciei, in quantum est sensibilis et phantastica maxime in stando in sensu, qui non potest similium iudicare dissimilitudinem. Transcendendo tamen sensus ratio bene diiudicat illam, et verum a falso discernit. Unde Augustinus in tota illa quaestione nihil intendit nisi quod imagines sensibilium ut sensibiles quasi omnino communes sunt vero et verisimili sive falso, secundum quod assimilantur species quas visus capit ab auro et ab aurichalco, quae discerni sensus iudicio nequeunt. Unde et somniantes de speciebus quae eis apparent iudicant quod sunt res ipsae. Quare cum non potest percipi verum nisi a falso discernatur, iudicium verum non est constitutum in sensibus. Et ideo concludit in fine: “Quamobrem salubriter admonemur,” etc., ut dictum est. Quaestio 2 Utrum quilibet homo certitudinaliter sciat quaecumque ipse scit Circa secundum arguitur quod non quilibet homo scit certitudinaliter quaecumque ipse scit. Primo sic. Augustinus dicit 83 Quaestionibus: “Comprehendi non potest quod sine intermissione mutatur,” quia antequam ratio iudicium potest complere, iam non est res ipsa quod fuit. Naturalia sunt huiusmodi, ut dicit Augustinus ibidem. Ergo comprehendi non possunt. Quod tale est non potest certitudinaliter sciri. Quamvis ergo contingit hominem naturalia scire, ut dictum est supra, non tamen contingit eum scire ea certitudinaliter. Secundo sic. Illa quae tantam habent diversitatem, ut homo vix sibi in eis potest cavere ab errore, non contingit hominem scire certitudinaliter. Moralia et legalia omnia sunt huiusmodi secundum Philosophum in Io Ethicorum, et tamen contingit ea hominem scire. Ergo etc. Tertio sic. Philosophus dicit IIo Metaphysicae: “Dispositio intellectus nostri apud illud quod est valde in natura manifestum similis est dispositioni oculorum vespertilionis ad lucem solis.” Oculus autem vespertilionis de luce solis non potest habere certam notitiam, quia non sufficit eam inspicere; ergo nec

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[faculty of the] mind, which possesses no similarity to a falsehood from which it could not be distinguished.”22 These points clarify the second argument, that “every sensible thing has a similarity to what is false,” to which we must say that it is true in terms of the species, to the extent that it is sensible and imaginary, especially when remaining at the level of sense, which cannot judge dissimilarity among similar things. Nevertheless, transcending sense, reason well distinguishes it, and discerns the true from the false. Whence, in that whole question, Augustine only means that the images of sensible things, as sensible, are altogether common, as it were, both to what is true and to what seems true or is false, just as the species which sight grasps from gold and brass are similar, which are unable to be distinguished with the criterion of sense. Whence, even those who dream about the species which appear to them judge that they are the things themselves. Wherefore, since the true cannot be perceived except as distinguished from the false, true judgment is not established by the senses. For that reason, he concludes at the end: “On that account, we are wholesomely advised,”23 etc., as was said. Question 2 Whether any human being knows with certainty whatever he knows Concerning the second question, it is argued that it is not true that any human being knows with certainty whatever he knows. First, as follows. Augustine says in On Eighty-Three Questions: “That which changes without interruption cannot be comprehended,”24 since before reason can complete a judgment about it, it already is not the very thing it was. The things of nature are of such a kind, as Augustine says in the same place.25 Therefore they cannot be comprehended. What is of such a kind cannot be known with certainty. Although, therefore, it is possible for a human being to know the things of nature, as was said above,26 still it is not possible for him to know them with certainty. Second, thus. Those [subjects] which contain so much disagreement that a human being can hardly avoid error concerning them, cannot be known by him with certitude. All moral and legal matters are of such a kind, according to the Philosopher in book I of the Ethics,27 and yet a human being can know them. Therefore etc. Third, thus. The Philosopher says in book II of the Metaphysics: “The disposition of our intellect with regard to what is very clear in nature, is similar to the disposition of the eyes of a bat with regard to the light of the sun.”28 However, the eye of a bat cannot have certain knowledge about the light of the sun, because it is not adequate to look at it; therefore, neither is our intellect adequate with respect to

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intellectus noster de illis quae in natura sua sunt valde manifesta. Illa secundum Commentatorem ibidem sunt divina et supernaturalia. Ergo quamvis contingit hominem ea scire, non tamen contingit eum ea scire certitudinaliter. Contra. Non contingit hominem aliquid scire nisi de quo habet veritatis notitiam, et in quantum veritatem noscit in tantum scit. Sed habendo notitiam veritatis non contingit errare de re cuius est, quia non errat nisi falsitate deceptus. Sed ubi non contingit errare, scit homo certitudinaliter. Ergo non contingit hominem aliquid scire quin sciat illud certitudinaliter.

Dicendum ad hoc quod secundum Philosophum scire non est aliud quam certam habere veritatis notitiam. Scientia ergo cuiuscumque sit aut certa est aliquo genere certitudinis aut scientia non est. Unde et Academici, quia omnia credebant esse incerta et tantis errorum tenebris involuta, ut de nullo posset homo certam notitiam habere, scientiam negabant omnino, ut dictum est supra. Unde cum, ut ibidem contra ipsos obtentum est, hominem possibile est scire et percipere notitiam veritatis, absolute concedendum quod homo quaecumque scit certitudinaliter scit, quia veritas cum menti apparet, de ipsa mens ipsa se ipsam certificat per naturale iudicatorium, quod penes se habet, de quo dictum est supra, licet aliquando non nisi magno labore homo ad hoc devenire potest ut sibi appareat. Propter quod dicit Avicenna: “Unaquaeque res certitudinem suam habet, qua est id quod est.” Unde si homines in omnibus iudicium rationis attenderent et exspectarent, numquam in certificando errarent. Nunc autem quia saepius homines iudicium rationis opinando secundum ea quae apparent praeveniunt, aliquando incertis tamquam certis adhaerent, et scire se credunt, cum solum opinionem habeant, ut dicit Philosophus VIIo Ethicorum.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod naturalia sunt in continuo fluxu, dicendum quod verum est in ipsis particularibus, non autem in universalibus abstractis ab ipsis, quae manent in mente, secundum quae de ipsis est certa scientia, qualitercumque particularia mutentur, ut dictum est supra. Non enim est

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those things which in their own nature are very much clear. Those things, according to the Commentator in the same place, are divine and supernatural.29 Therefore, although it is possible for a human being to know them, yet he cannot know them with certainty. Therefore, etc. The argument against goes as follows. It is not possible for a human being to know something unless he possesses knowledge of its truth, and he knows to the extent that he recognizes truth. However, while possessing knowledge of truth, it is not possible to err about the thing whose truth it is, because a human being does not err except when deceived by falsehood. But when it is not possible to err, a human being knows with certainty. Therefore, it is not possible for a human being to know something unless he knows it with certainty.

Regarding this question, we must say that, according to the Philosopher, to know is nothing else than to have knowledge of truth.30 Therefore, knowledge, of whatever it may be, is either certain through some kind of certainty or it is not knowledge. Whence, even the Academics, since they believed all things to be uncertain and wrapped in so many errors of ignorance, so that a human being could have sure knowledge of nothing, denied knowledge altogether, as said above.31 Hence, since, as stated against their view in the same place, it is possible for a human being to know and perceive knowledge of truth, it absolutely must be conceded that a human being knows with certainty whatever he knows, because when truth is apparent to the mind, the very mind certifies itself with the very truth through its natural power of judgment, which it has under its own control (as stated above), even though sometimes a human being can reach this [state] whereby [truth] is apparent to him only with great effort. For this reason, Avicenna states: “Any one thing has its own certitude, whereby it is what it is.”32 Hence, if human beings in all cases attended to and waited for the judgment of reason, they would never err when ascertaining. Now, however, since often human beings anticipate the judgment of reason by opining through appearances, sometimes they cling to uncertainties as if they were certainties, and believe themselves to know, when they only have opinion, as the Philosopher says in book VII of the Ethics.33

To the first [argument] in opposition, that the things of nature are in continual flux, we must say that this is true of particular things themselves, but not of the universals abstracted from them, which remain in the mind, through which there is sure knowledge of them, howsoever particular things may change, as said above.34 For there is

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scientia de rebus in quantum sunt extra in effectu, sed in quantum natura et quidditas earum a mente est comprehensa, sive res sint extra sive non, ut infra dicetur. Ad secundum, quod moralia in maxima sunt varietate, dicendum quod licet moralia et legalia propter condiciones et circumstantias particularium in summa sunt varietate, ut quod modo statutum est ad medelam in proximo vergat ad noxam, ut non possint statui in eis aliqua principia universalia certa certitudine et apud omnes observanda, dico proxima, prima tamen principia operandorum remota certa sunt semper et infallibilia et semper et ubique eadem manentia, ut quod “unicuique reddendum est quod suum est, cum est in statu recipientis” et quod “nemini iniuriandum est,” et cetera huiusmodi, ex quibus pro tempore et loco valiturae certae regulae vivendi possunt institui, quae tamen postmodum variatione temporum et locorum variari poterunt. De quibus intendit Philosophus illud supra dictum Io Ethicorum. Variari autem poterunt illae regulae secundae manentibus primis regulis invariabilibus, ex quibus aliae de novo institui possunt, similiter pro tempore et loco valiturae. Per quas etiam sapiens certam habet operandorum scientiam. Unde quod dicit Philosophus quod moralia “videntur esse sola legis” institutione, hoc secundum Commentatorem verum est quantum ad communem aestimationem et suspicionem hominum, qui prima principia operandorum, ex quibus alia instituuntur, non percipiunt. Praecepta enim moralia secundaria, quae sunt regulae proximae operandorum, instituta sunt a iustitia quae est legis positiva, cui de quibusdam non contingit universaliter recte dicere, nec tamen peccatum hoc est in lege, nec in legislatore, sed in natura rei. Materia enim operabilium et eius natura talis est quod variabilis est secundum loca et tempora et personas. Unde illa iustitia quae dicitur legis positiva, quae in principiis proximis operandorum consistit, superior est iustitia quae appellatur legis directiva, quae consistit in primis principiis operandorum, et frequenter mutat quod statutum est a legis positiva. Verbi gratia, iustitia quae appellatur legislativa dicit quod “omni deponenti reddendum est depositum,” ubi quandoque accidit inconveniens in particularibus quae legislator non consideravit, qui non potuit omnia particularia considerare, ut quando depositor fur esse perpenditur vel in furiam versus. In istis enim casibus deponenti non est reddendum depositum, puta, si sit gladius quo furiosus velit se ipsum occidere. Unde tunc supervenit legis directiva corrigens et complens legis

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no knowledge of things inasmuch as they exist in fact externally, but rather inasmuch as their nature and quiddity is comprehended by the mind, whether things exist externally or not, as will be explained below. To the second [argument], that there is maximum diversity in morals, we must say that although moral and legal matters are most diverse due to the conditions and circumstances of particular cases, so that a decision which now leads to remedy in the next [case] turns to harm, so then specific universal principles that must be observed in all cases cannot be established here with sure certitude—I mean proximate [principles], nevertheless first, remote principles of action are always certain and infallible, remaining [the same] always and everywhere, such as “one must give back what belongs to someone, when he is in the condition to accept it” and “one must harm no one,” and other [principles] of this sort, from which definite rules of life can be established that will be valid through times and places, but which can be modified according to the differences among times and places. It is about those [secondary rules]35 that the Philosopher speaks in that passage of book I of the Ethics mentioned above. Those secondary rules indeed can change while the first rules remain unchangeable, out of which others can be established anew that will be valid for the time and the place as well. Through them, the wise person still possesses sure knowledge of what ought to be done. Wherefore, what the Philosopher states—that moral [norms] “appear to exist only by established law”36—is true according to the Commentator with respect to the common estimation and mistrust of human beings, who do not perceive the first principles of action by which the other [principles] are established.37 For, the secondary moral precepts, which are the proximate rules of action, are established by the justice posited by law, with which it is not possible to judge universally regarding those secondary precepts, and this fault is neither in the law nor in the legislator, but in the nature of things. For, the subject matter and nature of action is such that it is variable according to place, time, and persons. Wherefore, the justice that is said to be directive of the law, which consists in the first principles of action, is superior to that justice which is posited by law, which consists in the proximate principles of action, and frequently alters what is set by the [justice] posited by law. For example, the so-called legislative justice38 says that “what is entrusted for safe-keeping must be returned always to the one who so entrusted it,”39 when in fact sometimes this happens to be unsuitable in cases that the legislator (who cannot consider all particular cases) did not consider, as when one considers that the depositor is a thief or has turned mad. In these cases, indeed, the deposit should not be returned to the depositor, say if it is a sword with which a madman wants to commit suicide. Therefore, at that point, the [justice that is] directive of the law takes over, correcting and completing what is posited by law, and excludes the thief and the madman, whom

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positivam et excipit furem et furibundum, quos legislator excepissset, si advertisset, quia non fuit intentionis suae hos includere, secundum quod haec omnia determinat Philosophus Vo Ethicorum ante finem. Propter quod dicit in IIIo Politicae: “Quaecumque non videtur posse determinare lex, neque homo potest utique nota facere. Sed universale lex instituit; reliqua iustissima sententia iudicare habent principes et disponere.” Et sic patet plane quod quantum in moralibus est scientiae, tantum in eis est certitudinis. Ad tertium, quod “intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima naturae sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis,” dicendum quod quantumcumque homo non habet, nec modicum notitiae clarae de supernaturalibus, sicut nec vespertilio de sole, tamen pro eo tantillo quod notitiam habet de eis bene potest habere notitiam certam sine omni scrupulo erroris. Non enim solum est certitudo notitiae, quia clara, sed quia ab errore libera, ut dictum est supra quaestione proxima. Unde vespertilio certa potest de sole esse quia lucet, licet hunc clare videre non potest. Quaestio 3 Utrum quilibet homo quaecumque scit sciat ea aeque certitudinaliter Circa tertium arguitur quod quilibet homo quaecumque scit scit ea aeque certitudinaliter. Primo sic. Scientiae certitudo est ex certitudine medii per quod res scitur, secundum quod certior habetur scientia medio propter quid quam medio quia. Quae ergo sciuntur uno et eodem medio semper aequaliter certo aeque certitudinaliter sciuntur. Tali medio novit homo quaecumque novit, quia notitia primorum principiorum. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Certitudo scientiae est ex notitia veritatis, pure intellectui se praesentantis, ut dictum est. Sed aeque pure cuiuslibet rei scitae veritas se repraesentat intellectui, quia secundum Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 1a: “veritas numquam falsitatem patitur” et impura reddi non posset nisi ex falsitatis commixtione, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro De Mendacio: “Veritas non nisi mendacio violatur.” Ergo etc.

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the legislator would have excluded, if he would have noticed, because it was not his intention to include them, according to how the Philosopher settles all these issues near the end of book V of the Ethics.40 For this reason, he says in book III of the Politics: “Whatever the law does not seem capable of determining, a man cannot clarify certainly either. However, the law established a universal rule; to judge and order the rest with a most just decision is the proper task of the rulers.”41 And thus it is plainly evident that insofar as knowledge exists in morals, to that extent there is certitude in morals. To the third, that “our intellect is disposed to what is most evident in nature as the eye of a bat is to the light of the sun,” we must say that however much a human being lacks, having not even a fraction of clear knowledge of supernatural realities, similarly a bat lacks [perception] regarding the sun; nevertheless, through the mere fact that a human being is aware of them, it is well possible to have certain knowledge without any concern for error. For, not only is there certitude of knowledge because [knowledge is] clear, but also because it is free from error, as was said above42 in the previous question. Wherefore, a bat can be certain that the sun exists because it shines, although it cannot see the sun clearly. Question 3 Whether any human being knows with equal certitude whatever he knows Concerning the third [question], it is argued that any human being knows with equal certitude whatever he knows. First, as follows. The certitude of knowledge exists from the certitude of the means through which a thing is known, according to which the knowledge obtained by means of a cause is more certain than that [knowledge] obtained by means of a fact. Therefore, those things which are known through one and the same means that is always equally certain, are known with equal certitude. By such means a human being knows whatever he knows, namely by means of knowledge of first principles. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. The certitude of knowledge exists from the awareness of truth, which makes itself present to the intellect in a pure way, as was said. But truth presents itself to the intellect equally purely with anything that is known, since according to Augustine in question 1 of On Eighty-Three Questions: “truth never suffers from falsehood,” and it could not turn impure except through admixture with falsehood,43 as Augustine says in his book On Lying: “Truth is not violated except through lying.”44 Therefore, etc.

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Contra. Secundum Philosophum in principio Ethicorum “certum non similiter in omnibus quaerendum est.” Hoc autem non est, nisi quia inveniri non potest. Ergo etc.

Ad hoc dicendum secundum praedicta quod certitudo scientiae de re scita non est, nisi quia clara est veritatis notitia aut ab errore secura. Nunc autem haec duo non aequaliter concurrunt in singulorum notitia quae homo novit. Idcirco dicendum absolute quod non contingit eum aeque certitudinaliter nosse quaecumque novit, dico in statu vitae huius. Immo quaecumque novit, a primis scibilibus usque ad ultima, necesse est eum omnia illa scire secundum gradus certitudinis, sicut secundum gradus ordinis de quibus dictum est supra. Ad cuius intellectum considerandum quod loquendo de certa notitia hominis ex parte hominis cognoscentis, de qua est quaestio, si comparemus certitudinem securitatis ab errore ad certitudinem claritatis in visione, sic multo certius fidelis novit ea quae sunt fidei, adhaerendo auctoritati primae veritatis, quam ea quae sunt cognita ab ipso naturali ratione, quantumcumque sciat ea medio claro demonstrationis, ita quod facilius posset trahi in dubium de conclusione scita medio demonstrationis, quam de eo quod fide tenet. In illis autem de quibus habemus certitudinem scientiae ex clara notitia veritatis non contingit hominem unum aequali certitudine scire singula, neque in diversis generibus scientiarum neque in eodem genere scientiae. “Sunt autem,” secundum Philosophum, “tres modi philosophiae essentiales, naturalis, mathematicus, et divinus,” in quibus homo secundum gradus certitudinem habet scientiae, quia maximam in mathematicis, tum quia sunt de rebus existentibus in sensibilibus et nostra cognitio a sensu incipit, tum quia sunt de rebus quantum est de se intransmutabilibus, tum quia secundum Commentatorem principio Physicorum “ea quae in illis sunt priora et notiora sunt simpliciter, priora et notiora sunt et nobis.” Minorem vero certitudinem habet in naturalibus, quia licet sunt de rebus nobis sensibilibus, tamen de summe mutabilibus, in quibus non sunt eadem priora et notiora nobis quae

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The argument against goes as follows. The Philosopher [says] at the beginning of the Ethics: “certitude ought not to be sought in like manner in all things.”45 This is the case, however, only because it cannot be so found. Therefore, etc.

In regard to this question, we must say, according to the aforementioned,46 that the certitude of knowledge about the thing known exists only because the awareness of truth is either clear or free from error. Now, however, these two [factors] do not concur equally in the knowledge of each thing that a human being knows. For that reason, we must say absolutely that it is not possible for him to know with equal certitude whatever he knows, I mean in the state of this life. Rather, whatever he knows, from the first of knowable things to the last of them, he necessarily knows them all according to degrees of certitude, just as according to degrees of order, about which we spoke above.47 In order to understand this issue, we must consider that (speaking about sure human knowledge in terms of the human knower, which is the focus of this question) if we compare the certitude of security against error to the certitude of clarity in [intellectual] vision, in this respect a person of faith knows those items belonging to the faith more certainly, by adhering to the authority of the First Truth, than those things which he himself knows by natural reason, however much he knows them through a clear means of demonstration,48 so that he might be thrown into doubt about a conclusion known by means of demonstration more easily than about that which he holds by faith. However, regarding those things about which we possess the certitude of knowledge based on the clear awareness of truth, it is not possible for one human being to know each one of them with equal certitude, either in diverse genera of science or in the same genus of science. According to the Philosopher, “there are, however, three essential modes of philosophy, [namely] the natural, the mathematical, and the divine,”49 in which a human being possesses the certitude of knowledge according to degrees,50 for maximum [certitude is found] in the mathematical sciences, since in this case they are about things existing in sensible realities (and our cognition begins with sense), but about things that are in and of themselves unchangeable, since in this case, according to the Commentator at the beginning of the Physics, “the things which are [treated] in them are prior and more known absolutely, as well as prior and more known to us.”51 Indeed, a human being possesses less certitude in the natural sciences, because although these sciences are about things that are sensible to us, nevertheless [they are about things that are] most changeable, in which what is prior and more known to us and [what is prior and more known] absolutely are not the same, but rather in

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simpliciter, sed a posteriori simpliciter incipit in eis omnis nostra cognitio. Et ideo dicit Commentator super IIum Metaphysicae quod “demonstrationes mathematicae sunt in primo ordine certitudinis et demonstrationes naturales sequuntur eas.” Minima vero homini est certitudo in divinis, tum quia sunt de omnino abstractis et elongatis a sensu, tum quia ad illorum notitiam non ascendimus nisi per sensibilium manuductionem. Et ideo dicit Philosophus Io Metaphysicae de sua scientia divina secundum unam litteram: “Notiores omnes hac, potior autem nec una est.” In eodem autem genere scientiae similiter numquam contingit duo aeque certitudinaliter hominem scire, quia nostra scientia, eo quod discursiva est, non cognoscit nisi posteriora ex prioribus usque ad primum seminarium scientiae animae innatum, quo primo cognoscit naturaliter primum principium incomplexum, ut primum conceptum entis, et deinde posteriores usque ad ultima composita; et mediantibus incomplexis cognoscit prima complexa, et ex illis posteriora usque ad ultimas conclusiones, ut dictum est supra. Et sic in unoquoque genere sciendi semper certior est cognitio principiorum quam principiatorum, et tanto certius unumquodque cognoscitur quanto cognoscitur mediante principio priori, et tanto minus certe, quanto cognoscitur mediante principio posteriori, quia semper clarius virtus primi principii cognitivi relucet in sibi proximiori quam remoto distantia ordinis naturalis, sicut oculus corporis tanto certius videt aliquid, quanto sibi videt propinquius in distantia debita locali, et tanto minus certe, quanto videt eum remotius ultra debitam videndi distantiam.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “eodem medio omnia sciuntur,” dicendum quod licet mediante primo principio omnia sciuntur, non tamen omnia per eandem immediationem se habent ad ipsum, et ideo certius sciuntur per ipsum proxima et immediata quam remotiora. Adhuc etiam dicendum quod non omnia ex principiis primis naturaliter scitis ab homine nata sunt sciri, sed solum illa quae subsunt naturali rationi, ut infra dicetur. Ad secundum, quod “veritas semper pura est,” dicendum quod in re ipsa semper pura est, non tamen ex parte cognoscentis. In quantum enim nobis praesentatur sub specie sensibilium abstracta a phantasmatibus, in qua cum

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these [natural] sciences all our cognition begins unqualifiedly with what is subsequent in reality. And, therefore, the Commentator says concerning the second book of the Metaphysics that “mathematical demonstrations belong to the first order of certitude and natural demonstrations come after them.”52 And indeed there is minimal certitude for a human being in the divine sciences, because while they are about things altogether drawn away and far from sense, we do not rise to the knowledge of them except through the direction of sensible things. And for that reason, the Philosopher in the first book of the Metaphysics says about his divine science in one line: “thus all [sciences] are more known, but none is better.”53 Moreover, similarly in the same genus of science it is never possible for a human being to know two things with equal certitude, because our knowledge, being discursive, only knows posterior by prior things, all the way to the first innate origin of the soul’s knowledge, by which it first cognizes naturally the first non-complex principle, as is the first concept of being, and from there posterior things all the way to the last composite things; and by means of non-complex ones it cognizes the first complex ones, and from them posterior ones all the way to the last conclusions, as mentioned above.54 And thus, in any one genus of science the cognition of principles is always more certain than [the cognition] of what is based on principles, and the more prior the principle by means of which something is known, the more certain it is, and the more posterior the principle by means of which it is known, the less certain [it is], because always the excellence of the first cognitive principle reflects more clearly on what is more proximate to it than [on what is] removed according to distance in the natural order, just as the bodily eye sees something more certainly the nearer it sees within proper spatial distance, and less certainly the farther it sees beyond the proper distance for sight.

To the first [argument] in opposition, that “all things are known scientifically by one and the same means,” we must say that although all things are known by means of the first principle, yet not all things relate to it through the same proximity, and therefore through it those which are proximate and immediate are known more certainly than the more remote. Besides, we also must say that not all things are suited to be known from first principles that are naturally known by a human being, but rather only those things which fall under the scope of natural reason, as will be maintained below. To the second, that “truth is always pure,” we must say that in its very reality it is always pure, but not in terms of the knower. Indeed, as made present to us under the guise of sensible things abstracted from phantasms, in which the similarity to the

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similitudine veri similitudo falsi commixta est, ut dictum est supra, ut per hoc ipsa similitudo possit nos decipere, ut falsum credamus verum, ut aurichalcum aurum, et e converso, ut sic quandoque omnino verum non intelligamus et privemur omnino scientia, secundum quod dicit Augustinus 83 Quaestionibus: “Omnis qui fallitur, in eo quod fallitur non intelligit.” Unde secundum quod tale quid magis et minus natum est contingere in notitia scibilium quorundam quam aliorum, secundum hoc quaedam nata sunt magis certitudinaliter sciri quam alia, et minime certe ea in quibus maxime nata est fieri deceptio talis, ut sunt naturalia, quorum scientia per sensus nobis maxime generatur, a quibus facillime sumit intellectus deceptionis occasionem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus IIIo De Academicis: “Veritatem obtinere nemo potest, si falsis imaginibus deceptus comprehensionis modos laxaverit. Sunt enim istae imagines quae consuetudine rerum corporalium nos etiam, cum veritas tenetur et quasi in manibus habetur, decipere aut illudere moliuntur.” Per hunc ergo modum in rebus in quibus verisimile contingit apprehendere cum vero, veritas falsitatem bene compatitur, quantum est ex parte intelligentis. Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod “veritas falsitatem non compatitur,” verum est ex parte rei intellectae, et maxime in illo quod est veritas per essentiam, de quo Augustinus ibi loquitur ad litteram, probans quod anima, quia secum quodammodo compatitur falsitatem, non est veritas per essentiam, sed participatione. Quaestio 4 Utrum omnes homines quicumque sciunt eadem sciant ea aeque certitudinaliter Circa quartum arguitur quod omnes homines quicumque sciunt eadem sciunt ea aeque certitudinaliter. Primo sic. Quicumque rem aequaliter intelligunt aeque certitudinaliter eam sciunt, quia ex modo intelligendi rem procedit certitudo scientiae de ea. Sed quicumque aliquid intelligunt aequaliter illud intelligunt, secundum quod dicit Augustinus 83 Quaestionibus: “Non est dubium nec posse rem alium alio plus intelligere.” Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Certitudo scientiae consistit in notitia veritatis, sed notitia veritatis non contingit diversis secundum magis et minus, quia est “adaequatio

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false is mixed with the similarity to the true, as was said above55 (so that on this account the very similarity can deceive us, and we may believe the false [to be] true, as that brass is gold, or conversely), so in this way sometimes we altogether do not understand the true and are wholly deprived of knowledge, according to what Augustine says in On Eighty-Three Questions: “Everyone who is deceived, in virtue of being deceived, does not understand.”56 Wherefore, according to how a given entity is more or less apt to fall in the knowledge of one class of knowable things rather than others, in this regard some things are more apt to be known with certainty than others, and least certainly are those things known in which such deception is especially apt to come to pass, as are the things of nature, of which knowledge is mainly generated for us through the senses, from which the intellect most easily has the possibility of deception, according to what Augustine says in book III of On the Academics: “No one can obtain the truth if, deceived by false images, he weakens his ways of understanding. For these images are those which, by the custom of bodily things, endeavor to deceive or fool us, even when truth is possessed and at hand, as it were.”57 Therefore, in this manner, regarding the things of which one may perceive the appearance of the true together with the true, truth well suffers from falsehood, as far as the knower is concerned. However, what Augustine says, namely that “truth does not suffer from falsehood,”58 is true in terms of the thing understood, and chiefly [true] about that which is truth by essence, about which Augustine literally speaks there, proving that the soul is not truth by essence, but rather by participation,59 since in a way it suffers from falsehood within itself. Question 4 Whether all human beings who happen to know the same things know them with equal certitude Concerning the fourth question, it is argued that all human beings who happen to know the same things know them with equal certitude. First, as follows. Any human beings who equally understand a thing, know it with equal certitude, because the certitude of knowledge about a thing proceeds from the way of understanding a thing. But any human beings who understand something, understand it equally, according to what Augustine says in On Eighty-Three Questions: “There is no doubt, nor is it possible for one person to understand a thing more than another person.”60 Second, thus. The certitude of knowledge consists in the knowledge of truth, but the knowledge of truth does not happen in different cases according to more and

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quaedam rei et intellectus,” et ita quaedam aequalitas. Aequalitas autem magis et minus non suscipit. Ergo etc. Contra est quia tunc docens et discens aequaliter scirent, quia discens aequaliter novit id quod novit docens, ut dictum est supra. Consequens falsum est, quia licet motum habeat aliquid eius quod habet motor, “non tamen habet ipsum eodem modo quo habet motor,” ut dicit Commentator super IXum Metaphysicae.

Ad hoc dicendum quod “dispositio intellectus de re intelligibili est sicut dispositio sensus de re sensibili.” Propter quod Philosophus IIo Metaphysicae “assimilavit virtutem intellectus in comprehendendo secundum certitudinem intelligibilia abstracta quae sunt summe intelligibilia debilissimo visui in comprehendendo maxime visibile, scilicet solem,” ut ibi dicit Commentator. Sicut ergo alterum altero contingit unam et eandem rem certius videre oculo corporis, sic contingit alterum altero unam et eandem rem certius videre oculo mentis, et per hoc eam certius scire, et hoc duplici de causa accepta ex parte videntis: una ex parte dispositionis naturalis in ipso, altera ex parte dispositionis acquisitae ab eo. Ex parte dispositionis naturalis, quia unus habet oculum intellectus altero clariorem, perspicaciorem et limpidiorem. Et ideo habet maiorem virtutem in se limpidius et perspicacius veritatem rei conspiciendi quam alter, secundum quod de hoc infra dicetur, et ex hoc certius sciendi eam, ut dictum est, sicut habens oculum carnis clariorem et limpidiorem et perfectiorem in se limpidius et clarius videt visibile corporale quam alter. Ex parte dispositionis acquisitae causa est quia unus magis exercitatus est circa inspectionem veritatis rei scitae quam alter. Et ideo de notitia eius habet habitum magis confirmatum quam alter, et condiciones particulares quidditatis rei distinctius videt quam alter, et ex hoc certius et discretius eam videt quam alter, secundum quod ille qui frequenter vidit imaginem aliquam sub imitatione ad archetypum perfectius secundum unamquamque particulam videt in quo eum perfecte imitatur, et in quo deficit, quam ille qui solo aspectu advertit quia est vera rei imitatio ad eius imaginem facta.

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less, because it “makes thing and intellect equal in a way,”61 and thus is a certain [mode of] equality. However, equality does not admit more and less. Therefore, etc. The contrary argument is that, if this were the case, teacher and student would know equally, since the student is equally cognizant of what the teacher is cognizant of, as said above.62 The conclusion is false, because although what is moved may have something of what the mover has, “nevertheless it does not possess it in the same way that the mover possesses it,” as the Commentator says regarding book IX of the Metaphysics.63

Regarding this question, we must say that “the disposition of the intellect regarding intelligible reality is like the disposition of the sense faculty regarding sensible reality.”64 That is why the Philosopher in book II of the Metaphysics “compared the capacity of the intellect to understand with certitude abstract intelligible realities, which are most intelligible, to the faculty of sight which is most weak for contemplating what is visible to the highest degree, namely the sun,” as the Commentator says in that place.65 Therefore, just as it is possible for one person to see one and the same thing more certainly than another with the bodily eye, it is indeed possible for one person to see one and the same thing more certainly than another with the eye of the mind, and, thereby, to know it with more certitude, and this has to do with the one who sees, in a twofold sense: on the one hand, in terms of his natural disposition, and on the other hand, in terms of his acquired disposition. In terms of natural disposition, this is so because the one has the eye of the intellect more sharpsighted than the other, keener and clearer. And, therefore, he has greater capacity in himself to see the truth of a thing more clearly and keenly than another (as will be discussed below regarding this issue66), and thus for knowing it more certainly, as was said,67 just as the person who has the more sharp-sighted, clearer, and more perfect, physical eye, sees a visible body more clearly than another. In terms of acquired disposition, the reason is that the one is more trained than the other to examine the truth of the thing known. And for that reason, he possesses a firmer habit by which to know it than the other, and sees the particular conditions of the essence of the thing more distinctly than the other, and thereby sees it more certainly and specifically than the other, just as he who sees frequently a copy against the archetype it imitates, sees more perfectly in every detail in what way it perfectly imitates and in what way it falls short, than he who by one look perceives that it is indeed an imitation made in its likeness.

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Ad primum quod “non contingit alium alio plus vel minus intelligere,” dicendum quod ‘plus vel minus intelligere’ potest determinare actum intelligendi vel respectu rei intellectae. Sic non potest eadem res secundum plus vel minus intelligi a diversis, quia non habet esse in se ipsa secundum plus vel minus in veritate, sicut neque in esse, quare neque etiam in cognitione. “Quod enim significat essentiam cuiuslibet, hoc finis cognitionis et esse rei,” ut dicitur Vo Metaphysicae. Essentia autem rei neque intenditur in se neque remittitur. Quia igitur res ipsa quaelibet uno et simplici modo se habet in sua veritate, quicumque in ea intelligit aliquid plus vel minus aliter rem intelligit quam est, et ita falso, quare nec eam tunc intelligit sicut argumentum dicit, quia non contingit intelligere nisi verum. Vel potest li ‘magis et minus intelligi’ determinare actum intelligendi respectu ipsius intelligentis. Sic bene contingit eandem rem unum plus intelligere quam alterum, et ita certius. Sed hic subdistinguendum quod rem eandem plus vel minus intelligere ex parte intelligentis potest intelligi intensive vel extensive: extensive hoc contingit quando unus particulas quidditatis et essentiae rei quas ratio distinguit distinctius intelligit quam alter; intensive quando unus limpidius videt id quod est veritatis rei quam alter, in quantum profundius visu intellectuali unus eam magis penetrat quam alter, et minus potest eum impedire obnubilatio phantasmatum. Et utroque modo contingit unum altero magis et certius aliquid intelligere. Ad secundum, quod “veritas est adaequatio,” dicendum quod verum est, quia quantum veritas manifestatur cuique, tantum eam intelligit. Hoc tamen non impedit quin uni plus manifestetur quam alteri, et eam plus intelligat. Et licet “veritas ipsa est adaequatio intellectus et rei intellectae” in quolibet intelligente, non tamen est adaequatio plurium intellectuum inter se. Sicut enim aequalitas est tanta binarii ad binarium quanta quaternarii ad quaternarium, non tamen est aequalitas binarii ad quaternarium, sic tanta est adaequatio rei et intellectus in minus apprehendente veritatem rei quanta in magis apprehendente, licet non adaequatur apprehensio unius apprehensioni alterius.

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To the first [argument], that “it is not possible for one person to understand more or less than another,” it must be said that [the phrase] ‘to understand more or less’ can specify, on the one hand, the act of understanding with respect to the thing understood. In this way, the very same thing cannot be understood by different people according to more or less, because it does not have being in itself according to more or less in terms of truth, just as neither it does in terms of being, wherefore neither also in terms of cognition. “For, what reveals the essence of anything [is] this: the achievement of cognition and the being of the thing,” as is stated in book V of the Metaphysics.68 However, the essence of a thing in itself is neither enhanced nor diminished. Therefore, since any thing possesses truth in itself in one simple way, whoever understands in it something more or less, understands the thing otherwise than it is, and thereby falsely, wherefore then neither does he understand it (as the argument states), since it is not possible to understand [anything] except truth. Or, the phrase ‘to be understood more or less’ can specify the act of understanding with respect to the very person who understands. In this way, it is well possible for one person to understand the same thing more than another, and so with more certitude. However, in this case one must further distinguish that ‘to understand the same thing more or less in terms of the one who understands’ can be understood either intensively or extensively: extensively takes place when an individual understands more distinctly than another the parts of a thing’s quiddity and essence which reason distinguishes; intensively, when an individual sees that which pertains to the truth of a thing more clearly than another, insofar as the one penetrates this truth more deeply with intellectual insight than the other, and the veil of phantasms can obstruct him less. And in both ways it is possible for one person to understand something more, as well as more certainly, than another. To the second, that “truth is a making equal,” we must say that it is true, because to the degree that truth is manifest to a person, to that degree he understands it. Nevertheless, this fact does not preclude that it be manifested to one more than to another, and thereby understands it more. And although “truth itself is a making equal of the intellect and the thing understood”69 within the person who understands, nevertheless it is not a making equal of many intellects among each other. For, just as there is as much equality between one pair and another, as there is between one group of four and another, but there is no equality between the pair and the group of four, so too there is as much of a making equal between the thing and the intellect in the person who understands the truth of a thing less as [there is] in the one who understands more, although the comprehension of the one is not made equal to the comprehension of the other.

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Quaestio 5 Utrum omnes homines apti sint aeque certitudinaliter scire Circa quintum arguitur quod omnes homines apti sunt aeque certitudinaliter scire. Primo sic. Ubi causa non recipit magis et minus, nec effectus, quia non intenditur effectus nisi per intensionem suae causae, ut nigredo per calidum, similiter neque remittitur. Causa quare homo est sciens est quia est rationalis. Sed rationale esse non suscipit magis neque minus, quia est differentia hominis specifica “substantialis, quae non recipit magis vel minus,” secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Ubi non est contrarium, neque magis vel minus, quia contrarium est causa eius quod est magis vel minus. Ut enim determinatur in Sex principiis, “albius est quod est nigro impermixtius.” Sed scientia non habet contrarium—propter quod etiam vult Philosophus in Topicis quod “delectationi per scientiam nihil est contrarium”—quare neque scientiae certitudo, quia in tantum est scientia, in quantum est certa, ut dictum est supra. Quare et certitudo scientiae magis et minus non potest suscipere. Non ergo contingit unum hominem certius scire quam alterum. Contra est quod non omnes sunt aeque proni ad discendum, ut patet ex experientia, quia diversi non possunt aequaliter proficere cum labore aequali, quare neque sunt aeque proni ad scientiam capiendum, et ideo neque ad certitudinaliter sciendum, cum ab eodem est scientia et certitudo scientiae.

Dicendum ad hoc iuxta dictum in praecedenti quaestione quod cum certitudo scientiae ad intellectum se habet ad modum certitudinis visus ad oculum, sicut non sunt omnes homines apti aeque certitudinaliter oculo carnis videre visibile, sic non omnes aequaliter apti sunt intellectu intelligere intelligibile. Et hoc contingit homini ex duplici causa, una naturali, altera accidentali. Causam naturalem assignant aliqui ex parte intellectus secundum se, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo non accipiendo occasionem bonitatis intellectus ex parte corporis, dicendo absolute, nihil discernendo ex parte corporis, quod

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Question 5 Whether all human beings are equally apt to know with certitude Concerning the fifth question, it is argued that all human beings are equally apt to know with certitude. First, as follows. When the cause does not admit of more or less, neither [does] the effect, because the effect is not intensified except through the intensification of its cause, as blackness [is intensified] through heat, nor likewise does it slacken [except through the slackening of its cause]. The cause whereby a human being is a knowing entity is that he is rational. But to be rational does not admit of more or less, because it is the specific difference of a human being, “which, being substantial, does not admit of more or less,” according to the Philosopher in the Categories.70 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Where there is no contrary, neither [is there] more or less, because the contrary is the cause of that which is more or less. For, as established in the book On Six Principles, “the whiter [thing] is the one less mixed with black.”71 But knowledge does not have a contrary—which is also why the Philosopher in the Topics declares that “the pleasure of knowledge has no contrary”72—and consequently, neither does the certitude of knowledge [have a contrary], because to the degree that it is knowledge, to that degree it is certain, as said above.73 Wherefore, the certitude of knowledge also does not admit of more or less. It is not possible, therefore, for one human being to know with more certitude than another. The argument against is that not everyone is equally disposed to learning, as is evident from experience, because different people cannot progress equally in the same task, whence neither are they equally disposed to grasp knowledge, and thus neither [are they equally disposed] to know with certitude, since knowledge and the certitude of knowledge stem from the same source.

Regarding this question, we must say (as mentioned in the previous question) that, since the certitude of knowledge pertains to the intellect as the certitude of sight [pertains] to the eye, then just as not all human beings are equally apt to see a visible thing certainly with the bodily eye, so too not everyone is equally apt to understand what is intelligible with the intellect. Moreover, this occurs among human beings from a twofold cause, one natural, the other accidental. Some thinkers define the natural cause in terms of the intellect as such, and this in a twofold way: in one way, without considering the role of the

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unus meliorem sortitur animam quam alter, et secundum hoc excellit in perspicacia intellectus et aliis viribus animae, secundum quod quidam haeretici dicentes Christum fuisse purum hominem dicebant ipsum sortitum fuisse meliorem animam aliis et ideo omnes excessisse in scientia et virtutum operatione, ut recitat Augustinus in libro De haeresibus. Alio modo alii ponunt idem, accipiendo tamen occasionem quod unus sortiatur meliorem intellectum alio ex parte corporis, dicendo quod quanto corpus melius est dispositum et praeparatum ad animae susceptionem, tanto meliorem sortitur animam et melius dispositam in omnibus viribus suis naturalibus, quia, ut dicunt, forma recipitur secundum capacitatem ipsius materiae, et sic, ut dicunt ambo, unus sortitus est animam subtiliorem ex natura sua quam alius, propter quod unus aptus est certius scire quam alter, et quod ideo dicat Philosophus in IIo De anima “molles carne aptos mente,” quia carnis mollities apta est susceptioni animae intellectus subtilis, non sic autem carnis durities. Hoc habet magnam dubitationem in se, de qua alias debet esse sermo, sed quantum ad praesens nihil; tamen circa hoc determinando magis apparet esse verius ponendum quod hoc non contingit ex dispositione animae in se, sed ex dispositione corporis et virium inferiorum quibus intellectus utitur ad suam operationem quoad specierum receptionem, ut quanto organum phantasiae et aliarum virium sensitivarum organa melius sunt disposita, ut imagines puriores, stabiliores, ordinatiores recipiant et conservent, quae per hoc habiliores sunt ut species intelligibiles ab eis abstrahantur puriores, stabiliores et ordinatiores, tanto intellectus mediantibus illis certius et limpidius intelligat, et e converso, ut quanto ex indispositione organorum imaginationes impuriores, fluxibiliores et inordinatiores recipiant et conservent, a quibus habent abstrahi species intelligibiles impuriores, fluxibiliores et inordinatiores, tanto intellectus mediantibus illis minus certe et obtusius intelligat. Unde, ut vult Philosophus VIIo Physicorum, indistinctio, inordinatio et perturbatio motus specierum in phantasia multum actum intelligendi disturbant, ut ex hoc infantes addiscere non possint neque iudicare consimiliter sensibus. “Multa enim,” ut dicit, “turbatio et motus est circa eos, sed in sedendo et quiescendo anima prudens fit et sciens.” Et ista pertubatio aliquando sedatur a natura per aetatem, secundum quod dicitur in principio Physicorum: “Pueri appellant omnes viros patres et mulieres matres; posterius autem discernunt unumquodque”; cum scilicet per aetatem vigoratur intellectus, non in se, sed in viribus inferioribus, cognoscit patrem

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body in the soundness of the intellect, they say absolutely (without any analysis of the body at all) that one individual ended up with a better soul than another, and this is why he excels in intellectual clarity and the other powers of the soul, as certain heretics, who claimed that Christ was only human, said that he had ended up with a better soul than the rest, and therefore surpassed everyone in knowledge and virtuous action, as Augustine indicates in the book On Heresies.74 In another way, other thinkers posit the same, but understanding the result that one person ends up with a better intellect than another in terms of the body, saying that the better the body is disposed and prepared for the reception of the soul, the better the soul it gets and the better this soul is disposed in all its natural powers, because, as they say, a form is received according to the potency of its matter; and so, as both parties claim: one person ends up with a finer soul than another through the very nature of the soul, and thereby one person is apt to know more certainly than another, and hence this is why the Philosopher makes the claim in book II of De anima, [namely that] “those who are soft of flesh are apt of mind,”75 since softness of flesh is apt to receive a soul with a fine intellect, but not so, however, hardness of flesh.76 This view is greatly questionable in itself, about which there must be a discussion elsewhere, but not for the present purpose; nevertheless, to settle this issue, it seems truer to claim that this does not occur from the disposition of the soul as such, but rather from the disposition of the body and the lower powers which the intellect uses for its operation, in terms of the reception of species, so that the better the organ of the imagination is disposed as well as the organs of the other sensitive powers, in the sense that they receive and preserve purer, more stable, and better ordered images, which are thereby more fit for purer, more stable, and better ordered intelligible species to be abstracted from them, the more certainly and clearly does the intellect understand by means of them, and conversely, so that, due to the unfitness of the organs, the less pure, more fleeting, and less ordered images they receive and preserve, from which less pure, more fleeting, and less ordered intelligible species are abstracted, the less certainly and less clearly does the intellect understand by means of them. Wherefore, as the Philosopher implies in book VII of the Physics, the lack of distinction, disorder, and disturbance in the processing of species in the imagination greatly undermines the act of understanding, so that due to this infants cannot learn or likewise judge by means of the senses. “For, there is much change and confusion in them,” as he says, “but settling and coming to rest the soul becomes judicious and knowledgeable.”77 And in time this disturbance is soothed by nature through age, according to what he says at the beginning of the Physics: “Children call all men fathers and women mothers; but later they distinguish each one”;78 that is, since through age the intellect is strengthened, not in itself, but rather in terms of the lower powers, [the child]

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inter ceteros viros et matrem inter ceteras mulieres; aliquando vero sedatur per consuetudinem et exercitium virtutum moralium, maxime castitatis, et per studium in bonis disciplinis. Unde qui ex naturali complexione et organorum sensibilium dispositione, et virtutum moralium exercitio et bonarum artium studio habent motus passionum sedatos et species in imaginativa puras, quietas et ordinatas, maxime subtiles sunt in actu intelligendi, et certiorem nati sunt acquirere de singulis scientiam quam ceteri, qui non sunt tales. Unde e contrario sustinentes motus passionum, vel ex malitia naturae vel ex vitio morum, et segnes ad bona studia, vel pravis studiis imbuti, maxime a pueritia, minime possunt scientiae alicuius certitudinem acquirere. Et ita in hoc quod quidam segnes sunt plus ad discendum quam alii, et quidam melioribus studiis et exercitiis imbuti a iuventute quam alii, consistit causa accidentalis quod non omnes aeque apti sunt ad certitudinaliter sciendum. Unde inter alia impedimenta cognoscendi veritatem quae Philosophus ponit IIo Metaphysicae, “primum et fortissimum,” sicut dicit Commentator, “est prava consuetudo ex pueritia.” Isti enim prave educati a pueritia secundum Philosophum dicere semper volunt “quod assueti sunt dicere, et iudicant inconveniens quod extra illud est, quia id ad quod consueti sunt maxime est eis applicabile animo.” Unde dicit Augustinus IIIo De doctrina christiana: “Si animum occupaverit alicuius erroris opinio, quidquid aliud asseruerit scriptura, figuratum arbitrantur.” Secundum vero impedimentum post hoc est segnities studii. Tales enim, ut dicit Philosophus ibidem, “odiunt sermonem perscrutatum, quia non statim possunt ipsum capere,” de quibus dicit Commentator quod “impossibile est ut addiscant.” Et ista sunt duo impedimenta ex causa accidentali. Tertium vero est ex causa praedicta naturali, quia in quibusdam dominatur virtus imaginativa, qui non possunt transire imaginationem, neque credere

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recognizes the father among other men and the mother among other women; in time, moreover, [the disturbance] is soothed through habituation and exercise in the moral virtues, especially chastity, and through the study of good disciplines. Wherefore, those who, by natural constitution and fitness of the organs of sensation, as well as by exercise in the moral virtues and the study of good arts, are untroubled by passions and have pure, settled, and ordered species in the imaginative faculty—they are most subtle in their activity of understanding, and are naturally suited to acquire more certain knowledge of each thing than the rest, who are not like them. Hence, contrariwise, those who engender a flux of passions, either from a fault of nature, or from vicious habits, and laziness for good studies or imbued with corrupt studies, especially from childhood, are least able to acquire certitude in a given science. And therefore, the accidental cause of the fact that not everyone is equally apt to know with certitude consists in this: some human beings are less prone to learn than others, and some are imbued from youth with superior studies and training than others. Hence, among other impediments to know the truth which the Philosopher advances in book II of the Metaphysics, “the first and most prevalent,” as the Commentator says, “is faulty habituation from childhood.”79 For, those individuals who are badly educated from childhood, according to the Philosopher, always want to say “what they are accustomed to say, and judge as unsuitable what falls outside that, because that to which they are accustomed is for them most congenial to the soul.”80 Whence, Augustine in book III of On Christian Doctrine says: “If erroneous opinion has taken hold of someone’s soul, whatever else Scripture has stated is judged as figurative.”81 After this, however, the second impediment is disinclination for study. For, such people, as the Philosopher says in the same place, “hate examined discussion, because they cannot grasp it at once,”82 about whom the Commentator says that “it is impossible for them to learn.”83 Moreover, these two impediments are caused accidentally. However, the third [impediment] is due to the aforementioned natural cause, since in certain people the imaginative faculty is the ruling principle; they cannot

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demonstrationibus, nisi imaginatio concomitetur eas. Unde isti ad certum intellectum veritatis attingere non possunt.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod aeque rationalis est quilibet homo, dicendum quod rationale, quia nominat potentiam quae habet comparationem ad actum et ad subiectum, magis vel minus circa ipsum potest intelligi in respectu ad actum aut in respectu ad subiectum. Primo modo bene potest intendi et remitti, in quantum unus ex causis praedictis habilior est ad actum intelligendi quam alius, et ad retinendum veritatis impressionem, secundum quod in Sex principiis dicitur quia “animantius est brutum arbore et rationale irrationali,” et hoc quia brutum natum est pati a speciebus sensibilium, arbor non, et rationale a speciebus intelligibilium, irrationale non. Et secundum hunc modum etiam unus homo dicitur rationabilior altero, quia magis natus est moveri veritatis impressione quam alter. Secundo modo subdistinguendum. Cum enim rationale sit potestas hominis, ut homo est coniunctus ex corpore cuius est et actus intelligendi et ratiocinandi, ut dicitur Io De anima, potest considerari prout convenit homini ratione speciei vel ratione alicuius individui. Si primo modo, cum species sequitur formam, quae in homine est anima rationalis, hoc modo non potest rationale suscipere magis vel minus, quia species secundum se una et eadem est, et aequalis in omnibus individuis, non potens diversificari neque intendi aut remitti in substantia sua. Si ratione individui, cum ratio individui se teneat ex parte corporis et materiae, hoc modo in individuo rationale bene potest suscipere magis et minus, secundum quod unus homo ex parte organorum sensitivorum magis est aptus ad intelligendum et ratiocinandum quam alter, ut dictum est. Et hoc contingit, quia stante unitate speciei semper formae in aliquo diversificantur in diversis individuis numero secundum diversitatem materiarum numero in quibus recipiuntur. Sed secundum hoc est ei materia quodammodo accidentalis, secundum quam ad omnes actus animae in corpore quidam sunt aptiores quam alii, et unus ad unum aptior est, alius ad alium, tam in moralibus quam in intellectualibus, et unus habilior ad unam virtutem vel scientiam, alius ad aliam, [ut sic] sicut in uno et eodem homine secundum

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transcend imagination, nor can they trust demonstrations, unless the imagination corroborates them. Wherefore, those people cannot attain certain understanding of truth.

To the first argument in opposition, that every human is equally rational, it must be said that the term rational, because it refers to the potency which relates to the act as well as to the subject, can be understood with regard to a human being according to different degrees, whether in relation to the act or in relation to the subject. In the first way, it may well be intensified or slackened, insofar as one person (from the aforementioned causes) is more fit for the act of understanding than another, and for preserving the impression of truth, according to what is said in On Six Principles, that “a brute animal is more alive than a tree, and that which is rational [is more alive] than the irrational,”84 and this is because the brute animal is apt to be affected by the species of sensible things, but not so a tree, and the rational [being is apt to be affected by] the species of intelligible things, but not so the brute animal. And in this sense too, one human being is said to be more rational than another, because he is more apt to be moved by the impression of truth than another. Regarding the second way, one must make a further distinction. For, since being rational is a capacity of human beings, insofar as a human being is constituted by a body and its soul and the act of understanding and reasoning, as is said De anima I,85 it can be considered as it pertains to a human being either as a member of the species or as an individual. In the first sense, since the species follows the form, which in human beings is the rational soul, being rational cannot admit of degrees in this sense, because the species in itself is one and the same, and equal in all individuals, being incapable of differentiation in terms of intensification or slackening in its own substance. But as an individual, since the definition of the individual is based on the body and matter, being rational in this sense, within the individual, may well admit of degrees, according to how one human being, due to the organs of sense-perception, is fitter for understanding and reasoning than another, as was said.86 Moreover, this happens because, while maintaining the unity of the species, forms are always in some way differentiated in numerically different individuals through the different number of matters in which they are received. However, in this case, matter is in a sense accidental to the form, according to which certain people are fitter than others with respect to all acts of the soul in the body, and one individual is more fit for one act, another for another act, whether moral or intellectual, one is more fit for one virtue or science, another [is more fit] for another, so that just as in

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unam et eandem animam in natura et essentia propter mutationem aetatis contingit ipsum esse habiliorem ad unum actum quam ad alium, et similiter ad eundem actum in diversis aetatibus, et similiter propter mutationem temporis. Quae quidem mutatio non ponit per se aliquam variationem ex parte substantiae animae, sed solius corporis, et per corpus per accidens circa operationes animae, ita quod eadem anima, si haberet aliam dispositionem corporis, aliter operaretur, secundum quod dicit Philosophus in Io De anima: “Si senex haberet oculum iuvenis, videret utique sicut iuvenis.” Virtutes enim animae in se non senescunt. Hinc dicitur in Sex principiis: “Corpus universum, ut est in tempore, suscipit mutationes temporis alteratur enim corpus in aestate hieme vere et autumno, similiter et anima. Acutius etenim quidam in hieme, quidam in aestate, quidam autem in vere speculantur secundum instrumenti complexionem. Anima enim coniuncta complexiones corporis comitatur, ut aridae et gelidae complexionis dementiores se ipsis saepe in autumno sunt, quibus vero sanguis principatur, in vere. Similiter autem et de aliis secundum similitudinem animalium et temporum.” Sicut, inquam, ista diversificatio in operibus animae contingit in eodem homine secundum eandem animam omnino ex parte corporis, consimiliter et in diversis hominibus secundum diversas animas, quia quantum ad substantialia speciei non potest esse diversitas ex parte animarum, quia quaelibet earum est tota species ipsa, et nihil aliud, secundum quod alias hoc debet probari. Si autem contingit diversitas, hoc non est ratione formae et speciei, sed ratione hypostaticarum dispositionum, quae per accidentia distinguunt species in supposita, sive istud accidens sit ex materia sive praeter materiam, secundum quod per accidentia in formis separatis species distinguuntur per hypostases, sicut in formis materialibus per materias, secundum quod docet Damascenus in libro De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, dicens: “Sciendum quod contentiva individuorum solum species dicuntur specialissimae, ut angelus, homo, equus, oliva, et talia. Contentiva autem specierum specialissimarum genera dicuntur.” “Natura quidem igitur est secundum sanctos commune et indeterminatum, scilicet specialissima species, hypostasis vero particulare secundum se ipsum subsistens, et simpliciter dicere natura commune est, veluti humanitas, hypostasis autem quod particulare, Petrus hypostasis est, non natura, sed habens perfectam naturam humanitatis.” “Impossibile est autem naturam constitui extra eas quae secundum ipsam naturales proprietates constituentes ipsam et dividentes a reliquis naturis, quarum congregatio in altera non consideratur specie, item rursus unam et eandem hypostasim non uti

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one and the same man through one and the same soul according to nature and essence, it is possible for him through change in age to be more fit for one act than another, and similarly with respect to the same act at different ages, and similarly through change in temporal circumstances. This change, indeed, does not imply per se some variation in terms of the substance of the soul, but rather only in terms of the body, and through the body accidentally [a variation] regarding the operations of the soul, so that the same soul, if it would have a different bodily disposition, would operate differently, as the Philosopher states in De anima I: “If an old man would have a young eye, certainly he would see just as a youth.”87 For, the virtues of the soul as such do not age. Hence, the book On Six Principles states: “Every body, insofar as it exists in time, admits of temporal changes, for indeed a body is changed in summer, winter, spring, and autumn, and similarly the soul. As a matter of fact, some people are sharper thinkers in winter, some in summer, while others investigate by various means in spring. For, the conjoined soul follows the constitutions of body, so that those of dry and cold constitution are in themselves often less sound in autumn, for whom, however, the blood takes control in spring. Similarly, this is true of the rest by resemblance to the animals and the seasons.”88 Just as, I say, this differentiation in the operations of the soul happens in the same man according to the same soul [but] wholly through the body, in like fashion too [this happens] in different human beings according to different souls, because with respect to what is substantial in the species there cannot be diversity in terms of souls, since any one of them is the whole species itself,89 and nothing else, which point must be proved elsewhere.90 However, if diversity does occur, this is not due to the form and species, but rather due to the disposition of the subjects, which distinguish the species into supposits91 through accidents, whether that accident is from matter or separate from matter (according to which, among separate forms, the species are distinguished through the subjects accidentally, just as in material forms [this happens] through matters92), as Damascene teaches in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, stating: “We must know that what contains the individuals are only the species which are referred to as most specific, such as angel, human being, horse, olive, and the like. However, the genera are said to be what contain the most specific species.”93 “Therefore, according to the saints, nature is certainly something common and indeterminate, namely the most specific species, but the subject is something particular that subsists in itself, and absolutely speaking nature is common, as humanity, but the subject is that which is particular; Peter is a subject, not nature, but he has the complete nature of humanity.”94 “However, it is impossible for a nature to be constituted without those things which for it are the natural properties which constitute a nature and divide it from the remaining natures, whose association with something different is not considered part of the species, and again

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characteristicis, et constitutivis ipsius et divisivis a reliquis hypostasibus.” “Dicamus igitur quid est naturalis proprietas et quid hypostatica proprietas, et harum differentiam. Naturalis proprietas est quae naturam constituit, velut rationale, vitale, quae dividit speciem a specie, hoc est naturam ab alia natura. Hypostatica proprietas est quae dividit hypostasim ab alia hypostasi, velut album nigrum,” “accidentia animae haec et adventitia,” quibus “differens fit naturalium usus.” Unde, ut determinat, omnia opera simpliciter determinantur a natura speciei, ut sunt velle, intelligere, et huiusmodi; pronitas autem et inclinatio ad volendum, aut intelligendum, aut aliquid aliud agendum sic vel aliter determinatur ab aliquo accidente quod contingit naturae in supposito determinate per illud accidens, sive secundum se sive in materia. Per quod unus aptus est ad magis certitudinaliter sciendum quam alter, non per aliquid quod est ex parte naturae et speciei, quae aequalis est quantum est ex parte sui in quolibet supposito, sed per aliquod accidens quod determinat et facit hypostasim distinctam ab alia hypostasi sub eadem forma. Ad secundum, quod scientia in anima non habet contrarium, dicendum quod magis et minus in eis quae intensionem nata sunt suscipere per se est ab agente, quia secundum quod maiori virtute agit puritatem formae magis imprimit. Magis ergo et minus causari potest in diversis, quia unum agens fortius agit ad imprimendum formae puritatem quam aliud, etiamsi forma non habeat contrarium in subiecto. Et hoc modo scientia de una re potest esse certior quam de alia in uno et eodem, quia veritas una magis nata est movere intellectum quam alia, et similiter scientia de una et eadem re potest esse certior in uno quam in alio, quia veritas eadem magis nata est movere intellectum unius quam alterius. In eodem autem magis et minus causatur per contrarium impediens agens, et secundum quod plus et minus impedit, plus et minus veritatem formae imprimit, sicut contingit in formis naturalibus, ut per hoc etiam in diversis causetur magis et minus in quantum agens in uno magis impeditur a contrario quam in alio. Iste ergo modus eius quod est magis et minus causatur ab eo quod est habere contrarium, non autem omnis modus suscipiendi magis et minus, ut dictum est.

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similarly for one and the same subject to be without those characteristics which constitute it and divide it from the remaining subjects.”95 “Let us say, therefore, what is the natural property and what is the property of the subject, and their difference. The natural property is that which constitutes the nature, such as rational, living, which divides one species from another, namely one nature from another. The property of the subject is that which divides one subject from another subject, such as white and black;”96 “these are accidental and external to the soul,”97 by which “there is a different usage of that which is said to be ‘natural’.”98 Whence, as he concludes, all operations, absolutely speaking, are determined by the nature of the species, as are willing, understanding, and the like; however, the propensity or inclination to will, or to understand, or to do something else in such a way or otherwise, is determined by some accident that is connected to the nature in the supposite, in a determinate way through that accident,99 whether in itself or in matter. Through it, one person is fit to know with certitude more than another, not on account of what stems from the nature or species, which considered absolutely is equal in any supposite, but rather on account of some accident which determines and makes the subject distinct from another subject of the same form. To the second [argument], that knowledge in the soul does not have a contrary, we must say that the difference of degree among those things which are naturally suited to admit of intensification is due to the agent, because the higher the excellence with which the agent acts, the more it impresses the purity of the form. Therefore, the difference of degree can be caused among different things, because one agent acts more powerfully impressing the purity of the form than another, even if the form does not have a contrary in the subject. And in this way, knowledge about one thing can be more certain than about another thing in one and the same person, because one truth is more apt to move the intellect than another [truth], and similarly knowledge about one and the same thing can be more certain in one person than in another, because the same truth is more apt to move the intellect of one than that of another. On the other hand, in the same [entity], the difference of degree is caused through a contrary that obstructs the agent, and according to the degree it obstructs, to that degree it impresses the truth of the form, as happens in natural forms, and for this reason even among different things it may cause a difference of degree insofar as the agent is obstructed by a contrary more in one case than in another. Therefore, that manner of exhibiting difference of degree is caused by that which is meant to have a contrary, but not every way of admitting differences of degree [is such], as stated.

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Quaestio 6 Utrum omnia scibilia nata sint aeque certitudinaliter sciri Circa sextum arguitur quod omnia scibilia quantum est ex parte sui aeque certitudinaliter nata sunt sciri. Primo sic. “Sicut se habet unumquodque ad esse, sic ad veritatem et cognitionem,” IIo Metaphysicae. Sed unumquodque se habet ad esse et veritatem quod aeque vere est id quod est, quia ita vere corruptibile est corruptibile, ut incorruptibile est incorruptibile. Ergo unumquodque aeque vere se habet ad cognitionem. Quae aeque vere se habent ad cognitionem aeque certitudinaliter nata sunt cognosci. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Veritas uniuscuiusque rei creatae similitudo est in ea qua imitatur suum exemplar primum. Tunc enim unumquodque in se vere est, cum est tale, quale ipsum fore exemplar repraesentat. Et tunc certe scitur, quando scitur tale esse. Sed unumquodque aequaliter natum est assimilari suo exemplari primo, quia tantum imitatur vermiculus ideam secundum quam factus est, quantum angelus suam. Ergo aequa certitudine potest sciri veritas cuiuscumque. Ex hoc autem est certitudo scientiae. Ergo etc. In oppositum est quoniam ex hoc nata est res certitudinaliter sciri, quod se ipsam clare manifestat iudicio intellectus, qui ex hoc per se testimonium perhibet veritatis. Sed non omnia aeque clare nata sunt se manifestare intellectui, quia hoc impedit materia in materialibus secundum Commentatorem principio IIi Metaphysicae. Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod veritas rei est id quo res scitur et intelligitur, quia ipsa est proprium obiectum intellectus. Ex eodem autem est scientia rei et certitudo eius, quia non est scientia nisi sit certa, ut dictum est. Certitudo ergo scientiae est ex veritate rei scitae, quare secundum modum veritatis repertae in rebus iudicandum est de certitudine scientiae earum. Dispositio enim per se effectus semper sequitur dispositionem suae causae. Nunc autem ita est quod veritas rei et esse eius parificantur, secundum quod dicitur IIo Metaphysicae: “Necesse est ut dispositio cuiuslibet rei in esse sit sua dispositio in veritate.”

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Question 6 Whether all knowable things are apt to be known with equal certitude Regarding the sixth [question], it is argued that all knowable things, in and of themselves, are apt to be known with equal certitude. First, as follows. “As each thing stands with regard to being, so too does it stand with regard to truth and cognition (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book II).”100 But each thing stands with regard to being and truth in the sense that each truly is what it is, since thus what is corruptible is truly corruptible, as the incorruptible is incorruptible. Therefore, each thing equally truly relates to cognition. Those things which equally truly relate to cognition, are apt to be known with equal certitude. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. The truth of each created thing is the likeness in it, whereby it imitates its first exemplar.101 Then, indeed, each thing of itself is true, since it is of such kind that it shows itself to be like the exemplar. And when it is known to be such, then it is known with certitude. But each thing is equally apt to be assimilated to its first exemplar, since a worm imitates the idea according to which it is made, as much as an angel [imitates] its own [idea]. Therefore, the truth of each thing can be known with equal certitude. The certitude of knowledge, moreover, is based on this fact. Therefore, etc. [The argument] in opposition is that a thing is apt to be known with certitude, because it manifests itself clearly to the judgment of the intellect, which thereby asserts through itself the evidence of truth. But not all things are apt to manifest themselves equally clearly to the intellect, because matter prevents this among material things, according to the Commentator at the beginning of book II of the Metaphysics.102 Therefore, etc.

Regarding this question, we must say that the truth of a thing is that by which a thing is known and understood, because [truth] itself is the proper object of the intellect. However, the knowledge of a thing and its certitude stem from the same source, because there is no knowledge unless it is certain, as stated. Therefore, the certitude of knowledge comes from the truth of the thing known, hence according to the way truth is discovered among things, one must judge regarding the certitude of the knowledge of them. For, the disposition of the effect per se always follows the disposition of its cause. Now then, it is the case that the truth of a thing and its act of being are paired, according to what is said Metaphysics II: “It is necessary that the disposition of any thing in being is its disposition in truth.”103 Whence, the other

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Unde alia translatio dicit ibidem: “Unumquodque ergo sicut se habet ad esse, sic se habet ad veritatem.” “Quanto igitur,” ut dicit Commentator ibidem, “res quaelibet magis fuerit perfecta in esse, tanto magis erit perfecta in veritate.” Et ideo dicitur in eodem quod “ens significat essentiam et veritatem rei” et quod id “quod significat essentiam cuiuslibet, hoc est finis cognitionis et esse rei.” In esse autem sic se habent res, quod non habent ipsum aequaliter, sed est unum ens primum, cui verissime convenit esse, quia habet esse per suam essentiam, a quo omne aliud ens habet esse per participationem, et ideo multo debilius, secundum quod dicit Augustinus VIIo Confessionum, dirigens sermonem ad Deum: “inspexi cetera infra te, et vidi nec omnino esse, nec omnino non esse: esse quidem quoniam abs te sunt; non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt.” Amplius in his quae habent esse per participationem, cum omnia entia sunt a primo per ordinem, non aequaliter esse participant, sed ea quae propinquiora sunt primo in esse, verius ipsum esse participant quam remotiora. Propter quod dicitur IIo Metaphysicae: “Primum semper est magis dignum in esse, posterius autem non sic”; et Augustinus XIIo Confessionum: “Fecisti caelum et terram, unum prope te, alterum prope nihil, unum quo superior tu es, alterum quo inferius nihil est.” Et est hoc dictum de materialibus compositis ex materia et forma, quia cum forma dat esse, et superiora corpora, quia plus habent de forma, verius habent esse et inferiora minus vere, quia plus habent de materia, ideo caelum, quod est supremum in corporibus, dicitur factum prope ens primum, terra autem infima in corporibus dicitur facta prope nihil. Substantiae autem spirituales secundum illos qui dicunt quod sunt formae purae, verissime et summe habent esse in creaturis. Materia autem pura, quantum est ex se, minime de esse habet. De qua dicit Augustinus quaerens quid sit, XIIo Confessionum: “Si dici potest ‘nihil aliquid’ et ‘est et non est’ “; et Plato in Timaeo: “Idem hoc inter nullam et aliquam substantiam positum invenitur, nec tamen nihil est.” Secundum igitur hunc ordinem, quanto res superior est et propinquior primo simplici, qui est forma et actus purus, tanto est perfectior in veritate, et quanto remotior est ab illo et propinquior materiae purae, tanto imperfectior est in veritate. Propter quod dicit Philosophus IIo Metaphysicae: “Unumquodque principiorum causa est eorum secundum quod sunt aliae res, et oportet ut illud quod est magis verum, sit illud quod est causa veritatis rerum quae sunt post.”

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translation says at the same place: “Therefore, as each thing stands with regard to being, so too does it stand with regard to truth.”104 As the Commentator says in the same place: “Therefore, the more any thing will be completed in being, the more will it be completed in truth.”105 Moreover, that is why it is stated there that “being indicates the essence and truth of a thing” and that “what indicates the essence of anything—this is the goal of cognition as well as the being of a thing.”106 However, things stand with regard to being in this way, because they do not possess it equally, but rather there is the one first being, to whom being most truly belongs, because being belongs to it by its own essence, from whom every other being gets to be through participation, and thereby most weakly, according to what Augustine says in book VII of the Confessions, addressing himself to God: “I examined the other things below you, and saw them neither to be altogether, nor not to be altogether: to be, indeed, because they are through you; but, on the other hand, not to be, because they are not what you are.”107 [Speaking] further about those things which get to be through participation: since all beings derive from the first through an order, ‘to be’ is not shared equally by them, but rather those which are closer to the first in terms of ‘to be’, share ‘to be’ itself more truly than the more remote. On which account, it is stated in Metaphysics II: “The first always is more worthy in terms of ‘to be’, but what is posterior not so;”108 and Augustine in Confessions XII: “You made heaven and earth, one close to you, the other close to nothing, the one above which you are, the other below which nothing is.”109 And this statement is about material entities composed of matter and form; for, since being comes from form, and the superior bodies are in a truer sense (since they have a higher degree of form) and the lesser bodies in a less true sense (since they have a higher degree of matter), therefore heaven, which is supreme among bodies, is said to have been made close to the first being, while earth—lowest among bodies—is said to have been made close to nothing. However, the spiritual substances, according to those [thinkers] who say that they are pure forms, have being most truly and to the highest degree among creatures. On the other hand, pure matter, in and of itself, has being least of all. About which, Augustine, investigating what it might be, says in Confessions XII: “It may be called ‘not anything’ and ‘it is and it is not’”;110 and Plato in the Timaeus: “This very thing is found positioned between no [substance] and some substance, yet it is not nothing.”111 Therefore, according to this order, the more superior and closer a thing is to the first simple [being], who is form and pure act, the more perfect [it is] in truth, and the more removed it is from that [first being] and the closer it is to pure matter, the less perfect it is in truth. That is why the Philosopher says in Metaphysics II: “Each principle is a cause by which other things are, and it is fitting that what is truer be the cause of the truth of the things that are posterior.”112

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Quare cum secundum exigentiam veritatis rei nata est de ea haberi certa scientia, absolute dicendum quod non omnia, immo nulla a primo ente usque ad ultimum, quantum est de natura rei, aequa certitudine nata sunt sciri. Immo primum in fine certitudinis natum est sciri, post ipsum autem substantiae immateriales spirituales angelicae, et ultimo materialia, et in rebus materialibus unumquodque natum est sciri tanto minus quanto magis materiale est. Unde et mathematica abstracta a materia sensibili certiori scientia cognoscibilia sunt quam naturalia. Et ideo dicit Philosophus de illis substantiis immaterialibus comparando scientiam earum, quantum est ex parte sui, ad scientiam materialium IIo Metaphysicae: quod “in natura sua sunt valde manifestae,” et quod “non est difficilis cognitio veritatis in eis propter ipsas res, sed propter nos,” e contrario ei quod contingit in rebus materialibus, secundum quod dicit ibi Commentator: “Rectum est ut difficultas in rebus quae sunt in fine veritatis, et in primo principio, et in principiis abstractis a materia sit ex nobis, non ex illis, quoniam abstracta sunt intellecta in se naturaliter.” Et ideo illa certissime nata sunt sciri, quanto sunt priora, secundum quod dicit Philosophus Io Metaphysicae: “Certissimae scientiarum maxime primorum sunt.” In aliis autem in se ipsis est difficultas sciendi ea, quia non sunt in se intellecta, sicut formae materiales. Difficultas enim in illis magis est ex se quam ex nobis, et maxime in cognoscendo primam materiam. Propter quod dicit Plato de ipsa quia “nec plane intelligibilis est, nec plane sensibilis.” Comparando etiam materialia inter se secundum certitudinem scientiae, dicit Philosophus quod “non oportet quaerere in qualibet scientia perscrutationem, sicut in mathematicis. Hoc enim non oportet quaerere nisi in eis quae non commiscentur cum materia. Et ideo iste modus non est naturalis, quia omnis natura fere admixta est cum materia”; ubi dicit Commentator: “Demonstrationes enim mathematicae sunt in primo ordine certitudinis, et demonstrationes naturales sequuntur eas,” et iterum inter mathematica tanto maiori certitudine nata sunt sciri, quanto sunt magis abstracta. Propter quod dicitur Io Metaphysicae: “Quae ex minoribus certiores sunt his quae ex appositione, ut arithmetica, geometria.” Est enim arithmetica de unitate, quae est substantia non posita, geometria vero de puncto, quae est substantia posita, et ita magis concernens materiam. Et ideo geometria sumit certitudinem ab arithmetica, descendendo de genere in genus in quantum “magnitudines numeri sunt,” ut dicitur in libro Posteriorum.

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Wherefore, since sure knowledge is apt to be had about something according to the requirements of the truth of the thing, absolutely it must be said that not all things, or rather none, from the first being all the way to the last—in terms of the nature of a thing—is apt to be known with equal certitude. Rather, the first is apt to be known with ultimate certitude, while after it the immaterial, spiritual, angelical substances, and lastly material things, and among material things each one is apt to be known less the more material it is. Hence also mathematical entities, abstracted from sensible matter, are knowable with more scientific certitude than natural beings. And that is why the Philosopher comments about those immaterial substances, when comparing the knowledge of them—as far as the things themselves are concerned, to the knowledge of material things, in Metaphysics II: “that in their own nature they are thoroughly evident,” and that “the cognition of truth in them is not difficult on account of the things themselves, but rather on account of us,”113 which is contrary to what happens in material things, as the Commentator points out in the same place: “It is right that the difficulty is ours, regarding things which are of ultimate truth, both the first principle and principles abstracted from matter, and not theirs, since abstract [entities] are understood in themselves naturally.”114 And therefore those things are apt to be known most certainly, insofar as they are prior, according to what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics I: “The most certain sciences are chiefly about first principles.”115 With regard to the other things, contrariwise, the difficulty in knowing them lies in themselves, because they are not understood in themselves, such as material forms. For, the difficulty regarding them has to do with them more than with us, and chiefly in cognizing prime matter. That is why Plato claims about it that “it is neither plainly intelligible, nor plainly sensible.”116 Furthermore, while comparing material things among themselves in terms of scientific certitude, the Philosopher says that “it is not fitting to seek the precision of mathematics in any science. For, it is fitting to seek this only in those [sciences] which are not attached to matter. And therefore this method is not proper to nature, because every nature as a rule is mixed with matter;”117 at which point the Commentator says: “For, mathematical demonstrations belong to the first order of certitude, and natural demonstrations come next,”118 and again among the branches of mathematics, those are apt to be known with greater certitude the more abstract they are. That is why it is stated in Metaphysics I: “Those things which are [known] through fewer [principles] are more certain than those [known] through an addition [of principles], as arithmetic [is to] geometry.”119 For, arithmetic is about unity, which is a substance that is not positioned, while geometry [is] about the point, which is a positioned substance, and thereby more concerned with matter. And, therefore, geometry derives certitude from arithmetic, through the reduction of one genus to another, insofar as “magnitudes are numbers,”120 as stated in the Posterior Analytics.

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Minima ergo certitudo rerum materialium nata est esse in scientia rerum naturalium, et tanto minor, quanto magis sunt mutabiles, quia praeter hoc quod minus perfecte habent esse et veritatem, quia sunt proxima materiae, id modicum quod habent esse et veritatis amittunt in quantum mutantur, secundum quod dicit Augustinus Vo De Trinitate: “Quod mutatur non servat ipsum esse, et quod mutari potest, etiamsi non mutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse. Ac per hoc illud quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam omnino mutari non potest, sine scrupulo accidit quod verissime dicatur esse.” Et ideo corpora caelestia, quia solum mutantur secundum situm, non secundum formam, sicut elementaria, certius nata sunt sciri quam elementaria, quorum naturam, scilicet in materia, in hoc quod minima certitudine sciuntur, sequuntur omnia moralia propter particularium variabilitatem circa quae sunt, de quibus dicitur Io Ethicorum: “Bona et iusta de quibus civilis intendit tantam habent differentiam et errorem, ut videantur sola lege esse.” Et quia propter mutationem, quae est in rebus naturalibus, ipsa minime esse habent et minima certitudine nata sunt sciri, ideo etiam contingit quod illa, quorum esse et natura est ipsa mutatio aut in mutatione consistit, minimum esse habent inter omnia naturalia et debilissime nata sunt sciri, cuiusmodi sunt motus et tempus. De tempore enim dicit Philosophus IVo Physicorum quod apparet “quod omnino non sit, aut vix aut obscure”; et Augustinus XIo Confessionum: “Quid est tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio. Quomodo enim esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit in non esse?.” Minime ergo ista nata sunt sciri, quia minime nata sunt esse determinatum habere. Unde et illud quod omnino habet esse indeterminatum, id nulla scientia humana comprehendit, cuiusmodi est ens per accidens, de quo dicit Philosophus VIo Metaphysicae: “Nulla scientia perscrutatur de hoc, quia non habet esse determinatum,” et ideo neque scientiam permanentem, quoniam omnis scientia permanens aut est illius quod est semper aut illius quod est in maiori parte, quia quod determinatur oportet quod sit semper aut in maiori parte. Unde et talia entia ad prima principia per se nota, quae ex natura sua certius nata sunt sciri quam posteriora in quolibet genere scientiae et in qualibet re scita, per accidens se habent. Unde ex illis primis principiis non potest ratio humana talium notitiam investigare.

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Therefore, minimal certitude about material things is apt to exist in the science of natural things, and to a lesser extent the more they are susceptible to change,121 because aside from the fact that being and truth belongs to them less perfectly, because they are closest to matter, what little they have in terms of truth and being they lose insofar as they change, according to what Augustine says in On the Trinity, book V: “What is changed does not preserve itself in being, and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, is able to not be what it had been. And therefore, that which not only is not changed, but also truly cannot be changed at all, without doubt it is the case that it is most truly said to be.”122 And therefore the heavenly bodies, which are changed only according to place, not according to form as the basic bodies, are apt to be known more certainly than the basic bodies, whose nature— which is in matter, and in terms of the fact that they are known with the least certitude—all the moral sciences include, on account of the variability of particular cases with which they deal, about which it said in Ethics I: “Good and just [actions], with which politics deals, include so much diversity and error, that they seem to exist only by law.”123 Moreover since, due to the change which exists in natural things, these things have minimal being and are minimally fit to be known with certitude, therefore it also happens that those things whose being and nature is change itself or consists in change, such as motion and time, least of all possess being among all natural things and are the least apt to be known. For, regarding time, the Philosopher says in Physics, IV, that it seems “that it does not exist at all, either barely or obscurely”;124 and Augustine in Confessions, XI: “What is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain to the inquirer, I do not know. For, how do we say that that is, for which the cause so that it be, is such that will not be, so that evidently we may not truly say of time that it is, except as directed to not be?”125 Therefore, those things are least apt to be known, because they are least apt to possess a fixed [way] to be. Wherefore, also, no human knowledge comprehends that which altogether has an indeterminate [way] to be, of which kind is accidental being, about which the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, VI: “No science investigates this,126 because it does not possess a fixed [way] to be,”127 and therefore neither [does it have] a stable science, since a stable science either deals with what is always or with what is for the most part, since it is necessary that what is fixed be either always or for the most part. Whence, also, such beings relate in an accidental way to the first principles which are known through themselves, which by their own nature are apt to be known more certainly than posterior things in any genus of science and in anything known. Hence, based on first principles, human reason cannot investigate the knowledge of such things.

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Sic ergo patet discurrendo per singula qualiter non omnia aeque certitudinaliter nata sunt sciri, sed quaedam certius, quaedam minus certe, ut dictum est.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “omnia aeque vere se habent ad esse,” dicendum quod falsum est, secundum quod patet ex dictis. Licet enim quaeque res aequaliter vere est id quod est, quia “nulla propositio est verior ea in qua praedicatur idem de se ipso,” absolute tamen non aeque vere habet esse quaelibet res, sed una verius altera. Unde arguendo sic “vermiculus aeque vere est id quod est, ut angelus; ergo aeque vere est,” fallacia est secundum quid et simpliciter. Ad secundum, quod aeque vere quaeque res assimilatur ei ad quem facta est; ergo aeque vere est, dicendum quod non sequitur, quoniam licet aeque vere assimilatur, non tamen tantum assimilatur, quia non secundum tantum et aequale nata est quaeque res ei assimilari, et tanto res in se verius est, quanto amplius illi primo assimilatur. Unde Augustinus 83 Quaestionibus: “Multis modis res possunt dici similes Deo: aliae secundum virtutem et sapientiam, quia in ipso est virtus et sapientia; aliae in quantum solum vivunt, quia ipse summe vivit; aliae in quantum sunt, quia ille summe est. Et ideo quae tantum sunt exigue sunt ad similitudinem eius; quae vero vivunt amplius participant similitudinem; quae vero sapiunt, similitudine propinqua sunt, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius.” Modicum ergo ens tantum assimilatur modico in ipso ad quod est, quod tamen in se non est modicum, sicut maximum maximo. Non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod tantum assimilatur modicum, sicut maximum. Modicum et maximum dico in Deo non ex se absolute, sed ex comparatione qua imitabilis est a creatura secundum gradus diversos.

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In this way, therefore, it is evident by considering things separately how not everything is apt to be known with equal certitude, but rather some things [are apt to be known] more certainly, others less certainly, as stated.

To the first [argument] in opposition, stating that “everything equally truly stands regarding ‘to be’,” we must say that this is false, as is evident from the aforementioned. For although each thing equally truly is that which it is, “since no proposition is truer than that in which the same thing is predicated of itself,”128 nevertheless, absolutely speaking, not everything possesses being equally truly, but rather one thing is truer than another. Hence, by arguing thus—“a worm, as an angel, is equally truly that which it is; therefore it is equally truly”—it fallaciously confuses what is said with qualification with what is said simply. To the second [argument]—that each thing equally truly is likened to that by which it was made; therefore, it is equally truly—we must say that it does not follow, since although it is likened equally truly, nevertheless it is not likened to the same degree, because each thing is not apt to be likened to it to the same degree and equally, and a thing is in itself truer the more fully it is likened to that first [principle]. Whence, Augustine [says] in On Eighty-Three Questions: “Things can be said to be similar to God in various ways: some according to virtue and wisdom, because in Him there is virtue and wisdom; some insofar as they only live, because He lives in the highest sense; some insofar as they exist, since He exists in the highest sense. And therefore those which only exist, exist in His likeness scarcely; those which live, however, more fully share in [His] likeness; but those who are wise exist by a close likeness, so that among creatures nothing is closer.”129 Therefore, moderate being is only likened by what is moderate in it to That Which Is, which nevertheless is not in itself moderate, just as the maximum [is likened] by what is maximum. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that the moderate is likened [to it] as much as the maximum. I do not mean ‘moderate’ and ‘maximum’ in God in an absolute sense, but rather based on the comparison by which He is imitable by the creature according to diverse levels.

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Articulus III De qualitate scibilium Quia disciplinati est in tantum certitudinem quaerere secundum unumquodque genus, in quantum rei natura recipit, ideo postquam visum est de certitudine scientiae humanae, videndum est de quidditate scibilis ab eo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque: primum, si contingit hominem scire non entia; secundum, si contingit hominem scire omnia entia; tertium, si contingit hominem scire omnia ex philosophicis scientiis; quartum, si contingit hominem scire omnia ex puris naturalibus; quintum, si contingit hominem scire per gratiam illa quae excedunt naturam. Quaestio 1 Utrum contingat hominem scire non entia Circa primum arguitur quod contingit hominem scire non entia. Primo sic. Ea quae non sunt solent praecaveri si suspicantur nociva, et sperari si suspicentur proficua. Haec non possent fieri nisi contingeret ea scire. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Prophetae praenuntiabant quae non erant et neque ex cursu rerum naturalium futura erant. Et illa non erant simpliciter et tamen illa sciverunt. Ergo etc. Tertio sic. Contingit praenuntiare eclipses solis et lunae, et cetera talium, antequam sint. Quod non esset, nisi contingeret scire non entia. Ergo etc. Quarto sic. Secundum Philosophum in libro Peri hermenias: “contingit vere enuntiare de eo quod non est non esse.” Hoc autem non contingeret, nisi contingeret quod non est scire. Ergo etc. Probatio mediae est quia si contingit vere enuntiare de eo quod non est non esse, contingit scire propositionem illam veram in qua enuntiatur quod non est non esse, quia omne verum est scibile. Sed non contingit scire veritatem complexionis nisi sciendo incomplexa, quia veritatem complexionis non cognoscimus, nisi in quantum terminos cognoscimus. Cum ergo termini illius complexionis et in subiecto et in praedicato sunt non ens, ergo etc.

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Article III Concerning the character of knowable things Since, for the instructed, it is proper to search for certitude in any genus as far as the nature of things allows, therefore after having examined the certitude of human knowledge, we must examine the quiddity belonging to that which is knowable. And about this issue, five questions are sought: first, if it is possible for a human being to know non-beings; second, if it is possible for a human being to know all beings; third, if it is possible for a human being to know all things through the philosophical sciences; fourth, if it is possible for a human being to know all things through purely natural means; fifth, if it is possible for a human being to know through grace those things which exceed nature. Question 1 Whether it is possible for a human being to know non-beings Regarding the first question, it is argued that it is possible for a human being to know non-beings. First, as follows. Those things which do not exist are usually prevented if harmful things are suspected, and hoped for if beneficial things are suspected. These [conditions] could not happen unless it would be possible to know them. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. The prophets foretold things that neither were nor were about to be through the course of natural events. Those things absolutely did not exist, yet they knew them. Therefore, etc. Third, thus. It is possible to foretell eclipses of the sun and moon, and other such things, before they come to be. This would not be the case, unless it were possible to know non-beings. Therefore, etc. Fourth, thus. According to the Philosopher in the book On Interpretation, “it is possible to speak truly about that which is not ‘not-being’.”130 However, this could not happen, unless it were possible to know that which is not. Therefore, etc. The proof of the middle term is that, if it is possible to speak truly about that which is not ‘not-being’, it is possible to know that true proposition in which it is said ‘that it is not not-being’, since every truth is knowable. But it is not possible to know the truth of what is complex, except by knowing what is non-complex,131 since we do not recognize the truth of what is complex, except insofar as we recognize the terms. Since, accordingly, the terms of that complex [statement], both in the subject and predicate, are ‘not-being’, therefore etc.

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Oppositum arguitur primo sic. Non contingit scire nisi verum. Verum et ens convertuntur. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Scientia hominis causata est a rebus. Non ens nullius potest esse causa. Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc secundum Philosophum in IIIo De anima quod intellectus est “quodammodo intelligibilia et sciens scibilia,” et cum “non sunt nisi duo modi essendi,” ut ibi dicit Commentator, “necesse est ut intellectus et sciens sint intellectum et scibile extra animam aut forma eius.” Res autem ipsa non possunt esse. Necesse est ergo quod sint quodammodo forma et species eius, specie scilicet rei intellectae et scitae informati. Unde “lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis.” Nihil igitur potest esse scibile, nisi quod per speciem suam natum est esse in anima, ut per speciem anima quodammodo sit ipsum. Quare cum non ens speciem habere natum non est, non ens nullo modo potest esse scitum in quantum huiusmodi. Sed quidquid contingit hominem scire necesse est quod ens sit, ita quod prima ratio scita oportet quod sit ratio et intentio entis, secundum quod dicit Avicenna: “Ens et res talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se, et alia ab eis.” Unde quod privat entis intentionem per se, est illud quod est per se et primo incognitum, ita quod sicut unumquodque scitum primo est cognitum sub ratione qua ens, ita unumquodque ignoratum primo est incognitum sub ratione qua non ens. Propter quod dicit Philosophus Io Physicorum quod “infinitum in quantum infinitum incognitum est,” quia infinitum in quantum infinitum est non ens. Intelligendum tamen quod “ens dicitur multis modis,” secundum Philosophum Vo Metaphysicae, et similiter per contrarium non ens dicitur multis modis. Quorum unus est secundum figuras praedicamentorum, et est certitudo qua unaquaeque res est id quod est, sicut albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo. Et hoc appellatur esse proprium rei, quod est essentiae eius. Non ens oppositum tali enti est illud quod nullam certitudinem habet in se, nec potest habere apud intellectum qua certificetur res esse id quod est, sed privat esse tale, et est illud de quo dictum est quod homo non potest ipsum scire, quia est omnino inscibile, quia rem cuiuslibet praedicamenti privat. Sed ens dicto modo secundum quodlibet genus praedicamenti dividitur in ens

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In opposition, it is argued first as follows. It is only possible to know what is true.132 Truth and being are convertible with each other. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Human knowledge is caused by things. Non-being can be the cause of no thing. Therefore, etc.

About this question, we must say, according to the Philosopher in book III of De anima, that the intellect is “in a certain sense those things that are intelligible as well as an entity that knows those things that are knowable,”133 and since “there are only two ways of being,” as the Commentator points out at that place, “it is necessary for the intellect and that which knows to be what is thought and is knowable outside the soul, or its form.”134 But they cannot be the very thing that is known. Therefore, it is necessary that they be in a certain way its form and species, that is to say, informed by the species of the thing thought and known. Whence, “the stone is not in the soul, but rather the species of the stone.”135 Therefore, something is knowable only because it is apt to be in the soul through its species, so that through the species the soul is in some sense the thing. Wherefore, since non-being is not apt to have a species, in no way can non-being be known as such. Instead, it is necessary that whatever a human being can know is a being,136 so that it is proper that the first concept known be the concept and intension of being, as Avicenna says: “Being and thing are such that they are impressed in the soul by a first impression; they are not acquired from other [concepts] that are more known, and others [are known] through them.”137 Hence, what takes away the intension of being as such, is that which is per se and primarily unknown, so that just as each thing that is known is cognized on the basis whereby it is a being, so too each thing that is unknown is first and foremost not cognized on the basis whereby it is not being. That is why the Philosopher says in book I of the Physics that “the infinite insofar as it is infinite is not cognized,”138 because the infinite insofar as it is infinite is not being.139 Nevertheless, we must understand that “being is said in many ways,”140 according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, book V, and similarly non-being is said in many ways. One of these ways is in terms of the types of categories,141 and this is the certitude whereby any one thing is that which it is, as whiteness possesses the certitude whereby it is whiteness. And this is called the proper being of the thing, which is its essence. The non-being opposed to such being is what has no certitude in itself, nor can it have the means whereby it is certified in the intellect as a thing that is what it is, but rather it takes away such being, and is said about it that a human being cannot know it, because it is altogether unknowable, since it takes away the reality of any category.142 But being, in the aforementioned sense—according to any

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potentia et in ens actu. Et dicitur illud quod est in potentia non ens respectu illius quod est ens actu extra animam, quia id quod solum est in potentia non est in actu. Quod tamen aliquando poterit esse tale vel potentia materiae per generationem vel potentia efficientis solum per creationem, de tali non ente non est negandum quin contingat hominem ipsum scire concipiendo quidditatem et essentiam talis entis, praeter hoc quod apprehendat ipsam esse in actu extra animam. Talis enim intellectus, quo apprehenditur res extra esse in effectu, semper concomitatur intellectum quo apprehenditur res simpliciter in essentia sua, ut dicit Avicenna ponens exemplum tale: “Verbi gratia, si dixerit aliquis ‘resurrectio erit,’ intellexisti ‘resurrectionem,’ quae non est, et intellexisti ‘erit,’ quod non est, et praedicasti ‘erit’ de ‘resurrectione.’ Sed intelligitur ut in hora futura vera sit de ea intentio de ‘est’.” Et sic, ut dicit, “enuntiationes non sunt nisi per id quod est in anima et per accidens per id quod est in exterioribus.” Et similiter est de intellectibus incomplexorum, secundum quod dicit Algazel in Logica sua: “Possibile est te intelligere hominem simpliciter, ita quod non intelligas an habeat esse extra, an non esse, sicut an habeat esse album, an non.” Et si dubitas forte an habeat esse in mundo an non, hoc non impedit tuum intellectum ad intelligendum essentiam hominis, quod manifeste dicit Philosophus secundum antiquam translationem IIo Posteriorum. “Apparet,” inquit, “quod intentio definitionis rei et quia existat, sunt duae res diversae, quia qui ostendit quid est res et eius definitionem, non apprehendit per hoc quod illa res existat. Nam cum homo ostendit definitionem circuli, quod sit figura plana, et cetera, non apprehendit per ostensionem illius quod sit esse circulo.” Nota per illud quod dicit “sunt duae res diversae” ipsum non intelligere nisi diversitatem intentionum in intelligendo, quod patet per hoc quod subdit, “quia qui ostendit” etc. De non ente vero quod opponitur enti secundum figuras praedicamentorum, quod privat rem cuiuslibet praedicamenti, de illo solo non ente non potest esse scientia nisi per accidens, sicut privatio cognoscitur per habitum, secundum quod dicit Avicenna Io Metaphysicae: “Esse est notius quam non esse. Esse enim cognoscitur per se, non esse vero cognoscitur per esse aliquo modo.”

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genus of category—is divided into being in potency and being in act. And that being which is in potency is said to be non-being with respect to what is being in act outside the soul, since what is only in potency is not in act. Nevertheless, that which can be actual at some point in the future, either through the potency of matter in generation or through the potency of the efficient cause as happens only in creation: about such being, one must not deny that it is possible for a human being to know it by conceiving the quiddity and essence of such being, prior to the action of apprehending that it exists actually outside the soul. For, such understanding, by which a thing is apprehended as existing in fact outside [the soul], always accompanies the understanding by which a thing apprehended in its essence without qualification, as Avicenna claims when he gives the following example: “For example, if someone should say ‘there will be resurrection’, you have understood ‘resurrection’, which is not, and you have understood ‘will be’, which is not, and you have predicated ‘will be’ of ‘resurrection’. But it is understood that at some point in the future, the intension of ‘it is’ would be true of it.” And thus, as he says, “assertions take place only through what is in the soul, and accidentally [they take place] through what is in exterior things.”143 And similarly, this is the case regarding non-complex concepts, as al-Ghazālī says in his Logic: “It is possible for you to understand ‘human being’ in an unqualified sense, so that you would not understand whether this [means that it] possesses existence outside [the soul], or non-existence, just as [you would not understand] whether this exists as something white, or not.”144 And if perhaps you doubt whether this exists in the world or not, this does not prevent your intellect from understanding the essence of a human being, as the Philosopher evidently claims, according to the old translation of book II of the Posterior Analytics: “It appears,” he begins, “that the intension of the definition of a thing and [the intension] of its existence, are two different things, because he who indicates what a thing is and its definition, does not apprehend thereby that that thing exists. For instance, when someone indicates the definition of a circle—that it is a plane figure, etc.—he does not apprehend, through the act of indicating that [definition], that which exists in the shape of a circle.”145 Observe that by saying “are two different things,” he means only a difference of intensions in understanding, as is clear when he continues, “because he who indicates” etc. However, regarding the non-being which is opposed to being according to the types of categories, which takes away the reality of any category—about that nonbeing alone there cannot be knowledge except accidentally, just as an absence is known through [the knowledge of] a certain state, as Avicenna says in book I of his Metaphysics: “To be is more known than not to be. For, ‘to be’ is known through itself, but ‘not to be’ is known through that which is in some way.”146

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Per haec patent obiecta utriusque partis, si quis inspiciat. Quaestio 2 Utrum contingat hominem scire omnia entia Circa secundum arguitur quod contingit hominem scire omnia entia. Primo sic. Philosophus dicit in IIIo De anima quod “intellectus quodammodo est omnia intelligibilia, sicut sensus est omnia sensibilia.” Sensus sic est omnia sensibilia quod potest omnia sentire. Ergo intellectus ita est omnia intelligibilia quod potest omnia intelligere. Haec sunt omnia scibilia et omnia entia. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Qui potest intelligere et scire magis scibile et intelligibile, et minus, secundum Philosophum in IIIo De anima. Homo potest scire et intelligere summe scibile, ut dictum Ioannis 17o: “Haec est vita aeterna.” Ergo etc. Oppositum arguitur primo sic. Ecclesiastici 3o, “Plurima sunt super sensum hominis.” Sed illa non potest scire. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Ecclesiastes 7o: “Dixi: ‘sapiens efficiar,’ et ipsa recessit a me multo plus quam erat.” Sed hoc non contingeret, si contingeret eum scire omnia entia. Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod ita est in omnibus quibus competit operatio aliqua exercenda per instrumentum, quod agens de se sufficiens ut agere possit, si habeat copiam instrumenti, dicendus est simpliciter posse in illam operationem, licet ei deficiat instrumentum, et ideo non possit procedere in actum, sicut oculus dicitur posse videre omne visibile, licet non possit procedere in actum videndi deficiente luce exteriori. Nunc autem ita est quod propria operatio hominis secundum quod homo est scire et intelligere, quia est eius operatio secundum intellectum et rationem, qua vere homo est, secundum Philosophum Xo Ethicorum. Ad operationem autem huiusmodi homo,

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Through these points, if one examines them, the objections from each side are clarified. Question 2 Whether it is possible for a human being to know all beings Regarding the second question, it is argued that it is possible for a human being to know all beings. First, as follows. The Philosopher says in book III of De anima that “the intellect is in a way all intelligible things, just as the sense faculty is all sensible things.”147 The sense faculty is thus all sensible things because it can sense each one. Therefore, the intellect is thus all intelligible things because it can understand each one. These are all the knowable things as well as all the beings. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. He who can understand and know what is more knowable and intelligible, also [can understand and know] what is less so, according to the Philosopher in De anima, III148. A human being can know and understand what is knowable to the highest degree, as stated in John 17: This is eternal life [John 17:3]. Therefore, etc. In opposition, is argued first as follows. In Ecclesiastes 3, There are many things above the perception of human beings [Eccles. 3:25]. But these cannot be known. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Ecclesiastes 7: I said: ‘I am wise by my own efforts’, and [wisdom] itself withdrew away from me even more than before [Eccles. 7:24–25]. But this would not happen, were he able to know all things. Therefore, etc.

Regarding this question, we must say that: for all things that are meant to exercise some operation through an instrument, since the agent of itself suffices for action, if it has enough of the instrument, the agent as such must be considered capable of that operation, even if it lacks the instrument and thereby cannot proceed to act, just as the eye is said to be capable of seeing every visible thing, even if it cannot proceed to the act of seeing when light is lacking from an external source.149 Now, moreover, it is the case that the proper operation of a human being, as a human being, is to know and understand,150 because it is his operation according to intellect and reason, by which he is a human being in the true sense, as the Philosopher says in book X of the Ethics.151 With respect to such an operation, a human being,

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quantum est ex natura sui intellectus, si sufficienter illustretur luce intellectuali proportionali cuilibet scibili secundum statum et gradum suum, est in potentia ut sciat et intelligat unumquodque. Absolute igitur concedendum est quod homo potest scire omnia entia, hoc est omnia scibilia. Et ob hoc dicitur in libro De spiritu et anima: “Anima ad similitudinem totius sapientiae facta omnium in se similitudinem gerit.” Dicit etiam Avicenna in IXo Metaphysicae suae quod “sua perfectio animae rationalis est ut fiat secundum intelligibile, et describatur in ea forma totius, et ordo intellectus in toto, et bonitas fluens in omne, et ut incipiens a principio totius procedat ad substantias intellectuales spiritales absolute, et deinde ad spiritales pendentes aliquo modo a corporibus, et deinde ad animas moventes corpora, et postea ad corpora caelestia, et ut haec omnia fiant descripta in anima secundum dispositiones et vires eorum, quousque perficiatur in ea dispositio esse universitatis, et sic transeat secundum intellectum in instar totius mundi, et cernens id quod est pulchrum absolute, et bonitas absolute, et decor verus, fiat unum cum eo, insculpta exemplo eius.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “plurima sunt supra sensum hominis,” dicendum quod verum est attingenda lumine naturali. Si tamen sufficienter illustretur lumine supernaturali, nihil est supra sensum hominis, quin possit illud attingere intellectu. Ad secundum, quod “sapientia recedit ab investigante,” dicendum quod dicitur recedere, quia quanto homo plus investigat scientiam lumine naturalis rationis, tanto patet ei profunditas. Nihil tamen est scibile in creaturis, si sufficienti lumine illustretur, quin poterit illud scire, maxime cum illustratur ad hoc quod possit scire summum intelligibile attingendo, licet non comprehendendo. In cuius cognitionis comparatione potest etiam verificari illud Ecclesiastes: “Dixi:‘sapiens efficiar,’” etc. Quanto enim amplius cognoscitur illud, tanto amplius recedere dicitur cognitio illius ab eo, quoniam semper de scibili illo claret plus restare cognoscendum quam iam cognitum est.

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moreover, in terms of the nature of his intellect, is in potency to know and understand each thing, if he is sufficiently illuminated by an intellectual light that is proportional to any given knowable thing according to its condition and level. Therefore, absolutely it must be granted that a human being can know all beings, that is to say, all knowable things. And that is why it is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul: “The soul, made in the likeness of all wisdom, bears the likeness of all things in itself.”152 Avicenna also says in book IX of his Metaphysics that “the perfection of the rational soul is that it becomes such as what is intelligible, and the form of the totality is described in it, as well as the intelligible order within the totality, and the goodness flowing in everything, so that, moreover, beginning from the principle of the totality, it may proceed to the intellectual substances that are spiritual in an absolute sense, and from there to the spirits that are in some way weighed down by bodies, and from there to the souls that move bodies, and thereafter to the celestial bodies, and so all these things become described in the soul according to its disposition and powers, until the disposition of the being of the universe is completed in it, and thus it transforms according to intellect into an image of the entire world, and distinguishing that which is fine absolutely, and goodness absolutely, as well as true beauty, it becomes one with it, engraved with its model.”153

To the first [argument] in opposition, that “there are many things above the perception of human beings,” we must say that it is true concerning the light of nature. Nevertheless, if [a human being] is sufficiently illuminated by supernatural light, nothing is above the perception of a human being that he may not reach it with the intellect. To the second, that “wisdom withdraws from the seeker,” we must state that it is said to withdraw, because the more a human being searches for knowledge with the light of natural reason, the more its depth becomes evident to him. Nevertheless, nothing is knowable in creatures that he cannot know, when illuminated by sufficient light, especially when he is illuminated to the point that he may know the highest intelligible object by connecting with it, though without comprehending it. In reference to the cognition of such object, that text of Ecclesiastes—“I said: ‘I am wise by my own efforts’, etc.”—also can be confirmed. For, the more it is known, the more the cognition of such object is said to withdraw away from him, because about that knowable object, it is clear always that there remains more to be known than what already is known.

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Quaestio 3 Utrum contingat hominem scire omnia ex philosophicis scientiis Circa tertium arguitur quod contingit hominem scire omnia ex philosophicis scientiis. Primo sic. Quaecumque sunt in universo per ordinem et connexionem se habent ad invicem. Connexio illa sciri potest ex scientiis philosophicis, quia fit per naturam influentiae inter motorem et motum, causam et causatum, quae sciri possunt ex scientiis philosophicis. Connexio autem et ordo aliquorum sciri non possunt, nisi simul sciantur connexa et ordinata, quia relative se habent ad invicem. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Ex scientiis philosophicis habet homo scientiam superiorum et inferiorum, corporalium et spiritualium, sicut patet. Et ista sunt omnia scibilia. Ergo etc. Contra est. Quoniam ex scientiis philosophicis nihil scitur nisi scientia quae hauritur ex sensibus et sensibilibus, quia secundum Philosophum omnis nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet. Sed multa sunt scibilia quorum scientia ex sensu et sensibilibus hauriri non potest, ut sunt omnia illa quorum notitiam per fidem tenet sacra scriptura. Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc secundum Philosophum IVo Metaphysicae quod scientiarum philosophicarum omnium una est universalis ad omnes, quam appellant philosophi primam philosophiam, aliae vero sunt particulares sub illa. Nunc autem, ut dicit Philosophus ibidem, “scientiarum particularium cuiusque est considerare de accidente quod accidit alicui partium entis divisae a toto ente,” contra alias partes quas considerant aliae scientiae particulares, sicut mathematicae accipiunt numeros et magnitudines et considerant de eis et suis accidentibus, et naturales de ente mobili. Scientia vero universalis de ente simpliciter considerat et de eis quae sunt entis per se, et ideo considerat etiam de primis causis et principiis entis simpliciter, de quibus nulla scientia particularis se intromittit. Si ergo aliqua pars philosophiae de natura et quidditate divinorum et de eis quae sunt propria Deo et substantiis spiritualibus consideraret,

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Whether it is possible for a human being to know all things through the philosophical sciences About the third question, it is argued that it is possible for a human being to know all things through the philosophical sciences. First, as follows. Whatever things exist in the universe relate to each other through order and connection. That connection can be known through the philosophical sciences, because it happens through the nature of the influence between mover and moved, cause and caused, which can be known through the philosophical sciences. However, the connection and order among given things cannot be known unless the things that are connected and ordered are simultaneously known, because they stand in relation to each other. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Through the philosophical sciences, a human being has knowledge of superior and inferior, of physical and spiritual things, as is evident. And those are all the knowable things. Therefore, etc. The contrary position is: through the philosophical sciences nothing is known except the knowledge which is drawn from the senses and sensible things, since according to the Philosopher all our cognition originates in the senses.154 But there are many knowable things whose knowledge cannot be drawn from the senses and sensible things, as all those things whose cognizance Sacred Scripture maintains through faith. Therefore, etc.

Concerning this question, we must say, according to the Philosopher in book IV of the Metaphysics, that of all the philosophical sciences there is one that stands as universal above all, which the philosophers call “first philosophy,”155 while the others are particular [sciences] under that one. Now, however, as the Philosopher says in the same place, “it is proper to each of the particular sciences to consider what belongs to and inheres in one of the parts of being, separately from being as a whole,”156 in contrast to the other parts considered by the other particular sciences, just as the mathematical sciences grasp numbers and magnitudes and consider them and their attributes, and the natural sciences [do the same] regarding being that can move. However, the universal science concerning being as such considers what is proper to being per se, and for that reason considers also the first causes and principles of being as such, regarding which no particular science occupies itself. If, however, some part of philosophy would consider the nature and quiddity of divine realities and those things which are proper to God and spiritual substances, that

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illa est prima philosophia, quia, ut dicitur in Io Metaphysicae, “Philosophus primus debet considerare de rebus quae sunt magis altae omnibus substantiis in veritate.” Sed constat quod de illis Philosophus non determinat nisi in universali, in quantum sunt principia et causae entis simpliciter, secundum quod ipse dicit in Io Metaphysicae. “Arbitramur,” inquit, “scire omnia sapientem, sicut contingit, non secundum unumquodque scientiam habentem ipsorum,” ubi dicit alia translatio: “non singularem eorum scientiam habentem.” Constat tamen quod non minus substantiae spirituales habent in se scibilia specialiter de eis scienda, quam substantiae corporales, de quibus scientiae particulares philosophiae particularia, ut dictum est, considerant. Quare cum illa particularia scienda circa substantias spirituales nulla pars philosophiae docet, nec universalis nec particularis, patet clarissime quia non contingit homines scire omnia scibilia sibi ex scientiis philosophicis. Unde et Philosophus, qui hoc bene sentiebat, quando occurrebant ei talia quae scientiam philosophicam excedebant, de hoc se non intromisit, sed considerationi alterius commisit, secundum quod de hoc habemus unum exemplum clarum in Io Ethicorum, ubi quaerit inter alia de felicitate an sit donum Dei; dicit sic: “Si quidem aliud aliquod deorum est donum hominibus, rationale et felicitatem Dei donum esse, maximum quanto optimum. Sed de hoc erit alterius perscrutationis magis proprium.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod ex philosophia scitur connexio omnium, ergo et connexa, dicendum quod connexa cognoscuntur ex philosophia, quantum potest manuducere connexio a sensibilibus ad insensibilia procedendo. Et hoc est solum quoad generalia, quae pertinent ad rationem causalitatis superiorum respectu inferiorum, non autem quoad propria, in quibus certior consistit eorum scientia. Ad secundum, quod “ex philosophia habetur scientia omnium,” dicendum quod verum est quoad genera singulorum, quia de quolibet genere entis considerat, sed non quoad singula generum neque quoad singula de singulis consideranda, sed quoad singula generum considerat substantias corporeas, non autem incorporeas, quae non minus scibilia sunt quoad singula specialiter consideranda circa eas quam corporalia, ut dictum est.

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would be first philosophy, because, as stated in book I of the Metaphysics, “the first philosopher must consider realities which are higher than all substances in terms of truth.”157 But evidently the Philosopher does not define those [realities] except in a universal sense, namely as far as they are principles and causes of being as such, as he himself says in Metaphysics, I: “We judge that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, but not as having knowledge of those things in terms of every detail,”158 where the other translation says: “not as having knowledge of them singly.”159 Nevertheless, it is plain that the spiritual substances have in themselves no less of what is knowable that ought to be known specifically, than the bodily substances, which the particular philosophical sciences consider, as mentioned. Wherefore, since no branch of philosophy, universal or particular, treats those specifics that ought to be known regarding the spiritual substances, it is most obvious that human beings cannot know for themselves all that is knowable through the philosophical sciences. Whence also the Philosopher, who well realized this, when such things that exceed philosophical science came to his mind, did not occupy himself with this, but rather delegated it to the consideration of another [field], of which we have a clear example in book I of the Ethics, where he inquires, among other things, whether happiness is a gift from God; he speaks thus: “If indeed there is some other gift from the gods to human beings, it is reasonable too that happiness is God’s gift most of all, as well as the greatest gift. But treating this will be more appropriate in a different investigation.”160

To the first argument in opposition—that in philosophy the connection of all things is known, therefore also the things that are connected—we must say that connected things are recognized in philosophy, insofar as the connection can be traced by proceeding from sensible to non-sensible things. Moreover, this is so only regarding general features, which pertain to the concept of causality as it belongs to superior things with respect to inferior things, but not regarding specific features, the knowledge of which is more certain. To the second argument, that “through philosophy the knowledge of all things is obtained,” we must say that it is true with regard to the genera of individual things, because it considers any genus of being, but not with respect to the individuals of the genera nor with respect to details about individuals, which ought to be considered; but with respect to the individuals of the genera, it considers bodily substances, but not incorporeal ones, which are no less knowable than bodily ones regarding details that ought to be considered specifically about them, as was stated.

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Quaestio 4 Utrum contingat hominem scire omnia ex puris naturalibus Circa quartum arguitur quod contingit hominem scire omnia ex puris naturalibus suis. Primo sic. Homo potest scire ex puris naturalibus suis illa quorum notitia includitur in potentia in primis principiis naturaliter cognitis, quia ex illorum notitia per naturalis rationis investigationem potest cognitionem aliorum deducere in actum. Omnia scibilia sunt huiusmodi. Omnium enim scibilium notitia in potentia includitur in primis principiis. Ergo etc. Probatio assumptae est, quia primum principium incomplexum est intentio entis in quantum ens est; primum complexum est “de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio,” ut dictum est supra. Sub intentione et conceptu entis simpliciter continetur omnis conceptus incomplexus, sive sit creati sive increati, ut vult Avicenna Io Metaphysicae suae; sub conceptu illius complexi “de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio,” continetur quilibet conceptus complexus, sive sint extrema entis creati sive increati. Secundo sic. Frustra esset aliquid in potentia ad aliud, nisi actu illud posset attingere. Cum ergo “intellectus humanus” secundum Philosophum “est in potentia omnia intelligibilia,” et hoc in puris naturalibus constitutus, “nihil autem est ponere frustra in fundamento naturae et creaturae,” ergo etc. Oppositum arguitur sic. Scientia hominis ex puris naturalibus non est nisi via sensus, secundum Philosophum. Sed plura sunt scibilia quorum notitia a sensu non capit ortum, quia non cadunt omnino sub sensu, nec ea quae cognoscuntur ex sensu sufficiunt ad hoc ut faciant illa sciri, ut sunt quidditates incorporalium. Ergo etc.

Ad hoc dicendum quod ab agente per instrumentum non potest procedere actio ad quam instrumentum se extendere non potest, quia instrumento artis fabrilis opus carpentationis faber efficere non potest. Nunc autem ita est quod ratio naturalis in cognitione quae sibi ex puris naturalibus competit utitur ut instrumento lumine naturali sibi veritates rerum illustrante et eas intellectui manifestante. Lumen autem illud, quia naturale est, limitatum est ad

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Question 4 Whether it is possible for a human being to know all things through purely natural means Concerning the fourth question, it is argued that it is possible for a human being to know all things through his own purely natural means. First, as follows. A human being can know through his own purely natural means those things whose knowledge is potentially included in first principles that are naturally known, because from knowledge of them, through the investigation of natural reason, he can deduce the cognition of other things in actuality. All knowable things are of such a kind. For the knowledge of all that can be known is included potentially in the first principles.161 Therefore, etc. The proof of the premise is that the first non-complex principle is the intension of being as being; the first complex [principle] is “about anything one either affirms or denies,”162 as said above. Every non-complex conception is contained in the intension and concept of being as such, whether it be created or uncreated, as Avicenna claims in book I of his Metaphysics;163 any complex conception whatsoever, whether it be at the extremes of either created or uncreated being, is contained in that complex conception, [namely] “about anything one either affirms or denies.”164 Second, thus. Something that is in potency to something else would exist in vain, unless it is able to reach that in actuality. Since, therefore, “the human intellect” according to the Philosopher “is in potency to all that is intelligible,”165 and this is based on purely natural means, “while as grounded in nature and creatures nothing is to be posited as existing in vain,”166 therefore etc. In opposition, it is argued thus. The only path of human knowledge, through purely natural means, is by the senses, according to the Philosopher.167 But there are many knowable things whose knowledge does not originate in sense, because they are not subject to sense at all, such as the quiddities of incorporeal realities, nor are those things which are cognized through sense sufficient to make them known. Therefore, etc.

About this question, we must say that an action through an instrument cannot proceed from an agent when the instrument is not applicable, as with an instrument for metalworking a craftsman cannot make a work of carpentry. Now, however, it is the case that natural reason, in terms of the cognition which befits it through purely natural means, uses as its instrument the light of nature which illuminates the truths of nature and shows them to the intellect. That light, however, since it is natural, is

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solummodo notitiam hominis naturalem illustrandam. Cum ergo illa notitia quae naturalis est sit adminiculo sensuum et sensibilium, lux homini connaturalis solum illustrat ad sciendum notitiam eorum quae mediante sensu nata sunt cognosci. Talia sunt illa quae sunt scibilia philosophica solum, praeter quae sunt plura alia, quae excedunt naturalem intellectum hominis, quia per sensibilia non potest ad illorum quidditates cognoscendas attingere, maxime autem Dei, quia omnia sensibilia sunt effectus quidam virtutem illius in nullo adaequantes, et sine cognitione eius quod quid est omnino scientia de natura rei haberi non potest, secundum quod dicit Philosophus VIo Metaphysicae: “Oportet non ignorare illud quod significat aliquid, quid est, quia absque hoc facere nihil est,” ubi dicit Commentator: “Quaerere enim aliud scire hoc non determinato est quasi non quaerere.” Unde volentes ex vestigio creaturae divinam essentiam perfecte cognoscere irridet Iob XIo: “Forsitan,” inquit, “vestigia Dei comprehendes et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies” et XXXVIo: “Ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram.” Et non solum clara illorum notitia nostri intellectus possibilitatem excedit, sed et illa quae nata est haberi de eis per fidem et in aenigmate, secundum quod dicetur infra.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “omnium notitia in potentia includitur in primis principiis,” dicendum primo ex parte primorum principiorum quod sicut in naturalibus illud quod procedit ex radice semper tenet et sapit naturam seu virtutem radicis, nec potest naturam radicis excedere, sic principia prima naturalis cognitionis, cum a sensibus et sensibilibus velut a radice trahantur, ut saepius dictum est, vim et naturam sensibilium excedere non possunt, ut sicut ipsa in naturali notitia hominis accepta sunt a sensibilibus, ultra notitiam eorum quae adminiculo sensuum nata sunt cognosci extendi non possunt. Licet ergo ratio entis simpliciter et absolute accepta sit in potentia sufficiens ratio cognoscendi quodlibet cognoscibile quod sub ratione generali entis continetur, in quantum tamen est accepta per sensum a sensibilibus, limitata est, ut sit in potentia principium cognoscendi solum illa ad quae potest deducere ratio naturalis adminiculo sensuum et sensibilium, et non alia. Secundo dicendum ex parte luminis naturalis intellectus, ut est coniuncti,

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limited only to illuminate the natural knowledge of human beings. Therefore, since the knowledge that is natural exists with the aid of the senses and sensible things, the light that is connatural to human beings only illuminates in order to know the concept of those things apt to be cognized through sense. Only such things are knowable through philosophy, besides which there are many others, which exceed the natural intellect of human beings, since through sensible things it cannot reach the knowledge of their quiddities, especially not that of God, since all sensible things are effects of a certain kind, in no way comparable to Him in excellence; and without the cognition of what something is, it is altogether impossible to have knowledge of the nature of a thing, as the Philosopher says in book VI of the Metaphysics: “It is necessary not to ignore that which indicates something, what it is, since without this one cannot make progress,”168 at which place the Commentator says: “For, to seek to know something else, without this as a fixed concept, is like not seeking.”169 Whence, those who wish to know, from the vestige of the creature, the divine essence perfectly are laughed at in Job, XI: Perhaps, it says, when you understand the vestiges of God you also will discover the omnipotent one all the way to perfection [Job 11:7], and in XXXVI: Behold God almighty, who defeats our knowledge [Job 36:26]. Moreover, not only does the clear knowledge of those things exceed the possibilities of our intellect, but also that knowledge which is apt to be had about them through faith and taken as a mystery,170 as will be discussed below.171

To the first argument in opposition, “that the knowledge of all things is potentially included in first principles,” we must say first, in terms of first principles, that just as among natural things that which stems from a source always preserves and has a sense of the nature or powers of the source, and cannot exceed the nature of the source, so too the first principles of natural cognition: since they are drawn from the senses and sensible things as from a source, as has often been said, they cannot exceed the power and nature of what is sensible, and since they themselves, within the scope of natural human knowledge, are taken from sensible things, so too they cannot be applied beyond the knowledge of those things that are apt to be cognized with the aid of the senses. Therefore, although the concept of being taken without qualification and absolutely would be potentially sufficient ground to know whatever is knowable as contained within the general concept of being, yet insofar as it is taken through sense from sensible things, it is limited, so that it is potentially a principle of knowing only those things which natural reason can infer with the aid of the senses and sensible things, and not others. Secondly, in terms of the natural light of the intellect, as belonging to what is conjoined [of soul and body], we must

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quod quamvis principia prima sunt, quantum est de se, sufficienter in potentia ad faciendum scire quodlibet cognoscibile, quia tamen lumen illud limitatum naturaliter est, ut non sit natum illustrare ad eliciendum notitiam aliquam ultra notitiam quae ex sensibilibus hauritur, ultra quam non potest se extendere, nisi ei adiutorium luminis superioris addatur, sicut lux naturalis in oculo cati sufficit ad illustrandum medium, ut eo videat aliqua visibilia grossa, et non potest ei ostendere minuta nisi lumine solis vel candelae, vel aliquo exteriori superinfuso. Ad secundum, quod omnia sunt homini naturaliter cognoscibilia, dicendum quod aliqua sunt homini cognoscibilia naturaliter, quia ex principiis naturaliter ei inditis potest in illorum cognitionem devenire sine adiutorio exteriori; sic homini in statu huius vitae solum sunt naturaliter cognoscibilia ea quae sensuum adminiculo capere potest. Alio modo sunt aliqua naturaliter ei cognoscenda seu cognoscibilia, quia de natura sua natus est illa intelligere, sed hoc non ut ex puris naturalibus illa intelligat, sed quia naturaliter ita ordinata est, ut nata sit recipere lumen quo adiuta illa intelligat. Unde secundum hunc modum homo ordinatur ad hoc, ut per gratiam elevetur ad suscipiendum magis bonum, quam sit illud quod potest attingere per naturam. Quod non videbant philosophi, et ideo cognitionem hominis et beatitudinem non posuerunt ultra id quod potest attingere per naturam, et errabant. Quaestio 5 Utrum contingat hominem scire per gratiam illa quae excedunt naturam Circa quintum arguitur quod non contingit hominem scire per gratiam illa quae eius excedunt naturam. Primo sic. Inter agens et patiens debet esse proportio. Non enim, ut dicit Philosophus, quodlibet natum est agere in quodlibet, sed unumquodque in sibi conveniens et proportionale. “Actus enim activorum sunt in patiente et disposito.” Scitum autem agit in sciens, et non est proportio intellectus humani in cognoscendo ad id quod eius naturam excedit, quia si in cognoscendo ipsum esset eius ad ipsum proportio, non excederet ipsum. Ergo quod excedit ipsam naturam eius non potest homo ullo modo scire.

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say that although the first principles are of themselves sufficiently in potency to make known anything that is knowable, nevertheless since that light is limited in a natural way, thus it is not fit to illuminate in order to elicit any knowledge beyond the knowledge gathered from sensible things, beyond which it cannot apply, unless supplemented with the help of a superior light—similarly, the natural light in a cat’s eye172 suffices to illuminate the medium [of vision], so that it thereby may see certain large visible objects, but it cannot show him the small ones, unless supplemented by the light of the sun, or a candle, or some external light. To the second argument, that all things are naturally knowable to a human being, we must say that certain things are knowable to a human being naturally, because he can arrive at their cognition from principles naturally available to him without external help; in such a manner, for a human being in the condition of the present life, only those things are naturally knowable which he can grasp with the aid of the senses. In a different manner, certain things are for him meant to be known or naturally knowable, because from his own nature he is apt to understand them, but not in the sense that he may understand them through purely natural means, but rather because, naturally, his nature is ordered in such a way that it is apt to receive the light by which, thus assisted, it may understand them. Whence, in this manner, a human being is ordered to this [goal], so that through grace he may be lifted for the contemplation of a good greater than what he can reach through nature.173 The philosophers did not see this, and therefore did not posit a knowledge and happiness for human beings beyond what he can reach through nature, and they erred. Question 5 Whether it is possible for a human being to know through grace those things which exceed nature About the fifth question, it is argued that it is not possible for a human being to know through grace those things which exceed his nature. First, as follows. There must be proportion between agent and patient. For, as the Philosopher says, a given thing is not apt to act in regard to anything whatsoever,174 but rather each thing [acts] in regard to what is fitting and proportionate to itself. “For, the actions of agents exist in what undergoes and is disposed.”175 However, what is known acts in the knower, and there is no proportion in terms of knowledge between the human intellect and that which exceeds its nature, since if there would be proportion between them when knowing that very thing, it would not exceed it. Therefore, in no way can a human being know what exceeds his very nature.

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Secundo sic. Si sciret per gratiam quod eius naturam excedit, illa gratia necessario est ei supernaturalis. Sed quod est supernaturale non est susceptibile per naturam, ergo solum per gratiam, et eadem ratione illa per aliam, et sic in infinitum. Hoc autem est impossibile ut sic procedatur; ergo et primum, quod homo sciat per gratiam quod non potest scire per naturam. Tertio sic. Sicut se habet oculus corporalis ad videndum mediante luce corporali sibi naturali, sic intellectus ad videndum mediante luce spirituali sibi naturali. Sed nullo lumine superiori potest oculus corporalis elevari ad videndum quod non potest videre lumine sibi naturali; ergo nec oculus spiritualis ad videndum quod non potest videre lumine sibi naturali. In contrarium est quoniam cognitio hominis naturalis non excedit adminiculum sensus. Si ergo non posset scire per gratiam quae non potest scire per naturam, nullo modo posset eius notitia excedere visibilia. Quare cum in ultima notitia hominis consistit eius beatitudo, beatus esset ex notitia causatorum sensibilium quam potest habere ex ipsis. Quare cum hoc sit haeresis philosophorum, aliam oportet homini dare scientiam per gratiam quam potest habere per naturam.

Dicendum ad hoc quod secundum Augustinum VIIIo Super Genesim “in ipso mundo gemina providentiae divinae operatio reperitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria, naturalis per occultam administrationem,” de qua dicit libro IXo: “Omnis iste naturae usitatissimus cursus habet quasdam leges naturales et determinatam vim, quid unumquodque valeat vel non valeat,” verbi gratia, “ut de grano tritici non nascatur faba, sed triticum. Super hunc cursum rerum naturalem voluntaria administratione potestas est creatoris facere de omnibus aliud quam eorum seminales rationes habent,” verbi gratia, “ut lignum aridum repente floreat, et fructum gignat, et asina loquatur, et cetera huiusmodi quae Deus naturis dedit, ut haec ex eis fieri possent actione potentioris. Non enim ex eis illa faceret nisi fieri possent,” ut ita dicit Ioannes Damascenus, “Quae tamen non dedit eis, ut haberent ex motu suo naturali. Et ideo potentia illa appellatur potentia oboedientiae, non naturae.” Nunc autem sicut Deus agit et movet ut primus motor in movendo creaturas corporales motu corporali, sic agit et movet ut primus motor in movendo creaturas spirituales motu spirituali,

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Second, thus. If he would know through grace what exceeds his nature, that grace necessarily would be supernatural to him. But what is supernatural is not available through nature, therefore only [it is so] through grace, and by the same reason, that [grace would be available] through another, and so on to infinity. However, such a process is impossible; therefore, so too [is] the first assumption, namely that a human being can know through grace what he cannot know through nature. Third, thus. As the bodily eye stands in regard to vision by means of corporeal light that is natural to it, so stands the intellect in regard to vision by means of spiritual light that is natural to it.176 But by no superior light can the bodily eye be lifted, so as to see what it cannot see by the light that is natural to it; therefore, neither can the spiritual eye [be lifted] so as to see what it cannot see by the light that is natural to it. The contrary position exists because human natural cognition does not exceed the aid of the senses. If, therefore, it could not know through grace what it cannot know through nature, in no way could its knowledge exceed what is visible. Wherefore, since a human being’s happiness consists in his highest knowledge,177 he would be happy from the knowledge of caused sensible entities, which can be obtained from these very things. Hence, since this is a heresy of the philosophers,178 it is necessary to grant to a human being knowledge through grace, which is different from what he can obtain through nature.179

About this question, we must say that according to Augustine in On Genesis, book VIII, “in this world a double operation of divine providence is found, partly natural, partly voluntary, the natural one under a hidden direction,”180 about which he says in book IX: “Each most customary course of nature has certain laws and a determinate force, for which each thing is fit or not fit,”181 for example, “that from a grain of wheat, a bean never sprouts, but rather wheat. Regarding this natural course of things, by means of voluntary direction the Creator has the power to make from all things something different than is established by their seminal reasons,”182 for example, “that dry wood should suddenly flower, and bear fruit, and donkeys speak, and other [powers] of this sort that God has given to natures, so that these things may come forth from them by the action of a more powerful agent,”183 as thus specifies John Damascene, “Which, nevertheless, He did not give to them so that they would have [these potencies] inherently in their natures. And therefore that potency is called potency of obedience, not [potency] of nature.”184 Now, however, just as God acts and moves as first mover when moving bodily creatures by bodily movement, so too does He act and move as first mover when moving spiritual creatures by

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et ideo sicut dupliciter movet, ut dictum est, creaturas corporales, una scilicet providentia generali et naturali, et altera providentia speciali et voluntaria, similiter congruit ut dupliciter moveat creaturam spiritualem. Motus autem eius est in intelligendo et volendo, et hoc scilicet providentia generali movendo eam lumine naturaliter sibi indito ad cognoscendum ea quae subsunt cognitioni naturali, et similiter ad ea agendum quae sibi ex naturalibus agere competit; providentia autem speciali movendo eam lumine supernaturaliter infuso ad cognoscendum quae sunt super facultatem rationis naturalis, et similiter voluntarie ad agendum quae sibi per gratiam agere competit, ut sic homo ordinetur, tam ex parte intellectus quam affectus, ad aliquid superius quam ex puris naturalibus possit attingere, quod non contingit in aliquibus ratione carentibus, et hoc ut homo, qui ferri debet in finem suum ratione et voluntate, quod non competit ratione carentibus, auxilium semper a Deo suo postulet, nec ipsum aliquando contemnat, quod de facili faceret, si ex puris naturalibus sibi omnino sufficeret. Et hoc est quod dicit Chrysostomus exponens illud Matthaei VIIo, “Date et dabitur vobis”: “Omnem,” inquit, “creaturam sensibilem Deus armatam et munitam creavit. Alios enim munivit velocitate pedum, alios unguibus, alios pennis, alios dentibus, alios cornibus, hominem autem solum sic disponit ut virtus illius sit ipse. Et in eo quod infirmiorem eum fecit omnibus, eo ipso fortiorem voluit eum esse in se. Nam sciens Deus quia cognoscere et colere Deum vita aeterna est, ignorare autem et contemnere perditio sempiterna, nec ita infirmum eum creavit, ut omnino nihil boni facere possit, ne quem super omnia et propter quem omnia fecerat, omnibus inveniretur esse deterior, nec ita potentem eum creavit, ut etiam sine Dei auxilio ex se ipso facere possit quod vult, ut infirmitatis suae necessitate coactus, semper necessarium habeat dominum suum. Si enim omnis virtus hominis in Deo est, et tamen contemnit omnium bonorum auctorem, quanto magis negligeret eum, si potentia eius esset in se ipso?”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “non est proportio intellectus ad sibi supernaturale,” dicendum quod verum est de se per lumen naturae, tamen lumine gratiae bene sit ei proportionale quod est supernaturale, sicut per lumen naturale est proportionale ei quod ex puris naturalibus potest cognoscere.

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spiritual movement, and therefore as he moves bodily creatures in a twofold way, as stated, namely one through general and natural providence, and the other by special and voluntary providence, similarly it is fitting that he move the spiritual creature in a twofold way. However, the motion of such creature consists in understanding and willing, and this occurs, namely, through general providence moving it by means of a light that is naturally given to it, in order to know those things that fall within the scope of natural cognition, and similarly in order to do those things which it can do through natural means; on the other hand, through special providence God moves the spiritual creature by means of infused supernatural light in order to know things above the faculty of natural reason, and similarly in order to do, freely, those things he can do through grace, and so a human being is ordered, in terms of both intellect and affection, to something higher than what he can reach through purely natural means (which is not the case among the beings that lack reason), and this is so that human beings, who should be brought to their proper end by reason and will (which does not befit beings lacking reason), may always seek help from their God, lest they ever disregard Him, which would happen easily if purely natural means would wholly suffice for human beings. And this is what Chrysostom says when expounding upon that text from Matthew, VII, Give and you shall receive [Matt. 7:7]:185 He says, “God has created every sensible creature fortified and protected. For, some He has protected with quick feet, others with claws, others with wings, others with teeth, others with horns, but man alone he has prepared in such a way that his own worth is himself. And by the fact that He has made him weaker than all the rest, He has willed him to be stronger in his very self. For, knowing that to cognize and worship God is life eternal, whereas to disregard and disdain him is everlasting ruin, neither did God create man so weak that he would not at all be able to do anything good, lest he whom he made to be over all things and on account of whom he made all things should be found to be weaker than all other things, nor did he create him so strong that, without the help of God, by himself he would be able to do whatever he wills, so that, compelled by the necessity of his weakness, it is always necessary for him to hold on to his Lord. For, if every worth of human beings is in God, and nevertheless he still devalues the author of all goods, how much more would he disregard Him, if his power would exist in his very self?”186

To the first argument in opposition, that “that there is no proportion between the intellect and what is supernatural for it,” we must say that, of itself, it is true in terms of the light of nature, yet by the light of grace what is supernatural may well be proportionate to it, just as through the light of nature what it can know through purely natural means is proportionate to it.

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Ad secundum, quod “illius luminis gratiae non est susceptibilis per naturam, sed per gratiam solum,” dicendum quod verum est, ita quod ex puris naturalibus illud sibi acquirat vel quod naturaliter lumen ipsum sibi inditum habeat. Est tamen ipsius susceptibilis per naturam, quia natura de se ad hoc ordinata est, ut munere creatoris hoc recipiat, et per illud illa quae natura non attingit cognoscat. Unde licet homo non accepit a natura quod per se ad illorum notitiam attingat, accepit tamen a natura ut alterum in se recipiat cuius adiutorio ad illam attingat. Aliter enim ad illam omnino attingere non posset, secundum quod dicit Damascenus libro De duabus naturis et una persona Christi: “Impossibile est qualemcumque naturam uti actione, vel operari operationem vel passionem, quorum potentiam non secundum naturam assumpsit, velut non potest germinare terra non secundum naturam accipiens a conditore germinativam potentiam.” Ad tertium, quod “oculus corporalis per nullum supernaturale lumen potest videre quod non potest videre in lumine naturali,” dicendum quod non est simile, quoniam praeter sensibilia in lumine materiali sensus non est aliud sensibile omnino, sed praeter intelligibile lumine naturali intellectus est aliud intelligibile ei lumine supernaturali, quod distat a naturalibus intelligibilibus intellectus et ab ipso intellectu, non sicut sapor vel odor a visu et a colore, quae nullo modo sunt visibilia, sed sicut visibile excellens distat a visibili temperato et a debili visu, ad quod non potest ipse attingere, nisi lumine clariori illustretur et fortificetur. Unde dicit Philosophus in IIo Metaphysicae quod “intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis.” Articulus IV De appetitu sciendi Quia scibilia non sunt facta homini cognoscibilia, nisi ut aliquando ea sciat et cognoscat, ad sciendum autem ea non se extenderet, nisi scire ea appeteret, idcirco postquam visum est de qualitate scibilium ab homine, videndum est de appetitu sive desiderio sciendi in ipso. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem: primum, si homo appetat scire; secundum, si omnis homo appetat scire; tertium, si homo naturaliter appetat scire; quartum, si omnes homines aequaliter appetant scire; quintum, si homo appetat scire ea quae notitiam naturalis

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To the second, that “the light of grace is not available through nature, but rather through grace alone,” we must say that it is true, if what is meant is that through purely natural means he could acquire that light for himself or that he could possess that light as naturally implanted in him. Nevertheless, that light is available through nature, because nature of itself is ordered to this [purpose], so that he may receive this as a gift from the Creator, and thereby may know what nature cannot reach. Wherefore, although a human being did not receive by nature the ability to reach on his own the knowledge of these things, nevertheless he did receive by nature the ability to accept something further by whose help he can reach that knowledge. For, otherwise he would not be able to reach it at all, as Damascene says in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ: “It is impossible for any sort of nature to engage in an activity, whether it be to perform an action or to undergo, for which it did not receive the potential according to nature, just as earth cannot generate without receiving according to nature the generating capacity from some origin.”187 To the third, “that the bodily eye cannot see by any supernatural light what it cannot see by natural light,” we must say that the comparison is not adequate, since aside from what is sensible in the material light of sense there is nothing else at all that is sensible, while aside from the natural light of the intellect there is something else that is intelligible to it through supernatural light, which differs from the natural things that can be understood and from the very intellect, not as taste or odor differs from sight and color, which in no sense belong to the class of visible things, but rather as the eminently visible differs from the mildly visible and from weak sight, which weak sight itself cannot reach, unless it be illuminated and strengthened by a clearer light. Whence, the Philosopher says in book II of the Metaphysics that “our intellect stands in regard to those things that are most evident by nature, as the eye of a bat stands in regard to the light of the sun.”188 Article IV Concerning the desire to know Since what is knowable does not become familiar to a human being except when he understands and learns it, but he would not exert himself in order to know it if he would not desire to know it, therefore after examining the character of what is knowable by human beings, we must examine the desire or wish to know in himself. And regarding this topic, nine questions are sought: first, if a human being desires to know; second; if every human being desires to know; third, if a human being by nature desires to know; fourth, if all human beings equally desire to know; fifth, if a human being desires to know the things that exceed the knowledge of natural

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rationis excedunt; sextum, si homo appetat scire omnia; septimum, si homo aequaliter appetat scire singula; octavum, si sit aliquod unum quod homo principaliter appetat scire; nonum, si propter illud quod homo principaliter appetit scire appetat omnia alia scire. Quaestio 1 Utrum homo appetat scire Circa primum arguitur quod homo non appetat scire. Primo sic. Si homo appeteret scire, aut quod novit aut quod non novit. Nec est medium, quia est divisio per contradictoria inter quae non cadit medium secundum Philosophum in Xo Metaphysicae. Non quod novit, quia eius quod novit iam habet scientiam, secundum enim Augustinum 83 Quaestionibus in scientiis idem est nosse quod habere. Appetitus autem non est respectu habiti, sed respectu non habiti, possibilis tamen haberi. Neque quod non novit, quia secundum Augustinum IVo De Trinitate “appetitus ex notitia procedit.” Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Potentia naturalis non est nata moveri nisi a suo proprio obiecto naturali. Obiectum proprium appetitus naturale non est verum quod movet ad sciendum, sed bonum. Ergo etc. Contra est quia homo, ut sciat, laborat. Quod non esset, nisi scire appeteret. Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod ita est in omnibus potentiis activis et passivis ordinatis ad invicem, quod illa potentia quae universalem finem respicit movere habet alias ad actus proprios illis et inclinare eos in fines proprios illarum, quos sub fine universali respiciunt tamquam fines sibi proprios et particulares ordinatos in finem universalem, qui est proprius finis primi moventis, qui omnia alia ad finem et ad bonum suum obtinendum movet, veluti caelum, quod intendit universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora, quorum unumquodque agit particulariter ad conservationem suae speciei. Similiter rex qui intendit bonum regni movet barones et ballivos qui intendunt bonum provinciarum aut civitatum quarundam,

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reason; sixth, if a human being desires to know all things; seventh, if a human being equally desires to know each single thing; eighth, if there is any one thing that a human being chiefly desires to know; ninth, if a human being desires to know all other things on account of that which he chiefly desires to know. Question 1 Whether a human being desires to know Regarding the first question, it is argued that a human being does not desire to know. First, as follows. If a human being desires to know, he desires either what he knows or what he does not know.189 Nor is there a third alternative, since this is a disjunction between contradictories, among which there is no place for a third alternative, according to the Philosopher in book X of the Metaphysics.190 It is not what he knows, since of what he knows he already possesses knowledge, for, according to Augustine in On Eighty-Three Questions, in the sciences to know is the same as to possess.191 However, desire does not concern what is possessed, but rather what is not possessed, yet can be possessed. Nor is it what he does not know, since according to Augustine in book IV of On the Trinity, “desire proceeds from knowledge.”192 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. A natural potency is not apt to be moved except by its proper natural object. The proper natural object of desire is not the true, which moves in order to know, but rather the good. Therefore, etc. On the contrary, a human being exerts himself in order to know. This would not be the case unless he desires to know. Therefore, etc.

Concerning this question, we must say that among all active and passive potencies ordered mutually, what occurs is that the potency related to the universal end is the one that moves the others to their proper acts and inclines them toward the ends proper to them, to which they relate (as subsumed under the universal end) as proper to themselves and as particular ends ordered to the universal end, which is the proper end of the first mover, which moves all the rest in order to obtain its own end and good, just as the heaven, which aims at the preservation of the things that can be generated and corrupted, moves all the lower things, among which each thing acts specifically toward the preservation of its own species. Similarly a king,193 aiming at the good of the kingdom, moves the barons and bailiffs, who aim at the good of

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et “architectonica ars movet alias artes, quae sunt sub ipsa,” ut determinat Philosophus in principio Ethicorum. Nunc autem ita est quod appetitus rationalis sive voluntas respicit tamquam suum finem bonum simpliciter ut bonum est, quaelibet autem alia potentia animae aliquod particulare bonum quod sibi bonum est, sicut visus perfici intentione coloris, intellectus perfici intentione veri, secundum quod dicit Avicenna in IXo Metaphysicae suae: “Dico oportere ut scias quod omnis virtus naturalis habet delectationem et bonum quae sunt sibi propria, et habet nocumentum et malum quae sunt sibi propria. Verbi gratia, delectatio irae est victoria, et delectatio aestimationis est fiducia, et delectatio conservativae est recordatio.” Appetitus igitur rationalis in homine sive voluntas movere habet omnes alias potentias animae ad actus suos et in proprios fines. Nihil autem movet ad actus inclinando in finem, nisi appetat finem. Appetit ergo voluntas in homine, immo homo per voluntatem, fines et perfectiones proprias omnium aliarum potentiarum animae comprehendendo sub actu suo actus omnium illarum et sub fine suo fines omnium illarum. Et est se ipsam movens primo appetens sibi bonum simpliciter et movens omnes alias appetens non sibi, sed eis bona particularia illis propria, sed hoc intentione ordinandi omnia illa bona in bonum sibi. Cum ergo de numero illarum potentiarum una sit intellectus, cuius obiectum et finis est verum et scire, dicendum quod homo per voluntatem appetit scire, sed secundum intellectum.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “homo non appetit, neque quod novit, neque quod non novit,” dicendum quod duplex est appetitus, naturalis et rationalis, quia voluntas et est natura et est ratio. Unde aliquid appetit appetitu naturali, ut est natura, et tali appetit quod omnino non novit, quia appetitus naturalis ut est a natura potentiae volitivae nudae non procedit ex notitia aliqua in appetente, sicut est de appetitu “materiae, quo appetit formam,” secundum Philosophum Io Physicorum, ubi Commentator distinguit duplicem appetitum: unum qui est sine cognitione et alterum qui est per cognitionem. Cum vero voluntas appetit aliquid “appetitu rationali, ille est qui procedit ex notitia” et de illo loquitur Augustinus. De quo sciendum quod cum homo appetit scire appetitu rationali, qui fit per cognitionem, scire illud quod appetit, et novit et non novit, aliter tamen et aliter, quia quod novit imperfecte et

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certain provinces or cities, and “the master art moves the other arts, which are under its rule,”194 as the Philosopher specifies at the beginning of the Ethics. Now, however, it is the case that the rational desire or will relates to the good simply as good, as its end, while any other potency of the soul [relates] to some particular good that is good for itself, as sight is completed by the attainment of color, [and] the intellect is completed by the attainment of truth, according to what Avicenna says in book IX of his Metaphysics: “I say it behooves you to know that every natural power has a pleasure and a good that are proper to itself, and has as well a pain and an evil that are proper to itself. For example, the pleasure of anger is victory, the pleasure of the estimative faculty is confidence, and the pleasure of memory is remembrance.”195 Therefore, the rational desire in a human being, or the will, is that which moves the other potencies of the soul to their acts and to their proper ends. However, nothing moves toward an act seeking an end, unless it desires the end. Therefore, the will in a human being, or rather the human being through the will, desires the ends and proper perfections of all the other potencies of the soul by encompassing, within its own act, the acts of all of them, and within its own end, the ends of all of them. Moreover, the will moves itself in the first place, by desiring the good as such for itself, and it moves all the other potencies by desiring, not its own good, but rather their particular goods that are proper to them, but it does so with the aim of ordering all of those goods for the sake of its own good. Since, therefore, the intellect is one of those several potencies, whose object and end is truth and knowing, we must say that a human being desires to know on account of the will, but he does so according to intellect.

To the first argument in opposition, that “a human being desires neither what he knows nor what he does not know,” we must say that desire is twofold, natural and rational, since the will is both a nature as well as reason. Wherefore, a thing desires by a natural desire, insofar as it is a nature, and as such it desires what it altogether does not know, because a natural desire, insofar as it stems from the nature of a bare appetitive potency, does not proceed from any knowledge within the entity that desires, as happens with the desire “of matter, by which it desires form,”196 according to the Philosopher in book I of the Physics, where the Commentator distinguishes a twofold desire: one which is without cognition and the other which is through cognition.197 However, since the will desires something “by means of a rational desire, this is the one that proceeds from knowledge,”198 and Augustine speaks about that one. Concerning this desire, one should know that, since a human being desires to know by means of a rational desire (which happens through cognition), namely

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in potentia et in universali non novit in actu et perfecte et in particulari, et appetit scire in quantum non novit et non appetit in quantum novit, sed per illud quod novit excitatur ad appetendum quod non novit, secundum quod dicit Augustinus Xo De Trinitate, ad modum quo dictum est supra de addiscente, qui aliquid novit et per illud movetur ad acquirendum quod non novit. Ad secundum, quod “obiectum appetitus non est verum, sed bonum,” dicendum quod verum est, quoniam non nisi bonum est obiectum appetitus, sed hoc vel bonum simpliciter, quod est bonum sibi immediate, vel bonum huic, quod est proprium bonum alicuius potentiae sub ipso. Unde obiectum appetitus non est verum ut verum sub ratione veri, sed sub ratione boni potentiae inferioris, ut intellectus, et per hoc ipsum appetit, ut dictum est, sicut e converso obiectum intellectus non est bonum voluntatis ut bonum sub ratione boni, sed sub ratione qua verum est. Et ideo istae duae potentiae, voluntas et intellectus, ad invicem sese movent, immo, ut magis proprie loquar, ipsum volentem et intelligentem, quia intellectus concipiendo finem per modum intentionis sub ratione veri proponit ipsum voluntati, quae ab ipso fine movetur sub ratione boni, et sic intellectus movet voluntatem metaphorice ad modum quo finis movet efficientem. E contra voluntas movet intellectum proprie et per modum agentis et impellentis in opus, ut dictum est. Et ideo istae duae virtutes reflectuntur super se invicem et super actus suos. Intellectus enim intelligit se intelligere et actum et obiectum suum; similiter voluntatem intelligit velle et actum et obiectum eius. Et e contrario voluntas vult se et actum et obiectum suum; similiter intellectum vult intelligere et actum et obiectum eius. Et sic utrique illorum est obiectum quidquid est obiectum alterius. Quaestio 2 Utrum omnis homo appetat scire Circa secundum arguitur quod non omnes homines appetant scire. Primo sic. Unusquisque quaerit quod appetit. Sed non omnes quaerunt et laborant scire. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Nullus appetit quod habere renuit. Scire multi renuunt, ut illi qui dicunt Deo Iob XXIo: “Recede a nobis, scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus” et Osee IVo: “Tu quoque scientiam reppulisti.” Ergo etc.

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to know that which he desires, this desire both knows and does not know, but in different senses, because what it knows imperfectly and potentially and generally it does not know in act or perfectly or specifically, and it desires to know insofar as it does not know and does not desire insofar as it knows,199 but rather through what it knows it is incited to desire what it does not know, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, in the manner explained above with regard to the learner,200 who knows something and, through that, is moved to acquire what he does not know. To the second, that “the object of the faculty of desire is not the true, but rather the good,” we must say that this is true, because only the good is the object of desire, but this is either the good absolutely, which is its own immediate good, or a given good, which is the proper good of some other capacity under its rule. Wherefore, the object of desire is not the true considered as the true so defined, but rather considered as the good of an inferior capacity, namely the intellect, and on that account it desires it, as stated, just as conversely the object of the intellect is not the good of the will considered as the good so defined, but rather as considered in terms of being true. And therefore, these two capacities, will and intellect, move each other mutually, or rather, to speak more precisely, they move the [agent] who wills and understands, because the intellect conceives the end defined as true and proposes it to the will, which is moved by the very end considered as good, and in this way the intellect moves the will in a metaphorical sense, the way in which the end moves the efficient cause. Contrariwise, the will moves the intellect in the proper sense, as that which drives and propels into action, as stated. And therefore, these two powers reflect on themselves mutually as well as on their acts. For, the intellect understands itself to understand, both its act and its object; similarly, it understands the will to will, both its act and its object. And conversely, the will wills itself, both its act and its object; similarly, it wills the intellect to understand, both its act and its object. And so, for each of them, whatever is an object for the one, is [also] an object for the other. Question 2 Whether every human being desires to know Concerning the second question, it is argued that not all human beings desire to know. First, as follows. Everyone seeks what they desire. But not all human beings seek and exert themselves to know. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. No one desires what they refuse to have. Many refuse to know, as those who say to God in Job, XXI: Go away from us, we do not want knowledge of your ways [Job 21:14], and Hosea, IV: You too have rejected knowledge [Hos. 4:6]. Therefore, etc.

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Tertio sic. Nullus appetit quod odit. Sed scire multi odiunt Proverbiorum Io: “Imprudentes odibunt scientiam.” Ergo etc. Contra est quia secundum Augustinum “omnes appetunt esse beati.” Beatitudo autem vel est scientia et notitia quaedam secundum Philosophum Xo Ethicorum, vel non est sine scientia secundum Augustinum Io De Academicis. Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod sicut praecedens quaestio est de hominis appetitu ut homo est, simpliciter intelligenda de appetitu hominis ratione speciei, ita quaestio ista, quia est de omnis hominis appetitu, intelligenda est principaliter de appetitu hominis ratione individui. Et differt multum de appetitu hominis ut homo est, qui sequitur speciem, et de appetitu hominis ut iste homo est, qui sequitur hypostasim. Et non solum hoc restat in appetitu, sed etiam in aliis actionibus et passionibus animae, secundum quod dicit Damascenus in libro De duabus naturis et una persona Christi: “Naturalis proprietas est quae naturam constituit et dividit speciem a specie. Hypostatica autem est proprietas quae dividit hypostasim ab hypostasi. Et simpliciter dicere, quaecumque omnes homines habent a conditore data naturales sunt proprietates. Differens autem usus hypostaticus est: voluntas et velle naturale est; differens autem voluntas et differens velle hypostaticum.” Omnis homo habet posse velle et omnis homo vult, sed non omnis homo similiter vult, quare simpliciter velle est naturale, hoc aliquid et taliter velle hypostaticum. Multum ergo distat ista quaestio a praecedenti. Intelligendum ergo, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sicut species est universale quid et simpliciter ens respectu individui quod est hic et nunc, ita appetitus speciei in quantum huiusmodi est appetitus boni ut est bonum speciei; appetitus vero individui, in quantum huiusmodi est bonum individui hic et nunc. Bonum autem speciei est bonum simpliciter, quia est bonum naturae quam continet species, et natura semper appetit quod bonum est simpliciter. Bonum vero individui est bonum quod videtur huic sive simpliciter sive delectabile vel utile quod est hic et nunc, quia non est bonum naturae nisi ut in hoc, et quod hoc est appetit quod sibi bonum est. Quia tamen ratio speciei continetur in individuo, bonum speciei est bonum

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Third, thus. No one desires what they hate. But many hate to know, as in Proverbs, I: The imprudent will hate knowledge [Prov. 1:22]. Therefore, etc. The contrary position exists since, according to Augustine, “everyone desires to be happy.”201 However, happiness is either knowledge and cognizance of some sort, according to the Philosopher in book X of the Ethics,202 or does not exist without knowledge, according to Augustine in book I of On the Academics.203 Therefore, etc.

Regarding this question, we must say that just as the previous question is about the desire of a human being as a human being (it should be understood simply as dealing with the desire of a human being in terms of his species), this question is such that, since it is about the desire of every human being, it should be understood as dealing chiefly with the desire of a human being as an individual. And [the question] about the desire of a human being as a human being, based on the species, differs much from that of the desire of a human being insofar as he is this human being, which is based on the subject. This, moreover, does not apply only to the desire, but also to other actions and passions of the soul,204 according to what Damascene says in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ: “The natural property is what constitutes a nature and divides species from species. The property of the subject is the one that divides subject from subject. And, speaking in an absolute sense, whatever things all human beings possess, as given them by their originator, are natural properties. However, the sense in which will and willing are natural differs when it comes to the subject; for, the will and willing are different as applied to a subject.”205 Every human being has the capacity to will and every human being wills, but not all human beings will similarly, therefore to will in an absolute sense is natural, but to will this particular thing or to will in such a manner pertains to the subject. This question, therefore, is far afield from the previous one. Therefore, we must understand that since desire is only for the good, just as the species is something universal, and unqualified being, with respect to the individual that exists here and now, so too the desire of the species as such is desire for the good insofar as it is the good of the species; but the desire of the individual as such is for the good of the individual here and now. The good of the species, however, is the good simply,206 because it is the good of the nature contained in the species, and a nature always desires what is good simply.207 However, the good of the individual is what seems good to it, either unqualifiedly or as pleasant or as useful, existing here and now, since the good of the nature exists only in individuals, and the individual desires what is good for itself. Nevertheless, since the definition of the species is included in the individual, the good of the species is the good of the individual in

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simpliciter individui, licet quandoque ratione individui respicit specialem rationem boni sibi convenientem. Cum ergo quaeritur an omnis homo appetat scire, dicendum quod omnis homo ratione qua est homo et continet in se naturam speciei, appetit scire, sicut et homo simpliciter appetit scire, ut dictum est, quia in scire consistit perfectio speciei secundum intellectum. Et unusquisque appetitu qui competit ei ratione speciei perfectionem speciei in se appetit, sicut et ipsa species sibi suam perfectionem appeteret, si esset separata ab individuis. Ratione vero individui distinguendum quod loquendo de scire simpliciter, omnis homo appetit scire; loquendo autem de scire aliquod scibile particulare hoc vel illud, non oportet quod omnis homo appetat scire vel hoc vel illud. Cum enim homo ratione individui in quantum huiusmodi non appetat aliquid nisi ut sibi conveniens vel simpliciter, vel ut delectabile vel utile, et scire per se ex natura sua sit delectabile et natum delectare quemcumque de quocumque scibili sit—et si non delectet, hoc est per accidens aliquod existens in individuo vel contingens ipsi ex ipso scire, ut iam patebit, sicut et gustum per se delectat dulce, et si non, hoc est per aliquod accidens existens in gustu vel contingens ipsi ex ipso dulci—, hoc igitur particulare vel illud omnis homo per se et naturaliter appetit scire in quantum scibile est, et similiter appetitu rationali, si aliquo modo ipsum cognoscat et advertat, et si aliquis scire non appetat hoc particulare scibile vel illud, hoc est per accidens. Et sicut est de voluntate et appetitu sciendi, sic et aliorum.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “non omnes quaerunt scire,” dicendum quod non quilibet appetitus movet ad prosecutionem appetiti, sed fortis quem non potest retrahere contrarius appetitus. Debilem enim sciendi appetitum habentes retrahit fatigatio ex labore, ne scire quaerant, et ideo contrarius appetitus fortior quiescendi retrahit appetitum discendi, ne ad actum moveat. Nihilominus tamen appetitus est in eis ad sciendum. Unde et multi non volentes laborare ut sciant, bene vellent scire sine labore. Ad secundum, quod “scire multi renuunt,” dicendum quod hoc est per accidens aliquod quo informatur repugnans scientiae ut per habitum contrarium,

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an absolute sense, although sometimes due to its individuality the individual aims at a particular version of the good that is appropriate to it. Therefore, since it is asked whether every human being desires to know, we must say that every human being, on account of being human and as including in himself the nature of the species, desires to know, just as any human being as such desires to know in an unqualified sense, as stated,208 since the perfection of the species according to intellect consists in knowing. And everyone inherently desires the perfection of the species, through the desire which befits him on account of the species, and likewise the species itself would desire its own perfection if it would be separate from individuals. However, in terms of the individual, we must make a distinction: speaking about knowing simply, every human being desires to know; speaking about knowing something particular that can be known, such as this or that, it is not necessary for every human being to desire to know this or that. For, since a human being, considered as an individual, only desires something as appropriate to himself, either unqualifiedly or as pleasant or as useful, and knowing per se is pleasant to him by nature and he is naturally suited to enjoy whatever is knowable of a thing—and if he does not enjoy it, this is something accidental existing in the individual or happening to him account of the act of knowing itself (as will be made evident), just as taste also of itself enjoys what is sweet, and if it does not, this is due to something accidental existing in the faculty of taste or happening to it on account of the sweet thing itself—therefore, every human being per se and naturally desires to know this or that particular thing insofar as it is knowable, and likewise by means of rational desire, if he somehow comes to find and encounter it, and if someone does not desire to know this or that particular knowable thing, this is by accident. Moreover, what occurs in regard to the will and the desire to know also occurs with regard to other faculties.

To the first argument in opposition, that “not all desire to know,” we must say that not every desire moves in such a way that the desire is pursued, but rather only a strong desire which the contrary desire cannot hold back. For, fatigue from exertion holds back those having a weak desire to know, so that they do not pursue knowledge, and therefore the stronger contrary desire for rest holds back the desire to learn, which does not lead to action. Nevertheless, there is still in them the desire to know. Whence, also the many who do not wish to exert themselves in order to know, do wish to know without having to exert themselves. To the second, that “many refuse to know,” we must say that this happens accidentally when something that disagrees with knowledge is possessed as a contrary

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sicut infidelis non desiderat scire scientiam fidei, quia nec in eadem delectatur. Unde dicit Avicenna IXo Metaphysicae suae: “Res conveniens praeparata virtuti apprehendenti, si fuerit prohibens vel impediens animam, abhorrebit eam, et eliget potius contrarium, sicut infirmus aliquis abominatur sapores dulces, et desiderat sapores malos abominabiles per essentiam.” Unde generalem causam quare multi non sentiunt delectationes intellectuales ex scientia, quamvis comparari non debent delectationibus sensus, quia in infinitum excedunt, dicit “quia nos in hoc nostro saeculo et nostro corpore demersi sumus in multa turpia. Ideo non sentimus illam delectationem cum apud nos fuerit aliquid de causis eius, nec allicimur ad eam, nisi prius deposuerimus a cervicibus nostris iugum voluptatis et irae et sorores earum, et degustemus aliquid illius delectationis, et sic fortasse imaginabimus de illa parum aliquid. Sed praecipue cum fuerint solutae quaestiones et revelata fuerint inquisita nobilia, tunc comparatio huius nostrae delectationis ad illam nostram delectationem erit sicut comparatio delectationis sensibilis quae est odorandi odores gustatorum delectabilium ad delectationem comedendi ea” vel est per accidens aliquod contingens ex scire, sicut peccator non vult scire legem, ne concipiat remorsum conscientiae ex ipsa, vel dicuntur scientiam renuere interpretative qui ut sciant nolunt laborare. Nihilominus tamen omnes isti quantum est ex parte scire simpliciter scire vellent. Per idem patet ad tertium. Scire enim nullus odit nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Quaestio 3 Utrum homo naturaliter appetat scire Circa tertium, quod homo non appetat scire natura, arguitur primo sic. Quod naturaliter determinatum est ad unum finem non naturaliter inclinat ad alium. “Appetitus naturaliter determinatur ad bonum,” quia est proprium obiectum eius. Ergo non inclinatur naturaliter ad verum. Sed appetitus non appetit naturaliter, nisi ad quod naturaliter inclinatur. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. “Natura determinata est ad unum” solum. Si ergo homo naturaliter appeteret scire, non nisi unum aliquid appeteret scire. Consequens est falsum. Ergo etc.

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habit, as an infidel who does not desire to know the science of faith, since he does not take pleasure in it. Whence Avicenna says in book IX of his Metaphysics: “An agreeably fitting reality for a virtuous recipient will be abhorred, while the contrary becomes more choice-worthy, if there is something restraining or impeding the soul, as when someone whose health is impaired abhors sweet flavors, and desires bad flavors which are repugnant by essence.”209 Wherefore, he says, the general reason why many do not feel the intellectual pleasures of knowledge, although these should not be compared to the pleasures of sense, as they infinitely exceed them, is “because during our age and in our bodies, we have sunken into many base things. Therefore, we do not feel that pleasure when something within us is among the causes of that [base condition], nor are we drawn to it, unless we first release from our necks the yoke of sensual pleasure and anger and their kindred vices, and taste a bit of that pleasure, and then perhaps we still will envision all too little of it. But, especially, when our inquiries will be resolved and the worthy sought truths revealed, then the comparison of our present pleasure to that other pleasure of ours, will be as the comparison between the sensual pleasure of smelling the scents of tasty foods and the pleasure of eating them”;210 or this is due to some accident contingent upon knowledge, as the sinner who does not wish to know the law, lest he feel remorse of conscience from it, or those who are said to refuse knowledge since they refuse working for it. Yet, as far as knowing as such is concerned, all of these people still want to know. These reasons suffice as a response to the third argument. For, no one hates to know except by accident, as stated. Question 3 Whether a human being by nature desires to know Regarding the third question, it is argued that a human being does not desire to know by nature, first as follows. What is by nature designated to one end is not inclined by nature to another end. “The faculty of desire by nature is designated to the good,”211 because this is its proper object. Therefore, by nature it is not inclined to the true. But, the faculty of desire only desires by nature that to which it is inclined by nature.212 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. “Nature is designated to one”213 only. Therefore, if a human being would naturally desire to know, he would desire to know only one thing. The consequent is false. Therefore, etc.

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Tertio sic. Ut dictum est per Augustinum, “appetitus non est nisi ex cognitione.” Si ergo homo natura appeteret scire, homo a natura aliquid sciret. Consequens est falsum secundum praedeterminata. Ergo etc. Quarto sic. Voluntas distinguitur contra naturam IIo Ethicorum. Quare cum homo appetat scire voluntate, non ergo natura. Contra est quod dicit Philosophus in principio Metaphysicae: “Omnes homines natura scire desiderant.”

Ad hoc dicendum secundum Philosophum IIo Physicorum quod quaecumque agunt secundum propositum et secundum naturam ambo agunt propter aliquid et propter finem, non secundum quod quidam dixerunt quod omnia naturalia sunt a casu et quod solum propter finem agerent quaecumque agunt per cognitionem. Nunc autem ita est quod quaecumque agunt propter finem necessario agunt mota a fine, et ideo intendendo finem, secundum quod dicit Philosophus IIo Metaphysicae: “Nihil incipit agere aliquam actionem nisi intendendo finem” et IIIo eiusdem dicit quod “impossibile est quod ista causa sit in rebus quae non movent erga perfectionem.” Intentio autem et motus erga finem non est nisi propter appetitum finis. In omnibus ergo agentibus propter finem necesse est ponere appetitum finis. Quare cum non omnia agunt propter finem per cognitionem et deliberationem, sed quaedam sine cognitione et deliberatione, ut agentia per naturam, non solum necesse habemus ponere appetitum deliberativum per cognitionem, sed etiam appetitum naturalem sine cognitione, secundum quod dicit Commentator in fine Ii Physicorum: “Appetitus alius est naturalis sine sensu, ut appetitus plantarum ad alimentum, et alius cum sensu ut appetitus animalium ad alimentum.” Quia igitur appetitus iste qui est animalis necessario fit per cognitionem et nulla cognitio naturalis est in homine, ut dictum est supra, tali appetitu non appetit homo scire naturaliter; appetitus autem naturalis, quia fit sine notitia, quodam occulto naturae instinctu per quem scilicet appetitus qui dicitur animalis vadit determinate in finem suum, ut semen tritici ad pullulandum in triticum, et materia mota per agens tendit ad formam. Cum igitur, ut dictum est supra, homo ex natura intellectus sui est in potentia omnia intelligibilia, et nihil eorum in actu antequam intelligat, et ita

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Third, thus. As stated by Augustine,214 “desire only proceeds from cognition.”215 Therefore, if a human being would desire to know by nature, a human being would know something by nature. The consequent is false, as established above.216 Therefore, etc. Fourth, thus. The will is distinguished from nature in book II of the Ethics.217 Wherefore, since a human being desires to know by will, then he does not do so by nature. The contrary position is what the Philosopher says at the beginning of the Metaphysics: “All human beings by nature desire to know.”218

Concerning this question we must state, according to the Philosopher in book II of the Physics, that all things that act according to intention and according to nature act, in both cases, for the sake of something and for the sake of an end,219 not as those thinkers who said that all natural things are by chance and that only what acts through cognition acts for the sake of an end. Now, however, it is the case that whatever acts for the sake of an end necessarily acts by being moved by the end,220 and thereby aims at the end, as the Philosopher states in book II of the Metaphysics: “Nothing begins to take action unless it is aiming for an end,”221 and in book III of the same work he says that “it is impossible for this cause to be in things that do not move toward perfection.”222 However, intention and movement toward an end exist only on account of desire for the end. Therefore, it is necessary to posit desire for an end in all things that act for the sake of an end. Wherefore, since not all things act for the sake of an end through cognition and deliberation, but rather some of them do so without cognition and deliberation, such as the things that act by nature, we must posit not only a deliberative desire through cognition, but also a natural desire without cognition, according to what the Commentator says at the end of the Physics: “Natural desire without sense, as the desire of plants for nourishment, is different from the desire that includes sense, such as the desire of animals for nourishment.223” Therefore, since this desire of animals necessarily happens through cognition, and there is no natural cognition in human beings, as mentioned above,224 a human being does not desire to know by nature through such desire; on the other hand, natural desire (since it occurs without knowledge) occurs through some hidden natural instinct, through which the so-called animate desire proceeds in a fixed way toward its end, like the seed of wheat toward the sprouting of wheat, and like matter tends toward form when moved by an agent. Since, therefore, as said above,225 a human being by nature of his intellect is in potency to all that is intelligible,226 and none of this is actual before he understands,

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naturaliter imperfectus est, perfectibilis tamen per species intelligibilium, ut per eas actu intelligat et sciat, et imperfectum naturaliter tendit in suam perfectionem, absolute ergo dicendum quod homo ante acquisitionem omnis notitiae appetitu illo qui non est animalis, sed in ipso pure naturalis naturaliter appetit scire simpliciter, sicut post adeptam aliqualem cognitionem imperfectam appetitu cognitivo appetit scire hoc vel illud, secundum quod imperfectam habet notitiam huius vel illius, ut scientia imperfecta in ipso perficiatur. Et hunc appetitum cognitivum praecedit ille appetitus naturalis sine omni cognitione. De quo appetitu dicit Tullius in libro De Academicis: “Mens ipsa quae et sensuum fons est, et ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet quam intendit ad ea quibus movetur, cum nihil ei est veritatis luce dulcius.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “appetitus naturaliter determinatus est ad bonum,” dicendum quod verum est, quoniam quod appetit verum, hoc est in ratione qua est bonum intellectus, et ita verum apud voluntatem habet rationem boni, sicut e converso bonum apud intellectum habet rationem veri, per quae voluntas et intellectus apponendo mutuo sua obiecta mutuo se movent, ut dictum est. Ad secundum, quod “natura determinata est ad unum,” dicendum quod verum est ad unum in genere, quia sub una generali ratione appetibilis, scilicet boni, appetit quidquid appetit. Sicut enim materia secundum quod materia quidquid appetit forma est, non tamen tantum unam formam secundum genus vel speciem appetit, sed generaliter omnes, similiter voluntas appetit scire generaliter sub ratione qua est bonum intellectus, et ideo omnem scientiam generaliter, ut infra dicetur, quia intellectus omni scientia natus est perfici, ut dictum est supra. Ad tertium patet solutio per dicta, quoniam naturalis appetitus purus non est per cognitionem. Ad quartum, quod “voluntas distinguitur contra naturam,” dicendum secundum quosdam, quod verum est, et quod homo appetit scire voluntate et natura, alio et alio appetitu est. Principium enim appetitus naturalis est in ipsa cognitiva potentia per seminarium scientiae, quo naturaliter ad actum sciendi intellectus inclinatur, de quo dictum est supra. Principium autem appetitus cognitivi est ipsa voluntas ex notitia aliquando iam habita, ut

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at which point he is naturally incomplete (though capable of completion through the species of intelligible things, by which he may understand and know in act), and [since] what is incomplete naturally tends toward its own completion, absolutely we must say that a human being before the acquisition of any knowledge—by means of a desire that is not the one proper to animals, yet still purely natural in himself—by nature desires to know in an absolute sense; similarly after obtaining some incomplete cognition [of this or that], through having only partial acquaintance with this or that he desires to know this or that by means of cognitive desire, so that his incomplete knowledge may be completed in himself. Moreover, that natural desire without any cognition precedes this cognitive desire. About such [natural] desire, Cicero states in the book On the Academics: “The mind itself, which is the source of perception and is itself perception, possesses a natural force which aims at the things by which it is moved, since nothing is sweeter to it than the light of truth.”227

To the first argument in opposition, that “desire is by nature designated to the good,” we must say that this is true, since the act of desiring the true happens in terms of its being the good of the intellect, and thus the true for the will has the aspect of the good, just as conversely the good for intellect has the aspect of the true, through which will and intellect move each other mutually by setting up their objects mutually, as stated.228 To the second, that “nature is designated to one thing,” we must say that this is true in regard to one genus, because under one general definition of ‘the desirable’, namely the good, it desires whatever it desires. For, just as anything that matter desires (considered simply as matter) is form, and does not merely desire one form of a given genus or species, but rather all in general, similarly the will desires to know in general inasmuch as this is the good of the intellect, and therefore desires all knowledge in general, as will be explained below, because the intellect is by nature apt to be perfected by all knowledge, as stated above.229 The resolution of the third is clear from the aforementioned, since pure natural desire does not take place through cognition. To the fourth, that “the will is distinguished from nature,” we must say, in line with certain thinkers, that this is true, and that the fact that a human being desires to know by both nature and will entails different desires. For, the principle of natural desire exists in the very cognitive potency as the seminal source of knowledge, by which the intellect is naturally inclined to the act of knowing, about which we spoke above. On the other hand, the principle of cognitive desire is the will itself on account of knowledge that is already possessed at some point in the past. But perhaps

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dictum est. Sed hoc falsum est forte, quia idem actus specie secundum idem obiectum non est nisi eiusdem virtutis. Cum igitur actus appetendi quocumque modo sit, non est nisi boni sub ratione boni idem specie est, non est igitur nisi eiusdem virtutis. Voluntas ergo, si appetit ex cognitione deliberative, etiam ipsa non alia potentia appetit naturaliter sine cognitione. Et sicut ex cognitione appetit bonum sibi et aliis, ut praedictum est, sic et naturaliter sine cognitione. Dicendum est igitur ad obiectum quod voluntas, ut est deliberativa, ex cognitione praecedenti distinguitur contra naturam, non autem voluntas simpliciter et in communi accepta. In illa enim bene distinguitur quod est natura et quod est ratio deliberativa, ut dictum est. Quaestio 4 Utrum omnes homines aequaltier appetant scire Circa quartum arguitur quod omnes homines aequaliter appetant scire. Primo sic. Illi aequaliter appetunt quibus inest aequaliter appetitivum principium, quia effectus proportionaliter sequitur suam causam. Omnibus hominibus aequaliter inest sciendi appetitivum principium, ut ipsa natura animae in appetitu naturali, et notitia primorum principiorum in primo appetitu cognitivo. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Appetitus scientiae homini inest propter imperfectionem suam et indigentiam. Sed aequaliter imperfectus est homo quilibet quantum est de se, et indiget scientia. Ergo etc. Contra est quoniam tunc omnes aequaliter niterentur ad sciendum, quia ubi est aequaliter motivum principium, est et motus aequalis.

Ad hoc dicendum quod loquendo de appetitu rationali cognitivo, non est dubium quin homines inaequaliter appetant scire. Unde non omnes ad acquisitionem perfectae scientiae aequaliter nituntur, et illius causa duplex est: una essentialis, alia accidentalis. Essentialis causa est quoniam non omnes aequaliter sunt imperfecta notitia informati qua movetur appetitus ad amplius sciendum. Qui enim plus novit, aliis eisdem retentis, plus appetit nosse quousque in ipso notitia compleatur, et cesset tunc primo appetitus, et motus

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this seems false, since the same act in kind according to the same object belongs only to the same power. Therefore, since the act of desiring, howsoever it may be, is only of the good considered as good and so the same in kind, therefore it belongs only to the same power. Therefore, if the will desires through deliberative cognition, it itself also desires naturally without cognition by means of no other potency. And just as it desires by means of cognition its own good and that of other [powers of the soul], as mentioned,230 so too does it desire naturally without cognition. Therefore, we must say to the objection that the will, insofar as it is deliberative, is distinguished from nature on account of its prior cognition, but not, however, the will simply speaking and taken in its general sense. For, in the will one may well distinguish what is nature and what is a deliberative principle, as stated. Question 4 Whether all human beings equally desire to know Regarding the fourth question, it is argued that all human beings equally desire to know. First, as follows. Those within whom a desiring principle exists equally desire equally, since the effect is proportional to its cause. The principle of desiring knowledge exists equally in all human beings, as the very nature of the soul in terms of natural desire, and as the knowledge of first principles in terms of initial cognitive desire. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. The desire to know is within a human being on account of his imperfection and need. But every human being considered as such is equally imperfect, and needs knowledge. Therefore, etc. The argument against is that, were this the case, all human beings would be equally advanced in knowledge, since where there is an equal motive principle, there is also equal motion.

Concerning this question, we must say that, speaking about rational cognitive desire, there is no doubt that human beings do not desire to know equally. Hence, not all equally advance toward the acquisition of perfect knowledge, the cause of which is twofold: one essential, the other accidental. The essential cause is that not all are equally informed with the incomplete knowledge by which desire is moved to know more fully. For, he who knows more, provided that other factors remain the same, desires to know more until his knowledge is completed, and at that point his desire

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in fine per quietem in ipso. Quanto enim aliquis de aliquo scibili plus novit citra finem notitiae, tanto plus fini assimilatur. Quare cum appetitus sit ratione assimilationis imperfectae ad finem, quanto plus novit quis et magis per assimilationem fini appropinquat, tanto magis appetitus inflammatur, et fit fortior eius motus in finem ad modum motus naturalis, qui semper intensior est in fine. Causa vero accidentalis quod appetitu rationali cognitivo non omnes aequaliter appetunt scire multiplex est et indeterminata, quia in quibusdam est indigentia necessariorum, quae causat in eis desperationem deveniendi ad scientiae perfectionem, per quam retrahitur et refrigeratur appetitus, in quibusdam vero circa temporalia occupatio et plures aliae infinitae. Loquendo vero de appetitu sciendi naturali, dicendum secundum praedeterminata quod aliquid dicitur naturale alicui ratione formae et speciei vel ratione materiae et individui. Quantum est ex parte formae et speciei, cum ipsa sit uniformiter in omnibus individuis, omnes homines aequaliter scire desiderant, secundum quod dictum est supra quod ratione speciei omnes apti sunt ad sciendum. Quantum vero est ex parte individui et materiae, secundum quod alii sunt minus apti ad sciendum, alii aptiores, ut dictum est supra, secundum hoc quidam plus appetunt scire, quidam minus, et quidam plus unam scientiam, quidam plus aliam.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “principium appetendi omnibus aequaliter inest,” dicendum quod non est verum in appetitu rationali, quia non omnes aequaliter notitia movente appetitum sunt informati, neque etiam in appetitu naturali, quantum est ex parte materiae et individui, quia quidam sunt minus dispositi ad scientiam quam alii, propter quod in quibusdam appetitus plus appetit quam in aliis, in quantum anima sequitur dispositiones corporis, et scire non est nisi coniuncti, ut dictum est supra. Quantum vero ex parte animae sive formae, nisi esset corpore impedita, omnes aequaliter scire appeterent, secundum quod aequaliter apti ad scientiam essent, ut dictum est supra, nisi velit aliquis dicere quod anima meliorum naturalium uni corpori infunditur quam alteri, de quo non debet esse ad praesens sermo. Ad secundum, quod “imperfectio est causa appetitus,” dicendum quod imperfectio, in quantum dicit carentiam, est causa appetitus per accidens, sicut privatio formae in materia per accidens est causa generationis. Sed in

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ceases and not before, having reached the end by resting in the end. For, the more someone knows about something knowable, without reaching the end of [complete] knowledge, the more he is assimilated to the end. Wherefore, since desire exists on account of the imperfect assimilation to the end, the more someone knows and approximates the end more through assimilation, the more his desire is inflamed, and his tendency toward the end becomes stronger after the manner of natural motion, which is always more intense at the end.231 On the other hand, the accidental cause of why not everyone equally desires to know by means of rational cognitive desire is manifold and indeterminate, since some people lack the necessities of life, which makes them hopeless of reaching perfect knowledge, on which account their desire withdraws and grows cold, while in others this has to do with the cares of this world, and there is an infinity of other reasons. However, speaking about the natural desire to know, we must say according to what was established232 that something is called natural either in terms of some form or species or in terms of matter and the individual. As far as form and species is concerned, since this exists uniformly in all individuals, all human beings equally desire to know, as was explained above, namely that all are fit for knowledge on account of the species. However, as far as the individual and matter are concerned, according to how some are less fit for knowledge, others fitter, as stated above233— according to this fact, certain people more intensely desire to know, others less, and certain people desire more of one kind of knowledge, others more of another kind.

To the first argument, that “the desiring principle is within all equally,” we must say that this is not true regarding rational desire, because not all are equally informed with knowledge that moves the desire, nor is it true regarding natural appetite as far as matter and the individual are concerned, because certain people are less disposed to knowledge than others, which is why in certain people the faculty of desire desires more intensely than in others, inasmuch as the soul follows the dispositions of the body, and the act of knowing is proper only to what is conjoined [of body and soul], as mentioned above.234 However, as far as the soul or form is concerned, if not obstructed by the body, all human beings would equally desire to know, inasmuch as they would be equally apt for knowledge, as stated above,235 unless someone wishes to say that a soul with better natural capacities is infused in one body rather than in another, which topic is not to the present purpose. To the second, that “imperfection is the cause of desire,” we must say that imperfection, inasmuch as it implies a lack, is an accidental cause of desire,236 just as privation of form in matter is an accidental cause of generation.237 Rather, concerning

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appetitu cognitivo id quod cognitum est incomplete per se est causa appetitus. Cum igitur illud non sit aequaliter in omnibus, nec appetitus cognitivus, ut dictum est, aequaliter inest. Similiter in appetitu naturali ipsa carentia notitiae pura non est causa appetitus nisi per accidens. Sed inclinatio ad scientiam per principium intra est causa per se appetitus, quae in omnibus aequalis est ex parte formae, sed in quibusdam impedita est plus ex parte materiae, in quibusdam vero minus, ut dictum est. Et ideo appetitu naturali, quantum est ex parte formae, omnes aequaliter scire appetunt, non autem ex parte materiae, ut dictum est. Quaestio 5 Utrum homo appetat scire ea quae notitiam naturalis rationis excedunt Circa quintum arguitur quod homo non appetat scire ea quae notitiam naturalis rationis excedunt. Primo sic. Appetitus naturalis non excedit potentiam naturae, quia oritur ex ipsa, et effectus non transcendit causam. Quare cum potentia naturae non potest attingere illa quae eam excedunt, neque eius appetitus ut ea appetat. Secundo sic. Frustra res habet desiderium ad quod non potest attingere; sed ratio naturalis non potest attingere ut cognoscat quae eam excedunt; ergo frustra haberet ad sciendum illa desiderium. Sed nullum desiderium naturale est frustra. Ergo etc. Tertio ex eodem medio contrario modo argumento Averrois super principium IIi Metaphysicae sic: “Comprehensio veritatis eius non est impossibilis, cuius habemus desiderium naturale sciendi, quoniam si esset impossibilis, tunc desiderium esset otiosum.” Et concessum est quod “nulla res est otiosa in fundamento naturae et creaturae.” Sed comprehensio veritatis a ratione naturali eorum est impossibilis quae excedunt eam. Ergo ad sciendum illa non est ei desiderium naturale. Quarto sic. Si homo ex puris naturalibus appeteret illa scire, cum vanus esset appetitus nisi posset illa scire, nec appeteret illa scire nisi cognosceret se posse illa scire, ergo oporteret ex puris naturalibus se cognoscere quod posset illa scire. Sed hoc non est nisi ex fide. Ergo ex puris naturalibus posset fides haberi. Consequens est falsum. Ergo etc.

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cognitive desire, what is known incompletely is per se the cause of desire. Therefore, since that does not exist equally in all human beings, neither does cognitive desire exist within them equally, as mentioned. Similarly, concerning natural desire, the pure lack of knowledge itself is the cause of desire only accidentally. Rather, the inclination to knowledge through an internal principle is per se the cause of desire, which is equal in everyone in terms of form, but it is obstructed more in some on account of matter, while in others it is less so, as mentioned. And therefore, in terms of natural desire, as far as form is concerned, all human beings equally desire to know, but this is not the case as far as matter is concerned, as stated. Question 5 Whether a human being desires to know those things that exceed the knowledge of natural reason Regarding the fifth question, it is argued that a human being does not desire to know those things which exceed the knowledge of natural reason. First, as follows. Natural desire does not exceed the potency of nature, because it originates from it, and the effect does not transcend the cause. Wherefore, since the potency of nature cannot reach the things that exceed it, neither does its desire whereby it could desire them. Second, thus. A thing with a desire for what it cannot reach exists in vain. But natural reason cannot reach the point of knowing the things which exceed it. Therefore, it would possess the desire to know them in vain.238 But no natural desire is in vain. Therefore, etc. Third, through the same premise but in a reverse way using an argument of Averroes concerning the beginning of Metaphysics, II, as follows: “Understanding the truth of that for which we have a natural desire is not impossible, because if it were impossible, then the desire would be idle.”239 And it is granted that “no thing is idle as based in nature and creation.”240 But understanding the truth of those things which exceed it is impossible for natural reason. Therefore, there is no natural desire in it to understand those things. Fourth, thus. If a human being would desire to know those things through purely natural means—since the desire would be in vain unless it could know them, nor would it desire to know them unless it would know its own capacity to know them— then it would be necessary for it to know through purely natural means its own capacity to know them. But this occurs only through faith. Therefore, faith could be had through purely natural means. The conclusion is false. Therefore, etc.

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Ad oppositum arguitur primo sic. Quod naturaliter est in potentia ad aliqua naturaliter desiderat fieri in actu illa, sicut patet de materia ad omnes formas ad quas est in potentia, quod naturaliter illas desiderat. Sed homo naturaliter est in potentia, ut sciat omnia, etiam illa supernaturalia, ut dictum est supra. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Omnes homines secundum Augustinum natura desiderant beatitudinem, non nisi illam quae vera est, quia natura non desiderat nisi quod melius est et bonum simpliciter. Unde Boethius: “Mentibus hominum inserta est summi veri et boni cupiditas.” Sed bona beatitudinis sunt supra notitiam naturalis rationis. Ergo etc.

Averroes, Commentator Philosophi, qui exponens illud IIi Metaphysicae, “dispositio intellectus in anima” etc., ponit quod homo ex naturalibus suis possit devenire, ut intelligat primum principium et principia separata post ipsum, diceret quod desiderium hominis esset ad sciendum ea, nec sine illorum adeptione cessaret appetitus. Sed hoc licet verum sit, tamen error est illud ex quo ponit. Ponit enim quoniam ex pura cognitione naturali quae est ex phantasmatibus de rebus sensibilibus possibile sit devenire in cognitionem quidditatis substantiarum separatarum, quod erroneum est, quia medium cognoscendi ex phantasmatibus limitatum est, ut de substantiis separatis ex sensibilibus sicut ex effectibus earum, amplius non potest homo cognoscere nisi quia sunt, non autem quid sunt nisi in generali, et remanet omnino cognoscendum quid in natura et in substantia sunt in speciali. Cum enim effectus exteriores sunt effectus artis sive substantiae separatae ut ars est, non autem essentiae ut essentia est, in notitiam artis ducere possent ut ars est, non autem in notitiam essentiae ut essentia est. Limitata est ergo in hoc notitia naturalis, ut ad illa cognoscenda attingere non possit, nec ad hoc se extendit lumen agentis, ut dictum est. Philosophi vero ponentes finem humanae cognitionis ex puris naturalibus haberi et in vita ista ex cognitione scientiarum speculativarum et primorum principiorum quantum homini possibile est, et quod in modica cognitione divinorum consistit eius summa perfectio et delectatio, licet non possit attingere ad quidditates substantiarum separatarum et eorum quae apud illas sunt, dicerent quod homo nullum appetitum haberet sciendi illa, ex quo ex suis naturalibus ad ea pervenire non posset, ne ille appetitus esset frustra.

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The contrary position is argued first as follows. What is in potency to certain things by nature desires to become those things in act, as is evident with respect to matter, which naturally desires all those forms to which it is in potency.241 But a human being by nature is in potency to know all things, even supernatural ones, as stated above.242 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. According to Augustine, all human beings by nature desire happiness,243 and only true happiness, since nature only desires what is better and good absolutely.244 Whence Boethius states: “Passionate desire for the good and for the highest truth is implanted in the minds of human beings.”245 But the goods proper to happiness are above the knowledge of natural reason. Therefore, etc.

Averroes, the Commentator of the Philosopher, who, while expounding upon that text of Metaphysics, II—“the disposition of the intellect in the soul,” etc.246—claims that a human being through the purely natural means available to him may arrive at the understanding of the first principle and the separate principles that follow it, would say that human desire aims to know these things and does not cease before grasping them.247 Although this may be true, still the claim is based on an error. For, he makes the claim assuming that it is possible to arrive at the cognition of the quiddity of separate substances through purely natural cognition derived from the phantasms of sensible things—which is erroneous, since the means of knowing through phantasms is limited, so that about the separate substances (based on sensible things considered as their effects) human beings can know only that they exist, but not what they are except generally, and there remains to know entirely what they are specifically in their nature and substance. For, since outer effects are the effects of production, or of the separate substances insofar as they produce, but not [the effects] of the essence as essence, they can lead to the knowledge of production as production, but not to the knowledge of essence as essence. In this regard, therefore, natural knowledge is limited, so that it cannot reach the knowledge of those things, nor does the [intellectual] light of the agent extend beyond this, as mentioned.248 However, the philosophers who claim that the end of human cognition is achieved through purely natural means and in this life, through the knowledge of the theoretical sciences and first principles as far as is possible for a human being, and that his highest perfection and pleasure consists in the modest cognition of divine things, though he cannot reach the quiddities of the separate substances249 and what is intrinsic to them, would say that a human being has no desire to know these, on which account he cannot arrive at them through the natural means available to him, and neither is human desire in vain.

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Sed quod hoc non potest stare apparet triplici via. Prima ex parte intellectus humani, quoniam secundum philosophos ipse est in potentia omnia intelligibilia, sicut sensus sensibilia, et hoc nec solum omnia intelligibilia ex sensibilibus abstracta, sed etiam ex se separata. Cum enim secundum Philosophum “illa nobis sunt difficile intelligibilia, non propter se, sed propter nos,” “non tamen,” ut ibi dicit Commentator, “sunt impossibilia nobis intelligi.” Frustra enim essent facta nobis intelligibilia et numquam ea intelligere possemus, sicut frustra esset sol factus nobis visibilis, si eum nullo modo videre possemus. Sed ita est quod sicut prima materia, si esset in potentia ad formas, ut quasdam posset recipere opere naturae et alias non posset recipere nisi opere supernaturali, omnes tamen tam has quam illas, naturaliter appeteret, sic intellectus humanus, cum sit in potentia ut perficiatur notitia rerum naturalium, quam potest sua actione naturali attingere, et similiter supernaturalium, quam solum potest supernaturaliter attingere, naturaliter appetet tam istam notitiam quam illam, ut nec solum homo ante adeptionem scientiae rerum naturalium appetat illarum notitiam, immo post adeptionem scientiae rerum naturalium appetat etiam notitiam rerum supernaturalium. Secunda via patet idem ex parte scientiae incompletae quam habet ex rebus naturalibus ad illa superiora cognoscenda, quoniam omne imperfectum quod se experitur imperfectum in aliquo actu desiderat consequi perfectionem in illo, quoniam notitia imperfecta de aliquo necessario excitat intellectum bene dispositum ad desiderandum eius perfectionem. Nunc autem experimur in nobis notitiam imperfectam separatorum ex effectibus eorum, scilicet notitiam quia sunt, et quid sunt in generali, quae est imperfecta respectu notitiae eorum quid sunt in speciali, sicut in complexis imperfecta est notitia quia est, ut quod sol eclipsatur, nisi sciatur quare eclipsatur. Quare necessarium est quod homo desideret consequi illam notitiam perfectam. Ex hoc ergo quod homo aliqua ex creaturis sensibilibus cognoscat de Deo et separatis, non quiescit eius desiderium, sed necessario excitatur magis ad cognoscendum illa, ad quae tamen naturaliter attingere non potest. Semper enim effectus cognitus incitat appetitum ad cognoscendum causam ignotam, secundum quod dicit Io Metaphysicae de primis philosophis quod videntes a principio effectus apparentes et deficientes in cognitione causarum, ut de lunae passionibus et quae fiunt circa solem et astra, admirati sunt, et “propter id quod est admirari, tunc

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However, that this is an unfounded position is apparent in three ways. First, in terms of the human intellect, because according to the philosophers the intellect is in potency to all that is intelligible, just as the sense faculty is to all that is sensible, 250 and this includes not only all intelligible things abstracted from sensible entities, but also intelligible things that are of themselves separate. For, indeed, according to the Philosopher, “those intelligible things are difficult for us, not on account of themselves, but rather on account of us,”251 “and yet,” as the Commentator points out at that place, “they are not impossible for us to understand.”252 Indeed, it would be in vain for these things to be made intelligible to us while we never are able to understand them, just as for the sun to be made visible to us would be in vain253 if in no way we could see it. However, this is just as if prime matter, if it would be in potency to forms in such a way that it could receive some by the action of nature while others only by supernatural action, then it would still desire them all, both the former and the latter, by nature; so too the human intellect, since it is in potency so that it may be perfected by the knowledge of natural things (which it can reach through its own natural action)254 as well as by that of supernatural things (which it can reach only supernaturally), desires by nature both the former and the latter knowledge, so that not only does a human being desire the knowledge of natural things before attaining science of them, but also indeed after attaining science of natural things it desires the knowledge of supernatural things as well. The same is evident in a second way, in terms of the incomplete knowledge obtained from natural things as a means to know the superior things, since every imperfect thing that is aware of its imperfection in some action desires to achieve perfection in that action, for imperfect knowledge about something necessarily stimulates a well-disposed intellect to desire the perfection of the knowledge. Now, however, we experience in ourselves the imperfect knowledge of separate substances obtained from their effects, namely the knowledge that they exist and what they are in general, which is imperfect with reference to the knowledge of what they are specifically, just as in judgments the knowledge that something is, is imperfect (such as that the sun is eclipsed, unless it is known why it is eclipsed). Wherefore it is necessary that a human being desires to achieve the perfection of that knowledge. Hence, the fact that a human being may know something of God and the separate substances from sensible creatures does not appease his desire, but rather necessarily stimulates him to know more about them, which goal he nevertheless cannot reach by nature. For, always a known effect incites the desire to know the unknown cause, as stated in Metaphysics, I, with regard to the first philosophers, who at first saw the apparent effects and lacked the cognition of the causes, such as the phenomena associated with the moon and what happens in regard to the sun and the stars, and were filled with wonder, and “on account of wonder, they then first began to

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primum inceperunt philosophari.” Et constat quod hoc non erat, nisi quia ex eis quae noverunt excitatus est in eis appetitus ad cognoscendum ea quae latere eos perceperunt. Et ex hoc aperte apparet tertia via. Non enim solum est in homine desiderium ad percipiendum imperfectam notitiam quam experitur in se, sed etiam ad expellendam illam quam in se experitur ignorantiam, secundum quod etiam dicitur ibidem: “Propter id quod est fugere ignorantiam philosophati sunt.” Quare cum homo ex effectibus creaturarum experitur esse illa quae naturalem eius cognitionem excedunt, et scit naturam et quidditatem eorum sibi esse ignotam, impossibile est quod appetitus eius non tendit ad illa cognoscenda, et tanto magis quanto plura circa illa per creaturas experitur, et cognoscit ex hoc suam incompletam cognitionem et ignorantiam, ut praedictum est. Absolute ergo dicendum quod homo appetit scire ea quae naturalis rationis notitiam excedunt, ita quod per naturam quiescere non potest humanus appetitus, quousque deveniat ad apertam notitiam separatorum, maxime quidditatis et essentiae eius qui est prima veritas, ita quod nihil citra ipsam sedare posset eius appetitum, etiam si videat clare omnes substantias angelicas, immo tunc adhuc amplius desiderium eius ad nudam divinam essentiam videndam excitaretur, quanto esset propinquior fini, et ei magis assimilaretur, secundum quod videmus corpora moveri ad loca sibi naturalia, et tanto velocius moveri quanto magis appropinquant fini. Nullum ergo firmiter scibile potest quietare appetitum hominis in sciendo, sed solummodo illud infinitum in summo cardine rerum constitutum. Cum enim anima naturaliter capax sit summi boni per affectum et summi veri per intellectum, minori impleri non potest, quia quod potest capere maius non potest impleri minori, sed semper maneret aliquid de vacuo quod appeteretur impleri, et ita adhuc etiam non esset quies. Et ideo dicit beatus Augustinus in principio Confessionum: “Tu excitas ut laudare Te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad Te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec quiescat in Te.” Revera magna est confusio philosophorum, qui haec omnia videre poterant, immo quia necessario viderunt et in se ipsis experimentati sunt, et tamen in infimis perfectionem humanae notitiae posuerunt. Unde et multi eorum ex desiderio quod perceperunt hominem habere ad illa cognoscenda, bene perceperunt quod notitia illarum non esset homini impossibilis, quoniam “desiderium naturale non potest esse frustra neque otiosum,” ut manifeste concludit

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philosophize.”255 And it is plain that this was the case simply because, based on the things they knew, their desire was stimulated to understand the things which they perceived to be hidden from them. Finally, this is plainly evident in a third way. For not only is there in a human being the desire to penetrate the imperfect knowledge which he experiences in himself, but likewise [the desire] to drive out what is experienced as ignorance in himself, as is also stated in the same text: “They philosophized for the sake of escaping from ignorance.”256 Wherefore, since a human being, from effects among creatures, becomes aware of the existence of things exceeding his natural cognition, and knows that their nature and quiddity are unknown to him, it is impossible for his desire not to aim at understanding those things, and as he experiences more and a variety of things about them through creatures, he also recognizes though this fact his own imperfect cognition and ignorance, as already stated. Therefore, absolutely we must say that a human being desires to know the things which exceed the knowledge of natural reason, so that through nature human desire cannot be appeased, but rather only until he arrives at the clear knowledge of the separate substances, chiefly that of the quiddity and essence of the one which is the First Truth,257 so that nothing below this truth can settle his desire, even if he may see clearly all the angelic substances—nay, rather at this point his desire would be stimulated even further in order to see the divine essence in its purity,258 the more he is closer to the end and more assimilated to it, just as we see bodies move to their natural place, which move all the faster the closer they approximate the end. 259 Nothing, therefore, can appease firmly a human being’s desire to know, except that infinite [being] alone which stands at the summit of reality. For, since the soul is by nature fit for the highest good through affection and for the highest truth through the intellect, it cannot be fulfilled by what is less, since what can take hold of what is greater cannot be fulfilled with what is less, as there always remains some emptiness that it would desire to fill, and so too up to this point there is no appeasement. And therefore the blessed Augustine says at the beginning of the Confessions: “You stir us up in a way that praising You brings delight, because you made us for Yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in You.”260 Truly, great is the confusion of the philosophers, who were able to see all these things, or more to the point, because they saw them of necessity and were themselves experts, yet still placed the perfection of human knowledge at such low level. Wherefore, even many of them, perceiving the desire human beings possess to know those things, well understood that the knowledge of them is not impossible for a human

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Averroes super IIum Metaphysicae. Et ideo multis et variis modis, sed erroneis conati sunt ostendere quomodo homo ad perfectam notitiam illorum posset in vita ista pervenire. “Viderunt enim bene,” ut dicit Augustinus Super Iovianum, “quo oportebat tendere, sed viam ignoraverunt,” quae est via fidei, qua oportet prius oculum mentis purgari, ut tandem ad illorum notitiam homo mereatur pervenire, non per naturam, sed per gratiam, nec in hac vita nisi forte ex privilegio speciali, sed in futura. Errabant ergo dicentes separata quoad essentias et quidditates suas cognosci posse ex puris naturalibus, plus dando naturae quam habuerit. Errabant etiam dicentes quod quidditates illae clare ab homine cognosci non possent, quia ex naturalibus ad illas non posset attingere, denegando naturae quod habuit, scilicet potentiam receptivam illius ex dono alterius. Medium est ergo tenendum, scilicet ut notitiam illorum recipere poterit, sed quod propria actione ad illam attingere non poterit.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “appetitus non excedit potentiam naturae,” dicendum quod notitia illorum non excedit potentiam naturae, quin naturalis ratio illa cognoscere potest, licet ex puris naturalibus ad illorum notitiam non possit attingere, sed solum per gratiam et adiutorio luminis infusi. Nunc autem appetitu naturali et cognitivo non solum inclinatur res ad illud quod per se potest attingere, sed etiam ad illud ad quod naturaliter ordinatur, ut dono alterius attingat illud. Licet enim non nisi dono alterius ad illud attingat, nihilominus tamen oportet quod in se naturalem potentiam habeat qua attingere possit, secundum quod dicit Ioannes Damascenus in libro De duabus naturis et una persona Christi contra illos qui dicunt quod homo de se nullam habet volitivam potentiam, sed a Deo habet bonam voluntatem, malam autem a diabolo. Dicit enim quod “isti ignorant quod impossibile est qualemcumque naturam uti actione cuius potentiam non secundum naturam accepit.” Et per idem patet ad secundum. Et similiter ad tertium, quod est ex dicto Averrois principio IIi Metaphysicae, qui ex hoc probavit quod separata possunt ab homine cognosci quid sunt, et verum est, sed non ex puris naturalibus illorum notitiam acquirendo, sicut ipse aestimavit, sed ex dono gratuito.

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being since “natural desire cannot be in vain or idle,”261 as Averroes manifestly concludes in regard to book II of the Metaphysics. Therefore, in many and various ways, they have tried, erroneously, to show how a human being can arrive at the perfect knowledge of them in this life. “For they saw well,” as Augustine says in On Jovinianus, “what was necessary to reach, but they ignored the way,”262 which is the way of faith, whereby it is first necessary to cleanse the eye of the mind, so that eventually a human being may deserve to arrive at the knowledge of them, not by nature, but rather by grace, and not in this life (except perhaps by special privilege), but rather in the future one.263 Therefore, those who claimed that separate substances can be known in terms of their essences and quiddities erred, by assigning to nature more than it had. In addition, those who claimed that their quiddities cannot be known adequately by a human being, since he cannot reach this through purely natural means, also erred, by denying what nature had, namely the potency to receive this through another’s gift. Therefore, we must hold the middle position, namely that it will be possible to attain knowledge of these things, but that it will not be possible to reach this knowledge through one’s own action.

To the first argument in opposition, that “desire does not exceed the potency of nature,” we must say that knowledge of those things does not exceed the potency of nature, and that natural reason can cognize them, although it cannot attain knowledge of them through purely natural means, but rather only through grace and with the help of infused light. Now, however, by natural and cognitive desire a thing aims not only at what it can reach per se, but also at that for which it is naturally ordered, so that it may reach it through another’s gift. For, although it may reach it only through another’s gift, nevertheless it is still necessary for it to have in itself the natural potency by which it can get there, as John Damascene says in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ against those who claim that a human being, of himself, has no faculty of will, but rather that he has good will from God, and an evil will from the devil. For, he says that “they ignored that it is impossible for any nature to make use of an action for which it did not receive the capacity according to nature.”264 This also suffices as a response to the second argument. Similarly also, in response to the third—which is based on Averroes’s remark at the beginning of Metaphysics, II, who on this basis esteemed that separate substances, in terms of what they are, can be cognized by a human being265—this is indeed true, but not by acquiring knowledge of them through purely natural means, but rather by a free gift.

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Ad quartum, quod “ratio naturalis iudicat impossibile hominem illa cognoscere,” dicendum quod falsum est, licet philosophi illud opinati sunt, qui non ponebant hominem elevari per gratiam ultra id quod posset per naturam. Ad quintum, quod “cognoscere se posse illa scire non est nisi ex fide,” dicendum quod non est verum. Immo ex puris naturalibus posset illud cognoscere. Posset enim ex puris naturalibus scire se ad illorum notitiam per se venire non posse et ignorantiam eius experiri et scire quod intellectus hominis esset in potentia ad illa cognoscenda, et ita quod naturaliter illorum notitiam appeteret. Et si stetisset philosophus in hoc, nec nimium praesumendo a recta ratione errasset, cognoscens propriam infirmitatem, et ignorantiam, et imperfectionem, compulsus fuisset divinum adiutorium invocare, et percepisset donum quo sciret quomodo ad illorum notitiam ascendere deberet. Sed nunc de proprio ingenio confidens et arrogantia excaecatus in errores a recta ratione deviavit, vel confidendo quod propriis viribus illam notitiam attingere posset vel quod omnino eam percipere non posset, et ita ab eius perceptione in desperationem cecidit. Et per hoc nec se notitiam illorum appetere percepit, quia bene percepisset, si se in naturali rectitudine tenuisset. Quaestio 6 Utrum homo appetat scire omnia Circa sextum arguitur quod homo appetat scire omnia. Primo sic. Sicut materia est in potentia ad omnes formas particulares materiales, sic intellectus humanus est in potentia ad omnes formas universales et spirituales. Sed “materia omnes formas materiales appetit” secundum Philosophum in fine Ii Physicorum. Ergo humanus intellectus appetit omnes formas universales et spirituales, non nisi ut eis perficiatur ad omnem scientiam. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Homo appetit scire ea ad quae est imperfectus et in potentia. Homo est imperfectus respectu scientiae omnium, et in potentia, secundum quod patet ex praedictis. Ergo etc. In contrarium est quoniam, cum appetitus naturalis non potest esse otiosus et frustra, si homo appeteret scire omnia, ille appetitus eius posset impleri, et ita posset homo esse perfectus scientia omnium, et in hoc parificari Deo, quod est impossibile.

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To the fourth, that “natural reason judges that it is impossible for a human being to know them,” we must say that it is false, although philosophers who did not hold that a human being is lifted by grace beyond what is possible through nature have supposed that. To the fifth, that “to recognize that one is able to know them happens only through faith,” we must say that this is not true. Rather, one may recognize that through purely natural means. For, it is possible to know through purely natural means that one cannot arrive at knowledge of them on one’s own, and experience ignorance of them and know that the human intellect is in potency to cognize them, and thus desire by nature knowledge of them. Moreover, if a philosopher had dwelled on this fact, and not strayed from right reason by taking too much for granted, recognizing his own weakness and ignorance and imperfection, he would have been compelled to call upon divine help, and would have perceived the gift by which he knew how he had to ascend to the knowledge of them. However, as things stand, through overconfidence in his own capacity and blinded by arrogance, he strayed from right reason into errors, either by presuming he could reach that knowledge through his own powers or that he could not acquire it at all, and so fell into despair of ever acquiring it. And on that account, neither did he perceive in himself the desire for knowledge of them, which he would have well perceived, had he persevered in the right path of nature. Question 6 Whether a human being desires to know all things Regarding the sixth question, it is argued that a human being desires to know all things. First, as follows. Just as matter is in potency to all particular material forms, so is the human intellect in potency to all universal and spiritual forms. But “matter desires all material forms”266 according to the Philosopher at the end of book I of the Physics. Therefore, the human intellect desires all universal and spiritual forms, so that through them without exception it may be perfected with every knowledge. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. A human being desires to know those things regarding which he is incomplete and in potency. A human being is incomplete regarding the knowledge of all things, as well as in potency, as is evident from the aforementioned.267 Therefore, etc. The contrary argument is that, since natural desire cannot be idle or in vain,268 if a human being would desire to know all things, this desire could be fulfilled, and so a human being could be perfect in the knowledge of all things, and in this regard be on a par with God, which is impossible.

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Dicendum ad hoc secundum Philosophum quod “scire contingit dupliciter, indeterminate et in universali, aut determinate et in particulari.” Consimiliter distinguendum est de appetitu scientiae, quod est appetitus indistinctus et in universali, alius vero distinctus et in particulari, et similiter quod alius est rationalis per cognitionem, alius vero naturalis sine cognitione. Primo modo, scilicet appetitu indistincto et in universali, bene contingit quod homo appetat scire omnia vel appetitu rationali, et hoc per aliquam eius generalem notitiam sub qua continetur notitia cuiuslibet particularis, vel etiam appetitu naturali qui est ad scientiam simpliciter, secundum quod homo iustus omnibus vult bonum, et “Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri.” Secundo modo, scilicet appetitu distincto et in particulari, non contingit quod homo appetat scire omnia, et hoc appetitu rationali, quia non potest homo per cognitionem ad omnia simul se convertere, sicut si navis haberet plurima foramina, singula posset homo unus obturare, non omnia simul, quia non habet homo nec potest habere simul determinatam inclinationem ad singula et omnia scibilia, quod oporteret, si appetitu determinato et in particulari omnia scire appeteret. Loquendo autem de appetitu naturali tali appetit scire omnia in quantum ad ipsa est in potentia, sed hoc quoad rerum cognitionem secundum species quae sunt de universi perfectione essentiali ordine, non autem secundum individua.

Per haec patent duo argumenta ad primam partem. Licet enim homo imperfectus sit et in potentia ad scientiam omnium, et ideo appetit appetitu naturali omnia scire eo modo quo est in potentia ad ipsa et quo natus est ipsis perfici, quod est in particulari, sicut materia de se indifferenter appetit omnem formam, quia tamen appetitu rationali non habet inclinationem ad omnia simul nisi in universali, ideo non nisi in universali appetitu rationali potest omnem scientiam appetere. Sicut enim materia universaliter appetit perfici qualibet forma, non tamen in particulari fertur in aliquam adipiscendam nisi determinata per agens extra, ut quando est sub forma aquae, igne agente extra fertur ad formam ignis determinate adipiscendam, non ad aliam, consimiliter intellectus appetitu rationali non fertur in aliquod particulare cognoscendum, nisi cum fuerit determinatus eius notitia universali.

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Concerning this question, we must say, according to the Philosopher, that “knowing happens in a twofold way, generally and universally, or specifically and particularly.”269 Likewise, one must distinguish regarding the desire for knowledge, namely that there is an indistinct and universal desire, while another is distinct and particular,270 and similarly that one is rational on account of cognition, while another is natural without cognition. In the first sense, namely regarding indistinct and universal desire, it may well be possible that a human being desires to know all things, either through rational desire (and this through some general knowledge of his, under which the knowledge of what is particular is contained), or even through natural desire, which is desire for knowledge as such, in the way that the just person desires the good for all, and God desires that all human beings become saved [1 Tim. 2:4]. In the second sense, namely regarding distinct and particular desire, it is not possible for a human being to desire to know all things, and this is so in terms of rational desire, because a human being through cognition cannot direct himself to all things at the same time (just as if a ship had many holes, a human being could cover one, but not all simultaneously), because a human being does not have, and cannot have, simultaneously a defined inclination toward each and every knowable thing, which would be necessary were he to desire to know all things by means of a defined and particular desire. However, speaking in terms of natural desire, by such desire he desires to know all things inasmuch as he is in potency to them, but this is so with regard to cognition according to species, which pertain to the perfection of the universe through essential order, but not [with regard to cognition] according to individuals.

The following points clarify the two arguments of the first part. For, although a human being may be imperfect and in potency to the knowledge of all things, and therefore desires through natural desire to know all things in terms of being in potency to them and apt to be perfected by them, namely in particular, just as matter of itself desires every form irrespectively, nevertheless since he, by means of rational desire, has an inclination to all things simultaneously only universally, therefore he can desire all knowledge by means of rational desire only universally. For, just as matter universally desires to be perfected by any form, but still is not moved to acquire a form in particular except as determined by an external agent (as when it is under the form of water, it is moved by fire as an external agent to acquire the form of fire in a definite way, and not another form), similarly the intellect, by means of rational desire, is not moved to cognize something particular, except when it has been determined with the general knowledge of that thing.

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Ad illud in oppositum, quod ille appetitus esset otiosus, dicendum quod non esset otiosus, licet numquam impleretur, sed si non esset possibilis impleri. Nunc autem possibilis est impleri in homine, saltem in postrema felicitate per gloriam, omnia videndo simul in veritate prima. Nec tamen aequiparabitur notitiae Dei, quia ad claritatem et limpiditatem visionis divinae creatura non posset attingere, neque etiam ad numerum cognitorum, quia Deus actu habet notitiam secundum numerum omnium quorum speciebus natus est intellectus creatus perfici, cui accidit quod notitia plurium individuorum sub eadem specie perficitur, nec posset perfici infinitis simul. Quaestio 7 Utrum homo aequaliter appetat scire singula Circa septimum arguitur quod homo aequaliter appetat scire singula. Primo sic. Homo aequaliter appetit illa ad quae per indifferentiam se habet, quia si aliqua inaequaliter appeteret, non se haberet ad illa per indifferentiam. Sed homo, quantum est de se, per indifferentiam se habet ad omne scibile, quia nullius notitiam habet naturaliter. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Quorum est una et eadem ratio appetendi, et aequalis appetitus, quia non variat appetitum nisi diversa ratio in appetibili. Sed sub una et eadem ratione intellectus appetit quaecumque appetit scire, scilicet sub ratione veri. Ergo etc. Ad oppositum est quoniam sicut est appetitus cognoscendi respectu veri, ita appetitus fruendi respectu boni. Sed homo non aequaliter appetit frui quolibet bono, sed magis uno quam altero. Ergo non aequaliter appetit scire omne verum.

Dicendum ad hoc quod appetitus natus est sequi duo, et dispositionem appetentis et qualitatem appetibilis, et utrumque natum est diversificare appetitum. Propter quod non contingit quod homo aequaliter appetat singula, quoniam impossibile est quod aequaliter sit dispositus ad singulorum notitiam, neque etiam singula scibilia aequaliter nata sunt movere appetitum eius. Est ergo primo impedimentum ex parte hominis appetentis, deinde ex parte scibilium.

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To the argument in opposition, stating that the desire would be idle, we must say that it would not be idle even if it is never fulfilled, but rather only [would be idle] if it could never be fulfilled. Now, however, it can be fulfilled in a human being, at least in the state of ultimate happiness through glory, when seeing all things at once in and through the First Truth. Still, this will not be on a par with God’s knowledge, since the creature cannot reach the clarity and purity of the divine vision, nor the number of things known, since God has knowledge in act of each and every single thing by whose species the created intellect is apt to be perfected, whose trait is to be perfected through familiarity with various individuals of the same species, and it could not be perfected by infinities simultaneously. Question 7 Whether a human being desires to know each single thing equally Regarding the seventh question, it is argued that a human being desires to know each single thing equally. First, as follows. A human being desires equally those things to which he relates without distinction, since were he to desire some unequally, he would not relate to them without distinction. But a human being, considered as such, relates without distinction to every knowable thing, because he possesses knowledge of none by nature.271 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. When there is one and the same basis for desiring things, the desire is also equal, because desire does not vary unless there is a different basis in what is desirable. But the intellect desires whatever it desires to know through one and the same basis, namely on the basis of truth. Therefore, etc. The contrary argument is that, as the desire for knowing stands with respect to truth, so does the desire for enjoyment stand with respect to the good. But a human being does not equally desire to enjoy any good, but rather one more than another. Therefore, he does not equally desire to know every truth.

Regarding this question, we must say that desire is apt to observe two things, both the disposition of the one who desires and the character of what is desired, and each of them is apt to distinguish the desire. That is why it is not possible for a human being to desire equally each single thing, since it is impossible that he be equally disposed to the knowledge of each single thing, nor indeed is each single knowable thing equally apt to move his desire. Therefore, first there is an obstacle in terms of the human being who desires, and then in terms of what is knowable.

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Ex parte hominis vero est impedimentum et ex parte speciei et formae et ex parte corporis et materiae. Ex parte enim speciei et formae, scilicet animae rationalis, contingit diversitas et quoad appetitum naturalem et quoad appetitum cognitivum. Quoad appetitum naturalem contingit diversitas, quia ipsa non est naturaliter ordinata ad aequaliter singula scienda, sed quaedam prius, quaedam posterius, quaedam clarius, quaedam minus clare, ut patet ex praedeterminatis. Et ideo naturali appetitu plus appetit et primo scire quae prius natus est scire et clarius, ut prius prima principia quam posteriora et cetera per ordinem quem habent ad prima principia. Quoad appetitum cognitivum contingit diversitas ex parte animae rationalis, quia plus appetit quisque scire, aliis eisdem retentis, de quo maiorem habet notitiam, quia, ut dictum est, cognitum imperfecte semper excitat appetitum ad amplius sciendum seu cognoscendum. Unde homines semper appetunt plus scire et audire qualia audire consueti sunt, ita quod contrarium eius quandoque audire non delectat, “secundum quod consuetis audire apologos et fabulas, illae magis sunt applicabiles eis quam suae veritates,” ut dicitur IIo Metaphysicae. Ex parte vero corporis et materiae contingit diversitas, quoniam dispositiones in corpore variant desiderium, ut dicit Philosophus IXo Metaphysicae, et ut dicitur in Sex principiis: “anima coniuncta complexiones corporis concomitatur.” Unde secundum quod penes corporis qualitates quidam aptiores sunt ad unam scientiam quam ad aliam, ut dictum est supra, secundum hoc quidam appetunt unam scientiam plus scire quam aliam, et diversi diversas. Unde in quibus abundant sensitivae virtutes magis apti sunt ad naturalia et ea plus appetunt scire, in quibus vero imaginativa, mathematica, in quibus vero aestimativa, leges et moralia, in quibus vero cogitativa, rationalia, in quibus vero intellectiva ex corporis temperantia, divina. Ex parte vero scibilis est diversitas, quia quaedam scibilia prius et clarius nata sunt sciri, et ideo naturaliter prius appetit homo illa scire, ut dictum est, et appetitu cognitivo similiter homo appetit magis scire illa in quibus invenit clariores veritates. Et ideo plus appetit scire mathematica quam alia, postquam aliqua in eis cognoverit. Et ideo instructi in philosophia non possunt proficere in legibus, quia post subtiles veritates perceptas in philosophia non delectant illa grossa et rudia.

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In terms of the human being, however, there an obstacle both in terms of species and form as well as in terms of the body and matter. For, in terms of species and form, namely the rational soul, diversity is possible both regarding natural desire and regarding cognitive desire. Diversity is possible regarding natural desire, because the soul is not ordered by nature to know each single thing equally, but rather some first, some subsequently, some more clearly, some less clearly, as is evident from the aforementioned.272 And therefore, by means of natural desire, it desires first and foremost to know the things for which it is apt to know first and more clearly, so that it desires to know first principles prior to what follows from them, and the rest according to their order in relation to first principles. Diversity is possible regarding cognitive desire in terms of the rational soul, since (provided that other factors remain the same) a person desires more to know about that of which he has more knowledge, because, as stated,273 what is recognized imperfectly always stimulates the desire to know or cognize more fully. Wherefore, human beings always desire more to know and hear the kinds of things they are used to hearing,274 so that the contrary does not ever please, “as for those used to hearing stories and fables, these are more relevant to them than their truths,”275 as stated in book II of the Metaphysics. However, diversity is possible in terms of the body and matter, since dispositions of body diversify the desire, as the Philosopher says in book IX of the Metaphysics, and as stated in On Six Principles: “the conjoined soul follows the configurations of the body.”276 Whence, due to characteristics proper to the body, some are more fit for one science than another, as stated above;277 for this reason, some desire more to know one science than to know another, and different people desire to know different sciences. Whence, those rich in sense powers are more fit for the natural sciences and desire more to know them, but those rich in powers of the imaginative faculty [are so regarding] the mathematical sciences, those with estimative powers [are so regarding] laws and morals, those with powers of thought [are so regarding] the rational sciences, while those with intellectual powers on account of bodily temperance [are so regarding] the science of the divine. Now, in terms of what is knowable there is diversity, because certain knowable things are apt to be known first and more clearly, and therefore a human being by nature desires to know them first, as stated,278 and by means of cognitive desire, similarly, a human being desires more to know those things in which he finds clearer truths. And for that reason he desires to know mathematical sciences more than others, after having discovered something about them. Moreover, that is why those trained in philosophy cannot make progress in law, because after the subtle truths encountered in philosophy they do not take pleasure in those that are rough and undeveloped.

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Ad primum in oppositum, quod “homo se habet per indifferentiam ad omnia scibilia,” dicendum quod verum est quoad hoc quod nullam scientiam habet naturaliter, non tamen quoad hoc quod indifferenter natus est inclinari per appetitum ad singula scibilia, ut dictum est. Ad secundum, quod “omnia appetit scire sub ratione veri,” dicendum quod verum est. Illa tamen ratio veri diversimode invenitur in diversis scibilibus, propter quod appetitus diversimode inclinatur ad diversa scibilia, et ipsa diversimode nata sunt movere appetitum, ex quibus contingit, ut dictum est, quod homo inaequaliter appetit scire diversa. Quaestio 8 Utrum sit aliquod unum quod homo principaliter appetat scire Circa octavum arguitur quod non sit aliquid unum scibile quod homo principaliter appetat scire. Primo sic. Si esset unum scibile quod homo principaliter scire appeteret, diversi studia sua non diversificarent, sed omnes ad scibile illud sciendum tenderent. Consequens falsum est, ergo et antecedens. Consequentia patet, quia unusquisque studio suo tendit ad illud quod principaliter scire appetit, nisi alias sit distractus aut impeditus. Secundo sic. Ubi potest procedere appetitus in infinitum, non est aliquod primo et principaliter appetitum, quia in infinitis non est primum. Sed in sciendo potest appetitus procedere in infinitum; potest enim velle scire species numerorum per ordinem, et illae procedunt in infinitum. Ergo etc. Contra est quia sicut se habet bonum ad affectum, sic verum ad intellectum. Sed ex parte affectus est unum bonum quod homo principaliter appetit ut proprium bonum affectus, sicut est bonum quod est ultimus finis operandorum. Ergo ex parte intellectus est unum verum quod homo principaliter appetit ut proprium bonum intellectus, quod est primum scibilium, quia principium in speculativis est sicut finis in activis secundum Philosophum.

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To the first argument in opposition, that “a human being relates to all knowable things without distinction,” we must say that it is true in the sense that he does not possess any knowledge by nature, but yet not in the sense that he is apt to be inclined through desire, without distinction, to each single knowable thing, as stated. To the second, that “he desires to know all things on the basis of truth,” we must say that it is true. Nevertheless, that basis of truth is found in different ways among different knowable things, on which account the faculty of desire is inclined in different ways to different knowable things, and these very things are apt to move the faculty of desire in different ways, from which reasons it happens, as stated, that a human being desires to know different things unequally. Question 8 Whether there is any one thing that a human being chiefly desires to know Concerning the eighth question, it is argued that there is not any one knowable thing that a human being chiefly desires to know. First, as follows. If there would be one knowable thing that a human being chiefly desires to know, his various studies would not differ, but rather all would aim at the knowledge of that knowable thing. The consequent is false, therefore so too is the antecedent. The conclusion is evident, since anyone aims, by his study, to that which he chiefly desires to know, unless he is otherwise distracted or impeded.279 Second, as follows. When desire can go on infinitely, there is nothing that is desired first and foremost, since nothing is first in an infinite sequence.280 But, in terms of knowledge, desire can go on infinitely; for one can wish to know different numbers in order, and those go on infinitely. Therefore, etc. The argument against is that, just as the good relates to the faculty of affection, so does truth relate to the intellect. But, in terms of affection, there is one good that a human being chiefly desires as the proper good of the faculty of affection, just as there is a good that is the final end of actions. Therefore, in terms of the intellect, there is one truth that a human being chiefly desires as the proper good of the intellect, which is the first among knowable things, since the principle in theoretical matters is like the end in practical matters,281 according to the Philosopher.

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Dicendum ad hoc quod sicut necesse est ponere aliquid “in unoquoque genere” quod per se et primo et perfectius in se habet naturam generis illius a quo et per cuius participationem “habent ipsam omnia alia quae sunt illius generis,” ut vult Philosophus, Xo Metaphysicae, sic necesse est se habere in genere appetibilium quod in omni genere appetibilium sit aliquod unum primo et propter se appetibile, et propter illud omnia alia appetuntur, quo subtracto non est quod intendatur, et quod moveat appetitum, ita quod non incipiat operari ad prosequendum appetitum. Si enim hoc appeteretur propter illud, et aliud propter aliud, et nihil propter se, iret processus in infinitum. Quare cum in infinitis non est ponere ultimum neque primum omnino, ut vult Philosophus in IIo Metaphysicae, homo aut nihil appetit omnino aut est aliquid quod primo et per se appetit. Et qua ratione hoc contingit in appetitu et appetibili quibuscumque aliis generaliter, eadem ratione in appetitu cognoscendi et scibili specialiter. Quod etiam patet ratione speciali in appetitu sciendi, qui in homine causatur ex actu sciendi, quoniam quandocumque aliquid in suo actu movetur semper magis ac magis intendendo motum, hoc non est, nisi quia mobile ipsum ad finem motus continue secundum maiorem et maiorem assimilationem appropinquat, ut dictum est supra. Cum ergo contingat in motu hominis in sciendo, quod procedendo magis ac magis in sciendo semper magis ac magis intenditur sciendi appetitus, ut praedictum est, hoc non est, nisi quia semper fini quem intendit magis ac magis continue assimilatur, secundum quod ei magis ac magis appropinquat. Quare cum non possit appetitus procedere intendendo in infinitum, necessario est hominis aliquis finis determinatus quem sciendo attingere appetit, in quo cum sciendo perventum fuerit, cessabit in eo omnino appetitus sciendi aliquid ulterius. Hoc autem non potest esse, nisi quia scitum illud sit summum et perfectissimum scibile homini, ultra quod non est aliud, quod non est nisi primum scibile et prima veritas—nisi forte dicat aliquis quod suprema creatura intellectualis habet pro intelligibili scibili illud quod est simpliciter summum et perfectissimum, homo vero, quia est inferior creatura intellectualis propter debilitatem intellectus sui ad cognoscendum maximum intelligibile, sicut debilis est oculus noctuae ad comprehendendum lucem solis, habebit pro intelligibili sibi perfectissimo aliquod inferius.

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Regarding this question, we must state that, just as it is necessary “in any genus”282 to posit something which per se and firstly and most perfectly possesses in itself the nature of that genus, from which and by sharing in which “all the other things that are part of that genus possess that very nature,”283 as the Philosopher intends in book X of the Metaphysics, so too must be the case in a genus of desirable things, that in every genus of desirable things there is some one thing that is first and foremost and through itself desirable, and on account of that thing all the rest are desired, without which there is nothing to aim for and move the faculty of desire, so that the faculty of desire would not begin to act in pursuit of a goal. For, if this is desired for the sake of that, and one thing for the sake of another, and nothing for its own sake, the process would go on infinitely. Wherefore, since in infinite [processes] one cannot posit a first or a last in any way,284 as the Philosopher implies in book II of the Metaphysics, a human being either desires nothing at all or there is something that he desires first of all and per se. And for the same reason why this applies to desire and what is desirable in all other areas generally, this also applies specifically to the desire to know and what is knowable. This is also evident on the specific basis of the desire to know, which is caused in a human being by the act of knowing, since whenever a thing is moved in act with increasingly intensifying motion, this occurs only because what is moved continuously approximates the end of motion through greater and greater assimilation, as stated above.285 Since, therefore, it happens in the human process of knowing that by advancing more and more in knowing, the desire to know always intensifies more and more, as mentioned previously,286 this is the case only because the desire always assimilates continuously and increasingly the end which it intends, as it approximates it more and more.287 Wherefore, since desire cannot go on aiming for an end infinitely, there must be some definite end for a human being that he desires to reach through knowledge, and when he has arrived at the knowledge of this end, his desire to know anything further will cease altogether. However, this is the case only because that known entity is the highest and most perfect knowable entity for a human being,288 beyond which there is no other, which is nothing else than the first among knowable objects as well as the First Truth—unless perhaps someone says that the highest intellectual creature289 has as its intelligible, knowable object that which is highest and most perfect in an absolute sense, but a human being, on the other hand, since he is an inferior intellectual creature due to the weakness of his intellect concerning knowledge of what is most intelligible (just as an owl’s eye is weak with respect to taking in the light of the sun), will have something inferior as his most perfect, intelligible object.290

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Quod non potest stare duplici ratione. Prima ex ordine rerum, quoniam cum omnis creaturae finis Deus sit, in quantum quaelibet creatura eius similitudinem participat quantumcumque modicum, homo autem, quamquam infima creatura sit inter intellectualia, superior tamen est omni creatura carente intellectu, et ideo ad ipsum tamquam ad finem suum ultimum perfectius attinget quam quodlibet aliud carens ratione, cum igitur unumquodque suum finem ultimum perfectissimum natum est attingere sua operatione perfectissima et perfectius aliis operatione illa qua excedit alia, cumque operatio hominis perfectissima, qua excedit alia, est operatio intelligendi vel ipsa immediate disponit ad illam, sicut si illa sit aliqua operatio voluntatis, necessario operatione sua intelligendi attinget ad illud summum et ultimum intelligibile. Quantumcumque enim modicum et minus attingat illud quam substantiae intellectuales superiores, hoc erit ei maior delectatio quam per cognitionem summe attingere quodcumque aliud intelligibile inferius. Unde dicit Averroes super XIum Metaphysicae quod “quaestio de intellectu divino desiderata est sciri naturaliter ab omnibus.” Insuper est secunda ratio ad idem ex natura intellectus humani, quoniam quantumcumque illud aliud intelligibile ab intelligibili primo, quod attingere posset, esset perfectum, tamen, cum intellectus humanus perciperet ipsum esse causatum, amplius accenderetur appetitus eius ad sciendum illud quod est causa eius. Aut igitur appetitus humanus in sciendo non stabit, sed semper intensius ulterius curret, aut stabit intelligendo illud summum intelligibile. Quare cum impossibile est ullum appetitum currere in infinitum extendendo se vel semper anhelando ad completum, et tamen numquam compleatur, necesse est ponere quod illud summum intelligibile intelligendo aliquando attingat, si recto ordine et rationabiliter procedat. Hoc autem non est nisi unum, scilicet prima et summa veritas, causa omnium, non causata, quae Deus est, qui solus potest in bonis replere desiderium nostrum, de quo dicit Augustinus XIXo De civitate Dei: “Finem hominis dicimus, non quod consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenius sit.” Sine illo autem plenus fieri non potest; quod enim capax est maioris minori repleri non potest. Absolute igitur est dicendum quod unum est scibile quod homo principaliter scire appetit, quod est prima et summa veritas.

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This position is untenable for two reasons. First, in terms of the order of reality, for the following reason: since the end of every creature is God, insofar as any creature shares in His likeness at least to a small extent, but a human being, although the lowest among intellectual creatures, still is superior to every creature lacking intellect, and therefore approximates God as his final end more perfectly than anything else lacking reason; since, therefore, anything is apt to attain its most perfect final end through its most perfect action (and more perfectly than others through that action by which it exceeds others), as long as the most perfect action of a human being, whereby he exceeds others, is the act of understanding, or this very action regulates that [act of understanding] immediately, as would be the case if the most perfect action would be one of will,291 a human being necessarily tends to that highest and ultimate intelligible entity by means of his act of understanding.292 For, to however small a degree he may attain this, and less than superior intellectual substances, there will be for a human being greater delight in this, than what he could attain through the most complete cognition of a lower intelligible object. Whence, Averroes says in regard to book XI of the Metaphysics, that “the investigation concerning the divine intellect is naturally desired to be understood by everyone.”293 In addition, there is a second reason for this same conclusion, on the basis of the nature of the human intellect, which is: however much that other intelligible object, which could be attained and is below the first intelligible object, may be perfect, nevertheless, since the human intellect would perceive it to be caused, its desire would rise further seeking its cause. Therefore, either human desire will not come to a standstill in knowing, but rather always goes on further more intensely, or it will come to a standstill when understanding that which is supremely intelligible. Wherefore, since it is impossible for any desire to go on infinitely stretching itself or yearning always for completion, and yet never reach completion, it is necessary to maintain that at some point it may reach that supreme intelligible object through the act of understanding, if it proceeds in the proper order and according to reason. This end, however, is but one, namely the first and supreme truth, cause of all, uncaused, which is God, who alone among goods can fulfill our desire [Ps. 102:5], about whom Augustine says in book XIX of On the City of God: “We mean by the end of a human being, not that he is extinguished so that he is no more, but rather that he is completed so that he is fulfilled.”294 However, without that end he cannot be fulfilled; for, what is capable of more cannot be fulfilled with less. Therefore, absolutely we must say that there is one knowable entity that a human being chiefly desires to know, which is the first and supreme truth.

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Ad primum in oppositum, quod non omnes ad illud studio tendunt, dicendum quod sicut est in appetitu boni quod omnes bonum appetunt et finem ultimum boni, in quantum appetunt suam imperfectionem adimpleri, quod non potest esse aut fieri nisi per actionem ultimi finis—unde et licet rationem huius actionis non omnes in eo quod est ultimus finis ponunt, ut quidam in honoribus, quidam in divitiis, et ceteri in ceteris, omnes tamen quod sic appetunt sub ratione ultimi boni appetunt, quia continet in se rationem omnis appetibilis—, similiter est in appetitu veri ultimi. Dicendum igitur quod omnes ipsum appetunt in quantum in sciendo quodcumque sit suam sufficientiam ponunt, quia hoc verum ultimum in se habet omnem omnis rationem veri, et nullum aliud verum aliquis affectat scire, nisi in quantum aliquam rationem huius veri in se continet, et ita in quodlibet aliud appetendo non nisi istud appetit. Ad secundum, quod “in scibilibus procedit appetitus in infinitum,” dicendum quod scibilium quaedam sunt ordinata adinvicem per se et essentialiter, ut principia et principiata,—in talibus non est processus in infinitum, ut in demonstrationibus, sicut probat Philosophus Io Posteriorum, “quia ex infinitis non contingeret scire,” ut dicitur IIo Metaphysicae, et talis est ordo omnium aliorum scibilium ad scibile primum—, quaedam vero sunt ordinata accidentaliter, quorum unum non scitur per alterum, in quibus non est ponere ultimum in suo genere, quia processus procedit in infinitum, ut est reflexio intellectus super suos actus, quia intellectus intelligit se intelligere et intelligit actum suum primum quo intelligit et illum quo intelligit se intelligere, et sic in infinitum. Et talis ordo est in speciebus numerorum, quia accidit praecedenti speciei numeri quod ei addatur unitas ut fiat nova species, nec est una species principium et causa intelligendi alteram. Et in talibus non contingit scire ex aliquo ultimo aut primo scibili quod sit in suo genere, ut propter illud omnia alia sciantur, quia nullum est tale. Contingit tamen scire omnia talia, quantumcumque procedatur ex eis in infinitum, aliquo uno extra suum genus, et propter illud, cuiusmodi est scibile primum, quod est veritas pura, quia habet in se rationem cuiuslibet numeri et infinitarum specierum numeri.

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To the first argument in opposition, that not all human beings pursue that [end] through study, we must state that just as it is the case regarding the desire for the good: that all desire the good as well as a final end among goods, insofar as they desire to complete what they lack, which can take place or come to be only through the influence of the final end—whence, even though not everyone conceives the nature of this influence in terms of the final end, so that some conceive it in terms of honors, others in riches, and others in other things, yet all who so desire, desire on the basis of the final good, because it contains in itself the nature of every desirable thing—so too is the case regarding the desire for the ultimate truth. Therefore, we must say that everyone desires this very truth, to the extent that they presuppose its plenitude when knowing that anything is, because that ultimate truth possesses in itself the whole nature of every truth, and a human being aims to know a different truth only insofar as it contains in itself some nature belonging to that truth, and therefore by desiring anything else he only desires that very thing. To the second, that “among knowable objects desire goes on infinitely,” we must say that among knowable objects some are ordered mutually per se and essentially, as among principles and the things derived from principles, and among such things there is no infinite process, as is the case in demonstrations,295 as the Philosopher shows in book I of the Posterior Analytics, “since it would not be possible to know through an infinite number [of causes],”296 as is said in Metaphysics, II, and such is the order of every other knowable object to the first knowable object. However, among knowable objects, some are ordered accidentally, of which one is not known through the other, among which one ought not to posit a final one in its genus, because the process does go on infinitely, as happens with regard to the intellect’s reflection on its own acts, since the intellect understands itself understanding and understands its first act by which it understands, and that by which it understands itself understanding, and so on infinitely. Such order also occurs among different numbers, since it happens that a unit may be added to a different preceding number so that a new one comes to be, and the one is not the principle and cause of understanding the other. And among such things it is not possible to know on the basis of something that is final or a first knowable object that is so in its genus, on account of which all the rest may be known, because there is no such thing. Nevertheless, it is possible to know all such things, however much they may lead to an infinite process, by one thing that is outside their genus and on the basis of that thing, of which sort is the first knowable object, which is truth in its purity, since it possesses in itself the nature of any number and of the infinite types of number.

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Quaestio 9 Utrum propter illud quod homo principaliter appetit scire appetat omnia alia scire Circa nonum arguitur quod propter illud quod homo principaliter appetit scire non appetit scire alia. Primo sic. Propter illud quod primam et perfectam habet rationem scibilis non est appetendum aliud scire, quia non eget alio ut sciatur, sed e converso alia indigent eo ut sciantur. Quod homo principaliter appetit scire est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Quae appetit homo scire tamquam vergentia in suam damnationem non appetit scire propter principale scibile, quia istud ordinatur ad omnium salutem. Multa talia appetit homo scire, ut patet. Ergo etc. Tertio sic. Philosophus Io Metaphysicae vult quod scientia speculativa est propter se ipsam. Non ergo homo appetit eam scire propter istud scibile. Quarto sic. Multa alia appetit homo scire non cogitans de hoc scibili. Quod non esset, si appeteret illa propter istud. Ergo etc. Contra est illud Augustini XIXo De civitate Dei: “Illud est finis propter quod amantur cetera.” Propter quod amantur appetuntur. Quare cum hoc scibile finis est scientiae humanae, ut dictum est, propter illum cetera appetet scire.

Dicendum ad hoc quod appetibilibus ordinatis ad aliquid unum, ut ad ultimum appetibile et finem, necesse est omnia alia appeti propter illud ultimum appetibile, ut scilicet mediantibus illis ascendat homo ad ultimum. Cuius ratio est quia nullum aliorum habet rationem appetibilis, nisi in quantum ratio ultimi appetibilis in ipso relucet. Sicut ergo in appetitu boni quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub ratione boni, et ideo necesse est quod appetatur aut tamquam bonum perfectum, quod est ultimum et finis, aut tamquam tendens in ultimum et finem, consimiliter in appetitu veri in sciendo quidquid homo

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Question 9 Whether a human being desires to know all other things on account of that which he chiefly desires to know Regarding the ninth question, it is argued that a human being does not desire to know other things on account of that which he chiefly desires to know. First, as follows. One does not desire to know something else on account of what possesses the primary and perfect nature of what is knowable, because the latter does not need something else in order to be known, but rather, conversely, other things need it in order to be known. What a human being chiefly desires to know is that sort of thing. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Those things that a human being desires to know, considered as things leading to his damnation, are not desired to be known on account of that which is chiefly knowable, since that being is directed to the well-being of all things. A human being desires to know many things of that sort, as is evident. Therefore, etc. Third, thus. The Philosopher in book I of the Metaphysics claims that theoretical science is for its own sake.297 Therefore, a human being does not desire to know it on account of that knowable object. Fourth, thus. A human being desires many things without thinking about this knowable object, which would not be the case, were he to desire them on account of it. Therefore, etc. The argument against is that of Augustine in On the City of God, XIX: “That [being] is the end on account of which the rest are loved.”298 Because they are loved, they are desired. Wherefore, since this knowable object is the end of human knowledge, as stated, he desires to know the rest on account of it.

Regarding this question, we must say that among desirable things ordered to one thing, as to a final desirable object and end, it is necessary for all the rest to be desired on account of that final desirable object, so that, namely, by means of them a human being may ascend to the final end. The reason for this is that the rest possess desirability only to the extent that the nature of that which is ultimately desirable reflects on them. Therefore, as it is with respect to the desire for the good, that whatever is desired is desired on the basis of goodness, and therefore it is necessary that it be desired either as the perfect good, which is the final end, or as something leading to the final end, so too is the case with respect to the desire for truth by knowing: whatever a human being desires to know, he desires it on the basis of some truth,

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appetit scire, illud appetit sub aliqua ratione veri, et ideo necesse est quod illud appetat tamquam ultimum verum, quod est finis, aut tamquam verum tendens in verum ultimum ut in finem; quod si sit ultimum, ut in eius cognitione sit status, si vero sit ad ultimum, ut eius cognitio sit gradus et via ascendendi ad notitiam veri ultimi. Semper enim imperfectum in quo est alicuius perfectionis inchoatio ordinatur ad illud in quo est ipsa perfectio. Et ideo dicit Chrysostomus super illud Matthaei, “Et ecce centurio”: “scriptura infallibilis de Deo creatura est omnium rerum, quia nihil creatum est in mundo per quod non manifestissime Deus ostenditur.” Et hoc quod tale est et ultimum est ultimo ab appetitu prosequendum et primum movens appetitum, per quod movent omnia alia appetibilia ordinata ad ipsum tamquam causae secundae, quae non moverent nisi motae a primo movente, et non nisi in ordine ad ipsum. Unde et sicut appetitus principalius est illius quod est ultimum quam alicuius aliorum, sic est aliorum per ordinem; semper enim est amplius et principalius quanto immediatius se habent et propinquius ad illud appetitivum. Et est advertendum quod propter ultimum appetuntur alia quae sunt ad ipsum dupliciter: et formaliter et finaliter. Primo formaliter, quia non appetuntur alia, nisi quia in se habent rationem et formam ultimi quodammodo, licet imperfectam, ut omne verum rationem primi veri et omne bonum rationem primi boni, quia omne aliud verum et bonum est sicut quaedam impressio primi veri et boni, per cuius rationem movet appetitum et intellectum. Et ideo secundo finaliter appetuntur propter ultimum verum et bonum, quia per ipsa tamquam per imperfecta proficiscitur appetitus quousque deveniatur ad ultimum ut ad verum et bonum perfectum habens in se perfectam rationem veri et boni simpliciter et omnem rationem cuiuslibet veri et boni particularis. Et ideo primum verum in omni alio vero et per omne aliud verum quasi vocat intellectum, ut tendat ad sui notitiam, et primum bonum in omni alio bono et per ipsum quasi vocat affectum, ut tendat in sui fruitionem et amorem. Et ideo quousque intellectus perducatur in perfectam notitiam summi veri et affectus in fruitionem summi boni, numquam potest humanus appetitus quiescere, sed illis duobus adeptis totus perficietur et nihil restabit appetendum, ut dictum est supra.

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and therefore it is necessary for him to desire it either as the ultimate truth, which is the end, or as a truth leading to the ultimate truth as end; in the case of the ultimate truth, it is desired in order to rest in its cognition, but in the case of what leads to the ultimate truth, its cognition is desired as a step, and as a way of ascending, toward the knowledge of the ultimate truth. For, what is imperfect, in which some perfection is incipient, is always ordered to what has that very perfection. And therefore, Chrysostom states about that text from Matthew, And behold the centurion [Matt. 8:5]: “The creation of all things is an infallible scripture about God, because nothing created exists in the world through which God is not revealed most manifestly.”299 Moreover, such a being, which is also ultimate, is both the final aim of desire and what first moves desire, through which all other desirable things, that are ordered to it as secondary causes, move, which would not move unless they are moved by the prime mover, and they do so only as ordered to it. Wherefore, in addition, just as desire aims for what is final more predominantly than anything else, so too does it aim for other things according to an order; for always what is less removed from and closer to that desirable object is desired more fully and more predominantly. Here we must point out that, on account of the final end, all other things that are ordered to it are desired in a twofold sense: in terms of form, and in terms of end.300 First, in terms of form, [this occurs] since other things are desired only because they possess in themselves in some way the imprint and form of the final end, although imperfectly, so that every truth has the imprint of the first truth and every good the imprint of the first good, because every truth and good is like a certain impression of the first truth and good, by whose imprint it moves the desire and the intellect. And therefore, in the second sense—in terms of end, they are desired on account of the ultimate truth and good, because through these very things, as being imperfect, the desire advances until it arrives at the final end, at the perfect truth and good which possesses in itself the perfect nature of truth and goodness in an absolute sense, as well as every nature of any particular truth and good whatsoever. Therefore, moreover, the first truth summons the intellect, as it were, in every other truth and through every other truth, so that the intellect may be directed to its knowledge, and the first good summons the affection, as it were, both in every other good and through itself, so that it may be directed to its enjoyment and love. Therefore, finally, until the intellect is led to the perfect knowledge of the supreme truth, and the affection to the enjoyment of the supreme good, human desire never can rest, but, on the other hand, when it attains both of them, it will be made complete altogether, and nothing will remain to be desired, as stated above.301

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Ad primum in oppositum, quod “ultimum verum non eget alio ut sciatur,” dicendum quod verum est quantum est in se, quia est summe scibile, quantum tamen est ex parte nostra, qui non sufficimus statim illud capere, per gradus aliorum verorum debemus ad ipsum ascendere, et ideo appetere debemus alia scire propter illud. Unde Augustinus VIIIo De Trinitate: “Consuetudo carnalis vera quae creata sunt sentit ut potest, veritatem autem qua creata sunt non potest intueri. Nam si posset, nullo modo esset lux ista corporea manifestior.” Et ideo sicut si exeunti de carcere, qui non posset solem aspicere, primo ostenderetur lumen candelae, deinde lumen solis reflexum in medio, deinde radium solis in aere, ut postea fortificatus posset solem in se ipso aspicere, sic nos debemus primo creatas veritates aspicere et per illas ad veritatem summam ascendere, ut docet Augustinus Io Soliloquiorum. Ad secundum, quod plurima scita vergunt in damnationem scientis, dicendum quod hoc non est propter scire, quia etiam secundum Philosophum scientia malorum bona est, et ideo etiam ad scientiam primi scibilis ordinatur, sed quod nocet, hoc est per accidens propter scientis abusum vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ad tertium, quod “scientiae speculativae sunt propter se,” dicendum quod verum est generaliter sumendo eas, scilicet secundum quod includunt speculationem summi scibilis, secundum quod illud dicit Philosophus maxime de prima philosophia in quantum est de cognitione Dei, quamvis in illa speculatio omnis quae ex scientia philosophica habetur non sit finis, immo ipsa ordinatur ad istam sicut ad finem, ut infra dicetur. Ad quartum, quod non omnis appetens scire cogitat de ultimo fine, dicendum quod immo implicite, in quantum in quolibet appetibili alio est impressa ratio ultimi appetibilis, propter quam appetitur, sed in quantum in ipsa invenit defectum ulterius nititur, quousque perfecte in se ipso ultimum appetibile reperiat.

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To the first argument in opposition, that “the final truth does not need another in order to be known,” we must say that, in and of itself, this is true because it is supremely knowable, yet with respect to us, who are not capable of grasping it immediately, we must ascend to it through steps by means of other truths, and therefore we must desire to know other things on account of it. Wherefore, Augustine [states] in On the Trinity, VIII: “Our bodily condition habitually perceives created truths since it is able to do so, but it cannot contemplate the truth by which they are created. For, if it could, in no way would that corporeal light be clearer [to us].”302 And therefore, as to one released from prison, who is not able to look at the sun, first candlelight is shown, then sunlight reflected in a medium, then a ray of the sun in the sky, so that later, already strengthened, he may look at the sun directly, so too must we first look at created truths and ascend through them to the supreme truth, as Augustine teaches in Soliloquies, I.303 To the second, that many known things lead to the damnation of the knower, we must say that this is not the case on account of knowledge, since according to the Philosopher too the knowledge of bad things is good,304 and therefore also ordered to the knowledge of the first knowable object. The fact that it is harmful, however, is accidental due to misuse by the knower or something of that sort. To the third, that “theoretical sciences are for their own sake,” we must say that it is true when considering them generally, namely in the sense that they include the consideration of the first knowable object, as the Philosopher says, mainly in reference to first philosophy insofar as it concerns the cognition of God,305 although with reference to that cognition every consideration derived from philosophical science is not the end, but rather ordered to that cognition as to the end, as will be discussed below.306 To the fourth, that not everyone who desires to know thinks about the final end, we must say, more precisely, that this is so implicitly, insofar as in any other desirable thing the nature of what is ultimately desirable is impressed, on account of which it is desired, but insofar as he finds a defect in this impression he seeks something further, until he discovers perfectly that which is in itself ultimately desirable.

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Articulus V De studio sciendi Quia appetitus sciendi frustra esset, nisi homo, ut scire posset, studium et diligentiam apponeret, ideo postquam visum est de appetitu sciendi hominis, videndum est quale studium adhibere debet homo scientiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur septem: primum, si studendum est homini ut sciat; secundum, si studendum est homini ut omnia sciat; tertium, si studendum est homini ut sciat scibilia super scientias philosophicas; quartum, si studendum est ei ut sciat omnia contenta in scientiis philosophicis; quintum, si studendum est ei ut sciat singula eodem modo; sextum, si studendum est ei scire propter se; septimum, si homo studio suo terminum debet imponere. Quaestio 1 Utrum studendum sit homini ut sciat Circa primum arguitur quod non est studendum homini ut sciat. Primo sic. Ad illud quod est homini inexplicabile non est ei studendum ut sciat, quia frustra studeret. “Cunctae res sic sunt difficiles, ut homo non possit explicare eas,” sicut dicitur Ecclesiastes Io. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Ad illud non est studendum quo adepto homo acquirit sibi materiam doloris. Scire est huiusmodi Ecclesiastes Io: “Qui addit scientiam addit et dolorem.” Ergo etc. Tertio sic. Ad illud non est homini studendum quod non potest invenire. Notitia rerum omnium est huiusmodi Ecclesiastes IIIo: “Mundum tradidit Deus disputationi, ut non inveniat homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem.” Ergo etc. Quarto sic. Homo non debet studere minori bono et dimittere maius. Scientia minus bonum est quam vita Ecclesiastes IIIo: “Cognovi quod non esset melius nisi laetari et facere bona in vita sua.” Studendo autem scientiae frequenter homo negligit opera vitae. Ergo etc. Contra est quoniam illi studendum est quod necessarium est saluti. Scire est huiusmodi, Isaiae Vo, “Propterea ductus est populus meus captivus, quia non

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Article V Concerning the pursuit of knowledge Since the desire to know would be to no purpose, unless a human being invests study and diligence in order to know, therefore after examining the desire to know in a human being, we should examine the kind of pursuit a human being should allot to knowing. And regarding this, seven questions are sought: first, if a human being should study in order to know; second, if a human being should study in order to know all things; third, if a human being should study in order to know realities that exceed the philosophical sciences; fourth, if he should study in order to know all that is contained in the philosophical sciences; fifth, if he should employ the same method of study in order to know each thing; sixth, if he should pursue knowledge for its own sake; seventh, if a human being should impose a limit on his studies. Question 1 Whether a human being should study in order to know Regarding the first question, it is argued that a human being should not study in order to know. First, as follows. A human being should not study in order to know what is unexplainable to him, since he would study in vain. All things in this way are difficult, so that a human being cannot explain them [Eccles. 1:8], as is said in Ecclesiastes, I. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. A human being should not study for that which, once acquired, provides occasion for pain in him. Knowing is that sort of thing, in Ecclesiastes, I: He who gains in knowledge also gains in pain [Eccles. 1:18]. Therefore, etc. Third, thus. A human being should not study for that which he cannot discover. The knowledge of all things is that sort of thing, in Ecclesiastes, III: God led the world to the art of argumentation, so that human beings would not discover the works God has performed from the beginning all the way to the end [Eccles. 3:11]. Therefore, etc. Fourth, thus. A human being should not to pursue the lower good and forsake the greater one. Knowledge is a lower good than life, in Ecclesiastes, III: I have recognized that nothing is better than to rejoice and do good works in one’s life [Eccles. 3:12]. However, by pursuing knowledge, a human being often neglects works in life. Therefore, etc. The contrary argument is that one must pursue what is necessary for salvation. Knowledge is that sort of thing, in Isaiah, V: Therefore my people have been taken

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habuit scientiam,” et XXVIIo, “Non est populus sapiens, propterea non miserebitur eius qui fecit illum.” Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod omnis qui intendit devenire ad terminum aliquem ad quem devenire non potest nisi per viam deducentem ad ipsum terminum, necesse habet se ponere in via et ambulare per eam. Nunc autem ita est quod terminus unus est vitae humanae ad quem devenire homo intendit, scilicet notitia perfecta summi veri, ad quam pervenire non potest nisi ambulando in cognoscendo per alia vera quae sunt ad ipsum tamquam per viam, ut dictum est. Ambulare autem per notitiam ab uno in aliud non potest nisi studendo scientiae, cum homini scientia non contingat nisi per studium et investigationem, ut dictum est supra. Necessario igitur studendum est homini ut sciat. Et ideo dicitur Ecclesiastes VIIo: “Hoc habet eruditio et sapientia, quod tribuit vitam possessori suo,” et ibidem VIo: “Quid amplius habet sapiens a stulto nisi ut pergat ubi est vita?.” Unde Augustinus XIIIo De Trinitate: “Sine scientia nec virtutes ipsae quibus recte vivitur possunt haberi, per quas haec vita misera sic gubernatur, ut ad illam quae vere beata est perveniatur aeternam.” Et e contra dicitur studere scientiae negligentibus Oseae IVo: “Quia tu reppulisti scientiam, et ego repellam te.” Hinc etiam Academici, qui negabant verum posse inveniri, dicebant tamen non esse cessandum a studio et veritatis investigatione, et hoc esse opus sapientis.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “cunctae res sunt homini difficiles et inexplicabiles,” dicendum secundum Glossam ibidem quod verum est, “ut ad plenum eas homo explicet, et ad summam scientiae earum perveniat in vita ista,” quia quanto homo magis sciendo notitiam rerum ingreditur, tanto amplius invenit eam profundam. Propter quod dixit Salomon, sapientissimus in rerum naturis, Ecclesiastes VIIo: “Dixi: ‘sapiens efficiar,’ et ipsa longius recessit a me amplius quam erat,” et ibidem VIIIo: “Est homo qui diebus ac noctibus somnum non capit oculis, et quanto plus laboraverit, tanto minus inveniet.” Unde Glossa super illud capitulum VIIum: “Quanto ad sapientiam accedis, tanto a te recedit, et

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away into captivity, because they did not possess knowledge [Isa. 5:13], and in XXVII, The people are not wise, therefore he who made them will not take pity on them [Isa. 27:11]. Therefore, etc. Solution Regarding this question, we must say that anyone who aims at reaching some end, which can be reached only through a path that leads to that very end, must embark on and travel that path. Now, however, it is the case that there is one end to human life, which a human being aims to reach, namely the perfect knowledge of the supreme truth, which cannot be arrived at except by traveling through the knowledge of other truths that lead to it like a path, as stated.307 However, traveling through knowledge, from one thing to another, is possible only through the pursuit of knowledge, since knowledge is only possible for a human being through study and investigation, as stated above.308 Therefore, it is necessary for a human being to study in order to know. And for that reason, it is said in Ecclesiastes, VII: Learning and wisdom have this [quality], that they give life to its possessor [Eccles. 7:13], and in VI of the same text: What more does the wise have than the foolish, except to go on to where there is life? [Eccles. 6:8]. Wherefore Augustine [says] in On the Trinity, XIII: “Without knowledge, the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed, through which this wretched life may be governed, so that it may lead to that eternal [life] which is truly blessed.”309 Contrariwise, it is said about those who neglect the pursuit of knowledge, in Hosea, IV: Because you rejected knowledge, I too will reject you [Hos. 4:6]. Hence, even the Academics, who denied that truth can be found,310 used to say nonetheless that one should not cease studying and inquiring after truth, and that this is the proper activity of the wise person.

To the first argument in opposition, that “all things are difficult and inexplicable to a human being,” we must say according to the Gloss, at that place, that it is true, “so that a human being may unravel them fully, and may arrive at the best knowledge of them in this life,”311 because the more a human being becomes familiar with reality through knowing, the more that he discovers its depth. That is why Salomon, most wise in the nature of things, said in Ecclesiastes, VII: I said: ‘I am wise by my own efforts’, and [wisdom] itself withdrew away from me even more than before [Eccles. 7:24–25], and in VIII of the same text: A human being is one who does not catch sleep with his eyes during days or nights, and the more he will labor, the less he will find [Eccles. 8:16–17]. Whence, about chapter VII, the Gloss states: “The more you

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altiorem se ostendit,” et hoc maxime verum est accedendo ad sapientiam quae de Deo est. Unde dicit Chrysostomus Super Matthaeum: “Sicut quanto acutius viderimus, tanto magis discimus quam longe a caeli regione differimus, sic etiam quanto ad virtutis ascendamus excelsum, tanto amplius docemur quam sit inter nos et Deum grande discrimen.” Et Origenes Super Ium Exodi, loquens de profunditate Sacrae Scripturae, dicit: “Videtur mihi unusquisque sermo divinae Scripturae similis alicui esse seminum, quod tanto accumulatius diffunditur, quanto peritus agricola plus semini laboris impendit. Ita et hic sermo, si peritum et diligentem invenerit colonum, cum primo contactus videtur exiguus et brevis, ut coeperit excoli crescit in arborem, ut possint disputatores et rhetores huius mundi habitare in ramis eius. Temptabimus igitur pro viribus nostris aliqua disserere, etiam si neque universa nobis explicare possibile est, quia et hoc ipsum agnoscere, quod supra vires nostras sit horum scientia, non parvae arbitror esse peritiae.” Nec est mirum quod sit inexplicabilis, quia ad infinitum scibile ducit, ut dictum est. Unde competenter potest homo dicere illud Psalmi, “Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, confortata est, et non potero ad eam.” Et nota quod talia dicta Sacrae Scripturae et de Sacra Scriptura non sunt ut studiosos terreant et a studio in desperantiam sciendi ponendo repellant, sed ut tepidos excitent et praesumptuosos confutent, secundum quod dicit Glossa super illud “Cunctae res sunt difficiles”: “Haec sententia est contra eos qui sine labore et discendi studio Sanctas Scripturas se novisse putant.” Ad secundum, quod “studio homo acquirit sibi materiam doloris,” dicendum quod duplex est dolor sicut et “tristitia,” secundum Apostolum IIa Corinthios VIIo, “saeculi et secundum Deum.” Saeculi dolor est qui est pro temporalium amissione et quia non in omnibus homo prosperatur ad nutum; iste nocivus est, et non additur ex scientia, immo repellitur. Dolor secundum Deum est dolere quia homo peccavit et fecit quae odit Deus; iste utilis est et additur ex scientia. Unde dicit Glossa super illud “Qui addit scientiam, addit dolorem” quia quanto plus scit, tanto plus divina iudicia timet, quia “cui plus committitur, ab eo plus exigetur.” Ad tertium, quod homo non potest opus Dei invenire, dicendum quod verum est ad plenum, non tamen propter hoc retrahendum est studium, quia studendo ex illis potest scire “multa sibi utilia,” ut ibi dicit Glossa.

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approach wisdom, the more it withdraws from you and shows itself to be even more lofty,”312 and this is especially the case when approaching that wisdom which concerns God. Wherefore, Chrysostom says in On Matthew: “The sharper we come to see, the more we learn just how far we are separated from the heavenly region; so too, the more we ascend to the height of virtue, the more fully we are taught just how great is the division between us and God.”313 And Origen, On Exodus, I, speaking about the depth of Holy Scripture, says: “It seems to me that each discussion on Holy Scripture is like a sort of seed, that the more abundantly it is spread, the more that an expert farmer invests labor on the seed. So too is this discussion, if it should find an expert and diligent cultivator; it seems meager and brief at the first contact, [but] as it begins to develop it grows into a tree, such that the debaters and speakers of this world could dwell on its branches. We will attempt, therefore, to unravel certain things through our own powers, even if we are able to explain none, because we also recognize this very thing: that above our powers there is knowledge of these things, which I believe to be of no small skill.”314 Nor should one wonder that it is inexplicable, since it leads to an infinite knowable object, as stated. Wherefore, a human being suitably can say as in the Psalms: Your knowledge is marvelous to me, it is powerful, and I cannot reach it [Ps. 138:6]. And note that such sayings from Sacred Scripture, and about Sacred Scripture, are not meant to frighten students and drive them away from study by making them hopeless of knowing, but rather to spur on the half-hearted and check the arrogant, as the Gloss says about the text All things are difficult [Eccles. 1:8]: “This judgment is against those who think themselves knowledgeable without toil and devotion for learning.”315 To the second, that “by study a human being acquires the occasion for pain,” we must say that pain is twofold, as is grief, according to the Apostle in the Second Letter to the Corinthians, VII: from this world and from God [1 Cor. 7:10]. Pain from this world exists due to the loss of temporal goods and because a human being does not fare well in all things at will. That pain is injurious and is not caused by knowledge, but rather fought against by knowledge. Pain from God is suffering because a human being sinned and did what displeases God; this pain is useful and is caused by knowledge. Whence the Gloss explains about the passage, He who gains in knowledge, gains in pain [Eccles. 1:18], how the more one knows, the more one fears divine judgment, since “from him to whom more is entrusted, more will be required.”316 To the third, that a human being cannot come to know God’s works, we must say that this is true in terms of complete knowledge, but yet he must not withdraw from study on account of this, since through study he can know from these works “many useful things for himself,”317 as stated in the Gloss.

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Ad quartum, quod “homo studendo negligit opera vitae,” dicendum quod non est verum, nisi vane studiosus sit; immo studere ordinata intentione, studere ipsum est opus meritorium vitae aeternae, quia nec sine scientia dirigi possunt virtutum opera, ut dictum est, propter quod dixit Christus Apostolis: “Estote prudentes sicut serpentes et simplices sicut columbae,” prudentes studendo scientiae, simplices studendo recta intentione. Et Apostolus Ia Ad Timotheum IVo: “Attende tibi et doctrinae. Hoc enim faciens te ipsum salvum facies et eos qui te audierint.” Quaestio 2 Utrum studendum sit homini ut omnia sciat Circa secundum arguitur quod studendum est homini ut sciat omnia. Primo sic. Studendum est homini ut scientia perficiatur qua est imperfectus. Sed omnium scientia est imperfectus, ut patet ex praehabitis. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Scientiae aliorum studendum est propter scientiam Dei adipiscendam, ut dictum est. Sed omnium scientia ad illud valet, secundum Hugonem in prologo Caelestis Hierarchiae: “Sicut omne bonum a summo bono est, ita et in omni bono secundum aemulationem participationis summum bonum contemplari potest.” Ergo etc. Contra est quod homini non est studendum illi ad cuius notitiam non potest pervenire. Ad omnium notitiam non potest homo pervenire secundum Philosophum IIo Metaphysicae: “Nullus hominum potest pervenire in veritatis cognitione secundum quod oportet,” ubi dicit Commentator, “Quia nullus comprehendit eam secundum totum vel magnam partem eius.” Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod vanitatis quorundam erat quod oporteret hominem omnium rerum investigare scientiam, ut ex hoc perfecte ascenderet in cognitionem Dei. Quoniam enim, ut dixerunt, in creaturis cognoscitur Deus ut in effectu, nunc autem ita est quod causa non perfecte relucet in parte sui effectus, sed in toto effectu, si ergo homo, ut dicebant, in cognoscendo aliquem divinum effectum in creatura deficiat, non potest Deum perfecte ex creaturis

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To the fourth, that “a human being by studying neglects works in his life,” we must say that it is not true, unless he studies in a vain manner; on the contrary, when studying with the correct aim, studying itself is a work deserving of eternal life, because without knowledge the works of virtue cannot be regulated, as stated, which is why Christ said: Be wise like serpents and simple like doves [Matt. 10:16], wise by pursuing knowledge, and simple by studying with the correct aim. In addition, the Apostle [says] in the First Letter to Timothy, IV: Pay close attention to yourself and to teaching. For, as this brings salvation to you, you will also bring salvation to those who will have listened to you [1 Tim. 4:16]. Question 2 Whether a human being should study in order to know all things Regarding the second question, it is argued that a human being should study in order to know everything. First, as follows. A human being should study to complete through knowledge what in him is incomplete. But he is incomplete in the knowledge of all things, as is evident from what has been established.318 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. One should pursue knowledge of other things in order to achieve knowledge of God, as stated.319 But the knowledge of all things is valuable for this purpose, according to Hugh in his prologue to On the Celestial Hierarchy: “As every good derives from the supreme good, thus the supreme good can be seen in every good as well, according to imitation by participation.”320 Therefore, etc. The argument against is that a human being should not investigate what he cannot come to know. A human being cannot reach the knowledge of all things, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, II: “No human being can reach the cognition of truth adequately,”321 at which place the Commentator says, “Because no one understands the whole or greater part of it.”322 Therefore, etc.

Concerning this question, we must say that for some, through empty pride, it was right for a human being to search for knowledge of all things, so as to ascend, from this basis, to the perfect cognition of God. For, as they claimed,323 God is recognized in creatures as in effects, but it happens that the cause is not reflected perfectly in part of its effects, but rather in the totality of effects. Therefore, they claimed, if a human being fails to recognize some divine effect in the creature, he cannot recognize God perfectly from creatures, to the extent that God can be recognized by

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cognoscere, secundum quod potest cognosci ab homine. Si ergo debeat ab homine cognosci secundum quod est possibile, debet eum cognoscere in omni creatura omnes creaturas cognoscendo, et in hoc ponebant hominem Deo perfecte assimilari, et finem humanae vitae. Revera deductio eorum vera erat de scientia quam homo potest habere de Deo secundum statum vitae huius ex puris naturalibus. Hinc dicit Augustinus Super Ioannem Sermone Io: “Attende fabricam mundi, et vide quae sunt facta per verbum, et tunc cognosces quale sit Verbum,” et loquitur de Verbo aeterno, quod est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia. Vana tamen erat illorum deductio, quoniam numquam erat hominem ad tantam creaturarum notitiam possibile devenire, tum propter vitae brevitatem, tum propter experientiae difficultatem, tum propter scientiae profunditatem, secundum quod dicit Yppocrates, “Vita brevis, ars vero longa, experimentum fallax, iudicium autem difficile.” Unde super illud, “Omnia sunt difficilia, et non potest homo ea explicare sermone,” dicit Glossa: “Non potest homo causas et naturas rerum explicare, nec oculus ad plenum intueri, nec auris etiam instruente doctore ad summam scientiae pervenire.” Revera non potest homo naturas rerum explicare propter vitae brevitatem, nec oculus intueri propter experimenti fallibilitatem, nec auris ad scientiam pervenire propter artis difficultatem. Dicendum ergo quod non est homini studendum ad sciendum omnia in vita ista: primo, quia hoc est ei impossibile, ut dictum est; secundo, quia per hoc negligeret magis utile, Ecclesiastes VIIo: “Quid necesse est homini maiora quaerere cum ignorat quid conducat?”; Glossa: “Quid sit utile sibi in vita sua, numero dierum peregrinationis suae, et tempore quod velut umbra praeterit?” Sed solum studendum est ei sic, ut studeat ad vitae futurae utilia et inter illa ad magis necessaria, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastici XIIIo, “Altiora te ne quaesieris et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris. Neque enim est tibi necessarium quae abscondita sunt videre oculis tuis, sed quae praecepit tibi Deus, cogita illa semper et in pluribus eius operationibus ne sis curiosus. In supervacuis rebus noli scrutari multipliciter.” Unde dicit Augustinus super illud Iae Corinthios VIIIo: “Scientia inflat”: “Laudabilior est animus cui nota est infirmitas sua, quam qui ea non respecta siderum vias scrutatur et terrarum fundamenta, et caelorum fastigia.” Et ideo dixit Apostolus: “Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere”; et Philosophus: “Arbitramur scire omnia sapientem sicut convenit.” Unde contra illos qui nimium scrutari volunt in supervacuis dicit finis dictae

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a human being. Therefore, if God should be recognized by a human being as far as possible, he must recognize Him in every creature by getting to know all creatures, and they held that a human being’s perfect assimilation to God, as well as the final end of human life, consisted in this. Indeed, their reasoning was valid with respect to the knowledge a human being can have about God in this life through purely natural means.324 Hence, Augustine says in his Sermon on John, I: “Pay close attention to the design of the world, and observe the things made through the Word, and then you come to know what the Word is like,”325 and he is referring to the eternal Word, which is God’s excellence and God’s wisdom. Yet their reasoning was futile, since a human being could never reach so much knowledge of creatures, first because of life’s brevity, next because of difficulties gaining experience, and then because of the vastness of knowledge, as Hippocrates says, “Life is short, but skill takes much time; experience is deceptive, while good judgment is difficult.”326 Whence, regarding that passage, All things are difficult, and a human being cannot explain them by words [Eccles. 1:8], the Gloss says: “A human being cannot explain the causes and natures of things, nor can the eye observe fully, nor can the ear, besides, achieve the highest knowledge from a teacher’s instruction.”327 In truth, a human being cannot explain the natures of things on account of life’s brevity, nor can the eye observe on account of the fallibility of experience, nor can the ear reach knowledge on account skill’s difficulty. Therefore, we must say that a human being should not study in order to investigate all things in this life: first, because this is impossible for him, as stated; second, because while doing this he would neglect what is more beneficial, as [stated] in Ecclesiastes, VII, Why must a human being search for things greater than himself when he ignores what is useful? [Eccles. 7:1]; the Gloss: “What is useful for him in this life, for the number of days of his journey, and with time passing by like a shadow?”328 Rather, it is only necessary for him to study thus: he should study the things that are useful for the future life, and among them the most indispensable ones, as stated in Ecclesiasticus, XIII: You shall not seek things higher than yourself, nor shall you become experienced in things mightier than yourself. For, neither is it necessary for you to see the hidden things with your own eyes, but rather the things God has taught you; consider them always and do not be curious about his many works. Refuse to examine superfluous things extensively [Ecclus. 3:22]. Whence Augustine says about that passage in the First Letter to the Corinthians, VIII, Knowledge makes one pompous [1 Cor. 7:1]: “A soul that recognizes its weakness is more praiseworthy than one which, without any regard for this, examines the paths of the stars and the foundations of lands and the heights of the heavens.”329 And therefore the Apostle said: No more understanding than what is proper to understand [Rom. 12:3]; and the Philosopher: “We consider that the wise person knows all things in a way that is fitting.”330

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auctoritatis, Ecclesiastici XIIIi, “Multos enim supplantavit suspicio eorum et in vanitatem detinuit sensus illorum.” Revera supplantavit suspicio, quia “dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt,” ut dicitur Romanos Io, ex hoc in errores incidentes. Secundum enim quod ibi dicit Glossa, “haeretici duobus modis fiunt, vel de creatore, vel de creatura ultra modum disputantes, et in errores incidunt et a veritate recedunt,” et in vanitate detinuit eos sensus eorum, quia non potuerunt quod intendebant attingere. Hoc tamen permisit eis Deus, ne otio torpescerent, Ecclesiastes IIIo: “Vidi afflictionem quam dedit Deus filiis hominum, ut distendantur in ea, cuncta fecit in tempore suo, et mundum tradidit disputationi eorum,” ubi dicit Glossa: “Propterea Deus etiam perversorum dogmatum magistris concessit occupationem, ne mens eorum otiosa torpesceret.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “homo omnium scientia est imperfectus,” dicendum quod imperfectum hominis in vita ista nec in creaturarum cognitione impleri potest, ut supra dictum est, sed hoc impletum erit in futuro, quando secundum Gregorium in IVo Dialogorum “nihil erit quod non videbit qui videntem omnia videbit,” quod solum continget eis qui hic solum ea quibus opus est scire quaerunt, et cuncta sobrie investigant ad opus doctrinae fidei et ad regulam fidei, cuius scientia magis est necessaria ut homo pervenire possit ad perfectionem humanae vitae in sciendo, quam omnis disciplina philosophica. Ad secundum, quod in omni creatura contingit summum bonum contemplari ad opus doctrinae fidei, dicendum quod verum est. Hoc tamen non est possibile hominem in omnibus perscrutari, nec opus est amplius scrutari quam scientiae fidei et pietatis satis est, ut infra dicetur.

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Wherefore, against those who wish to research superfluous subjects too much, the last part of the quoted authority, Ecclesiasticus, XIII, says: For many have been tripped up by their mistrust, and their judgment has held them back through vain pursuits [Ecclus. 3:26]. Indeed, mistrust has brought down many, since those who call themselves wise are made fools [Rom. 1:22], as said in the First Letter to the Romans, on account of which they fall into errors. For, as the Gloss says about this, “heretics come to be in two ways, by discussing either the creator or creation beyond measure, and they fall into errors and stray from truth,”331 and their judgment held them back through vain pursuits, because they were not able to attain what they intended. Yet God permitted this to them, lest they became dull in idleness, [as stated in] Ecclesiastes, III: I have seen the affliction which God has given to the sons of men, so that they may be busy with it; he made all things at the appropriate time, and delivered the world to their disputes [Eccles. 3:10–11], at which place the Gloss says: “For this reason, God also allowed this occupation to the teachers of corrupt doctrines, lest their idle minds become dull.”332

To the first argument in opposition, that “a human being is incomplete in the knowledge of all things,” we must say that what is incomplete in a human being cannot be completed either in this life or in the cognition of creatures, as stated above, but rather this will become completed in the future, when according to Gregory in Dialogues, VI, “there will be nothing that he will not see, who will see the one who sees everything,”333 which will only happen to those who in this life seek only the things for which there is need to know, and temperately investigate all things pertaining to the body of faith teachings and the rule of life proper to the faith, the knowledge of which is more necessary in order to enable a human being to reach perfection in human life through knowledge, than every philosophical discipline. To the second, that it is possible to contemplate the highest good in every creature with reference to the body of faith teachings, we must say that it is true. However, it is not possible for a human being to examine this in all things, nor should a work be more examined than the sufficient portion of knowledge of the faith and of right conduct, as will be discussed below.334

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Quaestio 3 Utrum studendum sit homini ut sciat scibilia super scientias philosophicas Circa tertium arguitur quod non est homini studendum ut sciat scibilia super scientias philosophicas. Primo sic. Ecclesiastici XIIIo sequitur: “Altiora te ne quaesieris et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris.” Illa quae sunt super scientias philosophicas sunt fortiora et altiora homine, quia supra vires naturales rationis, ut dictum est supra. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. De notitia illorum quae fidei sunt et supra scientias philosophicas dixit Christus in evangelio: “Nolite cogitare quomodo aut quid loquamini,” etc. Sed illud ad quod non est cogitandum ut cognoscatur, sed munus Spiritus Sancti exspectandum, non est studio investigandum. Ergo etc. Contra est illud Ii Esdrae VIIo: “Esdras praeparavit cor suum, ut investigaret legem Domini,” quod non erat nisi studio. Lex autem Domini erat de scibilibus supra scientias philosophicas. Ergo etc. Et super illud Sapientiae VIo “Cogitare de illa sensus est consummatus,” dicitur in Glossa: “In praesenti studendum est sapientiae, et secundum normam disciplinae vivendum.”

Dicendum ad hoc secundum Augustinum in principio De doctrina christiana quod error erat aliquorum quod “praecepta de modo studendi et investigandi obscura Sacrae Scripturae non erant necessaria, sed quod intellectus eorum divino munere esset exspectandus,” et ita negabant quod non esset homini studendum ad sciendum scibilia supra scientias philosophicas. Contra quos dicit Augustinus loquens suis: “Fratres,” inquit, “moneamus omnes ne parvulos suos ita doceant. Immo quod per hominem discendum est, sine superbia discant, neque temptemus eum cui credimus, ne talibus inimici versutiis decepti ad ipsum quoque audiendum evangelium atque discendum nolimus ire in ecclesias aut codicem legere,” scilicet studendo per nos, “aut doctorem praedicantemque hominem audire; et exspectemus rapi usque ad tertium caelum, et ibi

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Question 3 Whether a human being should study in order to know realities that exceed the philosophical sciences Regarding the third question, it is argued that a human being should not study in order to know realities that exceed the philosophical sciences. First, as follows. Ecclesiasticus, XIII, goes: You shall not seek things higher than yourself, nor shall you become experienced in things mightier than yourself [Ecclus. 13:22]. Those things which are above the philosophical sciences are mightier and higher than a human being, since they are above the powers of natural reason, as stated above. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Concerning the knowledge of those things which belong to faith and are above the philosophical sciences, Christ said in the Gospel: Consider not how or what you speak [Matt. 10:19], etc. But what is not meant to be known by considering, but instead must be awaited for as a gift of the Holy Spirit, should not be investigated through study. Therefore, etc. The argument against is that passage from the first book of Ezra, VII: Ezra prepared his heart, in order to investigate the law of the Lord [Ezra 7:10], which happened only through study. However, the law of the Lord is one of those realities which are above the philosophical sciences. Therefore, etc. Moreover, on this point, Wisdom, VI, states: To think about her is perfect understanding [Wis. 6:16], and in the Gloss it says: “One must study wisdom now, and live according to the rule of its teaching.”335

Regarding this question, we must say, according to Augustine at the beginning of On Christian Doctrine, that some held erroneously that “principles concerning the method of studying and investigating obscure points of Sacred Scripture were not necessary, but rather their comprehension was awaited for as a divine gift,”336 and thus they denied that a human being needed to study in order to know realities above the philosophical sciences. Against them, Augustine says when speaking to his own people: “Brothers,” he begins, “let us advise everyone lest they teach their children in this way. Rather, since one must learn from another human being, let them teach without arrogance, and let us not tempt Him in Whom we believe, lest deceived by such wiles from our enemy, we also refuse to go to churches to listen to the Gospel itself, and to learn or read a book,” namely by undertaking our own studies, “or to listen to a teacher preaching; and expect to be carried all the way to the third heaven, and there hear

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audire ineffabilia verba, aut ibi videre dominum Iesum, et ab illo potius quam ab hominibus audire evangelium.” Dicere ergo absolute quod talibus quae sunt super scientias philosophicas non est studendum, error est et temptare Deum. Verumtamen sciendum quod triplex est modus cognoscendi res: quidam naturalis et modo naturali, quidam supernaturalis et modo supernaturali, quidam medius supernaturalis et modo naturali. Primus est ille quo cognoscuntur scienda in disciplinis philosophicis, quae sunt de rebus naturalibus, quarum notitia est naturalis, quia investigatione naturalis rationis et modo naturali, quia via sensus et experientiae capit ortum. Secundus est ille quo cognoscuntur clare et aperte quidditates caelestium spirituum Dei et angelorum, quae sunt res supernaturales, quorum notitia non est naturalis, quia non naturalis rationis investigatione, neque modo naturali, quia nec per illa quae accipiuntur a sensu, sed immediate et pure a divino dono speciali. Unde ad notitiam talem et talium scibilium super scientias philosophicas habendum non est studendum rationis naturalis investigatione, ut in vita ista acquiratur, quia studium ad hoc esset frustra et labor perditus, sed sic vivendum est in praesenti vita, ut in futura haberi promereatur vel, si Deo placuerit, ad horam concedatur. Tertius modus est ille quo supernaturalia et divina hic cognoscuntur per fidem, quorum notitia est supernaturalis, quia per lumen infusum, modo tamen naturali, quia in aenigmate rerum sensibilium. Non enim in istis complexa et articulos fidei credimus per lumen fidei, nisi prius terminos et incomplexa lumine naturalis rationis adminiculo sensus intelligamus, secundum quod dicit Augustinus VIIIo De Trinitate: “Credimus dominum Iesum Christum natum de virgine, quae Maria vocabatur; quid sit virgo, quid sit nasci, et quid sit nomen proprium non credimus, sed prorsus novimus”; et super illud “Da mihi intellectum,” Glossa: “Nemo potest credere in Deum nisi aliqua intelligat, tamen fide sanatur, ut ampliora intelligat.” Circa talia ergo quae fide cognoscuntur de supernaturalibus principaliter quaestio exponenda est. De talibus ergo sciendis notandum quod initia fidei accipimus divino lumine, sicut initia primorum principiorum scientialium sumimus lumine

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ineffable words337 or see there the Lord Jesus, and from him hear the Gospel more than from human beings.”338 Therefore, to say absolutely that one should not study such things which are above the philosophical sciences is both to err and to tempt God. Nevertheless, we must understand that the way of coming to know a thing is threefold: one is natural and in a natural manner, another supernatural and in a supernatural manner, and another is intermediate, being supernatural and in a natural manner.339 The first is that by which knowledge is gathered in the philosophical disciplines, which pertains to natural things, whose knowledge is natural since it occurs through the investigation of natural reason, and it happens in a natural manner since it originates by means of the senses and experience.340 The second is that by which the quiddities of the celestial spirits, of God and the angels, come to be known clearly and openly; these are supernatural things, the knowledge of which is not natural341 since it is not through the investigation of natural reason, nor does it occur in a natural manner since it does not come from things gathered by the senses, but rather it comes immediately and purely as a special divine gift. Wherefore, by investigating through natural reason, one cannot study in order to have such knowledge and knowledge of such realities beyond the philosophical sciences, and so acquire it in this life, since studying for this purpose would be in vain and a waste of effort, but rather one must live the present life in such a way that having it in the future life may be deserved and indeed, if it shall be pleasing to God, that it be granted at some point. The third way is that by which supernatural and divine realities are known in this life through faith, the knowledge of which is supernatural, since it occurs through an infused light, yet it occurs in a natural manner, since it occurs in the obscurity of sensible reality. For, we do not believe in those complex [propositions] and articles of faith through the light of faith, unless we first understand the terms and noncomplex [meanings] by the light of reason with the help of sense, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, VIII: “We believe in the Lord Jesus Christ born of the Virgin, who was named Mary; what is a virgin, what is to be born, and what is a proper name—these we do not believe in, of course, but rather already know”342; and about that passage Give me understanding [Ps. 118:34], the Gloss says: “No one can believe in God unless he understands some things, yet by faith he is made well, so that he understands further.”343 Therefore, we must develop this question chiefly in regard to what is known by faith about supernatural realities. About such objects of knowledge, therefore, we must note that we accept the starting points of faith by means of divine light, just as we gather the starting points

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naturalis rationis, et quod se habent prima credibilia fidei ad omnia posteriora credibilia, sicut et prima scibilia philosophica ad posteriora scibilia. Sicut ergo homo, antequam noverit prima principia scientiarum philosophicarum, non potest addiscere neque cetera studio aliquo investigare, ut dictum est supra, sic ad cognitionem illorum quae fidei sunt studere non potest antequam lumine fidei prima principia credibilium cognoverit. Quibus cognitis ad duo investiganda studendum est. Primo, ut ex primis credibilibus investigentur posteriora. Sicut enim lumine naturalis rationis homo potest studendo investigare notitiam eorum quae in potentia cognita sunt in principiis scientialibus, sic lumine fidei potest investigare credibilia quae in potentia cognita sunt in primis principiis credibilium, secundum quod Paulus futuram nostram resurrectionem probat credendam ex resurrectione Christi quam iam credimus factam. Et ideo dicit Origenes super Genesim in Homilia de archa, “quod de aliquibus Sacra Scriptura nihil rettulit, sed solum traditio tenet, quia opportunum videtur super hoc habitum silentium de quo sufficienter conclusionem ratio docet.” Secundo autem studendum est eis quae sunt fidei, ut credita fiant intellecta. Secundum enim quod dicit Augustinus Super Ioannem in principio, “sacra lectio ad hoc legitur et auditur, ut exponatur et intelligatur.” Hinc dicit in fine De Academicis: “Ita sum affectus, ut quid sit verum non credendo solum, sed intelligendo apprehendere impatienter exspecto.” Non enim cum auditur et creditur, statim intelligitur, quia, ut dicit Chrysostomus super illud Matthaei Io “Inventa est in utero habens”: “Non aestimes te cum cuncta audieris continuo cuncta didicisse.” Ut ergo quae fide sola tenemus intelligamus, studere debemus, non viribus solum naturalis rationis. Cum enim, ut de philosophis dicit Hugo super prologum Caelestis Hierarchiae, “post scientiam philosophicam novissime theologiam perscrutatione invisibilium quasi consummaturi sapientiam addiderunt, ibi corruere coeperunt in mendacia figmentorum, et assumpserunt species visibilium simulacra divinorum, ut invisibilia viderent per ea quae videbantur, et evanuerunt cum transire vellent mente ea quae sola mente acceperunt. In hac ergo scientia sapientes mundi stulti facti sunt, quia solo naturali documento secundum elementa et speciem mundi incedentes exemplaria gratiae non

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of first scientific principles through the light of natural reason,344 and as the first tenets of belief stand with regard to subsequent tenets of belief, so too do the first knowable objects in philosophy stand with regard to subsequent knowable objects. Therefore, just as a human being cannot learn or investigate other things through a given study before having familiarity with the first principles of the philosophical sciences, as stated above,345 so too he cannot study in order to know what belongs to the faith before having become cognizant of the first principles of belief through the light of faith. Having become cognizant of such principles, one should study in search of two things. First, so that subsequent truths, derived from the first principles of belief, are considered. For, just as by the light of natural reason a human being through study can seek to learn things that are potentially known in scientific principles, so too by the light of faith he can seek to learn tenets of belief which are potentially known in the first principles of belief, in the way Paul shows that one must believe in our future resurrection on the basis of the resurrection of Christ, which we already believe is a fact [cf. 1 Thess. 4:14]. And therefore Origen says in On Genesis in the Homily on the Ark, “that Sacred Scripture has not referred to some things at all, which are only held from tradition, because it seems suitable to be silent about what reason sufficiently can instruct us to establish.”346 Second, one ought to study what belongs to the faith, so that what is believed becomes understood. For, as Augustine says at the beginning of On John, “the reading from Sacred Scripture is read and heard, so that it may be explained and understood.”347 Hence, he says at the end of On the Academics: “I am moved in such a way that I long impatiently to grasp what is true not merely through belief, but also through understanding.”348 For, when it is heard and believed, it is not immediately understood, because, as Chrysostom says about that passage in Matthew, I—She was found pregnant [Matt. 1:18]: “Do not think that when you hear everything, you have knowledge of everything right away.”349 Therefore, so that we may understand what we hold by faith alone, we must study, and not only through the powers of natural reason. For, as Hugh says about the philosophers in the prologue of On the Celestial Hierarchy, “those who pretend to encompass wisdom recently have added, after philosophical science, theology understood as the examination of invisible things; there they have begun to fall into the falsehood of unrealities, and have assumed that the species of visible things are likenesses of divine realities, as if they were seeing invisible things through the things that were being physically seen, and they then vanish when they wish to transform them with the mind into things grasped through the mind alone. In this science, therefore, the wise of the world are made fools [cf. Rom. 1:22], because they proceeded only by natural instruction through the elements and species of the world and did not have the models of grace,

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habebant, in quibus etsi species erat humilis, manifestior praestatur demonstratio veritatis.” Non ergo solum viribus naturalis rationis ad sciendum naturalia studendum est, sed viribus naturalis rationis adiutae lumine supernaturali ad intelligendum illa. Unde Chrysostomus super illud “Petite et dabitur vobis”: “Deus ita nos disposuit esse, ut nec studentes et laborantes circa scripturas quaeramus salutarem scientiam sine gratia Dei, ne nobis imputemus quod scimus, nec tamen gratiam acquiramus nisi studuerimus et laboraverimus circa scripturas, ne Dei donum negligentibus detur. Gratia enim adiutoria est infirmitatis humanae. Adiutorium autem non dormientibus datur, sed festinantibus et praevalentibus. Sicut enim in bello non omnis qui pugnat vincit, nemo tamen vincere poterit nisi pugnaverit, sic non omnes qui student et legunt acquirunt scientiam spiritualem, nemo tamen eam acquirere potest nisi studiosus fuerit ad legendum, assiduus ad audiendum.” Unde idem super illud “Nolite sanctum dare canibus”: “Non omnis potest ascendere in altitudinem sensuum, et illas invenire mysteriorum absconditas margaritas, nisi vir spiritualis qui habet exercitationem spiritualium narrationum Dei.” Tali ergo gratia Dei adiutus potest homo studere et proficere in supernaturalibus. Et hoc ideo, quia talium scientia sub sensibilibus occultatur. Intelligere autem et maxime talia quae sunt supernaturalia quandam interiorem considerationem dicit eorum quae non statim intellectu capiuntur cum audiuntur. Dicitur enim intelligere quasi ‘intus legere,’ id est enucleare quod latet, ut sub intentione et specie sensibili accepta a sensu latet veritas et quidditas rei, et sub signis figuralibus ipsa figurata, et sub eis quae tenentur ut credita veritas nota, et sub effectu causa, et cetera huiusmodi. Unde ista cognitio, quae consistit in intelligendo, solido cibo comparatur; simplex autem notitia per fidem comparatur lacti, secundum quod dicit Chrysostomus super illud Matthaei XXIo “Ex ore infantium”: “Omnis prima instructio fidei, id est simplex doctrina, lac dicitur, quoniam sicut lac sine labore et opere dentium manducatur et manducantem suavitate sua delectat. Panis autem est perfectioris doctrina iustitiae, quam accipere non possunt nisi exercitati sensus circa res spirituales, quoniam qui audit necesse habet intra se tractatibus quibusdam discutere et meditari, quasi quibusdam dentibus spiritualibus molere.” Idem super illud Matthaei XXIIo “Misit servos vocare invitatos”: “Sicut enim qui mittit in os fragmentum panis, primum molit cum dentibus et ita mittit in stomachum, sic

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regarding which, even if their evidence was slight, the indication of truth is more manifestly outstanding.”350 Therefore, not only should one study with the powers of natural reason in order to know natural things, but also in order to understand them with the powers of natural reason as supported by supernatural light. Whence, Chrysostom says about that passage Ask and you will receive [Matt. 7:7]: “God has disposed us to be in such a way, that we may not seek salutary knowledge about the Sacred Scriptures, through study and hard work, without God’s grace, lest we take full credit for our knowledge, and yet in such a way that we may acquire grace only by having studied and labored with regard to the Scriptures, lest God’s gift be given to the careless. For, grace assists human beings in their weakness. However, assistance is not given to the inactive, but rather to those who hasten and endure. For, just as in war not all who fight win, yet no one can win unless he has fought, so too not all who study and read acquire spiritual science, yet no one can attain it unless he shall be eager to read, and alert and consistent at listening.”351 Whence he [says] expounding upon that passage, Do not give consecrated food to dogs [Matt. 7:6]: “Not everyone can ascend to the heights of perception, and find those hidden pearls of the mysteries, but rather only the spiritual man who has training in the spiritual narratives of God.”352 Therefore, assisted by such grace from God, a human being can study and make progress with regard to supernatural matters. Moreover, this is so because the knowledge of such things is concealed in sensible things. However, to understand—and indeed especially with reference to supernatural things—means a certain interior view of those things which are not immediately grasped by the intellect when they are heard. For, to understand (intelligere) means, as it were, ‘to read within (intus legere),’353 that is to expose what is hidden, as the truth and quiddity of a thing is hidden in the sensible intension and species taken from the senses, and that which is signified in figurative signs, and the known truth in those tenets which are accepted through faith, and the cause in the effect, and other such cases. Wherefore, that cognition which consists in understanding is compared to solid food, while simple acquaintance through faith is compared to milk, according to what Chrysostom says about that passage in Matthew, XXI, From the mouth of babies [Matt. 21:16]: “Every first instruction in the faith, that is simple doctrine, is called milk, because like milk it is taken in without effort and work of teeth, and it pleases the one who takes it by its sweetness. Bread, however, is a more perfect teaching of justice, which only those whose perception is trained to consider spiritual realities can grasp, because he who hears it must possess internal examination and contemplation by means of certain methods, in order to grind, as it were, by means of certain spiritual teeth.”354 He also expounds upon that passage in Matthew, XXII, He sent the servants to call the guests [Matt. 22:3]: “For, just as he who puts in his mouth a piece of bread, first

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et cum audimus omne verbum, necesse est illud meditari in ore sensus, et quasi quibusdam dentibus id tractantibus molere et videre quid est quod dicit, aut unde dicit, aut propter quam rem dicit. Nam quemadmodum qualemcumque cibum, nisi masticaverimus dentibus, non sentimus saporem eius, ita et verbum quod custodimus, nisi masticaverimus tractantes in nobis, non possumus intelligere veritatem verbi illius. Nam et manna in eremo figuram habens verbi ideo dicitur manna, quod interpretatur ‘quid est hoc?’, ut quotienscumque audiamus verbum, admoneat nos ipsum nomen requirere: ‘quid est hoc quod audimus?’ Nam quemadmodum non prodest cibus, nisi cum fuerit masticatus et in stomachum descenderit, sic non proficit ad salutem verbum, nisi cum fuerit intellectui et memoriae traditum. Qui autem sic manducat de spirituali convivio impletur spiritu, dilatatur sensibus, nutritur in veritate, pinguescit in fide, et sic ingrediens ad interiora voluntatis Dei et manens in eis acquirit sibi vitam aeternam. Qui autem ab hoc convivio verbi Dei longe factus fuerit evacuatur spiritu, angustatur sensibus, deficit a veritate, distillat a fide, et sic egrediens ab omnibus voluntatibus Dei novissime cadit in mortem.” Sicut ergo ratio naturalis adiutorio luminis naturalis, quasi fodiendo sub signis et intentionibus sensibilium quae patent, potest [homo] in cognitionem venire eorum quae sub ipsis latent propter naturalem colligantiam eorum ad signa quae patent, sic ratio naturalis adiutorio luminis fidei, quasi fodiendo sub credibilibus, potest venire in cognitionem veritatis eorum. Licet enim per se ad hoc non potest devenire ratio solo lumine naturali, quia non habet veritas latens naturalem ordinem ad illa signa quae patent, sub quibus credenda proponuntur, adiutorio tamen luminis superioris hoc bene potest. Unde ad intellectum veritatis huius “corruptam posse parere” potest pervenire intellectus lumine rationis naturalis, sed ad intellectum illius “virginem posse parere” non nisi lumine superiori. Et ideo sicut philosophi studuerunt ad cognoscendum posteriora ex prioribus et ad intelligendum veritatem rerum naturalium solo lumine naturalis rationis adiuti, sic fideles debent studere ad cognoscendum posteriora credibilia ex prioribus et ad haec et illa intelligenda adiuti illustratione Spiritus Sancti. Unde super illud Sapientiae IXo “Difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt et invenimus cum labore. Quae in caelis autem sunt quis investigabit?” dicit Glossa: “Ne desperemus, praemissis subiungit consolationem Sancti Spiritus.” Unde

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grinds it with his teeth and then swallows, so too when we hear the Word each time, it is necessary to consider it in the mouth of sense, and grind it by means of certain teeth that handle it, as it were, and see what it is that it says, or whence it says it, or on account of what thing it says it. For, just as we do not taste the flavor of any food unless we have chewed it with our teeth, so too with respect to the Word we protect: we cannot understand the truth of that Word unless we have chewed by an inner treatment. For, also the manna in the desert which is a symbol of the Word is on that account called ‘manna,’ which is translated as ‘what is this?’, so that whenever we may hear the Word the very name admonishes us to ask: ‘what is this that we hear?’ For, just as food does not benefit, except as already chewed and gone down into the stomach, so too the Word does not engender well-being, except as already delivered to the intellect and memory. However, he who partakes of the spiritual banquet in this way is filled in spirit, expanded in perception, nourished by truth, strengthened in faith, and by advancing in this way to the interior things belonging to God’s will, and by remaining in them, acquires for himself eternal life. On the other hand, he who will have been brought far away from this banquet of God’s Word is emptied in spirit, narrowed in perception, wanting in truth, dry in faith, and thus moving away from all the things belonging to God’s will in the end falls into death.”355 Therefore, just as natural reason with the help of natural light, by digging (as it were) under the signs and intensions of sensible things which lie in the open, can come to the cognition of those things that are hidden under them, through their natural connection to the signs that lie in the open, so too can natural reason with the help of the light of faith, by digging (as it were) under the tenets held by faith can come to the cognition of their truth. For, although reason per se cannot reach this by means of natural light only, because the truth that is hidden does not have a natural order to those signs which lie in the open, under which what is to be believed is put forth, nevertheless this is well possible with the help of a superior light. Wherefore, the intellect through the light of natural reason can reach the understanding of this truth—“a corrupt woman can give birth,” but instead can reach understanding of this one—“a virgin can give birth,” only through a superior light. For that reason, therefore, just as philosophers have studied in order to know posterior things derived from prior things and in order to understand the truth of natural realities through the help of natural reason alone, so too should the faithful study in order to know posterior tenets of belief derived from prior principles, and this in order to understand both the former and the latter assisted with the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Whence, regarding that passage in Wisdom, IX, We judge with difficulty and discover with toil the things existing on earth. However, who will track down the things in heaven? [Wis. 9:16], the Gloss says: “Let us not despair, to what has been sent in advance he joins the comfort of the Holy Spirit.”356 Whence

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sequitur: “Spiritum autem tuum quis sciet, nisi tu dederis sapientiam et miseris Spiritum Sanctum tuum de altissimis?” Et debet esse primum studium fidelis, ut cognoscat quid credendum, deinde quomodo intelligat credita, quoniam, ut dicitur Isaiae VIIo: “nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.” Unde de sapientia legis divinae dicitur Ecclesiastici VIIo: “In omni animo tuo accede ad illam, et in omni virtute tua conserva vias eius. Investiga illam, et manifestabitur tibi.” Et debet esse ista investigatio non solum studio exercendo intellectum, sed etiam bonis operibus mundando affectum. Unde super verbum illud praecedens “Quibus autem cognita est,” dicit Glossa: “Qui eam recta fide et opere servant.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “illa sunt homini altiora,” dicendum quod illa quae excedunt lumen naturalis rationis altiora sunt homini simpliciter, ut homo est, et quae excedunt lumen fidei, illa sunt altiora fideli, ut fidelis est. Unde qui metas nitebantur excedere, sive philosophiae sive doctrinae catholicae, illico in errores ceciderunt et haeretici facti sunt, vel de creatore vel de creatura ultra modum disputantes, ut dictum est in praecedenti quaestione. Quod non oportet fieri circa eos qui pia fide quaerunt notitiam divinorum supernaturalium, et non praesumunt ad illa per propria naturalia pervenire, secundum quod dicit Augustinus Vo De Trinitate capitulo 1o: “Non impudenter in illa quae supra sunt divina et ineffabilia pietas fidelis ardescit, non quam suarum virium inflat arrogantia, sed quam gratia creatoris inflammat.” Ad secundum, “Nolite cogitare,” etc., dicendum, secundum Augustinum IVo De doctrina christiana, distinguendo quod est hora deliberationis ad loquendum et est hora opportunitatis, et pro hora opportunitatis, in qua non conceditur deliberatio, intelligitur illud dictum evangelii. In hora autem deliberationis fortiter studendum est, ut homo faciat quod in se est, ut hora opportuna quantum poterit paratum se inveniat, secundum quod dicit Augustinus IVo De doctrina christiana: “Discat omnia quae docenda sunt, qui et nosse vult et docere. Facultatem dicendi, ut decet virum ecclesiasticum, comparet. Ad horam vero ipsius dictionis illud cogitet bonae menti convenire quod Dominus ait, ‘Nolite cogitare,’ etc. Quisquis autem dicit non esse hominibus praecipiendum

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it continues: Who will know your spirit, unless you have given out wisdom and sent your Holy Spirit from on high? [Wis. 9:17]. Moreover, the first study of him who is faithful should aim to know what should be believed, and then why, as this is how he may understand what is believed, as is said in Isaiah, VII: unless you believe, you shall not understand [Isa. 7:9]. Whence, with regard to the wisdom of divine law, it is said in Ecclesiasticus, VII: Approach it with all our soul, and observe its ways with all your strength. Investigate it, and it will be made clear to you [Ecclus. 6:27–28]. Moreover, this investigation should be not only through study that trains the intellect, but also through good actions that purify the affection. Whence, regarding that preceding phrase, To which persons, however, is it made known? [Ecclus. 6:23], the Gloss says: “To those who preserve it through right faith and action.”357

To the first argument in opposition, that “those things are higher than a human being,” we must say that those things which exceed the light of natural reason are higher in an absolute sense than a human being, insofar as he is a human being, and those which exceed the light of faith are higher than a believer, insofar as he is a believer. Wherefore those who have pushed to the point of exceeding the limits, whether of philosophy or of catholic doctrine, at that very point have fallen into errors and have become heretics, by discussing either the creator or creatures unduly, as stated in the preceding question. But this need not happen to those who seek familiarity with supernatural, divine realities with devout faith, and do not presume to reach them through their own purely natural means, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, V, chapter 1: “Faithful piety is not unmindfully eager to reach what is above, divine and indescribable, is not puffed by arrogance of its own powers, but rather is inflamed by the grace of the creator.”358 To the second, “Consider not,” etc., we must respond, according to Augustine in On Christian Doctrine, IV, by making a distinction: there is a time for deliberating what will be said and there is a time for opportunity, and it is in terms of the time for opportunity, where deliberation is not permitted, that this saying of the Gospel is meant.359 However, during the time for deliberation one should study vigorously, so that a human being may do what is up to him, so that at the opportune time he finds himself prepared as far as possible, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, IV: “He who wants both to know and to teach should learn all that should be taught. He should develop the ability to speak as it is fitting to a man of the church. However, at the time of delivery, let him consider that which God has said, ‘Consider not,’ etc., as appropriate for a virtuous mind. Yet, whoever says that, if the Holy

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quemadmodum doceant, si Spiritus Sanctus docet, potest dicere non orandum nobis esse, quia dominus ait, ‘Scit pater vester quid vobis sit necessarium priusquam petatis.’” Quaestio 4 Utrum studendum sit ei ut sciat omnia contenta in scientiis philosophicis Circa quartum arguitur quod non est homini studendum scientiis philosophicis. Primo sic. Qui scientiis philosophicis studet in vanitate ambulat, secundum quod dicit Hieronymus ad Damasum papam: “Videtur in vanitate sensus et obscuritate mentis ingredi qui diebus ac noctibus in dialectica arte torquetur, qui physicus perscrutator oculos trans caelum levat, et ultra profundum terrarum et abyssum in quoddam inane demergitur.” Sed in vanitate non est ambulandum. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Studens in scientiis philosophicis corripiendus est, secundum quod dicit Rabanus De pressuris Ecclesiasticis: “Legimus de beato Hieronymo, quod cum libros legeret Ciceronis, ab angelo correptus est, eo quod vir Christianus paganorum figmentis intenderet.” Sed non est studendum ei pro quo quis corripiendus est. Ergo etc. Tertio sic. In eo quod non valet ad salutem, sed mittit in errorem, non est studendum, quia omne studium Christiani ad rectam doctrinam ducentem ad beatitudinem debet ordinari. Scientiae philosophicae sunt huiusmodi, ut dicit Ambrosius super epistolam Ad Colossenses. Ergo etc. Contra est illud quod dicit Beda super Regum, “Turbat acumen legentium et deficere cogit qui eos a legendis saecularibus litteris omnino aestimat prohibendos; alioquin Moyses et Daniel sapientia et litteris Aegyptiorum et Chaldaeorum non paterentur erudiri.”

Ad hoc sciendum quod scientiarum quaedam est necessaria, quaedam utilis sive fructuosa, quaedam vana et superstitiosa.

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Spirit teaches, then human beings are not to be admonished as to how they teach, may as well say that we should not pray, since the Lord said, ‘Your father knows what you need before you desire it.’”360 Question 4 Whether a human being should study in order to know all that is contained in the philosophical sciences Regarding the fourth question, it is argued that a human being should not study the philosophical sciences. First, as follows. He who studies the philosophical sciences walks in a path of vanity, as Jerome says to Pope Damasus: “He who twists and turns days and nights in the art of dialectics seems to enter the vanity of sense and darkness of mind; the researcher of nature lifts his eyes across heaven and beyond the depths of the earth, and plunges uselessly into some abyss.”361 But one should not walk in the path of vanity. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. The student of the philosophical sciences should be chastised, as Rhabanus Maurus says in On Ecclesiastical Pressures: “we read about the blessed Jerome, who, when he was reading Cicero’s books, was chastised by an angel, because a Christian man was intent upon pagan fictions.”362 But one must not study what justifies being chastised. Therefore, etc. Third, thus. One should not pursue what is worthless for salvation and leads to error, since every pursuit of a Christian should be ordered to right doctrine leading to blessedness. The philosophical sciences are of such a kind,363 as Ambrose says concerning the Letter to the Colossians [see Col. 2:8]. Therefore, etc. To the contrary, there is what Bede says on the Books of Kings, “He who considers that students should be forbidden to read secular literature altogether, disturbs their incisiveness and engenders ineptitude; otherwise, Moses and Daniel would not have undergone the study of the wisdom and literature of the Egyptians and Chaldeans.”364

Regarding this question, one must be aware that among sciences some are necessary, some are useful or profitable, and some vain and superstitious.

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Superstitiosa est omnis ars per pactiones daemonum et hominum instituta, quae, ut dicit Augustinus IIo De doctrina christiana, “est ad facienda vel colenda idola, vel creaturam sicut Deum, vel consultationes a daemonibus faciendas vel accipiendas, vel ad quorundam eventuum significationes denotandas, qualia sunt molimina artium magicarum, haruspicum, et augurum libri, ad quod genus pertinent omnes ligaturae atque remedia” morborum superstitiosa, motus et gestus, et incessus superstitiosi, vel in se ipsis vel in volatibus avium et motibus animalium, similiter annotatio constellationum geniturae, necnon et ea quae fiunt per pythones responsa. Haec et his similia milia inanissimarum observationum genera, quibus, ut dicit Augustinus, “occulto Dei iudicio pro meritis voluntatum suarum traduntur homines illudendi, atque ab angelis praevaricatoribus decipiendi, penitus sunt repudianda et fugienda Christiano, quia in eis omnino societas daemonum est formidanda, qui nihil nisi nos illaqueare conantur.” Idcirco enim ministerio daemonum huiusmodi “superstitionibus et divinationum generibus multa futura dicuntur, nec aliter quam accidunt dicuntur, ut curiosiores homines fiant, et magis illaqueentur daemonum operatione.” Qui, ut dicit Chrysostomus super illud Matthaei IVo “Non in solo pane”: “si utile aliquid iubeant, nec sic quidem eos debemus audire, nec diabolo credamus umquam, etiamsi magna quaedam necessitas urget.” Tali ergo scientiae, ut ait Augustinus, nullo modo est studendum. Per quam tamen studiosus transiens, “quisquis bonus et verus Christianus domini sui esse intelligat, ubicumque invenerit veritatem,” nec debet philosophica, nec daemonica reputari. Utilis autem scientia est scientia vere philosophica, quia ad perfectionem humanae naturae inventa est. Et isti, ut dicit Augustinus, studere non licet ad delectationem, aut ut in eis spes adipiscendi bonam vitam ponatur, aut deceptionem, aut rixandi libidinem. “Omnino enim cavenda est libido rixandi et puerilis ostentatio decipiendi.” Ob hoc enim sermonem sophisticum et captiosarum argumentationum genera detestatur Sacra Scriptura, cum dicit: “Qui sophistice loquitur odibilis est.” Studere tamen ei licet in quantum utilis est et proficua est, secundum quod de omni tali scientia alia a Sacra Scriptura dat Augustinus regulam generalem versus finem IIi De doctrina christiana, dicens: “Videtur mihi studiosis et ingeniosis adolescentibus et timentibus Deum, beatam vitam quaerentibus salubriter praecipi, ut nullus doctrinas quae praeter ecclesiam Christi exercentur, tamquam ad beatam vitam capessendam sequi audeat, sed eas sobrie diligenterque diiudicent; si quas vero invenerit vanas et ignotas, maxime si habent cum daemonibus societatem, repudient penitus et studium detestentur.

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Every art based on pacts between demons and men is superstitious, which, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, II, “is for the purpose of making or harboring idols, or a creature as if it were God, or for developing or accepting communications with demons, or to indicate the significance of certain events, which are the chief efforts of the magical arts, of soothsaying, and of the books of augury, to which class belong all amulets as well as remedies”365 of superstitious maladies, superstitious movements, gestures, and goings, either of people themselves or in the flights of birds and movements of animals, similarly the comments on horoscope constellations, as well as the events associated with soothsaying. These and thousands of sorts similar to these most empty observations, through which, as Augustine says, “by the hidden judgment of God human beings are brought to delusion, deserved by their own willing, and also deceived by the collusion of demons,366 must be totally rejected and fled from by the Christian, since all fellowship with demons in them should wholly terrify us, whose only goal is to ensnare us.”367 For, indeed, by the ministry of such demons “many future happenings are told, and happen as they are told, by different sorts of superstition and divination, so that human beings become even more curious, and thus more deceived by the works of demons.”368 Regarding them, as Chrysostom says about that passage in Matthew, IV, Not in bread alone [Matt. 4:4]: “Even if they say something useful, we certainly must not listen to them in this case, lest we ever believe in the devil, not even in cases of great need.”369 Therefore, such knowledge, as Augustine says, in no sense should be pursued. What is more, neither the philosophic nor the demonic pursuit should be considered as the means for the student to become “a good and true Christian that discerns the being of his Lord wherever he may find truth.”370 However, truly philosophical sciences are useful, since they were developed with the aim of completing human life. But one should not pursue them for pleasure, as Augustine says, or with the hope of gaining by them worldly success, or for deceitfulness, or love of quarrel. “One must be fully on guard against quarrelsomeness and any childish display of deceit.”371 For, on this issue, the whole class of sophistical speech and captious argumentation is condemned by Sacred Scripture, when it says, He who speaks in a sophistical manner is hateful (Ecclus. 37:23). Yet, it is permitted to study them insofar as they are useful or profitable, according to Augustine’s general principle concerning every such science distinct from Sacred Scripture, stated near the end of On Christian Doctrine, II: “It seems to me that a salutary warning is suitable for studious and clever youths who fear God and seek blessedness, that none be trained in teachings outside Christ’s church under the impression that through them blessedness is to be gained, but rather soberly and carefully discriminate among them; if they are found to be vain and ignoble, especially if they include association with demons, they should repudiate them and loath their study. However, they

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Illa vero instituta quae ad societatem conviventium valent, non negligat, sed nec liberales scientias visui veritatis aptiores et praecepta moralia utilissima de ipso uno Deo colendo, quae inveniuntur apud ipsos”; et De civitate Dei VIIIo: “Quamvis homo Christianus ecclesiasticis litteris eruditus cavet eos qui secundum elementa huius mundi philosophantur, non secundum Deum, a quo factus est mundus. Admonetur enim praecepto apostolico, quod audit: ‘Cavete ne quis vos seducat secundum philosophiam et inanem seductionem, secundum elementa huius mundi.’ Deinde ne omnes tales esse arbitrentur, audit ab eodem apostolo dici de quibusdam. Quia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis. Deus enim illis revelavit”; et De moribus ecclesiae: “Nomen ipsum philosophiae, si consideretur, rem magnam totamque animo appetendam significat, siquidem philosophia est amor studiumque sapientiae. Cautissime Apostolus, ne ab amore sapientiae deterrere videretur, subiecit secundum elementa huius mundi. Sunt enim qui desertis virtutibus et nescientes quid sit Deus, et quanta maiestas naturae semper eodem modo manentis, magnum se aliquid agere putant, si universam istam corporis molem, quam mundum nuncupamus curiosissime intentissimeque perquirant. Unde tanta superbia etiam gignitur, ut in ipso caelo, de quo saepe disputant, sibimet habitare videantur.” Idem De ordine libro Io in fine: “Divinae scripturae non omnino philosophias, sed philosophos huius mundi evitandos, atque irridendos esse praecipiunt. Nam quisquis omnem philosophiam fugiendam putat, nihil nos vult aliud quam non amare sapientiam”; item, in eodem libro IIo: “Ego si quid meos monere possum, quantum mihi apparet, quantumque sentio, censeo illos disciplinis omnibus erudiendos.” Hinc dicit Hieronymus de tribus pueris in Daniele: “Qui de mensa et vino regis noluerunt comedere ne polluantur, utique si sapientiam atque doctrinam Babyloniorum scirent esse peccatum, non acquiescerent discere quod non licebat.” Unde super illud Exodi IIIo “Postulet mulier a vicina sua et hospita,” Glossa: “Poetae et philosophi quodammodo sunt nobis vicini,” quia in multis conveniunt. “Vasa argentea et aurea,” Glossa: “Argentum et aurum ab Aegyptiis petimus, unde tabernaculum Deo fabricemus, cum poetas et philosophos legimus, ut divinam scripturam sapientius et facundius legamus.” “Ac vestes,” Glossa: “Morum atque bonorum operum.” “Ponetisque,” Glossa: “Erudiendo.” “Super filios vestros,” Glossa: “Maiores”; “et filias,” Glossa: “minores.” “Et spoliabitis Aegyptum,” Glossa: “Auferendo quae tabernaculo domini sunt utilia.”

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should not neglect those established sciences which are valuable for communal living,372 nor the liberal sciences, which are more apt for the contemplation of truth, and very useful moral precepts regarding the one God are found to dwell in them”373; and in On the City of God, VIII: “It is true that a Christian man learned in ecclesiastical literature is on guard against those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, rather than according to God, who made the world. For, he is admonished by an apostolic precept which says: ‘Be careful not to be led astray by philosophy and vain seduction, based on the elements of this world.’ But then, lest all philosophers be considered this way, he hears from the same Apostle the following statement about some of them. That is, what is known of God is clear to them. For, God has revealed it to them”374; and in On the Morals of the Church: “The very name of philosophy, if considered, signifies something most noble, to be desired with the whole soul, if indeed philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom. Most cautiously, the Apostle, lest he seem deterred from the love of wisdom, added the phrase, “based on the elements of this world.” For, some who abandon virtue and ignore what God is, and how much majesty in nature remains always the same, think they are doing something great if they scrutinize most inquisitively and carefully this entire mass of body which we call the world. Wherefore, also, so much hubris is engendered that they seem to dwell in heaven itself, which they often discuss.”375 The same sentiment is found in On Order, at the end of book I: “One must shun altogether the philosophers of this world, and take them as laughable, but not altogether the philosophies of Sacred Scripture. For, whoever considers that one must flee from all philosophy, wishes us nothing else than not to love wisdom”376; similarly, in book II of the same work: “I myself, if I can give some advice to my people, from my perspective and personal experience, recommend them instruction in all disciplines.”377 Hence, Jerome says in regard to the three children in Daniel [see Dan. 1:8]: “Those who refused to partake in the table and wine of the king lest they be defiled, would not have delved into illicit learning had they known that the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians was sinful.”378 Wherefore, regarding that passage in Exodus, III, A woman may request from her neighbor and guest [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss says: “Poets and philosophers are in a way our neighbors,”379 since we agree on many things. Utensils of silver and gold [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss: “We ask for silver and gold from the Egyptians, so that we may fashion the tabernacle, whereas we read poets and philosophers so that we may read the divine Scriptures more wisely and fluently.”380 And clothing [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss: “Pertaining to morals and good actions.”381 You also will put them on [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss: “Through education.”382 On your sons [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss: “Our ancestors”383; and daughters [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss: “The descendants.”384 And you will plunder Egypt [Exod. 3:22], the Gloss: “By taking what is useful for the tabernacle of the Lord.”385

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Scientia autem necessaria est Sacra Scriptura, cui principaliter studendum est, et omni alteri propter ipsam, ut infra dicetur.

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “scientiis philosophicis studere est in vanitate ambulare,” dicendum quod verum est studentibus in illis propter se et ad immorandum et delectandum aut ad libidinem aliquam. Retorquendo tamen illas ad meliorem usum, Sacrae scilicet Scripturae, ut infra dicetur, non est ita. Unde Hieronymus super epistolam Ad Titum: “Geometria, arithmetica, et musica habent in sua scientia veritatem, sed illa non est scientia pietatis.” Potest tamen proficere ad vitam, dum fuerit in meliores usus assumpta. Ad secundum, quod propter studium aliarum scientiarum est homo corripiendus, dicendum quod verum est, dum homo nimis eis vult immorari et delectari propter quod erat correptus Hieronymus. Non autem est corripiendus qui studet in illis, ut vera inventa in illis ad meliorem usum convertat et propter alias causas, quae infra dicentur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus IIo De doctrina christiana: “In omnibus tenendum est ne quid nimis attemptetur.” Ad tertium, quod “scientiae philosophicae ducunt in errorem, et non valent ad salutem,” dicendum quod scientiae aut scripta quae non valent ad salutem, sed ducunt in errorem, quia haeresim contra sacram doctrinam continent, sicut continent plurima scripta philosophorum, aut auctor eorum per ecclesiam reprobatus est et damnatus, aut non. Si sic, “non debent admitti,” neque studendum est in illis, quamvis aliqua utilia contineant, ut 16a “Canones,” , Extravaganti, de hereticis, “Fraternitatis,” et maxime cum damnatus est auctor ante mortem. Si enim damnatus fuerit post mortem, scripta observantur ratione bonae scientiae quam continent, licet aliqua habent erronea, ut scripta Origenis, ut XVIa quaestione 7a, et maxime cum postmodum fuerint approbata in bene dictis, sicut erant scripta Origenis, secundum quod haec notantur a Glossa, Extravaganti, de hereticis,“Fraternitatis.” Si ergo error nec ante mortem auctoris nec post mortem fuit damnatus, sicut errores philosophiae plurimi per sententiam Ecclesiae numquam erant damnati, sententiae bonae talium tenendae sunt, et in scriptis eorum studere licet, nec vitandae sunt propter vitium personarum, etiamsi aliqua falsa contineant, sed propter illa falsa sunt cavendae, secundum quod dicit Augustinus capituli IIIi

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However, the indispensable science is Sacred Scripture, which should be studied above all, and all other studies are for its sake, as will be discussed below.386

To the first argument in opposition, “that to study the philosophical sciences is to walk in a path of vanity,” we must say that this is true about those who study them for their own sake, and for remaining in them and delighting in them, or for the sake of some passion. However, by redirecting them to a better use, namely for Sacred Scripture, as will be explained below, this is not the case. Whence, Jerome says regarding the Letter to Titus: “Geometry, arithmetic, and music are sciences that contain truth, but this is different from the science of piety.”387 Yet, philosophical science can improve one’s life when brought to better uses. To the second, that a human being ought to be chastised for studying other sciences, we must say that it is true, as long as a human being wishes to remain and delight in them exceedingly, which is why Jerome had been chastised. On the other hand, he who studies them in order to redirect their truths to a better use and for different reasons, as will be discussed below, should not be chastised. For this reason, Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, II: “One must have measure in all pursuits, lest too much of something lead one astray.”388 To the third, that “the philosophical sciences lead to error and are not valuable for salvation,” we must say that some sciences or writings are not valuable for salvation, but rather lead to error, since they contain heresies contrary to sacred teaching, as many writings of the philosophers do so contain, whether their author is rejected and condemned by the church or not. If the authors themselves are so condemned, “they must not be allowed,”389 nor must one study them, even though they may include some useful things,390 as stated in the Canons, 16, the Gloss, Extravaganti, “On Heretics” and “Of the Brotherhood,” and this is so mainly when the author was condemned before death. However, if the author was condemned after death, the writings are inspected because of the salutary knowledge they do contain, even though they have some errors, such as the writings of Origen,391 as in XVI, qu. 7,392 and especially when later they become officially approved, as were the writings of Origen, as noted by the Gloss, Extravaganti, “On Heretics” and “Of the Brotherhood.” Therefore, if the error was not condemned either before the death of the author or after death, as the many philosophical errors that were never condemned by the Church, the sound views of such authors should be preserved, and it is allowed to study their writings, nor should they be shunned on account of the deficiencies of the persons themselves, even if they may contain some falsehoods, but rather they must be approached carefully on account of those falsehoods, as

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quaestione 2a, “Dominus determinavit,” Apostolus dixit, “Cretenses malae bestiae, pigri corde”: “Si ergo Apostolus nescio cuius alienigenae testimonium, quia verum comperit, etiam si ipse attestatus est, cur nos apud quemcumque invenerimus quod Christi est, et verum est, etiamsi ille apud quem invenitur perversus et fallax est, non discernimus propter vitium quod habet homo, veritatem, quam non suam, sed Christi, habet?” Quaestio 5 Utrum studendum sit homini ut sciat singula eodem modo Circa quintum arguitur quod eodem modo studendum est homini ad investigandum scientiam de unoquoque. Primo sic. Illo modo studendum est homini investigare scientiam de unoquoque quo nata est sciri, quoniam, ut dicit Augustinus IIo De doctrina christiana, “scientiae verae non sunt ab hominibus institutae, sed animadversae, et in rerum ratione et natura compertae.” Sed unus est modus et idem quo unumquodque natum est sciri, scilicet ex suis causis, secundum quod dicitur IIo Metaphysicae: “Nos non scimus veritatem absque eo quod scimus causam eius.” Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Quod inest homini a natura idem est et eodem modo se habet respectu cuiuslibet obiecti, ut patet in visu respectu colorum. Sed modus sciendi ad investigandum scientiam nobis est innatus secundum Philosophum Io Physicorum: “Innata est nobis via a certioribus nobis et notioribus.” Ergo etc. Contra est quoniam, si eodem modo studendum est ad investigandum scientiam in unoquoque, ergo aequali perscrutatione. Hoc autem reprehendit Philosophus, cum dicit IIo Metaphysicae: “Non oportet quaerere in qualibet scientia perscrutationem sicut in mathematicis.” Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod ponere quod eodem modo studendum est ad investigandum scientiam de unoquoque est summum impedimentum investigandi scientiam in pluribus scibilibus, ad quod habent reduci omnia impedimenta sciendi quae determinat Philosophus IIo Metaphysicae. Si enim idem esset

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Augustine says in chapter III, question 2, “The Lord Has Determined,” on the Apostle’s passage, the Cretans are evil beasts with a lazy spirit [Titus 1:12]: “Therefore, if the Apostle [states this] on the testimony of someone of an alien race, whom I ignore, because he verified it, even if he himself bears witness to this fact, why don’t we, when we find what belongs to Christ in anyone, as well as its truth, even if the person in whom it is found is corrupt and deceitful, distinguish between the vice of the person, and truth he has, which is not his property, but Christ’s?”393 Question 5 Whether a human being should employ the same method of study in order to know each thing Concerning the fifth question, it is argued that a human being should employ the same method of study when seeking knowledge of each thing. First, as follows. A human being should study to seek knowledge of each thing in the manner by which the thing is apt to be known, because, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, II, “true sciences are not established by human beings, but rather noticed and discovered in the order and nature of things.”394 But each thing is apt to be known in one and the same way, namely through its causes, as is said in Metaphysics, II: “We do not know a truth without knowing its cause.”395 Therefore, etc. Second, thus. What belongs to a human being by nature is the same, and relates to any object in the same way, as is evident with regard to sight in relation to color. But the method of knowing employed when seeking knowledge is innate to us, according to the Philosopher in Physics, I: “The way of proceeding, starting from the things that are more certain and more familiar to us, is innate to us.”396 Therefore, etc. On the contrary, if the same method of study should be employed when seeking knowledge in each field, then the precision would be equal. However, the Philosopher rejects this, when he says in Metaphysics, II: “It is not proper to expect from any science the precision found in the mathematical sciences.”397 Therefore, etc.

Concerning this question, we must say that to maintain that one should employ the same method of study when seeking knowledge of each thing is the greatest obstacle in the search for knowledge of the variety of knowable entities,398 from which stem all the obstacles to knowledge defined by the Philosopher in Metaphysics, II.399 For,

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modus investigandi omnem scientiam, cum modus investigandi idem est cum modo sciendi, quia ex eisdem habet res sciri et scientia eius investigari, idem esset modus sciendi omnia quae sciuntur, et ulterius, cum ex modo sciendi habetur scientiae certitudo, eadem et aequalis esset scientiae certitudo in omnibus quae sciuntur. Unde cum impossibile sit quod sit eadem et aequalis certitudo sciendi omnia, ut dictum est supra, impossibile est omnino quod sit idem modus sciendi, sive idem modus scientiam investigandi in omnibus sive idem modus studendi, ut scientia investigetur in omnibus, et hoc neque in notitia principiorum quando eam opus est declarare, neque in notitia conclusionum. Ignorantia igitur modi sciendi summum est impedimentum investigandae veritatis circa unumquodque scibile, et e converso cognitio modi sciendi summum est promotivum. Propter quod dicit Augustinus De utilitate credendi: “Non putabam latere veritatem, nisi quod in ea quaerendi modus lateret.” Ad cognoscendum igitur modos sciendi in scientiis, advertendum est quod habet diversificari modus sciendi, sicut studendi ad investigandum scientiam, ex tribus: ex materia, ex proprietate scientiae, et ex dispositione scientis. De primo dicit Boethius Io De Trinitate: “Unumquodque ut intelligi atque capi potest inspiciamus. Nam optime videtur illud dictum: ‘eruditi est hominis unumquodque ut ipsum est, ita de eo fidem capere temptare.’ Nam cum tres sint speculativae scientiae partes, naturalis est in motu et inabstracta, mathematica vero sine motu inabstracta, theologia vero sine motu et abstracta—et loquitur Boethius de abstractione reali—, in naturalibus ergo rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinabiliter, in divinis vero intellectualiter versari oportet.” De duobus etiam primis dicit Philosophus simul in principio Ethicorum: “Non oportet certitudinem in omnibus similiter exquirere, sed in singulis secundum subiectam naturam,” et in tantum in quantum proprium est doctrinae. De tertio dicitur in principio Physicorum: “Innata est nobis via ex prioribus et notioribus nobis.” Primo igitur studendum ad investigandum scientiam circa unamquamque rem secundum naturam subiecti et materiae, secundum quod dicitur in Io Ethicorum: “In unoquoque dicetur sufficienter, si secundum subiectam materiam

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if the method of investigating all knowledge would be the same, then, because the method of investigation is the same as the method of knowing (since a thing is both known and investigated as a knowable object from the same principles), then the manner of knowing all that is known would be the same; and further, since the certitude of knowledge is derived from the manner of knowing, the certitude of knowledge would be the same and uniform among all the things that are known. Wherefore, since it is impossible for certitude to be the same and uniform when knowing all things, as stated above,400 it is entirely impossible that the method of knowing be one and the same always, whether it be the same method of searching for knowledge in each case or the same method of study whereby knowledge is searched in each case, and this cannot occur either in terms of knowledge of principles, when the task is to indicate it, or in terms of knowledge of conclusions. Therefore, ignorance of the method of knowing is the greatest obstacle in the investigation of truth concerning each knowable thing, and conversely, knowledge of the method of knowing is most conducive to this end. That is why Augustine says in On the Benefit of Believing: “I did not think truth was hidden, unless the way to seek it was hidden.”401 Accordingly, in order to recognize the methods of knowing in the sciences, we must point out that the method of knowing varies, as does the method of study in the search for knowledge, according to three factors: the subject matter, the special character of the science, and the disposition of the knower. Regarding the first factor, Boethius says in On the Trinity, I: “We should consider each thing in terms of how it can be understood or grasped. For, the following saying seems most appropriate: ‘a learned person deals with each thing as it is, and in this way tries to hold a belief about it.’ For, since there are three areas of theoretical science—natural science which is in motion and not in abstraction, mathematics which is without motion and not in abstraction, and theology which is without motion and in abstraction”—and Boethius is referring to abstraction in reality—“therefore, it is suitable to engage in natural studies scientifically, in mathematics systematically, and in the divine science intellectually.”402 Concerning the first two factors, the Philosopher also refers to them simultaneously at the beginning of the Ethics: “It is not suitable to demand uniform certitude in all areas, but rather according to the nature of the subject in each area,”403 and to the extent that it belongs to the special character of the given area of learning. Regarding the third factor, he says at the beginning of the Physics: “The method of proceeding from the things that are prior and more familiar to us is innate to us.”404 Therefore, first one should study in search for knowledge of each thing according to the nature of the subject matter, as stated in Ethics, I: “There will be an adequate treatment in each case, when it is evidenced according to the subject matter. For, it

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manifestetur. Disciplinati enim est in tantum certitudinem inquirere secundum unumquodque genus in quantum rei natura recipit. Proximum enim et simile inconveniens videtur mathematicum persuadendo scientiam suam investigare et rhetorem demonstrando.” Et hoc intelligendum quando est possibile investiganti secundum materiae exigentiam procedere, sicut contingit in moralibus et mathematicis. In moralibus enim, ut dicitur Io Ethicorum, “oportet grosse et figuraliter veritatem manifestare,” et hoc propter incertitudinem materiae et variationem particularium, circa quae sunt moralia. In talibus enim, ut dicitur in principio Topicorum, “habemus sufficienter methodum, quoniam similiter habemus ut in rhetorica et medicina, et in huiusmodi scientiis coniecturalibus, hoc est ex contingentibus facere quae appetimus,” et de nullo subtilem rationem assignare, sed aliquantulum figuraliter pertransire. In mathematicis autem est e contrario. In illis enim propter materiae abstractionem a materia et transmutatione secundum intellectum oportet investigare veritatem secundum perscrutationem maximam, et “demonstrationibus in primo genere certitudinis,” ut dicitur IIo Metaphysicae, et cum hoc etiam “quia in illis ea quae sunt priora et notiora simpliciter sunt priora et notiora nobis,” ut dicit Commentator super principium Physicorum. Secundo autem est studendum ad investigandum scientiam propter proprietatem doctrinae, secundum quod de angulo gnomonis rector aedificiorum inquirit an sit rectus, in quantum valet ad opus suum regulandum, et hoc per experimentum et signa apparentia. Geometra vero inquirit idem ut cognoscat ipsum quale quid sit in se, non in ordinatione ad aliquod opus, et per rationem et causam demonstrativam, sicut dicitur Io Ethicorum. Tertio studendum est ad investigandum scientiam in unoquoque secundum dispositionem investigantis, inchoando scilicet a prioribus et notioribus sibi, et prosequendo ad investigandum minus nota sibi, etsi aliquando illa sunt magis nota in natura sua, ut contingit in scientia naturali et divina. Naturalia enim nobis sunt occulta et incerta propter se et propter materiam magis quam propter nos; divina e converso magis propter nos, quia sumus indispositi ad ipsa capienda, quam propter se, ut dicit Commentator super IIum Metaphysicae et dictum est supra. Unde errant qui in talibus, maxime in divinis, exquisitam quaerunt perscrutationem, sed sufficere debet in eis manuductio nobis proportionalis, quia in divinis secundum exigentiam materiae in perscrutando “procedere non

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is proper to a learned person to seek as much certitude in a genus of things as the nature of the given reality admits. For, it seems alike and similarly unfitting for a mathematician to investigate in his science by persuasion, and for a rhetorician to do so by demonstration.”405 And this should be understood as applying to cases when it is possible for the student to proceed according to the demands of the subject matter, as happens in morals and mathematics. For, in morals, as stated in book I of the Ethics, “it is necessary to manifest the truth roughly and figuratively,”406 and this is due to the uncertainty of the subject matter and the variability of particular cases, which morals treats. Indeed in such subjects, as stated at the beginning of Topics, “we possess an adequate method, since this is similar to what we have in rhetoric and medicine, and in sciences of that sort based on conjecture; this means that we do what we strive for with what we have at hand,”407 and in none do we assign an exact account, but rather carry on a bit figuratively. On the other hand, the contrary applies to the mathematical sciences. For in them, due to the subject matter’s abstraction from matter and change at the hands of the intellect, it is fitting to investigate the truth at the highest degree of precision, “and by means of demonstrations of the highest order of certitude,”408 as stated in Metaphysics, II, and this is so too “because in these sciences, the things that are prior and more known in an absolute sense, are prior and more known to us,”409 as the Commentator says with regard to the beginning of the Physics. Second, however, one should study in search for knowledge as defined by the special character of the field of learning, just as the master builder inquires if the angle of the gnomon is a right angle, to the extent that this serves the plan of his work, and this he settles through experiment and visible signs. Geometry, on the other hand, inquires into the right angle in order to know what it is as such, not in order to craft a work, and through an account and cause that is demonstrative, as stated in Ethics, I.410 Third, one should study in search for knowledge in each area according to the disposition of the student, namely by starting with the things that are prior and more familiar to him, and then continuing with the investigation of what is less known to him, even if sometimes those things are more known in their very nature, as happens in natural science and theology. Indeed the natural things around us are hidden and uncertain more on account of themselves and on account of matter, than on our account; divine things, conversely, are more so on our account than theirs, since we are ill-suited to grasp them, as the Commentator remarks on book II of the Metaphysics411 and as stated above.412 Wherefore, those who expect perfect scrutiny in those areas, especially concerning divine things, are misdirected, but rather in them a treatment that is proportional to us should suffice, since due to the demands of the examination of the subject matter

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possumus propter illorum excellentiam et animarum nostrarum infirmitatem,” ut dicit Avicenna in Io Metaphysicae suae, secundum quod etiam dicit Plato in Timaeo tractaturus de caelestibus et divinis: “Praedico,” inquit, “nunc iam, Socrates: si dum de natura universae rei disputatur, minime inconcussas inexpugnabilesque rationes afferre valuerimus, ne miremini, quin potius illud intuere, si consentaneas affectiones afferam. Memento enim tam me qui loquor quam vos qui iudicatis homines fore, atque in rebus ita sublimibus mediocrem explanationem magni cuiusdam onus esse laboris.” Et contingit iste modus investigandi veritatem iuxta nostram possibilitatem, non solum circa totas scientias, sed circa principia scientiarum, quarum cognitio, cum non fuerit manifesta nobis, investiganda est diversimode, secundum quod nobis poterit manifestari. Licet enim manifestissima sunt in sua natura, nobis tamen aliquando possunt esse occulta, secundum quod dicit Philosophus VIo Metaphysicae: “Omnis scientia habet principia, aut secundum finem certitudinis, aut secundum perscrutationem simplicem”; et secundum quod ibi dicit alia translatio, “quaedam habent principia certiora, quaedam simpliciora.” “Et intendit,” ut dicit Commentator, “simpliciora illa quae non sunt valde certa.” Et ideo oportet ea quandoque notificare, non tamen uno et eodem modo, sed secundum quod facilius nobis possunt innotescere, quia, ut dicitur Io Ethicorum, “quaedam comtemplantur inductione,” ut illa “si ab aequalibus aequalia demas quae remanent sunt aequalia” et “si aequalibus aequalia addas, tota sunt aequalia”; “quaedam vero contemplantur sensu,” ut elementorum qualitates: calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum; “quaedam vero consuetudine quadam,” ut quae sunt virtutum moralium; “alia vero experientia,” ut vires medicinarum; “alia vero aliter,” ut potentiae rerum naturales per suos effectus. Secundum igitur hunc modum diversimode temptandum est nobis studendo singulorum notitiam investigare, secundum quod innata sunt cognosci, vel in se vel secundum proprietatem scientiae, maxime autem secundum possibilitatis nostrae dispositionem, et hoc “ut non extra opera plurima fiant,” et multiplicetur super nos inquisitio eius quod excedit opus negotii, ut dicitur Io Ethicorum.

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when dealing with divine things, “we cannot advance due to their excellence and our weakness,”413 as Avicenna says in book I of his Metaphysics, and as Plato also states in the Timaeus when he is about to discuss heavenly and divine matters: “Now,” it reads, “I make this warning besides, Socrates: if while the nature of the reality of the universe is discussed, we are only fit to convey accounts that fall short of being firm and unassailable, we should not be surprised that we are not more capable of seeing that reality, if I am to convey impressions that are appropriate. For, remember that both I who speak and you who judge are human beings, and that concerning things that are of such high rank a moderate explanation is a burden of considerable effort for us.”414 Moreover, this method of searching for truth according to our ability takes place not only with respect to all sciences, but also with respect to scientific principles, whose cognition (when it is not evident to us) must be sought in different ways, whereby it can be made evident to us. For, although they are most evident in their nature, sometimes they still can be hidden from us, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, VI: “Every science has principles, either in terms of maximum certitude or in terms of simple examination”415; and according to what another translation states there, “some have principles that are more certain, others principles that are simpler.”416 “And by ‘simpler,’ he means,” the Commentator points out, “those principles which are not openly certain.”417 Therefore, it is necessary at times to make them known, yet not by one and the same method, but rather as they can be made known more readily to us, because, as stated in book I of the Ethics, “some are noticed by induction,” for instance, “if you subtract equals from equals, equals remain,”418 and “if you add equals to equals, the sums are equal”; “however, some are noticed by sense perception,” such as the qualities of elements: hot, cold, humid, dry; “but others by a certain habituation,” such as the properties of moral virtues; “while others by experience,” such as the strengths of medicines; “and others by other means,”419 such as the potencies of natural beings through their effects. Therefore, in this sense we should try to search for knowledge of each thing by different methods of study, according to how things are naturally suited to be known, either in themselves, or according to the special character of the science, but especially according to the capabilities of our disposition, and this is meant “in order not to generate unrelated tasks,”420 so that our inquiry is extended beyond the purpose at hand, as stated in Ethics, I.

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Ad primum in oppositum, quod “unumquodque natum est sciri ex suis causis,” dicendum quod verum est in rebus habentibus causas. Hoc dico propter scientias quae sunt de primis principiis cuiuslibet entis, quae carent causis. Quia tamen in rebus habentibus causas, illae nobis frequenter sunt incognitae, oportet praestituere nobis ordinem e contrario his quae sunt a principio, et sic melius proficere, sicut in his quae addiscimus, ut dicitur Io Metaphysicae. Et quia nobis in diversis diversimode via est ad principia et causas, ideo diversus studendi modus est in diversis scientiis, sicut et investigandi et addiscendi eas, nec solum propter nos, sed etiam propter proprietatem materiae et condicionem scientiae quandoque, ut dictum est. Ad secundum, quod “inest nobis a natura procedere a notioribus nobis,” dicendum quod iste modus semper debet esse principalis, sed tamen in diversis diversimode ex nobis notioribus minus nota investigantur, ut in moralibus ab his quae frequenter homines agunt, in naturalibus ab effectibus qui apparent, et sic diversimode in diversis, ut dictum est circa declarationem principiorum. Et illa diversitas frequenter accidit propter materiae proprietatem et propter scientiae condicionem, ut dictum est. Quaestio 6 Utrum studendum sit homini scire propter se Circa sextum arguitur quod studendum est homini scire propter se. Primo sic. Studendum est homini per se propter intellectus perfectionem et ignorantiae amotionem. Sed ipso scire intellectus perficitur et ignorantia amovetur. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Omnis actio ordinata ad aliquid ut ad finem ultimum, est ad illud propter ipsum. Finis ultimus studii humani, cum studere sit actus proprius rationis, est ipsum scire, quia est ultimum in quod potest ratio ut ratio est. Ergo etc. Tertio sic. Ad illud studendum est propter se quod studens propter se desiderat et propter quod acquirendum studere intendit. Scire est huiusmodi, secundum quod dicit Philosophus Io Metaphysicae: “Scire,” inquit, “desiderans propter se maxime scientiam desiderabit. Hoc autem maxime scientis est.” Unde

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To the first argument in opposition, that “each thing is apt to be known from its causes,” we must say that this is true among things that have causes. I say this keeping in mind that there are sciences concerning the first principles of being as such, which principles lack causes. However, since frequently, regarding things that have causes, these causes are unknown to us, it is necessary for us to follow a reverse order beginning with things derived from principles, and thus we advance more effectively, by gradually increasing our learning, as stated in Metaphysics, I.421 And since for us the way to principles and causes differs in different areas, the mode of study therefore is different in different sciences, as is also the mode of investigating and learning them, not only on account of us, but also on account of the peculiarity of the subject matter and condition of the science each time, as stated. To the second, that “it belongs to us by nature to proceed from the things that are more familiar to us,” we must say that this method always should be the chief one, yet in different subjects what is less known is sought from what is more familiar to us through different methods, as in morals we depart from what human beings frequently do, in natural science from evident effects, and thus differently in different subjects, as stated with reference to the exposition of principles. Moreover, that diversity frequently occurs because of the peculiarity of the subject matter and because of the condition of the science, as stated. Question 6 Whether a human being should pursue knowledge for its own sake Regarding the sixth question, it is argued that a human being should pursue knowledge for its own sake. First, as follows. A human being per se should study to perfect the intellect and remove ignorance. However, through knowing as such the intellect is perfected and ignorance removed. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Every action ordered to a thing that serves as final end, seeks that thing for its own sake. The final end of human study (since study is the proper act of reason422) is knowing as such, since it is the final end that reason, as reason, can reach. Therefore, etc. Third, thus. Something is pursued for its own sake when the student desires it for its own sake, and aims to study for the sake of its acquisition. Knowing is that sort of thing, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, I: “He who desires to know for its own sake,” it reads, “will desire knowledge to the highest degree. This is also

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et consequenter addit dicens quod “philosophi propter id quod est scire et intelligere, philosophati sunt, et non commodi alicuius causa. Et quod ideo sapientia philosophica libera est, quia est sui ipsius gratia.” Contrarium est illud Apostoli Ia Corinthios XIIIo “Si habuero prophetiam,” Glossa: “futurorum notitiam”; “et noverim mysteria omnia,” Glossa: “occulta novi et veteris testamenti”; “et noverim omnem scientiam,” Glossa: “divinam et humanam”; “caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum,” Glossa: “nihil mihi prodest” ad vitam. Sed ad tale non est studendum propter se. Ergo etc.

Ad intellectum quaestionis in principio est hic advertendum quod, cum quaeritur an studendum est homini ut sciat propter se, id est, propter ipsum scire, interrogatio potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, ut li “propter” dicat circumstantiam causae formalis, alio modo ut dicat circumstantiam causae finalis. Si causae formalis, cum scientia de se formaliter bona et delectabilis sit et desiderabilis, ut merito propter eam studeat homo, secundum quod dicit Tullius De Academicis: “Nihil est humanae menti veritate dulcius,” hoc modo bene concedi potest quod studendum est homini scire propter se, scilicet formaliter, sed hoc non excludit quin studendum est propter aliud finaliter, secundum quod virtutes et propter se sunt expetendae, tamquam in se bonae et delectabiles formaliter, et propter aliud, quia propter felicitatem finaliter, secundum etiam quod amicos dicimur diligere propter se, etsi nobis nihil boni inde contingeret, etsi in India essent, ut Philosophus vult. Si vero interrogatio intelligatur ut li “propter” notat circumstantiam causae finalis, ut scilicet scire ponatur finis ultimus studentis, non ad aliquid aliud ulterius ordinandus, dicunt aliqui quod quantum est ex parte ipsius scire, ipsi non est studendum propter se in statu vitae praesentis. Cuius rationem assignant quoniam status vitae praesentis est status meriti, et meritum non procedit ex intellectu, sed ex affectu, nec ex scire, sed ex agere, nec ex lectione, sed ex devotione. “Servus enim sciens voluntatem domini sui et non faciens vapulabit multis,” et ut dicit Iacob, “melius est viam domini non agnoscere quam post agnitam retroire.” In statu ergo huius vitae dicunt quia non est

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characteristic of the knower above all.”423 Wherefore, he consequently adds that “philosophers have philosophized for the sake of knowing and understanding, and not because of some ulterior advantage. Moreover, that is why philosophical wisdom is free, since it is for its own sake.”424 On the contrary, there is what the Apostle says in the First Letter to the Corinthians, XIII: If I shall have prophecy [1 Cor. 13:2], the Gloss: “knowledge of what is to come”425; and shall know all mysteries [1 Cor. 13:2], the Gloss: “the secrets of the New and Old Testaments”426; and shall know every science [1 Cor. 13:2], the Gloss: “divine and human”427; but shall not possess charity, I am nothing [1 Cor. 13:2], the Gloss: “it profits me nothing”428 for life’s purpose. But for such a purpose one should not study for its own sake. Therefore, etc.

In order to understand this question, first of all we must point out here that, when it is asked whether a human being should study to know for its own sake, that is, for the sake of knowing as such, the question can be understood in two senses: in one sense, the phrase ‘for the sake of’ indicates an instance of the formal cause, while in another sense, it indicates an instance of the final cause. With reference to the formal cause, since knowledge of itself is essentially good and pleasant and desirable, so that a human being rightly studies for its sake—as Cicero says in On the Academics: “Nothing is sweeter for the human mind than truth,”429—in this sense, one may well grant that a human being should study for its own sake, namely in terms of form, but this does not exclude that one should study for the sake of something else as a final cause; thus, the virtues are both desirable for themselves insofar as they are good and pleasant essentially, and also desirable on account of something else, namely on account of happiness as the final cause; thus too, we are said to love friends for themselves, even if we derive no advantage from that—even if they live in India, as the Philosopher would have it.430 On the other hand, if the question is understood in the sense that the phrase “for the sake of” indicates an instance of the final cause, namely so that knowing is considered as the final end of the student, without being for the sake of anything else beyond that, some thinkers claim that—concerning the very knowing as such—one should not pursue it for its own sake in the present life. The reason they provide is that the condition of the present life is one based on merit, and merit does not derive from the intellect, but rather from the affection, not from knowing, but rather from acting, not from reading, but rather from devotion. For, the servant that knows the will of his lord, but does not act will be beaten many times [Luke 12:47], and, as Jacob says, it is better not to know the way of the Lord than to regress after having known it

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omnino homini studendum ut sciat propter se, statum scilicet faciendo in scire, sed ut sciendo cognoscat quid agere, et ad quid tendere debeat. Dicunt igitur quod qualitercumque erit in patria caelesti, sive visio futura perfectior sit quam amor, sive fruitio, an e converso, in via tamen merendi hic proculdubio actio praeferenda est cognitioni. Melius est enim, ut dicunt, facere et non scire quam scire et non facere. Quare cum actus studii non respicit nisi modum acquirendi scientiam via rationalis deductionis procedendo a noto ad ignotum, ut per notum cognoscatur ignotum—qui locum non habebit in patria, ubi cognitiones nostrae discursivae a noto ad ignotum non erunt, sed solum locum habet hic in via—, dicunt absolute dicendum quod non est studendum homini finaliter ut sciat propter se, id est propter ipsum scire, ibi stando. Hoc enim est vanitas vanitatum et fuit vanitas philosophorum, quoniam “cum cognovissent Deum,” secundum quod dicit Apostolus Romanos Io, “quod notum est Dei manifestum est illis,” Glossa: “quod de Deo est cognoscibile ductu rationis, notum est illis.” Et tamen “non sicut Deum eum glorificaverunt,” Glossa: “bene vivendo et colendo.” “Evanuerunt in cogitiationibus suis,” putantes se esse aliquid cum nihil essent, quod revera vanitas erat summa. Et ideo “dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt,” revera stulti, ponendo beatitudinem in cognitione quam habere poterant per creaturas, quae solum ponenda est in cognitione creatoris. Et ideo dicit Augustinus IIo De doctrina christiana, loquens de notitia creaturarum quam habebant philosophi: “Illa,” inquit, “plurimum intellectum adiuvat; tantum absit error quo videntur sibi homines ipsam verae vitae veritatem didicisse cum ista didicerint.” Istorum positio non potest stare. Cum enim omnis actio virtutum moralium ad serenandum oculum mentis ordinetur, ut mundatus possit Deum videre, et hic quantum possibile est per intellectum et fidem, in futuro vero per speciem, superior profecto et perfectior est notitia sciendi Deum et divina quam omnis virtutis moralis actio; non est ergo scire simpliciter propter agere, sed e converso. Et quod scire dirigit agere, hoc est propter se, ut clarius contingat scire oculo mentis serenato per agere. Nec est agere per virtutes morales omnino maioris meriti quam secundum intellectuales; immo e converso quantum est de genere operis maioris meriti est opus contemplative

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[2 Pet. 2:21]. Therefore, in the state of this life, they claim that a human being should not at all study to know for its own sake—ceasing his activity as he rests in knowing—but instead, by knowing he should recognize what to do, and to what aim he should direct himself. They claim, therefore, that whatever may be the case in the heavenly fatherland, whether contemplation in the future life is more perfect than love or delight, or conversely, still in this life of merit action is undoubtedly preferable to cognition. For, it is better, they say, to act and not know than to know and not act. Wherefore, since the act of study relates only to the acquisition of knowledge through rational deduction going from the known to the unknown, so that through the known the unknown is recognized—which procedure will not take place in heaven (where our cognition will not be discursive, going from known to unknown), but rather only takes place in this life—they say one should claim absolutely that a human being should not study for the end of knowing for its own sake, namely for the sake of the very knowing, resting therein. For this is the vanity of vanities [cf. Eccles. 1:2] and was the vanity of the philosophers, since when they had recognized God [Rom. 1:21], as the Apostle says in the First Letter to the Romans, what is known about God became clear to them [Rom. 1:19]; the Gloss: “what can be recognized about God by means of reason became known to them.”431 And yet, they did not glorify Him as God [Rom. 1:21]; the Gloss: “by living righteously and by worshipping.”432 They have vanished in their reasonings [Rom. 1:21], thinking they were something when they were nothing, which truly is supreme vanity. And therefore, claiming they were wise, they were made fools [Rom. 1:22], fools indeed, by thinking that happiness is found in the cognition they were able to gather from creatures, while it only can be found in the cognition of the Creator. That is why Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, II, when discussing the knowledge which the philosophers had about creatures: “That knowledge,” it reads, “helps the intellect very much, as long as it avoids the error whereby human beings think themselves to have learned the truth itself of true life when they have learned about that [other knowledge].”433 Their position is untenable. For, since every action of the moral virtues is regulated to polish the eye of the mind, so that, made clean, it may see God (in this life, as far as possible through intellect and faith, but in the future life through vision), the knowledge found in the understanding of God and divine realities certainly is superior and more perfect than any action of moral virtue; therefore, knowing is not for the sake of acting in an absolute sense, but rather the contrary is the case. Instead, acting is ordered to knowing for its sake, so that knowing becomes clearer when the eye of the mind has been polished through actions. Nor is activity through the moral virtues entirely of greater merit than activity according to the intellectual virtues; rather, contrariwise, as far as the genus of work is concerned, contemplative work is

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quam active, et magis debet esse in electione, in quantum tamen contemplari ex voluntate imperatur et caritatis amore. Sed hoc declarari habet in quaestione de comparatione vitae activae et contemplativae. Dico autem ex caritatis amore, quia sine caritate nulla valet praesentis vitae actio, ut dictum est secundum Apostolum Ia Corinthios XIIIo, nec cognitio, quia scientia huius vitae, si sola sit, inflat, et non nisi per caritatem aedificat, ut dicitur Ia Corinthios VIIIo, ubi dicit Glossa: scientia, si sola est, “in superbiam” extollit. Ergo si vis non habere inflantem scientiam, “adde caritatem, et utilis erit scientia.” Per se enim inutilis est, ut patet in rationibus supra inductis ad hoc et etiam dictum est supra, secundum Apostolum Io Corinthios XIIIo. Qualitercumque ergo se habebit res in statu gloriae, in statu praesentis vitae non est studendum ad scire propter se, sed ut per habitam scientiam sciens ex cognito dirigatur in actionem, et hoc quantum ad scientias practicas, quantum vero ad scientias speculativas, ut amplius inflammetur ad amorem. Unde videtur esse distinguendum de scire et agere. Est enim quaedam scientia agibilium, quaedam vero speculabilium, similiter est quaedam actio executionis agibilium, quaedam vero dilectionis speculabilium. Loquendo de scientia et actione in agibilibus, scientia est propter actionem et actio est finis scientiae, ut in scientiis practicis, in quibus studendum non est scire propter se, sed propter opus, secundum quod dicit Philosophus de scientia ethicorum: “Praesens negotium non est ut sciamus, sed ut boni fiamus.” Loquendo vero de scientia et actione in speculabilibus, sic similiter scientia est propter actionem. Nec enim est studendum scire speculanda nisi dirigendo ad illa quae ex caritate sunt diligenda, ut cognita diligantur. Propter autem operanda primo modo non est studendum scientiae secundo modo dictae, sed propter ipsam magis est operandum illa operatione. Absolute ergo dicendum quod nulli scientiae studendum est scire propter se, sed semper propter aliud, aut propter actionem agendorum, ut in scientiis operativis, aut propter amorem diligendorum, ut in scientiis pure speculativis. Unde super illud Iae Corinthios VIIIo: “Scientia inflat, caritas autem aedificat,” dicit Glossa: “Addite scientiae caritatem, et utilis erit, scientia per se

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of greater merit than the work of action, and should be more choice-worthy,434 as long as contemplation still is commanded by the will and the love of charity.435 However, this issue is clarified in the question on the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.436 Still, I stress the love of charity, since without charity no action in the present life is worthy, as stated by the Apostle in the First Letter to the Corinthians, XIII [1 Cor. 13:1–3], nor is cognition thus worthy, since knowledge in this life, if it stands alone, makes one pompous, and is edifying only through charity, as stated in the First Letter to the Corinthians, VIII [1 Cor. 8:1], where the Gloss says: knowledge, if it stands alone, aggrandizes itself “into pride.”437 Therefore, it you do not want to have pompous knowledge, “add charity, and the knowledge will be useful.”438 For, on its own it is useless, as clarified by the reasons presented above on this issue, and as stated above too, according to the Apostle in the First Letter to the Corinthians, XIII [1 Cor. 13:2]. Therefore, howsoever may be the future state of glory, in the state of the present life one should not study to know for its own sake, but rather, instead, so that the knower is led into action based on understanding derived from the knowledge he has acquired (and this applies as much to the theoretical sciences as it does to the practical sciences), in order for the knower to become more driven by love. Wherefore it seems necessary to make distinctions regarding knowing and acting. For, some knowledge deals with what can be done, another with what can be contemplated; similarly, some action pertains to the execution of deeds, another to the enjoyment of contemplative truths. With reference to knowledge and action as it pertains to deeds, knowledge is for the sake of action and action is the end of knowledge, as is the case in the practical sciences, which are not pursued for the sake of knowledge as such, but rather for the sake of deeds, as the Philosopher says in regard to the science of ethics: “The task at hand is not for us to have knowledge, but rather to become good.”439 With reference to knowledge and action in contemplative matters, indeed knowledge is likewise for the sake of action. For, one should pursue knowledge of contemplative truths only as pointing to what should be loved out of charity, so that what is known becomes loved. However, for the sake of deeds in the first sense one should not pursue knowledge as defined in the second sense, but rather through this latter knowledge one should engage more intensely in that [loving] activity. Therefore, absolutely we must say that one should not pursue knowledge for its own sake in any science, but rather always for the sake of something else, whether for the sake of doing what ought to be done, as in the practical sciences, or for the sake of loving what we ought to hold dear, as in the purely theoretical sciences. Hence that passage from the First Letter to the Corinthians, VIII: Knowledge makes one pompous, but charity edifies [1 Cor. 8:1], on which the Gloss says: “Add charity

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inutilis est.” Quare nec praecipuae isti scientiae Sacrae Scripturae, cuius proprius “finis est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta,” et hoc tam quoad praecepta credendorum quam agendorum. Propter quod dicit Augustinus in Sermone de laude caritatis: “Totam magnitudinem et altitudinem divinorum eloquiorum secura possidet caritas, qua Deum proximumque diligimus,” ut infra dicetur, loquendo de auditore huius scientiae. Et ideo dicit Augustinus XIIIo De Trinitate: “Habet scientia modum suum bonum, si quod in ea inflare solet aeternorum caritate vincatur.” Unde dicit Bernardus: “Non probat apostolus multam scientiam si modum sciendi nescias. Modus autem sciendi est ut scias quo ordine, quo studio, quo fine nosse quaecumque oportet: quo ordine, ut illud prius quod maturius ad salutem; quo studio, ut id ardentius quod vehementius promovet ad amorem; quo fine, ut propter tuam et proximi utilitatem. Quidam enim student ut sciant, et curiositas est; quidam ut sciantur, et turpis vanitas est; quidam ut ditentur, et turpis quaestus est; quidam ut aedificent, et caritas est.”

Ad primum in oppositum, quod “scire est intellectus perfectio,” dicendum quod in argumento est figura dictionis commutando quale in quid. Cum enim dicitur quod studendum est homini propter perfectionem intellectus, “perfectio” stat ibi concretive, et supponit ibi ut quale. Sub hoc sensu studendum est homini propter perfectionem intellectus, id est, ut intellectus eius perfectus fiat. Supponit autem pro abstracto cum dicitur “scire est perfectio intellectus,” et ita ut quid. Scire enim est ipsa perfectio. Et ideo non sequitur conclusio pro abstracto quae pro concreto bene sequeretur. Haec est enim vera: studendum est homini ut sciat propter intellectus perfectionem, id est ut ipse intellectus sit perfectus. Illa tamen est falsa: studendum est homini ut sciat, id est propter ipsam scientiam sive propter ipsum scire. Licet enim scientia sit finis et perfectio intellectus—intellectus enim ultra scientiam nullo alio perficitur—, non tamen est finis sui ipsius ut sit propter se ipsam scientia

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to knowledge and it will be useful; knowledge per se is useless.”440 Therefore, these admonitions are not peculiar to the science of Sacred Scripture, whose proper end is charity from purity of heart and good conscience and genuine faith [1 Tim. 1:5], and this applies to precepts regarding both proper belief and proper action. That is why Augustine says in the Sermon in Praise of Charity: “Charity, by which we love God and neighbor, contains securely the entire scope and eminence of eloquent expression on the divine,”441 as will be stated below,442 when discussing the student of this science. Accordingly, Augustine also says in On the Trinity, XIII: “Knowledge has its own way of being good, if in it arrogance is trained to be overcome by love of eternal realities.”443 Wherefore Bernard claims: “The Apostle does not approve of much knowledge if you ignore the right way to know. And the right way to know is recognizing in which order, by which study, and to which end it is fitting to know anything: in which order, so that what is at the time more seasonable for salvation comes first; by which study, so that what engenders love more intensely is studied more passionately; to which end: for the benefit of both yourself and your neighbor. Some study in order to know, and then you have meddlesome curiosity; some in order to be known, and then you have ugly vanity; some in order to be rich, and then you have base profit; some in order to be edified, and then you have charity.”444

To the first argument in opposition, that “knowing is the perfection of the intellect,” we must say that the argument includes a figure of speech that replaces a quality with something essential (quid). For, when it is stated that a human being should study for the sake of the perfection of the intellect, “perfection” is taken there in a concrete sense, and stands there for a quality. In this sense, a human being should study for the sake of the perfection of the intellect, namely, so that his intellect becomes complete. However, the term stands for something abstract when it is said that “knowing is the perfection of the intellect,” and thus stands for something essential. For, knowing is this very perfection. And for that reason the conclusion does not follow in this abstract sense, while it could well follow in the concrete sense. This proposition is true: a human being should pursue knowledge for the sake of the perfection of the intellect, namely, so that the intellect itself becomes complete. Nevertheless, this other proposition is false: a human being should pursue knowledge, namely, for the sake of knowledge itself or for the sake of the very knowing. For, although knowledge is the end and perfection of the intellect445—since the intellect is not completed by anything else beyond knowledge—still it is not its very

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vel ipsum scire, et sit ultimus finis, et in eo sit status, quia scire ordinatur ad perfectionem ulteriorem in homine, ut dictum est. Ad secundum, quod “scire est finis humani studii,” dicendum quod de actu studii loquendum est dupliciter: uno modo secundum se et absolute, et sic solum verum est quod actus studendi est propter scire, ut propter ultimum finem eius, quia studens ut studens studio suo nihil amplius quaerit suo actu studendi nisi scire; alio autem modo loquendum est de actu studii ut cadit sub intentione voluntatis imperantis ipsum; sic non est verum quod actus studendi est ad scire propter se, quia voluntas hominis bene regulata imperans actum studendi in homine finem actus studendi qui est scire, in finem ulteriorem intendit dirigere, qui est finis alterius actus, ut actus amoris ad quem ordinatur actus studendi, ut dictum est, et hoc modo protenditur quaestio. Ad tertium, quod “studens propter se desiderat scire,” dicendum quod Philosophus, qui hoc dixit, consideravit hominis perfectionem in habitibus et actibus ex puris naturalibus acquisitis, aut per mores quoad virtutes practicas aut per studium quoad virtutes speculativas. Et ideo perfectionem hominis in puris naturalibus statuens scire ex scientiis speculativis ultimam ponit hominis perfectionem. Et revera bene in hoc posuit, ut alibi videbitur. Et ideo dixit quia homo scire desideraret propter se. In hoc tamen quod in scire ex rebus naturalibus posuit consistere ultimam hominis perfectionem nec posse ulla ulteriori perfici, in hoc erravit. Est enim ulterior perfectio illa quae consistit in gratuitis, quam homo natus est recipere, licet non ex puris naturalibus ad illam attingere possit, ut dictum est supra, et ad opus illius perfectionis gratuitae, quod est dilectionis et caritatis, ordinatur omnis scientia, sive naturalis sive supernaturalis, quia ipsa plus fini ultimo coniungit, in quo consistit ultima perfectio. Hinc dicit Hugo super VIIum capitulum Caelestis Hierarchiae: “Dilectio superveniens scientiae maior est. Plus enim Deus diligitur quam intelligitur. Intrat dilectio ubi scientia foris stat.”

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own end in the sense of being for the sake of knowledge itself or the very knowing, nor is it the final end whereby activity comes to rest, because knowing is ordered to a further perfection in a human being, as stated. To the second, that “knowing is the end of human study,” we must say that one should characterize the act of study in a twofold way: in one way, it is considered as such and absolutely, and thus it is only true that the act of study is for the sake of knowing as its final end, because the student as such, through his pursuit, does not seek anything else beyond knowing through his act of studying; however, in a different way, we must characterize the act of study as falling under the intention of the will which commands such an act. In this sense, it is not true that the act of studying is for the sake of knowing as such, since a well-regulated human will, commanding the act of studying in a human being towards its end, which is knowing, means to aim for an ulterior end, which is the end of another act, namely the act of love to which the act of studying is ordered, as stated, and in this way the search is extended. To the third, that “the student desires to know for its own sake,”446 we must say that the Philosopher, who said this, understood the perfection of a human being in terms of habits and actions acquired through purely natural means, either through regular practice leading to the practical virtues or through study leading to the intellectual virtues.447 And, therefore, basing human perfection on purely natural means, he supposes that the knowing proper to the theoretical sciences is the ultimate human perfection.448 In fact, to this extent, he supposed correctly, as will be shown elsewhere.449 For this reason, then, he said that a human being desired to know for its own sake. Nevertheless, he erred in supposing that the ultimate human perfection consists in the knowing derived from natural things, and that there cannot be a further human perfection. For, the additional perfection is the one based on the gift of grace, which a human being is apt to receive, although he cannot gain it through purely natural means, as stated above. Moreover, every science, whether natural or supernatural, is ordered to the activity of that freely given perfection, which is the activity of love and charity, since then science becomes more united to the final end, in which ultimate perfection consists. Hence, Hugh says in On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter VII: “The love that supervenes knowledge is greater. For, the love of God is higher than the knowledge of God. Love penetrates while knowledge remains external.”450

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Quaestio 7 Utrum homo studio suo terminum debeat imponere Circa septimum arguitur quod homo studio suo in acquirendo scientiam terminum aliquando debet imponere. Primo sic. Apostolus dicit: “Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem.” Sed si terminus studio non esset imponendus, numquam contingeret tantum sapere quin plus oporteret sapere. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Proverbiorum XXIIIo super illud “Noli laborare ut diteris,” Glossa: “scientia.” Et sequitur in textu: “Sed prudentiae tuae pone modum.” Non autem esset ei ponendus modus scientiae, si studio terminus non esset imponendus. Ergo etc. Contra est illud Ecclesiastici VIo: “Fili, a iuventute excipe doctrinam, et usque ad canos invenies sapientiam.” Sic autem facere numquam esset cessare secundum intentionem sapientis. Ergo etc. Item. Augustinus Io De Academicis dicit: “Philosophia est cuius uberibus nulla aetas quaerit excludi.” Ergo etc.

Dicendum ad hoc quod, cum ea quae sunt ad finem a fine determinari debent, et studium hominis in quacumque scientia finaliter ordinatur ad investigandum notitiam subiecti eius et eorum quae circa subiectum consideranda sunt, in tantum procedendum esse studium requirit scientia quaelibet, quousque notitia subiecti et eorum quae circa ipsum consideranda sunt haberi possint. Notandum igitur quod circa hoc aliter sentiendum est in studio Sacrae Scripturae et aliarum scientiarum. Cum enim in Sacra Scriptura studendum est, ut hic proficiendo per fidem circa illa quae traduntur in ea, perveniamus in futuro ad contuendum illa per speciem, in isto autem profectu quanto homo magis procedit, tanto magis proficit, et quanto amplius invenit, tanto amplius inveniendum sentit, in tali autem studio numquam est cessandum in via, quousque ad terminum aperte contuitionis perveniatur in patria, idcirco quantum ad studium Sacrae Scripturae absolute dicendum quod terminus studii in eo ponendus non est, immo dispositus et ordinatus ad hoc semper intentionem proficiendi amplius et amplius in ea habere debet, et hoc maxime

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Question 7 Whether a human being should impose a limit on his studies Concerning the seventh question, it is argued that a human being should impose a temporal limit on his pursuit of acquiring knowledge. First, as follows. The Apostle says: No more savoring than what is fitting to savor, but rather savor to be sober [Rom. 12:3]. But if a limit on study is not imposed, one would never savor only [the knowledge of] what is fitting to savor. Therefore, etc. Second, thus. Proverbs, XXIII, says refuse to labor to be rich [Prov. 23:4], and the Gloss specifies: “in knowledge.”451 And the text continues: But rather assign a measure to your wisdom [Prov. 23:4]. However, he would not assign a measure to knowledge without imposing a limit on study. Therefore, etc. On the contrary, there is that passage from Ecclesiasticus, VI: To a son: take on learning from youth, and you will continue to discover wisdom till old age [Ecclus. 6:18]. In this sense, however, as the wise intend it, the pursuit would never stop. Therefore, etc. Also, to the contrary, Augustine says in On the Academics: “Philosophy’s udders may be sought at any age.”452 Therefore, etc.

Concerning this question, we must say that since that which aims for an end should be determined by the end, and human study in any science is for the purpose of seeking knowledge of its subject and of what must be considered about the subject, a science requires delving into study to the point that knowledge of the subject, and of what must be considered about it, can be possessed. Therefore, we must point out that in this regard one should approach the study of Sacred Scripture differently from the other sciences. For, since one should study Sacred Scripture so that, by our progression in faith during this life regarding what is revealed in it, we may in the future life arrive at its contemplation through vision, but the more a human being proceeds in this progression the more he advances, and the more he discovers the more he feels he needs to discover, then one should never cease from such study along the way,453 until the end of open vision is reached in heaven; therefore, as far as the study of Sacred Scripture is concerned, absolutely we must say that one should not place a limit on it, but rather, prepared and geared to this end, one should aim at an ever greater progress regarding it,

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ideo, quia scibile in ipsa est infinitum, circa quod potest profectus procedere in infinitum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus Super Ioannem, parte IIa sermone IXo: “Divini cantici vox est: ‘Quaerite Dominum et vivet anima vestra.’ Quaeramus inveniendum, quaeramus inventum; ut inveniendus quaeratur, occultus est, ut inventus quaeratur, immensus est. Unde alibi dicitur: ‘Quaerite faciem eius semper.’ Satiat enim quaerentem, in quantum capit, invenientem capaciorem facit, ut rursus quaeratur implere ubi plus capere coeperit, quia ‘cum consummaverit homo, tunc incipit,’ donec ad illam vitam veniamus, ubi sic impleamur ut capaciores non efficiamur, quia et perfecti erimus ut iam non proficiamus. Tunc enim ostendetur nobis quod sufficit nobis. Hic autem semper quaeramus non ut fructus inventionis non sit finis inquisitionis, sed ideo hic semper dicimus quaerendum, ne aliquando hic putemus ab inquisitione cessandum, atque ita quarendo tendamus, et inveniendo ad aliquid perveniemus, et ad id quod restat quaerendo et inveniendo transimus, quousque ibi fiat finis quaerendi, ubi perfectioni non superest intentio proficiendi.” Et in sermone XLIIIo: “Spiritus Sanctus nunc docet fideles quanta quisque potest capere spiritualia et in eorum desiderium magis accendit, si quisque in ea caritate proficiat qua et diligat cognita et cognoscenda desideret, ita ut ea quoque ipsa quae nunc quandocumque cognoscit nondum se scire sciat, quomodo scienda sunt in ea vita, quam nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quo sciendi modo, si nunc ea vellet interior magister dicere, id est, nostrae menti aperire et monstrare, humana infirmitas portare non posset.” Unde dicit Chrysostomus in principio Super Matthaeum: “Non a pueritia eligi aliquos ad discendum iubentes, certum annorum numerum praefinientes ad consummandum studia virtutum, sed cunctis generaliter aetatibus differentes.” Unde Origenes in Homilia, quomodo Abraham accepit Cethuram in uxorem, exponens quomodo sancti in extrema aetate uxores duxerant, in typo sapientiae semper conquirendae, dicit sic: “Patriarcharum coniugia mysticum aliquod indicant sacramentum. Abraham quamvis esset senex, hoc tamen sciebat, quod sapientiae nullus est finis, nec discendi terminum senectus imponit. Sarae dormitio virtutis est intelligenda consummatio. Qui vero perfectae et consummatae virtutis est semper necesse est ut in aliqua eruditione versetur, quam eruditionem ‘coniugem’ eius sermo divinus appellat. Accepit ergo senex Abraham uxorem Cethuram. Maior enim ad sapientiam sensibus nostris capacitas inest, quando mortificatio Iesu circumfertur in corpore mortali. Quanto enim quis carne fessus est, tanto erit animi virtute

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especially because the knowable reality it treats is infinite, regarding which one’s progress could proceed infinitely, as Augustine says in On John, in part II of sermon IX: “The words of the holy song are: Search for the Lord and your soul will live [Ps. 68:33]. Let us search for what must be found, let us search for what has been found; as He who must be found, He is hidden, [and] as he who, already found, is searched, He has no measure. Whence it is said elsewhere: Seek His face forever [Ps. 104:4]. For He satisfies the seeker as much as he can take, making him who finds more capable, so that again he may seek to be filled where he can begin to take more, because ‘when a human being will have finished, then he begins,’ to the point that we arrive at that life, where we are filled without becoming more capable, since we will be perfect in a way that we no longer progress. For then what is sufficient for us is revealed to us. However, in this life, let us always search so that the reward of discovery is not the end of the search, but here we always say He must be sought, lest here we should consider stopping the search at a given point, and thus searching we may continue extending ourselves, and moreover by thus finding we will gain some ground, and cross the remaining part by searching and finding, until the end of the search is there, where the aim to progress does not exceed what is accomplished.”454 And in sermon XLIII: “The Holy Spirit now teaches the faithful as much spiritual truth as a given individual can receive and inflames his desire more, so that if anyone makes progress in that charity whereby he both delights in what is known and desires to know more, he may know that he also does not know yet those very things he now knows imperfectly, in the way they will be known in that life, which no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor reached by the human heart; this way of knowing is such that if the interior Master were willing to tell us these truths now, namely to reveal them and expose them to our minds, our human weakness could not withstand it.”455 Wherefore Chrysostom says at the beginning of On Matthew: “I did not elect children as leaders in learning, since a certain number of years is required to accomplish studies on virtue, however [this study applies] generally to all different ages.”456 Whence Origen in Homilies, noting how Abraham took Keturah as wife, and depicting how saints had married in old age as a metaphor of how wisdom should always be sought, says the following: “The marriages of the patriarchs indicate some mystical sacrament. Abraham, although he was an old man, still knew this, namely that there is no end to wisdom, and old age places no limit on learning. The death of Sarah is to be understood as the consummation of virtue. However, he who has perfect and consummate virtue always needs to engage in some learning, which learning the sacred word calls ‘spouse.’ Therefore, the old Abraham accepted Keturah as a wife. For, there is greater capacity for wisdom in our senses, when the death of Jesus is spread in a mortal body.457 For, the more someone is weary in body, the more vigorous will he be in virtue of soul, and the more apt for relations with

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robustior, et sapientiae complexibus aptior. Igitur ad tales nuptias per senectam nullus excluditur, immo maturae aetati plus convenit.” Propter quod dicit David in Psalmo: “Laetetur cor quaerentium Dominum et confirmamini, quaerite faciem eius semper.” Quod exponit Augustinus XIIo De Trinitate in principio, dicens: “Videtur quod semper quaeritur numquam inveniri. Et quomodo iam laetabitur et non potius contristabitur cor quaerentium, si non potuerint invenire quod quaerunt? Et quod inveniri possit dum quaeritur, testatur Isaias, cum dicit: ‘Quaerite Dominum, et mox ut inveneritis, invocate illum.’ An et inventus quaerendus est? Sic enim sunt incomprehensibilia quaerenda, ne se aestimet homo nihil invenisse, qui quam sit incomprehensibile quod quaerebat potuerit invenire. Cur ergo sic quaerit, si incomprehensibile comprehenditur esse quod quaerit nisi quia cessandum non est, quamdiu ipsa incomprehensibilium inquisitione proficitur, et melior meliorque fit quaerens tam magnum bonum, quod et inveniendum quaeritur, et quaerendum invenitur? Nam et quaeritur ut inveniatur dulcius, et invenitur ut quaeratur avidius. Secundum hoc accipi potest quod dictum est in Ecclesiastico: ‘Qui me manducant, adhuc esurient, et qui me bibunt, adhuc sitient.’ Manducant enim et bibunt, quia inveniunt, et quia esuriunt et sitiunt, adhuc quaerunt.” Et IXo De Trinitate in principio: “Tutissima est quaerentis intentio donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus, si ea recta intentio est, quae proficiscitur a fide. Sic ergo quaeramus tamquam inventuri et sic inveniamus tamquam quaesituri. ‘Cum enim consummaverit homo, tunc incipit.’” Et hoc totum contingit propter scibilis infinitatem, secundum quod dicit Hilarius De Trinitate: “Incipe, percurre, persiste. Etsi non perventurum, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita persequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet,” et revera saltem in futuro attinget, secundum quod dicit Augustinus De dono perseverantiae: “Bonae spei est homo, si eum sic proficientem dies ultimus huius vitae invenerit, ut adiciantur ei quae proficienti defuerint, et perficiendus quam puniendus potius iudicetur.” Unde de profunditate huius scientiae et infinitate scibilis in ea dicit Augustinus in Epistola ad Volusianum: “Tanta est Christianarum profunditas litterarum,” etc., usque ibi, “‘cum consummaverit homo, tunc incipit’”—longa est auctoritas, sed communis. Unde Origenes, exponens illud quod dicitur de Isaac Genesis XXVo, “‘Habitavit iuxta puteum nomine viventis et videntis’: Intelligentibus,” inquit, “grandis est ista benedictio. Qui potest singula quae in lege et prophetis sunt scire, et intelligere, ille habitat ‘ad puteum visionis.’ Magnam benedictionem accepit

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wisdom. Therefore, because of old age no one is excluded from such weddings, but rather this is more appropriate to ripe old age.”458 In this vein, David says in the Psalm: The heart of those who seek the Lord rejoices and we are strengthened; seek his face always [Ps. 104:3–4]. Augustine expounds upon this passage at the beginning of On the Trinity, XII: “It seems that what is always sought is never found. And how will the heart of those who seek rejoice now, and not be saddened instead, if they will not be able to find what they seek? Moreover, that He can be found provided He is sought, is testified by Isaiah, when he says: Seek the Lord and when you have found Him, call upon Him [Isa. 55:6]. And can it be that, already found, he is to be sought? For, thus incomprehensible things should be sought, lest a human being consider himself to have found nothing—he who will be able to discover how incomprehensible is what he was seeking. Why, therefore, does he seek in this way, if what he seeks is understood to be incomprehensible, unless this is because one must not stop seeking as long as one makes progress by the search of things incomprehensible, and becomes better and better by seeking such a great good that is both sought in order to be found and found in order to be sought? For, it is both sought as it is found sweeter, and found as it is sought more eagerly. In this sense, what is said in Ecclesiasticus can be interpreted: Those who eat of me still will be hungry, and those who drink of me still will be thirsty [Ecclus. 24:29]. For, they eat and drink, because they find, and because they are hungry and thirsty, they still seek.”459 Moreover, at the beginning of On the Trinity, IX: “Most secure is the aim of the seeker, until we lay hold of that for which we aim, if that aim is straight as proceeding from faith. Therefore, let us so search as ones who will find, and let us so find as ones who will search. For, when a human being will have accomplished, then he begins [Ecclus. 18:6].”460 Moreover, all this occurs due to the infinity of the knowable object, as Hilary says in On the Trinity: “Begin, run through, persist. Even if I am not arriving, I will still rejoice in the progress. For, he who dutifully pursues the infinite, even if he does not ever reach it, still always progresses,”461 and indeed at least in the future he may arrive, as Augustine says in On the Gift of Perseverance: “A human being is of good hope, if the last day of this life will find him so progressing, so that what is lacking in his progress will be supplied, and is judged more as one who should be made complete than as one who should be punished.”462 Wherefore, concerning the depth of this science and the infinity of its knowable object, Augustine remarks in his Letter to Volusianus: “The depth of Christian literature is so great,” etc., up to: “when he will have accomplished, then he begins [Ecclus. 18:6]”463—the authoritative source is vast, but shared in common. Whence Origen, expounding upon what is said of Isaac in Genesis, XXV, “‘He lived near a well by the name of the Living One and Seeing One,’” says: “That blessing is for great minds. He who can know and understand each thing that is in the law and from the prophets, lives by the well of

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Isaac, ut habitaret ‘ad puteum visionis.’ Nos quando satis mereri poterimus, si forte transitum habere possimus per ‘puteum visionis’? Certe si non potuero omnia intelligere, assideo tamen Scripturis divinis, et ‘in lege Dei meditor die ac nocte,’ et omnino numquam desino inquirendo, discutiendo, tractando, certe, quod maximum est, orando, et ab illo poscendo intellectum ‘qui docet hominem scientiam,’ videor et ego habitare ‘ad puteum visionis.’ Tu ergo si semper perscruteris propheticas visiones, si semper inquiras, semper discere cupias, haec mediteris, in his permaneas, percipis et tu benedictionem a Domino, et habitas ‘apud puteum visionis,’ et Dominus aperiet tibi scripturas.” In ceteris autem scientiis studio terminus est ponendus. Cum enim, ut dictum est supra, in aliis scientiis studendum non est nisi in quantum utiles sunt, et, ut infra dicetur, in tantum utiles sunt in quantum ad hanc Sacram Scripturam proficiunt, in tantum ergo studendum est unicuique; in aliis scientiis in quantum ex hoc profectum poterit habere studendi consequenter in Scriptura Sacra, ne nimium immorando in aliis in illis tempus consumat per quod fructuosius in ista proficere posset, etiam si quis illis intendat, ut ad istam scientiam veniens amplius et pluribus proficiat, cum residuum temporis vitae suae ad capiendum ea quae sunt huius scientiae non sufficiat. “Ridiculum est enim,” ut dicit Augustinus in Epistola ad Dioscorum, “cum propterea multa superflua didiceris, ut tibi aures hominum ad votum praeparentur, ipsa necessaria non tenere, quibus superflua praeparaveris, et dum occuparis ut discas unde facias intentos, nolle discere quod infundatur intentis”; et Augustinus De utilitate credendi: “Intelligere superflua fortasse non nocet. Sed fortasse discere nocuit, cum tempus necessariorum occuparent.” Permittit tamen Deus curiosos diutius in illis immorari scientiis, ne tempore illo implicent se deterioribus, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastes IIIo: “Vidi afflictionem quam dedit Deus filiis hominum, ut distendantur in ea. Cuncta enim bona in tempore suo, et mundum dedit disputationi eorum,” ubi dicit Glossa: “Propterea Deus dedit in praesenti etiam perversorum dogmatum magistros, concessit occupationem, ne mens eorum otiosa torpesceret. Deus enim fecit omne bonum quod fecit. Sed in tempore suo bonum bonum est, numquam ulterius quam opus est.” Et ideo Augustinus, loquens de studio scientiarum saecularium, dicit IIo De doctrina christiana: “In doctrinis

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vision [Gen. 25:11]. Isaac received a great blessing, that he lived by the well of vision [Gen. 25:11]. When we are sufficiently deserving, might we perhaps have access to the well of vision [Gen. 25:11]? Certainly, if I have not been able to understand all things, I still assiduously engage with the Holy Scriptures, and reflect on the law of God day and night [Ps. 1:2], and never once abandon inquiry, discussion, elaboration, and what is certainly most important, prayer, and by asking through that for the understanding that knowledge gives a human being [Ps. 94:10], I seem to myself to dwell by the well of vision [Gen. 25:11]. Therefore, if you always examine the prophetic insights, if you always search, always long to learn, reflect on these things, and remain in them, you too are perceiving the blessing of the Lord, and dwell by the well of vision [Gen. 25:11], and the Lord will uncover for you the meaning of the Scriptures.”464 On the other hand, one should impose a limit on the study of the other sciences. For, since (as stated above465) one should only study the other sciences to the extent that they are useful, and (as will be discussed below466) they are useful insofar as they assist Sacred Scripture, therefore one should study each of them only to such an extent. One should delve into the other sciences as far as they can enhance the subsequent study of Sacred Scripture, lest by dwelling in other sciences too long, the time spent on them extinguish the more profitable advance that could have been achieved in this science, even if someone’s aim in pursuing them is coming to this science more prepared for greater and richer progress, since the remaining part of his life may not suffice to grasp what is essential in this science. “For, it is laughable,” as Augustine says in his Letter to Dioscorus, “when you have learned many superfluous things to prepare the ears of human beings for what is promised, and not possess what is necessary, for the sake of which you had prepared the superfluous things, and while you are busy learning about the way to your purposes, you refuse to learn about what is delivered by these purposes”467; also, Augustine in On the Benefit of Believing: “Understanding superfluous things is perhaps not harmful. But learning them may be harmful, when they occupy the time for necessary things.”468 Still, God allows the curious to dwell for long in those sciences, lest they involve themselves in worse matters instead during that time, as stated in Ecclesiastes, III: I have seen the burden that God brought to the sons of men, that they may be distracted by it. For all things are good in their proper time, and he handed the world over to their arguments [Eccles. 3:10–11], where the Gloss says: “The reason why God has permitted even now teachers of improper doctrines is to allow them an occupation, lest their minds grow dull in idleness. For, God has made everything he has made good. However, that which is good is good in its proper time, never otherwise than is needful.”469 Therefore also Augustine, discussing the study of the secular sciences, says in On Christian Doctrine, II: “Regarding the disciplines discovered by people, in all one

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quae apud gentes inveniuntur, in omnibus tenendum est: ‘Ne quid nimis,’” et De ordine libro IIo: “Talis eruditio, si quis ea moderate utatur—nam nihil ibi quam nimium formidandum est—talem philosophiae militem nutrit, ut ad summum illum modum ultra quem requirere aliquid nec possit, nec debeat, nec cupiat, perveniat.” Revera opus est cavere in studio scientiarum philosophicarum “ne quid nimis,” quia, ut dicit IIo De doctrina christiana, “plerumque accidit ut facilius homines res assequantur propter quas assequendas ista discuntur, quam talium praeceptorum nodosissimas disciplinas et spinosissimas.” Et tamen, ut ipse subdit ibidem, quandoque miseros “magis in his omnibus ipsa spectamina veritatis delectant saepe.” De quibus dicit Chrysostomus libro Io Super Matthaeum: “Plerique totos dies peragunt propter illam occupationem vanissimam et multa detrimenta patiuntur. Et cum omni diligentia quod audierint memoriae commendant, eaque ad animi sui perniciem infixa custodiunt. Hic vero ubi loquitur Deus nec exiguum quidem tempus patienter exspectent,” ultimum scilicet senectutis. Quod tamen utile esset multum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus Ad Hieronymum, “Ad discendum quod opus est, nulla aetas sera videri potest, quia etsi senes magis decet docere quam discere, magis tamen discere quam quae doceant ignorare.”

Ad primum in oppositum, “non plus sapere quam oportet,” dicendum quod semper oportet plus, non tamen plus quam oportet, “sed ponere prudentiae nostrae modum,” ut dicit secunda ratio. Et hoc fit semper pie secundum regulam fidei quaerendo, “non transgrediendo terminos quos posuerunt patres nostri,” ut dicitur Proverbiorum XXIIo. Unde post illud Proverbiorum XXIIIum “Prudentiae tuae pone modum,” statim sequitur: “Ne erigas oculos tuos”; Glossa: “mentis”; “ad opes quas non potes habere,” Glossa: “divinitatis perscrutandas, quia caelestibus tantum civibus patent.” Per idem patet secundum.

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must adhere to the following: ‘nothing too much,’”470 and in On Order, book II: “Such learning, if someone uses it moderately—for nothing in those areas should be feared except too much of them—nourishes such a soldier of philosophy, that he reaches that highest method beyond which requiring something else is neither possible, nor proper, nor desirable.”471 Indeed, there is need in the study of the philosophical sciences carefully to observe: “nothing too much,”472 because, as he says in On Christian Doctrine, II, “generally it happens that human beings more easily follow the realities for the sake of which these [sciences] are learned, than the knottiest and thorniest instruction in such lessons.”473 And yet, as he says shortly after this passage, on occasion “the very tokens of truth in all these endeavors frequently cause more delight”474 for wretched people. Chrysostom speaks about them in book I of On Matthew: “Generally they use up all their days on that most vain occupation and suffer many ills. And when they commit to memory with the utmost care all that they have heard, they preserve the plague of those things implanted in their souls. However, concerning this area where God is discussed, they could be waiting patiently for less than the barest exposure,”475 of course finally during old age. Nevertheless, this still may be very useful, as Augustine says in his Letter to Jerome: “For the purpose of learning what is necessary, no age can seem too late, because even if an old person ought more to teach than learn, still he ought more to learn than ignore what is instructive.”476

To the first argument in opposition, “no more savoring than what is fitting,” we must say more is always fitting, yet not more than is fitting, “but rather assign a measure to our wisdom,” as the second argument states. And this is so by always investigating dutifully according to the rule of faith, by not transgressing the limits which our fathers established [Prov. 22:28], as stated in Proverbs, XXII. Wherefore, after Proverb XXIII, Assign a measure to your wisdom [Prov. 23:4], immediately it follows: Do not raise your eyes [Prov. 23:5]; the Gloss: “of the mind”;477 toward powers that you cannot have [Prov. 23:5]; the Gloss: “in order to inspect divine matters, since they are evident only to heavenly citizens.”478 This also clarifies the second argument.

Notes Frequently Cited Works PL = Patrologia latina, cursus completus, 221 vols., ed. J. P. Migne (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1844–65). PG = Patrologia cursus completus, series graeca, 161 vols., ed. J. P. Migne (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1857–66). Aristotle, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis (Venice: apud Junctas, 1562–74; reprinted, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962). Aristotle, De anima, in Alberti Magni De anima, ed. Clemens Stroick, Alberti Magni Opera omnia 7.1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1968). Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis sive “Liber Ethicorum,” 5 vols., Aristoteles Latinus XXVI:1–3 (Leiden: Brill; Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1972–74). Aristotle, Metaphysica I–X; XII–XIV. Translatio anonyma sive media, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, Aristoteles Latinus XXV:2 (Leiden: Brill, 1976). Aristotle, Metaphysica I–IV,4. Translatio Iacobi et composita, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, Aristoteles Latinus XXV:1–1a (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970). Aristotle, Metaphysica II, in Averroes, In Aristotelis librum II (α) metaphysicorum commentarius. Die lateinische Übersetzung des Mittelalters auf handschriftlicher Grundlage mit Einleitung und problemgeschichtlicher Studie, ed. Gion Darms, Thomistische Studien 11 (Freiburg [Switzerland]: Paulusverlag, 1966). Aristotle, Metaphysica V, in Averroes, In librum V(Δ) metaphysicorum Aristotelis commentarius, ed. Ruggero Ponzalli, Société suisse des sciences morales, Travaux 13 (Berne: Francke, 1977). Aristotle, Physica. Translatio vetus, ed. Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams, Aristoteles Latinus VII:1–2 (Leiden: Brill, 1990). Augustine, Contra Academicos, ed. William M. Green, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970). Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 44A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975). Augustine, De doctrina christiana, ed. Joseph Martin, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 32 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962). Augustine, De Trinitate libri XV, ed. William J. Mountain and François Glorie, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 50A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968). Averroes, In Physicam commentarium magnum, in Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, vol. 4 (Venice: apud Junctas, 1562–74; reprinted, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962). Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum, in Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, vol. 8 (Venice: apud Junctas, 1562–74; reprinted, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962). Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, ed. Gion Darms, Thomistische Studien 11 (Freiburg [Switzerland]: Paulusverlag, 1966). Avicenna, Metaphysica (Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina), ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Biblia sacra cum Glossa ordinaria, 6 vols. (Antwerp: apud Ioannem Mevrsivm, 1634). Henry of Ghent, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae), art. I–V, ed. Gordon Wilson, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 2, XXI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005).

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1. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 9, qu. 9 (p. 16, ll. 9–10). 2. See Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chap. 1, 980a 21–981a 7. 3. See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, chap. 19, 1000a 3–4. 4. See Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 5, 432a 3–14. 5. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 9 (p. 16, ll. 14–15). 6. See Augustine, Contra Academicos II, chap. 6, no. 14 (p. 26, l. 21). 7. Aristotle, Metaphysica IV, chap. 3, ed. Junctas (fol. 73rF–vG; 1005b 12–17). 8. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 11 (p. 181, l. 57–p. 182, l. 97). 9. See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 187, l. 39–p. 196, l. 214). 10. See ibid., qu. 1 (p. 11, l. 107–p. 12, l. 127; p. 16, ll. 196–204); qu. 2 (p. 45, l. 331–p. 50, l. 418). 11. See ibid., qu. 2 (p. 50, ll. 419–426). See also our Introduction, p. 6 above. 12. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 40, l. 242–p. 43, l. 283). 13. Augustine, Contra Academicos III, chap. 6, no. 13 (p. 42, ll. 13–17). 14. Augustine, De Trinitate XII, chap. 14, no. 23 (p. 376, ll. 54–61). 15. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 62, ll. 629–40). 16. Augustine, De Trinitate IX, chap. 1, no. 1 (p. 293, ll. 25–6). 17. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, chap. 25, no. 45 (p. 523, l. 17–p. 524, l. 19). 18. See Jerome, Epistulae 53, chap. 9, ed. Isidor Hilberg, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Lationorum 54 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996), p. 462, ll. 9–10; Cicero, Lucullus, chap. 23, no. 74, ed. Otto Plasberg (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1969), p. 63, ll. 10–11. 19. John Chrysostom, Opus perfectum in Mattheum, hom. 4, chap. 3 (PG 57:43). 20. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VII, chap. 5, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 276, ll. 1–2). 21. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1 (p. 20, l. 69–p. 22, l. 306). 22. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 9 (p. 17, l. 24). 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. (p.16, ll. 7–8). 25. Ibid. (p. 16, l. 11–p. 17, l. 23) 26. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 135, ll. 119–31). 27. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 2, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 142, l. 28–p. 143, l. 11). 28. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 53, ll. 13–15; 993b 9–11). 29. See Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, l. 51–p. 56, l. 67). 30. See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, chap. 2, 71b 9–23. 31. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 5 (p. 127, l. 78–p. 128, l. 99); art. 1, qu. 7 (p. 148, ll. 125–9). 32. Avicenna, Metaphysica I, chap. 5 (p. 34, ll. 55–6). 33. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, chap. 5, 1146b 26–27. 34. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1 (p. 207, l. 15). 35. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 3, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 143, l. 28–p. 144, l. 11). 36. Ibid. (p. 142, l. 33). 37. Eustratius, Enarratio in Primum Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum, chap. 2, ed. H. P. F. Mercken, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p. 34, l. 69. 38. This is the “justice posited by law” referred to earlier. 39. See Cicero, De officis III, chap. 25, no. 95, ed. Karl Atzert (Leipzig: Teubner, 1971), p. 114, ll. 24–6. 40. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea V, chap. 16, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 248, l. 15–p. 249, l. 14; 1137a 31–b 24).

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41. Aristotle, Politica III, chap. 16, trans. Guillelmi de Moerbeke, ed. Franz Susemihl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1872), p. 228, ll. 8–11; 1287a 25–27. The point that Henry wants to take from Aristotle is that a particular law, formulated for a given time and place, cannot cover all possible cases. However, since it depends on the first principles of justice, rulers trained to consider these principles can settle the exceptions and supply what a particular law lacks by definition. 42. See above, art. 2, qu. 1. 43. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 1 (p. 11, l. 6). 44. Augustine, De mendacio, chap. 19, no. 40, ed. Josef Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 41 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900), p. 461, ll. 8–9. 45. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 2, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 142, l. 30). 46. See above, art. 2, qu. 1. 47. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 12 (p. 35, l. 132–p. 39, l. 226). 48. Demonstration is taken here in its Aristotelian sense, namely as an argument whereby the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. For instance, Socrates is mortal (conclusion) because he is human and all human beings are mortal. The means by which the conclusion is reached (the so-called middle term in logic) is knowledge of what a human being is (which includes the property of mortality). 49. Aristotle, Metaphysica VI, chap. 1, ed. Junctas (fol. 145vL; 1026a 17–19). 50. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 43, l. 284–p. 44, l. 301). See also above, art. 2, qu. 1, and below, art. 2, qu. 6. 51. Averroes, In Physicam commentarium magnum I, comm. 2, ed. Junctas (fol. 6vM). 52. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 16, ed. Darms (p. 79, ll. 12–14). 53. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. Iacobi (p. 10, ll. 15–16; 983a 10–12). 54. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 5 (p. 124, l. 28–p. 128, l. 106). 55. See ibid., qu. 2 (p. 44, l. 318–p. 45, l. 330). 56. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 32 (p. 46, l. 4). 57. Augustine, Contra Academicos III, chap. 6, no. 13 (p. 42, ll. 11–17). 58. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 1 (p. 11, l. 6). 59. See ibid. (p. 11, ll. 6–9). 60. Ibid., qu. 32 (p. 46, ll. 8–11). 61. See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, qu. 1, art. 1, ed. Leonina 22/1 (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae/Editori di San Tommaso, 1970), p. 6, ll. 186–7. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 56, ll. 531–2). 62. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 9 (p. 169, l. 33–p. 165, l. 56). 63. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum IX, comm. 14, ed. Junctas (fol. 241vM). 64. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, ll. 59–60). 65. Ibid. (p. 55, ll. 59–63). 66. See below, art. 2, qu. 5. 67. See above, art. 2, qu. 3. 68. Aristotle, Metaphysica V, chap. 15, ed. Ponzalli (p. 183, ll. 8–9; 1022a 9–11). 69. See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, qu. 1, art. 1, ed. Leonina 22/1 (p. 6, ll. 186–7). See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 56, ll. 529–30). 70. Aristotle, Categoriae, chap. 5, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Palluelo, Aristoteles Latinus I:1–5 (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), p. 11, l. 21; 3b 33–34. 71. Aristotle, Topica III, chap. 5, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Palluelo, Aristoteles Latinus V:1–3 (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969), p. 59, ll. 18–19; 119a 27–38.

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72. Ibid. I, chap. 15 (p. 22, ll. 18–22; 106a 36–106 b1). 73. See above, art. 2, qu. 2. 74. See Augustine, De haeresibus VII, ed. Roeland Vander Plaetse and Clemens Maria Beukers, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 46 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), p. 293, l. 1–p. 294, l. 11. 75. Aristotle, De anima II, chap. 9, ed. Stroick (p. 132, l. 82; 421a 26). 76. This association with Aristotle is made in terms of the views of the two parties discussed in the paragraph. Aristotle himself stresses greatly the unity of soul and body, and in fact Henry quotes Aristotle in the paragraphs that follow to argue for a different view. 77. Aristotle, Physica VII, chap. 3, trans. vetus (p. 267, l. 16 and ll. 24–5; 247b 24 and 248a 26). 78. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 1, trans. vetus (p. 8, ll. 7–9; 184b 12–14). 79. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 14, ed. Darms (p. 75, l. 9). 80. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 3, ed. Darms (p. 75, ll. 1–6; 995a 1–6). 81. Augustine, De doctrina christiana III, chap. 10, no. 15 (p. 87, ll. 24–6). 82. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 3, ed. Darms (p. 76, ll. 5–6; 995a 9–10). 83. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 15, ed. Darms (p. 78, l. 42). 84. Anonymus, Liber sex principiorum, chap. 2, no. 29, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dodd, Aristoteles Latinus I:6–7 (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966), p. 41, ll. 10–11. 85. See Aristotle, De anima I, chap. 1, ed. Stroick (p. 11, ll. 66–72; 403a 3–10). 86. See above, art. 2, qu. 4, and qu. 5. 87. Aristotle, De anima I, chap. 4, ed. Stroick (p. 41, l. 86; 408b 21–22). 88. Anonymus, Liber sex principiorum, chap. 4, nos. 46–7 (p. 44, l. 18–p. 45, l. 4). 89. “Species” here should be taken as equivalent to “form” (and not as the entire group of members that make up the species). The meaning is that a given human soul possesses humanity fully or as a whole; one human being is not more or less human than another. 90. See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, qu. 3, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven: Leuven University Press; Leiden: Brill, 1979), p. 10, l. 43–p. 11, l. 69. 91. In this context, supposit (suppositum) and subject (hypostasis here or subiectum in other places) refer to the same thing, namely, the individual substance belonging to a species, as Peter is an individual substance belonging to the species human. However, “subject” connotes the underlying reality in which the form is instantiated, while “supposit” connotes the distinct, independent, and subsistent individual. Henry analyzes terms that indicate individual subsistence in Summa, art. 53, qu. 1 (solution). 92. The point here is that regarding forms which include matter, such as natural forms (like the species dog, juniper, etc.), individuals are distinguished from other members of the species through material differences. On the other hand, with regard to forms that are immaterial (such as spiritual substances), the distinction among substances cannot be through matter. This passage relates to a broader and more complicated topic, namely, Henry’s view of individuation. Henry’s mature position disagrees with Aristotle’s (and Aquinas’s) position that matter is the fundamental principle of individuation. For Henry, matter does play a role, but for him the primary cause of individuation is the efficient cause (that which produces the individual). See Flores, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity (150–2). 93. John Damascene, Institutio elementaris, chap. 7 (PG 95:107B–C). 94. John Damascene, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, chap. 4 (PG 95:131D–134D). 95. Ibid., chap. 1 (PG 95:127A–129A). 96. Ibid., chap. 4 (PG 95:134B–D). 97. Ibid., chap. 1 (PG 95:129A). 98. Ibid., chap. 7 (PG 95:135C). 99. See ibid., chaps. 34–5 (PG 95:171A–D). 100. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, trans. Iacobi (p. 37, l. 11; 993b 30–31).

Notes

213

101. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 39, l. 225–p. 40, l. 239). 102. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, l. 51–p. 56, l. 67). 103. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 58, ll. 9–10; 993b 30–31). 104. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, trans. Iacobi (p. 37, l. 11; 993b 30–31). 105. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 4, ed. Darms (p. 59, ll. 46–7). 106. Aristotle, Metaphysica V, chap. 7, ed. Ponzalli (p. 128, l. 53; 1017a 31–32); chap. 15 (p. 183, ll. 8–9). 107. Augustine, Confessiones VII, chap. 11, no. 17, ed. Luc Verheyen, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), p. 104, ll. 1–3. 108. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 2, ed. Darms (p. 70, ll. 2–3; 994b 17–18). 109. Augustine, Confessiones XII, chap. 7, no. 7 (p. 220, ll. 14–16). 110. Augustine, Confessiones XII, chap. 6, no. 6 (p. 219, l. 29). 111. Plato, Timaeus 52C, trans. Chalcidii, ed. Jan Hendrik Waszink, Plato Latinus IV:1 (Leiden: Brill, 1953), p. 51, ll. 1–3. 112. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 57, ll. 2–5; 993b 23–26). 113. Ibid. (p. 53, ll. 12–15; 993b 3–9). 114. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, ll. 52–5). 115. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. Iacobi (p. 8, l. 19; 982a 25–26). 116. Plato, Timaeus 51A–B, trans. Chalcidii (p. 49, ll. 12–13). 117. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 3, ed. Darms (p. 79, ll. 1–4; 995a 13–19). 118. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 16, ed. Darms (p. 79, ll. 12–15). 119. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. Iacobi, (p. 8, ll. 19–21; 982a 26–28). 120. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora I, chap. 7, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dodd, Aristoteles Latinus IV:1–4 (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1968), p. 19, ll. 19–20 and p. 20, l. 2; 75a 36–37 and 75b 6. 121. See above, art. 2, qu. 3. 122. Augustine, De Trinitate V, chap. 2, no. 3 (p. 208, ll. 12–17). 123. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 3, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 142, ll. 32–3). 124. Aristotle, Physica IV, chap. 10, trans. vetus (p. 170, ll. 13–14; 217b 32–37). 125. Augustine, Confessiones XI, chap. 14, no. 17, ed. Verheyen (p. 202, l. 8–p. 203, l. 19). 126. See Aristotle, Metaphysica VI, chap. 2, ed. Junctas (fol. 147vG; 1026b 4–5). 127. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum VI, comm. 4, ed. Junctas (fol. 148rA–B). 128. See Boethius, De interpretatione VI, chap. 14, ed. Karl Meiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880), p. 480. 129. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 51 (p. 79, ll. 33–80). 130. Aristotle, De interpretatione, chap. 6, trans. Boethii, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus II:1–2 (Bruges/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1965), p. 9, ll. 11–13; 17a 27–28. 131. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 12 (p. 187, l. 61–p. 188, l. 81). 132. See ibid. (p. 191, ll. 136–42). 133. Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 8, ed. Stroick (p. 223, ll. 70–1; 431b 21–23). 134. Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De amima libros III, comm. 38, ed. F. Stuart Crawford, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem Versionum Latinarum VI:1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), p. 504, ll. 22–30. 135. Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 8, ed. Stroick (p. 223, ll. 74–5; 431b 29–432a 1). 136. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 37, l. 174–p. 38, l. 190). 137. Avicenna, Metaphysica I, chap. 5, ed. Van Riet (p. 31, l. 2–p. 32, l. 5). 138. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 1, trans. vetus (p. 19, l. 17–p. 20, l. 1; 187b 7).

214

Notes

139. See Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 2, ed. Darms (p. 71, ll. 3–5). 140. Aristotle, Metaphysica V, chap. 7, ed. Ponzalli (p. 125, l. 1–p. 126, l. 13 and 128, l. 44–129, l. 65). 141. For Henry’s understanding of the categories, see Summa, art. 32, qu. 5; Quodlibet V, qu. 2; Quodlibet VII, qu. 1–2. 142. See Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 2, ed. Darms (p. 71, ll. 3–5 and p. 73, l. 2). 143. Avicenna, Metaphysica I, chap. 5, ed. Van Riet (p. 39, ll. 28–37). 144. al-Ghazālī, Logica, chap. 2 (Venice: P. Liechtensteyn, 1506; reprint: Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969), p. 247, ll. 22–7. 145. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora II, chap. 7, ed. L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dodd (p. 257, ll. 3–11; 92b 19–24). 146. Avicenna, Metaphysica I, chap. 5, ed. Van Riet (p. 41, ll. 80–2). 147. Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 8, ed. Stroick (p. 223, ll. 70–1; 431b 21–23). 148. See Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 4, ed. Stroick (p. 198, ll. 80–2; 429a 29–b 5). 149. See Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 3, ed. Stroick (p. 176, l. 68; 429a 1–3). 150. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 33, l. 87). 151. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea X, chap. 7, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 361, ll. 7–10). 152. Anonymous, De spiritu et anima, chap. 6 (PL 40:783A). 153. Avicenna, Metaphysica IX, chap. 7, ed. Van Riet (p. 510, l. 72–p. 511, l. 83). 154. See Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 1, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 7, ll. 3–18; 980a 21– 981a 2). 155. Aristotle, Metaphysica IV, chap. 1, ed. Junctas (fol. 64rA; 1003a 21–22). 156. Ibid. 157. Ibid. (fol. 65rC; 1003b 15–19). 158. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. Iacobi (p. 8, ll. 4–8; 982a 9–10). 159. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 9, ll. 16–17; 982a 9–10). 160. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 14, trans. Lincolniensus (p. 154, ll. 25–7). 161. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 33, l. 91–p. 34, l. 97). 162. Aristotle, Metaphysica IV, chap. 3, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 66, ll. 1–2, 5–6, 11–12; 1005b 19–20, 23–24). 163. See Avicenna, Metaphysica I, chap. 5, ed. Van Riet (p. 34, l. 50–p. 35, l. 61). 164. Aristotle, Metaphysica IV, chap. 3, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 66, ll. 1–2, 5–6, 11–12; 1005b 19–20, 23–24). 165. Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 5, ed. Stroick (p. 201, ll. 83–5; 429b 30–430a 2). 166. Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 9, ed. Stroick (p. 229, ll. 83–4; 432b 21–23). 167. See Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 1, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 7, ll. 3–18; 980a 21– 981a 2). 168. Aristotle, Metaphysica VI, chap. 1, ed. Junctas (fol. 145vG; 1025b 29–30). 169. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum VI, comm. 2, ed. Junctas (fol. 146rA–B). 170. See 1 Cor. 13:12. 171. See below, art. 5, qu. 3. 172. For this example, see Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, ed. Leonina 24/2 (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Cerf, 2000), p. 110, l. 437. 173. See below, art. 4, qu. 5. 174. See Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 9, trans. vetus (p. 39, ll. 11–14; 192a 16–18). 175. Aristotle, De anima II, chap. 2, ed. Stroick (p. 77, l. 70; 414a 11–12). 176. See above, art. 2, qu. 4.

Notes

215

177. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea X, chap. 7, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 358, l. 25–p. 359, l. 1). 178. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 12 (p. 186, ll. 38–48). 179. See also below, art. 4, qu. 5. 180. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, chap. 8, ed. Josef Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 28 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1894), p. 243, l. 25–p. 244, l. 4. 181. bid. IX, chap. 17, ed. Zycha (p. 291, ll. 9–14). 182. Ibid. (p. 291, ll. 18–22). 183. Ibid. (p. 292, ll. 4–10). 184. John Damascene, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, chap. 7 (PG 95:143A–B). 185. See also Luke 6:38. 186. Anonymous (Pseudo-Chrysostom), Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 18 (PG 56:730). 187. John Damascene, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, chap. 7 (PG 95:143A). 188. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 53, ll. 13–15; 993b 9–11). 189. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 6 (p. 133, ll. 33–7), and art. 1. qu. 10 (p. 167, ll. 6–10). 190. See Aristotle, Metaphysica X, chap. 4, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 193, ll. 15–16; 1055b 7–8). 191. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 35 (p. 51, ll. 32–3). 192. Augustine, De Trinitate IX, chap. 12, no. 18 (p. 310, l. 59). 193. Even though intellect and will (the chief faculties of the human soul) are interdependent, Henry sees the will as ultimately sovereign. For the will is fundamentally free in the sense that it is its own cause: it moves itself, it wills itself to will (as Augustine, Bonaventure, and others also claim). The will depends on the intellect only as a necessary condition for its action: the will can will only what is known at some level. On the other hand, the intellect is caused by the will in a more strict sense: the will moves the intellect, through desire, toward the acquisition of truth and knowledge. See the reply to the second argument in this question. (A helpful article on this theme is: Roland Teske, “The Will as King over the Powers of the Soul: Uses and Sources of an Image in the Thirteenth Century,” Vivarium 32/1 [1994]: 62–70.) Henry also understands the very triune nature of God in terms of intellect and will. Human intellect and will are analogous to divine intellect and will (since, for Henry, the soul is made in the image of God), but of course there are fundamental differences between the human and the divine. Still, in God, Henry sees the will as the proper cause of the intellect, and the intellect as the necessary condition for the will. For Henry’s view of divine intellect and will (with reference to human intellect and will and other aspects of his thought), see J. C. Flores: “Intellect and Will as Natural Potencies: Connecting Theology, Metaphysics, and Psychology in Henry of Ghent,” in Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, 31 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 277–305. 194. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 1, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 141, ll. 18–19; 1094a 14). 195. Avicenna, Metaphysica IX, chap. 7, ed. Van Riet (p. 507, l. 9–p. 508, l. 15). 196. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 9, trans. vetus (p. 40, ll. 2–4; 192a 22–23). 197. Averroes, In Physicam commentarium magnum I, comm. 81, ed. Junctas (fol. 46rC–vG). 198. Augustine, De Trinitate IX, chap. 12, no. 18 (p. 310, l. 59). 199. See Augustine, De Trinitate X, chap. 2, no. 4 (p. 315, l. 1–p. 316, l. 32). 200. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 3 (p. 82, l. 250–p. 83, l. 280), and art. 1. qu. 4 (p. 102, l. 235–p. 103, l. 251). 201. See Augustine, De Trinitate XIII, chap. 5, no. 8 (p. 392, ll. 29–30). 202. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea X, chap. 7, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 358, l. 25–p. 359, l. 1; 1177a 12–17). 203. See Augustine, Contra Academicos I, chap. 2 (p. 5, l. 1–p. 6, l. 50), and chap. 8 (p. 16, ll. 33–57).

216

Notes

204. See above, art. 2, qu. 5. 205. John Damascene, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, chaps. 4–6 (PG 95:134C–135B). 206. See Aristotle, Metaphysica VII, chap. 4, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 126, l. 16–p. 127, l. 1; 1029b 3–12). 207. See Aristotle, De generatione et corrruptione II, chap. 10, trans. vetus, ed. Joanna Judycka, Aristoteles Latinus IX:1 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), p. 76, ll. 3–5; 336b 28–30. 208. See above, art. 4, qu. 1. 209. Avicenna, Metaphysica IX, chap. 7, ed. Van Riet (p. 509, l. 50–p. 510, l. 53). 210. Avicenna, Metaphysica IX, chap. 7, ed. Van Riet (p. 512, ll. 4–15). 211. See Auctoritates Aristotelis, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, Philosophes médiévaux 17 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974), 13, p. 249, l. 6. 212. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea II, chap. 1, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 163, ll. 10–16; 1103a 19–26). 213. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qu. 41, art. 2, resp., ed. Leonina 4 (Rome: Typographia poliglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1888), 422b. 214. See above, art. 4, qu. 1. 215. See Augustine, De Trinitate IX, chap. 12, no. 18 (p. 310, ll. 56–61). 216. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 4 (p. 107, ll. 341–4). 217. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea II, chap. 5, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 169, ll. 12–13; 1106a 9–10). 218. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 1, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 7, l. 3; 980a 21). 219. See Aristotle, Physica II, chap. 1, trans. vetus (p. 42, l. 3–p. 49, l. 12; 192b 8–193b 22). 220. See Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 12, ed. Stroick (p. 242, ll. 57–60; 434a 32–b 3). 221. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 2, ed. Darms (p. 68, ll. 6–7; 994b 14–15). 222. Aristotle, Metaphysica III, chap. 2, ed. Junctas (fol. 40vG; 996a 23–28). 223. Averroes, In Physicam commentarium magnum I, comm. 81, ed. Junctas (fol. 46rD). 224. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1. qu. 4 (p. 107, ll. 341–4). 225. See above, art. 3, qu. 4. 226. See Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 14, ed. Stroick (p. 201, ll. 84–5: 430a 10–17). 227. Cicero, Lucullus II, chap. 10, no. 30–31, ed. Plasberg (p. 42, ll. 15–18 and 29–30). 228. See above, art. 4, qu. 2. 229. See above, art. 3, qu. 2. 230. See above, art. 4, qu. 1. 231. See Auctoritates Aristotelis, 3 (p. 164, l. 58). 232. See above, art. 4, qu. 2. 233. See above, art. 4, qu. 2. 234. See above, art. 2, qu. 5. 235. See above, art. 4, qu. 3. 236. See above, art. 2, qu. 5. 237. See Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 7, trans. vetus (p. 33, ll. 10–13; 190b 8 25–28), and chap. 8, trans. vetus (p. 37, ll. 10–11; 191b 17–18). 238. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 34, ll. 116–17). 239. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, l. 63–p. 56, l. 67). 240. Ibid. (p. 55, ll. 23–4). See also Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 9, ed. Stroick (p. 229, ll. 83–4; 432b 21–23). 241. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 9, trans. vetus (p. 39, ll. 7–8; 192a 13–14). 242. See above, art. 3, qu. 2.

Notes

217

243. See Augustine, Contra Academicos I, chap. 2, nos. 5–6 (p. 5, l. 1–p. 6, l. 50). 244. See Aristotle, De generatione et corrruptione II, chap. 10, trans. vetus (p. 76, ll. 3–5; 336b 28–30). 245. Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae III, chap. 2, no. 4, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca Teubneriana (Munich: G. K. Saur, 2000), p. 60, ll. 12–14. 246. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 53, l. 13; 993b 10–11). 247. See Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, l. 51–p. 56, l. 67). 248. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 31, l. 45–p. 32, l. 67). 249. See Aristotle, De partibus animalium I, chap. 5 (644b 24–25); see also Auctoritates Aristotelis, 9 (p. 217, l. 109). 250. See Aristotle, De anima III, chap. 14, ed. Stroick (p. 201, l. 84; 429b 30–32). 251. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 53, ll. 12–13; 993b 7–9). 252. See Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, l. 63–p. 56, l. 67). 253. Ibid. 254. See above, art. 3, qu. 4. 255. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 10, ll. 18–22; 982b 12–16). 256. Ibid. (p. 10, ll. 25–6; 982b 11, 19–21). 257. See below, art. 4, qu. 8. 258. See above, art. 4, qu. 4. 259. See Auctoritates Aristotelis, 3 (p. 164, l. 58). 260. Augustine, Confessiones I, chap. 1, no. 1, ed. Verheyen (p. 1, ll. 6–7). 261. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 54, ll. 23–4). 262. Augustine, Sermones 160, no. 4 (PL 38:875). 263. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (pp. 62, l. 626–63, l. 666). 264. John Damescene, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, chap. 7 (PG 95:158A). 265. See Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, l. 63–p. 56, l. 67). 266. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 9, trans. vetus (p. 40, ll. 1–5; 192a 22–23). 267. See above, art. 4, qu. 5; see also Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 5 (p. 126, l. 78–p. 127, l. 99). 268. See above, art. 4, qu. 5. 269. Aristotle, Metaphysica XII, chap. 10, ed. Junctas (fol. 350rB; 1087a 15–19). 270. See above, art. 4, qu. 1. 271. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 4 (p. 101, ll. 212–13), and art. 1, qu. 12 (p. 187, ll. 61–8). 272. See above, art. 4, qu. 4. 273. See above, art. 4, qu. 5. 274. See above, art. 2, qu. 5. 275. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 3, ed. Darms (p. 75, ll. 5–7; 995a 3–6). 276. Anonymous, Liber sex principiorum, chap. 4, no. 46, ed. Minio-Paluello/Dodd (p. 44, l. 23–p. 45, l. 1). 277. See above, art. 2, qu. 5, and art. 4, qu. 4. 278. See above, art. 4, qu. 6. 279. See Aristotle, Metaphysica IX, chap. 5, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 173, l. 20–p. 174, l. 6; 1048a 10–21). 280. See Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 2, ed. Darms (p. 60, ll. 1–12); ibid., trans. anonyma sive media (p. 37, ll. 11–20); 994a 1–11.

218

Notes

281. See Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 11, l. 19–p. 12, l. 3; 983a 12–21). 282. Aristotle, Metaphysica X, chap. 1, ed. Junctas (fol. 251rC; 1052b 18–19). 283. Ibid. 284. See Aristotle, Metaphysics II, chap. 2, 994a 1–11. 285. See above, art. 4, qu. 4 and art. 4, qu. 5; see also Auctoritates Aristotelis, 3 (p. 164, l. 58). 286. See above, art. 4, qu. 5. 287. See ibid. 288. See ibid. 289. This would be an intellectual substance (in Aristotelian terms) or angel (in Judeo-Christian terms), whose essence is purely spiritual. 290. See Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, 993b 11–12. 291. As mentioned in note 193 above, for Henry the will is sovereign in the soul and regulates the intellect. Therefore, for him the highest human activity is strictly one of will, but includes knowledge and understanding. 292. See above, art. 4, qu. 5. 293. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum XII, comm. 51, ed. Junctas (fol. 335rD). 294. Augustine, De civitate Dei 19, chap. 1, ed. Bernhard Dombart and Alfons Kalb, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 48 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), p. 657, ll. 16–17. 295. See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, chap. 3, 72b 5–73a 20. 296. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 2, ed. Darms (p. 71, ll. 3–4; 994b 21–23). 297. See Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chap. 2, 982a 29–b3. 298. Augustine, De civitate Dei 19, chap. 1 (p. 657, ll. 12–13). 299. Anonymus (Pseudo-Chrysostom), Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 22 (PG 56:751). 300. See below, art. 5, qu. 6. 301. See above, art. 4, qu. 5. 302. Augustine, De Trinitate VIII, chap. 1, no. 2 (p. 269, ll. 3–6). 303. See Augustine, Soliloquia I, chap. 13, no. 23, ed. Wolfgang Hörmann, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 89 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1986), p. 35, l. 1–p. 36, l. 15. 304. See Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations I, 165a 24–25. 305. See Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, chap. 1, 1026a 19–22. 306. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 11, qu. 7, ed. Jodocus Badius (Paris, 1520; reprinted, Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953), fols. 87vG–88vR. 307. See above, art. 4, qu. 9. 308. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 4 (p. 107, ll. 341–344), and art. 1, qu. 5 (p. 127, ll. 85–90). 309. Augustine, De Trinitate XII, chap. 14, no. 21 (p. 374, l. 3–p. 375, l. 6). 310. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1, (p. 15, l. 190–p. 16, l. 195). 311. Glossa interlinearea in Ecclesiasten 1:8, ed. 1634, III (1764c). 312. Glossa interlinearea in Ecclesiasten 7:24, ed. 1634, III (1799–1800c). 313. John Chrysostom, Opus perfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 25, chap. 4 (PG 57:332). 314. Origen, In Exodum homiliae, hom. 1, no. 1, ed. Marcel Borret, Sources chrétiennes 321 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1985), p. 42, l. 1–p. 44, l. 30. 315. Glossa ordinaria in Ecclesiasten 1:8, ed. 1634, III (1764c). 316. Glossa interlinearea in Ecclesiasten 1:18, ed. 1634, III (1767–68a).

Notes

219

317. Bede, In Lucae evangelium expositio III, chap. 8, ed. David Hurst, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 120 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1960), p. 190, ll. 929–30. 318. See above, art. 4, qu. 4. 319. See above, art. 4, qu. 5. 320. Hugh of St. Victor, Commentarii in Hierarchiam caelestem Dionysii Aeropagitae II (PL 175:935D– 936A). 321. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 53, ll. 2–3; 993b 2). 322. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. Darms (p. 55, ll. 47–8). 323. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 7 (p. 142, l. 21–p. 143, l. 37). 324. See above, art. 3, qu. 4. 325. Augustine, In Ioannis Evangelium tractatus 124, tract. 1, no. 9, ed. Radbode Willems, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 36 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), p. 6, ll. 14–16. 326. Hyppocrates, Aphorismi 1; see Pearl Kibre, “Hippocrates Latinus: Repertorium of Hippocratic Writings in the Latin Middle Ages (II),” Traditio 32 (1976): 257–92, at 270. 327. Glossa ordinaria in Ecclesiasten 1:8, ed. 1634, III (1764d–e) . 328. Glossa interlinearea in Ecclesiasten 7:1, ed. 1634, III (1793–4). 329. Augustine, De Trinitate IV, prooem., no. 1 (p. 159, ll. 3–19). 330. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, trans. Iacobi (p. 8, ll. 4–5; 982a 8–9). 331. Glossa ordinaria in Ecclesiasten 3:26, ed. 1634, III (2006d). 332. Glossa ordinaria in Ecclesiasten 3:9–11, ed. 1634, III (1777b). 333. Gregory, Dialogi IV, chap. 34 (PL 77:376Bb). 334. See below, art. 5, qu. 6, and art. 5, qu. 7. 335. Glossa ordinaria in Sap. 6:16, ed. 1634, III (1919a). 336. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, prologus, nos. 3–4 (p. 2, ll. 25–7). 337. See 2 Cor. 12:2–4. 338. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, prologus, no. 5 (p. 3, l. 67–p. 4, l. 83). 339. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 8 (p. 150, l. 39–p. 152, l. 70). 340. See Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chap. 1, 980a 21–981a 6; Posterior Analytics II, chap. 19, 100b 3–5 and 100a 3. 341. See above, art. 3, qu. 4. 342. Augustine, De Trinitate VIII, chap. 5, no. 7 (p. 277, ll. 28–31). 343. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps. 118, serm. 18, no. 3, ed. Eligius Dekkers and Jean Fraipont, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 40 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), p. 1724, ll. 28–9. 344. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 2 (p. 64, l. 669–p. 65, l. 692), and art. 1, qu. 5 (p. 125, l. 58–p. 126, l. 64). 345. See ibid., qu. 1 (p. 26, l. 405–p. 27, l. 414); art. 1, qu. 4 (p. 111, l. 430–p. 112, l. 439); art. 1, qu. 10 (p. 172, ll. 104–16); art. 1, qu. 10 (p. 174, l. 157–p. 175, l. 164). 346. Origen, In Genesim homiliae, hom. 2, no. 1, ed. Wilhelm A. Baehrens, trans. Henri de Lubac and Louis Doutreleau, 2nd ed., Sources chrétiennes 7b (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1976), p. 84, ll. 102–05. 347. Augustine, In Ioannis Evangelium tractatus 124, tract. 1, no. 1, ed. Willems (p. 1, ll. 11–12). 348. Augustine, Contra Academicos III, chap. 20, no. 43 (p. 61, ll. 20–2). 349. John Chrysostom, Opus perfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 4, chap. 3 (PG 57:43). 350. Hugh of St. Victor, Commentarii in Hierarchiam caelestem Dionysii Aeropagitae I, chap. 1 (PL 175:925D, 926A, 928A–B). 351. Anonymous (Pseudo-Chrysostom), Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 18 (PG 56:730). 352. Ibid., hom. 17 (PG 56:729).

220

Notes

353. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1 (p. 28, l. 446). 354. Anonymous (Pseudo-Chrysostom), Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 38 (PG 56: 843). 355. Ibid., hom. 41 (PG 56:860). 356. Glossa interlinearea in Sap. 9:16, ed. 1634, III (1936a). 357. Glossa interlinearea in Ecclesiasticum 6:13, ed. 1634, III (2019–20b). 358. Augustine, De Trinitate V, chap. 1, no. 1 (p. 206, ll. 25–8). 359. See Augustine, De doctrina christiana IV, chaps. 15–16, nos. 32–3 (p. 139, ll. 17–20 and p. 139, ll. 1–5). 360. Ibid. 361. Jerome, Commentarium in Epistulam ad Ephesios II (PL 26:536D–537A). 362. Gratian, Decretum I, dist. 37, chap. 7, in Corpus iuris canonici I, ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1881), p. 137, l. 9 (PL 187:203A). 363. See Ambrosiaster, In Epistolam ad Colossenses, ed. Heinrich Josef Vogels, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 81 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966), p. 181, ll. 17–26. 364. Beda, In I Samuhelis libri IV, II, chap. 14, ed. David Hurst, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 119 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), p. 121, ll. 2209–14. 365. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 20, no. 30 (p. 54, ll. 1–9). 366. Ibid., chap. 23, no. 35 (p. 57, l. 1–p. 58, l. 4). 367. Ibid., chap. 23, no. 36 (p. 58, l. 26 and p. 59, ll. 36–9). 368. Ibid. (p. 58, ll. 6–12). 369. John Chrysostom, Opus perfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 13, chaps. 2–3 (PG 57:210–11). 370. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 18, no. 28 (p. 53, ll. 10–12). 371. Ibid., chap. 31, no. 48 (p. 65, ll. 6–7). 372. Ibid., chap. 39, no. 58 (p. 72, ll. 1–14). 373. Ibid., chap. 40, no. 60 (p. 74, ll. 15–17). 374. Augustine, De civitate Dei 8, chap. 10 (p. 226, ll. 1–14). 375. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae I, chap. 21, no. 38, ed. Johannes B. Bauer, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 90 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992), p. 43, ll. 8–18. 376. Augustine, De ordine I, chap. 11, ed. William M. Green, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), p. 105, l. 42–p. 106, l. 49. 377. Ibid., II, chap. 5 (p. 115, ll. 34–6). 378. Jerome, Commentarii in Danielem I, 1, ed. François Glorie, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 75A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1964), p. 780, ll. 82–5. 379. Glossa interlinearea in Exod. 3:22, ed. 1634, I (507–508d). 380. Ibid., 508d. 381. Ibid., 507–508a. 382. Ibid., 508b. 383. Ibid., 508c. 384. Ibid. 385. Ibid. 386. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 7, qu. 8, ed. Badius (fols. 58rG–59vL), and art. 7, qu. 13, ed. Badius (fol. 62rR–vX). 387. Jerome, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Titum (PL 26:593A–B). 388. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 39 (p. 72, ll. 19–21).

Notes

221

389. Gregory IX, Decretales una cum glossis V, tit. 7, chap. 4 (Rome: in dibus Populi Romani, 1582), 1670h. 390. Gratian, Decretum I, dist. 16, chap. 1, in Corpus iuris canonici I, ed. Friedberg, p. 41 (PL 187:81A). 391. See Gregory IX, Decretales una cum glossis V, tit. 7, chap. 4, 1670h. 392. See Gratian, Decretum I, causa 16, qu. 7, chap. 9, in Corpus iuris canonici I, ed. Friedberg, pp. 802–03 (PL 187:1045–7). 393. Augustine, Contra litteras Petiliani II, chap. 30, no. 69, ed. Michael Petschenig, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 52 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1909), p. 59, ll. 9–14. 394. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 35, no. 53 (p. 69, ll. 1–4). 395. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 1, ed. Darms (p. 57, ll. 1–2; 993b 23). 396. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 1, trans. vetus (p. 7, ll. 8–9; 184a 16–18). 397. Aristotle, Metaphysica II, chap. 3, ed. Darms (p. 79, ll. 1–2; 995a 13–14). 398. See above, art. 2, qu. 5. 399. See Aristotle, Metaphysics II, chap. 3, 994b 32–995a 5. 400. See above, art. 2, qu. 3. 401. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, chap. 8, ed. Josef Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 25:1 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1891), p. 25, ll. 4–5. 402. Boethius, De sancta Trinitate, chap. 2, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca Teubneriana (Munich: G. K. Saur, 2000), p. 168, ll. 64–p. 169, l. 80. 403. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 1, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 142, ll. 28–30; 1094b 13–27). 404. Aristotle, Physica I, chap. 1, trans. vetus (p. 7, ll. 8–9; 184a 16–17). 405. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 3, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 142, ll. 28–143,11; 1094b 13–27). 406. Ibid. (p. 143, ll. 4–5; 1094b 20). 407. Aristotle, Topica I, chap. 3, trans. Boethii, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus V:1–3 (Brussels/Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969), p. 7, ll. 23–5; 101b 5–7. 408. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, chap. 3, 995a 14–20, ed. Darms, p. 79, ll. 1–10. 409. Averroes, In Physicam commentarium magnum I, comm. 2, ed. Junctas, (fol. 6vM). 410. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, chap. 7, 1098a 29–31. 411. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum II, comm. 1, ed. G. Darms (p. 55, ll. 51–5). 412. See above, art. 2, qu. 6. 413. Avicenna, Metaphysica I, chap. 3, ed. Van Riet (p. 24, l. 38). 414. Plato, Timaeus 29C–D, trans. Calcidii (p. 22, ll. 9–14). 415. Aristotle, Metaphysica VI, chap. 1, ed. Junctas (fol. 143vM; 1025b 6–7). 416. Ibid., trans. anonyma sive media (p. 116, ll. 6–7). 417. Averroes, In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum VI, comm. 1, ed. Junctas (fol. 144rF). 418. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora I, chap. 10, ed. Minio-Paluello/Dodd (p. 23, ll. 15–18; 76a 42); Euclid, Elementa I, comm. concep., 3, ed. H. L. L. Busard, in The Latin Translation of the Arabic Version of Euclid’s Elements Commonly Ascribed to Gerard of Cremona (Leiden: Brill, 1984), p. 33; see also Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 5 (p. 126, ll. 73–4). 419. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I, chap. 7, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 152, ll. 5–6; 1098b 3–4). 420. Ibid. (p. 151, ll. 29–30; 1098a 32–33). 421. See Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chap. 2, 983a 12–22. 422. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1 (p. 9, ll. 69–71). 423. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 10, ll. 7–9; 982a 32–b 2). 424. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. Iacobi (p. 9, l. 26–p. 10, l. 1; 982b 26–27).

222

Notes

425. Glossa interlinearea in 1 Cor. 13:2, ed. 1634, VI (311–312a). 426. Ibid., 312a. 427. Ibid. 428. Ibid., 312d. 429. Cicero, Lucullus, chap. 10, no. 31, ed. Plasberg (p. 42, l. 30). 430. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, chap. 2, 1156a 3–5; chap. 3, 1156a 6–22; chap. 5, 1157b 1–3. 431. Glossa interlinearea in Rom. 1:19, ed. 1634, VI (23–24b and c). 432. Glossa interlinearea in Rom. 1:21, ed. 1634, VI (25–26b). 433. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 37, no. 55 (p. 70, ll. 3–6). 434. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 8, qu. 3, ed. Badius (fol. 65vT). 435. For Henry, the will’s superiority to the intellect within the human soul (discussed in note 193 above) also indicates that, in terms of ultimate happiness, the love of God (an act of will which includes prior knowledge) is superior to the sole knowledge of God (an act of intellect). See also below the responses to the second and third arguments of this question. In this regard, Henry is influenced by Bonaventure and other Augustinians like Hugh of St. Victor (whom he references at the very end of the question), while rejecting the view of Thomas Aquinas (who draws more from Aristotle on this issue). For Aquinas’s contrasting position, see Summa contra Gentiles III, chap. 26. 436. See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, qu. 35, ed. Macken (p. 195, l. 5–p. 202, l. 80). 437. Glossa ordinaria in 1 Cor. 8:1, ed. 1634, VI (259b–c); see also Augustine, In Ioannis Evangelium tractatus 124, tract. 27, no. 5, ed. Willems (p. 272, ll. 16–17). 438. Ibid. 439. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea II, chap. 2, trans. Lincolniensis (p. 164, ll. 24–6; 1103b 26–28). 440. Glossa ordinaria in 1 Cor. 8:1, ed. 1634, VI (259b–c); see also Augustine, In Ioannis Evangelium tractatus 124, tract. 27, no. 5, ed. Willems (p. 272, ll. 16–18). 441. Augustine, Sermones 350, no. 2 (PL 39:1534). 442. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 12, ed. Badius (fols. 83vS–90vM). 443. Augustine, De Trinitate XII, chap. 14, no. 21 (p. 374, ll. 1–2). 444. Bernard, Sermones in Cantica, sermo 36, chap. 2, no. 3–chap. 3, no. 1, ed. Jean Leclercq and Henri M. Rochais, vol. 2 (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1958), p. 5, l. 17–p. 6, l. 3. 445. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1 (p. 9, ll. 69–71). 446. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, chap. 2, trans. anonyma sive media (p. 10, ll. 7–9; 982a 32–b 2). 447. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, chap. 1. 448. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 1, qu. 1 (p. 9, ll. 69–71). 449. See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, qu. 35, ed. Macken (p. 195, l. 5–p. 202, l. 80). 450. Hugh of St. Victor, Commentarii in Hierarchiam caelestem Dionysii Aeropagitae VI (PL 175:1038D). 451. Bede, In Proverbia Salomonis II, chap. 23, no. 4, ed. David Hurst, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 119B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1983), p. 117, l. 20. 452. Augustine, Contra Academicos I, chap. 1 (p. 5, ll. 84–5). 453. In via, “along the way,” means “in this life.” 454. Augustine, In Ioannis Evangelium tractatus 124, tract. 63, no. 1, ed. Baehrens/de Lubac/Doutreleau (p. 485, l. 2–p. 486, l. 31). 455. Ibid., tract. 97, no. 1 (p. 572, l. 6–p. 573, l. 15). 456. John Chrysostom, Opus perfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 1, chap. 5 (PG 57:20). 457. Origen, In Genesim homiliae, hom. 11, no. 1, ed. Baehrens/de Lubac/Doutreleau (p. 278, l. 22– p. 280, l. 54). 458. Ibid., no. 2 (p. 282, ll. 11–13, and p. 284, ll. 53–54).

Notes

223

459. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, chap. 2, no. 2 (p. 461, ll. 5–27). 460. Augustine, De Trinitate IX, chap. 1, no. 1 (p. 292, l. 21–p. 293, l. 30). 461. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate II, chap. 10, ed. Pieter Smulders, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 62 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979), p. 48, ll. 13–16. 462. Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, chap. 21, no. 55 (PL 45:1028). 463. Augustine, Epistulae 137, no. 3, ed. Alois Goldbacher, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 44 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1904), p. 99, l. 14–p. 100, l. 11. 464. Origen, In Genesim homiliae, hom. 11, no. 3, ed. Baehrens/de Lubac/Doutreleau (p. 286, ll. 20–1 and p. 288, l. 28–p. 290, l. 77). 465. See above, art. 5, qu. 6. 466. See Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 7, qu. 8, ed. Badius (fol. 58rG), and art. 7, qu. 9, ed. Badius (fols. 58vO–59rP). 467. Augustine, Epistulae 118, chap. 2, no. 11, ed. Alois Goldbacher, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 34 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1898), p. 675, ll. 21–6. 468. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, chap. 11, ed. Zycha (p. 32, ll. 1–3). 469. Glossa ordinaria in Ecclesiasten 3:10, ed. 1634, III (1777b). 470. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 39, no. 58 (p. 72, ll. 14–21). 471. Augustine, De ordine II, chap. 5, no. 14, ed. Green (p. 114, ll. 10–15). 472. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 39, no. 58 (p. 72, l. 21). 473. Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, chap. 37, no. 55 (p. 70, ll. 6–9). 474. Ibid. (p. 71, ll. 20–1). 475. John Chrysostom, Opus perfectum in Matthaeum, hom. 1, chap. 7 (PG 57:22). 476. Augustine, Epistulae 166, 1, ed. Alois Goldbacher, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 44 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1904), p. 546, ll. 3–6. 477. Beda, In Proverbia Salomonis II, chap. 23, ed. Hurst (p. 117, l. 26). 478. Glossa interlinearea in Prov. 23:5, ed. 1634, III (1711–12a, c).

Index of Authorities Scripture OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 25:11, 205 Exodus 3:22, 175 Ezra 7:10, 159 Job 11:7, 85 21:14, 99 36:26, 85

3:12, 147 3:25, 75 6:8, 149 7:1, 155 7:13, 149 7:24–25, 75, 149 8:16–17, 149 Wisdom 6:16, 159 9:16, 167 7, 169

Psalms 1:2, 205 68:33, 201 94:10, 205 102:5, 137 104:3–4, 203 104:4, 201 118:34, 161 138:6, 151

Ecclesiasticus 3:22, 155 3:26, 157 6:18, 199 6:23, 169 6:27–28, 169 13:22, 159 18:6, 203 24:29, 203 37:23, 173

Proverbs 1:22, 101 22:28, 207 23:4, 199, 207 23:5, 207

Isaiah 5:13, 149 7:9, 169 27:11, 149 55:6, 203

Ecclesiastes 1:2, 191 1:8, 147, 151, 155 1:18, 147, 151 3:10–11, 157, 205 3:11, 147

Daniel 1:8, 175 Hosea 4:6, 99, 149

226

Index of Authorities NEW TESTAMENT

Matthew 1:18, 163 7:6, 165 7:7, 91, 165 8:5, 143 10:16, 153 10:19, 159 21:16, 165 22:3, 165

7:10, 151 8:1, 193 13:1–3, 193 13:2, 189, 193 13:12, 85 n. 170 2 Corinthians 12:2–4, 161 n. 337 Colossians 2:8, 171

Luke 6:38, 91 n. 185 12:47, 189

1 Thessalonians 4:14, 163

John 17:3, 75 Romans 1:19, 1:21, 1:22, 12:3,

1 Timothy 1:5, 195 2:4, 127 4:16, 153

191 191 157, 163, 191 155, 199

Titus 1:12, 179

1 Corinthians 7:1, 155

2 Peter 2:21, 191 Ancient and Medieval Authors

al-Ghazālī Logica, 73 n. 144 Ambrosiaster In Epistolam ad Colossenses, 171 n. 363 Anonymous De spiritu et anima, 77 n. 152 Liber sex principiorum, 53 n. 84, 55 n. 88, 131 n. 276 Anonymous (Pseudo-Chrysostom) Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, 91 n. 186, 143 n. 299, 165 n. 351–2, n. 354, 167 n. 355

Aristotle (The Philosopher) Analytica posteriora, 23 n. 3, 31 n. 30, 63 n. 120, 73 n. 145, 139 n. 295, 161 n. 340, 185 n. 418 Categoriae, 47 n. 70 De anima, 23 n. 4, 49 n. 75, 53 n. 85, 55 n. 87, 71 n. 133, n. 135, 75 n. 147–9, 83 n. 165–6, 87 n. 175, 107 n. 220, n. 226, 115 n. 240, 119 n. 250 De generatione et corruptione, 101 n. 207, 117 n. 244 De interpretatione, 69 n. 130 De partibus animalium, 117 n. 249 De sophisticis elenchis, 145 n. 304

Index of Authorities Ethica Nicomachea, 27 n. 20, 29, n. 27, 31 n. 33, 33 n. 35–6, 35 n. 40, 37 n. 45, 65 n. 123, 75 n. 151, 81 n. 160, 89 n. 177, 97 n. 194, 101 n. 202, 105 n. 212, 107 n. 217, 181 n. 403, 183 n. 405–6, n. 410, 185, n. 419–20, 189 n. 430, 193 n. 439, 197 n. 447 Metaphysica, 23 n. 2, 25 n. 7, 29 n. 28, 39 n. 53, 45 n. 68, 51 n. 80, n. 82, 59 n. 100, n. 103, 61 n. 104, n. 106, n. 108, n. 112, 63 n. 113, n. 115, n. 117, n. 119, n. 126, 71 n. 139–40, n. 142, 79 n. 154–6, 81 n. 157–9, 83 n. 162, n. 164, n. 167, 85 n. 168, 93 n. 188, 95 n. 190, 101 n. 206, 107 n. 218, n. 221–2, 117 n. 246, 119 n. 251, 121 n. 255–6, 127 n. 269, 131 n. 275, 133 n. 279–81, 135 n. 282–4, n. 290, 139 n. 296, 141 n. 297, 145 n. 305, 153 n. 321, 157 n. 330, 161 n. 340, 179 n. 395, n. 397, n. 399, 183 n. 408, 185 n. 415–16, 187 n. 421, 189 n. 423–4, 197 n. 446 Physica, 51 n. 77–8, 65 n. 124, 71 n. 138, 87 n. 174, 97 n. 196, 107 n. 219, 113 n. 237, 117 n. 241, 125 n. 266, 179 n. 396, 181 n. 404 Politica, 35 n. 41 Topica, 47 n. 71–2, 183 n. 407 Auctoritates Aristotelis 105 n. 211, 113 n. 231, 117 n. 249, 121 n. 259, 135 n. 285 Augustine Contra Academicos, 23 n. 6, 25 n. 13, 41 n. 57, 101 n. 203, 117 n. 243, 163 n. 348, 199 n. 452 Confessiones, 61 n. 107, n. 109–10, 65 n. 125, 121 n. 260 Contra litteras Petiliani, 179 n. 393 De civitate Dei, 137 n. 294, 141 n. 298, 175 n. 374 De doctrina christiana, 51 n. 81, 159 n. 336, 161 n. 338, 169 n. 359, 171 n. 360, 173 n. 365–8, n. 370–1, 175 n. 372–3, 177 n. 388, 179 n. 394, 191 n. 433, 207 n. 470, n. 472–4

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De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus, 23 n. 1, n. 5, 29 n. 22–25, 35 n. 43, 41 n. 56, n. 58–60, 67 n. 129, 95 n. 191 De dono perseverantiae, 203 n. 462 De Genesi ad litteram, 89 n. 180–3 De haeresibus, 49 n. 74 De mendacio, 35 n. 44 De moribus ecclesiae, 175 n. 375 De ordine, 175 n. 376–7, 207 n. 471 De Trinitate, 27 n. 14, n. 16–17, 65 n. 122, 95 n. 192, 97 n. 198, 99 n. 199, 101 n. 201, 107 n. 215, 145 n. 302, 149 n. 309, 155 n. 329, 161 n. 342, 169 n. 358, 195 n. 443, 203 n. 459–60 De utilitate credendi, 181 n. 401, 205 n. 468 Enarrationes in Psalmos, 161 n. 343 Epistula 118, 205 n. 467 Epistula 137, 203 n. 463 Epistula 166, 207 n. 476 In Ioannis Evangelium tractatus, 155 n. 325, 163 n. 347, 193 n. 437, 195 n. 440, 201 n. 454–5 Sermo 160, 123 n. 262 Sermo 350, 195 n. 441 Soliloquia, 145 n. 303 Averroes (The Commentator) Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, 71 n. 134 In Metaphysicam commentarium magnum, 31 n. 29, 39 n. 52, 51 n. 79, n. 83, 59 n. 102, 61 n. 105, 63 n. 114, n. 118, 65 n. 127, 85 n. 169, 115 n. 39–40, 117 n. 247, 119 n. 252–3, 123 n. 261, n. 265, 137 n. 293, 153 n. 322, 183 n. 411, 185 n. 417 In Physicam commentarium magnum, 39 n. 51, 43 n. 63–5, 97 n. 197, 107 n. 223, 183 n. 409 Avicenna Metaphysica, 31 n. 32, 37 n. 49, 71 n. 137, 73 n. 143, n. 146, 77 n. 153, 83 n. 163, 97 n. 195, 105 n. 209–10, 185 n. 413 Bede In Lucae evangelium expositio, 151 n. 317

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Index of Authorities

In Proverbia Salomonis, 199 n. 451, 207 n. 477 In I Samuhelis libri IV, 171 n. 364 Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones in Cantica, 195 n. 444 Boethius Consolatio philosophiae, 117 n. 245 De interpretatione, 67 n. 128 De sancta Trinitate, 181 n. 402 Cicero De officiis, 33 n. 39 Lucullus, 27 n. 18, 109 n. 227, 189 n. 429 Glossa ordinaria 149 n. 311, 151 n. 312, n. 315–16, n. 327–8, 157 n. 331–2, 159 n. 335, n. 356, 169 n. 357, 175 n. 379–85, n. 245–8, 191 n. 431–2, 193 n. 437–8, n. 440, 205 n. 469, 207 n. 478

155 167 189 195

Euclid Elementa, 185 n. 418 Eustratius Enarratio in Aristotelis Moralium ad Nichomachum I, 33 n. 37 Gratian Decretum, 171 n. 362, 177 n. 390, n. 392 Gregory Decretales una cum glossis, 177 n. 389, n. 391 Dialogi, 157 n. 333 Henry of Ghent Quodlibet I, 55 n. 90, 193 n. 436, 197 n. 449 Quodlibet V, 71 n. 141 Quodlibet VII, 71 n. 141 Summa art. 1, 25 n. 8–12, 27 n. 15, n. 21, 29 n. 26, 31 n. 31, n. 34, 37 n. 47, n. 50, 39 n. 54–5, 43 n. 62, 59 n. 101, 69 n. 131, 71

n. 132, n. 136, 75 n. 150, 83 n. 161, 89 n. 178, 95 n. 189, 99 n. 200, 107 n. 216, n. 224, 115 n. 238, 117 n. 248, 123 n. 263, 125 n. 267, 129 n. 271, 149 n. 308, n. 310, 153 n. 323, 161 n. 339, 163 n. 344–5, 165 n. 353, 185 n. 418, 187 n. 422, 195 n. 445, 197 n. 448 art. 2, 35 n. 42, 37 n. 46, n. 50, 47 n. 73, 65 n. 121, 89 n. 176, 101 n. 204, 113 n. 234, n. 236, 131 n. 274, n. 277, 179 n. 398, 181 n. 400, 183 n. 412 art. 3, 107, n. 225, 109 n. 229, 117 n. 242, 119 n. 254, 155 n. 324, 161 n. 341 art. 4, 87 n. 173, 89 n. 179, 103 n. 208, 107 n. 214, 109 n. 228, 111 n. 230, 113 n. 232–3, n. 235, 121 n. 257–8, 125 n. 267–8, 127 n. 270, 131 n. 272–3, n. 277–8, 135 n. 285–8, 137 n. 292, 143 n. 301, 149 n. 307, 153 n. 318–19 art. 5, 85 n. 171, 143 n. 300, 157 n. 334, 205 n. 465 art. 7, 177 n. 386, 205 n. 466 art. 8, 193 n. 434 art. 11, 145 n. 306 art. 12, 195 n. 442 art. 32, 71 n. 141 art. 53, 55 n. 91 Hilary of Poitiers De Trinitate, 203 n. 461 Hippocrates Aphorismi, 155 n. 326 Hugh of St. Victor Commentarii in Hierarchiam caelestem Dionysii Aeropagitae, 153 n. 320, 165 n. 350, 197 n. 450 Jerome Commentarium in Epistolam ad Titum, 177 n. 387 Commentarii in Danielem, 175 n. 378 Commentarium in Epistolam ad Ephesios, 171 n. 361 Epistulae, 27 n. 18

Index of Authorities John Chrysostom Opus perfectum in Matthaeum, 27 n. 19, 151 n. 313, 163 n. 349, 173 n. 369, 201 n. 456, 207 n. 475 John Damascene Institutio elementaris, 55 n. 93 De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 55 n. 94, 57 n. 95–9, 89 n. 184, 93 n. 187, 101 n. 205, 123 n. 264 Origen In Exodum homiliae, 151 n. 314

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In Genesim homiliae, 163 n. 346, 201 n. 457, 203 n. 458, 205 n. 464 Plato Timaeus, 61 n. 111, 63 n. 116, 185 n. 414 Thomas Aquinas Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, 87 n. 172 Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 43 n. 61, 45 n. 69 Summa contra Gentiles, 193 n. 435 Summa theologiae, 105 n. 213