Handbook of Humility: Theory, Research, and Applications 9781138960008, 9781138960015, 9781315660462

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HANDBOOK OF HUMILITY

The Handbook of Humility is the first scholarly book to bring together authors from psychology as well as other fields to address what we know and don’t know about humility. Authors review the existing research in this burgeoning field that has well over 100 empirical articles and an increasing trajectory of publication. This work should form the basis for research in humility for many years. In this book, chapters address definitions of humility that guide research. Authors also reflect on the practical applications of humility research within the areas they reviewed. The book informs people who study humility scientifically, but it is also an exceptional guide for psychotherapists, philosophers, religious and community leaders, politicians, educated lay people, and those who would like to fuel an informed reflection on how humility might make interactions more civil in relationships, organizations, communities, political processes, and national and international relations. Everett L. Worthington, Jr., PhD, is the Commonwealth Professor of Psychology at Virginia Commonwealth University. He is also a licensed clinical psychologist in Virginia. He has published over 35 books and 400 articles and scholarly chapters, mostly on forgiveness, marriage, and family topics and religion and spirituality. Don E. Davis, PhD, is assistant professor of counseling and psychological services at Georgia State University. He has published over 130 journal articles and scholarly chapters. His research focuses on humility, forgiveness, and religion/ spirituality. Joshua N. Hook, PhD, is associate professor of psychology at the University of North Texas. He is also a licensed clinical psychologist in the state of Texas. He has published over 150 journal articles and scholarly chapters. His research focuses on humility, religion/spirituality, and multicultural counseling.

HANDBOOK OF HUMILITY Theory, Research, and Applications

Edited by Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook

First published 2017 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Taylor & Francis The right of Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. The purchase of this copyright material confers the right on the purchasing institution to photocopy pages which bear the photocopy icon and copyright line at the bottom of the page. No other parts of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-96000-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-96001-5 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-66046-2 (ebk) Typeset in ITC New Baskerville by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To Kenneth I. Pargament, an inspiration to me and one of the most humble people I’ve had the privilege of knowing Everett L. Worthington, Jr. To my mom and dad, Donna and Don Davis Don E. Davis To my parents, who helped me develop a love for learning and asking questions Joshua N. Hook

CONTENTS

List of Contributors x Acknowledgements xv

Introduction: Context, Overview, and Guiding Questions Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook

PART I Theory, Definitions, and Measurement

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  1 Humility as a Moral Virtue Jeffrie G. Murphy

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  2 Humility from a Philosophical Point of View Robert C. Roberts and W. Scott Cleveland

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  3 Religious Perspectives on Humility Steven L. Porter, Anantanand Rambachan, Abraham Vélez de Cea, Dani Rabinowitz, Stephen Pardue, and Sherman Jackson

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  4 Intellectual Humility Ian M. Church and Justin L. Barrett

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  5 Political Humility: A Post-Modern Reconceptualization Everett L. Worthington, Jr.

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  6 Cultural Humility David K. Mosher, Joshua N. Hook, Jennifer E. Farrell, C. Edward Watkins, Jr., and Don E. Davis

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  7 Relational Humility Don E. Davis, Vanessa Placeres, Elise Choe, Cirleen DeBlaere, David Zeyala, and Joshua N. Hook

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  8 A Few Good Measures: Colonel Jessup and Humility Peter C. Hill, Elizabeth K. Laney, Keith J. Edwards, David C. Wang, William H. Orme, Annette C. Chan, and Frank L. Wang

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PART II Predictors, Correlates, and Sequelae of Humility

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  9 Personality Predictors and Correlates of Humility Joseph Leman, Megan C. Haggard, Benjamin Meagher, and Wade C. Rowatt

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10 A Social Psychological Perspective on Humility Daryl R. Van Tongeren and David G. Myers

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11 Relational Predictors and Correlates of Humility: An Interdependence Analysis Jeffrey D. Green, Jody L. Davis, Athena H. Cairo, Brandon J. Griffin, Anna Maria C. Behler, and Rachel C. Garthe

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12 The Humble Mind and Body: A Theoretical Model and Review of Evidence Linking Humility to Health and Well-Being Loren L. Toussaint and Jon R. Webb

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13 Spiritual and Religious Predictors, Correlates, and Sequelae of Humility Mark M. Leach and Adebayo Ajibade

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PART III Applications of Humility to Relationships and Treatment

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14 Humility in Career Development Bryan J. Dik, Jessica Morse, Micah White, and Adelyn B. Shimizu

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15 Humility in Romantic Relationships Rachel C. Garthe, Chelsea A. Reid, Terri N. Sullivan, and Brianne Cork

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16 Fostering Intellectual Humility in Public Discourse and University Education C. Nathan DeWall

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17 Organizational Humility and the Better Functioning Business Nonprofit and Religious Organizations Angela S. Wallace, Chia-Yen (Chad) Chiu, and Bradley P. Owens

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18 Boosting State Humility via Gratitude, Self-Affirmation, and Awe: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives Peter M. Ruberton, Elliott Kruse, and Sonja Lyubomirsky

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19 Humility Intervention Research: A Qualitative Review Caroline R. Lavelock, Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Brandon J. Griffin, Rachel C. Garthe, Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook 20 Humility and Psychotherapist Effectiveness: Humility, the Therapy Relationship, and Psychotherapy Outcomes Edward B. Davis and Andrew D. Cuthbert

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21 Humility in Psychotherapy Steven J. Sandage, David Rupert, David R. Paine, Miriam Bronstein, and Christopher G. O’Rourke

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22 Microaggressions and Cultural Humility in Psychotherapy Joanna M. Drinane, Jesse Owen, Joshua N. Hook, Don E. Davis, and Everett L. Worthington, Jr.

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23 The Clinical Application of Humility to Moral Injury: An Exemplar of Positive Military Psychology Brandon J. Griffin, Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Robert F. Dees, Laurel Shaler, John Benesek, Treven Pickett, Joshua N. Hook, and Don E. Davis

Epilogue: What We Have Learned, Where We Are Likely to Go Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook

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Index 357

CONTRIBUTORS

Adebayo Ajibade, MS, Department of Counseling & Human Development, University of Louisville Justin L. Barrett, PhD, Graduate School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary Anna Maria C. Behler, MS, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University John Benesek, PhD, Hunter Holmes McGuire VA Medical Center, Richmond, VA Miriam Bronstein, MSW, Albert and Jessie Danielsen Institute, Boston University Athena H. Cairo, MS, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Annette C. Chan, MA, Graduate Student, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University Elise Choe, MS, Counseling and Psychological Services, Georgia State University Chia-Yen (Chad) Chui, PhD, School of Management, University of South Australia Ian M. Church, PhD, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh W. Scott Cleveland, PhD, Postdoctoral Fellow, Saint Louis University and Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Mary Brianne Cork, BS, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Andrew D. Cuthbert, MS, Department of Psychology, Wheaton University

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Don E. Davis, PhD, Counseling and Psychological Services, Georgia State University Edward B. Davis, PsyD, Department of Psychology, Wheaton University Jody L. Davis, PhD, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Cirleen DeBlaere, PhD, Counseling and Psychological Services, Georgia State University Robert F. Dees, MS, Major General (Retired), Institute for Military Resilience, Liberty University, President, Resilience Consulting LLC C. Nathan DeWall, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky Bryan J. Dik, PhD, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University Joanna M. Drinane, MEd, Department of Counseling Psychology, University of Denver Keith J. Edwards, PhD, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University Jennifer E. Farrell, MS, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas Rachel C. Garthe, PhD, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Jeffrey D. Green, PhD, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Brandon J. Griffin, MS, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Megan C. Haggard, MA, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Baylor University Peter C. Hill, Professor, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University Joshua N. Hook, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas Sherman Jackson, PhD, School of Religion, University of Southern California Elliott Kruse, PhD, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University Elizabeth K. Laney, PhD, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University

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Caroline R. Lavelock, PhD, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Mark M. Leach, PhD, Department of Counseling & Human Development, University of Louisville Joseph Leman, MS, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Baylor University Sonja Lyubomirsky, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside Benjamin Meagher, PhD, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Baylor University Jessica Morse, MS, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University David K. Mosher, MS, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas Jeffrie G. Murphy, PhD, Regents’ Professor of Law, Philosophy, and Religious Studies, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University David G. Myers, PhD, Department of Psychology, Hope College William H. Orme, MA, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University Christopher G. O’Rourke, MDiv, Albert and Jessie Danielsen Institute, Boston University Jesse Owen, PhD, Department of Counseling Psychology, University of Denver Bradley P. Owens, PhD, Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University David R. Paine, MA (PhD candidate), Albert and Jessie Danielsen Institute, Boston University Stephen Pardue, PhD, Department of Systematic Theology, Asia Graduate School of Theology, Philippines Treven Pickett, PsyD, Hunter Holmes McGuire VA Medical Center, Richmond, VA Vanessa Placeres, MS, Counseling and Psychological Services, Georgia State University Steven L. Porter, PhD, Rosemead School of Psychology and Talbot School of Theology, Biola University

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Dani Rabinowitz, PhD, Philosophy, University of Oxford Anantanand Rambachan, PhD, Professor of Religion, Philosophy and Asian Studies, St. Olaf College Chelsea A. Reid, PhD, Department of Psychology, College of Charleston Robert C. Roberts, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Ethics, Baylor University Wade C. Rowatt, PhD, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Baylor University Peter M. Ruberton, MA, Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside David Rupert, PsyD, Albert and Jessie Danielsen Institute, Boston University Steven J. Sandage, PhD, Albert and Jessie Danielsen Institute, Boston University Laurel Shaler, PhD, Department of Counselor Education and Family Studies in the School of Behavioral Sciences, Liberty University Adelyn B. Shimizu, BA, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University Terri N. Sullivan, PhD, Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University Loren L. Toussaint, PhD, Department of Psychology, Luther College Daryl R. Van Tongeren, PhD, Department of Psychology, Hope College Abraham Vélez de Cea, PhD, Philosophy & Religion, Eastern Kentucky University Angela S. Wallace, PhD, Value Centric, Orchard Park, NY David C. Wang, PhD, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University Frank L. Wang, MA, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University C. Edward Watkins, Jr., PhD, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas Jon R. Webb, PhD, Department of Psychology, East Tennessee State University Micah White, MS, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University

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Everett L. Worthington, Jr., PhD, Commonwealth Professor in the Department of Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University David Zeyala, MS, Counseling and Psychological Services, Georgia State University

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been an enormous pleasure to see this book on the scientific understanding of humility take shape. We offer our deep gratitude to many, many people. First, we thank the authors who have labored to put together a coherent story about the research in their particular subfield of interest. Constructing chapters is always a labor of love, given the reward system in psychology is more in line with generating original empirical research. We also want to note how amazingly attentive the authors were to the deadlines. This book has come off without a hitch, and the authors have been very responsive to the sometimes detailed and laborious revisions that we recommended. We heard not a single complaint, and people hit their marks precisely (or even early). We would like to acknowledge the many talented collaborators—faculty, research faculty, and graduate students—with whom we have been privileged to work as we jointly studied humility. We have been very blessed, fortunate, and privileged indeed. We could not have completed the work also without the support of our three universities and the departments within which we work— Virginia Commonwealth University, Georgia State University, and University of North Texas, for Ev, Donnie, and Joshua, respectively. This book, indeed the whole field of humility, is deeply indebted to the John Templeton Foundation ( JTF) for funding research studies on which many of the investigators have built up their body of knowledge. The JTF has been incredibly generous with their resources, and we acknowledge their commitment to promoting new spiritual information. Humility certainly falls within that body of spiritual information. The three of us are indebted to the JTF for funding research on humility and particularly our research on relational and intellectual humility. We also want to express our gratitude to the Fetzer Institute (#2266, Forgiveness and Relational Spirituality) and the John Templeton Foundation (#14979, Relational Humility; #48321, Behavioral Measures of Humility in Couples), which together funded different aspects of our transition to parenthood project that kicked off our study of relational humility. We are further indebted to the Fuller Theological

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Seminary/Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation (IH#108, Intellectual Humility in Religious Leaders) for contributing the funding toward some of the projects described in this book that made it possible. In fact, in 2015, grant #14979 from the JTF funded a conference of humility researchers in Atlanta, and that conference not only engaged researchers in collaborating with each other, but it also led to many of the presentations and reviews that comprise the present book. The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fetzer Institute, the Fuller Thrive Center, or the John Templeton Foundation. We have enjoyed great support from the JTF on other projects as well, and we are grateful for their confidence in us. We are thankful to Sir John and to Dr. Jack, both of whom have now passed on, for their humble pursuit of new spiritual information. The world, after their influence, will never be the same.

INTRODUCTION C o n t e x t , O v e r v i e w, a n d G u i d i n g Q u e s t i o n s Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook

In this introductory chapter, we consider why humility is relevant for our time. We suggest ways that you might organize what the authors in this volume are going to tell you. Finally, we introduce each chapter briefly. Context for Humility A wave of cultural currents in both the United States and the world points to important shifts in society. Today, many people value the self highly relative to their value on other relationships or broader institutions. Why Humility in an Age of Me-ism? Jean Twenge (2006) dubbed the millennial generation “Generation ME.” Probably, though, these trends began earlier. Tom Wolfe, in a cover article in New York Magazine, referred to Baby Boomers as the “me generation” (Wolfe, 1976; see also Lasch, 1979, who called the Baby Boomers’ culture a culture of narcissism). Wolfe concluded his article like this: . . . they discovered and started doting on Me! They’ve created the greatest age of individualism in American history! All rules are broken! . . . One only knows that the great religious waves have a momentum all their own. Neither arguments nor policies nor acts of the legislature have been any match for them in the past. And this one has the mightiest, holiest roll of all, the beat that goes . . . Me . . . Me. . . . Me . . . Me . . . (http://nymag.com/news/features/45938/index13.html; retrieved December 21, 2015) More recently, New York Times columnist David Brooks (2015) points to a rapid changing of the guard in the post–World War II era between two

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competing visions of humanity and their accompanying narratives about how one develops moral excellence. Brooks asserts that the United States exchanged a ­crooked-timber tradition (i.e., “Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made”; Kant, 1784), which assumes that people are inherently flawed (i.e., crooked timber) and moral excellence occurs when humans own and adjust for their limits, for a Romantic tradition, which assumes people are inherently good and moral excellence comes through protecting human innocence from corrupt systems of society. Given the strong cultural currents that normalize attending to the self, is there any room for humility as a virtue? According to Brooks, the crooked-­ timber vision calls for humility to offset the natural bentness of humans, whereas Romanticism tends toward a me-centeredness that adores and trusts the self, perhaps too much. Despite the strong cultural forces emphasizing individualism, psychological science has seen a recent surge in research on the virtue of humility. A PsycINFO search on January 1, 2016, revealed, in two-year increments, an accelerating number of indexed publications on “humility” over the past two decades (see Table 0.1). Several conclusions are clear. First, there is substantial existing theoretical and empirical work on humility. Second, the pace is accelerating. Third, the acceleration began about the time of the onset of the positive psychology movement (1999–2000), although the vast majority of empirical work on humility has occurred within the past five years. The first decade of the positive psychology movement (approximately 2000 to 2010) focused on a variety of positive mood states such as subjective well-being or gratitude. Even work on more communal virtues such as forgiveness was often justified based on

Table 0.1  Number of publications indexed in PsycINFO for “humility” in two-year increments Years

Number of publications in each period

Average annual publications in the period

1900–1995 1996–1997 2000–2001 2002–2003 2004–2005 2006–2007 2008–2009 2010–2011 2012–2013 2014–2015

211 11 27 50 79 107 132 159 220 282

2.1 5.5 13.5 25.0 39.5 53.5 66.0 79.5 110.0 141.0

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individualistic reasons, such as the benefits of forgiveness to individual physical and mental health. But a number of researchers appear to have realized the limitation of focusing on individualistic virtues without also attending to the quality of social bonds that tie us together in relationships and communities. This increase in other-oriented rather than self-focused virtues has accompanied increased work on humility. How Can You Benefit from Reading This Book on Humility? This book brings together the major writers and researchers who have written about humility, both theoretically and empirically. We have invited authors who study humility to reflect on the literature that has accumulated in their particular area of expertise. Some writers focus on the nitty-gritty of what humility is and what it is related to. Others reflect on the applications of humility in various contexts, including psychotherapy, organizations, religious institutions, and politics. As such, each chapter not only summarizes existing research, but also discusses implications for psychological and mental health practitioners. This is an academic book of thoughtful reviews on the science of humility. However, given the rapid changes toward individualism, which cut across all areas of life—including work, love, family, sexuality, and spirituality—we will not be too surprised if future works draw on this volume as a primary resource for understanding and translating the science of humility to a popular audience. Our goal is to provide the definitive source of theoretical and empirical integration of scholarship on humility at this moment in this juncture of cultures. Thus, we believe that this book could influence people far beyond academic researchers in a narrow subfield of psychology. In fact, humility— with its emphasis on accurate self-perception, modest self-portrayal, and other-oriented relational stance, as well as a penchant for showing up (or hiding) when egos are strained—is at the core of a cluster of virtues that bind society together, including love, compassion, forgiveness, altruism, generosity, gratitude, and empathy. All of those virtues have at their base the other-orientedness that is facilitated by humility. We are writing this book for helping professionals, religious leaders, business leaders, and people who want to see more peace in their relationships, communities, countries, and the world. Five Essential Questions To guide your reading throughout these chapters, we present five foundational questions that we believe are important to understanding the science and practice of humility.

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everett l. worthington, jr., et al. Essential Question #1: What Is Humility?

When a scientific field is new, many battles are fought over the best definition to use. Indeed, definitions are one of the fountainheads of knowledge, and how a researcher defines a construct often leads to asking different scientific questions. In the field of humility, authors still debate how to best define it. One question to think about in the forthcoming chapters is how to best define humility to allow scientific investigation to proceed rapidly. Are there certain characteristics that are common across most or all definitions? To explore how the various authors in this book define humility, we have asked each author to begin their chapter with their definition of humility (or at least clearly include their definition before the chapter’s end). We personally believe that humility has three core aspects. First, humility involves an accurate assessment of self, including an awareness of one’s limitations. Second, humility involves a modest self-presentation. Humble individuals are not only honest in their self-assessment but seek to be honest in their self-presentation. Third—and this is perhaps the most controversial aspect of our definition—we believe that humility involves an interpersonal stance that is other-oriented rather than self-oriented. Essential Question #2: Are There Different Types of Humility? Humility is best observed in contexts where it is difficult to act humbly. Just as courage is difficult to assess until someone is placed in danger and is fearful, and forgiveness is hard to evaluate until one is deeply hurt or offended, humility is best observed when the ego is placed under strain. Given that many different kinds of situations can strain the ego, our team has come to the conclusion that there are likely different types of humility, and people may not necessarily possess all types simultaneously. As you read, stay alert to different types of humility. Ask yourself whether you think the types of humility are unique or part of the same underlying construct. To the degree that they reflect the same underlying construct, a person could have general humility, which is a trait that extends across time, situations, varieties of ego strains, and types of humility. Or, to the extent that they are different, a person could have one type of humility but not others. For example, one type of humility that has received increased attention in recent years is intellectual humility, which includes an openness to modifying one’s ideas and to negotiating ideas fairly. A second type of humility is cultural humility, which involves remaining open to cultural diversity and seeing the value in people of different cultures. Related to intellectual and cultural humility, we observe that other areas of intellectual disagreement might include political identification

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and values (i.e., political humility). Because so much rests on politics, political humility might have an emotional overlay that some other types of humility might not have. Even more emotionally loaded might be the realm of religious convictions, practices, and commitments (i.e., religious humility). And depending on one’s relationship with what one believes to be sacred, one might have spiritual humility. It is an ongoing question and debate about how best to conceptualize the various types of humility. Essential Question #3: Can Humility Be Measured Accurately? Another important area of focus in any science involves the measurement of the central construct. Early researchers struggled with the measurement problem of humility. An early paper by Tangney (2000) observed the obvious—that self-report measures of humility might be invalid because the very act of reporting oneself to be “very humble” might be akin to bragging. On one hand, some researchers have begun to question this assumption and point out the lack of empirical evidence for the “problem” (e.g., Ashton et al., 2014; Davis & Hook, 2014). On the other hand, even if a problem with self-report measures does exist, there is a way forward. Indeed, many constructs in psychology require confirmation of self-reports from other sources. For example, there is a rich tradition within personality psychology of comparing the accuracy of self-reports, other-reports, and observation of behavior or reaction-based measures (e.g., Funder, 1995). Concerns about measuring humility using self-reports led investigators to develop several instruments (Davis et al., 2010). As reviewers describe what is known about humility in their respective research areas, often they draw from studies using one or two instruments. Pay close attention to the different measures of humility that investigators use. The items in a measure can predetermine what questions can and cannot be answered. Also, note whether there is agreement or disagreement among the sources of measurement. As research in the field of humility progresses, ideally there will be more consensus on how to best measure humility. Essential Question #4: What Are the Predictors and Sequelae of Humility? Humility has been linked with a variety of predictors, and several benefits are also associated with humility (e.g., personal, relational, and societal). Some predictors of humility are associated with the situation or context in which the behavior occurs. For example, situations characterized by conflict are likely to evoke nonhumble responses. Situations with high-demand characteristics for humility might lead to higher (e.g., hiring to work on a team, or being affiliated with an organization that emphasizes humility) or lower (e.g.,

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military situations, police training, sport performance for elite athletes, self-­ presentations to receive awards, etc.) self-ratings or behavioral expressions of humility. In addition to situational factors, personality characteristics such as agreeableness or conscientiousness might make humble behavior more likely. Besides research exploring predictors of humility, a growing body of research has begun to explore what might follow humble behavior. For example, what benefits (e.g., personally, relationally, or societally) might be associated with humility? On the other hand, might drawbacks or negative consequences follow humble behavior? Thus, an important area of research involves exploring the situations or personality characteristics that make humility more likely, as well as the benefits or consequences that follow humble behavior. Essential Question #5: Can Humility Be Developed? If humility is a virtue that can lead to benefits for individuals, relationships, and society, an important question is whether humility can be developed. And another is, if so, how can we best cultivate humility in our own lives, relationships, and communities? Currently, there are few empirical studies of humility interventions. There is a rich historical tradition of promoting humility within certain religious traditions such as Christianity, in which humility is a cardinal virtue (see Philippians 2: 1–11). Christian approaches have emphasized other-oriented humility that derives from spiritual humility (i.e., humility in relationship to God). Thus, disciplines like prayer, submission to legitimate authorities, self-sacrificial acts, and service have been taught as ways toward humility. Secular methods of building humility also are available—inspiring stories of heroic humility (Worthington, 2007; Worthington & Allison, 2016) and examples of persistent humility and service to others (e.g., Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Mother Teresa). Interventionists have begun to investigate ways of promoting humility scientifically, often drawing on traditional recommendations. Look for these as you read this book. Five Hypotheses about Humility In addition to the five essential questions, our team recently proposed five hypotheses that we hope will be helpful as you organize what you are learning in this book. Hypothesis 1: The Virtue and Vice Hypothesis Humility is related to other virtues such as empathy, altruism, forgiveness, gratitude, and self-regulation. Likewise, humility has been shown to be negatively correlated with certain vices, such as narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy (which comprise the so-called dark triad), self-absorption, narcissistic

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entitlement, high emotional reactivity (i.e., neuroticism), impression management, group dominance, right-wing authoritarianism, prejudice, antisocial behaviors, aggressive bullying, proclivity toward sexual harassment, deviant behaviors in the workplace, vengefulness, and the belief that the world is a competitive place. To what degree will you see evidence in the coming chapters for the virtue and vice hypothesis? Hypothesis 2: The Social Functioning Hypothesis Humility is (generally) a pro-social personality disposition. Humility strengthens most social bonds (social bonds hypothesis), promotes sacrifice for others (sacrifice-threshold hypothesis), buffers the social wear and tear of the competition on the relationships (social oil hypothesis), makes better leaders (humble-leader hypothesis), and yields more physically and mentally healthy partners (social health–transmission hypothesis). Look for ways these aspects of the social functioning hypothesis are or are not supported. Hypothesis 3: The Humility-Health Hypothesis To the extent that one is humble, one will experience better mental health and physical health outcomes. The mental and physical health benefits are hypothesized to accrue because humble people are likely to experience fewer disruptive negative interpersonal experiences and less interpersonal stress. Additionally, humble people have a disposition that is largely agreeable and conscientious. Indirectly, humility is related to better mental health, better relationships, and perhaps higher spirituality, all of which tend to have a positive impact on physical health. Seek evidence relevant to the humility-health hypothesis. Hypothesis 4: The Societal Peace Hypothesis If a society is composed of more humble citizens, the society is likely to be more socially just (due to the other-orientedness of humility), less combative (due to less offense taking, more awareness of one’s limitations, and more modesty, instead of provocatively presenting one’s position), and more valuing of diversity (due to the other-orientedness of humility). Do you find support for any or all of these? Hypothesis 5: The Satisfaction with Life Hypothesis Humility will help people evaluate their life as satisfying even if they do not rate it as necessarily happier than others. Some humble people might be rejected by people who want them to fit in, might not pursue temporal pleasures that might make them happier, or might sacrifice for others excessively (e.g., care of elders with dementia). In those cases, people may rate their lives as satisfying but not happy. Is this hypothesis supported?

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everett l. worthington, jr., et al. Other Important (But Perhaps Not Essential) Questions

1. Are many people today—and we might ask this in particular about psychotherapy clients—actually concerned with being more humble? Are people open to a wider cultural conversation about humility? Would clients be open to interventions to promote humility? Or is the orientation toward the self, so evident in the Boomers and the Millennials, something that might result in complete alienation if a therapist suggested humility as a goal of psychotherapy? 2. Would more knowledge about humility fulfill legitimate needs? In examining the types of humility noted earlier, it is clear that we need to know more about them. Would that knowledge be considered useful or a mere exercise engaged in by ivory-tower academicians? 3. If people were more religiously humble, would there be less religious conflict and violence? Religious humility speaks to the tensions that have recently intensified between radical Muslims—both within Islam and in opposition to other religions and people in secular societies. But aggression, violence, discrimination, and prejudice are not just present in radical Muslims. Those destructive tendencies permeate almost all religions and secular societies. Moderate and radical Muslims need to be in dialogue with each other to work out positions that moderate violence and prevent reactions against Islam. Muslims and people of other religions (or those embracing no faith perspective) also need to be in dialogue. From reading the chapters, can you make practical suggestions about how people of various faiths might increase religious humility? 4. If people were more politically humble, might we have less gridlock in Washington, fewer political struggles within nations, and fewer wars? Political humility is also necessary for a civil society. In the United States, the Democrats and Republicans have become increasingly polarized. Even within parties, polarizations have sprouted. Understanding how humility might help mitigate polarization has important implications for thriving and peaceful governments around the world. Can you find practical ways that political humility might be promoted? 5. If people were more intellectually humble, might we be able to share ideas, find win-win solutions to problems, and be less intellectually arrogant? Intellectual humility is necessary to have civil conversations and discussions that advance knowledge. Ideally, intellectual communities gradually work to correct biases, but this is not inevitable. Intellectual humility in individuals, as well as structures and processes, can help prevent communities from becoming increasingly entrenched. Can you see

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ways to change communities as well as help individuals transform their own perspectives to promote additional intellectual humility? 6. If people were more culturally humble, might they be able to improve international relations, make international business run more smoothly, and have better relations among the races? Cultural humility is necessary for dealing effectively with multinational corporations, with the travel industry, in interacting and exchanging information across cultures, and within fields such as the helping professions in which a professional must understand the problems of many individuals from many different cultural backgrounds. In addition, recent years have seen a surfacing of racial and ethnic tensions and violence in the civil arena. How can we heal these ruptures in our social fabric? Does cultural humility provide an opening for a different conversation that allows both sides to consider their own misdeeds and contributions to the public conversations? 7. If people were more relationally humble, might they have better relationships? Relational humility refers to one’s ability and capacity to prioritize the needs of the relationship. Thus, it is shaped differently in different types of relationships. It requires being sympathetic to the other person in the relationship and seeking to consider his or her fundamental needs, then, being other-oriented, shaping our behavior to elevate the other person’s agenda. It involves creating a context in which sacrificing for the relationship becomes self-reinforcing because both partners invest heavily and appreciate each other. Thus, investing in the relationship becomes mutually reinforcing, as both partners grow in commitment and both enjoy giving to the relationship. Humility gives relationships the potential to thrive. Can you see ways in which relationships might be improved through partners cultivating more relational humility? Research Agendas for Humility The quantity and quality of research on humility has consistently accelerated over the last 15 years, as you will see upon reading the chapters in this volume. Numerous researchers are doing work on humility, but even more exciting, young researchers are looking for a field to which to devote their work. Many of those seasoned and young researchers write within these pages. Studying humility and providing more knowledge about it is a noble task. Part of the scientific study in any field is that problems are identified and solved and new problems are then identified. These new problems make up the research agendas identified in each chapter. As a reader, can you see additional research directions that the writers did not identify? Perhaps you can spot trends that synthesize research agendas from different chapters. Perhaps you can see critical fault

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lines between positions that need to be defined and exploited. And, of course, we all seem to filter our reading through our own research agenda, so how do the suggestions throughout the book stimulate new ideas you can apply in your own work? The supply of research on humility and demand to know more about humility are coalescing. The field needs consolidation so that researchers have clear research agendas to guide the next generation of theories, research instruments, and studies. We invite you to read actively, having your mind and heart engaged so that you, too, can make a contribution (or additional contributions) to this emerging field. Perhaps you will be drawn to a particular question, type of humility, or arena for application. Perhaps you will become a researcher or thoughtful scholar. Perhaps you will be an activist who can transform political, religious, or relationship conflict. We believe that the following pages provide invitations for thought, and we are glad you are on this journey with us. Organization of the Book We now lay out the logic of the book’s chapters by summarizing each part. We do not try to provide equal-length mini-abstracts for the chapters. Rather, we just hint at what you might find in each. Part I: Theory, Definitions, and Measurement After this present introductory chapter, we jump right into exploring the meaning of humility. We begin with voices from other disciplines that have been thinking about and discussing humility for several years—philosophy and religion. Both philosophers make distinctions between humility and competitors. Philosopher Murphy (Chapter 1) draws a distinction between a kind of degraded humility that most people find morally disgusting and a kind of admirable humility that involves a moral value. In modern times, many people turn up their noses at the idea of humility, and Murphy argues that perhaps that contempt might be for the wrong kind of humility, not humility as a moral value. He thinks of humility as involving three separate parts: focused attention, a strong sense of the role of luck in one’s own life, and empathy or compassion. Roberts and Cleveland (Chapter 2) regard humility as an intelligent lack of concern for self-importance. They acknowledge that theirs is a controversial view among philosophers. They distinguish their view from humility as understood to be such things as small-mindedness, low self-esteem, low ambition, restraint of undue ambition, dogmatic ignorance of one’s excellence, nonoverestimation in self-evaluation, owning one’s limitations, and inattention to one’s virtues. Roberts and Cleveland suggest—and we agree—that philosophical work is a crucial stage in any empirical investigation of a new construct.

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Religions have also thought long about what forgiveness is. Porter (Chapter 3) is joined by five religious scholars who describe humility and its importance from the viewpoint of the five major world religious. These summaries help educate all of us in this age of religious pluralism—and promote understanding needed for us to develop more religious humility. At the end of the chapter, Porter wraps up the summaries with an integrative and critical discussion. He concludes several things. First, humility seems to be a universally appreciated positive trait that is needed by people and that derives from a transcendent view, usually provided by religion—which raises the question of whether humility can be experienced and understood outside of a religion. Second, these religions seem to agree that humility does not involve a low view of self, but rather an accurate view of self. Next, we have contributions on what is known about different types of humility. Church and Barrett (Chapter 4), in discussing intellectual humility, tentatively suggest a surprising and provocative twist on what general humility might be. Political humility (Chapter 5) is discussed by Worthington. In today’s polarized political climates in many countries (and between countries), the development of political humility might—if it could happen—move us a notch toward more peace in the world. Mosher and his colleagues (Chapter 6) discuss cultural humility. The importance of respecting different cultures has become a hallmark of the early decades of the twenty-first century, so this chapter is extremely timely. Davis and his colleagues (Chapter 7) provide a discussion of relational humility—which assumes that to talk about humility always implies an observer, either the self or another person. Relational humility, then, is about humility specific to particular relationships and thus, for many of us, is the most relevant of all types of humility. We aren’t all involved in intellectual, political, religious, or even cultural debate. But we are all in multiple relationships, and perhaps more relational humility might prevent some social grenades from exploding more relationships more often. To round out the section on Humility 101, Hill and his colleagues (Chapter 8) share a comprehensive review of the potentials and pitfalls of ways of measuring humility. Measurement is at the heart of understanding in science, so this is a crucial topic for keeping abreast of and making sense of scientific findings about humility. Part II: Predictors, Correlates, and Sequelae of Humility Leman and his colleagues (Chapter 9) review research describing personality predictors and correlates of humility. Much of this research has used the HEXACO-PI (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Leman et al. describe the HEXACO model of personality. They note associations of honesty-humility with psychopathy, risk taking, and antisocial processes. They also summarize positive associations

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between humility and prosocial processes like cooperation and forgiveness. They review findings using other measures of humility in light of some measurement issues. Van Tongeren and Myers (Chapter 10) tackle the other end of the situationperson array of causes, examining a social psychological view of humility by beginning with the common finding of a positive self-attributional tendency. They examine motivations, biases, and functions of such biases in regulating relationships. They describe ways to reduce the self-enhancing bias. Green and his colleagues (Chapter 11) use interdependence theory (Thibault & Kelley, 1959) to delve into the situational aspects of humility, namely relationship factors involved in whether people act humbly or not. They describe humility as a transformative relational process whereby individuals move beyond selfish preferences to consider their close partner’s well-being, thus building commitment, trust, relationship satisfaction, and persistence in relationships. Toussaint and Webb (Chapter 12) and Leach and Ajibade (Chapter 13) consider mental and physical health and spiritual health, respectively. Both chapters address the correlations with humility but also the consequences or sequelae of humility. Humility has a number of positive effects on individuals. Most of those involve better mental health. There is a surprising lack of research on humility and physical health even though that is an important connection. Leach and Ajibade demonstrate how humility has proceeded from spiritual stances and how spiritual humility can also be a necessary way of enhancing one’s spiritual life. In addition, spiritual humility can be affected by and can affect relationships, which are related indirectly to better mental and physical health. The sequelae of and consequences of humility—properly understood (harken back to Chapters 1, 2, and 3 on the other-discipline perspectives on humility as well as the way authors have defined humility throughout)—seem largely positive, though it is clearly not always positive. Part III: Applications of Humility to Relationships and Treatment Humility can be promoted or cultivated (1) to enhance and enrich relationships, people, or organizations; (2) to help resolve difficulties in relationships, people, or organizations; or (3) to prevent problems from developing. In this third part of the book, authors consider how applications that promote or invite humility might look. To start considering applications, we observe the well-known statement attributed to Freud that normal people can do two things more facilely than can people with psychological difficulties—to work and to love. So, we begin with Dik and his colleagues (Chapter 14), who have studied humility in the context of career development. Bridging the gap between enhancing and remediating, their insights could be used to enhance career

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performance or to aid in career counseling. Garthe and her co-authors (Chapter 15) have used the vulnerability-stress-coping model as an integrative framework to view the social oil hypothesis, which helps us apply how to get along in romantic, family, friendship, and (yes) work relationships. DeWall (Chapter 16) considers humility in writing for and speaking to large undergraduate populations about scientific subjects. The importance of both intellectual honesty and modesty of one’s scientific claims is stressed, as well as the importance of recognizing that being a teacher can influence students toward higher virtue. Wallace and her colleagues (Chapter 17) discuss the role of humility throughout organizations. This involves humility in leaders, teams, and workers. There are times when humility is called for in organizational life. But there are also times when it might hurt organizations and damage the productivity of the organizations. Wallace et al. explore these conditions. Two research teams have considered direct interventions to boost humility. Ruberton and his colleagues (Chapter 18) have studied states of humility, what can influence them, and what influences they have. They argue that treating humility as a state can enhance research on immediate causes and correlates of humility. There might be conditions in which being in a humble state might affect relationship outcomes. This team has investigated brief interventions to promote self-affirmation, gratitude, and awe. People having those experiences increase self-esteem, reduce self-focused defensiveness, deflect focus from the self to the importance and value of others, increase self-concept accuracy, and promote connectedness to others. On the other end of the spectrum, Lavelock and her colleagues (Chapter 19) describe a randomized controlled trial and replication that increased trait humility using a seven-hour self-directed workbook. Importantly, though, the humility exercises also increased forgiveness, self-control, and patience and decreased trait negativity without addressing these qualities directly in the intervention. All of the interventions in the first half of Part III are aimed at enhancing people’s experiences through promoting humility. However, it is also possible to promote humility with a therapeutic mind-set. Chapters by Davis and Cuthbert (Chapter 20), Sandage and colleagues (Chapter 21), and Drinane and her colleagues (Chapter 22) examine humility within psychotherapy. We find that humility is a virtue that permeates the psychotherapy process. Davis and Cuthbert look at humility as a facilitative quality for psychotherapists. To help patients, psychotherapists must have the humility to listen and not assume they know the person just because they know the person’s diagnosis. Sandage and et al. consider humility throughout the conduct of psychotherapy. Drinane et al. consider what happens when offenses involving various identities (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, or religion), called

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microaggressions, occur in psychotherapy (and in broader social contexts). For those involved in psychotherapy, couple and family counseling, pastoral counseling, or even lay helping, humility is a must. In Chapter 23, Griffin and his colleagues consider humility’s role in preventing (and treating) service-related moral injuries that people experience by being pressured into acts that violate their own inner moral standards. Humility is seen as a resilience-promoting, harm-inhibiting quality that can help people be immune to some moral dilemmas, treat moral failures that have occurred, and prevent problems from lasting, even when they have been experienced. Following these chapters that have described research on humility, in the epilogue, we will revisit our essential questions and core hypotheses. We will try to draw conclusions to firm up, synthesize, and supplement much of the learning you gained by your reading. And, we might even provide some insights that you did not think about in your engaged reading of the chapters. Moving Forward We hope you find this book to be both interesting and useful. Leading scholars from several disciplines have contributed and offer their unique perspectives on the topic of humility. It is interesting to see the connections and themes across chapters and also to note the unique offerings from each writing team. Instead of calling our last section of this chapter a traditional “Conclusion,” we know that this is actually just the beginning of your expansion of knowledge and understanding about humility. References Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 150–166. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & de Vries, R. E. (2014). The HEXACO Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, and Emotionality factors: A review of research and theory. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18, 139–152. Brooks, D. (2015). The road to character. New York, NY: Random House. Davis, D. E., & Hook, J. N. (2014). Measuring humility and its positive effects. APS Observer, 26(8). http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2013/ october-13/measuring-humility-and-its-positive-effects.html Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(4), 243–252. Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach. Psychological Review, 102, 652–670. Kant, I. (1784). Idea for a general history with a cosmopolitan point of view. Proposition 6. Translation by Lewis White Beck. From Immanuel Kant, “On History,” Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963. Lasch, C. (1979). The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

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Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19(1), 70–82. Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York, NY: Wiley. Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today’s young Americans are more confident, assertive, and entitled—and more miserable than ever before (revised and updated). New York: Atria Paperback. Wolfe, T. (1976, August 23). The “Me” decade and the third great awakening. New York Magazine. Retrieved December 21, 2015, from http://nymag.com/news/features/45938/ index1.html Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2007). Humility: The quiet virtue. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press. Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Allison, S. T. (in press). Heroic humility: What the science of humility can say to people raised on self-focus. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Part I T H E O R Y, D E F I N I T I O N S , AND MEASUREMENT

1 H U M I L I T Y A S A M O R A L V I RT U E Jeffrie G. Murphy

I have spent most of my academic career writing on the philosophy of punishment and related issues such as mercy and forgiveness. So when I was asked to contribute an essay to a volume on humility, I was surprised at being asked and unsure that I could bring to bear my own scholarly expertise and focus to the topic. After some reflection, however, I came to think that many of the things that I find morally deplorable about America’s so-called system of criminal justice (Murphy, 2014) can in part be explained by a lack of humility, and so I was drawn to considering humility in more depth and in a context not limited in scope to criminal law. Humility is a complex concept that cries out for interdisciplinary inquiry. Psychology and the brain sciences have much to teach us about what can be learned through controlled empirical inquiry, but I think that the humanities have much of value to teach us about humility as well. This, at any rate, will be my assumption in what follows as I bring to bear both philosophy and imaginative literature as sources of illumination on the topic. Unlike scientists, philosophers tend not to open their discussions with a formal definition of the concept in question, since a central part of their inquiry is to understand the concept in all its messy detail. A definition of sorts might emerge at the close of their inquiry, but to start with one risks (to use Herbert Hart’s fine phrase) “uniformity at the price of distortion” (Hart, 1994, p. 38). One thing that philosophers tend to do, as a part of their conceptual analysis, is to draw distinctions. Indeed, one of my first philosophy teachers said that the drawing of distinctions is the occupational disease—perhaps even the occupation—of philosophers, so I will begin by suggesting that several different things can be meant by “humility” and that different conceptions of the value of humility will depend upon which sense of “humility” one has in mind. I will here have space to draw just one distinction—a distinction between a kind of degraded humility that most of us now deplore and a kind of admirable humility that will be the primary object of my inquiry in this essay. There are those who have contempt for humility and it is very likely that what I have called the degraded kind is what they have in mind.

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jeffrie g. murphy Uriah Heep: Humility as Behavioral Servility

Consider, as one example of humility, the kind of humility embodied in the character of Uriah Heep in Charles Dickens’s novel David Copperfield. Most current readers of this novel find Heep, in his fawning and manipulative claims of being “’umble,” loathsome—a man who gives them the creeps. His kind of humility certainly does not make him a decent person—indeed, quite the ­contrary—and he certainly would not be used as an example of humility by those who claim that humility is a virtue. Of course, there are those who would like to see humility as an unambiguous virtue and always use the word “humility” as an honorific designation. They will say that Heep is not truly humble at all, that he is simply faking humility for his own advantage and that it is a misuse of language by him and others to call him humble. I think that this move is too quick and a mistake. In highly class divided societies people of lower social orders will be expected to be extremely deferential and even obsequious to their “betters” and will be criticized—or even dismissed from service—for lacking what will be called (with, given the norms of the day, no misuse of language) appropriate humility. This is a behavioral and not an internal conception of humility. Heep, given his lower class origins, in this sense really does truly regard himself as humble; and he is in fact humble in this behavioral sense. What he has learned, alas, is that his kind of humility—a humility that causes him to seethe with resentment at those with class power over him—can lull his “betters” into a false sense of security to such a degree that he can manipulate and steal from them. He captures this very well as he describes what he was taught as humility in his childhood and “education”: How little you think of the rightful ’umbleness of a person in my station, Master Copperfield! Father and me was both brought up at a foundation school for boys; and mother, she was likewise brought up at a public, sort of charitable, establishment. They taught us all a great deal of ’­umbleness— not much else that I know of, from morning to night. We was to be ’umble to this person, and ’umble to that; and to pull off our caps here, and to make bows there; and always to know our place, and abase ourselves before our betters. And we had such a lot of betters!. . . . ‘Be ’umble, Uriah’ says father to me, ‘and you will get on. It was what was always being dinned into you and me at school; and it’s what goes down best. Be ’umble,’ says father, ‘and you’ll do!’ And really it ain’t done bad! (Dickens, 1983, p. 639)

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When made more fully aware of Heep’s background and the way in which this background has formed his personality, many people will become less harsh in their judgments of him, and may even come to pity him. They will at least think that simply describing him as loathsome does not do justice to the moral complexity of his character and situation. Humility as a Cluster Virtue My view is that it is a different and morally valuable kind of humility that allows us to revise the hasty negative judgments we are initially inclined to make about people such as Heep and to scale back the suffering, if any, we may think they deserve. I will suggest that this humility involves three main aspects: attention, a strong sense of the role that luck has played in one’s own life, and empathy or compassion. Since each of these aspects can be regarded as themselves virtues, I am inclined to view humility as what might be called a “cluster virtue”—a virtue to be analyzed as composed of all three of these. They can, of course, bleed into each other, but I think it is useful at the outset to sharply distinguish them. Immanuel Kant and Iris Murdoch Before exploring these three virtues (by which I mean a trait that makes a person possessing it a better and more admirable person than if he did not), let me first indicate the philosophical framework that will guide my thinking about them and their relation to humility. This framework is essentially Kantian (with some assistance from Iris Murdoch, 1971) and will draw primarily on Kant’s thoughts expressed in his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1960) and his Doctrine of Virtue (1996). I have also been influenced by Jeanine Grenberg (2005) for both an excellent survey of the philosophical literature on humility and a rich discussion of Kant’s contribution to our understanding of that topic, and by Norvin Richards (1992) for the best general philosophical introduction to the topic of humility as a virtue. Central to my largely (but not exclusively) Kantian account of humility is his doctrine of Radical Evil (Kant, 1960). Although the phrase “Radical Evil” is now generally used to refer to mass atrocities such as the Holocaust, this is not Kant’s usage. By “Radical Evil” Kant means a depravity inherent in all human nature. Such evil is, in essence, the unavoidable tendency within all human beings to subordinate morality to the demands of what Kant calls “the dear self.” I do not think that by the phrase “the dear self” Kant means merely ordinary selfishness of a kind that seeks to promote the welfare or happiness of the person engaging in the conduct itself—although this is certainly a part of

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it. I believe he would also include those who act, even at considerable cost to personal happiness and well-being in the ordinary sense, out of loyalty to evil principles—a Nazi soldier, for example, who remains at his post that is under attack from Allied forces and willingly suffers painful wounds and ultimately death to make sure that a final trainload of Jews is sent on its way to the extermination camp at Auschwitz. This is still an act corrupted by the “dear self,” however, since it represents an act of a self (a self of evil although principled desires) that has chosen to follow its own desires without properly subjecting those desires to appropriate moral scrutiny and having them vetoed on the basis of such scrutiny. Such Radical Evil can never be totally overcome by human beings (it is a kind of secular equivalent to a doctrine of original sin without the bizarre notion of inherited guilt), but its impact can be constrained to some degree by the three virtues constitutive of humility that I noted earlier. Let me now briefly explore each of these. Attention One of the most moving passages in Shakespeare’s King Lear, at least for me, is when old Lear—suffering on the storm-tossed heath the torments of lost status, abandonment by family, hunger, and bitter cold—has an epiphany of self-­ transformation when he notices (for the first time in his life) the suffering of others, sees an equality with them, and seeks to assist them in the small ways he still has available to him. He says to his Fool (1997, p. 298): In, boy, go first—You houseless poverty— Nay, get thee in. I’ll pray, and then I’ll sleep. Poor naked wretches, whereso’er you are, That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm, How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides, Your loop’d and window’d raggedness, defend you From seasons such as these? O, I have ta’en Too little care of this! Take physic, pomp; Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, That thou mayst shake the superflux to them, And show the heavens more just. (Act III, Scene 4) Being aware only of his status and power as king, Lear had previously never even noticed those around him as people of a moral worth and dignity equal to his own. If he paid any attention to them at all, it was only to see them as useful

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for his amusement or service—to see them, in Kant’s language, as means only and never as ends in themselves. The philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch, influenced by Simone Weil, made the concept of attention central in her analysis of morality. By speaking of attention, Murdoch did not mean simply superficially noticing other people as bodies to be ordered around, ignored, or even mistreated—depending on one’s whims of the moment—but attempting to see each person in depth and as sympathetically as possible. She refers to this kind of attention as just and loving attention, and gives a rich example of such attention in an often-quoted passage. She describes a mother, M, who initially feels hostility to her daughterin-law, D, regarding her as lacking in refinement and dignity—pert, familiar, brusque, rude, tiresomely juvenile. But then: Time passes, and it could be that M settles down with a hardened sense of grievance and a fixed picture of D. . . . However, the M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts her. M tells herself: “I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again.” Here I assume that M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters. . . . D is discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on. (Murdoch, 1971, p. 17) Of course this attempt to see in a good light what appear to be a person’s bad qualities will not always work. The person’s qualities may really be bad. But to at least try is an important kind of humility—to have as one’s primary disposition an attempt to see others at their best and not at their worst. We would all welcome this applied by others to our own case, and the world would be better—less hard and cruel—if this disposition became common. Not everyone possesses this disposition of just and loving attention, of course, but I think it is a virtuous trait in those who have it (as Lear came to have it) and is one that those who do not have should at least attempt to acquire. How one might make such an attempt will be discussed later in this essay. Recognition of Luck There is often deep insight in clichés, and one such insight is to be found in “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” Many people who have attained a certain level of success and happiness in their lives—money, status, professional, or

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athletic accomplishments, etc.—have a tendency to overestimate their level of actual desert for these accomplishments and thus fail to see the role played in them by what John Rawls called “luck on the natural and social lottery” (Rawls, 1971, pp. 74–75). The circumstances of one’s natural genetic endowment, upbringing, and education; the fact that important mentors gave their favors to them rather than others; and many other factors over which these people had no control played a significant role in what they have accomplished. This does not mean that they should take no legitimate pride in what they have done with the hand they were dealt, but an awareness of all this good luck should make them avoid taking excessive pride in their accomplishments and have the insight and modesty to give thanks for the good fortune that helped to make them possible. Many such people, however, not only feel no gratitude for their good fortune but come to think that their status or accomplishments make them somehow better as human beings than ordinary people. As the recent scandalous behavior of successful athletes illustrates, they may come to feel a special sense of entitlement to do things that mere mortals should not be allowed to do. And the larger celebrity-worshiping society itself, alas, often gives them a pass on their behavior. Even within the academic and business and legal worlds we often find this attitude present in those of great fame and accomplishment—not universal by any means, but more prevalent than it should be. One of the worst ways in which such a self-perception of entitlement can manifest itself is the presence of a smug sense of such purity and superiority that such people begin to hold others who are poor or who have done wrong (such as Uriah Heep) in total contempt, happily accepting for them suffering out of all proportion to what—all things considered—they actually deserve. We see this in America in the attitude of many people toward those who are poor or who have committed crimes—dismissing the former as nothing but “welfare chislers” and advocating (or at least being totally indifferent to) excessive punishments or unspeakable prison conditions for the latter as no more than what they deserve. Finally, it is all too common for those who have not done certain wrongs to feel an unjustified certainty that they are righteous and thus can hold in utter contempt those who have fallen. If one seeks to persuade them to soften their harshness by reminding them of Jesus’s counsel to “let him who is without sin among you be the first to cast a stone at her” ( John 8:7), they will simply respond “but I am without sin with respect to the kind of sin found in drug dealers, rapists, torturers, and murderers so it is perfectly OK for me to cast the stones.” They say this without any consideration of the possibility that, had they had the opportunity and the temptation, they might have done things just as

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bad, and that it is not for nothing that the Lord’s Prayer contains the plea “Lead us not into temptation.” They are rather like those who, never having been in battle or endured torture, smugly condemn as “cowards” or “traitors” those who run from battle or who cooperate with the enemy under torture. Consider as an example of descent from virtue into depravity the confession of Doctor Miranda in Ariel Dorfman’s powerful play Death and the Maiden. Miranda had for many years been a conscientious physician and family man—a generally kind person. He was then asked to serve as a physician for interrogation sessions under the dictatorial regime then in power. (We are to imagine that this is Chile under Pinochet.) His role is to make sure that the interrogation is not so severe that those being interrogated will be rendered incapable of cooperation or even killed. Since it was not really possible to refuse such a request under the regime in power, he agreed and thought that his task was consistent with his role as a physician. He was at first shocked by the torture and rape that took place in the sessions, but still believed that those being treated in this way were better off with his care than if he refused to play his physician role. Soon he began to be drawn into this web of evil, however, and became a rapist himself. He described the process of his descent into evil by saying that at first he told himself that he was just a doctor saving lives by making the torture stop if he thought it would lead to death. Eventually, however, he started to participate in the torture and rape himself, and found that he really liked the freedom of acting out every fantasy he had ever had with no fear of consequences and with the support and even encouragement of all of those he worked with and for. So here is a man who had spent most of his life as a decent human being and caring physician until, given circumstances in which he could do evil without restraint, he began raping, sodomizing, and otherwise torturing women—being able to say in his defense only that he had never killed any of them. Dorfman’s play is based on actual occurrences in Chile during the Pinochet regime. For those inclined to mistrust literature, however, some reflection on the famous Milgram Experiments would be in order (Milgram, 1974). In these experiments it was revealed that ordinary “nice” people would be willing to impose great pain upon others when normal social reinforcers against doing this were not present and when encouraged to do so by the authorities controlling the experiments. Also worth reading in this regard is Christopher R. Browning (1992) and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen (1996). In summary: Our excellences are often to some degree a function of good luck, and our goodness may be at least in part a function of our good luck in never being in circumstances that present irresistible temptations to evil. This should encourage a certain degree of humility but, given our great capacities

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for self-deception, it often will not. As Nietzsche famously said, “ ‘I have done that’ says my memory. ‘I cannot have done that’ says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually memory yields” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 81). Much of what I have tried to convey in this section has been well captured in this passage from Kant’s (1960) Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone: [People] may picture themselves as meritorious, feeling themselves guilty of no such offenses as they see others burdened with; nor do they ever inquire whether good luck should not have the credit, or whether by reason of the cast of mind which they could discover, if they only would, in their own in-most nature, they would not have practiced similar vices, had not inability, temperament, training, and circumstances of time and place which serve to tempt one (matters which are not imputable) kept them out of the way of these vices. This dishonesty, by which we humbug ourselves and which thwarts the establishing of a true moral disposition in us, extends itself outwardly also to falsehood and deception of others. If this is not to be termed wickedness, it at least deserves the name of worthlessness, and is an element of the radical evil of human nature, which (inasmuch as it puts out of tune the moral capacity to judge what a man is to be taken for, and renders wholly uncertain both internal and external attribution of responsibility) constitutes the foul taint of our race. (pp. 33–34) Iris Murdoch expressed a similar thought in saying, “We are all mortal and equally at the mercy of necessity and chance. These are the true aspects in which all men are brothers” (1971, p. 72). As a result of this susceptibility, we are all subject to failures of knowledge due to culpable failures of attention or insufficient appreciation of the role that luck has played in our lives—­particularly when we are judging the wrongs of others and what suffering we may think they deserve. This shows that what might be called epistemic humility is also an important part of the mix. In my own familiar context of criminal law, Judge Richard Posner (1995) has counseled caution and humility (without using the word) before making overly harsh judgments about prison inmates and what they deserve: There are different ways to look upon the inmates of prisons and jails in the United States . . . . One way is to look upon them as members of a different species, indeed as a type of vermin, devoid of human dignity and entitled to no respect. I do not myself consider the . . . inmates of American prisons and jails in that light. We should have a realistic conception of the

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composition of the prison and jail population before deciding that they are scum entitled to nothing better than what a vengeful populace and a resource-starved penal system chooses to give them. We must not exaggerate the distance between “us,” the lawful ones, the respectable ones, and the prison and jail population; for such exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny that population the rudiments of humane consideration. (p. 151) Empathy, Compassion, and the Acquisition of Humility I do not believe that one fully possesses the virtue of humility simply by an intellectual grasp of all that has previously been discussed in the present essay. As already indicated in Murdoch’s idea of “just and loving attention,” to be truly humble, in the sense in which humility is an important moral virtue, one must also develop the emotions—particularly empathy, compassion, and a disposition toward tolerance, forgiveness, and mercy—that should be the ultimate “payoff” of such intellectual understanding. But this, alas, is not always the case. So how is humility to be acquired by those for whom it is not already a part of their nature? I am not certain about any of this, but I do have what I think are some informed guesses. For people whose temperament and beliefs can find room for this, prayer might be a good place to start. By “prayer” I do not mean the kind of superstitious petitionary prayer in which one asks God for wealth or victory for one’s favorite football team. “Please, God, set aside the normal causal order of the universe in order to assist the petty desires of my dear self” reveals that the person making such a prayer radically lacks humility and is certainly not in this prayer on the road to it. I prefer Kierkegaard’s understanding of prayer—namely, that we pray not to change God but to change ourselves (Kierkegaard, 1956). Another possible route to humility might be to follow Lear’s advice and “expose thyself to feel what wretches feel.” One might do such things as volunteer at the kitchen of a shelter for the homeless or teach classes in prison. Such work might start as a dutiful chore but might gradually transform itself into a labor of love. When Jesus counseled that we visit those in prison (Matthew 25: 31–45), for example, he was surely in part concerned to show even very dangerous and malicious people who deserve to be in prison that we share a common humanity with them and are not giving up on them—in the hope that they will not give up on themselves and the possibility of their own moral rebirth (or, in religious terms, their own salvation). Aristotle claimed that virtues are to be acquired by a process of habituation: make oneself act regularly in a particular way, and very often one will find that the values behind the ritual become internalized and a part of one’s own

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character. Iris Murdoch (much more a Platonist than an Aristotelian) puts it this way: “Our ability to act well ‘when the time comes’ depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of attention”(Murdoch, 1971, p. 55). Now Kant (1996) again, this time from his Doctrine of Virtue : It is an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural . . . feelings in us. . . . It is therefore a duty not to avoid places where the poor, who lack the most necessary things, are to be found; instead it is a duty to seek them out. It is a duty not to shun sickrooms or prisons and so on in order to avoid the pain of pity, which one may not be able to resist. For this feeling, though painful, nevertheless is one of the impulses placed in us by nature for effecting what the representation of duty might not accomplish by itself. (pp. 575–576) Of course there are some people upon whom this will not work at all. But I know from my own family experience that it can work. My mother, prior to my father’s death, led a rather sheltered life. Although highly intelligent, she had no education beyond her high school education in a very small mill town in South Carolina and carried with her the kind of racial prejudices characteristic of that town and that time. She married my father and joined him during his 30-year career in the United States Navy. She was mainly a homemaker and parent—being a sole parent during the many times my father was at sea during times of war. She had few friends because socializing among Navy wives, at least at that time, involved a great deal of alcohol consumption and my mother did not drink. After my father died, economic necessity forced my mother to seek employment. Doing very well on a civil service examination, she was offered a position as a receptionist and initial intake worker at a public welfare agency. She reluctantly started the job with a general conception of the poor (particularly the black poor) as a bunch of lazy deadbeats. As she began to learn the nature of their lives through her conversations with them, however, she gradually came to see them in a much more enlightened and sympathetic way. She once even said to me, after telling me the sad story of a particularly needy client, “Were it not for the grace of God that could be me.” In addition to prayer and getting to know a wide variety of people and their circumstances, one more aid to acquiring humility and the empathy and compassion that should be a part of it can be found in aesthetic experience: art, music, nature, and particularly literature. All of these can take one out of oneself and provide at least moments of transcendence. Iris Murdoch (1971) goes so far as to claim that, “For both the collective and the individual salvation of

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the human race, art is doubtless more important than philosophy, and literature most important of all” (p. 33). Although this may seem a bit grandiose (and a bit self-serving coming from a novelist), I do think that her placement of literature ahead of philosophy is in this context a correct ordering, for only literature can give us vicarious experiences of many sorts of lives, lives far more varied than we could experience through personal contact. Of course, this will be of use in building humility and empathy only if one reads some literature about people other than people of one’s own sort. Richard Rorty, for example, has suggested that academics should not confine their reading (or class assignments) exclusively to “highbrow” literature (Henry James, for example) but should also consider novels such as Dorothy Allison’s Bastard out of Carolina—a novel of poverty in the American South (Rorty, 1996). Since it might seem that boosting literature as an aid for the acquisition of empathy could easily be dismissed as simply the occupational prejudice of a humanities scholar, I was pleased to see that the distinguished cognitive scientist Steven Pinker also sees the value of literature as an aid to the development of empathy and compassion. In his recent book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, he claims that “Empathy” in the sense of adopting another’s viewpoint is not the same as “empathy” in the sense of feeling compassion toward the person, but the first can lead to the second by a natural route . . . . Realistic fiction, for its part, may expand readers’ circle of empathy by seducing them into thinking and feeling like people very different from themselves. (Pinker, 2011, p. 175) But it also might not, of course, and the arts are no guaranteed road to humility or other forms of moral improvement. Hitler liked and had generally very good judgment about classical music, for example, but he seemed impervious to its moral usefulness. I suspect, however, that the arts work their wonders more frequently than they do not—particularly if introduced into the lives of the young before their personalities have hardened in undesirable ways. This would be a good issue for empirical investigation. At the mention of young people, it occurs to me that parenting surely also plays an important role in developing humility in the next generation. Although a good parent will want children to have self-respect, a child’s development of an absurdly high sense of entitlement is not desirable. Some schools and teachers still place such a strong emphasis on building self-esteem through praise and rewards for almost everything that there is a danger, exemplified alas in many of my college students, of a kind of self-esteem that is indistinguishable

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from arrogance—arrogance that makes them resent any grade lower than an A or even any criticism of their work. A Summing Up I have tried to make a brief start toward an understanding of the role that the virtue of humility (as I have analyzed it) plays in morality. I have explored obstacles to that virtue in terms of the dear self’s failures of attention; its self-deceptions concerning the limitations, shortcomings, and dependencies (and even the latent cruelty) present in all human beings; and—perhaps most important—its self-deceptions concerning the role that luck plays in the lives of us all. I have also attempted to sketch ways in which one might seek to attain or expand humility in one’s own character: prayer, interactions with disadvantaged people, and reading literature. Will all of these work for everyone? Of course not, since the dear self will constantly be at war with them and its power will vary from person to person, with no person entirely escaping its influence. So humility will be a matter of degree, with some more fully (but never perfectly) realizing the virtue than others. Let me emphasize one additional point: I do not regard the virtue of humility as incompatible with having pride in one’s accomplishments or in thinking that negative moral judgments and sometimes even punishments are appropriate for deserving others. It is rather that human beings very often take excessive credit for and pride in what they do and very often make overly harsh judgments of others’ wrongdoings and the level of punishment or other forms of suffering they may deserve for those wrongdoings. I thus see the virtue of humility mainly as a corrective for some very common and dangerous human vices. A Genius Exception? A Matter for Further Reflection What I have provided in this essay may easily be taken as a pious sermon in favor of humility as a virtue. This is indeed what it is, but as such it leaves me with just a bit of uneasiness. This uneasiness arose when I read this remark by the writer V. S. Pritchett: “Let the academics weigh up, be exhaustive, build their superstructures . . . . The artist lives as much by his pride in his own emphases as by what he ignores; humility is a disgrace” (quoted in Amis, 2015, p. 1). If arrogance is indeed a vice, must we not—if truly honest with ourselves—admit that we are glad that there are people who have this vice if it is instrumental in producing their works of creative genius? To adapt an example from Bernard Williams, are we not glad—all things considered—that Gauguin had the arrogance to abandon his wife and family and live in Tahiti because he thought his artistic genius would flourish there—where indeed it did (Williams, 1981)?

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According to Williams, this makes our overall assessment of Gauguin a function of nonmoral values (artistic values in this case) and also a function of luck, since if it had turned out that he became a second-rate artist we would not have a positive assessment of the value of his decision. As illustrated by Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, it is a common self-deception to think that one is exceptionally gifted when one is not. It takes humility not to make this assumption about oneself, but it also takes humility to acknowledge that one is grateful that some truly gifted others have not been humble in this way. The issue does not have to involve an artist, of course. What if a great general is able to win an important battle and save our country in part because of his arrogant and even bullying personality—and even a certain willingness to deceive, manipulate, and humiliate others? Will we not be glad that this general had the considerable moral failings that he did if we think that, with a different personality, he would have been less effective as a general? For those who are inclined, as I am, to view the world in moral terms, it is hard to admit that I am glad that Gauguin made the choice that he did. But I am glad, and this disquiets me—as perhaps it will disquiet some of my readers. Williams (1981, p. 23) puts it this way: While we are sometimes guided by the notion that it would be the best of worlds in which morality were universally respected and all men were of a disposition to affirm it, we have in fact deep and persistent reasons to be grateful that it is not the world we have. I leave my reader with an invitation to think more about this. References Amis, M. (2015, April 27). “There is simply too much to think about”—Saul Bellow’s non-­ fiction. New York Times Sunday Book Review. Browning, C. R. (1992). Ordinary men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland. New York, NY: Harper Collins. Dickens, C. (1983). David Copperfield. New York, NY: Penguin. Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). Hitler’s willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York, NY: Knopf. Grenberg, J. (2005). Kant and the ethics of humility. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The concept of law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Kant, I. (1960). Religion within the limits of reason alone. New York, NY: Harper Collins. Kant, I. (1996). The doctrine of virtue (Pages 507–603 of Kant’s Practical philosophy. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Kierkegaard, S. (1956). Purity of heart is to will one thing. New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York, NY: Harper and Row. Murdoch, I. (1971). The sovereignty of good. London, England: Routledge.

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Murphy, J. G. (2014, July 26). “In the penal colony” and why I am now reluctant to teach criminal law. Criminal Justice Ethics. Nietzsche, F. (1989). Beyond good and evil. New York, NY: Vintage Books. Pinker, S. (2011). The better angels of our nature. New York, NY: Viking. Posner, R. (1995). Chief Judge dissenting in Johnson v Phelan, 69 F. 3d 144 (1995). Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press at the Belknap Press. Richards, N. (1992). Humility. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Rorty, R. (1996). Duties to self and to others. Salmagundi, 111. Shakespeare, W. (1997). The complete plays—Tragedies. Bath, England: Folio Society Bath Press. Williams, B. (1981). Moral luck: Philosophical papers 1973–1981. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

2 HUMILITY FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW Robert C. Roberts and W. Scott Cleveland

Both the nature and value of humility are controversial in philosophy. Diverse and contrary definitions of humility abound. Some hold it to be a hindrance to a good life, whereas others hold it to be essential. Without denying the intuition of many that the word humility can be and is used by some people to denote a state of chronic shame or low self-esteem, lack of ambition, obsequiousness, servility, or small-mindedness (so there are kinds of humility that are character defects), we will here offer and defend an account of humility as an admirable, valuable trait. We will situate our view vis-à-vis rival views, most of which also take humility to be a virtue. Clarity about the nature of humility is vital for empirical research into the topic, and providing such clarity is the essentially philosophical part of empirical research into the trait. Defining Humility The virtue of humility is intelligent lack of concern for self-importance, where self-importance is construed as conferred by social status, glory, honor, superiority, special entitlements, prestige, or power. Let us explain this definition. We think that the handiest way to get to the concept of humility as a virtue is to focus on what we call the vices of pride. Traditionally, humility has been thought of as the contrary of pride. The Christian tradition, for example, has sometimes conceived pride as the chief of all sinful dispositions and humility as the opposite, as though the humble person can have no pride and the proud person no humility. David Hume (1888) also opposes humility and pride, but reverses the Christian evaluation, making pride the good thing and humility a kind of vice (one of the “monkish virtues”); Tara Smith, a contemporary disciple of Ayn Rand (see Rand, 1964), does something similar (Smith, 1998). We think that this black-and-white thinking about humility and pride is misconceived and that there are both good and bad traits that are called humility and good and bad traits that are called pride. There is not only vicious pride, but also such dispositions as pride in one’s work (the contrary of slovenliness);

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self-confidence (a can-do, will-to-be-heard attitude); authoritativeness in leadership; a sense of dignity; pride in one’s country, family, and children; aspiration to worthy ends; and no doubt others. These might be called the virtues of pride. The vices of pride, by contrast, include conceit, invidious pride (the pleasant counterpart of envy), vanity, arrogance, hyperautonomy (aspiring to be self-made), self-righteousness, haughtiness, and domination (the disposition to lord it over others). We think the virtue of humility is just the absence of the vices of pride. Sometimes we are asked how a virtue can be merely the absence of something bad. We think it’s somewhat like the absence of a flu virus: it’s just an absence, but a very desirable one because health is such a good thing. What do all the vices of pride have in common? What do people with the vices of pride all want? Our answer is that they want to be important in a very special way: the various vices of pride are all at root the concern to be self-important. Self-importance is not the same as importance. We all want to be important to our friends and family, and we all want a little importance in our work: we want to have contributed something. Also, self-importance is not the same as being important to yourself. To the tax collector who beat his breast and said “God have mercy on me a sinner” (Luke 18.9–14), the state of his self was very important; that’s why he was so sorry that it was such a mess. Jesus commended him for his self-concern, but condemned the self-righteous Pharisee for his. Self-­importance is the idea that people express when they say someone has a “big ego.” What do people who have a big ego want? Typically, they want such things as social status, glory, credit, adulating attention, honor, superiority, special entitlements, prestige, and power. Why do they want these things? They want them because these things make them important. It’s possible to want them for other reasons. For example, young academics might want the prestige that comes from publishing in excellent journals because they have a family to feed and the prestige is a way to a higher salary or a job that pays enough to feed the family. Or maybe they want it because it can lead to promotion and more opportunities to do the kind of research they want to do. Here they are seeking prestige not “for its own sake,” but for the sake of their family or research activity. But people with the vices of pride want such things because they make them self-­ important. But what are the marks of self-importance or the big ego? We think that most adults have an intuitive sense for what conceited, arrogant, and snobbish people care about, so we might just list the vices of pride and then say that self-importance is what people with those traits care about. The conceited person cares about being a big shot, the arrogant person cares about the entitlements that inflate his importance, the vain person cares about the adulation of others because they confer importance on her, the domineering person cares about controlling other people’s lives because it makes him feel big. We should

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note that the concern for self-importance can manifest itself in failure; we are not saying that the person who cares about self-importance always succeeds in getting the kind of importance that he desires. Wounded vanity, for example, in which the vain person feels small, is still based on a concern for self-importance. And the domineering person who gets angry or feels worthless because others don’t truckle to her efforts to control them is concerned for her self-importance. But let’s try to do better at defining self-importance than just to point to the list of vices of pride. It seems to us that the kind of importance that people with the vices of pride care about is comparative and noninstrumental. These seem to be two general features of self-importance. Exemplars of the vices of pride want to be more important than, or at least as important as, others, and they want this, not as a means to some other end, such as getting elected to office, creating a well-functioning organization, getting a raise, being an example to others, turning out excellent students, winning a game, or some such possibly worthy goal. Rather, exemplars of the vices of pride want this sort of superiority (or equality) “for its own sake” as we say, which means they want this superiority simply because it makes them superior. So self-importance is (usually) socially comparative importance. Consider some of the vices of pride. In his conceit, the conceited person thinks of himself, not just as important, but as comparatively so. So conceited persons have a tendency to feel contempt, at least mild, for the people to whom they conceive themselves as superior; they look “down” on them. Envy is notoriously comparative, and much of its nastiness is that the envier wishes ill or demotion for the person to whom she feels she’s losing the competition for importance. Envy is just the loser’s version of invidious pride, the very same competitive concern to be important by being superior to the other. Others don’t always cooperate in our quest for personal importance because they’re on a similar quest for comparative credit and power in the interest of their importance. And so we and they tend to construe them and us as rivals, and we land ourselves in the spirit world of Invidia. We construe our rivals’ excellence as our belittlement and their deficiency as our exaltation. In our minds we are elevated by their defeats and defeated by their elevations. When their defeats seem to elevate us, we feel the vicious triumph of invidious pride, and when their successes abase us in our eyes, we feel the vicious defeat of envy. To be invidious, the kind of superiority that the prideful individual prizes has to be noninstrumental. For example, athletes typically want to outdo their competitors, but this concern for superiority need not be invidious, because it can be teleologically subordinate to winning the game, which may be merely playful. Even when it gets “serious,” the desire for competitive superiority need not take pleasure in the other’s inferiority, nor need be focused in that way, and certainly need not have the character of contempt.

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In self-righteousness moral goodness and rectitude can become the material of our self-importance. Self-comparison is at the heart of this vice when we enjoy comparing ourselves with others whom we see as less upright than ourselves (less industrious, less relaxed, less tolerant, less rigorous, less liberal, less conservative, less wise, less pious, less enlightened, less frugal, and so forth) and so enjoy the feeling of our moral superiority. A related aspect of the concept of importance that dominates the vices of pride is credit, a preoccupation with getting credit for one’s actions and accomplishments. Notice that one can take pleasure in acting and the ability to act well in a variety of ways; this is an aspect of virtuous pride. (Let’s call it secure agency. It’s a kind of self-confidence as agent or confidence in one’s own agency.) But seeking and loving agency differ from seeking and loving credit for one’s agency; the concern about credit, especially if it’s noninstrumental, is one of the marks of vicious pride. Giving credit, generously or justly, can be a way of recognizing, loving, or respecting another; when the received credit is happily construed as an expression of one of these, it is not vicious. The vice that we call hyperautonomy is the concern to be self-made, not to owe others for what one is and has accomplished, and this concern is obviously linked to the concern for credit. Earlier, we qualified our observation that self-importance is comparative with the word “usually.” An example of hyperautonomy that is an exception to this generalization is the case of Lucifer’s fall, which some think was the result of wanting to know God in the beatific vision by his own natural powers. He pridefully refused God’s grace, which was needed to elevate him so that he could have the beatific vision. He wanted, in this way, to be self-made, but in this case, the vice of hyperautonomy seems to be exemplified without any comparing. Snobbery’s basis of relative importance is the exclusive social circle or clique or guild with which we ­identify—our Ivy League university, our country club, our religious denomination, our membership among the wine cognoscienti, and the like. In the vice of domination the vicious sense of your personal importance is based on the concern to lord it over others, to dominate them as a way of being important. This may take the form of wanting credit, not only for what we have accomplished, but also for what they have accomplished. But you can dominate others in a variety of ways: by determining what they do, by making them fear you, by being their protector against other things they fear, by controlling their movements, by shaping their minds. (As a prominent theologian is reputed to have commented, “Hale, I don’t want to teach ’em to think for themselves; I teach ’em to think like me!”). Well-ordered social life requires that some people be in charge of others, and the concern to be in control of others may aim instrumentally at that end, but the vicious attitude involves seeking such control as a way of being personally important. A sense of personal authority, a

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confidence in assuming intellectual leadership when that is a way to guide your students toward the truth quite apart from your personal importance, can be regarded as a kind of pride, and it can be virtuous. The ambiguity of the theologian’s expression as to whether he is domineering or properly prideful illustrates the difficulty of assessing a subject’s humility on the basis of empirically observable behavior. The fact that the concerns characteristic of the vices of pride all have instrumental counterparts affords scope for self- and other-deception. We can almost always construe our vicious concerns as not vicious because what we really want in wanting them is some worthy good—and sometimes (or usually) our motives are mixed in a way that’s hard for even us to sort out. Our domination is for the other’s good or the good of the organization, our vanity is really a commitment to excellence in fashion or to pleasing our spouse with our trim neatness, our snobbery is really a commitment to excellence in higher education, and so forth. Our thesis is that the virtue of humility is simply the intelligent absence of the vices of pride. It consists in not being motivated by self-importance. If you are utterly free from envy, domination, snobbery, hyperautonomy, haughtiness, grandiosity, arrogance, vanity, and any other vice of pride, then you are utterly humble. And if you are somewhat, or impressively but not completely, free of these vices, then you are somewhat humble, or quite humble. Humility, on our account, doesn’t have any characteristic motive. In that way it differs from the virtues of justice and compassion, which have the characteristic motives of concern for just states of affairs and the relief of suffering. But obviously, the life of the humble person requires motives, and these motives need to have normal coherence. If a person lacks all the vices of pride, but does so because she is severely enough afflicted with mental deficits not to be able to be concerned with self-importance, or because of some other neurological defect (for example, damage to the prefrontal cortex), then “humility” is not a very good name for her condition. This is why we say that the lack of concern for self-importance needs to be “intelligent” to count as humility. This qualification is a low hurdle. It is perhaps arguable that small children are not capable of either the vices of pride or the corresponding humility. Their lack of the vices of pride might be why Jesus of Nazareth told his disciples that “of such is the kingdom of God.” A toddler’s lack of the vices of pride has not yet developed into the virtue of humility because the child has not yet made intelligent choices concerning the kind of goods that people consider means to self-­importance. Thus the lack of concern for self-importance would make small children analogous to people with the virtue of humility, but it would not be sufficient for their actually having the virtue.

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Among the many conceptions of humility that have been proposed in the philosophical literature, we have chosen seven that seem to us to be most widely held. We have drawn examples all the way from the ancient philosophers to a new view that was published in 2013. Humility as Small-Mindedness Among the virtues discussed by ancient Greek philosophers, humility is decidedly a minor character. As heirs of the Homeric idealization of strength, courage, and self-assertion, they do not, for the most part, countenance humility as we have described it. It is arguable, however, that Socrates, despite being an updated Achilles (Plato, 1997, Apology 28b–d), exemplified a virtue in the neighborhood of humility, and at one point in Plato’s Laws, Plato’s apparent mouthpiece, the Athenian, declares that steadiness in the pursuit of justice requires that in obedience to God justice be followed “with meekness and humility” (Plato, 1997, Laws 4.716a–b; see Pinsent, 2012, p. 248–50). But Aristotle, more faithful, it seems, to the Homeric ideal, tells us that pride (magnanimity or great-souledness), which is “a sort of crown of the virtues” (1998, §4.3), makes people sufficiently attentive to the honors that are due them for their greatness that they utterly despise “honor from casual people and on trifling grounds.” This strong awareness of the honor that is due them, along with its evaluation in light of their own excellence, smacks pungently of a concern for self-importance (for example, as conceit). People who construe themselves as less worthy of honor than they in fact deserve are pusillanimous (small-minded, the contrary of magnanimous or proud). By contrast with the Greek philosophers, the Bible and the subsequent Christian tradition are chock full of commendations of humility as a virtue. Socrates (Plato, 1997, Apology) and the passage from Laws both stress subordination to God (obedience) as a fruit of what we call humility. They don’t attempt to define it or elaborate the concept, but we can see how our account of it as a lack of concern for self-importance would support what they do say. Aristotle’s great-souled person seems strongly oriented by the concern for self-sufficiency, or what we call the vice of hyperautonomy, and behind that is the concern for his own personal importance, his greatness. Socrates, by contrast, is consumed by his search for integrity and truth, in indifference to honor as well as other “external” goods (safety, money). He depicts himself, indeed, as not an “authority” on anything, but instead as a “midwife” (a kind of servant) who helps other people give birth to ideas (Plato, 1997, Theaetetus). He seems to be a prime exemplar of humility as lack of concern for self-importance, though

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he has very high aspirations to understand reality and to be a person of integrity (species of virtuous pride, in our vocabulary). Humility as a Brake on Irrational Ambition Thomas Aquinas says that for aspirations that are difficult to achieve, we need a virtue “to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility” (1981, 2a2æ, Q161, art.1, responsio). “Humility restrains the appetite (reprimit appetitum) from aiming at great things against right reason” (ibid., reply 3). “. . . it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself (aliquis reprimat seipsum) from being borne towards that which is above him” (ibid., art.2, responsio). Aquinas’s idea is that we have an appetite for good things that are difficult to attain. Such an appetite can go wrong in two ways, by discouragement because of the difficulty, or by overexuberance in seeking things that are beyond what is proper for it. So to be properly disposed, the appetite needs two virtues, one to encourage it (thus magnanimity) and one to restrain it from going overboard (humility). For Aquinas and the Aristotelian tradition, temperance is the virtue that moderates “appetites”—desires, urges, concerns—in accordance with right reason. The basic or cardinal virtue of temperance moderates appetites for food, drink, and sex; that is, it makes them stay within their proper bounds, where “proper” means rational or reasonable for human beings (or for an individual human being). But we also have other “appetites” that can get out of bounds, and one of these is our aspiration to great things like being president of the United States, or a gourmet cook, or full professor, or billionaire oil tycoon. “Appetite” for such things is the kind of appetite that humility governs, according to Aquinas. These pursuits have conditions of rationality having to do with individual talents and other characteristics, moral constraints, constraints imposed by unavoidable social circumstances, and so forth. Humility is the disposition, in the appetite for great things, to stay within the bounds of those conditions. Humility is a limiting mechanism, like a governor on a gasoline engine that prevents it from being revved up beyond safety standards for the particular kind of engine it is. It seems to us that a person might pursue an aspiration that was beyond her capacities or reasonable opportunities out of ignorance of those limits, and thus do so in a way that is not unhumble. When we’re young, we’re often lacking in understanding of our own talents and will not find out whether we’re talented enough for greatness in a certain pursuit unless we actually try to attain it. If we shoot for the stars without proper regard for our personal limitations, that doesn’t necessarily come from lack of humility. And even if we continue to

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pursue them “irrationally” after seeing the writing on the wall in mid-life, that irrationality is still not necessarily unhumility. In our view, the motivation is what makes the difference. Even if we stay prudently within our limits in pursuing greatness, if we do so out of a concern for self-importance (rather than, say, musical excellence, intellectual understanding, or political service to our country), then we are lacking in humility. Humility might help us stay rationally within our limits inasmuch as it eliminates one possible motive for going beyond them (namely, the concern for self-importance); that is how it is related to staying within limits in the pursuit of greatness. Is humility a kind of self-control or self-regulation? In the quotations that open our discussion of Aquinas, he speaks in two different ways about how humility “restrains” appetite. He says that humility restrains the appetite, and he says that the humble person restrains himself (meaning, we suppose, that he restrains his appetite). But temperance differs from self-control inasmuch as the temperate person doesn’t need to control himself, because temperance is a matter of having a right appetite in the first place. On the view that we’re advocating, humility is not a form of self-control, because it is the lack of the appetite for self-importance. A fully humble person doesn’t have a desire for self-importance that needs to be restrained. Of course, very few, if any, of us are fully humble, so we do need to restrain our appetite for self-importance, trying not to be conceited, snobbish, arrogant, vain, hyperautonomous, and the like. But that’s because we’re not humble. Humility as Chronic Shame or Low Self-Esteem David Hume treats “humility” in Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature, “Of the Passions” (Hume, 1888, pp. 277–290). So he conceives it as a passion, or what contemporary English speakers would call an emotion. To us it seems a bit odd to think of humility as an emotion, though we do speak of feeling humiliated or humbled. But neither of these is the trait that we call humility. In fact, you will be less vulnerable to humiliation if you are humble. Being vain, arrogant, snobbish, and hyperautonomous sets you up for humiliation because you care so much about your self-importance that persons and circumstances can easily bruise it (think of “wounded vanity”). Hume’s example of pride—which he also treats as an emotion—is feeling good about yourself because you have a beautiful house. So an example of humility in his sense of the word would be feeling bad about yourself because you live in a slum. Insofar as it’s an emotion—a feeling that occurs at a given moment, say, in reflecting on the place you’re living in contrasted to where the nice people live—we would call this shame, not humility. And insofar as such shame becomes a chronic disposition to think and feel and act and see the world in certain terms, we might call it low self-esteem. The

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Oxford English Dictionary, in its first definition, says that humility is “the quality of being humble or having a lowly opinion of oneself,” and Norvin Richards (1992) regards this as the “usual” way of conceiving humility. Even this seems odd to us, Oxford and Richards notwithstanding. Perhaps some people speak English this way, in which case sometimes the word “humility” is used to designate a vice or at least an emotional defect. But it’s not what we would call the virtue of humility. We have to admit, though, that the Christian tradition has sometimes seemed to mistake low self-esteem for the virtue of humility. Jonathan Edwards says that love to God tends to humility, which is one main root of a meek and long-suffering spirit. Love to God, as it exalts him, tends to low thoughts and estimates of ourselves, and leads to a deep sense of our unworthiness and our desert of ill, because he that loves God is sensible of the hatefulness and vileness of sin committed against the Being that he loves. And discerning an abundance of this in himself, he abhors himself in his own eyes, as unworthy of any good, and deserving of all evil. (Edwards, 1969, Sermon 4) This may be what we call a humbling experience. But humility as lack of concern for self-importance does not imply that the humble person will have a low view of himself; but it does imply that he will lack a major barrier (his love of self-importance) to noticing and admitting shameful things about himself. We note, too, that the Christian tradition often elides the virtue of contrition (sadness about one’s sins and sinfulness) with humility. It’s wrong, from a Christian point of view, to think humility implies contrition, because Jesus Christ is sinless and yet he is the prime exemplar of humility in the New Testament. Related to, or perhaps an aspect of, the low self-assessment view of humility is the low ambition view. Tara Smith expresses it this way: Typically, the humble person does not want very much. She is content with a minimal standard of living, or job, or romance, and satisfies herself with relatively low-level needs and aims. (Smith, 1998, p. 78) Here humility is taken to be or imply a kind of lethargy, passivity, or maybe hopelessness—certainly a deficiency of aspiration. If we think that a mark of an excellent, well-formed agent is energy and initiative and a sense of high calling, then a person like this is certainly defective as a human specimen. We agree with Pinsent (2012, p. 247), who says that “humility [the virtue] is not incompatible with greatness of leadership, action, and achievement.”

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Some years ago Julia Driver (1989) stirred up some lively discussion among philosophers by claiming that the person with the virtue of modesty will insist, against all evidence, on his lack of excellences. Modesty is “a dogmatic disposition to underestimation of self-worth” (1989, p. 378; see also Driver, 2000, chapter 2, section 1). Modesty is, thus, one of the “virtues of ignorance.” It is not just ignoring your excellences, but actually being ignorant of them and refusing to listen to reason if somebody thinks you’re virtuous. If you come to think maybe you are modest or kind, immediately you lose your modesty. The “modesty” she’s trying to describe seems to be just as well called humility; it has to do, not with covering up your more private body parts, but with not bragging, not noticing ways you are superior to others, and not insisting on getting credit for what you’ve done. In our view, the humble person is perfectly capable of acknowledging and assessing her excellence. If she’s a concert violinist she may know quite exactly who is better than she and who is inferior among her colleagues. There is no reason grounded in humility that she should not know this. She will probably not be preoccupied with these rankings, and will certainly not be preoccupied with them because of a concern for her status in the community of musicians (unless that status has instrumental significance for something she wants—say, a fellowship to study with an outstanding teacher). The reason for her lack of concern with the rankings will, if she is humble, be due to her lack of concern for self-importance. She is ultimately interested, not in being an important “figure” in the music world, but in being a good musician. Any interest she has in being an important “figure” is because it somehow enables her to make the music she loves or serves some other end that she wants. Humility as Nonoverestimation in Self-Evaluation In an effort to avoid the rather obvious infelicities of the shame/low self-esteem and ignorance views, several philosophers proposed that humility (modesty) is a disposition not to exaggerate your own worth or excellence. “According to the non-overestimation account, the modest person may well have a perfectly accurate sense of her accomplishments and worth but she does not overestimate them” (Flanagan, 1990; see also Ben Ze’ev, 1993). Richards (1992) thinks that to have the virtue of humility is to understand yourself so well that you have no inclination to exaggerate your self-worth. Humility dispels self-overestimation that is motivated, as it often is, by a concern for self-importance, but we don’t think nonoverestimation in self-­ evaluation is sufficient for humility, because it is compatible with some of the vices of pride. The musician who envies those whose status in the music

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community is higher than her own may well judge accurately her own musical value relative to theirs; but she lacks humility because the kind of importance she wishes for in being equal to or better than the other musicians is self-­importance. Accurate self-evaluation is also compatible with snobbery and invidious pride: our musician accurately ranks herself vis-à-vis the other musicians, but she feels snobbishly pleasant contempt for, or invidious pride toward, those who rank below her. If her musical skills are fairly high, she might be vain about them without overestimating them. Humility as Owning One’s Limitations A view of humility that is similar to non–self-overestimation, perhaps a subspecies of that account, is the owning-one’s-limitations account. Nancy Snow (1995, p. 210) defines humility as “the disposition to allow the awareness of and concern about your limitations to have a realistic influence on your attitudes and behavior.” Jeanine Grenberg (2005, p. 7) comments that humility is “a virtue that is meant to bring us to terms with our limits,” and Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder (2015) have proposed that intellectual humility is owning one’s intellectual limitations. The expressions “realistic influence,” “bring us to terms with,” and “own” all suggest that the recognition of your limits that is required for humility is something more than mere notional acknowledgment or belief. You need to have accepted, internalized, and come to terms with those limitations in a deeper way. If, for example, you see your limitations clearly but feel deeply humiliated and resentful on their account, your reaction to them shows that you are not humble about them. Or you might own your intellectual limitations because you want to wow everybody at philosophy conferences, or because you enjoy lording it over others intellectually, and you realize that taking your weaknesses very seriously is crucial to realizing such ends. No doubt humility is a disposition to own your limitations, but for that disposition to be humility, it has to be the right kind of disposition. Perhaps that “kind” is that you not react to the clear presentation of your limitations with any action or emotion based in a concern for self-­importance. In that case, the lack of that concern would be basic to proper “ownership” of your limitations; it would be one of the explanations of why you are so willing to admit them—as well as of all the other happy consequences of being humble. It seems arbitrary to pick ownership of limitations out from the many good consequences of humility and to say that that is what humility is. Humility as Inattention to One’s Excellences Nicolas Bommarito (2013) writes about the virtue of modesty, but says he takes the terms “modesty” and “humility” to be interchangeable (p. 93, footnote 1).

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We think that the concept he is explaining plausibly fits in a discussion of humility and will treat his account as about humility. Humility, then, “is rooted in certain patterns of attention” (p. 93). This view is not nearly as widely held by philosophers as the non–self-overestimation and limitations-owning views, and of all the accounts we have surveyed it is the closest to the one we advocate. Bommarito’s proposal is that what is most fundamental about humility is not that the humble person makes a certain self-evaluation, whether low, unexaggerated, or accurate, nor that he is ignorant of his excellences. Humility is compatible with knowing about your own excellences, but also compatible with being mistaken about them by either overestimation or underestimation. In that, he agrees with the view we advocate, namely that humility is a lack of interest in your self-importance. But he doesn’t quite agree with us. He thinks, instead, that humility (or as he calls it, modesty) is a disposition not to pay attention to your excellences. It is “a virtue of attention,” namely inattention—to your own excellences. Contrastingly, we might say that our view is that humility is “a virtue of concern,” namely unconcern—about your self-importance. In our view, it is probably true that the humble person, on the average, pays less attention to the fact that he’s Ivy League than the snob, less attention to his meritorious special entitlements than the arrogant, less attention to important people’s admiration of himself than the vain, less attention to his achieved agency than the hyperautonomous, less attention to his power over others than the domineering, and less attention to his merits than the conceited. But the not paying of attention is a secondary, consequential feature of humility, not the one that makes humility humility. What makes these various kinds of attention express the vices of pride is, in our view, the fact that they express the subject’s concern for the various kinds of self-importance or inflation of “ego,” and what makes their absence characteristic of humility is the subject’s lack of interest in self-importance and ego puffing. Each of the kinds of attention that we just listed is compatible with humility if motivated by something other than ego inflation. For some purposes or other, the humble person may pay attention to his Ivy League background, his power over others, and so forth. Actually, Bommarito makes our point himself, saying that the pattern of attention is not sufficient for modesty; it must happen for the right reasons. Those who are inattentive to their good qualities only because an attention disorder prevents them from attending to anything for very long or because they are the kind of pessimists who never attend to any good qualities at all are not modest. (2013, p. 103, italics added)

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Our attention is drawn to what we care about; our concerns give us reasons for attending and determining the specific character of our acts of attention. And yet Bommarito’s overall argument is that a pattern of attention is the essential mark of modesty/humility. We think that his conclusion should be that humility is a virtue of (un)concern. Conclusion In our view, of the concepts that surround and constitute that of humility, the one most in need of further philosophical (conceptual) clarification is that of self-importance. Currently our understanding of this concept is largely intuitive, being presented by way of the rich English vocabulary for the vices of pride (arrogance, vanity, conceit, grandiosity, narcissism, and so forth) and by such popular expressions as self-importance, big ego, puffed up, stroking one’s ego, and selective abusive uses of the word pride. On the account that we have given in this chapter, the concept of self-importance will need to be approached by way of careful conceptual analyses of the more specific vices of pride, of which the virtue of humility is the absence. A more rigorous account of self-­ importance will advance our understanding of humility, and therewith the precision of empirical studies. The more general point of which the above is an instance is that empirical investigations of character traits and other psychological features of human beings depend crucially on adequate conceptualization of the object of investigation. If an empirical researcher lacks a clear and plausible conception of humility or bases his empirical work on too simple an operationalization of the construct, for example, we cannot expect very much in the way of reliable information from that researcher’s investigations. Empirical research on constructs such as humility is therefore deeply dependent for its fruitfulness on prior philosophical work, whether that be done by a professional philosopher or by a philosophically sophisticated psychologist. This chapter suggests that conceptual work on humility is difficult and highly contested among experts. Given the dependence of empirical investigations on conceptual work, it seems likely that that contest will be characteristic of empirical investigations for the foreseeable future as well. Humility, to the extent that it can be actually achieved, has good consequences both in the life of its possessors and in the lives of their families, colleagues, and even acquaintances. It improves friendships, child rearing, and the culture of workplaces. It improves a person’s self-understanding and, more broadly, intellectual functioning (Roberts & Wood, 2007). It reduces unhappiness and, we speculate, many of the psychological problems that drive people to therapists. It is, therefore, a very “practical” virtue. A practical implication of humility’s

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practicality is that it is incumbent on psychologists and educators to devise and test interventions that will reduce people’s concern for self-­importance. For some practical proposals suggested by the conception of humility proposed in this chapter, see Roberts (2016).1 Note 1 We thank the John Templeton Foundation for support during the research and writing of this chapter. Scott Cleveland was a recipient of a post-doctoral fellowship with the Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility program at Saint Louis University, and Robert Roberts a recipient of a grant from the Self, Motivation, and Virtue program at the University of Oklahoma. The opinions formulated here are those of its authors and are not necessarily views of the John Templeton Foundation.

References Aquinas, Thomas (1981). Summa theologiae. Fathers of the English Dominican Province [trans.]. New York, NY: Christian Classics. Aristotle (1998). Nicomachean ethics. David W. Ross [trans.] J. O. Urmson and J. L. Ackrill (Eds.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Ben Ze’ev, A. (1993). The virtue of modesty. American Philosophical Quarterly, 30, 235–246. Bommarito, N. (2013). Modesty as a virtue of attention. Philosophical Review, 122, 93–117. http://doi.org/10.1215/00318108–1728723 Driver, J. (1989). The virtues of ignorance. The Journal of Philosophy, 86(7), 373–384. Driver, J. (2000). Uneasy virtue. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Edwards, J. (1969/1851). Charity and its fruits. Edinburgh, Scotland: Banner of Truth. Flanagan, O. (1990). Virtue and ignorance. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(8), 420–428. http:// doi.org/10.2307/2026736 Grenberg, J. (2005). Kant and the ethics of humility. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Hume, D. (1888). A Treatise of human nature. Selby-Bigge (Ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Pinsent, A. (2012). “Humility” in Being good: Christian virtues for everyday life. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company. Plato (1997). Apology. In John M. Cooper (Ed.), Plato: Complete works (pp. 17–36). Indianapolis: Hackett. Rand, A. (1964). The virtue of selfishness. New York, NY: New American Library. Richards, N. (1992). Humility. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Roberts, R. C. (2016). Learning intellectual humility. In J. Baehr (Ed.), Intellectual virtues and education: Essays in applied virtue epistemology (pp. 184–201). New York, NY: Routledge. Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, T. (1998). The practice of pride. Social Philosophy and Policy, 15, 71–90. Snow, N. (1995). Humility. Journal of Value Inquiry, 9, 203–216. Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2015). Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, n/a–n/a. http://doi. org/10.1111/phpr.12228

3 RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON HUMILITY Steven L. Porter, Anantanand Rambachan, Abraham Vélez de Cea, Dani Rabinowitz, Stephen Pardue, and Sherman Jackson

Introduction to Religious Perspectives on Humility Perhaps one lesson of humility is that modern social-scientific investigation is at its best when it attends to premodern psychological wisdom. While philosophical and literary sources were considered in Chapters 1 and 2, this present chapter considers wisdom traditions that have been preserved and honed within the world’s religions. There are at least two reasons why it is especially important to attend to the collected wisdom of the world’s religions. First, humility has been a central topic of religious reflection for millennia. Second, the concept of humility appears to be particularly at home within religious frameworks. For instance, humility was not regarded as a virtue by the ancient Greeks and was, in fact, hailed as vicious by the likes of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, whereas within religious discourse humility has been perennially extolled. This might suggest that humility is somewhat difficult to understand without some appreciation of the religious context from which it has emerged. Before turning to the five religious perspectives summarized in the present chapter, two caveats are in order. First, there are multiple branches of each religion presented here and even within a particular branch there is not always consensus on the nature of humility. So, each of the authors faced the nearly impossible task of briefly articulating a coherent expression of humility that faithfully represents a diverse faith tradition. Second, other important religions were not included in this analysis due to space constraints (e.g., Sikhism; see Mandair, 2013). Brief Summaries of Humility from Five Major World Religions Humility in Hinduism—Anantanand Rambachan In the Bhagavadgītā (13:7), regarded as one of the scriptural pillars of the Hindu tradition, humility is the first in a list of virtues mentioned by the teacher, Krishna. Others mentioned include noninjury, forgiveness, purity, and self-control. The same text (5:18), describes learned persons (paṇḍitāḥ) as rich

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in wisdom and humility. On two occasions, the text employs the term nirahaṁkāraḥ (without ego) to describe the liberated person who is dear to God. The commendation of humility implies the avoidance of its opposite, but the text is also explicit on the problems of arrogance. Arrogance (3:27) (māna/ ahaṁkāra) is an expression of ignorance and delusion. In a lengthy discussion (16:10–21), arrogance is associated with greed, hypocrisy, anger, and the hurting of others and self. Attached to insatiable desire, full of hypocrisy, arrogance and conceit, having accepted false notions through delusion, they work with unclean resolves. Clinging to immeasurable anxiety, ending only in death, with gratification of desire as their highest aim, convinced that this is all. Bound by a hundred ties of desire, intent on greed on anger, they seek to obtain, by unjust means, hoards of wealth for their pleasure. (16:10–12) The Bhagavadgītā’s commendation of humility and its problematization of arrogance are similar to what we see in other Hindu sacred texts. Humility is the fruit of wisdom and right knowledge, while arrogance manifests ignorance and false knowledge. Humility, in the Hindu tradition, is rooted theologically in a proper understanding of the relationship between God and the world. It is to this relationship that we now turn. The Upaniṣads, or the wisdom section of the authoritative Hindu scriptures (the Vedas), offer many suggestive analogies to describe the emergence of the universe from brahman, the infinite (hereafter, I translate brahman as God but this does not imply that I equate brahman with all attributes of God in monotheistic traditions). Among the most well known of these are the analogies from the Chandogya Upaniṣad (ch. 6): Just as through one lump of clay everything made of clay is known, so difference of shape is just name, dependent on speech: “clay” is the reality. Just as through one copper ornament everything made of copper is known, so difference of shape is just name, dependent on speech: “copper” is the reality. Śaṅkara (c. 8th CE), the most famous of Upaniṣad commentators, interprets such texts to teach that brahman is both the intelligent cause of the universe and its material ground. The Hindu tradition does not employ the language of creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) to speak of the emergence of the world from God. At the same time, the tradition does not equate God with the world

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(i.e., pantheism). God is immanent in the world as its ground and ontological truth, while also transcending it. Transcendence, however, is not understood in spatial terms. The relationship between God, living beings, and the world is never imagined on the model of the watch and watchmaker (i.e., after its creation, the watch exists and functions independently from the watchmaker). The analogy of the clay and clay pot suggests that in every moment the universe is dependent on God for its very existence and functioning. To make this point, Kena Upaniṣad (ch.1) describes God as the Ear of the ear, the Mind of the mind, the Speech of speech, the Breath of the breath, and the Eye of the eye. No organ, physical or mental, functions in the absence of God, the reality indwelling everything. While our achievements in life depend on the use of our bodies and minds, we do not create these; their source is in God. All human achievements are ultimately dependent on God, the source and sustainer of body and mind. This is not exaggerated praise; it is truth arising from our understanding of God’s nature and relationship with the world. Human arrogance is as untrue as a clay pot claiming independent reality from clay. In the Hindu tradition, however, humility is not the same as self-deprecation. The Bhagavadgītā (6:5) warns against self-degradation and commends friendship with self. It is not wrong to take pride in one’s achievements. We exercise freedom and initiative in developing our gifts; humility and gratitude follow from the understanding that God is the source of these gifts. The truth of humility is rooted also in the recognition of our dependence on the universe and on a complex network of interrelated beings for our existence and flourishing. The Hindu tradition speaks of the human being as living in a condition of indebtedness. Although three of these are emphasized (God, teachers, and ancestors), the list includes the world of nature and human beings. Acknowledging the truth of our constant indebtedness to others, known and unknown, we grow in humility and overcome our disposition to false independence and arrogance. In the Bhagavadgītā (3:12) the person who lacks the understanding of his indebtedness is represented as behaving in the world like a thief—taking greedily from the universe without giving back. In fact, the prosperity of the universe is dependent on mutual giving that is founded in a deep understanding of being a receiver of the gifts of others. The spiritual benefits of humility (vinaya), in the Hindu tradition, are better appreciated in the light of the problems of its opposite, arrogance (māna). First, arrogance is rooted in untruth about ultimate and social reality. It does not reflect knowledge of brahman as the intelligent cause and material ground of the universe as well as our indebtedness to others. Second, arrogance blinds

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us to our limitations and is, therefore, not conducive to spiritual and ethical growth. Humility is equated with knowledge since it is the condition for learning. Third, arrogance causes an increase in interpersonal and social friction. It results in the tendency to underestimate and even demean others in the attempt to assert one’s own superiority. Such attitudes are not conducive to building relationships of love and trust. Finally, arrogance increases personal anxiety because of the preoccupation with how one is seen by others. It perpetuates the feeling that one’s qualities are never fully recognized by others. Besides being impatient when recognition is not accorded, arrogance enhances one’s susceptibility to flattery and manipulation by those who are willing to indulge the ego for their own selfish ends. In the Hindu tradition, humility is the fruit of understanding the nature of ultimate reality (paramārtha) as well our interrelated social reality (vyavahāra). Since it is grounded in an honest appraisal of our abilities, it leaves room for personal growth and development. Humility is not threatened by the achievements of others and enables us to be generous in relationships. It promotes deeper human relationships founded on understanding and respect. Humility is associated with peace (śānti). A humble person is free from the anxiety for praise born out of an exaggerated sense of self-importance and free from the hurts that follow the persistent demands for recognition from others. Humility promotes generous self-giving and is prosperity. As a virtue, humility expresses wisdom while also being the way to wisdom. Humility in Buddhism—Abraham Vélez de Cea Defining humility from a Buddhist perspective is not an easy task, both because there are many different Buddhist schools, and because humility is a Western concept that has not always been understood in the same way by Western secular and religious traditions. Here I limit myself to reconstructing a Buddhist concept of humility based on the Buddha’s teachings in the Pāli Nikāyas, the earliest Buddhist texts available. In short, I understand Buddhist humility as the absence of “māna” or “conceit.” Conceit is one of the ten fetters (saṁyojana) that prevents beings from attaining the ultimate goal of the Buddha’s teachings (i.e., liberation from suffering). More specifically, conceit is one of the five higher fetters, and it disappears only at the highest level of holiness and spiritual development (arahantship). Thus, the cultivation of humility (i.e., the gradual removal of conceit) is indispensable to progress in the spiritual path and eventually attaining liberation. Buddhist liberation, however, requires not only the removal of conceit, but also the removal of craving and other fetters. For instance, M.I.12; M.I.122; A.III.444 describe the liberated being thus: “He has cut off craving, removed the fetters,

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and with the complete comprehension of conceit (sammā mānābhisamayā) he has made an end of suffering.” The importance of humility cannot be underestimated. Conceit hinders our ability to properly treat people worthy of respect, veneration, and reverence. For instance, at S.I. 177–178 the Buddha explains to whom people should avoid conceit: First one’s own mother and father, then one’s eldest family brother, then one’s teacher as the fourth: Towards these one should avoid conceit; Towards these one should be reverential; These should be well respected; These it is good to venerate deeply . . . Having struck down conceit, humble, one should pay homage to the worthy ones. This teaching allows us to infer that without humility people fail to respect parents, elders, teachers, and holy people. So Buddhist humility helps us appreciate the value of certain roles within society as well as the wisdom and the virtues of certain kinds of people. Conceit is often associated with arrogance (atimāna). Both are considered evil (pāpaka) qualities (M.I.15) that defile the mind (cittassa upakkilesa) (M.I.36). The Buddha teaches that someone who is not arrogant pays homage to one who should receive homage, rises up for one in whose presence he should rise up, offers a seat to one who deserves a seat, makes way for one for whom he should make way, and honors, respects, reveres, and venerates one who should be honored, respected, revered, and venerated, (M.III.205) Thus, Buddhist humility can be said to foster appropriate conduct toward all those who deserve to be honored and venerated, not just toward parents, elders, teachers, and holy people as S.I. 177–178 seems to suggest. Conceit presupposes an inaccurate assessment of one’s abilities and accomplishments. For instance, at M.II.252 the Buddha speaks about the excessive conceit or overestimation (adhimāna) of some disciples who declare to have attained final knowledge without having actually attained such knowledge. In fact, the fourth pārājika or transgression entailing expulsion from the community of monks and nuns is to falsely claim that one has attained liberation or any spiritual state. Thus, Buddhist humility not only has to do with appropriate conduct toward people worthy of respect and honor, but also accurate knowledge of one’s limitations.

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Conceit also presupposes an inaccurate understanding of one’s nature. The subtlest form is egocentric conceit, that is, “asmimāna,” which means “the conceit ‘I am.’ ” On egocentric conceit people measure up against each other, giving rise to three main subtypes: (1) the conceit “I am better” (seyyo ‘ham asmimāna), which entails a sense of superiority; (2) the conceit “I am equal” (sadiso ‘ham asmimāna), which entails a sense of competitiveness or complacency; and (3) the conceit “I am worse” (hīno ‘ham asmimāna), which derives from a sense of inferiority. For the Buddha, these three kinds of egocentric conceit must be abandoned (S.V.56). The main problem with egocentric conceits is that they seem to assume the existence of a permanent, unchangeable, and unconditioned self underlying one’s identity, which for the Buddha is always fluid, impermanent, and dependently originated, thus subject to change and not to be fixated in absolute terms as being better, equal, or worse than anything or anybody. Another problem with egocentric conceit is that it leads to negative consequences. For instance, at S.I.11–12 the Buddha states that the liberated being does not think “I am equal, better, or worse,” which may lead to engaging in disputes (cf. Sn.842). Buddhist humility is closely related to the Buddhist doctrine of non-self. For the Buddha, doctrines that assume the absolute existence of a permanent, unchangeable, and unconditioned s/Self lead to disputes and provide a foundation for self-centered, selfish, and conceited attitudes. In contrast, the Buddhist doctrine of non-self is intended to avoid disputes and facilitate the removal of self-centered attitudes, literally “I-making activity” (ahankāra), selfish attitudes, literally “mine-making activity” (mamankāra), and egocentric conceit (i.e., “the conceit ‘I am’ ”). The profound link between the doctrine of non-self and the most advanced forms of Buddhist humility can be inferred from A.IV.353, where the Buddha states that “[o]ne who perceives non-self eradicates the conceit ‘I am,’ [which is] nibbāna in this very life.” However, first it is necessary to abandon clinging to doctrines about a self or views on personality (sakkāyadiṭṭhi), and only afterward the complete removal of the conceit ‘I am’ takes place (S.III.128–131). In order to develop the most advanced forms of humility the Buddha recommends different types of meditation. For instance, at M.I.424–5, the Buddha advises Rāhula to develop meditation on the perception of impermanence. At M.III.19, the Buddha recommends to know and see the five aggregates, that is, the five basic constituents of all beings, as “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not myself” (netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā’ti). At M.III.115, the Buddha also recommends contemplation of the rising and falling of the five aggregates. However, meditation alone does not seem to be sufficient to eradicate the subtlest forms of conceit. In fact, at S.V.56 the Buddha teaches that the Noble Eightfold Path is “to be developed for direct knowledge of the three kinds of

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conceit, for their full understanding (abhiññā), for their utter destruction, for their abandoning.” Humility in Judaism—Dani Rabinowitz On the surface Judaism appears to be a religion focused on law. Much of daily life is governed by an extensive array of legal obligations. Given the preponderance of attention devoted to legal minutia, one may be excused for thinking that in Judaism matters pertaining to human nature play second fiddle to legalities. A closer look, however, reveals a religion deeply committed to the development of the moral virtues. The biblical Moses casts a long shadow. Apart from being the divinely elected recipient of the Torah and orchestrating the exodus, Moses is also a person whose character is revered. Of all his character traits that could have been recorded for posterity, the Torah chose to accentuate his humility. “Moses was very humble, more so than any person on the face of the earth” (Num. 12:3). It is not surprising, therefore, that we find the prophetic works and rabbinic literature replete with praise for humility and exhortations to achieve it (Adler, 1992; Green, 1973; Kohler & Schreiber, 1906). In a telling Talmudic anecdote, Rabbi Joshua learns from Isaiah 61:1, “The spirit of the Lord God was upon me, since the Lord anointed me to bring tidings to the humble,” that the highest or most important moral virtue is that of humility. Despite the serious light in which classical Judaism takes humility, it is somewhat of a curiosity to learn that few Jewish sources have devoted much time to explicating the concept itself. Perhaps the concept was seen as so obvious by extension that such conceptual analyses were deemed redundant. An intuitive understanding carried the day. However, in a distinct departure from the norm, it is in the hands of Moses Maimonides that the centrality and significance of humility reached the highest cadence in rabbinic literature. Channeling Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Alfrabi’s Aphorisms of the Statesman, Maimonides crafts a virtue ethics into the fabric of Jewish law itself wherein a moral virtue is defined as the midway between two excess points (Davidson, 2005). Importantly, Maimonides’s legal motivation for this inclusion is the positive commandment to emulate God (Deut. 22:9), who is described as exhibiting such character traits. By way of example, Maimonides mentions prodigality and tightfistedness. Neither character trait is virtuous. Rather, one should develop a trait that lies at the midpoint between these two extremes. This is Maimonides’s version of Aristotle’s golden mean. Maimonides (1998) makes two exceptions to this scheme—anger and arrogance: There are temperaments with regard to which a man is forbidden to follow the middle path . . . Among these is arrogance. If a man is only humble, he is

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steven l. porter, et al. not following a good path. Rather, he must hold himself lowly and his spirit very unassuming. That is why Numbers 12:3 describes our teacher Moses as “very humble” and not simply “humble.” Therefore, our Sages (T.B. Sotah 5a-b) directed: “Hold oneself very, very lowly.” Also, they declared: “Whoever is arrogant is as if he denied God’s presence,” as implied by Deuteronomy 8:14: “And your heart will be haughty and you will forget God, your Lord.” Furthermore, they said: “Whoever is arrogant should be placed under a ban of ostracism. This applies even if he is only somewhat arrogant.” (2.3)

There is no tolerance for those failing to develop a robust sense of humility. With Moses as the exemplar, the bar is set very high indeed. Maimonides (1998) writes that those who have character traits at one end of the spectrum should “move in the direction of the opposite extreme, and accustom himself to that for a long time, until he has returned to the proper path, which is the midpoint for each and every temperament.” Insofar as humility is concerned, one who is full of pride should cause himself to experience much disgrace . . . sit in the lowliest of places, dress in tattered rags which shame the wearer, and the like, until the arrogance is uprooted from the heart. (2.2) While Maimonides’s account is not sufficiently robust insofar as conceptual analysis is concerned, it nevertheless draws the reader’s attention to the range of self-reflective mental states wrapped up in humility. Intuitively, humility would seem to require a sense of self-nullification or self-effacement wherein one considers oneself worthless. This couldn’t be further from the Jewish perspective on humility, as demonstrated by Bachya Ibn Paquda (1996) and Abraham Isaac Kook (1971). Both consider humility to involve a robust sense of self-esteem, a pride in one’s spiritual achievements and qualities. This healthy pride acts as a motivator, leading one to acknowledge that given one’s potential and worth, there is still much to be done and achieved: This pride does no harm to humility and does not keep it distant. (Bachya Ibn Paquda, 1996, p. 163) At times we should not be afraid of the feeling of greatness, which elevates man to do great things [as] all humility is based on such a holy feeling of greatness. (Kook, 1971, p. 141)

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At the root of arrogance lies a lack of self-esteem; the arrogant person seeks to assuage his sense of worthlessness by bringing others down and seeking out their praise. He considers his achievements exemplary given his limitations. In contradistinction, the humble person recognizes that she could achieve so much more given her talents and worth. A person who thought himself a “nobody” could neither provocate before the ruler of Egypt nor stand before God on behalf of a nation. Only someone confident in his talents, secure in his skin, and robust in his convictions could achieve these historical and spiritual highs. It was Moses’s humility that underpinned his greatness. When humility is viewed in this light, it is not surprising that Judaism is a religion predicated upon spiritual obligations because Judaism considers human beings capable of spiritual heights and demands it of them. Humility is the key to achieving these heights. Humility in Christianity—Stephen Pardue Jewish thinking on humility served as the starting point for early Christians. Along with the Hebrew Bible, early Christian writers assert that humility is rooted in humanity’s limited knowledge about and place within the universe (see, e.g., Ps. 8 as cited in Heb. 2), as well as human brevity in the grand scheme of history (see, e.g., Isa. 40:8 as cited in Jas. 1:9–11). However, Christian humility quickly adopted its own shape as early Christians reflected upon the life and teaching of Jesus. In the Gospel narratives, Jesus often highlights children for their diminutive stature and low social status and states that “whoever humbles himself” like a child “is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 18:4, ESV). He likewise calls on his disciples to be servants to all if they desire greatness in the kingdom of God (Matt. 23:11; Mk. 9:35, 10:44), and on the night before his crucifixion he washes his disciples’ feet, subverting social norms and explicitly calling his followers to similar acts of humble service ( Jn. 13:1–20). These socially oriented applications of humility were countercultural and gave rise to a distinctively Christian understanding of the virtue. Most poignantly, from the earliest stages, Christians have regarded Jesus’s death on the cross not only as an act of uncommon love, but of humble self-giving that is worthy of emulating in analogical ways. In what is widely regarded as one of the earliest Christian hymns, the apostle Paul exhorts Philippian Christians to “do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility count others more significant than yourselves” (Phil. 2:3) and cites the incarnation and death of Jesus as an exemplary instantiation of humility. Although the import of humility cuts across all Christian traditions, individual thinkers differ when it comes to defining humility. For example, whereas

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Aquinas (ST II-II, 161) describes humility as a limit on our aspirations, so that we do not aim for things beyond our capacities, Bernard of Clairvaux (1974) describes it as true self-knowledge, which inevitably results in submission to God. In the monastic tradition, humility is tied closely to self-sacrifice and humble obedience to authority, and these practices are grounded in Christ’s own humility (Burton-Christie, 1993). In spite of differences in emphasis, however, most Christian accounts of humility suggest that it includes (1) an opposition to pride or vanity, (2) a suitable response to creaturely limitations and flaws, and (3) a willing submission of the self to God. Although scores of Christian thinkers have reflected upon humility’s significance for the spiritual life, Augustine of Hippo has perhaps been the most influential. In Augustine’s thought, Jesus’s humility is the controlling principle of both metaphysics and ethics. Metaphysically, it is the Son of God’s humble willingness to embrace incarnation and crucifixion that allows humans to return to the fellowship with God that they lost in Eden (Ruddy, 2001). In the realm of ethics, Augustine highlights humility as the hallmark of Christian conversion. He notes that even upstanding and admirable pagan teachers lack this virtue, and that this is what keeps them from completing their quest for moral and intellectual wholeness (Dunnington, 2016). The reason that humility is so significant for those following Jesus is that it is the virtue that most directly combats pride (superbia), humanity’s most endemic spiritual disorder. Christian tradition regards humility toward God and others as ultimately beneficial to the practitioner. Proverbs 3:34, which espouses the general principle that God “opposes the proud but gives grace to the humble,” is explicitly cited multiple times in the New Testament ( Jas. 4:6; 1 Pet. 5:5), not least in the magnificat of Mary after she receives the news of Jesus’s conception: “he has brought down the mighty from their thrones, and exalted those of humble estate” (Lk. 1:52). Moreover, the Gospels often highlight the continuity between Jesus and the Hebrew Bible’s long line of key characters who were consistently regarded by society as inadequate for their grand callings. Thus, just as David was least likely among his brothers to be selected as king (1 Sam. 16:1–13), so also Jesus of Nazareth is regarded as an unlikely candidate to fulfill messianic expectations (Mk. 6:1–3, Jn. 1:46). And the general theme of the humble triumphing over the proud is emphasized repeatedly throughout the New Testament (Lk. 14:11, 18:14; 1 Cor. 1:18–2:16; Jas. 1:10). Christians thus regard humility as having not only spiritual benefits—disentangling the soul from the clutches of pride and renewing in them the image of God—but also practical ones. The humble are more likely to enjoy divine blessing and are more likely to be on the right side of history in the long run.

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There is strong evidence that from the earliest days of Christian monasticism, humility was regarded as a crucial goal, and even an organizing principle for monastic life. An early collection of sayings from Egyptian monks, for example, demonstrates not only a close association between asceticism and humility—the practices of self-deprivation and silence were designed to keep one mindful of one’s shortcomings and to simulate an imitation of Jesus’s self-giving life and death—but also an awareness that “going through the monastic motions” was not sufficient to produce humility (Burton-Christie, 1993, p. 237). Such warnings against simply imitating an external rule are common throughout the tradition, but this did not stop Christian thinkers from seeking to reflect on the cultivation of humility in a systematic way. The most influential treatment of humility’s cultivation is Benedict of Nursia’s description in his influential Rule for monastic life. He outlines twelve steps toward acquiring humility, which include the submission of one’s will to divine commands, regular confession of one’s shortcomings to a trusted elder, a grateful acceptance of one’s work assignments and food allotments, and the strategic use of silence geared toward cultivating solemnity. Today, many of these practices persist in Christian communities, even if in less extreme forms than in Benedictine monasticism (Pardue, 2012). Humility in Islam—Sherman Jackson Humility is a central virtue in Islam, a sine qua non of the religion. It is less a formal religious doctrine, however, than it is an ethos that suffuses Muslim religious consciousness, sensibilities, and imagination. Several words and phrases in the Qur’ān underscore the value of humility: The servants of the All-Merciful are those who walk upon the earth in humility (hawnan), and when the impudent address them they say, ‘Peace’ [25:63]; If only, when Our salutary afflictions came upon them, the people had humbled themselves (taḍarra‘ū) [6:43]; Has the time not come for the hearts of the Believers to be humbled (takhsha‘) by the remembrance of God? [57:16]. In the Qur’ān, Prophetic literature, and Muslim tradition, however, the full scope and significance of humility are conveyed disjunctively as the antithesis of arrogance. Arrogance, the Qur’ān intimates, is humanity’s deadliest flaw. The very first verses revealed to Muḥammad speak of humans’ propensity to “transgress all bounds,” based on delusions of self-sufficiency (istighnā’) [96:6]. Arrogance (istikbār) is also the source of Satan’s insubordination [2:34], Pharaoh’s blasphemous megalomania [28:39], and whole peoples’ rejection of their prophets [45:31]. The Qur'ān proclaims, God does not love those who are arrogant, full of conceit [4: 36]. Indeed, so toxic is the disease of arrogance that a Prophetic hadith warns: “No one in whose heart resides a mustard seed of arrogance shall enter Paradise” (Muslim, 1415/1995, p. 1:89).

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The value and virtue of humility are firmly grounded in Islam’s monotheism. The third/ninth-century sage, al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857) explains: “Self-aggrandizement is the preserve of God alone, being improper and unacceptable for anyone else; for everyone besides God is a contingent belonging, while God is the All-Powerful, Divine Owner” (al-Muḥāsibī, N.d. 373). Humility flows, thus, from humans’ recognition of their status as created, contingent entities, with all that this implies in the way of debt and duty to the Creator. This, in fact, is the ground of the very act of islām itself, literally “humble submission.” Al-Muḥāsibī insists that humans can only question this debt and duty to God via a willful disregard for the bounties that God bestows. Such heedlessness underwrites a sense of unaccountable autonomy and, when stoked by the natural desire for status and validation, breeds haughtiness and contempt for the truth and for people. Humility is the antidote to all of this. Even religious people, however, who acknowledge their debt and duty to God, may lack humility. In fact, religion may actually land in the employ of this psycho-spiritual deficit. Al-Muḥāsibī speaks thus of religious scholars who privately disdain the laity, “even though the latter are (often) more God-­fearing” (al-Muḥāsibī, 383). And he censures those who argue merely for the sake of reputation, refusing to acknowledge the truth if it appears on the tongue of an adversary. Arrogance and a lack of humility even prevent some scholars “from seeing anyone other than themselves as being capable of speaking truth about God,” imagining that “no one else on earth is guided except them” (al-Muḥāsibī, 389). Of course, humility is not a challenge for the learned, powerful, or well-to-do only. As the celebrated Ibn “Aṭā” Allāh al-Sakandarī (d. 709/1309) admonishes: Do not think that arrogance only resides in people of power or wealth. On the contrary, it may reside in one who does not have enough food for a single night. Yet, he spreads corruption instead of good, due to his arrogance towards God’s creatures. ( Jackson, 2012, p. 61) Indeed, the Prophet placed the “arrogant poor” (‘ā’il mustakbir) among the most contemptible in the sight of God (Muslim, 1:97). Beyond its religious and social functions, Muslim tradition holds humility to be key to enhancing human powers of perception and understanding. Al-Muḥāsibī insists that God is not apt to grant those who lack humility true knowledge, understanding, or insight. He cites the verse, “I will turn away from My signs those who unjustifiably proceed with arrogance in the land” [7:146], noting that the exegetes explained this to mean that God will “lift the Qur’ān

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from their hearts” and “veil their hearts from the secrets of the spiritual world” (al-Muḥāsibī, 376). As for acquiring, sustaining, and enhancing humility, the famed al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) cites a two-pronged approach. The first seeks to excise arrogance from the heart, beginning with monotheism (tawḥīd), recognizing God’s grandeur and the truth about humans’ nature, provenance, and ultimate end. This, he insists, leaves no justifiable attitude other than humility. The second prong aims at preventing outside forces from corrupting one’s sense of humility. This is achieved by following the example of the Prophet—the exemplar of humility par excellence— alongside the legacy of the righteous ancestors of old (al-Ghazālī, N.d., 3:348–58). Humility is not the same as self-abnegation. In the aforementioned hadith (para. 2) that warns of the eschatological consequences of arrogance, a man responds by asking, “O Messenger of God, what of a man who loves that his shoes and clothing be fine?” The Prophet replied, “God is beautiful and loves beauty. Arrogance is disregard for the truth and contempt for the people” (Muslim, 1: 89). Humility is simply the opposite. Discussion—Steven L. Porter From the foregoing review, it is clear that each of these religions possess rich treatments of the nature of humility that deserve further investigation. Moreover, there appear to be at least four insights that have import for contemporary research on humility. First, humility is universally recognized and appreciated among the major world religions, while its opposite is decried. Although this widespread endorsement of humility among religions has been noted before (e.g., Woodruff, Van Tongeren, McElroy, Davis, & Hook, 2013), the perspectives gathered here make it clear that each religion has its own independent reasons to regard humility as a crucially important character trait. The lesson here is that continued research on humility is called for because humility clearly stands out as one of the most universally appreciated positive traits. Second, according to these world religions there is a centrality and necessity to humility in human life. Humility is not tangential or optional, but is the fitting posture of human persons, fundamental to one’s orientation to the world, and foundational to human flourishing. The insight here is that these world religions predict that humility will be meaningfully related to other virtues and negatively related to vice. Third, these religions agree that humility does not involve an undue negative assessment of self, but rather an accurate view of self. So, while religious humility stands against self-exaltation, it does not involve self-­ deprecation. This brings us to the fourth lesson. From the religious perspective, the virtue of humility is necessarily grounded in a transcendent reality: something that stands outside of and gives ultimate meaning to the universe to which

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one owes deference. The religious transcendent not only puts human selves in perspective, but for each religion transcendent reality is the on-going source of existence such that humility requires an on-going response of dependence and submission. There is, then, a real question from the religious perspective whether humility can be fully appreciated and fostered outside of a religious context. This is not to say that religious persons will be more humble than nonreligious persons or that nonreligious persons cannot be humble (see Wielenberg, 2005), but rather that the concept of humility is most coherently located within a religiously transcendent view of the world (see Bollinger & Hill, 2012). These five religious perspectives on humility also point toward several insights that have import for contemporary practice of humility within and across the religious perspectives. First, each religion sees an absence of self-aggrandizement, self-importance, and ego-centeredness as a proper part of humility such that we might expect religious communities to be exemplars in manifesting a humble way of life (e.g., respectful, interreligious dialogue). But a complication here is that a religion’s practice of humility toward others (horizontal humility) will be modulated by humility to its religious authorities (vertical humility). Those religious authorities, whether sacred texts and/or God, might be understood to dictate a posture toward certain others (e.g., those outside one’s faith) that limits the application of humility in that case. In other words, a lack of humility within a religious community is not always hypocritical if the stance is rooted in some other religious principle that recommends a posture other than humility. How this possible tension could be resolved would need to be investigated within the framework of each religion. Second, for each religion humility is a trait that comes in varying degrees and is susceptible to development. Distinct formative practices are put forward by each religion (e.g., the Eightfold Path) that serve to accurately position one’s self in the universe such that one develops greater humility. Lastly, when it comes to humility within these religious contexts there is an apparent push and pull. Due to one’s relationship to religious transcendence (God, brahman, etc.) there is a ground for humility (e.g., you are creature, not Creator) as well as an opportunity for healthy pride (e.g., you are specially related to the Creator). Perhaps this is precisely the balanced beauty of humility in religious contexts: there is a mechanism that simultaneously deflates (the pull) as well as inflates (the push) the self such that we end up with an accurate view of self that is neither self-aggrandizing nor self-deprecating. References al-Muḥāsibī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥārith b. Asad. al-Ri‘āyah li ḥuqūq Allāh, ed. ‘A. A. ‘Aṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyah, N.d.).  al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid. Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn, 4 vols. (Cairo: ‘Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī and Sons, N.d.). Adler, S. (1992). Humility. In Aspaklaria: Compendium of Jewish thought. Jerusalem: Aspaklaria.

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Bachya Ibn Paquda (1996). Duties of the Heart (Hovot ha-Levavot) Trans: Daniel Haberman. New York: Feldheim Publishers. Bernard of Clairvaux, S. (1974). Treatises 2: The steps of humility and pride on loving God. Washington: Cistercian Publications. Bollinger, R. A., & Hill, P. C. (2012). Humility. In Thomas G. Plante (Ed.), Religion, spirituality, and positive psychology: Understanding the positive psychological fruits of faitb (pp. 31–47). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Burton-Christie, D. (1993). The word in the desert: Scripture and the quest for holiness in early Christian monasticism. New York: Oxford University Press. Davidson, H. (2005). Moses Maimonides: The man and his works. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunnington, K. (2016). Humility: An Augustinian perspective. Pro Ecclesia, XXV(1), 18–43. Green, R. (1973). Jewish ethics and the virtue of humility. The Journal of Religious Ethics, 1, 53–63. Jackson, S. (2012). Sufism for non-Sūf  īs: Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh al-Sakandarī’s Tāj al-‘Arūs. New York: Oxford University Press. Kohler, K., & Schreiber, E. (Eds.). (1906). Humility. In Jewish Encyclopedia. Vol. 6. New York: Funk and Wagnalls. Kook, A. I. (1971). Musar Avikha u-Midot ha-Reiya. Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook. Maimonides, M. (1998). Mishneh Torah. [Trans. E. Touger]. New York: Moznaim Publishers, Hilkhot De’ot. Mandair, A. S. (2013). Sikhism: A guide for the perplexed. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj. (1416/1995). Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 5 vols. Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm. Pardue, S. (2012). Kenosis and its discontents: Towards an Augustinian account of divine humility. Scottish Journal of Theology, 65(3), 271–88. Ruddy, D. W. (2001). A christological approach to virtue: Augustine and humility. PhD diss., Boston College. Wielenberg, E. J. (2005). Value and virtue in a godless universe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Woodruff, E., Van Tongeren, D. R., McElroy, S., Davis, D. E., & Hook, J. N. (2013). Humility and religion: Benefits, difficulties, and a model of religious tolerance. In C. Kim-Prieto (Ed.), Religion and spirituality across cultures (pp. 271–285). New York: Springer Publishing Co.

4 INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY Ian M. Church and Justin L. Barrett

All too often, when faced with difficult questions, people ignore, dismiss, and marginalize dissent. The speed at which political disagreement is recast in terms of the intellectual failings of opponents is astounding, and religious dialogue, from the orthodox to the militant, remains tinted by a terrifying and dehumanizing arrogance and dogma. Even we scientists and other scholars often find ourselves stubbornly defending “our” ideas rather than pursuing truth, willfully blind to evidence challenging our positions and uncharitable toward the views of rivals. The world, it appears, needs more intellectual humility. But the significance of intellectual humility is not merely practical—it also has important theoretic and scientific implications and is central to various projects in both philosophy and psychology. The problem, however, is that a robust conceptual, theoretical, and empirical understanding of intellectual humility is surprisingly difficult to come by. Intellectual humility has sometimes been explicitly delineated as a subset of concepts such as humility and wisdom. For example, research into folk conceptions of wisdom reveals components such as open-mindedness, not being afraid to admit and correct a mistake, and listening to all sides of an issue (what Sternberg [1985] calls “sagacity”) that resonate with intellectual humility, but what of intellectual humility itself? If we do not understand precisely what intellectual humility is, we will be unable to explore the full significance of intellectual humility (both practical and academic) with much precision. Prima facie, humility is the virtuous mean between something like arrogance, on the one hand, and self-deprecation or diffidence, on the other. Humble people do not value themselves too much (arrogance), nor do they value themselves too little (diffidence or self-deprecation). Instead, they think of ­themselves—their value, their status among their peers, and their abilities—as they should. We might imagine, then, that intellectual humility, in its simplest form, is the virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual diffidence. The intellectually humble person, to put it roughly, does not overly value his or her beliefs (intellectual arrogance), nor does he or she undervalue

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them (intellectual diffidence). Instead, intellectually humble people value their beliefs and their intellectual abilities as they ought. Given its focus on beliefs, this rough approximation of intellectual humility is what we will be calling the doxastic (i.e., relating to beliefs) account of intellectual humility. In this chapter, we will try to unpack and defend this simple, intuitive account of intellectual humility. Although recent empirical research suggests that intellectual humility might be a multifaceted and multilayered virtue—with moral dimensions, interpersonal dimensions, intrapersonal dimensions, etc.—we will be defending a fundamentally doxastic account of intellectual humility (Samuelson et al., 2014). Whatever social or moral dimensions the virtue of intellectual humility might have, we will suggest that it needs to be built upon or understood within this basic, doxastic account. Problems with the Current Seminal Accounts of Intellectual Humility Robert Roberts and Jay Wood (2003, 2007) developed the current preeminent account of intellectual humility in the scholarly literature. In developing their account, Roberts and Wood define humility by contrasting it with vices like arrogance and vanity. As they explain: Like many other epistemic virtues, humility has a wider than merely intellectual sphere. So our strategy will be first to explore it in its broader moral application, and then to carry what we have learned into a discussion of the intellectual life . . . . Often, virtues are best described in connection with their vice-counterparts, and this is especially important with humility . . . . Humility is opposite a number of vices, including arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, impertinence (presumption), haughtiness, self-righteousness, domination, selfish ambition, and self-complacency. (2003, pp. 257–258) And so, Roberts and Wood explicate intellectual humility by working from an understanding of humility in general, generated by contrasting it with vices approximately summarized as “improper pride” (p. 258). In this way, Roberts and Wood go on to define intellectual humility as: an unusually low dispositional concern for the kind of status that accrues to persons who are viewed by their intellectual communities as intellectually talented, accomplished, and skilled, especially where such concern is muted or sidelined by intrinsic intellectual concerns—in particular, the

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ian m. church and justin l. barrett concern for knowledge with its various attributes of truth, justification, warrant, coherence, precision, and significance. (2003, p. 271)

According to Roberts and Wood, intellectual humility is a virtue that can be negatively defined by its opposition to intellectual variants of vices such as arrogance, vanity, snobbishness, and domination. One way of understanding many of these kinds of vices is that they are often focused on the social well-being of the possessor. Thus, according to Roberts and Wood (2007), intellectual humility must be something quite the opposite: as they put it more recently, “a striking or unusual unconcern for social importance, and thus a kind of emotional insensitivity to the issues of status” (p. 239, emphasis added). The important nuance here being that the possessor of intellectual humility is not unaware of his or her status, excellence, or importance, but that he or she is largely unconcerned with the issue and is motivated to pursue epistemic goods by something beyond social status. The first concern for such an account is that it is not at all clear that intellectual humility is just the opposite of intellectual arrogance. We can easily imagine a person who is too humble—a person who is so intellectually diffident that he or she fails to appropriately recognize and appreciate his or her own intellectual achievements. Consider the case of Emma, a brilliant, expert zoologist who cares little for her (high) social status relative to Bruce, an ignorant pretender. Emma and Bruce are at an aquarium when they have a disagreement about the scientific name of a certain species of whelk. Caring nothing for her intellectual status and accolades (or Bruce’s negative status), Emma takes Bruce’s dissent seriously and treats him as an intellectual peer. According to the Roberts and Wood account, Emma exhibits intellectual humility; she is not at all concerned about her intellectual social importance or her academic status. Our intuition in this case is that she is not being virtuous. For a highly acclaimed and accomplished zoologist like Emma to take the dissent of a zoological dunce like Bruce seriously seems intellectually vicious. That someone could care too little about their relative intellectual status is a dimension missing from the Roberts and Wood account. Second, because it is built from concerns around social status, the Roberts and Woods account of intellectual humility seems to lead to strange asymmetries when it comes to nonsocial scenarios—those where intellectual status within a community is simply not possible. Consider the following case: SHIPWRECKED:  Tragedy has befallen Bruce—the ignorant, yet arrogant wannabe zoologist—and he has been shipwrecked on a small deserted island. He is entirely alone, except for the

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marine animals that he in fact knows so little about. And with no social status to care about, Bruce can no longer be obsessed with his status among his peers and how much they think of him. In this case, with no social status to be gained or lost, Bruce cannot help but be intellectually humble. He can have no concern for his social status because there is no social status to be concerned about. And even though he might sit on the island, endlessly telling himself that all of his zoological judgments are right and true, he simply cannot be intellectually arrogant—at least not according to the Roberts and Wood account. As Bruce endlessly tells himself that all of his zoological judgments are right and true, it sure seems like he is being intellectually arrogant. A more recent account of intellectual humility comes from Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, and Howard-Snyder (2015), who define intellectual humility as “proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one’s intellectual limitations” (p. 12). Perhaps the most striking feature of this limitations-owning account of intellectual humility is that in order to be intellectually humble one need be only attentive to and own one’s intellectual limitations; being attentive to and owning one’s intellectual strengths, according to Whitcomb et al., is a different virtue altogether, namely proper pride. With such a distinction, intellectual humility qua intellectual humility is blind to intellectual strengths. As Whitcomb et al. admit, their account of intellectual humility “says nothing about one’s orientation or stance toward one’s intellectual strengths” (2015, p. 20). As Whitcomb et al. noted, this approach may lead to some bizarre conclusions. Imagine someone who is duly attentive to and owning of their intellectual limitations but radically overestimates and brags about their intellectual strengths. Insofar as someone is intellectually arrogant if they radically overestimate and brag about their intellectual strengths, then it looks like the limitations-­owning account leads to this odd conclusion: it is possible for someone to “be at once intellectually humble and intellectually arrogant” (Whitcomb et al., 2015, p. 20). And that seems like a reason to reject the view outright. The inability to rule out the possibility of someone being at once intellectually arrogant and intellectually humble is a limitation that we do not want to own in accounts of intellectual humility. In response, Whitcomb et al. argue that such a result is metaphysically impossible for an agent who is fully internally rational. Of course, for anyone who is not fully internally rational—which, sadly, is most everyone—it is still possible to be at once both intellectually humble and intellectually arrogant on the l­imitations-owning view, but that is a limitation Whitcomb et al. are willing to own. To soften the blow, they note that “perhaps [such a result]

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should not be all that surprising. When irrationality is on the scene—as it can be in the human mind—seemingly incompatible mental states can coexist” (2015, p. 25). We still regard this coexistence as a serious limitation of the view. Imagine someone said to you, “You need to meet Richard! He’s such a kind and humble guy. Watch out, though, he’s an arrogant jerk.” You would think you just heard a contradiction, not, “Well, I guess Richard must be less than fully internally rational.” Even if it is right that the limitations-owning view of intellectual humility can avoid cases where someone is at once intellectually humble and intellectually arrogant just so long as that person is fully internally rational, the view still allows for cases where even a fully rational someone can be at once intellectually humble and, to use Whitcomb et al.’s term, “intellectually servile.” By their reckoning, if someone does not appropriately recognize their own intellectual strengths enough, and, hence, doubts their good judgments unnecessarily or is gullible and easily duped, then they are intellectually servile. Here again, since Whitcomb et al. insist on limiting the scope of intellectual humility to intellectual limitations (excluding strengths), we get another odd result: someone can be at once intellectually humble and intellectually servile. And here, it does not look like appeals to fully internally rational agents can soften the blow. Perhaps objectionable to psychologists, Whitcomb et al.’s position clearly leaves open a state-like understanding of intellectual humility. One could thoroughly own his or her limitations of knowledge or intellectual capacity in one domain but not others, or at some moments but not others. Bruce, the arrogant yet ignorant wannabe zoologist, could contentedly own his limitations in a domain that he cares little about, such as early-nineteenth-century British literature, but should such owning earn him the privilege of being counted among the intellectually humble? We suspect that most people who would surely merit the label of “intellectually arrogant git” have at least some domain in which they freely admit their ignorance or incompetence. Indeed, it is possible to be prideful about what one does not know, regarding it as beneath one’s attention. Along with the concerns raised earlier in regard to the Whitcomb et al. account, this conclusion might further dampen our enthusiasm for their view of intellectual humility. The Doxastic Account of Intellectual Humility Whatever worries one might have about Roberts and Wood’s “low concern for status” account of intellectual humility or Whitcomb et al.’s “limitations-owning” account, they are two of the seminal focused accounts of intellectual humility in the literature. As we’ve seen, however, both accounts face serious worries. And in both cases, these are worries we should try to avoid, thus they motivate us to look for alternative accounts of intellectual humility.

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The alternative account that we want to explore is what we’re calling the doxastic account of intellectual humility. Again, intellectual humility intuitively seems to be the virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual diffidence. The intellectually humble person, as we have said before, doesn’t overly value their beliefs, nor do they undervalue them. Instead, they regard their beliefs, their epistemic status, and their intellectual abilities as they ought. Or, as a rough first approximation: DA (Doxastic Account): Intellectual humility is the virtue of valuing one’s own beliefs as he or she ought. It is tempting to equate this valuing of beliefs with how firmly someone holds a given belief, to how resilient a given belief is to revision or relinquishment. After all, it seems right to think that an intellectually arrogant person would be someone who is completely unwilling to change his or her belief in the face of disagreement, threat, or counter-evidence. Likewise, it seems right to think that intellectually diffident people would be those who hold their beliefs loosely and revise or change them with the changing wind. Intellectual humility, then, would amount to holding beliefs as firmly as you ought. Psychological dynamics, however, suggest that belief firmness, or a belief’s resilience to revision or relinquishment, is not the only or best relevant metric for intellectual humility. Consider a case in which a doting mother finds it impossible to believe that her adult son is a violent criminal even though she can admit the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Similarly, consider a heroic young woman who commits her life to ending human trafficking in a country in which experts tell her that the situation is utterly hopeless, but she refuses to believe them. Are the women in these examples exhibiting intellectual vice? It seems to us that the psychological dynamics surrounding why beliefs are revised or not in the face of disagreement or contradicting evidence bear upon whether one is intellectually humble versus arrogant or diffident. Intellectual humility does not collapse to simply being open-minded to the right degree. What cases like these seem to suggest, however, is that “value” in DA should actually track the numerous factors that lead to forming and holding appropriate beliefs, something like what philosophers call justification or warrant or, to be entirely nonpartisan, positive epistemic status. Roughly, take positive epistemic status to be whatever, in sufficient amount, bridges the gap between (mere) true belief and knowledge. No doubt, how much positive epistemic status one attributes to one’s beliefs will often go hand in hand with how firmly this person believes it. It seems natural to think that the intellectually arrogant person attributes far more positive epistemic status to their beliefs than they should,

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just as the intellectually diffident person attributes far less positive epistemic status than they should. However, cases like the doting mother show that attributions of positive epistemic status and belief firmness can and do occasionally come apart; and when they do, it seems like what really matters when it comes to intellectual humility is the former. With this in mind, perhaps we can now think of DA in terms of the following: DA′: Intellectual humility is the virtue of attributing positive epistemic status to one’s own beliefs as he or she ought. Imagine two amateur space enthusiasts, Luke and Thomas. Upon hearing the news that traces of water might have been found on Mars, Luke comes to believe very strongly that there is life on Mars. Thomas is also excited about the recent news regarding water on Mars; however, after reading unhinged speculations on a prominent flat-Earth conspiracy theory website, Thomas begins to doubt whether Mars is really even a planet. Given that the possibility of water on Mars is, at best, weak evidence for thinking that there is life on Mars, then DA′ would predict that Luke is intellectually arrogant in holding his belief as strongly as he does; and given that flat-Earth conspiracy theory websites should not in any way upset established scientific research, DA′ would predict that Thomas is being intellectually diffident in holding his belief as weakly as he does. Neither Luke nor Thomas is being intellectually humble; neither one seems to be accurately tracking the positive epistemic status of their respective beliefs. But there are still a couple of problems (at least) facing DA′. First of all, it would be nice if we could say a bit more about the normative component— about what determines the positive epistemic status that a given belief ought to be attributed with. And relatedly, it’s not entirely clear that the attribution of positive epistemic status is really what is at issue; it’s not clear that attribution is really what we ought to be concerned about when it comes to intellectual humility. After all, attributing positive epistemic status to a belief seems like a highly reflective activity requiring explicit, controlled (system 2) cognitive processing, and it’s not obvious that intellectual humility should only be relegated to that domain. First of all, it seems like the positive epistemic status someone ought to attribute to their own beliefs is the positive epistemic status such beliefs actually have. So, minimally, perhaps a doxastic account of intellectual humility should be most concerned with whether or not someone is accurately tracking—be it consciously or subconsciously—the positive epistemic status that their beliefs actually enjoy. And what is more, accurately tracking positive epistemic status, perhaps unlike attributing positive epistemic status, does not seem to require highly reflective activity; accurately tracking positive epistemic status, perhaps

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unlike attributing positive epistemic status, seems like the sort of thing that can be done implicitly and subconsciously. All that said, we can modify our doxastic account of intellectual humility accordingly: DA′′: Intellectual humility is the virtue of accurately tracking the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Helpfully, like DA′, DA′′ allows us to rightly attribute intellectual arrogance to Luke in his belief about life on Mars, and it allows us to rightly attribute intellectual diffidence to Thomas in his weak belief about Mars being a planet. And it does all this without being completely normatively underdescribed or inadvertently demanding highly reflective cognition. For even if one is attracted to a strong reflective component in developing intellectual humility at the outset, we would expect some expertise to develop over time in this regard, such as becoming more reflexive in seeking disconfirmatory evidence. What was system 2 activity may become system 1 activity, or, habitual in a sense that would satisfy Aristotelian views of virtue. Even so, we might need to make some sort of caveat with DA′′ in order to account for situations where someone has been nonculpably deceived. Consider the following case: LIE: Mary has known Martha for many years and has always found her to be extremely trustworthy. One day, Martha is feeling a bit cheeky and decides to tell Mary a lie. Feigning a panic, Martha runs up to Mary and tells her that Mary’s house is on fire. Naturally enough, since Mary has never known Martha to be anything but entirely honest, Mary nonculpably, yet falsely, believes that her house is on fire and takes such a belief to have a lot of positive epistemic status (via Martha’s testimony). And as such, Mary heads home in a hurry. In order for DA′′ to rightly handle cases like LIE, we need Mary’s belief, taken to have a lot of positive epistemic status, to not count as intellectual arrogance simply because she was deceived in a manner that she could not be reasonably expected to have caught. Thus, we make a final adjustment to our doxastic account of intellectual humility: DA′′′: Intellectual humility is the virtue of accurately tracking what one could nonculpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Since Mary is nonculpable in believing Martha’s testimony, DA′′′ helps guarantee that Mary won’t be wrongfully ascribed with intellectual arrogance.

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Intellectual humility, according to DA′′′, is assessed along two axes: how much positive epistemic status a given belief enjoys, and how much positive epistemic status a given agent thinks it enjoys. Consider the following figure. If a belief enjoys only a very marginal amount of positive epistemic status (perhaps the belief that an ideal tropical beach includes no fewer than 20 but no more than 40 palm trees per 100 meters of coastline), then intellectual humility requires that a given agent track that modest positive epistemic status accordingly. In contrast, if a given belief enjoys a tremendous amount of positive epistemic status (as in the belief that the external world actually exists), then the intellectually humble agent will value such a belief accordingly, tracking its positive epistemic status. Ascribing too much positive epistemic status to a given belief would be vicious (intellectually arrogant, upper-left corner of Figure 4.1), as would ascribing too little (intellectual diffidence, lower-right corner of Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 The doxastic account of intellectual humility. *Adapted from an earlier version of a figure in Ian Church’s article, “Is Intellectual Humility Compatible with Dogmatism” (forthcoming), which was produced for Biola University’s Center for Christian Thought and funded by the John Templeton Foundation.

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Addressing Some Objections, Further Questions, and Future Directions Now, although we would humbly suggest that the doxastic account is the best way to think about intellectual humility, experience tells us that everyone may not be convinced. In closing, we briefly discuss six common questions that may spawn additional research in the philosophical and psychological treatments of intellectual humility. Is Intellectual Humility Really a Virtuous Mean? Some philosophers (like Roberts and Wood) might object to the idea that intellectual humility (or humility) is really best conceived of as a virtuous mean, an issue with major implications for psychological measurement. The principal reason one might think intellectual humility isn’t a virtuous mean is because it seems like we would have to encourage someone who is extremely self-­deprecating or intellectually diffident that they need to be more humble, and that seems counterintuitive. So it might seem as though we have conflicting intuitions here. We suggest that we can explain away this apparent conflict as an unfortunate consequence of common language use that does not reflect a deeper problem. Consider the virtue of courage. We take it that most people would agree that courage is the virtuous mean between cowardice and foolhardiness (or rashness). But even so, like humility and intellectual humility, it might feel odd to encourage someone who is recklessly foolhardy to be more courageous. Why is this? Common encouragement to “take courage” is generally aimed at people who are cowardly, not foolhardy, and so encouraging a rash person to not be rash but courageous is uncommon. It does not follow that courage is a one-­dimensional virtue. Analogously, in discussions concerning humility, arrogance is the most commonly targeted vice and so our language does not readily accommodate the idea of diffidence as lacking humility. Dichotomous thought and speech seem to come easier to human psychology than thinking in terms of virtuous middles. Are We Really Talking about Intellectual Humility? Perhaps we are not really talking about intellectual humility at all but about another virtue and just calling it intellectual humility. Perhaps our account highlights a feature of intellectual virtues in general but we are not picking out intellectual humility in particular. Or, if we are picking out something specific, perhaps we are really just talking about intellectual honesty, accuracy, or firmness, and not intellectual humility (e.g., see Wood, 2012). The philosophy of intellectual humility is currently something like a wild frontier. As Roberts (2012) noted in his discussion summary for the Big

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Questions Online piece, “What Is It to Be Intellectually Humble?,” “One of the most striking things to emerge from our discussion of intellectual humility is the lack of consensus on what ‘humility’ and ‘intellectual humility’ mean.” As the conversation develops, it has become manifestly clear that there is no shared or even entirely dominate view of intellectual humility in the literature; the Roberts and Wood view is different from Whitcomb et al.’s view, which is different from our view, etc. So it seems like the state of play right now is to try to stake a claim and defend it as best you can (but without attributing it with inappropriate positive epistemic status)! And that’s what we’re doing. Of course, if there were consensus regarding that with which we are confusing intellectual humility, then perhaps we should still back off from our account, but there is no such consensus. Is Intellectual Humility a Virtuous Trait or Context Dependent? We have assumed that intellectual humility is best conceptualized as a general tendency or trait that characterizes a virtuous knower. The empirical question for psychologists is whether exhibiting intellectual humility, as conceptualized here, really generalizes across situations and domains of thought. We suspect that intellectual humility differs from courage in this regard. Compare the firefighter who places fear aside on a daily basis to save others with a timid child who runs from fear except when her younger sister is threatened, and then she rushes into harm’s way courageously. The child exhibits courage in a particular moment, and the firefighter does so with enough frequency that we regard the virtue as trait-like; both show courage. Accurately tracking the positive epistemic status of a large number of beliefs, however, is something that a great many people probably do with a large proportion of their beliefs. Unlike courage, however, most of us would not be terribly impressed if someone “rose to the occasion” and accurately tracked the epistemic status of just one belief or belief in only one domain. Imagine the sophomore in college who, in the face of her philosophy professor arguing that the student is only a brain in a vat and everything she thinks is the external world is only in her mind still maintains that there is a real world. Such a student may be accurately tracking the positive epistemic status of her belief that the external world is real, but we would probably not award her a medal for intellectual virtue. Why? Probably most of us already do a reasonably strong job of tracking the positive epistemic status of beliefs that fall at both extremes of the horizontal line in Figure 4.1, and we are even bound to accurately track the positive epistemic status for beliefs closer to the middle at least occasionally. Much more interesting for both psychologists and philosophers would be to examine whether intellectual humility as presented here is more likely across some domains of beliefs or environmental contexts in individuals who are not broadly intellectually humble.

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How Accurate—and in What Way—Does One Need to Be in Tracking One’s Beliefs? The trait-state distinction raises another potential concern relevant to measuring intellectual humility. One may be concerned that our definition of intellectual humility fails to specify just how accurate one must be in tracking the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs to be intellectually humble versus arrogant or diffident. Must one accurately track the positive epistemic status of all of one’s own beliefs with an extremely high degree of fidelity, or only most of them with a moderately high degree of fidelity, or somewhere in between? Whereas we are content to allow intellectual humility to fall somewhere on a continuum (again, like courage), some comment is required regarding which counts more: the breadth or depth of accurate tracking in gauging or measuring intellectual humility. The question is analogous to measuring intelligence: Is a genius someone who is exceptionally strong in a particular domain or generally strong in an exceptional number of domains? Both the depth and the breadth positions have merit. We confess to having no strong commitment to whether “accuracy” in our definition should be construed in terms of high degree of accuracy tracking fidelity on any given belief versus high proportion of accuracy tracking across beliefs. Whereas we are inclined toward the latter “breadth” view—akin to seeing intelligence as strength across an exceptional number of domains— we wish to withhold commitment until more data are available. Psychological research may demonstrate that intellectual humility is more like general intelligence with very fluid domain and situational boundaries or more like special intelligences with sharp strengths in only some areas. What about a Social Dimension? Recent empirical research (including some of our own; see Samuelson et al., 2014) seems to strongly suggest that folk conceptions of intellectual humility contain not only a doxastic/epistemic dimension but also a clear social dimension. Intellectual humility, in the folk mind, often seems to be connected with how we engage with and treat other people, and this seems right to us. It is a worry for our account that it seems so very focused on the doxastic or epistemic dimensions of intellectual humility. There are, we think, three ways to respond to this worry. First, we could back off on giving a “full-blown” account of intellectual humility and just satisfy ourselves with the claim that the doxastic account of intellectual humility is merely a necessary condition on intellectual humility, and maybe something else—another condition—needs to be added to it in order to account for the social dimension. Second, it is not obvious that the doxastic account of intellectual humility is not already suited to incorporate interpersonal or intrapersonal elements

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within it. After all, positive epistemic status is an extremely open-ended concept. If intellectual character virtues or social, epistemic virtues are included as at least a part of the positive epistemic status at issue (which we think they should be), and if interpersonal and intrapersonal considerations can be incorporated within such virtues (which they often are), then there is a straightforward way for the doxastic account of intellectual humility to account for such dimensions. For instance, part of raising or lowering the degree to which one holds a belief’s positive epistemic status may include whether a person that one ought to humble themselves before holds an opposing view. Third, contrary to initial appearances, perhaps intellectual humility really does not need to have a social dimension. Think of someone who is completely socially oblivious because of a developmental disorder or a cross-cultural setting. In the United States, not tipping a waiter or waitress is the sort of thing you only do when you are looking to signify your distaste for the service you received. In China, however, tipping a waiter or waitress is the sort of thing you do only when you are looking to insult someone. If we did not know about this social norm and we visited a restaurant and tipped handsomely for what we thought was excellent service, we would be considered raging jerks—but would we really be? We do not think so. Our hearts were in the right place, we just did not know the social norms. To be sure, our actions often go hand-in-hand with our intentions, and that might explain why we tend to think intellectual humility has a social component. Usually, if someone is acting like a total, arrogant prig, it is because he or she is a total, arrogant prig. But we wonder if the so-called “social dimensions” of intellectual humility are not actually necessary for a useful conception of intellectual humility. Does the Doxastic View Split Intellectual Humility from Humility? Because the doxastic view focuses on how one holds beliefs rather than on social status or treatment of others, it may appear that this view distances intellectual humility from general humility. Isn’t intellectual humility a subclass of humility? Alternatively, it could be the case that humility is a subset of intellectual humility: perhaps humility is just being intellectually humble about how one conceives of himself or herself. If this is correct, then perhaps the most parsimonious way to understand humility is by way of intellectual humility. Indeed, in a seminal theoretical piece in the psychology literature, Tangney (2000) grounds the definition of humility in two realms: a proper understanding of the self (accurate assessment, keeping one’s abilities/accomplishments in proper perspective, low self-focus) and a certain intellectual disposition (acknowledging mistakes, intellectual openness). Various measures of humility have also reflected these dimensions (Davis et al., 2011; Landrum, 2011; Rowatt et al., 2006). Perhaps some of the challenges that have been encountered in the measurement of humility could find resolution if humility was seen as a component of intellectual humility.

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Conclusion Based upon our analysis, our working definition of intellectual humility is the virtue of accurately tracking what one could nonculpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. We regard this definition as both a virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and diffidence and as having advantages over other recent conceptions of intellectual humility. Further philosophical work and psychological evidence will help determine how this construct relates to general social humility on the one hand, and intellectual traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity, and honesty on the other. Our hope is that this model of intellectual humility will be helpful for psychological and social scientists in developing useful measures of this intellectual virtue as well as curricula and interventions that may encourage its development. References Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J., . . . . . . Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93(3), 225–234. doi:10.1080/00223891.2011.558871 Landrum, R. E. (2011). Measuring dispositional humility: A first approximation. Psychological Reports, 108(1), 217–228. doi:10.2466/02.07.09.pr0.108.1.217–228 Roberts, R. C. (2012, June). What is it to be intellectually humble?: Discussion summary. The Big Questions Online. Retrieved October 4, 2012, from www.bigquestionsonline.com/ node/135/comment/summary/all Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2003). Humility and epistemic goods. In Linda Zagsebski & Michael DePaul (Eds.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology (pp. 257– 279). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rowatt, W. C., Powers, C., Targhetta, V., Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & Labouff, J. (2006). Development and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to arrogance. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1(4), 198–211. doi:10.1080/17439760600885671 Samuelson, P. L., Jarvinen, M. J., Paulus, T. P., Church, I. M., Hardy, S. A., & Barrett, J. L. (2014). Implicit theories of intellectual virtues and vices: A focus on intellectual humility. Journal of Positive Psychology, 10, 389–406. 10.1080/17439760.2014.967802 Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(3), 607–627. doi:10.1037/0022–3514.49.3.607 Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19(1), 70–82. doi:10.1521/ jscp.2000.19.1.70 Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2015). Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), 1–31. Wood, W. J. (2012, December). How might intellectual humility lead to scientific insight: Discussion summary. The Big Questions Online. Retrieved October 4, 2012, from www. bigquestionsonline.com/node/177/comment/summary/all

5 POLITICAL HUMILITY A Post-Modern Reconceptualization Everett L. Worthington, Jr.

In the United States today, political interactions within the political system are characterized with highly partisan divisions between parties, and even within parties, there are stark differences. Acrimony and intransigent adherence to cherished positions seem to rule discussions about political issues. When I mention that I am writing on political humility, an almost universal reaction is to mutter something about an oxymoron. It seems that the common lay belief (and I admit that the validity of my observation is uncontaminated by actual scientific data) seems to be that it is virtually impossible to find a politician who is politically humble. The general attitude seems to be that when people talk about political issues with others who do not share their beliefs and values, humble, or even respectful, sharing of ideas or compromise is, at best, unlikely. Political lack of humility has many historical and proximal causes. In a brief chapter, I can at best hope to provide a cursory overview and point readers to some relevant literature. Although I admittedly will be skimming the surface, I hope to advance the conversation. Perhaps this cross-disciplinary chapter will provide fertile ideas for investigation across disciplines. I close with practical suggestions for civil discourse in a free society. Understanding Political Humility as One Type of Humility Several understandings of humility have developed from its study within positive psychology (for a review, see Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). I will define humility as I understand it and then describe several types of humility. Defining Humility Humility is defined as (a) having accurate self-assessment that involves seeing oneself as a limited agent, (b) presenting oneself modestly to others, and (c)

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holding an attitude oriented toward benefiting others (not just oneself) that might be characterized as exerting power under control to build others up and not squash them down (Worthington et al., 2016). Types of Humility Humility may be divided into subtypes. General humility is a trait self- or ­other-evaluation that describes the person as meeting the definition of humility in virtually all situations and relationships. Relational humility is humility within a particular relationship. The humble president of a country, leader in political office, corporate boss or CEO, military leader, parent, child, teacher, student, or scientific expert might share some qualities of how their relational humility manifests, but they will also differ on some. Some relationships involve a considerable amount of intellectual interchange, and in those cases, intellectual humility might be a substantial portion of the relational humility. Spiritual humility is humility before what one considers sacred (Davis, Hook, Worthington, Van Tongeren, Gartner, & Jennings, 2010). For many, this is God. For some, it is nature or environment; for others, humanity; for still others, it is what seems transcendent or beyond the mundane. Intellectual humility involves an accurate awareness that one’s knowledge is limited, a modesty in being able to admit, and actually admitting, one’s limited knowledge, an acknowledgment that one could be wrong that is heartfelt and not perfunctory, and a way of sharing ideas that values the person with whom one is sharing and takes his or her ideas seriously. It also involves the willingness to revise one’s beliefs, values, and practices as a result of interpersonal interactions with other-minded (and like-minded) people that maintains a sense of coherence yet openness to correction or modification when persuaded to do so by reason or to preserve valued interpersonal relationships. When people differ intellectually, the ego is placed under strain and that often brings about either humility or lack of it. Intellectual humility is a subtype of humility that allows people to respect others’ ideas and intellectual positions. Many topics have ideas in which people personally invest. Political humility is a subtype of intellectual humility. Political humility is imbued with particular emotional charge for people who are invested in leadership, people who feel very affected by the leadership of a country or organization, or people whose expertise might depend on the way public events are interpreted (i.e., news commentators, politicians, political scientists, etc.). It is also considered crucial for people who treat political identity or treat country as sacred. Political humility is specifically concerned with negotiating and respecting others’ political, philosophical, and pragmatic ideas. Religious humility is also a subtype of intellectual humility, but it is of special significance because it involves people’s commitment to the sacred.

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People can hold many things to be sacred, and when they do, the objects are imbued with special significance. Zeroing In on Political Humility We briefly turn to the philosophy of science to illustrate political philosophy. Philosopher of science Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) suggested that scientific research programs were made up of both hard core and auxiliary hypotheses (Lakatos, 1978). The hard core included theoretical assumptions, values, beliefs, practices, and strongly supported findings that form the structure and process of the research program. The auxiliary hypotheses were less supported by data and theorizing and not integral to the structure of the research program. Karl Popper (1963) had suggested that science seeks to disconfirm theories and hypotheses by finding contrary evidence. Thus, disconfirming evidence should be grounds for abandoning a favored theory. Yet, in practice, that rarely happened. Scientists held on to their favored theories tenaciously. Lakatos argued that forming or changing ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses helped theories become elaborated. If we may take some license, we might apply these ideas to political humility. People have core beliefs, assumptions, and supporting networks about political reality. For some people, the hard (political) core is very important. A great deal of psychological energy is invested in their political assumptions, values, beliefs, and practices. Those are rarely doubted, and when challenged, people are usually not open to modifying them. Other political ideas might seem quite important but are less crucial to the structure of assumptions, values, beliefs, and practices that make up the hard core. A politically humble person is someone who considers both the logic of a challenging intellectual argument and the interpersonal environment within which the argument is levied. The politically humble person is open to modifying his or her auxiliary political assumptions, values, beliefs, or practices if the reasoning or interpersonal situation is compelling enough. Importantly, though, the politically humble person usually maintains a hard core that is much more impervious to modification. Political humility then involves (a) being aware of and honest about one’s hard core and auxiliary hypotheses regarding politics, including the weaknesses and limitations as well as one’s adherence to commitments to people (i.e., individuals, communities, and political systems); (b) presenting one’s political assumptions, values, beliefs, and practices modestly in ways that are not off-­putting, belligerent, and argumentative; and (c) being other-oriented (i.e., aware of interpersonal situations, structures, relational commitments, obligations, and nuances) so that one is able to build people up, respect their political sensibilities and positions, and act with responsible power toward people

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similar and different to one politically in a way that exhibits power under control to help others instead of hurt others. A Brief and Simplified History of Humility and Its Intersection with Secularization In the present section, I provide a brief summary of the history of political humility. This will lead us to today’s perspective rooted in modernity and post-modernity. Greek and Roman Absence of Humility In the Roman world, government was derived from a Greek cultural democratic perspective. Culturally, one of the biggest reasons for human moral failure within the Greek culture was hybris, overweening pride. The concept of humility did not exist in Greek thought. In the Roman Empire, Greek culture and Roman military might reigned. Augustine (354–430) became the pre-­eminent theologian in the Roman Empire. In Augustine’s view, people were completely dependent on God for moral capability. Humility reflected this absolute dependence. The fundamental sin was thus pride, a rejection of humility. That way of thinking held hegemony into the Age of Enlightenment (ca. 1650s to ca. 1780s). Erosion of the Augustinian Hegemony The Enlightenment was focused on what Charles Taylor (2007) called a “subtraction story” (p. 22). By this he meant that secular modernity subtracted confining horizons, or limitations of knowledge. Often the religious underpinnings were subtracted. Regarding humility, Hume (1711–1776) tried to redeem pride as a virtue from the slur of what he considered Augustinian-derived false religion. Hume vilified humility as keeping people mired in weakness and inaction. Pride empowered human agency. Thus, humility was characterized as limiting, confining, harmful, and, above all, weak. Hume’s agenda was largely to remove Christian considerations from public life. That project has been the center of the culture wars of recent decades. In many ways, Hume’s agenda succeeded. Earlier, deism was an attempt to maintain personal spirituality but exclude God from the public arena. Also, concepts like a wall of separation between church and state were introduced and gained a foothold. The Christian-shaped Augustinian view of humility as virtuous was largely undone. Augustinian humility required absolute dependence on God, and Protestant theologies formulated during the Reformation reinforced the idea that God was supreme and thus a religious view must mean that humans were dependent. Thus, humility was seen primarily as virtuous, but often as

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weak. Until recently, viewing humility as a desirable virtue has been largely confined to overtly religious communities, and it does not necessarily dominate all of those. Humility in secular life, especially secular political life, has been out of favor. Recent Attempts to Reclaim a Secular Grounding of Humility However, in a provocative book, Secular Powers, Julie E. Cooper (2013) seeks to rehabilitate humility by examining three other Enlightenment writers: Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Cooper claims that Hobbes has not been carefully read. He is often seen as a co-belligerent of Hume. But, Cooper argues that instead, Hobbes advocated humility as empowering, a source of strength because it acknowledged all humans as equal. Spinoza and Rousseau came at the issues differently (see Cooper, 2013, for excellent and thorough analytic accounts). They were both explicitly hostile to humility; however, they were also hostile to pride. Both saw a necessity of removing God from politics. Cooper argues that Enlightenment philosophers’ efforts to free politics from theological considerations were not an attempted prideful overthrow of God by arrogant humans. Rather, it was seen as a collective project empowered by an appreciation of human capabilities and limits. Humility, then, as awareness of such an appreciation of both capabilities and limitations, could be seen to empower, not weaken, humans. Philosopher Stephen K. White (2009), in The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen, was eager to redeem humility from the secular doldrums where it had languished since Hume and the Enlightenment writers. White agrees with Augustine that humility requires accepting individuals’ inherent weaknesses, which he terms embracing one’s finitude. However, by acknowledging one’s individual moral and existential weaknesses, one can engineer a society that guards against inevitable human weaknesses and foibles. By accepting human weaknesses, the humble person can build checks and balances into government, can set term limits on chief political officers, can provide for a system of passing laws that engages people with multiple perspectives, and can require a process that is often prolonged. A Secular Age and the Role of Humility within It Perhaps the definitive modern understanding of secularism has been articulated by Charles Taylor (2007) in A Secular Age. He asks how in 1500 virtually all people held religious views, but by the end of the twentieth century, society simply was not seen often as an arena for religious beliefs and values. His answer was that in 1500 selves were “porous” (Taylor, 2007, p. 38)—vulnerable to attack by demons, spirits, situations, and powerful human agents. Modernity led to a concept of the self as “buffered” (p. 38)—impermeable, encapsulated,

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and disengaged. They were distanced and separated from their own minds, the external world, and other people. They sensed that one was able to order life without God. But Taylor argues that this was not an urge to dethrone God and take over sovereignty. It was, instead, a feeling that one is buffered from attacks by the encapsulated self. Secular people felt that some pride was appropriate, not the sinful curse with which Augustinian theology had tarred it. We live not just in modernity but on the bubble between modernity and post-modernity. The post-modern person has nagging doubts that people really can be impermeable, encapsulated, disengaged, and separated from their own minds, the external world, and other people. Rather, some tenets of post-­ modernism are that people live in co-constructed worlds; thus they are inevitably influenced by culture, other people, and situations (Gergen, 2015). Taylor understands the secular world as one that is characterized by diversity. He also believes that it is virtually impossible for any side to array a case with evidence that holds unopposable force. Thus, he recommends humility as a realistic, pragmatic stance. He believes that most people know that unassailable arguments are impossible. They thus feel that their own arguments are fragile. That knowledge, he asserts, “fragilizes” (p. 531) life, creating an underlying belief that others think differently from oneself and thus, dogmatic self-­assertion is foolish. Humility, thus, is perhaps the virtue for the secular age. This meshes with a post-modern understanding of values that are contextualized within communities. Diversity is embraced, because reality is understood differently in different communities and none is ipso facto superior. Eight Reasons for Recapturing Political Humility as a Virtue Although a post-modern understanding of political humility might make it untenable to expect that political humility would be universally understood, I suggest that there are important reasons to recapture a sense of humility. Namely, the nature of political conflict, the nature of relationships, and the status of interparty and intraparty conflict in the United States have all changed in recent decades and will likely change even more in the future. There are several reasons why political humility is needed and is within practical grasp today. Humility Is Needed When Real Power and Resources Are Being Negotiated Humility is needed when the ego is under threat. Because political negotiation is often about power, the participants in the system are almost always in a state of ego challenge because real power is being wielded that can literally affect people’s survival. Thus, humility is almost always needed within the political system if people are to negotiate agreements from different philosophical and political positions.

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everett l. worthington, jr. Political Polarization Makes Humility More Needed Than Ever

Second, political humility has been sorely lacking in recent years due to political polarization. Effective government and political action often requires bipartisanship and reaching agreements with people who are different politically. The lack of humility and the consequences of this are seen in our government today, especially the inability to work together to pass legislation, government shutdown, etc. Perhaps humility could provide a way forward. Haidt (2012) suggests that this gridlock is due to ideological differences at the core of belief. He suggests seeking to try to understand (rationally) the core values of the people in other political camps to promote less polarization. However, it is likely that effective solutions might be less rational. Worthington et al. (2016) have adduced evidence in support of the social bonds hypothesis. People who are humble are hypothesized to be more likely to form and maintain social bonds. McElroy et al. (2014) found that participants who were able to hold different intellectual beliefs about ideas, religion, or politics and to share them respectfully experienced more trust and forgiveness and reported higher relationship quality than did those lower in intellectual humility. Thus, politicians who are more politically humble might be able to develop stronger personal bonds that could improve collaboration across the political aisle. Humility Is Needed When the Stakes Are Winning and Losing Third, the social oil hypothesis (Worthington et al., 2016) states that humility makes repair of relationship ruptures and forgiveness more likely. The public political process is about defeating the other side, which causes friction and relationship breakdown. Perhaps humility could buffer the negative effects that come with these competitive traits that are commonly found in politicians. International Pressures Make Humility More Necessary Fourth, with increasing globalization—not to mention the spread of communications technology that keeps people in contact electronically throughout the world in almost real time—it has become increasingly important to be respectful of others’ different political ideas. Even as the United States is becoming less religious and more spiritual, the rise of Islam has meant that political negotiations are increasingly conflated with religious differences. Political humility is needed to disentangle the conflagration and work out peaceful solutions. Social Pressure Makes Humility More Necessary Today Fifth, social pressure has increased as a consequence of mass media. Legislative and executive hearings are often televised. News media monitor politics 24/7. Bloggers opine about every public act. Social media outlets provide public forums.

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Such social scrutiny ups the pressure on politicians to convey the impression they have firm (and often extreme) political opinions. This contributes to a polarized social climate. Changing Demographics Affect the Electorate and Political Parties and Make Humility More Necessary Sixth, political humility is demanded by the changing demographics in the country (Teixeira et al., 2015). In decades past, each of the two major political parties had a clearly demarcated constituency. Demographics have shifted dramatically and are predicted to shift further by 2060. The States of Change monograph (Teixeira et al., 2015) predicts that many states will not have a racial or ethnic majority within their borders in the near future. Each party will be trying to appeal to several minorities, each with competing values and agendas. Neither party is likely to have a clear platform that can rally a strong consensus. This might transform the political process to a multiple-party, coalition-­ government system. Also, ethnic diversity will demand more ability to respect the political differences of various constituencies. And, if coalitions do emerge, political humility will be needed to permit coalitions to work together. Humility Is Needed When an Administration Is in Power Seventh, after an election, political humility is still needed. Political humility involves being aware of one’s limitations. Being nondefensively analytical about how an administration is doing might aid effective governing. Scientific Research on Humility Has Provided a Definition that Can Accommodate Polar Different Political Philosophies Eighth, scientific advances provide a better understanding of political humility. By using our three-part definition and observing that it is suited to post-­ modern, community-contextualized applications, science has set the stage for public acceptance of political humility, which can now be accurately viewed not as weakness, but as power under control. Summary I have drawn on our understanding of political humility to suggest eight reasons why political humility is needed today. But neither a host of needs nor an adequate definition is enough to advocate a societal shift in stance toward a post-modern, science-informed political humility. We need a body of research that demonstrates the benefits of political humility for politicians and citizens. The research on general humility is burgeoning. It is important, therefore, to examine the status of scientific research specifically on political humility.

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everett l. worthington, jr. Implications for Research on Political Humility

Unfortunately, scientific research on political humility is sparse. This is an excellent target for researchers seeking to study humility. Four of the five published articles were done by a single research team in Italy (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010; Desimoni & Leone, 2013; Leone, Chirumbolo, & Desimoni, 2012; Leone, Desimoni, & Chirumbolo, 2012), and the fifth (Lee, Ashton, Ogunfowora, Bourdage, & Shin, 2010) was done in Canada and Korea. Thus, we know little about how the findings might generalize to the United States or other countries. Some Studies that Are Relevant for Political Humility Chirumbolo and Leone (2010) investigated the impact of the HEXACO model of personality structure in predicting political ideology and voting. For 517 participants, conscientiousness was linked to voting for right-wing parties in Italy. Honesty–Humility, Agreeableness, and Openness were related to voting for leftwing parties in Italy. Leone et al. (2012) hypothesized that “dangerous world” beliefs shape RightWing Authoritarianism (RWA) and “competitive jungle” beliefs shape Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), which is a preference for hierarchical rather than egalitarian relationships among social groups. In Study 1 with 297 Italian adults, personality associations with RWA were unmediated by dangerous-world beliefs. Personality associations with SDO were mediated by competitive-­jungle beliefs. In Study 2 with 344 participants from the United States, Honesty, Humility, Openness-culture, and Openness-curiosity were each correlated with RWA and SDO. Lee et al. (2010) investigated the personality bases of Hierarchy (versus Equality) Orientation and Social Conformity (versus Change) Orientation. In Canadian (N = 207) and Korean (N = 185) college student samples, Lee et al. found that preference for hierarchy correlated primarily with low Honesty– Humility, whereas social conformity correlated primarily with low Openness to Experience. Leone et al. (2012) hypothesized that the relationship between Honesty– Humility and SDO and that between Openness and RWA would be moderated by interest in politics for 344 participants. Honesty–Humility affected SDO, and Openness affected RWA more strongly among individuals with a higher level of interest in politics. Desimoni and Leone (2014) sought to replicate and extend findings from Lee et al. and Leone et al. (2012). In Study 1 (N = 820), Humility negatively predicted RWA, whereas Honesty positively predicted RWA. Humility, but not Honesty, was related to SDO. In Study 2 (N = 586), Desimoni and Leone replicated both those findings and the moderating role of interest in politics.

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Research Questions in Need of Rapid Answers Much has been found regarding Humility’s negative correlation and Honesty’s high correlation with Right-Wing Authoritarianism and preference for hierarchy in Italy. Not surprisingly, high interest in politics sharpens the connections. We can consider political humility a fledgling subfield of humility studies, yet the questions investigated to date are myopic. Here are a dozen questions that need to be addressed soon.   1. How is political humility related to general humility?  2. How similar and different is political humility from other intellectual humility? With whom does political humility matter besides those with high interest in politics?   3. How much of political humility is due to internalized attitude, and how much is learned?   4. What is ideal political humility in a candidate for elective office? Do combative and arrogant positions usually help candidates get elected? When voters’ mood is primarily negative toward incumbents, might more militant positions be favored more than when voters’ mood toward incumbents is supportive?  5. Can the political humility of a politician or a citizen discussing political ideas with someone of different political persuasion facilitate joint decisions?  6. Does other-oriented political focus extend to out-groups as well as in-groups?   7. How is political humility different in closer relative to less close personal relationships? Does having a closer relationship facilitate states of political humility?   8. Political humility tends to promote civil discourse and smoother political processes, but political parties might not value political humility as much as political loyalty, commitment, and even fanaticism. What predicts attitudes toward political humility?   9. What kinds of intrapersonal and interpersonal effects might a citizen versus an elected official expect if he or she became more politically humble? 10. Can people learn to be more politically humble? How? 11. What can be done to induce states of political humility in people who are emotionally engaged in a political issue? Is it beneficial to do so? In what ways? 12. How can people demonstrate political humility in political discourse with family members, coworkers, friends, and acquaintances?

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The social scientific study of political humility is wide open. There are enormous gains to be made and few people aimed at studying the issues. The benefits and potential payoffs are high for researchers. I highly recommend this as an exciting area of study. Practical Advice In this section, I provide practical advice regarding political humility in two important arenas. I first consider advice to public politicians. Then I suggest advice for citizens. Practical Advice for Public Political Processes Know Yourself and the Opposition Haidt (2012) has observed that different political orientations are powered by different fundamental beliefs and values. People actively engaged in public political service place themselves under scrutiny by elective or appointive bodies. They thus declare and invest in those commitments. However, politicians sometimes misunderstand opponents’ political ideologies. And we must understand that all political behavior is not driven merely by ideological consistency. Practical politics involves public compromises. A humble stance can open people up to compromising or forging win-win scenarios. Widen the Circle of the “Other” Political systems are always other-oriented. For public officials, the “other” is first of all their constituents. However, for civil interaction, the circle of others has to be widened to include one’s opponents. Talk Civilly During Conflicts An excellent set of guidelines on having difficult public discussions regarding hot political topics is Richard Mouw’s (2010) Uncommon Decency: Christian Civility in an Uncivil World. Some of Mouw’s advice applies more to Christians than people who do not adhere to Christianity, like taking a “divine gaze,” or a perspective from what one believes to be God’s perspective. However, anyone can benefit from his advice. For example, he suggests contacting opponents privately prior to making a negative public statement to ask whether the statement is offensive or wrong. Convicted civility is based on relationships—even tentative and uneasy ones—in which one considers the other empathically. Thus, if people have acted uncivilly in the past, they might apologize and seek forgiveness. Mouw also calls for careful hearing and careful speaking, honoring people who differ. If people adhere to these guidelines, they will be more likely to

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act civilly—with “public politeness . . . tact, moderation, refinement and good manners towards people who are different from us” (p. 14). Importantly, Mouw emphasizes that we do not have to approve of other people’s views or like them. Instead, we commit ourselves to at least listen to others’ views respectfully. Political Conversations with Family, Friends, Colleagues, and Acquaintances Almost everyone belongs to many personal networks. People disagree across networks. Even if one adopts a strategy of keeping political (and religious) opinions close to the vest, we sometimes get pressured into speaking publicly. A politically humble person can do things before, during, and after sharing. I draw on a program of negotiating, the Harvard Negotiation Project (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011), which describes a way of arriving at win-win solutions to difficult and often seemingly intractable conflicts that is consistent with political humility. Preparing to Share Controversial Political Ideas Intellectual preparation is paramount to acting politically humble. My basic attitudes in preparing for political discussion are these. I remind myself of several things I know. First, I cannot “win” any argument by force of argument and still maintain a good relationship. I might overpower the other person’s arguments by my force of logic, but that usually produces resentment, wounded egos, and bitterness. Second, my opponent is neither stupid nor evil just because he or she advocates a different position than I do. Third, I have issues or actions that often trigger emotional, unthinking combative, withdrawing, or approach responses. (I have had enough emotion-regulation failures in my past to make this a time-consuming inventory.) Fourth, I need to be teachable. Fifth, I remind myself of various ways to promote states of humility. Ruberton, Kruse, and Lyubomirsky (Chapter 18, this volume) have identified and discussed three—self-affirmation, gratitude, and awe—that inspire humble states. I need to know my own positions and the interests behind those positions. Fisher et al. argue that intractable conflict occurs because each party locks in incompatible positions on issues (i.e., either vote a policy up or down), but they take the positions (i.e., auxiliary hypotheses; Lakatos, 1978) they do because they are protecting several interests (or hard-core assumptions, values, and beliefs; Lakatos, 1978). If parties examine the interests behind their positions, they often find ways to meet both parties’ interests. Similarly, I need to assay my opponent’s value as a human, ability to teach me things, triggers, likely positions, and interests behind those positions. My attitude should be one of “convicted civility” (Mouw, 2010, p. 14).

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everett l. worthington, jr. Discussing Consistent with “Convicted Civility”

My relational commitments form the context for discussions. I am usually closest to my family, next closest to coworkers (because they are hard to change), next to friends, and least to acquaintances. Value of the relationship governs much of my care in discussion. I want to use good communication methods regardless, but usually take more care in valued relationships than in more distant ones. From couple counseling (see Ripley & Worthington, 2014), we know that good communication involves “I-language,” not accusatory “you-language.” Emotion regulation is important. When I get angry or feel anxious or threatened, I must self-soothe, taking calming breaths. Threat instigates stress (Lazarus, 1999) and defensiveness (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992), and good emotion-focused coping can mitigate both (Lazarus, 1999). I try to reason logically even if I am emotionally aroused (Kahneman, 2011). I employ the Harvard Negotiation Project getting-to-yes method (Fisher et al., 2011) of discovering our interests behind the positions we advocate. I also seek to cultivate and exhibit other virtues—patience, self-control, justice, fairness, and courage—besides humility. And I forego the temptation to exhibit my superiority through the dark triad of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathology (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014). Numerous social psychological theories tell us why it is hard to stay issue oriented during conflict or debate. Those emotion-laden conversations are situations, and they can bring other motives to the fore—those I am not proud of—because I am reacting to faces, words, tones, nonverbal communications, memories, associations, and the entire associative history of my interactions with the person. Instead of adhering to principle-driven discussion, it is easy to get threatened, defensive, and stressed and to engage evolutionarily prepared coping mechanisms—freezing (panic), fleeing (moving away from), or fighting (moving against) or seeking social support that yields tending and befriending (Taylor et al., 2000). Do a Post-Mortem After the conversation, I try to reflect on it rather than merely lick my wounds or gloat over my victory. In the post-mortem, I consider whether I need to apologize for things I did, said, or even implied (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). And I need to seek forgiveness for my wrongs (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010), and, after doing so, I seek to deal with any self-condemnation through self-forgiveness (Worthington, 2013). Relationship repair is important, if for no other reason than I might have to have similar discussions in the future.

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Conclusion Despite the common reaction that political humility is an oxymoron, political humility has a long history in political philosophy from religiously inspired humility, to a post-modern approach that sees situations as highly differentiated with community norms shaping each community’s value on political humility. I described reasons why political humility is important today and then provided practical advice for political humility. Political humility that embodies reflective intrapersonal awareness, modest interpersonal self-presentation, and orientation to building others up is an attitude and social stance that reflects the best of humans and often draws humble reactions from others. Politics might make the world go round but relationships hold it together, and being committed to political humility within and then being able to discuss political issues and still maintain relationship closeness are necessary twenty-first-century skills for committed civility (Mouw, 2010). References Chirumbolo, A., & Leone, L. (2010). Personality and politics: The role of the HEXACO model of personality in predicting ideology and voting. Personality and Individual Differences, 40, 43–48. Cooper, J. E. (2013). Secular powers: Humility in modern political thought. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., & Jennings, D. J., II (2010). Relational spirituality and forgiveness: Development of the Spiritual Humility Scale (SHS). Journal of Psychology and Theology, 38(2), 91–100. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(4), 243–252. Desimoni, M., & Leone, L. (2013). Openness to experience, honesty-humility, and ideological attitudes: A fine-grained analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 59, 116–119. Desimoni, M., & Leone, L. (2014). Openness to experience, honesty-humility and ideological attitudes: A fine-grained analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 59, 116–119. Djeriouat, H., & Trémolière, B. (2014). The Dark Triad of personality and utilitarian moral judgment: The mediating role of honesty/humility and harm/care. Personality and Individual Differences, 67, 11–16. Fehr, R., & Gelfand, M. J. (2010). When apologies work: How matching apology components to victims’ self-construals facilitates forgiveness. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 113, 37–50. Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in, rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books. Gergen, K. J. (2015). An invitation to social construction, 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Chatel, D. (1992). Terror management and tolerance: Does mortality salience always intensify negative reactions to others who threaten one’s worldview? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 212–220.

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Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon Books. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scientific research programmes: Philosophical papers, Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lazarus, R. S. (1999). Stress and emotion: A new synthesis. New York: Springer. Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Ogunfowora, B., Bourdage, J. S., & Shin, K.-H. (2010). The personality bases of socio-political attitudes: The role of Honesty-Humility and Openness to Experiences. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 115–119. Leone, L., Chirumbolo, A., & Desimoni, M. (2012). The impact of the HEXACO personality model in predicting socio-political attitudes: The moderating role of interest in politics. Personality and Individual Differences, 52(3), 416–421. Leone, L., Desimoni, M., & Chirumbolo, A. (2012). HEXACO, social worldviews and socio-­ political attitudes: A mediation analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 995–1001. McElroy, S., Rice, K., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hill, P. C., Worthington, E. L., Jr., . . . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical elaborations in the context of religious leadership. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42(1), 19–30. Mouw, R. J. (2010). Uncommon decency: Christian civility in an uncivil world, rev ed. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. Ripley, J. S., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2014). Couple therapy: A new hope-focused approach. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. (a CAPS Book) Taylor, C. (2007). A secular age. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Taylor, S. E., Klein, L. C., Lewis, B. P., Gruenewald, T. L., Gurung, R. A. R., & Updegraff, J. A. (2000). Biobehavioral responses to stress in females: Tend-and-befriend, not fight-orflight. Psychological Review, 107, 411–429. Teixeira, R., Frey, W. H., & Griffin, R. (2015). States of change: The demographic evolution of the American electorate, 1974–2060. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution, February, 2015. Retrieved from www. americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/ states-of-change/ White, S. K. (2009). The ethos of a late-modern citizen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2013). Moving forward: Six steps to forgiving yourself and breaking free from the past. Colorado Springs: WaterBrook/Multnomah. Worthington, E. L., Jr., Goldstein, L., Cork, B., Griffin, B. J., Garthe, R. C., Lavelock, C. R., . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2016). Humility: A qualitative review of definitions, theory, concept, and research support for seven hypotheses. In Lisa Edwards & Susana Marques (Eds.), Shane Lopez (Gen. Ed.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from Oxford Handbooks Online: www.oxford handbooks.com

6 C U LT U R A L H U M I L I T Y David K. Mosher, Joshua N. Hook, Jennifer E. Farrell, C. Edward Watkins, Jr., and Don E. Davis

With the rise of positive psychology near the turn of the twenty-first century (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), the study of virtues has flourished and rapidly expanded. Due to definition and measurement problems, the study of humility got off to a slow start relative to other virtues (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010); however, this appears to be changing, and researchers have begun to study humility in a variety of settings and situations. The role of humility in the context of cultural factors that might strain a relationship, called cultural humility (Hook, Davis, Owen, Worthington, & Utsey, 2013), is one important area that has received increased attention in recent years. Cultural humility involves both intrapersonal and interpersonal components. Intrapersonally, cultural humility involves an awareness of (a) limitations of one’s own cultural worldview and (b) limitations in one’s ability to understand the cultural background and experiences of others. Interpersonally, cultural humility involves a stance that is other-oriented toward (or open to) another individual’s or group’s cultural background and worldview (Hook et al., 2013). Cultural humility prioritizes developing mutual respect and partnerships with others. Because individuals and groups can be highly invested in their own cultural worldview, beliefs, and values, meaningfully infusing humility into dialogues about cultural differences can be difficult. Cross-cultural research supports the idea that culture and conflict are inextricably intertwined (Berry, 2002). Cross-cultural conflicts, often inspired by group belief and value differences, appear in varied contexts (e.g., politics, interfaith dialogue, academia, etc.) and take varied forms (e.g., ruptured relationship bond or group competition over limited resources). In our current cultural context, examples abound of cultural differences being linked with disagreement and conflict between groups (e.g., the Black Lives Matter movement and resistance toward it, attitudes toward immigration and illegal immigrants, attitudes toward Muslims, conflicts about abortion and LGBT issues, etc.). Cultural humility can be essential to working through such conflicts.

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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive literature review about cultural humility. We (a) consolidate definitions of cultural humility and distinguish it from other related concepts such as cultural competence, (b) consider the theoretical foundation of cultural humility, and (c) summarize the current empirical literature. By summarizing the current knowledge base, we hope to galvanize and chart direction for further work in this area. Method Inclusion Criteria We included all publications from the present literature that explicitly focused on measuring, defining, or describing cultural humility (e.g., articles that contained the words “cultural humility” in the title or included cultural humility as a measured variable). We included both theoretical and empirical articles, published and unpublished. We excluded studies that involved only brief reflections about cultural humility. Literature Search First, we conducted our literature search by using the following computer databases: PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, PubMed, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection, Academic Search Complete, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global, and Google Scholar, up to February 5, 2016. The search included the following key terms: “cultural” and “humility.” Second, we searched the reference lists of the articles to identify any missed studies. Overall, a total of 65 studies were identified using our search criteria. Eleven articles did not focus specifically on cultural humility and were excluded, leaving 54 reviewable studies. Results Of the 54 reviewed studies, 33 were theoretical papers and 21 were empirical studies. A table and reference list of the included studies is available from the first author. The literature review is organized into two sections: (a) theoretical/conceptual papers and (b) empirical studies. Theoretical/Conceptual Papers Most cultural humility publications have been theoretical in nature. These theoretical papers were categorized into three main themes: (a) work that sought to spur research by defining and providing a conceptual framework for cultural humility; (b) work that sought to distinguish or differentiate cultural humility from other relevant terms (e.g., cultural competence); and (c) work that stressed the importance of cultural humility across a wide range of fields and domains.

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Defining Cultural Humility To identify core features and consolidate definitions of cultural humility, it is important to review definitional commonalities and differences. Some core aspects of cultural humility were found across almost all definitions. First, cultural humility has been viewed as a lifelong learning experience rather than an end point. For example, in Borkan, Culhane-Pera, and Goldman’s (2008) model, the “L” in the Acronym H.U.M.B.L.E. stands for lifelong learner. (The other letters in the acronym are H—Be Humble about the assumptions you make about knowing the world from your patients’ shoes; U—Understand how your own background and culture can affect your care of patients; M—Motivate yourself to learn more about the patient’s background, culture, health beliefs, and practices, as well as the unique points of view of their families and communities; B—Begin to incorporate this knowledge into your care; and E—Emphasize respect and negotiate treatment plans.) Similarly, Chang, Simon, and Dong (2012) suggested that cultural humility involves a lifelong process of learning by fully engaging patients through active listening. This focus on lifelong learning is especially important when contrasting cultural humility and other related constructs such as cultural competence, which implies that people will get to a certain place after training and experience where they are deemed “competent.” Cultural humility, in contrast, is often conceptualized as a virtue or value that shapes one’s worldview, mind-set, or way of being across the lifespan. Second, most cultural humility definitions include a focus on cultural self-awareness and the importance of checking one’s cultural assumptions and biases via intrapersonal reflection. Cultural humility is considered to be anti-ethnocentric, emphasizing development of understanding others through exploration, active listening, and being mindful of one’s own assumptions and biases (Cruess, Cruess, & Steinert, 2010; Fahey et al., 2013; Foronda, Baptiste, Reinholdt, & Ousman, 2016; Foronda & MacWilliams, 2015; Tervalon & Murray-Garcia, 1998). For example, Foronda et al. (2016) describe cultural humility as follows: “In a multicultural world where power imbalances exist, cultural humility is a process of openness, self-awareness, being egoless, and incorporating self-reflection and critique after willingly interacting with diverse individuals” (p. 4). Third, most definitions of cultural humility include a focus on interpersonal respect in cross-cultural interactions. Although respecting others is not necessarily unique to cultural humility, it is an important component that helps individuals develop and maintain positive cross-cultural interactions and relationships. For example, Miller (2009) demonstrated the importance of cultural humility in fostering long-term partnerships of nurses from different countries.

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Similarly, Chang, Dong, and Simon (2011) theorized that culturally humble people engage others in conversations that foster mutual respect. In addition to lifelong learning, cultural self-awareness, and interpersonal respect, some writers incorporated other constructs into their cultural humility definition. These are constructs that are not yet widely accepted as core to the definition of cultural humility, but they merit future thought and research. For example, cultural humility has been theorized to incorporate a fluid-thinking framework that requires personal accountability in navigating power differentials (Fisher-Borne, Cain, & Martin, 2015). Researchers who focus on constructs such as fluid thinking aim to explore the underlying cognitive processes of culturally humble people that set them apart from culturally arrogant or ethnocentric individuals. This focus aligns well with other humility research, which theorizes that humility is a governing force of internal processes that often leads to more positive social interactions (Lavelock et al., 2014). In other cases, cultural humility has been defined as involving vulnerable authenticity and a willingness to adopt a nonexpert stance. As Issacson indicated (2014), not being an expert requires the courage to be vulnerable, and vulnerable authenticity helps foster key elements of cultural humility (e.g., mutual respect, lifelong learning). Thus, most researchers agree that cultural humility involves a lifelong process that involves self-awareness, intrapersonal reflection, and interpersonal respect in cross-cultural interactions. The core components of this definition are similar to those of humility in general, which has been defined as including both intrapersonal (i.e., self-awareness) and interpersonal (i.e., other-oriented) components (Davis et al., 2011). Other components (e.g., fluid thinking, vulnerable authenticity) have been proposed by some researchers as important aspects of cultural humility, but more research is necessary to determine whether these constructs are constitutive to the definition of cultural humility, or simply associated with cultural humility (but not core to its definition). Cultural Humility versus Cultural Competence Many studies have compared and contrasted cultural humility with cultural competence. The first main point of comparison has been whether cultural humility is a separate model from the cultural competence model or an important addition to the cultural competence model. Some authors argued that cultural humility is a completely separate concept, a different viewpoint, approach, or way of life that has not been included in cultural competence models. One example is Yeager and Bauer-Wu’s (2013) distinction that cultural humility is not defined by the end result of knowledge/skills acquisition, but rather as a lifelong commitment to value others culturally and reflect on one’s own cultural background.

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Others have suggested that cultural humility is actually an expansion of the original cultural competence focus on cultural knowledge, awareness, and skills. For instance, Ross (2010) conceptualized cultural humility as a strand within cultural competence that expands knowledge, attitude, and skills (e.g., knowledge of health disparities in treatment, recognition of privilege, and nonauthoritarian communication skills). The second main point of comparison between cultural humility and cultural competence has been on the extent to which the models focus on attitudes versus a set of skills. In general, cultural humility is viewed more as an attitude, value, or way of being, whereas cultural competence has focused on skills or ways of doing. For example, Butler et al. (2011) suggested rebranding cultural competence as cultural humility for medical multicultural education, emphasizing lifelong learning rather than knowledge/skills acquisition. Most discussion has centered on cultural humility as a mind-set, with far less attention being given to cultural humility “skills” (cf., active listening; Ortega & Faller, 2011). It remains to be seen whether cultural humility will be viewed as an independent model or be subsumed as part of the existing cultural competence framework. What appears to be clear is that the focus on cultural humility does offer something new and important that was perhaps not given adequate attention in existing models of cultural competence. There may be conceptual advantages to the cultural humility framework relative to the cultural competence framework, especially for training purposes. For example, it may be important to frame cultural training as a process rather than an end goal, which fits with the cultural humility framework. Also, models of cultural competence may imply that there is an agreed-upon knowledge base and set of skills that must be mastered by trainees, which may not be true for all fields. Finally, cultural humility draws from pre-existing theory and research on humility as a character strength or virtue that promotes social bonds and facilitates the self-regulation of behavior, which may support the idea of cultural humility being key in buffering against cross-cultural conflicts (Davis et al., 2013). Importance of Cultural Humility Across Domains The third major theme to emerge is that the theoretical literature about cultural humility is quite diverse and spread across many fields and disciplines. Cultural humility appears to be highly important for the helping disciplines, such as medicine, psychology, and social work, but it could arguably apply to any profession that involves cross-cultural engagement (Cruess et al., 2010). For example, Groll (2014) contended that cultural humility, because it contributes to respect, understanding, and partnership, is important for engineering practice.

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Moreover, cultural humility goes beyond occupational benefits. It is often seen as a way of life that enhances all relationships (Foronda et al., 2016). Humility may be the underlying variable that draws people closer together, buffers against relationship disruptions, and helps repair damaged relationships (Davis et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2015). Cultural humility seemingly functions similarly in matters of cultural conflict and likely applies to myriad cross-cultural relationships. For example, cultural humility could help improve relationships in a business setting, where individuals or groups from different cultures compete over limited resources. If culture can be a major source of relational conflict, perhaps cultural humility is its antidote. Although most existing research on cultural humility has been focused in the counseling and helping professions, it is clear that cultural humility may have applications across a wide variety of domains. Empirical Studies In this section, we first summarize the methods used in the reviewed empirical studies and, second, summarize the main empirical findings. Methods Used in Empirical Studies research design Of the 21 reviewed empirical studies, the majority (N = 11) were qualitative, with fewer studies using quantitative (N = 5) or mixed-methods designs (N = 5). This qualitative emphasis is likely because cultural humility is a relatively new research area. Studies of new concepts often describe and explore first before testing specific hypotheses. For example, one qualitative study was a cross-­ sectional life history study of physical therapists; the primary research method was one-on-one semistructured interviews about practicing cultural humility (Hilliard, 2011). Most reviewed studies used cross-sectional research designs (N = 18) (e.g., involving interviews, ethnographies, or surveys). However, two studies used a longitudinal research design (Schuessler, Wilder, & Byrd, 2012; Sheridan, Bennett, & Blome, 2013) and one used an experimental design (Kutob et al., 2013). One of the longitudinal studies examined 200 journal entries from 50 nursing students across two years of study (Schuessler et al., 2012). The second longitudinal study examined the effects of a cultural humility training program in three cohorts of social work students (N = 100) across four years that were transitioning from working in Western countries to another cultural context (Sheridan et al., 2013). participants Sample size was reported in 18 studies. The total number of participants was 2,129. Only 11 of the 18 studies reported sample demographic characteristics;

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the majority of participants were female (60.9%). About half of the participants (50.2%) identified as White, with the rest identified as a racial/ethnic minority. Only eight studies reported participants’ mean age; the mean age was 31.7 years. measures Three quantitative studies measured cultural humility using the Cultural Humility Scale (CHS; Hook et al., 2013). The CHS is a 12-item other-report measure of the extent to which a therapist was culturally humble toward the most important aspects of a client’s cultural background. It includes both positive (i.e., “Is open to explore”) and negative (i.e., “Makes assumptions about me”) items. Items on the CHS had strong factor loadings, and the scale showed evidence of internal consistency and construct validity, being significantly correlated with measures of cultural competence, working alliance, and client improvement. The CHS is a relatively recent scale, and more research on the CHS is needed. However, it appears to be a promising instrument for research on cultural humility moving forward. A fourth quantitative study used the Cultural Competence Assessment Tool (CCAT; Kutob et al., 2013) to assess cultural competence and cultural humility. The CCAT is a 68-item self-report measure that was modified to include items specifically pertaining to American Indian and Asian racial groups, which resulted in a total of 81 items. There are six subscales, including (a) Cultural Self-Awareness, (b) Nonjudgmental Thinking, (c) Cultural Knowledge, (d) Nonverbal Communication, (e) Empowerment, and (f) Explanatory Model Elicitation. Although the CCAT was used in one study to assess cultural competency and cultural humility, the original purpose of the scale was to be a self-­ assessment tool for doctors in training courses on cultural competency, and the majority of items are focused on competency rather than humility. One mixed-methods study used the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI; Hammer, Bennett, & Wiseman, 2003) and the Miville-Guzman ­Universality-Diversity Scale—Short (M-GUDS-s; Fuertes, Miville, Mohr, Sedlacek, & Gretchen, 2000) to assess cultural humility. The IDI was based on Bennett’s developmental model of intercultural sensitivity and consists of a 50-item questionnaire that is administered and scored electronically. The IDI provides individual and group scores referred to as developmental orientation (DO) and perceived orientation (PO). The DO score indicates the primary orientation toward cultural difference, whereas the PO score represents how people rate their own capabilities in adapting to cultural differences. The M-GUDS-s is a 15-item questionnaire that was developed based on a theoretical, holistic notion of a Universal-Diverse Orientation (UDO). The

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measure has three subscales: diversity of contact, relativistic appreciation, and comfort with differences. Together, these two measures were a part of an assessment of first-year engineering students’ cultural humility. None of the qualitative studies used the same method for assessing cultural humility. One study used home ethnography to assess cultural humility through stories told by participants. Four studies used various methods of interviews (e.g., semistructured, life history method), and two studies created quantitative Likert-scale, self-report measures. Another four studies used various coding methods (e.g., hermeneutic phenomenology) of journals, videotapes, or observations. One exploratory study drew from a combination of theories and a post-modern form of inquiry associated with Narrative Therapy and Collaborative Therapy. One study did not report any measurements or observation methods. Overall, the research designs of most studies appeared to lack rigorous methodologies found in established fields. This may be due to cultural humility being a relatively new area of research. Several of the studies utilized convenience samples, untested measures of cultural humility, and some studies did not report the characteristics of their sample at all. Relatively few studies utilized more sophisticated research designs or sampling techniques. Moving forward, there is ample opportunity for researchers to explore the topic of cultural humility using more sophisticated research designs and sampling techniques, and there is also an opportunity to improve the measurement of cultural humility. summary of empirical findings The empirical findings can be grouped into three areas. First, eight studies described what cultural humility looks like in the helping professions and how it develops over time. Four of these studies interviewed helping professionals who were regarded as being culturally humble in their professional work. For example, Hilliard (2011) explored the life experiences of eight culturally humble physical therapists and identified five common themes for how cultural humility evolved: (a) being open-minded, (b) responding to clients’ emotions, (c) focusing on clients’ goals, (d) engaging and teaching empowerment, and (e) being aware of the community’s needs and assets. In two other studies, students engaged in a reflective journaling exercise so that their cultural humility development could be examined. Both studies concluded that cultural humility cannot be solely taught in classroom settings and that reflective journaling can be useful in stimulating cultural humility development. Another study explored cultural humility in engineering students using a mixed-methods approach that demonstrated a need for cultural humility training in first-year students due to

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the high frequency of polarizing and minimizing language toward others’ cultural identities (Groll, 2014). Second, 10 studies implemented a training or education program to help participants improve their level of cultural humility. All studies found the programs contributed to the desired improvements. The improvements in cultural humility included both intrapersonal (e.g., increased self-awareness and confidence) and interpersonal characteristics (e.g., increased likelihood of eliciting client beliefs about treatment, enhanced client relationships). For example, Ross (2010) demonstrated that students could apply knowledge from cultural humility classroom lectures to a community practicum setting; graduate students reported higher levels of knowledge (e.g., underlying factors driving disparities), attitudes (e.g., awareness of bias), and skills (e.g., culturally humble communication) associated with cultural humility. Although most of these studies had promising findings, caution should be made when interpreting the effectiveness of these training programs. None of the studies were randomized controlled trials, and most of the studies utilized a single-group pre-test/ post-test design. More research is needed for firm conclusions to be made about the efficacy and effectiveness of these programs for improving cultural humility. Third, three quantitative studies explored the links between cultural humility and counseling outcomes. The first study (Hook et al., 2013) created a measure to assess cultural humility (Cultural Humility Scale); favorable client perceptions of a counselor’s cultural humility were found to be positively related to a stronger working alliance and more improvement in counseling. The second study (Owen et al., 2014) explored cultural humility specifically in the context of a client’s religious and spiritual beliefs. Although favorable client perceptions of a counselor’s cultural humility toward religion related to stronger working alliance and better counseling outcomes, client religious commitment moderated that relationship. Associations between cultural humility toward religion and counseling outcomes were positive and significant for clients with high levels of religious commitment, but not for clients with low levels of religious commitment. The third study (Owen et al., 2016) examined the effects of therapists’ cultural humility and their ability to create meaningful cultural dialogues in therapy on therapy outcomes. Therapists who missed opportunities to engage in cultural discussions with clients had worse therapy outcomes, but this negative relationship was buffered by therapist cultural humility. These studies point to an initial link between perceptions of cultural humility and positive counseling outcomes (e.g., working alliance, improvement). Again, caution is recommended when interpreting these findings. All of these studies were cross-sectional. Thus, causal conclusions should not be made. Longitudinal and experimental research would be a welcome addition to the field.

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In this chapter, we conducted a literature review of theoretical and empirical cultural humility publications. Most papers were theoretical, with attempts being made to define and conceptualize cultural humility and lay the groundwork for future research. A smaller number of publications explored cultural humility empirically, mostly using qualitative research designs. Overall, although this is a relatively recent topic of inquiry, there was quite a bit of consensus for how to define cultural humility. Definitions included key elements such as being a lifelong learner, accurate cultural self-awareness, and interpersonal respect in cross-cultural engagement. The core components of the definition of cultural humility were similar to that of general humility (Davis et al., 2011) and intellectual humility (McElroy et al., 2014), which have usually incorporated both intrapersonal and interpersonal components. In general, it appears that definitions are consolidating, which is a positive development and bodes well for the future of cultural humility research. There was less consensus about the relationship between cultural humility and cultural competence. Some researchers viewed cultural humility as a separate, stand-alone construct, whereas others considered cultural humility to instead be an expansion of cultural competence. It is likely that both the cultural humility and cultural competence models have something to offer as we move forward to consider best practices in cross-cultural training and education. Regardless of how some of these conceptual issues resolve over time, cultural humility is clearly now seen as being important in a wide variety of disciplines. The empirical articles were mostly qualitative and covered three main areas. First, several studies painted a more detailed picture of what cultural humility looks like in practice and how it might develop over time. Second, several studies tested educational intervention programs that were designed to increase cultural humility; the initial results were promising, suggesting that training interventions can positively affect both intrapersonal (e.g., increased self-­awareness) and interpersonal (e.g., enhanced client relationships) components of cultural humility. Finally, the few quantitative studies mainly focused on the relationship between client perceptions of cultural humility and client outcomes; the results again were promising, suggesting that favorable client perceptions of cultural humility relate to better counseling outcomes (e.g., stronger working alliances). Caution is suggested when interpreting the empirical findings, as most studies utilized cross-sectional designs. Limitations and Directions for Future Research There were several limitations in this literature review. First, most articles were theoretical. If cultural humility theories are to be supported, more empirical research, both quantitative and qualitative, is sorely needed. Specifically, there

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needs to be more longitudinal and experimental research exploring cultural humility. In regard to training or educational programs designed to promote cultural humility, future research should employ randomized controlled trials to measure the efficacy and effectiveness of these programs. Also, relatively little research has worked to provide reliable and valid measures of cultural humility. With only one quantitative measure specifically measuring cultural humility, more research is needed to explore multiple methods (e.g., self-­report, ­other-report, behavioral observation measures, semistructured interviewing) of accurately assessing cultural humility. Second, most studies focused on racial/ethnic cross-cultural exchanges, with little attention given to other aspects of culture. Future research ideally will continue to include participants from various racial/ethnic groups, as well as consider other important aspects of cross-cultural exchanges (e.g., religion, sexual orientation, politics, etc.). Third, more research could explore the internal processes that occur when individuals are more or less culturally humble. Some researchers have begun to consider these internal processes, even noting characteristics such as fluid thinking as being part of the definition of cultural humility. It would be interesting to describe and assess the cognitive processes that occur when individuals are behaving in a culturally humble manner versus a culturally arrogant manner. Fourth, applied research has begun to explore cultural humility in the context of counseling and psychotherapy with diverse clients. Other applied settings could be excellent settings for research on cultural humility. For example, research could describe culturally humble hospitals and doctors, culturally humble teachers and professors, or culturally humble religious leaders. Practical Lessons Instead of being the cultural “expert,” or taking a cultural training and viewing oneself as “competent,” cultural humility advocates for viewing positive cultural engagement as a lifelong learning process, where cultural self-­awareness and mutual respect are privileged (cf. Gallardo, 2014). Intrapersonally, cultural humility involves honest self-appraisal and self-examination and being open and vulnerable about the limitations of one’s own cultural worldview and perspective. Interpersonally, cultural humility involves being open-minded, actively listening, and responding with respect to culturally different individuals and groups. For example, cultural humility could help an individual build a positive working relationship with another person who might come from a different cultural background and disagree about important attitudes, beliefs, and values (e.g., religion, politics, racial views, sexual values, etc.). In these

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cross-cultural relationships, people are often strongly invested in their own cultural worldview and perspective and may have strong emotions or reactions when their beliefs are disagreed with or challenged. Cultural humility can help an individual be more comfortable and open to differences when they occur, rather than needing to withdraw or end the relationship. As our population grows increasingly culturally diverse, cultural humility may well be an increasing necessity for meaningfully engaging culturally diverse others (Hook & Watkins, 2015). Research suggests that cultural humility can be developed and worked on over time. For example, exercises in which a person self-reflects on his or her own cultural perspectives, beliefs, values, and attitudes could lead to a more honest appraisal of the limitations of one’s cultural worldview. Reflecting on historical instances where one’s cultural group has made grave mistakes (e.g., slavery, discrimination against women or LGBT individuals, etc.) may likewise instill an acknowledgement that all cultural perspectives have limitations, including one’s own. Purposefully putting oneself in situations where it is necessary to engage and try to understand the perspective of culturally different others could lead to increased openness to different cultural perspectives. Asking for feedback in one’s relationship with culturally different individuals and groups could also help increase understanding for how one can work on becoming more culturally humble. In one’s quest to become more culturally humble, it is important to remember that cultural humility is neither an endpoint nor a destination: It is a lifelong process that, in our view, makes possible and substantively contributes to true cross-cultural encounters, engagement, and exchange. References Berry, J. W. (2002). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Borkan, J. M., Culhane-Pera, K. A., & Goldman, R. E. (2008). Towards cultural humility in healthcare for culturally diverse Rhode Island. Medicine and Health, Rhode Island, 91, 361–364. Butler, P. D., Swift, M., Kothari, S., Nazeeri-Simmons, I., Friel, C. M., Longaker, M. T., . . . . Britt, L. D. (2011). Integrating cultural competency and humility training into clinical clerkships: Surgery as a model. Journal of Surgical Education, 68, 222–230. Chang, E. S., Dong, X., & Simon, M. (2011). Depression in the Chinese aging population: Leveraging cultural humility to improve the quality of care of a vulnerable population. Aging Health, 7, 849–863. Chang, E. S., Simon, M., & Dong, X. (2012). Integrating cultural humility into health care professional education and training. Advances in Health Sciences Education, 17, 269–278. Cruess, S. R., Cruess, R. L., & Steinert, Y. (2010). Linking the teaching of professionalism to the social contract: A call for cultural humility. Medical Teacher, 32, 357–359.

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Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J. II., . . . . . . Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225–234. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(4), 243–252. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Hook, J. N., Emmons, R. A., Hill, P. C., Bollinger, R. A., . . . . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2013). Humility and the development and repair of social bonds: Two longitudinal studies. Self and Identity, 12, 58–77. Fahey, J. O., Cohen, S. R., Holme, F., Buttrick, E. S., Dettinger, J. C., Kestler, E., . . . . . . Walker, D. M. (2013). Promoting cultural humility during labor and birth: Putting theory into action during PRONTO obstetric and neonatal emergency training. The Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing, 27, 36–42. Farrell, J. E., Hook, J. N., Ramos, M., Davis, D. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Ruiz, J. M. (2015). Humility and relationship outcomes in couples: The mediating role of commitment. Couple and Family Psychology: Research and Practice, 4, 14–26. Fisher-Borne, M., Cain, J. M., & Martin, S. L. (2015). From mastery to accountability: Cultural humility as an alternative to cultural competence. Social Work Education, 34, 165–181. Foronda, C., Baptiste, D. L., Reinholdt, M. M., & Ousman, K. (2016). Cultural humility: A concept analysis. Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 27, 210–217. Foronda, C. L., & MacWilliams, B. (2015). Cultural Humility in simulation education: A missing standard? Clinical Simulation in Nursing, 11, 289–290. Fuertes, J. N., Miville, M. L., Mohr, J. J., Sedlacek, W. E., & Gretchen, D. (2000). Factor structure and short form of the Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 33, 157–169. Gallardo, M. E. (Ed.). (2014). Developing cultural humility: Embracing race, privilege and power. Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Groll, L. (2014). Negotiating cultural humility: First-year engineering students’ development in a lifelong journey. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Purdue University, West Lafayette. Hammer, M., Bennett, M., & Wiseman, R. (2003). Measuring intercultural sensitivity: The intercultural development inventory. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 27, 421–443. Hilliard, M. J. (2011). Stories and cultural humility: Exploring power and privilege through physical therapist’ life histories. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. DePaul University, Chicago. Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Owen, J., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Utsey, S. O. (2013). Cultural humility: Measuring openness to culturally diverse clients. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 60, 353–366. Hook, J. N., & Watkins, C. E., Jr. (2015). Cultural humility: The cornerstone of positive contact with culturally different individuals and groups? American Psychologist, 70, 661–662. Isaacson, M. (2014). Clarifying concepts: Cultural humility or competency. Journal of Professional Nursing, 30, 251–258. Kutob, R. M., Bormanis, J., Crago, M., Harris, J. M., Senf, J., & Shisslak, C. M. (2013). Cultural competence education for practicing physicians: Lessons in cultural humility, nonjudgmental behaviors, and health beliefs elicitation. Journal of Continuing Education in the Health Professions, 33, 164–173. Lavelock, C. R., Worthington Jr., E. L., Davis, D. E., Griffin, B. J., Reid, C. A., Hook, J. N., . . . . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). The quiet virtue speaks: An intervention to promote humility. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 99–110. McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hill, P. C., Worthington, E. L., Jr., . . . . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical

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elaborations in the context of religious leadership. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 19–30. Miller, S. (2009). Cultural humility is the first step to becoming global care providers. Journal of Obstetric, Gynecologic, & Neonatal Nursing, 38, 92–93. Ortega, R. M., & Faller, K. C. (2011). Training child welfare workers from an intersectional cultural humility perspective: A paradigm shift. Child Welfare, 90, 27–49. Owen, J., Jordan, T. A., Turner, D., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., & Leach, M. (2014). Therapists’ multicultural orientation: Client perceptions of cultural humility, spiritual/religious commitment, and therapy outcomes. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 91–98. Owen, J., Tao, K. W., Drinane, J. M., Hook, J., Davis, D. E., & Kune, N. F. (2016). Client perceptions of therapists’ multicultural orientation: Cultural (missed) opportunities and cultural humility. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 47, 30–37. Ross, L. (2010). Notes from the field: Learning cultural humility through critical incidents and central challenges in community-based participatory research. Journal of Community Practice, 18, 315–335. Schuessler, J. B., Wilder, B., & Byrd, L. W. (2012). Reflective journaling and development of cultural humility in students. Nursing Education Perspectives, 33, 96–99. Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55, 5–14. Sheridan, M. J., Bennett, S., & Blome, W. W. (2013). Cultural humility and shared learning as hallmarks for international teaching: The SWEP experience. Social Work Education, 32, 818–833. Tervalon, M., & Murray-Garcia, J. (1998). Cultural humility versus cultural competence: A critical distinction in defining physician training outcomes in multicultural education. Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 9, 117–125. Yeager, K. A., & Bauer-Wu, S. (2013). Cultural humility: Essential foundation for clinical researchers. Applied Nursing Research: ANR, 26, 251–256.

7 R E L AT I O N A L H U M I L I T Y Don E. Davis, Vanessa Placeres, Elise Choe, Cirleen DeBlaere, David Zeyala, and Joshua N. Hook

The study of humility has many ironies and paradoxes. For example, someone who claims to be humble may actually seem like they are bragging. Even though we want others to be humble, practicing humility ourselves may seem risky because it involves prioritizing the interest of another person or relationship. In the present chapter, we review the extant research on humility in light of several hypotheses derived from our theory of relational humility, which aligns the study of humility with the rich theoretical and empirical literature on personality judgments (Funder, 1995). First, we define humility from this theoretical viewpoint. Then, we organize our chapter by evaluating seven hypotheses. The first pertains to the modesty effect hypothesis, which relates to concerns that self-reports of humility are inherently paradoxical. The next five pertain to theorized benefits of humility for interpersonal relationships. The final hypothesis predicts a relationship between humility and health. Defining State, Trait, and Relational Humility Our model delineates three levels of measurement specificity. Most studies assess trait humility, which refers to one’s behaviors across relationships and situations. Although generally ignored, a few studies have begun to emerge on state humility, which involves individuals’ sense of the degree to which they are currently experiencing humility at any given moment (e.g., I feel humble right now). Finally, there is a mid-level construct that involves one person’s perception that another person is humble, which we call relational humility. Although these judgments involve appraisals of a stable trait, they are often subject to changes over time based on ongoing events in the relationship. Within this tradition, the best way to assess trait humility involves aggregating across different informants, which might involve self-report, other-report, or observation of relevant behavior (always another form of other-report). For the remainder of this chapter, we will use the term humility to refer to trait humility, and will reserve the term relational humility only for instances in which the construct being

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assessed involves perceptions of another person’s humility. With this general foundation, we proceed to define trait humility. In contrast to more circumscribed virtues, such as forgiveness or gratitude, humility pertains to a range of contexts, which has resulted in multifaceted definitions that span intrapersonal and interpersonal behaviors. Most researchers agree that humility involves having an accurate view of self—not thinking too highly or lowly of oneself. Humility involves having an accurate sense, particularly of one’s limitations. For example, having an accurate sense of one’s limitations likely involves both awareness and ownership that motivates individuals to limit the drawbacks of those limitations. However, they tend to disagree on the particular interpersonal qualities that are essential to humility. In fact, Davis and Hook (2014) identified approximately 10 subdomains of humility sampled among the nearly 20 measures of humility. Researchers diverge in the degree to which they consider interpersonal behaviors to be essential to humility. Some researchers prefer to define humility as purely an intrapersonal construct (e.g., Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014). Although this method may have advantages for other theoretical approaches, it is inconsistent with a personality judgment perspective, which assumes that the point of trait-language is to describe interpersonal behavior (Funder, 1995). Self-reports are a complex case of person perception in which the judge is also the target person, and the intended goal of these self-judgments is to regulate behavior in order to conform adequately to social norms. Drawing on theory of the lexical study of personality (Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014), we assume that humility language functions to pass information about how a target person is likely to act within relationships. Because having a good reputation is extremely valuable and may promote or hinder opportunities for cooperation, people are motivated to maintain a positive reputation. ­ therTherefore, we contend that, interpersonally, humility involves being o oriented rather than self-oriented, marked by behaviors that indicate a lack of superiority within a relational and cultural context (Davis et al., 2011). As we elaborate later in the social bond hypothesis, humility is not just being a doormat, which might express a sense of interpersonal inferiority. Rather, humility involves cultivating the kind of relationships in which one is able to transform motivations through viewing oneself as belonging to and committed to something larger than oneself, so that sacrificing for the good of the relationship or collective is tantamount to acting in one’s own best interest. Individuals might express an interpersonal quality of other-orientedness somewhat differently across subdomains of humility, which share one feature: they all involve contexts that make humility more difficult to practice. This conceptualization aligns squarely with Funder’s (1995) model of accurate person

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perception, which suggests that to judge a trait accurately, one must have the opportunity to observe relevant behavior. Just like it is hard to tell if someone is courageous until one sees that person respond to danger, it is also difficult to decipher whether someone is humble until one sees how he or she responds to situations that would typically evoke egotism and defensiveness. Thus, there are a variety of subdomains from which we might sample characteristic behavior, including how they handle the potential to receive attention that would elicit envy in others, disagreements or power struggles, being hurt or exploited, or being in a position of power. Method We located empirical articles on humility using several methods. First, we identified studies by conducting searches on PsycINFO and Google Scholar through August 19, 2015. We searched with the term “humility,” which resulted in over 1,000 abstracts. Second, the reference sections of included articles were examined for additional studies. Articles that were included had a measure of humility and other measures that allowed us to evaluate one of the seven main hypotheses evaluated in the present review. Articles were excluded if they did not use quantitative methods or were not written in English. In each section, we review key evidence relevant to the specific hypothesis, followed by suggestions for future research. Results Hypothesis 1: The Modesty Effect Hypothesis The modesty effect hypothesis suggests that, as actual humility increases, people will more modestly rate their own humility on self-reports measures, because claiming to be humble is ironically like bragging about one’s humility. It is notoriously difficult to know oneself well, or for researchers to assess whether people know themselves well (Wilson, 2009). There are two competing approaches related to this hypothesis. The first assumes that self-reports are guilty until proven innocent. Robust evidence across 830 traits demonstrates that people tend to self-enhance on evaluative traits (Asendorpf & Ostendorf, 1998). These results suggest that people are likely to self-­ enhance when completing self-reports on virtues such as humility. Furthermore, given the intuitive paradox of reporting one’s own humility, which seems akin to bragging, researchers adopted a highly cautious and conservative approach and generally mistrusted self-reports. This mind-set led researchers to explore a variety of multimethod strategies for assessing humility without having to solely rely on self-reports (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). However, not many programs based on this approach have extended beyond one or two studies.

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The second approach assumes that self-reports of humility are innocent until proven guilty. This strategy has prevailed in recent years (Davis & Hook, 2014). Even if self-reports are problematic, the more liberal approach has several pragmatic advantages. Relaxing lofty standards for measurement has allowed the initial literature on humility to accelerate, which has provided a base for evaluating alternative measurement strategies. Indeed, developing a variety of methods is a prerequisite for comparing the validity of different measures of humility. So it seems prudent to entertain a variety of definitions and measures of humility so that the process of psychological science can refine knowledge. This pragmatic approach has allowed a rather large empirical literature on correlates of self-reports of humility to develop rather quickly. A variety of studies have linked humility self-reports with various trait-related behaviors, including productive or counterproductive work behavior (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014), exaggerated intelligence (Hilbig, Heydasch, & Zettler, 2014; Kajonius, 2014), extreme responding (Zettler, Hilbig, Moshagen, & de Vries, 2015), and moment-to-moment emotion and experience (Sherman, Rauthmann, Brown, Serfass, & Jones, 2015). In light of this evidence of construct validity, in a recent narrative review, Ashton, Lee, and de Vries (2014) presented several indicators that would be consistent with the modesty effect hypothesis—including lower reliability and validity, lower self–other agreement, or evidence of response bias using a bifactor model in confirmatory factor analysis (Lee & Ashton, 2013). Prior studies have not found any of these potential warning signs. However, there is some evidence that socially desirable responding can be an issue for self-reports of humility. For example, people tend to self-enhance on evaluative traits (Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010), and several studies have confirmed that people are able to fake good or bad on measures of humility (Grieve, 2012; Grieve & de Groot, 2011). In terms of next steps regarding the modesty effect hypothesis, we encourage researchers to use a variety of experimental approaches to explore the extent to which contextual factors can influence self-reports of humility. Even if the main effect is negligible, it remains possible that particular types of individuals are especially prone to a modesty effect, which might emerge if researchers employed latent profile analysis to explore different patterns in ratings across different methods of measuring humility. In the meantime, we contend that the pragmatic approach is probably most helpful for advancing science. Until there is evidence to the contrary, it seems logical to assume that, consistent with other traits, self-reports and other-reports of humility contain distinctive information and may uniquely predict criteria (Vazire, 2010).

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Hypothesis 2: The Social Bonds Hypothesis The social bonds hypothesis states that humility judgments help regulate the strength of social bonds. Social bonds are emotionally laden structures that provide an affinity for another person or group, causing one to act as if the other person’s or group’s interests are tantamount to one’s own interests (Brown & Brown, 2006; Davis et al., 2013). Social bonds help motivate other-oriented and unselfish behavior, but can be exploitive when someone draws strong bonds from others without reciprocating. Thus, social bonds require precise regulation. Davis et al. (2013) argued that relational humility helps regulate the strength of social bonds. Namely, seeing someone act selfishly causes one to view another person as less humble, which weakens the social bond (i.e., commitment). Alternatively, seeing someone act unselfishly causes one to view another person as more humble, which can increase one’s commitment to the relationship. This theorizing also dovetails with Ashton et al. (2014) theorizing on the HEXICO-PI, which asserts that honesty-humility, agreeableness, and emotionality regulate altruism and cooperation. Specifically, ­honestyhumility involves cooperating even when one has the power to exploit a relationship. Several lines of research support the social bonds hypothesis. Regarding formation of relationships, greater humility was negatively related to manipulative mating strategies (Holden, Zeigler-Hill, Pham, & Shackelford, 2014) and positively related to viewing a potential dating partner as attractive (Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014). Regarding maintenance of relationships, relational humility has been linked with greater relationship quality in both romantic and married couples (Farrell et al., 2015; Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011). Moreover, in a cross-sectional dataset, commitment mediated the relationship between relational humility and relationship quality (Farrell et al., 2015). Regarding repair of relationships, both relational humility and self-reports of one’s own humility have been linked with forgiveness (Carmody & Gordon, 2011; Davis et al., 2011; Farrell et al., 2015; Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007; Sheppard & Boon, 2012) and tendency to apologize (Dunlop, Lee, Ashton, Butcher, & Dykstra, 2015). In terms of next steps, the social bonds hypothesis predicts a particular mechanism through which humble behavior affects commitment or other aspects of relationship quality (e.g., closeness, trust, or forgiveness). However, most studies have not used strong research designs for evaluating the causal inferences implied by the hypothesis. Consequently, an important next step is to use experimental or longitudinal methods to study dyads or groups. Another potential

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concern is that relational humility (i.e., the way a person perceives the partner) may be a proxy for relationship quality, which could make it almost tautological to show that perceptions of humility lead to positive changes in relationship quality. Thus, it would be helpful to demonstrate that perceptions of humility explain variability in relationship commitment above and beyond perceptions of agreeableness or likeability. Hypothesis 3: The Social Oil Hypothesis The social oil hypothesis asserts that humility is especially important for buffering the wear-and-tear that competitive behaviors or traits can have on relationships. In this way, humility can provide a competitive advantage, because someone could exhibit higher levels of a competitive behavior without suffering the same negative relationship consequences that would likely be present at lower humility. One of the first appearances of this hypothesis occurred in Jim Collins’ (2001) book Good to Great. Collins studied companies who were not only high performing, but also their excellent performance extended beyond the leader’s tenure. These exceptional leaders shared two qualities: relentless pursuit of excellence, which is typically selected for in CEOs, and personal humility, the more surprising result. One exemplary study (Owens, Wallace, & Waldman, 2015) provides initial evidence consistent with the social oil hypothesis. In a sample of healthcare managers, narcissism (as rated by their subordinates) was negatively related to leader effectiveness, as well as job engagement and performance of employees, but these associations were weaker in leaders perceived as more humble (across multiple raters). The next steps for a research program on the social oil hypothesis are relatively straightforward. A variety of personality qualities tend to have a negative effect on one’s relationships (e.g., perfectionism, competitiveness, having high standards). The social oil hypothesis predicts that humility, as a trait, will buffer relationships from deterioration caused by these qualities. Another extension of the hypothesis would be to examine relationships during circumstances that tend to create strain, such as examining couples during the transition to parenthood, when many couples experience precipitous drops in relationship quality (Fillo, Simpson, Rholes, & Kohn, 2015), or during leaders’ transitions into new roles, which many leaders begin by failing to transition well and failing quickly (Dragoni, Park, Soltis, & Forte-Trammell, 2014). Hypothesis 4: The Prosociality Hypothesis The prosociality hypothesis states that humility promotes moral and prosocial behaviors. Humility is conceptualized as not just involving an accurate view of self, but also other-oriented rather than self-oriented behavior. One of the key

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areas to evaluate this hypothesis might be the study of leadership, given that power differentials can make humility especially difficult to practice. This hypothesis has generally received support. Humility correlates most strongly with agreeableness from the traditional five-factor model (i.e., openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism) and has shown robust negative relationships with antisocial traits (Ashton et al., 2014). Likewise, humility has been positively linked with helping behaviors (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 2012) and generosity (Exline & Hill, 2012). Furthermore, latent profile analyses of a variety of moral constructs yielded a three-class structure (i.e., high, medium, and low morality; Cohen et al., 2014). Class predicted key workplace outcomes (i.e., harmful work behaviors, helpful work behaviors, delinquent behaviors, and attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics), and honesty-humility was one of the measures that showed the clearest differences by class. In terms of next steps, an important alternative explanation is that humility correlates with other prosocial constructs because they all assess evaluative traits (i.e., good stuff correlates with good stuff). The effect sizes in some studies were not particularly large, so it is possible that humility is not causally related to prosocial behavior, but allows for a sorting of larger groups based on other variables that are causally more proximal to criterion behaviors. The only way to fully address this critique is to employ designs that allow strong tests of theorized mediators, including longitudinal or experimental designs. Hypothesis 5: The Span Hypothesis The span hypothesis states that humility will promote evenhanded processing of information and a willingness to negotiate ideas fairly. Humility ought to promote an epistemic style that allows one to change one’s mind when confronted with new evidence. Furthermore, humility ought to cause people to place themselves willingly in the position to receive new evidence, rather than reviewing only evidence that confirms their prior convictions and ideological commitments. This hypothesis suggests that humility promotes greater ideological span (Woodruff, Van Tongeren, McElroy, Davis, & Hook, 2014), such that despite one’s ideological commitments, one is able to negotiate novel ideas fairly and develop strong allies with those who hold very different commitments. For example, a good test of span for a committed liberal might involve interactions with a staunch conservative; for an atheist, a staunch theist; for a pro-choice activist, a staunch pro-life advocate; and so forth. Testing one’s ideological span requires engagement with individuals who hold convictions that are the antithesis of one’s own deeply held convictions.

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There is mixed support for the span hypothesis. For example, several studies have examined the relationship between humility and social dominance, defined as a preference for hierarchical rather than egalitarian relationships. In these studies, humility consistently correlates negatively with social dominance, but correlates positively with right-winged authoritarianism (i.e., defined as a preference for conformance to traditional authority structures that has been linked with prejudice) in some samples (e.g., Lee, Ashton, Ogunfowora, Bourdage, & Shin, 2010) and negatively in others (e.g., Leone, Chirumbolo, & Desimoni, 2012). Of course, avoidance of prejudice is not necessarily the same as positive engagement of cultural differences. A compelling set of studies (Stürmer et al., 2013) provided evidence that the HEXACO subscales associated with social, ideological, and activity investment (i.e., extraversion, openness, and conscientiousness, respectively) predicted xenophilia (i.e., love of ethnically different groups) more strongly than the aspects of the HEXACO associated with different types of altruism (i.e., honesty-humility, agreeableness, and emotionality). One challenge in evaluating the span hypothesis is that values may affect how people understand and practice humility. In a new version of the Schwartz Values scale (Schwartz et al., 2012), with 19, rather than 10, values, humility tended to align with self-protection values (i.e., more conservative) in some samples, but with anxiety-free growth values (i.e., more liberal) in other samples. Accordingly, within a group, values may affect how people understand and perceive humility. Namely, people likely judge humility based on their own particular values about what it means to fairly negotiate ideas. In addition, because they ascribe to different moral values and weight different sources of authority variably, it may affect how we need to approach the study of humility. Therefore, the next steps likely involve experimental studies that examine how values may moderate the perception of humility when observing stimuli involving trait-relevant behavior. Furthermore, basic tests to evaluate measurement invariance across different groups (e.g., religious versus nonreligious; conservatives versus liberals; men versus women) seem warranted. We also suspect that in communication, people may weight reputational information based on whether they perceive the informant as having similar or different values. This raises questions about the elements of humility that may cut across different values and cultural expressions. Finally, we wonder if the span hypothesis has been measured adequately. Developing ways of operationalizing span that are not proxies for political or theological values should be a high priority. For example, it would be interesting to study strongly conservative individuals with very large span or strongly liberal individuals with very large span. Furthermore, it would be important to study various types of ideological conversations

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and whether these conversations tend to lead to increases or decreases in one’s span in the short- and long-term. Hypothesis 6: The Security Hypothesis The security hypothesis suggests that humility is characterized by enhanced self-­ regulation, particularly with regard to addressing anxiety in relationships with other people or the sacred. Several authors have explicitly utilized self-regulation language to conceptualize humility (e.g., Dwiwardani et al., 2014). Indeed, Goldilocks definitions (i.e., not too high or low, but just right self-esteem, confidence, and so forth) signal the need for self-regulation to be an important component to humility. Humility involves having a secure sense of self (i.e., rooted in attachment theory), rather than various forms of insecurity that require increasingly defensive processes that distort perceptions of self and others. Several studies provide initial evidence that humility is associated with constructs relevant to attachment style or emotional maturity. For example, in a sample of graduate students (N = 265), humility correlated negatively with avoidant attachment style, but not anxious attachment style (Dwiwardani et al., 2014). In another sample of 211 graduate students, humility correlated strongly with differentiation of self, a construct related to emotional maturity and self-regulation ( Jankowski & Sandage, 2014; Jankowski, Sandage, & Hill, 2013). Likewise, in another sample of graduate students (N = 162), humility correlated negatively with insecure attachment to God and desire for idealization (Sandage, Paine, & Hill, 2015). A series of studies tested this idea more directly by examining whether humility can help buffer existential anxiety (Kesebir, 2014). Kesebir (2014) found that humility buffered the relationship between reminders of death and negative outcomes. Also, Kesebir implemented a more direct test of her hypothesis by explicitly priming participants with humility, pride, or a neutral condition. The humility prime condition buffered participants from death anxiety relative to a neutral or pride condition. Finally, in a fifth study, priming humility buffered people from ego depletion (i.e., degree of temptation) after receiving a mortality salience prime. As promising as these initial findings are, several major gaps in the literature remain and should be addressed in future work. Self-regulation develops throughout childhood (Raffaelli, Crockett, & Shen, 2005), yet none of these studies have focused on children or adolescents or surveyed people during important transitions, such as adjustment to college, adjustment to the workforce, marriage, parenthood, adjustment to divorce, empty nesting, and so forth. Before such work can occur, measures are needed, and it is crucial to evaluate measurement invariance across time.

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The health hypothesis states that humility is related to a number of physical and mental health benefits, likely due to the positive associations between humility and greater attachment security, self-regulation, and relationship health. One sample has been used to evaluate initial evidence for this hypothesis (Krause, 2012). The study involved a national sample of older adults, in which participants completed measures of humility and self-rated health across two waves. Humility correlated positively and weakly with self-rated health across two waves. These findings should be considered preliminary. However, given the potential public health implications and the general lack of relevant research, this hypothesis deserves attention. Researchers also might explore how humility affects people’s coping processes. For example, humble individuals might process transitions and traumas differently and find it easier to manage disappointments or to reconstruct their worldviews after a trauma. Furthermore, humble individuals may be more willing to employ a wide range of coping strategies, some of which require admitting limitations, such as asking for support from friends or seeking professional assistance. Limitations of Humility We have focused on various hypothesized benefits of humility for relationships, but there may be some contexts within which humility has a potential “dark side.” Any virtue expressed at the wrong time and place can have drawbacks (McNulty & Fincham, 2012). For example, although forgiveness has many benefits, there may be some situations such as physical abuse in which a focus on boundaries or justice might be a more healthy response than forgiveness (McNulty & Fincham, 2012).​We highlight initial evidence for a potential dark side of humility. First, based on feminist theory, one drawback of humility involves differential application of humility norms to women or other groups (Schein, Muller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996). Ample research has demonstrated that women in the workplace experience double-standards that negatively influence their ability to compete for high-paying positions. For example, women are viewed more harshly for exhibiting assertive behaviors. Based on our relational theory, we hypothesize that humility-relevant behaviors might be perceived differently for men and women. A close variant of this theme involves acculturation of Asian-American students to humility norms within the United States (Wong, Wang, & Maffini, 2014). For instance, stereotypes may inflict a double-penalty, because people may not only expect Asians to act more humbly, but also it may damage their

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reputation more when they do not align with expected behavior. Thus, our theorizing suggests that humility norms, when differentially applied, may provide a covert mechanism for maintaining the status quo and protecting power of more privileged groups. Practical Lessons The results of this chapter point to several key benefits of relational humility. Across a variety of relationships, relational humility (i.e., perceptions of humility) are theorized to play a key role in consolidating commitment and thus creating the opportunity for people to invest heavily, in terms of identity and physical and psychological resources, in something larger than themselves. Moreover, our approach suggests that relational humility may be one of the critical ways through which people regulate commitment in their relationships. When people disregard or otherwise fail to live in line with humility norms, they are systematically punished and given less opportunity to form cooperative relationships with others. Although our initial ideas were speculative at this point, we also pointed to ways that humility norms may serve to protect the interests of those with greater power, across an array of relational systems, ranging from couples or families to larger organizations or even societies. More work is needed to illuminate these processes and integrate these mechanisms with existing research programs on relationships. Another practical lesson involves implications of the social oil hypothesis. If future research supports this theorizing, it suggests that humility, assessed as a trait, may be especially important for certain kinds of relationships that are experiencing ongoing strain. As basic research accumulates, researchers might integrate the theme of humility into interventions designed to help people during potentially stressful transitions, such as couples having their first child, religious leaders accepting their first job placement, or leaders who have recently received a new promotion. Finally, the security, prosociality, and health hypotheses, if supported, may have major implications across a variety of applied domains. Humility norms may provide one of the key languages to help people develop greater self-­ regulation in their relationships. People consistently struggle with the demands of balancing the needs of self and other and setting appropriate boundaries. Individuals, therapists, leaders, and a variety of other roles require people to balance these tensions and live in line with their values and maintain a sense of integrity. Maintaining an accurate view of self and generally trusting that one can invest heavily in relationships—even at some risk of exploitation—are key elements of humility.

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8 A FEW GOOD MEASURES Colonel Jessup and Humility Peter C. Hill, Elizabeth K. Laney, Keith J. Edwards, David C. Wang, William H. Orme, Annette C. Chan, and Frank L. Wang

“You want answers? You can’t handle the truth!” One of the most famous lines in movie lore was uttered by Colonel Jessup ( Jack Nicholson) in the 1992 movie A Few Good Men. Though the movie itself is now dated and the story line as well as the portrayal of Jessup may be forgotten, many who saw the movie may recollect that Jessup was anything but a paragon of humility. Believing that he only was capable of handling the truth, combined with an unwillingness to acknowledge his own limitations as a military leader nor able to admit his preoccupation with status, Jessup’s lack of humility is easily noted by even the most novice observer of human behavior. However, not everyone’s humility, or lack thereof, is so easily discerned. Scientific progress has, until recently, been lacking in humility research, in part due to the lack of psychometrically developed instruments to measure the construct. We will see in this chapter that this is rapidly changing. However, recognizing that measurement without good conceptualization is futile, we first present a brief overview of what humility is and what it is not. Conceptualizing Humility As an abnegation of self-serving thoughts and attitudes with a corresponding increased respect and appreciation for the value of others (Tangney, 2000, 2009), humility fits well within what Leary and Terry (2012; see also Brown & Leary, 2016) identify as a hypoegoic mind-set. As such, humble individuals lack an emotional egocentrism and maintain a low degree of self-centeredness. This does not mean, however, that humility is characterized by such common misperceptions as timidity, weakness, or incapability, even when accurately acknowledging one’s personal finiteness, including limitations or mistakes (Tangney, 2000; Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, & Howard-Snyder, 2015). Humility, properly understood, requires a sense of security and enduring personal worth and therefore provides a foundation that has important psychological

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implications for self-acceptance, a recognition of strengths and limitations, an ability to respond to others’ ideas and advice (even if contrary to one’s own views), and a freedom from relying on social comparison processes motivated by a concern for social status. It is, in the words of Worthington (2008), the quiet virtue. As an underlying disposition, humility is composed of multiple dimensions and is not defined exclusively by just one characteristic. For example, Tangney’s (2000, 2009) six components of humility comprise a profile far different from a lay understanding: a willingness to see the self accurately, an accurate perspective of one’s place in the world, an ability to acknowledge personal mistakes and limitations, openness, low self-focus, and an appreciation of the value of all things. Humility is multidimensional and the measures reviewed next reflect this reality. What is clear from theory and research is that humility is generally conceived as involving both intrapersonal and interpersonal components. However, researchers have noted that the subdomains of humility (such as intellectual, spiritual, or relational humilities) are not highly associated with one another, posing questions about whether subdomains are actually learned skill sets, a function of salient convictions, or even a representation of accurate self-­ appraisals (Davis & Hook, 2014), and whether or not they are actually derived from a central character trait of humility. Truth be told, we do not know how accurate our conception of humility is. Large parts of it have yet to be empirically tested. The empirical work to be done requires reliable and valid measures of humility. And so, with this brief conceptual summary in mind, we will now focus more specifically on such measurement efforts. Measuring Humility We cannot claim in this brief chapter to provide an exhaustive review of all available measures of humility. The field is rapidly expanding, and much effort is currently underway in developing new measures, some of which we do not know about. We have, however, identified 16 measures of humility that represent a cross-section of methods as well as facets and domains of humility. Most of the measures are published and are among the most widely used measures in the field. For each measure, we report the number of items, subscales, scoring, and reliability estimates and evidence of validity. We will begin our review of specific measures by looking at humility as a broad dispositional characteristic. Next, we will focus our attention on two specific domains of humility: relational and intellectual humility. We will then conclude by looking at how humility measures have been applied to special populations or situations where humility may be especially important. First, however, we must consider the field’s heavy reliance on self-reports in the study of humility.

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The Self-Report Measurement Challenge Like most constructs of interest to psychologists, measurement in the empirical study of humility has relied primarily on self-reports. Indeed, 11 of the 16 measures reviewed herein use self-report (four other measures rely on ­other-ratings and one is an implicit measure), and we can expect that selfreport measures will continue to be necessary for the development of systematic empirical research on humility. Self-reports are often suspect because of potential bias—a concern that, in the case of humility, should not be disregarded. However, there is little evidence to date that self-reports of humility ­ resenting a detailed examinaare, in fact, biased. Instead, for example, after p tion of the possibility of self-report bias in the HEXACO Humility (H) scale, Ashton, Lee, and de Vries (2014) concluded: several lines of evidence support the construct validity of self-reports of H, at least when personality is assessed under anonymous, low-stakes conditions typical of psychological research. In particular, self-reports of H show score distributions similar to those for the other HEXACO factors, moderately high levels of agreement with observer reports from close acquaintances, weak loadings on a factor of self-report social desirability bias, and modest negative correlations with exploitive or dishonest behaviors as observed in laboratory settings. (p. 149) They further suggest that for many aspects of humility, the individual is in a position to give more valid ratings than observers. Given that (a) humility is widely accepted as involving intrapersonal qualities, (b) the conditions of assessment allow the respondents a degree of confidentiality, and (c) the respondents have little incentive to “fake” their responses, there is ample evidence in research using these scales to show that self-report measures provide a valid source of data. Measuring Humility as a General Dispositional Characteristic Honesty-Humility (Ashton & Lee, 2008, 2009) The Honesty-Humility (HH) subscale of the six-factor HEXACO Personality Inventory (HEXACO-PI) is among the first and most widely used measures of dispositional humility. Created with a cross-cultural lexical methodology, the same methodology used to create the Big Five and Five-Factor Model of personality structure, the 10-item HH consists of four components: Sincerity, Fairness, Greed-Avoidance, and Modesty. Respondents rate each item on a five-point Likert scale. Sample HH items, with higher ratings signifying greater honestyhumility, include, “I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work,

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even if I thought it would succeed,” and “If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars” (reversed score). The scale has acceptable (α = .79; Ashton & Lee, 2009) to high internal reliability (α = .92; Ashton & Lee, 2008). The combination of honesty and humility in the HH scale raises some questions about its convergence with the construct of humility defined by Tangney (2000) and briefly presented earlier in this chapter. The humility facets of the HH scale do appear to have some convergence with other approaches to assessing the construct. For example, Ashton et al. (2014) indicate that high scorers on Greed-Avoidance are not especially motivated by monetary or social-status considerations. Similarly, high scorers on Modesty view themselves as ordinary people without any claim to special treatment (p. 149). It could also be argued that Honesty converges with the accurate self-­assessment aspect of humility in other measures. CEO Humility (Ou et al., 2014) As its name suggests, the CEO Humility measure was developed to assess humility in corporate leadership and attempts to capture cognitive, motivational, and behavioral components of humility. The measure was initially developed by sampling 63 Chinese companies, resulting in a 19-item, other-report measure on a six-point Likert scale with higher numbers indicating higher humility. The measure consists of six dimensions: a core cognition of a transcendent self-view; two underlying motivations, which are low self-focus and self-transcendent pursuit; and three behavioral manifestations, which are self-awareness, openness to feedback, and appreciation of others. Items consisted of ratings such as, “My CEO is open to the advice of others.” The scale demonstrates good internal consistency with Cronbach alphas ranging from .78 to .81 for its six dimensions. Its cognitive-motivational measure of humility strongly correlated with its behavioral measure of humility (r = .60, p < .01). Convergent validity was supported in that the scale was found to be positively correlated with sharing of power with subordinates; enhanced willingness of members of management to work together; and managers’ mental health, commitment, and performance. Healthy Humility Inventory (Quiros, 2012) The Healthy Humility Inventory (HHI), based on concepts of humility developed by Tangney (2000) and Richards (1992), defines humility as “an unexaggerated, open perception of the abilities, achievements, accomplishments, and limitations of oneself and of others—a perception that focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the value of the non-self” (Quiros, 2012, p. iii). An 11-item, six-point Likert scale (1 = not at all like me to 6 = very much like me), the HHI consists of four factors: Other-Focused, Accurate Perception of the

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Self, Openness, and Spirituality. Sample items include “I have compassion for others” (­Other-Focused), “I think it is important to know myself” (Accurate Perception of the Self), “I keep my opinions open to change” (Openness), and “I am guided by some higher being” (Spirituality). The overall scale is internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .83). HHI differs from self-esteem and is not significantly correlated to it. However, the author suggests that individuals high on HHI likely possess a subtype of self-esteem that is high and stable. Humility and Modesty in Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) The Humility and Modesty subscale (grouped together as one of 24 strengths) of the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS) consists of 10 items rated on a five-point Likert scale (very much unlike me to very much like me). The VIA-IS defines humility as a nondefensive willingness to see one’s strengths and weakness accurately. Though the VIA-IS conceptually differentiates humility from modesty in that humility is a private self-evaluation (an internal focus), whereas modesty refers to the social behavior of refraining from boasting regarding oneself (an external focus), humility and modesty are grouped together for measurement purposes (and hold together in a single factor structure) with both belonging to the virtue of Temperance. Sample items include “I am proud that I am an ordinary person,” and “I like to talk about myself” (reverse scored). The scale demonstrates internal consistency over several studies with alphas greater than .70, and the scale does not correlate significantly with Marlow-Crowne social desirability scores. However, a serious limitation of the Humility and Modesty subscale is that its validity has not been clearly established in the published literature. Validity studies have reported on the VIA-IS as a whole and not on this particular subscale. The General Humility Scale (Hill, Laney, & Edwards, 2015) The General Humility Scale (GHS) is an unpublished, 13-item self-report scale based upon the conceptualization of humility presented earlier in this chapter. It is rated on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) with higher scores indicating greater levels of humility. The scale has three factors: Low Concern for Status (five items), Other-Orientation (five items), and Accurate Assessment of Self (three items). Sample items include “Getting special attention from others is not that important to me” (Low Concern for Status) and “To view myself more honestly, I am willing to face things I don’t like about myself” (Accurate Assessment of Self). The GHS has good internal consistency (low concern for status, α = .83; other-orientation, α = .85; accurate assessment of self, α = .73). Support was found for both convergent and divergent validity.

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After controlling for social desirability, the GHS significantly correlated with gratitude and a tendency to forgive. Inverse relationships were found with narcissism, psychological entitlement, and dogmatism, attesting to the scale’s discriminant validity. The Quiet Ego Scale (Wayment, Bauer, & Sylaska, 2015) The term “quiet ego” describes a self-identity that has transcended the preoccupation of egotism, allowing for a more compassionate orientation toward the self and others, and the concept is closely aligned with dispositional humility (Exline, 2008; Kesebir, 2014; Hill & Laney, 2016). The Quiet Ego Scale (QES) is a 14-item, five-point Likert (strongly disagree to strongly agree) measure significantly correlated with humility in two college student samples (r = .56 and .57). Items were drawn from existing measures that aligned closely with four theoretically predetermined factors: detached awareness, inclusive identity, perspective taking, and growth, with sample items such as, “I have the sense that I have developed a lot as a person over time” (growth) and “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision” (perspective taking). The overall scale was found to be internally consistent in six samples of college students (N = 2,044), with coefficient alphas ranging between .73 and .79. Although the subscales generally correlated with one another, the overall QES reliability was slightly weakened by inconsistent correlations between the detached awareness and inclusive identity scales. Preliminary evidence was found for convergent validity. The QES correlated with related constructs such as self-determination, social relationships, self-compassion, self-transcendence, and authenticity. It was inversely related to negative thinking, physical and verbal aggression, anger, hostility, psychological entitlement, and psychological risk taking. Dispositional Humility Scale (Landrum, 2011) The Dispositional Humility Scale (DHS) is a six-factor, 33-item measure on a five-point Likert scale with higher values indicating higher endorsement that measures dispositional humility. In an effort to avoid possible modesty or self-enhancing effects that may skew the rating of one’s own humility, Landrum (2011) took an indirect measurement approach by asking participants to rate how much they like humble characteristics in other people. The assumption is that humble people tend to like other humble people, so they should endorse higher admiration for humble characteristics in others. The DHS offers a general prompt, “I like people who. . .” to which respondents rate items such as “can admit to their mistakes,” “are open and flexible,” and “accurately assess one’s abilities and achievements.” Factor 1 (α = .87) was

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simply described as high humility and was characterized as closely related to the elements of openness and an ability to acknowledge personal limitations. The other factors were low humility (α = .76), envy and jealousy (α = .73), modesty (α = .61), accurate self-perception (α = .68), and self-confidence (α = .57). In validity analyses, Landrum (2011) primarily focused on Factors 1 and 5, as these were judged to represent core features of humility. Factor 1 was found to positively correlate with self-esteem and need for achievement. It was unrelated to social desirability or narcissism. The DHS may represent an innovative way to measure humility and thereby serve as a potentially valuable supplement to other measures, though additional work is needed to better establish its validity. Humility-Arrogance Implicit Association Test (Rowatt et al., 2006) The Humility-Arrogance Implicit Association Test (IAT-HA) provides an alternative method for measuring humility (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Using computer administration, participants are shown single-word attributes related to humility (e.g., humble, respectful) and arrogance (e.g., egotistical, conceited, close-minded) and must classify each word as related to the self or others. An implicit humility score is then calculated based upon reaction times, with shorter reaction times indicating higher implicit associations with particular attributes because less time is needed to determine if the attributes are characteristic of oneself. Rowatt et al. (2006) found that the IAT-HA was internally consistent at baseline (α = .87) and after two weeks (α = .89). Test-retest reliability was acceptable (r = 0.45, p < 0.001, N = 54). Some evidence was found for construct validity. Implicit humility positively correlated with self-reported humility when compared to arrogance. Informant ratings of humility among a subset of participants was generally correlated with self-reported humility but not implicit humility when one or two informants were used; when three informants were used, other-ratings of humility aligned more closely with implicit humility scores. In regard to convergent validity, the IAT-HA positively correlated with implicit self-esteem and was inversely related to narcissism, exhibitionism, vanity, and entitlement. In addition, implicit humility was unrelated to theoretically distinct constructs (e.g., introversion-extraversion, conscientiousness, depression), lending support for the discriminant validity of the IAT-HA. Later studies, however, found no relationship between implicit and self-reported humility (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 2012; Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007). Given these inconsistencies, further research is needed to clarify the exact nature of the contribution that the IAT-HA makes to an overall humility measurement strategy.

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The 16-item Relational Humility Scale (RHS) is an informant-rated scale designed to measure the informant’s subjective judgment of a target person’s humility. The measure is based on a model of relational humility that conceptualizes humility as a personality judgment. Thus, the relational conception of humility is that if it is authentic, it ought to be reliably observed by others. Such an informant measure avoids the inherent problems of self-reports. The RHS has three subscales: Global Humility, Superiority, and Self-Awareness. Example items measured on a five-point rating scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree) include “Most people would consider him/her a humble person” (Global Humility), “He or she has a big ego” (Superiority), and “He/she knows him/herself well” (Self-Awareness). The RHS demonstrates strong reliability with full-scale Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .90 to .95 and subscale alphas from .79 to .97 (Davis et al., 2011). Convergent validity has been established with moderately positive correlations with the Honesty-Humility subscale of the HEXACO-PI and with measures of empathy and forgiveness. Moreover, findings supported the incremental validity of the RHS in predicting additional variance in unforgiving motivations such as avoidance and revenge over and above what is explained by the HH subscale of the HEXACO-PI alone. The authors also presented initial evidence supporting the Global Humility subscale of the RHS as a stand-alone brief version of the scale. The Expressed Humility Scale (Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013) Similar to the underlying rationale of the Relational Humility Scale, Owens, Johnson, and Mitchell (2013), posited that the various characteristics of humility should be observable by others. Consequently, these researchers developed a nine-item, informant-rated measure of humility in the context of organizational leadership. They defined the construct of expressed humility as an interpersonal characteristic emerging out of social contexts that connotes (a) a manifested willingness to view oneself accurately, (b) a displayed appreciation of others’ strengths and contributions, and (c) teachability. These three characteristics of expressed humility are each represented by three items scaled in a five-point Likert format (strongly disagree to strongly agree). Example items include “This person actively seeks feedback, even if it is critical” (Accurate Self View), and “This person is willing to learn from others” (Teachability). In its initial validation study, the Expressed Humility Scale demonstrated strong reliability in both a student sample (α = 0.95) and a work sample (α = 0.94).

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The Expressed Humility Scale was shown to moderately correlate with modesty, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and a learning goal orientation. Validation studies have also found that expressed humility predicts individual performance as well as contextual performance (i.e., quality of team member contribution) over and above the variance explained by conscientiousness, self-efficacy, and general mental ability. Measuring Intellectual Humility Humility has drawn considerable interest, especially among philosophers, as an intellectual virtue (Hazlett, 2012; Roberts & Wood, 2003). In fact, some philosophers have questioned the degree to which knowledge can be advanced without such intellectual virtues as honesty, courage, humility, and the like (see DePaul & Zagzebski, 2003). When applied specifically to the intellectual domain, humility involves the extent to which one is willing to hold beliefs tentatively (and therefore willing to change beliefs if given a convincing reason), to undertake a critical scrutiny of one’s beliefs, and to acknowledge that equally capable people may reasonably hold differing views (Hill & Laney, 2016). As a domain-specific humility, it is unclear of the extent to which intellectual humility is independent of a broader dispositional characteristic. Regardless, several measures have been developed to assess specifically intellectual humility. The Intellectual Humility Scale (McElroy et al., 2014) The Intellectual Humility Scale (IHS) was the first published measure specifically of intellectual humility and is a 16-item, informant-rated measure on a fivepoint Likert scale with higher scores indicating higher humility. Intellectual humility was operationalized as the recognition of one’s limit in knowledge and reacting to opposing points of view in a nonoffensive manner. The proposed two-factor measurement model consisted of an Intellectual Openness subscale (α = .92), with items such as “Seeks out alternative viewpoints” and the Intellectual Arrogance subscale (α = .93), with items including “Often becomes angry when their ideas are not implemented.” The two subscales correlate highly with each other (r = .73, p < .001). To date, the IHS has been utilized to measure attitude toward religious out-groups as well as perceptions of the intellectual humility of religious leaders (Van Tongeren et al., 2015; Hook et al., 2015). However, the validity of the informant-report nature of the scale, at least as it applies to discerning intellectual humility, has been questioned (Meagher, Leman, Bias, Latendresse, & Rowatt, 2015). Meagher et al. found that group consensus of intellectual humility and intellectual arrogance could be reached only after considerable engagement over months. Within-group consensus was not found among unacquainted participants after a 20-minute group task.

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The Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale (CIHS) is based on a conception of intellectual humility as a nonthreatening awareness of one’s intellectual fallibility. The scale consists of 22 items answered on a five-point Likert format (strongly disagree to strongly agree). The four subscales of the CIHS measure openness to revising one’s viewpoint, lack of intellectual overconfidence, respect for others’ viewpoints, and independence of intellect and ego. Example items include “I am willing to change my position on an important issue in the face of good reasons” (openness to revising one’s viewpoint), “My ideas are usually better than other people’s ideas” (reverse scored; lack of intellectual overconfidence), “I can respect others, even if I disagree with them in important ways” (respect for others’ viewpoints), and “When someone contradicts my most important beliefs, it feels like a personal attack” (reverse scored; independence of ego and intellect). Cronbach’s alpha for the full scale was .88 and ranged between .73 and .89 for the four subscales. The scale demonstrates convergent validity with other measures of intellectual humility and with measures of open-mindedness and openness to experience. It also demonstrates discriminant validity by lack of association with low self-regard, conformity, and low social confidence. The Intellectual Humility Scale (Hill, Laney, & Edwards, 2015) Based on an adaptation of Tangney’s (2009) definition of humility as it applies to the intellectual domain as well as the work of Roberts and Wood (2003), a 17-item self-report measure of intellectual humility is rated on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) with higher scores indicating greater levels of humility. The measure resulted in three factors: low concern for intellectual status (items reversed), perspective-taking, and low intellectual defensiveness (items reversed). Sample items include statements such as “It is important to me to get special attention from others for my intellectual achievements.” The internal consistency for the low concern for status (.85) and perspective-taking (.88) subscales is strong. However, the low intellectual defensiveness factor yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .66. The three-factor model indicated good convergent validity to scales such as forgiveness and gratitude, as well as good discriminant validity with narcissism, psychological entitlement, and dogmatism. Special Application Measures A few measures of humility, whether general, intellectual, or relational, have been designed with specific topics or populations in mind. We will conclude this chapter by identifying and briefly discussing three such measures.

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Spiritual Humility Scale (SHS; Davis et al., 2010) Given the possibility that the quality of spiritual humility (e.g., surrendered to God, being obedient to God, serving the needs of others as a mission from God) may serve as the “humility ideal” (p. 93) for those who are religiously and spiritually committed, this brief four-item informant-rated measure was developed. Example items in this single-factor measure include “He/she accepts his/her place in relation to the sacred” and “He/she knows his/her place in relation to nature.” Items are rated on a five-point (strongly disagree to strongly agree) Likert scale. The SHS demonstrates good internal consistency (α = .85). Evidence of construct validity includes moderate correlation with the Relational Humility Scale as well as other measures of spiritual appraisals. The measure also correlated with forgiveness. Intellectual Humility Scale Specific to Religious Beliefs (Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014) An underlying premise behind the development of this scale is that measures of intellectual humility that are more domain specific are likely to provide a more valid assessment of the phenomenon. Thus, it is wise to develop a measure of intellectual humility that can be adapted to most any specific domain such as politics, sports, religion, or norms/etiquette. This particular measure is a four-factor scale in the domain of religious beliefs. The four factors included the awareness of fallibility of beliefs (e.g., “When it comes to religious or spiritual beliefs, mine are more accurate than others”; reverse scored), discretion in asserting beliefs (e.g. “Even when I have a strong religious or spiritual belief, I don’t need everyone to know it”), comfort keeping beliefs private (e.g. “It’s important to share my religious or spiritual views with others regardless of whether they agree with me”; reverse scored), and respect for others’ beliefs (e.g. “I listen to others’ religious or spiritual beliefs without disagreeing even when I think I am right”). The Cronbach alpha levels for the four subscales ranged from .71 to .89. The researchers found that people who scored low on their measure of humility report stronger views both in favor of and against religious beliefs. Cultural Humility Scale (Hook, Davis, Owen, Worthington, & Utsey, 2013) Recent shifts are trending toward measuring therapists’ multicultural orientation (MCO; Owen, Tao, Leach, & Rodolfa, 2011) as opposed to the multicultural competencies (American Psychological Association, 2003). Hook et al. (2013) have accordingly developed a scale designed to measure the construct of cultural humility—the ability to maintain an interpersonal stance that is ­other-oriented (or open to the other) in relation to aspects of cultural identity

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that are most important to the client. The 12-item Cultural Humility Scale (CHS) is a client-rated measure of therapists’ cultural humility with items such as “[Therapist] is genuinely interested in learning more” and “Makes assumptions about me,” all rated on a five-point Likert scale. The CHS has demonstrated strong reliability for the full scale (α = 0.86) as well as its two subscales (α = 0.88 for the Positive Cultural Humility subscale; α = 0.84 for the Negative Cultural Humility subscale, reverse scored). The researchers demonstrated that higher scores on the Cultural Humility Scale (i.e., client perceptions of their therapist’s cultural humility) were positively associated with developing a strong working alliance as well as improvement in therapy. Future Measurement Efforts Though challenging, we strongly advise the move toward measures beyond self-reports. Such efforts have begun with informant scales and an IAT measure. Research will benefit from implementing more complex psychometrics as researchers begin to pursue with greater precision the humility construct. For example, could humility be discerned from an analysis of facial expressions in humility-relevant situations? Sophisticated video analysis technology exists that might support such assessment. Furthermore, the subdomains of humility are many and the applications multitudinous. Research will benefit from casting even wider measurement nets in an attempt to apply humility research in numerous applied settings and, in so doing, the field can begin making recommendations for both interventions to develop humility as well as creating social conditions under which humility may be fostered. Conclusion Unlike Colonel Jessup’s accusation, the recent focus on measurement suggests that humility researchers seem both eager and capable of handling the truth. Most of the measures reported here have been developed in light of careful conceptual work, many of which are based on a conceptualization similar to what has been presented here. As a result, several viable measures are available. Humility is a particularly relevant characteristic in any interpersonal context, whether the workplace, marriage and parenting, religion, therapy, or academia, particularly for individuals in positions of power or influence. Thus, it is crucial not only that we have an accurate conceptual understanding of humility, but also that we develop valid measures. One benefit of nearly all of the available measures is that they are practical for use among researchers, clinicians, and laypeople alike. As measures of humility gain traction in different domains, researchers can begin to identify the specific conditions under which humility is an especially important characteristic.

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Hopkin, C. R., Hoyle, R. H., & Toner, K. (2014). Intellectual humility and reactions to opinions about religious beliefs. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 42, 50–61. Kesebir, P. (2014). A quiet ego quiets death anxiety: Humility as an existential anxiety buffer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 610–623. Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J., & Rouse, S. V. (2016). The development and validation of the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, doi:10.1080/002 23891.2015.1068174 LaBouff, J. P., Rowatt, W. C., Johnson, M. K., Tsang, J., & Willerton, G. M. (2012). Humble persons are more helpful than less humble persons: Evidence from three studies. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7(1), 16–29. doi:10.1080/17439760.2011.626787 Landrum, R. E. (2011). Measuring dispositional humility: A first approximation. Psychological Reports, 108(1), 217–228. doi:10.2466/02.07.09.PR0.108.1.217–228 Leary, M. R., & Terry, M. L. (2012). Hypoegoic mindsets: Antecedents and implications of the quieting self. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (2nd ed., pp. 268–288). New York, NY: Guilford Press. McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hill, P. C., Worthington, E. L., Jr., . . . & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical elaborations in the context of religious leadership. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 42, 19–30. Meagher, B. R., Leman, J. C., Bias, J. P., Latendresse, S. J., & Rowatt, W. C. (2015). Contrasting self-report and consensus ratings of intellectual humility and arrogance. Journal of Research in Personality, 58, 35–45. Ou, A. Y., Tsui, A. S., Kinicki, A. J., Waldman, D. A., Xiao, Z., & Song, L. J. (2014). Humble chief executive officers’ connections to top management team integration and middle managers’ responses. Administrative Science Quarterly, 59(1), 34–72. doi:10.1177/ 0001839213520131 Owen, J., Tao, K., Leach, M. M., & Rodolfa, E. (2011). Clients’ perceptions of their psychotherapists’ multicultural orientation. Psychotherapy, 48, 274–282. Owens, B. P., Johnson, M. D., & Mitchell, T. R. (2013). Expressed humility in organizations: Implications for performance, teams, and leadership. Organizational Science, 24, 1517–1538. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Powers, C., Nam, R. K., Rowatt, W. C., & Hill, P. C. (2007). Associations between humility, spiritual transcendence, and forgiveness. Research In The Social Scientific Study of Religion, 18, 75–94. doi:10.1163/ej.9789004158511.i-301.32 Quiros, A. E. (2012). The development, construct validity, and clinical utility of the Healthy Humility Inventory (Doctoral dissertation). Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: Sciences and Engineering, 68(9-B), 6331. Richards, N. (1992). Humility. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2003). Humility and epistemic goods. In L. Zagzebski & M. ­DePaul (Eds.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology (pp. 257–279). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Rowatt, W. C., Powers, C., Targhetta, V., Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & Labouff, J. (2006). Development and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to arrogance. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1, 198–211. doi:10.1080/17439760600885671 Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 70–82. doi:10.1521/ jscp.2000.19.1.70 Tangney, J. P. (2009). Humility. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (2nd ed., pp. 483–490). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Van Tongeren, D. R., Stafford, J., Hook, J. N., Green, J. D., Davis, D. E., & Johnson, K. A. (2015). Humility attenuates negative attitudes and behaviors toward religious out-group members. The Journal of Positive Psychology, (ahead-of-print), 1–10. Wayment, H. A., Bauer, J. J., & Sylaska, K. (2015). The quiet ego scale: Measuring the compassionate self-identity. Journal of Happiness Studies, 16, 999–1033. doi:10.1007/ s10902–014–9546-z Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2015). Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi:10.1111/phpr.12228 Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2008). Humility: The quiet virtue. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 27, 270–273.

Part II P R E D I C T O R S , C O R R E L AT E S , A N D SEQUELAE OF HUMILITY

9 PERSONALITY PREDICTORS AND C O R R E L AT E S O F H U M I L I T Y Joseph Leman, Megan C. Haggard, Benjamin Meagher, and Wade C. Rowatt

Humility is a dimension of personality correlated with a range of social behaviors. We begin with a review of the HEXACO model of personality and honesty-humility associations with psychopathy, risk-taking, and antisocial processes in the workplace. We then focus on positive associations between humility and prosocial process like cooperation and forgiveness. Finally, we synthesize research using other measures of humility, discuss a few measurement issues, and consider future directions of social-personality research about humility. Honesty-humility (HH) emerges as a sixth dimension of personality in many languages around the world (Ashton, Lee, & Goldberg, 2004; Ashton et al., 2004; Brocklebank, Pauls, Rockmore, & Bates, 2015; Lee & Ashton, 2004) and uniquely predicts a range of psychological traits and behaviors. Among researchers who study humility, however, there are legitimate questions about the construct validity of the HEXACO “honesty-­ humility” dimension (Davis et al., 2010), in part because honesty and humility are measured together and because humility and modesty are assumed to be synonymous. One can make a reasonable argument that humility is distinct from honesty and modesty, but that is not our task here. Rather, our primary aim is to provide some background on the HH facet and synthesis about what HH and other measures of humility predict (or do not predict). As reviewed later, we find measures of HH and humility predict a range of fascinating positive psychological qualities. Method of the Review To locate articles, we searched PsychInfo in August 2015 for articles with both terms “humility” and “personality” anywhere in the text. This search returned 433 results. We then subjected each result to two criteria. The first criteria was that use of “humility” and “personality” in the text be related to the topic of this chapter and not refer to something else (e.g. current events or post-modern

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literature). The second was that the article be in a journal with an impact factor above 1. One hundred thirty-three articles met both of these criteria. Humility within the HEXACO Model and Initial Psychometric Studies Humility Definition The majority of studies we review take a trait-based approach that assumes humility to be a relatively stable, enduring quality. Generating a widely accepted definition of humility is difficult given its overlap with related qualities like honesty, modesty, and arrogance. Within the HEXACO model of personality, Honesty and Humility are combined into one overarching factor (HH) with four facets or subscales: Sincerity, Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and Modesty, with the latter two facets comprising the Humility portion of HH. Initial Development of HEXACO Prior to the twenty-first century, substantial research converged to support a basic view of personality with five underlying factors—Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness—which comprise the Big Five (Goldberg, 1990) or Five-Factor Model (McCrae & Costa, 1987) of personality. A sixth factor that includes humility can be found in several languages (Dutch, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Korean, Polish; Ashton et al., 2004; Brocklebank et al., 2015; Lee & Ashton, 2004). In German, for example, the sixth factor was labeled “sincerity/boastful” (Ashton et al., 2007), “trustworthiness” in Italian (Ashton et al., 2006), and “integrity” in Hungarian (Boies, Yoo, Ebacher, Lee, & Ashton, 2004). These results parallel a psycho-lexical investigation of 1,710 English words in which the sixth factor emphasized trustworthiness, modesty, lack of greed, and lack of slyness and was named Honesty-Humility (Ashton et al., 2004). The emergence of the sixth factor of Honesty-Humility (HH hereafter) was best seen after rotating the Big Five original factors of Agreeableness and Emotional Stability (Ashton et al., 2004). Ashton and Lee showed that by adding a sixth factor, HH, content related to having an even temper and a lack of irritability shifted from the Emotional Stability factor to the Agreeableness factor, and items involving bravery, toughness, and sentimentality made the opposite shift from Agreeableness to Emotional Stability (Ashton & Lee, 2005). new hexaco-pi measure (lee & ashton, 2004) The emergence of the HH factor and shift of content between Agreeableness and Emotional Stability factors led to the development of the HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 2004). The HH scale has been found to have high estimated internal consistency (α = .91) and was correlated with Conscientiousness (r = .28) and Agreeableness (r = .21; Lee & Ashton, 2004). Lee and Ashton

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emphasize the HEXACO factor rotation has an empirical basis that is at least as plausible as that of the traditional Big Five axes, while the higher variation in individual facets and the addition of the HH factor allow for greater predictive ability for certain dispositions (Lee & Ashton, 2004). early construct validation Ashton and Lee conceptually tested their new measure by comparing two facets from NEO-PI-R Agreeableness (Straightforwardness and Modesty) and the new HH factor to predict social adroitness and self-monitoring. These constructs were picked because they involve deceit and affectation without rudeness and hostility, and thus more accurately discriminate HH from aggression and other related Five-Factor Model (FFM) facets. Not only did HH better predict these constructs, but the correlation between HH and Agreeableness was primarily driven by the Straightforwardness and Modesty facets (Ashton & Lee, 2005). In a similar study, Ashton and Lee (2008b) compared the Big Five and Five-Factor Model to HH in the prediction of criterion variables seductiveness, unethical business decisions, and sexual quid pro quo. HH outperformed the older models and also beat out a proxy factor made from the facets of the Five-Factor Model that are most correlated with HH, leading the authors to conclude that materialistic and delinquent tendencies are better predicted by HEXACO. Lee et al. (2005) compared the Big Five to HEXACO for 10 traits found by Paunonen and Jackson (2000) to have low loadings on Big Five models. HH accounted for substantial variation (r = .65) in the first unrotated factor of 10 supernumerary traits. Thus, the authors concluded that HH subsumes aspects of some personality traits that lie just out of Big Five status, further cementing its importance as a domain of personality (Lee, Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005). Ashton and Lee point out the similarities between the HH and Agreeableness factor with regard to reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). HH involves fairness and sincerity, whereas Agreeableness involves tolerance and forgiveness, all conceptually involved in social interactions with conspecifics and at play in reciprocal altruism (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Furthermore, the authors theorize that HH is inversely related to negative phenomena like crime, sexual abuse, materialism, power seeking, etc. Specifically, risk of social maladjustment is higher when HH is low and combined with low Conscientiousness (impulsivity), low Agreeableness, (angry), or low Emotionality (fearlessness and sentimentality) (Ashton & Lee, 2008a). Correlates with Honesty-Humility Negative Correlates of Honesty-Humility Although humility is often construed as a positive quality, it has been the focus of researchers who investigate the darker side of human nature (Furnham,

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Richards, & Paulhus, 2013; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Next we review studies in which largely negative traits are predicted by (or potentially overlap with) more general personality traits, such as neuroticism, agreeableness, and HH (Ashton, Lee, & Goldberg, 2004). The Dark Triad One recent contribution to the study of antisocial personality traits comes from Paulhus and Williams (2002), who coined the phrase “dark triad” to describe three basic, aversive attributes: (a) psychopathy, characterized by reckless impulsivity and callousness towards others; (b) Machiavellianism, characterized by being manipulative and self-serving when interacting with others; and (c) narcissism, characterized by feelings of entitlement, grandiosity, and a desire for social admiration. Paulhus and Williams (2002) originally characterized these traits as conceptually distinct but linked by what they called a “disagreeable core.” However, subsequent research employing the HEXACO model indicates this core is characterized less by low Agreeableness than low levels of HH ( Jonason & McCain, 2012; Lee & Ashton, 2005, 2014; Lee et al., 2013). This discovery is notable, as Ashton and Lee (2007) proposed the key distinction between HH and Agreeableness is their respective association with either active or reactive beliefs and behavior. Whereas Agreeableness entails beliefs about whether one can or will be exploited by others, HH represents one’s motives and beliefs about successfully exploiting others. Thus, the common element linking psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism appears to be this proactive, antisocial tendency to pursue one’s own needs and interests irrespective of others. Consistent with this theoretical claim, a pair of studies (Lee & Ashton, 2005; Lee et al., 2013) found that HH and the common element of the Dark triad were nearly identical in terms of variance, with latent correlations averaging near −0.90 for both self and observer reports. This finding suggests that the HEXACO model provides a more parsimonious personality measurement than measuring the Five-Factor Model with dark triad traits (cf. Aghababaei, Mohammadtabar, & Saffarinia, 2014) (Lee & Ashton, 2014). Psychopathy is conceptualized as a constellation of antisocial thoughts, behaviors, and emotions, including low empathy, minimal affect, high impulsivity, and exploitativeness (Hare, 1991). HH shows a consistently negative association with psychopathy, whether it has been measured using the Hare (1991) Psychopathy Checklist (de Vries & van Kampen, 2010; Lee & Ashton, 2005), or a brief, four-item subscale of the Dirty Dozen measure (Aghababaei et al., 2014; Jonason & McCain, 2012), although the magnitude of the correlation has generally been stronger with Hare’s method. Moreover, Lee et al. (2013)

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found similar patterns of correlations between HH and psychopathy regardless of whether the measures were collected through self-report or observer report. Of the individual facets constituting HH (fairness, sincerity, greed avoidance, and modesty), both Lee and Ashton (2005) and Jonason and McCain (2012) found fairness to be most strongly correlated with psychopathy, although all four facets showed the expected negative relationship. Machiavellians possess a highly pragmatic, duplicitous, and self-serving social strategy characterized by a willingness to manipulate others and a belief that the ends justify the means. Several studies reveal negative correlations between HH and a few different measures of Machiavellianism and related constructs, such as the Mach-IV scale (Lee & Ashton, 2005), items from the International Personality Item Pool (de Vries & van Kampen, 2010), the brief four-item Dirty Dozen subscale (Aghababaei et al., 2014; Jonason & McCain, 2012), and both self and observer reports (Lee et al., 2013). Similar to psychopathy, the HH facets of fairness and sincerity most strongly correlate with Machiavellianism and the grandiose component of narcissism. Antisocial Behavior in the Workplace HH is inversely related to a range of undesirable workplace behaviors (Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005; Lee, Ashton, & Shin, 2005; Lee, Gizzarone, & Ashton, 2003; O’Neill et al., 2013). For example, HH correlates negatively with sexual harassment proclivities (Lee, et al., 2003); workplace delinquency in Australian, Dutch, and Canadian samples (Lee et al., 2005); and general delinquency (Dunlop, Morrison, Koenig, & Silcox, 2012). O’Neill et al. (2013) found low levels of HH were associated with a greater willingness to lie about their levels of agreeableness during pre-employment personality tests, increasing the probability of being hired on false pretenses. Risk Taking and Status Seeking One potential explanation for the relationship between HH and these types of deviant workplace behaviors is the association between low HH and a willingness to engage in high-risk behaviors as a means of enhancing one’s own status (Ashton, Lee, Pozzebon, Visser, & Worth, 2010). Interestingly, individuals low in HH not only appear to have greater expectations about the benefits of risky behavior, they also evaluate these behaviors as being less risky—a finding demonstrated both attitudinally (Weller & Tikir, 2011) and behaviorally (Weller & Thulin, 2012). Fairness and greed avoidance facets in particular were predictive of risk seeking in circumstances that involved either trying to achieve high gains or avoid potential loses (Weller & Thulin, 2012). Thus, low HH appears to be

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characterized both by a greater sensitivity for opportunities to enhance one’s status and a greater aversion to possible losses of status (Ashton et al., 2010). More broadly, this tendency to seek and attempt to maintain high status among those low in HH is also manifested interpersonally in other ways. For example, Lee et al. (2013) found self- and peer-reported low HH predicted a number of attitudes related to acquiring social status and resources, including power (e.g., social dominance orientation and desire for power), money (materialism and conspicuous consumption), and sex (short-term mating strategies). Low HH also predicts a number of antisocial mate retention strategies, such as emotional manipulation, jealousy induction, and threatening violence against rivals (Holden, Zeigler-Hill, Pham, & Shackelford, 2014). These types of threatening behaviors also extend to interactions with peers. For example, in Dutch and Canadian samples, HH was negatively correlated with all facets of antagonism from the personality inventory for the DSM-5, which includes manipulativeness, deceitfulness, and callousness (Ashton, Lee, de Vries, Hendrickse, & Born, 2012). Book, Volk, and Hosker (2012) also found that HH correlated negatively with both reactive and instrumental forms of aggression, and it (but not Agreeableness) predicted bullying frequency after controlling for these forms of aggression. Across all these studies is a common element of HH correlating negatively with motivations to acquire greater status and resources at the expense of others. Humility and Positive Traits Complementing evidence of inverse associations between humility and dark traits, we find the presence of humility corresponds with bright traits linked to prosociality. Consistent with the theorized relationship between HH and reciprocal altruism, persons lacking HH could be expected to exploit others or treat them unfairly, whereas honest-humble persons are expected to be more cooperative and helpful, even when they could exploit (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Cooperation Several studies indicate HH predicts cooperation. For example, self-reported HH correlates with fair resource allocation (Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012) and cooperation in a prisoner dilemma game (Zettler, Hilbig, & Heydasch, 2013). A few studies reveal general humility predicts helpfulness. Among American college students, self-reported humility and self-reported helpfulness correlated positively (r = .27) and humility continued to predict self-reported helpfulness when the Big Five personality dimensions and impression management were statistically controlled (β = .22; LaBouff et al., 2012). Note: humility

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was measured with the 16 “humility” items (Greed Avoidance and Modesty) (α =.88) from the 32-item HH subscale of the HEXACO-PI. LaBouff et al. (2012) also found implicit humility relative to arrogance predicted the total number of hours participants volunteered to help a student in need. A combined variable (made up of both implicit and explicit measures of humility) also predicted helping behavior when social pressure to help was low (LaBouff et al., 2012). That humility predicted helping even when social pressure to help was low (but not when social pressure to help was high) suggests humble persons may help more when altruistic motives are evoked. De Vries et al. (2009) found an inverse relationship between HH and egoism among Dutch participants (even when the Big Five were controlled). Hilbig et al. (2012) found social value orientation mediates the effect of HH on cooperativeness. Taken together, we conclude humility does predict cooperation and helping as theorized by Ashton and Lee (2007) and that specific motivations to help or social values could mediate the relationships between humility and helping. Apology and Forgiving Among Australian and Canadian participants, self- and other-reported HH accounted for unique variability in the proclivity to apologize (Dunlop et al., 2015). HH also correlates with several measures of trait forgivingness (Shepherd & Belicki, 2008). Harmony at Work and Schools Among Germans and Americans, inverse relationships were found between HH and counterproductive work and academic behaviors (Marcus, Lee, & Ashton, 2007), even when controlling for integrity and the other five personality dimensions. HH correlates inversely with insensitivity as well (van Kampen, 2012), which has important implications for workplace harmony. Self-Control and Disgust Among Dutch college and community participants, HH accounted for unique variability in self-reported self-control (De Vries et al., 2013) and both moral disgust and to a lesser degree sexual disgust (but not pathogen disgust; Tybur & de Vries, 2013) when other dimensions of personality were statistically controlled. Low Sociopolitical Dominance Among Koreans, Canadians, and Americans, HH correlated negatively with social dominance orientation (Lee, Ashton, Ogunfowora, Bourdage, & Shin,

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2010). However, among Italians, the humility component (Greed Avoidance and Modesty facets) of HH uniquely predicted social dominance orientation (β = −0.43), but the honesty component (Sincerity and Fairness facets) of HH did not (β = −0.07). The inverse relationship between humility and social dominance orientation was stronger among those with high interest in politics than low interest in politics. Among Italians, HH (and openness to experience) uniquely predicted liberal political ideology and voting for a left-wing party candidate or coalition (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010). Non–Self-Report Measures Many researchers recognize non–self-report scales can advance our understanding of humility (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013; Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). Landrum (2011), drawing on Tangney’s (2000) description of humility, examined the perceptions associated with humble individuals and found positive correlations with self-consciousness, self-esteem, and need for achievement. Similarly, Bronk (2008) investigated humility using youth exemplars in the United States. In a single interview, these purposeful youth spontaneously described over 100 instances of humility, which included moments of openness, accurate assessment, forgetting the self, and appreciation for others (Bronk, 2008). Gregg and colleagues’ (2008) prototype analysis of modesty revealed that being humble was in the central cluster of exemplar categories and seen as positive and mostly observable. Rowatt and colleagues (2006) used semantic differentials, a single thermometer item (very arrogant—very humble), other-report measures, and an implicit association test to assess humility relative to arrogance. Scores on the humility semantic differentials were positively correlated with implicit self-esteem, Rosenberg self-esteem scale, satisfaction with life, agreeableness, openness, spiritual transcendence, forgiveness, and gratitude but negatively correlated with unhealthiness and neuroticism. Similarly, the humility thermometer item showed a similar pattern of correlations. Discussion Limitations Due to Self-Enhancement and Measurement Methods Most researchers use self-report measures of humility and related constructs on which participants could easily self-enhance or self-efface. For example, humility/modesty and self-appraised intellectual ability are inversely related despite no relationship between humility/modesty and actual cognitive ability (Hilbig, Heydasch, & Zettler, 2014). Although excellent evidence for the convergent validity of the modesty component of the “humility” facet of the

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HEXACO personality model, it’s also an indication that humble-modest people could underestimate their ability or virtuousness in other domains. For example, Veselka et al. (2010) suggest the small positive associations between HH and emotional intelligence among twins could be due to the complex structure of the HH facet in the HEXACO model. When considering correlates of HH, it is important to keep in mind that common method variance inflates correlations between constructs (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Yet most researchers, including us, continue to use self-report methods. Alternative measurement options are to use an implicit measure (see Rowatt et al., 2006), other-report by family or peers, or relational measures of humility (Davis et al., 2011). Self- and other-reported HH correlate positively (r = .50; Lee & Ashton, 2004). Over the course of a few months, groups of people can reach consensus about the intellectual humility of a target person (Meagher, Leman, Bias, Latendresse, & Rowatt, 2015). Practical Applications Humility researchers should keep in mind that the HEXACO HH factor contains four separate facets: Sincerity, Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and Modesty. Of these facets, the latter two comprise humility. Depending on the operationalization of humility in a study, researchers may want to limit correlations between dependent variables and HH to just the facets that matter. Future Directions for Research and Questions Measures of humility account for unique variability in myriad traits and behaviors. Future research is needed from a developmental perspective. Given children are egoistic/self-focused, when and how does humility develop? What does the formation of humility look like across time, given what we know about the stability of other personality traits (Roberts & Wood, 2007), and how might life circumstances such as success or failure affect humility? In addition, future research should expand on predicting humility in certain contexts. Just as day-to-day changes in humility are useful in predicting certain positive traits over and above baseline humility (Kruse et al., 2014), humility as a state experience may be more relevant in some situations than humility as a trait. For instance, when (and how) would state humility lead to internally lowering one’s self-­image vs. outwardly displaying deference of self-interest to a group? How does humility or arrogance affect individual and group performance? In a group, is it advantageous to have all humble persons, a blend of humble and arrogant persons, or one humble person among the arrogant?

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Humility is a fundamental component of personality. In broad terms, humility (HH) correlates negatively with motivations to acquire greater status and resources at the expense of others and is correlated positively with altruism, social harmony, and low sociopolitical dominance. Although issues with self-report measures of humility remain, this construct is intimately connected with many psychological variables and will continue to be important to understanding how individual differences shape our psychological and social landscapes. References Aghababaei, N., Mohammadtabar, S., & Saffarinia, M. (2014). Dirty dozen vs. the H factor: Comparison of the dark triad and honesty–humility in prosociality, religiosity, and happiness. Personality and Individual Differences, 67, 6–10. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2005). Honesty-humility, the big five, and the five-factor model. Journal of Personality, 73(5), 1321–1353. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(2), 150–166. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2008a). The HEXACO model of personality structure and the importance of the H factor. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(5), 1952–1962. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2008b). The prediction of honesty-humility-related criteria by the HEXACO and five-factor models of personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(5), 1216–1228. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., de Vries, R. E., Hendrickse, J., & Born, M. P. H. (2012). The maladaptive personality traits of the personality inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5) in relation to the HEXACO personality factors and schizotypy/dissociation. Journal of Personality Disorders, 26(5), 641–659. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., de Vries, R. E., Perugini, M., Gnisci, A., & Sergi, I. (2006). The HEXACO model of personality structure and indigenous lexical personality dimensions in Italian, Dutch, and English. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(6), 851–875. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & Goldberg, L. R. (2004). A hierarchical analysis of 1,710 English personality-descriptive adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 707–721. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Marcus, B., & De Vries, R. E. (2007). German lexical personality factors: Relations with the HEXACO model. European Journal of Personality, 21, 23–43. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P., De Vries, R. E., Di Blas, L., . . . & De Raad, B. (2004). A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives: Solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 356. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Pozzebon, J. A., Visser, B. A., & Worth, N. C. (2010). Status-driven risk taking and the major dimensions of personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 44(6), 734–737. Boies, K., Yoo, T.-Y., Ebacher, A., Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of scores on the French and Korean versions of the HEXACO personality inventory. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 64(6), 992–1006.

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Book, A. S., Volk, A. A., & Hosker, A. (2012). Adolescent bullying and personality: An adaptive approach. Personality and Individual Differences, 52(2), 218–223. Brocklebank, S., Pauls, S., Rockmore, D., & Bates, T. C. (2015). A spectral clustering approach to the structure of personality: Contrasting the FFM and HEXACO Models. Journal of Research in Personality, 57, 101–109. Bronk, K. C. (2008). Humility among adolescent purpose exemplars. Journal of Research in Character Education, 6(1), 35–51. Chancellor, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). Humble beginnings: Current trends, state perspectives, and hallmarks of humility. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(11), 819–833. Chirumbolo, A., & Leone, L. (2010). Personality and politics: The role of the HEXACO model of personality in predicting ideology and voting. Personality and Individual Differences, 49, 43–48. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington Jr., E. L., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J., . . . & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93(3), 225–234. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L. J., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(4), 243–252. De Vries, R. E., De Vries, A., De Hoogh, A., & Feij, J. (2009). More than the big five: Egoism and the HEXACO model of personality. European Journal of Personality, 23(8), 635–654. De Vries, R. E., & Van Gelder, J. L. (2013). Tales of two self-control scales: Relations with Five-Factor and HEXACO traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 54(6), 756–760. De Vries, R. E., & van Kampen, D. (2010). The HEXACO and 5DPT models of personality: A comparison and their relationships with psychopathy, egoism, pretentiousness, immorality, and Machiavellianism. Journal of Personality Disorders, 24(2), 244–257. Dunlop, P. D., Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Butcher, S. B., & Dykstra, A. (2015). Please accept my sincere and humble apologies: The HEXACO model of personality and the proclivity to apologize. Personality and Individual Differences, 79, 140–145. Dunlop, P. D., Morrison, D. L., Koenig, J., & Silcox, B. (2012). Comparing the Eysenck and HEXACO models of personality in the prediction of adult delinquency. European Journal of Personality, 26(3), 194–202. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The dark triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(3), 199–216. Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative “description of personality”: The big-five factor structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(6), 1216. Gregg, A. P., Hart, C. M., Sedikides, C., & Kumashiro, M. (2008). Everyday conceptions of modesty: A prototype analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 978–992. Hare, R. D. (1991). The hare psychopathy checklist-revised. Toronto, CA: Multi-Health Systems. Hilbig, B. E., Heydasch, T., & Zettler, I. (2014). To boast or not to boast: Testing the humility aspect of the Honesty–Humility factor. Personality and Individual Differences, 69, 12–16. Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., & Heydasch, T. (2012). Personality, punishment, and public-goods: Strategic shifts towards cooperation as a matter of dispositional Honesty-Humility. European Journal of Personality, 26, 245–254. Holden, C. J., Zeigler-Hill, V., Pham, M. N., & Shackelford, T. K. (2014). Personality and mate retention strategies: Honesty–humility and the willingness to manipulate, deceive, and exploit romantic partners. Personality and Individual Differences, 57, 31–36.

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Jonason, P. K., & McCain, J. (2012). Using the HEXACO model to test the validity of the Dirty Dozen measure of the Dark Triad. Personality and Individual Differences, 53(7), 935–938. Kruse, E., Chancellor, J., Ruberton, P. M., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2014). An upward spiral between gratitude and humility. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5, 805–814. LaBouff, J. P., Rowatt, W. C., Johnson, M. K., Tsang, J. A., & Willerton, G. M. (2012). Humble persons are more helpful than less humble persons: Evidence from three studies. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7, 16–29. Landrum, R. E. (2011). Measuring dispositional humility: a first approximation. Psychological Reports, 108(1), 217–228. Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO personality inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39(2), 329–358. Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2005). Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and Narcissism in the Five-Factor Model and the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Individual Differences, 38(7), 1571–1582. Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2014). The Dark Triad, the Big Five, and the HEXACO model. Personality and Individual Differences, 67, 2–5. Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., & de Vries, R. E. (2005). Predicting workplace delinquency and integrity with the HEXACO and Five-Factor Models of personality structure. Human Performance, 18(2), 179–197. Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Ogunfowora, B., Bourdage, J. S., & Shin, K. H. (2010). The personality bases of socio-political attitudes: The role of Honesty–Humility and Openness to Experience. Journal of Research in Personality, 44(1), 115–119. Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., & Shin, K.-H. (2005). Personality correlates of workplace anti-social behavior. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 54(1), 81–98. Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Wiltshire, J., Bourdage, J. S., Visser, B. A., & Gallucci, A. (2013). Sex, power, and money: Prediction from the Dark Triad and Honesty–Humility. European Journal of Personality, 27(2), 169–184. Lee, K., Gizzarone, M., & Ashton, M. C. (2003). Personality and the likelihood to sexually harass. Sex Roles, 49, 59–69. Lee, K., Ogunfowora, B., & Ashton, M. C. (2005). Personality traits beyond the Big Five: Are they within the HEXACO space? Journal of Personality, 73(5), 1437–1463. Marcus, B., Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2007). Personality dimensions explaining relationships between integrity tests and counterproductive behavior: Big Five, or one in addition? Personnel Psychology, 60(1), 1–34. McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(1), 81. Meagher, B. R., Leman, J. C., Bias, J. P., Latendresse, S. J., & Rowatt, W. C. (2015). Contrasting self-report and consensus ratings of intellectual humility and arrogance. Journal of Research in Personality, 58, 35–45. O’Neill, T. A., Lee, N. M., Radan, J., Law, S. J., Lewis, R. J., & Carswell, J. J. (2013). The impact of ‘non-targeted traits’ on personality test faking, hiring, and workplace deviance. Personality and Individual Differences, 55(2), 162–168. Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(6), 556–563. Paunonen, S. V., & Jackson, D. N. (2000). What is beyond the big five? Plenty! Journal of Personality, 68, 821–835. Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rowatt, W. C., Powers, C., Targhetta, V., Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & Labouff, J. (2006). Development and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to arrogance. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1(4), 198–211.

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Shepherd, S., & Belicki, K. (2008). Trait forgiveness and traitedness within the HEXACO model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 45(5), 389–394. Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19(1), 70–82. Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57. Tybur, J. M., & de Vries, R. E. (2013). Disgust sensitivity and the HEXACO model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 55(6), 660–665. van Kampen, D. (2012). The 5-Dimensional Personality Test (5DPT): Relationships with two lexically based instruments and the validation of the absorption scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 94(1), 92–101. Veselka, L., Petrides, K. V., Schermer, J. A., Cherkas, L. F., Spector, T. D., & Vernon, P. A. (2010). Phenotypic and genetic relations between the HEXACO dimensions and trait emotional intelligence. Twin Research and Human Genetics, 13(01), 66–71. Weller, J. A., & Thulin, E. W. (2012). Do honest people take fewer risks? Personality correlates of risk-taking to achieve gains and avoid losses in HEXACO space. Personality and Individual Differences, 53(7), 923–926. Weller, J. A., & Tikir, A. (2011). Predicting domain-specific risk taking with the HEXACO personality structure. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 24(2), 180–201. Zettler, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Heydasch, T. (2013). Two sides of one coin: Honesty–Humility and situational factors mutually shape social dilemma decision making. Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 286–295.

10 A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON HUMILITY Daryl R. Van Tongeren and David G. Myers1

Google reports its customers send an average of 93 million “selfies” every day (Brandt, 2014). Twitter declared 2014 the “year of the selfie.” With such a great focus on the self—indeed, to such a degree that a new term, “selfie,” emerged— one might wonder whether humility is a thing of past, an anachronistic virtue or historical relic of previous eras. If almost 34 billion selfies are being shared each year, what role does humility play in our social lives? This chapter briefly defines humility from a social psychological perspective and then describes (a) various motivations that feed a positive self-image, (b) prevailing biases that obstruct our objectivity and impede humility, (c) ways to reduce bias and increase humility, (d) social functions of humility, (e) practical steps toward becoming more humble, and (f) costs and benefits of humility. What Is Humility? Previous research from a relational humility perspective identifies three humility components (Davis et al., 2011; Worthington et al., 2015): • An accurate view of oneself: Humble individuals know their strengths and limitations. To paraphrase C. S. Lewis (2002), humility is not handsome people trying to believe they are ugly and clever people trying to believe they are fools. Humility is more like self-forgetfulness than false modesty. It leaves us free to affirm our talents and, with the same honesty, to recognize the talents of others. • A modest self-presentation: Humble individuals present themselves modestly. They share credit without seeking attention. They offer praise and do not tout their achievements or act with a sense of superiority. • An orientation toward others: Humble individuals are concerned with the well-being of others. They regulate their selfish impulses for others’ benefit. They prioritize others’ needs and relationships over their own desires.

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This definition is consistent with other conceptualizations of humility emphasizing sincerity, fairness, avoiding greed, and modesty (Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014). Why Is Humility So Rare and Difficult? Motivations for Maintaining a Positive Self-Image Humility has long been considered a virtue and a contrast to human self-­ aggrandizement. Social psychological research shows that the desire to view oneself positively is widespread (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), especially in Western individualistic countries such as the United States (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Indeed, narcissism in the United States has steadily risen over the last several decades, reaching almost “epidemic” levels (Twenge & Campbell, 2009). But why are people driven to perceive and present a positive self-image? The largest social psychological literature on positive self-regard focuses on self-esteem, one’s global attitude toward oneself. Theorists have debated why humans seek to maintain high self-esteem. Sociometer theory (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) contends that self-esteem functions like a gauge of our belonging to a group. Given that belonging to a group increased our ancestors’ survival and reproduction, self-esteem motivation is a by-product of the evolutionary drive for group inclusion. Terror Management Theory posits that humans desire self-esteem to help thwart existential concerns that arise from realization of human mortality (TMT; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). The superiority of human thinking and self-awareness makes humans aware of their own finitude. This awareness—called “mortality salience”—evokes existential anxiety, which must be managed. To the degree that people feel significant, worthy, and valuable—or have high self-esteem—they should feel less existential anxiety and respond less defensively when reminded about death. Feeling unique, special, and as if one is making a lasting and meaningful difference in the world provides a sense of symbolic immortality, in which one will be remembered long after death. Thus, according to TMT, the drive for self-esteem is created by the unique human predicament of being aware of our inevitable death and unable to do anything about it. One way we maintain a positive self-image is through downward social comparisons: we evaluate our abilities or standing relative to others of lesser ability or standing. Feeling relative superiority gives our self-esteem a boost. High self-esteem individuals seek out such downward social comparisons when their ego is threatened (Vohs & Heatherton, 2004).

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The motivation to view oneself more positively than accurately makes humility difficult to practice. The drive for positive self-regard also gives rise to cognitive biases that impair our ability to see the world, and ourselves, objectively. Biases that Obstruct Objective Thinking (and Humility) Humility is marked by viewing oneself accurately—from strengths and superlatives to flaws and foibles. However, several cognitive biases make accurate self-perception difficult. Self-Serving Bias In many experiments, people have readily accepted credit when told they have succeeded (by attributing the success internally—to their ability and effort). But when told they have failed, they attribute the outcome to such external factors as bad luck or the problem’s “impossibility.” Similarly, we professors commonly credit our intellectual prowess when our papers are accepted, but often attribute rejections to biased reviewers or shortsighted editors. That is, one takes credit when things go right and blames others (or the situation) when thing go poorly. Such self-serving “attributions” make humility difficult. Better-than-Average Effect It’s not just in Lake Woebegone that all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average. Back in the 1970s, one of us was stunned to discover among nearly a million high school students’ responses to a College Board survey, that only 2 percent rated themselves below average in leadership ability, whereas 70 percent rated themselves above average. In “ability to get along with others,” 60 percent rated themselves in the top 10 percent and 25 percent rated themselves in the top 1 percent. This better-than-average effect also appears among adults on most any subjective, socially desirable dimension (Myers & Twenge, 2016). More than 90 percent of professors have rated themselves as better than the average professor. Most folks see themselves as better than the average driver. And most people also see themselves as more ethical than the average person and as more unprejudiced, friendly, healthy, and intelligent. We even think we’re likely to outlive the average person, a phenomenon recognized in Freud’s alleged joke about the man who told his wife, “If one of us should die, I think I would go live in Paris.” That people see themselves with a favorable bias is hardly new. The tragic flaw portrayed in ancient Greek drama was hubris, or pride. Like the subjects of modern experiments, the Greek tragic figures were not self-consciously evil; they merely thought too highly of themselves. In literature, the pitfalls of pride

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are portrayed again and again. In religion, pride has long been first among the “seven deadly sins.” Samuel Johnson recognized the corrosive perils of pride in one of his eighteenth-century Sermons: “He that overvalues himself will undervalue others, and he that undervalues others will oppress them” ( Johnson, 1825, p. 344) The positive thinking apostle, Dale Carnegie, foresaw the danger in 1936: “Each nation feels superior to other nations. That breeds patriotism— and wars” (Carnegie, 1936/1964, p. 102). False Uniqueness and False Consensus We do realize that in some ways we have excelled and in other ways we have failed. However, biases make it difficult to think of ourselves objectively. For positive behaviors (e.g., contributions in a relationship), we tend to think that we are unique relative to others (e.g., “I certainly spend more time on housework than my partner”). However, for negative behaviors (e.g., forgetting important events in a cherished relationship), we tend to think that other people share in this negative behavior (e.g., “Surely everyone forgets an anniversary every now and then”). This helps us maintain a positive image by viewing our positive events as unique to ourselves and our negative behaviors as consensual behaviors in which most people engage. Thus, we take credit for the good and dismiss the bad. We display similar false uniqueness when judging our abilities and false consensus when overestimating public support for our opinions. Simply put, people tend to see their virtues and gifts as rare and their failings and opinions as normal. Overconfidence People regularly underestimate the difficulty of certain tasks, likely because they overestimate their own capacities or abilities. When answering factual questions such as, “Is absinthe a liqueur or a precious stone?,” most people are more confident than correct—as when people, on average, feel 75 percent sure of their answer but only 60 percent answer correctly (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). History is full of leaders who, when waging war, were more confident than correct. The business world is similarly plagued by investors who have been overconfident of their ability to out-guess the efficient marketplace (Malkiel, 2012). Unrealistic Optimism Most of us display “an unrealistic optimism about future life events” (Weinstein, 1980,1982). University students perceive themselves as far more likely than their classmates to get a good job, draw a good salary, and own a home and far less likely to develop a drinking problem, suffer a heart attack before age 40,

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or get fired. Likewise, most Americans, though knowing that about half of U.S. marriages end in divorce, are confident, on marrying, that theirs will not. Alas, blind optimism, like pride, often goes before a fall. Unrealistic optimism also distorts projections of the time needed to complete various tasks, from school assignments to construction projects. When was the last time a work project took you less time than you expected? Rather, we overestimate ourselves (e.g., “I’ll be able to get a lot of work done on that redeye flight”) and underestimate the difficulty of the task (e.g., “How hard can it be to grade a stack of term papers when out-of-town guests are visiting?”), leaving us underprepared, our work incomplete, or our deadlines expired. The Actor-Observer Effect We have inside access to many more of the inputs that affect our decisions than we do for others’. Thus, we tend to attribute others’ negative behaviors to their disposition and make situational explanations for our own negative behaviors. For example, if we see someone speeding on the highway, we presume that he is impatient and selfish; if we speed on the highway, it’s because we’re running late to a very important commitment. Bias Blind Spot If all of these biases weren’t enough, we’re actually biased about how biased we think we are. Emily Pronin and colleagues (Pronin, Yin, & Ross, 2002) have found that even when people are made aware of these biases, they think they are at least less biased than others. For example, when you were reading about the above-average effect, you might have thought to yourself: it’s a good thing I don’t do that. So, working against our biases can be challenging because we’re inclined to see others as biased and ourselves as more objective. Summary A variety of cognitive biases serve a shared goal of maintaining a positive self-­ image. These self-enhancing biases make it difficult for humans to view themselves accurately and to recognize their weaknesses. They also make it harder to view others as equals, which is a barrier to acting positively toward others. In short, much of our evolved cognitive wiring makes humility an exception rather than the default. Reducing Biases and Acting Humbly As the bias blind spot makes evident, changing one’s biases can be difficult. How, then, can we reduce these biases and think and act more humbly? Becoming aware of these biases is a good first step. Students we have taught have

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shared that simply becoming aware of the various ways humans are naturally biased has helped them change their behavior in a variety of interactions: they are less defensive when receiving an unfavorable grade on an exam, plan more time to complete their coursework, and acknowledge the role of situational pressures in other people’s behaviors. However, simply knowing our predispositions is insufficient to fully curb our biased tendencies. One step to overcome bias and enact humble thoughts and actions may be to shift into a conscious corrective mode. Many of our biases operate implicitly on a nonconscious level (Greenwald et al., 2002). As we operate most of our day on “cognitive autopilot,” our default reaction is to prioritize the self and fall prey to these biases. Once we are aware of these situations, consciously (i.e., effortfully, willfully, intentionally) overriding these implicit, gut-level affective responses can be a small step toward correcting our selfishly bent thoughts and behaviors. However, research suggests that overcoming natural biases, such as our fundamental tendency to view others’ actions as indicative of their disposition, requires both effort and motivation (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Another strategy for overcoming these biases is to build one’s “humility muscle.” Previous research on self-regulation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) has demonstrated that restraining one’s selfish impulses is depleting, similar to working a muscle. Imagine runners who begin a training program: they can barely finish running three miles. In the short term, self-regulation makes additional self-regulation more difficult. In the long term, training develops their muscles and stamina, and they can run successively longer before becoming depleted. Thus, it stands to reason that whereas the first time we practice humility (sharing credit with a colleague), we may be disinclined to continue to act humbly (we may feel freer to brag about a recent accomplishment). However, with practice, we develop the self-regulatory capacity to regularly engage in humble thoughts and behaviors and are able to do so longer before becoming depleted. We encourage future research efforts to explore this directly with humble behaviors. Humility is also about an orientation toward others. Previous research has found that humility is linked with prosocial actions, even at the cost to the self (Hilbig, Glockner, & Zettler, 2015). Humility might be developed by cultivating other prosocial virtues, such as compassion, love, empathy, forgiveness, and gratitude. Indeed, previous work has linked humility with forgiveness (see Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014) and gratitude (Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014), suggesting that perhaps humility could be nurtured by routinely, and habitually, practicing virtues (see Hampson, 2012, on the importance of virtuous habits).

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One irony about humility is that people may not be the best judges of their own humility. People can easily overestimate their own humility. Arrogant individuals, especially, may think they are more humble than average. As Martin Luther said, “True humility does not know that it is humble. If it did, it would be proud from the contemplation of so fine a virtue” (Luther, as quoted in Bainton, 1948). To remedy this, one might seek outside feedback regarding their humility. Especially in situations in which the perceiver has little to no investment regarding the assessment of the target, such third-party judgments may be both accurate and helpful. Social Functions of Humility The motivational pressures to view oneself positively, and the cognitive biases that obstruct objective thinking about oneself, make practicing humility difficult. So, does admonishing humility run counter to prevailing selfish pressures that facilitate survival and reproduction? After all, why would I acknowledge my weaknesses rather than tout my strengths, share the credit instead of take the praise, and put the needs of others before (or at the cost of) my own desires? Put differently, what are the social functions of humility? Self-Regulation First, humility helps regulate the ego, and self-regulation plays an important role in myriad activities from diet and exercise to educational attainment (see Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Insofar as humble behaviors involve restraining selfish desires for others’ well-being, self-regulation plays an important role. Indeed, most goals that involve several concrete steps require persistence and forgoing immediate selfish gratification for the hope of a larger future reward. Self-regulation enables human achievements such as advancements in science, medicine, and art. By facilitating the development and promotion of culture, humans have solved many evolutionary problems, such as making it easier to survive and promoting guidelines to facilitate mating. Bonding Second, humility promotes social bonding through friendships (Davis et al., 2013) and romantic relationships (Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014). People are more likely to want to be friends with humble individuals, and they rate humble potential dating partners more positively. In stressful relationships, humility facilitates forgiveness. Humility also signals to others how they might be treated in a relationship, and it increases with commitment (Farrell et al., 2015). When individuals perceive a potential partner as humble, they are more likely to invest in and commit to that relationship, which leads to increased

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relationship quality. Thus, one of the functions of humility is a signal to potential mating partners, indicating that the humble partner values the relationship and is likely to treat their partner well. Once in relationships, perceptions of humility elicit greater commitment, which strengthens the social bond. In short, humility makes potential social relations, either friendships or mating partners, more attractive. We acknowledge that there are other ways to attract friends or partners, such as through wealth and power, and future empirical research may investigate which strategies are most effective. Other-Orientation Third, humility indicates that an individual values the well-being of others, suggesting a lower risk for exploitation. This respect for others promotes forgiveness (Burnette, McCullough, Van Tongeren, & Davis, 2012), which may increase cooperation in groups. Humble individuals are also more helpful and generous (Exline & Hill, 2012; LaBouff et al., 2012). The other-orientation associated with humility facilitates social interactions, making such humble individuals highly desirable in social groups. Minimal Prejudice Fourth, empirical work has shown that humility is associated with lower intergroup prejudice (Van Tongeren et al., in press) and greater group harmony. The other-orientation of humility and accuracy of one’s self-view leads one to highly value the opinions of others and acknowledge the weaknesses in one’s own beliefs. The result is greater tolerance and acceptance of those with differing beliefs and a more positive view of out-group members. Thus, humility helps promote positive intergroup interactions. So, humility functions to (a) help promote self-regulatory capacities; (b) facilitate the development, maintenance, and repair of relationships; (c) smooth intragroup interactions insofar as humble individuals are helpful, generous, and less of an exploitation risk; and (d) ease intergroup interactions by promoting intergroup tolerance. Thus, humility serves important evolutionary functions. It signals to potential mating partners that they will be valued in a close relationship and helps cohere group interactions and reduce tensions with outgroup members, which likely help improve chances for survival. Promoting Humility: Theoretical Considerations and Practical Steps Situational Pressures That Affect Humility So far, we’ve largely talked about humility as a personality characteristic that people possess to varying degrees. However, the big lesson of social psychology is that situations are powerful. Although personality features are important

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predictors of behavior, situational features can overwhelm (or at the very least, interact with) personality. As in the classic Asch (1951) conformity and Milgram (1963) obedience experiments, might there be powerful situations that would make otherwise humble individuals act selfishly or arrogantly or, conversely, lead selfish individuals to respond with heroic humility? We see at least three situational features that would affect the expression of humility. First, situations that measure humility make it difficult to practice (Davis et al., 2011, 2013). Situations in which selfish motives are rewarded would be particularly useful for assessing humble behavior that runs counter to the situations—indicating a humble disposition ( Jones & Davis, 1965). For example, in economic decision-making games, humility predicts more generous allocations to strangers (e.g., Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015). Other work reveals that priming humility reduces aggression—as measured in the amount of detested hot sauce doled out to a critical interaction partner. This suggests that humility eases default retaliatory responses (Van Tongeren et al., in press). Thus, situations where the benefit to the self is clear would likely make humility harder to enact but easier to measure. Second, situations that reward humility should make humility easier to practice (and should encourage more people to behave humbly). Certain cultural values reward the expression of humility and punish acting arrogantly or selfishly. Even in Western societies where individualism is the norm (Heine et al., 1999) and narcissism is rampant (Twenge & Campbell, 2009), social values pressure individuals to share credit following success and to value members of other groups. Despite a potential “default” setting toward selfishness, situations (e.g., military combat) or cultural values (e.g., sports) that laud altruism, humility, and sacrifice may lead otherwise egocentric individuals to act humbly. Given the positive reinforcement from acting humbly, prosocial norms that encourage humility, and the motivation to avoid negative feedback, social influence supports humility-related behaviors. Third, situations that shift one’s attentional focus outward should promote acting humbly. Previous work has linked gratitude, which involves acknowledging external contributions to one’s well-being, with humility (Kruse et al., 2014). This suggests that moving one’s attention outward and reducing self-­focus promote acting humbly. Similarly, given that humble people are more helpful (LaBouff et al., 2012), it appears that reducing the necessity to tend to one’s own needs should promote humility. In direct examination of this hypothesis, one study examined the effects of priming relationship affirmation on humble reactions following a threat. Participants who were instructed to think about their most cherished relationships acted more humbly (i.e., less defensively) after receiving critical feedback about their cherished beliefs (Van Tongeren,

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et al., 2014). More specifically, participants wrote an essay about their cherished beliefs and ostensibly exchanged their essay with another participant, clearly identified as an out-group member, who strongly criticized their essay (all participants received the same negative feedback). Participants then had the opportunity to read and provide feedback on their partner’s essay. Participants whose relationships were affirmed provided more positive evaluations of this critical out-group member than those in the neutral priming condition. Efforts to reduce focus on one’s self and instead think about others may promote humble responses. Practical Steps to Develop Humility Despite self-serving evolutionary forces and powerful situations, humility can be cultivated. Insofar as humility is valuable and a desirable feature of social life, what steps can be taken to develop one’s humility? • Get feedback from trusted sources. Given our propensity to view ourselves with a positive bias, one way to develop humility is to seek feedback about our behavior from trusted sources. Indeed, some measurements of humility rely on third-party assessments of a target’s humility (Davis et al., 2011). Similarly, ask people with whom you interact in several domains (e.g., family, friends, coworkers) to provide you with feedback on ways to improve your humility. Of course, be receptive to the feedback when you receive it; it is no help to act defensively by discounting their feedback and instead arguing for how humble you actually are. • Know your tendencies. We’ve listed earlier the various biases to which we all fall prey. Understanding these is a great first step in curbing them. Take time to identify when humility is particularly difficult and relatively easy to enact. • Identify challenging situations. We discussed how situations are powerful and can overwhelm even the best of intentions. Respecting the situation by understanding the effects on one’s propensity to act arrogantly or respond humbly is important in deciding whether to approach or avoid such situations. Moreover, if a situation is unavoidable, preparing oneself for it may help one remain aware of how it is affecting behavior so adjustments can be made. • Practice developing that muscle. Acting humbly requires self-regulation. Because self-regulation functions like a muscle, which grows stronger with practice, humility may be developed through practice. Acting humbly across situations and over time may be one of the surest ways to increase your capacity for future humble responses, perhaps even in situations that would otherwise be particularly challenging or straining.

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• Shift the reward intrinsically. We have highlighted how social norms and positive reinforcement might help promote humility. But as individuals internalize rewards, behaviors will become more integrated into their sense of self and should be easier to practice (see Ryan & Deci, 2000). Shifting the reward for humility internally has two positive effects. First, it helps circumvent false humility, which may be a product of a self-presentation motive in which one simply wants to appear humble for social gains or to avoid negative feedback (but still may act in a self-promoting way). Second, it increases the likelihood of practicing humility in the absence of rewarding situations. Being humble for its own sake or because it is a noble virtue is a step toward developing a stronger and more consistent humility. • Compare upward. “If anyone would like to acquire humility,” offered C. S. Lewis (1960, p. 99), “I can, I think, tell him the first step. The first step is to realize that one is proud. And a biggish step, too.” The way to take this first step, continued Lewis, is to compare upward rather than downward. The greatest upward comparison is to glimpse the greatness of God and see oneself in light of it, Lewis advised. He and you are two things of such a kind that if you really get into any kind of touch with Him you will, in fact be humble, feeling the infinite relief of having for once got rid of the pretensions which [have] made you restless and unhappy all your life. Is Humility All Good? The Social Costs and Benefits of Being Humble We have treated humility as a mostly positive concept. However, is it possible that identifying one’s weaknesses, regulating praise and acting modestly, and putting others before oneself while reducing self-promotion might lead to more negative outcomes? Indeed, there are both costs and benefits to being humble. Chief among the costs of being humble is risk of social or ideological exploitation by others. There is a perception that humble individuals may fall prey to socially dominant acquaintances or power-hungry partners. Because humble individuals may be quicker than their arrogant interaction partners to admit wrongdoing, confess to weaknesses, and hold their beliefs more tentatively, this might result in being dominated or exploited relationally, fiscally, or ideologically. In times of uncertainty, people may desire strong, clear leadership rather than considering multiple perspectives; when faced with a challenge to one’s core beliefs, humility might inhibit the defense of one’s cherished values. If

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this is true remains to be empirically examined, but a perception exists that too much humility may be a liability (but self-deprecation or automatic deference is not true humility). Thus, a cost of humility may be a self-fulfilling prophecy based on an inaccurate schema drawn from a cultural misunderstanding of humility. There are several tangible benefits of humility. Humility helps regulate social relationships. Humble individuals have more forgiving (Davis et al., 2013; Van Tongeren et al., 2014), committed (Farrell et al., 2015), and sexually faithful (Bourdage, Lee, Ashton, & Perry, 2007) relationships. Moreover, humble individuals are more likely to be helpful (LaBouff et al., 2012), generous (Exline & Hill, 2012), and grateful (Kruse et al., 2014) and are more committed to their religious faith (Krause, 2014). Indeed, some research has even linked humility to better coping with negative life events (Krause & Hayward, 2012). Full coverage of the benefits of humility is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Worthington et al., 2015 for a thorough review). But several converging lines of research detail the benefits of humility for humble individuals and their relationship partners. In short, although there may be some potential or perceived costs associated with humility, we suspect that true humility is largely beneficial for the individual, dyad, and society. Advancing Research on Humility Social psychological research on humility could be advanced in at least four ways: • Methodological diversity: Much research has relied on correlational methods. Future work should employ experimental (e.g., Van Tongeren et al., in press) and longitudinal designs (e.g., Davis et al., 2013) and focus on non–self-report humility-related behaviors. • Solving the self-report paradox: Do humble people accurately indicate they are humble or do they underreport humility? Researchers should determine whether self-reported humility is reliably accurate or if third-party ratings provide a more objective assessment of one’s humility. • Identifying mediators (mechanisms) and moderators: Researchers should identify additional mechanisms through which humility operates, as well as personal or situational moderators that affect the expression of, and outcomes related to, humility. • Theoretical integration: Finally, researchers should identify additional costs and benefits of being humble; understanding the social function of humility may require novel theoretical development, or it might require the integration of humility into existing theories.

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In the wake of increasing cultural pressures for self-promotion and narcissism, we do not think that humility is a misplaced, antiquated ideal. To the contrary, given the strong current toward self-aggrandizement, humility is a beneficial virtue and worthy of empirical investigation. From a social psychological perspective, a variety of self-oriented motives, cognitive biases, and situational forces make humility difficult to practice. However, there are practical steps one can take to cultivate a life marked by increased humility. As researchers continue to uncover the structure of humility, explore its social functions, and identify reliable ways to develop and cultivate it in a variety of domains, we hope that more individuals will more fully embrace a desire to think and act humbly. Note 1 Preparation of this chapter was supported, in part, by a grant from The John Templeton Foundation (#48321). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

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11 R E L AT I O N A L P R E D I C T O R S A N D C O R R E L AT E S O F H U M I L I T Y An Interdependence Analysis Jeffrey D. Green, Jody L. Davis, Athena H. Cairo, Brandon J. Griffin, Anna Maria C. Behler, and Rachel C. Garthe

Though philosophers, poets, and religious leaders over the centuries have extolled humility as a virtue that plays a central role in human affairs, empirical work on humility in general, and on humility in the context of close relationships in particular, is largely a twenty-first-century phenomenon. Valuable theoretical work on relational humility, which construes humility as a relationship-specific personality judgment, has been developed in recent years and propelled the empirical study of humility forward (Davis et al., 2011). Conceptualizations of relational humility have addressed scholarly concerns about the assessment of humility by associating self- and other-reports of humility and relating humility to various pro-relationship behaviors (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010; Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011). This innovative work should be complemented by linking humility to existing relationship theories, particularly macro theories such as evolutionary theory, attachment theory, and interdependence theory. Some initial steps have been taken in this regard. For example, the social bond hypothesis of humility (Davis et al., 2013) draws upon selective investment theory (Brown & Brown, 2006) to explain how humility can regulate the strength of social bonds by acting as a cue that a social partner will be unselfish, committed, and likely to reciprocate helping behavior. Regarding attachment theory, correlational research suggests that low avoidant attachment is linked to self-reported humility (Dwiwardani et al., 2014). We propose that one macro theory of relationships that could serve as a framework for contextualizing current humility research as well as guiding future research is interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and its generative extension, Rusbult’s investment model of commitment (Rusbult, 1980). Before elaborating on relevant tenets of interdependence theory, we briefly discuss definitions of humility.

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Definitional disagreements as well as measurement challenges (principally, the dubious validity of a self-report measure of humility) have hindered humility research. Some resolution may have been achieved regarding the latter, as a cogent argument has been made that humility should be measured as a personality judgment (Davis et al., 2010). However, disagreement continues over defining humility (or the various types of humility, as illustrated in many chapters of this volume). Many researchers proffer multidimensional elements that include both intrapersonal and interpersonal components (e.g., Davis et al., 2011; Sheppard & Boone, 2012). The intrapersonal elements usually emphasize a moderate and/or relatively accurate self-view (Davis et al., 2011; Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014). The interpersonal elements typically are more wide ranging and thus have been harder on which to come to consensus (Davis et al., 2013); they involve pro-relationship behaviors such as forgiveness and helping and may occur in both egalitarian relationships (e.g., romantic partners; Farrell et al., 2015) and in hierarchical relationships (e.g., religious and business settings; McElroy et al., 2014). Given our topic of relational predictors and correlates of humility, we focus on humility within the context of relationships, or relational humility. We propose that in the context of relational humility, the process of transformation of motivation (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003)—changing orientation from one’s own happiness or preferences in an interaction to taking a broader, ­relationship-oriented perspective—captures the interpersonal nature of humility. Put another way, the interpersonal dimension of relational humility is the act of engaging in transformation of motivation. Though we are not the first to see the advantages of this theorizing (cf. Van Tongeren et al., 2014), we will focus more squarely on it and related theoretical concepts from interdependence theory. We choose not to dwell overly on the accurate self-appraisal element of the definition for several reasons. First, because we are looking at relational humility almost exclusively, the interpersonal element is more critical. Second, it is conceivable that someone could be inconsistently humble across different facets of the definition. For example, an individual could be rather boastful and have an inflated view of self, but still engage in transformation of motivation, resulting in pro-social behaviors directed toward his or her partner. In practice, we suspect these elements naturally correlate to a high degree. But from a relationship standpoint, the proof is in the pudding: the actions—and their underlying transformation of motivation—speak louder than words. Correlational and experimental evidence suggests that individuals tend to be more humble with

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close others, but self-enhance more with strangers (Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995). Also, individuals in close relationships (both friendships and romantic relationships) who felt that their basic psychological needs were met had a lower desire to prioritize a particular self-image goal (Hadden, Øverup, & Knee, 2014). That is, individuals whose needs are fulfilled in a particular relationship are able to have more authentic interactions. Interdependence Theory as a Framework for Relational Humility: Literature Review Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) focuses on a repertoire of behaviors within a dyad and the outcomes (satisfying or dissatisfying) for each interaction partner of the various possible combinations of behaviors enacted. Sometimes outcomes are correspondent, such as when partners have the same preference for saving versus spending money, but other times outcomes do not align, such as when partners disagree about division of labor for household chores. In the inevitable situations in which preferences diverge, partners are faced with a dilemma. The real test of a relationship, according to interdependence theory, is when partners encounter such dilemmas in which preferences conflict and thus outcomes for each partner are inversely correlated. Each partner is faced with a choice: try to maximize one’s own well-being versus prioritize the partner and the relationship. These dilemmas can involve transgressions, difficult interactions, or simply incompatible goals or desires. Humility speaks to these dilemmas because their resolution affects the health and well-being of the relationship and of each partner, as well as the very longevity of the relationship. These situations have been termed diagnostic situations because Partner A’s transformation of motivation—acting in ways that are not aligned with self-interest, or a humble response—reveals important information to Partner B regarding Partner A’s broader goals and values, particularly how he or she prioritizes and values the relationship. In diagnostic situations, individuals have two fundamental options; in the language of interdependence theory they may behave in a manner consistent with the given situation or the effective situation. The given situation is characterized by individuals’ automatic, “gut-level” impulses to respond to situations based on self-interest or their own preferences. The effective situation is characterized by individuals’ behaviors that reflect broader goals or motives such as the partner’s preference or the long-term health of the relationship. Over time in the context of healthy-functioning close relationships, other-oriented motivations may become routine, habitual, and perhaps even nonconscious: long-time partners may not even think about forgoing certain preferred behaviors because they know that the outcomes for their partner will be low (Righetti, Finkenauer, &

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Finkel, 2013). That is, such altruistic habits will become the fabric of a close relationship, though they may take months or years to evolve. What motivates individuals to consider the outcomes of the partner rather than only their own outcomes (for example, maximizing shared or joint outcomes or, more dramatically, maximizing outcomes for the partner)? What influences the likelihood or nature of such a transformation? Distal factors such as disposition, social norms, and relationship-specific motives all affect the likelihood and nature of transformation of motivation through their influence on the proximal effects of cognition, emotion, and habit. Some individuals are dispositionally oriented toward transformation of motivation, focused on maximizing the partner’s or the dyad’s outcomes, whereas others are dispositionally oriented toward competition, focused on maximizing the relative difference between own and partner outcomes, even if that means lower outcomes for the self (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). For instance, married partners high in empathic accuracy were more likely to respond constructively to negative behavior from each other (Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & Rusbult, 2002) and married partners with greater trait humility were more likely to forgive (McCullough, 1997). Trait humility should facilitate transformation of motivation by downregulating egoistic goal seeking. In contrast, narcissists tend to espouse agentic orientations toward relationships, believing their own perspectives to be most important (Foster, Shira, & Campbell, 2006). They are less forgiving both in the short term and over time (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004). Beyond dispositional predictors, certain situations and social norms will elicit transformation in almost everyone (e.g., a person crying out for assistance), whereas other situations may inhibit transformation away from selfish motives (e.g., provocation). Most pertinent to the expression of relational humility via transformation of motivation are relationship-specific motives, and the two most relevant motives are commitment and trust. Relationship-specific motives are preferences to act a certain way with a specific interaction partner. Commitment is the felt experience of dependence on a relationship partner for important needs and is characterized by psychological attachment to the partner, long-term orientation to the relationship, and intent to persist in the relationship (Rusbult, Olson, Davis, & Hannon, 2001). Thought, emotion, and behavior all are shaped in a benevolent manner by a high level of commitment. Thus, commitment leads to transformation of motivation, of which we will elucidate several examples later (e.g., forgiveness). Importantly, relational humility and commitment are associated (Farrell et al., 2015). Moreover, when the partner reliably engages in transformation of motivation, individuals develop trust. Trust emerges when individuals have a high degree of confidence in the partner’s prosocial orientation. That is,

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when Partner A consistently eschews selfish choices in diagnostic situations and chooses behaviors that reflect the well-being of Partner B, Partner B develops trust, confident that Partner A will consistently be responsive to his or her needs in the future (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999). In high-humility relationships, there should be greater trust; consistent with this idea, those high in self-reported trait humility engaged in more trustworthy behaviors in a Dictator game (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). Commitment and trust and other relationship-specific motives are strengthened in response to transformation of motivation (Rusbult et al., 2001). Moreover, individuals are likely to reciprocally engage in transformation of motivation to build a beneficial upward spiral termed mutual cyclical growth (Wieselquist et al., 1999). For instance, individuals who have greater self-reported humility reported feeling stronger positive emotions and weaker negative emotions when recalling having received an act of kindness (Exline, 2012); humility also seems to promote grateful acceptance of others’ help as opposed to indebtedness, both when measured at the trait level (Exline, 2012) and at a state level in a daily diary study (Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014). Thus, it may be that humility facilitates positive giving and receiving experiences among romantic partners to create stronger relationships via mutual cyclical growth. Transformation of motivation, even in close relationships, appears to require some time in order to reflect and move beyond gut-level self-interested responses (Yovetich & Rusbult, 1994). However, transformation of motivation can occur relatively automatically in response to frequently encountered situations, becoming a relationship habit (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). It could even be that the routine accumulation of experiences of prioritizing the needs of a partner and/or relationship in which expressions of humility become a relationship habit promote the development of humble character. Conversely, Dwiwardani et al. (2014) found that an avoidant romantic attachment style was negatively associated with self-reported trait humility. It is possible that highly avoidant individuals lack the experiences of giving and receiving with humility that tend to build humble character over time for individuals who are more willing to become interdependent and trusting with close others. Furthermore, transformation is likely easier to engage in when one’s partner also engages in it (McCullough et al., 1998). That is, observing multiple instances of a partner’s pro-relationship orientation may help individuals feel valued and subsequently more willing to reciprocate by giving up their own hedonic preferences. Transformation of Motivation Revealed Interdependence theorists have identified several outcomes of commitment described as “maintenance mechanisms” (Rusbult et al., 2001)—the processes

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involving transformation of motivation by which partners keep a relationship intact. These mechanisms are behavioral demonstrations of relational humility that should also be a consequence of high-trait humility. Accommodation Accommodative behaviors are pro-relationship responses to irritating or inconsiderate behaviors by a relationship partner. When faced with a destructive act by the partner, such as a cutting remark or a failure to follow through on a promise, individuals typically have an impulse to engage in a reciprocal destructive act. Therefore, accommodation involves inhibiting this impulse to counter with a destructive act and instead enact a more constructive response. Such a response demonstrates relational humility in the act of transformation of ­motivation—eschewing gut-level, self-oriented preferences in favor of a benevolent response. Accommodation is effortful and is more likely to occur in relationships characterized by high commitment (Rusbult, Bissonnette, Arriaga, & Cox, 1998). Research has confirmed that accommodation represents a transformation of motivation from gut-level self-oriented responses to more pro-relationship responses. Members of couples who recalled destructive actions by their partner reported considering more destructive responses than they eventually chose to enact (Yovetich & Rusbult, 1994). In addition, when given a limited time (i.e., insufficient time for transformation of motivation) to react to a hypothetical destructive action by their partner, individuals typically chose destructive acts; however, when given ample time to react, individuals typically chose more pro-relationship acts (i.e., sufficient time for transformation of motivation). Individuals for whom a humble response has become habitual may take less time to accommodate to their partner’s destructive behaviors. Other research (Finkel & Campbell, 2001) has revealed that when self-­ regulatory resources are low (the state of ego depletion), accommodative responses are significantly less likely to occur. In a related vein, individuals high in trait self-control are more likely to engage in accommodation. For example, theorists surmise that self-control is required for humility in order to overcome self-enhancing tendencies (Baumeister & Exline, 2000). Ego depletion can be ameliorated over time if a behavior becomes habitual (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999), so humble people likely are able to engage in routine pro-relationship responses because they are less likely to become ego depleted in critical situations. In support of this hypothesis, priming a humble mind-set is associated with increased self-control in laboratory tasks (Tong et al., 2016). It is important to note that the insights from this research regarding having ample time in which to decide on an accommodative behavior,

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as well as the critical role of ego depletion, almost certainly apply to prorelationship responses such as sacrifice and forgiveness, discussed next. Sacrifice Another behavioral consequence of diagnostic situations and ensuing transformation of motivation is willingness to sacrifice. As previously discussed, noncorrespondent situations are commonplace and inevitable in close relationships. When partners have different preferences, individuals acting with humility are likely to sacrifice their wants and prioritize their partner’s wants to resolve the dilemma, though this hypothesis has yet to be tested directly. Sacrifices can range from the mundane (which type of food to eat) to the profound (which city to live in). When a partner routinely makes sacrifices for the sake of the relationship, it avoids conflict and sends a powerful signal to the partner that a benevolent approach to the partner is a habitual orientation. Higher commitment predicts sacrifice (Nielson, Marrone, & Slay, 2010; Rusbult & Agnew, 2010) and perceiving relationship sacrifices as less harmful to the self (Agnew & Dove, 2011). Forgiveness Commitment predicts forgiveness (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002) and humility also predicts forgiveness (Sheppard & Boone, 2012). How do these constructs fit together? One causal pathway is that humility and its transformation away from self-centeredness increases relationship satisfaction, which in turn enhances commitment to the relationship, promoting forgiveness (Farrell et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2011). Humility is an attractive quality: it is associated with being perceived as a better potential romantic partner (Van Tongeren et al., 2014) as well as greater acceptance and higher status in a small group after performing a series of tasks (Davis et al., 2013). Thus, people who enter into relationships with humble others should report greater satisfaction with the relationship. Individuals high in humility likely are more remorseful for their transgressions and are more likely to provide an apology in the aftermath of perpetrating an offense. A chronic other-oriented response should engender greater trust and reduced fear of exploitation by the partner (Burnette, McCullough, Van Tongeren, & Davis, 2012; Farrell et al., 2015). Relatedly, individuals who scored higher on the Honesty-Humility HEXACO scale were less likely to intend to commit vengeful acts that were premeditated and calculated (Lee & Ashton, 2012). It is quite possible that partners high in humility engage in fewer transgressions, at least serious transgressions, but this hypothesis has not been directly examined. Davis et al. (2013) conducted a longitudinal study of individuals who had been recently hurt in their romantic relationships in which they described the nature

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of an offense by their partner and their reaction to it and then completed six weekly follow-up surveys. These surveys included measures of forgiveness and perceptions of their partner’s humility. Judgments of greater humility predicted reduced unforgiveness at subsequent time points. In a related vein, Van Tongeren, Davis, and Hook (2014) found that individuals involved in long-distance (vs. proximal) relationships reported more unforgiveness of their partners, but that perceptions of the partner as humble buffered the link. The impact of perceived partner humility on unforgiveness was stronger in the long-distance relationships relative to proximal relationships. Thus, it appears that humility is a particularly beneficial orientation in the context of more stressful long-­ distance relationships. Other Pro-Relationship Processes It is likely that several other behaviors or orientations are associated with humility that influence close relationships. For example, one set of studies found that there is an upward spiral of humility and gratitude (Kruse et al., 2014). To be specific, a gratitude manipulation (writing a grateful letter) predicted state humility, and state humility also influenced amount of gratitude experienced after writing a letter of gratitude. Most importantly, a diary study revealed that gratitude and humility reciprocally predicted each other (when controlling for the other variable at a previous time point). Both gratitude and humility involve transcending the self (Mathews & Green, 2010), which might enhance one’s perception of one’s partner’s investments. In addition, the inverse association between humility and self-enhancement suggests that humility might facilitate the development of more respectful interpersonal interactions among culturally diverse populations (Hook et al., 2013). For example, humble individuals who represent ethnic majorities may be more oriented to the well-being of socially marginalized groups and less likely to commit insensitive or aggressive acts. On the other hand, humble individuals who represent ethnic minorities may be less likely to suffer from the negative effects associated with being a victim of discrimination because they have a clear and accurate sense of self that is independent from the evaluation of others. Although these hypotheses are not yet empirically examined, they elucidate the potential of humility research to the development of harmonious relationships in an increasingly culturally pluralistic society. Discussion: Future Research and Practical Applications Future research should examine directly the various relationship-maintenance behaviors previously articulated such as sacrifice, accommodation, and gratitude. Existing research on forgiveness and humility could serve as a model

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for these other behaviors. For example, in reacting to a partner’s undesirable behavior, humble individuals should be better at accommodation. More specifically, humble individuals should more effectively inhibit the desire to reciprocate negatively, as well as have the strength to replace a destructive response with a more constructive response. Similarly, humility (measured at the trait or state or particularly the relationship-specific level) should predict sacrifice for the partner, which in turn should increase commitment and trust. Speaking of these macro motives, humility should be examined in conjunction with them to understand more precisely how they interact to predict both individual and couple well-being. Furthermore, increased methodological rigor is needed to advance understanding of humility and its correlates, particularly in an interpersonal context. Our survey of the current literature suggests that the majority of this work until recently has been personological, emphasizing correlational analyses of self-reported trait humility (e.g., HEXACO Honesty-Humility subscale, Lee & Ashton, 2004). As Davis et al. (2010) have noted, empirical investigations of humility have been hindered by the dubious validity of self-reports for too long. One fruitful method of testing humble behaviors has been to observe humility in social situations that naturally instill power or prompt self-enhancement (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013), thus inhibiting transformation of motivation. Using observer reports as well as more sophisticated research designs (e.g., longitudinal) will help researchers better understand the interpersonal functions of humility and establish causal links between humility and relationship behaviors. Practical Applications Various practical applications may be adduced from our interdependence analysis of relational humility. First, we have argued that transformation of motivation characterizes the interpersonal component of humility. This transformation may be illustrated by relationship enhancement through accommodation and sacrifice for the sake of the relationship, and couple-focused interventions may aim to promote these behaviors (Lavelock et al., Chapter 19, this volume). However, promotion of humility may be a more effective approach than directly targeting accommodation and sacrifice behaviors, given that increased humility may yield generative changes that include other positive relational experiences (e.g., enhanced gratitude, greater forgiveness; Worthington, 1998) as well. Second, Clark, Mills, and Powell (1986) argue that what differentiates communal from exchange relationships are unique patterns of receiving and giving benefits. Individuals in exchange relationships give to the extent that

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they expect their partner to reciprocate comparable benefits. However, those in communal relationships give out of concern for their partner’s needs without the expectation of reciprocation. The evolution from exchange to communal relationships that characterizes close relationships may be driven by a humble orientation, particularly toward giving (Exline & Hill, 2012) and receiving (Exline, 2012), leading to greater commitment and trust between partners. Furthermore, as partner intimacy and interdependence increase, so does conflict. However, transformation of motivation or interpersonal humility facilitates pro-relationship responses between both perpetrators (e.g., offering an apology) and victims (e.g., offering forgiveness) of relational offenses. For these reasons, humility interventions would be a welcome inclusion in couples-­ focused therapy, both at the early stages of close relationships as new patterns of interaction are developing (e.g., pre-marital therapy) and in situations in which relationship reparation is needed following violations of trust and commitment (e.g., affair recovery counseling). Third, the modality by which humility intervention has been administered to this point is individual, self-directed therapy (e.g., Lavelock et al., 2014). This approach ought to be augmented by modalities of therapy that provide a better platform for interpersonal expressions of humility. Although it is possible that individuals who complete self-directed activities experience interpersonal as well as intrapersonal benefits, relationships provide a critical platform for the development of humility as a transformation of motivation from self- to other-­ focus. Future intervention investigations should examine the benefits reported by people who participate in couples, group, and community-based humility intervention efforts relative to those who participate in individual and self-directed therapies. We expect that interpersonal modalities of therapy would provide a supportive context for individuals to practice humble behaviors in an environment that simulates extra-therapeutic relationships. Conclusion Philosophers and religious leaders have exhorted individuals to be humble for millennia. Now empirical work on humility, and its intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes, is just now entering its golden age. An interdependence analysis of humility reveals that a transformation of motivation from self-oriented to other-oriented yields a host of pro-relationship responses from sacrifice to forgiveness to accommodation. These responses in turn increase relationship commitment and trust. In short, the decision to humbly prioritize a partner’s needs over one’s own needs results in greater relationship satisfaction for both partners.

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12 THE HUMBLE MIND AND BODY A Theoretical Model and Review of Evidence Linking Humility to H e a l t h a n d We l l - B e i n g Loren L. Toussaint and Jon R. Webb

This chapter offers a theoretical model for how humility is connected to health and reviews evidence relevant to the model. We begin by considering the nature of humility and offer a definition. We then provide a theoretical model and review the scant scientific literature on humility and health. Given the dearth of work in this area, we consider limitations; outline research questions and recommendations for future work; and conclude with a discussion of practical implications for health, healthcare, and the broader public. Definition The study of humility and health begins with a clear definition of humility. Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, and Jewish teachings are replete with encouragement to be humble (Hook & Davis, 2014; Jeste & Vahia, 2008; Porter et al., in preparation; Shah-Kazemi, 2014), and virtually all world religions hold humility in high esteem (Hook & Davis, 2014; Woodruff, Van Tongeren, McElroy, Davis, & Hook, 2014). Likewise, ancient and modern philosophers have discussed, explicitly or implicitly, the role, relevance, and importance of humility in ethical, virtuous, and healthy life (Hull & Peikoff, 1999; Kaufmann, 1970; Lebell, 1995; Norton & Norton, 2000; Tredennick, 1976). Early luminaries in the field of psychology also acknowledged and discussed the inherent value of humility (Frankl, 1986; Fromm, 2006; James, 1994). Consequently, humility has strong connections to religious/spiritual, philosophical, and psychological traditions. This has naturally led to several contemporary accounts of humility within the field of positive psychology. Tangney (2000, 2009) was an early contributor in outlining key theoretical features of humility. Accordingly, Tangney suggested that humility consists of an accurate view of oneself, including one’s abilities and achievements. One must acknowledge limitations and imperfections but not be overly focused on

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these aspects of the self so as to negatively influence self-image. Openness to others’ perspectives and being other-oriented are also key features. Peterson and Seligman (2004) partially share Tangney’s (2000, 2009) view arguing that humility is an accurate self-evaluation including both strengths and weaknesses. Peterson and Seligman also suggest that perfect accuracy in self-­evaluation is not critical, but openness toward accurate information aids self-awareness, and this quality may allow humble individuals to be teachable. Davis et al. (2013) similarly agree that humility involves having an accurate view of oneself and the ability to inhibit self-focused and promote other-focused emotions and behaviors. Critical to an accurate definition of humility is an understanding of what humility is not (Tangney, 2009). As with many positive psychology concepts, it is tempting to think of humility as simply the opposite end of an otherwise logical continuum—in this case, narcissism. However, the absence of narcissism doesn’t necessarily imply that an individual has the characteristics of humility. The lack of a pathologically broken self-system doesn’t necessarily imply an accurate view of oneself and being other-oriented. Modesty is also commonly confused with humility. Although modesty may be one facet of humility, it is generally too narrow a concept that focuses on one’s presentation in social circumstances. Finally, humility is sometimes conflated with self-esteem. Humility does not imply low self-esteem. Self-deprecation, self-loathing, and holding a low opinion of oneself suggest that one’s view is negatively biased and not accurate, and hence, are contrary to many notions of humility where an accurate view of oneself is a core aspect of the definition. Indeed, humility may arguably be a necessary (but not sufficient) component of high self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1989). Based on this review of conceptual notions of humility, we have identified two fundamental commonalities that inform our definition. The first hallmark feature of humility is an accurate view of oneself. The second is the quality of being selfless and other-oriented. A Theoretical Model of Humility and Health There are several reasons why humility should be related to mental and physical health, and Figure 12.1 offers a theoretical model. First, as a construct antithetical to narcissism, humility by its very definition should be composed of characteristics that directly ease mental and physical burden and allow for better health (see Figure 12.1, path A). Chancellor and Lyubomirsky (2013) review many of the hallmark characteristics of humility that would facilitate better health status, including such things as decreased tendencies toward rumination about the self, secure and accepting identity, modulation of negative emotions, and openness to experience. Much of the present research supports the direct correlations between humility and mental and physical health outcomes, and this will be reviewed later.

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Indirect routes of humility’s influence on health should not be overlooked as research and theorizing on important mechanisms is rapidly developing. Key indirect routes by which humility should be related to mental and physical health are through stress and social support (see Figure 12.1, path B). Narcissism has been linked to greater stress (Orth & Luciano, 2015), and humility is often considered a construct with an inherent prosocial focus (Davis et al., 2013). As such, humility should reduce stress and promote social integration and support and defend against loneliness. Stress and social support (see Figure 12.1, path C) are major contributors to both mental and physical health (Contrada & Baum, 2011). Although the indirect paths through stress and support displayed in Figure 12.1 clearly connect humility and health, there are critical midstream mediators of the connections between humility and stress and social support themselves that should be examined (see Figure 12.1, paths D and E). These variables are key to understanding the most proximal mechanisms that facilitate the connections between humility and stress and support health. That is, it is important to consider how humility is related to variables such as forgiveness, gratitude, and self-regulation (Davis et al., 2013)(see Figure 12.1, path D) as they serve to decrease stress and increase social support, and forgiveness, gratitude, and self-regulation variables may also have independent and direct associations with health (see Figure 12.1, path F).

G

Stress & Social Support B

C

A

Humility

Health & Happiness E

D

F SelfRegulation Gratitude Forgiveness

Figure 12.1 Theoretical model of associations between humility and health and well-being and sequential mediating mechanisms of: a) self-regulation, gratitude, and forgiveness, and b) stress and social support. Unique effects labeled A-G.

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A final aspect of this model focuses on the extent to which humility might act to buffer individuals from the effects of stress on health (see Figure 12.1, path G). Early evidence (Krause, 2014), exists to support this hypothesis in a religious context, and it could be the case that humility may act more broadly as a moderator of stress–health relationships. Especially where interpersonal stress is concerned, humility may act as a buffering mechanism that reduces the impact of interpersonal stress on health. This may be because humble individuals more accurately assess their own, often imperfect, role in interpersonal conflict and stress, have greater concern for others in social relationships, and therefore experience less stress and more support that defend against depression or physical ailments. Furthermore, humble individuals may perceive interpersonal stress as less severe, be equipped with better coping responses, or be capable of avoiding stressful circumstances altogether (Orth & Luciano, 2015). In summary, the present model integrates research and theorizing about humility and health into a broad model that offers several hypotheses and lines of investigation. Researchers should continue to build from the small empirical database to establish the generalizability and robustness of the direct connections (see Figure 12.1, path A) between humility and health. They should also examine direct effects of humility on health-promoting variables such as decreased stress and social support (see Figure 12.1, path B). Finally, researchers should consider mediating mechanisms and be attentive to mediation processes that occur both in parallel and serial fashion. For instance, some researchers may choose to examine the benefits of humility for stress reduction and social support (parallel mediators) and its indirect connection through these constructs to health (see Figure 12.1, path C). Others may choose to examine how humility promotes forgiveness (see Figure 12.1, path D), which in turn promotes social support or decreased stress (serial mediators, see Figure 12.1, path E), which then promotes health (see Figure 12.1, path C). It is hoped that the model offers direction and flexibility in creating research questions and hypotheses that can guide work aimed at understanding the humble mind and body. Next we review the literature bearing on this model. Incomplete as it is, the existing research offers beginning support for several lines of investigation building from the proposed model. Literature Review Method The literature search was conducted on February 1, 2016, using three databases: (a) PsycINFO, (b) PubMed, and (c) GoogleScholar. Searched terms included “humility and heal*” or “humble and heal*”. Title searches for these key phrases yielded 7 studies in PsycINFO, 19 studies in PubMed, and 29 studies in

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GoogleScholar. Subject term searches revealed 23 studies in PsycINFO. MESH major topic searches showed 22 studies in PubMed. Searching the phrase “humility and health” and the phrase “humble and health” anywhere in an article turned up 11 studies using GoogleScholar. PsycINFO searches produced the most focused and useful results returning empirical studies of humility and health. PubMed and GoogleScholar searches tended to overinclude studies focused more broadly on issues of provider humility and cultural humility in healthcare. Studies of humility and general mental and physical health were the focus of this review. Studies examining humility and personality disorders (e.g., psychopathy, Machiavellianism, schizotypy, etc.) were excluded. Results Only a handful of the aforementioned studies met our inclusion criteria for review; that is, measurement of humility, not just self-esteem or narcissism, and mental or physical health. Type of measurement, sample, and design were allowed to vary. This resulted in 14 empirical studies of humility and health available for review. Five studies contain data on the direct correlation (see Figure 12.1, path A) of humility and mental health ( Jankowski, Sandage, & Hill, 2013; Kesebir, 2014; Krause, 2014; Quiros, 2008; Rowatt et al., 2006). Four of these studies are correlational and one is experimental (Kesebir, 2014). Three of the correlational studies show a consistent negative association (rs = −0.13 to −0.46) between humility and depressive symptoms ( Jankowski et al., 2013; Krause, 2014; Quiros, 2008). One study shows a similar negative association (r = −0.24) between humility and anxiety (Quiros, 2008). Krause’s (2014) study also shows that humility acts to buffer (see Figure 12.1, path G) the relationship between stressful interactions with church members and depressive affect. Kesebir’s (2014) experimental studies show that humility protects against (see Figure 12.1, path G) fear of death under mortality salience priming and that humility priming itself is sufficient to reduce death anxiety (rs = .23–.27; see Figure 12.1, path A). Rowatt et al.’s (2006) study was the only one of the five not to show a connection between humility and mental health (|rs| = .01–.09). These five studies were conducted with undergraduate and graduate student samples and middle and older aged American adults. Sound psychometric assessments of both humility and mental health were used. Based on this small handful of studies, it appears that humility may have a negative association with symptoms of depression and anxiety and may moderate the effects of stress on these mental health outcomes. Eight studies offer data on the direct correlation (see Figure 12.1, path A) between humility and happiness, and four of these studies were published by the same research team (Aghababaei, 2014; Aghababaei & Arji, 2014; Aghababaei

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et al., 2015; Aghababaei, Mohammadtabar, & Saffarinia, 2014). Aghababaei and colleagues have consistently measured humility using the HEXACO honestyhumility subscale and happiness using measures of life satisfaction, subjective happiness, and multidimensional aspects of psychological well-being as defined by Ryff and Keyes (1995). A distinctive feature of this emerging body of work is that the participants originate from areas that are underrepresented in the psychological literature (e.g., Iran, Poland, Malaysia). A consistent theme in these four studies is that humility is unrelated, or very weakly related, to subjective happiness and life satisfaction (|rs| = .03–.20). Stronger associations (|rs| = .14–.33) are found between humility and Ryff and Keyes’ (1995) aspects of psychological well-being (e.g., autonomy, self-acceptance, positive relations, mastery, purpose, and growth). The honesty-humility subscale of the HEXACO measures broad aspects of personality that extend beyond humility, and as such, has been criticized as a measure of pure humility (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). The measures used to assess happiness are standard ones and psychometrically sound. Four other studies were identified that examined humility and happiness (Dangi & Nagle, 2015; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; Pollock, Noser, Holden, & Zeigler-Hill, 2016; Rowatt et al., 2006). Park et al. (2004) used large Internet samples and the Values in Action (VIA) humility subscale to examine the connection between humility and life satisfaction, and associations were small to nonexistent (|rs| = .00–.05). Opposite findings were reported by Rowatt et al. (2006) who used a humility semantic differential scale and showed a significant correlation with life satisfaction (r = .28). Two other studies correlated the HEXACO honesty-humility subscale with happiness. Pollock et al. measured mood and life satisfaction and found small, nonsignificant correlations with the HEXACO honesty-humility subscale (|rs| = .02–.13). Dangi and Nagle used Ryff and Keyes’ (1995) assessment of happiness and found the subscales of selfacceptance (r = .42) and purpose in life (r = .37) were significantly correlated with the HEXACO honesty-humility subscale in a sample of adolescents from India. Overall, the relationship between humility and happiness appears a bit nuanced. The correlation between humility and affect, life satisfaction, and subjective happiness is quite small, if one exists at all. On the other hand, the correlation of humility and broader conceptualizations of happiness (Ryff & Keyes, 1995) is stronger. Perhaps the investigation of humility and happiness should focus more intently on how humility contributes to a rich and meaningful life through such things as autonomy, self-acceptance, positive relations, mastery, purpose, and growth and not simply how it relates to in-the-moment mood or evaluations of life. It is also important when interpreting findings in

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this area to be mindful of differences in measures and samples across studies, as there is considerable variability. Only three studies offer data on the direct correlation (see Figure 12.1, path A) between humility and physical health (Krause, 2010, 2012; Rowatt et al., 2006). Krause’s (2010, 2012) two studies examine humility and health in a sample of Americans with an average age of 78. Both studies come from the larger Religion, Aging, and Health Survey. This impressive 15-year, five-wave, longitudinal project has offered numerous insights into religious and spiritual factors, including humility, and connections to mental and physical health. Krause’s (2010) first study showed that humility was positively associated with self-rated physical health (β = .27), and Krause’s (2012) second study offered evidence that as humility increases across time it is associated with similar increases in self-rated physical health over the same time span (β = .11). In both studies, confounding variables such as sociodemographics and religiousness were controlled. The third study (Rowatt et al., 2006) offers relevant evidence, though sampling, measurement, and control of confounds are not as rigorous. Nevertheless, Rowatt et al.’s (2006) study showed that measures of humility, both a single item (r = −0.22) and a semantic differential scale (r = −0.21), showed negative associations with unhealthy physical symptoms. With few studies to draw from, it would be reckless to offer sweeping conclusions, but the evidence appears to lean in favor of the notion that humility is associated with better physical health. Limitations of Existing Work Before reaching any conclusions about the state of the evidence on the relationship between humility and health, it would be prudent to consider first the numerous limitations of this small body of work. First and foremost, the evidence base is quite small. Second, most of the samples are convenience samples of college students. Third, no established gold standard of measurement exists for humility. Measures used have shown some, but often not sufficient, evidence of psychometric soundness. Fourth, only one experimental study and one prospective population-based study have been completed. The rest are cross-­sectional, correlational studies. Fifth, all measures of health are self-­ reported, and no objective health indices have been used. Conclusions The existing literature provides a foundation on which to base future work. The data offer a suggestion, though not yet well replicated, that humility might be positively related to both mental and physical health. The same might be said for the relationship between humility and some, but not all, kinds

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of happiness. Associations between humility and mood, life satisfaction, and subjective happiness were not common, and when they did exist, were small in magnitude. Stronger associations were observed between humility and broader conceptualizations of happiness that included such things as autonomy, self-acceptance, positive-relations, mastery, purpose, and growth. A common mantra of positive psychologists is that the absence of the negative (e.g., narcissism) does not guarantee the presence of the positive (e.g., humility) (Tangney, 2009). But beyond that understanding, it may be important to consider that positive psychological traits and virtues may not facilitate all types of positive health and well-being end-states. That is, it might be that humility has inverse associations with poor mental health (e.g., depression) but is unrelated to some forms of happiness. We suggest this based on a few studies. Careful consideration of measurement issues and samples is important before drawing too strong of conclusions on the matter. Given the early state of the literature and the tentative nature of our conclusions, we turn to what future research might bring to bear on the question of if and how humility might be related to health. Research Agenda Because the research base is quite small at the present moment, much of the low-hanging fruit remains to be picked. Straightforward and methodologically sound studies can make considerable contributions to the literature. We consider several lines of research to address the humility and health connection. Measurement Brief humility measures are needed for use in health studies with sick or challenged patient populations. Efficient measures are also useful in health experiments and epidemiological studies where time and survey space are limited. Krause (Krause, 2010, 2012, 2014) has used an abbreviated four-item version of Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) measure and shown scores with good estimated internal consistency and construct validity in divergence from other constructs. Likewise, the measures offered by Rowatt et al. (2006) are useful because of their brevity (one-item humility thermometer and seven-item semantic differential scale) and good estimated internal consistency. Regretfully, none of these measures have been subsequently evaluated in independent samples, but this verification could be done. Davis et al. (2011) have made a valuable contribution in developing a psychometrically sound assessment appropriate for health studies, and a brief five-item version is available. There are some good beginnings here in the measurement of humility for health studies. Investigators

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should extend this work and more rigorously evaluate these assessments, keeping a keen eye to length. Health Presently, assessment of health outcomes is limited to self-report measures. Self-reports of health are valid predictors of physical health outcomes (Idler & Benyamini, 1997), but conceptualization and assessment of health could be expanded. For instance, often measures of pain, impairment, or functional status are relevant to health researchers because of what they indicate about health status and health-related quality of life. Health behaviors, including but not limited to, nutrition, exercise, sleep, and substance use, should be included. Finally, psychophysiological measures (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate), biomarkers (e.g. cortisol, adrenaline), and neural measures (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI], positron emission tomography [PET]) of humility remain to be explored. Sample Much humility-health data come from college students. These samples are fairly idiosyncratic, being from Christian schools or from countries such as Iran, Poland, and Malaysia. The only two existing published population-based studies come from the same population of Americans with an average age of 78 years. Representative, population-based work investigating humility and health in young and middle-aged adults is simply absent despite the mounting evidence that lack of humility and growing narcissism are concerns not as much of the older generations but much more so for younger generations (Twenge, 2014). Growing narcissism in more recent generations could be resulting in poor health outcomes (Reinhard, Konrath, Lopez, & Cameron, 2012), but how humility is involved in health is unclear because it simply hasn’t been studied in adolescents and young and middle-aged adults. Cause and Effect Presently just one study speaks to the effect of humility on health. Kesebir (2014) showed, in a humility priming experiment, that humility can protect individuals from death anxiety. Investigators would be wise to build from Kesebir’s priming model to design experimental studies. The methodology used by Kesebir is straightforward and holds good promise for replication. Furthermore, it could be easily extended to examine the influence of humility priming on depressive affect, generalized anxiety, stress, and somatic and other symptoms of psychological distress. In addition, humility interventions could be used to

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examine the effect of increases in humility on health. Interventions are sparse at the moment, but Lavelock et al. (2014) have developed and evaluated an approach that is efficacious in promoting humility. Intervention trials in both healthy and patient samples investigating the impact of humility promotion on health conditions would be valuable contributions to the literature. Mechanisms of Action Studies need to be designed to understand why humility might be linked to health. Our model outlines several mechanisms of the association between humility and health. Stress and social support are key mediators, but research suggests that so, too, are forgiveness (Davis et al., 2011), gratitude (Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014), religiousness and spirituality (Krause, 2010), self-regulation (Davis et al., 2013), and positive and negative emotion (Davis et al., 2011). Our model also suggests that humility acts as a buffer against the untoward effects of negative affect and stress on health. Krause (2014) provided early evidence of this model, showing that the effect of stress from interacting with religious congregations on depression was buffered by humility. What other specific types of stress might be buffered by humility? Might the buffering effect of humility act more powerfully for religious versus nonreligious individuals or vary based on spirituality (see Webb, Toussaint, & Dula, 2014)? Might humility play a role in the relationship between temptation and health (see Webb, 2014) or the associations among spirituality, forgiveness, substance abuse, and suicidal behavior (see Webb, Hirsch, & Toussaint, 2015)? Might the role of humility be influenced by other factors such as age, gender, or socioeconomic status? Many questions remain in this area, and studies designed to specifically examine mediating and moderating models of the humility-health connection would be useful. Practical Lessons At the moment early studies favor the notion that humility might be healthy for body and mind, but studies are sparse. Consequently, considering the applications of this knowledge has to be done with a degree of considerable caution. Our ideas about practical applications are probably better framed in terms of what might be useful if continued, rigorous scientific studies bear out what early work promises. If that is the case, then there are many reasonable extensions of this knowledge into everyday areas of life. First, because religious communities are some of the earliest commentators and teachers on the topic of humility (Hook & Davis, 2014; Krause, 2010), it would prove useful to know that what is fitting with theological doctrine is also in alignment with good public service and public health. Many religious communities

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are involved in health ministries either as direct outreach efforts (i.e., part of social outreach) or as supporting partners of healthcare facilities (i.e., founding or financially supporting partners in clinics and hospitals). Understanding the health effects of humility offers a unique intersection between religious teaching and health promotion in which multidisciplinary teams of chaplains, psychologists, physicians, and nurses can collaboratively work. Second, college campuses are being overwhelmed by students in need of mental health services (Kadison & DiGeronimo, 2004). Growing narcissism and entitlement in college students of today (Twenge, 2014) may be bringing with it mental health struggles. Humility, with its emphasis on accurate self-perception, selflessness, and other-orientedness, may be just what today’s college students need. Facilitating conversations about humility between students and their professors, coaches, residence hall assistants, and other members of student-life teams may be especially useful. Undoubtedly, these conversations will have to be brief, but effective, and able to squeeze between all the commitments and challenges that college students face. Third, the Twelve-Step Model warns against self-centeredness as the crucible of addiction and stresses the critical role of humility in recovery (Alcoholics Anonymous, 2001). Empirical verification of this long-standing yet anecdotal observation will likely strengthen resolve in the recovery community. Finally, extensions to businesses, nonprofits, philanthropic organizations, and governments are warranted if the case for healthy humility can be made. Encouraging humility among employees and volunteers may not only bring organizational benefits by enhancing productivity, but it may also bring rewards in fewer sick days and health insurance claims and improved functioning in the workplace. The practical applications of humility and its end-game bonus to health seem almost boundless, and continued attention to this intriguing connection will bring greater understanding of when and why humility might bring health gains and in what contexts it is best to encourage it. References Aghababaei, N. (2014). God, the good life, and HEXACO: The relations among religion, subjective well-being and personality. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 17(3), 284–290. Aghababaei, N., & Arji, A. (2014). Well-being and the HEXACO model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 56, 139–142. Aghababaei, N., Błachnio, A., Arji, A., Chiniforoushan, M., Tekke, M., & Fazeli Mehrabadi, A. (2015). Honesty–humility and the HEXACO structure of religiosity and well-being. Current Psychology: A Journal for Diverse Perspectives on Diverse Psychological Issues. doi:10.1007/ s12144–015–9310–5 Aghababaei, N., Mohammadtabar, S., & Saffarinia, M. (2014). Dirty dozen vs. The H factor: Comparison of the dark triad and honesty–humility in prosociality, religiosity, and happiness. Personality and Individual Differences, 67, 6–10. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.03.026

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Alcoholics Anonymous. (2001). Alcoholics anonymous: The story of how many thousands of men and women have recovered from alcoholism (Fourth ed.). New York, NY: Author. Chancellor, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). Humble beginnings: Current trends, state perspectives, and hallmarks of humility. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(11), 819–833. Contrada, R. J., & Baum, A. (2011). The handbook of stress science: Biology, psychology, and health. New York: Springer. Dangi, S., & Nagle, Y. K. (2015). Personality factors as determinants of psychological well being among adolescents. Indian Journal of Health and Wellbeing, 6(4), 369–373. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J., . . . & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93(3), 225–234. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(4), 243–252. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Hook, J. N., Emmons, R. A., Hill, P. C., Bollinger, R. A., . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2013). Humility and the development and repair of social bonds: Two longitudinal studies. Self and Identity, 12(1), 58–77. Frankl, V. E. (1986). The doctor and the soul: From psychotherapy to logotherapy [R. & C. Winston, trans.]. New York: Random House (Original work published in 1946). Fromm, E. (2006). The art of loving (50th anniversary edition). New York: HarperCollins (original work published in 1956). Hook, N. J., & Davis, E. D. (2014). Humility, religion, and spirituality: Introduction to the special issue. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42(1), 3–6. Hull, G., & Peikoff, L. (Eds.). (1999). The Ayn Rand reader. New York: Penguin Group. Idler, E. L., & Benyamini, Y. (1997). Self-rated health and mortality: A review of twentyseven community studies. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 38(1), 21–37. doi:10. 2307/2955359 James, W. (1994). The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature. New York: Random House (Original work published in 1902). Jankowski, P. J., Sandage, S. J., & Hill, P. C. (2013). Differentiation-based models of forgivingness, mental health and social justice commitment: Mediator effects for differentiation of self and humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 8(5), 412–424. doi:10.1080/17439 760.2013.820337 Jeste, D. V., & Vahia, I. V. (2008). Comparison of the conceptualization of wisdom in ancient Indian literature with modern views: Focus on the Bhagavad Gita. Psychiatry, 71(3), 197– 209. doi:10.1521/psyc.2008.71.3.197 Kadison, R., & DiGeronimo, T. F. (2004). College of the overwhelmed: The campus mental health crisis and what to do about it. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Kaufmann, W. (1970). I and thou: Martin Buber [W. Kaufmann, Trans.]. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Kesebir, P. (2014). A quiet ego quiets death anxiety: Humility as an existential anxiety buffer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(4), 610–623. doi:10.1037/a0035814 Krause, N. (2010). Religious involvement, humility, and self-rated health. Social Indicators Research, 98(1), 23–39. Krause, N. (2012). Religious involvement, humility, and change in self-rated health over time. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 40(3), 199–210. Krause, N. (2014). Exploring the relationships among humility, negative interaction in the church, and depressed affect. Aging & Mental Health, 18(8), 970–979. doi:10.1080/ 13607863.2014.896867

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Webb, J. R. (2014). Incorporating spirituality into the psychology of temptation: Conceptualization, measurement, and clinical implications. Spirituality in Clinical Practice, 1(3), 231–241. doi:10.1037/scp0000028 Webb, J. R., Hirsch, J. K., & Toussaint, L. (2015). Forgiveness as a positive psychotherapy for addiction and suicide: Theory, research, and practice. Spirituality in Clinical Practice, 2(1), 48–60. doi:10.1037/scp0000054 Webb, J. R., Toussaint, L., & Dula, C. S. (2014). Ritualistic, theistic, and existential spirituality: Initial psychometric qualities of the RiTE measure of spirituality. Journal of Religion & Health, 53(4), 972–985. doi:10.1007/s10943–013–9697-y Woodruff, E., Van Tongeren, D. R., McElroy, S., Davis, D. E., & Hook, J. N. (2014). Humility and religion: Benefits, difficulties, and a model of religious tolerance. In C. Kim-Prieto (Ed.), Religion and spirituality across cultures (Vol. 9, pp. 271–285). New York, NY, US: Springer Science + Business Media.

13 SPIRITUAL AND RELIGIOUS P R E D I C T O R S , C O R R E L AT E S , A N D SEQUELAE OF HUMILITY Mark M. Leach and Adebayo Ajibade

The rise of the positive psychology movement over the past several years has witnessed a marked increase in interest and empirical research on character strengths and virtues (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Empirical research continues to mount and to deepen scientific understanding of positive psychological constructs such as forgiveness, gratitude, and happiness. Humility research has been a bit slower to accumulate, primarily for two reasons. First, there have been concerns over its definition, and second, its empirical measurement has proven elusive (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). However, as this book can attest, there is growing consensus as to the primary factors associated with humility (Davis et al., Chapter 7, this volume). Furthermore, instruments recently developed to measure humility are promising (e.g., Exline & Hill, 2012; Jankowski, Sandage, & Hill, 2013). Growth in these two areas has allowed for the recent surge in literature in this area. In fact, a significant amount of the work in this area has occurred just over the past six to eight years. Though the literature has grown regarding humility, in this present chapter the authors restrict their review to the association of religion and spirituality (R/S) and humility, a much smaller literature. One reason that may contribute to the lack of humility and R/S research is the often varying R/S constructs and measurement strategies found in the literature. We briefly define humility and R/S, then briefly offer examples of research from the literature, which is delineated into sections of health, forgiveness, and social and personality correlates. We identify gaps in the existing literature, including cultural correlates, and future areas of research in the intersection of humility, religion, and spirituality. Fundamental Concepts Definitions Defining humility has proven to be challenging, though it has been theorized to have both interpersonal and intrapersonal components reflecting at least three

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broad areas: accurate self-view, other orientation/low self-focus, and emotional self-regulation (Davis et al., 2011; Jankowski & Sandage, 2014). Tangney (2009) presented a broader multidimensional view of humility, including acknowledging one’s limitations, perspective taking, openness to the importance of considering contradictory ideas, and seeing worth in all things (see also Grubbs & Exline, 2014). As empirical work in humility continues to accumulate across a variety of subdomains (e.g., religious leadership, organizations), the continued consolidation of definitions of humility is necessary (Davis & Hook, 2014). Though different forms of humility will be mentioned in this as well as other chapters, readers can draw at least one common denominator across the definitions. They can think of strongly humble people as possessing less ego involvement than those with less humility. For the purpose of this chapter, the authors adopt a broad definition of R/S. We define religion as the adherence to a belief system and practices associated with an organized tradition, with agreement about what is believed and practiced (Hill et al., 2000). On the other hand, we define spirituality as a broader feeling of closeness and connectedness with the sacred (Davis, Hook, & Worthington, 2008). Many people likely experience spirituality in the context of their religious practices, but others may experience spirituality outside of any such structure. Spirituality can be experienced in the context of connections with humankind, nature, or the transcendent (Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007). Humility, Religion, and Spirituality Lundberg (2010) assembled the basic doctrines of every major world faith group, each considering humility an important character attribute. In addition, in the present volume, Porter and his colleagues have described five major religions’ approaches to humility, and all major religions value humility. Though humility is an important construct in many religions across the world, there may be fundamental differences in how it is understood and applied by each faith tradition. This may affect the influences and roles humility plays in daily life for members of different faiths. As pertinent as this topic may be, it is beyond the scope of this chapter, though discussion of humility across the major world religions can be found elsewhere in this handbook (for a review, see Porter et al., Chapter 3, this volume). Method of the Review The authors completed a literature search through November 1, 2015, using EBSCOhost and Medline with the search term “humility,” resulting in an initial search of over 1,300 articles. We then included the search terms “religion” and “spirituality.” Articles and chapters were chosen only if they included a religious or spiritual variable in conjunction with humility. References contained in article content but not found through the initial search were also examined.

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Both quantitative and qualitative empirical articles were included in the review, whereas theory-based articles were omitted. After screening, a total of 83 articles were included in the final review. Results of the Review Humility and Religion/Spirituality A number of studies have shown positive correlations between R/S and humility (e.g., Exline & Hill, 2012; Rowatt, Kang, Haggard, & LaBouff, 2014). In one such study, Exline and Geyer (2004) investigated humility word-meaning associations with 127 undergraduate students from a predominantly Christian institution and found that humility was generally viewed as a strength, and positive views of humility were associated with religiosity. These findings indicate that more religious participants viewed humility as a positive attribute and desirable in themselves and others. Researchers are now extending these relationships to assess types of faith relationships. For example, in a study of 120 undergraduate students Rowatt et al. (2014) found that Protestant and Catholic adults self-reported higher levels of humility than their nonreligious counterparts. Self-reported humility was associated with religious practices, meaning in life, R/S coping, and humility ratings from others. As suggested by the authors, perhaps the prominence of humility in religious teachings was meant to temper self-righteousness in the faithful. Indeed, there is some evidence that higher levels of humility are associated with a reduction of the intensity of reactions to others’ supportive and contrary opinions regarding one’s religious beliefs (Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014). In a follow-up correlational study using a small sample Rowatt et al. (2014) found that increases in both self-reported humility and self-reported R/S were positively correlated. Additionally, increases in self-­reported R/S were associated with positive increases in an individual’s humility as reported by others, meaning that R/S people are perceived by others as humble. Krause and colleagues have focused on humility and R/S primarily through cross-sectional data from national surveys of middle-aged and older adults. For example, Krause and Hayward (2014) determined that, in a sample of over 1,100 individuals, those attending church more frequently received more spiritual support, resulting in greater trust in God and a closer relationship with God, which is associated with feelings of awe toward God, resulting in greater humility. This study highlights different humility hypotheses that will require further examination in future research. The authors found that people who are more committed to their faith are more humble and there is a greater negative interaction in the church for people with lower humility scores. Contrary to expectations, individuals did not become more humble as they age, previously

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considered part of a normal developmental process. The continued interest in humility and R/S is exciting, and the field is ripe for more research, as will be highlighted in the discussion section. The following sections will highlight existing research delineated into sections on the relationships between R/S and humility as related to health, forgiveness, and social and personality variables, as these areas are most associated with R/S and humility in the literature. Humility, Health, and Religion/Spirituality The humility and R/S literature is lacking in a number of areas, and perhaps none more so than its relationship to mental and physical health. An increasing body of literature indicates that religious individuals tend to experience better mental and physical health than less religious individuals, though this relationship is complex (Koenig, 2013; Moore & Leach, 2015). There is some recent evidence that humility may also be related to better health, for two reasons (see Krause, 2010). First, using the stress literature as a foundation, Krause (2010) argued that successfully navigating through and eliminating a stressor requires both a realistic appraisal of the event and a successful coping plan, but these must be based on a truthful and realistic self-­ appraisal. Peterson and Seligman (2004) included in their conceptualization of humility accurate self-appraisals—as have most people who define and conceptualize humility. Thus, to the extent Krause’s conceptualization is accurate, humble people should be able to cope with stressors better than nonhumble people, resulting in better health. Second, humble individuals are more likely to have positive interactions with others, whereas prideful or arrogant individuals are more likely to feel a variety of negative feelings toward others when their egos are (inevitably) challenged. These interactions with others have been associated with poorer health outcomes (Krause, 2010; Newsom, Mahan, Rook, & Krause, 2008). Though a growing amount of research has been conducted examining the relationship of humility to health (see Toussaint and Webb, Chapter 12, this volume), much less has been considered when examined within a religious/ spiritual perspective. Krause and Hayward (2012, 2014, 2015) have offered a series of studies using model estimation, largely from a longitudinal, multiwave dataset conducted by Harris Interactive. As with many datasets of this type, it is limited by the use of self-reported health ratings, but it provides important data nonetheless. Using social survey data from approximately 1,000 older adults Krause (2010) sought to assess the link among church attendance with spiritual support, humility, and self-reported health and found evidence for each link. Though there were multiple results for this study the one most relevant to this chapter may be that older adults who participated in religious/spiritual

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communities were more likely to be humble and, in turn, were more likely to rate their health more positively than less humble adults. In addition to self-reported health, two studies have examined the relationship of humility with trauma and depression. Krause and Hayward (2012) found that higher levels of humility offset the negative effects of religious doubt resulting from lifetime trauma. Krause and Hayward (2014) uniquely assessed stress by examining humility within the context of difficult church member interactions. It was expected that humble people would be better able to cope with these interactions and report lower levels of depression than less humble people, and although found to be true, it was only for individuals who reported the highest humility scores. Though only very humble individuals are most likely to offset depression through negative interactions in a church setting, humility may be a critical virtue in decreasing the onset of depression. Humility, Forgiveness, and Religion/Spirituality The importance of humility to interpersonal relationships (e.g., Krause & Hayward, 2014) has been found in a number of studies, with humility associated with multiple positive outcomes. Humble individuals receive more support from others (Exline, 2012), are more generous (Exline & Hill, 2012), and have higher relationship quality (Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011). Much like humility, the process of forgiveness can be a means to increase interpersonal relationships. In fact, we might suggest that humble people, who are both other-oriented and have an accurate picture of their own contributions to offenses, might be more likely to forgive offenders than to seek revenge or hold on to grudges. Following Worthington’s (1998) suggestion that humility is a critical feature of forgiveness, there has been increased interest in investigating the two constructs. For example, using a student sample from a religiously affiliated university Jankowski, Sandage, and Hill (2013) found that dispositional forgiveness promoted lower depression levels through higher humility levels and that humility appeared to have a positive relationship to interpersonal forgiveness. Again, humility appears to be related to both lower depression levels and greater forgiveness. In an international study of Turkish Muslims, Ayten (2012) found a positive relationship between humility and forgiveness and a negative relationship between humility and pride. Other researchers are now investigating additional forgiveness-related constructs and their relationship with humility. For example, the forgiveness research includes what is known as the injustice gap, or the degree to which victims of an offense see the outcome as meeting expectations of ideal justice, and a recent article examined this gap and its relationship to humility (Davis et al., 2016).

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Some researchers have identified relational humility (see Davis et al., Chapter 7, this volume) as a means of quantifying others’ perceptions of an individual’s humility (Davis et al., 2011). Relational humility is considered important in the formation and maintenance of interpersonal relationships (Davis et al., 2013), and recent studies have begun assessing forgiveness within this lens (e.g., Davis, Hook et al., 2010). For example, Davis, Hook et al., (2010) found that after an interpersonal offense a victim’s spirituality scores were positively correlated with the extent of an offender’s spirituality and gratitude, and spiritual humility and unforgiveness were negatively correlated. Furthering relational humility, McElroy et al. (2014) found that appraisals of intellectual humility were positively related both to a parishioner’s forgiveness of religious leaders after an offense and positive attitudes toward the sacred. Finally, Powers, Nam, Rowatt, and Hill (2007) conducted a study on the intersection of forgiveness, humility, and spiritual transcendence, among other variables, and determined that more spiritual individuals may report more humility and valuing more forgiveness, though they pointed out that valuing and engaging in forgiveness are different issues. Overall, the literature is now seeing a surge of studies investigating the connections of humility and forgiveness, as these appear necessary for affirming continued relationships. Humility, Personality and Social Psychological Relationships, and Religion/Spirituality A growing number of studies have investigated humility within personality and social-psychological frameworks. For example, religiousness has been repeatedly associated with the high agreeableness [A] and high conscientiousness [C] factors of the Five-Factor Model of personality, but there have been concerns that nuances within personality and religiousness need to be assessed to get a more robust picture of these relationships (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2007). A newer, six-dimensional HEXACO model of personality has been gathering attention because of its honesty-humility [HH] factor (which includes fairness, morality, greed avoidance, and modesty; Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009). Using this framework, religiousness is associated more strongly with HH than A (e.g., 2014; Visser & Pozzebon, 2013), including a study with Iranian Muslims (Aghababaei, Wasserman, & Nannini, 2014), offering opportunities for more nuanced investigations of humility as a personality construct and R/S. For example, in a study comparing the dark triad (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, Machiavellianism) and the HH factor, Aghababaei, Mohammadtabar, and Saffarinia (2014) confirmed that narcissism was the strongest (negative) correlate with humility, consistent with previous empirical research (e.g., Jonason & McCain, 2012), as well as providing theoretical insights on intellectual arrogance (e.g., Gregg &

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Mahadevan, 2014). In a correlational study of 137 undergraduate students, Silvia, Nusbaum, and Beaty (2014) found that participants reporting higher humility scores were more likely to describe religion as important to their lives and report less negative attitudes toward and more literally adhere to religious institutions and doctrine. Humility may also have implications for the quality of one’s faith. In a recent study humility was negatively related to divine struggles and religious fear and guilt (Grubbs & Exline, 2014). Related, the security of one’s religious/spiritual beliefs can affect humility. For example, incorporating attachment theory and relational spirituality theories, Jankowski and Sandage (2014) found that it may be difficult to exhibit humility while experiencing insecurity in relationship to God and others. Instead of finding comfort and reassurance in relationship with God, some people experience fear and shame, resulting in self-regulation difficulties and eventually lower levels of humility. In a recent study of undergraduate students, Sandage, Paine, and Hill (2015) found that humility is related to several facets of spiritual maturity, including being negatively related to spiritual grandiosity and an insecure attachment to God and spiritual impression management. In an experimental study assessing meaning, Van Tongeren and colleagues (2014) developed a study in which 79 Christian undergraduate students were challenged by a supposed interaction partner on their views of a strongly felt topic and were placed into in-groups and out-groups. Humility was defined through a meaning-focused conceptualization, as reduced defensiveness to their partner’s negative comments, in part due to humble individuals being more open to alternative perspectives. Their results indicated that affirming relationships with others may decrease defensiveness toward out-group members not sharing similar attitudes. Thus, the authors concluded that bolstering meaning through affirming relationships with others may increase humility and positive interactions. It is clear that more investigations in this area are needed. A related study including nonvalidated, though theoretically sound, questions was conducted to determine how intellectually humble people react to messages from others that are consistent or inconsistent with their religious beliefs (Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014). The authors found intellectual humility characterized by an understanding that religious beliefs are fallible, realizing discretion in asserting those beliefs, being comfortable with keeping religious beliefs private, and being respectful of others’ beliefs. Overall, humility as a personality factor and religiousness seem to be significantly correlated, consistent with previous theoretical and empirical work. Though the body of empirical research investigating humility as a personality trait remains sparse, recent developments in measurement instruments provide opportunities for continued growth of research activity in this area.

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Discussion Humility has always been embedded within religious faith groups across the globe, and given this historical relationship, it would seem appropriate to assess the empirical relationships of humility and religion. The majority of studies including both religious and humility variables have occurred primarily in the past five years, and this chapter briefly summarized the literature in this area. Humility, within a context of faith either through instrument inclusion or study participant sample, shows relationships with facets of physical and mental health, forgiveness, and personality variables. Due to the paucity of existing literature on the outlook for future research of the intersection of R/S and humility is exceptionally bright. Next we offer three broad areas to be considered for future research on the intersection of humility and R/S. Future Research First, the broader research literature on R/S itself without the inclusion of humility has been hampered by a paucity of studies comparing R/S believers with nonbelievers (Moore & Leach, 2015). Much of the literature has compared individuals on a varied, though limited, range of R/S variables, with those scoring low often considered to exhibit low R/S. However, these individuals could represent a wide array of beliefs, from having a generalized higher power belief system to being agnostic, atheist, or any other nontheist belief system. Related, very little research has been conducted including spiritual, as opposed to religious, variables. One area to consider going forward is to measure the strength of the belief rather than solely the belief itself. For example, when assessing beliefs as well as the strength of the beliefs in a sample of over 4,600 participants, Moore and Leach (2015) found that secular and religious adherents reported similar mental health levels, contrary to previous empirical research. Given the strong historical, philosophical, and empirical link between R/S and humility and writings indicating that humility grows from faith, it seems that a fruitful area of research would be to incorporate nonbelievers to determine the relationships of humility to health and related constructs. Additionally, humility has been associated with the interpersonal and spiritual support derived from church attendance, though the inclusion of studies incorporating nonbelievers could lend some insight into the role of church relationships and spiritual support itself, particularly when compared with other nonchurch-related support systems. Perhaps strong believers are in awe of God, which is then related to humility (Krause, 2012) whereas nonbelievers develop and maintain humility through a different mechanism.

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Additionally, in a multiwave study Krause (2012) found that the stability estimate of humility over time is low, suggesting that it may be more situational than personality based. Following the research line to include nonbelievers, it would be interesting to determine whether they have similar stability estimates as believers and whether the development of humility differs over time in traditionally nonbelieving and believing households. In essence, are the developmental trajectories of humility different based on exposure to nonbelieving ideations? Second, with few exceptions, the R/S and humility literature has been dominated by the focus on Christian groups. Though the major faith groups worldwide emphasize humility, it is currently unknown whether the development, correlates, and manifestations of humility are consistent across these groups. Are R/S individuals reporting and exhibiting similar levels of humility across faith groups? Is humility perceived differently depending on faith group? Different religious traditions may understand humility differently, such that religion might lead individuals to judge other people’s humility based on conformance to tradition and authority structures. Or whether right-winged authoritarianism correlates as strongly with religious fundamentalism as it does with Christian groups in the United States? Are there differences in spiritual humility toward others depending on their perceived faith group? The research possibilities in this area alone are many. Third, there is theoretical evidence that race and ethnicity may influence the role that humility has on other variables. There is abundant evidence showing that Blacks are more likely than Whites to attend church and pray (Levin, Taylor, & Chatters, 1994) and are more likely to report stronger congregational support systems than White congregants (Krause, 2002). Given that humility includes a strong social component, it would seem that Black individuals involved in a faith community would be more likely to show humility than White individuals. There is some evidence to bolster that argument. Krause (2015) determined that older Blacks reported more humility than older Whites, though they were also more likely to have attended church services. Krause and Hayward (2014) also found that, among nine virtues assessed, Blacks were more likely than Whites to report higher virtue scores in general, including humility. Their conclusion was that Blacks’ relationship to their faith accounted for the differences between the two ethnic groups. No study to date has examined the development of humility across racial and ethnic groups or focused on other ethnic groups. What cultural variables contribute to additive effects when considering R/S and humility? How does humility and R/S interact with culture at both broad and specific group levels? The humility literature is almost devoid of studies examining broadly Asian-American, Hispanic-American, and American

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Indian cultures, as well as immigrant and refugee groups that have become part of the American social fabric, and research in this area is in need of considerable empirical attention. Lee, Leung, and Kim (2014) recently argued that psychologists could use face and dignity cultures as proxies for individualism-collectivism, and include humility as a means to explain these differences among East Asians and European Americans. Though their work focused on Asian cultures outside the United States, the same idea can be applied in the United States. Humility and East Asian religions are inextricably intertwined, and humility is considered a strong virtue in Asian and collective cultures. Other findings indicated that East Asians are likely to embrace a humility bias in order to maintain status within the group (see Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010). Although most faith groups embrace humility and deference to a higher power, within Buddhism, humility allows for self-­surrender and being present (Weber, 2006). On a broader level Eriksson and Funcke (2014) investigated the betterthan-average effect across countries, or the idea that most people describe themselves as above average on desirable characteristics (seemingly contrary to humility). The authors found that more religious people tended to refrain from judging themselves to be better than other people, particularly when comparing themselves to their religious in-group, with the latter phenomenon considered humble self-enhancement. International studies such as this hold great promise in this area. Practical Lessons All of the published research on humility has merit, but translating some of the research into therapeutic interventions with clients seems particularly important. Lavelock and colleagues (2014) developed a two-week intervention promoting humility based on the work of Worthington (2003) and the REACH model, an intervention to promote forgiveness. The efficacy of the workbook was evaluated by students being assigned to either the workbook intervention or a control condition, and the researchers found that trait humility increased over time within the humility condition, though religious commitment and spiritual transcendence contributed to this improvement. Thus, the humility intervention equally benefitted both R/S and less R/S individuals. It is the first study to evaluate the potential for an efficacious humility intervention, and future researchers can build on this study to more fully integrate it into treatments. Some possible lines of research include mindfulness and contemplative practices in both religious/spiritual and nonreligious/spiritual individuals (for reviews, see Griffin et al., Chapter 23, this volume; Lavelock et al., Chapter 19, this volume; Sandage et al., Chapter 21, this volume).

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In this chapter, the authors summarized relevant research in the area of humility and spirituality R/S. Though it remains a relatively small area of study, researchers are beginning to investigate the ways in which these constructs interact and affect different aspects of a person’s life. As the body of research continues to accumulate, there is exciting room for growth in understanding the role humility and R/S may play in several facets of the human experience. New research continues to shed light on the reaches of humility and R/S, from mental and physical health to interpersonal relationships and everywhere in between, and the authors encourage continued empirical investigation into this relevant and important work. References Aghababaei, N., Mohammadtabar, S., & Saffarinia, M. (2014). Dirty dozen vs. the H factor: Comparison of the dark triad and honesty–humility in prosociality, religiosity, and happiness. Personality and Individual Differences, 67, 676–710. Aghababaei, N., Wasserman, J. A., & Nannini, D. (2014). The religious person revisited: Cross-cultural evidence from the HEXACO model of personality structure. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 17, 24–29. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2005). A defense of the lexical approach to the study of personality structure. European Journal of Personality, 19, 5–24. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 150–166. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2009). The HEXACO-60: A short measure of the major dimensions of personality. Journal of Personality Assessment, 91, 340–345. Ayten, A. (2012). How religion promotes forgiveness: The case of Turkish Muslims. Archiv Für Religionspsychologie / Archive for the Psychology of Religions, 34, 411–425. Davis, D. E., & Hook, J. N. (2014). Humility, religion, and spirituality: An endpiece. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42(1), 111–117. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., & Worthington, E. J. (2008). Relational spirituality and forgiveness: The roles of attachment to God, religious coping, and viewing the transgression as a desecration. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 27(4), 293–301. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. J., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., & Jennings, D. I. (2010). Relational spirituality and forgiveness: Development of the Spiritual Humility Scale (SHS). Journal of Psychology and Theology, 38, 91–100. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. J., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J., . . . & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225–234. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. J., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 243–252. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. J., Hook, J. N., Emmons, R. A., Hill, P. C., Bollinger, R. A., . . . & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2013). Humility and the development and repair of social bonds: Two longitudinal studies. Self and Identity, 12, 58–77.

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Davis, D. E., Yang, X., DeBlaere, C., McElroy, S. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., Hook, J. N., . . . Worthington, E. J. (2016). The injustice gap. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 8(3), 175–184. Eriksson, K., & Funcke, A. (2014). Humble self-enhancement: Religiosity and the betterthan-average effect. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5, 76–83. Exline, J. J. (2012). Humility and the ability to receive from others. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 31, 40–50. Exline, J. J., & Geyer, A. L. (2004). Perceptions of humility: A preliminary study. Self and Identity, 3, 95–114. Exline, J. J., & Hill, P. C. (2012). Humility: A consistent and robust predictor of generosity. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7, 208–218. Gregg, A. P., & Mahadevan, N. (2014). Intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility: An evolutionary-epistemological account. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 7–18. Grubbs, J. B., & Exline, J. J. (2014). Humbling yourself before God: Humility as a reliable predictor of lower divine struggle. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 41–49. Hill, P. C., Pargament, K. I., Hood, R. J., McCullough, M. E., Swyers, J. P., Larson, D. B., & Zinnbauer, B. J. (2000). Conceptualizing religion and spirituality: Points of commonality, points of departure. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 30(1), 51–77. Hopkin, C. R., Hoyle, R. H., & Toner, K. (2014). Intellectual humility and reactions to opinions about religious beliefs. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 50–61. Jankowski, P. J., & Sandage, S. J. (2014). Attachment to God and humility: Indirect effect and conditional effects models. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 70–82. Jankowski, P. J., Sandage, S. J., & Hill, P. C. (2013). Differentiation based models of forgivingness, mental health and social justice commitment: Mediator effects for differentiation of self and humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 8, 412–424. Jonason, P. K., & McCain, J. (2012). Using the HEXACO model to test the validity of the Dirty Dozen measure of the Dark Triad. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 935–938. Kim, Y., Cohen, D., & Au, W. (2010). The jury and abjury of my peers: The self in face and dignity cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 904–916. Koenig, H. G. (2013). Religion and spirituality in coping with acute and chronic illness. In K. I. Pargament, A. Mahoney, E. P. Shafranske, K. I. Pargament, A. Mahoney & E. P. Shafranske (Eds.), APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol. 2) (pp. 275–295). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. Krause, N. (2002). Church-based social support and health in old age: Exploring variations by race. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences And Social Sciences, 57B(6), S332-S347. Krause, N. (2010). Religious involvement, humility, and self-rated health. Social Indicators Research, 98, 23–39. Krause, N. (2012). Religious involvement, humility, and change in self-rated health over time. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 40, 199–210. Krause, N. (2015). Race, religious involvement, and feelings of personal control in middle and late life. Archiv Für Religionspsychologie / Archive for the Psychology of Religions, 37, 14–36. Krause, N., & Hayward, R. D. (2012). Humility, lifetime trauma, and change in religious doubt among older adults. Journal of Religion and Health, 51, 1002–1016. Krause, N., & Hayward, R. D. (2014). Religious involvement and humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 9, 254–265. Krause, N., & Hayward, R. D. (2015). Humility, compassion, and gratitude to God: Assessing the relationships among key religious virtues. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 7, 192–204.

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Lavelock, C. R., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Davis, D. E., Griffin, B. J., Reid, C. A., Hook, J. N., . . . & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). The quiet virtue speaks: An intervention to promote humility. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 99–110. Lee, H. I., Leung, A. K., & Kim, Y. (2014). Unpacking East–West differences in the extent of self-enhancement from the perspective of face versus dignity culture. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8, 314–327. Levin, J. S., Taylor, R. J., & Chatters, L. M. (1994). Race and gender differences in religiosity among older adults: Findings from four national surveys. Journal of Gerontology, 49, S137-S145. Lundberg, C. D. (2010). Unifying truths of the world’s religions. New Fairfield, CT: Heavenlight Press. McElroy, S., Rice, K., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hiu, P. C, Worthington, E. L, Jr., . . . & Van Tongeren, D. R (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical elaborations in the context of religious Leadership. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 19–30. Moore, J. T., & Leach, M. M. (2015). Dogmatism and mental health: A comparison of the religious and secular. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, doi:10.1037/rel0000027 Newsom, J. T., Mahan, T. J., Rook, K. S., & Krause, N. (2008). Stable negative social exchanges and health. Health Psychology, 27, 78–86. Peters, A. S., Rowatt, W. C., & Johnson, M. K. (2011). Associations between dispositional humility and social relationship quality. Psychology, 2, 155–161. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association; New York: Oxford University Press. Powers, C., Nam, R. K., Rowatt, W. C., & Hill, P. C. (2007). Associations between humility, spiritual transcendence, and forgiveness. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 18, 75–94. Rowatt, W. C., Kang, L. L., Haggard, M. C., & LaBouff, J. P. (2014). A social-personality perspective on humility, religiousness, and spirituality. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 31–40. Sandage, S. J., Paine, D., & Hill, P. (2015). Spiritual barriers to humility: A multidimensional study. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 18(3), 207–217. Seligman, M. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55, 5–14. Silvia, P. J., Nusbaum, E. C., & Beaty, R. E. (2014). Blessed are the meek? Honesty–humility, agreeableness, and the HEXACO structure of religious beliefs, motives, and values. Personality and Individual Differences, 66, 6619–6623. Tangney, J. P. (2009). Humility. In S. J. Lopez, C. R. Snyder, S. J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of positive psychology (2nd ed.) (pp. 483–490). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Van Tongeren, D. R., Green, J. D., Hulsey, T. L., Legare, C. H., Bromley, D. G., & Houtman, A. M. (2014). A meaning-based approach to humility: Relationship affirmation reduces worldview defense. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 62–69. Visser, B. A., & Pozzebon, J. A. (2013). Who are you and what do you want? Life aspirations, personality, and well-being. Personality and Individual Differences, 54(2), 266–271. Weber, S. L. (2006). Doubt, arrogance, and humility. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 42, 213–223. Worthington, E. L., Jr. (1998). An empathy-humility commitment model of forgiveness applied within family dyads. Journal of Family Therapy, 20, 59–76. Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2003). Forgiveness and reconciling: Bridges to wholeness and hope. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Part III A P P L I C AT I O N S O F H U M I L I T Y T O R E L AT I O N S H I P S A N D T R E AT M E N T

14 HUMILITY IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT Bryan J. Dik, Jessica Morse, Micah White, and Adelyn B. Shimizu

The fundamental goal in studying career development is to understand how people select, create, interact with, adjust to, and transition into and out of their educational and work experiences within the broader context of life as a whole (e.g., Brown & Lent, 2013). The study of virtues as factors that influence the career development process would seem a fruitful path for scholars to pursue, yet efforts to address these linkages empirically are conspicuously absent from the literature. One virtue in particular—humility, the focus of this edited volume—seems an especially likely candidate that may serve as an asset, or under some circumstances perhaps a detriment, to a person’s ability to successfully navigate the career choice and development process. Ask people to name public figures, past or present, who exhibited high levels of humility in their work, and you are likely to hear names like Martin Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa, or Mahatma Gandhi. Then ask for a list of people driven by a sense of calling, and the names may be the same. Based on such observations, intuition points to humility as a facilitative factor that promotes positive career development. Yet within many career paths, a certain amount of self-promotion may be required to advance or to sell ideas or products effectively. Similarly, in some highly competitive careers, a collaborative approach may undermine someone’s progress. To what extent is humility a barrier rather than a help in such circumstances? To date, the role of humility within career choice and development per se remains largely uninvestigated. In fact, despite numerous studies of humility in organizational and leadership contexts, our PsychINFO search of the keywords “humility” and “career” failed to identify a single study investigating humility as a factor in career choice or work adjustment. This chapter explores possible linkages of humility within career development. We begin by defining humility, then offer a brief primer on career development theory, before outlining intersections between humility and career development. We close by proposing future directions for research and practice.

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A consensus definition of humility has proven elusive in philosophical, religious, and social science scholarship (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010), and diverse definitions invariably create challenges in measuring a construct. Despite this challenge, investigators have made substantial progress in examining humility empirically. Some strands of this research continue to use self-report methods, most notably the Honesty-Humility facet of the HEXACO-PI model of personality structure (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Developed as an alternative to the Big Five trait model, the HEXACO-PI representation adds Honesty-Humility as a sixth distinct dimension defined by genuineness in relationships; modesty; and avoidance of fraud, opportunism, and greed (Ashton & Lee, 2005). Individuals high in Honesty-Humility demonstrate sincerity, a low sense of entitlement or status seeking, and intrinsic cooperativeness, even when there is potential to exploit others for profit without consequence (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Yet the Honesty-Humility scale has been criticized for containing items that lack face validity and appear to primarily assess modesty, a construct distinct from humility, while failing to represent other key aspects of how humility is typically conceptualized (Davis et al., 2010). Furthermore, humility is almost by definition difficult to measure through self-report (Tangney, 2005), given the inherent paradox in inviting individuals to claim humility. Partly in response to such complexities in measurement, Davis et al. (2010) introduced relational humility, a personality judgment best measured by informant ratings that draw from cumulative experiences of a target person. Relational humility is marked by “other-orientedness” in relationships (i.e., others’ welfare is considered at least as much as one’s own welfare), socially acceptable regulation of “self-oriented” impulses (especially when one’s ego is strained), and an accurate self-perception (i.e., not thinking too much or too little of oneself). Although not yet directly examined in the context of career choice and work adjustment, we believe Davis et al.’s (2010) conceptualization shows substantial promise for better understanding humility’s role in career development, given work’s inherently relational nature (e.g., Blustein, 2006). It is worth noting before we continue that diverse types of relational humility have been proposed (e.g., Worthington, 2014). Intellectual humility is relevant in the context of arguments about ideas with people with whom we may disagree. Leadership humility is expressed when leaders adopt a listening and learning orientation and maintain a mind open to feedback and ideas from others. Political humility is a (perhaps rare) form that is activated when candidates, lawmakers, or voters express a genuine interest in considering opposing points of view. Is there a “career development humility”? Perhaps within the

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career development process generally, there are elements of humility that are particularly relevant when competing with others for a job, or when learning from others about how best to advance within an organization, or when revising a resume or preparing for an interview. Yet different types of humility are relevant within different fields of work (e.g., leadership humility, medical humility, scientific humility, theological humility), and more than one type may be helpful to forge an objectively and subjectively successful path within a particular career field. In this chapter, our default conceptualization of humility conforms to that of Davis et al. (2010). Career Development and Humility For context, we provide a very brief overview of career development theory before exploring conceptual and empirical connections, both positive and negative, between humility and successful career development. Career Development Theory Career development is an umbrella term that covers the factors that influence the trajectory of one’s work throughout the lifespan. Diverse theoretical perspectives have driven career development research and practice during the course of its history. An early, yet still prominent, approach is the person–environment fit perspective. Person–environment fit theories assume that positive work outcomes occur when there is a good “fit” between an individual and a work environment (Larson, 2012). For example, John L. Holland’s (1997) theory of vocational types builds on the “birds of a feather, flock together” axiom by articulating how people gravitate toward environments occupied by others with similar interests and personalities. Holland introduced the RIASEC types (i.e., realistic, investigative, artistic, social, enterprising, conventional) and the hexagonal structure that are ubiquitous in career counseling practice and in vocational interest research (Dik & Rottinghaus, 2013). Similarly, Dawis and Lofquist’s (1984) Theory of work adjustment demonstrated that people’s satisfaction and productivity (and, in turn, the length of time in a job) flow from the relative correspondence of a person’s abilities with the job’s requirements and of a person’s needs with the job’s reinforcers, respectively. The theory of work adjustment also proposes that person–environment fit is dynamic and that individuals engage in various strategies or “adjustment styles” to improve a poor fit or ensure that a strong fit remains strong. Developmental theories take a longitudinal approach, examining changes in how people interact with their work in the context of other life roles throughout the lifespan. The most established of these is Donald Super’s life-span, lifespace theory (e.g., Hartung & Taber, 2013), which postulates that people strive

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to actualize a vocational self-concept. In this theory, work is one of several life roles that vary in relative importance across five primary career development stages: growth, exploration, establishment, maintenance or management, and disengagement/retirement. These stages are sequential, but are typically cycled through multiple times as a result of various life transitions. As Super’s theory evolved, its stage model and the construct of career adaptability (i.e., readiness and resources for coping with career development challenges) became increasingly flexible in application, ultimately intersecting with constructivist approaches such as career construction theory (Savickas, 2013). Career construction theory articulates how people simultaneously play the roles of actor, agent, and author of their career stories: a person may be an actor when developing a self-concept by interpreting interests, skills, and abilities; an agent when navigating life’s developmental tasks and adapting to environmental influences; and an author when interpreting past experiences, identifying themes, and making meaning. Social cognitive career theory (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) has risen to prominence within the last two decades. This theory applies Bandura’s (2001) general social cognitive theory to the career domain by explaining how factors related to the person, overt behavior, and environments interact to influence career choice and development. More specifically, social cognitive career theory proposes that when people develop a requisite degree of self-efficacy for particular tasks paired with relevant outcome expectations, they develop personal goals that then drive behavior related to the development of vocational interests, educational and career choices, and job performance. A feedback loop stemming from these outcomes ultimately results in revising or reinforcing subsequent self-efficacy and outcome expectations, and so on (Lent et al., 1994). Research attention focused on these theoretical approaches has been uneven, with more investigative effort devoted to Holland’s theory and social cognitive career theory than other theories. Each has found enough support to attract adherents (for reviews, see e.g., Brown & Lent, 2013; Larson, 2012), and although calls for integrated theory or meta-theory occasionally surface (e.g., Osipow, 1990), most scholars and career counselors seem comfortable drawing from multiple theories, based on their particular set of research questions or the particular career-related concerns with which clients present. Finally, a recent review of career development research published from 2007 to 2014 identified three overarching themes: promotion of personal agency, equity at work, and well-being in occupational and educational contexts— with a particular emphasis on eudaimonic well-being (Brown & Lent, 2016). This work on eudaimonic well-being moves beyond the historically favored

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outcomes of job satisfaction and performance to investigate meaning, purpose, and a sense of calling among individuals in the career development process. In particular, theory and research on a sense of calling—a transcendent summons to purposeful work that serves other-oriented goals (Dik & Duffy, 2009)—has rapidly accumulated of late, with the number of published studies on this construct increasing approximately tenfold within the last decade (Dik & Domene, 2015). A sense of calling may be especially relevant for individuals high in humility, given the conceptual overlap of the constructs, a point we review in greater detail later. Humility as a Likely Career Development Asset In general, research on humility suggests that it is likely an asset within career development in many respects because qualities associated with being humble typically (theoretically and/or empirically) contribute to positive career development outcomes. Most research related to this question has investigated employee and leadership outcomes relevant to organizational success, typically from a management perspective. For example, humble employees receive higher supervisor ratings and perform better in caregiving positions ( Johnson, Rowatt, & Petrini, 2011). Humility is also negatively correlated with workplace delinquency and with counterproductive behaviors at work (Marcus, Lee, & Ashton, 2007) and appears to buffer against the negative consequences of organizational politics (Wiltshire, Bourdage, & Lee, 2014). Humility is frequently examined within research on leadership (Morris, Brotheridge, & Urbanski, 2005; Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013). It is especially relevant to servant leadership (Greenleaf, 1997), which is defined in much the same way as relational humility but with an added dimension focused on motivating others. Evidence suggests that the humility component of servant leadership positively predicts the work engagement of followers, especially for high-level leaders (Sousa & van Dierendonck, 2015). Collins (2001), in his empirical but highly selective review, reported that organizations led by humble CEOs are consistently among the highest performing, for long periods of time and through challenging transitions. Other outcomes of leader humility include enhanced organizational efficiency and collaboration (Frostenson, 2015); higher sense of empowerment and gratitude among employees (Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014); greater interpersonal closeness and supportive relationships in the workplace (Morris et al., 2005); and socialized power that encourages worker autonomy, self-sufficiency, and participation in the organization (Morris et al., 2005). Humility nurtures an other-focus among leaders (Owens et al., 2013) that fosters delegation of tasks by matching employees to current demands on the basis of their strengths—an effective and

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endearing practice (e.g., Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005; Exline & Geyer, 2004; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Humility also tempers the negative impact of leader narcissism (Owens, Walker, & Waldman, 2015) and contributes to an atmosphere of stability and trust. Although the research summarized earlier sheds important light on employee outcomes and the impact of humility on performance within some types of work—leadership in particular—the lack of humility research undertaken specifically within a career choice and development frame requires appealing to theoretical linkages. Such points of connection are easy to identify. First, the accurate self-perception that is characteristic of relational humility, particularly in terms of one’s skills, knowledge, strengths, and weaknesses, has many benefits in the career choice and work adjustment process. For example, the person–environment fit theories described earlier postulate that accurate self-assessment is a key prerequisite to informed career decision making. Similarly, developmental theories focus on the importance of actualizing an occupational self-concept, a process that unfolds much more smoothly for people who have an accurate picture of their self-concept. Indeed, career counseling interventions stemming from these paradigms typically incorporate individual assessment, a strategy designed expressly to foster an increased understanding of one’s unique personal attributes. Second, individuals high in relational humility also strive to maintain and enhance the accuracy of their self-perception through interactions with and feedback from others. They are typically transparent about their strengths and weaknesses, seek to learn from others, and take steps to modify actions based on feedback (Owens et al., 2013). These qualities are characteristic of self-awareness, a key career development meta-competency (Hall & Chandler, 2005) that is linked to the highly adaptive “protean career” orientation. Protean careers are marked by values-driven decision making that links people to work that expresses their gifts and facilitates personal growth (Hall, 2004). This self-awareness that accompanies relational humility improves interpersonal work relationships, job-related decision making, and job performance; increases trust and relational satisfaction among coworkers; and decreases the likelihood of complacency, arrogance, and other counterproductive workplace behaviors (Owens et al., 2013). Third, along with openness to feedback, those high in humility are typically open minded and eager to learn and use what they learn to cope effectively with challenges. Such behavior reflects adaptability, the other key meta-competency that fosters a protean career orientation. Also a key construct within Super’s life-span, life-space theory (Savickas, 1997) and career construction theory (Savickas, 2013), adaptability has been shown to positively predict

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problem-solving confidence, career exploration behavior, proactivity, and occupational self-­efficacy and to negatively predict negative affect and career decision-making difficulties (e.g., Hirschi & Valero, 2015; Rottinghaus, Day, & Borgen, 2005), among other beneficial career development criteria. Adaptability fosters a desire and willingness to learn new skills, a highly valued asset in a rapidly changing economy with increasingly specialized job demands. Fourth, striving for achievement without ego, as is the case with those high in humility, may promote superior academic outcomes and enhanced internalization of learned material (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). The stress and fear of failure that typically interfere with intrinsic approaches to learning are less evident among humble people. In this way, humility may offer an educational advantage, one that may manifest earlier in life. Evidence suggests that those high in humility approach learning with a mastery rather than a performance orientation, better understanding the material they encounter, achieving greater academic success, and ultimately entering the workforce with a deeper knowledge base and greater openness to on-the-job learning (Dinger et al., 2015). A mastery orientation also helps foster some of the factors that inform self-efficacy and outcome expectations within social cognitive career theory, most notably performance accomplishments, vicarious learning, and attention to self-generated outcomes (Lent, 2005). Finally, the other-oriented focus within humility is shared by the construct of calling. People who experience a calling typically feel drawn to pursue work that aligns with a broader sense of purpose in life and that is driven by other-oriented motives and goals (Dik & Duffy, 2009). The accumulating research on calling has largely focused on the construct’s correlates and consequences, revealing that workers with a calling experience greater job satisfaction (e.g., Bunderson & Thompson, 2009; Duffy et al., 2012), are more committed to their careers and organizations (Duffy, Dik, & Steger, 2011), and miss significantly fewer days of work (Wrzesniewski, Mccauley, Rozin, & Schwartz, 1997) than those who view their work in other ways. Those with a calling may also exhibit the aforementioned meta-competencies (e.g., self-awareness and adaptability; Hall & Chandler, 2005). College students with a sense of calling are more firmly decided and comfortable in their career choices, view their careers as carrying more importance, have stronger vocational self-clarity, improved work outcome expectations, and increased career decision self-efficacy (Duffy & Sedlacek, 2007; Dik, Sargent, & Steger, 2008). Yet evidence also suggests that career development and well-being benefits are most pronounced for those who do not only perceive a calling, but also feel that they are currently living it out (e.g., Duffy et al., 2012). Research on calling has been slower to identify antecedents (Duffy & Dik, 2013). Humility may function as one, to the extent that those high in

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humility may be inclined to pursue career paths that align with their self-­ perceptions and other-focus. Of course, it also is plausible that living a calling promotes or reinforces humility. Perhaps most likely of all, genetic and/ or early environment factors may predispose some people toward prosocial attitudes that influence both humility and a sense of calling. (The genetic basis is not yet well understood for either construct, e.g., Dik & Duffy, 2012; Zettler & Hilbig, 2015.) Living out a calling may also be, for some, a spiritual expression of surrender and obedience to God or the transcendent, which is included in some definitions of humility (Emmons & Kneezel, 2005; Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007). Furthermore, humble people demonstrate a greater willingness to cooperate and contribute to the public good (Zettler, Hilbig, & Heydasch, 2013), characteristics typical of people living a calling. Humble people may also stay in careers to which they are called longer because of increased job performance levels ( Johnson, Rowatt, & Petrini, 2011; Owens et al., 2013) and fewer counterproductive work behaviors, even under the stress of job insecurity (Chirumbolo, 2015). The conceptual linkages between humility and calling are clear; research is needed to substantiate and extend them. To summarize, an accumulating body of research indirectly supports the very clear conceptual connections between humility and career development theory. Most of this points to humility as a construct highly facilitative of positive career development outcomes, although research clearly is needed that investigates these conceptual linkages more directly. Furthermore, there may be boundary conditions in which humility may actually serve as a detriment rather than an asset to one’s career development. Humility as a Possible Career Development Liability Despite the positive ways humility may influence career development, in some circumstances humility may be introducing problems as well. For example, Wiltshire et al. (2014) found that job candidates with high humility scores are less likely to engage in impression management behavior during an interview, which may negatively affect their likeability and potential for getting hired. Also, Western cultures, perhaps especially in the United States, are often understood to value, reward, and promote those who engage in self-promotion and who demonstrate bravado (Worthington, 2008), characteristics that seem to run counter to humility. In fact, Exline and Geyer (2004) found that humility was rated unfavorably as a quality of leaders, albeit by a small undergraduate sample. If people view humility as a weakness, perhaps linking it with low self-­esteem or submissiveness, then being viewed as humble could potentially detract from advancement opportunities and career growth.

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Finally, some may argue that humility could stall career growth if it precludes one from taking credit for accomplishments or self-promoting sufficiently. However, relational humility calls for accurate self-assessment and promotion of others’ needs without denying one’s own needs and values. Thus, although high levels of relational humility may seem to run counter to such traits as narcissism and arrogance, relational humility does not contradict self-esteem, ambition, or leadership. In summary, the relative length of this section compared to the prior section testifies that humility appears more likely to serve as a help than a hindrance within most career development contexts. Directions for Future Research Relational humility is likely to play a meaningful role in the career choice and development process, but research has not yet investigated proposed conceptual linkages directly. Our most important and obvious suggestion for researchers is to begin testing some of the possible connections described earlier. For example, researchers investigating person–environment fit theory have long noted the possibility that personality factors may moderate the relation between fit and criterion variables such as well-being (Dik & Hansen, 2011). Its accurate self-perception component suggests that humility may function as a moderator in this relationship, such that the relationship between fit and positive career development outcomes (e.g., career commitment, job satisfaction) is stronger for people high in humility than low. This possibility warrants an empirical test, as does the possibility that humility fosters self-awareness and adaptability, the two key career development meta-competencies (Hall & Chandler, 2005). If such relationships are established, examining potential mechanisms that explain them may follow. Moreover, self-awareness and adaptability may serve as mediators between humility and positive career development outcomes. These relationships and others, if supported by evidence, could be combined into a theoretical model useful for driving additional hypotheses. Research also is warranted to test proposed links between humility and educational achievement (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013), a key predictor of eventual career success. Social cognitive career theory could be used as a framework for bringing these constructs together, with humility serving as a “person variable” that informs self-efficacy and outcome expectations (perhaps via a mastery orientation), which in turn inform personal goals. It is noteworthy that of the studies examining humility in an organizational or leadership context, most used Ashton and Lee’s (2005) self-report Honesty-Humility scale. A benefit of the prospective line of research proposed here is its use of informant judgments to measure relational humility.

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Future research might also examine the relationships between humility and having and living a calling. Does one precede the other, is there a third variable (e.g., prosocial values, intrinsic religiousness) that cultivates the development of both, and are humility and calling mutually reinforcing? Does humility account for incremental variance beyond a sense of calling in predicting key career development and general well-being criterion variables? Duffy and Dik’s (2013) review of calling research identified several future directions that could serve as frames for examining the role and function of humility, such as examining behavioral (rather than self-report) antecedents, correlates and outcomes; using longitudinal designs; advancing theory; and testing interventions. Other ideas for future research include investigating the role that humility may play in how career choices are implemented. Do humble people market themselves to employers differently than less humble people? Extending Wiltshire et al.’s (2014) work, do humble people approach employment interviews with different strategies than less humble people? Analog studies gathering ratings from hiring managers of applicant humility and likely hiring success would offer a fascinating starting point for this line of research. Similarly, research might examine promotion and raise patterns for individuals high or low in humility. Do humble employees pursue promotions or ask for raises with a different frequency than employees low in humility? Are there differences in the motivation or rationale underlying these behaviors for individuals at various levels of humility? Such research may also identify compensation gaps between similarly qualified high- and low-humility employees, similar to how workers with callings may receive lower extrinsic rewards compared to other employees (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009). Finally, it is interesting to consider the methodological challenges that may emerge when investigating various workplace contexts. For example, self-­report measures of humility, although perhaps a reasonable strategy for investing humility in many contexts, seem unlikely to yield valid results in situations when one’s ego is challenged. This may be the case when interviewing for a position that involves working closely and self-sacrificially with a team, a scenario that induces a respondent to report a higher-than-actual level of humility. Or, if leaders are being hired in an organization with a cutthroat culture for which tough, headstrong leadership is desired, these leaders may rate themselves as lower on humility than they actually are. Understanding and predicting potentially systematic patterns of such response biases may prove extremely helpful in considering appropriate measurement strategies given particular characteristics of a situation.

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Practice Implications Numerous potential applications to career counseling and management interventions would be informed by the research proposed earlier. Much of the discussion in this chapter has focused on how humility may intersect with established career development theory. Counselors or human resource professionals working with clients or employees who consistently exhibit relational humility may assume high levels of self-awareness and accurate self-perception, strengths that can be leveraged to help people identify opportunities that fit them well. From a person–environment fit perspective, if self-knowledge is strong, attention may be directed toward gathering information about career paths or opportunities within the organization and evaluate their relative fit, keeping in mind the unique developmental contexts in which this process unfolds for people. The prosocial orientation exhibited by humble people may also make relevant strategies to connect people more directly, at least cognitively, to the beneficiaries of their work, an approach that increases the sense that one’s work is meaningful (Dik & Duffy, 2009). Finally, if some aspects of humility negatively affect career development, raising awareness of this for clients and offering compensatory strategies would be helpful. To the extent that humility is helpful in the ways described in this chapter, efforts to optimize its potential benefits are indicated, as are efforts to increase or cultivate a sense of humility in clients for whom improving humility is a growth edge. References Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2005). Honesty-humility, the big five, and the five-factor model. Journal of Personality, 73, 1321–1354. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 150–166. Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 1–26. Brown, S. D., & Lent, R. W. (Eds.). (2013). Career development and counseling: Putting theory and research to work (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley. Brown, S. D., & Lent, R. W. (2016). Vocational psychology: Agency, equity, and well-being. Annual Review of Psychology, 67, 27.1–27.25. Blustein, D. L. (2006). The psychology of working: A new perspective for counseling, career development, and public policy. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Bunderson, J. S., & Thompson, J. A. (2009). The call of the wild: Zookeepers, callings, and the double-edged sword of deeply meaningful work. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54, 32–57. Chancellor, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). Humble beginnings: Current trends, state perspectives, and hallmarks of humility. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 819–833. Chirumbolo, A. (2015). The impact of job insecurity on counterproductive work behaviors: The moderating role of Honesty-Humility personality trait. Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 149, 554–569.

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15 HUMILITY IN ROMANTIC R E L AT I O N S H I P S Rachel C. Garthe, Chelsea A. Reid, Terri N. Sullivan, and Brianne Cork

Humility contributes to the quality of relationships, as humble individuals demonstrate interpersonal virtues such as patience, gentleness, respect, and empathy (Means, Wilson, Sturm, Biron, & Bach, 1990). Humble individuals are able to view themselves accurately, are other-oriented, and are able to recognize their own limitations (Davis et al., 2011). This chapter illustrates how humility functions within romantic relationships and proposes that humility contributes to the VulnerabilityStress-Adaptation (VSA) model (Karney & Bradbury, 1995). The VSA framework is a commonly used model to explain adjustments and the maintenance processes of romantic and committed relationships; partners’ enduring traits and vulnerabilities, couples’ adaptive processes, and stressors ultimately affect relationship quality and satisfaction. We theorize that humility is an enduring trait that should be considered in the VSA framework, because scholarship demonstrates that humility is associated with both adaptive processes and stressors and relationship quality. Finally, although Karney and Bradbury (1995) hypothesized that enduring traits and vulnerabilities within the VSA model are relatively stable, it also is important to examine how enduring traits, such as humility, may change during the course of romantic relationships. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research and clinical applications of humility in romantic relationships. A Vulnerability-Stress-Adaptation Model A variety of theories have been used to examine the development and changes within romantic relationships, including attachment theory (Ainsworth, 1989; Bowlby, 1979), behavioral systems theory (Furman & Wehner, 1994; 1997), interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), and crisis theory (Hill, 1949). All of these theories demonstrate ways in which relationships change, how partners react to stressors and transitions, and how partners may bring vulnerabilities to a relationship (e.g., via insecure attachments). Although these theories are commonly used to explain and describe functioning in romantic relationships,

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a more comprehensive model that combines aspects of all of these theories may be more useful in understanding functioning within romantic relationships during challenging times. The Vulnerability-Stress-Adaptation model (VSA; Karney & Bradbury, 1995) is a comprehensive model that examines specific factors and mechanisms that may influence how relationships change over time. The VSA model highlights that the stability and quality of committed romantic relationships are influenced by a system of three mechanisms: adaptive processes, stressors, and enduring traits and vulnerabilities. First, adaptive processes include the ways in which romantic partners interact and engage with one another (e.g., provide support, problem solve, engage in effective communication processes, and forgive). Stressful events arise at varying points of committed romantic relationships and may create challenges and strains on the relationship (e.g., moving to a new city, getting a new job, having a child, losing a job). Finally, enduring traits and vulnerabilities are the relatively stable personality and individual characteristics that each partner brings to the relationship (e.g., attachment styles, personality traits, family of origin, and mental health). Together these three mechanisms reciprocally influence the stability and quality of relationships. Within a VSA model framework, we propose that humility (an enduring trait) may be a key contributor to stress management (i.e., stressors), relationship maintenance and relationship processes (i.e., adaptive processes), and relationship quality in romantic relationships. First, we define humility, and then we examine the literature linking humility and aspects of the VSA model. Humility Humility is composed of several dimensions; a humble individual has the ability to (a) admit his or her own limitations, (b) acknowledge his or her strengths without arrogance, (c) be genuinely other-oriented, displaying modesty and self-effacement, and (d) be open to ideas and advice (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010; Tangney, 2000). Humility is linked with numerous positive interpersonal qualities, including empathy, altruism, gratitude, and self-esteem (Exline & Geyer, 2004; Means et al., 1990). A humble partner acknowledges that he or she cannot control everything, displays patience and gentleness, and expresses empathy and love (Davis et al., 2011; Means et al., 1990). Greater humility is linked to greater social relationship quality (Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011) and greater marital satisfaction (Estephan, 2007). Additionally, a wealth of scholarship correlates humility with virtues necessary for high-­quality relationships: patience and gentleness (Worthington, 1998), kindness, caring, generosity (Exline & Geyer, 2004), forgiveness (Davis et al., 2013; Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007; Sheppard & Boon, 2012; Worthington, 1998),

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gratitude (Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014), and helpfulness (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 2012). Furthermore, high levels of humility were associated with less manipulation, deception, and exploitation in romantic relationships (Holden, Zeigler-Hill, Pham, & Shackelford, 2014), and humility promoted sacrifice for others (Zettler, Hilbig, & Heydasch, 2013). When examining humility, researchers need to consider how to measure humility. Humility can be difficult to measure; humble individuals may underreport characteristics of humility due to modesty, but individuals who are more arrogant and egocentric may over-report their own levels of humility (Davis et al., 2010). Thus, relational humility, a subjective measure of an individual’s perception of their partner’s levels of humility within a particular relationship, may provide a more accurate assessment of humility. Relational humility is defined as perceiving a romantic partner as other-oriented (e.g., showing empathy, gratitude, sympathy, love), regulating self-oriented emotions (e.g., pride and superiority), and being able to objectively perceive themselves (Davis et al., 2010). Seeing one’s partner as humble may increase an individual’s level of trust and intimacy, deepening the social bonds of that romantic relationship (Davis et al., 2010). Furthermore, in conflictual, stressful, or transitory times, relational humility “counteracts the natural tendency of these situations to cause instability in relationships” (Davis et al., 2011, p. 227). Thus, to truly understand how humility functions within a romantic relationship, it is important for researchers to consider using both self-reports and other-reports of humility (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). Humility as an Enduring Trait Enduring traits and vulnerabilities are the backgrounds that individuals bring to their romantic relationships. These traits can include attachment orientation, mental health symptoms, and temperament and personality traits. Humility is defined and demonstrated in the literature as a personality disposition (Davis et al., 2013), a personality dimension (Lee & Ashton, 2004), and a character virtue (Tangney, 2000). For example, Ashton and Lee (2007) included Honesty-Humility as a core personality dimension of their HEXACO personality theory (comprising the traits Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience). The Honesty-Humility dimension comprises the traits of sincerity, fairness, greed avoidance, and modesty. This personality dimension is associated with prosocial behaviors, including cooperativeness, benevolence, and fairness (Hilbig, Thielmann, Wuhrl, & Zettler, 2015). Although humility has not been included in the VSA model as an enduring trait in previous literature, humility is associated with a variety of other enduring traits and vulnerabilities within the VSA literature. For example, greater

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humility is associated with more secure attachment styles in adults (Dwiwardani et al., 2014), fewer symptoms of depression ( Jankowski, Sandage, & Hill, 2013), and less negative affect (Chow, Berenbaum, & Flores, 2013). Furthermore, throughout the literature, humility has been linked to other components of the VSA model, including adaptive processes, stressors, and relationship outcomes. Humility allows individuals to regulate responses to stress (e.g., Krause, Pargament, Hill, & Ironson, 2016), as well as maintain aspects of one’s relationship through forgiveness and commitment (e.g., Farrell et al., 2015). Ultimately, when couples are inevitably faced with difficulties and stressors, adaptive relationship processes need to be implemented to maintain relationship quality. Individuals with a humble disposition may be in a better position to positively cope with stressors and use adaptive processes within their relationships, compared to those with low levels of humility. Humility and Adaptive Processes Adaptive processes are practices that couples engage in to handle stressors, including communication, problem solving, commitment, support (Doss et al., 2009), and forgiveness (Sheldon, Gilchrist-Petty, & Lessley, 2014). A budding area of literature demonstrates that humility is positively associated with a few of these adaptive processes. Davis et al. (2013) proposed the social bond hypothesis, which suggests that humility allows for positive relationship processes through the regulation and maintenance of social bonds. In other words, humility allows couples to repair and strengthen social bonds through forgiveness and enhanced levels of commitment. The social bond hypothesis is derived from social investment theory (Brown & Brown, 2006), which postulates that individuals are motivated to have affinities for others with whom they share social bonds. These affinities for strong social bonds typically manifest themselves in the form of other-oriented emotions, including empathy and sympathy. Self-focused emotions, including shame and contempt, may depreciate the relationship bonds. Thus, the social bond hypothesis suggests that humility may enhance social bonds, due in part to the other-oriented emotions that are integral to a humble disposition. The social bond hypothesis also suggests that humility repairs and maintains aspects of romantic relationships. For example, individuals with higher levels of humility may demonstrate higher levels of forgiveness for relationship offenses, ultimately repairing the romantic relationship and social bonds that are damaged by difficulties and transgressions. Thus, the social bond hypothesis illustrates how humility can affect adaptive processes within romantic relationships. Worthington (1998) suggested that many couples in romantic relationships inevitably face wounds or encounters that threaten the trust and intimacy

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within a relationship. These wounds are detrimental to romantic couples; negative communication, loss of intimacy and trust, withdrawal, and nonadaptive relationship processes may result. However, forgiveness (i.e., a reduction in vindictive and heated thoughts, feelings, and emotions, often accompanied by an increase in positive thoughts or feelings) of these wounds allows couples to repair the damage sustained by their relationship and move forward in a positive direction within their relationship (Wade & Worthington, 2003). In order for forgiveness to occur, Worthington (1998) proposed that individuals in relationships need to feel a sense of empathy for the offender, humility in order to see his or her partner as fallible, and the commitment to actually forgive his or her partner. Worthington (1998) and Worthington and Sandage (2016) proposed that humility, in conjunction with empathy and commitment, is essential for both forgiveness and marital therapy. Thus, humility is thought to be integral to the process of maintaining social bonds via adaptive processes such as forgiveness and commitment. Humility and Stressors Stressors comprise contextual strains, including situational demands and circumstantial events, including the transition to parenthood, moving, separation, or changing jobs. In the face of stressors, romantic partners may respond by providing support and guidance to their partners. When couples provided support and assistance to their partners in the face of stress, ratings of relationships became more positive (Bodenmann, Pihet, Shantinath, Cina, & Widmer, 2006). Humility is a virtue and a trait that may allow individuals to cope more effectively with stress. For example, Krause et al. (2016) suggested that humility allows individuals to recognize their own limitations, making humble individuals more likely to accept support than individuals who are not as humble. Humble individuals may also be more willing to admit wrongdoings, and they are more likely to forgive themselves (Krause et al., 2016). Thus, humility has a strong potential to affect how couples react to and manage stressful situations. By allowing self-forgiveness, accepting support, and admitting wrongdoings and fault, humble individuals are more apt to effectively cope with stressors. Humility is also linked to more positive outcomes when directly enduring stressors. For example, the effects of stress became weaker at higher levels of humility; individuals who experienced stressors but had high levels of humility showed lower levels of depressed affect, generalized anxiety, and increased levels of happiness (Krause et al., 2016). Furthermore, individuals with high levels of humility reported better physical health (Krause, 2010; Krause & Hayward, 2012). Accurate self-appraisals are a hallmark of humility; coping with stressors

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relies on one’s ability to make accurate self-appraisals about the cause of stressors and one’s ability to cope with a stressor. Humble individuals are viewed as better adjusted (Exline & Geyer, 2004), show fewer symptoms of depression ( Jankowski et al., 2013), rate health more favorably (Krause, 2010), and cope better with stress (Krause et al., 2016), compared to individuals with average or low levels of humility. Although this is a new area of the literature with great room for further exploration, the existing literature demonstrates a relationship between humility and stress. Humility and Relationship Quality The final piece of the VSA model is to understand how enduring traits and vulnerabilities, adaptive processes, and stressors affect the overall relationship quality in romantic and committed relationships. Together, these individual, contextual, and relational factors reciprocally influence relationship outcomes. So far in the extant literature, humility has been related to greater social relationship quality (Peters et al., 2011) and greater marital satisfaction (Estephan, 2007). Relational humility also was associated with higher levels of relationship satisfaction (Farrell et al., 2015), as well as greater levels of dyadic adjustment among 69 married couples who were transitioning to parenthood, a period of life often characterized by life stress and relational strain (Garthe et al., under review; Reid et al., in press). These studies highlight that humility plays an important role in the quality of relationship bonds in romantic relationships. However, there is a deficiency in the existing literature with regard to longitudinal investigations that link humility to all of the aspects of the VSA model, and the literature may benefit from investigations of this hypothesis across other major life transitions and stressors (e.g., moving, changing jobs) that committed couples typically face. Proposed Model Scholarship demonstrates that humility is an enduring trait that is associated with a variety of factors within the VSA model. We propose that humility contributes to the VSA model. Not only may humility affect adaptive processes, including relationship commitment and forgiveness, but humility also may reduce the negative effect of stressors, allow for more positive coping, and ultimately, positively affect levels of relationship quality. In addition to examining humility as an enduring trait, it is important to examine if and how this virtuous trait may change during transitions or developmental processes within a romantic relationship. Humility is typically defined as a personality disposition (Davis et al., 2013), but most personality traits display some variability in adulthood (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Kogan

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(1990) highlighted contextual models, which suggest that researchers should consider contextual and situational influences on personality, and interactional models, which suggest that researchers should consider the interaction between traits and one’s environment. Past research suggested that life experiences and expectations lead to changes in personality traits, especially with new roles and expectations with age (Roberts & Caspi, 2003), and that changes in personality result from maturational or historical processes (McCrae et al., 2000; Roberts et al., 2006). Personality and perceptions of personality may also change as a result of relationship transitions and stressors (Katz-Wise, Priess, & Hyde, 2010). In other words, individual traits and characteristics may be altered to some extent in response to new demands, new roles, and shifts in their own relationship. One particular transition that has been examined extensively within romantic relationships is the transition to parenthood. This transitory period can lead to major shifts in identity (Bost, Cox, Burchinal, & Payne, 2002), restructuring of the family system, and added stress and adjustments (Crnic & Low, 2002). Among couples who were transitioning to parenthood for the first time and experiencing greater levels of stress, individuals were more likely to experience decreases in relational humility (Nonterah et al., in press). This was the first study to examine if relational humility changed across a major transition or stressor, and the results highlight the need to further investigate changes in humility (Nonterah et al., in press). Worthington et al. (in press) proposed a developmental hypothesis of humility, suggesting that people may become more humble from managing stressful, demanding, and ego-straining events. Humility may act as a coping strategy and may fluctuate across development. For example, when individuals are faced with stressors and strains (i.e., suffering, pain, loss) but consistently maintain a character of humility, they may be more likely to display a more stable humble personality. Adults who experienced more lifetime trauma but displayed humility were less likely to experience negative mental health symptoms over time compared to nonhumble adults. The authors concluded that humility is an effective coping resource when faced with an accumulation of stressful situations and events (Krause & Hayward, 2012). Thus, the proposed VSA model (see Figure 15.1) examines initial levels of humility as an enduring trait (i.e., intercept of humility) and fluctuations in humility across time (i.e., slope of humility). The model specifically looks at how the intercept and slope of humility influence the rest of the VSA model, including stressors and adaptive processes in romantic relationships. The proposed model highlights the need for researchers to (a) consider the developmental nature of humility and (b) consider how humility may

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Enduring Trait: Humility Intercept

Adaptive Processes

Humility Time 2

Humility Time 3

Relationship Quality Enduring Trait: Humility Slope

Stressors

Figure 15.1 Proposed VSA model examining initial levels of humility (as an enduring trait) and changes in humility over time with stressors, adaptive processes, and relationship quality. *Adapted from Vulnerability-Stress-Adaptation model (Karney & Bradbury, 1995)

contribute to aspects of romantic relationships, especially in moments of stress and adaptation. Research Agenda The implications of this proposed model are twofold. First, the proposed VSA model of relational humility will allow researchers to investigate the developmental nature of humility. There is a dearth of research examining how personality traits, such as humility, or perceptions of personality traits, such as relational humility, may change across the lifespan. There is also a scarcity of research examining how humility and relational humility within romantic relationships may change across major transitions and events. To date, only one study has examined how relational humility changes across a major adulthood transition (Nonterah et al., in press). More research is necessary to truly understand the developmental nature of humility. Second, the proposed VSA model will provide researchers a framework for understanding how humility operates in romantic relationships. The VSA model examines vulnerabilities and traits in relation to stressors and adaptive processes, ultimately affecting relationship satisfaction and relationship outcomes. The social bond hypothesis provides support for adding humility into the VSA model; humility repairs and maintains social bonds. Additionally, humility was directly associated with components of the VSA model, including stress (Krause et al., 2016; Ripley et al., in press), adaptive processes (i.e., forgiveness and commitment; Davis et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2015), and relationship quality (Farrell et al., 2015; Reid et al., under review). Future research should examine how humility fits into the proposed VSA model, especially looking at how all of the VSA components function together in one model.

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Finally, the literature also would benefit from examining enduring traits, including humility, across major transitions and developmental processes in romantic relationships. Transitioning to parenthood is just one such transition; marriage, relocation, first-time home ownership, beginnings of new careers, and coping with the loss of loved ones are additional transitions that are ripe for research in this area. Johnson, Galambos, and Krahn (2014) demonstrated the importance of examining changes in traits and vulnerabilities on relationship functioning. Thus, future research should focus on investigating how a) humility changes across time; b) how humility is associated with stressors, adaptive processes, and relationship outcomes within one model; and c) how humility may affect relationship variables within the VSA framework across major transitions and developmental processes in romantic relationships. Practical Lessons Research and clinicians working with individuals in romantic relationships will benefit from the proposed model. Worthington (1998) proposed that clinicians use the empathy-humility-commitment model for family therapy. By allowing couples to forgive one another through increasing empathy, humility, and commitment for forgiveness, social bonds will be enhanced and damages and wounds to the romantic relationship will be repaired. For instance, cultivating empathy, humility, commitment, and apology enhanced forgiveness among couples coping with infidelity (Fife, Weeks, & Stellberg-Filbert, 2013), and a workbook intervention to enhance humility was associated with increased levels of forgiveness and patience, as well as decreases in negativity (Lavelock et al., 2014). We encourage researchers and clinicians to utilize the model proposed in this chapter to examine how humility can be understood within the proposed VSA model. Additionally, by understanding how humility changes over time, we will be able to examine its influence on stress and adaptive processes, including forgiveness. We will also be able to examine how humility changes developmentally over time, ultimately influencing levels of relationship quality. References Ainsworth, M. S. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. American Psychologist, 44, 709–716. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 150–166. Bodenmann, G., Pihet, S., Shantinath, S. D., Cina, A., & Widmer, K. (2006). Improving dyadic coping in couples with a stress-oriented approach: A 2-year longitudinal study. Behavior Modification, 30, 571–597. Bost, K. K., Cox, M. J., Burchinal, M. R., & Payne, C. (2002). Structural and supportive changes in couples’ family and friendship networks across the transition to parenthood. Journal of Marriage and Family, 64(2), 517–531.

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16 FOSTERING INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE A N D U N I V E R S I T Y E D U C AT I O N C. Nathan DeWall

The world is full of teachers. They can take the form of grandparents, toll booth operators, mail carriers, and college professors. Sometimes our teachers share specific information, something they secured through life experience or advanced training. Other times, they give us something less concrete but just as useful: a way of living. What matters is that they show us what to do—and occasionally, what not to do. Consider the case of Charles Darwin. He knew himself well. Initially a pre-medical student, he favored exploring the outdoors and collecting beetles. No task was beneath him, especially when it fed his passion for learning about the ebb and flow of nature. Although his father wanted him to attend the seminary, young Charles preferred ship rides to faraway places. Following his own interests paid off handsomely: the greatest intellectual achievement of all time may be his theory of evolution. But Darwin also knew his mind wasn’t the only one to entertain such a theory. When he learned that another person, Alfred Russel Wallace, developed a similar idea, he didn’t fret. Rather than fight over the theory’s ownership, Darwin agreed to publish an abstract of his theory alongside Wallace’s theory. What set Darwin apart from Wallace—and that of many intellectuals who have come before and after him—was his intellectual humility. His theory underwent constant intellectual attack. Darwin responded by focusing on how to improve the theory rather than how to rebuild his battered ego. “Although scientific theories imply their falsifications, they rarely list them,” notes the brilliant essayist Adam Gopnik (2010). “Darwin’s does.” The scientific literature is littered with cautionary tales about an absence of intellectual humility. When we think of the most wrong of all scientific notions—a geocentric and static universe, a young and flat Earth—they gained traction and resisted abandonment because their advocates lacked intellectual humility. Critics were vilified, disconfirming evidence was quashed, and scientific progress was stalled.

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Many people would rather have a world filled with intellectual humility. Yet it is unclear the path we should take to foster intellectual humility. This chapter is designed to fill this gap. In a mix of science and personal storytelling, I offer an approach to increase intellectual humility in university education. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section defines humility and its close relatives of relational and intellectual humility. In the second section, I make a case for how cultural changes in attitudes, emotions, and motivations make raising intellectual humility a pressing need. In the third section, I provide examples of how psychologists have responded to intellectual attacks with high and low levels of humility—and how well these different strategies boded for scientific progress. Fourth, I describe how I try to apply these principles in my own life as someone who communicates psychological science to a general audience. What Is Intellectual Humility? Humility is a slippery concept. Academic psychologists will probably never agree on a clear definition of humility or an airtight way to measure it. This lack of agreement relies as much on the concept of humility as a newcomer in the psychological literature as its inherent difficulty to pin down conceptually and statistically. Knowing these limitations, I offer what seem the clearest definitions of humility. General humility refers to having an accurate self-appraisal of strengths and weaknesses, along with a tendency to focus on others rather than oneself (Davis et al., 2011; Worthington, 2007). Humble people restrain self-focused emotions in order to maintain social acceptance. They know themselves and spend their time trying to cooperate rather than compete with others. Relational humility is a close relative of general humility (Farrell et al., 2015). It differs from general humility by requiring someone’s relationship partner to report on his or her level of relationship humility. For example, whereas general humility involves asking a person to report on the accuracy of their self-appraisals and how much they focus on others versus themselves, measuring relationship humility engages relationship partners to report on how much their partners have these qualities of accurate self-appraisal and being other-­ focused. In this way, relational humility does not suffer from the potential limitation of humble people underreporting because of modesty and narcissistic people overreporting because of arrogance. Intellectual humility is an even narrower aspect of humility (McElroy et al., 2014). It focuses exclusively on how people approach information, whether it is what they know or how their discoveries have added others’ knowledge base. Intellectually humble people know what they know and what they don’t.

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Embracing limitations on their knowledge spurs intellectually humble people to explore new ideas. There is another side to intellectual humility, one that relates to how people exchange ideas. When they present their ideas, intellectually humble people take pains to prevent others from taking offense. Even if their ideas conflict with those that others hold, intellectually humble people know that their notions represent one way of looking at a topic, question, or problem. Many perspectives exist, and intellectual progress is hindered when people feel attacked or otherwise affronted. When critics question their ideas, intellectually humble people communicate their gratitude for the remarks rather than lashing out. Do We Need to Foster Intellectual Humility? Is fostering intellectual humility a pressing need? The answer depends on two related factors. The first is whether cultural forces exist that threaten to reduce intellectual humility. Second, if such cultural forces exist, do they produce outcomes that strengthen individual, relational, and societal well-being? American university students have never had a greater need for intellectual humility. The main reason is that they have never been so narcissistic (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008; Twenge & Campbell, 2009; Twenge & Foster, 2010). Compared with their same-aged peers of a previous generation, today’s college students are more likely to agree with statements such as “I always know what I am doing,” “I can make anybody believe anything I want them to,” and “If I ruled the world it would be a better place.” Narcissists have both inflated and fragile self-views (Gregg & Sedikides, 2010). Because of their fragility, adversity and criticism shatter narcissists’ self-views. Narcissism stands in stark opposition to humility (Sandage, Paine, & Hill, 2015). A defining feature of humility is having accurate self-knowledge that involves seeing oneself as a limited agent (see Chapter 5, this volume). Narcissists know themselves well, including that others’ liking for them rises initially and deteriorates over time (Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011). But narcissists do not believe they are limited. To a narcissist, overconfidence is common sense. Such an approach to thinking critically about one’s thoughts, feelings, decisions, and actions. Critical thinking is required to make intellectual progress, making narcissism a major obstacle. Narcissists also have difficulty presenting themselves modestly. Indeed, one question on the most widely used self-report measure of narcissism, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988), asks people to select whichever of the following two statements describes them best: “Modesty doesn’t become me,” and “I am essentially a modest person.” Thus, narcissists lack a

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core feature of humility, which involves presenting oneself and one’s ideas in a fair and modest fashion. Does narcissism offer a desirable substitute for intellectual humility? Let’s look at the data. Narcissism does have some benefits. One is that narcissists enjoy good mental health (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). They report lower levels of anxiety, depression, and other signs of psychopathology. Their positive mental health is due in large part to their positive self-views. Because they love themselves and they think of themselves often, they are bombarded with frequent positive thoughts that make it difficult to feel anxious or depressed. Narcissists also do well early on in their relationships (Oltmanns, Friedman, Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004). They are exciting people. At a cocktail party, they will regale others with stories about their adventures and accomplishments. Narcissists also flaunt their bodies and appearance. This can drive others to show initial interest in forming a relationship with them. But narcissism is linked to more negative than positive outcomes. These problems occur at three different levels of analysis: individual, relational, and societal. At the individual level, narcissists often experience social rejection. When rejected, narcissists become enraged and aggressive (Chester & DeWall, 2016; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). Narcissists struggle the most in their relationships. A main reason lies in how narcissists approach their relationships. Unlike many people, narcissists approach their relationships with a game-playing mentality (Campbell, 1999). They engage in more infidelity and are more likely to sexually assault people who threaten their egos (Bushman, Bonacci, van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003; McNulty & Widman, 2014). A rise in narcissism also negatively affects society. Narcissism hurts the economy because narcissists make poor employees (Meier & Semmer, 2013). They feel entitled to benefits they have no earned, do not work well with others, and as a result the companies that employ them struggle. Narcissists are also unhelpful (Zhou, Zhou, & Zhang, 2010). With the dual rise of narcissism and income equality, it is unlikely that narcissists will help the ever-growing number of people who need assistance. Following the data on narcissism leads to two conclusions. First, there is a growing need to foster intellectual humility among university students. Over the past generation, students report higher levels of narcissism, a trait that hinders their ability to value and pursue intellectual humility. Second, narcissism’s costs outweigh its benefits. By strengthening intellectual humility, students may grow in their appreciation for others and recognize their own limitations.

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But how does intellectual humility affect scientific thinking? Does it improve or inhibit scientific progress? The next section explores these questions. How Does Intellectual Humility Influence Scientific Progress? Scientific progress requires constant revision. A germ of an idea is planted. Scientists nurture the idea, prune any weaknesses they notice, and then send the idea to others for further inspection. Once it is thinned of fatal impurities, the idea is ready to share. It then grows and pollinates other ideas, evolving along the way. Intellectual humility helps make scientific progress possible. To grasp the importance of intellectual humility, let us consider two topics of psychological research. Each topic has sparked controversy, in which groups of researchers passionately disagreed with each other. Lively debate and healthy skepticism help sharpen our thinking. But the scientific attitude that drove these researchers’ debates involved either high or low intellectual humility. These examples showcase how science thrives from intellectual humility. We can summarize the first topic with a simple question: Does familiarity lead to liking or contempt? Intuition might tilt our answer in one direction or another, which is why we need to use the scientific method to try to answer it. Years of evidence point toward familiarity and liking (Berscheid & Regan, 2005). We like familiar people, places, and things. The case seemed iron clad until some researchers suggested an alternative possibility, that similarity might breed contempt (Norton, Frost, & Ariely, 2007). Across several innovative studies, these researchers showed that participants would rather know less than more about a stranger or potential romantic relationship partner. People would rather not know how much another person is ambitious, bright, cultured, deliberate, emotional, enthusiastic, individualistic, level headed, observant, polite, self-disciplined, stubborn, studious, and talkative. Knowing a lot results in little liking. Knowing a little results in lots of liking. Disagreement ensued. A new group of ardent relationship researchers were not convinced by the findings showing a link between familiarity and contempt (Reis, Maniaci, Caprariello, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2011). They argued that Norton and colleagues’ results relied on a highly unusual context—learning information about someone on the basis of a series of trait adjectives. Through a series of new experiments, Reis and colleagues showed that in live interactions, the more people interacted, the more they liked each other. What happened next best illustrates how intellectual humility promotes scientific progress. These erstwhile adversaries kept an open mind and merged their ideas about familiarity and liking into a new theoretical model (Finkel et al., 2015). By practicing intellectual humility, the field of psychology now has

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a better understanding of how, when, and why familiarity increases or decreases liking. A less fortunate example comes from the media violence literature. For decades, researchers have wondered whether exposure to violent media increases aggression (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Josephson, 1987). Correlational, longitudinal, and experimental evidence painted a consistent pattern of results. Greater media violence exposure related to more aggressiveness (Anderson et al., 2003). The evidence was so convincing that, in 1972, the U.S. Surgeon General issued the following statement: It is clear to me that the causal relationship between televised research and antisocial behavior is sufficient to warrant appropriate and immediate action . . . There comes a time when the data are sufficient to justify action. That time has come. (Steinfeld, 1972, United States Senate, pp. 25–27) The advent of violent video games led to further research. Across numerous studies, researchers found a causal relationship that playing violent video games increased aggressive thoughts, feelings, and actions (Anderson & Bushman, 2001). Just as in any scientific endeavor, this research spawned new ideas that sought to identify the mechanisms, moderators, and other nuances underlying the link between violent video games and aggression. Yet not all people were convinced that media violence exposure bore any relation to greater aggression. Some skeptics began to express concern that the empirical evidence linking media violence to aggression was not as clear and consistent as people think (Ferguson & Kilburn, 2009). They raised several other concerns, such as whether media violence exposure had any real-world consequences. How, they wondered, could playing video games increase aggression when the proportion of people playing those games have increased during the same years that real-world violence has diminished? Things didn’t add up. They also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2011 Brown vs. EMA decision expressed doubt that violent media game exposure leads to aggression. Faced with this fork in the scientific road, the two research groups took slightly different approaches. One group, led by Craig Anderson, went back to the scientific literature to identify any scientific studies they had missed when previously surveying the literature. Next, they evaluated the quality of the study to determine whether better-designed studies yielded stronger or weaker effects. Finally, they tested new hypotheses, such as whether cultural differences existed between Japanese and Western countries. After meta-­analyzing 381 effect sizes across over 130,000 participants, the results showed a robust

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link between violent video game exposure and antisocial outcomes (Anderson et al., 2010). The other group, led by Christopher Ferguson, continued to criticize research showing a relationship between violent video game exposure and aggression. They suggested that many problems continue to plague this literature, including self-serving biases among violent media researchers themselves (Elson & Ferguson, 2013). Elson and Ferguson (2013) note, correctly, that they and other skeptics have experienced personal attacks against them from the other group, such as that they are not “true aggression and violence experts” (Bushman & Anderson, 2011, p. 9). Their response is, in some ways, expected. “In fairness,” they say, “once a debate becomes heated, both sides are likely to focus on refuting the other side rather than looking for ways to dialog and improve the science” (Elson & Ferguson, 2013, p. 2). Neither side of the media violence debate has taken an other-oriented approach in the same way we saw with research on familiarity and liking. It is also clear that both sides of the debate have non-neutral views on the nature of the relationship between violent video game exposure and aggression. Regardless of one’s perspective, the debate has impaired scientific progress on whether there is a relationship between violent video game exposure and aggression. There is no end in sight to the arguing between the disagreeing groups. Writing for a General Audience as a Case Study in Intellectual Humility We have now seen many benefits of intellectual humility. It strengthens relationships, sharpens thinking, and promotes scientific progress. We also saw the flipside of intellectual humility and its consequences. In this section, I describe my personal journey toward writing for a general or broad audience. By general audience I mean people other than my usual clack of like-minded friends who speak the same specialized language, share a common knowledge base, and care more about ideas than how those ideas are communicated to others outside the tribe. The Early Years It all happened by accident. I never intended on attending college. School was never my thing. My older sisters were born with the brains. Growing up in a musical family, I felt my true calling was as a professional musician. But I went to college anyway, intent on staying for just one year. I took some music classes and, to fill out my schedule, I enrolled in Introduction to Psychology. We used a textbook written by a professor named David Myers. The psychology class didn’t go too well. I loved the material, but I had lackluster study skills. I ended up earning a B minus, which was one of my lowest

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grades in my total college experience. I redoubled my efforts, learned how to study, and became a devoted psychology major. By the time I graduated, I had taken more psychology classes than anyone in the history of my college. On I went to graduate school, where I entertained a dream of becoming a writer. Believe me, to use the word dream was no accident. I was not a good writer. This is not modesty. My first feedback I received as a graduate student at the University of Chicago read, “You seem to not only misunderstand the concepts, but your writing is so difficult to understand that I would not know if you understood what was asked of you.” My professor required that I take a remedial writing course the next semester. My poor-writing peers and I attended class every week. It was known as the “Little Red School House.” Not only was I a poor writer, I had never known any writers. My dad had a friend who called himself a writer. Dad said he was the best writer he had ever known. But dad’s friend never published anything. I didn’t know if that meant he had some special writer status. Either way, I knew how much I enjoyed reading and writing. Writers got to do both. I told myself I would commit a decade to the task of learning how to write. I was young and, I figured, I could do something else if the writing life didn’t pan out. At the eleventh hour, I was selected to attend Florida State University’s PhD program in social psychology. (On the final day of admissions, a top candidate decided to go elsewhere, opening up a spot for me. I accepted the offer, loaded up my car, and drove to Florida.) I would work with Roy Baumeister, who is one of the most prolific and broad-thinking psychologists of the modern era. He taught me how to enjoy the writing life. “Write every day,” he told me at our first meeting. “Do enough research that you always have something to write.” Over the next four years, I learned a lot about writing and psychology. I learned that the peer-review process was meant to strengthen me rather than to break me down. I learned that relationships matter more than publications. I learned that curiosity and creativity matter as much as carefulness. Most of all, I learned that my job was to grow as writer and researcher year after year, month after month, and day after day. The Middle Years I was now five years into my How to Become a Writer Boot Camp. It was time to take stock of my progress. There were some positives and some negatives. On the positive side, I had earned enough publications that I interviewed at several universities and accepted a wonderful offer to join the faculty at the University of Kentucky. On the negative side, I had no idea how to be a faculty member. Worse yet, I had to cut my umbilical cord to my advisor. I needed to prove to myself and others that I could make it on my own. I also wanted to find another writing coach.

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This was a major turning point. Rather than finding a single writing coach, I began reading writing books. My goal was to find a new skill from each book. I soon realized how much better I could use my time. Rather than working all of the time, I could allot specific writing times. Just as I plan my teaching time, I began to plan my writing time. Soon I started to become more productive. My writing also improved. I learned other tricks of the trade. I started to include warm-up and cool-down writing exercises. I developed a structure that helped me frame my papers. I also started writing other things for fun. Over several years, I led a student group through National Novel Writing Month (NaNoWriMo). In this month, each member of the group had to write a 50,000-word novel from scratch. I almost never read fiction. I also had never written any fiction. But I took a risk and found that I enjoyed it. I even wrote a couple of other novels on my own. They are purely for fun. I doubt I’ll ever publish them. Besides, they’re not that good. Several years went by. I made my way up the rungs of the academy. I continued reading writing books, talking with writers whom I admired, and writing every day. My laboratory was large and active. We explored new ideas every year, which kept things fresh and exciting. I felt safe publishing papers in academic journals. Occasionally, my research would receive coverage in the popular press. Through many interviews, I did my best to help print and television journalists communicate our science to a general audience. It had been nine years since I pledged to devote my energies to become a writer. I had started to feel like a writer. On a summer business trip to Hong Kong, I received an unexpected email. It was from David Myers, the professor who wrote my college Introduction to Psychology textbook. “I wonder if you might have an interest in communicating psychological science to a general audience,” he wrote. My jaw dropped. The Later Years At this point in the story, you may see some themes related to intellectual humility. Once I set my goal of becoming a writer, I had to become honest about my strengths and weaknesses. I also needed to learn to embrace criticism. It wasn’t always easy. Some reviews still cause me to wince. In nearly every case, I did not lash out at those who criticized my work. The one time I did, I immediately sought to make things right. The person forgave me. I vowed to never again take my work so personally that I felt a need to become defensive. So far, I’ve lived up to my promise. When David Myers contacted me, he wondered if I would have an interest in becoming the new co-author and ultimate successor to his suite of Introduction to Psychology textbooks. I did not know that the previous nine years had served

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as my intellectual humility training camp. I was about to embark on the most challenging and rewarding work I had ever done. It would teach me how I still clung on to an assortment of weaknesses I needed to work out—and how I had an entire set of strengths I had never used. The first aspect of textbook authoring that requires intellectual humility relates to knowledge mastery. Psychology is a vast discipline. One person can only know so much. Not only did I need to accept that I wasn’t the smartest person, I needed to embrace it. This came easily. Remember how my sisters were the ones born with the brains? But seriously, the reason to embrace nonmastery is not out of modesty. It is a means to an end. The ingenious and well-spoken psychologist Steven Pinker (2014) argues that experts often write poorly because they know so much. This “curse of knowledge” cripples otherwise smart people from communicating their ideas clearly. It is hard to write in generalities when you think in specificities. To write to a general audience, it helps not to get stuck in the minutiae. A three-way interaction with double mediation that replicates in four independent samples might dazzle academic reviewers. There is a place for that sort of work. It isn’t a textbook. The second lesson I learned about textbook writing involved the need to welcome feedback and criticism. Over the years, I thought I had experienced my share of harsh criticism. I had come to appreciate it as part of the learning process, of making a written document better. What changed was the frequency and intensity of feedback I would receive. Let’s begin with feedback frequency. When I receive feedback on an academic journal article, I will get three or four external reviews. On an Introduction to Psychology chapter, I will also receive three or four external reviews—before I start the revising process. After I revise a chapter, it will go back through a peer-review process, in which I respond to another three or four external reviews. The process is then repeated. A standard Introduction to Psychology textbook has 16 chapters, corresponding to the number of weeks in a typical academic semester. Thus, a textbook requires an author to respond to over 30 times more reviewers than in an average academic journal article. This doesn’t count my co-author and the six editors who review the work, line by line, and offer suggestions. Luckily, I enjoy receiving this type of feedback. But responding to reviewer and editor feedback involves walking a fine line. I am open to new ideas; part of that is my temperament and part of it relates to the situation. I also need to avoid taking dictation, desperately trying to please everyone. Sometimes I will agree with feedback and other times I won’t. What I find is that each editor and reviewer bring at least one unique perspective that strengthens the textbook. My job is to ferret out each nugget of wisdom and incorporate it into the book.

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The more difficult part of the feedback process involves its intensity. I will never forget the first time I attended a dinner assembled for people who used our textbooks. One woman, who sat next to an executive from the publishing company, looked me in the eyes and said, “I read your new parts. I’ve got to say, the writing was for sh#@.” I sunk into my chair and thought that things couldn’t get any worse. I thanked her for being honest and asked her which specific parts she didn’t like. “All of them,” she said. “It’s all for sh#@.” I was embarrassed and retreated to the restroom. When I returned, several people pulled me aside and apologized for her rudeness. This was not the last time I received a rude review. Over time, they hurt less and less. I have also experienced the warm glow of positive reviews. But their weight also diminishes over time. What is left is the most crucial part of any piece of feedback: useful material to improve my ability to communicate psychological science to a general audience. The final lesson I learned was how much I took for granted about textbook publishing. I underestimated the hundreds of hours it takes to ensure that each sentence, image, and citation meet the highest possible standard of communication. From the moment I wake to when I lie down to sleep, I am on the prowl for new information that can help a student better learn the science of psychology. This happens every day. I comb through research articles. I read popular newspapers and science magazines. And I always remain open to real-world examples—whether I encounter them at a movie theater, on a long-distance run, or in my own house—that will resonate with students. But most of all, I am grateful to have an opportunity to teach students about the importance of intellectual humility. In our textbooks, we discuss how the scientific attitude has three components: curiosity, skepticism, and humility (e.g., Myers & DeWall, 2016). Through our writing, we teach students that scientists know they are prone to error and remain open to unexpected ideas and perspectives. To welcome intellectual humility is to support a scientific mindset. Concluding Remarks Intellectual humility benefits individuals, relationships, and society. In recent decades, American parents focused less on making kids self-disciplined and more on making kids self-loving. This self-esteem movement had the unfortunate consequence of creating a generation of late adolescents marked by narcissism (Twenge & Campbell, 2009). Faculty can choose to coddle students, fearful of shattering their grandiose and fragile egos. Or faculty can show students how to take an honest appraisal of their strengths and weaknesses, how to welcome lively debate, and how to work well with others. By fostering intellectual humility, we have seen how former adversaries become friends, how conflicting ideas

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become enmeshed, and how the field of psychology improves. My own journey shows how intellectual humility helped me on my quest to communicate my passion for psychological science to a general audience. References Anderson, C. A., Berkowitz, L., Donnerstein, E., Huesmann, R. L., Johnson, J., Linz, D., Malamuth, N., . . . & Wartella, E. (2003). The influence of media violence on youth. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4, 81–110. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological Science, 12, 353–359. Anderson, C. A., Shibuya, A., Ihori, N., Swing, E. L., Bushman, B. J., Sakamoto, A., Rothstein, H. R., . . . & Saleem, M. (2010). Violent video game effects on aggression, empathy, and prosocial behavior in Eastern and Western countries. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 151–173. Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Berscheid, E., & Regan, P. (2005). The psychology of interpersonal relationships. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education. Bushman, B. J., & Anderson, C. A. (2011). Weighing the evidence: Comparison of two amicus briefs submitted to U.S. Supreme Court violent video game case. White paper. Bushman, B. J., Bonacci, A. M., van Dijk, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Narcissism, sexual refusal, and aggression: Testing a narcissistic reactance model of sexual coercion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 1027–1040. Campbell, W. K. (1999). Narcissism and romantic attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1254–1270. Carlson, E. N., Vazire, S., & Oltmanns, T. F. (2011). You probably think this paper’s about you: Narcissists’ perceptions of their personality and reputation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 185–201. Chester, D. S., & DeWall, C. N. (2016). Sound the alarm: The effect of narcissism on retaliatory aggression is moderated by dACC reactivity to rejection. Journal of Personality, 84, 361–368. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L. Jr., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J. II, . . . & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225–234. Elson, M., & Ferguson, C. J. (2013). Twenty-five years of research on violence in digital games and aggression: Empirical evidence, perspectives, and a debate gone astray. European Psychologist, 19, 33–46. Farrell, J. E., Hook, J. N., Ramos, M., Davis, D. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Ruiz, J. M. (2015). Humility and relationship outcomes in couples: The mediating role of commitment. Couple and Family Psychology: Research and Practice, 4, 14–26. Ferguson, C. J., & Kilburn, J. (2009). The public health risks of media violence: A meta-­ analytic review. The Journal of Pediatrics, 154, 759–763. Finkel, E. J., Norton, M. I., Reis, H. T., Ariely, D., Caprariello, P. A., Eastwick, P, W., Frost, J. H., . . . & Maniaci, M. R. (2015). When does familiarity promote versus undermine interpersonal attraction? A proposed integrative model from erstwhile adversaries. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10, 3–19. Gopnik, A. (2010). Angels and ages: Lincoln, Darwin, and the birth of the modern age. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Gregg, A. P., & Sedikides, C. (2010). Narcissistic fragility: Rethinking its links to explicit and implicit self-esteem. Self & Identity, 9, 142–161.

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Josephson, W. L. (1987). Television violence and children’s aggression: Testing the priming, social script, and disinhibition predictions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 882–890. McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hill, P. C., Worthington, E. C., Jr., . . . & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical elaborations in the context of religious leadership. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 42, 19–30. McNulty, J. K., & Widman, L. (2014). Sexual narcissism and infidelity in early marriage. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 43, 1315–1325. Meier, L. L., & Semmer, N. K. (2013). Lack of reciprocity, narcissism, anger, and instigated workplace incivility: A moderated mediation model. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 22, 461–475. Myers, D. M., & DeWall, C. N. (2016). Exploring psychology (10th Ed.). New York: Worth Publishers. Norton, M. I., Frost, J. H., & Ariely, D. (2007). Less is more: The lure of ambiguity, or why familiarity breeds contempt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 97–105. Oltmanns, T. F., Friedman, J. N., Fiedler, E. R., & Turkheimer, E. (2004). Perceptions of people with personality disorders based on thin slices of behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 216–229. Pinker, S. (2014). The sense of style: The thinking person’s guide to writing in the 21st century. New York: Penguin. Raskin, R., & Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct validation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 890–902. Reis, H. T., Maniaci, M. R., Caprariello, Eastwick, & Finkel, E. J. (2011). Familiarity does indeed promote attraction in live interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 557–570. Sandage, S. J., Paine, D. R., & Hill, P. C. (2015). Spiritual barriers to humility: A multidimensional study. Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, 18, 207–217. Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy?: Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 400–416. Steinfeld, J. (1972). Statement in hearings before subcommittee on communications of committee on commerce (United States Senate, Serial #92–52, pp. 25–27). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). “Isn’t it fun to get the respect we deserve?” Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 261–272. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2009). The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement. New York: Atria Books. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2009). The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement. New York: Atria Books. Twenge, J. M., & Foster, J. D. (2010). Birth cohort increases in narcissistic personality traits among American college students, 1982–2009. Social Psychological & Personality Science, 1, 99–106. Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (2008). Egos inflating over time: A cross-temporal meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Journal of Personality, 76, 875–901. Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2007). Humility: The quiet virtue. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press. Zhou, H., Zhou, H., & Zhang, B. (2010). Relationships among narcissism, empathy, and prosocial behaviours. Chinese Journal of Clinical Psychology, 18, 228–231.

17 O R G A N I Z AT I O N A L H U M I L I T Y AND THE BETTER FUNCTIONING BUSINESS NONPROFIT AND R E L I G I O U S O R G A N I Z AT I O N S Angela S. Wallace, Chia-Yen (Chad) Chiu, and Bradley P. Owens

Prior to the late 1970s, humility was viewed as a positive characteristic within the religious community, but was perceived by many as weakness when expressed in an organizational context. Thus, research examining the influence of humility in organizations is almost nonexistent prior to 1978. During the late 1970s two authors suggested that humility might be beneficial to organizations. First, Hayes (1978) noted that most of those reporting on the favorable characteristics of organizational members focused on surety, firmness, and confidence particularly among organizational leaders. Hayes suggested that organizational humility was vital to organizational harmony. A year later, Lasch (1979), in a landmark book, implied that humility was essential to successful organizational functioning by noting that organizations at the time were promoting detrimental characteristics among their organizational members by glorifying organizational behavior associated with narcissism rather than shining the light on those aspects of human behavior that promote organizational harmony. For the remainder of the twentieth century the notion of humility as an aspect of organizational functioning was touched upon, but still in association with such characteristics as low self-esteem (e.g., Knight & Nadel, 1986; Weiss & Knight, 1980). Then came the twenty-first century and the onslaught of numerous corporate scandals. In 2001, Enron’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeff Skilling and former CEO Kenneth Lay were accused and later found guilty of accounting fraud. The following year WorldCom’s CEO Bernie Ebbers was accused and subsequently found guilty of accounting fraud, and Tyco’s CEO Dennis Kozlowski and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Mark Swartz were accused and found guilty of engaging in questionable accounting practices. In 2003, HealthSouth’s CEO, Richard Scrushy, was accused and later found guilty of inflating numbers by $1.4 billion to appease shareholders and Freddie Mac’s executive management team (i.e., the CEO; chief operations officer; CFO; and senior vice presidents) were accused and later found

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guilty of misstating $5 billion in assets. A couple of years later, in 2005, American Insurance Group’s CEO Hank Greenberg was accused of accounting fraud, bid rigging, and stock price manipulation. The year 2008 saw two major corporate scandals, the first from Lehman Brothers’ executives and auditors from Ernst & Young who were accused and later found guilty of hiding more than $50 billion in loans disguised as sales; the second was from Bernie Madoff Investments in which Bernie Madoff, the company’s founder, along with his accountant David Friehling and Frank DiPascalli, swindled investors out of $65 billion dollars in the biggest (detected) Ponzi scheme in American history. In 2009, Saytam’s founder and CEO Ramalinga Raju admitted to boosting revenue by $1.5 billion. These organizational leaders along with their partners in fraud acted in blatant disregard for others, including their employees, shareholders, and investors. Many news and other outlets have claimed these scandals to be due in part to the excessive hubris, arrogance, and sense of entitlement possessed by the leaders involved (see Owens & Hekman, 2012; Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013). This led to a “crisis of leadership,” or fundamentally questioning what leadership is about and what kind of leaders we are producing in business schools compared with the kind of leaders we should be producing. Among other things, luminaries in organizational and leadership study have said that humility is a vital characteristic for business leaders in the new millennium (Weick, 2001). Furthermore, movements in positive psychology and positive organizational scholarship are legitimizing the study of the history of virtues like humility in contemporary contexts. Cameron, Bright, and Caza (2004) said that humility is one of the important “organizational virtues” that forms the foundation for moral action within the workplace. History of Humility in Organizational Contexts Humility is not a new concept. In antiquity, humility was considered to be a moral virtue that was widely encouraged by philosophers and theologians (Argandona, 2015; Kellenberger, 2010), “. . . but it lost its luster in the modern era, probably because it was confused with a disposition considered not worthy of the individual’s worth and self-reliance” (Argandona, 2015; p. 64). The onslaught of corporate scandal in the twenty-first century ushered in research investigating humility beyond the context of theology and philosophy beginning with Tangney’s (2000) conception of humility as a strength. Vera and Rodriguez-Lopez (2004) extended Tangney’s conceptualization of humility by suggesting that humility expressed collectively by an organization functions as a competitive advantage and leads to improved organizational resilience and greater organizational performance. Consequently, the edification of the concept of humility within organizational contexts began to flourish, but with this

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build-up came a lack of consensus regarding the definition of humility within organizational environments (Davis et al., 2013). However, as more and more definitions of humility began to emerge, these definitions began to converge into a consonant definition of expressed humility in organizations. Definition of Humility in Organizations Organizational scholars have viewed humility as a malleable way of thinking, acting, and feeling (Whatley, 2014) that is expressed through a manifested willingness to view oneself accurately; to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of others in a manner that is not boastful, self-deprecating, or humiliating; and to be able and willing to learn (Owens et al., 2013) not only about oneself, but also about and from others. Scholars describe humility as a dynamic virtue (Kellenberger, 2010; Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 2011; Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004) that is evinced through interactions with others (Davis et al., 2013; McElroy et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013). What underlies humility is a desire to acquire knowledge about oneself in respect to others (de Bruin, 2013) and to use this acquired knowledge to drive success that is beneficial to self and, to a greater extent, others. However, humility goes beyond a mere willingness to consider the good of others and extends to an intent leading to behavior that is indicative of one’s ability to self-reflect; to accept one’s own strengths, weaknesses, and limitations; and to learn from others in a manner that lends itself to the benefit of the whole, ultimately leading to effective organizational functioning (Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004). This expression of humility within organizations has been explored from two perspectives. Humility from an individual perspective has been explored as the perception of a person’s expressed humility by others, whereas humility from a collective perspective has been explored as the aggregate perception of a group’s expressed humility by the group. Individual humility has focused specifically on organizational leaders (leader humility), whereas collective humility has primarily focused on teams (team humility) and the organization as a whole (organizational humility). Varieties of Humility within Organizations Leader Humility Leader humility consists of the three core behavioral facets—self-awareness, appreciation of others’ strengths and contributions, and modeling ­teachability— as perceived by followers (Owens & Hekman, 2012; Owens et al., 2013). Gunn and Gullickson (2006) noted that humble leaders engage in three key behaviors that are aligned with these three core facets of humility. First, humble leaders exemplify self-awareness by keeping a perspective through the admission of

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mistakes with compassion for self and others and through the acknowledgement of their own fallibility and intellectual limitation (de Bruin, 2013; Crigger, 2004; Gunn & Gullickson, 2006; Nielson, Marrone, & Slay, 2010), which stems from their understanding that they encounter the same organizational challenges and successes as their followers (Hayes & Comer, 2011). Second, leaders who are humble show their appreciation for others’ strengths and contributions by drawing attention to these and by giving due credit to others (Crigger, 2004; Gunn & Gullickson, 2006; Nielson et al., 2010). Finally, leaders who express humility model teachability by remaining open and curious to others’ feedback. In short, humble leaders are tuned into their followers (Sutton, 2010) and put their own capabilities, strengths, and limitations in perspective in order to serve those they lead (McKennan & Brown, 2011). In addition to exhibiting behaviors that align with the three core components of humility within organizations, organizational leaders engage in other behaviors that are commensurate with humility. For example, these leaders are described as avoiding the spotlight except when doing so is beneficial to the organization (Hayes, 1978; Morris, Brotheridge, & Urbanski, 2005). Also, as orchestrators of constructive conflict, these leaders enable others to express their thoughts safely, thus, building a foundation of mutual trust (Sutton, 2010). In doing so, humble leaders create a safe zone, which enables knowledge sharing among organizational members, including the leader (de Bruin, 2013; Elrod, 2013). Advantages of Leader Humility In a study of 704 health service employees rating 218 leaders, Owens and his colleagues (2013) found that leader humility predicted team-learning goal orientation, follower job engagement, and follower job satisfaction. Furthermore, this study demonstrated that leader humility decreased follower voluntary turnover. Basford, Offerman, and Behrend (2014), in a study of 511 employees from various industries rating their leaders, found that leader trustworthiness and sincere leader apology for mistakes led to follower perceptions of humility. Moreover, their study showed that leader humility directly predicted follower forgiveness of mistakes along with transformational leadership. This same study examined the indirect effects of leader humility and illustrated that leader humility indirectly and favorably influenced follower perceptions of trust/loyalty, satisfaction with supervision, quality of the leader–follower relationship (i.e., leader–member exchange), and affective commitment. Another study involving 1,512 employees from six countries (Australia, China, Germany, India, Mexico, the United States) rating their leaders found that leader humility positively influences followers’ perceptions of inclusion (Prime & Salib, 2014). In the assessment of the trickle-down effects of CEO

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leader humility flowing down to top management teams (TMTs) and ending with followers of the TMT, Ou and her colleagues (2014) collected data from 63 CEOs, 328 TMT members, and 645 middle managers and found that CEO humility positively influenced CEO-empowering leadership and indirectly and positively affected TMT integration; empowered organizational climates; and positively affected the responses of TMT subordinates, such as work engagement, affective commitment, and job performance. In a more recent study that included 876 health insurance employees rating 176 leaders, Owens, Wallace, and Waldman (2015) found that narcissistic leaders who tempered their narcissism by practicing humility favorably affected followers’ perception of their leader’s effectiveness, follower job engagement, and follower job performance. Finally, Ou and her colleagues (Ou, Waldman, & Peterson, in press) investigated whether humility as expressed by an organization’s CEO had a favorable impact on firm performance. They collected data from 105 CEOs and found that CEO humility directly and positively influenced TMT integration and that TMT integration indirectly improved firm performance. Despite the many advantages of leader humility there are some potential disadvantages of being a humble leader. Disadvantages of Leader Humility Unlike the advantages of leader humility, the disadvantages of leader humility are not as well explored and, to our knowledge, empirical research examining the potentially negative effects of leadership humility has not been conducted (Ou et al., in press). However, researchers have suggested that leader humility can be detrimental depending on how and when these behaviors are carried out in the organization. One disadvantage of leader humility stems from the conventional perception of humility as a form of weakness. For this reason, leader humility can be misconstrued as submission or self-abasement, low self-esteem, or insecurity (Gunn & Gullickson, 2006) all of which are analogous to weakness or passivity. For example, not speaking up for oneself or not bolstering one’s self-worth can be damaging to a humble leader (Davis & Hook, 2013). Leaders who do not speak up for themselves can damage their own reputations, and damaged reputations, according to Davis and Hook (2013), are detrimental to establishing effective relationships. In fact, Gunn and Gullickson (2006) recount an incident in which a humble leader was laid off due to the organization’s belief that the leader lacked voice. Thus, although some may suggest that humble leaders must not respond defensively to criticism (Lencioni, 2009; Nielson et al., 2010), not responding to deleterious criticism may convey a sense of weakness to others.

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Finally, candidly admitting mistakes such as not reaching organizational goals or not achieving desired results may lead to perceptions of leader incompetence. Although the organization may espouse humble behaviors associated with admitting mistakes, the organization may value reaching goals and achieving desired results more than humility. Therefore, the admission of mistakes such as these can be detrimental. McKennan and Brown (2011) suggest that leader humility comes at a potentially high political cost. Being humble may require sacrificing receiving due credit, which could lead to a lack of promotion or a lack of employee or board recognition of the leader’s contributions. Furthermore, these authors suggest that humble leadership may ultimately result in job loss. To be effective, humble leaders must respond astutely in their organizational situations in order to demonstrate humility in a manner that does not forsake self while, at the same time, benefits organizational others. However, the call to portray humility at work does not rest with organizational leaders; it also extends to organizational members who work with each other. Team Humility Team humility is an interpersonal dynamic that reflects the overall engagement of team members in three underlying dimensions of humble behavior: self-awareness, appreciation of others’ strengths and contributions, and modeling teachability (Owens & Hekman, in press). In conjunction with these three foundational aspects of humble behavior, Greer (2013) suggests that team humility includes two additional behaviors: inclusion of and care for other team members. Team members who express humility include other team members in team functioning (e.g., including all team members in team communications, the benefits of which include shared understanding and the elimination of subgroups or cliques). Humble team behavior also includes the caring for fellow team members, which promotes the growth and functioning of each team member for the good of the team and, ultimately, the organization. Humble team members view their fellow team members as having comparable worth to the team as themselves. Specifically, these team members recognize that, much like themselves, their fellow team members have strengths and weaknesses, too. Ultimately, when team members know themselves and when they are willing to learn from and share with each other (Greer, 2013) team humility flourishes. This in turn leads to the generation and continued perpetuation of collective attentiveness, active listening among team members, and opportunities for team enrichment through reciprocal exchange (Greer, 2013). Reciprocal exchange, then, establishes and maintains a safe zone in which team members can share knowledge. Finally, exhibiting humility becomes a valued norm

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shared by all team members. In summary, the strengths of each team member collectively add value to the team and the team’s efforts as a whole. Team members who exhibit humility understand that the coming together of their collective strengths (i.e., their interdependence) benefits the team. In other words, these team members understand that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” Advantages of Team Humility Results from various studies demonstrate that team humility favorably affects team performance. In a study of 85 student teams, Owens and McCornack (2010) found a positive association between team humility and team performance. In another study of 53 student teams, Owens and Hekman (in press) found that team humility operating through a collective promotion focus (i.e., collective focus on team achievement) improves team performance. Finally, Bradley and his colleagues (2012) suggested that task conflict may have a favorable impact on team performance if the team had a shared belief of safety regarding interpersonal risk taking such that team members felt a sense of confidence in sharing their thoughts without the threat of embarrassment, punishment, or rejection (i.e., psychological safety). Their results, gathered from 117 student teams, illustrated that task conflict positively affects team performance for teams experiencing high psychological safety. Based on the concept of collective humility, team humility appears to reflect a condition of psychological safety. Thus, task conflict in humble teams is likely to have a favorable impact on team performance. Disadvantages of Team Humility As with leader humility, the advantages of team humility have received far more attention than the disadvantages, and these disadvantages stem from the same foundation as that of leader humility. That is, team humility can be disadvantageous when it is executed in the wrong organizational situation. First, team humility may be better suited to performance contexts where maximizing the expertise of all members is more important than letting a strong member carry the team (i.e., conjunctive vs. disjunctive tasks; Steiner, 1972). Also, generally speaking, the interpersonal processes of team humility may take time to unfold. Thus, team humility may be a disadvantage in contexts requiring quick, lithe, and decisive action, or as Owens and Hekman (2012) put it, contexts comprising “significant threat and time pressure.” Along with the exploration of team humility within organizations, researchers have also begun to explore collective humility within organizations as an expression of the organization as a whole. Although organizational humility

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has not received the same level of attention as team humility, researchers and laypersons alike have made mention of this form of collective humility. Both have indicated that humility expressed as an organizational attribute is beneficial to the organization as a whole. Organizational Humility Few scholars have explored collective humility at the level of the organization, with most of the research being theoretical. As with leader and team humility, organizational humility is proposed to consist of three underlying behavioral factors. Researchers suggest that organizational humility consists of self-­awareness; appreciation of other organization’s strengths, contributions, and weaknesses; and modeling teachability. Organizational self-awareness manifests when the organization’s leaders and members are aware of the organization’s strengths and weaknesses (O’Brien, 2010; Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004). Organizational weaknesses are not limited to what the organization does not do well, but also includes gaps between the organization’s espoused values and the organization’s enacted values (Lips-Wiersma & Morris, 2011). Appreciation of other organizations’ strengths and contributions is illustrated when the organization reaches out to another organization(s) who is able to assist the organization in accomplishing a goal better than the organization could accomplish the same goal on its own. This aspect of organizational humility was recently demonstrated by Francis (Frank) Tolentino, former chairman of the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) in the Philippines.1 Realizing that one of his organization’s shortcomings was the handling of traffic enforcement laws, Frank Tolentino announced that the MMDA was allowing the Philippine National Police-Highway Patrol (PNPHP) to take over traffic enforcement rules. In his response to the media regarding this decision, Tolentino stated, “This is not a sign of weakness, but I think this is a kind of organizational humility, so to speak, that one organization cannot do it alone” (Philippines Star, September 10, 2015). Tolentino, representing the MMDA, demonstrated that the MMDA understood that the PNPHP was better able to handle the enforcement of traffic rules and that bringing traffic safety to the community was a task that required cooperating and working with other organizations. Finally, modeling teachability is achieved when the organization is willing to accept and receive feedback with grace, ask for advice (O’Brien, 2010; Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004), and learn from other organizations—even those that may be considered inferior (Ross, 2013). Together these three aspects of organizational humility are manifested in the organization’s enacted values, preferences, policies, and procedures placed on the development of humility within the organization and as carried out by the organization’s leaders and

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members (Casper, O’Brien, Roberto, & Yang, 2009; O’Brien, 2010; Vera & ­Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004). Advantages of Organizational Humility Research examining the benefits of organizational humility is primarily theoretical. Vera and Rodriguez-Lopez (2004) propose that organizational humility leads to organizational learning, organizational service, and organizational resilience. In turn, they suggest that each of these organizational characteristics lead to favorable organizational outcomes such as innovation and productivity via organizational learning, employee and customer service satisfaction via organizational service, and employee commitment via organizational resilience. In a discussion regarding positive organizational cultures, Ramlall (2008) proposed that organizational cultures that promote such positive attributes as humility have better financial performance than those organizations that do not promote such attributes. In perhaps the only study empirically examining the outcomes of organizational humility, O’Brien (2010) proposed that organizational humility among relief organizations would facilitate the ability to form temporary networks in response to natural disasters. O’Brien developed a scale to measure organizational humility that included two of the three organizational humility dimensions: self-awareness and modeling teachability. The scale demonstrated acceptable reliability (α = .87) and was used to assess the impact of organizational humility on temporary network formation from 90 members representing 69 relief organizations located across the United States. Although the results of O’Brien’s study did not indicate that organizational humility facilitated the formation of temporary networks among relief organizations; it did find that organizational humility is positively correlated with network tie strength and to having sufficient organizational resources to respond to recent natural disasters, such as funding, personnel, equipment, and management. Disadvantages of Organizational Humility As with leader and team humility, researchers have not explored the disadvantages of collective humility at the organizational level. However, some researchers have suggested that organizational humility alone may not be effective (Nour, 2013; Vera & Rodriguez-Lopez, 2004). Specifically, Nour (2013) suggested that organizational humility in isolation may lead to organizational complacency and doubt in the organization by its members. Another potential disadvantage of organizational humility is rooted in the formation of interorganizational relationships.

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The potential disadvantage in partnering with other organizations is the possibility of incongruency between the two organizations’ cultures, which could result in the difficult management of the partnership, especially if the humble organization is partnering with an organization that is more powerful than itself (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). If the humble organization is the less powerful organization in the partnership, this may be especially disadvantageous for the humble organization, as the more powerful organization has influence on the acts of the less powerful, in this case, the humble organization (French & Raven, 1959) such that the humble organization may not be able to engage in those acts that both promote humility and maintain the partnership with the more powerful organization. Therefore, in order to keep the partnership, the humble organization may have to disengage in some of their humble behaviors, thus lessening the organization’s degree of expressed humility. One of the disadvantages of maintaining an organizational culture of integrity may hold true for maintaining an organizational culture of humility. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015) suggested that publicly traded companies may suffer more negative consequences than private companies because public companies must satisfy their shareholders. These authors propose that publicly traded companies are able to maintain a culture of integrity, provided sustaining such a culture leads to positive outcomes for shareholders. Conversely, if such a culture negatively affects shareholder satisfaction, it will be difficult for the organization to maintain a culture of integrity. This scenario is likely to hold true for humble organizations. So long as organizational humility does not infringe upon favorable shareholder outcomes, organizational humility is to be sustained. However, if maintaining organizational humility negatively affects shareholder satisfaction, the organization is likely to forego humility in favor of engaging in behaviors that are less humble, but more in tune with satisfying shareholders. To combat these disadvantages humble organizations must be strategic in forming alliances with other organizations. Discussion Future Research Laypersons and researchers alike are aware that humility in organizational contexts has received increased attention due, in part, to the increased incidents of corporate scandal at the beginning of the twenty-first century along with the movements of positive psychology and positive organizational scholarship. The increased attention to this softer side of organizational functioning follows a previous focus on the harder side of organizational functioning (i.e., confidence, etc.), which almost completely advocated against this softer side

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of organizational functioning. So that organizations do not repeat history such that we experience other debacles due to a lack of expressed humility within organizations, researchers should continue to examine the impact of leader, team, and organizational humility. Leader Humility Leaders are pressured to perform, produce, and get the job done (McKennan & Brown, 2011)—oftentimes by any means necessary. The review of the literature surrounding leader humility suggests that “getting the job done” must be paired effectively with humility in order to achieve favorable organization outcomes. Research has begun to show that humility combined with paradoxical leadership traits such narcissism result in improved organizational functioning. Future research could benefit from the exploration of humility in tandem with other more aggressive leadership traits such as dominance, assertiveness, and Machiavellianism ( Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009). Additionally, research has shown that leadership tends to flow from the leader down to the followers of humble leaders, suggesting a sort of contagion. It could be that humility flows in this manner due to power that humble leaders have over their followers. It would be interesting to know whether humble behaviors promote humble behaviors laterally within the organization. Team Humility and Organizational Humility Research has shown that collective humility as exhibited by teams improves team performance. However, most of the current research has been gathered from student teams (for an exception see Owens & Hekman, in press). More research is needed to examine the benefits and drawbacks of team humility with teams composed of employees in order to expand our knowledge of the impact of team humility in a more practical setting. In addition, future research should explore how team humility influences team formation and its developmental lifecycle. Although leader and team humility have been explored empirically, organizational humility has not received the same attention for the most part. Future research on this perspective of humility would greatly benefit from empirical studies that examine the impact of organizational humility on organizational functioning. Finally, to lend insight into leader, team, and organizational humility and as suggested by Davis and his colleagues (2013), researchers should further explore ways in which humility forms, maintains, strengthens, and repairs organizational relationships. Practical Applications This review of humility within organizations demonstrates that humility can be advantageous for the organization; however, injecting humility in organizations

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is likely no easy feat. According to Ou and her colleagues (2014, in press) and Owens and his colleagues (in press), humility trickles down from organizational leaders to those directly below the leaders and continues in this fashion down through the organizational hierarchy. This suggests that organizations may benefit from including humility as an aspect of executive and leadership training. Additionally, organizations should ensure that beyond mere training that humility is also enacted and appreciated by organizational members possibly through human resource practices that reward humble behaviors. As Lawrence (2006) suggests, espoused humility within an organization via the inclusion of this virtue as part of the organization’s core values that are then taught to organizational members is not enough. Organizations must embrace humility in both words and action. Conclusion Prior to the start of the twenty-first century humility within organizational contexts was viewed as a weak personality trait. However, at the onset of the twenty-first century we witnessed the impact of a lack of humility within our organizations with the fall of large corporations at the hands of a few organizational leaders who focused on themselves to the detriment of the organization (e.g., Enron). Although fairly new, research exploring the influence of humility in organizational contexts is flourishing. In this chapter, we summarized how organizational scholars have defined humility within the contexts of organizations. We focused on the three types of humility: leader, team, and organizational. Although this chapter focuses predominately on the advantages of organizational humility, it also presents the potential drawbacks of humility expressed within organizational contexts. Despite inevitable boundary conditions, when humility is expressed in the appropriate organizational context and received as humility by others, the advantages of this virtue are likely to be realized. Note 1 Francis Tolentino resigned his position as chairman of the MMDA to run for senator in 2016.

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18 B O O S T I N G S TAT E H U M I L I T Y V I A G R AT I T U D E , S E L F - A F F I R M AT I O N , A N D AW E Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives Peter M. Ruberton, Elliott Kruse, and Sonja Lyubomirsky

Humility is a psychological characteristic marked by a balanced, accurate self-concept and pronounced focus on other people rather than oneself (Tangney, 2000). We propose that humility is characterized by five hallmarks, or observable markers: (a) a secure and accepting self-identity; (b) freedom from distortion about one’s strengths and weaknesses; (c) openness to new information about oneself and the world; (d) high focus on others relative to the self; and (e) a belief that other people are equally worthy (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). Each hallmark must be present, but none is individually sufficient for a person to be humble. These hallmarks thus both define humility and differentiate it from what it is not. In particular, the opposite of humility is high self-focus, including an excessively positive (e.g., narcissism or arrogance) or negative (e.g., depression or low self-esteem) self-view. Fur­ allmarks-based definition, humility can be distinguished from ther, under this h modesty. Although humble people are frequently modest, they may sometimes behave immodestly when speaking frankly about their genuine strengths and accomplishments. Additionally, narcissistic individuals may behave outwardly modestly for self-presentational purposes while maintaining an inwardly inflated self-worth. As such, humility is neither merely the absence of arrogance nor the presence of modesty. In contrast with alternative perceptions of it as self-deprecation or weakness (Tangney, 2000), humility is generally viewed as a positive personal characteristic (Exline & Geyer, 2004). Humility has also been linked to a number of prosocial outcomes. For example, humble undergraduates were more likely to help a fellow student than their less humble peers, even when the social pressure to help was minimal (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 2012).

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Humble people have also been found to be particularly generous with their time and money (Exline & Hill, 2012) and more likely than nonhumble people to cooperate in economic games, even when cooperation is costly to them (Hilbig & Zettler, 2009; Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012). Humility may also have benefits in specific domains such as medicine and business. In a study from our laboratory of patient–physician interactions, humble physicians were rated as more effective at communicating with patients than their less humble counterparts (Ruberton et al., 2016). Because physician communication is associated with better patient outcomes (Ong, de Haes, Hoos, & Lammes, 1995; Stewart, 1995), physician humility may thus have downstream benefits for patients. Furthermore, humility in a sample of business CEOs was associated with greater empowerment in followers (Ou et al., 2014), whereas narcissism in a sample of business managers was positively associated with rates of white-collar crime (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006). State Humility Using the hallmarks-based definition of humility as its foundation, our research treats humility as a malleable psychological state. By contrast, most research to date—including the work cited earlier on the benefits of humility—has approached humility as a relatively stable personality trait (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2008; Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). Traits indicate stability in people’s experiences across time and situations. Thus, trait humility is necessarily composed of a sequence of consistently experienced states of humility. Although we recognize that individuals do vary in their overall levels of humility, we propose that humility also varies within individuals across time in a potentially predictable, controllable manner. People high in trait humility may simply experience the states more often and more consistently than do others. This state-based approach allows for the examination of specific psychological and contextual antecedents of humility, and thus ways to increase momentary feelings of humility. To that end, our laboratory has already tested three experimental interventions to boost state humility: practicing self-affirmation (Kruse, Chancellor, & Lyubomirsky, 2016a), expressing gratitude (Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014), and experiencing awe (Chancellor, Nelson, Cornick, Blascovich, & Lyubomirsky, 2016). The background and details of each intervention are described in detail next. The success of interventions to date at boosting humility demonstrates that humility is not necessarily a permanent characteristic of an individual; rather, it is also a transient state that can be elicited by specific cognitive activities or situational cues. If people can be made more sensitive to such activities and cues, then they may be able to become more humble across situations.

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Methodologically, the state approach facilitates at least two kinds of research designs. First, it lends itself to building a state measure of humility that may be used as a manipulation check. Presently, the lack of such a published measure impedes experimentation. Second, state humility can be explored in nonexperimental prospective investigations, as well as daily diary and experience sampling studies. Unlike trait-based studies, in which temporal variability is often interpreted as error, a state approach assumes that change across time may be substantively meaningful and correlated with other psychological factors. Measurement of State Humility Humility, by definition, resists self-rating: those who label themselves as humble may be self-aggrandizing, and those who truly are may not be aware of it or reluctant to report it (Davis et al., 2010, 2011). Given this paradox, many past researchers have regarded self-report measures of humility to be unfeasible, preferring to use indirect measures, such as other (peer)-report (e.g., Davis et al., 2011). Other-reports are ideal for assessing observable phenomena, such as visible behavior and stable dispositions. However, they are less useful for tracking subtle fluctuations in humility, for implementing experimental paradigms, and for identifying humility’s intrapersonal dimensions. In light of these considerations, we propose that self-reporting state humility is both possible and necessary. To that end, we developed a short instrument that can measure fluctuations in self-reported humility: the Brief State Humility Scale (BSHS; see appendix). Notably, the BSHS can be adapted to assess both state and trait humility. The BSHS shows strong construct validity and good reliability, is sensitive to experimental manipulation, and does not correlate with social desirability (Kruse, Chancellor, & Lyubomirsky, 2016b). The Brief State Humility Scale facilitates three novel methodological approaches in the humility literature. First, as demonstrated by our experimental studies (see later), the measure is responsive to experimental change and therefore may be used as a dependent variable (or a manipulation check). The Brief State Humility Scale can be used alone, as the only direct measure of humility, or it can complement other measures of humility, such as informant reports. Second, our new scale enables researchers to explore whether state humility may moderate other constructs that hinge upon a “quiet ego.” For example, if people who feel humble experience greater openness and attentiveness (Kruse et al., 2016b), then they may be more likely to enter the state of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Third, in longitudinal research, other-report depends on coordinating multiple people and assumes that the informant has interacted with the participant meaningfully and sufficiently between time points. Selfreport circumvents both of these requirements and as such can facilitate

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research with multiple time points. In summary, the Brief State Humility Scale complements current measures and opens pathways to new research directions. Humility Interventions As noted earlier, a state-based approach to studying humility enables the development of cognitive or behavioral interventions that may provide short-term boosts to humble thoughts and feelings. Our research has tested three such interventions: affirming personal values, writing letters of gratitude, and experiencing awe-inspiring moments. We will now discuss the theoretical basis and empirical evidence supporting each intervention. Although some of the studies presented in this chapter are still under review, to our knowledge, they represent among the best evidence for state-humility interventions available. Self-Affirmation Self-affirmation (aka values affirmation; e.g., Logel & Cohen, 2012) is a process by which people reflect on personal values when confronted with information that threatens their self-concept (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Self-affirmation theory posits that people seek to preserve a positive self-image, and thus may respond defensively to information that threatens the self (Steele, 1988). For example, they may dismiss or discredit information that challenges their closely held beliefs (e.g., arguments against the death penalty presented to a proponent of capital punishment; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) or attribute their failures to external causes rather than to themselves (e.g., Miller & M. Ross, 1975). These defensive biases are often unconscious and automatic (Sherman & Cohen, 2006) and so may serve to reduce dissonance that results from encountering a threat to one’s self-view (Steele & Liu, 1983). Notably, self-affirmation does not mean directly asserting one’s own goodness or worth as a person (e.g., the Saturday Night Live catchphrase, “I’m good enough, I’m smart enough, and doggone it, people like me!”); rather, it refers to reinforcing central, self-­relevant values, which in turn promotes a more stable self-image. Self-affirmation thus serves as a substitute for defensive biases by reinforcing the self-image in other domains unrelated to the threatening information (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). By strengthening other aspects of the self, self-affirmation enables individuals to accept threatening information in an open and nondefensive manner. Relatedly, humility is associated with a secure, accepting identity and an acceptance of negative self-information (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013; Tangney, 2000). As such, bias reduction is one pathway by which self-affirmation may increase humility. Affirming one’s central values may allow one to accept one’s limitations because it is not necessary to dismiss or ignore those limitations to

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preserve a sense of self-worth. Additionally, self-affirmation may boost humility by increasing positive other-focus. In one study, self-affirmation promoted feelings of loving and connectedness, which in turn predicted greater acceptance of self-relevant information about the risks of smoking (Crocker, Niiya, and Mischowski, 2008). Completing a self-affirmation activity also decreased narcissistic aggression in a sample of adolescents for a period of up to one week following the affirmation activity (Thomaes, Bushman, de Castro, Cohen, & Denissen, 2009). Self-affirmation thus promotes positive, egalitarian attitudes and behaviors toward other people, which is a key hallmark of humility (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). Finally, humility involves relatively low negative affect and depression, and self-affirmation has been found to temper negative affect (Nelson, Fuller, Choi, & Lyubomirsky, 2014). In line with this theory, a series of studies by our lab experimentally examined the relationship between self-affirmation and humility (Kruse, Chancellor, & Lyubomirsky, 2016a). Across five experiments, participants who completed a self-affirmation activity showed greater self-reported (using the BSHS) and observer-rated (using a short writing activity; e.g., “Imagine that someone is angry with you”) state humility. However, this effect was only present when the self-affirmation was immediately followed by exposure to self-relevant information (e.g., when participants wrote about their strengths and weaknesses or why someone may have been angry with them). That is, self-affirmation alone did not increase humility, but rather enabled a humble response to a self-­threatening or self-enhancing cue. This finding is consistent with past research showing that self-affirmation enables nonbiased responses to self-relevant information: only when such information is salient is the effect of affirmation felt. Furthermore, exposure to negative self-information alone (e.g., self-denigration) did not promote humility, and the effects of self-affirmation on humility could not be explained by increased positive affect or self-esteem. That is, affirmed participants did not report greater humility than nonaffirmed participants simply because they felt good about themselves in general. In sum, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that self-affirmation is associated with high humility. Self-affirmation reduces defensive biases toward threatening information, enables greater acceptance of one’s limitations, promotes a more positive view of other people, and diminishes negative moods—all key components of the experience of humility. Consistent with this theoretical framework, experimentally manipulated self-affirmation did, indeed, lead to increases in humility in response to self-relevant information. Although further research is needed to explore other mechanisms by which self-affirmation may boost humility, it is clear that self-affirmation and humility are inexorably linked.

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Gratitude Gratitude is a cognitive and emotional reaction to externally attributed positive events and circumstances. It has been described as a moral emotion that occurs when individuals recognize that they have benefited from another person’s actions (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001), particularly when people believe that the benefits they received were altruistically motivated and costly to the benefactor (Wood, Maltby, Stewart, Linley, & Joseph, 2008). Additionally, gratitude may be conceptualized as a broader appreciation of positive factors in life, rather than merely of a specific positive event (Wood, Froh, & Geraghty, 2010). Similar to humility, gratitude may be treated as a stable trait (i.e., a grateful disposition; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002) or a transient, but malleable, state (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Fredrickson, 2004; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, Boehm, & Sheldon, 2011). Gratitude and humility are linked through several overlapping mechanisms. First, gratitude is an other-focused—and, indeed, other-praising (Algoe & Haidt, 2009)—emotion. As such, it inherently requires recognition of the positive influence of other people (or other factors outside of the self) in one’s life, which naturally decreases self-focus and thus increases humility (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013; Tangney, 2000). In a similar vein, experiences that promote gratitude may also bring about feelings of dissonance or uncertainty about one’s capabilities because they imply that the recipient of the benefit was unable to, or simply did not, carry out a particular goal independently. Accordingly, gratitude prompts individuals to recognize that their capabilities are limited—that is, to acknowledge that they cannot “go it alone” to achieve their goals. In other words, gratitude invokes themes of humility because one cannot simultaneously be grateful for someone else’s efforts and attribute successes completely to oneself. Consistent with this idea, writing letters of gratitude has not been found to be a wholly positive experience; rather, in three studies, the activity evoked feelings of indebtedness, guilt, and humility, suggesting that it made participants cognizant of their own shortcomings (Layous, Sweeny, Armenta, & Lyubomirsky, 2016). Furthermore, practicing gratitude appears to promote increased effort toward self-improvement goals (Layous, Nelson, Kurtz, & Lyubomirsky, 2016), suggesting that gratitude-evoking experiences make individuals more aware of a need to improve themselves. In sum, experiences that bring about gratitude may also bring a greater recognition of one’s limitations, a key facet of humility (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). A recent series of studies by our lab empirically tested the relationship between humility and gratitude (Kruse et al., 2014). Consistent with the hypothesis that

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gratitude-inducing activities can also induce humility, participants who wrote a letter of gratitude were rated by others (in response to a humility-eliciting writing activity) as more humble at that moment than those who completed a neutral activity. This effect was mediated by ratings of low self-focus in the letters of gratitude. Additionally, humility moderated the impact of writing a letter of gratitude on gratitude itself: only participants who were initially humble reported feeling more grateful after writing the letter. Finally, in a daily diary study, day-to-day gratitude and humility mutually predicted one another over a 14-day period. Participants who felt particularly grateful on a certain day were more likely to become more humble (as measured by the BSHS) by the next day, and vice versa, than less grateful participants. Taken together, these findings suggest the possibility that gratitude and humility may exist in a mutually reinforcing upward spiral: Gratitude boosts humility, which in turn enables one to feel more grateful. Awe Awe is an emotional response to grand, powerful, overwhelming, or unexpected environmental stimuli (see Fredrickson, 2013; Keltner & Haidt, 2003), such as nature, beauty, or great accomplishments by other people (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). It is a discrete emotion (Ekman, 1992; Shiota, Campos, & Keltner, 2003) and is regarded as a positive state (Fredrickson, 2004; Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010; Shiota et al., 2007; cf. Lazarus, 1991) or even a moral emotion (i.e., an emotion triggered by non–self-relevant stimuli that promotes prosocial behavior; Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Keltner and Haidt (2003) propose that awe is distinguished by two primary components. First, awe evokes a sense of vastness, or a recognition of forces larger (either physically or socially) than the self. Second, awe promotes cognitive accommodation, or the expansion of mental structures to make sense of new or overwhelming experiences. The empirical research on awe suggests that awe-eliciting experiences may also evoke feelings of humility. Specifically, awe promotes a diminished, detached sense of self (Shiota et al., 2007), and humility involves low self-­focus and an accurate view of oneself and one’s position in the world (Tangney, 2000). Additionally, awe is associated with increased cognitive openness and a broader, less close-minded worldview (Griskevicius et al., 2010; Rudd, Vohs, & Aaker, 2012; Shiota et al., 2007), and humility is associated with high levels of openness to new information about oneself and the world (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). A study from our laboratory provided support for the hypothesized awe– humility relationship by using a virtual reality environment to induce awe

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(Chancellor et al., 2016). Participants were exposed to either a high-awe simulation (a spaceship slowly moving away from Earth with narration of a passage from the book Pale Blue Dot [Sagan, 1994]) or a neutral simulation (a generic office setting with narration of an encyclopedic description of the dwarf planet Pluto). As expected, participants who viewed the awe simulation subsequently reported greater awe and humility than participants who viewed the neutral simulation. However, the increase in humility was not directly mediated by increases in awe itself, suggesting that the mechanisms by which awe-eliciting experiences induce humility operate parallel to the mechanisms by which the experiences induce awe. For example, viewing the Pale Blue Dot may have fostered accurate self-awareness, which simultaneously promoted both greater awe and greater humility. Hence, reported feelings of awe itself may not be necessary for awe-related experiences to increase humility. Furthermore, little is known about the conditions under which awe-eliciting stimuli might be most effective at increasing humility. For example, insecure individuals may be reluctant to diminish their self-view and thus resistant to the cognitive effects of awe. Consistent with this hypothesis, the awe simulation increased humility via increased feelings of connectedness to other people, but only in individuals with high self-esteem (Chancellor et al., 2016), perhaps because people without a stable sense of self-regard found the experience to be threatening. Awe-related experiences may therefore be most impactful on humility when individuals have already been made to feel somewhat humble. Although further research is needed to understand how and when awe-related experiences elicit humility, it is clear that such experiences are nonetheless a valuable means of boosting humility, particularly in conjunction with other techniques such as self-affirmation and gratitude. Limitations and Future Directions Taken together, our laboratory’s interventions provide a diverse set of paths to boosting state humility. Theoretically, each intervention links to humility through a distinct mechanism: self-affirmation by securing self-esteem, gratitude by promoting other-focus over self-focus, and awe by increasing accuracy of self-judgments and openness to new information. However, further experimental research is needed to replicate these interventions, to test the duration of their effects, and, most important, to understand precisely how and when the interventions increase humility. Furthermore, these activities are by no means the only ones that might promote humility. For example, practicing forgiveness in response to a transgression—or working to make amends for one’s own transgressions—may encourage an accurate view of one’s own importance and a higher valuation of others, both defining characteristics of humility.

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In addition to catalyzing the development of state humility interventions, the state-based view of humility opens a number of exciting new directions for humility research in general. From a theoretical perspective, by acknowledging that humility may fluctuate, several new research questions become available. First, as discussed earlier, if humility can rise and wane over short periods, it can be experimentally boosted and lowered. As such, the state approach opens questions about what precedes, causes, and results from shifts in humility. Second, the state approach also makes possible the study of how trait humility ­develops—for example, whether people acquire humility (or lose it) in response to humbling (or ego-inflating) life events (e.g., birth of a child, unexpected success or failure), through slow personal growth over time due to daily behaviors and uplifts (e.g., loving interactions with one’s spouse, expressions of gratitude to coworkers), or a combination of these and other factors (e.g., genetics, values). Third, the state approach has implications beyond humility itself, as it raises questions about the dynamic nature of the self and self-focus (Exline, 2008; Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006), as well as about what thoughts, emotions, and behaviors precede, follow, or co-occur with humble feelings, as they arise in real time. Finally, our research on humility interventions has examined only shortterm changes in humble thoughts and feelings. However, a state approach to humility also enables the development of interventions to promote long-term boosts to humility by accruing and building short-term humble states into longterm humble traits. Recent models of volitional personality change have proposed that behavioral techniques—such as identifying values, setting goals, and monitoring behaviors and their effects—that succeed at stimulating behaviors consistent with the desired personality trait will, in turn, boost the trait itself (Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Magidson, Roberts, Collado-Rodriguez, & Lejuez, 2014; see also English & Carstensen, 2014). (Or, as Funder [2014] succinctly put it: “Change the behaviors, and the trait will follow.”) Humility change may follow a similar approach: Promote repeated humble thoughts and behaviors (e.g., via humility interventions or contextual cues) and people will become sustainably more humble. To that end, our lab is conducting a series of studies (funded by the John Templeton Foundation) aimed at translating our shortterm activities into a long-term humility intervention. State-level humility interventions may thus be the first step toward lasting increases in humility. Practical Lessons A recurring theme of our studies is that humility can be induced by positive activities, rather than by self-denigration or other negative behaviors. As such, people who wish to become more humble can do so in natural, even enjoyable,

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ways, such as by taking more time to appreciate the awe-inspiring ways in which other people have helped them. Because our interventions are not explicitly about “humility,” they may also be humbling even for those who do not consciously seek to become more humble. Indeed, our interventions may provide a means of boosting humility in domains where it may be beneficial but has often been dismissed as an undesirable weakness. For example, research has shown that humble physicians are particularly effective at communicating with their patients (Ruberton et al., 2016), in contrast with media portrayals of arrogant physicians as successful physicians (e.g., the long-running television show House, M.D.). Humility interventions for physicians may therefore benefit both the physicians themselves and the patients under their care. Furthermore, although humility is not often viewed as a strength in business leaders (Exline & Geyer, 2004), leader humility has been linked to positive outcomes in the workplace (see Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 2011, for a review). Because our interventions avoid explicit self-deprecation, they may be particularly useful for CEOs who might benefit professionally from being more humble, but would not accept an intervention that (they believe) would make them weaker. Experimental studies on the impact of humility interventions for people in influential positions thus represents a promising future direction in state humility research. References Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The “other-praising” emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 105–127. doi:10.1080/17439760802650519 Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2008). The prediction of honesty-humility-related criteria by the HEXACO and Five-Factor models of personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 1216– 1228. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2008.03.006 Blickle, G., Schlegel, A., Fassbender, P., & Klein, U. (2006). Some personality correlates of business white-collar crime. Applied Psychology, 55, 220–233. doi:10.1111/j.1464–0597.2006.00226.x Chancellor, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). Humble beginnings: Current trends, state perspectives, and hallmarks of humility. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 819–833. doi:10.1111/spc3.12069 Chancellor, J., Nelson, S. K., Cornick, J., Blascovich, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2016). Above the Pale Blue Dot: Awe and state humility in immersive virtual environments. Manuscript under review. Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Mischowski, D. (2008). Why does writing about important values reduce defensiveness? Self-affirmation and the role of positive other-directed feelings. Psychological Science, 19, 740–747. doi:10.1111/j.1467–9280.2008.02150.x Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Finding flow: The psychology of engagement with everyday life. New York: Basic Books. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J., . . . & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225–234. doi:10. 1080/00223891.2011.558871

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Layous, K., Nelson, S. K., Kurtz, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2016). What triggers prosocial effort? A positive feedback loop between positive activities, kindness, and well-being. The Journal of Positive Psychology. doi: 10.1080/17439760.2016.1198924 Layous, K., Sweeny, K., Armenta, C. N., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2016). Gratitude interventions induce more than gratitude. Manuscript under review. Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. Leary, M. R., Adams, C. E., & Tate, E. B. (2006). Hypo-egoic self-regulation: Exercising self-­ control by diminishing the influence of the self. Journal of Personality, 74, 1803–1832. Logel, C., & Cohen, G. L. (2012). The role of the self in physical health: Testing the effect of a values-affirmation intervention on weight loss. Psychological Science, 23, 53–55. doi:10.1177/0956797611421936 Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2098–2109. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 Lyubomirsky, S., Dickerhoof, R., Boehm, J. K., & Sheldon, K. M. (2011). Becoming happier takes both a will and a proper way: An experimental longitudinal intervention to boost well-being. Emotion, 11, 391–402. Magidson, J. F., Roberts, B. W., Collado-Rodriguez, A., & Lejuez, C. W. (2014). Theory-driven intervention for changing personality: Expectancy value theory, behavioral activation, and conscientiousness. Developmental Psychology, 50, 1442–1450. doi:10.1037/a0030583 McCullough, M. E., Emmons, R. A., & Tsang, J. (2002). The grateful disposition: A conceptual and empirical topography. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 112–127. doi:10.1037//0022–3514.82.1.112 McCullough, M. E., Kilpatrick, S. D., Emmons, R. A., & Larson, D. B. (2001). Is gratitude a moral affect? Psychological Bulletin, 127, 249–266. doi:10.1037/0033–2909.127.2.249 Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213–225. doi:10.1037/h0076486 Nelson, S. K., Fuller, J. A., Choi, I., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2014). Beyond self-protection: Self-­ affirmation benefits hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. doi:10.1177/0146167214533389 Ong, L. M., de Haes, J. C., Hoos, A. M., & Lammes, F. B. (1995). Doctor-patient communication: A review of the literature. Social Science & Medicine, 40, 903–918. doi:10.1016/0277–9536(94)00155-M Ou, A. Y., Tsui, A. S., Kinicki, A. J., Waldman, D., Xiao, Z., & Song, L. J. (2014). Humble chief executive officers’ connections to top management team integration and middle managers’ responses. Administrative Science Quarterly, 59, 34–72. doi:10.1177/0001839213520131 Owens, B. P., Rowatt, W. C., & Wilkins, A. L. (2011). Exploring the relevance and implications of humility in organizations. In K. S. Cameron & G. M. Spreitzer (Eds.), Handbook of positive organizational scholarship (pp. 260–272). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ruberton, P.M., Huynh, H., Miller, T., Kruse, E., Chancellor, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2016). The relationship between physician humility, physician-patient communication, and patient health. Patient Education and Counseling, 99, 138–145. Rudd, M., Vohs, K. D., & Aaker, J. (2012). Awe expands people’s perception of time, alters decision-making, and enhances well-being. Psychological Science, 23, 1130–1136. doi:10.1177/0956797612438731 Sagan, C. (1994). Pale blue dot: A vision of the human future in space. New York: Random House. Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 183–242). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

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Appendix B R I E F S TAT E H U M I L I T Y S C A L E

Please answer these questions based on how you feel right this moment. (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = neither agree nor disagree; 7 = strongly agree) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

I feel that, overall, I am no better or worse than the average person. I feel that I have both many strengths and flaws. I feel that I do not deserve more respect than other people. To be completely honest, I feel that I am better than most people. I feel that I deserve more respect than everyone else. I feel that I do not have very many weaknesses.

Items 4–6 are reverse-scored.

19 HUMILITY INTERVENTION RESEARCH A Qualitative Review Caroline R. Lavelock, Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Brandon J. Griffin, Rachel C. Garthe, Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook1

Thomas Aquinas defined virtue as ultimum potentiae, or the highest potential a person could achieve (Alvarez-Segura, Echavarria, & Vitz, 2015). The positive psychology movement has long supported the promotion of virtue-based flourishing, both in the presence and absence of adversity (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In this chapter, we define humility and consider its role in psychopathology, making the promotion of humility of interest. Next, we review the few existing studies that explore how one might work to increase one’s level of humility and consider the extent to which the promotion of humility is adaptive. We then highlight the sparse amount of humility intervention research and propose future research directions. What Is Humility? Humility is a warmth-based virtue involving intrapersonal and interpersonal qualities. Intrapersonally, humility is characterized by an accurate view of the self, understanding one’s strengths and weaknesses, and acknowledging one’s limitations. Interpersonally, humility involves presenting oneself modestly and sensitively and maximizing one’s orientation to others above the self, fostering connection while “transcend[ing] egotistical concerns and the attendant urge for defensive, self-serving maneuvers” (Davis et al., 2011; Hook & Davis, 2014; Kesebir, 2014, p. 611; Worthington et al., 2015). When people worry less about their own needs or interests, freedom exists to care for the needs and interests of others (Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014). Humility, Mental Illness, and Psychotherapy Radical individualism in Western society makes humility a challenge. Sentiments such as “look out for number one,” and “you do you” emphasize the primacy

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of the self in today’s world. Although some attention to the self is important and adaptive, radical glorification of the self engenders a culture of narcissism, entitlement, overcompetitiveness, attention seeking, and self-obsession (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Myers; 2000; Putnam, 2000; Twenge & Campbell, 2009). For example, in a pair of studies examining American books published in the twentieth century, usage of terms related to Christian values, such as humility, patience, kindness, gratitude, and charity, significantly decreased over time (Kesebir & Kesebir, 2012). This decrease may be in a parallel decline with religious affiliation, which has traditionally supported the idea of a disciplined ego and a greater focus on the public good (Chaves, 2011) and is consistent with the burgeoning Zeitgeist of self-interest. In this normatively egocentric paradigm, psychotherapy is rarely pursued for the sake of promoting humility (Worthington, 2007). Moreover, clients in psychotherapy rarely make humility an explicit treatment goal, despite humility’s implications for positive relationship functioning (Davis et al., 2013). Nonetheless, humility plays a central role in the psychotherapeutic relationship (see Davis & Cuthbert, this volume; Drinane, Owen, Hook, Davis, & Worthington, this volume; and Sandage, Rupert, Paine, Bronstein, & O’Rourke, this volume). For example, the very act of seeking help through psychotherapy requires humility, because the patient acknowledges his or her limitations and accepts help from another person. The patient is also willing to be vulnerable, acknowledge his or her role in causing or maintaining his or her problems, and learn and take assistance from another person (Rowden, Harris, & Wickel, 2014). Conversely, narcissism in patients has been implicated in poorer treatment outcomes relative to humble comparisons (Hart & Huggett, 2005). The success of psychotherapy is also contingent upon the humility of the psychotherapist (Sandage, Chapter 21, this volume; Owen, Chapter 22, this volume; Worthington, 2007). The ethical psychotherapist humbly enters the patient’s value system and exercises cultural and intellectual humility, allowing not only tolerance and acceptance of the patient’s differences, but also facilitating growth and positive change within the patient’s cultural context (Gregg & Mahadevan, 2014; Hook et al., 2013). A patient is often sensitive to a psychotherapist’s humility. When clients view their therapists as humble, this allows the client to risk greater vulnerability, which leads to better outcomes in psychotherapy (Owen et al., 2014). Self-Focus, Shame, and Low Humility One reason humility may be important to promote is that pathology often involves various forms of low humility (e.g., egocentric cognition, emotions, and motivations and narcissistic vulnerability; Alvarez-Segua et al, 2015; Book, Visser, & Volk, 2015). For example, narcissism and paranoia have obvious links to self-focus, whether it is a defensive and grandiose love of self or whether it

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involves an uncomfortable concern that others show care for them more than the others really do (Dwiwardani, 2012; Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004). Social anxiety charades as concern about others, but it is more likely concern for how others perceive the self. Depression can be considered a heightened focus on one’s own sadness, making it difficult to know or connect with anyone or anything beyond the suffering of the self. Patients suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder tend to burden themselves with the idea that the fate of self and others depends on their rituals. Disordered eating centers around self-image and self-doubt. Substance abuse and impulsivity are born of the need to find relief or feel good right now. Grief desires departed loved ones, and existential identity issues involve struggling with the self’s physical demise (Kesebir, 2014). Trauma strands the self in a shameful past (Andrews, Brewin, Rose, & Kirk, 2000), whereas anxiety ruminates on the self’s future. Borderline personality insists that others are the problem and never themselves; histrionic personalities crave attention to the self; dependent personalities insist that others care for the self; and antisocial personalities lack the capacity to empathize with others beyond the self. Almost by definition, pathology involves various ways of addressing the needs of the self in ways that have been deemed problematic for social living. Thus, we might conceptualize much of the psychotherapeutic enterprise as an exercise in ameliorating various forms of self-focused thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that make a person less fit to contribute to society, let alone flourish personally or interpersonally. Most people do not set out to get entrenched in ineffective strategies of balancing their own personal needs with the needs of others. Rather, self-focus often develops somewhat unconsciously, and the fire is accelerated by shame. Shame—a quiet devaluation of the self—begs not to be seen (Lewis, 1987). Behavior appraised as bad becomes an indication of the bad self (e.g., if people really knew who I am, they would harshly judge me). Shame is painful and sometimes leads to maladaptive behaviors (e.g., moral disengagement, avoidance, withdrawal, secrecy, compartmentalization of the self; Shapiro & Powers, 2011). If the heart of coping with shame involves moral disengagement (Fossati, Pincus, Borroni, Munteanu, & Maffei, 2014)—or numbing oneself to the pain of being judged as morally bereft and thus unfit for close relationships—then it makes sense for humility to facilitate moral engagement after shame. Humility may help to free the self from the debilitating effects of shame on human personality. For example, humility helps people become aware of defenses that socially isolate the individual and preempt the potential for healing and social integration, including strengthening of social bonds and the give-andtake of help and compassion within a healthy relational system. Humility allows one to see what has been intolerable to see and connect that which shame has

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disconnected. Thus, humility exposes the self to the self, vulnerably and accurately, and allows the person to see beyond shame to correctively experience connection to others. Shapiro and Powers (2011) thus note, “It is only when shame reaches the light of day that the healing process can begin” (p. 125). Interventions Designed to Promote Humility Humility has only recently gained empirical attention, and relatively limited work has focused on promoting humility. Recent research supports the importance of secure attachment style in early childhood as a predictor of humility (Dwiwardani et al., 2014). Psychotherapeutic modalities that emphasize corrective emotional experiences related to establishing secure relationships can benefit patients who developed shame as a result of insecure attachments during formative years. Relatedly, mentalization, or “the ability to attend to the mental states of self and others” (Worthington & Sandage, 2016, p. 190), is born of security and may lead to humility. But what of specific interventions designed to promote humility? A PsycINFO search of “humility” conducted on November 18, 2015, yielded 1,483 results; further refinement using the search term “intervention” winnowed results to 47. Of these, three related to the direct promotion of humility using a targeted intervention. The first of these, “wisdom therapy” (Robins, 2008), was introduced as a method for facilitating humility, well-being, mindfulness, and ultimately wisdom. Wisdom therapy combines cognitive behavioral, m ­ indfulness-based, and humility-driven techniques to ameliorate anger, anxiety, depression, antisocial personality behaviors, and narcissism. Narcissism was specifically targeted in wisdom therapy, with the fearful aspect of narcissism being addressed using cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and the grandiosity aspect of narcissism being addressed with humility. The humility portion of the intervention treats humility as an appreciation that one’s perceptions are limited, and the intervention aims at loosening any rigid assumptions and expectations that attend certainty of one’s rightness. A second aspect of the intervention was to induce awe and respect for the size and complexity of the universe. A third aspect of the intervention was to undermine certainty that what we see is real. Visual illusions were used to undermine confidence in one’s visual perceptions. This intervention is a limited humility intervention. The stated goal of the intervention is to help people develop more wisdom through increasing humility. We note several weaknesses in this research. First, the available research was never adjudicated by peer review. Second, no process research was done that demonstrated that (a) humility was actually promoted by the intervention or (b) that people achieved some measure of wisdom to the degree that they attained humility. In fact, one dissertation study found that wisdom therapy did

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not promote humility more than rational emotive behavior therapy in a sample of substance-dependent clients (McCulloh, 2009). Thus, although the claims relate to humility, the supporting evidence for this as an evidence-based intervention for promoting humility specifically is limited. Second, a workbook intervention to promote humility (Lavelock, Worthington, & Davis, 2012; available at www.EvWorthington-forgiveness.com) was created in response to a need for a protective buffer of humility against mental illness, as well as to a call for mental health resources that could be widely disseminated (Kazdin & Rabbitt, 2013). Early conceptual research informed the workbook content, including (a) acknowledging accuracy regarding selfstrengths and limitations, (b) inducing states of awe for things greater than or beyond the self, (c) performing menial tasks, (d) seeking forgiveness for one’s transgressions, (e) recording thoughts of gratitude daily, and (f) furthering close relationships (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Grounded in these tenets, the 80-page workbook guides participants through five steps to promote humility, forming the acrostic PROVE: Pick a time when you were not humble, Remember your abilities within the big picture, Open yourself, Value all things, and Examine limitations (for a detailed description of the workbook, see Lavelock et al., 2014). Initial research has supported the efficacy of the humility workbook (Lavelock et al., 2014). Between pre-test and a follow-up two weeks after workbook completion, 26 undergraduates in the workbook condition reported significantly greater increases in trait humility than did the 33 undergraduates in the control condition, who did not change in humility over time. Participants in the humility condition also saw gains in trait forgiveness and trait patience and decreases in trait negativity; the participants in the control condition did not. Neither religious commitment nor spiritual transcendence predicted increased humility as a result of the workbook, demonstrating the accessibility of humility for both religious and nonreligious individuals (Lavelock et al., 2014). The initial study had notable weaknesses. First, the number of participants was small, and the population was undergraduate students at a public university. Second, only trait or dispositional measures were used, and the time of follow-up was only two weeks. Longer-term assessment is needed to ensure that the results are replicable. Third, all intervention research is specific, despite the claims to promote changes in its focal construct (in this case humility). However, just because a treatment claims to promote humility does not mean that is what is happening. Though randomized controlled trials seek to control for effects of repeated assessment, there is no guarantee that the retested control condition controlled for demand characteristics associated with participating in any intervention.

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However, further analyses have compared the humility workbook to additional workbooks. Each workbook was designed to promote a particular virtue (e.g., forgiveness, patience, self-control) (Lavelock et al., 2016). These three workbooks each resulted in significant improvement for their target virtue, and importantly to the contention that virtues are interrelated, each workbook showed significant improvement among other trait virtues as well. Participants who completed the humility workbook, however, reported the most statistically significant improvements compared to other workbooks. Participants in the other workbook conditions did not report improvements in humility. This might be interpreted that humility might be a higher-order virtue that promotes a variety of other virtues. The main conclusion after the study by Lavelock et al. was that replication and further analyses were needed, especially given that the results still could have been shaped by demand characteristics. The humility workbook was then revised to refine and clarify concepts and minimize redundancy. The revised version (Lavelock, Worthington, & Davis, 2013) yielded an identical constellation of outcomes as in the primary efficacy trial, with improvements in trait humility, trait forgiveness, and trait patience and decreases in trait negativity (Lavelock et al., 2016). This exact replication minimizes the threat of demand characteristics as the primary agent behind these results. Importantly, the major difference between the two versions of the workbooks was not in number of outcomes or average completion time, but in effect size; the effect size of the revised humility workbook was .86, compared to .35 for the original (Worthington et al., 2014). The third intervention to promote humility was an art intervention, called Shibboleth, intended to promote humility and self-awareness and prevent hubris in leaders (Romanowska, Larsson, & Theorell, 2014). In this intervention, 20 leaders and 64 subordinates provided written responses and participated in guided group discussion after witnessing a 60- to 70-minute art performance representing multiple genres, media, and moods. These participants were compared on several leadership measures to another group of 20 leaders and 66 subordinates who participated in a more conventional leadership training seminar. Leaders in the art group improved self-awareness, humility, and stress coping and demonstrated a style of leadership less characterized as laissez faire. Romanowska et al. (2014) posit that the performance’s inclusion of topics of genocide, suffering, and injustice may have been important factors in this change. We note that this intervention does not explicitly target humility. Furthermore, leadership, rather than humility, was the target of the intervention. In conclusion, the intervention workbook to promote humility (Lavelock et al., 2013) appears to be the only existing intervention to specifically target the cultivation of humility. Although there is preliminary evidence of its

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efficacy, much more research is needed. This includes use of state measures of humility as well as dispositional measures, careful process research on what elements of the workbook are active treatment ingredients, and use of alternative conditions that control for demand characteristics. In addition, it is possible to critique the content of the workbook in light of the definition we advanced. We noted six elements of the workbook earlier. These were (a) acknowledging accuracy regarding self-strengths and limitations, (b) inducing awe for things beyond the self, (c) performing menial tasks, (d) seeking forgiveness, (e) gratitude, and (f) furthering close relationships. According to our threepart definition (i.e., accurate view of self, modest self-presentation, and other-­ orientation), the intervention covered accurate self-appraisal in element 1 and other-orientation in elements d, e, and f. However, little attention was given to modest self-presentation. Thus, more could be done to strengthen the PROVE Humility intervention. Humility in Moderation Scholars have recently argued that virtues can have a “dark side” when used in excess or in inappropriate circumstances (McNulty & Fincham, 2012). In fact, almost every virtue examined in positive psychology has generated studies examining how the benefits of that virtue may have important boundary conditions. For example, forgiveness is generally thought to be an important virtue. However, for a person who is a victim of physical abuse, perhaps the virtue of courage, leading to behavior that prioritizes seeking safety for oneself and one’s children, should be prioritized over forgiveness. After safety is achieved and one has established appropriate boundaries, one can then perhaps consider forgiveness. Indeed, virtuous behaviors require appropriate balance with other virtues. Thus, despite the many theorized and some empirically supported benefits of humility (Davis & Hook, 2013; Kesebir, 2014), it might be wise to consider the adage, “all things in moderation,” in application to humility. As such, there are likely limitations and boundary conditions to humility as well. For example, humility involves an accurate view of self and modest self-presentation. However, there may be situations in which it is adaptive for one’s mental health and well-being to have a positive illusory bias (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and years of research on self-esteem demonstrates that it is possible to take awareness of limitations and modest self-presentation to the point of low self-esteem or fragile high self-esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). Also, humility involves an interpersonal stance that is other-oriented rather than self-focused. However, we acknowledge that contexts indisputably occur in which it is important for individuals to prioritize one’s own needs and wants rather than defer to the needs and wants of others.

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Additionally, situations certainly exist when it is important to stand firm to one’s convictions, even if it differs markedly from the convictions of others. In these ways, a moderate exercise of humility, as seems to be the case with other virtues, may be merited. And yet, humility is hallmarked by its accurate and moderate view of the self. One who is truly humble embodies this moderation, so to be too humble may not be possible. Future Directions and Practical Lessons Humility research has flourished in recent years; yet, because humility is relatively new to the empirical scene, far more work must be done to explore the construct, its implications and relationships to other constructs, and how it can be predicted and cultivated. The evolving definitions and measurement strategies for studying humility have presented a challenge for humility intervention research thus far, but as basic humility research advances, applied research and practical applications can follow. Predictors of who benefits from humility intervention remain elusive, as little predictive research has been conducted to determine what personality traits and factors may lend themselves best to noticeable improvements in humility. For example, the role of attachment in the development of virtues should continue to be explored (Dwiwardani et al., 2014). Additionally, though a workbook to promote humility has evidence supporting its efficacy in healthy populations, the utility of humility and interventions to promote it in clinical samples represents an exciting area for future research and application. Given the implication of maladaptive self-focus in a number of diagnosable pathologies, future research should explicitly assess the efficacy of humility interventions for treatment of specific psychological disorders. Such research would also shed light on the utility of humility for acute stressors relative to more chronic concerns. Predictors of when humility intervention is necessary and most successful have also yet to be examined. For example, it may be that promoting humility is most necessary or successful during a depressive episode, following an argument, or in the aftermath of a traumatic experience. Alternatively, it may be during times of stability or following a meaningful accomplishment. Future research should examine the life circumstances under which humility intervention is the most needed and effective. This line of research may also reveal whether the presence of other virtues (e.g., forgiveness following conflict, gratitude following an accomplishment) facilitates humility or perhaps whether it is humility that facilitates other virtues. When considering the who and when of humility intervention, modality (i.e., the where) is an important and yet relatively unexplored factor in humility intervention. Given that humility is a multifaceted construct, composed

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of intrapersonal and interpersonal factors, certain components may be more effectively promoted in specific contexts. For example, the group psychotherapy modality may lend itself well to interpersonal humility promotion (e.g., increasing in other-orientedness), as group psychotherapy is a shared environment where shame is often addressed interpersonally. This could have a strong propensity for both increased humility, as well as a corrective emotional experience (Shapiro & Powers, 2011). Alternatively, a more private, self-directed experience may lend itself well to intrapersonal humility promotion (e.g., accurate self-appraisal). Workbook interventions such as Lavelock et al. (2013) capitalize on the participant’s self-reflection, a powerful agent of change according to a number of therapeutic orientations. Future research would do well to examine the growth of specific components of humility across a number of modalities (individual psychotherapy, group psychotherapy, self-directed intervention, etc.); in particular, process research on the humility workbook intervention can illuminate exactly which exercises are effective for which components of humility. An important practical application of humility and its research is greater understanding and acknowledgement of why humility is a vital in the therapeutic process. Cultural and intellectual humility should be emphasized in training programs and in continuing education (Hook et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2014). Further research is necessary to examine patient perceptions and outcomes related to the humble clinician, as well as the role of humility as a mechanism of positive change in psychotherapy. Qualitative methods may be especially helpful for detailing the process of successful psychotherapy, both in specific humility interventions and in more general interventions provided by the humble therapist. In general, greater reliance on multiple methods, rather than simply self-report, will also supplement findings in future studies testing humility interventions on wider, and potentially clinical, contexts; specifically, behavioral measures of humility can add an accurate and nuanced view of humility and why it is can be effective for clinical treatment (Davis et al., 2011; Dorn, Hook, Davis, Van Tongeren, & Worthington, 2014). Conclusion Leary (2004) writes that the self is both our greatest ally and our worst enemy. Humility may yield the optimum relationship with the self; one which knows and acknowledges the self, while disabling shame and self-focus and diminishing the need for defenses that can escalate to mental illness. We conceptualize humility as therapeutic for mental health, yet very little research has sought to promote humility with specific interventions. The impact of interventions to promote humility is far from fully realized; thus, it is essential

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that researchers continue to seek ways to promote humility and implement them in clinical practice. Note 1 We would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary/Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation (Grant No. 108, Intellectual Humility in Religious Leaders), as well as the John Templeton Foundation (Grant No. 29630, The Development, Validation, and Dissemination of Measures of Intellectual Humility and Humility; Grant No. 14979, Relational Humility: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of Humility). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.

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20 HUMILITY AND PSYCHOTHERAPIST EFFECTIVENESS H u m i l i t y, t h e T h e r a p y R e l a t i o n s h i p , and Psychotherapy Outcomes Edward B. Davis and Andrew D. Cuthbert1

Research has robustly shown psychotherapists vary in their effectiveness in promoting positive psychotherapy outcomes (Baldwin & Imel, 2013). In this chapter, we build on this research and argue that psychotherapist effects on outcomes occur primarily via how the psychotherapist’s qualities and behaviors affect the therapy relationship, which in turn affects outcomes. We highlight the potential role of psychotherapist humility in this process. Definitions To begin, we define our terms. First, psychotherapist effects refer to “the effect[s] of a given therapist on patient outcomes as compared to another therapist” (Baldwin & Imel, 2013, pp. 259–260, emphasis in original). The therapy relationship refers to “the feelings and attitudes that [the] therapist and client have toward one another, and the manner in which these [feelings and attitudes] are expressed” (Norcross & Lambert, 2011b, p. 5). Humility is defined as “a multidimensional construct comprised of (a) a willingness to perceive the self accurately, (b) other-orientedness and avoidance of self-enhancement, (c) openness, and (d) the ability to acknowledge one’s limitations and mistakes” (Paine, Sandage, Rupert, Devor, & Bronstein, 2015, p. 5). We view humility as both a trait and a state (e.g., Davis et al., 2013; Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014). Trait humility refers to the degree to which a person tends to exhibit humility across time, situations, and contexts, whereas state humility refers to the degree to which a person exhibits humility at a specific time or in a specific situation or context. Also, we view humility as having several distinct yet interrelated subtypes, which are expressions of humility within specific contexts or domains (Paine et al., 2015). Cultural and clinician humility are two of those subtypes. Cultural humility is “having an interpersonal

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stance that is other-oriented rather than self-focused, characterized by respect and lack of superiority toward an individual’s cultural background and experience” (Hook, Davis, Owen, Worthington, & Utsey, 2013, p. 353). Clinician humility is an “evolving inclination toward accurate self-assessment, recognition of limits, the regulation of self-centered emotions, and the cultivation of othercentered emotions in a clinical setting” (Paine et al., 2015, p. 10). Literature Search and Chapter Limitations For our literature search, we first identified relevant articles, chapters, and books by reviewing reference sections of seminal scholarly sources (e.g., Baldwin & Imel, 2013; Norcross, 2011; Paine et al., 2015). Next, we conducted searches in the PsycINFO, PsycBOOKS, and PsycARTICLES databases through November 24, 2015, using the limiters “English language” and “exclude dissertations.” Here we used the following key terms: (a) [humility OR humble] AND [therapist OR counselor] (144 results, 16 of which were empirical), (b) therapist effects OR therapist variables (363 results), and (c) therapy relationship AND outcome* (88 results). As can be seen, there as yet is very little empirical research on psychotherapist humility, which is thus the main limitation of this chapter. Therefore, in what follows, we mainly extrapolate from the robust literature on psychotherapist effects and the therapy relationship. In particular, we theorize about how psychotherapists affect positive psychotherapy outcomes by exhibiting high trait, clinician, and cultural humility and thereby cultivating and maintaining strong therapy relationships. Ultimately, we aim to provide a theory-based, research-­informed guide that researchers and clinicians can use to advance their research and improve their practice. Psychotherapist Effects on Outcomes Baldwin and Imel (2013) conducted the most rigorous meta-analysis of psychotherapist effects to date. Averaging across 46 random-effects studies (including 1,281 therapists [per-study median: 9] and 14,519 patients [per-study median: 7.6 patients per therapist]), the mean intraclass correlation was 0.05 (95 percent CI: .03–.07). That is, on average, roughly 5 percent of the variance in psychotherapy outcomes is attributable to the psychotherapist. When Baldwin and Imel (2013) only examined naturalistic/effectiveness studies (i.e., studies maximizing external validity [real-world generalizability]; N = 17), they found 7 percent of the variance in outcomes is attributable to the psychotherapist. In sum, the psychotherapist makes a notable impact on patient outcomes (e.g., symptoms, functioning, and well-being), especially in real-world settings.

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This contribution may seem rather small. However, research suggests only 60 percent of the variance in psychotherapy outcomes is explained (i.e., attributable to known factors), with 30 percent of outcome variance attributable to patient factors (e.g., baseline severity), 12 percent to the therapy relationship, 8 percent to the treatment method, 7 percent to the psychotherapist, and 3 percent to other factors (Norcross & Lambert, 2011b). Although psychotherapists account for a relatively small percentage of explainable outcomes, their contribution is not negligible. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine psychotherapist factors (e.g., humility) that might contribute to positive outcomes. Regardless, it is worth noting that psychotherapists’ 5 percent to 7 percent contribution means 93 percent to 95 percent of the variability in psychotherapy outcomes is within a particular psychotherapist’s caseload. Stated differently, a given psychotherapist’s effectiveness will vary widely across his or her caseload, such that he or she has positive outcomes (e.g., recovery or improvement) with certain patients but less-than-optimal outcomes with others (e.g., no change or deterioration; Baldwin & Imel, 2013; Kraus, Castonguay, Boswell, Nordberg, & Hayes, 2011). For example, Okiishi et al.’s (2006) seminal study of psychotherapist effects suggests that when the best- and worst-performing psychotherapists are compared, the best-performing psychotherapists will have roughly 22 percent of patients who recover (i.e., experience clinically significant positive change), 22 percent who improve (i.e., experience notable but not clinically significant change), 51 percent who experience no change, and 5 percent who deteriorate in outcomes (compared to 11%, 17%, 61%, and 11% for the worst-performing psychotherapists, respectively). Thus, even if one is seeing a high-performing psychotherapist, one still has a roughly 50 percent chance of experiencing no measurable change, and if one is seeing a poorly performing psychotherapist, that chance is around 60 percent (Baldwin & Imel, 2013; cf. Chow et al., 2015, p. 341). Of itself this finding suggests psychotherapists need to cultivate humility regarding how many patients they can expect to help experience recovery or improvement. In another study, Kraus et al. (2011) found psychotherapists’ differential effectiveness with patients on their caseload may be domain specific, reflecting differential competence in treating certain presenting concerns or functional impairments. This finding ought to promote psychotherapists’ humility as well, in that it encourages psychotherapists to maintain openness to feedback that will help them identify growth areas (e.g., areas of less-than-optimal effectiveness or competence). It also encourages psychotherapists to acknowledge humbly there are limitations to their competencies. That is, there are certain disorders or impairments they can treat competently, whereas there are others they are not yet competent to treat. To illustrate, in Kraus et al.’s (2011) study

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of 696 psychotherapists, the modal number of treatment areas in which psychotherapists (42 percent) were competent was 5 out of 12, with most psychotherapists (96 percent) being competent in at least 1 domain and no one being competent in all 12 assessed domains. Unfortunately, psychotherapists normatively lack humility when it comes to appraising their psychotherapeutic effectiveness and skills. For instance, in a landmark study, Walfish, McAlister, O’Donnell, and Lambert (2012) found that, on average, psychotherapists reported roughly 75 percent of their patients improved by participating in psychotherapy with them, with two out of three psychotherapists indicating 80 percent or more of their patients improved. (Recall the aforementioned evidence that only 30 percent to 45 percent of patients will improve; Okiishi et al., 2006.) Walfish et al. (2012) also found 25 percent of respondents rated their overall psychotherapeutic skills at the ninetieth percentile or above. Only 8 percent of respondents rated their overall skills as below the seventy-fifth percentile, and no one rated their skills as below average (i.e., below the fiftieth percentile). In fact, Tracey, Wampold, Lichtenberg, and Goodyear (2014) argued psychotherapists’ inaccurate self-appraisals are a key reason psychotherapists do not tend to demonstrate increased psychotherapeutic effectiveness with increased professional experience. To remedy this effectiveness–experience disconnect, Tracey et al. (2014) have recommended psychotherapists improve their effectiveness by routinely obtaining outcome feedback. Adopting such an open, feedback-welcoming stance may require psychotherapists to cultivate greater humility, yet it could result in demonstrable growth in psychotherapists’ effectiveness (Paine et al., 2015). Miller, Hubble, and Duncan (2007, 2013) have identified three main elements for fostering improved psychotherapist effectiveness, and they call these elements the “cycle of excellence” (Miller, Hubble, Chow, & Seidel, 2013, p. 91): (a) determine one’s baseline degree of effectiveness; (b) obtain formal, ongoing, systematic feedback; and (c) engage in deliberate practice designed to enhance effectiveness in growth areas. Humility may play a key role in each of these elements. First, psychotherapists need humility to welcome data about their baseline degree of overall psychotherapeutic effectiveness (e.g., does their average patient reliably improve, deteriorate, or neither improve nor deteriorate) and domain-specific psychotherapeutic effectiveness (e.g., does their average depressed patient reliably improve, deteriorate, or neither improve nor deteriorate). Relatedly, psychotherapists need humility to welcome data comparing their baseline effectiveness to that of other practitioners in their setting, as well as to national/international norms and standardized benchmarks (e.g., reliable improvement; Kraus et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2007, 2013).

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Second, psychotherapists need humility to welcome formal, ongoing, systematic feedback about patient progress (or lack thereof), about the therapy relationship, and about their performance relative to that of other psychotherapists. It takes humility to be open to feedback that some patients are “not on track” toward improvement or are dissatisfied with some aspects of their treatment. Likewise, it requires humility to be other-focused and teachable enough to make needed adjustments, so as to prevent patient deterioration, unplanned termination, or alliance ruptures. It also takes humility to compare one’s progress in overall and domain-specific effectiveness to that of other psychotherapists. Getting such feedback can be scary and humbling, but it can foster better awareness of one’s psychotherapeutic strengths and growth areas, including areas of demonstrated competence and areas where further training, education, or experience may be needed (see Kraus et al., 2011; Okiishi et al., 2006; Tracey et al., 2014). Nonetheless, obtaining feedback is a necessary but insufficient ingredient for promoting psychotherapist effectiveness. To become more effective, psychotherapists need to engage in deliberate practice designed to enhance effectiveness in their feedback-identified growth areas (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Miller et al., 2007, 2013; Tracey et al., 2014). Humility (e.g., being open to growth and fighting inklings one “has arrived”) may be crucially involved in deliberate practice too. Such activities may include (a) thoughtfully reflecting on past sessions and planning for future sessions, (b) reviewing recordings of psychotherapy sessions, or (c) participating in training seminars or workshops. In fact, Chow et al. (2015) found the amount of time psychotherapists engage in deliberate practice predicts their psychotherapy effectiveness. Psychotherapist Effects on Outcomes via the Therapy Relationship Psychotherapists’ differential effectiveness is presumably tied to certain psychotherapist qualities and behaviors. We suggest humility undergirds many of these qualities and behaviors and mainly contributes to psychotherapists’ effectiveness by contributing to the development and maintenance of facilitative therapy relationships (cf. Norcross, 2011; Paine et al., 2015). Psychotherapist qualities and behaviors traditionally have been classified along two intersecting dimensions: (a) objectively observable versus subjectively inferred and (b) extra-therapy/context-general traits versus therapyspecific states. Research has reliably shown that observable traits (e.g., sex, age, and race), observable states (e.g., type and amount of professional training and experience), and inferred traits (e.g., personality characteristics, emotional well-­ being) account for little, if any, psychotherapist variability in outcomes (Baldwin & Imel, 2013; Beutler et al., 2004). Conversely, inferred states—particularly

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the therapy relationship—have received the most empirical support (Baldwin & Imel, 2013; Baldwin, Wampold, & Imel, 2007; Owen et al., 2014). In other words, high-performing psychotherapists are generally able to establish and maintain stronger therapy relationships with their patients, and those stronger therapy relationships are the main contributor to why these psychotherapists outperform their less psychotherapeutically effective colleagues (cf. Norcross, 2011). Indeed, Baldwin et al. (2007) found that 97 percent of the variation in outcomes between psychotherapists is attributable to variation in psychotherapists’ ability to establish and maintain strong therapy relationships. This finding is consistent with Anderson, Ogles, Patterson, Lambert, and Vermeersch’s (2009) landmark study indicating psychotherapists’ differential effectiveness is largely due to their facilitative interpersonal skills (i.e., ability to perceive, comprehend, and communicate wide ranging interpersonal messages and to persuade patients to adopt positive behaviors and abandon negative behaviors). Notably, because humility is such a critical ingredient for cultivating, maintaining, and repairing relationship bonds in general (Davis et al., 2013), within the psychotherapy context, humility is likely a core ingredient of facilitative interpersonal skills as well (Hook et al., 2013). In particular, humility is likely centrally involved in a psychotherapist’s ability to form, maintain, strengthen, and repair therapy relationships with their patients, given the emotional complexity and intensity that characterizes psychotherapeutic encounters. For example, humility helps psychotherapists maintain other-orientedness (e.g., focusing empathically on their patients’ emotions, experiences, and needs), even in the face of therapy-relationship strain and even when working with difficult patients. Moreover, humility helps psychotherapists remain teachable (e.g., open to feedback and to making adjustments), even in the face of criticism or resistance. More broadly, it is important to consider (a) what specific psychotherapist qualities and behaviors influence the therapy relationship and (b) what specific therapy relationship components influence psychotherapy outcomes. The most comprehensive reviews of the former were the critical qualitative reviews conducted by Ackerman and Hilsenroth (2001, 2003) and Norcross (2010), and the most comprehensive reviews of the latter were the quantitative meta-­ analyses presented in Norcross (2011) and Norcross and Lambert (2011a). Building on these critical and meta-analytic reviews, we present a model (see Figure 20.1) explaining psychotherapist effects on outcomes via the effect of psychotherapist qualities and behaviors (e.g., trait, clinician, and cultural humility) on evidence-based therapy relationship components (e.g., working alliance, empathy, and adapting the treatment to the patient), which in turn affect psychotherapy outcomes. Next we unpack this model, highlighting the role of psychotherapist humility.

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Psychotherapist qualities and behaviors Positive qualities and behaviors

Negative qualities and behaviors

• e.g., high trait, clinician, and cultural humility

• e.g., low trait, clinician, or cultural humiltiy

Evidence based therapy relationship components Elements of the therapy relationship • e.g., working alliance, empathy, and collecting patient feedback

Methods of adapting the treatment to the patient • e.g., characteristics, culture, and preferences

Psychotherapy outcomes Posttreatment symptoms, functioning, or well-being

Change in symptoms, functioning, or well-being from pre- to posttreatment

• e.g., degree of functional impairment

• e.g., degree of patient improvement

Figure 20.1 Model explaining psychotherapist effects on outcomes via the effect of psychotherapist qualities and behaviors on evidence-based therapy relationship components, which in turn affect psychotherapy outcomes.

Psychotherapist Qualities and Behaviors Affecting the Therapy Relationship Positive Qualities and Behaviors Certain psychotherapist qualities positively affect the therapy relationship, including psychotherapists’ flexibility, openness, warmth, friendliness, honesty,

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respectfulness, trustworthiness, confidence, enthusiasm, and alertness. Likewise, certain psychotherapist behaviors have a positive impact on the therapy relationship, including when the psychotherapist (a) adopts a psychotherapeutic stance that is supportive, affirming, understanding, empathic, active, collaborative, and empowering; (b) facilitates patients’ exploration, reflection, and emotional expression; and (c) focuses on patients’ experiences, successes, and strengths (Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2003; Norcross, 2010, 2011). Negative Qualities and Behaviors In contrast, certain psychotherapist qualities negatively affect the therapy relationship, including psychotherapists’ rigidity, emotional distance, aloofness, distractedness, uncertainty, manipulativeness, and criticalness. Similarly, several negative psychotherapist behaviors have a deleterious impact on the therapy relationship, including when the psychotherapist (a) adopts a psychotherapeutic stance that is therapist-centric, controlling, unyielding, or confrontational; (b) conducts therapy in an overstructured, understructured, superficial, or one-size-fits-all way; (c) uses silence or self-disclosure in a psychotherapeutically inappropriate manner; (d) makes comments that are belittling, hostile, condescending, critical, blaming, or rejecting; or (e) fails to address therapy-­relationship strain or rupture (Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2001; Norcross, 2010, 2011). Impact of Psychotherapist Humility on the Therapy Relationship Taken together, many of these psychotherapist qualities and behaviors can be distilled into the presence or absence of psychotherapist humility. For instance, relative to their less humble counterparts, psychotherapists who exhibit hightrait humility will presumably also exhibit more positive qualities (e.g., flexibility, confidence, friendliness, and openness) and behaviors (e.g., behaving in a supportive, affirming, empathic, collaborative, and other-focused way), while concurrently exhibiting fewer negative qualities (e.g., rigidity, manipulativeness, and aloofness) and behaviors (e.g., behaving in a controlling, critical, confrontational, or excessively self-focused way). Thus, psychotherapists high in trait humility will likely demonstrate better ability to build and maintain strong relationships in general, including therapy relationships. Indeed, research suggests trait humility is related to the quality of one’s social (Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011) and workplace relationships (Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013), and longitudinal research suggests trait humility helps people develop, repair, and strengthen social bonds (Davis et al., 2013). Likewise, within the psychotherapy context, relative to their less humble counterparts, psychotherapists who exhibit high clinician or cultural humility will presumably exhibit more positive qualities and behaviors (and fewer

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negative qualities and behaviors), which likely enables them to build and maintain better therapy relationships. Preliminary evidence supports this possibility. For example, Hook et al. (2013, Study 2) demonstrated that patient perceptions of their psychotherapist’s cultural humility predicts the quality of the therapy relationship, even when controlling for patient ratings of their psychotherapist’s overall multicultural competencies. Although quantitative research on clinician humility has not yet been conducted (partly because there as yet are no reliable and valid measures of clinician humility), there is convincing qualitative evidence that effective psychotherapists exhibit high clinician humility and harness that humility to develop and maintain strong therapy relationships. For instance, in a series of qualitative studies of the distinguishing characteristics of peer-nominated expert psychotherapists in the United States and Singapore, Jennings and colleagues (e.g., Jennings & Skovholt, 1999; Jennings et al., 2005, 2008) found that both American and Singaporean expert psychotherapists are characterized by high humility, facilitative interpersonal skills, self-awareness, and commitment to ongoing professional growth. In sum, cross-cultural evidence suggests highly effective psychotherapists exhibit teachability, other-orientedness, and accurate and balanced self-views. Evidence-Based Therapy Relationship Components Affecting Psychotherapy Outcomes Effective Elements of the Therapy Relationship But what components of the therapy relationship actually account for the impact of the therapy relationship on psychotherapy outcomes? The meta-analyses presented in Norcross (2011) and Norcross and Lambert (2011a) reveal the following elements of the therapy relationship are demonstrably or probably effective in promoting positive psychotherapy outcomes: alliance (in individual, youth, family, and couples therapy), cohesion (in group therapy), empathy, collecting patient feedback, goal consensus, collaboration, and positive regard (see Norcross, 2011, for a review). Across these elements, one can recognize the core features of humility—other-orientedness, openness, and the willingness both to receive accurate feedback and to acknowledge mistakes and limitations. Effective Methods of Adapting the Treatment to the Patient Likewise, those meta-analyses reveal that psychotherapy outcomes are enhanced by adapting (i.e., tailoring) the therapy relationship to particular patient characteristics. Specifically, it is demonstrably or probably effective to adapt the therapy relationship to the patient’s reactance/resistance level (e.g., state or trait opposition to external demands and influence), preferences (e.g., role, therapist-characteristic, and treatment preferences), culture (e.g., cultural metaphors, symbols, goals, and values), religion/spirituality, stage of change,

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and coping style (e.g., internalizing vs. externalizing; see Norcross, 2011, for a review). Humility (e.g., other-orientedness, openness, teachability, and flexibility) may be centrally involved in adapting the treatment to the patient’s characteristics, culture, and preferences, perhaps even placing it at the nexus of evidence-based practice (Paine et al., 2015; cf. APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006). Impact of Psychotherapist Humility on Outcomes via the Therapy Relationship The empirical research on psychotherapist humility and psychotherapy outcomes is in its nascence. However, the existing evidence suggests psychotherapist humility has an influence on outcomes and primarily does so via its influence on the therapy relationship. For instance, Hook et al. (2013, Study 3) demonstrated that patient perceptions of their psychotherapist’s cultural humility predict patients’ self-rated improvement in psychotherapy, and this relationship is mediated (i.e., explained) by patients’ perceptions of the therapy relationship (working alliance). In fact, 37 percent of the variance in patient improvement was explained by the indirect (mediated) influence of cultural humility on outcomes via the therapy relationship, indicating a large-size indirect effect. In another study, Owen, Jordan et al. (2014) found that patients’ perceptions of their psychotherapist’s cultural humility predict positive psychotherapy outcomes (e.g., patients’ self-rated improvement in psychotherapy). Yet here the relationship between cultural humility and psychotherapy outcomes was only evidenced among patients who were highly religiously committed. This finding suggests the degree to which a psychotherapist humbly responds to the culturally salient aspects of a patient’s identity has a direct effect on the quality of the therapy relationship and thereby affects psychotherapy outcomes. Such a possibility is consistent with the aforementioned evidence that adapting the therapy relationship to the patient’s culture is demonstrably effective in promoting positive outcomes (Smith, Rodriguez, & Bernal, 2011). Taken together, preliminary evidence suggests patients of psychotherapists who exhibit higher humility experience better psychotherapy outcomes than patients of psychotherapists who exhibit lower humility, and these better outcomes are mainly the result of having a higher-quality and culturally responsive relationship with their therapist (Hook et al., 2013; Owen, Jordan, Turner, Davis, Hook, & Leach, 2014). Next, we discuss research and practice implications of the literature we have reviewed. Discussion implications and recommendations for researchers Develop and Validate a Patient-Report Measure of Clinician Humility Future research on psychotherapist humility might begin by developing and validating

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a psychometrically robust patient-report measure of clinician humility (Paine et al., 2015), so psychotherapy research on that construct can ensue. Validated measures of trait humility (Davis et al., 2011; Owens et al., 2013) and cultural humility (Hook et al., 2013) already exist and can be used with confidence. Explore the Unique and Interactive Effects of Trait, Clinician, and Cultural ­Humility  Researchers can explore the unique and interactive effects of psychotherapists’ trait, clinician, and cultural humility in predicting psychotherapy outcome variables (e.g., patient improvement) and process variables (e.g., working alliance). For example, research could explore the hypothesis that these three types of psychotherapist humility uniquely and jointly affect outcomes and primarily do so via the therapy relationship, as preliminary evidence suggests (Hook et al., 2013; Owen, Jordan et al., 2014). Research could also explore hypotheses about which type of psychotherapist humility affects outcome and process variables under which set of clinical circumstances. For instance, cultural humility may be especially important in predicting outcome and process variables when the psychotherapist and patient differ in culturally salient ways or when providing a culturally adapted treatment. Clinician humility may be quite vital in predicting outcome and process variables when the patient has strong preferences or expectations for treatment and thus wants or expects the psychotherapist to adjust treatment accordingly (cf. Norcross, 2011). Trait humility may be particularly crucial when working with certain types of patients whom the psychotherapist finds challenging (e.g., patients toward whom the psychotherapist has strong countertransference; patients with significant personality pathology). Examine How Humility Affects Psychotherapy Process and Outcome  Research on how humility affects the psychotherapy process (e.g., therapy relationship) and outcomes is needed too. Various facets of humility may primarily explain (mediate) the effect of the aforementioned positive and negative psychotherapist qualities and behaviors on the therapy relationship, thereby affecting outcomes. For instance, the other-orientedness facet may be a mechanism by which a psychotherapist’s empathy and warmth (vs. emotional distance) contributes to a strong psychotherapist–patient emotional bond, leading to better outcomes. The openness facet may be a mechanism by which a psychotherapist’s flexibility and collaborative stance (vs. rigidity or a therapist-centric or one-size-fitsall approach) lead to strong consensus on psychotherapeutic goals and tasks, which in turn yields better outcomes (cf. Bordin, 1979; Norcross, 2011). In the same way, the effect of certain evidence-based therapy relationship components on psychotherapy outcomes may be mediated by particular

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humility facets. For instance, the effect of collecting patient feedback on outcomes may be mediated primarily by the accurate self-views and openness/ teachability facets. The accurate self-views facet helps psychotherapists seek and welcome feedback (vs. passively ignoring or actively rejecting it), and the openness/teachability facet enables them to be open to adjusting treatment based on feedback (vs. being wedded to the inherent correctness of their typical methods and pre-existing ideas; cf. Norcross, 2011). Study Whether Humility Differentiates the Most and Least Effective Psychotherapists  Researchers also need to study whether psychotherapist humility (trait, clinician, and cultural) differentiates the most effective psychotherapists from the least effective psychotherapists. As mentioned previously, qualitative evidence suggests this possibility is true (e.g., Jennings et al., 2005, 2008), but quantitative and mixed methods research is needed to explore more fully if and when humility is a distinguishing characteristic of highly effective psychotherapists. For instance, is psychotherapist humility especially differentiating of highand low-performing early-career psychotherapists because it motivates novice psychotherapists to work hard at becoming more effective and learning from their mistakes? Alternatively, is humility especially differentiating of high- and low-performing late-career psychotherapists because it helps experienced psychotherapists keep improving and fight inklings they “have arrived”? Investigate How Psychotherapists Can Grow in Humility  There is a need for research on how psychotherapists can grow in humility. For example, research could explore whether obtaining feedback (e.g., about patient progress and/ or relative psychotherapist performance) helps psychotherapists grow in humility over time. Such feedback may be an effective method for helping psychotherapists develop and maintain more accurate, humble self-appraisals of their psychotherapeutic effectiveness and competencies (cf. Tracey et al., 2014; Walfish et al., 2012). There also is a need to investigate whether targeted humility interventions (see Chapter 19) can help less effective psychotherapists improve their psychotherapeutic effectiveness and skills. Implications and Recommendations for Practitioners Cultivate Humility and Facilitative Interpersonal Skills As is clear from this chapter, psychotherapists’ humility and facilitative interpersonal skills seem to be key ingredients of psychotherapist effectiveness (Anderson et al., 2009; Hook et al., 2013; Jennings & Skovholt, 1999; Jennings et al., 2005, 2008; Paine et al., 2015). Thus, we encourage psychotherapists to

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cultivate their trait, clinician, and cultural humility and facilitative interpersonal skills, because doing so will likely improve their psychotherapeutic effectiveness. For instance, growth in humility may enhance psychotherapists’ ability to learn from their mistakes, avoid ethical dilemmas, act more modestly with their patients (and avoid relationship strain), and behave in a more other-focused way (and thus promote better empathy toward patients, openness to patient feedback, and emotional bonds with patients). More broadly, given the robust link between humility and various indicators of well-being (e.g., psychological, physical, and spiritual well-being; see Toussaint & Webb, this volume), cultivating psychotherapist humility will likely improve psychotherapists’ overall well-being, thereby enabling them to be even more effective agents of healing (Paine et al., 2015). Engage Humbly in the “Cycle of Excellence” As mentioned earlier, Miller et al. (2007, 2013) identified the three key ways for psychotherapists to become more effective: determine baseline effectiveness, obtain ongoing feedback, and engage in deliberate practice. We argued humility plays a crucial role in each element. Therefore, we suggest psychotherapists make it a routine practice to engage humbly in this “cycle of excellence.” In so doing, they can cultivate humility by becoming more aware of their limitations and by pursuing continued growth. Develop and Maintain Humble Self-Appraisals Relatedly, psychotherapists tend to lack humility when it comes to appraising their psychotherapeutic effectiveness and skills (Walfish et al., 2012). In fact, they “routinely overestimate their effectiveness—on average, by about 65%” (Chow et al., 2015, p. 343). Thus, we recommend psychotherapists develop and maintain more accurate, humble self-appraisals of their psychotherapeutic effectiveness and skills. Doing so can help them grow in their overall effectiveness and expertise (Tracey et al., 2014), as well as in their domain-specific competencies (Kraus et al., 2011) and self-awareness (Paine et al., 2015). Conclusions This chapter focused on the role of psychotherapist humility in promoting positive outcomes via the therapy relationship. We have built on the robust literature demonstrating that psychotherapists vary in their effectiveness and that certain characteristics and behaviors play a key role in that variation, especially as it relates to establishing and maintaining strong therapy relationships. We have argued that humble characteristics and behaviors play a key role in psychotherapist effectiveness, and we eagerly await future research examining this possibility.

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Note 1 Author Note: Edward B. Davis and Andrew D. Cuthbert, Psychology Department, Wheaton College. This publication was made possible through the support of two grants from the John Templeton Foundation (Grants #44040 and 45112). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

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Kraus, D. R., Castonguay, L., Boswell, J. F., Nordberg, S. S., & Hayes, J. A. (2011). Therapist effectiveness: Implications for accountability and patient care. Psychotherapy Research, 21, 267–276. Kruse, E., Chancellor, J., Ruberton, P. M., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2014). An upward spiral between gratitude and humility, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5, 805–814. Miller, S. D., Hubble, M. A., Chow, D. L., & Seidel, J. A. (2013). The outcome of psychotherapy: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow, Psychotherapy, 50, 88–97. Miller, S. D., Hubble, M. A., & Duncan, B. L. (2007). Supershrinks. Psychotherapy Networker, 31, 26–35, 56. Norcross, J. C. (2010). The therapeutic relationship. In B. L. Duncan, S. D. Miller, B. E. Wampold & M. A. Hubble (Eds.), The heart and soul of change: Delivering what works in therapy (2nd ed., pp. 113–141). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Norcross, J. C. (Ed.). (2011) Psychotherapy relationships that work: Evidence-based responsiveness (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Norcross, J. C., & Lambert, M. J. (Eds.). (2011a). Psychotherapy relationships that work II [Special issue]. Psychotherapy, 48, 4–8. Norcross, J. C., & Lambert, M. J. (2011b). Evidence-based therapy relationships. In J. C. Norcross (Ed.), Psychotherapy relationships that work (2nd ed., pp. 3–21). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Okiishi, J. C., Lambert, M. J., Eggett, D., Nielsen, L., Dayton, D. D., & Vermeersch, D. A. (2006). An analysis of therapist treatment effects: Toward providing feedback to individual therapists on their clients’ psychotherapy outcome. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 1157–1172. Owen, J., Duncan, B., Reese, R. J., Anker, M., & Sparks, J. (2014). Accounting for therapist variability in couple therapy outcomes: What really matters, Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, 40, 488–502. Owen, J., Jordan, T. A., II, Turner, D., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., & Leach, M. M. (2014). Therapists’ multicultural orientation: Client perceptions of cultural humility, spiritual/religious commitment, and therapy outcomes. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 91–98. Owens, B. P., Johnson, M. D., & Mitchell, T. R. (2013). Expressed humility in organizations: Implications for performance, teams, and leadership. Organization Science, 24, 1517–1538. Paine, D. R., Sandage, S. J., Rupert, D., Devor, N. G., & Bronstein, M. (2015). Humility as a psychotherapeutic virtue: Spiritual, philosophical, and psychological foundations, Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health, 17, 3–25. Peters, A. S., Rowatt, W. C., & Johnson, M. K. (2011). Associations between dispositional humility and social relationship quality. Psychology, 2, 155–161. Smith, T. B., Rodriguez, M. M. D., & Bernal, G. (2011). Culture. In J. C. Norcross (Ed.), Psychotherapy relationships that work (2nd ed., pp. 316–335). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Tracey, T. J. G., Wampold, B. E., Lichtenberg, J. W., & Goodyear, R. K. (2014). Expertise in psychotherapy: An elusive goal? American Psychologist, 69, 218–229. Walfish, S., McAlister, B., O’Donnell, P., & Lambert, M. J. (2012). An investigation of self-­ assessment bias in mental health providers. Psychological Reports, 110, 639–644.

21 HUMILITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY Steven J. Sandage, David Rupert, David R. Paine, Miriam Bronstein, and Christopher G. O’Rourke

Humility is a topic that has generated a long history of cultural and religious reflection. Many cultural and religious traditions have promoted humility as a virtue that can contribute to spiritual, social, and moral well-being (Paine, Sandage, Rupert, Devor & Bronstein, 2015; Wolfteich, Keefe-Perry, Sandage, & Paine, in press). Although the virtue-status of humility has been challenged by certain philosophers (e.g., Hume, Nietzsche, Rand), it is often described as a character strength by many theologians and spiritual leaders. Nevertheless, humility was a neglected topic in psychology until recent years, perhaps due to an emphasis on the individual in Western psychology, which could seem at odds with certain construals of humility. Interest in humility and other virtues has grown substantially in the social sciences over the past decade with the advent of the positive psychology movement, which called for a shift in focus from psychopathology to virtuous qualities that promote well-being (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Clinical applications of positive psychology research on virtue and well-­being is a nascent but growing area (see Wood & Johnson, 2016). The popular clinical topic of mindfulness, which has been described as having “a quality of active humility” (Morgan, 2005, p. 142), is also part of a shift in psychotherapy seeking to balance emphases on human agency with practices grounded in acceptance. Humility is also an implicit part of mentalization-based therapy, which has gained empirical support for the treatment of borderline personality disorder (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). The basic thrust of mentalization is to relate to clients with an active curiosity about their subjective experiences without making assumptions about the validity of clients’ self-understanding. The concepts of mindfulness and mentalizing share an emphasis on “open and receptive awareness” (Allen et al., 2008, p. 53). Mindfulness is broadly applied to any objects in awareness, whereas mentalizing is focused on the mental states of both self and other. Mindfulness- and mentalization-based approaches to

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therapy offer valuable insights into the role of humility in psychotherapy, which we discuss later. Theoretical and empirical research on humility has expanded greatly in the past few years, leading to advances in defining, measuring, and investigating factors related to humility. Yet almost all of this empirical research is outside therapeutic contexts. In the only humility intervention study we could locate, Lavelock et al. (2014) developed and tested the effects of a structured humility workbook with a nonclinical sample of undergraduate students and found participants in the workbook condition increased in humility, forgiveness, and patience, whereas participants in the control condition did not show change in these virtues. Humility has been discussed at length by a few clinical theorists (see Rowden, Harris, & Wickel, 2014; Worthington & Sandage, 2015), although the conceptual contributions to literature have been modest. Given these limitations, we will draw upon relational theories of psychotherapy and clinical experience to describe some applications of humility in the process of psychotherapy. Definitions of Humility in Psychology Tangney (2000) authored a seminal article on humility, providing a conceptual understanding of the virtue that psychologists continue to utilize. Humility may be understood as a multidimensional construct with interpersonal and intrapersonal components, including (a) a willingness to perceive the self accurately, (b) other-orientedness and avoidance of excessive self-enhancement, (c) openness, and (d) the ability to acknowledge one’s limitations and mistakes. Other dimensions included in some psychological accounts include appreciation of value in others (and the world) and avoidance of narcissistic or entitled behaviors and attitudes (Tangney, 2009; Worthington, 2008). Humility may be distinguished from low self-esteem or shame by the willingness to perceive the self accurately rather than making global negative self-evaluations. This has been an important concern for psychotherapists because shame tends to empirically correlate with psychological and relational dysfunction in Western contexts. Accurate self-understanding includes positive self-appraisals, acknowledgement of strengths, and facing limitations. Moore (2003, p. 72) offered a succinct summary of humility as (a) an awareness of one’s personal limitations and (b) a willingness to get needed help. The latter dimension might be consistent with a clinically relevant client attitude of openness to receiving input and support from outside oneself. The capacity for self-regulation of emotions, particularly pride and shame, has also emerged as an important dimension or correlate of humility (Jankowski, Sandage, & Hill, 2013; Paine et al., 2015). Excessive or dysregulated emotional

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states could promote either grandiosity, elevating oneself above others, or dysphoric states of inferiority, defensiveness, and reactivity. Whereas many cultural and religious traditions have focused on pride (i.e., grandiose narcissism) as the antithesis of humility, psychological research now suggests negative selfappraisals, vulnerable narcissism, anxious-ambivalent attachment, or excessive needs to idealize others can also correlate negatively with humility ( Jankowski & Sandage, 2014; Sandage, Jankowski, Bissonette, & Paine, in press; Sandage, Paine, & Hill, 2015). Our program of research on humility has shown that differentiation of self (DoS), or the ability to (a) relate flexibly with others across differences and (b) self-regulate emotions, mediates the relationship between humility and many other psychological processes. Therefore, we define humility as an expression of DoS related to (a) a balanced and accurate assessment of one’s strengths and limitations and (b) a capacity to mentalize or practice relational mindfulness. Promoting Humility in Psychotherapy? Humility has been linked with a number of positive psychological, relational, and spiritual indices, including prosocial behavior, social relationship quality, forgiveness, generosity, and spiritual maturity, among others (Exline & Hill, 2012; Jankowski & Sandage, 2014; Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011). Based on these findings in nonclinical samples, it might be tempting to assert that a worthy goal of psychotherapy is to increase client humility. However, clinical data are needed to support such an assertion, and several other contextual points must also be carefully examined. First, clinicians who recognize the value of humility and its associated outcomes must be careful not to misrepresent what is meant by the term in discourse with clients, who may use the term quite differently. Lack of careful discernment on the part of therapists could lead to the promotion of shame, false modesty, and porousness to unhealthy inputs from others, thus undermining psychological and relational health. Second, all clinicians’ understanding of humility (positive or negative) will be rooted in their own experiences and sociocultural perspectives, thus requiring intercultural competence (Paine, Jankowski, & Sandage, 2016) or cultural humility (Hook, Davis, Owen, Worthington, & Utsey, 2013) to remain attuned to differences between their worldview and that of clients. Predetermined ideas of how humility ought to manifest phenotypically may not hold across diverse contexts. For example, an unreflective clinician, influenced by ideas equating humility with meekness or modesty, may misunderstand a client with a more assertive cultural conflict style as lacking humility. Some clients will also understand the meaning and practices related to humility through their spiritual,

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religious, and theological traditions, which might differ in certain ways from assumptions embedded in contemporary psychotherapy models (Wolfteich et al., in press). Learning about the diverse ways in which humility is embodied can help therapists consider this assertiveness as compatible with an accurate self-understanding and relational engagement. This mentalizing attitude is a kind of double humility, or humility about the diverse expressions and understandings of humility. Third, clinicians must discern client needs on a case-by-case basis. Humility may not always be a primary goal in treatment planning. For example, building an awareness of personal limitations may not be the first goal for a severely depressed individual with chronically low self-esteem. That is not to say that humility is not compatible with recovery from depression. Accurate self-appraisal and emotion regulation are parts of many treatments for depression. However, clinical decisions require nuanced developmental and contextual awareness of individual differences. Even when cultivating humility would prove beneficial, one must also attend to other psychological and relational factors that act as barriers to cultivating this virtue. For example, grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, shame, insecure attachment, low differentiation of self, and spiritual and emotional dysregulation are all factors that may frustrate the development of humility ( Jankowski et al., 2013; Sandage et al., 2015). Clients high in grandiose narcissism may seem the clearest candidates for humility intervention; however, they will often need considerable mirroring and pacing before they are prepared to trust a therapist with facing their own limitations. Thus, treatment strategies will need to target these underlying factors and embed explicit discussions of humility within an integrative perspective tailored to specific clients. At the same time, humility and mentalization demand we hold conceptualizations somewhat loosely and stay receptive to clients as co-constructors in treatment. We must also recognize that clinicians with divergent approaches to therapy will strive to foster humility in different ways. Clinicians who take the position of “expert” may have confidence they can acquire a thorough understanding of the client and use this understanding to alleviate client distress. For example, both classic psychoanalytic approaches and certain forms of cognitive therapy boldly use the therapist’s conceptual framework and underlying assumptions to try to help clients deal constructively with their human limitations. Highly structured approaches to therapy attempt to formulate specific strategies for helping clients cultivate interpersonal and intrapersonal skills, and this skills focus could be consistent with cultivating humility through ongoing practice (e.g., Lavelock et al., 2014). Alternatively, our own preference is for relational approaches to therapy, which are less focused on clinical authority or

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predetermined interventions than with the quality and dynamics within the therapeutic alliance. This relational approach is characterized by receptivity to the client and the modeling of humility by the therapist (Paine et al., 2015). From a relational perspective, one of the clinical challenges is that differing clients will need different relational experiences, which requires strong capacities for mentalization and relational flexibility by therapists. We view humility as a valuable intentional goal for clinicians, but also as an implicit dynamic that may emerge without direct intentionality in the therapy relationship. In the next section, we discuss this dialectic of humility as both a virtue to be developed and a gift to be received. Humility as a Virtue and a Gift Humility may contribute to the therapeutic process as a virtue to be developed for both clients and therapists. “Virtue” may be understood as an evolving disposition of the self that is oriented to the right action and “the Good” (Aristotle, trans. 2004). Aristotle described virtues as particular dispositions that are essential for living a flourishing life. Openness to the relational process of therapy, being willing to perceive oneself accurately, and acknowledging strengths and limitations are all compatible with client factors that are necessary to make meaning of struggles and pursue change in therapy. We have also argued that humility is a virtue supportive of best practice that might be actively developed among psychotherapists (Paine et al., 2015). Humility as a virtue is distinct from a clinical skill or technique. Although skills are critically important, we prefer to understand humility as a way of being with clients. In the context of psychotherapy, humility represents the developmental progress of clinicians toward accurate understanding of one’s skills and limitations as a healer. Humility also involves a strong commitment to ­other-orientedness in the context of the work. The pervasiveness of the medical model in mental healthcare and clinical training places significant emphasis on practitioner expertise, authority, and technical knowledge. However, the complexities of therapy often present situations where a humble approach may be more effective and beneficial. We have previously suggested and illustrated with clinical vignettes that several dimensions of practice, including multicultural competence, the therapeutic alliance, the use of client feedback, collaborative care, and professional consultation, may be significantly enhanced through the cultivation of therapist humility (Paine et al., 2015). Cultivating an internal disposition to humility both serves the individual client and enhances relational dynamics in the clinical systems in which care is delivered. For example, clinicians who engage in regular peer consultation characterized by both support and rigorous self-examination are likely to find it enhances the quality of their

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work and may inject some professional humility into the organizational climate of their clinics. Aristotelian conceptions of virtue emphasize individual effort and personal action in the cultivation and acquisition of virtues. One becomes virtuous through intent, training, mastery, and discipline (Aristotle, trans. 2004). Although experience, theory, and empirical research support this proposal (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), there is another perspective on the acquisition of virtue. Within classical philosophy, it was proposed that virtue is not only achieved but received; not only a goal but also a gift (Plato, trans. 2009). For Plato, virtues were both cultivated by individuals and received as gifts from the Divine. Without making theological claims, we suggest it is useful to reflect on the experience of virtue as gift and explore the ways in which therapy is a vehicle receiving virtues such as humility. Thus, opportunities to experience humility may emerge for both clients and therapists independent of specific intentions or strivings. It may even be the case that the struggles, fluctuations, disappointments, and ruptures in the relational process drive the acquisition of humility as much, if not more so, than the individuals themselves. In the following sections, we draw on clinical experience to describe the role of humility in relational therapy. In particular, we focus on the tensions between these active and passive dimensions of humility within therapists and the associated power dynamics. We also seek to describe the experience of humility as a virtue and a gift, using clinical examples to demonstrate how therapist striving and receptivity may lead to growth in the virtue. Humility and Clinical Power Dynamics Some approaches to psychotherapy place therapist humility at the foundation of their philosophies and therapeutic techniques. Many post-modern theories of psychotherapy (e.g., intersubjective and relational psychoanalytic approaches, feminist and liberationist therapies, narrative therapies) employ a careful analysis of power dynamics and view psychotherapist “expertise” with some caution. To be sure, within these systems of thought and practice practitioner competence is a basic expectation of any responsible therapist. However, the therapist as “expert about the client ” is eschewed in deference to respect for the uniqueness of the client and the ethical assertion that the therapist should be willing to differentiate their experience and perspective from that of the client. This ideology represents the importance of an actively pursued humility on the part of the therapists. Such mentalizing efforts may be directed toward empathy and intersubjective “joining,” which can serve as healing bridges between human beings. This active other-orientation may allow a therapist to accurately understand a client’s emotions, behavior, history, meaning system,

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unconscious conflicts, and suffering. Nevertheless, it is commonplace in therapy that well-intentioned efforts toward empathic attunement with the client sometimes fall short. Knowledge of “what is best for the client” may be occluded by the personal limitations, therapist values, cultural differences with the client, unconscious enactments, or a myriad of other factors. In such cases, therapeutic ruptures may force therapists to confront the limits of their understanding, as well as offer opportunities for new ways of relating. In this sense, humility may be emergent rather than pursued. Therapeutic approaches rooted in the theory and empirical observations of human attachment systems also recognize that healthy growth and development is facilitated, inhibited, or thwarted by interactive processes between subjects. The nature of the dance between caregiver and infant, teacher and student, societal institution and citizen is a crucial factor in whether or not the child, student, or citizen will thrive. So too, the multifaceted interactions that occur between therapist and client have a great impact on the outcomes of psychotherapy. From this vantage, we believe the therapist’s effectiveness does not typically come about through the transmission of expert opinions or the provision of wise interpretations. Rather, healing and growth are fostered limbically through the building of a secure relationship that is constructed, in part, through the recognition of both mutual and differentiated needs, experiences, and roles. Given this reality, the therapists do well to actively attend to their own personal subjectivity with due humility, because subjectivities and associated behaviors inevitably affect the client. Concretely, this leads us to affirm one of the basic practices of psychoanalytic traditions in valuing regular opportunities to process our own countertransference as therapists in dialogue with other clinicians. We would add that it is crucial for these professional relational “holding environments” for consultation to be diverse in order to foster awareness of differences and checks against various forms of prejudice and bias. In relational psychotherapy, collaboration is privileged as part of cultivating humility. If the therapist recognizes their knowledge and insight into the client will be limited, then it is wise and caring to cultivate a collaborative partnership with receptivity to client inputs and feedback about the process. Psychotherapists are competent partners to their clients by (a) actively honing their knowledge of human psychology and their skills as counselor and (b) keeping their self-importance and attachment to their own expertise in check. A humble therapist can mentalize by offering ideas, perspectives, authentic responses, deep listening, and thoughtful questions without becoming overly attached to the outcomes of their offerings. Humble therapists will also be able to stand aside at times, acknowledging error, and even apologizing when appropriate. But a humble therapist may also take a stand at times. They may assert, confront,

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interpret, address, or make suggestions when they believe they have something genuinely valuable to contribute. For some therapists, these active or confrontive stances will be ego-syntonic, whereas other therapists will need a certain form of humility to do what is needed and make an active intervention even if it is ego-dystonic. When their offerings are dismissed, rejected, or ignored, the humble therapist will nevertheless strive to understand why this is so, respecting the perspective and self-determination of their client. Therapists may also be offered the gift of humility in the guise of therapeutic ruptures, “stuck” clients, and unsatisfactory outcomes. Those with a humble disposition are not immune to these developments, which may be received as opportunities to reframe the relational processes of therapy and, indirectly, grow deeper in humility. Clinicians who have neglected the active cultivation of humility may undervalue collaboration and find themselves comfortable in the role of expert for a time. However, they, too, will face the inevitable disappointments of the therapeutic process. Such frustrations, though unpleasant, may be construed as potentially transformative, both in the trajectory of care and the personal formation of the therapists. If clinicians are receptive to what such moments call for (collaborative repair rooted in a recognition of limits), they may achieve new ways of relating in therapy and enhance their inclinations toward humility. However, clinicians may not recognize the opportunity and/or not receive the gift. Therapists may also take a defensive position, placing responsibility for therapeutic disruptions on the client and become entrenched in their own perspective. In the next section, we explore concrete ways in which humility serves the objectives of both client and therapist in treatment. In describing the nature and impact of therapeutic strategies involving humility, we witness both the benefits of an already acquired disposition and the deepening of virtue that takes place in the context of the client–therapist relationship. Intervention Strategies for Psychotherapeutic Humility In this section, we explore the ways in which humility both advances the therapeutic endeavor and manifests in the process. We focus on using humility as a reframe, not knowing, and attending to rupture and repair dynamics. Humility as a Reframe Although it is true that people sometimes learn humility through hard experience and painful lessons, there are moments when humility may be a source of refuge and hope. This is especially true when a therapist or client needs to manage and reduce shame or recover from a serious mistake. Shame and regret may be triggered in different ways, ranging from abuse by others to facing the

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consequences of our own limits, vulnerabilities, or capacity for evil. Whatever the source, shame often generates paralyzing dysregulation and intense self-loathing. Humility in various forms can metabolize shame by acknowledging the shameful situation while also conveying a basis for constructive action and self-respect. Shame is powerful, in part, because there seems to be no escape from what feels awful. Humility-based interventions try to acknowledge shame while softening its impact. This may occur in different ways. In normalization, humility reframes the struggle by locating it within a larger community. One may feel less “alone” or uniquely exposed by relinquishing a sense of being different or above the common struggle. Permission giving is another type of reframe. Permissions may take different forms—for example, permission to be a learner, permission to make amends, and permission to be self-compassionate, among others. These interventions integrate acceptance with specific intentions grounded in a humility-based value or perspective. A learning reframe combines not knowing with trying to learn. Amends reframes encourage responsibility through acknowledgment of mistakes or wrongdoing and taking positive action for repair. Self-compassion invites kindness in the face of vulnerability or failure. In our view of therapy, these permissions are most meaningful when they operate at the limbic level of interpersonal experience rather than neocortical rationality. In practice, reframes almost always start with acknowledgement. Establishing emotional contact with the problem grounds the conversation in the struggle or dilemma. Moreover, attending to how a person came to feel shame, remorse, regret, and other emotions can be a way of honoring that person’s conscience and values. Reframes also try to offer a path or way to be constructive despite what has been destructive. These offerings are most effective when they resonate for the person involved because they connect to present or emerging values or have some narrative, poetic, or metaphorical power to inspire. ­ urkishConsider the following example: Michael was a 58-year-old Orthodox T American man who struggled with treatment-resistant depression and loneliness. He had been in therapy for over five years, something most of the people in his life could not understand. Michael was engaged in treatment and made use of various resources such as medication, groups, and exercise. He had grown in various ways, including becoming more accepting of self and others and developing new coping strategies. Nevertheless, depression returned periodically. In those moments, Michael became especially distressed by “my failure to get better, my failure to solve this after all these years [of therapy].” Efforts to note progress were met with heartfelt complaints about what was still

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not right. Affirmations from others were too infrequent to make a difference, and “besides, they don’t know the real story, but I do.” The therapist struggled with the unspoken reality that Michael’s complaint indicted himself but also the treatment. Had she failed as a therapist? Both felt defeated. However, defeat became less toxic once they began to explore the situation from a reframe of human limitation and resilience, a frame of acknowledging that some situations cannot be overcome by human effort and that each person has unique strengths and limitations. Michael recalled spiritual and cultural stories that affirmed this view. Once these beliefs were introduced, new possibilities for appreciating what had been accomplished emerged, as well as grief for the on-going struggle and self-respect for “continuing the good fight.” The therapist’s willingness to acknowledge the limitations of treatment created relational space for Michael to develop a new, edifying narrative of persistence in humility. Not-Knowing Stances Another potential expression of humility in psychotherapy is adopting a stance of not knowing. Professional therapists must practice within their scope of competence, but competence in psychotherapy involves many elements, including respecting the client’s perspectives, preferences, and autonomy. Psychotherapy research provides useful knowledge on processes of change, but psychotherapists work with a complex reality that includes each client’s unique background, stressors, resources, emotional states, and immediate and developing relational dynamics with the therapist. Clinical practice grows even more complex when considering the array of potentially helpful interventions in any given moment. In the face of such complexity, relational therapists who value humility tend to emphasize tolerance of ambiguity, flexibility, and responsiveness rather than certainty or prescience. At the core, not knowing involves the paradox of remembering that the client may see things differently and may know better than the therapist in any given moment. This awareness invites humility in the form of ongoing listening to what the client communicates in direct and implicit/nonverbal ways. Ironically, this kind of listening and observing may be most difficult to practice precisely when it is most needed—for example during an enactment, after a rupture, or when a client is struggling and only partially aware of his or her contribution (but quite clear on the therapist’s contribution). It is the practice of returning to a listening or mentalizing stance, of being willing to stop and look again, that manifests the humility of not knowing. Approaching humility as openness and attentiveness grounded in this kind of not knowing may help with the related dangers of becoming proud of being

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humble or adopting a merely passive stance. Therapeutic not knowing as we are commending presupposes responsibility and professional competence; otherwise, it is merely an excuse for sloppy work. Moreover, therapists move in and out of awareness, so it is unlikely that any therapist could hold a humble attitude at all times. Perhaps it is better to think of recovering, returning to, or being receptive to humility. The opposite danger—passivity and deference to avoid being prideful—raises other concerns, most notably the possibility of leaving certain clients too alone in their struggles or failing to provide scaffolding for growth and change. It is our experience that many clients have been dissatisfied with previous therapists who “just listened,” and most clients want contact with the therapist as a person actively engaged in the relational process. So what might humility in this look like in practice? Consider the following examples: After reaching an initial agreement on a client’s concerns and an appropriate treatment plan, a client then introduced several other topics in the next few sessions. At first glance this seemed like avoidance, but the therapist came to understand that there were other meanings, such as an attempt to help the therapist understand the larger context, a request for help with pressing situational factors, and sharing additional concerns. The therapist learned about these meanings by engaging the client with curiosity and adjusting his expectations. Another client told many stories about how others had failed her by being neglectful, controlling, or simply unhelpful. She complained that that treatment was not helping either and responded to questions seeking her input on the treatment with, “Am I supposed to know how to help myself? I thought you would have some expertise.” Although many factors implicated the client in this impasse, the therapist wrestled with his own participation and eventually recognized a tendency to be passive and deferring in moments of potential conflict. This awareness enabled him to face his own anxiety and take a more active role in structuring the treatment for a period of time. Later in the therapy, several instances of what could be seen as noncompliance signaled the need to adjust again, in this case by taking a more passive stance to honor the client’s increased wish and readiness to initiate. In another case, an adult client with significant childhood trauma struggled with a recurrent sense of being victimized and an underlying sense of low selfworth and distrust of her own experience. Her therapist provided empathy, acceptance, and help with affect regulation. When the client began to express a need to make progress, the therapist invited consideration of choices and action steps, but the client said it was “too hard.” Efforts to help the client muster courage or find a manageable first step were unsuccessful. Continued exploration led to recognition of a complex dynamic around “ease and struggle”

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and a need for more experiences of nonstriving before attempting to attain concrete life goals. The therapist reduced focus on life goals and asked more questions about striving and nonstriving. This eventually helped the client to acknowledge her fear that making progress would lead to losing the consolation and connection she had felt with the therapist around her pain. Rupture and Repair Our relational approach to psychotherapy also values rupture and repair processes that have been empirically supported to represent another way clinical humility may manifest in psychotherapy (Safran & Kraus, 2014). These processes involve some kind of disruptive interaction that leads to withdrawal or confrontation, hopefully followed by efforts to re-establish the therapeutic alliance. A key element in repair is willingness to recognize one’s impact on another and make active efforts to re-establish a sense of connection. Rupture and repair processes may take many forms and sizes. Small ruptures probably occur in every therapeutic hour in subtle ways. Imagine a therapist making a comment that does not feel quite right to the client, who says “It’s more like this . . . . ” and offers a different version. If the therapist is able to receive the clarification with simple acknowledgement (e.g., a nod and “I see”), the dyad may proceed with minimal disruption despite the initial misunderstanding. Sometimes clients do not speak about such discrepancies, but alert therapists may notice nonverbal cues and inquire, for example, “How did that sound to you? I’m not sure it really fit.” Larger ruptures may be implicit or explicit. Implicit ruptures are sometimes described as enactments, interactions in which both parties feel trapped or coerced and neither party is fully conscious of their participation. Escaping and repairing enactments usually requires finding new freedom to act (Wallin, 2007), owning previously disavowed thoughts or feelings (Bromberg, 2011), or adopting a new relational stance that eludes the complementary power positions of “doer or done to” (Benjamin, 2004). These actions exemplify humility in various ways such as openness; willingness to own one’s own vulnerability, mistakes, and limitations; and attention and concern for the other. Consider the case of a middle-aged White Lutheran female client in long-term treatment for depression who began to complain on a regular basis that her middle-aged White male agnostic therapist was not helping enough. The therapist made efforts to clarify the client’s concerns and adjust the treatment plan, but nothing changed. Transference interpretations were rejected, and efforts to find adjunctive resources fell flat. The therapist felt more and more defensive and helplessness as the client felt alternately blamed and abandoned. This stalemate began to ease only after both parties were able

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to incorporate previously unacknowledged material and take new risks. For the therapist, this involved acknowledging his ineffectiveness, offering to help the client find a new therapist if she wished, and asking the client to be less avoidant in certain ways during the session. For the client, this meant recognizing and expressing her frustration that they were not talking more about religious themes and voicing fears of potential invalidation if religious issues were engaged. These offerings broke the impasse and opened new threads of conversation. Major ruptures may be explicit and painfully clear. In one case, an adult ­Indian-American male client repeated stories of being overburdened at home and at work. After several months of exploring concerns and possibilities, his White male therapist commented that the client seemed unwilling to make a change in either situation. The client retorted, “I can’t make a change, can’t you see that? I’m paying you to help me find meaning in all of this.” Poignantly, this was the first time the client’s dilemma had been framed in this way or seen this way by the therapist. The therapist acknowledged his mistake and the client’s perspective, but the client dropped out soon afterward. In this case, therapeutic humility meant reflecting on lessons learned and sending referrals for other therapists. Conclusion Humility may manifest in psychotherapy through intention or by emergence and receptivity. Both clients and therapists may draw on humility to reframe suffering, accept finitude, and repair alliance ruptures. We emphasize humility as a resource for relational psychotherapy, but believe this virtue/practice/gift may enrich other approaches in similar or distinct ways. There is a place for humility in receiving feedback and managing rupture–repair dynamics across orientations. However, humility may also be relevant to distinct approaches in more specific ways. For example, a client engaged in dialectical behavior therapy may exercise humility by consistently completing homework and skills practice outside of session, even when one does not feel particularly competent at that work. Clinicians rooted in cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) exhibit humility when they are not excessively attached to particular strategies for reducing symptoms and are willing to let client experiences inform their technique. Humility is an integral foundation of some therapeutic modalities, especially humanistic-based approaches like motivational interviewing. More broadly, we believe humility can contribute to effective practice within various orientations, as awareness and management of inequitable power dynamics is always crucial. The capacity for mentalization and mature reflection on diverse conceptions of the virtue bolsters the practical fruits of humility in diverse settings. More

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clinical research on humility in psychotherapy will support best practices, leading to improved client outcomes. References Allen, J. G., Fonagy, P., & Bateman, A. W. (2008). Mentalizing in clinical practice. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing. Aristotle. (2004). Nicomachean ethics [F. H. Peters, Trans.]. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble. Benjamin, J. (2004). Beyond doer and done to: An intersubjective view of thirdness. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 73, 5–46. Bromberg, P. M. (2011). The shadow of the tsunami: And the growth of the relational mind. New York ; London: Routledge. Exline, J. J., & Hill, P. C. (2012). Humility: A consistent and robust predictor of generosity. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7(3), 208–218. doi:10.1080/17439760.2012.671348 Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Owen, J., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Utsey, S. O. (2013). Cultural humility: Measuring openness to culturally diverse clients. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 60, 353–366. Jankowski, P. J., & Sandage, S. J. (2014). Attachment to God and humility: Indirect effect and conditional effects models. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42(1), 70–82. Jankowski, P. J., Sandage, S. J., & Hill, P. C. (2013). Differentiation-based models of forgivingness, mental health and social justice commitment: Mediator effects for differentiation of self and humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 8, 412–424. doi:10.1080/17439760 .2013.820337 Lavelock, C. R., Worthington, E. L. Jr., Davis, D. E., Griffin, B. J., Reid, C. A., Hook, J. N., . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). The quiet virtue speaks: An intervention to promote humility. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 42, 99–110. Moore, R. L. (2003). Facing the dragon: Confronting personal and spiritual grandiosity. Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications. Morgan, S. P. (2005). Depression: Turning toward life. In C. K. Germer, R. D. Siegel, P. R. Fulton, C. K. Germer, R. D. Siegel & P. R. Fulton (Eds.), Mindfulness and psychotherapy (pp. 130–151). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Paine, D. R., Jankowski, P. J., & Sandage, S. J. (2016). Humility as a predictor of intercultural competence. Family Journal, 24(1), 15–22. doi:10.1177/1066480715615667 Paine, D. R., Sandage, S. J., Rupert, D., Devor, N. D., & Bronstein, M. (2015). Humility as a psychotherapeutic virtue: Spiritual, philosophical & psychological foundations. Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health, 17, 3–25. Peters, A. S., Rowatt, W. C., & Johnson, M. K. (2011). Associations between dispositional humility and social relationship quality. Psychology, 2, 155–161. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. Washington, DC; New York, NY: American Psychological Association. Plato (2009). Meno [R. Waterfield, Trans.]. New York: Oxford University Press. Rowden, T. J., Harris, S. M., & Wickel, K. (2014). Understanding humility and its role in relational therapy. Contemporary Family Therapy: An International Journal, 36, 380–391. doi:10.1007/s10591–013–9297–8 Safran, J. D., & Kraus, J. (2014). Alliance ruptures, impasses, and enactments: A relational perspective. Psychotherapy, 51, 381–387. Sandage, S. J., Jankowski, P. J., Bissonette, C. D., & Paine, D. R. (in press). Vulnerable narcissism, forgiveness, humility, and depression: Mediator effects for differentiation of self. Psychoanalytic Psychology. Sandage, S. J., Paine, D. R., & Hill, P. C. (2015). Spiritual barriers to humility: A multidimensional study. Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, 18, 207–217.

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Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 70–82. doi:10.1521/ jscp.2000.19.1.70 Tangney, J. P. (2009). Humility. In S. J. Lopez, C. R. Snyder, S. J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of positive psychology (2nd ed.) (pp. 483–490). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Wallin, D. J. (2007). Attachment in psychotherapy. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Wolfteich, C. E., Keefe-Perry, C., Sandage, S. J., & Paine, D. R. (in press). Humility: Empirical psychological research in dialogue with practical theology. International Journal of Practical Theology, 20(1), 143–155. Wood, A. M., & Johnson, J. (Eds.). (2016). The Wiley handbook of positive clinical psychology: An integrative approach to studying and improving well-being. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2008). Humility: The quiet virtue. Journal of Psychology & Christianity, 27, 270–273. Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Sandage, S. J. (2015). Forgiveness and spirituality in psychotherapy: A relational approach. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

22 MICROAGGRESSIONS AND C U LT U R A L H U M I L I T Y I N PSYCHOTHERAPY Joanna M. Drinane, Jesse Owen, Joshua N. Hook, Don E. Davis, and Everett L. Worthington, Jr.

Hook and Watkins (2015) pose the following question: Why is it that many psychologists—despite such increasingly diversifying opportunities for cultural contact, despite being trained and steeped in the values of multiculturalism, and despite being designated as leaders in promoting multiculturalism and positive cultural engagement—continue to seemingly struggle to positively engage with culturally different individuals and groups? In this chapter, we seek to address this dilemma. No amount of training can fully prepare a psychotherapist for the unique dynamics that result from the interaction of cultural identities, both visible and invisible, within each psychotherapeutic dyad. These dialogues can be perceived as threatening and have the potential to arouse feelings of dread, anxiety, anger, and frustration, which can disrupt communication and behaviors (Sue, 2013). The experience of emotionality and anxiety in the face of cultural difference can be all too common among people, regardless of context. That said, in the intimate, “protected” psychotherapy setting, even the most culturally oriented psychotherapists are not capable of addressing all situations in the exact way that their clients need or want. Despite the relaxed and unassuming stance certain psychotherapists take in psychotherapy, their reactions or attempts to initiate cultural conversations can at times be inattentive to or mistaken about clients’ feelings. As a result, cultural misunderstandings or ruptures can occur when psychotherapists make assumptions or overgeneralize about the ways that culture influences clients’ day-to-day experiences. Although psychotherapists may be well meaning and

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have positive intentions, they sometimes are unable to navigate the depth and subsequent influence of their own biases. Psychotherapists’ cultural errors can range from minor (e.g., a small misunderstanding of a client statement) to more severe (e.g., microaggression or other type of cultural rupture). The impact of these mistakes may be lasting for clients and can have deleterious effects on the work clients do in psychotherapy. Psychotherapists are responsible for successfully navigating these cultural dynamics with as much ease as possible in order to act ethically and in the best interest of their clients. We believe that one way of navigating some of these tensions is represented by psychotherapists who are able to cultivate and practice cultural humility. Frankly, the current chapter is in many ways speculative. It is based on nascent theorizing on cultural humility and emerging research drawn from a limited number of studies. However, the area is fecund, and we identify by the end of the chapter a whole world of possible research hypotheses that might be investigated regarding cultural humility. Cultural Humility in Psychotherapy Cultural humility is a psychotherapist characteristic that conveys interest, curiosity, awareness, and openness, particularly in situations when these qualities are strained by cultural differences or similarities (Hook et al., 2013). It represents one of three components comprising the multicultural orientation framework, which, broadly speaking, describes psychotherapists’ way of being with clients and is guided by their philosophy and its emphasis on culture as a factor that affects clients’ lives (Owen, 2013; Owen, Tao, Leach, & Rodolfa, 2011). As a construct, cultural humility is composed of both intrapersonal and interpersonal components. Intrapersonally, it involves having an accurate view of the limitations of one’s own cultural perspective, as well as one’s ability to know or understand the cultural background and experiences of another individual or group (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010; Hook et al., 2013). Interpersonally, cultural humility involves being culturally other-oriented rather than self-­ focused (Davis et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2010; Hook et al., 2013). Culturally humble psychotherapists are able to engage their clients with attitudes of respect that are characterized by lack of superiority and attunement to cultural processes (Hook et al., 2013; Owen, 2013). Psychotherapists who operate in this way rarely assume their own competence based on prior experience working with clients from particular groups (Hook et al., 2013). In essence, they work collaboratively with clients to accurately understand the unique intersection of the multitude of identities present in the room and how they then

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influence the developing psychotherapy alliance (Hook et al., 2013). With this in mind, psychotherapists who demonstrate cultural humility during conversations with their clients are more apt not only to develop positive therapeutic relationships with clients, but they are also better able to maintain them. They can engage clients in positive and accepting ways and are also open to and skilled at repairing relational ruptures. Psychotherapists’ cultural humility can enhance clients’ participation in meaningful and purposeful work in psychotherapy (Hook et al., 2013). In a series of three retrospective psychotherapy studies, Hook examined clients’ (N = 726) perceptions of their therapists’ cultural humility. They found clients who perceive their psychotherapists as being more culturally humble typically report being more aligned with their psychotherapists and having better psychotherapy outcomes (Hook et al., 2013). Furthermore, Owen, Jordan, Turner, Davis, Hook, and Leach (2014) examined 45 clients who identified that their religion/spirituality was a salient cultural identity. They replicated the finding from Hook and colleagues (2013) by examining the effect of psychotherapist cultural humility toward the client’s religious or spiritual background. In this study, psychotherapists’ cultural humility accounted for over 10 percent of the variance in psychotherapy outcomes across a variety of life functioning areas (Owen et al., 2013). The importance of cultural humility may also be a function of the salience of the identities clients hold. For example, in the same study, for clients with high levels of religious commitment, there was a positive relationship between psychotherapist cultural humility and psychotherapy outcomes. However, for clients with low levels of religious commitment, there was no relationship between psychotherapist cultural humility and psychotherapy outcomes (Owen et al., 2014). Hook and Watkins (2015) contend that cultural humility may be the foundation for recognizing the need for learning about culture and then acting accordingly. In the absence of a culturally humble perspective, learning about and openness to the “cultural other” is inherently less likely (Hook & Watkins, 2015). Indeed some clients do not view their psychotherapists as being supportive of their cultural identities (e.g., Constantine, 2007; Owen, Imel, Tao, Wampold, Smith, and Rodolfa, 2011; Owen, Tao, & Rodolfa, 2010). Practicing cultural humility can be difficult in situations where clients’ beliefs, values, and goals are discrepant from those of their psychotherapists. In spite of the beneficent intentions of many people entering the field as psychotherapists, the existence of these differing worldviews has the potential to lead to ruptures in the working alliance that are attributed to cultural conversations. Such ruptures, which likely connect to a lack of cultural humility on behalf of the psychotherapist, challenge the ideal representation of the psychotherapy relationship as being only “safe,” supportive, and protective. Instead, these ruptures have the

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potential to alienate clients during their time of greatest need. In particular, this comes about as psychotherapists inadvertently express their cultural biases via more nuanced and subtle forms of microaggression. Cultural humility may be a protective quality that allows psychotherapists to facilitate prevention and repair of these cultural missteps in psychotherapy. Microaggressions Microaggressions are exchanges between individuals of similar or different identities that convey underlying biases or assumptions. Sue and colleagues (2007) indicate that these derogatory, identity group–based messages can be verbal, behavioral, or environmental in nature. The challenge with microaggressions is that those who often perpetrate or express them do not realize that what they are saying or doing is rooted in discrimination (Sue et al., 2007). They also may not grasp the degree of the impact their messages can have on those they are communicated to (Sue et al., 2007). As a result of these indiscretions being invisible and at times unintentional, they often go unrecognized (Sue et al., 2007). Microaggressions can occur on the basis of any minority identity. Owen, Tao, and Rodolfa (2010) identify target identities that may be misunderstood or improperly judged such as ability status, sexual orientation, gender identity, socioeconomic background, and religious affiliation. Many of these identities are not represented in the literature on microaggressions; however, this makes sense as those same identities are underrepresented and misunderstood in mainstream society. To highlight the range of comments that can be considered microaggressions, we will reference a few themes illuminated in focus group discussion, which are related to the psychotherapy context, but are by no means extensive (Constantine, 2007). Among those are colorblindness; overidentifying with a person based on identity, denial, or minimization of cultural differences or concerns; stereotypic assumptions; culturally insensitive treatment recommendations; and dysfunctional helping (Constantine, 2007). There is a subjective quality to microaggressions that can be influenced by privilege and power. Some statements that fit into the categories defined earlier may be recognized as microaggressions by the persons involved, whereas others may not. However, the underlying meaning is likely rooted in some bias taught or reinforced by the systems in which people reside. For example, a psychotherapist may tell a client, “It doesn’t matter to me that you are gay. I see you as a typical client, and I like working with you.” This quote from a fictional psychotherapy session may sound affirming as it rolls off the psychotherapist’s tongue. However, there is an underlying message to the client that is denying who they are and what they have experienced as a person who identifies as gay. Far from a culturally humble intervention, this communication is built on assumptions about the role of culture in the room and in the client’s life. Furthermore,

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another example from a psychotherapist might be, “As a woman among men, I know just how you feel when you are discriminated against because you are transgender.” The psychotherapist involved may be attempting to join with the client. However, as far as interventions go, intention does not always correspond with impact. The gender bias experienced by a person who identifies as trans* is not the same as that experienced by a cis-gender woman. The assumed similarity expressed by this psychotherapist can convey a lack of understanding of gender-based oppression, which was the opposite of what the psychotherapist intended to do. The effects of these negative interactions can be painful and can have a lasting impact on clients. Microaggressions can occur across contexts; however, when they occur in psychotherapy, they have the potential to hinder progress in treatment (Constantine, 2007; Owen et al., 2012; Owen, Tao, Imel, Wampold, & Rodolfa, 2014). Researchers have found negative associations between client perceptions of microaggressions in session and the working alliance, satisfaction with psychotherapy services, and psychotherapy outcomes (Constantine, 2007; Hook et al., in press; Morton, 2011; Owen et al., 2010; Owen, Imel, Tao, Wampold, Smith, and Rodolfa, 2011; Owen, Tao, Imel, Wampold, & Rodolfa, 2014). The confidential nature of the psychotherapy relationship can amplify the sense of betrayal clients feel because of microaggressions. As such, it is important to work with psychotherapists to understand the impact of these sorts of ruptures and to cultivate the skills necessary to repair them so that the relationship quality and the psychotherapy outcomes are not compromised for the long term. Within the therapeutic dyad, psychotherapists carry power, and based on their role, clients often view their remarks as meaningful. Consider the following example of a Native American client who is seemingly shy and does not make eye contact with his White psychotherapist. Before fully exploring the possibilities for the client’s behavior, the psychotherapist diagnoses the client with social anxiety and conceptualizes the client’s behavior as a symptom of his pathology. In reality, there may be other reasons for the client’s hesitancy to share and connect, which could include a history of being looked down upon in public school or mistrust for people outside of his community. A psychotherapist in this position might even say something like, “You mentioned that you think your shyness is a function of you being Native American—I think it’s just your anxiety kicking in.” Microaggressions of this nature may come from a “clinically informed” place, but they emphasize the values of the dominant culture and ignore the possible cultural attributions that clients may have for their distress. In an ideal world, psychotherapists and clients alike would discuss and work to repair the damage caused by microaggressions when they happen. However, clients report that psychotherapists seldom address microaggressions when they occur

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in psychotherapy (Owen, Tao, Imel, Wampold, & Rodolfa, 2014). For instance, a study by Owen and colleagues found that 53 percent of racial ethnic minority clients reported experiencing a microaggression from their psychotherapist. Of those, nearly 76 percent reported that the microaggression was not discussed (Owen, Tao, Imel, Wampold, & Rodolfa, 2014). Some quality of these conversations leads many clients and psychotherapists alike to avoid working through them together in session. Accordingly, the working alliance was lower for psychotherapeutic dyads where the client and psychotherapist did not discuss the microaggression than those who did (Owen, Tao, Imel, Wampold, & Rodolfa, 2014). This lack of conversation and repair regarding microaggressions may be due to lack of awareness on the part of the psychotherapist, discomfort discussing culturally laden topics, or the absence of the skills needed to facilitate rupture repair. In order to own that one has committed a microaggression, psychotherapists must acknowledge having biased perspectives and attitudes. This can be a challenging thing for anyone to face, let alone individuals who are committed to a field that strongly values “multicultural competence.” Failing to live up to aspirational ideas can cause therapists to feel a loss of personal and professional integrity, which can be very painful. Nonetheless, those standards are in place because minority clients experience oppression in their daily lives, and psychotherapy settings should attempt to be different. Cultural Humility and Microaggressions in Psychotherapy Unfortunately, there has been little systematic work exploring how psychotherapists can (a) avoid committing microaggressions toward their clients and (b) effectively work through and process microaggressions when they do occur. Whereas several studies indicate that microaggressions occur in counseling, less is known regarding the characteristics of qualities of psychotherapists who are more or less likely to commit them. By way of exceptions, Owen, Imel, Tao, Wampold, Smith, and Rodolfa (2011) explored clients’ (N = 232) ratings of perceived microaggressions by their therapists in a retrospective analysis of psychotherapy. They found no difference in the frequency of microaggressions based on psychotherapist race or racial/ethnic match between client and psychotherapist. This finding was replicated in another study of racial/ethnic microaggressions with 120 racial/ ethnic minority clients who were treated at a college counseling center (Owen, Tao, Imel, Wampold, & Rodolfa, 2014). Additionally, in a sample of 121 women, Owen et al. (2010) found no difference in the frequency of microaggressions based on psychotherapist gender or whether psychotherapist and client were matched on gender. Constantine (2007) found that psychotherapists who were rated by their clients as having higher levels of general and multicultural competence were less likely to commit racial microaggressions with their clients.

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Theoretically, the concepts of cultural humility and microaggressions are inextricably linked. Each connects to the psychotherapist’s values and how those values influence the psychotherapy process. As Hook et al. (2013) assert, psychotherapists must embrace different worldviews or they will inherently face difficulty when attempting to connect with diverse clientele. Psychotherapists who display cultural humility may be more at ease while working through and accepting their biases. The focus of the work of a culturally humble psychotherapist is driven by what is most salient to the client. This translates to psychotherapists being tuned in to the client’s needs and the degree to which the client wants aspects of culture to be integrated into psychotherapy. Because of this, culturally humble psychotherapists may be less likely to engage in culturally inappropriate treatment recommendations or dysfunctional helping. Culturally humble psychotherapists in essence co-construct the role that culture plays in session and do not assume an expert role. Although culturally humble psychotherapists may in fact be more aware of their limitations and the existence of their underlying assumptions and biases, they also may be more apt to facilitate repair in the face of misunderstandings. Because they are other-oriented, rather than self-focused in relation to cultural issues, they may be more attuned to the inevitable missteps that happen during cultural conversations. In essence, they can recognize mistakes they make and in turn be comfortable acknowledging them and processing them with clients. They will likely be less defensive and more introspective when facing the reality that they committed a microaggression. By definition, their responses are not driven by pride, and therefore they can more effectively navigate relationship repair efforts with their clients following a cultural microaggression. The psychotherapist’s cultural humility is also connected with components of relationship quality. Perceptions of cultural humility have been linked with increased levels of forgiveness in interpersonal relationships (Davis et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2015). Based on this research, clients who perceive their psychotherapists to be culturally humble are likely more willing to forgive their psychotherapists for committing a microaggression and to repair the relationship. Psychotherapist cultural humility shown throughout the course of psychotherapy influences the ways in which the relationship is maintained and how well and quickly therapeutic ruptures are repaired. A recent study by Hook et al. (in press) examined association between client ratings of their psychotherapists’ cultural humility and client perceptions of their psychotherapists committing racial microaggressions. The sample for this study is unique in its size and demographic breakdown (N = 2,212 racial/

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ethnic minorities). Psychotherapists who were perceived as being more culturally humble had fewer instances of microaggressions in counseling, and microaggressions they did commit had a lower impact (Hook et al., in press). This association remained significant even after controlling for client perceptions of the general competence and the multicultural competence of their psychotherapist (Hook et al., in press). The increased sensitivity to diversity and respect for cultural differences characteristic of culturally humble psychotherapists may facilitate developing, recovering, and repairing ongoing psychotherapy relationships. Culturally humble psychotherapists who commit microaggressions may be more apt to admit their limitations and to communicate respect and understanding for the ways in which their actions may have negatively affected the psychotherapy relationship (Hook et al., in press). Case Example Consider the following examples from a fictional psychotherapy dyad. James is in counseling for some mild depression. He is a 28-year-old Black and c­ isgenderidentified male who has completed his master’s in business administration. This dialogue represents his third session with his psychotherapist where he describes struggling to remain engaged and active in his work community.

Psychotherapist: So you are in survival mode, just trying to make it through? What do you think is contributing to that? James: Hmm. I think that in part it has to do with my being the only Black man in my office. Like I feel so on edge without a feeling of community and connection with my colleagues, and it wears on me all the time. The only other person who isn’t white is an Asian woman. I’m on my own and people aren’t really reaching out. It’s exhausting trying to make it all come together and being by myself. Psychotherapist: That sounds really tough . . . and a lot of people experiencing depression feel lonely and isolated. I’m not even sure your race has anything to do with it. Don’t be so hard on yourself. James: Huh—I guess so. I’m just not really sure what to do.

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In this example, the psychotherapist emphasizes the role of symptoms in James’s distress. However, James is overtly saying that he believes his presenting concern has a cultural component. The psychotherapist is assuming that the primary issue is his depression and that it is not his work environment. This example conveys a microaggression that might go unnoticed by many theory-driven psychotherapists. For example, a cognitive behavioral psychotherapist might assume that his depression is purely the result of maladaptive thoughts. This perception about his work environment might even be one of those thoughts. However, theory-driven work and cultural orientation are not mutually exclusive. Culturally humble psychotherapists work with clients to understand the salience and relevance of their cultural identities and how they connect to an underlying theoretical conceptualization of their distress. Consider the following alternative. James presents to a different psychotherapist and the conversation changes. As you are reading, attend to the moments where this psychotherapy goes differently. Try to connect with how you might feel if you were James. Do you think the direction in which this new session goes is a valuable one?

Psychotherapist: So you are in survival mode, just trying to make it through? What do you think is contributing to that? I think in part it has to do with my being the only Black man James: in my office. Like I feel so on edge without a feeling of community and connection with my colleagues, and it wears on me all the time. The only other person who isn’t white is an Asian woman. I’m on my own and people aren’t really reaching out. It’s exhausting trying to make it all come together and being by myself. Psychotherapist: Wow, yeah, that sounds exhausting. What is that like for you? To be the only Black man and to feel so alone? Tell me how that feels. I think it just reminds me of how hard it’s going to be for me James: to make it. To know that I’m drowning in a sea of white— not really feeling of being seen the same as everyone else. It makes me depressed—can’t focus, can’t sleep.

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In this version, the psychotherapist follows James’ lead and assesses how relevant/salient James feels his racial identity to be. The psychotherapist does not assume that race is most relevant to what is being experienced, nor that it is irrelevant. Rather, the psychotherapist asks James more about his experience. This reply exemplifies an other-oriented stance and demonstrates interest and openness. This exchange opens the door for James to share more about how his culture is linked to his distress. Research Moving Forward There is a significant need for further research on the intersection of cultural humility and microaggressions. To date, much of the research on microaggression in psychotherapy has been limited to racial identities (cf. see Owen et al., 2010, for an example of microaggression against women). Future directions could involve exploring microaggressions based on other cultural identities, including but not limited to gender identity, sexual orientation, and religious affiliation. In a psychotherapy context, it will also be important to conduct studies that are longitudinal. Getting away from a cross-sectional approach will allow for further assessment of rupture repair cycles that occur over time and may be influenced by cultural humility and microaggressions. Utilizing longitudinal methodology also can help researchers establish if cultural humility is state based (varying each session) or if it is a trait that certain therapists possess across sessions. Moving forward, quantitative measurement of cultural humility will be enhanced if both client (as is done currently) and observer ratings of this construct are collected and included in analyses. Research on the topic of cultural humility is still early in its development. Questions that have the potential to drive the future of quantitative study design on this topic might include the following: • What are the actual behaviors associated with cultural humility? • What do culturally humble relationship-repair efforts involve? • Does cultural humility predict whether psychotherapists are able to recognize and repair microaggressions in psychotherapy? • Does cultural humility aid in learning new approaches for working with culturally diverse clients? • Does the awareness of committing a microaggression impact therapists’ sense of their own cultural humility? Due to the complexity and subtlety of psychotherapist and client interactions, it will also advance the research on this topic if studies are designed qualitatively. Utilizing qualitative methodology allows researchers to gain access to

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more comprehensive description and meaning of cultural interactions that occur in psychotherapy. In addition, qualitative approaches can call attention to specific things that psychotherapists do in response to microaggressions (i.e., things that work and things that do not). Client narratives of the psychotherapy process can help researchers build theories and models that are informed with rich explanation of the dynamics that occur in session as a part of the psychotherapeutic relationship. Qualitative methodology does not begin with development of hypotheses. Instead, it is anchored by a research problem. In this case, that relates to a lack of understanding of how clients experience cultural humility and its impacts on the psychotherapy process. The goal of qualitative work in this area may be to cultivate insight into the behavioral and attitudinal components of cultural humility that clients pick up on in session. The intention would be to describe this component of multicultural orientation in more depth so psychotherapists can emphasize this with their clients. The following are a few questions that may be asked of clients to capture their experiences: • How does your psychotherapist convey understanding of your culture? • Recall the moment when you and your psychotherapist discussed cultural identities in session. How did they seem to approach this conversation? • Have you been microaggressed in psychotherapy? What about your psychotherapist led to you approach or avoid this situation? What was the impact? • Describe how your psychotherapist responds to you when you bring up identities that you differ on. Practical Application The theory and research surrounding cultural microaggressions and humility suggest that psychotherapists need to fine-tune their way of being with clients in session. Many psychotherapists rely on models of competency, which have the potential to perpetuate cultural stereotypes. We recommend that psychotherapists instead work with each client to make meaning of how collectively their cultural identities interact in the psychotherapy room. In many ways, this is easier said than done. To cultivate a multiculturally oriented perspective, we suggest that psychotherapists begin to do the following things both in and out of session. Psychotherapists should engage in activities that allow them to develop an accurate view of their cultural strengths and limitations (i.e., observation, cultural immersion, requesting feedback, evaluating their power and privilege). Psychotherapists should also work to explore their cultural backgrounds and worldviews,

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including those that relate to biases and growth edges. This involves deep reflection and questioning of things that are kept far from the surface. While working with clients, psychotherapists can develop a cultural o ­ theroriented stance. This is characterized by asking questions when the psychotherapist is uncertain rather than assuming some level of understanding. In addition, this involves moving past stereotypes learned in textbooks or accumulated from work with previous clients of similar demographics. Cultural humility involves adopting a curious attitude about clients’ cultural background and experiences. Rather than setting the goal of being the perfect treatment provider, psychotherapists instead should accept that these inevitable and unintentional cultural missteps will occur and that they can have the courage to work through them. This will convey openness to clients and a willingness to integrate their feedback into the process. If psychotherapists express a desire to know more about their clients, then their clients feel permission to share more and to do more in psychotherapy. Cultural humility orients therapists to be genuine and flexible with clients surrounding cultural issues, which is likely to enhance the relationship and what clients take away from the psychotherapy process. References Constantine, M. G. (2007). Racial microaggressions against African American clients in crossracial counseling relationships. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 54, 17–31. doi:10.1037/ 0022–0167.54.1.1 Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J. II., . . . Emmons, R. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225–234. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Relational humility: A review of definitions and measurement strategies, Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 243–252. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Hook, J. N., Emmons, R. A., Hill, P. C., Bollinger, R. A., & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2013). Humility and the development and repair of social bonds: Two longitudinal studies. Self and Identity, 12(1), 58–77. Farrell, J. E., Hook, J. N., Ramos, M., Davis, D. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Ruiz, J. M. (2015). Humility and relationship outcomes in couples: The mediating role of commitment. Couple and Family Psychology: Research and Practice, 4(1), 14–26. Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Owen, J., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2013). Cultural humility: Measuring openness to culturally diverse clients. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 60, 353–3. Hook, J. N., Farrell, J. E., Davis, D. E., DeBlaere, C., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Utsey, S. O. (in press). Cultural humility and racial microaggressions in counseling. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 63, 269–277. Hook, J. N., & Watkins, Jr., C. E. (2015). Cultural humility: The cornerstone of positive contact with culturally different individuals and groups. American Psychologist, 70, 661–662. Morton, E. (2011). The incidence of racial microaggressions in the cross-racial counseling dyad. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B, 72, 6416.

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Owen, J. (2013). Early career perspectives on psychotherapy research and practice: Psychotherapist effects, multicultural orientation, and couple interventions. Psychotherapy, 50, 496–502. doi:10.1037/a0034617 Owen, J., Imel, Z., Adelson, J., & Rodolfa, E. (2012). ‘No-show’: Therapist racial/ethnic disparities in client unilateral termination. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 59(2), 314–320. Owen, J., Imel, Z., Tao, K., Wampold, B., Smith, A., & Rodolfa, E. (2011). Cultural ruptures: Working alliance as a mediator between clients’ perceptions of microaggressions and psychotherapy outcomes. Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 11, 204–212. Owen, J., Jordan II., T. A., Turner, D., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. E., & Leach, M. M. (2014). Psychotherapists’ multicultural orientation: Client perceptions of cultural humility, spiritual/ religious, commitment, and psychotherapy outcomes. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42, 91–98. Owen, J., Tao, K., Leach, M., & Rodolfa, E. (2011). Clients’ perceptions of their psychotherapists’ multicultural orientation. Psychotherapy, 48, 274–282. Owen, J., Tao, K. W., Imel, Z. E., Wampold, B. E., & Rodolfa, E. (2014). Addressing racial and ethnic microaggressions in psychotherapy. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 45, 283–290. Owen, J., Tao, K., & Rodolfa, E. (2010). Microaggressions against women in short-term psychotherapy: Initial evidence. The Counseling Psychologist, 38, 923–946. Sue, D. W. (2013). Race talk: The psychology of racial dialogues. American Psychologist, 68, 663–672. Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A., Nadal, K. L., & Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. American Psychologist, 62(4), 271–286.

23 T H E C L I N I C A L A P P L I C AT I O N O F HUMILITY TO MORAL INJURY An Exemplar of Positive Military Psychology Brandon J. Griffin, Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Robert F. Dees, Laurel Shaler, John Benesek, Treven Pickett, Joshua N. Hook, and Don E. Davis1

Military service in general, and combat in particular, can present a wide variety of scenarios to service members that pose ethical challenges and in some circumstances violate personal values. Although exposure alone does not necessarily lead to clinically significant levels of distress, moral injury can occur when service members witness or perpetrate an act that violates their sociomoral values and impairs their perceptions of self-worth and social connection. In the current chapter, we develop a sociocognitive framework to guide efforts intended to alleviate the problem of service-related moral injury, and we introduce humility—that is, a dispositional tendency to form accurate self-appraisals, behave in other-orientated ways, and present oneself modestly—as a component of prevention and intervention efforts that target moral injury. Humility The field of positive psychology complements a historical focus among social scientists on disorder by investigating character strength, virtue, and wellbeing. In fact, positive psychological emphases on resilience, values-based living, and leadership have even given rise to a positive military psychology (Matthews et al., 2008). Nevertheless, humility is one of the latest positive psychological constructs to debut and has yet to be integrated into military healthcare settings (Worthington et al., 2015). Scholars conceptualize humility to have three components. First, humility entails having an accurate view of oneself (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010). It is neither self-enhancing nor self-depreciating. Humble individuals are aware of their limitations as well as secure in the value of their accomplishments.

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Second, humility is characterized by a benevolent orientation toward others (Davis et al., 2011). Humble people are attentive to others’ needs, empathic, and prioritize shared outcomes above their own self-focused gain. Third, humility is expressed behaviorally in modest self-presentation (Davis et al., 2016), which contrasts with perfectionistic self-presentation of one’s abilities, moral character, or social influence. A Sociocognitive Model of Moral Injury The concept of moral injury has only recently received attention from military health professionals. Shay (2014, p. 182) initially described moral injury as “(a) a betrayal of ‘what’s right;’ (b) either by a person in legitimate authority or by oneself; (c) in a high stakes situation.” Although this definition and its revisions were a seminal step forward that increased awareness of moral injury, its anecdotal heritage inspired little confidence among professionals in a military healthcare system informed by a promulgation of evidence-based practice. For this reason, diverse theoretical perspectives continue to proliferate. From their collective clinical expertise, Litz and colleagues (2009) define moral injury as “perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (p. 697). Likewise, based on interviews with military health and religious professionals, Drescher et al. (2011, p. 8) described moral injury as a “disruption in an individual’s sense of personal morality and capacity to behave in a just manner.” And, Nash and Litz (2013, p. 368) framed moral injury as a developmentally inappropriate challenge to moral cognition that precipitates “a state of loss of trust in previously deeply held beliefs about one’s own or others’ ability to keep our shared moral covenant.” We focus the current analysis on what is common across these ­definitions—that is, threatened trust. We first establish a model of moral injury. According to social cognitive theory, moral self-regulation occurs as individuals monitor their planned behavior for morally relevant information, judge their planned behavior in relation to internalized sociomoral values and perceived situational constraints, and decide to act in order to maximize their sense of self-worth and social connection (Bandura, 1986, 1991). Yet, perpetration of behavior judged as morally unacceptable inevitably occurs and might result in condemnation from oneself and others (Bandura, 1999). Importantly, these violations can occur in situations wherein service members have limited time and information to make difficult decisions, or as a product of situational pressures, and not solely for reasons such as a premeditated perpetration of an atrocity (Zimbardo, 2008). For example, service members may be involved in firefights in which innocent civilians are inadvertently harmed in the context of chaotic urban warzones, or a service member

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might engage in the excessive use of violence toward enemy combatants to retaliate for the demise of a compatriot if personal responsibility is diffused among others in a unit. In situations where sociomoral violations occur that an individual later perceives as morally reprehensible, moral self-­reparation is the process through which an individual’s sense of self-worth and social connection can be restored. We adapt a sociocognitive model of moral injury by theorizing that exposure to a potentially morally injurious event affects self-worth (i.e., intrapersonal outcomes) and social connection (i.e., interpersonal outcomes) via mechanisms including self-condemnation, threat to meaning, traumatic grief, and sacred desecration. In the current chapter, each aspect of the model will be reviewed; then, applications of humility that are proposed to assuage the problem of moral injury by resolving mechanisms that link exposure to impairment will be discussed. Exposure to Potentially Morally Injurious Events Potentially morally injurious events saturate the military environment, but exposure looks different at various levels of the command hierarchy. For enlisted ranks, exposure to potentially morally injurious events may include killing an enemy combatant, injury or death of a fellow soldier, and injury or death of innocent civilians. Combat-related killing has been consistently associated with higher levels of posttraumatic stress when statistically controlling for common predictors of distress such as combat exposure (e.g., Maguen et al., 2010), and the moral struggle that ensues when a service member kills an enemy combatant may be one explanation of the exaggerated traumatic response to killing. Next, military officers and leaders might experience moral injury when they make decisions that have high human costs (e.g., injury or death) for those under their command, and support personnel who adhere to morally salient professional ethics codes, such as combat medics or chaplains, may experience a moral injury if they feel unable to adequately serve those under their professional care. Although the prevalence of moral injury in military personal at any level of the command hierarchy is not well established, Stein et al. and the STRONG STAR Consortium (2012) found evidence to suggest that, among active duty personnel in treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 12 percent perpetrated a morally injurious event and 22 percent witnessed a morally injurious event. Impairments Associated with Moral Injury For service members who sustain moral injuries, the emotional, relational, and quality of life tolls may be long lasting irrespective of the time since the morally injurious event. We classify impairments as (a) psychological and behavioral

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problems within the individual and (b) relational problems between the individual and others. Intrapersonal Problems First, moral injury has been associated with psychological problems including depression, anxiety, and hostility, as well as behavioral problems including social withdrawal, substance abuse, and risk-taking behaviors (Litz et al., 2009). In fact, some scholars have suggested that emotional distress secondary to moral injury may be one explanation for the alarming rates of self-harm and suicidal behavior among service members (Bryan, Theriault, & Bryan, 2015). These intrapersonal problems often manifest in conjunction with persistent offense-related cognitions (e.g., blame appraisals) and emotions (e.g., guilt and shame). Interpersonal Problems Interpersonal problems occur between service members and others. For example, evidence suggests that one’s own self-condemnation threatens the relationship satisfaction of both partners in a romantic dyad (Pelucchi, Paleari, Regalia, & Fincham, 2010). Perhaps due to difficulty trusting others, service members who sustain moral injuries frequently report conflicts with others such as romantic partners and coworkers. If service members labor to withhold information about their morally injurious experience from others, the individuals may serve as triggers that perpetuate rumination in the mind of the service member. For example, exposure to a potentially morally injurious event may lead to chronic sleep disruption due to nightmares if a service member chooses to protect their spouse by not sharing their experiences but simultaneously re-experiences a traumatic event while lying next to their uninformed spouse in bed. Furthermore, evidence has suggested that individuals relate to whatever they hold to be sacred (e.g., God, nature, humanity, etc.) in a similar way that they relate to others (Davis, Worthington, Hook, & Van Tongeren, 2009). These sacred relationships may also be affected by the presence of moral injury. Moral injuries may cause religious/spiritual struggles, including feelings of anger, alienation, and betrayal, which characterize one’s relationship with whatever one holds to be sacred (Exline, Pargament, Grubbs, & Yali, 2014). Exposure to a morally injurious event may also precipitate disengagement from stable beliefs and practices, which might impel people who were not religious toward religion or, alternatively, steer people who were once religious away from religion. Wuthnow (1998) has described this as disrupting spiritual dwelling and resulting in spiritual seeking (see Worthington & Sandage, 2015).

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Potential Mechanisms that Lead to Distress Not every service member exposed to a potentially morally injurious event will experience clinical levels of distress. Individual differences exist in service members’ reactions to traumatic events; therefore, we seek to understand how service members who sustain moral injuries might react differently to exposure than those who do not sustain moral injuries. We focus our analysis on four mechanisms hypothesized to link exposure to a potentially morally injurious event to individual and relational problems. These include self-condemnation, threat to meaning, grief, and experiences of sacred desecration. Self-Condemnation Service members may experience recurrent intermittent or chronic self-­ condemnation if they engage in, fail to prevent, or witness actions that violate their values (Worthington & Langberg, 2012). Self-condemnation has been associated with traumatic stress, depression, and anxiety among veterans (Witvliet, Phipps, Feldman, & Beckham, 2004), and condemnation toward oneself may be perpetuated or exacerbated by actual or perceived judgment of others. Although research suggests that negative emotion is not necessarily maladaptive, given its positive association with amend-making behavior in the aftermath of perpetrating an interpersonal offense (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), negative emotions like shame and guilt are maladaptive when they persist long after an event occurs. Thus, persistence of negative emotions is the problem. Oftentimes, service members condemn themselves for their role in events for which they find it difficult to exercise direct amend-making behavior such as apologizing to, offering restitution to, or seeking forgiveness from those affected by the event (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Instead, service members and veterans may use avoidant ways to cope with self-condemnation such as seeking sexual pleasure, focusing on career, or abusing substances. Coping strategies associated with meaningful interpretation and healthy resolution of negative emotions, such as engaging in amend-making behaviors, tend to be more adaptive than strategies characterized by avoidance. Threat to Meaning Service members who experience moral injuries have difficulty making meaning out of their traumatic experiences. “Meaning-making” is the process through which individuals strive to achieve an understanding of the meaning of previously experienced stressful events (Park, 2010). Currier, Holland, and Malott (2015) demonstrated that exposure to a morally injurious event was related to traumatic stress, depressive symptoms, and suicide risk after warzone service,

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in part because service members struggle to make meaning out of their experiences. We speculate that the violation of trust that is characteristic of moral injury shatters people’s foundational beliefs about themselves and the world to the extent that there is little foundation for the critical reparative process of cognitive restructuring to occur ( Janoff-Bullman, 2010). Grief War will always cause loss, and grief is the human response to loss. Stein and colleagues (2012) found that 30 percent of post-9/11 veterans from the U.S. military conflicts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) reported traumatic losses, such as the death of a fellow soldier. Also, Toblin and colleagues (2012) found that grief was associated with physical and occupational problems among service members after controlling for demographics, combat experiences, injuries, and mental health variables. Moreover, Boss (1999) expanded conceptualizations of what service members lose in war, noting that some report ambiguous losses such as loss of innocence, a sense of self, or feelings of intimacy resulting from morally injurious experiences. Although the losses of close others can be extremely challenging, cultural and religious rituals provide people with permission to grieve these losses. For service members who experience ambiguous losses, such as loss of trust, control, or compassion, there are no instructions or protocols about how to grieve. Consequently, service members may neither recognize their distress as grief, nor engage in the grieving process to integrate the loss experience into a new healthy lifestyle. Experiences of Sacred Desecration Service members may view some moral injuries as sacred desecrations to the extent that they perceive that their sacred values were somehow violated by the event (Exline, Pargament, Grubbs, & Yali, 2014; Witvliet et al., 2004; Worthington & Sandage, 2015). Violating sacred values tends to amplify distressing emotions (Pargament, Magyar, Benore, & Mahoney, 2005; Wortmann, Park, & Edmondson, 2011), which often causes religious/spiritual struggles such as feeling alienated from or betrayed by whatever one holds to be sacred. Sacred desecration, however, does not require affiliation with a specific religious group that coheres around belief in a supreme being. Even nonreligious individuals may experience spiritual struggle when their cherished values (e.g., patriotism, a family legacy of military service, or commitment to military values that transcend the individual) are offended by encountering a potentially morally injurious event.

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Practical Lessons in the Clinical Application of Humility to Moral Injury In summary, exposure to a potentially morally injurious event may lead to psychological, behavioral, relational, and spiritual problems insofar as service members’ responses to exposure are characterized by self-condemnation, threat to meaning, unresolved grief, and sacred desecration. It is in the intersection of these mechanisms that trust is ruptured, distorting perceptions of self and others, and it is here where we propose that clinical application of humility has an important role in shaping prevention and intervention efforts intended to alleviate symptoms of moral injury. We organize our analysis of the practical lessons in the clinical application of humility according to three propositions: (a) As a component of prevention, humility buffers the association between exposure to a potentially morally injurious event and mechanisms of distress that link exposure to impairment; (b) as a component of intervention, humility facilitates meaningful interpretation and healthy resolution of mechanisms of distress that otherwise persist chronically and lead to impairment; and (c) humility is a critical component of the provider–patient relationship that enhances therapeutic outcomes among individuals seeking treatment for moral injury. Practical Lesson 1: Humility Buffers the Association between Traumatic Exposure and Mechanisms of Distress Efforts to prevent moral injury must begin before service members ever enter a war zone. Although the training received by U.S. military service members reduces the likelihood of moral injuries by promoting adherence to the rules-of-engagement and escalation-of-force guidelines, many service members report that the ethical aspects of training are insufficient and most often eclipsed by the technical component of training. Thus, our first proposition is that incorporation of humility into predeployment training would help weaken the links between exposures to potentially morally injurious events from the hypothesized mechanisms of distress. A growing body of evidence supports our first proposition that humility buffers the association between exposure to a potentially morally injurious event and mechanisms of distress (e.g., self-condemnation, threat to meaning, loss and grief, and sacred desecration). For example, demonstrating the intersection of humility with grief, Kesebir (2014) found that when reminded of one’s own mortality, individuals high in trait humility are less likely to morally disengage. Those low in trait humility appeared to inflate self-esteem, exaggerate the level of intimacy in their relationships, rigidly defend beliefs about the world, and distance themselves from authority figures. Thus, in response to mortality cues such as the death of a battle buddy, we suggest that humble individuals might better tolerate challenges to their beliefs by demonstrating cognitive

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flexibility. Humility may facilitate processing of traumatic events that otherwise challenge foundational assumptions about personal invulnerability and belief in a just world, which ultimately may result in greater unit cohesion, trust in command, and ethical-decision making. In addition, Krause and Hayward (2012) found evidence to suggest that the strength of the association between lifetime trauma and doubt weakened at high levels of humility. We suggest that exposure to potentially morally injurious events challenges service members’ foundational beliefs about themselves (e.g., I am a good person) and others (e.g., Other people are generally trustworthy), which ultimately may result in loss of trust in one’s own or others’ abilities to live in a morally responsible way. Humble individuals appear to negotiate these challenges to foundational beliefs with less trouble, perhaps because they are less defensive of their worldview, accepting failures in their belief system and leaving open the possibility for continued growth (Grubbs & Exline, 2014). This theorizing aligns with Van Tongeren et al.’s (2014) findings that humility promotes recollection of important interpersonal relationships to reduce distress caused by challenges to one’s foundational beliefs. Practical Lesson 2: Humility Facilitates Meaningful Interpretation and Healthy Resolution of Mechanisms of Distress Humility facilitates meaningful interpretation and healthy resolution of mechanisms of distress, thereby preventing mechanisms of distress from producing intrapersonal and interpersonal problems. For example, regarding self-condemnation, we argued that condemning feelings of guilt and shame in response to exposure to a morally injurious event are common, though offense-related emotions become problematic when they are chronic. Given the accurate self-appraisal and other-oriented components of the construct of humility, people who are dispositionally humble may be more likely to accept themselves as flawed and be more apt to exercise amend-making behavior, ultimately leading to the resolution of offense-related negative emotions in response to self-perceived violation of a moral value. Thus, humility may facilitate forgiveness of oneself by catalyzing a decision to accept responsibility for an offense and make amends as well as by evoking replacement of self-­condemning emotions with self-affirming emotions (Bryan, Theriault, & Bryan, 2015; Dees, 2011; Griffin et al., 2015). In addition to the recovery-oriented model whereby individuals are theorized to return to a pre-event level of functioning, growth-oriented models suggest that exposure to stressors sometimes promotes positive changes that enhance one’s functioning beyond the pre-event level (e.g., reorganization of priorities, increased focus on intimate relationships, greater appreciation of beauty, etc.). Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan (2000) conceptualize this

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posttraumatic growth as “the experience of significant positive change arising from the struggle with a major life crisis” (p. 521). A variety of predictors of posttraumatic growth have been identified and incorporated into clinical interventions including openness to new experience, sense of coherence, optimism, internal locus of control, benefit-finding, and acceptance coping (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). We hypothesize that a humble disposition provides fertile grounds for these seeds of stressor-related growth. That is, humility interventions are beginning to proliferate (Lavelock et al., Chapter 19, this volume), and humility may be an upstream target of intervention that promotes generative change in known predictors of posttraumatic growth. For example, the accurate self-appraisal that is characteristic of humble character may enhance the internal locus of control by facilitating use of problem-focused coping in controllable situations and acceptance coping in uncontrollable situations. Humility may also promote a sense of coherence, such that individuals might make meaning out of encounters with adversity as a form of character development and personal growth. Although these hypotheses have yet to be empirically tested, theory suggests that future investigations may observe positive associations between dispositional humility and predictors of posttraumatic growth such as openness to experience, internal locus of control, benefit finding and acceptance coping, and other predictors of growth among trauma survivors. Practical Lesson 3: Humility Builds Trust in the Provider–Patient Relationship Humility among providers is a critical component of the provider–patient relationship that enhances therapeutic outcomes. Support for this exists in psychotherapy research (see Mosher et al., Chapter 6, this volume; Drinane et al., Chapter 22, this volume; Sandage et al., Chapter 21, this volume), particularly when providers address aspects of identity valued by patients. However, this might be especially true for providers treating service members who seek help for problems related to moral injury, given that moral injury is rooted in the violation of trust. Individuals who have sustained moral injuries may be acutely aware of situations in which they are vulnerable to betrayal by another (e.g., treatment providers, family members, government officials, etc.). They know that entering into a relationship with an imperfect individual makes them vulnerable, and they may engage in avoidance behaviors overtly (e.g., by delaying seeking treatment) and/or covertly (e.g., by discounting the recommendations of a civilian provider). Providers can help facilitate recovery from moral injury by modeling humility to provide opportunities to build and repair trust in a safe environment that will increase service members’ confidence that they can

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negotiate feelings of vulnerability that deter them from maintaining close relationships and sequester them from aspects of their lives that they say they value most (e.g., family). Future Research Directions Although we have adduced evidence demonstrating how humility interacts with each of the hypothesized mechanisms of distress that are known to link exposure to a potentially morally injurious event to intrapersonal and interpersonal impairments, much empirical work remains to be done. Empirical studies could add to the literature by assessing the stress-buffering functions of humility, especially as it is associated with self-condemnation, threat to meaning, traumatic grief, and sacred desecration. Furthermore, applied studies of humility are only beginning to emerge (Lavelock, et al., Chapter 19, this volume), and the characteristic features of moral injury, as well as the organizational framework of the military, provide an excellent platform for humility intervention design and development. There will be challenges weaving humility into the fabric of military culture. Some authors purport that military service members rarely value ­temperancebased virtues (e.g., forgiveness, mercy, and humility; Matthews, 2006), as such values may be viewed as signs of personal weakness. Awareness-raising campaigns that emphasize the importance of humility in a military setting may therefore be most effective if humility is framed as a principal component of leadership, promoting a sense of mission accomplishment, unit cohesion and cooperation, and ethical decision making (Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 2011; van Dierendonck, 2011). Additionally, interventionists might draw on Worthington et al.’s (2015) claim that humility involves other-orientedness that reflects power under control to maximize benefits for others rather than self-serving ends. Next, scholars have investigated methods through which individuals develop humility such as dealing with difficult life transitions and stressors (Krause & Hayward, 2012); engaging in community and religious activities (Krause, 2014); observing inspirational heroically humble models (Worthington & Allison, 2016); practicing other-oriented virtues like gratitude, altruism, and forgiveness (Ruberton et al., Chapter 18, this volume); and even participating in psychological interventions (Lavelock et al., Chapter 19, this volume). We hypothesize that humility might not only be a value component of resilience to and recovery from trauma, but also that traumatic experience may facilitate the development of humility. Trauma challenges foundational assumptions, such as perceptions of personal invulnerability, and humility may be one possible outcome of the meaning-making process by which some individuals positively reframe their

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negative experiences to achieve posttraumatic growth (Tedeschi & McNally, 2011). Further empirical investigation is needed to test this hypothesis. Finally, although PTSD may be seen as a result of threat to safety and moral injury seen as a threat to trust, at least one model of PTSD conceptualization and treatment (cognitive processing therapy and the theory behind this specific evidence-based treatment) associates both threat to safety and trust with PTSD. In fact, cognitive processing therapy (CPT) helps individuals with PTSD challenge “overgeneralized beliefs about oneself and the world” related not only to safety and trust, but as related to control, esteem, and intimacy as well (Resick, Monson, & Chard, 2008, p. 3). It may be that moral injury and PTSD represent different patterns of response and are unique stressor-related disorders, though this is an empirical question. Furthermore, future applied investigations are needed to determine if individuals who sustain moral injuries, when it does not co-occur with PTSD, might respond differently to evidence-based treatments typically used to treat service members who report exposure to traumatic events. All of these questions coalesce around evidence-based practice for assessing and treating moral injury that has yet to develop. Conclusion In conclusion, we adapted a sociocognitive model to conceptualize the experience of exposure to potentially morally injurious events, intrapersonal and interpersonal problems that sometimes result from exposure, and mechanisms of distress that link exposure to impairments. Violation of trust was identified as an essential feature of the construct of moral injury, and humility was hypothesized to buffer the association between exposure and mechanisms of distress, facilitate meaningful interpretation and healthy resolution of mechanisms of distress when they occur, and enhance therapeutic outcomes by fostering trust in the provider–patient relationship. We hope that this theoretical framework provides a firm foundation for the expansion of humility into prevention and intervention efforts that target service-related moral injury. Note 1 Authors’ Note: We want to express our gratitude to the John Templeton Foundation (#14979, Relational Humility) for contributing the funding toward the current project that made it possible. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

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Maguen, S., Lucenko, B. A., Reger, M. A., Gahm, G. A., Litz, B. T., Seal, K. H., . . . Marmar, C. R. (2010). The impact of reported direct and indirect killing on mental health symptoms in Iraq war veterans. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 23(1), 86–90. Matthews, M. D. (2006). Toward a positive military psychology. Military Psychology, 20, 289–298. Matthews, M. D., Eid, J., Kelly, D., Bailey, J. K. S., & Peterson, C. (2008). Character strengths and virtues of developing military leaders: An international comparison. Military Psychology, 18, S57–S68. Nash, W. P., & Litz, B. T. (2013). Moral injury: A mechanism for war-related psychological trauma in military family members. Clinical Child Family Psychology Review, 16, 365–375. Owens, B. P., Rowatt, W. C., & Wilkins, A. L. (2011). Exploring the relevance and implications of humility in organizations. In K. Cameron & G. Spreitzer (Eds.), The handbook of positive organizational scholarship (pp. 260–272). New York: Oxford University Press. Pargament, K. I., Magyar, G. M., Benore, E., & Mahoney, A. (2005). Sacrilege: A study of sacred loss and desecration and their implications for health and well-being in a community sample. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44(1), 59–78. Park, C. L. (2010). Making sense of the meaning literature: an integrative review of meaning making and its effects on adjustment to stressful life events. Psychological Bulletin, 136(2), 257–301. Pelucchi, S., Paleari, F. G., Regalia, C., & Fincham, F. D. (2010). Self-forgiveness in romantic relationships: It matters to both of us. Journal of Family Psychology, 27, 541–549. Resick, P. A., Monson, C. M., & Chard, K. M. (2008). Cognitive processing therapy: Veteran/ military manual. Veterans Administration, Washington, DC. Shay, J. (2014). Moral injury. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 2, 182–191. Stein, N. R., Mills, M. A., Arditte, K., Mendoza, C., Borah, A. M., Resick, P. A., Litz, B. T., . . . Strong Star Consortium (2012). A scheme for categorizing traumatic military events. Behavior Modification, 36, 787–807. Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 345–372. Tedeschi, R. G., & McNally, R. J. (2011). Can we facilitate posttraumatic growth in combat veterans? American Psychologist, 66, 19–24. Toblin, R. I., Riviere, L. A., Thomas, J. L., Adler, A. B., Kok, B. C., & Hoge, C. W. (2012). Grief and physical health outcomes in U.S. soldiers returning from combat. Journal of Affective Disorders, 136, 469–475. van Dierendonck, D. (2011). Servant leadership: A review and synthesis. Journal of Management, 37, 1228–1261. Van Tongeren, D. R., Green, J. D., Hulsey, T. L., Legare, C. H., Bromley, D. G., & Houtman, A.M. (2014). A meaning-based approach to humility: Relationship affirmation reduces worldview defense. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 42(1), 62–69. Witvliet, C. V. O., Phipps, K. A., Feldman, M. E., & Beckham, J. C. (2004). Posttraumtic mental and physical health correlates of forgiveness and religious coping military veterans. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 17, 269–273. Wuthnow, R. (1998). After heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s. Berkeley: University of California Press. Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Allison, S. T. (2016). Heroic humility: What the science of humility can say to people raised on self-focus. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Worthington, E. L., Jr., Goldstein, L., Cork, B., Griffin, B. J., Garthe, R. C., Lavelock, C. R., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2015). Humility: A qualitative review of definitions, theory, concept, and research support for seven hypotheses. In Lisa Edwards & Susana Marques (Eds.), Shane Lopez (Gen. Ed.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology, 3rd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press and Oxford Handbooks.

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Epilogue W H AT W E H AV E L E A R N E D , W H E R E WE ARE LIKELY TO GO Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook

In the introductory chapter of this volume, we introduced the topic of humility by surveying the history and context in which the scientific study of humility began. We oriented readers by identifying five essential questions and five core hypotheses. We also introduced each chapter briefly. You have now read the chapters, and we hope you have new insights and an in-depth understanding of the scientific study of humility. In this final chapter, we review the evidence for the five questions and five hypotheses and offer some concluding thoughts for future theory, research, and practice of humility. Five Essential Questions Prequel: Do People Need More Humility? Even before launching into the essential questions—which presupposes the importance of humility—some of the chapters brought up a question that should be asked prior to considering scientific research on humility: Do people need more humility?’ There is a bias inherent in drawing conclusions based on the writings of people who are committed to studying humility. However, to answer this question, we can note the reasons advanced for the importance of humility in individuals, groups, communities, nation-states, and broader societies. For example, Van Tongeren and Myers highlighted the need to regulate the natural motive to esteem oneself. People have developed many ego-protective cognitive heuristics to maintain a positive and stable sense of self-esteem. A second reason we might need humility is that cultural norms in the United States (and perhaps other parts of the world) have increased individualistic traits such as narcissism. Perhaps the pendulum of societal change has swung too far toward individualistic traits. Numerous authors cited the cultural shifts toward higher subclinical levels of narcissism (e.g., Church & Barrett; DeWall; Van Tongeren & Myers; Worthington).

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A third reason we might need humility is that it might address difficult challenges we face as a global society. Writers who addressed intellectual humility (i.e., Church & Barrett; DeWall) observed that conflict over intellectual positions has created much ill will in society, and we seem to be in a time when Internet postings on blogs and other social media invite controversy. For example, our society seems to be increasingly divided along racial, political, and religious divides. Humility may be one strategy for building bridges between individuals and groups who are different. For example, Porter et al. discussed humility from the point of view of five scholars from different religious traditions. Despite viewing humility differently, these scholars each saw humility as a fundamental part of their religion. Porter et al. provide a model of humility in which the adherents of the different religions cooperatively wrote a chapter and engaged in interreligious conversation. Likewise, Worthington noted a lack of political humility in national, international, and organizational politics and between individuals who discuss controversial issues. Most authors began their chapter by describing the importance of humility and ended with the need for research on humility. However, there are no data on the degree to which individuals themselves value humility. On a spectrum, some might (a) value humility as a primary virtue, (b) find it to be an important but secondary virtue, (c) think humility is not important or relevant, or (d) think humility might even be a weakness or vice. Research is needed that investigates how individuals and groups think about and value humility. Question 1: What Is Humility? There is no universal definition of humility. Definitions of humility are still up for debate, especially among philosophers. In this volume, there were three philosophical approaches, each embracing an analytic philosophy approach which focuses on subtle differences between constructs. The psychologists in this volume seemed more unified in their definitions of humility, though not completely so. Philosophers Murphy argued that humility is a combination of four qualities: attention, recognition of one’s luck, empathy for others, and compassion for others. Roberts and Cleveland, in contrast, argued that humility is best defined as an intelligent lack of concern for self-importance and contrast their position with other philosophical views of humility. They make an important point that critical work on definitions is important in the early stages of a scientific field. Church and Barrett took on Roberts and Cleveland’s understanding of humility most directly. Taking an Aristotelian approach to humility, they describe intellectual humility

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as being the virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual diffidence. Intellectually humble people do not value their beliefs too much, which would be intellectual arrogance. Nor do they undervalue their beliefs, which would be intellectual diffidence. Rather, they value their beliefs as they ought to be valued. Thus, they provide what they term a doxastic account of intellectual ­humility—in which doxastic describes how people reason about beliefs. Psychologists Whereas analytical philosophers seek to parse definitions precisely and arrive at the necessary and sufficient phrases that comprise the most accurate definition of humility, psychologists seem more content to treat humility as a multidimensional construct. The dimensions do not always precisely line up across investigators, though they tend to be similar. Instead of the perfect definition, psychologists seem content to have a “good-enough definition”—good enough to permit empirical research and hypothesis testing. Early definitions focused on the intrapersonal aspect of humility. For example, Tangney (2000, 2009) identified six intrapersonal aspects of humility: willingness to see the self accurately, accurate perspective of one’s place in the world, ability to acknowledge personal mistakes and limitations, openness, low self-focus, and appreciation of the value of all things. In alignment with a focus on intrapersonal qualities, others speak of humility as involving a quiet ego (Hill & Laney, in press; Kesebir, 2014) or hypo-egoic state (Leary & Terry, 2012). As the science of humility has accelerated, psychologists have gravitated to definitions of humility that include both intrapersonal and interpersonal components. For example, Davis and colleagues (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010; 2011) define humility along these lines. Intrapersonally, humility involves having an accurate view of self—including an awareness of one’s limitations. Interpersonally, humility involves an interpersonal stance that is other-oriented rather than self-focused, marked by behaviors that indicate a lack of superiority within a relational context. Other teams have worked to provide more detail on both intrapersonal and interpersonal components of humility. For example, Worthington et al. (2015) define humility using three necessary but not sufficient conditions: (a) having accurate self-assessment that involves seeing oneself as a limited agent, (b) presenting oneself modestly to others, and (c) holding an attitude oriented toward benefiting others (not just oneself) that might be characterized as exerting power under control to build others up and not squash them down. Others have focused on humility in particular contexts. In the context of psychotherapy, Paine, Sandage, Rupert, Devor, and Bronstein (2015, p. 5; see also Sandage et al.), have defined humility as “a multidimensional construct

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comprised of (a) a willingness to perceive the self accurately, (b) other-­ orientedness and avoidance of self-enhancement, (c) openness, and (d) the ability to acknowledge one’s limitations and mistakes.” In the context of leadership, Owens and his colleagues (see Wallace et al.) have defined humility as the desire to obtain knowledge about the self and to use that knowledge to benefit the team, organization, and the individuals within the team and organization. This requires self-reflection, acceptance of one’s own strengths, weaknesses, and limitations, and intent of contributing to the more effective functioning of the team or organization. We need to document the key intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects of humility. Two definitional issues also require immediate attention. The first involves the HEXACO. Although many humility scholars have criticized the Honesty-Humility subscale of the HEXACO, about 40 percent of all studies of humility use this measure (for a review, see Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014; Ashton et al., 2004). Critiques of the HEXACO often focus on poor face validity of items on some of the facets of the Honesty-Humility subscale (especially the Sincerity and Fairness items). Recent work suggests that the two humility-­ related facets (i.e., Modesty and Greed-Avoidance) show strong correlations with other scales designed to assess humility (Davis et al., 2016). Critiques of the HEXACO as a measure of humility (at least the Modesty and Greed-Avoidance subscales) may be overstated. Question 2: Are There Different Types of Humility? Humility can be practiced in a variety of contexts or relationships. Many of these have great societal implications. For example, humility between partners or within families could result in more intact families and couples. Humility practiced in the workplace could shape relationship dynamics within an organization. Humility practiced in psychotherapy could result in more positive courses of healing and recovery in counseling. As work on humility has progressed, researchers have begun to explore several different types of humility. In this section, we outline some of the major types of humility discussed in this volume. Relational Humility Relational humility involves one person’s view of another person’s humility. Perceptions of humility within relationships are associated with relationship qualities such as building, maintaining, and repairing a relationship. Relational humility is relevant in virtually all relationships, but especially those requiring people to live and work together. For example, both Green et al. and Garthe et al. investigate relational humility in romantic relationships. Green et al. propose that transformation of motivation (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003) occurs

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when people are humble. Successful romantic relationships require sacrifice. Partners must change their orientation from sole focus on achieving their own happiness or preferences to a broader, relationship-oriented perspective that might involve giving up their own happiness or preferences, at least in the short term, so that the relationship will be better in the long term. In a complementary chapter, Garthe et al. investigate the role of humility in the ­vulnerabilitystress-adaptation model within relationships. Intellectual Humility Intellectual humility involves humility in the context of different ideas, opinions, and viewpoints. There is much published writing on intellectual humility. Church and Barrett wrote philosophically about it, defining it as a virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual diffidence. DeWall reflects on intellectual humility, observing that it involves the way people exchange ideas. He applies this to the exchange about ideas regarding psychology. As an author of a major text in introductory psychology, he has the opportunity and responsibility to convey scientific understanding to many students, especially on topics that psychologists might not agree about. He thus finds intellectual humility to be an essential skill in scientific writing. Cultural Humility Cultural humility involves having an awareness of the limitations of one’s own cultural worldview, as well as engaging cultural differences in an other-oriented manner, characterized by respect and lack of superiority (Hook, Davis, Owen, Worthington, & Utsey, 2013, p. 353). Mosher et al. reviewed the existing literature on cultural humility, and Drinane et al. examined cultural humility in the context of cultural ruptures in psychotherapy. Cultural humility is a relevant social and political topic, as there have been several high-profile conflicts related to cultural differences in recent years (e.g., police violence against African Americans leading to advocacy and the Black Lives Matter movement). Religion is also intertwined with culture, so religious conflicts often have cultural components. It is possible that higher levels of cultural humility could improve intercultural relations. Religious Humility Religious humility involves the ways that individuals and groups engage around religious beliefs, values, and practices. Religious humility may be important in a world that is increasingly characterized by religious differences, disagreement, prejudice and discrimination, and even violent conflict. Religious humility was modeled in the chapter by Porter et al., who enlisted five diverse scholars of

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different religions to reflect on humility from their own religious traditions, and the existing literature on religious humility was reviewed by Leach and Ajibade. Political Humility Political humility may be important in our current political climate that is characterized by increased polarization, disagreement, and government shutdowns. Unfortunately, there has been little empirical research on political humility. Worthington has provided a starting point by outlining suggestions for humble communication regarding political ideas. Namely, he proposed an analogy to Lakatos’s (1978) philosophy of science and suggested that people’s core beliefs might be objects that they hold on to without compromise, but they might be willing to modify some of the less central propositions. Discussing political ideas might be governed by convicted civility (Mouw, 2010). This could be supported by using methods of conflict resolution derived from business, peacemaking, conflict negotiation, and couple therapy literatures. Clinician Humility E. Davis and Cuthbert refer to clinician humility as the degree to which a psychotherapist exhibits an “evolving inclination toward accurate self-assessment, recognition of limits, the regulation of self-centered emotions, and the cultivation of other-centered emotions in a clinical setting” (Paine et al., 2015, p. 10). Clinician humility is a type of state humility—specifically, the state of expressing humility from moment to moment in the psychotherapy context. Both Davis and Cuthbert and Sandage et al. note that humility is necessary to completely understand a vulnerable person (i.e., a psychotherapy client) in ways that can promote transformation of the person’s life. Taken together, we see that scholars are beginning to examine a variety of potential types or subdomains of humility. Scholars have only begun to consider how to conceptually relate these constructs to each other (e.g., How should we begin to organize and prioritize these various types of humility). In the future, we expect a variety of scholars to advance theories of humility that make sense of the current marketplace of “humilities.” Question 3: Can Humility Be Measured Accurately? Hill et al. have thoroughly summarized the status of measurement of humility. In the beginning, researchers had concerns about self-report measures of humility, worrying that claiming to be “very humble” would be akin to bragging. However, recent empirical research has suggested that self-report measures of humility can provide reliable scores and valid interpretations of scores. Thus, this is probably not as large a problem as researchers first thought. Also,

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researchers have begun to employ multiple methods to measure humility, including self-reports, other-reports, behavioral measures, and implicit measures. The status of measurement in the field of humility is much improved, and the field is poised to move forward rapidly. For humility, as with all aspects of science, the measurement of the construct is intertwined with definition and theory. Thus, we see that many measures of humility might be assessing different components of humility. Also, when there are disagreements about the underlying definitions or theories about humility, there may be differences of opinion in how to interpret measures based on those definitions and theories. Question 4: What Are the Predictors and Sequelae of Humility? We proposed five major hypotheses that addressed predictors and sequelae of humility. As we discuss those hypotheses in the following major section, we describe the evidence relating the predictors and sequelae of humility. Thus, we will defer this discussion until the next major center heading. Question 5: Can Humility Be Developed? Can humility be developed or cultivated in our lives? Humility can be developed through maturation or through intentional intervention. In this volume, we had few people address developing humility through life experiences as people age. We did have several entries that addressed interventions to help people develop humility. Lavelock et al. provided a review on some of the initial intervention studies to promote humility. Her workbook interventions were effective in helping participants become more humble, as well as develop other virtues such as forgiveness and patience. Other than this initial work, however, there is little intervention research on humility. Both Davis and Cuthbert and Sandage et al. discussed developing humility through psychotherapy. In summary, at this point, although many people want to become more humble, sometimes for religious or spiritual reasons, we actually know little about how to help willing participants become more humble. Systematic research is needed to learn how to do this effectively. The need for the development of interventions and the testing of those interventions in randomized clinical trials is a pressing concern for research on the development of humility. Summary of Learning about Essential Questions and New Questions Although we have gone a long way toward addressing questions about definitions, types of humility, and measurement, we still have more work to do in regard to developing and cultivating humility. Also, in the process of providing some answers, we have created more essential questions. For example, how do disparate definitions and types of humility relate to each other? Resolution to

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additional definitional questions also will provide a good context for evaluating which measurement strategies will become the most used in the future because measurement and definition are intertwined. All the while, as definitional and measurement issues continue to develop in sophistication, both theoretically and methodologically, we expect basic research on humility (or should we say various humilities) will also continue to advance, including work designed to lay a foundation for applied work. Hypotheses about Humility At the outset of the book, we identified five hypotheses under which we expected to see results organized: (1) the virtue and vice hypothesis; (2) the social functioning hypothesis; (3) the humility-health hypothesis; (4) the societal peace hypothesis; and (5) the satisfaction with life hypothesis. In this section, we discuss each in turn. The Virtue and Vice Hypothesis We suggested from the outset that humility is correlated with other virtues and vices. We might be tempted to assume that humility might cause other virtues. But it is possible that other virtues cause humility or, more likely, simply covary in clusters of virtues. These might be grouped into (a) warmth-based virtues (Worthington & Berry, 2005), such as altruism, compassion, forgiveness, mercy, gratitude, and awe; (b) conscientiousness-based virtues (Worthington & Berry, 2005), such as self-control, patience, justice and fairness, conscientiousness, responsibility, and accountability; or (c) epistemic-based virtues (Worthington & Berry, 2005), such as the pursuit of truth, openness to new or different ideas and people, and honesty. There are substantial numbers of studies supporting the relationships between humility and virtues (see Worthington et al., 2015), including some reviewed in the present volume (DeWall and Leman et al., who examined epistemic virtues; Ruberton et al., who examined warmthbased virtues). Leman et al. also reviewed the relationships between humility and the dark triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathology). The Social Functioning Hypothesis Humility has several potential benefits for social functioning. Davis et al. conducted a narrative review of research on relational humility and organized the effects of humility and social functioning in several sub-hypotheses. The Social Bonds Hypothesis The social bonds hypothesis states that humility judgments help regulate the strength of social bonds. Research presented by Davis et al. support this hypothesis, as do other chapters in this volume and additional recent research (Davis

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et al., 2013; Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014). Many studies demonstrate that people look to humble others for potential friendship, support, mentorship, and collegiality in work environments. The social bonds hypothesis describes why humility might be seen as a desirable attribute. Humble people are perceived as low maintenance, honest yet sensitive, modest, and oriented toward the other. Namely, we want to be friends with people who are humble because they are likely to promote our welfare. In addition, we might wish to be more humble because we believe that if we are humble, others will perceive that humility and want to be our friends or mate, thus providing evolutionary advantage in survival and reproduction (Van Tongeren, Davis, & Hook, 2014). The Social Oil or Buffering-of-Stress Hypothesis Humility has been hypothesized to be important for buffering the wear and tear that competitive behaviors or traits can have on relationships. Davis et al. summarize research supporting this hypothesis (see also Owens, Wallace, & Waldman, 2015). Davis et al. concluded that research on the social oil hypothesis must involve examining relationship-harming personality characteristics (e.g., perfectionism, competitiveness, and having high standards) to see whether humility will buffer relationships from deterioration if one relational partner has any of those qualities. The Tolerance Hypothesis This hypothesis states that humility will promote fair processing of information and a willingness to negotiate ideas fairly. Davis et al. found mixed support for the tolerance hypothesis; although humility was negatively related to social dominance across samples, there were some samples in which humility was positively associated with right-winged authoritarianism, a trait that would seem antithetical to tolerance. The Humility-Health Hypothesis Humility researchers have theorized about the positive benefits of humility for mental and physical health. In looking at the existing empirical literature, humility has been linked to some mental health benefits, likely due to the positive associations between humility and greater attachment security, self-­ regulation, and relationship health (Toussaint & Webb). However, at this point in the science, we find a weak and inconsistent literature. Toussaint and Webb could locate only five studies relating humility to mental health. Four of these studies were correlational, and the correlations were generally (but not always) positive and small. Toussaint and Webb could locate only three studies reporting a correlation between humility and physical health. Despite the hypothesis that humility is related to both mental and physical health, we anticipate that,

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after further research, we may conclude that the effects of humility on physical health and mental health will be small and indirect. It may be that the mental health benefits of humility are because others are drawn to the humble person because he or she is oriented toward the relationship as a whole rather than solely toward the self. Thus, people are drawn to humble people and thus humble people may experience more social support, friendship, wider and deeper social networks, and other social benefits than nonhumble individuals, and this may in turn result in better mental and physical health. Also, humility may help people resolve conflict in interpersonal relationships and groups, which is related to higher levels of stress and reduced mental and physical health. The Societal Peace Hypothesis Worthington, Goldstein et al. (2015) have identified nine studies supporting a cross-sectional connection between humility and various indices of societal peace. For example, humility was related to (a) pro-environment attitudes; (b) less tendency to bully, respond aggressively, or act out as delinquents in adolescents; and (c) less workplace deviance, music piracy, and crime. The evidence strongly supports that highly humble people fit well into society. Societal peace also is promoted when people are able to manage conflict with convicted civility (Mouw, 2010). Church and Barrett, Worthington, Leach and Ajibade, Porter et al., and Mosher et al.—among others—discuss ways to negotiate differences with humility and convicted civility. The Satisfaction with Life Hypothesis Humility has been hypothesized to be related to satisfaction with life, and to a lesser extent, happiness. Humble individuals may be more satisfied due to a variety of factors, including better social relationships or a more fulfilling spiritual life and relationship with the Sacred. Toussaint and Webb found eight studies that reported a direct correlation between humility and happiness, but they found the connections to be weak and unstable. It is possible that certain aspects of humility may make individuals less happy. For example, humble people might not pursue temporal pleasures that might make them happier in the moment, or they might sacrifice for others excessively. More systematic research is needed on the relationship between humility, happiness, and satisfaction with life. Looking Forward: How to Be More Humble Researchers made many suggestions and drew implications throughout the chapters, which are found in the practical sections at the end of each chapter. These practical suggestions about how to be more humble are important as we

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try to become more humble individuals, partners, and community members. Here are a few of the ways people learn to be more humble. Models People often learn about humility by observing models (Worthington, 2007). Models might come from current events (e.g., recent exemplars such as Mother Teresa or Nelson Mandela), history (e.g., Abraham Lincoln or George Washington), fiction or drama (e.g., George Bailey from It’s a Wonderful Life), one’s personal hall of humility exemplars (e.g., a family member or teacher), and even notable examples of arrogance (and we will allow readers to insert their favorite example of political arrogance here). For example, Wallace et al. introduced a variety of examples of failed humility, and the disastrous consequences that ensued, to show why humility might have caught traction in the organizational literature. Interventions Interventions that are aimed at fostering the virtue of humility as a personality trait or character trait can provide exercises and guided activities to promote humility. These can involve religious activities, philosophical exercises, and practical wisdom. Intervention science to promote humility is just beginning. There are centuries of practical experience, but there are very few scientifically informed and evaluated interventions. Endurance of Trials, Testing, and Suffering People are frequently and repeatedly tested throughout their lives. They might be tested toward humility or arrogance through the suffering that comes from being exposed to temptations, trials, and traumas, and thus meeting those challenges with equanimity and learning valuable lessons from them. Here are some potential lessons that we can learn from trials that promote humility: (a) we are not masters of our fate and captains of our soul as Invictus (by William Ernest Henley) proclaims, (b) all people eventually suffer, (c) discipline and self-sacrifice are required to achieve anything meaningful in life, (d) we need to depend on others, and (e) we need a sense of spirituality that there are things in life that are greater than we are. Following Humble Leaders Wallace et al. reviewed the literature on ways that humble leaders can affect other members of their organizations. They might lead through their personal characteristics, acts, and policies. They might also foster a climate of a humble team or possibly even organizational humility.

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Virtually every chapter in this book had a research agenda, so it is difficult to prioritize overall what the most important research directions are for the field of humility. However, after reviewing all the chapters, we probably would identify the following research priorities: 1. Clarification of which definitions of humility are likely to be most productive. 2. Continued investigation about the social benefits and ramifications of humility, and documentation of the mechanisms by which social benefits of humility interface with physical, mental, and spiritual benefits. 3. Development of interventions to improve humility, including in psychotherapy, prevention, and enrichment, and testing interventions in randomized controlled trials. 4. Empirical exploration of the various types of humility, including how the various types are related to each other and to one’s general level of humility. Conclusion We hope that the Handbook of Humility: Theory, Research, and Applications has persuaded you to invest in the emerging science of humility. Whether you are a psychotherapist, graduate student, professor, teacher, researcher, religious leader, philosopher, public policy specialist, politician, philanthropist, or just person in civil society, we hope you see the benefits that this new scientific endeavor are unveiling. Regardless of your walk of life, we hope you have emerged from reading the chapters in this volume by being not only more intellectually stimulated, but also being more interested in being a more humble person and fostering humility in those people you know and value. We are walking this life together. We believe that humility will make that walk a more productive, virtuous, and ultimately satisfying experience. References Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & de Vries, R. E. (2014). The HEXACO honesty-humility, agreeableness, and emotionality factors: A review of research and theory. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18, 139–152. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P., De Vries, R. E., Di Blas, L., . . . De Raad, B. (2004). A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives: solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 356–366. Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington Jr, E. L., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, D. J., . . . Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225–234.

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Davis, D. D., McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Choe, E., Westbrook, C., Hook, J. N., Van Tongeren, D. R., DeBlaere, C., Hill, P., Placares, V., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2016). Is modesty a subdomain of humility? The Journal of Positive Psychology, 11, 439–446. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L. J., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 243–252. Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Hook, J. N., Emmons, R. A., Hill, P. C., Bollinger, R. A., . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2013). Humility and the development and repair of social bonds: Two longitudinal studies. Self and Identity, 12, 58–77. Hill, P. C., & Laney, E. K. (in press). Beyond self-interest: Humility and the quieted self. In K. Warren Brown & M. R. Leary (Eds.), Oxford handbook of hypo-egoic phenomena: Theory and research on the quiet ego (pp. 243–256). New York: NY: Oxford University Press. Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Owen, J., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Utsey, S. O. (2013). Cultural humility: Measuring openness to culturally diverse clients. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 60, 353–366. Kesebir, P. (2014). A quiet ego quiets death anxiety: Humility as an existential anxiety buffer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 610–623. Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scientific research programmes: Philosophical papers, Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leary, M. R., & Terry, M. L. (2012). Hypoegoic mindsets: Antecedents and implications of the quieting self. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (2nd ed., pp. 268–288). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Mouw, R. J. (2010). Uncommon decency: Christian civility in an uncivil world. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. Owens, B. P., Wallace, A. S., & Waldman, D. A. (2015). Leader narcissism and follower outcomes: The counterbalancing effect of leader humility. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100, 1203–1213. Paine, D. R., Sandage, S. J., Rupert, D., Devor, N. D., & Bronstein, M. (2015). Humility as a psychotherapeutic virtue: Spiritual, philosophical & psychological foundations. Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health, 17, 3–25. Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). Interdependence, interaction, and relationships. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 351–375. Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 70–82. Tangney, J. P. (2009). Humility. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (2nd ed., pp. 483–490). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Van Tongeren, D. R., Davis, D. E., & Hook, J. N. (2014). Social benefits of humility: Initiating and maintaining romantic relationships. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 9, 313–321. Wallace, H. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). The performance of narcissists rises and falls with perceived opportunity for glory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 819–834. Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2007). Humility: The quiet virtue. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press. Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Berry, J. W. (2005). Character development, virtues, and vices. In William R. Miller & Harold D. Delaney (Eds.), Human nature, motivation, and change: Judeo-Christian perspectives on psychology (pp. 145–164). Washington, DC: APA Books. Worthington, E. L., Jr., Goldstein, L., Cork, B., Griffin, B. J., Garthe, R. C., Lavelock, C. R., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., . . . Van Tongeren, D. R. (2015). Humility: A qualitative review of definitions, theory, concept, and research support for seven hypotheses. In Lisa Edwards & Susana Marques (Eds.), Shane Lopez (Gen. Ed.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology, 3rd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press and Oxford Handbooks Online, www.oxfordhandbooks.com

INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate tables and figures. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī 59 accommodative behaviors 170 – 1 Ackerman, S. J. 291 actor-observer effect 154 adaptability 212 – 13 adaptive processes, humility and 224 – 5 Aghababaei, N. 182 – 3, 197 – 8 Allison, D. 29 al-Sakandar, Allāh 58 American Insurance Group 247 Anderson, C. 238 – 9 Anderson, T. 291 antisocial workplace behavior 141 Aphorisms of the Statesman (Alfrabi) 53 apology/forgiving, honesty-humility (HH) and 143 Aquinas, T. 39, 56, 274 Aristotle 27 – 8, 38, 53, 305 – 6 arrogance: described 62; intellectual 345 Asad al-Muḥāsibī 58 Ashton, M. C. 108, 109, 121 – 2, 138 – 9, 140, 141, 143, 215, 223 attachment theory 221 attention: humility and 22 – 3; Murdoch and concept of 23 Augustine of Hippo 56, 79 auxiliary scientific hypotheses 78 awe, state humility and 266 – 7 Ayten, A. 196 Bachya Ibn Paquda 54 Baehr, J. 43, 65 – 6, 72 Baldwin, S. A. 287, 291 Bandura, A. 210 Basford, T. E. 249 Battaly, H. 43, 65 – 6, 72 Bauer, J. J. 124

Bauer-Wu, S. 94 Beaty, R. E. 198 behavioral systems theory 221 behaviors, psychotherapist see qualities/ behaviors, psychotherapist Behrend, T. S. 249 Benedict of Nursia 57 Bernard of Clairvaux 56 Better Angels of Our Nature, The (Pinker) 29 better-than-average effect 152 – 3 bias blind spot 154 biases obstructing objective thinking/ humility 152 – 4; actor-observer effect 154; better-than-average effect 152 – 3; bias blind spot 154; false uniqueness/ consensus 153; overconfidence 153; reducing 154 – 5; self-serving 152; unrealistic optimism 153 – 4 Big Five personality trait model 138, 208 Bommarito, N. 43 – 4 bonding 156 – 7 Book, A. S. 142 Borkan, J. M. 93 Boss, P. 334 Bradbury, T. N. 221 Bradley, B. H. 252 Brief State Humility Scale (BSHS) 262 – 3 Bright, D. 247 Bronk, K. C. 144 Bronstein, M. 345 – 6 Brooks, D. 1 – 2 Brown, T. 251 Browning, C. R. 25 Brown vs. EMA 238 Buddhism, humility in 50 – 3; arrogance and 51; conceit and 50 – 2; doctrine of non-self and 52; meditation and 51 – 2

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buffering-of-stress hypothesis 351 Butler, P. D. 95 Calhoun, L. G. 336 – 7 calling 213 – 14 Cameron, K. S. 247 Cann, A. 336 – 7 career construction theory 210, 212 career development theory 207 – 17; defined 209; future research direction for 215 – 16; goals in studying 207; humility as asset and 211 – 14; humility as liability and 214 – 15; overview of 209 – 11; practical implications for 217; theoretical linkages to 212 – 13; virtue studies and 207 Carnegie, D. 153 Caza, A. 247 CEO humility measures 122 Chancellor, J. 179 Chang, E. S. 93, 94 Chirumbolo, A. 84 Chow, D. L. 290 Christianity, humility in 6, 55 – 7 chronic shame, humility as 40 – 1 Clark, M. S. 173 clinical power dynamics, humility and 306 – 8 clinician humility 348; defined 287 cluster virtue, humility as 21 cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) 277 Collins, J. 110, 211 Colonel Jessup analogy see measuring humility commitment 168; maintenance mechanisms of 169 – 70 Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale (CIHS) 128 conceit 35 Constantine, M. G. 321 Cooper, J. E. 80 cooperation, honesty-humility (HH) and 142 – 3 credit 36 crisis theory 221 Culhane-Pera, K. A. 93 Cultural Competence Assessment Tool (CCAT) 97 cultural competence vs. cultural humility 94 – 5 cultural humility 4, 9, 91 – 102, 347; components of 94; cross-cultural conflicts and 91; vs. cultural competence 94 – 5; defined 91, 286 – 7; definitional

commonalities/differences of 93 – 4; described 317; empirical studies on 96 – 9; future research for 100 – 1, 325 – 6; importance of 95 – 6; interpersonal components of 91; intrapersonal components of 91; lessons learned 101 – 2; microaggressions and (see microaggressions); in psychotherapy 317 – 19; research methods used 92, 96 – 8; study results 92 – 6, 98 – 9; theoretical/ conceptual papers on 92 – 6 Cultural Humility Scale (CHS) 97, 99, 129 – 30 cycle of excellence 289, 298 Dangi, S. 183 Dark triad 140 – 1 Darwin, C. 233 David Copperfield (Dickens) 20 Davis, D. E. 106, 109, 126, 129, 171 – 2, 173, 179, 185, 197, 208, 209, 224, 250, 256 Dawis, R. V. 209 “dear self” 21 – 2 Death and the Maiden (Dorfman play) 25 demographics, political humility and changing 83 Desimoni, M. 84 developmental orientation (DO) 97 Devor, N. D. 345 – 6 de Vries, R. E. 108, 121 – 2, 143 diagnostic situations 167 Dickens, C. 20 differentiation of self (DoS) 303 diffidence 62; intellectual 345 Dik, B. J. 216 DiPascalli, F. 247 disgust, honesty-humility (HH) and 143 Dispositional Humility Scale (DHS) 124 – 5 distress, mechanisms leading to 333 – 4 Doctrine of Virtue (Kant) 21, 28 domain-specific psychotherapeutic effectiveness 289 domination 36 Dong, X. 93, 94 Dorfman, A. 25 doxastic account of intellectual humility 63, 66 – 70, 345; defined 67, 68, 69; described 63; LIE case example 69; positive epistemic status and 67 – 9, 70 Drescher, K. D. 330 Driver, J. 42 Duffy, R. D. 216

index Duncan, B. L. 289 Dwiwardani, C. 169 Ebbers, B. 246 Edwards, J. 41 Edwards, K. 123 – 4, 128 effective situation 167 Elson, M. 239 emotions, humility and 27 – 30 enduring traits, humility as 223 – 4 Enron 246 envy 35 Eriksson, K. 201 Ernst & Young 247 Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen, The (White) 80 eudaimonic well-being 210 – 11 excellence: humility as dogmatic ignorance of 42; humility as inattention to 43 – 5 Exline, J. J. 194, 214 Expressed Humility Scale 126 – 7 facilitative interpersonal skills 291 false consensus 153 false uniqueness 153 feminist theory, humility and 114 Ferguson, C. J. 239 Few Good Men, A (movie) 119 Five-Factor Model 138, 139 forgiveness: honesty-humility and 143; predictors of 171 – 2; religion/spirituality, humility and 196 – 7 Foronda, C. 93 Freddie Mac 246 – 7 Friehling, D. 247 Funcke, A. 201 Funder, D.C. 106 – 7 Galambos, N. L. 229 Gandhi, M. 207 general humility 4, 77; defined 234 General Humility Scale (GHS) 123 – 4 Geyer, A. L. 194, 214 Goldhagen, D. J. 25 Goldilocks definitions 113 Goldman, R. E. 93 Goldstein, L. 352 Good to Great (Collins) 110 Goodyear, R. K. 289 Gopnik, A. 233 gratitude: humility and 172; state humility and 265 – 6 Greek and Roman absence of humility 79

359

Greenberg, H. 247 Greer, T. W. 251 Grenberg, J. 21, 43 grief, service members and 334 Groll, L. 96 Guiso, L. 255 Gullickson, B. R. 248 – 9, 250 Gunn, R. W. 248 – 9, 250 Haidt, J. 82, 86, 266 hard core scientific hypotheses 78 Hare, R. D. 140 Harris Interactive 195 Hart, H. 19 Harvard Negotiation Project 87, 88 Hayes, J. L. 246 Hayward, R. D. 194, 196, 200, 336 health and well-being, humility and 178 – 88; assessment of 186; cause and effect studies of 186 – 7; data samples for 186; future research for 185 – 7; literature review of 181 – 4; measurement of 185 – 6; mechanisms of 187; practical lessons from 187 – 8; previous study results 182 – 4; research limitations 184; theoretical model of 179 – 81, 180 health, religion/spirituality (R/S), humility and 195 – 6 HealthSouth 246 Healthy Humility Inventory (HHI) 122 – 3 Hekman, D. R. 252 HEXACO Humility (H) scale 121 HEXACO model 346; construct validation 139; HEXACO-PI measure and 138 – 9; Honesty-Humility subscale of 137, 346; humility within 138 – 9; initial development of 138 – 9 HEXACO Personality Inventory (HEXACO-PI) 138 – 9; Honesty-Humility (HH) subscale of 121 – 2, 126, 208, 223; theorizing 109 Hilbig, B. E. 143 Hill, P. C. 123 – 4, 128, 196, 197 Hilliard, M. J. 98 Hilsenroth, M. J. 291 Hinduism, humility in 47 – 50; arrogance and 48, 49 – 50; Bhagavadgītā mentions of humility and 47 – 8; self-deprecation and 49; Upaniṣads and 48 – 9 Hobbes, T. 80 Holland, J. L. 209

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honesty-humility (HH) 137; antisocial workplace behavior and 141; apology/ forgiving and 143; cooperation and 142 – 3; Dark triad and 140 – 1; disgust and 143; harmony at work/school and 143; within HEXACO model 138; measures 121 – 2; negative correlates of 139 – 42; positive traits and 142 – 4; risk taking and 141 – 2; self-control and 143; sixth factor of 138; sociopolitical dominance and 143 – 4; status seeking and 141 – 2 Hook, J. N. 106, 126, 129 – 30, 172, 197, 250, 294, 295, 316, 318, 322 Hopkin, C. R. 129 Hosker, A. 142 Howard-Snyder, D. 43, 65 – 6, 72 Hoyle, R. H. 129 Hubble, M. A. 289 H.U.M.B.L.E. 93 humble mind and body 178 – 88; see also health and well-being, humility and humble, ways to be more 352 – 3 humbling experience 41 Hume, D. 33, 40, 47, 79 humility: adaptive processes and 224 – 5; aspects of 4; benefits of 161; in career development (see career development theory); as career development asset 211 – 14; as career development liability 214 – 15; clinical power dynamics and 306 – 8; components of 150, 329 – 30; conceptualizing 119 – 20; consequences of 5 – 6, 349; context for 1 – 3; cultural (see cultural humility); defining 4, 33 – 7, 41, 43, 63, 74 , 76 – 7, 122, 138, 166 – 7, 178 – 9, 192 – 3, 208 – 9, 222 – 3, 234 – 5, 260 – 1, 274, 286, 329, 344 – 6; development of 6, 159 – 60, 349; as enduring trait 223 – 4; feminist theory and 114; gratitude and 172; hallmarks/markers of 260; health and well-being connection to (see health and well-being, humility and); hypotheses of 6 – 7, 350 – 2; indexed publications on 2; intellectual (see intellectual humility); interpersonal components of 345 – 6; interventions to promote 277 – 80; intrapersonal aspects of 345 – 6; limitations of 114 – 15; measurement of 5, 223, 348 – 9 (see also measuring humility); in Me-ism age 1 – 3; in moderation 280 – 1; modesty and 179; moral injury and (see moral injury, service-related); as

moral virtue (see moral virtue, humility as); narcissism and 179; need for more 343 – 4; organizational (see organizational humility); personality predictors/ correlates of (see personality predictors/ correlates of humility); philosophers’ definitions of 344 – 5; philosophical view of (see philosophical humility); political (see political humility); positive traits and 142 – 4; predictors of 5 – 6, 349; promoting 157 – 60; psychologists’ definitions of 345 – 6; psychopathology role of 274 – 7; psychotherapist (see psychotherapist humility); psychotherapy context of 345 – 6; questions concerning 8 – 9; as reframe 308 – 10; relational (see interdependence theory, relational humility and; relational humility); relationship quality and 226; religion/ spirituality and (see religion/spirituality (R/S), humility and); religious perspectives on (see religious humility); research agendas for 9 – 10; in romantic relationships (see romantic relationships); self-esteem and 179; self-focus, shame and 276 – 7; self-reports and study of 121; situational pressures affecting 157 – 9; social dominance and 112; social functions of 156 – 7; social psychological definition of 150; social psychological perspective on (see social psychological perspective on humility); state (see state humility); stereotypes and 114 – 15; stressors and 225 – 6; subtypes of 77 – 8; types of 4 – 5, 346 – 8; understanding science and practice of 3 – 6; as virtue and gift 305 – 6 Humility-Arrogance Implicit Association Test (IAT-HA) 125 humility-health hypothesis 7, 114, 351 – 2 humility in psychotherapy 301 – 14; clinical power dynamics and 306 – 8; definitions of 302 – 3; intervention strategies for 308 – 13; not-knowing stances and 310 – 12; overview of 301 – 2; promoting 303 – 5; as reframe 308 – 10; rupture/repair processes and 312 – 13; as virtue and gift 305 – 6 humility intervention 277 – 83; future research for 281 – 2; moderation and 280 – 1; practical lessons from 281 – 2 humility muscle, building 155, 159 humility scale 273 hybris 79

index hyperautonomy 36 hypoegoic mind-set 119 Imel, Z. E. 287 impairments: associated with moral injury 331 – 2; classes of 331 – 2; interpersonal 332; intrapersonal 332 inferred states 290 – 1 inferred traits 290 intellectual arrogance 345 intellectual diffidence 345 intellectual humility 4, 8 – 9, 62 – 75, 77, 233 – 44, 344 – 5, 347; context of 72; definitions of 63 – 4, 65, 75, 234 – 5; described 62 – 3; doxastic account of 63, 66 – 70, 70, 74 ; fostering 235 – 7; measuring 127 – 8, 129; measuring, trait-state distinction and 73; narcissism and 235 – 6; overview of 62 – 3, 233 – 4; philosophy of 71 – 2; political humility as subtype of 77; questions concerning 71 – 4; religious humility as subtype of 77 – 8; Roberts and Wood position on 63 – 5; scientific progress and 237 – 9; seminal accounts of, problems with 63 – 6; shipwrecked case 64 – 5; social dimension of 73 – 4; as virtuous mean 71; Whitcomb et al.’s position on 65 – 6; writing for general or broad audience case study of 239 – 44 Intellectual Humility Scale (IHS) 127, 128; specific to religious beliefs 129 Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI) 97 interdependence theory, relational humility and 165 – 74; accommodation and 170 – 1; forgiveness and 171 – 2; future research for 172 – 3; literature review 167 – 9; practical applications for 173 – 4; pro-relationship processes 172; in romantic relationships 221; sacrifice and 171; transformation of motivation 169 – 72 international pressures, political humility and 82 interventions to promote humility 277 – 80 irrational ambition, humility as brake on 39 – 40 Islam, humility in 57 – 9 Issacson, M. 94 Jackson, D. N. 139 James, H. 29

361

Jankowski, P. J. 196, 198 Jennings, L. 294 Johnson, M. D. 126 – 7, 229 Johnson, S. 153 Jonason, P. K. 141 Jordan, T. A., II 295 Judaism, humility in 53 – 5; Maimonides and 53 – 4 just and loving attention 23, 27 Kant, I. 21 – 2, 26, 28 Karney, B. R. 221 Keltner, D. 266 Kesebir, P. 113, 182, 186, 335 Keyes, C. L. M. 183 Kierkegaard, S. 27 Kim, Y. 201 King Lear (Shakespeare) 22 – 3 King, M. L., Jr. 207 Kogan, N. 226 – 7 Kook, A. I. 54 Kozlowski, D. 246 Krahn, H. J. 229 Kraus, D. R. 288 – 9 Krause, N. 182, 184, 185, 187, 194, 195, 196, 200, 225, 336 Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J. 128 LaBouff, J. P. 143  Lakatos, I. 78, 348 Lambert, M. J. 289, 291, 294 Landrum, R. E. 124 – 5, 144 Laney, E. K. 123 – 4, 128 Lasch, C. 246 Lavelock, C. R. 187, 201, 282, 302 Lawrence, P. 257 Laws (Plato) 38 Lay, K. 246 Leach, M. M. 199 leader humility 248 – 51; advantages of 249 – 50; behavioral factors of 248 – 9; disadvantages of 250 – 1; future research for 256 Leary, M. R. 119, 282 Lee, H. I. 201 Lee, K. 84, 108, 121 – 2, 138 – 9, 140 – 1, 142, 143, 215, 223 Lehman Brothers 247 Leone, L. 84 Leung, A. K. 201 Lewis, C. S. 150, 160 Lichtenberg, J. W. 289

362

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life-span, life-space theory 209 – 10, 212 limitations, humility as owning one’s 43 Litz, B. T. 330 Lofquist, L. 209 low self-esteem, humility as 40 – 1 luck, humility and 23 – 7 Lundberg, C. D. 193 Luther, M. 156 Lyubomirsky, S. 179 Machiavellianism 140, 141 Madoff, B. 247 Maimonides, M. 53 – 4 maintenance mechanisms: accommodation 170 – 1; of commitment 169 – 70; forgiveness 171 – 2; sacrifice 171 McAlister, B. 289 McCain, J. 141 McCornack, D. 252 McElroy, S. 82, 127, 197 McKennan, R. 251 McMillan, J. 336 – 7 meaning-making, service members and 333 – 4 measuring humility 119 – 30; CEO humility measures 122; Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale 128; conceptualization and 119 – 20; Cultural Humility Scale 129 – 30; Dispositional Humility Scale 124 – 5; Expressed Humility Scale 126 – 7; future efforts for 130; General Humility Scale 123 – 4; Healthy Humility Inventory and 122 – 3; honesty-humility measures 121 – 2; Humility-Arrogance Implicit Association Test 125; intellectual domain of 127 – 8; Intellectual Humility Scale 127, 128, 129; overview of 120; Quiet Ego Scale 124; as relational characteristic 126 – 7; Relational Humility Scale 126; self-reports and 121; special applications for 128 – 30; Spiritual Humility Scale 129; Values in Action Inventory of Strengths 123 Me-ism age, humility in 1 – 3 mentalization-based therapy, humility and 301 – 2 Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) 253 microaggressions 316 – 27; avoiding/working through, in psychotherapy 321 – 3; case examples 323 – 5; client perceptions of 320; cultural humility and 316 – 19; defined 319; future research for 325 – 6; practical

applications for 326 – 7; psychotherapist examples of 319 – 21; target identities of 319 Milgram Experiments 25 Miller, S. 93 Miller, S. D. 289, 298 Mills, J. 173 mindfulness 301 – 2 Mitchell, T. R. 126 – 7 Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity ScaleShort (M-GUDS-s) 97 – 8 modesty 42; humility and 179 modesty effect hypothesis 107 – 8; guilty until proven innocent approach to 107; innocent until proven guilty approach to 108; trait-related behaviors of 108 Mohammadtabar, S. 197 – 8 Moore, J. T. 199 Moore, R. L. 302 moral injury, service-related 329 – 39; clinical application of humility to 335 – 8; defined 329, 330; distress mechanisms of 333 – 4; exposure to, events 331; future research for 338 – 9; humility and 329 – 30; impairments associated with 331 – 2; sociocognitive model of 330 – 8 morally injurious events, exposure to 331 moral self-regulation 330 moral self-reparation 331 moral virtue, humility as 19 – 31; attention and 22 – 3; behavioral servility example of 20 – 1; cluster virtue view of 21; emotions and 27 – 30; further reflection of 30 – 1; Kantian account of 21 – 2; luck and 23 – 7; overview of 19 Mother Teresa 207 Mouw, R. 86 – 7 Murdoch, I. 21, 23, 26, 28 – 9 mutual cyclical growth 169 Myers, D. 239, 241 Nagle, Y. K. 183 Nam, R. K. 197 narcissism 140; humility and 179; intellectual humility and 235 – 6 Narcissistic Personality Inventory 235 Nash, W. P. 330 negative psychotherapist qualities/ behaviors 293 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) 53 Nietzsche, F. 26, 47 Norcross, J. C. 291, 294

index not-knowing stances 310 – 12 Nour, D. 254 Nusbaum, E. C. 198 O’Brien, W. R. 254 O’Donnell, P. 289 Offerman, L. R. 249 Ogles, B. M. 291 Okiishi, J. C. 288 O’Neill, T. A. 141 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 334 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 334 organizational humility 246 – 57; advantages of 254; behavioral factors of 253 – 4; definition of 248; disadvantages of 254 – 5; examples of 246 – 7; future research for 256; history of 247 – 8; leader 248 – 51; overview of 246 – 7; practical applications for 256 – 7; team 251 – 3; varieties of 248 – 55 other-orientation 157 Ou, A. Y. 122, 250 Ou, Y. 250, 257 overall psychotherapeutic effectiveness 289 overconfidence 153 Owen, J. 295, 318, 319, 320 – 1 Owens, B. P. 126 – 7, 249, 250, 252, 257 Paine, D. R. 345 – 6 Pale Blue Dot (Sagan) 267 Park, N. 183 Patterson, C. L. 291 Paulhus, D. L. 140 Paunonen, S. V. 139 perceived orientation (PO) 97 personality predictors/correlates of humility 137 – 46; future research/questions for 145; HEXACO model and 138 – 9; limitations of 144 – 5; methodology used 137 – 8; negative honesty-humility correlates 139 – 42; nonself-report measures 144; overview of 137; positive traits 142 – 4; practical applications for 145 personality/social-psychological relationships, religion/spirituality (R/S), humility and 197 – 8 person-environment fit theories 209 Peterson, C. 123, 179, 185, 195 Peterson, S. J. 250 philosophical humility 33 – 46; as brake on irrational ambition 39 – 40; as chronic shame 40 – 1; competing 38 – 45; defining humility 33 – 7; as dogmatic ignorance of

363

one’s excellence 42; as inattention to one’s excellences 43 – 5; as low self-esteem 40 – 1; as nonoverestimation in self-evaluation 42 – 3; overview of 33; as owning one’s limitations 43; as small-mindedness 38 – 9 Pinker, S. 29, 242 Pinsent, A. 41 Plato 38, 306 political humility 4 – 5, 8, 76 – 89, 208, 348; advice regarding 86 – 8; Augustinian hegemony and 79 – 80; changing demographics and 83; elected administration and 83; Enlightenment writers and 80; Greek and Roman absence of 79; Harvard Negotiation Project and 87 – 8; history of 79 – 81; international pressures and 82; need for 81 – 3; overview of 76; philosophy of science and 78 – 9; political negotiation and 81; political polarization and 82; recapturing, as virtue 81 – 3; relationship ruptures and 82; research on, implications for 84 – 6; research questions for 85 – 6; scientific advances and 83; Secular Age and 80 – 1; social pressure and 82 – 3; studies relevant for 84; as subtype of intellectual humility 76 – 9 political humility, practical advice regarding 86 – 8; for citizens 87 – 8; to public politicians 86 – 7 political humility, scientific research on 84 – 6; questions in need of answers 85 – 6; relevance of 84 political negotiation, political humility and 81 political polarization, political humility and 82 Pollock, N. C. 183 Popper, K. 78 positive epistemic status 67 – 9 positive psychotherapist qualities/behaviors 292 – 3 positive self-image, maintaining 151 – 2 Posner, R. 26 – 7 posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 331, 339 Powell, M. C. 173 Powers, C. 197 Powers, T. A. 277 prejudice, minimal 157 pride: vices of 33 – 7; virtues of 33 – 4, 36 Pritchett, V. S. 30

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Pronin, E. 154 proper pride 65 prosociality hypothesis 110 – 11 protean careers 212 PROVE Humility intervention 278 – 80 psychopathology, humility and 274 – 7; low humility and 275 – 6; self-focus and 276; shame and 276 – 7 psychopathy 140 – 1 psychotherapeutic effectiveness: adapting patient treatment 294 – 5; domain-specific 289; elements of 294; on outcomes 287 – 90, 292; overall 289; via therapy relationships 290 – 1, 292 psychotherapist effects, defined 286 psychotherapist humility 286 – 98; cultivation of 297 – 8; cycle of excellence and 289, 298; definitions 286 – 7; future research for 295 – 7; impact of, on outcomes 295; impact of, on therapy relationship 293 – 4; literature search 287; negative qualities/behaviors and 293; outcomes, psychotherapist effects on 287 – 90, 292; overview of 286; positive qualities/ behaviors and 292 – 3; practitioner recommendations 297 – 8; qualities/ behaviors and 290 – 4, 292; self-appraisals and 298; therapy relationship and, effective elements of 294; treatment to patient, adapting 294 – 5 psychotherapist qualities/behaviors 290 – 4, 292; effects on outcomes 292; negative 293; positive 292 – 3; therapy relationship impact of 293 – 4 qualities/behaviors, psychotherapist 290 – 4, 292; effects on outcomes 292; negative 293; positive 292 – 3; therapy relationship impact of 293 – 4 quiet ego 124 Quiet Ego Scale (QES) 124 Quiros, A. E. 122 – 3 Qur’ān: arrogance and 57; value of humility in 57 Radical Evil doctrine (Kant) 21 – 2 Raju, R. 247 Ramlall, S. J. 254 Rand, A. 33 Rawls, J. 24 REACH model 201 relational humility 9, 77, 105 – 15, 208, 346 – 7; benefits of 115; commitment and

168; components of 150; defined 105, 166, 223, 234; feminist theory and 114; health hypothesis 114; interdependence theory and (see interdependence theory, relational humility and); lessons from study on 115; limitations of 114 – 15; modesty effect hypothesis 107 – 8; overview of 105; prosociality hypothesis 110 – 11; security hypothesis 113; social bonds hypothesis 109 – 10; social oil hypothesis 110; span hypothesis 111 – 13; state humility defined 105; study results 107 – 15; trait humility defined 105 – 7; transformation of motivation and 166, 169 – 72; trust and 168 – 9 Relational Humility Scale (RHS) 126 relationship quality, humility and 226 religion, defined 193 religion/spirituality (R/S), humility and 192 – 202; concepts of 192 – 3; forgiveness and 196 – 7; future research for 199 – 201; health and 195 – 6; methodology used in review of 193 – 4; overview of 192; personality/social-psychological relationships and 197 – 8; practical lessons from 201; review results 194 – 8; studies of 194 – 5 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (Kant) 21, 26 religious humility 5, 8, 47 – 60, 77 – 8, 347 – 8; in Buddhism 50 – 3; in Christianity 55 – 7; in Hinduism 47 – 50; introduction to 47; in Islam 57 – 9; in Judaism 53 – 5 RIASEC types 209 Richards, N. 21, 41, 42, 122 right-winged authoritarianism 112 risk taking 141 – 2 Roberts, R. C. 46, 63 – 5, 71 – 2, 128 Rodolfa, E. 319 Rodriguez-Lopez, A. 247, 254 Romanowska, J. 279 romantic relationships 221 – 9; adaptive processes and 224 – 5; enduring traits/ vulnerabilities and 223 – 4; humility in VSA model of 226 – 8, 228; overview of 221; practical lessons from 229; relationship quality and 226; research agenda 228 – 9; stressors and 225 – 6; Vulnerability-StressAdaptation model of 221 – 6 Rorty, R. 29 Ross, L. 95, 99 Rouse, S. V. 128 Rousseau, J-J. 80

index Rowatt, W. C. 125, 144, 182, 183, 184, 185, 194, 197 Rupert, D. 345 – 6 rupture/repair processes 312 – 13 Rusbult, C. E. 165 Ryff, C. D. 183 sacred desecrations, service members and 334 sacrifice 171 Saffarinia, M. 197 – 8 Sandage, S. J. 196, 198, 225, 345 – 6 Śaṅkara 48 Sapienza, P. 255 satisfaction with life hypothesis 7, 352 Saytam 247 school harmony, honesty-humility (HH) and 143 Schwartz Values scale 112 scientific progress, intellectual humility and 237 – 9 Scrushy, R. 246 Secular Age, A (Taylor) 80 – 1 Secular Powers (Cooper) 80 security hypothesis 113 self-affirmation, state humility and 263 – 4 self-awareness 212 self-comparison 36 self-condemnation 333 self-deprecation 62 self-esteem 151; humility and 179 self-evaluation, humility as nonoverestimation in 42 – 3 selfies 150 self-importance 34 – 5; features of 35; further philosophical clarification of 45 self-regulation 156 self-reported self-control, honesty-humility (HH) and 143 self-reports 121 self-serving bias 152 Seligman, M. E. P. 123, 179, 185, 195 seminal accounts of intellectual humility 63 – 6 sense of calling 211 Sermons (Johnson) 153 servant leadership 211 shame, defined 276 Shapiro, E. L. 277 Shay, J. 330 Shibboleth 279 Silvia, P. J. 198 Simon, M. 93, 94

365

situational pressures affecting humility 157 – 9 Skilling, J. 246 small-mindedness, humility as 38 – 9 Smith, T. 33, 41 Snow, N. 43 social bond hypothesis 109 – 10, 224, 350 – 1 social cognitive career theory 210 social dominance 112 social functioning hypothesis 7, 350 – 1 social oil hypothesis 82, 110, 115, 351 social pressure, political humility and 82 – 3 social psychological perspective on humility 150 – 62; actor-observer effect and 154; advancing research on 161; better-than-average effect and 152 – 3; bias blind spot and 154; bonding and 156 – 7; development steps 159 – 60; false uniqueness/consensus and 153; humility definition 150 – 1; lower intergroup prejudice and 157; other-orientation and 157; overconfidence and 153; overview of 150; positive self-image and 151 – 2; reducing biases and 154 – 6; self-regulation and 156; self-serving bias and 152; situational pressures and 157 – 9; social costs/benefits 160 – 1; unrealistic optimism and 153 – 4 social-psychological relationships, religion/ spirituality (R/S), humility and 197 – 8 societal peace hypothesis 7, 352 sociometer theory, self-esteem and 151 sociopolitical dominance, honesty-humility (HH) and 143 – 4 Socrates 38 span hypothesis 111 – 13 Spinoza, B. 80 spiritual humility 5, 77 Spiritual Humility Scale (SHS) 129 spirituality, defined 193 state humility 260 – 9; awe and 266 – 7; defined 105, 286; future research for 267 – 8; gratitude and 265 – 6; interventions 263 – 7; limitations to 267 – 8; measurement of 262 – 3; overview of 261 – 2; practical lessons from 268 – 9; self-affirmation and 263 – 4 States of Change (Teixeira et al.) 83 status seeking 141 – 2 Stein, N. R. 331, 334 stressors, humility and 225 – 6 STRONG STAR Consortium 331 subtraction story 79

366

index

Sue, D. W. 319 Super, D. 209 – 10 Swartz, M. 246 Sylaska, K. 124 Tangney, J. P. 5, 74 , 120, 122, 128, 144, 178 – 9, 193, 247, 302, 345 Tao, K. 319 Taylor, C. 79, 80 – 1 team humility 251 – 3; advantages of 252; behavioral factors of 251 – 2; disadvantages of 252 – 3; future research for 256 Tedeschi, R. G. 336 – 7 Terror Management Theory 151; self-esteem and 151 Terry, M. L. 119 theory of work adjustment 209 therapy relationship, defined 286 Toblin, R. I. 334 Tolentino, F. 253 tolerance hypothesis 351 Toner, K. 129 Tracey, T. J. G. 289 trait humility, defined 105 – 7, 286 transformation of motivation 346 – 7; commitment/trust and 169; defined 166; relational humility and 169 – 72 Treatise of Human Nature (Hume) 40 Twenge, J. 1 Tyco 246 Uncommon Decency: Christian Civility in an Uncivil World (Mouw) 86 – 7 Universal-Diverse Orientation (UDO) 97 unrealistic optimism 153 – 4 Uriah Heep example of humility 20 – 1 Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS), Humility and Modesty subscale in 123 Van Tongeren, D. R. 172, 198, 336 Vera, D. 247, 254 Vermeersch, D. A. 291

virtue: defined 274; humility as 305 – 6; intellectual humility and 71; political humility as 81 – 3 virtue and vice hypothesis 6 – 7, 350 Volk, A. A. 142 Vulnerability-Stress-Adaptation (VSA) model 221 – 6; adaptive processes and 224 – 5; enduring traits/vulnerabilities and 223 – 4; future research for 228 – 9; humility in 223 – 8, 228; overview of 221 – 2; relationship quality and 226; stressors and 225 – 6 Waldman, D. A. 250 Walfish, S. 289 Wallace, A. R. 233 Wallace, A. S. 250 Wampold, B. E. 289 Watkins, C. E., Jr. 316, 318 Wayment, H. A. 124 Weil, S. 23 well-being see health and well-being, humility and Whitcomb, D. 43, 65 – 6, 72 White, S. K. 80 Williams, B. 30 – 1 Williams, K. M. 140 Wiltshire, J. 214, 216 wisdom therapy 277 Wolfe, T. 1 Wood, J. 63 – 5, 72 Wood, W. J. 128 workplace harmony, honesty-humility (HH) and 143 WorldCom 246 Worthington, E. L., Jr. 82, 120, 126, 196, 201, 224 – 5, 227, 229, 338, 345, 352 Wuthnow, R. 332 Yeager, K. A. 94 Zingales, L. 255