Handbook of Logical Thought in India 8132225767, 9788132225768

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Sundar Sarukkai Mihir Kumar Chakraborty Editors

Handbook of Logical Thought in India

Handbook of Logical Thought in India

Sundar Sarukkai • Mihir Kumar Chakraborty Editors

Handbook of Logical Thought in India With 220 Figures and 32 Tables

Editors Sundar Sarukkai Founder, Barefoot Philosophers Former Professor of Philosophy National Institute of Advanced Studies Bangalore, Karnataka, India

Mihir Kumar Chakraborty School of Cognitive Science Jadavpur University Kolkata, West Bengal, India Former Professor of Pure Mathematics University of Calcutta Kolkata, West Bengal, India

ISBN 978-81-322-2576-8 ISBN 978-81-322-2577-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5 © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature India Private Limited The registered company address is: 7th Floor, Vijaya Building, 17 Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 110 001, India

Preface

Any volume, such as this handbook, reflects the times in which it is produced and is not a mere collection of received knowledge. Although knowledge, particularly philosophical knowledge, is often considered to be “timeless,” it is important to recognize the implicit and explicit presence of the temporal and material conditions under which knowledge is defined and produced. Today it is no longer possible to believe that knowledge in any domain is reducible to purely epistemological factors alone. There are important social factors that influence the nature of disciplines and knowledge, and what gets produced as such. Thus, a preface to this handbook has to reflect on these factors as it matters to the very meaning of terms like “Indian philosophy,” “Logic in India,” and “Indian logic” since not only are terms like “India/Indian,” but also those like “philosophy” and “logic,” have become widely contested. Since logic and philosophy accrued cultural values within dominant Western societies, colonial discourse consistently denied the capacity for logic or philosophy to the colonized societies. This is ironic considering that logic is arguably the heart of philosophy in the many traditions of philosophy in India. Moreover, while the terms “India” and “Indian” point to a geographic localization, the scholars in the field of “Indian philosophy,” visible in the English speaking world, the de facto world today of international academics, are not so geographically situated. Even when there are “Indian” scholars, many prominent ones among them are outside India. This sociology matters to the international face of this discipline and is also well reflected in the fact that well-established journals such as Journal of Indian Philosophy are located outside India. Routinely, handbooks and encyclopedias on Indian philosophy in English produced outside India have little representation of scholars working in India. This has led to a unique and poignant presence of the “international” as intrinsic to “Indian” philosophy. While this may seem to be a problem specific to the production of Indian philosophy in English language, there are major consequences of it including the inability to draw upon traditional scholars in these disciplines who are often uncomfortable in English or refuse to write in English. This leads to a skewed ownership of intellectual practices within cultures and raises the question of who can be spokespersons for these historical traditions.

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Preface

The collection of articles in this volume has to be seen within this socio-political background of international scholarship. Its strength and weakness (particularly in terms of representation) are a testament to these deep-rooted sociological problems related to writing about, and disseminating work, in Indian logic in particular and in Indian philosophy in general. What adds to the problem is the asymmetry in acknowledging and accepting the legitimacy of these traditions within “mainstream” philosophy which de facto has become “Western” philosophy. The constant struggle to make these philosophical traditions part of “mainstream” global philosophy is another important factor that influences the content, the style of writing as well as the rhetoric in this domain. This begins right from the title – “Logical Thought in India” – as a way to include the various logical traditions that were part of ancient and later philosophical traditions in India as well as point to some contemporary work in this field. We do this while being very conscious of the fact that “logic” as referred to in contemporary mathematics or computer science is markedly different from earlier traditions of logic. However, bringing these topics under one umbrella of “logic in India” is to indicate not just broader metaphysical commonalities but also the continued lived practices that evolve over time. Today, logic is primarily spoken of under the “modern” label but there is much in terms of its training that shares a common space with traditional training in philosophy. By doing this, we are not suggesting that the multiplicity of different logical traditions must be clubbed under one “mainstream” vision. Rather, we want to explore the possibility of placing these multiple offerings on the same plate without inbuilt biases on the merit of each. The challenge in such a comprehensive approach is that there is substantial material that could be part of this collection. Moreover, there are also a large number of books and articles that have already been published on many of these topics. Thus, we have attempted to balance the articles between introductory ones that discuss basic themes and those which offer some new ideas that have not had much visibility before. So while there are the standard inputs from traditions such as Nyāya, Buddhist, and Jaina logical schools, there are also some new approaches from the Tamil traditions as well as from the poetic, aesthetic, and linguistic traditions. There are also some absences, in spite of our best efforts to convince people to write on those topics. Typically, Indian philosophy is grouped under various schools. We believe that while this is useful for many purposes, it is also limiting in that readers tend to associate ideas and styles exclusively with one school. However, these traditions are not independent of each other in that there are themes that are common, arguments that are commonly debated, overlapping epistemological and metaphysical structures, and so on. Thus, in this handbook we have decided to group the articles not under the respective schools but distributed under the following headings: Texts, Fundamentals, Particularities, Language, Comparative, and Modern. Each of the section discusses some aspects of logic under these larger themes. However, they are not mutually exclusive but they are distributed in this manner in order to suggest a different way of understanding these logical traditions. The articles under the first section “Texts” provide a small sample of the wide variety of texts encountered in Indian philosophy. These texts often require codes of reading and interpreting. As is

Preface

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well known, some of the most important discussions in Indian philosophy are not to be found in the primary texts but in the various commentaries to primary texts. From this very small sample of texts discussed in this section, one can already note not just the different themes but also styles of reasoning. The second section has articles under the title of “Fundamentals.” These articles discuss some foundational issues associated with different traditions and give some idea of the fundamental principles of some of these traditions as well a brief account of their development. Even though there are overlapping foundational themes, there are also some unique features in each of these philosophical schools. The articles in the section “Particularities” provide samples of the type of uniqueness that characterize some of the philosophical approaches of these different schools. Following this section is the one under the heading of “Language.” Indian philosophy has had a sustained and very rich reflection on language. There are many innovative aspects in their approach, such as the creation of foundational ideas in linguistics as well as the attempt to create a “technical” language. The next section consists of articles that are largely about the comparative approach between different schools. While almost all of Indian philosophy should be seen as a comparative enterprise in that agreement and disagreement between schools can be seen as the core of philosophical practice, we can nonetheless identify a few limited themes to give a sample of this comparative process. We include articles that not only illustrate a notion of comparative between the earlier traditions but also that between these traditions and modern logic. The last section compiles articles under the heading of “Modern.” These articles are examples of the rich practices of logic in India, their contemporary interpretations, and those in the domains of mathematical logic and in computer science. In bringing these articles also into this fold, we are also problematizing a specific essential idea of “India” as something totally encoded in the past or located in some specific traditions. When this volume was first envisioned, it was in terms of the traditional grouping under the various schools. However, as the volume took shape, we realized that this would not be the best way to present the material in this volume. So although our section editors were responsible for grouping articles under each school, we have changed the final categorization of the sections. We are deeply grateful to the following scholars who were responsible for soliciting articles from their colleagues: Pradeep P. Gokhale (Chaps. ▶ 1, ▶ 4, ▶ 8, and ▶ 12), Jayendra Soni (Chaps. ▶ 2, ▶ 9, ▶ 16, and ▶ 31), Shrinivasa Varakhedi (Chaps. ▶ 23 and ▶ 30), Jonardon Ganeri (Chaps. ▶ 14, ▶ 20, ▶ 27, ▶ 34, and ▶ 35), Nirmal Selvamony (Chaps. ▶ 3, ▶ 10, ▶ 19, and ▶ 22), Amba Kulkarni (Chaps. ▶ 24, ▶ 25, and ▶ 26), and Mrinal Kaul (Chaps. ▶ 5, ▶ 11, ▶ 15, ▶ 18, and ▶ 29). We are also deeply thankful to all the authors of this volume who have spared their precious time and effort to contribute to this venture. Bangalore, India Kolkata, India November 2022

Sundar Sarukkai Mihir Kumar Chakraborty

Contents

Volume 1 Part I

Texts

.............................................

1

1

Buddhist Logic: Sample Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pradeep P. Gokhale

3

2

General Introduction to Logic in Jainism with a List of Logicians and Their Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jayandra Soni

23

3

Logic in nīlakēci and maṇimēkalai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nirmal Selvamony

45

4

Introduction to Buddhist Logicians and their Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . Madhumita Chattopadhyay

67

5

Logical Proofs in the Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda John Nemec

91

Part II

Fundamentals

................

....................................

115

6

Logic in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amita Chatterjee

117

7

Charvaka (Cārvāka) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

139

8

General Introduction to Buddhist Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joerg Tuske

161

9

Logic of Syād-Vāda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anne Clavel

183

10

Logic in Tamil Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nirmal Selvamony

205

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11

Contents

Causal Reasoning in the Trika Philosophy of Abhinavagupta . . . . Mrinal Kaul

Part III

Particularities

....................................

227

255

12

Some Issues in Buddhist Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pradeep P. Gokhale and Kuntala Bhattacharya

257

13

The Nyāya on Logical Thought J. L. Shaw

...........................

281

14

Early Nyāya Logic: Pragmatic Aspects Jaspal Peter Sahota

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353

15

Āgama as Pramāṇa in Kashmir Śaivism Navjivan Rastogi

....................

373

16

Logical Argument in Vidyānandin’s Satya-śāsana-parīkṣā . . . . . . Himal Trikha

421

17

Jaina Theory of “ANUMĀNA” [Inference]: Some Aspects Tushar K. Sarkar

......

437

18

Pratyabhijñā Inference as a Transcendental Argument About a Nondual, Plenary God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David Peter Lawrence

489

19

Logic in Tamil Didactic Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thanga Jayaraman

519

20

The Logic of Late Nyāya: Problems and Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eberhard Guhe

539

Volume 2 Part IV

Language

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569

21

Logical Aspects of Grammar: Pāṇini and Bhartṛhari . . . . . . . . . . Raghunath Ghosh

571

22

Logic in tolkāppiyam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nirmal Selvamony

595

23

Dependency of Inference on Perception and Verbal Testimony . . . Vinay P

617

24

Influence of Navya-Nyāya Concepts and Language in Vyākaraṇa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. V. Venkataramana

633

Contents

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25

Technical Language of Navya Nyāya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O. G. P. Kalyana Sastry

657

26

The Importance of Śābdabodha in Language Analysis Rajaram Shukla

.........

681

27

Early Nyāya Logic: Rhetorical Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Keith Lloyd

695

28

Logic of Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reetu Bhattacharjee, Mihir Kumar Chakraborty, and Lopamudra Choudhury

719

Part V

Comparative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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29

Abhinavagupta on Śānta Rasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sthaneshwar Timalsina

803

30

Convergence and Divergence of Nyāya and Tattvavāda (Dvaita) Theories of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vaishnavi Nishankar

821

The Opponent: Jain Logicians Reacting to Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marie-Hélène Gorisse

847

32

The Catuṣkoṭi, the Saptabhaṇgī, and “Non-Classical” Logic . . . . . Graham Priest

869

33

Imperative Logic: Indian and Western . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manidipa Sanyal

889

31

Part VI

Modern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

929

34

Later Nyāya Logic: Computational Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amba Kulkarni

35

The Logic of Late Nyāya: A Property-Theoretic Framework for a Formal Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eberhard Guhe

955

A Few Historical Glimpses into the Interplay Between Algebra and Logic and Investigations into Gautama Algebras . . . . . . . . . . Hanamantagouda P. Sankappanavar

979

36

931

37

Algebraic Logic and Rough Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Mohua Banerjee

38

The Logic of Nonpersons Rohit Parikh

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103

xii

Contents

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119

39

Philosophical Aspects of Constructivism in Logic Ranjan Mukhopadhyay

40

Logics of Strategies and Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Sujata Ghosh and R. Ramanujam

41

Synthesizing Skolem Functions: A View from Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 S. Akshay and Supratik Chakraborty

42

Terms and Automata Through Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Kamal Lodaya

43

Consequence-Inconsistency Interderivability in Paraconsistent Logics and Paraconsistent Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Soma Dutta and Sourav Tarafder

44

An Introduction to Theory of Graded Consequence Mihir Kumar Chakraborty and Sanjukta Basu

. . . . . . . . . . . 1289

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1329

About the Editors

Sundar Sarukkai works primarily in the philosophy of the natural and the social sciences. He is the founder of Barefoot Philosophers (www.barefootphilosophers.org) and is currently a Visiting Faculty at the Centre for Society and Policy, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. He has authored Translating the World: Science and Language, Philosophy of Symmetry, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, What Is Science?, JRD Tata and the Ethics of Philanthropy, and coauthored two books with Gopal Guru – The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory and more recently, Experience, Caste and the Everyday Social. His book Philosophy for Children: Thinking, Reading, Writing is published in English, Hindi, Tamil, Kannada, Malayalam, and Telugu. His latest book is The Social Life of Democracy. He is the Series Editor for the Science and Technology Studies Series, Routledge. He was a professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies until 2019 and was the Founder-Director of the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities from 2010 to 2015.

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About the Editors

Mihir Kumar Chakraborty School of Cognitive Science Jadavpur University Kolkata, West Bengal, India Former Professor of Pure Mathematics University of Calcutta Kolkata, West Bengal, India Mihir Kumar Chakraborty is currently Visiting Professor, School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, India, and Adjunct Professor, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi (IIIT-Delhi). He was formerly Professor at the Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Calcutta, India; Visiting Professor, Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology, Shibpur, India; Visiting Professor, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India; Guest Professor, Chongqing Southwest University, China; and Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata (IISER, Kolkata), Kalyani, West Bengal, India. His research interests are non-standard logics, fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic, rough set theory and logics of rough sets, paraconsistent logics, foundations of mathematics, mathematics and culture, logic of diagrams, functional analysis, topology, and knowledge representation. He has widely toured various countries on academic visits and authored and edited several books in both English and Bengali. One of the founders of Calcutta Logic Circle (CLC) and Association of Logic in India (ALI), he has also been awarded fellowships by Indian Institute of Advanced Studies (IIAS), Shimla; West Bengal Academy of Science and Technology (WAST); Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR); International Rough Set Society (IRSS); and Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD).

Section Editors

Jonardon Ganeri Bimal K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Toronto, ON, Canada

Pradeep P. Gokhale Department of Philosophy Savitribai Phule Pune University Pune, India

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Section Editors

Mrinal Kaul Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay (IITB) Mumbai, India

Amba Kulkarni Department of Sanskrit Studies University of Hyderabad Hyderabad, Telangana, India

Nirmal Selvamony Madras Christian College Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India Central University of Tamil Nadu Thiruvarur, Tamil Nadu, India

Jayandra Soni Department of Philosophy University of Innsbruck Innsbruck, Austria University of Marburg Marburg, Germany

Section Editors

xvii

Shrinivasa Varakhedi Kavikulaguru Kalidas Sanskrit University Ramtek, Nagpur, India

Contributors

S. Akshay Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India Mohua Banerjee Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India Sanjukta Basu Department of Philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Reetu Bhattacharjee School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Kuntala Bhattacharya Department of Philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Ramkrishna Bhattacharya Pavlov Institute, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Mihir Kumar Chakraborty School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Former Professor of Pure Mathematics, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Supratik Chakraborty Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India Amita Chatterjee School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Madhumita Chattopadhyay Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, The Center for Buddhist Studies, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Lopamudra Choudhury School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India Anne Clavel Department of Philosophy, University of Lyon, Lyon, France Soma Dutta Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Olsztyn, Poland xix

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Contributors

Raghunath Ghosh University of North Bengal, Darjeeling, West Bengal, India Sujata Ghosh Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai, India Pradeep P. Gokhale Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India Marie-Hélène Gorisse Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium Eberhard Guhe Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai, China Thanga Jayaraman Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, Tamil Nadu, India Mrinal Kaul Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS), Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay (IITB), Mumbai, India Amba Kulkarni Department of Sanskrit Studies, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, Telangana, India David Peter Lawrence Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, USA Keith Lloyd Faculty of English, English Kent State University Stark, North Canton, OH, USA Kamal Lodaya The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India Ranjan Mukhopadhyay Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India John Nemec Indian Religions and South Asian Studies, Department of Religious Studies, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA Vaishnavi Nishankar Research Scholar, Mumbai, India Vinay P Faculty of Vedanta, Karnataka Samskrit University, Bangalore, Karnataka, India Rohit Parikh CS, Math, Philosophy, Brooklyn College and CUNY Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA Graham Priest Departments of Philosophy, The CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, USA University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia R. Ramanujam Instititute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India Navjivan Rastogi The Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages, Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics and Shaiva Philosophy, University of Lucknow, Lucknow, India

Contributors

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Jaspal Peter Sahota Inavya Ventures Ltd, London, UK Hanamantagouda P. Sankappanavar Department of Mathematics, State University of New York, New Paltz, NY, USA Manidipa Sanyal University of Calcutta, Calcutta, India Tushar K. Sarkar Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India University of Waterloo, Windsor, ON, Canada O. G. P. Kalyana Sastry Department of Nyaya, National Sanskrit University, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh, India Nirmal Selvamony Madras Christian College, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, Tamil Nadu, India J. L. Shaw Department of Philosophy, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Rajaram Shukla Department of Vaidic Darshan, Sanskrit Vidya Dharm Vigyan Sankay, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India Jayandra Soni Department of Philosophy, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany Sourav Tarafder Business Mathematics and Statistics, Department of Commerce, St. Xavier’s College, Kolkata, India Institute of Philosophy and the Humanities, University of Campinas (UNICAMP), São Paulo, Brazil Sthaneshwar Timalsina Religious Studies, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA Himal Trikha Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris, France Joerg Tuske Department of Philosophy, Salisbury University, Salisbury, MD, USA B. V. Venkataramana Department of Philosophy, Evening Sanskrit College, Karnataka Sanskrit University, Bangalore, Karnataka, India

Part I Texts

1

Buddhist Logic: Sample Texts Pradeep P. Gokhale

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Text I: Diṅnāga’s Nyāyapraves´akasūtram: Aphorisms Introducing the Theory of Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Text II: Chapter Two of Nyāyabindu: “On the Inference for Oneself” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Text III: A Section from Hetubindu: On the Nature of a Valid Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definitions of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 4 13 17 21 21 22

Abstract

In this chapter, three sections from three different texts are chosen which discuss some of the core doctrines in Buddhist logic. The first section, namely, Nyāyapraves´akasūtram discusses Diṅnāga’s theory of inference which includes his theory of “inference for oneself” and “inference for others” and fallacies of inference including those of the thesis, reason, and instance. The second section chosen from Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu deals with “Inference for oneself.” Dharmakīrti here tries to construct a comprehensive and tight framework of inference. Accordingly, hetu can be only of three kinds: svabhāva, kārya, and anupalabdhi. Dharmakīrti in this chapter also explains the 11-fold classification of anupalabdhi-hetu. The third section selected from Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu discusses formal logical issues concerning the inference for others. Here Dharmakīrti contends that the statements of pakṣadharmatā and vyāpti are the only logically necessary and sufficient premises and that the statements of positive and negative concomitance

P. P. Gokhale (*) Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_4

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entail each other such that only one of the two needs to be stated. This gives rise to two basic forms of inference which resemble Modus Ponuns and Modus Tollens.

Introduction In this chapter, three sections from three different texts are chosen which discuss some of the core doctrines in Buddhist logic. 1. The first section is Nyāyapraves´akasūtram, a short text which the tradition attributes to Diṅnāga. The text along with Haribhadrasūri’s Vŗtti and Pañjikā of Pārśvadeva was edited by A. B. Dhruva in 1968. It was then translated and commented upon in Hindi by Ranjan Kumar Sharma in 1999. There has been a controversy about the authorship of this text – Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya and M. Tubianski arguing that it is not the work of Diṅnāga but of some other author of Diṅnāga’s tradition (probably Śaṅkarasvāmin) and A. B. Keith (The Indian Historical Quarterly Vol. 6:1, 1928, pp. 16–22) countering their arguments and reclaiming the authorship of Diṅnāga. However, the importance of this text lies in the clear and precise way it presents the gist of Diṅnāga’s theory of inference. The translation of the text included here is authored by Pradeep Gokhale. 2. The second section is chosen from Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu. Nyāyabindu is a systematic treatise which gives essence of Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference. The second and the third chapters of the text deal with “Inference for oneself” (svārthānumāna) and “Inference for others” (parārthānumāna), respectively. Here the chapter on svārthānumāna has been selected. The translation included here largely follows Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay’s translation (as in Vinītadeva’s Nyāyabinduṭī kā, 1971) but at times deviates from the latter. 3. For the discussion of “Inference for others,” however, a section from Dharmakīrti’s another work, namely, Hetubindu, has been chosen. In Nyāyabindu, the account of inference has been given in an aphorismic and expository way. On the other hand in Hetubindu, it is given in an explanatory and argumentative way. The original text is not available in Sanskrit, but its restorations by Rahul Sankrityayan (included as Appendix 7 of the Hetubinduṭī kā, 1949) and Ernst Steinkellner (Dharmakī rti’s Hetubinduḥ, (Teil I), 1967) are available. Here an English translation by Pradeep Gokhale based on these restorations has been taken from Hetubindu of Dharmakī rti (A Point on Probans) by Pradeep P. Gokhale (1997), pp. 14 to 21. The author has edited and revised the translation while including it in this chapter.

Text I: Din˙nāga’s Nyāyapraves´akasūtram: Aphorisms Introducing the Theory of Reasoning Proof and refutation along with their fallacies are meant for the sake of others’ knowledge and perception and inference along with their fallacies are meant for one’s own knowledge.

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This is the collection of the topics discussed in this work. Out of them, proof means the statement of the thesis, etc., because the fact unknown to the inquirers is made known to them by the statements of thesis, probans, and instance. Out of them thesis refers to the property-bearer, which is desired to be itself proved as qualified by a well-known characteristic. Moreover, it should be uncontradicted by perception, etc. For example, “Word is eternal” or “Word is non-eternal.” Probans has three characteristics. What are these three characteristics? 1. Being the property of the thesis-subject 2. Existence in similar cases 3. Nonexistence in dissimilar cases What is the similar case and what is dissimilar case? Similar case is similar to the thesis by way of possessing the provable property as the common feature. For example, when Word is to be proved as impermanent, a thing such as a pot is a similar case. Dissimilar case is that where provable property does not exist. Whatever is permanent is seen to be a nonproduct like space. Here, the property of “being a product” or the property of “being produced through efforts” exists only in similar cases; it does not exist in dissimilar cases at all. Probans for proving impermanence, etc., can be explained in this way. [Diṅnāga here has stated the doctrine of the triple character of probans. Of course when he says that the probans should exist in similar cases, he does not mean that it should exist in all similar cases. What he means is that it should exist in at least a few similar cases. Though Diṅnāga does not make the point clear in this text, it is implied. Here Diṅnāga refers to two probanses for proving impermanence of Word: “being a product” and “being produced through efforts.” Out of them the first probans exists in all similar cases, whereas the second probans exists in a part of the class of the similar cases. Here the similar cases, namely, “the class of impermanent things” consists of the things like pot which are produced through efforts and also the things like lightning which is a natural product, not produced through efforts. In this way, the probans “being produced through efforts” presented for establishing impermanence of Word exists only in a few similar cases, not all. Even then it is a good probans.] Instance is of two kinds: one by similarity and the other by dissimilarity. Out of them, instance by similarity is that where the existence of probans in similar cases is shown. For example, whatever is a product is seen to be impermanent like a pot, etc. Instance by dissimilarity is that where the nonexistence of probans is stated where there is nonexistence of the provable property. For example, whatever is permanent is seen to be a nonproduct like space. Here, by the word “permanent,” “absence of impermanence” is stated. Similarly, the word “nonproduct” also indicates “absence of product-hood.” For example, existence is absence of absence. Hereby, we have stated thesis and other factors of proof.

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The statement of these three, that is, the thesis, the probans, and the instance, is called proof at the time of convincing others. For example, “Word is impermanent” is the statement of the thesis; “because it is a product” is the statement of the reason, that is, that of the property of the thesis-subject. “Whatever is the product is seen to be non-eternal like a pot, etc.” is the statement of positive concomitance in similar cases. “Whatever is eternal is seen to be a non-product, like space” is the statement of negative concomitance. Only these three are called limbs of inference. [In the above formulation of inference given by Diṅnāga, his use of the word “seen” (“dr¸ṣṭam”) is important. It implies that the positive concomitance (anvaya) and negative concomitance (vyatireka) refer to the observed world. In this sense, the inference as understood by Diṅnāga is a passage from “observed to unobserved.” In Dharmakīrti’s revised version of inference, the statement of concomitance is an observation-independent universal statement. Hence, Dharmakīrti drops the word “seen” in his formulation.] Fallacious thesis is that which is desired to be proved but which is contradicted by perception, etc. This is as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Contradicted by perception Contradicted by inference Contradicted by scripture Contradicted by public custom Contradicted by the own utterance The predicate term of which is unproved The subject term of which is unproved Both the terms of which are unproved The relation in which is well-known

1. “Contradicted by perception” is like the following: Word is inaudible 2. “Contradicted by inference” is like the following: The pot is eternal 3. “Contradicted by (one’s own) scripture” is like the following: When a Vaisesika would try to prove, “Word is eternal” 4. “Contradicted by public custom” is like the following: “Scull of human head is pious, because it is the limb of animal, like conch-shell and oyster-shell.” 5. “Contradicted by its own utterance” is like the following: “My mother is barren.” 6. “The predicate term of which is unproved” is like the following: A Buddhist argues to a Saṅkhya,“Word is perishable” 7. “The subject term of which is unproved” is like the following: A Saṅkhya argues to a Buddhist, “Soul is conscious.” 8. “Both the terms of which are unproved” is like the following: A Vaisesika argues to a Buddhist, “Soul is the material cause of pleasure, etc.” 9. “The relation in which is well known” is like the following: “Word is audible.”

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The statements of these amount to defective declaration (of the thesis) either because the statement is rendered impossible by way of denial of the nature of the provable property or due to superfluity of proving it. The fallacies of thesis have thus been stated. Fallacies of probans are: 1. Unproved probans 2. Inconclusive probans 3. Contrary probans Out of them, unproved probans is of four kinds as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Probans unproved for both the debaters Probans unproved for one of the debaters Probans unproved because of doubtfulness Probans, the locus of which is unproved Out of them,

1. “Probans unproved for both” is like the following: When Word is to be proved impermanent, then “because Word is visible” is unproved for both. 2. “Unproved for one of the debaters” is like the following: When somebody argues against the one who accepts the manifestation of sound, “Word is non-eternal, because it is a product.” 3. “Unproved because of doubtfulness” is like the following: When combination of elements, about which there is a doubt that it is vapor, is being stated as a probans for proving fire. 4. “The locus of which is unproved” is like the following: When somebody argues against the one who accepts nonexistence of space (ether), “Ether is a substance because it is locus of qualities.” Inconclusive probans is of six kinds: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Common probans Uncommon probans Probans existing in a part of similar cases, but the whole of dissimilar cases Probans existing in a part of dissimilar cases, but the whole of similar cases The probans existing partly in both cases Probans concomitant with the contrary probandum Out of them

1. “Common probans” is like the following: Word is eternal, because it is knowable. Here, knowability is the inconclusive probans because it is common to both eternal and noneternal types of objects. It is inconclusive because it causes the

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doubt: Is Word impermanent because of knowability, like a pot, or it is permanent because of knowability, like ether? “Uncommon probans” is like the following: Word is eternal, because it is audible. This is because audibility being excluded from both eternal and noneternal types of objects, and because the thing cannot be excluded from both the categories, namely, eternal and noneternal, audibility becomes the cause of doubt as to how the Word becomes audible due to eternality or noneternality. “Probans existing in a part of similar cases, but the whole of the dissimilar cases” is like the following: Word is not caused by efforts, because it is impermanent. Here, that Word is not caused by efforts is to be proved. Lightening, ether, etc., are similar cases. Out of these similar cases, impermanence exists in the things like lightening but not in the things like ether. Again, (in this inference) that Word is not caused by efforts is to be proved. For that, the things like pot are dissimilar cases. In all these dissimilar cases, namely, pot, etc., impermanence exists. Hence, impermanence becomes inconclusive because of its similarity with lightening and pot. Here the doubt arises as to whether Word is made by efforts because it is impermanent like a pot, or it is not made by efforts because it is impermanent like lightening, etc. “Probans which exists in a part of dissimilar cases, but the whole of similar cases” is like the following: Word is made by efforts, because it is impermanent. Here, that Word is made by efforts is to be proved. Pot, etc., are its similar cases. Impermanence exists in all these cases like pot. Now, (in this inference) “the pot is made by efforts” is to be proved. Its dissimilar cases are lightening, ether, etc. Out of them, impermanence exists in one part, namely, lightening, etc., but not in ether, etc. Therefore, this probans is also inconclusive like the earlier one due to its similarity with lightening and pot. “The probans existing partly in both cases” is like the following: Word is eternal, because it is intangible (or having unlimited size). What is to be proved (in this inference) is that Word is eternal. Its similar cases are ether, atom, etc. Out of them, amūrta-hood (unlimited size) lies in one part, namely, ether, etc. It does not lie in atom. Now, again, eternality is to be proved (in this inference). Its dissimilar cases are pot, pleasure, etc. Out of them amūrta-hood exists in one part, namely, pleasure, etc., but it does not exist in pot, etc. Therefore, this probans too is inconclusive because of dissimilarity with pleasure and ether. [In the above example, the meaning of the term amūrtatva is not clear. Rather two meanings of the term seem to be mixed up in the above example. The word mūrta has two senses (1) Tangible: That which can be known through external senses. (2) The thing which has limited size. Amūrta is the opposite of mūrta. Now, Ether is amūrta in both the senses: It cannot be perceived through external senses and it has unlimited size. Atom (paramāṇu) is mūrta in the second sense because it has limited size. And Diṅnāga also treats atom as mūrta. (But it is not mūrta in the first sense. It is not perceptible through external senses. Diṅnāga seems to ignore this aspect.) But pleasure cannot be measured by size. So the question whether it is mūrta in the second sense does not arise. But it can be called amūrta in the first sense, because it cannot be cognized through external senses.]

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6. “Probans concomitant (also) with the contrary probandum” is like the following: Word is noneternal, because it is a product like a pot; Word is eternal, because it is audible like soundness. These two probanses taken together is one inconclusive probans, because they together cause a doubt. Contrary probans is of four kinds as follows: 1. The probans which proves opposite of the nature of the provable property. 2. The probans which proves opposite of a specific character of the provable property. 3. The probans which proves opposite of the nature of the property bearer. 4. The probans which proves opposite of a specific character of the property bearer. Out of them 1. “The probans which proves opposite of the nature of the provable property” is like the following: Word is permanent, because it is a product or because it is produced through efforts. This probans is contrary probans, because it exists only in dissimilar cases. 2. “The probans which proves opposite of a specific character of the provable property” is like the following: The things like visual sense organ are meant for something else, because they are composite, like the specific bodies, such as bed and seat. This probans proves the other-dependent character of visial sense organs, etc. But it also proves composite nature of that other, namely the self, because this probans is concomitant which both. 3. “The probans which proves opposite of the nature of the property bearer” is like the following: Existence is neither a substance not a motion nor a quality because it resides in a single substance and it also resides in qualities and motions, like specific universals. This probans proves that existence is not a substance, etc., but it also proves that existence is absence, because the probans is concomitant with both. 4. “Probans which proves opposite of a specific character of the property bearer” is like the following: The same probans in the same thesis-subject which is stated above proves “causing the experience of non-existence,” which is opposite of the specific characteristic of the property-bearer, namely, “causing the experience of existence” because it is concomitant with both. [Out of the four types of Contrary probans mentioned above, the first one is basic according to which the probans exists only in dissimilar cases and none of the similar cases. Elsewhere Diṅnāga refers to two subtypes of this contrary probans: (1) the probans which exists in a few dissimilar cases but in none of the similar cases and (2) the probans which exists in all dissimilar cases but in none of the similar cases. In fact, the two types of contrary probans mentioned above along with the first five types of inconclusive probans and the two types of good probans which make

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the total of nine types of good or bad probans constitute what Diṅnāga calls the wheel of probans (Hetucakra). The wheel of probans is a ninefold classification of probans, which is the property of the thesis-subject (pakṣadharma). That is, it fulfills the first condition of a good probans, but it may or may not fulfill the other two conditions. Hence, the property of the thesis subject (pakṣadharma): • May exist in all similar cases, only a few similar cases, or in no similar case • May exist in all dissimilar cases, only a few dissimilar cases, or in no dissimilar case The combinations of these possibilities yield nine varieties, which can be presented in tabular form as given in the Hetucakra-Table below. Position with respect to dissimilar cases Position with respect to similar cases I. Resident II. Nonresident III. Resident and nonresident

(a) Resident

(b) Nonresident

(c) Resident and nonresident

Ia: Inconclusive IIa: Contrary

Ib: Good

Ic: Inconclusive

IIb: Inconclusive IIIb: Good

IIc: Contrary

IIIa: Inconclusive

IIIc: Inconclusive

(Hetucakra: Table)]

Fallacious instance is of two kinds, one by similarity and one by difference. Fallacious instance-by-similarity is of five kinds, as the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Where the probans is unproved Where the provable property is unproved Where both the properties are unproved Where positive concomitance is absent Where the converse of positive concomitance is present There

1. “Where the probans is unproved” is like the following: “Word is eternal, because it has unlimited size like an atom. Whatever is seen as having unlimited size is seen to be eternal like an atom.” In this example, eternality, which is the probandum, exists in atom, but the probans namely having unlimited size does not exist there, because atoms have limited size. 2. “Where the provable property is unproved” is like the following: “Word is eternal, because it is intangible like cognition. Whatever is seen to be intangible is seen to be eternal like cognition.” In this example, intangibility, that is the probans, resides in cognition, but eternality, that is, the provable property does not exist there, because cognition is noneternal.

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3. “Where both the properties are unproved” is of two kinds: real and unreal. Out of them, “like a pot” as instance is real and it is that in which both the properties are unproved. The second example would be “like space.” There the instance is unreal according to the one who does not accept reality of space, and it is also the one in which both are unproved. 4. “Where positive concomitance is absent” is like the following: It is that in which coexistence of probandum and probans is shown without positive concomitance, for example, “In a pot both product-hood and non-eternality are seen” 5. “Where the converse of positive concomitance is present” is like the following: It is where the debater says, “Whatever is seen to be non-eternal is seen to be a product,” when he should have said, “Whatever is a product is seen to be non-eternal.” “The fallacious instance-by-difference” is of five kinds like the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Where absence of probandum is not there Where absence of probans is not there Where absences of both are not there Where negative concomitance is not there Where the converse of negative concomitance is present Out of them

1. “Where absence of probandum is not there” is like the following: “Word is eternal, because it has unlimited size unlike an atom. Whatever is seen to be non-eternal is seen to have limited size, for example atom.” In this example, the probans namely having unlimited size (amūrtatva) is absent from the atom, because atoms have limited size, but the probandum, namely, eternality is not absent from atoms, because atoms are eternal. 2. “Where absence of probans is not there” is like the following: “unlike motion.” Here eternality is probandum which is absent from motion, because motion is not eternal. But intangibility (amūrtatva), which is the probans, is not absent from the motion because motion is intangible. 3. “Where absence of both is not there” is like the following: “unlike space” – When this is presented as an instance to one who accepts existence of space. Both “eternality” and “having unlimited size” are not absent from space, because space is eternal and has unlimited size. 4. “Where negative concomitance is not there” is like the following: It occurs where the absence of probans and probandum in a dissimilar case is shown without indicating absence of probans and probandum (in general). For example, one says: “Tangibility and non-eternality both are seen in a pot.” 5. “Where the converse of negative concomitance is present” is like the following: “One says that whatever is seen to be tangible is seen to be non-eternal,” when one should have said “Whatever is non-eternal is seen to be tangible.”

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The statements of fallacious thesis, probans, and instance are called fallacies of proof. For the sake of one’s own knowledge, however, there are only two means of knowledge – perception and inference. Out of them, perception is that cognition which is devoid of mental construction, with respect to the object such as form (rūpa) without the construction of name, universal, etc. It is called pratyakṣa in the sense that it occurs with respect to the respective sense organ (akṣa). Inference is the cognition of an object based on the probans. We have said that probans has three characteristics. The cognition, which arises with regard to the inferable object from the probans of that kind, such as “There is fire here” or “Word is impermanent,” is inference. In both the cases, the cognition itself is the result, because it is of the nature of determinate cognition. It is also pramāṇa (means to knowledge), because it is cognized as having an operation. Constructive cognition which occurs regarding a different object (from what is given) is called pseudo-perception. That is, the cognition which arises in constructing mentally ‘a pot’ or ‘a cloth’ is a pseudo perception, because it does not have a unique particular as its object. The cognition caused by fallacious probans is pseudo-inference. We have stated various kinds of fallacious probans. The cognition which an ignorant person has with reference to the inferable object from the fallacious probans is a pseudo-inference. Refutation means pointing out a defect in a proof. The defects (possible) in a proof are: 1. Deficient-ness (incompleteness) or 2. The defect in thesis such as “contradicted by perception,” etc., or 3. Defect in probans, namely, “unproved probans” “Inconclusive probans,” or “contrary probans,” or 4. Defect in instance, such as “(the instance-by-similarity,) the probans in which is unproved.” Pointing it out and convincing the questioner (the judge) is refutation. Pointing out the defect in proof when the defect is not there is pseudo-refutation. For example, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

To say that the proof is deficient (that is, incomplete), when the proof is complete To say that there is a defect in the thesis when the thesis is nondefective To say that here there is an unproved probans, when the probans is proved To say that the probans is inconclusive, when actually the probans is conclusive To say that the probans is contrary, when he probans is not contrary To say that the instance is defective, when the instance is not defective

These are the pseudo-refutations, because the opponents’ thesis is not refuted by them, because the thesis is faultless. We stop here. In this work, we have stated the categories only to give the initial direction. Whatever is justified or nonjustified with respect to this is explained well by us elsewhere. The text called “aphorisms introducing the theory of reasoning” is complete.

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Text II: Chapter Two of Nyāyabindu: “On the Inference for Oneself” [The second text has been chosen from Nyāyabindu, a lucid and concise work of Dharmakīrti on the theory of Pramāṇas. The work consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, Dharmakīrti introduces the notion of right cognition (samyak-jn˜ āna), that is, pramāṇa and then classifies it into two kinds, perception and inference. He then defines perception and also its fourfold classification. The Second and third chapter are devoted to the discussion of inference. The second chapter, which is now being presented in translation, deals with “inference for oneself” with its different aspects.] [2.1:Two Types of Anumāna] Inference is twofold – for one’s own sake (svārtha) and for the sake of others (parārtha). [2.2: Definition of Svārthānumāna] Of these, a svārthānumāna is knowledge which is produced through a reason property [Literally, mark (liṅga)] having three characteristics (trirūpa) and pertains to an “inferable object” (anumeya). Here [i.e., in the case of inference] also the arrangement (vyavasthā) with regard to the effect [produced by] an instrument of right cognition and [the instrument itself] is just the same as in the case of perception. [2.3: Trirūpaṁliṅgam: Triple Character of the Reason Property] The three characteristics of a mark are (1) its definite (eva)presence in the inferable object, (2) its presence only (eva) in similar cases (sapakṣa), and (3) its definite (eva) absence in dissimilar cases (asapakṣa). And [all these must be] properly ascertained. [2.4: Definitions: Anumeya (Pakṣa), Sapakṣa, Asapakṣa] An inferable entity here means a property-bearer (dharmin) – the property of which is “sought to be known” ( jijn˜ āsita). /5/ A similar case is an object which is similar (samāna) through the possession of the “general inferred property” (sādhya-dharma-sāmānya). A case which is not similar is dissimilar – [it can be] different from it, contrary to it or its absence. [2.5: Trī ṇiliṅgāni: Three kinds of Reason Property] There are only three kinds of the reason property, which have the three characteristics. [The three kinds of reason are] nonapprehension (anupalabdhi), own nature of a thing (svabhāva), and effect (kārya). [2.6: Anupalabdhi-hetu: Nonapprehension as Reason] Of these, a case of nonapprehension, for example, is: There is no jar on a particular spot somewhere, because there is non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) of “what fulfils the conditions of cognisability (upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpta).” The fulfillment of the conditions of cognizability consists in the presence of the totality of the conditions (pratyaya) of cognition (upalambha) other than [the object itself] and “a distinct nature (of the object)” (svabhāva-vis´eṣa). The distinct nature is that (by which) the object, if existent, is necessarily perceived – when all the other conditions of cognition are available. [2.7: Svabhāva-hetu: Own Nature as Reason] Own nature (of an object) is the reason in relation to an inferable property which exists merely on account of its own [i.e., of the reason] existence. For example: This is a tree, because it is a s´iṃs´apā. [2.8: Kārya-hetu: Effect as Reason] An effect (kārya) as reason is, for example, there is fire here, because there is smoke.

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P. P. Gokhale [2.9: Justification of the Three Kinds of Reason] Of these three, two [forms of the reasons] establish a positive entity (vastu) and the other is the cause for establishing negation (pratiṣedha). A thing can indicate [the existence of] another thing only when there is a “connection through one’s intrinsic nature” (svabhāva-pratibandha). Because there can be no invariable and necessary concomitance in the case of one that is not so connected [i.e., through one’s intrinsic nature]. Such a connection is [a connection] of the reason property with the inferable object and [it is established] on the ground that [the reason property] is actually identical with the inferable entity or that [the reason property] actually originates from the inferable entity. That is because an entity [i.e., the reason property] which is not identical in nature with it or which does not originate from it cannot be necessarily and invariably connected with it [i.e., with the inferable entity]. These relations of identity and causation belong respectively to [a reason property] which has an identical nature and that which is an effect, and that is why the existence of a positive entity is proved by them. The establishment of negation also is accomplished by the same nonapprehension as has just been mentioned. Because there can be no such nonapprehension when an entity is actually present. Because, otherwise in the case of objects which are “temporally, spatially or by nature inaccessible” (des´a-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa) and which do not fulfill the conditions of cognizability – there can be no ascertainment of an absence even when one’s own perception has ceased to function.

[Dharmakīrti here has tried to construct a comprehensive and tight framework of inference. Given any situation of inference, there are two objects – sādhya and hetu. Sādhya is known on the basis of hetu. For that there has to be necessary relation between the two such that hetu cannot be there without sādhya. Dharmakīrti calls this relation svabhāvapratibandha. It is a binding relation based on the own nature of things. Now there are two possibilities: sādhya is of the nature of existence or nonexistence. If it is of the nature of nonexistence, then it can be known through nonperception as hetu. If it is of the nature of existence, then it could be related with hetu in either of the two ways. They may be two distinct entities or two inseparable entities. If hetu and sādhya are two distinct entities, then the necessary relation between them of the form “hetu cannot be there without sādhya” is possible only if the relation is that of causal necessity. For example, smoke and fire are two distinct entities, but it is possible to infer the existence of fire from smoke. We can say that smoke cannot be there without fire only because smoke is caused by fire. If on the other hand, hetu and sādhya are inseparable entities, then they must be two aspects of one and the same thing such that the thing cannot have hetu aspect without having sādhya aspect. For example, s´iṁs´apā and tree are two aspects of one and the same thing such that a thing cannot be a s´iṁs´apā without being a tree. The issue of nonapprehension as hetu is more complex. Nonexistence of a thing can be inferred on the basis of its nonperception only if the thing is perceptible. If the thing is imperceptible, that is, if it is not remote in space and time but remote by its very nature, then its nonexistence cannot be established by nonperception. But Dharmakīrti also claims that nonexistence of a thing can also be established

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by existence of a thing which is incompatible with it. For example, fire and cold are incompatible with each other. So if one experiences fire which is capable of removing cold, one can infer that there is absence of cold there. Another point to be noted is that although Dharmakīrti talks of nonexistence as the object of inference, he does not mean thereby that nonexistence exists in the same way as a positive entity exists. When one sees no pot on the floor, one may describe the situation as “there is no pot on the floor.” At that time there is a negative description of floor, but no entity called “absence of a pot.” Hence, through nonapprehension, a negative usage (abhāvavyavahāra) is established according to Dharmakīrti.] [2.10: Explanation of Anupalabdhi-hetu] A negative usage (abhāva-vyavahāra) is established by nonoccurrence (nivṛtti) of the perception of a knower (pratipattṛ) referring to the past or the present provided the “reminiscent impression” (smṛti-saṃskāra) has not been obliterated (amūḍha). That is because an absence is ascertained exclusively on the basis of such [nonoccurrence of perception]. [2.11: Eleven kinds of Anupalabdhi-hetu] This [nonapprehension] is of eleven kinds according to the difference in the formulation. 1. [Svabhāvānupalbdhi]: The example of the “non-apprehension of the own nature of an object”: “Smoke does not exist here, because there is the non-apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability [i.e., of smoke which is a perceptible object].” 2. [Kāryānupalabdhi]: The example of the “non-apprehension of the effect”: “The efficient (apratibaddhasāmarthya) causes of smoke do not exist here, because there is no smoke.” 3. [Vyāpakānupalabdhi]: The example of the “non-apprehension of the pervader”: “A s´iṃs´apā does not exist here, because there is no tree.” 4. [Svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi]: The example of “apprehension of something incompatible with the own nature of an object (svabhāva-viruddha)”: “Sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is fire.” 5. [Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi]: The example of “apprehension of an effect produced by something incompatible with the object”: “Sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is smoke.” 6. [Viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi]: The example of “apprehension of something pervaded by what is incompatible with the object”: “There is no certainty of destruction of even a produced entity because it (=the destruction) depends on other causes.” 7. [Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi]: The example of “apprehension of what is incompatible with the effect produced by the object”: “The efficient causes of cold do not exist here, because there is fire.” 8. [Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi]: The example of “apprehension of what is incompatible with the pervader of the object”:“The touch inhering in ice does not exist here, because there is fire.” 9. [kāraṇānupalabdhi]: The example of “non-apprehension of the cause produced by the object”: “Smoke does not exist here, because there is no fire.” 10. [Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi]: The example of “apprehension of what is incompatible with the cause of the object”: “The person does not betray any special symptom of cold – e.g., having erect hair, etc. – because there is a specific form of fire nearby.” 11. [Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi]: The example of apprehension of the effect produced by what is opposed to the cause: “This spot is not characterised by a person who has the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair and the like, because there is smoke.”

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P. P. Gokhale [2.12: Explanation of the 11-fold Classification] All these ten forms of formulation based on nonapprehension – beginning with kāryānupalabdhi – can be included indirectly into [the first form, namely,] svabhāvānupalabdhi. Although there is difference [in the nature of] the various forms of formulation, because they either affirm or negate something else, still, [such inclusion is possible] in an indirect way. [These formulations] are specially mentioned here – even under the discussion on inference for one’s own sake – because due to repeated consideration of the formulations one can oneself have the ascertainment of an absence in a similar way [i.e., just in any of the forms stated above]. In these various cases of nonapprehension which is the cause of a negative usage, the absence is said to be proved by either the apprehension of the incompatible, etc., or the nonapprehension of the cause, etc. [2.13: Significance of the Condition of Cognizability] In all these cases, it is to be understood that such apprehension or nonapprehension means only [the apprehension or nonapprehension of the incompatible or the cause] which actually fulfills the condition of cognizability. That is because, in the case of others, (that is, if the condition of cognizability is not fulfilled,) the existence and nonexistence of incompatibility (virodha) as well as the causal relation are not established. In the case of an inaccessible object, the nonapprehension, which is characterized by nonoccurrence of perception and inference, is only a source of doubt. That is because the nonoccurrence of pramāṇa does not necessarily prove the absence of an object.

[An Explanation of the 11-fold Classification of Nonapprehension As Dharmakīrt himself clarifies, among these eleven kinds svabhāvānupalabdhi is basic and all others are based on it. In fact, he could have said that svabhāvānupalabdhi and svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi are basic. These two are governed by two basic principles: 1. The basic nonapprehension principle (svabhāvānupalabdhi) is: If an object A fulfills the condition of cognizability, but it is not apprehended in a particular place at a particular time, then A does not exist there at that time. 2. The basic incompatibility principle (svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi) is: If A and B are two mutually incompatible objects, and A is apprehended at a particular place at a particular time, then B does not exist there at that time. These are the two basic forms of apprehension or nonapprehension which give the knowledge of absence of a thing. By applying other principles we get the remaining varieties: 3. The principle of cause as sufficient condition: If a cause has unobstructed power to produce the effect, then it can be called the sufficient condition (which is called efficient cause above) of the effect. In such a case, nonexistence of effect implies the nonexistence of its cause. This principle is used along with the basic nonapprehension principle in the second type of anupalabdhi-hetu (“Kāryānupalabdhi”) above. Similarly, this principle is used along with the basic incompatibility principle in the seventh type of anupalabdhi-hetu (“Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi”) above.

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4. The principle of pervasion: When there is pervaded-pervader relation (vyāpyavyāpaka-sambandha) between two objects, the pervaded object implies the pervader-object and the negation of the pervader-object implies the negation of the pervaded object. These can be called the assertive and the negative versions of the principle of pervasion. For example, between “being a Śiṁśapā”(=S) and “being a tree”(=T), S is the pervaded property and T is the pervading property. Here S implies T and negation-T implies negation-S. The negative version of this principle is used along with the basic nonapprehension principle in the third type of anupalabdhi-hetu (“Vyāpakānupalabdhi”) above. The assertive version of this principle is used along with the basic incompatibility principle in the sixth type of anupalabdhi-hetu (viruddhavyāptopalabdhi) above. The negative version of this principle is used along with the basic incompatibility principle in the eighth type of anupalabdhi-hetu (Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi) above. 5. The principle of cause as a necessary condition: A cause in Indian philosophical tradition is generally understood as a necessary condition of the effect. Fire is the cause of smoke in this sense. In such cases, the effect implies the existence of its cause and nonexistence of a cause implies nonexistence of its effect. These can be called the assertive form and the negative form of the principle, respectively. In the fifth type of anupalbdhi-hetu above (“viruddhakāryopalabdhi”), the assertive form of this principle is used along with the incompatibility principle. In the ninth type of anupalabdhi-hetu above (“kāraṇānupalabdhi”), the negative form of this principle is used along with the basic nonapprehension principle. Similarly, the negative form of this principle is used along with the basic incompatibility principle in the tenth type of anupalabdhi-hetu (“kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi”) above. And lastly in the eleventh type of anupalabdhi-hetu (“Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi”), both the assertive and negative versions of this principle are used along with the basic incompatibility principle.]

Text III: A Section from Hetubindu: On the Nature of a Valid Argument [The third text chosen for this chapter is a section from another work of Dharmakīrti, namely Hetubindu. The main focus of the work is the nature of reason – what makes the reason a sound reason, what the constituents of a sound reason are, and what the types of sound reason are. All these issues are important in the context of “inference for oneself” and Dharmakīrti duly discusses them in that context. They are included in the second chapter of Nyāyabindu, which was the previous section of this chapter. But an important question in the context of “inference for others” is:“How is a sound reason to be presented in an argument? What is a valid form of an argument (or what are the valid forms of arguments)?.” The following passage from Hetubindu deals specifically with this issue.]

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P. P. Gokhale [Three Kinds of Reasons] The reason possessing these distinctive characteristics, is only threefold; that is, it is only of three kinds: own-nature, effect and non-apprehension. For example, (1) Realness (is an own-nature kind of reason) when something is to be proved as impermanent; (2) Smoke (is an effect kind of reason when some region (is to be proved as) possessing fire. (3) Non-apprehension of a thing which fulfils the condition of apprehensibility (is a non-apprehension kind of reason) when the absence (is to be proved). (These are the only three kinds.) That is because the non-variance relation is limited only to the reason of these three kinds. The non-variance relation means the pervasion of the reason-property of the provable property-bearer (with the provable property) as has been stated above. It is called limited (Niyata) to this because it does not exist in any case other than the threefold reason. [Explanation of Own-nature as Reason (Svabhāva-hetu)] Among these (three kinds of reason), own-nature is the reason when the provable property is concomitant with mere existence of the reason-property. The provable property is in reality the own-nature of the reason, although the properties differ because of differences between their exclusions from different things. The qualification in the above definition namely, “concomitant with mere existence ...” is stated in response to the opinion of others, (and is not really required) because there will be no variability in the positive concomitance when the provable property is the own-nature of the probans. The reason (why the qualification is stated) is that the opponents accept as own-nature even that which is conditioned by some other object and which is also not implied by its (i.e., reason’s) very existence. By making the above qualification one points out that a thing of that kind (i.e., a thing that is conditioned by some other object) is not the own-nature of that (reason) and that the reason has a variable relation with such a provable property. For example, product-hood has (variable relation) with caused destruction. [Forms of the Argument from Own-nature:] The (argumentative) expression of it (=the own-nature kind of reason) is of two kinds, One is through similarity and the other is through difference. For instance; [An expression based on similarity:] All that is real is momentary. For example, the things like a pot. And sound is real. And [An expression based on difference:] There is the absence of realness where there is the absence of momentariness. And sound is real. The (argumentative) expressions (of the self-nature kind of reason) based on similarity and difference, which are characterised by the presentation of all-subsuming pervasion, have (thus) been stated.

[Note: The two basic forms of argument Dharmakīrti is introducing here are similar to Modus Ponuns and Modus Tollens, respectively. Of course in Dharmakīrti’s formulation only premises are stated and conclusion is not stated, because according to Dharmakīrti it follows necessarily from the premises and hence is redundant.] [Steps in an Argument: Praijn˜ā (Declaration) Is Redundant.] Here (in the above examples) we have not indicated statement of Declaration, because the content of a Declaration is cognized from the force of the statement of (1) the (reason, being a) property of the property-bearer and (2) the relation (of pervasion). [Objection:] How can the object of (inferential) knowledge be cognized if it is not indicated (by stating the Declaration)? [Answer:] Who indicates the object of (inferential) knowledge when one knows (inferentially) by oneself? When someone who sees smoke in the region recollects its

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pervasion with fire, he knows by the very force of it the content of the Declaration “Here there is fire.” Nobody indicates to him that there is fire there. Nor is it the case that he himself knows something (namely, the content of his Declaration) beforehand, because without an authentic means to knowledge, there is no reason for his knowledge (of the provable property). And in case he knows (the content of the Declaration beforehand), then redundancy of the reason follows. What is this sequence of knowledge such that after settling by oneself and from no source, that there is fire, one follows a reason for knowing it? Even if it (=the content of the Declaration) is stated by someone else, it gets washed away, as that is of no use. If the indication of the subject is the use of it, then (we ask,) what is the use of that being indicated? All this would be fair if the (inferential) knowledge is not possible otherwise. Therefore this fellow (i.e., the Naiyāyika) who in the case of his own knowledge knows the inferential object without anyone to present it (separately), requires a manifest price (viz. Declaration) when he sees us in need (to make an inference for others), (as he is) like a Brahmin performing seasonal rites. [For his own rites he needs no expenses but he demands positive fees from needy persons for whom he has to perform the rite]. Now even if we state (the Declaration), he knows the probandum (not from our statement, but) by following the mark (i.e., probans) known by himself. What is the difference between the two states of affair then? And we have seen that the (inferential) knowledge takes place even without Declaration from the argumentative expression based on similarity, etc. Which merely consists of the statement of (two things:) (1) (the reason being) the property of the provable property-bearer (2) the relation (of pervasion). What is the use of the Declaration then? A proof (i.e., inference for others) is meant for creating a determinate cognition in others like that which he (=the inferer) himself has. Now what is the reason for him to follow a novel order while conveying his piece of knowledge to others when he himself knows without the object of knowledge being presented? No purpose, therefore, is served by the statement of the object of knowledge, because (inferential) knowledge arises even without that. [Steps in an Argument: Upanaya and Nigamana serve no purpose.] The same (line of argument) relates (the alleged necessary steps in an argument, viz.) Application (Upanaya), Conclusion (Nigamana), etc., because the knowledge of the probandum arises only from this (i.e., from the statement of the probans’ being the property of the provable property bearer and pervasion). Leave your attachment to (the behaviour of) a naked master (“ḍiṇḍika-rāga”), shut your eyes and think whether the knowledge will arise from this much or not. If it will, what is the use of a series of (unnecessary) verbal constructions? Therefore, the argumentative) expression only of this size (i.e., the one consisting of the two steps) is preferable in a statement of proof.

[This is Dharmakīrti’s response to the Nyāya view according to which an argument should contain five steps: (1) Pratijn˜ ā (Declaration of the thesis to be proved, (2) Hetu (Reason), (3) Udāharaṇa (Instance and also the statement of pervasion according to later Naiyāyikas), (4) Upanaya (Application of instance or pervasion to the present case), and (5) Nigamana (Conclusion). Contrariwise according to Dharmakīrti only two steps are necessary and sufficient: (1) Pakṣadharmatā (The statement of the existence of the reason property in the provable property bearer) and (2) Vyāpti (The statement of pervasion). The exact significance of the term ḍiṇḍika-rāga is not clear. But probably what Dharmakīrti means is that while deciding whether a particular step in an argument is logically necessary or not one should not try to adhere to what one’s teacher says. One has to appeal only to one’s power of reasoning.]

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P. P. Gokhale [The order of the premises is logically insignificant] Here there is no restriction regarding the sequence (of the steps of an argument, which states that): the reason should be expressed first and then the instance. That is because in either case it (=the argument) causes (inferential) knowledge.

[This is Dharmakīrti’s response to the Nyāya view that the steps in an argument should be stated in the fixed order as: Pratijn˜ ā-Hetu-Udāharaṇa-Upanaya-Nigamana. If in a debate, a debater presents an argument by following a different order, then the debater, according to Nyāya, will commit an occasion of defeat called “aprāptakāla.” According to Dharmakīrti logically it makes no difference if you state pakṣadharmatā first and vyāpti next or vice versa. Dharmakīrti makes the same point while criticizing the Nyāya theory of occasions of defeat in his work Vādanyāya.] [The positive pervasion and negative pervasion are equivalent] There is no difference in the meaning (of the two forms, namely positive and negative,) in the statement of the relation (i.e., pervasion) also, because in both cases it conveys its (=reason’s) being the same thing as that (=provable property). And this is because, if the reason (in the inference based on own-nature) is not identical with the provable property, the existence of the latter will not conclusively follow from that of the former. Nor will the former be excluded when the latter is excluded. For example, (there is no conclusive existence of) the property of “being invariably related with effort,” when product-hood exists. Similarly, in the case other than that of the own-nature, when the effect is absent, that (= its other relatum, i.e., the cause) is not excluded. When, for example, there is exclusion of one out of the two (namely, the property of being invariably related with effort), the exclusion of the other (namely, product-hood) does not follow.

[Here Dharmakīrti is underlining the rule of transposition according to which the statements of the form “If A then B” and “If not-B then not-A” are logically equivalent. Similarly, he is pointing out that the two vyāpti-relations, namely, identity and causation are mono-directional or unilateral and not bi-directional or bilateral. For example, one can say that “being śiṁśapā” by its own-nature amounts to “being a tree,” but one cannot say that “being a tree” by its own nature amounts to “being a śiṁśapā.” Similarly “being invariably related to efforts” amounts to being impermanent, but being impermanent does not amount to being invariably related to efforts. (For example, lightning is impermanent, but it is not connected with anybody’s efforts.) That is why for going from anvaya to vyatireka or vice versa, we have to alter the order of the antecedent and the consequent. That is how the same mono-directional identity relation is expressed through anvaya statement as well as vyatireka statement.] [Any one type of pervasion should be stated, not the both] Therefore, even when one out of the two concomitances, namely positive and negative, as they were defined before, is expressed, it implies the other. Therefore, both should not be expressed in a single statement of proof, as it is redundant. When positive concomitance is proved through one (=provable property) being the very nature of the other (namely the reason property); that the former is absent when the latter is absent is also proved. Similarly, when that (i.e., negative concomitance) is proved, positive concomitance is also proved. [The possible objection of the Opponent]: The (separate) expression of negative concomitance is for indicating the rule that reason should be absent only from the cases where

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there is the absence of that (=the provable property) and not from the cases other than or contrary to the bearer of the provable property. [Answer]: This cannot be the justification for the (separate) expression of negative concomitance. Because, the cases other than as well as the contrary to the bearer of the provable property are (nothing but) dissimilar cases.

[In Dharmakīrti’s scheme, the two conditions, namely, “existence of Reason property only in sapakṣa” and “non-existence of it anywhere in vipakṣa,” when they are understood not as existential statements, but expressions of a necessary rule, imply each other. For that he is defining vipakṣa or asapakṣa as a wider concept, as an external negation of sapakṣa such that it includes something dissimilar to sapakṣa, something other than sapakṣa as well as something contrary to sapakṣa.]

Definitions of Key Terms Pakṣa

Sādhya (Probandum)

Hetu (Probans)

Sapakṣa (Similar cases) Vipakṣa or Asapakṣa (Dissimilar cases)

Anvaya-vyāpti (Positive pervasion or Positive concomitance) Vyatireka-vyāpti (Negative pervasion or Negative concomitance)

(1) Locus or property-bearer in which a property is inferentially claimed to exist. (2) Thesis Target property: The property which is inferentially claimed to be existent in Pakṣa. Reason property: A property which provides the reason or ground for the existence of Sādhya in Pakṣa. A set of property-bearers similar to Pakṣa in that they possess Sādhya. A set of property-bearers dissimilar to Pakṣa in that they do not possess Sādhya. Positive invariable relation between Hetu and Sādhya of the form: “Wherever there is Hetu, there is Sādhya.” Negative invariable relation between Hetu and Sādhya of the form: “Wherever there is absence of Sādhya, there is absence of Hetu.”

Summary The first section of the chapter throws light on how an inference when presented in the form of an argument consists of three aspects: thesis, reason, (probans) and instance. It also shows how one can distinguish between good thesis and bad thesis,

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good probans and bad probans, and between good instance and bad instance. Diṅnāga shows with illustrations that a probans in order to be a good probans should be the property of the thesis subject, should exist in at least a few similar cases, but it should not exist even in a single dissimilar case. The second section exposes Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference for oneself. According to Dharmakīrti, hetu which possesses three characteristics is only of three kinds: self-nature, effect, and nonapprehension. That is because hetu can have necessary relation with sādhya only in three ways. The third section indicates the way in which Dharmakīrti in his theory of inference for others was aware of the rules of formal logic which the inference has to adhere to. Dharmakīrti hints at the rules such as Modus Ponuns and Modus Tollens, Transposition between the statements of positive and negative concomitance and idea that no redundant steps should be presented in an argument.

References Dhruva, A.B., ed. 1968. Nyāyapraves´a. Baroda: Baroda Oriental Research institute. Gangopadhyay, Mrinalkanti, Trans. 1971. Vinī tadeva’s Nyāyabinduṭī kā (Sanskrit original reconstructed from the extant Tibetan version with English Translation and annotations). Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present. Gokhale, Pradeep P., Ed. and trans. 1997. Hetubindu of Dharmakī rti (A point on probans). Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Sankrityayan, Rahul, ed. 1949. Hetubinduṭī kā, G. O. series, no. CXIII. Baroda: Oriental Institute. (Appendix 7). Sharma, Ranjankumar, ed. 1999. Nyāyapraves´akasūtram. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. Steinkellner, Ernst. 1967. Dharmakī rti’s Hetubinduḥ, (Teil I). Wein: Herman Böhlaus Nachf.

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General Introduction to Logic in Jainism with a List of Logicians and Their Texts Jayandra Soni

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ages of Jaina Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lists of Jaina Logicians and Their Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Short List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kundakunda (Second to Eighth Centuries) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Samantabhadra (Fourth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Umāsvāti (Fourth or Fifth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Siddhasena Divākara (c. Fifth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Akalaṅka (Eighth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mallavādin (Fifth to Sixth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vidyānandin (Ninth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hemacandra (1089–1172) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Māṇikyanandin (Eleventh Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prabhācandra (Eleventh Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abhayadeva (Eleventh Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vādidevasūri (Twelfth Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yaśovijaya (1624–1688, Wiley 2004: 239) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Long List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

In comparison to the work and research done in Brahmanism/Hinduism and Buddhism, studies in Jaina philosophy and particularly Jaina logic are relatively ignored areas. The Jaina contribution to the land of its origin, for example, to J. Soni (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_14

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literature, art, and architecture, is widely acknowledged, and one is hard pressed to find a reason for the scanty interest in its philosophy and logic. This chapter suggests a possible reason for this in the Indian tradition. At the same time, it is shown that Jaina philosophers and especially logicians have made significant contributions to the development of ideas throughout the history of Indian philosophy. A short list of 13 thinkers and their major works (annotated) is regarded as the minimum one needs for a study of the basic orientation to the development of Jaina logic over a period of 1,500 years. A long list of 43 thinkers with their major works related specifically to logic is also provided additionally. This long list too is a succinct and summary one, especially when it is known that in the Jaina tradition, a list can be drawn entailing, e.g., 352 authors and 951 works. Keywords

Jaina logic · Ages of Jaina logic · Anekānta-vāda · Syād-vāda · Naya-vāda · Kundakunda · Samantabhadra · Umāsvāti · Siddhasena Divākara · Akalaṅka · Mallavādin · Vidyānandin · Hemacandra · Māṇikyanandin · Prabhācandra · Abhayadeva · Vādidevasūri · Yaśovijaya

Introduction A brief look at published works and research done in Brahmanism/Hinduism and Buddhism shows that studies in Jainism are lagging behind, despite the fact that Jainism has been an influential part of Indian culture since ancient times. Of the many traditions, apart from the Brahmanical, that were extant around the fourth to fifth centuries BCE (like the Ājīvikas and several others), only Jainism and Buddhism have survived to this day. The Jaina treasures, for example, of literature, art, and architecture, are acknowledged contributions to the land of its origin throughout history, and one is hard pressed to find a reason for the scanty interest of this tradition. The Jaina contribution to philosophy generally and to logic in particular has hardly been taken seriously. One reason might well be because of Śaṅkara’s (eighth century) criticism, albeit unfounded, that the Jaina syād-vāda is a theory of “doubt” because the use of the word syāt (also syād or syān) according to him indicates uncertainty and that the Jainas are not in a position to make any clear and definite statements about an object of inquiry. Moreover, syād-vāda was seen as the only main aspect of Jaina philosophy as a whole, which therefore perhaps led to other areas being ignored as well (see “Syād-vāda is not Saṃs´aya-vāda,” in Soni 1996: 20–45). However, Jaina thought is well recorded, and its value in contributing to the history of ideas in India is clearly evident on the basis of the available material (e.g., introducing the concept of the mode or modification of a substance in the discussions about substance and its quality: dravya, guṇa, and paryāya; see Soni 1991). Syād-vāda is a part of the “theory of manifold perspectives” (anekānta-vāda), literally “perspectives that are not one-sided” or “many-sided perspectives,” and has

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been appropriately been seen as the “central philosophy of Jainism” (see Matilal 1981). It will be dealt with in detail by Anne Clavel in a contribution to this section of Jaina logic. Suffice it to make but a few remarks about it here. The sevenfold predication which constitutes syād-vāda involves demonstrating, for example, that a person is or can be a daughter and a mother, at the same time, but that only one aspect among several others is emphasized in a particular context. Not only in Śaṅkara’s time in the eighth century but also thereafter, this syād-vāda, which demonstrates that our knowledge is partial when we pass a judgment on an object of investigation, was regarded by others to be the entirety of Jaina philosophy. Other aspects of the Jaina position which constitute their theory of manifoldness as a whole were ignored (e.g., naya-vāda, the theory of particular standpoints, like the universal or particular standpoint when talking of a fruit or a mango). Further, Jaina epistemology and logic were also largely ignored. Only recently, especially since this century, has there been a keen interest in what has been called the Jaina multivalued logic. The Jainas themselves took cognizance of the faults that others inadmissibly leveled against them and hence mentioned them explicitly (doubt, contradiction, infinite regress, etc.) and demonstrated their inapplicability from the Jaina point of view (see Soni 2007a for various lists of faults leveled against the Jainas). Although Śaṅkara’s critique of Jaina philosophy had a lasting and scathing effect on Jainism in the Indian tradition, there have been earlier attacks on Jaina syād-vāda, for example, by Dignāga (fifth to sixth century) and particularly by Dharmakīrti (seventh century) in his chapter on inference for one’s own sake (svārthānumānapariccheda) of his Pramāṇa-vārttika, “commentary on the means of cognition.” Even ad hominem remarks are used, for example, calling the Jainas “shameless ones,” referring to the monks of Digambara Jainism, and “proud fellows” in a derogative sense. Some criticisms against Jaina philosophy also included the problem of particulars and universals, which occupied Indian thinkers quite early in their philosophical activity. Jaina thinkers like Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin took up the challenge and occupied themselves with it; the latter pointedly meets Dharmakīrti’s attacks against Jaina views (see Soni 1996: 20–22, and 1999: 245–158, and Gorisse’s contribution mentioned below in this section on Jaina logic). In any case, it is clear from some of the criticisms against the theory that the Jaina technical use of the word syāt was not recognized by the opponents, where the word is not the third-person optative of the same verbal root as, which in the third-person singular is asti; each of the predicates of the theory employs both syād and asti, and the opponents ignored the special use of syāt as an indeclinable particle, erroneously regarding both as finite verbs. With a meaning similar to something like “from one perspective,” the Jainas employed the word syāt in a single statement to implicitly say two things: that the predication is from one perspective and, at the same, it implies there can be another perspective. This basic form of the theory was then substantiated logically by the Jainas to account epistemologically for partial and perspectivistic predications of an object inquiry. The opponents were not ready to see that the Jainas expanded and systematized an attitude in Indian philosophical thinking which some others also employed (see the introduction in Shah 2002, especially p. ix and the footnotes).

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Indian logicians did not use symbols to express their abstract thinking, but they effectively used natural language in a technical way to present their arguments. Indeed, this way of implementing natural language presupposed a study of and acquaintance with how to employ the language for technical philosophical discussions of abstract ideas, as is the case with knowing the rules governing the use of the various symbols in logic. However, there have been successful attempts to apply symbolic logic to represent the logical arguments of the Indians, including the sevenfold predication of syād-vāda (e.g., in the works of pioneers like D.H.H. Ingalls, B.K. Matilal, Frits Staal, and recently by Jonardon Ganeri, to name but a few in this area). Piotr Balcerowicz formalizes it in Potter 2014: 29–51. As with other Indian systems of thought, Jaina logic is also a part of epistemology (prāmāṇya-vāda) in which logical issues are incorporated in the means of cognition or knowledge called “inference” (anumāna). Inference incorporates a “new” element that is not contained in another means of cognition such as sense perception, although perception may aid it. The classical example for inferring something new, something which perception alone does reveal, is inferring the existence of fire by seeing only the smoke. The model for the implementation of logic for valid inferential arguments was preeminently set up by the Nyāya school, and the Jainas heavily drew upon its methods and terminology. This is evident in one of the earliest presentations of Jaina logic, in Siddhasena Divākara’s c. fifth century “Introduction to [Jaina] Logic,” Nyāyāvatāra (see stanzas 18 and 22 for a reiteration of the Nyāya categories of the major and middle terms, sādhya and sādhana, reason or hetu, and argument fallacies or hetvābhāsa). We shall see in more detail in this section on Jaina logic how the Jainas used logic to criticize other views and to defend their own theory. This will be shown in the contributions by Marie-Hélène Gorisse, “The Opponent: Jaina logicians reacting to Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference” with special reference to Māṇikyanandin and Prabhācandra, and Himal Trikha: “An example for the use of logical principles in Vidyānandin’s Satya-s´āsana-parī kṣā.”

Ages of Jaina Logic In his well-known 1971 work Jaina Ontology, now a standard reference work, K.K. Dixit very conveniently divides the history of Jaina philosophical speculation into three so-called Ages of Logic (88–164), after having dealt with the “Age of the Āgamas” (12–87). The word “logic” in the “Ages of Logic” may be understood as the logic of the arguments by Jaina thinkers in different periods or ages, namely, their arguments both against non-Jaina views as well as those in support of their own position on philosophical issues. The ages are divided chronologically in terms of important texts by renowned thinkers. Dixit seems to want to clearly demarcate Śvetāmbara and Digambara contributions in the different ages. It is clear even from his classification that in the early phases of Jaina philosophical activity, the Digambaras took the center of the philosophical stage. Dixit’s work is useful for us as a starting point because of the basic orientation it provides and for the classification it gives.

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In the first period, Dixit (1971: 89) says that the important Śvetāmbara texts are Siddhasena’s San-mati (perhaps fifth century), Mallavādin’s Naya-cakra (fifth or sixth century), and Jinabhadra’s Vis´eṣāvas´yaka-bhāṣya (sixth to seventh century). And the first important Digambara texts are Kundakunda’s (eighth century?) three “essences” or sāras (Pan˜ cāstikāya, Pravacana, and Samaya) and Samantabhadra’s (fourth century) Āpta-mī māṃsā. The second age of logic according to Dixit is represented by the eighth-century Śvetāmbara scholar-monk Haribhadra with his Anekānta-jaya-patākā, his magnum opus, and his Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya and two Digambara thinkers for the last of this stage, Akalaṅka (eighth century, Rāja-vārtika, Aṣṭa-s´atī , Laghī yas-traya, Nyāya-vinis´caya, Pramāṇa-saṅgraha, and Siddhi-vinis´caya) and Vidyānanda [= Vidyānandin] (ninth century, Tattvārtha-s´loka-vārtika and Aṣṭa-sahasrī ). The third stage is represented by four thinkers: (1) the Digambara Prabhācandra (eleventh century, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, a commentary on Akalaṅka’s eighth-century Laghī yas-traya, and Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin’s eleventh-century Parī kṣā-mukha), the Śvetāmbaras (2) Abhayadeva (also eleventh century, San-mati-ṭī kā), (3) Vādideva (twelfth century, Syādvāda-ratnākara), and the polyglot (4) Yaśovijaya (seventeenth century, Nayarahasya, Anekānta-vyavasthā, Nayopades´a, and Tarka-bhāṣā). The threefold division of the ages of logic, in contrast to the age of the Āgamas, is based on the view that certain tendencies characterize the ages of logic. These are based on the areas of philosophical activity of the thinkers mentioned (Dixit, 106): (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

To vindicate the doctrine of anekānta-vāda To establish a particular doctrine of pramāṇas To evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views To defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views

Dixit (p. 107) then summarily divides these “ages” of Jaina logic by grouping them thematically into three major parts, namely: (i) That related to the doctrine of anekānta-vāda (ii) That related to the doctrine of pramāṇas (iii) That related to the traditional Jaina philosophical views Dixit’s threefold division of the age of logic takes into account 12 thinkers and 25 works from about the fourth to the seventeenth centuries. The advantage of this classification is that it groups together a specific number of thinkers and texts in order to facilitate an overview of Jaina speculation on specific themes directly or indirectly related to Jaina ontology through arguments put forward by the thinkers. In the field of logic, the main points, as we saw, deal with a vindication of the theory of manifoldness (anekānta-vāda), the development of the doctrine of the means of cognition or knowledge (pramāṇas), and a defense of traditional Jaina philosophical views. That the scheme is practical may be seen from the fact that although Māṇikyanandin’s

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eleventh-century Parī kṣā-mukha is conspicuous by its absence, Prabhācandra’s Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa in the third age is mentioned, which is a commentary on it. One could argue that the scheme is an oversimplification of 13 centuries of Jaina speculation and disregards a vast amount of speculation by other thinkers. This would no doubt be true. If thinkers are left out (e.g., Māṇikyanandin, just mentioned) and many important works ignored (like Vidyānandin’s Satya-s´āsana-parī kṣā and Āpta-parī kṣā), we certainly get a limited picture. In other words, Dixit’s work has to be consulted with caution and with exhaustive supplementation. Moreover, many of his remarks have to be carefully weighed in the light of their opinionatedness, as, for example, in the case of Prabhācandra (see Soni 2013).

Lists of Jaina Logicians and Their Work One can draw two specially selected lists of Jaina logicians for our purposes here, a short one of 13 thinkers and their works relevant for Jaina logic and a long one of at least 43 (see Trikha 2015: 425, for other lists of Jaina thinkers entailing 93 authors and 216 works and 352 authors and 951 works). Logic in Indian philosophy, as already pointed out, is dealt with under the rubric of epistemology in which inference in general, and especially what constitutes a “valid” inference, is included as an instrument or means of cognition or knowledge (see also Vidyabhusana 1971). Our short and long lists, which span a period from about the second to the seventeenth centuries, therefore includes noteworthy philosophical activity of specific thinkers concerning epistemology as well. Their arguments are relevant for logic in general. In our short list, it is necessary to include early thinkers and authors because many aspects of the development of Jaina logic presuppose an acquaintance with their work so as to be able to follow the arguments of later thinkers based on them. For example, Prabhācandra’s contributions are based on a treatment of Kundakunda’s seminal works, namely, Kundakunda’s four so-called essence or sāra-works. Moreover, insightful works, e.g., by Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin require a thorough grasp of Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra, and hence, Umāsvāti cannot be omitted, not only because the Jaina tradition accords a very special status. In this sense, the short list is the minimum one needs for a basic orientation to the development of Jaina logic over a period of 1,500 years. The list also includes thinkers who have given nuanced interpretations of the basic problems, in many cases affording a different perspective to broaden our understanding of the crucial issues, as, for example, in the work by Māṇikyanandin and Vādidevasūri. It must be noted that especially for the early thinkers, only their names have been passed on to posterity with hardly any biographical details, if at all. Even their dates in some cases are uncertain. However, the Jaina tradition has a well-recorded list of authors, and works from which a selection, related especially to logic and epistemology, is given here. Preference has been given only to the author and his selected works. In the development of ideas in Indian philosophy, different schools emerged on the basis of a basic text which a tradition came to regard as an authoritative work, generally a sūtra-text. Such works were regarded as an authentic and reliable source

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for the tradition concerned. Although the text itself remained by and large unaltered in the respective traditions, commentators freely argued about how the text is to be understood, without which the basic text is often hardly understandable. The same basic text was often commented on by many commentators with their special emphases and interpretations, with arguments justifying their position or expanding on earlier views. Flexibility in thinking was exploited in the commentaries to balance the rigidity of a basic text that a tradition respects as unalterable. Some initial commentaries were themselves commented upon in different periods, expanding the scope of the basic text and making it relevant for the specific period when a commentary to a commentary was written. This is the case, for example, with the basic works by Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. Since much of the development of Jaina logic has evolved out of their seminal works, they are, together with Samantabhadra, among the first three for the beginning of the history of ideas related to Jaina logic.

The Short List A short list of 13 Jaina logicians in chronological order with their works annotated (for many dates, see also Dundas 2002 under the names of the respective thinkers):

Kundakunda (Second to Eighth Centuries) Since Kundakunda’s dates vary from the second to the eighth centuries, unresolvable problems arise regarding possible influences on him and those whom he may have possibly influenced. He was also known as Padmanandin. Four works with the suffix -sāra or “essence” are regarded as his philosophical masterpieces with far-reaching consequences on the development of Jaina logic. The significance ascribed to them, particularly in the Digambara tradition, gives them an almost scriptural status. He wrote in the Prakrit language, and these four works have been commented upon in Sanskrit, including a Sanskrit translation of all the Prakrit stanzas, by the commentator Amṛtacandra (perhaps the tenth century) offering important insights into Kundakunda’s basic thought. There are many editions of these works, among them those published by the Shrimad Rajchandra Ashram in Agas, Gujarat, with translations in English and/or Hindi. The Pavayaṇa-sāra/Pravacana-sāra or the “Essence of Scripture” is written in three books or chapters. Chapter 1 is concerned with knowledge (which is said to take place through the sentient principle, jī va) and omniscience which the Jaina tradition accepts. Chapter 2 deals with the objects of knowledge, namely, substances which have to be always seen together with their qualities and modes or modifications. This chapter also deals with the manifestation of the sentient principle through its so-called application, technically called upayoga. The application of this intrinsic function of the sentient principle has direct implications and relevance for epistemology and logic (see Soni 2007b). Chapter 3 deals with conduct, particularly for

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ascetics, with interesting basic ideas for Jaina ethics. Ethical arguments can be derived from them, for example, regarding attachment to worldly pleasures (3, 4) and bondage (3, 19). Samaya-sāra or the “Essence of the Doctrine” deals with the basic categories of Jaina ontology and metaphysics, like the sentient principle ( jī va) and the insentient categories (altogether called ajī va), the influx of matter into the sentient principle, the resulting bondage, etc. The significance of this work for Jaina logic is the arguments with regard to the sentient substance ( jī va-dravya). Views on it are seen from the so-called practical or common point of view (vyavahāra) and from the “certain or definite” (nis´caya) point of view. Stanzas 31–32 of the text, for example, supply the basic Jaina view to help better understand the logical arguments based on them. The Pan˜ catthi-kāya-sāra/Pan˜ cāstikāya-sāra or the “Essence of the Five Entities” deals with the sentient and insentient categories, the principles of motion and rest, and space or ether. It is noteworthy that the category time (kāla) is omitted here in this work, because it is not an entity like the others. The category time is given a special and separate status. The text also supplies the basic Jaina position for the arguments justifying the acceptance in the tradition of the five entities. The Niyama-sāra or the “Essence of Restraint” deals with ascetic conduct for the purposes of liberation from bondage as the Jainas understand it. The work is related more to the Jaina ethical code of conduct than to Jaina logic, although relevant for the arguments related to ethics. The work also entails basic Jaina metaphysics and ontology. In addition to the seven basic categories found in Umāsvāti’s TS, Kundakunda includes two more categories, referring to human actions which bring merit or demerit (puṇya and pāpa).

Samantabhadra (Fourth Century) Samantabhadra, who belongs to the Digambara tradition, wrote two seminal works which have had far-reaching consequences for both Jaina philosophy as a whole and Jaina logic especially. The first is his Āpta-mī māṃsā (an “Investigation into [who is] a Reliable Teacher”). The work is also referred to as the Devāgama-stotra, a “Hymn about the Coming of the Gods,” because the text begins with the compound word devāgama referring to the gods who come when a Jina gives his first sermon. The Āpta-mī māṃsā is a relatively short text of 114 stanzas, divided into 10 sections in the form we have it. Jaini (1979: 84) summarizes the significance of the work for Jaina logic which “introduced a major point of controversy into Indian philosophical dispute. This controversy inspired several Jaina logicians to produce extensive commentaries on Samantabhadra’s work . . ..” The Jaina logicians referred to here are the commentators to this work, namely, by the Digambaras Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin. It is noteworthy that a commentary on the latter’s commentary was written by the seventeenth-century renowned polymath Yaśovijaya, a Śvetāmbara thinker, who, apart from showing respect to Digambara scholarship, adds a new dimension with his expertise on Navya-Nyāya (which developed around the

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thirteenth century, initiated largely by Gaṅgeśa’s Tattva-cintāmaṇi). Commentaries written at different periods to one and the same work are valuable because of their nuanced arguments based on ideas that were developed in the meantime. Samantabhadra’s second work important for Jaina logic is his Yukty-anus´āsana (“Instructions into Reason”) in 64 compact stanzas. In this work Jaina syād-vāda is exploited to justify the lines of arguments used in the tradition, and there are several examples demonstrating their logical consistency (e.g., in stanzas 40 about particulars and universals and 46–47 on syād-vāda and substance, quality, and mode).

Umāsvāti (Fourth or Fifth Century) Umāsvāti wrote the first all-encompassing work on Jaina philosophy in the Sanskrit language, the Tattvārtha-sūtra (also called Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra), “Mnemonic Rules on the Meaning of the Reals” (Dundas 2002: 86). Its significance and status can be compared with say of the Brahma-sūtra for Vedānta. No biographical details are available about Umāsvāti who is also called Umāsvāmin. Scholars have come to accept his dates as given above, although the traditional dating is a couple centuries earlier. Both the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras regard him as belonging to their own tradition so that the work has a unique status for Jainism as a whole. Although there are two versions of the text depending on the tradition, there is no essential difference regarding basic Jaina metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology. The differences in the two versions pertain mainly to the rules concerning the ascetics. However, there is an unresolvable dispute concerning the first commentary to this work, because of the differing views between the two groups. The Digambaras maintain that Pūjyapāda wrote the first commentary called Sarvārtha-siddhi (“Establishing the Reals”) in the sixth century, and the Śvetāmbaras hold that Umāsvāti wrote an auto-commentary called Svopajn˜ a-bhāṣya (“Self-composed Commentary”). Whatever the case, it is obvious that as with Kundakunda’s work for the Digambaras, Umāsvāti’s work has also gained an almost scriptural status for both traditions. The significance of Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra for the whole of Jaina philosophy lies in the status it has achieved since early times. Practically all thinkers in both traditions see the development of Jaina logic directly based on the ideas contained in it. One of the curious facts is that Umāsvāti explicitly mentions naya-vāda but not syād-vāda. However, syād-vāda is regarded as being implicit in Chaps. 5 and 32 (5, 31 in the Śvetāmbara version) of the work which talks about so-called contradictory statements which nonetheless retain their validity depending on what is being emphasized in a particular context. The example that Pūjyapāda gives in his commentary to it is “Devadatta being a father, son, brother, etc.,” where the one or the other is important for a specific context. It has been already stated both these theories are part of the Jaina theory of manifold perspectives as a whole, with far-reaching consequences for the development of Jaina logic.

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All standard works on Jaina philosophy refer to the basic contents of Umāsvāti’s work, and hence no details are relevant here for the contents of his Tattvārtha-sūtra (see, e.g., the three entries on Jaina philosophy in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Soni 1998) and volume ten of the Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies (Potter 2007).

Siddhasena Divākara (c. Fifth Century) Siddhasena is also regarded as belonging to both the traditions and is perhaps the first thinker who deals specifically with issues in Jaina logic, writing in both Sanskrit and Prakrit. He is “portrayed as having been attached” to the legendary king Vikramāditya who is said to have given him the “epithet ‘Sun’ (divākara)” (Dundas 2002: 131). The Jaina tradition ascribes to him three works significant for Jaina logic. Siddhasena’s “Introduction to [Jaina] Logic” or Nyāyāvatāra, written Sanskrit, clearly shows how he adopted the method of the Nyāya school to serve the purpose of arguing in favor of Jaina views, to prove his own arguments and to show inconsistencies in other, non-Jaina, views. Among other things, his arguments concern explicitly defining fallacious examples based on the use of the technical term in Indian logic where the hetu or the probans is the middle term, in association with the major and minor terms. Siddharṣi (gaṇi) (tenth century), Abhayadeva-sūri (eleventh century), and Devabhadrasūri (twelfth century) commented on Siddhasena, adding significant aspects based on the development of logical arguments till their times, with special references to the logic in other schools. The commentaries serve as indispensable tools to better understand Siddhasena’s basic ideas. See Balcerowicz 2001 for an extensive study on the Nyāyāvatāra and its most important commentaries. Siddhasena’s Sammai-takka-sutta/Sanmati-tarka-sūtra/Sanmati-prakaraṇa or the “Mnemonics on Proper Understanding” is in three parts with a total of 168 stanzas. It is written in Prakrit and deals mainly with the means of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and the standpoints. Usually the seven standpoints in Jaina logic also take into consideration the quality of a substance and its mode, but according to Siddhasena, the quality of a substance cannot be given a separate status that others (e.g., Umāsvāti) give it. Siddhasena omits it because Jaina scripture makes no explicit reference to the term quality as such. Siddhasena is also credited with having written what is simply called the “Thirtytwos,” Dvā-triṃ-s´ikā, 21 short compositions, each in 32 stanzas. This relatively ignored work is also significant for Jaina logic because, apart from eulogies to Mahāvīra, it contains a critique of Buddhist and Hindu schools (see Upadhye 1971, especially his introduction on “Siddhasena and his Works,” pp. *3–*72).

Akalan˙ka (Eighth Century) With Akalaṅka a landmark is set for a significant phase in Jaina epistemology and logic, one which directed future cogitations and gave Jaina philosophy an undeniable

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position as a noteworthy contester and contributor to the history of ideas in the Indian philosophical tradition. With the earlier thinkers like Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, and Pūjyapāda’s commentary, there is a clear Digambara line of philosophical acumen and achievement, extended now by Akalaṅka with unparalleled insight and precision until then. To say appropriately that he “established a reputation as the outstanding critic of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti of Nālandā” (Jaini 1979: 84) is to acknowledge him on the reputation of others. However, the Jaina tradition as a whole, and on its own, accord to him the renowned status for which he is known in defending basic Jaina ideas against attacks, from both within the tradition (e.g., for his views on Jaina epistemology and arguing for the special status of the quality and mode or modification of a substance) and outside it. Several works by him remain masterpieces for their lasting significance for epistemology and logic. The first work that needs to be mentioned is Akalaṅka’s Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika (or simply Rāja-vārtika), a commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra, expanding in much greater detail the Sarvārtha-siddhi by Pūjyapāda, mentioned above. This commentary is valuable for the basic orientation to the Jaina Digambara position as a whole. At innumerable places Akalaṅka develops arguments justifying or clarifying the Jaina position (e.g., the commentary to TS 1, 6 on how knowledge is gained not only through the acknowledged different means but also through the standpoints or nayas). The work is a necessary source for Akalaṅka’s basic views which he develops further in other works. Akalaṅka’s Aṣṭa-s´atī, the “800 stanzas,” is a commentary on Samantabhadra’s Āpta-mī māṃsā mentioned above and is one of his earliest works relevant for Jaina logic and epistemology. The significance of the original work and this commentary is evident by the fact that Vidyānandin (ninth century) and Yaśovijaya (seventeenth century) commented on this commentary, adding intricate elements Jaina argumentation. The Laghī yas-traya, “Three Short Pieces,” with a total of 88 stanzas with Akalaṅka’s own gloss on them are (1) the Pramāṇa-praves´a, “an introduction to the means of knowledge”; (2) Naya-praves´a, “an introduction to the (Jaina) standpoints”; and (3). Pravacana-praves´a, “an introduction to scripture.” All the three were commented upon at length in the eleventh century by Prabhācandra in his Nyāya-kumuda-candra (see below), a landmark for the perceptive arguments he develops based on Akalaṅka’s basic ideas. The Nyāya-vinis´caya, the “Ascertainment of Logic,” deals with perception, inference, and Jaina scripture. The division into these three sections does not mean that Akalaṅka is giving a different classification of Jaina epistemological categories but that he is grappling with them in Buddhist and Brahmanic terms, perhaps to bring out the unique Jaina position. An eleventh-century Śvetāmbara scholar, Vādirājasūri, has shown deep respect to Akalaṅka by writing a voluminous commentary on it called Nyāya-vinis´caya-vivaraṇa (literally, “Uncovering” the Ascertainment of Logic) substantiating the basic ideas even more clearly. The Pramāṇa-saṅgraha, the “Collection of the Means of Knowledge,” is divided into nine sections dealing with logical and epistemological categories (sections 1 and 2); inference, including the “faults” (doṣas) of doubt, contradiction, reason, and

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infinite regress (sections 3–5); and rejection of some Buddhist views (section 6) with sections 7–8 dealing specifically with the Jaina categories and anekānta-vāda. This work and the previous two mentioned above have been published together in one volume as Akalaṅka-grantha-traya, “Three works by Akalaṅ ka.” (see Soni 2002). The Siddhi-vinis´caya, the “Ascertainment of Perfection,” continues with Akalaṅka’s ongoing concern with epistemological and logical issues. It was commented upon by Anantavīrya (tenth century). Akalaṅka’s works in the above list need to be thoroughly studied in order to determine the state of Jaina logic during his time and also for the development of his ideas which the commentaries bring to light.

Mallavādin (Fifth to Sixth Century) Although Mallavādin’s (Dvādas´āraṃ) Naya-cakram (“Twelve-Spoked Wheel of Standpoints”) has been lost to posterity, a commentary on it by Siṃhasūri (seventh century) called Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī , “Scrutinising Logic,” is extant. The text has been reconstructed from it as far as possible, because the commentator does not quote the original in full. The Jaina tradition as a whole and especially the Śvetāmbaras are fortunate that a Jaina scholar-monk and specialist, Muni Jambūvijaya (1923–2009), was the most competent person to edit it with critical notes, so that this milestone in Jaina logic is now accessible (see the reference below under = Jambūvijaya 1966–1988). The significance of the work for Jaina philosophy and logic is clear from a summary description of it (Dixit 1971: 114): “Nayacakra is written in the form of a marathon debate taking place between some seventeen disputants where the incoming one criticises the outgoing one before presenting his own case.” The case of this work shows how commentaries can be a help not only in restoring original works but also for the wealth of information they provide in understanding the text.

Vidyānandin (Ninth Century) This Jaina scholar-monk’s works related to logic can be conveniently divided into commentaries and independent works, with three in each group. Not much has been researched on this outstanding Jaina thinker who demands here a more detailed record of his masterpieces. Among his commentaries the Aṣṭa-sahasrī (the “Eight Thousand”) is a landmark in which the scholiast Vidyānandin brings up-to-date Jaina responses to the critiques leveled against Jainism. This is a commentary on Akalaṅka’s work Aṣṭa-s´atī which itself is a commentary on Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā. In the seventeenth century, Yaśovijaya brought it again into prominence with his commentary on Vidyānandin’s commentary. The second noteworthy commentary by Vidyānandin is the Tattvārtha-s´lokavārttika on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra. As the title indicates, it is a commentary written in both verse (s´loka) and prose (vārttika). There are several arguments

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developed in the entire work in defense of the Jaina position and a critique of other thinkers and schools. Among many significant topics for Jaina logic are, for example, his responses from the Jaina perspective to the logical objections raised by the Buddhist Dharmakīrti and the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The third commentary is Vidyānandin’s Yukty-anus´āsanālaṅkāra on Samantabhadra’s Yukty-anus´āsana. Among his chief concerns in this text are the arguments he develops for Mahāvīra’s teaching as being trustworthy. Vidyānandin’s first independent work for our purposes here is his Āpta-parī kṣā, an “Investigation into (who is) a Reliable Person.” Vidyānandin develops arguments against the reliability, for example, of Īśvara in the Nyāya school, Kapila in Sāṅkhya, and the Buddha. In proving the reliability of an Arahanta (a Jina, especially Mahāvīra), Vidyānandin also develops arguments against the existence of a creator god in this work containing 124 stanzas. The original plan of Vidyānandin’s independent work Satya-s´āsana-parī kṣā, an “Investigation into the True Teaching,” was originally to investigate 14 teachings of the different schools in Indian thought. However, only 11 have been completed, with the 12th incomplete, in the form available to us since 1920 when it was discovered. Sections 9–10, for example, investigate the teachings of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Among the few studies on this text, Trikha 2012 has done an in-depth analysis of Vidyānandin’s critique of the Vaiśeṣika school, bringing out the different levels of argument and their logical impact. Similar studies on the other schools need to be undertaken to bring out the value of the type of arguments Vidyānandin employs at that time. Vidyānandin’s independent work Pramāṇa-parī kṣā, an “Investigation into the Valid Means of Knowledge,” discusses various epistemological categories, including the technical term hetu or reason in Indian logic. Vidyānandin develops his arguments based on the typical Jaina position that for a means of knowledge or cognition to be “valid” (including preeminently inference), such a means has to have what the Jainas technically call samyag-dars´ana, a correct view (sometimes translated as correct “faith”) as its sign (lakṣaṇa). Together with samyag-jn˜ āna and samyak-cāritra (correct knowledge and conduct), samyag-dars´ana constitutes what the Jainas refer to as the three jewels which, together, make up the path to liberation from bondage (mokṣa-mārga). Vidyānandin’s independent work Patra-parī kṣā is an investigation of many schools showing how their views lead to contradictions or entail the fault of infinite regress. For this he draws pointedly on the logical terms of reason, middle and major terms (hetu, sādhana, sādhya). Dharmakīrti, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga are specifically mentioned and critiqued. The main point of this relatively ignored short and compact text is to vindicate the Jaina position of multiple views which do not entail any of the errors which other schools say they have. Vidyānandin closes a significant phase in the early development of Jaina logic and philosophy following in the Digambara line of thinkers like Samantabhadra, Umāsvāti, Siddhasena, and Akalaṅka. A thorough grasp of the scholastically produced argumentation in at least the works mentioned above can reveal further insights considering the status of Indian philosophy as a whole in the ninth century.

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In Vidyānandin we see clearly that to understand the intricacies of Jaina philosophy and logic, a knowledge of the other schools is also imperative.

Hemacandra (1089–1172) See Dundas 2002 (especially pp. 133–136) for the available biography on him and his importance “for establishing Śvetāmbara Jainism as a resilient and self-confident presence in western India” (p. 134). Among the several works of Hemacandra, his Pramāṇa-mī māṃsā, an “Investigation into the Means of Knowledge,” stands out for the encyclopedic nature of his examination of the other schools of philosophy and logic. His Anya-yoga-vyavacchedikā, the “Rescinder of other Systems” (Thomas 1960: 7) in 32 stanzas, was commented upon by Malliṣeṇa in his Syād-vāda-man˜ jarī which Thomas 1960 translates as “The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine” to bring out its logical significance. This has become one of the standard works on Jaina logic.

Mānikyanandin (Eleventh Century) ˙ Māṇikyanandin has left his mark as a notable Digambara thinker with his Parī kṣā-mukha the “Gateway to Investigation” in six sections with a total of 210 stanzas. He summarizes in it the basic issues in Jaina logic and epistemology, drawing on previous Digambara thinkers, particularly Akalaṅka. Section “Lists of Jaina Logicians and Their Work” is particularly concerned with logic. In 3, 14, for example, he says that the knowledge derived from inference is the knowledge of the major term which itself is based on the knowledge of the minor term. Inference also involves the technical term “pervasion” of elements in the major and minor terms in the inferential process. That the work contains a wealth of significant aspects for Jaina logic is evinced by the voluminous commentary on it by Prabhācandra (see below). The work with its commentary also became a standard one for basic Jaina logic in the Digambara tradition.

Prabhācandra (Eleventh Century) Commentaries highlight intricacies of an original text and as such are not restricted to the parsimony of the original text. They are also indispensable for a proper understanding of the text from within the tradition, apart from substantiating the original text as we have it. Commentaries are sometimes also an aid in reconstructing the original, as in Mallavādin’s case above. Prabhācandra is acknowledged in the tradition as a reliable commentator who unpacks the text, often indicating the intention of the author as he sees it. Two of his commentaries are noteworthy here. One is the Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa (“The Sun [That Causes] the [Day] Lotus of Knowables [to Bloom],” Jaini 1991: 109), a commentary on Māṇikyanandin’s Parī kṣā-mukha, mentioned above.

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The other commentary is called Nyāya-kumuda-candra (“The Moon [That Causes] the [Night] Lotus of Logic [to Bloom],” Jaini 1991: 109) on Akalaṅka’s Laghī yas-traya, mentioned above. Whereas Amṛtacandra’s commentaries on Kundakunda “merely” expound the basic text, Prabhācandra is listed here separately because his commentaries expound the text in such a way that they can also been seen as independent works (see also Jaini 1991: 109 and Potter 2013: 53).

Abhayadeva (Eleventh Century) Abhayadeva’s name to fame is his Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī -ṭī kā, a “Commentary Establishing the Knowledge of the Reals” (also called Vāda-mahārṇava, the “Great Ocean of Discussion”), a commentary on Siddhasena’s San-mati-tarka. We saw that the original work written in Prakrit was largely a text of mnemonics which is difficult to unpack without a commentary. Abhayadeva does it in Sanskrit, and his arguments against the other schools, implicitly or explicitly alluded to, reflect the Jaina view in defending its own position of manifold perspectives and standpoints as a basic philosophical attitude. Further, in the third part of the text, Abhayadeva clearly elucidates Siddhasena’s view that we can talk only of a substance and its mode, with the quality of a substance omitted, because the canonical texts do not mention it.

Vādidevasūri (Twelfth Century) This Śvetāmbara scholar from Gujarat is famous for his work which became a standard for medieval Jaina logic and epistemology, together with his own commentary on it: his Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra, the “Ornament-Lustre of the Means of Knowing and the Standpoints” together with his auto-commentary Syādvāda-ratnākara, the “Jewel-mine of Perspectives.” As is customary with such scholastic works, the opponents’ views are first put forward and then refuted from the point of view of the author and his tradition. The arguments are developed in a complex way requiring a keen understanding of all the systems of Indian thought, with a thorough grasp of the basic Jaina position.

Yaśovijaya (1624–1688, Wiley 2004: 239) This Śvetāmbara polymath and prolific writer is seen as “perhaps the last truly great intellectual figure in Jainism, whose fame rests largely on his learning combined with a mastery of sophisticated logical techniques” (Dundas 2002: 110). He is renowned not only for his mastery over the other schools of Indian philosophy but also over the Navya-Nyāya logic, referred to above under Samantabhadra. Further, Yaśovijaya draws on both Digambara and Śvetāmbara scholarship in bringing out clarity, for example, regarding the standpoints (nayas, see also Dixit 1971: 162).

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Ganeri (2008: 2–3) summarizes Yaśovijaya’s “intellectual biography” in three phases bringing out the outstanding relevance for his contributions to Jaina logic: “an apprenticeship in Varanasi studying Navyanyāya, a period writing Jaina philosophical treatises using the techniques and methods of Navyanyāya, and a time spent writing works with a markedly spiritual and religious orientation.” This special training earned him “the respectable title Nyāyaviśārada, ‘One who is skilled in logic’” (ibid., p. 3). There are several works attributed to him and we select but a few here. Yaśovijaya’s Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā or “A Manual of Jaina Logic” (Bhargava 1973: 33) deals with the means of knowing, the standpoints (naya), and the typical Jaina use of words in the technique called nikṣepa. This technique is employed when describing something through the use of specific terms, for example, of name, representation, substance, and its mode. The significance of the use of these words in philosophical discourse is to further emphasize the partial and restricted views when they are used to describe an object of inquiry. The aim is to demonstrate that no description can be all encompassing but that only certain elements are highlighted in a specific context. His Jaina Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khādya (a “Short Section on Logic”) and Jn˜ āna-bindu (a “Drop of Knowledge”) can also be mentioned with the “Manual” for reiterating Jaina epistemology and logic drawing on Navya-Nyāya logic to uphold the Jaina position of manifoldness of perspectives and standpoints. Another group of works dealing with specific aspects of Jaina anekānta-vāda are the following, each highlighting one or the other aspect in a nuanced way: Nyāyāloka, Nayakarṇikā, Nayopades´a, Nayarahasya, and Anekānta-vyavasthā. In all these works, Yaśovijaya defends Jaina views against the explicit or implicit attacks by other schools. Yaśovijaya’s Aṣṭa-sahasrī-tātparya-vivaraṇa-ṭī kā is a brief commentary on Vidyānandin’s work that deserves to be mentioned here for acknowledging the Digambara Vidyānandin for his perceptive insights; in his commentary, Yaśovijaya adds elements based on his training in Navya-Nyāya. How exactly the Jainas argued against so-called opponents is exemplified in three articles in this section on Jaina logic, dealing with specific authors and issues: Anne Clavel on the central aspect of Jaina logic, namely, the theory of manifold perspectives encapsulated in the seven statements of syād-vāda, Marie-Hélène Gorisse who draws on the arguments presented by Māṇikyanandin and Prabhācandra in their reaction to Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference, and Himal Trikha who deals with the use of logical principles in Vidyānandin’s Satya-s´āsana-parī kṣā. A long list of selected Jaina thinkers is also supplied below alphabetically with their most significant works on Jaina logic and epistemology without further detail. The aim of this list is to place on record that from the early beginnings of Indian philosophical activity, Jainism has continuously produced a host of reputable thinkers whose works need much further study. It is fortunate that even though the contribution of Jaina philosophy was not taken very seriously, the tradition itself clung onto what was handed down over the years from generation to generation. Indeed, much has been lost to posterity but what is available should encourage further research (see also Mahaprajna 1984: 159–161 and 162–177).

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The Long List The list of 13 thinkers given above can be expanded with an additional 43 thinkers, with only the names of the philosophers and selected titles of relevant works for logic. This list with a total of 56 thinkers is arranged alphabetically for quick reference. An asterisk (*) below indicates that the philosopher is mentioned in the short list above: *Abhayadeva, tenth to eleventh century Abhayatilaka, fourteenth century: Nyāyālaṅkāra-vṛtti, Tarka-nyāya-sūtra-ṭī kā, Pan˜ ca-prastha-nyāya-tarka-vyākhyā *Akalaṅka, eighth century Anantakīrti, ninth to eleventh century: Bṛhat-sarvajn˜ a-siddhi, Laghu-sarvajn˜ asiddhi Anantavīrya tenth century: Siddhi-vinis´caya-ṭī kā, the commentary on Akalaṅka’s work Āśādhara, 1188–1250: Prameya-ratnākara Bhāvasena, eleventh to thirteenth century: Vis´va-tattva-prakās´a Candrasena, twelfth to thirteenth century.: Utpāda-siddhi Candrasūri, twelfth century: Ankekānta-jaya-patākā-vṛtti-ṭippaṇaka, a commentary on Haribadra’s work Devaprabhasūri, twelfth to thirteenth century: Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippaṇa, a commentary on Siddhasena’s work Devasena, tenth century: Dars´ana-sāra Dharmabhūṣaṇa, fourteenth to fifteenth century: Nyāya-dī pikā, Pramāṇa-vistāra Guṇaratnasūri, fourteenth to fifteenth century: Tarka-rahasya-dī pikā Haribhadra, eighth century: Ankekānta-jaya-patākā, Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya, Ṣaḍ-dars´ana-samuccaya *Hemacandra, (1089–1172) Jinabhadragaṇin, fifth to sixth century: Vis´eṣāvas´yaka-bhāṣya Jinadattasūri, thirteenth century: Ṣaḍ-dars´ana-samuccaya-vṛtti, a commentary on Haribhadra’s work Jinapatisūri, thirteenth century: Prabodha-vāda-sthala Jineśvarasūri, twelfth to thirteenth century: Pramālakṣma saṭī kā Jñānacandra, fourteenth to fifteenth century: Ratnākarāvatārikā-ṭippaṇaka, a commentary on Ratnaprabhāsūri’s work Kumaranandin, eighth century: Vāda-nyāya *Kundakunda, dated second to eighth century *Mallavādin, fourth to fifth century Malliṣeṇa, fourteenth century: Syād-vāda-man˜ jarī *Māṇikyanandin, tenth to eleventh century Merutuṅga, fifteenth century: Ṣaḍ-dars´ana-nirṇaya Naracandrasūri, thirteenth century: Nyāya-kandalī *Prabhācandra, eleventh century Pradumnasūri, twelfth century: Vāda-sthala

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Pūjyapāda, sixth century: Sarvārtha-siddhi (“Establishing the Reals”) mentioned under Umāsvāti Rājaśekharasūri, fourteenth to fifteenth century: Ratnākarāvatārikā-pan˜ jikā Rāmacandrasūri, thirteenth century: Vyatireka-dvātriṃs´ikā Ratnaprabhāsūri, twelfth to thirteenth century: Ratnākarāvatārikā, a commentary on Vādidevasūri’s Syād-vāda-ratnākara *Samantabhadra, fourth century Samantabhadra Laghu, thirteenth century: Viṣama-pada-tātparya-ṭīkā Śāntisena, twelfth century: Prameya-ratna-sāra Śāntyācārya (twelfth century): Nyāyāvatāravārtika Siddharṣi, tenth century: Nyāyāvatāra-ṭī kā, a commentary on Siddhasena’s work *Siddhasena Divākara, fifth century Śivārya, fifth to sixth century: Siddhi-vinis´caya Somatilakasūri, fourteenth to fifteenth century: Ṣaḍ-dars´ana-samuccaya-ṭī kā, a commentary on Haribhadra’s work Śrīcandrasūri, twelfth century: Nyāya-praves´a (Haribhadra-vṛtti-pan˜ jikā) Śrīdatta, seventh century: Jalpa-nirṇaya Śubhacandra eleventh century: Jn˜ ānārṇava (Jaini 1979: 255, fn. 21) Śubhacandra, sixteenth century: Ṣaḍ-dars´ana-pramāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha Śubhaprakāśa,?: Nyāya-makaranda-vivecana Sukhaprakāśa,?: Nyāya-dī pāvalī -ṭīkā Sumati, eighth to ninth century: Sanmati-tarka-ṭīkā, a commentary on Siddhasena’s work *Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmin, fourth or fifth century Vādībhasiṅha, eighth to ninth century: Syād-vāda-siddhi *Vādidevasūri, (1086–1169) eleventh to twelfth century Vādirājasūri, eleventh century: Pramāṇa-nirṇaya, Nyāya-vins´caya-vivaraṇa (a commentary on Akalaṅka’s work) Vasunandin, eleventh to twelfth century: Āpta-mī māṃsā-vṛtti *Vidyānandin, ninth century Vimaladāsa, fifteenth century: Sapta-bhaṅgī -taraṅgiṇī *Yaśovijaya, eleventh century

Summary This chapter began with the point that studies in Jainism are lagging behind in relation to those in Brahmanism/Hinduism and Buddhism. It was suggested that one of the reasons for the lack of attention paid to Jainism early in the Indian tradition may be attributed to Śaṅkara’s criticism of syād-vāda, erroneously seeing it as a theory of doubt. The Jainas themselves were certain about the well-founded logic of their theory and defended it with all their philosophical acumen, including other aspects contained in their anekānta-vāda, like naya-vāda. Their defense is evinced in the masterpieces of major thinkers in the tradition who also put forward noteworthy arguments for this and other aspects of the philosophy, such as their views

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regarding a substance, its qualities, and the modes or modifications of the substance. The so-called ages of logic shows that the Jainas constantly contributed to the development of ideas in the Indian tradition. The short and long lists of thinkers and their works, which span a period of about 1,500 years, evince how these thinkers kept abreast of philosophical themes in each epoch, even drawing on earlier ideas and furnishing new and nuanced arguments.

Definition of Key Terms Ajīva

Anekānta-vāda Anumāna Digambara

Doṣa Dravya

Guṇa Hetu Hetvābhāsa Jīva Naya-vāda Paryāya

Pāpa Pramāṇa Prāmāṇya-vāda Puṇya Sādhana Sādhya Saṃśaya Saṃśaya-vāda Sūtra

Non-sentient principle(s): one of two substances in Jainism (a generic term for five categories; see jīva) The theory of many sidedness, manifoldness, or non-one-sidedness Inference, one of the means of cognition/ knowledge Literally “sky-clad,” one of the two major groups of Jainism whose monks are naked (see Śvetāmbara) Fault or error, especially one which an argument might have Substance, of which there are two in Jainism, jīva and ajīva (dravya is treated together with guṇa and paryāya) Quality of a substance (treated together with dravya and paryāya) The “reason” in an inference A fallacy in an inference Sentient principle, together with ajīva one of the two substances in Jainism The theory of standpoints The mode or modification a substance can have, like a pot made of gold or clay (treated together with dravya and guṇa) Demerit, refers to actions which are unmeritorious An instrument or means of cognition/knowledge The theory of cognition/knowledge, epistemology Merit, refers to actions which are meritorious The middle term in an inference The major term in an inference Doubt A theory of doubt Literally “thread,” a teaching, also refers collectively to a work containing these

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Syād-vāda

J. Soni

Literally “white-clad,” the second major group in Jainism; the ascetics are clad in white clothes (see Digambara) The theory of perspectives, denoted by the use of the word syāt (which changes to syād or syān in accordance with the rules for phonetic change in Sanskrit)

References Balcerowicz, Piotr. 2001. Jaina epistemology in historical perspective. Critical edition and English translation of logical-epistemological treatises: Nyāy^avatāra, Nyāy^avatāra-vivṛti and Nyāy^avatāra-ṭippana with introduction and notes. In 2 volumes, Stuttgart: Steiner. Bhargava, Dayanand. 1973. Mahopādhyāya Yas´ovijya’s Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā, with translation and critical notes. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas. Dixit, K.K. 1971. Jaina ontology. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology. Dundas, Paul. 2002. The jains. London: Routledge. Ganeri, Jonardon. 2008. Worlds in conflict. The cosmopolitan vision of Yaśovijaya Gaṇi. International Journal of Jaina Studies (Online) 4 (1): 1–11. Accessed 28th Oct 2015. Jaini, Padmanabh S. 1979. The Jaina path of purification. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas. Jaini, Padmanabh S. 1991. Gender and salvation. Jaina debates on the spiritual liberation of women. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Jambūvijaya, Muni. 1966–1988. Dvādas´āraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamās´ ramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Simhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamās´ ramaṇa. Published in three volumes, Bhavnagar: Śrī Jaina Ātmānanda Sabhā. Mahaprajna, Yuvacarya. 1984. New dimensions in Jaina Logic, New Delhi: Today and Tomorrow’s Printers and Publishers (English rendering by Dr Natmal Tatia of “Jaina Nyāya kā Vikāsa”). Published under the auspices of Jaina Vishva Bharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1981. The central philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-Vāda), Series 79. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. Potter, Karl H., general ed. 2007. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume X. Jain Philosophy Part I, ed. Dalsukh Malvania and Jayendra Soni. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Potter, Karl H., general ed. 2013. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Volume XIV. Jain philosophy part II, ed. Karl H. Potter, and Piotr Balcerowicz. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Potter, Karl H., general ed. 2014. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Volume XVII. Jain philosophy part three, ed. Piotr Balcerowicz and Karl H. Potter. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Shah, Nagin J., ed. 2002. Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth (Anekāntavāda). Delhi: Motilal Banasidass. Soni, Jayandra. 1991. Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya in Jaina thought. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 19, 75–88. Netherlands: Kluwer. Soni, Jayandra.1996. Aspects of Jaina Philosophy. Madras: Research Foundation for Jainology. Three lectures on Jainism published on behalf of the University of Madras, Department of Jainism, by the Research Foundation. Annual Lecture Series 1994–95. Contents: “The Karma Theory and Jaina Ethics”; “Syādvāda is not Samśayavāda”; and Vidyānandin on Umāsvāti’s pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, (Tattvārthasūtra 1, 6). Soni, Jayandra. 1998. ‘Jaina Philosophy, Issues in’ (6000 words). In Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy, ed. Edward Craig. Soni, Jayandra. 1999. Aspects of Jaina epistemology with special reference to Vidyānandin. In Approaches to Jain studies: Philosophy, logic, rituals and symbols, Centre for South Asian

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studies, in the series South Asian papers, ed. N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnström, 138–168. Toronto: University of Toronto. Soni, Jayandra. 2002. Epistemological categories in the Akalaṅkagranthatraya. In Śikhisamuccayaḥ. Indian and Tibetan studies, ed. Dragomir Dimitrov et al., 185–191. Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien. Universität Wien. Soni, Jayandra. 2007a. Anekāntavāda Revisited — for doṣas. In Indica et Tibeta Festschrift für Michael Hahn zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Schülern überreicht, ed. Konrad Klaus and Jens-Uwe Hartmann. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien. Soni, Jayandra. 2007b. Upayoga, according to Kundakunda and Umāsvāti. Journal of Indian Philosophy 35: 299–311. Soni, Jayandra. 2013. Prabhācandra’s Status in and Contribution to the History of Jaina Philosophical Speculation. Paper presented at the 15th Jaina Studies Workshop, SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), London. Published online here: http://www.soas.ac.uk/research/publications/journals/ijjs/file88721.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2015 Thomas, F.W. 1960. The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine. Śrī Malliṣeṇasūri SyādVada-Man˜ jarī, translated and annotated. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968). Trikha, Himal. 2012. Perspektivismus und Kritik. Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vais´eṣika in Vidyānandins Satyas´āsanaparī kṣā. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library edited by Gerhard Oberhammer, Utz Podzeit and Karin Preisendanz, Volume XXXVI. Wien: Sammlung de Nobili ... Universität. Trikha, Himal. 2015. Trends of research on philosophical Sanskrit Works of the Jainas. In Sanmati. Essays felicitating professor Hampa Nagarajaiah on the occasion of his 80th birthday, ed. Luitgard Soni and Jayandra Soni. Bengaluru: Sapna Book House. TS: Tattvārtha-sūtra by Umāsvāti. _ Upadhye, A.N. 1971. Siddhasena Divākara’s Nyāyāvatāra . . . as well as the Text of 21 Dvātriṁsikās and the Sammaı¨-Suttam. Bombay: Jaina Sāhitya Vikāsa Maṇḍala. Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra. 1971. A history of Indian logic (ancient, mediaeval and modern schools), Jaina Logic 157–224. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Wiley, Kristi L. 2004. Historical dictionary of Jainism. Lanham, etc.: The Scarecrow Press.

Logic in nīlakēci and manime¯kalai ˙

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Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Logic in nīlakēci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . uttikaḷ in the Debate Between nīlakēci and picācakaṉ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Logic in maṇimēkalai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proposition (pakkam, Pn) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reason (ētu, R) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unacceptable (acittam) Types of R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Types of Non-unidirectional (aṉaikāntika) R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contrary (viruttam) Rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Illustration (tiṭṭāntam, E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defective Es of the cātaṉmiyam Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defective Es of the vaitaṉmiyam Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nayam/niyāyam and vātam: Types of Logic in the Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definitions of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

The present chapter attempts to unearth the salient features of logic in the Tamil epics, nīlakēci and maṇimēkalai. In the former text, we have a few verses which expound the fundamental validative criteria (aḷavaikaḷ) of the Jaina faith, and a surfeit of debates the heroine has with exponents of rival faith systems. These debates amply illustrate the techniques of debate called uttikaḷ explained in tolkāppiyam. Using these techniques, the heroine goes about demolishing rival arguments. The kind of debate she engages in is identified in the essay as “vātam.” Though Jaina philosophy is based on the multivalued logical concept of nayam, nīlakēci’s debate is based on the bivalent logic of vākai (vātam). In the N. Selvamony (*) Madras Christian College, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, Tamil Nadu, India © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_34

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case of the Buddhist epic, maṇimēkalai, logical matters are dealt with primarily in two cantos (27 and 29). Unlike her Jaina counterpart, maṇimēkalai, the heroine, is content to listen to the tenets of rival faith systems and also to those of her own spiritual guru, aṟavaṇa aṭikaḷ. The exponents of Tamil logic are aḷavai vāti, the logician who explains all the ten aḷavaikaḷ of Tamil logic, and aṟavaṇa aṭikaḷ who deals with aḷavaikaḷ briefly, and inference elaborately. Though the latter speaks of the five-member Tamil syllogism-like text, he elaborates the proper forms and defects of the three-member counterpart adopted by the Buddhists. Similarly, though aṭikaḷ identifies nayam (based on multivalent logic) as a trait of Buddhist syllogistic text, the theory of inference he expounds is based on bivalent logic.

Introduction Both the Tamil epics, nīlakēci (hereafter, N) and maṇimēkalai (hereafter, MM (The present writer concurs with those scholars who date nīlakēci to fifth c ACE (cōmacuntaraṉār 21; Chakravarti 1984, 8) and maṇimēkalai to second or third c ACE (vēṅkaṭacāmi nāṭṭār and avvai turaicāmip piḷḷai 496–497, 529; mayilai 2002: 269–280, 160, 165, 87, 159; Krishnaswami Aiyangar 1928, xxvi; 80; Dikshitar 1978, 8, 11–19, 414; Champakalakshmi 1998, 84, 86; va. cupa. māṇikkam in tamiḻt tuṟai āciriyarkaḷ 1979, 17; Danielou xv-xvi; Balusamy 1965, 157–167) seek to establish and propagate their respective faiths, Jainism and Buddhism. The eponymous heroine nīlakēci who sets out to fulfill this objective is initiated into the doctrines of Jaina faith (by her guru, municcantiraṉ) before she goes about demolishing the arguments of her opponents. Though a considerable bulk of the text consists of the heroine’s debate with exponents of rival sects, we learn about Tamil Jaina logic mainly from her guru and from nīlakēci herself who (like her Buddhist counterpart, maṇimēkalai) probably represents the many female Tamil logicians female Tamil logicians of the past. It is true that logic is only a small part of what the guru teaches the disciple, and that it is the subject of only 3 verses out of the total 58 on Jaina philosophy, but the centrality of nayam in Jaina logic is affirmed by these verses on validative criteria. Such a criterion called nayam, based on multivalued logical (Burde 2012: 137–147, 2014: 54–56) is a standpoint of reality. Though Jaina faith is based on such a concept, proponents of this faith (like nīlakēci) seek to establish it in a verbal duel, which itself is based on two-valued logic. Based on the logical traditions of Tamil and Jainism, N’s logic is of the vākai type (vātam). Buddhism absorbs the multivalued logic of nayam and contains it in its divalent logic of truth and falsehood. Unlike her Jaina counterpart, maṇimēkalai does not challenge the exponents of other faiths to verbal battle. But such a response on her part is not due to the influence of the logic of nayam but because she had not yet been initiated into the intricacies of Buddhist logic and philosophy by her guru, aṟavaṇa aṭikaḷ. From him we learn most of the Tamil Buddhist logic enshrined in the text, though the indigenous nonreligious logic inherited from the primal society is expounded in a modified form by the aḷavai

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vāti in canto 27. The latter explains all the ten aḷavaikaḷ, whereas aṭikaḷ in the 29th canto deals with the doctrine of inference, the five inferential members, and the defective and proper forms of only three of them. To the Buddhists, only the threemember inferential text, earlier called kāṇṭikai (Selvamony 1990, 1996, 2000: 100– 119) in Tamil philosophical tradition, was a valid one.

Logic in nīlakēci In stark contrast to MM, N is more concerned with the application of logic than a theoretical discussion of the principles of the latter. However, three verses in the first canto called taruma uraic carukkam (canto on doctrinal discourse) mention aḷavaikaḷ. A Jaina preceptor (N 34) converts the demoness nīli to Jaina faith and instructs her in Jaina doctrines. He groups aḷavaikaḷ into two classes: kāṇṭal (perception) and kāṭciyil aḷavaikaḷ (non-perceptual validative criteria) and speaks of seven others which are not put under either of the two classes mentioned earlier (N 118–120). kāṇṭal or perception is of five types: aimpoṟi (perception through five senses), maṉam (sensing pleasure, pain, and memory), avati (telepathy, Bhaskar 1992, 49), maṉap pariyāyam (direct knowledge of the minds of others, especially. of their past births, Tamil Lexicon 1982), and kēvalam (perfect knowledge, especially of the past, present, and future, Tamil Lexicon 1982) (N 118). There are five types of kāṭciyil aḷavaikaḷ: niṉaivu (remembrance), mīṭṭuṇarvu (recognition), ūkam (tarka, Bhaskar 1992, 34, 56), aṇumai (inference, N, comm., cōmacuntaraṉār 1973 [hereafter, CC]), and ākama moḻi (authoritative text) (N 119). The additional validative criteria are vaippu (disposition), nayam (deixis), pukuvāyil (approach), uyir (soul), kuṇam (quality), and mārkkaṇai (margana 2018, conditions of the jīva or soul, Wisdom Library). vaippu is knowing an entity by disposing it in its proper relation to its name, form, kind of substance, and significance (verse of unidentified source, N 120, comm. CC). Knowing an entity by attributing a meaning to it without embracing or rejecting the other meanings is known as nayam. Citing a verse from a lost text, the commentator of N (120) tells us that nayam, a synonym of cuṭṭu (deixis), consists in pointing to one aspect of something by adopting one standpoint (rather than another) implying that from another standpoint, yet another aspect of the same entity could be pointed at. The third criterion, pukuvāyil consists in knowing an entity by adopting not only deixis but also other categories like relation, instrument, time, number, place, purpose, and event (verse of unidentified source, N 120, comm. CC). uyir or life, an existent substance, is also considered a validative criterion. As for kuṇam, there are 14 types, which are criteria that could validate our knowledge of the qualities (kuṇam) of the souls (uyir). mārkkaṇai is the condition of the soul ( jīva) and Jain texts speak of 14 such. Of all the validating criteria, the one that is unique to Jaina philosophy is nayam. Bhaskar conveys the same idea thus: “Jain logic proves the existence of a substance

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through Anekantavada and Nayavada” (6). Interestingly, the statement shows the connection between nayam and logic. Logic, known as nyaya, is “a solid medium to comprehend the reality by means of Pramana and Naya, which are collectively named as Yuktisastra or Nyaya (logic)” (Bhaskar 1992, 2). If so, nayam and pramana are also known as nyaya. As nayam itself is pramana or aḷavai (as the Tamil text tells us), nyaya might well be a variant of the Tamil term, nayam (Ta. nayam > nyaya), if we note that nayam (nayaṉ) meant niyāyam or justice (tirukkuṟaḷ 1949, 219). Besides mentioning nayam a couple of times in this sense, tolkāppiyam 1982, (hereafter, tol.; tol. III. 5. 41: 4; 6. 27: 3) also says that there are a few kinds of nayam (tol. III. 5. 41: 4). Unfortunately, the commentators’ glosses of the term nayam are not very helpful unless one sets the gloss against the original meaning. nacciṉārkkiṉiyar’s meaning “acatiyāṭik kūṟutal” or speaking playfully (cf. pālacuppiramaṇiyaṉ 2016, 245) and ilakkuvaṉār’s 1963, “tactful manner” (210) do not convey directly the original meaning, namely, “neither true nor false,” unless one interprets the playful or tactful as that which is neither true nor false. Though the commentators do not mention the kinds of nayam, a rare verse of unidentified source in N does: uṇmai nalliṉmai uṇmai iṉmaiyum uraikkoṇāmai uṇmai nalliṉmai uṇmai yiṉmaiyō ṭuraikkoṇāmai naṇṇiya mūṉṟum āka nayapaṅkam ēḻu (N 660, comm. CC). Translated, the verse reads: presence, absence, presenceabsence, and inexpressibility, presence inexpressible, absence inexpressible, and inexpressible presence-absence constitute aspects seven of nayam (adaptational translation by the present author). From N we learn that each nayam is a paṅkam (> pakkam) or part. The commentator glosses paṅkam as “paṅku, kūṟu” (N 660, comm. CC; kūṟu, part). Significantly, the term paṅku is a variant of the term, pāl (part; from paku, to divide > pakal, division, day, being a division of time > pāl, a division, part; paku > paṅku > Skt. saptapaṅki, seven parts). According to the ontology in tol., reality basically has three parts (pālkaḷ/paṅkukaḷ): oṉṟu pāl (one part), vēṟu pāl (other part), and oṉṟi uyarnta pāl (part emerging out of the uniting of parts, tol. III. 3. 2: 1–2). This theory of pāl/paṅkam implies that the whole reality could only be seen through its parts as exemplified in the story of the seven blind men who could see only a part of the elephant at a time. Significantly, this analogy itself is a nayam, later known as the niyāyam, namely, antakaja niyāyam (murukavēḷ 1960, 118, naṭēca kavuṇṭar 2004, 363). nayam is both a kind of validative criterion and a generic name for validative criteria. Hence mokkalaṉ, a Buddhist scholar, refers to nīlakēci’s validative criteria as “nayap piramāṇaṅkaḷ” (validative criteria of nayam, N 375). The major red herring he finds in Jainism is the concept of nayam by virtue of which the Jaina exponents attribute to one and the same entity both permanence and transitoriness, presence and absence, and identity and difference (N 376). The Jaina will aver that each validative criterion (disposition, deixis, approach, soul, condition of soul, and quality) will reveal different aspects of the same entity. Though municcantiraṉ does not introduce kāṇṭikai to nīlakēci, she is already aware of its nature, its use, and its members. Mark her references to the terms

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associated with it: pakkam (N 702: 5), kōḷ (N 414: 4; 707: 4; mēṟkōḷ, N 753: 2; 763: 3; kuṟi, N 870: 4), ētu (N 831; ētuppōli, N 367), and kāṭṭu (example; N 866: 2). Deploying all the logical resources at hand, she engages exponents of faith systems other than Jainism and wins them all in debate. To understand the logical nature of the debates, we can analyze the debate nīlakēci had with picācakaṉ, the materialist in the court of the king, mataṉacittu. Though debates with the Buddhists form the bulk of the text, the full force of Jaina logic is evident in the debate with the materialist too, as it is in the most characteristic logical aspect of the debate, namely, utti, the debating technique (tol. III. 9: 112). In fact, in the early days, logic itself was identified with utti and therefore known as Yuktisastra (Bhaskar 2). Much before nyaya came to mean logic, utti did so (Preisendanz 2010, 58–59). Therefore, we may do well to dwell on the uttikaḷ nīlakēci used in her debate.

uttikal in the Debate Between nīlakēci and pica¯cakan ¯ ˙ A close look at the uttikaḷ in tol. (III. 9. 112) shows how they facilitate oral delivery of a carefully constructed argumentative text combining aḷavai, elements of kāṇṭikai, and the traditional techniques of debate. When picācakaṉ opens the debate, he first states the position of his opponents (piṟaṉ kōḷ kūṟal, tol. III. 9. 112: 19; cf. vipakkam) and rejects the opponents’ view. Though this rejection is not based on arguments, it does convey his resentful attitude to his opponents’ position. Following this, he states his own position (taṉ kōḷ kūṟal, tol. III. 9. 112: 10; cf. sapakkam) and while doing so, he states again the view of his opponents (about the existence of the soul, N 10: 6). From nīlakēci’s arguments, we learn that picācakaṉ had compared the emergence of knowledge and pleasure as the effect of the combination of the elements to the effect of intoxication due to the combination of material ingredients of toddy. This is an evidence of the use of the utti, namely, “analogy” (oppak kūṟal, tol. III. 9. 112: 9). The debate comes to an end when picācakaṉ accepts nīlakēci’s position, which is the utti called “accepting what the opponent accepts” (piṟaṉ uṭaṉpaṭṭatu tāṉ uṭaṉpaṭal, tol. III. 9. 112: 11). Though the debate in the present case ends when the opponent accepts nīlakēci’s position, it need not in other cases, wherein the opponent does not accept the main contention but only provisionally does a part of the argument in order to refute the main contention. Before advancing her arguments against picācakaṉ’s position, nīlakēci understands the main contention of her opponent, namely, the nonexistence of soul, and tolkāppiyar calls this “understanding what is meant” (nutaliyatu aṟital, tol. III. 9. 112: 2). We may infer this from the arguments she advances. Then she organizes mentally her objections in the most effective order, and this may be the utti called, “ordering by effect” (atikāra muṟaimai, tol. III. 9. 112: 2), which also may be inferred from her argument. nīlakēci’s argument begins by focusing on the question of aḷavai. She targets the validity of the doctrinal position of picācakaṉ before zeroing in on his

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position itself. Accordingly, she challenges picācakaṉ’s rejection of the authoritative text as a validative criterion in arguments. In fact, she turns his rejection against him. The primary and original text (mutal nūl in tol. III. 9. 95; ākamam in MM) authored by a sage, regarded as the founder of a school of thought, has the force of truth (called āṇai). Quoting or invoking such a text is the utti called “speaking from authority” (āṇai kūṟal, tol. III. 9. 112: 15). The force of authority inheres in the word. This is evident in tol.’s definition of mantiram: what is uttered authoritatively by persons who could wield the power of the word (āṇaiyiṉ kiḷakkum, tol. III. 8. 171: 1; cf. maturaikkāñci 176 in (caṅka ilakkiyam 1963)). If the authority (āṇai) derived from the word itself and also from the primary text composed by a sage (muṉaivaṉ, tol. III. 9. 96) in tiṇai or primal society, in the state society depicted in the epics, it did from the doctrinal texts of each religio-philosophical school, say for example, The Kalpa Sutras (Jainism) or Dhammapada (Buddhism). Then, she restates his view in a concise manner, and this may be regarded as the use of the utti, namely, tokuttuk kūṟal or summing up (tol. III. 9. 112: 3). When nīlakēci draws out the implication of picācakaṉ’s rejection of textual authority, she employs the utti, namely, conveying what is implicit through what is explicit (vantatu koṇṭu vārātatu uṇarttal, tol. III. 9. 112: 7). When she points out that picācakaṉ’s notion of each element causing each sense leads to the notion that there is a sixth element which causes the soul, she draws out the implication of picācakaṉ’s words. The postulation of a sixth element appears to be the implication (eccam) of picācakaṉ’s view and such postulation is the utti known as “conveying the implication of what is said” (colliṉ eccam colliyāṅku uṇarttal, tol. III. 9. 112: 21). When she forces picācakaṉ to choose one of the three options he has suggested (N 10: 17), namely: 1. Each sense produces one type of knowledge. 2. Each sense produces five types of knowledge. 3. There is some other source of knowledge. and convey his decision, she adopts more than one utti. Firstly, she points out that he does “not focus on one thing” (orutalai aṉmai, tol. III. 9. 112: 14), which itself is a utti, and, secondly, that his lack of focus on a single theme causes “ambiguity in what he had said earlier” (muntu moḻintataṉ talaitaṭumāṟṟu, tol. III. 9. 112: 8). The latter could well be a utti in some cases, but here, as nīlakēci points out, it is a fault rather than a utti. Therefore, she exhorts him to adopt the uttikaḷ of “stating one thing” (orutalai moḻi, tol. III. 9. 112: 9) and “conveying the decision” (muṭintatu kāṭṭal, tol. III. 9. 112: 15). nīlakēci brings the debate to an end not by arriving at a conclusion but by wielding her intimidating supernatural power. She takes the form of a ghost and terrifies him into accepting her position. Such a debate is an example of the vātam type based on two-valued logic, the values being truth and falsehood. Now let us see how logic fares in MM.

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Logic in manime¯kalai ˙ In MM, logic-related matters are dealt with in two cantos – “canto on what was heard from religious exponents on their positions” and “canto on what she heard on the True Way in the disguise of a nun” – mainly in the form of principles. In the former canto, maṇimēkalai visits the city of vañci and hears the exposition of the doctrinal position of ten religio-philosophical exponents (Kanagasabhai). Of the ten positions, each of the following six – aḷavai, Saivism, brahmaism, nikaṇṭam, vaicēṭikam, and pūtam – is identified as “vātam” or verbal duel. The term, aḷavai in aḷavai vātam, the first system, is logic itself. However, though the term “vātam” is tagged to brahmaism, nikaṇṭam, and pūtam, no argument is advanced by the exponent of each of these schools. Each merely states his position. The briefest assertion, namely, “nāraṇaṉ is solace” (MM 27: 99), comes from the exponent who recited the epic of the ocean-hued one. With a mythological narrative (purāṇam) as its authoritative text, the exponent would do well to chant (ōtiṉāṉ, MM 27: 99) rather than debate it. A close contender is the expounder of brahmaism who affirms that this world is an egg laid by a deity (MM 27: 96–97) though this expounder is identified as a “vāti,” a debater. The term “urai” (utterance, commentary) expresses the nature of vedism. Vedists choose to expound the Veda rather than debate it and that is why it is necessary for cāttaṉār to name the position of Vedism, “vētiyaṉ urai.” If the school of Ajivaka is a textual tradition, Sankhya is a doctrinal school with religious fervor (as indicated by the word, “matam”). The first exponent met by maṇimēkalai, namely, aḷavai vāti defines aḷavai, which generically means logic and, specifically, epistemic validative criterion. Such logic embraced epistemology, rhetoric, what we today call “research methodology” and even ontology. The logician (aḷavai vāti), who might well be a representative of the indigenous logical tradition, chooses to use more local Tamil technical terms than their Sanskritic equivalents unlike aṭikaḷ who prefers the Sanskritic terms to the local ones. The aḷavaikaḷ of aḷavai vāti are: kāṭci/kāṇṭal (perception, MM 27: 14–24), karuttaḷavu (karuttaḷavai, inference, MM 27: 25–40), uvamai (analogy, MM 27: 41– 42), ākamam (authoritative text, MM 27: 43–44), aruttāpatti (inferring from what is akin to what is said, MM 27: 45–46), iyalpu (appropriateness in a context, MM 27: 47–48), aitikam (popular belief, MM 27: 49–50), apāvam (absence, MM 27: 51–52), mīṭci (implication, MM 27: 53–54), and uḷḷaneṟi (nature or what is natural in a situation, MM 27: 55–56). The defects associated with aḷavaikaḷ (piramāṇa āpācaṅkaḷ) are the following: cuṭṭuṇarvu, tiriyak kōṭal, aiyam, tērātu teḷital, kaṇṭuṇarāmai, aṟivaṟiyāmai, ilvaḻakku, uṇarntatai uṇartal, and niṉaippu. cuṭṭuṇarvu consists in considering only one aspect of an object to know what it is. For example, when one is in doubt whether what one sees is a tree stump or a human, one’s inference is based only on the appearance of the object, and not on its other aspects such as name, class, quality, and action. Further, the doubt (aiyam) in the mind of the viewer itself is a defect. On the other hand, without any doubt if one were to take the tree stump for a human, the defect is called, tērātu teḷital, which

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means “deciding without due consideration.” tiriyak kōṭal is misperception; taking one thing for another. The example adduced is regarding radiant seashell as silver. If one encounters a tiger and does not realize that the animal is at close quarters, the defect is kaṇṭuṇarāmai or “not knowing even when seen.” ilvaḻakku consists in presupposing the existence of nonexistent things like “hare horn.” Though it is a fact that fire is hot and there is chillness in fever, fire is not the remedy for fever. One presumes so because of regarding something inappropriate from what one knows or “uṇarntatai uṇartal.” niṉaippu is going by what others say. For example, if one regards a couple as one’s parents because others say so, it is defective knowledge. Of the ten aḷavaikaḷ, only two were postulated by āticinēntiraṉ, the earliest Buddhist teacher who probably was a Jaina at first (Danielou 1993, 152). He could have been a Jaina because Jainism is a much older faith system than Buddhism, which had borrowed several concepts from the former (Burde 2014: 43–45; Selvamony 2008: 45). According to Dasgupta 1932, Bhadrabahu’s Jaina text on logic predates the earliest Buddhist texts on logic (309) and mayilai cīṉi vēṇkaṭacāmi also acknowledges Jainism as the oldest religion in Tamil Nadu (1970, 40). Influenced by Jainism, āticinēntiraṉ accepted only two validative criteria, kāṇṭal and karuttaḷavu, and among the two, considered the latter of utmost significance in Buddhist logic. To aḷavai vāti, karuttaḷavu has two components: aṉumāṉam, the proposition, and aṉumēyam, the reason (which are also the members of kāṇṭikai). It is of three kinds: mutal, eccam, and potu. mutal (first) is inferring the effect from the cause as in the case of predicting rain (effect) from the rain clouds (cause). eccam (remainder) is inferring the cause from the effect, as when the rain in the highlands (cause) is inferred from the wet lowland (effect). potu is inferring from what is common to both factum probandum and factum probans, as in the case of inferring the presence of an elephant in the forest from the trumpeting that is heard (MM 27: 25–40). According to aṭikaḷ, karuttaḷavai (inference) is of three types: kāraṇam, kāriyam, and cāmāṉiyam (MM 29: 52–56), which correspond to aḷavai vāti’s mutal, eccam, and potu. Of these three, he recognizes only kāriyāṉumāṉam (eccam) or inferring cause from effect, as the valid one. If the effect is pakkam (proposition), cause is ētu (reason). Evidently, these are only two of the five members of kāṇṭikai, though aṭikaḷ’s variety is a three-membered one, as the members, upanayam and nikamaṉam, in his opinion, are subsumed by the member, illustration (MM 29: 109–110). Based on the concept of nayam, which here means, analogy as justification, upanayam (secondary nayam) particularizes the general rule stated in illustration. analogy is nayam because it was the predominant impartial device (acceptable to both parties) used to settle disputes and such dispute resolution was called niyāyam, a variant of nayam, which means naṭu or impartiality. Just as nayam links reason and proposition in the middle (naṭu/naṭai, iṭakikaḻi, vestibule as the connecting middle, Tamil Lexicon 1982, IV, 2145) of kāṇṭikai, upanayam walks the argument and, therefore, it is called naṭai (walkway, tol. III. 9. 104: 3). An equivalent of niyāyam, oppuravu combines the ideas of both justice (cf. tirukkuṟaḷ 1949, 219, comm.) and analogy (oppu, analogy + uravu, strength). The fifth member is nikamaṉam (muṭivu; cf. tol. III. 9. 104: 2).

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Considering the preeminent role of the concept of nayam (employed by the confidanté in tol. III. 5. 41: 4) based on analogy in kāṇṭikai, we might infer that originally argument was based solely on nayam (niyāyam or analogy as in mutumoḻi). Later on when the force of both ētu (reason; employed by personae in tol. III. 5. 12: 2; 4. 27: 4) and nayam were deployed together to establish the proposition, then emerged the five-part text, kāṇṭikai. Now let us see what MM says about the first three members of kāṇṭikai in some detail.

Proposition (pakkam, Pn) The proposition (hereafter, Pn; kōḷ [that which is “apprehended,” position], mēṟkōḷ [position adopted earlier], cūttiram [cūḻ, to surround + tiram, firmness ¼ cūttiram, what is firmly held after considering all sides of an issue]) has two parts: subject (hereafter, S; poruḷ; taṉmi; vicēṭiyam; e.g., hill) and predicate (hereafter, Pr; pakkam, tuṇi poruḷukku iṭam [locus of factum probandum], civañāṉa cittiyār 1946, 15; taṉmam; vicēṭiyam; e.g., fire). If Pn (kōḷ) is “There is fire in this hill,” “hill” is S (poruḷ/taṉmi), whose Pr, “there is fire,” is its pakkam (the phrase, “pakkamum taṉmiyum” [in vēṅkaṭacāmi nāṭṭār 1946, and avvai turaicāmip piḷḷai {hereafter, V&A 1946} 486] shows pakkam and taṉmi are two different entities). pakkam also particularizes the argument of kāṇṭikai unlike the latter’s Aristotelian counterpart (Kanagasabhai 2017, 226; Randle 2017). Though pakkam is Pr of Pn, often Pn itself is called pakkam (“side” > Skt. paksha) in Tamil because Pn lends itself for taking sides: one’s own side (i.e., what one asserts or self-side, called taṉ kōḷ [“self-assertion”], tol. III. 9. 112: 10) or capakkam [< svapakkam], and the opponent’s side (piṟaṉ kōḷ [“the other’s assertion”], tol. III. 9. 112: 19) or vipakkam (V&A 1946 479). For example, if A asserts “There is fire in the hill,” the opponent, B, is expected to disagree with A holding the view that “There is no fire in the hill.” The disagreement between A and B is essential for debate. When A and B agree on a Pn, as in the case of a Pn marked by appiracitta campantam (a Pr on which there is no disagreement between the contenders), there is no possibility of an argument, resulting in pōli or pseudo argument (Matilal 2017: 28; Raja 286). They could disagree because A and B could take different sides (pakkam1 and pakkam2) of one and the same proposition. The term pakkam needs closer attention. It derives from the verbal base, paku, to divide > pakku, break + am, nominal suffix ¼ pakkam, part (pakuti), side, place. pakkam is the part or side or place of the predication of the S that has to be concluded (pakkam tuṇiporuḷukk(u) iṭamām, civañāṉa cittiyār 1946, 15). When one asserts something, one can only assert a part (pakkam/pāl) of reality (poruḷ), never its whole, and hence tol. asserts that reality obtains as one part, the other part, and also as the united part (III. 3. 2: 1–2). The part of reality asserted is a Pr that occurs only in a definite locus, namely, pakkam. For this reason, an action itself, rather than its locus, is often metonymically referred to as “pakkam” (tol. III. 2. 7: 6; 11: 9; 14: 5; 16: 1, 2, 3, 6).

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Importantly, pakkam is marked by two nayaṅkaḷ: oṟṟumai (identity) and vēṟṟumai (difference) (MM 29: 112–121), a point that easily goes unnoticed as in Kandaswamy’s discussion of nayam in MM (2000: 40–42). Later, aṟavaṇa aṭikaḷ explains these nayaṅkaḷ (MM 30: 217–234). If oṟṟumai is knowing cause and effect as one and the same thing (speaking of rice grain as rice), vēṟṟumai is being able to see them separately (V&A 1946 565–566). When nayam is applied to the proposition of kāṇṭikai, oṟṟumai nayam consists in the identity of the poruḷ and pakkam (S and Pr), and vēṟṟumai nayam does in the inapplicability of Pr to all entities other than S. Accordingly, a Pn can assert only one Pr negating its opposite. For example, the Pn, “sound is impermanent,” is a valid one because it asserts impermanence by negating its opposite, namely, permanence. This means that vēṟṟumai nayam creates the condition for argument by enabling assertion of a Pr and rejection of its opposite. Such a conception of Pn shows two things: (a) how the Buddhist scholars have adopted the theory of (multivalued) nayam for their two-valued logic and (b) how this conception could be the source of Dinnaga’s trairupya (triple-character) concept of which he himself is not the author (Matilal and Evans 2012: 1). However, later, when aṭikaḷ speaks of the uses of nayaṅkaḷ, he says that these help us see how everything is related to each other ruling out the possibility of discrete entities and also understand how one thing could be both cause and non-cause for an effect. The latter may be evident in the case of the seed being both the sprout as well as not the sprout (V&A 1946 567). From what aṭikaḷ says about nayam, it is apparent that there does emerge space for multivalued logic in Tamil Buddhism. But this space remains a gap in a text which privileges bi-valued logic especially in the praxis of debate. A good Pn has to avoid nine defects (MM 29: 147; Raja 286). 1. appiracitta vicēṭiyam: S (such as the hill itself) is unknown to opponent (MM 29: 151–152; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128; Raja 1998, 288; Hikosaka 1989, 140). 2. appiracitta vicēṭaṇam: Pr (such as presence of fire) is unknown to opponent (MM 29: 150–151; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128; Raja 1998, 288; Hikosaka 1989, 140). 3. appiracitta upayam: Both S and Pr are unknown to opponent (MM 29: 152; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128; Raja 1998, 288; Hikosaka 141). 4. When a contrary Pr (such as infertility) is attributed to S (one’s own mother), we have the defect of cuvacaṉa viruttam (MM 29: 149; the variant, “cuvavacaṉa viruttam” [contrary self-utterance] is found in V&A 491; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128; Raja 288; Hikosaka 139). 5. Applying contradictory Pr (such as permanence) to S (such as a pot) is the defect, aṉumāṉa viruttam (MM 29: 148–149; Aiyaswami Sastri 128; Raja 288; Hikosaka 139). 6. appiracitta campantam is a pakkam (Pr) on which there is no disagreement between the contenders (MM 29: 153; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 129). For example, if the Buddhist is the opponent, the Pn, “sound is impermanent” will be defective because he is not likely to disagree with that view. V&A point out that

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cāttaṉār speaks only of appiracitta campantam, not piracitta campantam (Raja 289; Hikosaka 141) and that Dinnaga’s Nyayapravesa, which succeeded maṇimēkalai and adopted its ideas (V&A 1946 496–497; 491), wrongly denoted the name of this defect as piracitta campantam (see Hikosaka [85–86] for the question of authorship of Nyayapravesa). 7. “To take the reverse of” (Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128) what is perceived is pirattiyakka viruttam (MM 29: 148; perceptual error; Raja 287; Hikosaka 139). “Sound is inaudible” is such a defective Pn. 8. Arguing against one’s own authoritative text is the defect, ākama viruttam (MM 29: 150; error related to authoritative text; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128; Raja 288; Hikosaka 140), which is evident if a Vaiseshika were to assert, “Sound is permanent” contradicting the view of his own ākamam. 9. Contradiction of common knowledge (such as not accepting that what is seen in the sky is the moon) is ulaka viruttam (MM 29: 149–150; error pertaining to common knowledge; Aiyaswami Sastri 1972, 128; Raja 288; Hikosaka 140). The first three are defects due to incomprehensibility, which is a textual flaw according to tol. (III. 9. 110: 8). The fourth and fifth defects arise due to uttering something that is universally meaningless. These two could be subsumed under the type of textual flaw, poruḷila kūṟal of tol. (III. 9. 110: 4; uttering that which is meaningless). The remaining four are defective application of aḷavaikaḷ such as pirattiyakkam, aṉumāṉam, ākamam, and ulakurai.

Reason (ētu, R) The second member of karuttaḷavu is ētu (hereafter, R; from e, interrogative pronominal stem [Gnana Prakasar 1999, 396] as in evvayiṉ [e + vayiṉ; which place? tol. II. 9. 32] > etu, which? > ētu, which? > Skt. hetu; cātaṉam; e.g., “Because there is smoke”), which means both reason and cause. For example, when we infer the presence of the elephant in the forest from trumpeting, the reason for such inference is trumpeting. Therefore, trumpeting is ētu. But the cause of trumpeting is the elephant. What is at dispute is not whether the elephant is the cause of trumpeting or not, but whether the inferer’s reason for affirming the presence of the elephant in the forest is the trumpeting heard in the forest or not. Such inference is based on the presupposition that only elephants (and not sound recording of trumpeting or any other thing) could trumpet ensuring the concomitance of elephant and trumpeting. A normative R has three characteristics: R must be invariably concomitant with Pr; R should apply to all similar instances (capakkam) and should not apply to all dissimilar instances (vipakkam; MM 29: 121–135; cf. Raja 285; Hikosaka 141–142). Defects of R arise due to unacceptability (acittam) of Pn or violation of the law of identity (when both p and not-p are true; aṉaikāntikam) or contrariety (viruttam) (MM 29: 191–192).

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Unacceptable (acittam) Types of R For the Pn, “sound is impermanent,” the R, “because it is visible” is futile because it is upayācittam (MM 29: 195–197) or unacceptable to both sides. If the Pn is “sound is impermanent,” the R, “because it is produced” is unacceptable (aṉṉiyatarācittam, MM 29: 198–202) to an adherent of Sankhya system because the latter is likely to understand R as “being produced by primal Matter itself.” When one is not able to tell whether the R for the fire in the hill is smoke or mist, such R is culpable of dubiety (cittācittam, MM 29: 203–206).

Types of Non-unidirectional (anaika¯ntika) R ¯ cātāraṇāṉaikāntika ētu (MM 29: 217–223; common non-unidirectional R) is that which applies to both one’s own Pr and that of the opponent. For Pn, “sound is impermanent,” R, “because it is known,” is defective as it applies to both permanence and impermanence. When R applies to S, but not to either one’s own Pr (capakkam) or that of the opponent (vipakkam), it is said to be acātāraṇāṉaikāntika ētu (MM 29: 223–230). If the Pn is “sound is permanent” and its R is “because it is audible,” audibility applies to S, sound. But, as permanence (capakkam) or impermanence (vipakkam) cannot be caused by audibility, audibility is not a valid reason to affirm permanence of sound or any other substance. When R applies partially to the proposition, and wholly to the opposite of the latter, such R is said to be capakka ēkatēca virutti vipakka viyāpi (MM 29: 231–242). In the Pn, “sound is not produced by any action because it is impermanent,” its R, impermanence, applies to one similar instance (capakkam) like lightning, but not to another such as ether (ākācam) as sound is a permanent quality of ether. Further, such R applies to all opposite instances (vipakkam) such as the pot. vipakka ēkatēca virutti capakka viyāpi (MM 29: 243–253) is R, which applies partially to the opposite (vipakkam) of the Pn and wholly to one’s own assertion (capakkam). In the Pn, “sound is produced by action because it is impermanent,” its R, impermanence, applies to the S, lightning, but not to the S, ether (vipakkam), of the opponent. It also applies to all Ss of capakkam such as the pot as well. As it applies to both one’s own assertion and also to the opposite assertion of the opponent’s, such R is defective. If R applies partially to both one’s own assertion and also to the opposite assertion, then, such R is upaya ēkatēca virutti (MM 29: 254–266). For the Pn, “sound is permanent because it is formless,” the R, formlessness, applies to one eternal S, ether, but not to another (eternal S), atom. Further, among those entities of vipakkam (impermanence) like pot and pleasure, R, namely, formlessness, applies to pleasure but not to pot. The defect of non-unidirectionality (aṉaikāntikam) is due to the uncertain relation between the R, formlessness, and the Pr (permanence) raising such unanswered questions like “Does formlessness cause permanence?” and “Are formless entities permanent like ether or impermanent like pleasure?”

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When “one and the same R” is adduced by both parties to arrive at opposite conclusions, such R is called virutta viyapicāri (MM 29: 267–274). The Pn, “sound is impermanent because it is produced by action,” is defective in capakkam and vipakkam instances. In the case of capakkam (impermanence), such as the pot, the impermanence of sound could be because it is produced by action. In the case of vipakkam (permanence) also, one can say that the permanent, generic audible nature of sound is due to the fact that it is produced by action.

Contrary (viruttam) Rs taṉmac corūpa viparīta cātaṉam (MM 29: 280–287) is R which establishes the opposite of what the Pr asserts. If the Pn is “sound is permanent because it is produced,” its R is defective because it asserts the opposite of what is affirmed, namely, impermanence. taṉma vicēṭa viparīta cātaṉam (MM 29: 288–302) is one that destroys the Pr’s unique quality (vicēṭam) necessary to establish the truth of the Pn. In the case of the Pn, “the soul is served by the perceptual organs because the soul is inseparable from the body,” the R, “inseparableness from the body,” destroys the true nature of the soul, namely, its non-dependence rather than dependence on the body. The unique “taṉmam” or Pr (non-dependence) of the S, namely, the soul, is destroyed by the R, bodily dependence. Unfortunately, cāttaṉār (through aṭikaḷ) depends a great deal on the example to explain this defective R (MM 29: 295–301), so much so one wonders whether his explanation applies to R or E. Therefore, the explanation given here avoids using the member, namely, example altogether. taṉmic corūpa viparīta cātaṉam (MM 29: 303–318) is R, which destroys the unique feature of S. The R of the Pn – “bhava is neither substance nor quality nor action,” “because it is not the existent reality (uṇmai) of substance, quality, and action” – is defective because it destroys the unique nature of the S (taṉmi), namely, bhava. The unique nature (corupa) of the S (taṉmi), bhava is existence, which is possible only through entities such as substance, quality, and action. By denying that bhava is the existent reality of substance, quality, and action, the R renders bhava, abhava. taṉma vicēṭa viparīta cātaṉam (MM 29: 319–325) is R, which negates the special quality of S. The R of the Pn, “bhava is not the existent reality (uṇmai) of substance, quality, and action,” “because it is neither substance, quality, nor action,” is defective because it destroys the unique nature of S (taṉmi), namely, bhava. In this type of R, the R of the previous type becomes the Pn.

Illustration (titta¯ntam, E) ˙˙ Normative E combines both invariable concomitance and example. Invariable concomitance between R (the presence of smoke) and Pr (fire) is called “aṉṉuvayam” (MM 29: 88; uṭaṉikaḻcci, V&A 1946 482). The Pr, “there is fire,” and R, “because

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there is smoke,” are connected by the following aṉṉuvayam: “Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.” The concomitance is invariable because the connection between R and Pr is universal, necessary, and logical (Stcherbatsky 2008, 325). The connection between “being made” (R) and “sound” (S), on the other hand, is real and factual (Stcherbatsky 2008, 325). It is a fact (and reality) that sound is something that is made. E is of two types: cātaṉmiyam and vaitaṉmiyam (MM 29: 136–142). cātaṉmiyam is that which has the Pr of S and R (V&A 1946 523). If the Pn is “there is fire in this hill” and the R is “because there is smoke,” then the E will be “wherever there is smoke there is fire (aṉṉuvayam), like the fireplace” (example). vaitaṉmiya tiṭṭāntam is one which has the opposite Pr of S and R (V&A 1946 523). If the Pn is “there is no fire in this mountain” and the R is “because there is no smoke,” the E will be “wherever there is no smoke, there is no fire, like a lake.”

Defective Es of the ca¯tanmiyam Type ¯ E in which R is not adequately present (cātaṉa taṉma vikalam, MM 29: 339–348): Let the Pn be “sound is permanent” and its R, “because it is formless.” If the E of such Pn is “whatever is formless is permanent, like the atom,” then the atom (example of E) is both permanent and has form and contradicts the R, and therefore, the E is defective. E in which the Pr of S is not adequately present (cāttiya taṉma vikalam, MM 29: 349–358): If the Pn is “sound is permanent,” and its R, “because it is formless,” and the E, “whatever is formless is permanent, like the mind,” the E is defective as it will be marked by the formlessness of R and lack the permanence of the Pr. E in which both R and Pr are not adequately present (caṉṉāuḷḷa upaya taṉma vikalam, MM 29: 363–372): If the Pn is “sound is permanent” and its R, “because it has form,” and the E, “whatever is formless is permanent, like the pot,” then the pot (E) will lack both the permanence of Pr and formlessness of R. Nonexistent example lacking both Prs of Pn and (acaṉṉāvuḷḷa upaya taṉma vikalam, MM 29: 373–384): If the Pn is “sound is impermanent,” and its R, “because it is formless,” and E, “whatever has form is impermanent, like the ether,” the E, which lacks both the impermanence of Pr and the form of R, will be defective if the opponent is one who denies the existence of the ether itself. aṉaṉṉuvayam (lack of invariable concomitance; MM 29: 385–392): If the Pn, “sound is impermanent because it is made,” is followed by an improper E such as “impermanence and the quality of being made are found in the pot,” without the aṉṉuvayam, namely, whatever is produced is impermanent,” such E is marked by the defect, aṉaṉṉuvayam. If the Pn and its R are “sound is impermanent, because it is produced,” the aṉṉuvayam, namely, “whatever is impermanent is produced,” is absurd

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(viparītāṉṉuvayam, MM 29: 393–401) because it reverses the order of the proper aṉṉuvayam, “whatever is produced is impermanent.”

Defective Es of the vaitanmiyam Type ¯ cāttiyāviyā virutti (lacks Pr of S; MM 29: 402–412): Consider the Pn, “sound is permanent, because it is formless.” If its E is “whatever is not permanent is not formless, like the atom,” it will be defective because it will have the Pr of permanence but not the formlessness of R. This is so because the atom has form and is permanent. cātaṉāviyā virutti (incompatible R; MM 29: 413–423): If the Pn is “sound is permanent because it is formless,” the E, “whatever is not permanent is not formless, like action,” is defective because only the opposite of Pr, namely, permanence, will apply to action, not the opposite of formlessness. This is so because action is formless and impermanent. uṇmaiyiṉ upayāviyā virutti (lacks Pr of S and R of existent example; MM 29: 429–440): If the Pn is “sound is permanent because it is formless,” the E, “whatever is impermanent is not formless, like the ether,” is defective because the opposites of both permanence of Pr and formlessness of R do not apply to the ether. This is so because the ether is both permanent and formless. iṉmaiyiṉ upayāviyā virutti (lacks Pr of S and R of nonexistent example; MM 29: 440–449): If the Pn is “sound is impermanent because it has form,” the E, namely, “whatever is not impermanent, is not formless, like the ether,” is defective to one who denies the existence of the ether, as both the asserted qualities, impermanence of Pr and having form, will not apply negatively as well as positively. avvetirēkam (non-opposite E; MM 29: 450–456): In the Pn, “sound is permanent because it is not produced,” the opposite E should be “whatever is not permanent is not non-produced, like the pot.” But instead of such an E with a proper aṉṉuvayam, a non-opposite (avvetirēkam) E such as “the pot is produced and impermanent” (lacking aṉṉuvayam) is defective. viparīta vetirēkam (inverted opposite E; MM 29: 460–468): If the Pn is, “sound is permanent because it has form,” the E, “whatever has no form is also not permanent,” is defective. The proper negative E will be: “whatever is not permanent is formless” (Raja 296). Though the five members of karuttaḷavai (kāṇṭikai) are mentioned by aṭikaḷ, the fallacies associated only with three members (Pn, R, and E) are explained by him. This is because only the three-member karuttaḷavai was favored by the Tamil Buddhist scholars like aṭikaḷ despite his description of the five-member kāṇṭikai in his discourse to his ward and the wide prevalence of the latter in the Tamil tradition. However, the three-member karuttaḷavai, according to aṭikaḷ, helps estimate the worth of one’s own philosophical position as well as that of others and tell truth from falsehood (MM 29: 470–473).

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Truth has to be the opposite of falsehood in order to validate logic. So, it has to be ēkāntika (assertion of either p or not-p), a kind of logical reductionism the Nyaya system expounded (Matilal 1999: 4) probably due to the influence of logic as vātam. Similarly, what is asserted must be either citta (real) or acitta (unreal). It cannot be both. If it is cittācittam (both citta and acitta at the same time), it is nothing but defective. In short, what we find in MM is two-valued logic.

nayam/niya¯yam and va¯tam: Types of Logic in the Texts Evidently, MM inherited its logic from tol.as well as from the philosophical school known as Nyaya, the earliest systematic logic in Sanskrit (Vidyabhusana 1978, 42). The influence of the latter is particularly evident in the identification of inference (karuttaḷavai) with kāṇṭikai (syllogistic text in Tamil tradition). Such identification is first found in Gotama’s 2016, Nyaya Sutras wherein the proposition of a syllogistic argument is treated as the statement of inference that requires proof (sutra 33) and, therefore, sutra 32 that mentions the five members of the syllogistic argument is placed after sutra 31, which speaks of a tenet that requires proof, in short, an inference. Unlike such treatment of the syllogistic argument in Nyaya, in tol. kāṇṭikai is treated as a kind of text (nūl). In MM, nyaya is also closely related to the concept of nayam expounded in tol. and Jainism. According to cuvāmināta tēcikar, nyaya originated from tol. and tirukkuṟaḷ (murukavēḷ 1960, 117). Let us consider the Tamil term niyāyam. As a variant of nayam (Ta. nayam > Pkt. nyaya [cf. Ta. pakuti, division of being > Skt. prakriti, primal substance; pa > pra] > Ta. niyāyam; nallapōlavum nayava pōlavum [puṟanānūṟu 58 in caṅka ilakkiyam] wherein nayam means niyāyam, katiravēl piḷḷai 1923, 1347) niyāyam originally meant naṭu or the middle (Winslow 1979, 672), which implied impartiality. naṭu is impartiality as it is neither of the two sides of the contending parties as in vātam. When nayam means naṭu, it means both impartiality (akanānūṟu 71: 1, 3; and kuṟuntokai 143: 4, 5, in (caṅka ilakkiyam 1963)) and non-monistic non-duality, which is neither p nor not-p; neither truth nor falsehood (tol. III. 5. 41: 4; “naṭuvāka nōkku” consider the middle, N 644: 4). When niyāyam means naṭu, it also means both impartiality and non-duality. In the post-caṅkam age, niyāyam was also used as a synonym of the earlier term mutumoḻi (tol. III. 8. 170; vaittiyanāta tēcikar 1974, 329–332), which referred to a primitive form of kāṇṭikai. Consequently, niyāyam itself came to mean kāṇṭikai (Vidyabhusana 1978, 42) and its variant, mutumoḻi. The latter was often a proverb, which explained something analogically. Analogy performed the function of ētu of kāṇṭikai – rationalizing or clarifying a difficult situation or answering a question or solving a problem. Such a solution or answer or clarification is niyāyam because it sorts out an issue without taking either of the two contending sides. In short, niyāyam was an impartial analogical utterance that sought to sort out an issue of two contending parties. For example, akaram mutal niyāyam or “the originariness of the phoneme /a/” is a niyāyam because it is an

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analogy between the originary speech sound and god as the creator of the universe (naṭēca kavuṇṭar 2004, 17–18). Even as the speech sound /a/ precedes all sounds, it also in-dwells in all of them just like god does in the whole world. akaram is niyāyam or nayam because it is neither wholly precedent nor non-precedent. Later, niyāyam meant not only analogy, and the “syllogistic” member, E, but the entire syllogistic text itself (murukavēḷ 1960, 144). As an analogy, it affirms a truth in a debate without taking either side of the contention. In Sanskrit sources, nyaya basically means “a system of philosophy delivered by Gotama 2016, or Gautama . . . is perhaps so called, because it ‘goes into’ all subjects physical and metaphysical according to the . . . syllogistic method treated of in one division of the system” (Williams 1964, 572). Williams’s explanation of the term shows how the meaning of nyaya in Sanskrit sources is quite different from its Tamil counterpart. Though MM was influenced by the Nyaya school, cāttaṉār was not persuaded to use the term nyaya, probably because it was not used in Tamil in the sense in which it was in non-Tamil texts. Neither did it denote “going into physical and metaphysical subjects,” nor was it free of the sense of non-duality in the Tamil context. Though the idea of non-duality existed in Tamil Buddhism in its concept of nayam (MM 30: 217–234; 29: 112–119), the kind of logic Tamil Buddhists were familiar with was a two-valued one and the term vātam described it better than niyāyam did. Evidently, MM identifies several exponents of faith (camayak kaṇakkar) as vāṭikaḷ, though its heroine does not engage any opponent in a vātam. In the case of N, it not only mentions the term vātam but also exemplifies the genre by constructing its plot (for the most part) with the debates between the heroine and the exponents of faiths other than her own. Therefore, we may say that vātam is the kind of logic that is common to both the texts. tol. calls this genre vākai and explains it as one in which each side asserts its belief (koḷkai) in an analytical form (III. 2. 15), which could imply the use of the argumentative text such as kāṇṭikai (III. 9. 103– 104, commentary, iḷampūraṇar; 101) and utti or technique of debate (III. 9. 112). Interestingly, one of the terms for proposition of kāṇṭikai, namely, kōḷ, is also the stem of the word, koḷkai, meaning “tenet” (koḷ to grasp > kōḷ what is grasped [such as a tenet], grasping/koḷkai tenet). Without a kōḷ/koḷkai, vātam (also vākai) is not possible. As we know, vātam is verbal duel, which was a part of tiṇai society, especially its social aspect called puṟam. In fact, combat is the characteristic praxis of puṟam life. So, both combat and verbal duel (vātam) were typical practices of the primal society. In stark contrast, the central personae of akam (the domestic aspect of tiṇai society) did not contend with each other as did their counterparts in puṟam. Their objective was union based on love (aṉpu; aṉpoṭu puṇarnta aintiṇai, tol. III. 3. 1: 2). If so, both union (of akam) and contention (of puṟam) were the two sides of the tiṇai coin. As there are evidences, in tiṇai society, of the use of nayam, based on multivalued logic, and the practice of contentious debate based on two-valued logic, we might say that the primal (tiṇai) society employed both logics, the two-valued and the multivalued.

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Contentious debate became the norm in the Tamil state society when the state itself sponsored religious polemic (as the Tamil epics testify). Though multivalued logic survived in the form of theory in both Jainism and Buddhism, it did not translate itself into popular practice at least in encounters of faith. This is evident in the 29th canto wherein aṟavaṇa aṭikaḷ focuses on the aḷavaikaḷ, namely, inference, reduces inference to the Tamil syllogistic text, and gives an elaborate account of the true and false forms of the three members – proposition, reason, and example. The rationale of these defective forms is two-valued logic. Though multivalued logic was the basis of Jaina philosophy, N is not based on such logic; its debate is not niyāyam (which was nayam-oriented) but of the vātam type based on two-valued logic. In the praxis of nīlakēci’s vātam, most of the uttikaḷ explained in tol. are exemplified. Though uttikaḷ were used both in vātam and niyāyam, they seem to have played a great role in fashioning the armory of logic by lending such technical terms as taṉ kōḷ (sapakkam) and piṟaṉkōḷ (vipakkam). True, maṇimēkalai does not practice vātam, but the bivalent logic on which the latter is based underlies aṭikaḷ’s exposition of Buddhist truth.

Definitions of Key Terms aḷavai ētu eṭuttukkāṭṭu karuttaḷavai kāṇṭal/kāṭci kōḷ/mēṟkōḷ nayam

pakkam pōli upanayam

utti vākai/vātam/vātu

Validative criterion; logic Reason; cause Illustration Inference Perception Proposition Teleologically positive middle between truth and falsehood; non-bivalent logic; also known as cuṭṭu (deixis, nīlakēci 120) or what is pointed at, which is neither truth nor falsehood about the entity pointed at, but a middle aspect Predicate of proposition; sometimes denotes the proposition itself Defective form of members of kāṇṭikai (upa, secondary + nayam [analogical mutumoli or proverbial language as] justification ¼ upanayam) Application, the fourth member of the five-membered kāṇṭikai; so called as it follows the nayam or the analogical member (as justification). If nayam as the example applies the universal principle (such as “wherever there is smoke there is fire”) to a particular case, such as “the fireplace,” upanayam also performs a similar function by applying reason (presence of smoke) to a particular subject (the hill). Technique (of debate) Logic as verbal duel

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Summary Points • nīlakēci contains several debates between the eponymous heroine and the Buddhists and exponents of the other faiths. Among all these debates that employ the debating techniques called uttikaḷ, the one between the heroine and the materialist is taken as a sample to show how these techniques are employed in the debate. – Though nayam, a concept based on multivalued logic, is central to Jaina logic, nīlakēci’s debate is based on two-valued logic. • In maṇimēkalai, aḷavaikaḷ discusses the ten aḷavikaḷ, the defects pertaining to them, and the three kinds of inference. – maṇimēkalai’s guru, aṟavaṇa aṭikaḷ, discusses inference elaborately, especially the three members of what Tamil scholars knew as kāṇṭikai, and briefly the concept of nayam. – Though the logic in maṇimēkalai accommodates the concept of nayam, its logic remains two-valued.

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Introduction to Buddhist Logicians and their Texts Madhumita Chattopadhyay

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Plan of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nāgārjuna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts: Vasubandhu (Vādavidhi) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dignāga: Nyāyamukha, Hetucakradamaru, and Pramāṇasamuccaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Śankarasvāmin: Nyāyapraves´a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dharmakīrti: Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Pramāṇavārttika, and Vādanyāya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sanskrit Commentators of Dharmakīrti: Dharmottara, Vinītadeva, Arcaṭa, and Prajñākaragupta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tibetan Commentators of Dharmakīrti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Post-Dharmakīrti Logicians: Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, Mokṣākaragupta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

From the origin of Buddhism in the sixth century BC to its expansion into four schools, logic was not looked upon as an independent branch of study within philosophy, though scattered uses of logical concepts and arguments were not rare in early Buddhist literature. Since the middle of fifth century AD, Buddhist logic developed into an independent area of study. This was possible because of the contributions of some great Buddhist thinkers who tried to develop logic not only as an independent study but also as a formal system where one can validly infer an unapprehended phenomenon on the basis of an apprehended phenomenon. Rules were also developed for turning debate into a rational enterprise. Pioneering works in the field of logic were done by Dignāga, who was considered M. Chattopadhyay (*) Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, The Center for Buddhist Studies, Kolkata, West Bengal, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_1

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to be the father of Buddhist logic, and Dharmakīrti. Later Buddhist thinkers were more or less engaged in the discussion of logical issues dealt by these two great thinkers and tried to defend the Buddhist position against the attacks of the opponents, both of Brāhmaṇical and non-Brāhmaṇical schools. It is in course of such counterattacks and defenses that Buddhist logic developed to have a position of its own in Indian philosophy. Keywords

Catuṣkoṭi – Tetralemma – Enumeration of all logically possible alternatives regarding a particular concept and then showing that each of them leads to absurdity · Anumāna – Inferential cognition or inference – A form of knowledge employed to provide information regarding an unknown phenomenon on the basis of a known phenomenon · Hetu or sādhana – Probans – That known phenomenon on the basis of which the unknown phenomenon is apprehended · Sādhya – Probandum – The object which was unknown beforehand becomes apprehended on the basis of the probans · Avinābhāva – Invariable concomitance – The necessary relation between the probans and the probandum such that in the absence of the probandum the probans cannot occur · Dūṣaṇa – fallacies – defects of inference due to any of the factors involved in the inference process · Vāda – Debate – Dialogue holding between two parties to establish a particular point leading to victory or loss

Introduction The history of thought in India may be classified into three periods – the preclassical period (up to the fourth century BC), the classical period (up to the tenth century AD), and the scholastic period (from the eleventh century on). In the preclassical period, philosophical inquiry was mainly centering round the Vedic study and justifying the practice of Vedic rites and rituals. Buddhist philosophy came into existence in the classical period challenging the authority and supremacy of the Brāhmaṇas. Realizing that the only way to salvation is through enlightenment regarding the real nature of entities, the task of Lord Buddha and his followers was to show the untenability of the opponent’s view, be that of the Cārvākas, of the Jainas, or of the Brāhmaṇa tradition. For the refutation of the opponent’s views and establishing their own views, Lord Buddha and his followers did not rely on any scripture or authority but presented arguments based chiefly on ample illustrations (dṛṣṭānta) and not on universal concomitance. It was in such arguments that the seed of Buddhist logic was sown. From the origin of Buddhism in the sixth century BC to its expansion into four philosophical schools, no systematic treatment of logic by the Buddhist thinkers was noticed. There were only a few haphazard references to logic in course of discussion on other subjects like philosophy, religion, etc. The works of

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Nāgārjuna, Maitreya, Asaṇga, and Vasubandhu contained discussion on logic, no doubt, but that did not establish logic as an independent branch of study within philosophy. With 450 AD began a period when logic was completely differentiated from general philosophy, and there were a good number of Buddhist thinkers who concentrated mainly on that branch of learning. The earliest known writer of this period was Dignāga. The time of Dignāga has been thought to be before 557–569 AD when two of his works had been translated into Chinese. His works set the framework within which subsequent Buddhist thinkers discussed philosophical issues pertaining to inference and debate. Reference may here be made to Śaṇkarasvāmin (about 550 AD) who wrote a brief manual of inference for the Buddhists, called the Nyāyapraves´a. A bit later, around 600–660 AD, Dharmakīrti, the greatest Buddhist logician, developed his own views on inference and debate within the conceptual framework founded by Dignāga. Vasubandhu in his discourse on logic had pointed out that inference was based on a formal relation, vyāpti which he described as “avinābhāva,” i.e., as a necessary relation. But the question, wherein lies the necessity of such a vyāpti relation, had not been dealt with by Vasubandhu. Dharmakīrti systematically investigated into this problem and identified that this necessity consists in the relation of causality (tadutpatti) and essential identity (tādātmya). In his different texts like Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇavinis´caya, Hetubindu, and Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti concentrated on the probans and its relation with the probandum. Like Dignāga, Dharmakīrti did not admit the existence of general concepts or universals and reduced them to difference from others. In his logic, the notions of tatpariccheda (possessing a particular characteristic) and atadvyāvṛtti (difference from others) were considered to be the two sides of the same coin. This atadvyāvṛtti, also technically known as apoha, is nothing but a mental construct having its root in the objective reality. Among the later Buddhist thinkers of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla (both belonging to the eighth century), Dharmottara (730–800 AD), Jñānaśrīmitra (tenth century), Ratnakīrti (eleventh century), and Mokṣākaragupta (late eleventh century) need special mention. These later logicians did not possess much originality of thinking as the two great thinkers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. They were more or less engaged in the discussion of epistemological and logical issues which had been dealt with by Dignāga and his followers. Their contributions, however, consisted in the fact that they tried to defend the theories of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti against the criticisms raised by the opponents of the Brāhmaṇical as well as non-Brāhmaṇical schools.

Plan of the Chapter In this chapter, an attempt is made to introduce the Buddhist logicians and their main logical texts in a brief manner so that the reader can get an idea of the development of Buddhist logic. This chapter is divided into eight sections:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī and Vaidalyaprakaraṇa Pre-Dignāga Buddhist texts: Vasubandhu (Vādavidhi) Dignāga: Nyāyamukha, Hetucakradamaru, and Pramāṇasamuccaya Śankarasvāmin: Nyāyapraves´a Dharmakīrti: Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Pramāṇavārttika, and Vādanyāya Sanskrit commentators of Dharmakīrti: Dharmottara, Vinītadeva, Arcaṭa, and Prajñākaragupta 7. Tibetan commentators of Dharmakīrti 8. Post-Dharmakīrti logicians: Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, and Mokṣākaragupta

Nāgārjuna In the galaxy of Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna outshines all in respect of his contribution to philosophy. Because of the vastness of his knowledge and extraordinary skill in respect of reasoning, he has often been revered as the “second Buddha,” and even within 100 years of his death, his images began to be worshipped in the several temples of South India. Several stories and myths have grown up or sprang up centering his life. His time is generally accepted to be the earlier part of the first century AD. The major contribution of Nāgārjuna in Buddhism is that it is under his influence that the prajñāpāramitā become popular in the northern part of India. He was the first systematic proponent of the Mādhyamika school of thought. In order to establish the essenceless-ness of all entities from the ultimate standpoint, Nāgārjuna in his two major texts, Mūlamadhyamakas´āstra and the Vigrahavyāvartanī , developed a special method of logic which is often referred to as catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma. The method consists in enumerating all the theoretically or logically possible alternatives regarding a particular concept and then showing that each of these logically possible alternatives ultimately lead to some kind of absurdity. In short, Nāgārjuna’s method involves two steps – (1) enumeration of all the possible alternatives and (2) pointing to the absurdity or contradictory nature of each of these alternatives. As all the possible alternatives lead to absurd consequence, it follows that the original position or view is not tenable. This second part of Nāgārjuna’s method is comparable to the reductio ad absurdum form of argument and is known as prasaṇga. This prasaṇga method is later on followed by most of the Mādhyamika thinkers like Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. Thus Nāgārjuna’s way of argument is a unique method based on two strategies, namely, the method of enumeration and the reductio ad absurdum. In short Nāgārjuna’s contribution to logic consists in his systematic application of the tetralemma to develop the assertions made in the Prajñāpāramita literature of the early Mahāyāna Buddhism about the emptiness of all entities in consonance with the notion of avyākṛtavastu or “unexplicated points” found in the early Buddhist literature.

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Vigrahavyāvartanī The texts Vigrahavyāvartanī and Vaidalyaprakaraṇa may be regarded as supplementary to Nāgārjuna’s magnum opus Mūlamadhyamakas´āstra. Nāgārjuna’s views on epistemology and philosophy of language can be found in these texts, and these topics are not so elaborately discussed in the former texts, from the stand point of logic. The importance of the text Vigrahavyāvartanī lies in the fact that it gives an insight into the kind of philosophical debates that used to take place in ancient India in the first and second century AD. It belongs to a group of six works known as the Yukti-corpus which the Tibetans refer to as a collection of six texts dealing with reasoning (rigs pa’i tshogs drug). These six texts are Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanī , Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, Sunyatāsaptati, Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, and Ratnāvalī . The text Vigrahavyāvartanī consists of seventy verses, and the topics discussed here may be classified into the following: (1) the status of the theory of emptiness; (2) epistemological issues, especially regarding the relationship between valid cognition (pramā) and the sources of the valid cognition (pramāṇa); and (3) semantic issues like empty terms (i.e., terms which do not refer to any corresponding objects) and negative terms like “not.” The style in which the text is composed is in the form of a debate, where the objections raised by opponents have been stated at once and the answers have been given by Nāgārjuna. In short, the text seems to be divided into two parts – one part containing the objections against the Mādhyamika theses and the other part containing the counterparts or refutations of those counterarguments. This specific structure has led some modern thinkers to regard the text to be written by two different writers. While making clear the notion of emptiness through different arguments and refuting the position of the opponents, Nāgārjuna makes it clear categorically that when he asserts that everything is empty, he is not thereby making any sort of selfrefuting assertion; in fact, he does not have any position of his own to establish. Thus, discussion made in this regard may be looked upon as similar to the discussion of liar paradox, specially of the Eubulidean form, found in modern Western logic and the way he refutes the charge of self-refutation, may be considered as an example of a type theory. Vaidalyaprakarana Vaidalyaprakaraṇa ˙is one among the six main treaties on logic by Nāgārjuna. The term “vaidalya” is derived from the root √dal with the prefix “vi,” which has as one of its meaning the sense “to tear into pieces” or “tearing.” In the context of the present treatise, the title signifies that the main purpose of the book is to demonstrate the absurdity of the 16 categories or padārthas admitted by the Naiyāyikas. The text Vaidalyaprakaraṇa is divided into 73 sections. Refutation of the 16 categories is not given equal stress. Depending on the importance of the categories, length of the discussion varies. That is, to refute some categories only one section is devoted, while there are some categories to refute which 20 sections are devoted.

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Through the refutation of the 16 categories admitted by the Naiyāyikas, Nāgārjuna actually tries to point out that it is impossible to assert anything regarding either the existence or the nonexistence of the categories. In other words, these categories are not actually what they seem to be, that is, existent and true realities; rather they are mere conventions and creations of the human mind.

Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts: Vasubandhu (Vādavidhi) Vasubandhu Vasubandhu, a great Indian Buddhist scholar, is well known for his magnum opus Abhidharmakos´a, a compendium of Abhidharma philosophy, and two small treatises Viṃs´atikā and Triṃs´ikā upholding the Yogācāra philosophy. But his contribution cannot be regarded to be confined to these three texts only. Another major contribution of him consists in his writings on logic, which had influences on Dignāga, and in that sense may be regarded as marking the dawn of Indian formal logic. Vādavidhi Of the different texts written by Vasubandhu on logic, the Vādavidhi is the earliest one and from the title itself it can be said that this book was concerned with the formulation of rules (vidhi) to make valid flawless arguments in the context of debate (vāda). Though rules for good argumentation were also provided in earlier texts, e.g., in the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama or in the works of Asaṇga, the text Vādavidhi exhibits its excellence over others in this regard for providing a complete logical structure of an argument in judging its validity. The uniqueness of Vādavidhi can be exhibited through the following facts. First, while the earlier texts followed the five member syllogism schema, in the Vādavidhi the redundancy of the last two members were pointed out and instead of the five members, for the first time three-member syllogism/argument structure was emphasized and this structure was followed by later logicians. The three members of the syllogism were the thesis, the reason/ justification, and the example, that is, the statement exhibiting the relation between the probans and the probandum. Secondly, in the explanation of the relationship between the probans and the probandum, the novelty of Vasubandhu is evident again. In the earlier texts, this relationship was presented in terms of mere regular coexistence (sāhacarya), in the form whenever there is A there is B or whenever there is absence of B there is absence of A. In the Vādavidhi this relationship was presented as invariable concomitance (avinābhāva) between two events. That is, the event of the probans can occur only if the event of the probandum occurs. It has been categorically said that the statement of such invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is necessary for the validity of an inference – schema. Thus the necessary character of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum, rather than mere concomitance, was first emphasized by Vasubandhu, which had been taken up by Dharmakīrti later. Thus presenting an argument in terms of three members and defining the relationship between the probans and the probandum as invariable concomitance and not

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as regular coexistence are the two important features of Vādavidhi. The criterion for a valid inference structure has been precisely stated without omitting any essential aspect. In that respect the text Vādavidhi opens a new area in Indian logical tradition.

Dignāga: Nyāyamukha, Hetucakradamaru, and Pramānasamuccaya ˙ Dignāga Ᾱcārya Dignāga (beginning of the sixth century) has often been regarded as “the father of medieval logic” because of the distinctness of his works from those of his predecessors in respect of matter and manner of the treatment on the subject. His opus magnum the Pramāṇasamuccaya is a logico-epistemological treatise dealing mainly with the pramāṇa or valid cognition and its means. The significant contribution of Dignāga in respect of logic lies in the fact that he consolidated and systematized the insights found in the works of his teacher Vasubandhu into a formal basis. First he made the distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others the fundamental basis of his treatment of inference. Secondly, he made the threefold characteristics of reason or a hetu (trirūpahetu) as recognized by Vasubandhu more precise by emphasizing on the Sanskrit particle “eva.” Thirdly and perhaps most strikingly he devised the “wheel of reason” (hetucakra), a three-by-three matrix setup to classify the pseudo-reasons in the light of the last two characteristic feature of the trirūpahetu. It is possible to conceive of the nine reasons or probans which are present in or absent from the similar instances (sapakṣa) and dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) either partly or wholly. The probans which are wholly or partly present in the sapakṣa but wholly absent from the vipakṣa cases are considered as valid and their opposites are contradictory or uncertain. Another important contribution of Dignāga in respect of logic was in respect of example or the dṛṣṭānta of an inference. Before the time of Dignāga, an example was considered to be simply a familiar case which was cited only to help the understanding of the listener. Dignāga converted an example into a universal proposition, i.e., a proposition which expresses the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum. This example may be either positive/homogenous or negative/heterogeneous, and an inference can become invalid if this reason is defective. An important consequence of the trirūpahetu or triple character of the probans led Dignāga to his notion of “apoha,” often translated as “exclusion theory”/ “differentiation theory” of meaning. According to Dignāga words or utterance of words behave as inferential signs because their meaning can be determined only by excluding any dissimilar object where the intended meaning does not belong. To be precise, the meaning of such common nouns like “cow,” “water,” etc. arises in the mind of the hearer from their utterance, not because there are positive universals like cow-ness, water-ness, etc. but because of the exclusion of complement classes of non-cows, non-water, etc. Such notion of differentiation or exclusion is thus a substitute for the objective universal admitted by the realist school like the Nyāya.

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Pramānasamuccaya ˙ The major work of Dignāga is the Pramāṇasamuccaya. This book in a sense constitutes the very basis of Buddhist as well as medieval Indian logic. In the introductory verse of the text, Dignāga, after offering his prayer to the teacher Sugata, states that the purpose of this text was to be a collection of his own views on valid cognition, which were scattered in different texts. The text consists of six chapters, all of which deal with different fundamental epistemological questions. The first chapter entitled Pratyakṣapariccheda deals with the Buddhist definition of valid cognition, classification of valid cognition into perception and inference, objects of these two varieties, definition of perception and classification of perception, and identity of (pramā) valid cognition and the means of such cognition (pramāṇa). The second and third chapters deal with the nature and necessary constituents of two varieties of inferential cognitions – inference for oneself and inference for others. In the second chapter there are important discussions on the probans and the invariable concomitant relation or vyāpti among other things, while in the third chapter the main topics of discussion are with the constituent statements like thesis (pratijn˜ ā), probans (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta). In the course of that, discussion on the different fallacies of thesis and probans have been made. The fourth chapter deals exhaustively with the nature of an example as also with different fallacies arising thereof. For Dignāga the term “Dṛṣṭānta” stands for actual example as also the third statement in a proof which actually is a statement of the relation of pervasion along with the example. The fifth chapter deals with the examination of interpretation of linguistic signs (apoha parī kṣā). A verbal sign is not different from the inferential mark or the probans in the sense that both function by excluding entities incompatible with what is signified. In the last chapter of the text entitled “Jāti” (futile rejoinder), Dignāga has discussed (dūṣana) refuting the opponents by pointing to defects in their arguments. The text Pramāṇasamuccaya had exerted immense influence on both Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers in respect of logic and epistemology. Śaṇkaraswāmi, a disciple of Dignāga, composed Nyāyapraves´a, a summary exposition of Dignāga’s views. The famous commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya had been composed by Jinendrabuddhi entitled Vis´ālāmalavatī. Dharmakīrti also wrote a commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya, entitled Pramāṇavārttika, which itself had superseded the original text in respect of the content and also the arguments employed for establishing the views of Dignāga. Dignāga himself wrote a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The original Sanskrit text is lost, though the Tibetan version of it is available and it has been the project of modern Buddhist scholars to restore the text in its original form from the Tibetan version. Nyāyamukha The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga has been regarded by G. Tucci as the oldest Buddhist text on logic. It is argued by scholars that this text was composed later than the Pramāṇasamuccaya and its auto-commentary, since passages from the latter two

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texts have been found to be quoted in the former. The Nyāyamukha, in a sense, contains the essence of the text Pramāṇasamuccaya; the difference between the two lies in the fact that in the former discussions on epistemology do not get much importance while the latter is wholly dedicated to epistemological discussions; on the contrary the text Nyāyamukha is basically intended to ascertain the real nature of the argument offered to establish a thesis as well as its refutation, a vāda. That is, the main concern of this book is with logic rather than with epistemology. This book unfolds one after another the different constituents of an argument, which according to him are three – the thesis, the probans, and the example. Along with presenting the nature of each of them, Dignāga points out with suitable example the fallacies which would occur if any of them were defective. For example, after discussing the thesis or the pakṣa, there occurs a discussion on the pakṣābhāsa. Similar is the case with hetu and dṛṣṭānta. After completing his discussion on the three constituents and their fallacies, Dignāga proceeds to discuss the refutation which consists in showing that the arguments provided by the opponent is vitiated by any of the logical error already enunciated by him. The fallacies of such refutation referred to as dūṣaṇābhāsa are also discussed in this context. In short, this book gives a primary idea of the logic by which one can establish one’s thesis and at the same time refute the view of the opponents who challenge that thesis. In that sense the title of the text Nyāyamukha is very appropriate. Hetucakradamaru The Hetucakradamaru is a small treatise on logic by Dignāga which deals exclusively with the threefold characterization of the probans (hetu). A valid reason or probans is one which is present in the locus and in all the homogeneous or similar instances and is not present in any of the heterogeneous or dissimilar cases. Regarding the presence, absence, and both presence and absence of the probans in similar and dissimilar instances, nine alternative combinations are possible. Of these nine possibilities, only two are considered to be valid while all the remaining seven are invalid because of the occurrence of different fallacies, like being either too broad or too restrictive or contradictory. The importance of this book consists in pointing out the necessity of all the three characters of the probans in establishing the probandum.

Śankarasvāmin: Nyāyapraves´a Śankarasvāmin Śankarasvāmin was a pupil of Dignāga. Much is not known about his life except that he was a native of Southern India. His time period is thought to be the middle of six hundred AD. However, his importance in Buddhist logic lies in the fact that it was through Śankarasvāmin along with ten other great scholars that the logic of Dignāga was handed to Śīlabhadra, who was the head of Nālandā University. The most famous work of Śankarasvāmin was Nyāyapraves´a.

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Nyāyapraveśa From the title Nyāyapraves´a, it is evident that the text was intended for introducing Buddhist logic. In that respect the content of this book came closer to the Nyāyamukha. In the introductory verse of Nyāyapraves´a, the author points out clearly that three propositions which constitute an inference as well as the fallacies involved in such inferences, means of refutation (dūṣaṇa) and fallacies in such refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa), are pertinent for convincing others regarding matters unknown to them. As contrasted with that, perception and inference together with their fallacies are relevant for one’s own understanding. Though he mentions both the categories in the introductory verse, in the book his main thrust has been on the first one, namely, on those which are necessary for informing another person a new fact. As such he has discussed in details the three propositions constituting the inference, the triple character of the probans, two varieties of examples (dṛṣṭānta), and their defects. He has classified fallacies under three heads – those relating to the thesis, those related to the probans, and those related to the example and has made detailed discussion on each of them. He has made a brief presentation of the definition of perception and that discussion is made in consonance with the definition offered by Dignāga. Because of the simplicity of language and lucid way of presentation, this text gained popularity among students of both Buddhist and Jaina tradition, and Jaina logician like Haribhadra Sūri wrote a commentary, entitled Nyāyapraves´avṛtti.

Dharmakīrti: Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Pramānava¯rttika, ˙ and Vādanyāya Dharmakīrti The logico-epistemological dimension of Buddhism which started with Dignāga, reached its highest point with Dharmakīrti who played the central role of importance in Indian epistemological tradition. The importance of this great logician can be understood from the fact that the influence of his works is noticed in later works of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers. When Dignāga’s arguments to establish Buddhist philosophy by refuting the views of the Brāhmaṇical schools were strongly criticized by the Naiyayika Udyotakara or the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, it fell upon Dharmakīrti as a task to establish the Buddhist position on strong logical foundations. This he did by even criticizing the views of some Buddhist logicians like Ῑśwarasena whose views he did not like. The following seven texts have been regarded to be written by Dharmakīrti: (1) Pramāṇavārttika, (2) Pramāṇavinis´caya, (3) Nyāyabindu, (4) Hetubindu, (5) Vādanyāya, (6) Sambandhaparī kṣā, and (7) Santānāntarasiddhi. In addition to these seven, Dharmakīrti wrote an auto-commentary on the Svārthānumānapariccheda, a chapter on inference for oneself of the Pramāṇavārttika, and also on the Sambandhaparī kṣā. According to Bu-ston all these seven treatises are actually commentaries on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga although Dharmakīrti himself considered only the first one to be a

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commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya. As a matter of fact, all the other treatises deal with some or other epistemological issues and the text Pramāṇasamuccaya had as its core concern different epistemological issues. So, it is quite natural that all the works of Dharmakīrti are related with the works of Dignāga. Though Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika intended to write a commentary on Dignāga, it is an irony of fact that his works superseded the original work in respect of merit. The seven treatise of Dharmakīrti have often been compared to that of a human figure, the first three constituting the body and the remaining four as constituting the limbs of the body. The first three are exclusively concerned with different basic epistemological issues, like the nature of valid cognition, its varieties, their objects, and the question of the identity of sources of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and the resultant cognition (pramā). The remaining books do not address these general issues but focus on one or other particular topics, for example, Hetubindu is an investigation into the nature of probans (hetu), and Sambandhaparī kṣā deals with the nature of relation. Vādanyāya is a treatise on the art of debating, that is, on the logic to be followed by proponents and opponents who wish to establish their own position or refute others, respectively. So these three deal exclusively with logical topics. The seventh text Santānāntarasiddhi deals with the question of admitting others’ minds in the framework of idealism. In respect of logic, the contribution of Dharmakīrti consists in the fact that he first provided reasons to account for the necessity aspect in invariable concomitance relation or vyāpti in terms of causality and essential identity. Thus giving epistemology a pragmatic orientation and making all the varieties of valid cognition invariably related with reality and explaining such invariable connection in terms of fundamental logical principles constitute the uniqueness of the logical system of Dharmakīrti. Nyāyabindu The text Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti is one of the most well-known popular books on Buddhist logic which is recommended for anyone wishing to pursue studies on the subject. In spite of the presence of a number of treatises on this area of Buddhism, including texts like Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga or the magnum opus of Dharmakīrti the Pramāṇavārttika or the Pramāṇavinis´caya, the importance of this Nyāyabindu lies in the fact that it presents the principles of logic in a brief and interesting manner. As such this book is essential for anyone who is interested for a precise understanding of Buddhist logic. Because of the importance of this text, several commentaries and subcommentaries had been written on it. Unfortunately only the commentary by Dharmottara and his followers are available in Sanskrit, but there were other Sanskrit commentaries which have become extinct though some of them are available in Tibetan version. The earlier commentary on Nyāyabindu was Nyāyabinduṭī kā by Vinītadeva, which is extinct in Sanskrit. There was another commentary on the Nyāyabindu by Ᾱcārya Śāntabhadra which is also not available in Sanskrit. But the existence of these two commentators is known from the fact that the later commentators have referred to and refuted their views. Some commentators like Durveka

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Miśra have mentioned Vinītadeva and Ᾱcārya Śāntabhadra together which indicates closeness and similarity of the philosophical standpoints of the two commentators. The most well-known commentary on Nyāyabindu is the commentary by Dharmottara in Sanskrit and this Sanskrit original is still available and it was translated into Tibetan from Sanskrit by Jñānagarbha. There had been several subcommentaries on the commentary of Dharmottara. Of them, one is by Mallavādin which is known as Dharmottaraṭippaṇa, and another is by Durveka Miśra which is known as Dharmottarapradī pa. In his Ṭippaṇa, Mallavādin mentioned the views of other commentators prior to Dharmottara but did not mention the views of other sub-commentators while Durveka Miśra had mentioned the views of other sub-commentators on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭī kā. In addition to the abovementioned commentaries and subcommentaries on Nyāyabindu, mention may be made to two other treatises which were written on Nyāyabindu, not to explain the necessity of each and every term of the text but to explicate the original content. One such treatise is named Nyāyabindu-pūrva-pakṣasaṇkṣepa, written by Kamalaśīla. From the title it is evident that the main purpose of this treatise was to present before the reader in a nutshell the view of all the pūrvapakṣa-s (earlier thinkers) which had been refuted by Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu. The other treatise is named Nyāyabindupiṇdārtha, composed by Jinamitra. The title of this treatise suggests that it is a summary exposition of the entire text Nyāyabindu. Both these texts were written in Sanskrit, though those original texts are not available. The Tibetan translations of the two, however, are available. In the very first Sūtra of Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti declares that the basic objective of this text is the exposition of valid cognition or samyagjn˜ āna since such valid cognition is the cause of the attainment of all human goals. Such valid cognition is classified under two heads – perception and inference. The basis of such classification is that there are two types of objects of knowledge – unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) and universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Unique particulars can be apprehended by perception alone and the sāmānyalakṣaṇa can be apprehended by inference alone and not by perception. Perception is indeterminate while inference is determinate character. In this chapter Dharmakīrti has clearly pointed out why these two types of objects alone are admitted as objects of cognition and how the Buddhists do explain the identity of cognition (pramā) and the sources of cognition (pramāṇa). Dharmakīrti classifies inferences into two varieties – inference for oneself and inference for others. Accordingly the three chapters of Nyāyabindu are devoted, respectively, to perception, inference for oneself (svārthānumāna), and inference for others (parārthānumāna). In the chapters on inference, Dharmakīrti has presented the threefold characteristics of the probans, classification of probans into three varieties – probans as essence, probans as effect, and probans as non-apprehension. Probans as non-apprehension is classified to be of 11 varieties. In addition to this discussion on probans, Dharmakīrti has also explained the nature of vyāpti or invariable concomitance relation, and the necessary character of this relationship is accounted for by regarding relation of identity and causality as the only two valid sources of establishing vyāpti. Discussion on inference is completed

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with discussion of the fallacies which are classified into three – fallacies with regard to the thesis (pakṣābhāsa), fallacies with regard to the probans (hetvābhāsa), and fallacies with regard to the instances (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa), which are offered to illustrate the invariable connection. Since in this book, the thing in itself is admitted as one variety of objects of cognition (prameya), question arises as to which school of Buddhism this text Nyāyabindu stands for. Though Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have shown their affinity to the Yogācāra, Vijñānavāda tradition, which believes in the nonexistence of external objects, in the Nyāyabindu this belief, is not adhered. The way the definition of thing in itself has been presented indicates that it is something existent outside. Hence this treatise is regarded not to belong to the Yogācāra tradition. Accordingly some commentators have held that in this treatise Dharmakīrti has left the ideology of the Yogācāras and accepted the position of the Sautrāntikas. Some commentators have tried to show that some of the Sūtras of the Nyāyabindu indicate an attempt to combine the views of both the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika schools. An attentive explanation is given by some commentators who argue that there is nothing contradictory on the part of Dharmakīrti to uphold the Yogācāra standpoint in his Pramāṇavārttika and Sautrāntika standpoint in the Nyāyabindu. Their point is that when discussion on pramāna (knowledge) and prameya (object of knowledge) is made, that discussion is made from the practical point of view, vyāvahārika standpoint and not from the ultimate standpoint or pāramārthika point of view. The ultimate reality is apprehended through direct insight (svajn˜ ā) and does not involve the categories of pramāṇa, prameya, etc. So, though the Pramāṇavārttika deals with the ultimate standpoint, in the Nyāyabindu the vyāvahārika or the empirical point of view predominates. Having pointed out the inadequacy in the analysis of pramāṇaprameya done by other schools and pointing out their real nature from the Sautrāntika standpoint, it became easier for Dharmakīrti to regard the Sautrāntika treatment as unsatisfactory from the ultimate point of view. In the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti has refuted the existence of external objects and established the ultimate reality of consciousness alone. Hence it seems that it is only to represent the empirical point of view that Dharmakīrti has presented the Sautrāntika position in the text Nyāyabindu, though he was an ardent follower of the Yogācāra tradition regarding his ultimate position. Hetubindu The term “Hetu” is used in different senses in Indian philosophy. Sometimes it is used in the sense of reasoning (Nyāya), for example, when the expression Hetuvidyā is considered to be synonymous with or equivalent to Nyāyavidyā or Tarkavidyā or even to Ānvī kṣikī . The term “hetu” has, as its sense, reasoning. But this is not the sense in which the term “hetu” is used in the title “Hetubindu.” There the term “hetu” refers to the probans which is one of the terms of an inference. The word “bindu” in Sanskrit means “drop.” So, by using this term “bindu” in the title, it is indicated that the text Hetubindu presents like a drop a concise exposition of the nature of probans which is as vast and deep as the great ocean. The title may alternatively be understood as standing for a short treatise which embodies only a part of the

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elaborate treatment of the topic on probans as found in the Pramāṇavārttika. In whatever way the title may be understood, it is a fact that Dharmakīrtī has presented his own views regarding the nature of the probans in the text Hetubindu. In short, the text Hetubindu is a short treatise dealing exclusively with probans which plays the fundamental role in the process of inference. Regarding the subject matter, this text may be regarded as similar to the Hetucakra of Ācārya Dignāga, for the Hetucakra also deals with discussion of the nature of probans which is a member of the process of reasoning. The text Hetubindu does not start with any invocation to Buddha or to any other divine being as is the case with auspicious verse (mangalācaraṇa) of other Mahāyāna Buddhist texts but begins with a verse accompanied by an introductory sentence. The verse, however, actually is a part of the Pramāṇavārttika, which states in very clear terms the characteristic features of the probans, the types of the probans, and also the consequences which would arise in the case of a defective probans; the rest of the text composed in prose is actually an elaborated exposition of this introductory verse. The subject matter of Hetubindu is mainly concerned with inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and so the text may be regarded as a short treatise on inference for oneself. The introductory verse of Hetubindu states that “the probans is that which subsists in the subject (pakṣa) of the inference and is pervaded by the probandum (sādhya) which also subsists in the same subject. Such a probans is of three types only, because invariable concomitance (avinābhāvaniyama) holds exclusively in these three. What are other than these are pseudo-probanses (hetvābhāsa).” Arcaṭa, the chief commentator of Hetubindu, has pointed out two alternative lists of topics from this verse. The first list contains three topics – (1) definition of probans, (2) number of the varieties of probans, and (3) reasons for restricting the number of probanses. The second list points to six topics – (1) nature of probans, (2) restriction of the number of types of probans, (3) restricting probanshood to the three types only, (4) reason for the numerical restriction and the restriction of probanshood, (5) statement of the implication, and (6) reason for not standing the definition of the pseudo-probans. Besides these main topics, other important topics of Buddhist philosophy have been clearly discussed. These include topics like refutation of the doctrine of universals (sāmānya), introduction of the notion of apoha as a substitute for uncaused destruction (nirhetukavinās´avāda), establishment of indeterminate perception as the only source of valid cognition, discussion of relation between cause and effect, nature of auxiliary conditions (sahakāritva), and the nature of absence (abhāva). Though these topics have been discussed elaborately in other works of Dharmakīrtī as, for example, in the Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti had introduced briefly along with the refutation of opponents’ views adding sarcastic remarks for them. The importance of this text can be judged from the great influence that it has imparted on later writers, both of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions. There is a detailed and elaborate commentary on Hetubindu, known as Hetubinduṭī kā by Arcaṭabhaṭṭa, and a subcommentary entitled Āloka by Durveka Miśra. Both the commentary and subcommentary are available in Sanskrit.

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Pramānavārttika The text˙ Pramāṇavārttika occupies a central position in the logico-epistemological tradition of Buddhism. Basically it was intended to be a Vārttika, i.e., commentary, on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga, but it contained more than what was discussed in the original text. The text is written in metrical verses and the total number of verses in this text is 1454. The text Pramāṇavārttika is divided into four chapters: one chapter dealing with perception (pratyakṣa), one dealing with inference for oneself (svārthānumāna), one dealing with establishment of pramāṇa (pramāṇasiddhi), and the other dealing with inference for others (parārthānumāna). But regarding the order of the chapters, there is a controversy among the thinkers. According to some the book starts with the chapter on establishment of pramāṇa (pramāṇasiddhi), while according to others the first chapter is inference for oneself. Those of the second group justify their argument on the ground that Dharmakīrti himself wrote an auto-commentary on it. Those of the first group, on the other hand, believe that the importance of Pramāṇavārttika lies not in its discussion of logic, but in its discussion of the fundamental reality of Mahāyāna in the form of Buddha and his specific qualities. The basic aim of the text is to present with logical vigor the Dharmakāya, Svabhāvakāya, and Jn˜ ānakāya of the Buddha, before those who challenge the authority of the Buddha. Whatever reason may be there to account for the difference in the arrangement of chapters, the importance of the text in the area of Buddhist logic lies in the fact that this book contains an elaborate analysis of the invariable concomitant relation (avinābhāva) and attempt to explain the necessary chapter of this relation in terms of causality or essential identity. Other important topics of logic are also discussed here elaborately. For example, the chapter on inference for others focuses on (i) the definition and function of such an inference, (ii) definition of thesis, and (iii) also on the notion of the probans (hetu). Incidentally it may be noted that although the Pramāṇavārttika was aimed to be a commentary on all the verses of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in the chapter on inference for others, Dharmakīrti has commented on only first eight verses of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Regarding the question to which school of Buddhism does Pramāṇavārttika belong, it is unanimously admitted by all that in this text, Dharmakīrti had defended the Yogācāra position very strongly. From the Yogācāra standpoint existence of the external objects are admitted only empirically from the standpoint of saṃvṛti-satya, and not from the ultimate standpoint, i.e., pāramārthika-satya. Hence the discussion on pramāṇa, prameya, etc. as done in logic or epistemology is carried out from the empirical standpoint. After refuting the discussion on pramāṇa and prameya as made by other schools, Dharmakīrti tries to reveal their real nature from the Sautrāntika perspective. After establishing the Sautrāntika standpoint, he showed that the reality of such external objects cannot be admitted from the ultimate point of view. So, from that point of view none of them can be admitted and what remains to be admitted is the ultimate reality of consciousness (vijn˜ aptimātratā) alone. In short, in the Pramāṇavārttika his affiliation to the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda trend, which had been ultimate position, has been expressed.

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Vādanyāya Of the other logical treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Vādanyāya is an important one. Etymologically the term “Vādanyāya” means the nyāya or logic of debate (vāda). The title is appropriate since the main thrust of the book is to discuss the rules of victory and defeat in debate. Considering a debate between two parties to be a rational enterprise, need is felt to formulate the rules by which one can judge the soundness, rightness, or wrongness of the arguments of the parties involved before declaring the winner and the loser in the debate. Dharmakīrti’s notion of vāda differs from that of the Naiyāyikas. For the Naiyāyikas vāda stands for a friendly discussion between a master or a guru and his disciple (s´iṣya) or between two co-disciples, and in such situation the question of victory and defeat does not arise. But what Dharmakīrti regards as vāda is a real situation of debate between two parties where one party tries to establish his own position by refuting the other. Naturally the question of winning and losing becomes important in such situation. Dharmakīrti developed his own logic of debate by pointing out that the points of defeat for the opponent (prativādin) cannot be the same as that of the proponent (vādī ), since the tasks of the two are not the same. The task of the vādī is to offer arguments in order to establish his own position, whereas the task of the opponent is to point out the defects in the arguments of the proponent to refute their position. So, it would be wrong to regard misapprehension and non-apprehension to be the same in both cases. For the proponent, non-apprehension will mean failure to present a sound argument or failure to justify the argument offered, and misapprehension will mean presentation of fallacious or redundant or irrelevant arguments to establish his own position. On the other hand for the opponent non-apprehension will mean inability to find the fault in the faulty arguments of the proponent and misapprehension would mean consideration of a non-fault as a fault. In the case of the proponent, the nigrahasthāna would therefore be asādhanāngavacana, failure to establish one’s own position, while for the opponent, it would be adoṣodbhāvana. Thus exposition of the nature of nigrahasthāna as found in Vādanyāya is not totally different from that found in the Nyāyasūtra; the difference lies in the precise way of presentation. The point in which the text Vādanyāya is critical of the Nyāya view is in respect of the classification of such points of defeat.

Sanskrit Commentators of Dharmakīrti: Dharmottara, Vinītadeva, Arcata, and Prajñākaragupta ˙ Arcata ˙ the different commentators of Dharmakīrti, Arcaṭa occupies an important Among position. From Tārānātha’s History of Buddhism, it is known that Arcaṭa was a Kashmīri and he was a Brāhmaṇa. Another name of Arcaṭa was Dharmākaradatta. Rahul Sankrityayan did not admit that Arcaṭa and Dharmākaradatta were one and the same person. Durveka Miśra in his subcommentary Āloka on the Hetubinduṭīkā

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mentions the two names as referring to the same person. He used the title Bhaṭṭa along with the name Arcaṭa and the title Bhadanta along with the name Dharmākaradatta. Since the title Bhadanta is generally applied to a Buddhist monk, it seems that Arcaṭa in his later life became a Buddhist monk and then he was known as Dharmākaradatta. From the statement of Tārānātha it is known that Bhadanta Dharmākaradatta was the teacher of Dharmottara. Much is not known about the personal life of Arcaṭa from his own statement as well as from the statement of Durveka Miśra; it can be known that Arcaṭa composed the following texts Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi and Pramāṇadvitvasidhi and wrote a commentary on Hetubindu of Dharmakīrti. From the titles of the texts, the content of them can be easily known. The text Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi has as its objective establishing the momentary character of all objects. The text Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi is aimed to show that the number of pramāṇas is restricted to two only. His literary style was very lucid and his penetrating philosophical insight is exhibited in his exposition of other’s positions both of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. Since he wrote a commentary on Dharmakīrti and he was the teacher of Dharmottara, it can be inferred that his period falls between the last part of the seventh century and first part of the eighth century AD.

Dharmottara Of all the commentators of Dharmakīrti, the most well known was Dharmottara. According to the report of Bu-ston, Dharmottara was the student of Vinītadeva but from the observations made by Tārānātha, it can be known that his teacher was Dharmākaradatta. He belonged to the lineage of Pramāṇavārttika in between Jñānaśrīmitra and Saṃkarānanda. As regards his time information may be gathered from Kalhaṇa. According to him, King Jayāpīḍa, one of the grandsons of Lalitaditya, saw in a dream that a sun was rising in the west and he invited Dharmottara to his court for teaching. Historical evidences report that the reign of Jayāpīḍa is known to be between 770 AD and the end of that century. His court had also other literary personalities like Kṣīra, Dāmodaragupta, and others. From this it can be said that the time of Dharmottara was the latter half of the eighth century AD. That Dharmottara lived in the eighth century is indicated by another fact. Dharmottara is a student of Dharmākaradatta, a contemporary of Prajñākarakara and a student of Śākyamati who was a student of Devendramati, a direct student of Dharmakīrti. Allowing a gap of 25 years among a teacher and his student, there is a difference of 100 years between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Since the period of Dharmakīrti is believed to be seventh century, Dharmottara can be said to belong in the eighth century AD. Though Dharmottara did not write any commentary on Pramāṇavārttika, the magnum opus of Dharmakīrti, he commented upon two other texts of this great logician – Pramāṇavinis´caya and Nyāyabindu. The former commentary is known as Pramāṇavinis´cayaṭī kā, which Durveka Miśra has mentioned as Vinis´cayaṭī kā. The original Sanskrit text however is extinct, though Tibetan translation of it by

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Parahitabhadra, a Kashmir Pundit, and Blo-etn-sesa-rab is available. But the most well-known commentary of Dharmottara is that on the text Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. Apart from writing commentaries on texts of Buddhist logic, Dharmottara himself had composed a few texts on Buddhism. One of them is Apohaprakaraṇa or Apohanāmaprakaraṇa. This text deals with the notion of apoha or exclusion which the Buddhists uphold as the referent of common noun and play the role similar to that of universal of the Nyāya Vaiśesika systems. Another well-known text of Dharmottara is Paralokasiddhi, which is aimed to prove the existence of a world after death, that is, a world different from the present one. The third text known to be written by Dharmottara is Kṣaṇabhangasiddhi, the main topic of which was to establish the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists. Most of the original Sanskrit texts of Dharmottara are lost; however, the Tibetan translation of these texts is available.

Vinītadeva Among the other noted scholars who wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti, mention should be made to Vinītadeva. According to Tārānātha’s History of Buddhism in India, Vinītadeva lived during the time of King Lalitachandra who was the son of King Gopīcandra and Vinītadeva was a teacher at the Nālandā University. He was a student of Prajñākaragupta and his time is supposed to be the latter half of the eighth century. He wrote commentaries on the famous texts of Dharmakīrti like Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Vādanyāya, and Sambandhaparī kṣā and Santānāntarasiddhi. The Sanskrit originals of these commentaries are lost; however, the Tibetan translations of all these commentaries, which were made with the help of Indian Scholars and Tibetan interpreters, are available. In addition to writing commentaries on the texts of Dharmakīrti, Vinītadeva also wrote a commentary on the Ālambanaparī kṣā of Dignāga. Apart from these commentaries, Vinītadeva composed a text named Samayabhedoparacana-cakra, which dealt with the history of the 18 sects of early Buddhism. Prajñākaragupta The other well-known commentator of Dharmakīrti is Prajñākaragupta. He was also known as Alaṃkāra-upādhyāya. He had been a disciple of both Brāhmaṇa Śaṃkarānanda and Yamāri. He lived during the time of King Mahāpāla. According to Pandit S.C. Vidyabhushan, Prajñākaragupta was a lay devotee and was different from another Buddhist thinker of a more or less similar name – Prajñākaramati. This latter person was a monk and belonged to the University of Vikramaśīlā and lived during the period of King Canaka, who was the maternal uncle of King Mahāpāla. Prajñākaragupta had composed an elaborate commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti which is known as Pramāṇa-Vārttikā-laṇkāra, in which he made a detailed analysis of the text. Another text written by Prajñākaragupta is Sahāvalambanis´caya. This text is basically on epistemology, dealing exclusively with a particular point, namely, joint occurrence of the ascertainment of an object and knowledge of the object. The original Sanskrit version of this text is no longer

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existent. But the Tibetan translation of it, made by the Nepalese Pandita Śāntibhadra and the Tibetan interpretation Śākya-hod, is available.

Tibetan Commentators of Dharmakīrti Most of the philosophical discussions found in Tibetan tradition since the eleventh century onward exhibit the strong influence of Dharmakīrti’s thoughts, specially his thoughts on logic and epistemology. This influence was to such an extent that Dharmakīrti’s terminologies were used even in course of discussion of the Mādhyamika thought. The two fundamental concepts of Dharmakīrti, namely, the concept of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and differentiation apoha, had been very frequently used in the case of debates taking place in the monasteries. In course of such debates, the logical rules that were followed were no other than those formulated by Dharmakīrti. The person who was responsible for the establishment of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology and logic in Tibet was Ngok Lo-dza-wa (1059–1109). The contribution of Ngok to Tibetan Buddhism was that he was the first person to emphasize on the philosophical aspect of Buddhism in Tibet which was formerly looked upon as a mere religion. Ngok made extensive translations of Dharmakīrti’s works. In addition to that he wrote commentary on the Pramāṇavinis´caya and paved the way for the tradition of logic and epistemology following the lines of Dharmakīrti. This task of establishing the logico-epistemological tradition got a strong footing by Cha-ba (1182–1251) who with his acute and original intellect made further developments in this regard. On the basis of all the epistemological works, Cha-ba composed a book Tshad ma sde bdun yid gi mun sel (Clearing of Mental Obscuration with Respect to the Seven Treaties on Valid Cognition) in which he presented in summary form the epistemological views of Dharmakīrti. The legacy of upholding the epistemological tradition of Dharmakīrti that was established by Ngok and Cha-ba continued in the thirteenth century in the hand of the fourth of five great Sagya masters, Sagya Paṇdita. Sagya Paṇdita pointed to the importance of Dharmakīrti by showing his necessity in understanding Buddhist account of knowledge as well as other aspects of Buddhism. Sagya Paṇdita stressed on critical acumen or prajṅā as central to Buddhist path and the study of epistemology as helpful to its development. And in this regard he put much emphasis on the study of Pramāṇavārttikakārikā as the text for understanding Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. He also composed a text entitled Tshad ma rigs gter (Treasure on the Science of Valid Cognition). In this text, he mainly depended on the words of Dharmakīrti himself as reflected in his different texts and not on the words of different commentators, though the views of the commentators were presented in a summary form. According to the available sources, Sagya Paṇdita studied with Sagya Śīlabhadra of Nalanda University for a long time, and on the basis of such study, he realized that the Tibetan interpretation of Dharmakīrti made so far corresponded partially to the actual thoughts of Dharmakīrti. That is why while writing his Tshad ma rigs gter he did not rely on the commentaries for understanding

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Dharmakīrti. In this book he criticized the realist interpretation of Dharmakīrti and attempted to reintroduce real universals in Buddhist epistemology. Though this approach of Sagya Paṇdita met with strong opposition initially, the situation changed around fifteenth century, mainly under the influence of Yak-dön. Yak-dön severely criticized the attempts of the followers of Cha-ba to read a realist interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thoughts so as to believe in the existence of common sense objects and universals, as knowable by the sources of knowledge. To point to the incorrectness of those approaches Yak-dön wrote a commentary on Sagya Pandita’s Tshad ma rigs gter and his auto-commentary. Thus among the Tibetan commentators of Dharmakīrti, two completely conflicting attitudes can be noticed – one ascribing a negative anti-realistic trend to Dharmakīrti and the other a realistic one to his epistemology. But later on during the fourteenth century onward, a new trend was noticed among Tibetan Buddhist interpreters of Dharmakīrti. They tried to point out that Sagya Paṇdita’s views were quite compatible with the realist interpretation put forward by Cha-ba. This group of thinkers had as their leader Dzong-ka-ba, also known as Tshong kha pa, the founder of the Geluk school. Among the followers of Tsing kha pa, mention may be made of Gyel-tsap, Kay-drup, and Ge-dün-drup in this regard. All of them attempted to show that Sagya Paṇdita’s refutation of realism was mostly done on the basis of philosophical arguments. On the contrary if the common sense argument is accepted, there is no problem to provide a realistic interpretation to Dharmakīrti. In short, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when Dharmakīrti’s works lost their popularity in India, his thoughts were given new interpretations in Tibet so as to make them compatible with the Buddhist thoughts prevalent in Tibet during that time.

Post-Dharmakīrti Logicians: Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, Moksākaragupta ˙ Jñānaśrīmitra Of the four great erudite scholars respected as the gatekeepers (dvārapaṇdita) of the famous Vikramaśīlā Mahāvihāra, Jñānaśrīmitra was the second. Jñānaśrīmitra belonged to an age when Buddhist philosophy attained its maturity and so it was possible for him to refer to the views of his predecessors in his texts. Though his main concern was interpretation of the views upheld by Dharmakīrti, his competence of the philosophy of the entire Mahāyāna tradition is evident from his different writings. His exposition, therefore, stood as a bridge between the ancient and later Buddhist thoughts. In one of his texts Sākārasiddhi he provided a long list of the teachers of the school and sub-school he belonged to. There he mentioned the names of Maitreyanātha, Asaṇga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Prajñākaragupta. Thus it is evident that he belonged to the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition of Maitreyanātha and the sub-school of Pramāṇavārttika led by Prajñākaragupta. Jñānaśrīmitra, nowhere, had explicitly stated anything regarding his early life, nor about his time, but on the basis of the evidences obtained so far from other works of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, it is now accepted that

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the philosophical career of Jñānaśrīmitra fell in the first half of the eleventh century AD. Jñānaśrīmitra composed twelve texts, namely, (1) Kṣaṇabhaṇgādhyāya, (2) Vyāpticarcā, (3) Bhedābhedaparī kṣā, (4) Anupalabdhirahasya, (5) Sarvas´abdābhāvacarcā, (6) Apohaprakaraṇa, (7) Ῑs´varavāda, (8) Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi, (9) Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa, (10) Advaitabinduprakaraṇa, (11) Sākārasiddhis´āstra, and (12) Sākārasaṇgrahasūtra. From the very title of these texts, it can be seen that they were composed on a variety of subjects, some of which were metaphysical like proving the momentariness of objects or discussing the Buddhist concept of causality or refuting the notion of an omnipotent godhead, while some were epistemological, discussing the relationship of knowledge and object (e.g., in Bhedābhedaparī kṣā) or showing the identity between the two (as in Advaita-bindu-prakaraṇa) that some dealt with the theory of meaning (e.g., Apohaprakaraṇa). But there were some texts in which he has dealt with topics of logic exclusively. Mention may be made of texts like the Vyāpticarcā, where the nature of invariable concomitance or vyāpti is discussed. Quoting the views of other logicians like Trilocana and Vācaspati and criticizing them, he tried to establish the position that the concomitance is in the form of essential identity and such invariable concomitance forms the basis of inferential cognition. In two other texts, namely, in Anupalabdhirahasya and Sarvas´abdābhāvacarcā, Jñānaśrīmitra discussed at length the nature and varieties of the probans as non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) which the Buddhists have admitted as the only way to obtain the knowledge of the absence (abhāva) of entities. Though these three texts of Jñānaśrīmitra deal exclusively with topics which fall within the scope of logic, his logical acumen is not confined to them only. Even in other texts where he had discussed other topics like momentariness or the existence of god, he had applied the subtleties of logic to refute the views of the opponents and to establish his own thesis. So, there is nothing exegetical to regard him as the great gatekeeper of the Buddhist tradition.

Ratnakīrti Among the latter thinkers who made noteworthy contributions to Buddhist logic, mention must be made to Ratnakīrti. Ratnakīrti was respected as a great scholar (mahāpaṇdita) and a practitioner of tantra. A detailed account of his personal life is not known except that he was a direct disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra and was associated with both Somapuri and Vikramaśīlā universities. Though he himself has nowhere stated his time, it is, however, inferred from the different sources available that he belonged to the first half of the tenth century AD. Regarding his academic lineage it can be said that he belonged to the tradition of VasubandhuDignāga-Dharmakīrti-Prajñākaragupta. His regard and respect for Dharmakīrti is evident from the fact that he considered him to be the only preceptor of the world (bhuvanaikaguru). Ratnakīrti took as his aim the task of presenting the rather difficult and elaborate works of Jñānaśrīmitra in a rather simple, lucid, and concise way. Besides Jñānaśrīmitra, he often had quoted passages from the works of Asamga, Maitreyanātha, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Prajñākaragupta.

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A number of nine books had been identified as being composed by Ratnakīrti. His works may be classified under three heads on the basis of their aims – (1) those having refutation of the opponent’s position as their aim. To this group belong texts like Īśwarasādhanadūṣaṇa, Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa, and Santānāntaradūṣana; (2) those aiming to establish the Buddhist views, like the Sarvajn˜ asiddhi, Kṣaṇabhangasiddhi, Apohasiddhi, and Citrādvaitaprakās´avāda; and (3) those aiming to establish the Buddhist theories by refuting the opponent’s views like Vyāptinirṇaya and Pramāṇāntarabhāva. Though the last two compositions have topics of logic and epistemology as their direct concern, his deep sense of logic is evident in each and every composition, whether it be for the purpose of refuting the opponents’ position or for establishing his own views.

Moksākaragupta After ˙the demise of Ratnakīrti, of those thinkers who tried to propagate Buddhist logico-epistemological traditions among the people, mention must be made to Mokṣākaragupta. Mokṣākaragupta belonged to the traditions of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. His magnum opus is Tarkabhāṣā which is one of the popular texts of Buddhist logic after the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. Like the text Nyāyabindu, Tarkabhāṣā also contains three chapters dealing with perception, inference for oneself, and inference for others, respectively. This text apparently looks like a summary of Dharmottara’s commentary Nyāyabindutī kā; but the novelty of Mokṣākaragupta lies in the fact that he has presented the views of later Buddhist thinkers like Ratnākaraśānti, Ratnakīrti, etc. He also had presented the objections of non-Buddhist thinkers like Trilocana and others and tried to refute their objections from Buddhist perspective. His knowledge of Buddhism in general is evident from the fact that he had presented different important theories of Buddhist philosophy like the theory of momentariness, the existence of an omniscient being, and theory of apoha in the context of his discussion on logic. The detailed account of his private life is not available. But from different available sources, it is known that his time period is eleventh century AD.

Concluding Remarks History of the development of Buddhist logic shows that Buddhist logic continued up to the eleventh century AD and came to an end along with the decline and fall of Buddhism in India. But the influence that Buddhist logic left on later Indian logic continued for long and truly speaking was much stronger than the influence of Brāhmaṇic logic. Traditionally in the Nyāya system based on the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, 16 categories were recognized while in the Buddhist logic only one category of pramāṇa was admitted. The Nyāyasūtra did not contain any reference to the invariable concomitance relation or vyāpti between the probans and the probandum as the basis of inferential cognition. Buddhist logicians, Vasubandhu,

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Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti particularly, gave much emphasis on this vyāpti relation and tried to explore its necessary character. Such discussions of inference and specifically of vyāpti left great influence on later Indian thinkers. After the decline of Buddhism, when there was revival of Brāhmaṇism, Brāhmaṇic logic became tinged by the colors of Buddhist logic and this gave birth to a new system of Brāhmaṇic thinking – the Neo-Naiyāyikas or the Navya Naiyāyikas who were engaged in the subtle analysis of vyāpti relation. Thus Buddhist logicians contributed significantly in developing a systematic formal system of logic in India.

References Anacker, S. 2002. The seven works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist psychological doctor. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Ltd. Reprint 2002. Bhattacharyya, K. 1978. The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī ), text critically ed. E.H. Johnston and A. Kuns. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Ltd, Burton, D. 2001. Emptiness appraised: A critical study of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Pvt Ltd. Chattopadhyay, M. 2002. Ratnakī rti on Apoha. Kolkata: Center of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Jadavpur University in collaboration with Maha Bodhi Book Agency. Chi, R.S.Y. 1984. Buddhist formal logic: A study of Dignāga’s Hetucakra and K’uei-cgi’s great commentary on the Nyāyapraves´a. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Pvt Ltd. Dalsukhabhai Malvania, Pt. 1955. Pt Durveka Mishra’s Dharmottarapradī pa. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayasaval Research Institute. Dreyfus, G. 1997. Recognizing reality: Dharmakī rti’s philosophy and its Tibetan interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press. Dunne, J.D. 2004. Foundations of Dharmakī rti’s philosophy. Boston: Wisdom Publication. Joshi, Lal Mani. 1977. Studies in the Buddhistic culture of India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Pvt Ltd. Kajiyama, Y. 1998. An introduction to Buddhist philosophy: An annotated translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität. Katsura, S. 2008. Nāgārjuna and the Tetralemma. In Buddhist studies: The legacy of Godjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathon A. Silk. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Pvt Ltd. Kellner, Birgit. 2007. Jn˜ ānas´rī mitra’s Anupalabdhirahasya and Sarvas´abdābhāvacarcā: A critical edition with a survey of his Anupalabdhi theory. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität. Mangala, M. 1988. Chinchore–Vādanyāya: The Nyāya-Buddhist controversy. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Pradeep, P. 1993. Gokhale–Vādanyāya of Dharmakī rti: The logic of debate. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Pradeep, P. 1997. Gokhale–Hetubindu of Dharmakī rti (A point on Probans). Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Shastri, Swami Dwarikadas, ed. 1972. Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acārya Dharmakī rti with the commentary Vipan˜ citārthā of Acārya Santarakṣita and Sambandhaparikṣā with the commentary of Acārya Prabhācandra. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Pt. and Muni Shri Jinavijayji. 1949. Hetubinduṭī kā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Mis´ra. Baroda: Baroda Oriental Institute. Thakur, Anantalal, ed. 1959. Jn˜ ānas´rī mitranibandhāvalī (Buddhist philosophical works of Jn˜ ānas´ rī mitra). Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

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Tilleman, T. 2000. Dharmakī rti’s Pramāṇavārttika; An Annotated Translation of the fourth chapter (parārthānumāna). Vol. 1. Wien: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Tola, F., and C. Dragonetti. 1995. Nāgārjuna’s refutation of logic (Nyāya). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Pvt Ltd. Tucci, G. 1930. The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga: The oldest Buddhist text on logic after Chinese and Tibetan materials. Heidelberg. Vidyabhushana, S.C. 1988. A history of Indian logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub Pvt Ltd. 1988 reprint. Westerhoff, J. 2009. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A philosophical introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Westerhoff, J. 2010. The Dispeller of Disputes: Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī . New York: Oxford University Press.

Logical Proofs in the Śivadrsti ˙ ˙˙ of Soma¯nanda

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John Nemec

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 The Syllogism of Somānanda’s Settled Opinion (siddhānta) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 When the Opponent Assumes the Nondualism for Which Somānanda Argues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 When the Opponent Must Accede to the Logic of Non-dual Śaivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Abstract

As is well known, Somānanada was a Brahmin of the Kashmir Valley who flourished circa 900–950 CE and who is the founding author of the famed Śaiva philosophical tradition known as the Pratyabhijñā or “Recognition” school. With the present chapter is pursued the somewhat modest concern of exploring various occasions when Somānanda deploys logical argumentation in his magnum opus, the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD). Three ways in which logic is deployed in the ŚD are examined in what follows. First is charted a syllogism appearing in the fourth chapter (āhnika), which is meant to prove the unity of all in the form of Śiva-asconsciousness. Following this, the present essay examines arguments Somānanda develops to illustrate how his opponents’ views can be understood to cohere logically only if they are understood implicitly to assume the existence of the ontological nondualism described by him. Finally, instances are examined in which Somānanda develops arguments with philosophical opponents, where the opponent is forced to accede to the nondualism for which he argues. Altogether, the present chapter illustrates the ways in which, for Somānanda, logical proofs offer more than mere rhetoric but are dispositive of the nature of reality itself. J. Nemec (*) Indian Religions and South Asian Studies, Department of Religious Studies, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_47

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Keywords

Somānanda · Pratyabhijñā · Dharmakīrti · Śivadṛṣṭi · Pramāṇavārttika · Nondualism Abbreviations

conj. ĪPK ĪPKVṛ ĪPV ĪPVV KSTS PV ŚD ŚDVṛ

conjecture Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies Pramāṇavārttika Śivadṛṣṭi Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti

Introduction What place does logic hold in a tradition that makes a strong claim for the unity of all of existence as a non-dual, dynamic Śiva-as-consciousness? What is the status of logic itself in the context of such an ontological and epistemological nondualism? How can logic be deployed to know the reality that the tradition claims as true and ever-present? To what uses may logic be put? Scholars have long understood that the Pratyabhijñā offered a privileged place to logical discourse from the time of Utpaladeva (Torella 1994: xx–xxi, xxx) and have shown more recently that a sophisticated hermeneutic in Utpaladeva’s and Abhinavagupta’s writings ordered the tradition’s understanding of revelation (āgama) as it stands in relation to logical argumentation (yukti), such that the latter depended on the former but in practical terms was privileged over the same on the grounds that only it could bring those who did not already have faith to understand the legitimacy of the scripturally expressed views regarding the unity and ubiquity of Śiva (Ratié 2013). Still elsewhere, a cogent argument has been made for the philosophical oeuvres of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta as prosecuting a transcendental argument for the existence of God, Śiva (Lawrence 2018). The present chapter maps a somewhat more modest concern. It seeks to explore some of the instances in which Somānanda deploys logical argumentation in his magnum opus, the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD). As is well known (Nemec Forthcoming-a; Nemec 2011: 19–24), Somānanada was a Brahmin of the Kashmir Valley who flourished circa 900–950 CE and who is the founding author of the famed Śaiva philosophical tradition known as the Pratyabhijñā or “Recognition” school, the contributions to Indian thought of which feature, in particular, the writings of Somānanda’s disciple, Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975), author of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās (ĪPK) and two auto-commentaries thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti (ĪPKVṛ) and the

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longer Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā-vivṛti or -ṭīkā, and also those of his great-grand disciple, Abhinavagupta (fl. C. 975–1025), the polymathic poet, aesthetician, tantric exegete, and philosopher who authored two sub-commentaries on Utpaladeva’s Pratyabhijñā writings, the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī (ĪPV) (commenting on the ĪPKVṛ) and the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī (ĪPVV) (commenting on the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā-vivṛti). As also is well known, the Śivadṛṣṭi was supplanted at a relatively early date by the ĪPK and, in particular, the ĪPV, which was often received as the normative expression of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. The Śivadṛṣṭi nevertheless captures our attention not only for its intrinsic value as a philosophical and theological expression of Śaiva nondualism but also because it contains the seeds of thought that were developed more thoroughly, or at least in a more broadly understood manner, in the writings of Somānanda’s disciple and great-grand-disciple. This author does not yet detect the kind of sophisticated meta-discourse around logical argumentation and scriptural revelation that, as noted above, have been identified in the writings of Utpaldeva and Abhinavagupta, though much remains to be deciphered of the contents of the Śivadṛṣṭi, a famously difficult work of seven chapters, only half for which any commentary survives. At a minimum, however, one can see Somānanda deploying logical argumentation extensively to define the nature of reality (as a non-dual Śiva-as-consciousness), so too to overturn the arguments of an array of philosophical opponents, particularly in the later chapters of his magnum opus. Simply put, logic in the Śivadṛṣṭi functions to confirm or explain the nature of reality and to determine dispositively who understands just that, and the purpose of the present essay is to chart just such uses of logic by Somānanda. Three ways in which logic is deployed in the Śivadṛṣṭi are examined in what follows. First, Somānanda makes an ontological claim that stands as a logical ground of most all his philosophical arguments, namely, that the multiplicity of phenomena appearing in quotidian experience – in and as the world as it is regularly cognized and understood – itself furnishes evidence for the existence of an underlying unity, the oneness of all existence in the form of Śiva-as-consciousness. This syllogistic argument is examined in section “The Syllogism of Somānanda’s Settled Opinion (siddhānta),” below. Following this are charted two distinguishable if related modes in which Somānanda deploys logical argumentation, both of which serve to reinforce the fundamental and comprehensive ontological claim of the work by challenging the philosophical positions of opposing schools of thought. First, the present essay examines arguments he develops that illustrate how his opponents’ views can be understood to cohere logically only if they are understood implicitly to presume the existence of the ontological nondualism described by him. Each suggests an opponent whose views can only be made sense of logically on the basis of the existence of a Śaiva non-dual ontology, with the opponent’s reliance thereon being enacted implicitly and unwittingly. These have been reviewed at length by the present author in a forthcoming book manuscript (Nemec Forthcoming-b) and will be mentioned only in brief here in section “When the Opponent Assumes the Nondualism for Which Somānanda Argues,” below.

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Second, Somānanda can be seen to force his opponents to accede to his view of reality in the course of explaining their own positions. In these instances, Somānanda hypothesizes that his pūrvapakṣin opponents might try to rescue their positions in one way or another; yet, while the logic his opponents deploy in doing so may be deemed to be sound, the positions taken force these opponents effectively to adopt Somānanda’s own Śaiva position. That is, logic dictates that the opponent’s view can be rescued only by way of adopting the Śaiva position. A review of these arguments will offer some detail to Somānanda’s self-understanding of his own nondualism and are charted in section “When the Opponent Must Accede to the Logic of Non-dual Śaivism,” below. Of particular note in this latter group is a heretofore underexamined passage of the sixth chapter of the Śivdṛṣṭi, which challenges the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 600–660) on his understanding of cognitions as utterly discrete and momentary phenomena, this by pointing to intrinsic logical contradictions and impossibilities attendant on maintaining that very momentariness of cognitions in the course of explaining cognitive errors whether incidental, as a false cognition of what is not present, or more fundamental, in particular what Somānanda’s Buddhist opponent claims to be a false understanding of the subjective-objective dimensions of cognition as real. Appearing in the part of the ŚD for which no premodern commentary is known to survive, this is a passage worthy of the reader’s considered reflection, this in particular given the central place Utpaladeva gave to a critique of the Buddhist epistemologists in his massively influential articulation of Pratyabhijñā. More simply put, the exemplar in question offers one further piece of new evidence for the as-yet little-understood contributions of the ŚD to the Pratyabhijñā tradition of philosophical debate with the Buddhist epistemological school, a tradition of debate that flourished following the production of the ŚD and in modes that supplanted Somānanda’s text with such overwhelming success.

The Syllogism of Soma¯nanda’s Settled Opinion (siddha¯nta) The settled opinion (siddhānta) for which Somānanda advocates is fundamentally an ontological one. And his proposition, that all things in the universe are in their very nature identical with the one and unitary Śiva, who exists in the form of consciousness, is presented in the fourth āhnika of the Śivadṛṣṭi on the order of a formal syllogism that is structured as follows: 1. All phenomena in the world are possessed of Śiva-nature (ŚD 4.1ab), 2. Because all phenomena in the world are possessed of causal efficacy (ŚD 4.1c-d). 3. Whatever has causally efficacy exists as a power or capacity that is controlled by an agent – what is Śiva-nature. This is so in the manner that a king directs those who serve him, for example, or the god of the dualist Śaivas deploys the power of illusion (māyā) and karmic equanimity respectively to create the world and to grace some among those dwelling within it with liberation (ŚD 4.4).

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4. Since all phenomena in the world are, indeed, possessed of causal efficacy, what is the mark of Śiva-nature (this inasmuch as the phenomena are identified ontologically with Śiva by virtue of being his very powers or śaktis) (ŚD 4.5), 5. Therefore, all phenomena in the world are powers or capacities of one who controls them – Śiva – , which is to say they are possessed of Śiva-nature (ŚD 4.6-7ab). The present author has translated and explained these passages of the heretofore understudied fourth āhnika of the ŚD in a forthcoming book (Nemec Forthcoming-b). It is evident the verses in question furnish all the five components of a classical, formal syllogism as defined at Nyāyasūtra 1.1.32 (pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ), though they are nowhere identified as such either in Somānanda’s source-text (mūla) or Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon, the Sivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ). Thus, (1) the thesis (pratijñā) is that all the many things apparent in the universe are ontologically unitary, one. (2) The reason (hetu) is that all are capable of producing results or effects in the world, which (3) requires an agent who directs or controls those causes, as is exemplified (the udāharaṇa) by a king whose subordinates act on his direction, or the like. And (4) inasmuch as all things in the world are causally efficacious (this being the “application” or upanaya), (5) one may conclude (nigamana) they are causally efficacious entities controlled by the one possessing them as powers, that is, by Śiva himself. Somānanda warrants this syllogism at ŚD 4.1d-3, this on the claim that the very existence of multiple capable entities in the world demands the existence of an organizing agent who commands and controls them, lest all things be themselves utterly independent. Action on Somānanda’s view, and contra his Buddhist interlocutors, is of necessity predicated on agentive intention, for, if each capable entity that may be witnessed to exist in quotidian life is to be kept to a discrete and designated sphere – to a circumscribed scope of action (lest everything be capable of doing anything) – then it follows that only the existence of a single, overarching and fully independent controller may guarantee their mutual relations, including not only that the range of their respective capacities is properly circumscribed but also that they may be mutually coordinated and set in motion. This, Somānanda argues, is to say that the very multiplicity of capable entities can only be understood to exist when said entities are set in and partake of a unitary, organized structural matrix, such that superior capacities bind or restrain subordinate ones, all in a single and controlled hierarchy. Without an underlying unity, the existence of multiple capacities – multiple capable entities – would engender chaos unseen in quotidian experience. The evident multiplicity of the world is evidence for unity, he thus claims, for there could be no other manner logically to understand a plural number of powers or capacities to function in a coordinated manner. Underscoring the realism of this position is the fact that Somānanda’s logical claim is not merely that multiplicity can only exist by way of unity but also that the very evidence for unity is the readily apparent multiplicity in the universe, which one experiences – knows – habitually in quotidian experience! For the fact that everything that is knowable performs some action and effects some result – at the very

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least, anything knowable in consciousness is capable of making itself thus known – suggests not only that all that can be experienced is real, but that all phenomena require a place in the aforementioned structural hierarchy and must be associated with a single agent who orders and controls them. Logic, he claims, proves that the multiplicity known ostensively is the very evidence of the ontological nondualism of all as Śiva, so too epistemological nondualism inasmuch as Śiva is a non-dual consciousness.

When the Opponent Assumes the Nondualism for Which Soma¯nanda Argues This, what is a theological claim made by way of this logical claim, is in fact grounds for a prolonged thread of arguments prosecuted in the fourth chapter of the ŚD, where the positions of the Buddhist Epistemologists, the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṅkhya, and the realist Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools are interrogated in the course of reinforcing the terms of the syllogism identified above. As the arguments against Somānanda’s various philosophical interlocutors from the fourth āhnika of the ŚD have been examined in detail by the present author (Nemec Forthcoming-b), it is hoped that it will suffice here briefly to allude to these arguments, as follows. First, the logic of Somānanda’s siddhānta implicitly and explicitly challenges the claim of his Buddhist Vijñānavādin opponents that causality could function in an impersonal manner and by being grounded in an ontology recognizing a multiplicity of phenomena only related by causally contingent events. Indeed, the entire core ontology of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV) is challenged in that Somānanda rejects the notion, expressed (in the course of explaining the unreality of universals) at PV (pratyakṣapariccheda) 3.44 (vastumātrānubandhitvād vināśasya na nityatā | asaṃbandhaś ca jātīnām akāryatvād arūpatā ||), that everything that is real necessarily ceases to exist. Instead, Somānanda argues not only as noted above, claiming that disparate appearances, disparate capable phenomena, could not be coordinated and could not interact in the absence of the existence of an organizing matrix, directed by an agent who possesses and directs and orders capable phenomena as capacities, but he also argues that everything is always and ever existent, if not always perceptible (for reasons explained in detail in the course of Somānanda challenging a Sāṅkhya articulation of the satkāryavāda). Somānanda argues, in a word, that none of the philosophical positions of the Buddhists addressed by him is logically supportable unless a permanent, if dynamic, unity – the one mapped in the syllogism found at the beginning of the āhnika, a unity embodied in the person of an ever-existent, powerwielding god, Śiva – is implicitly assumed to exist. In the fourth āhnika of the ŚD, the Mīmāṃsā presents as an apparent ally. As noted by the present author (Nemec 2019; Nemec Forthcoming-b), Somānanda seems to accede to his Mīmāṃsaka counterparts’ understanding of the nature of the relation of word (śabda) to thing denoted thereby (artha) – namely, that the relation or saṃbandha thereof is real and natural, not fabricated – but he does so only

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on the understanding that the same view implicitly assumes the existence of a unifying and unitary ontological reality of Śiva-as-consciousness to explain the same. (This, however, is evidently presented as a confirmation and not a criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor.) Indeed, Somānanda argues that certain plainly observable capacities of language demand the existence of all as Śiva, as follows. First, one can see language used effectively to refer to unseen or unreal entities, the latter instance of which is particularly problematic if one understands the saṃbandha of word and object to be real, the logical implication being that unreal objects denoted by speech would themselves have to be real in order to partake (as relata or saṃbandhins) in their very relations with the words that denote them. A unity of all existence is therefore required to allow for such a possibility, reality and unreality being comprehensible, one may implicitly understand Somānanda to argue, only on the terms outlined above: a connection of a word to an “unreal” entity poses no problem when all of existence is understood to be the unitary and dynamic Śaiva in the form of consciousness, the existence of an illusion, error, or unreal object being explicable inasmuch as it appears in consciousness as a form or object thereof. Second, Somānanda similarly suggests that the same eternally existent relation could not be countenanced in instances where novel associations of word and meaning are fashioned, as when naming a newborn child or applying the word “cow” to a newborn calf, for example. It is the ontological unity of such names and objects, Somānanda argues, that necessarily serves to guarantee the Mīmāṃsaka understanding of language as regards denotation in such instances. Even linguistic multiplicity is sensible only under the condition of an epistemo-ontological nondualism of Śiva as consciousness. A detailed account of the satkāryavāda in ŚD 4, in turn, serves to support the thesis (pratijñā) of the syllogism that opens that āhnika by offering another reason (hetu) for the same. It defines the very manner in which a causal process, a procedure for the manifestation of apparently multiple entities in the universe, can be accounted for in the context of an ontological nondualism. The Sāṅkhya causal theory, even if it, like the Śaiva one, may properly be labeled a satkārya doctrine, fails to account for the appearance of the world as it is experienced in quotidian life, as a world where entities appear as if “manifested” and “destroyed” and cannot always be seen to be present. Causality must be grounded as much in explaining the non-manifestation of entities as in explaining how the multiple entities of the universe may be produced, what is that for which, Somānanda and Utpaladeva argue, only a theory of all as Śiva-as-consciousness can account. Non-manifestation must be accounted for, that is, for otherwise the doctrine that the effect is existent prior to the application of what causes it to be manifested, the satkāryavāda (so understood), could not stand, for everything would ever and always be perceptible, and everyday experience proves so much is not the case. More specifically, and as has been established in previous scholarship (Nemec 2012), what can account for any manifestation of duality is in fact constituted by an absence, a non-cognition of the ever-present non-duality (abhedākhyāti). Thus Somānanda says the following (ŚD 4.56 cd-57ab) in replying to an opponent’s objection, which suggests that Śiva-nature cannot be ubiquitous, because if he exists in the form of the effect he is destroyed when the effect is destroyed, and if Śiva is not present in the effect, then he is not ubiquitously present:

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J. Nemec naivaṃ yato hi bhāvānāṃ vināśe ’smāsu neṣṭatā || 4.56 || aṃśābhivyaktitā nāśo na nāśaḥ sarvalopitā | [Somānanda’s Reply:] This is not so, since we do not maintain that the entities are destroyed [at all]. For destruction is [nothing more than] the fact that a [different] part [of Śiva-nature] is manifested; it is not the case that destruction is a complete elision [of the “destroyed” entity in question].

Utpaladeva’s ŚDVṛ explains the matter in part as follows: asmaddarśane hi mauleḥ kaṭakotpādakāle ’ṃśasya hemamātrasyābhivyaktiḥ prāktanasya maulipariṇāmakṣaṇasyeti nāśa ucyate na tu sarvāṃśādarśanam. For in our philosophy, at the moment when the bracelet [made of gold] is produced from the [golden] diadem, there occurs a manifestation of a part [that is the bracelet] that is nothing but gold; it is the manifestation of the preceding moment, that of the transformation of the diadem [into the bracelet], that is spoken of as destruction, but it is not the case that every part [of the gold] ceases to appear.

In sum, only a unity of all as Śiva, with the possibility of the absence of a cognition of the same, can explain the appearance and disappearance, the alternating cognizability and non-cognizability, of objects that exist prior to their being produced as effects. Finally, Somānanda clearly indicates that he opposes the dualism of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophical formulations precisely because they cannot account for the manner in which individual entities may logically be understood to stand in mutual relation. For indeed – and as argued above –, he understands the appearance of duality in precisely the inverse manner as does his realist interlocutor: apparent duality, on his understanding, proves unity. Unity, in turn, is presupposed but may be subjected to a sort of (metaphorical) dissection by way of a witnessing of one or another of its aspects or parts (aṃśas). Reality is not built up from discrete entities into complex wholes, but rather the opposite: it is a single unity that comes to be known in real and discrete parts. Indeed, only by presupposing unity can any mereological analysis cohere logically. In a word, Somānanda prosecutes a thorough critique of his dualist, realist interlocutors in an effort to support the warrant that justifies the core argument of the fourth āhnika, leading him logically to claim, as he does, that the appearance of multiplicity in fact serves to establish the very existence of the one, unitary Śiva.

When the Opponent Must Accede to the Logic of Non-dual Śaivism Let us turn our attention now to three occasions when Somānanda finds his opponents inadvertently acceding to the logic of his own nondualism. In each, Somānanda hypothesizes that a demand for logical coherence in the given

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opponent’s position requires that same opponent to accept his own formulation of Śaiva nondualism. First, at ŚD 2.57ab, Somānanda says the following: kiñcit paśyati vā sūkṣmaṃ tad asmaddarśanānvayaḥ | Alternatively, she [i.e., paśyantī] sees some subtle entity, in which case you adopt our point of view.

The context of the present comment, which, as we shall see, suggests that agent and object of cognition are identical, is one in which Somānanda challenges the philosophical views of the Grammarians (the vaiyākaraṇasādhus, as he refers to them at ŚD 2.1c) – that is, in particular, Bhartṛhari. This assault famously consumes the entire second āhnika and begins at ŚD 2.2 with Somānanda summarizing his opponents’ position: ity āhus te paraṃ brahma yad anādi tathākṣayam | tad akṣaraṃ śabdarūpaṃ sā paśyantī parā hi vāk || 2.2 || They say the following. The supreme Brahman, which is beginningless and endless, imperishable, whose form is speech, is paśyantī, supreme speech.

Somānanda shares with Bhartṛhari and the Grammarians their conception of all as a non-dual consciousness, but he argues an implicit dualism is imputed in their formulation of the same: he asks how what Bhartṛhari refers to as paśyantī can be said to be the ultimate when by its very definition it involves a distinction of the seer from what is seen. Thus, ŚD 2.20cd-21ab: vartamānasamārūḍhā kriyā paśyantyudāhṛtā || 2.20 || dṛśiḥ sakarmako dhātuḥ kiṃ paśyantīti kathyatām | The verbal form “paśyantī” is in the present tense, [and] the verbal root “to see” is transitive, so, do tell, what does paśyantī see?

As Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 2.57 clarifies, Somānanda’s position is that the Grammarians can attempt to navigate a way out of the implicit dualism of the etymological meaning of paśyantī, this by suggesting that the term in fact refers to a single entity, one with agency, which is both seer and seen, and which does not “take in,” as it were, external objects of sight. But this would be to accept Somānanda’s philosophical position: yadi vā bhavadbhir nānyan nīlapītādi sthūlaṃ vibhaktasvarūpaṃ dṛśyaṃ paśyaty api tu dṛśyabhuvam anāpannaṃ draṣṭāram eva kiñcid avikalpyaṃ sūkṣmam apṛthagrūpaṃ paśyati, na ca na (na ca na conj.; na ca Nemec 2011: 334, KSTS edition, Torella 2014: 569) paśyati dṛśyārthamayadraṣṭṛrūpaiva (dṛśyārthamayadraṣṭṛrūpaiva Nemec 2011: 334; dṛśyārthamayadṛṣṭṛrūpaiva KSTS edition, dṛśyārtham adraṣṭṛrūpaiva Torella 2014: 569)

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satī prakāśate paśyantīti kathyate. tato ’smadīyadarśanānugamaḥ syāt paśyantyarthaḥ kriyākartṛkarmakālavibhāgātmā tyakto bhavet. Alternatively, you might argue that she [i.e., paśyantī] does not see a distinct, coarse visible object whose nature is differentiated [from her], what is blue, yellow, or the like, but she instead sees a certain inconceivable, subtle entity not different in form [from her], what has not acquired the nature of a [distinct] visible object, [but] is nothing but the seer (this interpretation of dṛśyabhuvam anāpannaṃ follows that of Torella 2014: 569); and [yet] it is not the case that she does not see, she being (i.e., inasmuch as she is) what appears as the very form of an agent of seeing who consists in the visible objects [that are cognized], [and thus] is called “seeing” (Torella 2014: 569 here offers a somewhat cavalier emendation based entirely in semantics, though it renders the Sanskrit syntactically awkward and semantically insufficiently precise). [Reply:] For that reason, you must accept our point of view. You [therefore] must abandon the [literal] meaning of [the word] paśyantī, which refers to the separation of action, agent, object, and time.

Paśyantī, “seeing,” must be explained to its literal meaning, but logic dictates that even to attempt coherently to do so requires the adaptation of an understanding of the nature of awareness that not only contradicts the implicitly dualistic semantics in play but also amounts to the adoption in full of Somānanda’s Śaiva ontology, which alone can account for any cognitive awareness so subtle as to be utterly non-dual in nature. Elsewhere – this is the second instance in which an opponent is forced to accede to the logic of Somānanda’s nondualism – , the apparent duality of the everyday world is shown not to be explicable by other non-dualistic traditions. The logic is straightforward: it is either the case that multiplicity must be explained away so as to allow only for the existence of a single unitary being, in which case the apparent multiplicity found in quotidian experience is an illusion or an error, what must be distinguished from the one, divine being and thus effects a duality that differentiates what is real from unreal; or, multiplicity is preserved, but its very existence destroys any ontological nondualism for its very multiplicity – unless, that is, one accedes to Somānanda’s explanation of the real existence of the many that is witnessed in the world of quotidian experience as one. The opponents addressed in the relevant section of the ŚD are adherents of the Pañcarātra and Vedāntins, who maintain a host of mutually distinguishable views too numerous to detail in the present essay but which have been examined already by Dyczkowski (1987: 232, fn. 96) and the existence of which were first noted, in particular for a certain prevalence of illusionism in the Vedāntic positions, by Sanderson (1985: 210, fn. 41). It is a Vedāntin opponent who is criticized in the passage to be reviewed here below. Context for the passage we wish to highlight is offered in the opening verses of the ŚD’s sixth āhnika, as follows: atha śakteḥ śaktimato na bhedo dravyakarmavat | sthāpito dravyato bhinnā kriyā no na ca nāsti sā || 6.1 || evaṃ tathā śaktimataḥ śaktasya samavasthitā | jagadvicitratā śaive na punar darśanāntare || 6.2 ||

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Now, no [ontological] distinction is established [in our view] between the power and the possessor of the power just as [we make no such distinction] between substance and action. Action simply is not (na u) differentiated from substance, nor is it the case that it [i.e., action] does not exist. And it is in this way that it is in Śaivism [alone] and not in any other philosophical system that the variegated nature of the universe is firmly established for [none other than] the empowered possessor of power.

In brief, the present passage, for which neither Utpaladeva’s nor Abhinavagupta’s commentary survives (the latter being lost altogether, excepting for the brief quotation thereof in Abhinavagupta’s Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa), suggests that the ontological distinction between substance and action noted in other traditions, such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, is erroneous. It also states that the variegated nature of the world of multiple entities is real and can only be explained by Somānanda’s brand of Śaivism, variegation belonging to, being the nature of, the empowered possessor of powers, Śiva himself. To be is to do, and vice versa, this per Śaiva nondualism and no other philosophical school, and the one who exists and acts is the empowered Śiva and no other, who is, as a result, the universe itself. It is immediately following this passage that the somewhat extensive arguments against the Vedānta, and the Pañcarātra, are offered. ŚD 6.3 suggests there are various views of variegation to examine, but the one here placed in question is brought to bear in the next verse. The criticism begins with Somānanda questioning how his various Vedāntin opponents could come to understand Brahman to become variegated (citra): yatra brahmocyate citraṃ kaiścid vedāntavādibhiḥ | ekasya citratā kena hetunā brahmaṇo bhavet || 6.4. || Where certain propounders of the Vedānta say that Brahman is variegated, [we must ask:] by what cause could the variegation of the unitary Brahman come into being?

The problem Somānanda identifies is in the mode in which his opponent explains how a singular Brahman could make itself multiple, or even apparently multiple; at question, therefore, is the nature of the relationship of the unitary Brahman to the myriad forms that make up the phenomenal world. Somānanda considers the possibility that the multiple entities of the universe, mutually differentiated as they are, are mutually distinguishable by their very natures. This suggests there is no cause of the production of variegation, but that it is always present, a possibility he rejects because so much would require there to be no underlying unity of phenomena: tathāvidhā vibhinnās te sarvadā nijabhāvataḥ | vibhinnā eva te naikyaṃ mṛtpiṇḍāt prāgavasthiteḥ || 6.5 || ghaṭādīnāṃ. . . [Objection:] Those sorts of entities [that make up the variegated universe] (tathāvidhāḥ) are manifold at all times by their very natures. [Somānanda’s Reply:] They are [therefore] truly

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manifold (vibhinnā eva); pots, etc., [for example,] would not be possessed of a unity derived from their [shared] previous state of being, from [their previous existence as] the ball of clay.

Here expressed, then, is a fundamental question regarding the relationship of the diverse world of phenomena to the divine agent that is said to be one. At question is the relationship of multiplicity to unity, with the integrity of the latter being challenged by the existence of the former. Somānanda suggests that it is not possible for his Vedāntin opponents to imagine an intrinsic difference in the entities in question, because there would thus be no way to find an implicit or underlying unity in them. But couldn’t they have a double nature, both unitary and manifold? This would suggest there is no need to account for the cause of multiplicity, but also that the ever-existent mutual differentiation of entities does not threaten the existence of any underlying unity. Somānanda telegraphs the matter as follows (ŚD 6.6a-b): . . .dvirūpatvaṃ na ghaṭādeḥ sadā sthiteḥ | [Opponent’s Objection:] They [i.e., the pot, etc.,] are possessed of a double nature (dvirūpatvaṃ). [Somānanda’s reply:] Not so, because the pot, etc., would continue to exist in perpetuity (sadā sthiteḥ) [as manifold entities].

The evident implication of this argument is this, that the variegated entities, the pot, etc., would perpetually exist as a pot and the like. On Somānanda’s view, it is not possible for the multiplicity to be real by dint of such diverse entities having such a dual nature, for in claiming the nature of the pot, for example, is that of the clay of which it is fashioned and a discrete entity (as a pot) leads to the eternal perdurance and not the ultimate dissolution of distinction or difference – in a word, of multiplicity. There would ultimately be no possible recourse to the unity of Brahman. If the manifold nature of the universe cannot be explained as perpetually existent, then it must be created; there must be a cause thereof. It is to the possibility that his Vedāntin opponent will attempt to account for this cause that Somānanda turns next, at ŚD 6.6c-d: nimittakalpanā kalpyā tarhy avidyā. . . [Opponent’s Objection:] There is a forming [of the manifold entities] by a cause (nimittakalpanā). [Somānanda’s Reply:] In that case, nescience (avidyā) must be imagined [by you as that cause].

With this tersely conveyed turn in the argument Somānanda anticipates his opponent will argue that a(n instrumental?) cause indeed can be conceived of for the variegation, to which he replies that it cannot but be “nescience,” avidyā, this of course being an item of prominent place in Vedāntic thought. The manifold entities that make up the universe thus are not eternally present but effected. Yet the implication of Somānanda’s reply is evidently this, that such a cause as avidyā

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inevitably leads one to understand the world of variegation to be, like its cause (i.e., avidyā), something unreal, a nescience. After all, Somānanda himself criticized his Grammarian opponents (at ŚD 2.22cd-23) on the hypothetical that they would claim paśyantī could see entities as external on the basis of an association with avidyā, part of the criticism being that it is difficult to countenance a connection of the real paśyantī with something unreal, such as avidyā. Utpaladeva’s ŚDVṛ with the following made the matter explicit, namely that avidyā by the very meaning of its name must be understood not to be real: avidyā hy avidyātvābhyupagamād evāsatyā, na cāsatyayā saṃbandho rūpaśelṣamayo yuktaḥ (“For avidyā is unreal only inasmuch as it’s nature as ‘non-knowledge’ is accepted, and it is not logically possible for there to be a connection that consists in a union of form with an unreal [avidyā].”). Here too, it appears, the conception of any manifestation by avidyā is doubted for the fact that the cause itself imputes non-existence, an illusionism or outright error. Somānanda thus hypothesizes next that his Vedāntin opponent might deny such a claim and argue instead that the variegated universe is not unreal but real, truly brought to be by its cause: . . .tadudgamāt || 6.6 || bhāvā bhaveyus tat prāptā hy asmākaṃ sarvasatyatā | [Vedāntin Opponent:] The entities may [in fact] come into being, this because it [i.e., avidyā] arises. [Somānanda’s Reply:] Therefore (tat), our own [view], the fact that everything is real, has been arrived at [by you].

In other words, if Brahman itself is understood to effect a real universe that is simultaneously one with itself, this with a power or instrument that, logically speaking, cannot be separated from itself if unity is to be preserved, then the position articulated becomes one identical to that of the Śaivas. The real manifestation of real effects that are nevertheless identical with their cause, which in turn is identified with the causal agent, all being consciousness – this is precisely the Śaiva view. But it is not that of the Vedāntins if avidyā can be at all what the term for it quite literally denotes. And yet, logic dictates they must accede to the Śaiva view of the matter if nondualism is to be preserved. Third and finally, we offer an important, heretofore little examined passage of the ŚD that presents new evidence of Somānanda’s engagement with, in particular, the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti. Somānanda opens his treatment of the views of his Buddhist opponents at ŚD 6.32cd, this by distinguishing realist from idealist traditions, and, as the following suggests, he rather understands and classes the schools in ontological terms: ye bāhyavādino bauddhās te bhedaṃ samupāśritāḥ || 6.32 || Those Buddhists who maintain the doctrine of [real] external [entities] (bāhyavādinaḥ ¼ bāhyārthavādinaḥ) resort to dualism.

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This is all Somānanda says here of the externalist Buddhists, who evidently merit no further discussion and this simply because they espouse a dualism, which of itself disqualifies them from serious consideration. Now, Caturvedi (Chaturvedi 1986: 227) suggests that Somānanda has a Vaibhāṣika opponent in mind, here, but it is also possible that a Sautrāntika opponent is addressed; for one must note that the ĪPK and its commentaries treat just such a Bāhyārthavādin with some detail. Specifically, Utpaladeva understands a Sautrāntika opponent to argue, contra the Vijñānavādin, that the latter must understand real objects to exist externally to consciousness, for it is the only logical inference to draw from the appearance of variegation in consciousness: An effect must reflect the nature of its cause, so multiplicity must present itself as a result of a multiplicity of causes. (See ĪPK and ĪPKVṛ ad 1.5.4; cf. Ratié 2011: 372.) This author regrets that there is no space here to summarize Utpaladeva’s treatment of these arguments, which is substantial. Somānanda for his part quickly moves to another ontological concern in initiating what is of present interest, a sustained critique of the Vijñānavādins, one requiring them to accede to the logic of Somānanda’s Śaiva nondualism. The critique is begun in earnest at ŚD 6.33. In invoking the name of his opponent Somānanda raises the question of the possibility of ontologically dissimilar entities or phenomena appearing in mutual relation, what is partially analogous to the impossibility, according to him, of material (mūrta) and immaterial (amūrta) entities finding ground for mutual interaction (at least in the absence of the existence of a Śaiva non-duality of all as consciousness), this as explained in the realist Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika schools (about which see Nemec Forthcoming-b): vijñānavādināṃ jñānaṃ satyaṃ pratyety asatyatām | bahiḥ kathaṃ na hy asatyaṃ satyād bhavitum arhati || 6.33 || The cognition of the Vijñānavādins, which is real, cognizes unreality (asatyatām) [that appears as if] externally [to itself]. How is this possible? For it is not the case that that which is unreal is able to come to exist as the product of that which is real.

Somānanda suggests, that is, that it is logically impossible to claim that that which is unreal can be produced by that which is real; and so, he further asks, how is it possible for this idealist school to suggest that the objects of experience can appear as external to consciousness even while they are held in fact not to be thus? As Chaturvedi in his Sanskrit commentary treats the matter (Chaturvedi 1986: 227), the Vijñānavādins – the following verses of the ŚD will clearly indicate that Somānanda here has Dharmakīrti in particular in mind, he being quoted in ŚD 6.39, as Torella 1994: xxii, fn. 28 noted, already, some time ago – suggest that nothing appears that is not apparent in, comprised of, consciousness; and, therefore, because this is all that may appear, no ontological difference between what is real and unreal may be maintained:

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tatraiva vijñānavādināṃ mate satyaṃ jñānaṃ bahiḥ ¼ bāhyaṃ jagadrūpeṇa asatyatāṃ pratyeti. satyaṃ jñānam asatyasvarūpeṇa bahirjagadākāreṇa bhāsate. Among these [Buddhist schools of thought], viz., in the thinking of the Vijñānavādins, a real cognition cognizes as external an unreality in the form of the world. [I.e.:] A real cognition appears in the form of the external world, whose nature is unreal.

Chaturvedi supports this interpretation of Somānanda’s intended argument by suggesting he here has PV (pratyakṣapariccheda) 3.335 in mind, that exceedingly well-known verse and doctrine (the sahopalambhaniyama), which Chaturvedi cites to illustrate the fact that no difference exists between an object – “blue” for example – and the consciousness thereof: darśanopādhirahitasyāgrahāt tadgrahe grahāt | darśanaṃ nīlanirbhāsaṃ nārtho bāhyo ’sti kevalam || PV 3.335 || Because there is no apprehension of that [object] which is devoid of that attribute that is perception, [and] because there is an apprehension [of the object] when that [perception] is apprehended, it is perception that has the appearance of “blue;” no external object exists that is distinct [from the perception]. (This translation is adapted from the French-language rendering of Ratié 2011: 346; cf. ibid. 347, fn. 87.)

As Chaturvedi sees it, then, Somānanda wishes to ask how a Vijñānavādin can explain the manner in which that which appears in consciousness can erroneously appear as if it were external to consciousness. So much should not be possible if what is unreal is not to be produced by what is real. Next, at ŚD 6.34ab, the Buddhist offers a retort, which is (as is Somānanda’s wont) laconically expressed: kāmināṃ katham etac ced uktā prāg asya satyatā | Objection: how is this so [i.e., how is it the case that it is impossible for something unreal to be produced by something real] for those possessed of desire[, etc.]? [Reply:] The reality of this [cognition, supposedly “erroneous,” belonging to those possessed of desire, etc.] was stated [by me], earlier.

Given that this half-verse refers to the fact that “the reality of this was stated, earlier” (uktā prāg asya satyatā), it is clear that Somānanda here makes an internal reference to an earlier part of the ŚD. And the context of this half verse demands a treatment of error, this because etat (ŚD 6.34a) must be taken to refer to “this [state of affairs, namely, that it is not the case that that which is unreal is able to come to exist as the product of that which is real (¼ ŚD 4.33c-d: na hy asatyaṃ satyād bhavitum arhati)].” For these two reasons, this author proposes that Somānanda refers to the quality of what are classed by the Buddhists as falsely-cognized entities, which can result from certain emotional states or the like. These were mentioned first at ŚD 1.45cd-46ab:

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dṛśyante ’tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ || 1.45 || tatra mithyāsvarūpaṃ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedṛśām | By his will, entities are seen here as a result of being associated with fear, etc. If you argue that they have an erroneous nature, I will establish the reality of such entities later on.

As has been known for some time (see Gnoli 1957: 22), Somānanda here refers to PV (pratyakṣapariccheda) 3.282: kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ | abhūtān api paśyanti purato avasthitān iva || (The KSTS edition, post correctionem, reads kāma- for bhīti- (ŚD 1.45d), but all the manuscripts so-far examined by the present author carry the latter reading, which therefore is preserved.) Utpaladeva’s ŚDVṛ adds some context to this statement in a passage that evinces no variant readings in any of the manuscripts examined thus far by the present author. It is recorded as follows: kāmaśokabhayādiyogāc ca te te bhāvāḥ puraḥ sphuranto dṛśyante. tatra bhagavadiccaiva kāraṇaṃ tāvaty aṃśe bhāvanāvaśād īśvaratāveśāt. na ca tatra caurādayo mithyārūpā bhānti yato ’gre satyatvam īdṛśānām avaśyaṃ sthāpanīyam. Moreover, by association with desire, sorrow, fear, etc., various entities are seen appearing in plain sight. It is the Lord’s will alone that is the cause of these, because the force of the [mental] cultivation [one has] toward such an entity results from [the individual] being penetrated by a state of being Īśvara; nor do they, i.e., the thieves and so on, appear in an erroneous form, as the reality of such [entities] will be definitively proven later on.

Thus, the present author concludes that the kāmins mentioned at ŚD 6.34a are those who are taken by desire, experience the apparitions of thieves, are afraid, and the like. (Of course, the survival of the ŚDVṛ on this passage would likely have aided in our interpretation of the same.) Somānanda therefore may be understood here to argue that the Buddhist cannot escape the problem to hand – that of the impossibility of something unreal being produced by what is real – by claiming that everyone, whether Śaiva or Buddhist, understands unreal appearances to come into one’s consciousness: the Śaivas have proven, so far as Somānanda is concerned, that everything is real qua the fact of appearing in/as consciousness; no unreality (i.e., an illusion or true error of cognition) is produced by what is real (i.e., by consciousness itself). (The argument for this position, moreover, is detailed in the fourth āhnika of the ŚD and examined in detail in Nemec Forthcoming-b.) What comes next is somewhat laconic (again) and admittedly somewhat mercurial in its meaning. At stake in ŚD 6.34cd-35 is a discussion of the nature of the agent and instrument of cognition. Let us read these lines of text first and following this interpret them in light of what precedes them. jñānasya karaṇatvena kartrapekṣā prasajyate || 6.34 || kartṛtve jñaptimātratve ākāṅkṣā karaṇe bhavet | dvirūpatve viruddhatvasakramatvaṃ pravartate || 6.35 ||

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[Somānanda: If your view of erroneous cognitions were correct, then:] What is occasioned (prasajyate) is that the cognition [of something held to be unreal] is in need of an agent [of cognition who deploys it, the kāmin, e.g.] as the instrument [of seeing the unreal cognition]. When the agency [as cognizer] exists as the very nature of the simple cognition, there arises a need for an instrument [by which the cognition sees “erroneously” and not accurately]. If [you argue that] there is a dual nature [to the cognition or jñāna, as both agent and instrument of knowing], [then] the result is that it is [self-]contradictory or is sequential in nature [and therefore not momentary].

This argument depends on the understanding that the cognition or jñāna, in the Buddhists’ view, is momentary and singular in nature. A problem arises in defining the nature of the source of the error in question. There must be both a cognition and something “added” that allows for the erroneousness to be introduced. The agent of knowing presents as the source of just this, given the nature of the source of cognitive error identified in PV 3.282, namely, the emotional states of the cognizers themselves. Consider, for example, what Manorathanandin’s commentary says about PV 3.282: bhāvanābhavaṃ kathaṃ spaṣṭam ity āha – kāmaś ca śokaś ca bhayaṃ ca tair unmādāś caurasvapnādayaś ceti kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādibhir upaplutā bhrāntās te ’bhūtān apy arthān bhāvanāvaśāt purato ’vasthitān iva paśyanti, yasmāt tadanurūpāṃ pravṛttiṃ ceṣṭante. Regarding the question as to how the coming into existence of a [mental] cultivation (bhāvanā) is perceived, he says: Those who are mad with these, viz., desire and sorrow and fear, as well as those whose dreams are of thieves, etc. – it is those who are afflicted with [such] desire, sorrow, fear, madness, and dreams of thieves, etc., are [thus] perplexed, who see objects appearing as if in front of them even though they do not exist, this due to the force of [their] [mental] cultivation. Because of this, they perform the behavior that is befitting of as much.

Thus, the present author understands Somānanda to argue that the erroneous cognition is dependent on an agent of cognition to see erroneously at all, possibly meaning that Somānanda argues that on this view the cognition is corrupted by an agent who is in some sense distinguishable from it (what would not accord with the Buddhist’s own understanding of the nature of cognition). On the other hand, if the Buddhist understands the cognition itself to cognize what is on their view in fact an error, then they lack an explanation for what instrument triggers the error in cognition, for after all a cognition could see correctly and not perceive what is in fact not present, but it is the “excess” of the erroneous cognition that must be explained. Something must lead the error to be cognized. Finally, if the Buddhist opponent claims that in fact the cognition or jñāna functions as both kartṛ and karaṇa – if the cognition plays the role of both the agent of the action that is cognition and the instrument of the same such that it cognizes erroneously – then one of two faults would arise. Either the jñāna would be possessed of mutually contradictory natures – seeing what is in fact present and what fear or the like causes it erroneously to see, therefore being both real and unreal; or

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the same cognition, being both agent and instrument (cognizing in distinct ways, one correctly, one erroneously), would have to exist in more than a single moment of time, viz., sequentially as one and then the other of the two modes of the act of cognition. It is impossible, by the argument of viruddhadharmasamāveśa – the impossibility of contradictory properties belonging to the same object (note that Somānanda examines Dharmakīrti’s own reference to a form of contradiction that is the co-presence of mutually contradictory forms, such as existence and nonexistence, about which see Nemec 2012: 231, fn. 17; Nemec Forthcoming-b) – , for the cognition simultaneously to be both the instrument of seeing and the agent of that act in question, the latter producing what is in fact unreal, the former what is real. On the other hand, Somānanda’s Buddhist opponent cannot understand the jñāna to be possessed of a dvirūpatva by virtue of changing over time, for this involves the jñāna perduring beyond its mere (supposed) momentariness: sakramatva necessarily contradicts momentariness (kṣaṇikatva). So much, then, brings us to the moment when Somānanda compels his opponent to acquiesce to his own philosophical position. ŚD 6.36ab reads as follows: akramatve ’smanmatatvaṃ tadaikyaṃ pariniṣṭhayā | If it [i.e., the jñāna] is not possessed of a sequence (akramatve) [and yet is held simultaneously to be both the kartṛ and karaṇa], you have adopted our view of it (asmanmatatvam): its unity [i.e, that of the cognition] (tadaikyam) [N.B.: It is possible that tadaikya is not a compound but a post-sandhi conjunction of tadā and aikya.] would exist fundamentally (pariniṣṭhayā) [in your view, if you accept as much].

If the opponent understands a consciousness to exist that is both agent and object of cognition simultaneously, and also is such without any sequence existing in its nature, then they accept the Śaiva view. A jñāna understood as such – as that which is sequence-less, simultaneously both agent and object – would be fundamentally one – precisely that for which Somānanda argues. And for Somānanda, such an entity is and must be not simply one, but also utterly real. It is, in fact, all that exists. And it exits in perpetuity, not as a momentary instant of consciousness/cognition. Evidently with this in mind, Somānanda goes on immediately to challenge the momentariness doctrine of his Buddhist opponent: na cāpi kṣaṇabhaṅgitve yuktā vaināśikī sthitiḥ || 6.36 || And it also is not the case that, when it [i.e., the cognition] perishes in an instant (kṣaṇabhaṅgitve), a state that is its perishing is logically tenable [for it].

Chaturvedi suggests that the destruction of what is utterly momentary presents a contradiction in terms, for the jñāna would in a single moment both exist and not exist: to be destroyed, it must be “present” as it were, at its own demise, which must not occur in the moment when it acts as karaṇa and/or kartṛ, and the two states (as agent and/or instrument of action; as the entity that is destroyed) are mutually contradictory in nature. Chaturvedi’s Sanskrit commentary (1986: 228)

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says the following: kṣaṇabhaṅgitve ¼ jñānasya kṣaṇikatve vaināśikī ¼ naśvarā sthitiḥ na yuktā ¼ asaṅgatā naśvaratvaṃ sattvaṃ ca sahaiva varttetām iti sarvathā asaṅgatam ity arthaḥ. The jñāna cannot be truly momentary, as the Vijñānavādin would have it; it cannot be both that which perishes and that which functions in the act of cognition in a single moment, for then existence and destruction would co-exist. Again, the law of self-contradiction proscribes the Buddhist position. Following this, Somānanda challenges the very complexity in the cognition, as it involves both a subjective or apperceptive and an objective or perceptive moment. Specifically, he suggests that both cannot occur in a truly momentary jñāna simultaneously: ahaṃ vedmi sa māṃ vetti na kartṛkaraṇāditā | jñānasyaikakṣaṇe yuktā taddvitvena kṣaṇakṣayaḥ || 6.37 || “I see”; “he sees me” – to be the agent, the instrument, etc., in [only] a single instant is [a state (sthitiḥ, by anuvṛtti from ŚD 6.36d) that is] not logically possible (yuktā) for the [momentary] cognition. [And:] There is a destruction of the moment [i.e., the fact that the cognition exists in a single moment] (kṣaṇakṣaya ¼ kṣaṇikatvakṣaya, though Chaturvedi (1986, 229) plausibly suggests kṣaṇakṣaya should be understood to mean kṣaṇabhaṅgavādakṣaya) as a result of it [i.e., the cognition] being two-fold.

Here, the general concern, at least, is evident enough: it is not possible for a single, truly momentary jñāna to function in a single moment as more than one of the factors of action or kārakas. The specifics of Somānanda’s objection, moreover, are spelled out in what immediately follows: vibhāgakālagrahaṇakālayor bhinnakālatā | vinaṣṭatvāt phalaṃ kasya kramāt karmaphale yataḥ || 6.38 || A temporal distinction [necessarily] exists [for the cognition] when there is a moment of the separation [of subjective and objective dimensions of the cognition] and a [subsequent] moment of the apprehension [of the contents of a cognition with such subjective and objective dimensions]. Because of the fact that it [i.e., the cognition] is destroyed [immediately after coming into being, this because, according to you, it is momentary in nature], [we ask:] to whom (kasya) does the result [of the cognition] (phalam) belong, since the action [of cognition] and the result [of the act of cognition] (karmaphale) exist sequentially (kramāt)?

The argument is this, that the single jñāna cannot be real and come erroneously to be seen as consisting of the agentive and objective dimensions of awareness in one and the same moment of time. So much can only occur in a sequence, otherwise the cognition would be real and unreal in a single moment of time. It cannot be innately complex, subjective and objective, etc., in nature, since these are understood to be seen in error, according to the Buddhists, and that which is real cannot be innately unreal. Again, all this requires a sequential nature if it is to exist as described, and that sequential nature cannot be admitted to by the Buddhists if the single cognition is to be momentary in nature; thus, it is not possible to explain the effect of the

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cognition, which must cross those moments of existence to produce subject-object distinctions as only apparent but ultimately unreal. Now, the matter Somānanda brings to question is addressed at Pramāṇavārttika (pratyakṣapariccheda) 3.354: avibhāgo ’pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ | grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate || 3.354 || Although undivided, the nature of cognition is perceived as if it were possessed of the divisions of object of cognition (grāhya), agent of cognition (grāhaka), and the consciousness [itself] (saṃvitti) by those whose perception is distorted.

Dignāga himself already articulated the idea that the pramāṇa and its phala were in fact really one, singular, for example at verse 10 of the pratyakṣapariccheda of the Pramāṇasamuccaya: yad ābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇaphalate punaḥ | grāhakākārasaṃvittyos trayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthak kṛtam || 10 || The appearance is the object of cognition, while the natures of the means of cognition and the result are present [respectively] in the form of the apprehending subject and the consciousness [itself]; hence, the three are not in fact [truly] distinct. (The present translation is based on the rendering of Ratié 2011: 43–44, fn. 17.)

Now, that Somānanda has PV (pratyakṣapariccheda) 3.354 here in mind is made explicit in ŚD 6.39, where he cites that verse, as follows: bhedavān iti lakṣyatve dṛṣṭānto ’sti na tādṛśaḥ | grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate || 6.39 || (grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavān conj.; grāhyagrāhakasaṃvitter bhedavān KSTS edition) If [you argue that] it [i.e., the nature of the cognition] is [merely] perceived as something that is divided (bhedavān iti lakṣyatve) – [for you say:] “it [i.e., the nature of that cognition] appears as if possessed of the divisions of object of cognition (grāhya), agent of cognition (grāhaka), and the consciousness [itself] (saṃvitti)” – , [we reply:] no example of such a thing exists.

According to the Hindi-language translation of Chaturvedi 1986: 229, the idea here expressed is this, that nowhere in consciousness do the grāhya and the grāhaka not appear as distinct: nowhere do they appear only as if separate, because they always simply present themselves as mutually distinct entities. The problem, moreover, must also involve the difficulty of explaining how in a single moment a cognition that is real, on the one hand, can be false, on the other, the latter for presenting in the form of what is not, in fact, present. But what the present author initially found puzzling, here, was Somānanda’s reply to the objection he attributes

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to his Buddhist interlocutor, namely, the notion that this claim knows of no exemplar analogous to it. What, precisely, did Somānanda here have in mind? The answer is found by simply reading the immediately following verses of the Pramāṇavārttika. Indeed, it is evident Somānanda wrote this section of the ŚD (and various other parts of it) with the pratyakṣapariccheda of the PV in front of him or front of mind, for the verses following seek precisely to furnish examples of the type of misperception identified. PV 3.355–357 say the following: mantrādyupaplutākṣāṇāṃ yathā mṛcchakalādayaḥ | anyathaivāvabhāsante tadrūparahitā api || 3.355 || tathaiva darśanāt teṣām anupaplutacakṣuṣā | dūre yathā vā maruṣu mahān alpo ’pi dṛśyate || 3.356 || yathānudarśanaṃ ceyaṃ meyamānaphalasthitiḥ | kriyate ’vidyamānāpi grāhyagrāhakasaṃvidām || 3.357 || For example, for those whose eyes are afflicted by mantras, etc., clay shards and the like appear absolutely erroneously [i.e., as something other than they are], even though they are devoid of that [erroneous] form [in which they appear], this inasmuch as they are [simultaneously] seen exactly as they are (tathaiva) by the unafflicted eye; or to offer another example (yathā vā), something although it is small appears to be large at a distance in the desert; and [in a similar manner] this condition (-sthitiḥ) as the object known, the means of knowing it, and the result is produced of the object of awareness, the agent of awareness, and the consciousness in accordance with how they are witnessed (yathānudarśanam), even though it [i.e., the condition or sthiti in question] does not exist.

Clearly Somānanda does not accept these examples as sufficient to explain the erroneous perceptual phenomenon in question, what thus brings us back to Chaturvedi’s interpretation of ŚD 6.39, though this author must admit that Somānanda’s precise logic here remains somewhat elusive to him.

Conclusion The treatment of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy continues past this point of ŚD, āhnika 6, though this author’s present analysis must end here, highlighting as it does the place where Somānanda suggests that acceding to his own Śaiva non-dualistic position could rescue a logical coherence for his opponent’s doctrine. Many other examples of what is offered in the present essay could be adduced, as well, from reading across the ŚD the various places where Somānanda engages philosophical interlocutors of various doctrinal identities, probing and debating their particular conceptions of the nature of reality by way of arguing the logical coherence of the same. Though it prosecutes a somewhat modest ambition, what the present survey of such arguments makes clear, it is hoped, is the fact that, for Somānanda as for virtually all philosophers, logical coherence is not only a sine qua non for any dispositive statement regarding the nature of reality, but – more than this – logical

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coherence itself can and does correspond with the nature of reality, such that reasoned argument can display, explain – prove – the very same. While the present author, to date, has not yet identified any place within the ŚD that offers a meta-explanation for this fact – an argument for the reasons one may be assured that argumentation, properly executed, is dispositive of reality – it is a simple fact that Somānanda evidently presumes as much to be the case. Logic can prove and does prove, on his view, that only the acceptance of the existence of a real, dynamic, and utterly singular Śiva-as-consciousness, a total nondualism, can possibly be real. Only such an ontological reality allows one logically to account for the existence and awareness of the multiple universe known in quotidian experience, just as the same (ontological and epistemological) nondualism alone can account for any capacity to speak and convey knowledge about the same. That reality is thus, for Somānanda, is evident in experience if properly observed and realized; but so too is it known and knowable by way of reasoned argument: the intellectual arguments of Somānanda’s philosophical proofs reveal reality accurately, because reality cannot be thus unless it accords with logic proofs for the same. Philosophy and reality, discourse and what is described thereby, mutually correspond, and what Somānanda’s logical proofs establish is no mere theory, but they are dispositive of the very fact that all one has ever seen is and has been the one dynamic, unitary Śiva-as-consciousness.

Bibliography Chaturvedi, Radheshyam, Trans. 1986. The Śivadṛṣṭi of Śri Somānanda Nātha. Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Saṅsthan. (Hindi with Sanskrit commentary). Dyczkowski, Mark. 1987. The doctrine of vibration: An analysis of the doctrines and practices of Kashmiri Shaivism. Albany/New York: SUNY Press. Gnoli, Raniero. 1957. Śivadṛṣṭi by Somānanda: Translation and commentary, chapter I. East and West 8: 16–22. Lawrence, David. 2018. “Pratyabhijñā Inference as a Transcendental Argument about a Nondual, Plenary God.” In Handbook of logic in Indian thought, edited by S. Sarukkai. https://doi.org/10. 1007/978-81-322-1812-8_29-1. Nemec, John. 2011. The ubiquitous Śiva: Somānanda’s Śivadṛṣṭi and his tantric interlocutors. New York: Oxford University Press. Nemec, John. 2012. The two Pratyabhijñā theories of error. Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (2): 225–257. Nemec, John. 2019. Somānanda on the meaningfulness of language. Indo-Iranian Journal 62 (3): 227–268. Nemec, John. Forthcoming-a. Somānanda. In The encyclopedia of philosophy of religion, ed. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro. Oxford: Blackwell Press. Nemec, John. Forthcoming-b. The ubiquitous Śiva Volume II: Somānanda’s Śivadṛṣṭi and his philosophical interlocutors. New York: Oxford University Press. Ratié, Isabelle. 2011. Le Soi et l’Autre: Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la Pratyabhijñā, Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture 13. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Ratié, Isabelle. 2013. “On Scripture and Reason in the Pratyabhijñā.” In Scriptural authority, reason and action: Proceedings of a panel at the 14th world sanskrit conference, Kyoto, September 1– 5, 2009, edited by Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser. 375–454. Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 79. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

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Sanderson, Alexis. 1985. Purity and power among the Brahmins of Kashmir. In The category of the person: Anthropology, philosophy, history, ed. M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes, 190–216. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Shastri, Kaul Madhusudan, ed. 1934. The Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānandanātha with the Vṛtti by Utpaladeva, KSTS. Vol. 54. Pune: Aryabhushan Press. Torella, Raffaele. 1994. The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the author’s Vṛtti: Critical edition and annotated translation. Rome: IsMEO. Torella, Raffaele. 2014. Notes of the Śivadṛṣṭi by Somānanda and its commentary. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (5): 551–601.

Part II Fundamentals

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Logic in India Amita Chatterjee

Contents Western Versus Indian Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concept of Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Principle of Noncontradiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modern Indian Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

This chapter aims at providing a broad overview of Indian logic pursued in the classical Indian philosophical systems as well as in contemporary India. It will be seen that traditional systems of logic do share some features, yet diverge from each other due to the differences in their ontology and practice. During the colonial period, logic was pursued mainly within a comparative framework. However, the perception of Indian logicians changed entirely as they came into contact with modern symbolic logic. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section deals mainly with the distinction between Western and Indian conception of logic. The second section provides the structure of inference in classical Indian philosophical systems. The third section analyzes the concepts of negation available in the Nyāya, Buddhist, and Jaina logic and links different concepts of negation to the metaphysical presuppositions of the systems. The fourth section lays bare the nature of contradiction as conceived in these systems, and the final section gives a brief account of the developments in Indian logic during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

A. Chatterjee (*) School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_39

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Western Versus Indian Logic Logical culture in the West was thought to be monolithic and inextricably intertwined with the development of the concept of reason. Kant wrote in the preface to the second edition of his first critique that the sphere of logic which “provides strict proof of the formal rules of all thought” is said to be “precisely delimited” and “complete” because logic is obliged to abstract from “all objects of knowledge and their differences, leaving the understanding nothing to deal with save itself and its form.” Though Kant never claimed to have gone beyond Aristotelian logic, he in fact anticipated many features of the modern formal logic developed by de Morgan, Boole, Venn, Peano, Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and others in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. In course of time this topic-neutral formal discipline, which belongs to the a priori realm of theoretical knowledge, assumed a near hegemony in the assessment of natural argumentation. Any rational being raised in this universalistic rational culture was supposed to argue in accordance with the rules of this classical logic. Logic was considered to be unitary and supposedly the common core of logic gets manifested in all cultures across board. Hence, if anyone failed to reason in accordance with the rules of logic he was considered to be irrational and a lesser human being. Though serious scholars of Indian philosophy and culture starting from William Jones to Jonardon Ganeri and other contemporary researchers thought otherwise, there was a strong opinion amongst some stalwarts of philosophy, e.g., Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Rorty, that philosophy including logic being a European phenomenon, whatever ancient Indians and Chinese were doing could not be philosophy or logic, in spite of the vigor and rigor of their endeavor. The point that we want to put forward against this view is that neither oriental mind nor oriental culture is wanting in logic; rather these are guided by some alternative logics. As opposed to the general idea that logic is culture-invariant, we maintain that it is culture dependent. In fact, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a breach in the universal logical tradition and culminated in the proliferation of alternative systems of logic. Some of these systems are just conservative extensions of the classical logic and the rest are marked by revisions, moderate, or radical. Logical culture has been prevalent in the classical Indian theoretical tradition for more than 2000 years. In fact, logic was a part of public and private life, rural and urban life, scientific and religious forms of life. “The wide surface-level gulf separating the logical traditions of ancient Greece and West on the one hand and that of India on the other has served as a deterrent in the search for the unity of logic as a trans-cultural theoretical discipline” (Pahi 2008). To make the nature of Indian Logic clear, we shall first try to show the main points of difference between the Western logic and Indian logic (Mohanty and Chatterjee 2009). The roots of Indian logic can be traced to two distinct traditions – the vāda (dialogical) and the pramāṇa (epistemological) traditions. Logic in India was never developed as an independent discipline but was embedded in epistemology or Pramāṇa theories. One of the important sources of Indian logic being the debating or the dialogical tradition, pattern/structure of explicit inference reflects this legacy. Though historical roots and trajectories of Indian and Western logical traditions were

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far apart, superficial similarities observed among two logical traditions led to some concerted efforts of translating Indian logic to syllogistics or the first-order predicate logic. But that effort was considered wrong-headed for more than one reason to which we shall come later. Let us concentrate first on the distinctive features of traditional Indian systems of logic. No Indian philosophical system, unlike Western logic, takes a purely formal approach to inference or inferential knowledge. Yet, we consider these theories of inference as logic insofar as these are theories of human reasoning and tell us how to distinguish good arguments from bad arguments, acceptable arguments from unacceptable ones. According to Wilfrid Hodges (2001), “in its first meaning, a logic is a collection of closely related artificial languages. . .In its second but older meaning, logic is the study of sound argument.” Indian theories of inference are compatible with the second meaning of logic. While the mainstream western logic primarily developed as a deduction-centric discipline and revolved around “the consequence relation,” logic in India has been mainly pervasion (vyāpti)-centric. Pervasion or vyāpti is the relation of universal concomitance between the ground of inference and the thing to be inferred. The notion will be made clear when we shall describe the structure of an inference. In the Indian logic, syntax always remains hyphenated with semantics. For inference as an accredited source of knowing the world, validity is not enough; soundness and epistemic progress also need to be guaranteed. In Indian theories of inference, the notion of validity/invalidity of an inference usually presupposes a host of background information and often essentially hinges on them. Two necessary corollaries of this stance are: (a) no constituent of an inference can have zero information content like a tautology and (b) validity of an inference cannot be delinked from soundness. Hence, an inference is valid only if it yields a true conclusion. One may point out that even in the West the main concern of older logicians was to discover the rules of sound argument. Therefore, the logical enterprises in the premodern world were not so different, be it in India or in the West. Here, the contrast is being drawn between the classical Indian logic and the modern logic, based on the developments in the nineteenth century mathematics, which “incorporates a theory of relations and thus goes beyond traditional syllogistics; it aims at developing a type of science that occupies the most fundamental place in the system of scientific disciplines. . . more traditional philosophical projects were largely eclipsed by changes within the field of philosophy, and by the increasing emphasis on the role of mathematics for modern logic” (Ziche 2011). In the Indian theories of inference, we find elaborate discussions on how inference results from a number of cognitive states and what conditions give rise to cognitive certainty. So, inference as a cognitive process admits of causal analysis. Here, the relation between premise and conclusion is viewed not as an abstract logical relation but as a psycho-cognitive relation of causal sequence. The question that Indian logicians addressed was how ordinary human beings reason in real life situations and avoid arriving at erroneous conclusions as opposed to the question raised in Western logic – how ideal rational beings reason under ideal conditions. This stance may make Indian logic vulnerable to the charge of psychologism, which

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both Frege and Husserl wanted to avoid. We can say the following in defense of Indian logic. Granting that in India logic was never separated from epistemology or psychology, we would like to argue that here psychologism never led to subjectivism because Indian logicians were dealing with psycho-causal conditions that apply to all cognitive agents. Besides, unravelling the psycho-causal conditions underlying an inferential process helps us build a viable model of mental reasoning. All Indian logicians adopted a grammar-based model of logical analysis, while in Western logic the geometrico-mathematical model is in use. But interestingly, this grammar-based model has led Indian theorists to some of the insights of mathematical logicians regarding logical connectives. It is true that the Naiyāyika-s, the most famous logical school of classical India, did not always stick to the Grammarian’s insights when they developed their formal language. While defining a language of properties and relations, they scratched beneath the grammatical surface expressed through ordinary language and arrived at logical correlates of their metaphysical categories. Western formal logic is extensional; Indian logic, it has been said, is basically logic of properties and hence intensional. Two properties having the same extension are found to possess different senses and would fail the substitutivity condition, e.g., potness (ghaṭatva) and the property of having a conch-like neck (kambugrī vādimattva) are extensionally the same but differ in meaning. However, we must remember what Indian logicians mean by “property” is somewhat different from its meaning in English. The term “property” here signifies any locatee, be it an abstract property or a concrete object, which resides in a locus. The basic combination in Indian logic is not a straightforward subject–predicate proposition but a Sanskrit sentence of the locus–locatee model, e.g., “a has f-ness.” As the sentences of the form “a has f-ness” can be easily correlated with the sentences of the form “a is f,” it is possible to read such logic of properties extensionally, thinks Matilal (1998) and his followers. But there are others like Guhe (2008) and Oteke (2009) who have showed that Nyāya logic should not be interpreted as a fragment of first-order logic because of the intensional nature of the property, “being a locus of”; one needs to go beyond the framework of first-order logic. The content of episodic cognition is the most suitable candidate to be the truthbearer. Indian logicians generally view the content of cognition as a relational complex referring to a complex object and not to a fact. Hence, it is always debatable whether the content of cognition should be represented by a proposition or just a complex term. Though ontological and epistemological commitments underlying different Indian logical systems are diverse and there are controversies centering the number of constituents (avayava) in an inference, yet every system accepts at least three inferential components. These are sādhya (the provable property, the probandum, the signified), hetu (the ground of inference, the reason, the sign, the probans), and pakṣa (the locus of inference). Finally, Indian theories of inference cannot be neatly categorized as deductive or inductive in the standard sense. Ancient Indian logicians were in fact trying to formulate conditions of human reasoning in general. Though they were trying to

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determine under what conditions an inferential leap from the known to the unknown would be warranted (Sarkar 1997), the nature and structure of inference cannot be identified with deduction or induction or abduction per se. In spite of sharing the above-mentioned framework, different Indian logical systems diverged from each other because of their difference in basic belief systems and metaphysics. Thus, within the logical culture of India, there emerged several subcultures of logic. For example, logic developed by the Nyāya School belonging to the orthodox tradition (Jha 1984) possesses features different from those logical systems belonging to the heterodox tradition, viz., Buddhist schools (Stcherbasky 1962). Even within the heterodox tradition, the presuppositions, nature, and practice of the Buddhist and the Jaina logic are entirely different. Though all systems of Indian philosophy except the materialist Cārvāka school developed their own theory of inference in accordance with their metaphysical presuppositions, we shall confine our discussion to the radical skepticism of the Madhyamika Buddhism, doctrinal realism of the Naiyāyika-s, and the pluralism of Jainism. These subcultures have many points of difference. However, we shall try to capture their differences mainly in respect of negation and contradiction.

The Structure of Inference Since fourth century AD, following the Buddhist logicians, all systems of Indian logic divide inference broadly into two types. Svārthānumāna (SA) or inference-foroneself deals with the psychological conditions, i.e., causally connected cognitive states leading to one’s own inferential cognition, while Parārthānumāna (PA) or inference-for-others essentially deals with the proper linguistic expression of this inference with a view to communicating it to others (Viśvanātha 1988). SA which is a process of mental reasoning par excellence consists of four steps in the Nyāya system, each of which is a state of cognition causally connected with the immediately preceding state. The process can be best explained with their typical example. A person first sees that (a) the hill (pakṣa/the locus of inference) possesses the smoke (hetu/the ground of inference/probans). This is a perceptual cognition which reminds him that (b) wherever there is smoke there is fire (sādhya/the provable/probandum), as he has always observed in a kitchen. The first step is technically called pakṣadharmatājn˜ āna, meaning the probans is known to be present in the locus of reasoning. The second step (known as vyāptijn˜ āna) is memory or a recollective cognitive state of the universal concomitance between smoke and fire. Then (a) and (b) are combined to produce a complex form of cognition called “parāmars´a” or “consideration” of the form (c) the hill possesses smoke pervaded by fire and then follows the conclusion (d) therefore, the hill possesses the fire. According to the Naiyāyika-s, PA has five constituents (avayava-s) arranged in the order pratijn˜ ā or assertion, hetu or reason, udāharaṇa or example, upanaya or application, and nigamana or conclusion. The typical example of a full-fledged inference for others is the following.

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Though the conclusion of a PA appears to be the same as the thesis proposed in the first step, these two perform two different tasks. The first step just presents the thesis while the conclusion declares that what is to be proved has been proved. The second step asserts that the hill is the locus of smoke and thus provides the ground of the final assertion in the conclusion. The third step, example or udāharaṇa, has two parts – a law-like generalization and an exemplar that instantiates the generalization. The fourth step asserts that the hill which is different from the kitchen is a locus of smoke in a nondeviant sense. All these steps warrant the conclusion or the fifth step. So, there is no redundancy involved in the five-membered inference for others. Sarkar (1997, 358) shows that necessary reliance on an exemplar brings out another unique feature of inference a la Nyāya. To quote from him, “it means that (i) all inferential justifications must have some observational basis and (ii) because of this self-imposed inflexible fact-compliance requirement, a Naiyāyika is prevented from entertaining a law-like generalization purely hypothetically. This . . . acts as an impediment to developing an abstract, formal approach to theory of inference. . .” According to the tradition, the first step is said to be generated by verbal cognition, the second is established by inference, in the third step, example is acquired through perception, and the fourth step is based on cognition of similarity. Since these four steps are established by four sources of true cognition admitted in the Nyāya School, the Naiyāyika considers this five-membered argument as the demonstration par excellence (parama-nyāya). Pervasion (vyāpti) is the relation of invariable concomitance of the ground of an inference (hetu) and the signified or the thing to be inferred (sādhya). Without the knowledge of this relation, it is not possible to infer. In a valid inference, “The hill has fire because it has smoke,” the sādhya is fire, the hetu is smoke, and pakṣa or the locus is the hill. If there is no universal concomitance between smoke and fire, by perceiving smoke, we shall not be able to infer fire in a new locus. In order that the relation of universal concomitance obtains between the sign and the signified, the sign needs to fulfill certain conditions, which also makes the sign legitimate (sadhetu). A sign is legitimate if and only if it possesses the following five features, viz.: 1. 2. 3. 4.

It is present in the locus of reasoning (pakṣa-sattva) It is present in a similar location (sapakṣa-sattva) It is not present in any dissimilar location (vipakṣa-asattva) It is not associated with the contradictory of the signified in the locus (abādhitatva) 5. If another sign tending to prove the contradictory of the signified is not present in the locus (asatpratipakṣitatva)

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These five features provide the truth conditions of the cognitive states involved in SA; (1) is the truth condition of pakṣadharmatājn˜ āna, (2) and (3) are the truth conditions of vyāptijn˜ āna disjunctively, and thus become the truth conditions of parāmars´ajn˜ āna too; while (4) and (5) have a direct relevance to the truth of the conclusion. The violation of any of these conditions results in unsound/fallacious arguments (Annaṃbhatta 1976) known as asiddha (unestablished), viruddha (hostile), savybhicāra (deviating), bādhita (contradictory), and satpratipakṣa (counterbalanced), respectively. All these defects of probans can be shown to be present in one nonveridical inference, e.g., “the lake has fire because it has potness.” In this example, the lake is the inference-locus, fire is the probandum, and potness is the probans. It violates the first condition, because the probans potness is not present in the locus of reasoning, the lake. It goes against the second condition, because potness is present only in pots but absent in various loci of fire, hence the probans is opposed or hostile. A more familiar example of this type of fault is: sound is eternal as it is an effect.) The inference under discussion is also vitiated by the defect due to a deviating probans. Here, the probans potness, which is present only in pots, can easily reside in a locus which is characterized by the absence of fire. That shows that potness is not invariably concomitant with fire, the probandum. In this example, the probans potness becomes contradictory and hence illegitimate, if the lake does not possess fire. Again, it is easy to show the possibility of the existence of an alternative probans, say, water, capable of proving the absence of fire in the lake, thus counterbalancing the force of the original probans and preventing the conclusion. All these defective probans are faulty because they somehow block the conclusion of the inference. Thus, it is obvious that the psychological conditions of inference are related to its conditions of validity in such a way that the fulfillment of the former guarantees the fulfillment of the latter. Thus the theory of reasoning, which began as a description of psychology of proof as well as a way of knowing, was transformed into a logical theory, not as a formal rule-driven axiomatic theory but as a theory of ordinary reasoning. Both Buddhist (Dharmakīrti 1955) and Jaina logicians admit the abovementioned distinction between SA and PA, they only differ with respect to the number of constituents of inference. Consequentially, their views on the nature and number of fallacies also vary.

Concept of Negation We have already mentioned that in ancient India inference was used as a part of the debating tradition. There are debates in the later Vedic texts, in the Buddhist and the Jain scriptures. I shall, however, remain confined to the Kathābatthu (Aung and Davids 1915) which supposedly contain a report of the Buddhist Council held around 255/155 BC. The text records topics of debate and various types of argument that a Buddhist monk can offer. The ancient text mentions two ways of refuting any motion, the underlying structure of which are given below. We have used the

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schematic representation of the examples available in the ancient text following Matilal (1998). 1. The Way Forward (anuloma) Opponent (O) Proponent (P) O P

: Is (A is B)? : Yes. : Is (A is C)? : No.

Rejoinder: O

: If A is B, then A is C; – Therefore – Not both: (A is B) and not (A is C); – Therefore – If not (A is C), then not (A is B). Thus the proponent’s thesis, A is B, is refuted and the debate is won by the opponent. The Way Backward (Pratiloma):

O P O P

: Is it not the case that A is not B? : No it is not. : Is it not the case that A is not C? : No it cannot be asserted that A is not C. Rejoinder:

O

: If A is not B, then A is not C; – therefore – Not both: (A is not B) and not (A is not C); – therefore – If not (A is not C), then not (A is not B).

Thus, the proponent’s denial of A is B is shown untenable. Interestingly, in the above representations, we find that even in the second century BC the Buddhist monks were acutely aware of untenability of inconsistency in an argument. They have used the well-known definition of material implication, “if p then q” ¼ def. “not both p and not q,” and the law of contraposition and modus ponens implicitly. If we look carefully, it also becomes obvious that there is an interchange between the object level and meta-level negation, i.e., between a negation attached to a nested sentence or a term and a negation attached to the principal assertion. This is striking because this kind of interchange is feasible only in a 2-valued system. (Maybe, this is due to utter conflation between object-level and meta-level negation on the part of the Buddhist monks, though there is ample

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evidence that the Grammarians were aware of this distinction.) But the Buddha himself used the well-known tetralemma, made famous by Nāgārjuna, the famous nihilist stalwart of the Mādhyamika School. When asked about the nature of postmortem status of a liberated soul, the Buddha usually kept mum but occasionally replied that none of the following alternatives can be upheld: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The liberated soul continues to exist after death The liberated soul does not exist after death The liberated soul both exists and does not exist after death The liberated soul neither exists nor does not exist after death

Nagarjuna used this tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) to buttress his radically skeptical metaphysics. A radical skeptic can uphold his position provided he sticks to his “refutation only” stance without falling into any inconsistency. Nāgārjuna interprets negation to ensure that. Nāgārjuna says that joint refutation of all the four positions does not lead him to logical contradiction nor does commit him to any thesis of his own. Following Matilal (1998), we can interpret Nāgārjuna’s tetralemma as an example of illocutionary negation. It is obvious that (a) ~ ├ (Ex) (x is F) and (b) ~ ├ ~ (Ex) (x is F) are not contradictory. One who asserts both (a) and (b) actually tries to avoid any false knowledge claim. Let us try to be a little more explicit. A. B. C. D.

Nāgārjuna negates the thesis p. Nāgārjuna negates the thesis ~ p. Nāgārjuna negates the thesis (p & ~ p). Nāgārjuna negates the thesis (p v ~ p).

Nāgārjuna’s Neg. is a meta-level negation like the illocutionary negation. Negation operator, employed here, may be interpreted as nontruth-functional. For, under truth-functional interpretation Neg. (p & ~ p) and Neg. (p v ~ p) can never have the same truth value. Besides, Nāgārjuna maintains that all four theses are to be rejected as meaningless, but their negations are not true. Hence, by proffering this tetralemma, he is not committing himself to any position of his own. Rather, he strictly declared that the negation of a philosophical thesis is no philosophical thesis. The upshot of the whole discussion is that the logic of the four-cornered negation was necessitated by the world view of the Mādhyamika School who made a sharp distinction between conventional truth and transcendent truth, denied the finality of any conventional truth and upheld that objects of our experience are totally devoid of essence or nature (niḥsvabhāva). Just as the four-cornered negation of Nāgārjuna, interpreted as illocutionary negation is intimately connected with the Mādhyamika ontology, to understand the Nyāya (especially the Neo-Nyāya) concept of negation (Matilal 1968), we need to understand their ontology of absence. Absence, they point out, is not merely a logical or linguistic operator, it is as objectively real as a positive entity is. Four types of absence are admitted in the system: (1) mutual absence or difference (anyonyābhāva), e.g., a jar is not a pen and vice versa; (2) absence of not-yet type

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(prāgabhāva), e.g., absence of a bread in flour before it is baked; (3) absence of no-more type (dhvaṃsābhāva), e.g., absence of a vase in its broken pieces, and (4) absolute absence (atyantābhāva), e.g., absence of color in air. So, an absence is always of something and that something is called the counterpositive or the negatum (pratiyogī ) of that absence. Consider the absence of smoke in a lake. Smoke is the negatum (pratiyogī ) of the absence of smoke and pratiyogitā or the relation of negatum-hood is the relation between an absence and its negatum. Here, the lake is the locus (anuyogī ) of the absence. Hence, anuyogitā or the relation of locus-hood that connects the absence in question with its locus. So in Nyāya system, the negation is mainly of two forms: (a) x is not y and (b) x is not in y or absence of x in y. The Naiyāyika-s subscribe to two-valued logic. Hence, for them, if S is P or if S is in P is true, then S is not P/ non-P or S is not in P is bound to be false. The Nyāya view of negation is quite in keeping with their realist and pluralist ontology. Their world contains innumerable entities that are in principle knowable and nameable. Each such entity has an intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Many of these entities are eternal, and even those that are noneternal, are stable, i.e., nonmomentary (akṣaṇika). Many of these entities are mutually related, and these relations are as real as their relata. The Jaina-s, on the other hand, believes that reality is many sided. Each real object is complex and possesses infinite facets. It is impossible for any finite being to comprehend the reality in its fullness. The flip-side of this theory is that all worldviews are partial and incomplete; no worldview can be entirely wrong. Each has some element of truth in it. If every assertion contains some element of truth in it, then how is one supposed to decide on the truth of any given sentence? “The difference between Buddhism and Jainism in this respect lies in the fact that the former avoids by rejecting the extremes altogether, while the latter does it by accepting all with qualifications and also by reconciling them” (Matilal 1998). Since the truth of a judgment is never one-sided, no judgment claims absolute truth or falsity. As every predication is relative to a particular point of view, the Jaina-s attach a prefix “syād” (Maybe) to every assertion thus giving rise to a sevenvalued logic (saptabhaṅginaya) in the following manner. • • • •

Maybe, it (some object) exists Maybe, it does not exist Maybe it exists, maybe it does not exist (a case of successive assertion and denial) Maybe it is nonassertible/inexpressible (a case of simultaneous assertion and denial) • Maybe it does exist, maybe it is nonassertible/inexpressible • Maybe it does not exist, maybe it is nonassertible/inexpressible • Maybe it exists, maybe, it does not exist, maybe, it is nonassertible/inexpressible. Different logicians have given different interpretations to this sevenfold predication. Graham Priest (2008), for example, has developed a many valued propositional logic corresponding to the Jaina theory of predication and a system of paraconsistent logic which can be supported by the Mādhyamika conception of fourcornered negation.

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The Principle of Noncontradiction Let us now see how these three systems deal with the Principle of Noncontradiction (Staal 1962). Aristotle stated this Principle as follows. It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect.

The Nyāya concept of inconsistency naturally comes very close to the Aristotelian notion as the Naiyayika-s like Aristotle admit a two-valued logic. According to the Nyāya School, an assertion is inconsistent if two contradictory predicates p and not-p are asserted of the same object X at the same time. To avoid contradiction, they introduce a technique of delimiting the predicates (Sen and Chatterjee 2010), if in a particular situation, inconsistent predicates are ascribed to the same object simultaneously. When, for example, a monkey sits on a tree, the tree may very well have contact with that monkey in respect of one of its branches; while the same tree in respect of its roots may simultaneously harbor the absence of that contact. In such cases, the locushood resident in the tree is said to be delimited (avacchinna) by different delimiters (avacchedaka) – the tree, as delimited by its branch is the locus of contact with monkey, and this is in no way opposed to the fact that the same tree, as delimited by its roots, is the locus of the absence of monkey contact. There would be a contradiction if the tree would have been a location of a contact and the absence of that contact in respect of the same delimiter. We have seen that Nāgārjuna would resist assigning truth to both (P& ~ P) and its denial ~ (P& ~ P); hence, he is not also going against the principle of noncontradiction. The Jaina-s would say that two sentences are inconsistent if their epistemic contents are incompatible. For example, Let C1 C2

¼ A pot is on the floor, and ¼ A pot is not on the floor.

C1 and C2, however, need not be incompatible, because the person who holds C2 may be referring to the pot (a different one) which he saw here yesterday, while C1 has as its epistemic content the pot which is now on the floor. Even a slight difference in any component of an epistemic content can change its identity. So, it can very well be the case that C1 and C2 do not share the same epistemic content. Therefore, they are not absolute incompatibles. The Jaina-s uphold that epistemic content of any piece of cognition may remain unspecified in four different respects, viz., dravya (substantiality), kṣetra (location), kāla (temporality), and bhāva (features). Each of which again admits of an infinite number of variations. So, any two assertions like C1 and C2 cannot be shown to be incompatible so long as even one dimension of their respective content remains unspecified. C1 and C2 will be inconsistent if the same pot characterized by all four features is and is not at the same location. Exact specification of all dimensions and degrees of a specific

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content, however, is not possible in normal cases as human knowledge is limited. Hence no epistemic claim is ever wholly untrue. “Partial truth is a sufficient condition of truth assignment for the Jaina-s” (Schang 2010). Not only that, the sevenfold logic avoids self-contradiction as Priest (2008) has pointed out “No yes-no answer occurs in the Jaina question-answer game, consequently: two different questions can result in the same answer or not, but no single question can be answered by ‘yes’ and ‘No’ at once. This is the gist of self-contradiction, and even the third basic predicate of inexpressibility does not state it because non-distinction does not mean an internal co-existence of opposite properties. These cannot co-exist by definition.” This logic is the logic of partial knowledge. The Jaina-s, however, maintain that a kevalin or an omniscient being can have perfect and complete knowledge and has offered a unique existence proof for such omniscient being. To establish this point, they admit that the graded series of incomplete knowledge is strictly linearly orderable and possesses a maximal upper bound which can be accessed by an actual omniscient being (Sarkar 1997). It appears that the Jaina-s would admit absolute truth in the realm of perfect knowledge and this aspect of Jaina logic makes an out and out relativistic account of it questionable. It is interesting to note that in none of the three logical subcultures of Indian logical tradition the Principle of Noncontradiction has been given up, though negation operator has been interpreted differently in different philosophical schools in accordance with their ontological presuppositions – thus showing that logic is not ontology-neutral. They have just devised different ways of upholding the principle in view of their respective metaphysical commitment and soteriological end. However, despite large-scale differences in the metaphysical and background beliefs leading to divergent logical practices, all schools of Indian logic admit that to arrive at a sound conclusion we have to be sure about the absence of any counter-example to the generalization on the basis of which we are supposed to take our inferential leap. This can be acknowledged as a mark of minimal rationality which Indian logicians shared with all ancient systems of logic.

Modern Indian Logic Mahamahopadhyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana (1921) in his History of Indian Logic mentioned three principal phases of development of Indian Logic – ancient, medieval, and modern. According to him, the representative text of the ancient phase is Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra (First century AD), of the medieval phase is Dinnāga’s Pramāṇa-samuccaya (Fourth century AD), and the most salient representative work of the modern phase is Tattva-cintāmaṇi (TCM) of Gangeśācārya (thirteenth century AD), the founder of the Neo- Nyaya school of logic. A large number of commentaries and subcommentaries were written on all these texts giving shape and maturity to Indian systems of logic. We have already discussed the first two phases. Let us, therefore, take a brief look at the third phase. Neo/Navya-Nyāya originated in Mithila led by Gangeśa (Gangeśa Upādhyāya 1892), who integrated and popularized the special technique of subtle argumentation

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and developed a higher-order technical language with a view to making perspicuous, the structure of our cognitive report of objective realities. The tradition (Potter and Bhattacharyya 1993; Bhattacharyya 2009) was carried forward by Vardhamāna, Yajñapati, Upādhyāya, and Pakṣadhara Miśra, among others. From Mithila, Navya-Nyāya traveled to Navadvīpa, in Bengal. The famous early exponents of Navya-Nyāya in Navadvīpa are Pragalbha Miśra, Narahari Viśārada and Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma’s disciple, the unorthodox logician Raghunatha Śiromaπi (sixteenth century), wrote a commentary on TCM entitled Dīdhiti, in which he went far beyond Gangeśa by introducing changes in NavyaNyāya metaphysics and epistemology. Subsequent prominent proponents of NavyaNyāya in Bengal – including Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra, and Gadādhara Bhattācāryya – wrote sub-commentaries on Dī dhiti, which contributed to the fullest development of Gangeśa’s technique of reasoning. The fame of Navadvīpa Naiyāyikas spread all over India, and scholars from other schools too adopted the Navya-Nyāya language. This highly technical language became the medium for all serious philosophical discussion by the sixteenth century, irrespective of the ontological, epistemological, and moral commitments of the discussants. Besides, Navya-Nyāya language was used in some important treatises on the Hindu law of inheritance, on Rhetoric and Grammar, and even on Aesthetics. That is, Mastery of Navya-Nyāya language became a hallmark of intellectual accomplishment all over India. Unfortunately, the craving for precision by the Navya-Naiyāyika-s reached such a height that they became gradually alienated from the masses, and their techniques reached obsolescence outside a very elite Sanskritist circle by the end of the eighteenth century. In the second decade of the nineteenth century, Indian logic is said to be discovered by the famous Orientalist and mathematician H. T. Colebrooke. He read Gotama’s Nyāya-sūtra with commentaries and glosses on it under the guidance of the traditional pundits and reported about his discovery at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1824. Prior to Colebrooke’s declaration, western scholars were blissfully ignorant about the scientific and logical pursuits of the ancient Indians, though they knew and acknowledged the contribution of Indian scholars in mathematics and astronomy. Most western scholars had thought that Indian mind was not logical at all. So, Colebrooke’s discovery is considered as a landmark in the history of ideas. Colebrooke (1824) showed that reasoning or inference proper forms part of the Nyāya theory of Evidence or Proof (pramāṇa). He meticulously observed the standard form of the argument and christened this argument “syllogism” following Aristotle because he found a lot of similarity between syllogism and the Nyāya inference. After Colebrooke, Indologists were engaged in the debate whether the structure of the Nyāya inference can at all be translated in terms of syllogistic. Though the name “Nyāya syllogism” stuck to the five-limbed inference, soon scholars found more dissimilarity than similarity between inference patterns of the West and the East. That is why, Max Mūller (1853) wrote, “Nevertheless, it would be wrong to call the Nyāya, Logic, in our sense of the word. The Nyāya, as well as the other systems, has for its highest object the solution of the problem of existence, and only as a means towards accomplishing this object, does it devote particular attention

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to the instruments of knowledge – and, as one of them, to syllogistic reasoning.” But after a few paragraphs, he observed, “Even terms as conclusion or syllogism are inconvenient here, because they have with us an historical coloring, and throw a false light on the subject.” However, in spite of Max Mūller’s warnings, most scholars, including Indian stalwarts like S. C. Vidyabhusana, B. N. Seal, S. C. Chatterjee, D. M. Datta, S. Radhakrishnan, and M. Hiriyanna – all endorsed this comparison with syllogism. With the development of mathematical logic by Russell, Lukasiewicz, and others, some new interpretations of the Nyāya argument came into vogue. Stanislaw Schayer (Ganeri 2001) was not ready to force Indian inference onto the Procrustean bed of the authentic Aristotelian syllogism under any circumstances. He pointed out for the first time that the Nyāya argument should rather be interpreted within the frame of the First-Order Predicate Logic. He symbolized the five-step argument as follows. 1. Thesis 2. Reason 3. Statement of pervasion 4. Application 5. Conclusion

Fa Ga (x) (Gx !Fx) Ga !Fa Fa

There is fire on a (¼ on this mountain). There is smoke on a. For every locus x: if there is smoke in x then there is fire in x. This rule also applies for x ¼ a. Because the rule applies to x ¼ a and the statement Ga is true, the statement Fa is true.

Like Colebrooke, Schayer too offered a path-breaking interpretation which influenced the views of later scholars: Both D. Ingalls (1951, 1955) and I. M. Bochenski (1961). Staal, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, and B. K. Matilal too developed their interpretations along this line. J. F. Staal (1973) was astute enough to understand that terms in an Aristotelian syllogism are related by one single relation, i.e., the relation of belonging to, but in the so-called Indian syllogism three terms (pakṣa, hetu and sādhya) are related by two relations. The relation between reason (hetu) and the thing to be inferred (sādhya) is that of pervasion while the relation of both these terms with the locus of the argument is that of occurrence. As Staal put it, “Since such a relation relates x to y, it is a two-place relation, which may therefore be written as A (x, y)” which can be read either as x occurs in y or y is the locus of x. So a sentence, “if (the hetu) smoke occurs on a mountain (pakṣa), then fire (the sādhya) occurs on that mountain (pakṣa)” is to be symbolized by A (h, p) ! A (s, p). Though Sibajiban Bhattacharyya (1987) and B. K. Matilal agreed more or less with Staal, they offered refined interpretation of their own. Following the texts of the New School of Nyāya, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya has laid bare the structure of a Nyāya argument vis-à-vis Aristotelian syllogism. Let us therefore look at Bhattacharyya’s analysis. To compare the standard Nyāya argument with Aristotle’s syllogism, Bhattacharyya takes the last three steps and gives exact English rendering of the Sanskrit terms. Let us look at the examples he has given.

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N.N.1. (The) hill (is) fire-possessing/because of smoke. N.N.2. This (is) fire/because of heat. In both the arguments, identifying the hetu and the pakṣa is simple. The term which is suffixed by the fifth case ending in Sanskrit or prefixed by “because of” in English is the ground/reason/hetu of the argument. The locus of the hetu is the pakṣa. But identifying the sādhya is tricky. In N. N.1., fire (not the word “fire”) is the sādhya, though in N.N.2 it is the property of being fire or fireness (neither fire, nor the word “fireness”). The Navya-Naiyāyika-s have given us a thumb rule for identifying the sādhya of any argument. The rule is in two parts, to be applied depending on the case at hand. (i) Drop the suffix “– possessing” when it occurs in the second term of the conclusion (Check N.N.1 now); (ii) add the suffix “ness” to it when the suffix “– possessing does not occur” (Check this part against N.N.2). By applying this rule, N.N.1 and N.N.2 may be fleshed out as follows. N.N.1.: Whatever is smoke-possessing is also fire-possessing The hill is smoke-possessing Therefore, the hill is fire-possessing. Of course, the argument can be more elegantly paraphrased in English as Whatever possesses smoke possesses fire The hill possesses smoke Therefore, the hill possesses fire. N.N.2.: Whatever is heat-possessing is fireness-possessing This is heat-possessing This is fireness- possessing. Or, Whatever possesses heat possesses fireness This possesses heat Therefore, this possesses fireness. According to Navya-Nyāya, “ness” is an abstraction operator and “– possessing” is a concretization operator. There is an interesting relation between these two operators. The Navya-Naiyāyika-s express this relation by the following equation: a-possessingness ¼ a-ness-possessing ¼ a. (dhūma- vat-tva ¼ dhūma-tva-vat ¼ dhūma). Application of this rule makes the difference between the Nyāya argument and a syllogism palpable. N.N.1*. Whatever possesses humanity possesses mortality Socrates possesses humanity Socrates possesses mortality

syllogism All men are mortal Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal

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It is therefore evident that three terms in the Navya Nyāya argument are: humanity, mortality, and Socrates, while in the syllogism three terms are: man, mortal, and Socrates. The rule of identifying the sādhya of an argument can be used more widely for determining the predicate of any sentence. Consider, for example, the sentence, “Socrates is wise.” According to Navya-Nyāya, it should be wise-ness or wisdom by the second part of the rule, since it does not contain “– possessing.” But this sentence can also be transformed into “Socrates is wisdom-possessing.” And in the latter case, we are supposed to drop “–possessing” and we have once again wisdom as the predicate of this sentence. Another important difference between the Nyāya argument and a syllogism lies in the fact that while in a syllogism the major and the minor premise together necessarily imply the conclusion, in a Nyāya argument a third premise is required as a necessary condition to arrive at the conclusion. So, the Navya-Naiyāyikas maintain that the fully fleshed out inferential form is as follows: 1. Smoke is pervaded by fire. (“whatever possesses smoke possesses fire” reformulated in terms of pervasion) 2. The hill possesses smoke 3. The hill possesses smoke pervaded by fire 4. Therefore, the hill possesses fire. Against the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas point out that (3) is not a conjunction of (1) and (2). (3) is weaker because the conjunction of (1) and (2) implies (3), but (3) does not imply this conjunction. The necessity of introducing (3) becomes obvious if we look at the generalized form of the premises. 1*. Something is pervaded by fire 2*. The hill possesses something 3*. Therefore, the hill possesses fire. To have a sound and valid inference, it is necessary that “something” in (1) and (2) stand for the same object, (1) and (2) must be combined to form one complex judgment, to represent “consideration” (parāmars´a) (3), “The hill possesses something pervaded by fire.” Otherwise, one could have the following argument: Smoke is pervaded by fire. The hill possesses light. Therefore, the hill possesses fire. According to the Naiyāyika, (3) is both necessary and sufficient for deriving the conclusion because then we need not even look at the substitution instance of something. It is therefore evident that the Nyāya argument should not be interpreted either as a syllogism or as an argument of the modern predicate logic.

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Around the fifth decade of the twentieth century Indian academics were exposed to Russell’s Principia Mathematica as well as the Natural Deduction systems. Under the influence of Western formal logic and semantics philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists came forward to pursue study and research in logic. Philosophers’ pursuit of logic followed three different trajectories. One group was engaged in reinterpreting tenets of traditional Indian schools of logic in the light of Set Theory and First Order Predicate Calculus; another group continued research in the area of formal logic – axiomatic systems of predicate logic, modal logic, and its variations, etc., and still another group was busy addressing deep-rooted philosophical problems through conceptual and logical analyses, thus contributing significantly to philosophical logic. The endeavor of the first group fell squarely in the area of comparative philosophy. All of them believed that apt symbolic representation of classical Indian logic would unravel the nature and structure of arguments available in Indian philosophical systems. For example, Navya-Nyya logic received various semantic interpretations in the hands of its modern interpreters. While Sibajiban Bhattacharya used Set theoretic tools and Predicate calculus in his reconstruction of Navya-Nyaya logic, Matilal (1998) suggested a Boolean semantics for some fragments of Navya Nyaya. Jonardon Ganeri (2004) offered a graph-theoretic semantics and Ganeri (2008) developed a set theoretic semantics. However, all of them encountered some problems in their attempt at reinterpretation of Indian logic by using tools of Western formal logic. Their predicament has been summed up by Ganeri (2001) as follows. “. . .any comparative project is liable to catch the Indian theory in a double-bind: either Indian logic is not recognized as logic in the western sense at all; or if it is, then it inevitably appears impoverished and underdeveloped by western standards. The only way to escape this dilemma is to reclaim for Indian logic its own distinctive domain of problems and applications, to see how it asks questions not clearly formulated elsewhere, and in what way it seeks to solve the problems it sets for itself.” Among the mathematically oriented philosophers, three names deserve special mention, Anjan Shukla, Viswambhar Pahi, and A. P. Rao. Anjan Shukla (1965, 1966) started his logical pursuit by solving an open problem in Alonzo Church’s Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Volume I, by developing a two-valued propositional calculus with independent axioms and rules with implication and converse implication as primitive connectives; in an alternative formulation of the same solution he used implication and nonequivalence as primitive connectives. Shukla (1967, 1970, 1971) also reduced the number of variables from two to one in one of the axioms of Lewis’s modal system S1. He solved the decision problem for the modal propositional calculus S1 and showed that it has the finite modal property. It was an open problem for 26 years which Shukla solved. His contributions to philosophical basis of modal logics were globally acknowledged. He constructed two modal propositional calculi which are closest approximations to “the true logic” obtained till 1970 and formulated two sequences of infinitely nonequivalent modalities in S6. His published works were cited by Prior, Cresswell, Pledger, Leberberg, Wronski, Zeman, Thomason, and others. Pahi taught in Rajasthan University and was mainly interested in extensions and matrices of implicational calculi

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(Pahi 1967), Independence Proofs in Propositional Logics, and problems related to Decidability besides problems of philosophical logic (Pahi 1987). A. P. Rao researched mainly in the area of Free Logical systems. He presented in a novel way the Classical Theory of First Order Logic (Rao 1970) from the point of view of meta-mathematics, especially for Indian academics who were not exposed to basic concepts of pure mathematics. The third group confined their logical exercises to philosophical logic. While discussing relevance of modern logic to philosophy, these philosophers offered two diametrically opposite viewpoints. One group of philosophical logicians upheld that all philosophical disputes could be settled with the help of logic alone. In fact, no significant philosophy could be done without a deep and extensive acquaintance with modern logic. Philosophers belonging to the other group emphatically pointed out that the activity of philosophizing cannot neatly be defined with the clarity and rigor of a formal system. To formalize philosophy is to trivialize it, mechanize it, affecting its creativity and growth. A compromise position was to uphold that logic includes both mathematical and philosophical logic (Sen 1980). Contributions in this area were truly heterogeneous. We find that logic-minded philosophers ventured into various different issues in logic-philosophy interface. They were particularly interested in the concepts of entailment, logical form, necessity and possibility, quantifiers and variables, different problematic conditionals and disjunctions, nature of the laws of thought, reference and truth, proper names and definite descriptions, regimentation of natural language, concepts of identity, consistency, justification of deduction, problems of induction and probability, different kinds of paradoxes, including the Liar paradox, the Sorites paradox, the paradox of material implication and their logical solutions, foundational issues and unsolved problems of relevant logics, deontic logics, and epistemic and doxastic logics. They published meta-level discourses on Aristotelean, Kantian, Hegelian, Fregean and Husserlian logic, dynamic systems, and different nonstandard systems of logic. Of course, this list is not an exhaustive one and includes only random examples. Though they were well aware of nonclassical many valued systems of logic, most of them concurred with Quine that bivalent logic would be the last thing to be given up (Sen 2000) and stuck to the classical laws of thought. Mathematicians, however, quickly proceeded to many-valued and nonstandard systems of logic, questioning the inviolability of the laws of thought. Naturally, they picked up research in nonmonotonicity and imprecision (Chatterjee 1994); some focused on para-consistent logics, fuzzy logics, Rough Set Theory, and Rough logic, etc. These researches highlighted the possibility of different concepts of consequence as well as of truth of which the notion of graded consequence (Chakraborty and Dutta 2019) and the correlated notion of Soft Truth deserve special mention. All these culminated into a bold statement on pluralism in mathematics and logic. A good number of researchers from mathematics dealt in algebraic semantics and logics, and were strongly drawn toward different kinds of algebraic structures. We find contributions in the area of Boolean algebra (BA) which provides the algebraic model of classical propositional logic. Some have looked into the algebraic models of modal logical systems through BAs with operators, in particular, topological BAs.

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Again, some scholars focused on Quasi-BAs having even more general structures than BAs which included all the axioms of BA except the law of excluded middle and the law of noncontradiction (Ghosh and Chakraborty 2004). Introduction of topological Quasi-BAs in connection with the semantics of Rough Set Theory by some Indian researchers has been recognized as a genuine move forward in the literature of Algebraic logic (Banerjee and Chakraborty 1996). In recent times, Logic research in India has also received a boost in the hands of computer scientists (Ditmarsch et al. 2011). Logic has become an essential tool in developing programming languages for computers, in natural language processing, and in knowledge representation techniques for artificial intelligence. Theoretical computer Scientists are found to depend on mathematicians in the areas of combinatorics, graph theory, and number theory, and on logicians in the areas of model theory and proof theory in devising algorithms and solving the problems of complexity and completeness in connection with real-time computations. Logic in contemporary India is no longer confined to the ancient systems of philosophy or their comparison with modern logic, but has become continuous with the mainstream of logic pursued all over the world.

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Charvaka (Ca¯rva¯ka)

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Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From Mythology to Logical Thinking to Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idealism and Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Is Materialism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Early Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Skepticism and Agnosticism in the Vedas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Indian Scenario: Pre-Vedic (Harappan), Vedic, Puranic, and Local Indigenous Cults . . . Evidence of the Upaniṣads re: Ontology and Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concept of Natural Elements in India and Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heterodox and Heretical Doctrines: Ājīvikism, Buddhism, Jainism, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Āstika and the Nāstika Systems of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Two Old (Pre-Cārvāka) Materialist Schools Before the Eighth Century CE. Maṇimēkalai – Bhūtavāda and Lokāyata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lokāyata Before and After the Fourth Century CE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New (Cārvāka) Materialism – The Base Text and Its Commentators in and around the Eighth Century CE and After . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Philosophical Outlook of the Cārvāka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Aphorisms and Pseudo-aphorisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Satirical Epigrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Cārvākas, the Buddhists, and the Jains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Cārvākas Against Caste and Gender Discriminations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disappearance of the Cārvākas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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R. Bhattacharya (*) Pavlov Institute, Kolkata, West Bengal, India © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_43

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R. Bhattacharya

Abstract

The Charvaka (Cārvāka)-s are the last known materialists in India. They appeared in or around the eighth century CE and, for some unknown reason, disappeared after the twelfth century CE. The earlier materialists flourished at least from the time of the Buddha (6th/5th BCE). They were found both in north and south India, bearing such names as Bhūtavāda, Lokāyata, etc. They believed perception to be the only means of knowledge. The Cārvākas, however, admitted inference to some extent as the second source, insofar as the inference was based on or followed from perception. It was in connection with the materialists’ denial of the Other World that their opponents developed their own form of arguments. The materialists were challenged by the opponents with the help of inference by analogy and verbal testimony. The Veda was the ultimate source of such testimony. The Buddhists and the Jains, too, were at one with the materialists in denying the status of the Veda. Thus, the philosophical systems of India were divided into two opposing camps – the āstikas (affirmativists) and the nāstikas (negativists). The contribution of the Cārvākas in particular to the logical thought in India lies in the distinction made by them between two kinds of inference: the first based on perception or verifiable facts, and the second, arguments based on scriptures. Their atheism and satire against vedic sacrificial rites made them stand out as heretics. Their opponents also complained that they were opposed to caste and gender discriminations. These traits also made the Cārvākas appear as the ultimate rationalists in pre-modern India. Keywords

Analogy or comparison · Atheism · Caste and gender discrimination · Consciousness · Elements or bhūtas · Inference · Materialism · Means of knowledge · The other world · Perception · Rationalism · Rebirth · Repeated observation · Spirit · Veda · Verbal testimony

Introduction Cārvāka (pronounced Char-va-ka, ‘ch’ as in ‘Charles’ in English) is a proper name first found in the Mahābhārata, the great epic of India, Book 12.39 (critical edition); 12.38 (vulgate). However, the ascetic bearing this name has got nothing to do with philosophy, let alone materialism. It is from the eighth century CE that we read in the Sanskrit philosophical texts of the Cārvākas who were materialist philosophers. They are mostly referred to in the plural, suggesting a whole school or at least a group. The members of this group were opposed to the concept of the Other World (the future state) and whatever followed from such denial, such as God, the immortal and incorporeal soul, the omniscient beings, heaven and hell and the like. In short, materialism in India appeared as the negation of theism, religion, belief in the supernatural, and the like. The Cārvākas were not the first to declare their views in

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clear, unambiguous terms. In fact, they were the last known group that continued to exist and grow up to the twelfth century CE. Thereafter all the works of this school, both the base text and commentaries on them, completely disappeared from the face of the earth. Some scholars have claimed Tattvopaplava-simha (The Lion to Upset all Principles), a polemical work by Jayarāśibhatta, to be an authentic Cārvāka work, but there are opponents of this view too. It is therefore better to leave it out of this discussion. In any case, such was also the fate of the Cārvākas’ predecessors, the pre-Cārvāka materialists of both north and south India. Their existence is testified in the Buddhist and Jain canonical and para-canonical works, as also, although indirectly, in the Upaniṣads, the source books of the brahmanical systems of thought. It is rather strange that, although the views of the deniers of all tenets of idealist philosophical systems, are known, no original works or commentaries there on have survived. They seem to have disappeared even before the fourteenth century CE. Nevertheless, a few fragments found scattered in the works of the opponents of materialism contain some extracts from the primary and secondary sources of the Cārvākas. Their opponents comprise Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and other non-brahmanical schools, such as Buddhism and Jainism. Not unlike the Presocratics, the works of the materialists of different kinds, too, have been referred to or quoted or paraphrased in the works that seek to refute their views. On the basis of all this their philosophical doctrine has been reconstructed. Thus, though the word, Cārvāka, originally signify the materialists of the eighth century and beyond, it is used as a generic name to refer to all materialists in India, right from the time of the Buddha down to the Cārvākas who flourished between the eighth and the twelfth centuries. Since they were condemned to be essentially argumentative, their opponents, too, had to develop several tools of debate in order to controvert them. Right from the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, attempts at refuting and denouncing the materialists continued for several centuries together. In the course of these clashes of arguments and counter-arguments, Logic in India gradually took shape. The materialists were known in Sanskrit by different names (Bārhaspatya, Bhūta-caitanya-vādin, Bhūta-vādin, Cārvāka, Dehātma-vādin, and Laukāyatika/Lokāyata/ Lokāyatika, etc.) at different periods and various parts of the land. They played a vital role in the formation of logical thought in south Asia. Materialism of India was known to China by its name, Lokāyata (Huan Xinchuan 1981, 179–186), and it was through the Buddhist works, both of the Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle) and the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) varieties, that the name “the doctrine of annihilation” (ucchedavāda) was communicated to the Buddhists all over the world. The doctrine of annihilation is but another name for proto-materialism.

From Mythology to Logical Thinking to Philosophy The transition from mythology to logical thinking and then to philosophy has not been the same or at least similar everywhere in the world. There were developed pre-Vedic urban centres in north-west and west India in the third millennium BCE. But in the absence of any written records, the intellectual aspects of the Indus Valley

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Civilization cannot even be conjectured. The first three sections of Vedic literature, the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Āraṇyakas (1500 BCE and after), were mainly preoccupied with sacrificial rituals and their muttering or singing of magic spells known as mantras. However, in order to provide some relief in the performance, the priests used to indulge in challenging other priests to answer riddles called brahmodyas (Sternbach 1975, 16–22) and argue about all sorts of questions. The exchange of arguments was called vāko-vākya (Vidyabhusana 1920/1988, 45). Such practice of holding informal debates was prevalent during the performance of Yudhiṣṭhira’s Horse Sacrifice (Mahābhārata critical edition, 14.87.1; vulgate 14.85) as also in the post mortem rites in the nineteenth century (testified in Tekchand Thakoor (the pen name of Peary Chand Mitter)’s novel, The Spoilt Child, chapter XX). There were also sceptics and even deniers of the cult of sacrifice even in the early Vedic times, but their doubts and denials did not form a cluster of thought that can be called philosophy proper. The oral tradition embodied in the Upaniṣads (600 BCE and after) may therefore be very conveniently taken as the point of departure. Logic and Philosophy in their rudimentary forms started to develop during the time of the Upaniṣads. The struggle between sacrificial ritual (karma) and knowledge ( jñāna) in the Īśā Upanisad (verse 2) marks one such moment of transition, when a compromise is made between the two, without denying the importance of either. It is followed by another question, whether or not there is life after death and the existence of the Other World (paraloka). This debate forms the focus of the Katha Upanisad (1.1.20). In the longer Upaniṣads, such as the Brhad-āranyaka and the Chāndogya, contests between the sages concerning the character of the Universal Spirit (Brahman) are reported. The identity of the self (ātman) and its relation to Brahman, etc., are quite prominent in the Upaniṣads. The Śvetāśvatara (1.2) mentions different claimants, including Time, Own Being (of every object), Destiny, Accident (Natural), Elements, etc., for the title of the first cause ( jagat-kārana). The emergence of a number of itinerant thinkers and their followers is recorded in the Maitrī Upaniṣad (7.8). They are denounced as non-Vedic (a-vaidika) (7.10) and their views are called negativism (nāstikya) (6.5). A large numbers of gurus and their doctrines are mentioned in the Long Discourses of the Buddha. The Upaniṣads do not speak in one voice: they do not follow a uniform or homogenous line of thought. They retain all sorts of speculations, dissimilar and even contradictory, prevalent among princes, sages, and commoners alike. Such an amalgam of views was redacted long after they had taken shape. In spite of such limitations, it will be proper to start from the late stage of the Vedic era.

Idealism and Materialism The word, materialism, as the name of a distinct approach to nature, both animate (including humans) and inanimate in the context of philosophy is found relatively recently. The first recorded occurrence of “materialism” in English, is presumably borrowed from French; it dates from the mid-eighteenth century (as noted in the

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Oxford English Dictionary). Idealism, the opposite of materialism, too, is not found in the philosophical context in English before the late eighteenth century. Other senses of these terms appear even later, in the nineteenth century only. The systems of philosophy that can be branded so, however, existed long before the names were coined. The terms have acquired different significations in philosophy and everyday use. A clear distinction between the vulgar and technical senses of these two words is maintained throughout this discussion.

What Is Materialism? Materialism considers matter to be the primary component of all things, living or non-living, that exist independent of the knower, human or any other animal. Every object, whether living or nonliving, has a nonliving material substratum. This is primary. Other attributes of all higher living beings, such as senses, consciousness, intelligence, etc., are secondary and presuppose the prior existence of matter. Materialism does not consider consciousness itself to be material. Nor does it claim (as many of its opponents wrongly declare) that matter (body) and consciousness are one and the same. Materialism simply asserts the primacy of matter over consciousness. Conversely, idealism holds that consciousness appears first, matter, next. Matter, it has been observed, is simply the name for what exists objectively, with the one proviso that mind, thought, consciousness are its products. All further questions as to the nature of matter, its structure or composition, the relation of mass, energy, space, time, etc., are not primarily philosophical, but are to be resolved by the natural sciences themselves. (Selsam and Martel 1987, 45).

Early Materialism The world history of philosophy bears out that materialism emerged in India, China, and Greece independent of one another. Nevertheless, the fundamental similarity in their approaches justifies the use of the term “materialism” to all the three manifestations. However, every country, depending on the peculiarities of her tradition, betrays some special features that are not to be found in others. For example, among the seven issues noted below, the first five are common to all materialist traditions everywhere and at all times, while. Nevertheless, the last two are specifically Indian: (i) Matter is the first cause ( jagat-kāraṇa); it precedes consciousness. (ii) Consciousness (variously rendered as self, spirit, or soul) ceases to exist after the death of the body. (iii) There is no Other World, that is, heaven and hell. (iv) There is no rebirth or reincarnation (metempsychosis). (v) Verbal testimony (āptavākya) or word (śabda) is not a valid instrument of cognition (pramāṇa); perception is the first and the best instrument.

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(vi) Performance of sacrificial rites (yajña) and post-mortem rites for the dead ancestors (śrāddha) is useless [It follows from the above five]. (vii) No benefit follows from paying donations (dakṣinā) and gifts (dāna) to priests and brahmanas [It follows from the first feature].

Skepticism and Agnosticism in the Vedas The Vedas, particularly the Saṃhitās, are widely revered and accepted as a selfrevealed work (so admitted by the Mīmāṃsā schools) or composed by God Himself (according to the Nyāya school). Yet, since very early times, we hear of strong dissident voices, challenging the authority of the texts as infallible. Yet there is no evidence that skepticism or infideism contributed to the birth of materialism in India. So far as the literary sources are concerned, they are either theological (as the Vedic literature) or quasi-historical secular works, itihāsa-purāṇa, like the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. In the Upaniṣads we find a strong idealist bent, permeating the philosophical issues concerning the self, and a definite assertion of life after death, of heaven and hell, and of rebirth. Materialism is said to be associated with the demons (asuras, literally non-gods). In any case, the Upaniṣadic philosophy of ātman and brhaman, replace both the Vedic sacrificial cult and the primitive materialism expounded by Uddālaka Āruṇi (see below). Materialism as a full-fledged philosophical doctrine does not appear before the Common Era. Even then, the doctrinal aspect seems to be of less importance than its anti-theological and anti-fideist nature.

The Indian Scenario: Pre-Vedic (Harappan), Vedic, Puranic, and Local Indigenous Cults There is no written record of anything significant in the remains of the oldest known centers of civilization in northwest India. For convenience’ sake, the word “Harappan” is generally used to designate the vast area extending from Mohenjodaro (now in Pakistan) to Lothal (Gujarat, India). However, unlike Mesopotamia and Egypt, no papyrus or any other written document is yet to be found which would shed light on the scientific achievements of the civilization. The architecture and town planning exhibit a very high caliber both of engineers and builders. That is all that can be said about the First Urbanization India (around 2500 BCE. For details, see Chattopadhyaya 1986, Chaps. 4, 7, 11 and 12). So much is being said about town planning, sewerage, etc. of the Harappan Civilization for the simple reason that they are all evidence of logical thought in practice. Religion had its own place in the cities, and superstition, too, was most probably utilized to keep the working people submissive. There are some cult items among the ruins, but nothing definite can be said about the patterns of belief and/or worship of the Harappans. Altogether, what has come down is a set of dumb witnesses of an

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advanced culture in which logical thinking must have had its place along with the irrational faith in rituals. The question of the arrival of the vedic people from the north via Iran is still hotly debated. However, one thing is certain: the vedic people were village dwellers performing sacrificial rituals of their own, owing practically nothing to the indigenous inhabitants of northwest India. Gradual intermixture of the people led to a mixture of culture (technically known as “acculturation”) over time. This inevitably led to the birth of a new set of beliefs and rituals. It was much later – unfortunately no definite date can even be suggested – that serious misgivings, doubts, and finally denials of all the existing ritual practices appeared. One such doubter called Kautsya challenged the vedic rituals and their viability on the ground of being nonsensical (For some instances see Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957, 34–36, 227 n1; Sarup 1984, 78–81; Del Toso 2012, 138–141). Scepticism, doubt concerning the widely accepted views regarding the origin of the universe and such fundamental issues are first manifested in a hymn called the “Nāsadīya Sūkta” in the Ṛgveda, Book 10 hymn 129 stanzas 1–7. Four of them are quoted below: There was neither non-existence nor existence then. There was neither the realm of space nor the sky which is beyond. What stirred? Where? In whose Protection? Was there water, bottom-lessly deep? 1 There was neither death nor immortality then. There was no distinguishing sign of night nor of day. That one breathed, windless, by its own impulse. Other than that there was nothing beyond. 2 ... ... ... Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it? Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation? The gods came afterwards, with the creation of this universe. Who then knows whence it has arisen? 6 Whence this creation has arisen – perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not – The one who looks down on it, In the highest heaven, only He knows Or perhaps he does not know.7 (https://www.sanskritimagazine.com/indian-religions/hinduism/the-hymn-of-creationnasadiya-sukta/)

Two other hymns in the Ṛgveda also expressed doubt (1.164 and 10.190). However, the most effective doubt evolved round the question of life after death. Whether there was any Other World and rebirth is voiced in the question of Naciketas to Yama, the lord of the Dead in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad throughout the later period this question appeared again and again. It divided up the thinkers into two groups: those who believed in the existence of the Other World and those who did not. Accordingly, they were known as āstikas (the assenters) and the nāstikas

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(dissenters). These were the original meaning of the words. Only the materialists were then regarded as dissenters, with the Buddhists and the Jains joining hands with the brahmanical people in condemning the materialists solely on this ground. In the course of time, however, a second point of difference arose: whether one believed in the Vedas as an infallible source of knowledge or not. This point alienated the Buddhists and the Jains from the assenters as they did not believe in the authenticity of the Veda. This is how Dharmakīrti (1943), a Buddhist philosopher, branded the brahmanical thinkers as follows: Acceptance of the authority of the Veda and of someone as the creator, the desire of getting merit through the (holy) dip, the vanity of (higher) castes, and torturing the body to redeem the sins – these are the five marks of stupidity (Quoted in Rahul Sankrityayan 1978, 8. Translation amended).

The Jains, too, were strictly vegetarian and satirized the vedic priests and their followers for eating flesh and drinking wine (particularly in the Sautrāmaṇī sacrifice). Thus they were at one with the Buddhists and the materialists. Their target was the annual ritual called Śrāddha, the post-mortem rites for the dead ancestors. In this way the materialists belonged to the same camp as the Buddhists and the Jains as the three were opposed to the vedic sacrifice-oriented rituals.

Evidence of the Upanisads re: Ontology and Epistemology ˙ Mention has already been made of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. It has been most probably composed to uphold the view of the immortality of the soul, rebirth, and the justice meted out by Yama against the nonbelievers in the Other World. Yama is the Lord of the dead and their abode called Naraka, equivalent to the Hell in other religious systems. Another Upaniṣad called Bṛhad-āraṇyaka contains the conversation between the sage Yājñyavalkya and his wife, Maitreyī: It is like this. When a chunk of salt is thrown in water, it dissolves into that very water, and it cannot be picked up in any way. Yet, from whichever place one may take a sip, the salt is there! In the same way this Immense Being has no limit or boundary and is a single mass of perception. It arises out of and together with these beings and disappears after them—so I say, after death there is no awareness. (Patrick Olivelle’s translation) This was of course not Yājñyavalkya’s own view. He said only to test his wife. Naturally she was confused. The sage then made his point clear. It is interesting to observe that Uddālaka Āruṇi uses the same simile (an instance of inference by analogy in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad). Uddālaka asks his son: “Put this chunk of salt in a container of water and come back tomorrow.” The son did as he was told, and the father said to him: “The chunk of salt you put in the water last evening—bring it here.” He groped for it but could not find it, as it had dissolved completely. “Now, take a sip from this corner,” said the father. “How does it taste?”

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“Salty.” “Take a sip from the center.—How does it taste?” “Salty.” “Take a sip from that corner.—How does it taste?” “Salty.” “Throw it out and come back later.” He did as he was told and found that the salt was always there. The father told him: “You, of course, did not see it there, son; yet it was always right there. “The finest essence here—that constitutes the self of this whole world; that is the truth; that is the self (ātman). And that’s how you are, Śvetaketu.” (6.13.1–3)

Concept of Natural Elements in India and Greece The separation of earth, air, fire, and water, as the basic constituent elements of all natural objects comprehensible by the five senses, marks the point of departure from mythology to philosophy. As in Greece, so in India, these four basic elements constitute the basis of many philosophical speculations, both in the idealist or materialist. All scientific speculations, whether in the field of natural sciences or of medicine, accept the concept of the elements called bhūtas or mahābhūtas that are at the basis of all phenomena. Unlike the Greeks, however, Indian speculators spoke also of a fifth element, sky (ākāśa, vyoma), or emptiness (śūnya). All philosophical systems except the Cārvāka/Lokāyata adhered to the five-element formula, corresponding to the five senses. Thus, earth corresponds to smell, air to touch, fire to heat, and so on. Even the earlier, pre-Cārvāka materialists had adopted it, which is one of the points on which the Cārvāka/Lokāyata differs from them. The medical compilation called the Caraka-saṃhitā is at bottom materialistic, but, unlike the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, it adheres to the five-element theory. In any case, one conclusion is inescapable: the material basis of all objects was universally accepted to be these four or five elements. All realist philosophical systems too accepted these elements as archē, whether or not there was a creator god. The doctrine of atomism too was molded to fit in this theory of elements. Besides the elements, own-being (svabhāva) was also claimed to be the first cause. In the works of later philosophers the doctrine of own-being is made to be associated with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, although originally this doctrine was distinct from that of the elements (as in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.2). The word, svabhāva, too was later interpreted in two diametrically opposite ways: svabhāva-as-accident and svabhāva-as-causality.

Heterodox and Heretical Doctrines: A¯jīvikism, Buddhism, Jainism, etc. The sixth/fifth century BCE in India, China, Greece, and Iran saw a great philosophical upheaval. Leaving aside other countries, India alone witness a breakdown of Vedic orthodoxy. The existence of no fewer than 52 itinerant preachers is attested

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by the Buddhist texts, such as “The Brahmajāla Sutta” in the Long Discourses (Dīgha Nikāya), but only six are named. One of them was known as Ajita of the hair-blanket. He preached proto-materialist doctrine, denying everything that was to be denied, particularly the Other World, of paying oblation to the gods, the inefficacy of gifts (dāna), etc. The Atharvaveda was a product of the acculturation between the Vedic and the non-vedic indigenous people. This Veda was for a long time not recognized as a Veda at all. There were difference of opinion even among the Vedists, such as Manu, the law-giver, opposing the entry of the Atharvaveda in the Trayī (the three Vedas, Ṛk, Sāman and Yajus only); Kumārila and Jayanta, two philosophers belonging to Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools respectively, supported the claim of the Atharvaveda, and thereby upheld the concept of Chaturveda (pronounced Chatur-veda, four Vedas) instead of three. For details, see Dipak Bhattacharya, “Trayi, triads and the Vedas” (forthcoming) and his Introduction to the Atharvaveda of the Paippalāda school, particularly vol.4. Thus, the so-called orthodoxy around the Veda was already in a jeopardy. The rise of Buddhism and Jainism dealt a blow to the concept of the Veda itself.

The A¯stika and the Na¯stika Systems of Philosophy Nāstikya is derived from nāstika, which literally means “one who says (or believes) that (it) does not exist.” The opposite word, āstika, similarly signifies “one who says (or believes) that (it) exists.” Originally it was the assertion and denial of the existence of the Other World, that is, life after death. In the course of time āstika and nāstika came to suggest the upholder and defiler of the authority of the Veda, the most sacred book of the brahmanical people, the theist and the atheist, and similar affirmation and denial of any doctrine (see Bhattacharya 2009, 227–232). Originally the negativistic systems were counted as three: (1) the Buddhist, (2) the Jain, and (3) the materialists. But then, perhaps to pair the number six of the affirmativistic systems (namely, (1) Mīmāṃsā (also called pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), (2) Vedānta (also called uttara- Mīmāṃsā), (3) Sāṃkhya, (4) Yoga, (5) Nyāya, and (6) Vaiśeṣika), the negativistic systems were also counted as six: the four schools of Buddhist philosophy (viz., Madhyamaka (or Mādhyamika), Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika), along with the Jain, and the materialists. Of these four, the first two were idealist, preaching the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyavāda), and that of the momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda), while the last two, realist. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (seventeenth century CE), in his Prasthānabhedaḥ 1977, 1, first identifies these as “six [negativist] philosophies” (ṣaḍ [nāstika] darśanāni). Cimanabhaṭṭa (1923, 89–90) repeats it, emphasizing their anti-Vedic character. See also Radhakanta Deva, Śabdakalpadruma 1836 Śaka, s.v. nāstika. “The six systems of Indian philosophy,” however, refer to the affirmativist systems only. For details see F. Max Müller 1899/ 1971).

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Two Old (Pre-Ca¯rva¯ka) Materialist Schools Before the Eighth Century CE. Manime¯kalai – Bhūtava¯da and Loka¯yata ˙ What has been seldom noticed – and even when noticed, never studied in detail – is the upheaval of the philosophical scene in India at a point of time between the fourth and the seventh century. It is to be found in the Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai. Six systems are said to be accepting logic, namely, Lokāyata, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā (27.77–85). The poem also provides evidence of the existence of at least two pre-Cārvāka materialist doctrines in south India, Lokāyata and bhūtavāda (an exact rendering of “materialism”). The exponent of bhūtavāda declares that in spite of several points of similarity, there are some differences between the two (27.265–77). As there is no mention of four elements instead of five (earth, air, fire, water, and space or emptiness), it is logical to assume that bhūtavāda was a five-elementalist (bhūta-pañcaka-vādin) doctrine. With the appearance of the Cārvākas, a new doctrine of four-elements (bhūta-catuṣṭaya-vāda) was introduced, perhaps for the first time. In the exposition of his doctrine the bhūtavādin in the Maṇimēkalai brings out the basic difference between old (pre-Cārvāka) materialism and new (Cārvāka) materialism. They are as follows: (a) Instead of five elements (including ākāśa or vyoma, space) as their principle (tattva), the Cārvākas spoke of four, excluding space, presumably because it was not amenable to sense-perception. (b) The followers of bhūtavāda believed in two kinds of matter: lifeless and living. Life originates from living matter, the body from the lifeless. The Cārvāka/ Lokāyatas did not believe in such duality; to them all beings/entities were made of the same four basic elements. (c) There was another domain in which the two differed more radically. Some of the pre-Cārvāka materialists were accidentalists (yadṛcchāvādins); they did not believe in causality. On the other hand, the Cārvākas appear to have endorsed causality; they adopted the doctrine of svabhāva-as-causality rather than the opposite one, namely, svabhāva-as-accident. (d) The Cārvākas admitted the validity of inference insofar as it was confined to the material and perceptible world (hence verifiable). They, however, made a clear distinction between the lokasiddha (commonly accepted) and tantrasiddha (following from scripture) hetu-s (Udbhaṭa quoted in the SVR, 265–266). Jayantabhaṭṭa used another set of terms to designate the same distinction: “The well-versed ones say that (in fact) there are two kinds of inference, ‘some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by one self’ (utpanna- pratīti), and ‘some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on somebody else’s advice)’ (utpādya- pratīti) [The former kind is valid, but the latter kind is not].” (Jayantabhaṭṭa Ch. 2, I: 184. Jayanta seems to have taken it from some commentary, most probably by Udbhaṭa, on the Cārvākasūtra). However, it should not be extended to the invisible and unverifiable areas, such as the imperishable soul, god, omniscient persons (admitted by the

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Buddhists and the Jains as well), the outcome of performing sacrifices called apūrva (as claimed by the Mīmāṃsa philosophers), etc., while some of the old materialists rejected inference as such as a means of knowledge, and clung to perception alone. Purandara, a Cārvāka philosopher, stated categorically: “The Cārvāka-s, too, admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them].” Eli Franco says, “This is probably the most significant contribution of Purandara to the Lokāyata school (at least it is the one for which he is remembered) [...]” (Franco 1991, 159). The most detailed and pointed challenge to inference as an independent means of knowledge has been provided in the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, Chap. 1. It runs as follows: Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the sign or middle term as the cause of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invarriably connected with the major. Now this invarriable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed; and this connection dose not posses its power of causing inference by virtue of its existence, as the eye, etc., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being known. What, then is the means of this connection’s being known? We will first show that it is not perception. Now perception is held to be two kinds, external and internal (i.e. as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind). The former is not the required means; for, although it is posssible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there never can be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition, which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existaence of the invariable connection in this particular case (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire). Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians. ‘The eye, ctc., have their object as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others.’ Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression. (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya 1990, 250–251).

Loka¯yata Before and After the Fourth Century CE Materialism in India has been known at different times by different names. One name that has stuck is Lokāyata in Sanskrit and Pali, and Logāyata in Prakrit. Earlier scholars tended to look at this word as always referring to materialism. Right from the Science of Polity by Kauṭilya (Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra) (c. fourth century BCE) down to the present day, the word occurs in diverse texts, philosophical and non-philosophical. A little reflection, however, shows that in some of these sources

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Lokāyata does not mean a system of philosophy which was a target of abuse indulged in by all orthodox Veda-abiding thinkers. The word, lokāyata, does not occur in the Vedas and its ancillary literature, or anywhere in the Pali Three Caskets (Tipiṭaka). In Kauṭilya’s work Lokāyata is associated with Sāṃkhya and Yoga, two systems known to be very much pro-Vedic in the later philosophical tradition of India. But then it is not known whether by Sāṃkhya, Kauṭilya means the atheistic Epic Sāṃkhya (found in the Book of Tranquillity, Śāntiparvan in the Mahābhārata) and what he means by Yoga: Nyāya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, or the system of philosophy attributed to Patañjali or something else (For details see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, Chap. 10, 131–136). The context suggests that Lokāyata stands for logic-based philosophy. All Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit texts, whether belonging to the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna) or the Less Vehicle (Hīnayāna), carry only one meaning: disputatio, the science of disputation (vitaṇḍa(vāda)-sattham) as recorded by all commentators of the Buddhist canonical and para-canonical texts as well as by the ancient lexicographers. In the “Discourse on the Fruits of Being a Monk” and elsewhere (e.g., the Jātaka tales), the doctrine of Ajita Kesakambala is called “the doctrine of annihilation,” Ucchedavāda not Lokāyata. Pali sources, however, speak of seven kinds of ucchedavāda (“Brahmajālasutta,” 1.3.84–91. Dīghanikāya 1958, 30–32). But nothing definite is known about the other kinds than that of Ajita’s. All these doctrines mentioned in the “Brahmajālasutta” are part of the 62 heresies (diṭṭhiyo). Neither the text nor its commentators are of any assistance in knowing about such doctrines as eternalism (sassatavāda), whose adherents held that the self and the universe are eternal. This doctrine too is of four kinds. There are references to 16 kinds of the doctrine which held that the spirit is conscious after death and eight kinds of its opposite doctrine which held that the spirit is unconscious after death. We are further told that there were eight kinds of yet another doctrine which held that the spirit is neither conscious nor unconscious after death. There is, however, another term in Prakrit to suggest the earliest form of materialism: “the doctrine of (it does) not exist” (natthikavāda and nahiyavāda). See Jamkhedkar, 1984, 184. In Sanskrit works we have the word nāstika which is explained in two different ways: first as a doctrine preaching the non-existence of the Other World, and later, as the doctrine that denies or defiles the Veda. Cf. Manu-smṛti 2.11: “The nāstika is a defiler of the Veda” (nāstiko vedanindakaḥ), vol. 2, 1975. Although nāstika is admitted to be a synonym of cārvāka by the Buddhist and Jain authors and lexicographers, to the Vedists it would mean not only the Cārvākas but the Buddhists and the Jains as well, for all the three were non- or anti-Vedic in their outlooks. Several schools of materialists, some believing in the existence of five elements, some in four (space or Aether is not admitted) are known from The Book Composed against the [heretical] Sūtras (Sūtra-Kṛtāṅga-sūtra), a Jain canonical text. All of them are said to believe in the extinction of the soul or the spirit after the death of the body (See 1978, 1–10; English translation by Jacobi 1895, II: xiii). In the Maitrī Upaniṣad and the Padma Purāṇa, there is a story that Bṛhaspati, the preceptor/chaplain of the gods, intending to deceive the demons, created a system of philosophy. Bārhaspatya, “associated with Bṛhaspati,” is the fourth name given to the materialist. In some eighth-century works, all the four names, Bārhaspatya,

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Cārvāka, Lokāyata, and Nāstika, have been used interchangeably, suggesting materialism (Jinendrabuddhi 2005, 24: atha vā cārvākaṃ pratyetaducyate . . .. Haribhadra 1969, 80a: lokāyatā vadanty evam, etc., but in 85d: cārvākāḥ pratipedire. Kamalaśīla, Pañjikā to Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha 1968, 1981 Chap. 22 entitled “Lokāyataparīkṣā,” uses the names Cārvāka and Lokāyata interchangeably. See TSP, II: 639,649,657,663,665, also II: 520 (bārhaspatyādayaḥ), 939 (lokāyataḥ) and 945 (lokāyatam). In Hemacandra’s Sanskrit dictionary (twelfth century), all the four names are treated as synonymous. Besides these four names. Śīlāṅka, the Jain commentator, uses another term, “the doctrine of the identity of the soul and the body” (tajjīva-taccharīra-vāda). This is one of the early records of this name, found only in Jain sources. Two other names are often found in later works: dehātma-vāda, the doctrine that claims that the body and the spirit are the same, and bhūta-caitanya-vāda, the doctrine that makes the elements and consciousness appear as one (See Śaṅkarācārya on Brahmasūtra 1988, 1.1.1; Vyomaśiva 1983–84, vol. I:155).

New (Ca¯rva¯ka) Materialism – The Base Text and Its Commentators in and around the Eighth Century CE and After After the Upaniṣads and stray references to proto-materialist ideas comes the time of the formation of the philosophical systems, each having a set of aphorisms (sūtras) and its commentaries and subcommentaries. Broadly speaking, the brahmanical position was unsparing in denouncing all the three of its non-Vedic adversaries, whereas the materialists had to put up a lone battle against all philosophical systems, whether Vedic or non-Vedic, but mostly against Buddhism, Jainism, Nyāya, and Vedānta. While all the writings, the base text/s and the commentaries, of the pre-Cārvāka materialist schools are as yet unavailable, some fragments of the new, Cārvāka school have survived. They can be divided into three kinds: (a) aphorisms (sūtras) and pseudo-aphorisms, (b) extracts from commentaries to the aphorisms, and (c) verses attributed to the Cārvākas. For details see Bhattacharya 2009/2011, 69– 104. The book of aphorisms was most probably compiled by Purandara, who is also credited with writing a short commentary (vṛtti) (Bhattacharya 2009/2011 Sen, 82, 90). Besides the aphorisms which can be safely admitted as genuine, some others are of dubious authenticity. The distinction is made on the basis of the fact that some aphorisms are found quoted in several works of the opponents with more or less the same wording. Those which occur only once are labelled as pseudoaphorisms. Aphorisms form the basis of all classical philosophical systems (excepting Buddhism, Jainism, and the like), whether Vedānta or Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika. Therefore such collections of aphorisms are rightly called base (mūla) text. All philosophical systems, excepting those mentioned above, developed round the commentaries (in some cases sub-commentaries, too) written by the adherents of every system. The case of the Cārvāka is no different. There was apparently a base text, probably the Paurandarasūtra, and an auto-commentary, Paurandarīyavṛtti.

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Names of four more commentators are found (with extracts from their works quoted) in other sources. They are Bhāviveka, Kambalāśvatara (“blanket-mule,” most probably a nickname), Aviddhakarṇa (“whose ear is not pierced,” probably another nickname), and Udbhaṭa-bhaṭṭa (Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa, most probably of Kashmirian origin, flourished in the ninth century). The Cārvāka system, very much like other systems, did not remain unaltered. It had its development. This is borne out by the interpretation of some of the aphorisms offered by some commentators in or before the eighth century. Kamalaśīla, Pañjikā on Tattvasaṃgraha verse 1864 mentions two approaches to the interpretation of an aphorism which contained no verb. One commentator supplied the verb “is born” after the subject, so that it reads “consciousness is born of these (elements),” while another commentator explained the same aphorism as “consciousness is manifested from these (elements).” Since Kamalaśīla uses plural in case of both, it is not clear whether he means two individual commentators (the plural being honorific) or two groups of commentators (each group having some adherents of its own). As no names are mentioned, it is impossible to decide what Kamalaśīla had in mind. Udbhaṭa is the last known commentator. Jayanta and Cakradhara both speak of the “old (cirantana) Cārvāka” like Bhāviveka and the recent one like Udbhaṭa. Udbhaṭa goes against the literal meaning of the aphorisms; he twists the meaning of some words which can be made, almost under duress to conform to the meanings preferred by Udbhaṭa. In many respects, this last of the commentators may be called a revisionist among the Cārvākas. In his way of interpretation the fundamental nature of the materialism is so compromised as to reach the threshold of idealism. Nevertheless, there is one point that unites the three commentators Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa. They all assert that, although inference based on perception can provide true knowledge, inference based on authority (āpta) and verbal testimony (śabda or āptavākya) are inadmissible. Hence, any statement concerning the existence of heaven and hell, god, an omniscient person (admitted by both Jains and the Buddhists), etc. are open to question. Nevertheless, according to all of them, inference per se is not an independent instrument of cognition. Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa between themselves provide a number of arguments, both subtle and to the point, to establish this view. As an instance of the logical acumen of the materialists in India, we quote below a passage in which the claim of inference as an independent means of knowledge is sought to be refuted from all possible angles. The anonymous author says: When we say that the ascertainment of the form “fire is in the hill” establishes fire as characterised by the hill, it is not stated what sort of fire is being spoken of in these sentences. Unless specially stated, expression “fire” may stand either (i) for all instances of fire, or (ii) for some unexpected fire, or (iii) for the fire that is known before, or (iv) for the fire that is in the hill. The statement made above dose not also state definitely as to where exactly fire is being established. The fire may be established either (i) everywhere, or (ii) in some unspecified place, or (iii) in some location previously known to us, or (iv) in the hill etc. that are now perceived. Now each of the four possibilities about the fire may be established by anumāna can be combined with each of four possibilities that hold about the location where the fire

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may be established. Thus, we have in all 4
4 ¼ 16 possibilities, and due to some defect or other, none of them can be admitted. . .. 1. Every Fire (as related to the hill) is present everywhere. 2. Every such Fire is present at some unspecified place. 3. Every such Fire is present in the location of the fire that has been previously known to us. 4. Every such Fire is present in the places that are being perceived now, e.g., the hill. 5. Some unspecified fire is present everywhere. 6. Some unspecified fire is present at some unspecified place. 7. Some unspecified fire is present in previously perceived location (e.g., the kitchen). 8. Some unspecified fire is present in the hill before us. 9. Some previously known fire exists everywhere. 10. Some previously known fire exists at some unspecified places. 11. Some previously known fire exists at some previously perceived location. 12. Some previously known fire exists in the hill that is being perceived. 13. The fire present in the hill exists everywhere. 14. The fire present in the hill exists at some unspecified places. 15. The fire present in the hill exists at some previously perceived location. 16. The fire present in the hill exists in the hill. Now among these alternatives, (1) is inadmissible, because it is contradicted by perception. The same is true for (2), (3), (4), and (5). (6) is a case of proving what is already established, i.e., admitted by everyone. (7), (8), (9), and (10) are contradicted by perception. (11) is again a case of siddha–sādhana, i.e., establishing what is already established. (12), (13), (14), and (15) are contradicted by perception. (16) is once again a case of establishing what is already established. Thus none of the alternatives that may be considered here has been found to be tenable (Sen 2010, 19–20).

The Philosophical Outlook of the Ca¯rva¯ka Here are the aphorisms that are found quoted in the works of the opponents of the Cārvākas over and over again, but some are found once only.

The Aphorisms and Pseudo-aphorisms I. Materialism I.1We shall now explain the principle. I.2 Earth, water, fire, and air are the principles, nothing else. I.3Their combination is called “body”, “sense” and “object”. I.4 Consciousness (arises or is manifested) out of these.

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I.5 As the power of intoxication (arises or is manifested) from the constituent parts of wine (such as flour, water and molasses). I.6 The self is (nothing but) the body endowed with consciousness. I.7 From the body itself. +I.8 Because of the existence (of consciousness) where there is a body. I.9 Souls are like water bubbles. The doctrine of inherent nature (lit. own being) II.1 The world is varied due to the variation of origin. II.2 As the eye in the peacock’s tail. The doctrine of the primacy of perception III.l Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge. III.2 Since the means of right knowledge is to be nonsecondary, it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of inference. The doctrine of the denial of rebirth and the Other World IV.l There is no means of knowledge for determining (the existence of) the Other World. IV.2 There is no Other World because of the absence of any Other-Worldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self). IV.3 Due to the insubstantiality of consciousness (residing in the Other World). The doctrine of the uselessness of performing religious acts V.1 Religious act is not to be performed. V.2 Its (religion’s) instructions are not to be relied upon.

The style of composing the aphorisms is not different from that of the other philosophical systems. Of these, one aphorism (I.5) is worth noting. It replies to an objection. Does any random combination of these elements as flour, water, and molasses (as mentioned in I.5) produce the intoxicating power? The Cārvākas said: No, only a particular kind of transformation of these elements, pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ, can produce such an effect. None of these is intoxicating in itself, but the total effect of a particular transformation results in producing the power of intoxication. Thus, a particular kind of combination of these elements, and no other, is an essential condition. Only one kind of combination would yield the desired result. This is what is called upamāna in Indian logic, comparable to inference by analogy in Western logic. As the aphorism shows, it was meant to be understood as a simile; the actual object of comparison (upameya) is consciousness being born or produced from the four natural elements, earth, air, fire, and water. The momentous question of how consciousness can come out of a body admittedly consisting of unconscious elements, was sought to be answered with the help of a simile. The Cārvāka/ Lokāyatas are often accused of being pramāṇaikavādins, they are alleged to have accepted only one means of knowledge, namely, perception. But in the very aphorisms forming their base text, reveals that inference by analogy had its place in the materialist system. Similes based on analogy are as much part of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata sayings as any other system of logic and philosophy in pre-modern India.

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The simile in question – nonintoxicating elements giving rise to the power of intoxication – thus represents more than it appears. Elsewhere too, similar similes are employed to prove the existence of the immortal soul. Kumāra Kassapa employs a series of similes to refute the materialist’s claim that consciousness perishes with the death of the body. The duologue between Pāyāsi (Paesi in Māgadhi Prakrit), the king/governor, and Kumāra Kassapa, a Buddhist monk in the “Pāyāsisūttanta” of the Long Discourses (Dīghanikāya) shows how comparisons could be so employed by both the parties: the materialists and the idealists, in order to prove the same truth.

Satirical Epigrams The verses that are attributed to Bṛhaspati or the Cārvākas are mostly of the nature of what was called “sung while intoxicated,” pramatta-gīta in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (1972, 18–19) and Śabara’s commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, 2.2.26 (110) and 3.1.17(159) as opposed to the pro-vedic verses called bhrāja. Such verses might have been composed by the Buddhists and the Jains as well and are not rare by any means. Only three of the ten and half verses quoted by Sāyaṇa-Mādhava may be said to reflect the materialist view proper; others might have originated from the Buddhist or Jain circles as well. The verses run as follows: There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world. Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect. While life remains let a man live happily; nothing is beyond death. When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again? If he who departs from the body goes to another world, How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred? (Sāyaṇa-Mādhava 1978, 13–15)

The Ca¯rva¯kas, the Buddhists, and the Jains The Buddhists and the Jains share some of the views of the Cārvākas. All the three were branded as “negativists” by the Vedists of all sorts. They were opposed more particularly to the performance of annual rituals for the departed ancestors (śrāddha) and sacrificial rites (yajña) with a view to fulfilling one’s heart’s desire, both in this world and the next. But the opposition of the two religious communities on the one hand and the Cārvākas on the other arose from different reasons. Both the rites involved slaying of animals, which was anathema to the doctrine of non-injury (ahiṃsā) of the Buddhists and the Jains. The Cārvākas too were opposed to the performance of post-mortem rites, for they regarded them as useless (since there can be no life after death) and no benefit can accrue from the performance of yajñas, for there were no gods to grant the sacrificers’ prayers. In spite of all this, the two religious communities clung to the idea of rebirth, after-life (paraloka), and the mysterious effects of karman and adṛṣṭa. The Cārvāka/Lokāyata stands apart from all other philosophical systems in India that strove against one another for centuries. They

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denied all that was axiomatic to others, specially the infallibility of the Veda and/or the doctrine of karman and rebirth. Since the Cārvākas did not consider philosophy to be a means of emancipation from the cycle of rebirth (mokṣa, mukti, or nirvāṇa) but viewed it as a practical guide to life, they incurred the wrath of all who believed in the Other World and rebirth. The Cārvākas preached an outlook that was life-asserting, while others proposed a negative attitude towards earthly existence. The Cārvākas did not think in terms of the four aims of life (puruṣārthas), namely, religious merit (dharma), wealth (artha), pleasure (kāma), and freedom (mokṣa). This too marks them apart from others.

The Ca¯rva¯kas Against Caste and Gender Discriminations What the opponents of the Cārvāka make them say regarding caste (varṇa) and women deserves attention. They are represented as opposed to caste discrimination and in favor of equality of women and men. This representation (censorial in intention) is borne out by the heretical views attributed to Kali, personification of the Iron Age, in Śrīharṣa’s Life of Naiṣadha (Naiṣadha-carita): Since purity of caste is possible only in the case of purity on each side of both families of the grandparents, what caste is pure by the purity of limitless generations? Fie on those who boast of family dignity! They hold women in check out of jealousy; but do not likewise restrain men, though the blindness of passion is common to both! Spurn all censorious statements about women as not worth a straw. Why dost thou constantly cheat people when thou, too, art as bad as women? (17. 40, 42, 58)

That this is not an isolated case or a mere figment of Śrīharṣa’s imagination is borne out by similar representations found elsewhere. In Kṛṣṇamiśra’s (eleventh century) allegorical play, Prabodhacandrodaya (Rise of Moon-like Intellect), Mahāmoha (Great Delusion), an avowed materialist, declares: If the bodies are alike in their different parts, the mouth, etc., how can there be a hierarchy of castes? 2.18ab. For details see R. Bhattacharya 36 (2010):37–42.

Disappearance of the Ca¯rva¯kas One of the many mysteries in the history of the philosophies in India is the disappearance of several religious and philosophical systems without leaving any trace whatsoever. The Cārvākas and their predecessors belong to those whose existence is attested but nothing of substance remains for the present generation to gather a more or less comprehensive knowledge of their doctrines. However, like the Ajīvikas, various stages of development of materialist thought in both north and south India can be and have been partially sketched by both Indian and European scholars since the first half of the nineteenth century. The fragments were discovered sporadically;

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their agreement with one another could be proved after the publication of new manuscripts. For instance, the discovery of Cakaradhara’s Granthibhaṅga, a commentary on Jayantabhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī, helped clear the identity of the “cunning Cārvāka” and “the well-educated Cārvāka” in the text. Instead of referring to two different persons, Jayanta, it is now known, was meaning one commentator only, that is, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa. His name was found in other sources as well, and thus several fragments of his commentary are at present available. More intensive research and further discovery of new manuscripts will surely facilitate the task of reconstructing the views of the Cārvākas.

Definition of Key Terms Caste (varṇa) discrimination

Inference

Materialism

Perception

Rationalism

The Indian society guided by the Vedas, the sacred books and religious law-books, promoted the inviolable division of four castes, the Brahmana (the priest class), Kṣatriya (the warrior class), Vaiśya (the trading and agricultural class), and Śūdra (the working class). The hierarchy was considered to be ordained by God Himself. It is a means of knowledge to draw conclusions from already established conclusions, particularly in such cases where perception cannot be resorted to. The philosophical views that consider matter to be primary and consciousness, secondary that arises out of matter. Consequently, consciousness perishes with the death of the body. The five senses of humans, namely, sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste, are accepted as the most definite means of knowledge, and superior to all others, such as inference, verbal testimony, and comparison. It is an approach that does not rely on any religious faith or dogma but prefers to be guided by reason in all walks of life (in the eighteenth century the meaning was different; it was then opposed to empiricism).

Summary Points • Priority of matter over consciousness. • Denial of the Other World, heaven and hell, etc. • Denial of the rebirth, karman.

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• Denial of the efficacy of religious rites, performance of sacrifices to the gods and post-mortem rites of the ancestors. • Denial of the existence of immortal and incorporeal soul. • Denial of the special status of the Veda as the ultimate source of all knowledge. • Denial of the existence of God or gods (atheism).

Appendix A. Aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms I. bhūtavāda I.1. athātastattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ I.2. pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni I.3. tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñāḥ I.4. tebhyaścaitanyam I.5. kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat I.6. caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ I.7. śarīrād eva +I.8. śarīre bhāvāt I.9. jalabudbudavajjīvāḥ II. svabhāvavāda II.l. janmavaicitryabhedājjagadapi vicitram II.2. mayūracandrakavat III. pratyakṣaprādhānyavāda III.l. pratyakṣam (ekam) eva pramāṇam III.2. pramāṇasyāgauṇatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ IV. punarjanma-paraloka-vilopavāda +IV.l. paralokāsiddhau pramāṇābhāvāt IV.2. paralokino ‘bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ +IV.3. paralokicaitanyaṃ niravayavatvāt V. vedaprāmāṇya-niṣedhavāda +V.l. dharmo na kāryaḥ +V.2. tad upadeśeṣu na pratyetavyam

References Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2009/2011. Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Firenze/London: Società Editriche Fiorentina/Anthem Press. Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2020. More Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. New castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Bhattacharya, Dipak. 2016. Introductions. In Paippalāda-Samhita of The Atharvaveda, vol. 4. Kolkata: The Asiatic Society. Bhattacharya, Dipak. Trayi, triads and the Vedas (forthcoming).

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General Introduction to Buddhist Logic Joerg Tuske

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Objects Are Empty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concepts Are Empty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Are Nāgārjuna’s Four Alternatives? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . How Is It Possible to Reject All Four Alternatives? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Diṅnāga on Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dharmakīrti on Diṅnāga on Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Meaning as Exclusion: apoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Case for apoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Header Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

This chapter discusses some key concepts of Buddhist logic from different traditions. The first part deals with Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga technique and his claim that reality is empty (s´ūnya). The idea that the claim that everything is empty, if true, might be regarded as empty itself is discussed. The second part provides an overview of Diṅnāga’s view on inference and his theory of the three conditions of an inferential sign (hetu). This theory is compared to the Nyāya view on inference and the question whether the second of Diṅnāga’s conditions is redundant is raised. The third part explores Dharmakīrti’s developments of Diṅnāga’s view on inference, particularly his introduction of the particle eva

J. Tuske (*) Department of Philosophy, Salisbury University, Salisbury, MD, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_2

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and the three types of hetu. The final part of this chapter presents an outline of Diṅnāga’s apoha (exclusion) theory of the meaning and function of concepts and words. Keywords

anupalabdhi-hetu (reason based on nonobservation) · apoha (exclusion) · catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) · eva (only exactly really) · hetu (inferential sign reason) · kārya-hetu (reason qua effect) · nis´citam (determinately, necessarily) · pakṣa (locus of inference) · paryudāsa (nominally bound) · prasajya-pratis´edha (verbally bound) · prasaṅga technique (technique showing the “consequences”) · sādhya (thesis-to-be-inferred) · sapakṣa (homologue or place which is known to possess the sādhya already) · svabhāva-hetu (reason based on natural reason) · s´ū nya (empty) · vipakṣa (heterologue or place which is known not to possess the sādhya)

Introduction The term “logic” played an important role in Indian philosophical thinking, even though there is no equivalent to this word in Sanskrit or Pāli. Indian thinkers were clearly concerned with ideas of inference and the meaning of language, all of which play a large role in the study of logic, as defined by Western philosophers. What makes logic “Buddhist” is the fact that many of the Buddhist thinkers were developing ideas based on their views about metaphysics and epistemology in opposition to other Indian thinkers, for example Naiyāyikas. As with most themes in Indian philosophy, it is difficult to find one common narrative within Buddhist logic. However, several contributions by Buddhist thinkers stand out: (1) the prasaṅga method of Nāgārjuna, (2) the theory of inference developed by Diṅnāga, (3) the development of the theory of an inferential sign by Dharmakīrti, and (4) the apoha theory of the meaning of concepts and words by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. In this chapter, an introductory outline of these four key developments in Buddhist thinking will be given.

Nāgārjuna’s prasan˙ga Technique The prasaṅga technique developed by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 CE) is a logical tool to establish his claim that all concepts and objects are empty or void (s´ūnya). He was aware that this claim was open to misinterpretation. In his work Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) he says: By a misperception of emptiness A person of little intelligence is destroyed. Like a snake incorrectly seized

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Or like a spell incorrectly cast. (MMK 24.11)

First, before analyzing the claim that concepts are empty or void, the probable meaning of Nāgārjuna’s claim that objects are empty or void will be discussed. This is necessary for understanding the prasaṅga technique.

Objects Are Empty In his work Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV), Nāgārjuna claims that: Whether in the causes (hetu), in the conditions (pratyaya), in the combination of the causes and the conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī ), or in a different thing, nowhere does exist an intrinsic nature of the things, whatever they may be. On this ground it is said that all things are void (s´ūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ). (VV 1)

These statements can be paraphrased as: 1. An object is empty or void if and only if it lacks any intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Nāgārjuna also says: That nature of the things which is dependent is called voidness, for that nature which is dependent is devoid of an intrinsic nature (yas´ ca pratī tyabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam). [. . .] Those things which are dependently originated are not, indeed, endowed with an intrinsic nature; for they have no intrinsic nature (ye hi pratī tyasamutpannā bhāvās te na sasvabhāvā bhavanti, svabhāvābhāvāt). – Why? – Because they are dependent of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāpekṣatvāt). If the things were by their own nature (svabhāvataḥ), they would be even without the aggregate of causes and conditions (pratyākhyāyāpi hetupratyayam). (VV 22)

This statement can be rendered as: 2. An object has self-nature if and only if it is independent (i.e., without causes and conditions) of other things. This is in part an “antiessentialist” doctrine. What is meant by this is that it is a rejection of the idea that objects possess fixed, eternal essences. But it is also more than that: it claims that objects have no intrinsic properties whatsoever. A property that belongs to an object independently of its relation with other things is an “intrinsic property.” A four-legged chair, for example, has the intrinsic property of “being four-legged,” and it might have the relational property of being to the left of the table. Nāgārjuna, however, claims that all properties are relational. Nāgārjuna’s system is called Mādhyamika or the “doctrine of the middle way.” “Middle way” means steering an alternative between two extreme positions which are called “eternalism” and “annihilationism” (or “nihilism”). An eternalist is an essentialist, who claims that each object exists independently of any others by

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having an immutable essence. An annihilatonist claims that objects do not exist at all. At first glance, annihilationism might not sound like a feasible position. It is based on the idea that it is seemingly impossible to establish a grounding for the objects of the five senses. Everything one perceives can, at least in theory, be divided up further. Hence, there is no final basis to reality. The annihilationist claims that this makes reality nonexistent. Nāgārjuna adopts a middle position between these extremes: objects exist, not by self-subsisting but by having a nature determined by their relations to other objects. The Sanskrit word s´ūnya which is translated as “empty” or “void” has another technical sense. It was used by the early Indian mathematicians as the name for the numeral zero. The point of introducing a zero into the counting system is that it serves as a place marker. The value of the other numerals like 1 becomes dependent on their place with regard to the zero. Take for example 10 or 100. Likewise, a zero only has a value in relation to the other numerals. Matilal points out that the analogy of a place marker works well if the emptiness thesis is understood as saying that an object’s or concept’s properties, including those that determine its nature, are relational. To say that a concept is s´ūnya means that it is like the zero because it has no absolute values of its own but has a value only with respect to a position in a system. (Matilal 2005, p. 118)

So, according to the doctrine of emptiness none of the observed objects in the world have any true nature which can be grasped by anyone. Objects are only objects in relation to other objects. Another way the doctrine of emptiness works is by application to concepts. It was just shown how it applies to objects but of course in order to think and talk about objects, one needs concepts. So, the next claim is that concepts are empty.

Concepts Are Empty The idea is that every concept, statement, or even philosophical theory is empty. A natural way to interpret this, in the light of the doctrine about objects, is: 3. Statements/theories/concepts have no independent semantic properties. This means that theories are empty in that the terms and concepts involved in them fail to refer at all. One example of a scientific theory which was held to be true at some point but which turned out not to refer to anything was the phlogiston theory in chemistry. Phlogiston is the putative name of a substance emitted during combustion. It turned out however that there is no such substance. The term phlogiston does not refer to anything just like the description “The present king of France” does not refer to anything when uttered in 2017. The fact that a statement is empty means that it lacks a referent. However, this does not mean that it does not have a functional role in language. Nāgārjuna wants to say that all statements are like statements with

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nonreferring expressions. This reading is supported by Nāgārjuna’s general philosophical prasaṅga technique. This technique works in the following way: one takes a hypothesis p and shows that it leads to a contradiction. In addition to that one shows that the negation of p also leads to a contradiction. If this can be done then one can infer that the concepts in this hypothesis fail to refer. Example 1: “A Square Circle Is Circular”

The idea of a square circle is contradictory, so to say that it is circular is contradictory as well. However, even if one said that a square circle is not circular one would still face the contradiction because of the term “square circle.” It is nonreferring. ◄

Example 2: Origination

Nāgārjuna argues that the hypothesis that objects self-originate, i.e., that they do not have a cause outside of themselves, leads to a contradiction. If they did originate solely from themselves, then their existence at an earlier time would be the cause of their existence at a later time. But that means that they can never come into existence. They would have to have always existed. However, at the same time Nāgārjuna wants to say that the hypothesis that objects originate from other causes than themselves leads to a contradiction as well. Nothing depends solely on the existence of something else. If both of these theses can be shown to be contradictory, and there is no third option, then the whole concept of causation or origination becomes suspect. Nāgārjuna nevertheless does not deny that this kind of statement might be useful for this discourse. ◄ In general, his attitude toward philosophical theories seems to resemble a theory called instrumentalism in philosophy of science. The instrumentalist claims that the theoretical terms in a scientific theory (e.g., “electron”) do not refer to anything real, but the theory as a whole is useful in that it allows one to make predictions based on observational data. George Berkeley for example criticized Newton for talking about forces as if they were entities in the world when really they are mathematical entities. Ernst Mach has reiterated that kind of criticism in the last century. Similarly, philosophical theories, according to Nāgārjuna have an instrumental utility in ordinary thinking, but no further claims to be correct descriptions. Nāgārjuna’s claims are part of a strand of Buddhist ideas at the basis of which is the notion that the world is not as it appears to be. The world does not consist of stable objects. Theories can never capture the truth. This is so because the world is merely appearance. All one ever has access to is the world of appearance. To say that there is more than appearance is unfounded. This raises the problem that if it is true that all objects, i.e., the physical world, and all statements/concepts/theories are empty then this statement itself must be empty as well. Nāgārjuna tries to get out of this by saying that the statement that all statements are empty, though it is a part of

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the Buddha’s teaching, is strictly speaking empty but that it is still useful in that it can demonstrate that objects and theories are empty. He wants to rescue the Buddha’s teaching and show in what way objects (the world) as well as statements (concepts, theories) can be empty without falling into the trap of nihilism. The prasaṅga technique occupies a central part of Nāgārjuna’s argument for emptiness. As mentioned above, the technique works along the following lines: take a hypothesis p and show that it leads to an unacceptable consequence. Then take the opposite hypothesis :p and show that it too leads to an unacceptable consequence. As a consequence, one can then assume that p and :p are empty. The Sanskrit term prasaṅga has different meanings. In this context, it is perhaps best translated as “(unacceptable) consequence.” The technique is supposed to show that all objects and all concepts/statements are empty by going through all the possible alternatives or cases and rejecting each of them. It will become clear shortly that simply rejecting a hypothesis and its negation is not enough for Nāgārjuna. His prasaṅga technique consists in setting out an exhaustive and exclusive list of the logically possible positions concerning some topic, and then showing that each in turn is untenable and therefore to be rejected.

What Are Nāgārjuna’s Four Alternatives? The law of the excluded middle states that, for any given proposition p, either p or :p. For example, it is either the case that dogs are mammals or it is not the case that dogs are mammals: there is no third option. The law of noncontradiction states that, for any given proposition p, it is not the case that both p and :p. If the proposition “dogs are mammals” is true then the proposition “it is not the case that dogs are mammals” must be false and vice versa. In the case of the law of the excluded middle the two options are exhaustive, which means that it is not possible for both of them to be false. In the case of the law of noncontradiction the two options are exclusive, which means that it is not possible for both to be true. At first sight, Nāgārjuna seems to reject these classical laws of the excluded middle and noncontradiction. He repeatedly claims that, if one wishes to have an exhaustive list, one must consider four, not two, exclusive possibilities. This is his doctrine of the “four alternatives” or catuṣkoṭi, usually translated as the “tetralemma.” Here are some examples from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: Neither from itself nor from another, Nor from both, Nor without a cause, Does anything whatever, anywhere arise. (MMK 1.1) Everything is real and is not real, Both real and not real, Neither real nor not real. That is Lord Buddha’s teaching. (MMK 18.8)

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“Empty” should not be asserted. “Nonempty” should not be asserted. Neither both nor neither should be asserted. They are only used nominally. (MMK 22.11)

There have been different interpretations of Nāgārjuna’s claims. In what follows a few of them will be discussed in brief.

The “Superficial” Interpretation It looks at first sight as if Nāgārjuna’s tetralemma takes the following form: p v :p v (p &:p) v (:p &::p) There are, however, two problems with this interpretation: first, the third clause (p & :p) is a contradiction and hence always false. It is not a genuine alternative because Nāgārjuna is seen as endorsing the principle of noncontradiction: An existent and non-existent agent Does not perform an existent and non-existent action. Existence and non-existence cannot pertain to the same thing. For how could they exist together? (MMK 8.7)

So, this interpretation allows for an alternative that violates the law of noncontradiction while Nāgārjuna, at least at times, seems to support this law. The second problem with this interpretation is that the fourth clause is equivalent to the third (rule of double negations) which means that if one is true then so is the other. This means that the alternatives are not exclusive.

Robinson’s Interpretation Robinson (1957) replaces the propositional analysis with one that takes each clause to have a quantified subject. This is motivated by examples such as the one about origination/causation (“everything is self-caused,” “everything is other-caused,” etc.). He reads the four clauses in the following way: 8x Fx _ 8x :Fx _ (∃x Fx & ∃x :Fx) _ (:∃x Fx & :∃x :Fx) Robinson tries to avoid a contradiction by interpreting the third clause, not as claiming that everything is both F and :F, but by claiming that some things are F and other things are :F. But what about his fourth clause? This is now logically equivalent to “everything is both F and :F” because “:∃x Fx” is equivalent to “8x :Fx” and “:∃x :Fx” is equivalent to “8x Fx.” So, by way of example, “there does not exist a man who is wise” is equivalent to “all men are unwise” and “there does not exist a man who is unwise” is equivalent to “all men are wise.” Therefore, the fourth clause can be read as “‘all things are F’ and ‘all things are not F’” which is a contradiction. To say that whatever exists has contradictory properties is to say that

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nothing exists, so the fourth alternative means, on Robinson’s interpretation, that the domain of quantification is empty. However, Jayatilleke (1967, p. 75) points out that one must take the universal quantifiers in the first and second clauses to have existential commitment, because otherwise the four alternatives are not exclusive. For example, if nothing exists then both the first and the second alternatives would be true. If there are no men then it is true that “all men are wise” and it is also true that “all men are unwise.” This is due to the fact that the statement “all men are wise” can be analyzed as “for all x, if x is a man x is wise.” This is a conditional and a conditional is true if its antecedent is false. So, Robinson’s reading of MMK 1.1 is: either things exist and are self-caused, or things exist and are all other caused, or things exist, some being self-caused and others other caused, or nothing exists. These alternatives are exhaustive and exclusive. The problem with this reading is that it does not fit the text very well. The text seems to postulate the existence of a single subject of predication in the third and fourth alternatives (“Everything is real and is not real, both real and not real, neither real nor not real. That is Lord Buddha’s teaching.” (MMK 18.8)). Nor can this reading deal with cases which have a nonquantified subject. For example, either Mount Everest is over 8000 m high or it is not. There are no third and fourth alternatives.

Jayatilleke’s Interpretation Jayatilleke’s (1967) interpretation seems to avoid many of the problems of the other interpretations. Consider the following example: 1. 2. 3. 4.

A is east of B, or A is west of B, or A is both east and west of B, or A is neither east nor west of B.

Alternative (3) is only apparently contradictory, for suppose that A is a line running east-west through B. Then it is both east and west of B, in the sense that part of it is east of B and part of it is west of B. Alternative (4) on this account does not entail that neither A nor B exist, for suppose that A is a line lying above B. Jayatilleke’s reading is: x is wholly F v x is wholly :F v (x is partly F & partly :F) v (x is neither F nor :F) It is important that one takes F and :F to be contraries rather than contradictories (as “west” is not “anything other than east” but “the direction opposite to east”) for otherwise it would be impossible to read the fourth alternative as saying that x is a thing to which neither F nor :F applies. Another example will clarify the point: Either x is wholly white (e.g., chalk) or x is wholly black (e.g., charcoal) or x is partly white and partly black (e.g., a zebra) or x is neither white nor black (i.e., it is something to which other color predicates apply, e.g., the blue sky).

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MMK 1.1 now reads: every object is either wholly self-caused, wholly othercaused, partly self- and partly other-caused, or neither self- nor other-caused (=noncausal/abstract, e.g., a universal or purely accidental object (yādṛcchika), occurring without any cause.). This interpretation seems to make most sense of the tetralemma. It is important to point out that that if the adverbs “wholly” and “partially” are read as involving quantification over parts, this proposal has the same logical form as Robinson’s. The improvement however lies in what is being quantified over (parts rather than objects). Note that this interpretation of the four alternatives entails no revision of classical two-valued logic. “Two-valued” means having the truth-values true and false only. So, according to this interpretation, Nāgārjuna has not rejected the law of the excluded middle. He has only extended it to four alternatives instead of two.

How Is It Possible to Reject All Four Alternatives? Nāgārjuna formulates the exclusive and exhaustive list of logical possibilities only in order to reject each and all of them. That is the essential point of a prasaṅga, a dialectical destruction of a theoretical position. However, it seems paradoxical, for if “1 v 2 v 3 v 4” is a logical truth then the rejection of all four, i.e., “:1 & :2 & :3 & :4” is equivalent to “:(1 v 2 v 3 v 4)” and hence a contradiction. So, the rejection involved cannot be a straightforward propositional negation. Nāgārjuna has to explain how he “rejects” philosophical theories without having a theory himself. If he thought of himself as proposing a theory, that theory would have to be empty as well. This means that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of theories cannot be the same as the assertion of the negation. Here are two ways in which one might try to explain what sense Nāgārjuna gives to the notion of rejection: 1. Matilal (2005) draws attention to the well-entrenched Indian distinction between “nominally bound” (paryudāsa) and “verbally bound” (prasajya-pratis´edha) negation. The first is like the “in-” as in “snails are invertebrates” – it turns one predicate or noun into another, namely its complement. The second kind of negation is a type of illocutionary negation like the “not” in “I do not say I will go.” The important difference is that whereas the use of a nominally bound negation still involves an act of assertion (“it is a vertebrate” and “it is an invertebrate” both make an assertion), the use of a verbally bound or illocutionary negation is a simple rejection without assertion (“I do not say I will go” does not entail “I say I will not go”). If one interprets Nāgārjuna as invoking illocutionary negation, then failing to assert some proposition p is not at all the same as asserting :p. So, it is possible for Nāgārjuna to withhold assent from all of the four alternatives “1 v 2 v 3 v 4” without asserting “:1 & :2 & :3 & :4” Nāgārjuna is portrayed as someone who refuses to be drawn when confronted with any of the alternatives. Withholding assent individually from 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 is consistent with assenting to the disjunction “1 v 2 v 3 v 4.” Nāgārjuna might just be incapable of making up his

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mind. However, this does not capture the sense in which rejecting all the alternatives leads to the claim that all theories are “empty.” For on this interpretation, one alternative might not be empty but Nāgārjuna does not decide which one. 2. The second way of making sense of Nāgārjuna’s term of rejection is the following: some philosophers (e.g., Peter Strawson) argue that sentences containing nonreferring singular terms, such as “The present king of France is bald,” are neither true nor false, because in order for a predication to be significant, the object has to have been singled out for further description. Perhaps Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the four alternatives with regard to some concept F indicates that the presupposition behind the four alternatives, namely that F refers to something, is false. Consider again MMK 1.1. The disjunction of the first three alternatives amounts to the claim that objects have some sort of cause, while the fourth alternative denies that this is so. In saying that the sentence “Objects have causes” is neither true nor false, Nāgārjuna is highlighting the fact that the presupposition behind the sentence, namely that “cause” refers to something, is false. Hence by rejecting each of the four alternatives, he demonstrates that the concept of a cause is “empty.” It is only at this point, when each of the four alternatives is rejected, that Nāgārjuna abandons the law of the excluded middle. In fact, this interpretation takes Nāgārjuna’s “rejection” to be like the “internal negation” in a three-valued logic. This means that a statement is negated, not because it is false but because the truth-value “undetermined” applies to it. It is negated because it cannot be asserted to be true, not because it is false. So the tetralemma and the prasaṅga technique are supposed to show that concepts and objects are empty. The question is, do they really show this? On the one hand, they seem to be successful in establishing that all objects and concepts are empty because they provide four exhaustive alternatives and show that none of them apply to these objects and concepts. However, there is one general problem with this idea which applies to all views that test the limit of thought in this way: the problem is that as long as a theory is used to convey a point, one has to assume some common ground between the speaker and the listener or reader. In the case of the prasaṅga technique, the common ground is that if one can reject all four alternatives, a theory is empty. So the question is why should one be concerned with logical alternatives if concepts, including the concepts of logic, are empty? If logical concepts are themselves empty then rejecting all four alternatives does not show anything. This is a general problem for any view that challenges the concept of theories on the basis of argument. In order to talk about the theories one wants to reject, one has to employ some form of argument and hence one has to have some agreement about what constitutes a good argument. In Nāgārjuna’s case, the prasaṅga technique is supposed to provide a reason for accepting that all theories/concepts/statements are empty. The technique itself relies on the notions of logically exclusive and exhaustive alternatives and the idea that a rejection of all of these alternatives is supposed to show a problem with any of these views. In order to do so, however, Nāgārjuna has

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to rely on certain assumptions which are expressed as statements and theories. It is possible for Nāgārjuna to argue that these are empty as well but he then has to provide some reason for why this constitutes an important insight. Nāgārjuna is trying to show that rational discourse does not yield the results one thinks it does, namely nonempty theories/concepts/statements. However, in order to show this rationally he is relying precisely on the audience accepting theories of rational argumentation as nonempty. In the end, what he can hope to gesture toward is an internal contradiction within the claim that objects/theories/statements are nonempty.

Din˙nāga on Inference This section will discuss Diṅnāga’s (fifth–sixthcentury CE) theory of inference, which is one of the main contributions to logic by any Buddhist thinker. It is worth noting, however, that his rules of inference were a criticism of the Nyāya syllogism which can be traced back to the Nyāyasūtras. In this text the nature of a good inference of the form “p has s because it has h” (or, “p is s because it is h”) is discussed. Subsequent writers of this and other philosophical schools tried to improve on this syllogism in their commentaries and criticisms of the Nyāyasūtras. According to the Nyāyasūtras (1.1.32) a good inference consists of five steps: (i) the statement of the thesis (pratijn˜ ā); (ii) the reason for the thesis (hetu); (iii) a general rule plus an example (udāharaṇa); (iv) the application of the rule to the case in question (upanaya); (v) the restatement of the thesis or conclusion (nigamana). This is best illustrated by citing an inference. One standard example in Indian logic is “Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.” The inference goes as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)

There is fire on the hill. For there is smoke. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen. This is such a case (smoke on the hill). Therefore, there is fire on the hill.

The hypothesis to be tested is (i). The data on which the inference is partly based is (ii). Step (iii) is a universal generalization. Step (iv) is not mentioned in western accounts of inferences. It serves to show that one is observing the proper inferential sign. Step (v) is the conclusion which in a good inference is the hypothesis of step (i). The Nyāyasūtras (1.2.4–8) mention several cases in which this inference might go wrong. Among those, one is called “deviating” (savyabhicāra). This is the case where the inferential sign does not warrant the hypothesis. If for example somebody wanted to infer the presence of smoke from the presence of fire the inference would deviate because there are cases where there is fire without smoke. A sign would be called “contradictory” (viruddha) if it proves the opposite of the conclusion. Thus a pool of water is normally a sign for the absence of fire. Another bad

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inference is the case where the universal generalization is not established. A nonestablished generalization cannot count as evidence for the hypothesis. An important requirement is that the generalization is not “counter-acted” (prakaraṇasama). This means that it is not supposed to be countered by another generalization showing exactly the opposite. The fallacy of petitio principii is called “unproved” (sādhyasama). In Chap. 2 of the Pramāṇasamucaya the Buddhist philosopher Diṅnāga claimed that the five step syllogism of the Naiyāyikas could be stated in the form of three conditions. Thus the form of logical inference is replaced by general criteria which have to be fulfilled for an inferential sign to be counted as evidence. In order to state these conditions, Diṅnāga introduces a few key concepts. He takes the concepts of hetu (inferential sign) and sādhya (thesis-to-be-inferred) from the Naiyāyikas. He adds the concepts of pakṣa (locus of inference), sapakṣa (homologue or place which is known to possess the sādhya already), and vipakṣa (heterologue or place which is known not to possess the sādhya). With the help of these concepts, he formulates three conditions for a good inferential sign. The three conditions are: 1. The inferential sign should be present in the case under consideration. 2. It should be present in at least one homologue. 3. It should not be present in any heterologue. In the case of the inference concerning smoke and fire, the first condition states that smoke has to be present on the mountain. The second condition states that it has to be present in a similar case, such as the kitchen. The third condition says that smoke has to be absent in dissimilar cases, such as the lake. One might object to this account of reasoning that the second condition is redundant. It says that among all the places which have fire, there has to be at least one that also possesses smoke. This means that within the class of fiery objects it is true that “Wherever there is smoke there is fire.” It is, however, possible that there is a place where there exists smoke without fire. This is why the third condition, which says “Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke,” is needed. This can be rendered as: a) (8x)(:Fx ! :Sx) Given this condition, the case of a smoky place without fire is ruled out. If this condition holds then not only is it true among the class of fiery objects that “Wherever there is smoke there is fire” but it becomes generally true. Thus the second condition can be formalized as: b) (8x)(Sx ! Fx) Clearly, b) is the contrapositive of a) which means that they are logically equivalent. It would therefore seem that condition (1) and (3) are sufficient to account for a good inference. It is however possible that Diṅnāga introduced the

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second condition in order to account for a logical problem. He divides the universe into pakṣa, sapakṣa, and vipakṣa. It is important that a sapakṣa is a case different from the pakṣa. The second condition ensures that a universal generalization of the form (8x)(Fx ! Gx) is not made true by there being no Fs apart from the one under investigation. If there were no Fs apart from the pakṣa then the generalization (8x) (Fx ! :Gx) would be true as well which is to be avoided. The second condition also ensures that there are examples outside the pakṣa which support the inference. Diṅnāga might have been motivated by the same idea as Mill (1843) who thought that the inference, Fa (8x)(Fx ! Gx) Therefore, Ga begs the question. The general rule already implies that the pakṣa is an instance of the rule, which is to be established. However, this also means that the real inference is not strictly deductive. For if the general rule says that every smoky place other than the mountain has fire, then the mountain might be the exception although that is unlikely. One important question which is raised by Diṅnāga’s discussion and which has applications for discussions of explanation in western philosophy is whether his method of inference implies a deductive or inductive argument pattern. At first sight, it seems that the pattern is deductive. One can use the membership and classinclusion relations of set-theory in order to illustrate this point. The inference “p has S, because it has H” can be rendered as: a) p  H b) H  S Therefore, p  S Diṅnāga, however, is not just concerned with the validity of an argument but also with the soundness of its premises. His three conditions are supposed to indicate under what circumstances it is rational to make certain inferences. On his account, not every H has to be included in S. It suffices if every known H is included in every known S. If K(h) stands for the class of objects which are known to be h then premise b) can be rendered as follows: b*) K(h)  K(s) This is clearly an inductive element in his account. It seems to be Diṅnāga’s intended meaning of the second and third conditions because the homologues and heterologues in his scheme are really the known cases which possess sādhya and which do not possess sādhya, respectively. The idea is that if one never observes an exception to a rule, then one is allowed to infer that the rule holds generally.

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But this creates a discrepancy in Diṅnāga’s account because although a) p  H b) H  S Therefore, p  S is a valid form of argument, a) p  H b*) K(h)  K(s) Therefore, p  S is not. In his work Hetucakraḍamaru (Hetucakranirṇaya), Diṅnāga argues that there are nine possible inferences to be drawn from his three conditions, of which only two are good inferences. He argues that the inferential sign might be present in all, some, or none of the class of homologues. Likewise it might be present in all, some, or none of the class of heterologues. The two good inferences are (i) when the inferential sign is present in all of the homologues and none of the heterologues and (ii) when the inferential sign is present in some of the homologues and none of the heterologues. Diṅnāga’s doctrine was criticized by the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara who points in his text Nyāyavārttika that either the class of homologues or the class of heterologues might be empty. One example, which is mentioned by Matilal (1990), would be “cows are distinct from noncows because they have dewlap.” There are no objects which possess “cowhood” apart from cows. Thus the class of homologues is empty. Yet, the inference indicates that the property “having dewlap” distinguishes cows from noncows. Uddyotakara’s extension of the wheel of reason allows therefore for three additional inferences: (i) the class of homologues is empty and there are no heterologues, (ii) the inferential sign is present in some homologues and the class of heterologues is empty, (iii) the inferential sign is present in every homologue and the class of heterologues is empty.

Dharmakīrti on Din˙nāga on Inference The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (seventh century CE) tried to clarify and improve Diṅnāga’s account of inference. In his Hetubindu, he pointed out that Diṅnāga’s conditions are not clearly stated. The problem with Diṅnāga’s formulation of the issue is that in the case of the pakṣa being a class, it is not clear whether the inferential sign has to be present in every member of this class or only in some. The same problem arises for the class of homologues. Does the inferential sign have to be present in every member of the class or only in some? Dharmakīrti resolves this problem by introducing the particle eva, meaning “only, exactly, really.” Hence the three conditions are restated as follows:

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1. The inferential sign should be really (eva) present in the case under consideration (which means it should be present in the whole, not just in a part). 2. Among the remaining cases, it should be present only (eva) in homologues. 3. It should not at all (eva) be present in any heterologue. With this formulation the inferential sign has to be present in every member of the pakṣa class. This was not clearly stated by Diṅnāga. Moreover, from the remaining cases, it should be present only in members of the class of homologues and never in any member of the class of the heterologues. This permits the existence of the sign in some homologues and not all. At the same time, it excludes the possibility of the existence of the sign in any heterologue whatsoever. The restatement of the second and the third conditions was implicit in Diṅnāga’s hetucakra (which, as mentioned above, gives a ninefold classification of inferences) because for him both inferences, one in which the sign exists in a part of the sapakṣa and one in which it exists in the whole of sapakṣa, are good inferences. Dharmakīrti, however, makes this explicit by his reformulation of the three conditions. In addition, Dharmakīrti inserted the word nis´citam (determinately, necessarily) in his formulation as applicable to all the three conditions (5.12). By this he indicated that the existence of the sign in homologues and its nonexistence in the heterologues is not accidental but rather a lawlike generalization. The next question was, under what conditions the generalization in question could be deemed lawlike. Dharmakīrti specified three such conditions, which provide three types of hetu. The second condition is that of natural reason (svabhāva-hetu). This comprises what is often called metaphysical necessity. An example of an inference would be “this is a mammal because it is a tiger.” The relation between being a tiger and being a mammal is not causal but it is not accidental either. The first condition is called reason qua effect (kārya-hetu). This condition applies if the sign is an effect of the property which is to be inferred. The inference “the mountain has fire because it has smoke” is an example of this kind of logical reason. The idea is that if the causal relation holds between the reason and the inferred property, then the smoke would not occur unless the cause occurred. The cause is necessary for its effect. The final condition is reason based on nonobservation (anupalabdhi-hetu). This is comparable to counterfactual statements. An inference of this type would be “there is no pot here because it is not observed.” The idea is that if there were a pot here it would be observed. Naturally, nonobservation of an object can imply its nonexistence only if the object is perceptible by nature. In other words, it is an object about which it can be asserted that “if it were there, it would have been perceived.” (For example, nonexistence of air in the room cannot be inferred on the basis of its nonobservation.) Dharmakīrti expressed this condition by the word upalabdhilakṣaṅaprāpta (observable, that which fulfills the condition of observability). Hence nonobservation as hetu was qualified as “nonobservation of the observable.” Dharmakīrti noticed that observation of a contrary object has the same epistemic role as nonobservation of the required object. For example, experience of excessive cold in a room also implies that there is absence of fire. Hence

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Dharmakīrti treated “observation of the contrary” (viruddhopalabdhi) as a kind of nonobservation. By combining this wider concept of nonobservation with other conditions he prepared a list of eleven types of nonobservation in his work Nyāyabindu.

Meaning as Exclusion: apoha Diṅnāga’s theory of the meaning of terms as presented in his Pramāṇasamuccaya draws on the hierarchical account of concept application. This means that concepts are organized by the relations of exclusion and containment, for example, “tree excludes pot” or “tree contains beech.” Historically, philosophers have provided different answers to the question of what this says about the meaning of words like “tree,” “pot,” or “beech.” The most obvious seeming answer is that the conceptual hierarchy corresponds to a real hierarchy in nature. The world itself instantiates a certain natural organization and conceptual classifications are not “invented” but stand for natural categories. This view is called “realism” in Western philosophy. According to this view, words such as “tree” denote things on the basis of being members of a real category of things, namely those which belong to the natural kind “tree-hood.” As a Buddhist, Diṅnāga rejects this realist view and develops a theory of meaning entitled apoha (exclusion). The idea behind this theory of meaning is that the conceptual hierarchy holds itself together functionally, without resting on the world. Diṅnāga’s idea is that concepts and words have content, not because they correspond to external objects, but because of their location in the hierarchy of concepts. Consider a familiar example: people often form themselves into groups, not on the basis of something they have in common, but rather in terms of what they reject. For example, a clique can be united only by its not allowing in anyone who is poor. Likewise, it is a familiar point that thinking of oneself as, for example, American is more a matter of who is excluded than of any unifying common feature. In this way, a concept can gather together a collection of people on the basis of who is excluded rather than by any common property. Now consider a word/concept like chair. Again, one would not want to say that “being-a-chair” is a natural property of the world. Nor could one find a property or set of properties that all chairs have in common. What would such a property be? Having four legs? Having a back? None of these are necessary or sufficient to account for a chair. Diṅnāga says that what makes something a chair is rather its ability to fulfill a certain function (“being-sittable-on”) which can be fulfilled by objects of vastly different shapes and materials. This means that a chair is defined by its relations with other things (human bodies). The idea is that all concepts are defined by their place in the hierarchy, by their relations with other concepts, of which exclusion is the most important. What is the relation between the term “lotus” and the term “blue lotus”? Diṅnāga’s answer is that the second term excludes more things than the first. The first excludes only nonlotuses while the second excludes both nonlotuses and nonblue things. So, as one moves down the hierarchy one

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arrives at concepts which exclude more and more things. But Diṅnāga claims that one never arrives at a concept so finely grained that it excludes everything except a single particular. Particulars are inexpressible. This means that words do not refer to objects. Instead, they exclude sets of objects.

The Case for apoha Why does Diṅnāga think that this is the right way to analyze meaning? He argues that the meaning of a word conveys knowledge to the hearer or reader. So the question is what does knowledge consist in and how is it conveyed? In order to answer this question, one has to know what the meaning of a word consists in. Diṅnāga goes through an exhaustive list of candidates for the meaning of a term and rejects each of them. These candidates are the following: 1. An individual or particular. The meaning of tree could be a particular tree that the speaker refers to. 2. A universal. The meaning of tree is the universal tree-hood. 3. A relation between the universal and a particular. The meaning could be this particular instance of a relation between the particular and the universal. 4. A thing possessing a universal. This is the idea that a particular instantiates a universal and that this instantiated universal is the meaning of a term. Diṅnāga provides the following reasons for rejecting these candidates: 1. The meaning of a word is a particular. The idea is that there are sets of particulars like the set of all trees and that the word “tree” picks out a particular tree. However, Diṅnāga objects to this by arguing that the word “tree” does not just apply to one tree. It applies to all trees, i.e., to all members of the set. So the problem is that as long as one says that even though knowledge is gained about a subset of trees when one hears the word “tree,” nevertheless the word applies to all members of the set of trees. So what about saying that when one hears the word tree one gains knowledge of the whole set of trees? The problem with this is that it is clearly not the case. When one hears the word “tree” one does not thereby gain knowledge of all existent trees. So if the meaning of a word is a particular, then it is either excluding certain particulars or it is including too many. Hence Diṅnāga concludes that particulars cannot be the meaning of a word. 2. The meaning of a word is a universal. Take the example to the standard inference “The mountain has fire, because it has smoke.” The meaning of the word “fire” in this example is not a universal. When one hears this sentence the word “fire” does not provide knowledge of a universal but of a particular fire. So the universal cannot be the meaning of a word either. 3. The meaning of a word is the relationship between a universal and a particular or between universals. This interpretation raises problems with regard to the meaning of sentences. When you hear the sentence “The tiger has stripes,” you might

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think that this sentence expresses the relationship between the universal’s tigerhood and stripeness. The universal tigerhood falls within the universal stripeness but not vice versa because all tigers are striped but not all striped things are tigers. However, the meaning of this relationship is not expressed by the words “tiger” and “stripes” in itself. The string of words “tiger, stripes” does not express the relationship between the two universals. Likewise, if you had a particular tiger called Bob and you said “Bob has stripes” the two words “Bob” and “stripes” do not express the relationship between the particular and the universal per se. The relationship is expressed by grammatical rules but not by the individual words. 4. The meaning of a word is an object possessing a universal or the idea that particulars instantiate universals. This apparently solves the problem of the meaning of sentences like “The tiger has stripes.” According to this view, the meaning of the terms “tiger” and “stripes” is the particular locus, i.e., the particular animal where tigerhood and stripeness occur. So the animal in question is the intersection of tigerhood and stripeness. Diṅnāga rejects this view on the following grounds: he argues that there are two ways in which one can interpret the idea that the meaning of a word is a particular instantiating a universal. First, one can think of it as a particular. The idea is that the animal is the particular place of the universals tigerhood and stripeness. But this raises the same problem as in the previous case when the meaning of a word could not be a particular because it picks out every particular under its extension. Secondly, one can interpret this hypothesis by way of saying that a word does not express a particular place of a universal but the general fact of a universal being present. This fact is common to all the places where a universal occurs. But this means that the word either expresses a universal itself, namely the universal of “universal-presence,” or it expresses the relation between a universal and its place of occurrence. However, as was demonstrated before, there are problems with the view that a word expresses a universal or a relation. The issue is that if one says that a particular instantiates a universal then one is talking about a certain place. This leads to the problem that this place is either a particular or a universal. So since all of these candidates fail to account for the meaning of a word, Diṅnāga concludes that the meaning of a word is not some “positive” entity. Instead, it is the absence of the exclusion class from a certain place. Matilal (1986) gives the example of the term “cow.” Diṅnāga argues that in order to find out what the meaning of the term cow is one would have to define the exclusion class. This goes back to his theory of inference where he divides the universe into homologues and heterologues. The exclusion class is all those things that are noncows. Matilal calls the class of noncows “woc.” One can then say that “no cow is woc.” The problem is whether or not this is a positive property that is attached to cows. Matilal suggests that one has to treat the property “woc” as simply saying what a cow is not without thereby attributing any positive property to a cow. It is helpful to refer back the concept of illocutionary negation which was mentioned in connection with Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga technique. One interpretation

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of this technique was that all four possibilities are negated in the sense of saying “I did not say that x.” In saying so, the speaker does not make a statement. The same might be said here. All that is expressed by the term “woc” might be that it is not a cow. It does not express anything positive. Just like referring to somebody as “non-American” does not say anything specific about that person’s nationality. All it says about a person is that the person does not belong to the class of American people. Matilal (1986, p. 400) mentions the following example: suppose the universe was made up of only six things: three cows, two horses, and one cat. For each individual animal there is one corresponding mental representation. Each mental representation has an exclusion class. One can say that the three mental representations of a cow and the two mental representations of a horse are only tokens of the same type. Diṅnāga wants to say that the reason that the three mental representations of a cow are tokens of the same type is not that they share certain features but the fact that they have the same exclusion class which is “horse, horse, cat.” The general criticism of the apoha theory has focussed on two questions: (1) In what way do sentences about members of the exclusion class refer to members of the original class? (2) How can one identify the exclusion class without first identifying the original class? Discussing these questions would go beyond the scope of this chapter. In general, the motivation for arguing that the meaning of a word is its exclusion class is that it does not require the existence of universals. One common answer that Diṅnāga had mentioned is that the meaning of a term such as cow might be the reference to its universal cowhood. But this means that for every general term there has to be a universal. Even realists about universals, such as the Naiyāyikas, do not believe that every general term refers to a universal. One can also find this in Plato. Plato believed that there are universals and he was quite happy to accept that there was a universal of beauty or gold. But he did not want to admit that there was a universal for dirt, for example. His explanation is that dirt is simply the absence of cleanliness. So it is the absence of the universal for cleanliness. Diṅnāga on the other hand argues that if not every general term refers to a universal why should one believe that some do? What is special about them? His answer is that there are no universals and that the meaning of a term is its exclusion class. So given that there are problems with universals and particulars as the meaning for words the apoha doctrine seems to present an interesting alternative, in spite of its own problems.

Header Summary • Introduction: Buddhist logic. • Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga technique: this part deals with Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga technique and his claim that reality is empty (s´ūnya). • Diṅnāga on Inference: the second part provides an overview of Diṅnāga’s view on inference and his theory of the three conditions of an inferential sign (hetu).

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• Dharmakīrti on Diṅnāga on Inference: the third part explores Dharmakīrti’s developments of Diṅnāga’s view on inference, particularly his introduction of the particle eva and the three types of hetu. • Meaning as Exclusion: apoha: the final part of this chapter presents an outline of Diṅnāga’s apoha (exclusion) theory of the meaning and function of concepts and words.

References Primary Sources Hetubindu by Dharmakīrti (texts and English translations): Gokhale, P.P. 1997. Hetubindu of Dharmakī rti (a point on probans). Delhi: Sri Satguru Press. Steinkellner, E. 2016. Dharmakī rti’s Hetubindu, critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner on the basis of preparatory work by Helmut Krasser with a translation of the Gilgit fragment by Klaus Wille. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissensschaften. Hetucakraḍamaru (Hetucakranirṇaya) by Diṅnāga (text and English translation): Chi, R.S.Y. 1969. Buddhist formal logic: A study of Dignāga’s Hetucakra and K’uei-chi’s great commentary on the Nyāyapraves´a. London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) by Nāgarjuna (texts and English translations): Garfield, J.L. 1995. The fundamental wisdom of the middle way. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Inada, K. 1970. Nāgārjuna: A translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an introductory essay. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press. Kalupahana, D. 1986. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna: The philosophy of the middle way. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, repr. 2006. Siderits, M., and S. Katsura. 2013. Nāgārjuna’s middle way. Somerville: Wisdom Publications. Streng, F. 1967. Emptiness: A study in religious meaning. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Nyāyabindu by Dharmakīrti (texts and English translations): Gangopadhyay, M. 1971. Vinī tadeva’s Nyāyabinduṭī kā. Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present. Stcherbatsky, Th. 1930. Buddhist logic. Vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, repr. 2004. Nyāyasūtra (NS) (texts and English translations): Gangopadhyay, M. 1982. Gautama’s Nyāya-Sūtra with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya. Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present. Jha, G. 1912–19. The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama, 4 Vols. Delhi: Motlal Banarsidass, repr. 1984 (includes a translation of the Nyāyavārtikka by Uddyotakara). Pramāṇasamuccaya by Diṅnāga (texts and English translations): Hayes, R. 1988. Diṅnāga on the interpretation of signs. Vol. 9, Studies of classical India. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Steinkellner, E. 2005. Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1: A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭī kā. http://www. ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf, with revisions of 2014: http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/ mediawiki/images/f/f3/Dignaga_PS_1_revision.pdf

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Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) by Nāgārjuna (text and English translation): Bhattacharya, K., E.H. Johnston, and A. Kunst. 1978. The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī . Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, repr. 2002.

Secondary Literature Jayatilleke, K.N. 1967. The logic of four alternatives. Philosophy East and West 17: 69–83. Matilal, B.K. 1986. Perception: An essay on classical Indian theories of knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Matilal, B.K. 1990. The word and the world. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Matilal, B.K. 2005. Epistemology, logic and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis. Edited by J. Ganeri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. First published in 1971 by Mouton, The Hague. Mill, J.S. 1843. A system of logic, in his Collected works. Vols. VII and VIII. Edited by J.M. Robson. London: Routledge, 1973, repr. 1996. Robinson, R.H. 1957. Some logical aspects of Nāgārjuna’s system. Philosophy East and West 6: 291–308.

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Logic of Syād-Vāda Anne Clavel

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical Development of the Sapta-Bhaṅgī . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Two Denominations: Syād-Vāda and Sapta-Bhaṅgī . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . External Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Plurivocal Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of the Sevenfold Predication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Number of Predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Combinations of the Predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Necessity of Seven Predications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Beyond Inadequate Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syād-Vāda and Logic Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Meaning of Syāt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contradiction and Tautology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definitions of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

The syād-vāda (“doctrine of syāt”), also called “sevenfold predication” (saptabhaṅgī ), constitutes a cornerstone of the Jaina doctrine of multilateralism, since it prevents a predicate from being attributed absolutely to a subject. According to Jainism, in order to consider a single state of affair as exhaustively as possible, one has to submit every predicative relation between a subject and a predicate to a structural rule made up of seven propositions, which are not conceived of as alternative truths but are all endowed with the same truth-value. A thorough under-

A. Clavel (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Lyon, Lyon, France © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_16

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standing of the syād-vāda raises tricky issues, such as the meaning of the adverb syāt in the context of this logical pattern, the compatibility of Jaina logic with basic logical principles, or the oddness of the number of propositions – why seven?

Introduction It is well known that one of the most emblematic features of Jaina philosophy is to give a faithful account of reality without excluding any possible perspective. By regarding the teachings of each of its philosophical adversaries as constituting a single, possible viewpoint among several others, Jainism proposes a conceptual synthesis that encompasses all other doctrines, the materialistic thesis as well as the monistic theory developed by Advaita-vedānta or the Buddhist theory that everything is momentary. Ontological tenets are consistent with such a purpose, inasmuch as Jaina philosophers defend the doctrine of the multiplex nature of reality (anekānta-vāda): Jaina philosophy aims at taking into account two complementary components of being, permanence and transitoriness, in other words the capacity of a substance to endure changes. Such a realistic ontology goes beyond the contradiction embodied in the Indian philosophical framework, by the opposition between the Buddhist theory of momentariness and the doctrine of immutability professed by Advaita-vedānta. Jainas recognize that all substances (dravya) in universe share a common structure combining consubstantial characteristics called properties (guṇa) and transitory modes (paryāya). Thus, each real thing is associated with two complementary aspects, permanence and transitoriness, without contradiction. Since each being is spoken of in terms of origination (utpatti), stability or permanence (dhrauvya, sthiti), and cessation (vyaya), a permanent substance can endure constant changes. Since no being can be reduced to only one aspect, reality must always be apprehended as multiplex (anekānta) and endowed with an infinite number of characteristics. This is why Jaina ontology is called the “doctrine of multiplexity of reality,” in contradistinction to all other systems which consider reality in a partial and unilateral way. Jaina thinkers see any other view as a “unilateral doctrine” (ekānta-vāda). Since matter and mind are not two realities absolutely different one from another, human faculties are not radically antagonist with reality but are rather adequate tools for its analysis. As a corollary of ontological theories, Jaina epistemology examines how things can be known through different procedures: on the one hand through the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), and on the other hand through two methods which are specific to Jainism, that aim at overcoming unilateral perspectives, namely viewpoints (naya) and sevenfold predication (sapta-bhaṅgī ). According to Jaina epistemology, the means of knowledge are intuitive or discursive operations that constitute the instrumental causes of knowledge. In its pristine purity, the soul knows everything, but its capacity is highly reduced by the hindering power of karman. Thus, when a soul endeavors to reach the final goal, namely liberation (mokṣa), its ascension necessarily implies reaching omniscience:

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the various stages of intellectual and spiritual progression, through which a soul is supposed to traverse in order to escape the cycle of rebirth, lead to a state where it regains its pristine purity back, especially its capacity to know everything perfectly. However, as long as a soul transmigrates, it must overcome the necessary limitations of its cognitive faculties by using the method of viewpoints and the sevenfold predication. The doctrine of viewpoints (naya-vāda) takes for granted that every judgment expresses only a part of reality; it depends on certain conditions, especially on the speaker’s intention, which makes it incomplete and partial. To choose to adopt a particular viewpoint which represents the most pertinent or efficient approach in a given circumstance does not imply an absolute rejection of all other possible viewpoints: the truth of an utterance does not imply that another utterance may be false. The different viewpoints share the same cognitive value: they provide a partial account of reality. Even though any object or situation can be accounted for from an infinite number of viewpoints, seven nayas are traditionally enumerated in Jainism, following an order that emphasizes a decreasing extension of their respective point of reference: they are namely the comprehensive viewpoint (naigama), the collective viewpoint (saṅgraha), the empirical viewpoint (vyavahāra), the instantaneous viewpoint (ṛjusūtra), the synonymous viewpoint (s´abda), the etymological viewpoint (samabhirūḍha), and the factual viewpoint (evaṃbhūta or itthaṃbhūta). The multilateral approach that features the naya-vāda is especially underlined by the structural distinction between substantial viewpoints (dravya-naya) – corresponding to the first three nayas – and modal viewpoints (paryāya-naya) – the last four nayas – a distinction which relies on the necessary coexistence of permanence and change in every existent thing. Whereas the naya-vāda can be seen as the analytical aspect of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality, its synthetical aspect is embodied by the sevenfold predication (sapta-bhaṅgī ). For, complete knowledge can be obtained if and only if the predicative content of a statement is subjected to the Jaina method called saptabhaṅgī . Without being false, a statement like “soul is existent” cannot claim an absolute truth because it is only a unilateral and partial judgment. However, the most complete and adequate description is reached when one considers the whole set of seven propositions that exhaust all possible predicative relations between the subject “soul” and the predicate “existent.” Following most of Jaina thinkers, this set of seven statements runs as follows: (S1) In some respect (syāt), soul is only (eva) existent. (S2) In some respect, soul is only nonexistent. (S3) In some respect, soul is existent and nonexistent. (S4) In some respect, soul is only inexpressible. (S5) In some respect, soul is existent and inexpressible. (S6) In some respect, soul is nonexistent and inexpressible. (S7) In some respect, soul is existent, nonexistent, and inexpressible.

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Historical Development of the Sapta-Bhan˙gī Two Denominations: Syād-Vāda and Sapta-Bhan˙gī Two denominations are concurrently applied to the set of seven statements: either syād-vāda (the “doctrine of syāt”) or sapta-bhaṅgī (the “sevenfold predication”). These two compounds share neither the same denotation nor the same connotation. Each term lays stress on a different feature of this logical pattern. The term saptabhaṅgī points out its structure by giving the number of propositions, i.e., seven (sapta-), and the status of each proposition: each bhaṅga is nothing but a part of the whole discourse, constituted by the set of seven statements, that can be held concerning the relation between a subject and a predicate; this is the meaning of the noun bhaṅga (literally “a portion” of a larger whole), derived from the root BHAJ- “to divide, to distribute.” The feminine ending –ī , that gives a collective value to this singular noun, underlies the fact that the seven statements are not alternative judgments but that each of them must be taken as an indefectible part of the whole. On the other hand, the compound syād-vāda draws attention to the fundamental presence of the particle syāt in each and every statement. This word is namely a cornerstone of the sevenfold predication, inasmuch as its presence is sufficient to make the coexistence of seemingly contradictory statements possible and consistent. Thus the terms syād-vāda and sapta-bhaṅgī are complementary, inasmuch as they highlight two fundamental aspects of this logical framework: the inclusion of the term syāt in each statement serves as a reminder that every bhaṅga is only one member of a larger whole, the seven constitutive parts of which throw light upon the multiplex nature of reality without bearing any contradiction. The contexts in which the words syād-vāda and sapta-bhaṅgī are used can also differ significantly. Whereas the term sapta-bhaṅgī is restricted to the logical framework constituted of seven propositions, the word syād-vāda can also be used in a broader sense (Nyāyavijayajī 2000, p. 328), as a synonym for the compound anekānta-vāda (the “doctrine of the multiplexity of reality”). In this wider meaning, it is then endowed with an ontological significance. This synonymity is expressed by several Jaina thinkers, e.g., Haribhadra, and it explains the fact that Samantabhadra calls anekānta-vāda this method of associating a pair of contrary features by predicating them from a real thing. In his ĀM Samantabhadra often repeats this point. The word sapta-bhaṅgī appeared as such quite late in the Jaina tradition, after the logical pattern of seven statements began to be elaborated. Balcerowicz (2015, p. 207) has shown that the existence of the word sapta-bhaṅgī was “not so well established or not so universally widespread among Jaina theoreticians even still around 500 CE.” Before the noun sapta-bhaṅgī itself appears for the first time, seeds could already be found in the form of the bahuvrīhi adjective compound saptabhaṅga (Pkt.: sattabhaṁgam, “to which the seven predications apply”), attested in Kundakunda’s Pan˜ cāstikāyasāra (PAS 14) and in Samantabhadra’s Āptamī māṃsā (ĀM 104), or in a periphrasis used by Siddhasena Divākara in his Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (STP 1.41): sapta-vikalpaḥ vacana-panthaḥ (Pkt.: sattaviyyapo vayaṇa-paho), “a verbal procedure that consists of seven options.”

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Historical Process The earlier strata of the so-called Canon do not indicate a set of seven predications as they have been later formalized by Jaina logicians. The sapta-bhaṅgī in the form in which it is now dealt with by contemporary scholars who address its logical consistency results from a slow elaborative process that took place over many centuries. Various elements that were originally dispersed were progressively integrated in a single framework so as to form the logical pattern constituted of seven propositions that has now become one of the most stimulating issues in the field of Indian logic. A predication of a pair of two mutually contrary predicates to the same subject, sometimes associated with the adverb syāt, resulting in three propositions is attested in the Bhagavatī-sūtra (Pkt.: Viyāha-pannatti), the fifth aṅga of the Canon: x is A, x is non-A (henceforth :A), x is A and :A. Dixit (1971, pp. 25–27) adds that this very text already aims at escaping contradiction by mentioning the distinction between the viewpoint of the substance’s own properties, according to which the predicate is affirmed, and the viewpoint of alien properties, according to which the predicate is negated. No explicit mention of the syād-vāda can be found by Umāsvāti, neither in the sūtras of the TS – that provide a compendium written in Sanskrit of the Jaina tenets in accordance with the scriptures – nor in the commentary recognized as being genuine by the Śvetāmbara tradition only. However, the sūtra TS V.32 (“The non-emphasized (anarpita) aspect of an object is attested by the emphasized (arpita) one”) has sometimes been understood as an allusion to syād-vāda; this distinction between emphasized and nonemphasized aspects has then laid the ground to a widespread interpretation elaborated by later commentators in order to solve the problem of a seeming incompatibility of contradictory judgments. Kundakunda goes one step further in the systematization of the doctrine, inasmuch as he associates many features to it: he explicitly enounces the first four predications, mentioning once the particle syāt, alludes to possible combinations of the three predicates previously mentioned (existent, nonexistent, inexpressible), and associates this kind of reasoning to the bahuvrīhi compound saptabhaṅga (cf. PAS I.14 and PS II.23). Moreover, while they tried to explain and interpret the logical structure of the syād-vāda, especially in glosses and commentaries, many philosophers integrated an ancient set of four nikṣepas (extensively dealt with by Bhatt 1991) as the four parameters that have to be considered to determine the viewpoint according to which a property is or is not predicated of a subject, namely substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla), and condition (bhāva). The introduction of the restrictive particle eva by the Digamabara Samantabhadra (c. 580–640?) is the last consequent innovation in the logical pattern. Thus, as Balcerowicz (2015, p. 206) brings it convincingly to the fore, “a mature theory of the sevenfold modal description took final shape by approximately the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries at the earliest.”

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External Influences The most important influence goes back to the sect of the Ājīvikas: as far as it can be deduced from the very few texts that have been preserved through indirect sources, various seeds of the Jaina sapta-bhaṅgī were already present in the Ājīvika doctrine (Basham 1981, pp. 274–275): the existence of three fundamental predicates, the fact that the third one results from the simultaneous association of the first two, the number of figures – seven – that is obtained from combining the three initial predicates. On the other hand, the introduction of the restrictive particle eva (“only”) attested for the first time by Samantabhadra may bear the influence of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (Balcerowicz 2015, pp. 206–207).

A Plurivocal Doctrine Significant variations can be found in the formulation of the seven predications. Most Jaina philosophers use the particle syāt only once in each statement, be it a simple statement or a complex one. In contradistinction, later authors like Malliṣeṇa (thirteenth century) adopt a distributive construction and repeat the word syāt in complex statements (SVM 23.104–112, p. 143.3–11), twice when there are two predicates (S3, S5, S6) and three times in the proposition involving the three different predicates (S7). For instance, the propositions S3 and S7 are formulated as follows: (S3) In a certain sense, x is only existent and in a certain sense it is only inexistent (syād asty eva syān n^ a sty eva). (S7) In a certain sense, x is only existent, in a certain sense it is only inexistent and in a certain sense it is only inexpressible (syād asty eva syān n^ a sty eva syād avaktavyam eva). The presence of the particle eva may also be subjected to variations. Many Jaina authors (e.g., Akalaṅka or Prabhācandra) use this word only in propositions containing – linguistically speaking – one predicate, in other words in propositions S1 (“in a certain sense, x is only (eva) A”), S2 (“in a certain sense, x is only (eva) :A”), and S4 (“in a certain sense, x is only (eva) inexpressible”). In this perspective, the restrictive value of the adverb eva lays stress on the possibility in one of these three bhaṅga to predicate only one property to the concerned subject, excluding any other predicate. In contradistinction to this general trend, other authors like Vādirāja (cf. NViV ad NVi III.66, II p. 350.17–19), Malliṣeṇa (SVM 23.104–112, p. 143.3–11), and Abhayacandra (SVBh ad LT 62, p. 85.4–14) integrate eva in each predication, without distinguishing between those which are made up of one predicate only (S1, S2, and S4) from those which contain two (S3, S5, and S6) or three predicates (S7). In such a case, two alternative cases are attested, depending on the number of occurrences of the particle eva in complex propositions: only once in Vādirāja or Abhayacandra’s version but as many times as there are predicates by Malliṣeṇa.

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The third variation pertains to the order of propositions S3 and S4 that has wavered during ancient times (Dixit 1971, pp. 25–26). Such a hesitation is especially noteworthy when it occurs even by one and the same author, e.g., Akalaṅka. In his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthādhigamastra, the predicate avaktavya (“inexpressible”) appears sometimes in the third predication (RVār ad TS IV.42, I p. 253.4–6 ) and sometimes in the fourth one (RVār ad TS I.6, I 33.17–18). Such an inversion is nevertheless devoid of real philosophical consequences inasmuch as the difference between propositions S3 and S4 does not concern the nature of predicates but only the way in which they are combined.

The Structure of the Sevenfold Predication A common structure can be brought out beyond the minor variations attested in the tradition. Fundamentally, the syād-vāda or sapta-bhaṅgī is a structural rule permitting a combination of two contrary predicates {A, :A} with one another in all possible ways, so as to consider one and the same state of affairs as exhaustively as possible. The whole set, which expresses all the possible ways to combine two contrary predicates, A and :A, is built on the following pattern (Model 1): Model 1 (S1) In some respect (syāt), x is only (eva) A. (S2) In some respect, x is only :A. (S3) In some respect, x is A and :A. (S4) In some respect, x is only inexpressible. (S5) In some respect, x is A and inexpressible. (S6) In some respect, x is :A and inexpressible. (S7) In some respect, x is A, :A, and inexpressible. Thus, every predicative relation between a subject (x) and a predicate (A) – even predicative relations obtained through the viewpoints (naya) or the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) – has to be submitted to this set of seven predications. Applied to the assertion “soul is existent,” the sevenfold predication runs as follows (Model 2): Model 2 (S1) In some respect (syāt), soul is only (eva) existent (syād asty eva jī vaḥ). (S2) In some respect, soul is only nonexistent (syān n^ a sty eva jī vaḥ). (S3) In some respect, soul is existent and nonexistent (syād asti ca n^ a sti ca). (S4) In some respect, soul is only inexpressible (syād avaktavya eva jīvaḥ). (S5) In some respect, soul is existent and inexpressible (syād asti c^ a vaktavyas´ ca). (S6) In some respect, soul is nonexistent and inexpressible (syād n^ a sti c^ a vaktavyas´ ca). (S7) In some respect, soul is existent, nonexistent, and inexpressible (syād asti ca n^ a sti c^ a vaktavyas´ ca).

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In such a case, the verb asti is not to be understood as a mere copula, but it is endowed with an existential value, since it also contains the predicate “existent.”

The Number of Predicates While it is obvious that the subject (x in Model 1; “soul” in Model 2) is identical in the seven predications, the number of predicates involved in a single set of seven propositions is a more tricky issue. Two different trends are represented among Jaina philosophers as well as contemporary scholars. Many scholars, such as Matilal (1981, 2000, 2008), Padmarajiah (1986), and Uno (2000), following an interpretation set forth by Vādideva Sūri, say that the sapta-bhaṅgī is based on three fundamental predicates: A, :A, and “inexpressible” (avaktavya). In this perspective, three judgments are considered as simple (S1, S2, and S4) inasmuch as they contain only one predicate, whereas four judgments are complex (S3, S5, S6, and S7) because they involve two or three predicates (Padmarajiah 1986). However, another interpretation, going beyond the seeming oddness of the predicate avaktavya, reduces the number of fundamental predicates to two (A and :A). This thesis is supported by most Jaina philosophers, for instance, the Digambara Akalaṅka (eighth century) who explains that the third predicate, “inexpressible,” is nothing but a peculiar association of the predicates A and :A. Thus, according to this logician and his successors, the sapta-bhaṅgī is based on two fundamental judgments only (S1 and S2), one based on assertion (vidhi), S1, and the other on negation (pratiṣedha), S2 (cf. Akalaṅka, RVār ad TS I.6, I p. 33.15). Both are then combined with one another in order to produce the five remaining ones. It can thus be understood that the predicate “inexpressible” never changes, whatever the content is expressed by the predicate A.

Combinations of the Predicates If only two fundamental predicates are involved in the sapta-bhaṅgī , it should be explained how seven different propositions can be obtained through their combination.

Propositions S3 and S4 The propositions S3 and S4 involve a first level of combination of the two fundamental predicates A and :A, because the predicate “inexpressible” (avaktavya) is a special association of A and :A: (S3) In some respect, x is A and :A. (S4) In some respect, x is only inexpressible (avaktavya). In proposition S3, the predicates A and :A are uttered explicitly and separately while their combination can no longer be detected in the enigmatic predicate

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“inexpressible” (avaktavya) of the fourth proposition. Jaina logicians like Akalaṅka (RVār ad TS IV.42, I p. 261.6–10) express this difference by distinguishing a mere association, expressed by the participles samuccita or pracita (“gathered, collected”) from a complete fusion, denoted by the adjective avibhakta (“undivided, unseparated”): on the one hand, the predicates that are associated (samuccita, pracita) in the predication S3 can still be identified and separated; on the other hand, the components that have merged (vibhakta) in the adjective avaktavya of the predication S4 have lost their genuine individuality to become an indissoluble unity. Later commentators have deepened this distinction between two kinds of association of the fundamental predicates A and :A by taking into account the criterion of temporality. Thus Abhayacandra (SVBh ad LT 62, p. 85.6–8) explains the third and the fourth predications as follows: (S3) In some respect, soul is only existent and nonexistent by expressing successively (krama-vivakṣā) its own substance, its own time, its own place, its own condition and another substance, another time, another place, another condition. (S4) In some respect, soul is only inexpressible by expressing simultaneously (yugapat-vivakṣā) its own substance, its own time, its own place, its own condition and another substance, another time, another place, another condition. Thus the predicate avaktavya (“inexpressible”) constitutes a new way to coordinate the predicates A and :A: the subject is said to be inexpressible because language has such limitations that it cannot express the simultaneous possession of two different properties (cf. for instance Jayatilleke 1998, p. 348 and Matilal 2000 pp. 3–4). In every act of speech, separating two elements can be realized only if two different words are uttered at two different moments, in other words successively. Two words can never be pronounced in the same breath: no language, whatever powers it may have, is able to escape temporality, neither Sanskrit nor any modern language. Even nominal compounds do not solve the problem because a copulative compound (dvandva) is nothing but a shortened coordination of two distinct terms that still can be separated from each other (Balcerowicz 2015). As a consequence, uttering simultaneously contrary predicates or laying a simultaneous emphasis on both of them (cf. Balcerowicz 2015, pp. 214–221) results in losing the content expressed by these predicates. Such is the price one has to pay in order to recognize their contradiction – as it appears in the predicate inexpressible – as well as language limitations. Thus, when two attributes are simultaneously predicated of a subject, there are two ways to express the discrepancy between being and language: either the periphrasis “x is A and :A simultaneously” where the adverb counterbalances the impossibility to express explicitly A and :A exactly at the same time – such is the solution adopted by commentators who aim at glossing the predicate avaktavya; or the peculiar meaning of A and :A is erased in order to have both united in a single attribute that gives preeminence to neither of them: then only a predicate such as “inexpressible” can fulfill this function; there is then no need to mention the criterion of temporality. Both solutions reveal that there is no perfect coincidence between being (astitva) and expressibility (abhidheyatva).

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This parallelism between the constitution of assertions S3 and S4, both made up of a peculiar combination of the predicates A and :A explains their possible inversion in ancient times, when the pattern was not definitely set.

Propositions S5 to S7 Once it is established that the coexistence of two contrary predicates in a single proposition can be expressed through two different kinds of combination, based either on succession (krameṇa) or on simultaneity (yugapat), one can wonder why the Jaina model goes beyond a fourfold predication, by adding three more propositions. In other words, why seven, neither more nor less? Does the number seven entail any necessity? This number seems rather amazing; no wonder that it has aroused mockery from opponents. This tricky problem has been noticed by many Jaina logicians who basically found two different ways of explanation. Several Jaina thinkers, for instance, Vādirāja (NViV ad NVi III.66, 350.14–16) and Prabhācandra (PKM ad PMS VI.73, p. 682.18–23), followed by contemporary scholars such as Nyāyavijayajī (2000, p. 348), Uno (2000, p. 50), and Venkatachalam (2000, p. 71), have tried to justify the number seven, in spite of its seeming oddness. A thorough version of this reasoning has been luminously presented by Mookerjee (1978, pp. 117–118) who grounds his development on the Saptabhaṅgī taraṅgiṇī by Vimaladāsa: But why should the number be seven, neither more nor less? The answer is that each proposition is an answer to a question, possible or actual. And only sevenfold query is possible with regard to a thing. The questions are seven because our desire of knowledge with regard to any subject assumes seven forms in answer to our doubts, which are also seven. Doubts are seven because the attributes, which are the objects of doubt, are only of seven kinds. So the sevenfold assertion is not the result of a mere subjective necessity, which has nothing to do with the mere objective status of attributes. All assertions are in the last resort traceable to an objective situation, which actually possesses seven modes or attributes as an ontological truth.

However, this reasoning entails significant drawbacks. First of all, grounding the number of bhaṅga on the number of characteristics of an object implies that these characteristics are reduced to a definite number, namely seven, which challenges one of the main ontological tenets of Jainism, i.e., the fact that every being is endowed with an infinite number of features (anekānta-vāda). Moreover, far from being really satisfactory and from setting forth a real necessity, this explanation of the internal structure of the sapta-bhaṅgī by extrinsic reasons and by a reasoning based on an infinite regress may appear as purely contingent. To solve this difficulty, one has to adopt a purely linguistic perspective and deal with the predicate “inexpressible” (avaktavya) as if it were a primary predicate – as well as A and :A – so that it can be combined, on the successive mode, respectively, with A (S5), :A (S6), or with A and :A (S7). Thus, the most elaborate proposition, i.e., the seventh (“in some respect, x is A, :A and inexpressible”) predicates A and :A twice, applying the modes used respectively in the third and the fourth propositions, i.e., firstly a successive association and then a simultaneous association

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expressed through the adjective avaktavya (“inexpressible”). If a successive predication is symbolized by ^ and a simultaneous one by a dot (.), the sapta-bhaṅgī can be formalized as follows (brackets are used from the fifth proposition for the sake of convenience, to let the predicate avaktavya appear obviously): S1 : A S2 : :A S3 : A ^ :A S4 : A.:A S5 : A ^ (A.:A) S6 : :A ^ (A.:A) S7 : A ^ :A ^ (A.:A) The order of the various propositions is not fortuitous: it matches a logic of increasing complexity, the most emblematic evidence of which is the increasing number of predicates. But then, what serves as a warrant that no other predication can be uttered so as to shed a new light on a state of affairs? Since there are only two combinatory modes, succession and simultaneity, but no third one, as it is acknowledged by Jaina logicians themselves (cf. Akalaṅka, RVār ad TS IV.42, p. 252.19–20), one has to try other combinations between the three predicates – A, :A, and avaktavya –, and see whether a new predication can be produced that could not be reduced to one of the seven original bhaṅga. Such a test has been experimented by Vādirāja (NViV ad NVi III.66, II p. 350.32–351.4) who concludes that the seven predications exhaust all possible combinations. For instance, associating successively propositions S1 and S3 leads to a useless repetition of the predicate A and is thus tantamount to proposition S3. Being only linguistic, repetition adds no new ontological fact and leads to a tautology. Vādirāja does not even try new combinations based on simultaneity: uttering two, three, four, or more predicates simultaneously does not change anything since only one word, namely “inexpressible” (avaktavya), can express the simultaneous association of many predicates. Thus, once the basic principles that grounds the sapta-bhaṅgī have been recognized – two predicates A and :A, that can be associated in two different ways, successively (krameṇa) or simultaneously (yugapat) – one can understand that seven propositions, neither more nor less, can be produced in order to express the complex relations between a subject and a predicate.

Necessity of Seven Predications Why the seventh predication, which is the most complete one since it contains the three different predicates (A, :A, and avaktavya), is not sufficient to give a faithful account of the multiplex nature of reality? In other words, what would be the need for the predications S1 to S6? The seven propositions of syād-vāda are nothing else than the seven possible attempts, complementary as well as necessary, that a speaker has at his disposal in

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order to give the most complete account for the complex relation between a subject and a feature that is predicated of it. Taken all together or separately, they reveal the incapacity of language to achieve its task; language is meant to fail when it has to face the multiplexity of reality: separately because each of the seven predications only gives a partial insight on reality; all together, because the fact that seven propositions are necessary to provide the most complete description of a single state of affairs puts to the fore the inadequacy of language to really express the quintessence of being. Even if the seventh and last bhaṅga seems to be the most complete one, it cannot be considered to be a better description than any other bhaṅga: the fact that this proposition must repeat twice each predicate (A and :A), combining their successive and their simultaneous associations (which corresponds to propositions S3 and S4, respectively), in order to shed light on their complex relation, is the best evidence of this incapacity of language to express the multiplexity of reality. No proposition is endowed with a higher adequacy than any other, and each of the seven propositions can be held as a complete description of reality (sakalādes´a), inasmuch as the statement is qualified by the adverb syāt: “the function of the term ‘syāt’ is to imply all possible standpoints and widen the scope of the discourse” (Uno 2000, p. 47). This is not contradicted by the presence of the restrictive particle eva. When used in simple propositions, the restriction expressed by the adverb eva aims at excluding unrelatedness (ayoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka), in other words at excluding properties that are contrary to the very property that is predicated of the subject. In the proposition “the jar is only red,” the adverb “only” aims at excluding any other color adjective other than red. At the same time, using the word syāt counterbalances the restriction of eva: it acts as a reminder of the unilateral and partial description contained in a single proposition; each proposition must be completed by the others. The sevenfold predication is thus a method meant to overcome limitations inherent to language and to any kind of empirical knowledge. That is why it wrecks neither the possibility of omniscience nor the fact that absolute truths can be professed by omniscient beings. The objection raised by Naiyāyika thinkers (cf. Joshi 2000) does not really question the validity of the sevenfold predication: according to them even a statement like “a Tīrthaṅkara’s teaching is true” should be submitted to the sevenfold predication, with the absurd consequence that Jaina would have to acknowledge that in some respect the teaching professed by a Tīrthaṅkara is not true! But the Jaina method avoids such an objection because some statements – those that are expressed from the transcendental viewpoint – escape the syād-vāda and hold true absolutely (Clavel 2012).

Beyond Inadequate Comparisons Jainism and Advaita-Vedānta: Avaktavya and Anirvacanīya Because of their analogous formation and their usual synonymy in everyday language, the adjectives avaktavya and anirvacanī ya, used respectively by Jainas and Advaita-vedāntins, have sometimes been considered to be philosophically

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tantamount (Venkatachalam 2000). However, their conceptions of inexpressibility are totally opposite: in the Jaina sevenfold predication, the subject is said to be inexpressible (avaktavya) because language is limited and cannot express simultaneously the fact that a being is endowed with contrary predicates; on the other hand, inexpressibility in the Advaita-vedāntin doctrine implies exclusion of contrary predicates: being eternal and devoid of any conditionality, the nature of the Brahman cannot be characterized by predicates, since they are illusory.

Jainism and Buddhism: Sapta-Bhan˙gī and Catus-Koti ˙ implicit – between the ˙ or A second comparison has often been drawn – be it explicit Jaina and the Buddhist logical frameworks, because the first two propositions of the Buddhist catuṣ-koṭi are obviously similar to the first two propositions of the Jaina sapta-bhaṅgī . Many scholars have tried to compare both logical patterns in order to put to the fore a similarity between them or to explain their differences. Some of them assumed either that the Buddhist catuṣ-koṭi matches the first four propositions of the Jaina sapta-bhaṅgī (e.g., Raju 1954) or that the fourth proposition of the catuṣ-koṭi is tantamount to the last four propositions of the sapta-bhaṅgī (e.g., Miyamoto 1960). But such comparisons are grounded on a misunderstanding of the Jaina logical framework, or at least of the meaning of the predicate “inexpressible” (avaktavya) as used in the Jaina perspective: according to Jainism, saying that something is inexpressible does not mean that it is neither existent nor inexistent, but actually both of them simultaneously. Thus both patterns are fundamentally different from one another because they do not exactly interpret the logical principles of contradiction and of excluded-middle in the same way (Clavel 2010).

Syād-Vāda and Logic Principles Since neither the subject nor the fundamental predicates changes throughout the sapta-bhaṅgī , the compatibility between the sapta-bhaṅgī and logical principles, especially the principles of contradiction and of excluded-middle, raises serious problems. The conformity between Jaina sapta-bhaṅgī and such logical principles constitutes one of the main issues addressed by contemporary scholars.

The Meaning of Syāt The word syāt is a cornerstone of the sevenfold predication because this very word appears in each and every proposition. This is why this logical pattern is called sapta-bhaṅgī (“sevenfold predication”) when one aims at highlighting the fact that this logical structure consists of seven propositions, neither more nor less, as well as syād-vāda when stress is laid on the invariable presence of the adverb syāt in every proposition. No wonder that a misunderstanding of this fundamental word has often led scholars to a general misunderstanding of the sapta-bhaṅgī. Several models entail such a flaw. According to Pandey (1984) who claims the model of

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many-valued logic, statements S1 and S2 “challenge the law of contradiction” because Jainas “give some truth-value (other than falsehood) to contradictory statements” (Gokhale 2000, p. 76). Pandey does not take into account the presence of the term syāt, which is however sufficient to remove contradiction, because syāt does not refer to the same respect in S1 and in S2. The model of modal logic as presented by Barlingay (1965) and Marathe (1984) provides a wrong description of the syādvāda, because by characterizing a proposition as an incomplete truth one cannot conclude the indeterminateness of each proposition. The model of conditionality by Sagarmal Jain and B.K. Matilal is not satisfactory either because it aims at specifying the exact respect according to which the property A can be predicated from the subject x, whereas the originality of the Jaina logical framework precisely lies in the mention of some respect – without any other precision – and in the repetition of one and the same word throughout the syād-vāda. Lastly, Gokhale’s model of existential quantifier fails to conceive what sapta-bhaṅgī really is, in claiming that a “syātstatement” is actually “metalinguistic.”

Syāt = “Perhaps, Probably”? Among all models mentioned above there is a strong temptation to rely on the interpretation of the adverb syāt as “perhaps, maybe.” In Sanskrit, the third person of singular of the optative of the root AS- (“be”), taken adverbially, is usually translated as “maybe.” However, translating this word in such a way in the context of the syādvāda has significant consequences, because it leads to a general misunderstanding of the logic involved in the syād-vāda, and then to a misunderstanding of the whole Jaina philosophy. Scholars who acknowledge in the adverb syāt the usual meaning of a probability (“maybe”) are invariably led to a probabilistic interpretation of the syād-vāda. That is the thesis adopted by Barlingay (1965) who qualifies the sapta-bhaṅgī as a “logic of possibilities.” Doing so, he opened the way to the model of “modal logic” set forth by Marathe (1984). An analysis, which leads to subjective indetermination and uncertainty, can be expressed in two different models, depending on the number of occurrences of the adverb syāt: in the first case, syāt is repeated each time a new predicate appears (Model 3.1), whereas in the second case, it is expressed only once in each proposition (Model 3.2). Such an alternative is not totally artificial inasmuch as Jaina logicians themselves have wavered between both formulations: for instance, Malliṣeṇa uses the adverb syāt in a distributive way, repeating it as many times as there are predicates in a single proposition, while Prabhācandra never uses it more than once in a single proposition (cf. supra, § 1.4.). Model 3.1 (S1) x is maybe (syāt) A. (S2) x is maybe :A. (S3) x is maybe A and maybe :A. (S4) x is maybe inexpressible. (S5) x is maybe A and maybe inexpressible. (S6) x is maybe :A and maybe inexpressible.

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(S7) x is maybe A, maybe :A, and maybe inexpressible. Model 3.2 (S1) x is maybe (syāt) A. (S2) x is maybe :A. (S3) x is maybe A and :A. (S4) x is maybe inexpressible. (S5) x is maybe A and inexpressible. (S6) x is maybe :A and inexpressible. (S7) x is maybe A, :A, and inexpressible.

The probabilistic interpretation, especially the model 3.1, seems to bring a convenient solution to the problem of compatibility between the syād-vāda and the principle of contradiction. This logical principle is wrecked neither by the coexistence of the various propositions nor by the formulation of a single one. For, modalization does not concern the whole proposition but only the predicative relation between the subject and each attribute taken apart (A, :A, inexpressible). Thus propositions S3, S5, S6, and S7 are no longer complex and are nothing but associations of two or three fundamental predications (as found in propositions S1, S2, and S4). Since the seventh proposition includes the three predicates and shows them as the three possible alternatives, it is not necessary to express the six other propositions. Consequently, if seven propositions (bhaṅga) are meant to build up a set, it has to be acknowledged that there is only one predicative relation per proposition, even though a predicative relation can consist in more than one attribute. Thus, the adverb syāt should not have a distributive value in complex propositions (S3, S5, S6, and S7). According to the probabilistic interpretation of the word syāt, the syād-vāda would only express several possible judgments without being able to assert anything as being indubitable. It would bring to the fore the absolutely unknowable character of the world, since it would always be possible to utter contradictory judgments about everything without choosing between them. Therefore, translating syāt by “maybe” or by any other modalization aiming at expressing a probability or a modality is a wrong translation which implies interpreting Jainism as a form of ontological indetermination or skepticism (cf. Soni 1996). Such a consequence has been perfectly set forth by Nyāyavijayajī (2000, p. 345): Wrong interpretation of the term ‘syāt’ as ‘may be’ imparts a sceptical form to syād-vāda. But in fact syād-vāda is not scepticism. It is not the uncertainty of judgement, but its conditional or relative character, that is expressed by the qualifying particule ‘syāt’. Subject to the conditions under which any judgement is made, the judgement is valid beyond doubt. So there is no room for scepticism. All that is implied is that every assertion which is true, is true only under certain conditions. Syād-vāda is not of the nature of doubt arising from the difficulty or inability of ascertaining the exact nature of a thing in regard to existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence, etc. It is not the doctrine of uncertainty. It is not scepticism.

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More generally, every attempt to explain the syād-vāda in the light of modern logical tools that were unknown to ancient and medieval times fails to provide a consistent conceptual framework. Only textual evidences and interpretations that are drawn from Jaina texts can be taken for granted. Moreover, syāt cannot be seen as a finite verb because with the finite word asti from the same root it would make a statement with two finite verbs meaningless.

Syāt = Kathan˜cit A precious clue provided by Jaina logicians invalidates the probabilistic and modal analyses of the syād-vāda. Many texts reveal that the adverbs syāt and kathan˜ cit are considered as synonymous. Their equivalence goes beyond the mere grammatical gloss and has also a semantic value. In this way, it is clear that the adverb syāt aims at expressing the nonunilateral or multiplex (anekānta) nature of reality, and also of every predication. To reject a unilateral thesis does not lead to the impossibility of asserting propositions with certainty. Thanks to the equivalence between syāt and kathan˜ cit, it is now taken for granted that the adverb syāt restricts the validity of a judgment by having it depend on a peculiar viewpoint. Using the word syāt (or kathan˜ cit) in a judgment acts as a remainder of its status: the judgment should not be considered as the only valid one; it is true only from a certain point of view, in some respect. Thus it is now taken for granted that the word syāt is to be translated by expressions like “from a certain point of view,” “in some respect” (cf. for instance Pardmarajiah 1986, p. 338, Kulkarni 2000, Nyāyavijayajī 2000, pp. 341–349 and Uno 2000). The syād-vāda is really a cornerstone of the doctrine the multiplex character of reality (anekānta-vāda) that avoids taking into consideration only a single aspect of a state of affairs or a univocal relation between a subject and a predicate. Nevertheless, the presence of this modalization does not obviate certainty to judgments. The predicative relation contained in the sentence “in some respect (syāt) x is A” is really asserted and is devoid of doubt.

Contradiction and Tautology As it has been expressed in Metaphysics Γ by Aristotle (1005b19–20), the principle of contradiction runs as follows: “It is impossible that the same thing at the same time both belongs and does not belong to the same object in the same respect” (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν α᾿ δύνατoν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ). The principle of contradiction seems to be wrecked by the sevenfold predication. This is why contemporary scholars have set forth many-valued logic models in order to solve the problems of compatibility between judgments that seem contradictory (for instance Barlingay 1965, Bharucha and Kamat 1984, Matilal 1981, Ganeri 2001 and 2002). However, such models are not consistent to give a right account of the syād-vāda, because Jaina thinkers themselves claim the principle of contradiction, such as the great logician Akalaṅka who makes it clear that the sapta-bhaṅgī really takes into account this principle: “Sevenfold predication is the set of judgments based on affirmation and negation, that are expressed without any contradiction

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(avirodhena) on account of a question with respect to one and the same real thing” (RVār ad TS I.6, I p. 33.15). Before explaining how the whole set of seven predications is consistent with that logical principle, one has to understand how the first two propositions can be uttered without contradiction, in other words, how two contrary attributes can be predicated of a single subject. One must not conclude from the recurrence of an identical word, i.e., syāt, in every proposition and especially in S1 and S2, that syāt always refers to the same viewpoint or perspective. Later commentators have explicated the viewpoints according to which a subject can be respectively said to be A and :A: are thus distinguished identity and alterity factors. In spite of the seeming equivocity of the word syāt, the subject is considered under two different sets of conditions. Soul is said to be existent from the viewpoint (vivakṣā) of its own substance, its own time, its own place, and its own condition, whereas it is said inexistent from the viewpoint of another substance, another time, another place, and another condition. Thus, the coexistence of S1 and S2 is consistent with the principle of contradiction inasmuch as the same subject is not qualified by two contrary predicates under the same set of circumstances (for an extensively developed instance, cf. Malliṣeṇa, SVM 23.113–120, p. 143.12–18). However, solving this difficulty makes another one emerge: if the coexistence of S1 and S2 is not inconsistent with the principle of contradiction, uttering successively the propositions S1 and S2 could appear as nothing but a verbal game, or in other words as a tautology. Saying on the one hand that a real thing is existent from the viewpoint of its own substance, place, time, and condition (S1) and on the other hand that the same thing is inexistent from the viewpoint of another substance, place, time, and condition (S2) may appear as a tautology, since S2 is nothing but the negative counterpart of S1. As such, the second assertion does not bring any new element that would not have been provided by S1. Several interpretations have been set forth to explain how the sapta-bhaṅgī can escape the objection of a tautology. Balcerowicz (2015) thus tries to explain the Jaina logical system in the light of the Buddhist theory of apoha (“exclusion”). According to Madhyamaka Buddhism, especially to Dharmakīrti (seventh century), one of its greatest representatives, if two things can be characterized as red, their redness is fundamentally the consequence of an exclusion process (x is red because x is not non-red, in other words x is A because x is : :A) and it only secondarily results in a similarity. From this perspective, the proposition S1 would predicate a property from a subject in the only way that is linguistically convenient, i.e., by asserting, while the proposition S2 would take into account thanks to negation the exclusion of what x is not. However, the Buddhist theory does not perfectly match the Jaina conception because it restricts the opposition between affirmation and negation to the linguistic field and it makes their ontological opposition disappear, or at least it reduces ontology to a mere effect of language. Jaina logicians invalidate this interpretation since they recognize that two contrary predicates (for instance, jarness and non-jarness) are not separated from one another (cf. Akalaṅka, RVār ad TS I.6, I, p. 35.1: ghaṭatvam aghaṭatvaṃ ca parasparato na bhinnam). Stating the inexistence of :A in the subject x does not

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only aim at drawing a strict delimitation between x and everything which is not x. Rather than rejecting negativity outside of the being, one has to understand, according to the Leibnizian theory of inter-expression, that negations are inscribed in the core of beings themselves. Such a conception matches another fundamental tenet of Jainism, namely the multiplex nature of reality (anekānta-vāda), according to which each and every substance has an infinite number of characteristics (cf. Uno 2000, p. 42). This complexity of beings is perfectly expressed by Akalaṅka: “Thought which consists in false and true, which consists in visible and invisible, in difference and identity, establishes by itself that one and the same reality consists in existence and non-existence” (LT 9cd-10ab). This inter-expression of substances sheds a new light on the whole Jaina doctrine: considering that each substance is a viewpoint on the world, one can understand that knowing perfectly a single thing requires knowing everything (cf. Kundakunda, NiS 158), since in each substance the determinations characterizing every other substances are inscribed, as it has been convincingly expressed by Balcerowicz (2015, p. 183): “the world is a complete network within which all the existents are related with all the remaining ones and that their essential character and nature is not only determined by what is in things themselves but also by all the relations in which they enter vis-à-vis all other existents.” The syād-vāda can thus be considered as a method that plays the part of an ersatz of omniscience for those who are not able to obtain this perfect and absolute knowledge of reality.

Definitions of Key Terms anekānta-vāda avaktavya

bhaṅga

eva kathan˜ cit

naya

pramāṇa sapta-bhaṅgī

“doctrine of multiplexity of reality.” third linguistic predicate used in the sapta-bhaṅgī “inexpressible,” generally considered as the only means to express two contrary predicates simultaneously. one member, i.e., one proposition among the set of seven that constitutes the sapta-bhaṅgī . The way each proposition is made up allows one to reconstitute the other six in order to give a full account of a single state of affair. restrictive particle “only.” “somehow,” adverb often used by commentators as a paraphrase of the term “syāt” in the context of the sevenfold predication. “viewpoint.” The Jaina tradition counts seven viewpoints: comprehensive (naigama), collective (saṅgraha), empirical (vyavahāra), instantaneous (ṛjusūtra), synonymous (s´abda), etymological (samabhirūḍha), and factual (evaṃbhūta or itthaṃbhūta). “means of knowledge.” “sevenfold predication,” set of seven predications that can express all possible relations between a subject and a predicate.

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syād-vāda

syāt

vastu

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“doctrine of ‘in some respect,” synonym of sapta-bhaṅgī when used in its most restrictive meaning, and of anekānta-vāda when used in its broader meaning. third person of singular of the optative of the root AS- (“be”). Taken adverbially, it is usually translated by “maybe” in Sanskrit, but in the context of the sapta-bhaṅgī , it is glossed by kathan˜ cit and rather means “in some respect.” a real thing.

Summary Points The syād-vāda (“doctrine of syāt”) or sapta-bhaṅgī (“sevenfold predication”) is an epistemological method of Jainism which is consistent with its ontology, i.e., the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda). The word sapta-bhaṅgī insists on the number of propositions in the logical framework, whereas the term syād-vāda lays stress on the fundamental adverb syāt used in each and every proposition. The sevenfold predication is the structural rule permitting a combination of two contrary predicates (A and non-A), with one another in all possible ways, so as to consider one and the same state of affairs as exhaustively as possible. The syād-vāda is based on two predicates only; the third one, namely “inexpressible” (avaktavya) is obtained when the first two are associated simultaneously. Two kinds of combination are used throughout the sapta-bhaṅgī, namely succession and simultaneity. All predications share the same truth-value: each can be considered as a complete description of reality inasmuch as the adverb syāt alludes to the six other. One judgment cannot be sufficient to give a faithful account of a single state of affairs because of the limited power of language. The word syāt has to be translated as “in some respect” but not as “perhaps.” Syād-vāda is not a doctrine of ontological indetermination or a skepticism. Nor does it challenge the logical principles, especially the principle of contradiction.

References ĀM = Samantabhadra. 1999. Āptamīmāṃsā. In Samantabhadra’s Āptamī māṁsā, critique of an authority, along with English translation, introduction, notes and Akalaṅka’s Sanskrit commentary Aṣṭas´atī , ed. & trans. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth. Balcerowicz, Piotr. 2015. Do attempts to formalize the Syād-vāda make sense? In Jaina scriptures and philosophy, ed. Peter Flügel and Olle Qvarnström, 181–248. London: Routledge. Barlingay, Surendra S. 1965. A modern introduction to Indian logic. Delhi: National Publishing House.

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Logic in Tamil Tradition

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Nirmal Selvamony

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Logic as Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tarukkam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tarukkam in Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tarukkam in Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tarukkam in Political Oration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vākai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The End of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definitions of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

Logic, in Tamil tradition, is inseparably connected with philosophy and rhetoric. It is a reasoning praxis, which includes knowing the truth and communicating it. If the former is the epistemic aspect of logic, the latter is its rhetorical. The rhetorical branch has two main divisions, the monological (tarukkam) and the dialogical (vākai). Examples are provided from classical literature, folk songs, folk drama, religious polemics, political oration, screen play, research methodology, forum for disputation, and debating forum. The purpose of logic is to affirm the normative mode of truth of each type of society. If the truth of the Tamil primal society is differentiated continuity, that of the Tamil state society is foregone conclusion, and that of the Tamil industrial society is anarchic indeterminacy.

N. Selvamony (*) Madras Christian College, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur, Tamil Nadu, India © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_5

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Introduction The phrase otta kāṭci in tolkāppiyam (hereafter, tol.) (III. 9. 112: 1) means literally “proper or befitting vision,” “seeing how something fits with truth.” Though the term kāṭci often denotes philosophy in early Tamil sources (Selvamony 1996), it particularly refers to philosophy as logic in marapiyal (of tol. III. 9. 112: 1) as the term is used in the context of debating techniques (uttikaḷ). Some other terms for logic are tarukkam (tarukku [tol. III. 1. 53: 4], to exalt [often] oneself verbally + am, a nominal suffix ¼ tarukkam, verbal exaltation, logic), vākai (tol. III. 2. 18, 19; vātu/vātam, verbal duel; “vāti” [verbal dueler], malaipaṭukaṭām 112; logic), aḷavai (literally, measure; cf. tol. III. 8. 186: 3; validative criterion; validation of knowledge; logic; see the present author’s “Logic in tolkāppiyam” in the present Handbook; civañāṉa cittiyār), and niyāyam (“niyāyam pēcu,” vāṉamāmalai 558–559). Though validation (aḷavai) is an important part of logic, the latter is not wholly a matter of validation to the ancient Tamil people because the ultimate end was the vision of truth, not validation of knowledge. Logic, then, is basically finding truth and communicating it to others effectively. If the former addresses the epistemic aspect of logic, the latter does the rhetorical. In the non-Tamil context, logic could focus on the “theory of pramāṇas or accredited means of knowing in general, perhaps with particular emphasis upon the specific theory of aṉumāṉa, inference considered as means of knowing” (Matilal 1) and thus lay emphasis on the epistemic aspect. The epistemic branch has contributed the criteria for validation of knowledge (aḷavai), the method of concluding an assertion (kāṇṭikai, Selvamony 1990, 2000), and the techniques of reasoning (uttikaḷ), all of these resulting in the development of a separate domain of study, aḷavaiyiyal (epistemology). The epistemic logical branch has also yielded what we today call “research methodology.” However, it must be pointed out that this branch of logic has overemphasized what David Abram calls “a calculative logic” (267) or “the exclusively human logic,” a derivative of the alphabetized intellect of the humans which stifles “a kind of logic in tangible qualities” (Levi-Strauss 1). The latter consists in direct perceptual contact with the world (Abram 268). Our epistemology has a biological basis in direct perceptual contact with the world, and, as Abram shows, our sophistication of epistemic logic is disproportionate with our basic organismic need for adequate perceptual contact with the world. In deed perceptual contact facilitates our ontically differentiated continuity with the world. But difference and continuity have to be negotiated with the help of epistemic and rhetorical aspects of logic.

Logic as Rhetoric Though the epistemic and the rhetorical aspects of Tamil logic may be studied separately, this essay will focus on the rhetorical as the latter incorporates the former almost entirely. In other words, to communicate the “proper vision” to others, we use the criteria of knowledge, the argumentative text, and techniques. We may also say

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that rhetoric is applied logic. Aristotle defined rhetoric as “the faculty [power] of discovering in the particular case what the available means of persuasion are” (Cooper 7). Put differently, speech can be properly persuasive only when it is logical or when it states the fitting, the reasonable, and hence the adjective, “otta” (befitting, proper) in “otta kāṭci.”

tarukkam The rhetorical branch of traditional Tamil logic has two main subdivisions: the monological and the dialogical. If monologically rhetorical logic is known as “tarukkam,” dialogically rhetorical logic is “vākai.” In later times, vākai came to be known as “vātu” or “vātam.” As tarukkam and vākai or vātu include rhetoric in their semantic range, it would be absurd to conclude that there is no Tamil equivalent for rhetoric (Bate 48). We find monological rhetoric in both the Inner (akam) and Outer (puṟam) domains of life. In the former it is traceable to courtship, the burden of the tiṇai known as kaikkiḷai in which a lad tries to woo a non-reciprocating girl (tol. III. 1. 53), and in the latter, it is known as “pāṭāṇ” (singing the ruler) in which skilled artists (who are also rhetors or orators) seek gifts from a benevolent donor (tol. III. 2. 25– 36). If the courting rhetor (the persuasive speaker) exalts himself in kaikkiḷai using hyperbole, the gift-seeking rhetor underplays himself/herself. Such praxic equivalence justifies the pairing of the Inner and Outer tiṇaikaḷ. Even as the courting lad exaggerates the charm of the girl, the gift-seeker overstates the virtues of the donor. Both rhetors (of the Inner and the Outer domains) employ knowledge-validating criteria such as example and reason; in fact, predominantly, the former to vindicate their claim. If the lad piles up similes and metaphors to express the girl’s beauty, the gift-seeker does so in order to underscore the donor’s generosity. Both lavish analogical language only to stress that the implorer is the legitimate (reasonable) beneficiary. If the boy reasons his rightful claim to the girl’s beauty, the gift-seeker does his to the donor’s generosity. When one’s claim is not conceded, argument ensues. As contention is its necessary condition, argument may be considered the verbal equivalent of combat. It creates maximal positive mental distance between the two parties. But if disagreement crosses the threshold point, the mental distance between the parties becomes negative and they could even become enemies.

tarukkam in Literature Even as the argument during heterosexual courtship precedes premarital love relationship, tiff (another form of verbal duel) does sexual union in marital relationship (tirukkuṟaḷ 1330). If the purpose of argument in courtship is to separate the partners in order to strengthen their unity, the end of tiff is to effect greater passionate sexual union (continuity). Both courtship argument and tiff between married couple should

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not exceed proper limits. This is evident in a courtship monologue (from the primal society/tiṇai; kalittokai 56) of a boy who pursues a girl (walking on a street) and makes wild allegations against her. His charge is that she is the source of great distress to the young males when she chooses to walk on the street without any escort. Instead of stating the charge, he chooses to express it in the form of questions. The reasons adduced as evidence are in the form of figures of speech, which express the girl’s beauty. When the same reason is given in different forms, the repetitiveness creates a sort of hypnotic effect on the listener. However, his allegations are provocative and awaken her rationality though she does not respond in any way. In other words, his rhetoric balances both rational sally (which ensures difference) and arational hypnosis (which promotes continuity). Finally, he acquits her by squarely shifting the blame onto the chieftain and wonders how the latter, who forewarned the people when an elephant in musth was at large chose not to alert the people when a pretty girl walked on the street without proper escort (kalittokai 56). Evidently, the final acquittal prevents the argument from taking negative effect. The kalittokai song we discussed belongs to the tiṇai called kaikkiḷai (an akattiṇai we discussed earlier), which means “minor relationship.” Though it is not one of the major five tiṇaikaḷ based on love (aṉpoṭu puṇarnta aintiṇai, tol. III. 3. 1), it is an important early stage in the development of sexual life. It deals with unrequited love during courtship, a kind of primordial behavior, not only of humans but also of several other creatures. In order to understand courtship, we may do well to remember that male animals have “stronger passions than the females. Hence it is the males that fight together and sedulously display their charms before the female.” In most animals, the male seeks the female (Darwin 578–79) and gets extremely pugnacious when pairing (Darwin 698, 703). Courtship behavior in humans (in tiṇai society) includes such acts as making sexual advances despite lack of any response from the female, constructing a provocative, hyperbolic, and yet logical monologue consisting of sensitive remarks about him and her, often challenging the ethicality of female behavior (tol. III. 1. 50). In humans, especially, males, unlike in the other organisms, the word is the most effective instrument of persuasion. In other species, the equivalents of the word are vocalization and “instrumental music” (Darwin 704–714), courtship antics (Darwin 714–716), the bright coloring, and the “various ornaments, which often become more brilliant during the breeding-season. . .” (Darwin 704). Compelled to use the word (logos>logic) in the most rhetorical manner possible for basic biological purposes, namely, mating and perpetuation of the species in tiṇai societies, the alpha human male asserts his dominance (like the males of most other species) to win the female. Humans may also resort to combat with other males or subdue animals, or go through ordeals to win the female not during tarukkam but in a prior competitive stage called vākai. Though vākai particularly refers to verbal duel, it may involve other forms of contest and trial too. But vākai does not involve the prized female. Even when the contest is physical, vākai is incomplete without verbal boast. After subduing the competitors successfully, the alpha male enters the tarukkam stage. His rhetoric has a double effect on the female. On the one hand,

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his argument addresses her rational mind; on the other, his words have a hypnotic effect on her. The female partner has to be rationally active enough in order to witness male self-assertion through eloquence. At the same time, she has to suspend her disbelief in his truth-claims. Though self-assertion is isolative in nature, ironically, it is the prelude to sexual union. On the one hand, he desires union with her, which should involve merging his self with the girl’s. On the other, he seeks to indulge in logical verbal display, which activates the rationality of both maximally. But when he loses his self and unites with her, he will not need logic anymore. Just as courtship is a desirable prelude and justifiable if it culminates in sexual union, divisive logic is justifiable if it leads to befitting vision or otta kāṭci which will facilitate integration (or continuity) of the members of tiṇai (humans and nonhumans). If logic served the integrative purposes of the rhetors of the primal (tiṇai) society, it set different faith-communities in opposition to each other in the state society. However, both societies employed monological rhetoric. Examples of monological rhetoric may be found in folk songs also. Consider the song titled, “araṇmaṉaikkāri” (literally, palace girl/woman) in which the male addresser tries to get the attention of the female addressee not unlike in kaikkiḷait tiṇai (cakannātaṉ 51–53): pallākku mēlē ēṟip pavaṉi pōṟavaḷē –rācātti pavaṉi pōṟavaḷē (O girl, my queen, who rides a palanquin, leading a procession, leading a procession). (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

Another type of monological rhetoric in injunctive mood can be traced to a practice (of the Outer domain) in the primal (tiṇai) society called “ceviyaṟivuṟū,” meaning, “counsel” (tol. III. 2. 34: 8). Here is an example: O you great chieftain, you belong to the forest country where elephants wander like cattle among the buffalo-like black rocks. Matchless you are; so, will I tell you this: Avoiding the company of those that have no love and grace and head towards hell, may you nurture your land like how a mother does her baby; proper it is; rare too. (puṟanāṉūṟu 5; trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

This rhetorical genre was effectively employed in the public assembly (avai) also. An ancient Tamil song tells us that a bard admonished the elders in an assembly probably because they were not discharging their duties properly (puṟanāṉūṟu 195; cf. Bate 48–52). We may note in the song quoted above how the analogy and the

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bard’s own status in the society lend authority to the admonition. The analogy appeals to a context that can validate the relation between the ruler and the ruled when both enjoy necessary continuity. The injunctive monological rhetoric of the tiṇai assembly anticipates the sermons and exhortations of the religious leaders of the state society. A classic example of this type occurs in the canto of cilappatikāram where the heroine kaṇṇaki charges the king of pāṇṭiyar with the crime of the murder of her husband. Through different rhetorical modes the rhetor seeks to persuade the addressee.

tarukkam in Research Methodology Persuasion is certainly a goal of the modern researcher also. The dissertation has to be written in a persuasive manner, and in this regard, the role of the argumentative techniques gains importance. The argumentative tradition of the tiṇai assembly may be regarded as the ultimate source of what we today call “research methodology.” The Tamil scholars tamiḻaṇṇal and ilakkumaṇaṉ (1977) maintain that in Tamil, the grammar texts, commentaries on grammar, and philosophical texts have always adopted their own research methods (161). They point out that classification and synoptic account are methods the grammarians adopt in their texts (163). If the commentator parimēlaḻakar brings out the significance of the arrangement of the ten couplets in tirukkuṟaḷ (164), the theologians of caiva cittāntam employ the research methods in their texts (161). The research methods adopted by the grammarians, commentators, and theologians are either what tolkāppiyar called argumentative techniques (uttikaḷ) or similar ones. tamiḻaṇṇal and ilakkumaṇaṉ (1977) show how many of the argumentative techniques discussed in naṉṉūl and tol. are applicable to the modern dissertation (161–164). What we call synopsis (or abstract) is a kind of tokuttuk kūṟal (tol. III. 9. 112: 3), and the argument is based on the technique of maṟutalaic citaittal (tol. III. 9. 112: 18). Stating of the hypothesis is tolkāppiyar’s “taṉkōḷ kūṟal” (tol. III. 9. 112: 10). Citing others involves either agreement with earlier scholars (piṟaṉ uṭaṉpaṭṭatu tāṉ uṭaṉpaṭal, tol. III. 9. 112: 11) or disagreement (maṟutalaic citaittal, tol. III. 9. 112: 18). When one disagrees, one has to say why, and this involves stating one’s view on the matter (taṉ tuṇipuraittal, tol. III. 9. 112: 18). When one engages another scholar’s view, either to agree or disagree, one has to cite relevant facts or principles (muṭintatu kāṭṭal, ñāpakam kūṟal, tol. III. 9. 112: 15, 22). In all this, consistency is taken care of by iṟantatu kāttal (supra) and etiratu pōṟṟal (infra; III. 9. 112: 12). By employing the argumentative techniques, the dissertation, an example of monological type of tarukkam, appeals to the “befitting vision” of the examiner by arguing a thesis. When truth is more a matter of form than content, rational evidences to justify the assertion are adequate as in a court of law. The reduction of truth to interpretation gives rise to multiple truths and subsequent epistemic anarchism which typically represents the zeitgeist of the industrialist society.

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tarukkam in Political Oration Another example of monological rhetoric is the modern political oration in Tamil. It is believed that ci. eṉ. aṇṇāturai (1909–1969) and karuṇāniti (1924) “were the first general practitioners of the new mode within mass politics in the early 1950s” (Bate 35). The phrase “new mode” here means, “mēṭait tamiḷ” (oratorical platform Tamil), a kind of literary Tamil used in political orations. In fact, such Tamil was in evidence earlier too. ma. po. civañāṉam discusses the mēṭait tamiḻ of a few Tamil orators during the Independence Struggle (211–223). But one would not want to ignore such orators as na. mu. vēṅkaṭacāmi nāṭṭār (1884–1944), and cōmacuntara pāratiyār (1879–1959) both of whom earned the title “nāvalar” because of their oratorical skills. The latter’s political speeches against the British Raj (from 1905), and the imposition of Hindi in the Tamil state in the 1930s were literary and argumentative at once as he was a Tamil scholar, and, by profession, an advocate. ci. eṉ. aṇṇāturai was quite familiar with nāvalar’s speeches as he had argued with him even in the debating forum on the question, “Should kamparāmāyaṇam Be Burnt?” (iḷañcēraṉ 227–37). It is highly likely that the popular Dravidian politicians are indebted to eminent public speakers like na. mu. vēṅkaṭacāmi nāṭṭār and cōmacuntara pāratiyār. However, ultimately, modern Tamil political rhetoric could be traced to the monological rhetoric of the tiṇai society. We may illustrate the use of logical devices such as the proposition, reason, and illustration in modern political oration with the help of an excerpt from ci. eṉ. aṇṇāturai’s speech on Islam on 7 October 1957, at the event of mīlāp, at Madras Beach. Proposition: Why is Islam a great way of life? Reasons: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Because it has several doctrines which can dispel the doubts of humans Because one of its doctrines forbids idolism Because another Islamic doctrine is about making humans whole Because it removes caste identity Because Bernard Shaw has stated that Islam will be the only best life-way Because it can be used for great purposes Illustration: 6.1 Like diamond which can be put to good use such as making jewels, and also to bad use, such as gambling.

In the abovementioned example, the speaker adopts the strategy of multiplication of reasons. In fact, this is one of the significant features of popular Dravidian rhetoric in the movies and in politics. If the lad who was courting a non-reciprocating girl (in kaikkiḷait tiṇai) was multiplying analogies (civaliṅkaṉār 418; kalittokai 30), the modern popular Dravidian rhetor multiplied reasons for the same reason, namely, poetico-dramatic effect. It must be noted that the multiplication of reasons is a rhetorical technique, which ultimately derives from the folk song. Again, all oral texts (the folk song, the kaikkiḷai song, and political speech) use repetition in order to create symmetry (Selvamony 2017), which has the power to cast a spell on the

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listener. In this regard, the rhetoric of the pursuant passionate lad and the popular Dravidian politician tend to get alogical rather than logical. Such alogicality helps the listener overlook the truth of the argument. By analogizing religion (of the state society) to the diamond’s ambivalent usage, the political rhetor of the industrialist society anarchizes truth. The rhetoric of a Tamil scholar like cōmacuntara pāratiyār employed chaste Tamil, classical literary style in a strictly argumentative form. If māyūram vētanāyakam piḷḷai (1826–1889), who was in the legal profession, attempted to Tamilize legal language and used ordinary Tamil in public platforms, cōmacuntara pāratiyār, who was also in the same profession, introduced the rigor of legal argument in literary Tamil in his public orations (nāvalar cōmacuntara pāratiyiṉ nūlkaḷ; while teaching tolkāppiyam, pāratiyār had also imparted oratorical skills to his disciple, V. P. K. Sundaram [1915–2003], who, in turn, adopted a similar pedagogical method while he taught tolkāppiyam to the present writer).

va¯kai So far we dwelt on the logical forms that are monologically rhetorical. Now we may turn to the dialogical ones. Dialogical rhetoric or vākai is verbal duel. In tol. it occurs as one of the stages of combat (III. 2. 18, 19). Apparently, verbal duel is found in other primal cultures too. Though it figures in the Tamil tradition, in the public (Outer) domain of tiṇai life, its origin may be traced to the Inner domain (akam). Like the male birds that try to attract the female with their song, the human males try to excel each other rhetorically when one of them attempts to capture the other. In vākai, the prize of the contest is not a third entity, such as a female, but the subdued opponent himself. If so, the origin of both logical forms – monological and dialogical—could be traced to courtship.

va¯kai in Folk Songs Dialogico-rhetorical logic informs a genre known as “tarkkam” in folk song and drama. Evidently, the older form “tarukkam” is changed in popular usage to “tarkkam.” But it must be noted that tarukkam, which figures in kaikkiḷai is a monological form, whereas “tarkkam” in folk song and folk drama is a dialogical one. In this genre we usually find a young man who pursues a non-reciprocating woman as in the tiṇai called kaikkiḷai (literally, “small relationship”). But unlike her counterpart in the tiṇai, this woman is quite vocal about her feelings. Consider the following example: Female: Why did you come over here you beggar, paṟaiyaṉ brat? You don’t want any hassles, quickly you may leave, believe me. Argue not with me. Go your way, go you may. (8th stanza)

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Before the brothers who left for the river return to raise a ruckus quietly you go away, roundly will you be thrashed. Argue not with me. Go your way, go you may. (27th stanza) Male: If the brothers come and ruckus raise I’ll whisk you away in a jiffy and fly in the sky. O my swan, poṉṉammā, I can’t keep my eyes open anymore. O my swan. (28th stanza) Female: If you fly in the sky carrying me, into the earth will I go and come up as grass. Argue not with me. Go your way, oh go you may. (29th stanza; cakannātaṉ 59–65) (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

A closer look at the song will show that statements (propositions) are couched in the question form and each statement is validated with reason(s). For example, “Why did you come over here. . .” restates the form, “Do not follow me,” and this injunctive utterance is followed by the reason, “Because, you do not want any hassle.” In another song, a woman’s male cousin tries to persuade her to go and watch the temple car festival. Male: O beauty with swan-like gait, O adorning jeweled beauty, O plaited beauty, desirable apple of my eye, Get ready to watch the temple car, my loving apple of the eye. (1st stanza) Female: O mataṉ*-like handsome man, O handsome man with entrancing word, O handsome man with lovely colour and form, My forehead mark-like maccāṉ,** To watch the temple car I will not go, Oh maccāṉ of our clan. (2nd stanza) (*male love god; **male cousin) Male: If you say you will not go O thou with round forehead mark, Even a few reasons, O desirable apple of my eye, Tell me without hesitation, my love, the apple of my eye. (3rd stanza) Pearl necklace will I buy you, The best earring will I give, I’ll give you, my virgin girl, O desirable apple of my eye, Marble-like coral I’ll give you, my love, the apple of my eye. (4th stanza) Female: Oil of campaṅki I need, China silk I need,

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Bombay soap I need, my forehead-mark-like maccāṉ, Ventilated blouse I need, Oh maccāṉ of our clan. (5th stanza; cakannātaṉ 68–69) (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony) (campaṅki: Magnolia champaca)

The first two stanzas state only the proposition. In fact, the predicate (pakkam) of the proposition occurs only in the fourth line of the first stanza and the fifth and sixth lines of the second. The remaining lines in those two stanzas state the subject (poruḷ) of the proposition in different poetic ways. Since the reason for not going to the festival with him is not given by the woman, the man seeks the reason in the third stanza and gives three reasons himself in the fourth as to why she should accompany him. The multiplication of reasons is a rhetorical technique the folk song contributes to the argumentative tradition in Tamil. We may contrast the rhetorical genre like cousin mutumoḻi (which does not explicitly state the reason) with the folksong, the argument in the court, the screenplay, and the political speech, which multiply reasons. In the fifth stanza, the woman states three conditions, in fact, three veiled reasons, for going with him. Analogy, as in the fifth stanza, also garnishes such songs. In yet another song, a woman goes looking for a lost bull in pouring rain out of mortal fear of having to face the wrath of her step mother. It is then does she chance upon a young man she calls, “poṉṉumāmā” (literally, “golden uncle”) with whom she engages in a verbal duel. The man asks her to forget her bull and take the one he would give her, but she insists on having her own bull. It is then does he ask, Why do you try to outsmart me? I will not be deceived. A thousand people like you have I seen – Oh golden ruby, I have seen all over the world, golden ruby. (stanza 7; cakannātaṉ 75) (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

It may be recalled that outsmarting is a characteristic function of the type of verbal duel called “vākai” described in tol. (III.2. 18, 19).

va¯kai in Folk Drama The rhetorical genre “tarkkam” occurs in Tamil folk drama too. In vaḷḷi tirumaṇam, we find this genre employed six times. The following is the first instance: Song: Hunter: O hill-dweller-deer that escaped the net, Did you see a deer come this way? Escaping the bow, the arrow of the bow, Running, distraught, straight towards you today – O hill-dweller-deer Confidanté: Who could see? You are a bowed hunter Looking for a deer among people. Does the deer you saw have feet and arms? Horns on the bosom, facing you directly? – Who could see? Prose: Well, smart guy! Will you look for deer among girls? You do look like someone looking for a deer! What an intrigue!

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Song: Hunter: No deceit or trickery! Great trouble entering this forest. The deer I saw in the forest Has name, domicile, and the company of girls – O hill-dweller-deer Confidanté: Thinking the girls would be unprotected Did you come over here by design? Don’t you know in this world irāvaṇaṉ because of cītai had to die? – Who will see? Hunter: O jesting beauty schooled in sciences! A flirting deer got out of control And hereabouts for red honey in this forest, a deer Straight towards the millet came over here – O hill-dweller-deer. (kuṟṟālam piḷḷai 34–35; trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

It may be noted that the confidanté phrases in question form her reasons for the impossibility of finding a deer among girls. The stanza in which she cites the authority of the canonical text (in this case, The Ramayana, which is regarded as scripture also) she implies a proposition and a reason: You shall not pursue vaḷḷi, Because, it will be fatal for you

A little later, there is tarkkam between the hunter and the central persona, vaḷḷi herself: Hunter: O divine damsel shooing birds crying ālōlam To my joyous desire yield – O divine. . . vaḷḷi: O hunter who came mysteriously, Disappear without losing dignity, O stupid fool – O hunter . . .. (kuṟṟālam piḷḷai 38; trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

If tarkkam in vaḷḷi tirumaṇam occurs only in kaikkiḷai situations between an unrelenting female and a pursuing male partner, in arccuṉaṉ tapacu also it figures in kaikkiḷai context, but between a pursuing female and an unyielding male partner. Here are the first couple of stanzas from the latter play: arccuṉaṉ: Woman, stay away from me. How can I embrace you? Without a doubt you say so much, Without fear you quarrel with me In this forest, you’re coming in my way. My intense penance you disturb Trying to enchant me saying you have a crush on me In vain you are babbling, yāk, yāk – Woman . . . pēraṇṭi: O sage in penance come near me, Embrace me give me a kiss. My soul-lord praised by the world,

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Speak to me with love, prakkiyātā, Uncontrolled is my mind, I melt in pain. Let us in the world, fondle a little, prattling the teaching Praising the feet of civaṉ, let us play – O sage . . . (arccuṉaṉ tapacu 18). (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

It may be noted that the genre tarkkam is used only once in arccuṉaṉ tapacu. In folk drama, tarkkam figures in kaikkiḷai situations as well as in warlike situations, and for this reason tarkkam is referred to as fight (caṇṭai, 15) in the play tiruppati veṅkaṭēcap perumāḷ ṇāṭakam. However, there seems to be a difference between tarkkam and vākai. If the former does not appeal to the audience to resolve an issue or settle a dispute, the latter does.

va¯kai in Religious Polemics If tarukkam in kaikkiḷai, vākai in puṟattiṇai, and tarkkam of folk song and drama employed several rhetorical or argumentative techniques and also knowledgevalidating criteria, mostly unconsciously, these techniques and criteria were identified and consciously deployed in the formal public assembly called avai of tiṇai society. When the latter transformed into scholarly academies (caṅkam), these techniques and criteria were employed by poets and scholars. For example, the preface of tol. composed by paṉampāraṉār invokes the previous texts (muntu nūl) in accordance with the technique known as “quoting” (III.9. 112: 22). When institutional religions like Saivism and Vaishnavism emerged in the state society displacing the primal (tiṇai) society, the earlier rhetorical tradition was deployed for religious purposes. The argumentative techniques helped establish the final truth (cittāntam) of a religious sect when the assembly became a forum for religious debate in the state society. cittāntam is, literally, conclusion of knowledge: cittu, will, mind, knowledge +antam, end, conclusion or cittāntam. Significantly, the word, antam, is used here as a synonym of the fifth member of kāṇṭikai (conclusion). In short, cittāntam is conclusive truth. When you know conclusive truth, you do not argue and deploy the argumentative techniques and genres to find the truth in a dialogical and heuristic manner, but defend the conclusive truth or refute the opponent who brings up something that counters or menaces your conclusive truth. Embroiled in forensic arguments, each sect tries to charge the opponent with falsehood. One’s religious position is true because it is sacralized. This is clearly evident in the strategies of “poruḷ vātam” (material argument), which consisted in the successful performance of a miracle such as healing an incurable disease, and “aṉal vātam” (fire argument) and “puṉal vātam” (water argument) of the bhakti period. Contenders of two religious sects, who performed the latter two types of argument, put their “truth-texts” to test by fire or water. If the text was not consumed by fire, the sect of the unburnt text won, and when the text was immersed in a flowing river, if it was not washed away, it was considered the text that asserted the truth (veḷḷaivāraṇaṉ 102–19). It might be noted that the message in the text needed to have power enough to survive fire and water. Only the Truth can invest the text with such power.

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Of the 14 canonical texts known as meykaṇṭa cāttiram (literally, Treatises That Saw Truth) that embody the doctrinal truths (conclusions) of Saivism, civañāṉa cittiyār is of special interest to us, particularly because it is rooted in the local logical tradition. The text has two sections, parapakkam and cupakkam. If the former is the doctrine (cittāntam) of the opponents, the latter is that of the author. The author states the views of 13 opponents, refutes them, and establishes his own Saivite position. In the latter part of the text (cupakkam), we find 14 verses under the heading of “aḷavai iyal” (logic). These verses are about the following topics: three criteria for validating knowledge, four types of perception, inference, proposition, reason, kāṇṭikai (which is here named “col”; syllogism-like text), other inferences, authoritative text, and inferential fallacies. These might have been regarded, in the medieval Tamil country, as the fundamentals of logic. We may consider just two stanzas from this text, the 9th and the 11th, as they are of significance to our deliberations. The ninth states that “pakkam tuṇiporuḷuk kiṭamām,” which means that the proposition (pakkam) is the locus (iṭam) of the predicate (tuṇiporuḷ, that which is concluded). For example, in the proposition (pakkam), “This hill is on fire,” the predicate is “on fire.” The predicate is what remains to be concluded in the argument. The 11th stanza tells us that kāṇṭikai was known as “col” (saying) in the medieval times and that it had two types — the affirmative and the negative: Affirmative saying (col) avers the presence of fire from the presence of smoke, as in the case of the fireplace, and negative saying avers the absence of fire from the absence of smoke, as in the case of the pond with lotus flowers and buds. There are those who will decisively state that these two forms of saying have five limbs each. (meykaṇṭa cāttiram, volume 1, civañāṉa cittiyār, 19; murukavēḷ 30; trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

Evidently, kāṇṭikai enjoyed wide application in the debates among scholars from different religions. The Saivites rallied their forces to intimidate the well-established scholarship and popularity of the Jains and Buddhists invoking the ideology of Tamil identity. It is not hard to find evidences for logical disputes among rival religious groups in the devotional literature of the period (tēvāram. campantar. 312.5; veḷḷaivāraṇaṉ 119–121; 285–288). In these disputes kāṇṭikai played a major role. Probably kāṇṭikai was alternatively known as “col” even during the pre-state period, but it is hard to find any evidence for such usage. But this medieval equivalent resembles the earlier one in terms of its five-part structure, and also in respect of all names of parts but one. The earlier name for the fourth part was not ēṟṟal (murukavēḷ 30) but naṭai (tol. III. 9. 103: 3).

va¯kai in the Modern Court of Law The purpose of the use of kāṇṭikai in religious polemics was to defend or refute a foregone conclusion. If the religious forum hierarchized truth as the orthodox and the heterodox, abandoning the open-endedness that characterized the tiṇai forum of argument, the modern court of law of the industrialist society desacralized (or secularized) truth and expressed it in the form of dictates of the state which

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went by different names – statutes, enactments, orders, directives, and so on (Jayaraman, Personal interview 2016). Now truth was neither the opposite of falsehood as it was in the state society until then, nor doctrine, but rule. Apart from its disengagement from the ultimate, the notion of truth as rule was anarchic as it lent itself to be interpreted to one’s advantage. In the forensic legal game of ingenious interpretations of statutes, the role of the foregone conclusion was significant. The ratio decidendi of a court is useful not only to those in the legal profession but also to the common people who are likely to use the courts of law (Jayaraman, Personal interview 2016). Understanding the close similarity between the ruling and the conclusion in the argumentative text, māyūram vētanāyakam piḷḷai (1826–1889) translated ruling, “cittāntam” (adopting a medieval term for a modern entity) and published in 1863 a compendium of the rulings of the court (Sudder Udalut) between 1850 and 1861. When there was no publication in Tamil on modern law, for the first time, vētanāyakam piḷḷai brought out a modern legal document in Tamil. This publication helped ensure transparency in matters of law, empowered those who did not know legal language and English (vētanāyakam piḷḷai iii) to participate in modern democracy better (Sen), and, most of all, ushered in Tamil modernity (Though modernity in South India is attributed to Serfoji II, a Marathi king who ruled tañcāvūr principality between 1798 and 1832, Tamil modernity, in particular, commences with vētanāyakam piḷḷai (Peterson; Selvamony 2011: 5).

va¯kai in Screenplay One of the important agents of Tamil modernity was cinema as it helped propagate the ideal of democracy. Further, the argumentative tradition and institutions, which nurtured it, including the court of law, played a significant role in the democratic processes in the society (Sen). We have seen how the argumentative tradition that commenced in the public assembly of the tiṇai society, despite historical changes from time to time, shaped the Tamil society. In the early twentieth century, the rhetorical strategies were deployed for the purpose of producing the screenplay also. Here is an example from the screenplay karuṇāniti wrote for a movie called, parācakti (literally, “transcendent power,” here, goddess who is “cakti” [power], 1952). Consider the following excerpt of the forensic argument of kuṇacēkaraṉ in the court of law defending his alleged antisocial actions. I created trouble in the temple (proposition 1) Not because I am against temples (reason expressed negatively, or negative reason) Because the temple should not be the place of the wicked (affirmative reason) I attacked the priest (proposition 1) Not because he is a devotee (of God) (negative reason) To reprimand hypocritical devotion (affirmative reason) Why are you so concerned about it? (question 1) Why do you show concern nobody else in the world does? (question 2) (Part of each question stated separately for formal effect): You will ask, I myself was the victim (answer 1) Direct victim was I (answer 2)

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You will say I am selfish (anticipation of counterargument) My selfishness is not without a tinge of common good (reply to counterargument) Like a fish that cleans the pond by eating the dirt in it (illustration) How do they say I am a criminal? (question 1) If you retrace a few steps in the life-path of this criminal, you could count the number of flash floods he has crossed (answer 1) There are no koels in my path in the jungle, Snakes with raised hoods abound there (answer 2) I have not known breeze I have crossed fire (answer 3). (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

In this speech, the question is in fact an alternative form of the proposition, and the answer, that of the reason. For example, “Why are you so concerned about it?” is a dramatic and rhetorical alternative of the proposition, “I am greatly concerned about temples and priests” and its reason: “I am a victim.” The technique of multiplication of reasons found in the folk song is adopted in the Tamil screenplay too. The following dialogue, from the play vīrapāṇṭiya kaṭṭappommaṉ (1959), is very popular among the Tamil-speaking people all over the world. Written by a Tamil scholar-politician, ma.po.civañāṉam (1906–1995), the argument in this screenplay adopts the technique of multiplication of reasons. Here is an excerpt: vari, vaṭṭi, kisthi. . . tax, interest, land tax. . . yāraik kēṭkiṟāi vari? Who are you asking to pay the tax? etaṟkuk kēṭkiṟāi vari? Why do you ask for tax? vāṉam poḻikiṟatu, pūmi viḷaikiṟatu It rains, the earth yields uṉakkēṉ keṭṭavēṇṭum vari? Why pay tax to you? eṅkaḷōṭu vayalukku vantāyā? Did you go with us to the fields? nāṟṟu naṭṭāyā? Did you plant the seedlings? ēṟṟam iṟaittāyā? Did you draw water? allatu, koñci viḷaiyāṭum eṉkulap peṇkaḷukku mañcaḷ araittāyā? Or, did you grind turmeric paste for my prattling playful kin women? māmaṉā? maccāṉā? Are you my uncle? Son-in-law? māṉam keṭṭavaṉē Shameless you! (Trans. Nirmal Selvamony)

The argument may be analyzed in the following manner: Proposition 1: We do not have to pay you tax Reason: 1. Because we have not taken our food from you 2. Because we have not taken your labor for

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2.1 planting 2.2 drawing water 2.3 grinding turmeric paste for our women Proposition 2: We do not owe you any money Reason 1: Because you are a stranger to us 1.1 you are no uncle to us 1.2 you are no son-in-law to us 2. Because you are a shameless person, you demand money from us who do not owe you anything In emotionally charged dialogues, the argument employs mostly reasons (ētu) rather than analogy and does not develop to a conclusion through application in order to qualify as a five-member argumentative text. Like the modern court of law, courtroom in a screenplay too approaches truth in an anarchic manner, leaving the validity of truth to the force of evidences.

va¯kai in valakka¯tu manram ¯ ¯ ¯ other cultural practices, which nurture the argumenta˙there are Besides the movie, tive tradition. One of these known as vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam (forum for disputation) is a forum for formal examination of evidence to decide guilt. The plaintiff levels the charges with evidences, and the defendant refutes each one of them with evidences, and finally the arbiter sums up the argument, stating the ratio decidendi and the judgment. In between, the plaintiff or the defendant may press the arbiter to give evidence for the latter’s claim (vēṅkaṭakirucṇaṉ 11). As the judgment for each charge is given at the end of the debate of each charge, the final judgment is no suspense as in the case of the paṭṭimaṉṟam, but an opportunity for the judge to advance more reasons by way of justification (11). This forum also employs the rhetorical strategy of multiplication of reasons. Though vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam also may be traced to the public assembly of the tiṇai society, modern version of this practice is evident from the nineteenth century, when the colonial court of law influenced the native argumentative traditions. A typical example is the literary court held (sometime before 1876) in an open hall in the temple of cīrkāḻi to try the worth of the new text, cīrkāḻik kōvai authored by makā vittuvāṉ mīṉāṭci cuntaram piḷḷai. The arbiter of this forum was māyūram vētanāyakam piḷḷai (naṭarācaṉ 60–63). va¯kai in pattimanram ¯¯ ˙˙ maṉṟam, Like vaḻakkāṭu paṭṭimaṉṟam also owes its origin to the Avai of tiṇai societies. Though the term, paṭṭimaṇṭapam, which refers to a “hall for the meeting of scholars” (Tamil Lexicon IV, 2425), is attested in the epics (cilappatikāram 5: 102; maṇimēkalai 1: 61), there is no evidence of the word paṭṭimaṉṟam (an assembly for literary debate) in ancient Tamil literature. In the twentieth century, it became a popular feature of Tamil festival celebrations, particularly, poṅkal (spring festival).

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Several media and academic institutions patronize it as it has tens of thousands of Tamil enthusiasts all over the world. In a typical paṭṭimaṉṟam, the arbiter (naṭuvar, literally, mediator) opens the debate by briefly introducing the topic of argument saying that (s)he will give the judgment at the end after duly considering the points made by each side. After each speaker resolves the problem posed for the debate by asserting any one of the sides of the argument, the arbiter pronounces the judgment by choosing the winning side and stating the ratio decidendi. In the example given by vēṅkaṭakirucṇaṉ, the problem for the debate is this: “Which predominates in the songs of cuppiramaṇiya pārati – love of god or love of land or love of language?” After listening to the case made by the speaker from each side, the arbiter concludes the argument in favor of love of land as the dominant theme of the songs of cuppiramaṇiya pārati. How are the two debating fora – vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam and paṭṭimaṉṟam – related? The former is said to be an offshoot of the latter (iḷañcēraṉ 240–241). However, if we consider the modern-day practice of these, it is possible to distinguish them. The debaters in both fora are learned persons (pulavar, iḷañcēraṉ 1, 39). This is so because both require knowledge of texts as the authority and validity of the arguments finally rest with the texts cited. Some of these texts are cilappatikāram, Mahabharata, Ramayana, and tirukkuṟaḷ. Of all these texts, tirukkuṟaḷ is quite unique because it is regarded as a compendium of statutes. Further, if the objective of paṭṭimaṉṟam is maximal persuasiveness, that of the vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam is finding and establishing the truth. In other words, the former is a rhetorical forum, whereas the latter is a court that settles disputes. For example, the legendary dispute kaṇṇaki had with the king of pāṇṭiyar about the culpability of her husband sought to answer the question, not unlike the modern crime thriller, “Whodunit?” Here, the authority did not lie with texts but with objective evidence for the right anklet of the queen, namely, the pearl pellets in the anklet. Since the contention (vaḻakku) of the debate is resolved by finding the truth, this forum is called vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam and the canto (in cilappatikāram), which deals with the contention, “vaḻakkurai kātai” (kātai, canto; vaḻakku, contention; urai, state). If the truth envisaged by the vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam in the epic is unassailable fact, the truth presupposed by the modern literary court is that which is plausible.

The End of Logic So far we have shown how logic is both finding the reasonable and communicating it. The reasonable is that which befits truth. Though reason tends to separate the elements it analyses, the ultimate end of the pursuit of the reasonable (or logic) is envisioning the truth. This is why tol. calls both logic and philosophy, “otta kāṭci.” The adjective “otta,” meaning “fitting,” describes philosophy and logic as vision that fits reality because the basic mode of knowing the world has been analogy, which helps us know the unknown by seeing how it fits with what we already know. Analogy developed into an enthymemic text called “mutumoḻi” and “niyāyam.” An ancient Tamil verse traces the origin of niyāyam to Tamil sources: “From

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tolkāppiyam, and tiruvaḷḷuvar’s ancient text originated Sanskrit nyaya” (“tolkāppiyam tiruvaḷḷuvar ātinūl/vaṭamoḻi niyāyam vaṉtaṉa . . .” murukavēḷ 117). If so, the source of niyāyam is mutumoḻi defined in the former and exemplified in the latter Tamil texts. If non-Tamil “nyaya” is an equivalent of kāṇṭikai, then mutumoḻi as an early form of the partial kāṇṭikai must be the source of non-Tamil nyaya. The latter came into being in the first century of the present era with the introduction of kāṇṭikai in the science of debate (Vidyabhusana xvi). In fact, the Sanskrit word, “nyaya” meant the syllogism-like text, and since this type of textual evidence is the basis of logic (and not just perception), “nyaya” itself came to mean logic in the 1st c. ACE in the non-Tamil circles (Vidyabhusana 41–42). Apparently, the first non-Tamil logical text is Aksapada Gautama’s Nyaya-sutra (Vidyabhusana xiii), and its ultimate objective was (like the other six non-Tamil systems of philosophy) “liberation, which means the absolute cessation of all pain and suffering” (Chatterjee and Datta 187). However, it must be pointed out that mutumoḻi, the precursor of nyaya, originated in the debates of the Tamil primal society, whereas Nyaya, one of the six systems of non-Tamil philosophy, emerged in the state society. The Tamil practice of niyāyam closely relates to the concept of nayam. Both Tamil terms mean justice and logic. The term niyāyam is used in the sense of justice even today in rural places (which continue some of the primal practices) as evident in a folk song from tarumapuri district of Tamil Nadu, which refers to the practice of the villagers convening a court of justice in the platform under the tree in the village: “puḷiyamarattiṉ kīḻē. . .poṇṇu niyāyam pēciṉāḷē” (the girl held forth under the tamarind tree on what was just in the case, vāṉamāmalai 558–559; naṭēca kavuṇṭar). niyāyam derives from nayam (Ta. nayam>niyāyam), which is neither of the two sides of an issue but its middle (naṭu) alternative. If nayam meant niyāyam (katiravēl piḷḷai 1347), niyāyam did naṭu, justice (Winslow 672). We might do well to remember that the ultimate value of tiṇai society is not justice, but love (aṉpoṭu puṇarnta aintiṇai, tol. III. 3. 1: 2). But it is hard to rationalize the means to love. If justice is impartiality (nayam/niyāyam) in social dealings, it may be regarded as a rationalized form of love, a necessary condition for living together amicably. For just and peaceful coexistence, the epistemic criteria helped validate people’s statements, claims, and assertions. Singly or collectively, these criteria were used at different points of time especially in social discourse. For a very long time, the statement of what one observed, the reason for affirming the statement, and analogy to establish the validity of the observation would have remained separate logical entities without getting consolidated into a single logical text as such (like mutumoḻi or kāṇṭikai). Yet these separate logical entities were necessary for socially acceptable communication, and justice with peace. Indeed, justice was necessary for the harmonious integration of the members of tiṇai. Theoretically, tiṇai is a harmonious community as the name suggests (from iṇai, joining, fifth relation in music, spouse; t + iṇai ¼ tiṇai, joining, a type of community). The members of this community, namely, humans, nonhuman beings such as trees and animals, and the spirit beings, form a family in which each is bound to the other by kinship. Each member is ontically continuous with the other. Like the tonic and the fifth notes (musicologically, iṇai pitches) in an “octave,” which are

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distinguishable as distinct notes but yet blend so well as to sound as if they were a single pitch, the limbs of the body are distinguishable and yet remain organically identical with the rest of the body. Such a state of being is neither oneness nor discreteness but ontic differentiated continuity (Selvamony 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2016–17). The implications of the state of ontic continuity for logic are significant. For one thing, definition of entities becomes problematized. If we say that x is continuous with y ontically, the conventional definition of x as “not y” or y as “not x” is no more valid. In the tiṇai world, x is x, as well as y, which is a middle alternative (naṭu), the perspective of nayam. This third middle combines both x and y yielding an ontology of differentiated continuity, which is crisply stated in tol.: oṉṟē vēṟē eṉṟiru pālvayiṉ oṉṟi uyarnta pālatu āṇaiyiṉ. (III. 3. 2: 1–2)

(By the decree of the higher part, the two parts, one and the other, united; trans. Nirmal Selvamony). The third is the higher part, which unites the two parts in a particular way. Let us explain this with the help of a couplet from tirukkuṟaḷ: Even falsehood is considered truth provided the former yields good. (292)

Truth (the first), and falsehood (the second) are differentiable in a context only in relation to the ultimate value (which is the higher third). It is the ultimate good that will decide (by virtue of its decreeing power or āṇai) whether falsehood would count as truth in a particular context. The need for context-specificity shows that truth and falsehood are continuous, and yet differentiable. On the one hand, they become continuous when one becomes the other, and on the other, they are differentiable as truth and falsehood. As tirukkuṟaḷ emerged in the state society where good and evil had already become oppositional, its author had to point to occasions where they were not merely oppositional but ontically continuous. Knowledge of the ontology of primal community called tiṇai is necessary to understand the nature of logic that prevailed in such communities. The logic of this era is markedly different from that of the state society. If the logic of the latter is based on the ontology of discontinuity (as evident in its law of non-contradiction), that of the former is based on the ontology of differentiated continuity. The ontology of discontinuity informs the truth claims of the different religious sects of the state society wherein truth is not that which fits the ultimate in a given context, but a foregone conclusion, a doctrine of a religious institution. Truth and falsehood have become opposites. In the industrialist modern era, when the British helped establish the modern court of law in India, truth was further redefined. Now truth is not the opposite of falsehood (as in the state society), but a statute, a form of desacralized and mechanical truth. Apart from its disengagement from the ultimate, the notion of truth as rule in the industrialist society is also anarchic by virtue of its interpretability.

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Definitions of Key Terms aḷavai Avai cittāntam kāṇṭikai

kaikkiḷai mutumoḻi nayam ontic continuity otta kāṭci paṭṭimaṉṟam tarukkam

vākai

vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam

also aḷavu, criteria for validating knowledge; epistemic logic; logic. public assembly in tiṇai society. foregone conclusion. five-member argumentative text. The members are cūttiram (pakkam; proposition), ētu (reason), eṭuttukkāṭṭu (illustration), naṭai (application), and muṭipu (conclusion). a tiṇai of unilateral relationship in which a boy tries to court a non-reciprocating girl. an enthymeme-like argumentative text which gave rise to the five-member kāṇṭikai. Its major component is example. justice, logic. nayam>niyāyam, justice, logic. The argumentative text that used nayam/niyāyam was called mutumoḻi. a condition of being in which the members of the community are continuous and yet differentiated, as in primal societies. the term in tol. for philosophy which includes logic. a debating forum. the rhetoric of a boy who attempts to court a non-reciprocating girl. By extension, it referred to monologically rhetorical logic and later, logic itself. tarkkam, a corruption of tarukkam; dialogical rhetoric or verbal duel, usually employed in Tamil folk song and theatre. an archaic form of vāṭam or vātu, both of which mean, specifically, verbal duel and generically, dialogically rhetorical logic and logic itself. a forum for disputation.

Summary Points • Logic is denoted by such terms as “otta kāṭci,” tarukkam, vākai, aḷavai, and nayam. • There are two major strands in Tamil logic: knowing what befits (truth, the reasonable), which is the epistemic, and communicating it, which is the rhetorical. • Epistemic logic is aḷavai, which deals with validating knowledge with various criteria such as perception, and inference. • Rhetorical logic has two major forms: the monological (tarukkam) and the dialogical (vākai). • Examples of monologically rhetorical logic could be found in classical literature, folk song, dissertation, and political oration.

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• Examples of dialogically rhetorical logic could be found in folk song, folk theatre, religious polemics, court of law, screenplay, and contemporary argumentative practices such as vaḻakkāṭu maṉṟam and paṭṭimaṉṟam. • The purpose of logic is to affirm the normative mode of truth of each type of society. If the truth of the primal society is ultimate-oriented differentiated continuity, that of the state society is foregone conclusion and that of the industrialist society is the unstable rule or statute.

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Causal Reasoning in the Trika Philosophy of Abhinavagupta

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Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophical Rationalization of Tantric Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Encountering Buddhists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Seed and the Sprout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Meditator’s Desire as Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Complex Causality of Totality Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Śiva as the Perfect Agent and His Autonomous Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

Abhinavagupta ( fl.c. 975–1025 CE) is a tantric philosopher whose rigorous epistemological discussions are deeply rooted in his Śaiva metaphysics. In order to strongly withhold the Trika doctrinal principle of non-duality, Abhinavagupta, like his predecessor Utpaladeva ( fl.c. 925–975 CE), is struggling to interpret the philosophical question of causality that rests in the analysis of cause and effect or subject and object duality. In this chapter, a short example from his magnum opus tantric manual, the Tantrāloka (9.1–44), and its elaborate commentary titled -viveka by Jayaratha ( fl.c. 1225–1275 CE) is discussed while also contextualizing the process of philosophical rationalization in the history of Trika Śaivism. The champions of the theory of causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva), the Buddhists, are precisely targeted, and following rational enquiry, Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha want to prove that Śiva alone is the supreme agent (kartā) or cause (kāraṇa) and He indeed is also the effect (kārya) since both cause and effect are the manifestation of M. Kaul (*) Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS), Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay (IITB), Mumbai, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_31

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and in a single consciousness. Even though the Tantrāloka is based on the revealed knowledge from early scriptures like the Mālinī vijayottaratantra, yet at every step, compelling efforts are being made to justify the revealed (āgama) knowledge with reason (yukti). Keywords

Causality · Abhinavagupta · Tantrāloka · Pratyabhijñā · Kāryakāraṇabhāva · Trika · Śaivism · Reason · Tantra · Buddhism Abbreviation

conj. em. ĪPK ĪPKvivṛti ĪPKvṛtti ĪPV ĪPVV Ked. KSTS MMK MŚV MVUT PHṛ PTv ŚD SK ŚS ŚSV TĀ TĀV TS

conjecture emendation Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā – TORELLA 2002 Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vṛtti Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī Īśvarapratyabjijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī Kashmir edition – KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies Mūlamadhyamakakākirā -> Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna Mālinīślokavārttika Mālinīvijayottaratantra Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya Parātriśikāvivaraṇa Śivadṛṣṭi Spanda-kārikā Śivasūtra Śivasūtra-vārttika Tantrāloka Tantrālokaviveka Tantrasāra

Introduction Logic and reason are the hallmarks of rational thinking in any philosophical tradition. Following the Eurocentric bias, many modern commentators have often interpreted the South Asian philosophical traditions either lacking in rational thinking or being highly inclined toward spirituality/religion and mysticism and thus deemed irrational. This gives rise to some very crucial questions: first, what does it mean to be “logical” and “rational” and should only “logic” and “rationality” qualify as philosophy? In other words, should philosophical investigations be limited to “rationality” alone? If that is so, what kind of structure do we expect rationality to have? This rationality that was inbuilt into the logical philosophical traditions of

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pre-modern South Asia like the Nyāya-sūtra was formulated in terms of 16 categories (padārthas) or even in the process of 5-membered syllogism (pan˜ cāvayava). The Nyāya-sūtra, while putting forth the theory of debate, distinguishes between the good debate that is based on reasoning (vāda) and the bad form of debate that is based on “wrangling” (vitaṇḍā) (see Matilal 1998: 44–54). Even the pre-modern medical treatises like the Charaka Saṃhitā has theorized debating on the principles of logic, reason, and argument (see Preisendanz 2009; Matilal 1998: 38–43). No doubt that the art of philosophizing is synonymous with the idea of rationalizing, yet a rational argument for the sake of argument alone may neither do justice to the idea of rationalization itself, nor can it logically justify the attempt of rationalizing that concept because the rationality of something should certainly lie in what one can do with it, rather than just formulating an argument. Second, should philosophy as one of the fundamental disciplines of humanities ignore the “irrational” and “illogical” patterns of thinking those have survived in the past or continue to survive in the present as a part of any domain that involves thinking? Just as ontological questions have been raised in case of logic and rationality, is it possible to raise same concerns for “irrational” and “illogical.” Is all philosophical query synonymous with rationality alone? If not, then what is the rationale for rationalizing what is otherwise deemed to be “irrational” and how and why do we want to do it? This is all the more reason to evaluate the concepts of “rational” and “irrational” simultaneously. What is really meant by “reason?” Is it converting irrational into rational, and if something is already rational enough, then perhaps reason is not required at all. In classical Indian thought, we witness compelling examples where revealed, or scriptural (āgama) knowledge has been justified with reason (yukti), or rather I should say that the former itself is converted into a proper means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) using the philosophical tool of reason (yukti). “[I]n India,” mentions Isabelle Ratié (2017b, paragraph 1), “the philosophical field has remained essentially scholastic, notably in the sense that most Indian philosophical systems never ceased considering scripture (āgama) as a proper means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). And despite great differences of opinion as to the way in which scriptural authority should be defined, these movements have most often asserted the supremacy of revealed speech over reason and experience – including those, such as the Nyāya, that were concerned with logic and epistemology rather than with scriptural exegesis.” Another question to ask is: is “reason” and “logic” always successful in mapping reality? In other words how do we justify real and unreal in terms of rationality? A deeper metaphysical concern that has bothered all philosophers at all times is the question related to the “real-ness” and “unreal-ness” of the phenomenal world of our empirical experiences. And we cannot afford to claim that everything that may seem “illogical” or “irrational” to us is always unreal. Can we fully explain, using logic and reason, the world of our experiences even though it may sound completely irrational from an absolutely common point of view? Is there a way we can make sense of “illogical” or “irrational” since we experience it to be so and not choose to ignore it at the cost of not being able to explain it in terms of logic and rationality? Can experience be rationalized? Whatever is rational and logical, can it always be real? Can experience still be real even if it cannot be rationally explained? Is

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everything rational also real at the same time? This constant tension that permeated “revealed” and “rational” and its juxtaposition with real and unreal nature of experience gave rise to revolutionary philosophical strategies in classical India. For instance, to counter as one form of “irrational,” the early Buddhist logician Dignāga (c. 400–480 CE) devised the theory of exclusions (apoha) (see Matilal 1998: 98–107), the new school of Naiyāyikas emphasized the concept of negation or absence (abhāva), or someone like Śaṅkara subtly developed his whole non-dual epistemological apparatus around the concept of exclusion. The question was if the experiential knowledge cannot be verbalized, then how do we know it and how can we communicate it (see Gupta 2009 for more on such questions and their answers from Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta point of view). Such questions with respect to “rational” and “experiential” were also being asked by the tenth to eleventh centuries Kashmirian non-dual Trika Śaiva thinkers like Somānanda ( fl.c. 900–950 CE), Utpaladeva ( fl.c. 925–975 CE), Abhinavagupta ( fl.c. 975–1025 CE), and Kṣemarāja ( fl.c. 1000–1050 CE). With them began the age of reasoning for Trika Śaivism. It was the time when the tension between the scriptural or revealed knowledge (āgama) and the logical reasoning (yukti) intensified and culminated into the emergence of the “Philosophy of Recognition” (Pratyabhijn˜ ā-s´āstra). In fact in their epistemological investigations, the āgama itself was brought to the fold of the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) (see the chapter by Navjivan Rastogi in this section of the present volume. Also see Ratié 2013, 2017b; Torella 2017). In case of the works like the Tantrāloka (TĀ) of Abhinavagupta that itself was a ritual manual (paddhati) of Trika Śaivism based on the scriptural teachings of the Mālinī vijayottaratantra (MVUT), this tension was very subtle as opposed to the Pratyabhijn˜ ā-s´āstra that, in fact, was meant to be a pure epistemological exercise. But before probing into this subtle tension, a short historical review would be strongly desirable here to understand the context.

Historical Context Kashmir possessed vibrant Tantric Śaiva traditions up through at least the thirteenth century of the common era (see Sanderson 2007a, 2009). Alongside the other major branches of this tradition, viz., Siddhānta, Krama, and others, Trika Śaivism emerged in the middle of the ninth century as a major post-scriptural ritual system of the Mantramārga (for Mantramārga see Sanderson 1988: 667. For a detailed history of the terms Atimārga and Mantramārga Śaivism, see Sanderson 2014: 8ff). It was at the same period that Mantramārga traditions were gradually evolving from their scriptural anonymity into an extensive body of Kashmirian exegesis (see Sanderson 1988: 690ff), in which the two major traditions competing with each other were the dualists (dvaita) and the non-dualists (advaita). The non-dualist authors adhered to the Trika and the Krama cultic systems, following the doctrine of the “left” (vāma) (see Sanderson 1995: 43ff). The dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta adhered to a ritual system functioning within the boundaries of Brahmanical purity, while on the other hand, Trika ritual involved transgressive contact with impure substances, persons, etc. (see

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Sanderson 1985, 1995: 17; Torella 2015). The Siddhānta ritual system centered on Śiva alone, who was to be worshipped without his consort, but the two non-dualistic currents were predominantly s´ākta, i.e., centered upon the worship of various female s´aktis, in addition to the worship of Śiva, particularly in the form of Bhairava. The most defining feature of the scriptures of the Trika was their pantheon of three goddesses, Parā, Parāparā, and Aparā, while the Krama or Kālīkrama was devoted to worship of a sequence (krama) of Kālīs (see Sanderson 1988: 673. See also Sanderson 2007a: 370–371; Dwivedi 2001: 539ff). Krama was a Kālīkula tradition that taught the esoteric worship of many forms of the goddess Kālī or Kālasaṃkarṣaṇī (see Sanderson 2007a: 250). The basis of this non-dualistic tradition mainly represented by Abhinavagupta was rooted in the teachings of the Śivasūtra (ŚS) (see Singh 1979; Dyczkowski 1992b; Sanderson 2007a: 402ff) that was further elaborated in the works belonging to the Philosophy of Vibration (Spandas´āstra) (see Dyczkowski 1987, 1992a; Singh 1980; Gurtu 1981). Based on the doctrine of the Mālinī vijayottaratantra (see Sanderson 1992; Vasudeva 2005), the great masters of this tradition Vasugupta (c. 825–850) and Bhaṭṭaśrī Kallaṭa (c. 875) taught that “ignorance” (ajn˜ āna) is the cause of bondage (bandha) (see ŚSV, 2.2:11–12). This “ignorance” was not defined as the absence of knowledge but as the incompleteness of knowledge or limited knowledge (apūrṇa-jn˜ āna) (see TĀ 1.25) (For Theory of Error in Pratyabhijñā, see Rastogi 1986; Nemec 2012). For unlike in the case of the sentient (cetana) objects, complete absence of knowledge is only found in insentient ( jaḍa) entities. Insentient entities are never subject to bondage and liberation. Thus the concept of mala that does not allow the complete manifestation of knowledge essentially refers to the incompleteness of knowledge and not not-knowledge (on the Śaiva concept of mala or impurity, see Acharya 2014). Abhinavagupta, in the first chapter of his Tantrāloka (TĀ), is clearly articulating the definitions of jn˜ āna and ajn˜ āna on the basis of the Śivasūtras (see TĀ 1.26–30). The Śaiva Siddhānta, on the other hand, was a tradition placing considerable importance on ritual, both doctrinally and in praxis, believing that emancipation (mokṣa) essentially transpires through the salvific power of Śaiva initiation (dī kṣā). But as opposed to this, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavored to establish a system emphasizing the paramount significance of knowledge ( jn˜ āna). Thus they attacked the perceived ritualism of their Śaiva Siddhānta contemporaries, who adhered to doctrinal dualism (see Sanderson 1988: 692; Dwivedi 2000: 310ff). In Trika, the absence of knowledge ( jn˜ āna) was taught to be the true cause of the impurity (mala) which obscures the soul’s inherent Śiva-nature (s´ivatva) (see Sanderson 2007a: 372). This impurity (mala) is nothing but ignorance (ajn˜ āna) that gives rise to bondage (bandha), and it is the removal of this impurity (mala) that leads one to the state of liberation (mokṣa) (see MVUT 1.23cd: malam ajn˜ ānam icchanti saṃsārāṅkurakāraṇam|). This emphasis on gnosis did not of course mean that there was no ritual practice prescribed in the Trika itself, but Abhinavagupta understood the path of following ritual as inferior, positing superior means, such as meditation and imaginative visualization through which liberation was possible (see Sanderson 2007b: 114–115. Also see Sanderson 1990). It is also important to

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mention here that both the dual and the non-dual Śaiva traditions understood the descent of the power (of grace) (Śaktipāta) (see Wallis 2007) as the only means of getting rid of the ajn˜ āna or mala. However, while an individual (aṇu) is expected to make an effort toward attaining the grace of the Great Lord (Parames´vara), yet this grace descends on an individual only at Śiva’s own autonomous “power of willing” (Icchās´akti). In the earlier Tantric scriptures, the means of doing away with the mala was usually said to be knowledge ( jn˜ āna), Yogic practices (yoga), ritual (kriyā), and observances (caryā) (see Brunner 1992). Thus an arrangement of dividing the teaching of an āgama into four sections (pādas) corresponding to the four means was common (see Torella 2017). However, moving away from this tradition, Abhinavagupta categorizes the Trika paddhatis after the idea of means (upāyas) (see Rastogi 2012: 94). This non-dual metaphysics based on Śaiva scriptural sources was in need of concrete rational foundation that demanded deeper analysis and clear and precise explanations and arguments to let it stand on firm grounds. Thus, the Philosophy of Recognition (Pratyabhijn˜ ā) was not only a further elaboration of the teachings expounded in the Śivasūtra and the Philosophy of Vibration (Spanda) but also a way of strengthening the non-dualistic tradition on the strong and firm pillars of logical and analytical arguments. Thus, while the teachings of the Śivasūtra and the Spandakārikā were elucidating the spiritual path of this tradition, at the same time, the Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda ( fl.c. 900– 950 CE) (see Nemec 2011) was beginning to formulate an analytical structure for such teachings (see Torella 2002: XIII). Following the teachings of his venerable master Somānanda, Utpaladeva further laid down the concrete foundational structure for the Pratyabhijñā-śāstra in his I¯s´varapratyabhijn˜ ākārikā (ĪPK) (see Torella 2002) and the two auto-commentaries thereupon titled the -vṛtti (I¯PKvṛtti) and the -vivṛti (I¯PKvivṛti). It should be mentioned here that the latter was supposed to have been lost, but the fragments thereof have been recovered recently (see Torella 2014; Ratié 2017c). Abhinavagupta went on to expand upon this by writing two elaborate commentaries on the ĪPK titled the -vimars´inī (ĪPV) and -vivṛtivimars´inī (ĪPVV). Together, along with the immediate master of Abhinavagupta, Lakṣmaṇagupta (none of whose works have come down to us), all of them are named as, as Jayaratha puts it, the makers and commentators of logical reasoning (TĀV 2.10: tarkasya kartāraḥ vyākhyātāras´ ca|) (also mentioned by Rastogi 2012: 150–151). It may be important to mention here that while Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta spoke for the non-dualistic Śaiva tradition, their contemporaries Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha (eleventh CE) and his son Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (II) (c. eleventh CE) were performing exactly the same role translating the dualistic teachings of the Śaiva Siddhānta into the philosophical-analytical realm. Thus Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha wrote commentaries on Sadyojyotiḥ’s Paramokṣanirāsakārikā, Mokṣakārikā, and Nares´ varaparīkṣā and also on Mataṅgapārames´varatantra, Kiraṇatantra, and Sārdhatris´ atikālottaratantra (for more details on the works of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, see Goodall 1998: xviii ff). The strategies of philosophical rationalization were not missing in Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha. Like Abhinavagupta, he too was a master of creative reuse (see Watson 2006: 388).

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Philosophical Rationalization of Tantric Sources Both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are seen presenting their teachings following clear logical arguments (sattarka). Abhinavagupta took up the earlier form of Trika represented in the MVUT, which he profoundly reshaped through a combination of additional scriptural sources, oral teachings, and his own creative brilliance (Abhinava emphasizes svaparāmars´a. Cf. TĀ 4.41: gurutaḥ s´āstrataḥ svataḥ. Also see Pandey 1963: 292; Singh (PTv) 1988: 83). He ascribes primary importance to his own spiritual experience (svasaṃvit) (Jayaratha glosses svasaṃvit with svānubhava. See TĀV 1.106) followed by clear logical arguments (sattarka) and the scriptural authority of Siddhānta and Trika (TĀ 1.106: iti yajjn˜ eyasatattvaṃ dars´yate tacchivājn˜ ayā|mayā svasaṃvitsattarkapatis´āstratrikakramāt||). Though Abhinavagupta claims that he bases the TĀ on the MVUT, he evidently draws on a wide range of other scriptural texts of the Śaiva Mantramārga, from the wider pool of Trika scriptures, including the Siddhayoges´varī mata, Tris´irobhairava, Devyāyāmala, Tantrasadbhāva, and Trikasadbhāva (see Sanderson 2007a: 374) to Krama scriptures such as the Kākī kula, as well as the archaic Brahmayāmala of the Vidyāpī ṭha and various Saiddhāntika scriptures (see Sanderson 2007a: 374). Particularly Abhinavagupta is engaged in providing critical philosophical structure to the teachings of the Trika scriptures (see Lawrence 2000: 17–18). Like his master Utpala, he is a master of his exegetical craft and mines and even manipulates his sources, making use of their teachings to counter the arguments of his opponents. Their main philosophical opponents are the Buddhists, particularly the Vijñānavādins but sometimes typically Mādhyamakas. A central purpose in this philosophical rationalization is to counter antagonistic contemporaries, such as the staunch followers of Śaiva Siddhānta ritualism, who embrace philosophical dualism, and on another hand to build their own Śaiva system of thought by challenging the philosophical positions of the Buddhists who would deny the existence of the absolute-self. Abhinavagupta’s “higher non-dualism” (paramādvayadṛṣṭi) is itself as much made of the doctrinal principles of the Siddhānta and Buddhists as it seeks to transcend it. Even though from doctrinal point of view, the Siddhāntins and Buddhists are his opponents, in the former case, he affirms and justifies the claims of their dualistic scriptural sources and appropriates their theological principles to fit them in his non-dualistic Śaivism, and in case of the latter, he literary wears the philosophical armor of Buddhists and counters their principles by their own arguments while presenting them as his own in many cases, as if he was wearing a Śaiva garb (see Ratié 2010a, 2011). And he does all this masterfully and comes up with a critical philosophical structure and uses it for explaining scriptural claims and for developing philosophical arguments in debates with real or imagined opponents (see Pandey 1963: 294). By applying this strategic method, he is laying a solid foundation for a rational system that he is developing. An example of Abhinavagupta’s philosophical rationalization of Trika rituals and scriptural doctrines is his treatment of the theory of causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva) before dealing with the description of the ontic realities (tattvas) and their mutual relationship in book nine of the TĀ (9.1–44) (for more on this, see Allen 2003).

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To explain, in the hierarchy of the tattvas, the causal sequence cannot be denied in view of the cause and effect relationship (kāryakāraṇabhāva) between them. Thus each tattva is related to the next by a cause and effect relationship: each higher tattva permeates and pervades the succeeding ones, with the highest and most subtle pervading and permeating all tattvas. This makes it clear that each successive lower tattva exists in and draws its sustenance from the successive higher tattvas which are also its material cause (for a discussion on the tattvas in the TĀ, see Kaul 2018). Hence in book nine of the TĀ, Abhinavagupta ensures that he first establishes a robust model of the theory of causality prior to discussing the nature of tattvas according to the Śaiva doctrinal principles and their ontological hierarchy. Here he also feels compelled to challenge the Buddhist theory of causality since they are the ones who champion its cause. By doing this Abhinavagupta is achieving twofold aim – he is demolishing the Buddhist theory of causality while simultaneously paving a way ahead for developing his own Śaiva theory of causality. This is what will be demonstrated in the rest of this paper. In the same fashion, he also seeks to establish the Śaiva theory of knowability (vedyatā) (TĀ 10.19–97) at the beginning of the book ten of the TĀ, prior to discussing the nature of and relationships between the seven knowing subjects (saptapramātṛs) and seven objects of knowledge (saptaprameyas). Abhinava bases his discussion on the refutation of the position of the Mīmāṃsakas, establishing that “knowability” (vedyatā) is an essential nature of an object (see Allen 2011 whose thesis is precisely based on the study of TĀ 10.19–97). Another example is a short Sāṃkhya debate (TĀ 13.32–41) that opens up the Chap. 13 in the context of Śaktipāta (Grace). Following exactly the lines of argument discussed above, Abhinavagupta offers an analytical account of the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (TĀ 3.1–65) in book three of the TĀ before discussing the doctrine of phonemic emanation (parāmars´odayakrama) (see Kaul 2019). Furthermore, as a part of a similar philosophical strategy, Abhinava, basing his idea of “six-limbed yoga” (ṣaḍāṅga-yoga) on his source text the MVUT, he opposes the eight-limbed model (aṣṭāṅga-yoga) of Patañjali. The uniqueness of this six-limbed yoga is that “reason” (Tarka) is accepted as the best among all the limbs of Yoga. Even if eight-limbed Yoga model is to be accepted, it would only be accepted if all of them function toward attaining the Tarka (see Muller-Ortega 2005; Rastogi 1992). By employing such critical methods and strategic models, Abhinavagupta is using a well-thought-out mechanism reusing the older scriptures: he reshapes their content and using dialectic methods offering them the efficacy of a convincing argument, thus defending and presenting his own new system. In other words Abhinava developed a Trika Śaiva system that, on one hand, adhered to key features of earlier Śaiva scriptures and, on the other, emerges as a distinct tradition with unique features of its own, much like an architect’s creative reuse of older structures and building materials. This process of creative reuse is visible not only in Abhinavagupta’s use of Āgamic scriptures but also at the polemic level in Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Recognition (Pratyabhijn˜ ā). In fact this process of creative reuse was not confined to Abhinavagupta alone. His celebrated predecessors

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like Utpaladeva himself, as also suggested by Rastogi, were influenced by Bhartṛhari’s dynamism of consciousness, Sāṃkhya’s ontology, the epistemology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (particularly the ideas related to inferential cognition), the pramātṛ notions from the Siddhānta, and pramāṇa ideas of the Vijñānavāda (see Rastogi 2013: 4–5). Both Torella (2008) and Rastogi (2009) have put forth their assessments of how Bhartṛhari has strongly influenced the Śaiva Advaita system. As indicated earlier, Ratié has further given us detailed and critical accounts of how both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta skillfully, subtly, and purposefully appropriate the themes and arguments of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism to fit their own Śaiva theological framework (see Ratié 2007, 2009, 2010a, b, 2011). This is particularly the case with the Buddhist logical-epistemological school’s profound influence on the Pratyabhijñā system (see Torella 1992). One can also take an example of how Abhinavagupta appropriates the idea of Inherited Cognition (prasiddhi) of Mīmāṃsā in developing one of the fundamental pramāṇas of Śaivas viz. agama pramāṇa (see Rastogi 2013: 141–196; Ratié 2013; Torella 2013). As already mentioned earlier, the Buddhists, who were anātmavādins, were the staunch philosophical rivals of the Śaiva non-dualists, so much so that sometimes the non-dualistic Śaiva masters were seen siding with Siddhānta Śaivism to mark their animosity for the Buddhists (see Torella 2002: XXII). To challenge the position of Buddhists and Siddhāntins, a stream of thought gradually emerged adhering to a strongly non-dualistic position. The emergence of non-dualistic Śaiva traditions may be understood in part as a reaction to Siddhānta Śaivism and the Buddhist Vijñānavāda in the same way as, in the earlier philosophical realm, the advent of Buddhist logic was basically a reaction to the Naiyāyikas. This non-dualistic position, as already mentioned previously, manifested into such branches as the Philosophy of Recognition (Pratyabhijn˜ ā), which was purely a dialectic method to encounter the Buddhists and to restructure dualistic Siddhānta positions as non-dualist. This philosophical rationalization, however, subtly follows the syllogistic scheme of the traditional logicians (Naiyāyikas), so much so that the formal structure of the ĪPK itself is presented in terms of the inferential cognition for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). The inferential method itself is seen as a recognitive structure (Rastogi 2012: 158; Lawrence 2000: 50–51). Following the traditional five-membered syllogistic method of the Naiyāyikas, Abhinavagupta indicates the first verse of the ĪPK as the thesis (pratijn˜ ā), the text in-between indicates reason (hetu) and example (udāharaṇa) and application (upanaya), and the last verse 4.1.16 is the conclusion (nigamana). What is important to keep in mind here is that Śakti or the reflective awareness (vimars´a) that is nothing different from Śiva or the Light (prakās´a) is herself employed as “reason” (hetu) in the inferential cognition. It is also important to mention here that even though the importance of Sāṃkhya theory of causality in the context of both dual and non-dual Śaiva philosophical evolution cannot be ignored, yet a choice of not focusing on the Śaiva-Sāṃkhya debate has been made in this paper (for more on Śaiva-Sāṃkhya debate see Ratié 2014a, 2015; Moriyama 2016). Since the focus of this paper is a specific section of the TĀ where the Sāṃkhya position is not dealt with exhaustively, and since this topic in itself deserves

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separate platform for discussion, the author has planned to do this in a separate paper altogether. We are already aware of the strong connections between the authors of Siddhānta Śaiva and Sāṃkhya (see Torella 1999; Watson 2006). Much of Sāṃkhya has permeated into non-dual Trika Śaivism through Siddhānta Śaiva sources. For non-dual Śaivas, the cause and effect relationship is not like that of the Prakṛti and its evolutes in Sāṃkhya where Prakṛti has to be the material cause of the effect it generates. As K. C. Pandey (1963: 435–436) notes in the context of the Śaiva theory of causality: “Both the theories of causality, namely, the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya and the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya and others, therefore, cannot stand. For, how can the insentient, which is devoid of the capacity of placing itself in a conscious relation with that object, to which its productive activity is related, produce an effect? The two, the seed and the sprout are separate from each other, and, being insentient, are self-confined, i.e. there is no conscious relation between them similar to that which exists between the potter and the jar, that is to be created. Therefore, if such things be supposed to be related to each other as cause and effect, there is no reason why any two things should not be supposed to be related. Moreover, if the essential nature of the effect before it comes into being is non-existence, as the Nyāya holds, it can become existent in any way. For, the essential does not change. But if it be existence, as the Sāṅkhya maintains, what is then to be effected by the cause? It cannot be said that the cause effects manifestation. For, the same question can be raised with regard to manifestation also i.e. does the manifestation exist before manifestation or not? If it does, the activity to bring it about ceases to have any meaning. But, if it does not, how can it then be brought about? For, according to the Satkāryavāda, nothing that does not already exist can be brought about. The Pratyabhijñā, therefore, puts forth its own theory of causality.” The problem is that how can one bring into existence something which is not there at all, and how can one bring into being something what is already existing. Manifestation cannot be the cause of manifestation, and manifestation cannot be the effect of manifestation either. Reading the emphasis of Pandey on the concept of “manifestation” (ābhāsa) above, it must be remembered that it is not the case that there is pre-absence or pre-presence and/or postabsence or post-presence of manifestation in the process of manifestation. Can nonexistence generate existence or can insentient generate sentient? In line with Pandey’s argument above, Isabelle Ratié (2014a) has convincingly shown how Utpaladeva is completely transforming the Sāṃkhya interpretation of the theory of satkāryavāda by manipulating the ideas of abhivyakti and s´akti to fit his Śaiva model. The problem in hand is what is the ontological status of effect, i.e., the potentiality of the potent and the agency of the agent. How can the insentient entity bring about the power of effect? To mention Abhinavagupta’s foundational idea of the satkāryavāda in his ĪPV 1.4.3: An effect can be assumed [to be] either existing or nonexistent [before the operation of its cause]. As for [this thesis:] “[the effect] is both [existing and nonexistent], neither [existing and nonexistent], inexplicable (anirvācya),” it is contradicted by its own formulation, so what is the point [of considering it]? [Now,] if the pot is nonexistent [before the operation of its cause], then, since this [pot]’s ultimate reality is nothing but its having a nonexistent nature, how could it obtain [through the operation of the cause] an existence that is contradictory with its nature? For even innumerable prostrations at its feet cannot make the blue accommodate yellowness! (I have used the translation of Isabelle Ratié 2014a: 131)

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Also the Siddhānta point of view significantly differs from Sāṅkhya on the following point: as opposed to the Sāṅkhya, Siddhānta does not admit puruṣa to be originally pure because the Self has beginning-less impurities. From the Siddhānta point of view, the cognition of something arises when two reflections are united by ahaṃkāra, the reflection of the subject comes from inside, and buddhi receives the reflection of the object from without. According to them the buddhi is insentient and cannot be an agent, while puruṣa is an agent since it is sentient (see Pandey 1986: 67; Watson 2006: 92–103 for more details). On the other hand, in the Pratyabhijñā system, Abhinava makes the Sāṅkhyavādins his target because there he has to establish that the buddhi is sentient as opposed to the Sāṃkhya view that it is insentient. Even though Śaiva perspective attributes purity or luminosity to the buddhi, Torella (2002: 93, fn12) reiterates on the basis of the ĪPV and the ĪPVV, the purity of buddhi is anyway no clearer than puruṣa. This again drives us to the conclusion that ultimately consciousness alone is pure according to Abhinavagupta. In addition to this, in the present context, it must also be mentioned that David Lawrence has talked about the “Śaiva Syntax of Causation” where he brings our attention to the subsuming cause-effect relation of Śaivas with their “idealistic agential syntax.” Like all the grammatical cases (kārakas) in an action (kriyā)oriented sentence have their substratum in a conscious agent; in the same way, it is the recognitive synthesis (anusaṃdhāna) of Śiva itself that serves as the substratum of the cause and effect relationship and all the components involved in there (see Lawrence 1998, 2000: 147–149, 2008, 2014). Keeping the above discussion in mind, one may now focus on a specific example from the Tantrāloka and see an illustration of how Abhinavagupta carries out the process of philosophical rationalization. The ninth chapter of the TĀ is titled the Tattvaprakās´āhnika, and it describes the hierarchy of ontic-levels (tattvakrama) as accepted by the Trika Śaivism. However, it is important to keep in mind that Abhinavagupta begins this chapter with a philosophical enquiry into the nature of causality because he is intending to explain the inconsistencies in the earlier Śaiva accounts of the tattvakrama and gradually moving himself toward a position where he is offering a standard Śaiva model of the tattvakrama (see Kaul 2018). Besides this, it is obvious that he is standardizing the theory of causality in the context of the tattvakrama as taught in the MVUT since tattvas are connected by causal relations (TĀ 9.48cd–49ab: kāryakāraṇabhāvī ye tattve ithaṃ vyavasthite|s´rī pūrvas´āstre kathitāṃ vacmaḥ kāraṇakalpanām||).

Encountering Buddhists As mentioned previously, even though the Vijñānavādins, who are the main philosophical rivals of the non-dual Śaivas, also argue (like their Śaiva counterparts) that the entire universe is nothing but consciousness alone (vijn˜ aptimātra), but their definitions of consciousness radically differ from each other. For a Buddhist idealist (Vijñānavādin), the knowable objects cannot exist independently of mind, and they are nothing but a series of momentary interconnected events that alone exists. Things do not exist in reality, but a kind of collective consciousness arising out of a store

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house consciousness (ālaya-vijn˜ āna) does. However the difference between the two idealistic positions is that a Vijñānavādin believes that the objects apparently external to consciousness are not a part of consciousness at all. They merely appear to be there because of our ignorance. For a Vijñānavādin there is no evidence that external objects exist. On the other hand, Abhinavagupta’s thesis is diametrically opposed to that of a Vijñānavādin. In his idea of consciousness, there is nothing external to it. Even what are called external objects by a Buddhist idealist are very much a part of consciousness according to the non-dual Śaivas. For Abhinavagupta, consciousness is nothing but supreme reality itself, and since, according to him, whatever is in fact said to be existing outside the domain of consciousness is also cognized within the domain of consciousness alone, there is no question of external reality at all (Ratié 2007, 2010a, b, 2011, 2014b). Criticizing the Buddhist position, Abhinavagupta himself says: “And it has been said by the Buddhists that even in the presence of the external reality, the cognition, perceiving one and many, assumes the form of many, but (in reality) it is one” (TĀ 3.55: uktaṃ ca sati bāhye’ api dhī rekānekavedanāt|anekasadṛs´ākārā na tvaneketi saugataiḥ||). So even if Buddhist also maintains that the cognition of many external objects is one, where does the conflict with non-dual Śaivas lie? Śaivas maintain that except Śiva who is the only cause and is also the effect of himself, there is no other sentient (cetana) reality that has any potent agency of its own. Agency lies with Śiva alone because he is the only sentient agent (cetana pramātā), and his agency is nothing different from his act (kriyā-s´akti). Another question that arises is that if the cause is one, how can effect be many? For Abhinavagupta there is no fundamental contradiction between oneness and manyness. Just as, he explains, a mirror is able to manifest singularly the manyness (differentiation), in the same way, consciousness is also able to do it (see Ratié 2017a; Kaul 2019). For Vijñānavādins, however, the universe is dynamic albeit this dynamism does not belong to any potential agent. They reject the existence of a permanent self (ātman) and only admit the existence of mind. For them, the mind is able to perform all roles of self, and so there is no need to admit to the idea of self. There are actions but no permanent agent to those actions. Even if the Vijñānavādins are the main philosophical rivals of the non-dual Śaivas, yet when it comes to establishing the Śaiva theory of causality in the TĀ, the challenge is how to target the champions of the Buddhist theory of causation, the Mādhyamika school that is mainly represented by Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). Nāgārjuna has shown in his Mūlamādhyamikakārikā (MMK) how causation is not possible on an absolute basis and how according to his doctrine the first cause does not exist in any form since whole phenomenon is based on the principle of momentariness where phenomenal entities come into being and die out in time and space. The existential phenomenon is interdependent, i.e., there is a chain of cause and effect relationship which gives rise to the universal phenomena. This is what, in brief, the Buddhist theory of dependent origination (pratī tyasamutpāda) stands for. In the short section of the TĀ what is being focused in this chapter, Abhinavagupta is clearly not content with the Mādhyamika Buddhist’s theory of causation. But what do Śaivas want to achieve by not agreeing with the causality principle of the Buddhists. As David Lawrence (2000: 147) notes: “The Śaivas

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elaborate some of the same basic syntactic considerations to produce an interesting refutation of the Buddhist logicians’ understanding of causation as “dependent origination.” According to it, causality is a mere regularity of succession between evanescent entities, without any continuous or substantial “connection” between them. The Śaivas interpret the regular priority and posteriority expressed with the locative construction as a sort of expectation (apekṣā) between the moments. They contend that such an expectation could not exist between discreet entities that in themselves lack recognitive synthesis (anusaṃdhāna).” Thus, for Buddhists, it is essentially the consciousness alone that is the cause of all existential phenomena. If one should follow the interpretation of Navjivan Rastogi (2006: VII), then the concept of cause manifests fully in the Śaiva notion of agent on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the effect is understood as nothing but the agency or functioning of the potential agent. If seen from the point of view of cause, the relationship of cause and effect is reduced down to the relationship of agent and action, and if assessed from the point of view of effect, the expedition from cause to effect is called “manifestation” or “reflection.” The universe is not (Rastogi 2006: XVII) the effect of Śiva, but Śiva is the sentient agent who creates the universe out of his autonomous Power of Will. According to Rastogi it will not be wrong to say that the absolute freedom is the cause, and the manifestation (ābhāsa) or reflection (pratibimba) is the effect. In other words, the absolute freedom and the manifestation of it are not two different things but are simply, like cause and effect, two ways of looking at the same reality. Like, for instance, light and luminosity are not two separate things at all, but we still call them as “light” and “luminosity” where the latter is understood as the essence or essential property of being the former. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in the ĪPK 2.4.14 and the TĀ 9.11ab, respectively, attack the Buddhist theory of dependent origination (pratī tyasamutpāda) that believes “that the phenomena are happening in a series and we see that there being certain phenomena there becomes some others” (Dasgupta 2004: 84ff). The causal formula of this system is; “This being, that arises” or “Depending on the cause, the effect arises” (asmin sati, idaṃ bhavati). Thus every object of thought is necessarily dependent, and because it is dependent, it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. In TĀ 9.11ab, Abhinavagupta sets up an argument saying “The essence of the situation in which some thing comes into existence upon the existence of something else is nothing but dependence” (tasmin sati hi tadbhāva ity apekṣaikajī vitam|). He further challenges this idea of Buddhists and asks “How can this theory be true in case of the things that are independent of each other in as much as they are selfcontained” (TĀ 9.11cd: nirapekṣeṣu bhāveṣu svātmaniṣṭhatayā katham|). Jayaratha writes a detailed commentary on this stanza, putting forward various arguments to refute the Buddhist position, and says that their only evidence of perception is that one sees only smoke and not-smoke after fire and before smoke only fire and not non-fire. However, it is unreasonable to decide this from the nature of perception alone, even without considering what actually are these perceived entities. Thus, Buddhists are bound to accept that there are some features within the specific natures of these two things which can limit them in this way. If this was not the case, it would be impossible to invert the conclusion that the smoke and nothing else, which

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follows fire, is a feature inherent in the nature of fire and that fire and fire alone which perceives the smoke is an intrinsic feature of smoke. But this is impossible because one inert thing cannot over determine the nature of another. Jayaratha goes on to suggest that no one, however many times and however much assisted by fate, sees a cloth after a pot even though they are thus internally unrelated still because of necessity the one is seen after the other which is not of course causally correct. He takes an example of Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī – the argument of Pleiades and Taurus is usually used to criticize Buddhists by their opponents, (see also Torella 2002: 183, fn.25) that would be related as cause and effect if the only criterion for this were to follow up the other, for Kṛttikā having arisen Rohiṇī must ascend. But Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī do not bear any causal relationship. So if the Buddhist’s only criterion is the regular succession of the effect after its cause, why do they not consider Kṛttikā’s relationship to Rohiṇī to be so as in the case with fire and smoke? There is a relation of dependence between them, and this dependence is of two types; the first consists in mutual association (anyonyānuṣaṅgitātmikā) and the second in the intentional (abhiprāyātmikā). Neither of these can apply to inert entities which Buddhists want to call cause and effect: in the first case because fire and smoke appear separately unlike fire present in a hot object which is mutually associated and in the second case because the cause and effect are produced by their unconscious nature from concealing each other’s specific identity, unlike intentional dependency such as that between an eater and its food (TĀV 9.11). (It should be mentioned here as a comment that Jayaratha in TĀV 9.11 cites references from important Buddhist texts like the Dharmālaṅkāra of Śaṅkarānanda or Śaṅkaranandana (ninth to tenth CE) (see Krasser 2001) and the Traikālyaparī kṣā of Dignāga). Cause and effect must exist simultaneously, during some time at least, in order that the action of the one upon the other should take place. According to the realist, the potter and the pot exist simultaneously. But for the Buddhist, the potter is only a series of point-instants. One of them is followed by the first moment of the series called the pot. Therefore, the cause can exist no more when the effect is produced by it. It springs up, so to speak, out of nothing, because a simultaneous existence of cause and effect is impossible (Stcherbatsky 1962: 120). Abhinavagupta says “If one were to say that A comes first and B follows, then if the prior and the posterior do not extend beyond their nature because they are totally self contained phenomena then there is no dependence between them and what they (Buddhists) are left with is only A and B” (TĀ 9.12: sa pūrvam atha pas´cāt sa iti cet pūrvapas´cimau|svabhāve ’natiriktau  cet sa sa em. Sanderson] cet sama Ked. ity avas´iṣyate||This emendation suggested by Alexis Sanderson is also supported by ĪPV 2.4.14: tatra svarūpādanadhikā cet pūrvatā paratā ca tat bhāvadvayamātraṃ, sa ca sa ca iti cārtho’pi vā na kas´cit tasyāpapekṣārūpatvāt sa sa ity eva hi syāt|). Jayaratha asks his opponents whether this priority and this posteriority are different from the actual prior and posterior entities or not. The Buddhists cannot accept the first possibility, for there is no such real thing as priority and the rest in their doctrine which could come into existence separately in the things themselves, and if they take the alternative position that they are not different or more than the things themselves, then they are left with nothing but two things which it is true they call cause and

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effect but between which they fail to indicate the nature of real affinity. Nor in the Buddhist doctrine does the causal relation exist as a specific feature over and above the fireness of fire and the smokeness of smoke. For this reason they introduce the function of supernumerary judgment (abhyuccayabuddhi). A supernumerary judgment according to them is a subsequent analysis of what was already contained in the initial perception. Perhaps the Buddhist will argue that these two features are established like momentariness as the intrinsic nature of the perceived forms and that is for this reason that a supernumerary judgment is necessary because nothing can be void of form nor can there be any sensation unfelt. So the form that a capacity to cause smoke takes is that of fire, and it is of this form that supernumerary judgment is required (TĀV 9.11–12).

The Seed and the Sprout Does cause continue to exist once effect is produced? For instance, does a seed still continue to exist once a sprout has come out of it? But a sprout can only emerge once the seed ceases to be. For a Buddhist, cause and effect belong to two different moments of time. The effect will always remain different from the cause (see Murti 2016: 173ff). Emphasizing the non-dual Śaiva doctrine of Abhinavagupta, Jayaratha says that if the nature of cause and effect is first seed and then sprout, then why should not there be a relationship between first pot and then cloth. It is possible that there could be no relation between cause and effect or between inert things. But in the world of our experience, we do find such perceptions as the sprout is born out of the seed. So we are forced to accept that there must be some subjectivity whose essential form is consciousness in which these two entities might be grounded and therefore enabled to be spoken of as cause and effect. To support his argument, Jayaratha quotes a verse from the ĪPK saying “The inert could have no power to bring the non-existent into being, therefore the relation of cause and effect is really that of agent and agency” (ĪPV 2.4.2). Therefore, in the Śaiva doctrine, the relation of cause and effect is really that of the agent and its agency, as already mentioned earlier. Abhinavagupta also points out that mere succession does not constitute causality saying: “So if the cause and effect is seed and sprout then why should not there be a causal relation between a pot and cloth. Mere succession, in other words, does not constitute causality” (bī jamaṅkura ity asmin satattve hetutadvatoḥ| ghaṭaḥ paṭas´ceti bhavet kāryakāraṇatā na kim||TĀ 9.13) (Cf. MMK 20.19–20 and also ĪPV 2.4.8–9). The opponent argues saying surely the seed and sprout are still distinct, but how can Śaivas make them into cause and effect simply by grounding them into a single subject. If the Śaivas could do this and the phenomena of a pot and cloth could be equally so since for them grounding in subjectivity is all phenomena (Kṣemarāja answers this objection very clearly in his Pratyabhijn˜ āhṛdaya (KSTS), pp. 3–4), then they must conclude that cause and effect are identical so that they can say that it is the cause that effects in various forms. We are aware that in the Buddhist model, there is no dynamic connection whatsoever between cause and effect (Stcherbatsky

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1962: 126). On the other hand, from the satkāryavāda point of view that believes in whatever evolves is by definition unconscious, and whatever changes is not conscious concluding that there can be no change in the conscious. According to satkāryavāda the universe is a self-evolving totality of primal matter. And this is what Abhinava attacks saying if the seeds were to be transformed as the sprout, the leaf, etc., then something which has one nature cannot reasonably have another nature. The opponent is asked that if he says that a seed has its nature as these, i.e. (the subsequent transformations like the seed are of the nature of sprout or leaf and so forth), then the seed and the sprout would not be contained within their own spheres (TĀ 9.14–15: bī jamaṅkurapatrāditayā pariṇameta cet|atatsvabhāvavapuṣaḥ sa svabhāvo na yujyate||sa tatsvabhāva iti cet tarhi bī jāṅkurā nije|tāvatyeva na vis´ rāntau tadanyātyantasaṃbhavāt||). Abhinavagupta is suggesting the constant transformation of degrees so that it would follow that the seed and the sprout would not be coincident with the separate spheres of their existence. This is because in that case the last stage of the one would be the first stage of the other and we would end up either having a Buddhist model in which things actually do not come into contact or we are going to have transformation in the model itself. In that case the Buddhists do not have the need to have boundaries. There has to be one thing which is manifest as a complex, which consists of seed or sprout, etc., because of the consequences of the beginning and the end of the other. Therefore it follows inevitably that this is some being taking on different forms co-extensive with the whole. Jayaratha cites the possible objection from the opponent saying: if you say so, let it be. Then we reply; some object cannot be both red and not-red. Let it be so, you may say, but we cannot allow this since this single entity is for you without consciousness, and it is not possible for something non-conscious to have a mutually contradicted form (TĀV 9.15–16). And therefore Abhinavagupta introduces the concept of succession saying “Let the insentient have a variegated form successively (through the sequence of time) but then what is contradiction therein?” (TĀ 9.17ab: krameṇa citrākāro ’stu jaḍaḥ kiṃ nu viruddhyate|). There is not something in addition to the nature of the things. They are just forms of our perception. So if the thing is successive or non-successive, there is nothing added on to the thing in itself. Those two things, succession and non-succession, are just the perceiving of those things in that way. Further Jayaratha asks that surely succession and simultaneity are not characteristics in the nature of the things themselves; they are attributes of perception. But it is consciousness which establishes the succession and non-succession when it perceives that a cloth is after a pot. The things themselves are not endowed with succession or non-succession as something super added to their natures. So the Buddhists cannot avoid the fact that they are superimposing contradictory attributes upon a single entity even though they are trying to get away by introducing succession (TĀV 9.18). The Buddhists believe in the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz., tādātmya (essential identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and effect). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect (Cf. Dasgupta 2004: 345).

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Finally Abhinavagupta comes down to a simple affirmation saying “If you decide that this succession is none other than the subject’s intrinsic nature and is spontaneously manifest in accordance with the intimate Lord, what more could we say. It is in this way we define that the agent is Śiva and Śiva alone” (TĀ 9.20cd–21cd: svarūpān adhikasyāpi kramasya svasvabhāvataḥ||svātantryād bhāsanaṃ syāt cet kimanyad brūmahe vayam|ithaṃ s´rī s´iva evaikaḥ karteti paribhāṣyate||). This one being that manifests succession and non-succession out of its very nature is consciousness, and that is the one agent. And this agency of this being (namely of Śiva) is simply the fact that he appears in this way, i.e., in the modalities of subjectivity, and his manifesting in this way exists in the relation of cause and effect (TĀ 9.22ab– 22cd: kartṛtvaṃ caitad etasya tathāmātrāvabhāsanam|tathāvabhāsanaṃ cāsti kāryakāraṇabhāvagam||). In his gloss on the verse 22, Jayaratha interprets tathā in the tathāmātrāvabhāsanam as vicitreṇa rūpeṇa which he further glosses as pramātṛprameyātmanāṃ mātrāṇām aṃs´ānām avabhāsanam atiriktatayeva em. Sanderson] iva Ked (TĀ vol. 6, p. 29). Jayaratha has resorted to rather unconvincing explanation here. He understands mātrā as parts, and he interprets these parts as Pramātā, Prameya, and Pramāṇa. tathāmātrāvabhāsanam means making manifest of his parts. It indeed is odd when Jayaratha mentions subject and object as the parts of Śiva. Abhinavagupta further maintains that “His (Śiva) appearing in this way exists also in the relation of cause and effect” (TĀ 9. 22cd: tathāvabhāsanaṃ cāsti kāryakāraṇabhāvagam|). So the manifestation of the relation of cause and effect (sprout and seed) is just an instance of his power of manifestation. In fact his appearing in this way, moreover, exists in causality. Just as a pot can also be manifest concomitant with the cloth or one can experience a pot after a cloth, in the same way, a cloth can follow immediately after the pot. But that is bereft of law (TĀ 9.23). Here Abhinava has tried to narrow down the definition of causality. It is just not the matter of Buddhists saying evam sati, idaṃ bhavati. There has to be a regular succession. There has to be a substantial connection between the things in addition to the mere perceived sequence. Jayaratha says in his commentary that according to the Buddhist theory, Kṛttikā should be the cause of Rohiṇī because one is always preceded by the other. But actually there is no causal relation between the two of them. Hence Abhinavagupta maintains “Therefore, we define that as the cause of that (something else) if something else appears immediately after it, but only as a result of a causal necessity (not just a matter of chance)” (TĀ 9.24) (According to Alexis Sanderson, here Abhinavagupta seems to be setting up three levels: mere coincidental succession, rule bound succession, and rule bound succession where there is a continuity of form). There is no causal connection between the two. The perception presented by consciousness does not include the perception of any causal connection. This is essentially a phenomenological analysis. It looks at what is given in consciousness. When consciousness manifests causal connection, it manifests immediate succession, but that is not all. That does not amount a perception of causality, it also amounts perception in accordance with a causal necessity. Here the additional condition is satisfied in the last pāda of the verse which reads sati rūpānvaye’

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dhike (connection of material form). One might say that we can have a cause where two things appear in succession as a result of causal necessity but that does not mean that one is the cause of another, e.g., Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī might be such a case. Manifestation of the world is such that whenever Kṛttikā appears, Rohiṇī appears. But in that case also, one is not the cause of another.

Meditator’s Desire as Cause Since the non-dual Śaivas have to be able to establish both cause and effect into the domain of a single subject adhering to their doctrinal position, they put forth the concept of Yogic creation wherein sheer Power of Will (Icchā-s´akti) of a Yogī acts as the cause of the effect. Yogis do not require a seed to create a sprout, and this stands as an example that sometimes an effect can come into being without its direct cause (see ĪPV 2.4.10– 11; ŚD 3.34–36). Yogis can create a sprout ex nihilo. They do not need a seed. This is what Abhinavagupta means when he says that “And the rule here has its essence consisting of nothing but manifestation of that form, for the manifestation of a sprout from a seed does not always occur” (TĀ 9.25: niyamas´ca tathārūpabhāsanāmātrasārakaḥ|bī jādaṅkura ityevaṃ bhāsanaṃ nahi sarvadā||). And because we come across such cases and there are sprouts of that kind which arise immediately without the pre-existence of the seed, hence in such cases there is also a causal necessity of the meditator’s desire (TĀ 9.26: yogī cchānantarodbhūtatathābhūtāṅkuro yataḥ|iṣṭe tathāvidhākāre niyamo bhāsate yataḥ||). This is a proof that in consciousness, there is also manifestation of causal necessity. In fact, it is not mere a matter of succession alone like Buddhists maintain, but there is also a causal connection between the two. It is not just that first Yogī wills and then the sprout comes into being. There is a manifestation of immediate succession (ānantarya). It should not be understood as something like random collocation of the events, but also mere succession in accordance is necessary. Also in dreams and within the territory of dreams, the pot and cloth can indeed appear to be cause and effect, and that appearance is an appearance of a connection between them in the course of cause and effect until it is contradicted (TĀ 9.27: svapne ghaṭapaṭādī nāṃ hetutadvatsvabhāvatā|bhāsate niyamenaiva bādhās´ūnyena tāvati||). Here Abhinava has given two examples of the supremacy of cause and effect: succession and necessity. It is also important to keep in mind here that as far as Abhinavagupta is concerned, the sprout born out of a seed is of the same nature as that of the sprout born out of a Yogi’s will. In the invariable association of cause and effect, since one is supposed to be prior to the other, it seems to produce an impression for limited consciousness that the posterior entity is the effect and the prior entity is the cause. Even if a Yogi’s will is the cause of an effect, it is still ruled by the idea of prior and posterior causation. However, the non-dual Śaivas claim that in case of both the cause and the effect, the real cause is consciousness. That is to say that it is the consciousness alone that is operational in the cause-ness of cause and the effect-ness of effect. So it does not really matter if we have a seed as the cause of a sprout or a Yogi’s will as the cause of any effect. In both the cases, it is consciousness alone that is being manifested, both as cause and as effect.

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The problem here is that if Śiva’s will alone is the ultimate cause of all the effects, then why do we need to bother about seeds and clay as the potential causes for their effects like trees and pots (see Kaw 1967: 213). How do we know if something that is an effect of a certain cause (kārya) or it is an essential nature (svabhāva) of the effect? It will depend on the causal law in both the cases we are told. Jayaratha states that the basis of causality is nothing but uncontradicted law (TĀV vol. VI, p. 34: evaṃ nirbādho niyama eva kāryakāraṇatāyā nibandhanam|). But what is this uncontradicted law and if causality is not mere succession, then what is it? For Abhinavagupta, the firm relationship between cause and effect, i.e., the state of being cause and effect, is where and in what form the necessary relationship and succession is manifest (TĀ 9.28: tato yāvati yādrūpyānniyamo bādhavarjitaḥ|bhāti tāvati tādrūpyād dṛḍhahetuphalātmatā||). What does this mean? Abhinavagupta uses the example of a scorpion to illustrate this point (see Kaul 2018: 257). He says: “. . .[I]n the world a scorpion can come out of cow-faeces, from another scorpion, from imagination, from memory, from the desire of a Yogi, from such factors as the power of certain substances and mantras” (TĀ 9.42cd–43ab: loke ca gomayāt kī ṭāt saṃkalpāt svapnataḥ smṛteḥ||yogī cchāto dravyamantraprabhāvādes´ ca vṛs´cikaḥ|). Elsewhere, in the Tantrasāra (Chap. 8, p. 73), Abhinavagupta reflects upon the same idea saying even if a scorpion as an effect is generated out of various causes like cow feces, insect, Yogi’s will, a mantra, and a medicine, in each of these cases, the effect (i.e., a scorpion) is the same each time despite each cause being different. Abhinava has also used this example as a maxim supporting his theory of causation in the case of a Yogi. A thing produced by a Yogi is accepted to be similar to something that is produced naturally. To clarify, he further says that this is unlike the case of a scorpion that is produced out of natural birth as opposed to the one produced from cow-faeces (see also ĪPV 2.4.11: yogī cchāpi sarvathā tādṛs´ameva na tu vṛs´ cikagomayādisaṃbhūtavṛs´cikādinyāyena kathaṃcit rasavī ryādinā bhinnaṃ kāryaṃ janayati|). What Abhinava is arguing here is that even if a scorpion produced out of a natural birth is not similar to the scorpion produced from cow-faeces, yet the idea that it is a scorpion is the same. Jayaratha elaborates the same argument of Abhinava, answering the hypothetical opponent, saying that if they consider a separate scorpion to be actually there because of some specific quality as a result of some specific cause, then surely there is some individual scorpions indexed to place, time, form, etc., that have come forth from a scorpion or faeces, etc. Each one of them has some specific characteristics pertaining to themselves, as a result of which they are different from each other. In spite of that, they always remain scorpions (the idea of being a scorpion is the same in all of them). That each is “a scorpion” is always constructed as “scorpion” through parāmars´a. So it is not wrong to teach variety in consistency of effects, both with respect to what they are, their definition, and then the order of their appearance (TĀ 9.43cd–44ab: kāmaṃ kutas´cit svavis´eṣataḥ||sa tu sarvatra tulyas tatparāmārs´aikyam asti tu|). This is what he means when he further says: “Within this law such as has been described which brings about the relation of cause and effect, causality is in reality nothing but the manifestation of consciousness and that is all pervasive” (TĀ 9.29: tathābhūte ca niyame hetutadvattvakāriṇi| vastutas´cinmayasyaiva hetutā taddhi sarvagam||).

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Complex Causality of Totality Factor The concept of complex causality (Sāmagrī ) is used by both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists in their discussions about causality. Referring to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyaman˜ jarī, Dasgupta says “Nyāya Vaiśeṣika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (sāmagrī ) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action un-contradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called pramāṇa or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge” (Dasgupta 2004: 330). Jayanta proposes a unique concept of pramāṇa emphasizing complex causality which is also seen as an exceptional attempt of interpreting the notion of karaṇa in Pāṇinian model of language (see Jha 2008; also see Matilal 1986: 376). While discussing about Sāmagrī in his Mūlamadhyamakakākirā (MMK), Nāgārjuna seems to criticize the idea of selfcausation (see MMK 20.1). However, Abhinavagupta typically seems to accept the totality factor of Buddhists but admitting that ultimately it is Śiva who is the supreme agent. He proposes that “in the production of a pot we say that the cause is the totality of the factors” (TĀ 9.30ab: ata eva ghaṭodbhūtau sāmagrī hetur ucyate|). In such a necessity which brings about the status of cause and effect, ultimately it is that whose nature is consciousness that is the cause and that is all pervasive. “For if one does not accept that the aggregate of causal factors forms a unity, the difference between the causes would give rise to a number of different effects” (TĀ 9.30cd: sāmagrī ca samagrāṇāṃ yady ekaṃ neṣyate vapuḥ||hetubhedān na bhedaḥ syāt phale taccāsaman˜ jasam|). Jayaratha tells us that here the word na used by Abhinavagupta in his text should be construed with an ironical sense (neti kākvā yojyam). Then if all these causal factors were distinct as the result of the multiplicity of the causes (each of these entities which refer to samagrāṇāṃ), then there ought to be a difference in the effect. It is impossible to bring about a single effect if there is not a unity in the causal factors. The grounding of all these factors in the single agent of cognition is the unifying factor. Jayaratha further maintains that resting in a single essence is the cause of all these causal factors. For if all these factors such as the clay, the potter’s stick, the wheel, etc., were causes of pot as isolated phenomena, then numerous pots would come into being because of non-disagreement that there is a plurality of effects from plurality of causes, and then the Buddhists would accept this principle (TĀV vol. VI, p. 35: kāraṇabhedāt kāryabhedasya avivādāt|). If there is plurality of causes, then there must be plurality of effects. If their causal factors do not constitute of singular causal complex, then the Buddhists would not be able to count for singularity of effects. Jayaratha adds that this Buddhist attitude is in accordance with the principle that they do not debate on the problem, namely, “if there is a plurality of causes, there would have to be plurality of effects.” Jayaratha therefore understands that these causal factors cohere in a single causal complex. Therefore because of grounding in a single agent of cognition, one must seek a single object of these things which is what they mean by the word sāmagrī (TĀV vol. VI, p. 35: ity ekapramātṛvis´rāntyā

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sāmagrī s´abdavācyamevaiṣāṃ ekaṃ conj. Sanderson] sāmagrī s´abdavācyamevaiṣāṃ Ked. vapur avas´yaiṣaṇī yaṃ|). But since the Buddhists accept the plurality of causes which is contradicted by sense perception therefore Abhinavagupta uses the expression ‘taccāsaman˜ jasam’ (and that is clearly false). We have a sense perception that guarantees plurality of causal factors. There must be something unifying those causal factors to guarantee the unity of the effect. So, Abhinava questions, would there be no plurality in the effect, and if that is so, then that will clearly be wrong because it is contracted by sense perception. Both Buddhists and Śaivas can agree to what is given to sense perception. This is where Mādhyamika Buddhists leave the discussion because they did not accept that there has to be any shared positions. Jayaratha is now defending the idea of complex causality (sāmagrī ) saying whatever is the precondition of something coming about that is its cause. He spells it out in the preceding introduction of the verse 31 saying it has been taught that that which conforms to the positive or negative of something is the cause of that. He defines the cause of something that which accords with both positive concomitance and negative concomitance. And that condition does not pertain to the clay, the potter’s stick, and the rest when taken separately, and it does exist when they are taken together. Here probably there is an embedded reference to the “triple character of inferential sign” (traikālya) of Dignāga (see Matilal 1998: 90–94). So something is the cause of something if that thing comes about when it is present and does not come about when it is absent. And Abhinavagupta tells Buddhists that if they say that then this blunt reasoning holds no appeal to them (TĀ 9.31cd: yadyasyānuvidhatte tāmanvayavyatirekitām||tattasya hetu cet so ’yaṃ kuṇṭhatarko na naḥ priyaḥ|). The Buddhist argument is that there are no real wholes and all wholes are imaginary. They reduce everything down into the minutest causal factors. According to them, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the individual atoms arise into being and die the next moment, and thus there is no such thing as “whole” (see Dasgupta 2004: 165). Keeping this in mind the Buddhists say that there is no purpose of this objective reality which Śaivas denote with the word sāmagrī. If the plurality of things is not together, then they do not produce the effect. Therefore there is no need to invent this additional thing called “collectivity” which is just an abstract entity. Jayaratha introduces the next verse by saying that if the “were not” of these things is some form of unity in addition to their merely being taken together, then these would be the undesirable consequences that even things far separated in time and place might be the cause. As Abhinavagupta goes on to say: “We believe just as the potter’s stick, cord, wheel, hand etc. are causes, so likewise distant and future entities; so we consider that these too would be causes as a necessary consequence of that position” (TĀ 9.32cd: samagrās´ ca yathā daṇḍasūtracakrakarādayaḥ||dūrās´ ca bhāvinas´cetthaṃ hetutveneti manmahe|). To this an opponent argues maintaining that in this case the positive and negative concomitance of the distant and the future has not been established so what proof is there that the Meru and Karki have some bearing on the production of the pot. “If Meru or some future being were there, surely a pot would not arise (without those obstacles). Just as potter’s wheel becomes a cause at a specific place and time, likewise the Karki and

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Sumeru will remain in their own limit” (TĀ 9.33cd: yadi tatra bhaven merur bhaviṣyan vāpi kas´cana||na jāyeta ghaṭo nūnaṃ tatpratyūhavyapohitaḥ|). The opponent poses the problem asking if what is meant is that the wheel, etc., has proximity in place and time or proximity in form. If that is the case, then it would be possible for cloth, pot or mat, etc., to be proximate. To illustrate the problem of proximity further a counter question is asked: if the potter in sitting on the mat which is present in right time and at a right place, is that also the part of the causal process? And in that case, there would be the undesirable consequences that they too would be bringing about the same single effect, i.e., pot. But the Buddhists do not accept the proximity of a substance, as it would imply that proximity is being in a fixed place and time. They too ought to be causes, i.e., Meru, etc. Therefore they must accept that there is a single form whose nature is the fact that they are rooted within a single perceiver by means of which this universe can become manifest, there being the Lord who is one reality as the agent of conjoining and disjoining of these multiple factors (TĀV 9.34). Abhinava is showing here an undesirable consequence. There has to be some additional factor which accounts for the fact that Meru and Karki are not actually causal factors in the production of the pot. It is very hard for a Buddhist not to accept that the totality thing in the universe is the collective cause of each individual event. There is no dynamic force in the blind Buddhist universe of causality which privileges some things over others. So the argument is that we have to accept that these various factors which we recognize as the cause in the production of the pot are grounded in a single substance which is the agency of the Absolute Agent, i.e., Śiva, and that provides the autonomy in the act of combining and disjoining the infinitely diverse factors of the universe, so that only some are brought together in the production of the pot and not Meru and Karki, even though they exist, especially from Sarvāstivādin point of view.

Śiva as the Perfect Agent and His Autonomous Agency According to the non-dual Śaivas, Śiva alone being autonomous can be the agent in the specific conjunctions and disjunctions of these various causes (TĀ 9.35cd: tathā ca teṣāṃ hetūnāṃ saṃyojanaviyojane||niyate s´iva evaikaḥ svatantraḥ kartṛtām iyāt|). The argument here is that the autonomous consciousness sees to it that only certain factors are relevant in the production of the pot and not others. But the opponent is still not satisfied and asks that how can Śaivas claim that Śiva is the only cause in every production, for in such cases as the pot, it is the potter that we see engaged in pot-making. The awareness of the potter in the conjoining of potter’s wheel, stick, etc., is nothing else but Śiva. There is no other specificity of consciousness. Consciousness “is” consciousness (TĀ 9.36cd: kumbhakārasya yā saṃvit cakradaṇḍādiyojane||s´iva eva hi sā yasmāt saṃvidaḥ kā vis´iṣṭatā|). If the awareness of the potter is as it were because of the manifestation of circumscription, then one must count it among the causal factors like potter’s stick, wheel, etc. (TĀ 9.37cd: kaumbhakārī tu saṃvittir avacchedāvabhāsanāt||bhinnakalpā yadi kṣepyā

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daṇḍacakrādimadhyataḥ|). The awareness of the potter is limited, but fully expanded consciousness is not, because it is not circumscribed by time, place, and form and is of the nature of absolute non-duality. Jayaratha provides a gist of the whole discussion saying that like a potter’s stick, etc., this is just a concomitant cause. The consciousness of the potter when seen from the point of view of contracted nature becomes just as it were another factor in the causal process. We have to have a conscious potter in order to produce a pot. But the fact that the consciousness is Śiva is the reason that the potter is not the immediate agent. The direct agent is Śiva. Just as consciousness that is Śiva projects its contraction itself and that contraction becomes a concomitant cause in the production of a pot, so it has been established that it is Śiva that is the agent in every cause. In the fashion of every single entity, Śiva is embodied entirely as the universal agent. Even the individual’s false notion that an individual itself is an agent is the action of the Lord (TĀ 9.38cd: tasmād ekaikanirmāṇe s´ivo vis´vaikavigrahaḥ||karteti puṃsaḥ kartṛtvābhimāno’pi vibhoḥ kṛtiḥ|). Here Jayaratha asks his opponent if actually Śiva alone is totally impersonal dynamic agent and its essential property is being identical with consciousness, then how is it that the potter thinks, even if he is in the same category as the pot and other factors of the production of the pot, that “I made this” (yan mayedaṃ kṛtam). And Jayaratha‘s answer on behalf of Śaivas follows that the notion that a potter is the agent has been established thus by the power of the causal necessity which itself pertains to Śiva. Indeed there is no plurality of selves in the non-dual Śaivism except that it is consciousness alone behaving spontaneously. Abhinava justifies that Śiva is the most competent agent of his creation (TĀ 9.8ab: vastutaḥ sarvabhāvānām kartes´ānaḥ paraḥ s´ivaḥ|) and maintains that the principle of causal relations which he is going to explain is projected forth by the will of Śiva (TĀ 9.7cd: kāryakāraṇabhāvo yaḥ s´ivecchāparikalpitaḥ|). The autonomy of Śiva is that it modifies individual consciousness on many different levels. It is always grounded in self-awareness, and that self-awareness is perennially present. There is no differentiation in that, and it is always the same dynamic force which is perceived as just conscious, and it freely manifests its own contraction.

Conclusion Either through his vast commentaries on the Pratyabhijñā literature or through his original treatises like the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta reiterates the crucial point having demonstrated the autonomy of Śiva as the true agency of consciousness. He maintains that self-perception is indeed a process of self-recognition which leads to the elimination of impurity (mala) or incompleteness of knowledge (apūrṇajn˜ āna) and thus to liberation. Abhinava’s metaphysics is indeed rooted in the Krama system in the kind of inchoate form and he is simply rationalising this and trying to direct the same kind of the path to expand the awareness through intellectual inquiry which brings one to suddenly see to intuit something about the consciousness. That intuition is the recognition of Śiva, and it is the same fundamental intuition that is also being pointed out in the philosophical principle of Pratyabhijñā. In fact, he is

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pursuing his own intellectual pursuit in redefining the theory of causality in the light of non-dual Śaiva metaphysics. And this he achieves by making the Buddhist’s theory of causality a target. While the principle of causality is inherently dependent on the binary of cause and effect, the major philosophical project of Abhinavagupta is to eliminate the duality of binary and present it as a principle that is invariably concomitant to the unitary cognition of the binary, i.e., the manifestation of the binary is singular. As far as the unique contribution of Abhinavagupta to the theory of causality is concerned, it must be said that he is mostly basing his premise on the philosophical principles laid down by his grand teach Utpaladeva primarily in his ĪPK, ĪPvṛtti, and ĪPvivṛti and also in his other shorter but seminal works like the I¯s´varasiddhi (see Ratié 2015) and the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi (see Lawrence 2009). What, however, remains a desideratum is how in the TĀ, Abhinavagupta executes and appropriates the theory of causality in illustrating the causal relationship between the 36 ontic realities (tattvas). While it might sound illogical or unreasonable to make statements like “everything is consciousness” or “both cause and effect are rooted in consciousness,” yet as this paper attempts to illustrates, Abhinavagupta makes no judgements or claims without offering any concrete arguments in favor of his philosophical position. He very carefully crafts his own philosophical stance while targeting other dominant philosophical positions on causality, mainly Buddhists, while at the same time critically evaluating their view-points and indirectly also using their philosophical tools to strengthen his own doctrinal standpoint. This paper should by no means be considered as a rigorous study of causality in Abhinavagupta. However, the context of causality has only been used to establish the point how Abhinavagupta successfully created a set of canonical texts like the TĀ that even though were meant to serve as a Trika paddhati or a ritual manual, yet they did also serve as an excellent example of how he practiced the art of philosophical rationalization by employing reason (yukti) to the revealed scripture (āgama). Note: All translations of the TĀ and TĀV in this chapter are my own, unless indicated otherwise. Readers may also consult the translations by Gnoli (1999) into Italian and both Miśra (1994) and Chaturvedi (2002) into Hindi.

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Part III Particularities

Some Issues in Buddhist Logic

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Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference Between Nyāya and Buddhist Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . History of the Dialectics Between the Two Systems of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Approaches to Ontology and Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Major Points of Difference Between the Theories of Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . How/How Far Dharmakīrti’s Logic Differs from Diṅnāga’s Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The General Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nature of Avinābhāva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nature of Parārthānumāna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anvaya, Vyatireka, and Their Interrelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is the Statement of “Instance” Required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fallacy Called Viruddhāvyabhicārī . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some Questions About Pervasion in Dharmakīrti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identity and the Question of Antarvyāpti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Causal Necessity and Inductive Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theoretical Issues Involved in Prasaṅga Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prasaṅgānumāna According to Dharmakīrti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nāgārjuna’s Use of Prasaṅga Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An Issue Concerning the Doctrine of Apoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Two Possible Ways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definitions of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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P. P. Gokhale (*) Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India e-mail: [email protected] K. Bhattacharya Department of Philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_3

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Abstract

The chapter deals with some important issues related to the Buddhist logic. Since Nyāya logic is treated as the mainstream Indian logic by many scholars, the true nature and the real contribution of Buddhist logic are many a time overshadowed by the studies in Nyāya logic. The first issue discussed in the chapter, therefore, is the differences between the Buddhist and Nyāya logic. Within the Buddhist logic, the contributions of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti are many times studied in a combined (and confused) way. How one can distinguish between the two is the second issue. Dharmakīrti is known for his view that probans-probandum relation should be a necessary relation, and this necessity can be derived from identity or causality. Some questions are raised such as whether identity leads to “internal pervasion” and how causal necessity can be ascertained. They are discussed in the third section. The fourth issue is concerned with the logical consistency in prasaṅga method which was used as the core method of Mādhyamika Buddhism. The last issue is concerned with the doctrine of apoha, which, though primarily concerned with word-world relation, is also concerned with the theory of inference in an indirect way.

Introduction This chapter will deal with some issues in the logical theory or theories developed in Buddhist tradition. They can be called issues in the sense that they involve a major or minor controversy either with a non-Buddhist logical theory or within the Buddhist tradition. The chapter will deal with the following issues: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

How Buddhist logic differs from Nyāya logic How/how far Dharmakīrti’s logic differs from Diṅnāga’s logic Some questions about pervasion in Dharmakīrti Theoretical issues involved in prasaṅga method An issue concerning the doctrine of apoha

Difference Between Nyāya and Buddhist Logic History of the Dialectics Between the Two Systems of Logic Indian logic has developed through inter-systemic and intra-systemic dialectics, and the main agents of this dialectical movement are Nyāya and Buddhist epistemologists-cum-logicians. Though Naiyāyikas were the pioneers of the theory of inference and argumentation in India, Buddhists tried to give a different turn to it sometimes by questioning it and sometimes by systematization of it. Nyāya logicians while

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responding to the Buddhist critiques and systematizations revised and reformed their own theory, and again there was a critical response from the Buddhist side. Hence the difference between the two logics has to be understood in terms of historical dialectics between the two. It is a generally accepted view that Akṣapāda Gautama, the author of Nyāya Sūtra, the earliest Nyāya text, was not the earliest Nyāya philosopher. Nyāya ideas were already prevalent, and Gautama did the task of collecting and organizing them so that a comprehensive treatise can be formulated. The date of Nyāya Sūtra can be traced back to the second century CE. The first critical reaction from Buddhist side to Akṣapāda Gautama’s categories came from Ācārya Nāgārjuna, who belonged to the second century CE. Nāgārjuna not only repudiated the categories of Nyāya logic but any possible theory of pramāṇas. From Nyāya side, the first commentator of Nyāya Sūtra, Vātsyāyana (fourth to fifth century CE), tried to establish the Nyāya categories and also address the Buddhist criticism. Around this period Asaṅga (fifth century CE) and his brother Vasubandhu (fifth century CE), the celebrated Yogācāra philosophers, are seen as taking up the study of Nyāya logic in a constructive way and trying to adapt it to strengthen the foundation of their own philosophical systems. But though Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic may contain seeds of certain ideas, a radical reconstruction of the theory of inference was carried out by Diṅnāga (fifth century CE) who was aptly regarded as the founder of the school of logic in Buddhism. From the Nyāya side Uddyotakara (sixth to seventh century CE), the author of Nyāyavārtika vehemently criticized Diṅnāga’s theorization and through this criticism also brought out some reformation in the Nyāya logic. Dharmakīrtī (seventh century CE) from Buddhist side not only criticized Uddyotakara, but his main task was to give Diṅnāga’s epistemology and logic a more sound and sophisticated form and to shape the version of logic which later Buddhist scholars accepted as standard. Dharmakīrti’s sophisticated theory of inference had a long lasting influence on Indian logic. Hence later Nyāya logicians such as Vācaspati Miśra (tenth century CE), Udayana (tenth to eleventh century CE), and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (tenth century CE) appropriated and also criticized Dharmakīrti’s innovations. From the Buddhist side, the commentators of Dharmakīrti such as Dharmottara (ninth century), Arcaṭa (ninth to tenth century), and Prajñākaragupta (tenth century) played their role in this debate. Hence Ratnakīrti (tenth to eleventh century) is seen to have criticized the Naiyāyikas like Trilocana and Vācaspati Miśra in defense of Dharmakīrti. After eleventh century, however, there was a decline in Buddhist logic for various historical reasons. The Nyāya logic which developed after that at the hands of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (fourteenth century CE) and various Navya-nyāya Ācāryas did not have Buddhism as their main rival system. Hence the development of the Nyāya logic and that of the Buddhist logic cannot be studied in isolation but in terms of their dialectical relationship. The contrast

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between them is not superficial or just a matter of detail. It goes much deeper than that. It was also not uniform in nature because it had a historical dimension.

Approaches to Ontology and Epistemology Before proceeding to point out the differences between Nyāya logic and Buddhist logic, it is necessary to mention that unlike other Indian philosophical schools where epistemology precedes ontology, epistemological theories of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti were constructed on the foundation of their ontological claims. In Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Diṅnāga says that since the knowables (prameya) are of two kinds, namely, svalakṣaṇa or the particular and sāmānyalakṣaṇa or the universal, the instruments through which they are known are also of two kinds, namely, perception and inference. Therefore, while for the Nyāya school, the object of perception can as well be an object of inference, for Buddhists like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrtī, object of inference can be sāmānyalakṣaṇa alone. Sāmānyalakṣaṇa for Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrtī is not a real object but a mental construct. The indirect knowledge of a sādhya based on the knowledge of a hetu has certainty and indubitability within this limit. On the other hand, svalakṣaṇas, which are the objects of perception, are described as unique particulars, distinct from both similar and dissimilar entities; and they alone are said to be real in the strict sense of the term. The ontology of the Nyāya, which it borrows from and develops over Vaiśeṣika, is much more populated. It contains particulars as well as universals and substances in atomic as well as composite form, qualities, movements, universals, particularities, inherence, and absences. In fact whatever is knowable and expressible in language is real according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. Naturally the use of reasoning has a very wide scope aimed at proving a large variety of “reals.”

Major Points of Difference Between the Theories of Inference The comparison between Nyāya and Buddhist theories of inference can be made at various levels. Here comparison on the following points will be presented: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

The distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others The nature of inference for oneself and the conditions of good hetu The nature of hetu-sādhya relation The structure of inference for others

The Distinction Between Inference for Oneself and Inference for Others Though Gautama and Vātsyāyana’s account of anumāna and stating avayava as a separate padartha suggest that they were aware of the distinction between inference as a cognition occurring to oneself and inference as a communicative act generating cognition in another person, it was not explicitly spelled out by them. Diṅnāga was the first Indian logician to clearly distinguish between these two kinds of inferences

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and apply the terms svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna to denote them, respectively. This distinction was later accepted by the Nyāya philosophers, but there is a difference between the Buddhist and the Nyāya understanding of the nature of svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. Gautama’s conception of avayavas suggested a specific structure of a sound argument. The steps in it follow a specific order. Naiyāyikas maintained that the inference for oneself also has an analogous structure. A person first sees a line of smoke on the mountain (hetujn˜ āna), she then recollects the relation between smoke and fire (sambandha-smaraṇa), then she applies that relation to the present case (parāmars´a), and at the next moment, she has the knowledge of the fire on the mountain (anumiti). Naiyāyikas in this way envisaged isomorphic relation between the process of knowing and that of justification. Buddhist logicians did not think of such an isomorphic relation in mechanical way. However, they did talk about the logical link between the two. The logical link is brought about by the concept of triple character of hetu. Inference for oneself for them is the knowledge of sādhya brought about by the hetu having triple character, and inference for others is the presentation of the hetu as having the triple character. The point is that the inference for oneself according to Buddhist logicians does not follow a rigid temporal order as it does according to the Nyāya logicians.

The Nature of Inference for Oneself and the Conditions of Good Hetu One technical difference between the Nyāya and Buddhist conceptions of svārthānumāna needs to be taken into account at the very outset. The two conceptions differ because in Nyāya anumāna is substantially different from anumiti, whereas the Buddhist logicians do not make such a substantial distinction. If we consider the inferential process from the knowledge of hetu to the knowledge of sādhya, then, Naiyāyikas hold, the intermediate step called “recollection of hetusādhya relation” is called anumāna, and the resultant knowledge of sādhya is called anumiti. Buddhist logicians on the other hand regard the resultant knowledge of sādhya itself as anumāna. The other important difference between the Nyāya and Buddhist conceptions consists in the condition of good hetu. Diṅnāga presented the theory of the triple character of hetu. Though it is true that in some pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic these three characteristics are mentioned, Diṅnāga seems to be the first logician to work out the theory of reasoning based on it. The three characteristics of a hetu, according to Diṅnāga, are as follows: 1. Pakṣasattva (the hetu must be present in the pakṣa) 2. Sapakṣasattva (the hetu must be present in the sapakṣa) 3. Vipakṣāsattva (the hetu must be absent in the vipakṣa) Uddyotakara raised important objections against Diṅnāga’s formulation of the triple characteristics of a hetu. According to Diṅnāga’s theory, every sound hetu should be related (by its being present or absent in) to the pakṣa, sapakṣa, and vipakṣa. Uddyotakara pointed out that a hetu can be sound even if it is related to the pakṣa and either of the two cases, namely, sapakṣa and vipakṣa. An anvayī hetu or

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universal positive mark, he says, is a sound hetu which has the pakṣa and the sapakṣa as its loci. It is nowhere found absent. A vyatirekī hetu, on the other hand, is a hetu which is absent in the vipakṣa, but does not reside in the sapakṣa because a sapakṣa, in this case, does not exist. Anvayī and vyatirekī hetus were later named kevalānvayī hetu and kevalavyatirekī hetu, respectively, and a sound hetu which involves the pakṣa, sapakṣa, and vipakṣa is named anvaya-vyatirekī . Almost all Nyāya philosophers accepted this division of hetu into three kinds, and it is acknowledged as a very important contribution toward formulation of inferential thought process. Nyāya philosophers after Uddyotakara suggested another improvement on Diṅnāga’s formulation of the triple characteristics. These Naiyāyikas advanced criticism from the opposite direction. They claimed that the three characteristics of hetu are not sufficient. The reasoning in which the hetu possesses all the three characteristics could lead to a false conclusion, under two conditions: 1. The conclusion can be shown to be false on the basis of another pramāṇa. 2. Another reasoning may be available which is at least as much strong as the proposed reasoning but proves the contrary of the conclusion. Of these three, the first condition falsifies the conclusion and the second one raises doubt about the truth of the conclusion. The first condition designates the fallacy called bādha and the second condition designates satpratipakṣatva. In order to exclude these fallacies, Naiyāyikas after Uddyotakara augmented the list of three characteristics by two more characteristics: 4. Abādhitaviṣayatva (the hetu must not be about the sādhya which is sublated) 5. Asatpratipakṣatva (the hetu must not be countered by an opposite hetu) While explicating inference for oneself, Diṅnāga specifies the conditions that yield certainty whenever one infers the sādhya on the basis of a hetu in a particular pakṣa. A hetu, to be adequate must, therefore possesses three characteristics. Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the conditions of good hetu shows that he was aware of both these objections against the theory of triple character of hetu. He answered these objections and defended the doctrine of the triple character of hetu. He, however, interpreted the triple character of hetu as implying the necessary relation between hetu and sādhya such that the former cannot exist without the latter.

The Nature of Hetu-Sādhya Relation Naiyāyikas claim that the Nyāya theory of inference had the concept of universal vyāpti relation between hetu and sādhya since the stage of Nyāya Sūtra. Such claims are made because generally the commentators claim that the interpretation they are providing exhibits the original view of the source book even if they are introducing new ideas. In this way Sūtra-Bhāṣya tradition hides the changes that take place in a system. This is true of the concept of vyāpti as well. The concept of vyāpti has evolved through the interaction between Nyāya and Buddhist logicians.

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Gautama while defining hetu and explaining the elements (avayava) of the inference repeatedly refers to the concepts of sādharmya or similarity and vaidharmya or dissimilarity. Hetu is similarity or dissimilarity of the properties of the udāharaṇa and the sādhyadharmī; udāharaṇa is the case similar to sādhya, either positively or negatively. Upanaya refers to the collection (upasaṁhāra) of the sādhya and the udāharaṇa together by demonstrating their similarity or dissimilarity (by the expressions “tathā” and “na tathā,” respectively). The term “tathā” means “is positively analogous to” and “na tathā” means “is negatively analogous to.” This shows that Gautama relied only on the relation of analogy (expressed as “being analogous to”) between sādhya and udāharaṇa for formulating a good inferential form. Obviously, analogy can never sufficiently account for the universal relation between hetu and sādhya which is needed to make a logically sound inference possible. Vātsyāyana, the commentator on Gautama’s Nyāya Sūtra, while elaborating on Gautama’s notion of inference, emphasizes on the relation between hetu and sādhya rather than only on the similarity or dissimilarity between the sādhya and the udāharaṇa. But a close examination of the way he explains hetu-sādhya relation suggests that he was talking about the relation obtained in the “observed” world and not a universal relation which pervades both observed and unobserved world. Secondly, though he talked about the observed coexistence and coabsence of hetu and sādhya, he was not clear about the specific direction of the implicative relation between them. This becomes clear when he regards “hetu existing without sādhya” and “sādhya existing without hetu” both as the cases of inconclusive hetu. Diṅnāga’s doctrine of the triple character of hetu specifies the exact direction of hetu-sādhya relation. He allowed partial existence of a good hetu in sapakṣa but insisted on its absolute nonexistence in vipakṣa. This implies that in the domain consisting of similar and dissimilar cases, if hetu exists, sādhya too exists, and if sādhya is nonexistent, hetu too is nonexistent. Accordingly, sādhya can exist without hetu, but hetu cannot exist without sādhya. Hetu-sādhya relation is properly directed in Diṅnāga’s scheme in this way. But it is limited to the world of similar and dissimilar cases. It is neither universal nor necessary. Dharmakīrti removed this deficiency and presented hetu-sādhya relation in the form of universal and necessary relation of pervasion. Naiyāyikas, who came after Dharmakīrti, included universal and unconditional (anupādhika) vyāpti in their scheme of inference. Still, there remain some points of difference between the conceptions of vyāpti according to Dharmakīrti and Naiyāyikas: (a) For Naiyāyikas vyāpti relation is universal and also categorical. Because of categorical nature, it has existential import and has an instantiation. For Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, though vyāpti is generally stated in categorical form, it is to be understood as a necessary conditional relation. Vyāpti relation in this form can stand without instantiation. (b) As a result of (a) above, Naiyāyikas hold, though generally we have both positive and negative vyāpti because both have instantiations, sometimes we

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have only positive vyāpti without its negative counterpart because the latter has no instantiation. Similarly sometimes we have only positive vyāpti without its negative counterpart. For Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, every positive vyāpti has its negative counterpart and vice versa. Hence there is no purely positive (kevalānvayin) or purely negative (kevalavyatirekin) hetu. (c) When Dharmakīrti held that vyāpti is a necessary relation, he was concerned with the question as to how this necessity is possible. He held that it is possible in either of the two ways: Either hetu is identical with sādhya or it is caused by sādhya. Naiyāyikas were not ready to restrict the scope of hetu-sādhya relation to these two relations. It sufficed for them if hetu is observed with sādhya, it is not observed without sādhya and no obstructive condition (upādhi) is observed.

The Structure of “Inference for Others” According to the Nyāya Sūtra, there are five avayavas in a structured reasoning, and these can be expressed through five statements. The five statements are used to publicly demonstrate a reasoning process in which the sādhya or an unperceived object is established as a property of the pakṣa or subject with the help of a hetu or signifying mark. If the debater, for example, tries to prove that “the hill has fire,” the five statements will assume the following form: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Pratijn˜ ā: The hill is fiery. Hetu: Because it is smoky. Udāharaṇa: Like the kitchen (or, unlike the lake). Upanaya: The hill is like that (or, unlike that). Nigamana: Therefore the hill is fiery.

The first statement asserts the pakṣa qualified by the property to be proved sādhyadharma. It, therefore, states the thesis (pratijn˜ ā). The second statement expresses the reason (hetu). The third statement expresses an example (Udāharaṇa), which is defined as the case which has similar or dissimilar characteristics as the pakṣa. The fourth statement is called upanaya. Upanaya which literally means “that which leads to the conclusion” (“upasaṁhriyate anena”) is to be understood as the statement which asserts the pakṣa as characterized by the presence or absence of the features present or absent in the udāharaṇa. The fifth statement, namely, nigamana, is the assertion of the thesis again as proved. One can notice that (1) this structure of argument involves a psychological order or a rhetorical sequence (2). It does not involve a universal statement of vyāpti (3). It is based on positive or negative analogy as it refers to similarity or dissimilarity between pakṣa and udāharaṇa. In response to this initial Nyāya formulation of argument, Diṅnāga presents a more systematic formula with three statements representing three elements of the inference: 1. Pakṣa: The hill is fiery. 2. Hetu: Because it is smoky.

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3. Dṛṣṭānta: Smoky things are seen to be fiery like the kitchen and things lacking fire are seen to be lacking smoke like a lake. Diṅnāga’s formula is oriented more by logical considerations than by psychological ones as it tries to get rid of unnecessary repetitions as one may find in the Nyāya formulation. Diṅnāga’s formula is still governed by similarity and dissimilarity. But here these considerations are systematically and logically arranged as a part of the doctrine of the triple character of hetu. Hence after stating the thesis in the first statement, Diṅnāga’s formula presents the first character of hetu (“existence in the property bearer”) in the second statement and the other two characteristics (“existence only in similar cases” and “definite nonexistence in dissimilar cases”) in the third step. Dharmakīrtī’s formulation of the inference for others follows the consideration of validity rigorously. His form of argument is no more based on positive or negative analogy, but is based on universal statement of vyāpti. The statement stating the example is redundant because its implication is revealed by understanding the nature of a hetu. The presence of the hetu in sapakṣa implies availability of positive instances. Similarly the absence of the hetu in the vipakṣa implies the availability of negative instances. (The point to be noted here: Naiyāyikas insist on availability of a real instance, whether positive or negative whereas in the Buddhist scheme even vacuous instantiation is permissible.) Now for Dharmakīrti, both the characteristics (existence in sapakṣa and nonexistence in vipakṣa) need not be stated separately because they are implied by a single statement of vyāpti whether it is stated in positive form (anvaya) or negative form (vyatireka). Dharmakīrti’s model of argument in this way consists of stating the two premises – statements of pakṣadharmatā and vyāpti.

How/How Far Dharmakīrti’s Logic Differs from Din˙nāga’s Logic The General Issue Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti are the two pioneering figures of the Buddhist logic. According to historians like Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan, Diṅnāga belongs to the latter half of the fifth century and the first quarter of the sixth century AD. Dharmakīrti’s period is said to be about 635 AD. Dharmakīrti is said to belong to the teacher-disciple tradition of Diṅnāga. The latter had disciples such as Śaṅkarasvāmin, who taught Diṅnāga’s logic to Dharmapāla, who was the teacher of Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti is also said to have learned Diṅnāga’s logic thoroughly from another Diṅnāga expert, namely, Īśvarasena. Like Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti also wrote many independent treatises on logic and epistemology. But more importantly he wrote an elaborate commentary on Diṅnāga’s work Pramāṇa-samuccaya. The commentary is entitled Pramāṇavārtika. A question can arise, as to whether Dharmakīrti simply continued the tradition of Diṅnāga or made some alterations in it. The question is important because there is no doubt about the fact that Indian

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philosophy has developed through sūtra-bhāṣya tradition. But there is no clarity on how this development has taken place. In fact, there are different ways in which such developments have taken place: (i) On the same source literature, different commentators give radically different interpretations which give rise to different schools of a system. Different schools of Vedānta have come into existence in this way. (ii) A system develops through commentaries and subcommentaries. This development is sometimes linear. A commentator or a subcommentator clarifies or elaborates the points which are available in unclear or abridged form in the source literature. But it may also have a dialectical aspect. A commentator has the task of defending the system against the criticism coming from the defenders of rival systems of his time, and he introduces newer ideas and theories in order to strengthen the system. But this is generally done as a part of elaboration and clarification of the source text and not by criticizing it. This has happened to a large extent in the Nyāya tradition. One finds there a chain of commentaries and subcommentaries where the latter commentary does not explicitly deviate from the earlier commentary, though one may find if one goes in minute details that it actually deviates in many respects. (iii) Sometimes the development brought about through commentaries may not be linear but explicitly dialectical. A commentator may sometimes radically deviate from the source material. At least sometimes he may do so explicitly, though sometimes in a disguised way. In the present context the question is: How is one to understand the development of logic from Diṅnāga to Dharmakīrti? The following alternatives come to the foreground: (i) It was a linear development. Dharmakīrti introduced new ideas or doctrines only as a part of elaboration and clarification of Diṅnāga’s theory and not in opposition to it. (ii) Dharmakīrti did differ from Diṅnāga on some details. But there was agreement at fundamental level. (iii) Dharmakīrti in his theory of inference deviated from Diṅnāga. Differences in detail were the manifestations of this fundamental deviation. However, Dharmakīrti generally avoided expressing the radical differences explicitly. Modern scholars are found taking one or the other position from above. B. K. Matilal seems to be taking the first kind of position. He claims that the idea of invariable concomitance was already introduced by Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti made an advancement to the extent that he described it as based on own nature or causality. (Matilal 1998: 11–12). Similarly Diṅnāga had introduced twofold classification of inference into inference for oneself and inference for others. Dharmakīrti introduced another threefold classification: inference based on own nature, causal relation, and nonperception (Matilal 1998: 108–109). Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan seems to have taken the second type of position. He brings out the points on which

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Dharmakīrti criticizes Diṅnāga. The latter had introduced the fallacy of hetu called implied contradiction (iṣṭavighātakṛt, a kind of viruddha); Dharmakīrti denied its independent status by including it in the first type of contradiction. Diṅnāga had introduced the fallacy called viruddhāvyabhicārī as a variety of uncertainty. Dharmakīrti rejected this fallacy. Thirdly in opposition to Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti maintained that example is not a part of a syllogism as it is included in the middle term (Vidyabhushan 2005: 315–318). Here it seems to be necessary to go to the root of the matter. If one goes deeper, one may find that the third possibility suggested above is stronger than the other two possibilities. Dharmakīrti was not simply clarifying or elaborating Diṅnāga’s frame of inference but was deviating from it and doing so at fundamental level. The points on which Dharmakīrti expressed explicit difference are like the manifest portion of an iceberg with the major portion hidden below it.

The Nature of Avinābhāva Although Diṅnāga talked about the invariable concomitance (avinābhāva) type of relation between hetu and sādhya, the relation of concomitance as formulated by Diṅnāga was a part of the triple character of hetu. It was limited to the domain of similar and dissimilar cases (sapakṣa and vipakṣa). The passage of inferential knowledge in Diṅnāga’s framework was from “observed” to “unobserved.” That is why Diṅnāga, while giving examples of anvaya and vyatireka, uses the word “dṛṣṭam” (“it is observed that”). In contrast with this, the concomitance relation understood by Dharmakīrti was universal and necessary. The following statements given by Dharmakīrti denoting concomitance may be considered: 1. “Yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ san nopalabhyate so’sadvyavahāraviṣayaḥ siddhaḥ” (Nyāyabindu 3/8) (If an object is not perceived even if all the conditions for its being perceived are present, then it is proved to be the object of a linguistic usage like “this is not present.”) 2. “Yat sat tatsarvamanityam” (Nyāyabindu 3/9) (Everything real is impermanent). 3. “Yatsadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ tad upalabhyateeva” (Nyāyabindu 3/23) (That which is existent and has all the conditions for its being perceived present will certainly be perceived.) 4. “Anityatvābhāvekṛtakatvāsambhavaḥ” (Nyāyabindu 3/122) (If something is not impermanent, then it is impossible that it will be a product.) 5. “Yadutpattimattadanityam” (Nyāyabindu 3/10) (That which has origination is impermanent.) These statements denting concomitance show that for Dharmakīrti, the relation between the probans and the probandum should be already proved (siddha), universal (sarvam), and certain (eva) and its negation should be impossible (asambhava) (Gokhale 1992, 88–89).

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This shows that while for Diṅnāga the relation of concomitance was restricted to observed similar and dissimilar instances, for Dharmakīrti the relation should be pervasive enough to include all cases, observed and unobserved. Dharmakīrti uses the term “sarvopasaṁhāra” to express such universality. Universality, however, is here obtained by showing that the relation is necessary. In order to ensure a necessary relation, Dharmakīrti introduces the notion of existential dependence (svabhāvapratibandha) which subsumes under it the notions of essential identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti). A probans necessarily implies a probandum if it depends on the probandum for its own existence or if it is identical or causally connected with it. The relation between the probans and the probandum will therefore be necessary if any of the following conditions obtain: (1) when the probans is essentially identical with the probandum, that is, when the inferential relation is a relation of class inclusion, as in, “This is a tree, because this is s´iṁs´apā (a kind of tree),” and (2) when there is a causal connection between the probans and the probandum, as in, “The hill is on fire as it has smoke.” In this way the difference between the approaches of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti to inference is not peripheral but at the core. Different points of difference between the two theories follow from this basic difference. A few points are discussed below.

The Nature of Parārthānumāna For Diṅnāga inference has three elements, namely, the inferential subject, probans, and the example. The structure of a sound inference for others should be, accordingly, as follows: Thesis (pratijn˜ ā): Sound is impermanent. Reason (hetu): Because sound is a product. Example (dṛṣṭānta): (a) Statement of similarity (anvaya), anything other than sound which is a product is impermanent, for example, pot, and (b) statement of dissimilarity (vyatireka), anything other than sound which is not impermanent is not a product, for example, sky. Dharmakīrti did not accept the above structure of three limbs of inference. He says that an inference made for others has only two constituents: the statement of the existence of hetu in the inferential subject (pakṣadharmatā) and the statement of concomitance (vyāptivākya). Hence according to him, the structure would be: Reason (hetu): (Sound is impermanent) because sound is a product. Concomitance (vyāpti): Whatever is a product is impermanent. Or: Whatever is not impermanent is not a product. This had implications to their approaches to fallacies. Since inference for others had three elements according to Diṅnāga, fallacies of an inference accordingly are of three kinds – that of the inferential subject (pakṣābhāsa), probans (hetvābhāsa), and

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the example (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa). Of these, Dharmakīrti was more concerned with the fallacies of probans (because as mentioned above, he did not give much importance to the thesis and the example) and discussed the different kinds of hetvābhāsas with greater details. In Diṅnāga’s framework of “inference for others,” instance covers “invariable concomitance.” The latter is limited to similar and dissimilar cases, and the subject of the thesis is kept outside the domain of the concomitance. Hence the thesis is not entailed by the premises. In Dharmakīrti’s framework of the inference for others, the invariable concomitance is universal, and hence it covers the subject of the thesis as well. Hence the thesis is entailed by the premises. Therefore Dharmakīrti claims that only two steps are sufficient. The thesis need not be stated because it is entailed by the two premises which state vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā.

Anvaya, Vyatireka, and Their Interrelation One of the issues in Buddhist logic concerns with the relation between the second and the third characteristic of hetu. Dharmottara, the commentator of Dharmakīrtī’s Nyāyabindu, argues that the second and the third characteristics of the hetu imply each other and, therefore, either of them is rendered redundant. This is one of the issues which become complicated if one identifies Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference with that of Diṅnāga. In order to tackle the issue, therefore, one has to consider the two theories separately. The second and the third characteristics according to Diṅnāga’s formulation can be stated as follows: 2) Hetu exists only in sapakṣa. 3) Hetu is definitely nonexistent in vipakṣa. The universe of discourse of an inference in Diṅnāga’s theory is exhausted by pakṣa, sapakṣa, and vipakṣa. In the first characteristic, Diṅnāga talks about the status of hetu in pakṣa. Naturally in the second and third characteristics, he is concerned with the world outside pakṣa, which consists of sapakṣa and vipakṣa. In this world (outside pakṣa), if hetu exists “only in sapakṣa,” it follows that it is nonexistent in vipakṣa (provided that vipakṣa exists). This follows by the force of the word “only” which excludes the other possibility. In this way the second characteristic implies the third characteristic. Similarly if hetu exists somewhere outside pakṣa but is definitely nonexistent in vipakṣa, then it follows that it exists in sapakṣa (provided that sapakṣa exists). In this way the third characteristic implies the second characteristic. If in this way the second and third characteristics imply each other, the question arises, why Diṅnāga states both? This questions the very core of Diṅnāga’s triple character theory of hetu. A possible answer within Diṅnāga’s framework is that the second and third characteristics in this framework are contingent characteristics having existential implications. The second characteristic implies that there is sapakṣa and hetu exists in it. Similarly the third characteristic implies that vipakṣa

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exists and hetu is nonexistent in it. (In exceptional cases vipakṣa may be nonexistent, for which Diṅnāga had to make a special provision.) If the existence of similar and dissimilar cases are presupposed or implied by the two characteristics, then the second and third characteristics cannot be reduced to each other. That is because the existence of similar cases is implied by the second characteristic, but the existence of dissimilar cases is not. Similarly the existence of dissimilar cases is implied by the third characteristic, but the existence of similar cases is not. But the way Dharmakīrti explains the two characteristics is different from the way Diṅnāga does. Dharmakīrti de-emphasizes the existential contexts of the two characteristics and expresses them by universal and necessary statements. The two characteristics then stand for anvaya-vyāpti and vyatireka-vyāpti, respectively, which can be expressed by the universal statements of the form: Anvaya-vyāpti: For all x, if x has hetu property, then x has sādhya property. Vyatireka-vyāpti: For all x, if x does not have sādhya property, then x does not have hetu property. It is obvious that the above two statements entail each other by the rule of transposition.

Is the Statement of “Instance” Required? In Diṅnāga’s framework of inference for others, just as both positive and negative concomitance need to be stated, each of them needs to be accompanied by an instantiation. That is because both the statements of concomitance have existential import. Dharmakīrti categorically states that separate mention of example, as an element of inference for others, is redundant. That is because the statement of concomitance for Dharmakīrti is a necessary statement. Though instances might have played some role in the formation of the statements of invariable concomitance, once the statements are formed, they stand not as contingent statements, but necessary ones. Now they can stand without examples. Accordingly, statements of concomitance in Dharmakīrti’s writings can be cited where the example is not stated (e.g., Nyāyabindu 3/24 and 3/25).This difference between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti is reflected in their formulations of fallacies of example (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa). If a statement of concomitance lacks an example, Diṅnāga would consider it as a fallacy of insufficient reasoning (nyūna). Since according to Dharmakīrti, example has no function over and above giving a hint for knowledge of concomitance, the above for him would not be a case of insufficient reasoning.

The Fallacy Called Viruddhāvyabhicārī Diṅnāga in his theory of inference had introduced a fallacy called viruddhāvyabhicāri. Though it is included within anaikāntika by Diṅnāga,

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viruddhāvyabhicārī is different from all other varieties of pseudo-probans. The other varieties are based on nonfulfillment of one of the three conditions of a probans. Viruddhāvyabhicārī meets all the three conditions and is yet fallacious because of the availability of a counter-probans which equally fulfills all the three conditions. Thus viruddhāvyabhicārī is defined as that which is concomitant (i.e., nondeviant) with the contradictory of that which is proved by another probans (viruddhaṁ na vyabhicaratī ti viruddhāvyabhicārī ). This kind of pseudo-probans leads the hearer to doubt as to which of the two alternatives he would accept, as both, being supported by “good” probans, are cogent. The fallacy occurs when with reference to a given sādhya, there are two hetus available: one hetu which “proves” the sādhya and the other hetu (which is called “prati-hetu” or counter-probans) which “disproves” the sādhya (i.e., “proves” the absence of sādhya). Dharmakīrti is vehemently against acknowledging this fallacy. This is quite natural because given the basic difference between the two frameworks of inference, the fallacy is possible in Diṅnāga’s framework, but it is not possible in Dharmakīrti’s framework. The point can be explained with the help of an example. Diṅnāga’s example of the fallacy is like this: Argument A(Di) – Mīmāṁsaka argues: Sound is eternal. Because it is audible. Audible things (other than sound) are seen to be eternal, for example, soundness. Non-eternal things (other than sound) are seen to be inaudible, for example, a pot. Argument B(Di) – Naiyāyika argues: Sound is non-eternal. Because it is a product. Products (other than sound) are seen to be non-eternal, for example, earthen pot. Eternal things (other than sound) are seen to be non-products, for example, ether. Here Diṅnāga points out that both the hetus are concomitant (avyabhicāri) with their respective sādhyas. But what they prove are the two incompatible properties of sound, namely, eternality and non-eternality. Hence the two hetus together become inconclusive (anaikāntika) with respect to eternality or non-eternality of sound. Here, both the hetus are good hetus insofar as the fulfillment of the three conditions is concerned. But the point to be noted here is that fulfillment of the three conditions does not imply universal relation between hetu and sādhya. The two hetus therefore are two strong analogies leading to opposite conclusions. The conclusions of the two arguments are contradictory, but the premises of them do not contradict with each other. Hence the odd situation of inconclusiveness occurs. But this is not possible in Dharmakīrti’s frame of inference. Here concomitance relation is understood as universal in nature. In that case the two arguments will be stated as follows:

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Argument A(Dh) – Mīmāṁsaka argues: Sound is eternal. Because it is audible. Whatever is audible is eternal (like sound). Argument B(Dh) – Naiyāyika argues: Sound is non-eternal. Because it is a product. Whatever is a product is non-eternal (like a pot). Here the premises of each argument entail their respective sādhya. If the premises of the argument A(Dh) are true, then sound must be eternal, and if the premises of the argument B(Dh) are true, then sound must be non-eternal. Hence if the premises of both the arguments are true then sound must be both eternal and non-eternal. But this is a contradiction. Hence the premises of both the arguments cannot be true. This implies that there must be the fallacy such as asiddha, viruddha, or anaikāntika in at least one of the two hetus. Hence Viruddhāvyabhicārī is not an independent fallacy, but is reducible to the other fallacies of hetu. In other words, there can be two good hetus in Diṅnāga’s sense leading to two mutually incompatible sādhyas. But there cannot be two good hetus in Dharmakīrti’s sense leading to mutually incompatible sādhyas. This difference is due to the difference between the concepts of good hetu according to them. It may be noted here that a pseudo-probans of this kind definitely conforms to the notion of pseudo-probans classified by the Nyāya as “the one accompanied by a counter-probans” (satpratipakṣa). This kind of fallacy, according to Nyāya, follows when a probans has the property of being contradicted by a counter-probans (asatpratipakṣatva). Dharmakīrti, consequently, does not consider this property a necessary prerequisite for the probans’ being legitimate.

Some Questions About Pervasion in Dharmakīrti Identity and the Question of Antarvyāpti It has been maintained above that the relation of pervasion according to Dharmakīrti should be universal and this universality should be based on some kind of necessity. But how this universal and necessary relation is to be obtained was an issue. For Dharmakīrti this relation was twofold: identity and causality. When probans is an essential aspect (svabhāva-hetu) of probandum, the relation between the two was identity (tādātmya) which can be understood as class inclusion. In the inference “this is a tree because this is s´iṁs´apā,” the pervasion relation of the form, “whatever is s´iṁs´apā is a tree,” simply means that s´iṁs´apā class is a subclass of the tree class. This relation of universal concomitance

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between s´iṁs´apā and tree is known by understanding the essential nature of some other s´iṁs´apā tree which was other than the subject of the inference (i.e., which was outside pakṣa). But Dharmakīrti was also concerned with the inferences based on identity, where the subject of inference was itself universal in nature. For example, in the inference of the form “All that is produced is momentary” (Sarvaṁ saṅskṛtam kṣaṇikam), the whole class of products is the subject. The question is, how is the relation of the form “Whatever is a product is momentary” to be known outside the subject? According to the Buddhist logicians such as Ratnākaraśānti, the relation is known in such cases in the inferential subject itself, and this would be a case of “internal pervasion” (antarvyāpti). Like some Buddhist logicians, some Jaina logicians such as Vādidevasūri also accepted internal pervasion. Internal pervasion was defined as the pervasion which exists and is known on the pakṣa (inferential subject) itself. And this has become a problem area in Buddhist (and Jaina) logic. It is difficult to explain how pervasion can be known on pakṣa itself. It seems that such a pervasion is possible only if it is understood as conceptual or analytical in nature. Pervasion which is an analytical or conceptual relation will be a priori, and hence it will be acceptable independently of instantiation. If on the other hand it is an empirical relation, then it will be “external pervasion,” that is, the pervasion which can be substantiated through instantiation.

Causal Necessity and Inductive Reasoning According to Dharmakīrti, even the empirical pervasion cannot be established only on the basis of observation and non-observation. Such a relation will be binding if it is based on causality. For example, there is invariable concomitance between smoke and fire because smoke cannot come into being without fire. However, how the so-called causal relation between smoke and fire can be ascertained is a problem. Dharmakīrti suggests that causal relation has an invariable character which a simple coexistence does not have. “When a type of effect is seen once as arising from a type of a cause, the former does not deviate from the latter.” (“Tad yādṛs´aṃ kāryaṃ yādṛs´āt kāraṇād dṛṣṭam ekadā tat tanna vyabhicarati” – Hetubindu 3.2). This necessity for him is due to the power or capacity (s´akti) of the cause to produce the effect. (“Kāraṇas´aktipratiniyame hi kin˜ cid eva kasyacit sādhanāyopadī yeta, nāparam, . . .” –Hetubindu 3.3). This suggests that Dharmakīrti rejected random causality and strongly stood for a regular or necessary relation between cause and effect. While explaining the ascertainment of causal necessity, Dharmakīrti and some post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians refer to observation and non-observation such as non-observation of the effect before its production, observation of the cause before the effect, and observation of effect after the cause. The question here is that if the necessity involved in a causal relation is derived from the regular sequence observed between cause and effect, then the necessity advocated by Dharmakīrti will not be logical, but empirical.

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Prajñākaragupta, while commenting on Pramāṇavārtika, says that causal necessity is known through direct transcendental perception. Dharmakīrti does not seem to subscribe to this view. As Nagin J. Shah (Shah 1967) points out, the general trend of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy suggests that for him necessity expressed in terms of identity and causality is apprehended through a mental construction (vikalpabuddhi). Perception knows unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) only. Mind constructs the concept of necessity and imposes it on the real particulars to derive an ordered world. Of course this only gives a tentative explanation of how inductive reasoning takes place. It does not solve the logical problem of induction. Dharmakīrti can perhaps claim only that inductive generalization on the basis of co-occurrence (or rather, sequential occurrence) of two types of phenomena cannot yield invariable concomitance unless the regular sequential occurrence is indicative of cause-effect relationship. In other words, all synthetic necessity is causal necessity. There is another issue about Dharmakīrti’s conception of causal necessity. Dharmakīrti generally understands cause as necessary condition of the effect so that one can infer cause from the effect and that gives the type of inference called “kārya-liṅgaka anumāna” (the inference which has effect as probans). However, while discussing the varieties of anupalabdhi-hetu (non-apprehension as probans), he also acknowledges cause as sufficient condition. For example, while talking about “non-apprehension of effect” (kāryānupalabdhi) as probans, he talks of “causes whose power (to generate the effect) is not obstructed” (apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni kāraṇāni). If such a cause is accepted, then it should be possible to infer effect from cause as well. But Dharmakīrti does not include kāraṇa-hetu (cause as probans) in his classification of hetus. This can perhaps be called a deficiency in Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference.

Theoretical Issues Involved in Prasan˙ga Method Prasan˙gānumāna According to Dharmakīrti An account of inference for others in Buddhism remains incomplete without discussion on prasaṅgānumāna. Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārtika (“. . .parakalpitaiḥ prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād ekāpāye’nyahānaye” – Parārthānumāna-pariccheda, kārikā 12) argues that an argument based on prasaṅga does not have the status of anumāna-pramāṇa because it does not operate on an established fact but on the opponent’s view which the proponent accepts hypothetically and by applying a general rule of vyāpti to it derives an absurd or unacceptable consequence from it. In this way he refutes the opponent’s view by an indirect method. For example, if a Buddhist wants to refute the Nyāya conception of sāmānya, then he may argue: Sāmānya according to you is “one that resides in many.” For instance, potness is one, but it resides in many pots. But if potness resides in many pots, then potness will be many (i.e., the potness of each pot will be different). But potness is not many according to you. Therefore sāmānya, which is one among many according to you, does not exist. This argument is not “inference for

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others” proper, because what is argued here is not a categorical or factual statement but an unacceptable consequence derived from a counterfactual conditional. Buddhist logicians after Dharmakīrti tried to give a more constructive role to prasaṅga type of reasoning. In Tarkabhāṣā, Mokṣākaragupta defines prasaṅga as the “reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of statement based on a vyāpti established by proof” (“pramāṇaprasiddhavyāptikena vākyena parasyāniṣṭatvāpādanāya prasan˜ janaṁ prasaṅgaḥ”). He also refers to the view of some logicians that prasaṅga and prasaṅga-viparyaya are useful for establishing vyāpti in dṛṣṭānta. How can be prasaṅga applied to grasp vyāpti? A formulation of prasaṅga establishing vyāpti of a probans as essential identity with its probandum can be given as follows: [A general statement to be established]: All produced things are momentary. [Contradictory statement]: Something, for example, a jar, is not momentary. [General statement already proved]: Whatever is capable of producing a certain effect at a certain time does produce that effect at that time. [Absurdity]: A jar, if not momentary, will be capable of producing past and future effects at the present time. [Conclusion]: It is true that all produced things are momentary. It may be noted here that although prasaṅga type of argument is useful in this way even to grasp vyāpti, it is not given the status of pramāṇa, but it is said to operate only by reminding one of the pramāṇa which grasps vyāpti (“sādhyasādhana-vyāpti-grāhaka-pramāṇa-smārakastu prasaṅge prayogaḥ,” Manorathanandin’s commentary on Pramāṇavārtika, 4.12). Reality can be known according to these Buddhist logicians only through pramāṇa and not through prasaṅga. [This view can be compared with the Nyāya view about tarka, which was defined as aniṣṭaprasaṅga (deriving an undesirable consequence), the role of which was accepted in the knowledge of vyāpti, without giving it the status of pramāṇa.]

Nāgārjuna’s Use of Prasan˙ga Method Prasaṅgānumāna was employed in a very different way by Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna was critical about pramāṇas in general. But he was not critical about prasaṅga method as other logicians were. That is because the goal of Nāgārjuna’s arguments was not to establish any ontological truths in their essentialist form. It was rather to “establish” which meant “to develop an insight into” the nonessential nature (niḥsvabhāvatā), that is, emptiness (s´ūnyatā) nature of reality. All nonMādhyamikas held some essentialist view (svabhāvavāda) in some form or the other, and Nāgārjuna tried to establish s´ūnyatā by refuting all types of the essentialist views of the opponents (particularly those of ābhidharmikas). For doing this, he elaborately used the prasaṅga method in his magnum opus called Mūlamadhyamakakārikā or Madhyamakas´āstra.

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Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga method can be described as the method of refutation without assertion. It differs from the method of Reductio ad Absurdum in this sense. While reductio involves accepting a view as valid by showing that absurdity can be deduced from its negation, prasaṅga has recourse just to the deduction of absurdity without implying its positive counterpart. Hence when existence of an entity is denied, that does not imply for Nāgārjuna affirming nonexistence of the same (Matilal 1985, 164). Rather, he aims at denying all the four possible views, existence, nonexistence, existence, and nonexistence, and also neither existence nor nonexistence (“Sarvaṁ tathyaṁ na vā’tathyaṁ tathyaṁ cātathyameva ca/ Naivātathyaṁ naiva tathyam etad buddhānus´āsanam// ” – Mūlamadhyamakārikā 18/8). Nāgārjuna applied prasaṅga method for refuting all types of views, and this gives rise to some logical issues. One important issue is whether his universal application of the method violates the laws of classical two-valued logic. While applying prasaṅga method, Nāgārjuna considers different possible combinations concerning the concept under scrutiny which generally assume the form of four alternative categories (Catuṣkoṭi). Then he refutes each category by deriving an unacceptable consequence from it. By refuting all such combinations, he tries to show the emptiness of the concept under scrutiny. The four alternatives are of the form: “yes,” “no,” “both yes and no,” and “neither yes nor no.” According to the classical two-valued logic, if the alternative, namely, “yes” is negated, then the alternative, namely, “no,” should be accepted and vice versa. Denying both will amount to violation of the law of noncontradiction. Nāgārjuna not only does that; he even considers the alternative “yes and no” and “neither yes nor no” as genuine alternatives which are obvious violations of the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle. Hence Nāgārjuna’s use of the prasaṅga method does not seem to be prima facie defensible within the framework of classical two-valued logic. The scholars like Galloway have tried to answer this problem by pointing out that the apparently contradictory alternatives are not contradictory, but contrary (i.e., they can be false together though not true together). While refuting them, Nāgārjuna is trying to show that they are based on certain common false presuppositions. The claim of this kind, however, cannot be defended beyond a limit. It can be suggested here that the application of prasaṅga type of argumentation may not lead to transgression of the laws of logic if the application is restricted to some specified views. But the global application or unrestricted application does pose a problem. To illustrate, Nāgārjuna in the second chapter of Madhyamakas´āstra (called “Gatāgata-parī kṣā”) presents a trilemma with reference to the act of going, gata, agata, and gamyamāna (“gone to,” “not gone to,” and “being gone to”), and shows that there cannot be “going” in relation to any of them. Following the position of Galloway, one can say that all the three alternatives can be denied because they are based on a common presupposition that there is the act of going. However, Nāgārjuna’s argument does not stop here. Because denial of the act of going leads one to think that since there is no going, there is staying. Nāgārjuna does accept this implication. He comes out with another trilemma and by applying

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prasaṅga method shows that what is applicable to gati (going) is equally applicable to sthiti (staying). Now is it possible to deny both “going” and “staying” without contradiction? One might argue that Nāgārjuna can deny both because both are based on another common presupposition which he wants to deny. The common presupposition is that things exist. But in the fifteenth chapter, viz., Svabhāvaparī kṣā, Nāgārjuna denies svabhāva (self-nature), parabhāva (other nature), as well as bhāva (existence). Now denial of the presupposition that things exist would lead one to accept its negation that things are nonexistent. But Nāgārjuna does not accept this logical consequence either. In the fifteenth chapter, he not only denies bhāva (existence) but also abhāva (nonexistence). So this leads to the next dilemma according to which things are neither existent nor nonexistent. It seems obvious that one cannot deny both the existence and nonexistence without transgressing the laws of logic such as noncontradiction, excluded middle, and double negation. Hence there are logical difficulties in the global application of prasaṅga method which Nāgārjuna exercises in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Buddhist thinkers and scholars have attempted to overcome the difficulties in different ways. Three major ways can be considered here: 1. Svātantrika approach: There was schism of the Mādhyamika school in the sixth century CE into two branches – the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika School founded by Buddhapālita and the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika School founded by Bhavya. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika School tried to demonstrate the emptiness or essencelessness of all dharmas recognized in the Abhidharma by prasaṅga method while the latter school thought it necessary to supplement Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga arguments by independent (svatantra) arguments formulated in accordance with the rules of logic. Both these alternatives were not without difficulties. If according to Svātantrika methodology independent inferences are presented for proving s´ūnyatā, then s´ūnyatā will itself be a kind of view. But s´ūnyatā amounts to rejection of all views (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇa) according to Nāgārjuna. Hence s´ū nyatā too will have to be rejected. If, on the other hand, prāsaṅgika method is accepted for rejecting all views, then, as suggested above, Nāgārjuna cannot do this without self-inconsistency because negation of a view and negation of this negation (which is also a view) cannot go together. 2. Ineffability approach: According to the second alternative, Nāgārjuna’s position does not amount to breaking the rules of logic, but it amounts to critique of logic. This critique of logic is rooted in the critique of language. According to this interpretation, reality is s´ūnya which implies that it is ineffable, and because it cannot be expressed in language, it cannot be captured by the rules of logic. Nāgārjuna’s position on this interpretation amounts to a kind of mysticism. 3. Negation as non-truth-functional operator: Nāgārjuna’s position appears to violate the laws of classical two-valued logic, because the “negation” in it is interpreted as truth-functional negation. If on the other hand negation is understood as a non-truth-functional operator, “p and negation-p” will not be a contradiction, and “negation of negation-p” will not be equivalent to “p.” Matilal

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(Matilal 1985: 17), for example, distinguishes between refutation and propositional negation. For him refutation of a position does not commit one to assertion of its negation. Similarly Seyfor Ruegg (Seyfort Ruegg 1986) regards Nāgārjuna’s negation as performative negation. A performative negation is different from a truth-functional negation in that by performatively negating a statement, one is not making another statement, but one is only expressing a negative attitude toward the statement.

An Issue Concerning the Doctrine of Apoha The Problem The doctrine of apoha (exclusion) introduced by Diṅnāga and developed by Dharmakīrti and some other Buddhist logicians was primarily concerned with the question as to how the words in language are related to the objects. But the doctrine has application with respect to the Buddhist pramāṇa theory in general. The unique particular, which is the object of perception, is unique in that it is excluded from everything else – both similar and dissimilar things. It is sajātī ya-vijātī ya-vyāvṛtta. Through an inference, one cognizes a universal object. For example, through inference from smoke, one cognizes the existence of “fire in general” on the hill. The “fire in general” simply means “something excluded from non-fire.” Through inference for others, one proves fire to be there on the hill. Here too the word “fire” means “something excluded from non-fire.” The Buddhist theory of exclusion (apoha) has become a target of criticism at the hands of non-Buddhists. Two points of criticism are frequently advanced against the apoha theory of meaning. (a) The problem of tautology: According to the apoha theory of meaning, “fire” means “something excluded from non-fire” or “not non-fire.” But this is a tautology which yields no information about the meaning of the word “fire.” (b) The problem of circularity: If the double negation involved in the notion of anyāpoha (exclusion of the other) is regarded as informative, then it will be a case of vicious circularity. Suppose there are three types of objects in the world: fire, tree, and dog. Then the word “fire” will mean “what is other than tree and dog,” “tree” will mean “what is other than fire and dog,” and “dog” will mean “what is other than fire and tree.” Hence the meanings of “fire,” “tree,” and “dog” will depend upon each other, and none of them will be understood independently (Siderits Mark et al. 2011: 27).

Two Possible Ways One way by which the charge can be answered is to hold, as Matilal does, that in “not non-cow” (a-go-vyāvṛtta), the first negation represented by “not” (“vyāvṛtta”) is external negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha), whereas the second negation represented by “non” (“a” in “a-go”) is internal negation (paryudāsa). To use Nyāya

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terminology, one is talking here of “absolute absence (atyantābhāva) of mutual absence (anyonyābhāva).” And since the two absences are different, it is not a case of “double negation” or “tautology.” The answer does not seem to be satisfactory because though Naiyāyikas regard absolute absence and mutual absence as different from metaphysical point of view, for logical purpose they can be treated as equivalent. “Pot has mutual absence with respect to cloth” and “there is absolute absence of clothness in pot” are equivalent expressions. The other way by which the charges of tautology and circularity can be answered is by treating the doctrine of apoha as not about the meaning of a word, but about the function of a word. The distinction is crucial to the theory of apoha, because the meaning of a word is something which is expressed or referred to by a word, whereas the function of a word is something which is done or performed by a word. The apoha theory seems to imply that exclusion of non-cows is done or performed by the use of the word “cow” and not that the negative object “not non-cow” is expressed or referred to by the word “cow.” It can be said that if apoha is regarded as the meaning of a word, then difficulties like tautology and circularity are insuperable. They will not arise if exclusion is treated as a function.

Summary The five sections of the chapter deal with some significant issues concerning five themes in Buddhist logic. The first section highlights how the Nyāya and Buddhist logic have developed through mutual criticism and how the contributions of the latter need to be understood by comparing and contrasting with those of the former. The second section brings out how the differences between the logical positions of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti are not superficial or peripheral, but they are deep rooted. The third section deals with two questions concerning Dharmakīrti’s concept of vyāpti as necessary relation. It suggests that the so-called internal pervasion can better be understood as a conceptual or analytical relation. It also tries to bring out some limitations of Dharmakīrti’s conception of causal necessity. The fourth section refers to the charge that Nāgārjuna through the use of prasaṅga method violates the laws of logic and considers different ways of answering the charge. The last section suggests that the charge of tautology and circularity against the doctrine of apoha can perhaps be lifted by treating the doctrine as about function of a word rather than meaning of a word.

Definitions of Key Terms Anvaya-vyāpti (positive pervasion or positive concomitance) Hetu (probans)

Positive invariable relation between hetu and sādhya of the form: “Wherever there is hetu, there is sādhya.” A property which provides the reason or ground for the existence of sādhya in pakṣa.

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Sādhya (probandum) Sapakṣa (similar cases) Vipakṣa (dissimilar cases) Vyāpti Vyatireka-vyāpti (negative pervasion or negative concomitance)

P. P. Gokhale and K. Bhattacharya

Locus or property bearer in which a property is inferentially known to exist. The method of refutation involving derivation of an unacceptable consequence of a thesis proposed by the opponent. The property which is inferentially known to be existent in pakṣa. A set of property bearers similar to pakṣa in that they possess sādhya. A set of property bearers dissimilar to pakṣa in that they do not possess sādhya. Pervasion, invariable concomitance. Negative invariable relation between hetu and sādhya of the form: “Wherever there is absence of sādhya, there is absence of hetu.”

References Dharmakīrti. 1975. Nyāyabindu, included in Shriniwasa Shastri (Ed.), Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara, Sahitya Bhandar, Merath. Galloway, Brian. 1989. Some logical issues in Madhyamaka thought. Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 1. Gokhale, Pradeep P., ed. and trans. 1997. Hetubindu of Dharmakī rti (a point on probans), Sri Satguru Publications Delhi. Gokhale, Pradeep P. 1992. Inference and fallacies discussed in ancient Indian logic. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Matilal, B.K. 1971. Epistemology, logic and grammar, in Indian philosophical analysis. The Hague: Mouton. [Chap. 5: “Nagation and the Madhyamika Dialectic”.] Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1985. Logic, language and reality: An introduction to Indian philosophical studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1998. In The character of logic in India, ed. Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari. Albany: State University of New York Press. Seyfort Ruegg, D. 1986. Does the Madhyamika have a thesis and philosophical position ? In Buddhist logic and epistemology, ed. B.K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans, 229–238. Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Shah, Nagin J. 1967. Akalaṅka’s criticism of Dharmakī rti’s philosophy. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology. Siderits, Mark, Tom Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds. 2011. Apoha: Buddhist nominalism and human cognition. New York: Columbia University Press. Vidyabhushan, Satish Chandra. 2005. A history of Indian logic, ancient, mediaeval and modern schools. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

The Nya¯ya on Logical Thought

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J. L. Shaw

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 1: Some Technical Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 2: Part I: Definition of a Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operation (vyāpāra) and Special Instrumental Cause (karaṇa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II: Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 3: Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nyāya on Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analogy or Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verbal Cognition or Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 4: Negation and Its Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 5: Universal Quantifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Common Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 6: The Principle of Contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 7: Gadādhara’s Theory of Definite Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 8: Six Pairs of the Nyāya Philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract

In this chapter, I shall emphasize the following features of the Nyāya logical thought: (1) some of the uses of Occam’s razor or the principle of simplicity; (2) how to avoid the postulation of tertiary entities, such as propositions or images; (3) how the concept of relevance has been used in the context of an inference; (4) the Nyāya view about understanding the meanings of contrary or J. L. Shaw (*) Department of Philosophy, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand © Springer Nature India Private Limited 2022 S. Sarukkai, M. K. Chakraborty (eds.), Handbook of Logical Thought in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_36

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contradictory expressions; (5) the Nyāya conception of negation, as it cannot be equated with the term negation or the proposition negation in Western philosophy; (6) the definition of the quantifier “all” as well as the pervader-pervaded relation; and (7) the reconstruction of Gadādhara’s theory of definite descriptions. I would also like to discuss the distinction between the pairs of terms anuyogī-pratiyogī (first term-second term), ādhāra-ādheya (substratum-superstratum), viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa (qualificand-qualifier), viśeṣya-prakāra (qualificand-relational qualifier), uddeśya-vidheya (subject-predicate), and pakṣa-sādhya (the locus of inference-probandum), which are analogous to the subject-predicate distinction in Western philosophy. These terms are used for the explanation of the distinction between perceptual, inferential, and verbal cognitions, as well as for the distinction in meaning between transformationally equivalent sentences and for suggesting a solution to Frege’s problem, why predicate alone is to be considered as unsaturated or to use the term of Russell “incomplete.”

Introduction In this chapter, I would like to focus on the following aspects of the logical thought of the Nyāya system of philosophy. Since the Nyāya philosophers emphasize the logical aspects of thinking, it is called tarkavidyā or ānvīksikī (Tarkavāgīśa 1982, pp. 3–7). The latter expression is derived from īksā, which means substantiation of a view or truth through argument or critical thinking. Logical thought or critical thinking implies consistency, relevance, justification, valid inferences, fallacies, and discussion on logical locutions such as “not” and “all.” It also involves the application of Occam’s razor or the principle of simplicity, delineating sharp distinctions for transparency or the removal of vagueness. According to Occam’s razor, “Entities should not be multiplied without necessity.” Hence one should select the solution with the fewest assumptions. Since this principle has been used in several places by the Nyāya philosophers, I shall begin with their conception or definition of causation as well as focus on their explanation of false beliefs, among many others. The conception of relevance has also been emphasized so widely that it relates almost everything to mokṣa, which is the summum bonum of life. I shall focus on their discussion on sources of knowledge and the relation between premises and conclusion, as well as the relation between premises of an inference. In their discussion of meaning, the Nyāya philosophers have drawn the distinction among a sentence, the meaning of a sentence, and understanding the meaning of a sentence. They have emphasized the absence of contradiction not only at the level of reality but also at the level of thought. Hence the thought of an impossible object is also impossible. From this, it does not follow that we cannot assign the value falsehood to a sentence or expression which is inconsistent or contradictory. In this context, I shall point out that the Nyāya view is a mean between the extreme views of contemporary Western philosophers.

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In this chapter, I would also like to mention how the Nyāya philosophers have opposed certain types of reductionism. If certain distinctions are obvious to us, then they are to be retained, not to be dispensed with for the sake of a theory. In this context, I will refer to my formulation or the explication of Gadādhara’s theory of definite descriptions, which retains the distinction between the expressions “The author of Waverley” and “The author of Waverly exists.” A comparison between Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions with that of Gadādhara’s will also reveal how certain shortcomings of Russell’s theory can be overcome. This is due to the fact that Gadādhara’s theory does not postulate supposed objects, in addition to things in the world. I shall also mention how the Nyāya philosophers have used certain categories or pairs of terms, analogous to subject-predicate distinction in Western philosophy, for explaining the phenomenological distinction between perceptual, inferential, and verbal cognitions, which is lacking in Western philosophy. The first section of this chapter will explain certain technical terms, which are useful for understanding the Nyāya conception of cognition, as well as for drawing the distinction between true and false beliefs and the fine-grained distinction in the meanings of expressions. In this context, I shall also introduce the concept of relevance and its types. The second section will deal with the application of the principle of simplicity, especially in the context of causation and the explanation of false beliefs. Since the Nyāya philosophers have explained false beliefs without postulating tertiary entities, they have falsified Russell’s claim that no one has succeeded in explaining a false belief without postulating the existence of the nonexistent. The third section will deal with the source knowledge, with special reference to inference. In this context, I shall discuss the Nyāya conception of fallacy and the classification of fallacies as well as the application of tarka (a type of counterfactual conditional), which is an auxiliary to an inference or gives rise to an inference. In this section, I shall also discuss how the Nyāya philosophers would explain the distinction in meaning between transformationally equivalent sentences, such as “Brutus killed Caesar” and “Caesar was killed by Brutus,” as well as the nature of atomistic and holistic understanding. The fourth section will deal with the Nyāya conception of negation as well as the types of negation in the classical Nyāya. The fifth section will refer to some of the definitions of the quantifier “all,” including the words “if” and “then,” as well as a definition of pervaded-pervader relation. The sixth section will focus on the Nyāya conception of the principle of contradiction as well as their view about understanding the meanings of contrary or contradictory expressions or sentences and the assignment of truth values to them. The seventh section will deal with the formulation of Gadādhara’s theory of definite descriptions, which will be compared with Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. The eighth section will focus on the six pairs of terms of the Nyāya philosophers for the phenomenological distinction between perceptual, inferential, and verbal

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cognitions. In this context, I shall also discuss how the Nyāya would explain the saturated nature of the subject and the unsaturated nature of the predicate, discussed in contemporary philosophy beginning with Frege.

Section 1: Some Technical Terms With the above aims in view, I would like to mention the following points, as I shall be focusing on the above topics from the Nyāya Perspective: (A) The Nyāya has drawn a distinction between qualificative (svavikalpaka) and non-qualificative (nirvikalpaka) cognitions. The Nyāya concept of qualificative cognition can be expressed by the form “aRb.” A qualificative cognition involves at least three elements, namely, a qualificand (viśeṣya), a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), and a qualification relation (viśeṣya- viśeṣaṇa-sambandha), which relates the latter to the former. According to the Nyāya, the possibility of qualificative perception cannot be explained without postulating non-qualificative perception. Let us consider the qualificative perception of a flower, which is atomic in nature. This cognition has three elements, namely, a particular flower which is a substance (dravya), flowerness which is a class character ( jāti), and the relation of inherence (samavāya sambandha) which relates the latter to the former in the ontology of the Nyāya. Since the perceptual cognition of a relation presupposes the cognition of its relata, the cognition of the inherence relation in this case presupposes the cognition of both the particular flower and the flowerness. These relata are cognized in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition. Now the following points are to be noted in this context: (i) Since only the qualificand and the qualifier of an atomic qualificative perceptual cognition are cognized in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition, they are not cognized as qualificand or qualifier. They are cognized as such without any mode of presentation. (ii) The objects of a non-qualificative cognition cannot be cognized by expressions. Hence a non-qualificative cannot be generated by an expression. For example, the expression “a flower” will not generate a cognition of a flower which is not qualified by a property. (iii) Regarding the truth of a non-qualificative cognition, the Navya-Nyāya philosophers claim it to be neither true nor false. This is due to the fact that both true and false cognitions presuppose qualificand-qualifier relations. Since there is no qualificand-qualifier relation in a non-qualificative cognition, it is outside the scope of true and false. (iv) Since it is a causal condition of perceptual qualificative cognition, it is always immediately prior to it. When a sense organ is related to its objects, the initial cognition which is due to this contact is non-qualificative. Thereafter, a qualificative cognition is generated. (v) Since it has been postulated to give an account of qualificative perceptual cognition, it is also considered as perceptual in character. The objects of

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non-qualificative cognition, such as the particular flower and flowerness in the above example, are cognized as being related in a qualificative cognition, such as the flower qualified by flowerness in the relation of inherence. Hence the objects of non-qualificative cognition are public, not private sense data. Therefore, the Nyāya view does not lead to relativism, phenomenalism, or solipsism. For this reason, the problems of the supporters of sense-data theory in contemporary philosophy do not arise in the Nyāya philosophy. From the above discussion, it follows that a qualificative cognition has the form aRb. If we consider a nonatomic qualificative cognition, such as a flower is red, then it will be described in the following way: The cognition in which the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā) residing in a flower is limited by (avacchinna) flowerness but determined by (nirūpita) the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) residing in the red color, which is limited by redness and the relation of inherence (samavāya).

Now let us explain the Nyāya conception of relation, as anything can play the role of a relation, and the distinction between the relation limited by and the relation determined by. R is a relation if and only if (Ǝx) (Ǝy) (it is due to R that x appears as the qualificand and y as the qualifier in the cognition xRy) and (Ǝx) (Ǝy) (it is due to R that there is a unified or qualified object or fact xRy), where x and y range over entities of the Nyāya system. It is to be noted that in this definition, the x and the y of a cognition need not be the same as the x and the y of a fact. If the cognition is true, then the x and the y of it would be the same as the x and the y of the fact xRy. The limitor-limited (avacchedaka-avacchinna) relation is usually defined in the following way, as there are exceptions: x is limited by y if and only if (i) both x and y are properties, (ii) x is a relational property, and (iii) the property y is a mode of presentation of the object where the relational property x resides.

The determiner-determined relation (nirūpya-nirūpaka-sambandha) may be stated in the following way: x is determined by y if and only if x and y are relational properties of correlatives.

As mentioned before, a qualificative cognition has the form aRb, where a is the qualificand (viśeṣya), b is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), and R is the qualification relation (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandha). The qualificand-qualifier category is used to differentiate the qualificand from other objects in terms of the qualifier. If R is a mode of presentation of b, which happens in almost all cases, then b is called prakāra (“relational qualifier”).

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The Nyāya has postulated several relational properties which signify the roles of objects, especially in epistemic contexts. The Nyāya also emphasizes the direction of the relation for the explanation of the meaning of a sentence as well as for semantical analysis. The relation of cognition ( jñāna) to the qualificand (viśeṣya) is called viśeṣyatā (“the property of being the qualificand”), the relation of cognition to the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) is called viśeṣaṇata (“the property of being the qualifier”), and the relation of cognition to the relation (saṃsarga) is called saṃsargatā (“the property of being the relation”). The relation of cognition to the relational qualifier (prakāra) is called prakāratā (“the property of being the relational qualifier”). As regards the ontological nature of these properties, there is no unanimity among the Nyāya philosophers. Barring the question of their ontological status, they are very useful for drawing epistemic distinctions, including the distinction between true and false cognitions. Let us consider the cognition of the brown table or the table is brown. The relation of cognition to the table which is the qualificand is viśeṣyatā, the relation of cognition to the brown color is viśeṣaṇatā, and the relation of cognition to the relation of inherence (samavāya) is saṃsargatā. But the relation of cognition to the brown color presented under the mode of the relation of inherence is prakaratā. It is to be noted that both the table and the brown color are presented under the modes of tableness and brownness, respectively. So we have altogether two objects, namely, the table, the particular brown color, and the relation of inherence, two propertylimitors (avacchedaka dharma), and three relational properties of being the objects of this cognition (viṣayatās). The Nyāya claims that they are related in the following ways: 1. The property of being the qualificand residing in the table is limited by tableness. 2. The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown color is limited by brownness. 3. The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown color is also limited by the relation of inherence. 4. The property of being the qualificand residing in the table is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the brown color. 5. The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown color is determined by the property of being the qualificand residing in the table. 6. The property of being the qualification relation (saṃsargatā) residing in the inherence relation is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the brown color. 7. The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown color is determined by the property of being the qualification relation residing in the brown color. The first three relations are called “limitor-limited” (avacchedakaavacchinna), but the remaining four are called “determiner-determined relations” (nirūpya-nirūpaka-sambandhas). It is to be noted that the above seven relations are present both in a true and in a false cognition. In other words, if the cognition

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of the table is brown is false, then also these relations are present. But when the cognition is true, it is related to the fact or the qualified object (viśiṣta-viṣayatā). Hence it is related to the fact the table being brown. This relation of the cognition to the qualified object is called viśiṣta-viṣayatā (“the property of being the qualified object”). It is to be noted that the viśiṣta-viṣayatā resides in the whole which includes the qualificand, the qualifier, and the relation. Hence it is not something over and above these three entities. If a qualificative cognition is represented by aRb, then the cognition of R which relates b to a, in addition to cognizing a as the qualificand and b as the qualifier, will amount to the cognition of the qualified object (viśiṣtaviṣayatā). As mentioned before, the function of a relation at epistemic level is to make one object as qualifier of another. Hence, in this case, b is cognized as the qualifier of a. Another function is to make a fact or a qualified object. In the case of a false cognition, the former function is present, but not the latter with respect to the same a and b, although it relates two other objects elsewhere or elsewhen. But in the case of a true cognition, both the functions are present with respect to the same items. When we put a book on the table, a new fact occurs, and the novelty of this fact is explained in terms of the novelty of the conjunction relation of the book to the table. But in the case of a false cognition, this novelty is missing, as a previously cognized relation makes one the qualifier of another. So far we have explained the relation of a cognition to its objects and the relation among the objects. Now let us point out the relation of objects to the cognition. In our above example, the relation of the table to the cognition is called viśeṣyitā. This relation is the converse of the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā). The relation of the brown color to the cognition may be called viśeṣaṇitā, which is the converse of viśeṣaṇatā, although this term has not been used by the Nyāya philosophers. The relation of the inherence relation to the cognition is saṃsargitā, which is the converse of the property of being the qualification relation (saṃsargatā). And the relation of the brown color under the mode of the relation of inherence to the cognition is prakāritā, which is the converse of prakāratā. The relation of the table being brown, which is a qualified object, to the cognition is viśiṣta-viṣayitā, which is the converse of viśiṣta-viṣayatā. As the properties residing in the objects of cognition are related to each other by the determiner-determined relation (nirūpya-nirūpaka-sambandha), so are the properties of a cognition which are due to relations of the objects to the cognition. Hence viśeṣyitā is determined by viśeṣaṇitā and the latter by the former. Again, saṃsargitā is determined by visesanitā and the latter by the former. Similarly, prakāritā is determined by viśeṣyitā and the latter by the former. As in a true cognition the relation of cognition to its qualified object is viśiṣtaviṣayatā, similarly the relation of the qualified object to the cognition is viśiṣtaviṣayitā. As the nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viṣayatās (the objects related to each other by determiner-determined relation) explain the unity of the objects of a cognition, similarly nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viṣayitās (the elements of a cognition related to each other by determiner-determined relation) explain the unity of the elements

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of a cognition. As viṣayatās are related to each other by the determiner-determined relation and the viṣayitās are also related to each other by determiner-determined relation, so are the relations between viṣayatās and their respective viṣayitās. That is to say, the relation of viśeṣyatā to viśeṣyitā, and its converse, the relation of viśeṣaṇatā to viśeṣaṇitā and its converse, the relation of saṃsargatā to saṃsargitā and its converse, the relation of prakāratā to prakāritā and its converse, as well as the relation of viśiṣta-viṣayatā to viśiṣta-viṣayitā and its converse are all determiner-determined relations. In a true cognition, all of them will hold good, but in a false cognition, the last one will not hold good, as the cognition is not related to the qualified object. In our above example, the cognition would be related to the table being brown by the relation of inherence if it is true, but not otherwise. By introducing the determiner-determined relation (nirūpya-nirūpakasambandha) at different levels, the Nyāya not only emphasizes the unity of the cognitive situation but also explains the difference between a true and a false cognition. It is to be noted that in the definition of truth, the Nyāya philosophers have used the terms viśeṣyakatva (the property having the converse of the qualificand at cognitive level) and prakārakatva (the property having the converse of the relational qualifier at cognitive level). I think this is due to the fact that these terms emphasize reference to the objects of cognition, although they are due to relations of objects to the cognition. The following diagrams will represent the points mentioned in the above discussion: 1. Objects of qualificative cognition

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2. Relation of cognition to objects

3. Relation of objects to cognition

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4. Relation among the objects of cognition

5. Relation among the elements of cognition

(B) In this context, I would like to explain the technical term saṅgati (“relevance”), as I shall be referring to it especially in my discussion of inference. Relevance is a relation which holds between the contents of expressions or sentences. According to some Indian logicians such as Gaṅgeśa, if P is relevant to Q, then Q is an answer to a question, say S, and S is due to a cognition, say T, and the content or the object of this cognition, say R, is the relation of relevance. Hence the property of being the content of this type of cognition would be the

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defining property of the relation of relevance. Let us explain with an example. Suppose John would like to make an apple pie. We gave him an apple. Now he asked: What are the other ingredients for an apple pie? The answer is white flour, sugar, and butter. Here P is the expression “apple,” while Q is the expression “white flour, sugar, and butter.” S is the question what are the other ingredients for an apple pie? T is the cognition of other ingredients, and R is the content of this cognition. Since the content of P is related to that of Q by the relation R, the former is the second term, and the latter is the first term of this relation, and the latter is characterized by this relational property. The causal condition for Q is S which, in turn, is causally related to T. Since R is the object of T, it (R) is related to T by the relation called “the property of being the object-possessor.” Hence the relation of relevance may be defined in the following way: P is relevant to Q Df The content of P is related to that of Q by the relation R which is the object of the cognition T, and T is causally related to the question S which is causally related to Q. According to Gaṅgeśa, there are six types of relation of relevance: 1. Memory Context (prasaṅga) Let us call this type of relation R1 and define it in the following way: P is related to Q by R1 Df (i) R1 is a memory object, (ii) it is revived by the cognition of P, (iii) it is related to the content of P, (iv) it is not something which can be ignored, and (v) the cognition of it (i.e., R1) will give rise to a question to which Q is an answer. Let us consider the relation between valid and invalid inferences. Consider P as the statement or the definition of a valid inference and Q as the definition of an invalid inference. The statement or the definition of validity of an inference will give rise to a cognition of validity. But the cognition of validity may give rise to the memory cognition of invalidity by the relation of opposition. Since invalid or fallacious inferences cannot be ignored from our discussion of inference, the cognition of invalidity will give rise to a question about invalidity, which is answered by defining “invalidity.” Hence the content of the definition of “validity” is related to the content of the definition of “invalidity.” The statement or the definition of “invalidity” would be an answer to the question: What are the inferences which are different from or opposed to valid inferences? Here the object of the cognition of inferences which are different from or opposed to valid inferences would be the relation Rl, and the invalid inferences are characterized by this relation. According to a broader interpretation, this type of relevance incudes not only memory context but also other contexts, where things are observed together or related to each other. 2. Justification (upodghāta) This type of relevance deals with the justification of what the speaker intends to say. It is also concerned with the truth or the falsity of a cognition, for example, the justification for the truth of the cognition that Judy is crossing the street.

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We may justify its truth by reference to perception, or inference, or verbal testimony. Here P is the expression “Judy is crossing the Street,” and Q is “I saw Judy crossing the street” if the justification is perceptual. Similarly, the definition of a term is justified in terms of its scope. For example, the definition of the term “human being” is justified in terms of “rationality and animality.” It may be defined in the following way: P is related to Q by R2 Df P is related to Q by the relation of justification.

3. Cause (hetu) This type of relevance refers to the causal conditions of the object of our statement. For example, perception is defined in terms of sense-object contact. Now we may ask about other causal conditions of perception. So the enumeration of other causal conditions, such as manas as well as contact with the self and negative causal conditions, such as not being too far, would answer this question. Hence P would be the definition of perception, and Q would the expression for other causal conditions. The content of P would be related to that of Q by being other causal conditions. 4. Cessation of Objectionable Questions (avasara) This type of relevance emphasizes the sequence of statements, chapters, or topics. Let us consider the sequence of statements, such as P, Q, and R. Since we have stated Q before R, it deals with the question why Q is to be stated before R. In some cases, the questions about R can be answered easily if Q is stated before it and after P. So Q paves the way for establishing R or answers some questions about R or prevents us from asking some questions about R. Let us consider the relation between perception, inference, and comparison which are sources of valid cognition or knowledge in Nyāya epistemology. There is a relation of relevance between perception and inference as well as between inference and comparison. Since the questions about inference are presupposed by questions about comparison, inference is to be discussed prior to comparison. If we know what an inference is, then we can answer the question why comparison is not reducible to an inference. Similarly, a set of topics or chapters are related to each other by this relation of relevance. 5. Having the Same Cause (nirvāhaka-aikya or nirvāhaka-ekatva) After determining or stating the effect of some cause, the question would be: What are the other effects of the same cause? If there are other effects, then the former is related to the latter by having the same cause. Cooking is an obvious example of this type of relation of relevance. If both the softening of the food and the change of color of the food are due to the action of cooking, then they are related to each other by the relation of having the same cause, and the statements about them are related to each other by this type of relation of relevance.

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6. Having the Same Effect (kārya-aikya or kārya-ekatva) If a particular effect is due to several causal conditions, then they are related to each other by the relation of having the same effect. For example, the inferential cognition is due to the cognition of invariable concomitance or pervasion (vyāpti) and the cognition of the property of being the locus of inference (pakṣatā). Hence the relation between these two causal conditions is one of having the same effect. Similarly, since both water and air are causal conditions for sapling, they are related to each other by the relation of having the same effect, and the statements about them exhibit this type of relation of relevance.

Section 2: Part I: Definition of a Cause (A) Now let us discuss the nature of the causal conditions for the substantiation of the application of the principle of simplicity which is one of the criteria for logical thinking, among many others (Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 5–6, pp. 102–118, pp. 287–288; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 30–31, pp. 227–245; PadārthatattvaNirūpaṇam, pp. 60–64; Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa, Vol. 1, pp. 56–57; Sibajiban Bhattacharya, Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity, Part 1, pp. 111–138). The Nyāya philosophers have defined causal conditions in terms of the following three properties: • The property of being related to the locus of the effect immediately prior to the effect (avyavahita pūrvavartitva) • The property of being always present (niyatatva) • The property of being simpler than other competing conditions (ananyathāsiddhatva) From the first condition, it follows that if x is a causal condition for the effect E, then x is present immediately prior to E. From the second condition, it follows that x is always present whenever E occurs. The third condition specifies the principle for selecting the conditions which have satisfied the first two conditions. Let us illustrate with an example of the Nyāya system. When an earthen jar is produced, there are innumerable conditions which are present immediately prior to this effect. Moreover, all of them are, directly or indirectly, related to the locus of the effect. These conditions can be divided into three types. Some of the conditions are such that they are present whenever an effect is produced. Positive causal conditions such as space and time are always present whenever an effect is produced. Hence they are called “common causal conditions” (sādhāraṇa kāraṇa). But there are certain conditions which are present whenever a type of effect such as a jar is produced. The conditions such as the jar-maker, the parts of the jar, the conjunction between the parts of a jar, the wheel, the stick, and the thread are present whenever an earthen jar is produced. This type of condition would

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come under uncommon causal conditions (asādhāraṇa kāraṇa). The third type of causal conditions may be called “unique conditions” (ananya kāraṇa). These causal conditions would explain the particularity of the effect as distinct from the effects of the same type. In this example, the particularity of a jar is to be explained in terms of the particularities of its parts. All the parts and the relations of conjunction between the parts are positive unique causal conditions. The not-yet type of absence of the jar would be the negative unique causal condition. Hence the distinction between different types of effect would be drawn in terms of the uncommon causal conditions and the distinction between the effects of the same type in terms of the unique causal conditions. Now the question is whether the conditions, such as the color of the stick, stickness, etc., which satisfy the first two conditions in the case of a jar, are to be considered causes of a jar. Similarly, in the case of a particular jar, the conditions, such as the donkey which has brought the clay or the father of the pot-maker, are to be considered causes of it. The Nyāya philosophers have introduced the third condition to eliminate these conditions which satisfy the first two criteria of a cause. The third condition emphasizes the simplicity of a causal condition in relation to other competing conditions. Regarding the criteria of simplicity, the Nyāya claims that an entity is simpler than another in respect of quantity, or knowledge, or relation. Let us state these criteria: (i) x is simpler than y in respect of quantity iff the limitor of x has less elements than that of y. For example, in the case of perception, both the magnitude of the object (mahatva) and being present in its several parts by the relation of inherence (anekadravya samaveta) equally satisfy the first two conditions. It is to be noted that in the case of perceptual objects only there is mutual pervader-pervaded relation between them. The acceptance of any one of them would explain the occurrence of our perceptual cognitions. Now we have to consider whether one of them is simpler than another in quantity. The object which is present in several parts of a substance by the relation of inherence is qualified by properties such as manyness, substancehood, and the property of being inherence, but the magnitude is qualified by the universal magnitudeness (mahatvatva) only in the ontology of the Nyāya. For this reason, the latter is simpler than the former. Hence, the latter, not the former, is to be considered as a causal condition. (ii) x is simpler than y in respect of knowledge iff the knowledge of x presupposes less than the knowledge of y. Let us consider the causal conditions of the smell of a flower. According to the Nyāya, both the not-yet type of absence of the smell and the not-yet type of absence of the color of the flower satisfy the first two criteria of a causal condition. It is to be noted that in the ontology of the Nyāya smell resides in the earth only. Hence the not-yet type of absence of smell is a cause of smell. The relation between the absence of smell and the absence of color is pervader-pervaded. The absence of smell is the pervaded (vyāpya), and the absence of color is the pervader (vyāpaka). Since both of them satisfy the first two criteria of a cause and do not differ in quantity, the question is whether both of them are to be considered causes of smell. On this

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point, the Nyāya claims that the knowledge of the not-yet type of absence of the smell is simpler than that of the not-yet type of absence of the color. Since we are determining the causal conditions of the smell of a flower, we already know its smell or we know what a smell is. But in order to know the not-yet type of absence of the color, we require the cognition of a color which we may not have. Again, the knowledge of a color alone is not sufficient as we are determining the causal conditions of the smell of a flower. Hence we require the knowledge of the smell in addition to the knowledge of the color. This is how the Nyāya claims that the knowledge of the not-yet type of absence of the smell is simpler than that of the not-yet type of absence of the color. (iii) x is simple than y in respect of relation iff the relation of x to the locus of the effect involves fewer relations than the relation of y to the locus of the same effect. For example, the relation of the stick to the parts of a jar, which is the locus of the effect, involves fewer relations than the relation of the color of the stick or the universal stickness to the parts of the same jar. The stick is related to the parts of the jar by the relations S and T, where S is the relation of the stick to the movement of the wheel and T is the relation of the movement of the wheel to the parts of the jar. But the color of the stick or stickness is related to the parts of the jar by the relations R, S, and T, where R is the relation of the color or stickness to the stick. Here R is the relation of inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. Hence the stick, not its color or the universal stickness, is considered a causal condition of a jar. Similarly, the father of the jar-maker and the donkey which has brought the clay are not considered as causal conditions of any jar or a particular jar even if they satisfy the first two criteria of a cause in the case of a particular jar. Since the jar-maker is a simpler condition than his father, the former is to be considered as a causal condition. Similarly, the lump of clay is simpler than the donkey which has brought it. Hence the lump of clay is a causal condition, not the donkey which has brought the clay. From the above discussion, it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have applied the principle of simplicity in defining causal conditions in three ways, either by knowledge, quantity, or relation. In modern science also, the principle simplicity is used in selecting a theory provided other conditions remain the same.

Operation (vya¯pa¯ra) and Special Instrumental Cause (karana) ˙ Now let us explain the distinction between the terms vyāpāra (“operation”) and karaṇa (“special instrumental cause”), which are technical terms of the Nyāya (Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 227–229; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 287–289). An operation (vyāpāra) is defined in terms of the relation of one causal condition to another. An operation is itself a causal condition, but it is due to another causal condition (tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam). Hence it may be defined in the following way:

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(a) x is an operation of the effect E Df (∃y) (y is a cause or a set of causes of E, and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y). In our above example, the movement of the wheel is due to the stick, and the jar is due to the movement of the wheel. For this reason, the movement of the wheel is considered an operation. Since the movement is due to the stick, the stick becomes the operation possessor (vyāpāravat). Other intermediary conditions such as the conjunction relation between the stick and the wheel are to be eliminated by applying the third criteria of a causal condition. Since the stick is related to the parts of the jar through this operation and becomes a cause by virtue of this relation, it is called karaṇa (vyāpāravat kāraṇaṃ karaṇam). Hence karaṇa may be defined in the following way: (b) x is a karaṇa of the effect E Df x is a causal condition, x is related to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only. With reference to our example of the jar, two more points are to be noted. Since there are several movements of the wheel, which are due to the stick, there are several operations. Moreover, the wheel is also related to the parts of the pot through the movements which are due to the wheel, and the wheel becomes a cause due to this relation. Hence the wheel is also regarded as a special instrumental cause (karaṇa). Therefore, in this case, there are at least two special instrumental causes and several operations. The special instrumental causes are related to the parts of the jar through these operations only. So this is an example of many-many relation between operations and special instrumental causes. According to the Nyāya, all the four types of relation, viz., (1) many-many, (2) one-one, (3) many-one, and (4) one-many, hold good between operation and special instrumental cause depending on the examples of causation. The example of jar illustrates the manymany type of relation. The following examples would illustrate the remaining types of relation. In the case of felling the tree by striking an axe with certain velocity, the operation is the contact between the axe and the tree, and the special instrumental cause is the axe. Hence it is an example of one-one relation between an operation and a special instrumental cause. The woodcutter or the agent is not a special instrumental cause as it is determined by the agent. Hence in determining a special instrumental cause, we have to exclude the agent. The agent is simply an instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa). When a piece of cloth is made by conjoining several threads together, the conjunctions between the threads would be the operations, and the loom (vemā) of the weaver would be the special instrumental cause. So it would be an example of many-one relation between the operations and the special instrumental cause. The act of cooking is an example of one-many relation between the operation and the special instrumental causes. The fire or the heat would be the operation and the logs of wood, or the pieces of coal used in generating this fire would be the special instrumental causes of cooking.

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From the above discussion, it follows that there is at least one operation and at least one special instrumental cause. It is to be noted that even in the case of destruction (dhvaṃsa), which is a negative effect, there is an operation and a special instrumental cause. Consider the destruction of a jar with a stick. The stick is the instrumental cause, and the contact between the jar and the stick with certain velocity is the operation. Hence, according to the Nyāya, every effect, positive or negative, has an operation and a special instrumental cause. The operation is defined in terms of the relation between causal conditions, but the special instrumental cause is defined in terms of the operation and its relation to the locus of the effect. In other words, it is related to the locus through the operation only. Now it may be asked whether the Nyāya philosophers would accept the operation of an operation. Since they have accepted the cause of a cause in determining the causal conditions of an effect, they might accept the operation of an operation as well. It may also be asked: Why do we need karaṇa at all? Is not operation adequate for determining the cause of an effect? In reply, the Nyāya philosophers have put forward two types of argument. As regards the operation of an operation, it is claimed that it would lead to a regress. Hence higher-order operations and thereby higher-order special instrumental causes of these operations are to be excluded by applying the third property of a causal condition (ananyathāsiddhatva). As regards other questions, the Nyāya makes an appeal to ordinary usage. In the case of felling the tree, if we consider the contact between the axe with a certain velocity and the tree as the only cause, then we are going against the ordinary usage. In our ordinary language (parlance), we consider the axe also as a cause. Since the Nyāya philosophers try to retain our ordinary usage as far as possible, they consider axe also as a causal condition. Since it is related to the locus of the effect through the contact which is the operation, it is considered the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the effect.

Part II: Belief In this context, I shall discuss the Nyāya conception of belief, as the Nyāya philosophers have explained false beliefs without tertiary entities, such as propositions or images. Since there is no proposition in the Nyāya as distinct from a sentence, beliefs are considered true or false. It is to be noted that belief is a doubt-free cognition. The Nyāya concept of doubt does not lead to skepticism, as a dubious cognition rests on certainty. Moreover, the Nyāya discussion of belief suggests solutions to some problems of belief in the Western philosophy. I shall also mention the view of Russell, as he claims that no one has succeeded in explaining a false belief without postulating the existence of the nonexistent. Russell, in “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” claimed that in a belief sentence, such as “Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio,” there are at least two verbs. Here the verbs “believes” and “loves” have occurred as genuine verbs, and the verb in the subordinate clause seems to relate Desdemona to Cassio; but in fact, it does not do so. He says:

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This is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief. You will notice that wherever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent (Russell 1977).

Now the question is how to explain the nature of this belief without postulating nonexistent love as an entity, which will relate Desdemona to Cassio. Moreover, Russell claimed that “loves” should be treated as a verb. This requirement leads to the rejection of his earlier view proposed in The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 1980), where this sentence has been analyzed as a four-place relation between Othello, Desdemona, loves, and Cassio. Hence it takes the form: B (Othello, Desdemona, loves, Cassio).

Since the verb “loves” in this sentence is on a par with the terms “Desdemona” and “Cassio,” this analysis does not fulfil one of the above requirements of Russell. In spite of these shortcomings, I think, Russell’s great contribution lies in the view that what occurs in a belief sentence is not a proposition, but the constituents of a proposition, and in his suggestions that a satisfactory theory of belief should not postulate nonexistent objects and should not reduce the verb in the subordinate clause to a term. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya, we shall see how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the shortcomings of Russell’s theory and at the same time followed the suggestions of a satisfactory theory of belief. Let us begin with the Nyāya analysis of this sentence. It is to be noted that in this case, we are not talking about Desdemona or Cassio, but about the belief state of Othello, which is related to the self by the relation of inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. In the content of this belief, there are three major elements, namely, Desdemona, Cassio, and the relation of love (loving relation). Desdemona is the qualificand, Cassio is the qualifier, and love is the qualification relation. The relation of the mental state of Othello to Desdemona is the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā) residing in Desdemona, to Cassio is the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) residing in Cassio, and to the relation of love is the property of being the qualification relation (saṃsargatā) residing in love. As a belief mental state is related to its objects, so are objects are related to the belief state. Hence the relation of Desdemona to this belief is the converse of viśeṣyatā, i.e., visesyitā; the relation of Cassio to this belief is the converse of viśeṣaṇatā, i.e., visesanitā, to introduce a technical term; and the relation of love to this belief is the converse of saṃsargatā, i.e., samsargitā. In addition to these elements, there are a few more elements in the content of this belief. Since both Desdemona and Cassio have occurred in the content of this belief, according to the Nyāya, they must be presented under some mode of presentation. In other words, the property of being the qualificand residing in Desdemona is limited by the property of being Desdemona, and the property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio is limited by the property of being Cassio (For a discussion on this property, see Shaw’s 1985, pp. 327–72.). Since the relation of love has been mentioned, it is presented under the mode loveness. So we have, broadly speaking,

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two terms called “qualificand” and “qualifier,” the relation of love, three propertylimitors or modes of presentation, and three relational properties of being the content. Now the question is how to explain the relation among these elements. The Nyāya claims that they are related in the following way: 1. The property of being the qualificand residing in Desdemona is limited by the property of being Desdemona. 2. The property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio is limited by the property of being Cassio. 3. The property of being the qualification relation residing in love is limited by loveness. 4. The property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio is also limited by the relation of love. 5. The property of being the qualificand residing in Desdemona is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio. 6. The property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio is determined by the property of being the qualificand residing in Desdemona. 7. The property of being the qualification relation residing in love is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio. 8. The property of being the qualifier residing in Cassio is determined by the property of being the qualification relation residing in love. In this context, it is to be noted that the above three types of relations which relate a belief to its content, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier, and the property of being the qualification relation, are present in any belief, true or false. But in a true belief, there is another type of relation which relates the belief to the unified content or the fact by virtue of which a sentence is considered as true. Now let us discuss the nature of the belief state. As a belief is related to its contents, so are the contents related to the belief. If the above three relations, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier, and the property of being the qualification relation are called “R,” “S,” and “T,” respectively, then the relation of Desdemona to this belief is the converse of R, the relation of Cassio to this belief is the converse of S, and the relation of love to this belief is the converse of T. These are all properties of Othello’s belief, and they are related to each other in the following way: (a) (b) (c) (d)

The converse of R is determined by the converse of S. The converse of S is determined by the converse of R. The converse of S is determined by the converse of T. The converse of T is determined by the converse of S.

In other words, by introducing the relations (a–d), the Nyāya emphasizes the unity of the belief state. Moreover, the truth of the sentence “Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio” does not depend on the truth of the sentence “Desdemona loves

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Cassio.” Now the question is: How can the belief state of Othello be related to the relation love which does not exist between them? If there is no such relation, then the converse of the property of being the qualification relation cannot characterize the belief state of Othello. In reply, the Nyāya claims that the belief state of Othello is related to a real relation of love, for example, between John and Janet, which is real elsewhere or elsewhen. Since this relation is real elsewhere and the belief state is related to this relation, it is characterized by the converse of this qualification relation. It is to be noted that here also the relation performs both the functions. It relates John to Janet, as John loves Janet, and makes Desdemona the qualificand and Cassio the qualifier. For this reason, the relation has not been reduced to a term. This is how the Nyāya has avoided the postulation of nonexistent entities in their explanation of false beliefs or cognitions. Moreover, this explanation does not reduce the verb in the subordinate clause to a term. This explanation of belief can be represented by the following diagram: Othello

Desdemona

Love

Cassio

John loves Janet

Section 3: Knowledge In this section, I shall focus on the Nyāya conception of knowledge and the classification of the causal conditions of each of the sources of knowledge into four types, so that the Nyāya concept of justification can be demonstrated. In the context of inference, I shall show how the premises and the conclusion are related by the relation of relevance. The Nyāya conception of fallacy is broader than its Western counterpart. In this context, I shall also demonstrate how tarka (a type of counterfactual conditional) is related to an inference. The Nyāya conception of meaning will demonstrate why transformationally equivalent sentences do not have the same meaning. The logical distinction between the atomistic and holistic understanding will also be mentioned.

Sources of Knowledge As regards sources of valid cognition or knowledge, all the systems of Indian philosophy have emphasized perception. In this context, it is to be noted that there

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is a substantial difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the sources of knowledge. For the Cārvāka (a type of materialist) philosophers, perception is regarded as the only source of valid cognition. The Bauddha and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept both perception and inference as sources of knowledge. The Sāṃkhya, Rāmānuja, and Bhāsarvajña accept perception, inference, and verbal testimony. The Nyāya accepts perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. But the followers of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā accept presumption in addition to the four sources accepted by the Nyāya. The followers of the Kumārila Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta accept non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) in addition to the previous five sources of knowledge. The followers of the Purāṇas accept two more, namely, entailment (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya). The followers of the Tantra accept gesture and posture (ceṣtā) in addition to the eight other sources of knowledge. The Jaina philosophers have accepted two more sources of valid cognition, namely, the use of a type of counterfactual conditional (tarka) and memory (smṛti). Since the Nyāya philosophers do not accept presumption as a source of valid cognition, it is reduced to agreement in absence type of inference (vyatirekī-anumāna). Similarly, non-apprehension is reduced to perception, entailment to inference, tradition to verbal testimony, and gesture (or posture) to inference. But tarka is not reduced to an inference. It gives rise to an inference and thereby becomes auxiliary to an inference. Similarly, memory is not reduced to some other source of valid cognition. But the truth of a memory cognition depends upon the truth of a previous apprehension which is derived from perception, inference, comparison, or verbal testimony. In this context, the Nyāya philosophers have also applied the principle of simplicity, as there is no need to accept more than four sources of knowledge.

The Nya¯ya on Knowledge The Nyāya philosophers have discussed the conditions or causal conditions of cognition, conditions of a true cognition, conditions of a false cognition, and conditions which justify the truth of a cognition. The causal conditions involved in the process are not exclusively internal. Hence some conditions are external.

Perception The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the internal sense organ (manas), the external sense organs (such as eyes), the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc. are positive causal conditions. In addition to these causal conditions, there are certain negative causal conditions. In this context, it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhya philosophers have mentioned the following negative causal conditions of

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perception, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya (Purnachandra Vedāntacuñcu, Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and Tattva-Kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra, with Bengali translation and commentary, first published in 1901, West Bengal Book Board, 1983, pp. 66–68): (a) Not being too far (atidūratābhāva) (b) Not being too close (atisāmīpyābhāva) (c) Absence of loss of sense organs, such as deafness, blindness, etc. (indriyanāśābhāva) (d) Not being inattentive (mano’navasthānābhāva) (e) Not being too subtle (sūkṣmābhāva) (f) Not having intervening objects such as wall, screen, etc. (vyavadhānābhāva) (g) Not being overshadowed (or covered) by a more powerful object (abhibhavābhāva), e.g., during the day, stars are not visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun (h) Not being mixed up with similar objects (samānābhihārābhāva), e.g., rainwater cannot be perceived in a lake or a river separately as it is mixed up with similar objects But the Nyāya philosophers have not treated all of them as negative causal conditions. They would consider only (a), (b), (g), and (h) as negative causal conditions. The remaining four will be considered positive. Therefore the third one will be normal sense organs instead of absence of loss of sense organs. The fourth one will be attentive instead of not being inattentive and the fifth one having some magnitude (mahatva) instead of not being too subtle. The sixth one is to be rejected as negative on the ground that the sense-object contact is a positive causal condition. Hence the Nyāya philosophers would consider only (a), (b), (g), and (h) in the above list as negative. In the case of an ordinary perceptual cognition, sense organs are special instrumental causes (karaṇas), and the sense-object contact is the operation (vyāpāra). Let us consider the following example of the Nyāya philosophers: The floor has a pot. In this case, our visual sense organ is the special instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense organ and the floor is the operation. Since our sense organ is related to the floor, it is also related to the pot which is on the floor. Since the cognition that the floor has a pot is due to a sense organ, it is considered as perceptual. In this case, the objects of cognition such as the floor, the pot, and the relation of conjunction are related to the cognition. Hence the cognition is also related to all these items. The cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence in terms of the relation between these items and the cognition alone, we cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When a perceptual cognition is true, our sense organ is related to the qualified object. In the above example, our visual sense organ is related not only to the floor but also to the floor that is qualified by a pot on it.

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Hence the cognition generated by this process will be related to the qualified object or the fact. The relation of the cognition to the fact is called viśiṣṭa viṣayatā, which is a relational property of the object of cognition. The cognition is characterized by the converse of this relational property, which is called viśiṣṭa viṣayitā. Thus a true perceptual cognition presupposes certain additional conditions. A false perceptual cognition could be due to a defect (doṣa) or an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya). A defect (doṣa) is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perceptual cognition, but an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya) is the weakness of a positive causal condition of a true perceptual cognition such as a defective visual sense organ or the absence of a positive causal condition of a true cognition such as blindness or loss of a visual sense organ. So a visual perception could be false due to distance (dūratva), which is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true cognition. Similarly, it could be false due to weakness of the visual sense organ or due to the absence of the visual sense organ. In our above example, if the cognition is true, then it is related to the floor, the pot, the relation of conjunction, and the qualified object, i.e., the floor qualified by a pot on it. The causal conditions of this perceptual cognition would include the relation of the visual sense organ to these items. But in addition to these relations of the cognition to its objects, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relation of the cognition to universal floorness and the relation of the cognition to universal potness. Now the question is: What is the need for these additional relations? In this context, it is to be noted that some contemporary epistemologists claim that identification and discrimination are necessary for knowledge. On Goldman’s theory, if S knows that p, then S can discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. In his system, these alternatives are counterfactual. But his theory cannot explain why a person, say Smith, is able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives, but another person, say Jones, is not able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. The Nyāya can explain this phenomenon in terms of the relation of Smith’s cognition to the universal floorness and the universal potness which are limitors of a floor and a pot, respectively. Since Smith’s sense organ is related not only to the floor and the pot but also to their limitors, his cognition is related to these limitors as well. Since the cognition of limitors can explain our ability to discriminate, there is a need for these limitors in epistemic contexts. This is how the Nyāya solves the problem of Goldman. From this discussion, it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have mentioned a set of conditions for perception, a set of conditions for its truth, a set of conditions for its falsity, and another set for the justification of its truth. 1. Inference Similarly, in the case of an inference, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the causal conditions of an inferential cognition (anumiti), the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of an inferential cognition or the ability to discriminate. An inference, according to the Nyāya, has three terms, namely, sādhya (probandum), pakṣa (locus of inference), and hetu

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(probans or reason). The term sādhya refers to what is to be inferred. The term pakṣa refers to the locus of inference where there is some doubt about the presence of sādhya. The term hetu refers to the reason by means of which the sādhya is inferred in the pakṣa. In this context, it is to be noted that an inference for others, according to the Nyāya, involves five members, which are related to each other by the relation of relevance. Relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions or sentences via some questions. Let us consider the following inference for others: Thesis (pratijñā): The mountain has a fire. Reason (hetu): Because of smoke. Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, etc. Application (upanaya): The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, the mountain has a fire. This inference has the following form: Thesis (pratijñā): a is G. Reason (hetu): Because of F. Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is F, there is G, as in b, etc. Application (upanaya): a has F which is pervaded by G. Conclusion (nigamana): Hence, a is G, or G is present in a, where a is the locus of the inference (pakṣa), F is the probans, G is the probandum, and b is the locus where G is known to be present (sapakṣa). An inferential cognition, according to the Nyāya, has certain instrumental causal conditions (nimitta-kāraṇas) such as parāmarśa (operation), vyāpti jñāna (cognition of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum), and pakṣatā (a special relational property of the locus). An inferential cognition (anumiti) is usually defined in terms of parāmarśa (operation). Parāmarśa (operation) is the cognition of the property of being the pervaded which appears as the qualifier of the probans which is present in the locus (vyāpti-prakāraka-pakṣadharmatā-jñāna). In other words, an inferential cognition of the form “a is G” is derivable from the cognition of the form “a is F which is pervaded by G,” where a is the locus, F is the probans, and G is the probandum. The latter is a causal condition of the former. But the truth of the inferential cognition does not depend on this causal condition. Hence the truth of the cognition a is G does not depend on the cognition of a is F which is pervaded by G. The truth depends on the fact that the locus which is cognized in the operation is characterized by the probandum. Now the question is whether a true inferential cognition would assume the status of knowledge. In this context, it is to be noted that a false operation such as “the mountain has fog which is pervaded by fire” might lead to the true inferential cognition “the mountain has fire.” Since the occurrence of a false cognition can be prevented by a true one, the occurrence of the above false operation can be prevented

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by the true cognition that fog is not pervaded by fire. If the occurrence of the operation is prevented, then the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to this operation would also be prevented. In other words, if a person knows that fog is not pervaded by fire, then he would not use this operation to infer that the mountain has fire. For this reason, the Nyāya would claim that the above true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge. In other words, if the inferential process which leads to a true cognition contains a false cognition, then the true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge, i.e., a justified true cognition. In an inference for others, all the five sentences are needed, because each of them is an answer to a different question and gives some new information. But in an inference for oneself, all of them are not required and there is no need to use a sentence. Hence a deaf and a mute person can also have an inferential cognition. What is required is the operation (parāmarśa), which corresponds to the application in our above example and the cognitions that will give rise to this operation. In our above example, the thesis (pratiñnā-vākya) is an answer to the question what is to be established in a (paksa). a is usually considered as something where there is doubt about the presence of the probandum. The reason (hetu-vakya) is an answer to the question what signifies the probandum. Hence it states that the probans signifies the probandum. The signifier-significate ( jñāpya-jñāpaka) relation holds between the objects of two cognitions. The cognition of the signifier ( jñāpaka) gives rise to the cognition of the significate ( jñāpya). The reason does not state that the locus a (pakṣa) is characterized by the probans. If it is stated as a is F, then one of the premises would be superfluous. Now it may be asked: Why should we consider the probans as the signifier? The answer is given by stating a rule (vyāpti) along with some examples which give rise to the cognition of the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum (vyāpti-jñāna). For this reason, the third step is called “example.” Both the examples of agreement in presence and agreement in absence are to be stated in support of this rule of invariable concomitance. The observation of the presence of the probans and the probandum in some loci and the nonobservance of the presence of the probans and the absence of the probandum in some other loci are required for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. The rule takes the form of a universal sentence that can be stated as: ðxÞ ðIf F x, then G xÞ: The application (upanaya-vakya) is an answer to the question whether a (i.e., paksa) is characterized by this type of F. Since the reason does not state that a is characterized by F, the application gives us some new information about a. The reason simply states that F is the signifier of G. Hence the application gives us some new information, which is not already contained in the previous sentences. The conclusion (nigamanavakya) is an answer to the question whether the probandum which is the significate of that type of probans is in a. Hence it is an answer to the question whether G which is the significate of F which is pervaded by G is present in a.

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The difference between the thesis and the conclusion lies in the fact that the thesis simply states what is to be established in the locus but the conclusion states how it is to be established in the locus. The word “hence” or its synonym in the conclusion means “the significate of the cognition of the probans.” Hence the conclusion (nigamana-vakya) means that G which is the significate of F, which is pervaded by G and is in a, is present in a. Here the new information lies in the fact that G is the significate of that type of F. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would explain the difference between the thesis and the conclusion. Since each of the members in an inference is related by the relation of relevance, an inference, valid or invalid, is considered a large sentence (mahavakya). The relation of the thesis to reason is upodghāta saṅgati, as the latter gives epistemic justification for the former. Similarly, the relation of reason to example is also upodghāta saṅgati, as it suggests an ontological ground for the relation of F to G. But the relation of example to application is kāryatva saṅgati, which is the converse of hetutā saṅgati. In other words, we cannot have the cognition of the latter without the cognition of the former. Hence they are related by cause-effect relation. Similarly, the relation of application to conclusion is kāryatva saṅgati, as they are related by the cause-effect relation. So we cannot have the cognition of the conclusion without the cognition of the application. From the above discussion, it follows that in the case of inference also, there are four sets of causal conditions. The guarantee for the truth of an inferential cognition depends on the truth of parāmarśa, although a false parāmarśa such as the mountain has fog which is pervaded by fire may lead to a true cognition: the mountain has fire. Again, a false parāmarśa, such as the lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire, will lead to a false inferential cognition the lake has fire. Hence the truth depends on the fact that the locus which is cognized in the parāmarśa is characterized by the sādhya. But the guarantee for its truth or its justification depends on the truth of the parāmarśa.

Valid and Invalid Inferences Now I would like to discuss the Nyāya distinction between valid and invalid inferences. Each of the sentences in an inference for others is an answer to a question, and each of them except the last one will give rise to a question. Moreover, each of them is used to generate cognition in the hearer. Since a self-contradictory sentence such as “a is both G and not G” cannot generate a cognition, it cannot be used either as a premise or conclusion of an inference. If the inference (not the inferential cognition) is valid (nyāya), then all the sentences must be true, and the conclusion will follow from the premise or the premises. In other words, there is no true preventer cognition. Hence the application (upanaya-vākya), which represents the operation (vyāpāra) of an inferential cognition (anumiti), will entail the conclusion. Invalid inferences (nyāyābhāsas) are divided into two types. One type of invalid inference contains a false premise or premises, but the other type does not contain any false premise. Hence the former may be called “logically invalid” and the latter “epistemically invalid.” Hence the truth of the premises and the conclusion is not sufficient to define the validity of an inference. But any inference, valid or invalid,

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must satisfy the relevance condition. This point also is very important for understanding the difference between the Western and the Indian concept of inference. Now let us discuss the nature of the probans in a valid inference. If the valid inference is of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence type, then its probans has the following five characteristics: (a) It is present in the locus of the inference (pakṣa). Hence it has the property of being present in the locus (pakṣa-sattva). (b) It is also present in some of the loci which are known to be characterized by the probandum. Hence it has the property of being present in similar loci (sapakṣasattva). (c) It is not present in those loci which are known to be characterized by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of being absent from dissimilar loci (vipaksāsattva). (d) It has no counter-probans (prati-hetu) which will demonstrate the absence of the probandum in the locus of the inference. A counter-probans is different from the probans in question, and it is pervaded by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of not having a counter-probans (asatpratipakṣattva). (e) It is different from the probans which can be used to establish the probandum in the locus which is characterized by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of being different from this type of probans (abādhitattva).

Fallacies An inference, according to the Nyāya, will be fallacious if the probans lacks one of these characteristics. In other words, if the probantia of the inferences of the agreement in presence and absence type do not have all the five characteristics and the probantia of the other types of inferences (agreement in presence only or agreement in absence only) do not have the remaining four characteristics, then they are fallacious. Since a probans is used to infer the probandum, the fallacy of an inference has been ascribed to the probans. Hence a fallacious inference is called hetvābhāsa (“defective probans”). A fallacy or hetvābhāsa has been defined in the following way: x is a hetvābhāsa if the true cognition of x prevents the occurrence of an inferential cognition (anumiti) or the operation (parāmarśa) which is the vyāpāra of an inferential cognition, where x is a qualified object of cognition.

Let us consider a fallacious inference, for example, this lake has fire because of smoke. In this case, the inferential cognition this lake has fire is false. From the above definition of fallacy, it follows that if the person would have known that this lake has no fire, then the inferential cognition would have been prevented. The absence of fire in the lake which is the object of cognition is the defect of the probans. Since smoke is the probans in this inference, it is infected with this defect. Now the question is: How can smoke be qualified by this defect? The Nyāya philosophers explain the relation between them in terms of the relation of a cognition to its object, which is called viṣayatā, and the limitor of the property of

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being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka). In other words, it is explained in terms of a conjunctive cognition such that one of them is the defect and the other one is the probans. In our above example, one of the objects of this conjunctive cognition would be the lake qualified by the absence of fire and the other one would be smoke. If we would have known this property of smoke, then we would not have inferred the presence of fire in the lake. Since smoke was used to make this inference and since this function of smoke will be restricted by our cognition of smoke qualified by the absence of fire in the lake, smoke as a probans is considered defective. In other words, it will fail to perform its function as probans for the above inference. There are five types of fallacies, viz., (1) asiddha (unestablished), (2) vyabhicāra (deviation), (3) viruddha (opposed), (4) satpratipakṣa (existence of a counterthesis), and (5) bādha (absence of the probandum in the locus). asiddha (Unestablished) If the probans cannot be established, it is called asiddha. This type of fallacy can occur in five ways: 1. The locus of the inference (pakṣa) is not real. For example, the golden mountain has fire, because of smoke. Here the golden mountain is the locus (pakṣa), smoke is the probans, and fire is the probandum. Since the locus is unreal or unexemplified (aprasiddha), the probans cannot reside in it. Since the locus cannot be established, this fallacy is called āśrayāsiddha (“unestablished locus”). Here the defect is the absence of gold in the mountain. The cognition of this defect is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (pakṣadharmatā-jñāna) and the inferential cognition (anumiti). Here the probans lacks the property of being present in the locus (pakṣa-sattva). 2. The probans does not reside in the locus of the inference, although the locus is real and the probans is real. For example, sound is non-eternal, because of visibility. Here both sound and visibility are real entities, but visibility does not qualify sound. Since the probans cannot qualify the locus of the inference, this type of fallacy is called svarūpāsiddha (“unestablished in the locus”). This type of fallacy is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (pakṣadharmatā-jñāna). Here also the probans lacks the property of being present in the locus (pakṣasattva). The defect (doṣa) is the absence of visibility in the sound. 3. The probans is unreal or unexemplified, although the locus is real. For example, the mountain has fire, because of golden smoke. In this case, the golden smoke which is the probans is itself unreal. Since the probans is unreal, this type of fallacy is called hetvasiddha (“unestablished probans”). This type of fallacy is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus of inference and the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Since the probans is unexemplified, it cannot have any of the properties of a genuine probans. 4. Another type of asiddha (unestablished) fallacy will occur if the probans of an unexemplified probandum is not present in the locus of an inference. For

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example, the mountain has golden fire, because of smoke. In this case, smoke is present on the mountain, but not as the probans of the golden fire. Hence this type of fallacy is called sādhyāsiddha (“unestablished probandum”). Here the probans lacks both sapakṣasattva (the property of being present in similar cases) and vipakṣāsattva (the property of being absent from dissimilar cases). Here the defect is the absence of gold in fire. The cognition of this defect is opposed to both the operation and the inferential cognition. 5. There is another type of asiddha fallacy known as vyāpyatvāsiddha (unestablished property of being the pervaded). In this case, the locus is real, the probans is real, and the probans is present in the locus, but the probans is not qualified by the property of being the pervaded which is limited by a property. The mode under which the probans has been cognized becomes the limitor of the property of being the pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka). This type of fallacy will occur when the mode under which the probans has been cognized does not limit the property of being the pervaded which resides in the probans. For example, the mountain has fire, because of blue smoke. If blue smoke is the probans, then the rule of invariable concomitance would be between blue smoke and fire. The property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke will be limited by blue smokeness. But this rule of invariable concomitance cannot substantiate the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Since there is no property of being the pervaded which is limited by blue smokeness and resides in blue smoke, the type of fallacy present in the above inference is called vyāpyatvāsiddha. Here the defect will be the absence of the property of being the pervaded which is limited by blue smokeness and which resides in blue smoke. The cognition of this defect would prevent the cognition of the invariable concomitance between blue smoke and fire and thereby the cognition of the operation. vyabhica¯ra (Deviation) There are three types of fallacy of deviation. In all the three cases, the cognition of the defect would prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. (a) sādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra (common deviation) If the probans is present in pakṣa (locus of the inference), sapakṣa (locus known to be characterized by the probandum) and vipakṣa (locus known to be characterized by the absence of the probandum), then this type of fallacy would occur, and the probans is called sādhāraṇa-vyabhicārī-hetu (“common deviating probans”). For example, the mountain has fire, because of knowability. Since the probans is present in the locus of the absence of the probandum, the cognition of deviation (vyabhicāra) is opposed to the cognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. If we take a lake as vipakṣa, then fire is absent from it, but knowability is present in it. Hence there cannot be a cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and fire. Moreover,

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since there is deviation, the rule of invariable concomitance will not hold good between the probans and the probandum. In this case, the defect (doṣa) is the absence of fire in a lake which has knowability. Hence the cognition of this defect will prevent the cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and fire and thereby the cognition of the operation. In this fallacy, the probans lacks the property of not being present in vipakṣa. (b) asādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra (uncommon deviation) If the probans is present in the locus of the inference (pakṣa) only, then it is called asādharaṇa-vyabhicārī-hetu (“uncommon deviating probans”). In other words, the probans is not present in sapakṣa (the locus of the probandum) and in vipakṣa (the locus of the absence of the probandum), but is present in pakṣa (the locus of the inference). For example, sound is non-eternal, because of soundness. In this case, sound is pakṣa, a non-eternal object such as a pot is sapakṣa and an eternal object such as space is vipakṣa. Since soundness is not present in a pot, it lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa. Since soundness cannot be perceived in non-eternal objects, there cannot be cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. But the probans is absent from the eternal objects. Since the agreement in absence between the probans and the probandum can be observed, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti) can be cognized. In this example, the defect is the absence of soundness in a non-eternal object such as a pot, and the probans lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa. The cognition of this defect would prevent the cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance (anvaya-vyāpti). But it will not prevent the cognition of the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti). Since there are two types of invariable concomitance, there would be two types of operation. The agreement in presence type of operation will be prevented by this type of defect. Hence the cognition of this type of defect does not prevent the cognition of all types of invariable concomitance or operation. For this reason, it may be treated as an epistemic fallacy as opposed to a logical one (where some of the sentences or cognitions are false). In the example above, the sentences would not be false, but we fail to cognize the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance and thereby the agreement in presence type of operation. Moreover, this type of epistemic defect can also be removed. In our example, this defect can be removed if there is certainty about the presence of the probandum in some sounds such as the sound of a music. If it were so, then the locus would not be sound in general as it is in the above example, but some specific sounds such as the one which follows lightning. Since this defect can be removed, it is called anitya (“impermanent”). (c) anupasaṁhārī-vyabhicāra (unsupported deviation) If everything becomes pakṣa and thereby the probans does not have either sapakṣa or vipakṣa, then the fallacy of anupasaṁhārī-vyabhicāra will occur. Let us consider the following two examples:

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(i) Everything is non-eternal, because of knowability. (ii) Everything is nameable, because of knowability. In both (i) and (ii), everything is the locus of inference. There is doubt about the presence of non-eternality in (i) and nameability in (ii). Since everything is pakṣa, there is no sapakṣa or vipakṣa. Since the copresence of the probans and the probandum cannot be observed, the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance cannot be cognized. Similarly, since the co-absence of the probans and the probandum cannot be observed, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance cannot be cognized. Since neither type of invariable concomitance is cognized, neither type of operation will occur. Since there is neither sapkṣa nor vipakṣa, the probans lacks both the property of being present in sapakṣa and the property of being absent from vipakṣa. As regards the nature of this fallacy, it is not logical, but epistemological. If a person does not have doubt about the presence of the probandum in everything, then this epistemic defect can be removed. viruddha (Opposed) If the probans is pervaded by the absence of the probandum, the probans is called viruddha-hetu (“opposed probans”). Hence the invariable concomitance would be between the probans and the absence of the probandum, not between the probans and the probandum. In other words, wherever the probans is present, the probandum is absent. For example, sound is eternal, because of the property of being an effect. Since an effect is non-eternal, the probans, far from establishing the probandum, establishes the absence of the probandum. In the case of viruddha fallacy, the probans lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa and the property of being absent from vipakṣa. Hence the agreement in presence (anvaya-sahacāra) and agreement in absence (vyatireka-sahacāra) cannot be observed. From this it follows that neither the invariable concomitance in presence nor the invariable concomitance in absence can be cognized. Moreover, since both the types of invariable concomitance are false, the defect would be the falsity of the invariable concomitances. Hence the cognition of this defect will be opposed to the cognition of both the types of invariable concomitance and thereby both the types of operation. It is also opposed to the inferential cognition. Since it is a permanent defect, it may be called “logical fallacy.” satpratipaksa (Existence of Counter-thesis) ˙ The word satpratipakṣa has two meanings. It may mean either the thesis of the opponent or a type of defect (doṣa) which will prevent an inferential cognition. Hence as a fallacy, it refers to a defect. Consider the following operations: (a) The lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire. (b) The lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire. The operation (b) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition “The lake has fire” which is due to the operation (a).

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The object of the operation (b) is the defect, and the probans of the operation (a) is infected with this defect. Since there is a counter-probans which is pervaded by the absence of fire, the probans of (a) lacks the property asatpratipakṣattva (the property of not having a counter-probans which is pervaded by the absence of the probandum). ba¯dha (Absence of the Probandum Characterizing the Locus) The fallacy of bādha occurs when a probans is used to establish a probandum in a locus which is characterized by the absence of the probandum. For example, fire is cold, because of substancehood, as in water. In the case of a bādha fallacy, the inferential cognition is directly prevented by the cognition of the absence of the probandum in the locus. In the above example, the operation is the cognition “Fire has substancehood which is pervaded by coldness.” This operation will yield the cognition “Fire is cold.” But the cognition “Fire has absence of coldness” will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition. Since the preventer cognition is true, its object is the defect (doṣa). Hence the cognition of bādha fallacy is directly opposed to the inferential cognition. It is to be noted that there is a difference between satpratipakṣa and bādha fallacy, although both of them are directly opposed to the inferential cognition. The difference may be explained in the following way. Let us consider the following satpratipakṣa: The lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire. This satpratipakṣa would prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition the lake has fire, which is derivable from the operation the lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Moreover, this operation is directly opposed to the cognition the lake has fire as it yields the cognition the lake has absence of fire. Therefore, it is directly as well as indirectly the preventer of the cognition the lake has fire. But the cognition of the bādha fallacy is directly opposed to the inferential cognition the lake has fire. From the Nyāya discussion of different types of fallacies, it follows that the Nyāya philosophers are dealing not only with the falsity of the premise(s) or the conclusion of a fallacious inference but also with the different ways the operation or the inferential co