Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium: Resilience, Transformation, (Re)Creation and Diffusion (Contemporary Gulf Studies) 981151528X, 9789811515286

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CONTEMPORARY GULF STUDIES SERIES EDITORS: STEVEN WRIGHT · ABDULLAH BAABOOD

Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium Resilience, Transformation, (Re)Creation and Diffusion Edited by Magdalena Karolak · Nermin Allam

Contemporary Gulf Studies Series Editors Steven Wright College of Humanities and Social Sciences Hamad bin Khalifa University Doha, Qatar Abdullah Baabood National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore

Salient Features: • The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the competing interests of global powers and therefore publications in the series reflect this complex environment. • The series will see publication on the dynamic nature of how the Gulf region has been undergoing enormous changes attracting regional and international interests. • The series is managed through Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, which has emerged as the leading institution within the Gulf region offering graduate degrees in Gulf Studies at both masters and doctoral level. Aims and Scope: This series offer a platform from which scholarly work on the most ­pressing issues within the Gulf region will be examined. The scope of the book series will encompass work being done on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait in addition to Iraq, Iran and Yemen. The series will focus on three types of volumes: Single and jointly authored monograph; Thematic edited books; Course text books. The scope of the series will include publications relating to the countries of focus, in terms of the following themes which will allow for interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquiry on the Gulf region to flourish: Politics and political development Regional and international relations Regional cooperation and integration Defense and security Economics and development Food and water security Energy and environment Civil society and the private sector Identity, migration, youth, gender and employment Health and education Media, literature, arts & culture More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15318

Magdalena Karolak  •  Nermin Allam Editors

Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium Resilience, Transformation, (Re)Creation and Diffusion

Editors Magdalena Karolak College of Humanities and Social Sciences Zayed University Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Nermin Allam Department of Politics Rutgers University-Newark Newark, NJ, USA

ISSN 2662-320X     ISSN 2662-3218 (electronic) Contemporary Gulf Studies ISBN 978-981-15-1528-6    ISBN 978-981-15-1529-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 Chapter 7 is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). For further details see licence information in the chapter. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1 Introduction  1 Nermin Allam and Magdalena Karolak Khaleeji Identity: A Framework for Analysis   4 Volume: Raison d’être and the Outcomes   6 Concluding Remarks and Acknowledgments  10 References  11 2 A  lliances and Regionalism in the Middle East After Arab Uprisings: An Assessment of the Durability and Fragility of the Gulf Cooperation Council 13 Nesibe Hicret Battaloglu Theoretical Framework on Alliances and Regionalism in the Middle East  14 Analytic Eclecticism and the GCC Case  16 Arab Spring and the GCC: Resilience or Demise of Khaleeji Identity?  22 Conclusions and Future Prospects  29 References  30 3 S  ectarian Transnational Identities Online: Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 33 Hala Guta Collective Identity and Social Movements  34 Mass Media and Collective Identity  35 v

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Shi’a Politics in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain  37 Methodology  40 Analysis  42 Conclusion  48 References  49 4 P  olitical Culture in Qatar: State-Society Relations and National Identity in Transformation 53 Betul Dogan Akkas and Gilla Camden The Theory of Political Culture  55 Types of Political Culture  56 Concept of the Civic Culture  57 Political System of Qatar  59 Methodology  60 Data Collection  61 Political Culture in Qatar  61 State and Society Relations: Subject Political Culture  62 Set of Orientations: Deference and Mutual Expectations  67 Conclusion: A Transformation?  70 References  71 5 “  The Side Door Is Open”: Identity Articulation and Cultural Practices in Post-­Arab Spring Kuwait 75 Emanuela Buscemi Introduction  75 The Current Debate About Democratization and Civil Society  77 The Kuwaiti Arab Spring Antecedents  82 Post-Arab Spring Kuwait: Identity, Engagement and Everyday Life  84 Conclusion  91 References  92 6 T  he Nation and Its Artists: Contemporary Khaleeji Artists Between Critique and Capture 95 Nesrien Hamid Defining National Identity  97 Art in the Arab Gulf  98 Ahmed Mater: Son of the Oil Civilization  99

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Manal AlDowayan: Gender, Tradition, and the Archive 101 GCC: The Neoliberal Nation 103 Global but Local 105 The Future of Khaleeji Artists 109 References 111 7 I dentity Lost and Found: Architecture and Identity Formation in Kuwait and the Gulf115 Roberto Fabbri Introduction 115 Identity, Identity Lost and Tradition in Transition 116 Adopting Modernity. Adapting Modernity 119 Architectural Transplants or Global Mobility? The Diplomatic Role of the Architect 122 Cultural Displacement and a Missing Heritage 125 Identity Reloaded 127 Conclusions: Architecture as Common Denominator? 129 References 131 8 C  lubbing in Dubai: The Making of a “Party Capital”135 Magdalena Karolak Introduction 135 Entertainment as a Tourism Attractor 137 Development of Clubbing in Dubai: Search for an Identity 141 Interview Data Analysis 149 Discussion and Conclusion 153 References 155 9 M  usic for Thought: Examining Saudi Identities Expressed Through Music on Social Media159 Magdalena Karolak Introduction 159 Arabic Music in Television and Social Media 160 Methodology 164 Satire 166 Re-creation of Western Genres 170 Dance as a Way Out 173 Discussion and Conclusion 174 References 176

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10 L  inguistic Hybridity and Cultural Multiplicity in Emirati Identity Construction179 Sarah Hopkyns Introduction: Globalization and Identity Construction 179 The UAE Context: Background 181 The Study 185 Findings 187 Summary of Findings and Discussion 194 Conclusion 195 References 196 11 L  anguage, Nation, Difference: Everyday Language Tactics of Young Emiratis201 İdil Akıncı Introduction 201 Language as a Marker of National Identity 203 Everyday Performances of the Nation 204 Building Gulf National Identities: The Role of Arabic and the Challenge of Its ‘Rivals’ 206 Methodology 209 The Success of Arabic as a National Language? 210 Residual Markers of Difference: Linguistic Boundaries Amongst Emiratis 212 Conclusion 215 References 216 12 H  igher Education Abroad in the New Millennium: GCC Scholarship Programs as GCC Culture and Identities Boosters. Saudi Arabia in the Spotlight221 Annalisa Pavan Introduction 221 GCC Scholarships Abroad: Student Mobility Policies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates 222 Studying Abroad: Retaining a Unique Culture? 227 Saudi Arabia Under the Lens 232 Concluding Remarks: Will Gulf Millennials Negotiate New Glocal Identities at the Crossroads Between Past and Future? 237 References 238 Index245

Notes on Contributors

̇ Idil  Akıncı is an Early Career Teaching and Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh. She holds a PhD in Migration Studies from the University of Sussex (2018), where she explored the everyday experiences of national identity and citizenship by young Arab migrant communities and Emirati citizens in Dubai. Her research interests and experience centre around the issues of national identity, citizenship, and belonging, with a focus on the Gulf states. Nermin  Allam  is Assistant Professor of Politics at Rutgers University-­ Newark. Before joining Rutgers, Allam held a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada postdoctoral fellowship at Princeton University. Allam holds a Doctorate of Philosophy in International Relations and Comparative Politics from the University of Alberta, Canada. Emanuela  Buscemi  holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Aberdeen (Scotland) and teaches at the University of Monterrey (Mexico). She is affiliated with CEFAS, French Center of Archaeology and Social Science, Kuwait. She previously taught at the American University of Kuwait (AUK). She conducted fieldwork in Kuwait and Mexico. Her research interests focus on alternative social movements, informal activism and resistance, identity, gender politics, communities and belonging. She is co-editing a volume on quotidian youth cultures in the Gulf and publishing her dissertation on Kuwaiti women’s cultural and political engagement in the post-Arab Spring.

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Gilla  Camden  is a doctoral researcher in Comparative Politics at the School of Government and International Affairs and the Centre for Institutions and Political Behaviour at Durham University in Durham, UK. She holds an MA in Arabic and a BA in Arabic Language, Literature, and Linguistics from Georgetown University in Washington, DC, USA.  Her research interests include the political economy of gender, voting choice and patterns, political culture, social policy, and civil ­ ­engagement in the Arab-speaking world, specifically the Gulf region. Betul  Dogan  Akkas  is a PhD candidate of the joint degree program between Qatar University Gulf Studies Center and Durham University School of Government and International Affairs. She also got her MA degree with the thesis titled “Securitization of Qatari Foreign Policy” at Qatar University. Dogan Akkas completed her BA in International Relations from Bilkent University. Her research interests include foreign policy making, security, and social transformation of the Gulf countries. Roberto Fabbri  is an architect, researcher and professor at the University of Monterrey (Mexico). As a former United Nations Development Programme consultant, he participated in the Kuwait National Museum rehabilitation project and completed the transformation of the American Missionary Hospital into an exhibition centre (2012 Aga Khan Award for Architecture nomination). He contributed to international conferences, recently in Yale, GRM Cambridge, MESA and INHA-Paris and published extensively on journals such as Domus, Faces-Journal d’Architecture and International Journal of Islamic Architecture. He released two books on Max Bill (Mondadori 2011; in Folio 2017) and co-authored the doublevolume Modern Architecture Kuwait 1949–1989 (Niggli 2015, 2017). Hala  Guta is Assistant Professor of Mass Communication at Qatar University, Qatar. She holds a PhD in Mass Communication from Ohio University. Her research interests include international communication; gendered communication; communication for social change; and the intersection of communication, culture, and identity. Her publications and conference presentations include papers on the role of media in gender negation and expression, the role of culture in communication, the role of communication in peace building in societies emerging from conflict, and the role media and other cultural institutions play in social change and the construction of identity.

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Nesrien  Hamid  is an independent researcher and translator based in New  York City. She recently completed a Master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the Graduate Center, City University of New York. She has a BA in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, and will soon commence her doctoral studies, where she will focus her research on the GCC states, specifically contemporary Saudi Arabia. Nesibe Hicret Battaloglu  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Area Studies at Middle East Technical University (METU). She obtained her Master’s degree in 2014 from Qatar University Gulf Studies program with a thesis entitled “A Comparison of Turkey and Iran’s Soft Power in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)”. Her research interests concern international relations of the GCC states, Gulf politics and identities. Sarah Hopkyns  is an assistant professor in the College of Education at Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. She holds a PhD in Educational Research in the discipline of Applied Linguistics from the University of Leicester, UK.  Her research interests include English as a global language, Emirati cultural identities, multilingualism, linguistic hybridity, and English as a medium of instruction (EMI). She has disseminated her research widely through international conference presentations as well as publications. She is the principal investigator (PI) of a funded research cluster on the pedagogical and sociological implications of EMI. Magdalena Karolak  holds a PhD in Linguistics from the University of Silesia, Poland and is Associate Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences at Zayed University, UAE. Her research interests include transformations of societies in the Arabian Gulf and comparative linguistics. Dr. Karolak has authored more than 40 journal articles and book chapters on the shifting gender relations, social media, culture and identity, and political system transformations in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Annalisa Pavan  is Professor of International Policies on Education at the University of Padova, Italy. After publishing books and editing volumes on the EU and UNESCO policies on education for over a decade, she has elected Saudi Arabian higher education policies, with a specific interest in Saudi government-funded scholarship programs for studying abroad as a main research focus. The scope of her most recent research and publications has expanded to include ongoing socio-political and cultural changes in Saudi Arabia, the image of the Kingdom in Western media, and Kuwaiti and Emirati overseas scholarship programs.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Arrivals of non-resident visitors among GCC states at national borders (Intra GCC). (Source: Author’s own calculation based on World Tourism Organization (WTO)) 25 Fig. 10.1 Emirati university students’ preferences regarding medium of instruction193

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Facebook groups analyzed Table 8.1 Electronic music scene in Dubai Table 9.1 Music videos: search results

42 146 165

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Nermin Allam and Magdalena Karolak

The inauguration of the Louvre Abu Dhabi Museum on November 8, 2017 by the French President Emmanuel Macron was a major cultural and diplomatic event. The project, ten years in the making, saw finally the light of the day but the debates it sparked were ongoing: Is this sister branch of the French Louvre a mere exportation or commercialization of culture? Is it simply an exclusive moneymaking project rather than a real cultural one? Is it expropriation of the French heritage? Is Abu Dhabi the right place from where to send the message of tolerance and universalism to the world? Over the years the project in construction gathered supporters, critics, believers, and naysayers; yet, it stands today as a masterpiece of architecture and a testimony to the rise of the Arabian Gulf among the world players in the domain of culture. Birgit Mersmann (2017, p. 266) highlights the transformative power of “the copy”: the

N. Allam (*) Department of Politics, Rutgers University-Newark, Newark, NJ, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. Karolak College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_1

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representatives from the Arab world are now “in possession of power to remake the ­original. They can remaster the original Louvre by remaking the birth of the museum in the Arab world, and thus gain the right to reinterpret the French legacy of world art history from their national, regional, or local point of view” (ibid.). Indeed, the recent shift in the cultural power of the region is striking. From being initially the backwaters of the world system to becoming the oil providers to the world, in the twenty-first century, the countries of the Arabian Gulf entered a new era. Culture and creativity are put forward as the new commodity to export abroad and a magnet for visitors. The notion of culture in relation to the Arabian Gulf requires an in-­depth analysis. What exactly constitutes the culture of the Gulf countries, that is, khaleeji culture? How can we contextualize the notion of culture in the multicultural and cosmopolitan landscapes of the Gulf? How did the region transform itself to become a world center of culture and acquire this cultural power? What type of identities are created and recreated as a result? The transformation of the Arabian Gulf countries, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, has not only been extremely fast but also striking for social scientists. Thanks to vast oil resources, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region has evolved from sleepy outposts to world-recognized centers of banking, tourism, trade, shopping, and more recently innovation and culture. The Gulf has put itself firmly on the world map as a place to be and to be seen with its glittering cities, extravagance of its urban projects, and wealth on display. Behind the oriental mask lies, however, a vibrant society that is young, cosmopolitan, and dynamic. In addition, the Gulf has become a magnet for a large workforce, from unskilled workers to highly skilled professionals, millions of tourists, businessmen, but also for international movie stars from Hollywood and Bollywood who spend their holidays in the Gulf and film there their new productions. Gulf citizens, on the other hand, are well connected to the world through Internet, international travel, and are becoming better  educated. Their accomplishments in various fields are often celebrated in local media. It is a huge shift from the past generations. Globalization has not only opened up opportunities with international trade and travel, while the accrued wealth strengthened consumerism, but also investments in various projects such as education, economic diversification, and preservation and showcasing Gulf heritage. It is important then to analyze the interplay of these various factors on the Gulf identity(-ies) and culture(s). Indeed, rather than obliterating the local culture and tradi-

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tions, the Gulf has transformed, created, or recreated its cultural a­ cumen and has entered the new millennium with a sense of pride in its recent achievements. In addition, thanks to multiple economic, social, and cultural links, the Gulf culture has begun to make an impact in other parts of the world. These developments have been parallel to nation-building projects in the GCC countries. Gulf nations are, for most, recent political creations. That is the reason why, Gulf societies have been characterized by religious, ethnic, tribal, and settlement cleavages that cut through the populations and are often seen as a factor that makes identification, and hence loyalty, with structures other than the state more salient. As a result, formation of national identities in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East has not been an easy project. Often, the structures of power kept in place determined exclusive national identity narratives and, as a result, strengthened other subnational patterns of identification. It is important to analyze these patterns in light of the economic and demographic pressures laying ahead for the region as well as regional conflicts and rivalries. Unifying national identities are more and more needed as GCC countries have begun to abandon the rentier model and hence ask new generations, both men and women, to actively contribute to their countries as citizens in various ways. Such contributions and sacrifices for a cause of the state occur in mostly non-participatory politics; as a result, strong identification with the state is a prerequisite to citizens’ commitment. In addition, the structure of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a political cooperation established in 1980, provided a platform for strengthening of a khaleeji identity unifying the Gulf. Yet, recent events put more pressures on the GCC. The Arab uprisings, military intervention in Yemen, and a diplomatic row with Qatar demonstrated that challenges abound. They put strain on the political and economic performance of the GCC countries but they also affect patterns of social identification. Consequently, the state of national identity-­building projects and khaleeji identity require careful assessment. All in all, the Gulf is characterized by multifaceted identities and cultures. Hence, we may talk about them as a plurality rather than singular phenomena. Similarly to the Russian matryoshka doll, the outer layer hides multiple inner ones within. It is necessary to go beyond the most visible appearances and peel off the outer layers. Fascinating accounts abound when researching deeper to the core. In light of these ongoing currents in the Arabian Gulf region, this book sets an ambitious goal of looking at the questions of GCC identity and

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culture from multiple perspectives and through various lenses. There is a vital need to assess in detail the recent changes to various aspects of the identities and culture of the GCC countries that are characterized by constant fluidity. Consequently, we aim at creating a platform for discussing the different factors, processes, and dynamics that influence the production, reproduction, and the representation of the khaleeji culture(s) and identit(-ies). These important transformations have gone largely unnoticed due to the fast nature of changes in the region that affect all aspects of the society. As a result, research lags behind. Our volume aims to fill this gap by looking from a holistic perspective at the intersections of language, arts, education, political culture, city, regional alliances, and family. It offers selected case studies based on original, extensive research carried out on  the region. Most importantly, the research is very recent, hence provides up-to-date analyses. The chapters offer a fascinating reading reflecting the fluidity of the concepts in question. To date, in-depth studies of GCC identities are very scarce and fragmented. In addition, the level of detail often escapes analysts who reside outside of the Gulf. Our volume aims to remedy these limitations. It provides an important support for academics, students, and professionals who seek to better understand the region.

Khaleeji Identity: A Framework for Analysis The concept of khaleeji identity, also referred to sometimes as Gulf identity or identity of the Eastern Arabia, has not been widely used in literature as a framework for analyses. While grounded in cultural, social, historical, and political homogeneity of the countries of the Arabian Gulf, it is a set of characteristics that can be equally well used to highlight similarities of these countries or, on the contrary, stress their particular differences depending on current circumstances. The khaleeji identity received primarily a boost with the creation of a political project, namely, the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. By projecting the concept of khaleeji identity into the scope of foreign affairs, members of the GCC strived to define this idea into a viable reality with the initiative moving forward and backward throughout the years (Lawson 2012; Popescu and Mustafa 2001); yet the recent split within the organization has made it clear that under the cover of similarities, there exist indeed sharp differences that can grow even deeper.

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Arabian Gulf provides the backdrop and foundation for the khaleeji identity. The geographical location at the crossroads of intercontinental trade promoted since ancient times cultural exchange, gave birth to trading cities, but also exposed the region to foreign invasions. The harsh desert climate has always required adaptation to the natural environment and similar architectural solutions were found in the past to alleviate the scorching heat. The region is the birthplace of Islam and the religious practice has had an everlasting impact on its societies. Arabic and, specifically, its dialectical versions commonly known as khaleeji Arabic set the region linguistically aside. The availability of crops and animals but also the early trade with other regions has influenced the regional cuisine. In its more recent history, the discovery of oil and in some countries also natural gas has brought sudden riches boosting the economic growth, while creating an economic model of rentierism (Luciani and Beblawi 1987) and a predilection for comfort and luxury among the inhabitants. It has also encouraged the flow of the foreign labor that changed the complex social fabric of the Gulf societies. The monarchical political systems that were cemented on the eve of independence provide another element of similarity. The societies, for most part tribal, were subsequently engaged in the process of modern nation-building that continues till this day. Apart from Bahrain and Oman that have experienced a history of a statehood in the past; other countries emerged as new states and the need of creating a unifying national identity arouse. Khaleeji identity predates the creation of national identities that split peoples apart. The social bonds are, nonetheless, strong in the Gulf as many extended families are spread across countries and cross-national intermarriages are common. The cultural homogeneity is visible in popular culture, poetry, music, sports, etc. The Arabian Gulf shares also similar future challenges that are related to the climate change and transition from oil dependence to a knowledge-based economy. While sharing these characteristics, khaleejis, that is, inhabitants of the Gulf, are set apart from among other Arabs. All in all, there exists a number of characteristics that form the base of the khaleeji identity that constitutes the outer layer of identity and culture phenomena in the Gulf. Yet, similar to the concept of European identity, they may not be sufficient to solidify a far-reaching regional identity. In addition, these characteristics should not underscore the differences that are not only visible between the countries but run deep within them. The tiny society of Bahrain alone comprises a number of social groups such as tribal Sunnis (Al Khalifa), rural Arab Shias (Baharna), urban Sunnis of

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Persian origin (Hawala), urban Sunnis of nontribal Arab origin (Najdi), urban Shias of Arab origin, and Shia Iranian migrants (Ajam) (Khuri 1980). In addition, there are many variances of the dialects of Arabic spoken across this archipelago. Consequently, there exist identities other than national or khaleeji shared by people living across GCC countries that may become more salient in specific circumstances; similarly, national identities may become contested. Such differences are visible in other countries of the Arabian Gulf where local cleavages cut through the social fabrics. Consequently, Gulf state’s societies have been formulating, on the one hand, a khaliji identity as a pan-Gulf concept (Alsharekh and Springborg 2012; McKeown et al. 2016) and the idea of national belonging on the other. Similar to other nation-building projects, these processes, scholars argue, are of deliberate character and instrumental and largely articulated by political elites; they are viewed as instrumental in sustaining their national legitimacy and international image amid growing national and regional challenges (Cooke 2014; Dresch and Piscatori 2005; Herb 1999). Among the salient challenges identified in the literature are globalization; austerity measures, political turmoil, social movements for reform; and anxiety over the overwhelming presence of non-nationals (Fox et al. 2006). To address these challenges specifically, Gulf states are increasingly resorting to conceptualizing national identity through different tangible and intangible mechanism. These mechanisms vary from rewriting historical narratives and common traditions to appropriating arts, sports, and architects (see Erskine-Loftus et al. 2016; Keshmirshekan 2015). Studies on the region underscore the centrality of these projects in charting the contours of the Gulf society and its modern nation-building process (Alsharekh and Springborg 2012; Cooke 2014; McKeown et al. 2016).

Volume: Raison d’être and the Outcomes The volume aims at analyzing culture and identity of the GCC countries focusing on the changes to these concepts in the last decades. On the one hand side, it will highlight rapid development of the GCC economies and increased pace of globalization, and on the other hand, it will trace the transformations of the notions of statehood and belonging in the Gulf. While national identities in the Gulf have been gradually shaped and crystallized in their more inclusive or exclusive forms, the concept of khaleeji, a pan-Gulf identity, provides yet another dimension for analysis. Furthermore, apart from internal transformations, GCC culture has begun to reverberate

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outside of the Gulf. The book builds upon and contributes to this body of scholarship. In line with literature, we interrogate the ways in which the processes of nation-building and identity formation are instrumental for the survival of Gulf monarchies and emphasize the different mechanism appropriated across its societies. In addition, we investigate the ways in which Gulf Millennial generation negotiates their identity in light of increased external pressures such as globalization. As a result, we look at the top-down but also at the processes on the grassroots level. The book expands and moves beyond the existing literature in two distinct ways: (a) it emphasizes the contributions and limitations of existing nation-­building and identity formation theories, and (b) it draws attention to the experiences of different groups and how they negotiate their role in these nationbuilding projects. First, unlike the existing scholarship, the analysis presented in this volume identifies convergence and divergence between old models of nation-­ building and theories of identity formation largely formulated in the West and the emerging forms of nation-building carried out in the Gulf. In so doing, we expand the contours of this literature and encourage comparative studies among different regions. Second, the book further problematizes the literature tendency to study nation-building as a top-down process; the implication of this top-down approach is erasing the agency of different groups in society. While it is true that the process is largely channeled by elites in the society, we examine how citizens interpret this process, negotiate their place in it, and push against some of its manifestations (Al-Rasheed and Vitalis 2004). The analysis also provides further insight into the limited—yet currently expanding body of literature—on how different groups’ experience and participation in this project is mediated by their class, religion, gender, and ethnicity (Bristol-Rhys 2010; Potter 2014; Fargues 2011). In so doing, the book will contribute to unpacking the ambiguities and contradiction surrounding these projects of identity formation. The book is divided into 12 chapters; each chapter introduces the readers to the literature on identity, culture, and state formation in the Arabian Gulf. The analysis put forward interrogates existing and intriguing aspects of the khaleeji identity. Together the chapters situate the process of identity formation, transformation, and dissemination within the social, political, and economic trends in the twenty-first century. These trends, we argue, help explain the rapid pace of change in Gulf societies. They create a pervasive need to anchor an identity among each of the GCC states.

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This process of identity formation often operates as a state project. It also constantly shifts and changes making the search for what could constitute a continuity all the more elusive as various stakeholders actively create and recreate various elements of regional, national, and group identities. These shifts and transformations occur on different levels, formal and informal, planned and random or unintended. The rapidity of changes prompted by the unprecedented development of the region accounts for the fluidity of the concepts examined in this volume. The organization of the volume proceeds from the political to the social and cultural aspects of the identity in the Gulf. Broader themes are analyzed first to provide a background for case studies. Selected aspects of identity and culture pertaining to all of the GCC countries are included in this volume. The analyses are interdisciplinary and span over the disciplines of political science, anthropology, and sociology. In Chap. 2, Nesibe Hicret Battaoglu examines the regional dynamics embedded in the processes of khaleeji identity formation in GCC societies. The chapter addresses the influence of regionalism, alliance building, and inter-state cooperation in demarcating the khaleeji identity. The chapter builds upon structural realism and constructivism to emphasize how material and ideational factors at domestic, regional, and international levels affect the durability and fragility of regional alliances in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf region in particular. This chapter opens the analyses providing us with a pan-Gulf lens. The next three chapters look at various aspects of social activism in relation to the political concepts of identity in selected GCC countries. They all focus on the grassroots level activism and subsequent changes. Chapter 3 turns our attention to a more specific form of identification and belonging. It focuses on the growth of sectarian identifications in the Middle East. Looking at the cases of Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Hala Guta analyzes the use of social media to uncover the emanations of a transnational Shi’a identity. The chapter argues the rise of political tensions between Iran and the Saudi Kingdom, the civil war in Iraq, the rise of ISIS, the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Countries in Bahrain in 2012, and the execution of Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr, among others, were the catalysts to the increase of the cross-border sectarian sentiments. Chapter 4 engages with the influence of political culture and its impact on state society relations. Using Qatar as a case study, Betul Dogan Akkas and Gilla Camden examine recent societal transformations in the country and their impact on how citizens are negotiating their own identities in relation

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to the nation. The authors elucidate the effect of tribal affiliation, Islamic identity, or other aspects of belonging on the citizens’ views of national identity. The chapter assesses these identities from the point of view of changes to the political culture and suggests a shift towards a participatory one. In Chap. 5, Emanuela Buscemi investigates the effects of grassroots movements further focusing on the influence of collective action and political dissent on challenging certain representation of national identity in contemporary Kuwait. The chapter examines the political and social role of activists, and how the articulation of their engagement in civil society contests and challenges dominant cultural and political paradigms surrounding the khaleeji identity. The chapter argues that this articulation introduces new identity markers and allows for navigating identities between social constructions and political negotiations. The following four chapters investigate different aspects of arts. To begin with, its role in articulating and challenging the khaleeji identity is discussed in Chap. 6. The chapter examines the recent profusion of world-­ class museums, galleries, and film festivals in GCC countries and the increasing prominence of a number of khaleeji visual artists at the international stage. The analysis explains the different ways in which arts play a role in shaping the ideas of self, national identity, and citizenship in the region. Artists, Nesrien Hamid eloquently argues, produce arts that communicate ideas of nation and citizenship that “may dovetail with, diverge from, or altogether subvert what is officially sanctioned by the government”. In Chap. 7, Roberto Fabbri expands the conversation on arts and its role in shaping ideas of self and national identity looking through the lens of architecture. The chapter explores its role in identity formation and representation focusing on Kuwait as a case study. It retraces the transition from the Arab medina to the construction of the very modern Kuwait City. The chapter argues that this process involved redefining fluid notions of tradition, modernity, and identity in relation with the urban environment. It also included sacrificing the traditional old town, and the injection of “other” narratives, thus blurring the contours of the local culture, identity, and sense of place. Chapter 8 investigates a different and often under researched aspect of the role of music and entertainment arts in dissemination and construction of peculiar identity. The chapter explores how music and the entertainment industry contribute to the process of identity formation, presentation, and dissemination in the Arabian Gulf region, looking specifically at the city of Dubai. It elucidates the changing identity of Dubai obtained through its rising electronic music scene and

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investigates how the city turned to become the center of party entertainment in the Middle East inscribing itself in the globalized trends of ­electronic music industry. Chapter 9 continues with the subject of music but within the context of Saudi Arabia. It looks at the music video production of Saudi artists who use social media to reach audiences in the country and abroad and who through their music touch upon important social issues. The analysis reveals the methods that are used to promote social change from within and to ultimately seek new identity for this country in full transformation. The next two chapters focus on an equally significant factor for identity formation, which is language. In Chap. 10, Sarah Hopkyns traces the effect of language on identity construction and language use with reference to international and local research. The chapter argues that the use of linguistic hybridity in the form of translanguaging and code-switching, as well as mixing of local and global cultures create new complexity and multiplicity surrounding the construction of Emirati identity. Carrying on with the theme of language, Chap. 11 explores the symbolic role of Arabic, the official language of the United Arab Emirates, in the construction and maintenance of contemporary Emirati national identity. It argues that in a context where citizens are outnumbered by migrants, visible performances of Emiratiness, such as speaking “Emirati Arabic”, become crucial in marking citizenship status and maintaining the boundaries of the Emirati nation. The last chapter looks at specific aspects of the transformation of social identities focusing on the role of government-sponsored scholarship and study abroad programs in unintendedly challenging the national identity in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE. The chapter suggests that beyond the stated official goals the government-funded scholarship programs, prolonged exposure of GCC students to non-GCC cultures can act as boosters of new glocal identities and a powerful and challenging tool for change and evolution from within in the traditionally conservative GCC culture and identity.

Concluding Remarks and Acknowledgments The volume offers a fascinating reading of various aspects of the Gulf culture and identities. The chapters not only highlight the rapidity of transformations and the fluidity of the concepts mentioned above but also skillfully show the Gulf societies as active agents in the negotiations of their meanings. This is a much-needed approach, it is significant to under-

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standing the modern Gulf societies and we have no doubts the readers will benefit thanks to the span of the topics and disciplines, as well as the depth of the analyses included in this volume. The idea for this undertaking came from the realization that such, very nuanced, studies of the GCC culture are scarce and there is a vital need to account for the transformations that have been occurring in the new millennium. The initial step for this project came through the organization of an interdisciplinary workshop at the ninth annual Gulf Research Meeting at the University of Cambridge in 2018. It provided us with the opportunity to lead a scholarly debate on the new trends and exchange ideas leading ultimately to a book project. As such we are indebted to the Gulf Research Centre (GRC) for their support to our project and to the dissemination of research on the Arabian Gulf in general. The publication of this book was made possible through GRC’s support.

References Al-Rasheed, M., & Vitalis, R. (Eds.). (2004). Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2004 edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Alsharekh, A., & Springborg, R. (2012). Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States. London: Saqi. Bristol-Rhys, J. (2010). Emirati Women: Generations of Change. New  York: Columbia University Press. Cooke, M. (2014). Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dresch, P., & Piscatori, J. (2005). Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London/New York: I.B.Tauris. Erskine-Loftus, P., Al-Mulla, M. I., & Hightower, V. (Eds.). (2016). Representing the Nation: Heritage, Museums, National Narratives, and Identity in the Arab Gulf States (1st ed.). London/New York: Routledge. Fargues, P. (2011). Immigration Without Inclusion: Non-Nationals in Nation-­ Building in the Gulf States. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 20(3–4), 273–292. Fox, J., Sabbah, N. M., & Mutawa, M. A. (Eds.). (2006). Globalization and the Gulf (1st ed.). London: Routledge. Herb, M. (1999). All in the Family. Albany: State University of New York Press. Keshmirshekan, H. (2015). Contemporary Art from the Middle East: Regional Interactions with Global Art Discourses. London/New York: I.B.Tauris.

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Khuri, F. (1980). Tribe and State in Bahrain. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lawson, F.  H. (2012). Transformations of Regional Economic Governance in the Gulf Cooperation Council. CIRS Occasional Papers. Available at SSRN: https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2825915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2825915 Luciani, G., & Beblawi, H. (1987). The Rentier State. New York: Croom Helm. McKeown, S., Haji, R., & Ferguson, N. (2016). Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory: Contemporary Global Perspectives. Cham: Springer. Mersmann, B. (2017). Image Enhancement Through Copying? Global and Local Strategies of Reproduction in the Field of World Art and Heritage. In C. Forberg & P. W. Stockhammer (Eds.), The Transformative Power of the Copy: A Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Approach (pp.  243–268). Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing. Popescu, M., & Mustafa, S. (2001). The Gulf Monetary. Unification: Opportunities and Challenges. Arab Bank Review, 3(1), 28–40. Potter, L. G. (Ed.). (2014). Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Alliances and Regionalism in the Middle East After Arab Uprisings: An Assessment of the Durability and Fragility of the Gulf Cooperation Council Nesibe Hicret Battaloglu

Regionalism, alliance building and inter-state cooperation have occupied a certain place in the discussions of the international relations (IR). The mainstream IR theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism underline the material considerations (albeit in a very different sense than each other) as the primary motives for states to form alliances. On the other hand, more recently, constructivist approaches toward alliances and regionalism claim that the role of ideational factors of regional awareness, identities and norms are the basis for regionalism (Legrenzi 2002). Within this very debate of regionalism in IR literature, the Middle East was perceived as a region where regionalism remains at minimum and fragile (Aarts 1999). In fact, there are numerous systemic, regional and domestic factors supporting the arguments that the Middle East is a region

N. Hicret Battaloglu (*) Department of Area Studies, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_2

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where high external power penetration, conflicting national interest and identities, and longstanding regional turmoil have impeded, not enhanced, regional cooperation. On the other hand, despite the aforementioned factors, the Middle East also presents an interesting case where cooperation and competition coexist and reinvent themselves overtime (Fawcett 2016). This chapter focuses on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as one of most longstanding sub-regional cooperation examples in the Middle East within the theoretical approaches offered by IR.  In order to capture a more complete picture, this chapter adopts a ‘flexible and inclusive’ (ibid.) theoretical framework, which recognizes the importance of both material and ideational factors and includes a variety of approaches of structural realism and constructivism in forming regional alliances in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf region in particular. Further, this chapter aims at contributing to the literature on regionalism in the Middle East by focusing on how material and ideational factors at domestic, regional and international levels affect the durability and fragility of regional alliances. This study examines the most relevant theoretical discussions on regionalism in the Middle East. For the sake of a clear explanation, both mainstream grand theories and area-specific scholarly explanations are reviewed. Then it focuses on historical experience of GCC regarding the motives, scope and depth of the cooperation alongside with the institutional design with reference to the theoretical framework. Also, the regional and domestic developments in GCC since Arab Spring, which significantly altered the balance of power and the nature of alliances, are examined. This chapter concludes that while realist explanatory factors such as power shifts, enduring conflict and uncertainties expose the fragility of GCC as a meaningful and functioning sub-regional organization after Arab Uprisings, the attainment of a common Gulf (Khaleeji) identity and shared norms and transnational links across the Gulf might enhance the likelihood of regional cooperation durability.

Theoretical Framework on Alliances and Regionalism in the Middle East The IR theories devote significant volumes to explain why states cooperate, build alliances and allegiances, and even attempt to move toward regionalism, which curtails some of the sovereign rights of the engaging parties. The Middle East region, in this sense, offers both a convenient

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and an interesting case to examine alliance formation and regionalism on the grounds. This region has a strategic location and witnesses frequently shifting alliance commitments, intense ideological rivalries, major shifts in relative power and significant superpower involvement (Walt 1990, p.13–14). On the other hand, the non-material foundations, ideologies and norms of the Middle East also fell into the interests of constructivist scholars who try to offer an alternative explanation of alliance formation and regional cooperation (Barnett 1998). Further, domestic level determinants most notably the calculations about regime survival and institutional arrangements within a given state can also be the unit of analysis for alliance formation in the Middle East (Hinnebusch 2010; Halliday 2005). The very first challenge for the scholars to study the regionalism in the Middle East is to define ‘where’ exactly the Middle East is and how to define Middle East as a region. For the sake of theoretical generalization and empirical practicality, the scholars tend to define the region according to their theoretical orientation (Gause 1999). For realist scholars, like Stephen Walt, it is the states, including Israel and other super-powers (US-Russia), that matter in understanding alliances in the Middle East; while for constructivists like Michael Barnett, Arabism is the ultimate notion in defining intra-Arab politics, and therefore the original members of the Arab League (Egypt, Lebanon, Syrian, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen and Saudi Arabia) states and non-state actor the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are included (Barnett 1998). Given the limited and well-defined scope of this chapter, the six Arab Gulf countries are the main focal point in the analysis. Yet, in order to capture the motive and motivations to form GCC and the changing dynamics within this organization, this chapter also considers other nonArab actors (Turkey, Iran etc.) and non-state actors (Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic State etc.) in the discussions. The strategic and systemic approaches treat regionalism in general as the politics of alliance formation (Legrenzi 2002). Thus, the cornerstone of a realist argument is that states form alliances as a response to acquire balance of power (BoP) in the anarchical environment (Waltz 2010). Yet, Stephen Walt presents an important revision to the BoP approach in understanding alliances in his book Origins of Alliances. According to Walt, balance of threat (BoT), in which not only aggregate power but also other elements such as geographical proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions are matter, is much more important for states to form alliances (Walt 1990). Therefore, states form alliances to balance against the most threatening state, not necessarily against the most powerful one. Further, within the

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realist school, Steven David’s concept of Omni-balancing underlines the importance of the domestic factors, most notably the calculations on regime survival in explaining the alliance formation in the Third World (David 1991). David notes, “The most p ­ owerful determinant of Third World alignment behavior is the rational calculation of Third World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power” (ibid., p.235). Omni-­balancing approach, therefore, attempts to widen the applicability and explanatory power of realist arguments in the Third World countries as well through considering both international and domestic ‘anarchy’ that those states operate in. Another systemic approach, neo-liberalism, elaborates cooperation, as a result of challenges and the states’ inability to address main issues in an increasingly complex world and limitations that they have to deal with (Keohane and Nye 1977). Regionalism and sub-regional organizations, therefore, are a form of cooperation for the benefit of all parties and alleviate common threats that those states face (Legrenzi 2002). Thirdly, constructivists explain foreign policy behavior and by extension alliance formation and regionalism by ideational factors such as norms, identities and culture. Michael Barnett, for instance, argues, “State identity offers theoretical leverage over the issue of the construction of the threat and the choice of the alliance partner” (Barnett 1996, p.401). Barnett’s work is important as it introduces the concepts of representational politics, the implication of rise and fall of Pan-Arabism on intra-­Arab politics and normative fragmentation into the analysis of state behavior and alliance formation in the Middle East. Other explanations move beyond the traditional treatments of the international system and question the applicability of such general frameworks on the non-Western settings (Bilgin 2005). Bigin notes, “What was missing from Cold War thinking about regional security in the Middle East was an understanding of regional actors’ thinking; that is, what they perceived as threats and how they sought to achieve security in this part of the world” (ibid., p.12). Such a critical thinking widens the concept of security and attempts to analyze the state behavior beyond both realist and constructivist approaches.

Analytic Eclecticism and the GCC Case The structural and constructive theories on alliance building and cooperation do not fully capture the GCC case alone. The separate research disciplines establish their assumptions, conditions, results and predictions

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based on their core premises, and therefore, isolate other factors or treat them as inferiors. Yet, as the GCC case and post-Arab Spring environment have shown, many of the well-established bodies of research have been caught in surprise amid the unpredictability of Middle East case. While a deeper engagement with such theories for adjustments would contribute to the literature, more modest and pragmatic attempts to elaborate on the GCC case provide immense merits. Analytical Eclecticism, developed and argued by Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, attempts to fill the gap of separate research traditions and incorporates complex situations of real-world politics (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). The uniqueness of this approach comes from its attempt to “specify how elements of different casual stories might coexist as part of a more complex argument that bears on problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners” (ibid., p.414). In understanding the formation, construction and durability of GCC, an analytically eclectic theoretical model can and perhaps should be adopted. As argued in this chapter, any particular existing theory falls short of explaining the shifting dynamics in interregional politics and why high levels of cooperation and conflict coexist among the GCC member states. Further, analytical eclecticism enables searching different linkages or mechanisms, in defiance of possible theoretical incommensurability, such as security concerns, identity construction and durability of the GCC. The GCC as a sub-regional organization was established as a result of shared insecurities of all six Arab Gulf states amid a regional turbulence stemming from the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. However, those insecurities have both material and ideological dimensions; therefore a hybridity of theories matches best to explain motives and motivations in establishing GCC. Further, analytical eclecticism also enables a study of construction of a distinctive Gulf (Khaleeji) identity and its casual relation to the durability of the organization. To put it more clearly, an inclusive theoretical framework of realism and constructivism is evidently necessary to understand how material and ideational factors came together and shaped the intra-GCC politics after the Arab Spring. The following parts aim at explaining this phenomenon. Motives and Motivations of GCC Establishment The GCC or in full Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was established in May 1981 as a sub-regional organization; as an effort to achieve “coordination, cooperation and integration between them in all

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fields” (The Gulf Cooperation Council n.d.-a) among its member states. Yet, given the ambiguity of the words in the charter and the developments toward a union in retrospect demonstrate that GCC can be defined as an inter-governmental cooperation body than a supra-governmental one. Rather, the term ‘unity’ is used in an ideational sense to refer to Arab unity (Patrick 2011).The organizational structure consists of the Supreme Council, which is the highest authority and composed of the head of the states, the Ministerial Council, which meets every three months and the Secretariat General, which is responsible for the maintenance of the organization (The Gulf Cooperation Council n.d.-b). Although the GCC charter does not explicitly mention the cooperation on external security, the international and the regional context in which the GCC emerged, the security concerns of such states are highlighted by many scholars. The British withdrawal from the region in 1971 left the small Gulf States without protection and opened a debate on Gulf collective security (Ispahani 1984). The Iranian Revolution of 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 (along with the Soviet proxies in Yemen and Ethiopia) and the outbreak of Iran-Iraq War during the same year have further created an impetus for the formation of such an organization. Each of those factors can find a place in the theoretical assumption mentioned above. The advocates of BoP approach may refer to the power vacuum left by the British withdrawal or Soviet advancements in the region as the main motives for cooperation, while Waltz’s argument of BoT elaborates on the threat perception that Iran poses given its geographical proximity, offensive power capabilities and open hostile rhetoric of Iran toward the monarchies on the southern shores of the Gulf. Indeed, on the second approach, Stephanie Cronin and Nur Masalha note, “The GCC states viewed the Iranian revolution as a mortal threat. Khomeini openly called for the populations of the Arab Gulf states to overthrow their monarchies, and the latter responded in kind, establishing the GCC in 1981 as a direct riposte and coordinating Arab support for Iraq in its war with the Islamic republic” (Cronin and Masalha 2011). A more nuanced argument of BoT, however, would be that the establishment of the GCC was also a balancing against both Iran and Iraq given the ideological threat of Shia Islamic revolutionary Iran and the revived Arab Nationalist enthusiasm of Iraq to internal security of those Gulf States (Patrick 2011). Therefore, considering the timing, the motive (neutrality) and the motivation (balancing) for the establishment of the GCC, the outbreak of Iran-Iraq War provided both impetus (crystallizing the pre-war security concerns and organization structure) and excuse to draw

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the boundaries of the organization (excluding Iraq). This also shows how internal security concerns stemmed from ideological factors are linked to external actors and play a role in determining the alliance choices and cooperation. Alternatively, constructivist approaches have found fertile grounds to explain the timing, the motives and motivations for the establishment of the GCC. Their emphasis, on the contrary, focuses on the ideational factors of ideology, sub-regional identity and monarchical solidarity. The main determinant of the cooperation in the Middle East, according to the constructivist approach, is the norms of Arab politics and state identities because “power is associated less with accumulating military force than with accumulating the symbols of Arabism” (Barnett 1998, p.43). From this point view, the establishment of the GCC as a sub-regional organization is a result of the fragmentation in Arab politics in the 1980s and a change in state identity toward statist localism. To put it more clearly, certain shared characteristics (oil, geography, culture and political system) have facilitated the construction a regional identity called ‘Khaleeji’ (meaning the people of Arabian peninsula) and this construction laid the basis of GCC’s boundaries, the threat definition and with whom to ally (Barnett 1996). Further, Matteo Legrenzi claims that the ideational factors can offer an explanatory power on the timing of establishment and sustainability of the GCC: Here we have a case in which ideational and normative concerns prevent the formation of a sub regional organization before a certain point in time. Such concerns also helped shape the boundaries of the association and determined who qualified as a suitable alliance partner after the organization was established. Matters of identity are also crucial in understanding the resilience of this particular sub-regional organization. (Legrenzi 2002, p.24)

The ideational factors also provide a significant explanatory dimension into the analysis of the alliances in the Middle East. Even from a security perspective based on realist accounts, the role of ideology and state identity are indispensible parts of the external threat perception and therefore should be included in any assessment on alliance formation, balancing and cooperation in the Middle East. For instance, Walt acknowledges that ideology is a source of external threat and “when states lack legitimacy, the ability to manipulate a popular ideology can provide opponents with a potent offensive capability” (Walt 1990, p.215). Therefore, while power

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politics prevails in determining balancing behavior, the domestic factors and trans-state ideologies are certainly parts of this politics. If the GCC is portrayed as a security alliance, then certainly it was not in terms of balancing Iran or Iraq militarily, rather it was the ideological construction of the GCC rulers to provide an alternative and meaningful loyalty to both pan-­ Arabism and revolutionary Islamism (Barnett and Gause 1998). The Scope and the Depth of GCC Cooperation Article 4 of the GCC charter defines the scope of the cooperation in the areas of economic and financial affairs, commerce, customs and communications, and education and culture.1 Therefore, the founding language of the GCC emphasizes the prevailing linkages between the people and the states in the region and does not mention explicit security threats surrounding them. Yet, although it was not initially intended, to some degree, albeit limited, cooperation between the member states took place following the establishment of the GCC. The Peninsula Shield was launched in 1985 and consisted of units from all six member states. Yet as noted by many commentators on Gulf affairs, this force was largely symbolic and in military terms, it functions as a ‘zero factor behavior’ (Reder 2017). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 only exacerbated this fact. Although the GCC took a unitary stand against the invasion, one of the very results of war was returning to state-centric sovereignty and bilateralism with the US on security matters and arms purchases. On economic matters, on the other hand, the GCC has set much more ambitious goals toward integration from the beginning. The Unified Economic Agreement of 1981 aimed at establishing an integrated economic bloc through harmonizing trade regulations and negotiations, coordinating intra-regional industrial and infrastructure projects, and ultimately achieving a common currency among its member states. It was not until the 2000s, however, that some tangible steps were taken toward economic integration: in 2003 a Customs Union Agreement was signed with a common 5 percent tariff on external trade; declared common market status in 2008 toward setting the stage for “citizens of member countries enjoy equal rights and privileges, including the rights to move, settle, work, receive social protection, retirement, health, education and social services,  For the full article see http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.aspx

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and engage in various economic activities and services” (World Bank 2010). Yet, the path toward the union is far from a smooth and steady progress. A 2009 goal of monetary union has failed as two member states, Oman and the UAE, opted out and ended up with the establishment of a GCC Monetary Council. The GCC states have proved to be more willing to cooperate on economic matters than the external security ones; however as highlighted by the World Bank report, high dependence on hydrocarbons fosters national strategies rather than regional ones and the issue of sovereignty carries high importance hindering movement toward supra-nationalism (ibid.) Most importantly, however, the state-led initiatives have created some level of supra-governmental interactions especially among the business elite. The Gulf Chambers of Commerce and Industry held regular meetings outside the inter-governmental schemes and pushed for reaching agreements on the GCC level and with the external states (Patrick 2011). The conscious attempts of state-level economic integration have created economic, professional and civic regionalization where business groups, NGOs and economic officials organized on regional (Gulf) basis (Legrenzi 2008). Further, this identity-based construction in the economic realm has started to operate below and beyond the state level as a societal identity, which, as argued in this chapter, might create an impetus for the durability of the organization. Barnett and Gause also capture this spillover effect as they note “as economic interests began to be affected, however marginally, by decisions taken at the regional level, business elites began to think, at least somewhat, in regional terms. If identity is shaped, at least in part, by economic interests, then these trends in the 1980s supported the development at the societal level of a stronger “Gulf” identity” (Barnett and Gause 1998, p.178). Especially after the Gulf War, while the member states opted for pursuing more statist policies with a strong emphasis on sovereignty and exclusivity over resources, especially in terms of external defense, the Gulf people have more interaction with each other. Yet, the crucial question still remains as to what extent the increased interaction among Gulf citizens whether through regular meetings among business elites/NGOs or via visits/holidays provides necessary impetus for states to advance toward further institutionalization of the GCC in the light of massive structural changes and ideological threats in the twenty-­ first century.

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Arab Spring and the GCC: Resilience or Demise of Khaleeji Identity? The Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria have caught the neighboring states in surprise and forced them to adopt or re-orient their positions in a very short time in this changing external (regional) environment. For academics as well, the uprisings have brought some serious re-­ assessments on the Middle Eastern politics, especially for the advocates of the Middle Eastern exceptionalism. The new and emerging dynamics in the region require adjustments in analysis, from both structural and constructivist perspectives alike. It is valid for alliances and regionalism in the Gulf region. Structurally, the Arab Spring has furthered the change in balance of power in the region following the US invasion of Iraq as other core Arab states, notably Egypt and Syria, have lost their prominence in projecting power in the region. Alongside, Iran has increased its visibility across the Middle East. Ideologically, Islamism, in the forms of statist and non-statist Jihadists (Volpi and Stein 2015), has started to compete with other identity formations, attracted significant audiences in the region and alleviated the construction of the threat perception by some pro-status quo regimes. Perhaps, most importantly the uprisings “shifted attention away from external domain and to the realm of domestic politics revealing how in understanding the region and its alignment the domestic domain deserve our close attention” (Fawcett 2016, pp.212–3). From the GCC states’ perspective; the uprisings in the neighborhood, first and foremost, have created a significant threat to their internal security as they resulted in unwanted changes, which were inspired by ideologies such as political Islamic thoughts, liberal political ideas and sectarianism that “poses the threat of destabilizing the conservative socio-political structure underpinning the Gulf region since the pre- state era” (Binhuwaidin 2015, p.13). On the global level, the US retreat from regional affairs, particularly Obama administration’s accommodative stance toward Iran and quietness for the fall of Egypt’s decades-long president and one of the closest ally of the US, Hosni Mubarak, changed the dynamics in the eyes of the Gulf countries (Ulrichsen 2017a). Regionally, the process started with the disintegration of Iraq since 2003 has accelerated after the Arab uprisings and alleviated Iran’s role in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. This real or perceived change in balance of power in favor of Iran has created both concerns and opportunities for the GCC states.

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From regionalism and alliance formation perspective, the post-Arab spring structural and ideological changes in the region seemed quite conducive for closer cooperation for the GCC states. For realist accounts, the balancing against Iran in the wake of the US reluctance and attempts to re-shape the gravity of power in the Middle East can be highlighted as the main motivations for closer GCC cooperation. From a degree of constructivist perspective, the further ideological fragmentation in the region and the rise of sectarian and Islamist discourses are expected to bring the GCC state to construct a tight-knit Gulf identity under the institutional umbrella to confront other competing and threatening identities and ideologies to their conservative monarchies. Indeed, some scholars have described the initial phases of the Arab Spring as paving the way for the regionalization in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf, given the latter’s increasing relevance and assertiveness in the region. The GCC response to the uprisings demonstrated a clear break from earlier cautious on sovereignty and non-interference policies. The GCC collaborated with NATO in Libya and two member countries, the UAE and Qatar, militarily participated in the air operations (Ghezali 2012). Further, a Saudi-led initiative under the banner of Peninsula Shield entered Bahrain to suppress popular uprisings and restored the monarchy in 2011. The GCC continued its assertiveness, militarily, politically and economically in other Arab Spring countries of Syria, Yemen and Egypt, aiming to balance the domestic and external threats. Referring to the emergence of a hegemon for regionalism, Martin Beck argues that the regional environment in 2010–2011 facilitated a “vitalization of regional organizations” referring explicitly to the Arab League and the GCC with a Saudi hegemony (Beck 2015). Beck notes “in this process, the emergence of a regional power and the strengthening of regional institutions could be the two sides of the same coin: growing regionalism” (ibid., p.202). Apart from the regional power reconfiguration, the domestic stability perspective also highlights the catalysis of the inter-­monarchical alliance, “driven by kings’ common interest in mutually preserving and boosting their popular legitimacy” (Calculli and Legrenzi 2016, p.225) as in the case of the common GCC stance in Bahrain. In essence, there was a cautious optimism of regional re-alignment of the GCC states given their activism in the regional affairs that prevails in post-Arab spring era (Fawcett 2016, pp.214–5). One of the first reactions was that the GCC ruling elites have capitalized on a state identity based on monarchical survival and stability.

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This  solidarity did not only manifest itself in the GCC’s unified stance toward Bahrain, but also extended to Morocco and Jordan in the shape of financial and political support. Further, the GCC considered expanding the club and invited Jordan and Morocco to join, in 2011 and 2014 (Ryan 2014). Although such an expansion has not been materialized for at the time of writing, the geopolitical circumstances and, the further fragmentation and the unreliability in Arab politics after the uprisings have enabled the GCC states to construct an identity union again that is not necessarily based on geographical proximity or distinct regional characteristics. According to Mehran Kamrava, the proposal “appears designed to transform the GCC into a more cohesive, politically dependable alternative to the Arab League” (Kamrava 2012, p.100). This state identity based on political affinity is also clearly demonstrated in the GCC stance toward neighboring Yemen during the same period. Since the beginning the GCC states managed to create an identity to exclude not only Iran and Iraqi but also republican Yemen. On the issue Silvia Colombo notes: By comparing the GCC’s different treatment of Jordan and Morocco, on the one hand, and Yemen, on the other, –without forgetting that Yemen has been seeking membership of the GCC for years with no success –the monarchies vs. republics dichotomy stands out as a relevant explanatory factor underpinning the GCC’s response to the “Arab Spring”. All in all, the GCC countries have attempted to demonstrate that the “Arab Spring” is a malaise of the Arab republics rather than the monarchies. (Colombo 2012, p.10)

This boundary drawing by defining a GCC-level state identity cannot be elaborated without a societal identity shared by the native citizens of all six Gulf States. Tribalism as a part of common culture, shared religious elements/laws based on the conservative brand of Sunni Islam, monarchism, as an accepted regional political culture and rentier lifestyle of the citizens are the main demarcations of the Gulfie (or Khaleeji) identity as one of the most homogenous regional societal identity (Bellamy 2014). Yet, the establishment of the GCC and the construction of Khaleeji identity have started to operate from outside the realm of state identity. Especially, on the basis of civil society organizations, the emphasis on “Khaleejiness” and Gulf-wide thinking has gained ground.2 These groups 2  Nadwat al-Tanmiya li Duwal al-Jazira al-Arabiyya al-Muntija li al-Naft (Development Panel for the Oil Producing States of the Arab Peninsula) and al- Multaqa al-watani al-khaliji (Gulf National Forum) are the most important of those GCC-wide NGOs.

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20000000 19000000 18000000 17000000 16000000 15000000 14000000 13000000 12000000 11000000 10000000

2005

2006

2007

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Fig. 2.1  Arrivals of non-resident visitors among GCC states at national borders (Intra GCC). (Source: Author’s own calculation based on World Tourism Organization (WTO))

were important to provide a collective regional thinking on common problems and aid in keeping the cooperation alive as in the 1990s when the integration was in decline (ibid., p.141). Over time, not only those NGOs continued to exist, the sustained group interactions among the Gulf citizens through travels, investments and social media have been achieved thanks to the GCC citizens ID cards, and advancements in transports and telecommunications even after the Arab Spring (see Fig. 2.1). A Kuwaiti Minister has recently reiterated the fact that “bolstering cultural ties would solidify the camaraderie between GCC countries” (Kuwait Times 2016). Yet, the very same dynamics of the post-Arab Spring politics have shown how cooperation and competition existed among the Gulf States simultaneously and even competition outpaced unprecedentedly. Especially, it can be argued that the change in the balance of power enhanced Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar’s power projection capacities in the Middle East. This change in the state power capacity in the regional system also showed the different threat perception, and distinct national interest priorities among the GCC members, which “brought to the surface deep differences in approach to regional affairs, and, particularly, over the role of Islamist groups in the political process” (Ulrichsen 2017a). The domestic level of analysis and sub-state variables of demographics and population combination along ethnic and/or sectarian lines, the state capacity to deliver services, and state-society relations also intervene in external threat construction and foreign policy orientations of various GCC states. Therefore, when compared to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,

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Qatar, which has more demographic coherence and societal support for the ruling elite and, less sectarian divisions and grievances, has been able to develop less securitized discourses and more engaged policies toward external state and non-state actors (Iran, Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood) than the former two members. These intra-GCC divergences between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE) have reached their peak in 2014 and recently in 2017; and displayed the fragility and the disunity of the GCC, which can be considered one of the most durable, albeit tentative, collective regional actor in the Middle East. It would be fallacious, however, to treat post-Arab Spring crisis as the first in GCC history. Qatar and Bahrain conflict over the Hawar Islands until 1997, border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 1992 and counter-coup attempts of Saudi Arabia for a ruler change in Qatar are some among many (Ulrichsen 2017b). Rather it is a renewed intra-GCC competition and conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in post-1995 leadership in Doha. In a sense, it is an undeniable fact that smaller Gulf States detect some degree of threat from Saudi Arabia as a hegemon in the GCC (Roberts 2012), and therefore they try to balance against and compete with the regional giant when possible. This also explains why the Saudi proposal toward a political union in 2012 and 2013 was rejected by other smaller GCC states. The rapid and massive structural changes in the regional balance of power after the Arab uprisings have exposed the intra-GCC hostilities more than ever since the establishment of the organization. This rivalry became mostly visible as being proponent or opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliates across the region. Qatar has been the only country within the GCC to welcome uprisings and developed a pro-Ikhwan strategy through economic, political, logistical and media supports. To balance this threat, the Saudi-led group has channeled massive financial aid and political support to anti-Brotherhood groups in Egypt and Libya. This brought Qatar and Saudi Arabia (along with the UAE and Bahrain) at odds as the latter group withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar claiming that Doha failed to “implement a November 2013 agreement not to back anyone threatening the security and stability of the GCC whether as groups or individuals—via direct security work or through political influence, and not to support hostile media” (Milton-Edwards 2017). Although the intra-GCC rift over the Brotherhood appeared as an ideological dispute, it is more convenient to claim that realist assumptions of changing balance of power and influence maximization prevailed and it was

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­interest-­ “ oriented alignments, power competition, and material power resources” (Calculli and Legrenzi 2016, p.233). The intra-GCC dispute has shown the fragility of cohesion among the council’s members and has also brought the identity aspect into the limelight. The blockade and the social media war that surrounded GCC rift, first and foremost, had revealed the coexistence of increasing individual Gulf nationalisms and loyalty to the regional collective identity (Ulrichsen 2017c). The latest crisis within the GCC has created undeniable divisions and wounds that are hard to repair. According to Khalil al-Anani from Doha institute Khaleejiness as the collective Gulf identity has lost its strength and significance, rather the current dispute has created the formation of a new nationally based sense of identity where each member state constructs its own individual identity aka Qataris, Saudis, Emiratis and so on. Al-Anani notes: This was clear after since the Gulf crisis and became dominant in the discourse of Gulf citizens on social media. Despite of the strong tribal and social connections that bind gulf people together, the political conflicts have immensely impacted these connections and affected its ability to operate as it used to do over the past decades. (Al-Anani, personal interview, 2018)

Similarly, Mahjoob Zweiri from Qatar University corroborates Al-Anani’s statement: The Khaleeji identity has been tested in the Gulf crisis. I think the development have shown that this identity is weak and facing serious challenges to survive. The state identity has become stronger at least in the case of Qatar. This is likely to continue even if the crisis is solved. (Zweiri, personal interview, 2018)

The frustration and despair among Qataris support the idea of the end of the GCC as a regional collective body. Even the imagination of Khaleejiness has changed its meaning for some. A Qatari woman (28) working for Qatar Petroleum said, “The khaleji identity characteristics are all about traditions, values and Islamism. Under the current gulf crisis, we see the all the three characteristics have been used against the union of Khaleji identity by blockade countries” (Qatari Citizen, personal interview, 2018) adding that now there are two Khaleeji identities (of Qatar, Kuwait and Oman versus of Saudi and Emirates).

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Yet, this study argues that the resilience of societal Gulf identity may act like social glue and might keep the door open for the durability (Abdulla 2016) of the GCC amid its gravest crisis since the establishment. One common theme of the interviews is that participants from blockading countries expressed their disapproval of government policies against Qatar. A Saudi female who spoke on the condition of anonymity said “this is not our decision and we do not want this situation” (Saudi Citizen, personal interview, 2018). An online Twitter survey conducted by Emirati Professor Abdulkaleq Abdulla reiterated the disapproval of participant Gulf citizens as 64 percent of voters were against the diplomatic rift (Al Jazeera, 19 June 2017a). Some of the interviewees, moreover, mentioned the strength of Khaleejiness even though the diplomatic crisis continues. A Qatari researcher, Musab A. (28), stated that the Khaleeji identity proves to be strong on the face of the crisis as there had been many breaks in the past. He quoted: The people of the Gulf still sharing the common identity and surprisingly still proud of it including Qatar. From Qatari perspective almost nothing changed. They just blame the leaders of the blockade countries for the crisis, not their people. Therefore, if the crisis over we will still holding the same feelings for them as we belong to one identity which is the ‘Khaliji. (Qatari citizen, e-mail interview, 2018)

Abdullah Baabood, an Omani Professor, also states “The Khaleeji identity is much more entrenched than many people expect and it goes beyond regimes disputes. One has to remember that families and tribes and blood and cultural affinity existed before the formation of the GCC as a regional organization. Khaleeji identity has been able to withstand previous inter-­ state conflicts” (Baabood, e-mail interview, 2018). Yet, he shares the aura of skepticism on the future and the durability of the GCC. Baabood mentions: The people are much more supportive of further cooperation and integration of the GCC than their own governments. The current crisis has made a big dent in their confidence about the future of the organisation especially that it went against the letter and the spirit of the declared GCC objectives and especially against the Common Market agreement that called for free flow of people, capital and goods and the decision of the blockade was taken outside the established GCC mechanisms (e.g. GCC Supreme Council). (ibid.)

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Conclusions and Future Prospects The GCC as a regional organization has been passing through crisis as the three members (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE) have turned against Qatar, trying to isolate the tiny Gulf country within the GCC and the region. The latest summit in Kuwait on December 2017 lasted shorter than planned with low-level participation from the Saudi-led group. It is hard to conclude whether the GCC crisis will be solved soon as uncertainties define the regional atmosphere following the Arab Uprisings. As this chapter argues, the GCC case demonstrates that the post-Arab Spring environment has impeded the cohesion of the regional organization although the theoretical frameworks would foresee the opposite. Paul Aarts noted decades ago “The GCC’s efficacy depends on the fear of (internal and external) threats. In times of tranquility, tensions among the member states grow; in times of turmoil, these disappear. All in all, persistent rivalries and suspicions among these Gulf states have made economic (and strategic) collaboration tenuous and fragile” (Aarts 1999, p.913). Yet, the GCC case proved that even in the times of turmoil, it exposes its fragility given the change in the regional balance of power and differentiation of threats among and power capabilities of the member states in the post-Arab Spring. Re-building trust among the members and being a relevant actor will certainly be the main issues to be addressed in the future. The regional identity that is both shaping and being shaped by the decades-long cooperation under the banner of a Khaleejiness may prove to be more resilient. This chapter also argues that any assessment on the formation and durability of the GCC is inevitable and includes ideational factors of ideology and identity. Analytical and theoretical hybridity is a necessity born out of the post-Arab Spring conjecture to understand the regionalism and particularly the GCC’s new direction in world politics. There is a strong emphasis on the strong social, tribal and family-based ties across the region, and “the only aspect that may lead to reconciliation is the social aspect, as families and tribes from the Gulf countries are complexly intertwined with one another” (Al Jazeera, 2 December 2017b, c). The sustained and even increased interaction between people on the elite and grass root level would act as a factor to hold the GCC together at a meaningful level amid the regional turbulence.

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References Aarts, P. (1999). The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism? Third World Quarterly, 20(5), 911–925. https://doi. org/10.1080/01436599913406. Abdulla, G. (2016, Autumn). Khaleeji Identity in Contemporary Gulf Politics. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from https://www.oxgaps.org/files/analysis_ abdulla.pdf Al Jazeera. (2017a, June 19). This Is How the Gulf Crisis Played Out Online. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/gulf-crisis-played-online-170618133957272.html Al Jazeera. (2017b, December 2). Qatar-GCC Crisis: ‘Loyalties Can Shift Overnight’. Retrieved June 18, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/ qatar-gcc-crisis-loyalties-shift-overnight-171119112005567.html?xif= Al Jazeera. (2017c, December 2). Qatar-GCC Crisis: ‘Loyalties Can Shift Overnight’. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/ qatar-gcc-crisis-loyalties-shift-overnight-171119112005567.html Al-Anani, K. (2018, May). [E-mail Interview]. Baabood, A. (2018, May). [E-mail Interview]. Barnett, M. N. (1996). Identity and Alliances in the Middle East. In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Barnett, M. N. (1998). Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order. New York: Columbia University Press. Barnett, M., & Gause, G. (1998). Caravans in Opposite Directions. In Security Communities (pp. 161–197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beck, M. (2015). The End of Regional Middle Eastern Exceptionalism? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council After the Arab Uprisings. Democracy and Security, 11(2), 190–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2 015.1037390. Bellamy, A. (2014). Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bilgin, P. (2005). Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective. Milton Park: Routledge. Binhuwaidin, M.  M. (2015). Essential Threats to the Security of the GCC Countries in the Post Arab Spring Era. Digest of Middle East Studies, 24(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12058. Calculli, M., & Legrenzi, M. (2016). Middle East Security: Conflict and Securitization of Identities. In International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Colombo, S. (2012). The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring. Between Outreach, Patronage and Repression. Retrieved from http://www.iai.it/sites/default/ files/iaiwp1209.pdf

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Cronin, S., & Masalha, N. (2011). The Islamic Republic of Iran and the GCC: Revolution to Reelpolitic? Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, 17th ser. David, S.  R. (1991). Explaining Third World Alignment. World Politics, 43(2), 233–256. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010472. Fawcett, L.  L. (2016). Alliances and Regionalism in the Middle East. In International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gause, F.  G. (1999). Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations. International Studies Review, 1(1), 11–31. https://doi. org/10.1111/1521-9488.00139. Ghezali, R.(2012, June 30). The Arab Spring’s Implications for NATO. Retrieved June 18, 2019, from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-arabsprings-implicat_b_1462866 Halliday, F. (2005). The Middle East in International Relations Power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge. Hinnebusch, R.  A. (2010). The International Politics of the Middle East. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ispahani, M.  Z. (1984). Alone Together: Regional Security Arrangements in Southern Africa and the Arabian Gulf. International Security, 8(4), 152. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538567. Kamrava, M. (2012). The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution. Orbis, 56(1), 96–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2011.10.011. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Kuwait Times. (2016, September 19). National Gulf Identity a Necessity: Info Minister. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/national-gulf-identity-necessity-info-minister/ Legrenzi, M. (2002). The Gulf Cooperation Council in Light of International Relations Theory. International Area Review, 5(2), 21–37. https://doi. org/10.1177/223386590200500202. Legrenzi, M. (2008). Did the GCC Make a Difference? Institutional Realities and (Un)intended Consequences. In Beyond Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East (pp. 107–124). Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Milton-Edwards, B. (2017, June 15). GCC Crisis: How to Resolve the Diplomatic Rift. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ markaz/2017/06/15/gcc-crisis-how-to-resolve-the-diplomatic-rift/ Patrick, N. (2011). The GCC: Gulf State Integration or Leadership Cooperation? Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States Research Papers, 19th ser. Qatari Citizen. (2018, May). [E-mail Interview]. Qatari Female. (2018, May). [E-mail Interview].

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Reder, J. (2017, November 21). The Peninsula Shield Force: The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Vestigial Organ. Retrieved June 18, 2019, from https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/05/08/peninsula-shield-force-gulf-cooperation-councils-vestigial-organ/ Roberts, D. B. (2012, July 10). Of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Union. Retrieved June 20, 2019, from https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/10/of-saudi-arabia-andthe-gulf-union/ Ryan, C. (2014, April 15). Jordan, Morocco and an Expanded GCC. Retrieved June 18, 2019, from https://merip.org/2014/04/jordan-morocco-and-anexpanded-gcc/ Saudi Citizen. (2018, May). [Personal Interview]. Sil, R., & Katzenstein, P.  J. (2010). Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms Across Research Traditions. Perspectives on Politics, 8(2), 411–431. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s1537592710001179. The Gulf Cooperation Council. (n.d.-a). The Charter. Retrieved December 15, 2017, from http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.aspx The Gulf Cooperation Council. (n.d.-b). The Organizational Structure. Retrieved December 16, 2017, from http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/ Pages/OrganizationalStructure.aspx Ulrichsen, K.  C. (2017a, Autumn). Foreword. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from https://www.oxgaps.org/files/gulf_affairs_autumn_2017_full_issue.pdf Ulrichsen, K. C. (2017b). The GGC Crisis: Regional Realignment or Paralysis? Retrieved June 21, 2019, from http://turkishpolicy.com/article/881/ the-ggc-crisis-regional-realignment-or-paralysis Ulrichsen, K. C. (2017c). Can the Gulf Cooperation Council Survive the Current Crisis? Retrieved June 21, 2019, from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/can-the-gulf-cooperation-council-survive-the-current-crisis/ Volpi, F., & Stein, E. (2015). Islamism and the State After the Arab Uprisings: Between People Power and State Power. Democratization, 22(2), 276–293. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010811. Walt, S. M. (1990). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of International Politics. Long Grove: Waveland Press. World Bank. (2010, October 6). Economic Integration in the GCC.  Retrieved June 18, 2019, from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/621311468276383272/pdf/575170WP0Box353768B01PUBLIC10GC CStudyweb.pdf Zweiri, M. (2018, May). [E-mail Interview].

CHAPTER 3

Sectarian Transnational Identities Online: Bahrain and Saudi Arabia Hala Guta

The Middle East has witnessed an increase in sectarian conflicts in recent years. The divide between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims is not recent and can be traced to the death of the Prophet Muhammad, but the conflicting regional aspirations of Saudi Arabia and Iran, and their allies, have led to an unprecedented exacerbation of this sectarian divide. Several geopolitical shifts in the region have created a favorable climate for the growth of Iranian political ambitions. The deposition of Saddam Hussein led to the emergence of the first Shi’a-dominated Arab state (Nasr 2006, p. 185). Furthermore, Iran backed Hezbollah and Hamas in their fight against Israel in Lebanon, winning over Middle Eastern public opinion (Rabi 2008, p. 14).1 Iran’s ambitions are seen as a threat to the Arabian Gulf countries that have substantial Shi’a populations and especially to Saudi Arabia, which claims religious and political leadership in the region. The areas populated by Shi’as in the Middle East form a crescent shape. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the 1  The tides of “Arab street” support have recently changed, given the Iranian backing of Bashar al Assad in Syria.

H. Guta (*) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_3

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idea of a “Shi’a crescent,” an area ­supposedly influenced by Iran, emerged. All these factors, combined with the continuing development of the Iranian nuclear program, caused a growing uneasiness among Iran’s Arab neighbors. As a result, Arab leaders publicly decried the “Iranian threat” (Walker 2006). The Arab uprisings that destabilized the region saw a further increase in Iranian regional involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, adding fuel to the “Shi’a crescent” argument. At the same time, Gulf countries launched direct military interventions in the Middle East, in part to counter Iranian interests. The emergence of the extremist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which occupied large territories in Syria and Iraq and aims at infiltrating other countries, created further rifts. Its ideology declared Shi’as non-­Muslims on occupied lands and forced conversion to Sunni Islam (or death). These events strengthened alliances based on sectarian denominations, visible in the breakup of the Hamas-Iran alliance and Iran’s support of Bashar al Assad and the Houthis. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate how this new environment has shaped Shi’a communities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The chapter will look into how sectarian politics in Saudi and Bahrain aided these communities in forging a common transnational identity. The analysis is based on the expression of this collective Shi’a identity on social media. The research fills a gap in the literature on Shi’a politics. A number of authors have suggested that Shi’a Islam should be analyzed “outside the box of a national framework, at its [Shi’a Islam] international networks and the profound interactions they entail” (Cole 2002, p. 1). Louër (2008) assessed the importance of direct face-to-face ties in the Shi’a transnational community, which “remain the most effective way to spread ideas and movements” (p. 3). Our study does not contest these findings, yet the proliferation of Shi’a transnational media (viz. TV channels, Shi’a social media, and even a Shi’a Wikipedia portal, Shiapedia) shows an increasing need in this community to cement their links and mark their presence using Information and Communication Technology (ICT). This chapter assesses how these developments, especially Shi’a social media, strengthen Shi’a transnational identity in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the context of the community feeling “under attack.”

Collective Identity and Social Movements Identity is a basic concept for analysis in social sciences. Yet defining identity poses a major challenge, as different approaches lead to multiplication of its meanings (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 8). Researchers differenti-

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ate between personal, social, and collective identity (Fearon 1999; Klandermans 2014; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Personal identity refers to “the roles and positions a person occupies,” such as student, Saudi, or mother. Social identity can be defined as “socially constructed cognitions of an individual about his membership in one or more groups,” while collective identity is “cognition shared by members of a single group about the group” (Klandermans 2014, p.  3). Generally, collective identity is attributed to “a shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences … in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’” (Snow and Corrigall-­ Brown 2015, p.  175). The individual’s identification can be considered the intersection between personal and social identity, while the group’s identification lies at the intersection of social and collective identity (Klandermans 2014). It is important to note that while “collective identities are in constant interplay with personal identities … they are never simply the aggregate of individual’s identities” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, p. 298). The concept of collective identity is of interest to our research. Castells (2004, p. 7) highlighted the fact that identity is a social construct. The building material of identity is drawn from history, geography, biology, collective memory, personal fantasies, power apparatuses, and religious revelations. However, as an identity is constructed, this material is processed, and its meaning is rearranged based on who is constructing the identity and for what purpose. Therefore, collective identity is more fluid and dynamic than social identity and personal identity. Collective identity dynamism is often associated with changes and challenges, whether these changes are abrupt, such as protests and movements, or take place over long periods, such as historical changes. As such, Shi’a collective identity can be rooted in the historical suffering of Imam Hussein and be solidified and strengthened by protesting and resisting more recent authorities’ oppressive practices.

Mass Media and Collective Identity The role of the media in identity formation has been well documented. Anderson (1991), and later his followers, suggested a link between print-­ capitalism (mass media participation in the market) and the emergence of national identity in what Anderson calls an “imagined community.” Although the mass media have been primarily linked to strengthening the idea of a nation-state, in recent years, the spread of ICT has prompted

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researchers to assess media influence on maintaining and strengthening transnational identities as well. Indeed, as effectively as they promote a national identity, media could promote the formation of a transnational “imagined community,” in which members do not meet face to face but sustain their kinship as a mental image. Researchers have documented the role of television in transnational identity formation. Indeed, television can transcend the borders of countries, thus removing the barriers of physical location and access, promoting a sense of closeness beyond borders (Meyrowitz 1985). Various researchers (Nisbet and Myres 2010; Lynch 2006; Cherribi 2006) argue that transnational Arab television fosters transnational Arab and Muslim identification. Given the fact that in recent years Shi’a television channels have proliferated, their role in the creation of a transnational Shi’a identity is worth exploring. The launch of Lebanese station Al Manar in 1991 strengthened not only Shi’a Lebanese identity (Matar and Dakhlallah 2006) but was able to reach the entire world satellites, fostering transnational Shi’a identity. Other transnational Shi’a channels, such as PressTV (UK), Ahlulbeit (UK), Ahl-e-Bait (Iran), AlAlam (Iran), and Bahraini opposition TV channel Lualua TV (UK), followed. It is important to highlight that mass media present the audience with predetermined content that is mediated by the audience. That means that the audience may choose whether or not to adopt and internalize the interpretation offered to them (Silverstone 2002). However, regardless of the negotiations taking place at the audience level, the audience are participating in a way just by consuming traditional mass media. Therefore, the power relation is paramount and the mass media have a “practical monopoly” on these “mediated representations” (Friedman 2002, p. 25). The emergence of the Internet changed this picture. The Internet breaks the monopoly of communication that was previously held by traditional elites, such as the government, or political parties. It empowers individuals to become political broadcasters and voice their opinions on an equal footing with any other user. It fosters pluralism, because in ­cyberspace there are no set answers in the form of dominant ideologies. Communication is characterized by informality, which may in turn encourage further freedom of expression. Moreover, the Internet creates an arena that is difficult for the government or other entities to control. The strength of the Internet lies also in its accessibility. Users can access the network in their own time and be in instant contact with whoever is also connected. The Internet can potentially connect the sender to an unlimited number of users. It helps not only challenge official ideologies but furthers dialogue

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and shapes opinions. The Internet, unlike traditional mass media, opened doors for individual creativity and a free flow of ideas from many to many. When it comes to collective identity, the Internet has enabled creation of “imagined communities” with more ease than traditional mass media. Without gatekeepers, and with the ability to bypass traditional centers of social control, the Internet became a safe haven for social movements. Treré (2015) found that social media acted as “digital comfort zones” in which activists reinforced their collective identity, expressed internal solidarity, and created an internal language, or what Treré refers to as a “communicative resistance grammar.” Moreover, the Internet creates a transnational public sphere that transcends geographical borders. The importance of the transnational public sphere created by the Internet from the point of view of transnational identities has been highlighted in scholarly research. Tubella (2005, p. 257) writes, “new forms of social interaction allowed by Internet oblige us to reconsider the meaning of concepts as community or identity.” The Internet not only allows transnational identities to be manifested and maintained online, it also fosters activism in groups usually excluded from participation. In the case of the Occupy Movement, for instance, Kavada (2015) concluded that social media groups “operate[ed] as ‘organizing agents’ in the place of formal organizations, allowing quick coordination among diverse individuals” (p. 883).

Shi’a Politics in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Shi’as as a religious community possess transnational ties that transcend the borders of modern states. The existence of the Shi’a religious identity predates the process of modern state formation in the Middle East. Brubaker’s concept of “borders crossing people” is applicable in this case. The SunnisShi’as split started with the conflict over the rightful leadership of the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death. Since the split in the seventh century, Shi’as have sought to recover the leadership that in their view should have passed through the descendants of Ali, the Prophet’s son in law, and the Prophet’s daughter Fatima. The martyrdom of Ali’s son Hussein and his followers in the battle of Karbala is the central event in Shi’a history. The Sunni caliph Yazid killed Hussein and, since that time, Shi’as have kept alive this memory of injustice and suffering at the hands of Sunni rulers. In this context, Shi’as refer to themselves as ahul al beit, people of the Prophet’s house, which strengthens the dichotomy between the

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“righteous” and the “wicked” (Brumberg 1997, p. 21). Nonetheless, their Sunni co-religionists often consider Shi’as to be a splinter group, and in the most radical cases do not acknowledge Shi’as as Muslims at all but declare them polytheists. Due to recent developments in the region, the sectarian division of the Middle East has become more salient and Shi’a feelings of martyrdom and oppression have acquired a new dimension. The Shi’a originally occupied the coastal areas around the Gulf in a stretch from Basra, Iraq, to present-day Qatar. Before formal statehood, “the lands of Bahrain” included modern-day Bahrain as well as Qatif and al-Hasa on the Eastern coast of present-day Saudi Arabia (Matthiesen 2013). This has contributed to a sense of a collective identity between the Shi’a of Bahrain and the Eastern Province, based on “Bahraini nativism” (p.  29). Both communities consider themselves the indigenous inhabitants of the lands of Bahrain. The Shi’a community of Saudi Arabia is concentrated mainly in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom; they make up 10–15% of the Kingdom’s population (Nasr 2006). The Al-Saud royal family conquered the region from the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century. The new conquerors made deals with the Shi’a leaders, granting them religious freedom in exchange for passivity and non-resistance (Matthiesen 2013). Two major developments in the region have led to radical changes. These are the emergence of a conservative, fundamentalist version of Islam known as “Wahhabi teaching” in Saudi Arabia, and the discovery of oil in the Eastern Province. After the Wahhabi’s conquest of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1924/25, the emerging Saudi state granted more powers to the religious clergies who took it upon themselves to “purify” the nation from “false teachings” and promote their version of Islam as the “true” Islam. Consequently, “Saudi leaders consistently condoned anti-Shi’a enmity expressed by religious scholars and permitted anti-Shi’a teaching in Saudi schools” (Jones 2010, p. 181). These developments were coupled with the discovery of oil in 1930 and the emergence of new urban centers built around oil facilities, such as Dammam and Dhahran. These new cities enjoyed most of the benefits of the Kingdom’s socioeconomic development, leaving the old townships of Qatif and Ahsa underdeveloped. With anti-Shi’a narratives on the rise, Shi’a communities allegedly faced discrimination in education and economic development, as well as employment discrimination from ARAMCO, the oil company. The region, which had depended on agriculture as its major economic activity, suffered environmental deterioration

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from oil exploration, drilling, and extraction (Jones 2010). Religious oppression, combined with discrimination and marginalization, led to the emergence of revolutionary ideologies among the Shi’a residents of the Eastern Province. These ideologies culminated in a youth-led uprising in 1979, the year of the Iranian revolution. In August 1979, in defiance of the Saudi authorities, Shi’a religious leaders declared that they would publicly celebrate the banned ceremony of Ashura (memorial of Martyrdom of Imam Hussein). Across the border in Bahrain, similar declarations were made. Unrest in Bahrain continued through the month of August, culminating in confrontations between authorities and demonstrators in September. In the Eastern Province, on the day of Ashura in November 1979, thousands took to the street to celebrate the occasion and openly defy the authorities. The celebration soon turned into a political protest and ended in a deadly confrontation between Saudi security forces and the Shi’a community. The uprising was crushed by Saudi security forces and hundreds of Shi’a youth, including the leader of the uprising, Hassan Al-Saffar, fled the Kingdom for Iran (Jones 2010; Matthiesen 2013). In Bahrain, the unrest continued for months, culminating in a failed 1981 coup attempt. Bahrain had a strikingly different population composition than neighboring Saudi. Shi’a are assumed to be the majority of Bahrain’s population (Nasr 2006). The Shi’a Arab of Bahrain often consider themselves the indigenous people of the land, in comparison with the ruling A-Khalifa family, whom are assumed to be conquers that came to Bahrain from outside (Karolak 2013; Khuri 1980). The 1981 coup was led by The Revolutionary Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, a militant Shi’a group, and aimed at overthrowing Al-Khalifa rule (Alhasan 2011). While Iran’s involvement in the Saudi 1979 uprising was unclear, the influence of Iran and the Iranian revolution in the Bahrain 1981 coup attempt was undeniable (Jones 2010). The transnational ties of the local Shi’a communities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in addition to the ­perceived relationship between the two revolts and the Iranian revolution, have led authorities to perceive the Shi’a as the fifth column of Iran, “an enemy within that secretly works to undermine the country” (Matthiesen 2013, p. 26). The Shi’a struggle for recognition and resistance against marginalization continued through the 1990s, albeit taking different trajectories in the neighboring countries. The Saudi government pursued a more conciliatory approach to Shi’a demands in 1990s, while Bahrain witnessed an outburst of demonstrations during the “dignity uprisings” of the 1990s. It is impor-

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tant to note that, while the leaders of the Saudi Organization of the Islamic Revolution, such as Al-Saffar, opted to adopt a non-­ confrontational approach to the ruling family of Al-Saud, other factions within the Shi’a community remained steadfast in opposing the Saudi government and expressing solidarity with the Shi’a cause in the region. The calm period between Saudi authorities and the Shi’a community ended in 2005 when Iran-Saudi relations soured and the Saudi ruling family resorted to political oppression of the Shi’a minority, resulting in scattered waves of protests (Teitelbaum 2010). When the winds of the Arab Spring reached the Gulf, and thousands of Bahraini protesters took to the Pearl Roundabout on February 14, 2011, brothers and sisters across the borders were fast to follow.

Methodology Frames can be defined as “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974, p.  21) or “cognitive constructs” (Graber 1984; Pan and Kosicki 1993) that are used as organizational devices to enable audiences to process information. Framing is not a neutral enterprise but rather a deliberate process to direct interpretation and the construction of meaning. Framing can thus be a “strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse itself” (Pan and Kosicki 1993, p. 57). The concept of framing is particularly relevant to collective identity. If we think of social movements as imagined communities (Anderson 1991), mobilizing these communities to create a collective identity that transcends physical space can be thought of as creating “communities of the mind” that engage in negotiating and constructing collective identity parameters beyond physical boundaries (Cerulo 1997). That is to say, social movements and collectives are not merely neutral carriers of ideas and ideologies but rather “signifying agents actively engaged in producing and maintaining meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Benford and Snow 2000, p.  613). The process of identity construction is an inherent part of framing, because “not only do framing processes link individuals and groups ideologically but they proffer, buttress, and embellish identities that range from collaborative to conflictual” (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 185). Many researchers have addressed how the process of framing is used by social movements to construct a collective identity and mobilize members to collective action (Hunt et al. 1994; Benford and Hunt 1992, 1994; Benford and Snow 1988; Snow 2004). For the

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purpose of this analysis, we chose framing analysis because it is an efficient instrument for recognizing the basic elements of a narrative, in this case, factors underlying identity. According to Benford and Snow (2000), social movements’ frames are interactive and discursive and aimed at generating collective action. Along the same lines, Polletta and Jasper (2001) identified three major tasks collective identity frames perform: recruitment of new participants, mobilization, and setting the boundaries of the group’s collective identity in order to sustain solidarity among the participants. Frames are used “to make compelling case of the ‘injustice’ of the condition and the likely effectiveness of collective ‘agency’ in changing that condition” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, p. 291). Frames also draw boundaries that separate the collective constituent from antagonists and create an “us” versus “them” mentality (Benford and Snow 1988; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1999). For the purpose of this study, we will investigate the formation of a transnational collective identity amongst the Shi’a communities of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, building on Taylor and Whittier’s (1999) analytical tools. Taylor and Whittier (1999) identified boundaries, consciousness, and negotiation as analytical tools for investigating the construction of collective identity. Boundaries refer to the interpretive or concrete borders a group draws to establish and mark the group’s territories by “highlighting differences between activists and the web of others in the contested social world” (Taylor and Whittier 1999, p. 176). Boundaries are essential in collective identity formation because they “promote a heightened awareness of group commonalities” (p. 176). In other words, boundaries establish and strengthen that sense of “we-ness” that comes with collective identity. Consciousness refers to “the interpretive frameworks that emerge from a group’s struggle to define and realize members’ common interests in opposition to the dominant order” (p.  179). Moreover, negotiation encompasses “the symbols and everyday actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination” (p. 176). To identify frames that indicate boundaries, consciousness, and negotiations, this chapter used a multidimensional approach for framing analysis (Tankard 2001). In this approach, various elements or dimensions of the story are recognized and included in the framing analysis. We recognized three criteria that frames should meet to be considered frames: (a) they have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics, (b) they are commonly observed, and (c) they are reliably distinguishable from other frames (Capella and Jamieson 1997, p. 47). However, it is worth noting

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Table 3.1  Facebook groups analyzed Group

Web address

Followers

February 14 Revolution Youth Coalition Eastern Province Revolution Qatif and Bahrain are one people not two peoples Qatifis for Bahrain

https://www.facebook.com/ Coalition14th/ https://www.facebook.com/rev.east.2/ https://www.facebook.com/ Qatif14Bahrain/ https://www.facebook.com/ KotaifenforBahrain/ https://www.facebook.com/ ShiiteBahrani/ https://www.facebook.com/ Revolutionbh/ https://www.facebook.com/althawrah/

109k

Bahrain Shi’a Bahrain Revolution February 14 Revolutionary Movement in Qatif

25k 20k 20 k 13k 4.1k 3k

that framing analysis poses a methodological challenge. Any text can have multiple meanings; therefore, different frames can be extracted from the same text (Gamson 1989; Graber 1984). Gamson (1989) suggested using the preferred reading in framing analysis in order to solve the methodological dilemma. The linguistic and semiotic indicators used in texts can identify the preferred reading. For data collection, we used the terms “Shi’a,” “Bahrain,” “Qatif,” and “Saudi Arabia” in different combinations in both Arabic and English to identify social media groups of interest. We excluded groups that were not political in nature, not current, or had less than 2000 followers. We selected seven active Facebook groups to study with a following between 3000 and 109,000. The groups selected were primarily in Arabic, reflecting the intended audience. Data were collected by systematically downloading messages from the selected groups. In the process of analysis, we assessed the interpretative framing tools used to demark boundaries, build consciousness, and engage in negotiation in order to form a collective identity among the Shi’a of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Table 3.1).

Analysi Boundaries The Shi’a community builds its identity around the religious connections at the historic heart of the Shi’a-Sunni split. Loyalty and devotion to the

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Prophet’s family (Ahlu Al bait) is the first requirement for identification as Shi’a in general. For the Shi’a community in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the fight against “oppression and injustices” marks a major boundary. This boundary divides two camps: the oppressors, consisting of the Saudi and Bahraini regimes; and the oppressed, who are represented by resistance groups in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Linguistics markers used to invoke the injustice and resistance frames includes descriptive words for the oppressor group such as “repressive regimes,” “tyrants,” “mercenaries,” and “occupiers.” Social media rhetoric often referred to the two governments as one category, depending on context. The Al-Khalifa and Al-Saud families are lumped together as “the descendants of Yazid,” in reference the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. This characterization as “descendants of Yazid” or “Yazidis” invokes psychological and emotional associations of animosity, becomes a major cultural mark of Shi’a identity, and creates a clear demarcation of social and political terrain. On the other side of this boundary is the oppressed group consisting of the Shi’a of Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Taylor and Whittier (1999) note that “boundary markers can vary from geographical, racial, and religious characteristics to more symbolically constructed differences such as social institutions and cultural systems” (p.  176). For the Shi’a communities, despite their religious nature, the political oppression of the two communities was the major boundary marker. The suffering of the people of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia is an omnipresent theme in the social media groups analyzed. The struggles of the two communities are not perceived as separate issues but as the united struggle of one group facing the same oppressor, creating a heightened sense of collectivity. Online groups continuously advocate for political prisoners in both Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. For instance, the 14 February Revolution Youth Coalition Facebook page often refers to Saudi prisoners as “our prisoners,” indicating a unity that transcends national boundaries. When Saudi security forces performed raids in the Eastern Province or killed Shi’a activists, Bahraini Shi’as took to the streets in protest. Often, symbolic funerals took place in Bahrain. Similar shows of solidarity and expressions of unity take place in Saudi Arabia in response to perceived injustices and oppression in Bahrain. Groups such as “Qatifis for Bahrain” and campaigns of solidarity, like those organized around the execution of Sheikh Al-Nimr, often employ discourse that emphasizes the unity of the two communities across the border. Examples of these linguistic devices are “your martyr is ours,” and

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“your prisoners are our prisoners,” which often accompanied solidarity campaigns in Bahrain and Qatif. When Saudi authorities sentenced two Shi’a activists to death in 2014, the 14 February Youth Coalition issued a statement and condemned the sentence on their social media platforms, expressing solidarity with the “revolution in Eastern Province” and closing with “May God have mercy on our martyrs.” The press release was cross-posted in the Saudi-based Facebook group “Qatif Free People” with the caption “your prisoners are our prisoners, your martyr is our martyr, whatever happens to you in Qatif, happens to us in Bahrain, Qatif and Bahrain one nation not two.” This caption captured the sentiments of loyalty and allegiance shared between the two communities. The “your martyr is our martyr” label has been attached to many solidarity campaigns, such as symbolic funerals for Gudaih victims in 2015, Saihat victims in 2016, and Awamiyah victims in 2017. For all these campaigns, social media platforms were utilized to document the events in both Bahrain and the Eastern Province, using the hashtags “your martyrs are ours” and “your prisoner is ours.” Another identity boundary is drawn by using the frame of “indigenous versus occupier.” Social media discourse often used the phrase “occupiers” to describe not only Saudi forces in Bahrain, but also the Bahraini Al-Khalifa royal family and the Saudi Al-Saud royal family. This frame is built on the historical narratives described earlier that portray the Shi’a communities of Bahrain and the Eastern Province as the native inhabitants of the “lands of Bahrain.” This frame of indigenousness invokes a deeper sense of “we-ness.” Statements made in the 14 February Revolution Youth Coalition group lump the Emirati-Saudi forces of the Arabian Peninsula Shield together with “Khalifi Occupiers” as “the occupier forces,” further uniting those resisting these forces as one collective. Similar sentiments were expressed in Saudi social media groups such as Qatif Free People, Eastern Province Revolution, and Qatifis for Bahrain. Activities undertaken by official security forces in the Eastern Province were dubbed “crimes by occupiers’ forces.” The continued persecution and marginalization perceived by the Shi’a community has contributed to the creation of a collective resistance identity. This resistance identity, though political, is rooted in the religious. According to Jones (2010), the Saudi Shi’a struggle stemmed from “a shared cultural identity and, perhaps most important, a sense of communal grievance—forged in the crucible of Saudi oppression—lent the uprising a religious ardor” (p. 182). The same can be said of the resistance in Bahrain.

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Consciousness Consciousness is the interpretive frame that makes a group of individuals a collective. Through consciousness, the collective identity is created and the sense of “we-ness” is established. The tumultuous history of the Shi’a community fosters the perception of constant suffering, oppression, and martyrdom among its members. In this sense, framing plays an integral role as interpretative tool. Benford and Snow (1988) identified three core framing tasks that generate collective consciousness in social movements: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames. Diagnostic frames deal with the identification of problems and the attribution of blame. Prognostic frames relate to proposed solutions, and motivational frames call to action to achieve proposed solutions (p. 200). In the case of Shi’a community in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, social media discourse is built around a diagnostic frame that highlights the unfairness of their current situation, portrays them as a group suffering from unjust treatment, and holds the royal families in both countries accountable for these injustices. The prognostic frame calls for resistance and revolt against the regimes. The motivational frames take different forms, from the revolutionary rhetoric of resistance to mobilizing and organizing acts of resistance. The Internet has enabled the two communities to defy traditional state boundaries and form a transnational community that is connected by a common cause. The Internet has become a virtual space for resistance groups, and offered the Shi’a communities a chance to come together to express support for each other and exchange encouragement. The Internet played a crucial role in three areas. First, the Internet became an alternative media source for publicity and information. Second, the Internet was used as a place for organizing and mobilizing for resistance activities. Third, it enabled groups to express support and solidarity, thus strengthening a sense of unity that transcends national borders. Like most opposition groups, the Shi’a communities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia do not control any mainstream media outlets, which are often state-controlled (Karolak 2019). Social media acted as an alternative medium by which to communicate news and provide information about resistance activities and attacks and arrests by the security forces. News about sit-ins, demonstrations, and resistance activities were posted on social media both before the event, for mobilization, and after, for publicity and documentation. Information about political prisoners and victims of state-sponsored violent

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acts was also shared on social media. Graphic photos to demonstrate the severity of the violence and create a “resistance political consciousness” oriented against the two ruling regimes often accompanied these posts, especially those about deceased victims. Social media allowed the Shi’a community a way to bypass not only state control and information censorship, but also geographical boundaries, and created sense of unity around a political cause, thus strengthening the transnational collective identity. Suffering was a major theme that was used as a bonding element between the two communities. As one user wrote, “If God loved someone, He let them go through hardships. Bahrain and Qatif take heart and cherish your hardships.” Collective identity is a cognitive and moral construct and involves feelings of belonging to a community and communal agency. Central to the formation of collective identity is solidarity. The relationship between collective identity and solidarity is dialectical; whereas collective identity leads to solidarity, solidarity can forge a sense of collective identity (Hunt and Benford 2004). Being part of a collective creates a connecting relationship to the collective, and that in turn facilitates “commitment by enhancing the bonding to leadership, belief systems, organizations, rituals, cohorts, networks, and localities” (Hunt and Benford 2004, p. 16). For Bahraini and Saudi Shi’a, social media is used as a platform for expressing support and solidarity that would otherwise be impossible to express due to geographical barriers. One recent example of such transnational political solidarity and mobilization is the case of Sheikh Al-Nimr, a Saudi Shi’a cleric and activist. When Saudi Arabia arrested Sheikh Al-Nimr, the Shi’a community took to social media to declare their support for the Sheik and, later, to condemn his execution. The hashtag “we are all Al-Nimr” drew supporters across borders on social media. Many linked the Shi’a suffering in Saudi Arabia to the suffering of Imam Hussein, fostering a sense of community that ties all Shi’a together. The online space was used to show solidarity and support as well to organize and mobilize. On July 10, just two days after Sheikh Al-Nimr’s arrest, the 14 February Revolution Youth Coalition used social media to organize a week of resistance and solidarity with Sheikh Al-Nimr and the people of the Eastern Province. The Solidarity with Al-Nimr week was planned under the motto “from Qatif to Bahrain, one nation not two.” The motto was not only an explicit declaration of the transnational ties that connect the two groups across geographical borders, but also an interpretative framework to create political consciousness. Comments on posts in the group reiterated the same senti-

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ment, declaring that the Shi’a of the Eastern Province and Bahrain are indeed one despite the “imaginary” borders. In 2015, as a Saudi court sentenced Sheikh Al-Nimr to death, protesters in Bahrain launched a campaign called “shame on you Al-Saud” to protest the sentence. Similar campaigns included a week of events against the 2013 Bahrain Formula One race. The events aimed to raise awareness of events and demonstrations in Bahrain and show solidarity with political prisoners in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Across the border, the Shi’a of the Eastern Province shared the same sentiments of unified transnational identity. Social media campaigns based in Qatif used a similar rhetoric of solidarity, such as “if Bahrain hurts, Al Qatif cries” and “the world might forget the unarmed people of Bahrain, but Qatif will never forget you,” to create a sense of common political cause. These posts reflect the belief that what connects the Shi’a community is stronger than political borders. The running thread throughout these campaigns is the idea that the two Shi’a communities share a common cause and face one enemy. Particularities are recognized, but the collective consciousness is that “Qatif and Bahrain are one nation, not two.” Negotiation Negotiation refers to the symbolic actions of resistance that are performed by individuals to fight the hegemony of the dominant group. These actions are embedded in peoples’ lives and result in “politicization of everyday life” (Taylor and Whittier 1999, p.  183). The result of this politicized everyday lived experience is the formation of a resistance identity. Resistance identity is an identity that is “generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society” (Castells 2004, p. 8). For the Shi’a community, the lived experience of perceived oppression and injustice is deeply rooted in the history of suffering and sacrifices exemplified by the death of Imam Hussein. The resistance identity is often linked to these historical roots, as when social media users use rhetorical devices and phrases such as “congratulations on martyrdom” and “following the master of martyrs, Imam Hussein, Peace be upon him” to link recent deaths to the history of martyrdom that dominates Shi’a historical narratives. Resistance is often referred to as “Husseini

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resistance,” an embodiment of the sacrifice of Imam Hussein and his followers in Karbala. Everyday lived experiences such as funerals are transformed into political protests and acts of defiance against the state. Funerals are celebrated as “weddings” where the celebration signifies “martyrs’ souls ascending to the heavens” and martyrs “becoming closer to the Prophet and Ahlu AlBait.” An illustration of this politicization of everyday experiences is the thank you note posted by the Al-Khumare family of Qatif after the death of family members in an explosion in a Shi’a mosque in the Eastern Province in 2015. The thank you note, which is typically created to thank condolers, was used as a political manifesto against the perceived sectarian oppression of the Saudi Shi’a. Social media has enabled the Shi’a community in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to connect and share their grievances. Symbolic funerals are often organized in Bahrain for Saudi martyrs and vice versa. Revolutionary rhetoric that mobilizes the masses around the idea of sectarian oppression created “a rising generation of religiously trained activists [who] led the call to action and to arms, making clear that political power was deeply connected to religious identity and authority” (Jones 2010, p. 182). Social media, by transcending political borders, brought the two communities together and provided a sense of a shared everyday experience of oppression, allowing for the construction of a collective identity built on resistance.

Conclusion Building on Taylor and Whittier’s analytical tools, this chapter attempted to understand the role of social media in forming and strengthening a collective Shi’a identity through the demarcation of boundaries, the development of a collective political consciousness and the negotiation of everyday resistance activities. The Shi’a communities in Saudi and Bahrain possess a transnational identity derived from a shared history, collective religious identity, and transnational religious leadership structure (marja’iyya) that transcends national borders. However, recent developments in the region, namely the Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Bahrain after the 2011 uprisings, have also created a sense of a shared enemy and a shared political cause among the Shi’a of the two countries. Social media acted as a platform where activists were able to transcend geographical borders and consequently cement a collective transitional identity between the Shi’a of Saudi

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Arabia and Bahrain. Discussion on social media invoked the historical narrative of the martyrdom of Hussein to create a transnational community bonded through a history of constant suffering, oppression, and resistance. Through social media, activists were able to draw boundaries that mark the collective territories of an in-group and out-group and consequently negotiate a collective identity that is not based on national boundaries. Through diagnostic framing, highlighting the perceived marginalization and oppression of the Shi’a community, social media was used to create a collective political consciousness. Invoking historical narratives also formed a prognostic frame that placed the blame for this suffering on the ruling families of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. For these framing core tasks, social media played multiple roles, including providing an alternative media outlet for disseminating information, creating publicity, organizing, and mobilizing. Social media has become a transnational “organizing agent” through which mobilization for demonstrations and protests takes place across borders (Kavada 2015). The Shi’a communities also use social media sites to express solidarity and support for their “brothers and sisters” across the border. The Internet’s ability to create solidarity stems from two characteristics. First, it helps people transcend geographical boundaries, creating unity around a common cause, purpose, or affiliation. Second, “it makes more information available to a greater number of people, more easily and from a wider array of sources than any instrument of information and communication in history” (Kahn and Kellener 2006, p.  704). These characteristics make the Internet a powerful alternative media source for social movements that are excluded from the mainstream media, such as the Shi’a. Shi’a use social media to mobilize, inform, and solicit support from Shi’a around the world and thus link group members regardless of their geographic location by creating a collective political consciousness around a common cause.

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Kahn, R., & Kellener, D. (2006). Oppositional Politics and the Internet: A Critical/Reconstructive Approach. In M. Durham & D. Kellener (Eds.), Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Karolak, M. (2013). Arab Spring and the Escalation of the Sectarian Divide in Bahrain: An Assessment. Conflict & Communication, 12(1), 1–10. Karolak, M. (2019). Social Media and Urban Social Movements: The Anatomy of Continued Protest in Authoritarian Contexts. Contemporary Arab Affairs, 12(2), 25–52. https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2019.122002. Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the Collective: Social media, the Occupy Movement and Its Constitution as a Collective Actor, Information. Communication & Society, 18(8), 872–886. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318. Khuri, F.  I. (1980). Tribe and State in Bahrain. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Klandermans, P.  G. (2014). Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Protest. Political Psychology, 35, 1–22. https:// doi.org/10.1111/pops.12167. Louër, L. (2008). Transnational Shi’a Politics, Political and Religious Networks in the Gulf. London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press. Lynch, M. (2006). Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. New York: Columbia University Press. Matar, D., & Dakhlallah, F. (2006). What It Means to be Shiite in Lebanon: Al Manar and the Imagined Community of Resistance. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 3(2), 22–40. Matthiesen, T. (2013). Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Meyrowitz, J. (1985). No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior. New York: Oxford University Press. Nasr, V. (2006). The Shi’a Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W. Norton. Nisbet, E. C., & Myres, T. A. (2010). Challenging the State: Transnational TV and Political Identity in the Middle East. Political Communication, 27(4), 347–366. Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. (1993). Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. Political Communication, 10(1), 55–75. Polletta, F., & Jasper, M. (2001). Collective Identity and Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 283–305. Rabi, U. (2008). The Shi’i Crescent: Myth and Reality. Retrieved from www.strategicdialoguecenter.org Silverstone, R. (2002). Complicity and Collusion in the Mediation of Everyday Life. New Literary History, 33(4), 761–780. Snow, D. A. (2004). Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields. In D. A. Snow, S.  A. Soule, & H.  Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (pp. 380–341). Walden: Blackwell.

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Snow, D. A., & Corrigall-Brown, C. (2015). Collective Identity. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Vol. 4, 2nd ed., pp. 174–180). Oxford: Elsevier. Tankard, J. W. (2001). The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing. In S. Reese, H. O. Gandy, & E. A. Grant (Eds.), Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World (pp. 95–106). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Taylor, V., & Whittier, N.  E. (1999). Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization. In J.  Freeman & V.  Johnson (Eds.), Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties (pp.  169–194). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Teitelbaum, J. (2010). The Shiites of Saudi Arabia. Current Trends in Islamic ideology, 10(73). Retrieved from https://www.hudson.org/research/9895the-shiites-of-saudi-arabia Treré, E. (2015). Reclaiming, Proclaiming, and Maintaining Collective Identity in the #YoSoy132 Movement in Mexico: An Examination of Digital Frontstage and Backstage Activism Through Social Media and Instant Messaging Platforms, Information. Communications Society, 18(8), 901–915. https:// doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043744. Tubella, I. (2005). Television and Internet in the Construction of Identity. In M.  Castells & G.  Cardoso (Eds.), The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy (pp. 257–268). Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations. Walker, M. (2006). The Revenge of the Shi’a. Wilson Quarterly, 30(4). Retrieved from http://archive.wilsonquarterly.com/essays/revenge-shia

CHAPTER 4

Political Culture in Qatar: State-Society Relations and National Identity in Transformation Betul Dogan Akkas and Gilla Camden

Political culture is one of the most controversial concepts in political science since it was defined by Almond in 1956. What makes political culture elusive to define or discuss is its mediating position within the political spectrum between citizens and governors. Also, political culture is an interdisciplinary term that encompasses conceptual frameworks derived from anthropology, sociology, and psychology to elaborate norms and values on which society is based. The term itself refers to an expected utility of the state and society out of political interaction which is a combination of political inputs and outputs (Almond and Verba 1963). Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states such as Qatar, societal changes are rapidly taking place that have lasting effects on the political culture of the region. Specifically, studies have identified the rise of a par-

B. Dogan Akkas (*) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_4

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ticipatory type of new nationalism that is characterized by the ­mobilization of the citizenry in support of both the state and its ruling monarchs (Diwan 2016). Within the Gulf rentier states where welfare distribution and tribal affiliation are interlinked, individual Gulf citizens are negotiating their own identities in relation to the nation, whether in regard to tribal affiliation, Islamic identity, or other aspects of belonging depending on the dynamics of inclusivity in their specific country contexts. As political culture is not inert but changes in relation to transformations in society (Molchanov 2002), this study explores the impact of recent developments in state-society relations and national identity on the political culture of Qatar, a topic which is yet to be examined empirically to the best of our knowledge. Although there are studies on political culture in other regions of the Arab world (Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014; Kedourie 2013; Luciani 1990) or other Islamic countries (Price 1999), the study of political culture within the Arab Gulf countries calls for a different approach due to the unique political, economic, and social system of the region. Not only have few studies been conducted on political culture in the Gulf, these were primarily based on a political history approach from an oil-economy perspective (Al-Naqeeb 2012), state-society relations in regard to identity and political culture (Alsharekh and Springborg 2012; Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014), or political culture of leadership instead of the public culture of the masses (Rugh 2007). Currently, there is a clear gap in the literature on mass political culture and its relationship to national identity formation within individual Arab Gulf states, particularly in regard to studies that apply a methodology that combines both a theory and a qualitative case study of public opinion. Thus, this study combines both methods along with an examination of the concept within official government publications (e.g. speeches of the Emir of Qatar, the Constitution, and the Qatar National Vision 2030 among others). First, an overview of political culture theory as it currently stands is presented followed by an elaboration of the political system of Qatar and various dimensions of political culture as these pertain to modern, Qatari society, specifically orientations and value clusters. Corroborated by the results of small-scale qualitative study based on personal interviews, the findings argue that traditional Qatari political culture is predominantly based on two sets of individual orientations: deference and the mutual expectations of the welfare state system as these relate to human capital G. Camden Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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dynamics. These orientations are linked to political objects, which include the political system of Qatar, its specific roles or structures, the incumbents of these roles, and public policies. Due to recent societal transformations in Qatar and their impact on how its citizenry views ­ national identity, we find that Qatari political culture may be undergoing changes that could have lasting and long-term impacts on the nature of state-society relations in this tiny, Gulf monarchy.

The Theory of Political Culture First, the theory of political culture requires attention. As mentioned previously, the concept of political culture was defined first in 1956 by a seminal study of Gabriel Almond (Almond 1956) and revisited and developed in a second study (Almond and Verba 1963). In this initial study, the term was used to highlight solely the political culture of Western states as it pertained to democratic performance. By looking at the United States, Britain, Italy, Germany, and Mexico, the study remained within the context of Anglo-American political development and argued that participant cultures are marked by widespread participatory norms and thus more likely to foster democratic outcomes than subject cultures, which are characterized by values of a primarily passive, subject form. However, due to the influence of the Cold War, the application of the concept outside of Western democracies emerged, specifically as it pertained Communism and the USSR (Almond 1983). Since few studies exist that focus on the concept of political culture within the Arab Gulf, this study first examines state-society relations (Al-Naqeeb 2012; Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014; Alsharekh and Springborg 2012; Ayubi 1996) to reach an understanding of this concept as it exists within the Gulf state of Qatar. There are two terms that theoretical discussions of political culture encompass: the term political culture itself and its second form, civic culture. Political culture is defined as “a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 12). The term ‘culture’ also is emphasized within studies in regard to its influence on political culture, which is a broader and explanatory variable in political science. Almond and Verba (1963) interpret ‘culture’ as one’s “psychological orientation toward social objects” (p. 13). From this perspective, political culture is embedded into psychology and societal traditions as a common value as it is “internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its populations” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 13). Jackman and Miller (1996) have identified the distinctive elements of the political culture approach as (1) the premise that these cultures are thought of as

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reflecting coherent clusters of attitudes (e.g. entrepreneurial spirits, civic virtue, etc.) (Banfield 1958; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993), (2) the focus of political culture arguments on the prevalence of said value clusters within societies, (3) an understanding of these cultural syndromes as durable with fundamental effects that persist in the long-term despite short-term forces, and (4) the claim that such cultural syndromes are important due to their ability to drive other outcomes (e.g. economic or political performance). Proponents of the political culture approach have viewed it as the fundamental driver of economic and political performance within a society—more enduring and more important than either objective conditions embodied in institutions or institutional change (Jackman and Miller 1996). In addition, this behavioral approach to political science regards political systems as an outcome of political culture yet with the caveat that subcultures exist within each individual type of political culture. For instance, most continental European countries are thought to have similar political cultures but different political systems (Almond 1956). Hence, in the historical evolution of political culture, England, the United States, and Scandinavian countries handled issues of political culture in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in similar ways. Put differently, the political and social atmospheres of these societies were similar compared to those of Africa or Anatolia. Although these societies have different political systems, a homogenous political culture would emerge after some time due to the presence of shared values. Since the conceptualization of political culture reflects the observation that long-lasting structures, norms and values of the society are embedded within it, proponents of this approach also emphasize that it is not easily changing. Thus, the impact of the experience of individuals is heavily curtailed by generational norms and their ways of adapting to changes are conditioned by cultural factors (Verba 1965; Moore 1966; Inglehart 1988). This perspective is also valid in the Arab world, where despite distinctness of countries (Ayubi 1996), there are similarities in the political culture of the Levant, Gulf, and North African states.

Types of Political Culture Ideal-political culture itself is defined as either parochial, subject, or participant. Parochial political culture refers to societies such as those found within African tribal societies where there are no specialized political roles. Political

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and economic roles of people are diffuse. Therefore, people do not ­necessarily ask for separate political roles beyond their economic, r­eligious, or social roles. Such societies are characterized by citizens with low orientation toward political objects and no expectations of any political change within their simpler, traditional political systems, which are viewed in familistic terms (Almond and Verba 1963). The second type, subject political culture, occurs when “the subject is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 17). Thus, there can be democratic institutions or systems in this political culture; however, the legitimacy and cognition of them is absent. In subject political cultures, citizens demonstrate high orientation toward political objects while viewing their own individual participation and influence as minimal. This is often found among authoritarian political structures with high levels of centralization. The participant political culture is the third one and defined as the predominant type. Citizens in participant political culture demonstrate both a high level of orientation to political objects and “tend to be oriented toward an activist role of the self in the polity” (Almond and Verba 1963, p.  18). Participant political cultures motivate the mobilization of social actors, thereby encouraging citizen’s active participation in the formation of decisions. It is this participant model upon which democratic systems and institutions are based. Yet, it is unlikely that actual political cultures will fulfill all the characteristics of any of these three types instead tending toward mixed cultures (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 22).

Concept of the Civic Culture These three types form a crucial base for understanding of the second concept embedded within Almond and Verba’s conceptualization of political culture: civic culture, which is a mixed culture that exhibits features of parochial, subject, and participant cultures (Almond and Verba 1963). While the rationality-activist model for democratic citizenship and voting dynamics is based on the idea that each individual citizen will act with rational choice without intense emotional involvement, civic culture moves beyond this (Almond and Verba 1963). Civic culture “stresses the participation of individuals in the political input process” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 30). In societies with high congruence between the political structure and the culture, civic culture exhibits participant allegiance (Almond and Verba 1963). However, civic culture still remains a mixed culture due

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to the fusion of the participant role with that of subject and traditional, parochial roles within the political orientations of society. Hence, the subject and parochial orientations remain the foundation of civic culture foundations in the participant political culture. Thus, within civic culture, the citizen perceives himself as influential within the political system and potentially active but also accepts elite decision-making and effective governance as well as maintains parochial ties (e.g. affiliations to family, clan, religious group, etc.) (Almond and Verba 1963). This is an important aspect of civic culture in democratic settings as it incentivizes moderation by balancing the traditional and rational, political and nonpolitical values in the political system (Almond and Verba 1963). For instance, it allows for a balance between mutual trust, a nonpolitical value, and social participation as well as rational and active citizenship and passivity coupled with commitment based on parochial values (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 30). Yet, Almond and Verba (1963) argue that this concept of civic culture is only found within established democracies characterized by a combination of modernity and tradition such as Great Britain and the United States. However, this assertion stems not from glorification of Anglo-­ Saxon political structures but proceeds from a historical approach.1 The historical process leading to the emergence of the term is crucial because Almond and Verba (1963) define political culture and civic culture in a behavioral way, meaning a combination of values and norms. Thus, civic culture as a process refers to transformation of the political culture in the Britain from a period of national unification and absolutism to a secular and participant consensus system (Almond and Verba 1963). This first period of national unification and absolutism was challenged firstly by secularization (e.g. the beginning of religious tolerance), secondly by the emergence of a merchant class that was both self-confident and affluent, and thirdly by the emergence of a culture that was neither traditionalist nor modern but instead civic in nature. This civic culture was based on the values of communication, persuasion, consensus, diversity, and permission of change in a moderate way (Almond and Verba 1963). This was the outcome of the political process undergone by Britain, thus reflecting that

 However, critics of Almond and Verba’s conceptualization of political culture may argue that it implicitly supports the cultural diffusion of Anglo-Saxon values—considered a hidden type of Eurocentrism or cultural Imperialism—by claiming the efficacy of these values to mediate the contradictions of democratic systems. 1

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the political culture of each state is a national value and represents its own political and social culture, not in an isolated but exclusive way.2

Political System of Qatar Before analyzing the building blocks of political culture in Qatar, the political system of the country requires attention. Formerly a British protectorate, Qatar, a small Emirate situated in the Arabian Gulf, gained its independence in 1971. However, even before the recognition of its independent statehood, its political system had begun its evolution from a purely tribal model of governance by the Al-Thani tribe to a formal and more hierarchical one. Indeed, the Ottoman and British recognition and consolidation of Al-Thani authority in the territories of today’s Qatar within the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries facilitated the construction of a formal ruling family in the twentieth century (Kamrava 2013; Ulrichsen 2014). In regard to the political structure of its system, the Constitution of Qatar outlines the basics of the state in Article 1: “Qatar is an independent sovereign Arab State. Its religion is Islam and shari’a law shall be a main source of its legislations. Its political system is democratic. The Arabic Language shall be its official language. The people of Qatar are a part of the Arab nation” (Constitution of Qatar 2003). Although the constitution defines its political system as democratic, this does not match with its existing regime. For example, The CIA World Factbook defines the governance of the Qatari state as absolute monarchy (Middle East: Qatar 2018). This type of incompatibility between the political discourse and political praxis is a general problem in the Arab world (Ismael and Ismael 1993). However, the constitution of Qatar does state the hereditary political system of the state in later articles. Thus, its absolute monarchy is confirmed in Article 8, “the rule of the State is hereditary in the family of Al Thani and in the line of the male descendants of Hamad Bin Khalifa Bin Hamad Bin Abdullah Bin Jassim. The rule shall be inherited by the son named as Heir Apparent by the Emir” (Constitution of Qatar 2003). Indeed, the 2  As noted by Dalton and Welzel (2014), early public opinion polls and representative mass surveys could not be conducted for large parts of the developing and Communist world during the period within which Almond and Verba introduced the term ‘political culture’. Thus, the quantitative data on the values and norms of nondemocratic society were sparse, which is perhaps one practical reason that this seminal study focused on the political and civic culture of Western democracies.

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last change of leadership via this hereditary system took place in 2013 with Shaikh Tamim’s accession of power through the abdication of his father, Shaikh Hamad Bin Abdullah (Ulrichsen 2014). As the political system of Qatar has thus been defined as an absolute monarchy with hereditary accession, the political culture of Qatar will be discussed as similar to nondemocratic, totalitarian systems (Almond 1956). Totalitarian regimes are defined in Merriam-Webster as “centralized control by an autocratic authority; the political concept that the citizen should be totally subject to an absolute state authority” (“totalitarianism,” n.d., para. 1), while an absolute monarchy is defined as “undivided rule or absolute sovereignty by a single person; a government having a hereditary chief of state with life tenure and powers varying from nominal to absolute” (“Monarchy,” n.d., para. 1–3). These definitions demonstrate that not every absolute monarchy is necessarily totalitarian. However, Almond explains undemocratic political cultures under the category of totalitarian regimes (Almond 1956). While this blanket generalization of political regimes does not entirely reflect the realities of the Qatari state, Almond’s categorization will be partially applied in the proceeding discussion of orientations of political culture in the state.

Methodology In regard to much of the existing literature on political culture, an artificial distinction between the micro-logical and macro-logical levels of analysis has been noted by Nesbitt-Larking (1992). This tends to ignore how micro-logical cultural practice and cultural material from a macro logical series of sedimented practices of meaning are interlinked. Thus, Nesbitt-­ Larking (1992) proposes a definition of political culture that is embedded in how “people, operating in an already existing symbolic field of cultural concepts and practices, convey to each other conceptions of the distribution and uses of valued resources and the making of decisions and rules” (Nesbitt-Larking 1992, p.  10). Opting to collect data on the political opinions, attitudes, and values of a segment of the Qatari population through structured interviews similar to those found within previous larger-scale studies on political culture (Inglehart 1997), this study employs a qualitative methodology to explore the political culture in Qatar and its relationship to state-society relations as it is experienced or ‘lived’ by Qatari citizens (Ely et  al. 1991). The qualitative data were collected from a small sample of citizens of the same gender with roughly the same

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age and level of education (e.g. female, aged 20–35, and college educated). This group was chosen as it represents an often overlooked yet growing segment of Qatar’s national population both in size and potential influence. Thus, this examination allows for fresh insight into the subtleties of political culture in Qatar and may serve as a starting point for further investigation of the concept as it pertains to identity construction and transformative processes. While the interviews provide insight into how individual opinions may influence political culture as a collective phenomenon, such types of data should not be interpreted or overgeneralized as representative of the whole population (Carreira da Silva et al. 2015).

Data Collection Data were collected in the form of nine qualitative personal interviews or questionnaires. In cases where conducting personal interviews was not possible, the participant answered identical interview questions via an e-mailed questionnaire. Thematic analysis techniques were employed as developed by Braun and Clarke (2006) in which initial codes are used to identify and define themes. The nine participants were asked 26 questions covering demographic information and inquiring about how Qataris view politics and how the relationship between state and society impacts the nature of political culture in Qatar. The study took place from November 2017 to November 2018 and neither the authors nor the participants received any monetary compensation or external funding. Participants were identified through snowballing and were required to sign a consent form that provided full details on the purpose of study, its future use, and data storage. All information was kept private, confidential, and stored securely with all identifiers removed from the data (e.g. participants referred to as participant 1 (P1), participant 2 (P2), etc. within the study).

Political Culture in Qatar In the Qatari context, national values and historical experience are deeply rooted within the concept of political culture. However, as political culture is defined as “a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes” (Almond and Verba 1963, p.  12), the first question for determining the dimensions of political culture in Qatar is to explore the set of orientations shared by the Qatari society and state that enable it to have a stable political system. The perception and tradition of the state and

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society both matter as political culture plays a mediating role between the citizen and the state. Such citizen-state relation is defined by the concepts of micro and macro politics (Almond and Verba 1963). Micro politics refers to an individual or a member of a sample of a larger population while macro politics is defined as the “structure and function of political systems, institutions and agencies and their effect on public policy” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 31). In this case, Qatari citizens and Qatari society are part of micro politics, which has a multidimensional relation with the macro politics that revolve around the Emirate’s bureaucracy, state institutions, political elites, and leadership. Thus, drawing on existing literature and the results of the qualitative study, the political culture of Qatar will be analyzed into the following two sections: (1) state and society relations in the Gulf and their connection to the subject political culture and (2) one set of orientations that serve as the basis of political culture in Qatar.

State and Society Relations: Subject Political Culture When exploring the set of orientations within Qatari society in regard to political culture, first we must consider the role of oil and wealth in the construction of the political system and its surrounding culture. In general, oil-rich monarchies of Arab Gulf states are mostly discussed and studied in their relation to this precious natural resource and those changes that have accompanied its discovery and production. This could be a natural outcome of their classification as rentier states in which economy and sociopolitical relations are based on the revenues of the resources. However, this oil-centered approach has historically led to the decreased study of political culture and state-society relations in general within rentier state theory (Beblawi and Luciani 2015) or an endless critique of the undemocratic governance of these states. However, the basic characteristics of state-society relations in the Arab Gulf are defined by Al-Zoby and Baskan (2014) with an alternative approach to this conventional analysis. Thus, a look at the features of state-society relations in the Gulf as micro and macro politics will guide the discussion of the political culture in Qatar. First of all, state and society are not completely separate entities in the Gulf but rather “state is embedded more deeply in society in the Gulf and that society has more subtle ways to impact and shape the state” (Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014, p. 6). This dimension is quite prominent in the case of

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Qatar, where the state structure evolved out of the society’s tribal tradition. In the tribal model, a group of people possess the same aim of “protection of their land rights and water wells, expansion of their livelihoods, and defense against enemy incursions” (Rugh 1996, p. 19). This attachment to the land in the tribal society encourages people to perceive the leader of their community as an equal as opposed to a political elite—someone like them. Put differently, members of a tribe do not recognize a state structure with an authority system that is based on grades but instead base their communities on a brotherhood behind a common leader (Khuri 1990). In this sense, the Qatari state is not merely an apparatus for organizing and administering state institutions but also the locus of a political leadership that has evolved out of society’s roots and traditions. The society is integrated with the state as it is a more formal, hierarchical, and institutional version of society’s traditional model. This perception of the dynamics of the statesociety relations in Qatar concurs with the subject political culture illustrated by Almond and Verba. In Qatar, the society as subject is aware of specialized governmental authority, acquiescing to elite decision-making (Almond and Verba 1963) as the Emir is considered the first leader among equal leaders (Rugh 1996). This tribal mode of governance was described by participants as less formal and alliance-based: “In Qatar, the tribal power is governed by the Diwan un-directly”3; “Although Qatar is a modern state, the tribe has a central role in it, and the loyalty is paid to the shaikh. The stability of the system relies on the alliances with the tribes and making sure they are satisfied and compensated.” A second dimension of state society relations in the Gulf States is the existence of informal channels of political engagement and participation that may take the place of formal structures—particularly in countries where these structures are lacking. For example, traditional tribal institutions like al-majaalis (majlis4) predate state formation and persist even today, providing an informal venue for the expression of opinions and grievances. As participant 2 [P2] described the role of the majlis in Qatari domestic politics, “There is a big role if the family is big and well known. 3  Diwan refers to the Amiri Diwan, which is “the seat of rule of the State of Qatar. It is the sovereign body and the administrative office of HH The Amir. It acts as a nexus between His Highness and all governmental and non-governmental bodies internally and externally.” https://www.diwan.gov.qa/amiri-diwan/about-the-amiri-diwan 4  The majlis is a traditional social institution in all Arab Gulf States that is often located within the foyer of homes, which provides a place where men can gather to discuss a wide variety of issues, including society and politics.

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Sometimes the Emir will recognize a family by visiting their majlis. The majlis is an open sphere between Qataris and lots of issues are discussed in the majalis.” In addition to this traditional institution, modern venues abound with the availability of online forums within various social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook that are akin to virtual majaalis (Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014). Indeed, Gulf Cooperation Council states are the most cyber-connected of the Arab region (Hakmeh 2017). While recent studies have noted a lack of online engagement on issues of public affairs in the Gulf region and particularly in Qatar and the United Emirates possibly due to fear of state retribution (Tétreault 2011; Aman and Jayroe 2013; Yuce et  al. 2014), a survey of internet users in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Lebanon found evidence that significant minorities of their populations, particularly youth, shared a belief in the empowering nature of social media and its ability to influence community change (Gunter and ElAreshi 2016). The influence of such virtual majlis was echoed in the statements of interviewees such as participant 1 [P1], “Yes it does, it gives us the chance to see their thoughts and ways of thinking that majalis didn’t, even Qatari women who has [ve] no other platform to express their thoughts. Currently, Qatari political talks is [are] all about the blockade and people[‘s] solidarity, I believe it use to be different before.” The centrality of these types of majaalis within the political culture of Qatar has become increasingly visible during the current GCC crisis. In every corner of Qatar’s major cities, huge banners and platform positioned at the entrances of homes and institutions display iconic images of the Emir of Qatar and provide a space where citizens and expatriate can express their support for the state through inscribing personal messages (Bukhari 2017). While there have been no public demonstrations or protests as these are not part of the subject political culture of Qatar, these banners and posters displaying pictures of the members of the royal family that were present in almost every family majlis served as a representation of public opinion and a show of mass solidarity. In addition, virtual platforms like Twitter which mimic the atmosphere of traditional majlis have been increasingly utilized by Qatari citizens as spaces for sharing hashtags to express their solidarity with the ruling family5 and counter smear campaigns against Qatar during 5  A variety of hashtags enjoyed widespread popularity and were retweeted by Qatari citizens and expatriates alike in both Arabic and English including #iloveqatar, #qatarisnotalone,

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the crisis.6 When societal interaction in the form of the majlis and social media (e.g. Twitter) is considered, their role in the political culture is more in a collective manner rather than a pure individual one (Putnam 1995). This brings a more diverse approach than mainstream political culture theory, which mostly refers to an individual or professionally organized network level of political bargain and political opinion. The concept of social capital refer to here refers to “features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam 1995, pp. 664–665). Definition of social capital frames any social engagement and network in a given society as tools for facilitating coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 2000). As such, the expansion of the traditional majlis and recent engagement in social media platforms such as Twitter are examples of such social capital. The majlis al-shura or Advisory Council is also an example of traditional but slightly modernized version of political expression. Shura or ‘consultation’ itself is a traditional concept within Islam that has been elaborated upon by both Classical and Modern Islamic political thought and has taken on the modern meaning of a sort of consultative council that advises Muslim political rulers and represents a type of democratic yet Islamic mechanism (Goddard 2002). According to the Constitution of Qatar Article 77: the “Al-Shoura Council shall consist of forty-five Members thirty of whom shall be elected by direct, general secret ballot; and the Emir shall appoint the remaining fifteen Members from amongst the Ministers or any other persons” (Constitution of Qatar 2003). Established in 1972 as the state’s only political body, majlis al-shura has legislative authority defined by the constitution as such its members are appointed by the Emir for four-year terms to debate legislations and issue recommendations (Bahry 1999). This majlis continues to evolve today as witnessed by the November 2017 appointment of four women to the council for the first time in the history of Qatar (“Qatar Appoints four women to Shura

#istandwithqatar, #fiftydayssincetheseige, #QatarWins, #WeAreQatar, #TamimtheGlorious, #Tamimalmajd—to name only a few. 6  An analysis of anti-Qatar propaganda bots on Twitter by Jones (2017) identified the presence of an organized, orchestrated campaign to spread claims against Qatar and finds that such bots are a cyber-tool used during the crisis as a form of intra-GCC diplomatic warfare; “Hacking, bots and information wars in the Qatar spat”. Project on Middle Eastern Political Science Briefings: The Qatar Crisis 31 (October 2017).

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council”, 2017).7 While majlis al-shura is not an elected body, it is an example of a locus for political expression or consultancy in a society where subject political culture exists. In the Qatari context, the role of this c­ ouncil was described by interviewees as being non-existent or limited yet positive by participants with P2 noting, “It is good because there is a room for sharing issues with the ordinary people—leaders of the tribes I mean.” A third dimension of state and society in the Gulf refers to the micro and macro politics of mutual expectations from each other. Although both tribal values and Islam play a role on such mutual expectations, there are also new dimensions to this relationship based on changes in world politics. According to Gellner’s concept of civil society, the lack of civil society in Muslim societies like Qatar could be attributed to the presence of a form of social solidarity in Qatari society that is based on Islam and tribal and kin solidarities (Gellner 1994). Yet, other studies have attributed the lack of civil society and democracy in predominantly Muslim countries to non-Islamic factors or established a connection between Islamic concepts within political cultures—shura/consultation, ikhtilaf/disagreement, ijtihad/independent interpretation, and ijma’/consensus—as having positive correlations with democratic norms.8 Similarly, Mujani has suggested that collectively performed, Islamic rituals represent an important form of civic engagement while stressing sensitivity to context or looking at the understanding and practice of Islam in a particular Muslim society.9 Thus, while the practice of Wahhabi Islam is practiced by the majority of Gulf societies, its specific dynamics within Qatar and how it affects state and society relations may differ from neighboring states. Similarly, while Al-Zoby and Baskan (2014) agree that tribalism and Islam are the definite roots of the political system and traditions of Gulf societies, they also contest the importance of contextualizing state and society relations in the Gulf within the wider regional and international sense by taking into consideration the effects of global politics and regional change (Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014). Thus, the role of Arab Spring, the current GCC crisis, or periodic downturns in oil prices impact the dynamics of state and society relations, particularly how these two entities perceive one another. For example, 7  Qatar appoints four women to Shura Council. (2017). Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera. com/news/2017/11/qatar-appoints-women-shura-council-171109165044169.html 8  For additional references, refer to Mujani, S. Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. (Ohio State University, 2003), 349–350. 9  Ibid.

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participants described the ongoing blockade of Qatar as potentially having a positive effect on civil engagement in Qatar, “Yes, before there was not much interest in the politics, but now everyone feels responsible toward the country. So lots are educating themselves about politics and try to see in which way a person can [be] involved.” A fourth dimension of state and society relations in the Gulf is an alternative to the conventional rentier state approach and argues that it is important that the intricacies of the societies of the Gulf be explored despite similarities in their state systems (Al-Zoby and Baskan 2014). When the political culture of Arab Gulf States is looked at as heterogeneous and state-society relations are not emphasized, discussions of the political system are reduced to region-level analysis, which lacks nuance and specificity.

Set of Orientations: Deference and Mutual Expectations When we go back to the question of sets of orientations within Qatari society, two main characteristics are found to exist within the political culture of Qatar. These sets of orientations are defined in this research with combination of the theoretical framework of political culture and political history of Qatar. The first dimension of Qatari political culture is deference. This is a very typical set of orientation for the political culture in totalitarian systems and for subject political culture (Almond 1956; Almond and Verba 1963). Social capital helps us in regard of the nature of deference in Qatari context. Although there is an accepted level of deference to the state, social capital referring the context of majlis, social media, and khutbat al-­ jumah10 enables society to engage with social and local ways of political bargaining in Qatar. When societies have high level of social capital through which trust and “horizontal ties of mutual involvement” abound, political culture benefits from that accumulation (Rotberg 1999, p. 339). Since Qatar is a monarchy, formal and institutional ways of political participation are clearly hierarchical and, thereby, vertical. However, with help of social capital the society when politically engaged via informal 10  This refers to the sermon that is given during the Friday noon prayer that male Muslims of the age of maturity are required to pray in congregation. This sermon may be crafted to address current political, social, or economic concerns.

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gatherings opens channels for horizontal state-society relations. For example, one participant noted, “I can say that these media outlets have helped most of Qatari people to know more about politics and knowing more doesn’t always mean a good thing. And it can be said that theses outlets have in somehow changed the way Qataris engage in politics in a way that mad them more aware about politics, knowing that many Qataris were not interested in politics before the crisis, but because they wanted to know more about the issue, so they have created twitter accounts to follow the news.” Secondly, Qatari political culture is based on mutual expectations of the state and society. The role of the state is to guarantee the welfare and security of the citizens through providing economic security and welfare benefits and the role of citizens is to show positive acceptance of this centrally controlled political system. This is not the same as deference because this dimension is based on the state’s ability to fulfill its roles by providing for its citizens. This connection between the welfare of citizens and political satisfaction is examined in a seminal study on cross-cultural differences and political culture by Inglehart (1988). In his initial stage of discussion of political culture, the concept is analyzed within rational choice theory (RCT). However, RCT sees political culture through the universalist approach wherein all people have the same rational choice without any consideration of personal preferences or the emotions on the ground. Thus, it underestimates the role of the unique, local characteristics of societies. Rational choice models based on economic variables have been dominant in the social analysis since the late 1960s despite their tendency to ignore cultural factors. Inglehart argues that it is not possible to investigate societies by looking at only economic factors because cultural dimensions like religion impact people’s voting behavior. Of course, economic factors are important and impact the political culture of a society. For example, an analysis of political culture within Muslim societies must address the role of Islam just as an analysis of political culture within Latin America must explore the role of Catholic Church (Inglehart 1988). Similarly, he argues that personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing political order are components of civic culture. These dimensions vary both cross-culturally and over time, which makes the political culture something that can change according to the overall life satisfaction of citizens. According to his study, there is a linear association between economic development and life satis-

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faction and interpersonal trust among the masses in the European context. Put differently, economic development profoundly impacts people’s satisfaction of life and intra-societal trust. This is important as it demonstrates role of economic welfare on people’s perspective toward the political order as only the three undeveloped countries, Mexico, Portugal, and South Africa were found to favor radical change in their countries. Hence, he argues that “autonomous and reasonably enduring cross-cultural differences exist and that can have important political consequences” (Inglehart 1988, p. 1205). This association between satisfaction and political culture is quite visible in the Qatari case. Qatar is a welfare state, which covers education and health, and provides many other forms of social spending on its citizens (Kamrava 2013). The welfare state perspective has a very wide scope and contains the state’s policies for development of human capital. Thus, distribution of the state’s opportunities to the citizens and investment on human capital are two duties of the Qatari state that factor into the mutual expectations upon which state-society relations are built. Hence, development of human capital is a central issue in the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2030) (Qatar National Vision 2020, 2008). The four pillars of the national vision—human, social, economic, and environmental development—emphasize developing society by investing heavily in building human capital to achieve lasting prosperity. QNV 2030 aims to reach its goals in regard to human capital by focusing on education to create a physically and mentally healthy, national labor force with a strong sense of a shared identity based on Arab culture and Islamic values. This emphasis on investing in human capital via state spending on programs to enhance the capacity of its citizens is a crucial element of the strategy employed by Qatar’s absolute monarchy to sustain state and society relations via a political culture based on inter-personal trust and satisfaction. Speaking of this investment, one participant described the duties of the Qatari state and its citizens as “The government should help in keeping security and [a] good welfare system and people should appreciate and protect their land and help the government by educating self and be a good citizen internally and internationally.” Thus, high congruence between culture and political structure will serve to foster further allegiance to the state instead of the apathy or alienation apparent when political culture and functional ­political structures exhibit weak congruence or incongruence (Almond and Verba 1963).

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Conclusion: A Transformation? This chapter aims to discuss state-society relations in Qatar with special focus on the political culture and its relationship to national identity. In this regard, the theory of political culture is introduced in detail by referencing two seminal works: Almond and Verba (1963) and Inglehart (1988). Among the three types of political culture proposed by Almond and Verba, Qatari political culture adheres to subject political culture as its political system is an absolute monarchy. Two sets of orientations within Qatari political culture—deference and mutual expectations—are defined in this research, which is not done so far to the best of our knowledge. The application of these sets of orientation is based on the welfare state system within Qatar and reflected in its investments on human capital. In conclusion, findings suggest that there may be a rising form of new nationalism taking root in Qatar that has been sparked by the current Gulf crisis and is linked to Qatari political culture and its relationship to increased political participation in informal venues and multiple macroand micro-level streams of identity construction at both the society and state levels. These two developments may indicate that important transformations are taking place within Qatari political culture that could have lasting effects on its political system. Indeed, according to a study conducted in 2016 that looked at the civic culture of the Arab world based on a comparative analysis of World Values Survey Data, Qatar along with Tunisia was one of the only Arab countries to score a total variance that showed the possibility of becoming and being consolidated as a democracy in the next decade (Tausch 2016). Indeed, the likelihood of such a development also was raised by interviewees, particular in the words of P3 on the topic of expectations of Qatari citizens from the government after the imposition of the blockade, “Qataris might be aspiring for more political participation; they feel more encouraged to be involved after the blockade. The government is happy with the unity and loyalty people showed during the blockade and it might give people more room to participate in politics.” Further quantitative and qualitative investigation of the elements of political culture in Qatar that have been identified by this study is needed to provide empirical evidence on the likelihood of such a development in the future.

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CHAPTER 5

“The Side Door Is Open”: Identity Articulation and Cultural Practices in Post-­Arab Spring Kuwait Emanuela Buscemi

Introduction In 2011–2013, Kuwait experienced a local version of the Arab Spring. Spurred by mobilizations in Tunisia and Egypt, tens of thousands of people, among which were many women and youth, rallied to protest against corruption demanding reforms. The government reacted repressing the manifestations and criminalizing activism. Activists, thus, have resorted to alternative and informal venues for the articulation of their political dissent, elaborating cultural projects and adopting subdued and nonconfrontational tones. Social change in Muslim Arab countries as Kuwait can be best addressed through the work of sociologist Asef Bayat and the conceptualizations of social nonmovements and noncollective actors (1997) to account for a broad social approach to Arab activism and dissent. These concepts are articulated not only through revolutions, protests, acts of defiance or open

E. Buscemi (*) University of Monterrey (UDEM), Monterrey, Mexico © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_5

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manifestations of dissent per se, but also through small, minute challenges to the dominant national rhetoric encompassed in “mundane practices of everyday life” (Bayat 2009). A creative delegitimization (Herrera and Bayat 2010) ensues, combining silence as a transformative marker, and dissent as a form of action operated in the interstices between civil society and the state, where culture can be conceptualized as “a disposal of power” (Bhabha 1994). Historically, and arguably to support projects of nation building and regime perpetuation, civil society has been relatively livelier in Kuwait than in other Gulf countries, and citizens have engaged in charities and associations, both secular and religiously inspired. Limited access to the main loci of institutional political debate, like the National Assembly, is peculiar to three main groups: youth, women and the bidūn (stateless). Through the construction of resistant identities (Buscemi 2017), these groups embody the contradictions and limits of a nationalistic cultural order, displaying varied and conflicting social and political practices. The recent emergence of groups, collectives, associations and platforms  active in civil society, however, is marked by a conscious choice to operate outside official channels of participation and refusing state sponsorship. Informality allows for flexibility and adaptability of these fluid civic structures, while avoiding government censorship (see section “Classical Theories About Civil Society and the Public Sphere”). As government repression escalated, with the detention of protestors, increased censorship over social and traditional media, and cracking down on freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch 2015), activists have turned to civil society and renewed forms of civic engagement or have reactivated already existing ties. The shift of political socialization and activism, and the extension of the political debate to more informal venues of participation, the aggregating role of social media and the elaboration of new projects of participation in society highlight a disaffection toward traditional politics and its expressions. This chapter investigates the political and social role of activists in contemporary Kuwait, and how the articulation of their engagement in civil society contests and challenges dominant cultural and political paradigms, allowing for new identity markers to be explored. The analysis will focus on the cultural roots and manifestations of local activism through everyday cultural practices, carving new spaces of autonomy and expressions of identity, while allowing for new forms of social interaction to occur. A re-­ appropriation of voice is thus endorsed through cultural and political practices of emancipation, in an attempt to overcome and erase social constraints and cultural barriers.

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The current research, by examining political practices carried out through cultural activism in society, investigates the articulation of identity in post-Arab Spring Kuwait. In so doing, the chapter contributes to the thematic topic of identity construction in the Arab Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula by analyzing identity as a category of analysis and practice (Brubaker 2013). Moreover, the focus on civil society allows for the examination of processes for navigating identities between social constructions and political negotiations, capturing the broader perspective of Gulf countries. Narratives from two ethnographic fieldworks with social and political activists ground the theoretical perspective while opening up interrogatives on national identity, as well as generational and political identity. This chapter, thus, situates Kuwaiti cultural and political activism within the broader theme of identity construction in the Arab Gulf and the Middle East. The chapter draws upon two ethnographies through participant observation carried out in Kuwait in 2013, and between 2013 and 2016, on Kuwaiti women in the street protests,1 and women’s cultural and political agency, respectively. Both ethnographies were based on open interviews.2 The data collected also include personal communications with friends, colleagues and students, as well as secondary sources. Research participants and gatekeepers included university students, advocates for the rights of the bidūn (stateless population), activist of local human rights groups, founders or participants in farmers’ markets and community gardens, established artists, engaged scholars, sports advocates, writers and entrepreneurs from different backgrounds in terms of socioeconomic milieu, education, age group, civil status, religious and tribal affiliation.

The Current Debate About Democratization and Civil Society The Arab Uprisings focused the world’s attention on the Middle East taking analysts, governments and the international community by surprise (Bayat 2017). Much of the current debate on the area revolves around the role of 1  Interviews with activists from the Kharamat Watan protests were co-conducted with Samyah Alfoory in 2013. 2  Interviewees’ names from the first set of interviews have been changed in order to protect their anonymity. For the second set of interviews, real names have been maintained, as per expressed wish of the participants.

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civil society in enhancing democratic reforms, possibly following the linear paths of democratization according to the model of the transitions to democracy that occurred in Eastern Europe and South America in the 1980s–1990s (Linz 1986; O’Donnell et al. 1986) during which civil society and reform from below constituted the main determinants for social and political change. The transition model from authoritarian state to democratic rule is best assured by power-sharing methods of government and state institutions subjected to the rule of law, progressively empowering or self-empowering society (Sajoo 2002). Alternative theories have been crafted to explain interrupted transitions to democracy in the form of authoritarian resilience (Hinnebusch 2006) or liberalized autocracies (Brumber, 2002, quoted in Arts and Cavatorta 2013). However, the role of civil society as a cornerstone of democratization and democratic theory and practices remains unperturbed (Browers 2006). In other words, the assumption that an active and vibrant civil society is both the prerogative of a successful transition to democracy, and simultaneously an indicator of a functioning democratic government, is here discussed against the backdrop of local specificities that might be otherwise overlooked. As Paul Arts and Francesco Cavatorta point out: [L]iterature [has been] ignoring informal and unofficial loci of dissent and activism. This has led to neglect potential actors and milieus of dissent production that might marginally exist under the ‘official’ surface [as] marginal realities of activism. (2013, pp. 3–4)

What is here discussed and investigated is the inability of the “transition paradigm” (Arts and Cavatorta 2013, p.  4) to explain and theorize the Arab Spring movements and their aftermath, as well as the need to employ original theories adapted to the local context. It is, however, important to analyze classical conceptualizations of civil society, power and political processes, moving from a classical politological and Western approach to alternative theories incorporating a postcolonial and decolonial perspective. Classical Theories About Civil Society and the Public Sphere Classical theories of civil society entail a direct and inescapable link with liberal democracy and, hence, processes of transition to democracy. Theories dating back to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cohen and Arato 1992) focused on individual citizens as rational beings whose actions are

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guided by the pursuit of the highest personal interest and, by virtue of an invisible hand, extend their benefits to the entire society (Smith 1993). Adam Smith individuated rationality and personal interest as the foundation of apolitical or pre-political human relations (Boyd 2013) and was influenced by Alexis de Toqueville (2003) in his studies on society and moral sentiments (Smith 2006). Other contractarians like Hobbes and Locke predominantly viewed civil society as opposed to a state of nature, a community of civility and order against brutality and arbitrariness (Boyd 2013). Much later, Habermas and Arendt conceptualized civil society as “an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction [that] is central to democratic theory and practice” (Villa 1992). Habermas paired civil society with the public sphere as a sort of political society. Moreover, Habermas’ social theory correlates the public sphere in a democratic setting to the level of participation and to the degree of elaboration of discourse in society (Calhoun 1992). Gramsci, on the other hand, insists on the anti-­ hegemonic nature of civil society to confront authoritarianisms as well as authoritarian involutions of democratic regimes. In his view, the autonomy of civil society both from the state and the market creates a social and physical space where culture flourishes and at the same time allows the articulation of resistance and action (Gramsci 1971). Seen as classical theories of civil society and the public sphere focus on liberal settings and prerogatives, in order to analyze activism in the Middle East alternative and more geographically specific theories will conceptualize and contextualize local prerogatives and societies. Alternative Conceptualizations of Civil Society and the Public Sphere Middle Eastern and Arab Muslim countries constitute a very heterogeneous area characterized by differences and cleavages. Scholars have attempted to account for a thorough and more fitting analysis of Middle Eastern civil society and its relationship with the (authoritarian) state in terms of processes, actors and institutions by incorporating postcolonial and decolonial critique as political epistemology. These approaches focus on nontraditional actors and techniques of (subdued) opposition that have been detected in different countries before and after the Arab Spring. For the purposes of the chapter I will concentrate on those theories that best describe and delineate Kuwait’s civil society and actors.

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Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat refer to subversive accommodation as [M]anoeuvring within the constraints and making the best of what is available […], extending between accommodation and subversion […], operat[ing] within and thus us[ing] the dominant (constraining) norms and institutions […] to accommodate their […] claims, but in so doing they creatively redefine and subvert the constraints of those codes and norms. (2010, p. 18)

Moreover, social nonmovements as the cumulative actions of individual actors (Bayat 2009) contribute a new perspective and lexicon to classical scholarship. Bayat’s theory of social change in the Middle East relies heavily on the assumption that everyday challenges to the status quo in the form of mundane practices of daily life encompass a degree of creativity entailing transformative effects (Baker 2002, p.  171). In similar terms, Arts and Cavatorta maintain: [O]pposition […] organizations that dissent from current authoritarian practices do not seem able and do not have the necessary ideological and material resources to challenge the incumbent authoritarian regimes in the Middle East […]. This leads many activists to accept the regime’s framework, to which they adapt by trying to maximise their results in the knowledge that any antisystemic approach will not work. (2013, p. 8)

Benoit Challand, on the other hand, refers to the counter-power of civil society and its ability to forge a new political imagery in the Arab World to contrast authoritarian rule: a new political subjectivity is thus formed: I have in the past defined civil society as a source for collective autonomy, […] limiting the Western-centrism of its European genealogy [in] an attempt to escape the necessary view that civil society is a residual category and cannot therefore be applied to a situation with a weak or even absent state apparatus […]. Protests entail a radical break from fragmented social structures. (2011, pp. 271–283)

Challand’s considerations reignite the discussion about the presence and role of local versions of civil society and contribute to analyzing oppositional manifestations in authoritarian settings and postcolonial contexts.

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Civil Society in the Middle East Civil society in the Middle East is conceived as the residual space between the state and the family, entailing notions of citizenship, kinship and belonging. In the Arab Muslim world, civil society has acquired two different connotations: while al mujtama al madani denotes a more urban concept of collective activism and civic organizations, al mujtama al ahli expresses religiously inspired formations. These overlap with opposing concepts of citizenship that have been developing along tribal lines and kinship as opposed to urban settlements, namely jinsiyya and tabaiyya. The patriarchal kinship continuities between the family and the state, together with wasta (brokerage) systems, strengthen tabaiyya as a form of membership in the state to the detriment of the jinsiyya paradigm of citizenship (Longva 2005). I argue that, while al mujtama al madani relates and responds to a jinsiyya construction of citizenship as participation and membership in a community, al mujtama al ahli refers to allegiance and membership in groups  and tribes, and considers its members as subjects, according to tabaiyya. However, the distinction between the two forms of civil society tends to be blurred in everyday life, encompassing fluid experiences defying and redefining the mentioned dichotomy. During the Arab Spring-inspired protests, the jinsiyya model of citizenship was reclaimed in the streets, evoking membership in the community and civic engagement and countering the prevailing tabaiyya model (Buscemi  2020). In relation to the role of the state, moreover, in Kuwait the government has alternatively promoted different concepts of citizenship, shifting support and benefits provided to opposite factions, according to adapting strategies of power consolidation (Buscemi 2016). The Kuwaiti National Assembly is the first established parliament in the Gulf. The local civil society, as a result, has been traditionally vocal, and citizens have engaged in charities and associations, both secular and religiously inspired. Political debate, however, is mainly channeled through diwaniyyas, domestic gatherings for men organized along tribal and sectarian divides, reproducing the existing societal cleavages. Diwaniyyas, traditionally led by heads of families or tribes, pre-date the Parliament as loci for the articulation of political debate and interests, providing patronage and brokerage. Limited access to traditional political

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debate is reserved to youth, women and the bidūn (stateless). With the Arab Spring and the later censorship and criminalization of political activism across the region, social actors traditionally excluded from formal sites of power have emerged among the most active groups in the protests. In the post-Arab Spring, these groups have acted as nontraditional actors (Arts and Cavatorta 2013), privileging indirect confrontation and informal venues (Alhamad 2008), outside of established and formal channels.

The Kuwaiti Arab Spring Antecedents Kuwait has always been a relatively lively country in terms of civil society groups and initiatives, traditionally sponsored or initiated by the government. Occasionally, however, citizens have taken to the streets, either to defend their country from external rule or to advocate for reform and democratization. These events, I argue, have represented and embodied a learning process whereby activists have been familiarized with campaigning techniques and methodologies. A first significant event was the 1991 resistance movement to the Iraqi Invasion. During the seven-month occupation women led the resistance while men operated in the underground armed opposition or fled abroad. After the liberation, women and youth engaged in an extensive campaign for the extension of suffrage, which was granted only many years later, in 2005, while the first four women MPs were elected in 2009. Since the beginning of the 2000s, women and youth have taken to the streets and reappropriated the cultural and social arenas with new forms of political practices, mobilizing for reform and democratization, like they did in 2005 with the extension of the suffrage. In 2006 the orange youth-­ led reform movement Nabiha Khams (“«We want five») focused on electoral redistricting to contrast vote-buying and corruption, successfully imposing a plan staunchly sustained from below. Another important moment for civic activism was the 2009 Irhal («Leave») campaign directed at the Prime Minister requesting his resignation over corruption allegations. The activists capitalized on the acquired skills for the subsequent street protests, especially the Karamat Watan («A Nation’s Dignity») campaign, the biggest in Kuwait’s history.

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The Karamat Watan Campaign The Karamat Watan campaign was motivated and inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, mobilizing tens of thousands of people. Nontraditional political actors, such as women, youth and the stateless population, gathered to request the full application of the 1962 Constitution in order to promote the democratic prerogatives originally foreseen in the document. Lameen, a human rights activist and a lawyer, explains: “We went back to take the streets” (2013). Here Lameen evocates the resistance to the Iraqi invasion and highlights the role of women both during the occupation and in the course of Karamat Watan, thus linking resistance to oppression to activism for reform and democratization. A feminist liberal lawyer, Lameen took part to the protests together with her mother, who had been active during the resistance to the Iraqi invasion. She also points out how, during the demonstrations, activists were waving the Kuwaiti flag to display loyalty to the country and wearing orange-colored scarves and accessories to remind of the Nabiha Khams movement, and the strength of reform campaigns from below. Nontraditional actors not only participated in the demonstrations but also actively contributed to the diffusion of information through social media, mobilizing participants and international groups alike, contributing to the organization of the marches and giving speeches during rallies (Buscemi 2020). As Farah recalls: A sit-in was organized in front of the […] Ministry of Justice. Lots of women [attended]: sisters, mothers, wives, lawyers, social activists, human rights advocates, all organized by a group of women, staying in the cold, taking decisions. (2013)

Political repression and increased vigilance over the media ensued, to the point that some activists, including members of the ruling family, were stripped of their citizenship, and others targeted as unpatriotic. Hala, a protest organizer, reflects on the way her political engagement has evolved as a consequence of the government sanctions: Now […] I take a low profile. I don’t post pictures when I go to diwaniyyas and when I go to prison to visit friends […]. I do not ask permission to my parents, but do not want to […] hurt them. (2013)

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The kinship nature of the national bond emerges clearly from Hala’s words, as she expresses her fear to taint the family name or have government censorship target her family members as a consequence of her actions. Hala’s narrative also highlights how engagement in street protests occasionally meant overstepping the gender divide and breaking symbolic barriers in terms of visibility and respectability. Zahra, an Islamic feminist from an Islamist family, took part in the Karamat Watan demonstrations with her mother: “Activism is not my cup of tea, but I have to do something […], I feel it as a responsibility on everyone […]. The Arab Spring affected us, but as a country Kuwait was already boiling” (2013). Activists’ words emphasize the process of empowerment and the debate on identity, belonging and a renewed concept of citizenship emerging from nontraditional actors.

Post-Arab Spring Kuwait: Identity, Engagement and Everyday Life In post-Arab Spring Kuwait new forms of engagement were forged around a politicized concept of culture. Manuel Castells has identified identity as an eminently relational process whose significances are developed through social interaction: “the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning” (1997, p. 6). Identity construction, then, acquires meaning in relation to cultural purposes through three main processes: while legitimizing identity is the process elaborated by the authoritarian state to secure allegiance and obedience, resistance identity is the product of a confrontation with authoritarian institutions and the dominant culture, typical of activists and protest organizers in the course of the Arab Spring. As a consequence of the repression and criminalization of protesters, activists in Kuwait have demobilized their confrontational stance while modifying the forms of their engagement according to the elaboration of a project identity (Castells 1997). In other words, culture has become a politicized outlet where activists have resumed their action, albeit through more subdued tones, to overcome censorship while building upon identity and resistance values. As such, this process has triggered a multiplier effect, mobilizing non-activists and expanding the scope of this renewed cultural resistance (Duncombe 2002).

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An important feature of this activism is its everyday component. Quotidian cultural projects obliterate the exceptionality of the protests to shift  the political message to everyday life. The recent emergence of groups, collectives, associations and platforms active in civil society through cultural engagement in the arts, environment and preservation, architecture and solidarity with deprived groups is marked by a conscious choice to operate outside official channels of participation and refusing to seek state sponsorship. Informality allows for flexibility and adaptability of these fluid civic structures while avoiding government censorship. Moreover, alternative communities and social bonds are developed, enhancing horizontal forms of engagement and producing democratizing discourses and practices (Buscemi 2018). State Sponsorship and Civil Society Organizations in Kuwait According to the Kuwaiti Constitution, the right to form associations and unions is granted by Article 43, provided they conform to the law. However, the legal framework regulating civil society organizations is very restrictive, amounting to almost full government powers and control (International Center for Not-For-Profit Law 2017): organizations need official approval prior to starting their operations (registration), nationality requirements reduce non-nationals participation, and fundraising restrictions are applied. Close supervision is maintained mainly through the Ministry of Social Affairs, which can dissolve a civil society organization board over misconduct or mismanagement of funds (The University of Texas at Austin Liberal Arts, Civil Society n.d.). Government authorities, thus, retain discretional and regulatory power, including censorship. What Quintan Wiktorowicz maintains on government control over civil society organizations in Jordan is valid for the case of Kuwait, too: Once created, these organizations [are] embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes which allow those in power to monitor and regulate collective activities. This web reduces the possibility of a challenge to the state from civil society […]. Under such circumstances, civil society institutions are more an instrument of social control than a mechanism of collective empowerment. (2000, p. 43)

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Informal organizations have been tolerated; however, government discretionality can seriously affect them. The promoter of an informal farmers’ market and a community garden elaborates about the difficult relationship with the authorities: “The more popular we became, the more they kept an eye on us and then gave us trouble” (Maryam 2016), including cutting off electricity and bulldozing the garden. Moreover, a grey area of unregulated and informal entrepreneurship is home businesses, escaping official figures on private initiative in Kuwait: “Whether they’re regulating small businesses or not, they’re happening […], whether or not they’re regulating grassroots movements, they’re happening” (personal communication 2016). These words mark the ineluctability of the development of civil society organizations and a parallel informal economy based on small trades, exchanges, donations and gifts, contrasting government concessions and rigid regulations, as well as state patronage. Government discretionality on civil society organizations also operates to counter alternative agendas from emerging social groups. Following a paternalistic and corporatist nature of the state, the Kuwaiti government has historically alternatively supported or promoted specific civil society groups over others according to priorities of state formation and consolidation (Buscemi 2016). This has been particularly evident in the case of women’s groups and political parties (alMughni 2010; Buscemi 2016). Censorship has had an important effect on women’s rights agenda, delaying the extension of the suffrage to 2005 or privileging Islamist women’s movements to the detriment of more liberal ones. Despite there being no formal nor legal ban on political formations, in fact, political parties are not allowed in Kuwait, even though the establishment has somehow tolerated the existence of blocs or informal political groups. Political accountability of popular representatives is, thus, very low, while corruption cases are widespread. State control over civil society formations and institutions reveals how the regime in Kuwait fosters a citizenship model privileging tabaiyya over jinsiyya, allegiance over of loyalty, and a legitimizing form of identity over resistance while it  projects identity for its own perpetuation in power. As Norton notes: Regional governments have often sought to depoliticize the public space by discouraging and dissuading any efforts by citizens to organize groups or

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initiatives independent of efforts expressly blessed by government. But the instruments of authoritarian power are vertical by nature and are not always well suited to controlling the horizontal [dimension]. (2006a; 2006b, p. 4)

An increasing number of organizations has therefore refused to seek state sponsorship to allow for political and financial independence from the government, thus enjoying a higher degree of flexibility. As Lubna, a social activist and home-business owner elaborates: [My mother and I] planned that we would have a place where people would come together […]. Now people come in […], whether I’m here or not. «Lubna, we have a meeting» [they say], and I [reply] «Come! The side door is open» […]. We’re creating a community based on complete trust […], very symbiotic, very interconnected. (2016)

This process generates debate and enhances dialogue, promoting democratic and reform practices in the horizontality of the interpersonal relationships, in the absence of rigid structures and rules, in the creativity of action. A social solidarity (Thijssen 2012), thus, emerges, within a new social framework, allowing for new practices of sociability and new forms of socialization, new spaces and spatial experiments where narratives are reformed also through memories of resistance (Buscemi 2018). To escape censorship, these formations rely on the informality of their activities and on an “under the radar” approach (Sandra 2015). To this regard, Maryam elaborates on the effect the community garden she promoted had on her grandmother: My grandmother wouldn’t understand the idea [of the community garden]. [She] thinks I am wasting my life, and «How would I defend you?» […]. She used to make fun of the neighbors, because they are not from her social Kuwaiti group […]. And now she goes [to the garden]. And they sit, they have their spot […] under a tree […], they have like plastic chairs or chairs from everywhere […], they take turns to make coffee. That’s what I wanted, you know? (Maryam 2016)

Maryam’s words well exemplify the extent and even material effects of this subtle political and social change that Kuwait is experiencing in the

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post-Arab Spring, also underlying the role and interconnections between political and social generations involved in the process of change through actions and narratives (Mannheim 1952). Civil Engagement and Political Practices Participants’ narratives exemplify the quotidian engagement of activists and citizens in civil society to foster social and political change in Kuwait, promoting events or habits, building spaces, creating encounters, crafting alternatives, inhabiting niches and adopting subdued tones. Reem, an entrepreneur, private sector employee and human rights activist, explains the reason of her engagement in society: “People always complain […]. In university, I decided I needed to do something […] and change things” (Reem 2015). Beyond the image of passive and subjugated Arab women, Reem feels a responsibility toward her country to actively promote change. Like Reem, many other people in Kuwait engage in cultural projects: urban spaces, gardening communities, art collectives, design forums, itinerant markets, mixed cultural diwaniyyas, organic lifestyle social gatherings, charities, literary groups, have become a recent feature of local social and cultural life. The relevance of these projects invests the political arena, although in a more nuanced, less confrontational attitude, circumventing government restrictions, pushing the boundaries for a more active and conscientious citizenship, promoting social change and democratic reform and shaping the elaboration of a critical political subjectivity. These experiences and experiments draw upon a heightened “sense of community” while “creating a dialogue and ruffling some feathers” (Shurooq 2015). They also fill in a gap in leisure activities, normally following a shopping malls consumeristic model of consumption, thus widening the pool of informal publics (Baker 2002, p. 65). Civic engagement is rooted in alternative cultural and political practices, reconfiguring identity and belonging. As Sarah Al Hamad, a food writer, explains: “I had this idea of accumulating all the recipes from my childhood into a book […], then I decided to explore the different food venues […] to creatively negotiate my […] need to connect” (Sarah 2015). Through multiple individual or collective projects, community is fostered while re-signifying belonging and citizenship, often operating outside formal channels but reinvigorating a preexisting culture and legacy of civil society formations. However, different tools and methodologies

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are employed, operating a creative delegitimization (Buscemi 2015) of dominant narratives to affect social change while recuperating a sense of community by affinity. The sum total of these cultural projects and experiences challenges the status quo through everyday practices, amounting to what Asef Bayat identifies as social nonmovements (Bayat 2009). As Hussa, a designer and cofounder of a cultural platform, points out: “I feel like we are reviving something that always existed [in] Kuwait, and creating acceptance again for it in society” (Hussa 2015). Through cultural projects, engaged citizens “explore new forms of activism that are not so overtly political, at least superficially” (Arts and Cavatorta 2013, p. 10). Sarah Alfraih, an architect and scholar, returned from the States after receiving her university degree. With four other young women, she cofounded an urban platform: “There was a student-run conference here in Kuwait […], I gave a lecture [on] how you can […] develop a more cohesive understanding of the city” (Sarah Alfraih 2015). She was approached by a fellow young architect and invited to share her ideas with a small group of like-minded women: “And I [told them] «This sounds exactly like what I want to do!»” (Sarah Alfraih 2015). Cultural projects and engagement in civil society and smaller communities has a multiplier effect, as Sarah explains: “One moment you are sitting [by yourself], and the next minute you find like-minded people [who] have a common […] interest and a common drive. It just makes sense [to] come together” (Sarah Alfraih 2015). However, activists are confronted on a daily basis with the need to keep a low profile to avoid government censorship and repression. As Sandra, an entrepreneur and promoter of an environmental film festival, explains: “We didn’t want to draw attention from anyone that might want to restrict [it], even as harmless as [it] is” (2015). As very few activists or intellectuals have directly confronted the government (Buscemi 2017), the great majority prefers to operate keeping a low profile, or “infiltrating the system subtly”, as Ghadah Alkandari, an artist and painter, explains (2015). Similarly, Ebtehal, a scholar and human rights activist who received death threats for her secular positions, prefers to avoid criticism when contributing to local newspapers. She prefers to write “between the lines” (2015), assuring that her readers have developed significant skills in tracing the original meaning of her words. Self-censorship, thus, if on the one hand limits and restricts creative expression, on the other hand can be transformed into an empowering tool to reach wider audiences while hinting at controversial or sensitive themes, contributing to widening the political debate outside of formal loci of political debate.

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Privilege, Community and Everyday Resistance Self-censorship, beyond a mere technical device, represents a common condition for citizens living under authoritarian rule in the Gulf countries. Borders and confines delimit classes, degrees of citizenship and belonging, communities, religious affiliations, ethnic groups, city neighborhood units and much more. Ghadah elaborates on the concepts of limit and its relationship with creativity: “I believe in sticking within a boundary and see where it takes me. That’s [a] challenge” (2015). In Kuwait, physical and symbolic limits also intersect with the privilege derived from nationality, class and kinship: “Being a Kuwaiti I understand that I have a certain kind of privilege, and […] to a certain degree it motivates me to do more”, explains Reem (2015). In the same way as self-censorship, the symbolical border and its implications in terms of social and ethnic cleavages  are inhabited by activists who articulate their political goals of reform and social change. As Nada sums up: “We are [our own] other” (2015). The political elaboration of cultural projects is thus explained: “social change is our mantra” (Hussa 2015). Cultural and civic projectualities revolve around, create, or reimagine communities. In a polarized society, the mere concept of forging alternative communities or re-envisioning old ones is revolutionary. Being together and sharing experiences, food, films, attending an exhibition or a poetry reading, or taking a crafts course generate new forms of interaction and new grammars of engagement and action. The cofounders of a creative platform decided to develop their project when they realized they were not able to answer one simple question: “«Where are the other designers?» […]. ‘They’re around, but we don’t know where they are»” (Hussa 2015). The need to connect and create a network for a community that was scattered and invisible was Hussa’s primary concern. The platform’s annual conferences brought people together and produced unexpected consequences: “A lot of people have been working together after the [annual conference], […] a lot of people changed their jobs” (Hussa 2015). Again, participants elaborate on the multiplier effects of their cultural projects: “There is a lot of potential in Kuwaiti society […], people want things to change” (Reem 2015).

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Conclusion In the course of the chapter the current debate on democratization and civil society has been examined through an investigation of classical and more recent theories on civil society and social movements, the latter inspired by decolonial and postcolonial scholarship. An exploration of the main official loci for the articulation of political debate allows to elaborate on the change produced as a consequence of the local uprisings. In particular, post-Arab Spring activism builds upon resistance practices elaborated during the demonstrations, employing peaceful means and subdued tones to spread the political message of social change. The elaboration of politicized cultural projects entails the informality of the organizational bonds, and the involvement of non-traditional actors, taking the political loci outside of the establishment: The type of activism that non-traditional actors are developing creates new dynamics of interaction between civil society and the regimes, leading to a reconfiguration of the role and objectives of activism. These actors have emerged as civil society actors, but their interests and work do not conform to a traditional understanding of activism […]. It is therefore in wider society, where less formal and looser ties are formed, that one would potentially find democratic potential, highlighting an interesting paradox whereby these actors seeking democracy only found authoritarianism, and those working within authoritarian constraint […] might be leading the way to democratic change. (Arts and Cavatorta 2013, p. 9)

Non-traditional actors, thus, engage in civil society in their everyday life to promote reform and social change, affecting identity and belonging, and enhancing the creation of alternative communities, thus progressively eroding authoritarian rule, and undermining its dominant narratives: “How people resist power and attempt to change society is intimately connected to their creativity and the capacity to challenge already imposed meanings” (Travaglino and Abrams 2017, p. V). Activism through culture, thus, operates to deflect government censorship and sanctions, exercising a multiplier effect on the wider society, and the construction of the identity of its members.

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CHAPTER 6

The Nation and Its Artists: Contemporary Khaleeji Artists Between Critique and Capture Nesrien Hamid

In a piece much shared and contested, Emirati writer and commentator Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi (2013a) argued that Gulf capitals have now supplanted the traditional cultural centers of the Arab world, namely Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad.1 Citing the expanding role the Gulf states have come to play in the regional cultural production, he enumerated the many institutions, festivals, and initiatives that now call the Gulf home, including the infamous Louvre Abu Dhabi, the annual art fair Art Dubai, and Doha’s Museum of Islamic Art. Al Qassemi himself possesses one of the largest collections of modern and contemporary Arab art, overseen by the organization he founded, Barjeel Art (Blair 2015). This novel turn to investing in cultural capital is, of course, part of the Gulf 1  This article was first published in October 2013 in the Washington, DC-based, online news site Al-Monitor. This piece as well as all others, penned by Al Qassemi for Al-Monitor, have since been removed. The article, however, is available on Al Qassemi’s personal website: http://sultanalqassemi.com/articles/thriving-gulf-cities-emerge-as-new-centers-of-arab-world/

N. Hamid (*) Independent Researcher, New York, NY, USA © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_6

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Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ goals of diversifying their corporate portfolios and reducing their dependence on oil. However, beyond their role as sponsors of cultural events and institutions and buyers of art, in recent years Khaleejis have come to contribute significantly to the global arts scene, not just as consumers, but as producers.2 A vibrant modern art practice thrived in many Gulf cities since the early twentieth century, but contemporary young artists are now gaining prominence and garnering attention from some of the world’s most prestigious art institutions (Al Qassemi 2013b). With their increased prominence and recognition both inside and outside the region, artists from the GCC are inevitably playing a role, even if modest, in shaping their societies. Art is an unstable space that can both evade and perpetuate the norms of society (Winegar 2006, pp. 11–15). Indeed, art is an agent that acts on society, shaping it, as much as it is shaped by it. In young countries like the GCC states, national identity, who it includes and excludes, and what constitutes its primary tenets, is subject to much debate and contestation, as they are elsewhere. What role do Khaleeji artists play in shaping each Gulf nation’s imagined community (Anderson 1983)? How does their art engage with state-sanctioned discourses on nationhood? Does their work present any particular ideas on what constitutes the nation? This chapter will analyze the work of three contemporary artists from the Gulf, namely Ahmed Mater, Manal AlDowayan, and the GCC collective, in an attempt to begin answering some of these questions. By analyzing their work, it will illustrate that, without providing readymade narratives for what constitutes the nation, they render it an open, contested project, thereby complicating its past, present, and future. More so, their work, discourse, and engagement with state narratives and institutions reveal a tension between their professed cosmopolitanism and their nation-oriented artistic and discursive practice. There are currently many successful contemporary artists from the Gulf, and focusing on the “art-making” of the aforementioned three is not to valorize them over others.3 Rather, this analysis is limited to Mater, 2  This chapter will use Khaleej, Arab Gulf, Gulf, and GCC interchangeably to refer to the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. Similarly, Khaleeji and Gulf nationals are used as synonyms referring solely to citizens of GCC states (Derderian 2017, 23). 3  In her definition of art-making, Winegar (2006) includes activities that are not restricted to producing art objects. Banal undertakings, such as going to graduate school, getting mar-

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AlDowayan, and the GCC collective in order to explore their art more deeply, and more importantly, because their work engages with questions that are directly relevant to this chapter’s focus and analysis. Additionally, their work has been exhibited worldwide, garnering both national and international attention, and hence, alludes to the often transnational processes of nation building (Salamandra 2005, p. 73). In addition to engaging with some of their artwork, this chapter will analyze their discourse on their work, art in general, and, of course, the nation. To that end, I examined (primarily English) written and video interviews available online, as well as public talks and lectures posted on YouTube. In the case of GCC, I also attended their exhibition and talk at the James Gallery in New York in February 2018, where I directly posed questions to them.

Defining National Identity Much has been written about the different ways national identity was and is constructed in the Arab Gulf countries. Scholarly literature has primarily focused on how forming national identity in the Gulf states has been a top-down project. Many have also noted the conflicts inherent in state-led national projects, which seek to create a coherent national identity from a fragmented tribal past and in the face of encroaching globalizing forces in the present. For example, scholars have looked at the role played by television drama shows in consolidating a normative Gulf dialect, how exposure to Western lifestyles through international shows has led to compartmentalization of public and private life, and marriage laws that depend on shifting notions of patrilineality and gender (Holes 2005; Mourtada-­ Sabbah et al. 2008, p. 129; Dresch 2005). More recently, because of the profusion of museums and heritage projects of various kinds, scholars have turned their attention to the role these institutions play in shaping the nation in the Gulf states. The newly proliferating national museums are a space where the state can decide what and who to include in its narratives of the past and to create an image of national authenticity (cooke 2014, p.  79). The UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have each sponsored archaeological digs with the aim of gathering material artifacts that would further root and validate the nation’s history and provide items to display in museums (Petersen 2016, pp. 103–105). ried, and conversing in coffee shops, are all part of what constitutes art production. Discourse is the most important activity that goes into art-making (pp. 9–10).

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This reimagining of the nation’s history also takes place within galleries, rebuilt “traditional” neighborhoods, and sporting events. miriam cooke (2014), for example, points to how aspects of the past, such as pearl diving, are romanticized and shirked of their harsh and difficult history (pp. 102–103). Others, like camel racing, are a wholly new invented tradition presented as an integral part of the histories of a number of Gulf states (pp. 105–106). She calls this casual borrowing and reinterpretation of the past, “heritage engineering,” insofar as it is an attempt at establishing a deep-rooted genealogy for these otherwise newly formed states. Given this new focus on investing in heritage projects and cultivating cultural capital, what role do contemporary artists play? How does their work engage with these state-led attempts to produce and define national culture?

Art in the Arab Gulf In a special issue of the Journal of Arabian Studies published in August 2017, a number of Gulf experts and scholars were tasked with examining the art and cultural scene in the Gulf. This issue was the result of a two-­ year research initiative organized by the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at Georgetown University in Qatar titled, “Art and Cultural Production in the GCC.” The authors tackle a number of topics, including the role and complicated reception of public art in the Gulf, the ways artists creatively deal with censorship, and how notions of authenticity (or lack thereof)—which are often deployed to discredit the Gulf’s importation of international cultural institutions—are socially and culturally situated (Mounajjed 2017; Demerdash 2017; Derderian 2017). This heightened attention to the burgeoning arts scene in the Gulf points to its importance as a space to examine the inevitable contestations over what constitutes the nation and national culture. To be sure, the visual arts are hardly mainstream in the Gulf, and so, their impact is not comparable to say television or film. However, as anthropologist Jessica Winegar (2006) points out, “attention to a marginalized practice like the visual arts is an especially illuminating way to get at the contours of the production of the nation, because debates over the nation itself are often intensified among those whose relationship to its truth claims is compromised in whatever way” (p. 8). Looking at both the work of artists and their discursive practice, therefore, provides a different perspective on how non-state actors articulate and engage with ideas of nationhood.

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This chapter will draw on anthropologist Alfred Gell’s (1998) conceptualizations of art works as social agents that are produced by and produce certain social arrangements (p. 17). It will not examine aesthetic value or analyze pieces from an “appreciative” perspective, that is looking at their artistic methods or mediums.4 Rather, this chapter is concerned with the social role artworks play, their embeddedness in a specific context, and the “action” they provoke, if any. I will look at a few works of each artist to examine how they variously engage with notions of nationhood, who they include and exclude, the histories they assume and produce, and the futures they seek to construct. Undoubtedly, the Gulf is not unitary, and artists as a class of professionals are not a coherent whole whether within or across national boundaries. They differ in their perspectives, practices, and relations with and attitudes toward both the nation and the international arts scene. The Gulf states also vary in their support for arts initiatives, censorship mechanisms, and, of course, official discourses on nationhood. Nevertheless, there are sufficient parallels for analyses in a particular Gulf state to be relevant in another. The Gulf states have similar histories, specifically the radical transformations brought on by the discovery of oil and the current anxieties over its imminent exhaustion. All six Gulf states, for instance, have turned their attention to the potential of the arts and culture industry to diversify their economies, and more importantly, to project and enhance their global profile (Gray 2017).

Ahmed Mater: Son of the Oil Civilization A trained physician, Ahmed Mater started his artistic career after joining Al-Meftaha Arts Village in Asir in the late 1990s. Al-Meftaha was founded by the governor of Asir at the time, Prince Khalid Al-Faisal, as a unique arts training retreat from which emerged what are now some of Saudi Arabia’s most renowned contemporary artists, including Mater, Arwa Alneami, and Abdulnasser Gharem (Samy 2017). Mater came to international recognition with the exhibition of X-Ray, a piece from his Illuminations series, at the British Museum in London in 2006 (Mishkhas 2006). 4  It is important to point out that the value judgments about art are socially and historically contingent. There are no universal parameters through which to analyze a piece of art or even to deem one as art and another as not. There are no ascendant aesthetic principles that are not produced and perpetuated by certain actors in certain contexts (Winegar 2006, p. 12).

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In a number of works, Mater explores how the oil economy changed life in the Gulf. In a series titled Evolution of Man, Mater probes what oil has meant for the human being. Oil, of course, has ushered in a deluge of wealth and material development in the Gulf states. Nevertheless, in the scramble for progress, much was trampled upon, including humans themselves. The series shows a gas pump that gradually becomes an X-ray of a person holding a gun to their head. Describing this work, he writes, I am a doctor and confront life and death every day, and I am a country man and at the same time[,] I am the son of this strange, scary oil civilization. In ten years our lives changed completely. For me it is a drastic change that I experience every day. (Ahmed Mater n.d.)

Mater, therefore, imbricates his own self in the changes brought about by the petroeconomy. He is aware of its centrality in producing the men and women of his and subsequent generations, and that there is no going back to an idyllic past. To be Saudi is to be simultaneously attached to vestiges of the past and its ways of life and untethered by the rapidity of change to the point of self-destruction. Similarly, in his series Ashab Al-Lal/Fault Mirage: A Thousand Lost Years, Mater overlays images of Saudi Arabia’s past and present landscapes. One piece in the series, for instance, shows a woman reclining on a couch watching television. In the distance, there is a car passing by on an asphalt road and a man standing next to a donkey. Another image shows a car on the road next to a Bedouin family standing amongst their meager belongings in the desert. Unlike the artists miriam cooke (2014) looks at, Mater’s work does not evoke nostalgia so much as presents the discontinuities and contradictions that Saudis are daily confronted with and from which there is no escape (pp. 112–118; pp. 154–160). His work does not assume an essential Saudiness that is hiding below the façade of modernity. The past and present converge not to produce a tribal modern barzakh, but a state of tension and alienation that can only be resolved through acknowledgment and confrontation (pp. 70–76).5 Historian Sean Foley observes: Mater challenges his viewer to become a kind of artist himself: to create the deep connections at which Mater himself only hints. We are dealing here 5  See pp. 70–76 in Tribal Modern for cooke’s definition and elaboration of the concept of barzakh, which derives from the Quran, in the contemporary Gulf states.

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with collage, certainly, but it is collage which becomes collision and finally— perhaps—an unexpected harmony. The work is in a certain sense chordal— functioning as a chord does in music. Various elements, harmonious and dissonant, are all present and in touch with one another. They exist as a fundamental, culture-defining question. What does it mean to be Saudi? What does it mean to have all these elements in simultaneous, conscious insistence? (Foley 2016)

The Saudi Arabia Mater depicts is a contested, ongoing project. Through these contrasts that he overlays and exposes in Fault Mirage, national identity becomes an interpretive undertaking that each person engages in, rather than a predetermined script one simply learns to adopt. Mater thus takes the present as his starting point to ask what could be, not what could have been. It is not the past that concerns him but the future. He acknowledges the entangled history that produced the Saudi nation, shirks any simplistic explanations or dichotomies, and seeks to confront it head on rather than retreat to nostalgic visions of pre-oil life. If the past and present are foreclosed, the future, as a becoming, is still open for reinvention. What future is Saudi Arabia, and humanity in general, hurtling toward? Mater does not provide any answers but his “diagnosis,” damning as it is, also points to the possibility of imagining alternative pathways (Hubbard 2016).

Manal AlDowayan: Gender, Tradition, and the Archive Fellow Saudi, Manal AlDowayan, shifted to a full-time career as an artist after spending ten years working in the oil industry. AlDowayan utilizes multiple mediums, including photography, sculpture, textiles, and immersive installations. Her work has been exhibited in galleries and museums around the world, such the Victoria and Albert in London and the Gwangju Museum of Art in South Korea. Almost all of AlDowayan’s work focuses on gender dynamics and women in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Her work is not so much concerned with challenging tradition or juxtaposing it against a desirable modernity but with redefining what constitutes tradition. Pointing to erasures in history and intentional forgetting, she conceives of her art as an intervention that highlights the erasures and makes visible what they hide. Much of her work is also participatory and includes ordinary women in its creation. Like

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Mater, AlDowayan neither romanticizes the past nor is her work nostalgic. She questions how a particular construction of the past and of tradition is deployed to justify social arrangements in the present. Unlike Mater, however, it is not just the present or the future that is open to reinvention and reinterpretation, but the past as well. In a project titled Esmi-My Name wooden beads bearing female names are strung on a thick rope woven by Bedouin women in the traditional Sadu style and hung from the ceiling, resembling prayer beads. The names are those of women of different ages from all over Saudi Arabia that participated in this project after AlDowayan put out calls in three Saudi cities asking for their contribution. Esmi is a critique of what, according to AlDowayan, has become a prevalent practice in Saudi society where men are ashamed to mention the names of their wives or female relatives in front of other men. Maintaining that this practice has no basis in either Islam or Bedouin tradition, AlDowayan notes, A wonderful hadith illustrates this concept; Amr ibn Al A’as said: The Prophet (PBUH) was asked (“Oh Prophet of God, who is the most beloved to you?” He said: “Aisha”). There are lessons to be learned from this hadith[.] The prophet and the Quran all mention women’s names and have never associated a woman’s name to shame or something that should be hidden. Tribal and Bedouin traditions also use women’s names proudly. (AlDowayan n.d.-a)

In this project, AlDowayan not only critiques a social practice but questions its attribution to tradition. She thus points to how tradition itself is not a given but constructed, negotiated, and most importantly, malleable. Furthermore, in utilizing Sadu, a traditional craft practiced by Bedouin women, she sheds light on an important aspect of Saudi history that is now erased: Bedouin women as primary wage earners. Through these intricate woven works, AlDowayan argues that women prior to the advent of oil were actually men’s equal income providers. She maintains, “Although their communities in the past allowed women and men to be equal earners and financial contributors, today it is the women who live in poverty or have become totally dependent on the earnings of the male members of their families” (AlDowayan n.d.-b). Similarly, in Tree of Guardians, which was another participatory project, AlDowayan made brass leaves and strung them together to create what looks like a shimmering forest. Each participant was asked to con-

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struct a matrilineal family tree that included the names of the generations of females in their respective families as far back as possible. The leaves also included songs and tales that have been handed down from one generation of women to the next. This project centers the female voice in the history of Saudi Arabia and in the continuity of tradition. According to AlDowayan, it is women who have always been the guardians of traditions, of the stories, songs, and customs that are now celebrated as part of the nation’s culture and history. Yet, the role women played and continue to play in keeping tradition alive is marginalized, if not altogether forgotten. For AlDowayan, Tree of Guardians is a family tree but from a female perspective. Men have put forward a vision of Saudi Arabia’s social history that is influenced by external factors, such as political and social relations. But women have a different history . . . and we are trying to promote Saudi customs and traditions from women’s perspective[s]. (Mishkhas 2014)

Through these projects, AlDowayan creates an alternative archive that dislodges the assumed facticity of the officially sanctioned one. She is cognizant that the “archive [is] an ideological tool for constructing national, historical and political narratives that shape a country’s modern-day perception and presentation of itself” (Downey 2015, p.  34). Her work, therefore, centers the female voice in the history of Saudi Arabia by using tradition itself to challenge the patriarchal, male dominance that has thus far defined the nation and limited the public role of women.

GCC: The Neoliberal Nation Perhaps more explicit than either Mater or AlDowayan in questioning Arab Gulf culture and identity as officially articulated by GCC governments, the GCC, whose very name alludes to the regional i­ntergovernmental organization uniting the six Gulf states, is a collective composed of eight artists from the region, seven Kuwaitis, and one Bahraini. The collective was formed in the VIP lounge at Art Dubai in 2013 (“Up and Coming” 2016). In a lot of their work, the GCC parody to excess the bombastic rituals, ostentatious ceremonies, and lavish objects involved in regional diplomacy and image management. Their goal is to lift these objects and images out of their banality and ubiquity in contemporary life in the Gulf so as “to make people aware” of their absurdity (Art Dubai 2015).

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In two of their collections/exhibitions, the GCC demonstrate how official narratives of the past, present, and future converge to perpetuate certain political and economic arrangements. In A Wonderful World Under Construction, the GCC mounted the paraphernalia of a fictitious government campaign of an unidentified GCC government offering PR services, that the government itself used, to its own citizens. The installation, which was exhibited in Kuwait, Miami, and Doha, included a mic on a conference table placed against a backdrop; a billboard showing a desert scape with an outstretched hand holding a generic person in blue who stands in front of an undifferentiated crowd of grayish people; and a screen displaying various logos including a fish, a camel, and a falcon. The whole exhibition makes use of what are now ubiquitous corporate marketing strategies meant to evoke things like efficiency, user-friendliness, and accessibility to point to how the state itself has become a brand concerned with its international and national image. It is no secret that various Gulf states hire PR companies to manage their image abroad, especially in light of criticism over migrant labor (Al-Yasin and Dashti 2009). The GCC explore how this plays out domestically as the government offers both its brand and its ethos of image management as a service to its citizens. Discussing this exhibition, the GCC note: Today, the neoliberal dream of privatization and the false individualism of the curated self have been magnified by the prevalence of social media and particularly by Instagram—which has become a platform for small businesses, turning legions of individuals into low-level, self-branding entrepreneurs. And here we imagine the government stepping in to facilitate this activity in the form of this app, posing as an aid to the citizen while covertly embedding its mechanisms of control. (“1000 Words” 2015)

In Belief in the Power of Belief, the GCC further explore government policy and its desire to create particular kinds of subjects. Specifically, they examine the confluence between “heritage engineering” and the current prevalence of positive-energy professionals in the Gulf (cooke 2014, p. 99). They created ancient-looking reliefs out of video stills and images of positive energy practitioners, who are self-proclaimed experts in the field of self-help and who make use of techniques, such as quantum-touch, to assist people with leading happier and more productive lives. One piece titled “Gestures V” shows a positive-energy professional leading a crowd of seated individuals into what looks like a group meditative/energy healing exercise. Another

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shows a man holding a mic and making a number three gesture with his other hand. The sculpture reads, “What is the secret behind it?” This particular piece references a speech given by the Dubai ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, at the Government Summit in 2013. In this speech, Al Maktoum described the significance behind his new three-finger salute that was meant to dislodge the more popular and ‘Western’ two-fingered peace/victory sign. The sign, which Sheikh Mohammed emphasized, was of his own creation in his desire to forge a distinctive path from Western models, signified winning, victory, and I love you (al-Maktoum 2013, 23:24). When the GCC installed this exhibition at the Berlin Biennale in 2016, they played a voiceover of a woman reading an English translation of a portion of Al Maktoum’s speech in which he discusses the difference between positive and negative energy. In both works, they probe how the GCC states (they do not specify which in their work) are seeking to produce neoliberal citizens. In this project, the past, present, and future are all subservient to capital. Heritage revival, positive psychology, and brand management as technologies for creating an individual identity are ultimately part of the GCC states’ desire to create futuristic citizens that can compete in the global economy and perpetuate the states’ survival (Maziad 2016, p.  123). In exposing the underlying neoliberal logic behind these practices and discourses by the state, the GCC also expose their instability and the possibility that they be challenged and reconfigured. The artwork of Mater, AlDowayan, and the GCC reveals their engagement with ideas of the nation and state discourses around what constitutes it. In their subtle and not-so-subtle critiques, they illustrate that nationhood is an open-ended project, open to interpretation, challenge, and reinvention. They each variously interface with the idea of a national archive and “interpose forms of contingency and radical possibility into the archive that sees it projected onto future rather than historical probabilities” (Downey 2015, p. 15).

Global but Local As their art circulates within the region and around the world, Mater, AlDowayan, and the GCC engage in various discursive practices and participate in the activities of state institutions in ways that further reveal their ideas of and complicated relations with the nation. A tension evident in their work and their discourse on it and their art praxis, in general, is that

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of seeking to be global, an artist primarily, while still maintaining a connection to their countries of origin. For instance, at a talk in August 2013 at the Beyond Borders International Festival of Literature & Thought in Scotland, AlDowayan complained to the audience that it bothers her that whenever she is invited to exhibit her work or is interviewed about it in the West, there is a fixation on casting her as primarily Saudi, and hence, necessarily censored and oppressed (Beyond Borders Scotland 2013). She maintained that she is rarely asked by interviewers about the art itself, the process of creation, and the methods she employs. She further said, I find that this journey within my zones and my borders was quite easy, and building a belonging to my community was easy. But now when I step out, and I want to sort of disconnect from this community that I worked on so long and belong to the global stage, I am being pushed back. We want you to be within that circle so that we can identify who you are. So, what’s popular now in the West is the ‘Middle Eastern show,’ ‘the Arab Women’s show,’ ‘the Saudi Women exhibition.’ (Beyond Borders Scotland 2013, 13:45)

These comments reveal AlDowayan’s ambivalence about being defined as a Saudi artist, and her desire to participate in the global arts scene as an equal, where she is viewed as an artist, rather than typecast as Saudi, Arab, or Middle Eastern. Yet, as noted previously, most, if not all, of her work focuses on issues concerning women in Saudi society, their historical erasure, and the role this plays in maintaining unequal gender dynamics in the present. That she is primarily asked questions about what it means to be a woman in Saudi Arabia or issues of oppression and suppression may indeed be indicative of bias on the part of her Western interlocutors, who view art coming from the non-West as incapable (yet) of graduating to the abstraction of Western high art (Winegar 2006, p. 3). Nevertheless, such questions are certainly inevitable given the issues her work itself addresses. In another interview, by contrast, she was reluctant to deem herself a feminist because “that word comes to us with so much baggage from the West” (Aziza 2016). While she admitted to her interviewer that she does consider herself a feminist, she advocated for an organic feminism rather than an imposed one from outside. Furthermore, she emphasized in this and other interviews, as well as the talk in Scotland, that none of her work is censored in Saudi Arabia. She was never prevented from showing her

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work, and, in fact, it always garnered positive press coverage in the Kingdom. She repeatedly pointed out the possibility of dialogue was always open in Saudi Arabia, and that this revelation was often disappointing to her Western interviewers. Similarly, on several occasions, Mater defined himself as a global artist (Khalil n.d.; Nuqat 2017, 15:38). As an illustration of his cosmopolitanism and engagement with international causes, he participated in the Standing Rock protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline by installing his Evolution of Man series. He mounted the images on flagpoles that stood next to the 300 flags representing various First Nations. Speaking on the reason for his participation, Mater noted, the protest at Standing Rock, which started very small with just a couple of brave individuals standing up to the power of a huge corporation, is now a chance to focus the world’s attention on a number of urgent global issues— that of environmental protection and the rights of indigenous peoples and cultures worldwide. We urgently need to work together, across nations and religions, to find alternatives to unregulated capitalism and imperialism. As an artist, brought up in the south of Saudi Arabia, I empathized with the struggle of the Lakota Nation against the impact of oil development. (Vartanian 2016)

At the same time, in a talk given on October 2016 at a conference held in his honor by the Cultural Council of Rijal Alma, Mater’s native town, he reinterpreted the same work, Evolution of Man, almost as a precursor to Saudi Vision 2030—which is the government’s comprehensive plan for curtailing oil dependence by 2030—and its aims of developing a diversified economy (Faʿāliyyāt qariyyat rijāl almaʿ al-turāthiyya 2016, 30:40). Certainly, reducing reliance on oil is one of the goals of Vision 2030, but it is not anti-capitalist or particularly concerned with environmental sustainability, let alone the rights of indigenous communities. Pointing out this discordance between Mater’s two interpretations of his same work is not to belittle the critical purchase of it, but to call attention to the desire to simultaneously be globally engaged and still connected with and intelligible to one’s nation. At a talk earlier this year at the James Gallery in New  York, I asked members of the GCC who their target audience was. They (they always speak in the collective voice) said it was people from the GCC. As a follow­up, I asked if they felt a burden of representation because their work is

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often displayed in Western cities that are largely ignorant of the history and culture of the Gulf states. They responded with a no, that they do not represent anyone but themselves. Interestingly, the woman sitting behind me told me after the talk ended that as an American she was indeed confused by the items on display in GCC’s Belief in the Power of Belief. She maintained that she did not possess the requisite literacies to be able to understand what she was seeing, let alone engage with it in anyway. Here, the GCC were conjuring an idea of the artist as wholly autonomous, independent of the society that birthed him or her. But their work uses a language that is both specific to the Gulf and, in their own words, directed to the Gulf. Therefore, whether they intend it or not, their work inevitably serves as a window for outsiders through which to glean some insights on contemporary life in the Gulf states. To be sure, seeking to be cosmopolitan and nation-oriented are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This does, however, point to a different way of envisioning the artist’s relation with society and what autonomy and authenticity mean. As Winegar (2006) points out in the case of Egyptian artists, [T]he ideal of authenticity common to some Enlightenment-based ideologies of the artistic life, which insist on the individual artist being “true” to her-or himself despite social mores (the rebel artist), was translated to emphasize the link, rather than the rupture, between the individual and society. Just as art was not set apart from the praxis of life, so artists did not, for the most part, conceive of themselves as wholly set apart from society. (p. 91)

Therefore, even as each sought to emphasize their globality and individuality, their work and discourse were still nation-oriented.6 Furthermore, while most members of the GCC live abroad and AlDowayan currently lives in London, none of them is exilic, and they all continue to exhibit their work in the Gulf. More so, even if critical, they do in fact work with state institutions, which, whether they are aware of it or not, or even consent to it, certainly uses them as part of their own goals of projecting a more palatable image of the nation and the government at 6  Ironically, the Gulf states are themselves seeking to cultivate global, autonomous citizens, and supporting artists and establishing cultural institutions is a part of that project. However, the global citizen they are seeking to produce is not of the humanist cosmopolitan variety that Mater, AlDowayan, and GCC are claiming themselves to be. Rather, it is the neoliberal kind that can compete in an ever-globalizing economy and guarantee the State’s reputation and survival after the eventual exhaustion of its natural resources (Maziad 2016).

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home and abroad. The GCC, for instance, was formed at Art Dubai, which while mostly privately run, still works closely with the Dubai government and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum serves as an honorary patron. Mater is the director of the Misk Art Institute, which was founded by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman to “encourage grassroots artistic production in Saudi Arabia and enable cultural diplomacy and exchange” (Misk Art Institute n.d.). As part of its mission, Misk organizes exhibitions of Saudi artists around the world, where they serve as “cultural ambassadors,” challenging stereotypes about Saudi Arabia and providing it with a more positive, relatable image (Kesting 2017). Perhaps in an attempt at minimizing the political import of her work, AlDowayan said, at the same talk in Scotland, that “art as a platform is just an expression of feelings and thoughts” as opposed to political activism (Beyond Borders Scotland 2013, 20:16). Her remarks reflect an implicit desire to continue working within the boundaries laid out by state institutions by painting her work as strictly “personal,” and maybe even “cultural,” but certainly not political. This is not to suggest that each Mater, AlDowayan, and the GCC are captured by the state. Rather, it is to complicate their relationship to it and suggest a view of art that is unconventional, one that even when critical still seeks to maintain relations with its society and the institutions that enframe it rather than break from them (Demerdash 2017, p. 45). In fact, Mater noted in a talk at Kuwait-based NGO, Nuqat, that he does not advocate for an elitist art that is detached from ordinary people (Nuqat 2017). It is important to him that society participates in an artist’s artistic and cultural output so as to a foster a more integrated social fabric. While their work challenges state narratives on the nation, Mater, AlDowayan, and the GCC nevertheless reinforce and validate the nation-­ state by creating art that utilizes a language and addresses issues specific to their countries and region. Furthermore, even as they each seek to present themselves as global rather than national artists, their discourse and engagement with state institutions paradoxically further imbricate them in the nation.

The Future of Khaleeji Artists Perhaps the most widely stereotyped region in the Middle East, the Arab Gulf countries are depicted as awash with money but devoid of culture. In fact, many of the critical responses to Al Qassemi’s article mentioned in the introduction rested precisely on such a portrayal of the Gulf as empty

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prior to the advent of oil (see, e.g., Abukhalil 2013). The modernity that Khaleeji artists as a specific category of postcolonials confront is, therefore, inflected not only by the dialectics of east/west, modern/traditional, backward/developed, but also by the Khaleej being thought as marginal in the many postcolonial movements and imaginaries that have emerged in the Middle East throughout the twentieth century. Through what frameworks, other than the nation, can and do they then negotiate their place in the international art sphere? This preliminary study would be enriched by a broader ethnographic engagement with the artists and the ways they make sense of their work and an analysis of the full spectrum of activities and discourses that go into their art-making. Furthermore, this generation of artists, whether they recognize it or not, or even wish to take on the task, are tracing the contours and engaging in debates over what constitutes Saudi, Kuwaiti, or even generally, Gulf art. How do these debates play out in the minutiae of their daily lives and interactions (Winegar 2006, p. 24)? How do different subject positions inform how they define art, culture, and value? Ultimately, the interpretations of their artwork and its ramifications for the nation are contingent on its receptions by their national compatriots. Some experts on the topic have pointed out that the audience for art in the Gulf remains elite and small (Mounajjed 2017, pp. 95–96). AlDowayan, for instance, noted in a Q&A session with aspiring artists after her first solo show in the Kingdom in 2013 that the Saudi public is still not familiar with the visual arts and needs to be educated on how to apprehend it (Chandrik 2013, 5:34). “They look at a piece and say ‘oh, that’s nice’ and move on,” she maintained (5:57). This echoes GCC’s response to my question that though Khaleeji citizens are their target audience, the messages they are trying to communicate to them are often not carried across. Finally, shifting regional dynamics and heightening tensions (the boycott of Qatar being the most pressing) will certainly affect the practice of Gulf artists. How will they continue to push back against and/or accommodate the exigencies of geopolitics? Will art serve as a platform through which to challenge some of these developments? As state institutions increasingly infringe on what was up until now, especially in Saudi Arabia, an independently run, privately funded arts sphere, how will their artistic output change (Fahim 2018)? Will this new state interest and support increase or limit opportunities for creative expression? Only time will tell, and as they each variously show in their work, the future is never a foregone conclusion.

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References 1000 Words: GCC. (2015). Retrieved May 15, 2018, from Art Forum: https:// www.artforum.com/print/201507/1000-words-gcc-54494 Abukhalil, A. (2013, October 9). Gulf Cities as the New Centers of the Arab World? Retrieved from The Angry Arab Blog: http://angryarab.blogspot.co. uk/2013/10/gulf-cities-as-new-centers-of-arab-world.html AlDowayan, M. (n.d.-a). Esmi-My Name. Retrieved May 15, 2018, from Manal AlDowayan: http://www.manaldowayan.com/my-name.html AlDowayan, M. (n.d.-b). Sidelines. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from Manal AlDowayan: https://www.manaldowayan.com/sidelines.html al-Maktoum, H.  S. (2013, February 11). Mohammed bin Rashid yuḥāwir al-muwāt ̣inı̄n wa al-ʿarab fı̄ al-qima al-ḥukūmiyya. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgHFt43vef0 Al-Yasin, Y., & Dashti, A. A. (2009, March). Foreign Countries and U.S. Public Relations Firms: The Case of Three Persian Gulf States. Journal of Promotion Management, 14(3–4), 355–374. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10496490802637713. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Art Dubai. (2015, March 26). Global Art Forum 9: Heritage Engineering: A Conversation with GCC.  Retrieved May 15, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcmDPfgdkv4 Aziza, S. (2016, March 1). In Search of the Saudi Artist Putting Women Centre Stage. Middle East Eye. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/growing-art-scene-saudi-finally-making-spacewomen-artists-790671651 Beyond Borders Scotland. (2013, November 18). Beyond Borders Int’l Festival Sunday Session 5—Manal Al Dowayan. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJ6REdh8pSY Blair, E. (2015, September 18). For Arab Artists With Something To Say, This Sheikh Is a Loudspeaker. NPR. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://www. npr.org/2015/09/18/440850284/for-arab-artists-with-something-tosay-this-sheikh-is-a-loudspeaker Chandrik. (2013, January 18). Saudi Artist Manal Al Dowayan interacting with the Public. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=7m_aH_JyRYM cooke, m. (2014). Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. Demerdash, N. (2017). Of “Gray Lists” and Whitewash: An Aesthetics of (Self-) Censorship and Circumvention in the GCC Countries. Journal of Arabian Studies, 7(sup1), 28–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2017.1352162.

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Derderian, E. (2017). Authenticating an Emirati Art World: Claims of Tabula Rasa and Cultural Appropriation in the UAE. Journal of Arabian Studies, 7(sup1), 12–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2017.1352161. Downey, A. (2015). Contingency, Dissonance and Performativity: Critical Archives and Knowledge Production in Contemporary Art. In A.  Downey (Ed.), Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East (pp. 13–42). London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Dresch, P. (2005). Debates on Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates. In P. Dresch & J. Piscatori (Eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (pp. 136–157). London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Faʿāliyyāt qariyyat rijāl almaʿ al-turāthiyya. (2016, November 30). Rijal Alma Cultural Council. Majlis almaʿ al-thaqāfı̄  – al-fanān al-tashkı̄lı̄ al-doktor/ Ahmed Mater al-almaʿı̄. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=iFNBIGMDvUE Fahim, K. (2018, January 10). As Saudi Arabia Relaxes Its Controls on Culture and Entertainment, Artists Dream—And Worry. Washington Post. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-saudi-arabia-eases-controls-on-culture-and-entertainment-artists-dream%2D%2Dandworr y/2018/01/10/d480874c-e42c-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_stor y. html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7c2588fce707 Foley, S. (2016, March 29). Dispatches. Retrieved from Culturerunners: http:// culturunners.com/dispatches/symbolic-cities# Gell, A. (1998). Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gray, L. (2017, August). Contemporary Art and Global Identity in the Arabian Peninsula and Azerbaijan. Journal of Arabian Studies, 7(sup1), 65–83. https:// doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2017.1356034. Holes, C. (2005). Dialect and National Identity: The Cultural Politics of Self-­ Representation in Bahraini Musalsalat. In P.  Dresch & J.  Piscatori (Eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (pp. 52–71). London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Hubbard, B. (2016, December 2). A Physician-Turned-Artist Offers a Diagnosis for Islam’s Holliest City. New York Times. Retrieved May 15, 2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/world/middleeast/saudi-ahmedmater-islam.html Kesting, P. (2017, May/June). Ambassadors of Art. AramcoWorld. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from http://www.aramcoworld.com/en-US/Articles/May-2017/ Ambassadors-of-Art?page=7 Khalil, N. (n.d.). Opposites Attract. Bespoke Magazine. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from http://www.bespoke-magazine.com/33/Article/Opposites-Attract

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Mater, A. (n.d.). Evolution of Man. Retrieved May 15, 2018, from Ahmed Mater: https://www.ahmedmater.com/evolution-of-man Maziad, M. (2016). Cultivating the Citizen of the Futuristic State. In V. P.-M. PamelaErskine-Loftus (Ed.), Representing the Nation: Heritage, Museums, National Narratives and Identity in the Arab Gulf States (pp. 123–140). London: Routledge. Mishkhas, A. (2006, June 22). Mind Over Mater at the British Museum. Arab News. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from http://www.arabnews.com/node/286619 Mishkhas, A. (2014, February 9). Forest of Family Trees. Asharq Al-Awsat. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/a-mishkhas/ lifestyle-culture/a-forest-of-family-trees Misk Art Institute. (n.d.). Retrieved May 16, 2018, from Misk Art Institute: https://miskartinstitute.org/ Mounajjed, N. (2017). Reflections on Public Art in the Arabian Peninsula. Journal of Arabian Studies, 7(sup1), 84–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2 017.1357362. Mourtada-Sabbah, N., al-Mutawa, M., Fox, J. W., & Walters, T. (2008). Media as Social Matrix in the United Arab Emirates. In A.  Alsharekh & R.  Springborg (Eds.), Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States (pp. 122–139). London: Saqi Books. Nuqat. (2017, October 25). Nuqat 2014—Day 3—Lecture 9—Ahmed Mater. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fdxIs ZYmb4o Petersen, A. (2016). Building the Past: Archealogy and National Development in the Gulf. In P. Erskine-Lotfus, V. Penziner Hightower, & M. Ibrahim Al-Mulla (Eds.), Representing the Nation: Heritage, Museums, National Narratives and Identity in the Arab Gulf States (pp. 95–108). New York: Routledge. Qassemi, S. A. (2013a, October). Thriving Gulf Cities Emerge as New Centers of Arab World. Retrieved May 13, 2018, from Sultan Al Qassemi: http://sultanalqassemi. com/articles/thriving-gulf-cities-emerge-as-new-centers-of-arab-world/ Qassemi, S.  A. (2013b, November 22). Correcting Misconceptions of the Gulf’s Modern Art Movement. Retrieved May 13, 2018, from Sultan Al Qassemi: http://sultanalqassemi.com/articles/correcting-misconceptions-of-the-gulfsmodern-art-movement/ Salamandra, C. (2005). Cultural Construction, the Gulf and Arab London. In P.  Dresch & J.  Piscatori (Eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (pp. 73–95). London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Up and Coming: GCC Is Outing Racism Against the Rich in a Way That’s Good for Everyone. (2016, April 13). Retrieved from Artsy: https://www.artsy.net/article/ artsy-editorial-up-and-coming-gcc-is-outing-racism-against-the-rich-in-a-waythat-s-good-for-everyone

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Vartanian, H. (2016, December 1). A Saudi Artist Hoists Flags at Standing Rock to Bring Attention to the Environmental Crisis. Hyperallergic. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://hyperallergic.com/342042/saudi-artist-ahmed-materstanding-rock/ Winegar, J. (2006). Creative Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture in Contemporary Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

CHAPTER 7

Identity Lost and Found: Architecture and Identity Formation in Kuwait and the Gulf Roberto Fabbri

Introduction Among the Gulf countries, Kuwait was one of the first to undergo rapid urban development. From the early 1960s to the late 1980s Kuwait catalyzed the attention of major international designers working with local firms and authorities and leaving on the ground important examples of late modern architecture. As Gulf countries gained independence from the British protectorate, the necessity of a new landscape to represent the fresh founded state grew high. At the same time, architects saw here the possibility to expand their professional horizons, to experiment and to shape an entire city almost from scratch. The extraordinary presence of valuable designers operating almost simultaneously in the same cities is a rare event in architectural recent history. However, such fast transformations raised concerns of superimposing a different identity over local traditions, despite Kuwaitis being at the time mostly in favor of complete demolition of the R. Fabbri (*) University of Monterrey, Monterrey, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_7

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old town. Currently, the lack of information and the misconception about the architecture produced in that season arise, while the population shows disaffection and a low sense of belonging to these spaces. Meanwhile, very few measures have been adopted in the past years to promote the conservation or the reuse of this heritage that, after all, represents the modernization era. Recently, some local institutions and parts of the civil society took action against the wiping of shared memories. These bottom-up initiatives started with a series of awareness campaigns and studies that call for preservation. This new attention is significant since all the post-oil Gulf cities were built in large part on a similar pattern, implying local visions, western know-how and Asian workforce. This process set the physical environment and embodied the visual identity of the new nations. Consequently, the architecture produced by this complex geography should be considered a legitimate part of a search for a khaleeji identity. In this framework, the present chapter investigates the modern architectural Gulf heritage as a possible element of collective identification. Focusing on Kuwait, it proposes to read the so-called ‘imported’ buildings as an intersection of indigenous narratives and historical patterns with cosmopolitan breath and technical knowledge. The aim is to question if modern architecture could be perceived as a plausible agent of identity-making in Gulf cities. The present study draws on original data collected in Kuwait and the Gulf between 2010 and 2016. It also builds on the debates, the exhibitions organized in the same period and on two books published in the framework of research grant from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences, which systematically identified and monitored the architecture in the country. Focusing on the notion of identity, this text builds on the previous results and moves forward in interpreting the significance of selected specimens.

Identity, Identity Lost and Tradition in Transition There is a strong connection between traditions, identity and the physical environment produced or inhabited by a society. The process of identity and social formation, and the cultural practices of individuals, as well as groups, are deeply influenced by their habitat (Gieseking and Mangold 2014, p.73). The notion of place-identity, initially introduced by Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, consists of knowledge and feelings generated by one’s everyday experiences of the built environment. The latter

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functions as a generator of memories and sense of belonging, creating meanings and mitigating changes (1983, p.57). At the same time, places, buildings and urban spaces are able to engender specific messages to build or foster national identities. For the architectural critic Deyan Sudjic, architecture built in small countries acts as a crucial factor to project their presence on a global scale, as well as to represent and express a sense of self. In his text about architecture and power, Sudjic questions how much this process is self-­conscious, artificial or an “authentic reflection of individual traits, of climate, materials and customs?” (2005, p.250). In other words, the relation between the societal or state narrative and architecture can simultaneously be a process of researching, defining, expressing and manufacturing identity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Kuwait was a port town of 40 thousand inhabitants sustained by trades, semi-nomadic livestock rearing and fishing. It has been a British protectorate since 1899. The local culture was a blend of distinct and coexisting maritime and desert traditions, amalgamated by the solid Islamic faith practiced by the majority of the population: “The physical configuration and appearance of Kuwait were, above all, the product of its ecology, local Arab architectural tradition and style and the spatial requirement of its maritime economy” (Broeze 1997, p.170). The urbanscape of Kuwait inevitably mirrored the identity of the place. The aerial view of the 1940s reveals a town as an intricate labyrinth of narrow alleys and mud-brick houses seamlessly extending from the port docks to the defensive wall. It was a typical Arab medina of the Gulf that for morphology, uniformity, proportions, colors, materials and typology reflected the residents’ lifestyle. As a matter of fact, the prevalent architectural type was the courtyard house, protected from the outside and introvert, which precisely translated social and domestic dynamics into space. During these years, Kuwait experienced a more traditional life, even though it was not isolated from the outer world. The port and the mercantile activities were opportunities of exchange with other cultures, and the British political agency in town, as well as the American missionary church, contributed to expand the geographical horizon of the country. Moreover, during the 1920s and the 1930s, the country’s governmental apparatus and educational system underwent a mild but significant modernization. In the same period, progressive ideas and culture stemming from the emerging modern Arab literature, prevalently Lebanese and Egyptian, informed Kuwait’s elite and the local cultural circles with anti-­ colonial ideologies (Al-Ragam 2017, p.48).

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The situation changed radically with the oil-struck in 1938 and in the years after WWII.  Sudden affluence and the urgent need for new infrastructures led to an unprecedented urban development, which continued, albeit at a different pace, for the following 40 years. The crucial decade between the mid-1940s and the mid-1950s generated Kuwait’s urban original sin: the demolition of the old town in favor of new dwelling units to be built outside the city limits. Two formal actions, taken by Sheikh Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, transformed drastically and irreversibly the built environment of the country and the people’s relation with the sense of place. The first action was the adoption of Kuwait First Masterplan, drafted in 1951 by the British firm Minoprio, Spencely and MacFarlane. This plan relocated all residential spaces in peripheral and repetitive neighborhoods, overlapped a geometric road network to connect the center with the new satellites, and finally demolished the traditional urban fabric to make space for a new commercial and administrative district. Like in many other urban transformations where massive demolitions were proposed, the plan was motivated and justified by the hygienization of the old quarters, by the practical needs of a modern transportation network, and by the urge of building a capital city that would represent the modern aspirations of an emerging country. Interestingly, in the age of liberation and anti-colonial spirit, Kuwait like many others former colonies resorted to an age-old urban strategy, regrouping the population by class, wealth, religion and ethnicity in disconnected residential districts (Al Sayyad 2008, p.257). The second action is a consequence of the first. In the same years, the government promulgated the Land Acquisition Policy to acquire private land inside and outside of the municipal boundaries to implement the Master plan. Under the legal rationale of the public interest, the plots were bought and sold at a highly inflated price, generating market speculations and bitter controversies that affect the land-use potential of the city to these days (Al-Mosully 1992, p.43). Demolition started immediately after that, proceeding relentlessly with phases defined by the new infrastructure agenda. The aerial pictures of the early 1950s show the new concrete box-type buildings alongside Fahad al-Salem Street emerging from a carpet of semi-demolished mud-brick houses, which now appear physically isolated and visually incoherent with the new context. “What was organic became mechanical,” lamented George Shiber, who directly witnessed the destruction’s outcomes in his capacity as head of the Planning Board (1964, p.53). The local population, in general, welcomed the flattening of the old town, and very few

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voices spoke in favor of preservation. When Shiber came to office in 1961, he could only document and portray a process already in action: “conventional urban growth patterns were shattered […]. Old Kuwait exploded and, as it did, it spilled over beyond the once-awesome desert landscape” (p.55). The dismantlement of the old town spared very few buildings: the mosques, the souks, some schools, a few governmental headquarters, the sheikhs’ palaces, the diplomatic residences, the Amiri and the American Missionary hospitals, and a meager number of courtyard houses. Among the few documented voices that stood against the demolition were Violet Dickson and Zahra Freeth, wife and daughter of Harold Dickson, the British Political Agent in Kuwait. They both recall in their publications how the local population seemed indifferent to the systematic removal of that traditional environment which fascinated the two women so much (Freeth 1956, p.83; Jonathan 1981). The Dickson house, once their residence, is currently one of the few pre-oil buildings that survived the demolition and still stand in front of the Gulf. The majority of the local population conveniently accepted to relocate to modern houses in new checkerboard neighborhoods. According to contemporary chronicle, traditional architecture was no longer perceived as suitable, neither acceptable, for modern Kuwaitis (Al-Ba’tha 1949, p.80). Ironically, the obliteration of the traditional environment did not displace the generation that witnessed it, but deeply affected one or two generations later, while in search of national roots and social identity. As we will see later in this text, the lack of a smooth transition in the architectural transformation of the traditional environment blurred the perception of place-identity, diluted the sense of belonging, and ultimately twisted the collective notion of heritage.

Adopting Modernity. Adapting Modernity According to art critic Harold Rosenberg, the condition of modernity is a “tradition of overthrowing traditions” (1959, p.81). His book Tradition of the New was published in 1959 when Kuwaiti modernization was in full swing. Modernity in the sheikhdom was embraced first as a concept by rejecting, or at least profoundly reconsidering, pre-oil traditional life. In many occasions, traditional habits or spaces became synonyms or reminders of the difficulties, the scarcity and the underdevelopment of the past. Only a few core aspects of the traditional customs, namely those concerning family structure, tribal relationships and religion, were less affected or

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rather remained untouched. Modernity was enthusiastically adopted as the new trend, meanwhile, international magazines like LIFE or National Geographic portrayed to the world the extravagant and exotic life in a dreamland, where everything was apparently possible because it could be bought and imported (Frazer 1965; De Carvalho 1965). In 1964 Herbert Marcuse published One Dimensional Man, depicting a world where people recognize themselves in their commodities, “finding identity (their souls) in their automobiles, hi-fi sets, split-levels homes, kitchen equipment” (p.9). In his analysis, only the outcasts in the West and the Third World were supposedly yet untouched by this process, and therefore able to escape from modernity’s kiss of death. Regrettably, the so-called Third World demonstrated not to be immune from this process, and Marcuse’s projection ended up to adequately describe the rush to acquire modernity through technology and material goods, which occurred in Kuwait during the 1960s. Almost every family was assigned a plot for a brand-new villa in a residential neighborhood. Nonetheless, modernity was not assimilated seamlessly or equally by every social group. For example, when social housing programs were launched for low-­ income families, bitter remarks rose about their difficulties to adapt to new forms of dwelling, to the point that apparently bathtubs were confused for goats feeding troughs, and therefore never used for the real purpose or dismantled (Al-Taher 1995, p.137). In these years, Kuwaiti houses grew bigger in size and developed extravagant shapes: “Architecture became an exercise in acrobatics and not an endeavor in creation, economics and organicism […]. It has become rare to find lines anchored to the earth. Instead, they all seem pivoted to point restively to outer space” (Shiber 1964, p.306). Houses embodied naively the country’s vision of the future, and often people mistook modernity for an abundance of appliances and house goods. From a morphological point of view, the basic urban component, the house, was not given the time to evolve into a new type based on the contemporary lifestyle and social necessities. The courtyard house, a traditional introverted residential typology where the rooms’ sequence reflected a precise hue in the level of privacy, was simply replaced by eclectic concrete shapes with more loose and arbitrary spatial relation. This process was also accelerated by the building codes, based on Western norms, requiring setbacks, which made the courtyard redundant (Al Sayyad 2008, p.258). In this framework, urgency and the resulting construction speed played an essential, problematic role, and it was reflected in the memoirs of for-

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eign visitors at that time. Donald Barron, a British urban planner, invited by UNESCO, reported: “the paramount problem has been to build quickly” (1967, p.10). R.  L. Banks, an American engineer who visited Kuwait in 1955, had the same impression. He published his preoccupation about Western technicians wishing to “introduce the tastes and the standards of Britain and the U.S.A.” while they would “have to be slowed down by the warnings of economists and sociologists concerned about the ability of the country to pay for all these things or to adjust itself quickly to all the changes they would bring” (1955, p. 48). Banks concluded that usually the limitation in financial resources slows down the pace of transformations and allows one country to evolve social changes. Because of Kuwait’s wealth, the works were restless. Banks reported an “uneven advance” that presented a striking contrast between the “most modern and the most primitive,” and representing in his opinion “the most interesting points of contact between East and West” (1955, p.50). Arif Dirlik affirms that it is not possible to understand modernity without reference to Eurocentrism (2000, p.25). Following this statement, and due to the sustained Eurocentric influence on architectural literature, it will be worth here to propose a brief parallel on how architectural modernity was developed in Europe. Early twentieth-century architecture, often generically referred to as the modern movement, did not reject the past a priori. It instead discarded the Beaux-Art, the historicism, the mimics, the nostalgic sentiments and the non-rational (mis)use of space as well as the unnecessary (ab)use of decoration. For many champions of the new architecture, modernity was also built through a dialectic relation with the past and the acceptance of the role of history. Modernist architects had to come to terms, in one way or another, with the pre-existing city and calibrate their insert. On the contrary and due to the common practice of demolition, there were very little opportunities in the Gulf to juxtapose the new structures to the pre-existing fabric, so to trigger a dialectic relation. In other words, the old was erased to make space for the new, implying the complete erasure of the past, starting from the pre-oil-­ built environment: the so-called ‘tabula rasa’ approach. Inevitably, the obliteration of a physical context had profound repercussions on the cultural identity of the place. One of the major criticisms addressed to the transformations that occurred in the Gulf countries in those decades lies in the difference between ‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’. The cultural and economic penetration of the West offered the possibility to introduce democratic

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reforms and social changes (Watenpaugh 2014, p.4). In Kuwait, however, this was only partially achieved. One can argue that in the aftermath of the independence, the government adopted a new constitution and introduced a parliamentary system—a unique case in the Gulf—among other administrative reforms and social plans. However, it also true that civil and political rights in the country were implemented differently for the citizens and based on social status, ethnicity, religion and gender. Modernity was adopted as an ideal, sometimes as an aesthetic or a device, and then adapted in conformity with traditions, religion and customs. As Noura Al Sayeh explains, very similar dynamics occurred in Bahrain: “The negotiation between modernity and local tradition was never fully resolved; […] it was mostly assimilated as a stylistic movement rather than as a political project; never completely absorbed and only partially consumed” (2014, p.8). Similarly, in the last analysis, it seems still pertinent what Bernard Lewis wrote about the earlier transformation process in Turkey, where technological development happened without concurrent belief in emancipation, secularism or rational epistemology: in other words, modernization without commitments to modernity (Lewis 1968, 1992).

Architectural Transplants or Global Mobility? The Diplomatic Role of the Architect Modernity in architectural terms is still an open subject. Dismissing any interpretation related to the notion of style, being too reductive, it is still problematic to attempt a convincing categorization of the architecture produced in the central decades of the twentieth century, in particular when new horizons arose out of the usual strongholds, like Europe, North and Latin America. In fact, these new geographies generated a coeval and different type of architectural modernity which can be read as variations on the theme, locally adapted, less orthodox, more experimental and sometimes not entirely resolved. As per Watenpaugh’s linguistic metaphor, modernity in post-colonial contexts is a language that maintained transnational intelligibility—to preserve legitimacy—but it was often conjugated in local dialects. At times these dialects lost coherence and lexical uniformity, contradicting the paradigms of the root idiom (2014, p. 14). Modernization in Kuwait resulted in a sort of architectural Esperanto. If so, what type of dialect does Gulf architecture speak? And who were the practitioners that generated this new or different lexicon? What was their understanding and interpretation of place and context?

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Alison and Peter Smithson, who were called to Kuwait in 1968 to develop urban form studies for the old city, preached for projects that could help define a national identity. They called for buildings that, in their words, could carry that “quality” to differentiate Kuwait from other Arab cities, such as Cairo or Beirut. They envisioned buildings within the frame of the Arab urban tradition and adapted to contemporaneity, without variations taken from models in America, in Europe or the Europeanized North Africa (Viadotto 1997, p. 138). The urban form studies for the old city in the late 1960s catalyzed the attention of major international designers. The extraordinary presence of architects, such as Alfred Roth, Balkrishna Doshi, Pier Luigi Nervi, Basil Spence, Reima Pietilä, Kenzo Tange, TAC, SOM, BBPR, George Candilis, Arthur Erickson, I.M.  Pei and Jørn Utzon, among many others, operating almost simultaneously in a single city, was indeed a contribution to the desired new image of Kuwait. International commissions were paired by renowned Arab designers also involved in the city’s transformation, including Sayyed Karim, Mahmoud Riad, Dar al-Handasah, Hassan Fathy, Mohammed Makiya and Rifat Chadirji, to name a few. Moreover, a new generation of young local architects emerged working side by side with these major firms and this proximity consequently impacted the work they later accomplished independently. Nonetheless, these rapid changes did shatter social patterns and so fostered the claim of an ignored local tradition. Such critique is still widely diffused, even if Kuwait always was and still is a crossroad between West and East. Its strategic position is deeply reflected in the multicultural society that has developed over the last 60 years, and this complex geography can also be drawn through the professional network of the many actors involved in the city’s transformation (Fabbri et al. 2016, pp. 14–15). In a recent conference and publication on the present and the future of the Arab city, American architectural historian Gwendolyn Wright reflects on the role of migrating architects, and her topic seems poignant in reading here the relationship between identity and architecture. Wright describes Western architects’ approach while working in other environments and the potential danger of failing to identify important aspects of local context. During the colonial time, local opinions and needs were not kept in consideration, and in many cases, decisions were enforced on people and layered over the existing urban fabric. Aside from this foreign practice insertion, a plethora of local designers educated abroad completed the scheme by imitating Western patterns. Wright concludes bringing, as an example, the design guidelines issued for internal purposes by the

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American corporate firm SOM, in the 1970s. The document is meant to suggest typologies equally adaptable to the entire Islamic world: indiscriminately from North Africa to India (2016, p.74). On the one hand, many post-colonial cities in transformation suffered irreparable damage from these planning practices and by the excess of faith in modern design thinking. On the other hand, the present text wants to build upon this prompt within the Kuwaiti context and reflect on the broader implications of the role of the architects and the variables of this architectural transplant. In respect to local identity, how was architecture practiced in the absence of historical heritage, major local references, substantial morphological elements, or evident urban footprint, and occasionally in the absence of adequate planning tools or their correct implementation? In cities like Beirut, Baghdad or Cairo modern architects had to negotiate spaces and create meanings in relation to an existing urban fabric and a codified architectural tradition, while in Kuwait, as argued above, the traditional city was demolished leaving the designer with very few hints to situate the project. Second, the built environment cannot be considered a direct emanation of the designer alone. The role of local patrons should be considered equally important in defining goals and ambitions during the decision-making process. Third, several designers active in the Gulf had a constant relationship with the region or lived here, developing a deeper understanding of the context through time. This inevitably made their design more aware of the residents’ practical and cultural necessities (Wright 2016, p.74). Fourth, significant transformations in Kuwait and the Gulf occurred when the leading principles of the so-called modern movement were under re-consideration. The 1959 CIAM meeting in Otterlo, the Netherlands, emphasized a fracture between the diffused functionalist approach to urban design and an emerging group of younger architects, initially called Team X, that steered their practice toward Structuralism, to generate a methodology that involved more analyses borrowed from sociology, psychology and anthropology. This new direction was meant to distance itself from the formalism and the mechanical functionalism of (some) late modern architecture, and to bring back the people at the center of the design process, with their social relationships, environment, culture and identity. Within this vision, principles like cultural relativism found a more effective role in informing and orienting the design process. In this framework, the Gulf once again demonstrates to be an interesting case study to understand the evolution of the idea of modernity, since many architects gravitating around Team X had the opportunity to work

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in the area. Alison and Peter Smithson’s Mat-Building for Kuwait City; the BBPR’s plan for the rehabilitation of the old Souk Mubarakiya, the Candilis’ housing complex in Sharq, the Kenzo Tange’s airport are all examples of mediating global practice with local circumstances. Unfortunately, several of these examples were not implemented, also because patrons expected signature buildings from renowned international architects, more than a reflexive critique on history, tradition and modernity. Let us consider, for example, Pietilä’s use of critical regionalism in the conception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The project was an attempt not to mimic native vernacular architecture but to discreetly interweave local narratives and visual patterns within other global cultural themes in order to create a pluralistic aesthetics (Botz-­Bornstein 2017, p.76). At the time of the project, the 1980s, foreigners represented 70% of the resident population in the country therefore MoFA meant to signify the institutions of the cosmopolitan nation. Unfortunately, the attempt at cultural hybridization and social integration did not succeed in representing the national identity in the eyes of the clients, and the building has been deeply altered to the point that the initial concept is barely traceable. In addition to this, and on the other side of the spectrum, SOM’s corporate system, which reduced the complexity of the context to an operative manual, offering standardized solutions, proved to be more successful, at least as a business model. Given the vast number of projects built in the region, the pragmatism, the efficiency and the turnkey offer of the American firm reassured the clients more than Team X’s conjectural speculations. In the Gulf, architects were often given the task to recalibrate the relations between a deliberately forgotten tradition and an undetermined way to modernity, and somehow to recalculate the dynamics between Eastern and Western cultures. Some of them relied on technology and environmental necessities, others on metaphors to represent the national or the client’s meanings, other again engaging with concepts like ‘authenticity’ and ‘cultural specificity’. As Amale Andraos puts it, this condition of encounter gave the architect an unexpected diplomatic role to waive past and future into a “mash-up of signifiers for both” (2016, p.9).

Cultural Displacement and a Missing Heritage The erasure of the old town did not affect the boom generation of the 1960s; however, 30 years later the lack of physical representation of local roots became a recurrent discourse in the country and intensified particularly

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after the Iraqi Invasion with the urge to reaffirm a well-defined, independent identity. In 1992, the Kuwaiti filmmaker Habeeb Hussain released a documentary entitled Kuwait Architecture: a Lost Identity. The first part, permeated with nostalgia, is a long sequence shot in the few courtyard houses that still stood, albeit mostly abandoned. Traditional elements of vernacular architecture, like housh (courtyard), liwan (colonnade/passage), teakwood doors and the pointed arches are visually counterposed to concrete components from contemporary successors: balconies, curtain walls, brisessoleil, boxes, pediments and eclectic apertures. Apart from the evocative shots, the importance of this document lies in the numerous interviews with Kuwaiti architects, engineers and public servants employed at the Baladiya (Municipality). The documentary portrays a univocal regret. Every interviewee feels deprived of the past, and the present built environment is generally perceived as an alien intrusion. The majority of interviewees rejects and dismisses modern architecture as non-­representative of the local character and people’s aspirations, as well as an inadequate response to the harsh climate. Their criticism seems directed more against the generic unauthored private villas, built in every form and shape, sometimes combining several styles in a unique pastiche. As a reaction, these Kuwaiti professionals seem to favor a series of revivalist buildings locally designed, which predictably adapt generic Islamic patterns to the geometrical elements of the façades, solid masses, earthy color palette and lavish interiors. In the commentaries, this combination appeals as a plausible solution and a practical direction to rebalance the lost identity (Hussain 1992). A decade later, Yasser Mahgoub, at that time visiting professor at Kuwait University, conducted a series of interviews addressing analogous questions to other local professionals and scholars with similar results (2007, p.171). The findings reveal that the ample majority again did not see any identity expressed in the modern city. They invoked the promulgation of specific regulations reinforcing Islamic/Arab/desertic characteristics and implementing the use of traditional elements like housh, liwan and diwaniya. The survey reveals a newsworthy, thus univocal, narrative. The limit of the research, however, seems to lie in the selected group of respondents, as they are all professionals who graduated in the 1980s and early 1990s. The survey, therefore, does not engage with the new generation that, as we will see later, is currently very active in the city debates and sees opportunities in modern buildings more than their predecessors.

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Identity Reloaded In recent years Kuwait experienced once again an intense construction boom. As a consequence of the 2003 US-Iraq war and the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the country has been perceived as a more stable ground for investments. On top of this, Kuwait’s crude oil tripled its value in a decade and, despite a contraction in the last years, the revenues generated a substantial surplus that ‘naturally’ endowed the speculative real estate market. High rises and crystal towers began to appear in a previously flatter skyline, and even though the city center would have needed more consolidation than intrusions, the construction of skyscrapers mostly happened there (Fabbri, Autumn 2016). In order to make space for these structures, the city center experienced a new demolition wave. Ironically enough, the post-oil concrete city, once accused of being the principal usurper of the traditional town, is now under attack of the bulldozers, and many valuable expressions of the 1960s and 1970s architecture have already been wiped. The latter is mainly due to the fact these buildings sit on valuable plot of land and are not yet perceived as heritage, even if personal and social memories are deeply related to this particular urban environment. Also, this is due to the lack of a legal framework that could guide the transformation and ultimately come to terms with the physical past (Albloushi 2017). The 1960 Antiquity Law and the 1988 Kuwait Heritage Building Registry were never implemented, and in the past 50 years, none of the three master plans has included a preservation chart. Only the 2005 Masterplan Review mentions under “environmental provisions” that historical buildings and archaeological sites shall be mapped and added to the National Register to prevent alterations or demolitions, in a joint effort of the Municipality and the National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters (KEG and Buchanan 2005). Nevertheless, in the last five years, several modernist buildings were torn down and replaced or altered. Among others, Dar al-Handasah’s Kuwait Airways Tower (1969–72) and the Chamber of Commerce (1964–66), and Antony Irvine’s Gulf Bank (1961–63) were totally or p ­ artially demolished, while the National Bank (1961–63) was cladded with aluminum panels and, as mentioned before, Pietilä’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973–83) was heavily altered. The Urban Development Plan 2015–2020 and the 2035 Vision for the country (New Kuwait 2015) promote the construction of satellite cities on remote desert land in response to the chronic lack of residential plots instead of consolidating the city center.

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Similarly, the New Urban Agenda presented in 2016 at the UN Habitat Conference in Quito does not include the notion of heritage as an asset for the city plans (UNHABITAT 2016). In late 2016, the design of the new Masterplan IV-2040 was assigned to Perkins & Will and Dar al-Handasah with the mandate of aligning the urban form with the Vision 2035. Namely, to transform Kuwait into an international business hub (Fourth Structural Plan Turns Kuwait into Commercial, Financial Hub: PM 2016). In a context like Kuwait, where the current urban development is happening again fast and under the high pressure imposed by speculative forces, regulations and urban plans proved that they could do very little in terms of preservation. In the last years, awareness campaigns and specific cultural agendas are demonstrating to be a more effective solution to reinterpret the local identity. Cultural institutions and civil society’s actions are currently engaging in the quest for an autochthonous cultural DNA suggesting that, due to the cosmopolitan past of the country, any possible definition of a national identity should be written considering the plurality of voices and contributions hinged on collective memories. An initial hint to measure how young people value the problem of cultural displacements in relation to the built environment is given by the many university theses produced in the last ten years around the theme of national identity and architecture in Kuwait. The same generation was also recently involved in sporting Kuwait’s architectural ‘drama’ in the last three editions of the Biennale di Venezia. Public talks, academic seminars and papers, exhibitions, magazines and social media have been the occasions to debate themes such as the accessibility of the city, the perception of a missing public space, the re-demolition of the city center, the current speculative urban development mode and the struggle to establish the notion of heritage. In 2014, the 1964 Kuwait Chamber of Commerce building was demolished, triggering an unexpected public protest by local and international activists, architects and artists. While these actions are relatively common in other parts of the world, this action was among the first in the region in defense of the modern heritage (Garcia 2014). Two years later, the first systematic study on modern Kuwait in architecture was published, featuring archival research on more than 150 buildings erected between 1949 and 1989, interviews with designers as well as scholars’ retrospective analyses (Fabbri et al. 2016; Camacho et al. 2017). The collective reflections on these themes boosted the emerging practice of place-making: a group action that capitalizes on the community’s assets and stimulates the accessibility of public spaces with the double

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outcome of fostering the sense of place and at the same time preserving the built environment (Lanzl et al. 2017). The South Mubarakiya (SOMU) and the Food Strip along the Gulf Road are valid examples of small commercial enterprises introduced in the 1960s city fabric with the logic of ‘minimum intervention’ on the existing structures. The aim is to introduce non-corporate commercial activities and restaurants not in competition with the pre-existing traditional market. The operation is an uncoordinated and punctual insert of new enterprises privately funded by young investors. The Shakshooka Market, an itinerant pop-up market organized weekly in public spaces, squares and parking lots, also reveals the urge to re-engage with parts of the city that are normally precluded to Kuwaitis’ social life. A similar initiative that is interesting for this chapter’s argument is the invitation of the Dubai-based French-Tunisian artist El Seed. As a famous muralist and contemporary calligrapher, Seed initially painted medium scale calligraphy on the rooftop of an abandoned building in Kuwait City. Later he was offered the assignment of creating an extensive piece on the lateral elevation of the Thunayan al-Ghanim building, the first multi-story concrete building of Kuwait designed and built by the Egyptian modernist Sayyed Kareem. Calligraphy, probably the most unifying form of art of the Arab world, is applied here with a contemporary style and at the urban scale as a community-engagement operation. Twenty-five people collaborated with the artist over five days to “inculcate a sense of ownership within the larger community and stretches beyond the superficial goal of creating a beautiful landmark” (Nuqat, March 1, 2014). All these actions are the initiative of an elite minority. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the need to re-engage with the 1960s concrete city, not as a nostalgic scene of a lost past, but as a place of opportunity to express Kuwait’s contemporary identity. They blend logics of re-appropriation of underused spaces with the need to transform them into places with character and a sense of authenticity.

Conclusions: Architecture as Common Denominator? In the twentieth century, the social and urban development of the Middle East confronted and redefined the notions of tradition, modernity and identity. In particular, the Gulf countries proved to be fast in dismissing the past and in embracing modernity, engaging in a rapid adaptation to changing lifestyle and customs. Later, they also proved to struggle to

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define a convincing national or social identity, and to discover value in their recent past. Gulf cities, initially very traditional and small, experienced a transformation that denatured the spatial relationship between the urban elements and social patterns. The traditional residential typology— the courtyard houses—a key element of the urban morphology, was not given the time to evolve and adapt to the new domestic need. Moreover, often in the Gulf, the old medina was demolished to make space for the new concrete ville moderne, precluding any possible dialogue with the physical past. Paradoxically, the obliteration of the old city did not affect the generation that witnessed it, but a few decades later the majority of the population showed nostalgia for the pre-oil town and disaffection for the urbanscape that replaced it. The conventional narrative pointed at the foreign modern architects and their supposedly technocratic approach as the leading cause for the lack of local character and the general sense of displacement. This could have been the case on several occasions, but many architects invited in Kuwait and the Gulf for the major national projects of the 1960s and 1970s belonged to a generation that already questioned orthodox functionalism and encompassed cultural relativism in their design approach. Architects usually give answers to contingent problems with the technical tools available in their time. In this case, they were also asked to realign locality and identity in the built environment and to recalibrate West-East dynamics in terms of cultural representation. The results, a sort of architectural Esperanto, not always met the patrons’ expectations: often, worldwide recognizable icons were preferred to buildings which attempted to negotiate modernity with the local context. In recent years, Kuwait has been experiencing another construction boom, boosted by a rise in the oil-price market. The concrete city of the 1960s and 1970s is now under the attack of bulldozers to make space for the new shiny glass and aluminum towers. After several decades of disaffection, the younger generation revamped interest in the post-oil city as a place of possible collective identity. While the municipal regulations and plans do not seem to prevent demolition effectively, a series of bottom-up initiatives were launched to re-engage with the city center, raise awareness and promote practices of place-making with the double outcome of fostering the sense of place and the attempt to preserving the post-oil city. Similar trajectories can be seen in the whole region and recently some city authorities began demonstrating interest in this unclaimed heritage. In 2018, The Municipality of Dubai announced the Modern Heritage

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Initiative aiming to preserve a number of buildings from the 1970s, such as John Harris’ World Trade Center and Jafar Tukan’s Al Khuloud Nursery School, among others (Gulf News, August 2, 2018). Abu Dhabi as well had a similar initiative in place. These are significant indicators of reconsidering the perception of heritage, even if it is not yet clear what type of preservation is envisioned and what level re-functionalization will be permitted to keep these spaces alive. In any case, all the Gulf cities experienced similar urban development, common fate and parallel dynamics, not only in the construction of the built environment, but also in cosmopolitan aspirations and international exchanges. By being a common denominator in these processes, could modern architectural heritage become a collective element of khaliji identity?

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Open Access    This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

CHAPTER 8

Clubbing in Dubai: The Making of a “Party Capital” Magdalena Karolak

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to assess the changing identity of the city of Dubai to becoming a hub of party entertainment in the Middle East. In 2012, Lonely Planet named Dubai and Tel Aviv “today’s party capitals of the Middle East.” The juxtaposition of these two very different cities in the Lonely Planet’s world ranking of “Ultimate Party Cities” testifies to the transformation of Dubai’s identity in recent years. Israel has already had a reputation of a party outpost in the region thanks to, among others, a number of music festivals organized there (“Best Festivals in Israel” n.d.), hence, the inclusion of its capital in the ranking testifies to a long-­ standing tradition of entertainment. But Dubai, thanks to “the swank bars and clubs of the Middle East’s most decadent desert getaway,” (Lonely Planet 2012) has grown its party reputation in the last decade and in the ranking, has outwon Beirut, a top contender traditionally known to be the

M. Karolak (*) College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_8

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party capital of the Arab world. This rapid transformation of Dubai’s identity is thus especially interesting to analyze. This study will look in detail into the development of Dubai’s clubbing entertainment, particularly focusing on the growth of the electronic music scene, from the point of view of the development of tourism industry. Electronic music has become in the last decades a global phenomenon, widely popularized on all continents and a major money generating business. Watson (2018, p. 10) has assessed the value of the industry at 7.3 billion USD in 2017/18 and the earnings of the top nine DJs called jointly “Forbes Electronic Cash Kings” at 279 million USD in 2017. The growth of this sector of entertainment provides opportunities for tourism marketing of cities that become part of this global phenomenon. Indeed, many destinations around the world have used the appeal of music to successfully attract tourism. With global brands of festivals and global music venue brands mushrooming around the world, Dubai has also inscribed itself in these trends, and this type of entertainment has proliferated in the city. The aim of this research is to understand how the growth of electronic music contributes to the creation of Dubai’s image as a “party capital” and how it can be used as a tourist attractor and support the Dubai brand. Clubbing-related entertainment is a new phenomenon in the Arabian Gulf region that has not been extensively studied. Through this research, the author will try to fill this gap by analyzing the potential this type of music offers to attract tourism. The researcher acknowledges that electronic music is not the only genre of entertainment offered in Dubai; yet the expansive growth of this music scene around the world was deemed particularly interesting to study the global trends Dubai inscribes itself in. In addition, Dubai, along with other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), seeks to diversify its economy through tourism. Electronic music along with other attractors will, in the long run, help increase the tourism appeal of Dubai. On the one hand, the research will assess the appeal of clubbing as a tourism attractor using Ritchie and Crouch’s Destination and Competitiveness Model (2003). In addition, it will trace the growth of the electronic music scene, among others, analyzing the expansion of global and local music brands in Dubai. Ultimately, this study will establish the characteristics of the electronic music scene in Dubai as compared to other destinations. This research was conducted by collecting data on the ground from nightclubs and through the analysis of their websites and

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local news starting from 2015. In addition, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with Dubai Brand Manager in 2016 and five music producers involved in the clubbing scene in Dubai in 2018. The study also builds upon my past findings about the development of tourism in the Arabian Gulf region.

Entertainment as a Tourism Attractor Ritchie and Crouch (2003) have extensively researched the factors behind tourism destination competitiveness. Their Destination Competitiveness and Sustainability Model includes seven Core Resources and Attractors; and entertainment is one of them making it an important factor behind the success of destinations. This category includes all sorts of live performances, for instance, theater, concerts, comedy festivals, operas and circuses, and the best-established cities in this regard are New York, London and Las Vegas. While entertainment is a broad category, within this context, it is important to focus on the relation between electronic music and tourism worldwide. Goulding and Shankar (2011, p.1435) reiterated following previous researchers that “clubbing is one of the most significant cultural phenomena of the last thirty years.” The beginnings of clubbing are linked to the emergence of a genre of dance music known as house. The latter has its origins in the USA, specifically in Chicago, at the end of 1970s. The new sound was made by mixing of various samples by a DJ to create a new form characterized by a fast, repetitive beat and deep basslines. It differed from its dance music predecessors such as disco and funk by its stress on the use of electronic instruments, among others, synthesizers, turntables and drum machines that made the sound minimal and mechanical in comparison. In the mid-1980s, the new music form reached Europe where it became popular in the UK, Germany and in the Spanish island of Ibiza. The tiny island has become a hub of electronic dance music and prompted the emergence of clubbing tourism with multiple club venues opening and its own Balearic sound emerging. The music that made Ibiza a tourist hotspot became an attractor along with the lenient attitudes toward the use of drugs, predominantly ecstasy, and permissiveness toward deviant behavior overall. The growth of tourism in Ibiza has been unprecedented with 3.3 million visitors in 2017, in this island of a population of less than 150,000 inhabitants. While Ibiza has more to offer than its electronic

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music clubbing scene, its main image abroad remains that of a party island (Krendzelak 2008, p. 31). The growth of clubbing tourism in Ibiza testifies to the growth of popularity of the electronic music worldwide. From its humble underground beginnings rooted in counterculture, the genre has expanded to many variants and subgenres, and has become mainstream, especially in its commercial version blended with pop, referred to as EDM.1 The music has produced its own subculture centered around major brands of nightclubs, labels, magazines, radio stations, websites, for instance, BE-AT.TV; online streaming services such as Beatport; and international festivals and music-­related merchandise (Watson 2018, p. 11). Thanks to such a growth in popularity, clubbing is “marketed as part of the touristic/leisure experience” worldwide (Goulding and Shankar 2011, p.1436). Many destinations around the world capitalize on its appeal by either offering extended clubbing experiences, among others, Ibiza, Mykonos, Playa del Carmen and Tulum, Ko Phangan; or by organizing international festivals that draw crowds for a specific number of days such as BPM (formerly Mexico, now Portugal), Tomorrowland (Belgium), Defected (Croatia), Ultra Music Festival (originated in Miami, with editions in Asia, Europe and South America); or stage their own electronic music festivals, for instance, Balaton Sound (Hungary). The numbers of attendees of electronic festivals are imposing. Electric Daisy Carnival in Las Vegas is a good example with 450,000 attending in 2018. Few festivals can boast a bigger audience, but those that do like Coachella that accommodated close to 600,000 (2017) offer a wide range of music genres than just one. Furthermore, electronic festivals experience a growth in popularity in new geographical areas such as China, where the number of events  was expected to rise to more than 150  in 2018 from 32 in 2016 (Watson 2018, p. 17). Similarly, the international brand Ultra Worldwide added 23 new events in 2018 making a total of 45 events it leads under its brand. Finally, Watson concluded that “[a]ttendance of 1m+ at 45 events in 20 different countries puts Ultra on par with the Winter Olympics & Formula 1” (ibid., p.  18). Cities that host such events can benefit by accommodating their attendees. Miami has been a good example as organizer of the Winter Music Conference for twenty-eight years. Its week-long Ultra Music Festival gathered 165,000 attendees and generated 1   Beatport reassessed in 2016 its classification of genres: https://www.factmag. com/2016/09/06/beatport-update-distinction-commercial-edm-undergroundelectronic-music/

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79 million USD in revenue for the county economy and $10 million in taxes (Godard 2018). The numbers behind the electronic music industry explain why it can generate national and international tourism flows, making destinations use its appeal to reach target populations worldwide and attract global consumers. Yet, in the Arabian Gulf, the promotion of entertainment as a form of leisure is a new phenomenon since efforts to promote tourism in general are recent. An overview of the latter is necessary to understand the developments in the area of entertainment. Among GCC countries, UAE “emerged as the forerunner in efforts to build tourism and market its attractions” (EIU 1993) starting as early as the beginning of the 1990s. It is especially true for the Emirate of Dubai, which successfully turned tourism into an important driver of the economy. Statistics indicate that in 2016 tourism accounted for 8.7 per cent of UAE GDP and 31 per cent of Dubai GDP alone (WTTC 2017) and 10.4 per cent of total employment. As a result, UAE have become a global leader in the higher-end leisure market. UAE are ranked 29th among 139 countries covered by the Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017. The progress in development of tourism is noteworthy as UAE came “ahead of many of the ancient tourism destinations, despite the moderate natural resources of tourism sector” (Emirates News Agency 2011). Given the fact that using international leisure tourism as a vehicle for economic development proved successful in UAE, other countries in the Arabian Gulf region embarked on similar ventures. Yet, UAE remain an undisputed tourism leader (WTTC 2017). It is also significant that UAE has managed to establish itself as an internationally recognized tourism destination. The majority of tourists to the UAE come from the Middle East (33.5 per cent), Europe (30 per cent) and the Asia–Pacific region (26 per cent), while Bahrain that ranks second after UAE in leisure tourist arrivals receives the majority of tourist arrivals from the neighboring Saudi Arabia. UAE present, however, stark differences when it comes to tourist appeal of its particular emirates. The shares of the tourism contribution to the UAE economy were distributed in the following manner: 66 per cent for Dubai, 16 per cent for Abu Dhabi and 10 per cent for Sharjah (Alpen Capital 2014). Dubai has become the undisputed leader of UAE and GCC tourism market with 17 million guests visiting Dubai in 2018, which made it the 7th most visited city in the world. Hong Kong, which tops the ranking, attracted 30 million visitors (Maceda 2018). Dubai’s tourism strategy set a goal of 20 million tourist arrivals in 2020.

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Within tourism strategies, entertainment is the newest form of tourism attractor in the Arabian Gulf. While local heritage festivals focusing on Arabian Gulf culture have existed in the past, it is more recently that investment in entertainment-related facilities is more pronounced on a national level. Gulf cities witnessed increased investments in culture in the region with opening of theaters and opera houses. Abu Dhabi and Doha were the earliest to build national theaters, in 1981 and 1982, respectively. Abu Dhabi saw further the opening of du Arena and du Forum on Yas Island in 2009, re-branded as part of the Emirati telecom giant du in 2012. In the last decade, Bahrain followed suit opening a national theater in 2012; Muscat boasts a Royal Opera House (completed in 2011) and its theater is under construction. Qatar opened doors of its Qatar Opera House in 2010, while Dubai opened its opera house in 2016. Dubai also hosts theater performances in its multi-purpose Madinat Theatre, and Al Habtoor City. In addition, 2019 saw the opening of a multi-purpose Coca-Cola Arena. Opening of such new facilities encourages, in turn, organization of various events in an all-year-round schedule. GCC countries host a wide array of entertainment performances ranging from opera, classical music, musicals, circus arts such as Cirque du Soleil, to popular music concerts, and so on. Saudi Arabia is also reviving its tradition of musical entertainment, including international acts, after years of shutdown. The UAE entertainment scene remains the liveliest in the region with big-name artists including Dubai and Abu Dhabi in their world concert tours. Nonetheless, it is the success story of Dubai as a forefront of tourism in the GCC that stands out, and entertainment has become part of its tourism appeal. Dubai emphasizes in its tourism strategy leisure activities in man-made environments that compensate for the flat desert landscape of the emirate (Karolak 2018). In addition, those activities are often linked to a status of luxury in Dubai (for instance, luxury brands shopping, golf, etc.) or to the wow factor (ski slope in the middle of the desert; one of the largest aquariums in the world located in a shopping mall). Thanks to investments in establishing such activities in man-made environments, Dubai has put itself firmly on the tourist maps offering this unique type of extravagant leisure. The type of activities mentioned above supports the strategy of Dubai Tourism and Commerce Marketing (DTCM), the principal authority for the planning, supervision, development and marketing of tourism in Dubai. From the interview conducted at DTCM in 2016

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with a Dubai Brand Consultant, it was clear that the tourism marketing strategy aims at showing Dubai as a living functional organism, not a lifeless city, which is a mere collection of beautiful buildings. Consequently, people whether tourists, residents or locals should be the ones to tell the story of the city that was previously identified worldwide mainly for its extraordinary architecture. Such an approach emphasizes the activities to be enjoyed and the variety of things to do in Dubai overall. In addition, the interviewee mentioned that people’s experiences shared on social media, for instance, are very beneficial even if critical reviews are posted since it is possible to learn from them and improve. As part of the tourism strategy, all events happening in the city are posted under one website maintained by DTCM to make them easily accessible for the public (visitdubai.com). Hence, Dubai is forging a new identity as a city basing its brand on people’s real experiences of enjoyment of a variety of activities. The music scene in Dubai has had an early start compared to other entities in the GCC, and recent years witnessed an expansion of music venues and electronic music offerings. This development is not easy to replicate by other Gulf cities, hence clubbing increases Dubai’s competitiveness as a tourism destination.

Development of Clubbing in Dubai: Search for an Identity This section traces the growth of Dubai’s electronic music clubbing scene. While the beginnings were centered on expatriates who were passionate about music, recent years saw major private investments into the development of nightclubs, making Dubai a party capital of the region. This evolution was accompanied by a shift from a low-key underground character of the clubbing scene to a luxurious and exclusive one. The availability of venues plays an important part in the development of a clubbing scene. The typical nightclub, especially in the early days of entertainment in Dubai, would be not surprisingly a venue within a hotel. The line between a bar and a club would be often blurry with bars changing stripes later at night to accommodate live entertainment of different sorts, such as live bands imported from Asia. This model worked best thanks to the venue being in a hotel building, not in a residential one, hence, in principle not causing disturbance to the wider population, and thanks to the greater ease of obtaining liquor licenses. This is especially

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true in the Middle East where this type of venues would be usually frowned upon and restricted. In addition, having a nightlife venue is an added advantage to the hotel facilities. The club in a hotel model has been ­successful until now but recent years saw an evolution and a sophistication of the clubbing scene. The transformation of Dubai’s clubbing scene in the last decade has accompanied the tourism trends. Yearly numbers of visitors to Dubai dwarf its resident population. In 2018, 17 million tourists visited this city of 2.7 million inhabitants (Gulf News, December 5, 2018). Dubai is in the top ten visited cities worldwide, and the most visited in the MENA region. Another factor that could be attributed to the exponential growth of entertainment is the expat population in the UAE. The statistics of resident UAE population show an increase from approximately 3 million inhabitants in 2000 to more than 8 million in 2010; and in 2018, the number of inhabitants crossed 9.5 million. The growth is attributed to migratory movement of population to the UAE as Emiratis constitute only slightly more than 11 per cent of the total number (Global Media Insight 2018). Apart from international tourists, the attractions in Dubai also serve UAE inhabitants and generate tourism flows within the country from one emirate to another. Visitors are attracted by the variety of offerings in the city, and entertainment is one of them. In addition, more visitors overall translate to more hotels, which in turn, would mean in principle more bars and/ or nightclubs and a greater competition between them. It comes as no surprise the Dubai clubbing scene has blossomed. The following trends are visible in the last decade. Firstly, a large number of international nightclub franchises was brought to the city. Famous club brands opened their doors in Dubai, using their names and worked out marketing approaches to add Dubai on the map of clubbing destinations worldwide. These include: designer’s Cavalli club (Milan, Porto Cervo, opened in Dubai in 2009); designer’s Armani/Privé (part of Armani hotels worldwide; Milan, Tokyo, Hong Kong, opened in Dubai in 2010); Cirque le Soir (London, Shanghai, opened in Dubai in 2011 and discontinued in 2019); Provocateur (New York; opened in Dubai in 2014 and discontinued in 2018); Gotha Club (Cannes, opened in Dubai in 2018 and discontinued in 2019), 1OAK (Los Angeles, New York, Mexico City, opened in Dubai in 2018); Pacha (10 locations worldwide; opened in Dubai in 2014 and discontinued in 2016), Drai’s Beachclub (Las Vegas, opened in Dubai in 2018); Toy Room (London, opened in Dubai in 2015); BlueMarlin (Ibiza, Cabo San Lucas, Bodrum, opened in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi on

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the border with Dubai in 2011), El Chiringuito (Ibiza and Marbella, opened in Dubai in 2016 and re-branded as Playa Nomade in 2018), Nikki Beach (Florida; Saint Tropez; Saint Barth; Marbella; Koh Samui; Mallorca; Ibiza; Porto Heli; Monte Carlo; Bodrum; Versilia; Barbados; Costa Smeralda; opened in Dubai in 2016); Sky Bar (Beirut, opened in Dubai in 2019); Nammos (Mykonos; opened in Dubai in 2019). O Beach (Ibiza) is about to open in 2020. It is important to analyze such a high density of nightclub franchises in one city. Franchising allows using the brand concept, such as the décor, light show, menu as well as the type of acrobatic performances or cabaret dancers. Most importantly, a strong brand with a worldwide appeal signifies a celebrity place to be and be seen at. Secondly, some new venues have become larger and meet the definition of a superclub, that is, a very large or superior nightclub, often with several rooms with different themes. The locally established successful nightclubs testify to this pattern, among them: White with a capacity of 2000 people, Soho Garden (2500), Soho Beach (6000), BASE Dubai (2500). The increase in the size of nightclubs is linked to the establishment of new locations of clubs in designated district areas and no longer within hotel venues, namely, Meydan complex (the location of Soho Garden and Soho Beach, Drai’s, Toy Room, White) and the Dubai Design District (the location of Base and Sky 2.0). Thirdly, Dubai following the footsteps of Ibiza and Mykonos, has seen the emergence of beach clubs that during the day offer DJ sets with lounging and brunches, while at night transform into party zones. These venues are open-air clubs located on the seashore (Zero Gravity, Playa Nomade) or inland with swimming pools (Drai’s, Soho Beach). Nikki Beach is yet another day club concept with resident DJs. Overall, this transformation of the nightclub scene generated the sense of exclusivity and luxury of those who frequent such venues since not all are allowed to enter due to strict door policies. Cirque le Soir’s announcement is illustrative: “an exclusive private members club, we fully reserve the right to a strict door policy. […] We particularly discourage casual dress code, intoxicated customers and male heavy entourages”, that is large groups of men. And, in the age of social media, presence in a specific venue creates photo opportunities surrounding it. The photos of partygoers taken by professional photographers are regularly posted on social media devoted to nightlife, for example, Dubai Night. There is a pre-­selection made, hence capturing the lives of those who may feel themselves to be the “beautiful people,” that is the wealthy or famous whose lifestyle is usually expensive and well publicized. In addition, VIP experiences offered in the club such

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as exclusive sitting areas protected by bodyguards, red carpets, individual service and separate access generate extravagant spending. In 2012, The National newspaper reported a bill of almost 400,000 Dhs (109,000 USD) spent in one night (Hanif 2012). Such expenditures and higher ones are not uncommon in Dubai nightclubs. Nightclubs maintain on their websites, Instagram and YouTube channels these luxury lifestyle images with Porsches parked in front of the venues, extravagant décor, for example Swarovski crystal chandeliers (Cavalli), their own brands of alcohol, champagne sparklers, and so on. The Secret Room nightclub that opened in 2018, for instance, invites special guests to drive in directly with their supercars such as Lamborghinis (Workman 2018). The location of a nightclub may also be an identifier of exclusivity such as Armani/Privé’s location in the tallest building in the world. Social media posts from disgruntled partygoers who were denied entry to a nightclub denounce door policies.2 The latter create a distinction between those admitted and those who were considered not good enough to be allowed  in. Goulding, Shankar and Elliott studied the clubbing experiences and noted that those “who are selected, are made to feel special, different, individual and worthy of notice. The threat of exclusion found on the ‘outside’ [of the nightclub] is replaced by a process of acceptance and inclusion […]” (2002, p. 273). Consequently, partygoers must pay attention to their look and those of their group mates and this is especially true in Dubai. A larger group or a group which is exclusively male, may often enter only if they book a table with a minimum consumption requirement. Those who don’t initially fit may thus buy their entry into a club. As such, nightclubs often reflect and reproduce the existing social divisions (Hunt et al. 2010, p. 20). The mark of exclusivity is at times directly stated as a goal of the venue: “Our aim is to create a truly VIP experience, which will match offerings that can only be found in some of the clubbing hotspots around the world, such as Las Vegas, Ibiza and Los Angeles” (Infusion Magazine 2019). Some nightclubs strive, however, to reject this trend as will be discussed later. The growth of Dubai nightlife was accompanied by greater competition between venues. It is visible, among others, in the yearly Time Out Awards Nightlife category as well as What’s On awards. Major nightclub brands support Dubai’s image as a luxury destination that leaves visitors bedazzled. In addition, countless bars and lounges were established. Due 2  Some examples can be found here: https://www.zomato.com/dubai/base-dubai-dubaidesign-district/info

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to the transient and cosmopolitan character of Dubai as a city, nightlife venues cater to every taste, nationality and size of the wallet. The exponential growth of the nightlife scene explains the identity of Dubai as what Lonely Planet defines a “party capital.” The brand and franchise trends have been especially visible in the electronic music scene. The latter has seen the popularization of worldwide phenomena in terms of brand labels, parties, festivals and related merchandise. Hence, many Dubai nightclubs have used these concepts to attract customers and inscribe the city into worldwide trends. Apart from the purpose of local marketing, these international brands operating on social media provide detailed information about their yearly schedules such as cities and venues where they organize events. International followers of a specific brand on social media are thus made aware that Dubai is part of a worldwide network of electronic music scene events. On the other hand, local partygoers can identify with the brand without having to travel abroad as the brand will tour with international DJs worldwide. The beginnings of the electronic music scene in Dubai are underground and the work of individuals who felt music was their passion. The growth of the scene became tied to specific people and venues they managed and they DJ-ed in. These niche local clubs included specifically the labels and events under the brands of Audio tonic and Analog Room, established in 2006 and 2012,3 respectively. They were soon joined by the massive nightclubs that sprung out in the city, as described previously and in detail below. They also included electronic music as part of their repertoire. The detailed overview below focuses only on the venues related to some extent to electronic music and its culture. It summarizes the trends by focusing on the type and ambience, incorporation of electronic music brands and overall, their input to the popularization of the genre (Table 8.1). The overview shows that electronic music has become a popular genre played at major clubs in Dubai. While many clubs organize nights with different music on different days of the week, electronic music has found its way among other popular genres such as hip-hop and pop. Brands support the appeal of electronic music in the most luxurious nightclubs in Dubai. Dubai’s venues can also afford to bring such internationally recognized talents, often without charging regular partygoers, or at least female ones, entry fees. Selling of pre-booked tables with minimum c­ onsumption, 3  Collin (2018) reported the first underground electronic club to be Terminal, established in 2000.

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Table 8.1  Electronic music scene in Dubai Name

Type

Electronic music types and brands

360

Local open-air club Best House Music Night, Timeout 2011, 2014; Favourite Club Night, What’s On Awards Dubai 2012, 2013

Cavalli Club

Venue in a hotel Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly CNN best party venue in UAE 2017 Venue in a hotel Started as “the first dedicated electronic music venue in the city” but played other music genres on some nights Beach club and nightclub

Home of Audio tonic label and parties; DJ sets of local talents and of noncommercial DJs from abroad; major promoter of various genres of noncommercial electronic music; Helped 360 enter DJ Mag Top 100 Clubs of The World (2009 and 2010) Ceased after thirteen years of successful operation (ten years with Audio tonic brand) Hosted occasionally major house DJs, among them, Roger Sanchez, Bob Sinclar etc.; organized Ministry of Sound events; Resident DJs: Commercial electronic mix

Provocateur (closed in 2018)

Blue Marlin Ibiza UAE

White

Open-air superclub Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly Voted World’s 20th Club, by DJ MAG Top 100 Clubs; Voted best club in Dubai (Time Out 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018)

Hosted a lineup of international noncommercial DJs over the years as well as resident DJs specialized in deep house sound Organized Ants brand parties Major promoter of various noncommercial genres of electronic music with local and international DJ sets, among others, Sven Vath; live mixes during the day and parties at night; Hosted party brands such as Kaluki, Cocoon, Rumors, Tale of Us Afterparty, Circoloco, Burning Beach Festival, etc. Hosted international DJs (commercial and noncommercial character) Hosted DJ MAG’s official parties

(continued)

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Table 8.1  (continued) Name

Type

BASE

Open-air superclub Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly Beach club and nightclub

Soho Garden; Soho Beach

Zero Gravity

Coma (closed in 2018) Analog Room

Electronic music types and brands

Music on by Marco Carola, hosted major DJs of various noncommercial electronic subgenres, BlackCoffee, Erick Morillo, Stacey Pullen, etc. Hosted a lineup of international noncommercial DJs over the years; organized Elrow, Ants, Defected, Vagabundos brands parties; runs series of Tulum Nights Beach club and nightclub Hosted international DJs (commercial and Electronic music offered on noncommercial character) a regular basis Favourite Club Night, What’s On Awards Dubai 2017 Venue in a hotel Resident DJs, purely noncommercial character Venue in a hotel

Playa Nomade Beach club and nightclub (El Chiringuito till Nov. 2018), The Penthouse Venue in a hotel House nights scheduled weekly Lounge format Cartel Small venue in a hotel Newly opened Q43; Two venues in the same The Dek on 8 hotel Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly Armani Privé Venue in Burj Khalifa Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly

Purely noncommercial underground sound mixed live from vinyl, resident and international DJs Major promoter of various noncommercial genres of electronic music with local and international DJs; live mixes during the day and night; hosted Rumours, Mayan Warrior events Hosted international DJs

Promises noncommercial experience; entry with a password Hosted international DJs (commercial and noncommercial character)

Resident DJs, noncommercial electronic

(continued)

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Table 8.1  (continued) Name

Type

Electronic music types and brands

Industrial Avenue

Venue in a hotel Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly Separate venue in Souq Madinat Jumeirah Trilogy Best House Night 2012 (Time Out Dubai) Mixed music during the week; house nights scheduled regularly Venue in a hotel Mixed music during the week; house DJs scheduled occasionally Beach club with night parties Venue in a hotel Mixed music during the week; house nights were scheduled regularly but ceased Best House Night 2016 Time Out

Resident DJs, noncommercial electronic

Trilogy, replaced by Pacha (closed in 2016)

GOTHA (closed 2019)

Nasimi Beach Movida

Trilogy held weekly noncommercial house nights; Pacha brand is a major electronic music franchise; Organized Dance Music Conference in 2016 Hosted few major events with DJ Solomun and Steve Aoki

Hosted occasionally major DJs Resident DJs

VIP experiences and branded food and drinks must compensate the DJ expenses. Nonetheless, in a city like Dubai down-to-earth and underground events have also been successful by creating a niche sector. Industrial Avenue is a good example stating that as a “club for the people” it goes against the trends giving “club-goers a more laid-back alternative to the glitz and glamour that the city is famous for” (“A new nightclub is now open in Dubai Marina,” 2018). The venue has no dress code. Dubai has also seen a number of electronic music festivals. Apart from those hosted directly by the nightclubs mentioned above, locally grown electronic music festivals include Groove on the Grass (so far completed seven seasons) and Bao, which began in 2018 and hosted top international EDM DJs. In addition, a major international festival franchise from Belgium, Tomorrowland, was brought as Unite with Tomorrowland to Dubai (2017) and Abu Dhabi (2018), and was organized simultaneously

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through a satellite connection in Germany, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan. The capacity of the venue was increased from 8000 in Dubai to 25,000 in Abu Dhabi. Major festivals are not only a feast for the ears but also for the eyes with light and laser shows and gigantic stages with outlandish decor. A description of the Bao setting is illustrative: “‘jaw dropping’ stage set up […] better than some of the biggest festivals in the world” with “a 72-meter long dragon and a 7 m3 dragon head” (“Middle East’s Greatest EDM Extravaganza Takes Center Stage,” 2018). All in all, Dubai nightclubs have inscribed themselves into the electronic music international trends. While the club ownership is private, as part of the DTCM strategy, electronic music events are publicized worldwide from its official website and social media accounts. The information is posted in many languages; hence visitors can easily find these events, among others. Hence, there are mutual benefits as clubs receive free advertisement and Dubai brand is strengthened through multiple offerings. In addition, the venues support the image of Dubai as a party capital with a predominantly luxurious character.

Interview Data Analysis For the purpose of greater understanding of the concept of “party capital” the researcher interviewed five individuals deeply engaged in the electronic clubbing scene in Dubai. Four of them were resident DJs, the fifth one was a DJ as a hobby and while attending events in UAE, played at festivals abroad. All the interviewees have resided in the UAE more than five years and were engaged in electronic music in their home countries before coming to Dubai. The interviewees mentioned that before coming to UAE, they were not aware of Dubai’s clubbing scene: “No, I did not know Dubai before coming. I was made an offer and I thought Dubai… money and so on and I came here without knowing how it was here”. Another interviewee confirmed: “Dubai had a wild factor to it […] I saw it on pictures and I thought I might live there”. For some, Dubai’s electronic music scene was a pleasant surprise on arrival: “When I arrived, the owner of the club [name] sent me in a car, I did not know Dubai; and he said you have to go to Blue Marlin, I want you to listen to the music to see how is the scene. And this day Nina Kraviz was playing […] she plays techno, she is very, very good, with vinyl. And I ended up thinking: that is something!” As

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such Dubai was not a known location for electronic music events even for the interviewees who before coming were engaged in the music scenes of UK, Spain and some even toured in locations worldwide. The changes to these perceptions are palpable as all the interviewees observed a clear evolution of the clubbing scene in recent years: “With the passage of time, we are more DJs and more parties with electronic music […].” Another one added: “The evolution of the scene has been quite good over the five years we are talking about many places… the scene has excelled, they play deep, commercial and on the extreme techno […]”. This growth of the offerings has had an impact on the inhabitants: “The beginnings was 2010–2011, Audio tonic, those were the people who started to play house music. Many people got to know the meaning of deep house, tech house, underground music, it was unknown before it was only Rn’B and hip hop. But now most people […] they will know [the difference].” The specialization is visible in the nightclubs as well as confirmed by another participant: “Each one has its own music identity Blue Marlin: deep house techno […]; Industrial Avenue: it is more tech house, more party. Soho Garden that is more house. […] And a purist one – Analog Room – this is techno played with vinyl.” The interviewees also observed the efforts to bring international artists to the city: “Dubai is bringing big names all the time […] if you are in another city like in Europe you may not see so many big-name DJs come. In Dubai, every week is so much choice going on of DJs.” Another one added: “Dubai makes this effort to bring this type of artists and they are able to get them here during 5 or 6 months and this is amazing.” Yet, some stated the financial reasons behind it: “A famous DJ would be paid four times more to play in Dubai than in Ibiza.” For some, economic reasons were combined with seasonal ones: “part of it is that Dubai is such a rich city and big spenders and so on… Second thing, where would David Guetta go in November time to an outside venue, for example, playing on a beach to a thousand of people … not many places.” Yet another participant saw the business side of DJ-ing as having a negative side on the quality of the music: “There are some DJs, very rare DJs playing in Dubai the same as in Europe but 99% of DJs they are just coming for money… they play a couple of hours and fly to another destination.” Nonetheless, all the interviewees agreed Dubai is able to regularly attract the biggest names in the industry ranging from the commercial to the underground spectrum of the electronic music. Furthermore, the interviewees were asked to reflect on the type of venues in Dubai, especially, in terms of a large number of franchises.

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One participant noted: “it is a way to attract people, it is all very VIP, for instance all 1 OAK around the world they are VIP, also Armani is a VIP brand and Provocateur from New York a luxe nightlife … but there is no Ministry of Sound, which is more down to earth […] in every city around the world there are one or two discos which are super exclusive and where famous people go, here it is the other way around, there are one or two that are normal.” Another one added: “People like brands. People would grab Chanel bags, people like to be branded, they like to go places that have that good image you know […] it is kind of posing city people wanna go ‘look at me I am in Drai’s’ …” Other participant agreed: “There are some people just going and posting on Facebook we are in this club.” Another interviewee explained the brand image creation process involving social media: “Superclubs can be known worldwide because so many people go to them and they just see everyone on Facebook and Instagram, whatever…” The financial opportunities for nightclubs offering such an image were clear for one DJ: “The record amount spent [in the club he worked] was 680,000 Dhs [185,000 USD] in two hours, a Mexican client, and the second was 400,000 Dhs, a French client, but it is the same in Ibiza.” Another interviewee summed up the business side of the clubbing industry: “Showing off and making money when you sell a bottle 500,000 Dhs.” But this commercial trend and exclusivity were also visible in other spotlight places: “Ibiza is becoming more and more like Dubai. Now there are customers coming with big money. Everything shot up: the rents are very high, people come to work in seasons. And on the level of electronic music, that is the difference, there is a lot of electronic but they also play a lot of commercial such as Paris Hilton has her own party in Amnesia and that is the same place Marco Carola has his party, where Loco Dice has his party.” This observation is interesting as Marco Carola and Loco Dice are very well-established and respected producers, while Paris Hilton could get her way into the world of DJs by bringing her own celebrity status and personal brand to it, and turn DJ-ing into another lucrative business venture (“Paris Hilton Earns up to 1m single DJ set,” 2014). Commercialization of Ibiza’s nightlife has already been reported by music analysts in the past (Garvan 2014) and nothing seems to have stopped it. From its humble underground origins, electronic music has become a product that can be wrapped in a luxury package and sold at high prices. The interviewees were asked further to compare Dubai with other cities regionally and worldwide. One of the interviewees concluded: “In the

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Middle East people recognize Dubai to be the best place from the point of view of the level of DJs and electronic music … on a global scale places like Madrid, Detroit, Chicago are on a different level. What happens is that people come here with a different mindset to do business. Many people sign contracts in clubs. It is a good place to meet and to be with a client, talk and close a deal but they also want to enjoy the city, its restaurants and its discos.” Furthermore, another interviewee added “Dubai is not known [abroad as having a house music scene]. When you go to Ibiza you expect house music, you don’t expect open format commercial, Rn’B … like Dubai is so from one end of the spectrum to another so as a hub of house music – no. As a central hub for party goers – yes. It is a good place to come for a choice of all genres but just one genre - no.” The interviewees all concluded that as of now, people would come to Dubai for a number of attractions and that electronic music was an added advantage to the whole array of activities that UAE can offer, for example, an interviewee mentioned Formula 1 races combined with parties with international DJs. The interviewees doubted that festivals organized so far could attract international tourism alone: “So, I went to both [Tomorrowland in Dubai and in Belgium] so the atmosphere of Belgium is just lot different than atmosphere in Dubai. Tomorrowland is 16 different stages […] it just didn’t have the same effect [in UAE]. [It is good] 100% for locals [people living in UAE] but I don’t know if people will fly [to UAE] from outside for this.” He specified that this could be an attraction for residents of other Arabian Gulf countries who would find Dubai much closer and those who have not been to the original festivals, hence would not know the difference. Another one added: “No, I don’t think they come for the music, they come for the beach and a party as leisure but not for a festival.” He explained that music was an added element to the whole Dubai experience but at this point international tourists would not be picky about the type of electronic music played, and they would enjoy any DJ anyway. But this could change if UAE organizes a major festival: “[So far] Benefits [stemming from electronic music are] for the clubs not for the city. Benefits for the city you need a big event 30–40,000 people for minimum 4–5 days […] It is also timing – these parties in Europe and States finishing 8–9  in the morning and here maximum 4 o’clock. It doesn’t work.” To become a major electronic music hub, one participant suggested: “They can make something in the desert in Fujairah or Ras Al Khaimah playing music 24 hours [especially there so] people are coming by charter flights from Scandinavian countries, Germany.” He also added

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there were talks of organizing an Ultra Music Festival in 2020 (announced to take place in March 2020 as of now), and possibly, BPM in the future. The participants also reflected on the local successful brands of electronic music: “Audio tonic and Groove on the Grass, those are the same people.” Despite the demise of Audio tonic, one interviewee mentioned that “Audio tonic was a collective and the main people left [Dubai].” Yet, one of Audio tonic’s main artists, Raxon, established a successful career in Barcelona. There is an opportunity for such artists and venues to grow in Dubai: “They have their niche so they will attract their niche crowds. […] They [venues] are quite small anyway so it won’t take much to fill them. Then there can be a snowball effect, people tell their friends, before you know you have a community so you just go to your venue […]” Although one interviewee was more pessimistic: “the niche venues, they never make money.” All the interviewees concluded that being in UAE has helped them grow professionally: “Being in Dubai gives you a certain importance, builds your curriculum… such as playing for a famous brand.” And they all concluded that the opportunities they get in Dubai exceed those they could personally encounter in other places worldwide. Consequently, they were all optimistic about the continued growth of Dubai’s electronic music scene: “In years to come the scene will be quite a big music scene and it will grow… I am not saying it will be another Berlin, Ibiza or Detroit, here we are talking business.” And “winter times is perfect weather [in Dubai] so Ibiza’s season finishes September-October; then the season starts in Dubai in October. So, it is a good chance for example for DJs who work in Ibiza for 6 months and then they can work in Dubai for 6 months and so it is a central hub […] probably not now but it is going this way, isn’t it?”

Discussion and Conclusion In recent years, Dubai has embraced entertainment as part of a broader tourism strategy to attract international tourist arrivals. Among other types of entertainment, Dubai’s nightlife venues experienced an important growth. Nightclubs have proliferated in the city and contributed to forging its new identity: that of a luxury nightlife destination. With new deluxe clubbing brands, extravagant shows and high spenders, Dubai is the Middle East’s playground for those seeking exclusivity, visibility and prestige in their enjoyment of nightlife entertainment. Among the recent worldwide trends, Dubai’s venues adopted the electronic music as a

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fashionable genre that generates high revenues. Consequently, nightclubs have hosted a lineup of the most sought-after DJs from around the world and the famous party brands that travel across the continents. In addition, the city has begun to adopt electronic music festivals with local concepts taking root as well as international franchises of well-established events organized on a regular basis. Lonely Planet’s assessment of Dubai being the “ultimate party capital” in the Middle East is thus justified by the many nightlife entertainment choices. Dubai, as stated by the interviewees in this study, may be still far from the top party cities worldwide though. Operations of nightclubs have strict time restrictions, and the international brands of parties and festivals are organized on a much smaller scale than their original counterparts. Yet, the trend is clearly visible, there exist financial means and demand for such events and the scene is likely to experience further growth and maturing. From the point of view of tourism, whether leisure or business, music is an added advantage to the variety of existing attractions and choices. Travelers to Dubai may experience a night-out clubbing or enjoying music at a beach club and are offered a whole array of choices, which adds to the overall enjoyment of their stay. In addition, nightlife entertainment attracts primarily local residents who enjoy the diversity of entertainment offerings. As such, it supports the approach of the Dubai brand as a city where people get together to enjoy life. Nightlife also testifies to the relaxed and tolerant approach making Dubai one of the most popular cities to visit worldwide. While, so far, the music and nightclubs alone may generate a tourism appeal internally within UAE and on a regional scale, especially for Arabian Gulf countries residents, in the future the emirate may support the organization of events at a larger scale and attract tourists for a festival. With regard to the electronic music, a large part behind its proliferation and appeal comes from the business considerations. Famous DJs, parties and nightclub brands can be packaged as a luxury product that partygoers want to identify with. As the young generations of partygoers are compulsive social media users, their photos from nightclubs posted online add to their own status among friends but also strengthen the popularity of the brand. In addition, as expats are the vast majority of consumers of such events, their social media posts promote Dubai among their families and friends abroad. Electronic music parties have become a sought-after product, and strict door policies of the majority of Dubai’s nightclubs make the experience even more exclusive. Whether partygoers identify with the music or just attend electronic music parties to feel special is not as important

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as the business side of clubbing. Dubai has been known as a city that attracts high spenders in general. Clubbing with its exclusive appeal has become part of the high revenue generating business that sells worldwide. Dubai is the perfect city to promote electronic music as exclusive brands and sell the entertainment services at exorbitant prices. Nonetheless, the demand for this type of services exists. The city also offers, however, opportunities for niche venues and artists to operate. The efforts and the operations of nightlife electronic music industry are as of now private ventures, whether artistic or business ones. The involvement of many stakeholders including national authorities will no doubt be needed if a large-scale execution of electronic music projects will be carried out in the future.

References A New Nightclub Is Now Open in Dubai Marina. (2018). What’s On. Retrieved January 3, 2019 from https://whatson.ae/dubai/2018/08/a-new-nightclubis-now-open-in-dubai-marina/ Alpen Capital. (2014). GCC Hospitality Industry. Retrieved January 1, 2015 from h t t p : / / w w w. a l p e n c a p i t a l . c o m / d o w n l o a d s / G C C _ H o s p i t a l i t y _ Report_24092014.pdf Best Festivals in Israel. (n.d.). Secret Tel Aviv. Retrieved October 23, 2018 from https://www.secrettelaviv.com/best-festivals-in-israel Collin, M. (2018). Rave on: Global Adventures in Electronic Dance Music. London: Profile Books Ltd. Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU]. (1993). United Arab Emirates. International Tourism Reports, 3, 29–54. Emirates News Agency. (2011). UAE Travel and Tourism One of Key Contributors to GDP. Retrieved March 30, 2015 from http://www.emirates247.com/ news/emirates/uae-travel-and-tourism-one-of-key-contributors-to-gdp2011-08-28-1.415393 Garvan, S. (2014, August 1). Top DJs Say Ibiza Is Too Expensive for Young People. BBC. Retrieved April 2, 2018 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/28472079/top-djs-say-ibiza-is-too-expensive-for-young-people Global Media Insight. (2018). United Arab Emirates Statistics. Retrieved January 3, 2019 from https://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/uae-populationstatistics/ Godard, T. (2018). The Economics of Electronic Dance Music Festivals. Retrieved November 30, 2018 from https://smartasset.com/mortgage/the-economicsof-electronic-dance-music-festivals Goulding, C., & Shankar, A. (2011). Club Culture, Neotribalism and Ritualised Behaviour. Annals of Tourism Research, 38(4), 1435–1453.

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Goulding, C., Shankar, A., & Elliott, R. (2002). Working Weeks, Rave Weekends: Identity Fragmentation and the Emergence of New Communities. Consumption, Markets and Culture, 5(4), 261–284. Hanif, N. (2012, January 4). Dh387,988 Receipt from Dubai’s Cavalli Club Creates Twitter Sensation. The National. Retrieved January 3, 2019 from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/dh387-988-receipt-from-dubai-s-cavalliclub-creates-twitter-sensation-1.603945 Hunt, G., Moloney, M., & Evans, K. (2010). Youth, Drugs, and Nightlife. London/New York: Routledge. Infusion Magazine. (2019). Retrieved March 30, 2019 from https://www.infusion.ae/new-luxury-nightclub-mantis-opening-in-dubai/ Karolak, M. (2018). Destination Place Identity, Touristic Diversity and Diversification in the Arabian Gulf. In A.  Mishrif & Y.  Al Balushi (Eds.), Economic Diversification in the GCC: Challenges and Opportunities (pp. 183–208). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Krendzelak, J. (2008). Tourism in Ibiza Island and Its Destination Life Cycle. Dissertation, University of Nottingham. Retrieved October 1, 2018 from http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23412/1/Tourism_in_Ibiza_and_its_destination_life_cycle.pdf Lonely Planet. (2012). Ultimate Party Cities. Retrieved March 1, 2018 from https://www.lonelyplanet.com/travel-tips-and-articles/ultimate-partycities/40625c8c-8a11-5710-a052-1479d2777622 Maceda, C. (2018, December 5). World’s Most Visited Cities in 2018 Revealed: Where Dubai Ranks. Gulf News. Retrieved December 6, 2018 from https:// gulfnews.com/business/tourism/worlds-most-visited-cities-in-2018-revealedwhere-dubai-ranks-1.1543991004982 Middle East’s Greatest EDM Extravaganza Takes Center Stage. (2018). Dubai Night. Retrieved October 1, 2018 from https://www.dubainight.com/dubai/ mag/news/middle-easts-greatest-edm-extravaganza-takes-centerstage,28,29280.html Paris Hilton Earns Up to 1m Single DJ Set. (2014, October 23). The Guardian. Retrieved May 2, 2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/ oct/23/paris-hilton-earns-up-to-1m-single-dj-set Ritchie, J. R., & Crouch, G. I. (2003). The Competitive Destination: A Sustainable Tourism Perspective. Wallingford: Cabi Publishing. Watson, K. (2018). IMS Business Report 2018: An Annual Study of the Electronic Music Industry. Retrieved January 5, 2019 from https://www.internationalmusicsummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/IMS-Business-Report2018-vFinal2.pdf

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Workman, A. (2018, October 11). WATCH: We Drive a Lamborghini into Dubai Nightclub Secret Room. The National. Retrieved October 12, 2018 from https://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/motoring/watch-we-drive-a-lamborghini-into-dubai-nightclub-secret-room-1.779395 World Travel & Tourism Council [WTTC]. (2017). Travel & Tourism 2017. Retrieved January 3, 2018 from http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/ downloads/traveltourism2017.pdf

CHAPTER 9

Music for Thought: Examining Saudi Identities Expressed Through Music on Social Media Magdalena Karolak

Introduction This chapter looks at the popular music diffused through social media in Saudi Arabia as means of uncovering the debates surrounding the Saudi society, its values, social practices and ultimately, its identity. The advent of social media has allowed independent Saudi producers to emerge and gain popularity among the, largely very young, Saudi society. The fact that social media provide direct access to millions of viewers has made it possible to circumvent the traditional gatekeepers who in the Saudi context would strictly control the content, style and genre of musical performances to be promoted in the country. The new generation of Saudi artists could take on to the stage on channels such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter and have their video clips shared further by viewers through social media platforms. In addition to simply breaking the access to the music industry, their M. Karolak (*) College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_9

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productions could touch upon the subjects important to the Saudi viewers despite the strict censorship in place. The analysis of their music videos offers an unparalleled opportunity to look into the social debates surrounding the values of the Saudi youth and the search for a new identity. Saudi Arabia is in the process of deep social reforms initiated by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Since taking de facto power in June 2017, he managed to successfully carry out a number of groundbreaking reforms relaxing the mores in the Saudi society. Some of the music productions to be analyzed further in this chapter predate Mohammad bin Salman’s ascension to power; yet, they testify to the existing debates at that time, and desires of the Saudi youth for social change that the new leader is making come true. When looking at music as research material, Frith noted that “Music constructs our sense of identity through the direct experiences it offers of the body, time and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives” (2003, p. 109). Furthermore, he observed that in the analysis, “the issue is not how a particular piece of music or a performance reflects the people, but how it produces them” (ibid.). Consequently, this chapter will assess the two sides of selected music videos, first, analyzing them as a reflection of the society in a specific moment of history, but most importantly, as a way of producing the artist and the public in the sense of vocalizing the transformed identities of Saudis that those artists wish to come true through social change. This research offers an interesting take on the social environment that Saudi Arabia is in today demonstrating the fluidity and the willingness to engage in debate about the core of being Saudi and the desire of the society to transform. To begin with, this chapter reveals the broader context of the production and the role of popular music in the Arab world; then, it focuses on the analysis of Saudi online music videos. Through a mixed method applied to the content, it sheds light on the linguistic and visual as well as musical aesthetic means that Saudi artists espouse in their quest for freedom of expression and ultimately, social change.

Arabic Music in Television and Social Media Hammond (2007, p. 159) asserts that starting from the 1980s the Arab music industry began to be dominated by pop music. While modeled on the Western genre, pop is infused with Arabic musical forms, hence creating a genre in its own kind—Arabpop—able to successfully compete with

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Western pop for audiences in the Middle East. The diffusion of this genre was facilitated by the emergence of TV satellite channels such as Rotana, Mazzika, Melody TV and Nessma. Those channels are widely accessible in the Middle East through satellite channels subscriptions. In addition, Hammond observed that the evolution of popular Arabic musical genre brought about also a change of topic. While during the Golden Age of Arabic music (1952–1977) Arab singers addressed political issues, Arabpop is “almost entirely apolitical” (Hammond 2007, p. 160). Arabpop artists have been avoiding the subjects of domestic political and social issues, and hence steered away from criticism of internal problems of particular countries; exceptionally an occasional allusion to the Palestinian conflict may appear. Since music TV channels played a crucial role in this transformation, it is important to explore the contents that they broadcast and the limitations that follow. Khalil and Kraidy (2009, p. 58) stated that music channels are one of the fastest growing types of television. Tracing back the explosion of music channels in the Arab world to the early 1990s, Khalil and Kraidy assessed that they are currently in the third stage of development, that is, they have evolved into a group of “niche and commercially viable satellite channels” (ibid.), in addition to international channels that established Arabic versions such as MTV Arabia. Over time, new channels were created while others evolved or disappeared during the last two decades with the most successful channels being as below. Among the earliest music channels, Music Now has established itself in 1994 as a channel for Western and Mediterranean hits. Mazzika founded in 2004 operates from its headquarters in Egypt and apart from Arabic music hits also includes Western mainstream music. Melody TV, owned by a Canadian group, is another example of a channel focusing on Arabic and international hits. MTV Arabia caters to Arabic and Western mainstream music tastes. Nojood television was established in Dubai to promote khaleeji music in particular. Rotana Mousica is a Saudi-owned channel (by Prince Al Waleed bin Talal) operating from Dubai and while broadcasting mainstream Arabic music, it focuses specifically on khaleeji and Egyptian styles. This channel added “its exclusive access to over a hundred artists signed to its label” (Khalil and Kraidy 2009, p. 62); hence, it is becoming a producer and a broadcaster in one. Finally, Nessma, a Tunisia-based music channel with a Pan-Maghreb reach was established in 2007; in recent years, it changed ownership and extended its scope from only music content to all forms of entertainment (Oxford Business Group 2010, p. 189).

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Until the emergence and popularization of social media, the traditional media controlled the access of emerging artists and the type of music to be aired. In this commercial model, gatekeepers monitor the access, and songs touching upon controversial political or social issues would not be broadcasted. In spite of their non-political stance, these channels were still breaking social taboos. Hammond (2007, p.  175) highlighted, among others, the progressive sexualization of Arab singers in musical videos, especially the female ones, which goes against the established social norms and marks an influence of Western video clips on Arab music industry. In addition, he pointed out the accessibility of such content diffused to conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia through satellite TV subscriptions. Hammond also noted that viewers could make comments and calls to the radio hosts and some of them were reportedly of indecent nature (ibid., p. 227). Nonetheless, Arabpop aimed at entertaining and distracting the viewers with light, pleasurable texts, music and videos and not questioning or undermining the established social order. Such goals were taken upon by underground artists whose songs rife with political messages were distributed primarily through social media. Indeed, the emergence and the spread of social media have transformed the music industry worldwide. But it is especially in countries where strict censorship exists that the access to social media could open new boundaries for artists allowing them to make their work visible and popularize it over social networks. Moore, for instance, assessed that in Indonesia where strict censorship exists, marketing potential of the Internet, and the freedom of expression it allows, helped “amplify artistic and political freedom” (2013, p. 382). Indonesian underground artists can, among others, reach new audiences within and outside of the country. She noted, however, that the situation is not ideal given the existence of online censorship. In addition, the country is, on the one hand, still widely dominated by pop music industry; hence, the society may not be receptive to alternative genres; and, on the other hand, conservative segments of society want to silence subversive lyrics. This situation leads to many constraints for alternative and politically engaged artists despite the use of social media. McLean et  al. (2010, p.  1366) also highlighted the existence of “economic power, surveillance, censorship and control” that has a continuous impact on independent musicians in the West and elsewhere. Social media alone cannot remove all the constraints for freedom of speech and for artistic freedom. Nonetheless, the impact of social media is noteworthy especially in the Middle East. It was clearly visible during the

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Arab Spring uprisings when young artists diffused protests songs over Internet (Facebook and YouTube) to express their desire for regime change. The genre of choice was par excellence rap represented by, among others, in Tunisia—El General, in Egypt—Arabian Knightz, in Libya— Ibn Thabit; but other musical genres were also recorded as protests songs throughout the uprisings (Swedenburg 2016). In the case of Saudi Arabia, any content that contradicts the official political system and social practices cannot be aired due to complete control of the media by the Saudi authorities, which is one of the strictest in the world (Stenslie 2012, pp.  27–31). In 2019, Reporters Without Borders (2019) described the government as “cracking down harder”, and ranked Saudi Arabia 172nd out of 180 countries for freedom of the press. The content in Saudi Arabia’s domestic mass media is under the control of the government, having to pass through censors before it makes it on air or in print. Furthermore, while the press is said to be privately owned, the editor-in-chief of each newspaper is appointed by the government. While in theory the law does not allow access to satellite TV, the country has experienced a rapid growth of satellite subscriptions, among others, due to restrictions on entertainment in the country. It is, however, the social media that created a new public sphere for wider discussion within the Saudi Arabian society (“Beating the censor,” 2014). Social media have taken Saudi Arabia by storm as the country ranks seventh worldwide in terms of individual accounts on social media. Internet penetration rates reached 91% in 2019, while active social media users account for 75% of all the users (GMI 2019). The statistics of major social media platforms report that approximately 70% of Internet users in Saudi Arabia being Facebook and YouTube users (GlobalStats 2019; GMI 2019). Among social chat applications, Whatsapp reaches 72%  of Saudis (GMI 2019). Researchers who have assessed the use of social media in Saudi Arabia acknowledge that it is the most important medium for political debates used by all segments of the society (Rifai 2014). In the same vein, Al Nashmi et al. (2010) noted that politics was an important topic in Saudi online discussion boards. Other analysts observed online exchanges about social mores and prospects of their reforms that do not necessarily lead to discussion but often end up in heated arguments and insults (“Beating the censor,” 2014). In addition, social media were also used to mobilize Saudis to join social campaigns; a notable example is the campaign to push for women’s right to drive in 2011 that used Facebook and Twitter (Agarwal et al. 2012). It does not mean, however, that social media are a safe space

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for those critical of the rulers and the religious establishment or the social order. On the contrary, harsh punishments such as incarcerations and flagellations were applied as penalties to those breaking the rules in the past. In spite of what seems to be the beginning of a long process of social change in Saudi Arabia, citizens asking openly for fast-paced reforms and mobilizing others online and/or offline are quickly silenced. Such is a recent case of a man who called for the abolishment of the guardianship system for women (Jeffery 2016). It is within this context that some Saudi artists decided to use music in order to encourage debate and question the social status quo using social media as modes of diffusion. Music has been an always present and important cultural tradition in the Arabian Peninsula. Yet, it has also been met with opposition among the most conservative segments of the Saudi society, especially if found to encourage bad mores such as mixing of genders, adopting Western fashion, drinking, homosexuality and so on. (Kumar 2017). Certain types of music, especially Western genres, are thus more of a concern than the traditional khaleeji style. Such is the case, for instance, of black metal music (Chester 2015) or, at times, rap. Due to these hesitations with regard to the influence of music on the audience, public concerts are rare in Saudi Arabia and local TV stations have only recently come back to broadcasting concerts—a sign of loosening of the grip of conservatives (“Tweeps sing praises as music concerts return to Saudi TV,” 2017). Consequently, the use of music in order to promote social change is not an easy decision, in spite of its only mode of diffusion available, that is, through social media, being widely accessible. Indeed, as noted by McLean et al. (2010) “the DIY artist is rebellious but not necessarily in an overtly political manner. The subject, content and sound of the music they create often places them outside of the commercial territory of the majors”. Indeed, an artist may not necessarily aim at challenging the established order, yet the result is such.

Methodology In order to uncover Saudi music videos that fulfill the functions described above, an online search was conducted on social media pertaining to the Saudi music scene. Some of the artists have already gained popularity on social media within Saudi Arabia and abroad through their music or through previous artistic work such as comedy. Others have recently begun to post such music contents, which could be attributed to, among

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others, the opening of the music scene in the country. In addition, it is worth noting that some Saudi artists left their home country and became producers abroad, hence having no longer to fear the censorship. Some of the artists also opt to use English rather than Arabic. Nonetheless, the majority of the artists uncovered as a result of the search reside in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, some of the ways to navigate this difficult terrain, while pushing the boundaries of what is permissible and simultaneously promote social change is to use satire; to co-opt Western genres to the traditional ones or ultimately, to break taboos by posting videos of dance performances. Table 9.1 summarizes the findings. In the following overview, I am going to discuss the examples of each of those modes to promote social change. Table 9.1  Music videos: search results Year

Song & artist(s) or producer

Number of times watched on YouTube

Description of the social issue

Style/genre

2013

“No woman, no drive” Hesham Fageeh “Bat Al Tha ar Nar Muheja” Al Namrood “Hwages” Majid Al Eissa “Barbs” Majid Al Eisa Mashup of Abu Hamdan’s Awafi & Despacito Mojo & Jean Al Shehri Saudi women driving (cover song) Most of us “Screw infidels” Folaim “Rise” Tamtam

16+ million

Women’s right to drive

Cover of “No woman, no cry” by Bob Marley

300,000+ views

Criticism of the government

Black metal

27+ million views 57+ million

Patriarchy

Original production

Dance craze

117,000+ views

NA

Mixed traditional & Western styles Mashup Western and Saudi songs

590,000+ views

Women’s right to drive

9+ million

Intolerance toward Rap; Western mores Telfaz11 production Gender equality Saudi artist in US; English language; Western style

2014

2016 2015 2017

2017

2015 2018

1+ million

Cover of “Born to be wild” by Steppenwolf

(continued)

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Table 9.1  (continued) Year

Song & artist(s) or producer

Number of times watched on YouTube

Description of the social issue

Style/genre

2019

“Never snitch” Skinny

2.8 million+

Use of drugs; gangsta lifestyle

2018

“O eye” Producer: Majid Al Eisa Singer: Amal “Bzwjk” Ibrahim Basha

2+ million views

Divorce

Saudi artist in US English language Gangsta rap Singing poetry

1.4+ million views

Marriage and society

“Aboya” Ibrahim Basha “Can I Go Out?” Folaim “Kafeel” Abdulkhaliq

1.2+ views

Idolization of fathers in society Patriarchy/ Women’s rights

“You won’t drive” Fe2aFala “Merciful Touch” Fe2aFala

11+ million views 3+ million views

Domestic abuse; Child abuse

“He won’t marry you” Fe2aFala

2+ million views

Dating and marriage in Saudi society

2019

2019 2017

2015

2016

2016

2015

2.7+ million views 12+ million views

Treatment of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia Women’s right to drive

Cover of “I Love It” by Kanye West & Lil Pump Cover of “Hallelujah” by Leonard Cohen Original production/ storytelling; Telfaz11 production Rap; Telfaz11 production Cover of “Cheap Thrills” by Sia Original production/ storytelling; Sponsored by The National Family Safety Program. Original production

Satire In her analysis of Western women’s movements and their aesthetics, O’Keefe (2014) noted that in order to subvert the existing social norms, such as patriarchal structures, signifiers of these structures of power should be (re)appropriated. She analyzes further various strategies of subversive reclamation that were used by protest movements. The strategies applied

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rely on “the strategic appropriation of carnivalesque performance and aesthetics, including playful mockery, ritualized inversion, gender bending”. However, not every performance is subversive. O’Keefe stressed that “subversiveness rests in […] ability to exaggerate the parody so that it is unmistakeably read as irony” (2014, p. 107) and furthermore, she argued that “the subversive potential is plausible when we ‘speak the language of the dominant (which allows you to be heard), but then to subvert it through ironic strategies of exaggeration, understatement, or literalization’ (O’Grady 1998 cited in O’Keefe, 2014)”. But when parody is not well communicated, the subversive element of the performance is erased, and the performance becomes a mere repetition of the structures set in place. Within the context of Saudi Arabia, satire can be a less threatening method of promoting social change than directly challenging the established order as in the process of (re)appropriation the language of the dominant power is used leaving at least some of the public wonder about the real intentions of the artist. The recording by Hesham Fageeh “No woman, No drive” (2013) is an example of such subversion. It uses the soundtrack of Bob Marley’s “No Woman, No Cry” song and along with its lyrics to create a parody of the Saudi restrictions of women’s right to drive. The recording was so successful on social media that it scored a record million views in just 24 hours from its posting. The video opens up with Hesham Fageeh announcing his inspiration for the video and stressing that his rendition of Bob Marley’s hit has “lyrics relevant to my culture”. In the video, the artist uses the language of the dominant patriarchal structures in order to subvert them. The position of the woman as secondary citizen is exaggerated though expressions such as “Say I remember when you used to sit/In the family car, but backseat”. A clash between the supposedly elevated status of the women “queens don’t drive” is juxtaposed with her subservient role at home “But you can cook for me my dinner/Of which I’d share with you”. Consequently, the woman should rely on the benevolence of the man who will share the meal she prepared with her if he feels like doing so. Man is, ultimately, a firm decision maker who prevents the woman’s freedom of movement as until recently was the case in the country: “Hey, little sister, don’t touch that wheel/No woman, no drive” and “Your feet is your only carriage/But only inside the house—and when I say it I mean it.” Finally, in the lines “Ovaovaries all safe and well/So you can make lots and lots of babies” the artist

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echoes also the statement made by a Saudi cleric who declared: “If a woman drives a car, not out of pure necessity, that could have negative physiological impacts as functional and physiological medical studies show that it automatically affects the ovaries and pushes the pelvis upwards,” and “That is why we find those who regularly drive have children with clinical problems of varying degrees” (McDowall 2013). Overall, the exaggeration creates a subtle parody of the patriarchal structures that discriminate the woman summarized by the antithesis of “bright future” and “past” that makes the woman “put [her] car key away”. The video focuses on Hesham Fageeh and his fellow artists. Similarly to Hesham Fageeh’s “No woman, No drive” video, two further productions are covers of Western songs that take on a satirical turn to criticize the Saudi mores. In the first one titled “You won’t drive”, Fe2aFala channel uses the language of the conservative segments of the society and exaggerates it to the extreme. In an exchange between a woman and a group of men in a car garage, she is told she will never be able to drive: “You won’t drive and stop all your questions. /We said no over and over, all women go back to the kitchen”. She tries to argue her case to allow her to drive using various arguments such as “But women are allowed outside (of Saudi Arabia)”; but to no avail: “But your society doesn’t accept it yet” and “Stay home/Your duty is to cook and keep the house clean”. This is despite woman’s need to do her errands and willingness to take care of the car: “I’ll steer, fill the gas and change the oil”. The second video, by Ibrahim Basha, uses the music of “Hallelujah” to expose the terrorizing father figure. In a video styled as the court of Versailles reminiscent of the times of authoritarian kings, the father enters his children’s rooms one by one to catch them doing some transgressions such chatting online, having an unconventional hairstyle or watching a kiss scene on TV. The father is characterized as “old and grumpy”, and punishes his children with extreme methods, instilling fear in them and exercising complete control over their lives. The outcome is a complete breakdown of parent-child relations with children’s unhappiness summed up by one of the sons: “he [the father] thinks I am nothing”. The issue of child abuse is also presented in another video by Fe2aFala “Merciful touch”. The video “Hwages”, an original music production, offers a more pronounced parody of the patriarchal structures. Majid Al Eissa, who is behind it, opted for a visual parody in his production. The video opens up with a group of women entering a jeep and taking back seat awaiting their driver—a ten-year-old kid—to get in the car. In the next scene, women are

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shown riding child bikes, skateboards and roller skates and later on playing basketball, dancing, bowling and riding a car in a carousel. This is not without a controversy as women were allowed to ride bicycles only in the presence of their guardians and females engaging in sports is still somewhat a taboo. These activities take place under the watchful eye of two Saudi men. The latter also embark on a trip to the “House of Men” presided over by Donald Trump, no doubt a reference to his misogynist comments and deeds. Overall, all men are shown as “crazy”. The lyrics of the song mention the ultimate wish of women to get rid of men who are moved by and create all sort of psychological illnesses. The productions of Telfaz11 media company state its goal as “combining narratives drawn from Middle Eastern culture with elements of comedy to promote a deeper and wider understanding of the Saudi culture among global audiences”. The videos of Folaim and Abdulkhaliq that are produced by Telfaz11 offer crude satire of the Saudi mores. In the exaggerated video “Screw the infidels”, the artists portray a story of a Saudi man who tries to get rid of what he considers to be vice in the Western society. In his trajectory, along with his companion in an American city, he applies violence and rude behavior to teach “infidels” a lesson. He strives to eradicate the Western mores that are prohibited in Saudi Arabia such as a romantic encounter between a girlfriend and a boyfriend, ownership of dogs as pets, generosity and a mixed gender pool party, as so on. He is stopped by another Saudi boy who confronts him saying, “You represent your family and country. It is people like you that give us a bad reputation” and offers him advice on being tolerant toward others; yet, he is able to eliminate him from the scene. As he continues his journey, he seems slipping into madness and his violence spirals out of control. The use of coarse language stands out, yet the rapper wears a rainbow color T-shirt that is usually associated with LGBT communities in the West, hence giving it a funny twist. The video ends with the Saudi man dressed up as a Statue of Liberty and zipping up his fly as the full screen closes the scene. Such elements of satire are reminiscent of the South Park aesthetics. Further video productions by Telfaz11 use similar strategies of satire through exaggeration. The video “Can I go out?” employs aesthetics of a video game in which a Saudi girl tries to win the possibility of going outside and meeting her female friend. She has to overcome various challenges such as her father, her mother, her sister and her brother. In what unfolds as a nightmare, the theme passes from grotesque to diabolic and very violent. Ultimately, let down by all her family members, she takes a

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taxi only to be confronted by the romantic advances of the taxi driver. The distinct aesthetics of Telfaz11 are also visible in Abdulkhaliq’s video “Kafeel” that shows workers from the Indian Subcontinent being critical of their Saudi sponsors. Ultimately, Fe2aFala uses humor to take on the subject of dating in the Saudi society. In the video “He won’t marry you”, the artists make fun of women who fall for men promising them marriage without the intentions of doing so. The opening text reads “we don’t mean through this video to offend women in general, but to poke fun at the ones who fell for the trap”. The lyrics portray men taking advantage of “foolish girls that got themselves in trouble”: “He just took what he wants/Forget it, he won’t marry you”; “This boy is a cheater and he couldn’t believe his luck/And the girl is desperate, she fell for it immediately/Man: ‘Show me your photos on Snapchat’ and the guy showed her photos to all his friends”; “And he says that he’s rich, but he’s broke, and his internet is cut off/She buys him gifts, perfumes, and phones, and he give these gifts to his other girlfriends”. Finally, the artists shatter the woman’s misconceptions about men: “girl forget it/In this country, there’s no romantic man/Without meaning well, without love, without craziness”. Overall, satire seems to be an efficient way to stir up emotions and make debate in the Saudi society. Without directly contradicting the established order or calling for reforms, it leaves the interpretation and reading of the irony to the audience. Social media are the main condition for diffusion of such content in the Saudi society and abroad. The large numbers of shares and views testify to the importance of this medium of diffusion in Saudi Arabia.

Re-creation of Western Genres Another way of creation and production of music facilitated by social media occurs through co-optation of Western genres into Saudi music through mashups, inspirations and adaptations. As seen already above, it could be complementary with the use of satire. But the purpose of such a technique alone could be purely recreational, celebratory or an attempt at exercising the artistic freedom. An example of such production is a co-operation of two artists who, working through social media from different cities in Saudi Arabia, created a mashup of the summer hit Despacito and Saudi artist Abu Hamdan’s hit song “Awafi”. The mashup that takes on the topics of love and s­ eduction

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would not be anything thought provoking by itself; it is the musical style that mixes the Western and khaleeji styles that has been frowned upon by the conservatives in Saudi Arabia that makes it stand out. It is worth mentioning that Despacito was banned from local stations in Malaysia due to its supposed immoral content. Social media were a mode of creation and diffusion of the Saudi mashup. Their production is not a novelty; in the past, other successful remixes of famous songs have emerged from Saudi Arabia, such as a remix of a Moroccan song “She wants someone”. Some of the examples of re-appropriating Western songs were discussed in the section of satire; however, at times, using a cover of another song allows Saudi artists to adapt the lyrics to the Saudi society and convey a meaningful message. A Saudi group, Most of us, decided to celebrate the announcement of women receiving the right to drive by recording a cover of the song “Born to be wild”, originally from the soundtrack of the movie “Easy Rider” (1969). The lyrics that mix Arabic and English are transposed to relate to the event in Saudi Arabia. They are meant to show the importance of the woman and her newly acquired right in the Saudi society. The accompanying video highlights this fact as the artists are shown as being dropped by a woman who in this manner facilitates them recording the video. The lyrics sang by men stress the importance of women and encourage them to act: “Drive me around”; “Instead of riding in the backseat/Come on over and take the wheel”, “Yeah ladies go make it happen/Take the wheel in a love embrace”, “Hit the gas and play your best beat”; as well as their independence: “Do your own errands”. The artists also show that driving is compatible with female character: “Like a true Arabian girl/You were born to shine like a pearl/Now it’s time to drive”. The celebratory tone of the cover aims at encouraging women to be brave and take the new right with courage and pride. The second example of a song cover is Ibrahim Basha’s production, a cover of Kanye West’s song, “Bzwjk”. It hails the life of a single man as opposed to the social obligation of getting married. The advantages of his current status are numerous: multiple girls he can look at and court, go out at late night, and remain “cool”. The video is also a copy of the West’s production but with a Saudi touch. Hip hop has a global outreach nowadays and is very popular in the Middle East. While taking the basic inspiration from the West, it is infused with “unique flavors of the local culture, including its language, dialect, musical instruments, and local issues, and transforms itself beyond imitation to invention and cultural creativity” (Kahf 2007, p. 360). It is a music

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of resistance and social and political critique par excellence, yet in Saudi Arabia, it takes different turns due to restrictions on the topics to be discussed. One of the most known Saudi rappers, Qusai AKA Don Legend the Kamelion, stated that he stays away from the subject of politics. He mentioned that he takes into account the political, religious and cultural limitations in his work, and that he tries to create a positive image of Saudi Arabia (WNYC 2017). While Qusai rose to fame, among others, through his appearances in MTV Arabia, Saudi artists residing abroad are able to reach the Saudi audience through YouTube. Such artists often resort to the use of English language thus also reaching Western public. And that combined with Western stylistics causes stark criticism in Saudi Arabia, as in the case of Skinny, a Saudi rapper based in US. His early video for the song “PMK” (2013) contained controversial lyrics and images of sheikhs, rabbis and a priest smoking joints and scantily clad women. His explicit lyrics, overt marijuana use and ghetto rap style earned him condemnation in his home country to the point that he received various threats. This is also the case of his latest production “Never snitch” that uses a Muslim formula to thank God but for all the elements of Skinny’s rapper life, which are considered obvious transgressions in Islam. His music is accessible in Saudi Arabia through YouTube and stirs debates among the viewers from within the country. Another raising Saudi artist residing in the US is Tamtam. She appears in her videos with no head covering or abaya, which is considered inappropriate in Saudi Arabia. Her most watched production listed in this research deals with arranged and forced marriage as a trauma that the woman has to get over with by taking life in her own hands. Ultimately, social media can offer the only outlet for expression to artists who deliberately go against the established social norms. Such is the case of the Saudi band Al Namrood that plays black metal with oriental musical touches and lyrics in Arabic. The very nature of black metal is against the Saudi norms as this type of music often reclaims Satanism or ethnic paganism. The country has one of the strictest laws in the world and all religions apart from Islam are illegal. Furthermore, apostasy is punishable by death. So could be paganism and black magic. As a result, the members of Al Namrood produce their music anonymously and under strict cover up. In their music, they openly profess their hate of religion, atheism, referring also often to pagan gods. Furthermore, the video listed for this research contains a vehement criticism of the ruling circles ­highlighting their greed and them stirring up wars for their own profit. If

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uncovered, the group members would be probably sentenced to death. Social media have allowed the very existence of such a group that is able to market their music from within Saudi Arabia but reaches primarily Western audiences. Their most watched video on YouTube so far gathered mostly comments from outside of the country. The music and the themes being so controversial, Al Namrood has not stirred up a debate in the Saudi society with regard to its relationship to religion or authority but remains out of sight due to safety concerns.

Dance as a Way Out The popularization of dance crazes through social media is also a fairly recent phenomenon. The best example comes from 2012 a Korean video “Gangnam style”. Its dance choreography created a worldwide interest with almost 3 billion views on YouTube as of today. The dance style was not only replicated by millions of fans around the world but also encouraged flash mobs dancing to the tune in public. It is, however, much more surprising when a dance craze originates in Saudi Arabia where certain styles of dancing may be deemed offensive to the mores. And yet, another local production by Majid Al Eisa “Barbs” created a dance craze that went beyond Saudi Arabia hitting a record number of over 57 million views on YouTube since its posting in December 2015. Social media were again the major factor of a success of this Saudi production across the region. The video clip incorporated a simple choreography performed by a group of men and included further breakdance sections. Fans in the Middle East recorded and posted their renditions of Barbs dance on YouTube. Videos were shared throughout the Middle East from Tunisia to Yemen. While the song of Travis Porter “Bring it back” was sampled in the Arabic version of “Barbs”, the choreography may vaguely echo the unruly dance style of the video of Silento “Watch me (Whip/Nae Nae)”. Despite its inspiration in terms of music, attire and choreography by Western hip hop, the music is infused with Middle Eastern themes thanks to the use of local instruments. Even though the dance routine was performed in the video only by men, and may as well be a playful rendition of the hip hop global trends, conservative segments of the Saudi society accused the producer specifically of Western influence that has supposedly a negative effect on the Saudi youth (Al Zarooni 2016). Some called for its performers in public to be arrested. The dance pushes thus the boundaries of the permissible despite the fact that it is a local reproduction, not a direct copy of a foreign dance style.

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Western hip hop inspired production has become absorbed in the Saudi and Arab mainstream in a way that, most importantly, does not offend the public through its lyrics (Travis Porter’s song that has clearly sexist lyrics) or through a video showing mixing of genders and skimpy attires (Travis Porter’s and Silento’s videos alike). All in all, the expression of the youth subcultures in Saudi Arabia faces a stark opposition and condemnation of the most conservative circles. The second example, Majid Al Eisa’s newest production “Hariqa” blended more traditional Saudi Arab music style with an expression of hip hop moves and sport performance by Saudi youth accompanied by traditional male dancers and singers. The video that celebrates the pride of the football club Al Hilal based in Riyadh received almost 3 million views since its publication on YouTube in August 2017. Dancing and Western-inspired dance moves are beyond doubt the main bone of contention between the Saudi conservatives and the youth. A local Saudi singer and TV host Abdullah Al Shahani was arrested after a dance performance in which he made a gesture of “dabbing” to a traditional Saudi music (Rannard 2017). Dabbing which stems from the US hip hop culture and became an Internet sensation in US was banned in Saudi Arabia due to its alleged connection to the drug culture. The ministry created a circular to warn the Saudi youth against the consequences of performing the gesture. It is clear that some types of dance are pushing the boundaries of what is permissible in the conservative kingdom and can be seen as acts of subversion. In the most unusual scenario, a Saudi youth was arrested for performing the Macarena dance moves in the middle of a road in Jeddah. He posted his performance on YouTube in 2016 and was arrested in 2017. The reasons for his arrest were cited as “a disruption of traffic and violation of public morality,” (Raghavan, August 23, 2017).

Discussion and Conclusion From the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that social media have greatly helped new Saudi artists who fall beyond the mainstream to create and popularize their music. Thanks to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter their work is seen, commented upon and copied beyond Saudi Arabia. This need for authentic Saudi productions is no doubt an expression of the youth that seeks entertainment and thanks to social media can access the content that they find interesting, locally produced and that the traditional media cannot provide them with. Saudis are creative and want to be part of the global trends such as hip hop, breakdance or dance in general. This

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does not mean, however, abandoning their heritage as most of the artists seek to include local aesthetics in their works. Productions inspired by or reproductions of Western trends have always elements of local creativity added. The youthfulness of the Saudi population where more than 60% are under the age of 30 helps explain the popularity of social media. The largest number of Saudi users are aged 26 to 34. With, until recently, a prohibition of entertainment on the ground such as concerts, clubs or cinemas, social media have become the only outlet for accessing content interesting, entertaining, and novel to the Saudi public. They benefit the creators and the audiences alike. The Saudi leadership seems to understand these trends and began relaxing the strict Saudi mores, among others, with regard to the availability of public entertainment. Social media open up debates over the artistic expression and/or social rules. As such, it is important to highlight that, on the one hand, in a highly digitalized Saudi society social media have become the main form of communication for the society allowing a discussion including various segments of the society. Videos that seem transgressing certain rules provoke various debates for and against the acceptance of the aesthetics or behaviors shown. Hence, those artists who seem to completely break away with the culture stemming from the Saudi society or directly challenge the structures of power must do so in hiding or while working from abroad. Social media cannot thus produce a space where freedom of artistic expression would be guaranteed. Right on the contrary they may expose the identity of the artists or performers who will then face prosecution. Despite the limitations, it is also interesting to note that music can push the boundaries, and lead to the expression of new Saudi identities. The artists analyzed in this chapter who were male offered support for Saudi women’s right to drive by exposing the outdated patriarchal structures. This support for women was also seen in the video exposing the difficulty of women’s movement in the city. As such, music videos present a new identity for Saudi women who are able to take control of their lives and become independent from men. Furthermore, a female artist touched upon the issue of a forced marriage and its effects on a woman’s life. Interestingly, the issue of marriage as social obligation was also denounced in a video by male artists who criticized it. This social obligation was also shown as pushing some women into desperation and choosing partners who fool them with the idea of marriage to take advantage of them instead. The ability to choose their life partners rather than marry following the

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mores of society without having a say is yet another expression of a Saudi youth identity. Furthermore, some artists tackled the issue of family relations exposing the abusive father-child relationships. Until recently, the issue of family violence was a social taboo. Finally, songs also highlight the importance of tolerance toward foreign cultures as opposed to the intolerant Saudi culture imposed through the strict mores and the religious police in the past. The theme of greater tolerance and appreciation is also used with regard to the foreign workers from the Indian subcontinent. Overall, songs on social media ask for a reform of society from within. Many employ satire as a way of avoiding directly challenging the social structures in place. Ultimately, music is also about pure entertainment and enjoyment of the listeners and viewers. New productions use musical themes coming from the West by adapting them to the Saudi cultural environment. It is important to highlight that adopting Western aesthetics may also become a challenge to the observed mores; hence, such artists may be pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable. The aim of this chapter was to investigate how social media help create and diffuse popular music in Saudi Arabia and how such music questions the officially accepted identities and social practices. It is clear that through music Saudi youth is able to connect and express the important issues to be transformed within. They seek to create a new Saudi modern identity that is currently in flux.

References Agarwal, N., Lim, M., & Wigand, R. T. (2012). Online Collective Action and the Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Opinions: A Case Study on Women’s Right-­to-Drive Campaigns in Saudi Arabia. In C. G. Reddick & S. K. Aikins (Eds.), Web 2.0 Technologies and Democratic Governance: Political, Policy and Management Implications (pp. 99–123). New York/Heidelberg: Springer. Al Nashmi, E., et al. (2010). Internet Political Discussions in the Arab World: A Look at Online Forums from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. The International Communication Gazette, 72(8), 719–738. Al Zarooni, M. (2016, January 23). Barbs Dancers Attract Saudi Youths, Rake Up Storm. Khaleej Times. Retrieved August 30, 206 from https://www. khaleejtimes.com/region/saudi-arabia/barbs-dancers-attract-saudi-youthsrake-up-storm Beating the Censor. (2014, February 8). The Economist. Retrieved September 30, 2017 from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2014/02/08/ beating-the-censor

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Chester, N. (2015, April 21). Meet the Saudi Arabian Black Metal Band Breaking Saudi Law By Being a Black Metal Band. VICE. Retrieved September 1, 2016 from https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zngeew/anti-religious-black-metalband-in-saudi-arabia-666 Frith, S. (2003). Music and Identity. In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity (pp. 108–127). London: Sage Publications. GlobalStats. (2019). Social Media Stats: Saudi Arabia. Retrieved August 19, 2019 from http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/saudi-arabia GMI. (2019). Saudi Arabia: Social Media Statistics 2018. Retrieved August 19, 2019 from http://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/saudi-arabia-socialmedia-statistics/ Hammond, A. (2007). Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics, and the Media. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. Jeffery, Y. (2016, December 28). Saudi Man Put Behind Bars for a Year After Publicly Calling for Women to Be Given More Rights. The Sun. Retrieved March 1, 2017 from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2492462/saudi-manput-behind-bars-for-a-year-after-publicly-calling-for-women-to-be-givenmore-rights/ Kahf, U. (2007). Arabic Hip Hop: Claims of Authenticity and Identity of a New Genre. Journal of Popular Music Studies, 19(4), 359–385. Khalil, J., & Kraidy, M. M. (2009). Arab Television Industries. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kumar, A. (2017, January 16). Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti Calls for Ban on Music, Movies Fearing They Lead to ‘Mixing of Sexes’. The Christian Post. Retrieved March 2, 2018 from https://www.christianpost.com/news/saudiarabias-grand-mufti-calls-for-ban-on-music-movies-fearing-they-lead-to-mixing-of-sexes.html McDowall, A. (2013, September 29). Saudi Cleric Says Women Who Drive Risk Damaging Their Ovaries. Reuters. Retrieved August 30, 2017 from https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-driving/saudi-cleric-says-women-whodrive-risk-damaging-their-ovaries-idUSBRE98S04B20130929 McLean, R., Oliver, P., & Wainwright, D. (2010). The Myths of Empowerment Through Information Communication Technologies. Management Decision, 48(99), 1365–1377. Moore, R. E. (2013). My Music, My Freedom(?): The Troubled Pursuit of Musical and Intellectual Independence on the Internet in Indonesia. Asian Journal of Communication, 23(4), 368–385. O’Grady, K. (1998). Theorizing Feminism and Postmodernity: Conversation with Linda Hutcheon. Rampike, 9(2), 20–22. O’Keefe, T. (2014). My Body Is My Manifesto! SlutWalk, FEMEN and Femmenist Protest. Feminist Review, 107, 1–19. Oxford Business Group. (2010). The Report: Tunisia 2010. Oxford: Oxford Business Group.

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Raghavan, S. (2017, August 23). A Saudi Teen Danced the ‘Macarena.’ Then He Was Arrested. The Washington Post. Retrieved November 17, 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/23/ a-saudi-teen-danced-the-macarena-then-he-was-arrested/ Rannard, G. (2017, August 10). Saudi Singer Arrested for Dabbing. BBC. Retrieved November 1, 2017 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-40886288 Reporters Without Borders. (2019). Saudi Arabia. Retrieved August 30, 2019 from https://rsf.org/en/saudi-arabia Rifai, O. (2014). Online Mobilization for Civil and Political Rights in Saudi Arabia. Asian Politics and Polity, 6, 500–504. Stenslie, S. (2012). Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia: The Challenge of Succession. New York: Routledge. Swedenburg, T. (2016). Egypt’s Music of Protest: From Sayyid Darwish to DJ Haha. Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved March 2, 2018 from http://www.merip.org/mer/mer265/egypts-music-protest Tweeps Sing Praises as Music Concerts Return to Saudi TV. (2017, October 4). Arab News. Retrieved March 1, 2018 from https://www.arabnews.com/ node/1171981/offbeat WNYC. (2017). How a Rapper’s Radio Interview Revealed a Saudi Soft Power Campaign. Retrieved January 4, 2018 from http://www.wnyc.org/story/ cultural-exchanges-and-saudi-arabias-soft-power/

CHAPTER 10

Linguistic Hybridity and Cultural Multiplicity in Emirati Identity Construction Sarah Hopkyns

Introduction: Globalization and Identity Construction The concept of globalization is not new. Robertson (1992), who is often cited as the inventor of the term, states that although the label ‘globalization’ has been in circulation only relatively recently, the concept has been around for hundreds of years dating back to the fifteenth century with explorers mapping the planet and the spread of the Catholic Church. What is new is the pace at which globalization has spread due to the diffusion of capitalism, the fall of communism and significant technological advances leading to faster and more efficient communication (Harris et al. 2002), as well as the rapid spread of English as a global lingua franca. The effects of globalization are far from neutral and are indeed the subject of much heated debate. While globalization could be seen to threaten local identity construction, it can also be a force for reinvigoration. Those who take the former view see globalization as a homogenizing

S. Hopkyns (*) Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_10

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force whereby ‘the English-speaking West’ subjugates ‘the rest’, where a single global culture is being created. Here malls, cinemas, theme parks, forms of social media and even YouTube children’s songs all replicate each other accumulating in a ‘single vast enterprise’ (Barber 1995, p.  97). Those who take the latter view see the changes brought about by globalization as dynamic and exciting opportunities for individuals and societies to create something new. For example, in Giddens’ (2000) view, ‘individuals are not dupes of overpowering social structures and events, but active, reflecting agents in the ongoing construction of social reality’ (p. 19). In this sense, rather than globalization obliterating local languages and cultures, ‘hybridization’ (Pieterse 1995) or ‘glocalization’ (Robertson 1995) in which local versions of imported language and cultural artifacts are established, overshadows ‘Englishization’. Whichever position one takes with regard to the nature of ‘the beast’, it cannot be denied that globalization, with English as its accompanying language, has dramatically affected linguistic landscapes and cultural identities worldwide. The Arabian Gulf countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been particularly influenced due to several factors, which include the diglossic nature of Arabic, the ‘superdiverse’ and frequently changing demographics in many Gulf states, as well as a strong presence of English in public, private and educational domains. A combination of these factors added to the exacerbated pace of globalization in the region has resulted in complex and dynamic linguistic landscapes as well as cultural multiplicity (Hopkyns et al. 2018). In the case of the UAE, Emiratis are increasingly adopting multiple forms of linguistic and cultural hybridity which serve to reshape language and local cultural identities. This paper will begin by describing the factors influencing the exacerbated effects of globalization in the UAE which have resulted in both linguistic hybridity and cultural multiplicity in the region. The study, which takes place in a government-sponsored university in Abu Dhabi, investigates university students’ and expatriate English teachers’ perceptions of the effects of global English on local cultural identities as well as their attitudes to English Medium Instruction (EMI) at tertiary level. The paper will conclude with a discussion of key themes emerging from the study and implications.

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The UAE Context: Background Diglossia in Arabic If asked to name countries or regions most vulnerable to the power of global English, those with isolated languages spoken by few people outside their borders would naturally come to mind. For example, Icelandic in Iceland, or tribal languages of Hawaii (Higgins 2010), would fit this description. Arabic, on the other hand, most definitely would not. Arabic is indeed in a strong position in the world today. It is the official language of over 20 countries and spoken by over 300 million people as a first language (Nydell 2012, p. 93). It was even selected as one of the six official languages of the United Nations in 1997 due to the vast amount of people speaking it as a native or second language worldwide (Al Fardan and Al Kaabi 2015, p. 11). In addition to this, Arabic remains strong globally through its intrinsic historical connection to Islam, and as the language of the Quran, making it the religious language of over a billion Muslims around the world (Gebril and Taha-Thomure 2014, p. 1). It is also growing as a second language in Western countries. According to a survey conducted by the Modern Language Association, it is now the eighth most studied language in US universities (Gebril and Taha-­Thomure 2014). However, the statistics above do not reveal the complexities and challenges involved in being an Arabic native-speaker. A salient feature of Arabic is diglossia meaning that ‘two or more varieties of the same language are used by some speakers under different conditions’ (Ferguson 1959, p. 324). Diglossia is not unique to Arabic, rather it exists in multiple countries such as Switzerland, Greece and Haiti, to name just a few. In the case of the UAE, it is common for Abu Dhabi locals to speak their local Emirati Arabic (EA) dialect ‘Khaleeji’ at home and among family and friends of the same dialect but use the standard language ‘Modern Standard Arabic’ (MSA) to communicate with speakers of other dialects or on public occasions. MSA, which descends from Classical Arabic, is viewed as a ‘superposed’ variety (Gebril and Taha-Thomure 2014) due to its being used in education, religion and officially, and not commonly spoken in everyday life. This gives it distance and prestige. The local dialect, on the other hand, is generally considered less prestigious than MSA and has no standard written form. There are significant differences between Khaleeji dialects and MSA, mainly in terms of pronunciation (e.g. the MSA sound /j/ being pronounced as /y/ in EA) and grammatical structure, with

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MSA inflectional systems for nouns and verbs being significantly reduced in Khaleeji dialects (Al Fardan and Al Kaabi 2015). Although Khaleeji dialects traditionally have had no written form, with the increased use of social media such as Instagram and Snapchat, informal creative written forms, such as Arabizi (use of the Latin script and numbers to represent Arabic sounds), can increasingly be seen. Furthermore, ‘Khaleeji’ phrase books in local book stores are now being sold and scholarly interest and validation of local dialects recently led to the first Emirati dialect database being built with data from 90,000 recorded sentences at the United Arab Emirates University (‘First Emirati Arabic Database’, 2018). Despite this increased recognition of the importance of dialects or ‘non-standard Arabic’ (NSA), the heterogeneity of Arabic results in Gulf students facing many difficulties with reading and writing due to the variation between the version of Arabic being spoken in everyday contexts, and the Arabic being taught via textbooks at school. Some would argue that learning MSA at school is similar to learning a second language (Yorkey 1974). The extra challenge learning Arabic presents contrasts with learning English, which is comparatively simple as a non-diglossic language, as well as being readily available in all spheres of life (Hopkyns et al. 2018). Superdiversity and Ubiquitous English In addition to diglossia in Arabic acting as an added impetus for mastering English, the varying demographics of many of the Gulf nations have resulted in English being not only appealing, but also readily accessible as the most commonly used lingua franca in multiple domains. The UAE can be defined as ‘superdiverse’ (Verovec 2007) as hundreds of nationalities currently live and work in the country. Foreigners flooded into the nation shortly after oil was discovered in the late 1950s, to work in construction, medicine, education, tourism and retail. These workers were needed in order for the UAE to achieve its ambitious transformation from a desolate desert to the booming metropolis that it is today. The percentage of expatriates currently living in the UAE is approximately 87%, and this number is expected to increase to 90% in 2020 (Harris 2013, p. 87). Kirk (2010, p. 11) describes this as a ‘demographic anomaly’ where Emiratis are outnumbered twice, once in the general population and again in the workforce where just 10% of employees are UAE nationals. Due to the UAE’s superdiverse population, it is estimated that there are approximately 100 languages spoken in the country today, including Urdu, Malayalam,

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Hindi, Singhalese, Bengali, Farsi and Tagalog, by 200 different ­nationalities (Habboush 2009). With many of the UAE’s expatriate workers coming from partly Anglophone countries such as India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines (Troudi 2007, p. 4) and majority English-speaking countries such as the UK and USA, English, more than other languages, has become a very practical tool used as a lingua franca in multiple domains. On a social and practical level, English is necessary for daily transactions, whether it be booking a hospital appointment, reserving a table at a restaurant or paying for one’s groceries in a supermarket. English is also frequently used in Emirati homes due to the normalcy of hiring nannies and housemaids from countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia, who communicate with the family at least partly in English. English in the home setting is also used amongst siblings (Hassall 2004) as well as online (Hopkyns 2014). In addition to this, since 2010 with the establishment of the New School Model in Abu Dhabi, English medium Instruction at all levels of education has taken the UAE by storm. This has meant a move away from Arabic medium instruction (AMI) with English as just a subject, to English medium instruction (EMI) for core subjects from Foundation Stage 1 (FS1) through to university. Currently, the primary instructional language at all the UAE’s federal universities is English, excluding majors in Islamic Studies and Shari’a Law. Although an increase in EMI universities and courses is a general trend in tertiary education across the globe (Macaro 2018), the situation in the UAE where there is currently no choice, for most majors, but to study in the medium of English is extreme. The unprecedented importance placed on English means that it is often the key determiner of academic success. Linguistic and Cultural Multiplicity in the UAE Such dynamic change and varied language contact has inevitably affected the UAE’s linguistic and cultural landscape in multiple ways. With English as the common lingua franca (ELF) amongst speakers in the UAE who share neither the first language nor the culture (Patent 2017), communicating effectively is generally considered more important than having native-like pronunciation. There are many ways in which Emiratis chose to reshape English and Arabic rather than adhering to standard native-­ speaker models. One example is the emergence of ‘Arabizi’ which is relatively new creative hybrid language using a modified Latin script and English numbers to replace Arabic sounds that have no spelling equivalent

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in English. For example, the number ‘7’ is used for a heavy ‘h’ sound, not found in English. The Arabic word for ‘one’ would, therefore, be written as ‘Wa7ad’. Further forms of linguistic hybridization can also be seen through extensive code-switching and translanguaging. The former can be defined by ‘instances where speakers switch to another language during their speech for another purpose’ (Hamam 2016, p. 4). The latter is characterized as ‘the ways in which bilinguals draw on their full linguistic toolkits in order to process information, make meaning, and convey it to others’ (Garcia 2009, p.  140). Translanguaging, therefore, moves away from seeing two languages as separate and toward ‘an integrated system which the speaker/writer draws upon depending on the need of the moment’ (Al-Bataineh and Gallagher 2018, p.  4). Here English and Arabic are used within the same sentence, as well as using vocabulary which is influenced by a range of other languages. For example, it is common to hear Arabic phases such as ‘Mashallah’ (what God wishes) or ‘Alhamdulillah’ (God bless you, e.g. when someone sneezes) traversing English sentences, or English words such as ‘project’ or ‘wow’ crisscrossing Arabic sentences. Words from other languages in the region such as Tagalog, Hindi, Ajami (local name for Farsi), Urdu and Korean are often adapted and also become part of daily dialogues. Not only is the Gulf a linguistically complex region, but there is also a unique myriad of cultures existing and evolving in a relatively small area. Despite today’s age being labeled postmodern, there is still a tendency to try and simplify the concept of culture by mistakenly using the words ‘culture’ and ‘country’ as synonyms. Even though nationality still plays a large role in defining one’s identity in intercultural relationships (Dervin 2014, p.  92), it should be recognized that this strand is only one element of intercultural relations. Defining culture by nationality alone hides a multiplicity of differences between individuals such as ‘unequal power relations, including poverty, structural inequalities such as racism and the possibilities of multiple identities’ (Hoskins and Sallah 2011, p.  114). A more useful paradigm is Holliday’s (1999, p.  237) concept of small culture where ‘culture’ refers to ‘small social groupings or activities wherever there is cohesive behavior, and thus avoids culturist ethnic, national or international stereotyping’. In today’s post-modern society, Mathews compares cultural identity construction to shopping in a ‘cultural supermarket’ arguing that ‘we have come to live in a world of culture as fashion, in which each of us can pick and choose cultural identities like we pick and choose clothes’ (Mathews

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2000, p. 4). Similarly, Saleh describes the notion of ‘interchangeable cultures’ (Saleh 2014, p. 119) existing in the UAE context, whereby Emiratis can ‘choose the best of the west’ and reject other parts. However, certain restrictions do exist especially in the Gulf context. As Mathews’ (2000, p. 401) recognizes: One’s choices from the cultural supermarket are deeply influenced by one’s given cultural shaping, and also by the array of social and institutional rules one must conform to and the roles one must fit. They are also shaped by the array of competing voices aimed at molding one’s mind, from the propaganda of nations, to the blandishments of advertisements and the allure of popular culture, to the pressures of one’s immediate social world.

In this sense, while multiplicity and choice are aspects of Emirati identity construction, cultural norms and expectations shape these choices.

The Study Background to the Study The study, which is part of a larger project, aimed to gain perspectives on the effects of global English on language, culture and identity in the UAE by exploring two main research questions: RQ1: How does English affect Emirati university students’ cultural identities? RQ2: What are Emirati university students and expatriate university English teachers’ attitudes towards English Medium Instruction (EMI) in the UAE? The study setting was a large public university which has a campus in Abu Dhabi and a campus in Dubai, UAE. Two groups of participants were included: university students studying in the university’s foundation English program, and expatriate English teachers teaching in the same program. Participants The first group of participants were 100 Emirati university students (20 males and 80 females) studying in a 20-hour-a-week foundation English program at the university’s Abu Dhabi campus. This difference in female/

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male student numbers is representative of the gender imbalance at the university, caused by several factors such as the relatively recent requirement for Emirati men between the ages of 18 and 30 to do between nine months and two years of military service (‘Military Service for Emirati Men’, 2014), as well as more males choosing to study abroad. From the participants, all 100 were questionnaire respondents and 24 were focus group members (three one-hour focus groups with six students in each). All student participants were aged between 18 and 24 at the time of the study, and aimed to achieve IELTS Band 5–6. They had all attended state schools as opposed to private schools. The second group of participants comprised 52 expatriate English university teachers who were all teaching in the university’s English foundation program at the Abu Dhabi campus. In this group, 56% (n = 29) were male and 44% (n = 23) were female. For the teacher participants, 40 were questionnaire respondents and 12 were focus group members (two one-­ hour focus groups with six teachers in each). The teachers were born in a range of countries with most coming from Anglophone countries such as the UK, USA, Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand (89%). They were aged between 30 and 60. The teachers had lived in the Gulf between 3 and 18 years. They, therefore, had a wealth of experience teaching in the region, and some of them had been living there for the same amount of time the Emirati student participants had been alive. Methodology The study took a hybridized approach in the form of a phenomenological multiple case study. The phenomenon being investigated was ‘global English, and its effect on local cultural identities’ and the cases or units of analysis were the two groups of participants (university students and university teachers). A key feature of phenomenology is its emphasis on the existence of multiple realities. As Denscombe (2010, p.  97) states, ‘Phenomenology rejects the notion that there is one universal reality and accepts, instead, that things can be seen in different ways by different people at different times in different circumstances, and that each ­alternative version needs to be recognized as being valid in its own right’. Phenomenological research essentially aims to ‘to make the invisible visible’ (Kvale 1996, p. 53) and focuses on the life world of participants with openness to their experiences.

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Prior to collecting data, ethical approval was granted by the university in which the study took place. The data collection tools included open-­ response questionnaires (in English and Arabic), semi-structured focus groups (conducted in English with Arabic translator on hand) and a researcher journal. These tools were designed to collect in-depth qualitative data, exploring opinions and experiences. The data were analyzed using thematic data analysis (TA), and methodological triangulation was employed for added validity.

Findings The questionnaire and focus group questions focused on the effects of global English on cultural identity (RQ1) and perspectives on English Medium Instruction (RQ2). Although there were many overlapping themes in the data from the two groups of participants, due to the ‘observational’ or ‘outside’ perspective of the expatriate university teachers, the participant groups’ perspectives are presented separately. All participant names shown in this paper are pseudonyms. Effects of Global English on Cultural Identity  mirati University Students’ Perspectives E The findings revealed a great deal of positivity surrounding English when it came to the impact it has had on individual lives and ways of thinking, in particular. Emirati participants often spoke of English bringing increased confidence, pride, and knowledge, which related to how they saw themselves in the world, but also how they felt others perceived them. English was also seen as liberating by some Emirati participants, as seen in Example 1. Example 1 It made my life better. My self-confidence is much higher than it was before and I have best opportunities in everything. (Atheya) When I think about something in English it’s opening and okay but in Arabic it’s hard because our religion stop something that the English thing it’s allowed. (Shoug) In the past, we travel in the past they don’t know from where I am from and they think oh she is Arabic woman, they don’t know an Emirati woman. But nowadays, they know I’m Emirati and I know how to speak English well. (Ghareeba)

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Seeing English as bringing positive additional aspects to individual lives and identities as described above, matches Garcia’s definition of additional bilingualism, where English adds (L1 + L2 = L1 + L2) rather than takes away (L1 + L2 – L1 = L2) (Garcia 2009, p. 142). Despite overall positivity, concerns were raised by some over the negative effects of global English on the Arabic language and local cultures, as seen in Example 2. Example 2 Some people prefer English in everywhere. They delete Arabic language. They speak 24 hour English. They also have a new alphabet like 3. Marah (Female Arabic name) which they write ma3 (3 represents the Arabic letter ‘‫( ) ’ع‬Sumeya) I go to their class, maybe five or six Emiratis kids and all from the other countries. That’s why they will talk Arabic with whom? Like even the teacher is English. (Rahma)

Rahma specifically makes reference to Emiratis being surrounded by English in international schools to the point where English is the only option for communicating with classmates and teachers. The use of the creative hybrid mix of English and Arabic, Arabizi, is also mentioned, by Sumeya, as negatively affecting the Arabic language. The expatriate community’s lack of Arabic and their expectations of an English-speaking environment in the UAE were seen as further exacerbating the problem of Arabic loss, as voiced by Nadia in Example 3. Example 3 They (expatriates) have to know more. They have to study Arabic because they are in an Arabic country so even if the English is most, the language here, they have to talk Arabic because we need to share Arabic in the whole country. (Nadia)

Comments were made on cultural changes that have taken place due to the increasing importance of English in modern Emirati society, particularly in education. English was equated to Wasta, which is a traditional form of social capital, where based on one’s nationality and family name, certain advantages are granted. English, like Wasta, was seen to hold a special inflated power that allowed its speakers to access advantages over those who did not speak it or did not speak it well, as articulated by Alanood in Example 4.

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Example 4 Yes, there are many people nowadays who forget Arabic. They all talk English. Now this world is all about English, especially universities. Students can’t pass and graduate from universities or schools without learning English and have to get IELTS to pass levels and go to general or majors. And that’s not fair. People stopped university because they didn’t bring IELTS. Some of them go straight get a job with wasta and some stay at home without job or continuing their education. (Alanood)

With regard to ways of dressing and entertainment, many participants felt Emiratis were ‘copying the West’ as seen in Example 5. Example 5 Some people follow the customs of the West and neglect the customs of the UAE. They don’t care about them. (Ghanem) Some guys only use English with each other, not Arabic. The music they listen to – Western. ….And they say that they are doing it to be like others in the West. (Malik)

 xpatriate University Teachers’ Perceptions E Whereas responses from the Emirati participants could quite easily be divided into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ effects, with many responses including both, the expatriate university teachers’ perceptions of Emirati cultural identity, from an outsider position, were ‘messier’ in nature. From the perspective of the expatriate university English teachers, cultural identity in the UAE, above all else, was seen as complex and multidimensional. Many of the expatriate university English teachers gave an affirmative first response to the question, ‘do you feel your students have a strong sense of cultural identity?’, providing a list of all the Emirati cultural practices they frequently observe. These included traditional dress (Abayas and Kandouras), food, henna at weddings, faith, respect for their leaders, separation of the sexes and the importance of family values. This initial response was then expanded upon by many, taking them down numerous paths. It was voiced by some participants that the diverse demographics of the UAE served to create a ‘besieged culture mentality’ similar to the situation in French-speaking Quebec surrounded by the mainly English-­ speaking other provinces of Canada. This was thought to make Emiratis more protective of traditional culture, serving to strengthen a distinct sense of cultural identity, as seen in Example 6.

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Example 6 If you’re a besieged culture you, most of us don’t think about our identity from day to day, we are just who we are. But if you are a minority in your own country of course your cultural identity becomes even stronger because it’s reactive. (Richard, Ireland)

Such reactivity involved utilizing Mathews’ (2000) concept of the ‘cultural supermarket’, whereby individuals have the power to choose to embrace certain aspects of other cultures and reject other parts, as seen in Example 7. Example 7 They also can also pick and choose what they decide to assimilate, not just from the American culture, there are a lot of things from the Indian culture that they have assimilated, big time. I mean look at the films and the biryani, the food. The language. I think quite honestly, they are quite lucky in that respect, they can say ‘I’ll have a bit of this and a bit of that, I reject that’. (Graeme, UK)

A further perception was the mixing of old and new to create a modern sense of cultural identity, making locals ‘no less Emirati’ but rather ‘new young Emiratis’ who were excited about the country and what they were becoming. Examples of this ‘new Emirati identity’ came in the form of mixing tradition and modernity, such as drinking coffee in the desert on a Friday night, but arriving by Nissan Patrols, not by camel. Such hybridity could be viewed as a Gulf millennial counter-discourse to imposed e­ xpectations of the older generations. Example 8 demonstrates new emerging forms of identity. Example 8 (They are) no less Emirati but new young Emiratis. ‘We do speak English and we do use Instagram…. and women are starting to drive cars and that’s because that’s what we’re making our country’. I think there is a real sense of ‘we are really proud of Sheik Zayed and the opportunities that he gave us’ and I think that they are really kind of thrilled in a way, certainly the ones we teach anyway, are excited about the country and what they are becoming. They are very proud of themselves. (James, Australia)

Such pride in agency was also mentioned with reference to language use. It was commented on that bilingualism and translanguaging were

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natural, empowering and fast becoming part of a new Emirati cultural identity, as seen in Example 9. Example 9 I was at a coffee shop, a Tim Horton’s, a Canadian restaurant, anyway, I think they were students, young females and they were switching between Arabic and English (clicks fingers three times) fluently and it seemed, I didn’t understand what they were saying in Arabic but I wondered why they switched. Did they switch for certain topics or why did they switch? But it was very bilingual. They could easily communicate with each other in both languages and chose in the course of one dialogue to use both languages. (Joe, Canada)

Here the use of linguistic hybridity in the form of translanguaging, Arabizi and code-switching could also be seen as a unifying identity position among young Emiratis, in that they are creating something special, that is ‘just for them’. Although some expatriate university English teachers, such as James and Joe, felt a move toward a new modern Emirati cultural identity was organic and positive, others commented on modern Emirati cultural identity being ‘manufactured’ and ‘superficial’ going so far as to describe Emirati students as ‘culturally adrift’ and ‘tourists in their own culture’, as seen in Example 10. Example 10 Compared to other nationalities that I’ve taught, Emirati cultural identity seems to be extraordinarily thin. They have very little connection to their past. Beyond a few generic cultural symbols, Emiratis seems culturally adrift. (Simon, USA) They have a very strong social religious identity but to some extent they are as much tourists in their own culture as we are as it is being manufactured for them. (Trevor, UK)

Similar to the Emirati participant concerns, expatriate university teachers also commented on the negative effects of English on the Arabic language. Rachel voiced concerns over the predominance of ‘semi-lingualism’ over bilingualism among Emirati youth, as she explains in Example 11. Example 11 I feel there is a whole generation of non-native speakers in this country now. I mean they’re not fluent in either language and I think that’s such a danger,

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and it has real implications academically because, how do you come across to people if you can’t communicate effectively in either one of your languages? (Rachel, UK)

Finally, the expatriate university English teachers commented on students being pulled in different directions after receiving mixed messages regarding how much cultural change was acceptable. This was thought to lead to confusion and uncertainty about which path to take, as demonstrated in Example 12. Example 12 Identity is always shifting and I think at this moment, this is the big issue for Emiratis, that identities are shifting and changing and moving and I think quite a few of them probably do feel insecure because I think they think, ‘how can I be modern and progressive and educated and a high achiever and keep my identity but at the same time embrace what is new, and at the same time balance and juggle?’, and I think it’s particularly hard for girls. (Rachel, UK)

Perspectives on English Medium Instruction The questionnaires and focus groups also explored participant perspectives on English medium instruction in tertiary education.  mirati University Students’ Perspectives E As can be seen in Fig.  10.1, the Emirati university students’ preferred medium of instruction varied, with the most popular options being a choice between EMI and AMI, followed by EMI. Students who wanted a choice or a mixture of EMI and AMI most commonly recognized the importance of both languages. However, the languages were deemed important mediums of instruction for different reasons. English was associated with progression and success, whereas concerns about losing Arabic and the fact that it allowed for greater creativity were given for preferring AMI. Some stated a preference for the use of EMI for certain subjects and AMI for others. Overall, a balance and a choice were favored, as seen in Example 13.

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Emirati university students' preferences for language of instruction at university No response 2% English 35%

Both / choice 39%

Arabic 24% English

Arabic

Both / choice

No response

Fig. 10.1  Emirati university students’ preferences regarding medium of instruction

Example 13 A balance is good. If they have a balance it would be good. (Alya) I prefer it to be my choice because I see that some people have forgotten Arabic and they can’t read it. (Ghanem)

Although only 38% of the Emirati undergraduate participants chose AMI, reasons given for this choice were strong. These reasons included greater understanding, more confidence and comfort and the ability to be more creative in one’s first language, as seen in Example 14. Example 14 When you study your subject or major in your own language (Arabic) you will innovate more. (Faiza) In Arabic, because it’s the mother language. It will be easier and all other countries study by their language, so this will help to be more creative. (Dalal)

 xpatriate University Teachers’ Perspectives E The expatriate university teachers were also asked to reflect on their attitudes toward EMI in the Gulf context. The varied nature of the teachers’ responses as well as issues commented on matched the Emirati cohorts’

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points to a great extent. Similar to the Emirati university students, the majority (55%) felt there should be either a mix of EMI and AMI, or a choice. It was recognized by the teachers that not all students are natural language learners, and English should not be a barrier to success for those who struggle with the language. Suggestions for a choice, a dual stream approach or certain universities adopting AMI and others remaining EMI, were also made, as seen in Example 15. Example 15 I would favour a system that allowed students to choose either an English study track or an Arabic study track at undergraduate level. Those who chose the latter might be able to do an English elective during their degree or in parallel with their degree, so that they could improve their English skills over an extended period of time, without the burden of having to operate beyond their level of linguistic ability. (Janet, UK) I don’t believe it (EMI) is the right option for all students. Some talented mathematicians may be poor linguists. (Grace, UK) A choice is always better. Choice. (Graeme, UK)

Despite the difficulties students often encounter with EMI, many teachers pointed out that it was a ‘necessary evil’ or stated there was ‘little alternative’. Others felt it was ‘too late’ to turn back, as illustrated in Example 16. Example 16 There’s little alternative. Arabic medium education cannot offer anything like a comparable body of literature and is not suited to a number of disciplines like Business. (Alexander, UK)

Summary of Findings and Discussion Overall, the findings from RQ1 revealed that modern Emirati cultural identities are varied and complex. These complexities often involve being pulled in two different directions. Having to decide on the value of certain aspects of cultural identity individually is challenging, but it is equally challenging to receive mixed messages from society about the direction one should follow. In the literature, Martin (2003) acknowledges this difficulty too, by commenting on the mixed messages Emirati students receive from

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their culture about furthering their education and pursuing a career (p. 52). Managing multiple identities can be challenging in any context, as was found in Mills’ (2004) study where British-Pakistani participants spoke of ‘living two lives’ in relation to the conflict experienced between their public, apparently westernized, self and their private, family, Muslim self, hidden from common view. Regarding preferred medium of instruction in universities, it was clear from the findings for RQ2 that a choice between EMI and AMI or a combination of the two would be optimal. This was also found to be the case in O’Neill’s (2014) study in which the majority of Emirati university students stated a preference for studying in English and Arabic equally (377 respondents, or 60.22%) (p. 11). A move toward bilingualism in higher education was also found to be desirable in Belhiah and Elhami’s (2015) study, in which 62% of the university students stated a preference for English and Arabic instruction, and only 27% preferred English medium instruction (p. 17). Troudi and Jendli’s (2011, p. 38) study investigating Emirati students’ experiences of EMI further supports findings from the present study, in that participants called for dual language education. A testament to the power of English in the UAE is that the second most popular preference amongst the Emirati university students was learning solely in English (EMI). Added to the power, prestige and usefulness of English, further factors such as negative Arabic learning experiences and the fact the participants had become accustomed to learning in English, added to this preference. This was also found in Troudi and Jendli’s (2011) study investigating Emirati experiences of EMI, where participants, some of whom had studied English their whole lives, commented that the thought of studying their courses in Arabic was daunting or ‘somehow a challenge’ (p. 32).

Conclusion It is clear from the findings that Emirati cultural identities are indeed multifaceted, socially constructed, fluid, dynamic and above all else complex. How Emiratis position themselves and how they are positioned by others is continually being morphed according to different contexts and interaction. Depending on the context and interaction, certain aspects of identity receive greater levels of acceptance and value. For example, English-­ speaking aspects of identity are highly valued at university, for access to future jobs and in many public domains. Presenting oneself as a confident

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English-speaker in such contexts leads to personal pride and acceptance from certain others such as teachers. Similarly, positioning oneself as an Arabic-speaker (Emirati dialect) in other contexts such as the home or with Emirati family and friends leads to great levels of inclusion and acceptance. Tensions arise mainly when aspects of identities are at odds with what is expected or preferred in certain domains. For example, young Emiratis may feel confident when speaking English and perhaps dressing in Western clothes at home as well as public places. However, such behavior may be viewed negatively by others, especially older generations, who see this as a betrayal to what it means to be Emirati. What has arisen from such tensions is hybridity, where there is a need to create something new which is made and ‘owned’ by young Emiratis. This can take the form of linguistic hybridity such as translanguaging and Arabizi, or cultural hybridity where a new twist is added to a tradition (e.g. using social media to show henna designs), as mentioned by multiple participants in the study. How such hybridity is viewed, however, varies according to individuals. For example, the conversation which expatriate teacher, Joe, described taking place in Tim Horton’s coffee shop in which two Emirati women used translanguaging throughout their conversation may make some wonder why two Arabic speakers could not communicate in their mother tongue without having to frequently punctuate their discussion with English. On the other hand, others would see this as a pertinent example of a new generation of confident bi-lingual Emiratis who can effortlessly switch back and forth using two languages, showing pride in this ability. Since language, culture and identity are neither static nor unchanging, the latter view of linguistic hybridity and cultural multiplicity needs to be embraced, while at the same time taking into account the participants wishes for a more balanced linguistic landscape in terms of the amount of Arabic and English in education, especially. More detailed findings from the study described in this chapter can be found in: Hopkyns, S. (2020). The Impact of Global English on Cultural Identities in the United Arab Emirates: Wanted Not Welcome. New York: Routledge.

References Al-Bataineh, A., & Gallagher, K. (2018). Attitudes Towards Translanguaging: How Future Teachers Perceive the Meshing of Arabic and English in Children’s Story Books. International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2018.1471039.

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CHAPTER 11

Language, Nation, Difference: Everyday Language Tactics of Young Emiratis Iḋ il Akıncı

Introduction In the pre-oil and pre-nation era, port cities of the Arabian Gulf, such as Dubai, have been home to diverse immigrant communities, as a result of trade relations, colonial affairs as well as slavery. As a result, inhabitants of the region spoke a variety of languages such as Urdu, Hindi, Swahili, Balochi, Farsi (Holes 2011, p.  138). While some of these culturally and linguistically diverse communities have been naturalized as Emirati, with the formation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971, Arabic has been declared as the official language of the state and used as a centralized language of education. As a result of nation-building efforts, which included Arabization of the national population, these pre-nation languages, despite being spoken to varying degrees by old and young generation Emiratis, have become a part of private life.

I.̇ Akıncı (*) Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_11

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Since the official and popular discourses suggest that Emirati nationals are bonded together with their shared ancestry, the region’s and its ­inhabitants’ links to, and origins from, various parts of the Indian Ocean, Yemen, Baluchistan, Southern Persia, the Arabian Gulf and Africa have been elided in the way the citizens are represented today (Potter 2014). Defining those who are in possession of Emirati passports, as Bedouin, tribal and Arab, these discourses suggest a cultural and linguistic homogeneity among the Emirati nationals, and attribute diversity solely to post-oil immigration. Consequently, the demographic imbalance migrants pose, where they outnumber citizens by 90% in the UAE, is often narrated as having brought cultural, social, economic and political implications on the ‘homogenous native population’. Language is one of the most debated issues in relation to post-oil immigration and its effect on national identity in the UAE, both in official and popular contexts. Emergence of English as the lingua franca of the UAE, following the influx of post-oil migration to the UAE, is perceived as a threat to the national and cultural identity of the Emirates (see O’Neill 2017). Consequently, as a part of its nation-building activities, the Emirati state runs projects to cherish and preserve the Arabic language from the infiltration of foreign languages. Emphasis on the centrality of Arabic for Emirati national identity reflects the tendency of official and popular discourses to depict national identity in a binary manner between the supposedly ‘homogenous’ Emirati citizens versus the ‘diverse’ migrant population. Taking into consideration the dominant role of language among the markers of national identity and nation-building efforts, this chapter explores how the linguistic diversity among Emirati citizens complicate presumptions about a shared identity centred around language in the Gulf and more specifically the Emirates (Limbert 2014, p. 591). In order to illustrate this issue, I use narratives of young Emirati citizens, collected from a year-long fieldwork in Dubai between 2015 and 2016. Narratives shared here, not exclusively but predominantly, focus on Emiratis whose ancestors migrated to Dubai from outside the Arabian Gulf and who as a result speak non-Arabic languages. Considering that Arabic is of unique importance to UAE ‘nation-­ statehood’ and collective identities (Findlow 2006, p.  24), this chapter aims to uncover how such ‘ethno-normative’ thinking shapes young Emiratis’ sense of national identity and their everyday performances of it through language. Drawing on from theories of everyday nationhood and

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performance (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Edensor 2002; Goffman 1999), this chapter argues that Arabic language is one of the most important symbolic markers for young Emiratis to establish commonality with the dominant groups in society and to become recognized as a part of the nation. I argue that while Arabic is a naturalized part of identity for young Emiratis, having an ancestral heritage that is outside of the Arabian Gulf is still a source of consciousness in the way certain Emiratis perform their identities, which is reflected on their everyday linguistic choices. By illustrating in detail how state-led projects on cultivating national identity are articulated and negotiated by Emirati citizens through ‘performing’, this chapter further explores the different ways in which the national identity is constructed, from official and popular ways to the everyday, (un)reflexive acts by which people inscribe themselves in place (Edensor 2002). Thus, in this chapter, I argue the need to move away from the tendency of reifying and depicting the study of national identity in a binary manner between Emirati citizens as a homogenous group versus non-citizens. Instead, I show how boundaries are similarly created, maintained and blurred within the members of the nation through various performances, which simultaneously define the content of Emirati national identity and determine why some inclusions are legitimated, while others are rendered outsider status.

Language as a Marker of National Identity Official and popular narratives on national collectivities subjugate ‘a hegemonic place in nation-states and their ability to frame the cultural boundaries of society’ (Beiner 2003, p.  168). While the ideal of such a state is represented by an ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogeneous population, inhabitants of national communities more often than not come from diverse cultural backgrounds (Hobsbawn 1990). Such cultural diversity in a national community, which can be reflected on the variety of languages spoken by individuals or different names/surnames they carry, might be a barrier to the ‘assimilation’ of certain segments into national community, given their potential to signify ethnic, national or geographical differences (see Johnson 1997 for her discussion of Latinos in the US context). With the motivation of constructing a national identity that is capable of uniting citizens, nation-states employ various strategies, often orchestrated through the creation of a set of cultural symbols (Guibernau 2007)

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and ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm 1990) that disseminate a certain image of the ‘nation’. Positing the primordiality of language as a ‘given’ of national identity is one of the strategies nation-states use in demarcating its boundaries and sustaining a national unity and cultural identity (Findlow 2006, p.  20; Scassa 1996, pp.  174–175; Gellner 1997; Hobsbawm 1990). The importance of a shared language for the tenacity of national identity comes from its primary function as a means of socialization, acculturation, education, political participation and intellectual transmission. Identifying through a language and being loyal to it are aims of building a nation, which are achieved through the enforcement of universal primary education in standard language, or at times through the prohibition of the use of minority languages in public spaces (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 1068). Avoiding to speak minority languages in public or voluntarily taking on surnames that fit the official narrative on national identity are also some of the ways in which individuals develop to conceal their difference from and ‘integrate’ to the national collective (see Aslan 2009, for the case of Kurds and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey). In this sense, language plays a central role in state sponsored and engineered projects that carefully craft national identities, and cultivate a sense of ‘sameness’ among citizens. Various state regulations in relation to the majority and minority languages are central in the way boundaries of national identities are marked and the illusion of commonality is established among the members of the nation, even if they may in fact be a relatively heterogonous group (Edensor 2002). However, these top-down approaches to the construction of national unity do not inform us on how they are read by, celebrated or challenged by populations they are aimed at, who more often than not represent an internal diversity (Hobsbawm 1990; al-Dailami 2014, p.  314). In order to understand how minority groups make sense of, relate to and identify with their national community, I draw from theories of everyday nation and performance, which I briefly review in the following section.

Everyday Performances of the Nation Our everyday practices, such as performances of mundane tasks and duties, are often identified in common-sense understandings as national (Edensor 2002). In order to claim a sense of belonging to this abstract unit of national identity, it must be domesticated, localized and made tangible. As

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discussed in the previous section, an official language for a nation is one tangible element of an otherwise ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawn 1990). This is how people, through the use of personal alliances, such as ‘the familiar building blocks of body, family and kinship’ make sense of large entities (Herzfeld 1997, p. 5 in Edensor 2002). The cultivation of national identity is achieved through what Connerton (1989) describes as ‘incorporating rituals’ in which groups transmit ideals and reproduce memory through systematic performances, for example, through the use of shared language among the nationals. According to Connerton, it is this demand for repetitive performances from participants, where memory and identity become incorporated into the performer or, in other words, inscribed into the body, which consequently becomes a part of ‘social habit memory’ (Edensor 2002). These reminders and cues, which are embodied in the group members’ acts as tools of collective remembering of what the nation is and who belongs to it, also act as powerful enactions of systematic forgetting (Chaney 1993, p.  20  in Edensor 2002). Connerton argues that these acts are performed in an unreflexive manner, for national rituals are not discursively (re)constituted but performed through embodied memory. Performances, however, are not always unreflexive. Unfamiliar surroundings may provoke acute self-awareness of otherwise iterative performances, whilst seemingly reflexive performances may become unreflexive to the actor (Edensor 2002). Goffman (1999, p. 519), for example, sees identity as a tactical construction, where people enact performances on a daily basis to achieve particular goals. He argues that front stage performances, our public performances, are often shaped by internalized norms and expectations of others in certain settings. These performances follow familiar social rules for how we interact with each other and they also shape how we speak, what language we choose to speak in public and in private how we dress and style ourselves, material objects we carry around and our behavioural manners. These performances shape how others perceive us, what they expect of us and how they behave toward us. When we are aware that our performances are not convincing to others, we consciously attempt to take on performances that are explicit/visible in the way they relate to an identity (Goffman 1999). In this sense, performances of national identity, through symbolic markers and cultural traditions, can be used by individuals as a tool to negotiate the boundaries within a national community and in order to be recognized as a part of it (Tufail and Poynting 2013; Bell 1999;

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Fortier 2000). This implies that our performances of identity are relational and situational, and can vary depending on the social context we find ourselves in, the persons we interact with and the proximity we wish to establish with them. In this study, I use the concept of ‘performance’ to understand how it is both used to conceal internal diversities between citizens and how Emiratis use performance to establish proximity to dominant groups in society. In particular, I focus on young Emiratis, whose ancestors migrated to Dubai from various parts of the Indian Ocean, Southern Persia, Arabian Peninsula and Africa and who as a result speak or have families that speak additional languages to Arabic. In other words, I want to understand the role of speaking Arabic for young Emirati citizens in the way it enables them to make sense of and relate to the dominant groups in their national community. This tactical approach is important for my research because actors have the capacity to construct and negotiate national identities within the context they find themselves in (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012). This is not to suggest that actors are completely free from power dynamics operating within a society and determining the outcome of claims of belonging. It rather suggests that negotiations are an interplay between social structure and social action: the former emphasizing the constraints on individuals in the interests of social order; and the latter emphasizing the capacity of social actors to shape the world around them (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012).

Building Gulf National Identities: The Role of Arabic and the Challenge of Its ‘Rivals’ The official and popular discourses in the UAE portray Bedouin Arabs as the authentic inhabitants of the United Arab Emirates and define Emirati national identity through citizenship, one that is premised on shared ancestry, language, kinship and descent among those who are in possession of Emirati passports (see Findlow 2006; Kanna 2011: 120; Alshawi and Gardner 2013, p. 47; Vora 2013, p. 178). While official accounts suggest that these societies are relatively homogenous (Alshawi and Gardner 2013), historical literature serves as a crucial point of reference to assert that the Gulf region has long been home to different cultural and linguistic communities, long before oil was found.

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Indian Ocean historians provide us with an expansive understandings of the region’s rich cosmopolitan past, through tracing the historical connections across both sides of the Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, Indian Ocean, as well as Africa (Al-Rasheed 2005; Onley 2005, 2014; Jahani 2014; Fuccaro 2005, 2014; Potter 2014; Peterson 2013; al-Dailami 2014; Hopper 2011, 2014). Consequently, we know that Urdu, Hindi, Swahili, Balochi and Ajami (a Southern Farsi dialect) were some of the many languages that were a part of everyday life in this era. This was not only the case among people of these specific linguistic backgrounds but also among Arabs, who were in constant contact with these segments of society (see Holes 2011, p. 138). Such linguistic diversity of the pre-nation and pre-oil era is reflected in the vernacular form of Arabic that is spoken in this region, which ‘incorporates too many Persian, Baluchi and Urdu elements’ (Piller 2017, p. 9). Infiltration of these languages resulted in the perception of Gulf Arabic by other Arabic speakers as a form of ‘corrupted’ language, in comparison to long-standing sophisticated forms of Egyptian and Levant Arabic (Piller 2017). With the economic dominance of the Gulf region in comparison to other parts of the Arab world, however, the prestige of Gulf Arabic, including the Emirati Arabic, is enhanced. Today, Gulf dialect in Arabic is perceived, both by Emiratis and non-Emiratis, as some of the most important markers of Emirati national identity and positioned as integral to Emirati history, while a variety of languages from the pre-oil and pre-nation era have been written out of official narratives of national identity (Holes 2011). While Arabic is the official language of the UAE, it is not the language of the majority. This is not only because Emirati citizens constitute a minority in their country, but also Arabic speakers, who are not Emirati nationals, only account for 13% of the population (Peel 2004, p. 82). Therefore, in everyday life, it is more common to hear one of the South Asian languages in such as Urdu, Hindi or Malayalam, as Pakistanis and Indians form nearly half of the population in the UAE (Holes 2011). English on the other hand has become the lingua franca of the UAE. Nearly 99% of the private sector is constituted by non-citizens and the working language is largely in English. In contrast, public sector in the UAE is operated mainly in Arabic and occupied predominantly by Emiratis. Education, similar to occupation, is also divided between English and Arabic. Nationals often go to public schools where Arabic is the language used in primary and secondary schools. Private schools, which is increasingly opted by nationals, teach in English with compulsory Arabic lessons

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(Findlow 2006). At university level, often cultural and local subjects, such as Shari’a, Islamic studies, arts/humanities, social sciences and education, are mostly taught in Arabic, however not exclusively (Findlow 2006). There is a proliferation of international university campuses in the Gulf which use English as a medium of instruction. This is also the case with certain local universities such as Zayed University, which uses English in teaching a predominantly Emirati student population. Reflecting the context discussed, the existing literature on Gulf identities and language focuses on the impact of post-oil migration and the dominance of migrant workers on the changing linguistic practices among young Emirati nationals (see Findlow 2006; Troudi 2007; Said 2011; Hopkyns 2015; Raddawi and Meslem 2015). These accounts predominantly echo the official and popular discussions: the infiltration of English into Arabic as a threat to the national and cultural identity of Emiratis (see O’Neill 2017, for a discussion on ‘Arabizi’). While very important in illustrating the tensions that arise from post-oil immigration to the UAE and its effects on Emirati national identity and language, this body of literature does not take into consideration the linguistic diversity among Emirati nationals, which results from their ancestral migration history or cultural background (except see Holes 2011 for a discussion on the linguistic homogenization in contemporary Bahrain and how it relates to sectarian differences). By doing so, this body of literature study and depict national identity in a binary manner between the supposedly ‘homogenous’ Emirati citizens versus the ‘diverse’ migrant population, which reproduces the official and popular narratives about who Emirati nationals are. While there are studies that acknowledge the internal divisions within Gulf citizens, such as geographical and sectarian origin, cultural traditions, economic class and legal status (see Longva 2006, p.  171; Nagy 2006, pp. 127–131; Partrick 2009, pp. 20–23; Kinninmont 2013; Jamal 2015), these studies rarely examine empirically how these divisions affect citizens’ claims to national identity and when they do, the taxonomy of Gulf citizenry is not diverse enough, that is, the linguistic diversities among citizens are not considered. Moreover, majority of these studies are not based in the UAE. Thus, bottom-up constructions of national identity by nationals themselves are often overlooked within the Gulf literature. This chapter speaks to this gap in the literature, where I aim to show how top-down approaches to national identity by state-driven projects, such as declaring Arabic as the official language, are read by citizens, whose ancestors might come from different linguistic origins.

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Methodology Findings in this chapter results from an ethnographic fieldwork of 12 months in Dubai (September 2015–September 2016), which explored the following question: ‘How do young adults, -both Emirati citizens and Arab residents of Dubai-, identify themselves and others as being included (or not) to the “Emirati national identity”’? The methods of data collection included interviews, ‘participant living’ and participant observation with Emirati and non-Emirati informants in order to better understand their everyday lives. While my fieldwork unveiled a complex and varied performances of national identity, ranging from sartorial choices (see Akinci 2019b), to asserting Arab roots, hair and beard cuts, and choice of cars, in this particular chapter, given the time and space constraints, I chose to focus on the role of Arabic as an important signifier of national identity among young Emiratis. The emphasis of this study, which included 56 in-depth interviews with informants aged from 19 to 32, is on the articulation of the nation by Emirati citizens themselves. The Emirati citizens I spoke to come from various backgrounds, including Emiratis who identify as Arab and/or Bedouin, Emiratis of Persian, Baloch, and African origin. In addition, second-­ generation Arab migrants, originating from various parts of the Middle East and North Africa, are equally important to this study: Sharing ‘Arabness’ and language with citizens, as well as, to a certain extent, religion, these second-generation Arab migrants complicate the boundaries of the Emirati nation, which is defined through these elements, yet excludes these groups from acquiring citizenship (see Akinci 2019). The biggest advantage I had in my fieldwork was the social and cultural capital I accumulated through my lived experiences in Dubai as a migrant for many years prior to the fieldwork. Thus, I was already soaked in the everyday life of the city before my fieldwork and had the privilege of gathering expansive knowledge, without theoretical or research concerns. This way, I learned the society not through goal-oriented participant observation, but through what Longva calls as spontaneous ‘participant living’ (1997, p. 13). These stocks of knowledge shaped what type of research I wanted to do both with my masters and PhD. Additionally, my lived experiences also enabled a smooth access to potential participants and the use of snowballing technique, thanks to a large network of friends and ­acquaintances living in the city. In the light of this brief methodological debate and some of the theories that informed this research, I now return to the empirical material I collected.

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The Success of Arabic as a National Language? Considering that language is one of the main elements of national unity and identity (Oommen 1997, p. 193), the UAE, like most nation-states, pursued a cultural and linguistic homogenization of an otherwise diverse population. While it was common for people in pre-oil times to identify primarily through their places of origin, tribe, linguistic or ethnic origins, with the foundation of the UAE state and its ‘Arabization’ efforts of its citizens, Emiratis of different ethnic origins have started to downplay their roots and assimilate into the officially defined identity (see Onley 2014). Consequently, other languages of the pre-oil and pre-nation communities, which could possibly blur the distinctiveness of an Emirati Arab identity, have become a part of the private sphere. Today, the majority of younger-generation Emiratis consider Arabic to be their native tongue. Their fluency in their parents’/grandparents’ language varies based on their families’ time of arrival to the UAE, the frequency of the language’s use at home by family members, their families’ fluency in Arabic as well as young Emiratis’ interest in their cultural origins. However, regardless of their proficiency in their linguistic ancestry, young Emiratis refrain from using any language apart from Arabic in public, in order not to jeopardize their claims of belonging and to establish a closer cultural proximity to dominant groups. I was told that this was something that was instructed to them by their families as they were growing up: My grandmother told me I should be Baloch with Baloch and Arab with Arab. She thought that if people heard, they would associate it with being poor, low class. (Ali, Emirati of Baloch origin) People were praising each other about being Arab, being pure blood. I grew up seeing my sisters hushing my mother and warning her not to speak Ajami in front of their friends or in public. Because Emirati society is very small and they didn’t want anyone to know we were coming from that place because that was a source of shame. (Fahad, Emirati of Persian origin) When I was younger I was shy speaking Swahili. I remember my cousins warning me not to speak Swahili when we are at school. They would say, if anyone asks what language you speak, tell them you speak French (laughs). (Mansour, Emirati of Zanzibari origin)

As statements above illustrate, my participants articulated their language choices as an attempt to get accepted by dominant groups in society

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as well as to avoid any negative connotation that may result from their ‘impure Arab’ origins. Having arrived in Dubai in the mid-1960s and coming from non-Arabic speaking backgrounds, Ali, Fahad and Mansour’s family decided that not speaking Balochi, Ajami or Swahili in public was the right thing to do linguistically, in order to be accepted by the dominant Emirati group, that is, Arabs. Their linguistic choices were shaped within dominant beliefs about what kind of language is good, beautiful and right to use in this specific context (Piller 2011, p. 158). In other words, their choices reflect the context-specific language ideologies that valorize some languages and speakers over others, based on the socio-economic aspects related to a given language (Piller 2011). Thus, proficiency in widely spoken languages of the region, such as Ajami, Swahili and Balochi, despite their usefulness, are not only discounted but also stigmatized. Conversely, speaking a global language such as French or English is seen as prestigious, a sign of modernization of Emirati society. Therefore, ‘celebration’ of bilingualism in this context is contingent upon whether the second language is in conflict with the purified image of the Emirati nation or not. While informants typically stated that their need to monitor their linguistic choices drastically reduced as they grew older, they still altered their performances based on the social context and the individual they were interacting with. Farhad’s anecdote illustrates how performance is relational and situational among Emiratis. Farhad, a third-generation Southern Iranian born and raised in Dubai, told me, for example, how Emiratis of Southern Persian origin refuse to speak to him in Ajami. Even though they speak amongst themselves in Ajami, when Farhad appears they immediately switch to Arabic. This shows the insecurity that Farhad’s presence creates for their national identity, as they see Farhad as a­ ttempting to blur legal and social boundaries that exist between them. Speaking in a common ‘foreign’ language with Farhad would also be a reminder for the wider audience that Emiratis originate from a similar place as an Iranian national, considered a ‘rival’ identity. The same logic also applied when my informants explained the absence of any cultural and linguistic organizations for Emiratis. Ali, an Emirati of Baloch origin, illustrates how cultural minority centres are avoided in the UAE, as they could potentially cater to both Emiratis with immigrant origins and the non-national population that originate from similar places and as a result would blur the salient boundaries between the two:

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The only Emirati ethnic association that has received recognition is Shohuh. Their language is called Shehi, mountain people mainly from Ras Al Khaimah. For me they are aboriginals of the UAE. But for a Baloch organisation it will be rather difficult as you can’t limit it for Emiratis. There are expat Baloch from Iran and Pakistan and they would want to join as well, which would not be a welcomed idea by locals.

As Ali clearly illustrates acknowledgment of the linguistic diversity among locals will jeopardize the privileged position of Emirati nationals in comparison to migrant groups. Emiratis’ discreteness about the internal diversity within their community can be explained by the fact that they are ‘upgraded’ as a homogenous ethno-class above all migrants (see Longva 1997 for Kuwait). Thus, a shared language between Emirati nationals and migrants, for example Baloch or Persian, will not only result in certain Emiratis being ‘downgraded’ in the eyes of the others but also blur the salient boundaries between the citizens and non-citizens.

Residual Markers of Difference: Linguistic Boundaries Amongst Emiratis Even though today young Emiratis speak with each other predominantly in Arabic, or Arabizi (a mixture of English and Arabic), there are residual elements of their linguistic heritage in the way they spoke Arabic that indicate their places of origin and ethnic backgrounds. Accents, pronunciation, sentence structure, word formation and mistakes in gender references when speaking the vernacular form of Emirati Arabic were commonly mentioned as markers of ‘impurity’ within the citizenry. These affected claims to national identity and intimate decisions, such as marriage, as Tawheed, an Arab Emirati illustrates below: If you say you are local and identify as Arab yet still can’t manage to speak properly, it is somehow a disgrace to other people. Once I teased my mum saying I was going to get married to an Ajami. She told me ‘you want to end up with a woman whose mum can’t even put two phrases together or can’t differentiate between male and female? You want your kid to use some Iranian words jumbled up in Arabic?’

Some informants have gone as far as to claim that these markers when speaking Arabic were as reliable as one’s tribe/surname, in  locating an Emirati’s ethnic origins. I was told that Ajams, historically the most impor-

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tant ethnic identity in the region, aside from Arabs (Potter 2014, p. 12), were the easiest group to mark out as they often threw in Persian words as they spoke Arabic and used different sentence structures. While there is no available statics, various accounts estimate up to 40–60% of Emirates’ ‘indigenous’ population being of Persian origin, of which many are settled in Dubai (Davidson 2008; Kanna 2010, p. 104). In the UAE and most of the Gulf countries, citizens of Persian origins are called ‘Ajam’, which is an Arab word that historically signified otherness. Originally the term meant ‘mute’—referring to those who were unable to speak Arabic properly—and over time the meaning shifted to refer to anything ‘foreign’ or ‘strange’ (i.e. non-Arabs). The term acquired the specific connotation of ‘Persian’ over time, especially in the context of the Arabian Gulf countries (Potter 2014). Eloquence in Arabic was a marker of ‘purity’ and ‘indigeneity’. Even though Emiratis with non-Arab or non-tribal origins were typically not accustomed with this way of speech, I was told by informants that Emiratis often mimicked the Bedouin way of talking if they wanted to impress someone. Those who mastered this way of speech also established closer cultural proximity to dominant groups. For example, Khalifa, who comes from a Bedouin family, suggests that he has a closer alliance with ‘Afro-­ Emiratis’ than Ajams: I have a friend from African descent, he is 100% local. Talks with Bedouin accent. I can relate to him more than an Ajami. Maybe we will call him khal (black) to joke, but they don’t find it offensive. It is not like ‘nigga’ in America. We have this concept here; you can’t be Emirati without being Arab. Their origins maybe in Central Africa, you know because we had some… I don’t want to say ‘abid’ (slave), but khadim (servant). But they have been here for many years.

As Bilkhair (2009) argues, as a result of the centuries-old dislocation from their ancestral homeland and their cultural assimilation into the ­families they served, Emiratis with slave origins did not develop as a racial minority. This is different from Ajami Emiratis who still maintain their linguistic heritage and whose Persian roots can at times prove ‘problematic’, especially when tensions rise with Iran. Thus, ‘being Ajam’ is potentially more of a salient social boundary within the citizenry than being black, even though the former’s phenotypical difference is, as many Emiratis have implied, not as visible as that of the latter. Similarly, bidoon

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were often mistaken for being Emirati because of their mastery in performing Emiratiness, including their way of speaking Arabic. Their performances of Emiratiness were not deliberate, but rather an inevitable consequence of their long years of residence in the region. In contrast, despite being ethnically Arab and thus native speakers of Arabic, naturalized Emiratis of non-Gulf Arab backgrounds (e.g. Syrians or Palestinians) were often marked as outsiders because of their choice of Arabic dialect. By retaining their Levantine dialect and not speaking with an Emirati dialect, they were perceived by Emirati citizens as lacking interest in being culturally assimilated to Emiratiness. While Emiratis of non-­ Gulf Arab origins were expected to speak in Emirati Arabic to express their belonging and loyalty to the nation, for non-Gulf Arab migrant groups, choosing to talk with an Emirati dialect were seen as crossing the boundaries of the Emirati community by citizens (see Akinci 2019a, p. 7). Amongst the citizenry, the degree to which Emiratis wanted or were motivated to speak Emirati Arabic was also affected by citizenship status. Ameer is one of these examples, a second-generation Iranian migrant who was recently naturalized as Emirati, in possession of a passport only. Having been educated in an international school, Ameer cannot speak either Arabic or Farsi. On a daily basis, Ameer is confronted by members of the Emirati community (whether it is his clients at work, an officer at the police station or the immigration officer at the airport) for his lack of Arabic skills, despite holding an Emirati passport and dressing as one. While Ameer understands the importance of speaking Arabic, not just because of his professional role but also to achieve social inclusion in the Emirati community, he is reluctant to invest his time in learning Arabic due to his precarious legal status. I took some classes from an Emirati friend at work but it didn’t last long. I also put Noor Dubai on when driving to work, RJ speaks slowly so I can follow. I also watch Emirati shows. So, I tried various things but then there comes a point when I say, is it worth the investment? If I had a guarantee of getting the full citizenship based on being able to speak Arabic, I of course would. But when you don’t know…Even if I learn, rest of my family doesn’t speak.

Ameer and his family have their Emirati passports renewed periodically, yet with no sight of receiving full citizenship status in near future. A rather unexpected change in their legal status does not offer Ameer’s family a gradual acquisition of competencies and dispositions that will acculturate

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them to the ‘dominant society’ (Jasso 2011). Instead, their new legal ­status requires deliberate effort and devotion (language training), while they are unsure about the returns of such investments. Thus, boundary crossing, the will to emulate Emiratiness, differs according to the legal status of Emiratis and corresponding costs and benefits attached to it (see Jasso 2011). Having said that, there are exceptions to this, as other passport holders I have spoken to are effortlessly Emirati because of their close proximity to the national community (schooling with Emiratis, having Emirati family members, longer years of residence). Many bidoon, stateless residents of the UAE, also fall under this category.

Conclusion This chapter discussed how national identity was constructed ‘bottom-up’ by Emirati citizens, who enacted their collective identities based on Bedouin Arab tribal traditions. Focusing on Arabic language, this chapter illustrated how the marker of language was taken as a proxy for national identity and how Emiratis used certain performances to cross these boundaries. I argued that if it were not for the high level of desire of Emiratis to emulate the officially narrated forms of Emiratiness, the ‘illusion of commonality’ that is needed among members of the national community could not be achieved, but would rather be threatened (see Edensor 2002). Thus, this chapter, by showing the performativity rather than the fixity of Emirati national identity, argued that identities are effects of performances and challenge naturalized forms of identities and categories (Butler 1993; Fortier 2000). While performances of Emiratiness have become second nature to Emiratis through repetition, I showed throughout the chapter that these performances were also self-conscious and reflexive (Edensor 2002). The chapter showed how Emiratis’ performances were often situational and in part ‘tactical’, to achieve the two following goals (see Goffman 1999). First, performances were used to negotiate differences and to be accepted as a part of the ‘mainstream society’. I showed how Emiratis shaped their public performances through internalized norms and expectations of ‘Emiratiness’, such as avoiding to speak a ‘foreign language’ in public. Second, speaking in Emirati Arabic maintained salient boundaries between citizens and migrants, in particular Arab migrants. As a result, other cultural expressions that may arise from Emiratis immigrant origins, such as speaking Ajami, Balochi or Swahili, were restricted to private spaces, as

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they would otherwise contradict the official and popular portrayals of Emirati nationals and blur the boundaries between migrant and citizen groups. Even though many informants, who come from non-Arab and non-­ tribal backgrounds, were aware that their collective identity was a cultural artefact, they expressed a shared language, among other markers of Emiratiness, consolidated a sense of a ‘common culture’ among nationals. I argued that internalization of top-down discourses on national identity by informants was possible as the assigned culture was the dominant one in society (see Yang 2000; Guibernau 2007). Additionally, citizens argued that ‘sticking with their roots’ would have tarnished the political and social stability the Emirates managed to establish, often comparing the UAE with other countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, which suffer from sectarian and ethnic conflicts, as well as European countries, which they perceived as facing a ‘multicultural backlash’. Having said that, even though performance of Emiratiness achieved the illusion of fixity and commonality (Edensor 2002) in the way Emirati nation was presented to outsiders, it did little to conceal the internal diversities among citizens. Emiratis, despite performances, were still able to decode one another’s ethnic and geographical origins. Surnames, accent and dexterity in spoken Arabic among others were some of the clues to an Emirati’s origins. Taken as a whole, however, as overall findings of my research indicated, it is safe to say that citizenship, historical links to and presence in the UAE, and cultural assimilation form the boundaries of the nation and naturalize differences among the citizenry—but only to a certain extent. Acknowledgment  Findings of this chapter result from my doctoral research at the University of Sussex (2014–2018), funded by the Chancellor’s International Scholarship.

References Akinci, I. (2019a). Culture in the ‘Politics of Identity’: Conceptions of National Identity and Citizenship Among Second-Generation Non-Gulf Arab Migrants in Dubai. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 1–17. Akinci, I. (2019b). Dressing the Nation? Symbolising Emirati National Identity and Boundaries Through National Dress. Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1665697

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CHAPTER 12

Higher Education Abroad in the New Millennium: GCC Scholarship Programs as GCC Culture and Identities Boosters. Saudi Arabia in the Spotlight Annalisa Pavan

Introduction “It will take time. But yeah, it will change”. This was the view expressed by a Saudi student in Canada when interviewed about the difficulties faced by Saudis graduating from foreign universities under the government-­funded King Abdullah Scholarship Program, KASP, on their return to the Kingdom (Murphy 2012, p. 140). It reflects the essential focus of this study, which suggests that beyond the stated official goals of the Saudi, Kuwaiti and Emirati government-funded scholarship programs for citizens who wish to study at foreign universities around the world, which are concerned mainly with economic development, prolonged exposure of Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) students to non-GCC cultures can act as a powerful and

A. Pavan (*) University of Padova, Padova, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Karolak, N. Allam (eds.), Gulf Cooperation Council Culture and Identities in the New Millennium, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1529-3_12

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challenging tool for change and evolution in traditionally conservative GCC culture and identities. The present study draws on official documents, facts and figures, press reports and recent literature rather than on field research, in the belief that, especially in the Saudi Arabia study case, changeable expectations and aspirations expressed by GCC youth may be influenced by readily accepted narratives forged both inside and outside the country. In the study, it will be explained that the scholarship programs can act as boosters of new glocal identities, well beyond the stated goals of the programs themselves, linked to economic development, provided that Gulf Millennials engage with the GCC political élites to negotiate the reshaping of a glocal identity taking in tradition and globalization, global and local, past and future. It is also suggested that scholarship programs should be regarded as facilitators for the construction of a new glocal identity. In fact, despite concerns about challenges faced by the Khaleeji, or pan-Khaleeji, identity when confronted with globalization, this new glocal identity could materialize as the result of a constructive and selective “appropriation of cultural elements” (Karolak 2016, vi) during the time spent studying abroad, followed by re-elaboration and incorporation of these elements into the Khaleeji culture and identities.

GCC Scholarships Abroad: Student Mobility Policies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates This section provides a comparative overview of government-sponsored scholarship programs for nationals from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE) who wish to pursue their tertiary education abroad, either in a neighboring Arab country or in the wider world. Saudi Arabia Of the three countries considered, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—the biggest oil exporter in the world and the Arab world’s largest economy, home to the first university in the Arabian Peninsula, the King Saud University, opened in 1957—has by far the oldest tradition of fully government-­ sponsored scholarships for study at foreign universities. Indeed scholarship-­ oriented policies have been part of the Al Sauds’ education strategy since

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the 1920s (Pavan 2013), even before the establishment of the modern kingdom in 1932. In contrast to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, the origins of Saudi Arabian educational policies regarding scholarships abroad have been tracked, described and disseminated by Saudi scholars through publications and seminars. Thanks especially to the works of Saudi academics, accordingly, it is possible to know how the first royal decision was made, in 1927, to send thirteen Saudi students to Egypt to specialize in teaching and juristic law, technical education (mechanical engineering), agriculture and medicine. By the time a second (1936) and then a third batch (1942) were sent to Egypt, a regulatory system for overseas scholarship affairs had been created, which established that all the expenses incurred by the students abroad would be met by the government, provided that the students returned to Saudi Arabia after graduation and worked in the field assigned by the government (Pavan 2017a). The 1966 issue of the International Yearbook of Education published by UNESCO-IBE states that “The Ministry of Education [established in 1953]…continues to send scientific missions to study or specialize in foreign universities. Only holders of a certificate of secondary studies with an average of 70% marks are sent abroad. The number of students abroad in 1965–1966 was 1,798 distributed as follows: 355  in the United Arab Republic, 65 in Syria and Lebanon, 588 in the United States of America, 375 in Germany, 89 in France, 69 in the United Kingdom, 180 in Italy, 35 in Pakistan, 12 in Austria, 9 in Belgium, 21 in Switzerland” (p. 306). The number of students, destinations and research fields grew in quantity and quality for decades, until the 1990s, when the trend was reversed, as reported by Chapin Metz (1993): “The expansion of the university system in Saudi Arabia has enabled the Kingdom to limit financial support for study abroad. Such restrictions had long been the desire of some conservatives, who feared the negative influences on Saudi youth from studying abroad” (p. 102). The King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP)—launched in May 2005, extended twice and now in its third stage under the new name Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program—has gained a reputation, over time, as “the largest nationally-funded higher education program in the world” (Molavi 2015), or, more realistically, “the most ambitious government-sponsored study abroad project in the Gulf” (Al Tamimi 2017), despite the troubled transition to the third stage (Pavan 2017b).

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The third stage of the former KASP is being implemented through a new scheme—Your Job and Your Scholarship—in order to link the foreign scholarship program to employment. Under this scheme, returning graduates are employed by various government departments and agencies that have signed specific agreements with the Ministry of Education to fund scholarships and employ graduates. More exactly, the implementation scheme aims to “distinctively prepare specialized competencies effectively and systematically to fill the available vacancies” (Ministry of Education 2018), while “Linking candidates’ capacities to the career fields appropriate for them”, with a new shift in the focus of Saudi scholarship policies away from quantity (sending abroad as many students as possible, regardless of their actual academic abilities) and toward quality (sending abroad less students, but more academically oriented: Pavan 2017a). As reported by the National Budget Statement for the Fiscal Year 2018 (Ministry of Finance 2017, p. 69), with total projected expenditure set at SAR978 billion ($260.8 billion), spending on the education sector—“public and higher education and workforce training” (p. 66)—accounts for less than 20% of the total figure, at SAR192 billion ($51.2 billion), with an estimated cut in expenditure of 15.8% compared to the previous year. At all events, education comes first among the nine key sectors covered by the budget, followed by the military (SAR210 billion, $55.9 billion, with a 6.3% cut over the previous year). It is stated that “The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program will continue. The total number of students sent abroad to study under the supervision of the Ministry of Education has exceeded 173,000 students and their escorts. The annual expenditures of this program will amount to SAR14.7 billion [$3.9 billion]” (p. 66). Unfortunately, detailed information in English about rules and regulations for joining the scholarship program, allowances and financial benefits is nowhere to be found. The website of the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in Washington provides only very general information in English, and no information whatsoever is available on the website of the Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in London. The US and the UK are, respectively, the first and second favorite destinations of Saudi students on the scholarship program. Kuwait A draft paper written in 2016 by a Saudi scholar—a former recipient of a KASP scholarship who graduated in the UK—and submitted to the author for review reports that “Studying abroad began for Kuwaitis in 1920,

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when some individuals funded their children’s university studies. The first scholarship at government expense was to the State of Bahrain, in 1940. This was followed by much sponsored foreign study in a number of countries, including India, Iraq and Egypt….Kuwait government has also sent students to study in military and teacher training institutes”. The draft paper cites Hussain et  al., 2002, History of education in the State of Kuwait: A Documentary Study, published by the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait. Unfortunately, there is no English version of the Center’s website, so this source cannot be verified. A slide presentation provided in 2011 by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Higher Education and available online (Al Saad 2011) states that “the Program started in the early 50’s due to the absence of institutions of higher education or universities at that time. The purpose of the program was to supply the labor market of an emerging country with an educated workforce. Destinations were limited to neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Egypt”. By contrast with the limited information available on the origins of the Kuwaiti scholarship, it is well known that the University of Kuwait was established in 1966, and until 1982, when the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET) was set up, it was the only tertiary institution in the State of Kuwait. The first private university was opened in 2002, and at present there are nine private post-secondary institutions accredited by the Ministry of Higher Education. However, private universities concentrate mainly on non-scientific majors and do not offer masters’ degree and PhD courses. As a result, the University of Kuwait’s classes are overcrowded with 37,000 students. “As a solution, the government provides full tuition for up to 6,000 Kuwaiti students annually to pursue their education abroad, while the number of students studying inside Kuwait at one of the private universities at the expense of the government reaches up to 4,000 each year. The government also pays full tuition fees for 7,000 Kuwaiti students annually, who enroll at the country’s sole public university” (“The Problem with Kuwait’s Higher Education”, 2016). Even taking into account that “The allocation of state revenues and expenditures in the GCC countries, with the partial exception of Kuwait, is vague, shrouded in secrecy, and prepared and audited by bodies that are not answerable to the public” (AlShehabi 2017), it must be said that there is no Kuwaiti equivalent of the Saudi National Budget Statement published anywhere. However, the availability of fragmentary information released at different times can give some idea of the amount invested by the Kuwaiti government in education. In December 2017, it was

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announced that the Ministry of Education had been assigned KD2.2 billion ($7.2 billion) for the fiscal year 2018/2019, compared to KD1.8 billion for the year 2017/2018. This consisted of “KD 1.6 billion for salaries and KD200 million for all other items, which is inadequate for the development of educational programs” (“Budget allocated for Ministry of Education”, 2017). Later on, at a news conference held to announce the state budget, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance said that total expenditure amounted to KD20 billion ($66.6 billion), albeit making no specific reference to the education sector (Kuwait News Agency, January 29, 2018). Whilst the website of the Ministry of Higher Education of Kuwait has no English version, useful information about the Kuwaiti government-­ funded scholarship program can be found in English on the website of the Kuwait Cultural Office of the Embassy of Kuwait in Washington. Here one can learn about the eligibility criteria for the Kuwait government scholarship, designated majors for scholarship to the US, and—most important— the scholarship rules and regulations, effective June 2013. The forty-page document in English sets clear and detailed requirements concerning the scholarship system. As concerning the financial aspects, the document uses the word “allowances”, albeit omitting any reference to the amount of such allowances, with the exception of those granted to “outstanding scholarship students”, which are KD1000 and KD500 for outstanding graduate students and outstanding continuing students, respectively (p. 34). United Arab Emirates Information on the establishment of the UAE’s main government-funded scholarship program is virtually non-existent, and not only English information, it seems. In 2013, the Saudi scholar Hilal noted that “The data is insufficient to assume what UAE wants to achieve by sending its students overseas” (p. 201). Fortunately, as in the case of Kuwait, the website of the UAE Embassy in Washington can help. The website explains that the Presidential Scholarship Program started in 1998 “by a decree from the late Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan specifically geared for distinguished UAE students who graduate from their high schools and who meet specific academic criteria. Initially, the scholarship was meant for the selected students to attend UAE universities only; however, there are students who have been sent to the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand and Canada”. As far as allowances are concerned, information is very limited: “All Presidential Scholarship undergraduate students receive

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$ 3,000 monthly allowance. Graduate students receive $ 3,500 monthly allowance” plus other allowances listed generically thereafter, with no specific amounts indicated. However, one wonders if the information available is updated, as the links to pages giving more details about the scholarship’s terms and conditions—which are in English and provide quite informative content—still refer to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which was merged into the Ministry of Education in 2016, following a cabinet reshuffle. The only really relevant information for the purpose of this study is that “His [Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan’s] goal was qualifying and training Emiratis so that they could participate in the dynamic growth of the UAE”. According to The National (November 7, 2017), a record Dh51.4 billion ($13.9 billion) federal budget was approved for 2018, where Dh10.4 billion ($2.8 billion) is allocated for general and higher education, totaling 17.1% of the overall budget, but unfortunately a detailed description of the budget is published only in Arabic (UAE Ministry of Finance website, Circulars, accessed March 5, 2018), with no information available in English about the allocations of the federal budget specifically devoted to the Presidential Scholarship Program. At present, UAE nationals can apply online for the scholarship program on the website of the Ministry of Education, and choose from 179 higher education institutions around the world (Ministry of Education website, accessed March 4, 2018). Other than introducing the online application service and summarizing the steps of the application in a few lines, no further information in English is available online. The paucity of data on the main Emirati scholarship—other scholarships do exist, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, sponsored by various public and private agencies—can be explained by the fact that the UAE “has focused mainly on importing IBCs [International Branch Campuses] rather than sponsoring students to be educated abroad”; in fact, “the UAE’s approach has been to transform the country into an international hub for world-class education” (Al Tamimi 2017, p. 12). In the Emirate of Dubai, there are 76 private universities and colleges, and many of these are foreign branch campuses of international institutions.

Studying Abroad: Retaining a Unique Culture? Given the popularity of the US among destinations selected by Saudis, Kuwaitis and Emiratis on study-abroad scholarships, it is interesting to analyze the latest Open Doors Report published annually by the Institute

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of International Education, the leading not-for-profit educational and cultural exchange organization in the US, for a closer look at figures relating to GCC students in the US. According to the 2017 Report, Saudi Arabia ranks fourth among the 25 leading places of origin of students who choose the US for their tertiary education, the top three being China, India and South Korea, while Kuwait ranks seventeenth. In the 2016/2017 academic year, there were 52,611 Saudi students in the US, down 14.2% from the previous year, the majority (61.8%) studying at undergraduate level. In the same year, there were 9825 Kuwaiti students in the US, up 0.5% from the previous year, the majority (73.3%) studying at undergraduate level. Emirati students numbered 2753, down 6.6% from the previous year, with 72.9% studying at undergraduate level. The Fall 2017 International Student Enrollment Hot Topics Survey found that 45% of higher education institutions across the US recorded a declining influx of new international students, which can be explained by various factors (p. 4). It is noted in particular that there are fewer Middle Eastern students, and “in a year marked by travel bans, immigration debates, concerns over personal safety due to gun violence, and tense race relations, institutions are concerned that some international students may no longer find the United States a welcoming and tolerant place to study” (p. 9). In effect, decreasing numbers of Saudis and Emiratis confirm the downward trend (8.4% less than the previous year) in overall numbers of Middle Eastern students choosing the US, whereas the trend in the case of Kuwaiti students is upward, perhaps reflecting the limited availability of places at Kuwait-based universities. As far as Saudi students are concerned, the new eligibility requirements for the third stage of the government-­ funded scholarship program (Pavan 2017b), ultimately favoring quality over quantity, are generally thought to provide a valid explanation for the decreasing numbers of Saudi students in the US. As Saudis represent the majority of Middle Eastern students in the US, they come routinely under the scrutiny of journalists and academics when discussing the adjustment of foreign students to American culture. And whatever may be said about Saudis is also applicable to Kuwaitis and Emiratis, given the substantial homogeneity of GCC culture. It is noteworthy that GCC culture and identities are often represented as “unique”, although the reasons for this supposed uniqueness are not exhaustively documented. For example, Springborg (2008), discussing the “unique traditions” of GCC culture, affirms that “The transition from tradi-

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tion to modernity in the Gulf is particularly interesting… The cultural and political models they are projecting are virtually unique”, further stressing the “remarkable ability to synthetise and create a distinctive, adaptable and productive culture” (pp. 12–13). Among GCC countries, Saudi Arabia is regarded as the “most” unique: Alyas, in his original work (2007), states that “The image of Saudi Arabia is unique in character” (p. 27); Alfawaz et al. (2014) observe that “Saudi Arabia has a unique society appearance in its adherence to its inherited values” (p. 24), and Al Alhareth et al. (2015) maintain that “Saudi Arabia… has a unique and complex culture” (p. 121). Assuming this uniqueness to be a distinctive feature of GCC culture and identities, it will be useful here to consider a number of culture and identity-related issues associated with the prolonged exposure of GCC students to American/Western culture. Self-Segregation As Unruh and Obeidat (2015) point out, “Domestic students and their professors in the US have been raised in a society that values individualism, coeducation, and the separation of church and state, including the prohibition of religious instruction in public schools. Saudis are Muslims from the Middle East, raised in a collectivistic culture with separation of males and females in education, and the study of Islam remains at education’s core” (p. 46). In principle, acculturation of GCC students in the US can be seriously challenging. Obviously the language barrier does not help. And it comes as no surprise, as reported by various sources, that “many Saudis abroad tend to self-segregate, living with other Saudis and befriending primarily Arabic-speakers” (Maatouk and Hausheer 2015, p. 4). Most Saudis “kind of stay in their own little groups and don’t mix with Americans” (Murphy 2012, p. 142). In addition, both male and female GCC students find it difficult to deal with the natural mixed-gender environment of US campuses. Veto on Mixed Marriages It is well known that GCC students on scholarship are prohibited by their governments to marry non-GCC nationals during their stay abroad (for the troubled relation between marriage, law and identity in GCC countries, see Dresch 2005, pp. 136–157). It can be argued that such a veto, though possibly justifiable under certain circumstances, may reinforce the

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tendency to self-segregate displayed by most GCC students. The Saudi cultural attaché in Washington affirmed that marriage between Saudis and Americans “is rare and has not been a phenomenon”. He added: “I often tell the male students that if they marry a foreigner, who will marry our women in Saudi Arabia?” (“Women students in US”, 2017). Both male and female students can comfortably start a family before departing on a scholarship abroad, because GCC scholarships provide generous allowances for the spouses and children of students while living away from home. In reality, GCC governments fear on the one hand that students abroad could feel homesick and lonely, which might adversely affect their academic results, while on the other hand warning them unofficially against unnecessary fraternization with people of the host country, especially when this could end in marriage. Clubs Saudi and Kuwaiti students’ organizations are a very popular option for students living abroad who want to keep up traditions and culture, avoid homesickness, offer and receive support and help to spread a positive image of their countries of origin. The clubs hold regular meetings, organize a variety of activities and, above all, provide an important window on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for the host country. In particular, Saudi Arabia sees its scholarship students as “ambassadors” (safeer) of the country and its culture, and, since the arrival of the first Saudi students in the US, clubs have always played a pivotal role in “showing the genuine image of the Kingdom like never before” and “giving a brighter image about the Kingdom and the Saudi society”, as explained on the website of the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in Washington. Saudi clubs “deployed at the American universities [more than 260 in 2015] in most cities and states are actually branches of the Embassy of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in the widest sense of the word”. However, the Saudi cultural attaché in Washington warned: “The homeland is a red line. Any student who dares to undermine it will be held accountable and will be reported to the concerned authorities in the Kingdom to take action against them” (“Women students in US”, 2017). So here again, what is encouraged is no more than cautious fraternization with the host country, and preferably with the sole purpose of spreading a positive image of Saudi Arabia.

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Mounting Islamophobia and Racial Hatred The rise in hate crimes against Muslims has understandably caused alarm among GCC students in the US (see, e.g. “Saudi students feel unease”, 2016, and Bager 2016, among others), and recent changes in the political and social climate in the US raise new concerns about falling numbers of Middle Eastern students at tertiary education institutions across the US, as noted above. But even before the Trump era, decisions were being made in some cases to stop sending GCC students to certain universities, in the wake of complaints filed by students reporting incidents of racism, as in the case of the Idaho State University (“Saudi Arabia, Kuwait stop sending students”, 2016). Academic Dishonesty Understanding and acceptance must be mutual and accordingly, if GCC students expect tolerance and understanding from the host country, then compliance with the laws, social norms and academic regulations of that country is legitimately expected from GCC students. A major issue concerning GCC students in the US, well documented by various sources, is the practice of cheating and even plagiarism, which are both legal offenses in Western countries. It seems that the well-established Western tradition of independent scholarship, intellectual honesty and personal responsibility sits uneasily with the tribal, collectivistic nature of the GCC culture: “What we might call cheating, they might call sharing” (Stoll 2016). There was at least one case, unveiled by WikiLeaks in 2012 and reported by the Associated Press in 2015, where some thirty alleged cheats at a Montana college were caught and accused of having systematically forged grades by giving presents to a college employee. The students were almost all Saudis, and “were offered flights home by their kingdom’s diplomats to avoid the possibility of deportation or arrest” (“WikiLeaks: Saudis shielded students”, 2015). Certainly, cheats are not good ambassadors for their countries, especially considering that academic misconduct and academic integrity are not an entirely new subject of debate in GCC countries. Razek (2014) investigates the cheating practices of Saudi students at an American university, and reaches the thought-provoking conclusion that “Most participants, though reporting several academic dishonesty behaviours as accepted practice, denounced cheating as opposed to their own cultural, religious and ethical beliefs” (p. 143). Even more worrying is the

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conclusion reached by Tayan (2016), who sees academic misconduct as an “inherent problem” in Middle Eastern higher education institutions, while research conducted at a Saudi state university shows that there is “lack of recognition in what exactly cheating or plagiarism entail” among students (p. 162). For those GCC students who want to make the most of their stay abroad, there is a wealth of advantages, as Abouammoh (2018) writes: “There are many benefits of KASP for Saudi Arabia, such as gaining access to leading academics, exposure to state-of-the-art facilities, mastering foreign languages and reducing the negative perceptions held by some foreigners about Saudi, Arab and Muslim cultures. Saudi students studying abroad can enhance some important work values and social behaviours, such as discipline, punctuality, teamwork, commitment to work and quality and perseverance” (p. 341). Despite limitations and challenges, the great potential and opportunity represented by the scholarship programs must not be lost. Hall (2013) suggests that “campuses in the US are dominated by a series of six cultures: the virtual, tangible, advocacy, developmental, managerial and collegial” (p. 43). In particular, the advocacy culture promotes “the inclusion of international students because they view the college campus as a place to promote understanding and provide unique opportunities for interaction between various groups that would rarely come into contact” (p. 45). It is hoped that, beyond the current worries over financial losses caused by falling numbers of Middle Eastern students at US campuses (Pavan 2017b), the advocacy culture will be embraced by US universities first and foremost, but similarly by all universities around the world, so that the values of education and democracy can be successfully united.

Saudi Arabia Under the Lens After Acculturation, Readaptation: Or Simply Economic Adjustment? Caught between tough acculturation issues—a topic widely explored by Saudi students in their dissertations: see Alsaif (2014); Alyami (2015); Ahmed (2016); Bar (2017), among many others—and the careful supervision of their attentive and generous sponsor (see, e.g. how financial struggles faced by Saudi students in the third stage of the scholarship program were relieved by a royal decree which provided them with a one-year 10%

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increase in stipend: “Saudi students abroad get 10% stipend rise”, 2018. More recently, King Salman has awarded $2000 to all Saudi students studying in the US: “King to award $2,000 to Saudi students”, 2018), reminded of their moral and religious obligations (“Studying abroad should not lull you into forgetting about your home country; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is waiting for your return and your active contribution”: see “Scholarship students”, 2013), Saudi students graduate at different academic levels (Bachelor, Master’s, PhD). When the time comes for readaptation to life in Saudi Arabia, Saudi graduates face the “breaking the mold or blending in” option (Murphy 2012, p. 140). At all events, readaptation very often brings reverse culture shock, especially for women. Alandejani (2013) highlights how Saudi women who graduate abroad develop a sense of belonging after returning home by focusing on work (pp.  69–71), whereas they perceive extended family-related social commitments as a burden (pp. 81–82). Almutairi (2018) describes the frustration experienced by Saudi female re-entry scholars who feel they are not given the same opportunities as male colleagues in their departments (pp.  130–131). On a positive note, Alamri (2017) explains how Saudi female graduates often find it less difficult to cope with the cultural conformity required in Saudi life (pp. 50–53), thanks to their new bicultural identity resulting from prolonged exposure to foreign cultures (p. 65). Once the loyalty of Saudi students to the homeland has been secured, the second priority of the Saudi establishment is the economic adjustment of graduates. Reverse culture shock is not a matter of official concern. The current stage of the scholarship program, initiated in 2015, includes an implementation scheme under which various government agencies sponsor a number of scholarships and subsequently employ those who graduate in their fields. In theory, all posts are secured for graduates under the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program. There is however no English language document available, as yet, evaluating the impact of the scholarship program on the Saudi labor market. The government-funded scholarship program is seen primarily as a means by which to enhance the performance of the Saudi economy, especially within the framework of Saudi Vision 2030, the ambitious roadmap launched in April 2016 to present the Saudi government’s long-term goals for economic diversification and social development. In particular, the government is committed to “closing the gap between the outputs of higher education and the requirements of the job market” (p. 40).

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According to the latest available official figures, unemployment in Saudi Arabia is running at 12.8%; the unemployment rate for males is 7.5%, while the rate for females is 31%. The peak unemployment rate (17.7%) registers among Saudis holding Bachelor degrees (General Authority for Statistics, 2018, pp. 71–74). Does the scholarship program “upgrade KSA standing to the level of developed nations” (Ministry of Education 2018)? Does it help build a Saudi knowledge-based society able to compete in the globalized world? Is the Kingdom a research-conducive environment, where Saudi graduates from foreign universities can make good use of the culture of innovation and creativity they learned abroad? “The effect of the graduates from KASP on research will depend on the number of KASP graduates that join higher education institutes or the country’s very few specialized research centres”. But “Precise figures on how many KASP graduates are recruited by these institutions are unavailable”, and “the impact of the KASP on research volume or quality is very limited”. In conclusion, “The national benefits [of the scholarship program] are still unclear” (El-Showk 2017). Brain Drain, Brain Gain Without doubt, the late King Abdullah intended “to expand dialogue, understanding and interactions” specifically between Saudi Arabian citizens and American citizens, in the aftermath of 9/11 (Joint Statement 2005), and this could be achieved more easily through the establishment of a new scholarship program. Hilal et al. (2015) write that “Many Saudis presume that King Abdullah’s secret objective in starting KASP was to create a critical mass of reform-minded Saudis who will eventually form a pressure group sufficiently powerful to untie the rule and influence of the ultraconservative ‘Wahhabi’ religious establishment over Saudi society” (p. 258). Widening horizons and exposing Saudi students to “otherness” have long been the non-economic aims of the scholarship program. As Abouammoh (2018) puts it, “It is expected that foreign-educated Saudi students will enhance the cultural, educational and socio-political diversity in the country” (p. 331). As intimated above, the new implementation scheme is aimed at encouraging students to go back to Saudi Arabia after graduation and contribute to the socio-economic progress of the country. And indeed “most graduates do return – only 1.3% of highly skilled Saudis emigrated in 2010, well below the global average rate of 5.3%” (El-Showk 2017).

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It was noted in the past that “Saudi Arabia has experienced almost no brain drain since it began sending students abroad; virtually all return. Observers ascribe this unusual phenomenon to several factors, including the availability of desirable jobs, the strong ties of family obligation, and the fact that all students abroad are closely supervised by government offices established in each country where Saudis study” (Nyrop et  al. 1977, p.  100). Today, brain gain is no longer a given, although drain is much less likely when it comes to female students (“Most Saudi women will not want to endure the family strife that would accompany a decision not to return home”: Murphy 2012, p. 146). Hilal et al. (2015) deplore the dearth of research on the extent of brain drain in Saudi Arabia, and warn that “If Saudis perceive that host countries offer better lifestyles and jobs opportunities than what remains back at home, the risk of brain drain is still relevant” (p. 260). Personal family-related choices (mixed marriages), the economic situation in Saudi Arabia and job market conditions are the reasons most cited by Saudi graduates who settle down in the US (see, e.g. “Many Saudi students settle down in US”, 2016), but there are no accurate statistics available discussing the magnitude of the brain drain in Saudi Arabia. Saudi graduates returning home in 2018 find a country being “reimagined” by the young Crown Prince MbS, who affirmed that “The crucial requirement for reform is public willingness to change traditional society”, and “The most concerning thing is if the Saudi people are not convinced. If the Saudi people are convinced, the sky is the limit” (D. Ignatius, The Washington Post, April 20, 2017). Will MbS draw on the new impetus provided by those Saudi graduates who carry “a third culture, merging traits from Saudi Arabia and their host countries” (El-Showk 2017), in order to build the vibrant society (p. 14) and thriving economy (p. 34) depicted in Saudi Vision 2030? If so, it is reasonable to expect zero brain drain in the very near future. Foreign University Campuses: No, Yes, Maybe In the context of “the shift to mass higher education throughout the Arabian Peninsula” (Eickelman 2017, p. 9), GCC countries have promoted international higher education within their borders through the establishment of foreign university campuses, which are often smaller-scale replicas of the home institution, based generally in the US (Stoll 2017). The only exception is Saudi Arabia, where there are no university c­ ampuses strictly

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definable as foreign—not even the internationally acclaimed King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), an educationally progressive albeit socially controversial “oasis in the desert”, as explained elsewhere (Pavan 2016)—but only a number of technical institutes and two-year colleges for technical and vocational training established by agreements between the General Authority for Technical and Vocational Training and certain foreign technical institutions (Abouammoh 2018). In recent years, the stance of the Saudi establishment regarding foreign university campuses on Saudi soil has gone through three phases, and to date (Autumn 2018) no final decision has been made. No-Phase: In 2014 it was reported on Saudi media that the Ministry of Higher Education was reviewing requests from Western and Arab universities for licenses to open branches in Saudi Arabia and setting strict conditions for opening such branches (“Foreign universities in the Gulf”, 2014). However, in 2015 the Shoura Council officially rejected the proposal to allow foreign universities in the Kingdom, due to the success of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program and concerns over breaching Saudi cultural traditions and gender segregation (“Shoura says no to foreign universities”, 2015). Yes-phase: Again a few months later, an unnamed source from the new Ministry of Education, which resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Education with the Ministry of Higher Education, announced that foreign branches would be allowed in the Kingdom under certain conditions, such as offering Islamic studies and Arabic courses, abiding by Saudi customs and traditions, and providing separate sections for male and female students (“Top world universities”, 2016). The cautionary message was that the idea of foreign universities “remains distinctive, but needs gradual implementation, assessment and follow-up” (“Foreign universities in KSA”, 2016). Maybe-­phase: In December 2017, the Al Eqtisadiah newspaper reported that a special committee comprising SAGIA (Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority) and the Ministry of Education was at work on procedures and policies that would license international universities to open campuses in the Kingdom. However, international campuses would be faced with several challenges: financial terms of licenses, content of academic programs, observance of Saudi values and culture, limitation of academic freedom, to name only the more important (Alruwaili 2018).

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Borrowing the terminology used by Manjang (2017) in his analysis of the Qatar higher education landscape, it can be said that Saudi Arabia prefers to exert its soft power through its students/ambassadors abroad rather than exerting public diplomacy within its borders, notably through the establishment of foreign university campuses. Very strict visa policies, limits to academic freedom and local sensitivities hamper a prompt and full integration of Saudi higher education into the “changing educational ecology” (Eickelman 2017, p. 12) at global level.

Concluding Remarks: Will Gulf Millennials Negotiate New Glocal Identities at the Crossroads Between Past and Future? Notwithstanding the lack of accessible, updated and reliable data in the English language—with the partial exception of Saudi Arabia—and of literature overviewing the topic of scholarship programs in GCC countries, this study concludes with three questions which hopefully will pave the way for further research. The questions revolve around three key words: Loyalty  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE governments grant scholarships to their citizens and expect loyalty from them in return. Culture/Identities  GCC students are ambassadors of their countries, and in this role they help to make GCC national culture and identities known abroad, while spreading and sharing their views on religion, family and society. They can help combat stereotypes and misconceptions. Economic Development  GCC Millennials who graduate abroad are expected to be the driving force behind the economic development of their countries. The hundreds of thousands of students government-sponsored to study abroad are potentially, and often malgré eux, a powerful drive for change. Prolonged exposure to the values of different cultures will inevitably impact on their views. They may decide, in keeping with the generally unstated but implicit intentions of GCC governments, that it is safer to retain their traditional beliefs and identities; alternatively, they may reject the culture they were brought up in. There is also a third way: negotiation, where graduate youth and political élites together find a way to

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navigate the new globalized world, alternating and mediating between tradition and modernity, past and future, old fears and new ambitions, since the reality is that “All GCC nationals share a sense that economic change is having profound social repercussions, including the possible loss of their distinctive identity, which they greatly fear” (Al Kazi 2008, p. 178). Will Gulf Millennials, despite loyalty, push the boundaries set by their conservative societies and act as the “wild card” (Murphy 2012, p. 137) in the future of GCC countries? If so, will scholarship programs eventually act as effective boosters of new glocal identities, well beyond their official goals linked to economic development? And if so, will the political élites allow scholarship programs to act as boosters of new glocal identities and endorse the new glocal culture and identities resulting from exposure to foreign cultures, rather than perpetuating blind attachment to traditional values?

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Index1

A Abu Dhabi, 1, 131, 139, 140, 142, 148, 149, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186 Al Ahsa, 38 Al Khalifa dynasty, 5, 39, 43, 44 Al Saud dynasty, 38, 40, 43, 44, 222 Arabic language, 59, 188, 191, 202, 203, 215 Arabic medium instruction (AMI), 183, 192–195 Arabizi, 182, 183, 188, 191, 196, 208, 212 Arab Spring, 14, 17, 22–28, 40, 48, 66, 75, 78, 79, 82, 84, 163 Architecture, 1, 9, 85, 115–131, 141 Art, 2, 4, 6, 9, 85, 88, 95–99, 96–97n3, 101, 105, 106, 108–110, 119, 129, 140, 208

B Bahrain, 2, 5, 8, 23–26, 29, 33–49, 64, 96n2, 97, 122, 139, 140, 180, 208, 216, 225 Bedouin, 100, 102, 202, 206, 209, 213, 215 C Censorship, 46, 76, 82, 84–87, 89, 91, 98, 99, 160, 162, 165 Citizenship, 9, 10, 57, 58, 81, 83, 84, 86, 88, 90, 206, 209, 214, 216 City, 4, 9, 10, 90, 115, 118, 121, 123, 124, 126–130, 135, 136, 139, 141–143, 145, 148, 150–155, 169, 175, 209 Civil society, 9, 24, 66, 76–82, 85–89, 91, 116, 128 Cosmopolitanism, 96, 107 Cultural supermarket, 184, 185, 190

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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INDEX

Culture, 1–11, 16, 19, 20, 24, 53–70, 76, 79, 84, 88, 91, 98, 99, 103, 107–110, 117, 124, 125, 127, 140, 145, 167, 169, 171, 174–176, 180, 183–185, 188–191, 195, 196, 216, 221–238

H Heritage, 1, 2, 97, 98, 105, 116, 119, 124–128, 130, 131, 175, 203, 212, 213 Higher education, 195, 223–225, 227, 228, 232–235 Hip hop, 145, 150, 164, 171–174

D Dance, 137, 165, 173–174 Demonstrations, 39, 45, 47, 49, 64, 83, 91 Dialect, 6, 97, 122, 171, 181, 182, 196, 207, 214 Diglossia, 181–182 Al Dowayan, Manal, 96, 97, 101–103, 105, 106, 108–110, 108n6 Dubai, 9, 105, 109, 130, 135–155, 161, 185, 201–216, 227

I Ibiza, 137, 138, 142–144, 150–153 Identity, 3–10, 14, 17, 19, 21–29, 33–49, 53–70, 75–91, 96–98, 101, 103, 105, 115–131, 135, 136, 141–150, 153, 159–176, 179–196, 202–213, 215, 216, 222, 229, 233, 238 Iran, 8, 15, 18, 20, 22–24, 26, 33, 34, 36, 39, 212, 213

E English language, 172, 233, 237 English Medium Instruction (EMI), 180, 183, 185, 187, 192–195 F Facebook, 42–44, 64, 151, 159, 163, 174 Feminism, 106 Framing, 40–42, 45, 49 Fujairah, 152 G Globalization, 2, 6, 7, 179–180, 222 Glocalization, 180 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2–4, 6–11, 13–29, 53, 64, 66, 96–98, 96n2, 103–105, 107–110, 108n6, 136, 139–141, 221–238

K Khaleeji (identity), 3–9, 14, 17, 22–28, 116 Kuwait, 2, 9, 10, 20, 25, 27, 29, 64, 75–91, 96n2, 103, 115–131, 212, 221–228, 230, 231, 237 L Linguistic hybridity, 10, 179–196 M Mater, Ahmed, 96, 99–103, 105, 107, 108n6, 109 Millennials, 7, 190, 221–238 Modernization, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 211 Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), 181, 182 Muscat, 140 Music, 5, 9, 10, 101, 135–141, 145–155, 159–176

 INDEX 

N Al Nimr, Nimr, 8, 43, 46, 47 O Oman, 2, 5, 21, 27, 64, 96n2, 180 Opposition, 36, 41, 45, 79, 82, 164, 174 P Place, 1–3, 7, 9, 13, 18, 20, 35–37, 43, 45, 49, 53, 60, 61, 63, 63n4, 70, 87, 98, 110, 117, 118, 121, 122, 129–131, 143, 150–153, 160, 164, 167, 169, 176, 180, 187, 188, 196, 203, 210–212, 228, 232 Political culture, 4, 8, 9, 24, 53–70 Q Qatar, 2, 3, 8, 23, 25–29, 38, 53–70, 96n2, 97, 98, 110, 140, 180, 237 R Rap, see Hip hop Ras Al Khaimah, 152, 212 Regionalism, 8, 13–29, 125 S Saudi Arabia, 2, 8, 10, 15, 25, 26, 29, 33–49, 64, 96n2, 97, 99–103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 139, 140, 159, 160, 162–165, 167–174, 176, 180, 216, 221–238 Scholarship, 7, 10, 80, 91, 221–238 Sectarian/sectarianism, 8, 22, 23, 25, 26, 33–49, 208, 216 Sharjah, 139 Shi’a/shiism, 8, 33–49

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Social media, 8, 10, 25, 27, 34, 37, 42–49, 64, 65, 67, 76, 83, 104, 128, 143–145, 149, 151, 154, 159–176, 180, 182, 196 Social movement, 6, 34–35, 37, 40, 41, 45, 49, 91 T Tradition, 2–3, 6, 9, 17, 27, 55, 58, 61, 63, 66, 98, 101–103, 115, 119, 122–125, 129, 135, 140, 164, 190, 196, 205, 208, 215, 222, 228–231, 236, 238 Translanguaging, 10, 184, 190, 191, 196 Tribe, 28, 29, 59, 63, 66, 81, 210, 212 Twitter, 28, 64, 65, 65n6, 68, 159, 163, 174 U United Arab Emirates (UAE), 2, 10, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 64, 96n2, 97, 139, 140, 142, 149, 152–154, 180–185, 188, 189, 195, 201–216, 222–227, 237 Urban/urbanization, 2, 5, 6, 9, 38, 81, 88, 89, 115, 117–121, 123, 124, 127–131 W Women, 3, 64, 65, 75–77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 100–103, 106, 119, 163, 164, 166–172, 175, 190, 196, 230, 233, 235 Y Youth, 39, 44, 64, 76, 82, 83, 160, 173, 174, 176, 191, 222, 223, 237 YouTube, 97, 144, 159, 163, 172–174, 180